Family Involvement, Inside Debt, and Geographic Distance of Acquisitions: Evidence from the U.S.

dc.contributor.authorSihan, Qi
dc.contributor.examiningcommitteeZheng, Steven (Accounting and Finance) Cui, Victor (Business Administration) Jiang, Depeng (Community Health Sciences)en_US
dc.contributor.supervisorWu, Zhenyu (Business Administration)en_US
dc.date.accessioned2017-09-06T19:44:29Z
dc.date.available2017-09-06T19:44:29Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.degree.disciplineBusiness Administrationen_US
dc.degree.levelMaster of Science (M.Sc.)en_US
dc.description.abstractThis study investigates the joint effects of family involvement and CEO’s inside debt on firm’s decisions on acquisitions, especially on the geographical distance between the acquirer and target. The empirical findings indicate that family firm tends not to choose long-distance acquisitions for the sake of preservation of its socio-emotional wealth, and that family firm is less likely to set debt-like compensation in CEO’s incentive compensation package. More interestingly, while firms offering more inside debt to their CEOs tend to acquire targets far from their headquarters in general, this effect is weakened by family involvement.en_US
dc.description.noteOctober 2017en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1993/32460
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.rightsopen accessen_US
dc.subjectfamily involvement, inside debt, acquisitions, geographical distanceen_US
dc.titleFamily Involvement, Inside Debt, and Geographic Distance of Acquisitions: Evidence from the U.S.en_US
dc.typemaster thesisen_US
local.subject.manitobayesen_US
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