Philosophy Theses and Practica

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Open Access
Absolute idealism as affecting social philosophy
(1923) Solmundsson, Johann Pjetur
Open Access
Actualist modal realism
(2010) Murray, Adam Russell.
Open Access
Adventures in space racism: going beyond the Turing Test to determine AI moral standing
(2015) Novelli, Nicholas; Shaver, Robert (Philosophy) Hannan, Sarah (Political Studies); Martens, Rhonda (Philosophy)
In pop culture, artificial intelligences (AI) are frequently portrayed as worthy of moral personhood, and failing to treat these entities as such is often treated as analogous to racism. The implicit condition for attributing moral personhood to an AI is usually passing some form of the "Turing Test", wherein an entity passes if it could be mistaken for a human. I argue that this is unfounded under any moral theory that uses the capacity for desire as the criteria for moral standing. Though the action-based theory of desire ensures that passing a rigourous enough version of the Turing Test would be sufficient for moral personhood, that theory has unacceptable results when used in moral theory. If a desire-based moral theory is to be made defensible, it must use a phenomenological account of desire, which would make the Turing Test fail to track the relevant property.
Open Access
The aesthetic relevance of artistic acts : an examination of recent contributions to the theory and metatheory of art
(1979) Davies, David Alan
Open Access
The aesthetics of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche : a comparative study
(1955) Engel, Srul Morris von
Open Access
Alasdair MacIntyre's tradition-constituted enquiry : an examination of its Aristotelian elements
(1995) Huebner, Christopher K.
Open Access
An analysis of empirical equivalence, its foundation, the evidence-theory distinction, and its entailment, underdetermination
(1999-10-01T00:00:00Z) Koolage, W. John
Historically, there have been three different forms of arguments to show that we can choose between theories in a non-arbitrary, and truth-tracking fashion: non-empirical virtues of theories provide a truth-tracking criteria, the evidence itself allows us to choose between the theories, and the historical success of science provides evidence for one theory over its rivals. I argue that each of these arguments fails to defeat the claim that, when faced with empirically equivalent rivals, selecting one theory over the others is not arbitrary. However, a defense of the claim that theory choice is arbitrary does not amount to the claim that theory selection is arbitrary. Thus, I argue that there is a motivation for the claim that we should not select any given theory, and that it is in principle possible to defend such a claim. However, my defense can only justify the claim that theory choice is arbitrary in a narrow set of cases: when it is used against people who are undecided with respect to realism and anti-realism, and when it used against people who are realists for reasons other than the belief that there are non-empirical virtues of theories. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)
Open Access
An analysis of the definition of qualitative confirmation proposed by Carl Hempel
(1969) Wiebe, Phillip Howard
Open Access
The analytic intelligence always proceeds by discriminations which introduce intellectual structure and contrast clearness into the subject but ultimately the distinction itself is subjective mental not objectively valid
(1935) Bellan, Alexander Louis
Open Access
Anarchal egalitarianism : equality, happiness and a denial of self-ownership
(1993) Fox-Decent, Evan.
Open Access
Apparently unjustified evil and the existence of God
(1997-05-01T00:00:00Z) Durston, Kirk
There are a variety of evidential arguments from evil against the existence of God. Common to all such arguments are observations of evil that appear to be unjustified, followed by an inductive inference to the conclusion that there is actually unjustified evil. Since unjustified evil is incompatible with the existence of God, it is concluded that God does not exist. If certain assumptions, commonly granted in discussions of the problem of evil, are granted, however, those assumptions, together with the consequential complexity of history, make the essential inference in all vidential arguments from evil rationally unjustified. All evidential arguments from evil therefore fail. In this thesis I argue that the consequential complexity of history is such that we are not rationally justified in inferring that there is actually unjustified evil. Given the absence of rational justification for the inference that is essential to all evidential arguments from evil, I conclude that all such arguments fail.
Open Access
Artworks as abstract objects
(2004) Callaghan, Lori
Open Access
Autonomy, the authority of reason, and reasonable authority : Kantian elements in contemporary political theory
(1990) Klimchuk, Dennis
Open Access
Bees, brain and behaviour, a philosophical essay in theorectical biology
(1999-05-01T00:00:00Z) Veldhuis, Phillip A.
In the introduction to the second edition of Karl von Frisch's popular monograph [1950] on honeybee behaviour, Donald Griffin concludes: " a reluctance to become embroiled in metaphysics should not anesthetize our perceptions. Heretical as it may seem to many behavioral scientists, I am willing to entertain the thought that perhaps the bees know what they are doing [Griffin 1971, p. xiii]." In this thesis I will not be daunted by metaphysics. Rather, I will attempt to establish whether honeybee behaviour is best described by Griffin's cognitive theory, and whether this implies that it is reasonable to think "the bees know what they are doing". Griffin has argued extensively that it is possible to learn whether non-human animals think consciously. He has founded and defended the recent and controversial scientific discipline of cognitive ethology, which attempts to make a scientific "analysis of the cognitive processes of non-human animals" [Griffin 1992, p. vii]. Cognitive Ethology seeks to combine and apply theory and method from biology, neurophysiology, and cognitive psychology to animal ethology. My analysis of bee behaviour will be made within the framework of cognitive ethology. I will conclude that the dance language of the honeybees is intentional. I reject Griffin's strategy of conflating cognition with consciousness and self-consciousness. Therefore, although I think the best explanation of honeybee behaviour is a cognitive explanation, I do not conclude that honeybees are conscious or self-conscious.
Open Access
Bishop Butler's ethical theory
(1904) Logan, Maggie Frances
Open Access
Can genetic technology make having a child immoral?
(2004) Guerrero, J. David
Open Access
The case for externalism in moral theory
(1997-08-01T00:00:00Z) Klassen, Douglas
The primary goal of this thesis is to determine in what way moral considerations are related to motives and reasons for action. This relation can be characterized in one of two ways. One can adopt an internalist position, which holds that the conn ction between moral considerations and motives or reasons for action is necessary, or one can adopt an externalist position, which holds that this connection is purely contingent. This thesis will proceed primarily by means of examining and evaluating the arguments put forth by David O. Brink in favour of a very thoroughgoing version of externalism, and to a lesser degree by means of examining the views of Philippa Foot, another prominent externalist. While I am willing to admit that some of the stronger forms of internalism are unacceptable, I am not willing to accept the strong externalist claim that there is no necessary connection whatsoever between morality and rationality. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)
Open Access
Christian faith and modern thought : an inquiry into the relations between religion and science
(1945) Onions, William George
Open Access
Comments on McGee's counterexample to modus ponens
(2000-09-01T00:00:00Z) Djordjevic, Vladan
Vann McGee publis ed a paper where he claimed that modus ponens is not a generally valid rule of inference for the natural language conditionals. Although he spoke only about the indicative conditionals, the counterexample of his that is considered in my thesis can be easily applied to subjunctive (counterfactual) conditionals also. After explaining what is paradoxical about the counterexample, and commenting upon McGee's solution, I consider various remarks to McGee's point that might be or already are made by some philosophers. I try to show that none of them helps us to remove the problem. I argue that in fact the 'counterexample' points mainly to the need of distinguishing the truth-functional and intensional disjunctions.
Open Access
Commercial contractual pregnancy, a Kantian argument against acceptance
(1998-10-01T00:00:00Z) Pidwysocky, Stephen J.
In my thesis I have applied relevant concepts found in Kantian ethics such as reason, good will, the second and third formulations of the categorical imperative as well as the duties of respect, beneficence, and sympathy to the practice of commercial contractual pregnancy. Unlike Kant, I have also extended practical rationality and autonomy to include every rational adult regardless of gender. By applying Kant's deontological theory to commercial contractual pregnancy, I argue that this type of reproductive arrangement should not be legally permitted. In the second chapter I have presented some of the objections raised by feminist philosophers against both commercial and non-commercial contractual pregnancy arrangements. Of the three criticisms I show why only one adopts a Kantian-feminist approach. In this chapter I also present Lori B. Andrews and John Robertson's arguments in support of procreative liberty. I contrast their arguments with the feminist objections that are presented by Sherwin, Overall, and Anderson. In the third chapter I discuss the legal issues associated with commercial contractual pregnancy. I respond to the two criticisms which state that by legislating against reproductive liberty I am also infringing upon the moral and legal autonomy of women and that this type of legislation impairs the Kantian framework for justice. I also present the reasons why I believe non-commercial pregnancy arrangements should be legally permitted. This thesis presents and defends the argument that--when grounded on Kantian ethics and a respect for the personhood of women--pregnancy should not be commercialized under the capitalist free-market system.