Invariantist Nihilism
| dc.contributor.author | Melamedoff, Damian | |
| dc.contributor.examiningcommittee | Diaz Leon, Encarnacion (Philosophy) Ghomeshi, Jila (Linguistics) | en_US |
| dc.contributor.supervisor | Tillman, Chris (Philosophy) | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2014-08-20T16:44:21Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2014-08-20T16:44:21Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2014-08-20 | |
| dc.degree.discipline | Philosophy | en_US |
| dc.degree.level | Master of Arts (M.A.) | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | In “Invariantist Nihilism,” I defend a particular set of views regarding the relationship between the semantic content of terms and the context of utterance of such terms. Invariantism is the thesis that most terms have a fixed semantic content: they do not change their meaning in different contexts. Nihilism is the view that many terms that appear to be context sensitive fail to denote anything at all. This thesis gives an exposition and defence of both Invariantism and Nihilism. | en_US |
| dc.description.note | October 2014 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1993/23834 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | en_US |
| dc.rights | open access | en_US |
| dc.subject | Philosophy | en_US |
| dc.subject | Language | en_US |
| dc.title | Invariantist Nihilism | en_US |
| dc.type | master thesis | en_US |