Directors and officers liability insurance coverage, tax avoidance and financial crisis
| dc.contributor.author | Zhao, Keyan | |
| dc.contributor.examiningcommittee | Gao, Jijun (Business Administration) Liu, Mingzhi (Accounting & Finance) | en_US |
| dc.contributor.supervisor | Wu, Zhenyu (Business Administration) | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2020-09-02T21:41:46Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2020-09-02T21:41:46Z | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2020-09-02 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2020-08 | en_US |
| dc.date.submitted | 2020-09-02T20:42:22Z | en_US |
| dc.degree.discipline | Management | en_US |
| dc.degree.level | Master of Science (M.Sc.) | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | With firms facing an increasing range of exposures and the resultant surging risks, directors and officers (D&O) liability insurance are available for corporations in order to mitigate or avoid potential litigation risks. However, this behaviour may cause a “moral hazard” problem in return, because insuring D&O “misbehaviours” mitigates the supervision effect of stakeholder litigation and encourages corporate risk-taking behaviours. Based on fixed effect models, this study investigates the effect of purchasing D&O liability insurance coverage on corporate tax avoidance behaviours. We find that higher insurance coverage encourages tax avoidance behaviours in non-crisis periods, instead of crisis periods. In addition, our findings document that this negative relation becomes inapparent in companies with higher profitability and lower default risk. | en_US |
| dc.description.note | October 2020 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1993/34943 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | en_US |
| dc.rights | open access | en_US |
| dc.subject | D&O liability Insurance | en_US |
| dc.subject | Tax Avoidance | en_US |
| dc.subject | Financial Crisis | en_US |
| dc.title | Directors and officers liability insurance coverage, tax avoidance and financial crisis | en_US |
| dc.type | master thesis | en_US |