Time for a change: a refutation of presentism
| dc.contributor.author | Kehler, Curtis | |
| dc.contributor.examiningcommittee | Matheson, Carl (Philosophy) Leboe-McGowan, Launa (Psychology) | en_US |
| dc.contributor.supervisor | Tillman, Chris (Philosophy) | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2011-09-09T17:10:53Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2011-09-09T17:10:53Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2011-09-09 | |
| dc.degree.discipline | Philosophy | en_US |
| dc.degree.level | Master of Arts (M.A.) | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | Presentism is the view that necessarily, it is always the case that only present objects exist and time passes. Characterized as such, presentism faces three objections: the reference objection, the grounding objection, and the objection from the special theory of relativity. Presentists cannot offer an adequate response to the latter objection, and can only avoid succumbing to the first two objections by adopting a descriptive account of propositions and a new account of truth grounding. The main motivation for presentism – the argument from experience – also faces serious objections, and is ultimately refuted by another objection from the special theory of relativity. A new version of presentism, Barcan presentism, can be shown to offer a better response to the reference objection than classical presentism. Barcan presentism, however, should still be rejected based on the grounding objection and the objection from the special theory of relativity. | en_US |
| dc.description.note | October 2011 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1993/4871 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | en_US |
| dc.rights | open access | en_US |
| dc.subject | Time | en_US |
| dc.subject | Presentism | en_US |
| dc.title | Time for a change: a refutation of presentism | en_US |
| dc.type | master thesis | en_US |