What's old is new: recovering virtue in contemporary moral philosophy
| dc.contributor.author | Crosby, Thomas | |
| dc.contributor.examiningcommittee | Stack, Michael (Philosophy) Leboe-McGowan, Jason (Psychology) | en_US |
| dc.contributor.supervisor | Dentsoras, Dimitrios (Philosophy) | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2015-12-17T15:49:26Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2015-12-17T15:49:26Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2015 | |
| dc.degree.discipline | Philosophy | en_US |
| dc.degree.level | Master of Arts (M.A.) | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | This thesis argues that virtue belongs in any framework of moral philosophy, and specifies this along several lines. In the first chapter I establish that virtue is a good, or a duty. I defend this against skeptical objections which argue that virtue is only an instrumental good. In Chapter 2 I specify some features of virtue. I argue that virtue is an attitude toward the good, and also is enhance by an inclination toward action and a stable disposition. Chapter 3 argues against certain meta-ethical objections that would question the veracity of the aspects of virtue discussed in Chapter 2. These objections draw from psychological studies about traits and the telos of a life. Chapter 4 suggests a hypothesis that eudaimonia, or human flourishing defined narrowly can provide the theoretical unification for virtue. | en_US |
| dc.description.note | February 2016 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1993/30976 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | en_US |
| dc.rights | open access | en_US |
| dc.subject | Moral Philosophy | en_US |
| dc.subject | Virtue Theory | en_US |
| dc.subject | Virtue Ethics | en_US |
| dc.subject | Virtue and Psychology | en_US |
| dc.title | What's old is new: recovering virtue in contemporary moral philosophy | en_US |
| dc.type | master thesis | en_US |