Sinnott-Armstrong on intuitionism
| dc.contributor.author | Hebert, Jamie | |
| dc.contributor.examiningcommittee | Tillman, Chris (Philosophy) Leboe-McGowan (Psychology) | en_US |
| dc.contributor.supervisor | Shaver, Robert (Philosophy) | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-01-03T22:08:14Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2013-01-03T22:08:14Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-01-03 | |
| dc.degree.discipline | Philosophy | en_US |
| dc.degree.level | Master of Arts (M.A.) | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | In his paper “Framing Moral Intuitions” (Sinnott-Armstrong 2008), Sinnott-Armstrong argues that three studies which he cites provide evidence of unreliability in all moral intuitions in all circumstances. Therefore, he argues that all of one’s moral intuitions require inferential confirmation for justification. I argue that the studies do not strike me as evidence for this conclusion. Thus, anyone who reads the studies and is not struck that they are evidence for this conclusion can have justified moral intuitions without inferential confirmation. Further, arguments are given for why Sinnott-Armstrong’s arguments fail to show that all moral intuitions are unreliable in all circumstances. Finally an argument is given which shows that even if one accepts the master argument, it need not lead to moral scepticism. | en_US |
| dc.description.note | February 2013 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1993/14394 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | en_US |
| dc.rights | open access | en_US |
| dc.subject | Intuitionism | en_US |
| dc.subject | Sinnott-Armstrong | en_US |
| dc.subject | x-phi | en_US |
| dc.title | Sinnott-Armstrong on intuitionism | en_US |
| dc.type | master thesis | en_US |