Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorKoolage, W. Johnen_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-05-18T12:17:02Z
dc.date.available2007-05-18T12:17:02Z
dc.date.issued1999-10-01T00:00:00Zen_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1993/1685
dc.description.abstractHistorically, there have been three different forms of arguments to show that we can choose between theories in a non-arbitrary, and truth-tracking fashion: non-empirical virtues of theories provide a truth-tracking criteria, the evidence itself allows us to choose between the theories, and the historical success of science provides evidence for one theory over its rivals. I argue that each of these arguments fails to defeat the claim that, when faced with empirically equivalent rivals, selecting one theory over the others is not arbitrary. However, a defense of the claim that theory choice is arbitrary does not amount to the claim that theory selection is arbitrary. Thus, I argue that there is a motivation for the claim that we should not select any given theory, and that it is in principle possible to defend such a claim. However, my defense can only justify the claim that theory choice is arbitrary in a narrow set of cases: when it is used against people who are undecided with respect to realism and anti-realism, and when it used against people who are realists for reasons other than the belief that there are non-empirical virtues of theories. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)en_US
dc.format.extent6747976 bytes
dc.format.extent184 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.format.mimetypetext/plain
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.titleAn analysis of empirical equivalence, its foundation, the evidence-theory distinction, and its entailment, underdeterminationen_US
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis
dc.typemaster thesisen_US
dc.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen_US
dc.degree.levelMaster of Arts (M.A.)en_US


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record