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dc.contributor.supervisorShaver, Robert (Philosophy)en_US
dc.contributor.authorHebert, Jamie
dc.date.accessioned2013-01-03T22:08:14Z
dc.date.available2013-01-03T22:08:14Z
dc.date.issued2013-01-03
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1993/14394
dc.description.abstractIn his paper “Framing Moral Intuitions” (Sinnott-Armstrong 2008), Sinnott-Armstrong argues that three studies which he cites provide evidence of unreliability in all moral intuitions in all circumstances. Therefore, he argues that all of one’s moral intuitions require inferential confirmation for justification. I argue that the studies do not strike me as evidence for this conclusion. Thus, anyone who reads the studies and is not struck that they are evidence for this conclusion can have justified moral intuitions without inferential confirmation. Further, arguments are given for why Sinnott-Armstrong’s arguments fail to show that all moral intuitions are unreliable in all circumstances. Finally an argument is given which shows that even if one accepts the master argument, it need not lead to moral scepticism.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.rightsopen accessen_US
dc.subjectIntuitionismen_US
dc.subjectSinnott-Armstrongen_US
dc.subjectx-phien_US
dc.titleSinnott-Armstrong on intuitionismen_US
dc.typemaster thesisen_US
dc.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen_US
dc.contributor.examiningcommitteeTillman, Chris (Philosophy) Leboe-McGowan (Psychology)en_US
dc.degree.levelMaster of Arts (M.A.)en_US
dc.description.noteFebruary 2013en_US


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