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dc.contributor.supervisor Shaver, Robert (Philosophy) en_US
dc.contributor.author Hebert, Jamie
dc.date.accessioned 2013-01-03T22:08:14Z
dc.date.available 2013-01-03T22:08:14Z
dc.date.issued 2013-01-03
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1993/14394
dc.description.abstract In his paper “Framing Moral Intuitions” (Sinnott-Armstrong 2008), Sinnott-Armstrong argues that three studies which he cites provide evidence of unreliability in all moral intuitions in all circumstances. Therefore, he argues that all of one’s moral intuitions require inferential confirmation for justification. I argue that the studies do not strike me as evidence for this conclusion. Thus, anyone who reads the studies and is not struck that they are evidence for this conclusion can have justified moral intuitions without inferential confirmation. Further, arguments are given for why Sinnott-Armstrong’s arguments fail to show that all moral intuitions are unreliable in all circumstances. Finally an argument is given which shows that even if one accepts the master argument, it need not lead to moral scepticism. en_US
dc.rights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject Intuitionism en_US
dc.subject Sinnott-Armstrong en_US
dc.subject x-phi en_US
dc.title Sinnott-Armstrong on intuitionism en_US
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis
dc.type master thesis en_US
dc.degree.discipline Philosophy en_US
dc.contributor.examiningcommittee Tillman, Chris (Philosophy) Leboe-McGowan (Psychology) en_US
dc.degree.level Master of Arts (M.A.) en_US
dc.description.note February 2013 en_US


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