• Libraries
    • Log in to:
    View Item 
    •   MSpace Home
    • Faculty of Graduate Studies (Electronic Theses and Practica)
    • FGS - Electronic Theses and Practica
    • View Item
    •   MSpace Home
    • Faculty of Graduate Studies (Electronic Theses and Practica)
    • FGS - Electronic Theses and Practica
    • View Item
    JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

    Sinnott-Armstrong on intuitionism

    Thumbnail
    View/Open
    Hebert_Jamie.pdf (400.5Kb)
    Date
    2013-01-03
    Author
    Hebert, Jamie
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    Abstract
    In his paper “Framing Moral Intuitions” (Sinnott-Armstrong 2008), Sinnott-Armstrong argues that three studies which he cites provide evidence of unreliability in all moral intuitions in all circumstances. Therefore, he argues that all of one’s moral intuitions require inferential confirmation for justification. I argue that the studies do not strike me as evidence for this conclusion. Thus, anyone who reads the studies and is not struck that they are evidence for this conclusion can have justified moral intuitions without inferential confirmation. Further, arguments are given for why Sinnott-Armstrong’s arguments fail to show that all moral intuitions are unreliable in all circumstances. Finally an argument is given which shows that even if one accepts the master argument, it need not lead to moral scepticism.
    URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/1993/14394
    Collections
    • FGS - Electronic Theses and Practica [25522]

    DSpace software copyright © 2002-2016  DuraSpace
    Contact Us | Send Feedback
    Theme by 
    Atmire NV
     

     

    Browse

    All of MSpaceCommunities & CollectionsBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsThis CollectionBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjects

    My Account

    Login

    Statistics

    View Usage Statistics

    DSpace software copyright © 2002-2016  DuraSpace
    Contact Us | Send Feedback
    Theme by 
    Atmire NV