Abstract:
In my thesis I have applied relevant concepts found in Kantian ethics such as reason, good will, the second and third formulations of the categorical imperative as well as the duties of respect, beneficence, and sympathy to the practice of commercial contractual pregnancy. Unlike Kant, I have also extended practical rationality and autonomy to include every rational adult regardless of gender. By applying Kant's deontological theory to commercial contractual pregnancy, I argue that this type of reproductive arrangement should not be legally permitted. In the second chapter I have presented some of the objections raised by feminist philosophers against both commercial and non-commercial contractual pregnancy arrangements. Of the three criticisms I show why only one adopts a Kantian-feminist approach. In this chapter I also present Lori B. Andrews and John Robertson's arguments in support of procreative liberty. I contrast their arguments with the feminist objections that are presented by Sherwin, Overall, and Anderson. In the third chapter I discuss the legal issues associated with commercial contractual pregnancy. I respond to the two criticisms which state that by legislating against reproductive liberty I am also infringing upon the moral and legal autonomy of women and that this type of legislation impairs the Kantian framework for justice. I also present the reasons why I believe non-commercial pregnancy arrangements should be legally permitted. This thesis presents and defends the argument that--when grounded on Kantian ethics and a respect for the personhood of women--pregnancy should not be commercialized under the capitalist free-market system.
