

THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE
ALONG THE NORTH WEST COAST OF HUDSON BAY

1717 - 1790

A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research

University of Manitoba

In Partial Fulfilment

Of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

by

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C

November, 1981

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of
the University of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements
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MASTER OF ARTS

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ABSTRACT

Chartered companies in the eighteenth century were plagued by a jealous public and a critical parliament. The Hudson's Bay Company, one of the smallest of these foreign trading concerns was not immune to attacks from merchants desirous of any chance to reap the riches of the fur trade.

Within the first few years of the Company's establishment its monopoly was challenged by Americans, Frenchmen and fellow Englishmen. Such threats to the Company's monopoly affected the character and progress of the development of trade along the north west coast of Hudson Bay in the eighteenth century.

The first real step towards the development of this northern trade came with the successful establishment at Churchill River in 1717. However, James Knight's ill-fated voyage in search of valuable minerals and the elusive Northwest Passage resulted in the suspension of expeditions for trade or exploration for the next twenty years. Only after the persistent proddings of Arthur Dobbs into the Company's affairs did the London Committee resume expeditions in search of the Northwest Passage.

The Parliamentary Inquiry of 1749, although reaffirming the Company's chartered rights, helped to spur the London Committee to engage in regular trade voyages northward from Prince of Wales's Fort at the mouth of the Churchill River. The need to develop new avenues of trade became increasingly important in the latter half of the century as the French and later, English traders from Canada, pushed deeper into the Company's chartered territory.

From 1750 to 1790 the Company pursued trade with the Inuit with little monetary success. Even the attempt at a Black Whale Fishery at Marble Island from 1766 to 1772 was a dismal failure. Why the London Committee insisted on developing a sea approach to the fur rich areas of the interior in spite of consistent low returns is examined with respect to the economic and political factors of the period.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

As with most projects of this magnitude, I am indebted to many individuals for guidance and support during the research and writing of this thesis. For the initial planning and development of this manuscript I am honoured to have worked under the supervision of the late Professor W.L. Morton. It was an opportunity few students of Canadian history are privileged to experience. I am sincerely grateful to Dr. Jean Friesen for taking on the responsibility for guiding a project on such short notice.

I also wish to thank those who agreed to read and reread drafts of this thesis: Carol Preston, Assistant Editor of The Beaver, who labouriously scrutinized the grammatical construction as well as the content; Dr. Ernest Burch Jr., who unselfishly gave up time from his own research schedule to advise and read the manuscript; and Dr. Glyndwr Williams, Queen Mary College, London, England, whose knowledge of the subject area provided me with invaluable direction. And special thanks to Marg Lamont who typed the original drafts.

Finally, I must extend my deep appreciation to Mrs. Shirlee A. Smith, Keeper of the Hudson's Bay Company Archives who first opened my mind to the stimulating resources of the Company's records. Without her enthusiasm for and intimate knowledge of the Company's history my interest in this subject might never have been generated.

INTRODUCTION

For the Hudson's Bay Company the eighteenth century was one of expansion, exploration and experimentation. In examining these three themes historians have focussed primarily on expeditions inland. Both E.E. Rich and A.S. Morton in their studies^{1.} reflect the view of many that the journeys of Kelsey, Henday, Hearne and others were the only significant attempts by the Company to expand its trade during this century.^{2.} This, however, is not the case. Indeed for most of this century the Company viewed the north west coast of Hudson Bay as the only viable area of expansion.

Years before the establishment of Churchill in 1717, the Company had viewed the coastal area north of York as a natural area of expansion. The possibilities of trade, whaling and mining of valuable minerals were the chief motivations behind the expeditions to this area in the 1680s. War, invasions by both foreign powers and English interlopers, and Parliamentary scrutiny of chartered companies in the 1690s postponed the London Committee's plan for a permanent establishment at Churchill River.

With the founding of Churchill in 1717 the Company embarked on its initial steps towards the development of trade along the north west coast of Hudson Bay. The failure of Knight's expedition northward in 1719, however, coloured the Company's view towards expansion of trade along the coast for the next thirty years. Public criticism and a Parliamentary Inquiry in the 1740s pressured the Company to renew activity along the coast.

The Parliamentary Inquiry of 1749 was the greatest political threat to the survival of the Company's charter during that century.³ Although the Charter had been challenged in the 1690s the public attention drawn to the Company's operations in the Bay in the 1740s threatened to expose the Company as a detrimental influence on the development of British commerce. Forced to reassess its policies of the past fifty years, the Company turned once again to trade voyages north of Churchill.

With the renewal of voyages northward in 1750 the Company embarked on a determined policy of expansion. Considerable investment in both manpower and money was allotted to the development of this area, and by the 1760s the London Committee no longer needed political pressure to expand the trade. The annual voyages and the attempt to establish a Black Whale Fishery at Marble Island demonstrate clearly the Company's persistent belief that the greatest chance of developing a lucrative trade was north of Churchill not inland.

In spite of the Company's determination their attempts of the next thirty years were marked by failure. Why a Company, generally intolerant of wasted expenditure insisted on pursuing such an unprofitable enterprise is a crucial question. The answer lies in the economic and political influences of the time as well as the Company's own traditional approaches to the development of trade.

INTRODUCTIONFOOTNOTES

1. E.E. Rich discusses the sloop voyages northward only briefly in Volume I of his history of the Hudson's Bay Company, 1670-1870. 3 Vols. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1960) pp 625-627

A.S. Morton devotes some attention to the sloop voyages of the pre-1750 period, but only as they apply to the founding of Churchill and the search for the Northwest Passage. See his A History of the Canadian West to 1870-71. 2nd Edition. Edited by Lewis G. Thomas. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973) pp 126-149

Another publication by Glyndwr Williams, The British Search for the Northwest Passage in the Eighteenth Century. (London: Royal Commonwealth Society, 1962) discusses the sloop voyages in greater detail. However, he focusses on their role in the search for the Northwest Passage, rather than on their real objective: trade.

2. Among the inland expeditions during this century were those undertaken by Henry Kelsey, 1690-2, Anthony Henday, 1754-55, Joseph Smith and Joseph Waggoner, 1756-57 and 1757-58, and Samuel Hearne, 1769, 1770, 1771-72.
3. The Hudson's Bay Company underwent a final parliamentary investigation in 1857.

CHAPTER I

CHARTERED COMPANIES

The dawning of the seventeenth century marked the beginning of a new era in the development of English commerce: the expansion of overseas trade. Events of the preceding century had laid much of the foundation for this development. Beginning with the discovery of North America by Christopher Columbus in 1492 Europeans escalated their activities in search of new markets for their domestic products, and new sources of exotic commodities for sale at home. In contrast to their Spanish and Portuguese counterparts English merchants were slow to invest in long distance enterprises. For the first half of the sixteenth century the English had only to go as far as Antwerp^{1.} to acquire all the foreign goods required.

By the early 1550s an economic slump and the curtailing of her major traditional European markets prompted a revitalization^{2.} of England's mercantile interest in long distance trading. With Spain and Portugal controlling conventional routes to the East, English merchants looked north easterly for markets for their manufactured goods. In 1555 the Muscovy Company was granted a charter to trade^{3.} with Russia. The closing years of the century saw the establishment of several more long distance trading concerns. In 1579 the Eastland Company was chartered to regulate the Anglo-Baltic trade for the English merchants involved. The Levant Company was formed in 1581 to conduct^{4.} trade with the Ottoman Empire.

The Dutch by this time had shown themselves to be formidable rivals, having cornered the spice trade to northern Europe. The English in the meantime had to be content with the spoils of plunder from the

Spanish treasure ships. By the 1590s however, the Portuguese hold in the Eastern spice trade began to falter. Domestic troubles since her absorption by Spain had caused Portugal's finances to be seriously drained and the Dutch and English were quick to take her place. The English sent out an expedition in 1591 but it failed disastrously. The Dutch were more fortunate in their venture four years later. Both countries pursued their interests in the spice trade and by 1602 the English and Dutch had founded their own trading companies.

Thus by the early 1600s the foreign trading company had assumed an important role in the pursuit of national interests through commercial expansion. As such the companies which emerged during the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries reflected in their organization the character of commercial thought of the time: mercantilism. The concepts of mercantilism which dominated this period had as their inherent characteristics a pursuit of economic life as the province of the State.^{6.} Conversely the development of private trade, that is, trade uncontrolled by the State, was believed to be harmful to the general public and the nation.^{7.} Hence the trading company needed royal sanction in the form of a charter of incorporation to insure that its area of trade would be protected not only from the antagonism of the State but also from the interference of its fellow countrymen.^{8.}

Throughout the seventeenth century this "state" control of foreign economy meant the Crown, and as such Parliament had little control over its development.

A king's power is both ordinary and absolute, and differs according to the ends it serves. The ordinary power concerns individuals...is exercised in the ordinary courts of law according to common law; and is subject to parliament. The absolute power exists

for the general benefit of the whole people is governed by rules of policy, and varies according to what the wisdom of the king thinks is for the common good.⁹

Since neither James I nor Charles I took an active role in the management of foreign trading companies their development was largely left to private individuals. Colonies were established by trading companies such as the Virginia Company along the New England coast (1606) with abortive attempts made in Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick.¹⁰ In India the East India Company slowly established permanent settlements on the mainland: Fort St. George (later Madras), Bengal and at Hughli. In the West Indies some success was attained in spite of Spanish dominance. In 1625 a colony was established in Barbados and Englishmen also occupied Nevis, Montserrat, and Antigua.¹¹

Following the execution of Charles I, the Long Parliament brought foreign trade and colonial expansion under closer control through a series of ordinances.¹² The domestic upheavals of the 1650s, however, brought a decline in the success of these foreign trading companies. The earliest of chartered companies, the Merchant Adventurers, was in serious difficulty by the time of the Restoration having lost many of its foreign markets for cloth during the Civil War years. In 1661 when cloth makers resumed exportation many refused to join the chartered organization and complained of the levy of cloth exported to Holland.¹³ The Levant Company was destroyed by internal dissension which manifested itself in fraudulent acts by its factors and agents abroad.¹⁴ By 1661 the company was heavily in debt. In Africa heavy losses forced the English to abandon their forts on the African coast.¹⁵ The East India Company alone fared reasonably well, having had its charter renewed in 1657 and again in 1661.¹⁶

Under Charles II the State took an active role in reversing this declining trend in English foreign commerce. In 1661 the East India Company was granted a new charter with even greater powers, including the right to seize interlopers and to wage war and make peace with non-Christian princes.^{17.} The trade to Africa and the West Indies was renewed under royal charter first in 1662 with Prince Rupert, cousin of Charles II, as its first Governor.^{18.}

In the midst of this resurgence the Hudson's Bay Company was chartered on May 2, 1670. The Hudson's Bay Company was organized along the joint stock format.^{19.} Both the East India Company and the Royal African Company adopted this type of organization as did other long distance trading concerns.^{20.} By the closing years of the seventeenth century the joint stock form of organization had superseded the regulated form^{21.} as the preferred type of organization. There are a number of reasons for this. On such long distance ventures there was a need for large sums of capital, sums which could not easily be raised by individuals or partnerships. Moreover, large expenditure of capital on the building of distant settlements was necessary if the defence of the trade was to be maintained in areas far from the assistance of formal government control. The high risk factor of such investments in which returns might be several years in the offing prompted individuals to provide only small sums of money at a time, thus forcing these concerns to adopt an organization issuing shares to the general public. Finally there was, of course, the need to be incorporated as a condition of obtaining the monopoly,^{22.} a monopoly which was the main prerequisite for any possible success.

The chartering of such a company to pursue the fur trade and settlement thus falls easily into the pattern of mercantile thought

of the time. The French had already established a profitable fur trade in New France, and it was predictable that England would look upon the establishment of its own concern in these parts as fulfillment of that perpetual desire to compete with its rivals for a product (in this case, furs) which would help to create greater economic self-sufficiency.^{23.} This trend of competition with the French in the late seventeenth century would replace that with the Dutch in the eighteenth century.

The initial years of the Company's operations reflected steady development and comfortable returns, although no dividend was paid until 1684.^{24.} But the growing success of the Company was subjected to a corresponding growth in public criticism. By 1688 the prosperity of the Restoration Period had reached its peak. International peace of the 1680s had seen dividends being paid by all three major joint stock companies,^{25.} and even the internal conflict affecting England by the end of this decade failed to seriously upset this growth. With the accession of William III and Mary II in 1689, indications of a changing mood towards trade by both the State and the general public appeared. The Revolution of 1688 was in itself indicative of this changing attitude. Those individuals who opposed the exercising of royal prerogative prior to the Revolution were now the advocates of freer trade. In short the revolution had resulted in the transfer of the power of regulating commercial affairs from the Crown to Parliament.^{26.}

Such a shift in perspective was dramatically symbolized in the attacks on chartered trading companies in the 1690s.

Companies which had held monopolistic rights to a trade chartered by the reigning monarch now found their very existence threatened by public pressure to obtain parliamentary approval. Many companies during this period met their end as a result of these inquiries. The Royal African Company chartered by Charles II in 1672 had been actively supported by James II. This association alone caused the company to be viewed coldly by the post-revolutionary Parliament. Interlopers, a frequent curse of many trading companies, had, by 1690 nearly brought the African company to financial ruin. To offset this infringement on its trade, especially in the West Indies, the Royal African Company turned to Parliament to obtain its official confirmation in the form of statutory law. The company made its first attempt in 1690 but Parliament adjourned before any legislation could be passed.^{27.}

Between 1694 and 1697 the African company worked towards this goal, persuading the Committee of Trade and Plantations to review its case. This time a decision was reached with the Committee upholding the company's joint stock organization over any regulated system. However, it did recommend that the trade in negroes alone be opened to all. Confirmation of this decision was postponed again.^{29.} The final blow came in 1698 with the passing of the Act which effectively stripped the company of its monopoly and its joint stock organization.^{30.} In it the trade of the West Indies and Africa was opened to all British subjects on payment of a duty on all exports by the individual trader. These funds were intended to assist the company in maintaining its forts in Africa.

Other companies were not as fortunate as the Royal African Company. The Merchant Adventurers lost its monopoly in

1689; the Muscovy Company ended as a joint stock venture in 1699. Two companies which survived the onslaught were the East India Company and the Hudson's Bay Company. The East India Company, however, did undergo severe revisions in its organization. The Act of 1698^{32.} conferred the sole right of trade with India on those who subscribed to a loan of two million pounds at 8% interest. The subscribers, in turn, could trade as individuals or as members of the corporation. As a result the subscribers formed a New Company leaving the Old Company to operate under the original charter. The whole affair was finally resolved in 1708 with reunion of the two companies into the United East India Company.^{33.}

The Hudson's Bay Company, the smallest by far of these trading concerns in financial investment,^{34.} was not immune to the attacks of jealous private interests. It too suffered from periodic infringements on its monopoly from both foreigners and its fellow countrymen. As early as 1680 the London Committee became aware of attempts to intercept its trade by fellow countrymen. Thomas Phipps, a committeeman and relative of a servant at Moose Factory was found to be plotting against the Company for a share of the trade. This betrayal was quickly suppressed; but it made the Company exceptionally cautious for the future.^{35.}

This cautious attitude was apparent in 1682 when the rumours of French interest and British private traders were causing great consternation among Committee members. The instructions for trade in 1682^{36.} urged the prevention of private trade among Company servants and from interlopers.^{37.} Their fears were not unjustified when one realizes that several of their captains, including Zachariah Gillam, father of the New England trader Benjamin Gillam, had keen

interests in lining their own pockets. Soon enough however, these suspicions became realities. The ketch Expectation had sailed from England bound for the Bay carrying four former employees. The chief instigator of the scheme was soon found to be none other than the
38.
former committeeman, Thomas Phipps. However, these immediate fears were temporarily allayed by the fact that the Expectation returned to port because of the lateness of the season. In the meantime the Committee, led by James Hayes, had acted immediately on word of the rival vessel's departure and had despatched the hurriedly bought James to intercept her in the Bay. Unfortunately the James
39.
was never heard from, presumably lost in the North Sea.

In the spring of 1683 the interlopers made one more attempt to usurp the trade. The Expectation sailing under the name Charles set out for the Bay. The Hudson's Bay Company's ship Diligence captained by Nehemiah Walker, intercepted the Charles while on its outward voyage. Making prisoners of the crew, Walker attempted to have his own men guide the vessel to Charlton Island, but she went
40.
aground and was lost.

These actions on the part of Walker and other servants embroiled the Company in a lengthy lawsuit with the owners of the Expectation in the Admiralty Courts. During the presentation of the case the interlopers (Charles Boone, John Duvall and Company) claimed the value of the ship and cargo, £1600, and charged that their vessel had not been taken near Cape Charles, in Hudson Strait, but had been captured on the high seas, a hundred leagues from Hudson Bay.
41.
Thus no infringement on the Company's charter had ever taken place. The Company in response to this suit brought its own suit against the interlopers and during the ensuing trial the rights of the Company

42.
were upheld.

The years 1682 and 1683 were difficult ones for the Company in its defence of its chartered monopoly. Not only had their monopoly been threatened by former servants but also by traders from New England and France. Benjamin Gillam arrived aboard Bachelor's Delight in Nelson River in August of 1682 from Boston. He was met by Radisson and his party, also interlopers who had been commissioned by the French Crown to build a post at Nelson River and forbid trade

43.
to aliens. When John Bridgar and Zachariah Gillam in the Rupert arrived they too were met by Radisson and his men. All three parties wintered in the area, but Radisson increased the French control in the area by making prisoners of Benjamin Gillam and his party. The following

44.
summer, Radisson captured the Hudson's Bay Company post and made Bridgar and his men prisoners. The French took Bridgar to Quebec while the rest of the crew left for posts at the bottom of the Bay.

45.
The New Englanders left in Bachelor's Delight for Quebec and were then released by the French.

46.
The result of this episode, especially the infringement by the French involved the Company in a lengthy diplomatic interchange over grounds of first discovery, subsequent trade and the damages incurred during the winter of 1682-1683. Although the Company's claim to the area would be reinstated in 1684 (ironically by Radisson the one who had captured it for the French), the Committee was still fearful of the active French interest in this area.

47.
Less than two years later the Committee's worst fears were realized when the French, led by the Chevalier de Troyes captured all the Bay posts except Port Nelson (York Fort). The Committee unfortunately was unaware of the capture of all these

posts until after the ratification of the Treaty in December 1686.^{48.}
 The French, on the other hand, knew well the events on the Bay and pushed through the negotiations which were based on the maintenance of the status quo.^{49.}

The Committee finally learned of the events in the Bay in February, 1687. The Committee lost no time in preparing its case, for on February 17, 1687 the Governor, Lord Churchill, and two Committee members presented their petition for redress to the King.^{50.} Along with compensation for damages the Company requested assurance from the French King that a veto would be put on further hostilities, the captured posts would be returned and the Company's monopoly of trade would be confirmed as stated in the Charter.^{51.}

In the ensuing months both the English, represented by Sunderland, Lord President of the Council, Middleton, Principle Secretary of State, and Godolphin and the French, represented by the Sieur de Bonrepas and M. Barillon, French Ambassador to London,^{52.} pressed their cases strongly for control of the Bay.^{53.} Much of the controversy stemmed from first claim to ownership of the territory. The outcome of these negotiations was indecisive and only a truce to dispense with further hostilities was agreed upon by December 1687. The Hudson's Bay Company retained control of York Fort.

The truce continued to hold through the last few years of the eighties. But even with such uncertainty as to control of the Bay, the Company still reaped good profits from its one operating post on the Nelson River. Indeed dividends were declared in 1688, 1689 and 1690.^{54.} The French remained in control of most of the Bay in spite of Company attempts to set up competing establishments adjacent to the French during the latter years of the decade.^{55.}

But by 1690 the Company was distracted from the immediate problems in the Bay when it attempted to obtain Parliamentary confirmation of its Charter.

In presenting its "Case" the Company emphasized that its Charter gave right of dominion and propriety and so differed greatly from the charters of East India Company and the Royal African Company.^{56.} It also requested that confirmation be given on the ground that the territory of Rupert's Land should be considered as one of His Majesty's plantations. To do so the Company had incurred great expenses including damages amounting to some £150,000 from the French. The Company also insisted that such trade could only be managed under a joint stock system.^{57.}

The Company's petition received only slight opposition, mainly from the Feltmakers' Company. They declared that the Hudson's Bay Company's monopoly would ruin the Russia trade and would be a hindrance to the whole trade of feltmaking. The Russia trade to which they referred was the import of beaver wool from Russia, an essential commodity for the feltmakers. The Feltmakers' Company was not a voice to be ignored since they were one of the successful agents of competition for this trade against the French. Furthermore, they successfully employed many of the skilled Huguenot refugees who had fled from persecution in France.^{58.} Other opposition petitions came from once again, the owners of the Expectation as well as merchants from New England. The Company's bill, however, was easily passed and the Charter confirmed for seven years.^{59.}

The fact that the Company had failed to have the Charter confirmed in perpetuity meant that the whole process -- petitions, and counter-petitions-- had to be undergone once more in 1697.

The years preceding this event were relatively prosperous ones for the Company. Even with only two forts in operation, York and New Severn, large quantities of beaver were brought home. Open hostilities with the French during this period were a constant concern of the Committee who feared another attack on the Bay posts.^{60.} Indeed, in 1690, d'Iberville had attempted to capture York Fort but he was chased out of the river by well-prepared Company men.^{61.} The establishing of British dominance in the Bay was successfully undertaken in the summer of 1693 when James Knight recaptured Albany, and the French by the autumn had abandoned Moose and Rupert when they met fierce opposition from the English ships in the Bay.^{63.} However the Committee's jubilation was short-lived. In the fall of 1694 d'Iberville was finally successful in capturing York Fort.

The news of the return of the French threat to the Bay spurred the Committee into immediate action. The few resources of York were far too valuable to the Company's survival to be lost for very long. With the continuation of the war with France the economic situation in England was steadily worsening, loans were difficult to acquire with the shortage of acceptable coinage and the Company was hard pressed to pay its bills. With sales of beaver down the Committee found itself faced with the problem of raising sufficient cash for the 1696 Expedition.^{64.} But fortunately for the Company York Fort was recaptured in the fall of 1696.^{65.}

The following year the Company was still in a tenuous situation in regard to dominance in the Bay. The negotiations over the Treaty of Ryswick continued with both French and English presenting their claims to the Bay. However, when the treaty was completed, the Company found itself deprived of its claims. According to the

terms, all countries, forts and colonies were to be returned to the nation which possessed them at the time war was declared. Thus the French were entitled to Albany and the Bottom of the Bay as a result of de Troyes' military success in 1686, and regardless of the Hudson's Bay Company recapture by Knight in 1693.^{66.} The Company was to retain the control of York Fort only. However, these terms were never observed by either party in Hudson Bay. In fact the situation was the exact opposite. The French who under d'Iberville had recaptured York Fort in the autumn of 1697 retained control of this valuable post. The English on the other hand continued to operate at Albany, the only post left in British hands.^{67.}

The problems caused by the Treaty were compounded by the pressing issue of renewal of the Company's Charter. The difficult situations faced by many chartered trading concerns during the nineties could not have gone unnoticed by the Committee especially when they saw how greater companies like the East India Company submitted to parliamentary pressure and relinquished chartered rights. The Committee thus approached the challenge with some trepidation given the fact that both the Company's and the nation's financial conditions were precarious. Sales of furs were down in Europe and the Company was left with beaver lying unsold from year to year at Amsterdam and Hamburg.^{68.}

The Committee began preparations for renewal of its charter as early as January 1697. In its "Case" the Company set down its reasons for the continuation of the Charter. It emphasized how the Company's trade resulted in the purchase of domestically manufactured goods and how the beaver trade would grow and bring greater benefits to England if it was allowed to develop. It

underlined the damages suffered by French aggression and claimed that if the Company was not supported by Parliament, the trade would fall exclusively into French hands. Thus only through the support of the present joint stock system of organization could enough funds be raised to build the forts, hire the men, and maintain the trade in successful opposition to the French.
69.

In March of 1698 the Company's bill was presented to the Commons and sent to a Select Committee for further study. Sir Stephen Evans, the Company's Governor at the time was a member of this committee.
70. Opposition to the Company's bill was more intense this time with various bodies presenting their own petitions which brought into question the solvency of the Company's financial state and its skill in managing the trade of this region. Pierre Radisson, now sixty-two years of age and the father of four English-born children, presented a suit claiming that the Company had failed to pay him £140 for duties performed by him. The inability to raise such a small amount of money made the Company's financial difficulties
71. apparent to all.

The Select Committee also heard petitions from the Felt-makers' Company, the Skinners' Company, the merchants trading between London and New York, and the unrelenting proprietors of the interloper Expectation captured and wrecked in the Bay in 1684. The Feltmakers' claimed that the Company should not send their furs to Russia since the technique of combing beaver wool was now known in England as well. The Company also suffered assaults from pamphleteers with the publication of the "Impartial Account of the present state of the Hudson's Bay Company". This publication insisted that the Company's trade had not noticeably improved during its years of operation; that

its forts were poorly constructed and showed little signs of the great company expenditure the Hudson's Bay Company contended it could only derive from a joint stock system; and that it had acquired wide privileges which were enjoyed by only a few investors.^{72.}

In spite of these protests the bill did receive a second reading and went to a Committee of the Whole House in May of 1698. After this it seems to have been lost in the records. It does not appear to have reached the House of Lords and it did not receive Royal Assent. Somehow a settlement must have been reached for the Company continued as sole proprietor of the lands under dispute. However, the fact that it had not received official parliamentary confirmation, and would continue to function under the increasingly tenuous premise of Royal Prerogative would be, in the years to come,^{73.} a recurring threat to the survival of the Company.

CHAPTER IFOOTNOTES

1. Antwerp was the commercial centre through which the English merchants traded their domestic products for foreign commodities. Brian Murphy, A History of the British Economy 1086-1970. (London: Longman Group Ltd., 1973) pp 55, 200-201
2. Ibid., 201
3. Ibid., 204
4. Ibid., p. 208
5. The English East India Company was chartered in 1600; the Dutch East India Company was chartered in 1602. Ibid., p. 213
6. E. Lipson, The Economic History of England, Vol. III: The Age of Mercantilism. 6th ed. (London: Adam and Charles Black 1959) p. 3
7. Ibid., p. 5
8. Cecil T. Carr, ed., Select Charters of Trading Companies AD 1530-1707. (London: Bernard Quaritch, 1913) p. xvi
9. Godfrey Davies, The Early Stuarts 1603-1660. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937) p. 10
10. Settlement was attempted in Newfoundland in 1610 but was abandoned in favour of temporary settlements; Nova Scotia and New Brunswick settlements had to be abandoned when Charles I made peace with France in 1629. Ibid., pp. 322-323
11. Ibid., p. 334
12. Fifteen commissioners for regulating trade were appointed to investigate the English plantations in America and elsewhere and to advise on their management. One of the results of their investigation was the Navigation Act which decreed that no goods could be imported from Asia, Africa or America except in ships owned by Englishmen or colonists. Ibid., p. 344
13. W.R. Scott, The Constitution and Finance of English, Scottish and Irish Joint-Stock Companies to 1720. Vol I: The General Development of the Joint-Stock System to 1720. (Cambridge: University Press, 1912) p. 268
14. Ibid., pp. 268-269

15. The antecedent to this company was called the Company of Royal Adventurers into Africa. *Ibid.*, p. 269
16. *Ibid.*, p. 270
17. Marguerite Eyer Wilbur, The East India Company and the British Empire in the Far East. (Stanford: University Press, 1945) p. 130
18. War with the Dutch (1665-1667) resulted in the collapse of this company and eventually its re-organization under a new royal charter in 1672. W.R. Scott, "The Constitution and Finance of the Royal African Company of England from its foundation till 1720", American Historical Review, VIII, No. 2 (January, 1903) 212
19. The joint stock company was "a corporate body whose capital was provided by a number of shareholders who participated in the profits...Its merit was that it enabled capital to be drawn from a wide area: anyone was free to hold shares in the company whether 'skilled in trade' or not". Lipson, p. lix
20. The Russia or Muscovy Company was the first chartered company to adopt a joint stock type of organization. It was first chartered on 26 February 1555. Thomas Stuart Willan, The Early History of the Russia Company, 1553-1603. (Manchester: University Press, 1956) pp.7, 21
21. In a regulated form of organization "each member traded on his own capital subject to the common rules laid down by the fellowship to which he belonged". Lipson, p. 195.
22. This prerequisite of incorporation had been established in an Act of 1662 in which a species of limited liability in favour of shareholders of joint stock companies like the East India Company and African Company meant that subscribers were not subject to law of bankruptcy in the event of losses incurred. Thus the shareholder was only liable for the amount unpaid on his shares. Scott, The General Development of the Joint Stock System, p. 270
23. Beaver pelts were used in the production of hats which were in vogue in the late 17th and throughout the 18th centuries. E.E. Rich, Hudson's Bay Company, 1670-1870, Vol I: 1670-1763. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1960) p. 49
24. *Ibid.*, p. 99
25. Scott, The General Development of the Joint Stock System, p. 318
26. Murphy, p. 309
27. K. G. Davies, The Royal African Company. (London: Longmans Green & Company, 1957) p. 128

28. The Committee of Trade and Plantations had its origins in the colonial period. In 1695 the two councils set up in the Restoration were reunited and remained so until 1768 when colonial affairs were finally separated from trade. Among its duties was the negotiation of commercial treaties, colonial affairs and import and export regulation. S.H. Steinberg, ed., A New Dictionary of British History. (London: Edward Arnold (Publishers) Ltd., 1963) p. 359
29. Davies, p. 132
30. Ibid., pp. 134-135
31. Rudolph Robert, Chartered Companies and their Role in the Development of Overseas Trade. (London: G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1969) pp. 45, 63
32. Lipson, p. 310
33. Ibid.
34. The capital of the Hudson's Bay Company was £10,500 in 1679; the original subscription of the East India Company was £30,000. E.E. Rich, ed., Minutes of the Hudson's Bay Company 1679-1684, First Part, 1679-1682. Hudson's Bay Record Society Vol VIII. (London: Hudson's Bay Record Society, 1945) p. xxiii; Lipson, p. 271
35. Rich, Hudson's Bay Company. Volume I, p. 95
36. E.E. Rich, ed., Copy-Book of Letters Outward &c. Hudson's Bay Record Society, Vol XI. (London: Hudson's Bay Record Society 1948) p. 36
37. Rich, Hudson's Bay Company, Volume I, p. 102
38. Ibid., p. 105
39. Ibid.
40. E.E. Rich, ed., Minutes of the Hudson's Bay Company, 1679-1684. Second Part 1682-1684. Hudson's Bay Record Society, Vol. IX (London: Hudson's Bay Record Society, 1946) pp. ix, xx
41. Charles Boone, John Duvall & Company also contended that "...upon the reading and perusing the said Grant or Patent publically declaire unto the said Hudson's Bay Company or some of them that by reason of the said exception there was nothing passed or granted to them in regard it was before granted to the said Muscovia or Russia Company or to that effect and the said Hudson's Bay Company or some of themselves to buy the Interest of the said Muscovia or Russia Company that soe they might have some pretense of right to the said Hudson's Bay..." Rich, Minutes...Second Part 1682-1684, pp. 263, 264, 279-80;

41. (cont'd) Rich, Hudson's Bay Company, Volume I., p. 150
42. Rich, Minutes...Second Part 1682-1684, p. 285
43. Rich, Hudson's Bay Company, Volume I, pp.136-137; Rich Copy-Booke of Letters, p. 87
44. Grace Lee Nute, Caesars of the Wilderness. (St. Paul, Minn: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 1978) p. 194
45. Ibid., p. 196
46. Rich, Hudson's Bay Company, Volume I, p. 138
47. Ibid., pp. 162-163
48. Ibid., p. 220
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., p. 222
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid., p. 223
53. For the Hudson's Bay Company's Case see Rich, Copy-Booke of Letters Outward &c, pp. 222-226
54. Rich, Hudson's Bay Company, Volume I, p. 238
55. Ibid., pp. 246-248
56. The Case is dated 28 April 1690. Ibid., p. 266
57. Ibid., p. 267
58. Ibid.
59. It had originally been given a period of confirmation for fourteen years but this was amended after further petitions were presented by the New Englanders. Rich, Hudson's Bay Company, Volume I, p. 268
60. England and France were involved in the War of the League of Augsburg (1689-1697) until settlement was reached with the Treaty of Ryswick. Rich, Hudson's Bay Company, Volume I, p. 289
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid., p. 303
63. Ibid., p. 304
64. Ibid., p. 335

65. Ibid., p. 337
66. Ibid., pp. 346-347
67. England and France were again at war by 1701 with the War of the Spanish Succession. The problems in the Bay would continue until the revisions of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 were implemented.
Ibid., p. 349
68. Ibid., p. 357
69. The Case of the Hudson's Bay Company. (London: 1697)
70. Rich, Hudson's Bay Company, Volume I, p. 360
71. Ibid., p. 361
72. Ibid., p. 362
73. Ibid., p. 363


CHAPTER II

THE PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY OF 1749

With the return of its chartered lands by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, the Hudson's Bay Company was able to embark on the first significant attempt to expand its trade and recoup the losses of the past twenty years. The successful establishment of a permanent post at Churchill River was the initial step towards the development of trade along the north west coast of Hudson Bay. However, the optimism with which it was founded was soon undermined by tragedy and the recurring threat of war. The resulting isolationist policy adopted by the Company during this period served only to intensify the anti-monopolistic feeling of the times. As a result the Company found itself faced with the greatest challenge to its chartered rights, the Parliamentary Inquiry of 1749.

But in the mood of optimism before the South Sea Bubble of 1720¹, the Committee quickly despatched its chief officers to re-establish the Company's posts on the Bay. James Knight, now² an elderly man with a long history of service to the Company, agreed to be Governor at York Fort at £400 per annum plus a proportion of any new trade he might develop in minerals, whale oil, whalebone and whale-fins.³ Henry Kelsey was appointed Deputy Governor.

Before Knight could embark on this search for new trade he had to re-establish the post at York and disperse the remaining French. Between 1714 and 1717 Knight pursued the Committee's orders with diligence. In the summer of 1716 William Stewart returned after a year inland with a group of Northern Indians to trade at York. Just as significant to Knight was the information related by



these Indians concerning the existence of a river along whose banks lay "great Quantitys of pure Virgin Copper lumps so bigg theat three or 4 Men cant lift it".^{4.}

Knight's keen interest in the location of these and other precious metals was not a new one. In preparing for his return to the Bay in 1714 he requested "Cruseables, Melting Potts Borax &c for the Trial of Minerals".^{5.} This preoccupation became an obsession in the following years and by 1717 he had decided that a sea expedition would be the best approach.^{6.}

The establishment of Churchill in the summer of 1717 can be viewed as a step towards the realization of this dream. However, it must not be overlooked that the Company had had a lengthy interest in the expansion of trade in this area. The desire to diversify the Company's returns by developing new sources of trade had been the motivation for the first founding of Churchill in the 1680s. In 1684 Captain John Abraham of the Hudson's Bay Company became the first European since Jens Munck to visit the Churchill River. His report so impressed the Committee that it decided to establish a post in 1688 primarily for the purpose of a white whale fishery.^{7.} The actual establishment did not take place until the summer of 1689 but fire destroyed the hastily assembled buildings soon after and the post was abandoned.^{8.} Undaunted the Committee was determined that the resources of Churchill be tapped and again ordered the area to be occupied in 1691. Casks for whale oil were sent out that year along with two "Greenland Shallops" in pieces, to be assembled and used for the whale fishery.^{9.} But this plan had to be suspended because of the severe shortage of men during the war years (1689-1697). Knight himself fully recognized the potential of Churchill as a trade centre

and had notified the Committee as early as 1715 of his intention to expand the Company's operations to this area.^{10.}

James Knight began construction of the post at Churchill River in the summer of 1717. The task was to prove more difficult than expected, as Knight found the area barren of game, water and timber.^{11.}

...but I never see such A Misserable Place in all my Life & there Was but one Little Place where the Danes had Wintred, wch is upon a point as hardly contains So much compass of Ground as the Royall Exchange Stands upon....

I find here is no fresh Water to be gott Nigher than a Quarter of a Mile...Our people...have been 2 or 3 times up the River as farr as they could go for rocks & Stones....

...the timber that grows Scragling here none less than 3/4 of a Mile to pack to ye Water & it is very Short knotty Stuff....^{12.}

However the arrival of the Company's supply vessel and the erection of suitable quarters at Churchill prevented any contemplation of abandonment. With much work still to be done Knight left Richard Staunton in charge for the winter.

The summer establishing Churchill had convinced Knight that an expedition by sea could reach the copper and gold mines so often referred to by the Northern Indians. In the fall of 1718 he returned to England to persuade the Committee to make his dream a reality.^{13.} This task was to be a fairly easy one for Knight. His long association with the Company, his experience in the Bay, and his occasional financial loans to the Company during difficult times all aided his negotiations. The Committee too had given Knight expressions of their favour in earlier years as well as during this contract in the Bay by allowing him to engage in private trade. The economic environment of the time must also have

played a major role in influencing the Committee's final decision. The heady atmosphere of speculation in South Sea Company shares was having its effect on Committee members, for in 1720 serious consideration was being made to treble the Company's stock.^{14.}

By 1719 Knight was well on his way to preparing for his fateful voyage. The Committee agreed to continue the post at Churchill even though it would depend heavily on European supplies. Knight was outfitted with two vessels and in company with the annual supply vessels set out for the Bay. The details of Knight's voyage have been recounted by Williams and will not be repeated here.^{15.} The outcome of this expedition, the loss of all hands on the two vessels in the icy waters of the Arctic had a great impact on the Committee and the development of northern trade for the next 30 years. With Scrogg's voyage northward in 1722 and his subsequent confirmation of the loss of Knight's expedition the Committee divorced itself from any further discovery expeditions and consequently curtailed expansion of trade from this point. The infrequent voyages which did take place during the next three decades were characterized by their brief duration and their focus on trade alone.^{16.}

In the early 1720s Kelsey made two voyages northward from York along the north west coast of Hudson Bay. His motivation was far removed from the lofty idealism of Knight and he concentrated instead on the practical aspects of diversification of the Company's trade.^{17.} Kelsey was sceptical of the future of Churchill and his voyages in 1719 and 1721 were in search of minerals, the development of trade with the Inuit and the feasibility of a black whale fishery.^{18.} He ventured as far north as 62°40'N latitude in 1719 but was turned back by unfavourable winds early in his voyage of 1721.^{19.} John

Hancock was ordered north by Kelsey in the summer of 1720 to trade with the Inuit for whalebone, oil and copper. If he contacted Knight's expedition and the explorations were completed he was to order the aged explorer to return to Churchill. However, Hancock's only news of Knight was that the explorer had wintered at Lake's Cove in 62°N latitude.^{20.}

Scroggs' voyage of 1722 which is most significant for the discovery of the loss of James Knight marked the end of voyages northward for either trade or discovery for many years. John Scroggs, master of the Whalebone, was ordered to sail as far as Thomas Roe's Welcome at 66 1/2°N latitude, making no stops along the way. Tidal directions as well as any whales were to be noted.^{21.} At 62°48'N Scroggs party found part of a ship's foremast in the water but made no other attempts to search the area for other clues concerning Knight's expedition. Although Scroggs would claim he had reached the northern end of the Welcome before returning he had reached only the area of Chesterfield Inlet and Daly Bay.^{22.}

On the return voyage a hasty stop was made at Marble Island near the place where the foremast had been found. Richard Norton, a crew member, found other evidence of Knight's expedition, but failure to find any trace of the actual vessels led to the belief that they had probably been lost along the rugged western coast near Lake Cove.^{23.}

The discovery of the fate of James Knight destroyed any lingering enthusiasm to explore the north west coast of Hudson Bay. From the early 1720s through the 1730s the Committee concentrated on developing the post at Churchill. Even exploration inland was restricted in part because Company servants were fearful

of being caught far from home by winter snows. During the 1730s the ever-increasing threat of war, and the building of the stone fortress to be called Prince of Wales's Fort superceded any notions of coastal expeditions in search of trade or discovery.

It was during this period of isolation that the Company became involved in Britain's renewed interest in the existence of a Northwest Passage. The search for such a route to the Orient had occupied the minds of enterprising men of the known world for two and a half centuries. Christopher Columbus had been searching for a western route when he was halted by the North American continent. In 1576 Martin Frobisher sailed from England in search of a northern passage to China. Less than fifty years later Henry Hudson was left to die after a mutinous crew refused to search any farther for the Northwest Passage. Thus it is not surprising that the interest aroused in such a route in the 1730s should be concentrated in Hudson Bay, the heart of the Company's chartered territory.

Arthur Dobbs, a wealthy Ulster landowner and member^{24.} of the Irish House of Commons had had his interest aroused in overseas trade with the expansion of Irish trade in particular, and British colonial trade in general.^{25.} In 1731 he drafted a^{26.} memorial on the probability of a Northwest Passage in which he first demonstrated his preoccupation with the height and direction of tidal waters. This theme would reappear in many of his future^{27.} publications as proof of the existence of such a passage. Other factors important in his belief in the existence of such a route were the black whales sighted on the west coast of Hudson Bay. No one had reported any of them passing through Hudson Strait

into the Bay, and thus he concluded that they must come from a western sea.

Although Dobbs' theories were based on the limited published accounts of explorations of the period he was determined to put them to the test. His first intention was to approach the South Sea Company and have their whalers search for the passage, but by 1733 this company had abandoned its fishery.^{28.} He showed his memorial of 1731 to Colonel Bladen, one of the Lord Commissioners of the Board of Trade and Plantations and to Sir Charles Wager, First Lord of the Admiralty. Two years later he received his first interview with Samuel Jones, Deputy Governor of the Hudson's Bay Company. However, Jones was less than enthusiastic about any such venture; the fate of Knight and the great financial loss still weighed heavily on his conscience. Undaunted, Dobbs continued to pursue his wooing of the Company and in 1735, he was able to peruse a copy of the Company's Charter.^{29.} Until this time the Company had successfully kept its private affairs from such public scrutiny. The success of this policy was based on its insistence that secrecy be enforced in all Company dealings. Thus ship's captains and Company servants on the Bay were forbidden to pass on any information or documentation regarding the Company's trade, navigation routes, pattern of life, and geography of the Bay. (Committee members too were cautioned against allowing copies of the Charter out of their control.) Such a stringent practice is understandable considering the disruptions of trade which had resulted from interlopers and foreign powers in the past.^{30.}

Dobbs, however, was considerably surprised at the extent of chartered privileges of the Hudson's Bay Company and realized that this Company alone would benefit most from the

discovery of a Northwest Passage. It was for this reason that he continued to push the Company into funding an expedition.^{31.} In that same year he approached Governor Lake with his scheme, softening the Governor's initial rejection of yet another expedition by stating that the Company need only send two small sloops north from Churchill to Ne Ultra and have them travel a few leagues west. Lake finally agreed to this limited expenditure.^{32.}

The orders sent to Richard Norton and Council at Prince of Wales's Fort that summer of 1736 were concerned first with trade and the search for minerals and second with a passage to the East.

...to find out a proper bay or harbour to lye secure in and trade with the Indians, also to pitch a Tent on the Land and make observations how farr distant from Trees and what the Soil is, and to Endeavour to promote a Trade by perswading [sic] the Indians to Kill Whales, Sea Horses & Seals, for whale Fins, Ivory, Seal skins and Oile...^{33.}

The late arrival of the Churchill and the Musquash in the summer of 1736 prevented any voyage from taking place that year. Thus the Company was forced to billet the crews of the two vessels for a winter at Prince of Wales's Fort. This unfortunate setback eliminated the original plan of having the vessels make the voyages over two years: the first year, 1736, to travel to Roe's Welcome and establish contacts with the natives and the second year to search for minerals and engage in trade.^{34.} Thus much had to be accomplished in one season to avoid the expense of the men spending two winters in the Bay.

^{35.}
On July 6, 1737 James Napper, commander of the expedition and Master of the Churchill sloop set out in company with the Musquash (Robert Crow, Master). During the five week expedition little was accomplished. Napper died at Whale Cove, the furthest

limit of the voyage and according to his orders Crow was forced to abandon the expedition and return to Churchill River.^{36.} No passage was found and as Norton reported in his annual letter to the Committee that year:

...we find noe Encouragement to Send ye Sloops there
Next Year, ye Coast being perrilous, No Rivers
Navigable that they could Meet with Ngr noe Woods
& ye Trade trifling & Inconsiderable.^{37.}

In all, the total trade received during the voyage was 100 pounds of whalebone, 20 pounds of ivory, some "unicorns horns" and 3 barrels of blubber which remained for factory use.^{38.} This was small compensation considering the Company's expenditure for two crews (Churchill: 12 men; Musquash: 6 men) including wages, room and board for one year. Two of these eighteen men were hired especially for the voyage with five being Company servants and three or four Indians.^{39.}

Dobbs, predictably, was extremely disappointed at the failure of this first expedition. The inexperience of many of the crew members in Arctic waters was believed to have been a major factor.^{40.} Dobbs was further met with the reluctance of the Committee to engage in any more expeditions. Even though the Committee reinstated voyages northward in 1738, 1739 and 1740 none went farther than Whale Cove and all were for the sole purpose of trade.^{41.} The London Committee was also faced with a certain lack of enthusiasm by its servants in the Bay. At Prince of Wales's Fort the emphasis was on the construction of this fortress and the interruption of this project to billet sailors hired especially for exploration irritated the officer in charge. In 1739 Richard Norton put his views on record in a letter to the Committee:

...most of ye Sailors that come over this Year
 For her is but Very Indifferent, there is not one
 of them capeable [sic] to be Trusted wth ye
 Charge of a watch or in ye boat amongst those
 Savages's. ^{42.}

With the outbreak of war with Spain in 1739 Dobbs found
 it increasingly difficult to find support for his enterprise. But
 his persistence prevailed and he succeeded by 1741 in acquiring the
 support of George II for an expedition that same year. During the
 latter half of the 1730s Dobbs had developed a valuable contact
 in Christopher Middleton, a longtime master of Hudson's Bay Company
 supply ships. ^{43.} Middleton had kept him well informed about the 1737
 expedition and supported Dobbs' search for a Northwest Passage. Thus
 it was no surprise that Dobbs turned to Middleton as the logical
 commander of this Admiralty sponsored expedition in search of the
 Northwest Passage.

The Committee, on learning of the intended expedition into
 their chartered territory and the role which Middleton was to
 play, called a General Court on the 9th April, 1741. The Committee
 was concerned about the effect such an expedition might have on its
 "Trade, Property, or Privileges". ^{44.} At first it refused to offer
 any more co-operation to this expedition than was necessary to prevent
 the loss of life and gave no outright agreement to provide shelter
 should the expedition need to winter in the Bay. ^{45.} The Admiralty
 on being informed of the Company's attitude pressured the Committee into
 agreeing to provide "the best the Company can give him" should the
 expedition have to winter in the Bay. ^{46.}

With this aspect assured the Furnace and the Discovery
 left for Hudson Bay in June 1741. The details of that winter have
 been fully related by Williams and other authors. ^{47.} Of concern

here is how the officers of the Bay responded to this encroachment on their safety and way of life. During the winter of 1741-42 James Isham was chief in charge of Prince of Wales's Fort. He had been informed of the possible arrival of such an expedition but was urged to approach any and all non-Company vessels with extreme caution. The Committee insisted on such an approach and with just cause. Company forts had been captured too easily and too often to allow any other attitude. The additional burden of supplying ninety more men at the post with fresh food when it was difficult enough in winter to feed just the Company's servants was particularly galling to Isham. During this winter it was especially tough since most of the Indians had been given elaborate quantities of ammunition by the retiring chief, Richard Norton, and had left the area to hunt on their own. Thus Isham had only his own men to hunt for fresh^{48.} meat. As well as feeding these interlopers Isham was faced with the burdensome task of providing sufficient winter clothing for Middleton's men. Most of them had arrived completely unprepared for the severe climate of Churchill. Isham thus had to employ the Company's tailor in making mittens and coats for the men when extra supplies^{49.} were not available from other posts.

The lack of preparation by these crews for such a winter inevitably resulted in several deaths. For Isham other complications arose with the coming of spring. Members of the expedition successfully lured five of Isham's men from the Company's service. Isham was furious at such behaviour and in his letters to London insisted that he be provided with more detailed instructions on how to deal with such flagrant violations of the Company's rights.

...Captn Middleton & his Officers have been Continually Induceing Our men wth Liquor, fine Words & Preferments; to Enter on board his Majesty's Ships & has Succeeded So far as to gett 5 men to Enter in his Majestys Service, who Left ye Fort Unknown to me, Viz't Jno Armount Sailor April ye 19, Wm Mackulloch, Labr June ye 1st, John Morgan Labr & Jno Mackbeath Sailor, June ye 26th and David Thomas, Labr June ye 28th. ^{50.}

With much relief on the part of both parties the Furnace and the Discovery set sail for the north on 30th June 1742. ^{51.} After an absence of two years the Company's sloop Churchill also sailed northward to trade with the Inuit. ^{52.} The Churchill returned on July 16 having gone as far as Whale Cove. The master, Francis Smith reported that very few Inuit were encountered since no ship had been sent the previous year to prepare them for trade. ^{53.}

The results of Middleton's expedition were inconclusive. After searching Thomas Roe's Welcome and noting the tidal directions the expedition turned south towards Marble Island. But as in the Welcome it was noted that the tide flowed east. By August 12 the crew, sick, demoralized and mutinous forced Middleton to turn the vessel homeward. By then he was convinced that no passage existed between Churchill and 67°N latitude. ^{54.}

On his return to England Middleton reported his findings to Dobbs who initially seemed to support the Captain's conclusions. However after examining the actual journal Dobbs reversed his opinion and instead openly cast doubts on Middleton's capabilities as a navigator and on his loyalties. So persistent and convincing was Dobbs in his attack on Middleton that the Admiralty interceded, calling on the commander to answer these accusations. Middleton's subsequent defence was contained in A Vindication of the Conduct of Captain Christopher Middleton published in 1743.

It was the first volley in a pamphlet war which raged for the balance of the decade.

For the Company the expedition of 1741 only intensified the issue of its role in the search for the Northwest Passage. Even while the expedition of 1741-42 was underway Dobbs had used the search as a stepping stone to the opening up of the trade in Hudson Bay.^{55.} His views were published in Remarks Upon Captain Middleton's Defence (1744) and in An Account of the Countries Adjoining Hudson's Bay. Thus Dobbs' attack on Middleton was closely linked to this new pursuit. In the former, Dobbs claimed that Middleton had been bribed (with £5,000)^{56.} by the Company thereby discrediting both the Company and the validity of the expedition. Dobbs had also acquired further ammunition for his campaign against the Company's monopoly by obtaining a pronouncement from the Attorney General disputing the rights of monopoly described in the Company's charter.^{57.}

In spite of the setback of 1741-42 Dobbs continued to look for financial and political support for his campaign against the Company all cleverly disguised under his search for the Northwest Passage. In 1744 he applied to Parliament to approve a £10,000 reward for the discovery of a passage. In 1745 on behalf of several London merchants he presented a petition to the Commons emphasizing that the discovery of such a passage westward from Hudson Bay would lead to the development of trade with Japan, China and the Phillipines. Again a reward was urged for the discovery of such a passage.^{58.}

For Dobbs it was the first taste of victory in his battle with the Hudson's Bay Company. The Committee of the Whole

House decided that such a discovery would benefit the trade of the country and agreed that a reward should be offered.^{59.} The bill allowing the reward of £20,000 remained in effect for thirty years. However it did include a clause stating that nothing in this measure was to prejudice any of the Hudson's Bay Company's rights and^{60.} privileges.

Encouraged by such obvious political support Dobbs continued his plans for another expedition. A committee of eight merchants called the North West Committee, was created. Money for this joint-stock venture was raised by means of £100 shares with no one person allowed to hold more than ten shares. The North West Committee's instructions to Captains Smith and Moor did include^{61.} trade with the Inuit when possible but this was done in order to prepare the way for future voyages, and was not intended to be a main source of monetary return on the expedition. The shareholders were gambling on the reward to provide them with the major return on their investment.

The London Committee of the Hudson's Bay Company was well aware of all these developments. The General Court of March 26, 1745 left the final policy decisions up to the London Committee.^{62.} In 1746, letters were sent to all factors in charge of Bay posts giving details of the discovery vessels, Dobbs Galley, and California commanded by William Moor and Francis Smith.^{63.} Unlike the 1741-42 expedition the Committee provided its servants with detailed instructions regarding their behaviour. Unless in obvious distress no vessels were to be permitted to winter at any Company post, and action was to be taken to prevent trade with the Indians and the enticement of Company servants to join the expedition.

The Committee also referred its servants to the clauses of the Act of 1745 which ensured protection of its trade and bound it to co-operate in some degree with these expeditions.^{64.}

Dobbs' second expedition set out on May 20, 1746 for York Fort. Both the captains of the Dobbs Galley and the California were seasoned sailors in the Bay. William Moor had served on Hudson's Bay Company supply vessels from 1737 until 1741 when he quit to join Middleton's expedition of discovery. Francis Smith entered the service of the Company about 1737 and captained the voyages northward from Churchill in 1738, 1739, 1740, 1742 and 1743. He returned to England when sloop voyages were halted as a result of war with France and Spain and terminated his association with the Company in 1745.^{66.}

The expedition was plagued from the start. Instead of sailing through Hudson Strait in a few days as in 1742 severe ice conditions delayed the Dobbs Galley and the California a whole month. When they finally reached York Fort, chosen for its less severe climate, James Isham was once again their host. As in 1742 Isham approached these vessels warily and until he was certain of their loyalty treated them as enemies.^{67.} This winter's problems were somewhat less severe than those of 1742-43 but some crew members still suffered from scurvy. With the arrival of spring and the increased activity of the men Isham's suspicions concerning the likelihood of private trade by these sailors were intensified.

Finally the vessels set sail on June 24. Their examination of the west coast as far north as the head of Wager Bay failed to prove the existence of passage but did determine that the Wager was indeed a river. However, their hopes seemed to rise with

the discovery of Chesterfield Inlet and although there was not sufficient time to explore it thoroughly,^{68.} it was espoused as the long-awaited passage.^{69.} Other publications resulting from the same voyage, however, would dispute this conclusion. Only when the campaign against the Company's monopoly was at its peak and Dobbs and his allies were determined to prove that the voyage of 1746-47 was not a failure did Chesterfield Inlet become of greater significance. Williams concludes that the controversy over Chesterfield Inlet remained for the "next half-century the main hope of those who still believed there to be a passage through Hudson Bay."^{71.}

The vessels returned home by October 1747, with three fewer crew members as a result of scurvy.^{72.} By this time the campaign against the Company's monopoly was in full swing. Dobbs' most famous work, An Account of the Countries Adjoining Hudson Bay had been released in 1744 and fully exhibited the change in his attack: from the search for the Northwest Passage to destruction of the Company's chartered monopoly. Much of Dobbs' discussion in this work centres on discrediting the Company's assertions that the climate and geography were unsuitable for extensive settlement. In asserting this claim, as with the search for the Northwest Passage, Dobbs was essentially trying to prove negligence on the part of the Company's chartered responsibilities. Proof of such behaviour was required if disciplinary action was to be evoked under the terms of the "Bubble Act" of 1720. Along with forbidding the operation of any joint stock concern lacking the confirmation of Parliamentary statute and the Crown it stated that:

...by Persons who do or shall use or endeavour to use the same Charters, for raising a Capital Stock...not intended or designed by such Charter

to be raised or transferred, and all acting or pretending to act under any obsolete Charter become void or voidable by Nonuser or Abuser ...shall for ever be deemed to be illegal and void, and shall not be practised or in any wise put in execution. 73.

By March 1748 the Company was well aware of the North West Committee's petition to acquire incorporation presented in January to the Privy Council. This petition presented the new approach by Dobbs: the attempt to have a charter of incorporation granted for a limited number of years of trade and embodying all the same rights to lands discovered as the Hudson's Bay Company. In the General Court held March 10, 1748 the Committee was ordered to prepare its formal opposition to such a petition and even had James Isham recalled to provide his expert testimony of the events. 74.

Unfortunately, for Dobbs he found himself a victim of the system he had tried to exploit. His remaining plan involved provoking the Company into a lawsuit by preparing yet another expedition. However, to do this he needed the prior grant of privilege and protection to encourage the public to invest. Thus Dobbs was "...unable to get incorporation until he had provoked the Company into a lawsuit and unable to raise money to provoke the Company until he had secured incorporation." 75.

In December of 1748 the Privy Council confirmed that the Charter was sound and rejected Dobbs' plea for incorporation. Dobbs made one final sortie -- he turned to Parliament. He prepared a petition for the opening up of trade in the Bay and the incorporation of a new company. He circulated this to the major merchant communities in Britain. But before it reached Parliament it was crushed by the opinion of an anonymous Parliamentarian who concluded "that by opening the Trade, or others embarking in it, might ruin their

Trade [ie, the Hudson's Bay Company] and the Whole be lost, and that it would be hard to attack the Company's property." ^{76,} This opinion dissolved all interest by the merchant community, and ^{77.} Dobbs seemed to accept defeat.

However, the Company was not safe yet. Dobbs' years of wrangling had had their effect and in March 1749 Parliament decided to conduct an investigation. For the Commons, such an investigation was only one in a long line created to solve conflicts in other areas of the nation's foreign commerce. Petitions regarding all types of exports and imports abounded with the Royal Africa Company bearing much of the brunt of the attacks as it teetered on the edge of bankruptcy.

With the appointment of the Committee of the House of Commons to "Inquire into the State and Conditions of the Countries Adjoining to Hudson's Bay and of the Trade carried on there" the Hudson's Bay Company underwent its greatest test of the century. Affidavits similar to those presented in 1748 were prepared by both sides. In addition to these a new onslaught of petitions from the merchant community were presented calling for an opening up of trade to the Bay. ^{78.} As in 1690 and 1698 the shareholders empowered the Committee to draw up its Case and the Solicitor formally composed the Company's defence in a three page pamphlet. In its Case the Company again stated that the climate and terrain were inhospitable; that it had attempted to search for the Northwest Passage and was convinced that it did not exist on the Bay's West Main; that it had indeed established a viable trade with the Indians and had successfully kept the French away since the attacks of the previous century; and that the factories and forts must be maintained

79.
to preserve this trade.

However, unlike its defence in 1690 and 1698 which had been free of any real challenge, the Company found itself facing an intense public campaign against its rights. Dobbs made one last attempt to sway Parliament in his favour. In his rebuttal of the Company's Case a pamphlet entitled A Short State of the Countries and Trade of North America Claimed by the Hudson's Bay Company was published anonymously by Dobbs. As the London Committee might have feared he maintained that the Company was operating "an illegal Monopoly, being without Act of Parliament".^{80.} He also reiterated his previous claims that the Company was not developing the full potential of the trade of the Bay and thus leaving the way open for French domination of the area.^{81.} This charge of "Nonuser or Abuser" was critical to many of the attacks against the Company for the Bubble Act of 1720 made this a major condition if a monopoly was to be revoked.

Another pamphlet entitled Reasons to shew, that there is a great Probability of a Navigable Passage to the Western Ocean through Hudson's Streights and Chesterfield Inlet appeared the same year and was probably written by Dobbs as well. His last pamphlet, A Short Narrative and Justification of the Proceedings of the [North West] Committee appointed by the Adventurers to prosecute the Discovery of the Passage to the Western Ocean of America, summarized Dobbs' final attempts to create support from the merchant community to charter a separate company for trade in the Bay.

The ensuing testimony from both sides clearly revealed that the majority of witnesses were hostile to the Company and its pursuit of chartered rights in the Bay.^{82.} However, the Company's own

petition, The Case of the Hudson's Bay Company, along with the other documents such as the Charter, a list of vessels sent out for exploration, instructions given the Captains, Kelsey's journal of his trip inland in 1690-91, all skilfully diluted the damning evidence of former Company servants.

The presentation of such documents was the first occasion in which the Company voluntarily broke its code of secrecy. This a code of secrecy can be severely questioned considering the repercussions exhibited in the 1740s. For Dobbs such a policy was often the basis of much of his frustration with the unco-operative London Committee. In his publications he often complained that the Company effectively prevented all other British subjects from conducting trade in the Bay by prohibiting "...their Captains and servants from publishing any Journals or Charts of their Voyages, or Discoveries (if any were ever made by them) or any Charts of those Seas..."^{83.} But the Company was adamant and even under the critical eye of a Parliamentary Inquiry it still managed to keep much of the public ignorant of its operations. Thus no one challenged the Company's statement that voyages between 1719 and 1737 had all been undertaken for the purpose of exploration nor could anyone challenge the contention that Kelsey was sent out in 1690-91 to explore inland when in reality his sole purpose had been to encourage the Indians of the interior to come to the Bay side posts to trade.^{85.}

Given the fact that the Parliamentary Committee could not have known these discrepancies their final decision is understandable. The Hudson's Bay Company would never again be subjected to such an inquisition from Parliament. But at the time the Hudson's Bay Company could not have been sure of this

and given the growing powers of Parliament over trade and chartered companies during the next several decades, the Directors moved towards a more co-operative and responsible policy in the areas of trade and exploration.

CHAPTER IIFOOTNOTES

1. The South Sea Bubble which burst in 1720 had arisen as a result of feverish speculation by people eager to make a quick fortune. The Company was chartered in 1711 to engage in the trade of the South Seas (mainly South America). As a result of shady manipulation of stocks and the collapse of the trade many people including royalty, lost incredibly large sums of money and much of the country and Europe was thrown into modern history's first great depression. The Bubble Act which was passed as a result of it seriously restricted the growth of joint stock companies throughout the eighteenth century. John Carswell, The South Sea Bubble. (London: The Cresset Press, 1960) p. 57
2. James Knight entered the Company's service in 1676 as a shipwright. He rose steadily becoming Governor of Albany in 1698 and HBC Committee member in 1700.
3. Such terms were not unusual for Company servants in the early years of the Company's operations in the Bay. As Rich states, "The Company's servants were encouraged...to hunt for small skins and promised that if they declared their furs...they should be allowed half of the sale price when the Company had disposed of them at its sales". See E.E. Rich, Hudson's Bay Company 1670-1870. Volume I: 1670-1763. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1960) pp. 427, 486
4. Provincial Archives of Manitoba/Hudson's Bay Company Archives [hereafter PAM/HBCA] B239/a/2, fo 18
The Coppermine River would eventually be explored by Hearne in 1771.
5. PAM/HBCA A1/33, fo 97d
6. Knight had originally envisioned an overland expedition, but the severe winter of 1716-17 resulting in the deaths of many Northern Indians at the post including the Slave Woman who had promised to bring in the valuable metal from the west (Knight believed it was gold) destroyed Knight's hopes of success. See Glyndwr Williams, The British Search for the Northwest Passage. (London: The Royal Commonwealth Society, 1962) p. 17
7. During the treaty negotiations the Committee learned that Great Britain imported £26,000 per annum of whalebone from Holland, Germany and France. True to the mercantilist spirit of the time the Committee turned to developing a British trade in these commodities. Thus the whale fishery was made a priority using the abundant resources of unemployed seamen at the end of the war. Rich, Hudson's Bay Company, Volume I, pp. 235, 440

7. (cont'd) E. E. Rich, ed., Letters Outward 1688-1696. Hudson's Bay Record Society, Volume XX. (London: Hudson's Bay Record Society, 1957) pp.9, 10
8. James F. Kenney, ed., The Founding of Churchill -- Being the Journal of Captain James Knight...14 July to Sept 13, 1717. (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1932) pp. 18-20
It was established by Captain Young.
9. Rich, Hudson's Bay Company, Volume I, p. 293
Rich, Letters Outward 1688-1696, p. 119
10. Rich, Hudson's Bay Company, Volume I, p. 440
11. This was in contrast to Kelsey's favourable report on the area after his expedition in 1689. Rich, Hudson's Bay Company, Volume I, p. 441
12. Kenney, pp. 119-120
13. Rich, Hudson's Bay Company, Volume I, p. 443
14. Williams discusses this plan to treble the Company's stock concluding that it had nothing to do with Knight's expedition but rather with the boom in South Sea Company shares. The Company, fortunately aborted this plan in December of 1720 after the bursting of the South Sea Bubble. Williams, p. 17
15. See Williams, Chapter I, pp.1-30
16. Rich, Hudson's Bay Company, Volume I, p. 447
17. The desire to diversify the Company's trade had stemmed from the lean years when although quantities of beaver were received in London, the market was glutted and the Company could make little profit. Ibid., p. 293
18. PAM/HBCA A6/4, fos 43d, 59
19. PAM/HBCA B239/b/1, fos 12, 28
Alan Cooke and Clive Holland, The Exploration of Northern Canada, 500 to 1920. A Chronology. (Toronto: The Arctic History Press, 1978) p. 53
20. Williams, p. 21
21. PAM/HBCA A6/4, fo 49d
22. Williams, p. 23
23. Ibid., p. 25
24. Ibid., p. 32

25. Desmond Clarke, Arthur Dobbs Esquire 1689-1765. Surveyor-General of Ireland, Prospector and Governor of North Carolina. (London: Bordley Head, 1958) pp. 31-35
26. PAM/HBCA E18/1, fos 71-105
27. Williams, p. 32
28. Ibid., p. 36
29. Colonel Bladen allowed Dobbs to inspect a copy of the Charter in the Plantation Office. Ibid., p. 39
30. PAM/HBCA A1/33, fo 77d; A6/6, fos 83, 110
Glyndwr Williams, "The Hudson's Bay Company and Its Critics in the Eighteenth Century," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society. 5th Series. Volume XX (London: 1970): 151-152
31. Williams, The British Search for the Northwest Passage, p. 40
32. Ibid.
33. PAM/HBCA A6/5, fo 109
34. Ibid., fos 109-109d
35. PAM/HBCA B42/a/17, fo 44
36. PAM/HBCA A6/5, fo 110
37. PAM/HBCA A11/13, fo 40d
38. Ibid.
39. PAM/HBCA A6/5, fo 109
40. Arthur Dobbs, Remarks Upon Capt. Middleton's Defence. (London: 1744) pp. 90-91
41. PAM/HBCA B42/a/19 & 20
42. PAM/HBCA A11/13, fos 56, 56d
43. In 1739 Spain and England were at war as a result of petty conflicts ("War of Jenkins' Ear"). This conflict led to the War of Austrian Succession on the continent (1740-1748).
Middleton entered the Company's service about 1721 and resigned in 1741. For biography see E.E. Rich, ed., Isham's Observations and Notes, 1743-1749. Hudson's Bay Record Society, Vol. XII (London: Hudson's Bay Record Society, 1949) pp. 325-334
44. PAM/HBCA A1/35, p. 169
45. Rich, Isham's Observations, p. 330
46. Christopher Middleton, A Reply to the Remarks of Arthur Dobbs, Esq. (London: 1744) Appendix, pp. 4-7

47. See such works as:
 A.S. Morton, A History of the Canadian West to 1870-71. ed
 Lewis G. Thomas, 2nd Edition. (Toronto: University of Toronto
 Press, 1973)
- Rich, Isham's Observations
48. PAM/HBCA B42/a/23, fo 10d; Williams, The British Search for the
 Northwest Passage, p. 61
49. PAM/HBCA B42/a/23, fos 10-10d
50. PAM/HBCA A11/13, fos 75d-76
51. PAM/HBCA B42/a/23, fo 39d
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid., fo 41
54. Williams, The British Search for the Northwest Passage, pp.67-68
55. Ibid., p. 69
56. Middleton denied this allegation in his Vindication stating
 "I deny, my Lords, that any of the Directors, either by themselves
 or others offer'd me five thousand pounds, or even one Shilling
 to return to their service, and not go the Voyage; or to search
 for the passage in Davis's Straits, or in any other Place but where
 I was directed..." Christopher Middleton, A Vindication of the
 conduct of Captain Christopher Middleton (London: 1743) p. 46
57. See Arthur Dobbs, Remarks Upon Capt. Middleton's Defence.
 (London: 1744) p. 60
58. Williams, The British Search for the Northwest Passage.
 p. 83
59. Great Britain, Parliament. Journal of House of Commons, XXIV
 p. 805; Williams, The British Search for the Northwest Passage.
 p. 84
60. Great Britain, Laws, Statutes, etc. Statutes at Large.
 Volume XVIII (1744) p. 329
61. Henry Ellis, A Voyage to Hudson's Bay by the Dobbs Galley
 and California in the years 1746-47. (London: 1748) pp. 106-
 119
62. PAM/HBCA A1/36, p. 284
63. PAM/HBCA B135/c/1, fo 9
64. Williams, The British Search for the Northwest Passage,
 pp. 88-89

65. Rich, Isham's Observations, pp. 334-336
66. Ibid., pp. 336-337
67. Ibid., pp. 244-245
68. Moor and Smith decided to go on to the Wager because of Dobbs' insistence that it was probably the passage. Williams, The British Search for the Northwest Passage. p. 105
69. See Henry Ellis, A Voyage to Hudson's Bay.
70. [T.S. Drage], An Account of a voyage for the discovery of a North-West Passage by Hudson's Streights...1746 and 1747. By the Clerk of the California. Volume II. (London: 1749) p. 303
71. Williams, The British Search for the Northwest Passage. p. 107
72. Ibid., p. 108
73. Great Britain, Laws, Statutes, etc. An Act for better securing certain powers and privileges intended to be granted by His Majesty, Statutes at Large, Volume V. (6 Geo I, C. XVIII) p. 302
74. Rich, Isham's Observations, p. xciii
75. The Bubble Act forbade the creation of any joint stock company without statutory or royal approval. Ibid., p. xciv
76. Rich surmises that it may have been Walpole. Rich, Isham's Observations, p. xcvi
 [Arthur Dobbs], A Short Narrative and justification of the proceedings of the Committee appointed by the Adventurers to prosecute the discovery of the passage to the Western Ocean of America. (London: 1749) p. 12
77. Rich, Isham's Observations, p. xcvi
78. Ibid., p. xcvi
79. [Hudson's Bay Company], The Case of the Hudson's Bay Company (London: 1749)
80. [Arthur Dobbs], A Short State of the Countries and Trade of North America. Claimed by the Hudson's Bay Company. (London: 1749) p. 4
81. Great Britain, Laws, Statutes, etc., Statutes at Large. Volume V. (6 Geo I, C. XVIII)

82. Witnesses testifying against the Hudson's Bay Company were: Arthur Dobbs; Joseph Robson, mason and surveyor at Churchill and York; Richard White who had served at Albany; John Hayter, house carpenter at Albany; Matthew Gwynne, surgeon, who had been with Middleton on his discovery in 1741; Captain William Moor master of Dobbs Galley. The only witness favourable to the Company was Henry Spurling, merchant dealing in furs and stockholder in the Company. See A.S. Morton, History of the Canadian West to 1870-1871, pp 219-220; Report from the Committee appointed to Inquire into the State and Conditions of the Countries Adjoining to Hudson's Bay and of the Trade carried on there. (London: 1749) pp. 217-226
83. [Dobbs], A Short State, p. 5
84. Actually only Knight's voyage in 1719 and Napper's in 1737 could truly be described as voyages of exploration; Kelsey, Hancock and Scroggs embarked for the main purpose of trade. Report, p. 249; PAM/HBCA A6/4, fo 49d
85. Report, pp. 276-281; Morton, p. 111

CHAPTER III

SLOOP VOYAGES NORTHWARD 1750 - 1760

The renewal of sloop voyages northward from Churchill in 1750 marks a turning point in the Company's trading history. Not only was it the beginning of a long term commitment to a difficult branch of trade but it also marked the commencement of a cautious expansion of trade to other parts of its chartered territory. Factors in addition to the Parliamentary Inquiry into the Company's operations, however, determined the implementation of such a policy. Historical precedents along with lingering reminders of Dobbs' attacks played major roles in the development of this expansionist trade policy.

Within a few months of the parliamentary decision the Hudson's Bay Company was approached once again by the Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations. On 27 July 1750 the Secretary read into the minutes a letter from the Secretary of the Committee of Trade and Plantations:

...that as it was for the Benefit of the Plantations that Limits or Boundaries of the British Colonies on the Continent of America should be distinctly known more particularly as they Border on the Settlements made by the French or any Foreign Nation in America, their Lordships desired as Exact an Account as possible of the Limits and Boundaries of the Territory Granted to this Company together with a Chart or Map thereof and all the best Accounts and Vouchers they can obtain to Support the same, and particularly if any or what Settlement have been made by the English on the Frontiers towards the Lakes and if any or what Encroachments have been made and at what Period, and to be exact in Stating every particular in the History of whatever Encroachments have been made, which may serve to place the proceedings in a true Light and Confute any Right

which may at any time be founded upon them.^{1.}

On October 3, 1750 the Company's solicitor forwarded the reply along with "Draft of the Bay prepared for that purpose having a line Struct to describe the Limits between Great Britain and France

2.
to their Lordships Secretary."

Two years later, almost to the day, the Committee was notified by the Lords Commissioners "That the Lords of Trade had under their Consideration a Petition of several Merchants of the City of London, Praying for a Grant of all that part of America Lying and being upon the Atlantick Ocean on the East part, Extending South and North from 52 Degrees of Northern Latitude from the Equinoctial Line to 60 Degrees of the same Northern Latitude, called Labrador...not at this time actually possessed by any of His Majesty's Subjects or the Subjects of any Christian Prince or

3.
State...".

The Deputy Governor, Sir William Baker, and Governor, Sir Atwell Lake met with the Board of Trade and were permitted to "...have an opportunity of Proving if they have any, or what Right to such Tract of Land, and to shew whether and how farr their Trade may be affected, should the Prayer of the said Petition be

4.
Granted..." The Company again prepared its case:

The Lands to the Northward of a Line drawn from 59 1/2 degrees of North Latitude in Atlantick Ocean, South Westward to the Lake Miscosink otherwise Mistoseny and through the same Lake down to the 49th Degree of North Latitude (as described in a Mapp delivered to the Lords of Trade) and thence continued by a Meridian Line of the said Latitude of 49 Degrees Westward.

These Boundaries together with a Demand of £108514.19.8 Sterling were claimed by the Company in the year 1709 and afterwards by

Commissaries appointed by Virtue of the Treaty of Utrecht. ^{5.}

The controversy over Labrador continued off and on for the next ten years with the Company persisting in its claim to the area by virtue of its charter and the establishment of trade in the area. ^{6.} The whole affair was finally resolved in 1763 with the signing of the Peace of Paris and the Company's claim to the area was upheld.

During this period publications concerned with British trade and commerce did not fail to comment on the Hudson's Bay Company's role. In 1750 Josiah Tucker, in his Brief Essay on the Advantages and Disadvantages which respectively attend France and Great Britain with regard to Trade criticized this Company along with the East India and Levant Companies with controlling three quarters of the world's trade for the benefit of a few "rapacious Directors". ^{7.} Malachy Postlethwayt's Universal Dictionary of Trade and Commerce (1751) also condemned the Company along the lines of Dobbs' attacks and discounted the Company's defence to the Commons in 1749.

Perhaps the most damning of documents to appear was another publication by a former Company servant. Joseph Robson's Account of Six Years Residence in Hudson's Bay from 1733 to 1736 and 1744 to 1747 (London: 1752) presented a first hand account of life on the Bay. In it Robson criticized the quality of life under control of powerful Company factors, the mismanagement and inefficiency of the construction of Prince of Wales's Fort (a task Robson had been closely involved in in his capacity as stone mason) and the Company's lack of aggressive-^{8.}ness in expanding its trade inland.

In addition to these haunting reminders of the Dobbs affair and the Parliamentary Inquiry, other factors established over many years determined the continuation of trade along the north west coast of Hudson Bay. The composition of the London Committee during the first half of the eighteenth century must be seen as a perpetual influence. Two families, the Lakes and the Merrys, dominated the leadership of the Hudson's Bay Company from the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht. Sir Bibye Lake (Governor from 1712 to 1743) guided the Company through its reconstruction in the post-war decades and authorized the establishment of Churchill and Knight's disastrous expedition. His son, Sir Atwell, served first as Deputy Governor (1746-50) and then as Governor (1750-1760). Another son, Bibye Lake, became Deputy Governor in 1765 and Governor in 1770.⁹ Sir James Winter Lake, son of Sir Atwell served as Deputy Governor from 1782-1799 and Governor from 1799 to 1807.¹⁰

The Merry family's first association with the Hudson's Bay Company predates that of the Lakes by 6 years. Captain John Merry was elected to the Committee in 1706 and held the position of Deputy Governor under Sir Bibye Lake until 1728. His sons, John Jr., and Robert, both sat on the Committee by 1750. John later became Deputy Governor under Governor Sir William Baker.¹¹

Considering the continuing interest of these two families it seems inevitable that interest in the trade of the north west coast would be renewed. The developments of the 1740s however motivated the Committee to act sooner than it might have. The increasing encroachment of French traders in the interior demanded a plan of expansion, and the controversy generated by Arthur Dobbs

concerning the Company's chartered rights further complicated the situation. Thus by the mid-1740s implementation of a multi-directional expansion policy was evident. In 1744 Thomas Mitchell and John Longland were ordered by the Committee to sail northward along the east coast of Hudson Bay as far as Richmond Gulf. They were to determine the location of a site for a post from which trade could be pursued with the Indians of the Quebec-Labrador Peninsula. 12. Unfortunately the information gathered from this voyage was so vague and the charts of the coast so poor that no further attempt to develop the area was undertaken until 1749. The success of the voyage of that year laid the foundation for the establishment of a post at Richmond Gulf in 1750. 13.

Prior to 1750 the only significant attempt to establish operations inland was at Henley House in 1743. Although this outpost of Albany remained in operation until 1759 it was of limited success. 14. Inland expeditions were not attempted with any regularity until the 1750s. In 1754 Anthony Henday was ordered inland from York after James Isham had received word that the French had established an outpost on the Severn River. The success of Henday's journey prompted the London Committee to encourage more expeditions. Thus Joseph Waggoner and Joseph Smith travelled inland in 1756-57 and 1757-58. 15. Others were sent as well, but like all others sent inland during this time their mission was not to trade but to rally the Indians for their voyage to the Bay posts. 16.

By the late 1740s directives had also been issued to resume voyages northward along the west coast of Hudson Bay. In 1747 the Churchill sloop was ordered to travel north early in the year to trade along the west coast at Sir Bibye's Island, Seal River

Knapps Bay, Pistol Bay, and Whale Cove (See Map, p. 25) and as far north as the sloop could go with safety. The master was encouraged to make discoveries and do all in his power to advance the trade. As an added incentive the Committee allowed the same allowance and benefit as settled in 1739: 5% of the profit to the Commander and 5% profit to be divided among the seamen.^{17.}

Much to the chagrin of the Committee their orders were not fulfilled for another 2 years. In 1748 Joseph Isbister, Chief at Prince of Wales's Fort reported that the sloop could not be sent north because of damage.^{18.} The following year the sloop arrived too late from Moose to allow time for her to be equipped and sent northward to trade. Isbister however, did manage to send the Churchill northward in August of that year to notify the natives of future trade voyages. The reports from this excursion were not encouraging and Isbister reported in his journal that the crew "having only Seen of ye Store houses (out of which ye Sloopers had taken some trifls, I judge that they are gone into ye Country to Kill Deer & other beastes)"^{20.}

Undaunted the Committee continued to reiterate their orders for voyages northward and added incentive to bolster the enthusiasm of their apparently recalcitrant chief. In 1749 a payment of 2 1/2% of the profit of all the northern trade (over and above the 10% allowed to the Master and crew) was to be made to Isbister as chief at the fort. This they underlined was more than they had ever allowed before.^{21.}

Finally in 1750 the sloop voyages were resumed on a regular basis. James Walker, sloop master of the Churchill commanded the first five voyages. Since these trading voyages were the first

ones undertaken by the Company in some time, Walker was given specific instructions with regard to distance to be travelled and information to be compiled regarding the coastline.

...and to stop at Cape Esquemaux and lye there 3 or 4 days alarming & bringing down the Natives to trade...after which he is to sail along the Coast to Whale Cove where he is to stay 6 days and search all the Cove and make a draft thereof and be exact in describing the Land on each Side and whether there is any Wood round the Cove of, what sorts and at what Distance and if any fresh Water and whether it be an Island and how far Distant from the Western Continent and whether it be a safe and convenient Harbour for a ship and if any Settlement or Factory can be made there, From thence he is to proceed... for we believe a little to the N^o ward of Whale Cove he may meet with some Indians with whom he may Trade Whalebone and oil.

Without the compilation of such information the London Committee would find it difficult to formulate a successful trading policy. Walker however, took little heed of the Committee's instructions and although he was ordered to sail "far beyond Cape Fullertine" he never ventured farther north than Whale Cove. At Whale Cove he did note that natives of the area had told him of a "great river of water Runing Inland", but he made no attempt to investigate the report.

The voyage of 1751 was much the same. Little information was compiled by Walker on the coastline and he rarely ventured close enough to shore to accurately chart the area. Although Walker was accompanied by "two North Ward Indians [Chipewyan] Who go With You to Endeavour to Contract a frend [sic] and help Between their Country Men and the Escomay and also to promote the Furr trade...". he found there was little opportunity to encourage trade relations. Few Inuit were sighted and those he did encounter

25.
 were "being Almost Starv'd" and "for as I observ'd they never came
 on board But Where beging Either Some Salt dears flesh Or the guts
 of the Salmon Wee Catch'd And some of them Would pull up their Jackets
 26.
 to Show us they Very poor..."

By 1752 the Committee was determined to ascertain the
 feasability of establishing a post at Whale Cove and insisted that
 Walker provide them with minute detail of the land and waters of
 the cove. In addition Isbister ordered him " to search in And About
 Latt'd 64^o where wee have an Information from the Natives that there
 is A Large Inlett Leading a great way in to the country Which
 if found out may prove of great Advantage to the Company..." 27.

However, as in his previous voyages Walker avoided all attempts at
 exploration and never travelled any farther north than Whale Cove.

Part of Walker's lack of enthusiasm for these voyages
 may have been the result of his encounters with Inuit of the
 area in 1752 and 1753. On the former voyage Walker found the Inuit
 at both Cape Eskimo and Whale Cove to be "very Rude". 28. The
 following year the situation had worsened. At Knight's Island,
 Walker went on shore to the Inuit camp to trade "But the Natives
 Beheaving So Very Rude to us And offering to Stab one of our
 men we Return'd to the sloop Without trading anything of them". 29.
 At Whale Cove the Inuit were also hostile. At one point while the
 natives were coming and going off the sloop an Inuk cut Walker
 in the leg when the sloop master caught him stealing. In
 retaliation for being thrown off the sloop the Inuk threatened
 Walker with a lance. Walker averted any further blood shed by
 drawing his pistol. 30.

The following day the Inuit men returned with their women

and put them in the small boat at the stern of the sloop. Walker ordered his men to ignore the women and after an hour the Inuit were forced to rescue their women from the rough waters. On the third day the Inuit again tried to board the sloop but Walker refused them admittance.

...at the same time wee sunk the boat to prevent their getting in her as has been their Common practice Which so Inrag'd them that they went all of them on the Rocks and got Each of them 3 or 4 Lances and Sharpened them before our faces When done they holding them up in a daring Manner Came off to us again in a Greater Number then before upon seeing of Which I Unmoor'd the sloop to get out of their Way Otherwise Wee Must Either destroy'd Some of them or suffer'd them to have destroy'd some of us, When wee got Under sail Wee Were surround'd by 22 Canoes and the Number of them standing on the Rocks wer at Least 150...³¹.

Walker's final voyage was pleasantly uneventful.

Although the Committee again ordered him to search the area between 61° and 64°N latitude he failed to do so, contenting himself with trading with the very few Inuit he encountered and painting the sloop. He only sailed as far as 61°38'N.³²

John Bean succeeded Walker as master of the new sloop Churchill in 1754.³³ Although his sailing orders for 1755 have not survived, his journal clearly indicates that the Committee continued to request detailed information about the coastline of the West Main. He set sail on his first voyage on July 15. Five days out of port Bean described the harbour at Cape Eskimo:

...each Quarter in going in to the Harbour there is on your Larbot Side a Long Dry high Ridge and make Like Isles at high watter and is Iles at that time Because there joigned with a chain of Rocks and Stones and appear Dry from half flood to half flood....³⁴.

Bean was a more aggressive and enthusiastic master than his predecessor.

This journal, as are all others by him, is characterized by minute detail regarding harbours, coastline and hazards of navigation. In his first journal he makes suggestions for improved methods of exploration. He emphasizes the need for more men and smaller crafts to venture into the rocky waters of the coast where the larger sloop could not venture. This may have been in part a reason why Walker failed to bring back any details of the area.

Bean, too, ventured much farther north than Walker, reaching Marble Island on his maiden voyage. On August 8, 1755 he discovered a good harbour at $63^{\circ}43'N$ which was 5 fathoms deep and 3 miles wide. He called it Bean's Harbour. The Committee obviously continued their instructions to search for the inlet reported by Walker during his voyage of 1751. But Bean who felt he had thoroughly searched the area of 64° latitude pronounced that

...hooever first made the Report that there was a Large River 4 Leagues Wide and Latt'd 64 and Long 32 miles Est from Marble Isle has been either too Implicit or else he's Dreamed it for in that Latt'd and severall miles on both Sides of it there is not such thing what ever may be ...it could not have Escaped us... 35.

Bean set out again in 1756 for trade and exploration. As before he proceeded as far north as possible, exploring and describing minutely the details of harbours and the rocky coastline along the way. Trade proved to be slow this year. At Knapps Bay Bean heard the first news of the massacre of a group of Inuit by the Chipewyan during the previous summer. At Cape Eskimo the situation was much the same. Not until he reached Nevils Bay and Knight's Island did he encounter any Inuit, described by him as those "thet Escapted the massacre at Naps Bay".
36.
Bean discretely asked questions about the massacre,

while feigning any previous knowledge for fear the Inuit might
 think the Europeans had had something to do with it.^{37.}

By the beginning of August Bean had reached Marble Island
 and continued his search easterly for the "fly away River".^{38.} He
 described for the Committee what he believed to be an exhaustive
 search of the area at $64^{\circ}12'$:

...the Coast hear on the Shore was very
 Even and Low without openings or Inlets But
 atended with the Same Dangers as all
 other parts of the Bay is viz Suden Shoalls and
 Ridges By the Observation hear I found the Coast
 to Ly mostly east and west But the Compasses
 I found hear very much afected which I had
 vizable prosses of Both at Sun Riseing and
 Setting at Noon a very Strong Curant Sets
 to the S.W. hear --^{39.}

Failing to find any river, Bean concluded that "...for if there
 was such a River it Resembells old Brazill viz not to be seen
 But by some Chimerical persons --".^{40.} On August 6 he left for
 Bean's Harbour where he engaged in more exploration, employing
 for the first time a small boat to do the surveying.^{41.}

Convinced that no river existed in latitude 64° Bean
 conducted a very routine voyage of trade in 1757. At Marble Island
 he went ashore to explore it but did not refer to any remains of
 Knight's expedition, which would eventually be discovered some
 eight years later.

Two years of voyages were conducted by James
 Wood, a man made of the same lack of initiative as James Walker.
 His voyages in 1758 and 1760 provided no new information on the coast
 for the Committee. On his first voyage he managed to damage the
 rudder of the sloop in a gale, resulting in a six day delay at
 Knapps Bay thereby preventing the sloop from travelling any farther

42.
north than $61^{\circ}58'N$. As a result of this damage no voyage occurred in 1759. The voyage of 1760 was uneventful, with Wood travelling only as far as Whale Cove to trade and returning to Churchill just over a month later.

The returns of this northern trade were minimal compared with the returns of Prince of Wales's Fort. (See Table I and Chart I) The best year by far was 1755 when John Bean commanded the sloop Churchill as far north as Marble Island. Out for only one month Bean managed to explore more territory and bring home a greater quantity of whalebone than any of his colleagues. Four hundred and twenty pounds of whalebone and twenty-one hogsheads of oil were finally sold by the Company for £97.0.10.

44.
The worst year was 1757 and strangely another year when John Bean commanded the expedition. Only 18 lb. of whalebone and 6 wolves and 5 foxes were sold by the Company as a result of this voyage. Bean was out for 42 days travelling northward again as far as Marble Island but this lengthy time made little difference in the returns. Delays were encountered when the optimism of an early spring was dispelled by the heavy ice of the northern latitudes. The reason for the small return of this voyage can perhaps be explained by reluctance of the Inuit to venture to a place where just two years before their people had been massacred. Throughout the many weeks at sea Bean managed only to trade 2 bayonets, 2 hatchets, 1 narrow chisel, 10 large long knives, 1 jack knife and 2 alchemy spoons.

45.
The expeditions of Walker and Wood were remarkable for their consistently low returns. For Walker 1752 and 1753 were his best years, returning 74 lb of whalebone in the first year and 200

lb. of whalebone in the second. (See Table I) Wood had the second lowest trade returns for the decade in 1758 when damage to the sloop's rudder provided a convenient excuse to return early to the fort for repairs.

In order to fully understand the significance of these low returns one must take into consideration the expenditures necessary to maintain this trade. By far the greatest expenditure for these voyages was the wages paid to the crew members. In Table II one can see that sloop masters received £35 to £40 per annum and sailors averaged £15 per annum or £1.3.0 each month. From the first voyage onward the Company recognized the need for experienced seamen to man the vessel and thus by 1753 all crew members but one were experienced seamen.⁴⁷ Thus by examining wages alone we can see that this expenditure far exceeds the account of sales for each of the ten voyages.

In spite of this overwhelming evidence of the apparent unprofitability of this trade the Committee still calculated and paid a percentage of "profit" to the crew and chief at Prince of Wales's Fort. It is evident from an examination of the Grand Ledger and Grand Journal that the Committee did not consider the expenditure of wages for these men as part of the overall expenses of these trading voyages. Table III illustrates that only three types of expenditures were considered: value of the goods traded, waterside and landing expenses (at London) and the duty paid on the imported produce. The whole procedure can be clearly illustrated by examining the accounts of the 1755 voyage. In that year the Company's accountant recorded the expenditures to be £19.0.10.⁴⁸ The account of sales for this voyage (as seen in Table I) was £97.0.10. Thus

the total profit for this voyage was £78.0.0. In turn a proportion (12 1/2%) of this profit was paid to the Company servants involved and the rest, £68.5.5 (or 87 1/2%) remained the Company's profit.

The Company's manipulation of the accounts distorts the true character of this northern trade. Crew members were paid an annual rather than a seasonal wage and as such were considered part of the fur trade world rather than the shipping world. Unfortunately, for the Company and its officers in the Bay, sloop masters and sailors found it difficult to accept this interpretation of their status. As early as the 1680s the Hudson's Bay Company had had to deal with the independent and often disloyal natures of its sailors. Throughout the eighteenth century the reputation of these servants as instigators of rebellion and participants in illicit trade is well documented. Joseph Isbister, Chief at Prince of Wales's Fort, described a typical incident involving the Mate of the Hudson Bay:

..[he] maks [sic] it his business to terrify ye men wth Such frightful Storys of ye Country & Masters that the people are quite mad to return with ye Ships & has been the Cause of our often being oblidge to give the Sailors Such extravagant wages to Stay in this Country...^{49.}

50.

James Walker and John Bean were no exceptions. During the weeks of sea travel sailors and sloop masters were much too busy to entertain or act upon disloyal thoughts. However, once in port they were unable to tolerate the seemingly endless months of idleness and confinement at the factory. Only sporadically were they employed in hunting or hauling timber, tasks not requiring their specialized training. It is not surprising then that rebellious incidents arose during these months.

Two areas of persistent turmoil between the Company's

chief at Prince of Wales's Fort and its sloop masters concerned the sloop itself and private trade. Both Walker and Bean became embroiled in a contest of wills over the safety of the sloop Churchill. On September 26, 1750 Walker and his crew presented Isbister with a formal petition protesting "...that whereas the above mentioned Sloop has by the Company's particular order been kept at anchor in the Said river though many daingers at this time we do Solomly likewise protest and declare that Neither the Said Sloop nor our Selves are any longer in Safty on board her...the Said Sloop being in the Utmost dainger of being Cut away from her morings or Sinking, from the great quantity of Ice floating in the Said river and that it is absolutely Necessary ...that She be immediately laid up..."^{51.}

Although still laden with supplies from the ship Isbister allowed the men to haul the Churchill into the safety of Sloops Cove.^{52.}

John Bean's chief confrontation with his superior Ferdinand Jacobs in the fall of 1755 originated from a similar protective attitude. About to spend his first winter in the Bay, Bean seemed to find it difficult to leave the familiar surroundings of the sloop for the more confined quarters of the factory. Repeatedly, Bean requested permission to stay on the sloop while he made minor repairs and checked for possible damage. When Bean openly requested permission to stay aboard her rather than live at the factory Jacobs likewise insisted that there was no such need for constant attention "provide She was well made fast in the Cove..."^{53.} Bean's continued insistence that she might suffer damage if placed in the Cove so late in the season was overruled by Jacobs. He ordered the Churchill into the Cove and moored with four ropes to prevent her from running aground.^{54.}

Bean refused to let the matter die. Even though Jacobs allowed Bean to visit the vessel every day to inspect her for damage he continued to thwart Jacobs' authority. Contrary to Jacobs' orders Bean and his men moored the sloop at the mouth of the Cove. Within a few days Bean was forced to report that the sloop "has Hurted her Self upon a Stone..."^{55.} and by the next day she was aground and had fallen on one side. Bean's plan (if it indeed was a conscious one) failed to convince Jacobs of the need for a constant watch. The men were ordered to move the sloop to safety and to report to the factory for the winter.^{56.}

James Walker proved to be the most troublesome of the sloop masters for this period.^{57.} Isbister succinctly described him as "a fool lead by ye Nose",^{58.} for his ability to be drawn into pranks by other Company servants. During the winters of 1750-51 and 1751-52 Walker was involved in several incidents usually related to private trade. In November of 1750 Isbister found Walker along with Robert Bass, surgeon, and Timothy Sutton in the Cook Room with two Indian women. Women were forbidden within the confines of the factory and Isbister ordered the men to leave immediately. Bass left promptly but Walker and Sutton "took ye Second bidding before they went out..."^{59.}

Problems with Bass, Walker and Sutton continued throughout the winter of 1750-51. In late November Isbister recorded several incidents when he noticed that Walker and Sutton had left the fort without his permission and "Went over this river to Cape Merry sid..."^{60.} The motivation behind these incidents appears to have been a perverse desire to thwart any authority keeping them within the confines of the post. They resented having to ask permission to leave the post

for any reason. However, Isbister believed their motives were entirely connected to private trade and had his suspicions supported when he found Walker with forty martens.^{61.}

Presented with such damning evidence Walker tempered his behaviour for the rest of the winter. By April Isbister was able to report in his journal that Walker "...he Seing thro ye folly has Volonterly left their party [ie Sutton and Bass] for which ye other two Cal him a turne Coat..." and "Jack of both Sides".^{62.}

With the breaking of spring and much work to be done the disruptive incidents subsided. However once winter returned the boredom of life at the fort bred further incidents of rebellion:

(this Shous what the man [Walker] is: at Ship time there is no Complaints & Nothing but Creeping & Cringing but after She is gone Good behavior is not regarded; yet I must beg leave to offer my Sentiments with regard to this man (that as your Honours did not think proper to recall him, nothstanding ye breach of his Contract Concerning ye 40 Martins; that you will be pleas'd to let him Stay his Contracted time & no longer.^{63.}

The winter of 1751-52 found Walker again being 'led by the Nose' by the Surgeon Bass. The same problems of private trade and fraternization with Indian women reappeared. When called to explain their actions of leaving the fort without Isbister's permission and their contact with a party of Indians with whom Isbister believed they had traded, Walker complained of the strictness at this factory "for here a man Cannot so much as loke [look] at an Indian he is so watched (this he spoke with regard to Indian women) ..." and that he would rather work under Isham at York.^{64.} With Bass sent home in 1752 Walker lost his enthusiasm for disobedience and settled into peaceful co-existence with his superiors for the duration of his stay in the Bay.^{65.}

Thus the first ten years of renewed trade voyages were characterized for the most part by unimaginative exploration, low returns and high expenses. Some of the reasons for the apparent lack of success of these initial years have already been discussed. The failure of Walker and Wood to pursue aggressively the Committee's directives to explore and develop the trade may have been the result of their perception of the Arctic environment. We have seen how the loss of Knight's expedition in the frozen Arctic seriously hampered the progress of the Company's trading policy for many years. Among the Company's servants the stories of Knight's loss coupled with their own first hand knowledge of the severity of northern winters must have struck terror into many men's hearts. Sloop masters who ventured northward lived with the fear of being trapped in Arctic ice for a winter. Walker especially seemed conscious of this possibility and never stayed out longer than four weeks in a possible six-week season. (See Table IV) Bean was the first sloop master to prove that voyages could be conducted for longer periods with safety.

If the Committee was concerned with the lack of initiative of its sloop masters it gave no indication. Neither Walker nor Wood appear to have received any formal reprimands. Indeed, the Committee seemed to accept the fact that the first few years would be experimental and devoted to laying the foundation for an escalation of trade. This was especially true with respect to the Inuit. A successful trading policy with this native group would take time to establish. The Inuit like their Indian counterparts would have to learn to hunt for surplus quantities of whalebone, oil and skins in order to have them available for trade with the Europeans

each summer. Moreover, their reputation for hostility kept Company servants at bay. If regular trade returns were to be realized along the coast the trust of the Inuit would have to be won and peace would have to be maintained. The next ten years would see a concerted effort to eliminate these obstacles to the development of trade along the north west coast of Hudson Bay.

TABLE I

TRADE RETURNS & SALES*

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>WHALEBONE</u>	<u>OIL</u>	<u>SKINS</u>	<u>ACCOUNT OF SALES</u>	<u>PRINCE OF WALES'S FORT ACCOUNT OF SALES</u>
1750	106 lb	3 tons 60 Gal	-	£57.5.0	£ 7614.12.7
1751	76 lb	-	-	22.3.2	7452.13.6
1752	74 lb	4 tons 186 gal	-	65.8.0	5766.7.7
1753	200 lb	17 hghd	-	70.11.10	6648.6.7
1754	62 lb	2 tons	-	30.7.10	5820.8.8
1755	420 lb	21 hghd	-	97.0.10	6919.7.11
1756	[no information traced]			26.5.3	6482.7.4
1757	18 lb	-	6 wolves 5 foxes	12.1.9	5384.15.8
1758	201 lb	[amt not traced]	-	13.13.6	5383.10.7
1759	[no voyage]				8105.15.4
1760	74 lb	1 ton 4 gal	-	33.7.4	6296.0.11

* Compiled from A14/11, fs 69, 97, 121, 143, 170.

TABLE IIWAGES

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>SLOOP MASTER</u>	<u>MATE</u>	<u>SAILORS</u>	<u>LABOURERS</u>	<u>TOTAL WAGES</u>
1750	£ 35	£27	£45	£ 16	£123
1751	35	27	45	16	123
1752	35	27	60	10	132
1753	35	27	75	6	143
1754	40	25	75	6	146
1755	40	25	75	10	150
1756	40	25	80	10	155
1757	40	15	88	10	153
1758	40	25	93	10	168
1759	40	30	58	10	138 [this figure is incomplete since no voyage took place this year and no complete crew list has survived]
1760	40	25	80	18	163

TABLE III

EXPENSES & PROFIT PAID

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>VALUE OF GOODS TRADED</u>	<u>LANDING EXPENSES</u>	<u>DUTY PAID</u>	<u>SERVANTS ' PROFIT</u>	<u>COMPANY'S PROFIT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1750	£ 1.1.11	£ 0.11.1	£2.6.2 ^{67.}	£6.12.11	£46.12.11	£57.5.0 [£58.5.0]
1751	1.0.7	0.7.2	1.5.6	2.8.6	17.1.5	22.3.2
1752	2.16.3	1.14.2	2.17.6	7.4.9	50.15.4	65.8.0
1753	3.2.7	1.17.11	4.18.4	7.11.8	53.1.4	70.11.10
1754	2.6.8	0.16.3	2.13.8 ^{68.}	1.18.6	22.12.9	30.7.10
1755	7.17.6	2.12.4	8.11.0	9.14.7	68.5.5	97.0.10
1756	1.13.1	0.8.8	0.12.6	2.18.7	20.12.5	26.5.3
1757	0.9.10	0.2.5	1.19.6	1.3.7	8.6.5	12.1.9
1758	1.7.0	0.6.5	0.10.1	1.8.9	10.1.3	13.13.6
1759	[no voyage]					
1760	1.10.11	0.11.8	2.3.8	3.12.1	25.9.0	33.7.4

TABLE IV

DURATION OF VOYAGES 1750-1760

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>DEPARTURE</u>	<u>RETURN</u>	<u>NO. OF DAYS</u>
1750	July 4	July 28	24
1751	July 2	Aug. 5	35
1752	June 22	July 22	31
1753	July 2	July 26	24
1754	July 16	Aug 9	25
1755	July 15	Aug. 14	31
1756	July 13	Aug. 23	42
1757	July 5	Aug. 15	42
1758	July 27	Aug. 21	24
1759	[no voyage]		
1760	July 16	Aug. 19	35

Average period of time:

James Walker:	27.8 days
John Bean:	38.3 days
James Wood:	29.5 days



CHART I

ACCOUNT OF SALES OF SLOOP VOYAGE
RETURNS

CHAPTER IIIFOOTNOTES

1. This request for information was not a specific attack on the Hudson's Bay Company but rather part of a larger inquiry established in 1749 by the British Government to determine the extent of British Claims on the North American continent. PAM/HBCA A1/38, pp 230-231; E.E. Rich, Hudson's Bay Company. Volume I: 1670-1763. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1960) p. 654
2. The "draft of the Bay..." is classified PAM/HBCA G2/6 Rich, Hudson's Bay Company, Volume I, pp. 244-245
3. Williams suggests that Dobbs once again had a hand in this new challenge. In his surviving papers, Dobbs even describes several ways of usurping control of the Bay, including its use as a penal colony. Glyndwr Williams, "The Hudson's Bay Company and Its Critics in the Eighteenth Century". Transactions of the Royal Historical Society. 5th Series, Volume XX (London: 1970):163 ; PAM/HBCA A1/39, p. 116
4. PAM/HBCA A1/39, p. 117
5. PAM/HBCA A1/40, p. 34
6. Fort Richmond was established in 1750.
7. Williams, "The Hudson's Bay Company and Its Critics", p. 165
8. According to Williams, Dobbs had a great hand in the production of this book. In fact Williams has traced a rough draft of Appendix I written in Dobbs' hand, containing a brief history of the Hudson's Bay Company and "Remarks upon the Papers and Evidence produced by that Company before the Committee of the Honourable House of Commons, in the Year 1749". He has also found ample proof that Dobbs revised those sections written by Robson. Joseph Robson served as a stone mason at Prince of Wales's Fort from 1733-1736 and 1745-48. Glyndwr Williams, "Arthur Dobbs and Joseph Robson: New Light on the Relationship between Two Early Critics of the Hudson's Bay Company". Canadian Historical Review. Vol XL, No. 2, (June, 1959): 134
9. Bibye Lake was Governor from 1770-1782.
10. Douglas McKay, The Honourable Company. (Toronto: The Musson Book Company, 1938) pp. 336-337
11. Sir William Baker served as Governor from 1760-65. Ibid., pp. 336-337

12. However a trade voyage did take place along the coast in 1748. Rich, Hudson's Bay Company, Volume I, p. 618 ; Alan Cooke & Clive Holland, The Exploration of Northern Canada. 500 to 1920. A Chronology. (Toronto: Arctic History Press, 1978) p. 64
13. Rich, Hudson's Bay Company, Volume I, pp. 617-619
14. A.S. Morton, A History of the Canadian West to 1870-71. 2nd Edition. ed. Lewis G. Thomas. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973) p. 253
15. In 1754 Anthony Henday set out on an overland expedition from York Factory to make peace with the Blackfeet Indians and encourage them to return with him to York to trade. Joseph Waggoner and Joseph Smith were involved in two expeditions inland from 1756 to 1758. They developed a route for the Indians to travel from Cross Lake, on the Nelson River to Lakes Winnipeg and Winnipegosis and Cedar Lake, thereby successfully avoiding contact with French traders active in the area. Cooke & Holland, pp. 72-74
16. Ibid., p. 63
17. PAM/HBCA A6/7, fos 141d-142
18. PAM/HBCA A11/13, fo 106d
19. PAM/HBCA B42/a/34, fo 1d
20. Ibid., fo 5
21. PAM/HBCA A6/7, fo 156d
22. PAM/HBCA A6/8, fo 18d
23. PAM/HBCA B42/a/35
24. PAM/HBCA B42/a/37, fo 2
25. Ibid., fo 9d
26. Ibid., fo 10
27. Glyndwr Williams states in his work, The British Search for the Northwest Passage in the Eighteenth Century. (London: Royal Commonwealth Society, 1962) p. 124, that this order indicates a renewed interest by the Company in the search for the Northwest Passage. However, the description of this body of water as "A Large Inlett" would indicate that Isbister believed it to be just that, a navigable waterway into the fur producing areas of the interior. Had he believed it to be the Northwest Passage it is unlikely, considering the events of the previous decade that it would have been described as being "of great Advantage to the Company."

28. that is, belligerent. PAM/HBCA B42/a/39, fo 18
29. PAM/HBCA B42/a/41, fo 13
30. Ibid., fo 14
31. Ibid., fo 15
32. PAM/HBCA B42/a/43, fo 11
33. A new sloop was sent out to replace the old Churchill in 1751. The exact cost of it has not been traced. PAM/HBCA A6/8, fo 71
34. PAM/HBCA B42/a/45, fo 10d
35. Ibid., fo 20d
36. It should be noted that England and France were fighting the Seven Years' War at this time. The war which lasted from 1756 to 1763 does not appear to have interrupted the Company's trade. PAM/HBCA B42/a/47, fo 8d
37. Some debate has arisen in recent studies concerning the nature of Chipewyan-Inuit relations. Drs Burch and Smith agree with Robert Janes' interpretation that "Chipewyan-Inuit relations have been a complex mixture of animosity and co-existence since the very beginning of the historic period". James G.E. Smith and Ernest S. Burch, Jr., "Chipewyan & Inuit in the Central Canadian Subarctic 1613-1977". Arctic Anthropology, Vol XVI, No.2 (1979): 76-101
- Inuit-Chipewyan hostility does not seem to have dominated all contact between these 2 groups, but rather was the result of specific incidents. In this case of the 1755 massacre, the Chipewyan apparently were insulted by the fact that the sloop did not stop to trade with them, but rather it went north to Knapp's Bay to meet the Inuit. PAM/HBCA B42/a/47, fo 2d
- Hearne gives a different reason for the attack, stating that it was the result of a magical spell cast by the Inuit that caused the death of two Chipewyan. The Chipewyan avenged the deaths by massacring the Inuit. Samuel Hearne, A Journey to the Northern Ocean, ed. Richard Glover. (Toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada Ltd., 1958) p. 219
38. PAM/HBCA B42/a/47, fo 14d
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., fo 19
42. PAM/HBCA B42/a/51, fo 3
43. PAM/HBCA B42/a/54, fo 15

44. One hogshead equals 63 gallons. Whalebone was especially valuable during the eighteenth century at times realizing a return of 30s per lb. It was used as a stiffener in many types of clothes and utensils. However, in 1747-48 the Hudson's Bay Company reported that it received only 2s 1/2d per pound for whalebone. See Report from the Committee Appointed to Inquire into the State and Conditions of the Countries Adjoining to Hudson's Bay and of the Trade carried on there. (London: 1749) pp.252-3; F.D. Ommanney, Lost Leviathan: Whales and Whaling. (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1971) p. 61
45. PAM/HBCA B42/a/37, & 38
46. Wages for Captains of HBC supply vessels were £6 a month or £72 per annum and thus were on a par with captains of other foreign trading vessels of the period. Sloop masters thus received half this wage each month or £3.
The captain and crew of an HBC vessel like those on other foreign trading vessels were only employed during their months at sea. Thus once the ship returned to port crew and captain alike were paid off and returned to their homes until the shipping season resumed. PAM/HBCA C2/2, fo 81; Ralph Davies, The Rise of English Shipping Industry in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1962) p. 138
47. Merchant seamen received 55s or £2.15.0 each month.
Davies, p. 137
48. that is, value of goods plus landing costs plus duty paid.
49. PAM/HBCA B42/a/36, fo 20d
50. Wood was involved in only a minor incident of suspected private trade and compared to his predecessors was a model sloop master.
51. PAM/HBCA B42/a/36, fo 11d
52. Ibid., fo 12
53. PAM/HBCA B42/a/44, fo 48
54. Ibid., fo 48d
55. Ibid., fo 50
56. Ibid., fo 50d
57. Both Ferdinand Jacobs and Joseph Isbister were stern task masters. There can be no doubt that Walker and other sloop masters acted contrary to Company policy but perhaps a more flexible superior would have allowed the sloop masters more freedom at the factory. It is interesting to note that Magnus Johnson, sloop master under Moses Norton during the 1760s exhibited none of the

behaviour of his predecessors. This may be explained in part by the fact that Norton had himself been a crew member on a number of sloop voyages and understood the nature of sloop masters some what better.

58. PAM/HBCA B42/a/36, fo 28d
59. Ibid., fo 14
60. Ibid., fo 23d
61. Ibid.,
62. Ibid., fos 50d, 59
63. PAM/HBCA B42/a/38, fo 26
64. Ibid., fo 28
65. PAM/HBCA A16/10, fo 33
66. Table III compiled from A15/10, pp.356,395,452,515; A15/11, pp. 36,159,215,293,399; A14/11, fo 43
67. This amount consists of 2 items of duty accounted for in A14/11, fo 43: £1.7.2 and £0.19.0. However, the latter figure £0.19.0, close to £1 does not appear to have been computed by the Company accountant. Thus there remains a £1 difference.
68. This figure consists of £1.7.11 for duty paid plus £1.5.9 to James Walker for his proportion of profit which was figured into this final accounting. PAM/HBCA A14/11, fo 43

CHAPTER IV

WHALING IN HUDSON BAY, 1717-1772

Compared to the first decade of renewed trade voyages, the 1760s provided the Company with unparalleled information on the potential resources of the west coast of Hudson Bay. Through exploration and experimentation the Company's servants made the final determination on the existence of a Northwest Passage, and embarked on the ambitious, albeit doomed, Black Whale Fishery at Marble Island.^{1.}

The plan to diversify the Company's trade in the Bay had been a principal reason for the founding of Churchill in 1717. Two possible industries recurred throughout the Committee's correspondence to its officers on the Bay. Precious minerals such as copper, and gold were still a sure road to wealth for the adventurous. Whaling, however, was a relatively new source of wealth. The first Europeans to develop this industry were the Basques, inhabitants of the French and Spanish Biscay coast around the Pyrenees. These people developed the technique of hunting the Biscay Right Whale by the twelfth century.^{2.} The Basques continued to dominate the industry well into the sixteenth century, adapting their methods of hunting whale to the Greenland Right Whale when the Biscay whale was hunted to extinction.

The English and the Dutch soon embarked on this new industry in the late sixteenth century when their exploration vessels to the north east and north west brought news of large numbers of Greenland Right Whales. The Muscovy Company chartered in 1555 obtained a monopoly from the Crown in 1576 to "Make train oil and kill whales" for twenty years, but its first ships did not sail north to Spitsbergen until

March, 1610.^{3.} Dutch competition in Spitsbergen soon defeated the British Company and they remained masters of the area until the latter half of the nineteenth century.^{4.}

Thus from the sixteenth to the end of the nineteenth century whaling was a major enterprise for many trans-oceanic countries. The British, Dutch and French and later the Americans pursued the whales of the Arctic for their valuable whalebone and 'train' or whale oil. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries whale oil was used as an illuminant and in the manufacture of soap and cosmetics.^{5.} Whalebone, however, was of greater value during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.^{6.} The flexible properties of whalebone or baleen made it useful for many different purposes: in stays and bustles of women's clothing, umbrellas, chair seats, bed bottoms and many other articles.^{7.} The monetary benefits from this trade are graphically described by William Soresby in his comprehensive work, An Account of the Arctic Regions.

This substance [whalebone] has been held in such high estimation that since the establishment of the Spitzbergen whale-fishery, the British have occasionally purchased it of the Dutch at the rate of 700 l per ton. It is calculated that at least 100,000 l per annum were paid to the Dutch for this article about the years 1715 to 1721 when the price was 400 l. About the year 1763, the price in England was 500 l per ton; but after an extensive importation of this article from New England, the price declined to 350 l and subsequently as low as 50 l per ton.^{8.}

With such high prices being paid, it is understandable that many British merchants were eager to usurp this market in the eighteenth century. Early in this century, the South Sea Company petitioned the British Parliament for the exemption from duty of all whale products it imported and then successfully

managed to attract sufficient funds to build a fleet of whaling ships. The Company's fleet of 12 ships cost £3,000 per annum to maintain. However, by 1732 it had caught no whales in the Arctic and had accumulated a debt of £180,000.^{9.}

Other companies were more successful. The Hull Whale Fishery Company formed in 1754^{10.} attempted to take advantage of the shortage of whale oil available in Britain because of the Anglo-French war, and equipped three ships for the hunt. In its first years of operation it had considerable success, catching 14 whales, yielding 236 tons of oil and 230 hundred weight of bone. However the whaling industry suffered greatly by the war in Europe which resulted in a general decline in trade and a brief financial crisis in 1758-9.

With the end of hostilities in America the situation was intensified by the^{11.} renewal of activity in the whaling industry by the colonies.

The activity in the whaling industry and the prospects of relatively good profits from a moderate number of whales caught certainly would not have gone unnoticed by the London Committee. As early as 1688, the Committee was instructing its officers at the new settlement of Churchill to employ "...One Edward Mills whoe is an Harponeir and hath all soe been bread in the Greeneland Whalefishing Trade [Spitsbergen] and will be the most Skilfull man of all to Discover and Direct what that place will produce as to Whalefishing lett him have all incoragment upon all occations that you Can".^{12.} Whaling in the Churchill river continued to be encouraged by the Committee during the first attempts to establish a permanent settlement north of York Factory. In 1691 the Committee went so far as to provide "Caske & wee hope hands Enough for your settling the Whale Fishery which wee have great expectation of Soe wee have all soe sent you 2

new Shallops in frames for that purpose..."^{13.} in spite of the fact that Churchill settlement had been burned two years before. The receipt of 10 tons of blubber at that time provided them with sufficient evidence that the industry was worth pursuing.

Whaling during these early years was concentrated in the rivers of Hudson and James Bays. Andrew Graham summarized their value to the forts on the Bay in his Observations.

They [the white whale or beluga] are very numerous in the rivers immediately after the breaking up of the ice. and many are killed annually which supply the Factories with oil, and furnish several tons to be imported into England...The usual length is about sixteen feet and twelve will produce a ton of sheer oil.^{14.}

With the successful establishment of a permanent settlement at Churchill in 1717, whaling in the Churchill river was diligently pursued for several years. From break-up in mid-June to mid-August men were employed in hunting the beluga. In these first years the men struggled with their own lack of experience and the frustration of faulty equipment. In 1719 harpoon after harpoon was lost in an escaping whale when the poor quality of iron in the harpoons caused them to break on impact.^{15.} In 1722 the men persistently complained that their failure to catch as many whales as possible was because the boat used was not painted white enough and the whales were frightened off.^{16.} Many a time too they had to leave a dead whale by a buoy because its weight or the equipment available was not appropriate for transporting it home. As a result some whales were lost when they drifted away from the buoy during the interim. Even with all these problems the abundance of whales in the river during these years resulted in an average of 24 whales per year being caught between 1719 and 1725. (See Table I)

In the twenty years preceding the resumption of trade voyages northward the Committee's interest in whaling declined. During the 1730s the Company's manpower and finances were concentrated on building the stone fort at Churchill. The only whaling done during these years was for oil for factory use and few references are made to the exporting of any oil. Between 1726 and 1749 only 43 white whales were caught at Churchill. (See Table II) In the mid-forties when attention was again turned to the trade and development of the west coast of Hudson Bay, the hunting of white whales at both Churchill and York increased. Indeed, during the late forties the Committee looked to York to develop a profitable whaling industry. In 1742 Thomas White, Chief at York, replying to the Committee's belief that a great number of whales could be caught in the river, stated,

As to ye Whales your Honours make mention of
I cannot tell where you might get your information
of Numbers being to be gott here, but I do
Assure Your Hon. it is but by Chance yt we now
& then gett one for ye Service of ye factory if
any Quantity should happen to be gott, we Shall
not faile of Sending ye Surplus home.^{17.}

Five years later York had acquired an experienced harpooner, Thomas Smith, who James Isham described as one who "understands the Nature of Harpooning we having nobody here yt did -- as itt's without Dispute great Quantity of oyl might be had where their is a proper person as above mentioned I shall take care to keep hm Strickly Employd upon the fisherye".^{18.}

When it became apparent that whaling at York would not be the success the Committee had hoped for, it turned its attention once again to Churchill. Between 1750 and 1760 a total of 197 white whales were caught at Churchill, averaging 17.9 whales per season. Much of the reason for this success must be attributed to the skill of an

19.
experienced harpooner and improved techniques. The whalers were ordered to concentrate their hunt at Cape Merry. By staying there for a week at a time these men could engage in the hunt whenever the number of whales permitted it, and decrease the amount of lost time by going back and forth from the fort. The use of the Speedwell shallop for transporting the large catch of whales to the fort helped to improve the efficiency and minimize the chance of captured whales

20.
being lost. In the latter years of this decade, no skilled harpooner was employed for the hunt and this lack of expertise is reflected in the lower number of captured whales. Moses Norton, the Company servant who would prove his worth during the exploration of Chesterfield Inlet in the 1760s, had little luck when leading the whale hunt of 1759. At that time only 3 whales were caught. The following year, however, the fort's Doctor was sent to lead the hunt. His skill as a harpooner (perhaps attributable to the steady hand of a surgeon) was considerably better than Norton's, catching 24 whales during the season. (See Table III)

The Committee's interest in developing the whaling industry in the Bay was extended during the 1750s to the Eastmain. Richmond Fort established in 1750 on an island in Winipeke Bay, Gulf of Hazard, was founded mainly with the hopes of exploiting the minerals of the area. However, when this venture failed the Committee turned its attention to the development of trade and the whale industry. John Potts, Chief at Richmond Fort in 1753 encouraged the Committee to send out sufficient equipment for the pursuit of this venture in Little Whale River. The technique of hunting whales on the Eastmain was considerably different from that employed at Churchill.

After the flood tide had brought the herds of whale into the mouth of the river, the Indians swarmed into the water and splashed and shouted to prevent them going out on the ebb tide. Then as the river fell the great sea-beasts were left stranded on²¹ the shore and the Indians killed them at leisure.

The reason for the use of nets, rather than harpoons alone, and Indians rather than Company servants, is not clearly stated in the records. Part of the reason may have been that there were more Indians in the area familiar with the hunting of these white whales, for at Churchill no references to any Indians or Inuit having been employed because of their expertise were ever traced.²² Another reason appears to have been the fact that hunting by nets eliminated the need to puncture the hide of the whale, thereby increasing its value.²³

Even after the transfer of operations to Little Whale River in 1756 whaling was never profitable. Henry Pollexfen wrote from Whale River House on July 20, 1756 that "...these Whale are to be killed by Indians and they are a People that can't nor won't be Commanded, will go when and where they please, and tho perhaps five or Six may be persuaded to stay it is morrally impossible to Coax them all, and a few will be of no Service..."²⁴ The lack of Indian interest in the whale hunt was compounded by the fact that if bad weather set in and the hunt could not be pursued, then the Company was obliged to maintain the Indian men, their wives and children until the hunt could be resumed. The failure of the whale hunt to realize a profitable return, plus the poor development of the fur trade and the mines resulted in the abandonment of Richmond Fort in August of 1759.


Although whaling in the rivers of Hudson Bay would continue to be pursued by the Company's servants for many more years, it had not and would not develop into the profitable trade the Committee had hoped. However, in the 1760s new developments caused the Committee to look once more at the possibility of exploiting the whale hunt. In 1761 William Christopher commanded the Churchill sloop northward on a routine voyage of trade. His discovery of "...the Straight or River Call'd by the Indians Kis-catch-ewen up wch he sailed 100 miles..." brought new hope of expanded trade for the Company. 26. For the next 3 years the Committee and its chief officer at Churchill, Ferdinand Jacobs ordered the Churchill to sail northward to explore this area to determine its potential value to the fur trade. Whether or not the Committee entertained thoughts of the existence of a Northwest Passage is not clearly stated in the records. It seems more likely that they hoped the inlet would prove to be a water route to the interior and the tribes of Indians who might live there.

The following year, William Christopher with his passenger, Moses Norton, set out for the area referred to as Chesterfield or Bowden's Inlet. The Churchill sloop carried with her as well the Strivewell cutter to be used by Norton to examine closely the coastline of the inlet. This voyage was one of exploration only, and Christopher's orders specified that he was to make no stops along the way to trade with the natives. 27. On reaching the mouth of the inlet the Churchill along with Norton in the cutter examined thoroughly the coastline of the inlet, noting all signs of life, both animal and human, the type of vegetation and all streams or openings. By August 7 they had reached the end of the inlet, naming the lake Baker in honour of Sir William Baker and his brother

28.
 Richard. Both Norton in the Strivewell and Christopher in the Churchill searched the lake before concluding that it held no opening to the west. Captain Christopher concluded his remarks on their exploration stating that the "half Tide that Flows in in [sic] this River, as well as upon the Coast, from Whale Cove further N. ward" may have deceived men into believing that the route to the Orient lay in this latitude. More specifically he remarked "...thus ends Mr. Bowden's Inlet, and a late Author's [Dobbs] Probability of a N. W. Passage."^{29.}

The following year Christopher and Norton returned to the area of Chesterfield Inlet, to make one final search of latitude 62°37' where Christopher suspected there might be another opening.^{30.} Christopher, however, reported the opening near Whale Cove "to be a kind of Bay, full of Ridges and Shoul Water..."^{31.} Moses Norton now in charge of Prince of Wales's Fort notified the Committee that he intended to order Christopher's successor Magnus Johnson to sail the sloop Churchill north to "The other opening in 63 Near Marble Island" referred to as Rankin's Inlet to make one final determination^{32.} of the possibility of any opening to the west. Johnson's orders for 1764 specified that he was to search the area of 63° and determine beyond a doubt whether Rankin's Inlet was a bay, strait or river. Johnson followed his orders to the letter and after searching Rankin's Inlet in a small boat for any outlets concluded that "...there is Nothing there that will be of any benefete [sic] to the Company...By my own Knoladg and Mr. Nortens Dericetions I am Certain it is finished".^{33.}

With all hope of any passage or river to the interior finally eliminated, the Committee with Norton's support, ordered



WKH 11 81

that on future voyages Mr. Johnson was to equip his sloop with the necessary equipment to hunt whales.^{34.} In 1763 Christopher reported the frequent sighting of black whales and lamented the fact that his sloop had not been equipped with such equipment to take advantage of their presence.^{35.} With this encouragement the Company embarked on its Black Whale fishery at Marble Island.

The Committee's approach to the establishment of a whale fishery at Marble Island gives little evidence that they viewed such a venture any differently than the hunting of white whales in the rivers of Hudson Bay. Their initial instructions to Moses Norton in 1764 simply stated that he should supply the sloop master with all proper materials for whale fishing. No suggestions of a plan or even the need for an experienced harpooner was broached by the Committee. Moses Norton, however, did devise a plan which he relayed to the Committee in his report of the fall of 1764. He specified the need for an harpooner "to go on ye Sloop & making her Complement up to 10 men & ye Cutter wch ye Sloop can Tow there as She has done before, ye Said Cutter & ye Sloops Boat may attempt to Strike a Whale while ye Sloop Lays in Marble Harbour..."^{36.}

While waiting approval of this plan and the arrival of an experienced harpooner, Norton sent Johnson northward to Marble Island to trade and to assess the possibilities of a successful whale fishery. In his initial instructions to Johnson, in July of 1765, Norton ordered him to travel to Marble Island and observe the number of black whales in the area and if possible, see if the Inuit of the area were willing to hunt the whales. Johnson successfully sailed to Marble Island but after 4 days in the area saw few whales. However, he did send John Braden "a man that had been to groonland

which told me that he had seen severall Whales Kill'd" with four
other men and 2 harpoons and lines to attempt to kill a whale. ^{37.}

They had no success. The Churchill sailed for Fort Prince of Wales on August 10. Norton in his annual letter to the Committee of that year made no reference to this futile attempt nor to the scarcity of whales in the area.

With the season of 1766 the Marble Island Whale Fishery was officially underway. By this time John Harwood, harpooner and one who "has been accustomed to the Greenland Fishery..." had arrived at Churchill and John Garbut had been engaged to sail the Success northward to the fishery. Garbut's orders for the Black Whale fishery were similar to Norton's original plan. He was ordered to sail north in company with the Churchill (which would conduct its usual trading voyage) as far as Cape Eskimo and then sail alone for Marble Island. ^{38.} Once at Marble Island Garbut was to allow the harpooner to decide where and when to hunt the whales. All were to return to Churchill by the 10th or 12th of August.

With a crew of 13 the Success set sail for Marble Island on July 19, 1766. Five days later she arrived at Marble Island. From July 28 (the day they arrived in the harbour) to August 12 the harpooner and his men vainly attempted to land one whale. Rough weather and cumbersome boats were cited by Norton as the chief causes for their lack of success. ^{39.} He requested that the Committee send out proper whale boats for the task.

London responded eagerly to Norton's suggestions for improvement of the whale fishery. They agreed to increase the complement of men for the Success to 18 and also ordered a greater

number of casks "for the readier package of the Oil and Blubber". An additional harpooner, Linsdell Burwood, was hired to assist in the fishery. They ordered that 6 men be assigned to each of the 2 whale (or greenland) boats, and 5 men each were to be assigned to the sloop's boats. The rest of the crew was to remain on board to care for the sloop.^{40.}

For the 1767 voyage there would be 3 harpooners: Thomas Bugg, John Harwood and Linsdell Burwood. The final sailing orders to Joseph Stevens the new Commander of the Success, were revised by Norton to the use of the 3 boats, each commanded by a harpooner, and their crews to hunt the whales. Magnus Johnson in the Churchill was ordered to join the fishery when he had completed his trade with the natives of the coast.^{41.} The Success set sail for Marble Island on July 15 with a crew of 16 with an additional four who would be transferred from the Churchill. Five days later they arrived at Marble Island harbour but rough weather prevented them from engaging in the hunt until the following day.^{42.} From July 21 to August 10 the harpooners and the crews attempted to kill a whale. Finally on the 11th they managed to return with one black whale.^{43.}

The experience of this year's fishery revealed other problems in the technique of hunting these huge mammals. Stevens commented soon after reaching Marble Island that the crowded conditions on the whale boats resulted in the loss of valuable time since the men had to eat in shifts. This meant not only double time to feed all the men, but that valuable manpower was wasted on searching for scarce firewood. Stevens recommended the use of biscuit "which would be by farr more handy to take in ye Boats than Doboys..."^{44.}

Stevens also recognized that the lateness of their arrival at the Island limited the amount of time they could devote to the hunt. And finally, the Success itself was in poor repair and required many hours to maintain her.

The harpooners for their part offered their own assessment of the fishery. They recommended that 2 sloops be employed to work in concert with the fishery. In 1767 another harbour on the S.E. part of the island had been discovered which offered more encouraging prospects for the fishery.^{45.} They recommended that a sloop be sent to each harbour with harpooners and whale boats, thereby minimizing the distances to be travelled to the mother ship and also increasing the confidence of the whale boat crews who would know that help was at hand should a crisis arise.^{46.}

Norton for his part reiterated Stevens' complaint about the poor condition of the Success and advised the Committee "...that if you Intend to Continue & Expect Success in ye Fishery & Trade, a larger Vessel must be Provided wth an Easy Draught of Water & that Can Stow 3 or 4 Boats for Towing is very dangerous of Loing them..."^{47.}

The London Committee took stock of all these suggestions and over the next two years fulfilled most of them. In 1768 Norton ordered the Success north again, with Joseph Stevens in charge, along with the Speedwell, commanded by Samuel Hearne. The Speedwell, was a shallop and as such a very small craft; but it would provide the whalers with some security when entering new and strange waters. Towing two whale boats, the Success in its poor and leaky condition and facing rough weather took 8 days to reach Marble Island. A leaky whale boat further delayed the fishery until August 3. As a final blow the rough weather prevented the Speedwell from accompanying the

three whale boats and their crews to the far harbour as planned. The lateness of the season and the rough weather resulted in no whales at all being caught during this trip.^{48.}

The season of 1769 seemed to offer more chance of success. The Committee had followed Norton's suggestion and purchased the brigantine Charlotte for the exclusive use of the whale fishery.^{49.} Sufficient biscuit was also sent out for the use of the whaling crews. By July 19 the Charlotte had already reached Marble Island and many whales had been sighted near the island. Because only the one vessel had been sent the harpooners recommended that the Charlotte follow them with their whale boats to the far harbour, where the whales were most abundant. Provisions would be left with them so that little time would be wasted travelling to and from the mother ship. A week later the harpooners returned to the Charlotte from the south east harbour and reported their failure to capture any whales despite their frequent attempts and the abundance of whales. (See Map p. 90)

Stevens reported in his journal one such frustrating attempt:

...they [Burwood and Holliday] Both Informed me of John Hollidays being on a fish ye Day before, But either by his or his Boatsteerers inexperience or both he got onto ye head of the fish; and in Consequence Could only Shove his Harpoon into or against ye Crown of ye Fish, tho ye other Boats was not farr they Could not get a Stroke at her before she went Down...^{50.}

Rough weather and the lateness of the season forced them to return to Churchill by August 16.

The last three years of the fishery gave the London Committee and Moses Norton little encouragement. Their letters show a distinct lack of interest in the venture and instead concentrate on the success of the northern trade, and the pursuit of the white

whale fishery. The year 1770 was especially discouraging since heavy ice prevented the Charlotte from reaching Marble Island, and no fishery was even attempted during that season. Thoroughly discouraged Joseph Stevens wrote in his log,

I now give over all hopes of the Voyge [sic] and heartily sorry am I that I should have ever Ingaged in so unsuccessful an undertaking and do really think one year more would put me out of my sences...I think that your Honours will never get ye fishery Properly carried on till you get a Master for your Vessel that is thoroly acquainted with it in all its Branches -- Nex is that I think It will Never be Carried on with any Success from Churchill or indeed from any other Place (without Wintering there at the Island) tho from York Fort three Years out of the 4 I have been in ye Country I think I could have been to Marble Island; at Least a fortnight before I have⁵¹ ever been which would Make a meterial Difference.

In 1771 bad luck continued to plague the fishery. Thomas Robinson newly appointed master of the Charlotte arrived at Marble Island somewhat earlier than usual, on July 10. At first the fishery managed much better success than other years, landing 3 whales in a two week period.⁵² However, just as things seemed to be improving his men were struck down by the effects of bad drinking water. By August 10 Robinson was forced to abandon the fishery for the year and return to Churchill with his sick men.

With the disappointment of the past two years, the Committee voiced its concern about the future of the fishery. No profits were paid to the men for the seasons 'of 1769 and 1770 and the cost of maintaining such a high complement of men on the Bay was becoming unjustifiable. By 1771 the Committee had decided that the success of this year's fishery "...will in a great measure form Our Determinations with respect to the continuing the three Harpooners whose Contracts

all expire next year."^{54.}

The final voyage of 1772 sealed the fate of the fishery. Although the Charlotte arrived in good time at Marble Island (July 13) the fishery was again plagued by bad luck. Between July 13 and August 11 only one whale was caught. At first rough weather was the main cause of their lack of success but by August 11 six of Robinson's men were incapacitated by "colds". By August 13 one man had died and Robinson was forced to return to Churchill. Norton fulfilled the Committee's instructions and reduced the number of men at the fort by ten. Most of the men engaged specifically for the fishery were sent home in the fall of 1772.

The reason for the failure of the Marble Island Whale fishery seems obvious when one examines the paltry returns of this venture. Only five small black whales were caught during the six years that the fishery operated. But this evidence alone does not adequately explain the failure of the fishery. Indeed the whole experiment seems, in retrospect, to have been doomed from the beginning. The Committee failed to view this enterprise in any different way than the white whale fishery of the Churchill river. The whales were there in great abundance -- all that was needed was men to hunt them. Such an attitude is surprising considering that the Greenland (ie Spitsbergen) whale fishery had been in operation for many years and that men with the expertise and knowledge of the equipment, type of ships, etc, needed to hunt these large mammals must have been available to the Committee members. However, short of hiring men 'who were acquainted with the Greenland fishery' no special arrangements were ever initiated by the Committee. They left it almost entirely to the direction of the men on the Bay,

who by trial and error came to realize that sheer manpower was not enough to make the fishery a success.

Scoresby's description of a well-equipped Greenland ship, although written in the early nineteenth century, shows clearly how primitive the Hudson's Bay Company's approach to this new industry was:

A ship intended for the Greenland or Davis Straits trade, should, I conceive be of three to four hundred tons measurement -- very substantially built, -- doubled and fortified -- should have six or seven feet perpendicular space between decks, -- should be furnished with a description of sails which are easily worked -- and should possess the property of fast sailing... 55.
vessels of 250 tons are too small for the fishery.

It was three years before the Company retired the dilapidated Success.

The Charlotte, although a much heavier vessel, was far smaller than those vessels usually employed in the hunting of black whales.

Fortunately Norton recognized that the sloop's boats were improper for the whale hunt, being too cumbersome and difficult to manoeuvre. Whaling boats or 'greenland' boats were well constructed crafts, could be rowed with great speed and readily turned around. Their superior manoeuvrability could make the difference between a valuable catch and a dangerous miss. 56.

Andrew Graham, who served in the Bay during the years of the fishery cited two other reasons for the failure of the fishery:

The Company have repeatedly established a fishery but with little success. The reason is this: first the water in these parts being remarkably clear occasions them to be more shy than in Greenland where the ice conceals the boat on its approach; lastly the vessels cannot get out of the rivers to proceed on their voyage before the beginning of July when the ice goes off the coast, and frequent storms render the sea turbulent. 57.

No reference to the clearness of the water contributing to the shyness of the whales was traced in any of the journals for the fishery.

His second reason, however, was one cited at the time by sloop masters involved in the fishery. Table IV shows the length of time the fishery was operated during each season. The average date of July 19 for arrival and August 14 for departure (with an average duration of 25 days) was far too short to take advantage of the schools of whales which passed through the area on their migration north.

Beginning in mid-May whales migrated northward and would have passed Marble Island by the time the sloop arrived in late July. ^{58.}

Had the Committee considered expanding the fishery to waters north of the island, greater success might have resulted. Moreover, the fact that wintering on the island was never considered by the Committee or its officers also limited the amount of time the men had to conduct the fishery. They had learned how important it was to engage in hunting whales as early as possible in the season at Churchill River, but no consideration of Stevens' conclusion in 1770 to winter at Marble Island was ever made. No doubt the discovery of the remains of Knight's expedition on Marble Island in 1767 eliminated any possible consideration of men staying any longer than necessary at Marble Island.

One cannot, however, question the perseverance of the Company's servants in conducting this venture. Unlike the first voyages of northern trade in the 1750s the masters of Company vessels, the harpooners and the crews worked hard to make the fishery a success. And it is a credit to the wisdom of the commanders that only one man was lost during these six years. ^{59.}

The closing of the Marble Island Black Whale fishery in 1772 brought to an end a most expensive venture. Samuel Hearne summarized the Company's failure,

...but notwithstanding the Company...were so far from making it [the whale fishery] answer their expectations that they sunk upwards of twenty thousand pounds; which is the less to be wondered at, when we consider the great inconveniences and expences they laboured under in such an undertaking. For as it was impossible to prosecute it from England all the people employed on that service were obliged to reside at their settlement all the year at extravagant wages, exclusive of their maintenance. The harpooners had no less than fifty pounds per annum standing wages and none of the crew less than from fifteen to twenty-five pounds; which together with the Captains salaries, wear and tear of their vessels, and other contingent expences, made it appear on calculation, that if there were a certainty of loading the vessels every year, the Company could not clear themselves... But the Hudson's Bay Company, with a liberality that does honour to them, though perfectly acquainted with the rules observed in the Greenland service, gave the same premium for a sucking fish as for one of the greatest magnitude.^{60.}

Hearne's less than objective assessment of the Black Whale Fishery is not far off the mark. How he calculated the sum of £20,000 as the cost of this venture is difficult to verify. Certainly one must consider the wages of these men which between 1766 and 1772 amounted to £2500. Each year that the fishery was operated the number of crew of the sloop was increased from 16 in 1766 to 25 in the last two years of the fishery. Harpooners, just as Hearne described, were paid £50 per annum, but were not paid a percentage of the profit as other crew members were.^{61.} Since the profit was relatively small when it was paid the £50 per annum proved to be the better arrangement. On the 1768 voyage two harpooners were paid this wage, while a third received the lower rate of £30. By 1770 the 'imported' harpooners were no longer being employed, so

that the Company utilized the skills of men trained during the past few years, and at the less expensive rate of £30 per annum. (See Table V)

Other expenditures to be considered are the cost of maintaining these men over the winter months, the equipment used on each voyage, the maintenance of the sloops (especially the dilapidated Success during the initial years of the fishery), the cost of the brigantine Charlotte which was purchased specifically for the fishery, and the purchase of the whale boats used in the fishery. Whether or not this would add up to £20,000 is immaterial. What is significant is the fact that this money was expended with
62.
virtually no return.

The Hudson's Bay Company's failure to diversify its activities to include a lucrative black whale fishery is therefore, not surprising. Had the Committee had the foresight to act on its servants' recommendations that whaling crews winter on Marble Island to ensure an early start to the hunt in the spring, their chance of success would have been increased immeasurably. As it was, it would be another century before the Company attempted another
63.
whaling venture.

TABLE INUMBER OF WHITE WHALES CAUGHT AT CHURCHILLRIVER 1717-1725

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>NO. OF WHITE WHALES</u>
1717-1718	[no record of whales caught]
1719	29
1720	30
1721	32
1722	31
1723	19
1724	14
1725	16
Total	171
Average	24.4 whales per annum

TABLE IINUMBER OF WHITE WHALES CAUGHT ATCHURCHILL RIVER, 1726-1749

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>NO. OF WHITE WHALES</u>
1726	0
1727	2
1728	0
1729	4
1730	2
1731	0
1732	3
1733	3
1734	2
1735	1
1736	8
1737	0
1738	7
1739	1
1740-1742	0
1743	1
1744	0
1745	1
1746	1
1747	2
1748	3
1749	2
Total	43
Average	1.8 whales per annum

TABLE IIINUMBER OF WHITE WHALES CAUGHT ATCHURCHILL RIVER, 1750-1760

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>NO. OF WHITE WHALES</u>
1750	24
1751	11
1752	12
1753	44
1754	28
1755	5
1756	8
1757	9
1758	29
1759	3
1760	24
Total	197
Average	17.9 whales per annum

TABLE IVDURATION OF WHALING SEASON

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>ARRIVAL</u>	<u>DEPARTURE</u>	<u>NO. OF DAYS</u>
1766	July 24	Aug. 12	19
1767	July 20	Aug. 14	25
1768	Aug. 2	Aug. 18	16
1769	July 19	Aug. 16	28
1770	[no voyage took place this year]		
1771	July 10	Aug. 11	32
1772	July 13	Aug. 13	31
Average	July 19	Aug. 14	25

TABLE V

WAGES FOR THE WHALE FISHERY

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>SLOOP MASTER</u>	<u>MATE</u>	<u>HARPOONERS</u>	<u>SAILORS</u>	<u>LABOURERS</u>	<u>TOTAL WAGES</u>
1766	£48	-	£ 50	£104	£ 28	£ 230
1767	40	25	50	153	22	290
1768						
<u>Success</u>	40	25	100	141	24	330
<u>Speedwell</u>	25	-	30	60	6	121
1769	40	25	80	216	50	411
1770	40	35	60	204	48	387
1771	40	35	60	186	64	385
1772	40	35	60	115	96	346

CHAPTER IV

FOOTNOTES

1. This information concerning the existence of a Northwest Passage remained the exclusive knowledge of the Hudson's Bay Company until the last two decades of the century. By then, a more open approach to the Company's cartographic records, under Governor Samuel Wegg (1782-1799), revealed to the world a more detailed knowledge of Hudson Bay and the North American continent. See Richard Ruggles, "Governor Samuel Wegg. Intelligent Layman of the Royal Society 1753-1802", Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London. Vol 32, No. 2, (March, 1978): 181-199
2. F.D. Ommanney, Lost Leviathan, Whales and Whaling. (London: Hutchinson and Company, 1971) p. 70
3. The Spitsbergen whale fishery was initially concentrated in the waters between this island and the east coast of Greenland. During the sixteenth century the English called this area "East Greenland". The phrase "Greenland Whale Fishery" became more common in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when the Greenland right whale retreated to the west and the hunt spread to Davis Strait and the west coast of Greenland and Baffin Land. Ommanney, pp. 74-77
4. Ommanney, p. 75
5. Whale oil, eventually was replaced in the late nineteenth century and twentieth century with oils derived from petroleum. Ibid., pp.55-56
6. Baleen: "The whalebone or baleen whales (Mystacoceti) are filter feeders...they do not feed by means of a mouth armed with teeth but strain out of the water large quantities of minute food...by means of a series of triangular flexible plates ...hanging down from the upper jaw..." Ibid., pp.30-31
7. William Scoresby, Jr., An Account of the Arctic Regions, With a History and Description of the Northern Whale Fishery. Volume II. (Edinburgh: Archibald Constable & Co., 1820) p. 435
8. Ibid., p. 417
9. The South Sea Company continued to operate for more than a hundred years after the disastrous Bubble Affair of 1720. Its main function was to continue to administer its assets but it still attempted to recoup its losses by engaging in such enterprises as whaling. Ommanney, p. 78
10. Gordon Jackson, Hull in the Eighteenth Century. A Study in Economic and Social History. (London: Oxford University Press 1972) pp.157,158,159

11. Ommanney, p. 79
12. E.E. Rich, ed., Hudson's Bay Copy Booke of Letters Commissions Instructions Outward 1688-1696. Hudson's Bay Record Society Volume XX. (London: Hudson's Bay Record Society, 1957) p. 9
13. Ibid., p. 124
14. The white whale, unlike the Greenland Right Whale is a toothed mammal with ten teeth on each side in both upper and lower jaws. Since it lacks the valuable whalebone or baleen sought during the eighteenth century its value to the Company was limited. Glyndwr Williams, ed., Andrew Graham's Observations on Hudson's Bay 1767-1791. Hudson's Bay Record Society, Volume XXVII. (London: Hudson's Bay Record Society, 1969) p. 116 ; Ommanney pp. 53-54
15. "I am apt to beleave the Iron is not over Good". PAM/HBCA B42/a/1, fos 51-53
16. PAM/HBCA B42/a/2, fo 50d
17. The exact reason for the failure of the fishery at York has not been traced. However possible reasons are the lack of expertise of Company servants in hunting the whale and the naturally smaller number of white whales frequenting the river near the factory. PAM/HBCA A11/114, fo 108d
18. Ibid., fo 126
19. From 1751 to 1758 John Paterson led the whale hunt in the Churchill river.
20. PAM/HBCA B42/a/44, fo 45d
21. E.E. Rich, Hudson's Bay Company, 1670-1870. Volume I: 1670-1763. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1960) p. 622
PAM/HBCA B182/a/7, fo 45
22. Indeed later on in the 1770s and 1780s when Inuit visited Prince of Wales's Fort more frequently it is noted that they occasionally hunted seals but never engaged in the white whale hunt.
23. "...which latter [ie, whale skins] to at best of small value are much less so by the Holes made therein by the Lances". The hide of the white whale was used in the manufacture of leather and bootlaces. PAM/HBCA A6/9, fo 1d; Ommanney, p. 54
24. PAM/HBCA A11/57, fo 38

25. One can only speculate as to why the Committee did not instruct their servants on the Bay to learn the Indian's method of hunting these white whales. Not even the suggestion of such an alternative was traced in the correspondence with the Committee. The whole approach to the whale hunt on the Eastmain is a strange reversal of the policy from that engaged in at other posts on the Bay. Rich, Hudson's Bay Company, Volume I, p. 624
26. PAM/HBCA A11/13, fo 165
27. Ibid., fo 180
28. Sir William Baker was Deputy Governor of the Company from 1750-1760 and Governor, 1760-1770. PAM/HBCA B42/a/57, fo 17
29. PAM/HBCA B42/a/57, fo 21d
30. PAM/HBCA A11/13, fo 172
31. PAM/HBCA A11/13, fo 189
32. Ibid
33. PAM/HBCA B42/a/61, fo 20
34. PAM/HBCA A6/10, fo 72d
35. The journal for this voyage has not survived in the HBC Archives. PAM/HBCA A6/10, fo 73
36. PAM/HBCA A11/14, fo 3
37. PAM/HBCA B42/a/63, fo 25
38. Although 1765 has been viewed as the beginning of the whale fishery at Marble Island the first full year of operation was not until 1766. PAM/HBCA A11/14, fo 46
39. PAM/HBCA A11/14, fo 34d
40. PAM/HBCA A6/10, fo 119
41. When ordered to do this previously by the London Committee, Johnson had stated that he could be of little help to the fishery since "...I am sent On a Trading Voyage and before I am done With ye 3 harbours that I have to go into and Not good to Get in or out of -- The Season of ye yeare Is all most gone before I arive to Marble Island." PAM/HBCA A11/14, fo 44
42. PAM/HBCA B42/a/69, fo 16d
43. PAM/HBCA B42/a/69, fo 22d
44. Ibid., fo 17d

45. They also discovered the first remains of Knight's expedition at this harbour. Magnus Johnson, with Joseph Stevens surveyed the area, finding the ruins of a house, an anchor, shoes and a human skull. Moses Norton reported these discoveries and sent pieces from the wrecks home with his annual letter. PAM/HBCA A11/14, fo 57; B42/a/68, fo 40d
46. PAM/HBCA B42/a/69, fo 23d
47. PAM/HBCA A11/14, fo 77d
48. PAM/HBCA B42/a/72
49. PAM/HBCA A11/14, fo 82
50. PAM/HBCA B42/a/76, fo 21d
51. PAM/HBCA B42/a/79, fo 20, 24-24d
52. PAM/HBCA B42/a/82, fos 13-14
53. PAM/HBCA A6/11, fo 98
54. PAM/HBCA A6/11, fo 129
55. The sloop in contrast, was intended as a coastal vessel and averaged about 50 tons. For the most part, the Company used these vessels for what they were intended, transporting supplies between posts along the coast of Hudson Bay. The brig or brigantine averaged about double the size of the sloop. Scoresby, Vol II, p. 187; Joseph A. Goldenberg, Shipbuilding in Colonial America. (Charlottesville, Virginia: University of Virginia Press, 1976) pp.77,79
56. Whaling boats measuring 26 to 28 feet long and about 5 1/2 feet wide could hold six or seven men and seven to eight hundred weight of whale lines and equipment. Scoresby, Vol. II pp.221-222
57. Graham was acting chief at York, 1765-1766 and from 1771 to 1772. Williams, Andrew Graham, p. 114
58. During the mid-nineteenth century American whalers launched their whaling activities in Hudson Bay. The hunting of whales was most successful in Roes Welcome where 20,000 lbs of whalebone was returned during one season. W. Gillies Ross, "Whaling in Hudson Bay, Part II, 1866-1867", The Beaver (Summer, 1973): 41 See also Ross' work Whaling and Eskimos: Hudson Bay 1860-1915. (Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1975)
59. This death which occurred in the last voyage of 1772 was not the result of any particular attempt to kill a whale but rather the result of illness.

60. Little is known of the actual wages paid Englishmen in Greenland whale fishery, although it is known that they were higher than those paid elsewhere. This reason along with exemption from naval service attracted many men to this work. See Jackson, p. 175; Samuel Hearne, A Journey to the Northern Ocean. ed. Richard Glover, (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1958) pp.252-253
61. A complete record of all wages and percentages of profit paid to crew members will be found in PAM/HBCA A16/10 and A16/11, Servants Ledgers, Churchill
62. The exact cost of the Charlotte and the whale boats has not been traced, however, in 1779 the Charlotte was sold to Messrs Moses Robertson & John Norton and Sons for £870. PAM/HBCA A14/12, fo 85; A15/13, fo 453
63. In 1866 the Hudson's Bay Company sent the Ocean Nymph to the whaling areas north of Marble Island, at Roes Welcome and Repulse Bay. After wintering at Marble Island in the company of an American whaler, the Orray Taft, she resumed whaling activity in Repulse Bay. However, the venture was far from a success, with no whales being caught by the crew of the Ocean Nymph. Ross, "Whaling in Hudson Bay", pp.42-47

CHAPTER V

THE NATURE OF TRADE ALONG THE NORTH WEST COAST OF HUDSON BAY

1765 - 1790

The first decade of renewed voyages had offered little encouragement to the Hudson's Bay Company. Returns failed to cover even the costs of wages; hostility from the Inuit was constantly feared; and little new knowledge of the resources of the west coast had been discovered. But while the Black Whale Fishery occupied much of the resources and attention of the London Committee between 1765 and 1772, the trading voyages along the coast offered the first real taste of success. Innovative and aggressive trade techniques coupled with a lasting peace between Inuit and Chipewyan were initially seen as the major factors which would contribute to the development of the trade. However, as the Company officers soon realized it was the presence of the Chipewyan, determined to trade all of their furs and skins at Knapps Bay rather than travel to Churchill which caused the increase in the returns of these voyages. This factor coupled with increasing competition from pedlars in the Athabasca forced the London Committee to make one last attempt to search for a sea route to the rich fur-bearing areas of the interior in 1790.

With the completion of exploration of the west coast of Hudson Bay by 1764, the Company initiated an aggressive policy for the development of the Inuit trade. Magnus Johnson, master of the Churchill sloop was instructed to negotiate peace between the Chipewyan and the Inuit at Knapps Bay during his trading voyage¹ northward in 1765. In the early sixties the Chipewyan had begun

to congregate at this traditional Inuit meeting place in order to trade the more cumbersome skins, such as caribou thereby avoiding the long journey to Churchill. Governor Moses Norton's orders to Johnson specified that he was to await the arrival of "Heas'thee, who is a Trusty Northern Indian with his tribe..." at Cape Eskimo, Knapps Bay and with his help conduct the negotiations.^{2.} Hostility between these two groups was legendary and understandably the London Committee felt that a truce had to be secured if the trade of the west coast was to progress.^{3.} To this end, Johnson set sail on July 15, 1765 for Knapps Bay. On this voyage he carried two Indian men along with 'Doll', an Inuit woman as interpreter. The introduction of an interpreter into the negotiations was an innovation on these voyages, and one the Company would frequently employ in the years to come.

The negotiations with the two native groups seemed successful with both sides reassuring Johnson that they would do their utmost to co-operate in the hunting of furs and other items requested by the Company. The Chipewyan leader, Heas'thee (or Hissty) even agreed to show the Inuit how to trap the furs if they continued to behave amicably toward his people. This agreement was a significant one with respect to the Company's coastal trade. If the Inuit could be taught how to hunt the furs so coveted by the Company, then the value of the returns for this area would be increased. Neither the London Committee nor its servants realized at this time that the very nature of Inuit life prevented such a development. The Inuit of this area travelled inland during the spring and fall to hunt the caribou on its north-south migrations. The summer months

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were spent by the coast, hunting sea mammals. Seldom during these travels did they venture far enough south to encounter the fur-bearing animals of the forests. Thus it was not simply a matter of learning how to manipulate a trap; they would have to change their very pattern of life in order to come in contact with such animals. Many years would pass before the Company would realize this basic flaw in their plan.

The voyage of 1765 not only established peace between the Inuit and Chipewyan along the west coast but also laid the foundations for a bond of trust between the European and the Inuit.^{5.} For most of the 1750s the Company's servants had lived in mortal terror of the violence of the Inuit of both the west and east coasts of the Bay. Attacks on Company servants during the voyages of James Walker in the early 1750s, the massacre at Knapps Bay in 1755 and the abandonment of Richmond Fort at the end of the decade had prevented Company servants from approaching these people with anything but fear. However, all this seemed to change with the introduction of Doll as interpreter and the greater knowledge imparted by this woman about her people. Doll had apparently spent at least the winters of 1763/1764 and 1764/1765 at Prince of Wales's Fort and had learned English well enough in that time to function as a most valuable intermediary in the peace talks of 1765.^{6.} Her success and obvious value to the development of the Company's trade prompted the Committee to agree to the boarding of other Inuit at the fort during the winter months. Johnson was ordered to pursue this course of action and on his return to Churchill river in the late summer of 1765 he brought two boys. These two boys, about 13 years of age had been picked up by

7.

Johnson at Knapps Bay on his northward voyage. Johnson showed considerable sensitivity to the welfare of his charges and the hazards which might beset two strangers in an entirely different culture. During the voyage to Marble Island he watched their behaviour closely, recording his relief when after a period of melancholy the two boys were restored to good spirits and chatted eagerly with the natives met at each stop along the way. But Johnson did not allow his concern for the boys to cloud his recognition of their value to the Company's business.

However I am very Certain that if Chang of victuals do not disturbe there health and that They live to Com back Safe the Nixt year, it will be a meens greatly to Ingratiate the Esquimaux Towards us or any other Christian people lett them be of what Country Soever, if ever any misfor~~ton~~^g Should happen to eather on this barbarous Coast.

During their first winter at the fort the boys came under the special attention of Governor Moses Norton and Sloop Master Johnson. Norton showed them how to build traps with ice and wood "...in order that they may know how to Catch those animals [ie wolves etc] & Show their Country men when they get Back again to their Country."⁹ Johnson took the boys hunting and introduced them to the gun. However, their contact with the Europeans on a prolonged basis resulted in a crisis which threatened to destroy the Company's relations with the Inuit. Shortly after their arrival at the fort one of the boys became ill for more than two weeks with a violent cold. Norton attended the boy personally ensuring that the boy took the European medicines.¹⁰

With the passing of winter the boy recovered and Norton was pleased to report that both boys seemed "...So much Satisfied with our ways & Treatment to them, that they Eat ye Same as we do,

but Drinks nothing but water & Endeavours to Mimicks us in Every thing they see us do, have Learnt them ye Use of a Gun wth which thus they are greatly Delighted and I only wish they may Both Lives to get back to their Friends...".^{11.}

The boys did indeed return safely to their friends and families at Knapps Bay in the summer of 1766. Without doubt the Company would have found it difficult to continue trading with the Inuit had any harm come to the boys. But with the sloop's return the Inuit seemed pleased with their care.

The Esquimaux Seems to be Intearly of Another way of thinking with Reguar'd to us Since we brought ye 2 Boys Saff out to there friends again.^{12.}

Throughout most of the latter part of the sixties and through much of the seventies, Inuit boys stayed often at Churchill to learn English, hunting and trapping. A few, like Hoebuck, St. Helen and Petee Gunee spent more than one winter at the fort.^{13.} One of their group, Santey, over-stayed his welcome and his behaviour prevented him from being invited a second time.^{14.} On two occasions in 1768 and later in 1777, notions of taking two of the boys to England were entertained by the chief officers at Prince of Wales's Fort. Moses Norton hoped that by taking the boys back to England with him in 1768 they might be able to converse with Inuit of Hudson Strait.^{15.} However, in both years none of the boys wished to travel far from their homeland and it does not appear that any ever reached the shores of England.

As important as the role of the Chipewyan at Knapps Bay initially appeared, their presence soon presented severe complications which threatened the development of the trade. The Company perceived

the Chipewyan as providing a supportive role to the predominantly Inuit trade by showing the latter group how to trap furs. However what the Committee had not expected was the persistence of these Indians to continue to trade all types of furs as well as skins at this place and to insist that they receive the usual types of trade goods in return. In 1770 Johnson encountered so much trade with the Chipewyan at Knapps Bay that he ran out of trade goods. The Chipewyan were much incensed at this inconvenience which meant that they would have to make the long journey to Churchill for the desired goods. Governor Norton's explanation, concurred with by the Committee, stated that he believed sending too many trade goods on these northern voyages might affect the Chipewyan dependence on Prince of Wales's Fort.

The presence of the Chipewyan also affected the type of trade goods sent north. During the 1750s a standard assortment of goods were traded with the Inuit: beads (which remained a popular item throughout the forty years of trade) and metal items such as awl blades, fish hooks, files, hatchets, ice chisels, knives and needles. It was not until the appearance of the Chipewyan that such items as brandy, gun powder, shot, guns, blankets and cloth were introduced. (See Tables I to III) The introduction of gun powder and shot is understandable since the Chipewyan had had the use of guns since the establishment of Churchill in 1717. Brandy as well, was a familiar item of trade for them. Blankets and cloth first appeared on the lists of trade goods sent north in 1770 after complaints that these items had not been sent.

As for the Inuit, they had little interest or sufficient

returns to indulge in most of these items. They had little need for blankets and cloth since they made more suitable clothing out of their caribou skins. Guns, however, did become familiar to them after 1765. It has already been noted that the Inuit boys brought back to the fort in 1765 were taught how to use this instrument and the Inuit man designated as leader by the Company servants received a gun as a gift from Moses Norton on the safe return of the boys in the summer of 1766. This introduction of guns is further evidence of the changing attitude of Company servants toward the Inuit. Up until this time the Company had forbidden the trade of firearms to the unpredictable and often violent Inuit. Such behaviour in the Hudson's Bay Company's opinion, made them a poor risk as custodian of such a dangerous weapon. But as Graham himself states,

...we must say in praise of the Esquimaux that they are less given to war. We may charitably imagine this to proceed from a peaceable disposition; though perhaps it may be out of fear, for their southern neighbours having the use of fire-arms, attack the Esquimaux to a great advantage; for the latter until a few years since were not permitted to trade any guns or ammunition.^{19.}

Although guns were sent northward as a trade good during
20.
the period of 1765 to 1790 there is no indication in the sloops' logs or the correspondence that these were actually traded to the Inuit. The reason for this may be explained by the volume and nature of the returns of the Inuit. One gun had the value of 14 MB and since the Inuit rarely brought in returns of such value it is unlikely that an Inuk would be able to purchase such an item.

Tobacco, another item introduced in 1762, appears to have been the exclusive domain of the Chipewyan. Like brandy, there is no indication in the journals that the Inuit had any interest in this item, and indeed Andrew Graham states that "Although all the different nations and tribes of Indians that I am acquainted with are so greatly addicted to smoking tobacco, yet the Esquimaux within the Company's Territories make no use of that plant in any shape whatsoever."^{21.}

Within the first ten years of employing these new techniques to develop the northern trade, the Company could see evidence of success. (See Tables IV and V) For the first time since resuming the sloop voyages in 1750 the Company realized an account of sales which exceeded their expenditure on crew members' salaries in 1767.^{22.} By 1775 the peak had been reached with the returns realizing a sale value of £615.9.7 (See Chart I & II)

It is doubtful that this increase in trade was due to the efforts of the Company's servants to introduce the Inuit to the fur trade. On the contrary, as early as 1766 an old Inuk told Johnson that although they would try to catch the desired furs his people rarely encountered them during their migrations.^{23.} Andrew Graham, chief at Prince of Wales's Fort, recognized by 1774 that the Inuit were still not bringing in significant numbers of furs and that, indeed, their trading habits had altered little over the past ten years.

Mr. Johnson receives the Wolves and Deer-skins from the Esquimaux and the few furs he gets is from the near Northern Indians who hunts Geese for us in the Spring; after doing us this service they directly proceed to Cape Esquimaux join these poor people, kill Deer and what else they can

scrape together and barter with Mr. Johnston;
 the Esquimaux then retire to their unknown
 winter quarters;...^{24.}

Graham's perception of the situation prompted him to agree to Johnson's suggestion that more trade with the Inuit might be obtained at Marble Island. Johnson sailed to Marble Island in the years 1774, 1775 and 1776, but with little success. The limited number of caribou deterred the Inuit from extending their hunt to this island and by 1776 Johnson was convinced that the natives brought all they had to trade to Whale Cove.^{25.}

The years 1778 and 1779 saw a sharp drop in the returns realized by this trade. (See Chart II & Table IV) One factor contributing to this decrease was climate. In 1778 heavy ice delayed the Charlotte in reaching the usual trading spots of Nevill Bay and Whale Cove, until late July. By that time the majority of Inuit had already begun their migration inland. In 1779 heavy ice continued to plague the Bay. On this northward voyage Johnson was forced to turn back to Churchill after twisting the rudder and breaking the tiller of the sloop. As a result no trade at all was conducted for the year.

The appearance of the Chipewyan at Knapps Bay continued to be a source of disruption to this northern trade and indirectly contributed to the decline in returns at the end of the seventies. Samuel Hearne, who assumed the command of Prince of Wales's Fort in January of 1776, had developed his own view on this northern trade. In 1777 Hearne ordered Johnson "not to trade any furs from the Northern Indians as it answers no other end than shortening their Journey & at the same time gives them an opportunity of cheating

the Company of many debts which they have contracted at this Factory a practice which many of them have been long accustomed to." The following spring, after the Committee had been able to assess the returns of that year's trade they voiced their displeasure at the fact that Johnson had been prohibited from trading furs valued at 1000 MB.^{27.}

In the fall of 1778 Hearne replied to the Committee's charges in several long letters. Hearne defended his actions by reiterating his reason for ordering Johnson to restrict trade to the Chipewyan. He reminded the London Committee that the reason the trade was allowed at all with the Chipewyan at Knapps Bay was to give these Indians a chance to dispose of the heavy, cumbersome caribou skins. Like Graham in 1774, he stated,

but at the same time must beg leave to observe that as the furr Trade encreases to the North it must decrease here in ye same proportion for as all the Furrs that has or may hereafter be traded from the Northern Indians would be brought to the Factory, consequently it is only Intersepting part of the established Trade here, and cannot be considered as a real increase tho brought through a nother Channell.^{28.}

As logical as these explanations were the London Committee had little sympathy for Hearne's arbitrary action. Their displeasure at his behaviour remained and in May of 1779 they ordered him to direct the new sloop master, George Holt, to collect all the furs and trade possible during his voyage.^{29.}

Hearne's criticism of the northern trade was not only based on his assessment of the fur trade of the period but also on his belief, presumably fostered by his own travels to the Arctic Ocean and the Saskatchewan, that the expansion of the Company's

trade should be directed inland to compete with the pedlars. In this respect Hearne had reported to the Committee his attempt to develop trade with the natives of the Athabasca by sending some of the Chipewyan into the interior. The Committee approved of his actions but reiterated their belief that "...We think Our own Vessel is a safer and expeditious method for bringing to Our Factor whatever Trade Mr. Johnston may be able to collect and therefore not to be interrupted."^{30.}

In this regard the London Committee proposed in 1781 that an attempt be made to expand the trade up Chesterfield Inlet to Baker Lake. Although they realized that the barrenness of the area would prevent even the building of a trading post at Baker Lake they still felt that a market might be created if the natives were notified that the sloop would visit the area at a stated time period each year. Such a proposal illustrates their concern for the survival of not only the sloop trade but also that of Churchill. By this time increased competition from the pedlars had resulted in the trade of Churchill being cut off and the returns reduced.^{31.}

Asked for his opinion, Hearne in his usual fashion, minced no words in telling the London Committee that their idea was hopeless. From his knowledge of the area he knew of no tribes of natives who possessed furs in such a northern area. Furthermore if the Charlotte was sent north it would mean that she would have to go straight for that area without stopping to trade at the usual places. By the time she returned homeward, the natives would have returned inland. This time Hearne's explanations were accepted and the Committee abandoned the plan for the time being.^{32.}

The voyages of George Holt in 1780 and 1781 were characterized by a moderate increase in returns, probably as a result of the renewed trade in furs with the Chipewyan. Certainly little increase resulted from trade with the Inuit since Holt found them to be in a destitute state and unwilling to part with their meagre supply of oil, blubber and caribou skins.^{33.}

With the French conquest of Prince of Wales's Fort in 1782 the trade of the west coast of Hudson Bay suffered a devastating blow. In the fall of 1783 Hearne returned to re-establish the Company's operations at Churchill. With the stone fort in ruins all the men were employed in re-building quarters "near or upon the place where the Old Wooden Factory stood".^{34.} The Indians who had frequented the post prior to the French attack had either died (as a result of the smallpox epidemic of 1781) or turned over most of their trade to the pedlars who had pressed deeper into the Athabasca in their quest for furs. With the desired European commodities so close to home the Chipewyan (for whose trade Churchill had originally been established in 1717) had no need to make the long trip to Churchill or for that matter to Knapps Bay on the coast.

But in spite of (or perhaps because of) this decrease in trade Hearne again received orders from London to resume the sloop voyages.

Our constant regard for the service of the Public in general equally with our attention to the Interests of the Company (which We deem inseparable) render it necessary that the Discoveries and Trade to the Northward be prosecuted as much as possible.^{35.}

Hearne's opinions regarding the resumption of this line of trade

had altered little in the past two years. In his annual letter home in September of 1784 he explained that the sloop had not been sent north as ordered because the men were needed to retrieve bricks, lead, etc from the old stone fort and thus did not have time to unload the 50 tons of dry goods she carried until the late summer. 36. However, Hearne did not let this opportunity pass by without reiterating his feelings on the whole issue of this northern trade.

The Northern Trade has for many years been Honoured with a greater share of your attention than it deserved, and it is the Interest of some persons in your service to Confirm you in your present opinion You must certainly greatly underrate my knowledge of your service, and true Interest have frequently heard my sentiments on that subject both by letter as well as verbally when in England last year. I never will alter my opinion as it is founded on a thorough knowledge of every advantage or disadvantage real or imaginary that can possibly be gained or lost on that Trade, But as it is the duty of a Servant to obey the commands of his masters, You may in future depend on my readiness to forward that Branch, tho I know it is contrary to that system of Policy which always ought to be carefully observed in this Country-- That I have ever been unjustly censured respecting the Northern Trade is but too True and that I shall continue so to be is much to be feared, for should that Branch not answer your utmost expectations and wishes, I am sure to be blamed, and should I transfer any part of the established trade from this place to the Sloop, I should then be highly blamable nor is there any medium -- Where a Servants Interest is so immediately connected with that of his Masters as mine is with Your Honours, it required very little persuasion (Discretionary Power would be quite sufficient) to make them exert their abilities to the utmost in promoting the general good. 37.

The last six years of voyages northward failed to bring to fruition the Committee's dream of a valuable northern trade with the Inuit. Hearne continued half-heartedly to order the sloop northward during his last few years with the Company.

As at other times when the trade had been halted for a year or two the Sloop Master had to re-establish trade relations with the Inuit who had abandoned the usual stopping places. On the initial voyage of 1785, the sloop did not leave Churchill until July 19, and the already minimal trade was compounded by the fact that the sloop arrived later than usual at the trading points along the coast. Any natives who might have been available to trade had already made their move inland by the end of July.

38.

Hearne continued to campaign against the encouragement of Chipewyan trading at Knapps Bay. In 1785 he tried once again to bring the Committee around to his way of thinking about this northern trade.

I have ever acknowledged that if the Esquimaux Trade alone and independent of drawing the Northern Indians from their wonted place of Trade, is sufficient to defrey the expence of the Sloop it may then be justly looked upon as real encrease of the general Trade at this Place...

39.

He also tried to explain why the Chipewyan should not be encouraged to go north to trade because of the frequency of fraudulent trade that inevitably resulted. According to Hearne the only Indians who travelled up the coast were the annual traders at the post,

who from long custom are frequently permitted to take up goods on trust, but to evade the payment there of they go and Trade their Furrs with your Sloop Master, by which means many considerable Debts are entirely lost, and the Company are Saddled with a Premium of £12 1/2 pr Cent for the very same goods that would most assuredly have been brought to their Factory at less than £2 1/2 pr cent. This I think cannot be called an encrease but to the Contarary [sic] is well known to have occasioned [sic] a great deminution.

40.

The Committee considered Hearne's arguments and attempted to offer a solution to the problem of fraudulent trade. However, Hearne responded bluntly to what he must have considered a very naive solution,

...for no Sloop Master that consults his own Interest will ever see clear enough when at the Northward to know the Factory debtors (tho they might have been pointed out to him with the greatest care and attention) well knowing that every skin he receive on that score lessen's his own emolument. Your Chiefs can have no such interested Views in preventing the Northern Indian from Trading with the Sloop Master for as long as they have a Premium on that Trade they receive more than double the emolument on the Northern Indians' Furs Traded to the Northward⁴¹ than on what they collect at the Factory.

Hearne's protests seemed to have had little effect on the Committee's enthusiasm for this northern trade and by the time he left Churchill in the fall of 1787, there was still no order from London to discontinue the trade.

The decision to suspend the trading voyages was finally sent to the Bay in 1790.⁴² Even at this time it is not certain from the records that the Committee believed the voyages would be permanently terminated. The directive to William Jefferson, chief at Churchill Fort, to dispense with trade on the next year's northward voyage was prompted by the Committee's decision to support an expedition in search of the Northwest Passage.⁴³

Why the Committee agreed to support yet another voyage of exploration into its chartered territory is related in part to the developments of the late 1780s. Trade at Churchill had been declining since the mid-seventies with the increasing activity of the pedlars. As early as 1778 the Committee had realized the

necessity of locating a route into the Athabasca to regain the trade lost from Churchill. However, the Committee still clung to the traditional sea approach to the fur rich areas of the interior and proposed such an expedition in 1781.^{44.} Hearne's dismissal of this project as wasted expenditure coupled with the French invasion of 1782 distracted the Committee's pursuit of this idea for some years.

By 1789 the Company had still not found any route between Hudson Bay and the Athabasca and the seriousness of the situation prompted them to undertake three expeditions: one sea and two overland into the area.^{45.}

The Company's commitment to another sea expedition resulted not only from their desire to find a quick, efficient route to the interior but also from the renewed British activity in the search for a Northwest Passage. Alexander Dalrymple, geographer and at this time hydrographer for the East India Company was an avid proponent of the existence of such a passage to the Orient. The failure of Cook to find an opening on the west coast spurred Dalrymple to look more closely at the geography of Hudson Bay. With the assistance of Governor Samuel Wegg, Dalrymple was given access to the extensive cartographic archives of the Hudson's Bay Company.

Dalrymple published his conclusions in his pamphlet A Plan for Promoting the Fur Trade.^{46.} In this work Dalrymple proposed that the furs collected by the Hudson's Bay Company be transported to East India Company vessels on the Pacific coast which would in turn sell them to the markets of Canton.^{47.} This amalgamation

of the two companies would leave the British in complete control of the fur trade on the North American continent. Thus it was crucial that another expedition be sponsored in search of this route.

Dalrymple's pressure on both the Company and the British government to sponsor an expedition was successful. In 1789 the Company agreed to a jointly sponsored expedition with the British navy to search for a passage to the west. Captain Charles Duncan, an experienced explorer in the British Navy, was appointed by the Government to lead the expedition. Although the London Committee may have entertained some hope of the existence of such a passage it is unlikely that they felt such a route existed along the west coast of Hudson Bay. Hearne's journey to the Coppermine River had left little chance that a viable waterway existed south of the sea he had viewed in 1771. Furthermore Duncan's instructions clearly indicated the influence of Company policy to pursue a trade route into the Athabasca rather than Dalrymple's view in which the coast south of Repulse Bay should be explored.^{48.}

Captain Duncan was ordered to search for the outlet in Hudson Bay of Yathked lake believed to be connected to the Bay by some waterway. If he failed, Duncan was then ordered to travel to Chesterfield Inlet, sail up it to Baker Lake, and then travel overland to Yathked and Dobaunt Lakes. When he reached this point he was to send George Dixon to search for a route to the Pacific by way of Hearne's Lake Arathapescow and Pond's Slave Lake. If a passage was discovered then Duncan was to sail through to the Pacific coast. From there he was to return or go on to China.^{49.}

Duncan arrived in the Bay too late in the season of 1790 to undertake any explorations. Moreover, he found the sloop Churchill put at his disposal for the expedition in a decrepit state. Duncan returned to England determined to buy a strong brig before venturing again to the Bay. His next attempt to fulfill his orders ended in frustration when ice delayed him in Hudson Strait in 1791 and bad weather held him at Marble Island. Undaunted he determined to winter at Churchill and venture northward as soon as possible the next year. 50.

In July of 1792 Duncan and his crew sailed north examining the coast for any likely inlets and finally entering Chesterfield Inlet. Just as Norton and Christopher had determined some thirty years before, Duncan found that the Inlet ended at Baker Lake. He did not fulfill that part of his orders directing him to travel overland to the Yathked and Dobaunt Lakes, perhaps because of the lateness of the season. Disheartened, Duncan returned to Churchill and then to England.

This final expedition sponsored by the Company for discoveries along the west coast of Hudson Bay was estimated to have cost £3000 and revealed no new information. In short it had only confirmed the opinions of Middleton, Norton, and Hearne that no route to the west lay along the coast of Hudson Bay. The postponements of the sea expedition in the early nineties plus the mounting opposition from the pedlars at this time turned the London Committee's energies to the fur trade of the interior. The Inuit, instead, were encouraged to come south to Churchill if they wished to trade their skins for European goods.

The termination of trade voyages northward along the

west coast of Hudson Bay thus cannot be seen as the direct result of low returns. By far the more compelling causes of their cessation were the capture of Prince of Wales's Fort in 1782 and the intensification of pedlar activity in the Athabasca during the last fifteen years of these voyages. A lesser but still important factor was the renewed interest in the search for the Northwest Passage led by Alexander Dalrymple. Given the experiences of the 1740s the London Committee of the 1780s was more willing to acquiesce to public demand for another voyage of exploration.^{51.} The cumulative effects of these events necessitated a reassessment of the overall policy of the fur trade and the Company had little alternative but to dispense with a trading venture that offered no assurance of financial reward.

TABLE I

GOODS TRADED, 1761 to 1769

Trade Goods	1761	1762	1763	1764	1765	1766	1767	1768	1769
Awl Blades	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Bayonets	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X
Beads		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Brandy		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Burning Glasses							X	X	X
Combs									
Files	X	X	0*	X	X	X	X	X	X
Fire Steels						X	X	X	X
Fish Hooks		0		0	0			X	X
Flints		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Guns							0		
Hatchets									
Middling	X	0				X	X	X	X
Small	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X
Hawks Bells		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Ice Chisels									
Broad	0	X	X	X	0	X	X	0	X
Narrow	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Knives									
Long	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Jack	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Box Handle				X	X	X	X	X	X
Roach	X	X	X	X	X				
Needles	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Powder					X	X	X	X	X
Scissors									
Scrapers	X					X		X	X
Sword Blades	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Shot									
Duck		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Partridge	X								
Bristol					X	X	X		X
Tobacco		X			X	X	X	X	X

* Trade Good was sent north but not traded

TABLE III

GOODS TRADED, 1780 to 1790

Trade Good	1780	1781	1785	1786	1787	1788	1789	1790
Awl Blades	X	0	X	X	X	0	X	0
Bayonets	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Beads	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Brandy		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Burning Glasses								
Blankets & Cloth			X	X	X	X	X	X
Combs	0	X	X	0				
Files	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Fire Steels	0	0	0	X	X	0	0	0
Flint	0	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Fish Hooks	X	X	0	0				
Guns		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Hatchets								
Middling	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Small			X					
Hawks Bells	0	X	0	0	X	X	X	X
Ice Chisels								
Narrow	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Broad	X	X	0	X	X	0	X	X
Kettles								0
Knives								
Long			X	X	X	X	X	X
Jack	X	X	X	X	X	X	0	X
Roach	X	X	0	X	0	0	0	X
Box Handle	X	X	0	X			X	X
Looking Glass			0	0				
Needles	X	X	0	0				
Powder	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Powder Horns	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Scissors								
Scrapers		X			0	0	0	0
Sword Blades	X	X	0	0			X	0

TABLE IIIGOODS TRADE, 1780 to 1790

<u>Trade Good</u>	<u>1780</u>	<u>1781</u>	<u>1785</u>	<u>1786</u>	<u>1787</u>	<u>1788</u>	<u>1789</u>	<u>1790</u>
Shot								
Duck	X	X		X	X	0	X	X
Partridge				X				
Bristol	X	X	X		X	X		X
Tobacco		X	X	X	X	X	X	X

TABLE IV

TRADE RETURNS & SALES

52.

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>WHALEBONE</u>	<u>OIL</u>	<u>FURS</u>	<u>SKINS</u>	<u>ACCOUNT OF SALES</u>	<u>PRINCE OF WALES'S FORT ACCOUNT OF SALES</u>
1761	[no information available]				£131.8.7	£ 6329.13.3
1762		3 hgh	1	-	19.6.5	6837.11.6
1763	[no information available]				89.0.11	8828.5.0
1764	120 lbs	6 hgh	6	-	54.6.7	3893.13.9
1765	88 lbs	15 hgh	59	-	96.7.8	8013.3.8
1766	27 lbs	10 hgh	41	80	71.11.8	5626.1.0
1767	90 lbs		251	150	151.15.9	5250.12.5
1768	828 lbs	2 hgh	148	300	308.12.6	6873.7.5
1769	100 lbs	7 hgh	676	280	401.19.9	4073.5.1
1770	148 lbs	1 hgh	959	310	467.0.0	9502.13.6
1771	282 lbs	4.5 hgh	887	376	464.5.0	8554.16.5
1772			148	853	220.3.11	1454.11.11
1773			6	100	151.14.3	7824.2.0
1774	249 lbs		476	824	389.6.0	11039.17.11
1775	980 lbs		230	1082	615.9.7	6345.10.6
1776	2400 lbs	1 hgh	236	1290	592.5.9	6818.11.8
1777	1400 lbs				559.10.8	10179.18.8
1778		2/3 hgh	189	330	215.10.0	5376.17.5
1779	[No voyage]					
1780	168 lbs	5 hgh	432	1185	393.0.4	7498.1.0

TABLE IV

TRADE RETURNS & SALES

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>WHALEBONE</u>	<u>OIL</u>	<u>FURS</u>	<u>SKINS</u>	<u>ACCOUNT OF SALES</u>	<u>PRINCE OF WALES'S FORT ACCOUNT OF SALES</u>
1781			569	783	£ 515.14.8	£ 9091.5.5
1782-1784	[No voyages]					
1785	342 lbs	1 hgh	84	467	321.12.8	3033.10.7
1786	168 lbs	5 hgh	259	563	419.17.2	3732.9.8
1787	28 lbs	5 hgh	390	513	378.12.3	4991.15.3
1788		1 hgh	128	539	192.16.10	4934.14.6
1789			177	795	260.13.6	5553.12.0
1790			349	701	251.8.0	3590.2.2

TABLE V

WAGES

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>SLOOP MASTER</u>	<u>MATE</u>	<u>SHIPWRIGHT</u>	<u>SAILORS</u>	<u>LABOURERS</u>	<u>TOTAL WAGES</u>
1761	[No information traced]					
1762	£40(Christopher)	£30	£ 36	£ 80	£ 28	£254
	40(Norton)					
1763	30	20		40	26	116
1764	40	20		40	45	145
1765	40	15		68	6	129
1766	40	15		54	15	124
1767	40	25		45	28	138
1768	40	18		75	10	143
1769	40	36		15		[91] ^{53.}
1770	40	15	36	65	10	166
1771	40	15	36	65	10	166
1772	40	15	36	50	22	163
1773	40	30	40	65	46	221
1774	40	25		110	46	221
1775	40	25		90		155
1776	40	25	36	60	10	171
1777	40	28		63	10	141
1778	40	28		99		167

TABLE VWAGES

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>SLOOP MASTER</u>	<u>MATE</u>	<u>SHIPWRIGHT</u>	<u>SAILORS</u>	<u>LABOURERS</u>	<u>TOTAL WAGES</u>
1779	£ 40	£ 28		£ 101		£ 169
1780	40	20		98		158
1781	[No information traced]					
1782-1784	[No voyages]					
1785	36	15		60	£ 10	121
1786	36	15		75	10	136
1787	36	30		81	10	157
1788	20	15	£ 36	61	12	144
1789	46	15	36	84		181
1790	46	18	36	81	30	181



CHART I

ACCOUNT OF SALES OF SLOOP VOYAGE
RETURNS



CHART II

ACCOUNT OF SALES OF SLOOP VOYAGE

RETURNS



CHART III

ACCOUNT OF SALES OF SLOOP VOYAGE

RETURNS

CHAPTER VFOOTNOTES

1. Magnus Johnson entered the Company's service in 1752 as a sailor and served on Northern Expeditions from 1753 to 1779. He was appointed Sloop Master of the Churchill in 1764. PAM/HBCA A16/10 and A16/11
2. The Company's servants no doubt recalled the massacre of Inuit by Chipewyan reported by Master John Bean in 1756. PAM/HBCA A11/14, fo 14
3. PAM/HBCA B42/a/62, fo 22; See also Footnote 37, Chapter III.
4. Glyndwr Williams, ed., Andrew Graham's Observations on Hudson's Bay 1767-91. Hudson's Bay Record Society, Volume XXVII. (London: Hudson's Bay Record Society, 1969) pp. xlviiii, xlix
5. No hostility between Chipewyan and Inuit was recorded by Captain William Christopher or Moses Norton in their journals for 1762. PAM/HBCA B42/a/57 & 58
6. Just where Doll came from is unclear from the records. Doll served as an interpreter on voyages of 1764 to 1769. She died on September 15, 1769 leaving a small child. Of her death Moses Norton wrote:
 "the Death of the Woman I doubt will be a Loss to the Northern Trade with the Esquimaux as she has been of great Service in Assisting to make Peace between the Northern Indians and her Country People..." PAM/HBCA B42/a/77, fo, 2d
7. There is no indication in any of the journals that force was ever used to persuade Inuit to return to Churchill. As will be seen many boys were eager to travel with the sloop in the years that followed.
8. PAM/HBCA B42/a/63, fo 23
9. PAM/HBCA B42/a/64, fo 9d
10. Ibid., fo 14d
11. Ibid., fos 14d-15
12. PAM/HBCA B42/a/65, fo 19
13. Petee Gunee, at Churchill winters of 1768 and 1770. St. Helen, at Churchill, winters of 1771 and 1772. Hoebuck, at Churchill winters of 1775 and 1777.

14. Santey spent the winter of 1776/77 at Churchill. Just how he offended the Company is not clearly described in the journal but Hearne insisted that "his principles are too vile to recommend him to the notice of any Europeans". PAM/HBCA B42/a/94, fo 39
15. The other years, 1777, Hearne agreed to try and send two boys home, as ordered by the London Committee in their letter to Graham dated May 15, 1776. PAM/HBCA B42/a/70, B 45d; A6/12, fo 57
16. PAM/HBCA B42/a/78, fo 38; A6/11, fo 128d
17. Brandy was sent first in 1762; gun powder in 1765 and shot in 1762.
18. Johnson reported in his log "...but the Natives Greatly lamented [sic] ye want of guns & a little Cloth So that I was obliged to trade My own blankets, as they absolutely refused to go to the factory before the fall of the year..." PAM/HBCA B42/a/75, fo 31,32
19. Williams, Andrew Graham, p. 236
20. Guns were sent north in 1767, 1771, 1774-1778, 1785-1790. However they were actually traded only in years 1774-1778 and 1785-90.
21. As it will be noted, tobacco became a very important trade good to the Inuit in the nineteenth century. See W. Gillies Ross, Whaling & Eskimos: Hudson Bay 1860-1915. National Museums of Canada. (Publications in Ethnology, no. 10) (Ottawa, 1975) pp. 69-70; Williams, Andrew Graham, p. 237
22. See Chapter III, Tables I and II
23. PAM/HBCA B42/a/65, fo 13
24. PAM/HBCA A11/15, fo 9d
25. PAM/HBCA B42/a/93, fo 32d
26. PAM/HBCA B42/a/94, fo 39
27. PAM/HBCA A6/12, fo 108d
28. PAM/HBCA A11/15, fo 47
29. This directive is somewhat surprising considering their agreement with Governor Norton in 1770 that the Chipewyan should not lose their dependence on Prince of Wales's Fort for trade. PAM/HBCA A6/12, fo 136
30. PAM/HBCA A6/12, fo 108d

31. E.E. Rich, Hudson's Bay Company, 1670-1870. Vol II: 1763-1820. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1960) p. 116
32. The London Committee would revive this plan in 1790 with the voyage of Captain Charles Duncan. PAM/HBCA A11/15, fo 81; A6/13, fo 46d.
33. PAM/HBCA B42/a/101, fo 23d
34. France joined the Americans in war against England in 1778. The Treaties of Paris and Versailles ended the War of American Independence. PAM/HBCA A6/13, fo 78.
35. PAM/HBCA A6/13, fo 106d
36. PAM/HBCA A11/15, fo 106
37. Ibid., fos 105d-106
38. The reduced number of natives encountered, including Chipewyan were not doubt the result of the smallpox epidemic of 1782 which devastated large numbers of Chipewyan and Cree. PAM/HBCA B42/a/105, fo 12d
39. PAM/HBCA A11/15, fo 118
40. Ibid., fo 118d
41. Ibid., fo 126. All crew members continued to receive a percentage of the profit during the period 1760-1790.
42. PAM/HBCA A6/14, fo 105d
43. Ibid.
44. *Supra*, p. 122
45. Glyndwr Williams, The British Search for the Northwest Passage in the Eighteenth Century. (London: Royal Commonwealth Society, 1962) pp. 239-40
46. Alexander Dalrymple, A Plan for Promoting the Fur Trade and Securing it to This Country by Uniting the Operations of the East India and Hudson's Bay Companys. (London: 1789)
47. The Hudson's Bay Company at this time sold their furs through the Russian market, which in turn sold them to China. Williams, The British Search for the Northwest Passage, p. 225
48. Ibid., p. 242
49. Ibid., pp. 242-243
50. Ibid., pp. 246-247

51. However, it should be noted here as well that the positive publicity which this venture generated did not harm the Company's interests at a time when its Charter still operated without Parliamentary approval.
52. Table IV compiled from PAM/HBCA B42/d , Churchill Account Books and A14/10-12, Grand Ledger.
Statistics on the amounts of whalebone, oil, furs and skins were taken from lists in sloops' logs indicating returns sent home. Not all lists for all voyages have survived and the figures should not be construed as being exactly the quantity sold in London. However, for the purposes of this study it will provide some indication of the pattern of trade of these items.
53. 1769. This total is just an estimate since no crew list was traced in the Archives for this voyage.

CONCLUSION

The desire to establish a lucrative trade with the Inuit along the north west coast of Hudson Bay was the chief pre-occupation of the Hudson's Bay Company for over seventy years. Beginning with the establishment of Churchill in 1717, the Company sought through exploration, expansion and experimentation to diversify the trade. These efforts though revealing much geographic information, failed to provide any substantial financial return. The preceding chapters have demonstrated that the Company persisted in such a venture in spite of continued heavy losses for economic reasons. Political pressure, a recurring influence during the period, played a less important role.

After two vain attempts to have its Charter approved by Parliament the Company proceeded cautiously in the first half of the eighteenth century to re-evaluate and consolidate its investment in the North American fur trade. The first expansionist venture involved the establishment of Churchill in 1717 to tap the trade of the Chipewyan and to diversify the limited trade at Churchill. The sporadic voyages of these first few decades were primarily exploratory intended to determine the possible resources, mineral or otherwise, of an unknown and often forbidding coastline.

The failure to receive Parliamentary approval of its Charter had left the Company in a tenuous situation vis a vis its monopoly of the fur trade. In time an avid promoter of British commercial expansion, Arthur Dobbs, discovered this omission and made it a basis for attack on the Company in the 1740s. This weakness in the Charter coupled with the pursuit of a renewed search for

the Northwest Passage brought the Company's operations under public scrutiny. The Parliamentary Inquiry of 1749 although not providing the statutory affirmation the Company desired did support the Company's claims to their chartered territory.

As relieved as the Committee must have been at the outcome of this inquiry the fear of another public attack on its monopoly lingered, colouring the Company's future trade policies for years to come. The voyages of the 1750s were conducted thus with two views in mind: the possible existence of a Northwest Passage to allay any future criticism of Company behaviour; and the development of trade with an unknown people along the coast. Little was accomplished in either category until the 1760s when the voyages of William Christopher and Moses Norton into Chesterfield Inlet eliminated the possibility of a passage along the west coast of Hudson Bay. Their discoveries also revealed to the Committee the first possibilities of lucrative trade with the Inuit as well as the opportunity to develop a whale fishery.

The potential of whaling to be a profitable industry was widely known in eighteenth century Britain. The price of whalebone and whale oil tempted many enterprising merchants to invest heavily in such a venture. Thus it is not surprising that the Hudson's Bay Company was eager to exploit such an opportunity. The London Committee of the sixties, however, resisted making any expenditures on experienced men and adequate equipment, thus dooming the venture to failure. The inexperience of both the servants in the Bay and the London Committee became apparent and there is little indication in the surviving records that the Committee consulted with any individuals

who had either invested in such an industry or had operated a whaling vessel in the Greenland fishery. Why the Committee would continue to isolate itself from the expertise that might have made the venture a success is not easily explained. The haunting reminders of the disruption of trade by interlopers in the Bay during the late seventeenth century and in the 1740s may well have caused the Committee to avoid divulging their plans to anyone outside the Company.

The trade of the decades before the French capture of Prince of Wales's Fort in 1782 brought the first benefits from the Company's investment in the coastal trade. Once the coastline had been charted and the possibility of a Northwest Passage eliminated by 1764, the Committee was able to concentrate on the task of developing the trade. However, unlike the whale fishery at Marble Island the Company's failure to make this a lucrative trade lay not in financial investment and expertise, but rather in the inability of the Inuit to adopt the recognized native-European mode of trade. The seasonal migrations of the Inuit across the Barrens in search of the caribou seldom brought them into contact with the fur-bearing animals of the forests of the south. Company servants although told of this fundamental pattern of Inuit life, doggedly continued to try all possible methods to encourage the Inuit to change. Their attempts were in vain. The only items the Inuit brought in to trade were surplus whalebone, whale oil, and caribou skins. For the most part any increase in the returns of the area were the result of the Chipewyan participation in the trade.

Political and economic factors played havoc with the

Committee's intention of resuming the trading voyages after 1782. The capture of Prince of Wales's Fort by the French, the smallpox epidemic and the subsequent interruption of trade relations with the Inuit sealed the fate of the sloop voyages northward. The advance of the pedlars into the Athabasca had seriously restricted the trade to Churchill, and the Committee was forced to face the fact that it would have to move inland as well if the trade was to be preserved.

The influence of the writings of Alexander Dalrymple and others at this time forced the Company once again to review its policy towards the existence of a Northwest Passage. As in the 1740s attacks on its operations brought the Company once again into the public eye. Edward Umfreville who served the Company at Severn and York between 1771 and 1783 left the service under less than amiable circumstances. His disenchantment with the Company for not promoting him and according him the salary of his choosing came forth in his publication The Present State of Hudson's Bay (London, 1790). Like Robson some forty years before, Umfreville berated the Company for its failure to pursue the inland trade and for the overbearing nature of its officers. The appearance of such a publication at the same time that Dalrymple was pushing for a renewed search for the Northwest Passage no doubt influenced the London Committee's decision to co-sponsor another expedition. With its Charter still requiring statutory confirmation the Company could not risk a public scandal and the possibility of another parliamentary inquiry.

What if anything then did these forty years of trade achieve for the Hudson's Bay Company? At the very least the London Committee could feel confident that all avenues of commercial

exploitation along the coast had been exhausted. The Inuit would by 1790 be encouraged to travel to Churchill, thus eliminating any further expenditure on voyages northward.

With the elimination of any viable trade route to the Orient through the Company's chartered territory the British navy took over the task of exploration through the Arctic waters north of the Bay during the following century. For Britain, and for that matter the rest of Europe, the knowledge derived from the Company's voyages of exploration helped to bring to a close the search for a Northwest Passage along the west coast of Hudson Bay.

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