

**Lawrence Kohlberg, the Just Community,
and Second Language Education**

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Abstract

This paper is concerned with the relationship between moral education and language education. The central premise is that the need for moral education in the curriculum makes the need for a moral component in language education explicit. Lawrence Kohlberg's concept of the Just Community School serves as perhaps the best model upon which a moral language classroom can be constructed.

This paper is divided into four main parts.

Part One is a general overview of the ancient Greek philosophy of moral education. The intent of this section is to show that moral concerns were at one time central to determining the form of curriculum. The ideas of the ancient Greeks act both as the starting point for a discussion of Kohlberg's theories and as general background, and are specific to Kohlberg's research and conceptualisation of the Just Community.

Part Two is a biography of Lawrence Kohlberg, with a description of his theory of stages of moral judgement and some of the main points of controversy regarding this theory. The controversy has not been resolved, and by no means is the author of this paper convinced of the validity of the theory of stages of moral judgement. But they present both an intriguing perspective on the codification of moral behaviour, as well as the point of origin for Kohlberg's work in the Just Community.

Part Three is a description of the application of Kohlberg's theories to education, in what he termed, "Just Community Schools." Two well-documented examples of these schools are the focus of this

part, illustrating some of the difficulties encountered, and also how the perspective of what were the Just Community School's objectives could affect the success or failure of such schools.

Part Four is a general discussion of ideas for utilising the Just Community idea in adult English as a Second Language education. These ideas are drawn with little practical support, and are based upon the premise that immigrants to Canada and the United States require a moral component to language instruction in order to maintain the existence of a working democracy, which is the Just Community writ large.

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Preface

My background is teaching adult English as a Foreign Language (EFL), primarily in the area of English for business or technical purposes. Neither I nor my colleagues had much opportunity to consider the moral implications of what we did, beyond specific issues related to business ethics. For example, in teaching businessmen how to negotiate in English, it was necessary at times to teach them how to be evasive, or to disguise the truth in such a way that it would fit the patterns of evasion used by American businessmen. We used to call this unit 'Mendacity 301'.

Honesty is an interesting quality. It seems to be far less significant than other qualities of character that influence how we treat each other. On the surface, there appears to be no reason why a lack of honesty should directly result in anyone's suffering.

However, if considered carefully, it becomes obvious that honesty is unequivocally crucial to communication, and so to society. Assume that the telling of lies is the norm. Every time someone says, "yes, I did," you cannot be certain if they did or did not. If someone tells you, "today is Wednesday," you cannot be sure if it is, or if it is any one of six other days. If a person tells you, "I bought a magazine," in fact they may have borrowed, or sold, or stolen it; or it may not have been a magazine, but instead a hamster, a packet of soup mix, or a pair of shoes; it may not have been them, but rather their sister, or a stranger, or a long dead ancestor. The whole interpersonal function of language becomes meaningless if honesty is not taken for granted (This is

not a new idea. Swift also comments on this in one of Gulliver's Travels).

There is a kind of sophomoric parlour game aspect to this, imagining the way our society would be if certain values did not exist. Speculating in this manner convinces us that certain characteristics of behaviour are, in fact, relative only to specific cultures.

However, many elements of morality are rooted in species survival. We abhor cruelty and evil because they, ultimately, result in the loss of human life. They diminish us, both spiritually and as a species. The greater the expanse of evil, the greater the loss.

These were idle thoughts I had while first working on a paper on Lawrence Kohlberg for a course in curriculum. I was completely unfamiliar with Kohlberg, and if I'd had a choice of topics, moral education in the curriculum would have been my last selection for a term paper.

My initial reaction when encountering Kohlberg's work was a kind of anthropocentric indignation. I was incensed that someone could actually have been allowed to abuse the scientific research paradigm so far as to attempt to quantify human morality. I felt there was something vaguely medieval about this, similar to those catalogue books that listed the varieties of demons who exist in each circle of Hell, the number of precious stones possessed by Prester John, the antidotes to the salamander's poison.

At the same time, I felt that to attack Kohlberg's work on

these lines was to look too much at the form and not at the substance. In one sense, phenomenology is a kind of vanity, a belief that we are more complex than we can know. It is this vanity that causes us to assume that human behaviour cannot be analyzed through objective criteria.

Plato wrote his dialogues with the intent to reveal the parameters and potentials of two questions, how should we live? And, knowing that, how can we live? Lawrence Kohlberg was very much a member of that philosophic tradition. Thinking this, I came to appreciate the effort he had undergone to create such a body of research in order to support the goal of defining our moral existence. From reading books on moral education, I confess I became obsessed with morality, although I still understand very little. Again and again, I fall back to the basic assumption that if we cannot address the issue of improving the way human beings act, then all other improvements, technical, intellectual, physical, become meaningless.

The connection between language and thought is one that intrigues me, and I have always been interested in writing something on that relationship. When the idea for this review paper was suggested to me by Dr. Sheldon Rosenstock, I saw this as an opportunity to look at a specific aspect of that relationship, the connection between our moral identity and linguistic competence. Kohlberg, as he is one of the more significant figures in the field of moral education, could act as a guide in exploring that connection. I am grateful both to Dr. Rosenstock for

providing me with that inspiration, and for Dr. Pat Mathews for giving his approval and support.

I have drawn upon the writings of Plato and Aristotle, because I am quite conservative and believe in the importance of tradition, and also because they were a strong influence in shaping Kohlberg's ideas. I have used sources by, and about, Kohlberg (I have found no lack of those). Among them I must especially credit the information provided by Dr. Andrew Garrod of Dartmouth College. Dr. Garrod was one of Kohlberg's last doctoral students and was able to provide me with many illuminating observations on Kohlberg's character and appearance.

I have used the writing of Primo Levi as an anchor, a connection to the world at its darkest. Levi was a survivor of Auschwitz who in his memoirs of that experience made several penetrating observations on the links between language and moral identity. This link has also been remarked upon by a vast number of other writers, whom I did not have time to draw upon more than in the most cursory manner.

Much of the final part, which attempts to be of a more practical nature, is still very theoretical. I am not yet a practitioner of moral education. But I recall the words spoken by the leader of the slave rebellion in the movie "Burn." "It is better to know where you are going, and not know how to get there, than to know how to go, and not know where."

Introduction

I understand that they are ordering me to be quiet, but the word is new to me, and since I do not know its meaning and implications, my inquietude increases. The confusion of languages is a fundamental component of the manner of living here: one is surrounded by a perpetual Babel, in which everyone shouts orders and threats in languages never heard before, and woe betide whoever fails to grasp the meaning. No one has time here, no one has patience, no one listens to you; we latest arrivals instinctively collect in the corners, against the walls, afraid of being beaten. (Levi, 1960, p. 44).

"Rafel mai amech zabi almi"
The savage mouth began at once to howl
Such was the sweetest and the only psalm he
Could sing. (Dante, p. 267).

When you are about to converse with any person, make this short speech to yourself: What notions has this man about good and evil? (Marcus Aurelius, p. 167).

Satan speaks a meaningless language, a metaphor for the chaos and calamity of hell. This is an image that has existed as long as the Christian era. It is shared by other cultures: Hell is a place of garbled sound that parodies human speech. And in his harrowing book on Auschwitz, Primo Levi refers several times to the dreamlike incommunicability within the lager. The compound of seemingly identical prisoners is actually a terminus for dozens of ethnic and linguistic groups transported from every country within the Nazi sphere. Each group is unable to speak to or help the other; the only communication is in an argot whose dominant notion is sarcastic irony. "Do you know how one says 'never' in camp slang? 'Morgen früh', tomorrow morning." (Levi, p. 139).

It must have been the same in the Gulags.

In a presentation at the University of Manitoba given in 1993,

C.A. Bowers stated that the complexity of our ideas is directly proportional to the words we know and can therefore use to express these ideas. He states this point again in The Promise of Theory (1984):

Although there are many factors that influence the student's pattern of thought, what happens in the language environment of the classroom, nonetheless, remains fundamentally important. The connection between language and thought...means that educational theorists and classroom teachers cannot be excused from understanding the role that language plays in transmitting the conceptual maps that enables [sic] students to participate in a shared social world. (p. 73).

He has made this point to support the sociology of knowledge, however the link between our consciousness and the language we use to express it is so tightly interwoven that it itself exists as a root metaphor, entrenched in human existence. "We do not speak to ourselves so much as speak ourselves. We provide our self-consciousness with its only and constantly renewed guarantee of particular survival by beaming a current of words inward." (Steiner, 1971. p. 64).

Language may not be unique to man, and not all men have language, but both those ideas can only be expressed through language. As with all true root metaphors, the boundary of our linguistic consciousness is so vast that it can contain its own contradictions.

The ancient Greeks saw a direct connection between being able to describe human virtue and directing their lives to achieve it, almost as if lack of words would result in the lack of a moral orientation to frame them. "When Adam names the animals paraded

before him, the name magically is the animal - and Plato still believed that the word creates the thing." (Hook, 1979. p. 59).

By the same token, we must be able to describe the evil so that we can recognize it when we encounter it. By knowing that something is wrong, and by knowing to say, "that is wrong," I am able to prove my moral self to the world and create the potential for moral action. Orwell, who knew more than a little about the manipulation of thought through language, remarked on "the difficulty of practicing a virtue or principle when one lacks the very words for expressing it." (Kilpatrick, 1992. p. 118).

Socrates disparaged rhetoric as being a form of shadow politics, but he believed very strongly in the cutting edges of words, in the clarification, or reification of thought through language. All the early Socratic dialogues are obsessed with definitions, and through these definitions, we are allowed a window into the speakers' moral outlooks.

I will argue not only that all teaching is moral, but in addition it is moral in two distinct ways. First, teaching involves a moral relationship between teacher and student that is grounded in the dominant power position of the teacher. Second, teaching is moral in the sense that a curriculum plan selects certain objectives or pieces of content instead of others; this selective process either explicitly or implicitly reflects a conception of desirable ends. (Tom, 1984, p. 78).

In the world of ancient Greece and Rome, all education was directed to the objective of creating a virtuous citizen. The components of that education included music, gymnastics, rhetoric, and geometry, but these were merely a mode of conveyance for the teaching of how to be virtuous. The swaying of the body in dance,

the actions of heroes described in poetry, the balance of a circle, all were exemplary models for the student to imitate, to build from, and to contemplate when in doubt.

In Greece the communities were so small that it was usually quite easy to perceive the connection between their aims and the aims of education. Athenian education was perhaps the most varied, but varied because Athens' own requirements, as a centre for trade and the closest ancient Greece ever came to a multicultural community, were also varied in order to meet both existing and unpredicted needs. The Athenians focused on trying to maintain the balance of the two classical realms of man, the spiritual and the physical. And it was made very clear, that whatever was done in ancient Greek schools was done to ensure the individual would possess virtue.

We are one step removed from the Greeks in this sense. It has become a casual thing for us to consider subject areas as ends in themselves, or as means to ends other than moral ones, for example, to gain technical skills in order to be a more valuable employee. Reading about the Greek concern for moral growth and thinking about how we have dissociated from it has caused me great introspection. I am a teacher of a very discrete subject area, (two of the roughly 4,000 languages in the world, English and Japanese). In almost every case, when I teach I am teaching towards discrete ends restricted by the subject matter itself (such as grammar, or literacy, or language related to a specific purpose). I cannot sustain this introspection for very long, but while I do, I ask

myself, if I am not teaching to make myself and my students better people, then what am I doing it for? Because the words we use form laws, make speeches, and indicate more truthfully than any other way we know what lies within our hearts, morality and language are intertwined. And because all education involves language, the moral dimension of education can never be ignored. Making this point (self-evident to many) is important to me because I am adamant that my focus on the ESL dimension of moral education does not preclude a more basic premise: Moral education is central to all education.

We are one step removed. When I teach writing business correspondence, I avoid dealing with business ethics. After all, these are the concerns of the businessman, not of the teacher. To put it another way, these ethics are part of the common concept that businessmen are assumed to share across language frontiers. As a language teacher, not a businessman, I am ignorant of their ethics. As a teacher, I allow myself to relinquish my moral judgement because I am willing to be mystified by their professional world. Surrendering in this way can bear significant implications.

EFL Teacher required to design language programme for apprentice interrogators. These students require fluent command of colloquial English in order to effectively question, intimidate, and threaten political prisoners, as well as academic language with which to study and receive training in up-to-date torture techniques. Candidates should be experienced in the communicative approach. (Ashworth, 1985, p. 120).

Canada is a nation of people who have come from somewhere else. The demand for ESL instruction for immigrants is increasing

with the influx of new Canadians. This ESL is more than a discrete skill or subject area. It is perhaps the most critical preliminary to the settlement process, and the fact that it is undervalued by the Canadian government does not in any way negate the crucial nature of ESL instruction for new Canadians.

Canada is a multicultural society, but it is also a single nation with a single culture that encompasses the others. When we talk about the 'patchwork quilt' or the 'mosaic' we are not denying the singularity of Canadian culture. Both these metaphors are of individual entities - a quilt or a pattern of tiles - that are composed of smaller, discrete units. To describe Canadian culture only in terms of the distinct subcultures that are joined within is to commit the same fallacy as the six blind men who examined the elephant.

The thesis of this paper is as follows: As moral education is necessary to all aspects of education, it is therefore necessary to ESL. The work of Lawrence Kohlberg (1927 - 1987) in moral development and his idea of the Just Community School presents one avenue for exploring the nature of moral education in the classroom. Because this community ideal was partially inspired by Kohlberg's faith in democracy as a moral structure, it may be especially applicable for new Canadians, as one of the most important aspects of settlement involves their acquiring the ability to participate in the democratic process. There are two reasons why the acquisition of this ability is crucial. The first is to give the new Canadians the skills to work within democracy so

they can actively respond to problems such as, for example, discrimination or racism, and also so they will not passively allow themselves to be herded into a growing underprivileged and inarticulate lower class. The second reason is of a broader implication. Democracy requires vigilance, informedness, and participation in order to work, and not, as it has been doing for the past fifty years at least, slide into bureaucratic despotism. To learn to participate with perception and thought in the principle that stitches the quilt together is of crucial importance for all Canadians if they wish to maintain their society. It is therefore crucial to Canadians born in other countries, just as immigrants are becoming a more and more significant section of the population, and just as in the US, they are under-represented and under-active in the political system of the country.

Part One

The Origins of the Just Community

The Ancient Tradition

It is commonly accepted that Western intellectual tradition springs from two main sources, one being ancient Greece, primarily Athens, through the writings of Plato and Aristotle, and the other the Kingdom of Israel via the Old Testament.

In writing a paper on the ancient conception of moral education, it may seem strange to ignore the Jewish tradition, and focus entirely on that of Greece. There are two reasons for this decision. One is that a central figure of modern moral education, Lawrence Kohlberg, although Jewish, strongly expressed his debt to Plato and the Socratic dialogues. One could argue that his Jewish background affected him in a more visceral, less analytic manner, but in the formal sense, Kohlberg considered himself to be a successor to Socrates.

The second reason is related to the ancient Greek conception of the afterworld. Although mythical heroes received special dispensation, for most there was no arrangement of Heaven and Hell. Instead, the afterworld was a cold, damp place, the absence of colour and light, like a neutral band between two locations, inhabited only by wraiths. There is an epigram of Callimachus where a man asks of a corpse: "what of the underworld?"

"Much darkness."

"And resurrection?"

"A lie."

"And Pluto?"

"A fable."

"We are undone!"

Pluto was the king and judge of the underworld, and his nonexistence has a terrifying implication, for this negates the possibility of any form of retribution, judgement, or explanation after death. This belief had a profound impact on the philosophy of morality. The point is simple, if there is a judge who assesses one's life and dispenses according to that assessment, then there is incentive to act in a way deemed to be morally correct for the sake of the afterlife, even if the rewards (as so often seems to be the case) are not forthcoming in this world.

But if the life after death is like an eternity on a cold street corner in twilight, then the resolve to follow any code of behaviour that does not guarantee immediate, individual reward is much more difficult to maintain. After all, what would be the point? Despite this, ancient Greek society was no more selfish and corrupt than any other, and I suspect they were far more concerned with the impact of moral behaviour on their daily lives than we are today. The Greeks, who had no religious reasons for doing so, were profoundly interested in virtue, what it was, whether it could be taught, and how, and through what other means it might be acquired.

There is a strong Kantian ramification to this. Kant was one of the first modern Western thinkers to isolate morality as being beyond the prescriptive dictates of religion.

All the metaphysical attempts to prove the immortality of the soul have been motivated by the need to allow for the

reward of virtuous deeds performed in ordinary life, he [Kant] argued, but are entirely unnecessary because only a morality that can motivate us to perform our duty without either promise of reward or fear of punishment is truly virtuous. (Guyer, 1992, p. 8).

Because morality was a concern of daily life, the here and now, the Greeks had a strong interest in the teaching of morality. Education itself was strongly linked to the survival of the city-state, because it was so important for the preservation of culture in a period of time when culture was closely linked to community survival.

Sparta and Athens provide the best-documented descriptions of ancient Greek educational systems. It would be wrong to argue that the Spartan was more extreme. Both were completely oriented to the preservation of their culture, and it is only that Athenian society more closely resembles our own that we find Sparta more exotic. Perhaps the real difference was that Sparta had a much clearer conception of what it felt it needed to survive, i.e. a strong army, and focused all its attentions to achieving that goal, while Athens, with a more pluralistic society, and certainly a more pluralistic criteria for survival, was less sure.

The crux of Athenian education was to answer the question, "how can the citizens of Athens acquire the individual and political excellences requisite for service in a democratic state?" (Castle, 1961. p. 42). Chief among these requirements was the habit of participation. The Athenians were much more involved in the day-to-day running of their state than we are (although this participation excluded women and slaves). Athenian fathers took

their sons to council debates and law courts. Imitating the arguments of these events was a childhood game.

Formal education for Athenian youth was divided between gymnastics and music. Gymnastics meant wrestling, which was intended to develop the body. Even Socrates never rid himself of the belief that physical beauty corresponded to spiritual beauty.

Music included poetry and later, rhetoric, and was intended for the soul and mind. It was widely believed that exposure to fine, moral words and ideas at a young age would result in their being assimilated by the child. This was, in fact, one of the tenets of sophist education. Socrates, in Gorgias, questions this idea. If it were true, he asks, then why is it that so many great fathers have such terrible sons?

Three Philosophers

He was poor yet never charged a drachma for his services; he was ugly to look upon and yet was loved by a beauty-loving people; he moved with superb confidence among the nobly and the lowly born and remained always his unique self, and still remains the most revered man in the history of the ancient world. He wrote nothing. When he was not fighting for his city, or serving in its offices, he sat about in Athens and talked. (Castle, 1961, p. 51).

Socrates spent his life in the company of Athenians, asking questions. At his trial he explains how this came to be. A friend and admirer of his went to the oracle of Delphi and asked "whether anyone is wiser than I [Socrates]. Now, the Pythia replied that no one is wiser." (Apology, 21a).

Socrates refused to accept this answer. He felt there was an irony, or hidden meaning to it, and so he resolved to search for

the people who seemed or were considered wise, and question them to judge their wisdom. He first questioned a politician, thinking that such a profession would demand a high level of wisdom:

But I left off thinking to myself, "I am wiser than that man. Probably neither of us knows anything worthwhile; but he thinks he does and does not, and I do not and do not think I do. So it seems at any rate that I am wiser in this one small respect: I do not think I know what I do not." (Apology, 22d).

This is the common theme of all of Socrates' appearances in the earlier dialogues. Socrates, who "is wise only in knowing that he does not know" (Allen, 1984, p. 141), seeks out and questions. He denies possessing any knowledge, and wants definitions of terms before anything else. If his companions talk at length, he pretends he didn't hear or understand what they said. He rarely answers questions, and infuriatingly demands that his targets follow the same rules of argument he does, i.e. simple questions and short, straight answers.

He was a juggernaut interrogator, a prowling rogue devil's advocate. About half the city loved him, and half hated him, which is reflected in the closeness of the ballot that voted him guilty of corrupting the youth. He was, I think, a moral educator in the most cognitive and individual sense, which may explain Kohlberg's regard for him. He demanded two things from people. The first was not to take any term or concept at face value. Instead one should always question the actual meanings of the words used to manipulate existence. The second thing was to constantly investigate one's own motives and desires. "Knowledge is virtue," he was fond of saying. He was suspicious of people who felt they could bear the

burden of knowledge for others, making others abrogate their responsibility to know. "When the winds fall, the sailor turns to oars. He relies no longer on any help outside himself. Socratic philosophy, as we know it from Plato, is the practice of this so-called second sailing." (Benardete, 1989, p. 2).

Meno's celebrated question is, "Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue is taught? Or is it not taught but acquired by practice? Or is it neither acquired by practice nor learnt, but present in men by nature or some other way?" (Meno, 70a)

Meno does not ask Socrates because he wants to know the answer. Rather, he thinks he already knows, and wants to share this knowledge. He knows because Gorgias told him.

Gorgias was a sophist, a member of a very loosely-knit school of philosophers who focused their efforts on the use of rhetoric. They were not what we would consider to be profound thinkers, in the sense that they did not build a corpus of philosophy, but they were extremely practical in their objectives.

They set up schools in a number of cities, including Athens, and taught the skills of speech and argument. Their intention was to develop these skills for the material benefit of their pupils. This was significant because ancient Greek society was so litigious. And, in ancient Greek law courts, logical argument was far more important than the provision of witnesses, because, after all, anyone can lie.

The sophists believed that the common good of the society could be best achieved by equipping each individual with the tools

to realize his desires, and letting ability sort them out. Socratic inquiry into the essences of things was not only fruitless, but its frustrations would weaken one's moral resolve. What is the use in trying to achieve virtue if you could not define what it was?

In many ways sophist philosophy shares characteristics with values clarification. Any statement that attempted to define the good was flawed by being either incomplete or restrictive. The sophists, so aware of the ability of words to change the appearance of reality, perceived that many of our root values could be seen as relative.

Gorgias expressed this in its most nihilistic terms:

Logos is ambivalent and cannot reveal truth, but is always split into inevitable antitheses. Both the antitheses are thinkable, though neither can be true. But that which brings about an acceptance of either antithesis on any given occasion is Apaté or Deception...There are, therefore, no universal, objective ethical prescriptions, but the will of the individual can lead to a right decision on particular occasions. The justice of an action such as lying or stealing depends on the circumstances, on whether, for example, one is dealing with friends or enemies. (Beck, 1964, pp. 174-75).

Plato and other commentators note how grateful the Greeks, particularly sophisticated urban dwellers, were for the message of the sophists. It allowed them to relax the constrictions of prescriptive social rules and instead pursue their own individual benefit. Moral behaviour became that which could be justified as moral, with the emphasis on the justification. To put it another way, moral behaviour was merely a term for behaviour as it is, and did not reflect a higher ideal.

What does Socrates say to Meno? The answer is also famous: "So far am I from knowing whether or not it is taught, I don't even know what it is at all." (Meno, 71c).

An important Socratic technique when discussing terms is to identify whether they have anything in common, because if they do, then that aspect in common would serve better as the argument. In this way, he wonders if justice and virtue are the same, or one part of the other. Or justice and holiness.

For my own part I should say both that justice is holy and holiness just; and, if you let me, I should give the same answer on your behalf too, that justness is either the same thing as holiness or very similar, and above all that justice is like holiness and holiness like justice. (Protagoras, 331b).

In this dialogue Protagoras asserts that courage is distinct from other virtues, because it can be found in the absence of knowledge or justice. Socrates points out this is poppycock. Courage without knowledge is foolhardiness; without justice is cruelty. We see the aspects of virtue are inseparable, the martial bound to the compassionate. For Socrates there is no sense in breaking virtue down into components, because they are all common to each other and exist together.

The significance of Socrates' emphasis on definitions is that only by knowing what our terms mean can we then realize his Laconic injunction to "know thyself." And these terms must be understood, not in terms of metaphors, or rhetoric, but as absolutes for each individual. There can be no virtue without knowledge. This is a precursor to Plato's idea that injustice can only be done involuntarily, as it is the result of ignorance. Socrates says,

Then of two things, doing injustice and suffering injustice, we say the greater evil is to do injustice and the lesser to suffer it. What then should a man provide in order to help himself so that he has both the benefits of not doing wrong and of not suffering wrong? Is it power, or wish? I mean this: if a man does not wish to suffer injustice, will he therefore not suffer it, or will he rather not suffer it if he procures the power not to suffer it? (Gorgias, 509d).

Likewise, he goes on to say, we need this power if we are to keep ourselves from doing injustice to others.

When Plato established his school, called the Academy, the scientific stagnation of the Periclean age was already well underway. In the previous century there had been great advances in mathematics, in astronomy, and in medicine. But, in part due to the paradoxes of Zeno, doubts about the validity of the scientific view of the world led to the sophists' focus on not the discovery of truth, but of improving the quality of human life. Plato reacted somewhat differently. "The philosophy of Plato's Academy was concerned with the intellectual scrutiny of ideas in separation from the data of sense experience." (Howie, 1968, p. 12). Plato believed that knowledge could only be apprehended through pure thought, which he termed philosophy.

In The Republic Plato says yes, virtue can be taught, provided the environment is perfectly controlled. Plato's Republic is a tightly structured autocracy, and one of its paradoxes is that why, in its perfectly ordered and supervised world, would anyone think that moral education need be such a concern? The evidence, though not the essence, of morality is evinced through decisions, and in Plato's Republic, no one need ever make them.

Music was the education of the philosophic part of the soul, while gymnastics educated the spiritual part. The full education of the individual was to balance these two in order to create the ideal harmony. "To satisfy its [the soul's] cravings with the right food, to offer true nobility to its admiration and true beauty to its love, to keep its perceptions wakeful and clear, to refine and balance its emotions, these are, in Plato's opinion, the functions of a 'musical' education." (Nettleship, 1935, p. 30).

Plato's Republic, a city built from the words of Socrates and his companions, is a utopia. Therefore, among its greatest concerns are the maintenance of its own perfection, i.e. its existing state. A utopia does not improve, because it already is perfect. So the concern for preservation is really a programme for avoiding the change that can only mean decay. In this way, the teaching of moral behaviour is entirely instrumental, the moral rules laid down by the structure of the city itself, as decreed by the rulers. This teaching begins at an early age, "The child is to be bred up in the belief that beings greater and better than himself have behaved in a certain way, and his natural impulse to imitate is thus to be utilised in forming his own character." (Nettleship, 1935, p. 34). This is carried through by the use of exemplary stories.

Plato, who thought long and hard about the subject of moral education, believed that children should be brought up in such a way that they would fall in love with virtue. And he thought that stories and histories were the key to sparking this desire. No amount of discussion or dialogue could compensate if that spark was missing. (Kilpatrick, 1992, p. 27).

He did not approve of the Socratic method for teaching morality to children. "Young minds, like young puppies, said Plato, would only 'pull and tear at arguments.'" (Kilpatrick, 1992, p. 89). The Socratic method of discussion would be withheld until the children reached adulthood. Much of this concept is the basis for the modern view of character education.

The city is ruled by a philosopher-king. Plato carried from Socrates the idea that concepts needed to be defined. Because of the inability to provide adequate definitions, Plato concluded that there did exist ideal representations of the good, and what most humans perceived were the images of these things in other forms. It was the confusion over forms that led one to confuse the essence. Philosophy would allow one to perceive the essence, but only a few would have the ability and the energy to practice philosophy. They would be responsible for ruling the others, who would only see the good in the guise of its various forms.

Socrates knows two things about the city: it is necessary for all men and cannot make any man happy. It is the place where the true difference between the necessary and the good can be discerned, and where the question of man's good and the question of the whole coincide. (Benardete, 1989, p. 153)

Socrates had argued in earlier dialogues that it was impossible to be both evil and happy, for doing evil itself implied wretchedness. This later Socrates is very different, speaking the words of Plato directly. Plato felt that the true goal of the city was to provide a just society, but ensuring this justice required certain things, such as complete social engineering and control, which would promote an illusory contentment (we think we are happy

because we are told so) over the true happiness of self-knowledge. In Plato's Republic no one is to know anything about the social strata above them in order that such knowledge does not lead to jealousy and ambition. More than that, it means that each strata accepts the moral code that has been laid down for it by the philosopher-king. This gives rise to the reconceptualist argument against Plato that prescriptive moral laws are actually the means of ensuring the dominance of the ruling class. Plato's Republic, after all, is not a democracy. If the rule of the enlightened despot is the best of all governments, this is only true as long as the despot remains enlightened.

The Republic is about providing justice through social control. Justice determines the moral alignment of the citizens of the city.

Polemarchus [a character in The Republic] apparently does not see that the mutual relations of friend with friend and of enemy against enemy cannot be prior to the issue of justice: justice itself must determine the relation of those who act justly toward one another...Justice is not a question of character and will, for it operates once certain conditions are fulfilled; it is designed to enhance as a means an already existing situation. It must be a kind of knowledge. (Benardete, 1989, p. 17).

While The Republic is concerned with a city built of words, Laws is about real cities. It is probably Plato's last work, and he lived a long time. Socrates does not appear. The central figure who occupies the Socratic role is referred to only as "The Athenian", a strange departure to anonymity. The two works are connected.

In both these treatises Plato is attempting to sketch a scheme whereby the individual may live the fullest life

in the service of his city. Thus formal education is to be directed towards the maintenance of the city's best traditions, while at the same time the city's institutions are so devised as to make the state itself one huge educational instrument. (Beck, 1964, p. 199).

However the relationship between The Republic and The Laws is similar to that of theory and practice. "The Republic teaches about politics by examining the nature of justice, which appears to be the goal of political life, and by showing the full realization of justice is impossible in politics." (Laws, p. 337). In this way, Laws goes on to see what is realisable.

Like The Republic, the leading figure of the city holds the responsibility, both to know what is good, and to then organize the mode to educate it. "Looking at things from a distance produces a dizzying obscurity in everyone, so to speak, and especially in children; but our lawgiver will do the opposite to opinion by taking away the obscurity, and will somehow or other persuade, with habits and praises and arguments, that the just and unjust things are shadow-figures." (Laws, 663b). By shadow figures Plato means they are opposite poles, or the inside and the outside, of a single thing. The evil man perceives injustice to be good, and so desires it because all men desire the good but not all men know clearly what the good is. Because people require this education in what is good "the main aim of education, therefore, is to produce the man who has achieved the self-mastery that 'leads you always to hate what you ought to hate, and to love what you ought to love, from the beginning of life to the end.'" (Castle, 1961, p. 85).

The last of our philosophers, Aristotle, is renowned for his

idea of the 'golden mean', the moral good as being a kind of midpoint running down the centre of a continuum.

That moral virtue is a mean, then, and in what sense it is so, and that it is a mean between two vices, the one involving excess, the other deficiency, and that it is such because its character is to aim at what is intermediate in passions and in actions, has been sufficiently stated. Hence also it is no easy task to be good. (*Ethica Nichomachea*, 1109a).

Aristotle established his school, called the Lyceum, in a grove where Socrates, who claimed and established no school, was said to have loved to walk. Unlike Plato, Aristotle observed phenomena not as shadows of more substantial ideals but as ends in themselves. "Looked at from the viewpoint of the self-actualization of the living organism, education becomes a process of assisting what is properly speaking a natural development." (Howie, 1968. p. 17). Aristotle was pragmatic when it came to education. Again, unlike Plato, who wanted the city to have its classes and professions closely dictated by some overall plan, Aristotle revelled in the variations of types. He enjoyed cataloguing, something that Plato rarely, if ever did. Plato wanted to find the elements common to objects of a class, and then discard the objects, using the class as the determinant. Aristotle was well aware that objects within a class can have their own existence independent of the commonality that links them. He was a biologist, a more than casual observer of nature. It is very possible that what he saw in the natural world led him to see virtue not as an unattainable abstract, but rather as a pragmatic reconciliation.

And so, he ignores the Socratic searching for definitions before debating methods. "We deliberate not about ends but about means. For a doctor does not deliberate whether he shall heal, nor an orator whether he shall persuade, nor a statesman whether he shall produce law and order, nor does anyone else deliberate about his end." (Ethica Nichomachea, 1112b).

Flexibility when it came to the understanding of abstract ideals, and a willingness to see components acting as discreet entities allowed Aristotle to analyze and dissect virtue into parts that were relevant to the world around him, but were perhaps not relevant to Plato's philosophical realm. "To live well two kinds of goodness are necessary - goodness of intellect and goodness of character." (Castle, E. 1961. p. 94). And how are these kinds of goodness to be instilled in the individual? "Intellectual virtue in the main owes its birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experience and time), while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit," (Ethica Nichomachea, 1103a).

For many educators today this still remains the most practical reconciliation to the paradox of teaching independent moral decision-making to children. Allowing for prescriptive moral training to be a base, proper instrumental instruction, i.e. teaching morality as a framework of certain taken-for-granted attitudes and behaviours, can result in an informed participant for later, more open-ended discussion. Towards the end of his life, even Kohlberg found himself coming round to this attitude, accepting that a certain amount of instrumental teaching is

required in the first stages of moral education.

This teaching of habits was approached pragmatically, and is expressed in one of Aristotle's most well-known statements: "For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them, e.g. men become builders by building and lyre-players by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts." (*Ethica Nichomachea*, 1103a). There is a certain, earthbound clarity to this idea. We learn to live by living.

Aristotle wrote *Ethica Nichomachea* after Socrates and Plato were dead and the sophists had hijacked the intellectual growth of Greece. The echo of his name can trick one into thinking he lived at the pinnacle of ancient Greek culture. This is not true. He was alive when Philip of Macedon occupied Athens, effectively ending the city's independence forever.

Since then we have seen a tremendous growth, both in the size of cities and the political systems that unite them. The concerns of the modern world are all tainted with alienation caused by the increasing separation of man from man, a natural result of the greater concentrations of people. In a city of ten thousand, one could know all one's neighbours, at least, and know them as individuals. In a city fifty times that size, this becomes impossible. To cope with this increase in alienation, the emphasis on moral education became more and more prescriptive, till it became the simple transmitting of tribal taboos, and was inseparable from etiquette. The results of this inability to cope

with the increasing anti-socialisation of the modern world helped cause the collapse of community and the tremendous excesses of state-sponsored injustice that have typified the twentieth century.

Long an unfashionable topic, moral education was to undergo a rebirth in the United States, as the crises of Vietnam, Watergate, and the antagonistic split between races and generations of American citizens awakened a new interest in the idea that education can be for aspects of human existence more fundamental than the acquisition of skills-oriented knowledge. "To what part of man does public education owe its first obligation? Is it to his intellectual-academic world, or his emotional-social one? Which is most likely to insure him a measure of happiness and a reasonable chance for survival?" (Eisner & Vallance, 1974, p. 106). As a young man in Europe in 1945, Lawrence Kohlberg was to see clearly that the link between learned knowledge and the moral function of society was extremely tenuous, and could be snapped easily. His work was to try to restore moral development to its station among educational priorities.

PART TWO

Lawrence Kohlberg and Moral Development

Lawrence Kohlberg

Lawrence Kohlberg was born in 1927. In a speech he gave in Tokyo in 1985, he recalled the profound effect Brothers Karamazov had on him as a child, particularly the debate between Ivan and Alyosha regarding the goodness of God. Ivan points out, "the unending series of cruelties and injustices to the innocent...and concludes that if there is a God...he would hand God back his ticket." (Kohlberg, 1985, p. 5)

His youth was like that of a character from Mark Twain. "As an adolescent, real life for me, outside of high school, was summer trips with friends, working on farms, road gangs and in an airplane factory. These experiences of working and getting to know our fellow workers reaffirmed an abstract faith in American democracy." (Kohlberg, 1985, p. 5). He travelled with vagrants and hoboes, hitchhiking from Chicago to Montreal.

Upon graduating high school he was swept up into World War Two. "I reached Europe in the fall of 1945 as a member of the United States merchant marine. Having a Jewish father, what struck me was not only the wreckage of buildings and lives due to the war, but getting to know the plight of the survivors of the Nazi holocaust." (Kohlberg, 1985, p. 5)

As soon as his term in the merchant marine expired, he volunteered to serve on the ships bringing Jewish refugees to Palestine. The ship he served on, the successor to the famous

'Exodus', was captured by the British navy, who "rammed the ship, used tear gas, steam and clubbed their way to the steering room and the engine room and stopped the ship. Several infants died in the scuffle though the British tried to use no unnecessary violence." (Kohlberg, 1985, p. 5)

He was interned in a British refugee camp on Cyprus. The Hagenah helped him escape to Palestine, where he lived on a kibbutz until he was equipped with false papers and able to leave, just prior to the 1948 war. "The Israeli kibbutz represented ideal of social justice I had to admire but was I really required to follow them, or could I live by the more familiar and easier demands of my American homeland?" (Kohlberg, 1985, p. 5). Kohlberg was to return to the kibbutz more than twenty years later.

Until he went to Israel he had no intention of entering university. But he was now driven by his already strong views of the nature of right and wrong. He enrolled in the University of Chicago, and studied philosophy as an undergraduate.

My own moral commitment or identity made sense within the context of the social contract, which was the foundation of American constitutional government. Still I could see that philosophers like Locke and Mill did not agree with each other and I looked for some principle that would underlie and justify all basic moral discussions. Kant's statement of the basic principle of the categorical imperative, 'treat every human being as an end in himself and not only as a means' seemed most fundamental. Equal respect for human dignity seemed to me to be the essence of justice. (Kohlberg, 1985, p. 6).

He went on to do his postgraduate work in psychology, studying under Bruno Bettelheim and Carl Rogers. He expresses his debt to these teachers, but he was unsatisfied, feeling the knowledge he

had gained was inconclusive.

I began to feel this more and more while spending two years as a clinical psychology intern in a mental hospital after completing my course work. A cumulating incident occurred when a paranoid patient yelled in my office to me that the chief psychiatrist was discriminating against her and persecuting her. The chief psychiatrist came by my office, overheard her, and put her on electric shock treatment. I protested to the chief psychiatrist that this would only confirm her sense of injustice. When he and others did not see the point of my position, it seemed to me time to refocus my energies. (Kohlberg, 1985, p. 6).

He did his doctoral work in moral development. He was influenced by Jean Piaget, who had already done preliminary work in identifying stages of moral development in children. "Piaget's observations began with children around age three and ended at around age eleven. In my own thesis work I proposed to follow the development of moral judgement and reasoning through adolescence." (Kohlberg, 1985, p. 8)

Through observation of children's behaviour while at play, Piaget had tentatively described the two initial stages of moral development in young children as: "a heteronomous morality of absolute obedience to rules and adult authority, and then a second morality of autonomous mutual respect between equals and of respect for rules as the result of social contract." (Kohlberg, 1983, p. 18).

Lawrence Kohlberg began his research on stages of moral development in 1955. His initial work involved a sample of 50 Chicago-area boys, whom he interviewed at approximately three-year intervals over twenty years. With the publication of his dissertation in 1958, a number of other scholars and psychologists

started to carry out similar research all over the world.

Although he was active as a teacher, not only in university but also in high schools, hospitals, and prisons, he spent much of his energies revising, clarifying, and defending his work. More than one of his books contains a final chapter entitled, 'In Response to my Critics'.

Possibly while doing research in Costa Rica he contracted giardia lamblia, an amoebic infection of the upper gastrointestinal tract. It is incurable. Its main symptoms are sudden, painful diarrhea and nausea. "A vintage Kohlberg lecture was something. About 45 minutes into a lecture - never on a trivial topic - Larry would become totally flustered, call a break and head for the bathroom." (Fowler, Snarey, & DeNicola, 1988, p. 29).

I remember a short story by the American author, Kurt Vonnegut, which describes a society where everyone is equal. People of above average intelligence are forced to wear headsets that play sudden loud sounds at irregular intervals, thus breaking up their train of thought. It must have been like this for Kohlberg, having to work while his body betrayed him with constant, gut-wrenching interruptions.

He was a good, if erratic speaker, better in small groups where he could demonstrate his fluent grasp of Socratic method. He was extremely untidy, and very uncomfortable in social situations, which I find surprising, since his background experiences would seem to indicate a wide range of contact with human nature and personality. He was very well read. He was an amateur magician,

and a writer both of doggerel and serious poetry, often on Jewish religious themes. He suffered from clinical depression, and for both this and the giardia was constantly under medication. He had a tendency to leave abruptly, and later turn up somewhere distant, in a hotel, seemingly recovered. He was married and had children. He refers to his son in some of his papers on morality and justice.

Lawrence Kohlberg vanished in January of 1987. "We learned that at the time he was experiencing much physical pain and severe mental depression. But Larry had disappeared before, been in pain before, been depressed before." (Fowler, Snarey, & DeNicola, 1988, p. 29). His car was found near Boston harbour, with keys, wallet and money lying on the passenger seat. His body washed up that April.

I have provided the above synopsis of Lawrence Kohlberg's life because it helps indicate some of the concerns and metaphors that permeate his work. Whether or not he was more concerned with morality than you or I is unresolvable (perhaps we are all very concerned with morality, but just feel uncomfortable admitting it). But he demonstrated his concern by devoting his life to the analysis and study of human moral behaviour in a way no one has done since Socrates. And like Socrates, he was not a stereotypical academic. He had an eventful life, involving more travel, danger, and adventure than most. His strong regard for the US Constitution as a moral document, and his belief in justice being the single moral trait that determines all others could only have been strengthened by what he saw in Europe in 1945.

He was very fashionable during the 1970's and early 1980's. But then controversy overcame him. The grants dried up. He was never able to successfully deal with the most crippling criticisms of his theory. His attempts at implementing his theories in actual education programmes met with mixed success and little support.

Towards the end, he expressed doubts about the dominance of the cognitive aspect of moral judgement. Frustrated by the mixed results in implementing his theories in education, he began to talk about the need for prescriptive, instrumental training in moral behaviour, at least at the preliminary level. Just before his death he had a conversation with Professor Edwin Delattre of Boston University:

He [Kohlberg] expressed perplexity about the ineffectiveness of his methods in prisons where he had been working. He told me that he posed for inmates one of his favourite dilemmas: [the Heinz dilemma]. The question he posed is whether you should let your wife die or steal the drug. The convicts were unperplexed. To a man, and without hesitation, they said, 'steal it.' 'But why,' Larry Kohlberg asked them, 'would you do that?' Laughing, they answered, 'Because we steal things. We wanna know why the stupid husband didn't steal it in the first place.' (Kilpatrick, 1992, p. 86).

Contemporary moral philosophers criticize Kohlberg for ignoring moral passion. There is a mystery here. What the critics claim is true: it does not seem to enter into his theory of moral stages at all. And yet it is evident that Kohlberg himself possessed moral passion, and was driven by it, even when the edifice of his work began to chip and totter.

The Stage Theory of Moral Development

The method of Kohlberg's research was a series of one-to-one

interviews. In the interview, the subject was presented with a form of problem, a moral dilemma. He was to explain what he felt was the best answer to the dilemma and explain his reasons why. For example:

In Europe, a woman was near death from a very bad disease, a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid \$200 for the radium and charged \$2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could get together only about \$1,000, which was half what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife.

a) Was what Heinz did right? Why or why not? (Mosher, 1980, p. 24).

The responses, and it is important to note that the rationale was a more important data source than the answer itself, were scored according to a rather complex key. Eventually there were to be two scoring instruments devised, one more holistic than the other, both very complicated to use. However, the scoring methods allowed for the quantification of the responses, so that the data could be subjected to inferential statistical analysis. A modified version of this interview has become known as the Defining Issues Test (DIT). It is the most common instrument for measuring moral judgement.

Based on his own research, Kohlberg was able to identify six stages of moral development, beginning with a punishment orientation, where one merely follows rules in order not to feel pain, and cumulating in an awareness of universal ethical

principles, chief among these being justice. These six stages are arranged into three blocks, each of two stages, and it is these blocks that are most commonly referred to in the literature.

The first block is the pre-conventional and consists of self-centred orientations, where the dominating concern is to avoid pain and to conform to higher authority. The second is the conventional, emphasising moral behaviour as rules, or prescriptive laws as determined by society. The third is that of moral reasoning based on an ethical principle not derived from either authority or social agreement, the post-conventional. The universal principle in this case is justice, a recognition of the equality of human rights, and the respect for the dignity of human beings as individuals.

Justice was the determining factor in Kohlberg's moral philosophy, and he was criticised for not being exactly clear on what he meant by it. Children, of course, have a very strong sense of fairness and become furious if that sense is violated. Justice, then, is something more than the fairness of the self receiving what he or she thinks is deserved. "A moral situation in disequilibrium is one in which there are unresolved, conflicting claims. A resolution of the situation is one in which each is 'given his due' according to some principle of justice that can be recognised as fair by all the conflicting parties involved." (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 194).

As Kant believed the moral imperative was based upon recognition of the equal right of all humans to existence.

Kohlberg extended this into a more concrete form by borrowing the concept of reversibility from philosopher John Rawls. Reversibility implies that a moral decision is right if it can be made by all the participants in a moral dilemma. "In Rawls' theory, a possible principle of justice is the fair principle of justice if it is the one that would be chosen under the original position, if one would choose it if one did not know who one would be in the society or the situation after the principle was used." (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 197). The more commonly known term for this idea is 'the golden rule.'

Kohlberg's initial research, and much of that of his supporters, developed longitudinally, thus greatly adding to the empirical support of his theory. In addition, Kohlberg and his supporters carried out verification studies in other countries. The chief conclusion of these studies was that morality, as defined by the theory of developmental stages, could be considered universal. There was no cultural relativism. Studies done in countries including Japan, Taiwan, India, Turkey, Israel, Nigeria, Germany, and the United Kingdom supported this. "In summary, the nature of our sequence is not significantly altered by widely varying social, cultural, or religious conditions. The only thing that is affected is the rate at which individuals progress through this sequence." (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 24).

Kohlberg's stage theory is the first assumption of most research in moral education carried out since his work was first published (this includes even when the intent of the research is in

opposition to his theory). The importance of his work lies in the fact that he had succeeded in giving a structural and universal interpretation to what had been, up till that point, considered ambiguous and somewhat mystical. It was like Thomas Aquinas proving the existence of God.

Controversy

His work was subjected to attack from a wide variety of sources. Moral philosophers felt he was treading clumsily on their turf, and it is interesting to read how their objections range from the petty (Kohlberg's misuse of terminology specific to moral philosophy) to the profound (Kohlberg's refusal to admit that a person could pretend to be of a higher moral stage than he/she actually was). While the philosophers attacked his theory for its narrow interpretation of morality, behavioral psychologists looked at his research methods and found clear indications of unsupported assumptions, and then of bias.

In response, Kohlberg 'saved the phenomena' i.e. he redefined the theory to cover its weaknesses. There is some debate about the validity of such a defense. Karl Popper, for one, argues that it is bad science, because it perpetuates what is already demonstrated to be flawed, and so makes it harder for new theories to gain their audience.

Reading research necessitates what Coleridge called "the willing suspension of disbelief." Educational research and drama have a lot in common. They are both created by, and purport to be about humans, yet only the most naive will confuse them with the

actuality of human life. Nevertheless, there is much that can be learned about man from research, although, as with drama, the most profound observations are also the most difficult to articulate. The difficulties in justifying the stage theory of moral development are many.

The first problem is the paradox of assuming that what one says he or she is doing, or will do, is the same as what that person is actually doing, or will do. In a way this cuts to the crux of human moral behaviour. Milorad Pavic's novel Dictionary of the Khazars centres on a dream a medieval king has, where an angel tells him, "The Lord is not pleased by your deeds, but is by your intentions." The Lord has, of course, the ability to read our intentions more clearly than we can know them ourselves. But how can we distinguish between the person who is good yet unable to act, and the person who is neither good nor able?

The discrepancy between moral behaviour and moral retrospect will be looked at again in Part III, but it raises an interesting sidelight on perhaps the most notable criticism of Kohlberg's research, that it suffers from gender bias. This was based primarily on the evidence reported by Carol Gilligan in her 1977 article "In a Different Voice", which she later expanded to a book of essays.

Gilligan conducted two sets of interviews with women subjects. The first set was done along Kohlberg's guidelines. What she discovered was that women seemed to be further back on the progression of moral stages than comparable male subjects. This

would seem to indicate either a) that women's moral development is slower, a conclusion that no responsible scholar would dare posit without extensive review and examination, or b) that Kohlberg's moral dilemma interviews were biased to be more difficult for women.

Gilligan concluded that Kohlberg's interview design suffered from gender bias. Curious about the specific nature of that bias, she then carried out a second series of interviews with women subjects, using restructured dilemmas and scoring systems. The crux of her results was that "morality really includes two moral orientations; first, the morality of justice as stressed by Freud and Piaget and second, an ethic of care and response which is more central to understanding female moral judgement and action than it is to the understanding of judgement and action in males." (Kohlberg, Levine & Hower, 1983, p. 122).

Universality for one half the population is not universality. But there is an interesting perspective to this. The second set of interviews Gilligan used were very different from the standard Kohlbergian set. Gilligan used the dilemma of whether or not to have an abortion, and her subjects were women who were, in fact, contemplating abortion at the time of the interviews. In other words, the dilemma was real.

From these interviews Gilligan got greatly differing results. It is very likely that the fact that the subjects were women was a contributing factor. But I suspect the immediate relevance of the situation was a greater source of variance. There are dangers

inherent in using real dilemmas, and one is the moral stance of the researcher. Some people have damned Gilligan. "Professor Gilligan built her theory by focusing on the decision-making process of twenty-nine women who were contemplating having abortions. Though the women themselves agonize over the decision, Gilligan does not." (Kilpatrick, 1992, p. 145).

The accusation of gender bias only can be used against Kohlberg's early (albeit most important) research. In 1969 Kohlberg published his longitudinal work stages of moral development of Israeli kibbutzniks, with a subject sample from both sexes, and this was soon followed by similar work done in Germany.

Gilligan's work was also based on a small, limited sample, and has also been extensively replicated. One should note that fundamentally there is little difference between the designs of the research of Gilligan and Kohlberg. They are different translations and the flaws of premise inherent in one will be applicable to the other. The jury is still out on this one too, as with any area of quantitative research in education.

Regarding the charge of sex bias in the Kohlberg system, readers may be interested in several recent systematic, comprehensive reviews of the issue...that indicate that Gilligan's charge that women score lower on Kohlberg's test is simply not true as a general trend. (Mogdil & Mogdil, 1986, p. 481).

Kohlberg of course was concerned with universality. If he could not make the claim of universality then the whole issue of moral education becomes moot, as one person's morality is another's sin. This was the crucial aspect behind all the studies done in other nations, such as Turkey, Taiwan, Nigeria, Israel, Germany and

others.

Until very recently this claim [that the stages of moral judgement are culturally universal] has so clearly outstripped the evidence for it that one had to take it not just with a grain, but a shaker of salt. However, John Snarey's recent, systematic review of forty-three studies in twenty-six countries concludes that these studies provide striking support for the underlying assumptions of Kohlberg's claim for cross-cultural universality, though they also, in Snarey's analysis, suggest kinds of possible biases at the upper end of the stage sequence, especially with regard to traditional folk societies and non-middle-class settings. (Mogdil & Mogdil, 1986, p. 44).

Universality across cultures has also come under attack. Despite the general support provided by the data collected worldwide, perceptive observers have noted the amount of distortion the DIT goes through in the process of translation to be applicable to the members of another culture. This has included the creation of entirely new moral dilemmas. For example, the dilemma of a child's sacrifice for her parents takes on an entirely new moral dimension when applied to a culture influenced by Confucius. The question is, how much can something be changed in translation and still be generalised back to the original?

Other analyses of the data seem to support the fact that less developed, smaller communities are either morally retarded or do not follow Kohlberg's model. And in Iwasa's 1992 comparison study of moral stages in American and Japanese adults, there is a strong indication that there are "major cultural differences in the approach to the fundamental value of human life."

However, I feel that the issues of cultural and gender biases are red herrings, and serve only to distract us from what must

always be the greatest source of variance in any research of this kind. This is the variance caused by individual human differences, a cumulation of an infinite number of factors of which gender and culture are only part. "I suspect that Gilligan's women subjects are but the well-documented tip of a rather large iceberg whose bulk includes both sexes" (Mogdil & Mogdil, 1986, p. 114).

Related to the problem of individual variance is the weakness of the scoring protocols. This is an unavoidable problem of using statistical analysis for human behaviour. In carrying out the distributive analysis that assigned answers to one of six stages, Kohlberg was able to claim, by comparisons to the mean, that any individual would occupy a specific stage of moral development, much in the same way a person can be said to spend seventy-five percent of his time in a specific room, or chair. But in fact, each individual's score indicated responses and answers that were spread out all across the continuum. Only by inferring from the mean could the stages and the locations of subjects in the stage sequence be determined. But this is a bit like defining the classical ages of man. We intuitively know when a person is a child, an adult, elderly, but we have no absolute scale of indicating these divisions, and they are different for all of us.

Indeed, much of the research can be read in another way, attesting to the fact that we each possess a number of different standards of justice, and their use varies from situation to situation.

In the light of the available evidence, there is good reason for believing that the hard core of Kohlberg's

research program is implausible. There are not clear stages of moral development - at best they are arbitrary fictions having little or no verisimilitude; the order in which individuals 'move through' these arbitrary fictions is far from invariant, and the sequence of the stages is certainly not logically necessary. (Cochrane, 1979, p. 247).

The final main area of contention regarding the research aspects of Kohlberg's work lies in the validity of the DIT. Does it in fact measure what it claims to measure? The problem is the decision-making in answering the dilemmas are based on a kind of post hoc justification for action. The central DIT question is "do you think X was right to do what he/she did? Why or why not?"

The problem here, as moral philosophers have indicated, is that the reality of moral judgement is based on the selection of alternatives for action. When we carry out a moral act in real life, what we usually do is make a choice of possible options, believing ours to be the best one. The DIT does not allow this choice, but is instead based on a kind of observational distance occurring after the choice has already been made. As Kaplan in his 1983 study notes, "retrospective reports of how one had formed a social judgement are unreliable." (Kaplan, 1983, p. 3).

Kaplan tried to demonstrate the ramifications of this weakness by re-writing the dilemmas to weigh them towards bias in each of the three large divisions of moral judgement stages. He then administered the DIT to two groups, one trained through pedagogy based on Kohlberg's theories, and the other a control group (control groups in research in moral education almost invariably turn out to be the social science class).

Kaplan discovered there was a greater amount of moral judgement that went contrary to the weighted bias in the experimental group. The members of the group were uniformly consistent in their answers, but there was no consistency in their use of the reasoning specific to any single stage. In other words, the experimental group may have been modified by their training to follow specific patterns of perceived 'right' moral behaviour, rather than to act independently (i.e. post-conventionally). They were supplying correct answers without considering why they arrived at the answers.

Kaplan concluded by stating that moral education programmes developed along the principles of Kohlberg's theory could actually condition the learner to act along prescribed, not necessarily desirable, moral guidelines. "They make use of morally toned material during discussion. This causes students to discuss moral values in dilemma situation, leading to a polarization of student responses towards the more predominant tendency." (Kaplan, 1983, p. 10).

Theory into Practice

Kohlberg called character education 'the bag of virtues' approach. "According to that view, parents and educators of young children must necessarily first rely on cultural transmission, inculcating a set of virtues before stimulating reflective moral development under conditions of free moral discussion. This mixture of indoctrination and reason is the solution of Plato's Republic." (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 2).

The crucial weakness to this approach is that there is no absolute guarantee of possessing any single one virtue. Is a cheater intrinsically different from an honest man? Kohlberg drew upon the results of Hawthorne and May's large-scale study of honesty carried out in 1928-30. They discovered that:

1. Almost everyone cheats some of the time. The population is a bell curve centred around a modest amount of cheating.
2. If a person cheats in one situation, it does not mean he will in another.
3. People's verbal statements about honesty have nothing to do with their actual demonstrations of honesty.

In other words, discrete virtues are fluctuating characteristics of personality, like moods or tempers. In trying to teach them, the error is made in assuming their possession will naturally lead to better behaviour. Kohlberg felt that what was required was a more general, cognitive structure that would allow for better decisions to be made, provided its guidance was followed, but which would be at least always present in the individual. Morality, for Kohlberg, was a way of looking at the world.

The second form of moral education, values clarification, was also deemed inadequate. "The fact that there are many moral stances does not mean that they are all equally compelling, just as the fact of the existence of many brands of audio equipment does not mean that they are all of equal worth. In fact, these alternate moral stances are not parallel perspectives, but rather,

reflect different developmental stages on a moral hierarchy." (Chazan, 1985, p. 84). Teaching that all moralities are of relatively equal value is wrong because it in fact retards progress through the moral stages. This can result in some interesting paradoxes: Kohlberg writes about a girl student who in responding to the Heinz dilemma replied that he should steal to provide the drug for his wife because human life was worth more than anything else.

I then asked her, 'Is there any such thing as a universal human value?' and she answered, 'No, all values are relative to your culture.'...If she were clear in her thinking, she would see that the fact that all people do not act in terms of this value does not contradict the claim that all people ought to always act in accordance with it. (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 13-14).

At this time Kohlberg was still acting as a researcher, gathering data and refining his theories. The actual implementation of his work to moral education was not yet the focus of his energies. The next question was how to bring the theory into the classroom.

PART THREE

The Just Community for Moral Education

Design

Kohlberg was a psychologist, and his theory was one based on observation of existing behaviour. He had been approached several times by educators interested in the application of his theory to curriculum, but although interested in the idea, he did not at that time have a clear conception of how it could be done.

However, in 1969, one of his doctoral students, Moshe Blatt published his work on the pedagogical aspects of moral stages. His research was based on the following premise:

If children were systematically exposed to moral reasoning one stage above their own, they would be positively attracted to that reasoning, and would, in attempting to appropriate the reasoning as their own, be stimulated to develop toward the next higher stage of moral development. (Power, Higgins, & Kohlberg, p. 11).

This hypothesis was not originally supported by Kohlberg. He felt, logically, that as moral development was a natural progression through stages, there was no way to instrumentally hasten that progression without actively teaching the moral dilemmas as problems to be solved, i.e. teaching to the test. However, he became excited by Blatt's results because they implied a solution to the problem of how to implement effective moral education, and he soon became fully involved in bringing Blatt's ideas to the curriculum.

The result of Blatt's research, using the DIT to measure the dependent variable, indicated that moral development could be accelerated through educational practice providing the following

three criteria were met:

- 1) The students had to be of a mixture of moral developmental stages, so that at least some could encounter moral reasoning at a stage higher than their own.
- 2) The students had to be presented with moral dilemmas, to allow them to express and justify moral decisions before their peers.
- 3) The teacher had to play a Socratic role, i.e. not dominating or correcting, but encouraging and suggesting.

How can we know the good? And how can we ensure that this knowledge will be passed down? At least part of the debate over moral education is due to the conviction of so many educators that morality is unteachable, and if attempted, becomes indoctrination in rules and relative values. Blatt seemed to prove that not only could morality be taught, but that the effective method for teaching it was no more than the thoughtful, yet disciplined, exchange of views on a topic, a form of education developed by the ancient Athens, surely one of the most enlightened of societies, and an educator's ideal.

It didn't work this way, and it is still unclear why not. The problem seemed to lie in the human nature of the teachers themselves. Kohlberg replicated Blatt's research in the Danforth Project. Twenty social studies teachers were trained in the use of moral dilemmas for eliciting moral reasoning and then let loose on their students. The data was strongly supportive of Blatt's original conclusions. But a year after the project ended, the same

teachers were surveyed in a follow-up study, and only one of the twenty were still using the Kohlberg-Blatt techniques. As Kohlberg said, "the operation was a research success but the educational patient died." (Mogdil & Mogdil, 1986, p. 252).

I have seen similar cases, though smaller-scale, in my own field. The teacher uses the techniques he or she feels comfortable with, and this comfort level is not necessarily in proportion to effectiveness. "Teachers will change their approach to teaching if and only if they perceive the change as of benefit to some problem which they face." (Mogdil & Mogdil, 1986, p. 252). As with all professions, it often requires a direct crisis to cause a shift in deeply-ingrained attitudes and methods.

When doing his own research in classrooms, Kohlberg was asked by educators why he used dilemmas so divorced from reality, and not ones that pertained directly to the school. He had originally developed the dilemmas to aid universality and also to demonstrate the dissociation of moral behaviour from specific contexts. But these concerns were, of course, not necessarily valid when considering the actual pragmatics of moral education. The rules that bind the building of theory do not need to bind its practice.

In order to implement moral education in schools, it was necessary to make moral education responsive to the immediate needs of teachers as well as students. Kohlberg looked for a solution to this challenge in the hidden curriculum. He was already strongly influenced by Philip Jackson. The then current approach to incorporating the hidden curriculum was reflected in alternative

schooling at the time, often built along communal lines. Kohlberg saw alternative community schools split between two camps, that of romantic freedom as exemplified by Neill's Summerhill, and the other that of cultural transmission as modeled by Emile Durkheim.

In the case of the former, the problem was that there would eventually come a time when the structure of the school would be pushed so far that someone would have to lay the law down. This is the paradox of liberty, where although liberty is desirable, there is a point at which it can be destructive, as one ends up claiming the freedom to take away freedom from others. "In Kohlberg's view no matter whether Neill exercises his power in economic or moral terms, the fact remains that in dealing with a conflict between the rights of the individual and the interests of the school, Neill puts the latter first." (Power, Higgins & Kohlberg, 1989, p. 22).

Durkheim, on the other hand, saw the necessity of moral education in application to the hidden curriculum not to free oneself from rules, but rather to involve the entire student body in the construction of those rules, reasoning that if you determine the way you should behave you will follow that guideline with greater faith than if the laws are laid down by another. "The serious work of deliberate moral education entails...dealing with the ways everyday rules of behaviour are made and enforced. For it is those rules that define the moral atmosphere - the context for moral learning - in the school." (Power, Higgins & Kohlberg, 1989, p. 23).

In the summer of 1969, Kohlberg returned to Israel to observe

moral education on a kibbutz. At that time, the kibbutz system was still strongly influenced by the theories of communal existence developed by Theodor Herzl. Kohlberg was able to see these theories in action as he observed a group of Jewish youth from disadvantaged urban backgrounds being trained in the kibbutz ethos. Much of this training was para-military, and also included practical work in agriculture, as well as trades such as carpentry. But acting as an umbrella to all this was the moral learning. Supervising the group and living with them was an educator whose responsibility was more of instilling awareness rather than actually transmitting information. He was to keep the group attentive to the concept of the kibbutz as a philosophy of living, so that, if any infraction occurred, it would be resolved (and if necessary punished) by the group acting in unison, according to the social guidelines.

Here was an educational system that, though informal and democratic in its style of operation, was not a Summerhillian free school with a romantic view of school life, but a collectivist enterprise demanding high values of its disadvantaged youth. The values demanded were the values of the kibbutz, but they were not taught in the abstract. Rather, the youth were to learn them by seeing them in practice in the (adult) kibbutz society and by putting them into practice in their own youth society. (Power, Higgins & Kohlberg, 1989, pp. 39-40).

The problem in turning Kohlberg's theory of moral stages into a programme for moral education was that it was essentially a theory of individuals. Like Socrates, Kohlberg believed that a moral community could only exist by being populated by virtuous individuals. His theory was a monitoring of individual growth in the moral domain.

However, like Durkheim, Kohlberg also believed that morality was manifested through social interaction. To those critics who charged that he had ignored the distinction between moral thought and moral deed, he would answer that, "to be human and to be moral is to interrelate with other people in a social context." (Chazan, 1985, p. 70). This is in keeping with Durkheim, who was very much a relativist, and some of Durkheim's theories are shared by values clarification. He felt that the community defined its morality. His maxims indicate this:

Morality begins with membership of a group; it is not related to an act which has individual interests [alone].

Without society, morality has no object, duty, no roots. (Chazan, 1985, p. 9).

This is not the same as a guiding morality of justice. Durkheim's point of view was anthropological, and concerned with things as they were. Kohlberg was more interested in the shift to what things should be, the change in point of view he termed, "From Is to Ought". On the kibbutz Kohlberg found a society whose prime concern was to exist according to a moral ideal. And this ideal was shared by the entire community and so acted as a bond, policing itself. The combination of informality and rigour impressed him (I imagine he saw it as a mirror of his own personality). On the kibbutz, the students "are told to call their educators by their first names, to visit them at home, argue with and vote against them at group meetings, while they are also told to respect the rules they insist upon. Autonomy and collectively coexist in this tension." (Power, Higgins, and Kohlberg, 1989, p. 44).

The kibbutz showed how the hidden curriculum could be an active component of moral education. "Though Durkheim's conception of morality -with its emphasis on respect for society's transmitted rules and attachment to the group - is different from Kohlberg's developmental conception oriented to justice, Kohlberg was quite attracted by Durkheim's vision of an explicit use of the hidden curriculum to create a moral society in the classroom." (Power, Higgins, and Kohlberg, 1989. p. 23). The chief difference was that unlike Durkheim, the Just Community school would build its moral structure around the concept of justice, already assumed to be the dominant characteristic of morality, the one that determined all the others.

The American equivalent to the commune was democratic society. Democracy would allow for the community of equal voices. There are a number of reasons why Kohlberg felt that structuring American schools on democratic lines would be most suitable for moral development. I summarize these from Power, Higgins, and Kohlberg:

- 1) democratic meetings deal with real-life problems, and so may be more effective than fictional moral dilemmas.
- 2) democracy equalises power relations, and so encourages students to think for themselves.
- 3) in line with the Aristotlean idea of learning by doing, a democratic school is the best way to teach democracy.
- 4) As J.S. Mill noted, errors are more likely to be corrected in a society where freedom of expression exists, than in a closed society. Teachers and administrators will make better

decisions regarding schools if students are included in the decision-making process.

5) democracy can help break the control of adult and peer cultures by creating shared ownership and responsibility in schools.

6) by voting openly for rules, one receives personal and social pressure to abide by them.

The Just Community School

In 1974, the Cluster Alternative High School in Cambridge, Massachusetts, opened as a school within a school. Some seventy students were chosen by lottery from a pool of volunteers taken from the larger school population to participate. They would have a double period every day to focus on moral issues in the guise of social studies, and a community meeting once per week to discuss and vote on moral issues directly related to their school lives. Outside of that they would attend courses in the regular curriculum of the school.

Eight teachers volunteered from the faculty to work as part-time Cluster staff. All were accepted. As with the students, they did not have much preparation for what would be required of them. "They, as with the students, would have to do much of their learning in the course of running the school." (Power, Higgins & Kohlberg, 1989, p. 65). Lawrence Kohlberg took part, nominally, as an observer.

In Cluster, moral education would occur through the determination of the rules for the school. The process for the

rule-making was fully democratic, one person one vote, whether teacher or student. Voting on decisions would occur at weekly meetings, which would be mandatory for all students and staff. This was easier said than done. At the very first meeting, in the last five minutes, a student proposed that if any student did not like the courses offered he or she could withdraw from the course. The vote was passed by an overwhelming majority, all seventy student ayes to eight teacher nays. The problem was that such a right was against the mandate of the mainstream school that contained Cluster. Kohlberg saved the day by saying the vote was only a straw vote, and that the real one would take place at the next meeting. He was quite right. There was nothing democratic about taking a vote on an issue before it had been discussed.

This also indicated one of the central obstacles to operating a successful alternative system. It invariably is contained within a larger mainstream, and when the rules of the smaller conflict with the rules of the larger, those of the larger may take precedence. Kibbutzim are often geographically separate from the larger urban Israeli community, but even they have undergone a steady erosion of their communal ideals over the past fifty years, as the greater society without slowly overwhelms them. Schools are much more closely linked to the surrounding society. Since one purpose of schools is to act as a feeder organ for society, supplying it with new, healthy cells, one could argue that trying to isolate it from society is contradictory.

Kohlberg was idealistic, but not naive. He knew very well

that democracy is fragile, and requires tremendous effort to maintain (both the U.S. and Canadian electorates could do with a good lesson from Kohlberg). I wonder how much he surprised the teachers who worked with him at the Cluster school. By all accounts he was a man who inspired those around him. From listening to him on tape I would say he was passionate and articulate, but not overbearing. He had a sense of humour. But a lot of the teachers at Cluster school must have expected something more in keeping with the accepted image of alternative education in America, an emphasis on freedom, on pursuing self-interest, on being able to ignore petty rules. Kohlberg would have disagreed with all of those. There is nothing in being moral that promotes freedom per se. Morality, as in possessing a sense of justice, is a burden of responsibility that restricts you, because it demands that you empathize with, and respect your fellow man as yourself. Self-interest he had already tagged. It was the libertine transition phase between Stage Four and Stage Five, where one makes the leap of seeing that morality is not derived from the sense of social bonds, but that social bonds are derived from the sense of morality. And the ignoring of rules for moral reasons is in fact a moral judgement, and moral judgements, in Kohlberg's eyes, were never petty.

An interesting example occurred when the students were taken by their teachers to see a movie at Harvard.

The students agreed previous to going that they would not smoke cigarettes in the viewing room. But as soon as the lights went off, out came the butts. The teachers present did not react. Kohlberg, who was also present,

had the film stopped and took the teachers out of the room. He told them that in a democracy it was crucial that the rules or agreements that the community makes be taken seriously. To sit by and watch the students violate the rules without reacting is to undercut the democratic authority of the community. (Power, Higgins & Kohlberg, 1989, p. 69).

There is, to my mind, something both human and heroic about this. It may simply be the reaction of seeing a person so inflexibly faithful to his commitments. One thinks, I wish I could be so firm. But the problem of resolving the duality of what one says and what one does came back to haunt the Cluster school again and again. And it had always been there, in the criticism of the original research.

Think-alouds in research on cognitive activities (such as reading) suffer from a similar flaw. In trying to determine what the mind is doing, the subject is encouraged to describe the mind's actions. But in focusing on describing itself, surely the mind is now doing something different. It is well recognised in science that the mere act of observing a phenomena changes the nature of that phenomena.

Each of the dilemmas used in Kohlberg's research involves serious issues, such as life and death. This is necessary for the dilemmas to cut across cultural boundaries. But it also makes the dilemma into a bit of a romantic fiction, and the subject's response will be similar. I can say with a fair degree of accuracy how I will respond when a beggar outside the Winnipeg Public Library asks me for spare change. But I am much less sure what I would do if I saw that same beggar attacked by an armed mob.

The Cluster school students were constantly breaking their own resolutions, because the reality of enforcing them was more complicated, and required greater moral courage, than they had anticipated. This is too human to be considered an individual moral failing, but it was a clear example of how inaccurately a person can foresee his/her actions in a stressful situation. No soldier knows how he or she is going to behave the first time they go into battle. To take it a step further, research in battlefield psychology supports the conclusion that bravery is a fluctuating characteristic that can either control fear or abandon the spirit almost at random. Just so, as many of Kohlberg's critics contend, a person can be both Jekyll and Hyde.

Recreational drugs were the critical issue for almost every Just Community school, not just Cluster. The problem, from a moral stages point of view, was not that the avoidance of using drugs was an ethical matter dictated by external laws, but that in order to progress through the stages, individuals had to pass through Stage Four, and the obeying of laws is necessary in Stage Four, just as their rejection in the face of higher concerns is necessary in Stage Six. Other problems, such as theft and absenteeism, were positively dealt with during Cluster's existence, and incidents of both decreased remarkably. But drugs remained the critical weakness, which, if nothing else, was indicative of the students' priorities as far as civil disobedience went.

The students met for their weekly meetings and debated various issues before voting on them. This was Blatt's principle of

pedagogy writ large, with the dilemma, the exposure to various moral judgements, and the Socratic guides all present (transcripts of the debates emphasize how even-handed the teachers were, and it becomes hard to tell them apart from the students based just on the words they say).

Some problems resulted in remarkable machinations. In a debate over the fate of one student caught smoking marijuana, the other students asked that they have the first hour of the meeting all to themselves before the teachers joined. Kohlberg felt this was a step forward, as it showed the willingness of the students to assume autonomy in decisions regarding moral issues. I am not so sure. There is always something vaguely deceitful about such closed-door discussions.

Reading the transcripts of the Cluster debates, one is struck not with how sophisticated the students' moral thinking was, but with how difficult it was for them to articulate their moral judgements. Their minds moved faster than their mouths, constantly. This problem was touched on in criticisms of his original research, where not only the distance of the dilemma, but also its being presented as a narrative, was seen as a source for confounding variables. The nature of the narrative meant that aspects of receiving narrative information that do not have to do with moral judgement would, in fact, affect the responses of the subjects. Kohlberg argued that there was a connection between cognitive and moral development, since the ability to make moral judgements is, essentially, an ability to judge, and therefore

requires cognitive understanding. But this is not the same as modalities of input. Some of us listen or read better than others, and this does not demonstrate anything of our ability to be good.

Cluster only lasted five years. It was subjected to the usual pressures of any alternative that tries to work within the mainstream. It was last in line for funding, and teachers working within it found they received little professional recognition. As facilities and faculty dwindled, so did the number of students. But it also became a dumping ground for difficult students so that though the number of students decreased, the incidents of discipline and learning problems increased. These problems eventually overwhelmed the intent of the school.

Cluster was not the only attempt to create the Just Community for moral education. The next attempt was to be the A school at Scarsdale Alternative High School. There were two major differences between the A school and Cluster. The first was that the A school was not a school within a school, but in fact an entire campus structured as an alternative. It had been in operation since 1972 (it was to become a Just Community school in 1978). It had been run on semi-democratic lines, but the administration had made the remarkably short-sighted decision of allowing attendance at the weekly meetings to be voluntary. This encouraged a split in both the faculty and student body, and within four years the school was suffering from terrible divisiveness. The second major difference from Cluster was that the socio-economic status and academic achievement of the Scarsdale students

was markedly higher than that of the Cluster students. This was to have an interesting ramification when a student published an article in Moral Education Forum claiming that the pressure the teachers placed on the students, trying to shift them up to a new Kohlbergian stage, resulted in moral intimidation. "In Cluster, students rarely experienced this form of faculty pressure because few of them worried about how the faculty thought of them or how they measured up according to Kohlberg's theory." (Power, Higgins & Kohlberg, 1989, p. 211).

As with Cluster, the drug issue was the insurmountable problem. Having read the accounts of these schools several times, I feel a great sense of frustration at the manner in which the theme of drug use reoccurs again and again as the crucial barrier to achieving the Just Community ideal. This frustration stems from a number of sources. First, I think I am very much a member of my birth cohort when I feel that making a major issue over the use of recreational drugs is somewhat ridiculous. It strikes me as trivial. Curious about the actual gravity of the situation, I recently read several books on the drug problem in America. There were generally one of two recommendations made in each book, one based on a viewpoint similar to my own, and arguing that repressive laws encourage social breakdown similar to what occurred during Prohibition in the 1920's. The other, the opposite, that in fact recreational drug use is a problem much more serious than, for example, tobacco or alcohol use, because the nature of drugs is different. I don't know which point of view is right, and perhaps

I was a fool to try to look for a consensus.

But the staff of the Just Community schools were emphatically against recreational drug use. And as they could not let the problem go, it arose again and again as the critical issue. The students saw it as a point of division between them and the faculty, thus effectively splitting the Just Communities in half. At the A school, for example, there was a vote held to determine a ruling over drugs. The voting on a rule to prohibit the use of drugs in school was unanimously in favour. But the second issue, that students should help enforce the rule, split the student body down the middle, and the third, that students would, in fact, enforce the rule, i.e. inform on students who broke the rule, was supported by only one third of the student body. Every time I read this I slap my hand on the table and say, "not again."

This event also demonstrates another problem. Communities tend to be made of smaller communities. Kohlberg hoped that the principles of Just Community would unite the staff and students together. But their social relationships still remained segregated, naturally because they were of different ages, backgrounds, and had different concerns. In school, where students interact informally with their peers far more often and more intimately than they do formally with their teachers, to ask them to work against their peers for the benefit of a more distant relationship may be too much of a demand. It is the old problem of betraying one's country or betraying one's friend.

After seeing his own programmes repeatedly result in the

opposite of what was intended, William Coulson, one of the founders of modern humanistic psychology, stated that, "On the subject of drugs and other life-and-death issues, children need 'authoritative guidance', not techniques designed to explore options and feelings." (Kilpatrick, 1992, p. 38). If this is so, than perhaps this could help explain Kohlberg's slow drift towards incorporating instrumental moral education.

That the Just Community schools did not succeed in their moral mandate should not stand as a critical flaw. We should expect to see such problems in these schools, just as we expect to see problems in maths understanding in maths class. The focus of the school will determine what issues are revealed to be problematic. With the focus of the curriculum dealing with moral issues and moral behaviour, then all the errors associated with these were fated to occur. But this is not the same as, for example, the case of values clarification programmes developed to reduce drug use, crime, and pregnancy among high school students that were shown by research to have poorer success rates than control groups who underwent no programmes of any sort at all. The Just Community schools did not create social breakdowns. But they encountered problems to which mainstream schools tend to turn a blind eye.

Democracy is very much a process, and that it is devised and manipulated by human beings obviously implies that it will suffer from flaws, and require, along with constant vigilance, constant repair and renewal.

The further question is left open: could justice, in making human beings human, be the perfection of a neutral

instrument for good or evil? Is it possible that what we are good for is no good, or we are only good for service (to gods, for example, as dogs and horses are to us) or self-sacrifice for the sake of the city or something else equally ideal. (Benardete, 1989. p. 19).

Part Four

The Moral Language Classroom

Where We Begin

The issue of 'moral principles' is surely a central question for the practice of moral education. Much of what goes on in schools is related to words, sentences, and statements, and the meaning and functioning of moral principles is obviously relevant in such a context. Hence, the most practical questions of moral education are very much dependant on the elucidation of the linguistic status and functioning of moral sentences, the universal or relative nature of moral principles, and the validity of alternative contents implicit in various moral standards. (Chazan, 1985, p. 3).

The generally accepted priority for adult ESL in Canada is settlement. This refers to the language and related skills required by new Canadians in order to integrate into the society. The focus of these programmes is standard English, often structured around functions and notions (they serve the dual purpose of teaching things like how to call for repairs for a broken appliance, or how to use the bank as discrete skills by also teaching the language patterns applicable to these actions). Content of such programmes is often determined through needs surveys. For ESL teachers in this area, the high point of satisfaction is usually reached when the student gets a job. By gaining employment, the settlement objective is considered reached (it often is by default, as students are of course oriented to finding employment as being the most important immediate task to successful integration).

Needs surveys tend to dominate adult ESL programme content. The rationale is that adult learners possess the maturity to

sincerely know what they require from a course of instruction. Due to design considerations, needs surveys are usually built around specific examples, and the programme content will reflect how the learners respond to those examples (surveys often tend to be prescriptive, and assume that items not mentioned do not exist). Because settlement is the central immigrant concern, its components dominate needs survey content. New Canadians need to know how to write job resumes, how to fill in applications, how to open bank accounts, and other tasks related to employment and ownership. These are the basic tenets of Canada's economic structure, but have little to do with the larger political structure, which monitors the economy by determining the nation's social structure and concerns.

By immediately satisfying these detailed, immediate needs, the ESL programme may defeat its own purpose. There is a difference between learning a language and learning how to fill out a form. The former implies general issues of affect, value, and cognition, and is potentially infinite and lifelong. The latter is a discrete skill that can be taught as a limited code within a given period of time, used once and then discarded. To make second language writing, for example, equivalent to one sub-skill of writing is to have an extremely short-ranged, and contextually-restricted view of language.

When a learner's language needs related to immediate settlement are satisfied, the focus of concern often switches directly to settlement itself. Having learned how to write a

resume to apply for a job, the job is then sought, and having been found, the need for language learning is superseded by the demands of employment. Hence, the development of workplace language instruction programmes, which are essentially band-aid solutions to shortfalls in the new Canadians' communicative competence. The minimum standard becomes the common, set standard. This is a reoccurring phenomena in ESL programmes for new Canadians.

But the level of literacy and general language ability required to deal with these discrete tasks (such as form-filling) is substantially less than the level required to take full part in the activities central to making a nation such as Canada so attractive to newcomers in the first place. In other words, the level of language ability required to answer a help wanted ad is nowhere near the level required by the new Canadian to be an active member of a modern democratic society, to play an intelligent role in dealing with the issues of equality, justice and discrimination that will affect him/her long after basic settlement needs are satisfied, and to utilize those higher-order skills, crafts and perceptions that he/she has brought to the new society. As Ashworth (1985) notes, "immigrants to one of the English-speaking countries will need a high level of fluency in English if they are to enter into the educational, social, vocational, professional, economic, and political life of the host community." (p. 16).

By allowing the language learning process to be restricted to the satisfying of a few discrete needs, ESL instructors may be, albeit with the best intentions, doing little more than helping add

to the growing underprivileged, under-realised and inarticulate class.

The issue need not be one of time, money, or staffing. Ivan Illich, speaking about the primary and secondary school establishment, indicates that commonly perceived 'problems' in education have in no way been alleviated by financial expense. He points out that "everywhere in the world school costs have risen faster than enrollments and faster than the GNP; everywhere expenditures on school fall even further behind the expectations of parents, teachers, and pupils." (1970, p. 14). These observations can, I think, be applied to adult and post-secondary education also, and like Illich, I have no illusions that problematic issues in education could be resolved if we only had enough cash to throw at them.

The issue is one of perceptions, both of the purpose of education, and of the relationship between linguistic competence and ability to function in a modern western democracy. Or to put it in more basic terms, the issue is of existence, and existence within socio-political parameters.

The Democratic Issue

Becoming informed politically...involves understanding public affairs which impinge upon second language teaching and perhaps taking sides. As has been shown, language classrooms do not operate in isolation from the various communities which surround them. It therefore behooves language teachers to develop a political awareness and sensitivity if they want to play a part in making decisions that will benefit their students. Ashworth, 1985, p. 102.

My own ideal society is not a democratic one. I am allowed to

carry out unlimited social engineering in my imagination. But the significance, or perhaps I should say miracle, of the democratic system of government is that it is a human construction, in fact the construction of a committee, and has been realised on earth. Kohlberg was proud of the achievement of the founding fathers, and I think justly so. No other realised ideal of how humans should live has contained the depth of respect for individuals, or the optimism that human cognition and human moral understanding can be directly beneficial to all mankind.

An effective information and communication network is crucial for the function of democracy as a system, in that it depends on an electorate both informed and able to communicate. The lack of such a network can cause the isolation of communities and an increase in paranoia. In this sense, the tools of communication, i.e. language, are crucial to the practical design of a democratic community.

Going beyond that, Kohlberg believed that democracy, more than any other system of social governance, permitted the morality of justice to be realised rather than just idealised. Democracy emphasised the rights of the individual. In Kohlberg's Stage Six, this essentially is the right to be treated as an individual among individuals. No one has priority of existence. Reversibility is in many ways a phenomenological concept. It states that the existential dilemma is confronted equally by all humans, perhaps by all living things. It is the only thing we can be certain we share.

Democracy is fragile. I do not mean this in the sense that it can be usurped by the unprincipled. This is obviously true; there are far more nations who have had democracy taken from them than have retained it. But it is a system that requires maintenance because it demands active participation in its process.

Democracy is more than a means of developing the master virtues of the common life; it is itself a master virtue, a subtype of the more general virtue of participation. As a virtue, democratic participation may be understood as a disposition to bring problems before the appropriate forum for public discussion and democratic resolution. (Nucci, 1989, p. 139).

The voice that individuals have in the construction of their social governance needs to be continual. If this does not happen, the system changes, as we can see clearly in North America, into a form of bureaucracy. Individuals have abrogated their voice in how they shall be governed.

Much of the reason for this, I believe, is that children are taught in North American schools that their democratic system is an established entity, and not, as they should be, that it is a form of dialectic. As a result, the study of democracy is a study of a structure that exists apart from the lives of the students. The governing system becomes as relevant as the workings of a distant city office. The Just Community schools were intended to train students how to approach their own government as a process, and see how it pertained to and influenced every aspect of their education, as well as to help them progress through the hierarchy of the moral domain.

For the immigrant also, the critical nature of being able to

actively take part in the system of government cannot be denied. As I have pointed out, without this not only will new Canadians be unable to effectively respond to discrimination, but they will also be unable to preserve the system that attracted them in the first place. The issue of anti-racist education is very much due to the failure of teachers to show all Canadians how the political structure exists for the very purpose of responding to problems such as prejudice. "Teaching for prejudice reduction is crucially a matter of changing existing attitudes and encouraging the development of new ones fully congruent with the ethical basis of a pluralistic democracy. Such a pursuit is essentially the provision of bases for moral attitudes, decisions and actions." (Lynch, 1987. p. 2).

The growing lack of dialogue between the people and their construction of government has resulted in, among other things, the growing dominance of extremist groups. I do not deny these groups their voice, but because they are more skilful manipulators of the law and government, they are often able to determine outcomes far out of proportion to their numbers and without debate. "In many instances, people simply lack the knowledge necessary for the exercise of communicative competence, and thus the political power to define 'what is' passes by default to those special interest groups that are able to impose their definitions." (Bowers, 1984, p. viii). The result is often the establishment of discriminatory policies. New Canadians are rarely equipped to combat them, and so the class system of injustice, where each level takes out their

frustrations on the one below, is perpetuated.

The Wider Perspective

Democracy is only a human construction. Its character changes with the changes in the composition of the society it binds. However, the issue of moral education is valid even in totalitarian governments (and in fact is more characteristic of such systems).

There are two central problems confronting modern man today, as identified by the reconceptualists and by the environmentalists. The first deals with the issue of human governance, and confronts the old paradox:

When Adam delv'd and Eve span
Who was then the gentleman?

In other words, what possible objective truth is there to support the unequal possession of access to wealth and property among humans? The issue of differences between genders, races, and cultures cannot be denied, but who has set the criteria to determine how these differences shall determine their bounty?

The second issue is really the same, but stretches the context so that the human concern becomes a planetary one. If you accept the first issue then the second is, I believe, a logical extension. For if we cannot establish priority or right to class and wealth based upon distinctions within humans, how can we assume these priorities exist based on distinctions between humans and other living things? If the world is not only for the technocracy, or not only for caucasians, or not only for the European heritage, then the world is not only for man.

These two questions have always been with us and have been

part of the interpretation each individual has of the world. The significance today is that our technical skills have outstripped our judgement in using them to the extent that we present a species-wide threat to ourselves, simply by being clever but not wise. By manipulating aspects of nature, such as the weather, for example, we have managed to taint every spot on earth with our own artifice. The result is terrible, "for the very thing that could stop us from continuing to destroy the planet - a sense of the awesome autonomy of nature - is no longer possible." (Bennet & Chaloupka, 1993, p. xi).

Kohlberg's view of the morality of justice is not inappropriate to either of these discussions. In fact I would argue that individual, human morality exists as a third factor that preempts both these others. Social reconstruction and environmental concerns are perceived as societal issues. Their spokespersons utilize models and maps that make use of terms such as 'frame factors', and try to encompass the whole of life's interactions, striving for a kind of global completeness.

This is well-intentioned. It may even be of benefit. But a goldfish in a bowl cannot know how thick the glass of the bowl is. It cannot know much about the true nature of its container, because by definition the container lies outside. But goldfish can know much about any other goldfish within the same bowl.

Communities are composed of individuals. The fluctuating energies, characters and perceptions of these individuals give the community its own personality, but, to reverse my earlier argument

regarding multiculturalism, this community personality is a reification of a combination of human individual characteristics. Marx always warned against personifying the social forces he identified as if they were legendary monsters. Capitalism no more continues its inexorable march of destruction than it sings, laughs, or jumps from a diving board. Democracy, as I mentioned before, was designed with this truth in mind, and so was presented as a process of governance, rather than as a governing structure.

Morality becomes an individual concern. It is the interaction of individuals to individuals, writ large by the population. The moral individual is that person who believes that no construction has priority over life, and that no individual has the right to restrict the existence of another. Few ideas could be more contradicted by our current system of education. And where not contradicted, they are ignored.

The teacher of any discrete subject matter is in fact teaching the student to exist in society. It is presupposed that mathematical skills, knowledge of computer programming, or a second language will benefit that individual, and through the reception of that benefit the individual will become a moral person. This is perhaps a form of transfer of learning, but it is very dubious. There is nothing in our history to show that knowledge as measured by the curriculum of discrete subjects has resulted in better behaviour, and in fact the opposite has been witnessed again and again. Technical expertise tends to result in improved techniques of injustice. The Greeks understood this instinctively. The Greek

education system was an education in how to be human (as limited as their view of what that entailed was). Our own perception is very different. As Eisner (1974) says, "It reflects the difference between seeing schools as an agent for moral uplift and seeing the school as a purely functional means of providing the survival skills necessary for the maintenance of civilization. This criterion would emphasize the difference between a broadly optimistic vision of what the schools can be expected to do and the narrower interpretation of their capacities." (p. 4).

The problem with the idea of these skills for maintaining civilization is that again we are dealing with something that is not maintained, but rather lived within. Modern man specializes in the ability to dissociate from environmental or contextual factors. We are within the goldfish bowl, yet somehow feel we can place it on a table at the other end of the room and look at it.

The Classroom

In 1985 there was the following recommendation by the committee of ministers of the council of Europe: democracy is best learned in a democratic setting where participation is encouraged. An appropriate climate is, therefore, essential to effective learning about human rights. (Lynch, 1987. p. 60).

Climate is a somewhat ambiguous term, and many educators interpret it to mean a combination of classroom layout and school facilities. But it can be also expanded to include the teaching approach and its corollary, the relationship between the teacher and the students.

Language-teaching approaches such as Freire's problem-solving approach attempt to combine the syllabus with the climate in a

manner that may be conducive to a Just Community classroom. In this approach, the content focus is on social issues directly related to the students' lives. It was originated as a literacy program for the underprivileged in Brazil, but may be very applicable to the situation of immigrants, who are often both underprivileged and lack the cultural literacy of the new country. "He [Freire] discovered that any adult can begin to read in a matter of forty hours if the first words he deciphers are charged with political meaning." (Illich, 1970, p. 26).

In this approach, the students and teacher work together as a single group. They begin by discussing critical issues in their lives, and ideally the fruition of this discussion is action. It benefits learners in that they are made aware that their problems do not exist because of a Deus Ex Machina, but are constructed by society and can be resolved through social rules. In many ways this parallels Kohlberg's work with Just Communities, although the difference being that the social rules in the case of, for example, the A School were the rules of the hidden curriculum. Adult ESL classrooms are just that - classrooms usually - as opposed to schools. But certain principles inherent in Just Community schooling can be applied:

- a) The teacher is a collaborator with the students, not a ruling authority. The teacher's status exists due to his greater knowledge of the target language. But his overt responsibility is to communicate this knowledge as quickly and as effectively as possible to the students. To use the gap

between the teacher's linguistic ability and the learners' as a justification for control makes no sense, as the teacher's professional obligation is to narrow this gap.

b) The students bear a responsibility to acquire the communicative competence required to participate in the democratic process. This can begin within the classroom, with basic issues determined through discussion and vote wherever possible (inability to communicate is a barrier, but a language teacher who is unable to communicate with his students is perhaps not in the right profession). As linguistic ability is a necessary adjunct to integration, students should understand that not only is it advisable to gain this ability in order to integrate successfully, it is in fact a requirement of settlement.

As Jim Cummins (1989) has explained to us, all good education should be additive. The student has to learn a new cultural orientation that will co-exist with the one brought from his native land.

Even certain specific skill areas can be utilised for the Just Community. A perfect example is literacy. Krashen (1993) points out, there is a strong connection established between reading and linguistic competence both in first and second languages. Because reading itself is beneficial, regardless of content, it has been suggested that extensive reading become the rule rather than the exception to reading instruction. In other words, the students are obligated to read what they want to read.

This can tie in very nicely with both discussion of moral dilemmas and even with more instrumental moral education, as moral concerns play a major role in the literature of all languages. Narrative tension in folktales and legends as well as modern fiction is usually established through moral dilemma and confrontation. "Stories and fairy tales, as Bruno Bettelheim points out, have a way of helping children work through such times of adversity." (Kilpatrick, 1992, p. 28). Bettelheim was discussing children, but I believe the same is true of adults, in that the aesthetic of literature can act as a comfort, and assist in the development of moral judgment for adults too. Reading as a second language skill can not only satisfy the purely linguistic requirement, the requirement for social informedness (or cultural literacy) through newspapers and journals, but also work with individual moral development.

The structural aspect of language teaching tricks teachers into forgetting the nature of linguistic content. Although I think that the reconceptualists have grossly simplified the idea, it is true that there is no such thing as neutral language. Because of this, the task of teaching language gains deeper implications in the manner it affects individual growth, which then exerts influence on the larger social constructions. "An essential element of a profession is that it sees itself as having an important role in society and a duty toward fellow citizens. In the case of teachers of foreign languages, this social conscience has an international dimension." (Esling, 1989, p. 84).

Moral stages may only exist within the manipulation of statistics. Absolute Just Community schools may be doomed to failure because children require instrumental moral education before they can be expected to take any effective part in moral discussion. But Lawrence Kohlberg perceived that the moral orientation of human beings is at least as important as our academic one. Just as we have always been proud to claim that our intelligence has saved us from rooting around in the savanna like apes, so our morality is the one factor that can stop us from wielding our cognitive abilities like a spray of grenades, blasting our landscape with the fruits of our knowledge, as if existence was a consumer product, and the first one to use it up will win.

After the Nazis evacuated the lager, Primo Levi wandered alone through devastated Poland. At an urban market, his camp uniform attracted attention and he was forced to explain himself to a crowd of townspeople. He did not speak Polish, and no one in the crowd spoke Italian. Finally, one person walking past agreed to interpret for him. They both spoke a little French. As Levi answered the crowd's questions and tried to explain where he had come from, where he had lived for the past two years, he realised that the interpreter was not being faithful to his words, that he was twisting Levi's answers so that, for example, 'Jew' became 'political prisoner'. The man was doing this for Levi's benefit. The attitude of the Polish populace to Jews was still very ambiguous. But Levi could only think about the experience he had gone through, and that he was not being permitted, and would never

be permitted to tell it.

I felt my sense of freedom, my sense of being a man among men, of being alive, like a warm tide ebb from me. I found myself suddenly old, lifeless, tired beyond human measure; the war was not over, there was always war. My listeners began to steal away; they must have understood. I had dreamed, we had always dreamed, of something like this, in the nights at Auschwitz: of speaking and not being listened to, of finding liberty and remaining alone. (p. 22)

Afterthoughts

I find it hard to create any kind of summary of the ideas in this paper. One reason is that in many ways the ideas are extremely open-ended. I am not yet the practitioner of moral education that I would like to be, and this lack of an understanding of moral education as craft as opposed to theory makes any form of conclusive statement rhetorical to the point of opacity.

Another difficulty with being able to conclude, to provide closure both for myself and the reader, is that such an attempt is a form of academic lie. In my own area of expertise, second language teaching, I can state quite confidently that no method is either more comprehensive or more effective than any other method. The differences in methods only emerge in their relationship to the individual instructors and students, and all the variables that influence them. By the same token, in a much more difficult to isolate area as moral education, we can be sure that only a fool would gamble on the one approach, or the last word. I hesitate to sum up, because I fear it would indicate that I have made such a wager.

I have reservations about many of the specific ideas in this paper. For example, although I have stated my conviction that a democratic system of government is the most able to create a moral society, I have since read a book dealing with the economic reform in the Pacific rim and comparing it to the political reform of the countries that made up the U.S.S.R. The author's point is simple: Who, of either Den Xao-Peng or Mikhail Gorbachev has done more to

improve the quality of life of the people of his nation? Whereas Russia is swiftly becoming a immense and terrifying chaos, China is well underway to achieving an economic miracle equivalent to that of Japan and South Korea, and the people of China, which once was one of the most calamitous developing nations on the planet, are beginning to be able to reap the benefits that this economic reform implies. It is very hard to argue against the change from not knowing whether one will have food the next day, to at least having that surety guaranteed. It seems plainly obvious to me that political reform without economic reform is an invitation to a nightmare, and therefore a working democracy can only be established in a community that possesses a least a certain set minimum quality of life.

Morality can become confusing when one deals with individual human suffering. Would any of Kohlberg's Stage Six individuals not suborn themselves to a lower stage of judgement-making if it could ease the burden of life for another human being? I cannot help but feel the US media's adulation of the Philippines' Corazon Aquino and other popular democratic leaders of developing nations takes little account of the incredible suffering these reform politicians inflict (albeit unintentionally) on their populaces simply because they have the naive conviction that democracy is a panacea. If I am guilty of trying to convince the reader of the same in this paper then I have made a grave error.

Another doubt, and one that will affect any moral educator, is the right of self-determination for the young (or for any dependant

group). When does one group have the right to say, "you should behave in this fashion," to another? The problem is a conflict of real and ideal worlds. "As J.F. Stephen observed, 'if children were regarded by law as the equal of adults, the result would be something infinitely worse than barbarism. It would involve a degree of cruelty to the young which can hardly be realised even in imagination.'" (Schrag. 1977. p.174.). To allow children the same status of moral decision-making and moral responsibility as adults would be to expose an entire block of our population to abuse and manipulation. We believe that we have to preserve some basic assumptions of authority, of guidance, because the world is real and capable of inflicting pain, especially on those who are smaller, weaker, less experienced. But even as we believe that this is the right decision, there is always the nagging doubt that by rejecting an impossible ideal, we might also be rejecting a possible one.

Convictions, passion, these are sparks that burn hot, but often not for great duration. My own challenge is to maintain my beliefs regarding the essential need for a moral component to all education even when I am most distracted by the practical, by the here-and-now of what I do. So much of teaching consists in modifying what one does in response to the students, and it is very difficult to teach with overriding principles (for those that do, these principles usually take such forms as, 'always give a spelling test on a Friday,'). For all of the theory that floats around it, the reality of teaching is a craft dominated by

practical concerns. How else can it be, when its participants and material are human beings?

In studying the ancient Greeks, I have learned that it is possible to have a society concerned with morality, that it is possible to look upon morality in a philosophical, as opposed to prurient or rule-governed dimension. I have learned it is possible to evaluate ourselves and our constructs using a criteria determined by constantly asking the question, how should we live?

From Lawrence Kohlberg I have learned that there is a valid need for at least maintaining a perspective on the moral component of education. I have also gained inspiration to pursue the means to incorporate moral education into my own teaching practice. Kohlberg's life is something of a romantic model for teachers, being full of eccentricity, adventure and non-conformism, as well as rejection, heroism, and sacrifice. Without wanting to trivialize his suicide as a post-modernist special effect, I think it can be seen partly as a signifier that behind the great certainty of the theorists and researchers with their data, books, and grants, remain doubts that remind us that we all share a lifelong confrontation with the same enigma, the world. To attempt to unravel this enigma is always to take a personal risk. Solomon, who knew, said, "He that increaseth knowledge, increaseth sorrow."

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APPENDIX: Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Development

LEVEL A. PRECONVENTIONAL

Stage One	Content	Social Perspective
The stage of punishment & obedience	<p>Right is literal obedience to rules & authority, avoiding punishment, & not doing physical harm.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Avoid breaking rules, obey for obedience' sake, & avoid physical damage to people & property 2. The rationale for the above is to avoid punishment & the superior power of authorities 	<p>Egocentric. Does not consider the interests of others, & doesn't relate two points of view. Judgment in terms of physical rather than psychological consequences. Authority's perspective is confused with one's own.</p>

Stage Two	Content	Social Perspective
The stage of instrumental purpose & exchange	<p>Right is serving one's own or other's needs & making fair deals in terms of concrete exchange</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Follow rules when it is to one's immediate interest. Act to meet one's own interests, & let others do same. Right is what is fair. 2. The rationale is to serve one's own needs or interests while recognizing that others have their needs too. 	<p>Concrete individualistic. Is aware that others have needs. Separates own needs from those of authority. Integrates or resolves conflicts of interest through fairness in exchange or distribution.</p>

LEVEL B. CONVENTIONAL

Stage Three	Content	Social Perspective
The stage of mutual interpersonal expectations, relationships, & conformity	<p>Right is playing a 'good' role, being concerned about others & their feelings, keeping loyalty & trust, & being motivated to follow rules & expectations</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Live up to expectations held by people close to one, or what general expectations of 'good' son, daughter, brother, sister etc. 2. The rationale is the need to be good in one's own eyes & those of others, & the logic of the Golden Rule. 	<p>The individual as related to other individuals. Awareness of shared feelings, agreements, & expectations. The virtue of putting oneself in the other's shoes.'</p>

Stage Four	Content	Social Perspective
The stage of social system & conscience maintenance	<p>Right is doing one's social duty, upholding the social order, & maintaining social welfare.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Fulfill one's social duties. Laws are upheld except when they conflict with social obligations. 2. The rationale is to keep the institution going as a whole. Understand the consequences of social irresponsibility. 	<p>The personal outlook is differentiated from the societal. One has to work within the definitions of the system. Individual relations are considered in terms of their place in the system.</p>

APPENDIX: Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Development

LEVEL B/C/ TRANSITIONAL	Content	Social Perspective
	Choice is personal & subjective, based on emotions. Conscience & morality are seen as relative.	The individual stands outside his/her own society, & makes decisions without generalized contract with society. One picks & chooses individual obligations.

LEVEL C. POSTCONVENTIONAL		
Stage Five	Content	Social Perspective
The stage of prior rights & social contract	<p>Right is upholding the basic rights of a society, even when they conflict with laws & rules.</p> <p>1. People hold a variety of values & opinions, & these are relative to the group. These must be upheld, in the interests of the social contract. Some rights, however, such as the right to life, are to be upheld no matter what the group determination is.</p> <p>2. The rationale is that one has made a social contract to abide by the laws for the good of the whole. Family ties & friendships are also equally binding.</p>	<p>There is an awareness of values & rights that exist prior to social contracts. These two perspectives are integrated through mechanisms of agreement & impartiality.</p> <p>One recognizes the conflict between the moral & the legal point of view & finds it difficult to reconcile them.</p>

Stage Six	Content	Social Perspective
The stage of Universal Ethical Principles	<p>Guidance for moral behavior is based on principles common to all mankind.</p> <p>1. In general, laws are upheld because they are based upon universal principles. When they are not, one acts in accordance to the principle, not the law. Principles include justice, equality of human rights, & respect for humans as individuals. These principles are not only supported generally, but are also followed in specific decisions.</p> <p>2. The rationale is that one sees the validity of universal principles, & commits to them.</p>	All social arrangements are based upon moral principles.

Note: This is taken from Chazan (1985). It is the 1981 revision of Kohlberg's model.