

THE NATURE, AND EFFECT ON BARGAINING
OF OCCUPATIONAL STEREOTYPING IN A
LABOUR RELATIONS CONTEXT

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(Abstract)

This developmental program of research focused on an extension of Haire's (1950) occupational stereotyping paradigm and an examination of the effects of such stereotyping on bargaining. The first phase of the research focused on adapting the basic Haire (1950) paradigm to include government officials within a tripartite framework. Materials and procedures were developed and tested on undergraduate students and then applied to contemporary working managers, union officers, and government officials. Results indicated that managers, union officers, and government officials generate stereotyped descriptions of themselves which are different from the stereotyped descriptions they use to describe the others and different again from the stereotyped descriptions the others use to describe them. The second phase of the research focused on an examination of the effect of these student generated occupational stereotypes (expectations) on the success of bargaining in a laboratory paradigm. In the laboratory, undergraduate students playing the roles of managers and union officers, negotiated the wages portion of a fictitious contract for experimental pay. Subjects' expectations for their opponents was experimentally manipulated within each bargaining dyad via descriptions of the opponents, and the effects of this manipulation on bargaining success was observed via seven separate dependent measures, including number of settlements, number of strikes, lockouts, and requests for conciliation, time to settlement,

distance apart at the conclusion of bargaining, subjects perceived success of bargaining, and willingness to renegotiate with same partner. The results indicated that violation of subjects' expectancies for their opponents' behaviour produced fewer settlements, more strikes and lockouts, more requests for conciliation, shorter times to settlement, less perceived success of bargaining, greater willingness to renegotiate, and a greater distance apart at the conclusion of bargaining. The implications for bargaining are that bargainers should become familiar with their opponents' expectations for their behaviour and act in accordance with their opponents' expectations.

CHAPTER 1
LITERATURE REVIEW & INTRODUCTION

The bargaining process has not escaped the attention of social psychologists though it will be shown later that the focus has been primarily away from the concept of stereotyped role expectation and its effect on bargaining outcomes. Since the late 1950's and early 1960's literally hundreds of studies on bargaining have taken place in the psychologist's laboratory. In the words of Rubin and Brown (1975):

"That researchers and theoreticians have found the area of bargaining important and noteworthy of their attention is attested to by the fact that more than 1000 different articles and books have been devoted to the subject since 1960 alone!" (p. viii)

Bargaining research by psychologists can be organized in basically three ways: (a) by the research paradigm employed; (b) by the choice of independent variables under investigation; and (c) by the choice of dependent measures used. The commonality is greatest among the research paradigms and the dependent measures employed since these have been relatively few in kind. I will present a brief review of these first followed by a more extensive description of the independent variables employed by social psychological research.

Research Paradigms

Typically, the research designs used to explore bargaining behavior fall in to one of four categories: (a) two choice matrix games; (b) distribution games; (c) economic exchange games; and (d) role playing.

(a) Matrix Games

These games pit a subject against either a game strategy (with the other player being a mechanized opponent programmed to play in a particular strategic fashion) or against another player. The object of the game is usually to accumulate points by making one of two choices. Point outcomes are a joint function of the choices made by the two "players". This type of game is typified by the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game (Luce and Raiffa, 1957). In research practice, the PD game has taken the form of subjects' choosing one of two buttons to press with the following corresponding outcomes (Alexander & Weil, 1969):

"Subjects were given a choice between pushing a RED or a BLACK button on each trial without knowing which the other player would choose. If both chose Red, each would receive fifteen points; and if both chose Black, each would receive five points. If there choices differed, then the one choosing Red would receive zero points, while the one choosing Black would receive twenty points. Obviously both players stand most to gain from a Red-Red choice combination, and least to gain from Black-Black. The Red-Black combination is temporarily most rewarding to the chooser of Black; but since it penalizes the chooser of Red, he is not likely to make it a stable combination". (p. 126)

Because the subject must choose between cooperating or competing to maximize his own outcome separately or jointly with the other player this type of bargaining paradigm has come to be known as a mixed-motive game.

A number of minor variations of the basic paradigm are possible but the essential features of two choices and joint outcomes, predisposing alternative strategies facilitating cooperation or competition, persist. Other more complex matrix games include the Parcheesi Coalition

game with three players (Vinacke and Arkoff, 1957) and the Acme Bolt Trucking game (Duetsch & Krauss, 1960). Morley and Stephenson (1977) criticize matrix games like the PD game on the grounds that they do not simulate bargaining, even very simple bargaining situations since: (a) even though outcomes are joint in the sense that they are a function of choices by both players, matrix games display an absence of joint decision-making; (b) subjects are given complete knowledge of the outcomes by way of a payoff matrix or table; (c) payoffs are normally trivial in value and not of inherent importance to participants; and finally (d) no social relationships are allowed to develop between players. Rubin and Brown (1975) add the following criticism: "since players typically can not choose to opt out of a PD relationship, one may question whether true bargaining can occur in this game". (p. 24)

(b) Distribution Games

As the name implies, these games involve the distribution of points or money between players with the winner being the one with the greatest number of points at the end of the game. Subjects are not allowed to split points evenly, and normally lower limits are set on the minimum number of points a player must receive on any one trial before that trial counts in his favour. A good example of this kind of game is the "Game of 9's" employed by Kelley, Beckman, and Fischer (1967). In each trial, players must decide how to divide a specified number of points between them (no even splits allowed) with each player having been given a minimum necessary share (MNS) value which he must meet or exceed to score on that trial. Subjects are usually ignorant of their

opponents' MNS values. Variations of this game might include the division of different point values (other than 9 used by Kelley, Beckman, and Fischer, 1967) or the division of money rather than points.

As Morely and Stephenson (1977) note, some limitations of distribution games are: (a) considerable time pressures which may induce focus on number rather than quality of settlements; and (b) restrictive communication that focuses on outcomes.

(c) Games of Economic Exchange

This popular bargaining strategy is exemplified by the Bilateral Monopoly game (Siegel and Fouraker, 1960). Players (subjects) are assigned the roles of buyer and seller and attempt to maximize profits (in points or real money) by selling commodities at high prices and buying commodities at low prices. Each player is provided with a profit table which specifies profits to be made by purchasing or selling a specified number of items at a variety of prices. Potential outcomes to buyers and sellers are negatively correlated.

Morley and Stephenson (1971) offer criticisms of such games as bargaining paradigms: (a) because outcomes are not perfectly negatively correlated, offers of equal value to one player (since profits are a function of a range of prices and quantities in some cases) may be of unequal value to his opponent; (b) some agreements maximize joint gain while others do not; and (c) excessive time pressures exist. Rubin and Brown (1975) offer the following criticisms: (a) communication is restricted to written exchange of offers; and (b) players can not choose to opt out of the relationship.

(d) Role Playing

In this paradigm (used extensively by Bass, 1966; and Druckman, 1967; 1968) subjects are required to learn the details of a particular dispute from standard materials provided by the experiments, are assigned roles (union and management for example), and then are required to negotiate the outcome of a number of issues as though they were representing parties to that dispute. Subjects are asked to reach agreement on as many issues as possible.

Two criticisms that can be levelled at this paradigm are: (a) the demands on the actors to simulate the behavior of parties to the dispute are considerable; and (b) it is not known to what extent such a paradigm simulates collective rather than interpersonal bargaining.

It can be seen that the more complex paradigms (role playing) demonstrate increased visual and verbal contact between subjects (something absent in the other game paradigms) but sacrifice experimental control of factors contributing to bargaining outcomes.

Dependent Measures

One feature which pervades almost all the bargaining research is a focus on tangible outcomes. Success in matrix, distribution, and exchange games is usually defined by points earned by subjects; success in role playing is usually established by the number of settlements reached. Though there can be little doubt that these are important indicators of success the restrictions on the bargaining process placed by this focus have been prohibitive. Researchers have typically limited their measures of behavior to cooperation and competition exclu-

sively in the game paradigms as well as the role playing paradigms since the assumption appears to be that cooperation produces high joint outcomes (successful bargaining) and competition produces either high or low individual outcomes or low joint outcomes depending upon the particular subject choices.

According to Rubin and Brown (1975):

"the two most frequently selected measures of effectiveness have been (1) the number of cooperative or competitive choices made throughout the total number of trials and (2) the magnitude of the outcomes obtained by the bargainers." (p. 34)

But bargaining often involves intangible issues which because of their difficulty or inconvenience in measurement, have been ignored. Again to quote Rubin and Brown (1975):

"the determination of bargaining effectiveness becomes a complex task. The gain or loss of honor, prestige, or reputation cannot easily be assigned a dollars and cents value: moreover, the effect of highhandedness - even if 'successful' on a future bargaining relationship is equally difficult to assess." (p. 33)

Morley and Stephenson (1977) offer similar sentiments:

"Negotiation may be regarded as successful when agreements are reached and those agreements are of high quality. However, while it is easy to measure number of deadlocks, time to agreement, etc. it is not always easy to say when an agreement is of high quality and when it is not ... in principle one might ask questions like: Did one subject dominate another? Did settlements reflect principles of equity or equality? How satisfied were the subjects with the agreements reached?" (p. 57)

In summary it has been suggested that bargaining research at least as it has been conducted by social psychologists has been relatively restrictive with respect to both types of paradigms and kinds of

dependent measures. Criticism has been offered to further suggest that these restrictions have served to limit the generalizeability of bargaining research to everyday bargaining particularly collective bargaining but not exclusively so. Some limitations mentioned have been severe time limitations, lack of availability to opt out of bargaining sessions, restrictive or lack of communication between parties, restrictiveness of alternatives, lack of joint decision making, and restrictive focus on tangible outcomes as measures of effectiveness or success. Armed with a knowledge of these restrictions it is time to turn to a brief examination of the range of independent variables employed in bargaining research.

Independent Variables Employed

This section will not attempt to describe all of the variables employed by social psychologists in their examination of the bargaining process. Rather it will be restricted to the portion of the field seen as most likely to yield insight into the relationship between subjects' expectations and success of bargaining. Other categories of variables are plentiful in the literature and have been treated fairly completely elsewhere (Rubin and Brown, 1975).

A good portion of the literature on bargaining research has been devoted to the behavior of the individuals in the bargaining process and is roughly divisible into two distinct categories: (a) background characteristics (age, sex, race, intelligence, status, etc.) and (b) personality characteristics (authoritarianism, need for approval, willingness for risk-taking, initial attitude, motivation, etc.). One

would expect to find the role of subject expectancies somewhere within these two categories, more probably in the latter although the relationship between background and personality is sufficiently complex to warrant a search through both classes of variables for a clue to the relationship between subjects' experimental expectancies and effectiveness of bargaining. A thorough search of the research utilizing both personality and background variables proved disappointing for two reasons: (a) only two studies found, directly address the possible relationship between subject expectancies and bargaining behavior (Garner & Deutsch, 1974; Lacy, 1978) and even here the variable was of secondary importance; and (b) many researchers have implicitly employed the concept of subject expectancies but have not systematically varied it as a unique variable and examined the consequences.

Presented first will be a review of those studies which address subject expectations implicitly but do not deal directly with such expectations as a variable in its own right. This will be followed by a description of the Lacy (1978) and Garner & Deutsch (1974) studies.

Studies Which Implicitly Deal with Subject Expectations

The studies which come closest to examining subject expectancies are those dealing with the issue of motivational orientation (MO), the attitudinal disposition toward the other in a bargaining dyad, most completely explored by Deutsch (1958; 1960). In the Deutsch paradigm, a subject's MO is manipulated via instructions so that the subject is induced to behave (a) cooperatively (with an interest in the other's as well as his own well being); (b) competitively (with an interest in doing

better than the other); or (c) individualistically (with an interest in maximizing his own benefit without regard for the other). Though MO is normally induced through experimental instruction requesting that he behave cooperatively, competitively, or individualistically, other researchers have attempted to induce MO through manipulation of reward structure (Wallace and Rothaus, 1969; Gallo and Dale, 1968; and Krauss, 1966). Following MO induction in the Deutsch (1958; 1960) studies, subjects bargained in a PD paradigm. The independent variables of interest for Deutsch were (1) the complexity of communication allowed (which varied from none, through communication of choice expectation for the opponent, to communication of choice expectation and reaction to violation of trust, i.e. fairly complete communication regarding responses to the other's choices; and (2) the particular MO induced.

Deutsch (1958) had subjects indicate how they expected their opponents to choose prior to their actually indicating their own choices to the experimenter so he had in essence a premeasure of subject's expectancies. Deutsch tabled the percentages of cooperative or competitive choices made by subjects with either cooperative or competitive initial expectancies but he failed to analyze the data for effects of violation or non-violation of choice expectancies. In addition the data appear to be confounded by two factors: (a) subjects' initial expectations may be predetermined by their experimentally induced MO's; and (b) notes exchanged by subjects indicating to their opponents their intentions were all cooperatively biased, that is they all expressed a cooperative intention.

It is surprising that Deutsch, (1958) overlooked the subjects' expectations and the consequences of the opponents' reactions to these expectations, particularly in view of the fact that he seemed to expect conflict when choice expectancies were violated:

"the nature of any ongoing system is such that violation is likely to occur, if only by chance. Hence, for the system to endure, there must be some way of avoiding the following self-perpetuating cycle: violation on the part of Person I, leading to a reaction to I's violation on the part of Person II, leading to expectation of distrust from II and hence, to repeated violation by I, leading to I's violation on the part of II, etc." (p. 273)

Several researchers have manipulated the concept of MO, some by utilizing the original method of induction by instructions devised by Deutsch (1958), eg. Griesinger and Livingston (1973), Kanouse and Wiest (1967), and Radlow, Weldner and Hurst (1968), some by showing subjects previous strategies employed by bargaining subjects and characterizing cooperation or competitive strategies with positive or negative adjective traits (Alexander and Weil, 1969) some by varying the reward structure attached to different MO's (Wallace and Rothaus, 1969; Gallo and Dale, 1968; and Krauss, 1966), and some by assigning subjects on the basis of some premeasured attitude (McNeel, 1973; Benton, Gelber, Kelley and Liebling, 1969; and Kelley and Stahelski, 1970a; 1970b).

Even though the very manipulation of MO has implicit in it certain expectations of a relationship between initial choice expectations by subjects for their opponents and bargaining outcomes, such a relationship has been overlooked in all these studies. Much of the blame can be attributed to the focus of attention on other relationships of interest with only passing interest in the overall outcome of subjects' predis-

positions or the outcome of a specific trial. The literature has dealt extensively with patterning of moves i.e. what are the consequences of a particular type (cooperative or competitive) of initial choice or a particular pattern of choices? Such studies are too numerous for the scope of this review and readers are referred to one of the excellent literature reviews such as Rubin and Brown (1975). What is clear is that even in the research on move patterns the focus has been on outcomes related to actual choices rather than subject expectancies.

That subject expectancies or any of a number of other subject related variables is an important area for investigation is stated in no uncertain terms by Rubin and Brown (1975):

"Social psychologists need to become far more imaginative in their development of dependent variables 'mean joint outcome' and 'frequency of cooperative choice' are valid measures of bargaining effectiveness. But surely there are other, perhaps more complex indices that may be employed to assess bargaining effectiveness as well ... all too often, moreover, potentially valuable measures of bargainers' preferences, expectations, intentions, and attitudes toward one another have been tacked onto a design simply because it is expedient or convenient to do so. The time has come to move such measures and others out of the dark recess known as 'supplementary analysis' and back into the forefront of researchers' attention, where they belong." (p. 297)

Clearly these remarks were intended to address the limitation placed by traditional researchers on the dependent measures employed but the arguments are equally salient in addressing the repeated choice of a seemingly standard set of independent variables. It is this relative restriction, I think, which allowed Rubin and Brown (1975) and others (Morley and Stephenson, 1977) to review many hundreds of articles in a fairly concise and organized fashion.

The Lacy (1978) Study

One of the two studies which bridge the gap between traditional bargaining research and the present investigation is a study reported by Lacy (1978) whose primary interest was in sex effects and who explored subject expectancies regarding their role as a mediator of sex effects. Subjects' initial choice expectations were assessed and the effects of these choices on cooperative or competitive behavior in a PD game analyzed. Lacy hypothesized that a participant's expectations of cooperation would be positively related to subsequent levels of cooperative behavior. Thus Lacy hypothesized that subjects who expected others to be cooperative and found this unconfirmed by the others behavior would respond with higher levels of competitive behavior. The overall predicted effect was confirmed although separate male/female analyses revealed that it was only statistically significant for women.

The Garner and Deutsch (1974) Study

The other crucial study which extends beyond the normal variables of interest in the MO literature to examine at least superficially, the effect on bargaining of subjects' expectancies, was reported by Garner and Deutsch (1974). These investigators systematically varied the information a subject received about his partner's orientation in a PD game and hypothesized that more intense negative affect toward their partners would be aroused when the subjects' expectations about partner were disconfirmed than when subjects possessed truthful information about their partners' dissimilar orientation. All subjects were given cooperative or competitive MO's via tape recording.

In each pair, one S was given the cooperative MO, and one the competitive MO. To create the expectation manipulation, some S's were told that both they and their partners were receiving the same instructions (thus each would have expectations of the other opposite to the way they were instructed to behave); some S's were told that only they were receiving a particular set of instructions and received notes indicating that their partners would be playing with an orientation opposite to theirs. The results showed: (a) that cooperative subjects who were informed that their partners also had a cooperative orientation when their partners actually had competitive orientations, felt more annoyed with and more hostile toward their partners after the game was played than before; and (b) that cooperative subjects who knew their partners had a different orientation from themselves felt less annoyed with and less hostile toward their partners after the game was played than before.

The latter result is of particular importance since later in the present research it will be shown that parties to a collective bargaining dispute hold stereotyped views of one another that characterize the two parties (management and union) as basically subscribing to different orientations. From the Garner and Deutsch (1974) study one would suspect that management and union representatives (who it will be shown have stereotyped expectations of one another) should encounter more negative affective orientations toward one another.

In view of the fact that of several hundreds of studies on bargaining only two researchers (to this investigator's knowledge)

thought it valuable to explore the effect of subject expectancies and even in one of those instances the expectancy variable was of secondary importance, one might validly question why the present research should focus on such an ignored variable as participants' expectations for the other, and why, as the reader will soon see, the investigation should be relatively much more complex in its' paradigm. Two reasons are of primary importance (a) the fact that managers actively involved in the process of negotiating collective agreements in the field focus on personality or "role" variables as significant determinants of conflict in bargaining practice; and (b) as has been described earlier, several researchers have criticized traditional research paradigms and classified them as relatively unrepresentative of the bargaining process as we know it in everyday use. Two sets of remarks by Rubin and Brown (1975) support the direction and form of the present research. The first set of remarks addresses the direction of the research:

"In order to understand the bargaining process, and in order to increase our confidence in this understanding, we need to consider the effects of multiple variables, using a variety of methods ... Bargaining, after all, goes on all around us, all the time, in innumerable contexts. Yet how often have we taken advantage of this fact and left the experimental laboratory in search of real bargaining incidents? Clearly there is a need for more, much more, observation of as well as intervention in the bargaining process as it occurs in reality." (p. 298)

The second set of remarks by the same authors addresses the need for more complex, more representative forms of research:

"First of all, social psychologists interested in the study of bargaining need to find a way of developing richer and more interesting laboratory paradigms than are presently available ... the PD game has given rise to hundreds of experimental studies, despite its obvious simplicity and many limitations. Similarly, other paradigms (such as the Acme-Bolt Trucking game, the Parcheesi Coalition game and the Bilateral Monopoly game) have been latched onto with considerable, if lesser, zeal even though they represent only partial and largely incomplete abstractions of the bargaining process." (pp. 296-297)

In keeping with some of the final considerations and suggestions provided by researchers, notably Rubin and Brown (1975) the present research represented an attempt to isolate and examine a single variable of interest, namely the expectations held of one another by parties to a bargaining or negotiating relationship, within a collective bargaining context, specifically those stereotyped expectations presumably attributable to the differential roles that they adopt (management versus union) as a function of their occupational roles. That such roles might influence the bargaining process and outcomes is suggested by the fact that surveyed managers condemn "personality clash" as a chief contributor to negotiating breakdowns. Within a social psychological perspective an examination of the meaning of this condemnation by managers represents a viable route for exploration and theory building in the area of the bargaining process.

Recently, a group of managers were asked to indicate why collective bargaining breaks down before agreement is reached (Belanger, 1975). These surveyed managers cited the behavior of individuals at the bargaining table as a major contributing factor. More specifically, "personality clash" was one of the most frequently mentioned problems.

What these managers have labelled personality clash might in fact better be called role clash or role conflict (Lawless, 1979): "I have often heard interpersonal conflict within the organization referred to as 'personality clash'. True personality clash is probably rare. The

problem is far more likely one of role conflict. Labelling a conflict as personality clash is usually taken to mean that it is 'unfortunate but unreconcilable' and hence it is impossible to do anything about it" (p. 342). Brown (1965) distinguishes between roles and personality in the following manner: "Roles are units of a social system and personalities are enduring traits and motives linked to a human organism" (p. 154). Wrightsman (1972) defines the term role as "the set of behaviours or functions appropriate for a person holding a particular position within a particular social context" (p. 23).

In a relatively short-lived interpersonal situation such as a single bargaining session or series of bargaining sessions it is very likely that roles rather than whole integrated personalities are being exhibited and it is possibly these roles that generate the conflict reported by the surveyed managers in the Belanger readings. Important questions to be dealt with here are: How does this "role conflict" come about? Does this conflict manifest itself in actual bargaining and if so, how?

Abravanel (1962) has demonstrated that "personality" which is perceived in the behavior of others is dependent on the roles which are presumed to apply to the others. Abravanel played a recording of a single speaker to his subjects under the guise of its being a telephone conversation (in which the listener never speaks) between: (a) a college instructor and one of his students, or (b) a college instructor and the Chairman of the instructor's department. The alleged speakers were the student and the Chairman respectively. Subjects were asked to characterize the conversation involving either the presumed Chairman or presumed student after hearing identical conversations. When the

conversation involving the fictitious student was characterized it was seen as "aggressive", "ambitious", and "egotistical". The same conversation was viewed as "hesitant", "compassionate", and "indecisive" when attributed to the fictitious Chairman. Thus ones perceived personality (if it can be represented by the sum of the traits ascribed) may vary as a function of the roles assigned to him, even though the behavior does not vary. This conclusion is supported by others (Asch, 1946; Haire and Grunes, 1950; and Kelley, 1950) and of particular importance, within a labour relations context (Haire, 1955). These studies will be dealt with later in this section.

In order to account for the above finding it is essential to distinguish, as Lawless (1979) does, between role "expectations" and actual behavior: "The expectation represents how the person (the actor) who fills the role category is supposed to act ... The role behavior refers to how a specific person in a role category actually behaves" (p. 237). If role behavior is not appropriate for the particular role expectation for an individual, then the perceived personality will be different from that for an appropriate role behaviour within the same role expectation category. Judging from the differential characterizations ascribed by Abravanel's subjects to the sham telephone conversation it would appear that for them at least, the content of the telephone conversation was more appropriate for the Department Chairman than for a student.

The Abravanel finding is not unique. In a classic study Asch (1946) found that the perception of a single personality variable (trait) influenced the perception of other aspects of the "total personality".

In this study two groups of students were read lists of characteristics that purportedly applied to a fictitious person. The two lists were different in only one respect: one list contained the word "warm"; the other contained the word "cold". This slight variation caused the two groups of subjects to form quite different impressions of the fictitious target. Kelley (1950), utilizing the Asch manipulation, obtained similar results in real ongoing interpersonal situations (he varied the actual behavioral warmth or coldness of the target as opposed to simply varying the written description of the target as Asch had done). Haire and Grunes (1950) were able to demonstrate the same Gestalt-like personality reorganization by varying the description of a factory worker's characteristics (here the word "intelligent" was either embedded in or omitted from a standard description).

How might conflict at the bargaining table be related to the phenomena just described? The studies cited above indicate that slight role or characteristic changes can generalize to major changes in perceived personality. If what managers report to be personality clash is in actuality role conflict that generalizes via reorganization to what they perceive as personality conflict, then an understanding of role perceptions in labour relations might help to clarify if not resolve these problems.

Haire (1955) investigated role perceptions of managers and union officers in an attempt to discern how each party viewed itself as well as how each party viewed the other. The subjects in this study were 76 members of a Central Labor Council (Union) and 108 industrial relations or personnel men (Management). Each party was presented with a

photograph of a man and an accompanying description of the man in the photograph. The photograph was chosen such that it represented an "ordinary person" (quotation marks mine). Within each category (management or union) the target (photograph) was described essentially the same except that the occupational role was varied; the target was either a "local manager of a small plant which is a branch of a large manufacturing concern" or a "Secretary Treasurer of his Union". In actual fact, two different photographs were employed in this investigation in a counter-balanced fashion but since the author did not elaborate on differences between them I will ignore this manipulation for the present. Subjects were asked to check off adjectives (from a list of 290) which they thought applied to the target based on the limited information they had at their disposal in the form of the photograph and the brief written description. The study was presented as one involving the perception of others in a limited information situation. The brief description consisted of the following: The person (1) is almost 46, (2) is healthy, (3) has been married for a long time and has a family, (4) has held several jobs, all successfully, (5) has few hobbies or interests outside of family and work, (6) reads newspapers and fixes things around the house, and (7) ... insert appropriate occupational role.

The results indicated that each category of occupation held a stereotyped perception of itself and of the other party and these perceptions were very different depending on who was perceiving whom. Management for example, saw itself differently from the way Union saw Management and differently again from the way it saw Union. In Haire's

words: "On the basis of this data it seems clear that labor and management are not talking to the same people when they confer with one another ... although they are only two people in the room, four people seem to be involved in the conversation ... under these circumstances it seems hardly possible that the statement can mean the same thing to both parties" (p. 211).

The situation described by Haire can be viewed as a potential source of conflict, one which involves the distinction between role expectations and role behaviour. The stereotypes of one another held by Union and Management correspond to the normative or expected traits for each party, depending on the point of view. If each party at the bargaining table holds differential expectations of one another's behaviour or characteristics underlying future behaviour then conflict is inevitable; each party may perceive that the other is acting out of character or out of role, yet each is acting in consonance with what it perceives to be normative for itself.

The initial aim of the present study was twofold: (a) Phase 1 - to examine the role perceptions of three parties, Union, Management, and Government; and (b) Phase 2 - to examine the effects of these role perceptions on bargaining behaviour involving union and management. The specific intention was to generate a picture of what role expectations each party has for itself and for the others. The addition of the third party (government officials) in the initial phase may satisfy many who believe that a tripartite labour relations system is an important concern for the future. Having established the specific role expectations for each party, it was then necessary to examine the effects of these role expectations on bargaining.

Figure 1 below illustrates the developmental sequence of events in this research program. From the figure, it can be seen that it was first necessary to develop the materials and procedures required and to test the validity of Haire's (1950) assumptions about role stereotyping. These assumptions would be expanded via some modification to Haire's (1950) paradigm to include government officials. Following this phase of the research (Pilot Study and Phase I) the research endeavoured to test the effects of the stereotyped role expectations on bargaining success in a laboratory setting.

FIGURE 1

The major developmental or chronological sequence of various phases of the total research program.

<u>Chronological Position of a Particular Phase and the Chapter in Which it can be Found</u>	<u>Descriptive Label Of the Phase</u>	<u>Purpose of the Phase</u>
1 (Chapter 2)	Occupational Stereotypes (Pilot Study)	To provide an initial test of material and procedures and some preliminary results for the investigation of occupational stereotypes
2 (Chapter 3)	Occupational Stereotypes (Phase I)	To test the validity of Haire's (1950) conclu- sions for contemporary managers and union officers and to extend these conclusions to a tripartite labour rela- tions system
3 (Chapter 5)	Ascertaining Students' Stereotyped Views of Managers and Union Officers (Preliminary Research)	To develop some of the materials and proce- dures necessary for the examination of the effects of stereotyped expectations on bar- gaining
4 (Chapter 6)	Effects of Stereotyped Expectation on Bargaining (Phase II)	To experimentally mani- pulate party's expecta- tions for his bargaining partner and examine effects of behavioural violation of the expecta- tions on the success of bargaining

CHAPTER 2

OCCUPATIONAL STEREOTYPES (PILOT STUDY)Introduction

Before actually attempting to measure role expectations for managers, union officers and government officials, it was necessary to first develop and test a number of materials and procedures for later use. In order to provide an initial test of materials and procedures for use in this proposed investigation and to provide some preliminary guidelines for research in this area, a pilot study was conducted which employed undergraduate students from the University of Manitoba Department of Psychology Subject Pool. The method and results of the pilot study appear below.

METHODSubjects

One hundred and five male and female subjects were drawn via sign-up booklets from the Introductory Psychology Subject Pool at the University of Manitoba and randomly assigned to one of four groups: (1) Materials Selection Group (N=60); (2) Experimental Group #1 (N=15); (3) Experimental Group #2 (N=15); (4) Experimental Group #3 (N=15)

Procedure for Materials Selection Group

The Materials Selection Group was employed in order to isolate a

target photograph appropriate for use in this experimental design which for the most part resembled that employed by Haire (1955). In a group setting, each of the 60 subjects was given a sheet consisting of 15 photographs (see Appendix A). Subjects were instructed to guess the occupation of each of the 15 males photographed (see Appendix B). Three choices were given: (a) Manager, (b) Union Officer, and (c) Government Official.

Results of Materials Selection

For the purpose of continuity the results of the stimulus selection procedure will be reported at this time. Of the 15 photographs three were ascribed predominantly one occupational statement or another (see Table 1). Photograph #4 was seen predominantly as a government official ($X^2=6.42$; $df=2$; $p<.05$). A significant number of subjects guessed that the person in photograph #6 was a union officer ($X^2=8.32$; $df=2$; $p<.05$) and that the person in photograph #14 was a manager ($X^2=8.32$; $df=2$; $p<.05$). Subjects failed to discriminate significantly between the other 12 photographs on the basis of probability of occupation (see Appendix A for identification numbers).

The criterion for acceptability as a stimulus target was earlier specified as a photograph which clearly did not elicit a particular occupational response. Since photographs #4, 6, & 14 elicited a predominance of a particular response they were eliminated from further consideration. A lack of predominance of one response over the others (a low chi square value) could be interpreted as representing a neutral stimulus. As the aim here was to select the most neutral stimulus tar-

get possible, the photograph which yielded the lowest chi-square value was selected; photograph #5 satisfied this criterion (see Table 1) but did not reproduce well, so photograph #11 was chosen.

Procedure for Experimental Groups

The remaining three groups of subjects were presented with the single stimulus target selected by the above procedure as well as a brief general description of the individual in the photograph (see Appendix C, D, or E). Experimental group 1 received the general description with a statement that the individual was a manager (see Appendix C). Experimental group 2 received the general description and was led to believe that the target stimulus was a union officer; the third experimental group received the general description but was led to believe that the target was a government official (see Appendices D and E respectively).

All subjects were asked to describe the target stimulus based upon the information provided by the brief general description (including the occupational statement embedded in the description) and the photograph provided by checking off any of the three hundred adjectives in the accompanying Adjective Check List (ACL) which they believed were probably characteristic of the target (see Appendix F).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Table 2 lists the adjectives most frequently used to describe a manager, that is, to describe the target by the subjects in experimental

Table 1

Percentage of subjects ascribing each of the three occupational statements to the fifteen potential stimulus targets

<u>Target I.D. No.</u>	<u>% guessing manager</u>	<u>% guessing union officer</u>	<u>% guessing gov't. official</u>	<u>X²</u>
1.	53	26	21	3.27
2.	42	47	11	4.53
3.	21	37	42	3.89
4.	32	11	58	6.42*
5.	32	37	32	.11
6.	26	63	11	8.32*
7.	53	21	26	3.27
8.	42	37	21	1.37
9.	47	21	32	2.00
10.	26	16	58	5.48
11.	26	37	37	.42
12.	42	21	37	1.37
13.	21	37	42	1.37
14.	63	26	11	8.32*
15.	37	11	53	5.16

* indicates significant ascription at $p < .05$

group 1 who believed the target to be a manager. Two criteria were employed for inclusion in this and the following lists: (1) an adjective must have been checked by approximately 13 subjects in a particular group (experimental group 1 in this case); and (2) an adjective must not overlap with any of those most frequently used to describe the other targets (union and government officials).

Tables 3 and 4 list the adjectives most frequently used to describe union officers and government officials respectively, employing the same criteria as for Table 2.

By comparing the lists of most frequently employed adjectives it can be seen that the descriptions of the same target individual varied according to which occupational statement had been experimentally assigned. Excluding overlapping adjectives (capable, intelligent, and patient) which were ascribed equally frequently to all three occupations, three different clusters of adjectives emerged for the three groups respectively.

The emergence of three distinct adjective clusters even though all subjects believed that they were describing the same target lends support to the manipulation of the occupational statement. The nature of the different clusters indicates that different stereotypes exist for the three different occupations employed in this study. Managers were seen by undergraduate students as being adaptable, cooperative, efficient, good-natured, industrious, kind, and quiet. Union officers, on the other hand, were seen as predominantly conscientious, considerate, determined, mature, organized, and serious. Finally, government officials were viewed as being calm, confident, fair-minded, reasonable, and sincere.

Table 2

Adjectives most frequently used by subjects to describe managers

	<u>% of use to describe managers</u>	<u>% of use to describe union</u>	<u>% of use to describe government</u>
Adaptable	90	75	64
Cooperative	90	75	64
Efficient	90	50	73
Good-natured	90	63	82
Industrious	90	50	46
Kind	90	50	73
Quiet	90	75	56

Table 3

Adjectives most frequently used by subjects to describe union officers

	<u>% of use to describe union</u>	<u>% of use to describe managers</u>	<u>% of use to describe government</u>
Conscientious	88	80	73
Considerate	88	70	55
Determined	88	60	27
Mature	88	70	82
Organized	100	90	56
Serious	88	50	73

Table 4

Adjectives most frequently used by subjects to describe
government officials

	<u>% of use to describe government</u>	<u>% of use to describe managers</u>	<u>% of use to describe union</u>
Calm	91	70	75
Confident	91	60	75
Fair-minded	100	60	75
Reasonable	91	80	75
Sincere	91	60	63

It is interesting that none of the clusters included negative traits; all three occupational groups were seen as positive. Each occupational group however is seen as having very different strengths.

The implication of these results for management-labour-government relations are great. If the same or similar stereotypes are shared by managers, union officers, and government officials then conflict could result in negotiating settings where actual behaviour of a particular group contradicts these stereotyped expectations. If for example managers behaved at the bargaining table in an inflexible, uncooperative, inefficient, ill-natured, lazy, hostile, or noisy fashion this might be viewed as inappropriate behaviour by the other parties concerned. Managers in this example would be seen as not acting in the best interests of all involved.

The results of Lacy (1978) and Garner and Deutsch (1974) isolate some of the affective consequences of violation of a subject's expectations for the other's behavior in a bargaining pair. It is via this affective restructuring that one would expect changes in levels of conflict and thus some resultant consequences to the success of bargaining in a negotiating context. That subjects' attitudinal predispositions can affect the outcomes and choices made by bargainers in a game-playing context has been adequately demonstrated elsewhere (Deutsch, 1958, 1960; Kanouse and Weist, 1967; Alexander and Weil, 1969).¹ One of the significant aims of the present research was to demonstrate that among

¹ For a complete review of articles reporting the effects of subjects' predispositions on bargaining outcomes, the reader is referred to Rubin and Brown (1975).

other effects, violation of subjects' behavioral expectations for their opponents had observed effects on the affectual predispositions of bargainers toward one another.

The picture at this point was incomplete. Two ingredients were required to round out the picture. The first of these was a knowledge of whether or not similar stereotypes existed among "real" managers, union officers, and government officials. The second was whether or not violations of the stereotypes that the various groups have of one other manifest themselves in the bargaining process. This information was needed to accurately if only partially examine some potential sources of conflict due to differences between role expectations (the existing stereotypes) and role behaviour (actual behaviour of the parties concerned).

There was still some doubt at the time of the pilot investigation whether the student population sampled in the pilot study was representative of the populations of real working adults to be sampled in Phase I. Some indirect supportative evidence was available: In a study which investigated the perception of Labour and Management by 855 school children in grades 7 through 11 (Haire and Morrison, 1957) it was found that children perceived the same labour-management situations differently depending on their socio-economic backgrounds (presumably this was related to whether they were more closely associated with either management or union oriented backgrounds). That there were differences in perception indicated that even school-aged children develop some stereotyping with respect to Management and Union.

This stereotyping was further supported by the pilot investigation

in which University undergraduates generated different descriptions of identical target photographs as a function of the stated occupation. These results suggested that occupational stereotyping is present at a relatively early stage and persists at least throughout the high school and University school period. They do not however provide any indicators of the similarity of stereotyping between college aged subjects and the working adults that were employed in the next phase of this study.

The materials and procedures employed in this pilot study appeared to be useful in examining the basic issues originally addressed in the major study. These preliminary results were suggestive of the stereotyped roles which might be encountered in the "real life" situation and lent definite support to the existence of occupational role stereotypes in the population of students employed here.

CHAPTER 3
OCCUPATIONAL STEREOTYPES (PHASE I)

METHOD

Subjects

A total of 97 subjects were recruited from Certificate courses in the Continuing Education Division of the University of Manitoba. Subjects were drawn as follows:

(a) Thirty-three subjects attending a regular class in one of the Management Certificate Courses at the University of Manitoba constituted the management sample. These subjects were all employed in managerial capacities in Canadian industrial settings.

(b) Thirty-two subjects from the Labour Certificate course at the University of Manitoba constituted the Union group. All subjects held union positions where they were employed and most were active in union administration matters. Some had previously negotiated collective agreements for their unions and most of those that hadn't admitted that such activities would be major responsibilities in the future.

(c) Thirty-two subjects from a class in the Management Certificate Course designed for employees in the Public Sector made up the government group. All subjects were employed at approximately middle-management levels in various government departments.

Materials

The materials employed consisted of the following:

(a) Target Photograph

The single target photograph employed here was photograph #11, used earlier in the pilot investigation (see Appendix A). This procedure represents a departure from the original Haire (1955) technique where two different photographs were used. Haire's conclusion after using more than one target stimulus was that a sampling problem existed: "The most serious sampling problem, however, is the degree to which the stimulus pictures represent management and labor in general." (p. 212). This uncertainty may have been Haire's rationale for employing multiple target photographs. In the present study careful attention was paid to selection of a target photograph which was sufficiently neutral that assignment to any one of three parties (Union, Management, and Government) was equally plausible.

(b) Target Descriptions

Three descriptions were constructed, all of which contained identical information except for the appropriate occupational statement. The identical information consisted of the following: the man in the photograph (1) is middle-aged, (2) is healthy, (3) has been married for a long time and has a family, (4) has held several jobs, all successfully, (5) has few hobbies or interests outside of family and work, and (6) reads newspapers and fixes things around the house. The occupational statements varied as follows: the man in the photograph is (1) the local manager of a small plant which is a branch of a large manufacturing concern, (2) Secretary Treasurer of his Union, or (3) the Regional Director for the Federal Department of Labour. The occupational statements were embedded within the standard target description (see Appendices C, D, and E).

(c) The Adjective Check List (ACL)

Subjects were asked to describe the target individual by checking off adjectives from the 300 that appear on the Adjective Check List (Gough and Heilbrun, 1965) that they believed applied to the "person in the photograph." Responses on the ACL constituted the only dependent measure in this Phase. The ACL was originally designed for the assessment of others in a clinical setting and encompasses a wide range of human behaviours (see Appendix F).

Procedure:

The procedure for Phase 1 of the study followed that reported earlier in the Pilot Investigation. Procedures were identical for each of the three groups involved (Management, Union, and Government). Subjects were asked to participate in a study ostensibly aimed at examining the accuracy of perception of others under conditions involving limited information about the others. Subjects participated in groups since the study was conducted during class time while attending their regularly scheduled Certificate Courses.

Each subject received one of the 3 target photograph-description combinations (which varied only in regard to occupational statement). These sheets were distributed at random throughout each class. In addition to a target photograph-description sheet each subject received an accompanying copy of the ACL and a computer scorable ACL response sheet (see Appendix G). A superficial examination of the target photograph-description sheets (Appendix C, D, or E) demonstrates that a detailed comparison between any two was necessary in order to discern the differences. This deliberate similarity combined with

random distribution was intended to prevent subjects from spotting the occupational manipulation. During the pilot investigation subjects expressed great surprise during the debriefing session when they discovered that they had not all been describing the same targets (occupationally).

From the subject's viewpoint the basic task was quite simple procedurally. He was asked to examine the target photograph and accompanying description and check off all the adjectives on the ACL that he thought were characteristic of the target. When subjects had completed the task they were debriefed as a group (in class) and all questions were answered; the true nature of the study and reasons for deception about the purpose of the study were explained.

RESULTS

Subjects fell into one of the following categories depending on who was describing whom: (1) M-M: managers describing a manager (N=11); (2) M-U: managers describing a union officer (N=12); (3) M-G: managers describing a government official (N=10); (4) U-M: union officers describing a manager (N=11); (5) U-U: union officers describing a union officer (N=10); (6) U-G: union officers describing a government official (N=11); (7) G-M: government officials describing a manager (N=12); (8) G-U: government officials describing a union officer (N=10); (9) G-G: government officials describing a government official (N=10).

Cross-tabulations of groups by adjective were performed yielding separate tables for each of the 300 adjectives employed. Only 5 of the 300 adjectives were not employed by some subjects. These 5 were: fickle, foolish, infantile, irresponsible, and mischievous. It is safe to say that the target was not perceived to have any of these five qualities.

It is difficult and somewhat arbitrary to decide at what point the target was seen to have a particular quality; that is, how many subjects must check off a particular adjective before one can assume that that group perceives the target as having that quality. If 50% of a group check off absent-minded for example clearly the other 50% do not. Thus with respect to absent-mindedness half the group believe that it applies and half do not. It is not at all clear what percentile is appropriate before we have confidence that a particular trait should be part of the stereotyped description of the target. This difficulty can be partially alleviated by taking a comparative approach to the issue. If we compare the percentages of employment of a particular adjective across groups of subjects we can then attain a measure of the relative importance of the adjective to each group. If 90% of one group uses a certain adjective to describe the target and only 50% of another group uses the same adjective to describe the target then clearly the former group sees the adjective as more characteristic of the target.

The comparative approach is not without its drawbacks. Let us assume that 50% of Group A uses the adjective absent-minded to describe the target while 0% of Group B uses the same adjective to describe the target. Clearly Group A feels more strongly that absent-

mindedness is characteristic of the target than Group B, but even within Group A the feeling is split - half of that group do not feel that absent-mindedness describes the target. Which half should influence our thinking about whether a particular characteristic is applicable or not?

The present analysis combined the two kinds of approaches (absolute vs. comparative) in an attempt to temper the weaknesses of either approach taken alone. Adjectives chosen for analysis were scrutinized for their percentage of use by the particular group involved. If an adjective was employed by at least 80% of all members of the selected group it was included in the list of "most frequently used adjectives" (with the exception of Table 8 where group choices never exceeded 75%). From this point a comparative analysis was employed in which frequency of usage was compared between the selected group and the other groups. For ease of presentation the results are categorized according to the particular group viewpoint under analysis. For reasons that will be made clear in the discussion section of this phase of the study, levels of rejection of $p = .30$ were employed for these analyses. All tests of significance were Chi Square tests.

1. How Managers viewed themselves

The adjectives employed in this analysis were those chosen by the group of managers who described the target identified to them as a manager.

From Table 5 it can be seen that only 2 adjectives, conservative and healthy, made the 80% cut-off point; that is only 2 adjectives were

Table 5

Adjectives most frequently used by managers to describe themselves

	% of all managers choosing adj.	% of use in describing same man as union	% of use in describing same man as gov't
	<u>M-M</u> (N=11)	<u>M-U</u> (N=12)	<u>M-G</u> (N=10)
conservative	91	50	70 p < .20
healthy	91	75	60 p < .30

employed by at least 80% of the group. The adjective conservative was employed by 91% of this group to describe a target they believed to be a manager. This is different from the frequency of usage of the same adjective to describe either a union officer (50%) or a government official (70%). The significance of these differences was modest ($p < .20$). The adjective healthy was chosen by 91% of the managers to describe themselves but by 75% to describe union officers and 60% to describe government officials ($p < .30$).

The above results indicate that managers saw themselves as significantly more conservative and more healthy than they saw either union or government (Table 5).

2. How Union Officers viewed themselves

The adjectives employed in this analysis were those chosen by the group of union officers who described the target identified to them as a union officer.

From Table 6 it can be seen that 9 adjectives met the inclusion criterion of 80% choice by group members. These adjectives were: organized, stable, active, ambitious, healthy, responsible, serious, sociable, and sincere.

The adjective organized was chosen by 100% of the union group to describe themselves while it was employed by 91% to describe management and 46% of the time to describe a government official. This difference was highly significant ($p < .01$).

The word stable was chosen by all members to describe union but by only 46% to describe management and 36% to describe government.



Table 6

Adjectives used most frequently by
union officers to describe themselves

	% of all union officers choosing adj.	% of use in describing same man as mgm't	% of use in describing same man as gov't
	<u>U-U</u> (N=10)	<u>U-M</u> (N=11)	<u>U-G</u> (N=11)
organized	100	91	46 p < .01
stable	100	46	36 p < .01
active	90	27	27 p < .01
ambitious	90	73	64 p < .50
healthy	90	46	91 p < .02
responsible	90	73	46 p < .10
serious	90	73	64 p < .50
sociable	90	27	27 p < .01
sincere	80	46	46 p < .20

Frequency of usage is shown for the other adjectives listed in the same table. Significant differences were found for 5 of the remaining 9 adjectives listed as follows: active ($p < .01$); healthy ($p < .02$); responsible ($p < .10$); sociable ($p < .01$); and sincere ($p < .20$).

Union officers thus viewed themselves as more organized, more stable, more active, more responsible, more sociable, and more sincere than either management or government; they viewed themselves as more healthy than management but not more healthy than government.

3. How government officers viewed themselves

In this analysis 5 adjectives equalled or surpassed the 80% choice criteria: conservative, dependable, capable, healthy, and practical.

Table 7 lists the adjectives most frequently used by government officials to describe a target identified as a government official. From the table it can be seen that only 1 adjective, practical, was significantly more often chosen to describe government officials than to describe one of the other groups. In this case government officials used practical more often to describe themselves than to describe management, but less often than to describe union officers ($p < .30$).

4. How managers viewed union officers

Managers did not use any adjectives with the required frequency of 80% when describing a target they believed to be a union officer. The most frequently used adjectives were healthy and mature (chosen by 75% of managers in this group). Table 8 illustrates this.

When frequency of usage of these two adjectives was compared for

Table 7
Adjectives used most frequently by
government officials to describe themselves

	% of all gov't officials choosing adj.	% of use in describing same man as mgm't	% of use in describing same man as union
	<u>G-G</u> (N=10)	<u>G-M</u> (N=12)	<u>G-U</u> (N=10)
conservative	90	83	70 p < .50
dependable	90	75	90 p < .50
capable	90	92	80 p < .50
healthy	80	75	90 p < .50
practical	80	58	90 p < .30

Table 8

Adjective most frequently used by managers to describe union officers

	% of all managers choosing adj.	% of use in describing same man as mgmt.	% of use in describing same man as gov't
	<u>M-U</u> (N=12)	<u>M-M</u> (N=11)	<u>M-G</u> (N=10)
healthy	75	91	60 p < .30
mature	75	55	40 p < .30

description of union officers versus description of management and government some differences resulted. The adjective healthy was used more often by managers to describe union officers (75%) than to describe government officials (60%), but not more often than to describe themselves (91%) ($p < .30$). The adjective mature was used more often by managers describing union officers (75%) than by managers describing either themselves (55%) or government officials (40%) ($p < .30$).

5. How managers viewed government officials

When managers described what they believed to be a government official three adjectives were employed with the required frequency: organized, methodical, and loyal.

From Table 9 it can be seen that 100% of the managers in this group used the adjective organized, to describe what they believed to be a government official while only 27% used the same adjective when the target was identified as a manager and 58% employed the adjective when the target was identified as a union officer. This difference was highly significant ($p < .01$). Table 9 illustrates that the other two adjectives, methodical and logical, were also employed differently when describing a government target than when describing a union target ($p < .10$ for methodical; $p < .30$ for loyal).

6. How union officers viewed managers

Union officers asked to describe a target identified as a manager employed four adjectives at least 80% of the time: conservative, conventional, organized, and practical (see Table 10).

Table 9

Adjectives most frequently used by
managers to describe government officials

	% of all managers choosing adj.	% of use in describing same man as mgmt.	% of use in describing same man as union
	<u>M-G</u> (N=10)	<u>M-M</u> (N=11)	<u>M-U</u> (N=12)
organized	100	27	58 p < .01
methodical	90	64	42 p < .10
loyal	80	46	58 p < .30

Table 10

Adjectives used most frequently by Union officers to describe managers

	% of all union officers choosing adj.	% of use in describing same man as union	% of use in describing same man as gov't
	<u>U-M</u> (N=11)	<u>U-U</u> (N=10)	<u>U-G</u> (N=11)
conservative	100	50	73 p < .05
conventional	100	40	27 p < .01
organized	91	100	46 p < .01
practical	91	70	64 p < .30

The adjective conservative was used by 100% of the union officers when describing managers but by only 50% when describing union officers and by 73% when describing government officials. These differences were significant ($p < .05$). A greater number of union officers used the adjectives conventional and practical to describe managers than to describe either themselves or government officials: 100% used conventional to describe managers while 40% and 27% used the same adjective to describe union officers and government officials respectively ($p < .01$); 91% described managers as practical while only 70% and 64% used the same adjective to describe union officers and government officials respectively ($p < .30$). Union officers used the adjective organized more often to describe managers than to describe government officials (91% vs. 46%) but less often to describe managers than to describe themselves (91% vs. 100%). The difference in this comparison (entirely attributable to the description of managers vs. the description of government officials) was highly significant ($p < .01$).

7. How Union officers viewed government officials

Only two adjectives were employed with the required frequency of 80% by union officers when describing a target they believed to be a government official (see Table 11).

The adjective healthy was used by 91% of the union officers to describe government officials, by 90% to describe themselves, and by only 46% to describe managers ($p < .02$). The same number of union officers (91%) used the phrase narrow-interests to describe government officials; this frequency of usage was significantly different ($p < .20$) from that used for both management (73%) and themselves (50%).

Table 11

Adjectives used most frequently by union
officers to describe government officials

	% of all union officers choosing adj.	% of use in describing same man as mgm't	% of use in describing same man as union
	<u>U-G</u> (N=11)	<u>U-M</u> (N=11)	<u>U-U</u> (N=10)
healthy	91	46	90 p < .02
narrow-interests	91	73	50 p < .20

8. How government officials viewed managers

For government officials describing a target they believed to be a manager seven adjectives met the 80% criterion for inclusion: civilized, capable, calm, conservative, conventional, intelligent, and responsible (see Table 12).

For three of these adjectives (capable, calm and responsible) no significant differences were found between the frequency of use to describe managers and the frequency of use to describe the other two groups (union and government). The adjective civilized was used by 100% of the government officials when describing a manager and by 90% and 80% when describing union officers and themselves respectively ($p < .30$). As seen in the table, significantly ($p < .20$) more government officials employed the adjectives conventional and intelligent when describing managers than when describing either union or themselves (83% vs. 50% and 50% for conventional; and 83% vs. 60% and 40% for intelligent). Government officials used the adjective conservative more often in describing managers (83%) than in describing union officers (70%) but less often than in describing managers (83%) than in describing themselves (100%). This difference was also significant ($p < .20$).

9. How government officials viewed union officers

When government officers described a target identified to them as a union officer, they employed seven adjectives often enough to meet the 80% criterion: cautious, dependable, healthy, practical, civilized, conscientious, and honest (see Table 13).

From Table 13 it can be seen that four of the adjectives were not

Table 12
Adjectives used most frequently by
government officials to describe managers

	% of all gov't officials choosing adj.	% of use in describing same man as union	% of use in describing same man as gov't
	<u>G-M</u> (N=12)	<u>G-U</u> (N=10)	<u>G-G</u> (N=10)
civilized	100	90	80 p < .30
capable	92	80	100 p < .50
calm	83	80	70 p < .50
conservative	83	70	100 p < .20
conventional	83	50	50 p < .20
intelligent	83	60	40 p < .20
responsible	83	60	60 p < .50

Table 13

Adjectives used most frequently by
government officials to describe union officers

	% of all gov't officials choosing adj.	% of use in describing same man as mgm't	% of use in describing same man as gov't
	<u>G-U</u> (N=10)	<u>G-M</u> (N=12)	<u>G-G</u> (N=10)
cautious	90	75	60 p < .30
dependable	90	75	90 p < .50
healthy	90	75	80 p < .50
practical	90	58	80 p < .30
civilized	80	100	80 p < .30
conscientious	80	67	80 p < .50
honest	80	67	60 p < .50

significantly differentially used by government officials to describe the three targets: dependable, healthy, conscientious, and honest ($p < .50$ in all cases). Of the remaining three adjectives one showed a higher frequency of use in describing managers and the same frequency of use in describing government officials (civilized). The adjective cautious was used by 90% of the government officials to describe union officers by 75% to describe managers and by 60% to describe themselves ($p < .30$). Ninety percent of the government officials used practical when describing union officers while 58% used the same adjective to describe managers and 80% used practical to describe themselves ($p < .30$).

Summary of Results

The many analyses presented thus far can be summarized in tabular form by eliminating those adjectives which do not meet the earlier specified significance requirements and by listing for each of the 9 group perspectives, the remaining adjectives (see Table 14).

A perusal of this table yields what one might construe to be some of the very basic and abbreviated stereotyped descriptions for each perspective. In order to make some sense of Table 14 it is necessary to review some of the fundamental findings thus far.

It was found from table 5 that managers viewed themselves as more conservative and more healthy than they viewed either union or government. This conservative view was supported by union's view of management (Table 10) and by government's view of management (Table 12), although from Table 8 it can be seen that government viewed itself as even more conservative than management. These results are reflected

Table 14

An abbreviated list of the most frequently chosen
adjectives by each of the 9 perspective groups

<u>M-M</u> ¹	<u>M-U</u>	<u>M-G</u>	<u>U-U</u>	<u>U-M</u>	<u>U-G</u>	<u>G-G</u>	<u>G-M</u>	<u>G-U</u>
conservative	healthy	organized	organized	conservative	healthy	practical	civilized	cautious
healthy	mature	methodical	stable	conventional	narrow-minded		conservative	practical
		loyal	active	organized			conventional	civilized
			responsible				intelligent	
			sociable					
			sincere					

¹ See p. 32 for a description of each perspective group.

in the listing of conservative as one of the most frequently used adjectives by (1) management to describe itself; (2) union to describe management; and (3) government to describe management.

Management was alone in seeing itself as healthy (Table 5); neither union (Table 10) nor government (Table 12) viewed management as healthy.

Union stood alone in seeing itself as organized, stable, active, responsible, sociable, and sincere (Table 6); neither management (Table 8) nor government (Table 13) described union with any of these adjectives. There was agreement by management however that union is healthy (Table 8).

Only government saw itself as being practical (Table 7). Neither management (Table 13) nor union (Table 11) used practical to describe government officials.

Union and government viewed management differently from the way management viewed itself (with the exception of agreement on conservative). Further, union and government were at odds with the way they viewed management with one exception - both saw management as conservative and conventional but while union saw management as being organized and practical, government viewed management as civilized and intelligent.

Management was in agreement with union that union is healthy but in disagreement with government in all respects. While management viewed union as healthy and mature, government viewed union as cautious, practical, and civilized.

Management and union held very different views of government.

While management saw government as organized, methodical, and loyal, union saw government as healthy and narrow-minded.

Discussion

Although there were other combinations of perspectives or viewpoints not dealt with in the analysis section enough patterns emerged in the tabled analyses to suggest that something very interesting was occurring in the data: although only three occupational groups were involved in the investigation several different patterns of adjectival description were generated as a function of which occupation was being described by which experimental occupational group. Some agreement existed as in the case where all three occupational groups viewed managers as conventional. More often however the groups described themselves differently from the way they described the other groups and from the way other groups described them. There appeared to be not 3 but rather several (at least 9) different targets being described by the subjects in this study.

Some precautionary notes are in order at this point. The adjectives listed as the most frequently employed adjectives by a particular group describing a particular target were arbitrarily chosen by an 80% choice criterion. There were of course many other adjectives chosen by each group, some which were close to the 80% criteria and some which were not so close.

Some of these adjectives which were not chosen for inclusion demonstrated higher levels of significance (when their frequency of usage by one group to describe a particular group was compared to the

frequency of usage by the same group to describe a different group) than some of those listed. Similarly some of those adjectives chosen were not significantly differentially employed when groups were compared. It should be recalled that the method of analysis was chosen because a technique was required which capitalized on the strengths of both approaches, one which employed some advantages of each. The present system produced stereotype clusters of adjectives for each group perspective which might change slightly depending upon the criterion for selection. The adjectives employed demonstrated two features: (1) a high frequency of usage by the particular group being examined; and (2) significant differences in usage by the same group when describing different targets. The alternatives, choosing only adjectives with high frequency of usage in describing different groups or choosing only adjectives which regardless of frequency of usage showed high differentiation in usage when describing different groups, both create problems in interpretation and meaning.

In many cases significance levels reported were very modest and exceeded the chance expectation levels normally considered conventional in psychological research. The reader should consider two important factors inherent in field research. Field research is limited in the availability of appropriate subjects for investigation. While subject pools in universities number in the hundreds the number of available and willing managers, union officers, and government officials is much smaller. Sample sizes for the study were representatively small (largest N employed was N=12) particularly when the available pool is divided up into 9 sub samples as was the case here. With small sample sizes rela-

tively large effect sizes are necessary to produce statistically significant differences when groups are compared. In addition to limitations on sample size set by the real world one must also recognize that the degree of control in the field is not nearly as manageable as it might be in the laboratory. Although much emphasis was placed on ensuring that only the intended variable was manipulated there may have been many unforeseen relationships between complex human factors that were neither observed, controlled, nor measured. One hopes in field research that such relationships and their consequences are randomized throughout the measurement process but of course some uncertainty always exists. Thus if one wishes to measure the effect of one particular variable in field research when several might be interplaying simultaneously sufficiently sensitive measuring devices must be employed or sufficiently liberal statistical approaches taken so as not to overlook the modestly effective variables which typically operate in social-psychological research in the field.

No pretense is made that the small samples employed here were representative of all management, labour, and government populations. A genuine attempt was made to ensure some representatives by the choice of samples. Ultimately the reader must decide whether the sampling process employed was appropriate. The intention of sample choice was to improve generalizability to the real world and in part ensure that the stereotyping processes were not limited to the psychological laboratory but rather bore some resemblance to the processes acting together in daily human activity.

That the cluster of adjectives employed by a particular occu-

pational group are stable and enduring is not clear from this one-shot approach. Ideally one would wish to experimentally assess the representativeness of each group's adjectival descriptions in a follow-up study. This could be done in a manner suggested by some of the preliminary procedures employed in the second phase of this research reported in Chapter 5. As an example, it might be useful to have managers, union officers, and government officials assign occupational labels to the lists of adjectives generated by their respective groups in Phase 1. One would expect for example that if managers stereotyped descriptions of themselves were accurately measured by this research then to the list containing the adjectives "conservative" and "healthy" they should predominantly ascribe the label "manager".

This phase of the research has suggested that management, labour, and government do hold views of themselves which are different from others' views of them and different from their views of others. The importance of this kind of behaviour or character stereotyping lies not in its mere existence, but rather in its consequences. It was important to discover whether or not the different occupational groups did generate stereotyped views of themselves and one another, as suspected in the beginning but having confirmed this notion in a preliminary fashion it was now crucial to examine what effects these stereotyped views might have on bargaining. The premise of the study as a whole was that management, labour, and government hold stereotyped expectations of their own and others' behaviour and that these differential expectations lead to conflict and variability of behavior in bargaining situations. Phase 2 represented an attempt to manipulate the stereo-

typed expectations that bargainers have of one another and to measure the effect of such manipulation on the success of bargaining outcomes.

CHAPTER 4

PHASE 2 - THE EFFECTS OF STEREOTYPED EXPECTATIONS ON
BARGAINING (AN OVERVIEW)

In general the results of Phase 1 of this study were similar to those found by Haire (1955). In his report Haire suggested the following: "It seems clear that a single person looks very different depending on whether he is seen as a manager or as a union Secretary. Moreover, the nature of this difference depends on whether he is thus seen by a manager or a union man. This difference in the impression follows Asch's experience with trait-names. It seems probable that the different perceptions lead to different overt behavior here, too, as they did in Kelley's (1950)¹ experiment." (p. 209).

The purpose of Phase 2 of the present study was to examine whether these different perceptions do indeed lead to meaningful differences in overt behavior measured specifically by observation of bargaining behaviour. It was reasonable to expect that within the limitations described earlier the differing perceptions uncovered in Phase 1 were true differences since the samples employed consisted of real managers, real union officers, and real government officials. The practical significance of these differences was dependent upon whether perceived differences do in fact manifest themselves in overt ways that might influence the bargaining process and in ways that are measurable.

The premise of the second phase of this investigation was simple. Parties presumably go into negotiations with certain expectations about

¹ This is Kelley's 1950 study described earlier in the 1st Chapter.

themselves and one another - they view themselves and each other as they have so described earlier (Phase 1). What is the effect on bargaining outcomes of violating or contradicting these stereotyped expectations? Clearly such questions present unsurmountable difficulties for field study. Imagine if you will, attempting to gain the co-operation of parties in a real life set of negotiations to submit to some experimental manipulation of human behavior. The costs are much too high and the risks too great (when we are dealing with company profits and employee wages) to solicit needed co-operation. Instead it was necessary to go in to the laboratory and attempt to duplicate with as much realism as possible, the outcomes and behavior of a bargaining situation.

To set the stage it was necessary to create a situation in which two parties bargained with one another for some potential gain or loss to both parties, this gain or loss being a function of the behavior of negotiating parties. Two elements seemed necessary if a good simulation of bargaining were to take place. First, the subjects involved had to represent two different parties (management and union) as closely as possible. If subjects were to enact roles naturally it would seem advisable that the roles not be too remote from subjects' natural tendencies. Thus it was necessary to ascertain the stereotyped notions that students held for managers and union officers. Although some descriptions were available from the Pilot Study reported in Phase 1 of the research (which employed undergraduate students as subjects) it was felt that the descriptions generated earlier by students might be inadequate for two reasons: (1) some time had elapsed (over 1 year) since this phase of the research and those stereotyped descriptions

generated earlier might not reflect the views of a new group of students;¹ (2) the selection criteria by which adjectives were selected for inclusion in a groups' stereotyped adjective cluster were different for the pilot study than for Phase 1 involving managers, union officers, and government officials. A new procedure was therefore designed to ascertain the stereotypes of managers and union officers held by students and to be employed in the student bargaining sessions. This procedure is reported in the method section.

The second important element of a good simulation was the salience of the bargaining situation. Clearly in real life the stakes are high: management and union are concerned with the costs of concessions and the benefits, financial and otherwise, of gaining acceptance for the various proposals "placed on the table." Put simply, the gains and losses are very real to both parties and radically affect their lives. Ethical considerations make it difficult to recreate this degree of salience in a laboratory situation but it is possible to administer or withhold rewards as a function of bargaining outcomes by employing additional experimental credit or money as an incentive to students participating in experiments.

These are the essential elements, though there may be others, of the bargaining process that must be constructed if one wishes to generalize from the laboratory to real life. Each will be dealt with

¹ Though one expects that stereotyped role expectations for occupations are relatively enduring traits, subtle changes or influences can be expected over time particularly in times of heavy publicity of union or industrial activity by the Press. Such publicity may indirectly shape perceptions of the public about the different roles of the various parties.

separately in the Method section. To summarize thus far: In order to demonstrate that the stereotyped occupational perceptions are functional in real-life negotiations, it was necessary to demonstrate that differences in bargaining outcomes were associated with differences in expectations held by negotiating parties during actual bargaining exercises. Further, in order to extrapolate from the laboratory to real life bargaining simulations would have to be constructed which contained as many elements of actual bargaining as were reasonable and practical.

CHAPTER 5
ASCERTAINING STUDENTS' STEREOTYPED VIEWS OF MANAGERS
AND UNION OFFICERS (PRELIMINARY RESEARCH)

Voluntary participation was solicited from 48 male and female undergraduate students from two summer classes at the University of Manitoba. These subjects were presented with two lists of adjectives labelled A and B which had been generated by students earlier in the pilot study of Phase 1 to describe managers and union officers (see Appendix H). Half the subjects were given sheets which listed the manager characteristics (adaptable, cooperative, efficient, good-natured, industrious, kind, and quiet) under the "List A" label and the union officer characteristics (conscientious, considerate, determined, mature, organized, and serious) under the "List B" label; the other 24 subjects were given the same lists of adjectives with the labels switched around. Distribution of the two kinds of lists was random.

All subjects were asked to label each list (A and B) as characterizing either managers or union officers (see instructions in Appendix H).

The analysis of response to these lists suggested that subjects were not able to assign either list predominantly to one occupational category or the other indicating that these adjective clusters were not valid stereotyped descriptions of managers and union officers for this group of subjects. Only 51% of these subjects made correct labelling decisions.

In view of the above result, an additional 60 male and female

subjects was surveyed in a Summer Session Introductory Psychology Class. These subjects were asked to list in order of importance, ten adjectives describing a "typical" manager and ten adjective describing a "typical" union officer (see Appendix I).

From these lists, the ten most popular adjectives (see Table 15) for each occupation were listed in order of frequency of choice on a sheet similar to that in Appendix H (see Appendix J). As in the earlier form, the labels on the two lists were counterbalanced and administered to sixty Summer Session Introductory Psychology Students from a yet unused class. In this task, subjects were asked to identify the occupation, manager or union officer, to which both lists belonged (see the instructions in Appendix J). This time, using revised lists generated by the new student sample, 88.33% of the subjects made correct choices when labelling the two lists of adjectives as characterizing a manager or a union officer. This result was highly significant ($X^2=33.74$; $df=1$; $p<.001$)

These new lists were the ones that would be used to characterize management and union in the bargaining sessions held in Phase 2 since for at least the last group of 60 sampled subjects they were viewed almost unanimously as characterizing management and union.

Table 15

Ten Adjectives used most frequently by
students to describe Managers and Union officers

To Describe Managers

Intelligent
Confident
Strong; powerful
Neat; well groomed
Agressive
Stubborn; uncompromising
Responsible
Domineering
Knowledgeable
Conservative

To Describe Union Officers

Aggressive
Loud; outspoken
Intelligent
Strong; powerful
Demanding
Confident
Greedy
Stubborn; uncompromising
Tough
Understanding

CHAPTER 6
EFFECTS OF STEREOTYPED EXPECTATIONS ON BARGAINING
(PHASE II)

METHOD

Subjects

Subjects for this study were 52 male undergraduate students drawn voluntarily from the University of Manitoba, Department of Psychology Summer Subject Pool. Only male subjects were employed since sex differences in bargaining were not of immediate interest and might not be adequately controlled in a design inviting voluntary participation.

Independent Variables and Design

This study employed one independent variable. The independent variable was the consistency of role expectation for the opponent. This was accomplished by varying the description of the opposing negotiator in each bargaining dyad. There were two conditions: 1) Consistent group - Here both subjects received information about their opposing representatives which was consistent with the descriptions generated by college students in the material development study reported in Chapter 5. The subject playing the role of manager received a description of the opposing union representative which consisted of the list of adjectives most frequently used by college students to describe union officers; the subject playing the role of union representative received a description of the opposing management representative that consisted of the list of adjectives used most frequently by college students to

describe managers (see Table 15). Thus both parties had information about the other which was consistent with the stereotyped view of the other that was seen as characteristic of the roles that they were playing. 2) Inconsistent condition - in condition 2 both subjects received information about their opponents which was inconsistent with descriptions generated by college students. The inconsistent descriptions consisted of the negated adjectives used in condition 1. For example instead of intelligent, confident, strong and powerful (for the manager), the inconsistent descriptions read lacking in intelligence, lacking in confidence, weak and powerless, etc.

The design then was a single variable one with two levels of the single factor "consistency of role expectation for the opponent".

Dependent Variables

Ideally one would have wished to measure some pure indicator of success of bargaining as a function of the manipulations but this was rather broad and difficult to measure for a number of reasons. It was difficult to know how to partition and weight various sub-components of bargaining outcomes. In daily life for example one party might gain more than the other financially but in so doing antagonize the other party and jeopardize future negotiations. Which aspect is more important is a subjective issue. This study isolated several components of bargaining and attempted to measure them. The measures taken here are not of course the only indicators of success of bargaining but were similar to events that take place in natural bargaining sessions.

Successful bargaining was measured in nine distinct ways:

1. Amount of Movement:

Agreements usually represent compromises by both parties. The distance (in percentage points) that subjects remained apart at the conclusion of negotiations in this study was recorded regardless of whether settlement was reached or not. If parties were fairly close on their final wage offers negotiations would be deemed more successful than if they remained far apart.

2. Settlement:

One of the most obvious measures of success of bargaining is whether or not parties reach agreement. Settlement or failure to settle was recorded for each bargaining dyad.

3. Calls for Strikes or Lockouts:

Just as parties (where applicable by law) may use threatened strikes or lockout for additional bargaining leverage, subjects in this study were allowed to elect such an option. In real life the costs of strike or lockout are enormous and it is normally a process which is reserved for desperate situations. The choice of this option represents a degree of conflict so high that bargaining alone is not sufficient to resolve the issues at hand. A set of negotiations in which a strike or a lockout had been called would be deemed less successful than one which was concluded without resorting to this measure.

4. Application for Conciliation:

In natural bargaining, parties often reach what appears to be an impasse in the negotiating process. Typically management has reached the upper limits of the guidelines it has set for negotiations and union is still not satisfied that it has gained all it had hoped to. Neither

party wishes to call off negotiations yet it appears that stalemate has been reached and the subjective involvement of both parties reveals "no room to move." Often at this point in negotiations the intervention of a third non-partisan party is the key to helping each party review what it has and has not accomplished in an attempt to facilitate further movement by both sides. This is the process of conciliation in which a government appointed conciliator is requested by one or both parties to intervene and get the negotiating process moving again with the hope that settlement will be reached.

Though it is not an intended purpose some parties employ the conciliation process for political reasons, as a bluff if you like, to prod further movement from the other side. Regardless of the intent it is important to recognize that neither party is normally prepared at this point in negotiations to actually strike or lock-out the other party.

The number of requests for conciliation was recorded for subjects in this study.

5. Time:

Time to settlement is always a cost-related bargaining issue since the members of union and management bargaining teams must be paid to negotiate but while bargaining are away from their normal duties and normal places of work. The shorter the time to settlement the less costly the negotiating process to both parties by way of negotiating team salaries or wages. Time to settlement was recorded for each bargaining dyad.

6. Perception of Opponents' Behaviour:

In this study subjects' expectations for their opponents' behaviour

would be consistent with the student generated stereotypes in one condition and contradictory in the other condition. It was essential in each case however that only the subject's expectation for his opponent vary, not the opponent's actual behaviour. In essence all subjects should have played roles which were consistent with the stereotyped views. This follows from the belief that in real-life negotiations each individual is acting in accordance with his own group norms and that the conflict results not from an individuals' straying from these norms but rather from his adhering to these norms which are different from his opponents' expectations of his behaviour. That subjects adhere to initial positions (what we may for the present refer to a normative structuring) and maintain their initial dispositional stances at least in game oriented bargaining contexts has been described by a number of researchers, most notably, Pilisuk and Rapoport (1964), Deutsch, Epstein, Canavan, and Gumpert (1967), and Deutsch, Canavin, and Rubin (1971). These studies report a tendency on the part of subjects to initiate a pattern of choices, cooperative or competitive and to persist throughout the bargaining with their initial orientation. For this reason it was important to assess each individual's actual behaviour during bargaining. Each subject rated his opponent on ten 9-point semantic differential scales which corresponded to the stereotyped description given to his opponent to role play (see Appendix M). In other words, subjects were rating their opponents' actual behaviour regardless of their expectations for their behaviour.

7. Perceived Success of Bargaining:

Besides the objective measures of success of bargaining it was

important to measure subjectively how each participant felt about the bargaining session in which he participated. As mentioned earlier the attitudes of the bargaining parties are important determinants of future bargaining success. Since subjects may have set different goals from one another the same financial settlement might produce different degrees of subjective satisfaction for two different subjects. It was therefore important to allow the subject to express his degree of satisfaction with the bargaining session. Following bargaining, subjects were asked to rate on a 9-point scale, the degree to which they were satisfied with the negotiations (see Appendix K).

8. Willingness to Renegotiate:

The global success of a bargaining session cannot be measured only by the fact that the two parties settled. Equally important consideration must be given to long standing labour-management relations. For this reason it was important to measure participants' willingness to meet again at the bargaining table in the future. Subjects were asked to rate on a 9-point scale their willingness to renegotiate with the same opponent (see Appendix L).

9. Manipulation Check:

In order to assess the success of the experimental manipulation subjects were asked to rate on a 9-point scale the degree to which they felt their opponents had followed their role playing instructions (see Appendix M). In the consistent condition where subjects' expectations were consistent with their opponents' role playing instructions these ratings should have been high while the opposite should be true in the inconsistent condition where subjects' expectations for their opponents'

behaviour and their opponents' role playing instructions were contradictory.

Procedure

Subjects who signed a list indicating interest in participating in Psychological Studies for pay were contacted by telephone and asked to participate. It was explained to the subjects that pay for the experiment was entirely dependent upon the actual settlement and not upon acting ability. Subjects were further told that a risk was involved and that they could earn a maximum of \$10.00 if settlement was entirely favourable toward them and a minimum of \$0.00 if settlement was not favourable. Appointments were made for subjects who indicated interest after this explanation.

Upon arrival at the experimental room subjects were randomly assigned the role of manager or union officer and given their instruction and information packages which consisted of a brief explanation of the task, a general description of the bargaining situation, general bargaining instructions, payoff schedules, and settlement or impasse forms (see Appendix N).

The actual bargaining situation was borrowed verbatim (with the kind permission of the authors) from one used successfully by Notz and Starke (1978). Notz and Starke were concerned with the consequences of employing different arbitration strategies and so the pay schedules employed were designed to discourage settlement. Whether or not subjects actually settled was not consequential as a dependent measure. The present study however was concerned with whether or not settle-

ment was reached so the pay schedules were altered in an attempt to facilitate a higher degree of settlement. In addition, actual bargaining instructions and procedures have been altered slightly to accommodate the use of different dependent measures than those employed by Notz and Starke.

Subjects were seated at tables in separate rooms and asked to read through the instructions and information and to prepare their arguments for the negotiating exercise. In addition to the information given to each subject were role description sheets instructing the subject how to play his role and indicating how he should expect his opponent to behave. These sheets served as the active manipulation. In both experimental conditions, subjects playing the roles of managers were instructed to appear intelligent, confident, strong and powerful, neat, well-groomed, aggressive, stubborn and uncompromising, responsible, domineering, knowledgeable, and conservative while subjects playing the roles of union officers were instructed to appear aggressive, loud and outspoken, intelligent, strong and powerful, demanding, confident, greedy, stubborn and uncompromising, tough, and understanding. In the consistent condition, subjects were told to expect their opponents to behave in the fashion described above: intelligent, confident, strong and powerful and so on, if their opponents were managers or aggressive, loud and outspoken, intelligent and so on, if their opponents were union officers. In the inconsistent condition, subjects were told to expect their opponents to be the polar opposites of what their opponents were actually instructed to be: lacking in intelligence, lacking confidence, weak and powerless and so on, if their opponents were

managers, or non-aggressive, quiet and soft-spoken, lacking in intelligence and so forth, if their opponents were union officers. Appendices O, P, Q, and R illustrate these instructions for managers in the consistent condition, union officers in the consistent condition, managers in the inconsistent condition, and union officers in the inconsistent condition respectively.

Up to 30 minutes were allotted for subjects to read through the materials and to prepare for negotiations. At the end of this time the subjects were brought together at a large table in the room assigned for bargaining. Subjects were seated opposite one another with a one-foot-high barrier between them in order to prevent accidental exchange of written information. At this time subjects were reminded that their entire pay for the experiment would be a function of the final settlement in accordance with the pay schedules held by each. Subjects were told that in order to get paid an agreement must be reached and signed by both parties within the total 30 minute bargaining period (20 minutes initial bargaining time at normal pay rates plus 10 minutes final bargaining time at 1/2 the normal pay rate following an impasse situation at the end of 20 minutes). Because of this risk subjects were given the opportunity to leave before the bargaining session began or at any time throughout the negotiations. Subjects were reminded to act out their roles as well as possible and were requested to signal the experimenter if any intervention were required. Subjects then began bargaining while the investigator moved to an adjacent room and viewed the bargaining session through a special glass window which allowed him to view the subjects without being seen himself. Permission to record

bargaining sessions on audio tape was obtained from subjects prior to negotiations.

The investigator interrupted subjects with time checks at the 10th, 18th, 25th, and 28th minute marks (where applicable) even though a clock was present on the bargaining table for both parties to view.

If settlement was reached within the initial 20-minute session, subjects were asked to fill out the "Contract" forms and exchange signatures (see Appendix N⁸). Subjects then filled out the 4 dependent measures: success of bargaining, willingness to renegotiate, perception of opponent, and the manipulation check (see Appendices K, L and M respectively). Debriefing followed.

If subjects had not reached settlement by the end of 20 minutes they were asked to fill out the "Final Offer at Impasse" form (see Appendix N⁹) and were reminded that pay schedules would now be reduced by one-half. They then proceeded to renegotiate for a maximum of 10 minutes. If subjects reached agreement in the final 10 minutes of bargaining they were treated in the fashion described for subjects who reached agreement within the initial 20 minute period. If they failed to reach agreement the experiment was halted at the end of 30 minutes and the dependent measures given, followed by debriefing.

Debriefing consisted of explaining the true purpose of the experiment to subjects. At this point all subjects were informed that they would receive a minimum \$5.00 for their participation regardless of the actual bargaining outcome. In only one case a subject earned more than \$5.00 and he was informed that he would be paid the earned amount. All questions from subjects were answered and subjects were

thanked for their participation. Subjects were paid by cheque following the completion of the study. It should be noted that experimentally it was essential that subjects believe they might not get paid in order to avoid easy or contrived settlements. This deception was explained in the debriefing session and all subjects were assured that they would receive payment for participation.

Hypotheses

If it were true, that conflict in the bargaining situation brought about by varying the subjects' expectation for his opponent's behaviour had an effect on bargaining outcomes, then the following hypotheses should have held for the nine dependent variables:

(1) Movement at end

At the end of bargaining (settlement or no) subjects in the consistent condition should have moved further from their initial starting points than subjects in the inconsistent group.

(2) Settlement

There should have been more settlements obtained by subjects in the consistent group than in the inconsistent condition.

(3) Strike or lockout

Subjects in the consistent condition should have called fewer strikes or lockouts than subjects in the inconsistent group.

(4) Conciliation

Subjects in the consistent group should have made fewer requests for conciliation than subjects in the inconsistent condition.

(5) Time

Subjects in the consistent condition should have taken less time to reach settlement than subjects in the inconsistent group.

(6) Perception of opponents behaviour

Since subjects were randomly assigned to the two conditions acting ability should have been evenly distributed so no differences between the two conditions should have been evident. Thus the expectation here was for no difference between the two groups on subjects' ratings of their opponents.

(7) Perceived success of bargaining

Subjects in the consistent group should have rated the success of bargaining higher than subjects in the inconsistent group.

(8) Willingness to renegotiate

Subjects in the consistent group should have shown greater willingness to renegotiate with the same opponent.

(9) Manipulation check

Influenced by their expectations, subjects in the consistent group should have rated their opponents higher in the degree to which their opponents followed the role playing instructions.

RESULTS

In summary this study utilized 9 dependent measures in all:

- (1) Movement at end
- (2) Settlement
- (3) Strike or Lockout
- (4) Conciliation
- (5) Time
- (6) Perception of Opponent's behaviour
- (7) Perceived success of bargaining
- (8) Willingness to renegotiate
- (9) Manipulation Check

The following 9 sections briefly describe each of these measures and the results obtained.

Movement at end

Each party had an initial starting point on the wage issue. Management's initial offer was a 4% wage increase; Union's initial proposal was a 28% wage increase. At the end of the 30 minute bargaining session or at the time of settlement the amount of movement from his initial starting point was recorded for each subject. Subjects in the consistent condition moved an average of 19.85% while subjects in the inconsistent condition moved only 11.08% on average. This difference was highly significant ($t=3.48$; $df=50$; $p<.001$).

Settlement

For each bargaining dyad settlement was scored as either present or absent. There were 6 settlements in the consistent condition but only 2 settlements in the inconsistent condition. Although this difference was not statistically significant ($\chi^2=1.33$; $df=1$; $p<.15$), it was in the expected direction.

Strike or Lockout

For each bargaining dyad subjects were scored separately within this category as calling for a strike or lockout, or not, since either or both parties could make such a request. In the consistent condition no strikes or lockouts were requested. In the inconsistent condition both parties in 4 bargaining dyads made a request, yielding 8 such requests in total. This difference was highly significant ($\chi^2=7.24$; $df=1$; $p<.01$).

Conciliation

In each bargaining dyad either party or both parties could request conciliation. All requests (including multiple requests from one subject) were summed separately for each of the two experimental conditions. Five such requests were made in the inconsistent condition while none were made in the consistent condition. This difference was significant ($t=2.30$; $df=50$; $p<.05$).

Time

In cases where settlement was reached the time taken to the end of bargaining was less than the 30 minutes allotted bargaining time. Time

to the end of the bargaining session (including those cases involving settlement) was recorded for each bargaining dyad. The average time-to-settlement was 28.73 minutes for the consistent group and 22.93 minutes for the inconsistent group. Although this difference was significant ($t=6.90$; $df=24$; $p<.01$) it should be noted that the distribution of time scores in the inconsistent condition was badly skewed by a single 12-minute settlement in which there was collusion. When this single datum was removed from the analysis the differences were not significant.

Perception of Opponents' behaviour

Each subject rated his opponent on ten 9-point semantic differential scales which corresponded to the 10 adjectives listed for each subject in his "Description of Opponent". Each subject's 10 ratings were summed, yielding an overall score that could vary between 10 (if the opponent's actual behaviour was perceived to be extremely incongruent with his role playing instructions) and 90 (if the opponent's actual behaviour was perceived as being extremely congruent with his role playing instructions). The average scores were 51.15 for the consistent condition and 52.12 for the inconsistent group. These differences in perception were not statistically significant ($t=-.28$; $df=50$; $p<.39$).

Perceived success of bargaining

Each subject rated on a 9-point scale, the success of the bargaining session, that is, the degree to which he was satisfied with the negotiations. The average rating for the consistent condition subjects

was 5.58 while it was only 3.39 for those subjects in the inconsistent condition. This difference was highly significant ($t=3.41$; $df=50$; $p<.001$).

Willingness to renegotiate

Subjects rated on a 9-point scale, the degree to which they would be willing to renegotiate with the same opponent. Subjects in the consistent group had an average rating of 5.59 while subjects in the inconsistent group rated their willingness slightly higher ($x = 5.85$). This difference was not statistically significant ($t=-.43$; $df=50$; $p<.34$).

Manipulation Check

Eighteen subjects¹ rated on a 9-point scale, the degree to which they felt their opponents had followed their role playing instructions (as the subjects perceived their opponent's instructions to be). Subjects in the consistent condition perceived their opponents as having played their roles much better than subjects in the inconsistent conditions, with mean ratings of 6.63 and 3.30 respectively. This difference was highly significant ($t=3.45$; $df=16$; $p<.002$).

¹ This measure was not included until more than half way through this phase of the research so that only eighteen of the fifty-two subjects responded to this measure. This fact was due to a procedural error in which it was discovered well into the study that instructions to rate opponents on this measure did not appear in subjects' instructions packages.

DISCUSSION

From the results of the manipulation check it was clear that subjects in the inconsistent group correctly perceived the incongruency between their expectations for their opponents via the experimental instructions and their opponents' actual behaviour. All subjects were given information about the roles that they were to play and about the roles their opponents were supposed to play but only in the inconsistent condition were there any inconsistencies in that information. Specifically the opponents in the inconsistent condition were asked to play roles which were opposite in nature to the expectations each subject was given about the opponent's behaviour. Imagine for a moment that you are a subject in the inconsistent condition who has been asked to play the role of a manager. You are told via the instructions that you are supposed to be intelligent, confident, strong and powerful, aggressive, and so on. Your opponent on the other hand is told that you are supposed to be lacking in intelligence, lacking in confidence, weak and powerless, non-aggressive and so on. It is not surprising therefore that in this condition your opponent will view you as having violated your role playing instructions; he will rate you poorly on the scale measuring "the degree to which" he feels you have "followed the role instructions" you were supposed to follow. You have in essence violated your opponent's expectations for your behaviour.

The differences between the ratings of subjects in the two experimental conditions on the manipulation check was not a function of differences in acting ability or other performance related factors since

when subjects rated their opponents' actual behaviour no differences were found between the two experimental groups. Each subject rated his opponent about the same (on average) as he was rated by his opponent. Because the average ratings were positive for both groups all subjects were seen by their opponents to have acted as they were instructed to - it is only in the inconsistent group that there was an incongruency between this rating and the expectations of the opponents for subjects' behaviour. Thus, subjects in the inconsistent group were viewed as acting "out of role" or "out of context".

Taken together the results of the "Manipulation Check" data and the "perception of the opponent" data strengthen the assumption that subjects followed their instructions properly and perceived the experimental manipulation correctly. This assumption lends confidence to the belief that any other experimental group differences are attributable to the fact that in one condition subjects' role expectations for the other party were violated while in the other condition this was not the case.

The other dependent measures were designed to quantify the success of bargaining in very diverse ways. Taken together the results indicate that bargaining was more successful in the consistent condition, that is, subjects in the consistent condition showed greater movement from their initial bargaining positions, requested fewer strikes, lockouts, and conciliations, expressed greater satisfaction with the bargaining outcomes, and settled more frequently within the time constraints imposed here. What is not clear of course is the priority of these measures in real-life. It is important to both parties to reach a speedy settlement but whether this is more or less important than

maintaining good labour-management relations is unknown. Research designs directed at such questions will be essential in the future.

Subjects in both conditions indicated an almost equal willingness to "renegotiate with the same opponent"; subjects in the inconsistent condition showed slightly more willingness to do so. This result seemed a bit surprising so four subjects were contacted after the experiment and questioned about their interpretation of this measure. Unanimously subjects indicated that they had interpreted this measure as a reflection of their desire to "get back at that guy" or to "take another crack at beating" their opponents (as two subjects phrased it). These subjects felt that they had not done as well as they might if given another opportunity and were expressing on this scale their desire to "get back into the ring" a little wiser than before - they viewed it as a challenge. This rationale makes sense if we assume that subjects who were less satisfied with the outcome of the bargaining session were more anxious to renegotiate in an attempt to better their first performances. This anecdotal evidence suggests that the scale itself, initially intended to measure in some fashion the atmosphere of labour-management relations, actually measured (though inversely so) the degree of satisfaction of the parties with the bargaining sessions. As such, it was redundant with the "perceived success of bargaining" scale.

It was anticipated that the "time-to-settlement" would be shorter in the consistent condition. As noted previously the inconsistent group contained one very quick settlement. If this one settlement is excluded from the analysis then the time-to-settlement would be shorter for the consistent group (though not significantly so). There were two deter-

mining factors in the actual results on this measure. First, the one quick settlement in the inconsistent condition was due to collusion: The parties exchanged information about their differential pay schedules and decided to settle at a figure which would pay one of the parties the maximum dollar payoff, agreeing to split that amount equally after the experiment. Although the instructions forbade such an exchange and parties were informed prior to the start of the experiment that such an event would halt the experiment immediately, by the time the investigator intervened parties had already exchanged signatures on their "contract form" and in essence the experiment was over anyway. After some deliberation it was decided that this datum was valid since it does in a sense represent one possible outcome, "sleeping with management", which though uncommon, does occur in real life.

The second factor affecting the "time-to-settlement" measure was the brief duration of the negotiating period. It is somewhat unrealistic to expect subjects to reach agreement in only 30 minutes time. In real life, settlement of only one proposal might take several meetings over a period of weeks and even months, particularly settlement of an issue as salient as wage adjustment. The artificiality of the time constraints imposed in this experiment undoubtedly contributed to the fact that most settlements occurred only a minute or two before the elapsed 30 minute time period, producing a small amount of variance for the time measure.

Related to the above comments was the result that the number of settlements was not statistically different for the two groups although it approached significance in the expected direction. Again the arti-

ficiality of the laboratory setting may have been influential, but crucial to this specific result, was an attempt to simulate reality: The parties' individual payoff schedules were quite divergent, meeting at a payment of only \$1.00 to each subject for a settlement at 16%. This pay schedule divergence was chosen deliberately in order to simulate the real-life expectation that a "quick and dirty" settlement which immediately compromises both parties should not be without cost. In the particular example employed in this experiment union, in view of previous wage concessions and in view of a rising cost of living, required a minimum of 18% wage increase just to keep abreast of inflation. Management on the other hand expected increases in revenue on the order of only 9-10% and could offer more than that to Union only by increasing taxes or reducing costs (perhaps by reducing man hours worked, by reducing its labour force, or by cutting costs elsewhere such as amortizing wage increases over a long period of time). A quick compromise settlement at 16% would quite obviously be costly to both parties. The pay schedules which were intended to reflect these costs may actually have hindered early or easy settlement by creating too much divergence between the two parties. When these pay schedules are viewed from the subjects' points of view it is really quite surprising that there were as many as 6 settlements in the consistent condition.

An important consideration for any laboratory study is the generalizability of results to situations outside the laboratory. The laboratory provides important control of variables but it is ultimately behaviour outside the laboratory that one wishes to predict. In the design of this study, some artificiality was necessary particularly with

regard to time constraints and to the number of participants for each bargaining session. Normally, bargaining takes place over a period of weeks or even months and each party is represented by several individuals, many of whom are experienced negotiators and all of whom share in the outcome, financial and otherwise, of the bargaining process.

The issue of greatest concern in this investigation was the degree of involvement that student subjects might demonstrate while bargaining. That is why subjects were led to believe that their pay for the study lay not in passive participation but rather in active persuasion of the opponent toward settlement. Appendices S and T contain transcripts from two bargaining sessions. Both sessions were in the inconsistent condition. These transcripts illustrate quite graphically the degree of involvement demonstrated by all subjects, particularly in the inconsistent condition. Both examples have been chosen from the inconsistent condition because the level of conflict was convincingly high in those sessions and was verbally more overt. The purpose of including these transcripts is not to illustrate the verbal differences between the two experimental conditions although a content analysis might yield some interesting differences, but rather to illustrate the degree of involvement shown by role-playing students.

These two demonstrated that violation of subjects' expectancies for their opponents can affect the outcome of bargaining at least with respect to the dependent measures employed here. That individuals do have expectations for others as a result of their occupational roles was demonstrated in Phase 1 but Phase 2 demonstrated that violation or non-violation of expectancies differentially affects measures of bargaining success.

CHAPTER 7

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study began by attempting to confirm the existence of occupational stereotypes, first for students (Phase I - Pilot Study) and then for managers, union officers, and government officials (Phase I). Although the data indicated that individuals generated different adjectival descriptions of a target depending on which occupational group was being described, the variability of description was great as a function of the subject sample chosen. Two groups of students separated by a year in time and employing different descriptive techniques generated very different descriptions of managers and union officers. It is not clear which technique was more accurately measuring the stereotypes. The first technique in which students described a target which they believed to be either a manager, union officer, or government official seemed fairly unobtrusive but the results seemed to lack face validity: it is not immediately obvious for example why managers were described as adaptable, cooperative, efficient, good-natured, industrious, kind, and quiet or why union officers were described as conscientious, considerate, determined, mature, organized, and serious. The second technique in which students generated rather than checked off adjectives which described managers and union officers appeared to demonstrate more face validity where managers were described as intelligent, confident, strong and powerful, neat and wellgroomed, aggressive, stubborn and uncompromising, responsible, domineering, knowledgeable, and conservative and union officers were described as aggressive, loud

and outspoken, intelligent, strong and powerful, demanding, confident, greedy, stubborn and uncompromising, tough, and understanding.

The proof of the two techniques lay in the fact that students were not able to correctly label the adjective lists produced by the first technique but almost unanimously were able to label the lists generated by the second technique. When managers, union officers, and government officials participated, they generated stereotyped descriptions via the first technique. The managers', union officers', and government officials' data can not be directly compared to that of students. If one views the two sets of data from the proper perspective it becomes clear that one should expect differences between students' stereotyped views of managers, union officers and government officials and the views expressed by each of those three occupational groups. In other words, a comparison of the students' views with those of the three occupations simply adds another occupational dimension to the enquiry, that of student.

The intent of this research was not of course to isolate the "true" stereotypes for any of the occupational groups, one which all groups agreed on for in fact the evidence is quite the contrary - there is no single description for a particular occupational group which is correct - that description varies as a function of the group generating the description. The intent rather was to demonstrate that different occupational groups do generate stereotyped descriptions of themselves and of other occupational groups. The fact that these descriptions vary as a function of occupation is the key to understanding one source of potential conflict when these groups meet to negotiate.

In Phase II subjects were given expectations for the behaviour of their bargaining opponents based upon a particular set of stereotyped descriptions, one appropriate to their occupational group - undergraduate students. This phase of the research demonstrated that violations of these expectations affected bargaining outcomes in measureable ways and in ways which resembled important characteristics of actual bargaining situations in everyday life. In basic terms these results suggest that regardless of one's expectations for his opponent, the bargaining process will be facilitated if these expectations are met but hindered if they are violated: Thus if it is expected that one's opponent is a "so and so", he'd better act like a "so and so" if negotiations are to be successful.

The true benefits of this investigation may arise from a more thorough investigation of the nature of these stereotypes and from educating the parties involved in the day-to-day negotiating process about their expectations for their opponents and about the effects of these expectations on the bargaining process.

There are many potential factors affecting the bargaining process and almost all require investigation - the literature on bargaining is surprisingly void of field research or even research which simulates the reality of the bargaining table. Many questions remain unanswered: How does the violation of behavioural expectations compare with other factors such as the experience of the negotiating parties, or the sheer economic constraints of the parties, or a myriad of other factors? What effect does sex difference have on bargaining outcomes? Such unanswered questions point to the limited understanding of the dynamics of bar-

gaining outside the Psychology laboratory and outside the vast array of two-person games.

This field of enquiry holds much promise and much potential gain to the parties concerned. The dividends will manifest themselves ultimately not in the laboratory but rather at the bargaining table.

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APPENDIX A



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APPENDIX B
INSTRUCTIONS

On the following page you will find photographs of 15 different men. Some of these men are managers, some are union officials and some are government officials. Though the occupations of the men vary, they have the following characteristics in common:

- all are middle aged
- all are healthy
- all have been married for a long time and have families
- all have few hobbies and interests outside of work and their families
- all read newspapers and fix things around the house

YOUR TASK is one of occupational perception. Study each photograph carefully and indicate on the IBM answer sheet provided, which of three occupations given applies to the man pictured in that photograph. Beside the number on the IBM sheet that corresponds to the identification number of the photograph MARK EITHER 1, 2, or 3, as follows:

- (1) local manager of a small plant which is a branch of a large manufacturing concern.
- (2) secretary-treasurer of a local chapter of a large international union.
- (3) assistant direct of an office of a federal government department.

DON'T be afraid to guess, but DO mark an occupation for each of the 15 photographs. REMEMBER there are only three occupational possibilities.

APPENDIX C
INSTRUCTIONS

At the bottom of this page you will see a photograph of a man. Your task will be to describe what you think he is like on the basis of some very limited information about him. Below is a brief description of the man you are to describe:

HE: is middle-aged; is healthy; has been married for a long time and has a family; has few hobbies or interests outside of his work and his family; is the local manager of a small plant which is a branch of a large manufacturing concern; and reads newspapers and fixes things around the house.

EXAMINE the photograph below carefully and on the basis of it and the description given above CHECK OFF all the adjectives on the accompanying Adjective Check List that you think are probably characteristic of the individual.

DON'T be afraid to guess!

DON'T spend too much time on any one adjective!

DON'T skip any adjectives!

CAREFULLY check off ALL those characteristics which you think belong to the person in the photograph!

APPENDIX D
INSTRUCTIONS

At the bottom of this page you will see a photograph of a man. Your task will be to describe what you think he is like on the basis of some very limited information about him. Below is a brief description of the man you are to describe:

HE: is middle-aged; is healthy; has been married for a long time and has a family; has few hobbies or interests outside of his work and his family; is the secretary treasurer of his local chapter of a large international union with local branches; and reads newspapers and fixes things around the house.

EXAMINE the photograph below carefully and on the basis of it and the description given above CHECK OFF all the adjectives on the accompanying Adjective Check List that you think are probably characteristic of the individual.

DON'T be afraid to guess!

DON'T spend too much time on any one adjective!

DON'T skip any adjectives!

CAREFULLY check off ALL those characteristics which you think belong to the person in the photograph!

APPENDIX E
INSTRUCTIONS

At the bottom of this page you will see a photograph of a man. Your task will be to describe what you think he is like on the basis of some very limited information about him. Below is a brief description of the man you are to describe:

HE: is middle-aged; is healthy; has been married for a long time and has a family; has few hobbies or interests outside of his work and his family; is the assistant director of a local office in his city of a federal government department; and reads newspapers and fixes things around the house.

EXAMINE the photograph below carefully and on the basis of it and the description given above CHECK OFF all the adjectives on the accompanying Adjective Check List that you think are probably characteristic of the individual.

DON'T be afraid to guess!

DON'T spend too much time on any one adjective!

DON'T skip any adjectives!

CAREFULLY check off ALL those characteristics which you think belong to the person in the photograph!

APPENDIX F

- | | | | | |
|--|---|--|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> absent-minded
1 | <input type="checkbox"/> cheerful
31 | <input type="checkbox"/> dependent
61 | <input type="checkbox"/> foresighted
91 | <input type="checkbox"/> impulsive
121 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> active
2 | <input type="checkbox"/> civilized
32 | <input type="checkbox"/> despondent
62 | <input type="checkbox"/> forgetful
92 | <input type="checkbox"/> independent
122 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> adaptable
3 | <input type="checkbox"/> clear-thinking
33 | <input type="checkbox"/> determined
63 | <input type="checkbox"/> forgiving
93 | <input type="checkbox"/> indifferent
123 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> adventurous
4 | <input type="checkbox"/> clever
34 | <input type="checkbox"/> dignified
64 | <input type="checkbox"/> formal
94 | <input type="checkbox"/> individualistic
124 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> affected
5 | <input type="checkbox"/> coarse
35 | <input type="checkbox"/> discreet
65 | <input type="checkbox"/> frank
95 | <input type="checkbox"/> industrious
125 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> affectionate
6 | <input type="checkbox"/> cold
36 | <input type="checkbox"/> disorderly
66 | <input type="checkbox"/> friendly
96 | <input type="checkbox"/> infantile
126 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> aggressive
7 | <input type="checkbox"/> commonplace
37 | <input type="checkbox"/> dissatisfied
67 | <input type="checkbox"/> frivolous
97 | <input type="checkbox"/> informal
127 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> alert
8 | <input type="checkbox"/> complaining
38 | <input type="checkbox"/> distractible
68 | <input type="checkbox"/> fussy
98 | <input type="checkbox"/> ingenious
128 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> aloof
9 | <input type="checkbox"/> complicated
39 | <input type="checkbox"/> distrustful
69 | <input type="checkbox"/> generous
99 | <input type="checkbox"/> inhibited
129 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> ambitious
10 | <input type="checkbox"/> conceited
40 | <input type="checkbox"/> dominant
70 | <input type="checkbox"/> gentle
100 | <input type="checkbox"/> initiative
130 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> anxious
11 | <input type="checkbox"/> confident
41 | <input type="checkbox"/> dreamy
71 | <input type="checkbox"/> gloomy
101 | <input type="checkbox"/> insightful
131 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> apathetic
12 | <input type="checkbox"/> confused
42 | <input type="checkbox"/> dull
72 | <input type="checkbox"/> good-looking
102 | <input type="checkbox"/> intelligent
132 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> appreciative
13 | <input type="checkbox"/> conscientious
43 | <input type="checkbox"/> easy going
73 | <input type="checkbox"/> good-natured
103 | <input type="checkbox"/> interests narrow
133 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> argumentative
14 | <input type="checkbox"/> conservative
44 | <input type="checkbox"/> effeminate
74 | <input type="checkbox"/> greedy
104 | <input type="checkbox"/> interests wide
134 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> arrogant
15 | <input type="checkbox"/> considerate
45 | <input type="checkbox"/> efficient
75 | <input type="checkbox"/> handsome
105 | <input type="checkbox"/> intolerant
135 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> artistic
16 | <input type="checkbox"/> contented
46 | <input type="checkbox"/> egotistical
76 | <input type="checkbox"/> hard-headed
106 | <input type="checkbox"/> inventive
136 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> assertive
17 | <input type="checkbox"/> conventional
47 | <input type="checkbox"/> emotional
77 | <input type="checkbox"/> hard-hearted
107 | <input type="checkbox"/> irresponsible
137 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> attractive
18 | <input type="checkbox"/> cool
48 | <input type="checkbox"/> energetic
78 | <input type="checkbox"/> hasty
108 | <input type="checkbox"/> irritable
138 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> autocratic
19 | <input type="checkbox"/> cooperative
49 | <input type="checkbox"/> enterprising
79 | <input type="checkbox"/> headstrong
109 | <input type="checkbox"/> jolly
139 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> awkward
20 | <input type="checkbox"/> courageous
50 | <input type="checkbox"/> enthusiastic
80 | <input type="checkbox"/> healthy
110 | <input type="checkbox"/> kind
140 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> bitter
21 | <input type="checkbox"/> cowardly
51 | <input type="checkbox"/> evasive
81 | <input type="checkbox"/> helpful
111 | <input type="checkbox"/> lazy
141 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> blustery
22 | <input type="checkbox"/> cruel
52 | <input type="checkbox"/> excitable
82 | <input type="checkbox"/> high-strung
112 | <input type="checkbox"/> leisurely
142 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> boastful
23 | <input type="checkbox"/> curious
53 | <input type="checkbox"/> fair-minded
83 | <input type="checkbox"/> honest
113 | <input type="checkbox"/> logical
143 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> bossy
24 | <input type="checkbox"/> cynical
54 | <input type="checkbox"/> fault-finding
84 | <input type="checkbox"/> hostile
114 | <input type="checkbox"/> loud
144 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> calm
25 | <input type="checkbox"/> daring
55 | <input type="checkbox"/> fearful
85 | <input type="checkbox"/> humorous
115 | <input type="checkbox"/> loyal
145 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> capable
26 | <input type="checkbox"/> deceitful
56 | <input type="checkbox"/> feminine
86 | <input type="checkbox"/> hurried
116 | <input type="checkbox"/> mannerly
146 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> careless
27 | <input type="checkbox"/> defensive
57 | <input type="checkbox"/> fickle
87 | <input type="checkbox"/> idealistic
117 | <input type="checkbox"/> masculine
147 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> cautious
28 | <input type="checkbox"/> deliberate
58 | <input type="checkbox"/> flirtatious
88 | <input type="checkbox"/> imaginative
118 | <input type="checkbox"/> mature
148 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> changeable
29 | <input type="checkbox"/> demanding
59 | <input type="checkbox"/> foolish
89 | <input type="checkbox"/> immature
119 | <input type="checkbox"/> meek
149 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> charming
30 | <input type="checkbox"/> dependable
60 | <input type="checkbox"/> forceful
90 | <input type="checkbox"/> impatient
120 | <input type="checkbox"/> methodical
150 |

- | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> mild
151 | <input type="checkbox"/> practical
181 | <input type="checkbox"/> sarcastic
211 | <input type="checkbox"/> sophisticated
241 | <input type="checkbox"/> tough
271 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> mischievous
152 | <input type="checkbox"/> praising
182 | <input type="checkbox"/> self-centered
212 | <input type="checkbox"/> spendthrift
242 | <input type="checkbox"/> trusting
272 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> moderate
153 | <input type="checkbox"/> precise
183 | <input type="checkbox"/> self-confident
213 | <input type="checkbox"/> spineless
243 | <input type="checkbox"/> unaffected
273 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> modest
154 | <input type="checkbox"/> prejudiced
184 | <input type="checkbox"/> self-controlled
214 | <input type="checkbox"/> spontaneous
244 | <input type="checkbox"/> unambitious
274 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> moody
155 | <input type="checkbox"/> preoccupied
185 | <input type="checkbox"/> self-denying
215 | <input type="checkbox"/> spunky
245 | <input type="checkbox"/> unassuming
275 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> nagging
156 | <input type="checkbox"/> progressive
186 | <input type="checkbox"/> self-pitying
216 | <input type="checkbox"/> stable
246 | <input type="checkbox"/> unconventional
276 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> natural
157 | <input type="checkbox"/> prudish
187 | <input type="checkbox"/> self-punishing
217 | <input type="checkbox"/> steady
247 | <input type="checkbox"/> undependable
277 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> nervous
158 | <input type="checkbox"/> quarrelsome
188 | <input type="checkbox"/> self-seeking
218 | <input type="checkbox"/> stern
248 | <input type="checkbox"/> understanding
278 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> noisy
159 | <input type="checkbox"/> queer
189 | <input type="checkbox"/> selfish
219 | <input type="checkbox"/> stingy
249 | <input type="checkbox"/> unemotional
279 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> obliging
160 | <input type="checkbox"/> quick
190 | <input type="checkbox"/> sensitive
220 | <input type="checkbox"/> stolid
250 | <input type="checkbox"/> unexcitable
280 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> obnoxious
161 | <input type="checkbox"/> quiet
191 | <input type="checkbox"/> sentimental
221 | <input type="checkbox"/> strong
251 | <input type="checkbox"/> unfriendly
281 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> opinionated
162 | <input type="checkbox"/> quitting
192 | <input type="checkbox"/> serious
222 | <input type="checkbox"/> stubborn
252 | <input type="checkbox"/> uninhibited
282 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> opportunistic
163 | <input type="checkbox"/> rational
193 | <input type="checkbox"/> severe
223 | <input type="checkbox"/> submissive
253 | <input type="checkbox"/> unintelligent
283 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> optimistic
164 | <input type="checkbox"/> rattlebrained
194 | <input type="checkbox"/> sexy
224 | <input type="checkbox"/> suggestible
254 | <input type="checkbox"/> unkind
284 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> organized
165 | <input type="checkbox"/> realistic
195 | <input type="checkbox"/> shallow
225 | <input type="checkbox"/> sully
255 | <input type="checkbox"/> unrealistic
285 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> original
166 | <input type="checkbox"/> reasonable
196 | <input type="checkbox"/> sharp-witted
226 | <input type="checkbox"/> superstitious
256 | <input type="checkbox"/> unscrupulous
286 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> outgoing
167 | <input type="checkbox"/> rebellious
197 | <input type="checkbox"/> shiftless
227 | <input type="checkbox"/> suspicious
257 | <input type="checkbox"/> unselfish
287 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> outspoken
168 | <input type="checkbox"/> reckless
198 | <input type="checkbox"/> show-off
228 | <input type="checkbox"/> sympathetic
258 | <input type="checkbox"/> unstable
288 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> painstaking
169 | <input type="checkbox"/> reflective
199 | <input type="checkbox"/> shrewd
229 | <input type="checkbox"/> tactful
259 | <input type="checkbox"/> vindictive
289 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> patient
170 | <input type="checkbox"/> relaxed
200 | <input type="checkbox"/> shy
230 | <input type="checkbox"/> tactless
260 | <input type="checkbox"/> versatile
290 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> peaceable
171 | <input type="checkbox"/> reliable
201 | <input type="checkbox"/> silent
231 | <input type="checkbox"/> talkative
261 | <input type="checkbox"/> warm
291 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> peculiar
172 | <input type="checkbox"/> resentful
202 | <input type="checkbox"/> simple
232 | <input type="checkbox"/> temperamental
262 | <input type="checkbox"/> wary
292 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> persevering
173 | <input type="checkbox"/> reserved
203 | <input type="checkbox"/> sincere
233 | <input type="checkbox"/> tense
263 | <input type="checkbox"/> weak
293 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> persistent
174 | <input type="checkbox"/> resourceful
204 | <input type="checkbox"/> slipshod
234 | <input type="checkbox"/> thankless
264 | <input type="checkbox"/> whiny
294 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> pessimistic
175 | <input type="checkbox"/> responsible
205 | <input type="checkbox"/> slow
235 | <input type="checkbox"/> thorough
265 | <input type="checkbox"/> wholesome
295 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> planful
176 | <input type="checkbox"/> restless
206 | <input type="checkbox"/> sly
236 | <input type="checkbox"/> thoughtful
266 | <input type="checkbox"/> wise
296 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> pleasant
177 | <input type="checkbox"/> retiring
207 | <input type="checkbox"/> smug
237 | <input type="checkbox"/> thrifty
267 | <input type="checkbox"/> withdrawn
297 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> pleasure-seeking
178 | <input type="checkbox"/> rigid
208 | <input type="checkbox"/> snobbish
238 | <input type="checkbox"/> timid
268 | <input type="checkbox"/> witty
298 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> poised
179 | <input type="checkbox"/> robust
209 | <input type="checkbox"/> sociable
239 | <input type="checkbox"/> tolerant
269 | <input type="checkbox"/> worrying
299 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> polished
180 | <input type="checkbox"/> rude
210 | <input type="checkbox"/> soft-hearted
240 | <input type="checkbox"/> touchy
270 | <input type="checkbox"/> zany
300 |

APPENDIX H

List A

adaptable
cooperative
efficient
good-natured
industrious
kind
quiet

List B

conscientious
considerate
determined
mature
organized
serious

Above you will see two separate lists of adjectives; the following questions apply to these lists.

1. Given that more than one list could be applicable to each occupation, the LIST A adjectives are more characteristic of:
 - (a) Managers
 - (b) Union Officers
 - (c) can't really decide

2. Given that more than one list could be applicable to each occupation, the LIST B adjectives are more characteristic of:
 - (a) Managers
 - (b) Union Officers
 - (c) can't really decide

3. Given that ONLY ONE list is applicable to each occupation, which list is more characteristic of Managers? (YOU MUST CHOOSE ONE!)
 - (a) LIST A
 - (b) LIST B

APPENDIX I

OCCUPATIONAL PERCEPTION

If you were describing a manager (but no one in particular) what ten adjectives would you use (in order of importance)?

If you were describing a union officer (but no one in particular) what ten adjectives would you use (in order of importance)?

APPENDIX J

List A

Agressive
Loud; Outspoken
Intelligent
Strong; Powerful
Demanding
Confident
Greedy
Stubborn; Uncompromising
Tough
Understanding

List B

Intelligent
Confident
Strong; Powerful
Neat; Well Groomed
Aggressive
Stubborn; Uncompromising
Responsible
Domineering
Knowledgeable
Conservative

Above you will see two separate lists of adjectives; the following questions apply to these lists.

1. Given that more than one list could be applicable to each occupation, the LIST A adjectives are more characteristic of:
 - (a) Managers
 - (b) Union Officers
 - (c) can't really decide


2. Given that more than one list could be applicable to each occupation, the LIST B adjectives are more characteristic of:
 - (a) Managers
 - (b) Union Officers
 - (c) can't really decide

3. Given that ONLY ONE list is applicable to each occupation, which list is more characteristic of Managers? (YOU MUST CHOOSE ONE!)
 - (a) LIST A
 - (b) LIST B

APPENDIX K

SUCCESS OF BARGAINING

Often the success of bargaining is not judged solely on the basis of the final wage settlement but rather on the feeling of the participants, since this has an effect on future negotiations. Mark an X on the scale position below that represents how successful you feel this bargaining session was; that is, how satisfied were you personally?



APPENDIX M
(MANAGER'S VERSION)

YOUR OPPONENT

In order to assess how well your opponent played his role, it is important that you scale the degree to which he appeared to have the characteristics given to him in his role description. Please describe your opponent by marking an X, on the scale point (for each characteristic), that represents the degree to which he was:

AGGRESIVE	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	NON-AGGRE-SIVE
QUIET; SOFT SPOKEN	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	LOUD; OUT-SPOKEN
INTELLI-GENT	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	LACKS INTEL-LIGENCE
WEAK; POWER-LESS	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	STRONG; POWERFUL
DEMANDING	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	UNDEMANDING
LACKS CONFIDENCE	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	CONFIDENT
GREEDY	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	GENEROUS
FLEXIBLE; COMPROMISING	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	STUBBORN: UNCONFORM-ING
TOUGH	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	SOFT
LACKS IN UNDERSTANDING	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	UNDER-STANDING

ON THE SCALE BELOW, CIRCLE THE NUMBER WHICH COMES CLOSEST TO THE DEGREE TO WHICH YOU FEEL YOUR OPPONENT FOLLOWED THE ROLE INSTRUCTIONS HE WAS SUPPOSED TO FOLLOW.

PLAYED HIS ROLE VERY POORLY	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	PLAYED HIS ROLE VERY WELL
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APPENDIX M

(UNION OFFICER'S VERSION)

YOUR OPPONENT

In order to assess how well your opponent played his role, it is important that you scale the degree to which he appeared to have the characteristics given to him in his role description. Please describe your opponent by marking an X, on the scale point (for each characteristic), that represents the degree to which he was:

INTELLIGENT	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	LACKING IN INTELLIGENCE
LACKING IN CONFIDENCE	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	CONFIDENT
STRONG; POWERFUL	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	WEAK; POWERLESS
SLOPPY; POORLY GROOMED	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	NEAT; WELL GROOMED
AGGRESSIVE	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	NON-AGGRESSIVE
STUBBORN; UN-COMPROMISING	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	FLEXIBLE; COMPROMISING
RESPONSIBLE	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	IRRESPONSIBLE
SUBMISSIVE	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	DOMINEERING
KNOWLEDGEABLE	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	NOT-KNOWLEDGEABLE
NON-CONSERVATIVE	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	CONSERVATIVE

ON THE SCALE BELOW, CIRCLE THE NUMBER WHICH COMES CLOSEST TO THE DEGREE TO WHICH YOU FEEL YOUR OPPONENT FOLLOWED THE ROLE INSTRUCTIONS HE WAS SUPPOSED TO FOLLOW.

PLAYED HIS ROLE VERY POORLY	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	PLAYED HIS ROLE VERY WELL
-----------------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---------------------------

APPENDIX N

BARGAINING SITUATION

This bargaining concerns some employees of the Municipal Government of Harmony, Manitoba, a city of about 500,000 population. Starting five years ago, the Government Office Workers of Canada (GOWC), a national union, had bargained yearly on behalf of municipal clerical and office workers. The current contract between the GOWC and the city is due to expire today. During the past few years, the negotiations between the GOWC and the City have approximated those in union management relations generally. Each side has given up some things in return for others. For example, in the current bargaining, the union originally asked that dental insurance premiums for workers be paid by the City. Management argued that start-up administrative costs for this type of program would be excessive. Instead, management offered to reduce prices in the cafeteria; since that system was already in operation, the costs would be less but workers would still benefit. The union accepted this offer and dropped the demand for dental coverage. As another example, the union had originally asked that plug-in rates for employees' cars not be increased as planned by management. Management felt that it could not do this in view of rapidly increasing hydro rates. However, management finally agreed to increase the rate less than was economically necessary and thus absorb some of the cost of employees' plugging their cars in during the winter. As a final example, management wanted to contract out clerical

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work during peak periods. The union objected to this, arguing that the City should hire more workers to handle the load. Management countered that this was impractical, because the peak work periods lasted only a few days at a time. Finally, a compromise was reached where the City hired a few additional workers and management was allowed to begin contracting out some work during peak periods.

At this point in time, agreement has been reached on all issues like those discussed above; the only issue not settled is wages. In the present contract, the base wage (on which wages and all jobs covered by the contract are based) is \$4.00 per hour. There are no wage controls or guidelines to which the contract must adhere. Over the last 5 years, contract wage increases for GOWC members have been in the 4%-20% range. The cost of living is projected to rise at around 12% over the next year, while GNP (Gross National Product) is expected to decline in real (as opposed to dollar) terms. Inflation last month was at an annual rate of 11%.

The recent pattern of wage settlements among other government clerical workers across the country have been 8%-15%. A recent United Auto Workers contract, which applies to many workers of this city (though not those employed by the city) included a wage increase of 13% over the next year. Some other recent contract settlements have been as follows: nurses, 18%; construction workers, 25%; transit workers, 12%; non-union city employees (e.g. teachers), 7% average.

City Administration's Position on Wages:

In general, labor costs are the most important part of the City's

Appendix N₃

operating budget. This means that there are severe limitations on the City's capacity to "absorb" wage increases. Although tax revenues are somewhat sensitive to inflation (e.g., as inflation increases, so do tax revenues), the relationship is not a perfect one. Thus the administration expects that this year's increase in revenues will be no more than 9-10% even though inflation is expected to be around 12%. Moreover, the current "climate" in the City is such that any proposed increase in taxes would be vigorously resisted and would only serve to alienate large numbers of voters. Indeed, many voters even now tend to have rather cynical views on how efficiently the City is run. Management's current offer to the Union is 4% (16 cents per hour).

Union Position on Wages:

The average cost of living increases of 13% per year over the last two years have swallowed up all of the recent wage increases; in fact, the workers' actual purchasing power has slightly decreased. On the other hand, City income rises with inflation, so the city has been getting, in effect, cheap labor. This contract is the time to change that. The union membership is firm in feeling an increase of more than the 6% of the last contract is required. The current union offer on the table is for an increase in the base wage of 28% (\$1.12 per hour).

General Bargaining Procedures:

Your job as a representative of management or union is to negotiate only the wages portion of the contract which is all that is left outstanding. Having read the situation description above you should

Appendix N₄

now devise strategies based on this information and create whatever arguments you need to bolster your position in negotiating a fair contract for your side. You will have about 15 minutes more to do so.

After this time, you will meet with the opposing representative and actually negotiate a contract. Your success in bargaining will have importance consequences not only for those you represent, but for you personally. In the real world, these personal consequences might take the form of promotions (in the case of management representatives), re-election to important positions (in the case of union representatives), or increases or decreases in salary or wages. In order to simulate these conditions as closely as possible, and to help ensure your involvement in the bargaining process, your pay for participating in this exercise will be determined by how well you bargain. Thus your pay will consist of the following:

LEVEL OF WAGE SETTLEMENT¹

<u>Pay</u>	<u>Union percentile</u>	<u>Mgt. Percentile</u>
\$10.00	25% or more	7% or less
\$ 9.00	24%	8%
\$ 8.00	23%	9%
\$ 7.00	22%	10%
\$ 6.00	21%	11%
\$ 5.00	20%	12%
\$ 4.00	19%	13%
\$ 3.00	18%	14%
\$ 2.00	17%	15%
\$ 1.00	16%	16%
\$.25	15 1/4%	16 3/4%
\$.00	15% or less	17% or more

¹ Each subject will receive only the level chart appropriate to his role.

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As you can see, every one-quarter of one percent you gain/save in the wage settlement will increase your own pay by \$0.25. Since any of this information regarding the personal consequences of various settlements would be of obvious value to the other representative in devising a strategy, be careful not to reveal any of this information to him. Should you do so, even inadvertently, the experiment will be halted and you will receive nothing.

You are free to use any of the information in the "situation description" to either directly shape your strategy or to create whatever additional arguments you might need to bolster your position. Your focus should be on rational persuasion of the other representative.

You will have 20 minutes to bargain initially with the other representative. If you reach agreement on a wage settlement during this period, enter the time and wage settlement on the attached "Contract Form", exchange signatures, and signal the investigator by pressing the buzzer on the table. If you have not reached agreement by the end of the 20 minutes it will be assumed that an impasse has been reached and a strike/lockout will automatically take place. You will then have a few minutes to re-think the issues and to revise your strategy. At this point, negotiations will resume for an additional 10 minutes using a revised pay schedule that will be explained below.

Strike/Lockout

You may at any time during negotiation call a strike or lockout. Just as there are costs to both parties in real life associated with strikes and lockouts, there will be a cost to you in choosing this option in this exercise. If a strike or lockout is called, the pay schedule for both parties will be cut in half. The maximum pay will thus be \$5 instead of \$10 and so forth down the schedule until 0 is reached. Your opponent's schedule will also be reduced by the same amount.

Summary of Bargaining Procedures

1. You will have a maximum of 30 minutes to review the materials and plan your bargaining strategy. You are free to use any information in the "situation description" to directly shape your strategy or to create whatever additional arguments you need to bolster your position. Your focus should be on rational persuasion of the other representative.
2. You will then have 20 minutes to bargain with the other representative.
3. If you reach agreement during this period, enter the wage settlement on the attached "contract form" (each party has a copy to be completed) and exchange signatures. Be sure to make a note of the time of settlement, then signal the experimenter by pressing the buzzer.

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4. If you have not reached agreement at the end of 20 minutes you will have a few minutes to prepare your final offer and supporting argument (on the "final offer at impasse" form). Your statement will be given to the other party and you will receive his.
5. During the ensuing strike/lockout period which will last for a maximum of 10 minutes, you should re-think the issues and revise your strategies. At this point negotiations will resume for an additional 10 minute using the revised pay schedule in which pay rates have been reduced by one half.
6. Remember that you can call a strike or lockout at any time during negotiations. If you do, both parties will be subject to an equal reduction of pay formula.
7. You may also at any time during negotiations request a period of conciliation by pressing the buzzer to signal the investigator. At this time the experimenter will separate you and your opponent and discuss individually with you some of the rules of negotiation, the focus of the negotiations and any other details that you might have forgotten from the situation description or from the general bargaining instructions. There will be no penalty associated with requesting conciliation; it is merely a time for you and your opponent to reformulate your thoughts and strategies and to review some of the instructions given previously.

CONTRACT FORM

Now that you have reached an agreement with your opponent quickly fill out the required information below.

TIME OF SETTLEMENT _____.

YOUR FINAL WAGE OFFER _____ %.

YOUR OPPONENT'S FINAL WAGE OFFER _____ %.

Your signature _____

Your opponent's
signature _____

FINAL OFFER AT IMPASSE

Even though you have not reached settlement at the conclusion of bargaining it is important to find out how far apart you and your opponent are at the end of the session for payoff purposes. Fill out the required information below.

YOUR FINAL WAGE OFFER _____ % .

YOUR OPPONENT'S FINAL WAGE OFFER _____ % .

Your signature _____

Your opponent's
signature _____

APPENDIX O

ROLE DESCRIPTION FOR MANAGERS

You have been selected to play the role of manager in this simulated bargaining exercise. To help you in playing your role as realistically as possible, the investigator recently surveyed a large number of Introductory Psychology Students and asked them to describe a "typical" manager. Below is a list of ten adjectives most frequently used by students in describing a manager. The adjectives are listed in order of importance.

- Intelligent
- Confident
- Strong; powerful
- Neat; well-groomed
- Aggressive
- Stubborn; uncompromising
- Responsible
- Domineering
- Knowledgeable
- Conservative

Wherever possible, you should behave according to this description

ROLE DESCRIPTION FOR OPPONENT

Since you are playing the role of a Manager, your opponent has obviously been asked to play the role of a Union Officer. Just as it is important for you to have an idea of the role that you are to play, it is crucial that you understand what your opponent's role is. When surveyed, students described the "typical" union officer as follows:

Aggressive
Loud; outspoken
Intelligent
Strong; powerful
Demanding
Confident
Greedy
Stubborn; uncompromising
Tough
Understanding

If your opponent plays his role well, he should come across looking like the description above. Hopefully this description of your opponent will help you plan the right strategies for bargaining.

APPENDIX P

ROLE DESCRIPTION FOR UNION OFFICERS

You have been selected to play the role of Union Officer in this simulated bargaining exercise. To help you in playing your role as realistically as possible, the investigator recently surveyed a large number of Introductory Psychology students and asked them to describe a "typical" union officer. Below is a list of the ten adjectives most frequently used by students in describing a union officer. The adjectives are listed in order of importance.

- Aggressive
- Loud; outspoken
- Intelligent
- Strong; powerful
- Demanding
- Confident
- Greedy
- Stubborn, uncompromising
- Tough
- Understanding

Wherever possible, you should behave according to this description.

ROLE DESCRIPTION FOR OPPONENT

Since you are playing the role of a Union Officer, your opponent has obviously been asked to play the role of a Union Officer. Just as it is important for you to have an idea of the role that you are to play, it is crucial that you understand what your opponent's role is. When surveyed, students described the "typical" manager as follows:

Intelligent
Confident
Strong; powerful
Neat; well-groomed
Aggressive
Stubborn; uncompromising
Responsible
Domineering
Knowledgeable
Conservative

If your opponent plays his role well, he should come across looking like the description above. Hopefully this description of your opponent will help you plan the right strategies for bargaining.

APPENDIX Q

ROLE DESCRIPTION FOR MANAGERS

You have been selected to play the role of manager in this simulated bargaining exercise. To help you in playing your role as realistically as possible, the investigator recently surveyed a large number of Introductory Psychology Students and asked them to describe a "typical" manager. Below is a list of ten adjectives most frequently used by students in describing a manager. The adjectives are listed in order of importance.

- Intelligent
- Confident
- Strong; powerful
- Neat; well-groomed
- Aggressive
- Stubborn; uncompromising
- Responsible
- Domineering
- Knowledgeable
- Conservative

Wherever possible, you should behave according to this description

ROLE DESCRIPTION FOR OPPONENT

Since you are playing the role of Manager, your opponent has obviously been asked to play the role of union officer. Just as it is important for you to have an idea of the role that you are to play, it is crucial that you understand what your opponent's role is. When surveyed, students described the "typical" union officer as follows:

Non-Aggressive
Quiet; softspoken
Lacking in intelligence
Weak; powerless
Undermanding
Lacking confidence
Generous
Flexible; compromising
Weak
Lacks understanding

If your opponent plays his role well, he should come across looking like the description above. Hopefully this description of your opponent will help you plan the right strategies for bargaining.

APPENDIX R

ROLE DESCRIPTION FOR UNION OFFICERS

You have been selected to play the role of Union Officer in this simulated bargaining exercise. To help you in playing your role as realistically as possible, the investigator recently surveyed a large number of Introductory Psychology students and asked them to describe a "typical" union officer. Below is a list of the ten adjectives most frequently used by students in describing a union officer. The adjectives are listed in order of importance.

- Aggressive
- Loud; outspoken
- Intelligent
- Strong; powerful
- Demanding
- Confident
- Greedy
- Stubborn, uncompromising
- Tough
- Understanding

Wherever possible, you should behave according to this description.

ROLE DESCRIPTION FOR OPPONENT

Since you are playing the role of Union Officer, your opponent has obviously been asked to play the role of union officer. Just as it is important for you to have an idea of the role that you are to play, it is crucial that you understand what your opponent's role is. When surveyed, students described the "typical" union officer as follows:

Lacking in intelligence
Lacking confidence
Weak; powerless
Sloppy; poorly groomed
Non-aggressive
Flexible; compromising
Irresponsible
Submissive
Not-knowledgeable
Non-conservative

If your opponent plays his role well, he should come across looking like the description above. Hopefully this description of your opponent will help you plan the right strategies for bargaining.

APPENDIX S

BARGAINING SESSION TRANSCRIPT

(INCONSISTENT CONDITION)

Mgmt.

I'm willing to listen to your argument first and then you can listen to mine.

Union

I'm afraid not. The position of the union is that we want to hear the City's position on the contract and then we will consider it.

Mgmt.

We will not consider any more than 4% until we know ...

Union

4% is totally unacceptable.

Mgmt.

So's your 28%. You realize it's ridiculous and you realize that there's no way we can give you that and we're not prepared to. So can I hear your opening statement please?

Union

Well I'll just state that in the past, City settlements have proven to be far below what was required when you take inflation into consideration.

Mgmt.

Inflation has nothing to do with this right at the moment.

Union

Inflation is always The union's policy is that we want to hear from the City that they are more responsive to our needs. As far as the union's concerned the City has not been responsive to our needs which is demonstrated by the previous contract settlements.

Mgmt.

As you can see from the contract which was worked out we have given you quite a bit at great expense to us. Granted the dental care we didn't get into but ...

Union

The city gave us a reduction in cafeteria prices ...

Mgmt.

When you settled for that that's your own problem but that does not ... doesn't matter what is demonstrates.

Union

It does not demonstrate any any City giving in to the Union. Food instead of dental care. It does not equate, that is not equitable at all.

Mgmt.

That is not in the contract right now. We're dealing with wages. Let's get down to wages. You said you want your 28%. You know that's ridiculous and I know that's ridiculous so let's forget it. I'm willing to give you 4%. The inflation is at 9% and that is a maximum increase.

Union

Inflation over the past 12 years is 13% which has eliminated any gain we might have had - that's not ...

Mgmt.

The cost of living....

Union

The cost of living has been projected to be 12% for this year.

Mgmt.

Inflation for this year is expected to be around 12%, the average cost of living increases of 13% over the last 2 years. Listen, we're willing to give you 4%.

Union

We're not going to take 4%.

Mgmt.

Then I'm afraid you're not going to take anything. Well you will, we'll

come to an agreement. I want you to know that if we increase your wages by an unreasonable amount that means we have to increase the revenue, and if we increase the revenue that means that your workers are still going to have to pay more money on the taxes and there goes their increase, so what's the point?

Union

The point is that inflation increases the city's revenue regardless...

Mgmt.

And the inflation is to do with your increased wages, so the more you want your wages increased the more revenue is going to go up, and the more the revenue goes up the more you guys have to pay, so it's not to your advantage to want more money.

Union

You cannot attach the blame for inflation to the specific union that I represent.

Mgmt.

But I am. That's all part of our increased cost.

Union

That is just too bad. The city should have been aware of that consideration when they gave other parties, other city employees their increases.

Mgmt.

Those are other city employees, they're not your union, and we're not discussing that.

Union

No, but the way the City has treated other people has a bearing on the fact of how we feel about it. You can't say that you can attach the blame specifically of inflation and the problems that the City's going to have with finding revenue to this union, to GWOC and try to limit us to a small increase and then turn around to some other union and give them substantially more than you want to give us.

Mgmt.

We have to give them more.

Union

Well you have to give us more too.

Mgmt.

Not that much more. 28%, are you serious about that?

Union

Our union is willing to compromise.

Mgmt.

Our management is also.

Union

But I think we're still far apart.

Mgmt.

Extremely. Are you willing to come down on the grounds that the previous increases were 6% and obviously you've been happy with that or you'd not have accepted that.

Union

What we previously accepted has no bearing as far as I'm concerned.

Mgmt.

Well as far as we're concerned it does because the City is a business...

Union

The unions perhaps before were very weak and they couldn't negotiate for the best interests of this Union, but I will negotiate for the best interest of my Union to get settlement that is in favor, and that is within the ...

Mgmt.

I am also negotiating for your union because the more we increase your wages the higher your taxes are going to go.

Union

Taxes will go up no matter how you raise our wages.

Mgmt.

We're willing to increase the taxes a maximum of 9 or 10%. It doesn't mean it will go up 9 or 10%. It might just go up 2%. The more you ask for the more the revenue has to go up. Okay you must realize the City is also a business. Now we have to make a profit, just as your workers have to make a profit. Now if we don't make that profit we cannot afford to give your workers those annual rates that they so request. You understand?

Union

I understand perfectly what you're trying to say.

Mgmt.

Good! So are you willing to ...

Union

Let's just find out what you're willing to go up to. 28% you say is too high.

Mgmt.

That's ridiculous.

Union

Well 4% is ridiculous. What is your next offer?

Mgmt.

I want to hear yours.

Union

That's too bad.

Mgmt.

4 1/4.

Union

4 1/4. Wow what a big increase that is!

Mgmt.

You have to come down.

Union & Mgmt. in unison

We'll come down to 27 3/4%.

Mgmt.

No, sorry. Your move.

Union

The City is just wanting to keep taxes down but we all know about previous settlements to certain City government employees. And we also know how most voters in the City feel about the work of the city council, how they feel the city council is not doing the job.

Mgmt.

Well if you notice the average wage, whether we're doing the job or not, has only been 7% increase.

Union

In previous times the contract settlements for the GOWC have reached a 4-20% range. Now we're not going to go for the 4% range.

Mgmt.

And we're not going to go to 28%. So you've already admitted that you're going to come down to at least 20%?

Union

No. In previous times settlements have not been sufficient.

Mgmt.

Yes it has, or it wouldn't have been accepted.

Union

We accepted them at the time but inflation has proven that they were not acceptable.

Mgmt.

At the time they were perfectly satisfactory. Granted I'll admit and I shouldn't, that the 6% was alright and now the 6% on that same old pay scale wouldn't work. I'm not saying that 6% on this wouldn't work,...

Union

You're offering us 4% and you've just stated that 6% didn't work ...

Mgmt.

I'm not saying it didn't work, I'm saying it didn't work on the old scale.

Union

On the old scale you said that 6% didn't work and that was in previous times and you're offering us 4% now and we both know that the GNP has declined, so in real terms the dollar is not worth what it was before, and you are offering us even a lesser percentage increase.

Mgmt.

That is because we cannot afford any more.

Union

But you're going to have to afford more. The City is going to have to find ways to increase its revenues, or streamlining its costs ...

Mgmt.

Streamlining our costs means locking you out and cutting your workers. We'll still have our money, you won't.

Union

Locking us out ...

Mgmt.

We're still going to have all the money we make from the revenue; you're still going to be locked out walking around without any money except for your union strike pay, which isn't a hell of a lot.

Union

We'll collect union strike pay and we'll also accept U.I.C. benefits, meanwhile the City will not operate ... We won't have to worry about paying taxes, there'll be no civil servants to process the tax forms.

Mgmt.

We'll bring people in. There's a lot of cheap labour out there.

Union

And cheap labour won't help you, bums off the street to process tax forms?

Mgmt.

No we'll get university students who are just happy to get a job where they can.

Union

Well we both know that university students are ...

Mgmt. & Union (in unison)

Bums.

Mgmt.

You said that your average thing was 4-20% somewhere?

Union

Well at least we agree on that.

Over the past years the range of settlement increases have been in the 4-20% range. But we're not saying that even 20% would be sufficient for us.

Mgmt.

Why?

Union

Because we had ...

Mgmt.

That's well over the rate of inflation and the cost of living. It's well over it.

Union

Our union feels that in the past we have made concessions to the City...

Mgmt.

To keep your jobs.

Union

And to keep the City running smoothly. Not as a business, as a society, as a civilization.

Mgmt.

As a business? What if we declared bankruptcy because we paid our workers too much?

Union

Well I guess you'd have to sell off City assets wouldn't you? We could start by eliminating all the high priced civil workers for the City,...

Mgmt.

... and the outrageously expensive Union negotiators. Okay, I'll offer you 5%.

Union

Well since you're so gracious the union may consider going down to 27%.

Mgmt.

That's ridiculous. We cannot give you that 28%. You are going to have to come down, there's no way. If we were to pay you that 27% we would be bankrupt in a few days, and you'd be out of work.

Union

Can you back that up?

Mgmt.

It's irrelevant! That's not fair!

Union

I don't have to accept your statement then.

Mgmt.

Okay! We'd be bankrupt in a year then, and you would all be out of a job. And the City would still have a few measly dollars to pay me, but you wouldn't get any because your union workers would be extremely annoyed at you.

Union

I don't think that the voters would allow the City to keep you employed. We both know the precarious position the City is in with reference to the voters. The voters have just about had it with the City, with all the lack of efficiency and all the waste.

Mgmt.

Lack of efficiency! And who puts all these things into effect? The civil servants, so they're not very efficient, they're just terrible.

Union

The civil servants put the City's policies in effect, but the policy decisions are made by the city council.

Mgmt.

But if they're not executed properly ... all our decisions are in the best interests of the people ...

Union

The problems in the city are in the policies of the city. Okay, we are willing to go down to 26 1/2%.

Mgmt.

That's still ridiculous and at the rate you're going... You must realize this: we've offered you 4%. The maximum amount we get in per annum is 10%. The less we take in the better. Now your cost of living increases are 13%, right? So if we were to give you that extra 16 1/2% ... it's just not feasible. Granted your workers may want it, but they're not going to get it because we can't afford it.

Union

Well! Let me just state that the United Automobile Workers employees, of which the City is comprised of many members of that union and many workers, somehow were able to get a 13% increase.

Mgmt.

And you're going to come down to 13% now?

Union

I'm just refuting your claims that you can't give a 16% increase.

Mgmt.

I didn't say 16%. I said 16% over and above the cost of living. Now I'm talking about your 26 1/2%. You look at all these other workers. Granted it says transit - 25%. These people are making nothing and these people have to survive. Your union workers are already making a fair amount.

Union

\$4.00 base is not a fair amount.

Mgmt.

It is! Transit workers are only making \$3.50. They're now making something like \$4.10. Now you are, \$4.00 or \$5.00 an hour. That's on parity with transit workers, is that what you want?

Union

As far as the Union is concerned transit workers are only being paid a 12% increase. So that goes to show you the lack of ...

Mgmt.

The figures handed to me were mistaken ...

Union

Okay let's get down to brass tacks here.

Mgmt.

Okay! 6%. You have to come down a lot more before I'm even willing to start giving you any decent amount. I've already increased it as much as I can.

Union

As much as the City wants you to increase it, not as much as you can.

Mgmt.

As much as I can afford.

Union

The Union will consider going down to 25%.

Mgmt.

Oh! Be reasonable.

Union

We are being reasonable. You offered construction workers a 25% increase. They were given a 25% increase.

Mgmt.

We didn't offer that to them. They were demanding over 50%. And we bargained it out, so why can't we just bargain it out here?

Union

Well let's bargain, make your offer.

Mgmt.

I did, 6%.

Union

That's ridiculous.

Mgmt.

Why, it's what you got last time.

Union

And it wasn't enough.

Mgmt.

Just because it wasn't enough doesn't mean it won't be enough now.

The average wage increases are 6%.

Union

Inflation has gone up 13% in the past 2 years, and inflation is forecasted to go up 11% this year with the dollar declining in real

terms. ... now you expect 6% to be satisfactory, that would be a net difference, not in our favour, of 5%. But the dollar has declined so in real terms we are not making more.

Mgmt.

Yes you are.

Union

GNP has gone down, so in real terms the dollar is not worth what it was before. So a 6% increase in comparison to what we were given maybe 2 years ago is not sufficient when inflation has gone up 11%.

LOCKOUT

Mgmt.

Okay now, we locked you out. Obviously we don't want you working for any unreasonable demands and so you are not making any money whatsoever right now. The city still has our money in the bank and your employees still have to buy all their food. Meanwhile I get paid nevertheless,

Union

Aha! That's what you think! You will find out how well you get paid when your cheque has not arrived in the mail.

Mgmt.

What do you mean .. it's your workers who are out. I get paid by the Mayor.

Union

Who do you think processes your cheques?

Mgmt.

The Mayor's private staff.

Union

The Mayor's private staff is on strike. That's going to be interesting when the people of the City find out that the Mayor has a private staff to ensure that...

Mgmt.

The people voted in that staff 2 years ago.

Union

I'm sure they did.

Mgmt.

Because they thought it was a great idea. Just in case the other civil servants were on strike they wanted the City to function.

Union

Well the City won't function. We represent the civil servants of a city of 500,000. How many people do you suppose our union is comprised of?

Mgmt.

5,000?

Union

5,000 isn't even close. Our union is much larger than you think. This is just wasting time.

Mgmt.

Are you willing to come down? I'm willing to increase if you are willing to decrease substantially.

Union

That has been the city's policy ... Substantial reductions in the demands...

Mgmt.

Substantial rises in taxes due to civil servants substantial demands.

Union

In the past the union has made quite substantial reductions in its demands and all we have gotten from it is token acknowledgement from

the City. I'm referring to our dental plan which we had wanted and we were willing to give up.

Mgmt.

You didn't have it to begin with so how could you give it up. What about Medicare?

Union

Medicare has nothing to do with the City, Medicare is a Provincial ...

Mgmt.

What about Blue Cross, you've got Blue Cross don't you?

Union

Blue Cross we pay for directly, it's private.

Mgmt.

That's irrelevant. You've already settled for your dental care.

Union

Our dental care we haven't got. The only dental care ...

Mgmt.

You indirectly got your dental care because of the reduced costs in the Cafeteria.

Union

How can reducing sandwiches by 10% ...

Mgmt.

At the outrageous prices we have to charge in order to

Union

Aha! Outrageous prices you do charge....

Mgmt.

In order to provide you ...

Union

The prices you charge are a ripoff.

Mgmt.

Well then don't eat there! Bring your own food!

Union

We are willing to come down to 24 1/2%.

Mgmt.

That's 1/2% less.

Union

Okay. 24%.

Mgmt.

That's 1% less.

Union

Let's hear what the City has to offer.

Mgmt.

With the 9 to 10% maximum amount in revenues ... I repeat maximum amount. And the minimum amount could be zero, don't forget that.

Union

It could be.

Mgmt.

It could be and it very well might be.

Union

And it very well might be. Time is running out.

Mgmt.

Okay we're up to 7%.

Union

That is totally ridiculous. Totally unacceptable.

Mgmt.

Why?

Union

Because inflation as I have pointed out ...

Mgmt.

You're already on parity with the other workers.

Union

We are not on parity with the other workers.

Mgmt.

X?#!! What do you think the average wage increases are?

Union

Wage increases ...

Mgmt.

Are 7%. Most of these workers are highly skilled. It doesn't take much to type.

Union

In previous contracts the wages have been in the 18-25% range. Where do you get your figures from?

Mgmt.

Some other recent contract settlements have been as follows ... etc.
etc. 7% average.

Union

Etc. etc. The only people who got 7% were non city employees such as
poor teachers, who don't have an effective union to represent them ...
construction workers received 25%.

Mgmt.

When was the last time that one of the city workers was on the top of a
building, willing to fall off, just for a lousy few dollars an hour?

Union

18% for nurses. Construction workers 25% ...

Mgmt.

Nurses? Do you know what they go through? All those patients going
to the washroom in beds. And what about transit workers, getting on
the bus and having to roll people off of them? That's harrowing, I
mean, it doesn't take much to sit at a desk and type, as if a worker's
going to get her fingers stuck in the typewriter, that's not very
dangerous.

Union

Our workers not only type.

Mgmt.

Oh they file! That's what we should do to them. I've come up to 7%, and you're down to 20% did you say?

Union

No. We are down to 24%.

Mgmt.

24?

Union

I may add that time has run out. 24%.

Mgmt.

You may add it too and we could very well lock you out.

Union

You have locked us out. After some consideration here the union is willing to drop down to 23%. We have moved 5% from our initial demands. The City has moved 3% from their initial offer.

Mgmt.

But all of that extra money over the cost of living would be purely profit for your workers

Union

... the City's revenue increases as inflation increases whereas the union members' income decreases due to inflation. We are in a no win situation.

Mgmt.

Ours doesn't increase ...

Union

It does increase with inflation because your revenue is based on the tax base. So if costs go up, the taxes go up to cover it. Whereas we are not so lucky; we don't have arbitrary raising of taxes. We have to negotiate.

Mgmt.

And that's what you're doing, and I might add unreasonably.

Union

Unreasonably? We have moved down 5% from our initial demand where the City has only gone up 3%.

Mgmt.

Okay I'll make it 4. We're now up to 8%.

Union

8%. We're far from meeting an equitable... What we want here...we're

far from an inequitable meeting.

Mgmt.

Why?

Union

8%. 8% while an inflation rate is 11%. We want to stay ahead of inflation. We don't want to lose ground

Mgmt.

So does the city ...

Union

The City's revenue increases with inflation, you are in an always win situation.

Mgmt.

No we're not.

Union

You are. The city's revenue increase is based on taxes, the taxes increase arbitrarily with inflation. ...

Mgmt.

And inflation for the city includes your raised wages. I'm looking at the best interests of both of us.

Union

Okay, the union after some talking is willing to go down to 22%.

Mgmt.

I'm willing to go to 9. That's the exact rate of increased revenue.

Union

That's 2 points below inflation.

Mgmt.

I'm not going to go any higher than 9%.

Union

Then we have an impasse.

Mgmt.

We have an impasse.

Union

Can I have a conciliatory talk here?

Mgmt.

Oh! Oh!

END OF BARGAINING SESSION

APPENDIX T

BARGAINING SESSION TRANSCRIPT

(INCONSISTENT CONDITION)

Union

As you know our current offer on the Board is 28% increase. We feel that over the last five years since the GOWC has been in operation we've been fair. We've bargained with you and I think everyone is quite happy with that. However, it seems as inflation is at 11% and the cost of living is going to be a predicted 12% and our wages in the last 5 years have reached a ceiling of 20% - that's 2% over what we need even to break even, even just to buy our milk, our bread, our butter ... I mean we're the people that work for you, the people that need your support and we give you our support to do a good job for this city and the amount of money that you're paying us now is not going to cover the simple economic costs that are increasing from day to day. So what we propose to you is that a wage increase of 28% will be both within your ability to pay and within our acceptance level.

Mgt.

28% is totally ridiculous, because our increase in revenues will not cover that. We'll go in the hole.

Union

Oh come now, come now. Inflation increases your revenue to the point at which you're right at this moment, since we have not had a contract increase for the last year, that you're making money on us, that you're

getting cheap labour from us. You know that as well as we do. All we're asking for is a fair deal here. We've negotiated several things already; we've negotiated hydro costs and as you know ...

Mgt.

Our revenue does not increase directly to our taxes, to inflation.

Union

Oh come on, we all know where the coffers are, we all know where the money is right here. We all know who's making money. If inflation is increasing at 12% and the the cost of living is going up but we have not had our wages go up, then you must obviously be making more money than you did last year. Therefore you can afford to pay more money to us this year.

Mgt.

28%? We can't afford to pay 28%; no one can afford to pay 28%; Big companies can't afford to pay 28% and you're expecting us to pay 28%.

Union

Look, I give you facts from across the country. 18% nurses alone.

Mgt.

Skilled labor.

Union

Office workers are not skilled laborers? I'll tell you the skills right now. There is clerical, there is management, there is years of university education going into these people - years of money that they paid out - a lot of time and effort and a lot of pride in the jobs that they are doing. Don't tell me skilled labor. Nurses spend 2-3 years in university after they have their undergraduate degrees. That goes the same for any management level, any clerical, bookkeeper, 2 years the minimum, Red River Community College.

Mgt.

If these people are so skilled they could get a job that paid more than \$4/hr. and we wouldn't have to be here. The way the economy is right now nurses can afford an 18% increase, we can't afford a 28% increase.

Union

We're getting paid on a lower level to begin with so we need that increase proportionately large in order to cover the inflation which is 22% - 22% over the last 5 years increases of 20% maximum, ceiling of 20%. We don't think there's anything wrong with that.

Mgt.

Inflation is 12%, not 22%.

Union

22% inflation and cost of living. Sorry, a little correction of information

there. But going back to examples across the country, the average ceiling on wage increases is 15%, 15% and that's from workers across the country, a lot of whom are considered high income earners, and office workers are definitely not, and yet we have to survive in this world as well. So I believe that 28% is not too much to ask when we consider the facts, that inflation is causing you an increase in revenue - where is this increase in revenue going?

Mgt.

Increase in revenue is not directly proportional to inflation.

Union

But there is still an increase in revenue. I'm telling you ...

Mgt.

There **is** still an increase in revenue, but there is no way we have a 28% increase in revenue. We'd have to have an inflation rate of 40% to have a 28% increase in revenue.

Union

I don't know where you get these figures from; I've never heard this before in my life. This is all arbitrary, it doesn't apply.

Mgt.

I can't afford to pay you 28%; nobody has ever settled for 28%. Skilled workers! Clerical workers, I don't care what kind of university degree

they have or don't have, are not skilled workers. Okay, we're talking here of an increase. That's fine but ...

Union

What we're discussing here, believe me we want to get this solved as quickly as you do, and what we're discussing here is bargaining to find a mutually acceptable wage level that will both cover the cost of living and the increase in inflation, without taxing the government to the point that it has to increase revenue through taxation.

Mgt.

Well at 28% we'll probably be losing money.

Union

Okay! Okay! This is a realistic wage level for us but give me some facts on why, why ... let me hear your revenue coffers, what's the situation there?

Mgt.

I cannot afford to pay you more than 7%, I cannot cover more than that.

Union

You do realize that we can strike. You do realize that?

Mgt.

Yeah you can strike.

Union

And you do realize the situation in the city right now. I mean they're not looking too happily at your government.

Mgt.

Which is why we can't afford to pay you more than ...

Union

I do think that if we were to strike people would definitely not vote for you in the next election which I believe is coming up shortly. I think we can find possibly a middle of the road point between 28 and 7 but definitely on the upper portions, say 2/3 of the way from 7 to 28, I believe 26 is more in line.

Mgt.

12%

Union

26 is more in line considering the fact that the United Auto Workers contract agreement was over 13% over the next year in itself - the United Auto Workers have been getting proportionately an incredibly higher wage level compared to office workers in this city. But you need our labor, you need us to work for you in this city.

Mgt.

Well sure we need your labor but not at 28%, not at 26%, not at 20%.

Union

Oh come now. How do you expect us to live?

Mgt.

Well you just told me United Auto Workers are making a lot of money.

Union

Perhaps we can deal with this in another manner. We've already discussed many bargaining positions and we've come to agreement on many things. Perhaps certain demands that we have already had accepted can be negotiated. Let's start at a 26% level here.

Mgt.

No, no, start at a basic 12% level here. Inflation's 12%.

Union

Inflation is 11% - a little mistake in our information. Cost of living is 12%, so considering that we need a 22% increase just to break even, then you must at least offer us 22%.

Mgt.

We will not break even at 22%.

Union

How can you say that? Already our wages are underneath the revenues that you've been getting in taxation alone. With the increased 11%

Appendix Tg

inflation rate, your revenue is increasing at a rate that our wages are not coming to the level of, because we haven't had a new contract agreement. That is the purpose of this contract agreement, is to simply break even. It's simple addition - 11 and 12 make 23 - 23%. 24% gives us that buying power to spend money in the economy that is going to once again come back to government. Right now we know there is going to be a slow growth period, and a slow growth period is not promoted to increase rapidly by having no money to spend. If people are going to put their money in banks and they're not going to go ahead and spend to put their money in private industry, to increase ... Eventually it gets back to government through taxation. You know that and I know that. What we're asking is a simple ...

Mgt.

What I know is that inflation is 11%, our increase in revenue will not be more than 7%.

Union

Your figures I do believe are incorrect. I can cite you here. At an inflation rate of 11% you will be gaining on your revenue 11% of that which is over and above all your expenses towards labor and extra cost, which is already quite an increase as you've not had a deficit in the last 5 years. You're working on an operating budget that is giving you a credit rather than a debit, and an increase of inflation on that is going to give you a greater amount of money to spend on labor. What

is it you are going to do with that excess money? There are no increased costs. We have negotiated ...

Mgt.

Increase in revenue will be 8%. This year's increase in revenues will be 8%. Now I can't afford to pay you anything over that.

Union

Right now, your increase in revenue is 8% perhaps. I do not agree on that figure, but even with an 8% revenue increase we already know that our wages are 23% underneath the operating budget alone. Then there's your other expenses which still give you a total of 13% profit. Ten percent alone is used for extracurricular expenses. 23% total would give us a 13% profit, increase, credit, whatever, above your base, which is what you're working with and an 11% inflation rate on that would give you an 8% increase above your base so if your base right now is 13%, given a dollar figure of \$300,000, an 18% increase on that.

Mgt.

Where's 13%?

Union

13%? If we're working at a wage level that is taking up approximately 77% of all revenue in this government right at the moment, 23% must be extra, and according to our calculations and calculations through the media, 10% is spent on other expenses concerning government office

workers of this city. Therefore 13% must be profit. 13% must be sitting there gaining money on this 11% inflation rate, which according to your figures, you say is an 8% increase from the base, and the base is approximately 13%, which is about \$300,000. 8% more on that is quite a lot of money my friend, quite a lot of money. And then what would you have, you would still have that profit which is being spent nowhere. I mean all we're asking for is an even ... Okay, I believe that we're getting away from the topic here, and I believe that this is getting nowhere. I believe I'm going to have to call the rest of the labor union executive. A strike is definitely on the horizon. I foresee no advancements in these talks; we've discussed some points.

Mgt.

Lockout!

(Break during Lockout)

Mgt.

I called this lockout because you were acting in an irresponsible manner.

Union

I believe that if we considered we were 6% beneath the cost of living, in our wage demands ... Obviously through figures last year you can see that we were 6% under and so this year to meet the cost of living from the base level of working at the cost of living from last year, it would be an increase of 12%, since that is the increase noted here of

12%. If we were at a base level we would have to have 12%, but with working under at a level of 6% we need an increase of 18% alone to equal the cost of living.

Mgt.

Last year! ... there's no need for you to assume an increase in revenue over ..

Union

Obviously our information differs.

Mgt.

I don't think it does.

Union

Obviously it does. Let's talk bargaining here. Let's get in to a little give and take, a little trade. We came to a compromise earlier, that during peak periods it was determined that you needed more help and we wanted more workers hired to spread the wealth, so to speak, and due to costs which you proposed were too high, you would rather contract out the work, rather than work someone full time during the year. We came to an agreement: a few additional workers and you would contract out some extra work during peak periods if it was necessary. What we propose is that any part time staff that is now working works a lower wage schedule than the full-time staff in our union, and any work contracted out is also at a lower schedule

proportionately to what our increase will be this year. Also, to add to that, we will offer...

Mgt.

This is just pennies.

Union

We're talking costs, and we're talking ways of decreasing costs in other areas to obtain an increase in salary which will provide us an ability to live at the cost of living. Is this not correct?

Mgt.

Cost of living is 12%? 11%?

Union

11% if you're working at the base level. Last year we were 6% beneath.

Mgt.

You can work at the cost of living. You were working at the cost of living last year as far as I'm aware, and it's okay by me if you work at the cost of living. I have nothing against your working at the cost of living; I do have something against you if you work at 28% or 20% or 15%, because that is over the cost of living, that is more than we can afford to pay you and you'd be dealing with a new administration if you tried that.

Union

We are willing to offer in the pot for a basic wage increase of 20%, which is 2% above our predicted 18% increase needed to level off at the cost of living.

Mgt.

No! You worked at the cost of living last year...

Union

We are willing to offer no strikes and in this economy the way it is right now you need that to stay in power.

Mgt.

Yeah, that's why I locked you out.

Union

We will offer no strikes over the extent of this contract agreement and into the next 2 years following that.

Mgt.

You're locked out, obviously I don't care about your strikes, that doesn't matter to me. What does matter to me is that I can't afford to pay you any more than 12%. I think that is what the inflation rate is.

Union

If we were to call a strike and were to prolong it we will not be the

ones hurting, it will be you. We have right now funds for strikes, enough money to cover us for quite a long time. Therefore, ...

Mgt.

So you can suffer and come back, then we might not give you enough compensation for your suffering, maybe ...

Union

Therefore, seeing the situation you're in with the electorate at the moment, and the situation you're going to be in if we do strike, without having the office workers to back you up, to aid you, your management and executive levels will fall apart. We are as much required ...

Mgt.

I cannot give you more than 12% which is the inflation rate which means you are coming out ahead from last year; it's more than you've ever gotten. You're coming out of the deal ahead of last year.

Union

12% would only give us equal to the cost of living. 13% would give us 1% over the cost of living. Seeing as we worked at 6% under last year...

Mgt.

I deny that. I've already given you 8%. I've gone from 4% to 12%. You haven't given an inch.

Union

The construction workers across the country received an increase of 25%. And that's based upon both cost of living and inflationary rates which they foresee at their wage level will provide an ability to live within this economy and spend and help it to grow. We're asking for ...

Mgt.

Construction companies make money; we do not.

Union

We're asking for 18%, 18% break-even, cost of living, 18% ... Oh come now, the inflation rate alone increases at 8% and if you had a 13% base increase last year, so we're talking 21%.

Mgt.

You're adding cost of living and inflation ...

Union

We're talking 3% above it, no I'm not adding inflation and cost of living. I'm talking the fact that 77% of your budget is used for labor costs, 10% for other costs and 13% is left profit according to last year's figures.

Mgt.

Municipal governments do not make profits. They don't run as

companies; they don't run on a profit basis.

Union

Are you telling me that no government has ever had a credit towards its budget? What is done with that money? It is credited, and is used in the following years for subsequent projects and things like that. What we're proposing to you is that out of that 13% and that 8% increase level, it's going to give you 23% left. We're proposing an 18% increase in wage levels so you're going to have approximately 14%: 13% or 14% pure profit.

Mgt.

Right now, we cannot afford to give you more than 12 because we have to keep these projects going, which means we need that money, and we need more than that money to keep the bridges building, to keep the roads building, not just for office work, not just for miscellaneous expenses I've negotiated with unions.

END OF BARGAINING SESSION