

UNITED STATES PROTESTANT MISSIONS IN EASTERN CUBA,  
1898-1935:  
SALVATION AND CONFLICT IN THE CRADLE OF INDEPENDENCE

By

Jason M. Yaremko

A dissertation

presented to the University of Manitoba  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the  
degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History

WINNIPEG, MANITOBA

August, 1996



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ISBN 0-612-16377-6

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JASON M. YAREMKO

A Thesis/Practicum submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of the University of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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## Dissertation Abstract

North American Protestant missions had existed in Cuba prior to 1898. But only in tandem with United States occupational forces, after the Cuban-Spanish-American war, was a substantial campaign mounted to liberate Cuba from what was regarded as Romanist obscurantism. Under US military rule, over twenty-four Protestant denominations began work in Cuba. Cubans, disillusioned with the colonial Catholic Church, joined the growing missions. Cuba was divided up among these missions. Eastern Cuba, the cradle of Cuban independence and focus of this study, was dominated by the American Baptists, Southern Methodists, and Society of Friends.

Committed to the idea of a "new Cuba," both US religious and secular interests moved to promote salvation for Cubans by acceptance of North American religious, socio-political, economic and cultural beliefs and institutions. Protestant schools became the main instrument for attracting new recruits to North American Protestantism. They also became some of Cuba's most prestigious educational institutions. These schools had the dual purpose of evangelizing Cubans and of preparing people to work at various levels in a capitalist-dependent economy, consistent with the needs of foreign capital.

Cubans were deemed worthy of salvation. But Cuban customs, mores, and institutions were judged according to their resemblance to US forms. Many missionaries perceived Cubans generally as incapable of running an indigenous church except in the very distant future. Not unlike the old colonial Church, Protestant evangelization and education was a means of instilling a value system that functioned as a form of social control. While many Cubans supported the new order, others confronted the reluctance of the Protestant hierarchy to allow for Cubanization of the Protestant church.

US hegemony functioned on many levels in Cuban society. The coincidence of US Protestant and government civilizing missions, however, was not a conspiracy. Instead, there was a convergence in the worldviews of religious and secular US interests in Cuba which generated common purpose toward similar goals. Ultimately, US ideology of mission clashed with Cuban nationalism in a struggle between Americanization and Cubanization in a post-war society struggling to reconstruct itself.

## Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for their support of my research for this dissertation. I would also like to extend my gratitude to those people in Cuba and the United States who gave generously of their time and knowledge and facilitated my research. I especially wish to thank the staffs of the National Archive of Cuba, the Archivo Convención Bautista de Cuba Oriental, the Seminario Teológico Bautista de Cuba Oriental, the Archivo Histórico Provincial de Santiago de Cuba, and the archivists of the numerous government and denominational archives in which I worked. I also wish to thank those Canadian friends and colleagues like Professors Ron Harpelle, Francis Carroll and John Kirk whose input in no small way influenced my work.

I am especially grateful to my advisor, Dr. Timothy E. Anna, for his influence, interest, support, direction and guidance through all my work. Thanks also to my families, particularly my daughter Erin, without whom this work would have been much more difficult to complete. Finally, I am eternally indebted to my wife and compañera, Cheryl, for her unconditional love, patience and support through all the vicissitudes of this process.

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## Chapter One: Missions in Cuba: Origins and New Beginnings

Nearly four hundred years before the Protestant Church established itself in Cuba, Spain's imperial government sent Diego Velásquez (1511) to colonize the land that Columbus had discovered. Accompanying Velásquez were four friars, one of whom became the first bishop of Cuba. The colonial Catholic Church in Cuba came to possess an exceptional group of priests and bishops, from Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas and Diego Avelino de Compostela to Juan José Díaz de Espada y Landa, and made important contributions to education in the founding of seminaries and the University of Havana. The Catholic Church in Cuba developed along the same general lines as elsewhere in Spanish America.

The first century of the Roman Catholic Church's tenure in colonial Cuba, however, proved particularly inauspicious. Cuba's first bishop resigned the same year the bishopric was established; the second, before even having travelled to his diocese.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, endemic contradiction, conflict and factionalism between the church and the government, among churchpeople, and within the church itself, helped to blunt the impact of the clergy among Cubans. Ultimately, such an "extremely shaky foundation," coupled with "the apparent lack of interest in firmly establishing a diocese in a clearly strategic locale" did not bode well for the

development of the Catholic Church in Cuba.<sup>2</sup> Upon the arrival four centuries later of the first Protestant missionaries from the United States, the Cuban Catholic Church was a nonentity. The church in Cuba, notes Marcos Ramos, "was simply Spanish."<sup>3</sup>

The end of the Spanish-Cuban-American war in 1898 did not merely signify the end of the Catholic Church's monopoly in Cuba. The deluge of US Protestant missionaries accompanying the flow of soldiers, diplomats and businessmen into the "new Cuba" after 1898 were not the first arrivals of organized Protestantism in Cuba (though many of them insisted they were). Protestants predated the establishment of Protestantism in Cuba, frequently visiting the island since the sixteenth century. The first Protestants to enter Cuba were among the numerous pirates, corsairs and filibusters (Huguenots, Dutch Reformed, Anglicans) attacking and engaging in contraband within the country.<sup>4</sup> In 1741, the first documented Protestant services occurred under the British occupation of the Guantanamo Valley. Two decades later, with the British usurpation of Cuba in 1762-1763, Cubans witnessed the turning of the San Francisco Church into an Anglican church by decree of the effective governor of western Cuba, the Earl of Albemarle, whose brother was a famous Anglican bishop. Though respecting the freedom of religion of Catholics and refraining from challenging the privileged status of the Catholic Church, the English did

insist on holding their own services. Numerous Cuban women married Englishman consistent with the rites of the Anglican Church.<sup>5</sup>

In the period after the British occupation, North American and British economic influence in Cuba grew significantly, especially by the mid-nineteenth century. Under Spanish rule, religious liberty for these Protestant groups was limited by both imperial law and availability of travelling circuit ministers. It was also during the course of the nineteenth century that a significant change in the Cuban perception of Protestantism occurred. Numerous members of Methodist and Baptist societies, and of churches in Jamaica and England, penetrated Cuba to help promote abolitionism among slave populations in sugar plantations. As slavery in Cuba became a more contentious issue, active Protestant abolitionists like the British consul David Turnbull enjoyed increasing support among sectors of Cuban society even as he earned the ire of the Spanish colonial government. Expelled by the government in 1842, Turnbull became a symbol of abolitionism among sectors of the Cuban intelligentsia, the tiny Cuban clergy, and the slave population.<sup>6</sup>

The Ten Years war (1868-1878) marked a turning point for colonial Cuba on several levels. During the 1870s and 1880s the Cuban economy became increasingly integrated into and dependent on the North American market as trade with the

United States continued to overtake that with Spain.<sup>7</sup> As North American and British capital expanded into various sectors of the Cuban economy, the growing foreign community in Cuba received the support of its government through the consul(s). Among the many functions of the US and British consuls was the facilitation of the spiritual as well as the material well-being of nationals. Thus, by the 1870s, growing foreign capital in Cuba was accompanied by the growth in foreign Protestant congregations ministered to by their respective foreign pastors and backed by a foreign government.

At the same time, Cubans, increasingly sympathetic to the tenets and personalities of liberal Protestantism, were not allowed to partake in the ministrations of foreign pastors. The first Cuban converts to Protestantism were among the many exiles who had emigrated to the United States as opponents of the Spanish regime and as participants in the Ten Years war. Numerous Cuban patriots such as Alberto J. Díaz, J.R. O'Halloran, H.B. Someillán and Aurelio Silvera returned after the war as converted Protestants and also as pastors.<sup>8</sup>

The 1880s ushered in what Ramos correctly refers to as the birth of Cuban Protestantism in Cuba. Unlike the process in the rest of Latin America, the first permanent ministry of Protestantism to serve Cubans was not initiated by foreign missionaries. The first Protestant churches in

Cuba were pastored and administered by Cubans. Foreign missionary boards like those of the United States that dominated Cuba after 1898, in the 1880s and early 1890s restricted themselves to limited economic cooperation with local efforts.<sup>9</sup> Before 1898 Cubans and Cuban pastors led the movement.

The abolition of slavery in 1886 and the extension of religious liberty guaranteed by the Spanish constitution to Cuba in the same year helped facilitate the growth of Cuban Protestantism. Still, the intolerance and general anti-Cuban position of the Spanish bishops in Cuba "contrasted sharply with the patriotism of the first evangelical missionaries, who were not foreigners, and encouraged hundreds to join their churches, and thousands to listen to their message."<sup>10</sup>

Numerous Cuban patriots cum pastors returned from exile in the United States along with their many converts and established churches throughout mostly western Cuba. Alberto Díaz returned to Cuba in 1883 as an employee of the American Bible Society and eventually established the Gethsemane Baptist Church of Havana. This mission was later described in 1897 as "the largest and most influential Protestant mission in Cuba, having preaching halls and schools in several parts of Havana and its suburbs."<sup>11</sup> At the same time, an Episcopal church was opened in Matanzas by Pedro Duarte, and a Presbyterian church in Santa Clara under

the auspices of Evaristo Collazo. In 1890, property was acquired for the establishment of the Baptist Temple of Havana which also housed a school.<sup>12</sup> Henry B. Someillán and Aurelio Silvera returned from Key West in Florida as representatives of the Methodist church. They also founded a church and a school which, like those of other denominations, began "growing like the mustard seed of the Gospel."<sup>13</sup> And Francisco Cala pastored a growing congregation in Havana that later became affiliated with the Society of Friends (Quakers).<sup>14</sup>

Halls, hotel rooms and homes doubled as chapels and classrooms as Protestant congregations in Cuba expanded. By the time of the Cuban war of independence (1895-1898), Protestantism in Cuba was represented by thousands of Cubans who attended church services, meetings, and Protestant schools. Ramos estimates some 2775 were members of the Gethsemane Baptist Church just prior to the war.<sup>15</sup> With the exception of a few schools and medical dispensaries, almost all Protestant mission activity before the war of independence was in the west. Only the contingencies of war stood in the way of what appeared to be a dynamic Cuban reformation.

The war for independence (and its aftermath) effectively decimated what seemed to be an incipient and inspired Cuban Protestantism. The qualified tolerance of the Spanish colonial government was rapidly transformed into

the open persecution and arrest of Protestant leaders and congregation members. Thousands of Cubans were exiled to the United States, many of them becoming reorganized into congregations in Tampa, Key West and New York. Many more Cubans remained to fight or to simply endure the onslaught of war.

Cuban pastors were accused by colonial authorities of conspiring against Spain, which was generally true. Alberto Díaz, one of the first to be imprisoned (later exiled), had spoken publicly against Spanish imperialism (to the chagrin of US Baptist colleagues), and was also an agent and fundraiser for General Antonio Maceo. His US citizenship prompted his release. Henry Someillán, in addition to being an independista, had been a secretary to José Martí while in Key West. Pastor Evaristo Collazo was one of many Cuban Protestants to take up arms in the ranks of the liberation army. Pedro Duarte participated in the independence movement by founding a chapter of the Cuban Revolutionary Party in Matanzas (1892).<sup>16</sup> During the war Protestant activity was reduced to a bare minimum, many Protestant Cubans either exiled or in the field.

In July 1898, United States intervention into the struggle for independence signaled the end of the war and the rekindling of Protestant missionary activity. The aftermath of the war of 1898 proved pivotal for both Cuba and the United States. Not unlike the US exclusion of

Cubans from negotiations for Spanish surrender and the Treaty of Paris--a harbinger of things to come--Cuban Protestant leaders were also effectively displaced by their North American "brothers":

The Americanization of Cuban Protestantism began formally in 1898.... That year missionary boards which had previously limited themselves to cooperating economically with the local efforts (Southern Baptists, Methodists, Southern Presbyterians, Episcopalians) took over. The Cubans who had led the movement thus far were relegated to secondary positions.<sup>17</sup>

The landing of the new North American missionaries would determine the structure of the Protestant movement in Cuba for the next three decades. Of the Cuban Protestant Church itself, "very little of a permanent character remained."<sup>18</sup> Likewise, by the end of the US military occupation, US government officials made similar conclusions about Cuban independence.

During what became known in North American historiography as the Spanish-American war, and well after, Protestant churches in the US supported the expansionist ideology of the period. Though publicly adopting a policy of neutrality and pacificism, the perceived need to "rescue" the Cubans from the cruel and inhumane misrule of Spanish imperial (and Roman Catholic) domination became a decisive factor in US Protestant considerations. The corollary to

all this, of course, was the realization that US control of Cuba would provide an "open door" for US Protestant missions to evangelize, educate and eventually "civilize" the Cubans. While US military forces had "saved" Cuba from Spanish imperialism, US Protestant churches assumed the role of liberating Cuba from both the "yoke of Spain" and the heavier yoke of Spain's religion:<sup>19</sup>

With the war over and with Spain forever banished from the Western hemisphere, where for four centuries the proud banner of Castile held bloody sway and where Rome had been enslaving the souls and consciences of men, the way was open to evangelical enterprise....<sup>20</sup>

Missionaries from various Protestant churches converged on Cuba virtually on the heels of the signing of the armistice that ended the Spanish-Cuban-American war (August 1898). The Southern Methodist Episcopal church was typical in its zeal "to be at the front if we are going to occupy the island.... We must be on the ground in the initial stage of treaty ratification and American influence."<sup>21</sup> As most US Protestant missions entering Cuba recognized, the US-dominated transition from colony to republic, and US influence thereafter, "facilitated the evangelical work extraordinarily."<sup>22</sup> Under the US military occupation (1898-1902), the limited religious freedom permitted by the Spanish government prior to the war opened up completely, enabling US Protestant missions to establish themselves in

important centers and locations throughout the Cuban interior. Protestant missions were established chiefly in the cities and towns of Cuba.

United States missionaries arriving in Cuba tended to represent the major traditional denominations in the US. These included Southern Methodists, Northern and Southern Baptists, Lutherans, Episcopalians, Presbyterians, and the American Friends. For the sake of cooperation and comity, and to avoid confrontation and conflict, these missions effectively divided the country into zones and claimed their evangelizing territories. Northern and Southern Baptists dissected the island into what eventually became, respectively, eastern and western conventions. Presbyterians, Congregationalists and the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, staked their claims in western Cuba. The Episcopalians settled in Matanzas and Santiago de Cuba.<sup>23</sup> In eastern Cuba the Southern Methodists, Friends, and Northern Baptists predominated.

Within weeks of the missions' establishment, congregations filled Protestant chapels and meeting halls while Cuban children increasingly enrolled in newly-opened Protestant schools. Education became the principal instrument in missionary efforts to combat and replace "the benumbing influences of Spanish colonial policy and of Rome's ecclesiastical system."<sup>24</sup> The Cuban response was not infrequently overwhelming. Missionaries in stations

throughout the country scrambled to meet the growing demand for US Protestant schooling. Missionaries' requests for more financial and labour support from their boards in the US soon trebled. Within a decade, North American Protestantism became a significant part of Cuban society. Missionaries appeared to compete with their business compatriots in the flurry of property acquisitions that characterized eastern and western Cuba in the postwar period of US military government.

The soil of western Cuba had long been broken not only by the earlier pre-war transformation of the traditional land tenure system into large, concentrated holdings. The social and economic change begun in the 1880s and 1890s, and intensified in the war's aftermath, also included changes in the cultural and religious realms.

Cities and towns in the western regions of Cuba were reclaimed by several of the denominations that had been active under the Spanish colonial regime. The Methodist, Southern Baptist and Episcopal churches which returned to western Cuba, however, were no longer under Cuban direction. As was the case throughout all Cuba after the war, Cuban pastors and laicos (lay workers) came under the direct supervision of North American representatives of US Protestant churches and their boards in the United States. North American missionaries acknowledged their effective usurpation of evangelical work begun by Cubans before the US

intervention.<sup>25</sup> Many Cuban pastors and laicos did not easily accept their displacement.<sup>26</sup> Most, however, chose to work within the new order of things. After 1898, neither sugar latifundismo nor organized Protestantism (both now foreign-dominated) were new to western Cuba. Eastern Cuba, however, was another matter entirely.

The eastern regions of Cuba possessed a different socioeconomic and cultural history than that of the west. Because of the importance of the relationship that evolved between the new Protestant missions and the social, political, economic and cultural forces in the "virgin land" of eastern Cuba--the focus of this thesis--it is necessary to understand the dynamic of change and overall structure of society in the eastern provinces which the missions encountered.

Before 1898, Cuba's eastern regions had experienced neither the significant impact of organized Protestantism nor the disruption and social disarray of economic reorganization of traditional land tenure systems as had western Cuba. Outside of the west-to-east immigration generated by slave emancipation and the destruction of traditional rural society in the west, exceedingly little in the way of new socioeconomic or cultural forces penetrated the eastern provinces of Camagüey and Oriente. Rather, the east had been a place of refuge for generations of Cubans; tens of thousands of the dispossessed migrated eastward in

search of open land and opportunity. As Louis Pérez pointed out, they were not disappointed.<sup>27</sup>

As in Matanzas province in the west, in Oriente, the estate also occupied a significant place in the local economy. In contrast, however, economy and society in eastern Cuba were generally far more traditional, diverse, and Cuban than in the west. Much like Oriente generally, sugar estates in the east were small family enterprises, self-contained and isolated from the economic and technological resources of western Cuba, "more traditional than commercial, more family than corporate."<sup>28</sup> Technological advances in the east were few and far between: "Out of 198 sugar mills, registered in the mid-nineteenth century, only 84 were driven by steam engines, and 61 of these were located in the jurisdiction of Santiago, near the principal port city."<sup>29</sup> Inadequate transportation (less than 60 miles of railroad and few traversible roads) and communication facilities also tended to discourage large scale commercial production before 1898. In its place, an independent subsistence system thrived.

Conditions in eastern Cuba before the war thus enabled a significant diversity of agriculture in which, compared to the west, sugar production did not predominate. In fact, in Oriente province, only 47 percent of municipios (counties) were involved in sugar production of various scale.<sup>30</sup> Even these estates functioned in tandem with coffee fincas, cocoa

fields, banana plantations, fruit orchards, coconut groves, vegetable farms, tobacco vegas, cattle ranches and mines.<sup>31</sup> The substance of eastern agricultural diversity was spread across the province: "sugar, coffee and cacao in San Luis, Guantánamo, Manzanillo and Santiago; fruits and vegetables in Holguín and Gibara; tobacco in Mayarí; cattle in Manzanillo, Jiguaní, Campechuela, Bayamo, Palma Soriano, and Holguín; bananas and coconuts in Baracoa; mining in El Caney."<sup>32</sup> Between Oriente in the east and Matanzas in the west, the economic contrast could not be more striking: Almost 80 percent of the total area of cultivated land in Matanzas was dominated by sugar; in Oriente only 35 percent of farm land produced sugar.<sup>33</sup> Such a contrast had its parallel effect in the size and distribution of property. As indicated in the 1899 census data, Matanzas had the highest concentration of landownership in Cuba (not including Camagüey province, where cattle grazing occupied extensive tracts). In Oriente, meanwhile, barely .5 percent of farms were larger than 330 acres. The eastern province had not only the largest number of small landowners, but also the highest number of renters.<sup>34</sup>

Louis Pérez notes, importantly, the social aspect of agricultural production: "Nowhere else in Cuba did tenure patterns reflect as accurately the racial composition of the island as in Oriente."<sup>35</sup> Relative to the disparate white monopoly over landownership in the rest of Cuba, Afro-Cubans

managed 41 percent of the farms in Cuba Oriental. In the case of coffee production, for example, Afro-Cuban farmers comprised a majority. Overall, some 75 percent of land farmed by black renters was to be found in Oriente province. Next to the eastern province of Camagüey, Oriente had the smallest average acreage, the largest portion of sugar estates, and the highest number of Afro-Cuban and white owners and renters farming the smallest parcels of land.<sup>36</sup>

There were other less positive indicators of the contrast between Cuba Occidental and Cuba Oriental. Oriente's history as the most rebellious province in Cuba had exacted social costs: The married population was reduced to barely 12 percent. The youngest population, and the highest proportion of children under 15 (43 percent) lived in Oriente. Orientales also had the highest rate of illiteracy, over 73 percent, and the lowest proportion of children between ages five and seventeen attending school (29 percent).<sup>37</sup> East and west in Cuba differed in many ways, and the east continued to be a region of sanctuary and opportunity for thousands of Cubans escaping marketization in the west. Land was the chief attraction and instrument for Cubans hoping to begin anew. Even in 1899, immigration to Oriente still increased substantially.

Yet in 1898, the devastation of war and subsequent US intervention laid the framework for a new epoch in eastern Cuba. Oriente province, the cradle of independence, lay in

ruins. The scorched-earth strategies of both Spanish colonial and Cuban independista armies had destroyed farms, factories, estates and local communities across the country. Almost all sugar mills, for example, were destroyed or inoperative, farmland lay dormant, and neither small farmers nor the planter class possessed the capital to revive the agricultural economy. Local officials in communities across the island echoed the demands of farmers, peasants and widows seeking to rebuild the mills, replant fields and revive agricultural production: Credit for Cubans in great need of farm animals and agricultural equipment.<sup>38</sup> But such assistance was not forthcoming.

The aftermath of war for Cubans meant nationwide impoverishment, a paucity of capital and equipment to restart agricultural production, and the end of a moratorium on property foreclosures, one of several key orders decreed by the new US military government. Through a series of civil orders (No.'s 34, 63, 139) enforced during US occupation of Cuba, the US government methodically laid the foundation for the expansion of North American--specifically US--capital into a war-impooverished economy.<sup>39</sup>

In western Cuba, the dissolution of rural communities had begun long before 1898 and had been deepened by the war. The postwar restoration of the latifundia, now under increasingly North American auspices, made the transformation of land tenure systems in the west a foregone

conclusion. At the same time, the aftermath of war and US intervention began the process of disruption, dispossession and economic reorganization anew in the east. Through a combination of depressed land values, foreclosures, and acquisition and concentration of small and communal properties (haciendas comuneras) by foreign capital--all facilitated by the policies of the US military government--traditional forms of tenure and tenancy in the east came to an end.<sup>40</sup>

The "new frontier" in eastern Cuba attracted Cubans and North Americans alike. But North American capital arrived well out of proportion to its agents. Cubans, especially in a war-devastated economy, could not conceivably compete with the vast resources of North American investors, nor with their conceptions of a "new Cuba." One North American observer expressed a sentiment typical of the period: "The more foreign capital that comes in, the better for the country. In other words, the only outlook for the Cuban is to serve as a hired man."<sup>41</sup>

As Louis Pérez demonstrates in Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution, the chief beneficiaries of North American rule, especially in eastern Cuba, were North Americans. Enormous expanses of land in Oriente province were absorbed by foreign capital during and after the years of US military occupation. US companies expanded quickly throughout the regions of Manzanillo and southern Oriente, and in the north

to Puerto Padre, Holguín, Gibara, and Banes, Antilla, and Mayarí in the northeast. Sugar mills and estates either defunct or in default were bought up in vast sums.

Thousands of acres were acquired by one US company near Manzanillo, tens of thousands by another in Puerto Padre. In the latter case, the newly-formed Cuban American Sugar Company (1899) built what became one of the most productive mills in Cuba, the Chaparra central. The most expansive property acquisitions in Oriente occurred throughout the northern coastal regions. The United Fruit Company bought up some 225,000 acres near Banes and Antilla. Almost 75 percent of the municipality of Banes and 50 percent of Mayarí came under the ownership of United Fruit. The Nipe Bay Company, a subsidiary of the United Fruit Co., acquired 40,000 acres in the Puerto Padre region and 130,000 acres near Mayarí, near Nipe Bay. In less than a decade, nearly all of Oriente's north coast, from Baracoa in the east to Manatí in the west, came under North American control.<sup>42</sup> Camagüey was no different, as tens of thousands of acres were deftly acquired by North American investors.

Sugar production was not the only interest that was usurped by foreigners. North American real estate companies purchased vast tracts of land to resell to various interests. Land was acquired for homesteading, farming, colonizing, and various other speculative ventures such as winter resorts. Sectors of the economy including mining,

manufacturing, banking, utilities and transportation, came under the increasing control of US and Canadian capital. Between 1900 and 1901, the Cuba Company, one of several prominent US-owned rail lines, completed the construction of the Cuban Railway throughout the eastern end of Cuba, in the process accumulating about 50,000 acres of land for rail stations, construction sites, towns and depots, and a right-of-way 350 miles long.<sup>43</sup>

Mining also passed under North American control. Oriente possessed the central mineral deposits located in two major mining regions which included the districts of El Caney, El Cristo and Bayamo in the south and Mayarí in the north. A group of US mining interests such as Juraguá Iron Company (Pennsylvania Steel Company and Bethlehem Iron Company) dominated the region. Between 1899 and 1902, the US military government issued 218 mining concessions; over 61 percent of those were situated in Oriente and almost entirely owned by US companies.<sup>44</sup>

In some seven years of formal Cuban independence, an estimated 60 percent of all rural property in Cuba passed under the ownership of US corporations and individuals: Spanish residents controlled an additional 15 percent. Cubans, those who had fought for or supported independence, owned 25 percent of the land.<sup>45</sup> Of course, such estimates do not include other sectors such as utilities and banking in which North American ownership accounted for 90 percent

or more. By 1905, the US consul in Havana concluded that the US owned more land in Oriente than in any other province in Cuba: over 1 million acres.<sup>46</sup>

Within a very short period of time since the war of independence, the thousands who had fought for an independent Cuba, and then settled in the eastern regions in anticipation of opportunity, found themselves without title, dispossessed, and struggling as unwelcome precaristas (squatters) in the mountain ranges of eastern Cuba. Of the rest, some resisted, either openly or covertly, the onslaught of North American intervention. Others cooperated and collaborated with their new North American tutors in the new order of things.

Eastern Cuba represented a "new frontier" for groups other than US corporations and big capitalists. Thousands of North Americans of significant diversity arrived in Cuba on the heels of US capitalists and speculators to take advantage of "opportunity in the form of cheap land and new hope."<sup>47</sup> Many chose to farm, ranch, and otherwise work in one of the many sectors of the Cuban economy recently appropriated by US capital. Numerous agricultural colonies were established by North American families throughout Cuba, most of them in Camagüey and Oriente. North American migration displaced Cubans no less so than big North American capital. US and Canadian colonies became small insular enclaves of North American society. Cubans,

considered as obstacles to North American conceptions of progress, were often regarded derisively. Other entrants came for gambling or adventure. Still others arrived to help mould the "new Cuba" as envisioned by the McKinley administration.

The next qualitatively significant group to enter Cuba was North American teachers. Learning English was perceived by many, Cubans and North Americans alike, to be of utmost importance in the new Cuba, especially for reasons of employment and commerce. During the US military occupation, a new public education system was constructed with organization and texts imported from the US. In 1900 Harvard University brought 1300 Cuban teachers to Cambridge for instruction in US teaching methods and North American middle class culture. Not a few Cubans protested against such efforts at Americanization, let alone the ethnocentrism with which it was carried out.<sup>48</sup> Many North American and Cuban teachers were typically affiliated with the growing movement of United States Protestant missions in Cuba.

US Protestant missions represented the religious and cultural counterpart to North American economic and political penetration of Cuban society. United States Protestant organizations also sought to cultivate the "virgin soil" in eastern Cuba, a region, unlike western Cuba, that had remained virtually untouched by Protestantism and Roman Catholicism alike. By the end of

1898, US Protestant church organizations had joined the ranks of North American corporations, capitalists, farmers, miners, ranchers and investors in acquiring properties in the war-torn cradle of independence for their missions. Protestant church leaders were cognizant both of the significance of eastern Cuba and of the process in which they participated. In the infancy of formal Cuban independence, Protestant missions generally lauded the "great inrush of American capital to Cuba, and a wonderful development of Cuban Commerce."<sup>49</sup> Charles S. Detweiler, head of the American Baptist mission in Eastern Cuba, added: "The steady growth of the political influence of the United States in this region has made it a real home mission field, a new frontier."<sup>50</sup>

Among the earliest and most active United States Protestant missions in eastern Cuba, and the focus of this study, were the American Baptist Home Mission Society (ABHMS), the Methodist Episcopal Church, South (MECS), and the American Friends Board of Foreign Missions (AFBFM), or Quakers. Acutely aware of the potential of eastern Cuba as "virgin land" for the evangelizing and civilizing mission, these denominations moved quickly over the threshold of the "wide open door" to establish their presence in key regions of Camagüey and Oriente.<sup>51</sup>

The policy for the occupation of eastern Cuba as a mission field by the American Baptists came to fruition at a

conference in November 1898 in Washington, D.C. There the home mission boards of the Southern Baptist and American Baptist conventions agreed to a partitioning of Cuba into, respectively, western and eastern zones. Three months later, Hartwell Robert Moseley of South Carolina transferred from the Mexico mission to Santiago de Cuba to assume the superintendency of the two eastern provinces. The Cuban pastor J.R. O'Halloran had supervised and built congregations in Santiago since September 1898. In February 1899 he relinquished his authority to the new superintendent.<sup>52</sup> Within four months of mission work in Santiago under O'Halloran the Baptists had a church, a Sunday School and a day school. By February 1899, the American Baptists claimed a total of almost 200 baptisms and some 400 students, split evenly between the schools. The Baptists then began vigorously acquiring more property for churches, schools and offices. By 1905, the American Baptist mission accumulated 45 properties in at least 16 cities and towns throughout Camagüey and Oriente. Nearly 50 percent of these early sites were "acquired by gift" from North American companies or leased at token rates from local municipalities.<sup>53</sup>

The Southern Methodists were no less active in Cuba's eastern provinces, even if their mission's beginnings were somewhat less auspicious than that of the American Baptists. The interest of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South in the

Cuban field became manifest in November 1898 when the newly-elected bishop Warren A. Candler determined to open the country to North American Methodism. After a short reconnaissance, Southern Methodist missionaries moved to "occupy" the field in Cuba in February 1899--but not without opposition from their sister church in the north. The Southern Methodist church and Methodist Episcopal church--the bifurcated result of a regional split in 1844 over the question of slavery--had not conferred over comity in the Caribbean. Both churches wanted Cuba. By reason of their work among Cuban exiles in Florida, and because they "were already on the ground and taking the first steps toward the occupation of the entire island," the Southern Methodists prevailed.<sup>54</sup>

Under David W. Carter, the superintendent of the Methodist Cuba mission, the Southern Methodists became the most active missionaries in Cuba. By 1905 the Methodists had acquired property in more than 25 cities and municipalities worth over US\$ 110,000. Eastern Cuba, under the supervision of Hubert W. Baker, accounted for about 40 percent of the value and included some of the best agricultural property in Holguín, Guantánamo and Mayarí. During the same period, the Methodist church in eastern Cuba reported a church membership of almost 300. Characteristically, those enrolled in Methodist Sunday and day schools would significantly outnumber the official

church membership. By 1905, Methodist education in eastern Cuba claimed over 750 students.<sup>55</sup> Methodist influence, however, transcended the official numbers of its congregations.

The first missionaries of the American Friends Board of Foreign Missions (AFBFM) landed in eastern Cuba in November 1900 after some reconnaissance the previous year. Under the supervision of Zenas L. Martin, and with the aid and encouragement of Captain Lorenzo Baker, President of the United Fruit Company, missionaries Emma Phillips, Sylvester and May Mather Jones, and Maria S. Trevino inaugurated the Friends work. The work of the Friends mission traversed the so-called Puerto Padre-Holguín-Banes triangle (Banes being the headquarters of United Fruit). The region was reportedly rich and underdeveloped both as a mission field and as an agricultural area. In a report to General Leonard Wood in 1901, Perfecto Lacoste described the Holguín area as "the least reconstructed" of any in Cuba.<sup>56</sup> Gibara, Oriente was the site chosen for the first station largely because it was "so related geographically to the business of the United Fruit Company as to make it a suitable place for headquarters of a mission which should have a strong branch mission in Banes."<sup>57</sup> The United Fruit Company provided aid to the Friends in the form of thousands of dollars for mission buildings and properties.<sup>58</sup> The plantations of corporations like United Fruit, and other US

companies, would provide thousands of souls with which the Friends and other Protestant missions could work. Within the first decade, the Friends mission in eastern Cuba claimed over 1300 adherents, 165 church members, and a combined total of nearly 800 day and Sunday School students.<sup>59</sup> One of the smaller missions, the American Friends came the closest of all traditional Protestant denominations to meeting its goal of the indigenization or Cubanization of the Protestant church in Cuba.

To both the representatives of North American capital and Protestant church organizations alike, eastern Cuba seemed to beg for reconstruction materially and spiritually. Camagüey and Oriente in particular represented "virgin land" in the historical absence of either pervasive foreign capital investment or organized Protestantism. For their part, Protestant missions from the United States set out to help rehabilitate Cuban souls and the social order. Determined to carry out their evangelizing and civilizing mission, missionaries and their families underwent ordeals of tropical disease, alien climate, challenging terrain, civil wars and the opposition of militant Roman Catholic priests. Their methods included religious work, relief programs, and most importantly, education. In the latter approach, missions were not infrequently aided by North American business interests and Cuban government officials. The inculcation of certain skills and values, for all

classes of Cubans, was a matter of great importance for religious and secular interests alike. Education and socioeconomic reconstruction were certainly no less important to the masses of war-weary Cubans. But while many Cubans subscribed to North American Protestant visions of a "new Cuba," many others did not.

For many Cuban patriots, especially of Afro-Cuban descent, US Protestant missions appeared as merely an agent of the larger US intervention which had denied them the rights that genuine independence could have ensured and that José Martí had promised. In becoming an increasingly important segment of the population in Cuba, Protestant missionaries relied for their legitimacy not only on the classes of Cubans that responded to their call, but also on the recognition and support of Cuban governments and US business. At the same time, US Protestant missionaries, as they themselves insisted, were neither simply puppets nor conscious agents of US hegemony in Cuba. Perceiving themselves moreso as the conscience of United States tutelage, US missionaries sometimes criticized American behaviour and actions in Cuba. Where the tariff was concerned, they even at times protested US economic policy in eastern Cuba. US Protestant missions' relationships with the forces of US intervention, while not conspiratorial, were indeed complex.

As this study hopes to demonstrate, however, "missionaries could scarcely escape their culture."<sup>60</sup> If US religious and secular interests were often at odds over the methods for tilling the "virgin soil" of eastern Cuba, their shared worldviews enabled them to agree on the principles of the evangelizing and civilizing mission. Amidst the grave social problems of the newly-independent, postwar Cuba--and for the next several decades--US Protestant missions judged the socioeconomic and political status quo to be essentially sound. The limited reformism of the Social Gospel was not inconsistent with secular notions of stability and progress. Social change was to come gradually, consistent with the Protestant work ethic, as people improved their station by dint of hard work and self-sacrifice, and most importantly, within the existing political framework. US secular and religious beliefs and interests in Cuba also often converged over the principles of the Platt Amendment. Thus, not unlike the old Spanish colonial church, the US Protestant church, independent and periodically in disagreement with US government and business practice concerning Cuba, nonetheless identified with fundamental US principles and goals there.

As a function of a shared western worldview, Cuban colonial history, and the missionaries' own efforts, the influence of Protestant missions would transcend their small numbers. The advance of these groups into a society of low

organizational development, together with the benefits to be had from identification with an advanced industrial power, gave the Protestant missions greater impact than the sum total of missionaries and financial resources imply at first glance. As an American Baptist superintendent recognized in 1912:

Though the Protestant element in Cuba represents only a little over 11,000 of the population, its influence cannot be measured in this way.... The germ of gospel truth has permeated many parts, the Cuban people are being influenced by Protestant evangelistic work in a much larger way than statistical tables show.<sup>61</sup>

Converts to Protestantism in eastern Cuba never constituted more than 5 percent of the total population. Like their counterparts in revolutionary Mexico, however, they represented a "forceful minority with significant institutional support."<sup>62</sup>

US Protestant missions in Cuba repeatedly stressed their political neutrality. But in a climate of a frustrated and volatile Cuban nationalism, especially in the cradle of independence, the mission and practices of the US Protestant church were inherently political as well as cultural in consequence if not in nature. Consciously or

not, Protestant missions played a central role in the US-oriented reconstruction of the Cuban republic.

## Chapter Two: The Politics of Missionary Motivation

The direct root of the North American "missionary crusade" that descended on Cuba in 1898 dates back to the revivals of evangelist Dwight L. Moody and his supporters. The 1870s was a period of rejuvenated interest in religion and in missions at home and abroad. But the Protestant missionary crusade of the late nineteenth century was both religious and secular in origin. As Kenton J. Clymer points out, it was part of the "bumptious spirit of nationalism" that evolved in the post-civil war period and that came to identify Protestant beliefs with United States nationalism.<sup>1</sup> As Protestants related their improved station to the rising political and economic strength of the United States, North American Protestantism also became closely identified with western middle class democracy and capitalism. The atmosphere of religious revival and rising nationalism converged in Protestants' increasing concern with the "suspect religious influences" that accompanied immigrating German, Irish and Italian Catholics. This generated concern for the definition of national values, a quest in which the churches took active part and which increasingly identified patriotism with Protestantism. Ultimately, loyalty and nationalism were perceived as "more naturally Protestant," and led "to the belief that US expansion was a peculiarly Protestant enterprise."<sup>2</sup>

Paradoxically, nationalistic expansionism mixed with humanitarian sentiment and tended to be mutually reinforcing, if fundamentally contradictory. All of these factors--nationalism, humanitarianism, expansionism--converged in the concept of mission that coalesced around Cuba. At the same time that Cuba came under US political and economic hegemony, US Protestant missions, idealized as "an expression and outgrowth of the highest form of patriotism," began an intensive penetration.<sup>3</sup> With the blessing of the most prominent Protestant in the United States, President William McKinley, and armed with the US administration's and their own vision of building a "new Cuba," US Protestant missions rapidly occupied war-torn Cuba.

The Spanish-Cuban-American war had been a relatively brief affair. But it was also the culmination of a long and devastating struggle for independence waged by thousands of Cubans with their own idea of a "new Cuba." The war had been brutal, disruptive and destructive. It was "a war in which the opposing armies seemed determined more to punish the land than each other."<sup>4</sup> Ruin accompanied liberation:

At the end of the war with Spain the economic situation was chaotic. Cuba's foreign markets had been disrupted, and the internal economy largely destroyed. Of the 3,000,000 head of cattle enumerated in 1895,

only 10 percent remained.... Moreover, about two-thirds of the real estate was mortgaged.<sup>5</sup>

Commerce and manufacturing were at a standstill. Towns and villages were razed, and Cuban infrastructure generally unuseable. Previously productive agricultural regions were replaced by scorched wasteland.<sup>6</sup> The human toll was equally great. Hundreds of thousands of Cubans had perished; the multitudes of survivors dispersed to the cities and elsewhere. The combination of war, high child mortality, and low fertility generated an extremely low population count in post-war Cuba. Only the guarded optimism of independence and war's end brought on an effective baby boom.<sup>7</sup>

In the eastern regions no less than in the rest of the country, the desolation was extreme. Populations in Camagüey and Oriente were reduced to a fraction of their pre-war number, and the regional economy was in shambles.<sup>8</sup> Human trauma and stunted economic recovery were the ingredients of a difficult peace in the aftermath of war. Cubans attempted to return to their lives and to the new, and uncertain, reality that included the unsolicited tutelage of a new foreign power.

At the end of the war of 1898, the United States established a military occupation governed by General John R. Brooke, and then former governor of the eastern provinces, General Leonard Wood. The first four years of

reconstruction in Cuba were overseen by a foreign military government whose stated purpose was to achieve a government and economy stable enough for appeal to foreign investment. Cubans participated in the process largely as recipients of military decrees.

The Southern Methodists, American Baptists and American Friends were some of the most active Protestant missions to follow hard on the heels of the US military, and dominated in eastern Cuba. North American missionaries landed in Cuba at a time of dire need, entering into an environment of destitution and privation, in command of goods and services. They provided services otherwise lacking, offering general assistance that promised relief immediately and the opportunity for advancement thereafter. The missions did not distance themselves from secular entrants into Cuba as much as distinguish themselves to Cubans. As Sterling Neblett of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South (MECS) asserted, the entrance of North American Protestant missionaries into postwar Cuba "who came to bring peace and safety to the Cuban people, was militant but not military."<sup>9</sup>

The Methodists and other missionaries who fanned out into Cuba's eastern provinces were products of the religious inspiration of the Moody revivals, and of the growing influence of missionary support institutions like the Students Volunteer Movement (SVM) and the YMCA. The revivals had roused interest generally in religion and

missions. To many, like Warren A. Candler, ordained Methodist Bishop of Florida and Cuba in 1898, the revivals were the necessary foundation of great republics: "The salvation of our own country and the hope of other lands."<sup>10</sup> And many of the missionaries who served in the Cuban field had been involved in organizations such as the SVM or the YMCA.<sup>11</sup>

US missionaries landing in Cuba in 1898 received their motivation from revivals, organizations like the Y, and also from the personal testimonies of those already in the field. Missionaries who answered the call to Cuba cited the influence of Alberto Díaz, H. B. Someillán, and other Cubans who headed the pre-1898 missions before their exile to Key West. For Methodist, Baptist, and Quaker alike, the posthumous plea "Don't give up Cuba" ascribed to Methodist minister J.E. Vanduzar, proved particularly inspiring.<sup>12</sup> The correspondence, denominational and personal accounts of all three Protestant churches demonstrate the universal appeal of exhortations like that from Vanduzar's gravestone, along with the commonality of experiences which led many young missionaries to Cuba and other foreign lands.

The evangelization of Cubans was, of course, the paramount duty: "The unexpected opening of new fields in Puerto Rico and eastern Cuba" begged for "the evangelizing of these people now calling so loudly for the Gospel."<sup>13</sup> Those tending to the work of gathering the Cuban flocks

shared a "comfortable certainty" about the missionary undertaking in a new and unfamiliar environment.<sup>14</sup> Part of the basis for such shared certainty was a set of ideals set out in a widely-used missionary manual written by Arthur J. Brown, secretary of the Presbyterian mission board. Brown posited three primary motivations for mission work. The first was "the soul's experience in Christ." The deeper and more genuine one's Christian experience, the greater the impulse to communicate it to others. Secondly, there was "the world's need of Christ." Although elements of the Social Gospel were included in this category, Brown asserted that the paramount need was the salvation of unchurched souls and their preparation for "eternal companionship with God." Brown noted that non-Christians could in theory be saved but, he argued, few actually were: "It is sorrowfully, irrefutably true that they are living in known sin, and that by no possible stretch of charity can they be considered beyond the necessity for the revealed Gospel." The third motivation was "the command of Christ." The commitment to God and mission was a humanitarian and divine "bugle call" of compelling power: "It is not a request, not a suggestion. It leaves nothing to choice. It is an order, comprehensive, unequivocal, a clear, peremptory, categorical imperative: 'Go!'"<sup>15</sup>

The Social Gospel's institutional reformism was beginning to exercise an influence on US Protestantism just

as missionaries were arriving in Cuba. But the drive to convert and regenerate individuals initially took precedence over the need for social transformation at least in the early missionary thrust. The perceived "clean slate" left by post-war devastation in Cuba, and the practical direction of the early stages of Cuba's reconstruction by the US government seemed to reduce the concern for societal transformation on the part of the churches.<sup>16</sup> Still, the primacy of individual salvation emphasized by generally all the missions had other grounds as well.

The primacy of salvation has its roots, of course, in traditional Protestantism in the need to prepare for the Second Coming. As American Baptist and superintendent of eastern Cuba Hartwell R. Moseley wrote in 1900, conversion was a crucial sign that "God is giving his spirit and souls are being born into the Kingdom."<sup>17</sup> But, as was the case for missions generally, Moseley's concern for saving souls had another fundamental basis.

Roman Catholicism was the established church in Cuba. Due largely to a long history of collusion with the Spanish colonial powers and absence of a genuinely Cuban church, Cubans were, at best, nominally Roman Catholic. Still, after four centuries of Catholicism, if most Cubans were far from being zealots, they still considered themselves as Roman Catholics, even if they were also santeros (followers of the Afro-Cuban religion, Santería).<sup>18</sup> Eastern Cuba,

unlike the central and western regions, was, if not more Roman Catholic, undisturbed by the pre-war conversion campaigns carried out by Cuban Protestant churches in the west. In this important sense, the eastern provinces did represent a "clean slate" for conversion, especially for the many Protestant missionaries who considered Roman Catholicism a non-religion. H.R. Moseley typically declared, "I think it may be truthfully said that Cuba has no religion."<sup>19</sup> Others went so far as to equate Roman Catholicism in Cuba with ignorance itself.<sup>20</sup> At any rate, whether a "great menace" or "dead religion," Roman Catholicism was to be replaced by way of individual conversion.<sup>21</sup> For many missionaries, the primacy of personal salvation emerged from looming political and cultural realities. Though there was certainly an enthusiastic consensus of support for US military, government, and business forces in Cuba, some missionaries feared the influence of the vices of North American culture on mission work and specifically on Cuban character. As if the legacy of Roman Catholicism were not enough to worry about, missionaries contended, now there were the droves of western infidels that they sometimes hesitated to acknowledge as compatriots. Though such concerns were general throughout the eastern missions, some, like the American Friends mission, conveyed more concern than others.

Zenas L. Martin, secretary of the Friends mission in eastern Cuba, was typical in his qualification of support for US intervention in Cuba: "I do not think the United States has done the best in all things and we have a lot of poor examples of Americans down here to represent us."<sup>22</sup> Missionaries' reservations were conveyed privately and publicly. The first conference of the Friends mission in Cuba in December 1904 even included a lecture by Minnie C. Holding on "How much we should avoid appearing to be Americans."<sup>23</sup> Others, like American Baptist Thomas Sprague, more typically distinguished between good and bad Americanization, and called for the weeding out of the "negative aspect of American life" in Cuba as represented by gamblers, drunkards and adventurers. Charles S. Detweiler of the American Baptists attributed Cuban opposition to Protestant evangelization to "the influence of Americans in Cuba who lived in such a way as to recommend neither our country, our government, nor our religion. These adventurers were regarded as Protestant products."<sup>24</sup>

The proliferation throughout war-torn Cuba of a new generation of carpetbaggers in the form of land-dealers, all manner of speculators, corporate agents and homesteaders raised no little alarm for Protestant missions as they pondered the implications of such an invasion for their religious and humanitarian work. The Southern Methodists, who worried about the impact of such a secular influx on

their workers no less so than on the Cuban flock, issued a warning. In their "Brief Notes for the Instruction of Candidates," they asserted: "The Methodists believe that the ministers of the Gospel ought to be men of rectitude and purity in private life as in public. An immoral and impure minister cannot be an agent of the Holy Spirit; he is not worthy of preaching the Gospel, nor should he be permitted to do so."<sup>25</sup>

Spreading the word of the Gospel--traditionally the principal evangelical approach--was not the only means for combatting blasphemy and reaching individuals. Many missions in Cuba (and generally) adopted other methods of evangelization. While they erected and organized churches and maintained detailed conversion records, they also soon established various types of philanthropic institutions which included clinics, hospitals, orphanages, dormitories, schools, colleges, libraries, community centers and social clubs. Missionaries increasingly "insisted that these institutional ministries supplemented preaching."<sup>26</sup> All acted as means to a holy end.

Of all such institutional enterprises, missionaries in the eastern Cuban field put the greatest emphasis on education. Sunday Schools, day schools and colleges were to attract those Cubans for whom traditional preaching had no appeal. "New ideas" would be "patiently implanted" by mission teachers within the walls of these institutions.<sup>27</sup>

Mission leaders like American Baptist Robert Routledge, the Canadian-born director of Baptist education in eastern Cuba, insisted on the importance of student enrollment as an "opportunity for evangelization."<sup>28</sup> Other missionaries believed that schools were becoming "evangelizing agencies of great value."<sup>29</sup> Protestant schooling was, for most missions, initially a secondary evangelical tool.

Missionary education programs in the eastern provinces soon outgrew their limited roles as agencies of evangelization. Within a very short time after landing, US Protestant missions not only came to regard education as equally important to preaching as a means of evangelization. They also increasingly took on the task as a civilizing mission. Both were a function of several factors, all interacting upon one another.

The attention to education was a tacit acknowledgement of the increasing influence that the Social Gospel was having on missions and missionaries overseas. Cuba was hardly "overseas" but not all missions were as immediately willing as, for example, the Methodists, to embrace education and the building of schools as fervently as churches. Importantly, education as a civilizing tool at times competed with the missionaries' conception of it as an evangelizing agent. This was of great concern to Arthur Brown, whose "secondary motivations" of mission work were the second factor (albeit not necessarily intentionally) in

encouraging the use of education as a primary evangelizing and civilizing agent. Brown's "secondary motivations" were consistent with the gradual rise of the Social Gospel's practical role in Cuban missions. Effectively subsumed under the rubric of "civilization," Brown included the motives of philanthropy, education and commerce. For Brown these were ultimately all subordinated to the primary motivation of salvation.<sup>30</sup>

This was also essentially the case for most missionaries in Cuba's eastern missions. But the historical realities of both Cuba and the United States converged to help generate a blurring of the line between evangelizing and civilizing missions.

Arguably, the Social Gospel need not have existed in order for US missionaries to have adopted the civilizing mission of their secular compatriots. Both these groups were, after all, products of the same North American culture. The concern to educate Cubans and instill the presumably absent qualities of honesty, sobriety, thriftiness, purity and industriousness, existed for both US religious and secular crusaders in Cuba. As noted above, US missions in Cuba were partly motivated by the need to protect Cubans from the infidels of North American civilization invading the country in the form of unscrupulous speculators, gamblers, and drunken soldiers. Missionaries like H.R. Moseley even went so far as to

protest the unfair trade practices of US corporations and their lobbies in the US Congress. But while missionaries may have opposed some of the symptoms of US government and business policies in Cuba, they identified with the fundamental principles and ideology of US expansionism perceived as a benevolent force.

The war in 1898 barely over, missionaries barely having set foot on Cuban soil, many US Protestant churches anticipated great change in Cuba, if only partly of their own doing. Most missionaries advocated "the extension of American and Christian ideals of education, sanitation and justice for all who are oppressed."<sup>31</sup> Also typical was Moseley's conviction: "The future of Cuba is unalterably bound up with that of the United States . We have made ourselves responsible for her political destiny, and...responsible in the eyes of God for the spiritual destiny of Cubans."<sup>32</sup> Such sentiment hardly differed from the declarations of secular actors like Gilbert K. Harroun, member of the annexationist Cuban American League, Secretary of the Cuban Education Association and a founder of public education in postwar Cuba. Harroun invoked the Providential imperative in rationalizing US tutelage of Cuba: "It is His hand that has done this thing, it remains for us to accept the responsibility.... This work is evidently ours; We have been led to it.... Let every other peoples beware how they interfere or stand in the way of God."<sup>33</sup>

Methodist bishop Warren Candler, for whom the character of a political system was "exactly determined by the faith that underlies it," believed that Providential necessity dictated that the US evangelize and civilize Cuba.<sup>34</sup> As the paramount Protestant country, Candler concluded, the US stood unrivalled in its morality. Some missionaries believed that the task of evangelizing and civilizing Cubans might not be all that difficult: Protestant institutions might easily replace those that had been destroyed like hospitals and schools, and those like the colonial Catholic Church that were discredited. To a great extent, this contributed to the perception of Cuba as "open" among US religious and secular interests alike. American Baptist Howard Grose even went so far as to conclude that "the vast majority of Cubans of all classes were Protestants at heart."<sup>35</sup>

Both the US government and US Protestant missions perceived their purpose in Cuba as the moral imperative of establishing a stable government and society. The assertions of General Leonard Wood were not inconsistent with the beliefs of missionaries in eastern Cuba when he declared that the United States assumed a position as protector of the people, "politically, mentally, and morally." The US administration's position was further proclaimed by President McKinley in his 1899 message to Congress:

This nation has assumed before the world a grave responsibility for the future of good government in Cuba.... We have accepted a trust the fulfillment of which calls for the sternest integrity of purpose and the exercise of the highest wisdom. The new Cuba yet to arise from the ashes of the past must be bound to us by ties of singular intimacy and strength if its enduring welfare is to be assured.... Our mission, to accomplish when we took up the wager of battle, is not to be fulfilled by turning adrift any loosely framed commonwealth to face the vicissitudes which too often attend weaker states.<sup>36</sup>

The cultural identification of US Protestantism with US nationalism and patriotism became an integral part of the larger mission of the salvation of Cubans. Yet the coinciding of the Protestant mission with US policy in Cuba was not conceived as imperialism, which Americans more commonly opposed in its European manifestations. Instead, this process was perceived as expansion, defined as the exercise of control for benevolent ends. In this way, US hegemony was rationalized as a process that, though possessing contradictory and negative elements, apparently necessitated spiritual guidance. This view and the practices that were its effects were less the result of hypocrisy than of a determined loyalty to a religious idealism repeatedly expressed. Providence at times used

devious methods toward certain ends, and, naturally, not all actions taken by the US government in Cuba received religious sanction. At a fundamental level, however, the will of God seemed to act through the instrumentality of the United States, making it the duty of the churches to ensure that this agency was both faithful to its lofty objectives and honourable in the methods used to instill them.<sup>37</sup>

Loyal to their theological and national origins, as Margaret Crahan pointed out, the route to salvation preached by the missionaries in Cuba stressed individual reward (on earth or in the hereafter) and confronted inequality by encouraging philanthropy and passivity. Not historically prepared to tackle issues like socioeconomic injustice, the missions touted individual benevolence, acceptance of the status quo, and personal salvation. In this way, both the wealthy and impoverished could gain---the wealthy through their philanthropy, and the poor through acceptance of their lot.<sup>38</sup>

This combination of pragmatism and altruism had inherent contradictions. A statement typical of the period and sentiment was that of Bishop Candler, a key actor in the first three decades of US Protestant mission activity in Cuba:

If we wish to see to the South of us this beautiful island filled with a tranquil, peaceful and prosperous people, having no need of costly and irritating

interventions we must give to the Cuban people evangelical churches and the religion of the open Bible. In this solemn matter our duty and interest coincide. To enlighten and evangelize Cuba should be our joy; to enslave Cuba, or to allow any other power, political or ecclesiastical, to enslave Cuba, should have no place in all our thoughts. The intervention which is least expensive and most blessed is the brotherly and Christian intervention of the gospel of peace under the leadership of the Prince of Peace.<sup>39</sup>

The providential viewpoint of Bishop Candler was one shared by the large majority of missionaries in Cuba. Candler, for whom "The call of Abraham and his departure from Chaldea, and the exodus from Egypt...were no more truly religious events than the founding of the American colonies," contrasted the "virtuous morality" of early American colonization to the "vicious herds" that colonized Latin America.<sup>40</sup> His conclusions for the implications of US tutelage in Cuba were part of a larger consensus among Protestant missionaries establishing themselves in eastern (as in western) Cuba in the opening decades of the young republic. Like the Southern Methodists, the American Baptists and other missions felt strongly that "Cuba should be rapidly Americanized," and that the missionaries offered the "best promise" of the new order.<sup>41</sup>

This position proved inconsistent with the declaration made by some missions of political neutrality and would prove problematic for missionaries in their future relations with Cubans. Discrepancies between publicly-acknowledged policies and private utterances, between theory and practice, at times became self-induced obstacles to mission growth, unintentionally alienating certain groups in Cuba while attracting others. One example of this question was the support given by certain mission leaders for the annexation of Cuba.

Though near dead, annexationism lingered in the hearts and minds of many senior US government and business representatives who, like Thomas Jefferson before them, felt strongly that Cuba's geographical closeness made it a natural part of the union (at least as a territory if not a state). General Wood, transferred from his governorship of Oriente province to the command of the national occupation in 1899, was strongly in favour of continuing the occupation indefinitely.<sup>42</sup> Wood, a proponent of "annexation by acclamation," or, the eventual annexation of Cuba, claimed to McKinley that "the people who are talking 'Cuba Libre' and the total withdrawal of the American Army...represent at most 5 percent of the Cuban people."<sup>43</sup> In actuality, the majority that Wood claimed to represent amounted to an elitist minority of Cuban propertied classes and all foreign interests in Cuba including missionaries

like Zenas L. Martin, Superintendent of the Friends mission in Oriente province. Martin echoed the sentiment of Wood and the annexationist minority:

While I do not think the United States has done the best in all things and we have had a lot of poor examples of Americans down here to represent us yet there has been a great thing done for Cuba and I feel quite sure the better class of Cubans think so.... There is no question but the government will be established and President Palma inaugurated.... All this talk of war is sure foolishness, Cuba has had all the war it wants.... I think the final outcome will be annexation which will certainly be the best for Cuba. But the greater need is annexation to the kingdom of God.<sup>44</sup>

The judgements of Martin and Wood were coloured by the growing conviction among US interests generally that Cubans were incapable of self-government. When annexationist claims fell under the Cuban reality of majority opposition to annexation, the US found solace in the support of the pro-US Cuban minority, and later, in the hegemonic assumptions of the Platt Amendment.<sup>45</sup> Although it is less clear what proportion of US Protestant missionaries in Cuba supported annexation, there is much evidence to indicate that missionaries were generally as favourable to US intervention as Cuban political and economic elites like

Cuban intellectual Enrique José Varona who asserted that: "The US saved Cuba for civilization and humanity, and this entitles them to the eternal gratitude of Cubans.... Those who say that Cubans themselves alone can dispose of their destinies are poisoners of the public conscience."<sup>46</sup>

Importantly, Protestant missionaries and their Cuban counterparts--secular and religious--demonstrated a complexity in their relationship with the forces of US hegemony not appreciated by advocates of missionary-government conspiracy theories. Missionaries in general found certain aspects and actors in US intervention in Cuba disagreeable: "They sometimes feared for the success of America's humanitarian mission because of the character of Americans."<sup>47</sup> Some, like Bishop Warren Candler, openly protested certain US policy initiatives in eastern Cuba. But, as this study hopes to demonstrate, missionaries, by and large, accepted the purported necessity of US tutelage of Cuba even as most Cubans demonstrated their opposition to it (ecclesiastically and politically). The decisive distinction to be made was that between missionary support for the methods versus the larger principle of US policy in Cuba. Missionaries, then, distinguished between good and bad Americanization, and urged an Americanization of Cuba comprised of "the highest type of virile Christian manhood.... May there be an influx of Americanism...."<sup>48</sup> Missionary advocates of the evangelizing and civilizing

missions sought to complement US objectives in order to transform Cuba morally and religiously. They also strived to facilitate stability in the "new Cuba."<sup>49</sup>

With the belief that religious and national goals were intimately linked, mission boards were generally not averse to identifying with the US government nor to supporting and working with US forces in eastern Cuba, at times in clear violation of the theoretical separation of church and state. As K.J. Clymer pointed out in the case of US missions in the Philippines, "ideological compatibility between church and state found practical expression in the missionary efforts to further the national purpose and in the close relations many of the missions enjoyed with the government."<sup>50</sup> In Cuba, US Protestant missions had similarly friendly relations with both the US military government and the national governments which ushered in the new republic after 1902. The relationship was manifest in Cuba not long after the establishment of the US military occupation.

The course of the US military occupation of Cuba (1899-1902) was partly influenced by the concern that if it were too severe it might result, as in the Philippines, in another native rebellion. The central deterrent to overbearing US control was the pledge of independence conveyed in the Teller Amendment.<sup>51</sup> The resolution limited the US administration's options in Cuba compared to the Philippines. Yet North American influence in Cuba, unlike

the case in the Philippines, had long been identified with the growth and progress of the great North American republic. Expansionists like former Secretary of State Richard Olney, General Leonard Wood, and secretary of the Cuban Education Association Gilbert K. Harroun strongly advocated annexation of Cuba at the same time that they opposed the same in the Philippines.<sup>52</sup> Compared to the controversy generated by annexation and war in the Philippines, "pacification" of Cuba stirred very little debate: "Even those who now felt free to raise the old issue of annexation could gain an audience simply by making it clear that they foresaw a natural rather than a forced process at work. Nobody spoke of ruling the island (for very long) without the consent of its people. The trick was to obtain that consent."<sup>53</sup>

Eventually, as the occupation progressed, the opposing goals of dominating and liberating Cuba were reconciled in the effort to "Americanize" the country. Many, like Senator Henry M. Teller, author of the independence amendment, soon chose to ally with the new consensus as they increasingly perceived Cubans to be incapable of self-government. The apparent reconciliation of contradictory goals enabled the formation of a front of imperialist, reformist, and liberationist forces for whom Cuban independence became less of a threat because it would be protectively moulded with the aid of US tutelage. For Cuba, the promise of formal

independence "eliminated the colonial option for the United States and led to a substitute form of control that depended upon healthy doses of North American influence."<sup>54</sup>

Protestant missionaries were certainly among the North American majority who believed that an increase in US influence was necessarily good. Missionaries were not unlike the majority of US officials in Cuba and the US who believed that eventually, by overseeing Cuba's social, political and economic development, Cubans would realize that union with North America was the only guarantee of racial and political stability, and of continued prosperity.<sup>55</sup>

A key institution in this respect, and one with which US Protestant missionaries identified, was North American education. One of the first programs introduced by the US military government was the institution of a new school system over the war ruins of the old. As early as October 1898, Gilbert Harroun, secretary of the CEA, an arm of the military government, was recruiting teachers as part of the larger effort to "stamp the American educational system upon Cuban ignorance and laxity."<sup>56</sup> The program took off under General Wood, who, as governor of Oriente, established 200 schools. With Wood's assumption of the position of governor-general, 3000 schools were established in the first year. Wood appointed Alexis Frye and Matthew Hanna to

organize the system in cooperation with Cuban educators. By 1902, over 250,000 Cuban children were in public schools.

A Harvard man, General Wood helped spearhead a project to send some 1500 Cuban teachers (60 percent of them women) to a summer session at Harvard in 1900. Ostensibly a training program for Cuban public school teachers, the Harvard experiment became an ambiguous medium for conditioning the Cubans. Rather than teaching curriculum and methodology, the experiment attempted to use education to instill the idea that US government and society was "the best of all possible models for Cuba."<sup>57</sup> Guided through US-oriented curriculum, visits to factories, and socializing with the Harvard ivy league, many of the Cubans protested the numerous forms of "Yankee condescension."<sup>58</sup> Many resented the racialism and paternalism of their Harvard hosts. In other CEA programs, many Afro-Cuban teachers were prevented from participating. Cubans neither completely rejected nor accepted US notions of the nature and function of education as laid out in the "Primary Instruction Manual." They agreed on the fundamental idea that education was a support for democracy, and insisted that "the new Cuban school was the most genuine incarnation of the Cuban revolution."<sup>59</sup> But the reality was much more ambivalent.

The apparent paucity of references for the establishment of a new system of education forced Cubans to look at, among others, the US model. Cuban educators

ultimately compromised in the debate over education and national identity in this period. The education system that emerged became a reflection of that compromise and ambivalence. The proximity of the US and the determination of US education policy to "mould Cubans' moral as well as their intellectual qualities" tended to push Cuban sentiment toward (not uncritical) acceptance of US norms for education and national identity.<sup>60</sup> Reforms toward Cubanization proved superficial, but Cuban educators continued the debate over national identity and the role of education, albeit in terms increasingly set by the US.<sup>61</sup> Ultimately, the Harvard experiment represented a microcosm of the larger, US-oriented education system in Cuba.

US Protestant missions had no qualm about US-dominated education in Cuba. Most missionaries hoped that the growth of US political and economic influence in Cuba would mean "the extension of American and Christian ideals of education" and other US institutions.<sup>62</sup> For their part, US officials saw a role for Protestant schools and moved to encourage them "by every legitimate means."<sup>63</sup> Subsequent state and Protestant mission efforts at education in Cuba were thus not unrelated. In a joint program with the CEA, for example, hundreds of Cubans "of loyal purposes and a zeal for education" were sent for training to Colleges across the US; numerous of these institutions were, like Earlham College in Indiana, founded and run by Protestant

church organizations.<sup>64</sup> In turn, Cuban teachers (predominantly white) trained in these colleges were recruited from the CEA joint program by US Protestant missions in Cuba.<sup>65</sup>

As for the direction of education in Cuba, during the military occupation and beyond, missionaries and US officials each perceived the other's system as necessary but inadequate. Therefore, each sought to complement the other. In this, the US missions took a more active role. It was, after all, the inadequacies of the public school system which, for the Protestant missions, reinforced the need for Protestant schools. As the missionaries themselves acknowledged, by the end of the US military occupation, the US-installed education system was a qualified success left uncompleted. Rural areas were left without schools, and in the towns facilities for primary schools were inadequate. Secondary education "was unknown in all of Oriente Province at that time."<sup>66</sup> Missionary sentiment concluded that the combination of rampant illiteracy, the legacy of Spanish colonialism and "Romish oppression," and the abortive nature of the US public education program, reinforced the great need for mission schools.<sup>67</sup> This is not to say that the public education program was without effect. By 1902, the ranks of Cuban teachers had reached over 3000 men and women; virtually all had taken part in some educational program in the US. The first republican generation of public school

children, notes Pérez, received instruction from teachers trained in the US.

US Protestant missions hoped to build on and transcend the public school experience. For the missionaries, the military occupation period was one of occupation and exploration. Education, meanwhile, was conceived as an instrument for both the evangelizing and civilizing missions. Protestant school beginnings, though meager during the US military occupation, flourished in the years after the occupation and with the establishment of the first Protestant mission institutions.

US Protestant missions began with the material foundations for their evangelizing and civilizing mission by acquiring property in eastern Cuba. In the first decade after 1898, but most feverishly during and shortly after the US military occupation, the missions appeared to compete with their secular compatriots in the buying up of property in postwar Cuba. The establishment of church edifices and schools was a particularly important matter to missionaries concerned to reinforce the permanence of the missions to Cubans. At the same time, it was believed that the erection of churches would enable US Protestant missionaries to distinguish themselves from the more temporary US military government, and to help reassure and reach potential Cuban converts. The three earliest and most active US missions, the Southern Methodists, American Baptists and American

Friends, each moved quickly to acquire properties for churches, chapels, schools, offices, and residences. By the end of 1906, shortly after the end of US military occupation, and the beginning of the second US intervention, the Southern Methodists had accumulated property in over 25 cities and municipalities throughout Cuba totalling almost US\$205,000. The two eastern provinces under the MECS accounted for more than US\$76,000 or 37 percent, well over a third of the national total.<sup>68</sup> MECS properties continued to expand significantly in the years that followed. By the early 1930s, MECS properties in Camagüey and Oriente well surpassed the US\$200,000 mark.<sup>69</sup> During their early period, the American Baptists acquired property in about 20 sites, at a cost of over US\$90,000. Their property value after three decades reached US\$325,000.<sup>70</sup> Though on a smaller scale, the American Friends also made their initial foray into Oriente province, buying property in Puerto Padre worth some US\$30,000.<sup>71</sup> Considering, however, that in certain regions of Cuba land could be had for as little as US\$1.50 per acre, even the beginnings of Friends mission properties proved quite substantial.<sup>72</sup> By the end of the first decade of mission activity, the two largest missions in eastern Cuba accounted for well over one quarter of a million dollars in property.<sup>73</sup>

The churches, schools, and various other properties under the aegis of the missions were distributed throughout

the eastern provinces. Under a comity agreement signed early in the occupation, the missions agreed not to "trespass" on each other's territories, specifically in centers with populations of less than 6000. Overall, the eastern missions tended to complement each other spatially and otherwise. Southern Methodists established stations ranging from Baracoa and Guantanamo in the east of Oriente to Camagüey city, the capital in central Camagüey. Their centers also went as far north as La Gloria in Camagüey to Cayo Smith, a small island in the south of Santiago de Cuba Bay. American Baptist stations stretched from Baracoa on the eastern tip of Oriente to Jatibonico in the westernmost region of Camagüey. The majority of their mission locations spanned central and southern Oriente and included the capital, Santiago de Cuba, and surrounding municipalities. Finally, the American Friends took up their stations along Oriente's northern coast and established their religious and educational work in the main urban centers of Puerto Padre, Gibara (the center of Friends activity in Oriente), Holguín, and Banes. The bulk of Protestant missions were located in Oriente province.

The majority of missions were also located in centers situated along major lines of transportation such as the new rail lines of the Cuba Railway Company, which spanned the length of the country. Missionaries were generally cognizant of the implications of the expansion of

transportation in Cuba: "The Cuban Railroad, which joins the west with the east end of Cuba...was a great event and of vast importance to trade as well as to missionary operations."<sup>74</sup> A.B. Howell, head of the Baptist mission in Guantanamo, was even more succinct: "As fast as they get to a new town I began gospel work there."<sup>75</sup>

Numerous mission stations were established in or near company towns and plantations, many of the latter only recently acquired in the flurry of property absorptions by North American companies during the US military occupation. As will be elaborated in the following chapter, mission location near, and subsequent relations with, North American business interests in Cuba proved to be a mixed blessing for Protestant mission growth in the eastern regions.

US Protestant missions received numerous gifts of land and property from North American companies. As will be demonstrated later, mutual interests were at stake. One of these interests was in establishing groups of adherents, crucial for both in their beginnings. Typically, the effective "buying out" of towns like Antilla by the New York-based Cuba Company served the purposes of both business and Protestant missions. Essentially, company towns ensured a captive labour pool as well as a captive congregation for the missions. Such arrangements became common throughout the eastern regions of Cuba and were ultimately practical and not conspiratorial. A significant proportion of the

tens of thousands of dollars expended by Protestant missions on properties in eastern Cuba in the first years of growth came from philanthropic corporations and individuals in the US. The missions, possessed of more zeal than resources, often relied upon the kindness of these strangers (many were not) for the initial establishment of their stations. Offers like that of the Cuba Company to the American Baptists in Oriente were frequent occurrences seldom refused: "I have no doubt that our directors will agree to a gift of suitable ground for your proposed church there. The town <Antilla> will certainly reach considerable importance within two or three years for it will be the chief seaport of all eastern Cuba."<sup>76</sup> The American Baptists, as noted, obtained some 50 percent of their mission sites by way of such contributions. While some missionaries expressed apprehension at becoming "a mere department of a great soulless corporation," the practices of most demonstrated otherwise.<sup>77</sup>

Like numerous US missionaries, H.R. Moseley sympathized with the multitude of dispossessed Cubans " who had no money to begin farming," and who increasingly felt deceived by the policies and actions of the US military government and US companies in Cuba.<sup>78</sup> Yet Protestant missions generally identified with North American capital in Cuba as much as with US policy on the island. H.R. Moseley typically identified mission (and Cuban) interests with those of US

political and economic institutions, asserting that, along with evangelization, "Cuba needed capital to develop her unlimited natural wealth. She needed a stable government that will guarantee life and property."<sup>79</sup> The sources for Cuba's wealth and stability, missionary sentiment concluded, resided in US institutions primarily, and only secondarily in Cubans themselves, effectively receptacles of North American know-how.<sup>80</sup> Such a general consensus, and the practices that followed, proved problematic for missionaries in the future.

One of many instances in which Protestant mission sentiment clashed with Cuban public opinion was during the constitutional convention that preceded Cuba's inauguration as a republic. Frustrated with its failed attempt to control the election of Cuba's first republican government, the US administration compensated by effectively forcing an amendment to the Cuban constitution which enabled the US, among other things, to intervene "for the preservation of Cuban independence and maintenance of a stable government, adequately protecting life, property, and individual liberty."<sup>81</sup> Left with the choice of accepting the Platt Amendment or, as US Secretary of War Elihu Root sternly warned, either an indefinite military occupation or, at least, the absence of tariff concessions in the future, the Cuban delegates eventually submitted to the US agenda.<sup>82</sup>

During the process of incorporating the Platt Amendment into the new 1901 constitution and then the Permanent Treaty of 1903, the tide of Cuban protest resonated across the country. Protests and anti-US demonstrations spread over the island, as Cubans of all classes attempted to resist the hegemonic implications of the Platt Amendment. Demonstrations converged on the Martí Theater where the Convention took place, and on Wood's residence. In Santiago, speakers at public rallies "alluded to the necessity of returning to arms to redeem national honour."<sup>83</sup> "Great processions" were reported in Oriente of Afro-Cubans speaking out against US impositions on the Constitution. Many had fought for independence and, if need be, "were ready to resume the field."<sup>84</sup> Throughout the country, municipalities, civic associations and veterans' organizations cabled protests to Havana.<sup>85</sup> Washington's position, indeed its basic long-term objectives in Cuba, remained irrevocable.

Try as they might to maintain at least a politically neutral veneer, Protestant missions in the eastern provinces were not immune to the human dynamic of the Platt Amendment. As noted, missionaries lamented the presence of many American civilians and soldiers in Cuba whom they considered "poor samples to sell" before the Cubans.<sup>86</sup> A few protested certain aspects of US political and economic policy in Cuba. But if there was disagreement with the

methods of the US in Cuba, historical evidence strongly suggests missionary support for the fundamental principles of US policy in Cuba. Struggling against the endemic mission concern to keep politics out of the church, US missionaries failed to perceive that their consistent identification with US interests in Cuba made US Protestant missions inherently political.<sup>87</sup> Though many were not as outspoken as the Carolinian Baptist Moseley, most were nonetheless advocates of the principles of the Platt Amendment. Most, like the American Baptists, believed that the amendment offered an antidote to future US military invasion in Cuba, and that diplomatic intervention as guided by the Platt Amendment was more ameliorative. The Southern Methodists generally concurred with this assessment as well as with the longterm practicality of the clause for mission work. "Cuba," Methodist Superintendent Sterling Neblett typically concluded, "is not subject to the disturbances that hinder mails and discourse with the outerworld as in Mexico. We have the Platt Amendment."<sup>88</sup>

At bottom, however, a deeper concern among missionaries, and US business and government representatives alike, was Cuban competence. Many like Baptist Charles Detweiler believed that "Cubans had not learned sufficiently well the art of self-government."<sup>89</sup> Through the mechanism of the Platt Amendment, missionaries concluded, it was possible to "help Cuba to correct its mistakes and to

overcome its weaknesses as it develops self-government."<sup>90</sup> Missions put their confidence in the governing class of the new republic. Many were favourably impressed by Cuba's first president, Tomás Estrada Palma, and hoped that, like most Americans, "the new president had the same love of American methods."<sup>91</sup>

Behind the concern for the enforcement of the tenets of the Platt Amendment and for the new Cuban government to govern accordingly, was the concern for stability. At this level, evangelical purpose fused indistinguishably with national policy. US and Protestant mission policy alike needed a stable environment for their work to progress. In a letter to President Estrada Palma in July 1902, the Missionary Conference of Evangelical Churches of Cuba reiterated their support for republican government. They stressed the importance of conserving public order, and asserted that such order was more than merely a temporal concern: "We recognize all human government as a divine order.... He who resists that authority, resists the authority of God."<sup>92</sup>

US missionaries committed themselves to Cubans' betterment spiritually and sought to facilitate what they perceived to be the proper social, economic, and political milieu conducive to salvation. Their conception of such a society was ultimately a conservative, western and middle class-oriented capitalist construction in which US and Cuban

interests finally coincided and for which US tutelage was the basis.

Furthermore, US missionaries committed themselves to importing elements of North American culture largely as a function of expansionist cultural baggage and self-conceived superiority. The personal stresses of coping with the deprivation and depression of fieldwork tended to reinforce the colonial mentality. Harsh conditions inclined the missionary to idealize his or her own country, to consider it a "maternal protector" and standard of values. It became tantamount to filial impiety not to accept and promote the colonial ideology of the missionary's country and of the age.<sup>93</sup>

Such a combination of religious commitment and an aggressive worldview provided enough confidence in the missionary's sense of calling to endure the sacrifices of living in what was perceived to be a primitive, disease-ridden island with little in the way of modern western comforts. Many missionaries were forewarned by their boards that their pioneering periods would feature self-subsistence, and foraging for church and school sites, and the souls with which to occupy them. Financing and salaries were always contentious issues. Keeping in mind, however, the largely educated, middle-class background of the US missionaries, another perspective is gained. US missionaries were, after all, better prepared to appropriate

household comforts than most Cubans or Cuban pastors. Missionaries received allowances for various expenses including travel, medical and housing.

Many were also able to supplement their incomes by way of additional employment or personal business ventures ( a bone of contention with some mission boards in later years). And missionaries' salaries were characteristically much higher than that of Cuban pastors. The latter were expected to undergo many of the same conditions of privation but without the same supports--this, part of the principle of self-support.<sup>94</sup> Nonetheless, missionary complaints about inadequate compensation were many. Though some may have been legitimate, especially from the more distant regions in the east, others appeared less so. Over the years, the proportion of impoverished Cuban pastors was much higher than that of US missionaries. Nor were missionaries without their luxuries. The allowances which the mission boards granted missionaries included a servant allowance. Zenas and Susan Martin of the American Friends employed at least two domestic servants, Jamaican and Cuban, at different times.<sup>95</sup>

Nevertheless, there were the substantial ordeals of harsh climate, disease and civil war. No mission was immune to the ravages of any of these phenomena. The persistence of the three accounted for a large proportion of the changes in mission membership: Some moved to stations in other parts

of Cuba; others departed to the US or other international fields. Missionaries and their families contracted malaria, tuberculosis, and other diseases. Some simply worked themselves into mental exhaustion.<sup>96</sup> Not infrequently, missionaries faced several such ordeals at once.<sup>97</sup> The most tragic casualties were children, some of them born in Cuba.

For the most part, missionary commitment transcended the adversity and considerable costs to themselves and their families. But if their unflinching determination enabled them to withstand the physical conflicts of rebuilding the "new" Cuban society, it also contributed to a significant amount of internal discord. While US Protestant missionaries were essentially united over the larger objectives of their evangelizing and civilizing missions, the details of the means were often in dispute.

Dissent within Protestant missions in eastern Cuba took several forms. First of all, problems occurred between the missions and their boards in the US. Virtually all missions in the eastern provinces (and generally) experienced center-periphery forms of conflict. Of the churches under study here, the Southern Methodists and American Friends appear to have had the most significant clashes with their boards.

As the missions underwent significant growth in their first decade in the Cuban field, the most common conflicts were those over the need for increased financial support.

As early as 1903, Hubert W. Baker, Methodist Secretary for the eastern district, complained to Bishop Candler that limitations in funding and other aspects of policy were triggering defections of some of their congregations to the Baptists. Other MECS supervisors made similar complaints to Candler and the board, at times openly contradicting the bishop's claims to generosity toward the eastern field.<sup>98</sup> Missionaries often insisted that their sacrifices were not recognized by the board back in the US. Friction over board support and control persisted through the years. The unresponsiveness of the mission board was not an uncommon complaint of missionaries in the eastern provinces.<sup>99</sup>

The apparent indifference of the board to certain mission needs and realities was also the grievance of the American Friends missionaries. Limited financial support from the AFBFM board, as others, induced missionaries to seek out supplemental financial security for themselves and their churches in the field. Some, like the Martins, established personal connections with business enterprises in eastern Cuba, and pursued their own ventures. Although the line between personal and mission finances sometimes became blurred, mission growth was at least partly a function of such relationships. For the Friends in Oriente, it enabled a significant expansion. Paradoxically, it was their relative success in later years (along with new priorities in Africa) that motivated the American Friends

board to cut funding for the Oriente missions. Zenas Martin struggled ceaselessly with the board, and with allies locally and stateside, to ensure continued support.<sup>100</sup> At the same time that the Friends' eastern fields were relinquished, however, the lone mission in Havana retained its share of the Mother Church's support.

The second form of mission discord was also board-inspired. The grievances arising from these disputes tended to pit mission interests in eastern Cuba against those in the west, and raised serious questions about funding distribution and regionalism. Here too, the cases of the Friends and Methodists appear more prominently. Relative to the Friends' more latent conflicts, east-west confrontations among the Southern Methodists in Cuba began early and became endemic. MECS missionaries in the eastern provinces attributed some of their board's unresponsiveness to western favouritism. Some missionaries in the eastern district also attributed their apparent funding restrictions to regional bias. The evidence indicates that such grievances were not unfounded. One of the most dramatic examples of this kind of conflict was the east-west dispute over Candler College in Havana. Within the first few years of Protestant mission occupation and establishment, the complaints of Methodist missionaries in the eastern field over board funding centered on a specific target. Complaints from the east heightened over the disproportionately high funding and

support directed at "the school" in Havana at the expense of other schools and churches in eastern Cuba.<sup>101</sup> The board, however, remained immovable. The missionaries, it reasoned, were expected to make all manner of sacrifice: "We shall expect you brethren in Cuba to sympathize with our necessities and cooperate with us in a line of expenditure that will help us to do the things that absolutely must be done, instead of branching out into things that might be left alone for a time."<sup>102</sup> Missionary complaints over distribution of support, typified by the Candler College example, continued through the years of mission activity in Cuba, and assumed new forms, with new antagonists.

Yet another kind of internal discord was that among the eastern field missionaries themselves. This took various forms, from personality clashes to doctrinal, organizational, and ethical conflicts between missionaries and their superiors. All three of the principal missions in eastern Cuba suffered from at least one form or another of these differences. Organizational disputes were probably the most common. Missionaries sometimes challenged their supervisors' decisions over matters of funding allocation, transfers, and their general exercise of authority. Southern Methodist Superintendent David W. Carter was the focus of a front of opposition of numerous missionaries. Missionaries from the eastern district were especially resentful of Carter's apparently unresponsive and uninformed

leadership. Though Carter dismissed the accusations as a conspiracy of "mischief-makers," Bishop Candler in this instance agreed with the missionary consensus, and censured Carter.<sup>103</sup> The secretary for eastern Cuba, William G. Fletcher, was also later disciplined for abusing his authority. Among the American Baptists, Superintendent Hartwell Moseley became embroiled in such a conflict.

As Clymer noted, then, Protestant missions were not monolithic models of harmony. Nor, however, was internal discord constant. Divided over certain matters of function, missionaries were essentially united on the various programs which undergirded the larger goals of mission. Though, as missionaries like Carter conceded, such disputes were significant (if not unusual) in themselves, their implications for missionary morale, and the potentially negative impact on the "untutored minds" of Cubans, were more far-reaching.<sup>104</sup> Cuban reactions to real and perceived mission inconsistencies or indiscretions began to emerge and become acute--ecclesiastically and politically--by the second US intervention in 1906. US Protestant mission ranks, sometimes beset by internal divisiveness, closed resoundingly over the questions of the proposed North American evangelical transformation of Cuban society, and over the capacity of Cubans as Christian and national leaders of the "new Cuba."

### Chapter Three: Mission, Race, and Cuban Culture

A few short years after having turned over office to those of the independentista generation who were willing to govern within the framework determined by United States interests, Washington intervened a second time in Cuba to quell revolt amongst the new governing class. The fraudulent re-election bid of Conservative President Tomás Estrada Palma provoked rebellion by the Liberals in August 1906, and a subsequent US military occupation (1906-1909).

The promises of Cuban independence had fallen far short of what Cubans had fought for and expected. In an economy dominated by North American capital and its few but powerful Cuban compradors, public office became a symbol for opportunity. The overwhelming presence of foreign capital in Cuba had pervasive effects: "With so much of the national wealth beyond the immediate reach of Cubans, public administration and political office guaranteed officeholders, their families, and supporters access to the levers of resource and benefit allocation in the only enterprise wholly Cuban--government."<sup>1</sup>

Politics thus constituted a matter of economic and social urgency for politicians and piece workers alike. The state logically became a provider in an economy and society increasingly conditioned to meet the demands of foreign capital at the expense of national needs. A system founded

in fundamental contradiction, hundreds of thousands of Cubans became dependent on it as a form of compensation for what most perceived to be a hollow independence. Afro-Cubans, whose massive participation in the independence wars had also resulted in post-war dispossession and racial discrimination, benefited the least from Cuban republicanism. They received none of the promises of political equality and social justice. Save for an elite few, the gains of the 1890s which put many Afro-Cubans in positions of distinction and power--in the military, mutual aid societies, revolutionary clubs, and in government--were soon wiped out under the first US military occupation.<sup>2</sup> Under the new republic, little changed. Meanwhile, the equation of public administration with economic well-being generated a level of corruption that pervaded Cuban public life and became the norm for the dependent republic.

The 1906 revolt, then, was more than an armed protest against electoral fraud. It was a response to the urgency of republican politics in Cuba, a matter serious enough to provoke war. Estrada Palma and the Conservatives had violated the informal understanding of cooperation between the parties, and had set new parameters for corruption in the process. The rise of new populist forces among the Liberals also attracted no little attention from the intervening US forces. The populists, however, were again thwarted as public administration fell under the sway

of a US provisional government headed by governor William H. Taft.<sup>3</sup>

For the US, the second intervention signalled defects in US policy as much as in the Cuban capacity to govern. President Theodore Roosevelt, in his annual address of December 1906, declared that the US wanted nothing from Cuba except that the country "prosper morally and materially."<sup>4</sup> US public opinion generally reflected Roosevelt's message. It was also apparent in the anger of at least one US senator at Cubans' seeming ingratitude: "Disgust with the Cubans is very general.... The feeling is that they ought to be taken by the scruff of the neck and shaken until they behave themselves. I should think that this...would make the anti-imperialists think that some peoples were less capable of self-government than others."<sup>5</sup>

A similar consensus existed among US Protestant missions in eastern Cuba. Among the American Baptist, Methodist, and Friends missionaries alike, President Estrada Palma represented the hope of Cuba. He was seen as an example of evangelical uprightness. A converted Quaker and naturalized US citizen, Estrada had met with numerous US missionaries, some of whom had also worked in local welcoming committees for the President.<sup>6</sup> Upon stepping down, Estrada put his children in the Methodist Irene Toland school in Matanzas, and returned to his home in Oriente.<sup>7</sup>

Unaware or disbelieving of Estrada's part in the fraudulent elections of 1906, most US missionaries, not unlike their secular compatriots, effectively blamed Cubans: "President Estrada Palma was re-elected for a second term, but the Cubans had not learned sufficiently well the art of self-government and insurrection at once began to be planned by his defeated opponents."<sup>8</sup>

The belief that, on their own, Cubans were incapable of self-government, formed part of a larger and contradictory North American worldview which became the popular corollary to Darwinism. Racialistic preconceptions pervaded US policy in Cuba (and generally) at all levels during the first decade and beyond. An extension of expansionist ideology, cultural stereotyping of Cuban capacities stemmed from suspicions about the mixed racial background of many Cubans. At the beginning of the first US military occupation, General Wood told a congressional committee that "many of the present Cubans are the result of intermarriage between blacks and the old Cuban stock, and such marriages produce an inferior race."<sup>9</sup> Such a pervasive and racialist worldview served to justify US intervention at various levels of Cuban society. Politically, the "black legend" of colonial Spanish cruelty and backwardness helped rationalize US government intervention in Cuba based on the apparent degrading effects of that legacy on Cubans' ability to govern themselves.

At the same time, US economic interests equally appropriated the chauvinism of the period in defending (to themselves, at any rate) their vast commercial appropriations in Cuba. Also, as a US State Department official typically pointed out in 1907, Cuba had an investment climate far more favourable than most southern commonwealths of the US because the white population was larger than the black. This fact in itself, however, was not sufficient reassurance of order and progress without the aid of the self-proclaimed champion of progress, the US business community. Cubans, the argument went, had to recognize their place as being "naturally dependent" on the US commercially if they were ever to learn North American industriousness and to "develop the degree of self-control necessary for self-government."<sup>10</sup>

The ethnocentric sentiments of US political and economic interests were not inconsistent with those of US Protestant missions in eastern Cuba. North American missionaries generally perceived themselves as the "third force" among US interests in Cuba, providing Cubans with the religious and cultural components of the civilizing mission. While these elements provided a counterweight to some of the corrupting influences of US business in Cuba, they were complementary overall. Missionaries were thus excited at the prospect not only of working in a region previously untouched by Protestantism, but also of missionizing Cubans

of presumably little culture or intelligence, relatively speaking: "The Cuban people have generations of bad training and no training to outgrow, new habits to form, new customs to adopt, before they can reach the conditions of civilization which they ought to have."<sup>11</sup> Most missionaries believed that the Cuban conscience was "untrained and on a different basis from that of Anglo Saxons;" these "passive subjects of tyrannical priestly rule...had no initiative" and "had to be taught how to behave themselves."<sup>12</sup> Such sentiment echoed the racist assumptions of General Wood and other senior US officials during the first US military occupation. Skeptical of Cubans' ability for self-government without US tutelage, Wood asserted, "We are dealing with a race that has been steadily going down for a hundred years and into which we have to infuse new life, new principles, and new methods of doing things."<sup>13</sup>

Of the many levels of racialism that existed during this period, North American missionaries in Cuba appear to have exhibited what George Frederickson called the neopaternalist strain. Though originating in the "New South" in the post-Civil War period, the benevolent philosophy of the new paternalism also echoed the chauvinistic beliefs of conservative northern philanthropists who so often confronted the "dangerous classes" when advocating (segregated) black education in the

South.<sup>14</sup> Missionaries, like their secular compatriots--and Cuban gente decente--certainly distinguished between black , mulatto and white Cubans, and not infrequently conveyed concern that the racial balance be maintained in favour of the latter.<sup>15</sup> Consistent with a paternalistic form of racialism, and in relative contrast to some of the more extreme racists, US missionaries saw hope at the same time that they perceived Cuban inferiority generally. "The Cuban," one missionary commonly observed, "is lacking chiefly in the qualities that are conspicuous in American men--virility, initiative, will-power, tenacity, reverence for women, and conscience... a capacity curiously combined with childishness" and a "lightness of character."<sup>16</sup>

The general association of Cuban character with idleness, docility, and passivity were also qualities attributed to North American blacks, women and children. This type of association may explain the ambivalence with which missionaries perceived and treated Cubans. Unable to either countenance or come to terms with miscegenation in Cuba relative to the US, many missionaries shared the North American viewpoint that the behaviour of Cuban men was not only childish, but effeminate. Certainly, the very political powerlessness and socioeconomic vulnerability of the Cubans was, from the North American perspective, an attribute of femininity.<sup>17</sup> Racialist consensus among missionaries in the eastern provinces, therefore, also

included sexual stereotyping and prompted generalizations like the following by a Methodist missionary: "The beautiful girls of Cuba...seemed possessed of every physical grace and were capable of the highest culture, but in many cases had suffered for lack of intellectual development and religious training. Cuban civilization and reform will never rise higher than the character and culture of her women."<sup>18</sup>

Though US missionaries characteristically arrived in Cuba with their racialist preconceptions in tow, a few differed in their opinions, at least initially. Upon beginning work in the Cuban field in 1900, Zenas Martin of the American Friends found the Cubans " a much brighter and intelligent-looking people than I expected to see."<sup>19</sup> Like many missionaries, however, Martin's optimism over "Cuban character" became tempered with the passing years: "I am getting a better insight into the condition of these people as I get to know them better.... They are so rooted and grounded in this life of indifferent ease that it seems like it will take a revolution of things to transform them."<sup>20</sup> Nor were missionaries immune to wielding racist slurs. In a letter to her daughter, Susan Martin used an unseemly analogy to describe her husband's labours in Holguín: "Papa is working like a nigger these days to get the house ready to open school."<sup>21</sup>

Missionaries' ambivalent attitudes toward Cubans remained relatively constant throughout the early decades of

mission penetration in eastern Cuba. Missions' official reports and private correspondence are indicative of how missionaries both approved and disapproved of "Cuban character." A Methodist mission report on fieldwork after two decades in Cuba closely resembled that made twenty years earlier:

The country is romantic and resplendent, and their history played out in such a luxuriant setting makes Cubans a people who are emotional, poetic, and at the same time proud of their national dignity. The more educated classes are inimitably charming and well-mannered. Even the poorer classes have a fine spirit of hospitality and kindness which comes from their Hispanic background.... In contrast to the attractive colours and the romantic and picturesque elements stands Cuba's crying need for the Gospel. Moral standards are being diluted to such an extent that immoral practices are prevalent. With an irresponsible, indifferent shrug of the shoulders, people complacently accept the grossest and crudest things.<sup>22</sup>

Twenty years after this report, US missionaries continued to characterize Cubans as an "adolescent" race, "still in the making."<sup>23</sup>

By the end of the second US intervention in Cuba, the first decade of mission work heralded little optimism in

missionaries' expectations of short-term success with Cubans' over their ability for self-government politically or ecclesiastically. Most missionaries judged the Cuban family, character, and institutions to be in such dire need of vast reform and "uplift" that the question of an indigenous church, for the time being, was inconceivable. By 1906, Baptist Superintendent H.R. Moseley typically concluded that the Cubanization of the Protestant Church could not be expected for at least ten years. Several years later, Baptist Howard Grose was no more optimistic about the "constantly revolting Cubans."<sup>24</sup> Grose conceded that the challenge of the evangelizing and civilizing missions in Cuba was of a greater duration than some had initially believed. He concluded that Cuban "standards of morals are as much unlike American as manners and customs are.... Christianity must create a new Cuba, but the product of centuries can hardly be transformed in a generation."<sup>25</sup> If missionary optimism became somewhat dampened, their determination held fast, especially when US missions fixated on what they perceived to be the source of Cubans' cultural corruption and inferiority.

The Roman Catholic Church, according to Protestant mission consensus in the eastern regions, was the bane of Cuba. Missionaries believed quite strongly that the colonial Catholic Church "had done more than Spanish government tyranny to repress the intellectual and moral

development of the Cuban people."<sup>26</sup> Importantly, as a mission field, eastern Cuba was considered particularly "open" due to the apparently unqualified immorality and neglect of the Catholic Church. At the same time, missionaries also commonly believed that "centuries of false teaching" made gospel work more difficult than in a "pagan field."<sup>27</sup> Thus, US missionaries strived to reform the perceived cultural inferiority of Cubans--attributed to the apparently superficial nature of Roman Catholicism--by education and conversion.

Protestant missionaries in eastern Cuba were not at all embarrassed at the fact of campaigning for Christianity in an already (albeit nominally) Christian land. Many US missionaries and, later, Cuban pastors, distinguished between false and true religions. The Roman Catholic Church in Cuba was deemed, accordingly, the enemy of the "true religion"--evangelical Protestantism.<sup>28</sup> Some missionaries went so far as to equate Catholicism with ignorance, declaring it a non-religion: "Here in Cuba there has never existed any real religion for the simple reason that the children have never been taught according to the spirit of any religion."<sup>29</sup> Missionizing became a duty toward reforming Cubans' "low standard of morals," the latter essentially a result of the "neglect and exploitation by the decadent and corrupt Catholic Church."<sup>30</sup>

To many missionaries, the decadence and corruption of the Roman Catholic Church in Cuba was more than just a matter of historical record--it was an inherent characteristic of the Church. Of the three principal missions in the eastern provinces, the Southern Methodists and American Baptists inveighed most frequently against the "cold and sterile ritualism of Romanism."<sup>31</sup> Missionaries vociferously rejected every institutional manifestation (and some that were not) of Catholicism. The Catholic concept of sainthood was condemned as idolatrous and that of the confessional as immoral.<sup>32</sup> Furthermore, worship of the Virgin of Charity in El Cobre was denounced as both "ridiculous" and "dangerous," an act of "robbing God of His Glory."<sup>33</sup> Of course, Protestant and Catholic interpretations of the Bible were compared, the latter characterized as little removed from paganism with its apparent idolatry and sanctification of religious celebrations.<sup>34</sup>

On yet another level, Protestant missionaries attacked Catholicism as an enemy of Cuban democracy and progress. Though all the missions made allusions to this issue, the American Baptist mission was one of the most vocal. "Catholicism," it was argued, "imposed a blind faith, evangelicalism, a reasoned faith."<sup>35</sup> Such reasoning served as the basis for further Protestant arguments that opposed Roman Catholicism to North American notions of spiritual and

material progress in Cuba. As a "reasoned" and "progressive" faith, missionaries asserted, Protestantism was in a position to facilitate and promote Cuba's transition to modernity and all its accoutrements. Early on, evangelical Protestantism was identified with patriotism and capitalist democracy. With the first years of mission penetration into eastern Cuba, the proliferation of scripture and Protestant education became closely identified with moral, material, and political progress.<sup>36</sup> Baptist missionary Juan McCarthy, one of the most vocal opponents of the Roman Catholic Church in Cuba, frequently characterized it, the pope, and the Vatican variously as enemies of Cuba, of modernism, and of western democracy.<sup>37</sup> Though by no means alone, McCarthy's many attacks proved one of the most thorough indictments of Roman Catholicism in Cuba. The English-born missionary spared no blows, and even explicitly referred to the Catholic Church as "anti-Christian."<sup>38</sup> For McCarthy, as for most missionaries, the Catholic Church was a defunct, retrograde institution impervious to change.<sup>39</sup>

For its part, the Catholic Church in Cuba found itself faced with the imperative of adapting or dying in a country that had long been (through no little fault of the Church) at best nominally Catholic. Its pro-Spanish inclinations and the ensuing enmity of most Cubans had caused the Church's credibility and legitimacy to plummet to new depths

by the end of the war in 1898. With the exile of waves of Spanish priests to Spain, and the influence of the patronato lost, the Catholic Church became a shadow of its former self.

Contrary to Protestant mission assertions, however, Catholicism in Cuba, though devastated, was not defunct. Wood, more liberal in his treatment of the Catholic Church than his predecessor Brooke, allowed legislation during the first US occupation which enabled the Church a chance for recovery less likely under the first, more hostile governor-general. Wood was "keen to enlist the support of the Church for his own purposes and so sought to pursue goals that would be mutually beneficial."<sup>40</sup> This included the equal legitimization of civil and church marriage, and allowance for the Church to retain a portion of its annual revenue-generating properties. Such concessions did not sit well with the newly-arrived Protestant missions. Yet the US military government and the republican governments that followed later enacted much legislation with which both churches alternatively agreed or disagreed.

Also contrary to many missionaries' convictions, the Catholic Church was not entirely immutable. Debates over the church-state relationship, though nowhere near as heated as in postrevolutionary Mexico, nevertheless generated strong opinions. Agreement on religious freedom came more easily than on the separation of church and state.

Eventually, however, the Cuban Catholic Church publicly declared in favour of the definitive separation of church and state--the first Latin American country to take such a step.<sup>41</sup>

This new position of the post-independence Catholic Church, and its incorporation into the new 1902 Cuban constitution, marked a "quiet transformation" of Roman Catholicism in Cuba.<sup>42</sup> Gradually, the Church moved to build a new support base among remaining Spaniards, and among the wealthy urban and middle class. It also sought to help, albeit "in a benign and paternalistic fashion," the urban poor, not unlike its Protestant counterparts.<sup>43</sup> Thus, the opening decades of the new republic found the Roman Catholic Church striving toward renewal.

At the same time, old habits, and Cubans' (and missionaries') perceptions of the Church died hard. Compared to Protestant mission penetration, eastern Cuba had had almost no contact with the Catholic Church. Still, Cubans here were slow to forgive the colonial Catholic Church's anti-independence position. Many Cubans who were practicing Catholics sought alternative sanctuary in the newly-established US Protestant missions. Outside of these and many others who participated in Afro-Cuban religions like Santería, most Cubans remained only nominally religious. As Manuel Sanguily put it during the

constitutional convention, "The Cubans have always been the most disbelieving people on earth."<sup>44</sup>

Cubans who flocked to the growing Protestant missions did so for several reasons. As noted, many Cubans who joined did so out of disillusionment with the discredited colonial Church, and because of the apparent progressiveness of North American Protestantism. Others were impressed by the more democratic forms of organization and worship practiced by Protestants. Still other Cubans, especially among the middle and governing classes, favoured the North American orientation and efficiency of Protestant schools. Many chose to convert purely out of patriotism, a significant reason why Protestant missionaries later scrutinized baptism candidates more closely.<sup>45</sup>

Probably the more painful defections from the Catholic Church to the Protestant were those of the Catholic priests themselves. Numerous clergy and Catholic seminary students in the eastern provinces abandoned the priesthood to convert to Protestantism. Some became outstanding representatives of their new faith. Others became vocal critics of their former church. Antonio Valiente y Pozo, a Southern Methodist pastor and former priest, created considerable Catholic agitation with a not untypically provocative sermon entitled "The Immorality of the Confessional."<sup>46</sup>

While the seeming exodus of Cubans of all classes tended to reinforce many a Protestant missionary's sense of

cultural superiority, priestly defections provided particularly savoury coups. This was especially true since Protestant-Catholic relations remained confrontational throughout the early life of the Cuban republic. Protestant missions in eastern Cuba generally attributed much of the "rapid and substantial progress" of the missions' first decades to "popular revulsion" toward the Catholic Church.<sup>47</sup> But growth did not come without opposition. The Catholic Church often accused North American missionaries of being emissaries of US hegemony. Missionaries were also accused of being annexationists (some in fact were).<sup>48</sup> In one instance, Carmelite priests in Ciego de Avila publicly accused Protestants and Masons of being responsible for President McKinley's death! The priests asserted that "it was fortunate for the Cubans that the days of the Inquisition were past."<sup>49</sup> Such rhetoric proved more prevalent than action on the part of Catholics or the Catholic Church. The Church did make several attempts to thwart or otherwise impede Protestant mission work. The founding of the Baptist schools at El Cristo encountered considerable opposition. Years later, the Catholic Church also tried to push through the constitutional convention a law that would have made the teaching of Roman Catholicism mandatory in public schools. These, like other efforts of the Catholic Church against Protestantism in Cuba, failed under the momentum of Protestant missions' growth.<sup>50</sup>

While the Catholic Church's resistance to and persecution of the US Protestant churches in eastern Cuba was at times persistent, it was rarely as violent as in the strongly Catholic countries of Mexico, Peru and the rest of Latin America. By missionaries' own admissions--many of whom came from missions in Mexico--opposition in Cuba was relatively innocuous. H.R.Moseley's observation was common of most missionaries in the eastern regions: "I have been struck with the absence of all fanaticism; all classes seem friendly. Romanism here seems to be asleep."<sup>51</sup> H.L.Morehouse's view also concurred with missionary consensus: "The absence, in general, of fanatical opposition such as is common in Roman Catholic countries...has been an encouraging feature of our work in Cuba.... Missionaries were cordially received by many, found open doors everywhere, were heard respectfully, and went about unmolested."<sup>52</sup> Far from experiencing the violent persecution common to other Latin American countries, missionaries like Baptist Frederick White observed, instead, that the work of the Protestant missions was stirring the Roman Catholic Church to compete with, if not emulate, the missions' growth.<sup>53</sup>

The relatively benign religious environment in eastern Cuba did little, however, to change Protestant missionaries' worldview and the Catholic Church's place in it. At least until the 1930s when liberal-conservative schism within

Protestant circles challenged traditional beliefs of the superiority of that religion over others, US missionaries maintained their zeal to "redeem" sinners without questioning their own racialism and chauvinism.<sup>54</sup> Mission ideology and strategy essentially remained constant. Most missionaries continued to consider Catholic priests as "generally indolent, immoral, and actuated largely by sordid motives."<sup>55</sup> Missionaries tended to attribute most of Cuba's ills to its Roman and Spanish heritage. The apparent lack of deep-rooted religious conviction convinced missionaries that Cubans in general had no moral sense in the realm of politics. The corollary to this was that the Cuban propensity to view political office as a lucrative business had Romanist underpinnings. Save for the "better classes," most Cubans were viewed in this way. Protestant missionaries regarded all this as "encouragement to offer solutions based on US models, disseminated primarily through their schools, where, they believed, a scientific spirit and critical capacity that would lead Cubans to reject Roman Catholicism and a corrupt political and economic order could be engendered."<sup>56</sup>

As Margaret Crahan pointed out, despite their paternalistic attitudes and sense of cultural superiority, the Protestant missionaries in eastern Cuba cannot be judged hypocrites. They were in fact enormously industrious, devoted believers in a religious, political and economic

order that encouraged neither criticism nor sensitivity or sophistication in the analysis of other cultures.

Missionaries were strongly committed to do what they thought was best for Cubans, at considerable cost to themselves and their families. But their limitations made them less enlightened than was necessary in order to contribute to Cuba's development "in such fashion as to make real the ideals of justice and fraternal responsibility which they claimed as their goal."<sup>57</sup>

Considering the origins of the missionaries and the historical and cultural context from which they came, it was highly unlikely that they would transcend their limitations. Of the missionaries sent to eastern Cuba, the bulk came from lower to middle class, southern or mid-western backgrounds. Their early exposure to conservative, evangelical Christianity nurtured "a conviction in the correctness of their definition of the universe and its viability elsewhere. This was reinforced by their nationalistic pride in the increasingly visible indicators of the country's domestic vitality and international status. Little doubt was felt that the strength of the US was, to a considerable degree, the consequence of its being a Protestant country."<sup>58</sup> Such a worldview generated a patriotism that in turn necessitated an outlet in public service, specifically one that could convey the message internationally. Following training in such institutions as

Vanderbilt, Emory and Southern Methodist universities, and in colleges like Guilford and Earlham, missionaries set out to save Cuba. As such, US missionaries' definition of Cuban needs was influenced by values, customs, and institutions derived from their own experience.<sup>59</sup> Throughout the early period of Protestant mission penetration in Cuba's eastern provinces, missionary energies were "so absorbed in traditional activities as they had evolved in the US that there was slight possibility of vision that might have prompted the churches to take a prophetic role," or to conceive of their affinity with US economic and political interests as a significant conflict of interest.<sup>60</sup>

A chauvinistic conception of Cuban society and a powerful belief in the superiority of one's own culture could not but affect the implementation of mission policy. During the first decade of missionary endeavour in Cuba, "evangelization" became a more inclusive term. It entailed both evangelism and "civilizing" functions. With the broadened definition of evangelization came, by 1910, a mission theory to go with United Fruit Company money and modernist ideology.<sup>61</sup> The first decade of Protestant mission growth in eastern Cuba proved vastly expansive. The portion of US Protestant churches' income directed to mission activity in the region was high, and the contribution of US business substantial.<sup>62</sup> Some missionaries were apprehensive about coming under the

influence of a corporation.<sup>63</sup> Many of these same missionaries, however, soon took their place among the large mission majority that generally associated the prosperity of big business in Cuba with mission and national growth and development. Such identification and affinity gave the lie to mission assertions of neutrality and had an impact at several levels. Mission association with North American interests affected (and reinforced) missionary attitudes and behaviour toward Cuban society as engendered in policy implementation, and ultimately drew forth Cuban responses at equally varied levels. Because Cubans were affected by all of the above, the following discussion elaborates first the dynamic of mission-building and the business connection.

By the end of the second US military occupation in 1909-1910, the three principal missions in eastern Cuba had expanded substantially. All three missions, amid lamentations of continued revolution and unrest--the legacy of Cubans' unfulfilled expectations of independence and of an increasingly structurally dependent economy and society--reported significant progress.<sup>64</sup> The success of the first decade of mission activity was decribed variously as "vigorous," "prosperous," and even "phenomenal."<sup>65</sup> Two key sources, mission boards and corporate contributors like Asa Griggs Candler of Coca Cola and the United Fruit Company, accounted for the bulk of financial support in this period.

The influence of such funds, construction programs, and the opening of Protestant churches and educational institutions was substantial. In some parts of the eastern provinces they had considerable impact on the local economy. This, combined with the spiritual transformation the US missionaries preached, increased the attractiveness of the evangelical churches. They appeared to offer not only eternal salvation, but political and economic stability for the country and individual well-being.<sup>66</sup> Combined, these factors had a tremendous effect on mission growth.

By 1910, all three eastern missions had surged ahead in the building of churches, schools, and membership. The bulk of growth went to the two larger Methodist and Baptist missions. The Southern Methodists had built 20 churches out of a total of 55 properties that included parsonages and schools. Almost 800 students were enrolled in day, boarding, and Sunday schools, and nearly 1000 Cubans comprised regular church membership.<sup>67</sup> The American Baptists claimed over 1500 church members, and more than 1100 students housed in 30 constructed churches out of a total of some 40 mission properties.<sup>68</sup> The American Friends, the smallest mission of the three, recorded 168 church members (plus 800 "adherents"), 722 day and Sunday school students, and five churches (the latter number tripled two years later).<sup>69</sup> It should be kept in mind that these statistics did not include missionaries' personal

properties, nor other properties acquired and used for enterprises which aided mission financing internally. This will be explained below. For now it is important to emphasize less the numerical growth of the missions than the dynamic behind that growth.

Despite political unrest and financial difficulties in Cuba, the growth of the missions often surpassed their ability to accommodate the increasing number of Cubans flocking to mission churches, and more so, schools. The complaints of the American Baptists of mission school openings drawing more than could be accepted was common to all the missions in the eastern provinces. But as several reports noted, this was not without its advantages: "We have had to turn down many applications. The large number of applicants made it possible to select our pupils."<sup>70</sup>

Overcrowding in Protestant churches and schools continued well after the first decade of mission activity. At the Methodist Pinson College in Camagüey, the student body grew beyond the means to confine it, forcing missionaries to use dining rooms, porches, and any other available spaces for classrooms.<sup>71</sup> By the 1930s, missions still complained of overcrowding in their churches and schools.<sup>72</sup>

Unlike the case in some Latin American missions, US missions in eastern Cuba found no need to disguise their intentions. The case of the widely respected Baptist schools in El Cristo is instructive. Openly avowed mission

intentions, as Howard Grose pointed out in 1908, did not dampen Cuban receptivity: "It was frankly announced that this was to be an evangelical school, that Christian influences would prevail, and that the Bible would be taught. Far from this deterring students from entering, the applications were so many as to be embarrassing to the management. Young people came from the very best homes."<sup>73</sup>

Cubans of all classes joined Protestant churches, schools, and societies. But, as will be elaborated in the next chapter, the distribution of the working and lower classes, and of the middle and governing classes among the different Protestant institutions proved striking. While more democratic in organization and doctrine than the Roman Catholic church, the Protestant missions proved nearly as hierarchical, and promoted social and economic hierarchy through their institutions and practices, whatever their rhetoric regarding fraternity and equality. Thus, as in the case of the Baptists, the great majority of church members, day and Sunday school students were indeed "poor in this world's goods."<sup>74</sup> But those who attended Protestant boarding schools (and usually Sunday schools) were predominantly those who could afford to pay school tuition-- children of the middle and governing classes. Mission ideology, and property location, consistent with the worldview and development of North American capital in

eastern Cuba, greatly facilitated, if not directed, this process and system.

As noted above, US Protestant missions and their capitalist acquaintances in the eastern regions shared certain basic commitments and values. Both advocated individualism, a belief in progress, an increasingly materialistic view of culture, philanthropy as a substitute for social justice, and, in general, the importance of accommodating the growing demands of industrialism.<sup>75</sup> Numerous North American missionaries (and their Cuban converts) were themselves former or still enterprising businessmen. The position assumed by the editors of the Baptist periodical El Mensajero ("The Messenger") was typical. They insisted that, far from money being the root of all evil, the real sins were in fact the misuse, abuse, or illegal gain of capital. John Rockefeller, John Wanamaker, and other prominent capitalists were held in high esteem as examples of a benevolent and Christian capitalism. The act of philanthropy, the missionaries concluded, was the true measure of the Christian capitalist.<sup>76</sup> Thus, there existed a convergence of ideologies, or sharing of assumptions that influenced mission policy implementation from the simple actions of determining mission location to attitudes toward and interaction with Cubans in the often volatile eastern regions.

Mission properties in Cuba grew more or less apace with the general growth of the US missions themselves. The bulk of mission properties were bought up during the first US military occupation and within the opening decade of independence, coinciding with the flurry of foreign capital penetration. The dual criteria of population size and potential for economic development counted for all three of the principal missions in locating central stations throughout Oriente and Camagüey. Mission outstations, meanwhile, were smaller towns and villages radiating outward from the main mission stations. Though accessibility was a greater determinant than commercial viability for many outstations, there were numerous instances in which missionaries appealed to their boards for outstation support based on commercial potential.

"The material development of the provinces of Oriente and Camagüey," Methodist Sterling Neblett observed, "was more marked than that of the central and western provinces."<sup>77</sup> In Camagüey, many families from the US bought up land in order to cultivate citrus fruits and vegetables, and to raise livestock. Throughout northern and southern Oriente, North American capital had been diligent, absorbing hundreds of thousands of acres of post-war property. The Southern Methodists were not unaware of the potential for commercial and church development. Under the direction of the eastern district superintendent, William

Fletcher, the Methodist mission expanded its holdings throughout northern, southern and central-eastern Oriente. Northern Oriente proved particularly appealing to the Methodists ( and other missions) because it also happened to be "where American capitalists had bought 200 square miles of land on the east side of Nipe Bay with the purpose of putting up a sugar mill which at that time would be the largest in the world."<sup>78</sup> Methodist optimism proved well-founded. By 1911, mission reports from the Nipe Bay region enthusiastically assessed Preston, Antilla, and other stations as successful. This and other regions of Oriente had proven to be "the richest section of the island, developing rapidly. Money is plentiful and the church is gaining ground better than ever before."<sup>79</sup>

Characteristically, with the exception of a few isolated stations like Baracoa in eastern Oriente, the American Baptist missions were generally located along major transportation and trade routes throughout the eastern provinces. Baptist mission stations stretched from Jatibonico in western Camagüey to Guantanamo. The most concentrated region was that within the districts of Bayamo, Santiago de Cuba, Guantanamo and Antilla. Of a total of some 40 Baptist churches and outstations in 1910, 85 percent were located on or within 5 miles of the Cuba Railroad Company's lines.<sup>80</sup> The Nipe bay region, central to the United Fruit Company's operations, also held appeal for the

Baptists. Henry Morehouse praised the industrial development of Nipe Bay and Antilla, and foresaw great potential therein for Baptist mission work.<sup>81</sup>

American Friends mission activity was centered in the townships of Gibara, Holguín, Banes, Puerto Padre, and the surrounding areas. Relatively inaccessible to the south until the opening of a central railway line in 1902, Gibara was the central port and commercial hub for northern Oriente. As the center of a large municipio or county, Holguín figured prominently in Friends mission plans. Banes, established almost simultaneously with Holguín, was the headquarters of United Fruit. And Puerto Padre's importance lay in its close proximity to vast sugar plantations, including two huge sugar mills owned by the Cuban American Sugar Company.<sup>82</sup> One mission report in 1909 even boasted, "Three of the largest sugar mills in the world are in our territory."<sup>83</sup>

For the missionaries of the American Friends church, the United Fruit Company became a common denominator for much of their development. Mission sites were consciously chosen with "the Company" in mind. Gibara, for example, was "so geographically related to the business of the United Fruit Company as to make it a suitable place for headquarters for a mission which should have a strong branch mission in Banes."<sup>84</sup> The Friends received "special invitation" from United Fruit to open missions among Cuban

employees and occupants of Company lands, and received numerous donations of money, land and property to facilitate mission-building.<sup>85</sup> "Friends have been invited," read an earlier mission report, "to bring the Gospel, good morals, and education to their thousands of native labourers and residents on those lands."<sup>86</sup> Not all Friends missionaries welcomed the increasing "friendliness" with the Company. Zenas Martin represented a minority for whom being "in the shadow of a great godless company" whose "methods of business will be in opposition to our teachings," seemed to augur ill for mission policy and neutrality.<sup>87</sup> Nevertheless, missionary demonization of North American capital in eastern Cuba proved an exception to the rule. Martin himself soon dropped his initial apprehension and, as will be seen below, not only cooperated with United Fruit, but became a business associate of it and other companies. In Banes, meanwhile, the first congregation to participate in dedication services was composed of "officials of the United Fruit Company and... citizens of the influential classes, as well as others."<sup>88</sup>

The relationship between the Southern Methodist and American Baptist missions, and US business was also notable. Methodist bishop Warren Candler's brother, Asa, owned the Coca Cola Company and donated generously to Methodist schools in eastern and western Cuba. Furthermore, the bishop owned shares in Coca Cola, which in turn had a

substantial interest in bottling and milling operations in Cuba.<sup>89</sup> In a letter to Methodist missionary H.B. Bardwell, Candler mulled over whether or not to invest in Cuban Railway Securities, "all railway securities being uncertain."<sup>90</sup>

In the facilitation of mission site development in eastern Cuba, corporate growth not infrequently met with Methodist missions' enthusiasm. In Bartle, one missionary reported eagerly a donation of 40 acres by the Central Canada Loan and Savings Company on condition that a school be built along with the church. The director of the company was described as a "live Methodist" and a "great aid" in the establishment of the church.<sup>91</sup> The prestigious Pinson College was the product of similar corporate largess. Another report from Camagüey urged approval of a school location in a suburb owned and operated by a local streetcar company. "They are willing to make us very fine concessions," Hubert Baker noted, "The manager agrees to furnish light to us for the school free."<sup>92</sup> Other companies donated scholarships, tuition, and funding for schoolteachers and employees.<sup>93</sup> The Methodist missions were also recipients of United Fruit Company generosity.<sup>94</sup>

As noted, 50 percent of American Baptist mission properties in eastern Cuba were "acquired by gift" or at token rates from North American companies and local municipalities. Many of these townships were company towns

owned and/or dominated by the local mill or plant.<sup>95</sup> One typical station was established in Niquero, a mill and mining town whose central administrator Juan Otero reportedly sympathized with and aided mission development there.<sup>96</sup> Baptist missions also received financial support from US patrons in and outside Cuba. One provided enough funding to build churches in four different stations.<sup>97</sup> Possibly to encourage more corporate support, annual mission reports often published their thanks to corporate benefactors like John D. Rockefeller.<sup>98</sup> In one instance, the Baptist Messenger published a list of prestigious "Christian capitalists" representative of various Protestant denominations. "Industrial Magnates and Evangelical Work" listed corporations like Heinz, Sherwin-Williams, Eastman Kodak, Colgate, Nabisco, Postum Cereal, and, of course, Quaker Oats. The US manufacturers were conveyed as "solid" Christian and corporate models.<sup>99</sup> The United Fruit Company was not on the list. However, judging from the "remarkable reception" given Baptist missionaries in the Nipe Bay region--the effective territory of United Fruit--missionaries there likely felt a measure of the Company's influence.<sup>100</sup>

Mission-business relations developed beyond the donations for the missions' material development. As US Protestant missions approached their second decade of activity in eastern Cuba, their relationship with North

American capital became increasingly interconnected, interdependent, and complex. The pattern of the relationship struck a marked symbiosis as the decades progressed, with implications not only for the missions' definition of neutrality, but for their relationship to the rest of Cuban society.

Protestant missions interacted with economic interests in the eastern provinces at several levels, each with an added element of complexity relative to the preceding one. In addition to the the material and financial support given for the erection of mission structures, companies also provided transportation, without charge, or at greatly reduced rates. This provided missionaries with greater mobility for evangelization, attending conferences, and so on. The promise of expanded railway connections to new centers in eastern Cuba had earlier been recognized by missionaries as a facilitator of evangelizing opportunity. Yet the direct provision of transport for specific mission needs bore a new and more deliberate element. American Baptist missionaries, for example, received ticket discounts of 30 to 50 percent from the Cuba Railway Company, and regularly acknowledged the company as a benefactor.<sup>101</sup> American Friends missionaries reported greater accessibility of more isolated villages and colonies on foot or, preferably, "on the cane and banana cars of the United Fruit Company."<sup>102</sup>

In addition to the facilitation of transportation, Protestant missions also received business support in the form of salaried employment. Sugar companies and plantation owners aided mission work on or near their properties by creating positions for mission layworkers and teachers, and by paying or supplementing the salary of the missionary. United Fruit officials at Preston, however, not only paid the salary of a mission worker. The Company also specifically requested the Methodist missionary A.C.Tossas to head the church there.<sup>103</sup> Growth in Friends missions in the company towns of Santa Lucia and Chaparra (the latter run by Mario G. Menocal before his presidency) was partly attributed to the Chaparra Sugar Company's donations of a church and mission worker expenses.<sup>104</sup>

As mission work steadily grew, and as the benefits of the mission-business relationship became more tangible, mission identification with North American capital increased. Protestant missions openly acknowledged the contribution of big business to mission growth as well as the relationship that inhered from it. Methodist mission reports praised "prominent businessmen" as "the greatest assets" to mission work in centers like Camagüey.<sup>105</sup> Baptist missionaries also gave private and public recognition to supportive business interests. Like other missions, the Baptists received encouragement from US companies early on. In addition to the financial and

material inducements, the first missionaries of the ABHMS were graciously received by the US vice consul and other members of the economic and political elite, and made honorary members of their prestigious Commercial Club.<sup>106</sup>

Among American Friends missionaries, the increasing association with company officials, employees and institutions at various levels of affect (and in all the US missions) could not but have some impact on missionary attitudes and practices. Typically, a Friends mission report noted the approval of mission development by missionaries, and also by corporate benefactors. Work for Jamaican and other congregations, the report concluded, "has been very prosperous, and is satisfactory to the <United> Fruit Company as well as to our missionaries."<sup>107</sup>

The increasing ties between business and Protestant missions also represented one element of the relation of Cuba's sugar monoculture to the Protestant Church. As these relations evolved, so too did mission expectations. The plea of Friends secretary Sylvester Jones reflected general missionary sentiment: "It is most important that we continue to merit and receive the confidence, and if possible, increase the active support of the leaders and captains of this great industry."<sup>108</sup> Friends superintendent Zenas Martin proved not averse to making overtures to United Fruit's president, Lorenzo Baker, for support.<sup>109</sup> Nor were missionaries of the Methodist and Baptist churches, numerous

of whom solicited business interests for everything from facilitating transportation to building mission schools.<sup>110</sup>

Some missionaries were ambivalent about growing ties between mission and business interests. However, the historical evidence strongly suggests that most US missionaries identified with economic interests in eastern Cuba and increasingly expected the latter to provide at least some support. Those who remained ambivalent became no less mired in the inherent contradictions of such relations. Though one of the more dramatic examples, that of the founding Friends missionaries Zenas and Susan Martin was not atypical. The Martins at times lamented the mission's association with United Fruit's headquarters in Banes. They thought of it as a difficult place for new mission workers: "It is hard to keep from being influenced by the Americans who care nothing for the Cubans."<sup>111</sup> Yet this did not prevent the Martins from developing their own business relations, relations that went beyond the "friendliness" described by Hiram Hilty and toward an ideological compatibility with the business and governing classes that distanced the missionaries from the majority of poor and working class Cubans who formed Protestant congregations.<sup>112</sup>

The interests of business, then, were neither incompatible nor inconsistent with the perceived interests of US Protestant missions. Indeed, the inclination of

numerous missionaries as well as Cuban pastors to have their own businesses was not generally discouraged if it did not openly interfere with mission work. Some missionaries even insisted that to engage in business was "natural" and, therefore, should not be discouraged in the overall program of making Cuban converts "the right kind of Christian men and women."<sup>113</sup> Missionary business practices were not thought to be inconsistent with the overall thrust of the Protestant work ethic. On the contrary, one Friends missionary typically characterized Christian-based free enterprise as "the stuff of which our future church is made."<sup>114</sup> If Cuban converts were to become the "stuff" of which the Martins spoke, they had their models in the leadership of the three principal missions. Zenas Martin had been a successful businessman in Iowa and, as will be demonstrated below, continued to exercise his business acumen as a Friends missionary in Oriente.<sup>115</sup> American Baptist Hartwell Moseley and Southern Methodist William Fletcher, both superintendents of their respective missions in the eastern provinces, also took advantage of business opportunities in their districts. All were considered eminent and trusted members both of their churches and, with qualification, within the business circles they cultivated.<sup>116</sup> All embodied the contradictions of professing mission neutrality, along with fraternity and social justice among Cubans, at the same time that their

actions demonstrated substantial discrepancies between policy and practice. The cases of Moseley and Fletcher proved particularly deleterious toward mission objectives of evangelization because of charges of corruption and misappropriation of mission funds made against them. Though never formally charged, nor the cases publicly aired, the negative impact on the respective missions and their flocks was significant.

Although the Moseley and Fletcher scandals came to a head within several years of each other (1909-1913), and differed in detail, at a fundamental level there were some striking similarities that had equally important implications. In both cases, following a period of several years, ample evidence had accumulated to justify an internal inquiry into the work of Moseley and Fletcher by their respective missions.<sup>117</sup> Subsequently, each was informally charged by their mission boards with misappropriation of mission funds for personal use, providing false financial statements, and, in Moseley's case, inflating church membership rolls.<sup>118</sup> While each missionary admitted erring, both of the accused vehemently denied culpability, instead redirecting blame at former friends and colleagues, many of whom ambivalently provided evidence against the two. Moseley and Fletcher were expelled by their respective mission boards, but escaped legal charges. This was only partly a function of mission expediency. It was also a

matter of the influence the two missionaries exercised in their capacities as businessmen. Allegedly using mission funds to play the stock market, William Fletcher had apparently earned a reputation as a stockbroker and cacique in his district.<sup>119</sup> As the evidence against Fletcher became overwhelming, Bishop Candler, who had previously insisted on formal charges, relented upon being apprised of the missionary's "numerous and powerful friends" whose wishes potentially "outweighed that of the missionaries on the field."<sup>120</sup> Fletcher "retired."

Hartwell Moseley had been responsible for nearly one-half million dollars in Baptist mission funds and property. The superintendent also personally owned land, property, livestock, and other assets in Cuba worth some US\$40,000.<sup>121</sup> If culpable, Moseley also proved unimpeachable regardless of the evidence. Upon his dismissal, the committee that confirmed charges against the missionary, an amalgam of bankers, accountants, and other missionaries, concluded that they had dealt "much more leniently than they would have acted in any other capacity."<sup>122</sup> Moseley's financial reputation, not unlike Fletcher's, was later variously described as "disquieting," "deviant," "manipulative," and "questionable" by various missionaries and other witnesses, including the Baptist mission's education director, Robert Routledge. Routledge, a longtime friend and colleague of Moseley's, had become

upset at the manner in which Moseley's questionable business practices increasingly reflected on Baptist mission management: "The mission had always had a very questionable financial reputation."<sup>123</sup> Routledge also expressed alarm over Moseley's apparent ability to "tell an untruth unblushingly" in his business dealings, and feared the application of such tactics in mission matters.<sup>124</sup> One of many missionaries affected by the scandal, Routledge conveyed deep concern for the "spiritual condition" of mission converts, students, and potential converts amid growing public awareness of Moseley's heavily qualified superintendency.<sup>125</sup>

The negative impact of a prominent missionary's corruption resonated throughout Cuba's eastern regions, and affected Cubans within and outside the Methodist and Baptist churches. The scandals carried serious implications for the Protestant missions' legitimacy in general. Historical evidence suggests that Fletcher and Moseley were certainly not the only individuals involved in "gainful occupation," or in taking liberties with mission accounts.<sup>126</sup> Yet the two senior missionaries were the most prominent representatives of a group whose faith professed moral standards superior to that of Cubans' "Roman-tainted" society. Though relatively discreet, the investigation and subsequent disciplining of the two missionaries, along with new Baptist mission rules which regulated future business

relations, proved insufficient. While more closely monitored, relations with business interests, on an organizational and personal level, largely continued apace for all the missions (with the possible exception of the Baptists for whom personal business ventures became taboo). The progressive and moral reputations of the churches became damaged in the eyes of those for whom the Protestant missions represented a better alternative to the old colonial Church. This was as true for foreign missionaries as it was for those Cubans who had justified their subordination to the new faith.

By the end of the Moseley affair, Routledge reported disconcertingly that the former superintendant's questionable mission management had created a negative impression abroad in Cuba. "Cubans believe," Routledge observed, "that Dr. Moseley's farm, cattle, store, etc., have all come out of the mission."<sup>127</sup> Understandably, the response of Cubans within the Baptist mission proved more ambivalent than among those who were not members. Routledge and other missionaries endeavoured to maintain morale among Cuban mission workers: "There has been some uneasiness among the members of our staff of teachers but I have tried to show them that it was their duty to stand loyally by the school."<sup>128</sup> Missionaries and faithful Cuban laicos met with mixed success. Numerous Cuban mission workers became exasperated over confronting the scandal's backlash. A

Cuban deacon, in asserting the higher standard of evangelical Protestant faith relative to Roman Catholicism, was met with a skepticism directly attributed to Moseley's reputation. "I try to defend him," the deacon lamented, "but... I know that they speak the truth."<sup>129</sup> Some Cuban pastors concluded that the "execrable example" of Moseley had discouraged many Cuban mission workers.<sup>130</sup> The observations of other mission workers were less forgiving and more graphic. One Baptist mission teacher summarized her conclusions anecdotally: "The other day I was going to the post office--a herd of cattle was being driven through town. I stopped in the house of a person here until the cattle passed, and the man of the house, pointing to the cattle, said, 'Those are the souls Dr. Moseley is trying to gain.'<sup>131</sup>

As Emilio Willems pointed out, the normative content of US Protestantism that the early missionaries touted and attempted to teach Cuban candidates and students imposed a series of restrictions upon personal behaviour usually subsumed under the rubric of "Protestant ethic." These norms "demanded strictest personal honesty, dedication to work, thrift, and abstinence" from various vices, "believed to be sinful or conducive to the commitment of sins."<sup>132</sup> Conceptualized as Protestant morality, these norms became "real" in that "the Protestant denominations made serious efforts to convert them to actual behaviour;" once

recognized by the non-Protestant sectors of the community as "Protestant behaviour," congregations "really had to watch their step to live up to expectations."<sup>133</sup> This included economic behaviour. The Latin American cultural stereotype was variously described by missionaries and others as "corrupt," "indolent," and "easy-going." Presumably, this made Cubans more susceptible to economic habits of gambling, speculation and manipulation. US Protestant churches made their claim to penetration of eastern Cuba based on the supposedly transcendental beliefs and qualities of "Protestant" behaviour over "Romanist" behaviour. By all accounts, many Cubans, if not convinced of the infallibility of US Protestantism, nevertheless were receptive to the churches' liberating rhetoric.

The poorly-contained scandals (save for those in the US) of the American Baptist and Southern Methodist missions, the largest missions in eastern Cuba, reverberated throughout the region. That the scandals damaged the missions' reputation for exceptional morality--especially in the context of the missionaries' unrelenting charges against Romanist immorality and commercialism--was made clear by the observations of numerous Cubans, especially within the churches. Thereafter, US missionaries were viewed with a relatively greater degree of caution and skepticism than previously.

As noted in the observations of US missionaries and Cuban pastors alike, the mission scandals also affected missions' membership growth. The extent of damage in this respect is less clear. In the next two decades, US Protestant missions in eastern Cuba continued to grow, but unevenly. Particularly in the case of the Baptist and Methodist missions, by 1916-1917, mission schools surpassed stagnating church congregations in membership. Of course, this is probably a function of several factors, including the mission scandals. Furthermore, the increased dissension among Cuban pastors and laicos that occurred within these missions during the course of and after their respective scandals had their origins years earlier in sporadic disputes with and among missionaries over salaries, administration, and general policy. Some Cuban pastors, like H.B. Someillán earlier, defected to other Protestant churches.<sup>134</sup>

At any rate, the scandals of eastern Cuba's largest Protestant missions were not the only reason for increased Cuban dissent by the beginning of the second decade. A correlation may be made, however, with the scandals as a key factor culminating in the unprecedented rise of Cuban mission workers' grievances. Among the American Baptists, Routledge confronted a barrage of complaints over Moseley's nepotism. The former superintendent's hiring of an unqualified relative as a teacher, and at a higher salary

than higher-skilled Cuban teachers, drew numerous complaints from the Cuban membership.<sup>135</sup> Moseley's actions became the basis for the airing of numerous grievances by Cuban workers. Routledge and the other missionaries appeared overwhelmed: "It is impossible to keep the rest of the staff and other teachers in the mission contented.... The mission is already very seriously injured by prevailing conditions and will be injured more as time goes on."<sup>136</sup> The grievances of Cuban mission workers generated by the experiences of the first decade of mission activity, and exacerbated by mission scandals, were eventually re-energized by the rising Cuban nationalism of the 1920s. They forced US Protestant missions to address Cuban concerns over their role in a Church that was ostensibly to become their own. How the missions dealt with Cuban concerns, however, is another matter.

Cuban dissent within the Southern Methodist mission assumed a more organized form which materialized at about the same time that the Fletcher scandal had climaxed. Hard on its heels, a group of Cuban ministers representing Cuban pastors and mission workers throughout Cuba, and apparently based in the east, presented a list of grievances to the board's secretary, W.R. Lambuth.<sup>137</sup> The "Letter of the Cuban Preachers to the Secretary of the Board of Missions" conveyed the cumulative grievances of Cuban workers in other missions with respect to several main points: insufficient

salaries; housing "in good sanitary condition;" and most importantly, a greater indigenous role in administration.<sup>138</sup> Cuban pastors complained most emphatically that they were too often kept under the authority of missionaries who were much less competent, "without experience, without practice in the work, without knowledge of the language or of the character of the people."<sup>139</sup> The Cubans also protested that more experienced and better-trained Cuban pastors remained "relegated to little country villages off the main lines of communication."<sup>140</sup> The pastors requested a thorough investigation into all fields of the MECS mission and inclusive of all workers, Cuban and North American.

The grievances of the Cuban delegation were not unfounded. Indeed, some US missionaries had voiced similar concerns.<sup>141</sup> Several decades later, the all-encompassing report of J. Merle Davis also confirmed the pastors' protests as valid and unresolved.<sup>142</sup> Nonetheless, in 1909-1910, most Methodist missionaries responded to the Cuban grievances with incredulity. Many who had earlier praised the competence of Cuban pastors and teachers now rejected the Cubans' overture on the same basis.<sup>143</sup> Mission administrators assumed a stance rank with the Anglo Saxon logic, worldview and terminology of their secular compatriots and business associates. Mission paternalism quickly devolved to chauvinism. Cuban mission workers were

publicly categorized as "mercenaries who worked for money and not to save souls," as "ringleaders," and as "complainers" who would never be successful ministers anyway.<sup>144</sup>

Despite the resistance and disparagement of US missionaries who felt that the Cubans had gone beyond their province, the Cuban pastors proceeded with their protest. Methodist mission administrators in the eastern district continued their vitriol, asserting that the pastors had let their education go to their heads. One missionary typically concluded: "There is little to call for or declare a heroic spirit among the native ministry."<sup>145</sup> The number of Cubans eventually dismissed or disciplined is unclear. More important, however, is how such indigenous dissent figured in the conclusions reached by US Protestant missions in their first decade of activity in eastern Cuba.

After ten years, US missions had not veered from their general conviction that Cubans were incapable of self-government, ecclesiastically or politically. Based on the hostile reactions of Southern Methodist missionaries to Cuban pastors' requests, Cubans were not even ready to participate in administration. Rather, missionaries' retention of their identification with US political and economic interests, coupled with the violence and general unrest under the second US military intervention and then of the 1912 revolt, appeared to reinforce the perceived need

for extended Protestant mission paternalism (as it did US tutelage generally). At both the religious and secular levels, Cuban protests for reform were met as a threat. Easton Clements, Methodist director of Pinson College in Camagüey, conveyed a common belief when he described such Cuban movements as a "greater danger" than "open and violent persecution."<sup>146</sup>

The only viable, long term solution, missionaries argued, to Cubans' dissenting habits and alleged inability to govern themselves, was through education. As for the Cuban pastors, one missionary typically theorized that they were not lacking in education per se, but in the right kind. The Board, Methodist H.B Bardwell believed, had to be more attentive to the need for education than it had been. "We cannot hope for successful teachers among the natives," Bardwell argued, "who have not been educated in our own schools. The viewpoint and motives in education must be that of Protestant American education."<sup>147</sup> The corollary to this was that, if Cubans were ever to govern themselves or run their own churches, it was ultimately going to be according to guidelines from the US.

## Chapter Four: "The Path of Progress":

### Protestant Education and Political Stability

At about the time that the Southern Methodist mission scandal was fading (and that of the American Baptist mission barely in evidence), Cuba's easternmost province, Oriente, was in the midst of a revolt. Known variously as "la guerra de razas," "la guerra racista," and as the "guerrita del Doce," the 1912 revolt spread throughout Oriente. It began as a nationwide protest by the Partido Independiente de Color (Independent Party of Color), a political party founded in 1908 by Evaristo Estenoz, a mulatto veteran of the 1895-1898 independence war, as a force against racism and for the promotion of Afro-Cuban participation in the new republic.<sup>1</sup> Though a detailed examination of the revolt is beyond the scope of this study, a brief summary of its roots, conclusions, and influence on missionary perceptions and policy is warranted in order to understand not only the context within which missions functioned, but their responses to events around them.

The revolt of 1912 stands out in Cuban historiography as another symptom of the legacy of Cuba's qualified independence. The frustrations manifest in the formation of the Independent Party of Color and its final resort to armed protest in 1912 had their roots in the end of the independence war. The apprehension, especially by Afro-

Cubans, of US intervention and toward many white Cubans in their welcoming the new US-imposed order, was confirmed after 1898. As noted, the US military occupation that followed exacerbated racial tensions in Cuban society.<sup>2</sup> Cubans generally, and Afro-Cubans especially, met with contempt from US officials. US policy kept Cuban blacks and mulattos from filling important positions at the same time that Spanish interests were protected and European immigration officially encouraged. To the dismay of some white Cubans, public education was racially integrated. Overall, however, US occupation policy was highly discriminatory.

US policy in this vein was largely continued under the first independent government of Tomás Estrada Palma, who determined that there was no need for any anti-discriminatory policy.<sup>3</sup> Afro-Cubans had suffrage but were limited to political parties which ignored the race issue altogether and sought only to reinforce clientele networks that served partisan interests. This frustrated the expectations of many Afro-Cubans who, since 1902, felt that their massive participation in the struggle for independence merited a relatively proportionate share in jobs. By 1908, relative to Spaniards and other foreigners, the only mode of employment in which blacks were prominent (save for foremen) was as temporary labourers.<sup>4</sup> Discriminated against by both US and now Cuban republican administrators, Afro-Cubans were

ready to protest. The August revolution of 1906 raised their hopes for change, and once again, Afro-Cubans were overrepresented in the insurgent army protesting Estrada Palma's fraudulent re-election.

When the hopes and expectations generated by the August revolution were similarly frustrated by the second US intervention, a grassroots political party, the Independent Party of Color, was formed and was recognized by the US administration. Though small in its beginnings, the Party eventually attracted a significant enough following to concern the traditional repository of black votes, the Liberal Party. Though the Liberals and their allies charged the Independents with black racism, the Independent Party of Color was clearly based in a program of racial integration, equality, and other values consistent with José Martí's vision of an independent Cuban society. With the failure of the Liberals to address the kind of fundamental change envisaged by the Independents, Afro-Cubans of all classes (and a minority of whites) joined.

By early 1910, the Independent Party of Color had active supporters in most provinces with Oriente its second largest region of support (next to Santa Clara). By mid-1910, the Party had become enough of a threat to the traditional parties for the government to pass legislation (the Morúa law) banning the IPC. Shortly afterward, the government carried out a massive imprisonment of Party

members, sympathizers and associates. Hundreds were jailed or lost their jobs. The following year, the Independents struggled to reorganize and lobbied to have the Morua law repealed. Having failed to achieve this, the Independents ultimately resorted to armed protest in 1912.

The protest was to have been a nationwide demonstration of militant opposition to the Morua law, not against the government. Despite this apparent understanding between the Independents and the government, prominent white fears escalated, war erupted, and the Miguel Gómez government readily took advantage of an opportunity to adorn its repression with the facade of the Haiti scare. Oriente was the theater of war in which thousands of Afro-Cubans died, as well as hundreds of Independents. The massacre by the army had proven more decisive than the Morua law or the Independents' earlier imprisonment--the Independent Party of Color was destroyed. As Aline Helg noted, the determination to destroy the Party suggests the scale of the threat posed by the Independents.<sup>5</sup>

In the short term, the Party represented a political challenge to the Liberal Party. In the long term, the Independent Party of Color, in demanding the "rightful share" of Afro-Cubans to a place in their own society, "threatened to change the class structure and patterns of power, wealth and income distribution, and to allow upward mobility to Afro-Cubans."<sup>6</sup> The Independents' radical

reform program challenged the bases of Cuban society. In turn, the repression of the Independents' movement demonstrated governing whites' "fundamental and long-lasting contradictions in their relationship with Afro-Cubans," a legacy of both Cuban history and US hegemony.

Yet, the rebellion in Oriente had another element to it. Thousands of Afro-Cubans participated in the uprising, giving vent to conditions of social deprivation long acknowledged even by US officials.<sup>7</sup> A "war against property and private wealth" became an extension of the war against racial inequality.<sup>8</sup> Stores, sugarmills, and offices, predominantly of North American capital, were razed throughout much of Oriente.

The eastern conflagration was thus no mere political disorder or "mix-up" as characterized by Zenas Martin of the Friends mission.<sup>9</sup> Nonetheless, the 1912 revolt was viewed by US Protestant missionaries generally as one in a series of political disturbances in a perennially erupting Cuba. Though missionaries publicly sympathized with the working and poorer classes from which most of the insurgents derived and from which the bulk of Protestant congregations was formed, during crises like that in 1912, missionaries' allegiances were clearly reaffirmed. Mission requests like that by Southern Methodist Guy W. Holmes in Bartle for the protection of US Marines are representative.<sup>10</sup>

The marines came. As Louis Pérez pointed out, order was restored but at a terrible cost. The US sent marines into Oriente in late May to protect North American property. Released from the responsibility of garrison duty, the Cuban military undertook a "ruthless and grisly pacification."<sup>11</sup> Reports from Palma Soriano, San Luis and Guantanamo described thousands of Afro-Cubans killed by decapitation, hanging and firing squad.<sup>12</sup> Constitutional guarantees for all of Oriente were suspended, and the concentration camps of Spanish infamy made a reappearance.<sup>13</sup> Compared to the waves of vehement condemnation that billowed from Protestant churches in the US over Spanish atrocities during the Cuban independence war, there is exceedingly little evidence of comparable indignation concerning very similar atrocities perpetrated on Afro-Cubans in the summer of 1912.<sup>14</sup> This is especially notable in the case, for example, of the summary executions which frequented the three towns mentioned: All were American Baptist stations. In the superintendent's June report, which corresponded with the height of the carnage, mission concerns appear other-directed: "Reports of the condition of the country grow better each day and we trust that very soon peace will be restored and our work which has been greatly hindered in parts of Oriente can go on as usual."<sup>15</sup>

Aside from reports of mission buildings burned in several towns, there appears to be no mention of the thousands of lives lost in mission stations like Palma Soriano, Guantanamo and others. This is particularly relevant to note since, as mission campaigns against social sins like alcohol, intemperance, tobacco and so on mounted, issues of race--let alone that of government repression and discrimination--were never addressed. Concerns for mission integrity and security seemed more important:

Nothing has happened at El Cristo, and we have been free from any outbreaks here. The property of the colleges has been sufficiently protected by the Cuban government, for which we are grateful.... If it should occur that the Cuban government could not protect the colleges, we have immediate American protection as these institutions belong to an American corporation, and really the children would be safer here than at their homes.<sup>16</sup>

By the end of the summer, peace returned to the eastern province. The rebellion meanwhile, became one of many popular responses to change in Cuban society, increasingly structurally dependent on its northern neighbour. To North American missionaries and many of their contemporaries, the 1912 revolt was just another of many political disturbances--virtually indistinguishable from one another--which plagued the young and "inexperienced"

republic. As for the "political excitement" that followed with the November elections (which brought Mario García Menocal to power), many missionaries publicly voiced their positions of political neutrality and their preference that, as one put it: "We shall have a rest from political discussions and excitement for awhile.... It would be a good thing if the elections were less frequent so that the people could give more attention to other things."<sup>17</sup>

One of these "other things" was the perceived need for nurturing and moulding a people consistent with the needs of a growing republic. For the Protestant missions and secular interests alike, each political protest, every subsequent US intervention, appeared to reaffirm the need for US tutelage in establishing stability and order in the Cuban republic. Acknowledged by both interests, stability was necessary not only for good government, but for the orderly dispatch of commerce. The outbreak of 1912 reinforced this sentiment. It also renewed interest in the reinforcement of education generally, and Protestant education particularly, as an instrument for the dissemination of values, beliefs and practices consistent with a more stable republic.

Several years earlier, the former US Superintendent of Public Education, Alexis Frye, had advocated an adult education program expressly designed to accommodate both ecclesiastical and secular interests' concerns for stability. Adult education would be introduced to combat

Cuban illiteracy and therefore, Frye argued, the apparent Cuban propensity for insurrection. Since "any persuasive talker with an ambition for office can start an insurrection in Cuba," Frye asserted that nearly all Cubans, "including the negroes who do most of the fighting," could be dissuaded from the insurrectionary habit and taught the histories of war's devastation in Europe, for example.<sup>18</sup> Frye marginalized any other reasons behind the second US intervention, or for the 1912 revolt and subsequent US interventions. Instead, he focused on the presumed political immaturity of Cubans and proposed the establishment of adult programs and classes in towns and cities but especially in plantations, "vegas" and villages. Adult education's purpose lay in "making insurrection impossible among the present generation of labourers; for the future he would rely upon the Cuban children who had been instructed in the public and private schools of the island."<sup>19</sup> Frye's plan was later rejected by Governor Charles Magoon and then Secretary of Public Education Lincoln de Zayas on the grounds that current education levels were sufficient, that the education plan interfered with the wheels of industry in Cuba, and that there were more important and "needed" public improvements to consider.<sup>20</sup>

Whether or not the US missions were cognizant of Frye's education program, those in eastern Cuba certainly

identified with its central, "counter-insurgency" stability-facilitating tenets. In essence, mission education policy identified very closely with those of the business and governing classes' needs concerning political and economic stability. And though not articulated, Magoon, Zayas and their associates may have believed the level of public and private education to be already conducive to nurturing stability, thus perceiving Frye's plan as superfluous. Protestant missions' education policies tended to converge, so much so that in another comity agreement, the various churches agreed to openly cooperate with each other in spreading Protestant education throughout Cuba. Mission education policy focused primarily on children. The education of children had other than intrinsic value: It served missions' present and future goals of, firstly, influencing and educating the parents and other adults in Christian, western democratic values; and secondly, of training the future leaders of both ecclesiastical and secular Cuban society. This explains, in large part, the zeal with which mission schools were first founded in Cuba.

Within the first few years of occupation, US Protestant missions wasted no time in establishing new schools for training future leaders in mission pulpits, churches, schools, homes and society generally.<sup>21</sup> By 1910, the three principal eastern missions accounted for dozens of schools and thousands of students enrolled in mission day, boarding

and Sunday schools, offering curriculum at the primary and secondary levels, and spread strategically throughout the eastern provinces. Many mission schools like the Baptist International Colleges in El Cristo earned recognition as some of the most prestigious education centers in Cuba and received support from the business and governing classes. Despite some resistance from local Catholic priests, mission schools attracted overwhelming numbers of Cubans from all classes and in various regions.

Among the more prominent institutions of Protestant education in eastern Cuba (and Cuba generally), were the Southern Methodists' Pinson Institute in Bartle and the Colegio Ingles in Camagüey, the famous Baptist International Colleges, and the Friends schools in Holguín, Gibara and Banes. Protestant schools characteristically located in close proximity to population centers such as cities and towns. Since North American businesses played such a significant role in influencing mission school location--directly and indirectly--Protestant schools were typically established on or near plantations, vegas, mills, and company towns as originally prescribed by Frye. As mentioned, Friends schools were typically located on or near the properties of North American companies like United Fruit and Chaparra Sugar Company in towns which included Banes, Chaparra and Santa Lucia. Baptist and Methodist schools were also similarly centered in major areas of North American

capital penetration like the Nipe Bay and Santiago regions where milltowns predominated.<sup>22</sup>

The Protestant schools' most dynamic growth was recorded during the first two decades of mission penetration. By about 1910, mission schools had expanded and diversified consistent with the apparent growing needs of the churches and Cuban society. Much of this development had been anticipated by the Protestant missions. Protestant education in eastern Cuba began with the establishment of day and Sunday schools. The rapid growth of these institutions, despite the vicissitudes of economic depression and socio-political unrest, persisted well into the second decade. Numerous mission stations reported class enrollments "booming" while others lamented the need to turn away dozens of students for a lack of capacity to accommodate their overwhelming success. Juan McCarthy of the American Baptists reported that Sunday schools in the Manzanillo and Bayamo districts grew to an enrollment of 500 within three months but had to be reduced dramatically to resolve overcrowding problems. Protestant day schools likewise flourished.<sup>23</sup> Such schools offered programs with the traditional curriculum, while a few also ran programs for specialized vocational and commercial training in agriculture, industry and trades.

Prestigious schools like the International Colleges in El Cristo, Pinson in Camagüey, and Los Amigos in Holguín

were also boarding schools. While mission schoolrooms were filled by Cuban students of all classes, boarders, those who could afford to pay tuition, were predominantly of the middle class, and other families among the political and economic elite. As will be demonstrated below, US Protestant missions looked to this latter group of students as the future leadership not only of the church but of the country as well. Although the line between the priority of Protestant education as an instrument of evangelization and that of "civilization" was not infrequently blurred, a "Christian education" oriented toward conversion and salvation had long been declared the primary function.

It is true that Protestant schools in eastern Cuba responded to the educational needs of an impoverished post-war republic, and an inadequate, inefficient, and ill-equipped public school system. But education also served the larger evangelical concerns of the new Protestantism in Cuba. By the beginning of the second decade, education had become the principal instrument for reinforcing the popular foundation of mission work of both evangelization and the formation of a Cuban ministry. If the publicly-stated goal of eventual Cubanization of the Protestant church was to have any substance at all, a trained indigenous leadership was imperative. Thus, from the perspective of both immediate need and long-term objectives, a Cuban ministry became one of the central objects of Protestant education,

and classrooms provided the essential forum for the moulding, observation and identification of prospective candidates for the ministry.<sup>24</sup> Education became an essential medium for equipping Protestant churches and schools with future indigenous leaders. This was a long-term process, the ultimate goal of which, wrote one Protestant teacher, was the establishment of "a self-supporting, self-directing, self-propagating native church."<sup>25</sup> The education of the rising generation of Cuban church leaders and teachers under missionary direction formed only part of the mission agenda. As one Baptist minister asserted, Protestant education was crucial "not only for the raising up of a native ministry equipped for a ministry that will command respect and a hearing, but also for those who are going to lead in public affairs and in business."<sup>26</sup>

Of course, while poised for training Cuban converts for their role as future leaders of the Protestant church, mission schools also sought to encourage conversion to the Protestant faith. With this as the "optimum goal," missionary educators strived to create an environment conducive to the progress of the evangelical enterprise, one in which "immediate local goodwill and long-term community support" were realized.<sup>27</sup> US missions relied on all the levels and types of Protestant schools to exercise some influence in cultivating support and membership for

Protestantism. But for the inculcation of values, beliefs and conviction considered necessary in any dedicated believer, convert, or, ultimately, church leader, Protestant missionaries placed enormous faith in the Sunday school as the vehicle for evangelization and in children as the promise of Protestantism's success in Cuba.

By the mid-1910s, many among the Protestant missions' leadership privately admitted to the limits of religious work as an instrument of evangelization. After ten years, Protestant church membership, though steady in growth, had greatly slowed relative to Protestant school numbers which had caught up to, surpassed, and often dwarfed congregation numbers. For American Baptist missionaries, the reality of limited church growth, and the limitations of religious work in evangelization, were made more painfully obvious by the revelation of their former superintendent's inflation of the rolls. By 1915, the Baptist mission had joined the ranks of Protestant missions for whom education was the primary instrument of evangelization.<sup>28</sup> Children assumed the role of vessels of mission teachings, and the focus for the future.

In an important sense, children also became instruments of evangelization, and on two significant levels. The first concerned the intrinsic advantage of teaching children. Cuban children, a Baptist missionary typically reported, "are easily moulded and make rapid progress under wise and

efficient teaching and discipline."<sup>29</sup> "The hope of the pioneer Church," another missionary concurred, "is in the children whose habits of life are not yet formed."<sup>30</sup> James Atkins, a Southern Methodist bishop, was more adamant: "If the present generation is to be saved, the children must first be saved."<sup>31</sup> Children thus assumed an importance not only as malleable receptacles of North American Protestant beliefs and values, but also as leaders of the future Cuban Church. Just as "it is the child that makes the Catholic," one missionary reasoned, so too would the latest generation of young Cubans be raised up as evangelical Protestant leaders.<sup>32</sup> This was an expression not merely of conviction and faith, but also of general policy when it came to Cubanization of the Protestant Church: "As advance in Christian education is made and more trained leaders become available, the number of American workers will gradually diminish.... But the native ministers must be properly trained, intellectually competent, and sufficiently mature in their spiritual experience before they can be entrusted with leadership, if the work is to hold the confidence and really win the people of all classes."<sup>33</sup> Yet, as will be demonstrated below, mission practice was not always consistent with mission policy.

The task of winning adherents, meanwhile, was undertaken by Protestant mission students while still children. This was the other immediate advantage of

conditioning Cuban children as effective instruments of evangelization. Children served as conduits through which Protestant mission influence reached Cuban adults, in many cases, successfully. American Baptist Gilbert N. Brink conveyed the experiences of many missionaries when he reported that the "most hopeful point of contact is through the mission schools; by reaching the children the parent is reached also."<sup>34</sup> Mission schools therefore enabled missionaries to evangelize "to reach the children and through them the parents and thus do a much more effective work."<sup>35</sup> Religious study comprised a part of the curriculum at all levels of Protestant education, from the primary to the college level. But the Sunday schools, seconded by the day schools, formed the foundation for evangelization and for mission schooling in general.

The Sunday school was "the most efficient handmaiden of the church," according to at least one Protestant missionary.<sup>36</sup> By the 1930s, the Sunday schools of the Baptist, Methodist, and Friends missions in eastern Cuba recorded enrollments totalling well over 9000 students.<sup>37</sup> Sunday schools represented such an important institution for the inculcation of North American evangelical Protestant beliefs and values that they became an integral element in the mission consensus on education. US Protestant missions had long agreed on the need for multidenominational unity in such areas of mission concern. The National Sunday School

Association was a function of this mission consensus on education in Cuba, and was administered by the North American members of the various missions.<sup>38</sup> The missions looked upon the Sunday school as one important example of institutionalized benevolence.

Yet, as Thomas W. Laqueur and E.P. Thompson had demonstrated, while Sunday schools were a key component of "beneficent education," they also served as instruments of social control. This was no less so the case in Cuba. Consciously or not, Sunday schools fostered social control and a level of conformity at the same time that they provided a form of moral and spiritual uplift, especially to those children for whom this mode of education was the only schooling they received. Protestant missions in eastern Cuba conceptualized the Sunday school as "an instrument for the moral rescue of poor children from their corrupt parents... the regeneration of society."<sup>39</sup> Once again, Cuban children were viewed by Sunday schools and Protestant organizations generally as "the advance troops, leading an invasion of godliness into their parents' houses."<sup>40</sup> The passionate evangelical belief in the paramountcy of the Bible as the source of salvation was the primary motivator for the advocates of the utility of Sunday schools. But it was not the only one.

The regenerating role of mission Sunday schools also included a secular component which interacted with the moral

and spiritual. Protestant Sunday schools also possessed a "civilizing" function not at variance with the needs of Cuba's foreign-dominated economy. In another context, Laqueur notes one Sunday schoolteacher who suggested to potential subscribers that the "immoralities of the poor which keep their employers in a constant state of suspicion and uneasiness would be a thing of the past now that, because of her school, the education of poor children is no longer left entirely to their ignorant and corrupt parents."<sup>41</sup> The historical context of Laqueur's example was that of a nineteenth century industrializing Europe. The sentiment conveyed, however, endured several generations of Protestant Church development and was transplanted into contexts such as mission work in countries like Cuba. The civilizing component in Protestant mission schooling survived intact well into the twentieth century. It was rather typically expressed by a Baptist director of education in eastern Cuba who, in addition to noting the spiritual imperative of mission schooling, concluded that "Every converted man also at once becomes a reliable labourer and his services are preferred by the neighbouring planters."<sup>42</sup>

Sunday schools, and Protestant education generally, played a significant role in the inculcation of belief systems deemed by missionaries to be consistent with correct personal behaviour. Yet as Laqueur correctly concluded, the

political role of religious education--and religion generally--varied over time and between cultures. England's working class lacked a revolutionary ideology, Laqueur argued, only partly because of the conformist teachings of Protestant education. Ultimately, England lacked a "1789." Cuba, in contrast, was not at all wanting in the culture of revolution. As the cradle of independence, eastern Cuba was to prove a mixed success as a mission field. Conversely, however, while the eastern provinces' revolutionary origins might qualify the impact of Protestant mission education, they were at the same time the function of contradictions generated by US hegemony and the missions' practical association with the forces of the hegemon.

Nevertheless, if the ideological influence of mission Sunday schools was incomplete, their religious and cultural impact was significant. Typically, by the 1910s, Protestant Sunday schools exceeded their churches in membership and development generally. Relative to church growth, mission Sunday schools reportedly grew by "leaps and bounds" and became one of the strongest Protestant institutions in organization and growth over and above that of the churches.<sup>43</sup> Sunday school growth was partly manifest in the increasing pleas made by missionaries for more school facilities, requests often generously met, as in the case of the 33 acre expansion of El Cristo's International Schools, by private donors.<sup>44</sup>

As an educational institution, Protestant mission Sunday schools increasingly became the single greatest source for the evangelization of Cuban children. The Southern Methodist mission reported in 1925 that their Sunday schools accounted for at least 35 percent of Cubans converted to Methodist faith.<sup>45</sup> Since American Baptist Sunday school enrollment was more than double that of the Methodists, their proportion of converts was probably significantly higher still. Logically, as Laqueur noted, the overall impact of this form of religious education was limited because of the brevity (once a week) of their experience. Again, however, this was only partly true as a generalization and even less applicable in the Cuban case. In the context of mission education in eastern Cuba, it was not uncommon for day school teachers to also teach Sunday school. Nor was it unusual for many day school students to attend Sunday school, and vice versa. Characteristically, as one Baptist missionary observed: "The general indifference on the part of the parents to Christianity... does not interfere with their desire to have their children well-educated, or cause them to hesitate to allow these same children to attend Sunday school and to be under the influence of the same teachers who give them instruction during the weekdays."<sup>46</sup> In some Southern Methodist day schools, a large majority of students also attended Sunday school. It was in this mutually-reinforcing sense that

mission Sunday schools played an even more significant role than they might have otherwise.

The dividends of such interrelatedness between Protestant Sunday schools and other mission schools were equally as significant. At a purely evangelical level, Sunday schools, in relation to mission day schools, provided an antidote to Cubans' apparent religious indifference. As noted, many Cubans welcomed US Protestant educational institutions at the same time that they resisted formal membership in the faith. As the Baptist mission's experience typically demonstrated, however, education is not neutral. "Some of the young people thus prevented in other years," one report concluded, "have later made a good profession of the faith gained in their childhood."<sup>47</sup>

Nor were secular interests in eastern Cuba unaware of the role played by mission Sunday schools and by Protestant schools generally. As noted earlier, North American capital contributed substantially to the financing, construction, equipping and, in numerous cases, staffing of Protestant schools in the early period of mission activity. The evolving relationship with mission schools assumed new forms and took on new supporters by the republic's second decade and beyond. Protestant schools continued to expand and so did the need for new facilities "to meet the demand" of company towns throughout eastern Cuba.<sup>48</sup> Protestant

missionaries found themselves heavily taxed to satisfy the growing demand for Protestant education in Cuba.

Protestant schools were popular for several reasons. Since they were "US schools," many Cubans assumed that that meant quality instruction. Mission schools' curriculum adhered to US formulae, thereby aiding entrance into schools in the US for advanced study.<sup>49</sup> Numerous courses were in English which was widely regarded as a guarantee of a job in a country increasingly geared toward US corporations and tourists.<sup>50</sup> Furthermore, Protestant schools proved more stable than public schools, and usually remained open in spite of fiscal and political crises. Mission schools more frequently demonstrated a vitality and resilience during crises like the Cuban "Dance of the Millions" aftermath than their churches did.<sup>51</sup> In fact, throughout the first three decades of Protestant mission activity in eastern Cuba, Protestant schools were well-attended and more financially self-supporting than Protestant churches ever became. They trained thousands of Cuban students, the bulk of whom were not Protestants, but many of whom were or later became members of the economic and political elite, thereby diffusing many of the attitudes and beliefs inculcated from their evangelical educators.<sup>52</sup>

Mission educators increasingly emphasized the need to guide Cuba's rapidly-developing public, social, economic and religious life within the framework of Protestant education.

The teaching of arts, letters and sciences, missionaries generally agreed, had to be facilitated with Protestant influence in moulding Cubans' moral and religious character, along with his general array of values and mores. Sunday school and other educational literature in the form of textbooks and teachers' manuals, whether published in the US, or, later, in Cuba, remained predominantly North American in conception. By the 1930s, when some allowance was made in mission education programs and texts for attention to local Cuban culture, some mission administrators insisted on maintaining certain fundamental aspects of the North American value system in manuals published in the US for teachers and pastors.<sup>53</sup> As noted earlier, these values, often alluded to as the "universal experience of the race," were more often part of the "Anglo Saxon lesson of labour and thrift" oriented also toward "a desire for better things."<sup>54</sup> Some missions even supported western-style PTAs as a method of reinforcing the agencies of Protestant education.

In an educational environment of conservative, anti-Romanist, North American conceptions of Cuban societal needs, mission educators taught their Cuban students how to be "good Christians," and "useful citizens."<sup>55</sup> In this context, all classes of Cubans, missionaries claimed, benefited from exposure to Protestant conceptions of spiritual and material betterment.<sup>56</sup> However, "universal

morality" was not infrequently associated with North American, middle class values, or "Boston manners," as one Baptist missionary summarized it.<sup>57</sup> Furthermore, consistent with the notion that not all North Americans were created equal, US missionaries did not view all Cubans equally capable of leadership in religious or secular society. Thus, it is true that all classes of Cubans attended Protestant schools in eastern Cuba. Of course, not all such Cubans attended the same kinds of schools or classes. And missions favoured some classes of Cubans more than others.

Protestant mission schools and programs possessed a cultural and class bias--a function of North American Protestant education philosophy and policy generally, and also of the needs of Cuba's business and governing classes. Early mission reports emphasized the need to establish schools for Cuban "children from some of the best families," as well as "others from very poor homes."<sup>58</sup> Missions became particularly emphatic on the need to educate and influence the youths of political and economic elites: "The need for proper training for our ministry and for Christian teachers has been constantly before us; but we have also the responsibility for Christian professional and businessmen," concluded a Southern Methodist report.<sup>59</sup> In the missions' perennial struggle to finance the expansion of Protestant schools, the turning away of growing numbers of

students due to insufficient facilities was always problematic. As exemplified in American Baptist mission reports, the turning away of children of the "best families" seemed particularly painful: "These boys and girls come from the influential homes of Cuba. Their fathers are the leaders of today and tomorrow. Turning these students away from their one opportunity to secure a Christian education means incalculable loss to the Kingdom of God."<sup>60</sup> Another mission report was more to the point: "These are not charity pupils, but children whose parents are able and willing to pay for their education. The most urgent need of the Cuban mission is for a greater school at El Cristo to provide the future leadership of our churches and of the island."<sup>61</sup>

Protestant mission schools, as mentioned, had several roles. Among these were the preparation of a Cuban ministry for the national Protestant Church of the future, the evangelization of the Cuban masses, and the education of Cuba's future business and governing classes--which included some members of Cuba's small middle class. In this latter role, the missions were probably the most successful. In projecting the future roles of graduates of the Baptist International Colleges, mission educators envisioned Protestant students from prominent families who "will one day be among the doctors, lawyers, planters and businessmen of the country, leading citizens in thought and action: They cannot help but take the influence of the school with

them."<sup>62</sup> Other missions, like that of the Friends in Banes, reported with great satisfaction that their schools had grown in influence among the "best families" of the township.<sup>63</sup>

The growing interest of Cuba's affluent classes in Protestant mission schools was reflected in an equally growing attendance and increasingly active support by these groups. By 1920, the business-mission relationship had evolved beyond the beginnings of North American capital's financial and material aid for mission structures. By the 1920s and beyond, the young of Cuba's governing, business and professional classes were being educated and influenced by Protestant missions in great numbers. At the same time, national business and political leaders also exercised an increasing influence over missionaries and mission policy, -especially reflected in Protestant education. Rather than clashing, the fundamental values and interests of Protestant missions, and of the dominant political and economic institutions of Cuba's dependent economy and society, became mutually reinforcing. Had there been no evidence of this being so, it is doubtful that Cuba's political and economic elite would have participated in the growth of Protestant education programs and societies as substantially as they did.

The appeal of Protestant education affected many among the upper echelons of Cuban society, from national political

and economic elites to local prestige groups at the municipal level. Protestant schools had long received support from North American capital. Also, since the inception of the republic, numerous of Cuba's political elites like Tomás Estrada Palma had long supported mission education. With the passing of the decades and of each political and fiscal crisis, support from these quarters increased. Government endorsement of Protestant schools came in the form of official recognition, property concessions, military protection during uprisings, and perhaps most importantly, in the sending of their children to Protestant schools.

Protestant missions were quite conscious of attracting students from elite families and others among the middle class. These were, after all, groups which financially undergirded Protestant institutions and were to become Cuba's future church and national leaders. Baptist mission reports put it more succinctly; these were students "who are able to pay a good price for tuition and board and who have the promise of becoming leading citizens of the island."<sup>64</sup> By 1920, eastern Protestant schools like the International Colleges had gathered prestige with the growing support of government officials and others considered the "very best" people. Baptist mission reports boasted:

Honourable Carlos M. de Cespedes, representative of Cuba in Washington, sent his son to the school and has

the highest opinion of it; a brother of President Menocal sent his two sons there.... The Vice-President of Cuba, Honourable Nuñez visited the school recently and said that no school in the island has commended itself more thoroughly to him than this school; the President of the National Institute of Santiago, the chief government school at the east end of the island...reported that the school at Cristo did the best work."<sup>65</sup>

Among the prominent families which supported the Methodist Pinson school was the Governor of Camagüey province whose three children were students of Pinson. Reports from American Friends mission schools boasted that the caliber of their students was "considerably above the average children of the street."<sup>66</sup> The list of families of Holguín school students included the former and new mayor of Holguín, state representatives, and the Secretary of the Board of Education, "who preferred our school to the one which he himself has charge of."<sup>67</sup>

Nor, as was the case in soliciting aid for Protestant church and school buildings, were missionaries merely passive recipients of government support and participation. Many missionaries actively sought out government support and endorsement not only, as in most other Latin American countries, to allow the schools simply to function, but also out of the need for accreditation and prestige. Friends

missionary and educator Clarence G. McClean enlisted the support of "high officials" in Santiago de Cuba in the interest of incorporating a Friends school. Incorporation and government endorsement were also means to the end of competing with prestige schools like those at El Cristo.<sup>68</sup>

Not all mission reports of relations with elites were as shining, however. Some among the Cuban political and economic elite--especially that which remained of the Spanish large landholding class--continued to send their children to Catholic schools. Others employed tutors. Among the affluent classes who no longer supported Roman Catholic institutions, some persisted in an aristocratic mentality that did not materially aid Protestant school growth but demanded the missions' education services nonetheless. A Friends teacher complained of certain prominent but unphilanthropic Cuban families who demanded private tutors: "One mother told me, with pride, that none of her children had ever gone to school, that they had always had teachers come to the home."<sup>69</sup> Clearly, not all of eastern Cuba's elites supported Protestant mission education. Yet many of the most important and influential national and local actors, from Coca Cola to United Fruit, from Estrada Palma to Fulgencio Batista, did much in their power to facilitate Protestant mission education.

While government representatives sent their children to Protestant schools, they also gave public endorsement and

attended mission events ( as missionaries did government events, inaugurations, etc.). As noted, Protestant schools in eastern Cuba not uncommonly received official endorsement from the executive branch of the Cuban government. Baptist, Methodist and Friends schools were given official recognition and recommended by numerous Cuban presidents and vice presidents.<sup>70</sup> These included Tomás Estrada Palma, Mario G. Menocal and Alfredo Zayas--several of whom had also been presidents and managers of US subsidiary companies in eastern Cuba. Unlike the more common experience of Protestant missions in most other Latin American countries, missions in Cuba had the advantage of relatively stable and consistent government support for their work.

US Protestant missions and their schools also received public endorsement from the lower levels of government. This was by no means always the case, as a few town councils resisted Protestant mission establishment even to the point of defying orders from the provincial and national levels of government.<sup>71</sup> Most mission stations, however, appeared to have been, if not enthusiastically supported by local townships, accommodated at minimum. In the towns where Protestant prestige schools had been established, government support, at all levels, appeared most consistently. One typical example is from the Governor of Oriente, Fernando García Grave de Peralta in the form of effusive praise for the Baptists' International Colleges. García lauded the

"noble task" Baptist educators had undertaken in the "great and altruistic labour" of facilitating Cuban independence, along with the "brilliant results" of those efforts.<sup>72</sup>

By the early 1920s, Protestant mission schools in eastern Cuba had established themselves as the primary choice for many Cubans among the middle classes and of the political and economic elite. Support from these groups had evolved along a continuum that began with financial and material aid for school construction, to participation at several levels of Protestant education development. This eventually included active participation in the formation of missions' education policy. The wish expressed earlier by one missionary for an increase in the active support of North American capital was realized in the realm of mission policy formation. Friends missionaries praised the United Fruit and Chaparra Sugar companies for their dispositions to facilitate mission work materially and "in other ways."<sup>73</sup> "Other ways" of supporting mission education work--and, ultimately, of influencing it--included the steering of campaign committees for Protestant school construction, and, subsequently, influencing curricular development. Southern Methodist missionaries conveyed their gratitude to the company managers, bankers and other prominent businessmen who had headed one such school committee in Camagüey in May 1919: "It has been most gratifying to see the interest they

are taking, and the time they are willing to devote to it."<sup>74</sup>

As Protestant missions continued to depend on the substantial donations of North American capital as well as on the active support of political elites for their schools' success, Protestant education programs increasingly came under the direct influence of these secular interests. By 1920, the demand for business schools and commercial programs was being thoroughly met by prestigious Protestant schools like the International Colleges, the Pinson school, and Los Amigos. These were the cream of the principal Protestant schools in eastern Cuba whose education programs were often subsidized by and conceived in conjunction with political and economic elites. Since at least 1910, when the now famous Candler College in Havana acquiesced to the calls of prominent bankers and businessmen for a business school, numerous Protestant schools in eastern Cuba developed their own programs for business and commercial training. Candler had its Oriental equivalents in the Protestant schools in El Cristo, Camagüey and Holguín. All played substantive roles in preparing functionaries for North American business interests and the Cuban government. The network of graduates that emerged from these schools, as Crahan pointed out, "not infrequently smoothed the way for companies having difficulties with the government."<sup>75</sup> At the same time, all of these schools earned national

reputations for excellence in education generally and for vocational training in particular.

Of course, not all Cubans had access to the same Protestant schools and programs. And "vocational training" held different meanings for different classes of Cubans. Protestant missions' declared intentions of promoting the development of fraternity, equality, and of the general spiritual and material betterment of all Cubans was not borne out in practice. Mission reports alluded to the structural divisions which Protestant education programs increasingly reinforced. A 1914 report on American Baptist school work in Camagüey noted the rising attendance of students from the "best families" as well as those from impoverished households; the bulk of the poor students attended the Baptist Industrial School in Camagüey.<sup>76</sup>

Industrial education, or vocational education as it was also called, became a significant part of Protestant education programs in eastern Cuba. Industrial schools were then in vogue in the United States, founded largely in order to train blacks and lower class whites as labourers and domestic servants in order to meet the growing needs of an industrialized US. Like the business schools noted earlier, Protestant industrial schools and programs in eastern Cuba were a function of the reciprocal relationship that characterized mission-elite relations by the 1910s. As North American business interests and Cuba's governing

classes increasingly lent support to Protestant missions, the missions reciprocated. Protestant schools developed curricula, along with the technical and vocational courses and programs, desired by US business interests. Cubans were trained directly for employment with North American companies at all levels.<sup>77</sup> The levels of training provided by mission schools corresponded with the kinds of skills needed by North American enterprises, and, subsequently, with the social and racial divisions of Cuban society. In this manner, US Protestant missions reinforced North American hegemony in eastern Cuba specifically, as it did in Cuba generally.

Protestant mission schools, located on or near company properties or towns like that of the Southern Methodist school in United Fruit-dominated Preston, and subsidized by the same, were well-positioned to work with such companies. Thus, the Preston school provided programs consistent with the needs of United Fruit, and mission teachers were paid by the Company. At the Preston school, courses were oriented toward moulding the girls into "intelligent and cleanly housekeepers," and the boys into "competent employees."<sup>78</sup>

Although the number of Protestant schools geared solely toward industrial or technical training in eastern Cuba was small before the expansion of the 1930s and 1940s (the Baptist and Methodist schools were among the earliest), the schools of the principal eastern missions offered numerous

courses and programs developed by their respective commercial departments. These also were a function of mission and company needs. Consequently, by 1920 the Friends mission school in Holguín had opened a commercial department with courses that included English, typewriting, and accounting. Missionaries asserted that the department was created because "there was a great demand for it, because it offered a means of replenishing the straightened school treasury, and because it would bring the missionaries in touch with a class of young people that would probably not otherwise be reached. It is too early to measure the spiritual results; financially, it is a success."<sup>79</sup>

Friends' other principal schools in Gibara, Banes, and Puerto Padre were modeled after the Holguín school. Where commercial courses were not offered, students were sent to Holguín.

During the 1910s, Southern Methodist and American Baptist schools also developed and expanded the commercial content of their educational programs. Methodist missionaries ran vocational programs in the Pinson school in Camagüey and Preston in Oriente. The Baptists, as noted, had an industrial school in Camagüey well before 1910. After that date, mission administration pursued the further development of industrial and commercial education programs, including the construction of an industrial school annex to the International Colleges in El Cristo.<sup>80</sup>

The missions' drive to, as one Baptist educator put it, "meet the demand for industrial and mechanical training," intensified with the boom in Cuba's prosperity during and after World War I.<sup>81</sup> These were years of "dazzling prosperity" in which sugar prices soared and production expanded, and climaxed in 1920, the year of the "dance of the millions." As the Cuban economy expanded from 1915 to 1920, so too did the operations of North American banks and mills.<sup>82</sup> The expansion of North American capital in eastern Cuba intensified companies' demands on Protestant schools for more capital-oriented education programs, which the missions strived to meet.

Protestant education, however, was more than the function of corporate interests and the Cuban economy. Demand for this type of education also came from the Cuban middle class, for whom the programs provided skills highly regarded as a way of maintaining middle class status.<sup>83</sup> This was also the group from whom missions expected much of Cuba's future leadership would derive. As Baptist missionary Robert Routledge observed: "Each year that passes sees a larger class of graduates going out--some to prepare for professional life in the National University of Havana, some to teach in our schools, and others to enter the business life of the community."<sup>84</sup> Like the American Baptists, most missionaries regarded these kinds of graduates as the "best advertisement" for mission schools in

attracting more of the kind of student who could pay tuition and board.<sup>85</sup> As the needs and expectations of Protestant mission educators and business interests continued to converge, contradictions in mission principles and practice became increasingly apparent.

Protestant schools' increasingly business-oriented curricula were framed by contradictory goals. As Rosa del Carmen Bruno-Jofré pointed out in the case of Peru during the same period, mission schools' curricula did not always teach what missionaries preached:

It aimed to develop spiritual life, that is, to uplift the individual and the nation through the free development of the potential of the individual and the cultivation of a freer personality. On the other hand, it aimed to provide practical skills and an ideology of corporate efficiency. The emphasis on vocational education and the creation of short-term programs were at odds with equality of opportunity, a principle highly praised by missionaries.<sup>86</sup>

Thus, despite missionary claims that their schools' curricula addressed the children of the working and middle classes equally, mission schools and programs responded more "to the backgrounds and possibilities of the children of the white collar employees and businessmen rather than to those of the children of the workers."<sup>87</sup> The Protestant prestige schools of Los Amigos, Pinson and International

Colleges increasingly accommodated those who became the doctors, lawyers and judges of eastern Cuba. The social aspirations of the Cuban working and lower classes were fostered by Protestant education programs less according to individual potential than to those classes' presumed station in life.

Not unlike the Spanish colonial Church, whose educational institutions also distinguished between the needs of the elites and those of the gente baja, or lower classes, Protestant schools helped reinforce class divisions in Cuban society by means of discriminatory education programs.<sup>88</sup> Characteristically, though the classes may at times have commingled, children of the elite were more often paying boarders while the children of the working classes were invariably day students. Furthermore, the "charity pupils'" stations in life seemed predetermined and thus reinforced by the limited opportunities afforded them by their education. This was especially evident when one notes the kinds of technical schools children of workers and the poor were restricted to relative to their middle class counterparts.

Protestant missions fostered industrial education as a means to combat the perceived indolence of the Cuban poor, and to enable them to learn the "dignity of manual labour," so as to become "useful citizens" and good employees.<sup>89</sup> Protestant industrial schools like those in Camagüey and

Preston directed their curricula at "preparing workers appropriately."<sup>90</sup> This included courses in agriculture, or more accurately, subsistence gardening, wood and brick work, building repair, and other forms of manual labour. Friends day schools also held "handwork" classes; in the Gibara school, for example, the curriculum included paperwork, embroidery, and basketweaving.<sup>91</sup>

Protestant industrial education programs both fed on class divisions and were reflections of them. At the same time, missions' reinforcement of the social hierarchy in eastern Cuba was an expression of one of the fundamental aspects of general Protestant mission practice. In an exceptionally insightful observation, one missionary revealed an important feature of the universality of the mission experience in Cuba. In a 1921 mission education report, Baptist George Rice Hovey noted the points in common of the mission experience in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and amongst Southern US blacks. One of these was the lack of sufficient mission workers. The other, however, was the emergence of a two-tiered, class-based system in worship and education: "Where abject poverty prevails, the schools almost of necessity are giving courses in agricultural and industrial work."<sup>92</sup> The Baptist missionary warned of the damage that "too great poverty and too constant toil" could have on mission evangelization work.<sup>93</sup> Judging from the historical record, however, such minority criticisms had scant effect

on proponents of Protestant industrial education--within or outside the Protestant Church in Cuba.

In addition to reinforcing US economic and political control in Cuba, and the division of labour that came with it, Protestant mission schools also facilitated gender and race divisions. Women's education was oriented toward the improvement of women's social condition as well as their preparation for the labour market. Women mission groups like the Methodist Women's Missionary Society and the Women's American Baptist Home Mission Society ran numerous schools and courses in addition to the coeducational primary, secondary and Sunday schools. These included girls' boarding schools and industrial schools managed in conjunction with other Protestant education programs in mission stations. American Baptist missions operated a Girls' Industrial School in towns throughout eastern Cuba, as did the Friends in the form of "Casas Hogares" or "domestic science" schools.<sup>94</sup> This type of vocational education sought to supplement the spiritual and intellectual study of regular schools with training in responsibility, discipline, and the "dignity of the home."<sup>95</sup> "Domestic science" fulfilled the essence of mission industrial schools for girls in their course offerings in home economics, gardening, sewing, embroidery and crochet.

Consistent with George A. Coe's thesis on religious education, missions perceived the family as the foundation of political democracy. Conceived in Protestant American bourgeois terms, this meant the nurturing of traditional ideals of women's roles. Mission education programs reinforced this direction in domestic training beyond Cuban women's school years and into adult life. This was done by forming various women's groups like the Baptist "What I Can" society and other philanthropic women's organizations. Sunday schools also included time to spend on embroidering or sewing. According to one woman missionary, "all Cuban women and girls love that kind of work."<sup>96</sup>

Yet not all women's education focused on domestic training; missions also prepared Cuban women for the labour market. Women were also given skills needed outside the home and filled the needs of several sectors. For the most part, this meant secretarial work for North American companies. But it also included training as teachers, many of whom taught in mission and public schools. A few even received training as missionaries. Those women who were employed in schools and US companies, however, were typically those who could afford to pay the tuition for that level of education. Protestant schools offered real advantages and opportunities to those of the middle class and others among the elite for whom public schooling was inadequate.

Protestant mission schools also offered solutions to those concerned about the colour line in Cuba. Many missionaries came from the southern US, especially Methodists and Baptists, and arrived in eastern Cuba "with ways to address the concerns of white Cubans."<sup>97</sup> David W. Carter, Superintendent of the Methodist missions in Cuba, recognized one of the chief concerns of white Cubans as being the mixing of races in public schools. As Carter and other missionaries concluded, this provided a propitious opportunity for missions. Such conditions created "a demand for first-class private schools on the part of persons who are able to pay for the education of their children, thus being opened up a way of access for the missionary to a large and influential class of people."<sup>98</sup> Subsequently, segregated schools became a prominent feature of Protestant education in the early decades of the republic.<sup>99</sup>

Protestant education was advancing in eastern Cuba, and US missionaries praised the progress of their work. Schools were thriving and all classes of Cubans--each in his or her own social station--seemed to be finding a place in the "new Cuba." These were the results, observed a Baptist missionary, "the significance of which lies in the fact that they show the common course of things."<sup>100</sup> Charles Detweiler aptly demonstrated one aspect of the "common course of things"--the relation of Protestant education to Cuban society--in his description of a typical student's

evolution. The student was a rural worker, and, as Detweiler believed, a case study in the course of Protestant mission education in a dependent society:

A number of years ago a young man began to come to a mission Sunday School in Cuba.... Soon after entering the Sunday School he joined the Young People's Society and later took up special studies.... The Christian ideals of life gripped him with a compelling force. As his life flowed out to others there came to him a new appreciation of what is worthwhile in material things. The missionary found that he had all unconsciously created a new market for American goods. The wages of this young man had not materially increased, but he now knew how to use them better. He now lives in a neat frame cottage made of lumber shipped from Charleston, S.C. His furniture was made at Grand Rapids, Michigan. The bread he has on his table is made from flour shipped from Wichita, Kansas. His clothes were woven in Massachusetts. He wears shoes that were manufactured in St. Louis. He is fond of music and he plays a violin that was purchased from a Chicago firm.<sup>101</sup>

To the above conditions may be added the enduring dominance of North American conceptions of education. Cuban teachers no longer represented a minority in Protestant education; but they still did not manage Protestant schools.

Complaints to this effect came not only from Cubans but also from some North American missionaries. Though in a minority, George R. Hovey and Canadian missionary Robert Routledge protested to their Baptist colleagues about the lack of Cuban participation in the management of mission schools.<sup>102</sup> Yet the continued dominance of the US churches in the running of Protestant education in Cuba was consistent with a larger mission policy that, by 1920, still insisted on US administration of mission work in eastern Cuba generally.

Despite the rhetoric and two decades of the new Protestantism, neither Protestant education nor the churches could be characterized as Cuban. Rather, their identity, with few exceptions, was more thoroughly North American, and was reinforced by the missions' continued association and identification with the interests of North American capital and their Cuban supporters among the elite. These conditions encouraged neither the formation of an indigenous Protestant church nor the political and economic stability which Protestant institutions sought to ensure. Such an atmosphere did, however, provoke challenges from those Cubans within and outside the Protestant Church concerned with realizing self-government in a shorter time-span than that vaguely forecast by US missionaries. Within the Protestant missions there were Cubans desirous of a genuinely Cuban Church, just as there were those Cubans who

continued to dream of a genuine Cuban independence. Both were influenced by Cuba's radical nationalist history. Both took action, and by the 1920s, raised the concern of their ecclesiastical and political superordinates.

## Chapter Five: Protestant Missions and Cuban Nationalism

The Cuban response to the third intervention by the United States since independence (1917-1923) was complex. Those among the supporters of the Conservative government under Mario G. Menocal, including many Protestant missionaries, welcomed it. The majority of Cubans, however, opposed the landing of US Marines as yet another imposition of US interests, of foreigners. This was most emphatically the case in eastern Cuba where thousands of Cubans took part in the February rebellion, and where a political revolt escalated into a much larger social protest.

The 1917 Liberal conspiracy against the Conservative government of President Menocal was based on the opposition to the president's illegal assumption of a second term in office. The Liberals had the support of the military and of Liberal constituencies throughout Cuba, and by mid-February had de facto control of Oriente province. The Liberals were so confident of success that they "conferred on the insurrectionary movement a distinctive festive quality," dubbing it "La Chambelona."<sup>1</sup> Liberal confidence, furthermore, was based on the expectation of a favourable hearing from the United States.

US political intervention came in February, and armed intervention in August. It came not on the Liberals' behalf, but, instead, in opposition to the "lawless and

unconstitutional act" of revolt for which the Liberals were "held responsible for injury to foreign nationals and for destruction of foreign property."<sup>2</sup> Given the nature of US control over the Cuban national system, the public announcement of the US February position proved sufficient to arrest the decline of the Menocal government and dissolve the Liberal cause in most regions of Cuba by mid-March. Through capture, death and exile, the government eliminated the threat to its power. Many Liberal leaders chose cooperation with the government. Among these were the Afro-Cuban congressman Juan Gualberto Gómez and General Gerardo Machado Morales. At the same time, however, that the national insurgency was collapsing, the rebellion was taking on a new form and purpose independent of the original political grievances.<sup>3</sup>

Workers, farmers and peasants throughout the eastern provinces had long been attracted to the populist appeal of the Liberal Party and accounted for the majority of Liberal support. Afro-Cubans, were a substantial part of the Liberal constituency. Consequently, these groups were active participants in the February rebellion. Furthermore, because their grievances went deeper than the largely political protest of their national Liberal leaders, the insurrection in eastern Cuba developed a momentum of its own, and persisted well after the dissolution of the 1917 February revolt. It had become a regional issue.

By 1917, eastern Cuba had undergone a dramatic transformation. As the Liberals contemplated conspiracy against the Conservative government, Cuba's eastern provinces were embroiled in socio-economic upheaval. The traditional system of predominantly small, self-sufficient landowning farm communities had been transformed by the sugar latifundia. The Cuban sugar boom generated by the World War I destruction of European beet crops helped consolidate North American control. From 1914 to 1919, so much US capital flowed into Cuba that many believed that Wall Street had gained effective control over the Cuban economy during World War I.<sup>4</sup> US banks cited James Blaine's description of Cuba during the war as "the most valuable piece of agricultural real estate on the globe."<sup>5</sup> US corporations expanded sugar mill ownership, construction and production at a frenzied pace. Most of these mills were in Camagüey and Oriente provinces, "on land untouched by sugar monoculture in the nineteenth century."<sup>6</sup> By the early 1920s, eastern Cuba produced more than half of all Cuban sugar, while US capital controlled two-thirds of the country's sugar production.<sup>7</sup>

Such expansion meant the further displacement and dispossession of Cuban farmers and peasants, who became dependent on wages depressed by the importation of cheap labour in the form of West Indian workers. In this manner, the new latifundia contributed substantially to reducing

living standards throughout the eastern provinces. As Pérez noted, and as a few Protestant missionaries also conceded, formerly self-sufficient farmers had been reorganized into a community consisting largely of dependent rural workers who worked for foreign companies, ate imported foods, lived in one of the many company towns, and bought their goods from company stores. Land in eastern Cuba "ceased to produce for the local population and became instead, the preserve of products destined for foreign markets."<sup>8</sup> This loss of control over agricultural production occurred almost simultaneously with the first of many price increases, particularly in food, as the price of staples such as rice, flour and beans rose anywhere from 46 to 75 percent.<sup>9</sup> Thus, the increasing mood of resentment and indignation prevalent among insurgent Liberal supporters in Oriente and Camagüey had in fact predated "La Chambelona."

Between 1914 and 1917, thousands of peasants, farmers and small landowners held organized protests in various parts of eastern Cuba. After 1917, and even more intensely after the collapse of the 1920 "Dance of the Millions," rebellion in the eastern provinces became endemic. From 1917 to the mid-1920s, as North American properties increasingly became the targets of local strikes and revolts, US military forces allied with the Cuban government to protect US properties and restore stability in eastern Cuba. Though under the guise of maneuvers for the European

war, one official of the Cuba Company made the purpose of the thousands of US Marines quite clear: "To aid in the protection of sugar properties and in restoring complete order."<sup>10</sup> Although US and Cuban government forces were successful in gradually diminishing local revolts (many insurgents receded into the eastern mountain ranges), not all protest was silenced. As conditions for many Cubans worsened, US interests in the country, including missionaries, continued to face the realities of rising Cuban nationalism.

The nationalist surge of the 1920s was represented by a range of social groups and political orientations, from the newly organized and reformist bourgeoisie to the mobilized and increasingly revolutionary students and working classes. By the mid-1920s, intellectuals and women's organizations had joined the movement. For virtually all of these groups, the 1920-1921 economic crisis served as a catalyst with which to transcend organization for the defense of local interests and broaden demands for national reform through political action.

An incipient entrepreneurial bourgeoisie counted among the more conservative of Cuban nationalist groups. With property owners, small investors and professionals among their ranks (formerly of the old planter class, political office holders, and/or second-generation immigrants), this new bourgeoisie rose to new heights by 1920. Having for the

first time surpassed foreign interests in industry and manufacture, this new class gained an increasing stake in the Cuban economy during the period leading up to the "Dance of the Millions." National uncertainty after 1920, fuelled by an endemically corrupt government and unstable economy-- both in turn a function of the growing domination of the US-- became a significant enough concern for this new class to organize and agitate for political reform. The product of this brand of reformism was the Junta de Renovación Nacional which in 1923 declared that "The Cuban people want to be free as much from the foreigners who abuse the flag as from the citizens who violate it and will end up burying it."<sup>11</sup>

Meanwhile, the combined impact of the Russian, and more so, Mexican revolutions, in conjunction with the formulation of the University Reform Movement in 1918 in Argentina, generated a renewed interest among Cuban students and intelligentsia to find nationalist solutions to the problems of monoculture and dependency. After 1920, Cubans' disenchantment with their governments, US business, and US intervention found greater expression among students, intellectuals and workers.<sup>12</sup> Organizations such as the Federation of University Students (FEU) demanded reform of the university and of corrupt government, and also increasingly denounced US intervention in Cuban affairs.

The working class too had organized and expanded. The boom-bust cycle of the Cuban economy affected labour disastrously. The aftermath of the "Dance of the Millions" served to accelerate labour organization and politicization. Throughout the 1910s and 1920s depression conditions generated strikes and boycotts across eastern and western Cuba, as workers demanded improved working conditions, equal pay for men and women, price controls, and better living standards. The massive National Workers Confederation of Cuba (CNOC), founded in 1925, became the organ for workers' interests. Politically, working class interests were also represented by organizations like the Cuban Communist Party (PCC). Together, these groups' demands extended beyond purely economic interests and included calls for radical reform of the Cuban state and society, while also denouncing US imperialism.<sup>13</sup> Of all member groups of the Cuban nationalism movement in the 1920s, these were certainly among the more revolutionary in orientation.

The crisis conditions of the early 1920s were both the cause and effect of the "currents that swirled about the republic," and which converged in the form of a rising tide of nationalism.<sup>14</sup> Organized and politicized, all of these groups served to apply significant pressure on the Alfredo Zayas government from various directions.

Against this background, Protestant missionaries' sentiment concerning Cuban nationalism, ecclesiastically or

politically, appeared ambivalent at best. The missionaries' exposure to the Cuban cycles of economic boom and bust, and the human toll of socioeconomic and political instability therein, made them little more amenable to the violent armed protests that were part and parcel of a rising Cuban nationalism. The numerous, more violent expressions of this nationalism, from the armed protest of the Independent Party of Colour in 1912 to the perennial banditry and labour strikes of the late 1910s and 1920s, found missionaries largely unprepared to respond in any fashion beyond that of other North American interests in Cuba.<sup>15</sup>

In the aftermath of the February rebellion, Zenas Martin of the Friends mission in Holguín conveyed a frustration not dissimilar to that of US business interests in the region. Martin lamented that the bands of revolutionists or outlaws (the two terms were often interchangeable) disrupted and prevented mission activity around local townships. "The government troops," he observed, "are scouring the country after these bands.... It is thought that in a few days they will be cleaned up."<sup>16</sup> Somewhat morbidly, the missionary concluded: "This would be a good place for <Teddy> Roosevelt."<sup>17</sup> The "veritable epidemic of incendiarism" as observed by American Baptist missionaries after 1920 was not entirely detrimental to mission work, however.<sup>18</sup> Reports from Protestant missions in eastern Cuba during this period related a general,

continued growth in mission school enrollments in contrast to relatively dormant church congregations, and in spite of (or because of) generalized political and economic crisis.<sup>19</sup> Missionaries like Baptist Robert Routledge remained confident of a "deepening" of faith in time of distress, concluding somewhat optimistically: "The great financial depression of today may in the end turn out to be for the glory of His name and furtherance of his cause."<sup>20</sup>

As for the ecclesiastical dimension of Cuban nationalism, Cuban pastors and lay workers had stepped up a struggle begun earlier for the indigenization of the Protestant Church through their increasing confrontations with missionary colleagues and supervisors (others simply defected). Naturally, both North American missionaries and Cubans mission workers were in agreement on the goal of Cubanization of the Church. Each, however, had different visions of the process of indigenization and the result, both of which became qualified by contradictions emanating from the Protestant missions and Cuban society. Ultimately, the issues of ecclesiastical and political nationalism were inseparable.

"The task," Baptist Howard Grose declared back in 1910, "is not that of a day or a generation... progress must be slow."<sup>21</sup> More than ten years later, this gradualist philosophy concerning the Cubanization of church administration still held sway for virtually all the

missions. By the 1920s, missionary attitudes toward Cuban administration of Cuban Protestantism remained ambivalent. The position taken by Methodist missionary Sterling Neblett was characteristic of missionary ambivalence toward indigenization. Neblett acknowledged that, after two decades of mission work, "the Cuban ministry had grown in experience, poise and spirit."<sup>22</sup> At the same time, the superintendent concluded that Cuban ministers still needed more time before they could contemplate a greater role in church government. Neblett suggested that Cuban ministers had yet to make the "transition from administrative childhood into adolescent experiment and preparation for man's estate."<sup>23</sup> After 1920, all American Baptist churches in eastern Cuba were pastored by Cuban ministers, and Cuban teachers were in the majority in Baptist schools. Yet, although, as Charles Detweiler noted, "Cubans themselves assumed responsibility for the evangelization of their island," Baptist schools and administration remained under the charge of the mission board in the United States.<sup>24</sup> After nearly three decades of mission development, Cuban pastors and lay workers continued to function according to the standards set by religious and educational programs sanctioned by the US churches.

The question of a larger role for Cubans in church and mission affairs, and, ultimately, of the indigenization of the Protestant Church in Cuba, remained a delicate matter

between missionaries and their Cuban colleagues. Cubans and missionaries certainly agreed on the necessity of a developed Cuban ministry. The latter was, of course, one of the primary goals of US missions in eastern Cuba. As Baptist Charles Detweiler, observed, "the secret of a self-supporting church is an educated ministry and laity."<sup>25</sup> But "self-support" was not the same thing as self-government. As missionaries themselves demonstrated, Protestant missions tended to be more ambiguous about Cuban self-government than they were about Cubans managing local churches.

By the 1920s, Protestant mission supervisors were increasingly confronted by the Cuban membership over the matter of a greater administrative role for indigenous pastors. This was not simply a function of the period of rising Cuban nationalism. Rather, it marked a process of gradually rising conflict with the missions begun since the US boards' effective takeover of Cuban Protestantism after 1898. Relations between Cuban pastors and North American missionaries since that time, though by no means conflict-ridden, were not always harmonious. The question of Cuban participation in church administration became a significant source of friction.

During the first decade of mission activity in eastern Cuba, the grievances of Cuban pastors and laicos became manifest in a range of actions from individual acts of

protest to petitions signed by Cubans and presented to the mission's North American administration. Individual Cuban pastors often defected--sometimes taking their own congregations with them-- as a way of resolving their organizational disputes with a particular denomination. H.B. Someillán was one of numerous Cuban pastors to leave the Southern Methodist mission in order to find "a less uneven charge" in another church.<sup>26</sup> Someillán, like other disaffected Cubans, had been an active supporter of the Cuban Liberation Army during the war for independence.<sup>27</sup> Cuban defections of this nature continued throughout the early decades of mission penetration, not on any epidemic scale, but often enough to draw comment from mission administrators, especially among the larger Baptist and Methodist missions. Cuban teachers were also numbered among the departing disaffected, some, like the pastors, taking students with them.

Yet, while the majority of Cuban mission workers appeared to have remained loyal to their churches, they did not do so unquestioningly. While some Cubans, unable to vote in earlier mission conferences, voted with their feet, others took concerted action to pressure their North American administrators to address Cuban concerns within the mission. This was most dramatically the case with the Southern Methodist mission in 1909-1910, and was repeated during the 1920s.<sup>28</sup> Nor were the American Baptists immune

to Cuban complaint. That the principal sources of Cuban grievances and conflict remained essentially the same in the 1920s as they had been two decades earlier was indicative not only of the relative continuity of the ecclesiastical dimension of Cuban nationalism. It also strongly suggested the inadequacy or inability of eastern Protestant missions like the Methodist and the Baptist to address Cuban concerns in key areas of mission development--areas which had significant implications for the future of the Protestant Church in Cuba. Two decades of Protestant mission endeavour had resulted in the development of a substantial group of Cuban pastors, teachers, and laicos. The US churches, however, appeared no closer to their presumed goal of Cuban management of Protestant institutions, nor to addressing effectively Cuban concerns in this regard. Cuban grievances in the 1920s, therefore, continued to center around the key areas such as funding distribution, salaries, and most importantly, greater Cuban participation in mission administration. That Cuban grievances remained largely unaddressed, and a Cuban National Church still a very distant prospect, became most evident among the largest missions in eastern Cuba.

Southern Methodists and American Baptists boasted about the Cubanization of their churches. Yet by 1930, both missions still lacked a Cuban administration for their missions. At the same time, many of these churches' Cuban

pastors were often hard-pressed to maintain a congregation and funding, a function of contradictory mission policy and dependent Cuba's socioeconomic reality. It was partly for the latter reason that many Protestant schools and churches located on or near the mills and factories of North American companies. Captive congregations, the populations of company towns were only as stable as the tiempo muerto or "dead season" allowed. Protestant missions also became susceptible to the vicissitudes of regional and international labour migration. Congregation loss due to worker migration, however, proved relatively less problematic for missionaries and pastors working in company towns than in other towns and villages in the eastern provinces.<sup>29</sup>

Cuban pastors and their congregations, furthermore, were expected by their US administrators to progress toward self-support (if not self-government) by implanting the concepts and infrastructure of a North American, middle class Protestantism in a region that, like the rest of Cuba, was unevenly-developed, socioeconomically impoverished, and vulnerable to the violent swings of a sugar monoculture. Genuine self-support among Cuban-pastored churches became a daunting task, even for some of the larger centers like Santiago de Cuba. More reflective of the 1920s and the 1930s was the observation of Baptist Robert Routledge, who, in 1925, noted that because "sugar is on the rocks," many

pastors were "finding difficulty in closing the year free of debt."<sup>30</sup> Methodist bishop Warren Candler later sounded similar alarms in contradictorily appealing to private donors for aid to Methodist churches in the field which "have been trying earnestly to reach the stage of self-support."<sup>31</sup> As the bishop conceded, "most of them being poor people," Cuban pastors and their congregations were highly vulnerable to volatile sugar prices and general depression.<sup>32</sup> Consequently, pastors' earnings and local church funds became so significantly reduced that financial self-support became increasingly difficult to achieve, let alone the payment of debts. When the Protestant churches finally attempted to address these contradictions, they did so largely in reaction to unrelenting pressures from Cuban members, and, ultimately, in a North American way.

US missions rationalized the generally lower salaries and funding of Cuban pastors relative to North American missionaries based on the necessity of learning self-support. Conversely, however, the models for pastoral self-support, the missionaries, routinely relied on their mission boards in the US for their salaries and expense accounts. Seemingly oblivious to the apparent double-standard at work, some missionaries chastened Cuban pastors for their dependency on the board. Some like Methodist Sterling Neblett contradictorily insisted that they rely on the example set by US missionaries who were not expected to rely

financially on local congregations or populations (in the same letter, Neblett proceeded to demand that more allowances be granted by the board for missionaries' expenses).<sup>33</sup>

Though the problem of support was fundamentally one of mission policy (and a degree of cultural chauvinism), it was exacerbated by regionalism. Both North American and Cuban mission workers had long complained of their mission boards' apparent bias against missions in the eastern provinces. This was dramatically the case among the Southern Methodists where east-west divisions appeared sharpest. Appropriations for Cuban pastors' salaries became one bone of contention as early as 1906. "I doubt not our Cuban men could use more money," bishop Candler had insisted, "and I wish I had it for them."<sup>34</sup> The bishop was able, however, to pool all the required resources for his namesake college in Havana, a commodious institution which, by the 1930s, remained one focus of long-standing friction between Methodist missions in the east and west.<sup>35</sup>

For Cuban churches, self-support remained deeply problematic even after several decades of mission activity. Denominational self-government, therefore, continued to be denied to the Cuban pastors and laicos of the principal Protestant missions in eastern Cuba. Not only did administration continue to be dominated by North American missionaries, Cuban participation in mission conferences

remained severely limited. By 1920, Methodist mission administrators had conceded a new law which allowed for limited indigenous participation in the Cuban conference. The Methodist mission board granted Cuban pastors certain rights and responsibilities, observed one missionary, without "going all the way and putting the mission in their hands."<sup>36</sup> At about the same time, the Baptist mission also gave their Cuban workers certain rights and functions in the form of fiscal administration of local churches. Missionaries equated the push for financial self-support-- which effectively collapsed after the "Dance of the Millions"--with self-government. Privately, however, the immediate goal was more limited, as Charles Detweiler remarked: "It has been a great relief to the Secretary and to other representatives of the Society in New York not to have to deal with the salary problem."<sup>37</sup> Even "financial independence" was frequently qualified by mission boards' intervention into the business of Cubans attempting to manage their own churches. Some Cuban pastors, refusing to countenance any interference in the limited administrative responsibilities of their pastoral labours, strived to keep their local churches self-supporting. Others, either weaned on mission board dependency or working against enormous odds (as many who found themselves in war zones during a rebellion did), accepted the mission administration's contradictory conception of self-support and the financial

aid which accompanied it. Financial self-support, even without the contradiction of mission intervention, did not translate into the broader powers of self-government by Cubans. Cuban control of mission administration remained a very distant object of the US Protestant churches' goals in eastern Cuba.

This was perhaps most dramatically evident in the case of the American Friends mission. By 1919 Cuban Friends were allowed limited participation in annual conferences like their counterparts in the larger missions. Prior to this period, Cuban pastors typically had no voice in policy and were not, strictly speaking, members of the "mission."<sup>38</sup> Cuban Friends pastors, as in all the Protestant missions, were largely recipients of the tutelage of US churches. This policy endured even after 1925 when, faced with massive cuts to mission funding consistent with a board decision to prioritize mission development in Africa, Friends missionaries were forced to contemplate an autonomous Cuban church. The initial decision of the Friends board in 1925 to prepare Cuban members in eastern Cuba for transfer to the Methodist mission was vehemently opposed by the Cubans who insisted on maintaining the Friends mission under Cuban auspices.<sup>39</sup> The Havana mission remained open under the aegis of founding missionary Sylvester Jones.

Zenas Martin, head of the eastern missions, was incredulous at the board's logic in discontinuing the

eastern Cuban mission because it had proven successful.<sup>40</sup> One of the smaller missions in eastern Cuba, the American Friends was one of the earliest missions to arrive in Cuba. When measured in numbers of adherents, accumulated properties, and (board-assisted) self-support in churches and especially schools, the Friends church in eastern Cuba had grown substantially since 1900.<sup>41</sup> Nevertheless, the board had decided in favour of its Havana mission, relinquishing the eastern field to its Cuban members. A combination of reduced funding from the US, the board decision to favour Africa over Cuba, and the catastrophic aftermath of the Cuban "Dance of the Millions," effectively forced the realization of a Cuban Friends Church in Oriente.<sup>42</sup> In 1927, a committee convened to establish the Cuba Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends. Yet the ostensibly autonomous Cuban Conference's first chairman was Zenas Martin, a North American missionary. Furthermore, as Friends historian Hiram Hilty pointed out, relative to most other national conferences, the Cuban Church's autonomy and independence were more theoretical than real:

Had Cuban Friends really reached maturity and a state of self-sufficiency in 1927? Of course they had not. Zenas Martin's report was to prove overly optimistic, and in the high praise coming out of Richmond there was perhaps an unconscious effort to salve the conscience

of an inadequate parent. One of the missionaries remaining on the field was quite blunt about it. The Yearly Meeting, he averred, was nothing more than a glorified Christian Endeavour Society, not a mature organization to be taken seriously.<sup>43</sup>

The Cuban Friends church had gained a formal autonomy not unlike the Cuban republic in 1902. The Cuban Friends remained at minimum financially dependent on the American Friends board in the US. Their dependency extended to other spheres of the Cuban church. "Far from going native," Hilty notes, "Cuba Yearly meeting equated being Protestant with perpetuating the forms and attitudes received from the pioneers."<sup>44</sup> In this manner, the Cubanization of the Friends church was severely qualified. It appeared that the break with "parental tutelage" was difficult for both US missionaries and Cuban members.

As for the largest Protestant missions (for which there was no such foreseeable separation contemplated), indigenization was even further away from realization. As noted, this was largely a function of contradictions in mission policy and between policy and practice. It was also a matter of North American missionaries' preemptive paternalistic chauvinism. Not unlike these churches, Friends missionaries remained susceptible to a type of paternalistic possessiveness which, while it allowed for optimism about the future of their now-autonomous Cuban

wards, still harboured doubt about the Cuban capacity for self-government: "Our young men and women are the hope of Cuba, but they must be helped to grow strong morally and become capable to fill responsible places in Church and State."<sup>45</sup>

After more than two decades, American Baptist and Southern Methodist missionaries also generally persisted in paternalistic attitudes and practices. The missions insisted on the need to continue their support of the Cuban field by maintaining control of education and administration, lest their Cuban dependents should regress into the "rotten social life" of Cuban society.<sup>46</sup> From the Methodist perspective, Sterling Neblett suggested that "Cuba is too small to set up for herself an independent and separate ecclesiastical body;" and vaguely concluded, "that would be unwise and even dangerous."<sup>47</sup> Overall, however, the missionary reaction to Cubanization of the Protestant Church was more complex.

While most missionaries appeared satisfied with the gradualist approach to indigenization, there was also a marked degree of ambivalence among North American missionary ranks. Some missionaries like Baptist Robert Routledge complained about continued US dominance in areas of mission administration like education, and were supported in their criticisms by their missionary colleagues. Baptist George R. Hovey, for example, also questioned the lack of Cuban

participation in mission administration: "We have done practically nothing for the training of Christian workers other than preachers."<sup>48</sup> By 1926, furthermore, missionaries from Methodist and Baptist ranks acknowledged the growing Cuban call for indigenization. As Routledge observed: "Many evangelical Cubans are already thinking in terms of a National Church as something entirely distinct from our present denominational groups."<sup>49</sup> Several years later, however, as the social and economic crises of the 1920s depression persisted, the optimism of missionaries like Routledge appeared to degenerate into a mixture of pessimism and chauvinism: "A tropical climate is not conducive to intensified religious culture any more than it is to intensified farming."<sup>50</sup>

Among Methodist missionaries also, a minority opposed sending more missionaries from the US to Cuba, in favour of more earnestly working toward Cuban ministry development. Easton Clements asserted that "so long as we have missionaries to fall back on, we will not be as much concerned as we should... for the building up of a Latin ministry. While we may never have in Cuba a situation like that of Mexico, still our hope lies in a strong Latin leadership."<sup>51</sup> Yet Clements also qualified his support for Cubanization: "We should of course maintain a missionary force in Cuba sufficient to hold things together."<sup>52</sup> Such ambivalence, particularly among the minority of missionaries

who criticized the vague mission program for indigenization, continued to plague Protestant missions well into the third decade of mission activity in eastern Cuba.

Missions' perceived need to "hold things together" continued to take precedence more unambiguously than any semblance of a policy for fostering a more substantial indigenous role in administration--rhetoric included. It also was the mandate of the Southern Methodist mission's "Committee on Nationalism in Cuba." Formed in 1928, ostensibly to monitor and address Cuban mission workers' views on the ecclesiastical dimension of rising Cuban nationalism, the Committee's survey ultimately served to reinforce missions' reluctance to contemplate seriously the implementation of a policy for Cubanization.

Methodist mission administrators drew their conclusions from a survey sent out in mid-1928 to Methodist missionaries, pastors, and selected laicos and church members. Inconclusive at best, the survey's results apparently confirmed for the Committee the "erroneous conception" Cuban pastors and laicos had of their role in mission administration.<sup>53</sup> As representative Sterling Neblett noted, "there are but few radicals among us, but practically all declare for a larger participation of Cuban leaders in the administration of the Church."<sup>54</sup> This demand for an increased role included: Cuban parity with US missionaries in local administration of mission districts;

an equal voice in the allocation of mission funds; and standardization of salaries. At bottom was the demand of the Cuban Methodist majority for a more substantive move toward Cubanization than the Methodist mission had yet taken.<sup>55</sup> Neblett and the Committee, however, chose to focus on another aspect of the survey's results for their own conclusions: The apparent consensus on the weakness of the Cuban Church in eastern Cuba.

As an accurate indicator of mission worker sentiment, the Methodist mission survey was flawed in that only a small percentage of the questionnaires sent out were returned by late 1928. It is also unclear what percentage of the survey results were used by the Committee in early 1929 for their conclusions, which were then sent to the Methodist General Committee on Nationalism. What is clear is that Cuban nationalism in the ecclesiastical realm long predated the Methodist mission's formal attempt to address it. As noted, Cuban agitation for a greater role in mission administration began long before the generalized rising nationalism of the 1920s. These were not, as US missionaries later recognized, radical demands. They were in fact logical requests which tested the weight of Protestant mission policy and rhetoric espousing the development of a Cuban leadership.

As reflected in the conclusions of the Methodist committee on nationalism in Cuba, however, mission policy on the indigenization of administration remained a long-term if

not distant objective. The Cuba Committee's 1929 report to the General Committee on Nationalism had a North American bias that implied more about the apparent weakness of the Church in Cuba than of the potential of its Cuban pastors, workers, and supporters. Neblett and the Committee defended the centralization of mission fund allocation in the US, and questioned the Cuban request for parity with US missionaries in the distributive powers.<sup>56</sup> Earlier, Neblett appeared to reassure the bishop that "there will be no serious demand at this time for a Cuban National Church...but for continued adherence to the Mother Church, with adjustments that will give them more voice in the administration."<sup>57</sup> Almost a year later, the Committee's report reflected that position, if not the Cuban reality.

The report insisted that the Cuban Church maintain its status as "an integral part of the Mother Church" in the US.<sup>58</sup> At the same time, Cuban participation in national church administration was to be expanded. But this was dependent on vague conditions of "adequate preparation" as determined by the the US board, and ultimately translated into slightly augmented but still significantly limited Cuban participation in their own mission administration.<sup>59</sup> Neblett and other missionaries saw no wrong in this. Cubans, he insisted, "exercised the same functions, rights and responsibilities in the Mission Annual Conference as did preachers in the homeland in the Annual Conference."<sup>60</sup> Yet

in both cases, mission administration derived from the US church, and was dominated by the US church board. Neblett seemed to imply that Cuba was, after all, a real home mission, and should be treated as such. This verged on imperialism, and was reminiscent of a chauvinism popular in the heyday of US expansionism, albeit in a new form.

If there were any significant gains made by Methodist Cuban pastors after the mission survey on nationalism, it was the mission's recognition that the Cubans' primary grievance continued to be "discrimination against them in the matter of responsible appointments," not salaries.<sup>61</sup> Yet, as the aftermath of the survey demonstrated, this recognition was more formal than substantive. By the 1940s, the Methodist mission still maintained the highest proportion of North American missionaries in eastern Cuba. Protestant missions in general continued to deny indigenous pastors a greater role in the administration of the national churches. Many Cubans within the Church, and even a few missionaries, felt that when the North American missions addressed the question, they did so inadequately. Several years after the Methodist survey on indigenization, the board's Secretary, O.E. Goddard, confirmed the gap between mission theory and practice. In an inspection of the mission in 1931, Goddard was of "the very definite conviction that the discovery and training of a native ministry," the "only hope" of an autonomous church, "had

not been the major concern of our work in Cuba."<sup>62</sup> The consequences of the North American bias in mission policy a decade later was further apparent in the observations of other missionaries. "A large part" of Cubans within and outside the Protestant Church, noted Methodist Maurice Daily, still "consider it as the 'American system' of religion...they do not consider it as theirs yet."<sup>63</sup>

Mission reports throughout the early period continued to stress the imperative of the development of a Cuban ministry. But as numerous missionaries also noted, missions were also concerned with the nurturing of responsible Christian corporate citizens.<sup>64</sup> National stability and prosperity remained an essential part of the evangelizing and civilizing mission. So much so that by the 1930s the "civilizing" or "moralizing" mission appeared to have confirmed its place as a means to the end of evangelization, as Goddard and other missionaries had observed.<sup>65</sup> This certainly goes a long way to explain the increased emphasis on education among Protestant missions in eastern Cuba, as well as the enthusiasm for cooperation among missions in this area of endeavour. Finally, the US churches' perceived need to direct and dominate education programs was even more palpable in their reactions to Cuban grievances over administration. Cubans were considered trainable as pastors and Protestant school teachers, but not as administrators of the larger mission field. By 1930, the Methodist, Baptist

and Friends missions could indeed boast that most or all of their churches were under the charge of Cuban pastors. But as one missionary also concluded: "In our educational work, we have gone more slowly."<sup>66</sup> Protestant education remained, along with administration generally, under the effective control of the US churches--this included the ostensibly autonomous Cuban Friends schools.<sup>67</sup>

As J. Merle Davis noted in a 1942 report on Protestant missions in Cuba, neither US intervention nor Protestant mission policy were of a character to foster national self-reliance. Dependency persisted as a key factor in the policies and practice of both. The successful development of Cuban institutions--secular or ecclesiastical--was ultimately judged according to the degree to which they resembled US forms. Whether in the building of churches and schools, or of a future Cuban leadership, US resources and standards predominated. As Davis insightfully observed, the Protestant church in Cuba was contributing to a hegemonic legacy of its own:

The new congregations needed churches, and these were built with US money; these churches needed pastors, and...the Cuban ministers were educated in US seminaries. This procedure developed a well-trained pastorate and a generation of Cuban church leaders who had been introduced to the amenities of US society. This training also gave the young leaders... the model

of US church building, organization, ritual, discipline and program of activities. These standards were influenced by centuries of Anglo-Saxon tradition and development and were alien to social and economic patterns of Cuban life.<sup>68</sup>

While the Protestant mission campaign was deliberate, however, it was ultimately more culturally-predetermined than conspiratorial:

The mission aim was to establish the Church of Christ in Cuba, rather than to adjust the Church to the economic standards and the peculiar culture of the country. This was inevitable under the missionary urge, and from the fact that the missionary was commissioned to establish the type of church which had trained him, and with which he was acquainted.<sup>69</sup>

Though a "foreign inheritance," paternalism and ethnocentrism continued to play an important part in determining Protestant mission policy and practice. The inherent contradictions of mission policy generated a significant response in the Cuban drive for mission reforms. Yet many North American missionaries maintained (implicitly or explicitly) that mission weaknesses were based in the culturally inferior conditions of the Cuban Church and its mission workers.<sup>70</sup> Even Davis, whose report was comprehensively critical of the US churches' policies in Cuba, asserted in the same report that Cubans were "a race

still in the making and in the adolescent period of development."<sup>71</sup> Cubans continued to be deemed incapable of assuming the major responsibilities of the highest posts, which continued to be filled by US missionaries until the Cuban revolution's radicalization in the 1960s. Furthermore, the unsettled economic and political conditions of Cuba in the 1920s and 1930s reinforced the position of US mission policymakers against the growing Cuban desire for an autonomous national church. Crisis conditions also coloured North American missionaries' attitudes toward the secular, political dimension of Cuban nationalism.

In the same way that Cuban Protestants stepped up their call for a greater role in mission affairs, Cubans on a political level actively contributed to a renewed movement of Cuban nationalism in the 1920s. The rising demands of Cubans for control over their own national destiny certainly played a part in influencing Cuban pastors' grievances regarding ecclesiastical affairs and vice versa.<sup>72</sup> A few were involved in both dimensions.

Cuban nationalism was represented by various social groups, from the working to entrepreneurial and professional classes. All of these by the 1920s had become newly-organized and highly politicized, and, despite the fundamentally differing political orientations, all converged in a renewed national opposition against the single most infamous symbol of US hegemony in Cuba--the

Platt Amendment. During the third decade of US intervention and Protestant mission penetration, as Pérez pointed out, attacks against the Platt Amendment increased substantially and with rare unity:

On few other issues had Cuban public opinion arrived at such unanimity of purpose. Political elites could neither dismiss rising nationalist sentiment nor remain neutral in the national debate. Nor could they acquiesce to continued US intervention without impairing their ability to govern. These developments increasingly forced officeholders to adopt a stronger nationalist position, if only to undercut the rising nationalist surge.<sup>73</sup>

Neither US armed intervention in eastern Cuba from 1917 to 1923, nor political intervention in 1920 to unilaterally reorganize the electoral and administrative system, had proven to be anything other than short-term solutions to the much deeper problem of structural dependency. For most Cubans, political and economic crises persisted, whether under the Zayas administration or under the new Liberal president Gerardo Machado, elected in 1924. The first political party to formally demand the abrogation of the Platt Amendment, once in power, Machado and the Liberals proved little more effective in combatting Cuban dependency on the US than their predecessors. Machado's "business nationalism" program--a policy which mixed nationalistic

rhetoric with limited economic reform that neither significantly challenged the interests of North American capital nor altered the terms of dependency--gained the support of many Cubans, especially among the entrepreneurial and professional classes. To these groups, the new government delivered. But the flawed experiment in industrial development and diversification proved a shortlived success vulnerable to the drastic cycles of Cuba's dependent economy.

When the depression struck Cuba in the late 1920s. it did so unevenly. With the earlier eastward shift in sugar production, the provinces of Camagüey and Oriente became the largest sugar producers in Cuba. Consequently, this region was among the most devastated by the depression and by government attempts to restrict sugar production. In addition, foreign-owned mills--the majority in eastern Cuba--withstood the depression better than Cuban-owned mills, while larger cane growers (colonos) did better than smaller colonos. The uneven distribution of the costs of sugar production, therefore, gave the political and economic crisis of the 1920s and early 1930s a "strongly nationalist inflection."<sup>74</sup> The working class was among the hardest hit, and one of the first to mobilize. As wages plummeted and unemployment soared, sugar workers along with workers from various sectors stepped up their protest. By the late 1920s, strikes and demonstrations disrupted production in

countless mills and factories. Meanwhile, political opposition accompanied labour militancy in the rapidly escalating warfare with a government which, like its predecessors, responded to crisis with the protection of foreign property and repression of workers and other government opponents.

Against the backdrop of a volatile Cuban nationalism, continued government corruption and repression, and the endemic political and economic crisis which was both cause and effect, US Protestant missions attempted to carry on business as usual. A few missionaries either supported the rising political opposition to the government, or appeared largely oblivious to the political and economic issues. Most, however, appeared to have favoured the status quo, and identified with the proponents, organizations and structures founded in US hegemony, including its surrogate representatives in the state and government.

In 1925 the Machado government advanced a form of nationalism that corresponded most to the interests of the most conservative elements of the bourgeoisie, to US interests, and to the interests of the Protestant missions. Though the "business nationalism" experiment was shortlived, while it lasted, foreign capital and local interests enjoyed a "reasonably felicitous coexistence."<sup>75</sup> This was indicative of the fact that US interests, under certain conditions, could coexist with a conservative type of Cuban

nationalism which, while it opposed heavy-handed intervention, was consistent with the US view that Cuba needed close supervision. From this perspective, the US was perceived as an ally of reform.<sup>76</sup> When the depression hit Cuba in the late 1920s, there were fewer Cuban republicans and nationalists who maintained this belief, as the protection of US interests at the expense of national interests once again became paramount. As the crisis intensified, coexistence gave way to a polarization of interests, and conservative nationalism to a more radicalized form dominated by workers, students and intellectuals who demanded the end of US interventionism.

Most Protestant missionaries, meanwhile, continued to identify with US interests and with a conservative, deprecating nationalism which effectively advocated only a greater share in Cuba's dependency on the US market. Mission reports noted that the "business adversity" of the period caused some decline in school enrollment and church membership. Some missions in eastern Cuba, such as the Baptist and Methodist, compensated for losses in church membership by evangelizing among the growing communities of West Indian workers or braceros imported by North American companies to combat labour shortages--and undercut the growing demands of Cuban workers for better wages and working conditions.<sup>77</sup> Much of the reasoning behind bracero conversion was, as Routledge demonstrated, based in

long-held racialist preconceptions. The Haitian was "valued for his brute capacity to stand the trying work of the cane fields but otherwise was held in disesteem, a very natural result when we consider the type of civilization he represents."<sup>78</sup> As among Cubans, Protestant missionaries continued to use conversion as a way of making more "reliable labourers" of Haitian and Jamaican braceros.<sup>79</sup>

"Conditions in Cuba," a Methodist missionary wrote in 1926, "are distressing, extreme poverty everywhere. Thousands without work wander about the streets and along the highways begging for bread, and the political unrest is everyday becoming acute."<sup>80</sup> At the same time, the eastern missions generally took a "business as usual" approach to mission work throughout the Machado era. The relative decline in work among Cubans generated more interest in missionizing among braceros. Though at a slower pace than in more prosperous times, new mission stations continued to be opened, particularly at sugar mills where operations and labour populations underwent an expansion fed by bracero labour. Thus, after 1925, the Southern Methodist mission opened a new station in San German, and shortly after in the United Fruit company towns of Preston and Mayarí.<sup>81</sup> The Baptists, meanwhile, expanded their work among Haitian braceros in Victoria de las Tunas, and several other milltowns.<sup>82</sup> Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, even when bracero numbers were later reduced by government deportation

orders, US missions continued to foster mission work among Haitian and Jamaican workers.<sup>83</sup>

Not unlike their corporate associates, then, Protestant missionaries adapted to alternate sources for their labours during periods of crisis, as they worked to make good Christians and reliable workers of braceros in Oriente and Camagüey. Part of the "natural" progress of mission work in Cuba, bracero evangelization also tended to reinforce mission ties with local planters and mill officials, and in turn generated less sympathy for striking workers. Most missionaries attributed the crisis conditions of the depression less to the functioning of foreign capital and sugar monoculture than to Cuban failings. After all, a Friends missionary fumed, US companies provided Cuban employment.<sup>84</sup>

Perhaps one of the more dramatic instances of missionaries' close association and identification with US business interests during this period was that of the Friends superintendent Zenas Martin. Since the dawn of Friends mission work in eastern Cuba, the United Fruit Company had been an essential associate of the mission. This was largely, though not solely, Martin's doing. A successful Iowa businessman and personal friend of then-president of United Fruit, Lorenzo Baker, Martin played an important role in guiding the mission-Company relationship through the years. Convinced, as Martin put it in 1902,

that "the Lord gave me a place among the men of the United Fruit Company," the missionary nevertheless initially appeared wary of allying with a "great soulless corporation."<sup>85</sup> Thereafter, Martin expressed a cautious confidence in being able to avoid a conflict of interests. Yet, as the cases of Baptist H.R. Moseley and numerous other missionaries demonstrated, the line between the interests of the mission and those of the Company soon became blurred.

During the first decade of Protestant mission-building, the Friends acquired "by gift" land and property in various sites from United Fruit, and other companies. At about the same time, Martin, a resident of Holguín, acquired several cane plantations which included Los Arroyos, La Yabe and Ceiba Hueca. By 1920, Martin had taken his place among the eastern region's other cane growers or colonos. He employed some 40 Haitian, Jamaican and Cuban workers on a seasonal basis, and sold his sugar crops to United Fruit, the Cuban American Sugar Company, and Cupey company mills in northern Oriente.<sup>86</sup> By the mid-1920s, through his business and mission relationship, Martin had become a favourite among the major mills' colono associates. So much so that, when in 1925 growers organized to demand higher cane prices, the missionary-colono sided with mill-owners. Martin also followed the companies' lead in replacing striking sugarworkers. The missionary was not amused by escalating labour conflict: "I have been enjoying another strike in the

canefield for a week.... Have things somewhat organized again with what you might call `scabs.'"<sup>87</sup>

Martin's death in 1931 generated a flood of condolences from business and mission associates alike. Highly regarded both as missionary and businessman, Martin's business and mission interests were apparently never recognized to be conflicting. Instead, some missionaries more typically regarded his business practices as "natural," behaviour not unbecoming of the "right kind" of Christian citizen."<sup>88</sup> Those missionaries who, like Martin and Moseley, mixed business ventures with mission work, identified more with the conservative "business nationalism" of Machado (himself an owner of a sugarmill and various other enterprises) than with the more radical elements among the students and working class.

With or without personal business interests to protect, most missionaries appear to have identified with and supported the state under Machado no less so than previous Cuban regimes. Missionaries, for the most part, appear to fall most clearly into the decadencia category of Cuban nationalism, and supported the idea that "Cuban culture was ill-suited to sustain a republic because it had been so misshapen by colonial rule.... They opposed heavy-handed intervention but applauded many of the aims of the moralization program."<sup>89</sup> Not all missionaries supported the Platt Amendment. Many, however, advocated a combination

of Protestant education mixed with other "benefits of US influence" as a formula which would foster a "stronger, more capable citizenship."<sup>90</sup>

Throughout the late 1920s and early 1930s, most missionaries in eastern Cuba continued to express the "altruistic side of the white man's burden."<sup>91</sup> They did so in the form of "moralization programs," run independently and in conjunction with the Machado government in 1927.<sup>92</sup> Created to combat political corruption, gambling, prostitution, and other presumably Cuban failings, moralization programs were another manifestation of missionaries' lack of confidence in Cubans' ability to govern themselves independently. As the failings of a dependent Cuban polity persisted--armed rebellion, government corruption, police repression, labour agitation, racial unrest, fraudulent elections--missionary reformers "sought to solve them with doses of North American middle class values and behaviour."<sup>93</sup> Among the missions, "moralization" became the new watchword for an era of mission endeavour that, not unlike earlier ones, promoted political and economic stability in Cuba for the sake of mission work as much as for the sake of foreign capital.

The promotion of "moralization," therefore, was not inconsistent with missions' support of a pro-US dictatorship over and above the less predictable--and more radical--forces of Cuban nationalism. The US government continued to

support the "effective president" Machado long after the illegal, "pseudo-constitutional extension" of his mandate in 1928.<sup>94</sup> Mission moralization aims likewise continued long after the defunct government moralization program and increased repression by the government of workers, students and other political opponents. As the depression in the sugar industry deepened, and as the government's crackdown of an increasingly nationwide opposition intensified, Protestant missionaries' actions--or inaction--further betrayed the rhetoric of political neutrality.

Like Zenas Martin's earlier confidence that "Menocal would handle things" in 1917, most North American missionaries in eastern Cuba at least tolerated the Machado dictatorship.<sup>95</sup> By 1930, the heightened government repression of student demonstrations and labour strikes merited little or no mention in Protestant reports. When it did, it was largely in the economic context of the lingering effects of "business depression" on mission work, while reports on temperance and hygiene campaigns appeared as higher social priorities.<sup>96</sup> In other instances, Mission organs like El Mensajero defended Machado's masonic background against Catholic criticism, and later announced the baptism of "a very close relative of our President."<sup>97</sup> Mission reports' references to "our president" after 1925 were tantamount to tacit recognition of the Machado government at a time when its political legitimacy was

being violently questioned on a national scale.<sup>98</sup> By the early 1930s, as communism replaced Catholicism as the new societal menace, mission support for the Machado dictatorship sometimes became explicit.

In the meantime, Protestant missions in eastern Cuba rejected armed struggle or popular rebellion at the same time that they generally maintained a silence over government repression. In 1929 Baptist secretary Charles Detweiler conceded the option of peaceful protest, but advised also in favour of "intelligent cooperation" in order to help "moderate" the government's martial position.<sup>99</sup> Methodist Sterling Neblett, while acknowledging the widespread opposition to the Machado regime, "forged ahead" with Methodist doctrine which counseled "all men to seek first the Kingdom of God and His righteousness for then and only then would peace and justice prevail."<sup>100</sup> Temporal solutions for addressing conditions under a national dictatorship were less numerous. The practical tendency of most missionaries toward identification with and support for the government of the day, and criticism of opposition forces--however popular--was maintained well into the 1930s. "Christian cooperation with the state" remained the rule.<sup>101</sup>

Missionary consensus, though by no means absolute, was a logical reflection of North American interests in Cuba generally. Yet, in the case of at least one denomination,

consensus for the status quo in eastern Cuba was a function of deliberate recruitment policy. In a letter to Methodist bishop Warren Candler in mid-1928, secretary O.E. Goddard reaffirmed the bishop's orders to keep missionaries considered liberal "black sheep" out of the Cuban field: "Cuba thus far had been free from liberalistic views and you wanted to keep it that way."<sup>102</sup> Missionary unity, therefore, was not always a reflection of ideological convergence among missionaries per se. Historical evidence strongly suggests, nevertheless, that the great majority of missionaries in eastern Cuba feared a progressive or radical Cuban nationalism more than the Machado government. The Protestant missions' vehement attacks on the Catholic Church endured into the 1930s, in sharp contrast to a relatively muted Protestant Church vis-a-vis the government. Yet if there was little ambivalence among North American missionaries toward Cuban nationalism and the Machadato, there is evidence of dissension among the ranks of Cuban pastors.

Of the writings of Cuban ministers which exist, there is evidence that some Cuban mission workers dissented with their mission boards on the political dimension of Cuban nationalism just as they had over the ecclesiastical dimension. While few if any Cuban pastors actively opposed governments like Machado's, individual Cuban Protestants

certainly did, against the wishes of missionaries and pastors.

Among the American Baptists, however, a few Cuban pastors clearly conveyed their opposition toward the corrupt governments of both Zayas and Machado. They apparently advocated the need to generate a progressive form of nationalism that combined evangelical Protestantism with Cuban patriotism--something missionaries were less likely to contemplate. Alfredo Santana, Juan Barrios and other Cuban pastors exhorted other Cuban ministers to protest the violations of civil and human rights carried out by the government.<sup>103</sup> The contrast between these pastors' vocal protests against government violence and US missionaries' criticisms of the forces opposing the Machado regime is striking. The Cuban pastors also criticized the general corruption of the Cuban political system, and declared it to be "without the moral strength to govern the masses" (while US missionaries tended toward skepticism of the masses' moral strength).<sup>104</sup>

Cuban pastors, however, were not likely to exhort their congregations to take action. Out of habit, protests were at times directed at the Catholic Church which was blamed for Cuba's crisis conditions.<sup>105</sup> Like the missionaries, many Cuban pastors criticized only the symptoms of US hegemony in Cuba, not the sources of dependency. Yet, the positive references made by the Cubans to Cuban nationalism, and

their critique of national leaders, were significant statements that were absent in the writings and reports of missionary colleagues.

The relative dissent of some Cuban pastors appeared not to have caused any significant rift within the principal Protestant missions. While there was a more concerted response by Cuban pastors toward the ecclesiastical dimension of Cuban nationalism--Cubanization of the Church--their actions within the realm of national politics appeared less organized and more individualized. At a fundamental level, little had changed for the Protestant missions in eastern Cuba. Cuban ambivalence over both dimensions of Cuban nationalism seemed to be contained by the paternalism of the North American churches. At the same time, most missionaries continued to oppose Cuban nationalism.

Yet, if the Protestant churches in eastern Cuba in 1932 were, as Neblett observed, "less disturbed than other institutions and groups of society" by the Machado's violence, most ordinary Cubans, within and outside the Church, were not so fortunate.<sup>106</sup> While a few Cuban pastors openly advocated a change in government, they along with their congregations remained vulnerable to deepening depression and rising rebellion. Yet unlike the thousands of Cubans--Protestant and otherwise--who, by the early 1930s, attempted to salvage and regenerate Cuban nationalism and then formed the first genuinely independent government

in Cuba, the Protestant Church in Cuba made no such move toward ecclesiastical independence. The early 1930s saw the violent culmination of Cuban nationalism. It was an era of great change within the Cuban nation; this was much less so the case for the Cuban Protestant Church.

## Chapter Six: Good Neighbours and Protestant Missions

The inauguration of Gerardo Machado in 1929 for his second (albeit illegal) term as President of Cuba was entirely inauspicious. Accompanied by the full impact of global depression and then the raised duties on Cuban sugar by the United States Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act, the already distressed Cuban economy was devastated. From 1930 to 1933, the Cuban share of the US sugar market dropped from 49 percent to 25 percent. Cuban government attempts to restrict production in order to raise prices only further aggravated the monoculture economy. Sugar prices plummeted by 60 percent as did sugar production. The volume of all Cuban exports fell by 80 percent.<sup>1</sup> Producers, meanwhile, attempted to stay solvent, reducing production costs through wage cuts and lay offs. The length of the zafra, the seasonal sugar harvest upon which tens of thousands of sugarworkers relied for employment, was drastically reduced. The United Fruit mills in Boston and Preston, for example, reported an average grinding period of 5 months, and almost 9 months during boom periods. By 1933, it had dropped to barely 2 months.<sup>2</sup>

Wage reductions, worker layoffs, and business and factory closures culminated in massive unemployment. Louis Pérez estimated that some 250,000 family heads, representing about a million people out of a population of less than 4

million, became completely unemployed. Agricultural and sugar workers who found themselves among the underemployed confronted wage reductions of as much as 75 percent or more. On numerous sugar estates, workers earned as little as 10 to 20 cents for a twelve-hour workday. Urban workers' wages dropped by 50 percent. By 1933, "60 percent of the population lived at submarginal levels of under US\$300 in annual real income; another 30 percent earned marginal wages between US\$300 and US\$600."<sup>3</sup>

As production in local industry and manufacturing contracted in cyclical response to the descent of Cubans' purchasing power, wages and employment continued to drop. As the depression wreaked havoc on Cuban society, local business sectors besieged the government for some form of support. But under Machado, "during the worst moment of the depression when national need was the greatest, government revenues that long had served as the major source of both subsidy of the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie and the solvency of officeholders were transferred into foreign hands in the form of servicing the government's debt."<sup>4</sup> Government construction projects were halted, numerous hospitals, schools and post offices closed, and public employees' salaries drastically cut (save for the armed forces). By 1933, thousands of traditionally secure government employees had joined the burgeoning ranks of the unemployed.

Such conditions generated an escalation of political confrontation and social conflict throughout the republic. Much of the rising political opposition had its origins in the membership of the traditional political parties who protested Machado's illegal re-election bid. This included Liberal party members like Carlos Mendieta, a well-known reformist who had broken with the president and formed a new political party, La Asociación Unión Nacionalista.<sup>5</sup>

Deteriorating social conditions generated an increasing number and frequency of labour strikes. The sugar sector in Camagüey and Oriente tended to favour employers and was characterized by significant labour mobility and the coexistence of diverse forms of work organization. Eastern centrales (mills) were isolated from other towns and connected by poor roads, though railroad links enabled some contact between certain groups of workers. Yet degenerating conditions, increasingly pervasive government repression, and the persevering efforts of newly-formed and diverse organizations like the Cuban Communist Party (PCC), the National Confederation of Cuban Workers (CNOC), the Workers Union of Oriente (UOO), and the University Student Directorate (DEU), helped spark a great wave of collective action in strikes, protests and mill occupations. The latter actions intensified after the fall of Machado in mid-August 1933, and, though organized, spread beyond the

control of the newly-established, radical reformist government of Ramón Grau San Martín.<sup>6</sup>

The "revolution of 1933," as Cubans know it, was the culmination of civil war which broke out in Cuba in 1931, and which pitted virtually all sectors of Cuban society (including the military) against the corruption of traditional politics and its latest symbol, the Machado regime. Unable to fill the political vacuum left by Machado's flight, the interim government of Carlos Manuel de Cespedes was removed by the sergeants' revolt of September 4, and replaced by the provisional administration of Grau San Martín.

Revolutionary rhetoric aside, this was an essentially reformist, radically-nationalist government which devoted itself to the economic, political and social transformation of Cuba. More importantly, it was also the republic's first government formed without the sanction and support of the United States.<sup>7</sup> Here was a government whose reforms were directed at a "Cuba for Cubans," and whose first declaration urged the abrogation of the Platt Amendment. Here too was a relatively popular government whose reforms were uncharacteristically consistent more with the defence of Cuban interests than of the US. As a result, this was not a government unfettered by opposition. The old political class, formerly cooperativista political parties, representatives of North American capital, and an

increasingly apprehensive military, all opposed the regulatory and increasingly progressively nationalistic reforms of a government considered too radical. On the other side, the PCC and CNOC condemned the new reformist government for being too moderate; labour demonstrations persisted. By the end of September, workers had occupied 36 mills, representing one third of national sugar production. One of the central axes of the occupation was in Oriente province.<sup>8</sup>

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's newly enunciated Good Neighbour policy precluded armed intervention by the US (although US warships were positioned offshore for psychological effect and in case of evacuation of nationals). Still, the US government was not about to let Cubans decide their own fate. US envoy Sumner Welles, having belatedly facilitated the ouster of Machado, was now charged with the policy of nonrecognition and isolation of the Grau government, and the unification of the opposition-- particularly the military. This was a policy of destabilization by diplomatic means. Though part of the US administration's New Deal policy, US actions in Cuba in the 1930s harkened back to the old (if evolving) hegemonic presumption that Washington could solve Cuba's problems for her:

In the nineteenth century, this perspective had derived from the North American belief in its racial

and cultural superiority and in an inevitable destiny. In the reformist era that ran from the New Deal to the Alliance for Progress, this perspective was reinforced by the North American belief in its capacity to promote and manage social change. As in the Progressive era, the new reformism led to an increase in the extent of US interference in Cuba even as Plattist forms of intervention were finally ended.<sup>9</sup>

Consequently, Welles and his successor, ambassador Jefferson Caffery, worked diligently and secretively to persuade the former sergeants who now formed the Cuban military's command, along with the middle sectors that shunned the Grau administration, to overthrow the provisional government because its radicalism blocked New Deal plans for Cuba.<sup>10</sup> By January 1934, when it became clear that the US would never grant recognition or economic aid to the Grau regime, Fulgencio Batista, leader of the sergeants revolt and now head of the military, finally responded to the US ambassador's "advice" and replaced Grau with a Washington favourite, Carlos Mendieta. In less than a week, the US recognized the new government. Having consolidated his own control over the army, Batista loosed the military on the militant Marxist and radical nationalist movements that had grown in popular support. Anti-government protests, and student and labour strikes intensified and multiplied. The new government, however,

was in no mood for negotiation. By the end of 1935, military repression claimed thousands of lives and exiled many others. Mendieta, his support base reduced to the military and a faction from the Liberal party, stepped down. He was succeeded by a series of puppet presidents manipulated by Batista until the latter's election in 1940.<sup>11</sup> The 1934 US-sanctioned abrogation of the Platt Amendment, meanwhile, appeared a moot point at best.

As Jules Benjamin and others note, the US reaction to the revolution of 1933 closely paralleled its earlier reaction to the nationalism of the 1899-1902 period. Similarly, Protestant missions, with some variation along lines of nationality, responded to the social and political turmoil of the 1930s largely as they had three decades earlier, sharing the hegemonic assumptions of the US. Not a few missionaries, like Emma Philipps Martínez of the American Friends, reminisced of life under the US military occupation when Cuba was a "paradise."<sup>12</sup>

In the autumn of the Machado, the principal Protestant missions also continued to weather the dual hardship of economic depression in the eastern provinces of Camagüey and Oriente. Throughout Oriente, hundreds of unemployed and militant workers descended upon the milltowns of companies like the Cuban American Sugar Company and United Fruit.<sup>13</sup> Mission location on or near numerous of these properties, and their increasing dependence on the

relationship with their corporate benefactors, made mission work even more susceptible to the conditions of depression and looming civil war. Thus mission reports described the crisis conditions in terms of a "business adversity" which in turn affected the progress of mission work.<sup>14</sup> Robert Routledge of the American Baptists reported a slowed enrollment at some Protestant schools and blamed poor financial conditions and the low price of sugar. Similarly, Southern Methodist and Friends missions also relayed to their boards news of some decline in enrollments, particularly in boarding schools, where parents, though "eager to send children," were unable to pay the fees.<sup>15</sup>

More typical and pervasive than declining school enrollments, however, was the depression's impact on Protestant churches in the eastern regions. Here the effect was also often mixed, as mission reports of overcrowded churches included the contrasting reality of recessive local funding. Reports of "overcrowded churches" and an apparent Cuban religious revival also observed that "Many Cuban pastors received little or nothing in return for their services."<sup>16</sup> By the mid-1930s, Protestant church growth, dependent on a predominantly poor, working class congregation, continued to be plagued by the membership's lack of disposable income.<sup>17</sup>

In turn, diminished financial contributions at a time of reduced US funding tended to slow the already-

evolutionary pace of the churches' indigenization program. This was certainly the case for the Methodist mission, where, as noted earlier, one mission administrator lamented that Cubanization of the Church "had not been the major concern of our work in Cuba."<sup>18</sup> Furthermore, although the Methodist, Baptist and Friends missions could more or less accurately proclaim that Cubans were assuming greater responsibility for the evangelization of their country, this was less so the case for mission education and administration. In the area of administration, all three missions had, by the 1930s, established their respective conferences which included Cuban participation and some management: The Methodists established a Cuban Annual Conference (1923) as a transitional organism toward eventually Cubanized administration; the American Baptists formed the Cuban Home Mission Society (1925) as an ostensibly autonomous, self-supporting administration; and the Friends declared the end of the foreign missionary phase in 1927 with the erection of the Cuba Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends.<sup>19</sup>

Cuban pastors and laicos had, as Routledge observed, "taken a larger share" in the direction of mission work.<sup>20</sup> Charles Detweiler likewise boasted: "Today all decisions concerning the budget and the appointments of pastors are in their power."<sup>21</sup> To a large extent, this could be said of all three missions in that Cuban pastors were responsible

for the local administration of their own charges, and to a much lesser extent, for their respective conferences' administration. Cubanization of mission administration was ultimately heavily qualified by mission practice and Cuban realities of dependence. Suffice it to say that, where indigenization of Protestantism in Cuba was concerned, the national conferences established by the US churches proved more symbolic than substantial.

Contrary to mission rhetoric which characterized the 1930s as the passing of the missionary era, the fourth decade of mission activity in eastern Cuba continued under the reign of US mission boards. The Methodists' Annual Conference was, as missionaries conceded, a transitional entity overseen by US missionaries and the US-based General conference. By 1935, a number of Cubans (largely through their own insistence) had served for several years as district elders, and a few were considered for positions as school directors. In 1934, a commission was appointed (Cubans and missionaries equally represented) in order to study "the establishment of a National Church in Cuba as early as may be practicable."<sup>22</sup> Yet by 1936, the Methodists' experiment in replacing North American missionaries with Cubans in district elderships and other local administrative positions was declared dead. Superintendent Sterling Neblett then renewed mission demands to the US board for more missionaries to head major centers

like Santiago and newer stations in United Fruit's Mayarí and Preston.<sup>23</sup>

The Baptists fared little better in their efforts at Cubanization. A few Cubans had assumed some administrative responsibilities, like Alfredo Santana as secretary of the Baptist Convention in eastern Cuba.<sup>24</sup> But, as was the case in the Methodist mission, both the eastern Baptist Convention and the Cuban Home Mission Society remained mere departments of the American Baptist mission board, granted as a result of Cuban pressure, and overseen by a superintendent from the US.<sup>25</sup> Neither financial self-support in a few districts (the Cuban Home Mission Society was founded in Baracoa, one of a minute number of self-supported churches), nor Cuban membership in subaltern subdivisions of the US conference really represented the beginnings of a national church. Nor, for reasons explained below, could they in Cuba. Baptist mission reports, formerly filled with effusive enthusiasm for the apparent progress made toward Cubanization, were notable for the paucity of such discussion during the 1930s. In the rare instance when it was addressed by missionaries, the discussion devolved from the question of Cuban self-government to financial self-support that had been severely forestalled by depression conditions.<sup>26</sup> All of the principal Protestant missions in eastern Cuba made claims to being first in the development of a self-governing Cuban

Church.<sup>27</sup> The American Friends, however, came perhaps the closest to realizing this ideal.

Protestant missions had long struggled with their respective mission boards over funding support at the same time that they contradictorily espoused the financial independence of an incipient Cuban church. For the American Friends, however, all this had come to a head in 1925 when the mission board announced its withdrawal from the eastern regions and cut funding by some 85 percent.<sup>28</sup> Cuban Friends, vociferously opposed to the board's proposal to transfer the eastern mission to the Methodists, persuaded the US church to leave the work in the hands of Cubans as a Quaker enterprise. Cuban Friends, meanwhile, appeared to assume a greater responsibility (albeit by default) for their own church on a level not experienced by either of the other larger missions. At first glance, this appeared to be an unprecedented move for a Protestant mission in the Cuban field. At an important level, it was a highly significant stage in the mission development in Cuba: Cubans were left to manage their own national church with the meager resources at their disposal and a token contribution from the US board.<sup>29</sup> Yet below the surface of apparent autonomy lay some significant qualifiers to any intimations of an independent Cuban Friends Church.

Cuban Friends retained their North American overseers. Zenas Martin and other remaining missionaries kept their

positions as supervisors and administrators. As noted, Martin, the American Friends superintendent, became chairman of the fledgling and ostensibly autonomous Cuban Friends Church (1927). As the Friends mission reverted to a variation of the US churches' pre-1898 policy--limited intervention in the form of equally limited economic aid to Cuban Friends--the change was met with ambivalence by both US missionaries and Cubans.

While apparently moving to place the mission work "squarely on the shoulders of a Cuban leadership," both the Friends US board and missionaries insisted that this leadership "undoubtedly needed" continued US supervision.<sup>30</sup> Though a consensus existed on Cubanization of the Church, American Friends--save for dissent over method and numbers--remained determined that this transition continue to be administered by US overseers, or else, as Emma Martínez typically concluded, "the entire work will fail."<sup>31</sup> Much of this reflected an enduring lack of confidence in Cuban competence. Yet the unwillingness of the American Friends to let the Cuban Church go was also based on pragmatism.

The heavily-qualified transfer of American Friends administration to the Cuban Friends was fraught with the contradictions which had long been inherent in Friends' Cuba mission policy. The US church's refusal to leave the administration of the Cuban Friends entirely to Cubans was, at minimum, tacit acknowledgement of the failure, after

three decades, of one of the central goals professed by American Friends and Protestant missions in general: Indigenization of the Church in Cuba. Characteristically, Friends annual reports had been optimistic about their progress toward Cubanization. Privately, however, the US church at the time of transfer conceded their neglect of this goal. The US board had anticipated "temporary loss" in evangelization as a price for the long term success of the Cuban Church, but later lamented that: "Had we placed the emphasis on the training of a native leadership ten years ago that we are seeking to place now, the transition period would have been over and we would have been on a much firmer basis than we find ourselves right now."<sup>32</sup>

Such hindsight proved of little consolation in fostering an independent Cuban Friends a decade later, as Cubans themselves protested. The paternalistic policy of the American Friends, rather than facilitating indigenization, concentrated unswervingly on cultivating the physical growth of the Church in eastern Cuba. As was the case for the other missions, a US-imported system became the foundation upon which Cuban mission workers became dependent for the definition and embodiment of their own Church. At the same time, the obligations of North American missionaries were increasingly those of maintaining or protecting the US entity from the presumed incompetence of the Cubans.

The Cuban membership, meanwhile, was divided between those who favoured continued US supervision and those who did not. Most Cubans, however, agreed with the assessment of the 1929 President of the Friends Yearly Meeting, Arsenio Catala, who opposed any more US supervision: "The problem that confronts the Yearly Meeting is this: We have received a great responsibility, but we have not received help in proportion to that responsibility. Our churches were in no way prepared to assume the care of such a great responsibility in the way that it has been done."<sup>33</sup> Catala represented a growing number of Cuban Friends who endorsed pre-1898 ties between the Cuban and US churches. His declaration provided Cuban confirmation of a failed indigenization policy acknowledged by the American Friends Board years earlier, and which 1930s conditions of depression and rising social conflict appeared to worsen.

The evolutionary and already limited indigenization policies of all the principal missions in eastern Cuba were aggravated further by the crisis conditions of the 1930s Cuba. The contradictions of promoting US-imported churches in a dependent, monoculture economy and society were sharpened. The already limited resources channelled into the development of a self-governing Cuban Church were further diminished by program and funding cuts.<sup>34</sup> Mission reports despondently described conditions as "hard times in the superlative degree."<sup>35</sup> The times fell hardest on Cuban

pastors and their congregations. Even prior to the descent of the world depression on Cuba, US mission boards' incremental reductions in financial support for Cuban pastors, and the meager contributions of many church congregations, generated the departure of Cuban members, especially among the "gente decente" or middle classes. Protestant congregations increasingly assumed a social composition dominated by the working poor, a fact noted by all the missions. By the 1930s, even the larger Methodist and Baptist missions which had not undergone the more drastic financial reductions of the Friends nevertheless identified with the increasingly common reality described by Friends missionary Henry Cox: "The congregation at Gibara has so changed that you would hardly know it, and without a single exception all are poor."<sup>36</sup> In turn, some Cuban pastors, unable to procure a living from the combined but meager contributions of the board and congregation, or disaffected by mission policy, or both, left the church either for another denomination or alternative means of support. Others supplemented their incomes by teaching, commerce, or in other ways. Though initially frowned upon, the missions had long since tolerated such attempts at survival.

Survival of many of the unemployed or underemployed working poor that made up Protestant congregations in eastern Cuba necessitated a regional migration that

escalated. Against this rising migration, missions were not always protected by having located on company properties. The depression forced many mills and factories to close down. The solvency of numerous of those upon which missionaries depended financially and bodily came into question. As Friends missionary Emma Martínez observed in Puerto Padre in 1932: "The sugar mills closed the first of April and hundreds of men are left without work. There is a rumour abroad that the Chaparra Company is leaving Cuba. That will mean the life of our country for everything depends on the sugar industry."<sup>37</sup> Baptist mission reports also lamented that depressed sugar prices and general financial crisis had slowed the enrollment and therefore the training of recruits for the ministry.<sup>38</sup> The Methodists, meanwhile, reported realities common to all the Protestant missions: The general disruption of religious and education programs by labour and student strikes.<sup>39</sup>

None of this was conducive to the propagation of a Cuban Protestantism, especially one structured on the basis of an imported North American system and culture. The emerging civil war that, by the early 1930s, accompanied depression in Cuba added further to the contradictions of promoting an indigenized church within a system and structure of foreign origin. The company town locales of Protestant missions in the eastern provinces brought with them a dual and contradictory effect consistent with the

boom-bust cycles of Cuban monoculture. Prosperous times brought forth a cornucopia for both milltown and mission. Conversely, both the company town and the mission station bore the impact of socioeconomic depression, labour strife and civil war. The 1930s in eastern Cuba represented some of the worst conditions since the Cuban war for independence. The social and political products of massive depression in economically dependent Cuba made themselves felt in Protestant missions throughout the eastern region.

As the economic crisis escalated, accompanied by a rising intensity and frequency of labour and student strikes and the retaliation of government forces under Machado, missions increasingly found themselves in the middle of war zones. Missionaries witnessed the striking and general uprising of all classes of Cubans, from local workers and company employees to local government leaders, all in generalized resistance to the Rural Guard and other forces of the Machado regime. One missionary described the popular rebellion as "an uprising of the people in general against the government."<sup>40</sup> As strikes by workers and students escalated, so too did clashes with the military. Many of the principal milltowns and mission stations became embroiled in conflict, which affected all the missions. Southern Methodists reported student strikes in two of their schools; American Baptist and Friends missions also reported local revolts and the involvement of sympathetic mission

school students in strikes with university students.<sup>41</sup> Though many Protestant school students appear not to have taken part, mission reports noted various levels of program disruption, particularly at Methodist schools. A few mission stations became de facto war zones. Gibara, Oriente, a central Friends station, also served as a rebel stronghold and became the target of an intense government summer bombing campaign in 1931.<sup>42</sup> Friends superintendent Roy Votaw, convinced that the military measure was accidental, reported minimal damage to mission properties, in contrast to the carnage inflicted on the rest of the population.<sup>43</sup>

The pervasive labour campaigns that progressively engulfed east and west Cuba, and that culminated in the August 1933 general strike that signalled the demise of the Machado regime, did not cease with the flight of the dictator. Mill occupations accelerated throughout Oriente province. Some missionaries, expectant of renewed stability and confident in the abilities of the interim president Carlos Mendieta, were at a loss to explain the prolonged violence: "Peace and order will be restored and a real attempt made to solve the economic problem.... Wild excesses were the order of the day... but a stable government is gradually emerging."<sup>44</sup> Mission hopes for stability, however, were as shortlived as the government itself. Cuban workers, mobilized and cognizant of a political vacuum where

missionaries perceived a new government, continued their strike actions and mill occupations. By September 1933, the "strike and occupation wave" had affected many of the larger mills and mission stations in Oriente, including Preston, Banes, Boston, San Germán, Chaparra and Delicias.<sup>45</sup> In Chaparra and Delicias, Friends reported the flight of the mills' manager and deputy manager, forced to seek refuge on a British freighter.<sup>46</sup>

Anti-Machado violence also spilled over in the wake of Machado's ouster, as a popular backlash targeted Machado supporters, US companies, and pro-US Cubans. These along with strike actions and mill occupations had set off a social momentum that endured into the government of the more popular Grau regime. Change in government, most Cubans were painfully aware, had yet to have any impact on the as yet unchanged crisis conditions of dependency and depression. At the same time, missionaries lamented "a new era of troubles."<sup>47</sup>

Beset by socioeconomic and political crises, as well as by natural disasters, (an earthquake and hurricane devastated the major cities of Santiago and Camagüey in 1932), the eastern regions of Cuba had born a disproportionate share of the national crisis. US Protestant missions, though certainly not insulated from the crisis conditions of depression and civil war, were not entirely vulnerable. As in the past, mission properties

and personnel had recourse to protection under the government and company auspices. The Cuban military, Rural Guard, and the United Fruit Company's armed guards at one time or another all played a role in protecting the missions. When, at the height of post-Machado hostilities, these were not as readily available, local police forces assumed the role. The Friends Puerto Padre mission, along with other missions, were beneficiaries of these services.<sup>48</sup> To a significant extent, this accounts for the reason why, as Sterling Neblett noted, Protestant missions were relatively "less disturbed than other institutions and groups of society," and "suffered less than might have been expected."<sup>49</sup>

At the same time, the effects of depression and civil war on mission work had not been all negative. Congregation numbers, if not depleted, had indeed become impoverished. Yet mission reports like that of Baptist Robert Routledge, that crowded chapels and houses "met us everywhere we went," were not uncommon in times of degeneration and chaos.<sup>50</sup> As Emilio Willems pointed out, the shock of crisis conditions--war, revolution, or other forms of violent change or societal transition--motivated those classes affected most to seek out a source of emotional and social affinity.<sup>51</sup> To many of Cuba's working poor--both those who took up armed struggle and those who did not--the Cuban-pastored churches

appeared to represent just such a sanctuary for, as Willems put it, survival and growth.

Protestant missions, meanwhile, continued to open new fields in eastern Cuba, and cultivated new social groups as a way of supplementing lapsing memberships, or, more commonly, falling contributions. The Friends mission had long worked with Jamaican braceros (Zenas Martin employed many on his plantations). Most were concentrated in the milltowns of Oriente province. Despite language barriers and bracero deportations, American Baptists continued their work among the Haitians in numerous towns for the remainder of the decade.<sup>52</sup> The return on missions' time and effort with these groups was believed to be, if not in the form of financial contribution, in the augmenting of the forces of Protestantism in Cuba. In addition, especially in the context of pervasive labour strife, an equally significant result was anticipated by missionaries: "Every converted man also at once becomes a reliable labourer and his services are preferred by the neighbouring planter."<sup>53</sup> Again, employers provided the facilities for evangelization.

Some gains were also made by the Protestant churches from the depression's disruption and closure of public schools in eastern Cuba. As an increasing number of Cuba's public schools were forced to close, Protestant schools endeavoured to fill the gap. Unlike the government schools, virtually all mission schools remained open for the duration

of the crisis. Protestant church leaders correctly anticipated the advantage of this reality. A few students did "defect" to Protestant schools. But their numbers were insufficient to stem the temporary drop in boarding and day school enrollment characteristic of the latter years of the Machado dictatorship. From about 1930 to 1934, student enrollments in virtually all the principal Protestant missions in Camagüey and Oriente declined by as much as 50 to 60 percent (See Tables).<sup>54</sup> In the few towns less affected by the fighting, and in towns of prestige schools like the Friends' Colegio Los Amigos in Holguín, enrollments were maintained.<sup>55</sup> Furthermore, the percentage lost to the exigencies of war and depression in eastern Cuba was disproportionately higher than those in the western regions, where Protestant normal school enrollments fell by some 15 to 20 percent. In both cases, however, the decline was shortlived.

By 1935, even amidst the martial backlash of Fulgencio Batista, Protestant boarding and day schools demonstrated a resilience that saw enrollments rise by an annual average of 10 to 20 percent or more (See Tables).<sup>56</sup> Sunday schools, apparently less affected by the excesses of the Machadato, underwent minimal decline. These were institutions which accounted for a large percentage of Protestant converts, and were also quick to reap some of the benefits of public school closures. By the early 1930s, Protestant Sunday

schools had grown both in student numbers and facilities. For many Cuban children whose parents were numbered among the impoverished working classes, Sunday schools were probably the only form of education they received. Missions, meanwhile, welcomed the exodus. Mission reports asserted that "outside the Church itself, the Sunday school is the strongest organization."<sup>57</sup> In fact, Sunday school enrollments often doubled church membership. When combined with boarding and day school attendance--even at their low point--Protestant schools in eastern Cuba dwarfed the churches in organization and growth. After 1935, with the return of Cuba's public school system to relative normalcy, this continued to be the trend.

The Protestant schools' relative resilience and growth was notable, especially in the tumultuous context of depression-ridden eastern Cuba. Yet though this said much for the Protestant churches' appeal and for Cubans' support, the missions' favourable statistical growth held little encouragement for Cuban pastors and mission workers concerned with building a national church. Particularly in the ever-important context of Protestant education, the disparity between the significant progress and influence of Protestant schools, and Cubans' control of these institutions and programs remained great. This was generally consistent with the enduring gap between the North American missions' rhetoric of indigenization and actual

practice. That this gap persisted was a function of an equally enduring and contradictory mission policy. At a fundamental level, mission policy enacted at the turn of the century, abetted by enduring cultural assumptions and attitudes, and reinforced by Cuban conditions, remained essentially intact decades later. In fact, by the 1930s, the Cubanization of Protestant education had even further to go than did the indigenization of the religious work of the churches.

Cubans had long predominated as teachers in Protestant schools (and in public schools). Cubans as administrators and directors of Protestant education institutions, however, were noticeable by their absence. Amid US mission boards' calls for more substantial movement toward indigenization of Protestantism in Cuba, Cubans, through an incremental process, began to become evident in lower administrative posts. Lorenzo Verdecia of the Methodists was director of Pinson College in Camagüey in 1935; Carlos Pérez in 1936.<sup>58</sup> Max Montel and Gelasio Ortiz were principals of prestigious Baptist schools like the boys' school at El Cristo.<sup>59</sup> And Ramón Morell, director of the Friends school in Holguín, was one of numerous Cuban school administrators who replaced US missionaries as part of Friends' forced-march indigenization program after 1925.<sup>60</sup> US Protestant missions had made significant progress in replacing missionaries with Cubans in the leadership of schools more

or less as they had in the churches. But consistent with the US churches' general policy of maintaining an evolutionary pace in the transition toward indigenization (Friends included), local Cuban leaders still deferred to a national leadership and administration based in the US. After nearly four decades of ministry development, the most senior administrative posts in Protestant education in eastern Cuba remained under the control of the US churches. The US missions continued to qualify the indigenization of the Church in Cuba by insisting, as they continued to in the education field, on retaining control over an ostensibly Cuban Protestantism.

In the initial years of mission penetration, the observation of Baptist educator Robert Routledge that Protestant education programs were so successful that the missions were "embarrassed by it" along with the school enrollments that far-exceeded congregation numbers, became a common refrain.<sup>61</sup> During the late 1930s, missions' school attendance continued to dwarf the church rolls. North American missionaries also continued to hold key command posts in Protestant education. Robert Routledge, for example, remained superintendent of the Baptist mission and director of mission education. Sterling Neblett remained superintendent of Methodist education in Cuba; Easton Clements, president of Methodist education in the eastern district. Among the ostensibly Cuban Friends, US

missionaries retained administrative control over such key institutions as the Colegios Los Amigos in Holguín, the most prestigious and successful of Friends schools.<sup>62</sup> Overall, US missionaries and the US churches retained their hold over many senior administrative positions in Protestant education.

As Protestant missions in eastern Cuba continued to stress the important role of education in evangelization (and "civilization"), and as public education remained "in very unsatisfactory condition," the role of Protestant schools continued to expand.<sup>63</sup> Furthermore, by 1936, Cuban law gave church schools greater autonomy from government regulation.<sup>64</sup> For these and other reasons, North American missions, while continuing their painfully evolutionary pace toward indigenizing the administration of Protestant churches, moved even more reluctantly in the direction of Cubanizing the administration of Protestant education.

"Cubans," Baptist Charles Detweiler asserted, "will have to continue to look to us for the training of their preachers and the maintenance of higher education."<sup>65</sup> Sterling Neblett, long resistant to the "premature" placement of greater administrative control of the Cuban Church into Cuban hands, essentially maintained his position--philosophically and administratively--with regard to the Cubanization of Protestant school management.<sup>66</sup> American Friends missionaries and board members, for whom

indigenization had apparently become the most urgent, nevertheless refused to countenance the full relinquishment of the US Church's education programs and institutions to the Cuban members of the Cuban Friends. The bulk of the Friends work in eastern Cuba was, as noted, to have been left on the shoulders of the Cubans.<sup>67</sup> Yet the maintenance of key assets such as the prestigious Holguín school at a level acceptable to the US Church apparently dictated, as the mission board concluded, that the Cuban Friends would require US supervision for an indefinite period.<sup>68</sup> This was the general consensus of the American Friends.

Mission refrains from the turn of the century returned to haunt nationalistic Cuban Protestants. Regarding Cuban control of Protestant education, one Friends missionary typically repeated: "We cannot change things in a day; it is a process of generations."<sup>69</sup> Friends missionary Emma P. Martínez, more sympathetic to Cuban nationalism than her colleague Zenas Martin, nevertheless had by the 1930s come to the same conclusion as the more ethnocentric missionary-businessman. In the midst of growing Cuban pressure for indigenization, Martínez and many other missionaries persevered in their resistance to a purportedly premature Cubanization of Protestant schools. Most missionaries attributed the apparent success of the missions to North American ingenuity. Cuban supervision, many of them

believed, would mean the death knell of decades of missionary effort.<sup>70</sup>

US missions' enduring ambivalence over indigenization was rationalized by many missionaries and their boards partly as a consequence of an inadequate policy, partly the logistics of a few missionaries amid high turnover rates attempting to do the work of a larger force, and partly the difficulty of working under the Cuban republic's perennial volatility. Until the substantive critique of mission policy written by J. Merle Davis in the 1940s, the central debate over the mission position on indigenization was dominated by those like Methodist Sterling Neblett who felt that the pace of Cubanization was adequate. On the other side stood a minority of missionaries who had long felt contrary and that recognition of the Cubans' capabilities was long overdue.<sup>71</sup> A skewed missionary force troubled by high turnover and reduced budgets, and besieged by the vicissitudes of Cuba's sugar monoculture, displayed less confidence in most if not all Cuban pastors and laicos than might otherwise have been the case. The combined effect of all the above factors tended to reinforce a culturally-determined ambivalence that could not conceive of Cuban control of a system of Protestant education that schooled the future leadership of the church and country.

Protestant schools like the Methodist Pinson school in Camagüey, the Baptists' International Colleges in El Cristo,

and the Quakers' Los Amigos school in Holguín had earned reputations as prestigious educational institutions, in eastern Cuba and nationally. Protestant education was accessible to all social classes, though not evenly. Though primarily concerned with making good Christians of all their Cuban students, it was not among the children of the poor and working class families that missionaries focused as the future leaders of the country. It was largely from the gente decente that the nation's leaders were drawn. It was also this group which provided the largest local financial and political support, facilitating Protestant schools' survival in the most difficult times. Mission schools received endorsements from all levels of government. More importantly, many businessmen and senior government officials had been educated in Protestant schools, and continued to send their children to mission education institutions. Zayas Bayan, secretary of state under Machado, was one of numerous members of the economic and political elite educated in Protestant schools. Fulgencio Batista, chief of the armed forces and later president of the republic, had been a student in the Friends Banes school.<sup>72</sup>

Missionaries had long recognized the implications of having some influence on national leadership as well as local. The position of missionary Emma Martínez was typical: "The Mayor, Chief of Police, and the Sanitary Chief were all my pupils at one time and are supporters of our

work.... I am sure that many of them would defend the work of the Friends."<sup>73</sup> Many actively did. But as was characteristic of mission schools, most of the governing classes, unlike the working and (to a lesser extent) middle classes, were not members of the Protestant churches. During the 1930s, Protestant missions sought to ameliorate this discrepancy "so as to bring some influence to bear upon those who are the real leaders of Cuba."<sup>74</sup>

Missions in Oriente and Camagüey acknowledged their influence on Cuban leaders and the benefits wrought in the latter's endorsement and support of Protestant institutions in Cuba. By the 1930s, and especially in the context of the Machadato, missionaries felt the need to make their influence more palpable at the national level. By 1940, Protestant churches' growing influence proved effective on at least two significant occasions. One was the aforementioned 1936 law which freed Protestant schools from government interference. The second was the defeat of a bill that would have made teaching Roman Catholicism mandatory in public schools.<sup>75</sup> Though technically a minority group, Protestant missions remained a constituency toward which influential former students remained largely supportive.

North American capital had proven no less supportive of the missions. Relative to the Protestant churches, Protestant schools had received the most consistent material

support from their corporate donors. By the 1930s, Protestant missions appeared at times to no longer have need to solicit the business classes for the support of Protestant schools; it became a matter of mutual interest. Thus companies like United Fruit continued to regularly provide "special grants," "gifts," and other donations in the form of property, financing, transportation, and other benefits.<sup>76</sup> In return, missions, observed one missionary, "naturally felt a special responsibility to make good."<sup>77</sup> To the many missionaries like Zenas Martin who effectively attributed the success of mission schools to US management and leadership, it behooved missionaries to maintain and build upon a success dependent substantially on business and government support. US missions therefore reciprocated.

Throughout the Machado dictatorship, and for the rest of the decade, Protestant missions openly endorsed or otherwise supported Cuba's successive governments. This was with the important exception of the radically populist Grau government. Missionaries generally distrusted the Grau administration as much as US ambassador Sumner Welles did, and likewise favoured its removal.<sup>78</sup> More characteristic was mission support for government actions often in direct conflict with the interests of their working class congregations, and consistent with status quo politics.

During 1932, as popular opposition to the Machado regime escalated, mission reports reflected other interests.

The American Baptist mission lamented that rebellious Cuba was not more like Mexico which "had been saved from this misfortune by the strong hand of the former President Calles."<sup>79</sup> By the end of 1935, the worst excesses of Batista's military had effectively destroyed Cuba's major labour organizations. Baptist mission reports, meanwhile, concluded that the "danger of a violently radical movement among the working men has always been before us," but "by the firm use of military power the strikers were overawed and peace was maintained.... There has been some improvement in business conditions, for all of which we are grateful."<sup>80</sup> The Southern Methodist mission demonstrated government support even more directly. Since 1918, the Pinson school in Camagüey had offered the "innovation" of military instruction toward developing "good soldiers" as well as good Christians.<sup>81</sup> In the 1930s, Methodist pastor N.J.Castellanos was employed--on loan--as a professor in the military academy.<sup>82</sup> Thus the Protestant missions conveyed their support for the pro-US forces of the status quo ante both directly and indirectly. Pacifist Friends missionaries, publicly opposed to violence and armed struggle, appeared less averse to the brutal but order-imposing martial crackdown of 1935. As one mission report observed then: "The extreme nationalistic feeling has not disappeared but it has moderated some.... The strong iron hand of the government to break up all tendencies to

organize strikes has kept workers at their posts. The situation is far from ideal but it is better than it was."<sup>83</sup> During this period, mission reports conveying gratitude for the restoration of order and commercial peace were common.

Protestant missions' reciprocal relations with North American capital extended back to the first years of mission penetration. By the fourth decade, US businesses in eastern Cuba not only continued to materially support Protestant schools and churches; in numerous cases they also actively influenced the admission policy, curriculum and personnel of Protestant schools. This was not entirely new. The United Fruit Company, for example, had manipulated Friends education programs in their Banes school for several years, and resorted to threats of withdrawal of support when not appeased. Missions generally continued to react to the corporate relationship as the Friends had: They "made good" and responded according to company wishes.<sup>84</sup> In Preston, the Southern Methodists reinforced missionary ranks at their Agricultural and Industrial School and established new fields in company towns like Felton. In these as in earlier cases, companies like United Fruit and Bethlehem Steel facilitated the work with donations for churches and schools. In Preston, Banes and other mission school locations, US companies directly influenced personnel changes.<sup>85</sup> In Preston, representatives of Bethlehem Steel

also sat on the board of directors of the Methodist school.<sup>86</sup>

The missions' reciprocal relations with North American capital also came to be evident in the Protestant schools' expanded roles as centers for commercial and industrial education. As noted, the Methodists opened numerous such schools including those in Felton and Camagüey.<sup>87</sup> Baptist mission schools also reported renewed growth after 1935 along with the opening of new fields in company towns like Banés.<sup>88</sup> Friends mission reports noted expanded enrollment in the "domestic science" and "manual training" departments of their schools in northern Oriente.<sup>89</sup> Mission reports further remarked on the full to overflowing classrooms of Protestant schools, an apparent confirmation of the appeal of mission education programs which fostered both a "religious consciousness invaluable to the proper development of the people," and practical training consistent with the needs of an "industrial-minded world."<sup>90</sup>

Protestant mission cooperation, then, was partly a function of their dependency on secular, corporate support developed since the turn of the century. This dependency grew so that by the end of the 1930s, US business was as much a part of the "Protestant establishment" in Cuba as it was in the United States. Yet most Protestant missionaries, and an increasing number of their Cuban colleagues, were not

unwilling dependents of US capital. The mission schools, departments and programs that prepared students both as Christians and as employees in a foreign-dominated and dependent economy were moreso the embodiment of an ideological and cultural affinity with secular western entities like North American capital.

Protestant missions cooperated--and in many cases, collaborated--with US business interests in eastern Cuba in the 1930s much like they had in the 1900s. The difference lay in the fact that, after three decades, missionary ambivalence was effectively replaced by a greater identification with the interests of North American capital. The missions had moved from a position of relative independence from and even apprehension of foreign capital influence, to a more complex and intertwining relationship based on mutual interests. In spite of the tragedy and turmoil of the world depression and its devastating impact on Cubans, missionaries continued to believe that "the moral uplift of true Christianity demanded the development of capitalist values."<sup>91</sup> The business of missions and the mission of business in eastern Cuba remained bound together until the revolutionary 1960s tore them asunder.

At the same time, Protestant missions never remained uniformly uncritical of their secular compatriots nor of US economic policy in Cuba. During the Machadato, Errol Elliot of the American Friends board remarked that "We are not

inclined to wholly exonerate Uncle Sam for the present difficulties."<sup>92</sup> A 1931 "Report of the Committee on International Relations" was comprised of several mission criticisms concerning US business interests, the Platt Amendment, and the US sugar tariff. Yet despite the committee's conclusions of "economic imperialism," they were reluctant to formally protest to the US government.<sup>93</sup> Overall, such critical sentiment was in a minority, as the more consistent practices of the missions suggest. A year later, the missions more characteristically chose to endorse a motion to encourage the US government to "help" Cubans and the Machado regime cooperatively resolve their differences.<sup>94</sup>

Ultimately, the minority within the missions who were critical of US policy and the rest who were not shared in common a preference for US intervention of some kind. Missionaries may have disagreed among themselves over symptoms of US policy such as the sugar tariff, but not with the principle of US intervention in Cuba. Most, like Friends superintendent Roy Votaw, disputed only the methods. Votaw attributed depression conditions in Cuba partly to the sugar tariff and not at all to US "economic imperialism." After all, the superintendent typically insisted, US business provided jobs for Cubans.<sup>95</sup> Votaw was also typical of many missionaries in his rejection of the Platt Amendment, not out of an opposition to US hegemony, but in

favour of a more effective form of social control. Education--particularly industrial education--Votaw concluded, was a better builder of "capable" Cubans.<sup>96</sup> The examples of missionaries like Robert Routledge, Roy Votaw, Emma Martínez, and others are highly significant in that these had been some of the more sympathetic to calls for Cuban self-government (ecclesiastically and politically). At the same time, these missionaries were not immune to wielding some of the same enduring cultural stereotypes and biases as their less sympathetic colleagues.

The dynamic of mission-business and mission-government relations, and the association and identification with political and economic elites in general, tended to reinforce an "other"-directed critique of Cuban society reminiscent of an earlier period. In this context, most missionaries, and some like-minded Cuban pastors, attributed Cuban crisis conditions less to foreign capital dominance and US policy than to Cuban character and culture. The expansion in the missions' emphasis on industrial education was more than an accommodationist response to the needs of North American capital. It also demonstrated the missions' general conviction that education--consistent with a division of labour conducive to a foreign-dominated economy--could reform a still purportedly deficient Cuban character.

Thus, turn-of-the-century terminology like "manifest destiny" and "civilizing mission" were replaced decades

later with new coats emblazoned with labels like "moralization." Missionary paternalism, now personified in the form of missionary "guides" and "advisors," continued to be coloured by a degree of chauvinism that an endemically unstable Cuban economy and polity tended to reinforce. Missionaries' perceptions of Cuban society--predisposed as they were--became more firmly aligned with those of their associates in US business and the Cuban government. Missionary bias was thus directed against workers, university students and other "old strikers" who, as one missionary bitterly remarked, "would like to run the whole country."<sup>97</sup> Old cultural stereotypes persisted and were resurrected to help explain Cuban conditions and the concomitant need for both education and more US tutelage.

After decades of experience in eastern Cuba Protestant missionaries continued to wield cultural stereotypes. Many attributed certain characteristics to "Cuban character" that presumably explained and also rationalized the retention of missions' control over key areas of the fledgling Cuban Church such as education. Some missionaries still commonly described Cubans as uniformly "pleasure-loving," "happy," or "highly-emotional."<sup>98</sup> In 1930 one missionary conveyed a typical theme disparaging of Cubans' morality: "In the US we do have Christian ethics dominating the home and business. There is none in Cuba."<sup>99</sup> Other missionaries came to even more pointed conclusions. "With few exceptions," Friends

superintendent Henry Cox remarked in 1933, "the average Cuban is not to be relied upon."<sup>100</sup> Most missionaries attributed such negative characteristics to Cubans' presumed lack of maturity. During the 1930s, Protestant missionaries disagreed amongst themselves over key aspects of mission policy like the appropriate pace of indigenization. Missionaries like Emma Martínez argued that attempts at Cubanization had come prematurely. Conversely, J. Merle Davis criticized missions' indigenization programs for being too slow. Both, however, shared the common belief that even a Cuban-run Church still required US supervision because Cubans in general still lacked "a developed mind."<sup>101</sup>

Such purported Cuban characteristics served as rationalizations to missionaries for the poverty and sociopolitical volatility of eastern Cuba in the 1930s. While they allotted some responsibility for the crises to aspects of US policy, missionaries almost inevitably came to conclusions which emphasized differences between North American and Cuban culture at the latter's expense. In 1934, mission reports thematically observed: "They are poets and we are engineers.... For Latin Americans, revolution is... a substitute for elections."<sup>102</sup> Perceived Cuban weaknesses preoccupied missionaries concerned with the volatile Cuban nationalism of the early 1930s, and particularly with the rise of the popular but shortlived Grau government. Many missionaries grew increasingly

alarmed at the apparent Cuban susceptibility to the growing influence of nationalism and the "communistic spirit" (the two often indistinguishable to missionaries).<sup>103</sup> For most missionaries--and North Americans generally--the Grau regime's nationalist-populist reforms reinforced the belief in Cubans' immaturity. Ultimately, missionaries' cultural biases toward broader Cuban society could not but have affected mission goals like indigenization.

One of the most vivid examples of the typology of missionary cultural bias and its impact on mission policy and practice is drawn from the Friends mission experience. Arguably, the American Friends had gone the farthest in the attempt to indigenize the Church. Proportionately, no other mission in eastern Cuba had undergone the drastic changes in mission board support and personnel that the Friends had. With the exception of a few like Zenas Martin who immediately warned against Cubanization as "a very dangerous thing and very unwise policy," most missionaries appeared optimistic.<sup>104</sup> In mid-1924, Emma Martínez conveyed to the board the more general consensus of confidence in the Cubans' church-management ability, if not in overall supervision of the mission field.<sup>105</sup> Certain Cubans were leadership hopefuls, and considered the exception (because mission-trained and presumably assimilated) to the broader stereotypical characterizations noted above.

By the late 1920s and early 1930s, crisis conditions of depression and civil war, and the disruptive impact on mission work, further darkened missionaries' perceptions of Cubans' ability to run the Friends mission. For most missionaries, such crises were the legacy of a people and system corrupted and weakened by Romanist and Hispanic statism, and by miscegenation. The enduring cultural stereotypes that missionaries used to rationalize the ills of secular Cuban society were also invoked as a rationale for limiting Cuban control of Protestant institutions even in the ostensible thick of indigenization.

Prior to the most recent civil outbreak, American Friends had (contradictorily) proposed missionary supervision as a way of encouraging more responsibility in Cubans in the transition to Cubanization<sup>106</sup>. But as conditions in Cuba worsened, and as Cuban Friends split over mission-manipulated definitions of indigenization, American Friends reconsidered the transitory nature of US supervision. By the mid-1930s, the Friends board and missionaries appeared increasingly doubtful not only of Cubans' ability to manage their own Church in eastern Cuba, but of their capacity to lead the mission's prestige schools. Increasingly, US missionaries appeared to consider themselves indispensable. "No Cuban," Zenas Martin insisted, "can take the Colegio Los Amigos and keep it up to its present efficiency."<sup>107</sup> Emma Martínez and numerous

other missionaries initially more favourable to indigenization than Martin had ever been, as noted, reconsidered. By the time of the US abrogation of the Platt Amendment, American Friends missionaries had determined that the Cuban Friends would need US tutelage for a long time to come. "Without Americans to help," Martínez vowed, "it will not be able to stand."<sup>108</sup> Friends mission sentiment to this effect was, of course, never unanimous. But even more liberal dissenters like Henry Cox and Roy Votaw who earlier insisted on the maximization of Cuban administration never escaped the contradiction of simultaneously insisting on US leadership.<sup>109</sup>

Nor did Friends missionaries shed the propensity to use racist arguments to justify prolonged US control over the indigenization process. Emma Martínez commented in 1930 that "Friends cannot afford to abandon a child that lies at their door and deserves a mother's care."<sup>110</sup> In 1932, a Friends missionary attributed the increasing involvement of Protestant school students in protests against the Machado regime to the presumed Cuban propensity to be "naturally dramatic."<sup>111</sup> Several years later, superintendent Henry Cox conveyed doubts about the capacity of Cuban Friends to ever govern themselves: "The Cuban's background is such that someone just must order and some just obey."<sup>112</sup> Finally, for Emma Martínez and most missionaries of missions generally, the radically-nationalist Grau regime, while a

high point for many nationalistic Cubans, represented a low point to US missions and mission. "Cuban character," Martínez typically concluded in 1934, "will show itself even among Christians. The present revolution has changed my opinion in regard to many things. The Friends mission will die without Americans."<sup>113</sup> Many Cubans, however, disagreed.

Mission efforts toward the Cubanization of Protestant churches during the 1920s and 1930s confronted a parallel and more intense phenomenon in a rising Cuban nationalism. The Grau government signalled the culmination of this movement in 1933-1934 with the establishment of wide-ranging reforms which--for the first time in the history of the young republic--favoured the interests of Cubans over and against those of the US state and North American capital. Logically, the US government opposed and eventually helped oust Cuba's first genuinely independent government with the help of an initially ambivalent Cuban military. Missionaries, however, were relatively less ambivalent about Grau and the more revolutionary expressions of Cuban nationalism. All of the principal missions made some motion toward the need to "save" Cubans from themselves, or more specifically, from the "influence of communism" as they incorrectly viewed the new government.<sup>114</sup> American Friends missionaries went further and explicitly endorsed the US plan to destabilize the Cuban government.<sup>115</sup> With the fall

of the Grau government and the US endorsement of the Platt Amendment's abrogation, most missionaries were little more optimistic of Cubans' capacity for self-government. Methodist Sterling Neblett conveyed a common view among missionaries with his citation of one conservative Cuban's inaccurate perspective: "Our liberty is now in the greatest danger. Cuba now depends upon her own capacity and judgement."<sup>116</sup> Yet this assessment was no more consistent with reality than the indigenization rhetoric of the Protestant missions.

As noted, it is unclear how many Cuban Protestants participated in the opposition to pro-US regimes like Machado's, or in militant labour and student organizations like the CNOC and the FEU--or in the Grau government. It is clear, however, that individual Cuban Protestants, against the Protestant churches' wishes, did participate, as labour strikes and mill occupations swept through Oriente mission stations. Though groups of militant workers migrated from region to region, local sugar workers also struck at and occupied their own employers' mills. A number of workers--Cuban and bracero--were also members of local and predominantly working class Protestant congregations. By the 1930s, these congregations were led by Cuban pastors. It is possible, furthermore, that the anti-labour rhetoric of some US missionaries may have played a role in the departure of some of these Cuban pastors from the missions

(some with their congregations). Evidence for this, however, is lacking.

Yet it is clear that presumably neutral missionaries chose sides and encouraged the Cuban membership to favour the Church's side. One of the more explicit illustrations of this was in the Friends mission during the military's "clean-up" of student and labour organizations. While praising the pro-US inclinations of Cuban pastors like Pedro Fonz, also a banker for the Chaparra Sugar Company which called Fonz in as soon as the corporation once again took charge, Emma Martínez asserted: "We are proud of his loyalty to the Company and to the Church, and of his confidence in Americans."<sup>117</sup>

There is also evidence to demonstrate a substantive political activism in the 1930s on the part of a number of Protestant school students. The position of the missions on student demonstrations was clear. Missionaries discouraged confrontation in favour of cooperation. They frowned upon mission students who chose to support the university students in active opposition to the Machado dictatorship. Of those who did not sympathize, a Friends superintendent wrote in 1932: "We are proud of the stand taken by several of our young men during the recent revolutionary activities in refusing to take part."<sup>118</sup> When university students clashed with the Batista military over university autonomy during the martial crackdown in 1935, a Baptist mission

report unambiguously conveyed the position of the mission: "The students of the National university and provincial institutes... would like to run the whole country.... The government has decided to do some housecleaning in the Department of Education. Cuba will yet come out on the right side."<sup>119</sup>

Protestant school students, however, were not always on the "right" side. American Baptist and Friends mission reports complained of "numerous" mission students who had left to join striking university students. Methodist schools reported student strikes within some of their own schools. Although the number of Protestant school students that participated is unclear, mission reports indicated that student involvement was significant enough to disrupt Protestant school programs.<sup>120</sup>

Cubans also transgressed against missions' views and wishes on another level. As one missionary insightfully observed: "Today, when the spirit of nationalism is impregnating the whole organism of Cuban life, it is natural that the Church should feel her part of that spirit."<sup>121</sup> The spirit of Cuban nationalism in the form of local pressures for indigenization had been evident from at least 1910. Since 1910 when Cuban Methodist pastors collectively agitated for a greater role in mission administration, many of the conditions that had generated the protest persisted decades later. Some progress had been made in the promotion

of a few Cuban pastors to higher posts.<sup>122</sup> North American missionaries had indeed become a much smaller minority.

Yet as numerous Cubans had observed, and as most Protestant missionaries continued to insist was necessary, this minority still predominated. Protestantism in Cuba remained subordinated to North American missionaries and the US Church.<sup>123</sup> To many Cubans within and outside the Church, Protestantism remained a foreign religion, an alien Church.<sup>124</sup>

Cuban Protestants had long protested this state of affairs. Since 1910 when the collective efforts to address this problem were met by the resentment and ethnocentrism of the US churches, many Cubans chose individual forms of protest, and voted with their feet. In the decades that followed, numerous Cuban pastors, teachers and laicos left their churches in protest against Americocentric mission policy. Some Cuban pastors defected to other Protestant denominations.<sup>125</sup> Others, pastors and teachers, departed in order to form their own churches and schools--some took their congregations and students with them. Methodist pastor José Rodríguez Figoroa, in response to a colleague pastor's intention "to devote the church exclusively to the better classes" of Santiago, left and opened his own church and school.<sup>126</sup>

A number of Cuban Protestant school teachers also struck out independently. Mission complaints over these

independents were not uncommon. Methodist Garfield Evans protested about a former mission school teacher in Camagüey who was "doing everything possible" to disrupt Pinson College: "He has already organized another school within a short distance of our school in the hopes of carrying as many pupils as possible with him."<sup>127</sup> Later, Cubans like Methodist Lorenzo Verdecia, teacher and former director of Pinson, addressed the enduring problem of meager salaries and lack of authority by forming independent schools and drawing students away from Protestant missions.<sup>128</sup> Pinson, like other mission schools, recovered. But the problems of salaries, administration and an abortive indigenization program remained.

As these fundamental issues remained unresolved or inadequately dealt with, Cubans continued to leave the Church. American Baptist and Southern Methodist mission reports suggest that an average of one Cuban pastor and/or teacher left the Church annually, at times over periods of several years. Some like Jamaican-born Cirilo De Roux chose to carry on their protest within their church. Missionaries complained of DeRoux's renegade approach: "He goes about our fields and tells the brethren that he depends on them and that the other pastors are supported by the North."<sup>129</sup> Baptist missionaries eventually had to concede that DeRoux, expelled in 1932, had much popular support and had been responsible for the success of the Baracoa field. Four

years later, the zealous and nationalistic pastor was brought back into the fold.<sup>130</sup>

Many of the Cuban protests were elements of the larger, more fundamental issue of indigenization. After decades of Protestant mission activity in eastern Cuba, Cubanization remained a relatively distant reality. All of the principal missions had claimed to have gone the farthest. Yet all continued to caution against the premature granting of too much administrative responsibility to Cubans. A Methodist mission report typically insisted in 1937 that "Cuba was too small to set up for herself an independent and separate ecclesiastical body; that would be unwise and even dangerous."<sup>131</sup> Even the Cuban Friends Church, an ostensibly autonomous organization, remained subordinate to and dependent upon the US Church, as the American Friends felt it should be. The heavily qualified indigenization of the Friends Church is perhaps the most exemplary of general mission reluctance to recognize Cubans as capable administrators of their own ecclesiastical institutions. The Friends mission is also representative of Cubans' responses to an uneven mission policy.

Available evidence points to the post-1925 period, when indigenization was supposed to have been realized shortly thereafter, as the period when the Friends mission experienced some of its most significant Cuban dissent. As noted, crisis conditions in the early 1930s had negatively

influenced missionaries' attitudes toward indigenization. Most missionaries had also drawn conclusions about the necessity for US tutelage--within and outside the Church: "Cubans who think want foreign help and advice."<sup>132</sup> Such sentiment echoed the consensus of US military administrators during the first occupation decades earlier.

Yet, contrary to this sentiment, some of the "thinking" class of Cubans thought otherwise. Mission hopefuls like Arsenio Catalá, José Reyes, and Juan Guzmán, part of a small group of Cuban Friends deemed capable by American Friends missionaries, were not always aligned with missionary thinking. Conflict surfaced and escalated at several levels. While the Cuban Friends remained financially dependent on the US Church, a function of Cuban conditions and mission policy in general, salaries remained a fractious issue. Cuban antipathy for the mission board's budget cuts in the early 1930s was particularly sharp in view of recent raises for US missionaries, exacerbating a pastor-missionary inequity of long duration.<sup>133</sup>

Disputes over authority increased as numerous Cuban pastors, teachers and laicos challenged missionaries and indigenization rhetoric. In the late 1920s, some Friends missionaries had acknowledged growing Cuban opposition to prolonged US missionary dominance; others dismissed it as "not serious."<sup>134</sup> By the mid-1930s, the elements of discord, as recalcitrant Cuban Friends were referred to,

cropped up at various levels: Some had challenged the authority of North American superintendents; others attempted to circumvent American Friends-designated administrative bodies and "take matters into their own hands;" still others simply left.<sup>135</sup> José Reyes, considered by missionaries to be an outstanding example for other Cubans, formed the Independent Friends Church, a separate organization unaffiliated with American Friends.<sup>136</sup>

The tireless efforts of Cubans like Miguel Tamayo and Arsenio Catalá who replaced US missionaries possessed of more resources, were recognized by American Friends but deemed inadequate to merit genuine self-government. Missionary confidence appeared to lay in certain individual Cubans but not in the larger group. Yet numerous Cuban Friends pushed, if not for complete independence, for more autonomy from the US Church's hegemony. Arsenio Catalá, a pastor popular among missionaries and Cubans alike, was one of several who called for greater financial support from the US, but in a context that suggested a return to the pre-1898 relationship of US economic ties and complete Cuban oversight of their own Protestantism.<sup>137</sup> Though some missionaries insisted that the Cubans needed US supervision more than financial support, a few toyed with the idea of the pre-1898 model. Nothing of substance, however, came

from these suggestions. For Cubans Friends, nevertheless, the struggle continued.

Yet Cubans were divided. This proved one of the mainstays of the US churches' prolonged dominance no less so than that of US hegemony generally. Meanwhile, Cuban pressures for more indigenization of the Protestant churches in eastern Cuba continued in varied form. Most typically, the movement appeared to have become atomized. Tensions over indigenization endured, however, partly through the reluctance of missions to move, as they believed, too hastily, and also because not all Cubans within the churches were united in the debate.

Friction over the issues of indigenization, as noted, were partly a function of nationality. After decades of experience, ambivalent missionaries and their US boards still questioned their Cuban colleagues' administrative abilities. Nor were all Cubans within the Church decided. Cuban pastors like Methodist Alberto Díaz and Baptist H.B. Someillán had long demanded a greater role for Cubans in administration. But some like the Methodist pastors Luis Alonso and Manuel Deulofeu suggested that such a question was premature, and heaped praise on the work of their North American mentors.<sup>138</sup> In the context of mission scandal, when an American Baptist superintendent became embroiled in questionable activities, the mission reported that many mission workers had become discouraged over the

inconsistency between the mission's rhetoric of morality and the practices of some of its missionaries. Yet Cubans like Enrique J. Molina and others nonetheless endeavoured to defend missionary actions to their compatriots.<sup>139</sup>

Among Cubans in the churches, the divisions over indigenization also followed partly along class lines. Cubans categorized by missionaries as "working in utmost harmony with the church" generally included those among the business, governing, and middle classes.<sup>140</sup> Some were active in the reigning Liberal and Conservative parties. Others like Cuban Friends Miguel Tamayo, owner of a drugstore and clinic, became Mayor of Banes, a major mission station.<sup>141</sup> Tamayo was praised by missionaries as "the backbone of the Banes Church."<sup>142</sup> He later became an active liaison between the Friends Church and corporate supporters like the United Fruit Company.<sup>143</sup> This type of relationship had a mutually reinforcing effect for Cuban mission workers. Some, like pastors José Reyes and Pedro Fonz, a banker, were also employees of the Chaparra Sugar Company. Reyes's eldest son was also an employee of the Royal Bank of Canada.<sup>144</sup> Many leading businessmen and public notables like Gil Ibañez, former graduates of Pinson, Colegio Los Amigos, and the International Colleges, by the 1930s returned the support given them as students of Protestant schools.<sup>145</sup>

These were among the Cuban members and non-members for whom the question of a Cuban National Church appeared less important, or at least, premature. Cubans within this group aspired to and/or identified with (or were among) the elite with whom North American missionaries so often allied. In turn, missionaries cultivated this group, hoping that they might "fill responsible places in church and state."<sup>146</sup>

Yet relative conformity with mission policies and perspectives also sometimes crossed class lines. Cuban pastors who shared the poverty of their predominantly working class congregations were also divided over the question of indigenization. Some, like Cirilo De Roux, were vocal in their nationalistic critique of mission policy. Others, like Pedro Deulofeu, appeared to accept the contradictory nature of a self-support policy qualified by financial and administrative dependency on a US mission board.<sup>147</sup> Nevertheless, both sides remained within their respective churches.

Numerous others had had their tolerance tested and left the church in protest, or simply in order to survive. Yet even amid this group, not all were able or desirous of breaking with mission policy completely. In at least one case, a Cuban pastor left his church behind but not its policies. In 1930, José Reyes had left the Friends to form the autonomous Independent Friends Church. Yet the

Independent Church, like the American Friends mission, patronized and depended on donors like United Fruit.<sup>148</sup>

The question of Cuban nationalism on the one hand, and of indigenization of the Protestant Church on the other, remained divisive for Cubans. For the US churches and their missionary representatives, despite some ambivalence, a consensual assessment of both the above as harmful and premature, endured beyond the 1930s. At the same time, the typological paternalism of US missions in eastern Cuba and their affinity with the local, regional and national forces of US hegemony, helped reinforce the conditions of dependency that Cubans experienced outside the Church on a daily basis.

Both groups of Cubans, those who left the church and those who resisted from within, functioned largely within the framework of policy and philosophy set by the US churches. Both, in turn, ultimately remained in one form or another dependent on the US Church because they had been weaned on it. This was just as true for the many Cubans who, though graduates of Protestant schools, were neither members nor converted Protestants (nor Christians, in some cases) but nonetheless, as members of a new generation of political and economic elites, were supportive of the Protestant missions' work.<sup>149</sup>

By the late 1930s and beyond, as one missionary accurately concluded, Protestant churches in eastern Cuba,

far from "going native," manifested the cultural influence of the US churches in their reproduction of North American religious institutions and practices. The ostensibly Cuban churches continued to equate Protestantism with perpetuating the forms and attitudes received from North American pioneers--numerous of whom remained in charge in Cuba.<sup>150</sup> All this was a function of the dynamic of US hegemony and of the reinforcing influence Protestant missions had. Though both were laden with contradiction, their combined influence in Cuban society proved pervasive.

Chapter Seven: Conclusion:  
Protestant Missions and US Hegemony

The end of the 1930s in Cuba signified the abortive end of yet another revolutionary era in Cuban history. Put another way, the decade that began amid "the pall of constitutional illegality" and popular rebellion ended with a call for constitutional renewal.<sup>1</sup> Under Fulgencio Batista as the power behind a succession of puppet presidents, and then as president himself in 1940, a period of reform followed the repressive mid-1930s.

The abrogation of the Platt Amendment (save for the clause concerning the Guantanamo naval base) set the stage for a new US-Cuba treaty consistent with the era of the Good Neighbour. This new concept of US-Cuban relations as one between "independent though friendly states," was typically more formal than substantive.<sup>2</sup> Cuban nationalism and its anti-US component--something the US never really understood nor accepted--endured precisely because US interventionism never relented. Economic conditions in Cuba, which improved by the late 1930s, also remained a function of international and of US needs and policy. Thus by 1940 the Cuban economy improved as US tariffs were lowered in response to both increased domestic demand and the needs of World War II.

Perhaps a more genuine act of Cuban independence was the 1940 constitution. The new constitution, unlike the US

model, provided for popular sovereignty, workers' rights, nondiscrimination by gender, race and even class, and state direction of the national economy.<sup>3</sup> The 1940 constitution was the product of a debate contributed to by the full spectrum of political orientations in Cuban political culture. Regarded by the US as radical, it was tolerated because its progressive clauses remained an agenda for the future. Despite the lack of enforcement provisions, however, the new constitution quickly assumed a place of central importance in Cuba's political culture. The constitution, as Louis Pérez noted, "brought both synthesis and closure to the revolutionary stirrings of the previous decade. Many reform objectives of the 1930s found vindication, if not implementation, in the new constitution."<sup>4</sup> More importantly, the constitution of 1940 laid the foundation for legitimacy and consensus politics for the next twenty years: "Success in Cuban politics would henceforth turn on which political group promised to interpret most faithfully and implement most vigorously the principal clauses of the constitution."<sup>5</sup> The end of the 1930s in Cuba, in essence, had culminated in the emergence of a new Cuban populism.

The 1930s also represented the end of an era for United States Protestant missions, though in Cuba this was not entirely substantive. By the mid-1930s, missionary activity in eastern Cuba--and generally--had undergone a considerable

decline in volunteers and funding, partly the function of indigenous replacements, of a rechanneling of resources to other fields like Africa, and most notably, as a result of internal schism and reorientation.

By 1940, the world was plagued by a host of problems that had an impact on the missionary enterprise generally.<sup>6</sup> Many of these, nationalism, anti-westernism, civil war, communism, had influenced the missionaries of the principal Protestant missions in eastern Cuba. In turn, the conservative-liberal schism which came to a head within the larger US missionary movement in the 1930s over the appropriate approach to these problems also was not without impact on Protestant missionaries in Cuba. A broader discussion of this question is beyond the scope of this study. Suffice it to say that, by the end of the 1930s, liberal proponents of the "new missionary" gained a voice in promoting their version of mission ideology and policy.

In theory, the new approach resembled a kind of missionary Good Neighbour policy that touted cultural sensitivity and criticized the chauvinism of traditional mission policy. Thus, US missionaries were chastised for aggressively advocating Prohibition laws about which Christians in the US were themselves divided, and pressing for North American types of reform--within and outside the church--without the knowledge necessary to adapt it to the specific conditions of the mission field.<sup>7</sup>

The work of the International Missionary Council's J. Merle Davis, The Cuban Church in a Sugar Economy (1942), addressed the above issues with respect to US mission work in the Cuban field. Requested by Latin American delegates to the World Missionary Conference at Madras in December 1938, the survey of Protestant churches in Cuba was a function of the apparent era of self-criticism within the larger missionary movement. It was also tacit acknowledgement of the limitations of four decades of Protestant evangelization in Cuba.

The Davis study described the Protestant Church in Cuba as "one of the greatest missionary achievements of our generation."<sup>8</sup> Yet, the survey's object, "to discover ways and means by which the Church might become more thoroughly domiciled in Cuban economy and in the life of the people," implicitly recognized fundamental deficiencies in mission work in Cuba.<sup>9</sup> These included flaws in key areas of mission activity: evangelization, rural work, and indigenization.

Evangelism had long been the cardinal emphasis of Protestant missions in Cuba since US missionaries landed in 1898. Closely allied with Protestant education, conversion was espoused as the principal instrument for building Protestant congregations throughout the Cuban field. Yet as the previous chapters argue, and as the Davis study also concluded, Protestant evangelization in Cuba remained deeply

problematic even after forty years of missionary endeavour.

The congregations of the principal Protestant missions in eastern Cuba had in fact grown manifold. By the end of the 1930s, the Friends church membership stood at over twelve times its 1901 count. The American Baptist and Southern Methodist missions, meanwhile, had increased their congregations more than twenty fold. Of its own accord, Protestant church growth was therefore substantial. This is especially significant when we take into account the difficult and at times dangerous conditions under which missionaries and Cuban pastors worked. Yet when measured against other contexts and variables, the success of Protestant evangelization in the eastern provinces is qualified.

As Davis observed, not only did active church membership--presumably the primary indicator of Protestant evangelism's success--represent well under 1 percent of national population (4,200,000 in 1942); church membership was also substantially below the number of students (many of whom were not members) enrolled in Protestant schools.<sup>10</sup> Secondly, by the end of the 1930s mission schools continued to thrive in enrollment and financial self-support (due primarily to the predominance of a middle class constituency). Church growth had not been as dynamic as that of Protestant education. Protestant churches, in contrast, continued to complain of Cubans' indifference, of

the growing influence of syncretic religions like Santeria, and of the fact that, relative to mission schools, church congregations were "financially extremely weak," the majority of the membership very poor, and financial self-support much rarer than in the case of the schools.<sup>11</sup>

Financial dependence of the churches on US sources endured both for those denominations like the Cuban Baptists and Friends who had substantially reduced the missionary presence, and for the Methodists who continued to maintain a large number of US missionaries. By 1940, as mission schools continued to prosper, the Cuban Church, as Davis concluded, was "reaching the limits of its growth."<sup>12</sup>

Part of the reason for Protestant evangelization's limitations in Cuba was its essentially urban emphasis. After decades of missionary endeavour, all of the major cities and smaller municipalities of eastern Cuba were occupied by at least one of the principal missions. The primary strategy of mission occupation of Cuba had been the "planting of churches in the cities of the island," and to this end they were successful.<sup>13</sup> Yet the religious work in this context remained superficial and unsustainable. Furthermore, the urban orientation of the Protestant churches--something for which missionaries strongly criticized the Roman Catholic Church--gave rise decades later to a revelation of "great unevangelized rural areas."<sup>14</sup>

Over half of the population of Cuba resided in the countryside. Yet, like the old colonial Catholic church, Protestant Churches remained urban-centered. As one mission report typically observed, mission activity in rural Cuba was notable only for its absence: "There are whole countrysides, with teeming populations, that are untouched by religious effort of any kind.... There are several hundred thousand people living in country districts that are largely untouched."<sup>15</sup> Other missions later reported that, outside of rural areas within the immediate vicinity or municipality of urban centers ( and even many of these), there were many villages throughout the countryside with "no church of any description."<sup>16</sup> With some 40 percent of their churches located in rural areas, the American Baptists were the sole exception to the preponderance of urbanized mission work.<sup>17</sup> Still, amid a predominantly rural population and economy, none of the missions based their work upon the rural field. Mission reports in 1940 continued to despair of the reality that Protestantism in eastern Cuba remained largely confined to the cities and towns, and that rural Cuba had been neglected by the evangelizing mission.<sup>18</sup>

The indigenization programs of the principal missions in eastern Cuba represented the third and perhaps greatest problem area for the churches. With the sole exception of the Cuban Friends Church in Banes, Oriente, no other self-

supporting congregation functioned out of the more than one hundred organized churches in the eastern provinces after four decades. Yet even Davis's definition of "self-support"--generally accepted by all US Protestant missions--was questionable since, after several decades, none of the missions, regionally or nationally, followed the policy of subsidy reduction with churches founded. The few churches designated as "self-supporting" and "independent" in the Cuban Church study continued to receive from 50 to 90 percent of their funding from the United States. After forty years, the study more accurately concludes, Protestant churches in Cuba were still economically dependent on the US churches.<sup>19</sup> Though many Cubans had become teachers and pastors, they remained effective employees of US organized religion.

Davis attributed the stunted growth of Protestant religious work in Cuba to several factors: The Roman Catholic Church; disaffection of youth; sectarianism; the rise of Pentecostalism; poverty; and Cuban economic dependency. The Catholic Church was a perennial target for Protestant mission problems. The popular appeal of syncretic, Afro-Cuban religions and the recent rise of Pentecostalism were also barriers to the growth of the traditional Protestant churches. In addition, Cuban youth found more appeal in Protestant education than in the rigidity of Protestant religious practices. Sectarianism

worked against indigenization by promoting numerous small and mission-dependent churches in areas where the combined, unified strength of smaller congregations might support a pastor and organization completely independent of the US Church.

From a systemic point of view, the Davis study's most insightful critique of the Protestant Church in Cuba centered on the problem of church growth in the context of poverty and socioeconomic disparity. Despite the substantial physical growth of the Church in Cuba, only one percent of the over 100 churches of the chief eastern denominations--and one percent of the over 400 churches of the seven leading missions nationally--were deemed financially independent of their mission boards. Indigenization, Davis perceptibly noted, could not be realized as long as the Protestant churches failed to adjust to the economic and social conditions of Cuba. The imposition of a "middle class and expensive institution in a largely lower class and poverty-stricken constituency" encouraged expectations and aspirations which, for the predominantly poor congregations, could not realistically be fulfilled in Cuban society without healthy doses of US sponsorship.<sup>20</sup>

Decades of Protestant mission activity in eastern Cuba had not altered the fundamental reality that Protestantism there-- at least since 1898--had been built on a foundation

and modelled according to standards set in the United States. Far from encouraging a spirit of independence-- despite the rhetoric--the Cuban Church was judged successful to the extent that it was consistent with US standards and norms. As cultural and ecclesiastical wards of the US churches, Cubans, overall, fell into line with the religious and educational programs imported from the US. This process became all "the more natural when these programs were financed by the mission boards from what seemed to the Cubans to be the inexhaustible treasure-house of American wealth."<sup>21</sup>

A boon in the pre-1898 era that enabled some economic support while giving free reign to the then more genuinely Cuban Church, US support after 1898 relegated Cubans to secondary positions in their churches. Mission intervention saturated the formerly Cuban Protestant Church. Decades later, what resulted was a logical extension of ecclesiastical usurpation, not the independent and Cuban Church prophesied. What had emerged was an essentially still-North American Church maladjusted in program, sustainability, and leadership for the specific economic, social and cultural conditions of eastern Cuba. The Protestant Church remained a North American, Anglo-Saxon and middle class institution super-imposed over an essentially impoverished, working class, and structurally-dependent society and culture. Furthermore, it was "an urbanized

institution" which belatedly sought to expand in a rural environment.<sup>22</sup> Even with a predominantly Cuban pastorate, the impact of this truism on evangelization remained palpable. Cubans, the converted and the curious, continued in 1940 to perceive Protestantism in Cuba as the "American system" of religion.<sup>23</sup>

Under these conditions, it might have been more surprising if a genuinely Cuban Protestantism had been forged after four decades of missionary endeavour. Yet the more common experience was that of the inability of a Cuban Protestantism to take root in soil saturated by North American Protestantism. In the struggle to sustain North American Protestant institutions, vulnerable and dependent Cuban churches could not survive without aid from the US. As mission reports noted: "The finances of Cuban churches depend so much on seasonal employment in the sugar plantations that it is hard to pay month by month the most necessary obligations when for long periods no income is received."<sup>24</sup>

At the same time, many Cuban pastors continued their struggle to cultivate a Protestantism that lived up to the western standards of US missions. A number of pastors aspired to the material standards of US missionaries, including missionaries' salaries, housing and servants, as a norm for themselves. In this context, the Cuban pastor not uncommonly fell victim to being "ground between the

millstones of foreign social and economic standards and the low wage level and supporting power" of the membership of the Protestant church.<sup>25</sup> Those among the ordained who came from the middle classes, like the businessman Miguel Tamayo and broker Pedro Fonz, were in no danger of having their expectations thwarted. Most others, frustrated by chronic economic struggle, developed a sense of injustice and, like the strongly nationalistic Cirilo DeRoux, spoke out against the hegemony of the US Church. Still others simply left the Church to begin their own or pursued another career. Whether by cooperation or resistance, Cubans within the Church continued to struggle in order to accommodate a Protestantism that was too costly to be carried by the economic power of its membership, and foreign to the cultural inheritance of Cuban society.<sup>26</sup>

Davis's critique of mission work in Cuba formed part of the larger response of a rising Protestant liberalism to the formerly predominant conservative and ethnocentric policies of traditional Protestant missions. The experience of US missions in Cuba, the study concluded, paralleled that of US and European missions worldwide. Western assumptions, Davis argued, had to give way to the specific needs of local culture and society if the Protestant Church was to survive as an independent and indigenous entity. The "new missionary" as envisioned in the 1930s, had to give ground

to the indigenous pastorate and, in the case of Cuba, let Cubans determine the form of Cuban Protestantism.

Yet the Davis study was not as seminal as it appeared. While it paralleled the larger liberal critique within the North American Protestant Church, it also reflected the lingering biases of a western institution. Typically, socioeconomic analysis commixed with old racial and cultural stereotypes reminiscent of the 1890s. Insight into Cuba's structural dependency--ecclesiastically and secularly--was coloured by references to the purportedly juvenile and highly emotional nature of the Cuban personality, and the "lax moral inheritance" descended "from the slave background of the Negro people."<sup>27</sup> "Cuban character" accounted in no small part for both the positive and negative realities of Cuban society. Significantly, Davis's otherwise substantive study of Protestantism in Cuba--ostensibly representative of a more progressive and "new" missionizing--devolved to nineteenth-century conceptions divorced from the dependency issues it attempted to address.

This was perhaps most evident in the study's chapter on "Constructive Measures" for a genuinely indigenous Church. The categories of measures discussed--organization, experimentation, and education--reflected the ambivalence of US missionaries' contradictory desire to both liberate and manipulate the Cuban Church. Thus, organizational solutions stressed the need for Cuban pastors to undergo still more

training. Projects were also recommended for the organization of rural mission work, local agricultural development, and church cooperatives. And agricultural education and "training in handicrafts and cottage industries" were in the forefront of educational solutions to the Cuban churches' economic dependence.<sup>28</sup>

For the most part, these "constructive measures" appeared inconsistent with the study's more sophisticated and far-reaching systemic critique of US missions in Cuba. However, they were reflective of earlier, symptomatic mission critiques. Not a few of the measures suggested were drawn from programs already begun by missionaries in eastern Cuba.

The survey's liberal perspective shared many of the same fundamental assumptions of its intended conservative audience. This included the perceived need, after decades of experience, to further educate Cuban pastors. This recommendation was not inconsistent with the observations of eastern mission reports that remained concerned about Cuban pastors' capacity for efficiency, and the need for prolonged US supervision.<sup>29</sup> In a related context, the study added that the Cuban's presumably "unusual artistic taste and deftness in the use of his hands" urged the development of a small handicrafts industry as a "source of economic rehabilitation of the Cuban people."<sup>30</sup> In addition to this and other recommendations for "economic rehabilitation" as a

path to church autonomy, Davis praised the operations of the United Fruit Company as one more example of a constructive measure. United Fruit's self-contained company town of Banes--specifically its employee housing and small farm units--were construed by Davis as a program for helping the Cuban rural worker to become an "independent" agriculturalist!<sup>31</sup> Davis judged the Company's operations in Banes as "in a class in itself," and "a model which the Church or any agency interested in human uplift should study."<sup>32</sup> As Robert Wauzzinski pointed out, even Protestant liberalism implicitly accepted the spirit of technological rationalization.

The final measure submitted by the survey entailed a rural education program that also included a "department for training in handicrafts and cottage industries" in order "to teach students in school, and people in their homes, to make things that can be sold. This would help make them independent of a one crop system."<sup>33</sup> In order to help Cubans with making and marketing their handicrafts, Davis recommended importing more experts from the US. Implicit in almost all the above measures was an enduring chauvinism and the need for other forms of US tutelage.

The Cuban Church in a Sugar Economy offered a potentially constructive and substantive criticism of North American Protestantism in Cuba. But it was inherently flawed by the inability to transcend the more fundamental ethos of

the conservative mission philosophy and policy that the Protestant liberal movement claimed to oppose. The Cuban Church, praised by missionaries like Methodist Sterling Neblett as "the most complete and trustworthy" work of its kind, was both incomplete and reflective of a North American paternalism and ignorance (if slightly more sophisticated) that, decades after the first mission landing, remained unreconciled to Cuban self-determination.<sup>34</sup> For both Davis and US missionaries in Cuba, the given of "financial independence" under US supervision, with US training, and through US models, remained.

As such, the Davis study was illustrative of the kind of typologies that Protestant missions in eastern Cuba developed over the decades, and that Cubans, depending on their class and other experiences, either opposed or were coopted by. There were no references in Davis--especially in the context of developing a "truly Cuban institution"--to the formation of Cuban Protestantism without the unilateral intervention of the US Church (or handicrafts experts). The measures recommended, the study appeared to imply, stood a better chance of success with US guidance. Despite the rhetorical flourishes regarding Cubanization, the survey devolved to a discussion of Cuban financial self-support under the benevolent eye of the Mother Church in the US.

In this context the emphasis of The Cuban Church on financial self-support under US auspices was symbolic of the

absence of fundamental change for which the Protestant missions in eastern Cuba were also representative. Earlier sentiment that missionaries could better afford to leave the Cubans without financial support than without US supervision found vindication in the recommendations of Davis. Ultimately, the US churches believed that they could never really leave it to the Cubans to develop their own institutions, their own Church. The celebrated Cuban Council of Evangelical Churches, founded in 1940 as the first permanent, national and representative Protestant organization, was headed by a US missionary.<sup>35</sup>

As a whole, US Protestant missions and missionaries, and their boards and churches in the US, were products of North American culture and society. It is thus perhaps not surprising that their preconceptions, ideologies and policies proved not dissonant with those of their secular compatriots and surrogate Cuban elite. At a fundamental level, the shared hegemonic assumptions of US secular and ecclesiastical interests in Cuba facilitated missionaries' association, identification and collaboration with US economic and political forces in Cuba. The experience of US missions in eastern Cuba was a microcosm of this process.

Thus both Protestant missions and secular US interests, whether the US government, United Fruit or US-naturalized Cuban elites, tended to equate formal Cuban independence with self-determination, or, more accurately, could not

perceive of Cuban independence without US tutelage of some kind. Both groups viewed US government and business interests in Cuba as fundamentally benign or benevolent. Finally, both--ecclesiastically and politically--at least tacitly doubted the capacity of the Cuban majority for self-government and therefore encouraged a greater role for North American educational intervention. In the secular realm as in the religious, education played a role in social control. Both secular and religious US interests appreciated this fact, as demonstrated in the mission experience in eastern Cuba, and eventually came to rely on each other for its realization.

That this process evolved into a mutually reinforcing relationship was clearly evident by the fourth decade of mission work in Cuba. By 1940, not only had US missions effected a full transition from reluctant association to identification with the forces of US hegemony, they and numerous of their Cuban wards collaborated with them. Certainly, there were shifts and variations in mission policy and its general relationship to the forces in Cuban society. Yet certain fundamental givens, such as a persistent paternalism and a cultural rootedness in the belief in North American superiority and benevolence--and Cuban incompetence--endured.

The relationship between Protestant missions and US economic hegemony in eastern Cuba was also rooted in

practical concerns. Since the turn of the century in the US, Revivalists and industrialists needed each other: "the former needed money, the latter legitimation.... Thus, the Protestant Church settled into a comfortable alliance with industrialism, thinking the republic was in all ways prospering."<sup>36</sup> This relationship, rooted in the US, was transplanted whole to Cuba like much else from the northern colossus. In Cuba, as in the US, the relationship between capital and the Church was not devoid of conflict. Yet relations between the two were reconciled more readily than the contradictory goals of the US missions could be.

As noted earlier, the theory of Protestant education in eastern Cuba sought, through religious education, to "uplift the individual and the nation through the free development of the potential of the individual."<sup>37</sup> Though this aspect was certainly consistent with Protestant advocacy of personal salvation, the other aim, the provision of practical skills and an ideology of corporate efficiency, was not. In the important case of Protestant education, which became the primary instrument of the Protestant evangelizing and civilizing mission in eastern Cuba, the eventual emphasis on vocational institutions and training, and the establishment of short term programs were significantly at odds with the highly-praised principle of equality of opportunity, let alone mission neutrality.<sup>38</sup>

Far from addressing the roots of Cuba's economic and structural dependency, US Protestant missions ministered to the causal ties of US economic hegemony by treating the symptoms and not the causes. At the same time, Protestant education in Cuba, founded in the emphasis on literacy and North American notions of progress, came to reflect a capitalist agenda. Consistent with the needs of North American capital, then, all of the principal missions in eastern Cuba effectively fell into line.

By 1940, the prosperity of the northern republic had been reaffirmed, while fascism (and communism) threatened. Protestant missions in Cuba, seemingly driven, at least in part, by the dictum that what was good for corporate America was good for Cuba, strived to accommodate US corporations in the eastern provinces. Far from seriously confronting the foreign-dominated sugar monoculture that imposed limitations on Cuban society, the Protestant missions effectively embraced it: "It is most important that we continue to merit and receive the confidence... and increase the active support of the leaders and captains of this great industry."<sup>39</sup> The trickle of mission commercial and industrial training programs of the first decade developed into a torrent of vocational and business-oriented courses, departments and schools by the 1930s and 1940s. Protestant schools like Pinson, Los Amigos, and the International Colleges catered to the needs of capital and also trained

new generations of Cuban capitalists, as well as the bureaucrats and políticos who became business associates. The Friends Holguin school was described in 1939 as "a school of unusual influence in national affairs."<sup>40</sup> Fulgencio Batista Zaldivar, President of Cuba in 1940, was one of numerous Protestant school graduates who identified with US capital interests and facilitated the framework of dependency in Cuba.

US Protestant missions facilitated North American capital's "harvesting" of the virgin field in eastern Cuba. Thus the US churches reinforced Cuba's structural dependency by helping to foster some of the economic and political forces that contributed to it. The US missions' need for material support, their desire to reaffirm North American culture and values based in western notions of social and industrial progress, and their own need for legitimation, helped forge an alliance with the forces of US hegemony that, if not premeditated, was probably preordained. After decades of missionary endeavour in the cradle of independence, a new generation of Protestant school graduates arose. Recipients of North American training, values and influence, from schools in Cuba and in the US, Cubans now carried on the evangelizing and civilizing mission.

Protestant evangelization, however, had long been dwarfed by the more dynamic and expansive Protestant

schools. Protestant education, previously secondary to evangelization, became the watchword and primary mission instrument for the "civilizing" or "moralizing" of Cubans. While US capital, and other political and economic elites in eastern Cuba appreciated the role played by Protestant education in the realm of social control, the missions and many Cubans recognized the instrumentality of Protestant schools for social mobility. The chief Protestant missions in eastern Cuba had long since established themselves as "waystations to further social ascent" among the Cuban middle classes.<sup>41</sup> Protestant education thus played several roles: As a means to the end of evangelization; the training of a Cuban ministry; a form of social control (especially for employers); and social mobility, though the evidence is less clear here. Yet, although mission education played a significant role in the conversion of students (Methodist Sunday schools accounted for 35 percent of the converted), it exercised a much broader and more far-reaching influence in the context of what might be referred to as US cultural imperialism.

To an important extent, it may be argued that, of the two interrelated mission objectives--evangelization and "civilization," or "moralization" later on--the civilizing mission proved far more effective, pervasive and enduring in its effects. Here, Protestant education--imported from the US and later adopted by the Cubans--was both instrumental

and illustrative. After the first decade, all of the principal Protestant missions advocated education as the primary mover in the struggle to win the hearts and minds (and souls) of Cubans.

The success, or at least, the depth of penetration of Protestant mission influence through education as opposed to religious work was reflected first in mission education statistics. After the first ten years of mission activity in eastern Cuba, total church membership was on average higher than school enrollment totals--save for the American Friends whose enrollment totals had always been higher than church membership. By the second decade, the enrollments of Protestant boarding, day and Sunday schools had overtaken congregation numbers. Thereafter, as the rate of church growth stagnated, mission schools excelled in number and quality until the mid-1930s when they consistently surpassed church membership by as much as 200 percent (See Tables).<sup>42</sup> By 1936, Baptist, Methodist and Friends schools in the eastern provinces accounted for more than 10,500 students.

The substantial growth of Protestant schools, and, therefore, of the influence of the US missions' curriculum of North American education and values, reflected the interests of several groups. As most missionaries believed, the promotion of North American values and institutions was necessary for the attainment of the condition of "civilization" and "progress." Protestant education, one

missionary proclaimed in 1923, was the "path of progress" and the "promise of a new life for Cuba."<sup>43</sup>

For many Cubans in the eastern region as in the rest of the country, the promise of a "new life" through North American-based instruction proved very appealing. Protestant schools responded to the needs of the Cuban middle classes for social status and mobility as much as they did to the backgrounds of the poorer working classes. The fact that the majority of Protestant school students were not converts indicates that the religious motivation for attendance was not the primary consideration. Aware that many of their students would one day be numbered among the doctors, lawyers, businessmen and other economic and political elite, mission educators strived to project their influence upon the future national leadership no less so than over that of the future ministry.<sup>44</sup> Thus by the 1930s and beyond, Protestant schools had evolved, fortifying their reputable religious and academic curricula with departments and programs conducive to the growth and development of middle class posterity. By the fourth decade of mission endeavour, some of the most prestigious business schools in Cuba were Protestant schools in the east.

Nor were missionaries any less cognizant of their influence over sectors of the Cuban working class. The effectiveness of evangelization was second only to education in helping mould a "reliable labourer."<sup>45</sup> By the 1930s and

1940s, Friends, Methodist and Baptist schools flourished, providing a wide variety of "industrial" and "handiwork" programs--many based on the industrial education program for blacks in the US. Geared toward both instilling North American Protestant values of thrift and industriousness, and the preparation of Cuban youth for the labour market, mission schools responded both to the perceived needs of "moralization," and, ultimately, the growing needs of foreign capital.

Lack of evidence makes the quantification of Protestant mission influence--and the concomitant reinforcement of North American values and institutions--problematic. Yet the accumulated, consistent growth in corporate support for Protestant education, much more consistent than that for religious mission work, becomes a highly significant indicator of the effectiveness and impact of Protestant education especially in the service of North American capital. Put simply, if US business interests had seen no favourable result for their investment, they would not likely have continued to sponsor the advance of mission schools in eastern Cuba. Yet they did. As the years passed, and as Protestant school enrollments grew, capital-mission relations also evolved. When enrollments recovered dramatically from the Machado's worst years, and Protestant commercial schools proliferated, business interests like the United Fruit Company had long outgrown

their role as silent partner and assumed new ones as active (and sometimes demanding) associates and advisers.

The growing influence of corporate-backed Protestant education--and the support that that influence accumulated--radiated from many quarters. They included "independent" schools run by Cuban pastors or teachers who, though having broken with their church, had nevertheless been trained in the US or by US instructors and continued to promote an appreciation for North American values and institutions in their schools.<sup>46</sup> Some of these splinter institutions, like the Independent Friends Church, maintained both the principles of the US Mother Church and the material support of US corporations.<sup>47</sup>

As was also demonstrated, Protestant missions' educational objectives also had the support of successive Cuban governments, from the local to the national level. Significantly, Protestant educators' influence also extended to many of those who neither were nor became either Protestant or even Christian. Yet these Cubans did become mayors, judges, police chiefs and presidents, and many never relented in their support for their alma mater. In turn, the missions not infrequently relied upon the gratitude of former students.<sup>48</sup> In addition to these, there were the thousands of other Cubans who, though outside the Church, regularly came into contact with Protestant members and/or supporters among the elite; many more attended mission

meetings and perhaps counted among the many "adherents" listed by the Protestant churches. These groups are significant because they demonstrate a substantive range of sympathy and support that went largely unexamined and unrecorded. Yet such groups remain an important consideration in the context of the dissemination and pervasiveness of North American values and culture in Cuba, a process facilitated by Protestant missions in the eastern regions.

Eastern Cuba was a microcosm for missionary activity in the rest of Cuba, Latin America, and for much of the missionary experience in the rest of the world. Yet in contrast to western Cuba, the missionary experience in eastern Cuba was planted in a unique foundation which complemented the region's historical rebelliousness, latent marketization, and Afro-Cuban culture. This same factor also facilitated the overall receptivity of Protestant influence. Eastern Cuba was arguably even less nominally Christian than the western regions. The Spanish colonial Catholic Church had not only been urban-centric; it was also regionally-biased. More predominant in the west, the colonial Catholic Church was non-existent in vast regions of the east for a very long period. Though it maintained a presence in the east, the colonial Church remained heavily-concentrated in the western provinces. Despite the obligatory Protestant mission invective against the Catholic

Church, the friction between the two was relatively less palpable in the eastern provinces than in the west, and certainly less so than in other Latin American countries. In this important sense, eastern Cuba was indeed "virgin soil" for US Protestant influence. The colonial Catholic Church itself "had more than adequately prepared the way for Protestant inroads."<sup>49</sup> As mentioned, Protestant missions had also been urban-oriented. Despite urgent missionary references at the turn of the century to the promise and potential for rural education and evangelization, four decades later the rural areas remained largely untouched by the Protestant churches. The Cuban countryside was generally neglected by the Catholic and Protestant missionaries alike. Protestant missions, therefore, had not deviated entirely from the practices of their colonial adversaries.

Early Protestant mission penetration of eastern Cuba was marked by several striking parallels with the colonial Catholic Church. Throughout the Cuban republic's early decades, while the US churches flourished, they also demonstrated similarities with the Spanish colonial model that eventually became a hindrance to evangelization. Ultimately, US Protestant churches shared in many of the assumptions, policies, and practices of the Catholic counterpart which they denounced.

One of the themes of Protestant criticism of the colonial church was the apparently overbearing dominance and intolerance of the Spanish church and state in Cuba. "The oppressive government of Spain," Baptist Howard Grose had typically asserted, "was accompanied by... the not less oppressive ecclesiastical rule of the Romish Church."<sup>50</sup> Methodist Sterling Neblett went further, castigating Rome for "enslaving the souls and consciences of Cubans."<sup>51</sup> Yet such invective did not conceal the reality that Protestant missions were also limited in their tolerance of Cuban culture. The very foundation for the US churches' evangelizing and civilizing mission was the Americanization of Cuban society. North American missionaries sought "to impress their own cultural, sociopolitical and religious values upon the Cubans."<sup>52</sup> Cuban customs, values, institutions and culture were deemed legitimate or salvageable to the extent that they resembled North American forms. All else was rejected by US missionaries as a function of the "benumbing influence" of the Spanish colonial Church.<sup>53</sup>

Also not unlike the Catholic Church which held a "very low opinion" of the spiritual and self-governing capacities of indigenous peoples, the Protestant Church in Cuba was reluctant to acknowledge Cuban competence.<sup>54</sup> Instead, Cubans were generally regarded throughout the early decades as children not to be abandoned, and even later, as

juveniles still in need of US tutelage.<sup>55</sup> These enduring cultural stereotypes negatively affected the growth of an indigenous, Cuban Protestantism as much as it did under the colonial Catholic Church. Far from encouraging the growth of national institutions, whether ecclesiastically or politically, US missionaries prescribed the "rescue" of Roman-tainted Cuba by salvation. Like their Spanish colonial counterparts, the US churches invoked God in their endeavour to "save" Cuba by promoting not only the acceptance of predominant North American religious beliefs, but also US political and economic institutions and practices.<sup>56</sup>

One of the principal North American institutions transplanted to eastern Cuba was Protestant education. Here too, the parallels between the Protestant and colonial Catholic Church were striking. Like Spanish Catholicism, Protestant education in Cuba, despite the rhetoric of cultural sensitivity, remained steeped in foreign--this time, North American--conceptions of Cuban needs. While the US churches held the Catholic Church responsible for the stunting of Cuban political maturity and development, the North American influence of Protestant education was no less distorting of Cuban national identity. The model that was imposed consisted of a system dominated by US missionaries, prayerbooks, and textbooks written if not published in the US, and institutions massively financed by both the US

Mother Church and North American corporations. Protestant schools were the primary instruments for the dissemination of US culture. The subsequent sociopolitical disintegration of Cuban culture, far from being seen as a product of North American hegemony, was contrasted to the stability of the US, and reinforced the perceived need for more North American Protestant education and intervention.

Finally, Protestant missions characterized Roman Catholicism as antithetical to nationhood, nationalism, and to a free and independent nation. This was based historically on the Catholic Church's collusion with Spanish imperialism, against Cuban independence.<sup>57</sup> Unfortunately, the US churches in eastern Cuba, if at times ambivalent, also demonstrated a general antipathy toward Cuban nationalism and self-determination when it was directed against the US. The enduring paternalism of missionaries, their Mother churches, and numerous US-trained Cuban pastors, fostered a generalized skepticism about the capacity for Cuban self-government without US supervision. Even among the more sympathetic of missionaries, Cuban nationalism raised alarm. Regarding Cuban nationalism within the Protestant Church, Methodist Easton Clements had warned: "We in Cuba are exposed to a danger that is greater and more insidious than open and violent persecution."<sup>58</sup> Since most missionaries identified with the forces of US

hegemony, most appeared to agree that Cuban nationalism was to be regretted.<sup>59</sup>

As a result of the Protestant churches' alignment with the hegemon of the day--a characteristic they shared with the old colonial Church--their political activism (despite the rhetoric of neutrality) was invariably concentrated in the maintenance of the status quo in Cuba. Protestant missions, like the Catholic Church under Spanish imperialism, deemed the status quo under US hegemony to be essentially sound, despite grave social crises, and generally condemned any attempts to deviate from it.<sup>60</sup>

At the same time, the US churches' increasing alignment with the dominant North American and pro-US proponents of the status quo helped reinforce Cuba's structural dependency on its northern overseer. Though aware of some of the symptoms of US intervention in Cuba, Protestant missionaries paradoxically continued to promote the importation of institutions and practices from the US as a solution to dependency. This hindered both the development of Cuban Protestantism (dynamic before the US takeover in 1898) and a Cuban national identity. As the protagonist lamented in Reasons of State by Alejo Carpentier (also a Protestant school graduate): "We are being invaded--and you know it--by Methodists, Baptists, Jehovah's Witnesses and Christian Scientists.... North American Bibles are part of the furniture of our rich houses, like Mary Pickford's

photograph in a silver frame, rubberstamped with her familiar 'Sincerely yours.' We are losing all our character."<sup>61</sup> This process also contributed to the belief that there was no nationalistic solution to Cuba's problems. This, in turn, tended to reinforce the "dependent mentality" which, as Margaret Crahan noted, given the relationship of Protestant mission activity to Cuban society, had significant impact on culture.<sup>62</sup>

Yet, while Protestant mission penetration represented one of the many levels on which US hegemony functioned, its influence was by no means absolute. Although many Protestant Cubans adopted the US churches' support for the status quo in Cuba, still others actively dissented. While the Protestant churches in Cuba largely aligned themselves with all US-blessed governments in Cuba, numerous individual Protestant Cubans did not. As the actions of Protestant school students in the late 1920s and early 1930s demonstrated, there was a "considerable Protestant presence in the struggle against the authoritarian regime of General Gerardo Machado."<sup>63</sup>

Likewise, Protestant church support for Fulgencio Batista, especially after the 1952 coup, was offset by significant opposition from some Cuban pastors and numerous Protestant individuals like Frank País, organizer and leader of the urban 26th July Movement in eastern Cuba. The Protestant Church maintained its opposition to what

eventually became a popular social revolution supported by many Cuban Protestants. After 1961, a radicalized revolution saw a Protestant Church fragmented, its only response, the exile of many of its missionaries, pastors and members to the United States. Only after decades of conflict and confrontation, and importantly, in the absence of US missionary tutelage, were Cuban Protestants and the revolutionary government able to reconcile their differences and work toward a constructive dialogue within the framework of a revolutionary society.

Despite substantive recommendations from the 1942 Davis report, social change in the Protestant Church in pre-1959 Cuba remained incremental and divisive. As John Kirk noted, by the time the Protestants decided upon a more appropriate approach to key concerns such as indigenization of the Church, it was too late. Despite the substantial influence of the US Protestant churches in Cuba, Cubans and Cuban nationalism remained, to an important extent, independent variables. Ironically, while the ethnocentric assumptions of North American missionaries on questions like Cuban self-government endured, Protestant institutions helped furnish many Cubans with the means to contradict their self-proclaimed mentors. Eventually, a slowly-evolving Church was overtaken by a more rapidly-developing Cuban nationalism. In the end, however, both were creatures of US hegemony.

Table 1: American Friends Mission Growth, Eastern Cuba  
(Source: AFBFM Annual Report).

	Church/ Out- station	Church Member- ship	Sunday Schools	Sunday School Students	Student Total
1903			2	165	
1904			4	130	
1905		38	3	105	
1909	3	168	9	544	
1912	5	165	10	647	789
1913	13	182	10	935	1051
1914		160		815	1105
1915	14	209	15	733	930
1916	17	223	20	1091	1290
1917	22	223	20	1203	1409
1918	17	273	9	418	650
1919	14	229	9	237	487
1920	16	233	14	921	1232
1921	10	338	14	935	1343
1922	20	239	14	915	--
1923	23	280	14	1030	1190
1924	16	568	14	1152	1354
1925	9	257	12	226	--
1926	13	236	15	--	--
1927	6	177	20	--	--
1928	10	151	7	350	--
1929	11	249	14	805	--
1930	7	248	13	702	780
1931	7	286	7	582	800
1932	7	283	10	841	848
1933	7	101	8	497	529
1939	13	444	19	1223	1839

Table 2: American Baptist Mission Growth, Eastern Cuba  
 (Source: ABHMS Annual Report of the Board, ABHS).\*

	Church/ Out- station	Church Member- ship	Sunday Schools	Sunday School Students	Student Total
1901		168	8	476	476
1902		218	7	316	316
1903	4	226	9	547	547
1904	6	443	14	651	651
1905		985	38	1175	1175
1906	76	1338	34	1484	1484
1907	99	1842	32	1583	
1908	74	2066	39	1841	
1910	112	2071	42	1948	
1911	125	2595	54	2633	
1912	137	2777	61	2445	2778
1913	131	2939	57	2396	2868
1914	98	1537	56	1640	2205
1915	100	1768	56	2254	2829
1916	99	1997	55	2091	2922
1917	91	1706	99	2976	3807
1918	82	1578	53	3150	4346
1920	72	1939	48	2687	4053
1921	88	2122	46	3005	
1922	36		50	3323	4316
1923	87		57	3437	4618
1924	82	2559	81	4896	6009
1925	36	2784	74	4032	5306
1926	86	3308	94	3252	4321
1927	83	3640	95	3800	4855
1928	111	4309	102	4720	5599
1930	103	4676	81	4285	5136

1931	89	3440	95	4860	5495
1932	120	3321	122	5561	6136
1933	113	3795	97	5440	6122
1934	120	3666	116	5500	6001
1935	125	3745	130	5600	6419
1936	129	3577	153	6233	7119
1937	125	3682	144	6076	7093
1938	123	3460	139	6497	7338
1939	150	3777	169	7430	7535

Table 2, cont'd.

\* Protestant mission statistics are admittedly incomplete and sometimes exaggerated for North American domestic consumption. Nevertheless, the general result is a substantial indicator of the direction of Protestant Church growth in eastern Cuba. This is especially clear in the case of the statistics kept by the Convención Bautista de Cuba Oriental (CBCO), whose estimates were considerably more conservative than those eventually sent out to the Mother Church in the United States by North American missionaries like Baptist H.R. Moseley. After Moseley's dismissal in 1913-1914, the statistics of the ABHMS and CBCO appear to converge and become more consistent. Partly for this reason, CBCO records are presumed to be more accurate overall.

Table 3: Convención Bautista de Cuba Oriental--Statistics  
 (Source: Actas de la CBCO, Archivo CBCO, Santiago de Cuba).

	Church/ Out- station	Church Member- ship	Sunday Schools	Sunday School Students	Student Total
1908	57	1572			
1911	52	1546			1156
1913		1717	41		1209
1914	41	1864	35		1267
1915	62	1819	42		1576
1916	56	1887	49		1895
1917	58	1625	58		3278
1918	60	1680	52		2967
1919	64	1772	52		3014
1920	64	1897	56		2942
1921		2118	44		3000
1922	53	2202	50		3223
1924	67	2575			
1925	70	3104	81		4212
1926	71	3300	94		4797
1927	74	3616	95		4572
1928	110	3973	101		5374
1929	120	4309	102		5448

Table 4: Southern Methodist Mission Growth, Eastern Cuba  
(Source: MECS, Anuario Cubano, UMCA).

	Church/ Out- station	Church Member- ship	Sunday Schools	Sunday School Students	Student Total
1906	11	229	13	583	785
1907	14	389	12	482	823
1908	17	708	17	803	998 *
1909	20	949	17	671	788 *
1911	20	967	19	784	943 *
1912	20	1123		814	851 *
1913	20		16	773	834 *
1914	21	1242	17	853	959 *
1915	23	1191	19	658	738 *
1916	21	1262	18	984	1072 *
1917	17	1103	18	863	1014 *
1918	19	1162	19	957	
1919	19	1196	16	779	1024 *
1921	16	1325	12	762	998 *
1922	20	1931		1303	1457 *
1925	16	1119	17	996	1321 *
1926	18	1301	18	865	1230 *
1929	14	1295	20	1411	1649 *
1930	16	1369	21	1527	1676 *
1931	19	1707	26	1516	1614 *
1932	14	1453	23	1831	1935 *
1933	18	1694	26	1955	2047 *
1934	21	1778	28	2116	2180 *
1935	21	1727	26	2085	

\* Not all MECS normal schools reported. In most cases, only the Pinson school in Camagüey is accounted for, excluding numerous Methodist schools throughout Oriente and the rest of Camagüey.

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#### Chapter Four

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