

CANADIAN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO ZAMBIA:  
WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR.

by

**Sontwa Sinkala**

A Thesis  
presented to the University of Manitoba  
in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy  
in  
The Department of Geography  
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Winnipeg, Manitoba  
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SONTWA SINKALA

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of  
the University of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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Ku mupite e baba Chipuzi Sinkala, kwe mama Nawakwi,  
naku mwanane Salipa.

## ABSTRACT

This thesis is an examination of the appropriateness and sustainability of Canada's development assistance to Zambia. The emphasis has been on development assistance to the country's agricultural sector. Until the early 1960s, Canada's commercial and political contacts in the Southern African region were mostly with white Southern Africa. Thus, most of Canada's activities in the region were determined by its relationships with white Southern Africa. However, this situation changed in the mid 1960s when Canada, as part of the larger Western alliance, realised that they could no longer count on white Southern Africa to maintain their influence in the region. This realisation was brought about by the black liberation movements which were gradually leading to political independence in a number of countries. Canada, therefore, began expanding its commercial and political relationships with black Southern Africa as a way of gaining some influence. Their main measure of achieving this was through increasing foreign assistance programmes.

The thesis has analysed Canada's principal motivating factors for providing Zambia with foreign assistance. Thus, an historical examination which shows how Canada first became involved in Zambia and how Canada's assistance has evolved over time has been presented. Strong politically motivated factors were responsible for Canada's early assistance to black Commonwealth Africa in general, and to Zambia in particular. Therefore, the argument that has been strongly advanced in the thesis is that Canadian foreign assistance began in the 1960s purely as a way of preserving the West's political interests in the region, with commercial considerations increasingly playing a role in the 1970s. These two considerations have also been the principal determining factors in Canada's choice of what sectors and projects to support. Canada's desire to gain political and commercial influence in Zambia was later reinforced in the 1970s with Zambia's deteriorating copper-dominated economy.

Because the major factors influencing Canada's foreign assistance to Zambia were politically motivated, Canada's early assistance was not adequate to make Zambia independent of its southern neighbours, particularly in the transportation sector. The assistance was also short-term as opposed to long-term assistance which would have made Zambia less dependent on transportation routes to the south.

Central to this thesis has been to address three principal issues concerning Canadian development assistance to Zambia's agricultural sector. These central issues were the appropriateness and sustainability of Canadian supported projects in the agricultural sector, and whether or not Canadian development assistance has helped in reducing the country's rural-urban disparities. The thesis has shown how Canadian aid policy of tying by procurement contributes to the projects' inappropriateness because machinery, equipment, and in some cases personnel, have not been the most suitable to the current Zambian socio-economic environment. As well, inappropriateness of Canadian assistance is a result of the way CIDA performs the project cycle when undertaking development projects. In most cases, there is very minimal Zambian input during the various stages of a project cycle. CIDA's strong tying regulations and limited Zambian input during project cycle performance results in projects that cannot be sustained by the Zambian government following CIDA's withdrawal.

It has been discussed that Canada has provided development assistance in a number of sectors. However, an analysis of the spatial distribution of CIDA projects reveals that they have a strong relationship to the country's pattern of development which tended to favour the "line of rail" provinces. Therefore, Canadian development assistance has done little in reducing rural-urban disparities.

The thesis has concluded that although there has been some serious shortcomings in Canadian assistance, some positive contributions were made to Zambia's development efforts. However, it recommends that Canadian assistance should have more Zambian

input in all the stages of the project cycle. It also recommends that in future, CIDA should direct more of its assistance in programmes rather than into projects. As well, it suggests that to reduce the chances of programmes not being sustainable, such programmes be developed from those already existing in the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development (MAWD) and that CIDA's project administrative structures be integrated with the MAWD structure.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Agdevco:	Agricultural Development Corporation
APU:	Agricultural Planning Unit
ARPT:	Adaptive Research Planning Team
BoZ:	Bank of Zambia
BSA Co.	British South Africa Company
CANAC:	Canadian National and Air Canada Consultancy
CARO:	Chief Agricultural Research Officer
CDC:	Cattle Development Corporation
CEA:	Canadian Executing Agency
CHC:	Canadian High Commission
CIDA:	Canadian International Development Agency
CUSO:	Canadian Universities Service Overseas
EFF:	Extended Fund Facility
GRZ:	Government of the Republic of Zambia
IDRC:	The International Development Research Centre
ILO:	International Labour Organisation
IMF:	International Monetary Fund
INDECO:	Industrial Development Corporation
INDP:	Interim Development Plan
IRDP:	Integrated Rural Development Programme
MAWD:	Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development
MAWD-PD:	Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development Planning Division
MCB:	Maize Control Board
MOU:	Memorandum of Understanding

NAMBoard:	National Agricultural Marketing Board
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCDP:	National Commission for Development Planning
NDP1:	First National Development Plan
NDP2:	Second National Development Plan
NDP3:	Third National Development Plan
NDP4:	Fourth National Development Plan
NGOs:	Non-Governmental Organisations
NIBMAR:	No independence before majority rule
NMC:	National Milling Company
NRDC:	Natural Resources Development College
NSERC:	Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council
NSI:	The North South Institute
ODA:	Official Development Assistance
OECD:	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PASU:	Projects Administrative Support Unit
PD:	Planning Division
PMC:	Project Management Committee
POP:	Plan of Operation
RDC:	Rural Development Corporation
SDP:	Staff Development Programme
SDR:	Special Drawing Rights
SIDA:	Swedish International Development Agency
TAZAMA:	Tanzania Zambia Pipeline
TAZARA:	Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority
UDI:	Unilateral Declaration of Independence

UMA:	Underwood, MacLellan and Associates
UNDP:	United Nations Development Programme
UNIP:	United National Independence Party
UNZA:	The University of Zambia
USAID:	United States Agency for International Development
YWCA:	Young Women Christian Association
ZADL:	Zambia Agricultural Development Limited
Zamhort:	Zambia Horticultural Company
ZCCM:	Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines
ZEGA:	Zambia Export Growers' Association
ZIMCO:	Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation
ZIT:	Zambia Institute of Technology


## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

Foreign assistance has become a major component of development programmes in Africa, particularly since the late 1970s. Donor funded projects in various sectors are an increasingly common feature throughout the African landscape. The reasons for one country providing assistance to another are many and varied. Politically, assistance has been given for the purposes of maintaining old, or initiating new relationships between countries. Certain countries, particularly the USA and its allies, have also given assistance because of concern that underdevelopment would leave Third World countries politically and economically unstable and, therefore, vulnerable to Communist interests. Eastern bloc countries have given assistance for similar reasons, that is, to cultivate new relationships that would weaken Western political and economic grip on underdeveloped countries. Among Western countries it was, therefore, thought that aid provided a medium through which post colonial linkages between former colonies and their colonisers could be maintained. Altruism also plays a part, especially among the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland and the Netherlands.

Above all, however, it is widely believed that foreign assistance could help lift underdeveloped countries to new levels of development. Consequently, foreign assistance made a significant contribution to the unprecedented post-independence expansion of infrastructural facilities and services in Africa. Although foreign assistance is now playing an important role in finding solutions to emerging social and economic problems that underdeveloped countries are currently experiencing, it has come under severe criticism in recent years (Raison, 1984). There is both public and official disappointment because

Figure 1.1  
Zambia in Africa.



despite massive foreign assistance, the problems of development in many underdeveloped countries seem to be getting worse.

Despite this lack of success, donor governments' development assistance institutions have not only increased in size, but have also become more complex in structure over the last three decades. There are now many governmental and non-governmental organisations involved in the aid process. This has added further complexity to foreign assistance profiles. The large number of donors found in recipient countries has not only helped to place large amounts of resources at the disposal of recipients, but has also created additional administrative problems which many underdeveloped countries are finding difficult to cope with (OECD, 1985). For example, in 1980, Zambia had 614 foreign-funded projects from 69 different donors (UNDP, 1986a). The concentration of many donors in a single sector is also a common feature. Consequently, underdeveloped countries, such as Zambia which receive assistance from many diverse sources, are more likely to experience problems associated with foreign assistance. These problems include project monitoring, maintaining independent and coherent sectoral policies and priorities, and adequate programme administration. It is not surprising, therefore, that in recent years, development assistance has become a focus of critical evaluations by scholars and administrators.

Foreign assistance to Zambia's agricultural programme has increased tremendously within the last 15 years. This has led to a proliferation of donor-funded projects which now form the bulk of the developmental activities of MAWD. Such projects have a number of characteristics which may be problematic for the long-term good of Zambia's agricultural development. As well, these projects bring with them rather specific requirements with respect to the way the project cycle is carried out.

This thesis is a critical investigation of Canada's foreign assistance to Zambia in terms of the performance of the project cycle, and project administration by CIDA and

Zambia. Project cycle performance and project administration are analysed to assess their impact on project effectiveness, while the nature and characteristics of projects, and project inputs are analysed to assess their impact on project appropriateness and project sustainability.

## 1.1 ZAMBIA'S ECONOMY; A BRIEF OVERVIEW

Zambia obtained independence from Britain in 1964 and has thus been under self-rule for 26 years. During this period, the Zambian economy can be seen as having passed through two distinct phases. The first phase is the period from 1964 to 1974, and the second one from 1975 to the present.

### 1.1.1 The First Phase

The first phase was marked by the application of new economic initiatives through certain reforms which achieved some significant social and economic objectives. It was possible to achieve these objectives because of a strong economy dominated by the mining industry with copper as its principal export commodity. In addition, rising world copper prices and increasing output in the 1960s, as well as support from external loans and foreign assistance during the 1970s, made it possible for the government to implement key projects in an attempt to expand the country's economic infrastructure. These included the construction of the Tanzania Zambia (TAZAMA) oil pipeline from Dar es Salaam to Ndola in 1968, the Tanzania Zambia Railway (TAZARA) between Dar es Salaam and Kapiri Mposhi in Zambia in 1976, a hydro electric power complex at Kafue Gorge in 1976, all weather roads to all provincial headquarters in Zambia, and, a modern railway repair workshop built and equipped with Canadian aid in 1971. This infrastructure construction

programme was also an economic response to the consequences of Southern Rhodesia's (now Zimbabwe) Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965, as it was an expression of the government's commitment to the country's development process.

Although the first phase is described as a period of good economic performance for Zambia, some negative trends in the economy started during this period. However, the impact of these negative trends was not felt until the mid and late 1970s. For example, there were some decline in world copper prices started during the late 1960s, but the results of the decline were felt later, in the 1970s.

#### 1.1.2 The Second Phase

The second phase in the Zambian economy, starting from the mid 1970s, has seen a dramatic decline in the country's economic performance. The country experienced steadily falling per capita incomes and an erosion in its foreign exchange earnings, with the consequent contraction in real import capacity and severe budgetary problems (Young, 1988). The causes of this crisis were partly external and partly domestic. External causes included the negative terms of trade, rising oil prices, and the indirect costs of the liberation wars in Southern Africa. Drought also badly affected agriculture.

Internal government shortcomings were a further major contributing factor, as the government either failed to adjust to new external realities or followed policies which themselves led to further economic difficulties. Some of the most commonly cited examples of inappropriate policies are low prices for export goods, excessive state intervention in the economy, over-valued exchange rates, and unproductive investments (World Bank, 1984; 1986a). The country's economic and financial difficulties started with the sharp decline in real copper prices and a drop in output which became worse between 1969 and 1970. The fall in copper prices led to a serious distortion in the country's terms of trade. During this period, export receipts, for example, fell by more than 40 per cent



(Kelly 1987: 17). As a result, imports declined to less than one third of their former volume during the 1974-1984 period (UNDP, 1986b: 3). These negative factors resulted in the most severe economic and political crisis the country has ever experienced.

Zambia's main productive base has traditionally been considered by most analysts to be its mineral wealth, particularly its copper. For many years, Zambia has relied on copper for over 95 per cent of its foreign exchange earnings, about 45 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) and 60 per cent of government revenue (GRZ, 1975b). The mining sector is also the country's second largest employer after the service sector (GRZ, 1975c-1988c; Mwananshiku, 1986: 33-36).<sup>1</sup>


However, during the latter part of the 1970s, and continuing into the 1980s, Zambia's wealth from mining has suffered considerably as world demand for copper and its derivatives have fallen, and prices have consequently dropped. On the other hand, production costs have continued to rise by as much as 187 per cent between 1970 and 1979 (Figure 1.2; Appendix I). In real terms, copper prices fell by over 55 per cent between 1972 and 1985 (World Bank, 1986a). This fall came as a result of world recession, as well as a consequence of development of substitute materials for some copper products. The substitution of fibre optics as the major raw material in the communication industry has contributed greatly to this drop in the demand for copper. Consequently, during the period 1975-1979, copper contributed 90 per cent of foreign exchange, 14 per cent to GDP and only 3 per cent to government revenue. The drop from 95 per cent to 90 per cent in copper's contribution to the country's foreign exchange might not seem much, only because copper was so dominant as the principal foreign exchange earner. Consequently, even if the decline of copper's contribution to the country's foreign exchange earnings in absolute terms was substantial, it would not easily show when presented as a percentage.

---

<sup>1</sup>To see how important the mining sector is, one needs only to consider reports which suggest that the Chief Executive Officer of ZCCM (Zambia's mining conglomerate) is the second most important person in the country after the president (Africa Confidential, 1988, Vol. 29.).

Figure 1.2

Copper Prices per Tonne (1964-1989) and Production  
Costs per Tonne (1964-1979) (US\$)

KEY

- Copper Price per Tonne  
 - - - - - Cost of Producing 1 Tonne of Copper

Source: GRZ, (1975a-1986a); World Bank, (1984; 1986a); Energy, Mines and Resources Canada, (1989); Southern African Economist, (1990) Vol. 3.


Notes: Data for cost of producing a tonne of copper were only available for the 1964-1979 period.

Figure 1.2 clearly shows that the mining industry was operating at a loss, as during some bad years in the 1970s, production costs were higher than copper prices. The major reason the mines did not close down was because of social impacts such an act would have on the people who work for the mines. As well, the government was very sensitive to the miners as they are considered to be the most politically volatile. The government therefore kept the mines operational and thereby avoided any confrontation with the miners.

The fluctuations in copper export earnings have had such a destabilising effect on the country's economy that balance of payments and budget deficits rose to 40 and 24 per cent respectively of the country's GDP. Although there has been a substantial increase in world copper prices since 1987, most analysts agree that this will be short lived. As well, Zambia will not benefit much from this price increase because production costs have mounted while the reserves are nearing depletion resulting in falling output (Figure 1.3). Copper production fell by about 30 per cent during the period 1970-1985. In fact, production has been declining steadily since 1976.

At independence in 1964, Zambians expected a brighter future in comparison to their past under British rule. However, this optimism started to wane when it became recognized that declining world copper prices were not reversible (Young, 1988). With this recognition, many enlightened Zambians realised that the country needed to diversify in order to accommodate shortfalls from declining mining revenue. As well, diversification would help find other sectors to act as cornerstones of the economy. The challenge for the country was, therefore, to seek new sources of wealth and employment to compensate for that which copper could no longer provide. This was a daunting challenge for a country which was increasingly relying on foreign assistance to support its economy. It required that all foreign assistance accepted be of a type and character that would help achieve the objectives of diversifying the economy, rehabilitating the infrastructure and bringing about

Figure 1.3  
Copper Production in Tonnes (1964-1989)



Source: GRZ, (1975a-1986a); World Bank, (1984; 1986a); Southern African Economist, (1990), Vol. 3.

regional development. This, in turn, depended very much on policies towards development assistance adopted by both donors and Zambia.

Historically, Zambia did not gear itself towards self-sufficiency in either the manufacturing or agricultural sectors. Zambia's economic development path, as perceived by its colonisers, was one in which the country, richly endowed with minerals, was to extract this wealth for export, and, in turn, would be a net importer of manufactured and agricultural products from its neighbours to the south and from its colonial master's home market in Britain.<sup>2</sup> Disappointingly, the perception that Zambia did not have much potential for agricultural and industrial development continued being reinforced for a long time after Zambia's independence in 1964. Consequently, the mining sector was favoured in national budgets, whereas investments in agriculture were minimal.

Young (1988) notes that current schools of thought about Zambia's development problems may be conveniently, or even somewhat simplistically, divided into two thrusts. He lists these as first, those who argue that following independence the country proceeded to squander a potentially prosperous future based upon its mineral wealth. Second, are those who believe that the country represents a classic case of dependent development because of its overdependency on only one primary product for export, which reflects an economic structure inherited from a colonial past. In reality, however, a more realistic picture lies somewhere between these two positions because both scenarios are represented in Zambia.

It must also be remembered that Zambia's economic development prospects cannot be excluded from its geopolitical position in Southern Africa. Zambia's dependence goes well beyond primary product dependence on copper, "it includes a dependency on South Africa for imports, and transport for Zambian imports and exports" (Young, 1988: v).

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<sup>2</sup> The policies towards agriculture during both pre and post independent Zambia are discussed in Chapter Three. For detailed discussions on this topic see, Gann, 1964; Davidson, 1972; Dodge, 1977.

Zambia is also vulnerable to South Africa's destabilisation policies because of its opposition to that country's apartheid policies. Also, as the problems of Rhodesia's UDI unfolded and reached confrontational proportions, Zambia became heavily involved in supporting the liberation war in Zimbabwe. It also supported similar wars in Angola, Mozambique, and Namibia. It therefore became necessary to divert some of its meagre foreign exchange resources to defence and national security. The effect of this was to place further strains on the economy.

The immediate consequences of poor economic performance was that economic growth has eluded the country since 1981. This led to a continued decline in per capita real income. Between 1980 and 1987 it dropped by almost 20 per cent (GRZ, 1988c; NCDP, 1987). Because there has hardly been any growth in the economy since 1981, the standard of living has been falling rapidly. This is compounded by a population growth rate of 3.6 per cent per annum and a high rate of urbanisation of 45 per cent (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1986). Thus, there is a critical need for the economy to expand in order to support better social services, physical infrastructure, and a higher standard of living.

Although it is not possible to provide reliable quantifiable indicators of the social implications of economic stagnation in Zambia, government publications indicate a rapid and large decline in real per capita income and consumption levels, while the cost of living has been increasing since 1980 (GRZ, 1987c; 1988c). For example, the President convened a meeting of Zambia's top leaders to discuss what he called "an all round examination of the soaring cost of living and take remedial measures" (Sunday Times of Zambia, Dec. 25th, 1987: 1). There has also been a serious deterioration in the country's infrastructure because of the general lack of resources for infrastructural maintenance. Consequently, there are frequent disruptions in production, supply, and distribution of goods and services.

Another serious economic problem facing the country is its external debt. This is a result of government borrowing to counter the consequences of an already bad economy. Zambia is now among the twenty two sub-Sahara African countries categorised as "debt distressed" nations, whose combined total external debt reached US\$45 billion in 1987.<sup>3</sup>

The combination of previous negative external trends, deteriorating macro-economic variables, shortcomings in internal policies, and an accumulated external debt pose tremendous challenges to Zambia's political leadership and planners. It is also an immense challenge to the country's donor nations and agencies, and to other international financial institutions who strive to achieve some form of economic growth, diversification from a mineral dominated economy, and a rehabilitation of infrastructure. Following poor economic performance, the government approached the IMF with requests for help to revive the economy. As well, friendly countries were requested to provide development assistance.

The donors' most decisive response to Zambia's declining economic situation would be to provide appropriate and sustainable foreign assistance. This would be made possible by the Zambian government having a strong project monitoring and coordinating mechanism that would provide it with timely warning of any inappropriately designed, and inappropriately implemented projects. A strong project monitoring and coordinating mechanism would thus facilitate the taking of remedial measures. In addition, projects administration by the donors and Zambia must also be well considered.

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<sup>3</sup> The other countries in this category are Benin, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zaire.

## 1.2 ECONOMIC REFORMS UNDERTAKEN TO REVIVE THE ECONOMY

After being ranked second on the "foreign assistance reliance ratio," Zambia undertook major reforms in its economic policies between 1970 and 1986 with the support of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and/or the World Bank, and other donor countries. However, serious foreign exchange shortages created by low copper prices, and strong social considerations (resulting from 1986 food riots) by the government, forced Zambia to abandon its structural adjustment programme in 1987 (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1987; GRZ, 1987).

To talk of any economic reforms in Zambia is to discuss structural adjustment programmes and policy reforms supported by the IMF and/or the World Bank. This is because these two world financial institutions have been at the forefront of Zambia's economic reform efforts. These agencies required certain changes to be made to Zambia's economic policy, including a foreign exchange auction system to determine exchange rates, a devaluation of local currency, increases in domestic currency prices for exports, a reduced budget deficit, and price control liberalisation and increased incentives for the private sector. The following section therefore discusses, albeit briefly, the reforms since the 1970s because this is the period during which Zambia has become increasingly dependent upon foreign assistance, the IMF and/or the World Bank.

### 1.2.1 Zambia IMF Agreements: 1970s

Zambia's earliest dealings with the IMF were in 1971 when such dealings were seen as routine for many developing countries. It involved the use of the IMF's Compensatory Financing Facilities in the amount of Special Drawing Rights (SDR) 19



million in 1971 and another SDR 19 million the following year.<sup>4</sup> This was also the period when Zambia's economy began to decline due to, first, a drop in copper prices and a simultaneous decline in production (see Appendix I), second, the rising cost of oil, which resulted in a general decline in the balance of payments. The IMF involvement was therefore an effort to address these problems. However, Zambia was not initially perceived as deserving any special treatment by IMF and the World Bank, since many other developing countries were experiencing similar, if not worse difficulties. In fact, Zambia was classified as a "middle income" country by the World Bank, as distinct from the "poor country" category which received priority for assistance. Also, the Zambian government considered its problems as temporary ones which could be dealt with by reducing government expenditures and the balance of payments deficit. Above all, the government strongly believed that the price of copper would return to earlier high levels. Serious actions required to diversify the copper dominated economy were, therefore, not taken at this time.

By the early 1980s, however, the government finally recognized that the problems the economy was facing were not temporary ones, and that some drastic solutions were required to reverse the situation. Thus there was an attempt at serious economic reforms, but such reforms were difficult to implement because this was, as Young (1988: 14) suggests, a period when ". . . external capital flows from all sources fell dramatically, compounding an already, precarious situation . . . external loans fell by 60 per cent between 1980 and 1984.

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<sup>4</sup> SDR is an internationally agreed upon exchange rate unit. Thus, a country's currency can be pegged either to a single currency, e.g. the US\$, or a currency composite, e.g. SDR. The Zambian currency, the Kwacha has been pegged to the SDR, while the US\$ is the intervention currency, and the rates of the Bank of Zambia for the US\$ are based on the daily calculations of the US\$ per SDR rate. Given below are the US\$ per SDR rates for the period 1973-1986. (That is, how much US\$ one gets for 1 unit of SDR).

YEAR	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
US\$/SDR	1.20	1.21	1.15	1.17	1.25	1.29	1.30	1.18	1.10	1.07	1.03	0.91	0.82

Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Aug. 1987) International Financial Statistics,

While multilateral lending fell only 3.4 per cent over this period, bilateral lending fell 59 per cent and private credits a full 85 per cent."

Even though the Zambian government perceived its economic problems in the early 1970s as temporary, some steps were undertaken to reduce their consequences, but it was not until the late 1970s that serious economic reforms, supported mostly by the IMF, were undertaken. Consequently, the Second National Development Plan (NDP2 1972-1976) (GRZ, 1971) and Third National Development Plan (NDP3 1979-1983) (GRZ, 1979) introduced real cuts in government expenditures and the government began to pay some attention to its balance of payments problems. In some cases, total government expenditures were reduced by as much as 50 per cent since 1975. During the same period, about 40 per cent of foreign exchange earnings have been going to service foreign debt. The consequences of this to the provision of social and economic services in the country were tremendous. The reductions in public spending has seriously eroded the quality of almost all social services.

The first agreement between the Zambian government and the IMF was in 1973, when a loan of SDR 19 million was agreed on. The principal objective of this agreement was "to limit the decline of Zambia's gross external reserves and the deterioration of the budgetary position" (Ncube, et al. 1987: 129). This was of very low conditionalities compared to the ones that the IMF and the World Bank usually require.<sup>5</sup> The usual conditionalities required of their borrowers by the IMF and the World Bank include devaluation of the local currency, decontrol of prices, and a freeze on all wage and salary increases. This particular agreement only required the Zambian government to constrain

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<sup>5</sup> The IMF provides financial support to its member countries based on their policies, particularly those concerned with reducing balance of payments imbalances. The policies that the IMF requires for such support to be provided are known as "conditionalities." The magnitude and the force by which the IMF enforces the conditionalities increases with the number of credit tranches withdrawn. Thus, the first credit tranche has the least conditionalities. For a brief discussion of conditionalities and tranches see, IMF Survey : A Supplement on the Fund, (Aug. 1989).

expenditures and introduce policies that would generate additional taxes as a source of government revenue.

There was a further one-year Stand-by arrangement of another SDR 19 million during the period 1976-1977, aimed at reducing the budget deficit and diversifying the economy so as to reduce the country's vulnerability caused by fluctuations in world copper prices. Unlike the earlier agreement, however, this one had conditionalities which the government was supposed to follow. It included the removal of consumption subsidies, imposition of a wage freeze, especially for civil servants, and a search for non-traditional exports to generate foreign exchange. However, it was difficult for the government to achieve any of these objectives since the liberation war in Rhodesia intensified during this period. The impact on the Zambian economy of the liberation wars waged by Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia in the 1970s was tremendous. First, the country had to divert substantial amounts of resources to its security, and second, it had to look after the many political refugees who were fleeing their respective countries into Zambia. Throughout the late 1970s, Zambia experienced continuously falling terms of trade. Young, (1983: 14) notes that during this period "GDP fell nearly 5 per cent in 1977; inflation doubled to 20 per cent and overall balance of payments deficit rose to SDR 243 million against a projected level of SDR 65 million."

Realising the seriousness of its economic problems, the government and the IMF again reached an agreement, this time for a two-year Stand-by arrangement involving SDR 250 million loan for the period 1978-1980. The objectives of this agreement were to help reduce inflation, restore the balance of payments, and provide an impetus for economic growth. The achievement of these objectives was mainly based on the assumption that the price of copper would increase during the period of the agreement. In return, Zambia devalued the kwacha by 10 per cent in an effort to improve the competitiveness and profitability of exports. It was also required to reduce arrears on external credits. As

well, it was asked to introduce better policies to increase agricultural production. In particular, it was to raise agricultural producer prices. This agreement was more successful than previous ones as was evidenced by reduced production costs of copper, and was assisted by an increase in world copper prices, although this was somewhat offset by declining copper production. The government also managed to reduce inflation and improve balance of payments. The benefits from these positive trends, however, were offset by two negative factors. First, drought experienced throughout the country led to poor yields and the consequent need to import food. Second, the high oil prices of the early 1980s used up a substantial amount of foreign exchange, thereby constraining other imports which resulted in many manufacturing firms operating at well below capacity.

#### 1.2.2 Zambia-IMF Agreements: 1980s

The IMF instituted a more comprehensive structural adjustment programme for Zambia during the three year Extended Fund Facility (EFF) of SDR 800 million to be implemented between 1980 and 1983. During this facility, the government introduced new measures and further strengthened older ones to curb overall expenditures and reduce budgetary deficits. Total expenditures were reduced by 15 per cent and revenues were increased by 20 per cent through taxes. Reductions of subsidies, and in some cases complete removal thereof, as well as a freeze on government employment were imposed. Other measures included the imposition of foreign exchange restrictions on recurrent spending, the introduction of better pricing policies, and increased diversification and domestic production in the agricultural and primary commodity sectors. Imports of wheat and cooking oil were also curbed, while agricultural service institutions were being reorganised in an effort to encourage farmers to produce more (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1985). The 1985 budget also emphasized domestic savings so that local financial resources could eventually substitute external financing. However, most of these measures

failed to achieve their objectives mainly because of continued decline in copper prices. This led to another one-year Stand-by arrangement involving SDR 211.5 million during the period 1983-1984. The main objective of this agreement was to restore financial stability in the economy.

Perhaps the best known agreement between the Zambian government and the IMF was the 1984-1986 Stand-by arrangement. It became well known because it led to the much publicised "Zambia - IMF divorce." During this agreement, which involved SDR 225 million for the period 1984-1986, and SDR 229 million Stand-by arrangement for the period 1986-1988, the principal objective was a more forceful reorganisation of economic stabilisation policies by checking on both internal and external imbalances. The government also introduced a 50 per cent foreign exchange retention scheme which was an incentive to both manufacturers and agricultural producers who exported their products. Although the policy initiative was good, it had two main problems. First, it took too long to stimulate non-traditional exports to replace copper. Second, it was difficult to find markets for the new exports since managers and sales persons were inexperienced and there was a lack of adequate support from government.<sup>6</sup> However, due to low copper prices and rising foreign debt servicing obligations, both the inflation and budget deficits rose with hardly any growth in the GNP. Furthermore, there was a continuing deterioration in the terms of trade while foreign exchange reserves were running low.

These conditions led to the introduction of the ill-fated foreign exchange auction in October, 1985. The proponents of the IMF programme argued that market forces should be determining the exchange rate and the final use of the available foreign exchange.<sup>7</sup> There

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<sup>6</sup> Farmers, for example, especially those in Lusaka Province growing fruits and vegetables and belonging to the Midlands Farmers' Cooperative, formed the Zambia Export Growers' Association (ZEGA) whose mandate was to scout for export markets, offer advice, and provide support in packaging, plane charters, etc. This Association is currently facing so many problems, including some created by government ministries, that many farmers have decided to give up their drive for exports (From interviews with senior ZEGA officials).

<sup>7</sup> For a fuller discussion of the foreign exchange auction system see Ndulo, and Sakala, (1987, or for a brief overview, see Young, (1988).

were some, however, who were pessimistic about the IMF conditions, arguing that the country's recourse to debt rescheduling would only provide a short-term respite since interest payments would swallow up more and more of the country's limited foreign exchange reserves. As the auctioning of foreign exchange progressed, the value of the Zambian kwacha fell from K2.22 to US\$1.00 in October, 1985, to K8.07 in October, 1986, and to K15.25 in December of that year. It reached an all time low of K21.01 to US\$1.00 in April, 1987 (Bank of Zambia [BoZ], 1986-1988). It was argued that the high demand for foreign currency for imports, and a rising uncertainty in the business community, drove the kwacha to this low level.

The impact of the auction system on the people, on the provision of social services, and on the general cost of living, was tremendously negative. The most publicised consequence was the eruption of riots in Zambia's richest, and most politically volatile, Copperbelt Province. These riots were a result of the progressive increase in the price of mealie-meal (Zambia's staple food) following the removal of a government subsidy as required by IMF conditions, and especially because of a subsequent overnight doubling in the price of "breakfast" mealie-meal in early December, 1986.

The foregoing discussion, although brief, shows that the past ten years have witnessed many changes in both policies and institutional arrangements in Zambia. The IMF became a major player in Zambia's structural adjustment programme, but its conditions for economic recovery have not been without serious social and economic consequences. Because of the social hardships and political insecurity which IMF economic structural adjustment programmes brought to the country, the government decided on May 1, 1987 to abandon the IMF programme. The government fixed the foreign exchange rate at K8 to US\$1.00, placed price controls on basic consumer commodities, particularly mealie-meal, and limited debt servicing obligations to 10 per cent of foreign exchange earnings. Instead of the IMF structural adjustment programme, the

government introduced the Interim National Development Plan (INDP) (GRZ, 1987) as the new blue print for development.

The economic implications to Zambia of this move have been mixed. Most independent critics say that this plan did not constitute a satisfactory alternative to the IMF programme for a number of reasons. First, it did not provide any solutions to raising incentives for exports, and provided only a weak solution, namely rationing to reduce import dependence. Second, the question of subsidies, particularly for maize, and the large fiscal deficit was not effectively addressed. Third, the government erroneously believed that it could control a wide range of commodity prices, despite the fact that there is a flourishing black market for most of these commodities (Loxley, 1989). Loxley, however, does give the government credit on one account and cautions the IMF and World Bank on the other. The credit he gives to the government is that it is possible for African countries like Zambia to design their own programmes without too much reliance on IMF or World Bank funding or advice. The caution to the IMF and the World Bank according to Loxley (1989: 16) is that Zambia's actions forcefully tells them that ". . . once the debt problem has reached a certain order of magnitude, the international institutions lose their leverage over member states."

### 1.3 DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO ZAMBIA

Zambia has been a recipient of various forms of development assistance since gaining independence in 1964. The government, however, was not considered aid-worthy for the first ten years of independence and thus only minimal assistance was given to it during this period. But, as more development prospects and problems unfolded, particularly beginning in the early 1970s, when serious economic and financial difficulties increased, the government sought foreign assistance to complement local resources and

efforts. Foreign assistance increased rapidly during the late 1970s and early 1980s with the highest amount being recorded in 1984 at US\$632.9 million (Table 1.1). From then on, total foreign assistance declined and reached US\$415.9 million in 1987, a cumulative decrease of about 37 per cent. Total foreign assistance decreased by 34 and 26 per cent since 1984 and 1986 respectively. The decrease in total foreign assistance has been caused by fluctuations in capital assistance. Capital assistance decreased by 60 per cent since 1986. However, there has been an increase in technical assistance since 1984 (UNDP, 1988 : 11). The general decline in foreign assistance during the mid 1980s was mainly due to a loss of confidence by most donors in Zambia's handling of its economic problems, which was further fuelled by its abandoning of the IMF supported structural adjustment programme in 1987.

In 1977, Zambia received a total of US\$237.5 million in foreign assistance, consisting of US\$40.5 million of technical assistance, US\$126 million of capital assistance, and US\$71 million of commodity assistance. Out of US\$40.5 million in technical assistance, US\$32 million was provided by 23 bilateral donors, US\$5 million by UN agencies and the rest came from other multilateral agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Between 1981 and 1983, Zambia received over US\$63 million non-capital assistance from various donors, of which 57.7 per cent was for technical assistance (UNDP, 1988a). In 1984, Zambia's per capita official development assistance reached US\$36.6, making it the second highest recipient among African countries with comparable populations, such as Niger and Senegal. During the same year, the official development assistance's share of the country's gross domestic investment had reached 64.4 per cent (World Bank, 1986a: 84). As well, over the last two decades the number of bilateral and multilateral agencies providing Zambia with foreign assistance has increased considerably. Because of Zambia's non-aligned stand, the country has accepted assistance



Table 1.1

Development Assistance to Zambia in US\$ (millions) for the period 1971-1987.

YEAR	TA.	CA.	COMAS.	TOTAL	% CHANGE
1971 <sup>a</sup>	15.5	62.5	0.0	78.0	204.5
1972	-	-	-	-	
1973	-	-	-	-	
1974	-	-	-	-	
1975	-	-	-	-	
1976	-	-	-	-	
1977 <sup>a</sup>	40.5	126.0	71.0	237.5	100.2
1979	102.7	224.9	147.7	475.5	
1980 <sup>b</sup>	-	-	-	-	-8.5
1981 <sup>b</sup>	-	-	-	-	
1982	121.6	241.4	72.0	435.0	
1983	83.8	248.8	78.5	411.1	-5.5
1984	100.6	455.0	77.3	632.9	54.0
1985	90.3	388.0	103.0	581.3	-8.2
1986	123.5	399.5	42.4	565.4	-2.7
1987	193.3	158.4	64.2	415.9	-26.4

TA- Technical assistance; CA- Capital assistance; COMAS- Commodity assistance.

a. Until the mid 1970s, when serious economic and financial difficulties arose, Zambia received little external assistance for its development requirements and financed most of its needs from its own resources. Consequently, UNDP Report on Development Cooperation was not recording the amount of aid received on an annual basis until 1979. Thus for the data above, the percentage change (204.5%) corresponds to the 1971 and 1977 recorded totals.

b. Data not available and so the percentage change of -8.5 corresponds to the 1979 and 1982 totals.

Source : Compiled from, UNDP, Report on Development Cooperation (1975a-1988a).

from both Eastern bloc and Western countries. This stand has been maintained consistently, although Zambia receives more assistance from Western than Eastern bloc countries.

With respect to individual donor contributions, the volume of assistance has tended to vary among donor countries. In addition, each donor country tends to have its special sector of concentration to which its aid is directed. For example, Canada concentrates on infrastructure and institution building, Sweden focusses its assistance on agriculture, education and natural resource development, Norwegian aid is mainly concentrated on the health and education sectors, and the United States emphasizes general economic support and agricultural development (UNDP, 1986b). The advantages of sectoral concentration include proper utilisation of donor resources, especially when a donor chooses to support a sector in which it feels it has the expertise. Sectoral concentration may also reduce overlap if there is a proper project monitoring and coordinating mechanism by the recipient government. On the other hand, sectoral concentration may lead to donor competition if there is no proper project monitoring and coordinating system by the recipient government.

In addition to sectoral focus, there is also regional concentration by many donors. One disturbing result of such concentration is that many donors have tended to create spheres of influence within the country (Wood and Smith, 1984). For example, the Netherlands is concentrated in Western Province, West Germany in the North Western Province and Norway in Northern Province. This suggests that the Zambian development assistance domain has been balkanised. Although a donor's choice of regions in which to locate its projects may be rational, it is questionable whether such a fragmented approach provides an effective and coherent strategy for tackling Zambia's development problems. In 1988, there were 14 countries supporting 92 bilateral projects and 10 multilateral agencies supporting 32 projects in the agricultural sector alone (MAWD, 1988). These realities about foreign assistance provided the basis for the present aim of analysing more

closely Zambia - Canada development assistance policies and administration in the agricultural sector. The author will return to a detailed discussion of Canada's foreign assistance to Zambia in a later chapter.

#### 1.4 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Zambia receives assistance in almost all its sectors as is seen from the range of programmes and projects benefiting from foreign assistance across ministries, departments, and even parastatal companies. It has already been shown that there are many donors, of which Canada is one, providing assistance to the agricultural sector. As a group, the donors are not at all homogeneous. The different donors involved in implementing development projects have different philosophies and approaches to development planning. They may also have a different attitude towards underdeveloped countries' development problems, the size of its foreign assistance budget, and how this is administered. Accordingly, each of the donors in the agricultural sector has evolved a different development assistance policy.

The criteria used by donors to choose which sectors, or indeed which projects to support is unclear. Equally unclear is Zambia's policy on development assistance to its agricultural sector. Is acceptance of assistance based on a donor's claim to have expertise in a particular sector or is it based on an acute development need of Zambia? Furthermore, it is desirable to investigate how a particular donor's foreign assistance policy to the agricultural sector fits into the broader context of Zambia's development policy. Whichever policy is pursued or promoted by Zambia on one hand, or by donors on the other hand, has important implications for the sector receiving assistance and the overall development of the country.

Being able to get assistance from many sources, especially in the form of programme aid, should give Zambia the advantage of flexibility in planning. Notwithstanding this advantage, however, assistance from many sources also presents Zambia with two basic problems. First, if Zambia does not have explicit guide-lines on investment priorities for aid, then the donors tend to support projects which accommodate their own interests. Second, too many donors supporting one sector leads to problems of coordination, monitoring, and evaluation of projects. Problems of coordination are experienced on two levels. First, there are problems of coordination between donors and the Zambian government. The second problems of coordination are experienced between donors with projects in the same sector. In addition, some of the present approaches to assistance by some donors are creating dependency because they are authoritarian and anti-participatory from the recipient's point of view. It is because of such problems that the management and administration of foreign supported projects have become a critical concern to recipient countries in recent years.

There are questions among scholars concerning current arrangements and practices in the administration of foreign assisted projects. More specifically, it has been pointed out that the extent of consultations and coordination between recipients and donors is minimal (Hawes and Coombe, 1986). This, it is argued, has had negative consequences on the overall performance of foreign supported projects. On the other hand, attention has been drawn to the fact that donors, like recipients, work under certain constraints which are not easily appreciated by either party (Hawes and Coombe, 1986). Recipients face many political and administrative problems in attempting to introduce changes in the existing foreign assistance arrangements. Recipients are mindful, for instance, of the fact that demand for changes in the administration of foreign assistance could threaten or even terminate assistance by some donors. They therefore tend to accept all forms of aid with the hope that there will be some benefits even from misdirected aid. Similarly, donors are

cautious of any changes in their aid policy, or administration practices which may be perceived as unfavourable to donors' national interests or public opinion.

Because of the various ways that donors conduct their project cycles, foreign funded projects in Zambia's agricultural sector have a number of specific characteristics which affect their long term impact in the country in a wider sense than just the achievement of the set project goals. These characteristics and their implications should be studied and become part of more comprehensive project identification, design, appraisal implementation and evaluation procedures applied to these projects.

Two central questions can be asked at the first stage in a project cycle. First, who identifies the project, and second, on what criteria? The latter question involves consideration of who, or what interests, are to benefit from the project. Usually donors, and to some extent the recipient government have the influence over project identification. However, the farmers who are to be the beneficiaries of a proposed project tend not to be consulted about their needs, or indeed whether they even need the project. The way a project is identified or selected, and the way it is designed, brings with it three important considerations in terms of whether or not it is appropriate to the local environment and whether or not it can be sustained by the recipient government after the donor withdraws. The first consideration would involve the nature and level of inputs and other components that will go into a particular project. The second, is whether the project is designed and implemented to make its integration into the recipient's existing programmes and administrative structure smooth. Third, is whether there is some sort of standardisation of the various projects undertaken by donors, or indeed one donor, to make them replicable through time and space with minimal modifications.

Most aid projects seek to develop Zambia's agricultural services with a view to handing over the new or modified service to the government after capital and technical input have been provided. However, in most instances the nature of the donors' contributions

are often different from that which the government can provide at present. The major differences between what is currently provided by donors and contributions that the Zambian government can provide, is a result of donor projects that are designed to involve major purchases from overseas and rely on considerable amounts of skilled manpower. Partly because of this, but also because of the political aims of some projects, many donor projects are of high profile and contrast strongly with the established services provided by the Zambian government.

Projects with such characteristics are inappropriate to the present Zambian situation as they cannot be sustained by government once donors withdraw. As a result, farmers' aspirations which were raised by the projects to unrealistic levels, are frustrated. This undermines the farmers' interest in agricultural development and their confidence in external intervention and support. Monopolisation of the project identification process by donor agencies and recipient governments may result in projects which do not adequately address the farmers' needs.

Another difficulty that has emerged in recent years is the element of conditionality by donors that tends to be attached to projects during the implementation stage. Wrongly conceived and designed projects often make heavy demands upon the Zambian government for counterpart staff and even for recurrent funds during the period that a project is being implemented. Donor funded projects designed with heavy requirements for Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development (MAWD) staff and funds have created strains within the ministry and have reduced the quality and effectiveness of existing government services to agriculture, even before MAWD has had to take over full responsibility for an aid project.

#### 1.4.1 Integration of Administrative Structures

Foreign aid directed towards the agricultural sector should be designed to assist in Zambia's agricultural development since this is its stated role. Because of poor selection of projects and their subsequent design which may ignore local economic and social realities, the projects donors fund are often poorly integrated into MAWD administrative structure and policies. Some aid projects are often agreed at political levels with little reference to technical and policy considerations, while the donors generally develop the details of projects. The range of approaches followed within Zambia's agricultural development policies has made it relatively easy for MAWD to accept projects with a range of emphases and orientations. However, there is a danger that such emphases within Zambian agricultural policy will become the result of donor rather than local initiatives. This is especially likely while shortage of funds restricts new government programmes and while donors are allowed to concentrate their aid in particular sectors and localities (Wood and Smith, 1984). As a result, it is increasingly necessary for Zambian authorities to pay particular attention to the way projects are identified and designed so as to ensure that they do not create policy conflicts within MAWD, which in turn cause problems in administration and increase overhead-costs. A recognition of these dangers will make it possible to develop an evolving and coherent agricultural development policy.

There is also a tendency among many donors to design their projects in such a way that they operate outside the administrative structure of MAWD. This is particularly the case with donors seeking a degree of independence and control over their projects for reasons of financial accountability, financial adjustments, and identity for political purposes. This practice may, however, make it difficult for MAWD to exercise the desired degree of control over the projects and allow donors to develop programmes in ways which deviate from those originally agreed in project documents. Such problems suggest that there should be more Zambian input in the process of carrying out the project cycle.

#### 1.4.2 Standardisation of Projects

A further area where careful identification and design is required concerns the standardisation of donor projects. With several donors involved in one technical area, but in different project areas, a variety of technologies with different specifications may be brought into the country. This can create major problems for the Zambian government when it assumes responsibility for the projects. The training of technical staff who can be transferred from one scheme to another becomes unnecessarily complex, while the maintenance of adequate stocks of spare parts, or the local production of these, is made more difficult than if a more limited range of machines were used.

The problem of standardisation has occurred even where the Zambian government has formed a standards programme into which donors can direct their funds and personnel. The Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) was developed in part to utilise growing foreign aid of the 1970s. By 1984, there were six different IRDPs funded by four major donors which had great diversity in their content and in their approach to integrated rural development (MAWD, 1984). Such diversity made coordination and monitoring, and especially comparative evaluation, very difficult and created concern in MAWD about the integration of the projects into a national programme once the donors withdraw. As a result, a major attempt to standardise these IRDP projects was undertaken in the mid 1980s with the hope of creating a more uniform set of contributions to the national programme. This involved the decision by National Council for Development Planning (NCDP) to decentralise the national planning functions leading to the organisation of Provincial and District Planning Units. These would then coordinate all planning activities at district, provincial and national levels.



### 1.4.3 Project Evaluation.

Most donors have an evaluation service to assess the effects of their projects and to determine which elements were successful and which were problematic. Notwithstanding the usefulness of evaluations, it can be argued that donors take little notice of the findings of their evaluation services. Thus, lessons that could be learned and applied in the design of new projects tend to be ignored. Findings are usually not followed because evaluations are used as ends in themselves rather than as means to an end. Evaluations are carried out to fulfil what is stated in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which specifies when a project will be evaluated.

## 1.5 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The main objective of this study is to undertake a critical investigation of Canada's foreign assistance to Zambia in terms of the performance of the project cycle and the administration of projects by Canada and Zambia. Project cycle performance and project administration are analysed to assess their impact on the appropriateness and sustainability of projects. Emphasis is deliberately placed on the agricultural sector because of this sector's importance to Zambia's current diversification efforts. The study has the following specific objectives:

1. To determine the factors making Zambia eligible for Canadian foreign assistance and to trace changes that have occurred on these factors during the period 1970 - 1987.
2. To critically examine Canadian foreign assistance projects in the agricultural sector in an effort to determine their impact on Zambia's agricultural development.

3. To determine the impact of the existing project administration arrangements between Zambia and Canada in project effectiveness.
4. To assess the appropriateness and sustainability of CIDA's foreign assistance to the agricultural sector in the context of Zambia's political and socioeconomic environment.

In tracing the growth of Canadian foreign assistance to Zambia, it will be argued that the increased flow of foreign assistance must be seen primarily as a result of the political conditions in the Southern African region, particularly during the period 1970-1980s (OECD, 1983). As the struggle for liberation of the former Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique intensified in the 1970s, and that for the British colony of Rhodesia before it finally attained independence in 1980, Eastern bloc and Western countries have competed for influence in Zambia. Canada and other Western countries wished to support what they saw as Zambia's "moderate" stand among the Frontline States.<sup>8</sup> With restrictions on direct military assistance placed by the Parliaments and public opinion in most of these countries, development assistance was the major means available to gain support and influence in Southern African politics. In addition, such assistance would prevent any undue pressure created by these politics upon Zambia and strengthen its deteriorating economy. Indeed, besides Canada gaining a favourable political climate by its aid to black Southern Africa over the years, it benefited commercially by the tying-regulations of its foreign assistance which is often up to 80 per cent (OECD, 1986). However, with the deteriorating economic situation in Zambia, particularly during the 1980s, such benefits have drastically declined as the country cannot afford to import many of its necessities.

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<sup>8</sup> The term "Frontline States" refers to countries in Southern Africa which may or may not physically share a boundary with one which at that time is waging a liberation war. They are referred to as Frontline States because of the help they render to liberation movements and the consequent hardships which they usually endure. This term was, therefore, applied to Tanzania, Botswana, Angola, Mozambique and Zambia when Zimbabwe was waging its liberation war. Now Zimbabwe and Namibia have also become known as a Frontline States following their independence.

In assessing the appropriateness and sustainability of Canadian foreign assistance to Zambia in general, and to the agricultural sector in particular, emphasis will be placed on the extent to which this assistance has helped Zambia's capacity to pursue some form of balanced and self-reliant development in the Southern African regional context, and more specifically, to achieve more balanced and self-reliant development in the agricultural sector. Attention will be focussed on the major factors motivating Canada's aid to Zambia and in the project inputs. The argument here is that if the motivation for Canadian foreign assistance to Zambia is mainly political, and if Zambia itself does not have well defined policies and roles to play during the whole project cycle, then the effectiveness of such aid and projects will remain minimal. Looking at project inputs, can projects promoted by CIDA be sustained by Zambia after CIDA ends its programme and withdraws the foreign assistance funds and cooperants?<sup>9</sup>

The purpose of this thesis is to analyse how effective Canada's foreign assistance is in promoting the agricultural development of Zambia. The framework of analysis is to examine each CIDA project in this sector in terms of the set objectives and the means to achieve them, the level of CIDA and Zambian coordination during the various phases of the project cycle and the nature of the assistance going into the projects. This assessment helps to bring into focus both the positive and negative aspects of CIDA's projects in the agricultural sector in relation to Zambia's development needs in that sector. The performance of CIDA is, therefore, assessed with reference to how effectively it performs the project cycle. The project cycle involves a number of phases identified as project identification, design and appraisal, implementation and evaluation (Appendix II).<sup>10</sup>

Richards (1985) has argued that experts from developed countries who work in African countries tend to underestimate the agronomic knowledge and adaptability of

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<sup>9</sup> CIDA refers to its personnel who work in recipient countries as cooperants as opposed to calling them expatriates.

<sup>10</sup> For a fuller discussion of the project cycle and project analysis see Baum, and Tolbert, (1985).

African farmers and therefore recommend inappropriate, and sometimes, harmful practices. In other words, they adopt a "top down" approach to development in which expertise is the preserve of expatriate and indigenous officials and the local farmers, the possessors of what Richards terms "people's science" have no worthwhile input into policy making.

However, foreign assistance effectiveness is not determined solely by factors appertaining to the donor countries and agencies. Efficacy is also dependent on the development environment of the recipient country, that is, the political and socioeconomic environment in which the assistance is used. Zambia's development environment has varied since independence as has been shown earlier in this chapter.

Thus, given the nature of project cycles, it is possible to analyse the rate and nature of coordination and monitoring of donors and recipients during the various phases of the cycle. Within this analytical framework, the basic question to be asked is 'who carries more power and weight during the execution of the various phases of the project?'

The CIDA projects which are investigated in the agricultural sector include:

1. Planning Division of the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development (PD-MAWD);
2. Maize and Fertilizer Storage Sheds project;
3. Zam-Can Wheat Project; and
4. School of Agricultural Sciences at the University of Zambia.

Because available data do not lend themselves to quantitative analysis, this study will not use any quantitative analytical models to help test hypotheses. The following hypotheses will however be qualitatively evaluated:

HYPOTHESIS ONE: That Canadian development assistance to Zambia's agricultural sector has not been appropriately attuned to the country's socio-economic situation. This has resulted in projects which cannot be sustained after CIDA withdraws its assistance and hands them over to the Zambian government.

HYPOTHESIS TWO: That Canadian aid to Zambia's agricultural sector has not been as effective as it might be because of limited integration of the administrative structures of CIDA and MAWD during the different stages of the project cycle, particularly during the identification, preparation and appraisal and evaluation stages.

HYPOTHESIS THREE: That the separate administrative structures of CIDA and MAWD during project implementation increase problems of project monitoring and coordination, and ultimately reduce project effectiveness.

HYPOTHESIS FOUR: That Canadian development assistance to Zambia's agricultural sector has not helped in reducing the country's rural-urban disparities.

There are three reasons why this study is important. First, most studies on foreign assistance and the administration of foreign funded projects have been undertaken by scholars from developed countries. While such studies are helpful, there are some aspects of the local political and socioeconomic environment which local scholars can understand better and offer some alternative insights. The lack of scholars from recipient countries undertaking such studies is mainly because funding for projects and programmes, including funding for their studies and evaluations, come from the donor countries which tend to favour their own scholars. Some characteristics of foreign assisted projects therefore, help to promote those projects which reflect the priorities and realities of the

donor environment with little or no relevance to the realities of the recipient country. This can be seen for example, in the large scale projects promoted by many donors (Rogge, 1977; Freeman, 1982; Young, 1983; Lavergne and English, 1987). However, some of these realities are now changing as can be seen from the practices of some donors such as Sweden, and more recently Canada, which now include local personnel in their evaluation teams.

Second, there is limited input from recipient countries in terms of personnel to coordinate and monitor the projects during the various phases of a project cycle. This is mainly due to the fact that most donors operate outside already established administrative structures of recipient governments and instead create their own. In addition, there is a general lack of clauses requiring them to work closely together in most Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) and Plans of Operation (POP) documents between donors and recipients. Donors have cited lack of qualified personnel in recipient governments as contributing to this limited input (CIDA, 1984).

Third, lack of data and problems of data collection in developing countries have precluded studies on the performance of projects supported by foreign assistance agencies. Clearly, studies of foreign assistance must pay closer attention to the appropriateness and sustainability of projects undertaken in recipient countries. Problems of monitoring and coordinating the activities of donors and recipients during the execution of various phases of the project cycle must receive careful considerations if aid is to be more effective. It is timely, therefore, to mount an investigation of CIDA projects, their appropriateness and sustainability, for a country like Zambia whose economy is in serious difficulties.

## 1.6 DATA SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY.

Data for this thesis are based on both secondary and primary sources collected in Canada and Zambia.

### 1.6.1 Canadian Secondary Data Sources

Much of the data collection was undertaken in Ottawa. As well, one week was spent in Montreal. The whole exercise took about five months. Secondary sources of data include documents and reports furnished by CIDA, especially by the Zambia Desk of the Anglophone Africa Section, as well as by the North-South Institute, a government sponsored think-tank on development policy and North-South relations based in Ottawa. Other sources were the Canadian Executing Agencies (CEA) for the selected projects, such as Agriculture Canada, Pringle Engineering of Montreal, the Agricultural Development Corporation (Agdevco) of Saskatchewan, and the University of Manitoba.

In particular, documents such as MOUs, POPs and project reviews for the projects under study, provide information on the project cycles. POPs provide detailed summaries of projects. Such summaries include information on project context, description of the project, project organisation and control, project procedures and how the project is to be evaluated. In addition, POPs also provide the project budget.

Other documents provided by CIDA included the Zambia: CIDA Programme and Country Information Report, which outlines the history of Canadian development assistance to Zambia and acts as a general information report for the Programme. It summarises the whole CIDA's Zambia Programme from its early years to 1987. Also used was the Computerised Project Listing by sector from the CIDA database for Zambia for the period 1972-1987. This shows all projects by sector, whether still active or terminated, as well as projects that were planned but never executed. Computerised Project Listings data

also indicates the amounts of funding that went into or would have gone into, the various projects, and whether the funding was in the form of loans or a grants. The listings show that since 1986, most bilateral funding to Zambian Projects has been in the form of grants.

Data were also collected from reports on the specific projects. These reports were in the form of assessment and evaluation reports, annual reports, reviews of particular projects, and termination reports. The latter is usually compiled by the Director of the Canadian Executing Agency or by a consultant when projects reach the end of a particular phase. Such reports discuss the experiences gained in implementing particular projects, the difficulties faced, and the failures and successes. They also recommend whether projects should be phased out or extended.

#### 1.6.2 Zambian Secondary Data Sources

Data on Zambia, especially those used for assessing and discussing the country's political and socio-economic environments came from a number of local reports. One source was Government of the Republic of Zambia's (GRZ) National Development Plans. There have been four development plans to date, starting with the Interim Plan which formed the basis for the First National Development Plan (NDP1) 1966-1970 (GRZ, 1966), the Second National Development Plan (NDP2) 1972-1976 (GRZ, 1971), and the Third National Development Plan (NDP3) 1979-1983 (GRZ, 1979). A Fourth National Development Plan was postponed for lack of funds in 1987, instead another Interim National Development Plan was introduced. The latter was a very important document in that it was the government's alternative to the IMF's Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). Finally, a Fourth National Development Plan (NDP4) 1988-1993 (GRZ, 1988) was, however, launched in 1988 and is currently in operation. Other important documents were produced by the World Bank and the IMF. The Economic Association of Zambia provided many seminar papers on the Zambian economy presented by its members.



Other government documents, including reports by the National Commission for Development Planning (NCDP), were also used. The NCDP is the main policy making and planning institution in Zambia. Reports and documents from the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development (MAWD), showing disbursements of foreign assistance into the ministry, and the ministry's relations with various donors were accessed. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Reports on Technical Cooperation to Zambia (UNDP, 1975-1987) was a valuable source of information on overall donor activities and programmes in Zambia. Also consulted were Zambian budget documents, Zambia/CIDA aid policy documents, Zambia/CIDA agricultural aid evaluation memoranda, agreed minutes and joint or individual evaluation reports, CIDA project and programme evaluation reports, especially those for the agricultural sector, and official speeches and articles in the Zambian national press.

### 1.6.3 Primary Sources of Data

Primary data were collected through a field survey, where the principal research tool was a questionnaire. There were essentially two types of questionnaires. First, was a questionnaire administered to CIDA personnel both in Canada and in Zambia, CEA personnel and consultants. A similar questionnaire with minor modifications was administered to Zambians associated with CIDA projects under study (Appendix III). Second, was a questionnaire specifically designed to elicit information about monitoring projects' performance which was administered to both Canadian and Zambian personnel involved in CIDA projects in the agricultural sector (Appendix IV). In addition, the researcher carried out follow-up interviews with some respondents chosen from among those who had answered the questionnaires. The basis for choosing respondents with whom to have follow-up interviews was whether they had indicated in a given space of the questionnaire that they would like to have further discussions on the survey. As well, the

researcher chose respondents who were closely associated with various projects. Thus, current team leaders, and former team leaders who could be traced were interviewed. These interviews followed a clearly formulated interview schedule and, where the respondent had no objections, they were recorded by tape recorder.

For the Zam-Can Wheat Project, the researcher interviewed with nine small scale farmers who are involved in the wheat trials. Of the small scale farmers interviewed, four were from Mpika, four from Kaka (near Mbala) and one from Mwenzo. The interviews were conducted in the local languages and the information sought was mostly of social and economic nature which helped establish the type of small scale farmers that CIDA was concentrating on for their trials, some of the problems experienced by farmers in adopting wheat growing, and their perception of the relationships between the Zam-Can Wheat project personnel and personnel from the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development during the implementation of the trials. Altogether, a total of eighty five respondents were involved in the study (Appendix V).

#### 1.6.5 Limitations of the Study

A major limitation of the study is CIDA's "confidentiality clause" regarding their projects and the way they operate. Hence, although the Zambia Desk was forthcoming in providing the researcher access to many files and documents, there were many files and documents that the researcher could not gain access to because they were considered "too confidential." Similarly, Zambian ministries and departments would not make certain files and information accessible to the researcher. Despite this, however, the researcher is confident that with the cooperation rendered by many CIDA personnel, consultants, and former cooperants in Canada as well as many officers in Zambia, much of the so-called "classified" information was obtained. The cooperation referred to was mainly rendered through informal discussions with some privileged personnel. Apart from using the

Canadian and Zambian governments, the researcher was also able to use other institutions such as the North-South Institute for further information.

There was also a shortcoming in the sampling procedure of the survey methodology employed. The selection of the sample to be interviewed in Canada was based on the availability of people who were either working or had worked for CIDA's Zambia Programme. Also included in this sample were those who were either working or had worked in other CIDA Programmes in the Eastern, Central or Southern African regions. The sample also depended on the number of people who had worked for CIDA as consultants in the same regions. Emphasis is, nevertheless, focussed on those who worked on the Zambian Programme, particularly on those projects on which this study concentrates. Lastly, other CIDA personnel in various sections such as the Policy and Evaluation Sections were also interviewed. Under the circumstances, therefore, the sampling procedure followed was the only one practical.

Notwithstanding this sampling weakness, there is a sufficiently good cross section of those interviewed to make the study representative of the CIDA-Zambia Programme.

## 1.8 THESIS ORGANISATION.

This thesis is organised into seven content chapters. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter Two reviews the available literature on development assistance issues. The aim of this chapter is to discuss the various schools of thought on development assistance, and their limitations and strengths.

Chapter Three places agricultural development into an historical perspective. It discusses Zambia's earlier policies towards this sector and how its development was neglected to concentrate on mining. It also discusses land tenure systems which favoured white settlers at the expense of indigenous Africans, and how Africans were deliberately

excluded from participating fully in the country's agricultural development. In addition, the chapter shows how agriculture was developed primarily to be a service to the mining industry. The result of these policies was that three different systems of agriculture had developed by the time the country attained independence. The chapter also discusses the policies pursued in independent Zambia and the strategies adopted to achieve them. Finally it introduces the entry and subsequent growth of foreign assistance to Zambia agricultural sector, discussing the changing nature and character of this assistance over the years.

Chapter Four discusses the context of Canadian foreign assistance to Zambia. Emphasis has been placed on Southern African regional, and Zambian political economies. This has helped to locate the Zambia - Canada interaction in the context of Southern African regional development. Canada's interest in black countries in Southern Africa is quite recent, hence it is difficult to gain an appreciation of the deeper significance of Canadian involvement in Zambia without this fuller regional analysis. Canada's involvement in Zambia has operated at two levels. First, as both an expression of explicit Canadian interests, many of which have been directly related to the political struggle in the Southern African region. Second, as an influence in the Canada (as a Western ally) Zambia (as a developing country) relations. This chapter also traces the growth of Canadian foreign assistance to Zambia and attempts some explanations for the trend. The chapter ends with a section on Canadian development assistance into the various non-agricultural sectors, and dwells specifically on Canadian ODA to agriculture. It therefore paves the way for the next chapter which discusses Canadian aid performance in Zambia.

Chapters Five and Six are the main chapters of the thesis. They discuss the effectiveness of Canadian foreign assistance to Zambia. They examine the four main projects in MAWD concentrating on the level of coordination in project administration between CIDA and MAWD. The various mechanisms of aid coordination, thoroughness of economic and technical project selection, evaluation, and the management arrangements

between CIDA and the government of Zambia are probed. The question of whether or not there is coordination and appropriate linkages in the planning and administration of donor funded projects between donors and recipients is addressed.

These issues need to be addressed because when there is no coherent sector coordination strategy between donor and Zambian line ministries, donors will tend to develop, implement and evaluate projects on their own merits. This may result in islands of development with high levels of technology being established, any one of which would look good in the donor country, and sometimes even in Zambia, for as long as the donor is executing the project. But when the donor leaves, these projects start deteriorating for various reasons.

The final chapter states the principal conclusions and makes some recommendations that could make future Canadian foreign assistance to Zambia more appropriate and sustainable.

## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERATURE REVIEW

Development assistance has attracted the attention of many scholars for a long time. Today, it is drawing even more attention because many developing countries, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa, are facing serious economic crises. In the available literature on development assistance, one finds that a combination of viewpoints and perspectives are advanced in the analyses, comments and criticisms of development assistance policies and projects. Such diverse viewpoints may range from ethical, theoretical, ideological to philosophical perspectives.

#### 2.1 FORMS OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

The terms "development assistance," "foreign assistance " and "aid" are used interchangeably and are assumed to be synonymous. They all refer to flows of resources which qualify as Official Development Assistance (ODA) (Ohlin, 1966). The terms of ODA include direct grants as well as concessional loans disbursed by a government development agency. There are also many non-governmental organisations (NGOs) involved in development assistance projects. The main goal of ODA, according to many donors' policy documents, is the promotion of economic development, although many critics argue that aid is given with other motives in mind (Carty and Smith, 1981; Hayter and Watson, 1985; Raison, 1984).

Aid can either be disbursed on a bilateral basis, that is, when it is provided directly by a donor country to a developing country, or on a multilateral basis, when it is channelled through an international organisation such as the United Nations Development Programme

(UNDP) or the World Bank. When assistance is disbursed on a bilateral basis, both the source of the aid and the aid channel are controlled by the donor government, whereas in multilateral aid, the source of the aid is still a donor government, but the channel of disbursement is multilateral and controlled by the particular multilateral agency. The respective merits and demerits of the two avenues of aid have been discussed by various scholars (Baldwin, 1968; de Silva, 1983; Todaro, 1981; Cassen, *et al.*, 1982). Both bilateral and multilateral assistance is transferred to underdeveloped countries either as project assistance, or programme assistance. Project assistance is usually targeted with more clearly defined objectives and is more discrete, while programme assistance is not as well targeted and has less discrete objectives. A wide variety of interests in donor countries play a role in determining the amount and form in which assistance is ultimately provided. These interests could be political, economic, or indeed humanitarian (de Silva, 1983).

### 2.1.1 Project Assistance

A project can be loosely defined as a cluster of tightly designed sets of activities with a predictable outcome (Bhagwati and Eckaus, 1970; Gittinger, 1982; Rondinelli, 1985a). As such, its implementation should result in concrete and tangible benefits. Because of its nature, project assistance tends to be favoured by many donors because it offers easy accountability for the resources disbursed. In addition, it is easy to make reviews and assessments of precise costs and benefits. Project assistance is also good to donor country electorates because of its visibility (Wood, 1982; Wood and Smith, 1984).

However, one principal weakness of the project assistance approach is that by focussing only on projects, little attention is given to the broader framework of development. As well, the normal procedure adopted by donors in financing a project is to meet only the foreign exchange component while leaving the recipient government to meet the local costs (Wood and Smith, 1984). This approach usually leads to projects with

heavy foreign exchange costs which are inappropriate and cannot be sustained by the recipient government. The project assistance approach is favoured by multilateral and bilateral donors.

### 2.1.2 Programme Assistance

Programme assistance approach is based mainly on the Keynesian approach to gaps in savings and foreign exchange within an economy (Todaro, 1981; Meier, 1984). It is assumed that the economy performs below capacity due to a shortage of capital, either in the form of local savings or foreign exchange (Todaro, 1981). Consequently, the provision of aid enables the economy to perform properly. Programme assistance is amenable to quick disbursement, more in line with the administrative capacity of the recipient government, and is sufficiently flexible to be easily switched between sectors. The current economic crisis and the need for structural adjustments by many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, have made programme aid more appropriate than ever before. There is, however, some strong arguments for an improved balance between project and programme assistance. Programme assistance affords donors the possibility of influencing general economic policy in a recipient country to a greater extent than project assistance because unlike project assistance which is linked to specific projects, programme assistance relates to general economic policy.

## 2.2 ECONOMIC THEORIES SUPPORTIVE OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

Although foreign assistance constitutes only a small part of many problems related to economic development, whether they relate to broader economic measures such as GNP, savings and investment, or exports and imports, most development literature and theories of economic development have some impact on foreign assistance. The characteristics and



patterns of development assistance, particularly its sectoral distribution at any given time could, at least partly, be attributed to the changing thinking in development economics. Furthermore, literature on development assistance is generally associated with particular schools of thought and times in history.

During the 1950s and 1960s, development economists relied heavily on experiences of industrialised countries in analysing problems of development in developing countries. During that time, the successes and impressions of the US administered Marshall Plan in post-war Europe were the dominant experience providing a framework for analysing developing countries' problems and ways of solving them. At the same time, the Marshall Plan type of assistance was also seen in relation to Western countries' motives for providing development assistance. It was also used for comparing and contrasting Western countries' assistance to that available from Eastern bloc countries' (Walters, 1970). During that time, the most dominant line of thinking was the one imbedded in the Harrod-Domar model (Todaro, 1981).

The Harrod-Domar model was based on a capital to output ratio. The principal assumption of the model was that underdevelopment resulted from a shortage of capital in developing countries due to low incomes, low levels of savings, and insufficient exports. It was therefore assumed that capital investment of a certain quantity would bring about an increase in output. The model's reasoning was used by many developing countries in formulating their development plans, while foreign assistance was seen as providing part of the required capital (Papanek, 1972).

During the 1960s, development economics and development assistance were also greatly influenced by Rostow's model of stages of economic growth (de Souza and Foust, 1979; Todaro, 1981). In this model, countries were presumed to follow the same pattern of economic development and the different countries were grouped in a hierarchical classification. Countries at the lowest stage of development had a long way to go before

they could reach the "take off" stage, as defined by Rostow, when they would have developed the dynamism to sustain economic growth. Investment capital in the form of development assistance was certainly one desirable means for them to arrive at this stage.

Another model, the Chenery-Strout model (Chenery and Strout, 1966) emerged during the same period of time, introducing the concept of "absorptive capacity." This model was concerned with analysing the extent to which underdeveloped countries could effectively utilise foreign assistance given the many administrative, managerial and other institutional constraints. It suggested that development assistance could play a role in improving the absorptive capacity of underdeveloped countries through investments in projects that would expand the economic base. The Chenery-Strout model therefore provided another boost to project assistance, particularly to technical assistance.

During the 1970s, scholars began questioning the wisdom of some of these older theories which had equated investment capital with economic development (Ahluwalia and Chenery, 1974). Development theories which emphasized economic growth were questioned because some underdeveloped countries had achieved economic growth without any meaningful development, as could be seen from widespread poverty. At this time, "growth with redistribution" (Lal, 1976; Sen, 1981) became a fashionable concept. Foreign assistance was once again attuned to accommodate this new concern about widespread poverty and the failure of the benefits of economic growth to "trickle down" to the whole society (Galtung, et al 1980; Seers, 1983).

### 2.3 LITERATURE ON DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN GENERAL

Most literature on development assistance falls into the "general" category. However, even within this category, there are differences in the way the subject matter has been approached and treated by the various authors. Some have taken a particularly

ideological and political perspective in their mode of analysis and comment on foreign aid issues (Baldwin, 1968; Walters, 1970; Freeman, 1978; Carty and Smith, 1981) while others have taken an economic or indeed a sociological approach (Mikesell, 1968; Wood and Smith, 1984).

Development assistance has also been examined in the context of economic growth models and other social theories of development (Mikesell, 1968). For example, Mikesell attempted not only to present a critique of the formal theories of development and their relationship with external assistance, but he also looked at how development assistance requirements for developing countries could be estimated in the post-war period. However, his analysis of development assistance did not focus on any particular recipient country, nor did he attempt to relate his analysis to any particular sector of a recipient country.

Similarly, Baldwin (1968) examined development assistance largely from a political perspective. He analysed development assistance within the context of inter-state intervention and political influence. The discussion was projected largely from a donors' perspective, to show the relationship between development assistance and donors' economic and political influence in recipient countries. Although in this particular case USA is frequently used as an example of a western country engaged in providing development assistance, the paper does not, however, focus on any particular recipient country.

There are several examples which indicate that literature on development assistance which appeared in the 1950s and 1960s was dominated by such themes as the cold war and its impact on economic development (Goldman, 1967; Montgomery, 1967; Koplan, 1963;). During this period, there was also a questioning of how development assistance could fit into underdeveloped countries' socioeconomic contexts (Hakim, 1963). One interesting observation concerning the general approach to the discussion and analysis of

development assistance is the general focus on political and economic theories and a complete lack of any in-depth analysis of any particular recipient country's relationship with a particular donor. Substantial evaluative literature focussing on any particular sector, projects or programmes in the underdeveloped countries was not produced during this period. In contrast, most of the literature on development assistance which began appearing in the 1970s and 1980s drew heavily on empirical field experiences in recipient countries. Consequently, there was less reference to the Marshall Plan experiences in Europe but, the impact of the cold war on development assistance became increasingly evident. Scholars' attention turned to assessing donor motivations for providing foreign assistance to underdeveloped countries.

There are essentially three schools of thought on development assistance in the existing literature. The first is usually referred to as the "conservative school" and is exemplified by Bauer (1971; 1981) who argues that aid tends to politicise everything and allows governments to intervene and interrupt market forces thereby making economies inefficient. The proponents of the school add that aid tends to conceal the negative effects of overvalued exchange rates, subsidies, and poor pricing policies prevalent in many developing countries (Bauer 1981). Advocates of this reasoning are not necessarily against the need for foreign capital, as they believe in the efficacy of foreign private investment.

For Bauer and Yamey (1981; 1982), the lifting of trade barriers by developed countries to underdeveloped countries' goods and services are more important than outright handouts in the name of development assistance. They strongly believe that trade is the engine of economic growth, while aid has only marginal impacts on development. The call in the 1970s for a New International Economic Order was in recognition of the limits of aid and the potentials of trade in enhancing development. Trade was seen as a source of foreign exchange earnings which has a multiplier effect on modernization and resource mobilisation through competition, while aid, unless in the form of grants, results in

indebtedness. Bauer's main argument was that development in underdeveloped countries should come from within, from the peoples' own initiatives and resources.

Second, is the "radical school", also known as the "dependency school" of thought, exemplified by scholars from both developed and underdeveloped countries such as Hayter (1971, Hayter and Watson, 1985), Amin (1973) and Payer (1982) who totally dismiss foreign assistance as a vehicle of development for three principal reasons. They argue that a) foreign assistance creates dependency between developing and developed countries; b) aid destroys self-reliant structures in underdeveloped countries; and c) they dismiss aid because it leads to foreign involvement in domestic affairs. Carty and Smith (1981) and Hayter and Watson (1985) also argue that there are political and economic donor self interests. They maintain that contrary to a donor's claim that aid is of mutual benefit, the provision of aid is part of a global system tying underdeveloped countries' economies to those of the developed countries for the benefit of the latter. The main concerns of scholars in this school, and the basis for criticising aid, are the inappropriate patterns of development and the cultural and economic traumas resulting from most foreign aid.

Because analyses of development assistance by the "radical school" have tended to be generally broad, with a strong political influence, certain positive aspects of development assistance have not received an equal share of attention. Rarely, for example, have critics in this school admitted that some of the failures of development assistance should be blamed on recipients themselves. However, despite this shortcoming, one notices an attempt to direct the assessment of aid on particular donor and recipient countries. For example, Schulz and Hansen (1984) examined German aid to sub-Saharan Africa while Vengrof (1982) looked at American food aid programmes in Africa. In terms of substance and arguments, one could say that both conservatives and radicals have points worth serious consideration by donors on one hand and recipients on the other. Both the

"conservative school" and "radical school" of thought arrive at the conclusion that aid to developing countries is inappropriate and should be discouraged.

Besides the literature on development assistance by the radical and conservative schools of thought, there is the literature of the "reformed school" of thought which has taken less of a political perspective. Meier (1984), and Cassen (1986) for example, have attempted to give apolitical views and assessments of foreign assistance. The appraisal by Meier (1984) is mainly set within the context of what he terms as "leading issues in economic development." Hence development assistance appears as a section within a broad economic development framework. His discussion of aid issues stretches from a general review of foreign assistance performance in underdeveloped countries to offering suggestions on ways of improving the quality of aid, drawing working boundaries for donors and recipients and identifying an effective system of aid allocation. Everything considered, Meier's review is a careful balancing act. He has on the one hand exposed existing deficiencies of development assistance and apportioned the blame on both donors and recipients. He also believes that underdeveloped countries cannot progress at a reasonable rate, or cannot progress at all without foreign assistance. Meier particularly has attacked underdeveloped countries' defiant and erratic economic behavior (especially in creating free market economies) which he sees as a major obstacle to aid yielding maximum benefits.

Although Meier's discussion of development assistance is thorough, well articulated and broad, his treatment of these issues has, however, lacked depth. Successful economic cases which were recipients of foreign assistance, such as South Korea which he has cited, have been discussed only in very general terms. The background to such success is much broader and deeper than Meier has been able to show. It is not just the receipt of foreign assistance and being amenable to free market economic policies that has put South Korea where it is today.

Foreign assistance literature points out that for political reasons, Korea and Taiwan have from the very beginning received substantially more foreign aid per capita from the USA than any other country in the region or in Africa. In addition, as Cassen, *et al.*, (1982) noted, for most of its history the government of South Korea has been both markedly authoritarian and intelligently interventionist in economic policy towards the private sector. Ghana's IMF and World Bank instituted structural adjustment programme, together with foreign assistance from various sources, is currently said to be working mainly because of the same authoritarian nature of the current military government. One of the major weaknesses in Meier's arguments is that he fails to focus on specific donors or on donor and recipient aid policies.

The recent development assistance review by Cassen (1986) is yet another example of a work which has attempted an assessment of the performance of development assistance. It is comprehensive and far reaching. It provides both basic facts concerning foreign assistance and more substantive insights into economic development aspects of aid. The country case studies in their work have been particularly useful in illustrating actual pitfalls in the aid business, especially for the recipients. The survey was basically a search for justification for foreign assistance and conditions under which new aid arrangements should operate, hence the title of their study "Does Aid Work?" Their study illustrates the move from works dominated by cold war politics (Goldman, 1967; Montgomery, 1967; Walters, 1970) to more practical oriented literature (McNeil, 1982; Todaro, 1981; Mosley, 1982; Smith and Wood, 1984; Wood, 1982). This is indeed characteristic of other literature seen in recent years, which has been more concerned with practical issues rather than political debate.

The "reformed school" of thought is also advocated by the Brandt and Pearson Commissions (Pearson, 1969; Brandt, 1982). The principal thrust of the Brandt Commission was the concept of "mutuality of interests" existing between developed and

underdeveloped countries because of the current world interdependency (Brandt, 1982: 64-77). Contrary to widely held impressions in developed countries that aid only helps recipients, the "reformed school" recognises that donors also have an interest, especially given that the world is looked at as a world economy. Consequently, any transfer of resources to developing countries makes them economically vibrant, thereby creating markets and making the whole world a better place for everybody. The Brandt Commission also recommended the formation of a multilateral World Development Fund where underdeveloped countries would have more say in lending for trade purposes. In view of the increasing levels of poverty in developing countries, the Brandt Commission proposed that a massive transfer of capital from the developed to developing countries take place (Brandt, 1982).

The call for structural changes to international economic relations regarding terms of trade, development assistance and monetary issues was also strong among African countries (Riddell, 1986). Young (1983) shows how Tanzania, which was a representative of the Group of 77 developing countries and the Non-Aligned Movement, championed these concerns.

The assessment of performance of foreign assistance projects has not been the monopoly of general writers or those who have been involved with development assistance issues. Many academicians have taken a keen interest in aid issues. Their work has ranged from carrying out short official and non-official evaluation assignments, to major and more comprehensive independent research on development assistance. Some (Ph.D and M.A.) studies conducted in North America and U.K. on development assistance reveal that most of the work has concentrated mainly on examining aid performance. Freeman's (1978) study looked at Canadian development assistance to black Southern Africa and concluded that aid was inappropriate, inadequate and was highly politically motivated. Stone's (1982)



thesis examined Canadian development assistance to wheat production in Tanzania using the costs and benefits analysis.

Donors' annual reports are another type of literature on foreign assistance. A common feature among these reports is their technical and evaluative nature, focussing on the distribution of aid resources to programmes and projects, and assessing their performance according to donors' criteria. Reports are usually based on short assessment studies commissioned by donor agencies and carried out by their own staff, or by consultants from their own countries. Rarely have nationals of recipient countries been involved in the evaluation of foreign assisted programmes and projects. The tendency to avoid a general assessment of all foreign assistance to a recipient country is quite evident. The purpose of these reports is mainly to provide an assessment which could guide any future investments or provide a means for justifying some new arrangements or approaches of implementing any new projects.

#### 2.4 BILATERAL ASSISTANCE

Bilateral assistance has a particular significance in development assistance (Gunnell, 1982). Scholars have devoted considerable time and attention writing and discussing bilateral assistance, both in a narrower and broader context. However, it is interesting to note that although the bulk of development assistance is channelled through bilateral arrangements, there are few studies which have specifically focussed on bilateral assistance. More often, bilateral assistance is discussed as a section within a chapter discussing development assistance in general.

A survey of literature on development assistance reveals that many scholars' attention to bilateral assistance has been motivated by a desire to compare and contrast donor country trends in their distribution of aid over a given time in a region or particular recipient. This

is evident in many books and reports. However, in recent years attention has shifted to analysing development assistance in terms of donor motivations and objectives, (Freeman, 1978; Cassen, 1986; Rylie, 1986). There has also been studies on donor and recipient policies and how these may impact on development (Smith and Wood, 1984; North South Institute [NSI], 1980; Young, 1983).

The principal debate about bilateral and multilateral channels of aid disbursement is over which of the two offers the best and most effective way of disbursing aid resources. Various arguments for and against the use of bilateral or multilateral channels to disburse aid have been advanced by donors. Depending on the audience being addressed, donors usually give different reasons as motivating factors for providing aid. For example, when addressing recipient government's representatives, the need to help in the development of the recipient country is the main reason advanced by aid officials, whereas when addressing business representatives from the donor country, they talk of the business opportunities in these countries.<sup>1</sup>

#### 2.4.1 Literature on Canadian Development Assistance in General

Canadian development assistance has not received wide attention by scholars other than by those who have been associated with its administration and the sensational articles by the news media. Independent critics appear to be very few indeed (Freeman, 1978; 1982; 1985; Carty and Smith 1981). To get a better idea of what has been written about Canadian aid one must look at a cross section of literature including Canadian government (Winegard, 1987) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) documents

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<sup>1</sup> Consider, for example, an article that appeared in the *Globe and Mail*, Oct. 7, 1987: B24 concerning a Trenton, Nova Scotia rail car plant receiving a government subsidy to produce rail cars for Zambia Railways. The article clearly shows that the major motivation was to provide employment for approximately 1,000 Canadians. However, the story told to Zambia changed, even when Zambia asked whether Canada would consider other sources, such as, Japan as suppliers of the railcars. The story was that Canada was supplying Zambia with "competitively acquired" rail cars that would improve Zambia's transportation needs (*Times of Zambia*, Aug. 24, 1988).

(CIDA, 1975; 1987), various commissioned project evaluation reports and a broad scale of assessments on Canadian assistance undertaken by consultants on CIDA contracts.

Government and CIDA documents on development assistance are intended for internal as well as foreign information. Literature in this category carries basic facts about Canadian aid policies, the volume of the assistance being disbursed to various regions and countries, and some information about on-going or completed projects. Thus, most of this literature serves to promote the image of Canadian development assistance both at home and abroad. CIDA annual reports contain some extracts from the budget which can be useful for analysing regional aid distribution. However, CIDA annual reports are often too descriptive and not very critical. There are important publications from the North South Institute (NSI) which provide useful information on Canadian development assistance. CIDA's commissioned studies are carried out on all projects both before and after their completion. These are designed to give some feedback to CIDA on the experiences of the various projects and programmes. They are, therefore, mainly concerned with the current prospects and problems of projects.

Assessments of Canadian development assistance by outside observers have been particularly useful in helping to present Canadian assistance in its wider perspective. Assessments have ranged from radical criticisms of Canadian aid policies to some mild comments on Canadian assistance in developing countries. Carty and Smith (1981) attempted an examination of the fluctuating trends in Canada's development assistance policies and programmes during the 1950s to 1970s period. Their examination is mainly in the context of relationships between developed and underdeveloped countries. In the study, Carty and Smith (1981: 6) describe foreign assistance as part of underdeveloped countries' problem, stating that foreign assistance is ". . . not the solution to poverty and underdevelopment" by arguing that currently and historically, the power relations in the implementation of the whole project cycle have been in favour of developed countries and

for as long as this remains the case, aid efforts are sure to fail. They add that their stand does not mean that they are against development assistance itself or aid reforms. But that these reforms will only make development assistance more effective if they are accompanied with a commitment by both donors and recipients to promote economic growth with redistribution.

Carty and Smith's study mainly concentrates on assessing CIDA programmes by drawing on some CIDA projects in Asia, Africa and Latin America. They also point out that there are some concerns and interests which affect Canada's distribution and resultant patterns of development assistance. They list these interests as firstly, whether Canada's role is to fill any gap in the developing countries left by either Britain or the US, and secondly, Canada's role in the Western World and their fight against communism. Another book which offers similar arguments is that edited by Clark and Swift (1982). This book is in five parts and concludes that aid cannot end poverty in underdeveloped countries because of the current unequal political, economic and social relations existing between these two groups of countries.

Of particular importance regarding Canada's development assistance to developing countries are studies that have been published by the Ottawa-based NSI. These include works by scholars such as Young (1983) who looked at aid to Tanzania, Ehrhardt (1983) analysed aid to Bangladesh, while Lavergne and English (1987) examined Canadian aid to Senegal. These are mainly economic studies examining Canadian foreign assistance policies and programmes by reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of these policies. Attempts to identify problems which constrain the effective implementation of many programmes are also made. However, all of these studies are primarily concerned with the economics of Canada's development assistance to developing countries. In addition, the NSI (1980) made an assessment of the governments' performance against its stated goals as outlined in the Strategy for International Development Cooperation 1975-1980. The

Strategy for International Development Cooperation 1975-1980 formed the guide-lines for the allocation of Canada's bilateral assistance in the late 1970s to the early 1980s.

Young (1983) examined Canada's development assistance to Tanzania for the 1961-1981 period. The work provides an historical account of Tanzania's development environment and the growth during the 1970s of both bilateral and multilateral assistance in its development strategy. Donor motivations in choosing Tanzania as a recipient of their assistance are identified. He summarises the motivating factors for most donors as first, political stemming from Tanzania's foreign policy and its anti-apartheid stand; second, economic motivations stemming from its development strategy which emphasized equitable distribution of wealth, and third, the general poverty of the country.

In his discussion of Canadian development assistance to Tanzania, Young focussed on its growth, sectoral distribution and its impact on the country's development. He acknowledges the difficulties of analysing Canadian assistance arising from its different and often conflicting objectives, such as its foreign policy considerations, commercial interests or the recipient's development needs. However, despite the conflicting objectives of Canadian aid, he makes a salient analysis by focussing mainly on its contribution to Tanzania's overall development. This is achieved by identifying successes and failures associated with various Canadian projects.

Although Young's work examined the whole CIDA programme in Tanzania, he attempted an analysis of Canadian development assistance to the agricultural sector. Using costs and benefits analysis he undertook a close assessment of the Canada Tanzania Wheat Project concluding that it was a ". . . highly profitable investment project" (70). However, another Canadian scholar, Freeman (1978), analysing the same project, was very critical of it on two accounts. First, she questioned whether it was not making Tanzania more dependent on aid considering the resources that have to be provided if the project is to be sustained. Second, she questioned the benefits of such a project to the majority of

peasants, some of whom were actually displaced from their land to make way for the large wheat farms (Freeman, 1982). However, Young did not discuss whether or not the project can be sustained by Tanzania if CIDA were to withdraw. This is a pertinent question CIDA needs to ask itself when designing any projects for developing countries.

Lavergne and English (1987) undertook an independent study of Canadian development assistance to Senegal. Their work was similar in many ways to that undertaken by Young (1983). They discussed the donors' motivations for providing Senegal with development assistance and identified three major factors. First, the prevailing political stability in the country; second, the respectability in Africa generally, and Francophone Africa in particular, of both Senegal's first President and the one who succeeded him; and third, the economic difficulties that the country was going through.

Lavergne and English then analysed the trend of development assistance focussing on the various sources and compositions of this assistance. They also discussed the impact this assistance has had on Senegal's economic development by concentrating on the fishing and educational sectors. They chose these sectors because of their belief that a full appreciation of the impact of aid in a country such as Senegal could only be gained by studying specific projects or sectors. With this sectoral analysis, they also discussed some of the constraints on the effectiveness of aid. The constraints were identified as Senegal's underdeveloped nature of basic institutions of development, CIDA's lack of experience on how to tackle development problems such as low productivity of peasant agriculture, and its lack of appropriate resources. These constraints are compounded by the failure of the two countries to work together, particularly during the design, appraisal and implementation stages of a project.

The above review set the context under which Canadian assistance to Senegal was analysed. The study shows that the growth of Canadian aid to this Francophone country during the late 1960s, 1970s and the 1980s has been substantial. They clearly identify the

role of internal politics (between English and Francophone Canada) in increasing aid to Senegal during the 1960s. In the 1970s and 1980s, the principal motivating factors for continued development assistance to Senegal have been identified as Canada's foreign policy and commercial considerations. Such an observation is in line with most scholars who have studied the motivating factors for Canada's development assistance (Freeman, 1978; Carty and Smith, 1981; Young, 1983). Lavergne and English (1987) then attempted to show how Canada's foreign policy and commercial interests contribute in making aid less effective.

Although their study is detailed, Canadian development assistance to the agricultural sector is not analysed in detail. They argue that the reason for their short analysis is because of Canada's limited emphasis of this sector compared to the education and fishing sectors. The finding that CIDA concentrated its assistance on the education and fishing sectors and not on agriculture is a contradiction by CIDA because it had designated agriculture as a super-priority sector for Senegal in the 1970s. During the 1975-1980 period, only 8.2 per cent of Canadian aid went to support agricultural projects, of which Lavergne and English (1987: 55) suggest ". . . over half of those funds were devoted to a meat refrigeration system that contributed only indirectly to the livestock sector."

Three government sponsored reports appeared during the year 1987 which illustrated the lively political interest in development assistance in Canada. These important volumes offered some interesting insights on CIDA, the International Development and Research Centre (IDRC), and on the wider culture of development assistance in Canada. The first one was entitled "For Whose Benefit" (1987) and was popularly known as the Winegard Report (after the chairman of the committee). It was a report of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and international trade which examined Canada's development assistance policies and programmes. The report identified certain weaknesses and offered some recommendations on how to improve on those weaknesses. Second was a report by CIDA

(1987) entitled "To Benefit a Better World" which was in effect a response to the Winegard Report and the challenges that it posed. The third publication was entitled "Sharing Our Future: Canadian International Development Assistance" (CIDA, 1988). This report contains the latest strategy and the charter of the principles and priorities of official development assistance. It is readable, accessible and is lavishly illustrated.

#### 2.4.2 Zambian Development Assistance Literature

Other than what one sees in the Zambian government and donor sponsored evaluation reports, there are very few independent critical writings on development assistance to Zambia. Only in the early 1980s did some scholars direct their studies to the work of foreign donors in Zambia. Smith and Wood (1984), Wood (1982) argue that foreign assistance has become an increasingly important factor in Zambia's development. Smith and Wood (1984), for example, note that foreign assistance to MAWD has been growing faster than the Zambian budget. UNDP (1970-1988) produces annual reports which summarise development cooperation information to Zambia. However, these reports are not up to date due mainly to the failure of some donors to report their foreign assistance disbursements and activities to UNDP.

The UNDP (1986b) also undertook a study in which it assessed the country's technical assistance requirements. The first part of their review examined the situation of development assistance in the country, but made no attempt to single out any donor for wider study of their assistance to Zambia. The second part of the report examined Zambia's manpower and training requirements in the face of the country's present economic decline and attempts to revive it. Clearly, missing from most of these studies is an investigation of pertinent issues in development assistance such as the implications of the lack of integration of management and administrative structures, the appropriateness of the assistance provided, and the sustainability of the projects implemented.



It is argued here that existing studies of Canadian aid have not been placed sufficiently into the broader context of the recipient's development environment. The questions of the appropriateness and sustainability of the projects and programmes undertaken are at times not given serious consideration. It is a well known fact that development in the underdeveloped countries' context is generally a complex process, and quite often their problems have defied solutions that have worked successfully elsewhere. Consequently, more detailed knowledge is required on Canada's aid to a country such as Zambia. Such knowledge will help the understanding of how Canadian aid has developed, changed or adapted to Zambia's demands and needs over the years.

## 2.5 SUMMARY

In concluding this chapter, it is apparent that literature on foreign assistance has patterns which can be identified and traced. It is possible to identify two phases in the history of development assistance. The first phase of development assistance immediately following the second world war saw a discussion and treatment of aid against the background of the Marshall Plan and the cold war. Aid was also discussed according to the prevailing theories and models of economic development. Individually and collectively, the cold war and the prevailing economic thought had profound influence on how external assistance and its objectives were perceived, implemented and studied. Pertinent questions and issues concerning development assistance during that period were often probed and answered in the contexts identified above. The literature in this category dealt with broad issues and questions of aid application and performance rather than detailed sector analysis. The second phase has seen a rapid increase in literature on foreign assistance which is more diversified in approach and purpose. Literature which has emerged in the 1970s and 1980s

has been more forceful in its attention and treatment of practical issues of development assistance. The work by Cassen (1986) illustrates the point being made here.

However, almost all the literature on foreign assistance in general, except for some major research studies, has taken a predominantly "current affairs" approach to the analysis of development assistance issues. There is little in-depth analysis of pertinent issues. The economic perspective is dominant in most of the discussions and analysis. There is, however, an apparent absence of any detailed analysis of assistance to specific sectors which has tended to leave gaps that inevitably need to be filled by a more detailed and more sector-focussed approach to the study of development assistance administration. Also in recent years, more and more attention has been turned to discussions of the relative value of multilateral and bilateral assistance.

Studies on Canadian development assistance to African countries has been mainly undertaken by the NSI. The approach taken by NSI authors involves an examination of Canada's motivations in providing assistance and an analysis of the general aid performance by looking at what are considered to be the successes and failures of the projects. The method of analysing aid performance has varied from one author to another. Thus, Young (1983) assessed CIDA's aid programme by selecting one out of the three main objectives of Canadian aid to Tanzania. His principal analysis therefore focussed on the contribution of Canadian development assistance to that country.

Lavergne and English (1987), on the other hand, believed that Canada's development assistance to Senegal could only be appreciated by studying specific projects and sectors. Consequently, their approach took the form of sectoral analysis in which they concentrated on the education and fishing sectors. These two sectors are the major beneficiaries of Canadian development assistance to Senegal. Within these two sectors they discussed project design, implementation and ultimately the impact of such projects on Senegal's

development. They argue that such an approach was the only one possible in identifying constraints on the effectiveness of Canadian development assistance.

This review of literature has served the purpose of indicating that development assistance is still considered a good topic of discussion by scholars. It has attempted to sketch the various approaches critics have taken in analysing development assistance. Some identified emphasis in aid discussions which relate to the interests of the present study include the need to conduct studies into foreign assistance policies to the agricultural sector and aid's appropriateness and sustainability. As well, problems experienced by both the donors and recipients particularly in the whole process of project cycle performance need to be addressed.

## CHAPTER THREE

## A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF ZAMBIAN AGRICULTURAL POLICIES

## INTRODUCTION.

Zambia has a total area of 752,614 square kilometres (Williams, 1988); it is relatively sparsely populated with about 8.1 million people, of whom 45 per cent live in urban areas (Population Reference Bureau [PRB], 1990). The urban areas are mostly concentrated along the "line of rail" stretching from Livingstone in Southern Province to Chililabombwe in Copperbelt Province. Rural population densities are low, averaging about 4.3 persons per square kilometre. Some rural areas are, however, more densely populated, especially the fertile arable lands in Eastern, Northern, and Southern Provinces. As well, there are areas with very low densities, especially the tse-tse fly infested National Parks which are currently not suitable for human habitation.

About 60 per cent of the country's total population depends upon agriculture for its livelihood although this sector's overall contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is low (World Bank, 1984). In 1985, agriculture's contribution towards the GDP was 17 per cent, a level which most analysts agree is substantially below the agricultural sector's potential (World Bank, 1986a; GRZ, 1988). The World Bank (1986a) estimates that only about 20 per cent of the 60 million hectares of arable land is currently under cultivation despite climatic conditions being favourable for a wide range of tropical and sub tropical crops. Productivity is low, with the average peasant farmer producing only about 0.9 tonnes of maize per hectare compared to an average of 3.6 tonnes that could be produced per hectare.<sup>1</sup> Over the last two decades, growth in agricultural output has averaged only 2.4 per cent per year while population growth rate has been about 3.4 per cent per year

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<sup>1</sup> Estimates made by MAWD.

over the same period (World Bank, 1986a). The result of these differences in the two growth rates has been recurrent food shortages, particularly during the 1980s. In Zambia, like in many other African countries, low agricultural productivity is a result of a number of factors, one being the long standing colonial legacy of neglect of the agricultural sector which was deeply rooted in the historical development of the country. However, in addition to the colonial legacy has been the poor policies towards this sector after independence. The next section examines the colonial legacy.

### 3.1 THE COLONIAL LEGACY

Although there had been explorers in Northern Rhodesia, such as David Livingstone, since the mid 19th century, British penetration in the area began to be felt only towards the end of that century. The first step in Britain gaining firm control took place in 1893 when the British South Africa (BSA) Company, which in 1891 had been awarded a charter by the British Imperial Government for the area lying south of the shores of Lake Tanganyika, succeeded in conquering the Ndebele of Southern Rhodesia (Gann, 1964). The defeat of the Ndebele freed up British resources to conquer areas lying north of the Zambezi River, which constituted the boundary between Southern and Northern Rhodesia. In 1898, British troops working on behalf of the North Charterland Company, defeated the Ngonis of Fort Jameson (Chipata) in Zambia's Eastern Province. By 1899, the Bemba in the northern part of Northern Rhodesia, who had been expected to offer strong resistance to any form of control, had also been brought under British rule with surprising ease because of the influence of the White Fathers who entered this region through Lake Tanganyika and the Eastern Coast (Gann, 1964). Elsewhere, treaties were signed between the BSA Company and the Lozi of Barotseland, who requested and received protectorate

status from Britain. This treaty remained in effect until 1924, when it was replaced by direct crown rule (van Horn, 1979).

The principal motivation of these companies and the British Government was profit to be gained from the extensive minerals which were thought to exist in the area. The acquired territories were, therefore, to supply labour for the mines on one hand, and to become areas of settlement for white farmers on the other. The BSA Company and North Charterland Company were disappointed, however, to find that these areas did not have as much minerals as had been hoped for. Despite the fact that they were given far reaching powers of government in their respective areas (Davidson, 1972), the companies never made any meaningful investments in the development of the country. On the contrary, their only interest was the development of strategies to get cheap labour for the mines and for the settlers, which led them to adopt the South African system of taxes, the non-payment of which often resulted in prison labour (Davidson, 1972). Hut and poll taxes were imposed in areas controlled by the Northland Chartered Company in an effort to force people to seek paid employment on either white farms or in the mines (Gann, 1964). Because of the low wages offered by farmers, many people chose to migrate to the mines which paid them a little bit more. This practice led to massive rural to urban migration by the males and resulted in negative consequences for agriculture in rural areas.

White settlers also restricted opportunities for Africans to practice commercial agriculture. By the beginning of the 1900s, white settlers had began to occupy the area known as Northern Rhodesia, particularly the fertile areas in the south and central parts of the country. Compensation to the Africans who had previously occupied these areas was non-existent. Most Africans became tenants on white settler estates and, in most cases, worked for minimum wages to pay their taxes (Gann, 1964; Muntemba, 1982). The position of the white settlers became more important in the late 1920s when the Colonial Office introduced new land tenure policies which effectively favoured increased settler

occupation. These policies included the demarcation as Crown Land and the subsequent clearance of Africans from all land within 36 kilometres either side of the "line of rail." This land became exclusively reserved for settlement by white farmers. In addition, much of the rest of the country was demarcated as unalienated Crown Land where white settlers could choose to settle and clear Africans from such land (Mvunga, 1982). The land reserved for future white settlement was vast and was never fully occupied.

Another feature of the new land tenure policies was the establishment of Native Reserves. These reserves were set up in areas adjoining Crown Lands where there was competition for land between Africans and white settlers. It was argued by the Government that this was done to ensure Africans had sufficient land for agricultural purposes. Unfortunately, the lands reserved for Africans were infertile and insufficient for the growing population. As Muntamba (1982: 38) rightly notes, ". . . settler lands almost coincided with the previously more densely populated areas because of the soil's higher fertility." When in the late 1940s, it was realised that the occupation of lands specifically reserved for white settlers had not been as high as hoped for, some of this land was returned to African jurisdiction as Native Trust Land. Although some of this land had potential for farming, much of that was far away from a developed infrastructure to support any meaningful farming.

It has been argued that the inadequate allocation of Reserve land was a direct result of the failure by those responsible for formulating land policies to understand two facts. First, was the failure to understand the nature of the traditional farming systems practised in the region, such as the "chitemene" system which needs bush fallow land. Second, was the failure to take into account the prospects for African population growth and the subsequent need for increased cultivation in response to increased population and market opportunities (Wood and Shula, 1987). Failure to understand these facts resulted in overcrowding on many of the reserves and led to serious deterioration of the environment.

Wood and Shula (1987) note that this unfavourable land tenure system excluded Africans from participating in market oriented agriculture.

By the late 1920s, the mining sector had become increasingly important and had attracted large numbers of labourers who in turn had to depend on cheap sources of food. To provide relatively cheap food for miners, the government adopted a deliberate low food-price policy (Dodge, 1977). Agriculture was being developed as a service industry for the mines. Maize, the main staple of the miners, and the main output of the white settlers, was given priority over traditional staples such as millet, sorghum and cassava (Royal Tropical Institute, 1983). However, despite the favourable soil conditions on the white farmers' lands, other conditions such as the depression of the 1930s made farming less successful. On the other hand, African farmers located on the more accessible areas, despite their unfavourable land and soil conditions, were succeeding in producing some surplus maize for sale to the miners. This limited success by some upcoming African farmers occurred despite any form of encouragement from the relevant authorities.

At first, production by African farmers was discouraged. During the depression of the 1930s, for example, when some mines in both Northern Rhodesia and the adjoining Katanga Province in Belgian Congo (Zaire) were closed leading to less demand for maize, the authorities ensured that African farmers did not increase their share of the limited market. Such market protection in favour of the white farmers was accomplished after recommendations of a 1935 report by the Agricultural Advisory Board led to the setting up of a Maize Control Board (MCB) (Dodge, 1977). The mandate of the MCB, established in 1936, was to regulate all marketing of maize.

Maize production on the more favoured areas of African reserves increased substantially during the period between the end of the Second World War and Zambia's independence in 1964 and African farmers provided increasing quantities of maize for the market. In Eastern Province, which is one of Zambia's most productive areas, Smith



(1984: 2-26) notes that production of maize increased from about 2,250 tonnes in 1927 to 13,140 tonnes in 1956, an increase of over 480 per cent. On the other hand, the less favoured areas of reserve lands continued to be seen primarily as labour reserves despite some half-hearted attempts by government to develop rural development projects (Muntemba, 1982).

Other measures of colonial agricultural policy which favoured white settlers but excluded the local population, included the provision of agricultural credit and extension services. As well, the establishment of the Cattle Control Board placed restrictions upon the import of high grade beef thereby protecting that produced by the white settlers. However, the Board permitted imports of low grade beef which competed with that primarily produced by the local people.

In their historical review of agricultural policies in Northern Rhodesia up to independence, Wood and Shula (1987) attempted to identify policies set by the MCB which were still being followed in independent Zambia's agricultural marketing system. They found that maize was the main crop grown for urban consumption on commercial farms which were mostly occupied by white settlers. Also, maize production was given priority over the production of all other traditional staples, such as millets, sorghum or cassava traditionally grown by local people. They argue that this preference for maize was due to first, the previous experience in maize production of the white settlers, and second, was due to the agricultural conditions in the areas they settled which favoured maize production. A further precedent set by the MCB was its role as the sole buyer of commercially grown maize. Like today's government-controlled buyers, it bought all the maize from the farmers, and therefore, guaranteed them a market. There are, however, some major differences in the marketing arrangements between then and now. First, only those farmers along the line of rail and on alienated Crown land had access to this important service, and second, white settlers were given preferential treatment for the service. The

outcome of these arrangements was to give a major advantage to white settlers in that they were protected from cheap imports and their producer prices did not need to respond to import or export parity prices (Dodge, 1977).

Given these colonial policies, it is not surprising that three different systems of agriculture had become prominent by the time Zambia attained independence in 1964. First, there were the large-scale farms of the white settlers concentrated along the "line of rail" in Southern, Central and Copperbelt Provinces, located mostly on Crown land and relying upon mechanisation and African labour for their operation. Second, there were the majority of African farms whose agricultural economy remained unassisted by the colonial government, and who thus remained as subsistence farmers scattered all over the country. Thirdly, there were a few small-scale African commercial farmers who lived adjacent to the white settlers along the line of rail provinces and parts of Eastern province (Smith, 1984).

### 3.2 ZAMBIAN AGRICULTURAL POLICIES DURING THE INDEPENDENCE PERIOD.

The political elite that gained power on independence in 1964 espoused to improve the living conditions of the poor and to promote the development of the country. The development of the country was defined in terms of producing goods and services and distributing them equally. These were the broad objectives of the ruling party, United National Independence Party (UNIP). UNIP's goals and programmes aimed at addressing these objectives were based on President Kaunda's philosophy of "humanism" (Zambia's version of socialism), designed to convert Zambia from the capitalist economy that it had become the colonial period to a socialist society based upon equality. The early actions towards attaining these goals involved the nationalisation of the mining industry, of some manufacturing industries and some financial services and establishing them as a parastatal

sector. Ollawa (1978) also notes that administrative decentralisation was attempted in the early 1970s by a massive move aimed at organising the rural population to participation in both rural development and the political process.

There were attempts by government to reduce the colonial legacy of rural-urban inequalities through multi-faceted rural development programmes, although none were initially directed at correcting the disadvantages of the rural poor. The main avenue of rural development was to be primarily from the spread-effect of mining and other industrial sector investments which were expected to generate high economic growth rates, and in turn, reduce poverty, rural urban income disparities, and provide employment (Ollawa, 1978). Arguably, agriculture played a distinctly secondary role to the maintenance and growth of the mining sector.

### 3.2.1 Independent Zambia; Policies Towards Agriculture.

Before an attempt is made to analyse Zambia's agricultural policies, it is important to know which institutions are responsible for policy formulation and implementation. Despite Zambia being a one-party state, quite different perceptions are held by politicians concerning what is good for the country and how to go about achieving that. Some politicians perceive economic benefits to be the most important goal of development while others see social and political considerations as most important. As the Central Committee is the supreme body of the Party, it is the principal policy making body for the country. Policies made by the Central Committee are subjected to interpretation and criticism by cabinet ministers and members of parliament respectively. Policy implementation is, however, the responsibility of civil servants who may have different perceptions of development from those held by the policy and decision makers (Wood and Shula, 1987). Thus, inconsistencies are created because of differing perceptions between groups responsible for policy formulation and implementation. This situation is important in

understanding some of the inconsistencies between agricultural policies as spelt out in the development plans, actual policy implementation problems, and ultimately, the overall performance of the agricultural sector.

The next section will, therefore, critically assess development plans and various government policy documents, their problems, and achievements. As expected, the objectives and goals pursued by the government since independence show a clear deviation from those of the colonial period. Emphasis has been on more balanced agricultural development and major improvements in living standards of the rural population, considered to be the most deprived social group in the country.

In its broadest terms, the main objectives of Zambia's agricultural development, as espoused in the various government policy documents, have been; a) to minimise inherited imbalances between the rural and urban areas; b) to develop production in agriculture that would reduce rural-urban income differentials, and c) to diversify the economy away from mining in general and copper in particular. This goal was particularly strongly emphasised in the First National Development Plan (NDP1) 1966-1970 (GRZ, 1966).

During the Second National Development Plan (NDP2) 1972-1976 (GRZ, 1971) the main goals were to achieve rural development so as to improve standards of living in rural areas. This was to provide rural employment and thereby reduce rural-urban migration. As well, the plan was to increase agricultural productivity, resulting in increasing contributions by agriculture to GDP, while at the same time leading to self-sufficiency in staple foods.

The Third National Development Plan's (NDP3) 1979-1983 (GRZ, 1979) goal and objectives were to give highest priority to rural development in order to create a strong rural economy. It placed major emphasis on; a) food self-sufficiency and the promotion of export crops; b) rural reconstruction centres, state farms, and production units in schools and colleges; c) village regrouping; d) promotion of small scale industries; e) improved

credit, extension services, marketing and distribution to benefit small-scale farmers; and f) rural development through the provision of social services such as electricity, improved water supply, feeder roads, housing, health and educational facilities.

Fourth National Development Plan (NDP4) 1988-1993 (GRZ, 1988) has set goals in the agricultural sector which are; a) to increase production and productivity; b) to streamline the marketing of both products and inputs; and c) to contribute towards the improvement of living conditions of the rural population.

Given these objectives, the government has had to follow certain strategies and policies to achieve them. Wood and Shula (1987) argue that the main guiding principles for the formulation of policy were threefold. The first principle has been the removal of the discriminatory policies practised during the colonial period leading to more Africans becoming commercial farmers. Second, it was recognised that such policies would inevitably produce some individualistic and capitalist farmers. This principle was in keeping with the thinking of some policy and decision makers whose perception of development was based more on economic rather than social ideals. The third principle reflected the views of policy and decision makers whose perception of development leaned more towards social and equity considerations; it emphasized rural development. Their policies focussed on the provision of social services such as electricity, improved water supply and better health and educational facilities in rural areas.

Inevitably, as time has progressed, Zambia has experienced new challenges which could not be solved with the old strategies and policies, and so its strategies and policies have had to be revised to face new specific challenges. For instance, its deteriorating economy during the mid 1970s and 1980s has meant that it cannot afford to subsidise the urban consumers as much as it did during the late 1960s and early 1970s.

To encourage participation of peasants in agricultural production, the government introduced production cooperatives. At the same time, the government established state

farms. The cooperative programme provided capital to any group of people who decided to farm cooperatively. Such an approach to farming was seen as being in line with Zambia's philosophy of humanism. It also offered a way of utilising available capital effectively since more people benefitted than would be the case if the capital was dissipated across the country to individuals. Cooperatives also attracted foreign assistance from various donors, although there was an increasing shift by the government and donors from production to marketing cooperatives. Most foreign assistance for cooperatives has come from the Netherlands, and Scandinavian countries.

Zambia's independence and some of its agricultural policies created uncertainty among white settlers, prompting some to leave the country. To fill the gap left by those deciding to leave the country, the government set up parastatals such as the Rural Development Corporation (RDC) and the Cattle Development Corporation (CDC). In addition to parastatals and state farms, some vacated empty farms, or in some cases newly created farms, were occupied by the newly created Zambia National Service which was established for school leavers who completed Form 5 but were unable to be accepted at a university or college. It also established the Rural Reconstruction Centres which were mainly for school dropouts, that is those who could not find places in Grade 8.

### 3.2.2 Marketing

After independence, the Zambian government sought to continue, and in certain instances expanded its control on marketing, crop pricing and retail pricing of agricultural products and inputs (Lombard and Tweedie, 1972). To this effect, the government established Namboard for grain marketing and input distribution and Zamhort for fruit and vegetable marketing. As well, the Tobacco Board of Zambia was set up to look after the interests of the tobacco farming community and to encourage more farmers to adopt tobacco farming. The government also encouraged farmers to produce new crops for either

the home market or the export market. One crop heavily promoted by government was cotton, which was to be grown by both large-scale and small-scale farmers. A marketing board called Lintco was established to exclusively support cotton production through pricing, extension services and marketing. Despite such support for new crops, maize continued to be the major crop. The introduction of hybrid varieties of maize has been particularly significant as a means by which peasant farmers could move up the ladder to becoming commercial farmers. This was not without cost to the government, however, as maize production has involved major subsidies and has resulted in the neglect of many other important staples.

Since it was anticipated that more Zambians would take up commercial farming as a source of livelihood, irrespective of their location in the country, the government established a uniform pricing policy for the whole country. This policy differed therefore from that of the MCB which had favoured farmers located in Southern, Central and parts of Eastern Provinces. Namboard's mandate was to buy grain from farmers and to distribute inputs such as seeds and fertilizers throughout the country. All farmers were guaranteed a market for their produce. Collection points were set up which also acted as input distribution centres. The programme involved major infrastructural investments in the form of storage facilities, feeder roads, trucks, and trained manpower. The guaranteed market for produce and the distribution of inputs to farmers, irrespective of their spatial location in the country, required major increases in government subsidies to the agricultural sector.

With regard to extension services, the government had to increase its investments to be able to cover the whole country. Improved extension services were seen as the vehicle for disseminating new technology and new farming techniques to farmers. This involved the construction of farm training centres and colleges. Subsidised mechanised units were also created facilitating farmers to hire tractors for cultivating their fields. Also, for the first time, farmers had access to credit through the creation of the Credit Organisation of

Zambia, a bank established specifically to provide small-scale credit to farmers at liberal terms and conditions (Lombard and Tweedie, 1972). Since independence, therefore, various marketing, pricing, extension and credit policies have been used by government to encourage more agricultural production in the country. One is bound to ask therefore, what has been achieved with all these policies in place? This question will be addressed in the following section.

### 3.2.3 Problems of Implementation

The collapse of world copper prices in the mid-1970s demonstrated the fragile nature of the mining industry. However, even without the collapse of copper price, experts agree that the development strategies espoused in the National Development Plans would not have succeeded in reducing rural-urban disparities. Ollawa (1978: 107) argues that the Zambian economy ". . . lacks the dynamic capacity to link up development in the modern sector with rural transformation." Because economic activities, including infrastructural development, have been overwhelmingly skewed to the maintenance and growth of the copper industry, agriculture which continues to be the mainstay of the majority of the population, has been relatively neglected. For example, investments in agriculture during the Second National Development Plan (NDP2) 1972-1976 (GRZ, 1971) were less than 5.5 per cent of total government expenditures. Real government expenditures in agriculture have also been falling since 1969.

In addition, there is also a new trend in the composition of investments in the agricultural sector which has become increasingly apparent in the 1980s, namely, the over-reliance in the budget on foreign assistance. There are usually two components to the estimates made for projects to be undertaken in each development plan. The first component is made up of the contribution of the Zambian government, while the second component is made up of the anticipated contributions from foreign donors (GRZ, 1988).



An important observation since the mid 1980s, is that the foreign component in the MAWD budget is higher than the local component. Most often, the foreign component goes to support those projects favoured by donors, a practice which at times leads to neglect of some vital areas within MAWD. This lack of local agricultural investment has eroded the infrastructural system so that it is now inadequate to support even present agricultural production, not to mention an increase. For example, roads in most rural areas are in such bad shape that companies in the trucking industry do not want to risk taking their trucks to such areas for fear of ruining their trucks. In addition, agricultural marketing and the distribution of inputs by government supported parastatal corporations is inefficient and highly mismanaged (World Bank, 1984; 1986b).<sup>2</sup> The inefficiencies of Zambia's agricultural system impact most seriously on the small-scale farmers scattered in remote areas and thus more difficult to reach by agricultural extension services and marketing boards.

The limited expenditures made in the agricultural sector continue to favour large-scale farmers (Ollawa, 1978; Wood and Shula, 1987). There is little consideration by government of the structure of Zambian agriculture and the subsequent categorisation of farmers into commercial, emergent and subsistence farmers when policies are designed. Taking these structures into account is necessary because different category of farmers have different production costs and consequently different needs in their farming practices. Farmers in the subsistence category usually cultivate less than one hectare using tools and methods that have undergone very little change for generations. Most of what they grow is for their own consumption, with only occasional surplus for sale. Depending on their

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<sup>2</sup> There is a lot of post harvest losses in the country. It is estimated that up to 30 per cent of Zambia's maize production is wasted in fields and poorly protected storage depots as a result of administrative inefficiency, a shortage of bags, tarpauline coverings and trucks and tyres (Africa Report, Jan.-Feb. 1989, Vol. 34, p. 12) According to Good, (1986), the 1985 marketing season was a particularly shocking example of mismanagement because by October, about five months after the harvest and just before the beginning of the rainy season, only 5 million bags had been collected and properly stored, while about 2.5 million bags had not been placed in proper storage.

geographical location in the country, they grow maize, cassava or millet; with beans, groundnuts and other vegetables.

At the other end of the continuum is a small but highly mechanised group of commercial farmers who grow about 40 per cent of the country's maize and about 55 per cent of other marketed agricultural products. In between these two extremes are the market oriented emergent farmers who cultivate an average of three hectares, mainly using hand tools and family labour, but may also employ oxen or hired tractors, and applying modest amounts of purchased inputs such as fertilizers. Their main crop is maize, although new crops such as cotton and sunflower are also grown. The lowest production costs are incurred by subsistence farmers, with the recently mechanised small- and medium-scale African farmers incurring the highest costs (Wood and Shula, 1987). In the middle of the spectrum are the commercial farmers who already have major investments in all the necessary production inputs. The policy makers, however, rarely appear to take these important facts into consideration when developing pricing policies or when designing extension services.

Although Zambia's humanist philosophy sought to reduce rural-urban disparities, this goal has not been achieved due to a lack of commitment among some leaders and some of the urban-based bureaucracy. Scarritt (1979) contends that from the time of independence, prestige has been an important consideration and is reflected in elite values and norms. The large gap between the rich, who were mainly urban-based, and the poor, who were mainly rural-based, was to be narrowed by bringing up the poor, not by equalizing across the board. Despite the introduction of the leadership code in 1972, which restricted the nation's leaders from using their positions to amass personal fortunes, Ollawa (1978: 120) points to the ". . . ruling class ambivalence towards the value system inherent in the official ideology of humanism." Richards (1981: 146) has also identified the ". . . unwillingness on the part of its (*the ruling party*) members to reject genuinely elitist

values." Since improving standards of living among rural population means eroding some of the privileged position of the elite. The preference of the elite is as Richards (1981) suggests, to create a rural gentry with interests similar to its own.

Current agricultural policies strongly reflect the interests of this elite rather than of the majority of peasant farmers. The nation-wide emphasis on maize as the staple food crop and the support for large state farms are cases in point. Enormous subsidies are needed to keep down the prices of mealie meal in urban areas. Subsidies have encouraged maize production and consumption in such provinces as Northern, North Western and Luapula where comparative advantage would favour other crops. Indeed, some farmers have pointed out that if appropriate services were available, farmers in these areas would focus on commercial production of millet, sorghum and cassava, which involve less risk and produce more profit than maize. However, to provide such production facilities would require that resources be diverted from maize production, with possible implications for the security and cost of the urban food supply. It is not surprising therefore, that the controlling elite does not encourage such a change.

It is not only a question of policy makers' commitment to reducing rural-urban disparities, but there are also conflicts in their perception of the problem and how best to go about solving it. Elliot (1983) identifies two distinct ideological camps each with quite different approaches to the question of how to promote rural development. The first advocates a technocratic view of rural development, emphasising maximisation of agricultural output and ensuring the efficient use of scarce resources, particularly government resources. Dominated by variants of neoclassical economics, this approach is concerned with ensuring that agriculture fulfils certain structural roles within a national strategy of general economic development.

The second camp is more concerned with the ideological issues surrounding the political economy of agriculture and how it relates to the philosophy of humanism. This

group has difficulty comprehending why a relatively small group of commercial farmers has come to dominate agricultural institutions and policies designed to serve the entire farming community. It wishes to avoid the exclusion of peasant farmers from the process of growth and development. These contrasting views on how to solve the rural-urban disparity problem are reflected in the diverse, and sometimes ambivalent policies adopted by the Zambian government since it attained independence.

During the First National Development Plan (NDP1) 1966-1971 (GRZ, 1966), the focus was on economies of scale through production cooperatives. This policy was in line with the philosophy of humanism but, as Smith (1984: 2-51) suggests, was unwillingly accepted by the party leadership to please President Kaunda. Quick (1978) and Smith (1984) suggest that the subsequent abdication of responsibility by policy makers may have encouraged the failure of the cooperative movement. With the failure of the cooperatives during the NDP1, the Second National Development Plan shifted the emphasis to individual family farms. The decline in maize production to below levels of self-sufficiency levels in the late 1970s resulted in a rethinking of such policies resulting in the Third National Development Plan calling for the establishment of state farms and turning away from the concept of individual small-scale farmers.

Such conflicts in policy and strategies through time have also been felt at the level of programme implementation. Most times, official policy may encourage a particular approach, but a commitment of funding is not necessarily made. This has led Elliot (1983: 169) to comment that ". . . the way in which the various agencies of rural development have coped with the confusion has made at least some elements of the rural poor more, rather than less, vulnerable to the fundamental pressures to which they are subject." This can be seen in the generally inadequate government support services such as poor crop and input collection and distribution records, inadequate storage facilities and weak extension services, all of which do not contribute to improved farming. It is apparent that there is a

general lack of commitment by government about the small-scale farmers' ability to produce a substantial amount of the country's maize requirements. This is despite the fact that the majority of this requirement is currently produced by what Good (1986: 284) calls the poor and middle peasantry. There is a similar lack of commitment in the attitudes of the leadership towards the goal of decentralisation. Ollawa (1978: 119) summarises these attitudes as follows:

"despite their public profession to mass participation most party functionaries and bureaucratic officials at the provincial and district levels have often viewed the whole question of transferring power to the masses with serious misgivings. There are those who see increased mass participation as an attempt to erode their decision making power and by extension their social status at the local level. There are others who feel that the masses are not sufficiently informed about the issues in question to make the necessary decisions."

It is therefore not surprising that Richards (1981) comments that they (the leadership) have so little commitment to the principle of decentralisation that more often than not, they by-pass already established local level development structures to pursue their own interests. Ollawa (1978: 121) is even more blunt pointing out that participatory democracy for the party is ". . . not in terms of shared influence the masses can wield in determining policy formulation on rural development, but is measured by the extent to which the regime members can mobilise the masses in support of party/government policies and development objectives." It can therefore be said that decentralisation has been used as a guise for co-opting the rural population to pursue the desires of the leadership rather than to encourage them to shape their own destiny.

It has already been discussed above how, following independence in 1964, Zambia's agricultural development was based upon policies and measures which applied across the nation and with a long term cumulative and evolutionary approach. This may be termed as the "programme approach." Substantial resources were directed into agricultural development and included policies such as the expansion of the crop collection and

agricultural extension networks and the encouragement of market oriented agriculture through fertilizer subsidies. One other central thrust was the introduction of IRDPs across the country.

Integrated Rural Development Programmes combine agricultural components with wide ranging developments in the social sector. While the main goal of the IRDPs was to increase agricultural productivity, many of them also incorporated other components such as feeder-road construction, health, education, women in development issues, ranching and well sinking. These development initiatives were institutionalised within MAWD, confirming the expectation of their long-term contribution to the country's agricultural development. With this rather critical background on the agricultural sector, the following section will look at foreign assistance to Zambia's agricultural sector, how it has become increasingly important to the agricultural budget, and some of the problems experienced by both the donors and the recipient.

### 3.3 THE CHANGING NATURE OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

The deteriorating economic situation of the 1970s and 1980s, and the intensification of liberation wars in Rhodesia, Mozambique and Angola, during the 1970s, made Zambia increasingly in need of aid. Much of the growing foreign assistance was directed towards the agricultural sector, which increased its share of all foreign assistance from 15 per cent in 1974 to 35 per cent by 1979. Sectors of the economy into which foreign assistance was directed changed in relative importance during the 1970s and continued changing during the 1980s. For example, in the early 1970s, education was the most important sector, attracting about 40 per cent of all technical assistance and 20 per cent of all capital aid. By the 1980s, technical assistance to education had declined to an average of 20 per cent per

year. Transport and communications also attracted considerable support as a consequence of the country's attempt to reduce dependence upon the southern rail route through Rhodesia.

During the latter part of the 1970s, agriculture became the leading sector in both technical and capital assistance, a position it continues to hold today. By 1987, agriculture received the largest share of all technical assistance representing a continuous commitment by donors to this vital sector of the economy. The share of technical assistance to agriculture was 33.8 per cent compared with 39 per cent the previous year, still representing an increase from US\$47.0 million to US\$65.6 million (UNDP, 1988).

This redirection of foreign assistance into the agricultural sector was a result of a number of developments. In part, it reflected lessening needs in education and transportation sectors since a good number of schools had been built, many roads had been tarred, and a major railway and pipeline had been constructed connecting Zambia to the Indian Ocean through Tanzania. However, the growth of assistance to the agricultural sector has been primarily due to major increases in donor expenditure in this sector rather than because they were withdrawing from other sectors. This increase in development assistance is due to the recognition by both donors and the Zambian government of the importance of agricultural development to the country's overall economic development. There were three basic reasons for this.

First, by the mid 1970s, it had become clear that poor performance of the agricultural sector was contributing to Zambia's difficult foreign exchange situation. Agriculture had failed to meet the growing local demand for food, leading to more food imports which, by 1980, had grown to over three times the level at independence (GRZ, 1982). By the mid 1980s, food imports were becoming intermittent and threatening the country's political stability. Food commodity aid in the short term, and technical and

capital assistance for agricultural projects and programmes in the long term were, therefore, seen as necessary to ensure Zambia's stability during the food shortages of the 1980s.

Second, agriculture was also identified as worthy of assistance because it was seen to be the only sector of the Zambian economy with favourable prospects for generating growth. With a bleak outlook during much of the 1980s for minerals in general, and copper in particular, it was clear that other productive sectors of the economy needed to be stimulated to provide employment, foreign exchange, and government revenue. Industrial prospects were limited because of that sector's dependency on imported raw materials and machinery both of which required foreign exchange expenditures. Thus, with the country's extensive areas of unused and underused arable land, a relatively reliable and moderate climate suitable for growing a variety of crops, and with increasing food shortages both in Zambia and in some neighbouring countries, agriculture was seen as the one sector of the economy most capable of expanding.

Third, was the government's desire to reduce rural-urban income inequalities. Considerable income and welfare variations exist in the country, particularly between rural and urban areas (GRZ, 1979; ILO, 1981). Although government policy statements since independence have repeatedly stressed the need to reduce inequality, rural-urban income differentials in 1986 had grown to more than twice the level existing in 1980 (GRZ, 1987; Young, 1988). As this inequality increased, donors have recognised that there is a large proportion of Zambia's population, especially in the peripheral provinces, who remain poor and in need of assistance.

Because of the country's poor economic situation and the resultant decrease in funding for agricultural development, there was an increase in foreign assistance to agriculture which led to changes in the nature and character of development initiatives and approaches in this sector. While established government programmes became less active and quite ineffective, donor funded projects grew both in number and importance from



only four in 1975 to 130 operational and planned projects by 1988 (MAWD, 1989). Wood, (1984) notes that donor funding grew from around 20 per cent of the budget of Ministry responsible for agriculture and rural development in 1975 to well over half its budget by 1985.<sup>3</sup>

Of equal, if not greater importance was the change in the nature and character of development approaches from long term programmes by government, to what can be termed as projectisation. Projectisation has involved supporting short term, area and problem specific projects by donors. There has also been a change from programmes established and integrated within the Ministry responsible for agriculture, to temporary projects, which are generally short lived accretions on the peripheries of the Ministry.

This project approach has become the dominant way of utilising foreign assistance funds by many donors because it offers advantages not only to donors, but also to the Zambian government.

### 3.3.1 The Benefits of Projectisation to Donors

It is generally acknowledged that the provision of foreign assistance by donor countries is due to their explicit and implicit interests in recipient countries. Such interests could be economic, political, or indeed humanitarian. As well, foreign assistance has become a major foreign policy issue for the donors and so the projects must also be seen as providing the appropriate political impact in the recipient country. One of the main administrative consideration for donors is to ensure that allocated aid funds are spent within a specified period, often one financial year. This way, a donor country can prove to its

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<sup>3</sup> The ministry responsible for agriculture has changed during the period under study. From the late 1960s to 1977, it was known as the Ministry of Rural Development. In 1978, it became the Ministry of Lands and Agriculture, until 1979 when it became known as the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development (MAWD). During a Press Conference held at State House in November, 1988, it was again changed to be known as the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MACO). However, the major part of this study was done during the period when the ministry was known as MAWD and so this is the name that is mostly used throughout this thesis.

government and electorate that through its foreign assistance budget, it is providing support, in a consistent pattern, for an underdeveloped country. Consequently, donors feel a need to have control over how their foreign assistance is spent, so that expenditure can quickly be matched to the supply of money resulting from political decisions in the donor country. An administrative approach of this nature also makes it easy for projects to be increased or reduced in number and size almost independently by the donor depending on the flow of aid funds.

Projects administered independently from those undertaken by recipient governments are preferred by many donors since they can be designed, implemented and evaluated in accordance with the donor's requirements concerning the type of development they wish to promote. Integrating the administration of foreign assistance within an established recipient government's structure may not meet the desires of the donor.

The impact of foreign assistance is also more easily measured and justified to the donor country electorate if it is channelled through new, rather than old and established programmes. The need for donor identity, and the visibility of foreign assistance which projects provide, also have political advantages in both the recipient country and with the donor's electorate. Because foreign assistance is also intended to foster political interests, it is important that it be clearly visible, thereby allowing the donor government to reap credit at home, in the recipient country, and within the international community.

### 3.3.2 The Benefits of Projectisation to Zambia

The project approach adopted by most donors has also proved attractive in certain respects to the Zambian government. However, this does not imply that there have not been certain costs to the government. In the first instance, the extent to which foreign assistance would become a major and long term feature in the agricultural sector was doubted by many agricultural planners, and the danger of becoming dependent upon

fluctuating foreign assistance funds is recognised. Consequently, government desired that long term national programmes did not become dependent upon foreign assistance funds and subject to the unpredictable behaviour of the donors. As well, given donor demands for accountability of aid funds, separate projects offered the easiest way of achieving this with minimum strain on the Zambian government's bureaucracy

Furthermore, it appears to some extent that the Zambian government was not greatly concerned about details of foreign assistance spending given the deteriorating economic situation of the country, especially since the late 1970s. Foreign assistance brought in much needed foreign exchange and provided a surge of activity in the otherwise neglected rural areas. It was seen, therefore, as advantageous from both an economic and political perspective. The form in which foreign assistance was provided, the way project cycle was performed, the policies followed by various donors, and the wider implications of donor activities were rarely given much attention when agreements were signed. As a matter of fact, it would seem as if the recipient ministries concerned with aid funds do not support research being conducted in this field.

#### 3.4 PROBLEMS OF MONITORING AND EVALUATING DONOR PROJECTS IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR

The proliferation of projects within MAWD has created a major strain on the ministry's monitoring and evaluation capacity. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, and before the reorganisation of the Planning Division in MAWD, this problem was particularly severe, but it still exists today. The problem stems partly from the range of goals and emphases in donor projects which makes evaluations by a MAWD team using standardised procedures difficult. Difficulties also occur because of a lack of qualified manpower for evaluation teams. Projects can rarely be evaluated on an annual basis, and a three year or

end-of-project evaluation cycle is common. Donors, who normally require annual reviews of their aid projects, have assisted in the process of monitoring and evaluation mission. However, even this creates pressures on MAWD to release staff and may disrupt on-going ministerial work. One clear result of the donors' demand for project monitoring and evaluation is that little MAWD staff time has been available in recent years for the monitoring and evaluation of its own programmes and policies in the agricultural sector.

External contributions to project evaluation in Zambia raise a number of questions. In the first instance, the timing of such evaluations is generally determined by donors with reference to their budget cycles and the availability of specialist staff from the donor country. Second, where joint evaluation missions (donor and Zambian) are used, there is a tendency for donor personnel to become more influential and dominant than the local personnel. Third, most terms of reference used in project evaluations have little relevance to the Zambian situation. For example, one measure often used as an indication of the success of an aid project is the rate at which the project funds are being disbursed and the project schedule implemented. If spending is on schedule then the project is successful since aid is being provided as planned and the political role of aid is being achieved. This approach becomes inappropriate when, despite timely disbursement of funds, the performance of the project is still poor.

Finally, it might be questioned whether project evaluations are too narrow in their terms of reference. They focus upon the project and its internal operations with little or no reference to the broader framework within which the project exists. The links which a project has with other activities in MAWD should be included in such evaluations. These may include local funding and personnel implications of a project upon other MAWD activities and the pressure upon MAWD administration, policy coordination and evolution which the project creates. In particular, the ability of the project to be sustained by MAWD after the donor hands it over need to be addressed.

### 3.5 SUMMARY

This chapter has attempted to show how the African society of Northern Rhodesia which had little, if any previous requirement for money, was deliberately introduced to a taxation system to create a need for cash. This new requirement for cash was met either by cash cropping or selling labour. It has also discussed a type of land tenure system and a whole range of agricultural institutions which deliberately discriminated against the local population favouring white settlers to produce the main crop of the time, maize. The local population had to continue with subsistence agricultural activities in order to feed their families with very little assistance given to them and hence their farming techniques evolved less quickly than those of the white settlers. Consequently, there was an ever increasing disparity between the two farming systems.

With the coming of independence in Zambia, and despite the professed goals of the ruling United National Independence Party to reduce the rural-urban income differentials and a whole range of inequalities, the strategies adopted failed to bring any major improvements in the living conditions of the rural population. The reasons for these failures include a lack of commitment to rural development by the leadership, wrongly conceived policies made without a clear understanding of the problems they were set to solve and a steady decline in the Zambian economy that made it difficult to make meaningful investments in the agricultural sector.

It has also been shown how numerous obstacles stand in the way of successful aid utilisation by MAWD. A variety of problems arise from the way projects are designed, implemented, and evaluated by the donors. These can include elitist project identification criteria, over ambitious targets, problematic conditionalities especially to do with funding, management and administration practices which rarely include Zambians.

## CHAPTER FOUR

## CANADIAN BILATERAL ASSISTANCE TO ZAMBIA

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Some of the reasons for Canada providing development assistance to Zambia, which began in the early 1960s, were discussed in the introductory chapter. Following Zambia's independence from Britain in the mid 1960s, and immediately after Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI),<sup>1</sup> Canada provided Zambia with emergency assistance to help it overcome the consequences of UDI, such as when its border with Rhodesia was closed in 1972 (Pettman, 1974; CIDA, 1976; Export Development Corporation 1970-1980). Motivated by different factors, Canada has continued to offer various forms of assistance to Zambia throughout the 1980s (CIDA, 1975-1987; UNDP, 1978a-1987a).

In tracing the beginning and the subsequent nature of Canada's development assistance to Zambia, it will be argued here that there is a close relationship between Zambia's geopolitical position in the Southern African region, its dependency on its neighbours to the south, and the assistance provided to Zambia by major Western countries, including Canada. Understanding the nature of Zambia's dependence on its southern neighbours, its struggle to become independent of some of these southern neighbours, and the reality of the political situation in the region, especially during the

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<sup>1</sup> The political status of Rhodesia prior to its Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on November 11th, 1965 was in principle, that of a British colony. The first colonial government in the area was provided by Cecil Rhodes' British South Africa Company under a Royal Charter in 1889. Various agreements and referendums with regard to the legal and factual situations of Rhodesia were reached from that period to the early 1960s. Thus, Rhodesia broke one of these agreements when it rebelled against Britain. The rebellion lasted from November, 1965 to December, 1979. For a fuller understanding of UDI and/or UDI and its impact on Zambia see: Good, (1973); Pettman, (1974); Strack, (1978); Anglin and Shaw, (1979).

1960s and 1970s, is necessary to analyse international reaction to the situation that Zambia found itself in.

Increasingly, the flow of assistance from the West to black Southern African countries must be seen primarily as a result of political conditions in this region, particularly during the 1960s and 1970s, and continuing into the 1980s. With the intensification of liberation wars in the early 1970s in the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, and in the late 1970s for the independence of Rhodesia, both Western and Eastern bloc countries competed for influence in the region. The liberation wars by the blacks, and the accompanying competition for influence by the West and East in the region resulted in Soviet and Cuban involvement in the Angolan civil war and in the establishment of socialist governments in both Angola and Mozambique. With these developments, Western policy towards the region changed drastically. To counter this growing Eastern bloc influence, Canada and other Western countries lent support to what they considered as Zambia's moderate stand among the Front Line States on Southern African politics. In so doing, they maintained an influence in the region.

Because public opinion in Canada was against direct military assistance to black Southern African countries, development assistance was the only alternative measure available to gain support and influence in black Southern Africa (Smith and Wood, 1984). There is evidence, however, that many NATO countries, including Canada, offered various forms of military aid to white Southern African states. For example, although Canada placed an embargo on the sale of military equipment to Portugal and South Africa in 1963, it continued selling spare parts to South Africa to service its military equipment until 1970.<sup>2</sup> It also continued as an ally of Portugal, through its membership in NATO, throughout Portugal's fight against the liberation movements in Angola and Mozambique. Canada also

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<sup>2</sup> At one time in the late 1960s, Canada decided that it would no longer give military assistance to any country that was not a member of the Western military alliance, NATO. This decision was, however rescinded in 1970. These comments were made by Respondent # 21.


actively promoted commercial relations with South Africa and Rhodesia through a system of Commonwealth preferences for South African produced goods, even after South Africa ceased being a member of the Commonwealth in 1961. In addition, Canada maintained commercial relations with South Africa where it had its largest trade office in Africa. While Western countries maintained all these commercial and military contacts with white Southern Africa, there were no meaningful contacts with black Southern Africa in the region.

With such disinterest in most of black Southern Africa among Western countries, and with the changing political climate, such as the establishment of socialist governments in Angola and Mozambique, Western governments wanted to increase their economic and political influence in the region. Moreover, besides the favourable political climate that the provision of aid would create, Canada stood to benefit commercially by tying regulations of its foreign assistance (OECD, 1985). It also stood to improve its international standing.

Zambia shares boundaries with eight countries; Zaire and Tanzania in the north and northeast respectively, Angola on the west, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia on the southern and south west respectively, and Malawi and Mozambique on its eastern border (Figure 4.1). Such a number of neighbours, combined with its Front Line location in the liberation struggle against the minority regimes in Southern Africa, emphasises the country's delicate geopolitical position. Compared to other Front Line States in the region, Zambia has been in an especially exposed position because four of its neighbours were waging liberation wars during the 1960s and 1970s (Figure 4.1). The social and economic pressures placed by these wars upon Zambia eased somewhat after independence in Angola and Mozambique in 1975, and even more so after Zimbabwe became independent in 1980. Zambia and Zimbabwe share close colonial linkages, such as language, energy supplies and communication networks.



Figure 4.1  
Zambia and her Neighbours



Zambia's shortest route to the sea for its imports and exports runs through Zimbabwe to the Mozambiquan port of Beira. Another route runs to the South African ports of Durban and Cape Town (Figure 4.2). Due to Zambia's geopolitical position, these southern routes have not always been open. For example, following Rhodesian UDI in 1965, the southern routes were closed to Zambian traffic. One of the alternative routes was the Benguela Railway running to the Angolan port of Lobito. However, this too was closed by the civil war that erupted after that country's independence in 1975. Thus, Zambia had to search for, and develop new routes for its imports and exports, namely, the Tanzania Zambia Pipelines (TAZAMA) and Tanzania Zambia Railway (TAZARA). As well, the previously unpaved Great North Road was surfaced to accommodate the increased traffic. All of these routes connected Zambia to the east African port of Dar es Salaam. However, the port of Dar es Salaam was already congested and so the increased cargo created by Zambia's needs resulted in further congestion.

This chapter will begin with an analysis of the nature and structure of Zambia's dependence on its southern neighbours from the 1950s to the time of its independence in 1964, including the common services that were created during the period of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which lasted from 1953 to 1963. The physical location of these services and the relative power that Zambia had in running them will also be addressed. The subsequent sections will discuss the implications that such dependence has had on Zambia, firstly, during the period of Rhodesia's UDI which lasted from November 1965 to December 1979,<sup>3</sup> and second, during the liberation struggles in Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia. In each case, these implications have been placed in the

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<sup>3</sup> Discussions concerning the economic implications of UDI to Zambia, as well as its efforts to meet these contingencies can be found in, Hall, (1969); Sklar, (1968); For a good analysis of the economic interrelationships that existed between Zambia and Rhodesia, see Williams, (1960).

context of international and Zambian reaction to its geopolitical position within Southern Africa.

#### 4.2 ZAMBIA'S DEPENDENCY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Zambia's economy was deeply integrated into Rhodesia's economy both before and during the ten-year Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. During the Federation and that of British rule, binding ties between Zambia and other countries in Southern Africa were created which resulted in a structure of dependence that had many consequences for the new government and its commitment to development. Zambia's transport and supply system became centred on Rhodesia. There was also an increasing reliance on South Africa and the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique for transport routes and harbours for its imports and exports (see Figure 4.2).

The development of railways in Southern Africa was almost entirely dependent upon commercial considerations especially during the late 1800s, when mineral reserves were being developed. As mineral reserves were discovered in the interior, railways were constructed connecting them to the coast. Commercial motivations were supplemented with political considerations which came to determine the routes to be followed and the sequence in which these railways were constructed.

In 1897, the railway reached Bulawayo in Rhodesia and Salisbury (Harare) was reached in 1899. The first railway crossed Victoria Falls into Zambia in 1905, and connected the Broken Hill (Kabwe) lead mine to the emergent railway network in 1906. In 1931, the Benguela railway connected the port of Lobito to Katanga in Zaire and to the Zambian Copperbelt.

Figure 4.2

Zambia's International Transportation Network; 1970s





Figure 4.3  
Zambia's International Transportation Network; 1980s



Some experts estimate that almost 60 per cent of Zambia's imports originated from Rhodesia and South Africa (Pettman, 1974; Strack, 1978; Anglin and Shaw, 1979) because other than copper mining, Zambia did not have any other major industry (Freeman, 1978). Most of Zambia's requirements were therefore met by imports. Processing of Zambian copper depended on coal and coke from Wankie and later, upon electricity from the southern bank of Kariba Hydro Electric Station (which was located on the Rhodesian side of the dam), while its exports to international markets depended upon Rhodesian Railways (Pettman, 1974; Strack, 1978). As well, almost all oil and petrol requirements came from a refinery in Rhodesia. Under the Federation, Zambia did not have any department of commerce and industry, in fact, the headquarters and the real power of operating most commonly held services, such as the railways, airways and energy supply companies were all in Rhodesia. This dependency, exacerbated by its landlocked position, made Zambia very vulnerable following UDI, a condition which also made it difficult and costly to effectively implement UN sponsored sanctions against Rhodesia (Good, 1973).

Rhodesia on the other hand, being in a much more favourable position, took full advantage of Zambia's apparent vulnerability. Consequently, following UDI, Rhodesia undertook certain punitive actions against Zambia which included cutting oil and petrol supplies, increasing the prices of its coal and coke, and requiring that the use of its railway by Zambia be paid for in convertible currency (Pettman, 1974). Because of these actions, Zambia was required to seek international support to disengage itself from Rhodesia and to survive the consequences of UDI. In addition, Zambia had to develop other sources of energy and to search for alternatives to all services that were previously provided by Rhodesia. Because of the nature and structure of Zambia's dependency, disengaging itself from its neighbours was an extremely difficult undertaking.

When Rhodesia cut oil and petrol supplies to Zambia, Canada, Britain and the USA provided emergency assistance as part of an international effort to help Zambia overcome

the consequences of Rhodesia's actions. This assistance took the form of air lifting oil from Dar es Salaam to Lusaka by Canadian and British transport planes. American planes had to fly fuel to Elizabethville (Lubumbashi) in Zaire, about 96 km. from Zambia's Copperbelt, because Zambian airports could not accommodate the large American planes (Good, 1973; Pettman, 1974: 116-118). From there, the fuel was ferried by road and railway to Zambia. Canada also provided Zambia with a grant to buy fuel storage tanks in an effort to avoid any serious fuel shortages. Canada withdrew from the emergency airlifting exercise in mid 1966 after alternative and less expensive arrangements to bring oil into the country were made. The airlift was undertaken at a time when most world leaders under-estimated Rhodesia, believing that the rebellion would be short-lived, and that the airlift would therefore, only be needed for about two months. Instead, the rebellion dragged on and countries such as Canada had to extend the airlifts for another three months at a total cost of \$1.5 million.

Canada also provided air traffic controllers as part of technical assistance to run the newly built Lusaka International Airport, and to train Zambian counterparts. As well, Canada took part in the 1965 British - Canada feasibility study of a railway to the eastern port of Dar es Salaam. However, this study did not result in the construction or financing of the project by any Western government (Pettman, 1974). The Chinese were later to finance and construct this line, much to the disappointment of many Western countries.

The success of Canada's efforts in assisting Zambia find alternative routes for its imports and exports is, however, doubted by some experts (Good, 1973; Freeman, 1978), as this will be seen when Canada's aid to Zambia's transport sector is analysed later in the chapter. Nevertheless, by providing Zambia with various forms of emergency assistance at a crucial time, Canada, Britain and the USA benefitted politically and internationally by keeping the Eastern bloc countries out of the Southern African region, at least for that period.

Some scholars have argued that Canada's assistance to countries directly affected by UDI, and its initiatives within the Commonwealth, were useful in diffusing the Rhodesian crisis, but that these actions were not decisive enough to resolve the Rhodesian problem (Good, 1973; Pettman, 1974; Anglin and Shaw, 1979). Canada, for example, supported Britain for not intervening militarily against the rebel government. At the same time, Canada and other Western governments with common membership in NATO did nothing to stop sanctions-busting by Portugal (also a member of NATO) or by South Africa (Good, 1973).

British failure to resolve the problem quickly, and the failure by the international community to monitor sanctions, meant that the Rhodesian rebellion lasted longer and became increasingly costly to Zambia. The costs to Zambia of implementing sanctions were enormous. By the end of 1968, the total net costs of sanctions to Zambia were estimated at approximately \$214 million (Sklar, 1968). British assistance to Zambia to help offset these costs was not only short term, but also inadequate despite the fact that the problem was one requiring long term solutions (Hall, 1969). The need for the development of alternative routes for Zambia's imports and exports, for example, was real and urgent. Zambia felt cheated by Britain because while Zambia observed the sanctions against Rhodesia, Britain did not do its part in ensuring that Portugal and South Africa also observed the sanctions (Ostrander, 1967; Good, 1973).

In contrast, Canada gained respect and trust among many African members of the Commonwealth because of its stand during the Rhodesian rebellion. Using the Commonwealth Conferences as its forum, Canada took a stand which on most occasions was in line with the majority of Commonwealth members, even when its position was far removed from that taken by Britain. Canada's Prime Minister during that era was Lester Pearson who put the matter succinctly following the 1964 Commonwealth Conference when he stated that ". . . if we can solve the Rhodesian problem, the Commonwealth will



grow greater still in world importance. If we cannot, then the future of the Commonwealth is dim indeed" (quoted in Good, 1973: 45). When Zambia's President Kaunda threatened to boycott the September 1966 Commonwealth Conference, and went so far as to threaten to pull the country out of the Commonwealth, Prime Minister Pearson sent a message to Kaunda in which he asserted that ". . . the Commonwealth was not a British Club" (Good, 1973: 167) and encouraged Zambia not to withdraw.

During the 1960s, and especially on the question of Rhodesia's UDI, the Commonwealth was basically divided into two camps. The first camp comprised of Britain, the older Commonwealth members of Australia and New Zealand, and also included Malawi and Malta. The second camp comprised mostly of newly independent African and Caribbean countries, India, Malaysia and Cyprus. The latter camp was unofficially referred to as the Afro-Asian-Caribbean lobby on UDI. Canada, tended to take the position of an intermediary between these two camps (Good, 1973).

The two camps had divergent views on how best to resolve the Rhodesian rebellion. The Afro-Asian-Caribbean group, realising the seriousness of the rebellion and what it meant to black Southern African countries, were urging Britain to use force and apply mandatory sanctions to end the rebellion. They obviously under-estimated British and other Western countries' interests in white Southern Africa. Consequently, to preserve these interests, the other camp called for caution when looking for a solution to the rebellion. In this way, they ensured that their interests in Southern Africa were preserved. In January and September 1966, two Commonwealth Conferences were held in Lagos and London, respectively. At both these meetings, the Afro-Asian-Caribbean camp was disappointed by the way in which Britain approached the Rhodesian problem, but Lester Pearson acted as a good mediator between the two opposing groups. At the Lagos conference, the Canadian Prime Minister succeeded in persuading the Afro-Asian-Caribbean camp (which was skeptical about the effectiveness of sanctions without the use

of military force) to put sanctions to test before they could evaluate them (Times of Zambia, April 29th and 30th, 1966). Here, Canada supported British initiatives in the Rhodesian UDI crisis and managed to secure African compliance with sanctions as the most appropriate way to secure an end to the crisis. This meant, therefore, that the use of force, which most Afro-Asian-Caribbean countries were advocating, was abandoned and resulted in the intensification of the liberation war. Lester Pearson's proposals led to the formation of two committees, the most important of which was the sanctions committee which was chaired by the Canadian High Commissioner to Britain. This committee had two mandates. The first was to review all aspects of sanction implementation and how to make them more effective. The second was to coordinate and monitor all foreign aid provided to Zambia in an effort to reduce the effects of UDI and sanctions (Good, 1973).

Eight months after the Lagos conference, at which some sanctions had been applied, the Commonwealth met again, this time in London. Zambia's and Tanzania's presidents did not attend this conference. This was their way of protesting, because they argued, like many other African leaders, that sanctions were not having their intended effect. During this conference, the position taken by the Afro-Asian-Caribbean camp was that Britain would have to persuade Smith (Rhodesia's rebel leader) to negotiate within the terms laid down by Her Majesty's Government. From such negotiations, they expected a deal which would eventually lead to a negotiated settlement on UDI. If negotiations failed, then Britain was to move significantly towards no independence before majority rule (NIBMAR), which had the support of most Commonwealth members, as well as impose stronger UN sponsored sanctions. The Afro-Asian-Caribbean camp's final draft insisted that if Rhodesia and Britain could not negotiate, then either Britain should use force or the UN Security Council should impose comprehensive mandatory sanctions. Their draft also called for a timetable with a deadline for UN sanctions policy to prove effective, a categorical declaration of NIBMAR, and a strong demand for a Rhodesian referendum

based on one man one vote (Miller, 1965; Times of Zambia, March 13, 1968; Good, 1973).

Britain found it extremely difficult to come up with an appropriate draft resolution that would accommodate both its demands and those of the Afro-Asian-Caribbean camp and thereby make it agreeable to both camps. Britain knew the favourable role that Canada would play in this and so the British Prime Minister requested the Canadian Prime Minister to ". . . try his hand at marrying the British and Afro-Asian-Caribbean [demands]" (Good, 1973: 175). Lester Pearson is quoted as saying, ". . . I wasn't sure whether I was being asked to commit polygamy or incest, but whatever it was, I did it" (quoted in Good, 1973: 175). Consequently, using Pearson's draft resolution as a base, a communique agreeable to both camps was written and adopted.

In broad terms, the substance of the Pearson draft was, first, to recognize the majority position, and second, recognize a number of British positions raised during the conference. The final communique therefore had three parts. In the first place, it advocated inter alia the use of force, but that it would only be applied if Britain failed to reach an agreement with rebel Rhodesia through negotiations. No timetable was, however, given for these negotiations. Second, the draft took into account the call by the Afro-Asian-Caribbean camp for NIBMAR. Third, it called for the imposition of comprehensive UN sanctions. The British positions, which were incorporated in the communique, included the basis for a negotiated settlement to be given to the rebel government as an ultimatum, and what Britain would do if Rhodesia did not find them acceptable.

By drafting a communique which was agreeable to both camps, Prime Minister Pearson scored another point making Canada a respectable and trustworthy Western nation in the eyes of the Afro-Asian-Caribbean countries. Since many countries in this camp at this time were threatening to leave the Commonwealth, or alternatively, to "expel" Britain from it, it can be argued that the Commonwealth's survival was attributed to Pearson's skill

in drafting the report and the trust he inspired in many members. One African delegate to the conference said, ". . . we still don't trust Wilson (Britain's Prime Minister at the time) an inch . . . but we trust Pearson to keep him from following his instincts" (quoted in Good 1973: 177).

It is apparent therefore, that the Commonwealth was the first platform at which Canada played its role in resolving the Rhodesian rebellion. It is also through the Commonwealth that Canada provided its first assistance to Zambia. As most African and even non-African Commonwealth members saw British inaction and indecision on the UDI issue, Canada, being close to Britain (through kith and kin), was provided with an opportunity to lead the Commonwealth while still respecting British interests.

The foregoing discussion on Zambia's vulnerability and Canada's inspired respectability and trustworthiness among the Afro-Asian-Caribbean countries, provides the background against which Canadian assistance to Zambia can be analysed. Going beyond the explicit political, philanthropic and commercial motivations which seem to shape the character and nature of all Canadian aid programmes, there are other underlying trends and orientations which have also had an influence on the recipient country's overall development. This section will begin with an analysis of the motivations which led to the establishment and further development of Canada's development programme in Zambia. It will conclude with an assessment of the implications of Canada's contribution to Zambian development in the Southern African regional context.

### 4.3 THE ENTRY OF CANADIAN AID IN ZAMBIA.

Although Zambia presented greater opportunity for Canadian commercial ties in the region, especially in minerals, political factors in Southern Africa have been more important in shaping and sustaining relations between Zambia and Canada. Canada's initial assistance to Zambia was part of an international effort to provide emergency aid in helping it overcome the social and economic pressures of UDI (Table 4.1). Consequently, Canada's earlier assistance to this Southern African country was relatively small. This is understandable since, had it not been for UDI and the subsequent hardships that Zambia was exposed to, assistance would not have been needed at that time. In fact, Zambia was not even classified as a country requiring foreign assistance at that time. Zambia's economy, although mainly dependent on copper, was doing well, and it was one of the richest in Africa south of the Sahara. The relative donor disinterest in Zambia at that time, therefore, made a lot of economic sense. It was only after this favourable economic condition deteriorated,<sup>4</sup> that donor countries, including Canada, started looking at Zambia as a country deserving special assistance. Besides a deteriorating economy particularly in the 1970s, there was also a deteriorating political situation resulting from the regional liberation wars and UDI. The primary motivating factors for Canadian assistance to Zambia were, therefore, political.

In discussing the motivations for Canadian assistance to Zambia, it is argued here that although Canada played an intermediary role, larger Western interests laid the foundation for Canadian activities in the region. In the first place, it is important to understand that Canada often undertakes diplomatic initiatives, as a member of the Commonwealth with close links to Britain, to resolve differences between African

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<sup>4</sup> Zambia's economy and some of its policies have already been discussed in Chapters 1 and 3. See in particular, Chapter 1, pp. 2-15 and Chapter 3, pp. 59-71.

members of the Commonwealth and Britain. Therefore, during the UDI crisis, Canada's desire to maintain close ties with Britain, overrode strong support for African desires, as could be seen from Canada's policies which were usually derivatives of British positions. As well, until the late 1970s, Canada and other Western countries relied exclusively on foreign assistance to black African countries affected by UDI as a way of "controlling" the tempers of these African countries. In addition, public statements which supported the liberation movements in Southern Africa and condemned white minority governments and apartheid were made in both the Commonwealth and United Nations. However, despite these condemnations, the actions and policies of Western countries especially with regard to the promotion of commerce with white Southern Africa was quite the opposite. Underlying concerns remained for investments and profits, for race relations, and even for strategic considerations. It is in this light that one can clearly understand Canada's diplomatic activities in the Commonwealth and its provision of emergency and foreign assistance to Zambia.

Within Canada, political pressure for increased assistance to the newly independent African countries in the Southern African region began to be felt by the late 1960s and the early 1970s (Freeman, 1978). Motivations for this too were political, bent on increasing the strength of black Southern African states relative to that of white Southern Africa. In Canada, pressure was coming from certain lobbying groups, notably the Canadian YWCA, the United Church of Canada, CUSO, and the Committee on a Just Canadian Policy Towards Africa. They encouraged the Canadian government to designate Zambia, together with Botswana and Tanzania, as core countries for Canadian development assistance. These organisations argued that the geopolitical position of these three countries, their new and insecure statehood and the undeveloped government and economic institutions, including their stand against white Southern Africa, needed to be supported by Canada (Freeman, 1978). Partly because of this early lobbying by Canadian groups for Zambia,

Table 4.1  
Flow of Canadian Emergency Assistance to Zambia; 1962-1974 ('000)

Year	Commitments			Disbursements			Annual % of Total Disbursement
	Grants	Loans	Total	Grants	Loans	Total	
1962-63	2.00	-	2.00	2.00	-	2.00	0.02
1963-64	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1964-65	17.00	-	17.00	17.00	-	17.00	0.19
1965-66	608.10	-	608.10	268.00	-	268.00	2.94
1966-67	82.10	-	82.10	422.10	-	422.10	4.63
1967-68	483.30	-	483.30	665.10	-	665.10	7.30
1968-69	397.60	-	397.60	593.50	-	593.50	6.51
1969-70	477.60	-	477.60	409.50	-	409.50	4.50
1970-71	1119.70	2500.00	3619.70	779.20	-	779.20	8.55
1971-72	1227.60	-	1227.60	807.80	700.80	1508.60	16.55
1972-73	1788.50	1000.00	2788.50	1272.60	825.60	2098.20	23.02
1973-74	2500.00	3500.00	6000.00	1575.80	773.90	2349.70	25.78
Totals	8703.50	7000.00	15703.50	6812.60	2300.30	9112.90	99.99

Source: Anglophone Africa Branch, Zambia Desk, various files; November, 1965; April, 1972.

Notes: The difference between committed and disbursed funds is that the former refers only to budgeted funds, while the latter refers to monies that have actually been spent.

1962-1970 period falls during the time referred to as Phase I in Chapter One, pp.1-3. During this period, Zambia's economy was relatively strong and hence did not need foreign assistance in terms of loans. In the early 1970s, the situation changed. This period is referred to in Chapter One pp.3-8 as Phase II during which Zambia started relying more and more on foreign assistance.

Tanzania and Botswana, Tanzania became a core country for Canadian aid in the late 1960s, and Zambia in 1973. Botswana is not designated as a core recipient of Canadian assistance because of its healthy economy.

Canada finally established a resident mission in Lusaka in 1972. Immediately following this, it categorised Zambia as a country of special interest. Before this office was established, all development assistance activities for Zambia were administered from Dar es Salaam. However, the long distance separating these two capital cities made programme administration slow and difficult. In 1973, CIDA designated Zambia as a core country for its aid,<sup>5</sup> which made Zambia a recipient of ever larger amounts of assistance. Zambia's new status also meant that it was included in longer term planning arrangements by CIDA. Because of these developments in Zambia's relations with Canada it became, in 1975, one of the five largest African Commonwealth recipients of Canadian development assistance (Table 4.2)

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<sup>5</sup> CIDA has categories for the countries in which it has development programmes. Countries categorised as "core" are the ones which, in the eyes of CIDA, are most deserving of aid.



Table 4.2  
Flow of Canadian Development Assistance to African Commonwealth  
Countries; 1969-1988 (in million \$)

COUNTRY		1969/70	1970/71	1971/72	1972/73	1973/74	1974/75	1975/76	1976/77	1977/78	1978/79
BOTSWANA											
	Grant	-	-	-	15.00	8.98	7.20	1.84	1.61	2.89	2.40
	Loan									35.68	
GHANA											
	Grant	2.24	7.01	10.01	9.21	9.66	13.17	17.63	12.34	6.82	5.29
	Loan									7.53	12.47
KENYA											
	Grant	1.17	2.07	2.53	2.25	6.19	5.20	6.48	9.34	5.64	4.09
	Loan									3.85	2.55
MALAWI											
	Grant	-	-	-	1.09	0.27	9.11	14.91	3.57	18.65	15.80
	Loan										
NIGERIA											
	Grant	4.44	6.63	12.13	12.61	11.98	10.20	13.95	8.14	2.05	1.32
	Loan									0.81	0.37
S. LEONE											
	Grant	-	-	-	-	0.30	0.29	0.06	0.03	0.04	0.23
	Loan										
SWAZILAND											
	Grant	-	-	-	0.04	0.30	0.65	0.54	1.48	1.80	1.49
	Loan										0.50
TANZANIA											
	Grant	1.99	3.12	6.02	6.22	17.67	38.34	24.38	14.75	95.61	33.01
	Loan									-70.62	-0.03
UGANDA											
	Grant	0.24	1.84	11.27	1.66	1.15	0.36	0.75	0.57	2.69	0.29
	Loan									-3.13	
ZAMBIA											
	Grant	-	-	-	2.10	2.35	4.39	6.39	11.85	3.64	2.58
	Loan									3.29	15.28

Cont'd . . .

Table 4.2 Cont'd.

COUNTRY		1979/80	1980/81	1981/82	1982/83	1983/84	1984/85	1985/86	1986/87	1987/88
<b>BOTSWANA</b>										
	Grant	3.56	2.92	3.81	3.99	5.11	6.55	4.21	10.62	1.83
	Loan									
<b>GHANA</b>										
	Grant	4.71	6.01	5.88	5.37	10.75	16.53	15.30	21.46	27.42
	Loan	13.26	8.08	5.40	2.82	1.31	-0.26	0.31	0.21	
<b>KENYA</b>										
	Grant	9.93	10.07	10.22	5.96	11.16	25.88	22.42	24.73	27.74
	Loan	2.85	6.88	33.89	35.56	7.96	3.81	0.39	0.40	-0.29
<b>MALAWI</b>										
	Grant	15.96	6.50	11.10	9.59	8.33	3.46	2.03	6.05	6.35
	Loan									
<b>NIGERIA</b>										
	Grant	1.02	0.54	0.79	0.68	0.29	0.40	0.25	-0.35	2.09
	Loan	-0.46	-0.25	-0.32	-0.81	-0.95	-0.59	-0.20	-4.06	-
<b>S. LEONE</b>										
	Grant	0.37	0.39	0.14	0.02	0.04	0.11	0.11	0.13	0.10
	Loan									
<b>SWAZILAND</b>										
	Grant	1.38	1.13	0.93	1.23	1.64	3.08	3.05	2.06	1.46
	Loan	0.31	0.13	0.20	0.03					
<b>TANZANIA</b>										
	Grant	27.64	29.41	25.66	30.46	30.50	40.75	24.29	43.98	32.90
	Loan									
<b>UGANDA</b>										
	Grant	0.27	0.98	2.41	0.44	5.62	2.49	0.76	2.20	7.54
	Loan									
<b>ZAMBIA</b>										
	Grant	8.32	6.85	6.26	4.58	5.10	13.80	15.85	17.01	30.67
	Loan	7.66	1.66	4.67	15.81	9.33	8.19	2.17	0.86	

Source: CIDA, Annual Reviews, 1970-1978; Annual Reports, 1978-1988.

#### 4.4 THE CHARACTER OF CANADA'S EARLY ASSISTANCE TO ZAMBIA

The main components of Canadian emergency assistance to Zambia in the 1960s comprised mostly of technical assistance, with increasing amounts of capital assistance added in the 1970s. Because assistance in the 1960s was provided as emergency aid it was, therefore, not recorded as ODA (Table 4.1). The change in the components of Canadian assistance during the 1960s, and to some extent in the 1970s also reflects Zambia's changing development needs, as was discussed in Chapter 1.

The need for technical assistance in the early post-independence years can be explained by analysing the legacies of British and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland policies for Zambia. These policies were that Zambia's economy would depend on mining, and the industry's labour force would comprise of unskilled workers from Zambia and skilled workers from South Africa and Rhodesia (Hall, 1969). The legacy of this policy was the deliberate neglect of human resource development in Zambia. White political leaders spent Federation funds on white agriculture and education. Such spending was not only out of proportion to numbers of whites, but was also absolutely more than that spent on African development. Consequently, Zambia did not have any professional and skilled personnel to direct strategic planning of the economy and reduce its dependency on South Africa and Rhodesia. During the periods of British and the Federation rule, investments in the educational sector were kept to a bare minimum. As a result, Zambia gained independence without any reservoir of skilled and educated manpower (Hall, 1965; 1969; Tembo, 1984). Consequently, Zambia had to rely on expatriate personnel from Britain, South Africa, and Rhodesia for virtually all sectors of its economy.

After independence, Zambia attempted to break away from its colonial legacy of having to rely on imported skilled and professional personnel. It attempted to diversify the origins of its expatriate work force by recruiting elsewhere in the world, including from

Eastern bloc countries, Western Europe, North America and India. However, when the economy subsequently experienced difficulties in supporting the costs of this substantial expatriate workforce, Zambia was required to request technical assistance from many of these regions.

Zambia's policy of encouraging the private sector with some form of foreign investment and its interest in promoting parastatal corporations (the equivalent to Canada's Crown Corporations) was in Canada's point of view, quite similar to its own experiences at home. Canada, therefore, responded favourably to Zambia's requests by sending economists, businessmen and managers to work in some of Zambia's economic institutions. At first, Canadian technical assistance was concentrated in three key institutions namely, the Industrial Development Corporation (INDECO), the Department of Technical and Vocational Training of the Ministry of Education, and Zambia Railways (CIDA, 1969-1979).

Canadian bilateral development assistance disbursements to Zambia from 1969 through to the fiscal year 1986/87 are presented in Table 4.3. This table summarises project aid by sector and shows the main emphasis within each sector. It also shows the percentage of disbursements to each sector in relation to aid to all sectors, as well as the percentage of disbursements to each project within a sector.

From 1969 to the end of fiscal year 1986/87, Canada had disbursed a total of \$160,041,025 to Zambia. From its modest beginnings in the early 1960s, when Canada provided Zambia with only emergency assistance, the aid programme has grown to one of about \$15 million annually by the late 1980s. During most of the 1970s, an average of about \$7.5 million was disbursed annually. Therefore, this represented an increase of 100 per cent within a decade. Assistance has been provided to projects in three main sectors, namely, agriculture, infrastructure and transportation, and education. Industry and institutional support also benefitted.

Projects of concentration within the agricultural sector, included wheat development, the construction of maize and fertilizer storage sheds, and institutional support to MAWD and human resource development at the University of Zambia's School of Agricultural Sciences. Major projects in the infrastructure and transportation sector were railway management, the supply of equipment and wagons to Zambia Railways, and the construction of feeder roads for fisheries development. Projects in the education sector ranged from a major overhaul of one key technical school to the training of university lecturers and the supply of technical assistance. However, it is difficult to make precise distinctions between capital and technical assistance in Canada's development assistance to Zambia because of the way aid budgets and disbursements are recorded. The two forms of expenditure are usually lumped together without much differentiations made between them.

Increasingly, as Zambia's economic and political situation has changed over the years, Canada's assistance programme has also changed its orientation. These changes in orientation have come about partly because of Zambia's changing economic and political environments, but also as a reflection of Canada's accumulated experience in the issues of development assistance. As well, changing trends among other donor agencies such as Swedish support for small scale farmers in rural Zambia has had some influence in Canada's change in its aid orientation.

#### 4.5 THE NATURE OF CANADIAN AID DURING THE 1970s AND THE 1980s

In the mid 1970s, Zambia's economy entered what has been referred to in Chapter One as Phase II, a period characterised by a general deterioration in the economy. This is the period during which Zambia became increasingly dependent upon foreign assistance. Some common features of Canadian aid to Zambia in the 1980s are that the programmes became longer term, covering approximately five year periods. There were also

modifications to some of the projects or new areas of emphasis were added to the old projects.

From the late 1970s through to the 1980s, many of the projects which had been started in the 1970s were expanded or were moved into new phases. For example, the Zam-Can Wheat Project entered its second and third phases in late 1979 and 1984 respectively, while the University of Zambia School of Agricultural Sciences entered its second phase in 1984. There were also changes in the focus of some projects during their second phases, mainly because of new insights gained by CIDA in implementing earlier phases. To that effect, the Zam-Can Wheat Project's focus on large scale farms during phases I and II of its operation shifted to small scale farms during the third phase. There were fewer new projects initiated, but major expenditures were made on the ongoing projects most of which had expanded into new phases. The new projects that were introduced, such as the maize and fertilizer storage sheds and the management training programme initiated in the 1980s reflected the new challenges that the Zambian economy and environment presented. The subsequent analysis of Canadian development assistance programme will focus mainly on projects implemented during this period.

Canada's assistance to the agricultural sector provided during the early years, differed with that provided during the late 1970s and 1980s in that it consisted mainly of technical assistance which was concentrated at the headquarters of the ministry responsible for agriculture. To that effect, in the late 1960s, CIDA provided a senior specialist who advised on new legislation and training requirements for credit unions and cooperatives. In addition, five agricultural economists assisted the Planning Division of the Ministry of Rural Development in the early 1970s. Their work included defining rural development projects for the ministry, and, a further five were seconded to the ministry as part of technical assistance, to be responsible for the restructuring of the ministry. As well, during

Table 4.3  
Canadian Aid to Projects by Sector; 1969-1987

Sector/Project name	Can. \$	Project %	Sectoral %
<b>AGRICULTURE</b>			
Zam-Can Wheat Project Phases I, II, III	13,337,887	22.5	
Wheat research	1,509,824	2.54	
Maize and fertilizer storage	34,154,019	57.6	
MAWD - Planning Unit, TA	5,804,746	9.79	
UNZA, TA and TA support	4,464,172	7.53	
Soya bean production	9,700	0.02	
Other	11,400	0.02	
Total	59,291,748	100	37.05
<b>EDUCATION</b>			
Zambia Institute of Technology	10,519,758	81.6	
Civil Aviation training	67,800	0.52	
Evelyn Hone College, TA	150,000	1.16	
Management skills Workshop (Manitoba)	18,000	0.14	
Bindery equipment	183,707	1.43	
Training miscellaneous	1,524,697	11.83	
Other	427,400	3.32	
Total	12,891,400	100	8.06
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE AND TRANSPORTATION</b>			
Zambia Railways, TA, management and equipment	15,891,365	35.24	
Transport of edible oils	1,288,000	2.86	
Feeder roads for fisheries	27,853,734	61.77	
Other	56,600	0.12	
Total	45,089,699	100	28.17
<b>INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT AND MANAGEMENT</b>			
Technical assistance	22,900	1.66	
NCDP			
Economic advisory group to the President	1,138	82.7	
Zambia Police training	11,300	0.82	
Other	204,000	14.82	
Total	1,376,286	100	0.86

Cont'd. . .

Table 4.3 Cont'd.

<u>INDUSTRY AND MATERIAL MANAGEMENT</u>			
Industrial Development Corporation (INDECO)	765,200	1.85	
Livingstone Coop. small scale industries	22,161	0.05	
TIED Programme assistance	14,125,714	34.13	
Development line of credit	26,478,817	63.97	
Total	41,391,892	100	25.86
<hr/>			
GRAND TOTAL	160,041,025		100
<hr/>			

Sources: CIDA Projects Listing by Area Branch and Country Corporate Memory; FIS Information by Fiscal Year 1972/73-1986/87 (last updated in May, 1987).

the same period, CIDA provided lecturers to the School of Agricultural Sciences at the University of Zambia.

As in many other countries where Canada has a development assistance programme, a major part of its assistance to Zambia has comprised of capital and technical assistance to the railway network. Canada began helping Zambia Railways in 1970 when CANAC, the Canadian National Railways' international transportation agency was contracted to manage Zambia Railways for the period 1970 to 1976. At the end of this period, CANAC remained for several more years as consultants. Under CIDA funding, Zambians came to study railway management at Canadian institutions. In addition, Canada funded the purchase of railway equipment and wagons, including rail tanks for fuel and edible oil transportation. Closely related to its support to Zambia Railways was Canada's programme with Tanzania to improve handling equipment at the port of Dar es Salaam,



upon which Zambia became increasingly dependent following UDI and the subsequent closure of Rhodesian border in 1972.

Besides assistance to the railways, Canada undertook another major capital project in the infrastructure and transportation sector. This involved the construction of feeder roads for fisheries development and the upgrading of fisheries roads in Northern and Luapula Provinces. The request for assistance for this project was first made in 1975, but because CIDA had to terminate the first CEA's contract, implementation was only able to begin in 1980 after another CEA had been found. The main objectives of this project were, first, to increase employment and income opportunities for the local population engaged in fishing, and second, to increase the availability of fish for rural and urban markets.

#### 4.6 PROGRAMME ANALYSIS

Having introduced the objectives of the Canadian development assistance programme in Zambia, this section will make an attempt to analyse Canada's assistance programme in the context of its achievements. This will be done by examining Canada's contribution to Zambia's development efforts in greater detail. Because of the importance of the agricultural sector, it will be omitted from this section's analysis, and analysed specifically in the next chapter. This section will be divided into two subsections discussing Canadian assistance to Zambia Railways, and feeder roads for fisheries development projects which are the main projects in the infrastructure and transportation sector. In each case, aid to each project will be examined to answer three important questions. First, the extent to which Canada's assistance made a contribution to Zambian development needs. Second, how much contribution Canada's aid made towards diversifying the economy. Third, how Canadian assistance helped to make Zambia

independent of its Southern Africa neighbours, especially with regard to transportation needs and industrial development needs.

#### 4.6.1 Canadian Assistance to Infrastructure and Transportation

Canada has made a significant contribution to this sector. From 1970 to 1987, a total of about \$45 million was disbursed to this sector, representing about 28 per cent of all aid disbursed to Zambia during this period (Table 4.3). In terms of monetary cost involved, the principal project undertaken was the construction of feeder roads for the fisheries project which utilised about 62 per cent of the resources to this sector. However, assistance towards Zambia Railways which represents about 35 per cent of all aid to this sector is discussed first because of the importance of the railways to the country's transportation network. Canada's assistance to Zambia Railways was in the form of management training, technical assistance and the supply of equipment

##### 4.6.1.1 Zambia Railways

Zambia made its call to the international community for assistance to its transport sector immediately following Rhodesia's declaration of UDI and the subsequent dissolution of Rhodesian Railways which had been jointly owned by Zambia and Rhodesia. although joint ownership and operation of the railway did not break down immediately UDI came into effect, because of the many conflicts and tensions created by UDI, it became increasingly difficult to rely on the railway. Joint ownership was finally dissolved in 1967 resulting in the separate formation of Rhodesia Railways and Zambia Railways. At the time of the break up, most of the rolling stock was in Rhodesia and effectively became that country's property (Pettman, 1974). In addition, the locomotive maintenance workshops

and the principal administrative centre were both located in Bulawayo. As well, most engineers, drivers, and technicians were primarily white, and those who had been based in Zambia migrated to Rhodesia leaving Zambia Railways with a serious trained manpower shortage.

Therefore, Zambia needed assistance at all levels for Zambia Railways to remain operational and meet the transportation challenges of the time. Specifically, assistance was needed to construct maintenance workshops, to buy new rolling stock, and to set up a viable administrative centre. As well, trained technical and administrative staff were needed to run the railways. To achieve all this, Zambia Railways needed capital and technical assistance, and, through the Commonwealth and the UN, it appealed to the international community for help.

Canada responded by awarding a contract to CANAC to become the CEA for the Zambia Railways project, which was to run from 1970-1975 and involved an initial loan of \$4 million. The project included the secondment of a team of management experts to Zambia Railways, as well as bringing Zambians to Canada for training under the auspices of the CN. When CANAC was awarded this contract, it had little prior experience in Africa in a similar type of work, except for a consultancy contract in Kenya. However, CANAC's lack of prior African experience did not hinder it from performing satisfactorily in Zambia. Their satisfactory performance could be attributed to the similarities that exist in railway operations, whether it be in a developed country like Canada, or in an underdeveloped country, such as Zambia. It could also be argued that Zambia was a good training ground for CANAC since this helped it gain the experience of working in an underdeveloped country.

The objectives of CANAC's management contract included maintenance of the railway and all its equipment, establishing of basic railway management procedures, restoring of some administrative order and finally the training of Zambian personnel who

could carry out these responsibilities after Canadians left. CANAC introduced a new management structure which had a General Manager at the top with three managers below him, each responsible for marketing, administration and operations sections, respectively. They produced manuals on various railway procedures and also prepared new tariff rates as Zambia Railways until then was still following the old rates used during the Rhodesia Railways era.

In addition, CANAC undertook a forecast analysis study focussing on the future needs of Zambia Railways in terms of equipment, revenue and personnel (INDECO Report, 1980). CANAC was also responsible for on the job training for many Zambians, while some had to come to Canada for training under the auspices of CN. Between 28 and 45 experienced personnel were to be sent from Canada, mostly from CN to work in Zambia (INDECO, 1980).

Almost halfway through its management contract, there were criticisms of CANAC at the slow rate of Zambianisation, especially at high levels of management. The criticism was levelled against CANAC by the Railways Union, however, it was unfounded since data show that in 1970 while approximately 500 to 600 expatriates were employed by Zambia Railways, this had dropped significantly to about 125 by 1974 (Times of Zambia, June 25, 1975).

It has already been stated how CANAC won the management contract at a time when Zambia Railways was very poorly run due to the consequences of UDI. It had few or no skilled manpower, railway administration and accounts handling procedures were poor, and there was a general lack of skills to market the railway services properly. Evidence points to the fact that CANAC achieved many of its objectives in both management and technology terms, thereby contributing greatly to Zambia Railways. By the time the management contract ended in 1975, Zambia Railways was well run, well organised and had a reduced accident rate (ZIMCO, 1976). CANAC, therefore, made a

highly commendable contribution to Zambia Railways and ultimately, the country's transport sector.

As is the case with most Canadian capital assistance, Zambia Railways' assistance was tied to the procurement of equipment and wagons from Canada. Thus, Canadian companies benefitted not because they necessarily were more competitive or had better products, but simply because they happened to be Canadian. This continues to this day as can be seen from the controversial \$32 million rail cars loan to Zambia in 1987 which was provided mainly because the Canadian government was trying to avert the closure of wagons manufacturing plants in Ontario and Nova Scotia (Globe and Mail, Oct. 1987: B24).

So, how much did Canadian assistance help make Zambia's transportation needs independent of white Southern Africa? To answer this important question, one needs to recapitulate on the activities of Western countries, including Canada on the possibilities of constructing a railway that would connect Zambia to the eastern coast. In 1964, USAID, the World Bank, and a UN Economic Mission chaired by Dudley Seers, prepared a report arguing against the economic viability of such a project given existing railway networks in the region and the cost that such a project would entail to Zambia.

However, after the Chinese showed interest in funding the project, the West also started showing some interest in the project. Canada was at one time a partner to a British feasibility study for a proposed Zambia-East Africa rail link which recommended a reversal of earlier Western positions. It recommended that the railway could be economically viable if it carried most of Zambia's cargo. This recommendation was also based on the availability of minerals along the proposed route for which transportation would be required if these deposits were developed. The Chinese offer to fund and construct this

railway, however, pre-empted any further participation in the project by a Western country.<sup>6</sup>

Although Canada's assistance to Zambia Railways contributed positively towards railways operations in the country, it made no contribution towards finding an alternative route for Zambia's imports and exports. This is so because Canada's assistance concentrated only on internal Zambia Railways operations, but failed to address the major issue of the time namely, finding alternative routes for the country's imports and exports which would have left Zambia independent of the Southern African routes.

It has been discussed how Canada's aid to Zambia was mainly a result of its unreliable transportation network and the volatile political situation to the south of Zambia. There was great need and urgency in finding alternative routes for the country, and one alternative route that could have resolved this problem was one to the eastern coast. However, no assistance ever went towards that direction. In this regard, Canada did not fare very well in helping Zambia become independent in the Southern African region. Ultimately, the loser turns out to be Zambia because if the issue was to make the country independent of its dependence on the southern routes, then the assistance offered was not helpful as the streamlined railway still relied on the mercy of the Rhodesian and South African politics to operate.

#### 4.6.1.2 Feeder Roads for Fisheries Development

A feeder roads project for fisheries development was requested by the Zambian government in 1975. Following the request, a number of studies were undertaken by CIDA, resulting in an agreement to develop a total of 500 kilometres of roads in Northern

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<sup>6</sup> See, "A British-Canadian Report on an Engineering and Economic Feasibility Study for a Proposed Zambia-East Africa Rail Link" Vol. II, August 1966 prepared by Canadian Aero Service Limited, Livesey and Henderson, Maxwell Stamp Associates Limited and Sumption Berkeley and Company.

and Luapula Provinces. The roads were to connect the fishing grounds of Lakes Tanganyika and Mweru-Wa-Ntipa to major fish markets in Central and Copperbelt Provinces.

Two years after Zambia's request, Canada approved a total of \$13 million, of which \$11.5 million was in the form of a loan, and \$1.5 million provided as a grant. Because of some depreciation in the Canadian currency, an additional \$1.25 million in loan funds was approved in 1979 to maintain the value of the Zambian Kwacha component of the project. Zambia's contribution to the project was the equivalent of \$1.5 million. The whole project was, therefore envisaged to cost \$15.75 million. As it turned out, the total cost came to just under \$28 million mainly because of delays in implementation and certain unforeseen costs resulting from poor planning.

As is quite typical of most agreements involving donor and recipient countries, there were delays in signing of the loan agreement and the MOU in Zambia. This delay set back the contracting of the CEA, the tendering of the project, and the procurement of equipment and building material and subsequently, the delivery of construction equipment from Canada to Zambia.

Further problems besieged the project almost immediately implementation started. Underwood, MacLellan and Associates (UMA) Engineering which won the contract as the CEA faced many staff and management problems which led to a stoppage in construction in November, 1980, and resulted in their contract with CIDA being terminated. Most of the problems experienced by the CEA were due to a failure on their part to understand the local socio-economic environment. UMA Engineering Limited is a successful Canadian company, and so based on their Canadian success, they went to Zambia expecting to be extremely successful, "after all, this was work in a Third World country being done by a

company that had succeeded in a developed country."<sup>7</sup> After the failure of UMA Engineering, CIDA contracted the work to Stanley Associates Engineering Limited, which resumed construction in August 1981.

The project area was the Lakes Mweru-Wa-Ntipa and Tanganyika region. Fishing has always been a source of livelihood for the people of this region. Fish was caught in the two lakes, dried and later transported to markets in Lusaka and the Copperbelt towns. Sometimes, fresh fish was also transported to these markets, but the poor roads mostly favoured dried fish. However, poor road network could not allow fishing to be fully developed because roads were only passable during certain months of the year, despite the availability of fish in the region throughout the year. The rainy season was a particularly difficult time to use the roads in the fishing regions. The other problem was a general lack of refrigeration facilities which was leading to spoilage and poor quality of fish by the time it reached markets.

The goals of the project were essentially two-fold. First and most important, the project was to increase employment by increased fishing and consequently, income opportunities for the local population in the area. Second, the project was concerned with increasing the availability of fish as a source of protein for both the rural and urban population. An improved transportation network was to make it easy for fish to get to markets while still in good condition. The project was conceived after realising that poor supply of fish, especially to the Copperbelt and other major markets, was in part, due to inadequate logistics and transportation in the fishing regions. The components of the project included the identification and construction of roads. The project was also expected to provide sufficient trained Zambians to maintain the roads and look after the equipment following the completion of the project.

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<sup>7</sup> From interviews with Respondent # 9. Respondent # 16 had more or less similar reasons for the failure of Underwood, MacLellan and Associates, but in his case, he points out that most Canadian companies go into Third World countries not quite prepared for the type of problems that those countries present.



After the project was completed fishing in the area improved greatly. Indeed, fishing improved so much that there was overfishing in the lakes. Depending on how one looks at the project, it can be concluded that it was highly successful on one hand, and a failure on the other. Successful, in the sense that the project led to increased traffic between fishing grounds and markets. One can also argue, however, that the project was a failure because when CIDA decided on the objectives and designed the project, little did they take into account the effects that improved fishing in the area would have on the environment. The project, therefore, did not have any conservation measures in it. It was only after overfishing had become a problem that CIDA sponsored a study to look into the effects of the project on the environment and ultimately the study recommended that local people should be taught conservation measures.

A good spin-off of the roads is that permanent settlements have sprung up along the roads resulting in some agricultural activity. Improved road network would prove beneficial to agriculture in the area because it would make it easier for input distribution and crop marketing. Improved accessibility would also help extension officers reach the area more easily than would otherwise be the case. It would be interesting to carry out a study investigating the impact of the feeder roads on agriculture in the area.

Other than the problems of starting work behind schedule and changing the CEA, the project run smoothly once it commenced. The question that was being asked after the completion of the project was whether Zambia could maintain the project equipment provided for the maintenance of the roads. It was felt by many respondents in the interviews that since the equipment left with the Zambia Roads Department was Canadian made namely, Champion graders and GMC trucks which are different from the makes currently used in Zambia namely, Caterpillar and Japanese makes, it would be extremely difficult to find replacement parts for Canadian equipment. At the time of this research,

some Canadian equipment was already breaking down and maintenance cost was already proving to be extremely high.

Problems experienced by the feeder roads after being handed over to the Zambian government raises the important questions of appropriateness and sustainability of aid supported projects. Notwithstanding the importance of feeder roads in the area, one doubts how appropriate the machinery and equipment brought in for construction and which has remained in the country for further maintenance work is, to the local environment. Since the machinery and equipment is to be used for maintenance, long after Canadians have left, naturally, it requires to be serviced, but so far, it is difficult to get parts for the makes and models that CIDA brought in as there are no suppliers in the country which carry servicing parts for most North American makes such as GMC trucks and Champion graders. This makes it costly for Zambia to order them from suppliers in Canada. In addition, the ordering process takes long, not to mention the question of the availability of foreign currency to make such orders. Such equipment is, therefore, not appropriate because it may soon become unusable then the project will not be sustained in the long run.

#### 4.7 SUMMARY

Chapter Four has presented an analysis of the nature and structure of Zambia's dependence on its neighbours in the south particularly on South Africa and Rhodesia. It has been argued that Zambia's economy was deeply integrated into Rhodesia's economy and that ties were created which resulted in a structure of dependency that had many consequences for independent Zambia. It has been shown how reliant Zambia was on South Africa and the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique for transport routes and harbours for its imports and exports. Zambia's dependence has been placed in an historical context and the implications of such dependence on the country during

Rhodesia's UDI and the liberation wars of Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique have been explored.

In this Chapter, the nature and development of Canadian foreign assistance to Zambia has been examined. Zambia's dependence on Rhodesia and South Africa, the intensification of liberation wars in the region which resulted in the creation of Soviet backed socialist governments in Angola and Mozambique provided the contexts in which Canadian development assistance to Zambia was analysed. Thus, it has been argued that larger Western interests laid the foundation for the beginning of Canadian assistance in the region. As well, it has been shown how early Canadian assistance to Zambia was mostly composed of emergency assistance such as air lifting oil supplies to Lusaka when the southern route was closed. The changing nature of Canada's assistance to Zambia from the 1960s through the 1980s has been well discussed concentrating on the motivating factors in Canada providing foreign aid to Zambia.

The Chapter has concluded by examining Canada's contributions to Zambia's development efforts by focussing on Canadian assistance to Zambia Railways and the feeder roads for fisheries development projects. It concluded that although Canada made some positive contributions to Zambia Railways, it made no contribution towards finding an alternative route that would have broken the country's dependence on the south for its imports and exports. With regard to the feeder roads for fisheries development project, the major criticism was levelled against the type of inputs that went into the project, particularly the machinery and equipment which were not suitable for the local environment.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### CANADIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR

#### 5.1 INTRODUCTION

When Canada's assistance to the agricultural sector shifted from mere technical assistance to project assistance, it was in conformity with Zambia's preoccupation with supporting large scale commercial and/or state farms. There have been three main thrusts in assistance to the agricultural sector. The first was concerned with food production and resulted in the Zam-Can Wheat Project. The second thrust has been institutional and human resource development manifested by the MAWD-PD and UNZA School of Agricultural Sciences projects, respectively. Third, Canada has also undertaken a major infrastructure building project for maize and fertilizer storage.

In all, Canada has spent about \$60,000,000 over 14 years on the agricultural sector, with wheat development and maize and fertilizer storage projects accounting for 22 and 58 per cent, respectively. As commercial agriculture increasingly became an important sector in Zambia's efforts to diversify its economy in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Canada expanded many of its older programmes, such as the Zam-Can Wheat Project, the MAWD-PD Project and the University of Zambia School of Agricultural Sciences Project.

#### 5.2 ZAM-CAN WHEAT PROJECT

##### 5.2.1 Background to the Wheat Project

Wheat growing was first introduced to Zambia in the 1940s. At that time, demand for wheat products was limited and was met by domestic production of rain-fed wheat.

After independence, restrictions on rural-urban migration which had been imposed on Zambians during the colonial period were removed. This led to more people migrating to urban areas resulting in the growth of the urban population. In urban areas, wheat products, such as bread and buns (scones) became increasingly popular as convenient foods. However, this increased demand for bread could not be met by existing wheat production. Consequently, wheat had to be imported. Zambia's relatively strong economy in the 1960s and early 1970s and the relatively low price of imported wheat encouraged wheat imports at the expense of increasing local production.

Table 5.1 shows that by 1975, local wheat production was about 934 metric tonnes compared to 157,000 metric tonnes of imported wheat, a shortfall of about 156,000 tonnes. From 1975-84, local production increased slowly and accounted for about 14 per cent of total consumption by 1983. By 1987, the total supply was about 50 per cent of that in 1975. Since 1984, however, there has been a marked increase in wheat production, but even this has not been able to meet ever growing demands. Shortfalls have continued to be met by imports, although these have declined steadily since 1981 due to the country's deteriorating economic situation which has limited the foreign exchange allocation for wheat imports. During the 1980s, when Zambia could not afford commercial wheat imports, its wheat requirements came in the form of either food aid, or commodity assistance. In this regard, Canadian food assistance featured prominently in 1979, 1984, and 1987 (Table 5.1; Figure 5.1).



Table 5.1

## Wheat Production and Imports: 1975-1987

Year	Production (Mt)	Commercial Imports (Mt)	Food Aid	Canadian Food Aid	Total Supply (Mt)	Production as a % of Supply
1975	934	157,000	-	-	157,934	0.59
1976	3,950	94,000	-	-	97,950	4.03
1977	5,324	97,000	-	-	102,324	5.20
1978	5,251	42,000	-	-	47,251	11.11
1979	6,528	74,000	32,000	10,000	122,528	5.33
1980	9,585	42,000	28,000	-	79,585	12.04
1981	12,479	74,000	58,000	-	144,479	8.64
1982	12,843	53,000	38,000	-	103,843	12.37
1983	10,216	42,000	22,000	-	74,216	13.77
1984	11,312	50,000	29,000	10,000	100,312	11.28
1985	18,000	8,000	62,000	-	88,000	20.45
1986	29,000	-	63,000	10,000	102,000	28.43
1987	36,000	6,000	25,000	15,000	82,000	43.90

Source: Based on Table 1 of Johnstone and Kasalu (1988) with updates on import data based on NMC data.

Figure 5.1  
Wheat Production and Imports; 1975-1987



The National Milling Company (NMC) Limited, a subsidiary of the government owned Industrial Development Company (INDECO) Limited, has a monopoly on importing and milling wheat, as well as in marketing and distributing wheat flour throughout the country. NMC operates three wheat flour mills, one located in Lusaka with a daily maximum capacity of 215 tonnes, and two in Kabwe with a combined daily maximum capacity of 250 tonnes. It is estimated by Johnston and Kasalu (1988) that the total annual milling capacity is approximately 100,000 tonnes if all three mills were operating for 300 days per annum. However, given adequate wheat supplies throughout the year, and seven working days per week, output could be as high as 130,000-150,000 tonnes per year (Johnston and Kasalu, 1988).

Milled flour is distributed by NMC to about 60 bakeries, most of which are located in urban areas. Supa Baking Company Limited, another subsidiary of INDECO operates two bakeries in Lusaka and Kitwe with a capacity of approximately 45 tonnes each per day (FAO Composite Flour Mission, 1982). During periods of flour shortages, Supa Bakery is favoured by NMC in its allocation of flour at the expense of independently operated bakeries. As well, buns have proved very popular with the rural population particularly in district headquarters (towns). This rural area demand for buns is met by informal sector bakeries which are usually located in homes. The buns are then sold in markets and on streets by enterprising individuals. However, NMC distributes flour to the informal sector bakers only after meeting the urban bakers' demands, which is rarely.

In Zambia, the government controls the prices at which wheat flour products can be sold. However, intermittent wheat flour shortages have resulted in the formation of formal and informal sectors in the marketing of wheat products. Thus, government registered bakeries can be categorised as being in the formal sector. On the other hand, "unregistered bakeries" such as those in homes, and operators of the urban parallel market who buy wheat products from government registered bakeries for resale at much higher prices, can



be categorised as being in the informal sector. Usually, the unemployed have the time to stand in lines outside bakery outlets and buy more than they can eat, reselling at higher prices to those who do not have the time to stand in lines. Others cut the bread into slices to resell in markets, and at bus and rail stations. This has become a common source of income for many unemployed youths. Evidently, there is an unlimited market for wheat flour products, the only limiting factor to the expansion of the market is the short supply of flour.

Almost all local wheat is grown by commercial farmers who have invested heavily in irrigation and other farming equipment. Such farmers enjoy government support which encourages large scale commercial agriculture with programmes such as the one that allows duty-free import of farming equipment. Most of the commercial farmers growing wheat are distributed along the "line of rail" running from the Southern through Central to the Copperbelt provinces.

### 5.2.2 Zam-Can Wheat Project The Beginning

Because of Canada's experience in producing wheat, Zambia requested in 1974 its assistance in increasing wheat production. Following this request, a feasibility study for the Zam-Can Wheat Project was undertaken in 1975. After the study, a team of Canadians consisting of a project director, an administrator, and some research staff arrived in the country in 1976. This marked the beginning of Phase I of the project which was planned to run until 1979. The project was subsequently extended into a second phase, which ran from 1979 to 1983. The project is currently in its third phase, which is expected to be the final one, and is to end in September, 1990. Throughout these phases, the principal objective of the project has been to increase domestic rain-fed wheat production and thereby to reduce Zambia's reliance upon imported wheat. In its concentration on rain-fed wheat,

the project departed from past practice where locally produced wheat was grown primarily with irrigation.

Irrigated wheat varieties, such as Canarie, Leorie and Emu traditionally grown in Zambia, cannot be successfully grown under rainfed conditions, due to the risk of infestation by a disease known as leaf blotch (*Helminthosporium sativum*). This disease defoliates the plant and also attacks the head, making it infertile, or alternatively, if seed is produced, it is of low quality. On the other hand, rainfed wheat varieties such as Whydah and Hornbill can be grown under irrigation during the cool dry season, although yields are reduced by almost half. Thus, a farmer is better off growing the right variety for the given method of production. The fact that wheat varieties developed for irrigated conditions cannot be grown under rain-fed conditions, and varieties developed for rain-fed conditions cannot yield their maximum potential under irrigated conditions emphasizes the need for the right variety of seed for the chosen way of production.

### 5.2.3 Earlier Conception of Zam-Can Wheat Project

In its original plan, the project was to commence with experimental plots to test whether or not rainfed wheat could be grown economically. The plan called for a target yield of about 1.8 tonnes per hectare.<sup>1</sup> If the target could be achieved on the experimental plots, the Agriculture Development Company (Agdevco) of Saskatchewan, which had been contracted to implement the project, was to bring Canadian farmers to Zambia for a period of six months. Each of these farmers would then have the responsibility of training Zambian farmers in wheat production. The Zambian farmers who were to work with Canadian counterparts were to be recruited from graduates of the University of Zambia's

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<sup>1</sup> In Zambia, the standard measure of the output of grain is the number of 90 kilogramme bags. 1.8 tonnes, or 20 bags per hectare is considered to be an economically feasible output.

School of Agricultural Sciences and from the Natural Resources Development College, both of which are located in Lusaka.

It was anticipated that after working with Canadian farmers for six months, the Zambian farmers would be capable of running their own wheat farms, although they would still require some supervision by experts. The Zambian government was to provide capital to new farmers for investment in machinery, buildings, roads and land clearance, as well as for inputs such as seeds, fertilizer and fuel. However, the plan did not make it clear whether or not this was to be in the form of loans, or indeed what criteria were to be used to determine how much capital was to be provided to each farmer.

In its original plan, the conceptual basis of the Zam-Can Wheat Project raises two fundamental concerns. First, notwithstanding the experience that Canadian farmers would bring to their Zambian counterparts, the six months period that they were to be in Zambia was much too short to produce meaningful results. With the exception of a few commercial farmers who were concentrated in the major commercial farming areas and who grow irrigated wheat, most other commercial farmers and extension workers had no previous experience in wheat production, let alone rainfed wheat. On the other hand, Canadian farmers had no previous experience of Zambia's socio-economic, climatic and environmental factors. They would, therefore, have needed considerable time to get accustomed to the local environment, the soils, the climate, as well as culture and farming practices.

The second concern arises from the project's concentration on a few educated farmers from the University of Zambia and NRDC. Such a focus would have encouraged only those farmers with a degree or a diploma and discouraged small-scale farmers who are the majority in the country. Thus, the project had little regard to spreading the benefits to peasant farmers and the rural areas. Moreover, the type of production and techniques envisaged were capital and energy intensive which cannot be afforded by a majority of

farmers. In fact, the production techniques envisaged for transfer were similar to ones used on large scale Prairie farms in Western Canada. Not that there is anything inherently wrong with the way wheat is produced on the Canadian Prairies, but such type of production requires vast investments which most Zambian farmers could not afford. Canadian farmers are able to afford these investments because of their government's support in such activities as fuel rebates to farmers, "drought subsidies" and also due to an already well developed institutions and infrastructure for such a scale of farming. Zambia has no similar support arrangements for its farmers.

#### 5.2.4 Climatic Conditions for Rainfed Wheat Production

The achievement of optimum yields in the production of rainfed wheat in a tropical environment such as Zambia's requires the following climatic and soil conditions. Rainfall is the most important single climatic variable affecting the growth and development of wheat in the tropics. Both its distribution and total amounts received are important aspects of this variable with regard to its effect on the growth and development of wheat. It must be evenly distributed throughout the growing season, although the most ideal condition would be to have less rainfall during the planting time, and more during the growing season, particularly during the plants' heading to maturity stages. The recommended amount of rainfall for successful production of rainfed wheat in Zambia is over 700mm. per year.

The ideal temperatures for wheat should average between 15-28° C during the growing season. However, in Zambia, variations in both daily and monthly mean temperatures during rainy season are relatively small and their effect on the growth and development of wheat is not considered to be significant (Mooleki, 1990).

Wheat requires soils with high levels of available plant nutrients and must have high retention ability for nutrients applied as fertilizers. Clays and clay loams are usually

recommended. As well, soil pH should be between 4.8 and 8.0. If the soil pH is lower than 4.8, liming is required, a practice which adds to the cost of production (Mooleki, 1990).

#### 5.2.5 Phase I

The original plan for the Zam-Can Wheat Project and how it was to be implemented has already been discussed. However, when time for project implementation was at hand, the original plan was not followed in three major ways. First, while the original plan called for research into the ideal varieties and conditions for rainfed wheat production, Canadian experts immediately commenced wheat production rather than first developing the ideal variety of rainfed wheat and researching the ideal conditions for its growth. Consequently, instead of starting with research on experimental plots, they started with clearing and preparing land for full scale production. The lack of research into the ideal wheat variety, climatic and soil conditions, and agronomy practices for rainfed wheat has had considerable negative consequences for the project, as it will be shown later.

Second, records indicate that no Canadian farmers were ever sent to Zambia to help in rainfed wheat production, other than one who joined the CEA as a cooperant for the Zam-Can Wheat Project. As well, no graduates were ever recruited from either the University of Zambia's School of Agricultural Sciences or from NRDC to become rainfed wheat farmers. No explanation is given regarding the changes made from the original plan in project implementation. Possible explanations for the departure from the original plan include the hurried way in which the project was planned without much input from Zambian planners.

When the Zam-Can Wheat Project was originally planned in 1974 to focus on the UNZA School of Agricultural Sciences and NRDC as sources of its farmers, the School of Agricultural Sciences had been in existence for only 2 years. In 1974, only 25 students

were enrolled in the school, while only 3 graduated from the school (UNZA, 1989). By the time they completed their studies, graduates from both of these institutions had acquired various agricultural skills which made them in great demand by the government and other businesses. Clearly, it was not realistic to have some of these graduates becoming farmers when many government positions requiring agricultural trained personnel were still vacant. Had the planners of the Zam-Can Wheat Project acknowledged a general shortage of trained personnel in most sectors of the country's economy, they would not have concentrated on the UNZA School of Agricultural Sciences and NRDC graduates as possible rainfed wheat farmers. Such an acknowledgement would have accordingly identified other sources of potential farmers, such as small scale farmers.

Zam-Can Wheat Project was first located in Livingstone in Southern Province where an attempt to grow 250 hectares of wheat was made during the 1975-1976 season. Land under wheat was increased to 500 hectares during the 1976-1977 season, despite the poor yield obtained during the previous season on the initial 250 hectares. Although Southern Province is one of the most agriculturally productive provinces, particularly for maize, there are some climatic factors which limit the production of certain crops. Rainfall of less than 800 mm. in the region is a major limiting factor for successful rainfed wheat production. Generally, soils in Southern Province are fertile, but rainfall which decreases southwards in the country, is not enough for rainfed wheat. Furthermore, Livingstone is in the Zambezi Valley where temperatures tend to be over 29° C during the day, which is too hot for rainfed wheat production. Such a situation has negative effects on wheat development. Given these climatic constraints, it was not surprising that initial performance of the project was poor. The project remained in Livingstone for two growing seasons, but during both seasons, there are no records indicating that there was ever any production.

During much of Phase I, the research component in plant breeding was weak. Consequently, appropriate rainfed wheat varieties which would be tolerant to the tropical climatic and soil conditions and would yield at least 1.8 tonnes per hectare were never developed. The soils and the related soil survey and land use components were also weak. In fact both plant breeding and soils research components of the project were dealt with more or less on an ad hoc basis.

#### 5.2.6 Phase II

After two unsuccessful growing seasons in Livingstone, the project was relocated to Mbala in Northern Province for the 1978/79 growing season. Relocating to Mbala was the beginning of Phase II of the project, which lasted from 1979 to 1983. During Phase II, an initial 360 hectares was cleared and prepared for wheat production during the first growing season. The area was later increased to over 1,000 hectares during the second growing season.

Northern Province falls under the high rainfall agroecological zone covering the Copperbelt, North-Western, Northern and Luapula Provinces. The region is characterised by high rainfall (1000-1500mm), all falling during the rainy season which lasts from November to April. The area has cooler temperatures (15-25<sup>o</sup> C) due to its high altitude of over 1400m, especially in Northern Province (Muchindu, 1985). Therefore, in terms of moisture and temperature conditions, this region is considered suitable for rainfed wheat production. Unfortunately, the soils are highly weathered, strongly leached, and acidic (Aulakh, 1984).

The predominant soils in the region are Ultisols and Oxisols, which are characterised by low levels of available plant nutrient and weak retention ability for nutrients applied as fertilizers (Fageria, *et al.* 1982). Their high acidity (pH less than 4) prevents the normal development of wheat. However, the problem of high acidity is not equally distributed

throughout the region, and hence some areas may require liming to reduce soil acidity while others may not. It is for these reasons that comprehensive soil surveys should have been undertaken to identify suitable locations before any attempt was made to produce rainfed wheat.

Thus, despite favourable moisture and temperature conditions, the location chosen for Zam-Can Wheat Project had one major problem, namely, its high soil acidity. Liming was attempted to control soil acidity, but because no appropriate research had been undertaken on soil characteristics for the area, it was not known how much liming was required, or indeed how many times liming was to be carried out. Consequently in 1982, the production phase ceased and all but 60 hectares of land was handed over to Zambia Agricultural Development Limited (ZADL). The 60 hectares of land that remained in the hands of Zam-Can was comprised of land on which buildings for offices, workshops and staff houses stood. Some of it was retained for use as experimental plots. Most of the equipment was also sold to ZADL for use on its farms in Mbala. ZADL hoped to use the land for beans or maize production. In 1984 a new agreement, which stressed research in plant breeding, agronomy and soils was signed between CIDA and MAWD.

#### 5.2.7 Analysis of the Project under Phases I and II

Zambia's need for rainfed wheat was a result of the growing urban population and the subsequent increase in demand for wheat products. During favourable economic conditions, most wheat was imported. However, the deteriorating economic situation brought about the need to conserve foreign exchange which reduced the foreign exchange allocation for importing wheat. In addition, all locally produced wheat is grown by commercial farmers with irrigation. These farmers rely heavily on foreign exchange to purchase the necessary irrigation equipment and other inputs. With the country's abundant arable land resource, much of which is currently unutilised or underutilised, and a climate



favourable for most tropical and subtropical crops, Zambia requested Canada for assistance in wheat production. The other driving force for the request was Zambia's desire to be self-sufficient in food. The need for a rainfed wheat project was, therefore, both apparent and real, as could be seen from the persistent shortages of wheat products and the amount of foreign exchange spent on wheat imports. The project's success was, therefore, to contribute greatly to the country's desire to conserve foreign exchange by growing its own wheat as opposed to importing, and ultimately to enhance its development efforts.

Because of Zambia's inadequacies in planning, project identification may have been based on inadequate knowledge since both economic and sector analyses which can provide an understanding of the development potential for the country were almost non-existent. As well, the request was made without any analysis of whether technical and institutional frameworks for a successful implementation of such a project were in place. The Zambian government officials who made the request believed that good climate and good soils were adequate for wheat production.

During project implementation the scope of the project was not well thought out on such questions as should the project start with a pilot or experimental phase. The whole project started as a large production farm despite limited knowledge about the areas, soils and climatic conditions. Research into development of varieties suitable for prevailing conditions was not undertaken. With such flaws, it is not surprising that the project produced poor quality wheat varieties at low yields. The poor yields were due to the varieties' inadequate resistance to leaf blotch disease (*Helminthosporium sativum*). There was also a lack of understanding of how cool temperatures stimulate tillering. High temperatures, on the other hand, reduce tillering and are also ideal for the development of disease. Increased tillering is important because it contributes to high yields.

Thus, the achievements during Phases I and II of the project, were minimal. Reasons for limited success can be traced to the way the project cycle was performed.

Discussions with people close to the project in its early years revealed that although many factors might have contributed to the project's poor performance, one can easily limit these negative factors to lack of suitable rainfed wheat varieties, poor climatic conditions and poor site selection for the location of farms.<sup>2</sup> This view is supported by CIDA which places the blame on nature, saying the early yields were poor "due to disease and high temperatures"(Zam-Can, 1979: 3).

Evidence that Livingstone has low rainfall and high temperatures can be found in any climatic literature on Zambia. Table 5.2 compares climatic conditions between Mbala and Livingstone. The table shows that mean monthly temperatures range between 16.9 and 20.3 degrees Celcius for Mbala, and between 15.8 and 26.3 degrees Celcius for Livingstone. The rainy season for both areas lasts about four months, although it is known to go on for at least five months in certain years. During this season, mean monthly rainfall for Mbala ranges from a low of 135 mm. in November to a high of 257 mm. in December. The corresponding rainfall figures for Livingstone are a low of 81 mm. in November and a high of 197 mm. in December. The table clearly shows that Mbala has a better distribution of rainfall with four months receiving over 200 mm. compared to Livingstone where rainfall does not exceed the 197 mm. mark. Mbala, therefore, seems to be a better location for rainfed wheat production.

Figure 5.2 shows the mean annual rainfall distribution in the country. It is clear from the map that the Central, Copperbelt, North Western, Luapula and Northern regions receive more rainfall than the Southern, Western and Eastern regions. It is also evident from Figure 5.2 that rainfall decreases southwards. Had CIDA seriously considered these factors, Livingstone should not have been chosen as a possible site for rainfed wheat production.

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<sup>2</sup> Much information here is from discussions with Research staff at Mount Makulu Agricultural Research Station, particularly respondent # 5 who is on the Norwegian Team of soil scientists.


Climatic Summary for Livingstone in Southern Province  
and Mbala in Northern Province; 1950-1980.

Month	Mean Temp.		Mean Maximum Temp.		Mean Minimum Temp.		Mean Monthly Rainfall (mm)	
	Livingstone	Mbala	Livingstone	Mbala	Livingstone	Mbala	Livingstone	Mbala
July	15.90	16.90	25.30	24.00	6.40	10.30	0.00	0.00
August	18.90	18.50	28.30	25.50	9.10	11.60	0.00	1.00
September	23.50	20.30	32.20	27.20	14.30	13.70	2.00	6.00
October	26.30	21.00	34.10	27.60	18.30	15.10	22.00	17.00
November	25.10	19.70	31.80	25.20	18.90	14.50	81.00	135.00
December	23.80	18.60	29.50	23.20	18.10	14.70	197.00	257.00
January	23.50	18.50	29.20	23.00	18.70	14.60	194.00	237.00
February	23.30	18.60	29.10	23.30	18.50	14.70	159.00	210.00
March	23.10	19.00	29.70	24.10	17.30	14.80	84.00	227.00
April	22.10	19.10	29.70	24.60	14.90	14.60	22.00	123.00
May	18.90	18.30	27.80	24.70	10.10	12.70	2.00	15.00
June	15.80	16.90	25.10	23.90	6.60	10.60	0.00	1.00
	21.70	18.80	29.30	24.70	14.30	13.50	763.00	1229.00

Source: Zambia Metereological Department, 1986 Report, Lusaka.

Notes: All data are for a 30 year period.

Figure 5.2  
Mean Annual Rainfall Distribution (mm); 1950-1980.



Source: Zambia Metereological Department, 1986 Report, Lusaka.

A senior CIDA cooperant who has been working for the project since 1981 as a plant breeder and who was also a project Team Leader at one time, feels that the earlier choice of Livingstone as the location of the project was totally wrong, and that blame should mainly lie with the consultants and CEA who undertook the feasibility study. "Livingstone for wheat? . . . it was a blunder. Zambian technicians at Mount Makulu had objected, but were pushed to accept by the Canadians." <sup>3</sup>

Reports on the project indicate that a feasibility study for the project was undertaken in 1975 with initial variety trials set up during the same year. Based on the results of these trials, the first wheat crop was planted in 1976 (MAWD, 1988). Project preparation should have clearly defined the project's objectives and how the objectives would be achieved. Clearly undertaken preparation and appraisal stages should have spelt out at the outset whether the project was to concentrate on research, on production, or whether it would initially start with research and proceed to production later.

When the feasibility study was undertaken, it should have provided the CEA with information assisting them in deciding in which area the project should proceed. The feasibility study should have identified Livingstone's adverse climatic conditions for rainfed wheat production. One must therefore question the validity of the feasibility study and the initial variety trials that were undertaken. For example, why was the hectarage in Livingstone, increased from the planned 250 to 500 only to be abandoned after the third growing season?

The selection of Livingstone as the location for Zam-Can Wheat Project was also influenced by the nature of Livingstone and the visibility that it would offer to a successful donor project. Livingstone is the tourist capital of Zambia because of Victoria Falls. Consequently, most visitors to Zambia travel to Livingstone. A successful CIDA project in

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<sup>3</sup> These comments were made by respondent # 31 who is a senior agronomist for the Zam-Can Wheat Project. Similar comments were heard during discussions with MAWD officials in Lusaka and Mt. Makulu Research Station.

the area would, therefore, be visible to the visitors, thereby promoting Canada's image internationally.

Livingstone also has good climate and has many recreational activities. A successful Canadian project in the area could have placed cooperants close to an area with many facilities that they would otherwise miss if the project were located in a typical Zambian rural setting. Canada's political benefits and considerations to making cooperants' living conditions comfortable, therefore, resulted in the project overlooking other factors that would have contributed to its success.

When the project moved to Mbala, the mistakes made in Livingstone were repeated. An area was chosen without undertaking the necessary soil surveys. The initial area of 360 hectares was increased to over 1,000 hectares during the second growing season, even though production results of the first growing season were poor. One would have expected that hectarage would be increased only if initial production was encouraging, rather than after initial production clearly suggested that something was wrong. The main explanation for increasing hectarage in both cases is that the feasibility study and initial experimental work were not rigorously undertaken, which meant that whatever results they produced would not count towards the success or lack of it of the projects. Unless of course, CIDA researchers chose to ignore their own findings.

Because the initial stages of the project cycle involving project preparation and project appraisal were poorly conducted, project success was minimal because what was being implemented was wrong right from the start. It is argued, therefore, that the initial problems experienced by Zam-Can Wheat Project could have been reduced had proper project preparation and appraisal procedures been followed. Project site selection procedures, should have included a more detailed feasibility study, including collecting data and information on local farming practices. This would have helped the CEA avoid choosing a wrong location for the project. In addition, greater consultation with local

professional and non-professional personnel could have helped CEA avoid the second mistake.<sup>4</sup> The cost of relocating personnel and machinery from Livingstone to Mbala, clearly well across the country, was high.

There are currently two prominent commercial farmers in the vicinity of the failed Zam-Can Wheat Project farm in Mbala. These produce wheat at about 2.3 tonnes of wheat per hectare, indicating that rainfed wheat can be successfully grown in the Mbala area. The locations of their farms were carefully chosen following elaborate soil surveys conducted by the Soils Department of MAWD based at the Mount Makulu Research Station. The School of Agricultural Sciences at the University of Zambia also has a strong soils department which undertakes soil surveys and tests for interested farmers. In addition, a Norwegian team is also involved in soil surveys for agricultural purposes in Northern Province. Unfortunately, none of these institutions were consulted by the Canadian team before they chose their site. It appears that their main concerns were proximity to the main road and adequate rainfall in the area.

Following this second failure of the project at Mbala, it was decided that the farm would have to be abandoned. However, despite the failure, the evaluation conducted at the end of Phase II did not recommend that the project be terminated. Instead, the Team Leader and one cooperant looked for ways of changing the direction of the project as it became apparent that the objective of producing commercial rainfed wheat would not be achieved. Thus, began a new approach of concentrating on the small scale farmers in Northern Province.

This new approach was received with skepticism by Agdevco and CIDA, although they adopted a wait and see attitude and allowed the Team Leader to proceed with implementing the new plan. The major players in the project, CIDA, Agdevco and GRZ, accepted this new approach as a stage towards phasing out the project, targeted for three

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<sup>4</sup> This argument is supported by information gathered during interviews with respondents # 32, 34 and 35

growing seasons later. Hence, since there remained approximately \$2 million in the budget, and personnel still had an average of 1.7 years before their contracts would expire, it was agreed that the new approach would be adopted, if only to reach the maximum number of years in Phase III and to use-up the funds allocated for the project during this phase.

#### 5.2.8 Phase III: The New Approach

Given the failure of the project in its earlier phases, major changes in the direction of the project were made for Phase III. The emphasis on production was totally replaced by an emphasis on research in plant breeding, soil fertility and agronomy (Zam-Can, 1986; 1988). More importantly, greater attention was paid to the needs of small scale farmers and to the economic aspects of rainfed wheat production drawing on the experiences and knowledge acquired during Phases I and II. The new approach also included an economic component which was concerned mainly with evaluating the profitability of rainfed wheat compared to irrigated wheat. It was hoped that this would be followed up by a study determining the amount of foreign exchange required in the total cost of growing rainfed wheat.

Agronomy and soil research are related and aimed at developing a production package for both commercial and small scale farmers. Agronomy and soils research is conducted in Mpika, Kasama, Mbala and at the Mount Makulu Research Station. Wheat breeding is conducted mainly, but not exclusively, at Mount Makulu Research Station and is aimed at developing appropriate rainfed wheat varieties. Unlike the earlier years when plant breeding research was undertaken independently by Canadians, it is now conducted by a team of Belgians, Canadians and Zambians (at the University of Zambia's Plant Science Department). So far, the research has succeeded in developing three favourable varieties of rainfed wheat called Whydah (1984), Hornbill (1986) and Coucal (1988).



More importantly, the contribution that small-scale farmers can make towards rainfed wheat production has been recognised. Consequently, research is also concentrating on small-scale farmers who rely on rainfall for their crops as opposed to the large scale farmers who use irrigation to grow wheat. Since 1985, therefore, trials have been carried out with a selected number of small-scale farmers in Mpika, Isoka, Mwenzo, and Kaka near Mbala.

Two important questions are being addressed in these trials. Firstly, whether rainfed wheat can be produced within the social, economic and environmental parameters faced by small-scale farmers. Secondly, what are the most effective agronomic approaches to successfully accomplish production? To answer these questions the project enlisted the advice of the Adaptive Research Planning Team (ARPT) and IRDP, which have a strong presence in this region and have been dealing with small-scale farmers in Mpika, Mbala, Isoka and Nakonde for over a decade. Based on ARPT and IRDP advice, preliminary observation trials were placed not on research stations, but directly on small-scale farmers' fields. This approach, it was reasoned, would be the most efficient way to identify the social, economic and environmental constraints facing the small-scale farmers.

Unfortunately, this study was undertaken at a time when insufficient data had been collected on the new approach to allow a meaningful analysis since trials had only been undertaken for one season. However, during these trials, yields ranged from 0.5 to 1.9 tonnes per hectare, depending on the management of the plots. These results indicate that it is possible to produce respectable yields under small-scale rainfed conditions. Recall that during Phase I, a yield of about 1.8 tonnes per hectare was the initial target set as being economically viable.

The approach followed during Phases I and II, and the change in approach during Phase III, can be evaluated in terms of Zambia's agricultural policy. Agdevco's earlier approach was very much in conformity with Zambia's preoccupation with the promotion of large-scale farms. Zambia's large-scale farmers, located along the "line of rail" provinces

and in a few outlying regions such as Eastern Province, have been favoured by agricultural support systems such as credit institutions and marketing boards. One is not surprised, therefore, by Agdevco's earlier project design concentrating on large scale farmers and locating in a province with a high number of large scale farmers. It is therefore evident that the earlier conception had little to do with reducing the country's rural-urban inequalities.

The approach followed during their third phase attempts to address the question of rural-urban inequalities and seeks to increase wheat production by the inclusion of small-scale farmers, who are in the majority in the country and currently produce over 60 per cent of all maize. However, the new strategy comes at a time when the project is winding down. Given the enthusiasm with which small-scale farmers grasped the techniques for growing the new crop, supported by favourable soil and climatic conditions in most parts of this region, an agronomic package for wheat production could have been developed over time.

However, most small-scale farmers interviewed were not optimistic that they would continue growing wheat after the project is phased out. Similar sentiments were expressed by Canadian cooperants when asked for their opinions concerning the future of the project in relation to small-scale farmers. The farmers' and Canadians' pessimism is because there is little integration of the project with the districts' MAWD departments, which would inevitably assume responsibility for the project after CIDA's departure. Currently, there are no extension workers for wheat production within district agricultural departments. As well, extension workers in the district agricultural departments are not involved in any of the experiments and trials currently being carried out by Zam-Can Wheat Project on small-scale rainfed wheat production.

### 5.2.9 The Training Component

In addition to the project components that have been discussed, the project MOU allowed for training of Zambian personnel. The objective of this training component is to strengthen Zambia's agricultural research capability. As well, training was seen as one way of transferring skills between Canadian cooperants and Zambian counterparts as they worked together on the project. However, throughout the three phases of the project, a comprehensive training plan that would outline the realistic total training needs of the project was never developed. For example, it was not known how many Zambians would be trained in the various fields to be able to effectively run the project after CIDA's withdrawal. On the other hand, job descriptions for Canadian cooperants do not allow for transfer of skills from cooperant to counterpart. Some cooperants indicated that due to the type of job descriptions and work assignments, it was difficult to have a one-to-one training relationship with counterparts.<sup>5</sup> Most of the cooperants worked with several counterparts, mostly on short term ad-hoc basis. Such informal type of contact has little training value because it tends to use Zambian counterparts as support staff and does not provide the type of transfer of skills that would be achieved if there was a training plan that provided for a long term one-to-one association.

Counterpart training is based on the premise that the Zambian counterpart should learn from the Canadian cooperant. It therefore assumes that the Zambian counterpart has less experience than the Canadian cooperant. Such an assumption would work if the cooperant had the necessary experience. However, the chances of achieving this objective are minimised if the cooperant does not have the necessary experience. This has been the case in a number of positions on this project where the cooperant was straight from a Canadian college or university without any work experience.

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<sup>5</sup> Interviews with respondents # 34, 36

Although the project commenced in 1975, the first Zambian technician and graduate were recruited in 1977 and 1978, respectively (Table 5.3). Table 5.3 also shows that about 69 per cent of Zambians were recruited during or after 1985. Clearly, there was a big gap between the time the project commenced and the time Zambians were recruited to work on the project. CIDA argues that it was necessary to wait for the project to develop before any meaningful recruitment could be undertaken. However, CIDA did not need to wait for almost ten years before deciding whether or not to recruit and train Zambians for the project.

In addition, over 80 per cent of those recruited left for further studies in Canadian universities and colleges in 1985 or later. Most of these were expected to complete their studies between 1988 and 1990. It is anticipated that by the time the project is phased out in September 1990, it will have created a strong research capability, with approximately 15 trained Zambians. There has been a failure rate of about 36 per cent in the project's training component. This compares favourably with MAWD-PD's failure rate of 27 per cent. UNZA School of Agricultural Sciences boasts of 100 per cent success rate in terms of students completing their studies at Canadian universities.

Furthermore, the slow development of the training component means that most Zambians have been returning at a time when the project is winding down and most Canadians are returning home. Such a situation means that Zambians have missed the opportunity to learn from the experiences of Canadians because as they undertake research and implement the project, Zambians who are supposed to be their counterparts have been away on studies. When this project passes through these important stages, only general workers and technicians are around to help with preparing research equipment, the land, planting and harvesting on instructions from CIDA cooperants. Canadians do not discuss or plan the procedure for research with these Zambian workers. In addition, Zambians are not involved in data analysis, indeed, they do not even understand why certain things have

Table 5.3  
Zam-Can Wheat Project Training Component.

	Joined Zam-Can as . . .	Date of Joining Zam-Can	Date of Further Training	Date of Completion	Qualification After Completion
1	Technician	1977	1986	1987	B. Science
2	Technician	1977	1988	1988	Diploma
3	Technician	1977	1986	1987	Failed
4	Plant Breeder	1978	1983	1990	On-going
5	Technician	1978	1988	1989	Failed
6	Soil Technician	1984	1988	1988	Failed
7	Soil Surveyor	1985	1986	1989	B.Science
8	Soil Technician	1985	1988	1988	Failed
9	Plant Breeder	1985	1986	1989	M.Sc. Crop Sc.
10	Technician	1985	-	-	-
11	Agronomist	1986	1987	1989	M.Sc. Agronomy
12	Agronomist	1986	1987	1990	M.Sc. Agronomy
13	Soil Chemist	1987	1987	1987	Failed
14	Soil Chemist	1987	1987	1989	Ph.D Soils
15	Agronomist	1987	1989	1992	On-going
16	Technician	1988	-	-	-

Source: From discussions with Team Leader, Respondent # 27 and from various project files.

to be done the way they are. Consequently, although it is difficult at this stage to evaluate what the impact of Canadians working without Zambian counterparts will be on the future of the project, one can clearly say that it will severely limit its success.

### 5.3 MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND WATER DEVELOPMENT - PLANNING DIVISION (MAWD-PD) PROJECT


#### 5.3.1 Background to the Project

The ministry responsible for agriculture has had an Agricultural Planning Unit (APU) since 1970. The APU was a product of combining four units which had previously operated independently, namely, the economic planning unit, the project development unit, the economic analysis unit and the agricultural statistics unit. The APU was initially staffed primarily by expatriates, most of whom were in the country prior to independence. However, most of them left the country after its independence. By 1971, seven years after Zambia's independence, the planning unit had only 2 Zambian professionals compared to 12 expatriates.

Since its inception in 1970, the APU has undergone two major structural reorganisations as the organisation structures in Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show. Figure 5.3 shows the structure of the early 1980s, when six sections were introduced. At this stage, the APU increased its total establishment from 14 to 30 positions. By mid 1982, 4 of the 30 positions remained vacant, and 4 Zambians were overseas pursuing further studies. Most other positions were still filled by expatriates from various donor agencies with projects in the APU. The shortage of qualified local personnel was a major constraint for the APU.

The status of the APU was raised to that of the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development Planning Division (MAWD-PD) in 1981. The new status reflected additional responsibilities for the PD's reorganised six sections namely, sectoral planning, project

Figure 5.3  
Organisation Structure of Agricultural Planning Unit (1980).



Source: Drawn with information from various MAWD documents.

planning, project monitoring and evaluation, marketing, statistics and technical assistance. Most changes to the original structure were made following a 1982 World Bank funded study (World Bank, 1982). The study's mandate was to review and assess the capabilities of PD in meeting the new and complex challenges of an expanded agricultural sector whose objectives were to increase food production, to increase agricultural exports and thereby reducing the country's dependence on copper as the main foreign exchange earner, as well as to increase rural employment and income.

The MAWD-PD has six main roles in the agricultural sector. These roles include, coordinating and monitoring foreign assistance to the sector, coordinating the annual budget and its preparation within MAWD, carrying out produce production forecasts and marketing studies. In addition, it undertakes the broader sectoral analyses and also generates agricultural data. In liaison with NCDP sectoral staff responsible for the agricultural sector, PD integrates NCDP and MAWD plans into national agricultural development plans. Planning division staff also have links to regional offices in the country making it easier to become sensitive to regional agricultural development issues when drafting national plans. The division staff also undertake special agricultural studies and serves on various committees. The roles of MAWD-PD are therefore, both operational and policy advisory in nature.

The World Bank report (1982) identified three serious problems in the PD. First, a high staff turnover and little staff continuity resulting from PD's reliance on expatriates on short-term contracts. Second, a general lack of clear priorities in MAWD's agricultural policy. Third, poor monitoring and coordinating arrangements and practices within MAWD. Other constraints which were externally (external to the ministry) imposed included inexperienced and inadequate staff. These findings resulted in recommendations which focussed on a new structure in which the Director of Planning would be reporting to the Permanent Secretary. The structure would also have two principal economists each




with three sections reporting to them (Figure 5.4). Consequently, the budget analysis, the project analysis and implementation, and the technical assistance sections would each come under one principal economist responsible for project development and evaluation issues, while the production and marketing section, the sectoral policy analysis section and agricultural statistics section would each be under the second principal economist responsible for economic analysis matters. In early 1983, MAWD-PD was reorganised as proposed in the report and it is that structure, with only minor modifications, which has remained in place ever since (see Figure 5.4).

Despite the reorganised structure, MAWD-PD continued to suffer from operational difficulties arising mainly from a lack of trained personnel and resulted in many positions not being filled. By 1985, MAWD-PD had a total staff establishment of 74, comprising of 55 general professionals (mainly economists), 16 administrators, and 3 secretarial staff. At one time during the mid-1980s, all the positions of principal economists and section heads were vacant. This obviously placed severe constraints on the Director who had to take responsibility for all the vacant positions.

Furthermore by 1987, a number of professional positions, including that of the Deputy Director and six senior economists remained unfilled. By 1988, there were 53 Zambian professionals compared to 9 expatriates in MAWD-PD. Most expatriates were working in MAWD-PD through various donor agencies with projects there. Although there was an increase in the number of local professional personnel in the division, most of them were rather inexperienced and had limited on-the-job experience having only graduated from the University of Zambia within the last five years. The human resource constraint faced by MAWD in general, and the PD in particular, brought to the fore the need for more human resource development which would help in filling the positions in the new structure and thereby making PD more effective. CIDA's project with MAWD was, therefore, a response to that need.

Figure 5.4  
 Organisation Structure of MAWD-PD (1988)



World Bank, (1982); Various MAWD files and documents.

### 5.3.2 MAWD-PD Project Its Beginning and Development

The Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development Planning Division Project began in 1979 as a follow up to an earlier CIDA project known as Technical Assistance to MAWD and NCDP. The project had two principal objectives. First, to strengthen, in the short term, the capacity of MAWD-PD in carrying out its planning and policy advisory functions. Second, to assist the staff of MAWD-PD in becoming self-sufficient in carrying out their regular functions. This was the project's longer-term objective; it was to be achieved by an appropriately designed programme of human resource development. It was anticipated that by the time of the project's completion in 1990, Zambian staff would continue to provide the type and quality of work currently undertaken by CIDA cooperants and other expatriates, as well as be able to work with confidence and self assurance. Ultimately, the project's objective was to contribute to Zambia's agricultural development by increasing the output in the sector.

The first phase of the project ran from 1979 to 1984. During this phase, the CEA was Agriculture Canada, with financial control exercised by Agriculture Canada's Overseas Project's Secretariate in Ottawa. Agriculture Canada continued as the CEA in implementing the project during its second phase which ran from 1984 to 1990. During the early years, Canadian cooperants participated mainly in the PD's line activities. This was beneficial to the cooperants as this practice familiarised them with MAWD-PD's work, its systems, and its problems.

As the project progressed, cooperants' responsibilities began shifting more from line to advisory activities. In addition, arrangements for counterpart training, which involved assigning specific Zambian staff to cooperants had been set. This allowed for more interaction among PD staff and CIDA cooperants. The most serious problem experienced by cooperants during the early years of the project was inadequate housing. However, this problem was quickly resolved by the Zambian government by providing appropriate

housing to a cooperant upon arrival. The CEA also cites problems of recruiting Canadians with the necessary Third World experience to go and work in Zambia.

The main inputs in MAWD-PD project were short and long term technical assistance. Total cost for technical assistance and related services was approximately C\$5 million. Technical assistance had three components. The first component was long-term assistance involving 30 man-years of cooperants. This was in the form of a five person team of specialists attached to four of the six sections of PD. Thus, a Team Leader, a financial officer, a statistician, a production economist and a sectoral planner were attached to PD. Cooperants were required to report to Zambian section heads, although more often than not, they acted as section heads and reported to their Team Leader, who in turn discussed the project's matters with the director of PD. Over the years, a total of ten Canadian cooperants have been involved in the project as can be seen in Table 5.4.

The second component was short-term assistance which included up to 1.25 man-years of short-term specialised technical assistance. This mainly involved consultants who were contracted to evaluate the project and included the mid-term evaluation of the project (Gaines and Milimo, 1987) and an evaluation of the training component of the project (Singhal, 1987, 1985). The third component of the project were the services of the CEA, which was responsible for the overall implementation of the project through its Canada-based Project Director. He was the chief administrator for the project.

The main output for the project was a trained cadre of Zambians to run MAWD-PD effectively. This was to be achieved through short term and long term training. The training input of the project included the provision of up to 31 man-years of training for Zambians. Training consisted of 27 man-years of long term formal academic training in Canada and 4 man years of short term specialised professional development training, such as short courses, seminars, and conferences. A total of eleven Zambians have passed through the training programme. Out of these, three which represents 27 per cent, failed to

successfully complete their programmes. Currently, there are thirteen Zambians in training at various Canadian universities (Table 5.5).

An evaluation of the project in 1982, indicated that although some progress had been made, the Planning Division continued to require assistance, particularly in areas of policy analysis, sectoral planning and project appraisal (Singhal, 1987). In addition, strengthening of the training component was identified as a critical need for the project. Such strengthening would ensure long term success of the project by having well qualified staff in service.

### 5.3.3 MAWD-PD Project, An Analysis.

Any analysis of the MAWD-PD project must inevitably dwell on how successful the project has been in achieving its principal goals of strengthening MAWD's planning and policy analysis capacity. These goals were to be achieved through an appropriately designed programme of human resource development.

It became clear from discussions with Canadian cooperants that of the short and long-term objectives of the project, there tended to be an emphasis on the short-term objectives. Thus, most cooperants have been involved in providing advice to senior Zambian staff such as the Permanent Secretary and the Director. They also found themselves writing reports and doing short-term assignments for the same senior Zambian staff.<sup>6</sup> This finding is in line with Singhal's contention that the project tended to focus too much on offering advice to high profile employees of the ministry. The emphasis on high profile officers in MAWD meant that the long-term objective involving overall human resource development and institutional building did not receive as much attention. Because cooperants spent most of their time on short-term assignments for senior staff, there was less time spent with junior staff. Thus, although training local staff was the major long-

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<sup>6</sup> Interviews with respondents # 7, 18, 19, 23, 25.

Table 5.4  
 CIDA Cooperants for the MAWD-PD Project

Cooperant Number	Section	Year went to Zambia	Year returned to Canada	Length of stay in Zambia
1	Marketing	1984	1986	1 Year 4 Months
2	Budget Analysis	1984	1987	2 Years 4 Months
3	Proj. implementation	1984	1988	4 Years
4	Policy & Statistics	1984	1987	3 Years
5	Director's Office	1984	1987	3 Years 8 Months
6	Marketing	1985	1989	4 Years 4 Months
7	Budget analysis	1986	1989	3 Years 6 Months
8	Policy and Statistics	1987	1989	2 Years
9	Proj. implementation	1988	1990	1 Year 5 Months
10	Policy and Statistics	1988	1990	1 Year 3 Months
Total Man-Years				32.2 Man-Years

Source: From files of the project's Director.

Table 5.5  
MAWD-PD Project Personnel in Training under Phases I and II

Personnel Number	Year of Further Training	Actual/Expected Year of Completion	Qualification After Completion
1	1982	1985	Agricultural Economics
2	1982	1986	Agricultural Economics
3	1983	Incomplete	
4	1983	Incomplete	
5	1983	1986	Agricultural Economics
6	1983	Incomplete	
7	1984	1988	Agricultural Economics
8	1986	1990	Agricultural Economics
9	1986	1990	Agricultural Economics
10	1986	1991	Agricultural Economics
11	1987	1990	Rural Sociology
12	1987	1991	Agricultural Economics
13	1988	1990	Rural Sociology
14	1988	1992	Agricultural Economics*
15	1989	1992	Agricultural Economics
16	1989	1992	Agricultural Economics
17	1989	1992	Agricultural economics
18	1989	1992	Agricultural Economics
19	1989	1992	Library Studies
20	1989	1992	Agricultural economics
21	1989	1992	Natural Resources

\* Student doing Ph.D studies.

Source: Agriculture Canada files and MAWD-PD files.

term sustaining mechanism for ensuring the continuity of knowledge and skills brought into the country by Canadians, not working with junior staff meant that this objective was not achieved. In this case, the need and importance of developing and implementing an effective training programme for the project cannot be over-emphasized. The project's long-term goal of leaving behind a cadre of Zambians who could continue providing the type and quality of work currently undertaken by expatriates could not be achieved by sending Canadian specialists and experts to undertake work and excluding Zambians who are supposed to be trained.

According to most cooperants, counterpart training has been slow because of three reasons. First, there was lack of counterpart continuity since a number of them had to go overseas for further training. Second, most counterparts had inadequate analytical technical skills to allow them to be given complex assignments. As a result, cooperants chose to do such assignments themselves. Third, cooperants were usually given assignments by senior staff which needed to be completed as quickly as possible. The urgency of such assignments did not allow the cooperant to include a counterpart as doing that would require more time to complete the assignment.

Although these factors contributed to the ineffectiveness of counterpart training, there were other factors which constrained the effective transfer of skills between cooperants and Zambian counterparts. Some of these factors were attitudinal, while others were due to cultural differences. As well, there was a perception by some cooperants that the levels and quality of education held by Zambians were low. Thus, Zambians were excluded from assignments that needed some analytical skills, and those that needed to be done as soon as possible.

Another problem which is apparent in most aid related projects is to have such projects as visible as possible to local politicians and voters in a donor country. Thus, in MAWD-PD, the cooperants' professionalism was measured by writing technical reports



and assignments that were immediately seen by politicians. Usually, these reports and assignments were quoted in MAWD and CIDA reports as proof of the cooperants' performance in a developing country. However, because of its nature, such as the period it takes to see the results, counterpart training is not as visible to local politicians, and so was not emphasized. The point being made here is that short-term goals, which do not contribute as much as the long-term goals to the project's long-term sustainability, should not have received as much attention as they did.

In addition to the problems discussed above, job description for Canadian cooperants do not provide adequately for counterpart training. There is very little reference to counterpart training as a requirement of the cooperants, and so no time is actually allocated towards that need.<sup>7</sup> Some cooperants stated that because most assignments lacked continuity, or were given at short notice, it was not possible to have a one-to-one relationship with their counterparts. They also added that the need for cooperants to transfer their skills to Zambian counterparts was not explained anywhere in their job descriptions.<sup>8</sup> It was, therefore, a personal matter for the cooperant whether or not to work closely with a Zambian.

More than 74 per cent of the 32 interviewed who were associated with this project agree that most of the objectives of the project have not been met despite the fact that it is in its final year. These respondents generally agreed that the training component of the project has so far been weak. This has resulted in the failure of Zambian staff to carry out their responsibilities with adequate confidence and self assurance. Also, whereas it has been relatively easy to measure the inputs of the project, mainly in monetary terms, the respondents suggest that it is difficult to come up with proper measure of outputs. One reason for this difficulty is due to the unnecessarily vague provisions in the cooperants' job

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<sup>7</sup> Job descriptions for cooperants in MAWD-PD project are not explicit on the role of counterpart training

<sup>8</sup> Respondent # 27; 38

descriptions, and in project guide-lines. They could not be used as the yardstick for adequately measuring either cooperant, or project performance progress. This led one cooperant to lament that ". . . job descriptions are not so specific as to allow the transfer of skills to be effective. How do you measure that skills have been transferred?"<sup>9</sup> Some observers have blamed the ineffectiveness of the project on the way CIDA manages and implements its projects. This issue is discussed in the next chapter.

#### 5.4 MAIZE AND FERTILIZER STORAGE SHEDS PROJECT

##### 5.4.1 Background to the Project

Historically, most storage facilities for agricultural produce and inputs were concentrated along the "line of rail" provinces of Southern, Central and Copperbelt.<sup>10</sup> Some additional storage facilities were provided by Provincial Cooperative Marketing Unions and were usually located in Provincial capitals or selected district capitals. However, facilities provided by Provincial Cooperative Marketing Unions are relatively insignificant in the overall storage arrangements because of their age. Another constraint of some of these facilities is their spatial location which may not necessarily correspond to production levels in such locations. As well, these facilities are inadequate and their sizes are small as they have not been updated for a long time. Moreover, most rural areas which have increased their production levels significantly over the past decade are not connected

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<sup>9</sup> Respondent # 29

<sup>10</sup> General information and data for this project was from the Memorandum of Understanding signed in 1978 and the subsequent Plan of Operation for the project which was also signed in 1978. There was a total number of eleven respondents who answered the questionnaire on the project. These respondents were assigned # 37-47. Comments were also made about the project by other respondents who were not directly involved with the project, but were nevertheless familiar with it by virtue of their work.

to the network of storage facilities and have to rely on traditional storage facilities which are not suitable to the current maize marketing procedures.

Traditionally, maize was either stored "on the cob" or it was threshed and placed in bulk in traditionally built storage bins. Such methods are still widely practised by small-scale farmers for storing produce for their own consumption. However, current marketing practices in the country require that produce be packaged into 90 kg. bags which ensures both accountability and ease of transportation to markets. Therefore, once maize is harvested, it is threshed and packaged into bags and placed besides roads awaiting transportation to storage facilities.

As was discussed in Chapter Four, Zambian farmers are classified as commercial, emergent and subsistence farmers, a classification which is based mainly on farmers' levels of production and their use of inputs. Maize is the main staple crop for the majority of people in the country. During normal years, maize accounts for about 40 per cent of the value of Zambian agricultural production and absorbs over 75 per cent of fertilizer used (Good, 1986). A CIDA (1982) report noted that there was a general lack of all weather storage facilities for both maize and fertilizer which impedes the effective and efficient flow from areas of production to areas of consumption. A MAWD-PD, (1984) report prepared by MAWD in collaboration with the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) identified inadequacies in the organisation of the country's harvest as a principal contributor towards the country's poor agricultural performance.

In 1981, it was reported that NAMBoard lost over 90,000 bags of fertilizers which were soaked by rain because of inadequate storage facilities. This resulted in significant downgrading of this important input (Times of Zambia, January 30; May 23, 1985). As well, the 1984 report by MAWD estimated that between 50,000 and 69,000 tonnes of maize were lost annually due to inadequate storage facilities. Such wastage is also a result of poor spatial distribution of storage facilities where some regions have more storage

space than they need, while other regions have nothing. The lack of adequate planning on ways of collecting maize from production sites and transporting it to storage facilities also contributes to this wastage (GRZ, 1987).

The burden of inadequate storage facilities for both produce and fertilizers falls most heavily on small scale farmers scattered in the country's rural areas. It is usually the produce of small-scale farmers which is not properly stored and results in much wastage. It is not uncommon to see uncollected bags by the road side in rural areas end up being soaked as is evidenced by numerous reports in the national press.<sup>11</sup> In addition, inputs such as fertilizers and seeds meant for small scale farmers are not well stored and consequently are severely downgraded by the time they are utilised. Commercial farmers are not as badly affected because they have some storage facilities on their farms. In addition, they also have trucks to haul produce to storage facilities.

Consequently, when Zambia focussed on agriculture as a priority sector in its development efforts, it was soon realised that it lacked the infrastructure to enhance proper distribution of inputs on one hand, and storage of produce and inputs, on the other. Thus, in 1975, Zambia made a request to CIDA to undertake a feasibility study on the need for, and provision of, additional storage facilities. The study looked at Zambia's capacity for building silos for strategic food storage reserves. As is the case with most of these studies, it was an extractive research conducted by a Canadian consultancy company. Its recommendations in this case were highly inappropriate as it supported the building of silos with material and technology imported from Canada (Ryle, 1976). However, CIDA did not make money available to import silos from Canada as it felt that these would be too expensive and quite inappropriate to local climatic conditions (Pringle, 1984). The

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<sup>11</sup> One sad agricultural news item that appears every year in the national press usually during the months of August (just after harvesting) to October (just before the beginning of the rainy season) is the real possibility of maize being soaked because it cannot be transported from production points to storage sites. This problem is particularly widespread in the rural areas of Eastern, Northern and Luapula Provinces, although it also occurs in some parts of Southern and Central provinces.

feasibility study was only concentrated on areas along the "line of rail" which were the traditional grain surplus areas of Zambia. Another recommendation of the study was that sheds which could hold maize bags be constructed in certain centres suitable for national distribution (Ryle, 1976).

#### 5.4.2 Maize and Fertilizer Storage Sheds Project: The Beginning

Project implementation ran from 1981 to 1986. It is claimed that the project was designed primarily to enhance Zambia's rural production capacity through reduction in maize and fertilizer losses and by facilitating maize and fertilizer distribution (MOU, 1982). This was a major capital project involving close to \$38 million and covering almost all provinces of Zambia.

The principal project objectives included the (a) reduction in losses of maize and fertilizers, (b) improvement of transportation of maize and the distribution of fertilizers on a more cost effective basis, and (c) increase in managerial and administrative capacity of NAMBoard. By the early 1980s, losses due to inadequate storage were estimated to be between 5 and 10 per cent of total marketed produce, depending on seasonal and climatic factors which determine farmers' yields. Construction of all-weather sheds to replace hardstanding facilities at chosen locations was, therefore, expected to reduce such losses. Hardstanding facilities include a concrete slab where bags are laid in a pyramid type of structure and later covered with tarpaulins.

One major benefit of the project was the cross-storage nature that the facilities were to have for both maize and fertilizers. This was to be achieved by constructing the facilities in such a way as to be able to accommodate either fertilizers or maize, depending on the need. However, the switch from one commodity to the other would be as easy as possible requiring mostly proper cleaning of the facility before utilising it.

The project was also to reduce the downgrading of maize and fertilizers. The downgrading of maize is a result of it being exposed to moisture in the lowest layers, and high temperatures in the upper most layers when it is stored in hardstandings covered with tarpaulins. Fertilizers also undergo, more or less, the same type of downgrading. Under normal stacking procedures for maize in hardstandings, approximately 20 layers are piled up, one layer therefore represents about 5 per cent of the total. Storage over a full year would certainly result in the downgrading of a full layer while lesser periods would affect a smaller proportion. Moreover, all weather storage sheds also eliminate the need for tarpaulins which are not produced in the country and therefore need to be imported.

The other benefit of the project was in reducing transportation costs. Certain areas in the high maize production provinces, such as Northern and Eastern, did not have permanent covered storage, or enough hardstanding facilities to accommodate the increasing use of fertilizers and the resulting increased production of maize. Thus, certain transportation needs could be reduced with strategically located storage facilities by keeping part of the produced crop at the production sites which removes the need for a return trip.

Other benefits of this project which need to be recognised included, improved distribution of both fertilizers and maize between production and consumption points, increased storage capacity and some form of coordination in transportation involving the railways and roads. Proper storage facilities also extended the period under which fertilizers could be stored without sacrificing quality. These benefits were achieved by the construction of 38 all-weather maize sheds with a capacity of approximately 190,000 tonnes, and the construction of 26 all-weather fertilizer sheds with a capacity of approximately 91,000 tonnes (Table 5.6). All except 5 maize, and 10 fertilizer sheds were constructed in the "line of rail" provinces. The project was designed to be implemented in two phases with a total budget of \$34.15 million.

Table 5.6  
CIDA Storage Sheds; Phases I and II

Province	Town	No. of Maize Sheds	No. of Fertilizer Sheds
SOUTHERN	Choma	8	5
	Monze	4	2
	Kaleya	4	0
	Mazabuka	0	2
Total		16	9
CENTRAL	Lusaka	10	0
	Mumbwa	2	0
	Kabwe/Natusek	0	2
	Mkushi	5	5
Total		17	7
EASTERN	Chipata	2	2
	Katete	1	2
	Lundazi	1	1
	Petauke	1	1
Total		5	6
NORTHERN	Kasama	0	1
	Mpika	0	1
Total		0	2
LUAPULA	Mansa	0	1
Total		0	1
N.WESTERN	Solwezi	0	1
Total		0	1
Grand Total		38	26

Source: NAMBoard Files; Pringle Engineering Files.

Table 5.7  
CIDA Storage Sheds; Phase III

Province	Town	No. of Maize Sheds	No. of Fertilizer Sheds
NORTHERN	Kasama	2	1
	Mbala	0	1
	Mpika	0	1
	Mwenzu	2	1
	Isoka	1	0
Total		5	4
EASTERN	Chipata	4	2
	Chadiza	1	0
	Katete	1	2
	Sinda	2	0
	Petauke	1	1
Total		9	5
LUAPULA	Mansa	1	1
WESTERN	Mongu	2	0
	Kalabo	1	0
	Kaoma	1	0
Total		4	0
N.WESTERN	Solwezi	1	1
Grand Total		20	11

Source: NAMBoard Files; Pringle Engineering Files.



By the end of Phase II, a total of about \$12.5 million from the second phase was not spent. Because of the unspent money, it was recommended that the project be expanded into Phase III by constructing an additional 20 maize, and 11 fertilizer sheds. All of these sheds were located in the peripheral provinces of Northern, Eastern, Luapula, Western and North Western provinces (Table 5.7). In addition, some of the inequalities in spatial location of the sheds during the earlier phases were recognised. Hence, all storage sheds constructed during Phase III were subsequently located in five rural provinces of Eastern, Luapula, Northern, North-Western and Western. As well, sheds were now constructed not only in provincial capitals, but in some district capitals. Out of the five provinces, Northern and Eastern have attained self-sufficiency in maize production. On the other hand, Luapula, North Western and Western provinces were regarded as deficit provinces where storage facilities were to be built for distribution purposes.

#### 5.4.3 Maize and Fertilizer Storage Sheds: An Analysis


Tables 5.6, 5.7 and Figure 5.5 clearly show that Canadian assistance towards storage facilities particularly, during the first and second phases of the project followed the old pattern of agricultural development in the country where, Southern, Central, and Copperbelt provinces received most of the benefits. Thus, 33 out of a total of 38 sheds for maize storage constructed during the second phase were located within these provinces, while 16 out of a total of 26 fertilizer sheds, were located in the same favoured provinces. The claim, therefore, that the project was designed primarily to enhance Zambia's rural production capacity through the reduction of maize and fertilizer losses and the easing of maize and fertilizer distribution (MOU, 1982) does not hold. The areas that benefitted were those that are located along the "line of rail" and which are already well served with storage facilities.

However, this approach changed significantly during Phase III of the project, as can be seen in Table 5.7. By locating most of the sheds away from Zambia's main agricultural regions along the "line of rail", CIDA moved away from its "high profile" type of projects. It also moved closer to achieving its objective of enhancing Zambia's rural production capacity. Two of the five provinces that benefitted during the third phase, Eastern and Northern, have increased their maize production and fertilizer requirements substantially during the last ten years (GRZ, 1988). However, despite increased maize production and fertilizer utilisation there were no adequate all weather storage facilities in these provinces. In fact, in Northern, Luapula, North-Western and Western provinces, the CIDA constructed sheds are the only all-weather storage facilities in existence. This phase of the project, therefore, made a significant contribution to the country's agricultural development in rural provinces which have been largely neglected by most government programmes.

Notwithstanding these achievements, the project suffered from the "high input" syndrome that is synonymous with most CIDA-supported projects. The project required major importation of construction material from Canada, even though some of these materials could have been found within the Southern African region. Moreover, local steel companies could have produced construction steel meeting local and regional specifications had they been provided with "raw" steel.

Construction steel from Canada was already in its finished form and only required to be assembled on the construction sites. The imported finished steel has profiles which are different from standard profiles of building steel found in the region. This means that if something happens to the sheds, Zambia will need to go to a Canadian firm to replace the damaged portions. The problem was succinctly argued by one engineer who worked on the project as the project engineer saying, ". . . if today a truck ran into one of those sheds

Figure 5.5  
 Spatial Distribution of Maize and Fertilizer Storage Sheds, Phases I, II & III



and made a hole in it, Zambia will not be able to replace the damaged part without help from Canada."<sup>12</sup> Fifty seven per cent of the respondents directly involved with this project suggested Canada's commercial interests as the motive for providing Zambia with already finished material. By providing Zambia with material not compatible with those manufactured locally or regionally ensures that Zambia will remain dependent upon Canada for as long as maintenance is required on the storage sheds.

## 5.5 UNIVERSITY OF ZAMBIA (UNZA), SCHOOL OF AGRICULTURAL SCIENCES PROJECT

### 5.5.1 Background to the Project

The University of Zambia (UNZA) was officially opened in 1966 following the recommendations of the Lockwood Report which was presented to the Governor of Northern Rhodesia in 1963 and published in 1964.<sup>13</sup> The objectives of the University had been stated in the report as " . . . to provide an education related to the economic, political, social and cultural conditions of Zambia" (Tembo, 1984). Furthermore, in formulating the objectives, the Lockwood Committee was clearly fostering the country's development as the major aim of the university.

At the time of the university's first intake in 1966, 312 students were enrolled at a temporary campus known today as the Ridgeway Campus. When the University began its operations there were three Schools, namely, Education, Humanities and Social Sciences and Natural Sciences. In 1968, it relocated to the newly built Great East Road Campus

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<sup>12</sup> Quotation take from interview with respondent #33. Similar sentiments were expressed by respondents # 7 and 36.

<sup>13</sup> Sir Lockwood, J. (Chairman) (1964) Report on the Development of a University in Northern Rhodesia. Government Printer, Lusaka..

and enrollment increased to an average of 2,600 by the early 1970s. By 1973, four more Schools had been added, namely, Engineering, Medicine, Law, and Mines (Tembo, 1984).

At the time of its establishment, the country's requirements for economic, political, social and cultural development were enormous. This was obviously due to the neglect of education for Africans perpetrated by the British and Federal Governments. In his installation speech as the Chancellor of the University, the President noted ". . . as far as education is concerned, Britain's colonial record in Zambia is most criminal. This country has been left by her as the most uneducated and unprepared of Britain's dependencies on the African continent" (Kaunda, 1966: 7)" At the time of Zambia's independence, the total population was three million people, of which only 100 had a university education and only 1,500 were school certificate holders (Tembo, 1984). This was the situation that the University of Zambia was set to improve.

The School of Agricultural Sciences enrolled its first four students in 1969. As was the case with all other schools at the University, the School of Agricultural Sciences relied on expatriates for its teaching staff. When it started, there were five teaching staff, all of whom were expatriates. During the mid 1970s, UNZA embarked on an ambitious programme known as the Staff Development Programme (SDP). The principal objectives of SDP were to train Zambians to become lecturers in their various specialisations and schools. The objective was to have 80 per cent of teaching establishments in all schools filled by Zambians by the end of the programme. There was no date set for the achievement of this objective as different schools reached the 80 per cent requirement at different times. The remaining 20 per cent was to be filled by expatriates as visiting lecturers, lecturers on sabbatical, or on research from other universities. The requirement for 80 per cent Zambian and 20 per cent expatriates was necessary for the university to enhance international scholarly collaboration which would benefit the young and upcoming Zambian lecturers.

The procedure for selecting future Zambian lecturers was a high academic standing on graduation and a willingness to pursue a university teaching career. Thus, graduates passing with a Distinction, and those with (high) Merits were selected as Staff Development Fellows (SDF).<sup>14</sup> Upon being selected, SDFs were either sent overseas for further studies or continued their graduate studies at UNZA. The question of whether to continue at UNZA or be sent overseas was dependent upon the availability of resources. The SDF programme has recently slowed down as most schools have, or are about to achieve the 80 per cent "Zambianisation" rate.

In 1981, the Schools of Business Administration and Environmental Studies were moved from the Great East Road Campus to the newly established Copperbelt Campus in Kitwe. The campus was located at the Canadian-built Zambia Institute of Technology (ZIT) College. This campus has since expanded and became the Copperbelt University in 1985, concentrating on business studies, environmental studies, architecture and urban planning.

#### 5.5.2 UNZA-School of Agricultural Sciences Project: The Beginning

It was in accordance with the SDP objectives that CIDA undertook the UNZA School of Agricultural Sciences project. The project was devoted towards human resource development. Phase I of this project ran from September, 1978 to August, 1984. The objectives of the project were to improve the quality of training given to students enrolled in the School of Agricultural Sciences and to promote the process of Zambianisation of staff in the school. Inputs of the project, therefore, included sending Zambian faculty for post-

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<sup>14</sup> UNZA's grading system is based on a point system derived from percentages and letters. First all work is assigned a percentage grade. Second the percentage is then assigned a letter grade ranging from A<sup>+</sup> to D<sup>-</sup>. These letter grades have a number of points, thus, A<sup>+</sup> (5 points), A (4 points), B<sup>+</sup> (3 points), B (2 points) and C<sup>+</sup> (1 point). Third, the points obtained by students during their last two years are added to give the final number of points which determine whether they pass with a Distinction, Merit, Credit or a mere Pass. In the Schools of Humanities and Social Sciences and Education, a Distinction requires 21 points, a Merit 15-20 points, a Credit, 9-14 and less than 9 points is a mere Pass.

graduate studies at Canadian universities. As well, Canadian cooperants were seconded to teach in Zambia during the period their Zambian counterparts were away on studies.

The project entered its second phase in September, 1984 following recommendations of a review team. Besides training and technical assistance, phase II also included the construction of a new School of Agricultural Sciences, the supply of equipment to the school and the construction of 35 housing units for school staff. The provision of staff housing is a strong incentive to keep trained personnel with UNZA. The project is gradually being phased out. It is to end in March, 1992, although most activities had already ceased by August, 1989.

### 5.5.3 UNZA School of Agricultural Sciences Project: An Analysis

Table 5.8 shows that during the 12 years of the project's life, 15 Canadian cooperants have provided 33 person-years of instruction at UNZA. Of these 15 Canadians, six were plant scientists, four were animal scientists, two were soil scientists, two were agricultural economists and one was an agricultural engineer.

During the same period, twenty seven degrees have been completed by Zambians at Canadian universities. Of these degrees, ten were Ph.Ds and seventeen were M.ScS (Table 5.9). Currently, ten students remain in training of which seven are pursuing Ph.D degrees while two are persuing M.Sc degrees (Table 5.9). The training component has, therefore, proceeded successfully as can be seen from the number of Zambians who have trained in Canada and subsequently returned to assume teaching responsibilities at UNZA. So far, the success rate, measured by successful completion of degree programmes has been 100 per cent. When the Project Director of the project was asked to identify one component of the project that he was proud of, he answered, ". . . the high academic success rate of Zambian students in Canadian universities."<sup>15</sup> This high success rate can

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<sup>15</sup> Comments by the Project Director.

Table 5.8  
CIDA Cooperants for the UNZA Project

Cooperant Number	Field of Specialisation	Year went to Zambia	Year returned to Canada	Length of stay in Zambia
1	Plant Science	Oct. 1978	Jan. 1979	4 Months
2	Animal Science	Aug. 1979	Jul. 1980	1 Year
3	Agric. Engineering	Aug. 1979	Aug. 1980	1 Year 1 Month
4	Animal Science	Sept. 1979	Aug. 1985	6 Years
5	Soil Science	Oct. 1979	Sept. 1980	1 Year
6	Soil Science	Feb. 1981	Aug. 1982	1 Year 7 Months
7	Animal Science	Aug. 1981	Aug. 1983	2 Years
8	Plant Science	Oct. 1981	Dec. 1981	3 Months
9	Plant Science	Jul. 1982	Jul. 1983	1 Year
10	Plant Science	Jan. 1984	Jul. 1984	6 Months
11	Plant Science	Jan. 1985	Aug. 1989	4 Years 7 Months
12	Agric. Economics	Sept. 1985	Aug. 1987	2 Years
13	Animal Science	Sept. 1985	Nov. 1987	2 Years 3 Months
14	Plant Science	Oct. 1985	Nov. 1987	2 Years 2 Months
15	Agric. Economics	Oct. 1987	Aug. 1989	2 Years
Total Man-Years				33.3 Man-Years

Source: Dean, UNZA-School of Agricultural Sciences files and Project Director's files.



Table 5.9

UNZA School of Agricultural Sciences Project; Training Component		
SDF Number	Actual/Expected Year of Completion	Qualification After Completion
1a	1982	M.Sc
1b	1987	Ph.D (Entomology)
2a	1982	M. Sc. (Soil Science)
2b	1989	Ph.D (Soil Science)
3	1983	M. Sc
4	1983	M.Sc. (Agric. Eng.)
5a	1983	M.Engineering
5b	1986	Ph.D (Agric. Eng.)
6a	1983	M.Sc. (Crop Science)
6b	1991	Ph.D (Crop Science)*
7a	1984	M.Sc.(Animal Science)
7b	1991	Ph.D (Animal Science)*
8	1984	Ph.D (Crop Science)
9	1984	Ph.D (Crop Science)
10a	1984	M.Sc. (Crop Science)
10b	1991	Ph.D (Crop Science)*
11a	1984	M.Sc. (Crop Science)
11b	1991	Ph.D (Crop Science)*
12a	1985	M.Sc. (Crop Science)
12b	1986	Ph.D (Food Science)
13	1986	Ph.D (Animal Science)
14	1987	M.Sc. (Animal Science)
15	1987	M.Sc. (Animal Science)
16a	1987	M. Sc. (Animal Science)
16b	1993	Ph.D (Animal Science)*
17a	1987	M.Sc. (Agric. Econ.)
17b	1994	Ph.D (agric. Econ.)*
18a	1987	M.Sc. (Animal Science)
18b	1994	Ph.D (Animal Science)*
19	1988	Ph.D (Agric. Econ.)
20a	1989	Ph.D (Soil Science)
20b	1990	Ph.D (soil Science)
21	1990	M. Sc. (Weed Science)
22	1995	Ph.D (Weed Science)*
23	1990	M.Sc (Animal Science)
24	1991	M.Sc. (Management)*
25	1991	M.Sc. (Animal Science)*

Notes: \* refers to on-going studies.

Source: Dean, UNZA School of Agricultural Sciences files; Project Director's files

be attributed to the fact that those who came to study at Canadian universities were selected from the best UNZA graduates as SDFs and were to be trained as teaching staff of the University.

However, the UNZA project, has had its share of problems. When Zambian staff at the School of Agricultural Sciences were asked about the quality and suitability of the cooperants' technical skills, sixty one per cent of the 24 respondents felt that some of the cooperants who had taught at UNZA were of low quality with below average technical skills and previous experience, particularly in an African context. Twelve cooperants were asked the same question and the corresponding percentage was 24. This concern is supported by a review document which cites problems of recruiting qualified teaching staff as being the single most challenging component of the project (1984 Zambia Consultations Project Review Document Package). This problem results from some qualified Canadians who are not willing to interrupt their teaching and research commitments at Canadian universities. For many Canadians, accepting teaching and research positions in underdeveloped countries sets them back in their research output and in their future standing with some Canadian research fund granting agencies such as the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council (NSERC). This is particularly the case with those whose nature of the research is mostly Canadian biased. Notwithstanding this observation, the school has benefitted from the services of other Canadians who were highly qualified and highly motivated in working in an underdeveloped country. Thirty one per cent of Zambians and 43 per cent of Canadians responded that cooperants had adequate skills required to make a meaningful contribution to Zambia's development needs.

One important issue that the project failed to address was why all training had to be in Canadian universities. Considering that training was proceeding satisfactorily, the project should have made efforts to help the School of Agricultural Sciences establish its own graduate training programme. This could have helped the school more because the

returned faculty could have gained more experience by supervising graduate students. As well, it could have meant that students undertook research which was more relevant to local conditions. One frustrating experience after returning to UNZA, as suggested by four Ph.D graduates (three animal scientists and one plant plant scientist), is finding out that the sophisticated equipment they used in Canada for their experiments cannot be found at UNZA. They are, therefore, forced to change their research areas or to modify local equipment in order to continue their research. At times, this has not been easy and has tended to waste valuable time. Thus, strengthening the school's research capabilities, encouraging more local training could have been a better way of consolidating the school. The problem of relevant equipment was also faced by cooperants, particularly those in animal and plant sciences who despite their light teaching load, spent their entire tenure without undertaking research.

The project could also explore possibilities of training in regional institutions with conditions similar to those found in Zambia to overcome the problem addressed above. However, CIDA's aid policy specifies that money allocated towards training programme should be spent in Canada. Thus, efforts are made to ensure that students come to train in Canada, even when they could effectively train elsewhere. Students are also "encouraged" to choose a research topic that can be undertaken in Canada, with the understanding that a research topic that requires travel outside Canada cannot be supported.

One problem faced by UNZA in recent years has been that of staff leaving for greener pastures mostly in other Southern African universities. The School of Agricultural Sciences has, however, not faced this problem. So far, only one lecturer in the school failed to return to UNZA.

The School of Agricultural Sciences is now situated in CIDA constructed buildings. Over 40 per cent of teaching staff have been trained under the auspices of CIDA. Student enrollment has increased leading to more graduates in the school. Much of the credit for

this success belongs to CIDA, particularly to the able management of the project by its Canada based director.

## CHAPTER SIX

### PROGRAMME ANALYSIS

#### 6.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, Canada's development assistance to the agricultural sector is analysed in detail. The analysis is placed in the context of the hypotheses that were set in Chapter One. Testing these hypotheses helps in addressing three major questions in the thesis.

First, aid projects are examined to determine their level of appropriateness in relation to Zambia's current socio-economic conditions. Second, the extent to which projects are sustainable after Canada hands them over to the Zambian government will be discussed. These two questions relate to hypotheses one and two which were set to test the appropriateness and sustainability of CIDA supported projects. Third, Canadian aid is examined to determine the extent to which a genuine contribution was made to Zambia's development needs in the agricultural sector.

Hypotheses one, two and three are interrelated. To determine the appropriateness and sustainability of projects, the nature of the components included in projects and the general attitudes to development which have been transferred by Canadians are examined. More importantly, indicators which determine the future viability of projects were used to assess the projects' long term sustainability by Zambians. A key indicator of a project's future viability is the ability of the Zambian government, or any other Zambian institution to take over, fund, and manage the project on a continuing basis following the withdrawal of Canadian support. Indicators for assessing sustainability of a project, therefore, include its achievements in human resource development, or what is generally referred to as

"Zambianisation," the project's ability to cover operational and maintenance costs, its institutional and organisational competency, and its socio-cultural and technical viability vis-a-vis the Zambian environment. Such an assessment helps to bring into focus both the negative and positive aspects of CIDA projects in relation to Zambia's development needs in that sector.

The question of Canada's contribution towards Zambia's development needs in the agricultural sector relates to hypothesis four which addresses Canada's contribution to reducing rural-urban disparities. There were two considerations in assessing the degree to which a genuine contribution was made to Zambia's development needs in the agricultural sector. First, emphasis is placed on the extent to which Canadian assistance has helped Zambia's capacity to pursue balanced and self-reliant development in the sector. The second consideration is how much Canadian aid has involved and benefitted Zambia's small-scale farmers. The framework of the analysis for this objective is to examine the spatial distribution of projects in the agricultural sector to establish whether or not less developed areas have benefitted from having projects located there. As well, the nature of the projects are examined in an effort to establish their benefits to the small scale farmers.

It is argued here that if Canada's motivations for providing foreign assistance to Zambia are determined primarily by political, economic and commercial concerns, then the effectiveness of such aid projects in reducing rural-urban disparities and encouraging small scale farmers to produce for the market will remain minimal. In the same vein, if Zambia does not have well defined agricultural policies, then no matter what Canada does, any benefits will be neutralised by misdirected Zambian policies.

## 6.2 HYPOTHESIS ONE; On Appropriateness and Sustainability of CIDA Projects.

**That Canadian development assistance to Zambia's agricultural sector has not been appropriately attuned to the country's socio-economic situation. This has resulted in projects which cannot be sustained after CIDA withdraws its assistance and hands them over to the Zambian government.**

It has been shown that Canada's development assistance to Zambia's agricultural and rural development sector has been primarily in three categories. These are human resource development, institutional support, and infrastructure building. There was also a project concerned with wheat development and production. The nature and character of the components of projects make it possible to further condense them into those which are classified as being "high profile" and "high input" projects. These are exemplified by such projects as the Zam-Can Wheat Project and the storage facilities project. There are also projects which are classified as not being so "high profile," but which are, nevertheless, "high input" projects. These are exemplified by MAWD-PD and UNZA-School of Agricultural Sciences projects which were concerned with institutional building and support. Some of the identified characteristics of Canadian supported projects in Zambia's agricultural and rural development sector have affected the projects' long term impact in the country in a wider sense than just the achievement, or not, of laid down project objectives. It is the nature and characteristics of projects which are important in examining the appropriateness and sustainability of CIDA supported projects.

### 6.3 HIGH INPUT AND HIGH PROFILE PROJECTS

CIDA's policy documents state that the principal goals of Canadian aid to the agricultural sector have been to seek and develop Zambia's agricultural institutions and services. The idea is to hand over new projects and re-arranged institutions to the Zambian

government after capital, equipment and technical assistance have been provided.<sup>1</sup> However, despite CIDA's stated goals, the nature of its contribution towards Zambian agriculture have often been different from that which the Zambian government can afford to provide at present. Evidence in this respect can be seen in the maize and fertilizer storage sheds project and in the feeder roads for fisheries project. The maize and fertilizer storage project and the feeder roads for fisheries project show that there was a tendency by CIDA to involve major purchases from Canada even though alternative sources for the appropriate material could have been found within the Southern African region. Alternatively, material could have been brought in "rough" form and been made in its finished form within the country. That way, the material could have been made to local and regional specifications.

Canadian aid also tended to support large scale wheat production even before research into suitable varieties and soils had been conducted. Thus, the Zam-Can Wheat Project started as a major production project in a wrong area. Partly as a result of Canada wanting to promote its goods, but also because of the role projects play in promoting Canada abroad, the maize and fertilizer storage project, the feeder roads for fisheries project, and Zam-Can Wheat project were deliberately designed to be of "high profile." However, their "high profile" characteristics contrasted strongly with those of the already established services and programmes provided by the Zambian government, and even those that it would afford to provide in the future.

Because of this type of Canadian aid, one cooperant lamented that, ". . . although aid should attempt to make Zambia self sufficient, Canada's aid in programmes such as storage project" whose replacement parts can only come from Canada; "Zam-Can wheat project" which needs massive capital for various inputs; "the feeder roads for fisheries development" which need spare parts from Champion grader and GMC truck manufacturers in Canada; ". . . make Zambia more dependent on Canada, and less self

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<sup>1</sup> This view is well stated in MOUs, POP and Programme Review Documents.



reliant."<sup>2</sup> These characteristics of Canadian aid, which keep Zambia dependent upon foreign aid following the completion of a project, are undesirable and should be guarded against when projects are designed. In this way, the presence of such inappropriate characteristics and their development can be avoided, or minimised.

Projects which rely strongly on 'high input' components are inappropriate to the current Zambian socio-economic environment, as they can neither be sustained by the government once CIDA withdraws, nor can their design be replicated more widely in the country. Consequently, many such projects are likely to collapse once CIDA withdraws. The likely collapse of the Zam-Can Wheat Project which has involved small scale farmers in its third phase is resulting in the frustration of farmers' aspirations which were raised to unrealistic levels by the project. This undermines both their interest in agricultural development and their confidence in external intervention and support. The failure to sustain high input projects is clearly manifested in the feeder roads project which was completed in 1988 and handed over to the Zambian government. This project was performing well while it was being implemented and administered by Canadians because of their access to spare parts for the GMC trucks and Champion graders. Now that the project has been completed and handed over to the Zambian government, maintenance is lagging as more and more equipment requires spare parts which are not available in the country.

Canadian cooperants and their Zambian counterparts were therefore asked to rate CIDA's project planning with regard to the need for continuity of projects after CIDA withdraws its assistance. The response was almost identical with 65 per cent of Zambians and 63 per cent of Canadians doubting whether the Zambian government would sustain these projects. Most respondents were of the opinion that if personnel were well trained and if the Zambian government was fully committed to funding them, then they would be sustained. However, they added that funding by GRZ, would not be adequate since it

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<sup>2</sup> Respondent # 45. Similar views directly related to this are express in an article by Smith, (1986).

currently fails to honour its financial obligations in most of these projects. One senior cooperant summed it this way, ". . . pessimistic, particularly if they (*Zambian government*) attempt to maintain them (*projects*) at their present levels."<sup>3</sup> The Canadian Development Agency should consider using third parties as suppliers of some of its inputs. For, example, British and Japanese suppliers of vehicles are well placed since most makes of vehicles in Zambia are either British or Japanese. Thus, there are already established spare parts suppliers in the country.

The majority of CIDA projects in the agricultural sector are not sustainable because of lack of finance, technical and managerial expertise to run the projects after CIDA withdraws. Projects that would be sustained are those that would generate their own funds, but so far none of CIDA's projects do that. By their very nature, projects such as MAWD-PD or UNZA-School of Agricultural Sciences may not generate their own funds as they are involved in basic institution building that the Zambian government should support.

However, projects such as the Zam-Can Wheat Project, the maize and fertilizer storage and the feeder roads for fisheries development would be self-supporting depending on how they are designed. Zam-Can Wheat Project would generate its own funds if it were designed to operate as a commercial farm(s) growing wheat for sale. Even if it were to concentrate on small-scale farmers, they would continue growing wheat only if they would get enough money to justify growing it. It would be just like growing maize, cotton or tobacco which many small scale farmers are currently producing because of the returns from them. The development of better wheat varieties, strengthening of research and extension services would go along way towards achieving that goal.

The maize and fertilizer storage project should also be self-supporting through the use of sheds by the Cooperative Unions. Provincial Cooperative Unions are currently responsible for buying maize and distributing fertilizers. They are also responsible for

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<sup>3</sup> The italics are the author's. The quotation is from interviews with respondent # 53.

milling and distributing mealie meal in their respective provinces. Storage sheds for maize and fertilizers have, therefore, increased their efficiency. Consequently, it should be the responsibility of Cooperatives to run and maintain the sheds.

The feeder roads for fisheries development would have been a self-supporting project if CIDA had an integrated approach to it. Merely opening up an area by way of connecting lakes to an existing road network was not enough to develop fisheries. The problem was initially identified as being the long distance separating the lakes from the existing markets in Lusaka and the Copperbelt which resulted in fish going bad before reaching the market. Thus, although better roads meant less travel time, the distance between the fishing grounds and the market was still too long for fish to reach still fresh. The project would have been better equipped to develop the fishing industry in the area had it incorporated simple processing and refrigerated facilities which do not require much imported inputs. Such facilities would have been organised on a commercial basis with the fishermen coming together as a cooperative or partners to operate it. Giving the fishermen such responsibility would have made the project self-supporting as they would have been the beneficiaries. However, it is difficult to understand why CIDA did not design some of the projects to run on a business-like basis despite the benefits that this would have on the Zambian economy, as well as, on Canada's political image.

Issues regarding self-supporting projects have to be addressed since Zambia is becoming more and more dependent on foreign donations. Unless CIDA can replace some of the projects which rely exclusively on its donations with those which try to build-in self generating funding, its aid programme in Zambia will not be sustained in the long run. Unfortunately, nothing in a way of projects with built-in self generating funding are planned for the country by CIDA. Of the projects under investigation which included the Zam-Can Wheat Project, UNZA-School of Agricultural Sciences, feeder roads for fisheries

development and maize and fertilizer storage sheds, all were found to rely mostly on Canadian aid, even though some could be generating their own money.

To say that there is a lack of technical and managerial expertise to run the projects after CIDA withdraws is not to imply that Zambia does not have such expertise. Rather, there are two problems with this. First, because all Canadian projects are managed by separate administrative personnel from those managing Zambian programmes, it becomes difficult to integrate the two structures when the project is in the process of winding down. Although the feeder roads project has now been completed and handed over to the Zambian government its equipment has not been fully integrated into that of the Zambian roads department. Consequently, the "Canadian" equipment is still kept separate from the "Zambian" equipment.

The second reason for Zambia's apparent, but not real, lack of technical and managerial expertise is due to Zambia's lack of incentives for its trained civil servants. Consequently, many qualified personnel leave the civil service for the better paying private sector. CIDA has been concerned about this problem for its trained personnel particularly those in the MAWD-PD project, but less so for the UNZA project. There is more concern for MAWD-PD staff leaving the civil service than there is for UNZA staff because UNZA is still regarded as one of the best employers in the country because of certain fringe benefits that UNZA staff enjoy.

The explanations outlined above indicate that the hypothesis on the appropriateness and sustainability of CIDA projects show that most CIDA projects cannot be sustained after CIDA withdraws its support and hands over the projects to the Zambian government. This is supported by interviews and by the nature and characteristics of CIDA supported projects in the agricultural sector, most of which do not take the country's socio-economic situation into account.

#### 6.4 HYPOTHESIS TWO; On the Impact of Limited Integration of CIDA and MAWD Administrative Structures on Project Effectiveness

**That Canadian aid to Zambia's agricultural sector has not been as effective as it might be because of limited integration of the administrative structures of CIDA and MAWD during the different stages of the project cycle, particularly during the identification, preparation and appraisal, and evaluation stages.**

##### 6.3.1 Integration

Notwithstanding the stated role of Canadian aid in the agricultural sector, projects that CIDA has funded are poorly integrated into MAWD's administrative structure. This is primarily because most CIDA projects are often agreed at a political level with little reference to Zambia's technical and policy considerations. As well, CIDA in conjunction with the CEA, generally develop the details of the projects with little or no input from the Zambian government. Thus, when Zambia saw the need to increase wheat production, it made a request to Canada which, after carrying out a feasibility study, agreed to undertake a wheat production project. This was the beginning of the Zam-Can Wheat Project. However, Zambia made the request in general terms, but specifics such as the six months that Canadian farmers were expected to spend in Zambia teaching their counterparts how to grow wheat, as well as the initial concentration on large-scale farms and many other details, were decided upon by Agdevco under the supervision of CIDA. In this particular project, there is no evidence that there was any analysis of prevailing production of rainfed wheat before its implementation. Had such an analysis taken place, it could have helped identify some of the major constraints in wheat production faced by farmers. An examination of the maize and fertilizer storage sheds project also showed that there was very little input from

Zambians during the whole project cycle. Details concerning the size of the sheds and the type and source of material to be used in their construction, were all decided upon by Pringle Engineering of Montreal. Thus, in both of these projects, it appears that little or no regard was given to Zambian input during the various stages in the project cycle.

The range of approaches which have been followed within Zambia's agricultural development policies, however, have made it relatively easy for MAWD to accept projects with different emphases and orientations. The country's policies towards the agricultural sector have been quite inconsistent over the years. Zambia usually accepts many forms of aid from different donors expecting to get some benefit out of it. Some of this aid, however, includes what has been classified in this thesis as inappropriate. The government is mindful that by saying no to some forms of aid it might jeopardise aid to other projects. Nevertheless, there is a danger in such an approach because it may result in Zambia compromising its agricultural policy. This, in turn, may lead to a situation where the country's policies are a result of donor, rather than local initiatives. This is especially likely when shortages of funds due to the poor economic situation restricts new government programmes and when donors are allowed to concentrate their assistance in specific sectors and localities.

All Canadian supported projects in the agricultural sector, except for the MAWD - PD project, operate outside the administrative structure of MAWD. This gives CIDA a considerable degree of independence and control over their projects in terms of flexibility in the use of financial resources and in financial accountability. Nevertheless, CIDA's administration of projects which operate outside MAWD's established structure, make it difficult for MAWD to exercise the desired degree of control over CIDA's projects. It also allows CIDA to develop programmes in ways which may easily deviate from those originally agreed to in the MOU. One might therefore ask why these important points are not articulated during the negotiations which lead to the signing of the MOU. Answers to

this question lie in the fact that there is less representation of Zambia during such negotiations. In addition, there are differences in the amount of influence between Canada and Zambia during the negotiations process.

Zambia exerts less influence during negotiations which is reflected in the way projects are requested by Zambia and later designed and implemented by a CEA. In this case, Zambians are in a weak position, politically and financially, and are therefore at a disadvantage during the negotiation stage of the projects. Some Zambians also feel that in many cases the representatives the country sends to undertake important negotiations are not experts in the particular fields, rather, their only qualifications are that they are politicians.

### 6.3.2 CIDA's Evaluation of Projects

The way CIDA projects are evaluated in Zambia raises a number of important questions. In the POPs and the MOUs, where the mechanisms and procedures for project evaluations are spelt out, it is left up to CIDA to determine these mechanisms and procedures. Foremost, the timing of such evaluations is generally determined by CIDA and the CEA with reference to their budget cycle and to the availability of Canadian consultants considered to be experts in the respective fields. Where CIDA considers Zambia, such consideration is usually made with reference to local conditions and how to make the project area accessible to the Canadian evaluation teams. Factors such as the budget cycle, availability of Canadian consultants and the accessibility of an area may severely limit the timing of the study. Accommodating the above factors may result in evaluations being carried out at unsuitable times which allow little to be learnt of the project, or of critical conditions in the field area.

A cooperant suggested that flying in of consultants for two weeks is both costly and misplaced considering the work these experts submit to CIDA. He was particularly

concerned by what he termed as the ". . . pushy behaviour of some consultants who totally outplayed the Zambians."<sup>4</sup> Another cooperant commented that, "These consultants usually came at wrong times, (such as in June for wheat) that is before the harvest which made it difficult to know the harvest amounts, . . . they met in Lusaka away from the field sites and made wrong decisions."<sup>5</sup> Discussions with a number of consultants who have evaluated projects such as Zam-Can Wheat Project and MAWD-PD project, showed that they often depend upon knowledge provided by local personnel. They then made some judgements from their own experiences, which may or may not have been directly relevant to the cases at hand.

The terms of reference for evaluations are drawn-up by CIDA with no input from MAWD. The head of the Projects Monitoring and Evaluation Section of MAWD lamented that ". . . I have never been asked to comment on terms of reference by an evaluation team . . . we are told that an evaluation team is arriving two days hence, so obviously the terms of reference have already been drawn up long before . . . then it is too late to talk about the appropriateness of the terms of reference."<sup>6</sup> The terms of reference may not be appropriate to measuring the success of a project by GRZ which calls for an inclusion of some Zambian terms of reference. Eighty three per cent of Zambians felt that more Zambians should be involved in evaluations compared to 63 per cent of Canadians who shared the same view. Most respondents felt that it would be more beneficial to MAWD in particular, and the country in general, if evaluation teams from Canada would work in Project

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<sup>4</sup> Comments made by respondent # 53 during an interview. Two programme officers at the CIDA Zambia Desk in Ottawa had similar sentiments particularly about the Zam-Can Wheat Project, and suggested this as a possible reason for its failure. Some consultants who evaluated Zam-Can Wheat Project and MAWD-PD Project defended their "evaluating from Lusaka stance" as the only one viable considering the time available to them to do evaluations.

<sup>5</sup> These views were expressed by respondent # 47

<sup>6</sup> The Section Head of the Projects Monitoring and Evaluation of MAWD was very critical of the way most donors evaluate their projects, which usually ignores the role of her section in project evaluations. She cited CIDA as one of the donors which usually informs MAWD about the arrival of a Canadian evaluation team by Telex just two or three days before their actual arrival in the country.



Monitoring and Evaluation Section of MAWD so that Zambians would also learn from their much more experienced counterparts. However, this would call for the direct placement of a Canadian into the section, rather than having consultants come in for a few weeks to conduct a study.

In the late 1980s, CIDA started including a Zambian on its team of evaluators, but usually, Zambians seconded to these teams are junior and, as suggested by one respondent, ". . . can easily be intimidated by their Canadian counterparts."<sup>7</sup> Some cooperants who were interviewed were also of the view that junior Zambian officers are usually made to accompany professional and more experienced Canadian consultants. For the Zambians, there is the other disadvantage of having little time to prepare for such evaluations because they are notified about them at very short notice. As well, Canadians are better at negotiations between donors and recipients because of their experience, and of course they have better contacts with CIDA's Zambia desk in Ottawa and with the CEA which hold the purse strings. As a result, Canadian consultants may tend to impose their perspectives upon evaluations. They make judgements using criteria which may be relevant to CIDA, but often fail to understand in depth the agricultural situation in Zambia and the conditions under which projects operate. The placement of Canadians in the relevant Zambian section would make it possible for them to better understand some of these concerns.

Zam-Can Wheat Project was listed by 78 per cent of the respondents as the least successful amongst CIDA's projects. The most notable reason given for its low success rate was the faulty professional advice on wheat agronomy and plant breeding research that this project has encountered. In addition, blame was put on the inability of the CIDA team to react quickly to a relatively slowly developing project. The project has had numerous problems since its inception and, while some of the consultants who have evaluated it were aware of some of these problems, they did not state them clearly in their reports.

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<sup>7</sup> Respondent # 39

The incidences of inappropriate evaluations for the Zam-Can Wheat Project were so bad that one report had to be returned to the consultants for rewriting because CIDA felt that they ". . . reported only what they thought CIDA wanted to hear."<sup>8</sup> Notwithstanding this, some evaluations, such as the MAWD-PD training component review (Singhal, 1986), have been perceptive of the realities of Zambia's agricultural situation, but CIDA usually does not implement their recommendations unless such recommendations fit in with CIDA's perception of what should be done. This tends to be frustrating to those who made the recommendations. Because there are few, or no Zambians on evaluation teams, because less time is spent on project sites, and because some of the terms of reference used in evaluations are inappropriate, evaluations are often of limited relevance to Zambian conditions and needs as they are attuned to the thinking of some influential development writers from Canada.

There are a number of examples of the use of criteria in project evaluations which have limited relevance to the Zambian situation. One measure often used by CIDA as an indication of the success of a project is the rate at which project funds are being disbursed and the project's schedule implemented. Accordingly, if spending is on schedule, then the project is seen as successful since assistance is being provided as planned for in the budget and the political role of foreign assistance is being realised. This was a commonly used measure of success in the evaluations of the Zam-Can Wheat Project, the maize and fertilizer storage project, and even for the institutional support and human resource development projects such as MAWD - PD and UNZA. While such terms of reference may be appropriate for some projects, it was definitely misleading for the Zam-Can Wheat Project since spending according to budget bore no correspondence to the project's performance.

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<sup>8</sup> These comments were made by Rob Beadle who at the time was the Zambian Desk Manager. He was so concerned about some of these distorted evaluations presented by consultants that he had to return one evaluation report to the authors so that a more realistic report could be written.

Consequently, the physical nature of a project such as money disbursement and the number of people going for further studies are often more important than the project's actual contribution towards agricultural and rural development. Even when the rural impact of a project is considered, Canadian emphasis in evaluations is often of limited relevance, since the political role of aid makes short-term results a priority. This is despite the widely recognised fact that agricultural and particularly rural development is not being realised rapidly.

Thus, misplaced emphases in CIDA evaluations, which tend to focus on short-term benefits, have had a negative impact on two projects. First, in the Zam-Can Wheat Project, many Canadian and Zambian observers, feel that Canada is pulling out at a time when a new and productive direction has been set. The current approach followed in phase III is different from the earlier approaches of Phases I and II in that it recognises the importance of small-scale farmers to Zambia's agricultural development needs. One observation in the MAWD - PD project is that the project's short-term goal which deals with specific policy issues and providing analysis and advice to senior Zambian staff, is to some extent being achieved. It is interesting to note that this goal falls in the high profile and high visibility area discussed earlier and, as such, is usually preferred by the cooperants, the consultants and the Zambian civil servants.

The second component of the goals, which deals with institutional building including the development of a cadre of well trained Zambians, is not as tangible, it is certainly less visible and is of low profile. Thus, despite the importance of a well trained cadre of Zambians to institution building, it is not accorded high priority by CIDA and most of its cooperants and consultants. Moreover, staff training is the only long term sustaining mechanism for enhancing and ensuring the continuity of knowledge, technology and skills brought into the country by Canadians and other donors at a very high price. Hence, these must be reinforced. This shortcoming on the part of CIDA is a serious one, because to be

successful, foreign funded projects require much laborious preparatory work which cannot be rushed. The failure of the Zam-Can Wheat Project can be partly attributed to the fast pace at which it was implemented, which resulted in the failure to seriously consider factors such as climate and the right varieties of rainfed wheat.

Many CIDA evaluations have criticised projects for being implemented too slowly. Thus, the Zam-Can Wheat Project, the feeder roads for fisheries development project and the MAWD-PD project have at one time or another been criticised for developing too slowly. This criticism arises from the failure by those involved in recognising that this is sometimes a result of working within the Zambian financial and administrative system. This is particularly true during the early stages of a project when new relationships have to be established and procedures learnt. Pressure from such evaluations to speed up project implementation, and so meet CIDA's political requirements, is a major cause of projects removing themselves from within the main structure of MAWD and establishing parallel structures. However, new structures create coordination, monitoring and integration problems for the ministry. Slow implementation may also be due to excessive demands upon the Zambian government for local funds and personnel for a project. This may, in turn, reflect the inappropriateness of the project to the current Zambian financial situation rather than because of a weakness on the part of MAWD.

The emphasis of Canadian projects in the agricultural sector upon capital equipment purchases, usually from Canadian sources, and the use of Canadian personnel, tends to encourage evaluations in terms of these components, their use and the results they produce. This is to be expected given the way projects are designed and implemented. However, it may be helpful, given the inappropriateness of the terms of reference of CIDA projects in the agricultural sector, for other criteria to be added to the terms of reference in evaluations. In particular, it might be asked whether, given the results achieved with high input approaches, some alternative methods might be used which would be more suitable

for the current Zambian economic situation, especially after the government integrates CIDA and other donors' projects into its budget after projects are handed over.

Finally, it might be questioned whether terms of reference used by CIDA to evaluate projects are not too narrow. They focus on the project and its internal operations, with little or no reference to the broader framework within which the project exists. The UNZA School of Agricultural Sciences evaluation, for instance, concentrated mainly on the Faculty of Agriculture with little reference to the University of Zambia. The two evaluations of the Zam-Can Wheat Project did not relate the project to other wheat research being undertaken in the country or to the general agricultural situation in the country.

Links which CIDA-supported projects have with other MAWD activities should also be included in an evaluation. These may include the local funding and personnel implications of a project upon other MAWD or related institution activities, and the pressures upon administration and policy coordination which might be created by foreign funded projects. In particular, the ability of projects to be integrated into MAWD structure and budget, need consideration if projects are supposed to be sustainable and produce long-term benefits after donor withdrawal. The current arrangements where most of the administration, budgeting and even implementation is done by CIDA and various project executing agencies operating outside the MAWD structure contribute to the projects' unsustainability following CIDA's withdraw.

### 6.3.3 Some Spin-Off Benefits From Canadian Dominated Evaluations

Notwithstanding the many criticisms of CIDA's way of conducting project evaluations, it must be recognised that there are some positive aspects accruing to Zambia in general and MAWD in particular from the practice. Canadian evaluations may have led to the involvement of a greater level of expertise in the evaluation of CIDA supported projects than would perhaps been the case had MAWD been responsible for this. As well,

Canadian funds and personnel have meant that at least some of Zambia's agricultural development activities have received quite regular evaluation, even if this has not necessarily been finely attuned to local conditions.

CIDA has also become aware of some of the negative implications for MAWD of their projects and have at times tried to help develop appropriate adjustments in projects and policies. In particular, the recurrent cost implications of aid projects are now well understood by CIDA and they have financed studies to investigate ways of reducing these costs and raising funds for them, hence the use of counterpart funding for quite a substantial amount of the local cost of projects.

6.4 HYPOTHESIS THREE: On the Effect of Separate Administrative Structures on Project Monitoring and Coordination.

**That the separate administrative structures of CIDA and MAWD during project implementation increase problems of project monitoring and coordination, and ultimately reduce project effectiveness.**

Once projects have been designed, there remains a need for monitoring, coordination, and evaluation while they are being implemented, to ensure that the projects are steered in the intended direction. The problem of monitoring and evaluating projects within MAWD is mainly due to the proliferation of donor projects which has created a major strain on the monitoring, coordination, and evaluation capacity of the ministry. This problem was particularly severe in the late 1970s and early 1980s before the ministry's reorganisation, and before the assistance to the PD under a CIDA project. Despite CIDA's assistance to MAWD, however, the range of goals and emphases that other CIDA projects in the agricultural sector have makes their monitoring and evaluation by MAWD difficult if

not impossible. Difficulties also occur because there are too many projects funded by different donors in the agricultural sector, some of which are in fact of the same nature, yet donors opt to implement them independently. For example, Canadians were implementing their maize and fertilizer storage project at a time when the Japanese and the Italians were implementing similar projects. As well, until the late 1980s Canadians under the Zam-Can Wheat Project were involved in rainfed wheat breeding independently, while the Belgians were also undertaking similar research, although both were located at Mount Makulu Research Station. Such a situation duplicates the efforts of the donors, wastes money and makes it difficult for MAWD to monitor and coordinate the work.

Most monitoring and coordination of projects in the agricultural sector is the responsibility of the Planning Division, which is also one of the CIDA-supported institutions. Project monitoring and coordination are undertaken by the Project Monitoring and Evaluation Section which also works in conjunction with the Technical Assistance Section, and the Project Identification, Formulation and Design Section. These three sections form what is known as the Programme Planning and Implementation Unit.

Project management and organisational procedures are similar for all CIDA projects. Project management and organisation are the responsibilities of the CEA which implements the project through its Canada-based Project Director. In Zambia, there is the Canadian Team Leader who is expected to work closely with the Zambian ministry under which the project falls. Each project has its project field staff which reports to the Team Leader on day to day work issues. Progress of projects is formally monitored by the Project Management Committee (PMC) which reports to CIDA and the Zambian Government through quarterly and annual-work plans and progress reports prepared by the CEA. CIDA's programme review meetings and a series of other evaluations are the additional means by which a project's progress is monitored.

Each CIDA project falls under the umbrella of a particular Zambian ministry. The relationships that exist between the ministry and the project are outlined in the MOU and the POP documents. Both of these documents are prepared by Canadians. They spell-out how the project cycle is to be performed. Lines of communication between Canadian agencies and institutions and those of the Zambian government are also established in the MOU and POP. Basically, the whole organisation structure involves four bodies; CIDA and the CEA in Canada, and the Canadian High Commission (CHC) and a respective government ministry in Zambia (Fig. 6.1). Such an organisation structure is the same for all projects, although some projects may have minor differences.


According to Figure 6.1, there is a channel of communication between a project's Team Leader and the CHC. Hence, any concerns that the CHC has about a particular project are communicated to the Project Team Leader who then speaks with the Director of CEA, because that in effect is his employer. If on the other hand, the Project Team Leader is having problems carrying out his mandate due to some stumbling blocks by a Zambian ministry, he communicates with the CHC who can then discuss such concerns with the Zambian ministry and try to resolve them.

On the basis of the current operating procedures between CEA and CIDA, there are no guide-lines which clearly define who is responsible for overall project control and management. The situation is complicated further when one attempts to identify MAWD's responsibilities in project management. A lack of clear guide-lines between CEA and CIDA for project control and management has a negative impact on project effectiveness in one major way. It is not clear on exactly who has the responsibility to monitor the project as it is being implemented and who decides to change course in implementation should there be need for that in order to steer the project in the right direction. With regard to CEA's relationship with MAWD, it is difficult for MAWD to coordinate similar projects



Figure 6.1

Organisation Structure of the Relationships Among Canadian and Zambian Governments' and Related Institutions



## KEY

———— Line of authority

- - - - Liaison/advisory

implemented by different donors because MAWD does not have much information on these projects since it is not involved in their implementation.

The organisational structure also shows that the CHC does not deal directly with the CEA, the CEA deals with CIDA in Ottawa. Moreover, the MOU and POP between CIDA and the Zambian ministry are weak contracts without clear guide-lines on the responsibilities of each party involved. As can be seen by comparing the number of direct lines of authority (continuous lines) with liaison or advisory lines (dotted), there are no direct lines of communications between Canadian and Zambian institutions. The only channels of communications between these institutions are liaison or advisory in nature. One major weakness of these arrangements is that the channels of communication between a Zambian department and a Canadian Team Leader are only by persuasion and not by a signed contract. Such arrangements lead to Project Team Leaders working outside established Zambian structures and this robs the Zambian government of building up its own expertise in such areas. Instead, each time a new project is proposed, CIDA brings with it its own experts who leave after the completion of a project, leaving behind projects that cannot be run by Zambians. Thus, separate administrative structures of CIDA and MAWD make it difficult for GRZ to assume effective responsibility for these projects after CIDA hands them over.

Other implications of such an arrangement are that project monitoring and coordination system is weak because there is no overall system for regularly monitoring projects in terms of flow of funds or even physical performance. Because project monitoring consists of comparing a project's actual performance over a certain period with what was planned, effective monitoring pre-supposes the existence of a work-plan that is well defined in terms of objectives, targets and time schedules. If such a work-plan is not available, or if one concerned party is not aware of it, monitoring may be difficult or even become impossible. This is exactly the situation for all CIDA projects in the agricultural

sector with the exception of the MAWD-PD project whose administration is loosely integrated with that of CIDA.

It was, therefore, established that except for MAWD-PD project CIDA does not provide MAWD with relevant data that can be used for project monitoring on time. Reports that compare planned and actual performance of projects in relation to physical and financial targets are not easily available to MAWD including reports on project achievements and constraints with proposed corrective action which reach MAWD long after these have been identified. Since an effective project monitoring system presupposes the availability of up to date and easily accessible data on each of the projects under it, CIDA and MAWD can make this possible by working towards achieving integration in important matters such as in input performance, output performance, impact assessment, indicators of future viability work plans and budget by component. Working together in these important areas would greatly strengthen MAWD's monitoring and coordinating capabilities resulting in improved project effectiveness.

During this study, it was also found that a number of management arrangements laid down in the projects do not actually work out according to how they were intended. For example, in the case of the Zam-Can Wheat Project, the POP identifies the Director of MAWD as the Chairman of the Project Coordinating Committee. Within MAWD, the Chief Agricultural Research Officer (CARO) based at Mount Makulu Research Station is responsible for the direction of all agricultural research activities in the country. The POP shows that the Canadian Team Leader reports to the CARO as would be required by virtue of his realm of responsibility. However, it was established that the authority implied between the Canadian Team Leader and the CARO does not actually exist. Rather, it is the Project Coordinating Committee that establishes research direction and approves work plans and project reports. The direct authority implied in the POP could be exercised if the CARO sat on the Project Coordinating Committee as the MAWD representative. This lack

of clear representation results in a serious anomaly with regard to research approval for the project.

Within CIDA's projects organisation structure there exists a supplementary body known as Projects Administrative Support Unit (PASU)<sup>9</sup> which helps all projects with their administrative requirements. It is important to understand that PASU does not "fit" anywhere in the organisation structure, but merely acts as a supplementary body on administrative matters.

Up until 1988, any project included an administrative unit. The size of the administrative unit depended on the size of the project itself. For smaller or short-term projects, such as the maize and fertilizer storage and feeder roads for fisheries development, all administrative responsibilities were borne by the Project Team Leader. The idea of PASU was therefore, to centralise the whole administrative process and employ economies of scale and reduce duplication of effort by individual projects. With one centralised administrative unit, it was possible to have greater efficiency in activities such as purchasing, housing and vehicle maintenance. Even more important is that over time a corporate memory is built because this unit is an on-going entity and does not start and end with an individual project. It theoretically surpasses the life of many individual projects, so that the way things are best done have already been mapped out, thereby removing the possibility of each project starting from scratch.

Notwithstanding the usefulness of the concept behind PASU, there are problems with this arrangement which complicate MAWD's coordinating and monitoring

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<sup>9</sup> The idea of PASU is somewhat similar to Programme Support Unit (PSU) found in Zimbabwe and Administrative Support Unit (ASU) found in Tanzania. However, there are some principal differences between PASU and the two bodies in Zimbabwe and Tanzania. Unlike PASU, PSU and ASU employ sector specialists in sectors such as agriculture, transportation and education. In addition, the mandate of PSU and ASU include programme monitoring, assessment and evaluations. However, PASU's mandate is basically project administrative support, while the Canadian High Commission is responsible for programme monitoring. PASU is, therefore, not involved in programme monitoring or evaluations but simply carries out an administrative support function for projects.

responsibilities resulting in projects becoming less effective. The arrangements under PASU would be much more useful to Zambia in the long run if PASU was set up to operate under NCDP which is responsible for the country's development planning. It would have Canadians and Zambians working together and that way, Zambians would know how to undertake the administrative responsibilities that are currently the monopoly of Canadians.

Enough evidence to support hypothesis three on how CIDA's setting of a separate administrative structure from that of MAWD increases problems of project monitoring and coordination and ultimately reduces project effectiveness has been presented. It has been clearly shown how poorly integrated CIDA's and MAWD's administrative structures are. This lack of integration results in less involvement of Zambians in the various stages of the project cycle, particularly in project monitoring, coordination and evaluation. In addition, separate administrative structures are expensive to run.

#### 6.5 HYPOTHESIS FOUR : On the Impact of CIDA Aid on Rural-Urban Disparities.

**That Canadian development assistance to Zambia's agricultural sector has not helped in reducing the country's rural-urban disparities.**

This hypothesis is related to the spatial distribution of projects and the impact this distribution might have on regional development. Spatial distribution of projects can be seen in Figure 6.2. This pattern of distribution has come about as a result of various forces which seem to influence choice and location of projects, but also as a result of the nature and characteristics of projects supported. In addition, various practices of both CIDA and GRZ aimed at making project administration simpler have had some influence on spatial distribution of projects.


The perceptions by CIDA of Zambia's needs in agriculture have had a direct influence upon choice of projects and ultimately on their location. In its earlier production projects, CIDA regarded the expansion of agricultural output and the achievement of high returns on investments made within a short period of time as important. Hence, the Zam-Can Wheat Project at both Livingstone and Mbala were designed to begin as one large farm growing wheat. In its earlier conception, the Zam-Can Wheat Project's location in Livingstone supported CIDA's view which gave priority to higher returns on its investments within a short period of time as important. Because of this view, the project was located in a province with a known high agricultural potential, an already established infrastructure, good accessibility to markets, and a number of already established commercially-oriented farmers. When the project was moved to Mbala in the north, the site chosen was still one that had characteristics similar to those in Livingstone, except for rainfall and soils.

However, since the earlier approach could not achieve its goals, and as CIDA became more experienced in Zambia's agricultural development problems, a new approach was sought. CIDA became committed to reducing rural-urban inequality through raising rainfed wheat production. This was to be achieved by focussing on rainfed wheat production research geared towards small-scale farmers in peripheral areas within Northern Province. Major experimental sites were therefore set-up in Mpika, Isoka and Mbala districts. CIDA was probably learning some lessons from Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) who through the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) directs much of Swedish development assistance to peripheral areas in Northern, Luapula and Eastern Provinces.

While such perceptions of Zambia's agricultural development needs may dominate CIDA's policies and ultimately their project location and management, there are other factors which have an influence on the location of projects. CIDA supports a range of

Figure 6.2

Spatial Distribution of CIDA Projects in the Agricultural Sector



Lusaka has the following projects, Zam-Can, MAWD-PD, UNZA School of Agric. Sc., and Storage facilities

projects for which no single factor can explain why projects are located where they are. For instance, the nature of CIDA's institutional support to MAWD and human resource development at the UNZA's School of Agricultural Sciences leads it to support indirectly, nation-wide projects both in developed and less developed regions of the country, because UNZA graduates work all across the country. In addition, MAWD-PD planners, although mainly located in Lusaka, produce plans which relate to the whole country.

There are, therefore, a number of other factors which have influenced CIDA's location of its projects. Canadian skills, and thus the sort of projects they can ably support, may direct projects into particular sectors, and at times, even the locations of such projects. Availability of Canadian human resources featured prominently as a strong factor influencing the choice of sectors to concentrate on. This may have led to the choice of wheat development, since Canada has substantial resources in this field. Notwithstanding this however, it is difficult to find explanations for the earlier choice of Livingstone in the dry Southern Province for rainfed wheat, and the choice of a farm location which was not really favourable for wheat production in Mbala.

The nature of the fisheries development project meant that Lakes Mweru-Wa-Ntipa and Tanganyika were the natural location for such a project. These areas are endowed with good fishing grounds, but were constrained by their inaccessibility and long distances to potential markets in Lusaka and the Copperbelt Provinces. The choice of the feeder roads for fisheries project and its requirements, therefore, placed environmental limitations on its location.

The nature and magnitude of the maize and fertilizer storage sheds project and the pattern of agricultural development in the country had influence on the location of sheds. This is one project which by the end of Phase III had spread across the country, without too much concentration in one particular region. However, during Phases I and II, it is possible to identify a pattern which supports the earlier argument that CIDA has tended to



concentrate its assistance in already developed areas of the country. Because actual production figures and not the potential production figures, were used to calculate the number of required sheds per district, it is possible that only those areas which have been favoured by past policies and so are already high maize producers received most benefits from the project.

There are many areas which are currently not large maize producers, but which have high potential of becoming large producers if the necessary infrastructure were put in place. Such areas did not benefit from Phases I and II of this project (Figure 5.5; Table 5.6). During these phases, most sheds were located in Central and Southern Provinces which already have a well developed infrastructure. Meanwhile, in peripheral areas of Northern, Eastern and Luapula Provinces, produce continued to rot for lack of storage facilities because the sheds were mainly concentrated in Provincial headquarters (Sunday Times of Zambia, Oct. 10, 1989; Times of Zambia, Oct. 3, 1987; Zambia Daily Mail, October 9, 1987).

Availability of information and data for planning purposes is another important consideration which has influenced CIDA in its choice of project locations, although minimising the risk of project failure has been equally important. These two considerations appear to have been combined in CIDA's choice of Mbala, and later Isoka and Mpika districts in Northern Province for trials of rainfed wheat development. Northern Province may be seen as being peripheral and somewhat less developed than those along the "old" line of rail. However, at the same time, the "new" line of rail runs across this province and the districts CIDA has chosen for its experimental plots have a well developed road network with good rainfall and relatively fertile soils.

Given the considerations outlined above, CIDA's choice of specific locations for its projects is a difficult matter on which to generalise. In most cases, the competitive attitude among donors requires that a project be located away from those of other donors. From

the donor's point of view, aid projects must be visible, and so the absence of other donors' projects in the area is an important consideration. Hence within Zambia, most West German aid is concentrated in North-Western Province, the Dutch are in Western Province and the Norwegians are in Northern Province where Canadians are also concentrating their wheat development project. A related need is for projects to have good access to urban centres so that they are visible to political elites. This consideration is often reinforced by the over-reliance among aid projects upon imported material, expatriates and sometimes highly qualified local staff, for whom access to urban areas is important.

Specific information gathered through political contacts or aid staff may also influence project location, while perceptions among donor personnel, Zambian politicians and among planners about what constitutes a suitable location for a particular project are also often influential. Overall, such information tends to favour the more accessible and better known areas. Thus, although some Canadian aid is channelled to the least developed provinces, it is often the more developed areas within these provinces which benefit.

The concentration of CIDA's projects in one region may have its benefits if properly instituted. By focussing CIDA's aid in specific areas, it may be possible for a coherent provincial development policy to be established and for projects to be identified which are more responsive to local needs than are those designed for nationwide implementation. CIDA has also found the concentration of their assistance in one or two provinces, instead of dissipating it across the country attractive because it tends to strengthen their image and may allow projects and their staff to be mutually supportive. This is definitely evident in Northern Province where the Zam-Can Wheat Project's trial sites are concentrated. Cooperants located in Mpika, Kasama and Mbala easily visit each other's trial sites, meet to discuss the progress on these sites, and still return to their respective base within a day.

In terms of project distribution, Canada's aid has covered almost all regions both urban and rural. This has been due to various factors determining project location. For example, the fisheries project could only be located in rural Northern and Luapula Provinces because that is where the inaccessible, but rich fishing grounds were. The change in approach by projects such as Zam-Can's Phase III, and the storage sheds Phase III have helped in bringing CIDA projects to rural areas, but whether this has contributed towards reducing rural urban disparities is questionable. It is questionable because the new Zam-Can Wheat Project approach which has potential to contribute towards reducing rural-urban disparities is still in its experimental stage, at the same time as the project is being phased out. If the project's experimental stage succeeded, and if the project were to be sustained by MAWD, then one would conclude that the new approach would help in reducing rural-urban disparities by helping the small-scale rural farmers.

Based on explanations outlined above concerning the factors that influence spatial distribution of CIDA projects, it is possible to argue that CIDA's aid has had some impact on reducing rural-urban disparities in the country (Figure 6.2). This is supported purely by the distributions of CIDA projects which are seen to cover most parts of the country. As well, when benefits to small-scale farmers are considered, it is evident that some forms of Canadian aid has helped in reducing rural-urban disparities, particularly with regard to the maize and fertilizer storage sheds project, as now small-scale farmers have access to storage which they did not have prior to the project. Thus, even with difficulties of measuring rural-urban disparities, one can conclude that some forms of Canadian aid have contributed positively towards reducing rural-urban disparities.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSIONS

Zambia has been a beneficiary of aid in the form of emergency assistance since the 1960s. However, since the mid 1970s, it has relied increasingly on foreign assistance for its development programmes. Zambia's geopolitical position within Southern Africa was identified as a major motivating factor for donors to increase the flow of foreign assistance. Another motivating factor was the serious economic and financial difficulties that the country had been facing, especially since the mid 1970s and during the 1980s. The principal causes of economic hardship have been both external and internal. External causes included declining copper prices, negative terms of trade, rising oil prices, and the indirect costs of the liberation wars in Southern Africa. Internal shortcomings which included the government's failure to adjust to the external realities, and its implementation of unfavourable policies have exacerbated the economic problems. Some of the widely cited examples of such policies include excessive state intervention in the economy, an over-valued exchange rate, and low prices for agricultural and export commodities.

Deteriorating world copper prices have had a tremendously negative impact on the economy because copper is Zambia's dominant export commodity. Falling copper prices have in turn affected the balance of payments and have resulted in budget deficits. Ever-rising production costs of copper and the dwindling reserve base have resulted in falling copper output which has exacerbated the situation.

Zambia has been a beneficiary of Canadian foreign assistance since the early 1960s. In the thesis, the development of Canadian development assistance to Zambia and its subsequent characteristics are related to the country's geopolitical position in Southern Africa. Zambia's geopolitical position and its membership in the British Commonwealth

were major factors motivating Canada's early assistance to Zambia. Evidence was clearly presented in Chapter Four that Zambia's geopolitical situation and its membership in the Commonwealth played a determining role in Canada's provision of aid to Zambia. It can therefore be concluded that Canadian foreign assistance to Zambia has been mostly politically motivated. Because of this, it has been shown how earlier Canadian development assistance took more of a political character than an economic or commercial one.

Canadian development assistance has had varying implications for Zambia's ability to strengthen its independence in the Southern African region. As well, it has had diverse implications on Zambia's need to pursue some form of independent development, while at the same time remaining a strong supporter of the liberation struggle in Southern Africa.

Thus, Canadian aid began as part of Britain's efforts to help Zambia search for alternative routes for its exports and imports following Rhodesia's UDI and the subsequent border closure. It was shown that this assistance was mostly temporary and involved air lifting oil into the country. However, when the question of constructing a railway to the East African coast of Dar es Salaam arose, a feasibility study conducted by a British and Canadian team recommended against it. The construction of such a railway was to be a lasting solution to the transport problem that Zambia faced at the time. Nonetheless, because of larger Western interests at play at the time, it was not in their interest to see Zambia becoming totally independent of South Africa. On the same question of Zambia becoming totally independent of its Southern neighbours, the temporary nature of Canadian aid is evident in Zambia Railways management contract which concentrated on improving management but did not address the deeper issue of making the country independent of its Southern neighbours. Although this project helped to streamline operations, the fact that Zambia Railways' main lines still run to the south meant that it was futile to use the lines for as long as no political solution to the Southern African political problem was found.

This clearly shows that although Canada came to Zambia's rescue following UDI, the nature of its assistance was temporary and thus did not go far enough to make Zambia independent in the Southern African politics.

During Rhodesia's rebellion, Canadian leaders, using the Commonwealth Conferences as their platform, acted as mediators between Britain and the Afro-Asian-Caribbean countries, which included Zambia, in attempts to resolve the Rhodesian crisis. During the Commonwealth Conferences held in the late 1960s, the Afro-Asian-Caribbean countries were urging Britain to apply tougher measures to end the crisis. However, in its mediation efforts on the Rhodesian rebellion, Canada's support for the British position was stronger than its support for the Afro-Asian-Caribbean countries. Notwithstanding the apparent support for the British position, the thesis has shown that Canada managed to moderate the British stand while at the same time defuse the Afro-Asian-Caribbean countries' call for military intervention in Rhodesia. Ultimately, because of Canada's negotiating skills, both Britain and Afro-Asian-Caribbean countries agreed to have economic sanctions applied against Rhodesia.

During negotiations of a peaceful settlement of the Rhodesian crisis, Canadian support for larger Western interests in the region were stronger than its support for the interests of the Afro-Asian-Caribbean countries. Associated with Canada's support for British, and accordingly, Western countries' position in the Southern African politics, is the question of their commitment to enforcing sanctions. The thesis showed how ineffective the economic sanctions were in ending UDI because Western countries, including Canada, did not enforce them. Consequently, countries such as South Africa, Mozambique and Portugal deliberately broke the sanctions regulations, but were not accordingly censured.

Although Canadian aid began purely as a political tool to preserve Western countries' interests in Southern Africa in the 1960s, Canada has continued to provide

Zambia with various forms of foreign assistance throughout the 1970s and 1980s. However, during much of this period, commercial considerations were the principal motivating factors. Consequently, it has been argued in the thesis that Canada's political and commercial considerations have been influential in determining the size and the characteristics of its development assistance to Zambia. These two considerations have also influenced the choice of projects, such as the maize and fertilizer storage sheds and the feeder roads for fisheries development, in which Canada has directed its development assistance.

In the late 1970s and during the 1980s, Canadian aid aimed at helping Zambia finance its development programme because its own revenue from copper continued to decline. Providing Zambia with Canadian technical assistance has been an important way of achieving this. During the 1980s, Canadian technical assistance to the University of Zambia's School of Agricultural Sciences increased the standards and quality of education offered in the school. It also allowed Zambians to be trained at Canadian universities. However, there have been some aspects of technical assistance, such as some inexperienced personnel to the Zam-Can Wheat Project, which have had a negative impact on the development efforts.

Most of the discussion of Canadian development assistance has been in relation to Zambia's agricultural sector. Chapter Three discussed pre-independent agricultural policies and performance in the country. During pre-independent Zambia, agricultural development was unevenly promoted with the "line of rail" provinces receiving almost all agricultural support than other provinces. The situation in post-independent Zambia has not changed much; the "line of rail" provinces have continued to be favoured, while small-scale farmers scattered in other parts of the country have received very little support from the government.

Zambia's failure to diversify its economy from an over-reliance on mining has contributed tremendously to its imbalanced pattern of development. Related to this has been its failure to develop the agricultural sector which has resulted in a failure to increase food production. This thesis has addressed three related questions with regard to Canada's foreign assistance to the agricultural sector. The first question dealt with whether or not Canadian assistance has helped to reduce rural-urban disparities. The second dealt with the appropriateness of CIDA projects in relation to Zambia's socio-economic condition. Third, the question of the sustainability of Canadian projects in the agricultural sector was addressed. The thesis has shown that Canada's development assistance to Zambia's agricultural sector has had both positive and negative impacts on Zambia's agricultural development efforts. Examples of projects that have made a positive contribution include the third phase of the maize and fertilizer storage project, and to some extent, the feeder roads for fisheries project. On the other hand, the Zam-Can Wheat Project's Phases I and II was identified as the largest failure for Canadian aid to Zambia. Overall, Canada has provided funds which have compensated for the general decline in government spending in this sector. It has also undertaken to evaluate its projects, an undertaking which might have been neglected by the Zambian government due to its worsening economic conditions. However, Canada's involvement in the agricultural sector has brought with it a new organisational form for agricultural development ---projectisation--- from which many lessons have been, and are still being learnt.

With regard to the impact of CIDA projects on reducing rural-urban disparities, one argument that was advanced in the thesis was that Canadian development assistance has generally conformed to Zambia's overall development strategy of focussing on urban development at the expense of the rural areas. In this respect, it was argued that Canadian aid has reinforced Zambia's development strategy with its bias towards development in urban areas and secondly, in the corridor along the old "line of rail." Thus, Canadian



concentration on capital assistance for Zambia Railways, Phase I and II of the maize and fertilizer storage sheds, Phase I and II of the Zam-Can Wheat project, all conformed to Zambia's pattern of development. Therefore, Canadian development assistance, just like Zambia's development strategy, has failed to assist the poor in rural areas and has reinforced Zambia's imbalanced pattern of development. One can therefore conclude that whatever the explicit intentions of Canada's foreign assistance, in the long term, it has not provided the kind of assistance which could help in reducing Zambia's rural-urban disparities.

There has been a noticeable change in CIDA's development programme since the mid 1980s. Its new thrust is aimed at benefiting small-scale farmers in Zambia's peripheral province, such as is manifested in Phase III of the Zam-Can Wheat Project. To some extent, it was also evident in the final phase of the maize and fertilizer storage sheds project. The new approaches followed during Phase III of the Zam-Can Wheat Project and the final phase of the storage project were sensitive to rural areas and small-scale farmers. However, these new approaches were a result of the massive failure of the original approach for the Zam-Can Wheat Project, and the need to expend the budget monies, in the case of both projects. The analysis of the Zam-Can Wheat Project has, therefore, shown that although the new approaches are welcome, they have come too late and are too limited to have any meaningful impact on small-scale farmers in Northern Province. It is too late because the project is to end in 1990, and too limited because the new approach was conceived as a way of expending the money allocated towards the project in the budget and finishing the number of years in the contracts of the cooperants.

In terms of the appropriateness of Canadian development assistance to the agricultural sector, it was found that CIDA projects have encountered a number of problems including those of integration and standardisation in relation to other MAWD programmes and to its administrative structure. The nature of most CIDA projects,

particularly their high input and high profile characteristics have also resulted in supporting projects which contrast strongly with those supported by MAWD.

The inappropriate nature of CIDA projects arises mostly during project preparation and appraisal stage. During this stage, CIDA often plans for inputs to come from Canada because of their tied-by-procurement consideration. As well, the focus of the Zam-Can Wheat project, the feeder roads for fisheries development project and the maize and fertilizer storage project were usually economic and commercial benefits for Canada rather than socio-economic benefits for Zambia.

Related to the question of project appropriateness to Zambia's socio-economic situation is whether or not projects supported by CIDA can be sustained by GRZ after CIDA's departure. This question was addressed in Chapters Five and Six and it was concluded that because of Canada's reliance on Canadian professionals and the large Canadian content in project inputs, most projects cannot be sustained after CIDA hands them over to the Zambian government. It was also argued that the separate administrative structures followed by CIDA and GRZ during project implementation contribute strongly to the unsustainability of projects. This is because by the time projects are handed over to GRZ, no Zambians have been close enough to the projects to know how to effectively run them. As well, too much reliance on inputs requiring foreign currency which Zambia cannot afford will mean that such projects will be neglected until they collapse. It is therefore suggested that CIDA should try to use inputs with a more local or regional content.

The lack of sustainability of CIDA projects is also a result of the way they were designed and implemented, which is itself a result of the way CIDA performs the project cycle. One factor influencing project cycle performance is the mechanisms involved in project administration by CIDA and GRZ. However, the organisation structure between CIDA and GRZ does not allow for effective consultations when a project runs through the

various stages of a project cycle. More involvement of both Canadian and Zambian personnel in the implementation of a project cycle, particularly during the important stages of project design, appraisal, implementation, and evaluation would remove some of these problems. The design of projects by Canadians based in Canada who may not know Zambia well without much input from Zambians, has a negative impact on the appropriateness and sustainability of projects implemented in Zambia.

These experiences suggest that in all stages of a project cycle, a more comprehensive perspective that includes both Canadians and Zambians is needed. The perspective needed during these stages should be one which considers the implications of the Canadian-content on the projects, and in particular their impact within MAWD. However, it is apparent from the study that CIDA has found the administration of its projects is better facilitated by keeping them separate from the MAWD administration. There is evidence, nevertheless, that this approach is good only in the short term while CIDA is in the country, and is not sustainable in the long run after CIDA completes its programme.

It was suggested that one way of making projects sustainable is to design and implement them in such a way that they would be generating their own funds after completion. This is possible for projects such as Zam-Can Wheat, maize and fertilizer storage sheds, and even for the feeder roads for fisheries development. By their very nature, projects such as UNZA School of Agricultural Sciences and MAWD-PD will have to rely on GRZ for their sustainability. However, for those projects which can generate their own funds, what is needed is that they be designed to have some meaningful commercial relations, such as emphasis on trade or joint ventures. At present, commercial assistance has come to Zambia mostly as a part of Canada's foreign assistance programme or as an offshoot of the promotional efforts of other Canadian government agencies. Thus,

what is referred to as commercial relations between the two countries in this thesis is in reality a result of tying aid by procurement.

There are also lessons to be learned with respect to the internal aspects of CIDA projects. In particular, it must be recognised that CIDA's influence is very strong in feasibility studies and the evaluation of projects. However, some of the terms of references used in evaluations, such as whether or not the budgeted money was being utilised on schedule for the Zam-Can Wheat project, were wrong because they did not take Zambia's overall socio-economic conditions into account. The use of such inappropriate criteria created unbearable pressure on the Zam-Can Wheat Project as was exemplified by the rushed way in which it was implemented which failed to consider climatic and soil factors. Thus, a poorly conducted feasibility study, and the evaluations with inappropriate terms of reference which did not take Zambia's socio-economic setting into consideration resulted in the project failing to achieve the set goals.

Consequently, there is need for strengthening Zambian inputs into project design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation and for greater Zambian technical contribution into the decision making concerning all aspects of a project cycle. MAWD must also attempt to more effectively sensitise Canada to the criteria which it finds most important in project selection, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation and try to counterbalance the political pressures which are brought to bear by Canada on their projects.

Finally, it is recommended that in future Canada should increasingly direct its funds into programmes, rather than into projects. Such programmes can be developed from those which already exist within MAWD. This would have three benefits. First, in many ways, this would ease the problems which foreign funded projects have created from the Zambian perspective, such as dependency on expensive foreign inputs rather than on cheaper local or regional inputs. Second, such an approach would allow for a more coherent approach to

agricultural development, which is highly desirable for the country now. Third, it would facilitate greater Zambian input in project selection, design, monitoring and evaluation, and help ensure that more appropriate criteria dominate in the whole project cycle performance. Such a change seems appropriate given the very poor prospects for the Zambian economy which threaten the continuation of major government services and raise doubts about the costly, high input, selective area projects approach. An approach that allows CIDA to develop its programmes from those which already exist in MAWD would also be less dangerous from the Zambian point of view today than in the past, as Canada now recognises the need for long term assistance to the country and so might be willing to make commitments for several years at a time. However, as with so much of aid, it is political considerations which weigh heavily and it remains to be seen whether the Canadian government's priorities can be subordinated to those of Zambia's agricultural development.

APPENDICES

## APPENDIX I


Copper Price/tonne 1964-1985; Copper Production 1964-1989 and Cost of Producing a tonne of Copper 1964-1979.

Year	Price perTonne (ZK)	Price perTonne (US \$)	Production in Tonnes	Cost per Tonne (ZK)	Cost per Tonne (US \$)
1964	693	1,940	644,000	292	818
1965	925	2,590	686,000	330	924
1966	1,091	3,055	588,000	436	1,221
1967	811	2,271	619,000	407	1,140
1968	887	1,242	660,000	440	616
1969	1,048	1,467	755,000	353	494
1970	1,011	1,415	686,000	518	725
1971	767	1,074	636,000	563	788
1972	765	1,070	701,000	572	801
1973	1,156	1,797	683,000	650	1,010
1974	1,327	2,062	709,000	786	1,222
1975	794	1,234	648,000	852	1,324
1976	1,007	1,269	712,000	958	1,207
1977	1,016	1,337	659,000	1,034	1,361
1978	1,090	1,385	654,000	1,191	1,513
1979	1,572	2,019	584,000	1,485	1,906
1980	1,719	2,183	609,000		
1981	1,514	1,741	560,000		
1982	1,374	1,484	592,000		
1983	1,985	1,588	576,000		
1984	2,500	1,400	551,000		
1985	4,472	1,655	480,000		
1986			474,000		
1987			450,000		
1988			415,000		
1989			450,000		

Sources: GRZ, (1975a-1986a); World Bank, (1984); NCDP (1984; 1986a)

Notes: Some foreign exchange conversions have been calculated by the author using Zambian official exchange rates.

APPENDIX II  
The Project Cycle





## APPENDIX III

THE CIDA/ZAMBIA PROGRAMME STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE

This questionnaire forms part of the information collecting process about the CIDA/Zambia programme. It seeks to tap the knowledge of CIDA officers within a structured format. It is being administered to a sample of CIDA officers who have been involved in the Zambian programme during the 1970-1980s period. A questionnaire has been chosen at this stage because it was felt that it would be less time consuming than personal interviews. It is therefore, designed in such a way that it would minimise both the time and effort involved in filling it out. It is also felt that responding to it will be an interesting and useful exercise for the respondents.

FUTURE INTERVIEWS AND CONFIDENTIALITY.

After reviewing the filled in questionnaires, follow-up interviews will be held with a few selected respondents. For this purpose therefore, would you please identify any questions which you would like to have further oral discussions with an asterisk (\*) in the left hand margin. It is, however, hoped that you will make liberal use of the large space left for comments. All information collected in this questionnaire will be kept strictly confidential and results will be published for academic purposes only, or provided to CIDA only in processed form.

EXAMPLE OF QUESTIONS

There is only one type of scale used throughout the questionnaire. It is a 5 point scale (0, 1, 2, 3, 4) ranging from the lowest to the highest. 2 is considered as the average. You are requested to circle the most appropriate number.

**Part I : Respondent general data sheet**

1. Respondent number \_\_\_\_\_

2. When were you closely involved with the CIDA - Zambia programme? 19\_\_ to 19\_\_

3. Would you please specify what positions you held during this period?

01 \_\_\_\_\_

02 \_\_\_\_\_

03 \_\_\_\_\_

4. Would you please indicate in what sectors you were directly involved during the specified time period?

01 \_\_\_\_\_

02 \_\_\_\_\_

03 \_\_\_\_\_

5. Would you please name the projects in which you were directly involved during the specified time period?

01 \_\_\_\_\_

02 \_\_\_\_\_

03 \_\_\_\_\_

6. During the specified time period, were you also indirectly involved in other sectors and projects? Please comment.

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7. Were you ever involved with the CIDA - Zambia programme at times other than during the period identified in question 4?

01. Yes \_\_\_\_\_

02. No \_\_\_\_\_

7b. If "yes" please describe your involvement: \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

**Part II : Aid allocation policies.**

The criteria outlined in the Government's Strategy for International Development Cooperation 1975 -1980 still remain the guidelines for allocation of Canada's bilateral assistance. However, with the changing international economic situation, the crisis in Africa and the different development needs among the recipients, attention is given to some particular criteria among the general guidelines.

Questions 1 to 8 therefore, seek to yield information on the factors considered important in choosing Zambia as a recipient of Canadian development assistance and the sectors and projects that are considered important for Zambia's development needs.

**A. Country concentration.**

1. Zambia is one of the African countries in which Canada concentrates its development assistance programme. Would you please rate the relative importance which you think each of the underlisted considerations has had in influencing Canada's decision to include Zambia in this group?

	DEGREE OF IMPORTANCE				
	none		average		utmost
a. Zambia's development needs .....	0	1	2	3	4
b. Zambia's development policies .....	0	1	2	3	4
c. Zambia's past development performance ....	0	1	2	3	4
d. Canada's political-diplomatic considerations	0	1	2	3	4
e. Canadian commercial benefits .....	0	1	2	3	4
f. Other donors' activities in Zambia .....	0	1	2	3	4

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

**B. Objectives of Canadian development assistance.**

2. Please rate the relative importance that you think each of the factors below has had in the general conception of the Zambian programme (choice of sectors, projects and ultimate regional location).

Canadian aid should support:	Relative importance of factors				
	none		average		utmost
a. Economic growth in Zambia -----	0	1	2	3	4
b. Reducing spatial inequalities -----	0	1	2	3	4
c. Canada's political-diplomatic objectives ---	0	1	2	3	4
d. Canadian commercial benefits -----	0	1	2	3	4

3. Please list any CIDA level objectives which are not listed above, but which you judge to be important.

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**C. Level and appropriateness of staff skills.**

4. How would you assess the level and appropriateness of the skills of the staff that CIDA has directed towards the Zambian programme in terms of the following balance of skill?

	ADEQUACY OF SKILLS				
	none		average		very adequate
b. Technical skills -----	0	1	2	3	4
c. Knowledge of Zambia					
-Book knowledge -----	0	1	2	3	4
-Previous field experience -----	0	1	2	3	4
d. Knowledge of other African countries					
-Book knowledge -----	0	1	2	3	4
-Previous field experience -----	0	1	2	3	4
e. Cross cultural relations -----	0	1	2	3	4
(To reduce cultural shock)					

Comments:

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5. Please make an assessment of development assistance that CIDA has brought on the following sectors in relation to Zambia's development needs on one hand and Canadian capabilities on the other.

	Zambia's development needs					Canadian capabilities				
	none	1	2	3	4	none	1	2	3	4
a. Agricultural and rural development.....	0	1	2	3	4	0	1	2	3	4
b. Education .....	0	1	2	3	4	0	1	2	3	4
c. Transport and communi_ cations .....	0	1	2	3	4	0	1	2	3	4
d. Public health .....	0	1	2	3	4	0	1	2	3	4
e. Other(s) (specify) .....	0	1	2	3	4	0	1	2	3	4

6. Do you believe there are sectors which are currently not given priority by CIDA, but which in fact should be?

01. Yes \_\_\_\_\_

02. No \_\_\_\_\_

6b If "yes" please specify these sectors and comment: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

**D. Planning and programming.**

7. How would you rate CIDA's planning and programming efforts for Zambia in the following respects?

	none	1	2	3	4
a. Coordination with other donors to Zambia -----	0	1	2	3	4
b. Coordination with Zambian planners -----	0	1	2	3	4
c. Efforts to reduce spatial inequalities -----	0	1	2	3	4
d. Efforts to fill gaps not supported by other donors or Zambian government -----	0	1	2	3	4
e. Need for continuity in sectors of emphasis even after CIDA's departure -----	0	1	2	3	4

Comments : \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

**Part III : Sectors and project selection.**

Question 8 to 16 seek to generate information on the factors that are considered important in sector and project selection and the merits and demerits of these factors in the CIDA - Zambia programme.

8. With reference to the time period during which you were involved with the Zambian programme, assess the degree to which you think the following factors played in the choice of the sectors to concentrate on.

	none		average		very much
a. Zambia's good performance in that sector----	0	1	2	3	4
b. Zambia's poor performance in that sector ----	0	1	2	3	4
c. Zambia's need and potential in that sector----	0	1	2	3	4
d. Need to reduce spatial inequalities -----	0	1	2	3	4
e. Availability of Canadian resources -----	0	1	2	3	4
f. Canadian political _diplomatic considerations	0	1	2	3	4
g. Commercial benefits to Canada -----	0	1	2	3	4

Comments : \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

9. Through your own personal experience with the CIDA - Zambia programme, how would you rate the degree of overall sectorial concentration?

inadequate                      average                      optimal  
 0                      1                      2                      3                      4

9b. Please give reasons for your judgement : \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

10. What is your opinion about the amount of time invested in the selection and/or approval of sectors on which to concentrate on?

inadequate                      average                      optimal  
 0                      1                      2                      3                      4

10b. Give reasons for your judgement : \_\_\_\_\_

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Degree of confidence in response of Question 10:    very low         average         very high  
   0            1            2            3            4

**E. Considerations taken into account when selecting and/or approving projects.**

11. Assess the degree to which the factors listed below were influential in the selection and/or approval of projects during the period you were involved with the Zambian programme.

Degree of importance of factors.

	none		average		utmost
a. Zambia's viable development plans .....	0	1	2	3	4
b. Zambia's development performance .....	0	1	2	3	4
c. Zambia's programme objectives as determined by CIDA .....	0	1	2	3	4
d. Need to reduce spatial inequalities .....	0	1	2	3	4
e. Availability of Canadian resources .....	0	1	2	3	4
f. Canadian political _ diplomatic considerations .....	0	1	2	3	4
g. Commercial benefits to Canada .....	0	1	2	3	4

Comments : \_\_\_\_\_

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12 Give your opinion about the amount of time invested in preparing projects for approval

          inadequate            average            optimal  
          0            1            2            3            4

12b. Degree of confidence in response :        very low         average         very high  
   0            1            2            3            4

Comments : \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

13. Name one or more projects (in their order of perceived importance) that exemplify what in your opinion is a relatively adequate selection and/or approval process. Briefly explain your reasons for these choices.

Name(s) of project(s): \_\_\_\_\_

Reasons for your choice: \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

14. Name one or more projects (in their order of perceived importance) that in your opinion were characterised by a relatively inadequate selection and/or approval process. Briefly explain your reasons for these choices.

Names of projects: \_\_\_\_\_

Reasons for your choice: \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

**F. Project design and execution.**

15. In your view, how much consideration has CIDA generally given to the following factors when designing and/or approving projects for Zambia?

DEGREE OF CONSIDERATION

none          average          very much

- |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| a. Appropriateness to Zambian needs -----     | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| b. Need for continuity of projects even after |   |   |   |   |   |



CIDA's departure -----	0	1	2	3	4
c. Flexibility of design to allow for any required changes when encountering new constraint information, etc. -----	0	1	2	3	4
d. Reducing tying by procurement to make aid more effective -----	0	1	2	3	4
e. Sufficient technical assistance to ensure appropriate training of Zambia personnel -----	0	1	2	3	4
f. Institutional and human resource limitations in Zambia -----	0	1	2	3	4
g. Socio - political constraints to reaching the poorest regions -----	0	1	2	3	4

Comments : \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

**G. Some potential problems in the effective running of the programme and CIDA's response.**

16. In your view, how have the following potential problems in the CIDA - Zambia programme influenced the performance of the programme?

Potential problems	Degree of influence on performance				
	0	1	2	3	4
a. Poor project proposals by Zambia -----	0	1	2	3	4
b. Projects not identified or chosen by Zambia ----	0	1	2	3	4
c. Poor management by the Zambian government --	0	1	2	3	4
d. Poor management by CIDA or CIDA consultants --	0	1	2	3	4
e. CIDA's failure to use Zambian consultants -----	0	1	2	3	4
f. Lack of coordination between Zambian and CIDA personnel -----	0	1	2	3	4
g. Lack of spare parts when and where necessary ---	0	1	2	3	4
h. Other(s) (specify) -----	0	1	2	3	4
	0	1	2	3	4

Comments : \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

## Part IV : Programme performance, effectiveness and impact.

This part comprising of questions 17 to 22 will seek to yield data on what stated objectives have been fulfilled and what sectors and projects can be considered as winners and which ones have been losers.

### H. Fulfilment of stated programme objectives.

17. With reference to your experience with the CIDA - Zambia programme, indicate the extent to which you think the programme has been effective in satisfying the following objectives.

	none		average		utmost
a. Reaching out to poorest regions .....	0	1	2	3	4
b. Considering spatial inequalities when locating projects .....	0	1	2	3	4
c. Increasing short-term commercial benefits for Canada .....	0	1	2	3	4
d. Increasing long term commercial benefits .....	0	1	2	3	4

Comments : \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

### I. Most successful sectors.

18. In which sectors do you think the CIDA - Zambia programme has been most successful?

Names of sectors: \_\_\_\_\_

Criteria for judging high success : \_\_\_\_\_

Notable reasons for success: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

**J. Least successful sectors.**

19. In which sectors do you think the CIDA - Zambia programme has not been so successful?

Name(s) of sectors: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Criteria for judging low success: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Notable reasons for low success: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

**K. Most successful project(s).**

20. Name the project(s) which you consider to be the most successful.

Name(s) of project(s): \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Criteria for judging success: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Notable reasons for the success: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

**Least successful project(s).**

21. Name the project(s) in which you think the CIDA \_ Zambia programme has been relatively less successful.

Name(s) of project(s): \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Criteria for judging low success: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
Notable reasons for low success: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Comments : \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

**M. Most Innovative project(s).**

22. In your opinion, which projects merit special attention because of their innovative nature (whether they were successful or not). State what the innovative features were/are, also indicate whether the project was actually successful or not.

Name of project	State innovative features and whether project successful or not.
_____	_____
	_____
	_____
	_____

Degree of confidence in response :    very low                  average                  very high  
   0                    1                    2                    3                    4

**Part V : General.**

Questions 23 to 24 are very general, seeking information about the various CIDA officers' experiences with the CIDA - Zambia programme.

23. From your personal experience with the CIDA - Zambia programme, please assess the evolution of CIDA's overall performance in the following areas during the 1980s. (Any comments you might make concerning changes which have taken place from the 1970s would also be appreciated).

AMOUNT OF IMPROVEMENT  
 none                    some                    tremendous

- |  |       |       |       |
|--|-------|-------|-------|
| a. Knowledge of Zambia's development needs ---   | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| b. Ability to accomodate Zambia's priorities --- | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| c. Appropriateness of technical assistance ----  | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| d. Coordination with other donors -----          | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| e. Procedures for selecting sectors -----        | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| f. Procedures for selecting projects -----       | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| g. Ability to reduce spatial inequalities-----   | _____ | _____ | _____ |

Comments : \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

24. If there were certain things that you would like changed in the CIDA - Zambia programme, what would they be?

\_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

*Thank you very much for your cooperation.*

## APPENDIX IV: QUESTIONNAIRE TO ZAMBIAN PERSONNEL

SECTION 1 : RESPONDENT GENERAL INFORMATION SHEET.

1. Respondent number \_\_\_\_\_

2. Ministry \_\_\_\_\_

3. Current position held \_\_\_\_\_

4. When were you closely involved with the CIDA / Zambia programme? 19\_\_ to 19\_\_

5. Would you please specify the positions you held during this period?

01. \_\_\_\_\_

02. \_\_\_\_\_

03. \_\_\_\_\_

6. Would you please indicate in what sectors you were directly involved during the specified time period?

01. \_\_\_\_\_

02. \_\_\_\_\_

03. \_\_\_\_\_

7. Would you please name the projects in which you were /are directly involved?

01. \_\_\_\_\_

02. \_\_\_\_\_

03. \_\_\_\_\_

8. Were you ever involved with the CIDA / Zambia programme at times other than during the period you indicated in Question 4?

01. Yes \_\_\_\_\_

02. No \_\_\_\_\_

8b. If "Yes" please describe your involvement \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

SECTION II : THE PROJECT CYCLE.

Each project passes through a cycle. The project cycle involves a number of phases or stages identified as first, project identification, secondly, design and appraisal, third is implementation and finally evaluation.

9. With reference to the time period during which you were involved with Canadian aid to Zambia, please assess the degree to which you think the following factors played in the choice of the sectors to concentrate on.

	none		average	utmost
a). Zambia's good performance in that sector .....	0	1	2 3	4
b). Zambia's poor performance in that sector .....	0	1	2 3	4
c). Zambia's need and potential in that sector .....	0	1	2 3	4
d). Need to reduce spatial inequalities .....	0	1	2 3	4
e). Canadian political-diplomatic considerations .....	0	1	2 3	4

Comments : \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

10. With reference to the time period during which you were involved with the programme, assess the degree of the role that Zambia played in the following activities.

	none		average	utmost
a).Sector selection .....	0	1	2 3	4
b). Project selection .....	0	1	2 3	4
c). Implementation of selected projects .....	0	1	2 3	4
d). Evaluation of projects .....	0	1	2 3	4

Comments : \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

11. Based on your personal experience with the programme, the degree of co-ordination in overall programme cycle performance (e.g. sector selection, project design, general implementation and evaluation) between Canada and Zambia has been:

Inadequate		average		optimal
0	1	2	3	4

12. Please explain your reasons for your judgement : \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

Examples pertaining to co-ordination and the process of project cycle performance.

13. Name one or more projects that exemplify what you consider to be a relatively thorough co-ordination process in project cycle performance.

Name of project(s) : \_\_\_\_\_  
 Reasons for your choice : \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

14. Name one or more projects that were characterised by a relatively inadequate co-ordination process in the project cycle performance. Give reasons for your choice(s).

Name of projects : \_\_\_\_\_  
 Reasons for the choice : \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

15. Disregarding whether or not there is any co-ordination between Canada and Zambia, how much consideration has CIDA generally given to the following factors as can be seen from the way sectors are selected and project cycle performed?

	none		average		utmost
a). Appropriateness to Zambian needs .....	0	1	2	3	4
b). Need for continuity of projects even after CIDA's departure (sustainability).....	0	1	2	3	4
c). Flexibility in design to allow for any changes when encountering new constraints, information, etc. ....	0	1	2	3	4
d). Sufficient technical aid to ensure appropriate training of Zambian personnel .....	0	1	2	3	4
e). Reducing regional inequalities .....	0	1	2	3	4



Comments : \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

16. In your opinion, how have the following potential problems influenced the performance of the CIDA / Zambia programme?

Degree of negative impact on performance

	none		average		high
a). Poor project proposals by Zambia .....	0	1	2	3	4
b). Projects not identified or chosen by Zambia .	0	1	2	3	4
c). Poor management by Zambian government ..	0	1	2	3	4
d). Poor management by CIDA / consultants .....	0	1	2	3	4
e). CIDA's failure to use Zambian consultants....	0	1	2	3	4
f). Lack of co-ordination between CIDA and Zamb.	0	1	2	3	4
g). Others (specify) .....	0	1	2	3	4
	0	1	2	3	4

Comments . \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

**SECTION III : PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE AND IMPACT.**

**Most and least successful sector(s).**

17. In which sectors do you think the programme has been most successful?

Sector(s) : \_\_\_\_\_

17b. Please give your criteria of success and some notable reasons for the success :

\_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

18. In which sector(s) do you think the programme has been least successful?

Sector(s) : \_\_\_\_\_

18b. Please give your criteria of low success and some notable reasons for the failure :

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Most successful and least successful projects.

19. In your opinion, what are the most successful CIDA project(s)?

Project(s) : \_\_\_\_\_

19b. Please indicate the factors for your judgement and specify notable reasons for the success: \_\_\_\_\_

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20. In your opinion, what are the least successful CIDA project(s)?

Project(s) : \_\_\_\_\_

20b. Please indicate the factors for your judgement and specify notable reasons for the low success : \_\_\_\_\_

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21. In your opinion, which CIDA project(s) merit special attention because of their innovative nature, regardless of whether they were successful or not. State what innovative features were /are , also indicate whether the project was actually successful or not.

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22. If there were certain things that you would like changed in the CIDA / Zambia programme, what would they be?

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23. If you feel you are familiar enough with the relationships of Zambia and foreign donors, please comment on whether Zambia has any policy towards bilateral aid.

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*Thank you very much for your co-operation*

## APPENDIX V; LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

1. Mr. Beadle, R. Manager, CIDA Zambia Desk
2. Mr. Olson, K. Projects officer, Zambia Desk, CIDA
3. Ms. Molson, A. Projects officer, Zambia Desk, CIDA
4. Mr. Lemp, C. CIDA
5. Ms. Epp, L. CIDA
6. Ms. Crerar, C. CIDA
7. Ms. McAllister, B. CIDA briefing and orientation programme
8. Ms. Martin, J. CIDA briefing and orientation programme
9. Mr. Young, R. the North-South Institute
10. Mr. Bellows, E. Consultant
11. Mr. Gilchrist, V. Consultant
12. Prof. Anglin, D. University of Carleton
13. Mrs. Baser, H. Agriculture Canada
14. Dr. Mackenzie, J. Director, MAWD-PD project
15. Mr. Benoit, R. Agriculture Canada
16. Mr. Murphy, L. MAWD-PD project
17. Mr. Singhal, I. Agriculture Canada
18. Mr. Suskin, B. Pringle Engineering, Montreal, Maize and fertilizer storage sheds
19. Mr. Ramachandran, C. Pringle Eng., Montreal, Maize and fertilizers storage sheds
20. Mr. Webster, J. Director, Zam-Can Wheat project
21. Mr. Pim, B. Deputy High Commissioner to Zambia
22. Dr. Temba, J. UNZA Project/Zam-Can Wheat Project/consultant
23. Mr. Mulele, MAWD/Consultant
24. Dr. Muleya, MAWD-PD Director

23. Mrs. Dickie, A. MAWD Projects monitoring section
24. Mr. Silwamba, MAWD, Projects monitoring section
25. Mr. Johnson, W. MAWD-PD project
26. Ms. Keller, B. MAWD
27. Mr. Soko, M. MAWD
28. Mr. Banda, A. Section Head, Technical assistance, MAWD-PD
29. Mr. Burton, J. MAWD-PD project
30. Ms. Kasalu, E. MAWD-PD Project
31. Ms. Chenoweth, F. MAWD-PD/USAID
32. Mr. Mwanaumo, A. MAWD-PD
33. Mr. Carvalho, Programme officer, UNDP
34. Mr. Schroll, UNDP
35. Mr. Siame, NCDP, Technical cooperation Department
36. Mr. Zulu, B. NCDP Technical Cooperation Department
37. Mr. Zulu, L. NCDP
38. Mrs. Ntalasha, C. NCDP
39. Prof. Mwauluka, K. Vice Chancellor, UNZA
40. Dr. Mwenya, UNZA
41. Dr. Mwape, F. UNZA
42. Dr. Lungu, J. UNZA
43. Dr. Milimo, J. Director, Rural Development Studies Bureau, UNZA
44. Dr. Chinene, V. UNZA
45. Dr. Smith, B. UNZA project
46. Dr. Devlin, T. UNZA project
47. Dr. Sichalwe, K. UNZA
48. Mr. Proud, B. Team Leader, Zam-Can Wheat project

49. Mr. Aulakh, B. Zam-Can Wheat Project
50. Mr. Gilliland, G. Zam-Can Wheat project
51. Ms. Namwila, J. Zam-Can Wheat Project; Ph.D candidate
52. Ms. Mugara, M. Zam-Can Wheat Project
53. Mr. Sikasote, G. Zam-Can Wheat Project
54. Mr. Hangala, M. Zam-Can Wheat Project
55. Mr. Hill, H. Zam-Can Wheat Project
56. Mr. Ngoma, H. Zam-Can Wheat Project
57. Mr. W. Kunda, farmer,
58. Mr. Muleya, farmer
59. Mr. Lwanga, C. farmer
60. Mr. Chanda, farmer
61. M. J. Mumbi, farmer
62. Mr. S. Moloshi, farmer
63. Mr. Bangwe, B. farmer
64. Mr. Silwimba, K. farmer
65. Mr. Kambo, B. farmer
66. Mr. Chalo, M. farmer
67. Mr. Chawela, M. farmer
68. Mr. Ngoma, H. Zam-Can Wheat project
69. Mr. Rimkus, A. Zam-Can Wheat project
70. Dr. Little, D. Zam-Can Wheat project
71. Mr. Rogers, W. Fisheries Feeder roads project
72. Mr. Musonda, R. Roads Department, Kasama
73. Mr. Chola, B. Roads Department, Kasama
74. Mr. Lubinda, F. (NCDP) Provincial planning officer, Northern Province

75. Mr. Mulenga, L. Northern Province Cooperative Union, Kasama
76. Ms. Simuchimba, D. Northern Cooperative Union, Kasama
77. Mr. Siulapwa, P. Northern Cooperative Union, Mbala
78. Mr. Mumba, Eastern Province Cooperative Union
79. Mr. Zulu, ZEGA
80. Mrs. Nazima, ZEGA
81. Mr. Mahoney, J. PASU
82. Major, Chola, E. NAMBoard/Maize and fertilizer storage sheds project
83. Mr. Chela, B. NAMBoard/Maize and fertilizer storage sheds project
84. Mr. Lupapulo, A. NAMBoard/Maize storage sheds project
85. Mr. Gondwe, B. Mount Makulu Research Station.

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