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The Foreign Policy Of The New Democratic Party, 1961-1988

By

Lloyd Penner

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in Partial Fulfillment of the requirements
for the Degree of**

Doctor of Philosophy

**Department of History
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A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of the University of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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ABSTRACT

The historiography of the New Democratic Party of Canada, extensive for domestic policy, has ignored the party's foreign policy. This work fills the gap by examining all aspects of NDP international affairs policy from 1961 to 1988. The central argument is that NDP foreign policy was a unique phenomenon both in Canada and within the global social democratic movement. Thus, all the traditional perspectives employed by political scientists and historians to describe Canadian foreign policy do not capture the essence of NDP foreign policy. A new term is required: Canadian social democratic internationalism.

The dissertation also demonstrates that the long-standing division in the NDP over foreign policy was fundamentally a conflict between realism and idealism. The clash was particularly manifested in the party's attempts to formulate defence and Canadian-American relations policy. This study shows that the conflict was not about the objectives of Canadian social democratic internationalism but about the means to achieve these objectives. It also shows why the struggle between the idealists and realists was never satisfactorily resolved. Thus, the dissertation reveals that the NDP did not move from a radical movement stage at its beginning to a later more "conservative" party stage. Throughout the 1961-1988 period, idealists, who tended to be less influential party figures, attempted to push realists, who dominated the party's inner circle, into adopting more radical foreign policies and building a Canadian movement in support of social democratic internationalism's goals.

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INTRODUCTION

The introduction will begin with a brief overview of the historiography of New Democratic Party and Canadian foreign policy followed by an analysis of why scholars have largely ignored NDP foreign policy. It will then explain why the traditional perspectives scholars have employed to interpret Canadian international affairs policy are inappropriate to understand NDP international affairs policy. This sets the stage for a new perspective. Finally, a framework is proposed to account for the NDP conceptualization of foreign policy and for persistent debates within the party.

The historiography of the New Democratic Party of Canada is extensive, but almost all of it is limited to the party's domestic policy. NDP foreign policy is largely ignored except for occasional brief references to defence, particularly the NATO issue. A few political scientists have provided somewhat fuller treatment, but again only on defence questions. For example, Nils Orvik includes a chapter by Hugh Thorburn on NDP defence policy in a work edited by him, Semialignment and Western Security.¹ Moreover, Tom Keating and Larry Pratt provide some analysis of what they describe as the unilateralist and isolationist tendencies of NDP defence policy in their book, Canada, Nato and the Bomb: The Western Alliance in Crisis.² Finally, S. Bowes, a

¹ Hugh Thorburn, "The New Democratic Party and National Defence," in Semialignment and Western Security, ed. by Nils Orvik (London: Croom Helm, 1986), p.p.169-185.

² Tom Keating and Larry Pratt, Canada, NATO and the Bomb (Edmonton: Hurtig Pub., 1988).

Queen's University Master's student has written a thesis examining NDP NATO policy during the Sixties.³

As for the major Canadian foreign policy scholars who write about the post-World War II era, one searches almost in vain for even fleeting references in their books or journal articles to NDP foreign policy. The list includes: J. L. Granatstein,⁴ Michael Tucker,⁵ John Kirton, David Dewitt,⁶ Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, John English,⁷ John Holmes,⁸ James Eayrs,⁹ G.P. Glazebrook,¹⁰ Garth Stevenson, Norman Hillmer,¹¹ Steven Clarkson,¹² Denis Stairs,¹³ C.P. Stacey,¹⁴ and Kim

³ S. Bowes, "The Defence Policies of the New Democratic Party, 1961-1969" (unpublished Master's thesis, Queen's University, 1983).

⁴ J.L. Granatstein, Canada 1957-1967: The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986); Granatstein, ed. Canadian Foreign Policy: Historical Readings, New Canadian Readings (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1986; Granatstein, ed. Canadian Foreign Policy Since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite (Rev.ed.; Toronto: Copp Clark, 1970); Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990).

⁵ Michael Tucker, Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary Issues and Themes (Montreal: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980).

⁶ David B. Dewitt and John J. Kirton, Canada as a Principle Power: A Study in Foreign Policy and International Relations (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1983).

⁷ Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, and John English, Canada Since 1945: Power, Politics, and Provincialism (Rev.ed.; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989).

⁸ John Holmes, Canada, a Middle-Aged Power (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976); Holmes, Life with Uncle: The Canadian - American Relationship (Toronto: Centre for International Studies, 1986).

⁹ James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada (5 vols.; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965).

¹⁰ G.P. Glazebrook, A History of Canadian External Relations (Toronto: Oxford University, 1950).

¹¹ Norman Hillmer and Garth Stevenson, eds., A Foremost Nation: Canadian Foreign Policy and a Changing World (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1977).

Nossal.¹⁵ Even Cranford Pratt, who has written quite extensively about the Third World policy of Canada and several European social democratic movements, has done very little on NDP policy in the same field.¹⁶ A partial exception is D.A Ross, who in his book on Canadian involvement in the Vietnam War, refers to NDP policy on occasion.¹⁷ Indeed, the entire area of the domestic sources and backdrop to Canadian foreign policy remains one of the major failings of the historiography in this field. This gap raises a specific question which has two broad implications.

The question is "Why have historians and political scientists ignored NDP foreign policy while paying considerable attention to its domestic policy?" First, since the party has never elected enough members of Parliament to form a government or even attain the status of official opposition, scholars have perhaps felt that its views on international affairs could safely be ignored. However, this same factor has not deterred them from examining NDP domestic policy. The underlying reason for this discrepancy is probably the fact that, while scholars have traditionally believed that the NDP has exercised considerable influence on Canada's domestic policies, especially in

¹² Stephen Clarkson, Canada and the Reagan Challenge (2nd ed.; Toronto: Lorimer, 1985); Clarkson, ed., An Independent Foreign Policy For Canada? (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1968).

¹³ Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War and the United States (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974).

¹⁴ C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External Policies, (2 vols.; Toronto: University Press, 1977, 1981).

¹⁵ Kim R. Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1985).

¹⁶ Cranford Pratt, ed. Internationalism under Strain: The North-South Policies of Canada, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989).

¹⁷ Douglas A. Ross, In the Interests of Peace: Canada and Vietnam 1954-73 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984).

the social field, such is not the case for foreign policy for the NDP or other parties. Underlining this is the fact that when confronted by the notion of an NDP international affairs policy, most people, including historians and political scientists, respond with the bemused comment, "I did not know the NDP had a foreign policy!"

Second, an equally important explanation for the inattention to NDP external affairs policy is that with few exceptions, ordinary citizens and Parliamentarians alike have traditionally displayed little sustained interest in the broader field of Canadian foreign policy. This is a point various MPs from all political parties have lamented periodically but have seemed powerless to change. Related to the desultory public focus, there has been a surprising lack of scholarly attention to the detailed debate about foreign policy. This absence is especially striking because almost all of the Canadian foreign policy authorities rely on glib generalizations about public opinion in order to explain foreign policy.¹⁸ In addition, as an essay by David R. Black and Heather A. Smith and one by Dennis Stairs have suggested, any attempt to define a distinct Canadian culture or understanding of Canadian foreign policy will require the detailed treatment of domestic political ideas about international relations which this dissertation draws on.¹⁹

The lack of any significant treatment of the foreign policy of a party that regularly received the support of between one-seventh and one-fifth of the electorate

¹⁸ See Maureen A. Molot, "Where do we, Should we, or Can we Sit? A Review of Canadian Foreign Policy Literature," International Journal of Canadian Studies, Vol.1 (Spring-Fall, 1990), pp.77-96; Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, The Domestic Mosaic: Domestic Groups and Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1985).

¹⁹ David R. Black and Heather A. Smith, "Notable Exceptions? New and Arrested Directions in Canadian Foreign Policy Literature," Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol.26 (December, 1993), pp.745-74; Dennis Stairs, "The Political Culture of Canadian Foreign Policy," Canadian Journal of Political Culture, Vol.15 (December, 1982).

in the years between 1961 and 1988 needs correction if Canadian political history is to be adequately understood and interpreted. If for no other reason, a study of this theme may well prove fruitful for scholars of general NDP history because of the close link in social democratic thinking between domestic and external affairs. Indeed, both have their origins in the same fundamental, comprehensive world view. Moreover, the ways the NDP formulated foreign policy views represented one aspect of the domestic sources of foreign policy that have long been ignored by academics.

It is particularly perplexing that historians of the "protest movement becalmed tradition" which has largely dominated NDP historiography have almost completely ignored CCF/NDP foreign policy. After all, their contention that the CCF/NDP gradually evolved from a radical socialist movement into a moderate social democratic party must adequately account not only for changes in CCF/NDP domestic policy but in foreign policy as well. This is particularly the case given that their argument rests to some extent on the premise that the intellectual origins and interests of the early CCF were strongly internationalist in orientation.²⁰

However, examination of Walter Young's book, The Anatomy of a Party: The National CCF 1932-61, the most comprehensive and articulate historical work employing this interpretation, reveals just a few brief references to foreign policy, and in only one of these does he attempt to integrate foreign policy with his main argument.²¹ In this reference he cites the party's 1950 decision to support Canadian

²⁰ Kenneth McNaught, A Prophet in Politics: A Biography of J.S. Woodsworth (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959), pp.257-9, 316-7.

²¹ Walter D. Young, Anatomy of a Party: The National CCF 1932-61 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969).

membership in NATO as illustrative of the "conservative" evolution from movement to party.²² However, Young fails to explore the NATO issue in any depth.

Others writing in the "protest movement becalmed" tradition, such as Leo Zakuta and John Smart, follow Young's pattern of ignoring CCF/NDP foreign policy almost completely.²³ As for Michael Cross, in his one brief reference to CCF attitudes towards external affairs, he argues that the party's emphasis on international concerns immediately after World War II is evidence that the CCF had no answer for the new post-Great Depression economic challenges facing Canada. In other words, a party bankrupt of ideas in the domestic sphere found in the image of Canada, the peacekeeping middle power, an outlet for its old moral fervour.²⁴ For Cross, then, foreign policy was just an escape from the supposed real area of left-wing concern, domestic affairs.

The story is much the same when historians of the NDP outside of the "protest movement becalmed" tradition are examined. In this group, Desmond Morton is the most important. To the extent Morton touches on external affairs at all, he reflects the dominant view of the NDP inner circle that foreign policy was primarily a source of strife within the party and, therefore, best ignored, at least at election time. In particular, as a strong supporter of NATO, Morton laments the inability of New Democrats to come up with a compromise defence policy that would appeal to the

²² Ibid., p.269.

²³ Leo Zakuta, A Protest Movement Becalmed: A Study of Change in the CCF (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964); John Smart, "Populist and Socialist Movements in Canadian History," in (Canada) Ltd: The Political Economy of Dependency, ed. by Robert Laxer (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973), pp.197-212.

²⁴ Michael S. Cross, ed., The Decline and Fall of a Good Idea: CCF-NDP Manifestoes, 1932 to 1969 (Toronto: New Hogtown Press, 1974), p.13.

broad middle-range of Canadian public opinion which generally favoured continued membership in the alliance.²⁵

In the 1990s, there have been signs that the neglect of NDP foreign policy may be ending in scholarly circles. Allan Whitehorn concludes his recently published book, Canadian Socialism: Essays on the CCF-NDP, with a spirited call to the NDP to abandon its preoccupation with Canadian nationalism in the interests of a renewed commitment to socialist internationalism. Specifically, Whitehorn wants the NDP to return to an early theme of CCF/NDP international affairs policy, the establishment and expansion of structures that would move the globe in the direction of world government, which, in turn, could help build a cooperative commonwealth in a global community.²⁶ Yet, Whitehorn formulates his assessment of contemporary NDP foreign policy and his prescription for its future, without first providing a careful examination of the origins and history of NDP foreign policy.

The main objective of this work, then, is to fill the gap in the domestic mosaic of Canadian foreign policy historiography by writing a comprehensive history of NDP foreign policy from the party's birth in 1961 to the end of the 1988 federal election.

Before commencing that task, it is essential to see if and where NDP foreign policy fits in terms of the three main perspectives which scholars of Canadian external affairs have employed in interpreting the history of Canada's international involvement in the post World War II era. As described by David B. Dewitt and John Kirton in their

²⁵ Desmond Morton, The New Democrats 1961-1986: The Politics of Change (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1986), p.227.

²⁶ Allan Whitehorn, Canadian Socialism: Essays on the CCF-NDP (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992), p.280.

major interpretive study, Canada as a Principal Power, the three interpretations are: liberal internationalism, peripheral dependence and complex neo-realism.²⁷

Liberal internationalism, the most influential of the perspectives has three main themes in Dewitt and Kirton's analysis. Foundational is the concept of functionalism. As applied by the Canadian government in the 1940s, the functionalist argument was that effective representation in international institutions should be based on the contribution each state could make to the issue in question and not on the country's relative military or economic strength or the notion of complete equality of states.²⁸ The second theme, and one which grew out of its interpretation of functionalism, was the growing demand by Canada in the 1950s for middle power recognition. This was in large part the result of Canada resolutely expanding its activity abroad during that decade and in the process assuming a kind of mediatory international broker role. The third theme, "distributive internationalism," was developed as a response to the demands of the newly decolonized world in the 1960s. It became a basic tenet of liberal internationalism that economic disparity between rich and poor countries should

²⁷ David B. Dewitt and John J. Kirton, Canada as a Principal Power (Toronto: John Wiley and Sons, 1983), p.p.17-28. In addition to these perspectives, Michael K. Hawes outlines five more which he calls: federalist, Parliamentary influence, policy process, economic integration and transnation/transgovernmental relations. However, since the influence of liberal internationalism, peripheral dependence and complex neo-realism far outweighs that of Hawes's additional perspectives amongst scholars of Canadian foreign policy, this dissertation will largely ignore them. See Michael K. Hawes, Principal Power, Middle Power, Or Satellite? Competing Perspectives in the Study of Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: York University Research Programme in Strategic Studies, 1984).

²⁸ Ibid., pp.17-21. For a more detailed discussion of functionalism, see A.J. Miller, "Consensus and Conflict in Functionalism: Implications for the Study of International Integration," Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol.10 (1971), pp.178-190.

and could be quickly and drastically reduced by providing development assistance largely through international organizations.²⁹

Canada's objective in pursuing these themes, according to the liberal internationalist perspective, was to advance universal values by steadily creating a more institutionalized and more just international order. Thus, Canadian practitioners of liberal internationalism were committed to multilateralism as opposed to unilateralism. Primarily, this meant supporting all the efforts of the United Nations to create a peaceful world community. Secondly, it entailed membership in many formal and informal blocs or groupings of countries to promote collective security.³⁰

In contrast with the important middle power status accorded Canada by liberal internationalism, peripheral-dependence, the second perspective, maintained that by the early Sixties, Canada ranked as a peripheral and dependent power within the international hierarchy. This dependency was based on three arguments: First, Canadian dependence on heavy American investment had severely curtailed Canada's economic independence. Second, and partly as a result of this fact, Canada had been unable to develop an autonomous foreign policy. Third, Canadian culture and values were being overwhelmed by the homogenizing power of American culture and corporate values.³¹

Dewitt and Kirton go on to describe a third perspective which they call, complex neo-realism, a theory developed partly in reaction to the perceived naivete of liberal internationalism and the crudity of peripheral-dependence. In their formulation of the theory, Canada is granted the status of a principal power mainly because of its

²⁹ Dewitt and Kirton, Canada as a Principal Power, pp.21-3.

³⁰ Ibid., pp.22, 27-8.

³¹ Ibid., pp.28-36.

ability to contribute decisively at times to the building of the international order especially in terms of the Third World. Since complex neo-realism denies a significant role for universal values, it has had little influence in Canadian social democrat circles and seemingly little relevance to their ideas.³²

Although both liberal internationalism and peripheral dependence had a major impact on NDP foreign policy, neither is capable of adequately interpreting the full scope and unique perspective of the New Democratic Party's international affairs policy. Thus a new interpretative tool was needed. The answer was found by examining the internationalism of the global social democratic movement.

The origins of social democratic internationalism go back to the interwar period. Nevertheless, the main spark was provided after World War II by the emergence of a well-organized global association of democratic socialist and social democratic parties called the Socialist International (SI) of which the CCF/NDP was a charter member. In its 1951 founding document, the Frankfurt Declaration, the SI defined its form of internationalism as follows:

Democratic socialism is international because it aims at liberating all men from every form of economic, spiritual and political bondage [and]...because it recognizes that no nation can solve its economic and social problems in isolation.³³

³² Ibid., pp.36-46.

³³ "Declaration of the Socialist International," adopted at its First Congress held in Frankfurt-on-Main, June 30-July 3, 1951, in Declarations of the Socialist International (London: Socialist International), NDP Research, p.9.

A decade later, the 1962 Oslo Declaration updated the work of the founding SI Congress by welcoming the participation of the newly decolonized peoples in the common quest for equality, justice and peace for all humanity.³⁴

Finally in 1989, at its Eighteenth Congress in Stockholm, the Socialist International reworked and restated the fundamental principles of social democratic internationalism. This declaration was made in response to the previous decade's rapid global changes, in particular, the growing internationalization and interdependence of the world, economically, politically and culturally. The challenge, according to the Congress, was nothing less than the creation through cooperation and consensus of a genuinely pluralistic and democratic world society based on the values of freedom, social justice, solidarity and tolerance.³⁵

The main argument of this dissertation is that NDP foreign policy is best understood as the Canadian variant of social democratic internationalism. First, this means that NDP foreign policy was fundamentally internationalist not isolationist. Second, it was social democratic because its primary objective was to remake the world according to social democratic principles. Third, it was distinctly Canadian in that it desired and foresaw a special prophetic role for Canada in attaining this goal.

Social democratic internationalism will be the term used in this dissertation rather than democratic socialist internationalism. This is primarily because, by 1961, when the NDP was founded, members of the Socialist International had largely dropped most of socialism's traditional approaches such as large-scale nationalization

³⁴ Ibid., p.11.

³⁵ "Declaration of Principles of the Socialist International," adopted at the 18th Congress, Stockholm, January 20-2, 1989, NDP Research, pp.20-8.

and class-based analysis. Including the CCF/NDP, they had evolved into social democratic parties with an emphasis on preserving the welfare state.

Within the Canadian political and foreign policy context, social democratic internationalism had at least five distinguishing characteristics. First, NDPers shared social democratic internationalism's basic suspicion of military alliances. Even those members of the party who advocated Canadian membership in NATO did so reluctantly and only because it was a lesser of two evils, one deemed necessary to forestall victory by totalitarian communism which would destroy the social democratic internationalist vision completely. For this reason, a constant theme amongst CCF/NDP supporters of NATO was the need to downgrade the alliance's purely military functions while highlighting its community building possibilities. In addition, they emphasized the necessity of fundamentally altering NATO's alleged provocative military policies in hopes of bringing it more in line with social democratic ideals. The party's strong misgivings about alliances is undoubtedly partly a reflection of the general anti-military bias that most NDPers feel to some degree, a residual manifestation of Canadian social democratic internationalism's early pacifism.

Second, social democratic internationalists wanted to fashion a world where cooperation, justice, equality and the satisfaction of human need would supersede private profit and where these values would dominate all economic, social and political life. As far as Canadian social democrats were concerned, the greatest contribution the CCF/NDP could make to the realization of this goal was by building a social democratic society in Canada in accordance with such principles.

Third, for this to be achieved on a world-wide basis, another element was required, namely, a systematic and democratic program of international economic

planning under the auspices of a powerful global organization.³⁶ Left to itself, the global capitalist system inevitably produced economic disparity leading to conflict and war. As M.J. Coldwell, CCF leader from 1941 to 1960, wrote on one occasion, "We seek an orderly world in which trade and investment policies are planned solely with a view to the satisfaction of human needs...not profit-making."³⁷ This was possible in the minds of social democrats because they had a profoundly optimistic opinion of human nature. They assumed that given the choice, people preferred to cooperate rather than compete.³⁸

The fourth distinguishing feature of Canadian social democratic internationalism was its contention that Canada was singularly well-placed to help the world achieve these objectives. It was the special prophetic mission or call of Canada's social democratic movement to ensure that Canada fulfilled its destiny. This notion played a key part in giving social democratic internationalism in Canada its distinctly Canadian flavour.

NDP concern about Canada's role is closely related to the fifth distinctive aspect of Canadian social democratic internationalism. As the social democratic party of a country particularly vulnerable to the overwhelming cultural, economic and political influence of the most powerful nation on earth, the United States of America, Canadian social democratic internationalism was forced to develop its own unique

³⁶ Faith in the efficacy of rational, scientific planning was a key element in Fabian socialism that strongly influenced the League for Social Reconstruction which, in turn, provided the early intellectual underpinnings of the CCF. This is well documented by Michiel Horn in his book, The League for Social Reconstruction: Intellectual Origins of the Democratic Left in Canada 1930-1942 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980).

³⁷ M.J. Coldwell, "Canada's Foreign Policy," in Planning for Freedom: 16 Lectures on the CCF: Its Policies and Program (Ontario CCF, 1944), pp.162-3.

³⁸ M.J. Coldwell speech, March, 1959, NAC, MG 32, C13, Vol.12, File 7.

strategy for dealing with this situation. By the 1960s, therefore, many Canadian social democrats had come to the conclusion that American economic policies and cultural values, as well as its foreign policy, were a threat to Canadian independence and thus Canada's ability to promote social democratic internationalism. On this point, they adopted the arguments of the peripheral dependence perspective to a considerable degree. In these circumstances, Canadian nationalism tended to be viewed as an ally in the struggle to maintain a distinctive Canadian international affairs policy.

However, once unleashed, Canadian nationalism could not easily be contained, a fact with very significant implications for the future of internationalism within the New Democratic Party. As Allan Whitehorn has written, an increase in nationalism is often made at the expense of internationalism.³⁹ For his part, Larry Pratt maintains that any attempt to engage nationalism in the pursuit of internationalist objectives is doomed to fail since nationalism emphasizes the beauty of the particular and the ugliness of the universal.⁴⁰ Pratt's observation is worthy of note since universalism lies at the heart of social democratic internationalism. The well-known international scholar of nationalism, Isaiah Berlin, is just as critical of nationalism, although he concedes that it need not always be destructive. Nevertheless, based on his extensive study of the phenomenon, Berlin concludes that all too often, imperialist aggression and paradoxically, isolationism, result from a revival of nationalism.⁴¹ Thus, of

³⁹ Allan Whitehorn, Canadian Socialism, pp.65,250.

⁴⁰ Larry Pratt, "Up from Nationalism," in Social Democracy without Illusions: Renewal of the Canadian Left, ed. by John Richards, Robert D. Cairns and Larry Pratt (Edmonton: Hurtig Press, 1991), pp.132-151.

⁴¹ See Nathan Gardels, interviewer, "Two Concepts of Nationalism: An Interview with Isaiah Berlin," The New York Review, Nov.21, 1991, pp.19-23 and Isaiah Berlin, "The Bent Twig," in The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas (London: Fontana Press, 1991), pp.238-261.

necessity, the interplay of nationalism and internationalism will be an important sub-theme of this dissertation.

While there was general agreement in the NDP on virtually all the long-term objectives of Canadian social democratic internationalism, NDPers often disagreed sharply on how best to achieve these goals when dealing with specific issues. Thus, a second principal objective of this dissertation is to explain why internal divisions on foreign policy matters occurred and kept recurring throughout the history of the New Democratic Party from 1961 to 1988.

Explanations based on socio-economic background and age were considered but ultimately rejected for several reasons. In his study of the Waffle phenomena of the late Sixties and early Seventies, Robert Hackett observed that the socio-economic background of members of the Waffle (who generally had more radical views on international affairs) were largely similar to those of other New Democrats. Moreover, he concluded that, while the Waffle movement was to some extent a revolt by the young against an aging party leadership, this factor must not be overemphasized since the Waffle drew support from every age group.⁴²

The theory was also examined that differences over foreign policy were a manifestation of an internal struggle between party activists and an entrenched "conservative" and bureaucratized leadership. Without doubt, as in all political parties, there was a relatively small inner circle of people in the NDP who had a strong influence on how the party was run and its policy.⁴³ However, while most of these people, who generally dominated the NDP's Federal Council and Executive and Policy

⁴² Robert Hackett, "The Waffle," Canadian Dimension, Vol.15 (Oct.-Nov., 1981), pp.19-21.

⁴³ See Cameron Smith, Unfinished Journey: The Lewis Family (Toronto: Summerhill Press, 1991); Horn, The League for Social Reconstruction, pp.1-25.

committee, shared a common perspective on international affairs, there were always notable exceptions. Moreover, the party's activists were themselves often divided. Thus, the idea that differences in the NDP on foreign policy can be explained largely as a conflict between the leadership and the activists is too simplistic. Nevertheless, where applicable, reference will be made to this explanation.

Regionalism also has some merit as an explication of the NDP's internal foreign policy difficulties. Specifically, western New Democrats, most particularly the BC section, were consistently more radical and willing to resist the party leadership on policy as will be illustrated on occasion in this study.⁴⁴

However, in the final analysis, all these explanations fall short of providing a satisfactory account for the long-standing internal divisions within the NDP on key foreign policy matters. This work contends that these differences need to be understood as a conflict over the role Canadian social democratic internationalism's original idealistic ideology should play in the formation of NDP foreign policy. In essence, the struggle is best characterized as one between what can be termed "idealism" and "realism". Social democratic idealists believed that the ideals of Canadian social democratic internationalism could not be compromised. At every stage, whether formulating policy at conventions or fighting election campaigns or running a future government, social democratic ideals must be determinative even if this hurt the NDP's electoral chances. On the other hand, realists insisted that pragmatic measures must prevail if holding rigidly to the party's ideals would damage

⁴⁴ For example, a poll of delegates to the 1983 NDP convention found that Westerners were more likely to support unilateral disarmament and oppose Canadian involvement with NATO and NORAD compared to Easterners. See Allan Whitehorn, Canadian Socialism, p.135.

it to a considerable extent electorally or if the ideals were unrealizable, at least in the foreseeable future.

In terms of the movement/party question, the idealists were those who wanted to ensure that the original ideals of the social democratic movement remained untarnished, while realists were much more conscious of what effect the uncompromising pursuit of these ideals might have on the future of the party. Of course, most NDP members found themselves on a continuum between idealism and realism feeling the "pull" of both to some extent. Yet on several key foreign policy issues, it is possible to identify two positions within the party to which the "idealist" and "realist" labels clearly apply. While it is true that most idealists could be classified as members of the left-wing of the NDP and most realists as right-wing, these terms are generally not very helpful in understanding the underlying differences between NDPers on foreign policy and are therefore used sparingly in this dissertation.

A specific example will illustrate how the idealist/idealist dichotomy affected NDP foreign policy. The definitive issue which most clearly divided the realists and idealists was defence policy, especially, Canada's membership in the NATO alliance. For people who saw virtually every issue first and foremost through the lens of idealism, regional military alliances were anathema because they appeared to postpone indefinitely the achievement of the social democratic universalist dream of a united world based on the principles of equality, peace and social justice. In contrast, realists accepted the liberal internationalist argument that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization under United States leadership was the only available means of containing Soviet communist expansionism, which threatened the very existence of these principles.

It is important to emphasize that the debate was not about the fundamental ideological orientation of the NDP. It was noted in a study of delegates to the 1987 NDP convention by Allan Whitehorn and Keith Archer that New Democrats display a high degree of consensus on basic attitudes such as continentalism, moralism and hawkishness.⁴⁵ Thus, both idealists and realists believed they were acting in the best interests of social democratic internationalism; the disagreement was about the best means to achieve their common long-term objectives. However, this point was usually forgotten in the midst of often passionate debate. Positions hardened and certainly for the idealists, opposition to NATO became a litmus test of a person's social democratic (or socialist) credentials, especially because the alliance question was associated with another divisive issue, namely, NDP attitudes to the United States. Pro-NATO realists (who in large measure shared the liberal internationalist perspective on NATO and its antipathy for anti-Americanism) were convinced that much of the idealists' strident opposition to membership in the alliance arose from visceral anti-Americanism. The idealists, in turn, accused the realists of being much too accommodating to Washington's foreign policy and America's domination of the Canadian economy and way of life.

Tension between idealism and realism was not unique to the New Democratic Party. Indeed, Michael Tucker has noted the presence of both tendencies in official Canadian foreign policy since World War II.⁴⁶ Moreover, other social democratic parties were similarly divided, often on the same issues such as NATO, unilateral

⁴⁵ Keith Archer and Alan Whitehorn, "Opinion Structure among Party Activists: A Comparison of New Democrats, Liberal and Conservatives," in Party Politics in Canada, ed. by Hugh G. Thorburn (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1991), pp.144-57.

⁴⁶ Michael Tucker, Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary Issues and Themes (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1980), pp.3-5.

disarmament or the role of military power. For example, Michael R. Gordon, a historian of the British Labour party, documents the continuing conflict in that party over foreign policy since World War II between what he calls "fundamentalism" and "revisionism". Fundamentalists insisted there should be no retreat from original socialist foreign policy principles and ideals, while revisionists argued that changing historical circumstances demanded a more pragmatic approach.⁴⁷

Another historian, Peter Clarke, in the course of his investigation of the cleavage in the Labour party on domestic and foreign policy questions, argues that the contest took place in three ways: Bevanites versus Gaitskillites, Left versus Right, and fundamentalists versus revisionists. Which of the three Clarke considers the most basic is not stated, but it is clear from the tenor of his argument that the latter played a key role in the longstanding disputes in the British Labour party over foreign policy and reflects the idealist/realist debate that scholars such as Michael Gordon have examined.⁴⁸

The same split characterized the West German Social Democratic party (the SPD) especially in the Fifties and early Sixties. Stephen J. Artner, a historian of the SPD, shows how the German party's traditional marriage of idealist, universalist sentiment with pragmatic, ad hoc decision-making was tested on a whole series of foreign policy questions. This was particularly true for the issues of German rearmament, military disengagement of East and West, NATO membership and nuclear weapons.⁴⁹ Artner classifies the tension in the SPD as basically one between

⁴⁷ Michael R. Gordon, Conflict and Consensus in Labour's Foreign Policy, 1914-1965 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), pp.287-9.

⁴⁸ Peter Clarke, A Question of Leadership: Gladstone to Thatcher (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1991), pp.236-255.

⁴⁹ Stephen J. Artner, A Change of Course: The West German Social Democrats and

"ideology" and "Realpolitik", which is another way of saying the conflict was between those most wedded to social democratic ideals and those for whom these ideals had to be tempered by "realistic" considerations.⁵⁰

The CCF, the forerunner of the NDP, had been racked by the same battles. For example, in 1950, shortly after the CCF endorsed Canada's participation in the Korean War, Kenneth McNaught (writing under the pseudonym of S.W. Bradford) and Frank Underhill engaged in a vigorous foreign policy debate that centred on the realist/idealist question. McNaught was angry because the CCF had seemingly acquiesced to the liberal internationalist doctrine of collective security which, under American leadership, insisted on putting "guns ahead of butter." Canada, he argued, ought to ensure that its contribution to the world was that of a nation not a satellite. McNaught concluded with a plea to Canadians to consider the "moral virtues of the third force", a group of neutral nations independent of either the Western or Eastern bloc. Thus, the realist, anti-third force notions of the then British Labour government's foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, must be rejected in the interests of a world which socialists could call free.⁵¹

In his written response, Frank Underhill castigated McNaught's views as unrealistic and devoid of "positive concrete suggestions". For example, the third force idea "had been shown to belong to the dream world." Moreover, he rejected the view of McNaught and his "disgruntled CCF fundamentalists" that they were the only "pure and uncorrupted" socialists, while other party members were "satellites" of the

NATO, 1957 -1961 (London: Greenwood Press, 1985).

⁵⁰ ibid., pp.xii and 93.

⁵¹ S.W. Bradford [Kenneth McNaught], "The CCF Failure in Foreign Policy," in Forum: Canadian Life and Letters, 1920-70, ed.by J.L. Granatstein and P. Stevens (Toronto, 1972), pp.261-3.

"American devils". Because of their obsession with an "original socialist" foreign policy, they had forgotten that the cliches of the 1930s were ill-adapted for the post-war world. Canada, Underhill was certain, could not escape the fact that power politics now ruled the world. He concluded with a statement that summarized the realist position precisely. "Until the threat of Soviet totalitarianism has been removed, freedom is a more fundamental issue in our world than socialism."⁵²

What this brief survey of historians and political commentators demonstrates is that the idealist/realist dichotomy is not only a legitimate approach to understanding the long-standing conflict in the NDP on international affairs, but also the most insightful. While some scholars of European social democratic internationalism employ the fundamentalist/revisionist classification instead of the idealist/realist one, the author rejected this as the basic framework for understanding the Canadian debate for several reasons. First, it would have created confusion on some issues. For example, after the NDP reversed its pro-NATO stance in 1969, it would have been difficult to know which side could now legitimately claim the revisionist or fundamentalist designations. Second, a major purpose of this dissertation is to explore the role of ideals in the formation of NDP international affairs policy and for this purpose the idealist/realist dichotomy is the most useful. Robert Dallek, has used the same approach in his inquiry into the domestic roots of twentieth century American foreign policy.⁵³ Third, as indicated earlier, the NDP internal debate was basically not about fundamental objectives but about how best to achieve these objectives.

⁵² Frank H. Underhill, "Canadian Socialism and World Politics," in Forum: Canadian Life and Letters, 1920-70, pp.263-6.

⁵³ Robert Dallek, The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983).

The argument of this dissertation can be summarized as follows. The foreign policy of the New Democratic Party from 1961 to 1988 is best understood as a Canadian version of social democratic internationalism. Internal debate between idealists and realists ensued over how to apply the fundamental principles of this internationalism to the key foreign policy issues confronting Canadians during these years. Of course, on some matters, conflict was minimal or nonexistent. In those chapters, a major objective will be to explain how and why this occurred.

The dissertation is divided into three parts. Part I will document the debate between idealists and realists on the important international issues of the 1958 to 1965 period, most especially nuclear weapons. In Part II, the emphasis will be on economic nationalism's impact on NDP foreign policy and American-Canadian relations during the years from 1965 to 1979. As nationalism diminishes after 1975, attention will shift to the increased accent in NDP circles with Third World and international human rights issues. Part III will begin in 1980 with the NDP conducting a thorough review of its foreign and defence policy. This review sets the stage for an era of heavy party involvement with international affairs during the Eighties. The main new areas of concern are Central America, revived East-West tensions, new weapons systems, NATO, and free trade with the United States.

In terms of broad characterization, the Sixties can be described as an era of contentious debate in NDP foreign policy followed by a decade of comparative retreat from involvement with international issues. This, in turn, was succeeded by a very active period which placed the NDP in the vanguard on most international issues throughout the Eighties.

PART I

The years, 1958 to 1965, saw the introduction of many of the themes which would dominate the international affairs agenda in the New Democratic Party until 1988. The two most significant events were the founding convention in 1961 and the nuclear weapons debate of 1962-3, after which NDP involvement with foreign policy matters diminished over the next two years. The international affairs platform passed at the 1961 convention demonstrated that the NDP would be a party committed to internationalism, while its anti-nuclear stand showed there was a difference between social democratic internationalism and the liberal internationalism practised by the other Canadian political parties.

This period also saw the main lines drawn in the conflict between NDP idealists and realists. The orientation of idealism was generally towards non-alignment with NATO, unilateral disarmament and anti-Americanism, while for realists, it was towards alignment with NATO, conditional disarmament and opposition to anti-Americanism.

CHAPTER ONE

OPENING SALVO - FOREIGN POLICY CONFLICT IN THE NEW PARTY (1958-61)

The 1958 federal election was a disaster for the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF). From twenty-five seats the party plummeted to just eight. Among the casualties were prominent Parliamentary figures such as Stanley Knowles and M.J. Coldwell, party leader. Key elements of the CCF decided, therefore, that its base must be expanded if the social democratic movement was to survive as an effective political force in Canada. To this end, negotiations commenced with the newly formed Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) to create a new party comprising the old CCF, organized labour and "liberally minded people".

However, foreign policy issues did not play a significant role in this decision. Evidently, the CCF leadership did not believe its massive electoral defeat had much if anything to do with the party's stand on the major foreign policy questions of the time. At the outset of the 1950s, the CCF had deliberately endorsed a strongly anti-communist, pro-NATO foreign policy. Thus, it largely came to share in the liberal internationalist foreign policy consensus which dominated the Canadian foreign policy

scene throughout that decade.⁵⁴ Part of the reason had been to escape charges that the CCF harboured pro-communist sympathies, accusations which had hurt the party considerably in the elections of 1945 and 1949.⁵⁵ Added to this was the fact that foreign policy had played almost no role in the 1958 election. Thus, if policy was to blame for the CCF debacle, the answer must lie in the domestic arena.

In light of this, it must have come as quite a surprise to those laying the foundations of the New Party to see foreign and defence policy questions emerging as prominent and contentious issues within the three constituent groups that were attempting to give birth to this new political force in Canada. How and why this occurred can only be answered by an examination of both external global trends and internal party developments.

Externally, rapidly developing events on the world scene pushed international affairs to the fore. East-West tensions were mounting in the late 50s and early 60s largely because the German problem remained unresolved. No sooner had Nikita Khrushchev, the leader of the Soviet Union, backed down on his threat to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany (which would have effectively negated Western rights in Berlin), than the shooting down of an American U-2 spy plane over the United States scuttled the 1960 Vienna Summit. This destroyed the hopes of politicians and ordinary citizens the world over for a reduction of tensions. Worse, the following summer saw the construction of the Berlin Wall effectively slicing the city in two. With American and Soviet tanks facing each other warily, one misstep could have led to war. What made this prospect even more menacing to Canadians, and

⁵⁴ Kenneth McNaught, "Foreign Policy," in Social Purpose for Canada, ed. by Michael Oliver (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), pp.457-8.

⁵⁵ Desmond Morton, The New Democrats, 1961-1986: The Politics of Change (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1986), p.14.

indeed all peoples, was that if all-out war came, it would be fought with nuclear weapons both tactical and strategic. Hence, the rapidly accumulating Soviet and American arsenals and the threat of nuclear proliferation made disarmament everyone's concern.⁵⁶

Naturally enough, any party formulating a platform in this atmosphere, especially one imbued with the objectives of social democratic internationalism, could not avoid foreign and defence policy issues.⁵⁷ To many idealists in the New Party movement, it seemed obvious that Canada could do much more to further the goals of peace and disarmament if it disentangled itself from the American Empire and threw in its lot with the new countries emerging out of the collapse of the old European colonial empires in the Third World.⁵⁸ The apparent willingness of the new United States president, John F. Kennedy, to impose Washington's hegemony over the Americas in an even stronger fashion than before (as his Cuban policy seemed to demonstrate) reinforced this sentiment.

Gradually therefore, in the years 1959 to 1961, a wide-ranging debate on several key questions evolved within the fledgling new party. How could Canada make the strongest possible contribution to world peace and disarmament? Did its commitment to NATO help or hinder the attaining of these objectives? Was Canada's

⁵⁶ T.E. Vadney, The World Since 1945 (Markham: Penguin Books Canada Ltd., 1987), pp.46-8; Albert Legault and Michael Fortman, A Diplomacy of Hope: Canada and Disarmament, 1945-1988 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992), pp.195-7.

⁵⁷ Defence policy is an integral part of foreign policy studies and will be treated as such in this dissertation. This needs to be remembered when the term "defence policy" is used repeatedly rather than "foreign policy" in chapters focusing particularly on the defence aspects of foreign policy.

⁵⁸ The term "Third World," is used to designate underdeveloped countries even though it only came into common usage in the 1970s.

close association with the American defence establishment through participation in NORAD and the Defence Sharing Agreement compatible with the creation of an independent Canadian foreign policy? Of course, these questions (or similar ones) had never been far beneath the surface during the CCF era as well. Indeed, NDP foreign policy cannot be understood apart from some examination of the origins and history of CCF policy in the field since most of the basic philosophical framework as well as the core leadership and even membership of the new party were largely the same.

From its birth in 1933, CCF international affairs policy was strongly influenced by contemporary political, religious and sociological thought and historical developments along with the personal beliefs of its key leaders, especially J.S. Woodsworth. Canadian social democrats, like their compatriots around the world, rejected the Marxist path of a violent class war leading inevitably to a worker's paradise.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, they strongly endorsed the socialist conception of a future utopia in which peace and justice would reign supreme.⁶⁰ For many in the early CCF who were greatly influenced by the social gospel, this notion was reinforced by their interpretation of the Christian concept of the kingdom of God as a concrete entity built by people on earth not a heavenly abstraction.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Allen Mills, Fool for Christ: The Political Thought of J.S. Woodsworth (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), pp.76-9; Kenneth McNaught, A Prophet in Politics: A Biography of J.S. Woodsworth (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959), pp.44-6.

⁶⁰ Mills, Fool for Christ, pp.57-8.

⁶¹ For a detailed discussion of the Social Gospel and its impact on reform movements see Richard Allen, The Social Passion: Religion and Social Reform in Canada, 1914-28 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973). For the impact of the Social Gospel on the early CCF see J. King Gordon, "A Christian Socialist in the 1930's," The Social Gospel in Canada, ed. by Richard Allen, Papers of the Inter-Disciplinary Conference on the Social Gospel in Canada, March 21-24, 1973, at the University of Regina (Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1975), pp.122-153. Also see Michiel Horn, The League for Social Reconstruction: Intellectual Origins of the

The social gospel was also a key element in the rise of the Progressive movement which in the first twenty-five years of this century promoted reform based on "moral uplift" in both the United States and Canada and even had visions of remaking the whole world in its image. A prime example was the attempt by American President, Woodrow Wilson, to turn World War I and the subsequent peace-making process into a moral crusade for the ideals of peace and justice.⁶² Therefore, the CCF was part of a much broader liberal reform movement where ideals and moral considerations played a prominent role.⁶³ As a result, moral imperatives, rather than socialist dogma became the chief "driving force" of both CCF domestic and foreign policy in the 1930s and beyond. The social gospel played an important role in bringing this about.⁶⁴

Early CCFers believed that the most effective way for Canadians to contribute to the new world order was by constructing a just and truly democratic society north of the 49th parallel based on the values of brotherhood and cooperation. However, they also wanted the cooperative spirit as exemplified most particularly in the Canadian

Democratic Left in Canada, 1930-1942 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), pp.61-3, 89. For a discussion of the impact of the social gospel on J.S. Woodsworth, see McNaught, "Reflections on Leadership: J.S. Woodsworth," Canadian Forum, Vol.68 (March, 1989), p.15 and McNaught, A Prophet in Politics, p.139.

⁶² Robert Dallek, The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983), pp.76-91.

⁶³ Gary Teeple has a fine discussion of the impact of liberalism on the early CCF in "Liberals in a Hurray," in Capitalism and the National Question in Canada, ed. by Gary Teeple (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), pp.232-5.

⁶⁴ J.King Gordon emphasizes this in his article "A Christian Socialist in the 1930's," pp.122-153. On the other hand, Walter Young does not agree. In fact, he makes only two relatively innocuous references to the contribution of the social gospel to the early CCF. Perhaps this is because he wrote before Richard Allen's seminal book on the social gospel had been published. Walter D. Young, Anatomy of a Party: The National CCF 1932-61 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), pp.34, 158.

West extended to the rest of the world. Only then could peace and justice prevail internationally.

The firm conviction of the founders of the CCF that cooperation must inevitably triumph over competition was reinforced by other ideas which were beginning to affect popular culture in the early 1930s. For example, a revised version of Darwinism was in circulation which taught that species survived not so much by competing with each other as by cooperating. On another front, early CCFers were among those who embraced the technological revolution most enthusiastically, partly because they believed it would inevitably promote interdependence and integration.⁶⁵ Many of them were also strongly influenced by Fabian socialism through the League for Social Reconstruction, especially its faith in government planning.⁶⁶ Just as planning was required to build a national Utopia, so was it imperative for the creation of an international one.⁶⁷ Fundamentally, therefore, Canadian social democratic internationalism was the extension of the CCF/NDP's domestic vision for Canada to the whole world.

The role of pacifism in early CCF thinking illustrates this very well. Just as Canadian socialism must be built not through revolution but by means of peaceful cooperation, human understanding and democratic methods, so must the world

⁶⁵ Richard Allen, "The Background of the Social Gospel in Canada," in The Social Gospel in Canada. pp.29-30. See also Mills, Fool for Christ, p.202.

⁶⁶ M. Horn, The League for Social Reconstruction, pp.87-8. Also see G. Teeple, Capitalism and the National Question, pp.240-4.

⁶⁷ Alan Mills, Fool for Christ, pp.162-3; M.J. Coldwell, "Canada's Foreign Policy," in Planning for Freedom: 16 Lectures on the CCF Its Policies and Program (Ontario CCF, 1944), pp.164-5.

community be established. Indeed, for Woodsworth and a sizeable number of early CCFers, pacifism and socialism were inseparable.⁶⁸

While most Canadian social democrats in the 1930s did not go this far, they all believed that in the end, true peace could not be achieved apart from social and economic justice for people everywhere. This was the argument of Social Planning for Canada, published in 1935 by the League for Social Reconstruction and the CCF. Ideally, they hoped for the creation of a world government or federation with the majority of member states being socialist commonwealths. Consequently, Canada's best contribution to the building of a peaceful world was to establish a socialist commonwealth itself.⁶⁹

Another movement of the inter-war period that should be mentioned was Christian internationalism. This was the belief held by key people in the powerful Protestant missionary movement that by spreading the Christian gospel around the world, Canadian Christians could play a special part in establishing order and civilization. The promotion of Christian internationalism throughout English Canada did much to educate ordinary Canadians about the broader world. This, combined with the missionary movement's increasing adoption of the social gospel with its stress on meeting the basic humanitarian and social needs of people overseas, helped lay the

⁶⁸ Thomas P. Socknat, "The Pacifist Background of the Early CCF," in "Building the Cooperative Commonwealth" Essays on the Democratic Socialist Tradition in Canada, Canadian Plains Proceedings 13 ed. by William Brennan (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Centre, University of Regina, 1984), p.58; Also see, McNaught, A Prophet in Politics, pp.196-7, 298-300.

⁶⁹ Socknat, "The Pacifist Background of the Early CCF," p.59.

basis for the general flowering of internationalism in Canada after World War II of which Canadian social democratic internationalism was a part.⁷⁰

However, the Canadian social democratic version of internationalism also faced serious challenges in these years. At its founding convention in 1933, the CCF had proposed a strongly idealist set of foreign policy objectives for Canada. First, economic and social justice ought to be recognized as the only basis for a true and lasting peace. Second, an international organization free of Big Power influence and to which disarmed members would surrender their military sovereignty should be created. Third, Canada must reject participation in any war. (By 1936, this was modified to read "any imperialist war."⁷¹ In short, the CCF proposed a neutralist foreign and defence policy. This platform must be understood within the context of North American isolationism which strongly influenced all political parties in Canada and the United States during the Thirties.⁷²

Does this mean that early CCF foreign policy was fundamentally isolationist? In terms of international trade, it definitely was not. For example, Michiel Horn demonstrates that the people who made up the CCF's "brain trust," namely, members of the League for Social Reconstruction, considered economic nationalism folly.⁷³ In fact, the CCF resisted the protectionist tide of the Thirties and vigorously promoted

⁷⁰ Robert Wright, A World Mission: Canadian Protestantism and the Quest for a New International Order, 1918-1939 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991), pp.255-7.

⁷¹ Agnes J. Groome, "M.J. Coldwell and CCF Foreign Policy, 1932-1950" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Saskatchewan, Regina Campus, 1967), pp.59, 148.

⁷² McNaught, A Prophet in Politics, p.274.

⁷³ Horn, The League for Social Reconstruction, p.147.

freer trade, although periodically it voiced some misgivings about the "sectional internationalism" of multinational companies.⁷⁴

True, Woodsworth advocated isolation from Europe and even Great Britain, but mainly because of their penchant for pursuing militaristic and imperialistic policies that ran counter to the goals of social democratic internationalism.⁷⁵ This was not pure isolationism but fear of involvement with anything that militated against achieving the ultimate end of a worldwide social democratic brotherhood. The CCF's favourable opinion of the United States during the Thirties is thus quite understandable. America's strength guaranteed Canada's safety against foreign attacks and allowed Canada to discharge its special duty to build a world community.⁷⁶

As the threat of fascism grew in the late 1930s, the CCF went through an agonizing reassessment of its neutralist stance which, despite Woodsworth's pleas, led ultimately to full-blown support for Canada's war effort by 1942.⁷⁷

With the issue of Canadian entry into the war settled, the CCF turned its attention to preserving the peace once the war was won and creating the conditions for economic and social justice through the formation of a world organization hopefully along the lines of world government or world federalism.⁷⁸ Somewhat similar hopes

⁷⁴ Mills, A Fool for Christ, pp.168-9.

⁷⁵ Ibid., pp.201-206. Also see, McNaught, A Prophet in Politics, pp.271-3.

⁷⁶ Mills, Fool for Christ, pp.204-207.

⁷⁷ Groome, "M.J. Coldwell and CCF foreign policy 1932-1950," p.153.

⁷⁸ Many books were written in the post war period outlining various proposals about how world government could be implemented. Most were very optimistic despite the emerging Cold War. For example see, Philip C. Jessup, The International Problem of Governing Mankind (Claremont: Claremont College, 1947); Mortimer Lipsky, Never Again War: The Case for World Government (London: Thomas Yoseloff Ltd., 1971).

were shared by many people in all Canadian political parties by 1944-5 (except in genuinely isolationist Quebec). Indeed, a broad liberal internationalist consensus on foreign policy was emerging led by External Affairs minister and later Prime Minister, Louis St. Laurent.⁷⁹

In such an atmosphere, the CCF genuinely believed that substantial progress towards many of its idealist foreign policies was imminent, especially with the UN apparently off to a good start. However, by 1948, the wartime alliance had broken up and the CCF found itself in a vigorous internal debate about Canadian participation in the newly formed North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Under strong pressure from its Federal Council, the CCF eventually formally endorsed membership in the alliance at its 1950 convention.⁸⁰ It was motivated by two main concerns. First, there was the communist threat to social democratic objectives. Second, the party's inner circle was convinced it would be branded with the politically fatal pro-communist label if it failed to endorse NATO. Very quickly, however, strong internal opposition to the pro-NATO decision surfaced in the West especially British Columbia. There was even concern for a time that the BC section of the CCF might disintegrate over the issue.⁸¹

Nevertheless, the voice of the idealists was largely drowned out in the early Fifties as the CCF was swept along by liberal internationalism's preoccupation with the cold war. In Frank Underhill's view (one of the founding fathers of the party), the real problem was the CCF's unwillingness to do the spade work necessary to mount a

⁷⁹ John Holmes, The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943-1957, Vol.I (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), p.195; Ibid., Vol.II, 1982, p.119.

⁸⁰ Groome, "M.J. Coldwell and CCF Foreign Policy 1932-1950," p.217.

⁸¹ F.J. Mackenzie to Donald C. Macdonald, Jan.18, 1951, NAC, MG 28, IVI, Vol.156.

vigorous critique of government foreign policy.⁸² The stagnant period that resulted was only broken at the end of the decade when, as part of the movement to form a new party, Canadian social democratic internationalism experienced a renaissance and with it, the beginning of a vigorous period of internal debate between idealism and realism. In fact, this emerged as the main underlying theme of a CCF conference on Canadian foreign policy held from February 26 to 28 of 1960 in Scarborough, Ontario.

The core of the idealist's argument at the conference was that foreign policy should be based on the world situation *as social democrats would like it to be rather than as it actually was*. (A clearer summary of Canadian social democratic idealist philosophy could hardly be imagined!) Only then, idealists maintained, would Canadian foreign policy break out of old patterns and integrate moral considerations into all decisions. From this axiom everything else followed: neutralism, unilateral disarmament if necessary, rejection of nuclear deterrence, the turning of collective security over to the United Nations and condemnation of Canada's alleged dependence on the United States economically, culturally and militarily.⁸³

Realists countered forcefully that to ignore existing world conditions such as the cold war, the effectiveness of deterrence in averting nuclear war, Canada's contribution to collective security, its military weakness and geographical situation, was not only unrealistic but self-defeating. Practical considerations must also

⁸² Frank Underhill, "Twenty-two Years of Canadian Foreign Policy," CBC Publications, 1953, NAC, MG 28, IVI, Vol.490.

⁸³ "Summary Report of a CCF Conference on Canada's Foreign Policy in the 1960s," Scarborough, Ontario, Feb.26-28, 1960, NAC, MG 28, IVI, Vol.490, File Canada Foreign Relations, 1952-66.

determine the extent to which an independent foreign policy should be pursued or faith placed in the United Nations as an effective instrument of collective security.⁸⁴

A year later in February of 1961, Andrew Brewin, CCF National Treasurer, who would subsequently become the New Democratic Party parliamentary spokesperson on international affairs following his election to the House of Commons in 1962, wrote an article for Canadian Forum outlining his interpretation of the struggle between realism and idealism which the new party would have to deal with at its founding convention. Brewin characterized the heart of the debate as one between "neutralism" or "non-alignment" on the one hand and acceptance of regional alliances and close cooperation with the North Atlantic community on the other.⁸⁵ He identified neutralism as an amalgam of seven different elements including: i) pacifism ii) "old fashioned" North American isolationism iii) nationalism flavoured strongly with anti-Americanism iv) a feeling of enormous anger with the cold war and an overriding fear of a nuclear holocaust v) a sense of frustration with the overwhelmingly difficult and complex tasks of promoting disarmament and relaxation of East-West tensions vi) a powerful desire to redirect resources from defence to relieving world poverty and vii) an over-dependence on the concept of universalism. "All are parts of the mixture," Brewin warned in conclusion, "and together they made a heady brew."⁸⁶

Of these elements, Brewin was convinced that nationalism, rooted as it was in anti-Americanism, carried the greatest emotional force. He cited James Minifie, who in his recently published book, Peace Maker or Powder-Monkey: Canada's Role in a

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Andrew Brewin, "Canadian Foreign Policy: The Need for Maturity," Canadian Forum, Vol.60 (February, 1961), p.245.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

Revolutionary World, claimed that Canadian neutrality would eradicate anti-Americanism by removing the links of subservience such as NATO and NORAD. However, Minifie fell into the trap of anti-Americanism himself, in Brewin's view, by garnishing his book with frequent remarks and innuendo that portrayed Americans unfavourably. For instance, Minifie suggested that "fat-cats" typified Americans, while "lean prophets" characterized Canadians. Minifie also assumed that somehow the Canadian struggle with the northern frontier brought with it a higher standard of virtue. While Brewin was prepared to acknowledge the legitimate historical basis of anti-American feeling in Canada, he nevertheless maintained that Canada's considerable dependence on the United States did not condemn it to satellite status.⁸⁷

In his analysis of neutralism, Brewin even went so far as to imply that neutralists were unwitting victims of communist and fellow-traveller propaganda.⁸⁸ Plainly, this was the voice of one who was at home to a considerable degree in the post-World War II liberal internationalist consensus in which the cold war provided the basic frame of reference. Not surprisingly, Brewin was quite often able to work on a non-partisan basis while serving as the NDP's main foreign policy critic from 1962 to 1979.

In addition to highlighting the seven components of Canadian neutralism, Brewin critically examined four major foreign policy "errors" that he said had traditionally characterized social democratic neutralists (which included most Canadian social democratic idealists). The first and perhaps most serious "error" was that they often denied or underrated the fact of the cold war and the negative effects on Canada if the

⁸⁷ Ibid, pp.245-6. David Orlikow, NDP member of Parliament from 1962-1988, agrees with Brewin that anti-Americanism undergirded neutralism. Orlikow interview, Dec.4, 1991.

⁸⁸ Ibid. p.245.

Soviets eventually prevailed. Their second "error" was to overestimate both the possibility and importance of national sovereignty in the modern world while underestimating the need for interdependence. Third, their suggestion that non-involvement in NATO would give Canada more influence with the uncommitted nations was false. Finally, the fourth "error" peddled by the neutralists was their contention that Canada did not have nor could it ever expect to have substantive leverage with the United States or the alliance as a whole.⁸⁹

In terms of the first "error," Brewin argued that leaving NATO would be disastrous because it would strengthen the communists if only psychologically. Brewin was prepared to concede the neutralist argument that the alliance system created a global regionalism that was inconsistent with their commonly shared, long range universalist dream of a world government. Nonetheless, while such regional approaches could only be a holding operation, they were essential for that very reason.⁹⁰

The whole notion of world government has had a powerful hold on the Canadian social democratic imagination, in good measure because of the conviction that substantive progress towards disarmament and real peace are impossible without its implementation in some form. This was the argument of George R. Fawcett, former Ontario CCF provincial candidate and a member of a local CLC executive, in a lengthy paper he wrote in the early Sixties on what he considered the most important question facing the New Party, "What can Canada do in the interests of peace, disarmament

⁸⁹ Ibid., p.246.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

and eventual world government?"⁹¹ Fawcett was encouraged by recent developments which seemed to indicate that world opinion was moving in that direction.

The almost universal disapproval of apartheid in South Africa is evidence of a developing world morality, a world morality that will eventually demand world law to back it up. This is the most hopeful development on the international scene in our time.⁹²

Further evidence of the strength of the world government movement in the early Sixties can be found in a report written for Saturday Night by Maxwell Cohen, a McGill law professor, entitled, "The UN: Toward a World Government," The author, who had recently served on an important UN committee, evaluated Canada's performance at the United Nations in the previous session almost exclusively on the basis of how well Canadian initiatives had contributed to the building of a global government.⁹³ Whatever his specific political affiliation, his argument typified the widespread conviction among Canadian social democratic idealists, in particular, that contemporary problems, even such an intractable and dangerous one as the cold war, paled in significance to the building of world community.

Indeed, T.C. Douglas considered world government or federalism so important that he made it a significant theme in his first national election campaign as leader of the NDP in 1962.⁹⁴ He argued that in the present circumstances, a world federation

⁹¹ George R. Fawcett, "A Third Force: Canada's Role For Peace: A Foreign Policy for the New Party," undated, NAC, MG 28, IVI, Vol.388, File 6, p.1.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Maxwell Cohen, "The UN: Toward a World Government," Saturday Night, Vol.75 (February 20, 1960), p.1.

⁹⁴ W.H. Pope, to T.K. Shoyama, executive assistant to T.C. Douglas, Feb.9, 1962, NAC, MG 28, IVI, Vol.449, File Tommy Shoyama, 1961-62.

was inevitable because only it could establish the rational rule of law as the basis for relations between nations.⁹⁵

What explains this propensity by so many Canadian social democrats to overlook current issues like the cold war and focus singlemindedly on idealistic hopes for the future? (It is significant that just as their Canadian compatriots were about to embark on a new round of controversy on the NATO question in the later Fifties and early Sixties, European social democratic parties were basically settling this question, as well as turning their backs on unilateral disarmament.⁹⁶) First, geographical and psychological separation from the concrete threat of war in Europe played a very significant part. Related to this was the fact that most Canadian social democrats had experienced World War II only at a distance.⁹⁷ Second, the traditional faith of all people on the left in the inevitable march of history towards socialism in some form, gave them a propensity to overlook so-called "temporary setbacks" like the East-West conflict. Third, socialists and social democrats had mixed feelings about the Soviet Union. On the one hand, most of them denounced its repressive policies both internally

⁹⁵ For Douglas, faith in the rational ranked with human equality and cooperation as fundamentals underlying the New Democracy. Thus, Douglas was convinced that ordinary Canadians would see the "irrefutable logic" of his party's arguments and vote NDP in their own supposed best interests if they had the proper education. See T.C. Douglas, "The Case for Human Dignity," Saturday Night, Vol.77 (May 12, 1962), pp.15-16.

Such thinking reflects the influence of Fabian socialism and its firm contention that political power must and would be achieved by peaceful means based on the alleged inherent moral rational superiority of democratic socialism.

⁹⁶ For the European situation, see Stephen J. Artner, A Change of Course: The West German Social Democrats and NATO, 1957-1961 (London: Greenwood Press, 1985), p.xiii; Michael R. Gordon, Conflict and Consensus in Labour's Foreign Policy 1914-1965 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), p.276; Peter Clarke, A Question of Leadership: Gladstone to Thatcher (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1991), pp.254-5.

⁹⁷ David Orlikow interview, Dec.4, 1991.

and externally in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, some of its economic and educational achievements inspired admiration. This ambivalence meant that social democrats often found it more difficult to accept uncritically the totally negative conventional wisdom about the Soviet Union that dominated western opinion and which helped non-socialists in the West to become so fixated by the cold war.

As for the neutralist "error" of overestimating the possibility and significance of national sovereignty while minimizing interdependence, Brewin's comments were harsh. Even the United States and the Soviet Union could not disregard their allies. The argument that Canada must be either completely uncommitted or a subservient satellite was nonsensical. It ignored the fact that degrees of independence existed within the North Atlantic Alliance. "Are Norway and Denmark within NATO but without American bases more or less satellites of the United States than Great Britain or Canada?" asked Brewin. "Is De Gaulle the puppet of the Pentagon?"⁹⁸

In essence, Brewin agreed with the Liberal Party's position as defined by Paul Martin and Lester Pearson throughout the 1960s that membership in NATO did not preclude Canada establishing a certain measure of independence in foreign policy affairs. Had he been in Parliament, he doubtless would have approved of Pearson's January 9, 1961 statement in the House of Commons that in seeking to check American mistakes, Canada must avoid neutralism and isolationism.⁹⁹

For Brewin, Orlikow and other realists, idealism had to yield to pragmatism on defence matters. Otherwise, there would be no possibility of ever fulfilling the

⁹⁸ Brewin, "Canadian Foreign Policy," p.246.

⁹⁹ Robert Spencer, "External Affairs and Defence," in Canadian Annual Review, ed. by John Saywell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), p.106; For more on Lester Pearson's views on foreign and defence policy, see John English, The Worldly Years: The Life of Lester Pearson, 1949-1972, Vol.II (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), pp.248-252.

objectives of social democratic internationalism to which both idealists and realists were committed. Unlike Brewin, however, Orlikow remained silent when the party discussed foreign policy issues. He did so not wishing to create dissension and also to preserve his political "capital" for domestic issues which interested him much more.¹⁰⁰ Of course, the realists in the party could afford to be sanguine since they were on the winning side in the 1960s on the NATO issue.

For many New Party idealists, membership in NATO or NORAD was associated with subservience to the United States. In the months prior to the 1961 founding convention, a New Party study paper on external relations and defence was circulated to interested parties, some of whom were asked to submit comments on the proposals to the New Party policy committee. In a well written seven page response, an anonymous commentator charged that the committee had largely "missed the boat" because the proposals either evaded fundamental issues or were too tame.

One senses a disinclination to come to full grips with concrete issues of over-riding importance and as a result some key questions are glossed over, others ignored.... There is hardly a point which is not already a part of Liberal Party policy or could not easily be adopted by it.... Indeed, in its recognition of the need to recast Canada's relation to NORAD, the Liberal position is somewhat advanced over the New Party Study Paper.¹⁰¹

In other words, as interpreted by the commentator, the Liberals were CCFers in a hurry when it came to foreign policy.

¹⁰⁰ David Orlikow interview, Dec.4, 1991.

¹⁰¹ "New Party Policy on External Relations and Defence: Some Comments," undated, NAC, MG 28, IVI, Vol.387, File 20, pp.3-4. This accusation may have inadvertently pleased some members of the party inner circle who were desperately trying to create a moderate image for the New Party and its defence policy.

The basis of this critique of the study paper was its failure to take as point of departure the concept of a totally independent Canadian foreign policy. Canada's image, the author argued, ought to be that of a

country disengaged and independent, with no conditioned reflex of hostility to any area or people of the world, but with a clearly expressed disposition to support every peaceful initiative, no matter what its source.¹⁰²

Such a policy must begin with a commitment to withdraw from all cold war involvements including NATO and NORAD with future deployments of Canadian troops limited to military operations sanctioned by the United Nations. Furthermore, Canada should take the lead in supporting disarmament even without an absolute assurance of security by unilaterally cutting its defence expenditures by at least 20%. In addition, Canada ought to demonstrate its independence by recognizing mainland China and by lending militant support to the rights of all nations to self-government and freedom especially in the Third World.¹⁰³

Another active member of the CCF, Mrs. O. Chalmers, in a letter to Carl Hamilton, executive secretary, National Committee for the New Party, asserted that only by adopting a pacifist position could Canada successfully implement an independent foreign policy. She accused the groups and individuals associated with the New Party Committee of adopting the contradictory position of the British Labour Party's right wing as well as majority opinion in the other European social democratic

¹⁰² *Ibid.* p.3.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p.5.

parties in deploring the nuclear build-up, while all the while accepting the "protection" of the American nuclear deterrent.

If we rely on armed power at all, we must, if we are honest, rely upon it absolutely. We must then accept the nuclear shield, the perils of accidental holocaust, the support of abhorrent regimes for strategic reasons, the dedication of youth, labour and science to destruction and the whole immoral business of arms industry and espionage. A half-way position in which we don't sully our own peace-keeping fingers, but accept the morality of world power politics and keep the conventional trappings of sovereignty is hypocritical and inconsistent.¹⁰⁴

She then went on to suggest that the New Party study paper ought to endorse only the "weapons" of passive resistance and non-cooperation which she believed were both more consistent with socialism and sensible in an insane world and most importantly, morally defensible.¹⁰⁵

Her argument that Canada must isolate itself from the politics and "conventional trappings of sovereignty" illustrates what could happen from a marriage of social democratic idealism and pacifist morality. In effect, Chalmers expected Canadians to dedicate themselves to the pursuit of collective sainthood. The end result, in her mind, would be a country "purified" and ready to fulfil its special call of bringing the "gospel" of social democratic internationalism to a needy world. Clearly, pacifism was still a force to be reckoned with in Canadian social democratic internationalism.

Without question, the appearance in 1960 of James Minifie's Peacemaker or Powder-Monkey just as debate on these matters was heating up, greatly aided the social democratic idealist cause. Minifie argued that Canada could not be both a leader

¹⁰⁴ O. Chalmers to Carl Hamilton, June 14, 1960, NAC, MG 28, IVI, Vol.382, File 7.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

in the quest for international peace and at the same time a very subordinate military ally of one of the two great powers whose rivalry was the very thing which threatened to destroy international peace. Instead, Canada must issue a Declaration of Neutrality, because freed of entanglements, it could resume a universal role and emerge as a leader of small powers.¹⁰⁶

Both idealists and realists in the New Party shared Minifie's view that Canada had a special call to help the newly emerging Afro-Asian and Latin American countries. Disagreement occurred, however, over whether leaving NATO and NORAD would enhance this objective. Brewin, in his third critique of neutralist "errors", stated there was not a shred of evidence that withdrawal would ensure more Canadian influence with uncommitted and Third World countries. "Does anyone seriously believe," he argued, "that this would give us more influence [with these countries] than if we are recognized as a country with considerable influence with our powerful neighbour yet fully capable of independent views and actions?"¹⁰⁷

In fact, idealists such as George Fawcett did believe in the positive force of Canadian neutrality. Emerging nations, he argued, wanted nothing to do with the cold war. They perceived the ideological struggle to be irrelevant to their real problems of poverty, disease, illiteracy and economic backwardness. In order for western style democracy to have any credibility with this growing bloc of uncommitted nations, the West would have to rid itself of the notion that everything hinged on the ideological struggle between the free and communist worlds. Indeed the so-called "free-world" included a number of countries whose peoples were as unfree as any communist

¹⁰⁶ James M. Minifie, Peacemaker or Powder-Monkey: Canada's Role in a Revolutionary World (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1960), p.11.

¹⁰⁷ Brewin, "Canadian Foreign Policy," p.246.

satellite. Fawcett was convinced that Canada was best suited of all Western countries to build a bridge to the new nations because Canada had no past colonial or territorial ambitions, maintained a reputation for tolerance and had evolved into independent nationhood largely without resorting to violence.¹⁰⁸

Whatever the historical accuracy of these assertions, it was clear that the myth of Canadian uniqueness had considerable influence among large sections of the social democratic left in Canada. They believed the only factors hindering the country from fulfilling its historical destiny were its military ties with NATO and to a lesser extent NORAD. As far as uncommitted nations were concerned, membership in these alliances made Canada part and parcel of the cold war alignments they sought to avoid while also sullyng her anti-imperialist credentials since NATO was dominated by history's greatest colonial powers.¹⁰⁹

Fawcett categorically rejected Brewin's premise that by leaving the military alliances, Canada would be isolating itself from diplomatic contact and influence with its traditional friends.

Indeed, if we have reached the stage where military alliances have become the sole basis of diplomatic relations, then the sooner we are quit of the whole sorry business the better. However, I do not think there is any truth in the premise. Have Sweden and India been cut off from diplomatic contact and influence because they have chosen to remain outside the Cold War military alignment? I think not.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ Fawcett, "A Third Force: Canada's Role for Peace," p.6.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p.7.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

By joining the neutralist bloc, Canada, he believed, could make play a decisive role in creating an effective Third Force dedicated to freedom and peace. Fawcett attacked those in New Party circles who would dismiss his views as idealistic nonsense. "It is not nearly as nonsensical as the idea of Canada undertaking the reformation of NATO," he claimed, "to say nothing of the pipe dream of 'socializing' a military alliance."¹¹¹

Fawcett was not a pacifist however; indeed, he maintained that Canada should build and sustain a strong conventional force available to the UN to help contain "brushfire" wars. Furthermore, he was prepared to increase conventional arms spending if all defence production for Canada's contribution to this United Nations police force occurred in Canada, thus relieving Canada from dependence upon the "capricious allocation of American Defence contracts". Fawcett also claimed that if increased Canadian defence spending were tied to a full employment program, more funds would be generated for foreign aid.¹¹²

The relationship between jobs and defence policy was made very forcefully by George Thomas, a Canadian naval officer, in a written response to the New Party's Foreign Policy Study Paper. He contended that most members of the armed forces joined because they could not find other jobs. Thus, in order to gain their vote, the New Party must advocate not defence expenditures cuts, but instead the equipping of the armed forces with Canadian designed and manufactured weapons. Interestingly, he anticipated the 1964 Liberal government's defence policy by advocating the amalgamation of the three branches of the armed forces into one under a single commander and uniform. This would not only save money, he argued, but produce a

¹¹¹ ibid., p.8.

¹¹² ibid.

more efficient defence machine and remove the cliques and interest politics which now characterized the Defence Department.

It is submitted that a Defence Policy based on the foregoing lines will bring votes, and votes we must have if we are going to have an opportunity to implement in Canada the ideal socialist state.¹¹³

Apparently, for people like Thomas, an expanding domestic Canadian arms industry and an idealist foreign policy were compatible.

Brewin's criticism of the fourth "error" of the neutralists was as pointed as the others. He categorically rejected the notion that Canada was without influence with the American government or the alliance, although he provided no specific examples proving that Canada had such influence. He maintained that if Canada had failed to pursue an independent foreign policy on such issues as recognizing mainland China, it had been this country's fault. Moreover, Canada had accepted membership in NORAD willingly without United States pressure. Throughout his article, Brewin demonstrated that the party's inner circle, of which he was a member, would be taking a very dim view of anti-Americanism at the founding convention.

In Brewin's mind the real issue was maturity. As a good realist, he insisted that electoral considerations must never be lost sight of when formulating policy. It would be a sign of immaturity if the largely neutralist resolution passed at the final CCF convention at Regina in July of 1960 was officially adopted by the New Party, because the Canadian people would then not entrust it with government responsibility. Furthermore, Brewin was convinced that even if the New Party was elected on a

¹¹³ G. Thomas, "Notes on the Study Paper on the Programme of the Proposed New Political Party for Canada," undated, NAC, MG 26, IVI, Vol.382, File 5, p.2.

neutralist platform, it would be unable to lead Canada in making a constructive contribution to world peace.¹¹⁴

Clearly, by the spring of 1961, a major foreign policy debate had begun in party ranks even though, as Frank Underhill charged, leaders like Stanley Knowles were trying very hard to ignore and cover up this fact.¹¹⁵ Moreover, whether Brewin and others in the realist camp liked it or not, Canadian-American relations was emerging as a major aspect of that debate and with it the issue of anti-Americanism. True, even some idealists voiced their doubts about anti-Americanism because as a party with new ideas such an old notion should be passe.¹¹⁶ For others, anti-Americanism was a potent force. They were even prepared to increase Canada's defence spending to create an autonomous conventional force, as Sweden had done, if that would mean more Canadian independence. In the booming Sixties, the notion of Canada becoming militarily self-sufficient appeared to be financially feasible and gained some support within the NDP. Fuelling anti-Americanism also, was pressure from Washington to join its trade embargo of Cuba.¹¹⁷

The most significant contribution to this facet of the debate was made by Kenneth McNaught, an NDP historian who had written the widely acclaimed biography of J.S. Woodsworth, A Prophet in Politics. In a chapter on foreign policy that appeared in the influential book, Social Purpose for Canada, published in 1961, McNaught

¹¹⁴ Brewin, "Foreign Policy Issues for the New Party," p.247.

¹¹⁵ Frank Underhill, review of The New Party, by Stanley Knowles. Canadian Forum, May, 1961, pp.35-6.

¹¹⁶ Ben Larracey to Carl Hamilton, Feb.18, 1961, NAC, MG 28, IVI, Vol.382, File 5.

¹¹⁷ William Mosdell to Carl Hamilton, New Party Secretary, April 19, 1960; Paul Klinghammer to Carl Hamilton, April 2, 1960, NAC, MG 28, IVI, Vol.382, File 5.

developed a strong case for an independent foreign policy, a theme which would increasingly dominate international affairs discussion in NDP circles as the Sixties unfolded.¹¹⁸ For McNaught, the starting point of a Canadian socialist foreign policy must be the defence of national independence in the face of the increasing American domination of Canada economically, militarily and politically.¹¹⁹ A spirited and sustained defence of Canadian independence was imperative if Canada was to make a meaningful contribution to what McNaught called "egalitarian internationalism" which he believed must be the ultimate objective of any socialist foreign policy.¹²⁰ While vigorously rejecting charges that his position was anti-American or isolationist, McNaught insisted that any socialist must be "vaguely anti-American" since the United States represented a way of life at variance with many aspects of democratic socialism.¹²¹

Some anti-neutralists, on the other hand, had a very different concern, namely, the party's policy towards communism. Accordingly, a former NDP MP for Dauphin, Manitoba, Fred Zaplitny, strongly urged the New Party to reject the unrealistic and "obsessive preoccupation" with international affairs which he maintained had plagued the CCF from its beginning.¹²² What Zaplitny probably meant was that he was dissatisfied with certain aspects of CCF foreign policy. As a Canadian of Ukrainian

¹¹⁸ Kenneth McNaught, "Foreign Policy," in Social Purpose for Canada, ed. by Michael Oliver (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), pp.445-472.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., p.466.

¹²⁰ Ibid., pp.446-7, p.471.

¹²¹ Ibid., p.468.

¹²² Fred Zaplitny, "A Policy for the New Party," Toronto, undated, NAC, MG 28, IVI, Vol.382.

extraction, he shared the strongly anti-communist views of most of his countrymen.¹²³ Like David Orlikow, he preferred party silence on specific foreign policies rather than people "shooting their mouths off" on controversial issues, because some of their statements might open the door to charges that the party was soft on communism. Grant Regalbuto, another anti-communist, wrote a letter to Carl Hamilton, New Party secretary, voicing his opposition to the New Party proposal to recognize Red China and admit China to the UN. He felt that if China was recognized and a member of the United Nations, the balance of power would tilt in favour of the communists.¹²⁴

For social democratic idealists, the general atmosphere of anti-communist paranoia and inflammatory cold war rhetoric in the early Sixties did not dampen their faith in the universalist vision inherent in social democratic internationalism. Indeed, they saw in the changes that were transpiring simultaneously around the world, such as decolonization, new opportunities for the New Party to fulfil its historic mission. A memorandum containing a suggested preamble for the New Party program put it this way.

Assuming that the arms race does not erupt into a nuclear holocaust, there is no party that has such a limitless opportunity to give dynamic and motivating leadership in relating...the great untapped resources of the Canadian people to the unmet needs of the world community.¹²⁵

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Grant Regalbuto to Carl Hamilton, December 22, 1960, NAC, MG 28, IVI, Vol.382, File 7.

¹²⁵ "Memorandum Re Suggested Preamble for the New Party Program," undated, NAC, MG 28, IVI, Vol.382, File 11, p.1.

The anonymous author of this memorandum believed that the New Party offered Canadians an unlimited opportunity to work on a world horizon rather than just within national or ideological boundaries. In a world that was moving from the dependency and independency of sovereign states towards the interdependency of a new era of world government, the author was convinced that only the New Party had the will, the creativity and the needed insights into the needs of the underprivileged to meet the challenge.¹²⁶

A clearer and more powerful statement of Canadian social democratic internationalism's prophetic mission (in addition to moral self-righteousness) could hardly be made. Here, at the outset of the Sixties, was recaptured some of the commitment and vision of Woodsworth's social gospel in which the whole world would be transformed by cooperation and planning. Thus would the basic needs of Third World people be met and the communist challenge to the West defeated. After all, communism's appeal to the new nations was its "apparent success in the lifting of underprivileged masses of people in a single generation and the apparent failure of the West to identify creatively with the aims and aspirations of the peoples on the march."¹²⁷ Indeed, if countries like Canada increased their contribution to foreign aid and provided proper guidance, Third World development was assured.

Meanwhile, the corporal's guard of 8 CCF members were soldiering on in the House of Commons. The knowledge that a new social democratic party was about to appear seems to have emboldened them, for the positions they took were stronger and more critical of the government's foreign policy than had been the case for much of the 1950s. The charge was led by the maverick British Columbia MP from Kootenay

¹²⁶ Ibid., p.7.

¹²⁷ Ibid., p.1.

West, H.W. Herridge, who has been described as the most socialist of the lot and a "loose cannon" who took special delight in firing shots at the Americans while vigorously and consistently championing an independent foreign policy for Canada.¹²⁸

Herridge wrote that Canada ought to stop "riding on Mr. Dulles's coattails" (the United States Secretary of State) and instead give audacious expression to a Canadian point of view.¹²⁹ For example, Canada should refuse to join the Organization of American (OAS) and instead concentrate its membership in agencies that were not under American control, especially the Commonwealth, the Colombo Plan and the UN.¹³⁰ Indeed, he felt the Commonwealth had a special role to play as an agent of Westernization. "I will continue to do all I can to promote those Christian principles upon which the Commonwealth is based."¹³¹

Herridge's opposition to OAS membership was, of course, part of his general distrust of Washington. During a major Commons foreign policy debate on April 26 and

¹²⁸ David Orlikow interview, Dec.4, 1991. Herridge did nothing to dispel such notions when he periodically insisted on addressing people as "comrade".

¹²⁹ H.W. Herridge to Dr. Charles Lipton, Aug. 15, NAC, MG 32, C13, Vol.34, File 25.

¹³⁰ House of Commons Debates (from henceforth called Debates), Sept.7, 1961, p.8078; Sept.11, 1961, p.8204.

¹³¹ H.W. Herridge to S.A. Whitfield, July 7, 1961, NAC, MG 32, C13, Vol.16. At this stage, like the rest of Canadian society, social democrats had not begun to question the notion that Third World countries must follow the historical path pioneered by Western countries to achieve democracy and economic development. Thus, while the CCF/NDP was somewhat "ahead" of most Canadians in condemning South Africa's apartheid system in the Sixties, it exercised little or no leadership in that period in questioning Western assumptions about the Third World. Partly this was because the social democratic vision was so dependent on the idea that scientific and social progress was inevitable, a notion that had been evolving in Western society since the Enlightenment. For example, see T.C. Douglas, "The Case for the New Democratic Party: Peace, Prosperity and Human Dignity," Saturday Night, Vol.77 (May 12, 1962), pp.15-17.

27 of 1961, he severely criticized American blunders, especially the Bay of Pigs fiasco (Liberal leader, Lester Pearson, also called it a mistake) and its consistent support of reactionary governments around the world. He further demanded that the Canadian government protest the Kennedy Doctrine which reasserted America's so-called right to intervene anywhere in the Western Hemisphere to halt the spread of communism.¹³²

Not surprisingly, Herridge also wanted Canada to pull out of NORAD and NATO, although at the same time he denounced isolationism as repugnant to every true socialist.¹³³ This reflected the typical idealist argument that there was no inherent association between neutralism and isolationism, a point emphasized very strongly by James Minifie.¹³⁴ Instead of adherence to the outmoded reliance on military alliances, Herridge wanted Canada to take the lead in presenting new proposals that would ease the tensions in Central Europe and move towards a permanent solution.¹³⁵ Specifically, he called for the withdrawal of all troops from Central Europe to make it a demilitarized and neutralized zone, followed by the creation of a loose federation of West and East Germany as a first step towards holding free elections.¹³⁶

Herridge and his fellow CCF MPs showed other signs of developing a more distinct and independent foreign policy in these pre-New Party convention days, albeit

¹³² Canadian Annual Review. 1961, p. 130.

¹³³ Debates. July 14, 1960, p.6311.

¹³⁴ James Minifie, Peacemaker or Powder-Monkey, pp.71-2.

¹³⁵ Transcript of Herridge CBC Radio Address, March 20, 1959, NAC, MG 32, C13, Vol.28.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

with certain clear limitations. While remaining steadfastly committed to Israel, Herridge denounced the Western imperialist powers for supporting the operation of the giant oil monopolies in the Middle East. The UN, he believed, should help the Arab countries take over ownership and control of their oil resources and help establish a Middle East Development Commission to promote general economic development throughout the region. The purpose of these measures would be threefold. First, the transformation of Arab nationalism into a constructive world force that would promote stability and not threaten Western interests. Second, the encouragement of a democratic overthrow of despotic totalitarian rulers. Finally, the regaining of the initiative by the West from the Soviet Union and the offsetting of anti-Western attitudes in the region.¹³⁷

These points illustrate two characteristics of Canadian social democratic thinking at the time. First, like other Canadians, people interested in forming a new moderate left-wing party were ethnocentric in their attitudes towards non-Western peoples and therefore judged them on the basis of Western values and interests. Second, while campaigning for an independent Canadian foreign policy, even radical idealists such as H.W. Herridge, who ostensibly favoured a neutralist policy concerning NORAD and NATO, fell victim at times to the Western bias which tended to see all foreign policy issues through the prism of the East-West Conflict.

The differences between the realists and idealists on defence policy came to the fore at the last convention of the CCF held in Regina from August 9 to 11, 1960. After a lengthy debate, younger, more idealistic delegates were able to push through a basically neutralist resolution calling for withdrawal from NORAD and NATO. They had taken advantage of the fact that quite a few of their realist opponents had already left for home. As John Saywell noted in the Canadian Annual Review, the passing of this

¹³⁷ Ibid.

resolution caused considerable embarrassment to the party leadership. They feared the decision would offend the largely pro-NATO CLC people whose enthusiastic participation in the New Party project was deemed essential for its success, as well as the average middle-of-the-road voter they hoped to attract. The CCF convention also reaffirmed the party's long-standing commitment to complete disarmament and opposition to Canada acquiring nuclear weapons.¹³⁸ Some members of the party saw in the passing of this resolution growing support for a more independent Canadian foreign policy which, in their view, reflected a move to the left.¹³⁹ In any case, this decision ensured that a lively debate would occur within New Party ranks at its founding convention the following year.

The new anti-alliance platform engendered journalistic opinion that was often harsh. For example, John Gellner, a former RCAF officer and now a respected commentator on defence matters, wrote that for a defence policy to be acceptable to thinking people, it must make sense both politically and militarily as well as be internally consistent. The CCF policy failed on all counts and could therefore hardly be called a defence policy at all. In disavowing nuclear weapons and concentrating on working towards the "millennium" of complete and universal disarmament while, in Gellner's view, leaving the country defenceless, Canada's socialists had disregarded "two historically proven facts: that disarmament follows peace, not peace disarmament; and that to be safe as a neutral, a country must be both militarily strong and comparatively unimportant." (Obviously, CCF/New Party thinkers and strategists who themselves disagreed with the 1960 Convention resolution found it difficult to

¹³⁸ John Saywell, "Parliament and Politics," Canadian Annual Review ed. by John Saywell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), p.56.

¹³⁹ Douglas Fisher, "The Last CCF Roundup," Canadian Forum. Vol.60 (Sept., 1960), p.123.

counter such journalistic attacks.) Interestingly, Gellner agreed with the CCF policy of NORAD withdrawal based strictly on military grounds; the day of the intercontinental bomber was over.¹⁴⁰

However, idealist supporters of the 1960 defence policy resolution in the party, including Professor Kenneth McNaught of the University of Toronto, were not afraid to challenge critics both inside and outside the party. McNaught took on both Andrew Brewin and John Gellner in a lengthy article replying to Gellner for a Saturday Night special report on defence issues in the summer of 1961 just before the New Party founding convention.¹⁴¹ In it, he urged non-alignment as the most realistic position since the division of the world into two armed camps was itself one of the chief stimulants of the arms race. "Each nation that continues membership in this structure increases the rigidity of international relations by a perceptible degree making nuclear war more likely."¹⁴²

McNaught took strong issue with people like Brewin who assumed that non-alignment meant neutrality. By withdrawing from all alliances, Canada would only be militarily non-aligned since both Canadian history and public opinion insured that Canada could not be truly "neutral" in the East-West conflict. Nevertheless, by "contracting out of the arms race", Canada would advance the

¹⁴⁰ John Gellner, "Political Parties and Canadian Defence," Saturday Night, Vol.77 (February 18, 1961), pp.9,10.

¹⁴¹ For his debate with Brewin, see "Debate on Defence," a 1960 party document, NAC, MG 28, C26, Vol.16.

¹⁴² Kenneth McNaught, "Canada Must Get Out of the Arms Race," Saturday Night, Vol.76 (June 10, 1961), p.25.

real interests of the West by demonstrating the truth that security today cannot rest upon the absolute power of annihilation: that security can only be found in a serious assault upon the problems of economic and social inequality and in undeviating support of the principle of a United Nations police force.¹⁴³

He also believed it was revolutionary, yet more realistic, to run the risks of unilateral disarmament than the risk of annihilation. Indeed, for McNaught, attaching the "realist" label to liberal internationalist defence policy was a misnomer. The true realists were the social democratic idealists who knew that effective security lay not in guns and alliances, but in tackling world-wide economic and social inequality. If force must ultimately be employed in any situation, it ought to be exercised by a world body whose inherently superior moral standards would ensure a greater measure of justice than if countries acted alone.¹⁴⁴

While all agreed it was in the interests of the West to avoid nuclear war, social democratic idealists were the ones most willing to countenance "revolutionary" means such as unilateral disarmament to achieve this goal. Perhaps it was the case that those who believed that capitalism was either dying or changing radically, were not as fearful as other Canadians of a world-wide communist victory even if it meant a Russian takeover of Canada. Still, McNaught and most idealists were not pacifists.¹⁴⁵

Social democratic idealists did not really believe that communists would ever seize control in Canada, especially if Canada would lead the way in withdrawing from military alliances and increasing foreign aid, thereby demonstrating "real Western values". In this way, idealists thought they were uniting idealism and "true" realism.

¹⁴³ Ibid., p. 25.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

Yet, in the final analysis, idealism predominated. For McNaught and others like him it was not necessary to demonstrate that non-alignment and unilateral disarmament represented the best chance of preserving peace; it was enough to believe it.

McNaught's arguments troubled Ramsay Cook, a historian of Canadian history who at the time was quite sympathetic to the New Party project. He castigated McNaught for placing purity of doctrine ahead of the duty to seek political power. It was time to leave the ghost of Woodsworth and his foreign policy views behind and bravely face the realities of the international situation. In fact, for Cook, McNaught and his unilateralist and non-alignment crowd were now the "real conservatives". Cook was particularly afraid that the New Party would be paralysed at birth if its founding convention was torn apart over foreign policy.¹⁴⁶

As this chapter has demonstrated, the main arguments of the idealist and realist camps had been outlined well in advance of the convention. However, with the influx of new people from the Canadian Labour Congress and New Party Clubs, neither side could be certain of victory in the foreign policy debate that was about to occur.

¹⁴⁶ Ramsay Cook, "The Old Man, The Old Manifesto, the Old Party," Canadian Forum, Vol.41 (May, 1961), pp.25-7.

CHAPTER TWO

IDEALISTS LOSE THE FIRST ROUND - THE 1961 NDP CONVENTION

Both idealists and realists approached the New Party founding convention with some trepidation. Would New Party leaders use that as an excuse to downplay international affairs in hopes of not drawing attention to these divisions?. Would the New Party remain a genuinely radical party trying to establish a critical ground for foreign policy debate or would it stifle debate in the interests of appealing to the moderate voter? Most importantly, would the New Party continue to make foreign policy largely from a realist perspective as the CCF had done during the Fifties especially on defence policy and relations with the United States, or would it embrace the unilateralist and pro-independence stance of social democratic idealism? The answers to these questions would help determine the future direction of social democracy in Canada.

Probably the majority of delegates who assembled in the heat of Ottawa's summer for the founding convention of the New Party in 1961 initially agreed with the non-aligned position. Indeed, Colin Cameron, long-time British Columbia CCF MP from Nanaimo-Cowichan-The Islands was so convinced. According to him, the pro-NATO leadership of the New Party had been so worried they would lose that extraordinary

procedures had been employed to delay the vote on the foreign policy platform until after T.C. Douglas was elected national leader and could bring his decisive influence to bear on the question.¹⁴⁷ Another part of their strategy was to label the anti-NATO people at the convention "isolationist" or "neutralist," something they resented, preferring instead "pro-independence". In fact, a resolution was proposed which stated, "Be it resolved that the foreign policy of Canada...shall stress positive independence rather than the term 'neutralism' which is so easily misconstrued".¹⁴⁸

Evidence of the strength of the neutralist position was seen in the list of foreign policy resolutions submitted by delegates. Of the 23 resolutions that mentioned NATO, 21 called for Canadian withdrawal. The other two made continued membership contingent on reform of the organization. Typical was the following from a New Party Club: "Be it resolved that Canada should withdraw from NATO and give its full support and place our complete faith for the preservation of peace in the United Nations."¹⁴⁹ Other delegates wanted Canada to disarm unilaterally except for those forces placed at the disposal of the UN, while some were content to demand that Canada permit no foreign military bases or troops on its territory or allow any foreign patrol flights.

H.W. Herridge led the pro-neutralist forces on the convention floor and from the podium. In a major address, he recycled all the traditional anti-NATO arguments of which three were most significant. First, leading NATO countries were continually breaking the organization's charter by making decisions without consulting the other partners. Second, the NATO agreement's commitment to promote meaningful

¹⁴⁷ Colin Cameron, "Memorandum," undated, NAC, MG 32, CI3, Vol.48, File 3.

¹⁴⁸ Resolution 499, in "Submitted Resolutions of the 1961 Convention," NAC, MG 28, IVI, Vol.387, File 23, p.89.

¹⁴⁹ Resolution 503. "Submitted Resolutions of the 1961 Convention," p.89.

economic and social cooperation amongst its members (the famous Canadian Article 2) had never been implemented and was therefore meaningless. Third, NATO was already for all intents and purposes a nuclear power.

Herridge also added a few new points of his own. For example, he proclaimed that morally Canada could not continue supporting a regional pact presumed to be defending freedom but which included such countries as Portugal with its ruthless dictatorship and savage treatment of Angola's native population.¹⁵⁰ Moreover, Canada's moral sensibilities should long since have been offended by the presence of former Nazi generals within the NATO command structure. He concluded, therefore, that a logical and consistent policy for peace demanded Canadian withdrawal from NATO and the bringing home of all troops to be made available for service in a UN Police Force as required. The money saved could be redirected to solving Canada's unemployment problem.¹⁵¹ Herridge concluded his anti-NATO diatribe with a call for the New Democratic Party to give leadership to the forces within Canada which desired a fresh and independent foreign policy.

This situation presents Canada with a challenge and an opportunity to give leadership to all the smaller countries that support freedom. This is not neutralism; this is acceptance of a challenge, an accepting of responsibility. This is an opportunity for the NDP to give leadership. Let us seize it with both hands by the vote of this convention.¹⁵²

Herridge was clearly reminding the delegates of their prophetic call, something that was supposed to characterize Canadian social democratic foreign policy.

¹⁵⁰ H.W. Herridge, "Why Withdraw From NATO," speech to 1961 convention, August 4, 1961. NAC, MG 32, C13, Vol.48.

¹⁵¹ ibid.

¹⁵² ibid.

Nevertheless, despite the existence of strong neutralist forces in the party and at the convention, the pro-NATO forces won the day. How and why did this occur? First, most of the key members of the party inner circle including Stanley Knowles, T.C. Douglas, David Lewis, and the CLC leader, Claude Jodoin, desired above all that the New Party project a moderate public image in both domestic and foreign policy. Thus, for example, the term "socialist" did not appear in the proposed Party Program. Capitalism was still denounced but the leadership warned against adopting rigid socialist solutions to problems.¹⁵³ As Leo MacIlsac, New Party Clubs National Council Chairman, made plain in his convention address,

We shall oppose vigorously any irrational attempts to impose unnecessary controls or to usurp unnecessarily any freedoms from ourselves or our neighbours.... We are not sympathetic to widespread centralization of economic power under government any more than under private control.¹⁵⁴

The New Party leadership could also point to the foreign policy of the major European social democratic parties for support. The longstanding pro-alliance stand of the British Labour Party provided strong evidence that such a policy was not a betrayal of social democratic ideals. Hugh Gaitskell, leader of the British Labour Party emphasized this point in his address to the NDP founding convention. (Although it must be added that Gaitskell was at that moment in the midst of a very tough fight with the idealists in his own party on the issue of unilateral disarmament of which anti-

¹⁵³ S. Bowes, "The Defence Policies of the New Democratic Party, 1961-1969," (unpublished M.A.thesis, Queen's University, 1983), p. 29.

¹⁵⁴ John Saywell, "Parliament and Politics," Canadian Annual Review. ed. by John Saywell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), p.82.

NATO sentiment was a major component.¹⁵⁵) Of equal significance were recent developments in the foreign policy of the West German Social Democratic Party where after many years of opposition to German membership in NATO, the SPD had gradually shifted its position to one of support by 1961.¹⁵⁶ This decision had largely eliminated the tension in the SPD between idealists and realists who had traditionally wanted more explicit recognition of the West's military needs.¹⁵⁷ The CCF/NDP leadership hoped that enough Canadian idealists would similarly "see the light" on the alliance issue.

The decisive factor however, in the minds of Knowles, Lewis, Douglas and company was the internal Canadian political climate of the early 1960s. Cold war fears and strong support for United States leadership of the "free world" amongst the Canadian populace required a moderate foreign and defence policy if the party were to have any chance of electoral victory.¹⁵⁸ There is no way of knowing for sure if they were right. Since most Canadians took almost no interest in international affairs, at least according to an article by Robert Reford in Saturday Night, the new party might have been successful even with a more daring foreign policy.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁵ Henry Pelling, A Short History of the Labour Party (London: St. Martin's Press, 1968), pp.121-6. Also see, Michael R. Gordon, Conflict and Consensus in Labour's Foreign Policy 1914-1965 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), pp.272-8; Peter Clarke, A Question of Leadership: Gladstone to Thatcher (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1991), pp.254-5.

¹⁵⁶ Stephen J. Artner, A Change of Course: The West German Social Democrats and NATO, 1957-1961 (London: Greenwood Press, 1985), pp. 223-225.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid. p. 253.

¹⁵⁸ Bowes, "The Defence Policies of the New Democratic Party," p. 20.

¹⁵⁹ Robert Reford, "Our Curious Apathy in Foreign Affairs," Saturday Night, Vol.76 (June 10, 1961), pp.34,37.

The key person working behind the scene to ensure victory for the moderate domestic and foreign policy platforms was, as in the past, David Lewis¹⁶⁰ He had exercised this power as long-term CCF national secretary and would continue to do so as a member of the NDP federal council through the 1960s and 1970s. Of particular importance had been Lewis's role as liaison between the New Party and the Canadian Labour Congress in the years leading up to the founding convention.

In fact, it was the overwhelming presence of the CLC at the NDP founding convention that ensured victory for the pro-NATO forces. Like the vast majority of trade unions in the non-communist world, most sections of the Canadian labour movement had lost their radical edge many years before. Indeed, as Irving Abella has shown, the CCF had cooperated with the old TLC and CCL in ostracizing, if not destroying, most of the radical or communist unions by the early 1950s.¹⁶¹ Thus when the CLC was formed by a marriage of these labour organizations in 1956, it identified quite closely with the anti-Soviet cold war position of mainstream Canadians. For example, in its 1960 submission to the Canadian government, the CLC rejected unilateralism as an unrealistic option for Canada given communism's aggressive moves around the globe. "We have no illusions about communist morality or ethics."¹⁶²

As its annual submissions to the Canadian government reveal, foreign policy was a matter of great concern to the CLC. Therefore, it did not hesitate to insert itself

¹⁶⁰ Bowes, "The Defence Policies of the New Democratic Party," p. 29. Also see, David Lewis, The Good Fight: Political Memoirs, 1909-1958 (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1981), pp.348-9.

¹⁶¹ Irving M. Abella, Nationalism, Communism, and Canadian Labour: The CIO, the Communist Party, and the Canadian Congress of Labour 1935-1956 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973).

¹⁶² CLC submission to the government, January 28, 1960, NAC, MG 28, IVI, Vol.382, File 6, p.26.

into all the major foreign and defence policy debates of the period. For example, its 1960 submission claimed to speak for the vast majority of Canadians in criticizing the Canadian UN delegation for abstaining on a vote condemning South Africa's apartheid system.

We do not think that Canada should ever equivocate on this matter.... To say the least, we feel extremely uncomfortable in the same company with the government of South Africa and would favour its exclusion from the councils of the Commonwealth of Nations.¹⁶³

In this, the CLC anticipated the policy adopted by the Canadian government a year later. In its 1961 submission, the CLC caught the mood of the times by reflecting the tension associated with the worsening cold war situation. "We have left the subject of international affairs to the last, not because we think it is least important but in order to give it the special attention which it deserves at this time."¹⁶⁴

That a congress of unions would, as a matter of course, devote a portion of its yearly submission to government to foreign policy matters is remarkable. After all, like most Canadians, the average labour union member was most concerned with economic and social issues. It is not self-evident why the CLC got so involved. Was it primarily an attempt to magnify its role as a major player on the Canadian public scene? Was it that the CLC thought it possessed particular expertise in this area? Certainly the CLC benefitted from its wide-ranging contacts with international labour organizations and through the CCF with the Socialist International. The key factor was probably the close ties the CLC leadership had with the upper echelons of the CCF through such people

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, p.28.

¹⁶⁴ CLC submission to the government, Feb.2, 1961, NAC, MG 28, IVI, Vol.382, File 6, p.28.

as David Lewis, Eamon Park, a member of both the CLC and CCF national executives, Kalmen Kaplansky, CCF member and Director of CLC Research at the time and of course Stanley Knowles, former MP and from 1958-62 an executive vice-president of the Canadian Labour Congress. Hence, it is not surprising that the CCF/NDP and the CLC developed very similar foreign policy positions on many questions.

For example, the CLC's comprehensive survey and analysis of all the world's major trouble spots closely echoed the International Affairs and Defence statement which the New Party policy executive had produced and circulated and which was to be endorsed by the founding convention. This was particularly true for all the most important policy areas including disarmament, NATO, nuclear weapons issues, deployment of BOMARC missiles, the United Nations, increased foreign aid and China. Interestingly, on several controversial issues like German reunification, peace in the Middle East, reunification of Korea and Vietnam, condemnation of China for its attacks on Tibet and India and the right of Algerian self-determination, the CLC statement was much more specific than the New Party executive's declaration.¹⁶⁵

The New Party platform, as befitted a party which believed it had a good chance of winning the next election, emphasized mostly general statements in order not to tie the hands of any future New Party government. Thus, only when the dream of winning power at the federal level slowly faded in the 1960s, did the party take stronger positions on most controversial subjects. Meanwhile, some CLC positions, as outlined in the 1961 submission, anticipated later NDP policies as, for example, on the Middle East.

On the key East-West issues, the 1961 CLC brief left no doubt that it stood squarely on the side of realism, albeit, with a few nods towards idealism.

¹⁶⁵ ibid., pp.28-32.

For reasons geographic, economic and historical, Canada must work in concert with those nations which share her outlook and interest, while at all times preserving her own integrity and striving for a world in which blocs and alliances will be obsolete. Unless and until there is disarmament, Canada must maintain, consistent with her resources, an effective military establishment which can be useful to herself, to her allies and the United Nations.¹⁶⁶

Clearly from the CLC standpoint, both neutrality and unilateral disarmament were not even worthy of consideration. Not surprisingly, then, it was the CLC leader, Claude Jodoin, who led off the attack against the neutralist position at the convention calling it a "complete illusion".¹⁶⁷

To avoid offending realist opinion in the Canadian Labour Congress, the New Party had given Jodoin a direct hand in formulating the New Party's foreign policy platform. Thus, in a pre-convention draft document entitled "Foreign and Defence Policies," and marked "confidential, Jodoin's handwritten comments appear in the margin. Of particular interest is that in the sentence, "We must cease wasteful expenditures on obsolete weapons and withdraw from commitments, such as NORAD," Jodoin had crossed out everything after the word "weapons" indicating the importance he placed on Canada's continuing membership in regional military associations.¹⁶⁸

Knowing that a major floor fight on the NATO issue was inevitable, party organizers had distributed copies of its draft platform quite widely well in advance of the convention in order to test concepts, anticipate the arguments of dissidents and

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., p.31.

¹⁶⁷ Claude Jodoin, "Claude Jodoin Urges Anti-Neutralist New Party Foreign Policy", Ottawa Journal. August 1, 1961, NAC, MG 28, IVI, Vol.380.

¹⁶⁸ "Foreign and Defence Policies," undated, NAC, MG 28, IVI, Vol.380.

receive counterproposals that could hopefully blunt the ant-NATO attack. One such was received from Walter Young, a self-styled "liberally minded person" or "independent left-winger" who welcomed the New Party as a moderate, not doctrinaire left wing party. While personally favouring NATO withdrawal, Young wrote in a letter to National CCF Secretary, Terry Grier, that if this was unacceptable to majority party opinion, a workable compromise might be a statement committing the New Party to a reexamination of Canada's role in NATO, and a pledge to work for a change in NATO's policies especially to promote more political and economic consultation amongst its member states.¹⁶⁹

The party leadership adopted this compromise position hoping, thereby, no doubt, to demonstrate that it too did not support NATO unconditionally thus deflecting some of the anti-alliance rhetoric. The proposed international affairs platform, "Cooperation for Peace," also included a statement that Canada must withdraw from NATO if the alliance itself or any more of its members, possessed or controlled nuclear weapons. Moreover, it asked the Canadian government to push for a demilitarized zone in central Europe and the simultaneous disbanding of both the NATO and Warsaw pacts.¹⁷⁰ The leadership also knew that most, if not all, New Party delegates who opposed NATO also detested NORAD. By including a pledge in the platform to dissolve NORAD, the leadership showed the party dissidents it was willing to meet them at least part way.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁹ Walter Young to Terry Grier, March 9, 1960, NAC, MG 28, IVI, Vol.382.

¹⁷⁰ Anne Scotton, ed., "Cooperation for Peace," New Democratic Party Policies 1961-1976 (Ottawa: New Democratic Party, 1976), p.95. (Subsequent references will be to "Scotton")

¹⁷¹ Desmond Morton, The New Democrats 1961-1986: Politics of Change (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1986), p.24.

How many idealists were mollified by this compromise is impossible to determine. What soon became obvious, however, is that the party leadership was so worried by the sheer number of anti-NATO speeches and resolutions introduced on the first day of the policy debate that a back-up strategy was hastily devised. As a result, the second day of the convention saw a steady parade of party "heavy hitters" to the microphone in an attempt to smash the unilateralist momentum including T. C. Douglas, M.J. Coldwell, Kalmén Kaplansky and David Lewis.¹⁷² Douglas, for his part, proposed that Canada withdraw from NATO only if the economic and cultural articles of the treaty were not fulfilled by some undetermined future date.¹⁷³ (Douglas's personal position in 1961 was probably not as pro-NATO as his convention statement implied. Just five months earlier when still Premier of Saskatchewan, he had stated that while the alliance had served a very useful purpose in the past, now it was time for NATO to turn over all its military powers to the United Nations.)¹⁷⁴ David Lewis, not surprisingly, met the anti-NATO argument head on. He declared, "It is false, misleading, and hysterical to say that to stay in NATO will lead to war - remember that if we withdraw, the nuclear weapons will stay where they are."¹⁷⁵

In the end, the arguments of the party leadership seemed to carry weight with the rank-and-file and after debate was cut off, the unamended proposals of the program committee were passed by a margin of four to one. The deluge of votes

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Quoted in the Ottawa Journal, August 1, 1961, NAC, MG 28, IVI, Vol.388.

¹⁷⁴ Premier T.C. Douglas, transcript of a speech made in the Saskatchewan Legislature, March 21st, 1961, NAC, MG 28, IVI, Vol.489, File Canada Defence No.2, pp.17-8.

¹⁷⁵ Quoted in Canadian Annual Review. 1961, p.83.

contributed by the trade union wing, the New Party clubs and over half of the CCF delegates ploughed under the opposition of the idealists.¹⁷⁶

Despite the length and passion of the deliberations, some observers such as Ramsay Cook found the quality of the debate disappointing. "NORAD must go, the convention decided, without seriously considering an alternative". Similarly, Cook found even the defenders of NATO too apologetic and unrealistic, while those who looked to the UN for their salvation ignored the contemporary paralysis in that organization.¹⁷⁷

How should the International Affairs/Defence platform passed at the 1961 Convention be assessed in terms of social democratic internationalism? For Cook, who equated internationalism with liberal internationalism, the NDP's acceptance of NATO membership for Canada indicated it had rejected "the narrow isolationist nationalism" of the early CCF.¹⁷⁸ He also believed that the statement successfully combined realism about the state of world politics with a willingness to try every hopeful method of preventing nuclear disaster.¹⁷⁹

Without doubt, Cook was correct in noting the overall internationalist spirit of the document. This is immediately apparent in the introductory paragraph of the party policy statement entitled, "Cooperation for Peace."

¹⁷⁶ S. Bowes, "The Defence Policies of the New Democratic Party," p.26.

¹⁷⁷ Ramsay Cook, "The Labour-Socialist Wedding: Moderation wins Down the Line in the NDP," Saturday Night, Vol.76 (September 2, 1961), pp.9-12.

¹⁷⁸ Cook, "Three Views of the New Party Convention: A Calculated Risk," Canadian Forum, Vol.41 (September, 1961), p.123.

¹⁷⁹ Cook, "Prosperity in the Midst of Affluence," Canadian Forum, Vol.41 (July, 1961), p.77.

The world has changed drastically since World War II. Powers long dominant have declined in importance; others have emerged to positions of prominence. Vast areas of the world, silent for centuries, insist that their voices be heard and already have gained a place of importance in world affairs.¹⁸⁰

The perspective here was broad with the whole world the stage not just one nation. Indeed, as further analysis will demonstrate, the foreign policy statement approved by the NDP founding convention met the basic criteria of social democratic internationalism. However, an equally important question to ask is, "Which orientation within social democratic internationalism did the document primarily reflect, idealism or realism?"

On defence policy there was never any doubt. In an unmistakeable attack on neutralism, the realist leanings of the document's authors were already apparent in the second paragraph. "In the struggle between democracy and totalitarianism, Canada cannot evade its responsibility; it must always stand squarely on the side of freedom and with the genuine forces of freedom."¹⁸¹

However, the document was also enlivened by appeals to long-term idealistic goals. For example, the primary aim of Canadian foreign policy was defined as one that would best contribute to the building of a world community. On this point there was a broad consensus within the party as the large number of submitted resolutions promoting world government reflect.¹⁸² To realize this objective, the platform

¹⁸⁰ Scotton, "Cooperation for Peace," p.94.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² For example, note Resolutions 512, 532, 548, 553, and 554, "Submitted Resolutions of the 1961 Convention," pp.91, 92, 95, 98-100, NDP Research.

committed an NDP government to attempt to persuade member states to turn over a part of their sovereignty to the United Nations and create a permanent UN international police force. Only in this way could the rule of Law become the basis of international relations which was the best hope for peace.¹⁸³

To enhance the prestige and effectiveness of the UN, an NDP administration would recognize mainland China and support its entry into the world organization in the interests of universal membership, a long-standing objective of social democratic internationalism. However, in deference to Canadian public opinion, the authors of the platform felt it necessary to add that "such recognition does not involve approval of China's system of government."¹⁸⁴

A significant portion of the 1961 international affairs document was devoted to economic aid for underdeveloped nations. The tone and content reflected a combination of idealism, moralism, paternalism and pragmatism, all of which were prime ingredients of social democratic internationalism. As such, the authors pledged that an NDP government would drastically alter the present ratio of expenditures whereby Canada's foreign aid budget was less than 5% of the amount allotted to defence. Their basic premise seemed to be that Canada was one vast agricultural and industrial warehouse one of whose chief *raison d'être* was to meet the needs of the poorer nations. Moreover, while moral necessity required that aid to underdeveloped countries be generous; social democratic ideology demanded it be planned. Canadian government grants, long-term interest free loans and joint government development enterprises were to be the key components. The authors also appealed to pragmatic considerations. For example, they argued that expanding credits and export subsidies

¹⁸³ Scotton, "Cooperation for Peace," p.94.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

to developing states made sense because expansion of international trade was in Canada's best interests.¹⁸⁵

Paternalism was also alive and well in the NDP. The authors of the platform assumed that what the underdeveloped countries needed was a mass influx of Canadian young volunteers (very similar to the American Peace Corps) to teach the "natives" techniques of community development in which Canadians were supposedly the experts. At the same time, Canada would open its doors to thousands of young people from the Third World to come for training. The Commonwealth's Colombo Plan was touted as the model that could be applied to other areas of Asia, Africa and the West Indies. Many of these individual ideas were not unique to the New Democrats within the Canadian political scene. For example, even Robert Thompson, leader of the right-wing Social Credit Party and a former Christian missionary in Africa, supported a number of these proposals.¹⁸⁶ Books were also appearing on Canada's supposed special philanthropic role in the world such as A Samaritan State authored by Keith Spicer, a prominent Liberal party organizer.¹⁸⁷

Nevertheless, there were two distinguishing features of NDP aid policy as outlined in its founding platform. First, was the sheer scope of the program. Only the NDP was prepared to more than quadruple the foreign aid budget to 2% of the national income, even if that meant substantially cutting defence spending. Second, inspired by social democratic idealism, faith in Western notions of development, and trust in the effectiveness of government initiated and planned programs, the NDP was

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., p.95.

¹⁸⁶ Debates, Jan.24, 1963, pp.3092-4.

¹⁸⁷ Keith Spicer, A Samaritan State: External aid in Canada's Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966).

convinced it possessed the best solutions to the social, political, and economic problems of the Third World.¹⁸⁸

A third major area of concern as outlined by the NDP international affairs document was Canada's connection with regional associations. At the outset of this section, the authors were careful to emphasize that what followed had the sanction of the UN Charter which acknowledged "the right of states to enter regional associations for the peaceful settlement of disputes and the maintenance of peace and security." On this basis, Canada's membership in NATO or any regional association was legitimate but conditional. It must genuinely and constructively work for peace, economic security, freedom and rule by international law. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the European Common Market also passed this test.¹⁸⁹

Hence, right from the founding of the party, NDPers continued the CCF tradition of judging the behaviour of nations by the yardstick of the UN charter. In good measure, this almost religious devotion to the United Nations was due to the belief that it embodied the best hopes for the eventual creation of a full-fledged world government that would implement all the idealist goals of social democratic internationalism.

The NDP International Affairs/Defence statement made no direct mention of the Organization of American States (OAS) but urged that Canada expand its relationship with Latin American countries. A relatively low-key debate on joining the OAS had been going on in Canadian social democratic circles for some time, but the issue was evidently not viewed as significant enough by the new party's leadership to include a

¹⁸⁸ Scotton, "Cooperation for Peace," p.95.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., pp.94-5.

definitive statement in the platform.¹⁹⁰ In the minds of many convention delegates however, the issue was of some significance. Indeed, several of the resolutions advocating withdrawal from NATO and/or NORAD also included references to staying out of the American-dominated OAS. Membership in any of the three organizations was viewed as a impediment to Canada's establishing an independent foreign policy.¹⁹¹

In the resolutions submitted by delegates opposing Canadian membership in the OAS, condemnation of American "imperialist" policies towards Cuba was often cited as the reason for staying out.¹⁹² The CCF leadership had condemned the Bay of Pigs invasion immediately after it had occurred but a few delegates wanted the convention to go further by declaring its "wholehearted support of the Cuban Revolution because it is the duty of the New Party to support socialists throughout the world."¹⁹³ Not surprisingly, a party leadership doing all it could to eliminate the word "socialist" from its platform did not approve. Nevertheless, American actions in Cuba gave those in the New Party who favoured neutralism and a distinctly independent foreign policy for Canada more ammunition.

The authors of the party platform did attempt to mollify this sentiment somewhat. For example, it promised that "under the New Democratic government

¹⁹⁰ In response to an inquiry about the subject just before the convention, Herridge alluded to this internal debate when he wrote that while the CCF contingent in Parliament actively opposed OAS membership, the CLC was openly campaigning for admission. Herridge to Hilda Peterson, June 30, 1961, NAC, MG 32, C13, Vol.34, File 25.

¹⁹¹ See for example, Resolution 512, in "Submitted Resolutions of the 1961 Convention," p.91.

¹⁹² Resolutions 530 and 533, in "Submitted Resolutions of the 1961 Convention," p.92.

¹⁹³ Ibid., Resolution No. 501.

Canada will base its votes in the United Nations on the merits of the issues, rather than on bloc alignments as it has done too frequently in the past."¹⁹⁴ The same was true for the promises to terminate the NORAD agreement with the United States and to create an independent peace research institute. The platform also reaffirmed unequivocally social democratic internationalism's traditional abhorrence of nuclear weapons with pledges to never acquire them for Canada and to lead in the establishment of a non-nuclear club of nations. However, unilateral disarmament was rejected with the words, "Any agreement on disarmament will require adequate inspection and control".¹⁹⁵

What had been accomplished at the founding convention of the New Democratic Party in terms of foreign policy? First, it had established itself as a party of peace, disarmament and the United Nations. Second, the NDP had promised to maintain and expand Canada's postwar status as a middle power in ways compatible with social democratic internationalism. Third, on defence matters, the realists had succeeded in committing the New Democratic Party to continued membership in the Atlantic Alliance (with some reservations). Finally, the NDP had laid some of the foundations for a distinctive foreign policy. What the convention had not done was settle the major internal squabble between idealists and realists on several key foreign and defence policy issues, a failure that would come back to haunt the NDP on many occasions in the future.

¹⁹⁴ Scotton, "Cooperation for Peace," p.94.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., p.95.

CHAPTER THREE

IDEALISTS AND REALISTS CONCUR - THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUE (1962-3)

Most NDP delegates returned home after the founding convention generally pleased with their convention's work and optimistic that they had set a course that would lead to major party status. They were also encouraged by the generally positive coverage given the convention by the major newspapers.¹⁹⁶ Even the defection of Hazen Argue, the last leader of the CCF, to the Liberals six months later, did not dampen their enthusiasm. Accordingly, the party diligently prepared for the forthcoming election, even though its financial resources, despite CLC largesse, could not compare to those available to the Liberals and Conservatives.

While the convention had not settled all foreign and defence policy questions within the party, the major issue that was emerging in the country (nuclear weapons) was one around which both realists and idealists could unite. Indeed, even those old CCF members of Parliament who had opposed membership in NATO, now bravely defended the NDP platform in the House. For example, H.W. Herridge dutifully read the

¹⁹⁶ Desmond Morton, The New Democrats, 1961-1986: The Politics of Change (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1986), pp.27,33.

founding convention's NATO policy into the Parliamentary record at his first opportunity on September 7th, 1961.¹⁹⁷

In the ensuing Commons debates on the Berlin Crisis and nuclear testing, the NDP emphasized that everything humanly possible must be done to reduce the threat of nuclear war, a theme that became the rallying cry for the party in Parliament and the election campaigns of 1962 and 1963. While nobody disagreed with the objective of avoiding nuclear war, social democrats were more prepared to countenance radical means to achieve this goal than most Canadians. The issue did create some division among NDPers. However, those idealists who favoured unilateral disarmament had been decisively defeated at the convention, a defeat from which they never really recovered.

Other idealists, led by the redoubtable Herridge, came very close to advocating what could be called "nuclear pacifism". He maintained there was virtually no cause, including defending Berlin against Soviet attack, for which Canada and the West should fight because the conflict might escalate into the unthinkable, an all-out nuclear war. To preclude such a development, a peace treaty with the Eastern bloc should be concluded accepting the permanent division of Germany and Berlin. Herridge even suggested, incredibly, that West Berlin should be dismantled and rebuilt in another part of West Germany if necessary, to avoid provoking the Russians.¹⁹⁸

Such a proposal must be understood in light of the widespread and deep-seated Canadian suspicion of Germany that was still strong in the early Sixties especially among social democrats. They well remembered that Hitler had singled out their German comrades for destruction in the early 1930s. In 1963, while attending the

¹⁹⁷ Debates. Sept. 7, 1961, p.8077-8.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid. pp.8075-7.

hundredth anniversary celebration of the founding of the German Social Democratic Party (as part of a Socialist International meeting) Tommy Douglas was intensely moved by the reading of the names of the thousands of social democrats killed by the Nazis.¹⁹⁹ Not surprisingly then, many NDPers were concerned about the possible re-emergence of a strong, reunited and rearmed Germany especially under the leadership of the conservative Chancellor, Konrad Adenaur. In a April 16, 1962 letter to Colin Cameron, Herridge referred to a disconcerting meeting he had had with Wenzel Jaksch, a member of the German Federal Parliament and Vice-president of the Union of Expellees which reaffirmed all of Herridge's fears about the ultimate objectives of the present West German government.²⁰⁰ Already the previous year, Herridge had condemned the alliance for rearming Germany and appointing generals to NATO's upper echelons who had had close ties with the Nazis during World War II.²⁰¹

Erhardt Regier, an NDP member of parliament from Burnaby, BC, felt that the German question must be understood in the wider context of what appeared to him to be a shifting of the alliance's aims. While he had supported NATO in the past, recent events had changed his mind. In his view, during the previous half decade, alliance members had been more guilty of aggression than the communist bloc as, for example, American actions against Cuba. His future support of NATO was contingent on its strict adherence to the alliance's original mandate of acting as a break against potential communist expansion in Western Europe and not as an instrument to launch

¹⁹⁹ "Report on the Eighth Congress of the Socialist International, September 9-12, 1963," Socialist Information (December 23, 1963), NAC, MG 28, IVI, Vol.483, pp.31-4.

²⁰⁰ H. W. Herridge to Colin Cameron, Apr.16, 1962, NAC, MG 32, C13, Vol.33, File 26.

²⁰¹ Debates, Sept.13, 1961, pp.8305-6.

nuclear war.²⁰² He also expressed concern that NATO was being forced to promote the interests of international capitalism.

We are prepared to defend political democracy but are not and never have been prepared to defend the interests of the international cartels, the oil monopolies, the chemical monopolies and those other monopolies with head offices in the United States of America.²⁰³

NATO, he concluded, was in danger of dictating the foreign policy of its members according to the wishes of these economic interests. Clearly, the alliance would not have a free ride within Parliament or the New Democratic Party if Regier had his way.

Indirectly, Regier had raised a matter that has always concerned social democrats, namely, the relationship between foreign and defence policy. The underlying question was, "What should be the primary conceptual framework - defence or foreign policy?" For social democrats, whether idealists or realists, the answer was obvious. As an anonymous NDP member argued in an article written just before the 1962 election, defence policy must serve the broader interests of foreign policy and not vice versa. If, for example, preserving the peace was Canada's overriding foreign policy objective, all defence decisions must further this end. Furthermore, matters such as the percentage of its total resources Canada devoted to the military, the size of its armed forces or the type of weapons needed to equip them or where their military forces were located, had to be viewed in this light.²⁰⁴ Andrew Brewin, the NDP's

²⁰² *Ibid.*, Sept. 11, 1961, p.8166.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, p.8167.

²⁰⁴ "Notes on a Foreign Policy for Canada," undated, NAC, MG 28, IVI, Vol.489. pp.1-3.

first external affairs critic, later reiterated these points in a major foreign policy address on November 28, 1963 in the House of Commons.²⁰⁵

(The anonymous author also outlined two other goals that should characterize NDP foreign policy, namely, the preservation of free government around the world and bringing about international justice. This required a fairer division of global wealth and an end to colonialism but did not mean the propping up of all the regimes in the so-called "free world".²⁰⁶)

For most members of the NDP, influenced to a greater or lesser extent by social democratic idealism with its isolationist and pacifist strands, military matters were fundamentally distasteful. In their hearts, they wished that a globe bitterly divided into two armed blocs with an ever-expanding arms race would just go away, since it was a world completely at loggerheads with their vision on almost every score. They were sure that poverty, malnutrition and illiteracy would be eliminated some day, but every dollar spent on the military delayed the fulfillment of that happy prospect. Similarly, any funds invested in constructing military blocs postponed the time when all nations would unite around the banner of world government. Thus, distaste for military matters made it almost inevitable, if for no other reason, that the NDP would subordinate defence policy to broader foreign concerns.

There were also practical, "realpolitik" reasons why the party's adopted such an approach. Although the '61 convention, albeit somewhat reluctantly, had accepted the notion that Canada could not be neutral in the East-West conflict, many NDP members believed that an independent foreign policy was nonetheless possible. The challenge was for Canada to find a way to make a distinct and significant contribution

²⁰⁵ Debates, Nov.28, 1963, p.5822.

²⁰⁶ "Notes on a Foreign Policy for Canada," p.1.

to the overriding issue of the time - the preservation of peace. How could this be accomplished?

First, in the view of Canadian social democratic internationalists, both idealists and realists, Canada was uniquely placed to strengthen the neutralist countries which could act as intermediaries between East and West in a crisis. The role of India in the Korean and Indo-Chinese conflicts, as well as that of the UN in Kashmir and Sinai illustrated this principle. As a perceptive anonymous party foreign policy expert observed, if the whole world had been divided up between the two camps, as the former American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles had wanted, Canadians would probably all have died in a nuclear holocaust by then. "If the Indians have been preserved from the Chinese by the American nuclear umbrella, the Americans have been saved from themselves by Gandhi's spinning-wheel."²⁰⁷

A second major contribution that Canada could make to peace as an aligned power (at least as the realists saw it), would be to use its influence in NATO to press for disengagement in Europe. Both sides should withdraw their troops from the front lines thus reducing tensions and the chance of accidental conflict. Such a move would also demonstrate again that Canadian defence policy was a function of its overall foreign policy objectives and not vice versa.

Third, while many NDPers were prepared to acknowledge, if grudgingly, the deterrent value of the American nuclear arsenal, their final assessment of the bomb was that it provoked more than it deterred.²⁰⁸ This was also true for NATO's commitment to a first-use policy for tactical nuclear weapons. Hence, Canada should lead in pushing for a reevaluation of the alliance's entire war fighting strategy. In fact,

²⁰⁷ "Notes on a Foreign Policy for Canada," p. 2.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., p.4.

by 1963 at the latest, various party members and not just idealists were arguing that Canada should reconsider its participation in NATO if such was not done. This went further than the party's founding convention foreign policy statement which had merely stipulated that continued NATO membership depended on a cessation of the nuclear build-up.²⁰⁹

Fourth, a reevaluation of Canada's NORAD policy also attracted some attention in NDP circles in the early Sixties. As mentioned in Chapter Two, it was widely believed that the party leadership had included the anti-NORAD plank in the party platform largely to appease the "get-out-of NATO crowd". The argument against NORAD centred around two key points: first, its alleged ineffectiveness in the face of the apparent decline of the bomber threat and concomitant rise of ICBMs; and, second, the loss of independence Canada continued to suffer as the very junior partner in a bilateral defence pact with the most powerful nation on earth, the United States.

However, in the period after the founding convention, it gradually dawned on some NDP thinkers that most Canadians did not accept the notion that a defence system which could potentially knock down at least some enemy bombers was completely useless. They also realized it would be impossible to argue that Bomarc anti-aircraft missiles with a range of 400 miles or the Distant Warning Line (DEW) line, could logically be interpreted by the Soviets as provocative, unlike the presence of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. In the view of the anonymous foreign policy critic, even the loss of independence argument was weak "because if Canada remained in

²⁰⁹ W.H. Pope, "NORAD, NATO and Nuclear Weapons", June 23, 1962, NAC, MG 28, IVI, Vol.489, File Canada-Defence and Civil Defence, pp.5-6.

NATO, membership in NORAD added or subtracted nothing from Canada's basic alignment."²¹⁰ He/she concluded therefore that in the 1962 election the NDP should,

put the main weight on no nuclear arms for Canada, that we shift the weight of the demand for a denuclearized Canadian force to a denuclearized NATO strategy, that we refuse to have bombs on our soil. We have also to find some kind of solution to the NORAD problem, but it would probably be easier to make less noise about this than about the other question. Thirdly, we should stress the positive aspects of the program; Canadian support for neutrals in the UN; aid to under-developed countries and so on.²¹¹

The author did not deal with the practical problem of how Canada could remain part of an integrated NATO force in Europe, which was committed to a policy of first-use of tactical nuclear weapons should the Soviets invade, and maintain the fiction that Canadian hands were unsoiled by contact with such weapons.

W.H. Pope, an economics teacher at the Ryerson Polytechnical Institute and NDP political theorist, attempted to resolve this dilemma. He argued that if NATO insisted on retaining its present "wrong-headed" tactical nuclear weapons and first-use strategy, Canada could remain non-nuclear while retaining its membership in the alliance by insisting that NATO commanders form separate tactical nuclear units with no Canadian involvement to back-up the front-line brigades, especially the Canadian units. (Andrew Brewin would develop this argument further a few years later in his response to the Liberal government's White Paper.) As for the Canadian air division, Pope believed that Canada could preserve its non-nuclear credentials by demanding that the Americans retain control of the nuclear bombs until just before the Canadian

²¹⁰ "Notes on a Foreign Policy for Canada," p.9.

²¹¹ Ibid.

squadrons needed them. "The Americans, I am sure have figured out a way of transferring nuclear bombs to these Canadian planes at a moment's notice."²¹²

The obvious question that Pope's convoluted reasoning raises is, "What was the difference if Canada's armed forces possessed nuclear weapons on an ongoing basis or only acquired them on the verge of battle?" Surely, only obsessive idealists would spend their waking hours devising such tortured formulas, all to maintain a kind of technical moral purity. No wonder the average Canadian voter found certain aspects of NDP foreign policy incomprehensible. On the other hand, such obscurantism did ensure that internal NDP debates about foreign policy could continue indefinitely.

The prospect of endless debates did not stop Pope and other senior NDP thinkers from continuing their search for a foreign policy that would supply all the answers in keeping with fundamental social democratic internationalist beliefs and their individual consciences. Pope reasoned that since Canada's military resources were such that it could not contribute meaningfully to nuclear deterrence and since there was no real defence against such weapons in any case, Canada's total defence effort should be directed ensuring that nuclear events would never occur.

Most of us in the New Democratic Party accept the grim necessity for a Western deterrent for the present and immediate future. But what we object to most strongly are preparations for actually fighting a thermonuclear war. Why prepare for suicide?²¹³

By employing this criterion, Pope could advocate the abandonment of NORAD, the Mid-Canada and Pine Tree radar lines and all other elements of air defence as well as

²¹² Pope, "NORAD, NATO, and Nuclear Weapons". p. 7

²¹³ *Ibid.*, p.12.

any attempts to find ways to defend against missile firing submarines. On the other hand, the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line should be retained because it could potentially contribute to deterrence, especially if converted into a means of providing information to both the USSR and the United States of possible attacks by one against the other.²¹⁴

Pope's first choice would have been to go one step further, namely, to withdraw from NATO and set the party's foreign policy unequivocally towards world federalism through the building of a Third Force of neutral nations. However, he recognized that compromise on this issue was necessary to keep the party united. Advocating NATO withdrawal would simply repeat the mistake of the CCF in the 1930s when it had constantly demanded a reduction in defence spending but offered no constructive alternative. In addition, the Third Force concept could not form the basis of an election platform since, in Pope's view, the electorate was not yet ready for it and the critics would smear the party with the isolationist charge. Consequently, the best that could be hoped for in these circumstances was a foreign policy critical of NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons.

Unlike most idealists, Pope pleaded for an NDP defence policy based on much more than moral criteria. The party must get through to Canadians that there was no defence against nuclear weapons. Then the "ban the bomb" movement would be respected, not because Canadians would suddenly have acknowledged the immorality of nuclear weapons, but because they would have accepted the futility of finding any defence against nuclear weapons.²¹⁵ Thus, by staying out of the nuclear arms

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Ibid., p.5.

business, Canada was not morally superior to the Americans but only recognizing that it could contribute nothing to deterrence. Similarly, the NDP ought to avoid preaching in favour of unilateral American disarmament since that would upset the balance that had helped avert nuclear war thus far. Despite the major weakness in his anti-nuclear argument noted earlier, Pope, it appears, discovered creative ways of balancing idealism and realism.

The context of all this soul-searching within the NDP, especially amongst the leadership and intellectuals, was the contemporary debate in the nation and Parliament which was beginning to heat up in late 1961 and early 1962 over whether Canada should acquire nuclear weapons for its Bomarc missiles and Honest John rockets in Europe. The governing Conservatives were split between those led by External Affairs minister, Howard Green, who were against Canada obtaining nuclear warheads for these missiles and those led by Douglas Harkness, the defence minister, who believed the country had no choice but to take them. The latter maintained Canada could only meet its obligations to continental defence and NATO by arming the missiles with nuclear warheads. Prime Minister John Diefenbaker kept delaying hoping that changing circumstances would make the decision for him. In particular, both Green and Diefenbaker believed nothing should be done to jeopardize the possible success of the current East-West disarmament and test ban talks that, if successful, would perhaps make the acquiring of nuclear weapons superfluous. The Liberal party was also divided on the issue although officially committed to an anti-nuclear policy.

Thus, it was in both of the "old-line" parties' interest to diffuse the issue and keep it on the back-burner in the last session of Parliament leading up to the election, as well as during the election campaign itself. Consequently, in the debate on the January 18th, 1962 Throne Speech, only a handful of Tory and Liberal speakers

referred to international affairs at all even though major foreign and defence policy questions were as yet unresolved.²¹⁶

NDP leader, T.C. Douglas, still without a House of Commons seat, led the party from the gallery. He tried to generate a debate on the nuclear weapons issue when in a radio address on January 8, 1962, he stated that,

the survival of the human race depends on our ability to persuade the great powers to negotiate a treaty for nuclear disarmament. We cannot do this if we ourselves become a nuclear power or if we shilly-shally so that nobody knows where we stand on so vital a matter.²¹⁷

Douglas could speak forcefully because he knew he had his party behind him.

Hence, the NDP strategy was to turn the 1962 election into a debate about nuclear weapons (without neglecting economic and health care issues of course).²¹⁸ This might attract voters who, while not supportive of all its domestic policies, would appreciate the NDP's unequivocal opposition to nuclear arms. A secondary yet related strategy, as outlined by Douglas in a press conference on May 6, 1962, was to link the notion of an independent foreign policy, which polls indicated was gaining in popularity, to a non-nuclear role for Canada.²¹⁹ Throughout the campaign, Douglas

²¹⁶ J.L. Granatstein, Canada, 1957-1967: The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1986), pp.125-6.

²¹⁷ Robert Spencer, "External Affairs and Defence," Canadian Annual Review, ed. by John Saywell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), p.90.

²¹⁸ Interview with T.C. Douglas and David Lewis, CBC Television Broadcast, NAC, MG 28, IVI, Vol.449, File Citizen's Forum, 1961.

²¹⁹ "NDP's Platform on International Affairs," Toronto: NDP Press Release of Douglas Statement, May 6, 1962, New Democratic Party: Papers, Press Releases and Communiques 1961-1970, Queen's Documentary Centre, Douglas Library, Queen's University, Kingston, Ont. cited in S. Bowes, "The Defence Policies of the New Democratic Party, 1961-1969," p.43.

repeated all the party's well-known arguments against Canada acquiring nuclear weapons and its conditions for remaining in NATO. He also steadfastly maintained that Canada was still in a better position to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons from inside the organization than outside.²²⁰

Yet evidence exists that the party was not keen on displaying its NATO and NORAD policies too prominently in the election. The concern was that at the height of the Cold War any reference to even a possible future withdrawal from NATO would disturb potential mainstream supporters. This surfaced in a letter from Terry Grier, national NDP secretary, to Tommy Douglas which was attached to a draft script that he had prepared for a June 5, 1962, New Democratic Party CBC television question and answer broadcast on foreign and defence policy issues. Grier explained that he had included material on NATO and NORAD only because they seemed to follow logically from the script's line of argument even though he was aware Douglas had not indicated he wished to discuss NATO and NORAD. Grier added however, "If you decide to omit them from the script, I think it will still hang together."²²¹ In other words, it was better to leave the alliance issue alone even in a television broadcast allegedly devoted to foreign policy. Otherwise, questions about the neutralist, anti-military pact stance of the idealist wing of the NDP would inevitably arise in the viewer's minds.

Even though the election results which produced only seventeen NDP Members of Parliament and the defeat of Douglas in Regina were discouraging, there was no

²²⁰ "Speakers's Notes for 1962," New Democratic Party: Papers, Press Releases and Communiques 1961-1970, cited in S. Bowes, "The Defence Policies of the New Democratic Party, 1961-1969," p.44.

²²¹ T. Grier to T.C. Douglas, May 31, 1962, NAC, MG 28, IVI, Vol.449, File Citizen's Forum, 1961.

immediate internal reappraisal of the party's foreign policy. That situation would begin to change six months later.

Before that happened however, two events occurred that captured the attention of the New Democratic Party as well as many Canadians. Both involved the American threat (real or imagined) to Canadian sovereignty, an issue of concern to both realists and idealists although the latter generally reacted more emotionally.

In the fall of 1962, the federal government was about to conclude a controversial agreement with the United States in the fall of 1962 that would result in the damming of the Columbia river in British Columbia to provide electricity to the Americans downstream. The NDP unhesitatingly launched a vigorous campaign against it. Party spokespersons condemned the proposed treaty on environmental, economic and nationalist grounds. In addition to destroying prime agricultural land, forests, beaches, fish, wildlife and allegedly hurting future economic development in the area, the treaty appeared to give control of Canadian waters to the United States. Herridge, who was the MP for the Kootenay region most affected by dam construction, interpreted the treaty as an attack on Canadian sovereignty. "For the first time in Canadian history, this treaty hands over to another state sovereign rights that belong to Canada." Instead, Canadian power resources should be developed for Canadians through the creation of a national power grid with any surplus water used to irrigate Canadian soil.²²² Here was a foretaste of the economic nationalism that would preoccupy the NDP in the later Sixties and early Seventies.

The nationalist temperature within the NDP was further heightened in the fall of 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The American decision to impose a naval blockade around Cuba without UN approval in an attempt to force the Soviets into

²²² Debates, Dec.13, 1962, pp.2617-8.

removing their newly-installed offensive missiles, caused considerable discomfort to social democratic internationalists already suspicious of America's self-appointed role as guardian of the West. However, because Canadian public opinion was largely supportive of both the initial American interpretation of the crisis and subsequent United States actions, the NDP faced a dilemma - how to criticize the United States without alienating Canadian voters. Initially, the party's strategy was to downplay the significance of the missiles' deployment in Cuba. Thus, in a statement released in Vancouver on October 22, 1962, Douglas declared,

Before we get too excited we should remember that for fifteen years the Western powers have been ringing the Soviet Union with missiles and air bases.... We have only the statements of the Americans.²²³

However, after a few days of evenhanded criticism of both sides, Herridge tried to shift the focus of the debate to a politically advantageous theme on October 25th. For the NDP, a crisis of this proportion which could unleash nuclear war, ought to be handled through the United Nations. Herridge charged that Washington had gone to the UN only after it had already decided on a course of action making the United Nations for all intents and purposes irrelevant in this case. A UN force, instead of an American one, should have been employed to police the shipping lanes around Cuba. Worse, America's NATO allies and its NORAD partner, Canada, had been informed but not consulted before Washington had acted unilaterally, which was a flagrant violation of these agreements.²²⁴

²²³ Canadian Annual Review, 1962, p.128.

²²⁴ Debates., Oct.25, 1962, p.917.

In the same speech, Herridge used the opportunity to make political "hay" on another front. The Cuban crisis, he pointed out, illustrated the correctness of his party's stand against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. He urged the United States with its farflung network of military bases to learn from this episode and dismantle some of them as a step towards disarmament.²²⁵ In the same spirit, Andrew Brewin asked if the Canadian government would support the UN Acting Secretary General's appeal for a fourteen day freeze during which all Soviet ships bound for Cuba would halt and the Americans, in turn, would suspend their blockade.²²⁶

Brewin argued that the crisis was an opportunity for Canada to give leadership to smaller nations by encouraging them to speak with one voice around a common policy. Canada should propose that the major powers dismantle their missile bases everywhere while simultaneously submitting all conflicts to the UN instead of acting unilaterally.²²⁷ Implicit in these statements was the NDP notion of the Third Force, a band of "righteous," neutral countries acting as intermediaries between the two blocs in the interests of peace and pointing out the path leading to world disarmament.²²⁸ This was social democratic idealism writ large.

²²⁵ Ibid., p.918.

²²⁶ Ibid., p.919.

²²⁷ Ibid., p. 1006.

²²⁸ Stanley Gray, a Canadian left-wing activist outside the NDP, wrote a perceptive article in the mid-1960s analyzing and criticizing the basis of the Third Force concept. He claimed to have demonstrated that the non-alignment and neutralism of the newly emerging nations was in essence the response of the native elites to pressing internal problems and an attempt to manipulate the international environment to their domestic political needs. An unstable political leader would bolster his image at home, deter attention from his domestic failings and defuse radical internal opposition to his rule by projecting a strong and independent international posture. According to Gray, this resulted in a growth in nationalism and not a movement away from the nation-state to a new kind of internationalism based on social democratic ideals as many NDPers had been led to believe. Stanley Gray, "Nationalism and Non-Alignment," Canadian

It was realism, however, which convinced T.C. Douglas that in the final analysis the NDP could not afford to leave the public with the impression that the party had truly been neutral in this major showdown between East and West. Hence, in the immediate aftermath of the emergency, he issued a "General Statement on the Cuban Crisis," declaring in part that,

all of us in the New Democratic Party are fully aware of the fact that the Soviet Union and Castro deliberately set out to provoke the United States and the Western Hemisphere by the installation of nuclear bases in Cuba. Our statements expressed regret at the Soviet action and we were united in condemnation of it. We also agreed that it was not possible for the United States to let the nuclear build-up in Cuba to proceed without taking appropriate action.²²⁹

In other words, Douglas was expressing approval of the American blockade of Cuba after-the-fact, even though the party had been quite critical in the midst of the crisis.

His party's sole problem with the American response, Douglas now insisted, lay in the fact that it was implemented unilaterally without consultation. "This, and this alone, was the basis of our criticism."²³⁰ Canada was only fulfilling its duty when it had publicly differed with the United States on Cuba, just as Canada had done in criticizing Britain and France during the 1956 Suez Crisis.

Dimension, Vol.3 (Mar.-Apr., 1966), pp.48-9.

²²⁹ T.C. Douglas, "General Statement on the Cuban Crisis," Ottawa, Nov.6, 1962, NAC, MG 28, IVI, Vol.449, File T.C. Douglas Speeches and Press Releases, p.1

²³⁰ Ibid.

It seems to me that it is possible and necessary to have unity in the West without a stultifying uniformity. Indeed, I am confident that Canada and other smaller nations can have a great influence for good if they speak out in a frank, though always friendly way when they think that some action taken is wrong.²³¹

President Kennedy and his advisors, Douglas agreed, had done their best, but they were fallible human beings who had had to make their decisions in an American environment that tended to get hysterical whenever the subject of Cuba was broached.

These statements illustrate the NDP leadership's position regarding the United States and the Western alliance in the early Sixties: friendly criticism of certain specific actions but no chastising of American foreign policy in general. That would only come in the latter half of the decade. There was also full acceptance of a Middle Power role for Canada, although the NDP had its own ideas what Canada should do with that status. Moreover, in those years, the Party's official policy on membership in the Alliance differed in degree but not kind from the Conservatives and Liberals. It can be said, therefore, that in the early Sixties the NDP did not question the fundamental premises and direction of general Canadian government foreign policy except for the nuclear weapons issue.

Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that suspicion of American foreign policy intentions was always just below the surface for many in the NDP caucus and under the right conditions could grow into full-fledged anti-Americanism (as the Vietnam War would demonstrate). Indeed, only one week after issuing his conciliatory "General Statement on the Cuban Crisis", Douglas expressed concern at reports that President Kennedy was under growing internal pressure to launch a full-scale invasion

²³¹ Ibid.

of Cuba.²³² Moreover, as news leaked out that the Americans had assumed the Diefenbaker government would automatically put Canadian forces on full alert when requested by Washington during the Missile Crisis, NDP suspicions about the United States received a shot in the arm. Indeed for radical idealists like Herridge, the suspicions had always been there. On November 9, he wrote a letter to an acquaintance in Kinnard, BC complaining that he was taking considerable heat in caucus for taking an anti-American line that some felt was too strong.²³³

Certainly, the anti-American tendencies of the idealists in the NDP was a continuing concern for Brewin. About a month after the Cuban missile, he received a letter from Philip Resnick, then a student at McGill University and involved with the campus New Democratic Party club. In the letter, Resnick took strong issue with Brewin's pro-NATO stand and accused the NDP external affairs critic of being much too gentle in his treatment of American foreign policy. Brewin was equally forthright in his response.

I think the basic difference between us is the extent of your distrust of the Americans.... I think we let down like-minded and hopeful elements in the United States...if we yield to the attitude which is all too common in the Canadian Left (including I may say, people of standing in our party), and make our main contribution a strident criticism of American policies, to be followed logically, by dissociating ourselves from the western alliance and also logically, in my opinion, by complete loss of influence on events, as well as political rejection by the Canadian people, who have more sense than they are usually credited with.²³⁴

²³² Debates, Nov.13, 1962, pp.1557-8.

²³³ H.W. Herridge to Pat Romaine, Nov.9, 1962, NAC, MG 32, C13, Vol.33.

²³⁴ Andrew Brewin to Philip Resnick, Ottawa, Nov.27, 1962, NAC, MG 32, C26, Vol.10, File 10.

Clearly, for Brewin, anti-Americanism was dangerous because it was a threat not only to his defence policy but also the entire fabric of his realist foreign policy. Implicitly, he was also accusing idealists like Resnick of demonstrating a serious lack of common sense.

Without question, the foreign policy topic that dominated the Canadian political scene between the '62 and '63 federal elections and which came to a head in early 1963 was whether Canada's armed forces should be equipped with nuclear weapons, specifically the Bomarc anti-aircraft missiles and Honest John rockets.²³⁵ The vacillations of the Conservative government and the decision by the Liberals to change their nuclear arms policy from rejection to acceptance ensured that the issue would hold centre stage in Parliament. The first hint that the Liberals were seriously considering altering their stance came in a December 14, 1962, speech to Parliament by Liberal MP E.C. Drury.²³⁶ However, the Liberal reversal was not made official until January 12, 1963 in a public address by its leader, Lester Pearson.²³⁷ The Liberals justified their about-face on the basis of two main arguments. First, accepting nuclear weapons was the only way Canada could fulfil its commitments to the United States and the Atlantic alliance. Second, rejecting nuclear warheads after having purchased their delivery systems, would be a huge waste of money.²³⁸

As the Conservative government disintegrated in early 1963 over the nuclear arms issue, the NDP seized the initiative. It did so by castigating the government for

²³⁵ J.L. Granatstein, Canada, 1957-1967: The Years of Uncertainty, pp.123-133.

²³⁶ Debates, Dec.14, 1962, pp.2682-4.

²³⁷ Robert Spencer, "External Affairs and Defence," in Canadian Annual Review, ed. by John Saywell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), p.286.

²³⁸ Ibid., pp.286-7.

its public indecision while allegedly moving secretly towards acceptance of nuclear weapons. Similarly, the NDP lambasted the Liberals for their policy reversal. Without doubt, the NDP fully expected to benefit politically in the coming election as the only party unequivocally opposed to nuclear arms.

Still, when the time came to decide whether to support the Liberal non-confidence motion, the NDP had a tough decision to make. In the end, most of the caucus supported the Liberals because the motion's rationale was based on the broad question of government competence in both the domestic and defence policy fields. However, H.W. Herridge and Colin Cameron, who could not stomach the Liberals' pro-nuclear stance under any circumstances, broke party lines to vote with the Progressive Conservatives, while Harold Winch abstained. These British Columbian idealists did not accept the position that the PC government was inevitably moving towards acceptance of nuclear weapons especially now that Harkness, the pro-nuclear defence minister, had resigned. Douglas, for his part, voted with the Liberals because, as he argued in caucus, they had promised to negotiate Canada out of a nuclear role in NATO and NORAD as soon as possible while, at the same time, its domestic policy proposals were more progressive than the Conservatives.²³⁹

What is most significant for purposes of this dissertation are the arguments used by the NDP spokesmen in defending their anti-nuclear weapons stance in Parliament prior to dissolution and the simultaneous debate behind the scenes in NDP circles about foreign and defence policy matters. With the likelihood of an election increasing and public interest in the topic growing, the NDP took advantage of the

²³⁹ S.Bowes, "The Defence Policies of the New Democratic Party, 1961-1969," pp.55-7.

situation to outline its foreign policies with a clarity and forcefulness not matched here to fore.

Brewin opened the final debate for his party on January 25, 1963 with a ringing denunciation of the nuclear warheads. In language taken straight out of the idealist vocabulary, he called them "militarily useless," "politically disastrous" and "morally unjustifiable." The enemy was war itself. Therefore, working to abolish war was the greatest contribution Canada could make to defence through such means as promotion of a Marshall Plan for poor countries.

Although continued NATO membership was deemed essential, Brewin had some deep concerns about the organization's military strategy, a theme he would return to many times over the next decade. Militarily, what NATO needed now were adequate conventional forces not more tactical nuclear weapons. The latter were provocative and ultimately counterproductive since their use in war would destroy the countries they were supposed to defend and almost certainly would trigger a full-scale nuclear war.²⁴⁰ Subsequently, David Lewis bolstered this argument by referring to statements by the American foreign policy analyst, Henry Kissinger, who had recently written that tactical nuclear weapons were now practically useless and dangerous.²⁴¹

In his eloquent contribution to the debate, Douglas pointed out that making NATO a nuclear power was an open invitation to the Warsaw pact nations to follow suit. They would naturally be concerned if the Germans had access to nuclear weapons even if under NATO control just as the West had been about Cuba. Most significantly, in keeping with social democratic idealism, Douglas was convinced that if Canada

²⁴⁰ Debates, Jan.24, 1963, pp.3141-2.

²⁴¹ Ibid, Feb.4, 1963, p.3417.

acquired nuclear weapons, the most serious loss would be to Canada's moral authority. Without doubt, Canada's effectiveness as a mediator in working for mutual disarmament between the great powers would be weakened. Douglas hastened to add, however, he was not advocating neutralism or unilateral nuclear disarmament.²⁴²

He also maintained, quoting a UN report, that if all the money spent on defence worldwide were to be redirected to peaceful means, all hunger, disease, and ignorance could be banished from the earth.²⁴³ Douglas warned against swallowing the propaganda of the military-industrial complex which had a strong stake in seeing the arms race escalate.²⁴⁴ Notable in his presentation was the social democratic internationalist axiom that issues of foreign aid and defence spending were inextricably connected. The NDP assumed that a decrease in spending on the latter would free equal amounts for the former. With the exception of their pro-NATO stance, the arguments presented by Messers. Brewin, Lewis and Douglas represented themes that practically every member of the party could endorse. Nevertheless, everything was not peaceful behind the scenes in the NDP camp.

The great Parliamentary defence policy debate of January and early February of 1963 became the occasion for a significant difference of opinion within the party including the caucus. On the one hand, idealists argued that certain aspects of NDP foreign policy were too conservative. On the other hand, realists wanted the more idealistic features re-assessed to bring the whole package more in line with mainstream public opinion.

²⁴² Ibid., Jan.23, 1963, p.2772.

²⁴³ Ibid., Jan.24, 1963, p.3100.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., Feb.5, 1963, p. 3961.

W.H. Pope, whose experience campaigning in the 1962 election had caused him to move in a realist direction, wrote a paper for the internal use of the federal executive and caucus in which he forcefully urged the NDP to cleanse its defence policy of any elements that could conceivably feed the all too pervasive public perception that the party was "soft on communism". Philosophically, he agreed with and much preferred what he described as the "idealist" positions taken by the founding convention on such matters as decreased defence spending, redirection of all armed forces to the UN and a massive increase in foreign aid. However, such policies, in Pope's words, would "doom us to a perpetual inconsequential role in Canada's public life. As it is now, even with our present policy, every time Khrushchev is rude, we lose votes".²⁴⁵

Pope recommended a revised strategy that would establish the NDP in the public mind as the only party simultaneously committed to both nuclear disarmament and total opposition to communism. This required a few changes to the party's NATO policy. First, it should welcome the agreement signed at Nassau by Britain's Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan and President Kennedy in December, 1962 which restricted Britain's independent nuclear arsenal in exchange for making NATO into a nuclear power, but one with many fingers on the safety catches of its nuclear weapons. He was disturbed that the NDP had felt duty bound to denounce the agreement because it violated the founding convention's prohibition against NATO becoming a nuclear power in its own right.

²⁴⁵ W.H. Pope, "NATO After Nassau," Jan.9, 1963 NAC, MG 28, 1V1, Vol.489, File Canada Defence.

Second, the NDP ought to propose that NATO switch from reliance on tactical nuclear weapons in Central Europe to a greatly strengthened conventional force to which Canada should commit a second brigade. In this way, the party's

unimpeachable opposition to communism would be evidenced by our desire to prevent westward communist expansion in Europe by doubling our conventional land strength in NATO. At the same time, our insistence on a conventional role for this brigade and its sister would again demonstrate our conviction that nuclear war would be suicidal.²⁴⁶

Pope's argument illustrates how NDP thinkers have traditionally felt obliged to "tip their hats" at least to some extent to both idealist and realist orientations.

Writing in response to Pope, Michael Oliver, president of the NDP at the time, made his own significant contribution to the party's internal reassessment of defence policy. Oliver, also a political scientist at McGill University, did so by attempting to answer two key questions: "Did NDP defence policy give clear guidelines for a constructive attitude to current problems?" and, "What areas required further elaboration?"²⁴⁷ Not surprisingly as party president, Oliver endorsed the NDP's official foreign and defence policies which he believed had been vindicated during the Cuban crisis. But he went on to suggest that the party at least begin discussing the matters raised by Pope. Should Canada be forced to choose between the two evils of a French expansion of its independent nuclear force or the emergence of NATO as a multilateral nuclear power, Canada should favour the latter. Oliver was well aware of the minefield this would open up for the party since its 1961 policy platform had called

²⁴⁶ Ibid., pp.8-9.

²⁴⁷ Michael Oliver, "Canadian Defence Policy, Memorandum for the Federal Executive," Jan.19, 1963, NAC, MG 28, 1V1, Vol.489, File Canada-Defence NDP.

for Canada's withdrawal from NATO if it went nuclear. Basically, he concluded that since the new NATO nuclear weapons formula was as yet hypothetical, no immediate decision was required. Oliver also recommended, in keeping with Pope, that the party consider carefully the possibility of calling for an increase in Canada's conventionally armed contribution to NATO to lessen the pressure for a further nuclearization of the alliance. This, despite the fact, that Canadian social democrats had traditionally fought to keep these forces to a minimum.²⁴⁸

Oliver also criticized the notion held by many New Democrats that nuclear weapons should be rejected primarily on moral grounds. This argument could only be employed by those who were willing to forego any advantages to this country from the American possession of a deterrent nuclear force. On the other hand, Oliver maintained that the party could oppose the new American strategy of counterforce on moral grounds, because this new strategy was based on the immoral proposition that the United States should be ready to risk a nuclear exchange with the loss of millions of lives since it could probably outlast the Soviets in such a war.²⁴⁹ Oliver knew when discussing foreign and defence policy in NDP circles that idealism, in the form of moral considerations, must be given its due. Hence, what he took away with one hand, he must give back with the other.

It was within this context of both internal party wrangling and the external Commons debate that Andrew Brewin made a major foreign policy speech on January 12, 1963, at Timmins, Ontario. Brewin clearly had two audiences in mind. On the eve of an imminent election, he wanted to remind all party members, especially the anti-NATOists and unilateralists, that the party would fight the election on the basis of the

²⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 11.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

largely realist policies approved at the 1961 convention. He also wished to remind the idealists that the fundamental reason for the party's rejection of nuclear weapons for Canada was not moral but the fact that a Canadian nuclear contribution would add little or nothing to the strength and effectiveness of the Western alliance, while seriously impeding the initiatives Canada could take towards promoting disarmament.²⁵⁰

Second, Brewin attempted to convince his broader audience, the Canadian voter, that the NDP was the only party with a coherent defence policy grounded solidly on an unequivocal anti-nuclear stance. In his speech, he showed himself in agreement with some of the key proposals of both Pope and Oliver but developed them further. For example, Brewin demonstrated why NATO should shift its emphasis from tactical nuclear weapons to highly trained, mobile conventional forces. Again the basis of the argument was not moral but practical. "The Western Alliance does not need nuclear but rather conventional forces."²⁵¹

Less than two weeks after Brewin's speech, the NDP's caucus defence sub-committee submitted a report to the rest of the caucus virtually endorsing all of Brewin's and Oliver's ideas. It also agreed with Pope's contention that everything must be done to avoid opposition charges of neutralism, pacifism and especially, "softness on communism". As a practical step, the report recommended the party demand the immediate renegotiation of Canada's NATO role in keeping with the mobile conventional force concept. Interestingly however, near the end of the report, the

²⁵⁰ Andrew Brewin speech, "Canadian Defence Policy," Jan. 12, 1963, NAC, MG 28, 1V1, Vol. 489, File Canada-Defence.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp.2,4. Brewin developed this concept further in a book he published in the mid-Sixties entitled, Stand on Guard: The Search for a Canadian Defence Policy (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1965).

subcommittee advised against highlighting this new policy theme because it would entail endorsing the sending of an additional brigade to Europe with its increased costs, a proposal which might confuse many NDP members (undoubtedly a correct supposition). What is truly amazing is that realists were even thinking about reversing the CCF/NDP's traditional commitment to reduced military spending, all in the interests of improving the NDP's electability. The committee also decided that whenever possible the party should draw attention to the "strong body of respectable, informed opinion in favour of a non-nuclear or conventional role for Canada."²⁵² On the key issue of whether changes in NATO nuclear policy now constituted grounds for withdrawal from NATO, the committee report was negative since,

there had been no official change in circumstances in NATO up to the present time that justified a reversal of the convention decision, and a fight within our ranks at this time on whether to stay in or get out of NATO would take the Liberals off the hook and lose us all political advantage.²⁵³

Despite the apparent consensus of the subcommittee, the report did not receive the unanimous approval of all members of the NDP caucus. In a written response, Colin Cameron outlined his opposition and that of his fellow idealists to the report. He contended that NDP defence policy, even as it stood, had been contributing inadvertently to the confusion and ambiguity generated initially by Conservative and Liberal policies amongst many Canadians. The NDP role should be to alert the public to the fact that in a nuclear age there was nothing that could be done to ensure their

²⁵² "Report of the Defence Subcommittee of the Caucus," Jan. 23, 1963, NAC, MG 32, C13, Vol.48, File 3-3.

²⁵³ Ibid., p.3.

safety and survival.²⁵⁴ Canada would only be able to play a positive role in the world if the Canadian people were educated to rid themselves of the "infantile attitudes" towards defence that kept emerging in the policies of every Canadian political party including the NDP. Contributing to a UN police force and channelling resources to attack poverty, ignorance and ill-health around the world were the path to national honour and purpose rather than "ridiculous military posturing".

Cameron maintained that such an effort would not bring the NDP to political oblivion, and he pointed to his personal success campaigning on such a platform in the 1962 election. He also not so subtly reminded the caucus that his views probably reflected the majority opinion of the party faithful. Ultimately though, it was his commitment to universal social democratic ideals that had persuaded him to take this stand. "We are in danger of failing in our responsibilities not only to the Canadian people," Cameron asserted, "but as citizens of the world, if we continue to support membership in NATO and its consequent military concomitants."²⁵⁵

The BC member of Parliament was convinced that developments within NATO over the previous two years now justified pulling out in accordance with conditions laid down by the 1961 convention resolution. At minimum, he pleaded that dissidents like himself should be allowed to propagate their views, albeit not as party policy, but as the sort of policies which the NDP believed would have to be adopted sooner or later. Canadian social democrats should be divided into two groups. NDP idealists ought to be freed from party constraints to a considerable extent in order to build a prophetic movement that would point the way and prepare Canadians for future foreign policy roles and initiatives. At the same time, the regular party apparatus would continue in

²⁵⁴ Colin Cameron, "Defence," NAC, MG 32, C13, Vol.48, File 3.

²⁵⁵ Ibid., p.5.

its role of devising short-term solutions to pressing contemporary foreign policy issues.²⁵⁶

Support for Cameron's position was not confined to caucus. George Cadbury, a strongly committed socialist originally from Britain and at that moment, NDP national treasurer and member of the federal council, wrote to the federal executive calling for withdrawal from NATO even if it meant the loss of the small bargaining power Canada still held as a junior ally of the United States. After all, in a real crisis, the Americans would occupy Canadian airfields or do whatever they wanted in their own interests whether Canada had a formal defence arrangement with them or not.²⁵⁷

Another NDP member of Parliament from BC, Robert W. Prittie (Burnaby-Richmond), wrote a confidential memo discounting Brewin's faith in the usefulness of NATO's conventional forces. In his view, a Soviet attack was being deterred, as it had always been, by the threat of all-out American nuclear retaliation, a fact demonstrated most forcefully during the Cuban crisis. Prittie concluded that since the only effective defence against nuclear war was its prevention, for which conventional forces were useless, and with NATO now a nuclear organization, the NDP must change its alliance policy forthwith. He bolstered his call by referring to a petition from scores of University of British Columbia professors. After demanding that the caucus give leadership to the party on this matter, Prittie reminded them rather ominously that the

²⁵⁶ Ibid. This is an interesting example of the movement/party controversy. Like many idealists, Cameron often resented party constraints on his actions and opinions.

²⁵⁷ George Cadbury, "A Reinterpretation of our Defence Policy," undated, NAC, MG 32, C13, Vol.48, File 3.

subject would doubtless be debated vigorously at the upcoming federal convention.²⁵⁸

However, before the date for the convention arrived, the NDP found itself in an election. In keeping with a party strategy designed to attract disaffected Liberals who felt betrayed by their party's abrupt shift on the nuclear question, Douglas kept insisting that the election was first of all a referendum on nuclear warheads.²⁵⁹ While maintaining that anti-Americanism was not an election issue, the NDP leader nonetheless managed to link the arms issue, the Liberal party and the domination of the Canadian economy by American controlled corporations.²⁶⁰ Despite Douglas's best efforts, the election produced a minority Liberal government. For the NDP, the results were disappointing once again with its seat total dropping from 19 to 17.

Again NDP foreign and defence policies had been of no assistance in an election. The conditions had seemed favourable with the Conservatives in disarray and the Liberals vulnerable. However, NDP hopes of riding to power on the back of distinctive foreign and defence policies had been proven wrong. The party leadership could be forgiven, therefore, if it chose to play down international affairs for awhile. However, given the strength of the opposition to official NDP defence policy centred particularly among the militant idealists of the West coast, this would not be easy.

²⁵⁸ Robert W. Prittie, "Comments on Defence," Jan., 1963, NAC, MG 32, C13, Vol.48, File 3.

²⁵⁹ John Saywell, "Parliament and Politics," Canadian Annual Review, ed. by John Saywell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), p.29.

²⁶⁰ Desmond Morton, The New Democrats, 1961-1986: The Politics of Change (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1986), p.41.

CHAPTER FOUR

DECLINE OF NDP FOREIGN POLICY AND THE RISE OF NON-PARTISANSHIP (1963-5)

The years 1963 to 1965 were relatively speaking a dry phase in NDP foreign policy, at least in comparison with the two year period after the party's founding convention and the latter half of the Sixties. Related to this were some NDP moves towards a more non-partisan external affairs policy, although by 1965, Andrew Brewin was mapping out a distinctive NDP policy once more. These developments and their effect on the party debate on international affairs are the main subject of this chapter.

If Tommy Douglas felt discouraged by the 1963 election results, he did not show it during his acceptance speech after being confirmed overwhelmingly at that summer's NDP convention. Indeed, his spirit had been buoyed by the recently signed Superpower partial test ban treaty. The next logical step, he urged, should be the outlawing of all nuclear tests leading to a nuclear disarmament treaty and followed finally by an across-the board general disarmament agreement under international inspection and control. The delegates were swept off their feet by Douglas's oratory as he raised before them the possibility that one of social democratic internationalism's most cherished goals might soon be realized. Canada, he noted, could help achieve the

first step by recognizing East Germany which was a prerequisite for a nonaggression agreement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.²⁶¹

The foreign policy platform approved at the 1963 convention basically reiterated these points while reinforcing traditional NDP foreign policy doctrines. Significantly, Douglas had to intervene again, as in 1961, to defeat another "get-out-of NATO" campaign by idealists. Obviously, the party was still hopelessly divided on this issue as the large number of anti-NATO resolutions submitted by riding associations testified.²⁶²

A few points in the 1963 statement merit specific attention because they indicate a less insular and more outward looking foreign policy. First, it called on Canada to immediately join with Norway, Sweden, and other smaller countries to establish a non-nuclear club within the United Nations. This was coupled with demands that Canada support those forces in the Western alliance that were working to reverse NATO's policy of reliance on tactical nuclear weapons, a point party president, Michael Oliver had called for earlier. (The "forces" referred to were the British Labour and German Social Democratic parties which, it was generally believed, would soon be

²⁶¹ T.C. Douglas, "Text of Acceptance Speech," Aug.8, 1963, NAC, MG 32, C28, Vol.109, File 1-14-1963, pp.7-8.

²⁶² John Saywell, "Parliament and Politics," Canadian Annual Review, ed. by John Saywell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), p.43. See also "Resolutions Submitted to the New Democratic Party 2nd Federal Convention," Regina, Saskatchewan, Aug.6-9, 1963, NDP Research.

In addition, some Trotskyites who had been expelled from the party circulated a paper calling for a total rejection of NATO and the OAS. They also criticized Douglas for allegedly making a speech in the House of Commons supporting a conventionally armed NORAD. They had no impact on proceedings but their choice of issues on which to confront the party's leadership is further indication that foreign policy matters were a source of some controversy at the '63 convention. "For a Socialist Policy: Position of the Expelled Members of the Ontario New Democratic Party," undated, PAM, MG 14, D8, Box 27.

governing their respective countries.)²⁶³ These developments indicate that the NDP was becoming more interested in identifying with the international social democratic movement and with countries whose governments were sympathetic to NDP foreign policy objectives.

Similarly, the Cuban Missile Crisis had kindled some NDP interest in Latin America, resulting in the convention extending enthusiastic greetings

to those social democratic and labour forces in Central and South America which have for decades struggled increasingly against tyrannical forces and today continue to fight for political and economic democracy and for improved living standards for all their people.²⁶⁴

Practically all NDPers found it easy to endorse such proposals because of their commitment in greater or lesser measure to the universalist claims of social democratic idealism.

Yet the party had still not worked out an official policy on Canadian entrance into the Organization of American States (OAS). This bothered some people on the left in the party such as Cy Gonick, a professor of economics at the University of Manitoba and editor of a new Canadian independent left-wing journal, Canadian Dimension. He criticized those inside and outside the NDP who ranted and raved about American domination over Canadian affairs, but failed to oppose unequivocally any move by Canada to join the American dominated OAS. The specific occasion was a recent

²⁶³ Anne Scotton, ed. "World Peace," New Democratic Policies 1961-1976 (Ottawa: New Democratic Party, 1976), p.96; See also Michael Oliver, "Canadian Defence Policy, Memorandum for the Federal Executive," Jan. 19, 1963, NAC, MG 28, IVI, Vol.489, File Canada- Defence-NDP, p.12.

²⁶⁴ Anne Scotton, ed., "World Peace," New Democratic Policies (Ottawa: New Democratic Party), p.96.

statement by new External Affairs minister, Paul Martin, that Canada was taking preliminary steps towards joining this organization. Gonick found it incredible that party leaders such as Douglas and Colin Cameron had thus far not questioned the government in the House on this policy. If Canada joined the OAS, Washington would pressure Ottawa to increase humanitarian aid to Latin America thereby reducing the financial burden on the Americans which in turn would enable them to boost financial and military support for reactionary and oppressive regimes in the region.²⁶⁵ Douglas replied that the NDP had not yet adopted a policy on OAS membership but would discuss it at the next Federal Convention.²⁶⁶

However, by 1965, the controversy within the party inner circle on the issue had evidently not been resolved and so no official stand opposing Canadian membership in the OAS was taken until the 1967 convention. Even then, the wording of the resolution was equivocal, leaving the door open for a future reversal. "Canada's membership in the OAS in its present form should not be encouraged".²⁶⁷

The election of the Liberals in 1963, despite their commitment to acquire nuclear weapons, took much of the steam out of the nuclear debate even though the NDP continued to attack the decision on occasion. For example, on May 21, 1963, Douglas almost succeeded in bringing down the Liberal minority government with a non-confidence motion accusing the Liberals of negotiating a bilateral agreement with

²⁶⁵ Cy Gonick, "An Open Letter," Canadian Dimension, Vol.1 (July-Aug., 1964), pp.3,4.

²⁶⁶ T.C. Douglas, "Letter to the Editor," Canadian Dimension, Vol.1 (Sept.-Oct., 1964), p.2.

²⁶⁷ Scotton, "OAS," p.98.

the United States without formal parliamentary approval.²⁶⁸ Then in the fall, a rejuvenated Douglas returned from a meeting of the Socialist International in Sweden (where the nuclear issue had been the chief topic of discussion) pledging to leave no stone unturned in an attempt to prevent stop the implementation of Canada's nuclear arms agreement with the Americans which had been concluded on August 8, 1963. The NDP leader continued his attack after Prime Minister Pearson announced a second agreement had been signed in early October specifying the conditions under which nuclear weapons would be stored at United States bases in Canada and made available to Canada in a crisis. Douglas viewed this development as one more link in the chain binding Canada to the United States as well as another step towards making Canada a nuclear power.²⁶⁹

This demonstrates forcefully how in NDP thinking the nuclear arms issue could not be separated from the broader question of American-Canadian relations. Which of these considerations was more fundamental is difficult to judge. On one point there was no doubt. As the 1960s progressed, the concept of an independent Canadian foreign policy came to color almost every aspect of NDP foreign policy, a theme to be developed in Chapters Five and Six.

Interestingly, when on occasion American foreign policy initiatives dovetailed with NDP foreign policy objectives, the party sometimes called on the Canadian government to adopt a specific action advocated by Washington. (This could not have occurred at the height of the Vietnam war in the latter years of the decade.) For example, on October 9, 1963, H.W. Herridge no less, urged Canada to follow the

²⁶⁸ Peyton Lyon, "External Affairs and Defence," Canadian Annual Review, ed. by John Saywell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), p.319.

²⁶⁹ Ibid., p.339.

American lead in halting approval of export licences for commercial arms shipments to South Africa as an initial step in stopping the flow of arms to that country in protest against its apartheid policies. Though NDPers often rejected specific American policies, nevertheless, these often constituted the "measuring rod" by which the NDP's own international affairs policies were evaluated.

Another curious aspect of NDP attitudes to the United States was that at the same time they were rebelling against the authority of "Big Daddy" to the South, Canadian social democrats were also very thankful for his reassuring presence. For example, in most of their speeches in the Sixties denouncing United States policies in such places as Cuba, Vietnam, and the Dominican Republic, NDP spokesmen coupled criticism with a grateful acknowledgement of the American role as the protector of the Western family and pledges of friendship for the United States.

The question of arms sales to other countries, especially in the Third World, demonstrated NDP foreign policy at its best. Social democratic idealism's universalist vision and its deep suspicion of the military provided the party with the insights needed to critique the role of Western arms in prolonging colonialism and white dominance in Africa. The general antipathy felt by social democrats for the arms industry was based not only on moral grounds but on the belief, as Albert Carthy, Secretary of the Socialist International in the early Sixties stated, "that the economy can be made to prosper and expand with a total excision of arms manufacture".²⁷⁰

Thus, while applauding the Liberal government's move on October 21st, 1963, to ban arms sales to South Africa and Portugal, the NDP criticized the exemption granted sales to the latter country designated for its NATO commitment. As Paul

²⁷⁰ Albert Carthy, "The Socialist International Today," Socialist International Information, Vol.14, (August 29, 1964), NAC, MG 28, 1V1, Vol.483, p.483.

Martin admitted, there was no way of guaranteeing that these arms would not end up being used by Portugal to maintain its repressive colonial system in Africa.²⁷¹

Similarly throughout the 1960s, the NDP took the lead in advocating an arms sale freeze to pressure the white Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian Smith, to negotiate majority rule with its black population. Had Canada and other Western governments adopted this course of action sooner, Smith would probably have been forced to give up his hopeless struggle to preserve white minority power much earlier and thus saved the Rhodesian/Zimbabwean people much bloodshed.

Despite these initiatives, on the whole, there was a noticeable weakening of zeal and interest in international affairs in party ranks. Partly, this was reflective of the general lethargic mood amongst the public and political commentators in relation to foreign affairs now that the nuclear question had apparently been settled and East-West tensions had diminished after the signing of the partial test ban treaty. Partly, it was because the idealists were licking their wounds after their decisive defeats at both the 1961 and 1963 conventions. Moreover, many NDP members, whether idealists or not, were beginning to realize that with the nuclear issue receding, NDP foreign policy need a face lift. Indeed, in the interregnum before the Vietnam War began to loom large in 1965, the party found itself with a largely outdated nuclear position and a NATO policy, if the truth be told, that in reality was much like the Liberals.

Therefore, when near the end of 1963, there was at least one unofficial meeting between certain NDP officials and some prominent Liberals to explore common goals, ways of cooperating and possibly even a merger, foreign policy evidently did not

²⁷¹ Debates, Oct.21, 1963, p.6309.

loom large as an impediment.²⁷² Such a meeting even a year before at the height of the nuclear arms controversy would have been unthinkable. Of course, Douglas quickly distanced himself and the party from such talk, news of which had even spread overseas to Socialist International headquarters.²⁷³

Evidence was also growing of a more non-partisan consensus emerging in the House on certain foreign policy matters. For example, when the Liberal government created a Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence in the spring of 1963, Brewin expressed the hope that it would not rehash the politically charged defence debates of the recent past but operate as much as possible on a non-partisan basis.²⁷⁴ Colin Cameron also supported the committee's establishment as long as moral considerations would not be sacrificed in its terms of reference.²⁷⁵ On December 20th, 1963, the committee issued a unanimous interim report which, as Peyton Lyon commented, represented a big step towards a nonpartisan defence policy and showed to what extent the nuclear issue had been diffused. Of particular interest is the fact that Andrew Brewin signed the report despite the inclusion of a pro-NORAD statement which directly contradicted official NDP policy.²⁷⁶

Another reason for the weakening of NDP stridency on foreign policy issues in late 1963 and throughout 1964 may have been because Canada's growing national

²⁷² Canadian Annual Review, 1963, p.43: Also see, Desmond Morton, The New Democrats, 1961-1986: The Politics of Change (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1986), p.50.

²⁷³ T.C Douglas, "Report from Canada," Socialist International Information (February 15, 1964), NAC, MG 28, IVI, Vol.410, p.14.

²⁷⁴ Brewin statement, June 27, 1963, NAC, MG 32, C26, Vol.10, File 9.

²⁷⁵ Debates, June 5, 1963, p.664.

²⁷⁶ Canadian Annual Review, 1963, pp. 19,340.

unity crisis diverted the energies of all political parties to internal affairs. As Peyton Lyon noted in the 1964 edition of Canadian Annual Review, "The Prime Minister could not for a moment forget that the first objective of Canadian foreign policy must be the preservation of Canadian unity".²⁷⁷ For the NDP to have continued attacking NATO policies vociferously would have identified the party in the public mind with De Gaulle and his anti-NATO campaign, this while the French President was widely believed by many Canadians to be encouraging Quebec separatism. In fairness it must be added that the NDP continued to oppose the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force, which Douglas feared could lead to West Germany becoming an independent nuclear power, a development that would dramatically boost tensions in Europe once more.²⁷⁸

The shift in focus away from the NATO question also occurred because, as Brewin noted in an important speech in Parliament on November 28, 1963, the major areas of instability in the world were not in Europe anymore but in Asia, Africa and South America. Communism's ability to exploit the urgent desire of the poor to raise their living standards required that the West meet this challenge with an approach similar to the Marshall Plan, which through massive aid and credits had rebuilt Western Europe after World War II. Such a measure was the best "defence" policy in the long run. In the best tradition of idealist social democratic internationalism, Brewin also repeated social democratic internationalism's faith in the ability of international planning to ensure an abundant world.²⁷⁹

²⁷⁷ Peyton Lyon, "External Affairs and Defence," Canadian Annual Review, ed. by John Saywell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), p.187.

²⁷⁸ Debates, April 2, 1964, pp.1701-2.

²⁷⁹ Debates, Nov.28, 1963, p.5221.

In keeping with public and editorial opinion in general, the NDP's response to many of the principles and specific proposals contained in Liberal Defence Minister Paul Hellyer's White Paper made public on March 26th, 1964, was favourable.²⁸⁰ In particular, the NDP approved of Hellyer's plan to unify the Canadian defence establishment under a single Chief and Defence Staff partly because of anticipated savings,²⁸¹ but mainly because this integrated force would be most useful for service in a future permanent United Nations or world government police force, a longstanding objective of Canadian social democratic internationalism.²⁸² (By 1967, party spokesmen would add the point that unification should lead to a complete reassessment of the roles of the armed forces resulting in withdrawal of all Canadian troops from Europe.²⁸³)

In the meantime, the NDP endorsed another key recommendation of the White Paper, namely that Canada continue to participate in UN peacekeeping operations.²⁸⁴ Not surprisingly, therefore, the NDP supported the Liberal government in the initiatives it took in the spring of 1964 to promote and establish a UN force to separate the warring Greek and Turkish factions on Cyprus, thus averting war between two NATO members. Douglas's enthusiasm for Canadian participation could not be restrained,

²⁸⁰ Canadian Annual Review, 1964, pp.215-6.

²⁸¹ Debates, May 8, 1964, p.3074.

²⁸² Scotton, "Unification," p.98.

²⁸³ Thomas Hockin, "External Affairs and Defence," Canadian Annual Review, ed. by John Saywell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), pp.262,264.

²⁸⁴ Debates, May 8, 1964, p.3074.

"Canada's most effective role is exactly what the House is now being asked to do".²⁸⁵

Indeed, all that NDP spokespersons had to do was include the term, "United Nations," in a policy statement or resolution and all factions of the party could be counted on to applaud. This almost blind devotion to the UN was never seriously questioned in the NDP during the 1961 to 1988 period, the years covered by this dissertation. Indeed, it has always fought for a greatly strengthened world organization with all-embracing powers to ensure its effectiveness as the world policeman. The party has never confronted the inherent dangers or potential impracticalities in creating such a highly centralized, powerful structure. If such a world organization abused its powers, sanctioned the use of nuclear weapons or came under the complete control of one of the superpowers, there would be no counterforce to stop it. The NDP has tended to assume that any type of world government structure would by its very nature operate on the basis of social democratic idealist values such as peace, solidarity and justice. In other words, the UN took on some of the qualities of an infallible institution.

While voicing approval of several specific proposals in the 1964 White Paper, Brewin did not let the report "off the hook" completely. His chief critique was that the government had promised a bold new defence policy but had not delivered. In particular, it had evaded the question of what role Canada's Armed Forces could/should play in the world. The White Paper proposed that Canada continue to meet its forward defence obligations by employing tactical nuclear weapons, while at the same time maintaining a tri-service conventional force available to the UN and

²⁸⁵ Canadian Annual Review, 1964, p.231.

NATO when needed.²⁸⁶ This dual conventional/nuclear role, in Brewin's view, would be too expensive and would help maintain NATO's reliance on tactical nuclear arms.

Brewin felt so strongly about the matter that he wrote a book, Stand On Guard: The Search for a Canadian Defence Policy, which outlined an alternative. While reminding his readers that the book did not represent official party policy, he, nonetheless, maintained he had the support of quite a number of caucus members.²⁸⁷ Brewin's main argument was for the creation of a conventional mobile force based in Canada that would serve double duty as a detachment available for UN service on a moment's notice, while also functioning as a reserve able to shore up NATO's European defences wherever most needed in a crisis. He also felt that Canada should re-negotiate the present first-strike role of the RCAF in Europe, a role which he described in Parliament as "obsolete, provocative and dangerous". Instead, the air force ought to concentrate on providing transport and tactical support.²⁸⁸ In support of the mobile force concept, Brewin cited the views of some members of the general staff, General Charles Foulkes and Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, and even United States Defence Secretary, McNamara and NATO Chief, General Norstad.²⁸⁹

As a realist, Brewin based his arguments primarily on practical not moral grounds, because the latter led too easily to notions of neutralism and unilateralism. He believed his position represented the middle ground between the unilateralists and those who, by their support of forward tactical nuclear defence, flirted with nuclear

²⁸⁶ Canadian Annual Review, 1964, p.215.

²⁸⁷ Andrew Brewin, Stand On Guard: The Search for a Canadian Defence Policy (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965), p. vii.

²⁸⁸ Debates, May 8, 1964, p.3174.

²⁸⁹ S. Bowes, "The Defence Policies of the New Democratic Party" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Queen's University, 1983), p.69.

war. Canada's practical contribution as a middle power should be to help maintain the present uneasy balance between East and West as a necessary safeguard for peace in the immediate future. At the same time, Canada must also accept a share of responsibility for a longer-term role in service of the future hopes of humanity, namely, through contributing to a UN peace force.²⁹⁰

In his final chapter, Brewin conceded that a new defence policy with a more appropriate and distinctly Canadian role was by itself very unlikely to achieve the long-term objective of a world community so dear to the hearts of all social democrats. While morality had little role to play in deciding short term defence policy, it was vitally important for the attainment of this ultimate goal. As a practising Anglican, Brewin believed that Christianity could provide that moral base. "There exists today in the world at least one world-wide institution whose teachings could form the moral basis or 'ethos' for a world-wide community. I refer to the Christian Church."²⁹¹ He also quoted from statements of both the World Council of Churches and Pope John XXIII to the effect that the ideal of human brotherhood would only be achieved through the development of world-wide institutions and world law.²⁹² Hence, while on defence policy, Brewin was a realist with much in common with liberal internationalists in other parties, on long term foreign policy objectives, he was devoted to social democratic idealism which in the tradition of J.S. Woodsworth and T.C. Douglas owed much to the social gospel and the Christian church.

However, some facets of Brewin's views were not to go unchallenged within the "inner sanctum" of NDP thought. While Desmond Morton, a former army officer

²⁹⁰ Brewin, Stand On Guard, p.128.

²⁹¹ Ibid., p.131.

²⁹² Ibid., p.133.

and now an historian of Canadian military history and key NDP theorist, could ignore Brewin's idealistic appeals to Christianity, he was quite disturbed by some of the conceptual and practical aspects of Brewin's ideas. For Morton, Brewin's realism was not pragmatic enough. He attacked the whole notion of "roles" as a cornerstone of defence policy. Such a concept would produce inflexibility because circumstances and needs were constantly changing.

In addition, since New Democrats were not military experts, Morton advised the party to develop a defence policy on the basis of a more "conservative" criterion than roles. This would entail the formation of the largest military force that could be trained and equipped efficiently within a predetermined budget.²⁹³ Efficiency would be attained by hiring less expensive civilian labour to do menial tasks, pruning those who were physically and mentally unfit for active service many of whom now occupied desk jobs, and finally by creating a smaller but more highly trained and equipped professional force. Morton acknowledged that a New Democratic government would be pressured to continue the present policy of treating the armed forces as a humane social service agency, but argued that social and unemployment problems should be solved through national social programs instead.²⁹⁴

In all this, Morton's principal concern was that the NDP was not doing a good job of preparing now for the practical defence problems it would face when forming a government, the likelihood of which he believed was increasing in the months leading up to the 1965 election. The country could not stand a repeat of a debacle like that perpetrated by the Diefenbaker government. For this reason, the lengthy and emotional

²⁹³ Desmond Morton, "Notes on a New Democratic Defence Policy: A Personal View," undated, NAC, MG 28, IVI, Vol.489, File Canada-Defence-NDP, p.2.

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.4.

defence policy debates at the 1961 and 1963 federal NDP conventions must not be repeated.

Instead of inquiring into the annual expenditure of a billion and a half dollars on defence, New Democrats were content with a platitude about "a general and searching reappraisal of Canada's role", and with another about the probable advantages of diverting both civic and military personnel to United Nations service.²⁹⁵

Morton was implicitly criticizing social democratic idealism's tendency to hide behind generalizations and avoid practical concerns.

Judged on the basis of the 1965 defence policy platform, Morton's views appeared not to have had much impact on those planning the convention and preparing the omnibus foreign policy resolution. Whether a convention can or should get into the "nuts and bolts" of defence issues as Morton wanted is a moot point. What is clear, however, is that both Morton and Brewin sensed that with Hellyer's plans for unification of the armed forces, Canadian social democratic internationalism faced new challenges as well as new opportunities.

Evidently this feeling was not shared either by most of the party's inner circle or the vast majority of NDP delegates to the 1965 convention where the dominant on defence matters was one of indifference, at least in comparison to previous NDP gatherings. Prior to the convention, Andrew Brewin had submitted a draft resolution to the party policy committee based on the main point raised in his book, the re-negotiation of Canada's role in NATO. The resolution also called for re-negotiation of

²⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.1.

Canada's participation in NORAD to eliminate the "obsolete missiles and interceptors," while continuing to cooperate with the United States in detection.²⁹⁶

In a memorandum explaining the rationale for the draft resolution, Brewin emphasized the political benefits of his proposals which he believed would make a radical change in Canada's defence policy. It would clearly distinguish the NDP from the Liberals White Paper and the defence policies of the other parties. "It would be realistic; it would be forward-looking; it would be consistent with sound international policies," Brewin explained. Furthermore,

it would hold out at least a reasonable promise of a reduction of defence expenditures. It would not be inconsistent with Canada filling the most effective role available to a smaller country within the Western alliance and the United Nations and it would constitute an effective protest against the continuance by NATO of an obsolete and dangerous strategy.²⁹⁷

Brewin's proposals should have garnered considerable support from the party leadership because they appeared to be politically attractive. By continuing in NATO, albeit in a new role, many voters who favoured NATO membership but were uncomfortable with nuclear weapons in Canadian hands should have been happy. Similarly, the flexibility of a tri-service, mobile force would appeal to people committed to both UN peacekeeping and the defence of Europe.

Nevertheless, despite these advantages, Brewin was unable to convince the federal council or the convention to adopt his resolution. It was not a case of the party

²⁹⁶ Andrew Brewin, "Draft Resolution Re Defence for New Democratic Party Convention," May, 1965, NAC, MG 28, 1V1, Vol.391, File 22.

²⁹⁷ Andrew Brewin, "Memorandum for Informal Conference: Defence and Strategy," NAC, MG 28, 1V1, Vol.391, File 22.

being diametrically opposed to Brewin's view, but rather that most NDPers had lost interest in defence policy matters for reasons discussed earlier and which reflected the mood of the electorate. (In the fall election of 1965, NDP campaigners such as Coldwell and Douglas did on occasion criticize the Canadian government for allegedly following the American foreign policy line too closely, but the issue failed to generate much response.²⁹⁸)

However, NDP delegates did manage to rouse themselves briefly to express concern about the financial crisis then facing the United Nations because some major powers were refusing to pay their share of peace-keeping dues. In a resolution they called on all UN countries "to abandon any position which would perpetuate the present impasse or drive some nations out of the union and for Canada to make a large contribution to bail the organization out."²⁹⁹ Since NDP internationalists of all types could not conceive of a world without the UN, they wanted Canadians to take the lead in defusing the crisis even if it meant considerable financial costs to Canada.

By 1965, the NDP was established as a permanent and important fixture on the Canadian political scene. In keeping with public opinion, interest in defence and disarmament questions had weakened considerably within party ranks and with it much of the passionate debate between idealism and realism. This, in turn, was due in no small measure to the fact that the idealists, disheartened by their earlier defeats on unilateral disarmament and NATO withdrawal, had kept a low profile from 1963 to 1965. Nevertheless, controversial issues like NATO and Canadian independence were

²⁹⁸ F.H. Soward, "External Affairs and Defence," Canadian Annual Review, ed. by John Saywell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), p.270.

²⁹⁹ Scotton, "The United Nations Crisis," p.97.

not dead within the party and needed only the right circumstances to spark a vigorous debate once more.

PART II

The period from 1965 to 1979 saw a gradual weakening of social democratic internationalism amongst most people associated with the New Democratic Party. The key factor was the growth of Canadian economic nationalism which had its greatest impact in the NDP during the early Seventies when the influence of the Waffle peaked. The result was that, as Canadian-American relations came to dominate NDP foreign policy, there was a commensurate decline in interest and involvement with the rest of the world, especially amongst social democratic idealists.

Meanwhile, economic nationalism combined with opposition to American policy in Vietnam to produce a general increase of anti-Americanism in idealist circles. This climaxed at the 1969 NDP convention with the passing of a resolution that committed an NDP government to pull out of NATO and follow the dictates of an independent Canadian foreign policy in all aspects of international relations.

The mid-Seventies saw a new NDP commitment to international human rights and the Third World, in particular, the New International Economic Order. However, part of the motivation, at least for idealists, was the opportunity to undermine American hegemony and its alleged oppressive political, economic, and social policies in the Third World.

CHAPTER FIVE

NATIONALISM AND ANTI-AMERICANISM ALMOST TAKE-OVER THE NDP (1965-9)

While interest in and debate on foreign policy issues at the 1965 convention was almost as low-key as on specific defence matters, there were signs that a longstanding topic in Canadian history was about to rise to new prominence both in the country and the NDP, namely, Canada's relationship with the United States. The story of the attempt to convert the NDP into the party of Canadian nationalism/independence and the overall implications of this move for NDP foreign policy is the main subject of this chapter.

For historical and geographic reasons, relations with the Americans have been and will probably always be the primary foreign policy issue that Canada will face.³⁰⁰ Most Canadians have admired the material success and historic commitment to democratic liberties of the "American Way". At the same time, many Canadians have traditionally harboured at least some concern that Canada's distinctiveness and interests were threatened by its neighbour, who also happened to be the dominant

³⁰⁰ Allan Gotlieb makes this observation forcefully and convincingly in his 1991 O.D. Skelton Memorial Lecture, "The United States in Canadian Foreign Policy," Toronto, Ontario, Dec.10., 1991.

cultural, economic and political power of the Twentieth Century.³⁰¹ Hence, most Canadians, including social democrats, have had a love/hate relationship with the United States.

For example, since World War II, a majority of NDPers have shared in the Canadian consensus that acknowledged America's leadership of the Western alliance against the communist threat, while expressing varying degrees of wariness about Washington's other foreign policy objectives. Trying to hold these two views simultaneously proved to be very challenging for the NDP and opened the door to severe criticism from both the left and the right. Thus, while the Liberals and Conservatives were accusing the NDP of anti-Americanism, the left (including many idealists in the party) was denouncing the official NDP stand on American foreign policy as timid, often on the same specific issue.

One phrase that united the Canadian political left for much of the Sixties both inside and outside the NDP was the call for "an independent foreign policy." Numerous articles were written and speeches made on the subject. In this, Canadian Dimension, a new left-wing journal dedicated to promoting an independent socialist Canada, led the way. The editor, Cy Gonick, was a party member for much of the Sixties and even served as an NDP member of the Manitoba Legislature from 1969 to 1973.³⁰² Throughout its history, Dimension has had its own love/hate relationship with the NDP, at times endorsing the party as representing the left's best chance for attaining power

³⁰¹ Allan Smith, a professor of history at the University of British Columbia, has explored the American influence on Canada's cultural life in considerable depth. In an article, Smith shows how Nineteenth Century English Canadians for the most part willingly adopted a continentalist cultural perspective and how this affects Canadians today. Allan Smith, "The Continental Dimension in the Evolution of the English-Canadian Mind," International Journal, Vol.31 (Summer, 1976), pp.442-69.

³⁰² Cy Gonick interview, June 22, 1992.

in Canada, while at other times denouncing the NDP as unworthy of support by any true socialist. The 1960s was one of those periods when, for the most part, Dimension held out considerable hope for the party and therefore expended considerable effort attempting to prod it into making a whole hearted commitment to an independent foreign policy.³⁰³

One of the first major articles in Canadian Dimension advocating an independent foreign policy for Canada was a particularly thoughtful and well reasoned piece that appeared in the December-January, 1963-4 edition, authored by C.B. Macpherson, a respected Canadian Marxist political theorist. For him, Canada could have no effective influence for peace in the world if it failed to develop a foreign policy that was independent of the United States. To accept Washington's policies was to align oneself with the military industrial interests which were committed to the arms race and its concomitant foreign policies.³⁰⁴

How much influence Canadian Dimension had on NDP foreign policy in the Sixties is difficult to measure. There is evidence that some members of the party's leadership took the journal quite seriously, especially in its early years. For example, the September-October, 1964 edition contained letters from both Herridge and Douglas responding to the journal's challenge to the NDP to develop an independent foreign policy. Herridge was most complimentary: "I have just finished reading the July-August issue of Dimension and cannot resist writing a short note to congratulate you on its contents and general approach to international and national issues." In closing, he

³⁰³ Ibid.

³⁰⁴ C.B. Macpherson, "Beyond the Nuclear Arms Issue," Canadian Dimension, Vol. 1 (Dec.-Jan., 1963-4), pp. 15-6.

wished them continued success in presenting facts to "a misinformed public and woolly-minded people".³⁰⁵

The notion of an independent Canadian foreign policy was greatly enhanced in NDP circles with the onset of the Vietnam war in the mid-Sixties. This led the party's federal caucus to mount a much more comprehensive and sustained critique of American foreign policy, although not enough to please its left-wing idealists. Why did the NDP so often cast itself in this role? Did the identity of the party or its individual members require a visceral suspicion and at times almost despising of the United States?

Psychological theories aside, there were concrete reasons for NDPers to be apprehensive about the Americans. As members of a party committed to government intervention in the economy, ever-expanding social programs, redistribution of income and gradual replacement of competition with cooperation, NDP members felt uneasy living beside the world's leading capitalist nation which constantly spouted the rhetoric of the unfettered market while denouncing anything else as communist. The party knew that the United States government would never take kindly to the possibility of a federal NDP election victory. If the Americans had intervened to assist the Liberal victory in 1963 over the Conservatives, what would they do if an NDP victory appeared likely?

More basic than this was the mutual antipathy between the social democratic and dominant American views of where history was going or at least should be going. As explained earlier, social democratic internationalism envisioned the evolution of a world federation of all nations based on peaceful cooperation and politico-economic equality among all countries, large or small. As Andrew Brewin declared in a speech

³⁰⁵ H.W. Herridge to Canadian Dimension, Vol.1 (Sept.-Oct., 1964), p.2.

to the CLC in 1963, a new world order must be based on world law which required as a prerequisite a sense of world community. This, in turn, could not be built as long as the striking contrast between the affluent West and the poverty-stricken Third World continued or income gaps between people within nations were not closed.³⁰⁶ Consequently, if social democrats wanted to remain true to their fundamental values, they had little choice but to take issue with American foreign policy which propped up right-wing dictatorships whose values were generally the antithesis of the above, all in the name of fighting communism.

Other related matters also bothered Canadian social democrats. The world order that the United States governing elite desired, even if it proved more benign than social democrats could imagine, would be dominated by one power, the Americans. Moreover, even a genuine detente between East and West, if and when it came, would see a few major powers dividing the world into spheres of influence. Such a scenario was contrary to the social democratic idealistic view of a global federation of equal states under the auspices of a neutral United Nations endowed with the military force to impose and maintain peace and order everywhere.

Indeed, it was usually NDPers with strong idealist orientations that led the fight for an independent foreign policy. They saw the stakes the most clearly. Unless Canada could break free from the constraints imposed by American foreign and domestic policy, Canada would never play the special role in world history to which it had been called. Thus, by the mid-Sixties, idealists were asking themselves how Canada could break free from American domination. The answer, they soon concluded, must lie in the rediscovery and assertion of Canadian nationalism.

³⁰⁶ Andrew Brewin, "Canada's Role," 1963, NAC, MG 32, C26, Vol. 83, File 5.

The rise of Canadian nationalism, especially in its economic and to a lesser extent cultural forms, had profound implications for both bilateral relations with the United States and Canadian foreign policy in general. The detailed story of how and why nationalism came to the fore in Canada and within the NDP cannot and need not be told here, although a few salient points will be mentioned.³⁰⁷

As Prime Minister from 1957 to 1963, John Diefenbaker had tried at various times to ride the nationalist "horse." He had been followed by Walter Gordon, Lester Pearson's finance minister, who between '63 and '65 spearheaded the passing of some nationalist economic legislation restricting foreign ownership of banks, newspapers, magazines and broadcasting.³⁰⁸ Gordon's thinking reflected the growing concerns of the Canadian managerial and professional classes that increasing American control of the Canadian economy was hurting their interests. For example, Gordon provided evidence that American based firms discriminated against their Canadian subsidiaries. Hence, Canadians were not getting their fair share of the benefits of the enormous economic expansion occurring in the Sixties. The Canadian managers and executives of the American branch plants also felt stifled to some extent by their

³⁰⁷ For a brief but well written account of the relationship between Canadian socialism and nationalism see, William Christian and Colin Campbell, Political Parties and Ideologies in Canada: Liberals, Conservatives, Socialists, Nationalists (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1983), pp.208-233. For a left-wing perspective see, Philip Resnick, The Land of Cain: Class and Nationalism in English Canada, 1945-1975 (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1977).

For the relationship of nationalism and the general history of the Sixties see, J.L. Granatstein, Canada 1957-1967: The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1986), pp.198-217; Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, and John English, Canada Since 1945: Power, Politics, and Provincialism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), pp.270-283.

³⁰⁸ William Christian and Colin Campbell, Political Parties and Ideologies in Canada, p.212.

limited opportunities for advancement.³⁰⁹ Thus, the first really significant attempts to put economic nationalism at the centre of Canadian economic life came not from the left but from the moderate centre. Indeed, when the government in 1964, under pressure from the United States, exempted Reader's Digest and Time from legislation taxing Canadian advertisements in foreign periodicals, the NDP response was somewhat less than might have been expected.

Ironically, the person most responsible for "kick-starting" left-wing Canadian nationalism was himself not a socialist or even a social democrat but an old-style conservative. The publication in 1965 of a short volume entitled, Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism by George Grant, a philosopher and professor at McMaster University, created a sensation in Canada, especially on the left, so much so that Canadian Dimension made Grant and his ideas the central focus of an entire edition.³¹⁰ Grant argued that Canada as a country with distinct traditions and values was disappearing under an American onslaught, culturally, economically and even politically.³¹¹ Social democratic idealists naturally viewed this prospect with alarm and soon were issuing strident demands for Canada to implement much stronger nationalist policies, both economic and cultural, to ensure Canadian independence.³¹²

³⁰⁹ Walter Gordon, A Choice for Canada: Independence or Colonial Status (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1966), pp.88-91.

³¹⁰ "George Grant: The Man and His Ideas," Canadian Dimension, Vol.2 (May-June, 1965), pp.12-15.

³¹¹ George Grant, Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965). However, Grant had little faith in the "good natured utopians" who traditionally have led the CCF/NDP because "they had no understanding of the mutual dependence of socialism and nationalism in the Canadian setting." Grant, Lament for a Nation, p.75.

³¹² Gad Horowitz, "Tories, Socialists, and the Demise of Canada," in Canadian Dimension, Vol.2 (May-June, 1965), p.15.

The result was the publishing of a veritable avalanche of articles in Dimension, Canadian Forum and other journals on the independence theme over the next ten years as well as many books.

Interest in the new nationalism soon spread to the academic community resulting in at least a few centre-left scholars issuing pleas for a more independent Canadian foreign policy. Paul Painchaud sketched the argument at the 1965 Third Annual Banff Conference on World Development:

There is required from Canadians a new attitude of mind, a properly political attitude where the possibility of an international role, diverging from the United States, is fully accepted and considered as salutary in the maintenance of the values which Canada and the United States share.³¹³

Painchaud also argued, like the NDP, that such a policy would allow Canada to play a more constructive mediatory role and encourage other countries to do the same. The next year, in the July edition of Canadian Forum, two important articles by University of Toronto economists, Melville H. Watkins and Abraham Rotstein, appeared. The gist of their argument was that an independent foreign and domestic policy were totally interdependent.³¹⁴

Also in 1966 the University League for Social Reform of Nationalism in Canada, published a compilation of recent essays by some of Canada's most distinguished academics on various aspects of Canadian nationalism. Among them was one by John

³¹³ Paul Painchaud, "Middlepowermanship as an Ideology," in Canada's Role as a Middle Power, ed. by King Gordon (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1966), p.34.

³¹⁴ Melville H. Watkins, "Is Gordon's Game Worth the Candle?" Canadian Forum, Vol.46 (July, 1966), pp.77-8; Abraham Rotstein, "Pearson's Choice," Canadian Forum Vol.46 (July, 1966), p.76.

W. Holmes, a former high ranking Canadian External Affairs official and now one of Canada's major foreign policy historians. Holmes saw a place for a temperate nationalism in bolstering a moderately independent Canadian foreign policy. This, in turn, Holmes believed, would strengthen Canadian nationalism and in so doing enhance Canadian independence. He interpreted the Canadian public's growing interest in nationalism as evidence of a frustrated idealism searching for an outlet.³¹⁵

However, surprisingly, it was not until early 1966 that prominent people in NDP circles began to pay any official attention to the "new nationalism". Its earliest responses were rather low-key and matter-of-fact as reflected in a letter George Cadbury, a member of the Federal Policy committee, wrote to the committee.

There is a reality and a virtue in the continued independent existence of Canada both because it could speak from the status of a strong middle power and because there is more hope of creating the kind of society we envisage in an independent Canada, than exists in the United States of America.³¹⁶

These points, which had always been fundamental to Canadian social democratic internationalism, provided common ground where idealists and realists could meet.

Debate over the coming years within the NDP would revolve around five main issues. How much of the traditional socialist program would Canada have to implement to preserve itself as an independent nation? Which should predominate, socialism or nationalism?. (Since these first two questions deal mostly with matters beyond the scope of this dissertation, relatively little attention will be paid them here.) However,

³¹⁵ John W. Holmes, "Nationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy," in Nationalism in Canada, ed. by Peter Russell (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Co. of Canada., 1966), pp.212-9.

³¹⁶ George Cadbury to NDP Policy Review Committee, Feb.21, 1966, NAC, MG 28, 1V1, Vol.437, File 30.

of prime significance are three others: Was nationalism a useful ally in creating and preserving an independent Canadian foreign policy? Did a renewed dedication to Canadian nationalism entail some form of anti-Americanism? Finally, did an NDP commitment to an independent foreign policy require a more radical foreign policy and most particularly, a reversal of the party's official pro-NATO defence policy?

One of the earlier significant contributions by an NDP thinker to the nationalist/independent theme was Charles Taylor's 1966 article, "Towards Canadian Nationalism".³¹⁷ Taylor, a philosopher and rising NDP star from McGill University, connected the achieving of economic independence for Canada with an enhanced strategic role in preserving peace by building on the trust Canada already enjoyed around the world as a middle power. In fact, once Canada had really established its existence as an independent country, its new status would thrust it forward as a leader on the international scene. Unfortunately at the moment, Canadian foreign policy was paralysed by continentalism in Taylor's opinion.

While NDP leaders like David Lewis and T.C. Douglas had in previous years on occasion expressed concern about the level of foreign control of the Canadian economy, their interest in and involvement with the issue was naturally heightened by the rise of the new nationalism in the mid-Sixties. For example, during a November 2, 1966 debate on a bill to build an oil and gas pipeline from Manitoba to Ontario through the United States instead of Canada, Douglas outlined what for him was the real issue. The decision, he declared, was only part of a much more important choice the Canadian people had to make. Would Canada, with so much to contribute to the world, survive as a fully free and independent nation with an autonomous economy or

³¹⁷ Charles Taylor, "Alternatives to Continentalism," Canadian Dimension, Vol.3 (July-Aug., 1966), pp.12-15.

would it become part of the great economic hegemony of the United States? The real political choice therefore, was between the creeping continentalism of the Liberals or a sane national policy as proposed by the NDP. As for anti-Americanism, Douglas claimed it played no role in NDP thinking on the issue.³¹⁸

However, economic independence and an independent foreign policy were directly related. In Douglas's keynote address to the 1967 federal party convention, the NDP leader stated his firm conviction that the Canadian government was not speaking out against the Vietnam war because

we are not masters in our house. We are becoming an economic colony of the United States and our capacity for independent action in world affairs is being reduced to zero. We must act to regain control of our economy so that we can play our part as an independent actor in promoting world peace based on the rule of law.³¹⁹

In these few words, the NDP leader clearly conveyed his party's understanding of the intimate connection between social democratic internationalism, economic dependency, and Canadian independence.

As Canada celebrated its centennial in 1967, left wing nationalists grew more strident fearing that the country's days as an independent nation were numbered. So desperate were they becoming that Canadian Dimension published an "Open Letter to Canadian Nationalists," calling for a common front of all nationalists across the political spectrum.³²⁰ In addition, they were convinced that Canadians were more ready than

³¹⁸ Debates, Nov.2, 1966, pp.9460-4.

³¹⁹ Douglas, "Text of Keynote Address to the Federal Convention," Toronto, July 3, 1967, NAC, MG 28, IVI, Vol.395, p.20.

³²⁰ "Open Letter to Canadian Nationalists," Canadian Dimension, Vol.4 (May-June, 1967), p.1,2.

ever to support strong government action. Dimension reproduced the results of a poll conducted by the Toronto Star showing the rising tide of concern felt by Canadians with American control of the economy and Canada's lack of independence from Washington's domestic and international policies.³²¹

In response to such public sentiments, the Liberal government, under the prodding of long-time nationalist cabinet minister, Walter Gordon, commissioned a task force headed by the economist, Mel Watkins, to study American control of the Canadian economy. Even the Tories held a conference on the subject at Kingston, Ontario where Dalton Camp, president of the party, argued the case for Canadian independence.

Despite these moves, left wing nationalists/idealists were still not satisfied because, in their view, none of the political parties, including the NDP, were responding with the urgency that the situation demanded. Instead of leading the fight for an independent Canada, the NDP seemed preoccupied with preserving the welfare state and erasing the socialist legacy of the CCF. Part of the problem, in the opinion of Cy Gonick, was the prevalence of

an important stream of anti-nationalist feeling in the NDP which regarded the concern over Canadian independence as reactionary and anachronistic; which agrees with American foreign policy in principle, if not in the methods used to carry it out.³²²

³²¹ "Do Canadians Really Want Independence?" Canadian Dimension, Vol.4 (Mar.-Apr., 1967), pp.18-20.

³²² Cy Gonick, "The Political Economy of Canadian Independence," Vol.4 (May-June, 1967). pp.18-19.

Here was a vigorous attack on the realism (with its anti-nationalist tendencies) of Lewis, Brewin and company. The idealist/realist conflict was obviously intensifying.

At the same time, the nationalist arguments of the NDP left-wing opened the door to charges that its views were fundamentally anti-internationalist, isolationist and even anti-socialist. Already in 1966, Ramsay Cook, a historian at the University of Toronto, had responded to an article by Charles Taylor, "Alternatives to Continentalism," by castigating Taylor and other Canadian intellectuals for their "fatal attraction" to nationalism. Cook had rejected the distinction between "good" and "bad" nationalism that Taylor had made on the grounds that the particularist claims of all types of nationalism, contradicted and undermined the universalist hopes of socialism.³²³

Ed Broadbent, a political science professor at York University (and soon to be an NDP Member of Parliament), also disagreed with the heavy nationalist emphasis of the idealists, especially their call for a common front of nationalists from all political persuasions. Socialists, he argued, should instead use "their intelligence and energy within the NDP to minimize both the liberal drift of the party and the increasing emphasis on nationalism. (I do not say nationalism should be entirely abandoned.)" Socialism, not nationalism, was the sole justification for wrenching Canada free from American domination in Broadbent's view.³²⁴

In the continuing debate, left-wing idealists struck back by defending the role of nationalism in building an independent and socialist Canada. In a major article, "On the Fear of Nationalism, Nationalism and Socialism: A Sermon to the Moderates," Gad

³²³ Ramsay Cook, Letter to the editor, Canadian Dimension, Vol.4 (Sept.-Oct., 1967), p.42.

³²⁴ Ed Broadbent, Letter to Canadian Dimension, Vol.4, (Sept-Oct, 1967), p.35.

Horowitz, political scientist at McGill University, stated emphatically that Canadian socialists were nationalist because they were socialist.

If the United States were socialist,... we should be continentalist at this moment. If the possibilities of building a socialist society were brighter in the United States than in Canada, or as bright, we would not be terrified by the prospect of absorption. We are nationalist because as socialists, we do not want our country to be absorbed by the citadel of world capitalism.³²⁵

In other words, for Horowitz, nationalism was only a means to an end. He contended that while socialism was internationalist in outlook, the fulfilment of the dream of a universal republic of mankind based on equality and justice could only be hindered by the absorption of Canada by the United States. In this fashion, Canadian nationalism served the long-range idealist goals of Canadian social democratic internationalism. Moreover, "the purpose of Canadian nationalism is not to close Canada to the world, but to open Canada to the world by keeping out the United States."³²⁶

John Warnock, a professor of political science at the University of Saskatchewan, came to much the same conclusion in his hard-hitting article, "Why I am Anti-American." He was proud of the label, "anti-American," because he opposed the moral and philosophical foundations of liberal individualism upon which American society was built and which, in his view, accounted for their "atrocious practices" in Vietnam. Canada, he believed, had gone down a different path both domestically and

³²⁵ Gad Horowitz, "On the Fear of Nationalism, Nationalism and Socialism: A Sermon to the Moderates," in Canadian Dimension, Vol.4, (May-June, 1967), pp.18-9.

³²⁶ Ibid., p.8.

internationally.³²⁷ In effect, Warnock was saying that a good Canadian by definition must be anti-American. Nevertheless, Warnock maintained that such a nationalism did not contradict true internationalism. Warnock's analysis reveals that the roots of social democratic (and probably socialist) anti-Americanism lay fundamentally in antipathy for American values which were said to be inferior to true Canadian values as exemplified in their purest form by social democratic idealism.

Two years later, just prior to the 1969 NDP convention, Ed Finn, leader of the Newfoundland NDP through much of the Sixties and a member of the Waffle, succinctly summarized the left-wing idealist view of internationalism as it related to nationalism: "While we may favour one world, we do not want it to be an American world." Hence, Finn wanted the NDP to convert itself into the only organized political force in Canada fighting for independence by elevating nationalism to the forefront where he was sure it belonged.³²⁸

In searching for ways to promote their version of Canadian independence, internationalism and anti-Americanism, a few radical idealists found their answer in a unique blend of anarchism, quasi-pacifism, anti-nationalism and world federalism. F.H. Knelman proposed that Canada become the first "anti-nation" in history opposed to all forms of national exclusivity and devoted to a form of inter-nationalism. In this scenario, Canada would disavow military power and dedicate the moral power it acquired thereby to the promotion of international peace and disarmament. Having halted all manufacturing and sale of arms and abandoned all military alliances, Canada would be in position to initiate moral alliances. Knelman acknowledged the naivete of

³²⁷ John Warnock, "Why I Am Anti-American," Canadian Dimension, Vol.5 (Nov.-Dec., 1967), pp.11-2.

³²⁸ Ed Finn, "Nationalism and the NDP," discussion paper for the Winnipeg convention, undated, NAC, MG 32, C28, Vol.152, File 16-2. p.5.

these proposals, but mused that even naivete could be advantageous in shocking people into a new awareness. Ultimate sovereignty would rest in the "supra-national sovereignty of humankind" and the purpose of the Canadian external affairs department would be limited to the support of international law, order, and government. Knelman admitted the economic impracticability of breaking with the United States, but maintained that economic conditions must remain secondary to supra-national principles.³²⁹

This was idealistic internationalism at its extreme. It is impossible to say to what extent Knelman's notions reflected NDP thought in the late Sixties, but without doubt, his semi-pacifist and world federalist sentiments would have resonated with many party members, although his theories about nationalism would not.

The unavoidable effect of this continual diet of anti-American, pro-nationalist/independence arguments on the idealist wing of the party was the emergence of quasi-isolationism. Intoxicated by the view that nationalism was indispensable to the survival of both Canada and socialism, left wing idealists in the NDP were prepared to cut most ties with the United States and concentrate on Canada to such an extent that for practical purposes the rest of the world would largely have been ignored.³³⁰ The full implications of this development will be explored in Chapters Eight and Nine which cover the 1970 to 1975 period. At this stage, it is enough to say that idealists in the late Sixties gave little indication that much thought

³²⁹ F.H. Knelman, "Anti-Nation and Canadian Identity," in Canadian Dimension (May-June, 1967), pp.20-21.

³³⁰ Cy Gonick argues strenuously, however, that the left wing as represented by the Waffle, was not isolationist. It did not emphasize foreign affairs because it had made a strategic decision that changing economic policy was the key factor if the fundamental direction of the party was to be altered. Cy Gonick interview, June 22, 1992.

had been given to the pragmatic economic and political implications if Canada had attempted to fully implement their quasi-isolationist and anti-American policies.

While the leadership of the NDP and much of the party mainstream did not share these views, the nationalist/pro-independence atmosphere emanating especially from the idealist NDP left-wing was affecting every aspect of the party's domestic and foreign policy by 1969. Of course, in theory, one could be pro-independence without embracing nationalism. However, in practice they reinforced each other and in this way contributed to the overheated atmosphere of the late Sixties and early Seventies in the NDP where foreign policy had to pass the independence litmus test to gain any hearing.

Thus we find Doug Rowland, a party executive assistant writing a memo to all NDP MPs on April 17, 1969, which was later published in one of the party newspapers, The New Commonwealth, in which he stated that from then on the notion of an independent foreign policy would be the explicit guiding principle undergirding all his specific foreign and defence policy recommendations.³³¹ The practical results were soon obvious in Parliament. For example, the NDP mounted a vigorous campaign to pressure the government throughout the spring and early summer of that year to halt any further American takeovers of Canadian financial institutions after Royal Securities was bought by the American firm, Merrill Lynch and Associates.³³²

In his book, The New Democrats, 1961-1986, Desmond Morton tried to build a case for the interpretation that the drive for a more radical NDP in the late 1960's

³³¹ Doug Rowland, "International Affairs and Defence," NAC, MG 32, C26, Vol.81, File 1.

³³² For example see, Debates, June 3, p.9382 and July 2, 1969, pp.10730-1.

began at the top as evidenced by David Lewis's organization of a federal caucus retreat on economic and political independence in December of 1968 at which papers were given by Charles Taylor and Kari Levitt, a left-wing McGill economist.³³³

While this argument has some merit, it was the release of the Waffle Manifesto in early August of 1969 which was the main catalyst for the debate about fundamental economic and foreign policy issues that occurred at the Winnipeg NDP convention in October of that year. The Manifesto, authored primarily by Mel Watkins, an economist who had earned a national reputation through his chairmanship of the Liberal government's 1968 report on foreign ownership, brought all the work previously done by left-wing nationalists to a logical conclusion at a time when political circumstances conspired to maximize its appeal within the party.

The NDP was still traumatized by its massive election defeat the previous year by the Liberals under their new leader, Pierre Elliot Trudeau whose appeal to moderate left-of-centre voters was still strong. Consequently, the NDP was looking for something to recapture the attention of the young in particular, who were increasingly adopting more radical values and ideas. As well, with American involvement in Vietnam showing no sign of ending and students rioting in Europe, this created an atmosphere in which the adoption of radical positions would hardly surprise. Thus, a reevaluation of NDP foreign policy was almost expected and could be very propitious for the party.³³⁴

³³³ Desmond Morton, The New Democrats, 1961-1986 (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1986), p.91.

³³⁴ John Bullen, "The Ontario Waffle and the Struggle for an Independent Socialist Canada: Conflict within the NDP," in Canadian Historical Review, Vol.14 (June, 1983), p.196.

However, in practical political terms, the main reason for the Waffle Manifesto's appeal to left-wing idealists was its successful integration of three themes: Canadian independence, socialism and anti-Americanism. As the Manifesto stated,

Our aim...is to build an independent socialist Canada.... The American empire is the central reality for Canadians. It is an empire characterized by militarism abroad and racism at home. Canadian resources and diplomacy have been enlisted in the support of that empire.... The American empire is held together through world-wide military alliances and by giant corporations. Canada's membership in the American alliance system and the ownership of the Canadian economy by American corporations precluded Canada's playing an independent role in the world. These bonds must be cut if corporate capitalism and the social priorities it created is to be effectively challenged.³³⁵

Here was summarized the left-wing idealist case against the United States and for an independent Canadian domestic and foreign policy.

The document sparked a vigorous debate between idealists and realists at the convention. While ultimately rejected by a majority of delegates, the Waffle Manifesto's influence was such that it compelled the realists to hastily put together their own "manifesto" which pushed the NDP further down the pro-independence/nationalist path than it had ever gone before.

Not surprisingly, in any debate devoted to this theme, the issue of anti-Americanism emerged as a major source of contention. Indeed, realists saw evidence of what the chairman of the CLC, Dennis Mcdermott, called "blighted anti-Americanism" (as well as isolationism) everywhere in the Waffle paper. Broadbent was especially upset that the Manifesto had linked what he believed were extraneous

³³⁵ "The Waffle Resolution 133," in Gordon to Watkins to You: Documentary: The Battle for Control of Our Economy, ed. by Dave Godfrey with Mel Watkins (Toronto: New Press, 1970), pp.103-4.

matters such as American racism and militarism with the issue of Canadian independence. In a similar vein, Allen Blakeney, leader of the Saskatchewan NDP, stated, "[The Waffle statement] seems to say to me that the reason why we want independence is because we don't like United States domestic and foreign policy." Charles Taylor focused his criticism on the spirit of the Manifesto, which, in his view, blamed American civilization for everything that was wrong in the world.³³⁶ Even before the convention opened, David Lewis had made his unhappiness with the anti-Americanism tone of the Waffle document known. Particularly, he had scorned the references to "American imperialism" and castigated the Waffle for allegedly ignoring the threat of Soviet expansionism.³³⁷

The idealists tried to deflect the anti-American charges in several ways. For his part, Watkins maintained that "to call such a clear statement of socialist principles anti-American...is to profoundly miss our point. A growing number of Americans reject American militarism and the exploitation of the Third World by its multi-national corporations." The key fact, in Watkin's view, was that while continentalism and capitalism had gone together in the past, "independence and socialism must go together in the future."³³⁸ For his part, Gerald Caplan argued that American imperialism in the underdeveloped nations was a legitimate reason for being anti-

³³⁶ "Debate on the Resolutions: 'For a United and Independent Canada' (C-17) and 'For an Independent Socialist Canada,' (R-133)," NDP Federal Convention, Winnipeg, October 30, 1969, NAC, MG 32, C28, Vol.109, File 1-14-1969, pp.6,8,10,18. Abraham Rotstein made the same arguments in an article written just before the convention. See Abraham Rotstein, "The Search for Independence," Canadian Forum, Vol.48 (October, 1969), p.147.

³³⁷ David Lewis, The New Democrat Vol.5 (Sept.-Oct., 1969), p.7.

³³⁸ Ibid., p.5.

American.³³⁹ Laurier Lapierre, while denying he was anti-American, stressed that Canada must do whatever was necessary to break the outside forces that dominated the country and these just happened to be American.³⁴⁰

The final assessment of whether socialism or nationalism predominated in the Waffle must wait until the rest of its history is told in a later chapter. However, in the view of Dan Heap who signed the Waffle Manifesto and was a delegate to the 1969 convention, socialism was largely submerged under the tide of nationalism. As Heap put it, "One point of agreement between the NDP in the late Sixties and early Seventies and Stalin was the insistence on socialism in one country."³⁴¹

This chapter has documented how the rise of Canadian nationalism affected the debate between NDP idealists and realists on socialism, Canadian independence and anti-Americanism.

³³⁹ Ibid., p.13.

³⁴⁰ Ibid., p.6.

³⁴¹ Dan Heap interview, June 15, 1993.

CHAPTER SIX

THE NDP'S RESPONSE TO CALLS FOR AN INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY: CHINA, LATIN AMERICA, RHODESIA AND QUIET DIPLOMACY (1965-9)

The major question still to be answered about the 1965 to 1969 period is what effect did the explosion of nationalism and the pro-independence movement in the NDP have on specific NDP foreign and defence policies? Two chapters will explore this theme with reference to the major events and developments on the global scene in those years guided by two questions. First, to what extent did the NDP develop an independent foreign policy stance in each case? Second, what debate, if any, occurred within the party?

Whether and when to recognize Red China was one of those matters that kept inserting itself into Canadian foreign policy deliberations, especially during the yearly United Nations debate concerning who should occupy China's seat at the UN, the Peking Communists or the Taipei Nationalists. According to Lester Pearson, Secretary of External Affairs at the time, Canada had been on the verge of recognizing communist China in 1950 following the lead of Great Britain, but was stymied by the outbreak of the Korean War.³⁴² Canada had been reluctant to offend the Americans

³⁴² J.L. Granatstein, "External Affairs and Defence," Canadian Annual Review, ed.

who saw behind the North Korean attack on South Korea the expansionist hand of Chinese (and Russian) communism.

Despite this, the CCF had consistently advocated Canadian recognition of Peking and its admission to the United Nations on the rational grounds that to exclude the defacto government of the world's most populous nation from the councils of the nations was dangerous to world peace and stability. By bringing China into the mainstream of the world community, China would be subject to global opinion and pressure on such key issues as disarmament.³⁴³

At its founding convention, the NDP picked up the cause and led the fight for Chinese recognition and for acceptance in the UN which culminated successfully in 1970 with the exchange of ambassadors between Peking and Ottawa and the following year with communist China's admission to the United Nations. Examination of the record throughout the 1960s indicates that NDP spokespersons consistently raised the matter in the House and on the campaign trail. For example in 1962, they argued that China's recent invasion of India demonstrated forcefully the necessity of having communist China in the UN where world opinion could perhaps deter such actions.³⁴⁴ For radical idealists like Herridge, there was no doubt that Canada's China policy in the Sixties was predicated on fear of offending the United States. "It is about

by John Saywell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), p.272. This is also confirmed by Escott Reid in Radical Mandarin: The Memoirs of Escott Reid (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), p.367.

³⁴³ H.W. Herridge, "CBC Speech," Mar.20, 1959, NAC, MG 32, C13, Vol.33.

³⁴⁴ For example, see Debates, Oct.25, 1962, p.917. Also see untitled memo written by Evelyn Gigantes, NAC, MG 32, Vol.34.

time we showed some courage instead of being a mere satellite to American policy."³⁴⁵

For other left wing idealists in the party however, the official NDP statements in the House on this issue were not strong enough. Cy Gonick interpreted a speech in Parliament by Paul Martin to mean that Canada would recognize China only after it had been admitted into the United Nations, because such recognition would then no longer be "an embarrassment to our friends". Gonick was shocked that NDP spokesmen had failed to display any outrage at such an "illogical policy". "Why are you silent when the field of 'undue American influence' extends to foreign policy?"³⁴⁶ In defence of the NDP, it should be noted that the party's External Affairs critic, Andrew Brewin, had responded to Martin's statement that very day in Parliament calling on the minister to recognize the People's Republic of China in order to help promote a world community.³⁴⁷ Evidently, Gonick considered this response too mild; the fundamental issue, in the left wing view, was not China but American influence over Canada's foreign policy and that demanded a much stronger statement. The recognition of Red China was thus interconnected with the broader theme of developing an independent foreign policy.

The question of what to do about China received new urgency when the People's Republic exploded its first Atomic bomb on November 19, 1964. To Andrew Brewin it was clear that Canada must move ahead of its neighbour and most of its other allies in recognizing communist China immediately. (In this he was supported by

³⁴⁵ H.W. Herridge to Nicholas Podovinnikoff, Secretary of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, Vancouver, Dec. 1, 1964, NAC, MG 32, C13, Vol.34.

³⁴⁶ Cy Gonick, "Editorial," Canadian Dimension, Vol.2 (July-Aug., 1964), p.3.

³⁴⁷ Debates, May 22, 1964, pp. 3501-2.

at least one Progressive Conservative, Eldon Woolliams.)³⁴⁸ Brewin then proceeded to give his listeners a history lesson concerning Western, and especially American exploitation of China. At the climax of his speech, Brewin grew even bolder when he proclaimed,

it would be an act of friendship to the United States for Canada to make it absolutely clear that this policy of attempting to exclude from the UN the People's Republic of China is dangerous to the interests of the United States and is based upon a total misapprehension of conditions in the world.³⁴⁹

Three significant things stood out in Brewin's speech. First, he assumed that his social democratic internationalist "reading" of world conditions was superior to that of the American State Department. Second, he very much wanted his explicit criticism of the United States position to be interpreted ultimately as an act of friendship and in the best interests of that country. Third, Brewin and the NDP caucus in general, saw their role as essentially that of teacher. They believed, as social democratic internationalists, they had a special call to educate other members of Parliament and the public by providing a perspective which would otherwise be lacking. This was probably more than simple moral posturing. NDP members of Parliament, even many of their political enemies would probably have acknowledged, were usually better informed on external affairs and took world issues more seriously than most MP's from other parties.

³⁴⁸ Debates, 1964, p.10269. Apparently, the Liberal government seriously considered recognition in 1964 but feared American economic reprisals. See Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, John English, Canada Since 1945: Power, Politics, and Provincialism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), pp.274-5.

³⁴⁹ Ibid., p.10266.

Part of the reason for this was the party's membership in the Socialist International (SI), even though ties were still somewhat tenuous through much of the Sixties despite the fact that key NDP officials had for some time wanted to improve them. As early as Feb. 23, 1959, the then National Secretary of the CCF, Carl Hamilton, had written SI headquarters in London asking its secretary, Albert Carthy, to inform the Canadian party whenever any leading European socialists were planning to visit Canada for any reason so the CCF could organize a public meeting to hear them.³⁵⁰

Indeed, the CCF/NDP was already benefitting from its association with the worldwide socialist movement. For example, on February 20, 1959, the secretary of the Socialist International in Latin America, Humberto Maiztegeu, wrote Hamilton providing him with the name of a key person in Latin America who could supply information to the NDP about a possible sale of aircraft by the Canadian government to Trujillo, the dictator of the Dominican Republic.³⁵¹ In addition, the SI regularly sent a publication, Socialist International Information, to its members as well as periodic press releases and special reports which contained much valuable background information on contemporary events transpiring anywhere in the world. The growing cooperation between social democratic/socialist parties around the globe was documented by Albert Carthy in an article written for the August, 1964 edition of the above journal entitled, "The Socialist International Today."³⁵²

³⁵⁰ Carl Hamilton to Albert Carthy, Feb.23, 1959, NAC, MG 28, 1V1, Vol.485, File SI Corr. 1955-70.

³⁵¹ Humberto, Maiztegui to Carl Hamilton, Feb. 20, 1959, NAC, MG 28, 1V1, Vol.485, File SI Corr, 1955-70.

³⁵² Albert Carthy, "The Socialist International Today," Socialist International Information, Vol.14 (Aug.29, 1964), NAC. MG 28, 1V1, Vol.483, File July-Aug., 1964, pp.23-6.

Contacts between the SI and the NDP expanded in the mid-Sixties especially as a result of the attendance by five Canadian delegates at the 10th Congress of the SI at Stockholm in 1966 including Terry Grier, national party secretary. Upon their return, they submitted a glowing report to the NDP Federal Council and MPs in which they strongly recommended increased party involvement with the Socialist International at all levels. In addition, Grier noted with pride that NDP policies on Vietnam, China, disarmament, and foreign aid were just as progressive as those of other socialist parties. He believed, therefore, that the NDP could play an important leadership role in the coming years in the SI. Another benefit of membership, in Grier's opinion, was that it "affords Canadians a perspective and an insight into international affairs which we could not otherwise obtain, and which it is essential for our leadership to have".³⁵³ Other political parties in Canada did not have access to such a highly organized and motivated world-wide network.³⁵⁴

In addition, the NDP had other sources of information about world affairs. Herridge, Brewin and Douglas, in particular, were the recipients of a never-ending stream of letters from people living in foreign countries as well as informational packets from organizations involved with world issues. For example, Herridge conveyed of material to the NDP caucus from James and Mary Endicott who regularly sent him their "Canadian Far Eastern Newsletter" in which they continually pressed for recognition of communist China.³⁵⁵ Moreover, letters from such organizations as

³⁵³ Terence W. Grier, "Report to Federal Council Members and MPs," May 20, 1966, NAC, MG 28, 1VI, Vol.487, File 1961-69.

³⁵⁴ A Liberal International existed but its organization was weak and the Liberal party of Canada was not even an official member.

³⁵⁵ For instance see James and Margaret Endicott, "Far Eastern Newsletter," Nov.8, 1962, NAC, MG 32, C13, Vol.33.

Amnesty International, Fair Play for Cuba, the United Church, Canadian Aid for Vietnam Civilians, the Voice of Women, the World Federalists and the United Nations Association in Canada, reoccur throughout the collected papers of these prominent NDP foreign policy spokesmen revealing the vast network of sources which provided them with background material on world affairs from a left-of-centre perspective. On one occasion in answer to a question in the House, Paul Martin submitted a long list of all Canadian organizations that had recently lobbied the government to change its China policy along the lines advocated by the NDP. Prominent on this list were many of the organizations mentioned above.³⁵⁶

So convinced was the party leadership of the correctness of its China policy and that events in general, along with public opinion, were slowly but surely moving in its direction on this matter, that the official party resolutions committee sponsored a detailed resolution on China at the 1965 convention.³⁵⁷ It called on the Canadian government "to lend every effort to achieve a basic reappraisal and re-fashioning of the policies of the Western nations and particularly of the United States of America in regard to the People's Republic of China."³⁵⁸

In keeping with social democratic internationalism's long term objectives, the resolution wanted to remove China as the "wild card" on the world scene and subject her to the constraints of international law under the auspices of the United Nations. As a growing industrial power, China also needed to be included in international

³⁵⁶ Debates, Nov.30, 1966, p.10548.

³⁵⁷ Newspapers and journal reports of the convention all noted this optimistic feeling. See for example, Canadian Dimension, "The New Democratic Party Convention," Vol.1 (Sept.-Oct., 1965), p.22.

³⁵⁸ Anne Scotton, ed., "China," New Democratic Policies 1961-1976 (Ottawa: New Democratic Party, 1976), p.97.

economic and trade agreements. Part of the motivation, of course, as Douglas acknowledged in a speech, was to increase trade between Canada and China.³⁵⁹ For this to occur, China's isolation must end and integration into the world community proceed forthwith. (Such motivation also underlay an accompanying resolution which asked the federal government to urge China to participate in Expo 67.³⁶⁰)

Accordingly, the main resolution on China emphasized that much more than diplomatic recognition and membership in the United Nations was involved. Canada's China policy must also include the pursuit of intellectual and cultural contacts between China and the West, the offer of economic cooperation and an invitation for China to join with the other four nuclear powers in working towards disarmament and treaties banning all nuclear tests and proliferation. Further, the resolution chastised the Canadian government for its "cowardly yielding to external pressure in failing to take those steps open to it to end the diplomatic isolation of China".³⁶¹ As will be apparent in the Vietnam and Dominican Republic resolutions to be analyzed later on, the tone of all these 1965 foreign policy resolutions was quite bold and reflected not only the NDP's optimistic predictions for the next election, but also the beginnings of a nationalist mood amongst ordinary Canadians. In effect, the NDP was saying that Canada need not be afraid to "thumb its nose" at the Americans when the occasion warranted it.

By late 1966, an apparent transformation in official Canadian policy towards China prompted the NDP to urge the government to clarify its position. On November 30, 1966, T.C. Douglas attempted to embarrass Martin into publicly announcing such

³⁵⁹ Debates, May 25, 1965, p.1605.

³⁶⁰ Scotton, "Expo '67," p.97.

³⁶¹ Scotton "China," p.97.

a change. The NDP leader referred to CBC correspondent, Tom Gould's report that a highly placed government official had leaked the news that Canada would recognize China within two months. Cagney as always and ever mindful of United States reaction, the External Affairs minister demurred, but over the next two years Canadian policy gradually shifted from support of Taiwan to Peking. The journalist, Charles Lynch, noted that in so doing, the government had finally caught up with the New Democratic Party.³⁶²

The cause was aided by speeches, articles and private lobbying behind the scenes with the Prime Minister by long time diplomat, and advocate of internationalism, Escott Reid, who as an NDP supporter wrote secret memos for the party on this and other foreign policy matters. Reid pressed for a policy on China that broke free of adherence to the straitjacket of American thinking and was far reaching in scope. After recognition, Canada ought to send its best young foreign service officers to Peking as a "forcing ground for talent on China which could serve the interests of the Western world". The government should also aid in the establishment of a first-rate institute for the study of contemporary China.³⁶³

Without really needing to, the NDP passed another resolution at the 1967 convention reiterating its support for communist China's admission into the United Nations. The purpose may have been to remind the public that, with the other parties adopting the NDP's long standing position, it was the NDP that should get the recognition. Thus, when after 18 months of negotiations, the Trudeau government finally exchanged ambassadors with the People's Republic of China on October 13,

³⁶² Thomas Hockin, "External Affairs and Defence," Canadian Annual Review, ed. by John Saywell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966), p.207.

³⁶³ Reid, Radical Mandarin, p.369.

1970, Douglas legitimately took some of the credit and rejoiced in the culmination of two decades of sustained effort by the CCF/NDP. His words in the Commons that day were therefore most appropriate, "Mr. Speaker, the members of this party have long urged the recognition of the People's Republic of China by the government of Canada".³⁶⁴

There had never been any debate within the NDP on this issue. Idealism and realism found common cause because both factions were committed to a world in which all the "players" were invited and involved. A number of liberal internationalists in other parties had also wanted to grant communist China recognition much earlier, but felt constrained by the strong anti-communist pro-nationalist China stance of much of their political constituency. Within the CCF/NDP, social democratic internationalism's single-minded vision of a united world overcame such sentiments and provided the energy to keep working for recognition of communist China for two decades despite the charge of being soft on communism these efforts often provoked. A side effect of the NDP crusade on this question was increased anti-American feeling in the party and beyond based on Washington's obstinate and quite irrational stand on the issue.³⁶⁵ (The Americans had diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union which was an even greater communist military threat to the United States than China.) These anti-American feelings, in turn, spurred the search in Canadian social democratic circles for an independent foreign policy.

³⁶⁴ Debates, Oct.13, 1970.

³⁶⁵ For a fine discussion of Canadian anti-Americanism and its relationship to the China issue see, Stephen Clarkson and Abraham Rotstein, "China Teach-in: The Ivory Microphone," Canadian Forum, Vol.46 (November, 1966), pp.176-8 and Melville H. Watkins, "The Discovery of America," Canadian Forum, Vol.46 (November, 1966), pp.178-9.

Events in the Dominican Republic in early 1965 gave added impetus to these sentiments and left a strong mark on the Canadian social democratic psyche. The landing of American marines in the Caribbean nation on April 28, ostensibly to protect American lives, but also with the clear motive of establishing a non-communist government friendly to the United States, dramatically reinforced NDP suspicions and fears of American foreign policy. It reminded them that despite the Alliance for Progress and the promise of a new era in United States-Latin American relations, gunboat diplomacy was alive and well.

The NDP reaction was cautious at first. On May 4th, it asked the Canadian government to request Washington to ensure that a dictatorship not be imposed on the Dominican Republic again.³⁶⁶ A week later, Douglas was still trying to be evenhanded when he expressed concern about possible communist involvement with one of the groups attempting to reestablish democracy.³⁶⁷ Gradually, as American support for the military junta became more obvious, NDP condemnation of the United States became more explicit. On May 18, 1965, Herridge inquired sarcastically whether Martin could give the House any information with respect to press reports that the United States government was now finally seeing the light and switching its support from the dictatorship to the Dominican Republic democratic forces. This was apparently too much for Martin; he blasted Herridge for persisting in showing such an unfriendly attitude to "our neighbour, the United States".³⁶⁸

³⁶⁶ Debates, May 4, 1965, p.887.

³⁶⁷ Ibid., p.1165.

³⁶⁸ Debates, May 18, 1965. See also F.H. Soward, "External Affairs and Defence," Canadian Annual Review, ed. by John Saywell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), p.241.

This did not silence Herridge who on May 20th used the word, "invasion," for the first time to describe Washington's actions while baiting Martin once more with the question, "Should we assume from the Minister's answer that the Government, at this time, has no criticism to offer of the invasion of the Dominican Republic by United States authorities?" The External Affairs minister's reply was vintage Paul Martin, the master of obfuscation. "My honourable friend would be incorrect in concluding that Canada was taking any action that would lead to the exacerbation of the situation."³⁶⁹ Such statements served only to confirm in NDP minds that the Liberal government was incapable of formulating an independent foreign policy concerning anything that had to do with the United States.

On May 28, Douglas stepped up the attack by denouncing the newly-proclaimed Johnson doctrine, which he interpreted as claiming that Washington had the right to intervene unilaterally whenever a country had a government whose ideology was unacceptable to the Americans. Moreover, the so-called, "peacekeeping force," ostensibly authorized by the Organization of American States, but in reality a United States occupation force, should only have gone to the Dominican Republic, if at all, after approval of the United Nations had been granted. The underlying motive, in the NDP leader's view, for the American action was the imposition of a "new form of colonialism masquerading as an anti-communist crusade." The Americans were afraid that "these countries will have governments that will want to exercise their right to manage their own economic affairs".³⁷⁰

In the same speech, Douglas found it necessary, as Brewin had done on the issue of recognition of Communist China, to establish his anti-communist credentials

³⁶⁹ Debates, May 10, 1965, p.1409.

³⁷⁰ Ibid., May 28, 1965, p.1795.

and admiration for many things American. He even went back to his speeches in the mid-1940s in which he had condemned the Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences for supposedly handing Eastern Europe to the communists.

The most striking aspect of this speech, however, was Douglas's unequivocal assertion that morality must be paramount in deciding foreign policy. "It is not important whose side you are on, but it is important that you are on the right side and that you support what is morally right."³⁷¹ Even if a stance was unpopular and contrary to government propaganda, living with one's conscience was more important than popularity. Here was Douglas, the Baptist preacher and inheritor of the Woodsworth social gospel legacy at his finest. Many of his fellow MPs in all parties were moved by this speech. For example, Progressive Conservative, Terry Nugent stated that he was very impressed, especially with Douglas's call for Canada to take an independent stand.³⁷² The strong position taken by Douglas and the NDP in the House was reflected in a resolution passed by the 1965 party convention condemning the American military action in the Dominican Republic as a violation of UN principles and contrary to the basic precepts of international law.³⁷³

The way Washington manipulated and cajoled the OAS into supporting continued American intervention in the entire Caribbean region only reinforced NDP opposition to Canadian membership in that organization. America's stepped up actions in isolating Cuba through economic sanctions and its attempts to pressure Canada to stop Canadian citizens from trading with Cuba also added to these feelings. Such efforts to impose extraterritoriality angered Canadian nationalists of all stripes and

³⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p.1796.

³⁷² *Ibid.*, pp.1806-7.

³⁷³ Scotton, "Dominican Republic," p.97.

fuelled the anti-Americanism of the left. Thus, Herridge found it easy to condemn Washington's Cuban sanctions policy as "the latest expression of United States economic imperialism".³⁷⁴ The Cuban issue reemerged in the spring of 1967 when an American based anti-Castro organization bombed the Cuban embassy in Ottawa. Douglas insisted that the United States administration curb the foreign terrorist activities of this outfit.³⁷⁵ (Yet, not then or since has the NDP gone so far as to endorse unequivocally the revolutionary path Cuba has taken.)

This new aggressiveness in NDP foreign policy towards the United States in the House of Commons and at the 1965 convention (to some extent) was noted by left wing party members who were often critical of party foreign policy. Cy Gonick wrote that, along with a more radical analysis of capitalist society, the NDP resolutions on Vietnam and the Dominican Republic showed it recognized that it was the United States which now constituted the greatest danger to world peace.³⁷⁶

The new found radicalism (if that was what it was) of the party leadership did not extend, however, to reopening certain key matters to discussion at the convention as idealists wanted. Gonick reported that many delegates were upset that controversial issues like NATO and even membership in the OAS were kept off the convention floor despite the submission of numerous resolutions on these questions by grassroots riding organizations.³⁷⁷ Conflict on these and other matters had also surfaced at the NDP Youth Convention held just before the main convention. The established leadership had

³⁷⁴ Debates, July 27, 1964, p.5996.

³⁷⁵ Ibid., Mar.14, 1967, p.13961.

³⁷⁶ Cy Gonick, "The New Democratic Party Convention," Canadian Dimension, Vol.2, (Sept.-Oct., 1965), p.22.

³⁷⁷ Ibid., p.23.

narrowly defeated the Left Caucus's draft program which included withdrawal from NATO.³⁷⁸

Despite such conflicts, all NDPers continued to be loosely united around the theme of an independent Canadian foreign policy, although disagreement would continue on specifics. By the 1967 convention, party leaders felt comfortable enough with the concept to integrate the term, "an independent foreign policy" into relevant policy resolutions. Hence, while rejecting OAS membership, the NDP asked Canada to take its responsibility towards Latin American countries seriously. Canada, the NDP believed, was in a very good position to show leadership to them as far as independence in international affairs was concerned. Of particular interest in this resolution was the sentence, "It would be a natural corollary to NDP philosophy for Canada's independence in economic matters."³⁷⁹ Clearly, by this time, economic nationalism (at least in some form) and an independent foreign policy were wedded in the minds of Canadian social democrats including the leadership of the NDP.

The desire for a more independent foreign policy was particularly evident at the 1967 convention with the passing of a resolution condemning "quiet diplomacy". This phrase had enjoyed considerable notoriety in Canadian foreign policy circles since the release of the Merchant-Heeney report in 1965. The authors, one each from the United States and Canada, had strongly recommended that differences between the two countries continue to be resolved behind the scenes through regular diplomatic channels without public posturing or criticism of each other's domestic or foreign policies. Supporters of quiet diplomacy maintained that this would allow Canada to

³⁷⁸ Stanley Gray, "The New Democratic Youth Convention," Canadian Dimension, Vol.2 (Sept.-Oct., 1965), p.23.

³⁷⁹ Scotton, "OAS," p.99.

exercise more effective influence on American attitudes and policies than if the Canadian government sought to distance itself publicly from United States policy whenever disagreements arose.³⁸⁰

Naturally such attitudes were anathema to Canadian nationalists strongly committed to an independent foreign policy. Canada, in their opinion, was already much too discreet in its public critique of American foreign policy. Except for Prime Minister Pearson's mild criticism of Washington's bombing of North Vietnam in his well-publicized speech on April 2, 1965, at Temple University in Philadelphia, the government, as epitomized by Paul Martin, had played the quiet diplomacy game to the hilt. Even before the release of the Merchant-Heeney report, Harold Winch had declared at the 1965 NDP convention that Canadians could and would not stifle their criticism of American foreign policy.³⁸¹ By the 1967 party conference, this feeling had grown to the point that the NDP was ready to denounce quiet diplomacy in no uncertain terms. "Quiet diplomacy has served only to convince the world's people that Canada lacks an independent foreign policy, and indeed labels Canada as an unqualified supporter of policies enunciated by the United States."³⁸²

What was most noteworthy about the resolution was its analysis of why quiet diplomacy had been a disaster for Canada. First, it had detracted from Canada's effectiveness as a mediator. Second, quiet diplomacy undermined the United Nations as an effective instrument for promoting the rule of law since a member (in this case,

³⁸⁰ A.D.P. Heeney, "Dealing With Uncle Sam", in Canada's Role as a Middle Power, ed. by King Gordon (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1966), pp.87-100.

³⁸¹ F.H. Soward, "External Affairs and Defence," Canadian Annual Review, ed. by John Saywell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), p.261.

³⁸² Scotton, "Quiet Diplomacy," p.99.

Canada) was inhibited by American domination of its foreign policy from both stating and marshalling support for its position on world issues. The resolution drew its inspiration from two complementary idealist visions of Canada, one domestic, the other international. "We are convinced," Douglas triumphantly asserted in his keynote address to the convention, "that we can build in this country a social democracy that will be vastly superior to the Great Society of our neighbour to the south."³⁸³ Second, there was the social democratic dream of Canada as a totally independent actor on the world scene mediating disputes and building world community. Here were unmistakable signs that social democratic idealism was moving towards ascendancy in the NDP, a movement which would climax at the 1969 convention.

This was aided by the wholesale adoption of the nationalist/pro-independence foreign policy stance by many of the new generation of scholars emerging onto the academic scene in the late Sixties as well as by the conversion of some older ones, such as James Eayrs and to a lesser extent John Holmes, to the cause.³⁸⁴ Eayrs, one of Canada's leading foreign and defence policy scholars, in an address to New York University on May 1, 1967, made his new views clear when he denounced quiet diplomacy and its practitioners in Canada's Department of External Affairs as well as Prime Minister Pearson. It was time, Eayrs was convinced, for Canada to make some "noise" in its relationship with the United States so that Canadian complaints and suggestions would no longer be ignored in Washington.³⁸⁵

³⁸³ Douglas, "Text of Keynote Address to the Federal Convention, Toronto, July 3, 1967," NAC, MG28, IVI, Vol.395, pp.17-18.

³⁸⁴ See for example, John W. Holmes, "Interdependence: Political Aspects," Canadian Forum, Vol.48 (February, 1969), pp.245-6.

³⁸⁵ James Eayrs, "In Defence of a Border," Canadian Forum, Vol.47 (June, 1967), pp.55-9.

In 1968, a major work edited by Stephen Clarkson, political science professor at the University of Toronto, entitled, An Independent Foreign Policy? was published. It contained twenty essays by up and coming academics most of which were written from a centre-left perspective.³⁸⁶ A substantial majority of the authors agreed with Clarkson's conclusion that not only was an independent Canadian foreign policy desirable, it was imperative. Clarkson contrasted that approach with the quiet diplomacy that had characterized Canadian foreign policy for the previous five years.³⁸⁷ True partnership, he argued, required equality and equality implied independence. He assumed that Canada had a comparatively strong bargaining position in dealing with the United States if only it mustered the will. He even insisted that rejection of quiet diplomacy was the ethically superior choice. Moreover, it would promote a sense of responsibility in Canadians. Just as a youth could only mature by liberating him or herself from parental control, "the nation state can only achieve full expression if it is master in its own house, able to act in the community of nations as a fully responsible entity."³⁸⁸ All of this was music to the ears of social democratic idealists.

NDP advocates of a more independent foreign policy also found in the Commonwealth an institution which could be used to strengthen their position, a development not without irony. As long time critics of colonialism and imperialism, the CCF/NDP now found itself enthusiastically supporting the very institution that had emerged out of the ashes of the British Empire and still carried part of its legacy. As

³⁸⁶ Stephen Clarkson, ed., An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada? (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1968).

³⁸⁷ Stephen Clarkson, "The Choice to be Made," in An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada?, pp.254-264.

³⁸⁸ Ibid., pp.263-4.

noted in Chapter One, the NDP, in its founding foreign policy manifesto, had singled out the Commonwealth and the United Nations as international organizations particularly worthy of praise and support. Of course, as T.C. Douglas asserted in the House on July 17, 1964, the UN must always take precedence, since it was the most inclusive international organization.³⁸⁹

The NDP commitment to the Commonwealth was periodically reaffirmed. Douglas, in a speech to Parliament on June 14, 1965, praised the Commonwealth for being a voluntary association of free nations that enabled peoples of many tongues and races to meet together with a common loyalty to democratic objectives. Therefore, Canada should consider concentrating its external aid efforts on Commonwealth countries within the Western hemisphere.³⁹⁰ Douglas was prepared to ignore the obvious fact that in some of these countries, democracy as understood in the West at least, was weak or virtually non-existent.

One possible reason for his rather extravagant praise of the Commonwealth was that it could provide a counterbalance to American and NATO influence on Canadian foreign policy. John W. Holmes, stated as much in an article he wrote in the mid-Sixties.³⁹¹ Of course, support for the Commonwealth was widespread among the general public and all political parties except the Creditistes. It was the NDP, however, that exploited the Commonwealth connection most effectively. The Commonwealth provided another tool with which to build an independent Canadian foreign policy. For example, on June 29, 1965, the NDP leader praised the Commonwealth decision to

³⁸⁹ Debates, July 17, 1964. p.5614.

³⁹⁰ Debates, June 14, 1965, p.2316.

³⁹¹ John W. Holmes, "Is There a Future For Middlepowership?" in Canada's Role as a Middle Power, ed. by King Gordon (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1966), p.26.

send a delegation to Vietnam armed with specific peace proposals including a call for the suspension of American bombing of North Vietnam. Subsequently, Douglas skilfully used the Commonwealth initiative to pressure the Liberal government to distance itself more from Washington's Vietnam policy.³⁹²

David Lewis also acknowledged that he and his party had grown in their appreciation of the Commonwealth to the point they wished to see it strengthened. Its handling of the Rhodesian crisis, which had threatened to split the organization, showed it had now become a force for international dialogue and a model of effective action to promote peaceful change. Lewis added, however, that if economic sanctions failed to bring down the illegal White government of Ian Smith, Britain must take the necessary policing steps to enforce its authority in Rhodesia.³⁹³

What particularly pleased the NDP was that the United Nations had called upon its members to support Britain in its sanctions campaign against Rhodesia. Douglas used this fact to defend the Canadian government from attacks by those in the Progressive Conservative party who thought Canada had been too hasty in supporting sanctions.

It is astonishing that the government of Canada should be accused of saying 'me too' to the United Kingdom and other countries when, indeed, it was following the request of the United Nations. If ever we are to have peace in the world, then surely it will have to come as a result of united action by the members of the United Nations in applying whatever economic sanctions are necessary in order to prevent an outbreak of war.³⁹⁴

³⁹² Debates, June 29, 1965, pp.2990-1.

³⁹³ Debates, Feb.4, 1966, pp.725-6.

³⁹⁴ Ibid., Feb.8, 1966, pp. 879-80.

In other words, anything that enhanced the prestige of the UN or strengthened its effective power to solve problems before they escalated into armed conflict had the NDP's automatic support.

The Rhodesian matter did create some discomfort for the NDP, given that the British government charged with resolving the crisis in the late Sixties was Harold Wilson's Labour administration, a fellow member of the Socialist International and one with which several NDP leaders had close ties. Throughout this period, as careful scrutiny of Hansard reveals, the NDP was reluctant to embarrass the British publicly on Rhodesia whether on the question of sanction effectiveness or the possible use of force to impose majority rule. This was in marked contrast to its open criticism of the Wilson government's tacit support of American foreign policy in Vietnam. Indeed, Douglas acknowledged these differences on several occasions in the face of scornful attacks by the other Canadian political parties. Douglas even admitted that Britain's Vietnam policy was closer to that of the Liberal government's than of the NDP's despite his concerted attempts to change Wilson's mind.³⁹⁵

Why did the NDP criticize Britain on Vietnam but not on Rhodesia when its sanctions policy failed to remove the Smith regime? The difference was that the NDP's Vietnam policy had become a vital ingredient in its quest for an independent foreign policy and could not be downplayed, even if it meant criticizing a social democratic government. In contrast, while the Rhodesian problem dragged on for many years without resolution, the Commonwealth, despite several close calls, did not disintegrate over the matter. As a result, the NDP, like the general public, largely lost interest in the late Sixties and any differences with Britain could be ignored. Interestingly, this changed dramatically in 1971 when the new British Conservative government

³⁹⁵ Ibid., p.881.

proposed a Rhodesian settlement without unequivocal provisions for Black Majority rule. The NDP immediately unleashed a vigorous response in Parliament which showed that partisanship also influenced how the foreign policy "card" was played from time to time.³⁹⁶

Its overriding concern for the Commonwealth (and the UN) also governed to a considerable extent the NDP's South African policy in the Sixties. Thus, while the party was on record since 1961 of opposing apartheid and favouring stronger sanctions, it did relatively little to keep the matter before the public except when events appeared to threaten the Commonwealth. For instance, on June 23, 1970, Andrew Brewin insisted that Canada tell the new British government of its opposition to any attempt to lift the South African arms embargo, "in the light of the recommendation of the UN...and the danger that such action might lead to the break-up of the Commonwealth."³⁹⁷

The New Democratic Party had begun the task of carving out an independent foreign policy in terms of the key foreign policy issues of the 1965 to 1969 period which both idealists and realists could largely support. This had been relatively easy to do on such matters as China, the Dominican Republic, quiet diplomacy and the Commonwealth. However, the Vietnam and NATO issues would prove to be much more difficult challenges.

³⁹⁶ ibid., Dec.1, 1971, pp.18043-4.

³⁹⁷ ibid., June 23, 1970, pp.1942.

CHAPTER SEVEN

VICTORIES FOR NDP IDEALISM: VIETNAM AND NATO - (1965-9)

Without doubt, the major event occurring on the world scene from the mid-Sixties to the early Seventies was the Vietnam War.³⁹⁸ What gave the Vietnam issue special significance in NDP circles was the fact that it became entangled with two other topics of great importance to Canadian social democrats, namely, economic nationalism and an independent Canadian foreign policy.

The first time the NDP raised concerns in Parliament about the United States's Vietnam policy was on March 8, 1962, when Erhard Regier from Burnaby, BC, urged that the Canadian government appeal to Washington to abide by the terms of the 1954 Geneva Accords and remove any appearance even of preventing their implementation. Regier's criticism was mild and his tone apologetic, almost self deprecating.

³⁹⁸ For some background on the effect the Vietnam war had on USA-Canada relations, see Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, and John English, Canada Since 1945: Power, Politics, and Provincialism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), pp.276-83. For a more left-wing examination of the theme, see Victor Levant, Quiet Complicity: Canadian Involvement in the Vietnam War (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1986).

I would hope that whereas we always welcome any advice that our good friend, neighbour and ally the United States decides it may wish to give us, it may also be receptive to a bit of advice, on occasion at least."³⁹⁹

For example, it was clear to him that communism could only be defeated by promoting positive social change. Hence, American support for a guerrilla war against the Viet Cong would be futile. Regier hastened to add, however, that he agreed with those who identified the communists as the root cause of the trouble in South East Asia.⁴⁰⁰ By 1964, the NDP was expressing increased concern about the unilateral actions taken by the Americans in Vietnam without UN approval as though it were the world's policeman.⁴⁰¹

When Vietnam rose to new prominence as a foreign policy issue in Parliament after the United States began bombing North Vietnam and landing marines in the South in early 1965, the NDP became even more concerned, as the tone and content of speeches by party spokespersons revealed. However, differences within the party on Vietnam had already begun to surface as early as 1964. Left wing idealists publicly chastised most of the NDP caucus for not taking the initiative and exposing Paul Martin's allegedly "misinformed and equally non-sensical statements about the war in South Vietnam".⁴⁰² Here were the first signs of a strategy that would be increasingly

³⁹⁹ Debates, Mar.8, 1962, p.1600.

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid., pp. 1600-2.

⁴⁰¹ Debates, June 26, 1964, pp.4751-2.

⁴⁰² Cy Gonick, Canadian Dimension, Vol.1 (July-Aug., 1964), pp.3-4.

employed by the anti-realists in the NDP, namely, the linking of Canada's policy on Vietnam with the broader theme of an independent foreign policy.

As Tommy Douglas's most recent biographers have demonstrated, Douglas found himself consistently taking a stronger anti-Vietnam war position than most members of the NDP leadership, which, on this issue at least, placed him closer to the left wing idealist position than to the realists, who were generally less willing to criticize the Americans and were more willing to interpret the communist challenge as a more serious threat.⁴⁰³ Consequently, when Gonick criticized the NDP's Vietnam policy in Dimension, Douglas was ready with a response in the next edition.

You can be sure that we will do everything in our power in the months ahead to develop an independent Canadian policy toward Southeast Asia, which will be distinct from the sabre-rattling policy of the United States.⁴⁰⁴

(In his major work on Canadian involvement in Vietnam, Douglas A. Ross fails to note the differences within the NDP on Vietnam and assumes they were united on the issue.⁴⁰⁵)

The whole Vietnam business was a most delicate matter for the NDP because the realists in the party, represented most particularly by the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC), saw the blatant anti-Americanism of the radical idealists both as a political albatross and an ideological error. The party could easily have fractured over

⁴⁰³ H. McLeod and Ian McLeod, Tommy Douglas: The Road to Jerusalem (Edmonton: Hurtig Pub., 1987), p.253.

⁴⁰⁴ T.C. Douglas to the editor, Canadian Dimension, Vol.1 (Sept.-Oct., 1964), p.2.

⁴⁰⁵ Douglas A. Ross, In the Interests of Peace: Canada and Vietnam 1954-73 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), pp.315-23.

this question if not for Douglas's skill in mediating between the two factions when circumstances demanded it. Indeed, throughout these years, Douglas was seen as a hero by the idealists on the left. By such efforts as the conciliatory letter quoted above, he kept them in the party during his ten years as leader, while simultaneously retaining the support of the party's more right wing realists through his pro-NATO stance⁴⁰⁶

Douglas's job was not made easier by people like Herridge, who publicly expressed his deep suspicions of the "pernicious influence" of the CLC on NDP foreign policy. In a letter to the editor of Dimension in July, 1964, Herridge called attention to the silence of the CLC on Vietnam and Cuba, while it diligently promoted support for NATO and Norad. He had no doubts as to the source of this silence:

In my opinion, it is in the field of international affairs that United States trade unions have the most damaging influence upon the policies of the Canadian Labour Congress. AFL-CIO leaders in the United States follow the US State Department foreign policy line religiously. My reading with respect to their cooperation with the CIA almost makes me vomit with disgust.⁴⁰⁷

As usual, Herridge was most intemperate and only partly accurate. By 1966, the CLC had broken with the AFL-CIO position to some extent and this was duly noted and applauded by Gonick (although Herridge was not so forgiving.)⁴⁰⁸ Of course, by this time, condemnation of America's Vietnam policy was coming from many quarters and

⁴⁰⁶ Cy Gonick interview, June 22, 1992.

⁴⁰⁷ H.W. Herridge to editor, Canadian Dimension, Vol.1, July, 20, 1964.

⁴⁰⁸ Cy Gonick, "Editorial," Canadian Dimension, Vol.3 (Mar.-Apr., 1966). p.1.

the CLC must have felt it could modify its stance without a public outcry from union members.

In early 1965, Canada's political parties outlined their positions on the Vietnam war, positions that were to remain largely unchanged for several years and which in the case of the NDP, set it apart on the Canadian political scene, although never sharply enough for the radical idealists in the party.

The underlying theme of T.C. Douglas's early Vietnam speeches was that Canada must take an independent stance on the issue. In one of his first major addresses in the House on the subject, on February 17, 1965, the NDP leader chided the government for timidity in failing to criticize American policy and in refusing to use Canadian membership on the Indo-China International Control Commission (ICC) and in the UN to propose creative solutions.⁴⁰⁹ A few weeks later on March 4th, the NDP mounted an even more vigorous attack on Liberal government policy, demanding that it publicly dissociate itself from the American bombing of North Vietnam and the use of gas and napalm in the South. Herridge's summary of the government's position was acerbic:

Don't rock the US boat. Don't do anything to annoy our neighbour to the south. Don't take any initiative without their prior consent. Don't do anything about the idiotic, dangerous, and hopeless war in South Vietnam.⁴¹⁰

Whether NDP arguments swayed the Canadian government in any way is difficult to judge. According to Escott Reid, Pearson shared the NDP opinion that

⁴⁰⁹ F.H. Soward, "External Affairs and Defence," Canadian Annual Review, ed. by John Saywell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), p.216.

⁴¹⁰ Ibid., pp.223-4.

bombing North Vietnam was disastrous. In a private conversation with Reid in the spring of 1965, the Prime Minister had astutely observed, "The United States is doing itself great damage by the demonstration it is giving of the most powerful nation in the world laying waste a small Asian country."⁴¹¹ Reid also helped convince Pearson to follow through on his plan to publicly urge Washington to suspend the bombing in a speech to be given on April 2, 1965, at Temple University in Philadelphia. However, President Johnson's furious attack on the Canadian Prime Minister the next day at a private dinner served only to confirm Pearson's predilection for quieter diplomacy as offering the only chance of influencing American foreign policy.

On May 28, 1965, Douglas delivered the most comprehensive speech he had yet given on Vietnam as part of the debate on the estimates of the Canadian External Affairs Department. He began by underlining the importance of dealing with the issue even if the polls were correct in showing that the public was not interested in foreign affairs. He then proceeded to set the war in Vietnam in the context of the social and political revolutions occurring throughout the Third World. (In this speech, Douglas could rely on a well-researched anonymous background paper called, "Crisis in the Pacific". This provided careful analysis of the origins of the crisis and weaknesses and blind spots in the American understandings of the region's problems and general history.⁴¹²)

⁴¹¹ Escott Reid, Radical Mandarin: The Memoirs of Escott Reid (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), p.371.

⁴¹² Memo, "Crisis in the Pacific," undated, NAC, MG 1VI, Vol. 438, File 16. This may well have been written by the Canadian diplomat, Chester Ronning, who was a long-time supporter of the CCF/NDP and an acknowledged expert on Asian affairs. Ronning later wrote a book on China entitled, A Memoir of China in Revolution: From the Boxer Rebellion to the People's Republic (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974).

With the ending of the old imperialism, the Vietnamese people were demanding the right of self determination which had nothing to do with communism, in Douglas's view. However, new forms of colonialism were arising, especially in the form of puppet governments put in place by the great powers, most particularly now the United States. The American presence in Vietnam was illegal because it was not authorized by the United Nations. Ignoring the UN was, in the NDP leader's words, "the tragedy of this whole affair". He rejected the domino theory (the notion that if Vietnam fell to communism the rest of South East Asia would follow) because communism was no longer a monolithic structure.⁴¹³

Douglas's peace proposals included an immediate end to the bombing of North Vietnam, unconditional peace negotiations, the convening of a peace conference following a cease fire under the auspices of the UN or the 1954 Geneva Accord powers, replacement of United States forces with a UN peace-keeping force and free elections followed by rehabilitation of the country.⁴¹⁴ These proposals became official NDP policy at the 1965 convention.⁴¹⁵

In his address, Douglas also demonstrated, with great clarity, how the war was a danger to world peace in that the bombing of the North might, as in Korea, bring China into the conflict with its vast number of troops. In turn, the United States might then feel obliged to use nuclear weapons, an action that the Soviet Union would not be able to ignore, producing a situation that could escalate into a world holocaust. "If

⁴¹³ Debates, May 28, 1965, pp.1790-1.

⁴¹⁴ Ibid., pp.1792-4.

⁴¹⁵ Anne Scotton, ed., "Vietnam," New Democratic Policies 1961-1976 (Ottawa: New Democratic Party, 1976), pp.96-7.

that time comes, I want to feel that we in this party have spoken out against the dangerous path along which mankind is moving."⁴¹⁶

At this early stage of the war, Douglas and the NDP were not yet calling for an immediate, unconditional pull-out of American forces in Vietnam. Despite the general moderation of Douglas's proposals and his repeated expressions of friendship for the United States, he was routinely attacked by many editorialists for his alleged "hostile criticism of the United States which could do nothing for the peace of Vietnam...[and] could only help the side of communist imperialism".⁴¹⁷ As was common in the early years of American involvement in Vietnam among those on the right who identified strongly with Washington's foreign policy objectives and methods, any pointed criticism of the United States was deemed completely unacceptable. Hence, the British Columbia newspaper, The Province, could describe Douglas as "the victim of a deep, almost religious antagonism to the United States".⁴¹⁸ This language is too strong as a description of Douglas's attitude towards the Americans, although it was probably true for many social democratic idealists.⁴¹⁹

As the Vietnam question increasingly polarized the country throughout 1966 and into 1967, Tommy Douglas restated his position that American policy was "legally indefensible and morally inexcusable".⁴²⁰ At a time when some Progressive

⁴¹⁶ Debates, May 28, 1965, p.1796.

⁴¹⁷ Editorial, Globe and Mail, April 12, 1965, quoted in Canadian Annual Review, 1965, p.232.

⁴¹⁸ Canadian Annual Review, 1965, p.232.

⁴¹⁹ For an analysis of the impact of the war in Vietnam on anti-Americanism in Canada at the time, see Abraham Rotstein and Melville H. Watkins, "Communication in a New Key," Canadian Forum, Vol.45 (Nov., 1965), pp.174-5.

⁴²⁰ Thomas Hockin, "External Affairs and Defence," Canadian Annual Review, ed. by John Saywell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966), p.186.

Conservative MPs wanted Canadian troops sent to Vietnam, Douglas sought assurances that Canada would under no circumstances participate in military ventures in Southeast Asia except as members of a peacekeeping force. While continuing to condemn the Canadian government's failure to move beyond quiet diplomacy, the NDP leader also wanted to know why Canada had refused to call for a reconvening of the Geneva Conference, or if that proved unsuccessful, withdrawing from the International Control Commission (ICC) altogether.

By 1967, many Canadians, including some editorial writers and a few Conservative Members of Parliament, were joining the NDP in criticizing the Liberal government's failure to develop a clear and independent policy on Vietnam. Douglas captured this mood of growing frustration when he stated that for three years, government policy had been "a series of platitudinous bromides calculated to put the House to sleep and to lull the fears of the Canadian people".⁴²¹

Douglas continued to endear himself to radical idealists in the NDP. For example, he agreed to help sponsor a group sending civilian aid to the North Vietnamese and civilians in Viet Cong areas of South Vietnam.⁴²² In addition, he delighted in addressing anti-war rallies while joining with a young academic, Edward Broadbent, in helping sponsors of the "Take Vietnam to Expo" protest of July 1, 1967.⁴²³ Even Andrew Brewin, who usually shied away from public identification with radical causes, participated in an Ottawa teach-in of University professors and students on Vietnam. There, at the beginning of March, 1966, he declared that since the International Control Commission was covering up American violations of the 1954

⁴²¹ Ibid., p.194.

⁴²² Montreal Star, April 14, quoted in Canadian Annual Review, 1966, p.191.

⁴²³ H. McLeod and Ian McLeod, Tommy Douglas, p.253.

Geneva Accords, the commission was losing its effectiveness.⁴²⁴ Indeed, evidence was mounting that the Canadian representatives on the commission had on a number of occasions since 1962 defended American interests in violation of its officially neutral status.⁴²⁵

The next major Parliamentary debate on Vietnam occurred in February of 1967. Douglas detected a shift in Liberal government policy with Martin now explicitly calling for an end to the bombing of North Vietnam. For the NDP leader, this was a welcome change from Martin's previous policy of "washing his hands of responsibility like Pontius Pilate". Essentially after two years of attacking the NDP's position on the bombing issue, the Liberal government was now adopting it. Evidently, in the minds of Martin and company, it was now safe to join with millions of Americans in publicly criticizing Washington's Vietnam policy without fear of a serious rupture in Canadian-American relations.

In his contribution to the February debate, Douglas again emphasized that his opposition to the war was rooted in morality. "What is happening in Vietnam is shocking the conscience of the world more than anything that has happened since Hitler tried to exterminate the Jews in Europe."⁴²⁶ To bolster his contention that this war (especially the bombing) was the greatest "moral issue of our time", he quoted statements from the Pope, the World Council of Churches and the secretary of the UN, whom he called the "world's foremost civil servant". Douglas demonstrated his social gospel roots when he went on to argue vigorously that, contrary to what Martin had

⁴²⁴ ibid., 1966, p.189.

⁴²⁵ Victor Levant, Quiet Complicity: Canadian Involvement in the Vietnam War (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1986), pp.177-88.

⁴²⁶ Thomas Hockin, "External Affairs and Defence," Canadian Annual Review, ed. by John Saywell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), p.107.

stated, there was no difference between an individual's convictions and a government's declarations. Both were subject to the same moral laws. Therefore, if Martin now believed that bombing of the North was wrong, he had no choice but to join with the NDP in passing a Parliamentary resolution calling on the United States to cease bombing North Vietnam unconditionally, a position, incidentally, then favoured by the majority of Canadians. Secondly, the government ought to halt arms shipments to the United States unless it provided iron-clad assurances that the arms would not be used in Vietnam.⁴²⁷

While Douglas was not oblivious to the strategic and pragmatic (especially its counterproductiveness to Western interests) arguments against the war, without question, morality was the fundamental basis of not only his opposition to this war but indeed, of his entire foreign and defence policy. Was Douglas too much of a moralist/idealist to have functioned effectively as Prime Minister? Examination of his record as Premier of Saskatchewan for 17 years would seem to indicate that Douglas could run a fiscally responsible and pragmatic government without compromising his fundamental ideals.

The other parties in the House of Commons often did not know how to respond to Douglas's approach, especially his habitual appeal to moral considerations as the final arbiter of foreign policy decision-making. Their reactions at various times ranged from approval, fascination and respect to incredulity, anger and scorn. Often they tried in one way or another to divert attention away from the fundamental moral questions raised by the NDP leader. A common counter attack was to accuse Douglas and the

⁴²⁷ Debates, Feb.13, 1967, pp.12987-93.

NDP of following the communist line, as PC Eldon Woolliams did in the midst of a House of Commons exchange on Vietnam in early February of 1966.⁴²⁸

One of the most furious attacks ever unleashed in Parliament on Douglas and the NDP in general, came in response to his major February 13, 1967 Vietnam speech discussed earlier. Liberal Bryce Mackasey, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Labour, called Douglas's remarks "nothing more than plain demagoguery". Mackasay totally ignored the moral issues raised by Douglas, while accusing the NDP of "unadulterated opportunism". All the NDP was trying to do was serve as a focal point for all dissident groups in Canada in hopes of profiting electorally. "They represent socialism in its worst form. They represent anti-Americanism in its worst form." His more substantive charge was that Douglas had failed to offer any concrete suggestions that would assist the government.⁴²⁹

Pearson, for his part, noted that Douglas's faith that substantive negotiations would almost automatically occur if the bombing of North Vietnam was halted unconditionally might be wrong and lead to massive disillusionment around the world.⁴³⁰ Pearson proved to be partially correct, for when Johnson halted the bombing in the spring of 1968, peace talks eventually began, but led nowhere for almost four years. By then (1969), the NDP would modify their policy insisting on unconditional total American withdrawal from Vietnam, evidently believing that a complete communist victory was preferable to a continuation of the devastating war.⁴³¹

⁴²⁸ Ibid., Feb.8, 1966. pp.884-5.

⁴²⁹ Ibid., Feb.13, 1967, pp.12993-4.

⁴³⁰ Canadian Annual Review, 1967, pp. 211-2.

⁴³¹ Scotton, "International Affairs and Defence," p.103.

As Vietnam sparked more concern and discussion in Canada, the internal debate between idealists and realists within the NDP on the issue also mounted. The differences had first emerged publicly at the 1965 convention. Two years later, Herridge was still lamenting the fact that he had been the only NDP Member of Parliament who had been willing to lead 200 party delegates from the National convention to the American consulate in Toronto to protest Washington's involvement in Southeast Asia.⁴³²

Even amongst the top brass of the party, differences were appearing, although well camouflaged, as a careful dissection of key speeches reveals. Most significant were the dissimilarities between T.C. Douglas and David Lewis on foreign policy in general and Vietnam in particular that became quite apparent by the middle Sixties. A comparison of Douglas's February 13, 1967 address with a major one by Lewis on February 1, 1966, will demonstrate this conclusively. On the fundamental issue they agreed. American intervention in Vietnam was unjustified and based on a faulty interpretation of history.

However, the divergences in their lines of argument are more remarkable. First, unlike Douglas who had an equally strong interest in both internal and international affairs, Lewis revealed his partiality for domestic issues in his opening remarks, something he displayed consistently throughout his political career, including during his tenure as NDP party leader from 1971 to 1975. As he stated near the outset of his speech, "I know that we, in this house, are here to study and try to solve numerous domestic problems as well as problems relating to federalism and poverty." Nonetheless, in light of the resumption of American bombing of North Vietnam, Lewis

⁴³² H.W. Herridge to E.P.Granger, May 17, 1967, NAC, MG 32, C13, Vol.33, File 31-1-2.

explained that he felt obliged to turn, even if temporarily, from the "real business" of the House to speak about this "dangerous war".⁴³³

The other differences between Douglas and Lewis in their respective approaches to the Vietnam issue reveal a great deal about the two competing foreign policy orientations in the party, idealism and realism. For example, Lewis made not a single reference to morality in his speech. It was not that morality was unimportant to Lewis. However, as Cameron Smith points out in his book, Unfinished Journey: The Lewis Family, in contrast to the social gospel which linked morality and socialism in opposition to materialistic socialism, Lewis's morality was permeated with the Jewish concept of "menschekeit." The objective was to strive to become a good person; this was the best guarantee that one's actions would be moral. Hence, in the thinking of David Lewis, morality was assumed to be the foundation of all his arguments but did not presume a life of its own, as was often the case with those strongly influenced by the social gospel such as Douglas. In Lewis's world, consequently, a way could always be found to wed the moral and the pragmatic in ways that would produce a workable policy. But for social gospel idealists, in particular, this approach was fraught with danger, because without a commitment to morality that superseded every thing else, moral considerations would tend to be sacrificed on the altar of pragmatism when tough decisions had to be made.⁴³⁴

Thus, right at the outset of his address, Lewis made it clear that his argument rested on realist presuppositions. What was wrong about American policy in Vietnam and the main reason for his opposition was the fact that the policy was almost certain

⁴³³ Debates, Feb. 1, 1966, p.507.

⁴³⁴ Cameron Smith, Unfinished Journey: The Lewis Family (Toronto: Summerhill Press, 1989), p.232.

to fail. Moreover, he reiterated right at the outset of his address that membership in the Western Alliance was natural, right and inevitable. Therefore, and this was a big concern, Canada could not afford to remain silent when Washington's policy undermined the integrity and purpose of the Alliance.⁴³⁵

Then, too, unlike idealists, and even more than most realists, Lewis was passionately committed to the proposition that countering communist aggressiveness anywhere in the world must be an important, if not the most important, ingredient in Western foreign policy.

The argument is not whether communist aims should be appropriately countered but how this can be done most successfully and most effectively.... The US escalation of the war in Vietnam is actually assisting the spread of communism in Asia, and in Africa rather than containing it.⁴³⁶

While Douglas's anti-communist credentials were also strong, he tended to believe that it should not be the central preoccupation of Canadian foreign policy or of any Western country for that matter.

Lewis's third crucial point was that escalation of the war by the United States was pushing the USSR to strengthen its support for North Vietnam because of growing

⁴³⁵ Debates, Feb. 1, 1966, pp.507-8.

⁴³⁶ Debates, Feb. 1, 1966, pp.510-11. David Lewis' opposition to communism had its roots in his family's experiences in revolutionary Russia when the Bolsheviks destroyed the Jewish Bund, a democratic socialist organization to which his father belonged. Lewis carried his fight against communism to Canada and was especially active in purging the CCF and labour unions of communist influence in the 1930s and 40s. See David Lewis, The Good Fight: Political Memoirs, 1909-1958 (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1981), p.10. Also see, Irving Abella, Nationalism, Communism and Canadian Labour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), pp.66-79, 92-3 and Gad Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), pp.85-132.

Soviet fears that otherwise they might forfeit leadership of the world communist movement to the aggressive Chinese, a development Lewis interpreted as fraught with peril for the West.⁴³⁷

Not surprisingly, radical idealists in the party were unhappy with David Lewis's line of reasoning. Opposing Washington's stepped-up involvement in the war because it might damage the Western Alliance felt like a wet blanket to those who were either indifferent or more than likely opposed to NATO membership. Already on February 15, 1966, the New Democratic Youth had bypassed the NDP caucus and joined with other organizations in appealing to the government for an end to all Canadian involvement in the war including arms shipments to the United States for use in Vietnam.⁴³⁸

Canadian Dimension continued to lead the idealist attack on the Vietnam issue throughout these years as part of their commitment to raise the profile of foreign policy matters in Canada. For example, in the spring of 1966, they published a twenty-one page supplement entitled, "Canadian Foreign Policy: The Decade Ahead," which brought together the disparate views of many centre-left thinkers in the field.⁴³⁹ Most significantly, in the July-August, 1966 edition, Cy Gonick published an "Open Letter to Prime Minister Pearson," eloquently summarizing all the arguments against the Vietnam war and concluding with a ringing call for Canada, on the eve of its one hundredth birthday, to issue its own "Declaration of Independence" on foreign policy matters.⁴⁴⁰

⁴³⁷ Debates, Feb.1, 1966, p.511.

⁴³⁸ "On the Canadian Involvement in the Vietnam War: An Open Letter to the 27th Parliament and the Government of Canada," NAC, MG 28, 1V1, Vol.476.

⁴³⁹ "Canadian Foreign Policy: The Decade Ahead," Canadian Dimension, Vol.3 (Mar.-Apr., 1966).

⁴⁴⁰ Cy Gonick, "Open Letter to Prime Minister Pearson," Canadian Dimension, Vol.3

It was becoming apparent that Vietnam would be a major issue at the 1967 NDP convention with many radical idealists on the left demanding a stronger party statement than the 1965 convention had produced. Thus, in the preceding year or so, a kind of "low intensity guerrilla war" broke out in party ranks on the question. This was reflected even at the highest levels of the NDP. The differences between Lewis and Douglas were manifested by their very different involvements in the campaign against the war. Douglas was not afraid to attend anti-war rallies which included real or perceived communist participation despite the strong misgivings of Lewis and other members of his caucus. Douglas responded by arguing that "in my opinion what we have to do is to attend in such numbers that it becomes our rally rather than theirs."⁴⁴¹ The NDP leader even agreed to meet with members of South Vietnam's National Liberation Front in his office, which moved an aide to remark that Douglas walked "arm in arm with folks that would have made David Lewis's hair curl."⁴⁴²

While Douglas as party leader had to show some restraint in his public anti-war activities, Herridge was under fewer constraints. As such, he wrote numerous anti-war letters and became the favourite Parliamentary contact for anti-war organizations of all types, some of whom he supported financially, especially, "Canadian Aid for Vietnam civilians". More audaciously, on February 1, 1966, Herridge publicly stated his support for Canadian communist W. Stewart's plea to the Canadian government urging President Johnson to accept the 1954 Geneva Agreement as the foundation for a peace settlement. His willingness to work with communists on this issue was shown again a year later when on February 14, 1967, he endorsed a call from William

(July-Aug., 1966), pp.1, 3-4.

⁴⁴¹ Quoted in H. McLeod and Ian McLeod, Tommy Douglas, p.253.

⁴⁴² Ibid.

Kashtan, National Leader of the Communist Party of Canada, for a non-partisan Parliamentary declaration asking the United States to halt the bombing of North Vietnam.⁴⁴³

As a maverick MP, Herridge was not afraid of the criticism that such actions and statements brought his way from realists within NDP ranks. In a letter written on March 1st, 1966, the unrestrained MP boasted that he was not one of those NDPers who

find it necessary to spend half of their time proving they are not communist by denouncing the government of communist China. This is what I call a feather dusting approach to the US policy in Vietnam.⁴⁴⁴

Herridge's uncompromising stand naturally made him a favourite speaker at anti-war rallies. For instance, on January 2, 1966, he received a letter asking him to speak at a public meeting in Toronto because the sender still remembered his vocal participation in the demonstration at the American consulate during the 1965 Federal NDP convention.⁴⁴⁵

Herridge was keenly aware that not many NDP MPs wanted to be identified publicly with the anti-war movement. Therefore, on occasion, he tried to embarrass them into coming out of the closet. For example, on March 15, 1966, he wrote a letter to Alex Lamb, encouraging him and his friends to write NDP Members of Parliament like Stanley Knowles and David Orlikow to pressure them to support a Vietnam Day

⁴⁴³ Herridge, Memo, NAC, MG 32, C13, Vol.34.

⁴⁴⁴ Herridge to Arthur Pape, Mar.1, 1966, NAC, MG 32, C13, Vol.34.

⁴⁴⁵ Anonymous to H.W. Herridge, Jan.2. 1966, NAC, MG 32, C13, Vol.34.

Committee in Winnipeg.⁴⁴⁶ (Orlikow, in particular, was generally pro-American in his foreign policy views and on one occasion got into a vigorous argument with Cy Gonick on the Vietnam issue at an NDP event. In Gonick's interpretation, the source of this pro-Americanism for many members of the older generation in the CCF/NDP was their admiration for Franklin D. Roosevelt and his New Deal, which they saw as a model for what the Canadian government should have done to get Canada out of the Great Depression.⁴⁴⁷)

Herridge was also aware of charges that some people in the NDP inner circle were trying to expel party members who called themselves "the socialist caucus" and who were working vigorously against the Vietnam war.⁴⁴⁸ This threat was obviously not carried out because the socialist caucus was quite active on many questions including international affairs at the '67 convention.

Most party officials had hoped to keep foreign policy discussion at the 1967 convention to a minimum - one hour at most - for at least two reasons. First, foreign policy was still viewed as a non-starter electorally. As Charles Taylor, whose influence was growing in the NDP, wrote in a letter to Douglas and Lewis in regards to possible convention themes,

⁴⁴⁶ H.W. Herridge to Alex Lamb, Mar.15, 1966, NAC, MG 32, C13, Vol.34.

⁴⁴⁷ Cy Gonick interview, June 22, 1992.

⁴⁴⁸ John Steele, Chairman of the Ontario Socialist Caucus to H.W. Herridge. According to Gonick, the socialist caucus was dominated by Trotskyites. Cy Gonick interview, June 22, 1992.

It is, of course true that foreign policy interests very few electors. A theme of this kind [Canada's role for world peace] doesn't have to get major billing in Tommy's speeches, although it might be given a bigger play before certain specialized audiences.⁴⁴⁹

This attitude partly explains why in preliminary lists of proposed topics for the convention, no foreign policy issues were even mentioned except foreign aid.⁴⁵⁰

The second equally important reason foreign policy was supposed to be downplayed at the convention was because NDP strategists did not want to take unnecessary policy risks when the polls showed the party gaining in popularity as dissatisfaction with the old-line parties mounted. In the strategists view, alienating mainstream Canadians with a strong anti-Vietnam, anti-American stance would be foolish. As Andrew Brewin stressed during the convention in response to charges that the NDP was waffling on Vietnam: "This party is approaching the responsibility of power.... It has responsibility and great influence. If we are going to be responsible we have to forego the luxury of extreme stands."⁴⁵¹

The irony was that there was at that moment, as documented in Chapter Six, a growing sentiment in Canada against quiet diplomacy and in favour of a stronger, more independent stand on Vietnam. Even some major newspapers such as The Star and The Globe and Mail, echoed this opinion and stated their agreement with the idealist view that by taking an independent stance, Canada could encourage American

⁴⁴⁹ Charles Taylor to Lewis and Douglas, undated, NAC, MG 28, 1V1, Vol.437.

⁴⁵⁰ Memo, undated, NAC, MG 28, 1V1, Vol.437, File 2.

⁴⁵¹ Quoted in Cy Gonick, "The NDP Federal Convention," Canadian Dimension, Vol.4 (Sept.-Oct., 1967), pp.4-5.

opponents of the Vietnam war, while simultaneously developing a more constructive relationship with China.⁴⁵²

The self-styled socialist caucus agreed with the party leadership's view that NDP popularity was growing, but believed this support was largely built on sand. In a paper published just before the convention, they argued that only a party committed to radical socialist domestic and international policies which fundamentally challenged the capitalist system, could construct a firmly rooted and mass working class political movement capable of winning an election. In terms of foreign policy, this would mean a much more serious effort to mobilize opposition to the Vietnam war. By making itself the focal point of anti-war sentiment, the NDP could build a powerful political movement that would do very well electorally. In addition, if successful in wedding opposition to the war with the organizational skills of a political party, the NDP could show the American anti-war movement how to gain political power.⁴⁵³

Thus far, as best the socialist caucus could ascertain, the party record on Vietnam had been quite dismal, contrary to the image the NDP had in the public mind of a group passionately committed to stopping the American involvement in Southeast Asia at all costs. The critics complained that, apart from a few speeches by Tommy Douglas and some other caucus members and a few press releases, little had been done. Local riding and provincial organizations had not been encouraged to mobilize public opinion against the war.⁴⁵⁴ As soon became evident at the convention, the party leadership and most of the rank-and-file were not yet ready in 1967 to adopt a

⁴⁵² Noted in "Vietnam, Norad, and the Canadian Foreign Policy Debate," Canadian Dimension, Vol.4 (May-June, 1967), p.4.

⁴⁵³ "Socialist Caucus Convention Program," NAC, MG 32, C13, Vol.35-4, File 3.

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid.

resolution proposed by the socialist caucus demanding immediate American withdrawal from Vietnam and calling on the NDP to establish a standing committee on the issue.

Despite this defeat, the activists did force the convention organizers to double the amount of time devoted to the debate on foreign policy matters and to toughen the Vietnam resolution somewhat, which in its initial form, was even milder than the 1965 version. A few other minor resolutions relating to the Vietnam question were also passed. One specifically acknowledged the leadership role of Sweden in supplying medical aid to North Vietnam as well as the South, while the second banned weapon exports to all belligerents in Vietnam. In another related resolution, New Democrats pledged that an NDP government would not sell war material to the parties in any dispute in which Canada was participating as a peacekeeper or in a truce supervisory agency such as the International Control Commission (ICC).⁴⁵⁵ (The following year, Douglas made a speech in which he condemned the Liberal government for continuing to sell arms to the United States bound for Vietnam. "Canada will not come before the bar of historic judgement with clean hands, because there is blood on them, blood money to the tune of \$300 million a year."⁴⁵⁶) The resolution was careful not to mention the United States by name, obviously to avoid charges of anti-Americanism.

This fear was also one reason why the NDP almost completely avoided mention of the Vietnam war and foreign policy in general during the 1968 federal election. However, equally significant was traditional voter apathy towards international affairs. According to a Star survey of election issues, only 2% of the respondents listed

⁴⁵⁵ Scotton, "Sale of War Materials," p.101.

⁴⁵⁶ J.L. Granatstein, "External Affairs and Defence," Canadian Annual Review, ed. by John Saywell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), p.271.

foreign policy as an important issue and this at the height of the Vietnam war.⁴⁵⁷ In the face of these facts as well as Trudeaumania, it was probably a wise choice to emphasize domestic concerns like housing rather than foreign policy in the 1968 election.

While the Vietnam issue was overshadowed by the debate over the Waffle Manifesto at the 1969 NDP convention, it did earn a separate heading in the main International Affairs and Defence Resolution. Significantly, the main thrust of the Vietnam section was that American troops must be entirely withdrawn as a precondition for peace, the very point that had been so emphatically rejected by the Federal party leadership and the majority of delegates at the 1967 convention. The resolution also included Douglas's words calling the war a "wholly immoral act" and blasted the Canadian government for allegedly disregarding its obligations under the Geneva Agreements as an ICC member, while condoning "American aggression and the puppet regime in South Vietnam." Incidentally, because the NDP wanted, as always, to appear evenhanded in its criticism of East and West, the resolution used the same words, "wholly immoral act," in denouncing the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.⁴⁵⁸

Why and how did this dramatic change in the NDP's official Vietnam policy transpire in the course of just two years? First, of course, the resolution reflected changing public opinion and as such was considered safe. Already at the end of 1968, the Federal Council had had little hesitation in authorizing the NDP Federal Office to appoint delegates to "The Hemispheric Conference to End the Vietnam War," that was

⁴⁵⁷ ibid., pp.219-20.

⁴⁵⁸ Scotton, "International Affairs and Defence," p.103.

to be held in Montreal, at the end of November, 1968, something that would probably not have been contemplated even a year earlier.⁴⁵⁹

Second, with President Nixon's announced phased withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam, the NDP could not so easily be tagged with the anti-American label for demanding a speeded-up schedule of withdrawal. In any case, so many people were disgusted with American involvement in the war by late 1969 that anti-Americanism was quite respectable.

Third, the key people in the party leadership appear to have decided to sacrifice key elements of realist foreign policy under pressure from the radical idealists, while marshalling their resources for what they considered the more serious domestic policy challenge coming from the Waffle Manifesto's call for a full-fledged independent socialist Canada.

However, there was a fourth factor which was probably even more significant. That was the dramatic rise in Canadian nationalism, as documented in Chapter Five, which made the building of an independent Canadian foreign policy not only respectable but imperative for the vast majority of delegates attending the 1969 Winnipeg convention. Indeed, Canadian social democratic idealists were on the verge of winning their greatest victory.

They were about to have fulfilled their long-standing desire to see the NDP founding convention's pro-NATO decision reversed. Given the atmosphere of 1969, a fundamental NDP reevaluation of defence policies that connected Canada to the United States in any way was virtually inevitable. Of course, this was also made easier by the general decline in public support for NATO which affected even the traditional strongly pro-alliance Canadian political parties. For example, in 1967, Tory party

⁴⁵⁹ "Resolution Adopted by Federal Council," NAC, MG 28, IVI, Vol.437, File 31.

president, Dalton Camp, had called for a major review of defence and foreign policy based on a functional philosophy. This would see specific goals such as disarmament, non-proliferation and foreign aid replace associations like NORAD, NATO, the UN and the Commonwealth as the primary conceptual framework.⁴⁶⁰

Increasingly, it was becoming clear to all that Canada's role in NATO, based on only 10,000 troops in Europe, was not military but political and diplomatic. As James Eayrs noted in an article written for the July 17th, 1968 edition of the Montreal Star, military participation helped fortify the will of Canada's European allies to resist Soviet blandishments and threats and enhanced Canada's influence in world affairs.⁴⁶¹ If this were so, many Canadians concluded, Canada might well achieve the same objective with fewer troops overseas or perhaps none at all.

The NDP 1969 convention decision advocating unilateral Canadian withdrawal from the alliance had been a long time in the making. Historically, the majority in the New Democratic Party in favour of continuing Canadian membership in NATO had never been large or that strongly committed. Every convention in the Sixties had brought a virtual avalanche of anti-NATO resolutions from riding associations across the country. And of course, the international events of the Sixties had done nothing if not harden the position of the neutralists. Kenneth McNaught made this clear in an

⁴⁶⁰ Canadian Annual Review, 1967, p.266. Camp also wrote the introduction to a book entitled, Alliances and Illusions, in which he made the same arguments and rejected the notion that a Canadian move away from the alliances would be isolationist. Neutralism and isolationism were not the same thing. He and the authors of the book wanted a foreign policy without illusions. See, Lewis Hertzman, John W. Warnock and Thomas A. Hockin, Alliances and Illusions, intro. by Dalton Camp (Edmonton: M.G. Hurtig Pub., 1969). Hockin's chapter is the most interesting. He traces the search for "moral opportunity" in both official Canadian external affairs policy and the statements of the political parties demonstrating how the vision of a better world has characterized all of them to a considerable extent. Ibid., pp.95-136.

⁴⁶¹ Canadian Annual Review, 1968, p.244.

article that appeared in Stephen Clarkson's, An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada?, in which McNaught stated that now more than ever Canada needed to break free from its status as a satellite of the United States.⁴⁶²

The 1967 international affairs resolution had also done its part in preparing the way for a fundamental shift on NATO policy. It had called for the replacement of both the Warsaw and NATO pacts by a European security system. In the meantime, since the original threat of a massive land invasion no longer existed, NATO ought to redefine its goals. Most importantly, Canada's role in the military alliance must be revised and renegotiated to fit the new facts.⁴⁶³ When little if any progress towards these objectives occurred in the 1967 to 1969 period despite repeated attempts by Brewin to pressure the Canadian government,⁴⁶⁴ support for NATO even from those within the NDP inner circle who had long spoken in its favour was undermined. Then, too, feelings against NATO were running high in the party because, contrary to the military pact's constitution, it allowed Portugal to retain membership despite the fact that Salazar, its leader, was a dictator. Equally upsetting was NATO's refusal to condemn the military junta which had overthrown democracy in Greece, another NATO member.⁴⁶⁵

⁴⁶² Kenneth McNaught, "From Colony to Satellite," in An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada? ed. by Stephen Clarkson (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 1968), pp.173-83.

⁴⁶³ Scotton, "International Affairs," p.100.

⁴⁶⁴ See for example, Brewin's Commons speech on April 5, 1967. Debates, Apr.5, 1967, p.14568.

⁴⁶⁵ Derek Blackburn interview, May 7, 1991. The 1969 anti-NATO resolution also reiterated these arguments. See Scotton, "International Affairs and Defence," pp.102-3.

The growing anti-NATO mood in the country was reflected in the Parliamentary debate on foreign affairs in the spring of 1969, six months before the NDP convention. Soon after winning the 1968 election, Pierre Trudeau, had authorized a reevaluation of NATO as part of a general foreign and defence policy review. When in early April 3 of 1969, the Prime Minister insinuated that all Canadian forces might be withdrawn from Europe, it was well received at home.⁴⁶⁶ (This was later revised to a 50% reduction after intense pressure from Canada's allies and Trudeau's own cabinet.) In leading off the debate, Trudeau acknowledged that he shared the long-standing NDP position that foreign policy must determine defence policy and not vice versa. "In the past several years, there has been a tendency for our foreign policy to be swallowed by our defence policy which in turn was swallowed by our NATO policy." That, Trudeau pledged, would now change; there would be no commitment to a NATO policy before foreign policy was established.⁴⁶⁷

Tommy Douglas was sceptical that any fundamental changes in NATO policy would be forthcoming from this pledge or the entire review process. He challenged the government not only to adopt the NDP's general approach to foreign and defence policy, but also its specific proposals including the complete withdrawal of Canadian military forces from Europe, the reassessment of NATO's role and a strengthening of the non-military agencies of the alliance. Douglas further indicated that his thinking on NATO was undergoing a transformation; his patience with it was almost gone. He was growing increasingly sceptical about NATO's ability ever to change from a purely military organization to that of a political vehicle capable of bringing about a

⁴⁶⁶ Christopher Rose, "Canadian Government Policy Towards Europe," in Semi Alignment and Western Security, ed. Nils Orvik (London: Croom Helm, 1986), p.154.

⁴⁶⁷ Debates, April 14, 1969, p.7468.

rapprochement between East and West. Douglas also expressed indignation because NORAD had been renewed without the House of Commons having had an opportunity to debate the matter, contrary to the government's promise.⁴⁶⁸

However, the most remarkable example of a change of mind on the NATO issue on the part of a key NDP figure was that of the staunch realist, David Lewis. In a remarkable speech on April 21st to Toronto's Empire club upon his return from a trip to Europe with the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence (SCEAND), Lewis proclaimed his almost complete conversion to the anti-NATO position. (His thoughts were later incorporated into an NDP minority report on defence policy.) The committee's visit to NATO headquarters convinced him that the organization's bureaucracy had no incentive to work for a break-through in East-West relations for the self-evident reason that they would lose their jobs if peace broke out. Perhaps, Lewis conceded, Canada could remain part of the alliance if it removed its military contribution but even that might prove unsatisfactory. Lewis frankly acknowledged that his thoughts were still in transition. "I am rapidly reaching the personal conclusion that perhaps we ought to get out of military alliances altogether. Perhaps Canada ought to begin a search for a new international role." Canada, Lewis went on say, could then become a leader and indeed a hero among the smaller nations in helping the Third World and attacking the insanity of nuclear terror.⁴⁶⁹ Clearly, if David Lewis could turn his back on realist defence policy and adopt social democratic idealism's stance instead, the latter's position in the party was very strong indeed.

A new NDP member of Parliament, Ed Broadbent, carried the arguments of Lewis and Douglas to their logical conclusion in his contribution to the foreign policy

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid., Apr.23, 1969, pp.7878-9.

⁴⁶⁹ "NDP Press Release," Apr.21, 1969, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.51, File 11.

debate. As such, he declared his support for immediate NATO withdrawal on political as well as practical grounds. Broadbent, like Lewis, emphasized the new things that Canada could do as a neutral middle power such as Sweden or Yugoslavia in contributing to peace and the alleviation of world poverty.⁴⁷⁰ It was a sign of the overheated pro nationalist, anti-American and anti-NATO atmosphere of the times that Broadbent, who for most of the rest of his political career was a strong supporter of NATO membership, should jump on the anti-Alliance bandwagon at this time.

Andrew Brewin, anticipating that a major challenge to the 1961 NATO policy was coming and still strongly committed to realist defence policies, wrote a detailed rebuttal of each of Broadbent's points which he circulated among party officials and the caucus. His central argument was that immediate withdrawal from NATO would minimize Canada's opportunity for international action in attaining the aims which he believed all New Democrats held dear and what made its foreign policy consistent and unique. The party's objective, he was sure, was an independently conceived, clearly stated international policy which recognized Canada's sovereignty and independence, one characterized by different priorities and a new style. Getting out of NATO would, in Brewin's opinion, either hinder or be irrelevant to the achievement of this and most other "sound and traditional" social democratic internationalist foreign policy objectives. Besides, NATO was still capable of becoming an instrument for peace.⁴⁷¹

In the article Brewin also restated (perhaps without fully realizing it) the same charges trumpeted by Martin and Pearson throughout the Sixties against social democratic idealism. Not surprisingly, Brewin echoed their judgement that anti-NATO

⁴⁷⁰ Ibid., April 24, 1969, pp.7942-4.

⁴⁷¹ Andrew Brewin, "The New Democratic Party and NATO," Aug., 1969, NAC, MG 32, C28, Vol.152, File 16-2, Aug.-1969.

opinion often contained a heavy dose of anti-Americanism especially in those people for whom withdrawal had become a symbol of independence. For his part, Brewin distinguished between a Canadian independence that, while offensive to some Americans, was essential for the fulfilment of the NDP's main foreign policy objectives, and an independence characterized by such "unnecessary" steps as immediate NATO withdrawal. That decision if carried out would justify accusations of anti-Americanism and neutralism for which he, and he suspected most Canadians, had no use. Furthermore,

ostentatious withdrawal by Canada into neutralism would be seen as an unfriendly act in many American eyes and would...minimize the influence that Canada as an outspoken but friendly critic could have on the United States.⁴⁷²

In reflecting on the '69 convention in a 1991 interview, Broadbent stated that he now felt that visceral anti-Americanism was the most influential factor in the party's decision to pass the resolution against NATO. For this reason, and unlike their compatriots in countries like Norway, Canadian social democrats could not distinguish intellectually and emotionally between vigorous opposition to the war in Vietnam and membership in NATO.⁴⁷³

While Broadbent is undoubtedly correct in giving considerable weight to anti-Americanism, other factors played an equally significant part in the victory of the radical idealists on the NATO question. As Bill Knight, MP from Saskatchewan and a delegate to the '69 convention, as well as principal secretary to Ed Broadbent in the

⁴⁷² ibid.

⁴⁷³ Ed Broadbent interview, May 1, 1991.

Eighties, remembers it, part of the dynamics of the anti-NATO decision was simply that younger leadership was threatening the old guard of which Brewin was a part. Thus, as mentioned earlier, to cut their losses and maintain overall control, the NDP inner circle and key power brokers decided to concede defeat on defence policy and concentrate their efforts on the more significant issue, the Waffle attempt to impose its radical economic agenda on the party.⁴⁷⁴ Then too, party leaders and convention organizers were trying to respond to widespread dissatisfaction with the way the 1967 convention had been run. Delegates had been particularly upset with the lack of time devoted to debating resolutions submitted by ridings and the "party brass'" domination of the debate on the resolutions prepared by the Federal Council.⁴⁷⁵

Some attempts were made to respond to these concerns. A larger more representative Resolutions Committee, co-chaired by Charles Taylor and Ed Broadbent and separate from the Federal Council was established to carefully consider riding resolutions with the purpose of incorporating their key points directly into the draft composite resolution submitted to the convention.⁴⁷⁶ Judging by some newspaper and journal reports and interviews with participants, the NDP succeeded in facilitating a more meaningful debate at the '69 gathering especially on the Waffle Manifesto and NATO issues.⁴⁷⁷ People were also happy that traditional NDP policies on NORAD,

⁴⁷⁴ Bill Knight interview, May 7, 1991.

⁴⁷⁵ Olivia Chalmers to J.A. Renwick, Pres. of the NDP and Betsy Naylor to Woodrow Lloyd. See also George Cadbury to Policy Review Committee, Aug.22, 1968. NAC, MG 32, 1V1, Vol.397, File Conv. Com. Corr., 1968-69.

⁴⁷⁶ See, "Report of the 1969 Federal Convention Arrangement Committee," adopted by Federal Council, Oct.4-6, 1968, in NAC, MG 28, 1V1, Vol.397, File Conv. Com. Corr., 1968-69.

⁴⁷⁷ "Symposium on the NDP Convention," Canadian Dimension, Vol.6 (Dec.-Jan., 1969-70), pp. 5-6.

the Defence Production Sharing Agreement, the OAS, China, the UN and disarmament had been confirmed.⁴⁷⁸ The same was true for the composite resolution's criticism of the possible American deployment of an anti-missile system (the ABM), something Andrew Brewin had already done in Parliament on several occasions.⁴⁷⁹

The years, 1965 to 1969, had seen a gradual increase in the profile of foreign policy in the NDP propelled mainly by the Vietnam war and nationalism and enhanced by the leadership of T.C. Douglas. Douglas had managed to articulate a foreign policy with passion and intelligence that had drawn from both idealism and realism. Things would not be quite the same after he stepped down from the leadership in 1971.

All in all, the convention convinced many people that the NDP had made a turn to the left in three key areas: the economy, defence and general foreign policy. If it had, it was largely due to the triumph of idealism over realism, at least for a time. This was evidenced in the NDP's greatly strengthened official commitment to economic nationalism and a fuller implementation of an independent foreign policy as demonstrated most explicitly by its anti-NATO decision.

Of course, dissatisfaction with things American contributed greatly to the victory of neutralism and quasi-isolationism at the 1969 convention. The party had now officially turned its back on "realism" with its generally more favourable attitude towards the United States and its role in the world. This was largely because the social democratic idealism of the late Sixties and early Seventies with its strong nationalist component was incompatible with both multilateral (NATO) and bilateral defence

⁴⁷⁸ Scotton, "International Affairs," pp.102-3.

⁴⁷⁹ See for example, Debates, April 23, 1967, pp.7878-9. The NDP members of SCEAND had also issued a statement to this effect on June 26th of that year in which they called for the discontinuation of the Bomarc anti-aircraft squadrons and NORAD. See "Press Release," June 26, 1969, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.34, File 4.

arrangements (NORAD, the Defence Production Agreement with the United States) and, indeed, almost all defence and foreign policy cooperation with the Americans.

CHAPTER EIGHT

NATIONALISM'S NEGATIVE IMPACT ON NDP INTERNATIONALISM-(1970-5)

By 1970, nationalism had claimed the ideological leadership in Canadian political life⁴⁸⁰ affecting all the parties and spawning new nationalist organizations. The most important was probably the Committee for an Independent Canada (CIC), a non-partisan group formed in 1970 which published a number of books.⁴⁸¹ Its objective was to educate the public about what it believed was a loss of control by Canadians over their economy and society and to this end and also to pressure the government to adopt vigorous, albeit moderate nationalist policies.

As for the NDP, the nationalist momentum from the 1969 convention carried over strongly into the early Seventies spurred by developments both within the party and on the national and international scenes which had an impact on both the party's

⁴⁸⁰ Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, John English, Canada Since 1945: Power, Politics, and Provincialism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), pp.271-83, 332-7. Also see the above volume for background on Canadian nationalism and foreign policy in the Seventies, pp.341-78 and 407-54. J.L. Finlay and D.N. Sprague provide a general overview of the period in The Structure of Canadian History (3rd ed.; Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1989), pp.422-30.

⁴⁸¹ Abraham Rotstein and Gary Lax, Independence: The Canadian Challenge (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Co., 1972) and Rotstein and Lax, Getting it Back: A Program for Canadian Independence (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Co, 1974).

domestic and foreign policies. The marriage of left-wing idealism and nationalism now threatened to distort, suppress and perhaps even destroy the internationalism which had historically been such an integral part of the CCF/NDP's thinking and agenda. Without doubt, the continuing Waffle presence in the party until 1972 was the chief internal factor in this equation.⁴⁸² However, it was a whole series of external events centering on Canadian-American relations which provided the fuel for a veritable explosion of Canadian economic nationalism climaxing in the 1972 to 1974 period.⁴⁸³

The initial spark was provided by the voyage in late 1969 of the American oil tanker, the Manhattan, through the High Arctic without asking the permission of Canadian authorities. This occurred in the midst of increased concern about American pollution of the Great Lakes, fishing disputes, the Garrison Diversion Project, the buying up of Canadian recreation land and American control over magazines, books and textbooks read in Canada. When it appeared the tanker was preparing for a second trip in early 1970, the Liberal government, under pressure especially from the NDP and newspaper editorialists, issued a statement asserting Canadian sovereignty over all Arctic waters passing between portions of Canadian territory. The fact that Washington had never acknowledged Canadian sovereignty (and still does not) over these waters also served to heighten nationalist anxieties.⁴⁸⁴

⁴⁸² Cliff Scotton, NDP Federal Secretary from 1966 to 1976 believes that economic nationalism was "ridden as much as driven" by the Waffle. Scotton to author, April 5, 1993, Author's Papers.

⁴⁸³ See Michael Tucker, Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary Issues and Themes (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980), pp.79-106.

⁴⁸⁴ J.L.Granatstein, "External Affairs and Defence," Canadian Annual Review, ed. by John Saywell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), pp.346-355.

In such an atmosphere, the Liberals slowly began to respond to the demands of moderate economic nationalists in three key areas. These were: foreign takeovers of Canadian business, a government funded Canadian development corporation and foreign investment. A sign of things to come was a report in early 1970 by an all-party Special Committee on External Affairs and National Defence (SCEAND) under the chairmanship of Liberal, Ian Wahn, recommending that major foreign subsidiaries be required to sell 51% of their stock to Canadians.⁴⁸⁵ The Wahn Report also expressed apprehension about foreign control of the Canadian labour movement by international (meaning American) unions.⁴⁸⁶ In general, Canadian unions were slow to respond to this complaint.

The year, 1971, marked a turning point in Canadian-American relations which, not surprisingly, affected the nationalist agenda. The Nixon administration imposed a 10% surcharge on a wide range of imported goods to deal with a worsening balance-of-payments position, but unlike previous American governments, refused to exempt Canada. Canadians woke up to the fact that its so-called special historic relationship with the Americans had been fundamentally altered. The surcharge was soon followed by other measures which further dramatized Canada's economic vulnerability especially with its trade so heavily orientated towards the United States.⁴⁸⁷ A comparison of poll results showed that, while in 1963 48% of Canadians had thought economic

⁴⁸⁵ Terence A. Keenleyside, Laurence LeDuc, and J. Alex Murray, "Public Opinion and Canada-United States Economic Relations," Behind the Headlines, Vol.25 (December, 1970), p.7.

⁴⁸⁶ William Christian and Colin Campbell, Political Parties and Ideologies in Canada: Liberals, Conservatives, Socialists, Nationalists (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1983), p.217.

⁴⁸⁷ J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), pp.64-70.

dependence on the USA was a good thing, by 1972 the figure had shrunk to 34%.⁴⁸⁸

The Canadian government reacted to President Nixon's move by authorizing a study of relations between the two countries which released its report in the fall of 1972 entitled, "Canada-United States Relations: Options for the Future." The paper laid out three possible options Canada could pursue in its bilateral relationship with the United States. It could try to maintain its special relationship with the Americans, move towards closer integration with the United States or pursue a comprehensive, long-term strategy designed to strengthen and diversify the Canadian economy by expanding its economic ties with Europe and the Far East. Given the tenor of the times, it is not surprising the Liberal government eventually chose the Third Option, although the practical results would prove disappointing.⁴⁸⁹

Canadian government initiatives were somewhat more successful in responding to another matter of major significance to economic nationalists, namely, foreign investment. Mindful of a poll showing that 69% of Canadians favoured an agency to screen new American capital with only 15% opposed, the government eventually decided to act along lines recommended by a 1971 report authored by Windsor Liberal MP, Herb Gray, the minister of national revenue. Thus, in 1973, Parliament passed the Foreign Investment Review Act. After strengthening and full implementation two years later, both new investment and takeovers of existing Canadian corporations were subject to review.⁴⁹⁰

⁴⁸⁸ Keenleyside *et al.*, "Public Opinion and Canada-United States Economic Relations," p.7.

⁴⁸⁹ R.B. Byers, "External Affairs and Defence," *Canadian Annual Review*, ed. by John Saywell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), pp.266-7.

⁴⁹⁰ Christian and Campbell, *Political Parties and Ideologies in Canada*, p.219.

Ironically, even while the Liberals were instituting these programs, economic nationalism was beginning a slow decline. For example, a comparison of poll results shows that the percentage of Canadians who believed that American investment was "a bad thing" rose from 36% in 1969 to a high of 55% in 1973 whence it dropped slightly (the biggest jump had been 36 to 46% from 1969 to 1970).⁴⁹¹ Most significantly, in a study of issues in the 1974 election, only 1% of the respondents mentioned foreign investment as the most important issue for them. When asked to define "foreign investment," only 17% made any reference to American activity in Canada.⁴⁹² In addition, just as Ottawa was moving towards full implementation of the Third Option in 1975, a poll showed that the percentage of Canadians favouring the First Option (keeping the special relationship with the United States) had increased from 38.9 to 46.1% in just one year. Even more significantly, support for closer ties with the United States (the Second Option) went up from 19.3 in 1974 to 21.7% in 1975, while those wanting the Third Option dropped from 29.0 to 21.4%.⁴⁹³

This weakening of economic nationalism among Canadians was due to at least two major developments. First, the end of the Vietnam war and Watergate scandals removed two factors that had contributed significantly to anti-Americanism.⁴⁹⁴

⁴⁹¹ Keenleyside, et al. "Public Opinion and Canada-United States Economic Relations," pp.8-10.

⁴⁹² Harold D. Clarke, et al. Political Choice in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980), pp.159-162.

⁴⁹³ Keenleyside, et al. "Public Opinion and Canada-United States Economic Relations," p.15.

⁴⁹⁴ Philip Resnick, political scientist at the University of British Columbia, argues that it was the weakening of American military, economic and political power after the mid-Sixties, exemplified most particularly by its failure in Vietnam, that had provided both the initial impetus for the upsurge of Canadian nationalism after 1965 and sustained it for the next ten years. You could now "thumb your nose at the Americans" and get away with it. Philip Resnick, The Land of Cain: Class and

Second, the rise of the Parti Quebecois in Quebec and the growing economic problems of unemployment and inflation shifted public interest to domestic concerns particularly national unity and the economy.⁴⁹⁵ Yet, having once jumped aboard the economic nationalist "horse", the NDP never completely got off after 1975. Thus, when economic nationalism experienced another surge in the early 1980s, the NDP instinctively supported it without serious reflection on its long-term implications.

To understand the hold economic nationalism acquired on the NDP in the Seventies, it is imperative to examine the key ideas of the Waffle, the chief internal source of economic nationalism and whose influence in the party was at its peak from 1970 to 1972. The crucial issue for the Waffle as introduced in Chapter Five was simple. Canadian independence must be maintained and strengthened if socialism was ever to flower in Canada. Every day, Canada was being pulled tighter into the imperialist orbit of American capitalism as an economic dependency.⁴⁹⁶ The instinctive response of those who strongly opposed this cross-border "pollution" was to "close the 49th parallel," as the title of a book published at the time stated.⁴⁹⁷

Nationalism in English Canada, 1945-1975 (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1977), p.197.

⁴⁹⁵ Robert A. Hackett, "The Waffle Conflict in the NDP, " in Party Politics in Canada, ed. by Hugh G. Thorburn (4th ed.; Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1979), p.200.

⁴⁹⁶ The work of economics professor, Kari Levitt of McGill, played a crucial role in convincing many NDPers who later became members of the Waffle of the alleged threat to Canadian independence and socialism posed by Canada's dependence on foreign investment especially from American multinational corporations. Mel Watkins acknowledges this in the preface he wrote for Levitt's book, Silent Surrender: The Multinational Corporation in Canada (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1970), p.xvii.

⁴⁹⁷ Ian Lumsden, ed. Close the 49th Parallel Etc.: The Americanization of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970).

A few days after the December, 1969 NDP convention, an event occurred which appeared to provide substance to these nationalist fears. J.J. Greene, Canada's Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources announced on a visit to Washington that he (presumably speaking for the Canadian government) favoured a continental energy policy which would create a single North American market in energy resources. This statement was immediately condemned by Canadian nationalists of all stripes who were certain that America's long-term objective was guaranteed unrestricted access not only to energy but also Canada's abundant fresh water resources. James Laxer, a prominent Waffle leader, fired off a book in short order titled, The Energy Poker Game: The Politics of the Continental Energy Deal.⁴⁹⁸ Laxer argued that the greatest danger in such an energy agreement for Canada lay not in possible natural gas or oil shortages down the road, but in the increased economic dependency it would create. In his opinion, a continental energy policy represented such a quantum leap in Canada's commitment to a hinterland economy that economic diversification and greater industrialization would become virtually impossible.⁴⁹⁹

In foreign policy terms, Laxer was convinced that

while no one pays much attention to the presence of Canadian diplomacy, the presence of Canadian resources are a factor of real importance in the world political arena. Our involvement in the Vietnam war has much more to do with the metals and the guns we sell to the United States than with our presence on the International Control Commission. Canadian oil, as a substitute for middle eastern oil for the United States and her allies, is potentially a far more important factor in the option open to great powers in the Middle East than any peacekeeping force we may have imagined.⁵⁰⁰

⁴⁹⁸ James Laxer, The Energy Poker Game: The Politics of the Continental Resources Deal (Toronto: New Press, 1970).

⁴⁹⁹ Ibid., pp.22-3.

⁵⁰⁰ Ibid., pp.16-17. Laxer ignored the fact that Canadian oil reserves were a

This remark well illustrates how economic nationalism influenced the Waffle's approach to foreign policy. Here was a strong rejection of the traditional scale by which Canadian foreign policy had always been evaluated. Canada's self-images of middle power, helpful fixer and peacekeeper were downplayed. What really mattered, in Laxer's world view, was Canada's existing and potential economic role in the world. His great concern was that Canadian resources would be used to bolster American and Western imperialism whether in Vietnam, the Middle East or elsewhere. While it was probably inconceivable that the imperialist forces of Western capitalism, as epitomized by the United States, could be thrown back on a world-wide scale in the foreseeable future, it was vital to resist these forces on a country by country basis beginning with Canada.

For Laxer and company, the most important contribution Canada could make to this struggle was to ensure that its rich resources were not turned over to American capital but held in trust for the people of the world. "Instead of serving a corporate and military empire with those resources," argued Laxer, "we must plan for their long-run use to benefit humanity at home and abroad."⁵⁰¹ None of this could occur, however, if Canada ceased to exist as an independent nation or if the Americans gained control of even more of the Canadian economy, a virtual certainty unless the tide of continentalism could be reversed. Nationalism was crucial, therefore, because it was the only force available with the potential to rouse the Canadian people to the cause. Thus, the Waffle found a key role for Canadian nationalism in fulfilling social democratic internationalism's prophetic vision for Canada in pointing the world towards the path of true peace and justice.

pittance by world standards.

⁵⁰¹ James Laxer, The Energy Poker Game, p.49.

At least one person associated with the Waffle had some reservations about Canadian nationalism. Daniel Drache, writing in Close the 49th Parallel: The Americanization of Canada, noted that it could be a two-edged sword. "Nationalism is both an instrument of class rule and an integral part of the class consciousness of the Canadian working people."⁵⁰² Nevertheless, despite its exploitative nature, bourgeois nationalism must not be completely rejected because it contained an element that was useful, namely, a sentimentality which expressed the discontent and general anxiety of the people living in an advanced capitalist and colonial state such as Canada. Out of sentimental nationalism, Drache argued, revolutionary anti-capitalist nationalism would evolve. Hence, in his schema, anti-imperialism, anti-capitalism, Canadian independence, and nationalism were inseparably linked.⁵⁰³

Cy Gonick's particular concern, as expressed in his chapter in Lumsden's book, was the part played by the multinational corporation in undermining Canadian independence. These corporations were, in effect, creating an alternative global government operating under its own rules while also serving American interests. As such, American foreign policy and the expansion of the multinational corporation were interdependent phenomena.⁵⁰⁴

Philip Resnick, a political scientist and contributor of articles to Canadian Dimension, wrote another chapter presenting a left-wing view of the relationship of Canadian and American defence policy. His thesis was that Canada's junior partnership in defence matters was part of the general subordination of Canada to the American

⁵⁰² Daniel Drache, "The Canadian Bourgeoisie and its National Consciousness," in Close the 49th Parallel, p.19.

⁵⁰³ Ibid., p.22.

⁵⁰⁴ Cy Gonick, "Foreign Ownership and Political Decay," in Close the 49th Parallel, p.69.

empire. Resnick tried to demonstrate that the Canadian political elite had always had a colonial mentality, first in deference to the British and then to the Americans. Since the middle 1930s, growing continentalism had expressed itself through Canadian defence and foreign policy in numerous ways. These included the Defence Production Sharing Agreement, NORAD, arms sales to the United States for use in Vietnam and toeing the American line in the Cold War.

Resnick argued, however, that these expressions of continentalism were unavoidable given Canada's economic development along the path prescribed by liberal capitalism in which Canada's function was to supply natural resources to the world-wide American economic empire. Hence, it was pointless to talk about an independent Canadian foreign policy or neutralism until Canadian capitalism was replaced by revolutionary socialism.

Rejecting capitalism on the one hand, Stalinism on the other, a socialist Canada might have been able to play a vital role in easing tension between the two blocs by unilateral disarmament of the North.... At the same time, she could have been much more forward in her support of the liberation of the Third World from all imperialism, including Canadian capitalism.⁵⁰⁵

Realistically, however, Resnick noted that neutralism would probably not lead to a reduction in overall defence expenditures. But armed neutrality in support of Canadian independence would at least provide Canadian defence policy with a different *raison d'être* than the present continentalism.⁵⁰⁶ At the same time, in Resnick's view, to

⁵⁰⁵ Philip Resnick, "Canadian Defence Policy and the American Empire," in Close the 49th Parallel, p.112.

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid., pp.94-113.

speak of an independent foreign or domestic policy centred on Canadian nationalism was hopelessly naive. Needless to say, most members of the Waffle did not agree.

John Warnock provided the most comprehensive treatment of foreign policy by someone associated with the Waffle in his book, Partner to Behemoth: The Military Policy of a Satellite Canada.⁵⁰⁷ He saw his work in the tradition of other revisionist historians such as Gabriel Kolko who had evolved a new interpretation of the cold war. Based on the arguments of this school of thought, Warnock attempted to demonstrate that Canada, after World War II, had had a choice. It could have moved towards an idealist internationalism rooted in universalism with primary stress on building the brotherhood of all mankind through the United Nations. Instead, Canada's political leaders, as representatives of the social and business elite, had accepted the American view of the world. The result had been that Canada had been a founding member of NATO against its best interests and had backed almost all of Washington's actions and policies in the previous twenty-five years. Warnock was also sure that this post-war defence policy had greatly accelerated America's influence in Canadian affairs including, of course, economic integration.⁵⁰⁸

Warnock's well researched book made a valuable contribution to the social democratic idealist interpretation of Canadian foreign policy but without solving one of its central paradoxes. Thus, simultaneously with issuing a call for the dissolution of the nation-state system, he expressed a strong desire for Canada to develop a much

⁵⁰⁷ John Warnock, Partner to Behemoth: The Military Policy of a Satellite Canada (Toronto: New Press, 1970). A few years later, Richard Preston picked up on the concept of the American "Behemoth" and wrote an article tracing the effect of the military potential of the United States on Canada for the past 200 years. See Richard Preston, "Two Centuries in the Shadow of Behemoth: The Effect on the Canadian Psyche," International Journal, Vol.31 (Summer, 1997), pp.413-33.

⁵⁰⁸ Ibid., pp.296-317.

keener sense of its sovereignty and independence. Nevertheless, while economic nationalism certainly influenced his analysis of foreign policy, Warnock did not become its slave, but produced a plausible foreign and defence policy interpretation and prescription given his assumptions.

This was not the case for most members of the Waffle. Ironically, only when the Waffle was in its death throes in 1974 (two years after being thrown out of the party in Ontario) did many of them seriously try to break free from nationalism, particularly the all-consuming nationalism that a segment of the Waffle led by Bob and James Laxer had by then embraced. (Bob Laxer had recently written that Canada's working people were now the capable and chosen instrument to lead the struggle combining nationalism and socialism for what Laxer called socialist independentism.⁵⁰⁹) The others, younger and more Marxist in orientation, largely turned their back on nationalism condemning it as incapable of mounting a fundamental challenge to capitalism.⁵¹⁰

How would NDP foreign policy have been affected if the Waffle had succeeded in taking over the party? Would they have built grass-roots mass resistance to American influence and more support for liberation movements around the globe? Some Wafflers had tried to do this on a limited scale while still a part of the NDP but had run into vigorous opposition from organized labour, especially on the question of American control of Canadian unions.⁵¹¹ On one point there can be no doubt. A

⁵⁰⁹ Bob Laxer, "Foreword," The Political Economy of Dependency (Canada) Ltd. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973), pp.22-5.

⁵¹⁰ Virginia Hunter, "Why I Left the Waffle," Canadian Forum, Vol.54 (March, 1975), pp.18-20.

⁵¹¹ See John Bullen, "The Ontario Waffle and the Struggle for an Independent Socialist Canada: Conflict Within the NDP," in Canadian Historical Review, Vol.14 (June, 1983), pp.198-204 and 206-212.

Waffle victory would have confirmed the NDP as the full-fledged neutralist party of Canada, a status most idealists would gladly have embraced.

However, the most important effect of a Waffle take-over of the NDP would have been a substantial rise in de facto isolationism in the party. This was due, not to its neutralist defence policy which is compatible with an activist role in the world, but to the Waffle's almost religious embrace of economic nationalism. The task of removing American control from the Canadian economy, culture and foreign policy to the extent the Waffle intended would have totally overwhelmed other foreign policy concerns in the New Democratic Party. After all, Wafflers saw Canada locked in a life and death war with a powerful enemy in which the odds were stacked against it. This, as former Waffle member Cy Gonick admits, was the reason the Waffle downplayed foreign policy in its policy resolutions and writings. The expectation was that once Canada's survival had been assured, attention would shift to the rest of the world.⁵¹²

Yet, given the nature of the titanic struggle with the most powerful nation on earth, would this ever have happened?. The fact is that viewing the world almost exclusively through the prism of the 49th parallel (as the Waffle did) for an extended length of time would inevitably have produced a narrow perspective from which the rest of the globe would disappear for all practical purposes. What would have worsened the situation was the defensive mentality bordering on paranoia that resulted from the Waffle's single-minded focus on a real or imagined enemy. Needless to say, in such an atmosphere, social democratic internationalism or any other kind of internationalism could not have thrived.

Moreover, creating an independent Canada as completely free of American influence as possible, like any ideal, easily becomes an all-or-nothing proposition. The

⁵¹² Cy Gonick interview, June 22, 1992.

danger is that once people realize the ideal is unreachable, they become discouraged and give up entirely, refusing to get involved with so-called half-way measures such as working for peace on a step-by-step basis within existing world institutions.

Even with the Waffle's defeat and departure, economic nationalism left an indelible mark on the NDP's psyche and on its foreign policy in the Seventies and beyond. Specifically, it reinforced the already existing neutralist and quasi-isolationist tendencies in the party in such a manner as to produce a more insular world view and less active involvement in international affairs at least compared to the decade before and the one that was to follow (with a few exceptions to be discussed in later chapters). This is also the firm opinion of Bill Knight who freely admits he was a member of the "nationalist club" from about 1965 to 1975. He also believes that nationalism and isolationism fed off each other during those years.⁵¹³

A major 1981 NDP discussion paper produced by its International Affairs Committee, "Peace, Security and Justice," attests to this retreat from internationalism in its assessment of the party's performance on foreign policy issues in the Seventies:

Among all contending political philosophies it has been democratic socialism that has championed international solidarity and concern for mankind beyond the national self-interest. In Canada the CCF, from its earliest days, gave special attention to international concerns.... In recent years, however, our concern about important domestic questions has overshadowed our traditional commitment to international questions and our commitment to being in the vanguard of Canadian involvement in international affairs.⁵¹⁴

⁵¹³ Bill Knight interview, May 7, 1991.

⁵¹⁴ "Report of the International Affairs Committee: An NDP Discussion Paper," presented to the 1981 convention, NDP Research. p.29.

Increasingly, then, as the Seventies progressed, foreign policy (except matters in keeping with the nationalist agenda such as bilateral economic relations with the United States and to some extent Third World issues) was downplayed by the party leadership at all levels including convention, Policy committee, Federal Council and even in Parliament. NDP foreign policy, such as it was, can for the most part be described as reactive for much of the 1970s. If major crises or events occurred, the NDP would usually comment but no comprehensive reviews of foreign policy were conducted during these years. In fact, Knight is convinced that the NDP had already "missed the boat" in the late Sixties. Instead of getting hung up on a symbolic fight over NATO, it should have conducted a comprehensive foreign and defence policy review.⁵¹⁵

In addition, little initiative as a party was shown in bringing important international issues to public attention except where the NDP constituency developed a specific interest and where Andrew Brewin, the party's long time external affairs critic, carried on a personal crusade such as Chile and the Third World. Another sign of the decline was the virtual absence of impassioned and eloquent speeches on international affairs by NDP spokespersons in Parliament. This lack of emotional involvement stands in marked contrast to the Sixties when Tommy Douglas, H.W. Herridge, Colin Cameron and Andrew Brewin, in particular, regularly stirred the hearts and minds of Canadians and even members of opposing political parties on foreign policy themes. Equally telling is the fact that one searches almost in vain for NDP speeches on the traditional social democratic internationalist themes of world community, world federalism, and world law. Even the United Nations had a somewhat lower profile in this decade in party activities and pronouncements.

⁵¹⁵ Bill Knight interview, May 7, 1991.

The major exception is, of course, bilateral economic relations with the United States, but the exception proves the rule, since this illustrates the point that for most NDPers in this decade, interest about the outside world was restricted to one country. In the 1970 to 1972 period, with the Waffle grabbing the media headlines on the economic nationalist issue, NDP spokespersons in the House of Commons had to be very careful. On the one hand, since they knew the Waffle's rhetoric and tone were too strong for the average voter, the NDP parliamentary caucus tried to keep its distance from this "party" within the party. On the other hand, the NDP leadership was cognizant of the rising nationalist enthusiasm both among party faithful and the public. Thus, for example, in his initial response to J.J. Green's continentalist speech in December of 1969, Tommy Douglas did not categorically denounce the energy minister's proposals. Instead, he asked that the whole question be referred to the appropriate standing committee or a special committee to avoid a situation where Parliament would later be confronted with a *fait accompli*, as had been the case with the 1962 Columbia River Treaty.⁵¹⁶

After negative reaction to Greene's speech continued to mount, Douglas, sensing the mood of the country, made a much stronger speech on January 13, 1970. The choice he said was between independence as offered by the NDP or the "paralytic" continentalism of the Liberal government. Yet in the same speech, Douglas emphasized that NDP concerns were not based on any "petty nationalism," an obvious attempt to distance the party mainstream from the strident nationalism of the Waffle.⁵¹⁷ Interestingly, Douglas bolstered his arguments in favour of economic independence not by referring to the strong resolution approved by the '69 convention

⁵¹⁶ Debates, Dec.18, 1969, p.2124.

⁵¹⁷ Ibid., Jan.13, 1970, p.2334.

titled, "For a United and Independent Canada," but to the more moderate 1968 Watkins Report. Indeed, throughout the early Seventies, party spokespersons in and outside Parliament made almost no reference to the 1969 statement.

Douglas followed his January 13th statement with a demand, about ten days later, for a clear and forthright declaration of Canadian sovereignty over the North in light of the Manhattan's voyage.⁵¹⁸ This, he avowed, was not a time for quiet diplomacy since the specific issue was only one facet of a much larger problem, namely, Canada's diminishing control over its affairs. The next decade would be crucial, Douglas claimed: "I believe that we will emerge from the Seventies either as a strong, united Canada with a potential for greatness or we will find ourselves absorbed as a junior partner in an American hegemony."⁵¹⁹

When President Nixon threatened to reduce the American quota on imported oil in the summer of 1970, Douglas denounced it as "a lever, to use a polite word, on Canada to agree to an energy package policy."⁵²⁰ Then, beginning in early January of 1971, Douglas and the rest of the NDP caucus stepped up the pressure on the Liberal government significantly, insisting that it produce an independent energy policy without further delay. In his arguments favouring this concept, Douglas reflected many of the points made by James Laxer in his 1970 book when worries about a continental energy program were at their peak. Indeed, even after stepping down as leader in 1971 until his death in the mid-Eighties, Douglas made it his business to vigorously promote and defend the goal of an independent energy policy for Canada.

⁵¹⁸ Ibid., Jan.22, 1970, p.2694.

⁵¹⁹ Ibid.

⁵²⁰ Ibid., June 18, 1970, pp.8275-6.

In this regard, the NDP's immediate concern in the early Seventies was the American desire to build a northern gas pipeline to export American and Canadian natural gas to the United States. Before granting approval for this project, the Canadian government, Douglas insisted, should refer the matter to a standing committee of the House of Commons to determine Canada's future gas needs and to study the ecological effects of pipeline construction in the North.⁵²¹ After the Liberal government released a proposal in 1972 for a Mackenzie valley route for oil and gas pipelines, David Lewis, the new NDP leader, renewed his party's attack based on environmental, financial and economic considerations, especially the project's dependence on American capital and technology.⁵²²

The New Democratic Party's energy policy was by no means the only manifestation of economic nationalism's strong effect on the party's approach to bilateral economic relations with the United States. Throughout 1971, in particular, the party mounted a sustained and multifaceted attack on the Liberal government's economic and foreign policies in connection with American control of other aspects of the Canadian economy. For example, party spokespersons continually badgered Herb Gray, the minister of national revenue, to release his long-awaited report on foreign investment and control of the Canadian economy.⁵²³ Even the least anti-American NDP MPs, such as Max Saltzman and David Orlikow, demanded a halt to American takeovers of Canadian companies which they claimed had accelerated in recent

⁵²¹ Ibid., Jan.21, 1971, p.2614.

⁵²² R.B. Byers, "External Affairs and Defence," in Canadian Annual Review, ed. by John Saywell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), p.370.

⁵²³ See for example, Debates, Nov.1, 1971, p.9553.

years.⁵²⁴ Moreover, Nixon's imposition of the ten percent surtax on Canadian imports provided the New Democrats with the opportunity to mount a vigorous campaign for an uncompromising response by the Canadian authorities against this action and American attitudes towards Canada in general.

In his major address on the subject in Parliament, David Lewis objected strongly to the Canadian government going "cap in hand" to Washington begging for an exemption from the surtax: "Canada is not a banana republic.... We are not in a position of weakness where we have to go on our knees to you (the US). You need our oil and natural gas."⁵²⁵ In retaliation, Canada ought to impose an export tax on oil and gas sales to the United States. Lewis's oration was undoubtedly one of the most defiant and, in one sense, anti-American speeches made in the House of Commons in the Seventies, especially coming from someone who usually shied away from such practices. The statement by Lewis demonstrated forcefully how economic nationalism went hand in hand with and reinforced traditional NDP fears of American dominance, which could quite easily spill over into anti-Americanism.

In his address, Lewis also showed how the key arguments of economic nationalism were interrelated. Canada, he maintained, had found itself particularly vulnerable to the ten percent surtax because consecutive Liberal governments "in their love of continentalism" had permitted the situation to arise in which seventy percent of Canadian exports was dependent on the United States market. This, in turn, had been caused by the massive foreign ownership of Canada's resources and the predominance of American multinational branch plants in this country. As a result, the Canadian economy found itself in a straight-jacket. At a minimum, Canada ought to

⁵²⁴ *Ibid.*, Feb.26, 1971, p.3805; Mar.4, 1971, p.3963.

⁵²⁵ *Ibid.*, Sept., 1971, p.7565.

establish a monitoring agency like that proposed by the Watkins Report and endorsed by the Special Committee on External Affairs and National Defence to ensure that Canadian subsidiaries did not transfer production to their American parent companies, particularly during the time when the surtax was in effect.⁵²⁶

Despite Lewis's bombastic tone, none of his ideas were particularly radical. In fact, they reflected the relatively "conservative" resolution passed at the NDP's 1971 spring convention on natural resources which promised that an NDP government would

increase public investment in and control of Canada's resource industries by all available and appropriate means, including public ownership and joint participation with private corporations; and especially, through public ownership of the oil and natural gas distribution systems.⁵²⁷

In the NDP convention debate on this resolution, Ed Broadbent had pointed out that it represented a retreat from the position adopted previously by the Federal Council advocating complete nationalization of the oil and gas industry.⁵²⁸ Both Broadbent's position and that of the Waffle, which insisted that nationalization be expanded to include all resource industries, were defeated. In fact, despite James Laxer's strong showing in the leadership fight, Waffle influence in the NDP was already in decline. Only two Wafflers were returned as members-at-large on the Federal Council compared to five in 1969.⁵²⁹

⁵²⁶ Ibid., Sept.7, 1971, p.7568.

⁵²⁷ Anne Scotton, ed., "Natural Resources," in New Democratic Policies 1961-1976 (Ottawa: New Democratic Party), p.47.

⁵²⁸ Michael Cross, "Third Class on the Titanic: The NDP Convention," in Canadian Dimension, Vol.8 (Apr.-May, 1971), p.5.

⁵²⁹ Ibid., p.4.

Nevertheless, two years later at the '73 convention, with the Waffle long gone, economic nationalism was still influential.⁵³⁰ The NDP platform continued to base its energy policy on opposition to continentalism but with the emphasis clearly shifted to public control of all energy resources rather than ownership. Federal government ownership, the convention determined, would be limited to one government-owned Canadian petroleum corporation and all pipelines.⁵³¹ This was at a time when a Gallup poll showed that 48% of Canadians favoured nationalization of the entire oil and gas industry with only 36% opposed.⁵³² The following year, after the onset of the energy crisis, the NDP's Federal Council felt compelled by events to pass a motion reaffirming the 1973 resolution but adding (among other things) that Canada should aim for energy self-sufficiency in oil by 1980 with all new energy developments containing a dominant public sector role.⁵³³ When public concern continued to mount, the Council moved to an even more radical position in 1976 calling for public ownership of resource companies with the ultimate objective of full public ownership of the entire energy sector by federal and provincial governments.⁵³⁴

The NDP endorsed this resolution knowing full well that its implementation would have led to a crisis in American-Canadian relations, a situation that later arose in the early Eighties when the Liberal government of the day passed a series of

⁵³⁰ After the Waffle was expelled from the NDP in 1972, Canadian Dimension, which had moved steadily leftward, largely lost interest in the NDP for the rest of the decade.

⁵³¹ Scotton, "A National Energy Policy," pp.49-50.

⁵³² Robert Laxer, "Foreword," The Political Economy of Dependency (Canada) Ltd. p.14.

⁵³³ Ibid., "National Oil Policy," pp.51-2.

⁵³⁴ Ibid., "Public Ownership and Control," p.53.

nationalist energy measures which the Americans viewed as provocative. Would a NDP federal government in the middle Seventies, even at the peak of the nationalist tide, have implemented the party's more radical proposals if faced with almost certain United States retaliation and a serious deterioration in bilateral relations? Nationalist pronouncements by a relatively minor opposition party were one thing; nationalist actions by a social democratic government against the economic interests of the most powerful nation in the world were quite another.

While NDP conventions were passing these nationalist economic resolutions and having some impact on Liberal government policy in this area, especially during the period when the NDP held the balance of power in Parliament from 1972 to 1974, a different story was being played out at election time. In fact, almost all the nationalist rhetoric and policy resolutions were ignored during the 1972, 1974 and 1979 elections. For example, just six months before the '72 election, in an address before a joint session of Parliament, President Nixon had taken it upon himself to support Canada's right to pursue an independent course in domestic and foreign affairs. In response, Lewis fumed, "The attempt to tell us that the independence of Canada has been declared in Washington makes me irritated...more than irritated."⁵³⁵ However, come the election, almost no nationalist appeal was made by the NDP leader to the electorate on the basis of Nixon's statement or the general issue of Canadian independence. The same was true in 1974⁵³⁶ and 1979, the latter being Ed Broadbent's first campaign as NDP leader. In the case of the '79 election, the Toronto

⁵³⁵ Canadian Annual Review, 1972, p.165.

⁵³⁶ Walter C. Soderlund and Ronald H. Wagenberg, "The Editor and External Affairs: The 1972 and 1974 election campaigns," International Journal, Vol.31 (Spring, 1976), p.253.

Star observed that the NDP had "turned subtly from dogma to pragmatism."⁵³⁷ Downplaying the nationalist/independence question was no accident as Lewis made abundantly clear in an August 28, 1974 interview. "We didn't promote the nationalist issue. People are interested in their daily bread."⁵³⁸

This underlines the ambivalent attitude NDP thinkers had in the Seventies towards the nationalist question. On one side, there were nationalist/idealists like Kenneth McNaught, the biographer of J.S. Wordsworth, who published an article in the January, 1970 edition of Canadian Forum refuting what he called "the consensus view of history," the interpretation that Canadian history was the story of a long, patient and nearly inevitable climb from colony to nation.⁵³⁹ In rejecting this view, McNaught showed that he accepted all the revisionist assumptions propounded by Waffle thinkers. Canada had just exchanged colonial masters; previously it had been Britain, now it was the United States. He was convinced that political domination by the latter would inevitably follow if American economic and military dominance over Canada were maintained. Having been betrayed by its economic elites, as McNaught saw it (including quite a few trade union leaders), Canada was now the most important and reliable "province" in the American Empire. The only hope lay in the English and French-speaking Left who had given a nationalist and "nationaliste" tone to the

⁵³⁷ Fred Lazar, "The National Economy," Canadian Annual Review, ed. by R.B. Byers (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), p.181

⁵³⁸ Transcript of anonymous interview with David Lewis, Aug. 26, 1974, NAC, MG 32, C23, Vol.48, File David Lewis 1974-1975. Lewis's opinion is largely confirmed by polls taken at the time. See Howard D. Clarke, et al., Absent Mandate: The Politics of Discontent in Canada (Toronto: Gage Pub., 1984), pp.79-84.

⁵³⁹ Kenneth McNaught, "The Permanent Colony," Canadian Forum, Vol.69 (January, 1970), pp.227-8. McNaught's interpretation accords well with peripheral-dependency theory as outlined by Dewitt and Kirton and discussed in the introduction.

demand for public ownership of the key sectors of the economy and strong regulation of foreign investment.⁵⁴⁰

If McNaught embraced economic nationalism wholeheartedly, the same cannot be said for Ed Broadbent and Desmond Morton writing in the same journal two and a half years later. In his article, "On Independence and Socialism," Broadbent began by noting the largely negative role nationalism had played throughout history. He challenged people on the Left who wanted both an independent and socialist Canada to avoid promoting attitudes and institutions, such as anti-Americanism, which would negate what he called "our libertarian objective." For Broadbent, it was fundamentally not from the American people or their government that Canadians must regain their independence but from American corporations and their goals.

To continentalize our economies and cultures now would be a victory for the right, for such actions would only serve to strengthen the already immense power of American-owned multinational corporations on a continental basis and would shatter the existing socialist agrarian West, our trade unions and our political parties.⁵⁴¹

Desmond Morton, a strong realist, who had led the anti-Waffle forces at the '71 convention as leader of a group called "NDP Now," went further than Broadbent in criticizing nationalism in an article entitled, "Independence: It won't Be Easy."⁵⁴² Morton highlighted specific examples in Canadian history of the "negative and even corrosive" effects of both political and economic nationalism. Consequently, nationalist

⁵⁴⁰ Ibid., p.228.

⁵⁴¹ Ed Broadbent, "On Independence and Socialism," Canadian Forum, Vol.72 (April, 1972), pp.31-3.

⁵⁴² Desmond Morton, "Independence: It Won't be Easy," Canadian Forum, Vol.72 (April, 1972), pp.20-1.

policies did not automatically deserve support simply because they claimed to aid independence. Morton believed nationalism incapable of helping Canadians answer the key question, "Why was Canadian independence so important?" Moreover, he noted that if the crisis facing Canadian independence was half as serious as "acres of newsprint and gallons of ink" would seem to suggest, four years of non-stop Canadian nationalism had accomplished disappointingly little either in finding realistic policy directions or selling them to ordinary Canadians.⁵⁴³

Morton's points were well taken, especially given the fact that, as observed earlier, nationalism seemed to have such limited appeal at election time. The problem for the NDP was that without the emotional appeal of nationalism, its arguments in favour of independence seemed to lack conviction both for party members and the general public. If this, in turn, led the party brass to downplay the independence question during election campaigns, it left the impression that, in the final analysis, the NDP was not really committed to the independence issue and indeed was afraid of it.

Could the NDP not have sold Canadian independence to the electorate by launching an all-out political effort to explain its alleged economic advantages in simple terms? One person, Bruce Hodgins, writing in the April, 1973 edition of Canadian Forum argued that the public were now ready to vote for a party which would do just that. What was needed was a vigorous campaign to show why continentalism, the natural resources crisis and ecological concerns were now "bread and butter" issues. In other words, that the independence and environmental agendas were the wave of the future and could be exploited electorally.⁵⁴⁴ Hodgins was to be disappointed; the

⁵⁴³ Ibid., p.21.

⁵⁴⁴ Bruce Hodgins, "The New Democrats," Canadian Forum, Vol.53 (April, 1973), p.16.

1974 NDP election platform centred on opposition to wage and price controls and other more traditional "bread and butter" themes.

The influence of nationalism with the general public and the NDP had begun to weaken by the mid-Seventies in all areas including bilateral American-Canadian economic relations. Indeed, in some circles, a reaction to nationalism and its agenda had begun.⁵⁴⁵ By that time, however, as this chapter has documented (and the following one will also), the negative effects of nationalism on Canadian social democratic internationalism were considerable.

⁵⁴⁵ For example, Alan Heisy, a Toronto businessman, published a thoughtful book which took issue with practically all aspects of the "new nationalism" which, he believed, had infected all political parties and the entire media. He called for a counter-insurgency by the internationalists in at least one of the parties in time for the next election to give the Canadian people a chance to choose between nationalism and internationalism. Alan Heisy, The Great Canadian Stampede: The Rush to Economic Nationalism - Right or Wrong (Toronto: Griffen House, 1973), p.147. John W. Holmes provides a more balanced assessment of nationalism, internationalism and Canadian-American at the mid-point of the Seventies in his book, Canada: A Middle-Aged Power (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1976), pp.192-203.

CHAPTER NINE

NAVIGATING WITHOUT A PLAN - NDP FOREIGN POLICY (1970-5)

Examination of the impact of the nationalist/independence issue on the NDP's handling of the broad sweep of foreign policy issues (besides strictly Canadian-American economic relations) in the 1970 to 1975 period must begin with the party's response to the Liberal government's long-awaited White Paper, Foreign Policy for Canadians.⁵⁴⁶ The report, released on June 25, 1970, contained the results of a major two-year review of most aspects of Canadian international affairs policy. There were six pamphlets with one each on Europe, the Pacific, Latin America, the United Nations, international development and general themes. The White Paper's main conceptual framework was that foreign policy should be the extension abroad of national policies of which the most important was national unity.⁵⁴⁷

⁵⁴⁶ Department of External Affairs, Foreign Policy for Canadians (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1970). For an overview of Canadian international affairs policy in the 1970s, see Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, John English, Canada Since 1945: Power, Politics, and Provincialism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), pp.371-8.

⁵⁴⁷ Bruce Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy: A Study in Decision-making (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972), p.182; J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), pp.3-35. Also see, John W. Holmes, Canada: A Middle-Aged Power (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1976), pp.8-19.

The six principal policy objectives were grouped in two tiers, while within each tier, items were listed in order of importance. Top ranking in the first went to economic growth followed by social justice, and quality of life. In the second tier were the more traditional foreign policy goals of working for peace and security, safeguarding sovereignty and independence and a new one, ensuring a harmonious natural environment.⁵⁴⁸ The designation of economic growth as the number one foreign policy objective was partly a reflection of the nationalist mood of the times and Prime Minister Trudeau's bias. The time had arrived for Canada to design a foreign policy that more closely reflected Canadian interests. In practical terms, this required shifting priorities away from Canada's traditional role as a responsible international "fixer" to the promotion of Canadian exports.⁵⁴⁹

In a series of articles and memos, Andrew Brewin, the NDP's foreign policy critic, responded to the White Paper with four major criticisms. In his view, the Liberal Paper was guilty of distorting foreign policy priorities, retreating from internationalism, failing to adequately treat United States-Canada relations and sacrificing social justice. In terms of priorities, social democratic internationalism required that social justice come before economic growth. However, in a nuclear world, the preservation of peace and security must rank first of all, closely followed by the safeguarding of Canadian

⁵⁴⁸ Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy, p.182,

⁵⁴⁹ J.L. Granatstein, "External Affairs and Defence," Canadian Annual Review ed. by John Saywell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), p.314. Despite this, Michael Tucker maintains that Trudeau's nationalism was in essence a form of internationalism, because he viewed Canada as a mentor state taking initiatives on behalf of the world community. See Michael Tucker, Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary Issues and Themes (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980), p.10. If Tucker is right, Trudeau's internationalism and social democratic internationalism had some things in common.

sovereignty and independence. This, Brewin argued, was because in the global village,

the creation of world community is the number one challenge, and in meeting this challenge Canada's sovereignty and independence must have a high priority if Canada's contribution to peace and security - her own and the world's - is to be given proper emphasis."⁵⁵⁰

Misplaced priorities were also a root cause of a second major problem with the government's proposals. The Liberal retreat from Canada's "helpful fixer" role represented, as Brewin saw it, an attitude of complacency and world weariness, an escape from internationalism into a "narrowly conceived national self interest, a negative isolationism and an unannounced but dominant continentalism."⁵⁵¹ In terms of the internationalist theme, Ed Broadbent censured the Liberal White Paper for omitting two other objectives, namely, increasing assistance to developing countries and fostering and protecting democratic socialist nations.⁵⁵² (The latter is a puzzling

⁵⁵⁰ Andrew Brewin, "Basis for Speakers Notes for Forthcoming Election on Foreign Policy and Defence Issues," August, 1971, NAC, MG 32, C26, Vol.83, File 11, p.2.

⁵⁵¹ Brewin, "Draft Only," Feb. 16, 1971. NAC, MG 32, C26, Vol. 83, File 11, p.2. Peyton V. Lyon, Prof. of Political Science at Carleton University, used even stronger language than Brewin in calling the White Paper "isolationism writ large." Lyon also noted that in abandoning its traditional active internationalist participation in global affairs, Canada was losing one of the few solid elements that fostered its distinctive identity. Peyton V. Lyon, "The Trudeau Doctrine," *International Journal*, Vol.26 (1970-71), p.41. Indeed, a few years earlier, David Cox had argued that Canada's heavy involvement with peacekeeping had aided the cause of Canadian independence because it broadened the perspective of Canadians. He concluded, therefore, that "in foreign policy internationalism is as good a way as any to resist continentalism." David Cox, "Peacekeeping in Canadian Foreign Policy," in *A Independent Foreign Policy for Canada?*, ed. by Stephen Clarkson (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1968), p.197. The de facto isolationists in the Canadian Left during that era seemed to have forgotten this point.

⁵⁵² Broadbent, "Transcript of Speech," undated, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.37, File 19.

comment but perhaps understandable as a reaction to Canadian trade ties with authoritarian governments.)

Brewin's observations about the White Paper deserve careful attention. First, they reveal that he for one was resisting the inward focused nationalist agenda of the Waffle and their fellow travellers in the NDP. In the midst of the turmoil of the early Seventies, with the influence of nationalism strongly in evidence even in the Liberal White Paper as witness its isolationist tendencies, Brewin maintained a strong commitment to social democratic internationalism. Canada, he maintained, still had a vital middle power role to play in promoting peace and security particularly because, as a friendly neighbour of a superpower and therefore least exposed to non-nuclear external aggression, Canada was free to help in peacekeeping and international development.⁵⁵³

Brewin did not ignore the issues raised by the nationalists; indeed, he ranked sovereignty and independence a close second to peace and security in importance. But he argued that care must be given to promoting a proper relationship between internationalism and national independence. Thus, while sovereignty and independence were prerequisites if Canada was to contribute to world peace and security, the promotion of a healthy and vigorous internationalism was also a necessary condition for true independence and sovereignty because, in the nuclear age, they would count for nothing if peace was not maintained.⁵⁵⁴

What was it about Brewin's internationalism that enabled it to survive better than most in the Canadian social democratic camp in the 1970s. The answer is that

⁵⁵³ Brewin, "Foreign Policy For Canadians: Comments on the White Paper," Behind the Headlines, Vol.29 (August, 1970) pp.1-2.

⁵⁵⁴ Brewin, "Speaker's Notes," p.3.

Brewin found a way to draw from both strands of NDP internationalism (idealism and realism), although on defence and Canadian-American relations, he remained firmly within the realist camp. In fact, Brewin liked to think of himself as "a practical idealist".⁵⁵⁵ Idealism provided the objective, which was a world without barriers built on principles of equality and justice. Realism supplied the knowledge that this course required (among other things) pain-staking traditional diplomatic efforts to achieve agreements such as the Salt I and ABM treaties which lessened the chances of nuclear war. In Brewin's view, attention must also be paid to alliances, because they provided stability and some measure of security during the time international bridge-building efforts were creating the atmosphere for detente with the Eastern Bloc, which, in turn, would eventually render the alliances obsolete. Moreover, as far as any special Canadian contribution to the international community was concerned, Canada must continue its steadfast support for the United Nations and peacekeeping.

The third major NDP criticism of the 1970 Foreign Policy White Paper was that it failed to take Canada's relations with the United States seriously. Brewin could not comprehend this omission given that so many Canadians were particularly solicitous about sovereignty and independence. In particular, he wanted to know where the

⁵⁵⁵ In his 1972 book review of Diplomacy and its Discontents by James Eayrs, Brewin drew special attention to the author's description of five possible attitudes a person could take when confronted by the evils of the world. They included: brutal realism, sceptical realism, liberal idealism, pharisean idealism or practical idealism. Brewin endorsed Eayrs's choice of the latter because he agreed with its primary dictum, namely, that the fundamental question to ask in any situation was, "How best could human suffering be relieved here and now?" Brewin also noted that, in his view, NDP idealists often fell into the trap of pharisean idealism with all the pride and hypocrisy that phrase suggested. Andrew Brewin, "Review of Diplomacy and its Discontents," NAC, MG 32, C26, Vol.49, File 11. Also see James Eayrs, Right and Wrong in Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966). By implication, Brewin was saying that the first question NDP idealists usually asked in any situation was, "How does what I am doing now help reach humanities' long-term goal of a world where the ideals of justice and peace will reign supreme?"

government stood on the spectrum between complete passive acceptance of American hegemony on the one hand, and total neutrality and non-cooperation on the other.⁵⁵⁶

In 1971, Andrew Brewin and Doug Rowland, MP for Selkirk, and the other NDP members of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence (SCEAND) released a minority report which outlined their differences with the majority's analysis of Canadian-American relations and the policies pursued by the Liberal government on the matter. The NDP report disagreed strongly with the notion that the United States posed no political threat to Canada or the majority report's conclusion that Canada was not yet a satellite of Washington. As Brewin and company wrote,

In our view, Canada has already become an economic satellite, and has already allowed itself to drift into a position of military, economic and cultural dependency upon the United States. In this situation formal political absorption becomes unnecessary and irrelevant.⁵⁵⁷

The report went on to accuse the Liberal and Conservative majority on the committee of ignoring difficult issues in Canadian-American relations and providing no analysis of the extent to which Canada's foreign and defence policies had displayed an undue degree of subservience and acquiescence to American policies in such policy areas as Vietnam, NORAD, NATO, the Defence Production Agreement, the deployment of new weapons systems and more. In the future, Canada ought to pursue concrete policies that promoted independence; only then could it claim to have an independent foreign policy. The analysis and prescriptions provided by the NDP minority report were

⁵⁵⁶ Brewin, "Foreign Policy for Canadians," p.1.

⁵⁵⁷ "Minority Report," SCEAND, 1971, NAC, MG 32, C26, Vol.77, File 9, p.1

largely in keeping with those put forward by the NDP in the Sixties, but the tone was now more strident and apocalyptic, reflecting the intense nationalism of the period. How comfortable Brewin was with this tone is hard to judge, but for him to sign a paper which included such trademark nationalist phrases as "economic satellite," and "military, economic and cultural dependency upon the United States," indicates that even Brewin, the cool headed realist, despite his best efforts, could not completely resist the nationalist tide that was inundating the New Democratic party.

The year, 1971, saw the release of another government White Paper. This one focused more narrowly on defence. It endorsed Brewin's view that protection of Canadian sovereignty through surveillance and control of its territory should be the main defence priority, a point that led Brewin to praise the White Paper for reflecting "much more realism than we are used to seeing in the government's defence thinking."⁵⁵⁸ The Defence White Paper's other three priorities in the government's stated order of importance were defence of North America in cooperation with the United States, fulfilment of NATO commitments and participation in peacekeeping operations.

Perhaps because Brewin felt handicapped by his disagreement with his party's official anti-NATO policy or because of the very low priority the NDP in general placed on defence policy in the early Seventies, there appears to have been no attempt to

⁵⁵⁸ R.B. Byers, "External Affairs and Defence," in Canadian Annual Review, ed. by John Saywell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), p.294. Jack Granatstein, historian and NDP sympathizer, was much less charitable in his critique of the Defence White Paper. To him, the emphasis on sovereignty was simply an excuse to keep more troops in Canada ostensibly to ensure surveillance of Canadian territory but in reality to aid the civil power in putting down dissent, as had happened in Quebec the year before. Here was the real message of the White Paper and showed how phoney the government's neo-nationalism really was. See J.L. Granatstein, "Once Contre Nous," Canadian Forum, Vol.51 (Sept., 1971), p.3. The NDP never picked up on this point, probably because it was still divided over whether the government had been justified in sending the troops into Quebec the year before under the War Measures Act.

formulate a systematic response to the Liberal Defence White Paper. Having apparently settled the NATO issue once and for all in 1969, most NDPers had even less interest than usual in discussing roles for the armed forces. Thus, when the House convened that fall, almost no questions were asked on the White Paper by members of the NDP caucus. However, this lack of interest in the topic characterized the Liberal government and the official opposition, the Progressive Conservatives, to a considerable extent as well. Incredibly, Parliament had to wait another four years after the release of the White Paper to have its first substantive debate on defence policy since 1969. Part of the explanation lies in the fact that two elections (1972 and 1974) were held in the intervening years which were dominated even more than usual by domestic affairs. In addition, the '72 election produced a minority government with the NDP holding the balance of power. Their priority was the implementation of nationalist policies in the areas of foreign investment and energy.

Consequently, it was not until November 27, 1975, that T.C. Douglas gave the NDP's full response to the government's defence statement. Liberal defence policy, he insisted, was based on a major fallacy. It assumed wrongly that Canada was a top rank military power. "Since the end of World War II we have been trying to ape the great military powers with the result that we do a little bit of everything but do not do anything particularly well."⁵⁵⁹ Moreover, he doubted whether Canada could afford the high costs of fulfilling all four priorities that the White Paper had outlined. He agreed with the government that defence of Canadian sovereignty and North American defence must rank first and second, but he argued that peacekeeping should come ahead of support for NATO. The latter stance was not surprising given the NDP's well known views on these matters.

⁵⁵⁹ Debates, Nov.27, 1975, p.9504.

One of the reasons Douglas gave for placing peacekeeping ahead of NATO was new at least for the NDP. Peacekeeping was cheap; equipping troops in Europe was expensive.⁵⁶⁰ This newfound NDP emphasis on economizing was partly a function of an emerging fiscal strain, which for the first time was beginning to threaten the social safety net which the NDP had fought to create. Economic concerns also explain why in the same address Douglas insisted that much of the \$950 million allotted for the replacement of the ageing Argus transport plane be spent in Canada to provide jobs for Canadians and put "some muscle into the Canadian aircraft industry." He urged that the government's choice of contractor not make Canada increasingly dependent on foreign aircraft manufacturers.⁵⁶¹

Thus, while the NDP still remained committed to its by-then traditional NDP defence policy themes, the party appeared more willing than a few years earlier to acknowledge the importance of other factors in making defence policy decisions, in particular, internal economic concerns. This would have a long-term dampening effect on social democratic idealism within the party because no longer could it be assumed that Canada would have the means to remake the world even if given the opportunity. Still, in the mid-Seventies, idealists were certainly not ready to acknowledge this shift.

In affirming the Liberal government's second priority, North American defence, Douglas had also taken the opportunity to restate the NDP's long-standing opposition to NORAD. After considerable study by SCEAND, Norad had been renewed in 1973, but only for a two year period, evidence that even the government was not very comfortable with the prospect of spending \$150 million a year to defend North America against a few Russian bombers in the missile age.

⁵⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁶¹ Ibid.

Judging by several briefs submitted to the parliamentary committee, opposition to NORAD was also growing amidst the general populace and academic community. Colin Gray, a Professor at the University of British Columbia, wrote,

It is difficult to resist the conclusion that if you scratch an air defence spokesman very hard, what you will discover a man bent upon defending North America and particularly upon defending the deterrent in terms more appropriate to 1955 than to 1973.⁵⁶²

There is little doubt that the atmosphere of nationalism and anti-Americanism in the early Seventies contributed to this renewed questioning of the joint American-Canadian air defence agreement.

Canada, the NDP members of SCEAND stated in a minority report on NORAD, must patrol and control its own air space. Its special contribution to North American air defence should be through detection and identification. The information would be shared with the Americans under the terms of a new framework agreement replacing NORAD.⁵⁶³ For those who claimed such a policy would harm Canadian-American relations, Brewin responded indignantly:

This is dangerous timidity and a denial of Canadian sovereignty as well as being insulting to the United States. Of course if we withdraw from NORAD on the basis that we want no truck nor trade with the Yankees this would cause difficulty.⁵⁶⁴

⁵⁶² R.B. Byers, "External Affairs and Defence," Canadian Annual Review, ed. by John Saywell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), p.280.

⁵⁶³ "News Release - Minority Report of the NDP Members of the Committee on External Affairs and National Defence on NORAD," Apr.16, 1973, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.76, File 11.

⁵⁶⁴ Debates, Apr.17, 1973, p.3303.

At a minimum, Brewin demanded that the government submit the renewal of NORAD for debate and ratification by Parliament.

In Brewin's mind, questioning NORAD was not a rejection of realism. Canada and the United States were partners in the Atlantic alliance and community with shared values and goals with or without NORAD. At the same time, he had no illusions about the real reason why Canada stayed in NORAD despite its military obsolescence. As he wrote in a memo to David Lewis on one occasion after a meeting with high Canadian government officials, "We were told that this [NORAD membership], together with our continuing presence in NATO was a necessary ticket for entry into the [Western] club of which the United States was the main member."⁵⁶⁵

NDP radical idealists could never share Brewin's fundamentally positive attitude towards the United States because to them the United States was less a partner and more of an adversary on the world scene. They would have preferred to cut all defence ties with Washington as a significant step towards Canada finding a new role in the world. However, in the Seventies, foreign affairs ranked too low on their list of priorities for the idealists to make a sustained attempt to radicalize NDP foreign policy. Then again, they knew from experience that attempts to do so could easily be stonewalled by the NDP inner circle through its control of the Federal Council, the Resolutions Committee and the rest of the party machinery.

For example, prior to the 1971 convention, delegates had submitted 58 foreign policy resolutions which were then boiled down to four by the Resolutions committee. As at most previous NDP conventions, one of these served as a composite resolution which attempted to draw together the disparate themes and concerns expressed in the

⁵⁶⁵ Memo, Brewin to Lewis, "Re: Canada's Independence in International Affairs vis a vis the United States," Oct.24, 1974, NAC, MG 32, C26, Vol.77, File 10.

resolutions submitted by delegates on foreign policy matters. Several delegates criticized the 1971 resolution for being too bland and full of broad statements with no bite. However, these protests were easily overridden by the party brass who ran the convention. The core of the problem was that if a delegate disliked something in a composite resolution, she or he had to convince the convention to vote a referral ordering the Resolutions Committee to rework the whole resolution. Because of time constraints, this usually meant that the revised resolution never made it back to the convention floor in time. It was left to the Federal Council to decide the final wording of the resolution as it saw fit after the convention had concluded. The control exercised over the resolution process in 1971 was particularly strong since the leadership was determined to avoid a repeat of 1969 when the Waffle had managed to influence the agenda and many of the resolutions.⁵⁶⁶

Sometimes, resolutions from the convention floor could be passed if they were narrowly focused or dealt with innocuous, non-controversial issues or had immediate emotional appeal. For example, the 1971 convention resolved that the Aluminum Co. of Canada should be prosecuted if it did not immediately cancel its involvement in the building of the Cabora Bassa Dam in Mozambique which would supply hydro-electrical power to the illegal Rhodesian regime.⁵⁶⁷ Similarly, in a spontaneous response to an address by Cesar Chavez, head of the United Farm workers in California, the 1973 convention endorsed the boycott of American table grapes lacking the Union label.⁵⁶⁸ The Greenpeace protest against French nuclear tests in the Pacific also warranted a

⁵⁶⁶ Stephen Clarkson, "Policy in the NDP: Power vs. Participation," Canadian Forum, Vol.51 (Apr.-May, 1971), pp.7-8.

⁵⁶⁷ Anne Scotton, ed., "Cabora Bassa Dam," New Democratic Policies 1961-1976 (Ottawa: New Democratic Party, 1976), p.105.

⁵⁶⁸ Ibid., "Grape Boycott," pp.105-6.

special resolution of support that year. It urged the Canadian government to order the closing of all trade commissions in Canada from any country conducting atmospheric nuclear tests.⁵⁶⁹ There were doubtless hundreds of other worthy international causes the NDP could have endorsed in 1973, but circumstances and probably luck dictated that the Grape Boycott and Greenpeace got special treatment. This is further evidence that NDP foreign policy in the Seventies proceeded without benefit of a systematic and broad plan or strategy. As a result, it tended to be unimaginative and reactive in nature.

Despite the lack of an overall strategy and the limitations imposed by the convention process, interest in foreign policy issues amongst rank and file NDP members remained relatively strong at least in the early Seventies, certainly stronger than among the leadership. In fact, the number of resolutions submitted by delegates was comparable with the figures for conventions in the Sixties. Social democratic idealism was also not dead. A survey of the delegates found that 85.3% agreed with the statement that, "Canada should spend less on defence" and 74.1% supported more aid to underdeveloped countries.⁵⁷⁰

The 1971 composite resolution reaffirmed the NDP's traditional commitment to social democratic internationalism by calling once again for the establishment of an international order based on law and social justice where the unilateral actions of nations, especially the superpowers, would be curtailed. To this end, an NDP government would work for a strengthened United Nations and World Court, creation of a permanent UN Peacekeeping Force with a strong Canadian contingent,

⁵⁶⁹ ., "Greenpeace 3," p.108.

⁵⁷⁰ Alan Whitehorn, "The New Democratic Party in Convention," in Party Democracy in Canada, ed. by G. Perlin (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1987), pp.283-4.

improvement of the UN's technical agencies and universal membership in the world organization.⁵⁷¹

As in the preceding decade, the NDP's overriding consideration in relations with the Soviet Union during the Seventies was the avoidance of nuclear war. Still, as an independent poll of delegates to the 1971 NDP convention found, most party members did not take the Soviet threat to Canada very seriously.⁵⁷² Indeed, in NDP circles, Soviet foreign policy normally received somewhat gentler treatment than American policies. The exceptions tended to prove the rule such as the 1969 convention's condemnation of Brezhnev's doctrine of "just intervention" by which he justified Soviet aggression against Czechoslovakia in 1968.⁵⁷³

One reason for this discrepancy, as NDP spokespersons noted from time to time, was simply that Canada had a much greater chance of influencing American policy than Soviet. Hence, on the rare occasions during the early and middle Seventies when new developments in the arms race were debated in the Commons, it was American actions that garnered most of the attention. For example, on February 2, 1970, T.C. Douglas demanded that the government refuse participation in any American scheme to create an Anti-Ballistic Missile System (ABM).⁵⁷⁴ The following year found the NDP spearheading the attack on an American plan to conduct a large underground nuclear test at Amchitka, Alaska.⁵⁷⁵ To avoid charges of anti-Americanism, the 1971 resolution which condemned Washington's actions, also stated

⁵⁷¹ Scotton, "International Affairs," p.104.

⁵⁷² Ibid., p.284.

⁵⁷³ Scotton, "International Affairs and Defence," pp.102-3.

⁵⁷⁴ Canadian Annual Review, 1971, p.293.

⁵⁷⁵ Ibid., p.293.

that the NDP was opposed to nuclear testing anywhere and welcomed the efforts of both superpowers in seriously pursuing Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.⁵⁷⁶ The NDP also welcomed the removal of the last Bomarc nuclear missile from Canadian soil on May 9, 1972, and demanded reassurance that they not be replaced by any other nuclear devices.⁵⁷⁷ Nevertheless, the disarmament issue had lost much of its status as a cause celebre in NDP circles.

The disarmament question only began to revive later in the decade after President Carter announced American intentions to build a neutron bomb. Although already ill from the disease that would end his life four years later, Brewin rose in the House on December 19, 1977 to express his outrage in unequivocal terms. First, morally, the notion of a bomb specifically designed to kill people was totally repugnant. Second, the United States should not be creating new types of weapons when it already possessed a qualitative superiority in weaponry over the USSR.⁵⁷⁸ By implication, Brewin meant that Washington must accept primary responsibility if a new arms build-up resulted from its neutron bomb decision.

When in the late Sixties, Willy Brandt instituted his Ost Politic (the policy of building bridges with the Eastern Bloc which led to the signing of non-aggression treaties with Poland and the USSR in the early Seventies), the NDP strongly welcomed the initiative of the social democratic Chancellor of West Germany. The NDP hoped these developments would open the door to the convening of a European Security Conference, followed by the recognition of both Germanies and their entry into the United Nations. This, in turn, could soon open the door to the dissolution of the two

⁵⁷⁶ Scotton, "International Affairs," p.104.

⁵⁷⁷ Debates, May 9, 1972, p.2084.

⁵⁷⁸ Ibid., Dec.19, 1977, p.2010.

military alliances (a longstanding NDP dream) and, of course the lessening of tension and the chances of war. Hence, when the West appeared at times to be dragging its feet in responding to the East's stated desire for such a conference, the NDP became quite disturbed.⁵⁷⁹

Another important section of the 1971 composite resolution dealt with the oppression and exploitation of peoples by colonial regimes particularly in Africa. Specifically, the resolution reiterated NDP support for the liberation movements fighting against Portuguese colonialism in Guinea, Angola and Mozambique. As for South Africa and Rhodesia, it committed a future NDP government to "spearhead a boycott of products...and take action against Canadian companies trading with these countries."⁵⁸⁰ This was considerably less radical than the 1969 statement which had pledged that an NDP administration would cease all dealings public and private with racist regimes. The '69 resolution had also spelled out in more detail what the nature of Canada's support for African liberation movements should be, specifically mentioning moral, diplomatic, economic and material aid.⁵⁸¹

The more conservative bent on African policy, (as well as foreign policy in general), continued at the 1973 convention. A resolution was passed asking the Canadian government to end the special Commonwealth preference arrangements with South Africa and withdraw its trade commissioners from there and Angola. However, the resolution equivocated somewhat on the question of whether new Canadian investment in South Africa should be tolerated. Moreover, there was no call for disinvestment by Canadian companies of their southern African holdings but simply a

⁵⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, Dec.4 1969, p.1588; Dec.8, 1969, p.1680; June 5, 1972, p.2831.

⁵⁸⁰ Scotton, "International Affairs," p.104.

⁵⁸¹ *Ibid.*, "International Affairs and Defence," p.102.

demand that Canada provide them with guidelines to prevent exploitation of the peoples of those nations.⁵⁸² In addition, instead of imposing a compulsory boycott of all South African goods, the 1973 resolution assumed that trade would continue, albeit without the aid of the special Commonwealth preference. In effect, there was little trace left of the 1969 stand against all dealings with racist regimes.

Why had this change occurred? Attention must again be focused on the NDP reaction to the Trudeau government's 1970 White Paper, "Foreign Policy for Canadians." As noted at the outset of this chapter, the NDP critique of the document had four primary thrusts of which three have already been examined. The fourth one charged that by making economic growth the Canadian government's first priority, social justice for the peoples of South Africa had been sacrificed on the altar of "current realities" (the term used in the White Paper). These "realities" had two main facets: first, the interests of Canadian businessmen who recognized "better than normal" trade and investment opportunities in South Africa; second, the assumption that Canada could do very little to help change the situation in that country.⁵⁸³ The result was that under Liberal policy, Canada would simultaneously trade with South Africa and condemn its apartheid policies, an approach Trudeau himself had disparaged the year before: "We should either stop trading or condemning."⁵⁸⁴

In response to the Liberal policy and in keeping with a document published by a group of churchmen and people with overseas experience titled, "A Black Paper: An Alternative Policy For Canada Towards Southern Africa,"⁵⁸⁵ Brewin argued that

⁵⁸² Ibid., "Southern Africa," pp.107-8.

⁵⁸³ Brewin, "Foreign Policy for Canadians," p.2.

⁵⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁵ Garth Legge, et al. "A Black Paper: An Alternative Policy For Canada towards

trading with South Africa was contrary to Canada's real interest which was the building of a world community. Such a goal would remain impossible if the world were divided deeply and irrevocably into two camps, one wealthy and white, the other poor and black. When compared to these realities, Canada's trade with South Africa paled in significance. As Brewin wrote,

trade cannot be weighed against a foreign policy which would reflect rather than defy the basic values of human dignity and equality which are fundamental to our way of life nor can it justify our failure to bring our specific policies into harmony with our affirmation of basic principles.⁵⁸⁶

Therefore, it was very important that the Canadian government halt the export of spare military parts to South Africa and demand that the new Tory government in Britain not resume arms sales there, since these weapons would probably be used to enforce apartheid.⁵⁸⁷

Apartheid also posed a severe threat to the building of world community because it undermined the United Nations, the Commonwealth and even weakened the moral underpinnings of NATO. Brewin was quite concerned about this point as he confessed in a document he wrote in preparation for the 1972 election:

Southern Africa," Behind the Headlines, Vol.30, (September, 1970), pp.1-18.

The detailed recommendations of the Black Paper were included in a minority report on southern Africa written by the NDP members of SCEAND as part of their examination of the Foreign Policy White Paper and also became the basis for the 1971 and 1973 party resolutions on the region. "Canada's Policy towards Southern Africa: A Critical Review," NAC, MG 32, C26, Vol.73, File 4, pp.1-9.

⁵⁸⁶ Brewin, "Foreign Policy for Canadians," p.2.

⁵⁸⁷ Brewin, "Statement by Andrew Brewin, MP Greenwood, 1970," NAC, MG 32, C26, Vol. 83, File 4.

These are not remote matters unrelated to Canada's security. The integrity of the United Nations and the existence of the Commonwealth as an association of multi-racial nations is at stake. We cannot afford to be weak and wavering. Indeed the strengthening and support of the United Nations is a central principle of the New Democratic Party foreign policy and has been for many years.⁵⁸⁸

There was complete agreement amongst New Democratic realists and idealists on the question of southern Africa, because the issue involved the fundamentals of social democratic internationalism.

Why then did the NDP pull-back somewhat from the radical position of the 1969 convention on southern Africa? The Black Paper was considered by most Canadians involved with the South African issue to represent the most radical position imaginable in 1970-71 even though the Paper wanted only to limit Canadian involvement in South Africa, not eliminate it. Hence, by endorsing the Black Paper, the NDP believed it was "sticking out its neck" as far as it dared go politically. As the NDP's minority SCEAND report on South Africa stated, "It may well appear to some that our approach is moralistic and utopian and...insufficiently pragmatic."⁵⁸⁹ The NDP could afford to be ahead of public opinion but not too far. Therefore, taking everything into consideration, including the views of the electorate, the positions of the other Canadian political parties who were reluctant to do anything on the South African situation, and the party's own anti-apartheid tradition, the NDP's South African policy represented a reasonable balance of idealism and realism.

The same desire for balance also explains the party's Rhodesian policy. In the early Seventies, the NDP maintained its long-standing support for effective

⁵⁸⁸ Brewin, "Basis for Speakers' Notes for the Forthcoming Election on Foreign Policy and Defence Issues," undated, NAC, MG 32, C26, Vol.83, File 11, p.5.

⁵⁸⁹ "Canada's Policy Towards South Africa: A Critical Review," p.8.

international sanctions against Rhodesia until majority rule was assured as well as its demand that Canada pressure NATO to stop all military and economic assistance to Portugal until that country had granted independence to its African colonies. Then in 1973, when Portugal's oppressive policies had finally earned it the public condemnation of virtually the whole world, the NDP evidently felt it was safe to extend its policy critique. Consequently, its major resolution on southern Africa that year asked Canadians to boycott oil companies which obtained their product from the Portuguese-dominated section of Angola.⁵⁹⁰

The Canadian Labour Congress, in its 1971 brief to the government, echoed all the criticisms made by the NDP about the Liberal White Paper. The CLC was even more direct than Brewin in condemning the government's failure to provide clear-cut statements of policy on such international questions as Vietnam, the Middle East, Berlin and the SALT talks. Of interest is the CLC's explicit promotion of Canadian membership in the Organization of American States, a stand which contradicted official NDP policy. The labour organization also rejected the NDP's 1969 "get out of NATO" stance in keeping with its traditional realist position.⁵⁹¹

Despite these differences, the CLC and NDP continued to work closely together on foreign policy matters. For example, local labour councils sometimes wrote to Brewin requesting information on specific foreign policy matters, while at the same time updating the NDP external affairs critic on their involvement with specific international issues. Such was the case on May 24, 1973, when the secretary of the Windsor and District Labour Council sent Brewin a copy of a lengthy press release they

⁵⁹⁰ Scotton, "Southern Africa," pp.107-8.

⁵⁹¹ "Submission by the Canadian Labour Congress to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence," Jan.30, 1971, NAC, MG 32, C26, Vol.83, File 13, p.5.

had just circulated demanding that the government pressure Canadian coffee companies to stop buying Angolan coffee so long as Portugal continued its colonial wars in Africa.⁵⁹²

The 1971 NDP convention statement on the Vietnam War also reflected a retrenchment from the more radical idealist position taken in 1969. In place of the latter's condemnation of American intervention in Vietnam as a "wholly immoral act, the 1971 statement quoted verbatim from a document prepared by four American Christian journals which began with the words, "We accuse United States leaders of a total lack of proportion between ends wrought and means used in Vietnam."⁵⁹³ A historian covering the convention observed that such a statement was like telling Hitler to slow down because the gas bill was too high.⁵⁹⁴

Wafflers at the 1971 convention objected that both the "South East Asia" and composite resolutions ignored the central issue of American imperialism. One of them, Jackie Larkin, a member of the NDP Federal Council, was quoted by the Globe and Mail as saying that American endeavours in Vietnam and elsewhere were worse than Portugal's because Washington's activities represented a new form of colonialism which she called neo-colonialism.⁵⁹⁵ Waffle members were also upset that the Vietnam resolution failed to clearly describe Canadian complicity in the war or set out any specific directions for further responses by the party on the issue.

⁵⁹² Deon P. La Bote, "Windsor and District Labour Council Legislative Committee News Release Statement," NAC, MG 32, C26, Vol.74, File 5.

⁵⁹³ Scotton, "South East Asia," p.105.

⁵⁹⁴ Michael Cross, "Third Class on the Titanic: The NDP Convention," Canadian Forum, Vol.51 (Apr.-May, 1971), p.5.

⁵⁹⁵ "Stand by Waffle Rejected; NDP Calls for Doubling of Foreign Aid," Globe and Mail, Apr.24, 1971.

After Tommy Douglas introduced the motion on Vietnam with his by now familiar phrase, "the greatest moral issue of our time," there followed a minute of silence. Then the chairperson, Eamon Park, proceeded directly to the vote without allowing any debate, while all attempts to refer the motion back to the Resolutions Committee were defeated. Lewis and Douglas had always tried to walk the fine line between criticism of specific American policies and anti-Americanism. In the midst of an already emotionally charged leadership fight between David Lewis and the Waffle candidate, James Laxer, a debate on an emotion-laden issue like Vietnam could get out of hand. In such a scenario, the idealists might be able to induce the convention to approve a much stronger and politically dangerous statement on Vietnam. The power brokers in the NDP were sure that Canadians would be turned off by a very anti-American stance, a reflection again of Lewis's belief that nationalism was not a vote-determining issue for the vast majority of the electorate. Moreover, by 1971, there were few political points to be gained any more on the Vietnam question because many people (even in the NDP) were tired of it.

In 1970, the NDP had managed to force a House of Commons emergency debate on Vietnam as a result of President Nixon's ground attack into Cambodia on May 1st. Party spokespeople repeated all the well-known moral and strategic arguments of the Sixties against the war and American involvement. Douglas also pleaded for Canada to give moral leadership to the world by going over the heads of the politicians around the world to call on ordinary citizens everywhere to pressure their governments to leave no stone unturned until the war was ended.⁵⁹⁶ David

⁵⁹⁶ Debates, May 1, 1970, p.6503.

Lewis, for his part, called on the government not to go "soft" on the Americans but "speak out ...without using weasel words."⁵⁹⁷

Douglas, Lewis and Brewin emphasized that as the closest friend and neighbour of the United States, Canada had a responsibility to tell the Americans when, in its judgment, their actions were not only wrong and endangering world peace, but also strengthening the communist position.⁵⁹⁸ Most revealing was Douglas's statement,

I say that before the bar of history every one of us who holds any public responsibility is in the dock unless we raise our voices and use our influence to try to find a way of establishing peace in the world.⁵⁹⁹

In other words, a leader was responsible before a higher power for his or her conduct of foreign policy and should therefore be guided by the ideals that had their origin in a spiritual or metaphysical realm. Such idealism born of the Christian and socialist visions of a new world could inspire people to action.

However, while Douglas could speak of Canada mobilizing the citizens and governments of the earth to stop the war, he and his NDP colleagues showed little initiative themselves in organizing the Canadian masses on this or any other foreign policy issue. The NDP caucus was content to lament the fact, in the words of a young NDP MP from Saskatchewan, Lorne Nystrom, "that we live in a state of international anarchy. We do not have an international organization with any real power, influence or sovereignty that can solve problems such as this."⁶⁰⁰

⁵⁹⁷ Ibid., p.6496.

⁵⁹⁸ Ibid., pp.6502-5.

⁵⁹⁹ Ibid., p.6503.

⁶⁰⁰ Ibid., p.6508.

The NDP had traditionally supported almost in knee-jerk fashion whatever initiatives the United Nations had taken in the interests of settling disputes peacefully throughout the globe. However, for practically the first time, the party began to question Canadian involvement in a UN sponsored activity, namely, the International Control Commission which had first been established to implement the 1954 Geneva Accords on Indo-China. Matters came to a head in February 1971, when South Vietnamese forces invaded Laos with American help to destroy North Vietnamese bases. By then, the ICC, made up of Poland, India and Canada, had virtually ceased to function, partly because member nations continually checkmated each other's effectiveness.⁶⁰¹

When attempts were made to reactivate the ICC later that year, Brewin hesitantly supported this move while simultaneously questioning whether Canada should remain a member. "I wonder whether it is consistent with the dignity of Canada any longer to remain a member of the International Control Commission which controls nothing in these countries."⁶⁰² Later in 1971, Brewin had further occasion to attack the Canadian role in the ICC when publication of the Pentagon Papers by the New York Times revealed that Blair Seaborn, the Canadian commissioner on the ICC, had acted as an intermediary for the United States with North Vietnam during 1964-5 contrary to the neutral role ICC commissioners were supposed to play. This provided further evidence of Canadian complicity with Washington's Vietnam policy.⁶⁰³

⁶⁰¹ Canadian Annual Review, 1971, p.274.

⁶⁰² Ibid., p.274.

⁶⁰³ Ibid., pp.275-6. Charles Taylor (not the NDP activist) wrote a book documenting numerous examples of Canadian government complicity with Washington's Vietnam policy. Instead, he argued, Canada should have abandoned its quiet diplomacy and helpful fixer approaches and taken a more critical public posture on the war. Charles Taylor, Snow Job: Canada, the United States and Vietnam (1954 to 1973) (Toronto:

The issue received new impetus in 1972-3 when Canada, under heavy American pressure agreed to serve as part of an ICC supervisory force to monitor the implementation of the Paris Peace Accords. However, by the spring of 1973, it had become obvious that there was no peace to monitor and Canadian conditions for participating were not being met.⁶⁰⁴ In the view of Doug Rowland, the NDP defence critic at the time, the Americans were using their economic muscle to exert enormous pressure on Canada to renew its membership on the ICC in order to lend international prestige to the reconstituted commission and to make "their [the United States] withdrawal from Vietnam appear less like a defeat."⁶⁰⁵ When, despite America's lobbying effort, Canada did leave a few months later, Andrew Brewin endorsed the decision but expressed a number of concerns about related matters.

First, the decision to exit from the ICC should not have been made until parliament had had a chance to debate it, because ultimate authority to decide foreign policy must be retained by the people's representatives. Brewin freely acknowledged that he was being influenced by events in the United States where Congress was seeking to assert control by the legislative branch over major American policy questions.⁶⁰⁶ Brewin reiterated this theme several times in 1973 with regards to other international issues as well.

Second, Brewin asserted that the NDP supported withdrawal from the supervisory commission partly because the Americans had violated the Peace Accords

House of Anansi Press, 1974), pp.191-4.

⁶⁰⁴ Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette, pp.52-60.

⁶⁰⁵ Quoted in Victor Levant, Quiet Complicity: Canadian Involvement in the Vietnam war, (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1986), p.226.

⁶⁰⁶ Debates, Nov.9, 1973, p.7693.

by bombing Cambodia and Laos. He shrugged off accusations of anti-Americanism by reminding the House that the supreme law-making body in the United States, Congress, had cut off funds for this operation. Brewin and the NDP were somewhat vulnerable to the anti-American charge in this instance for two reasons. They had not condemned the communist violations of the cease-fire and, only four months before, Brewin had reported to the House that based on talks he had had with the North Vietnamese on his recent visit to the North, he was convinced they sincerely wanted peace and would not try to achieve national reconciliation by force. "I believe...that the situation will be approached by one side at least with an attitude of good will and a determination to make that aim succeed."⁶⁰⁷ The implication was obvious: Brewin had trusted the communists more than the Americans (and South Vietnamese) to keep their word in this instance.

Third, Brewin insisted that Canada shared responsibility for the thousands of civilian prisoners held by South Vietnam because it had not pressured Washington enough to ensure their release. He maintained that such an appeal would not constitute unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of South Vietnam, but was in accordance with well established traditions of international law which permitted outside intervention where fundamental human rights were denied on a large scale.⁶⁰⁸ He also got fifteen members of Parliament from three parties to become involved with an international organization whose aim it was to free South Vietnamese political prisoners. In addition, Brewin served as the focus of attention for many other groups working on the question. His efforts to persuade Canada to bring the matter

⁶⁰⁷ Ibid., Jan.29, 1973, p.598.

⁶⁰⁸ Ibid., May 29, 1973, p.4197.

before the United Nations were stymied, however, by the mandarins who controlled the Department of External Affairs.⁶⁰⁹

The condemnations of American bombing and the treatment of South Vietnamese political prisoners were incorporated into two resolutions passed by the 1973 convention. Moreover, the convention called on Canada to recognize and establish diplomatic relations immediately with the communist Revolutionary Government (Viet Cong) of South Vietnam.⁶¹⁰ With the war almost over, the NDP finally felt safe to go on record demanding the immediate withdrawal of all American forces and war materials from Cambodia and Southeast Asia, something it had not explicitly mentioned in 1971 when the end of the conflict was not yet in sight.⁶¹¹

The last gasp of the Vietnam issue on the Canadian political scene (apart from the refugee question in 1979) transpired after the communist victory in May of 1975 when the NDP, with some support from the other parties, urged Canada to help rebuild Vietnam. As part of a wide-ranging speech on foreign policy matters on June 17, 1975, Andrew Brewin argued that Canada's contribution to peace and reconstruction in Vietnam should be at least as great as the profits had been from arms sold to the United States for use in Southeast Asia over the years.⁶¹²

There was another reason why Canada should offer immediate reconstruction aid according to Brewin. "I am not much of a cold war warrior," he told the House of Commons, "but I have read that the seas of Indochina are full of Soviet vessels taking

⁶⁰⁹ Brewin, "Memo on South Vietnamese Prisoners," NAC, MG 32, C26, Vol.89, File 21.

⁶¹⁰ Scotton, "Vietnam," p.107.

⁶¹¹ *Ibid.*, "Bombing of Laos and Cambodia," p.107.

⁶¹² Debates, June 17, 1975, p.6837.

food and other things into Indo China. I do not think we should accord them any monopoly in that field.⁶¹³ Brewin's statement once more revealed his basic acceptance of the Cold War framework and the need to outbid the Soviets for influence in the unremitting struggle between East and West. Even near the end of his political career, Brewin's fundamentally realist orientation remained unaltered.

The central thesis of the last two chapters has been that the traditional balance between internationalism and nationalism within the NDP shifted noticeably in favour of nationalism in the late Sixties and early Seventies. Strong social democratic idealists were usually strong nationalists because they saw in nationalism the means by which to preserve Canada's existence as an independent nation and thus to fulfil its historic mission. However, the nature of nationalism is such that it often overwhelmed the internationalism of the idealists resulting in their retreat into quasi-isolationism and what John Holmes, writing in 1976, called "obsessive chauvinism." Holmes was disturbed that this attitude had taken hold even in Canadian socialist circles where "one customarily expects expansive internationalism."⁶¹⁴

Resistance to Americanism masquerading as internationalism is entirely justified. However, an obsession with the need to protect our interests in competition with a very powerful neighbour seems, to an articulate minority of Canadians to justify a policy of national self-interest in which we lose sight of our responsibilities in the wider world.⁶¹⁵

⁶¹³ Ibid.

⁶¹⁴ John W. Holmes, Canada: A Middle-aged Power (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976), p.38.

⁶¹⁵ Ibid.

Even though the realists in the NDP resisted this tendency to a considerable extent, they were nevertheless affected by the shift in the party's ideological centre of gravity from internationalism towards nationalism. Andrew Brewin was probably the most successful in retaining his internationalist outlook throughout the Seventies, but even at that, he did not attempt to lobby for a restoration of the pre-1969 party's NATO stance. The party's involvement on the Vietnam question was a partial exception to this general retreat from internationalism, but even here it was mostly a case of the NDP helping to end this sorry episode rather than the result of a grand internationalist vision.

This back-sliding from internationalism was abetted by the 1971 change in leadership to David Lewis from T.C. Douglas. Lewis placed a much higher priority on domestic issues than foreign ones. This is not surprising given that, as noted earlier, Lewis's entire working life had centred around building the CCF/NDP's political organization and convincing voters of the merits of social democratic solutions for Canada's economic problems.

So little did foreign affairs play in the strategic thinking of Lewis as NDP leader, that very seldom in his major reports to the NDP Federal Council, was foreign policy even mentioned. In a August 26, 1974 interview, Lewis excused his lack of emphasis on international affairs by stating, "In the situation when we had the balance of power, I had no influence on foreign policy."⁶¹⁶ Yet during those years from 1972 to 1974, Lewis had exercised considerable influence on domestic legislation. Examination of the record makes clear that Lewis seldom tried to have an impact on Canadian foreign policy. Hence, in answering the question of why international relations played a

⁶¹⁶ "Transcript of Interview with David Lewis," Aug. 26, 1974, NAC, MG 32, C23, Vol.108, File David Lewis 1974-1975, p.6.

relatively minor part in the total scheme of things for the NDP in the early Seventies, David Lewis's role is a significant factor.

However, in fairness, it must be remembered that economic nationalism peaked during Lewis's tenure as NDP leader from 1971 to 1975. Thus, the times were not propitious for foreign policy both within the party and the Canadian political scene in general. John Brewin, son of Andrew Brewin and already very active in the party at that time, also pointed out in an interview that in the mid-Seventies, the party was feeling its way around on everything, not just foreign policy.⁶¹⁷

With the election of a new leader in 1975, Ed Broadbent, the opportunity arose for a revival of social democratic internationalism within the NDP. The question was whether sufficient idealism and practical political commitment still remained for this to occur? However, before assessing Broadbent's and the party's foreign policy performance in the period from the mid-Seventies to the end of the decade, it is imperative to examine a major component of NDP international affairs policy that has been largely ignored thus far in this dissertation, namely, the party's Third World assistance policy.

⁶¹⁷ John Brewin interview, June 14, 1993.

CHAPTER TEN

THE LIMITATIONS OF IDEALISM - NDP THIRD WORLD POLICY (1961-75)

Shortly after World War Two, Canada, along with most western countries, embarked on external aid programs to help poorer nations in what eventually came to be called the Third World. According to Keith Spicer, later a prominent Liberal party organizer, who published a book in 1966, A Samaritan State? External Aid in Canada's Foreign Policy, the objectives of Canada's foreign aid programs were threefold: humanitarian, political and economic.⁶¹⁸ In other words, Canadians wanted to assist underdeveloped countries because it was the moral thing to do, would help stem the advance of communism and would benefit the Canadian economy in both the short and long term.

Later, by the middle Sixties, some politicians and scholars were talking about two additional motives. First, a strong Third World assistance policy would provide Canadians with a common purpose and thus promote the Canadian identity and national unity. Second, Canada's continued status as a Middle power with a good

⁶¹⁸ Keith Spicer, A Samaritan State? External Aid in Canada's Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966), p.4.

international reputation required a vigorous attempt to close the gap between rich and poor countries.⁶¹⁹

It is important to note that support for Third World assistance programs cut across political lines in Canada during these years. Indeed, for most of the Sixties, there was little disagreement amongst scholars, politicians or development experts with the philosophy of Canada's foreign assistance program. However, by the end of the decade this had changed, and a vigorous philosophical debate had begun, partly because twenty years of pouring money into the Third World had not brought the expected results. Hence, for some Canadians working in the field, "trade not aid," became the rallying cry; others wanted greatly expanded levels of both aid and trade, while many questioned the form in which aid was being made available to the poor nations. In particular, attention began to shift towards the removal of trade barriers that kept products from underdeveloped countries out of Canada.⁶²⁰ By the mid-Seventies, impelled by events in the non-western world, new fundamental questions began to be asked about the relationship of world economic structures and Third World problems. However, discussion of that theme must await Chapter Fourteen when the period from 1975 to 1988 is examined.

In keeping with its internationalist vision of a world brotherhood of peoples and nations, the New Democratic Party had always been strongly committed to helping

⁶¹⁹ Peyton Lyon, "Introduction," Canada and the Third World, ed. by Peyton V. Lyon and Tareq Y. Ismael (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1976), p.xlvi.

⁶²⁰ In addition to the works by Keith Spicer and Peyton Lyon/Tareq Ismael, other useful sources for the 1961 to 1975 era include: Ivan L. Head, On a Hinge of History: The Mutual Vulnerability of South and North (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991); Clyde Sanger, Half a Loaf: Canada's Semi-Role among Developing Countries (Winnipeg: The Ryerson Press, 1969); Stephen Clarkson, ed. An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada? (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1968), pp.226-252.

underdeveloped countries. Since both idealists and realists agreed on that score, no rival camps arose in the party advocating completely divergent policies as with NATO. Then too, the rise of Canadian nationalism in the middle Sixties and its strong impact on many aspects of NDP foreign policy seems to have had comparatively few repercussions for the party's Third World development policy. Having said that, however, there were some effects, and these will be documented in this chapter as will other tensions and contradictions in NDP foreign assistance policy in the years from 1961 to 1975.

The problems were largely unacknowledged in party ranks. Such is the luxury of a political party that has never had to shoulder the weight of actually exercising power at the national level. Certainly, for example, an NDP federal government would have had to make some difficult choices between liberalizing Canadian trade policy on Third World imports and the economic concerns of Canadian workers as well as the general fears of nationalists. This chapter will examine NDP Third World aid and trade policies from 1961 until the mid 1970s when the party's policies were challenged by new currents sweeping through the underdeveloped world.

An analysis of NDP Third World policy must begin with a discussion of underlying objectives or motives. When all the idealistic rhetoric is stripped away, the fundamental reason in Canadian social democratic thinking why the living standards of the underdeveloped nations had to be raised was to enable these nations to join the modern world (as defined by the West). This was explicitly stated at the outset of the 1965 convention statement, "Economic Aid and Trade With the Developing Nations":

It is essential that Canadians along with those in the rest of the industrialized world...make a serious and concentrated effort to assist these peoples of the underdeveloped areas to move into the modern world.⁶²¹

Joining the modern world, in turn, was necessary before these nations would be able to help build a world community based on principles of equality and justice, the centrepiece of social democratic internationalism. As Andrew Brewin made clear in a speech to the CLC in 1963, "We cannot build a world community while there continues to exist a striking contrast between the affluent West and the poverty stricken continents of Asia, Africa and South America."⁶²²

In this argument, Brewin was also drawing upon the deep reservoir of moral concern that democratic socialists around the world shared on the subject. For example, in his introductory speech to the Socialist International's Seventh Congress held at Rome in 1961, Hugh Gaitskell, leader of the British Labour party, matter-of-factly stated, "We as socialists instinctively, automatically in principle, believe that it is the duty of wealthier nations to help poorer nations."⁶²³ In a similar vein, another SI leader, Jan Tinbergen, wrote a few months later that abolishing the disparity in living conditions between the developed and developing world ranked second only to preserving the peace in the Socialist International's list of priorities for the Sixties.⁶²⁴

⁶²¹ Anne Scotton, ed., "Economic Aid and Trade With the Developing Nations," New Democratic Policies 1961-1976 (Ottawa: New Democratic Party, 1976) p.98.

⁶²² Brewin, "Canada's Role," undated, NAC, MG 32, C26, Vol.83, File 8, p.2.

⁶²³ Hugh Gaitskell, "Speech to the Socialist International," in Socialist International Information, Vol.11 (October 23-27, 1961), NAC, MG 28, IV1, Vol.483, File October 1961-March 1962, p.238.

⁶²⁴ Jan Tinbergen, "SI Information," Vol 12, Jan.6, 1962, NAC, MG 28 1V1,

So important was this topic becoming for Western social democrats that the 1962 SI convention hastily organized a special conference to be held before the end of that year at Baden, West Germany with the focus on two interrelated themes, namely, the tasks facing the newly emerging nations and the obligations socialists in the developed nations had towards these countries.⁶²⁵

The basis for this moral concern and desire for a world community was an idealistic social democratic version of internationalism centered on human solidarity, social justice and democratic principles. For this reason, speaker after speaker at the Rome conference of the Socialist International reiterated the the point that it was impossible to accept the present division of the world into have and have not nations.⁶²⁶ Indeed, Emmanuel Scherer of the International Jewish Labour Bund captured the mood of the conference when he insisted that the essence of socialism was internationalism.⁶²⁷

Therefore, as Harold Wilson, who had become leader of the British Labour party in 1962 after the sudden death of Gaitskell, stated in an address to the German Social Democratic party on the occasion of its centenary in 1963, social democrats could not separate domestic and foreign policy.

Vol.483, File October 1961-March 1962, p.6.

⁶²⁵ "Report on Baden Conference," Socialist International Information, Vol.12 (December 22, 1962), NAC, MG 28, 1V1, Vol.483, File October 1962-March 1963, p.756.

⁶²⁶ J.G. Suurhaft, "The World Today-the Socialist Perspective," Socialist International Information, Vol.12 (June 30, 1962), NAC, MG 1V1, Vol.483, File October 1961-March 1962, p.6.

⁶²⁷ "Presentation of the International Jewish Labour Bund," Socialist International Information, Vol.11 (April, 14, 1962), NAC, MG 28, IVI, Vol.483, File April 1962-July 1963, p.247.

In our work through the Socialist International, we have jointly pledged ourselves to promote these ideals, once put forward as the basis for life within a nation, as the basis for relationships between nations. From each according to his means, to each according to his needs: he is no true socialist if his faith stops dead at the shores of his native land.⁶²⁸

Following the 1963 Amsterdam SI conference, Karl Czernetz, a member of the Austrian Socialist Party Executive wrote an article in which he called for an even stronger SI organization and reiterated the central role of morality in social democratic internationalism.

What we want is to solve the great social problems of our unprecedented revolutionary age. To accomplish this task, we democratic socialists need, more than ever in our history, an International that would act as the organising instrument of a purposeful Socialist Policy on a world scale. But we also need such an International as the bearer of the fruitful life force of the moral idea of Socialism.⁶²⁹

Stanley Knowles, NDP member of Parliament for Winnipeg, in a speech to the Eighth Congress of the SI at Amsterdam, September 9th to 12th, 1963, indicated the NDP's full endorsement of the Socialist International and its efforts to build international solidarity.⁶³⁰ Indeed, a 1967 NDP convention resolution publicly testified to the party's proud membership in the Socialist International with the

⁶²⁸ Harold Wilson, "Speech at the Centenary of the German Social Democratic Party, Socialist International Information, Vol.13 (Sept.7, 1963), NAC, MG 28, 1V1, Vol.483, File April 1963-September 1963, p.524.

⁶²⁹ Karl Czernetz, "The International Today," Socialist International Information, Vol.13 (December 7, 1963), NAC, MG 28, 1V1, Vol.483, File Sept.-Dec. 1963, p.720.

⁶³⁰ Stanley Knowles, "The Canadian View," Socialist International Information, Vol.14 (April 11, 1964), NAC, MG 28, 1V1, Vol.483, File April 1964-September 1964, p.94.

following words, "Democratic socialist parties across the world are linked by ideals of human brotherhood."⁶³¹

Similarly, the preamble of the main 1967 NDP convention resolution on international affairs tried to capture the quintessence of the social democratic understanding of the unity between domestic and foreign policy in these words: "It has been the proud assertion of the New Democratic Party that in its domestic policies it puts people first. The same is true of its policies in international affairs."⁶³² Hence, for the NDP as part of the world-wide social democratic movement, helping underdeveloped countries was seen as a natural component of social democratic internationalism. Of course, the crucial question was, "What practical policies would best implement this vision?"

Throughout most of the Sixties, all of NDP development assistance policy was premised on the belief (shared by most so-called "development experts"), that if western countries could supply enough capital to undeveloped nations like India in the form of grants, loans, food, and equipment, these poorer countries would "take off" economically by the end of the decade, significantly narrowing the gap between rich and poor in the process.⁶³³ The NDP charged that under Liberal and Conservative governments, Canada had failed to do its share in this regard, ranking well below most western nations in the percentage of Gross National Product (GNP) devoted to foreign aid. Hence, the main emphasis in NDP foreign assistance policy in the Sixties was a demand for an immediate and massive expansion of the aid budget to bring the number

⁶³¹ Scotton, "Socialist International," p.99.

⁶³² Scotton, "International Affairs," p.99.

⁶³³ Brewin, "Canada's Role," pp. 3,8.

up to 2% of Gross Domestic Product (which would have amounted to about a 500% increase based on 1962 figures).⁶³⁴

NDP spokespersons hammered away on this theme unrelentingly both in Parliament and in any public forum where foreign policy was discussed. Thus, in the midst of the crucial January, 1963, House of Commons defence policy debate, T.C. Douglas inserted an earnest plea for a greatly enlarged foreign assistance budget.⁶³⁵ In the next major debate on supply for the External Affairs department the following year, Brewin reprimanded the Liberal government for still contributing less than half of the international UN standard of 1% of GNP to external aid, a standard he considered too low in any case. In response to sustained pressure from the NDP and a few Progressive Conservative MPs, as well as its own increased commitment to Third World development, the Liberal government finally announced on February 2, 1967, that it hoped to reach the 1% standard by 1970.⁶³⁶ When, in 1969, this was pushed back to 1975, Douglas accused the government of paying lip-service to the cause of helping the hungry.⁶³⁷

There were other factors besides human solidarity and morality that motivated NDP aid policy in the Sixties. Not surprisingly, given cold war tensions, the party emphasized the role development assistance could play in preserving peace in the world. Since a basic tenet of social democratic internationalism was the belief that the fundamental causes of war were poverty, starvation and ignorance, a generous aid program would do more in the long run to promote peace than anything else Canada

⁶³⁴ Scotton, "Economic Aid and Trade With the Developing Nations," p.98.

⁶³⁵ Debates, Jan.29, 1963, p.3100.

⁶³⁶ Ibid., Feb.2, 1967, p.12588.

⁶³⁷ Ibid., April 23, 1969, p.7879.

could do. Such arguments were employed repeatedly by NDP spokesmen. The equation was simple; less money for arms equalled more funds for the Third World and peace. For example, on January 24, 1963, Douglas quoted a United Nations report that if the money spent on defence world-wide were transferred to peaceful uses, "we could banish hunger, disease and ignorance. It is in this war against man's age old enemies that Canada can play her most effective role."⁶³⁸

Such a policy was also the most productive way to fight communism because "the menace of communism itself arises out of, and exploits, the urgent desire of the poverty-stricken two-thirds of the world to raise their living standard".⁶³⁹ Hence, it was clear to the NDP that foreign, defence and aid policy were all intertwined. Canada's role in all three was the same, to provide leadership to the movement for solidarity, peace and justice around the world.

However, the NDP's extensive 1965 resolution on aid and trade was based upon another motive that was never far from the surface when party thinkers defended a generous development assistance policy, namely, economic self-interest. The resolution argued that practical economic considerations required more Canadian interaction with the world economy. Since emerging nations constituted the greatest potential field for trade expansion, Canada must move quickly to establish a foothold there as an essential first step towards this goal.⁶⁴⁰

In his convention address that year, Tommy Douglas picked up on this theme. He unapologetically directed the attention of the delegates to the manifold benefits a

⁶³⁸ Ibid., Jan. 24, 1963, p.3100.

⁶³⁹ Brewin, "Canada's Role," speech to 1963 CLC convention, MG 32 C26, Vol.83, File 5.

⁶⁴⁰ Ibid., "Economic Aid and Trade with the Developing Nations," p.98.

generous aid and trade policy would bring to Canada. He chastised those who criticized the NDP's 2% of GNP foreign aid target,

as though this meant sending gold bullion or Canadian dollars abroad. We must let the Canadian people know that it means shipping locomotives, power plants, factories, machine tools and farm tractors. It means shipping surplus food, consumer goods and appliances, all of which we can produce in abundance, thereby giving employment to our people and establishing trade patterns for the future. Above all, it means creating good will with people of all other races and tongues, so that some day their and our children will live in a world where 'the war drums throb no longer and the battle flags are furled in the Parliament of Man, the Federation of the World'.⁶⁴¹

For Douglas, therefore, generous trade and foreign aid programs were ultimately important means of achieving social democratic internationalism's dream of a world government. There was no contradiction in his mind between working for this long-term objective and Canada's own immediate economic interests.

Douglas's rather naive notion that Canada could (or should) solve its unemployment problems by increasing its foreign assistance budget manifested itself in several forms. On one occasion in 1964, Stanley Knowles matter-of-factly asserted that Canada ought to consider its unemployed people not as a problem but as another resource to be shipped overseas to raise the living standards of the poor:

We feel that a great deal could be done in a country like ours to make it possible for hundreds of thousands of our people to be made available to carry on the tasks of education, helping to set up public administration, providing means for the developing of health etc.⁶⁴²

⁶⁴¹ T.C.Douglas, "Convention Speech, 1965, NAC, MG 32, C28, Vol.109, File 1-14-1965.

⁶⁴² Stanley Knowles, "The Canadian View," p.94.

Two years later, Colin Cameron was still making essentially the same argument when he advocated that hundreds of individuals trained in the thousand and one skills needed to build the structure of a modern society be sent overseas.⁶⁴³ Cameron also repeated Douglas's point that the less developed countries offered great export opportunities for Canadian goods. He chided the government for not doing a better job of educating the Canadian public that foreign aid was, in a purely selfish way, of great value to Canada economically.⁶⁴⁴

The NDP assigned so much importance to the creation of an effective and mutually beneficial external aid program, that the main 1965 convention international affairs resolution called for radical changes in domestic institutions and policies to accommodate this concern. First, Canada ought to greatly increase its expenditures on education to provide the trained personnel needed at home and abroad. Second, investment ought to be redirected to ensure the production of the kinds and quantities of foods and goods in Canada required by the aid program. Third, a careful program of foreign trade and finance should be devised to enable recipient countries to take advantage of what Canada had to offer.⁶⁴⁵

There was no apparent concern at this stage that such aid, labelled "tied aid," often benefitted Canada more than the nation that received the assistance. This ensued because recipient governments were forced not only to buy Canadian goods with a high percentage of the aid money received, but also to reserve a high proportion of contracts in their own countries for Canadian companies. In the mid-Sixties, the

⁶⁴³ Debates, Feb.3, 1966, p.681.

⁶⁴⁴ Ibid., p.680.

⁶⁴⁵ Scotton, "Economic Aid and Trade with the Developing Nations," p.98.

NDP apparently never considered that tied aid might distort or even hinder development in the very countries they were supposed to be helping.

They were also operating to a great extent under the assumption that western countries knew best what types of aid Third World people needed. Canadian social democratic internationalism, with its overarching commitment to the creation of a world community patterned largely on Western values and concepts of development, modernity, democracy and statehood, found it impossible in the mid-Sixties to recognize the inherent paternalism and even imperialism of its attitude towards the Third World.

One area where NDP Third World policy was perhaps more progressive at this stage than the other Canadian political parties was the party's call for Canada to channel as much as possible of its aid through multilateral agencies, especially the United Nations, rather than bilaterally from Canada to the recipient country.⁶⁴⁶ Implementation of the NDP idea would have meant less direct control by Canada and perhaps better results for the nations acquiring the aid.

The relationship between Canadian domestic concerns and aid policy also manifested itself at another level in NDP thinking. The 1965 international assistance resolution proposed to sell the party's overseas aid package as a way of enhancing the Canadian identity and resolving its national unity crisis. The idea was that "in carrying out such a program involving more and more Canadians directly and indirectly, we may well find that sense of purpose and national unity and identity for which we so anxiously search today."⁶⁴⁷ However, there is no evidence that the NDP seriously tried to exploit this strategy in any subsequent election.

⁶⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁷ Ibid.

The 1967 convention provided clear evidence that faith in the capacity of traditional assistance programs to solve all the problems of the Third World still burned brightly within the New Democratic Party. No less than five "aid" resolutions were passed giving full vent to social democratic idealism. For example, one argued that government should establish a program whereby key Canadian personnel would be given paid leave of absences, then loaned to underdeveloped nations and upon returning to Canada, receive their original jobs back without loss of seniority.⁶⁴⁸

The previous year (1966), the NDP had conducted a partial review of its aid policy with some input from Escott Reid, a life-long supporter of the CCF/NDP, who periodically wrote background memorandums on foreign policy issues for the party.⁶⁴⁹ However, no substantive changes in foreign assistance policy resulted, although the 1967 general International Affairs resolution did provide more guidelines on where and how money should be spent. Specifically, it called on Canada to concentrate on countries with which it had a close connection, the Caribbean, the Commonwealth, and the French and English-speaking nations of Africa, emphasizing agricultural, literacy and family planning programs.⁶⁵⁰

In addition, for the first time, fairer trade practices were given brief mention. A resolution on this issue had been submitted to the NDP Federal Council on May 2, 1967, by an anonymous party member, but its more radical ideas were not incorporated into the official resolution that was submitted to the Convention. For instance, the anonymous member's resolution had called attention to the fact that

⁶⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, "External Aid," p.100.

⁶⁴⁹ Robert F. Gordon, Director of NDP Research, to George Cadbury, Feb. 14, 1966, NAC, MG 28, IVI, Vol.402.

⁶⁵⁰ Scotton, "International Affairs," pp.99-100.

prices for many Third World export commodities had fallen recently. Redressing such imbalances in the terms of trade would be of more value to these countries than traditional aid. He or she went further, even anticipating some of the arguments of those who would call for a New International World Order in the mid-Seventies. For instance, the concept of international commodity agreements between producer and consumer nations on a world-wide scale was broached as well as cooperative selling. Second, the author proposed a major change in tariff policy whereby the rich countries, like Canada, would have to sacrifice some of their industries in order to create export markets for newer economies.⁶⁵¹

Probably, the NDP Policy committee did not include these recommendations in the 1967 official resolution for at least two reasons. First, over the years, the NDP had invested too much political "capital" in the notion of aid as the solution to seriously countenance alternatives at this stage. Second, and perhaps even more significantly, the anonymous author's proposed radical shift in Canadian tariff policy would have met strong opposition from the NDP's important labour constituency, who naturally feared that increased Third World competition would lead to job losses in Canada. The party would wait until 1973 before officially acknowledging that some major modifications in its approach to trade with Third World countries were necessary to accommodate at least some of their concerns.⁶⁵²

Meanwhile, the new aid and trade ideas which were beginning to percolate among some academics and people who had worked overseas had not yet affected the leader of the New Democratic Party. Thus, in a speech to the House on April 23, 1969, T.C. Douglas reiterated the old NDP paternalistic panaceas for Third World

⁶⁵¹ "External Aid," undated, NAC, MG 28, 1V1, Vol.395, File 82.

⁶⁵² Scotton, "Canada and Third World Development," pp.106-7.

development. Canada, with its excess of food, technical knowledge, and a generation of young people who were willing to go to the four corners of the earth to help others as teachers, doctors, nurses, farmers and artisans, could play a major role in removing the basic causes of war. The best Douglas could do was echo Escott Reid's plea that Canada should spend twice as much on aid as on the military.⁶⁵³

The inability of Douglas to contemplate fresh approaches to Third World development needs some explanation. It must be remembered that the NDP leader's thinking had been formed in the postwar period when it seemed that Western technology and ways of doing things could solve any problem if given the chance. Moreover, Douglas's socialism centered on the belief that, if people combined moral concern and good planning, almost anything could be accomplished. What was true for Canada, must be true for Third World nations.

Meanwhile, in the late Sixties, interest in Third World issues had begun to grow in Canada for several reasons. One was the creation of a Canadian government agency in 1968 devoted exclusively to coordinating and promoting general Canadian aid policies and programs called the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).⁶⁵⁴ Maurice Strong, a person with wide experience in business and development work, was appointed CIDA's first president. This was followed in 1970 with the establishment of the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) in Ottawa with Canadian funds to promote research into the whole field of development.⁶⁵⁵ Apparently, David Lewis, as a member of SCEAND, made a

⁶⁵³ Debates, April 23, 1969, pp.7879-80.

⁶⁵⁴ Clyde Sanger, Half a Loaf, p.217.

⁶⁵⁵ J.L. Granatstein, "External Affairs and Defence," Canadian Annual Review, ed. by John Saywell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), pp.334-5.

significant contribution to this endeavour.⁶⁵⁶ (Lewis and the other NDP members of the committee also performed a valuable service in calling attention to poor Canadian government administrative practices which had resulted in 40% of the funds appropriated by Parliament for foreign aid in the 1964-69 period never being spent.⁶⁵⁷) The Liberal government's promise in the late Sixties to dramatically increase Canadian foreign aid by 1975 had also helped in raising the Third World's profile with Canadian public opinion.

On October 1, 1969, former Prime Minister Lester Pearson finished his work as head of an eight-person Commission on International Development established by the World Bank in 1968. The Pearson report, as it came to be known, highlighted two unfortunate recent developments on the world scene. The amount of aid provided by western countries had stagnated, while at the same time, the terms of trade for Third World goods entering the West had worsened. Pearson recommended that a single strategy guide all western aid, trade and investment policies. He also called attention to the fact that to meet the government's aid target of 1% of GNP by 1975, Canada would have to triple its development assistance expenditures.⁶⁵⁸

The single most important reason for the public's increased interest in Third World matters was probably the Nigerian Civil War (1968-70). Reports of the purported death each week of thousands of people by starvation in the secessionist region named Biafra, aroused genuine concern amongst many Canadians. The NDP (with help from some Tories) spearheaded the attack on the Liberal government for

⁶⁵⁶ Steven Langdon interview, June 15, 1993.

⁶⁵⁷ Marc Elieson, Director of NDP Research, to David Lewis, Re: Foreign Aid, undated, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.51, File 11.

⁶⁵⁸ J.L. Granatstein, "External Affairs and Defence," in Canadian Annual Review, ed. by John Saywell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), pp.260-1.

stubbornly maintaining its position that because this was a civil war, Canada could not send aid to Biafra without the Nigerian government's consent. The NDP demanded that Canada ignore international protocol and airlift food to the starving people even if this offended the sensibilities, not only of the Nigerian administration, but of the majority of other African leaders as well. In addition, Andrew Brewin, who had just returned from a visit to Biafra, insisted that the Canadian authorities press the UN to employ its influence to end arms shipments to both sides.

What was at stake, in Brewin's opinion, was much more than the fate of Biafra and Nigeria. The security of everyone depended on the creation of a world community where basic human rights superseded old legalisms.⁶⁵⁹ In support of his party's Biafra stance, David Lewis delivered what journalist Charles Lynch called in an Ottawa Citizen report "one of the most powerful pieces of advocacy heard in the House of Commons in many years."⁶⁶⁰ Ed Broadbent and Brewin even journeyed to the United Nations to pressure Canada's UN ambassador, George Ignatieff, to raise the issue in that world forum.⁶⁶¹

Evidently for Lewis, Brewin and company, when confronted with a clash between the demands of humanitarian relief and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state, the former must prevail. This was affirmed in the NDP's 1969 convention resolution on international affairs and defence which insisted

⁶⁵⁹ Debates, Nov.27, 1969, pp.1306-9.

⁶⁶⁰ Canadian Annual Review, 1969, p.257. Donald Bary argues that it was Parliament, especially the opposition parties, who played the decisive role in awakening and sustaining public interest in the Biafran issue, one of the few times this has occurred on a foreign policy matter. Donald Bary, "Interest Groups and the Foreign Policy Process: The Case of Biafra," in Pressure Group Behaviour in Canadian Politics, ed. by A. Paul Pross (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1975), p.136.

⁶⁶¹ George Ignatieff, The Making of a Peacemaker: The Memoirs of George Ignatieff (Markham, Ontario: Penguin Books, 1987), pp.236-7.

that a relief operation against the will of the Nigerian government was a "justified humanitarian act."⁶⁶²

This should have raised some questions for party thinkers. As mentioned on several occasions in this dissertation, the centrepiece of NDP foreign policy had always been the creation of a world community based on an expanded system of world law. As a step in this direction, the party had traditionally urged respect for international law including those laws which affirmed the principles of equality of all nations and non-interference in each other's affairs. There was not then, nor has there been since, a public discussion and debate in NDP circles on what to do about the clash of these two principles, namely, the commitment to meeting human need on one hand and the adherence to international law on the other. One commentator, John Cartwright, writing on the issue in the February, 1969 edition of Canadian Dimension, observed that Canadians would not take kindly to criticism by African politicians if at some time in the future the federal government tried to keep Quebec in Confederation by force.⁶⁶³

Just as public interest in Third World matters was beginning to rise modestly in the late Sixties, a vigorous debate on foreign aid policy broke out amongst people working in the relevant Canadian government departments, academics, some parliamentarians, people involved with NGO's (non-governmental aid organizations) and concerned individuals in the general populace. What primarily fuelled the debate were growing doubts about the effectiveness of Western aid policies. An article in the January, 1969 edition of Canadian Forum by Jim Lotz, summarized the resulting

⁶⁶² Scotton, "International Affairs and Defence," pp.102-3.

⁶⁶³ John Cartwright, "Biafra: A Cause For The Left?" Canadian Dimension, Vol.5 (February, 1969), p.44.

frustration in Liberal-Left circles about the whole question. Nevertheless, Lotz was unable to offer new and creative solutions to the problem. What he proposed was basically more of the same, namely, the sending of better trained idealistic young people abroad to teach and learn the techniques of development. He hoped they would enter into meaningful and equal relationships with Third World peoples and upon their return, teach Canadians what they had learned about development.⁶⁶⁴

At the same time, most Canadians still supported the concept of sending economic aid to underdeveloped nations. Indeed, calls for increased levels of contributions did not diminish. For example, an anonymous editor of Canadian Forum noted that the new generation of Canadians were puzzled by priorities that made Canada spend more than five dollars on defence for every dollar on external aid.⁶⁶⁵

Nevertheless, the desire for reform continued to grow manifesting itself in several key ways. Escott Reid, who had a life-long interest in Third World development issues, was one of the trailblazers in the campaign for change. In 1967, he had written an article in the International Journal to the effect that Canada should take the lead in multilateral efforts to make the international development agencies more effective in combating world poverty.⁶⁶⁶ Two years later, he advanced the argument that aid-giving countries should stop financing so many huge capital projects like steel mills and nuclear power plants that brought prestige to donor and recipient alike, but did little, in his view, to promote real long-term economic growth. Reid also argued that a better balance must be found between aid in the form of grants, loans and technical

⁶⁶⁴ Jim Lotz, "Foreign Aid and Domestic Difficulties," Canadian Dimension, Vol.40 (June,1969), pp.54-5.

⁶⁶⁵ "S," "Reviewing a Review," Canadian Forum, Vol.48 (March, 1969), pp.131-2.

⁶⁶⁶ Escott Reid, "Canadian Foreign Policy, 1967-1977: A Second Golden Decade," International Journal, Vol.48 (Spring, 1967), pp.171-81.

assistance and investment on the one hand, and the stimulation of trade, private investment and the securing of higher commodity prices for Third World staples on the other. In addition, Canada should raise its projected total aid budget target for 1975 from 1 to 2%, double what the Liberals had announced. However, aid should go only to deserving countries who were trying to correct grossly uneven distribution patterns of wealth and power.⁶⁶⁷

Reid soon went further to challenge the broader foreign policy conceptual framework in which development assistance policies were determined. In a guest lecture to a Liberal Party Conference at Harrison Hot Springs on November 21, 1969, he contended that Canada no longer had a major part in NATO, but had a special role to play in the fight against world poverty, a role that would also have the additional benefit of uniting all Canadians.⁶⁶⁸ Both defence and foreign aid should be considered equal aspects of the same policy, namely, investments in security. Since foreign aid was the more effective of the two in avoiding war, its budget should surpass that of the defence department by 1975.⁶⁶⁹

Gradually Reid's ideas began to have an impact on the party platform. For example, we find his concept of aid as an investment in security incorporated into the 1969 convention international affairs and defence resolution.⁶⁷⁰ Indeed, under the impact of all the new thinking both in and outside the party, the 1969 convention marked the beginning of a fundamental shift in NDP Third World policy. For the first

⁶⁶⁷ Reid, Radical Mandarin: The Memoirs of Escott Reid (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), p.378.

⁶⁶⁸ Canadian Annual Review, 1969, p.260.

⁶⁶⁹ Canadian Annual Review, 1970, p.333.

⁶⁷⁰ Scotton, "International Affairs and Defence," p.103.

time, the party officially acknowledged that a successful international development assistance policy would have to go

far beyond the present content of foreign aid, and the provision and distribution of technical and financial assistance. It must express itself in all aspects of our relationship with the developing nations of the world with particular emphasis on trade policy.⁶⁷¹

The Party also began to see that its fixation with ever-increasing amounts of aid was misplaced. In the wider public foreign aid debate taking place in the country, critics were successfully demonstrating the absurdity of making a specific number the central issue in Canadian foreign aid policy. For example, one wrote,

This magical figure (Why not a sum equivalent to all the money spent in Canada on liquor, or cigarettes, or for that matter, bus tickets?) is bandied around as if it were the result of a divine revelation to the decision makers.⁶⁷²

By 1971, the NDP responded to such sentiments by cutting its aid objective from 2% to 1%, thereby bringing it in line with the United Nations standard.⁶⁷³ Two years later, the 1973 convention was prepared to accept even the Liberal government's goal of .7%. Most significantly, the resolution on Third World development stated that "our aim should be to expand the development impact of our aid program and avoid fixation

⁶⁷¹ Ibid., "International Development," p.103.

⁶⁷² Lotz, "Foreign Aid and Domestic Difficulties," p.54.

⁶⁷³ Scotton, "International Affairs," p.104.

with percentage target figures."⁶⁷⁴ Even though it returned to the 1% figure in 1975, never again did a specific aid target play such a central role in NDP Third World Policy.

Probably more significant than the above modification was the NDP decision at the 1969 convention to examine development assistance policy in the broadest possible context. From then on, aid policy, like defence, must be consistent with and more explicitly serve the general aims of the party's overall foreign policy. In his short speech to the convention in support of the Waffle Resolution, "For an Independent Socialist Canada," Gerald Caplan, who had worked in Africa, challenged present Canadian aid and investment policies in an even more fundamental way, calling them "exploitative" and "imperialistic".⁶⁷⁵ He was saying, in effect, that these policies were inconsistent with social democratic internationalism's original vision.

While the official convention resolution did not use Caplan's forceful terminology, it did commit a future NDP government to a Third World policy that was independent of the policies of the world power blocs and alliances, a natural counterpart to the NATO decision which tilted the party towards quasi-neutralism.⁶⁷⁶ However, in subsequent years, the party did very little to relate the concept of an independent Third World assistance policy directly to the overall theme of a Canadian independent foreign policy that had ostensibly become its guiding principle in the late Sixties and early Seventies.⁶⁷⁷ Potentially, this could have enhanced both. This

⁶⁷⁴ Ibid., "Canada and the Third World," p.106.

⁶⁷⁵ "Debate on the Resolutions: 'For a United and Independent Canada,' (C-17) and 'For an Independent Socialist Canada,' (R.133)", NDP Federal Convention, Winnipeg, October 30, 1969, NAC, MG 32, C28, Vol.109, File 1-14-1969, pp.11-12.

⁶⁷⁶ Scotton, "International Development," p.103.

⁶⁷⁷ Stephen Hymer and Brian Van Arkadie explored the close relationship between these two concepts in an article. See "Offering Options to the Third World," in An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada?, ed. by Stephen Clarkson (Toronto: McClelland

failure is further evidence of a lack of an integrated foreign policy strategy in this period.

Evidently, the NDP had also concluded that development assistance should no longer be sold to the public primarily as a way of staving off communism or ensuring world peace. From now on, the object of all development efforts, the 1969 resolution stated, ought to be the building of independent self-reliant nations capable of exercising full control of their economies, a carry-over no doubt from the economic nationalism that dominated the convention. Canada should also be ready to enter into long-term commitments with developing countries to assist them in economic planning.⁶⁷⁸ The assumption was that Third World nations would naturally need and desire to follow social democratic economic policies to develop successfully, another prime example of NDP foreign policy growing out of NDP domestic policy and illustrative of social democratic internationalist thinking. All in all then, even though members of the Waffle paid very little direct attention to Third World concerns (Gerald Caplan's speech was the exception not the rule), their success in helping reverse the party's direction on NATO and in sensitizing the party about nationalist concerns (whether Canadian or Third World) had important effects on NDP development policy. (Interestingly, in his book, Half a Loaf, also written in 1969, Clyde Sanger urged Canadian withdrawal from NATO as a means of freeing its aid of all suspicion of military-political motives, a move of particular benefit in southern Africa.⁶⁷⁹

The 1969 convention statement also revealed a greater party sensitivity to the form in which aid was provided. It recognized that in the past, assistance had been

& Stewart, 1968), pp.226-43.

⁶⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁹ Clyde Sanger, Half a Loaf, p.221.

provided in such a manner as to export Canadian values and ways of doing things. To avoid this as much as possible, recipient countries should largely determine the nature and form of the aid. In addition, the bulk of Canadian assistance ought to be independent of the short-term interests of Canadian foreign policy, although the remainder could still serve Canadian domestic agricultural and employment needs. Finally, Canada should largely end the practice of tied aid.

Both the NDP, as noted earlier, and the Liberal government had traditionally defended the tied aid policy. Paul Martin provided the underlying reason in an address to Columbia University on April 28, 1967: "Canada maintains the policy of insisting that its aid be given in the form of Canadian goods and services.... We do this of economic necessity, rather than by conviction."⁶⁸⁰ The NDP, for its part, naturally had to be sensitive to the fact that over 100,000 Canadian jobs were connected to the foreign aid program.⁶⁸¹ Therefore, while the party flirted with the notion of untying all Canadian aid unconditionally in 1971 (as advocated by Brewin in a paper written earlier that year criticizing the Liberal White Paper⁶⁸²), by 1973 they had retreated from this position. This convention recommended that, at least for now, Canada should reduce the level of tied aid from 80% to 50% of total bilateral appropriations.⁶⁸³ In this way, the party preserved the idealistic long-term objective while responding to the practical immediate political constraints both of its labour constituency now

⁶⁸⁰ Paul Martin, "Speech on Peacemaking," Columbia University, April 28, 1967, NAC, MG 32, C13, Vol.33.

⁶⁸¹ David Brown-Leyton, "External Affairs and Defence," Canadian Annual Review, ed. by John Saywell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), p.302.

⁶⁸² Brewin, "Draft of Response to the White Paper," Feb.16, 1971, NAC, MG 32, C26, Vol.83, File 16. p.3.

⁶⁸³ Scotton, "Canada and the Third World Development," p.106.

experiencing the beginnings of the Seventies economic slowdown, and of many adherents still strongly influenced by economic nationalism.

In the two years following the 1969 convention, several new forums became available in which the party could promote its new Third World assistance policies. First, the Trudeau government decided to shift some of the detailed examination of policy and administration from the House of Commons to the standing committees of which SCEAND was a prominent one.⁶⁸⁴ Second, a special SCEAND subcommittee was created dealing exclusively with Canada's development assistance program. Third, the government conducted a major foreign policy review which touched on aid policy to some extent. Of considerable importance also was the active support of the new Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp for the Standing Committee on External and National Defence's recently expanded role. He encouraged it to conduct extensive hearings on a wide range of subjects and to issue detailed reports which, of course, the NDP could try to influence.⁶⁸⁵

How well did the NDP do with these opportunities? First, while attendance at SCEAND meetings by NDP members actually declined in the 1968-72 period compared to the 1960-68 years, the average number of questions from each MP remained virtually unchanged. With more committee meetings and a greatly increased number of subjects, the small NDP caucus had trouble covering all bases.⁶⁸⁶ Nevertheless, there is evidence that the NDP members of the committee pressed their agenda on

⁶⁸⁴ Don Page, "The Standing Committee on External Affairs, 1948-1983 - Who Participates When?" in Parliament and Canadian Foreign Policy, ed. by David Taras (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1985), p.48.

⁶⁸⁵ David Taras, "From Bystander to Participant," in Parliament and Canadian Foreign Policy, p.14.

⁶⁸⁶ Don Page, "The Standing Committee on External Affairs, 1948-1983 - Who Participates When?" p.53.

many aspects of development assistance quite vigorously. For example, on April 8, 1970, David Lewis asked people who were testifying for their opinion about what the Canadian government could do to persuade or force Canadian corporations to act responsibly in their dealings with Third World nations.⁶⁸⁷ A few days later, Lewis called attention to the NDP position that private investment was no substitute for official government to government aid, because private investors were not interested in providing money for basic infrastructure such as schools, roads and airfields.⁶⁸⁸

However, NDP Third World policy in the late Sixties and early Seventies must be evaluated not only by what party spokespersons and resolutions stated, but also by what they did not say. While the party was willing to reassess some of its long-standing attitudes to development assistance, much of this was really a case of old illusions dying in the face of new realities. The simple fact was that throwing money into the development "pot" had not produced the expected results.

However, this did not necessarily mean that the party was now ready to embrace wholeheartedly the more radical ideas being proposed by some experts in the field. For example, in testimony before SCEAND, S.G. Triantis, Professor of Economics at the University of Toronto, offered that if advanced nations were truly interested in promoting justice in the distribution of control over the world's natural resources, they should pay compensation or rent (not aid) for the use of these resources. The underdeveloped countries were entitled to these payments by right as a form of world income redistribution.⁶⁸⁹ This was something that should have appealed to a party

⁶⁸⁷ Reports and Transcripts of the Special Committee on External Affairs and National Defence (SCEAND), No.35, Second Session, 28th Parliament No.35, April 8, 1970, p.292.

⁶⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.290-2.

⁶⁸⁹ SCEAND, No.35, May 12, 1970, p.307.

ostensibly committed to both income redistribution and idealistic internationalism. Yet the NDP did not seize this idea and publicly endorse it or even pledge to study it.

The best the New Democratic Party could do in the early Seventies was to promote reform of Canada's existing foreign aid program. The major objective was to lessen the likelihood that it would benefit Canadians more than the recipient peoples. With this in mind, the NDP repeated its 1965 call for the Canadian government to redirect most of its aid from bilateral to multilateral channels, especially the United Nations.⁶⁹⁰ More significantly, the NDP passed a major resolution in 1973 asking for, among other things, the widest possible involvement by the underdeveloped countries in the planning and execution of Canada's aid effort. Specifically, it recommended that the Canadian financed International Development Research Centre in Ottawa be converted into an international organization supported by other industrial countries, but also with significant Third World participation.

Moreover, in response to growing concern about how CIDA was being run, the resolution proposed that it be reorganized as a public corporation free from the bureaucratic constraints of its departmental status. CIDA's president should be advised by a council of non-governmental organizations and Third World country representatives. The 1973 resolution also insisted that CIDA's objectives be clarified to specify that its funds be employed exclusively for the advancement of social justice and economic development overseas and not for the promotion of Canada's exports. Finally, the same resolution endorsed Canadian government cooperation with underdeveloped nations in setting up joint public ventures, particularly in high

⁶⁹⁰ R.B. Byers "External Affairs and Defence," Canadian Annual Review, ed. by John Saywell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), pp.258-9.

technology fields.⁶⁹¹ As evidence of CIDA's mismanagement continued to mount in the mid-Seventies, the NDP naturally became concerned that this would lead to a loss of support among the Canadian populace for foreign assistance programs.⁶⁹²

The second major aspect of NDP Third World assistance policy involved trade. By the late Sixties, certain development experts were coming to believe that living standards in poor countries would never rise significantly unless the trading practices of Western nations were drastically altered. In other words, the crucial issue was trade not aid. Specifically, tariffs, quotas and other restrictions on imports from underdeveloped countries must be reduced and even eliminated, while trade preferences and ways to stabilize commodity prices had to be instituted.

At its 1969 convention, the NDP had pledged cautiously that, if elected, it would seriously examine such measures particularly for a few raw materials such as coca, coffee and sisal.⁶⁹³ Of course, unrestricted imports of these particular raw materials threatened no Canadian industries or jobs. The 1971 and 1973 conventions passed resolutions reaffirming the commitment to more open trading policies but the wording continued to be general and tentative:

Consideration would be given to the reduction and elimination of tariffs on products of the less developed countries. This might be taken to extend new and larger preferences for Third World products. Quotas and restrictions on imports from less developed countries wherever they exist should be examined with a view to their elimination.⁶⁹⁴

⁶⁹¹ Scotton, "Canada and the Third World Development," pp.106-7.

⁶⁹² R.B. Byers, "External Affairs and Defence," Canadian Annual Review, ed. by John Saywell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), p.281.

⁶⁹³ Scotton, "International Development," p.104.

⁶⁹⁴ Scotton, "Canada and the Third World Development, p.106.

This 1973 resolution also sought to reassure the NDP's most important constituency (labour) with the pledge that Canadian workers would be guaranteed work or compensation if such measures were implemented.⁶⁹⁵

A partial exception to the NDP's caution in embracing more liberal trade policies in the early Seventies was a 1971 resolution urging that special trade and immigration considerations be granted to Commonwealth Caribbean states because of, among other things, Canada's historical ties with the region and for the reason that Canadian prosperity had been enhanced by heavy Canadian corporate investment in the region. (In its 1971 statement to SCEAND on the government White Paper, the CLC also drew attention to the Caribbean countries as worthy of special consideration.⁶⁹⁶) Specifically, the NDP wanted Canada to reduce tariffs for Caribbean goods and to assist their governments in promoting sales in Canada. In addition, Canada ought to promote joint ventures with Caribbean governments in establishing publicly owned industries and assist them in nationalizing Canadian corporations in the region if the host nation so desired.⁶⁹⁷

Here again was the mixing of the NDP's domestic agenda with foreign policy based on the assumption that what was good for Canada must be good for the Caribbean. This also illustrates a central argument of this dissertation that NDP domestic and foreign policies were products of the same vision, namely, that through rational planning, government at the national and global level can build a new international community of plenty, justice and peace. Rational also to the social

⁶⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁶ CLC, Submission to SCEAND, Jan. 30, 1971, NAC, MG 32, C26, Vol.83, File 13.

⁶⁹⁷ Scotton, "Canadian Assistance to Commonwealth Caribbean States," pp.104-5.

democratic internationalist mind, was the resolution's call for liberalized immigration policies for the peoples of the Caribbean Commonwealth in order to ease over-population which inhibited economic growth.⁶⁹⁸ Still, none of these measures posed any substantive threat to Canadian jobs.

What would happen in a situation where the NDP would be forced to choose between radical internationalist trade initiatives and nationalist domestic concerns? The short answer appears to be, as with tied aid, that while the rhetoric was often internationalist, the concrete policy and action was largely nationalist. For example, in testimony before SCEAND on October 6, 1970, M.G. Helleiner, professor of political economy at the University of Toronto and a noted expert in the aid and trade field, strongly criticized the recently released Liberal government White Paper, Foreign Policy for Canadians, for its treatment of international development issues. Helleiner argued that the White Paper

appears to reflect a concern for our... material and short-term self interest..., and does not adjust itself to the longer-term issues and the structural changes which will be required of our own economies if we are to participate in a true world economic community.⁶⁹⁹

Canada, he believed, should be phasing out those labour intensive industries, such as textiles, in which developing countries had a comparative advantage, while providing the affected Canadian industries and workers with good adjustment programs.⁷⁰⁰

⁶⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁹ SCEAND, No.35, Oct.6, 1970, p.327.

⁷⁰⁰ Ibid., p.335.

The NDP members of SCEAND verbally endorsed these proposals and committed themselves to trade liberalization.⁷⁰¹ Brewin candidly acknowledged that a major change was required in Canadian political attitudes which would recognize that it was in this country's long-term interest to endorse Helleiner's ideas. Brewin went on to blame special interests for blocking such changes.⁷⁰² However, there is no evidence that Brewin ever attempted to confront the special interest groups, particularly labour, in his party who generally resisted liberalized trade measures the most. Hence, while the NDP endorsed duty-free entrance for goods from Third World nations in principle, it failed to develop a concrete and detailed plan for Canadian trade liberalization. It also showed no signs in the early Seventies (or any other time for that matter) of making a determined effort to sell the concept to party members. For example, in a written response to the Liberal White Paper's treatment of Third World issues meant for internal NDP consumption, Brewin's chief criticism was the government's failure to deal with the population explosion, but he ignored the document's shortcomings on the trade liberalization issue.⁷⁰³

In such circumstances, mounting a crusade at election time for trade liberalization and a radical Third World policy in the interests of international solidarity with peoples living in underdeveloped countries was evidently never even considered. Social democratic internationalism found itself torn between the interests of the poorer nations and the interests of its own "poor," the Canadian worker. In the nationalist climate of the early Seventies, there was never very much doubt that the latter would

⁷⁰¹ SCEAND, No.35, Oct.6, 1970, p.333.

⁷⁰² *Ibid.*, p.330.

⁷⁰³ Brewin, "Draft of Response to White Paper," p.3.

prevail. Even Third World policy, an issue so close to every social democratic idealist's heart, could not break free from those realities.