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THE AESTHETIC RELEVANCE OF ARTISTIC ACTS: AN EXAMINATION OF RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE THEORY AND METATHEORY OF ART

by

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principles constitutive of that framework are construed in the manner of traditional philosophy of art. I argue, however, that the problem resides in the construal rather than in the principles themselves, and the arguments offered against these principles are at best conclusive only against these principles under their traditional interpretations. Weitz's arguments against the 'Essentialist Principle' only tell against definitions of art which refer to 'directly exhibited' properties of objects relevant to their being appreciated as artworks, and are thus ineffective against definitions in terms of 'non-exhibited' properties such as those contained in the 'institutional' accounts of art proposed by Dickie and Binkley; such accounts explicate 'arthood' in terms of the acquisition of a particular place in the 'artworld' through the performance of an 'artistic act' by the artist. Dickie and Binkley are wrong, however, in thinking that the 'artistic act' theory of art demonstrates the falsity, or dispensability, of the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance', save under its traditional interpretation. Indeed, so I argue, it is only if 'artistic acts' are related to certain concepts of the 'aesthetic' that the 'artistic act' theory of art can avoid a form of vicious circularity which vitiates the accounts offered by Dickie and Binkley.

In the light of this analysis, I attempt to develop an alternative version of the 'artistic act' theory on the basis of Binkley's notion of 'piece-specification' and the 'semiotic' theory of the 'aesthetic' expounded by Nelson Goodman. The 'artistic act' theory is rendered tenable through supplementation by Goodman's thesis that artworks are 'aesthetic symbols'; conversely, so I argue, Goodman's

thesis must itself be supplemented by an 'artistic act' theory if it is to adequately explicate the arthood of objects and the nature of artistic appreciation. Once this mutual supplementation is effected, it becomes possible to resolve artistic puzzlement without necessitating the rejection of either of the traditional methodological principles of the philosophy of art.

Chapter One Introduction

The formulation of philosophical theories, no less than that of scientific theories, is an activity that occurs within the context of an explicitly or implicitly espoused metatheory. Such a metatheory not only prescribes and attempts to validate the theoretician's adoption of a particular methodology, but also establishes the criteria by reference to which theories are to be assessed. When metatheoretical concerns proliferate in the literature of a given area of study, therefore, it may reasonably be assumed that at least some of the practitioners of that discipline are skeptical as to the acceptability of the established methods of formulating and evaluating theories within their field. An examination of recent literature in the philosophy of art reveals a growing concern with questions of a metatheoretical nature. Several writers have argued for the rejection of certain established methodological principles in the field, while others have even expressed doubts about the future viability of the field itself. In the following pages I shall attempt to evaluate the arguments of the former, as a means to possibly assuaging the doubts of the latter.

A necessary preliminary to such an endeavour will be an elucidation of the methodological principles whose tenability is in question. We might enquire as to what these principles are, and what considerations might establish their *prima facie* credibility as principles that should govern theoretical reflection about art. I shall try to answer these questions by looking, firstly, at the phenomena which the theories are attempting to explain, and, secondly, at

some of the theories which attempt to explain these phenomena. It will be argued, on such grounds, that the philosophical treatment of art has, until quite recently, occurred within a methodological framework the constitutive principles of which reflect salient features of artistic and critical practice. These principles I shall term the 'Essentialist Principle' and the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance'. The ' Essentialist Principle' asserts that the primary goal of a philosophical theory of art is the formulation of a definition of 'art', or of 'work of art', which captures the 'essence' of arthood through the specification of a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing's being art, or a work of art. The 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance' asserts that the philosophical treatment of art falls within the purview of philosophical aesthetics, and that the properties of objects relevant to an understanding of what it is to be, or function as, a work of art are 'aesthetic properties', properties having the capacity to elicit 'aesthetic experience' in those who engage in an experiential encounter with objects possessing them.

It is these principles that have come under fire in the proliferation of metatheoretical activity that has characterised philosophical reflection on art over the past quarter of a century. Morris Weitz and a number of other writers influenced by the later Wittgenstein(1) have argued that traditional methodology in the philosophy of art is misconceived in that it presupposes the acceptability of the 'Essentialist Principle'. The latter, so it is claimed, is untenable, since it rests upon a mistaken conception of the 'logic' of the concept 'art'. 'Art', according to Weitz, is an 'open' concept, and this precludes the possibility of formulating a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing's being a work of art. Weitz's claims have been disputed by George

Dickie, who has attempted to confer a new respectability on the 'Essentialist Principle' by offering a definition of the term 'work of art' that trades on Arthur Danto's notion of the 'Artworld'.(2) The 'Artworld', according to Dickie, is the institutional setting in which certain artifacts acquire the status of 'work of art' by virtue of being treated in certain ways. In his endeavour to defend the 'Essentialist Principle', however, Dickie is led to reject the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance'; works of art are to be distinguished from non-works not in terms of their possession of 'aesthetic properties', but, rather, in terms of the 'non-exhibited' property of having received, by conferral, the status of 'work of art'.

While the metatheoretical proposals of Weitz and Dickie may seem radical when viewed in the context of traditional methodology in the philosophy of art, Timothy Binkley, in a recent paper(3), takes both writers to task for their conservatism, and demonstrates his own philosophical radicalism by arguing for the rejection of both of the established methodological principles. While agreeing with Weitz that the concept 'art' is not susceptible to definition, Binkley claims that this is not, as Weitz believes, a consequence of the 'openness' which the concept shares with other empirical concepts, but, rather, a consequence of what Binkley terms its 'radical openness', a characteristic unique to the concept 'art'. Further, in arguing for his position, Binkley also rejects the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance', claiming that 'aesthetics is a study of aesthetic qualities, and aesthetic qualities are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of arthood'.(4) Such heresies seem to call for an inquisition, or at least for more careful scrutiny. Such scrutiny I shall attempt to provide in the remainder of this paper.

As I noted above, however, there are certain preliminary questions requiring prior examination. I shall begin with a brief account of certain puzzles arising in the context of our practical commerce with works of art. Two of these puzzles - concerning the treatment of forgeries and the relevance of knowledge of the artist's intentions to the appreciation and understanding of works of art - are included in the traditional repertoire of problems on which philosophers of art have exercised their skill and ingenuity. The remaining puzzles, however, concerning the artistic status of non-artifacts and 'Readymades', originate in the creative ferment of modern art. Such puzzles, although they arise out of aspects of practice, are not 'practical' problems susceptible of practical solution. It is arguable that practice is never wholly uncompromised by theoretical liaisons. Whatever the more general case, however, our puzzlement over the problems cited above clearly depends, so I shall argue, upon an apparent conflict between the way in which we treat certain objects and a certain framework of beliefs, albeit somewhat unsystematised, concerning the nature of art, artistic appreciation, and artistic criticism. These beliefs, when made explicit, will be seen to involve a conception of the experience of works of art closely resembling that which is enshrined in the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance'. One's finding the puzzles puzzling, it will be argued, is at least partly a consequence of one's accepting this principle, and the 'Essentialist Principle', in a more or less sophisticated form.

The methodological principles of traditional philosophy of art are thus implicated in our 'common-sense', or pre-theoretical, understanding of art. That puzzlement over certain issues arises in the context of such an understanding does not imply, however, that no satisfactory resolution

of this puzzlement will be forthcoming within the methodological framework established by these principles. That one is puzzled reflects, perhaps, the unsystematic nature of one's understanding of art. A more fully and carefully developed theory of art might well perform a welcome act of demystification. With this possibility in mind, I shall briefly examine a representative sample of those theories of art developed prior to the advent of metatheoretical concern. In presenting these theories, I shall endeavour to show that they do, indeed, comply with the methodological principles of 'Essentialism' and 'Aesthetic Relevance'. As will be seen, such theories offer mutually incompatible 'solutions' to the artistic puzzles under consideration. If attention to traditional theories of art is to banish artistic puzzlement, therefore, some means of choosing between such theories will be required. After considering one possible method of making such a choice, I shall turn to an examination of the alternative possibility, argued for by the metatheoretical 'radicals' cited above, that no such choice is necessary, since <u>all</u> of the traditional theories of art are implicated in the 'guilt' of the methodological principles that they share.

The artistic puzzles that I shall discuss in the following chapter are significant, not only for the light which they throw on the practical implications of the methodological principles espoused by traditional philosophers of art, but also for other reasons germane to the spirit, and even the letter, of this paper. In the first place, a failure to achieve a satisfactory resolution to our puzzlement over such matters may adversely affect our ability to appreciate and understand certain works of art, and especially certain contemporary works. Secondly, it is puzzlement over such matters that generates much philosophical reflection

upon art, supplying the philosopher with both interest and impetus. Finally, and most significantly, if practical puzzles are often the progenitor of theory, they may also serve as its executioner. Nelson Goodman has written of such artistic puzzles, that '...answers to them do not amount to an aesthetic theory, or even the beginning of one, (but) failure to answer them can well be the end of one; and their exploration points the way to more basic problems and principles'.(5)

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Part Two

Chapter Two The Structure of Artistic Puzzlement

The common man, that most ubiquitous of fictions, is commonly characterised as one relatively ignorant about art but omniscient concerning his own preferences. The little knowledge that 'not knowing much about art' permits would include, perhaps, the 'knowledge' that Leonardo's "Mona Lisa" is a work of art, whereas the latest model from the Ford assembly line, promotional literature notwithstanding, is not. The common man, if taxed upon the subject, might also admit to knowing that certain objects may be used in different ways, some of which uses might be termed 'artistic' and others 'non-artistic'. Consider, for example, a hard-back edition of James Joyce's novel Ulysses. If one opens the book and engages in the sequential reading of pages of the text, one is, in normal circumstances (but see below), putting the book to an 'artistic' use; the same book, if thrown at the cat in the interests of domestic tranquillity, is presumably being put to a 'non-artistic' use.

If the little knowledge possessed by the common man can carry him thus far without difficulty, its limitations begin to show when we consider cases that seem to call for more precise formulations of the intuitive distinctions between 'art' and 'non-art', and between 'artistic' and non-artistic' uses of objects. The following cases may serve to exemplify the sort of instances that might perplex our hypothetical common man:-

1.) The "Mona Lisa", let us agree, is a work of art. More specifically, it is a painting, and thus a work of visual art. The 'artistic' use of works of visual art would seem to involve attending to the perceptible properties of a painted canvas, a piece of marble, etc.

Consider the case of a copy of the "Mona Lisa" painted by a later artist. This copy, let us hypothesise, is perceptually indistinguishable from the original, save, perhaps, under 'abnormal' conditions of viewing (e.g., scrutiny of minute areas of the canvases under a powerful microscope). If the 'artistic use' of a painting involves attending to the painted surface of a canvas, and if the painted surfaces of the two canvases in question are, ex hypothesi, perceptually identical, then the original and the copy seem to admit of identical 'artistic uses'. And, if the original is valued for its 'artistic use', then the same value should presumably be accorded to the copy. Practice, however, rules otherwise; for while the original is recognised to be a valuable work of art and is exhibited in a gallery, the copy is denigrated as a forgery and is rarely, if ever, made available for public appreciation. It is worth noting, also, that this discrepancy in treatment is not necessarily rendered more intelligible if we modify our example so as to allow that the paintings are perceptually distinguishable to an expert, though not to the competent layman. For it seems highly implausible that so refined a perceptual difference could support so radical a difference in the values assigned and the treatments accorded to the paintings - the more so when we consider the number of paintings that are recognised to be artistically inferior to the "Mona Lisa" yet are nonetheless valued as works of art.

We are faced, then, with the following puzzle: if, as seems to be the case, we value works of art for the 'artistic uses' to which they can be put, why do we not recognise copies of paintings that are perceptually indistinguishable from the originals as being equally val-

uable? Wherein lies the relevant difference between the original, which is a work of art, and the copy, which is not?

2.) The "Mona Lisa", the common man's paradigm work of art, is an artifact, that is, a product of human workmanship. Since the latest model from the Ford production line is also an artifact and is not a work of art, artifactuality is clearly not a sufficient condition for something's being a work of art. It may be a necessary condition, however, in that the existence of a work of art seems to presuppose the productive activity of the artist of which the work is itself the product. Furthermore, 'natural' objects, such as mountains, lakes, trees, and animals, which are clearly non-artifacts, might be cited as paradigm cases of non-art. Again, however, practice, both artistic and linguistic, appears to confound our intuitions. Firstly, as Weitz has pointed out(1), we may describe a piece of driftwood as 'a lovely piece of sculpture', and hence, if pieces of sculpture are works of art, as a work of art. Secondly, the recent history of art furnishes examples of non-artifacts, such as rocks and stones, exhibited by artists in the name of art. If such non-artifacts are accepted as art, we might ask by what criterion they are to be distinguished from other non-artifacts, which are presumably not works of art. Perhaps these non-artifactual works differ in that they perceptually resemble certain paradigm works of art that are artifacts. Perceptual resemblance of this sort might render some non-artifacts suitable objects for 'artistic use'. However, as we have seen in the case of forgeries, neither perceptual resemblance to a <u>bona fide</u> work of art nor potential for 'artistic use' seem sufficient to establish the artistic credentials of an object. We are left with the problem,

therefore, of explaining how, if at all, certain non-artifacts can qualify as works of art.

3.) An analogous problem arises in connection with certain artifacts that have figured prominently in the recent annals of art history. Marcel Duchamp, in the 1930's, initiated the 'Readymade' tradition in the fine arts by exhibiting, in various Parisian art galleries, such mass-produced artifacts as a hat-rack, a snow shovel, and a urinal. Each 'work' was duly labelled and displayed as befits an artwork; the urinal, for instance, was entitled "Fountain", and the snow shovel "In Advance of the Broken Arm". Duchamp thereby achieved first notoriety and then canonisation within the church of art, and his influence can be seen in such recent developments as 'junk sculpture' and 'forund art'. As with the non-artifactual 'artworks' discussed in '2', our intuitions are of little assistance in our attempts to grasp the 'arthood' of such works of art. It would seem that Duchamp's 'Readymades', as mass-produced artifacts, should be classified, with Ford automobiles, as non-art. And we might ask, again, as to the criterion by which such works are to be distinguished from other mass-produced artifacts which are not art. Perceptual resemblance to paradigm cases of art proves to be even less satisfactory as a criterion of 'arthood' in this context than it was in the case of non-artifactual artworks. For nothing will perceptually resemble Duchamp's snow shovel to a greater degree than other snow shovels of the same design. If perceptual resemblance to paradigms were the criterion of arthood in these cases, all snow shovels of the same design as Duchamp's would seem to have an equal claim to being artworks. Or would the other shovels, proffered by later artists as their works,

be forgeries of Duchamp's work?

4.) The first three puzzles suggest that the common man's intuitive distinction between art and non-art is incapable of rendering intelligible certain features of artistic practice. If any hopes be cherished that the intuitive distinction between 'artistic' and 'non-artistic' uses of objects will prove less fragile, they may soon be blasted by the following considerations. 'Artistic' use of the hard-back edition of Ulysses, we may recall, was taken to involve an engagement with the textual contents of the book. But such engagement, even if it is a necessary condition for 'artistic' use of the book, is clearly not a sufficient condition. For example, consider the case of a blackmailer who, desiring a particular word to complete a 'paste-up' blackmail note, engages in a sequential reading of the pages of Ulysses in the hope of finding what he is looking for. This, surely, should not count as an 'artistic' use of the book. Perhaps 'artistic' use of a literary work of art requires that the text be read in a certain way, but which ways of reading are to count as 'artistic' uses of a book? What about the reading of a psychiatrist who seeks, in the textual contents of Ulysses, confirmation of the hypothesis that Joyce was the victim of certain sexual neuroses?

'Artistic' use of an object, it might be claimed, involves attending to those properties of the object relevant to appreciating and understanding it as a work of art. But what is it to 'appreciate and understand something as a work of art'? What sort of properties are properly attended to in the furtherance of such activities? Attention to the text of a literary artwork is, as we have seen, at best a necessary condition for the 'artistic' use of the book containing the

text. Is knowledge not directly obtainable from an object of any relevance to appreciating and understanding the object as a work of art? More specifically, is knowledge of the artist's intentions in creating a given work either necessary or desirable for an adequate reception of the work? If one reads Kafka's The Trial as a perceptive statement on man;s existential condition in the absence of God, and if Kafka intended the work as a satire on the modern bureaucratic state, is one's reading thereby rendered inadequate, or is it justifiable to the extent that it can be supported by reference to the text? As we shall see, persuasive arguments can be offered for either of these alternatives. Until such issues as this are resolved, however, the notion of 'appreciating and understanding something as a work of art' will be of little help in making more precise the notion of 'artistic use'.

The common man, if taxed with puzzles of this sort, might reaffirm his claim not to know much about art, and defer, on such matters, to the judgement of those less peripherally concerned with the arts, those whose principal business it is to create, present, perform, and critically evaluate works of art, and those whose principal pleasure it is to appreciate the same. But, if puzzlement over such matters is a mark of ignorance about art, the common man may be in better company than he thinks. For such matters may prove equally obscure to those whose practical acquaintance with the arts will presumably render them competent judges of any matter to which such acquaintance is pertinent. The problem, it would seem, is that, while these issues are profoundly practical in their implications, the puzzlement that they occasion can be dispell-

ed only by recourse to theoretical reflection. Practice poses, but cannot dispose of, such puzzles.

Why this is so becomes apparent when we consider the logical structure of the presented puzzles. For puzzlement in such cases arises in the context of an apparent conflict between the way we treat certain objects and the way that we ought to treat these objects. We relegate forgeries to the basement, for instance, when it seems that we ought to treat them as objects admitting of valuable 'artistic use'. The belief that we ought to treat forgeries, etc., in a certain way is partly derived from other features of our practical commerce with artworks and non-artworks, but it also reflects, in its normative force, certain more or less explicit assumptions as to the nature of art and artistic appreciation. The practitioner differs from the common man, perhaps, not in the absence of puzzlement but in the more explicit recognition of the underlying assumptions upon which his puzzlement is based. 'Common knowledge' about art is knowledge of 'paradigm' cases, knowledge that certain things are properly included within the extensions of the terms 'work of art' and 'artistic use' as those terms are customarily employed within the speaker's linguistic community. The common man also believes, quite reasonably, that other objects resembling the paradigms in relevant respects will also be properly included in the extensions of these terms. His 'ignorance' surfaces, however, when he is faced with cases which require a more explicit formulation of what are, and what are not, 'relevant respects' in this context. It is his ignorance of the principles governing the employment of these terms that renders him incapable of determining whether the terms are properly projectible over certain instances the artistic status of which has not been established by prior

usage. The practitioner, on the other hand, will usually be able to formulate in fairly precise terms the sorts of considerations that he takes to be relevant to the classification of objects as 'works of art', and of uses of objects as 'artistic uses'. Such formulations, together with more general beliefs that subsume them, provide the practitioner with a sort of 'working theory' of art, a loose framework of assumptions as to what is involved in being, and in being appreciated as, a work of art. The practitioner may acquire his 'working theory' in various ways - possibly through casual acquaintance with systematic theorising about art, but also, more significantly, through learning, or becoming 'initiated'into, a certain mode of discourse about art. The specialised language employed within a given community of practitioners of the arts reflects those more general assumptions about art maintained within that community; it does so by identifying certain features of objects as those features to which reference is properly made in discourse about those objects as works of art. In learning to apply the term 'cubist composition' to certain paintings, for example, the practitioner not only acquires beliefs about the properties properly attended to in these paintings, but also assimilates a more general theory as to the relevance of 'formal' properties to an object's being, and being appreciated as, a work of art.

The puzzlement of the practitioner arises because, in certain cases, his 'working theory' doesn't seem to work. His framework of beliefs about art suggests that forgeries ought to be treated in one way, yet the community treats them differently. To be puzzled about forgeries and related issues presupposes the acceptance of those assumptions about art which make up the 'working theory'. Such assumptions, fairly explic-

it in the beliefs of the practitioner, are implicitly contained in 'common knowledge' about art, such that their truth will readily be affirmed by the common man once they have been formulated for his consideration. Indeed, as will soon become apparent, I have tacitly introduced such assumptions in setting out, for the attention of the common man, the artistic puzzles sketched above.

If our assumptions lead us into difficulties, the obvious method of obviating our difficulties might be to reject our assumptions. If the entrenchment, or the apparent self-evidence, of our assumptions, makes such an option seem unappealing, we might seek instead some form of modus vivendi with our difficulties. In the present circumstances, however, another course of action recommends itself. For our assumptions are only a 'working theory', a loose and fairly unsystematic set of beliefs acquired piecemeal in an ongoing and lengthy interaction with works of art. The resolution of our difficulties might be sought, therefore, through the development of a more comprehensive and systematic account of art and artistic appreciation which would explicate and clarify our 'working' assumptions about art and, thereby, provide us with answers to the puzzles of artistic practice. Such a theory, capturing the 'essence' of art in a definition stating necessary and sufficient conditions for something's being a work of art, would allow us to understand why 'Readymades', for example, have an artistic status that other mass-produced artifacts lack by making explicit those conditions of arthood that the former, but not the latter, are able to satisfy.

The formulation of such a definition of art has traditionally been taken to be the principal task facing the philosopher of art. Furthermore, those philosophers who have taken up this task have generally con-

curred in the belief that the 'working' assumptions about art which underly artistic puzzlement are fundamentally correct, requiring clarification rather than replacement. In the following three chapters I shall attempt to determine, firstly, what these assumptions are, and, secondly, how traditional theorists of art have set about giving them a more systematic formulation.

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Chapter Three Artistic Puzzlement and the 'Working Theory' of Art

In discussing the notion of 'artistic use' in the previous chapter, it was suggested that this notion might be understood in terms of attention to those properties of an object which are relevant to appreciating and understanding it as a work of art. The obvious problem with such an interpretation, it was further suggested, is that we seem to be explicating one unanalysed notion, that of 'artistic use', in terms of another, that of 'appreciating and understanding something as a work of art'. The latter notion, however, may prove more fruitful than the former in that the 'working theory' of the practitioner, while it fails to provide a precise account of this notion, does contain certain beliefs as to the sort of thing involved. By examining these beliefs, we may both clarify the notion of 'artistic use' and arrive at a clearer conception of those general assumptions about art that the 'working theory' contains.

The explicans of the proposed explication of 'artistic use' refers to certain properties of objects relevant to their being appreciated and understood as works of art. Such properties may be tentatively characterised as the 'artistically relevant', or 'A-relevant', properties of an object.(1) The notion of 'A-relevance' may be illustrated by reference to the common man's 'paradigms' of 'artistic' and 'non-artistic' use. Consider again our now well-worn edition of Ulysses. The book is a physical object and possesses certain specifiable physical properties, many of which can be determined directly from an inspection of the book. It is, for instance, of a certain size, weight, and shape; it contains a specifiable number of pages; the pages have printed on them a certain

sequential arrangement of marks which together constitute the text of the novel Ulysses; these marks are occasionally accompanied by other marks in blue ink, representing the more or less coherent observations of some previous reader of the book; the book was purchased at a small second-hand bookstore in Toronto. 'Artistic use' of the book, it was suggested, involves the sequential reading of pages of the text; this is at least a necessary condition for 'artistic use' to occur. The 'A-relevant' properties to which one must attend if one is to appreciate and understand the book as a work of art, therefore, will be the sequential arrangement of marks that constitute the text of the novel. 'Non-artistic use' of the book as a projectile is also dependent upon certain physical properties of the object - in this case, its size, shape, and weight, which render it easily graspable and projectable in a chosen direction. Such use may also involve attention to these properties, as when one considers the relative merits of the hard-back and the paperback editions of Ulysses for the task in hand. What is clearly not involved, however, is any attention to the textual contents of the book, those 'A-relevant' properties specified above.

Attention to 'A-relevant' properties might thus be taken as a necessary condition for 'artistic use' of an object. The activities of the blackmailer and perhaps also those of the psychiatrist referred to above indicate, however, that we do not yet have sufficient conditions for such use. To remedy this, we might try to distinguish different types of attention, or, alternatively, we might try to give a more specific characterisation of the objects of attention. While recognising that this problem remains, however, the increment to understanding that even a clear statement of necessary conditions for 'artistic use' would provide

should not be overlooked. As yet, of course, we have only a single illustration of the relationship between attention to 'A-relevant' properties of objects and the 'artistic use' of these objects, and since the relationship is itself a logical one, established by definitional fiat, this is hardly informative. Of considerably greater interest would be an account of the conditions, if any, which limit the properties of objects that can function as 'A-relevant' properties. Such an account may be forthcoming if we return to the notion with which this chapter began, namely, the notion of appreciating and understanding something as a work of art.

A central feature of our 'working theory' of art, explicit in our discourse about, and implicit in our practical commerce with, works of art, is the belief that appreciating and understanding a work of art necessarily involves an experiential encounter with the work itself. Vicarious appreciation, mediated by another's description of a work or of his own experience of a work, is no appreciation at all. However articulate and perceptive the critic may be, however comprehensive his description of a work, however sensitive his interpretation. his writings are at best a supplement to the experience of the work itself. If we are to appreciate and understand the "Mona Lisa", Ulysses, or The Seventh Seal as works of art, we must take the appropriate steps to bring about an experiential encounter with these works. The belief that an experiential encounter with an artwork is a necessary condition for appreciation is closely related to the further belief that the value of appreciating works of art resides in the experience of the receiver when he engages in such an encounter. To appreciate a work of art is to have certain valuable experiences as a result of an immediate interaction

with the work. Axiologically, if not ontologically, the esse of a work of art is percipi.

If we hold that the value in artistic appreciation lies in the experiences produced in experiential encounters with artworks, our reasons for rejecting 'vicarious appreciation' are fairly obvious. For it would seem most unlikely that the experience of listening to a verbal description of the "Mona Lisa", for instance, will significantly resemble the experience of looking at the picture itself. Nor is such a distinction confined to cases where the work and its 'substitute' are experienced through different sensory modes of reception. Our experience upon reading a discursive paraphrase of Keats' "Ode to a Nightingale" will surely differ from our experience upon reading the original poem. It is not merely a difference in experience that seems to be involved in such cases, however, but a difference in the value of the respective experiences. The experience that results from an encounter with the work itself is held to have a value that is absent in any experience derivable from 'substitutes' for the work. It is the belief in such a difference in value that underlies the claim that it is tantamount to 'heresy' to maintain that the 'meaning' of a poem can be adequately rendered by a paraphrase.(2) The 'meaning' of a poem, it is held, is not its propositional meaning, something that may be abstracted from the text of the poem and reformulated in other words. Rather, grasping the 'meaning' of a poem involves an experience only attainable in an encounter with the poem itself. More generally, this sort of approach provides an answer to the 'philistine' who opines that, if the artist really had something significant to say, he would state it in a clear discursive form rather than disguise it in the enchanting embroidery of art; for such a charge

against the artist may be countered by the argument that no such discursive presentation could produce the unique experience afforded by the original work, and that it is in this experience that the 'meaning' of the work, what the artist has to 'say', resides.

'A-relevant' properties have been defined as those properties of an object relevant to its being appreciated and understood as a work of art. It has now been argued that artistic practice and criticism implicitly or explicitly manifest the belief that such appreciation and understanding require an experiential encounter with a work, and that the value of artistic appreciation resides in the experiences elicited in a receiver who engages in such an encounter. The nature and purported value of these experiences have yet to be explained. Nonetheless, we might now be in a position to delimit more clearly the field of possible 'A-relevant' properties. The 'A-relevant' properties of an object, it would seem, are those properties which, when attended to in an experiential encounter with the object, have the capacity to elicit in the receiver that mode of valuable experience characteristic of art. This suggests two criteria by means of which 'A-relevant' properties might be distinguished. Firstly, the proviso that such properties should be possible objects of attention in an experiential encounter with an object seems to imply that 'A-relevant' properties must be perceptible in such an encounter. Any property of an object not perceptible in a given encounter would not, therefore, be an 'A-relevant' property of that object for that encounter. Thus, for any experiential encounter subsequent to its purchase, the property of having been purchased in a small bookstore in Toronto would not be an 'A-relevant' property of our hard-back edition of Ulysses.(3) Of course, being a currently perceptible property of

an object is, at best, a necessary condition for being an 'A-relevant' property; the size and shape of the given edition of Ulysses are perceptible in any experiential encounter with the book, but these are presumably not among its 'A-relevant' properties. Rather, the 'A-relevant' properties of an object, on this account, will form a sub-set of the set of its currently perceptible properties for a given encounter. This sub-set may be distinguished from the larger set, perhaps, by reference to the second condition embedded in the given characterisation of 'A-relevance, namely, the capacity to elicit a particular kind of experience in a receiver. Attention to the shape, size, or quality of paper of the hard-back edition of Ulysses, for example, will presumably not elicit the experience appropriate to the appreciation of the book as a literary work of art. The properties that will elicit such an experience (in appropriate circumstances), and thus the 'A-relevant' properties of the book, are the textual properties, the sequential series of marks that constitute the text of the novel.

'A-relevant' properties, on the foregoing account, will be those perceptible properties of an object having the capacity to elicit, in one who attends to them, an 'artistic' mode of experience. Given a more specific account of the mode of experience peculiar to our interaction with works of art, we might be able to determine which sorts of perceptible properties have the capacity to elicit such experience, and thereby establish more precise criteria for distinguishing those properties of objects which are 'A-relevant' from those which are not. The task of formulating such an account and deriving such criteria falls within the province of the philosopher of art, and I shall postpone consideration of attempts to perform this task until the following chapters. The pre-

ceding reflections are intended only as an elucidation of our 'working' assumptions concerning the 'artistic use' of objects, those assumptions that a more systematic theory of art might be expected to clarify.

If our 'working' assumptions concerning the 'artistic use' of objects can be elucidated in terms of attention to 'A-relevant' properties, we might enquire whether a similar analysis is available for our 'working' notion of what it is to be a work of art. Can we elucidate our 'pre-theoretical' distinction between art and non-art in terms, not of attention to, but of possession of 'A-relevant' properties? Such a distinction is implicated, I think, in our pre-theoretical treatment of art. Given our belief that works of art function through the eliciting of certain experiences in receivers, and our further belief that the capacity to so function depends upon the possession of 'A-relevant' properties, we assume that it is the possession of such properties that distinguishes works of art from non-works. We also assume that this distinction, suitably explicated in a more systematic theory of art, might provide us with a definition of art stating necessary and sufficient conditions for something's being a work of art.

The perceptive reader, whose critical eye is not deceived by logical sleight of hand, might remark here that the foregoing inference to the possibility of distinguishing or defining works of art in terms of the possession of 'A-relevant' properties is somewhat precipitate. For such a possibility can only be inferred from the analysis of 'artistic use' if certain assumptions be granted, and the acceptability of these assumptions is open to dispute. While the critical observations of the perceptive reader involve a higher level of philosophical sophistication than our 'working theory' permits, it may be useful at this point to

consider why the inference in the preceding paragraph might be deemed questionable. The significance of such considerations will emerge when we turn to the problems involved in the attempt to provide a definition of art.

The inference from the analysis of 'artistic use' to the possibility of distinguishing or defining works of art in terms of the possession of 'A-relevant' properties presupposes the acceptability of two assumptions. I shall consider each of these assumptions in turn:

1.) The first assumption is that we can give an adequate account of what it is to _be_ a work of art in terms of what it is for an object to _function as_ a work of art; or, put slightly differently, that those properties of objects relevant to an analysis of the distinction between 'artistic' and 'non-artistic' uses of objects are also relevant to an analysis of the distinction between those things that are works of art and those things that are not. This assumption does not seem unreasonable. For we do seem to distinguish certain types of things, particulary artifacts, at least partly by reference to their performance of a specific function. And the claim that works of art are artifacts seems to be intuitively unexceptionable (prior to the production of puzzling counterexamples). Even if we find this first assumption _prima facie_ acceptable, it will be helpful to specify more clearly what it is that is being assumed, and I shall attempt to do this by distinguishing two senses in which a property of an object might be said to be 'artistically relevant'. The first sense is the already familiar one in terms of which the notion of 'A-relevance' was defined: an 'artistically relevant' property of an object is a property relevant to the appreciation and understanding of that object as a work of art, or, in other words, a property

relevant to an object's functioning as a work of art. This sense may now be distinguished from a second sense in which we may talk of the 'artistic relevance' of a property, namely, the property's relevance to its possessor's being a work of art, as a distinguishing or defining characteristic of artworks. I shall describe properties of this second type 'A-relevant$_2$', and recharacterise properties of the first type as 'A-relevant$_i$'. The first assumption underlying the inference in questiion may therefore be restated as follows: the 'A-relevant$_2$' properties of an object are its 'A-relevant$_i$' properties.

It might be objected that the assumption, as stated, is unnecessarily strong. While we do distinguish certain types of artifact by reference to the capacity to perform specified functions, such functional capacities are rarely, if ever, the only factors to which we need to refer. Functional capacities, while they may be necessary conditions for something's being an artifact of a certain sort, are not thereby defining conditions. It may therefore be necessary to weaken the formulation of the first assumption if it is to be plausible.

2.) That such weakening may indeed be necessary when we consider the acceptability of the second assumption, which effectively asserts that no such weakening is required. The second assumption is that possession of 'A-relevant$_i$' properties, when suitably explicated, is a necessary and sufficient condition for something's being a work of art; or, in other words, that all and only works of art have the capacity to function as works of art, where such functioning involves the eliciting of a particular kind of experience in receivers. The first thing we might note, here, is that, whereas attention to the 'A-relevant$_i$' properties of an object is only taken to be a necessary condition for 'artistic use' of

that object (recall the blackmailer and the psychiatrist), possession of such qualities is held, on the above assumption, to be necessary and sufficient for something's being a work of art. Thsi asymmetry is unproblematic, however, since it is only claimed that all and only works of art have the capacity to function as works of art, not that they must always so function. The assumption that possession of 'A-relevant$_i$' properties is necessary and sufficient for being a work of art is thus quite compatible with the further assumption that not all uses of an object involving attention to such 'A-relevant$_i$' properties are 'artistic uses'.

More questionable, perhaps, is the claim that only works of art can function as works of art, the truth of which is required if possession of 'A-relevant$_i$' properties is to count as a sufficient condition of arthood. To function as a work of art, on the 'working theory', is to elicit in a receiver a particular kind of experience. Whether it is the case that only works of art can so function will depend on how this mode of experience is characterised. If, for instance, it were to be characterised as 'experience of the beautiful', it would seem that many things which are not works of art have the capacity to elicit such experience in receivers. If 'A-relevant$_i$' properties are those properties are those properties relevant to something's functioning as a work of art, and if natural entities such as landscapes and sunsets can so function, then such natural entities will possess 'A-relevant$_i$' properties and possession of such properties will not be a sufficient condition for something's being a work of art.

If a definition of 'work of art' in terms of the possession of 'A-relevant$_i$' properties is too broad, one might attempt to salvage the definition by the addition of one or more further necessary conditions

designed to exclude such unwelcome counter-examples. If 'artistic' experience is explicated as 'experience of the beautiful', for instance, the additional necessary condition of arthood required might be that the entity in question be an artifact. Works of art would then be all and only those artifacts possessing 'A-relevant$_i$' properties. The important thing to note, here, is that any explication of 'artistic' experience which fails to guarantee that <u>only</u> artworks can function as works of art will necessitate that any purported definition of art accepting this explication include at least one non-'A-relevant$_i$' property in its set of necessary and sufficient conditions of arthood. Thus, for any purported definition of this type, we would require a weaker formulation of the first assumption discussed in '1' above. The first assumption, suitably weakened, might be restated as follows: at least some of the 'A-relevant$_2$' properties of an entity are its 'A-relevant$_i$' properties.

Thus far in this chapter, I have been attempting to elucidate those general assumptions about the nature of art and artistic appreciation that are implicated in the loose framework of beliefs which constitutes the practitioner's 'working theory' of art, and which underlies the intuitive judgements of the common man. These assumptions may now be summarised as follows: it is held that works of art function through the eliciting of certain types of experiences in receivers of works; these experiences are only available in an experiential encounter with the actual work; the value of attending to works of art resides in the value of the experiences elicited; the capacity of works to elicit such experiences depends upon their possession of certain perceptible properties, and the possession of these properties is the distinguishing character-

istic, or, at least, one of the distinguishing characteristics, of works of art.

It is the acceptance of these assumptions, together with certain features of our practical commerce with works of art, that generates the sort of puzzlement discussed in chapter two. That this is so may be more apparent if the puzzles are reformulated in terms of these assumptions and the notions of 'A-relevance' introduced earlier in this chapter.

1.) In setting up the problem of forgeries, I hypothesised two paintings, perceptually indistinguishable under normal conditions of observation, one of which is an original work of art, such as the "Mona Lisa", and the other a copy by a later painter. In saying that the paintings are 'perceptually indistinguishable under normal conditions of viewing', I am saying that it is impossible to tell, by looking at either of the paintings with the naked or bespectacled eye, whether one is looking at the original or the copy. Suppose that the two paintings are displayed, in turn, in the same position on the wall of an art gallery, and that each painting, thus displayed, is viewed by a given observer. Since, ex hypothesi, the two paintings are perceptually indistinguishable under such conditions, they will present identical perceptible properties for the attention of the observer.(4) The 'A-relevant$_i$' properties of the original are those of its perceptible properties attention to which may elicit a particular experience in the observer. Since the original and the copy share all their perceptible properties, the copy will possess the same sub-set of perceptible properties that are 'A-relevant$_i$' for the original. Attention to this sub-set of properties in the case of the copy, therefore, will presumably elicit in the receiver the same experience as in the case

of the original. This sub-set of the perceptible properties of the copy, then, will be its 'A-relevant$_i$' properties. If arthood is a matter of the possession of 'A-relevant$_i$' properties, both the original and the copy should qualify as artworks. Yet only the original is so regarded in practice.

This might be taken as an indication that there is some additional 'A-relevant$_2$' property, over and above the possession of 'A-relevant$_i$' properties, which is possessed by the original but not by the copy. Perhaps this property is that of being an original creation.(5) But, if originality is 'A-relevant$_2$', the question arises why this should be so. This question is hardly less puzzling than the puzzle that the 'originality' requirement for art purports to solve. For, if artworks are valued for the sake of the experiences that they make available, what does it matter whether the painting which produces a particular experience is an original work or a copy? Should we not take advantage of the copy to make more widely available the experience elicited by the original work? Yet we relegate forgeries to the basement, rather than distributing them to galleries not fortunate enough to possess the original. Does a failure to meet a somewhat mysterious 'originality' requirement merit such ignominious treatment?

2.) In considering whether non-artifacts can be works of art, it was suggested that certain non-artifacts might so qualify by virtue of their perceptual resemblance to artifactual artworks. A large smooth rock, for instance, might perceptually resemble a sculpture by Henry Moore. If so, attending to certain perceptible properties of the rock might elicit an experience suitably analogous to that which is elicited by attention to the 'A-relevant$_i$' properties of the piece of sculp-

ture. These perceptible properties of the rock might then be characterised as its 'A-relevant$_i$' properties, and, if possession of such properties were a sufficient condition of arthood, the rock would thereby qualify as a work of art. Of course, when we talk of possible non-artifactual artworks, we have in mind those natural objects that have actually been offered as works by established or aspiring artists. But the argument from perceptual resemblance, as just advanced, would seem to artistically enfranchise certain natural objects regardless of whether an artist has lavished such attention upon them or not. This sudden plethora of artworks is somewhat embarrassing for the argument from perceptual resemblance. As was the case with forgeries, simple possession of 'A-relevant$_i$' properties seems insufficient for an object to qualify as an artwork. We seem to require an additional 'A-relevant$_2$' property to separate the artistic sheep from the non-artistic goats. But what is this property to be, and how are we to explain its 'A-relevance$_2$'? Can we describe <u>any</u> non-artifacts as 'original creations' of an artist? Is the additional 'A-relevant$_2$' property being treated in a certain way by an artist? While this will certainly serve to distinguish those non-artifacts that we might want to accept as artworks from those we would want to exclude, it does so purely by fiat, and thus engenders the same kind of second-order puzzlement as did the 'originality' requirement as a proposed resolution of the problem of forgeries.(6)

3.) The problem of 'Readymades' is susceptible to a similar analysis to that given for the problem of non-artifacts, save that the situation is made even more acute by the availability of an abundance of 'readymade' counter-examples, non-artworks that would seem to qualify

as art by virtue of perceptual resemblance to paradigm artworks. If 'Readymades' are works of art by virtue of possessing 'A-relevant$_i$' properties, and if such properties are a sub-set of their perceptible properties, then other mass-produced artifacts of the same type - e.g. other snow shovels of the same design - should also be works of art. Again, we seem to require some additional 'A-relevant$_2$' property if we are to make the necessary distinctions between art and non-art, and again, the puzzle then becomes why this property <u>is</u> 'A-relevant$_2$'.

4.) The problem of the relevance of the artist's intentions to the appreciation and understanding of the artworks that he creates differs from the preceding problems in that it concerns the nature of 'artistic use' rather than the nature of works of art. It thus raises questions, not about the relationship between 'A-relevance$_i$' and 'A-relevance$_2$', but about the sort of properties that are 'A-relevant$_i$'. 'A-relevant$_i$' properties, it has been assumed, are perceptible properties. That this is so seems to follow from two assumptions of the 'working theory', namely i) that artworks function through the eliciting of certain kinds of experiences in receivers, and ii) that such experiences are only available in an experiential encounter with the actual work; since any property not perceptible in such an encounter will presumably be unable to elicit experiences in a receiver. That 'A-relevant$_i$' properties are perceptible properties is an assumption clearly implicated in the foregoing analysis of the first three puzzles.

On this account, the artist's intentions, since they are presumably not perceptible properties[7] of an object functioning as a work of art, cannot be 'A-relevant$_i$' properties of that object and thus,

by definition, are not relevant to the appreciation and understanding of the object as a work of art. Yet it seems undeniable that knowledge of what the artist intended in a given work can, on occasion, radically affect the experiences elicited in a receiver of the work. If one knows that the unexplained absence of one of the characters in the 'dance of death' at the end of Bergman's Seventh Seal was not intended to signify that this character had achieved some form of 'redemption' from death, but resulted, rather, from a shortfall of available personnel at the time of shooting, one's reception of the film will surely differ from that of another who, lacking this knowledge, endows the absence with a heady religious significance. Is such a difference in receptive experience to be discounted, as irrelevant to a 'proper' appreciation of the work, on the grounds that it is not founded on perceptible properties of the film?

If we admit that the artist's intentions may be 'A-relevant$_i$', this will clearly have far-reaching implications for the other threee artistic puzzles, since the formulation of these puzzles involved the presupposition that only those properties perceptible in an experiential encounter with an object could be 'A-relevant$_i$'. Clarification of the relevance of knowledge of the artist's intentions to the appreciation and understanding of artworks awaits a clearer exposition of the sort of experience characteristic of such activities, and this, in turn, awaits a more systematic theoretical account of what it is to be and function as a work of art. It is to an examination of such formal theories of art that I shall turn in the following two chapters.

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Chapter Four Traditional Methodology in the Philosophy of Art

In chapter one, it was claimed that, until quite recently, philosophical reflection on art has taken place within the confines of a particular methodological framework, the constitutive principles of which I have termed the 'Essentialist Principle' and the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance'. It was also claimed that these principles represent a more rigorous formulation of those assumptions which structure the pre-theoretical understanding of art. In this and the following chapter, I shall attempt to substantiate these claims.

We may begin by examining the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance' in order to determine more clearly what methodological prescriptions it involves. This principle, we may recall, asserts that i) the philosophical treatment of art is a province of philosophical aesthetics, and ii) the properties of objects relevant to an understanding of what it is to be, or function as, a work of art are 'aesthetic properties', properties having the capacity to elicit 'aesthetic experience' in receivers. 'i', here, prescribes a particular relationship between two fields of inquiry. the philosophy of art and philosophical aesthetics (hereafter referred to simply as 'Aesthetics'), the former of which is held to be properly included within the latter. If 'i' were intended only as a description of philosophical practice, we might easily verify that such a relationship has indeed obtained, at least since Baumgarten's coining of the term 'Aesthetics' in the eighteenth century.(1) Philosophers of art have assumed, and continue to assume, the title of 'aesthetician', and the fruits of their labours have been classified under the heading of 'Aesthetics'. The clearly prescriptive intention of 'i', however, precludes our taking

the relationship in question as a matter of purely taxonomical significance. The implication, rather, is that the two areas of study are connected in a more intimate fashion, such that adequate answers to questions arising in the former field can only be given on the basis of answers to questions arising in the latter. This claim is made explicit in 'ii', which affirms that certain concepts belonging to the field of Aesthetics - such concepts as 'aesthetic property' and 'aesthetic experience' - are necessary components in any adequate account of art.

Why might one believe 'ii' to be true? An answer to this question will also help us to answer another question, namely, why might one accept the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance'? To answer both of these questions, we must look more closely at the scope of Aesthetics. Aside from its purported sovereignty over artistic phenomena, Aesthetics encompasses, as its realm of inquiry, the 'aesthetic' dimension of human experience of natural phenomena and non-artistic artifacts. 'Aesthetic experience', in this sense, is experience a description of which necessarily involves predicating one or more 'aesthetic qualities' of an object of attention. 'Aesthetic qualities', here, are qualities such as beauty, grace, elegance, and possibly ugliness. We might enquire by what criterion experiences of this sort are to be distinguished, or, put differently, why experiences whose descriptions require the predication of such qualities should be separated from experiences otherwise describable and accorded special status. While writers have failed to reach a concensus as to the aetiology of 'aesthetic experience', in the present sense, there is relative agreement as to its phenomenology, and it is by reference to the latter that the alleged distinctness of such experience may be clarified.

The classical roots of the term 'Aesthetics' offer a clue as to the unique features that 'aesthetic experience' is purported to possess. The Greek word aisthanesthai means 'to perceive', and Baumgarten, in drawing on this root, wished to bring out the necessary relationship which he felt to exist between those experiences to be termed 'aesthetic' and perceptual activity. Operating within a 'faculty' theory of the mind, Baumgarten conceived the task of the new discipline of 'Aesthetics' to be the investigation of that form of 'perfection' proper to the perceptual faculty, or 'imagination', of man. Aesthetics, so conceived, was intended to complement the Cartesian account of the species of 'perfection' proper to the intellectual faculty, a 'perfection' consisting in the possession of 'clear and distinct ideas'. The evidence for an analogous 'perfection' in the case of the perceptual faculty was phenomenological in nature. There is, so Baumgarten believed, a particular form of pleasure which accompanies certain operations of the perceptual faculty, which pleasure is grounded not in some concern extrinsic to these operations but in intrinsic qualities of the perceptual activity itself. Thsi pleasure, he claimed, is the perceptual correlate of the pleasure which accompanies the 'proper' operation of the intellectual faculty in the entertaining of 'clear and distinct ideas'. In the case of either faculty, certain operations of the faculty are attended by a pleasure not dependent on the satisfaction of some interest of the individual concerned, but grounded, rather, in the nature of the operation of the faculty in question. 'Interested' pleasure, in the case of the operation of the perceptual faculty, might be exemplified by the pleasure experienced by a farmer on perceiving, in the redness of the sunset, a portent of favourable weather for the following day.

This is to be contrasted with the 'disinterested' pleasure of one whose enjoyment of the sunset derives simply from experienced qualities of the act of perceiving it. It is characteristic of such 'disinterested' pleasure that the perceiver desires to prolong the perceptual encounter which is attended by such pleasure, since, in prolonging the encounter, one will prolong the pleasure; whereas, in the case of 'interested' pleasure, this will rarely be so.(2)

Baumgarten's theory, whatever its merits as an explanation of 'aesthetic experience', serves to illustrate the conception of a distinct mode of experience that seems to require further elucidation. Baumgarten is remembered for his act of christening, but, it might be noted, the subject of this christening was not his own offspring. The idea that the pleasure arising in perceptual experience of 'the beautiful' is 'disinterested', for instance, may be traced back to Shaftesbury.(3) In writers both before and after Baumgarten, there is a recognition of certain phenomena that require explanation and of certain features about these phenomena that such an explanation must account for. The data, for these writers, are certain perceptual experiences attended by a 'disinterested' pleasure; the problem is to determine the conditions under which these experiences occur, and to explain why they are found to be pleasurable.

Baumgarten, as we have seen, attempts to account for 'aesthetic experience' from within the conceptual framework of Cartesian Rationalism, arguing that such experience occurs when perceptual activity is exercised upon those things which are the 'proper' objects of the perceptual faculty. We may notice, in Baumgarten's account, two sorts of factors to which aestheticians have referred in their attempts to spec-

ify the conditions governing the occurrence of 'aesthetic experience'. Firstly, there are what may be termed 'subjective' conditions, capacities in the subject the exercise of which is a necessary condition for 'aesthetic experience' to occur. Within a faculty theory of mind, such capacities may be attributed to a single 'faculty', as in Baumgarten's contention that the perceptual faculty can achieve 'perfection' when exercised upon its 'proper' objects, or in the British Empiricists' notion of an aesthetic 'sense' which registers the 'tertiary' qualities of things(4); or they may involve an interaction between several 'faculties', as in Kant's proposal that aesthetic pleasure is grounded in an experienced harmony between the Imagination and the Understanding.(5) Alternatively, these capacities have been explicated, by later writers, in terms of a particular activity on the part of the subject, where such activity may be taken to involve simple attention to presented phenomena, at one extreme, or the adoption of a unique psychological state, the 'aesthetic attitude', at the other.(6) Secondly, there are what may be termed 'objective' conditions, capacities, in possible objects of attention, to elicit 'aesthetic experience' in subjects whose psychological constitution complies with the subjective conditions for the occurrence of such experience. In their attempts to specify what these objective conditions are, aestheticians have assumed that reference must be made to perceptible properties of objects of attention, even if, as in the cosmic numerology of Augustine's Neo-Platonist theory of Beauty, the aesthetic efficacy of these perceptible properties is to be explained in terms of purely intelligible principles in which they 'participate'.(7) 'Aesthetic experience' occurs when such properties are attended to by appropriately constituted perceivers.

The 'aesthetic qualities' or 'aesthetic properties', as they may be termed, have usually been characterised in fairly general terms. Some writers, following Plato, have stressed the mathematical nature of these properties, grounding the experienced beauty of an object of attention in the proportional relationship between its parts. Others, following Aristotle, have drawn upon the biological sciences for their metaphors, referring to the 'organic unity' or 'organic wholeness' of beautiful objects, or, in the case of Kant, the 'purposiveness without purpose' of certain representations of the faculty of Imagination. Even more general, perhaps, are the accounts offered by the British Empiricists, although here, as in the other types of account, the degree of specificity varies; Hutcheson's claim that beautiful objects are distinguished by their 'uniformity in variety' appears quite informative if placed beside Hume's characterisation of 'aesthetic properties' as 'some particular forms or qualities (which) from the original structure of the internal fabric are calculated to please'.(8)

The foregoing analysis, though somewhat synoptic, may serve to clarify the scope and general orientation of Aesthetics, construed as an inquiry into the aesthetic dimension of human experience of natural phenomena and non-artistic artifacts. 'Aesthetic experience' is taken to be a mode of perceptual experience attended by 'disinterested pleasure', where such pleasure is grounded in the qualitative character of the perceptual encounter with an object of attention. The occurrence of 'aesthetic experience' is to be explained in terms of subjective and objective conditions (or, in the case of extreme versions of the 'aesthetic attitude' theory, in terms of subjective conditions alone). The objective conditions for such experience refer to 'aesthetic proper-

ties', perceptible properties of objects of attention capable of eliciting such experience in appropriately constituted receivers. Given this analysis, we may return to the question which initiated this excursion into the field of Aesthetics. Why should we believe that the notions of 'aesthetic experience' and 'aesthetic property' are necessary components in any adequate theoretical account of art?

The putative connection between Aesthetics and the philosophy of art becomes apparent when we compare the notions of 'aesthetic experience' and 'aesthetic property', as explicated above, with those 'working' assumptions about art and artistic appreciation discussed in chapter three. It was argued there that artistic practice and pre-theoretical discourse about art manifest, implicitly or explicitly, the belief that i) works of art function through the eliciting of a particular mode of experience in receivers, and ii) the value of appreciating artworks resides in the value of the experience thus elicited. Such experience, it is held, is only available in an experiential encounter with the work itself. These beliefs might now be reformulated in terms of the 'pleasure' that attends the appreciation of works of art. That our viewing of paintings, films, and plays, our listening to music, and our reading of poems and novels are voluntary activities, and that we tend to prolong and repeat these activities, would seem to constitute evidence, if such is required, that we find these activities pleasurable. Even where there seem to be unpleasurable circumstances attending the appreciation of artworks, as in the 'fear and pity' evoked in the watching of tragedy, that the experiences attending such appreciation are, as a whole, enjoyable appears undeniable. Not all pleasures arising out of attention to artworks, however, are pleasures referrable to

the appreciation of these works. A mother's pleasure on viewing her son's painting exhibited in a gallery, for instance, might not be so referrable; nor, perhaps, might the son's pleasure in the same circumstances. The pleasure proper to the appreciation of a work of art, it might be said, is grounded in qualities of the experience elicited in the experiential encounter with the work, and not in any relationship between the work and some concern or interest extrinsic to the experience of the work. The pleasure which attends the appreciation of an artwork will thus be 'disinterested', in the same sense of the term as was distinguished in characterising the pleasure attending 'aesthetic experience'; it is an experienced satisfaction grounded in the qualitative character of an experiential encounter with an object of attention, namely, a work of art. 'Aesthetic experience' was described as a mode of perceptual experience attended by 'disinterested pleasure'. The appreciation of artworks, according to our 'working theory', involves a particular mode of experience elicited in an experiential, and presumably perceptual, encounter with a work; the pleasure attending this experience also appears to be 'disinterested'. Given such analogous characteristics, therefore, the mode of experience elicited in the appreciation of works of art might also be termed 'aesthetic experience', and we might hope to clarify the nature of such appreciation by applying, to 'aesthetic experience' in this broad sense, the analysis in terms of subjective and objective conditions that was prescribed for 'aesthetic experience' in the narrow sense.

If considerations of this kind establish the relevance of the notion of 'aesthetic experience' for the philosophy of art, little further argument is necessary to show that the notion of 'aesthetic prop-

ties' is also relevant. 'Aesthetic properties', we may recall, are those perceptible properties of objects of attention that form the objective component of the conditions governing the occurrence of 'aesthetic experience' in the narrow sense. If 'aesthetic experience' in this sense presupposes the presence of 'aesthetic properties' in the object of attention, we might expect to find similar 'aesthetic properties' in artworks, as necessary conditions for the occurrence of that form of 'aesthetic experience' which characterises the appreciation of works of art. According to the 'working theory', the capacity of an object to function as a work of art depends upon its possessing certain perceptible properties, which properties were termed 'A-relevant$_i$'. On the present account, the 'A-relevant$_i$' properties of an object will be its 'aesthetic properties'.

The 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance' asserts that the notions of 'aesthetic experience' and 'aesthetic property' are necessary components in any adequate theoretical account of art. The arguments that might support this assertion, and thereby recommend the principle for acceptance, have been seen to be of two kinds. Firstly, there are arguments that may be advanced in support of those assumptions about the nature of art and artistic appreciation contained in the 'working theory' of art outlined in chapter three. Such arguments point to features of our treatment of, and discourse about, works of art which may be taken to support the assumptions in question. Secondly, there are arguments purporting to establish that the appreciation of works of art, as characterised by the assumptions of the 'working theory', resembles the 'aesthetic experience' of natural phenomena and non-artistic artifacts to a degree sufficient to justify the subsumption of artistic app-

reciation under the concept of the 'aesthetic'. These arguments draw upon the notion of a 'disinterested pleasure', grounded in the experienced qualities of the perceptual encounter with an object of attention, which pleasure allegedly attends both 'aesthetic experience' in the narrow sense and the appreciation of works of art.

Three points arising out of the preceding anlaysis merit brief attention. Firstly, that the appreciation of artworks is attended by a form of 'disinterested pleasure' does not imply that we value artworks purely for the 'pleasure' that we derive from them. All that is being asserted is that the pleasure which does attend the appreciation of art is 'disinterested'. This is quite compatible with the view that the experiences elicited in artistic appreciation have a value independent of the pleasure that accompanies them, e.g., a psychological, moral, or social value. Secondly, the subsumption of artistic appreciation under the concept of the 'aesthetic' does not imply that there are no significant differences between the 'aesthetic experiences' elicited by works of art and 'aesthetic experience' occurring outside the realm of art. Again, all that is being asserted is that both types of experience are 'aesthetic' in the specified sense, i.e., that they are attended by a form of 'disinterested pleasure' grounded in the qualities of an experiential encounter with an object of attention. This allows for the possibility that a difference in the objects of attention, in terms of their 'aesthetic properties', will produce a difference in the experiences elicited and thereby support a difference in the extrinsic value accorded to the types of experience. It also allows. of course, for the contrary possibility that no such significant differences exist, as might be the case if art were characterised as the production of beaut-

iful artifacts (as, for instance, in the Renaissance view of art as 'the imitation of beautiful nature'). Finally, the idea that the pleasure which attends the appreciation of works of art is 'disinterested' suggests a solution to at least some of the difficulties encountered earlier in the attempt to distinguish between 'artistic' and 'non-artistic' uses of objects. Attention to 'A-relevant$_i$' properties of objects, it will be recalled, provides no sufficient condition for 'artistic' use of that object, since it will include such intuitively 'non-artistic' uses as the blackmailer's search for the missing word and the psychiatrist's search for confirmation of his hypothesis. These cases might be excluded, however, by the requirement that, for 'artistic' use to occur, the pleasure attending attention to the properties of an object must be 'disinterested'. The psychiatrist's pleasure at confirming his hypothesis (or, for that matter, his displeasure at failing to confirm it) is clearly not 'disinterested', since it is grounded in concerns extrinsic to the experiential encounter with the text.

In discussing the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance', I have thus far restricted my attention to the claim that concepts of the 'aesthetic' are relevant to an account of the functioning of works of art, as this is manifested in the appreciation of artworks. This is only part of the picture, however, for the 'Principle' also asserts that such concepts are necessary for an account of what it is to be a work of art. The aesthetic concept in question here is clearly that of being an 'aesthetic property'. If we combine our 'working' assumption that the possession of 'A-relevant$_i$' properties is the, or a, distinguishing characteristic of artworks with the claim, above, that the 'A-relevant$_i$' properties of an object are 'aesthetic properties', we may derive the

further claim that possession of 'aesthetic properties' is the, or a, distinguishing characteristic of artworks. Bearing in mind what was said in chapter three concerning the possibility of defining 'work of art' in terms of the mode of functioning of artworks, we might ask whether possession of 'aesthetic properties' is to count as a necessary and sufficient, or merely a necessary, condition of arthood. This, it seems, will depend upon the specification given to 'aesthetic properties' in the context of art. If such properties are characterised in such a way as to distinguish them from the 'aesthetic properties' of natural phenomena and non-artistic artifacts, possession might constitute a necessary and sufficient condition of arthood. If, on the other hand, the characterisation allows no such distinction to be made, then possession will only count as a necessary condition of arthood.

Consideration of how 'work of art' is to be defined presupposes that such a definition is possible. The possibility, and the importance, of providing such a definition is asserted by the 'Essentialist Principle', and the reflections in the preceding paragraph implicitly assume the acceptability of this principle. According to the 'Essentialist Principle', the primary goal of a philosophical account of art is the formulation of a definition of 'art', or 'work of art', which captures the 'essence' of arthood by specifying necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing's being art, or a work of art. Our intuitive acceptance of this principle rests, perhaps, upon the *prima facie* reasonable assumption that, if a given term is correctly applicable to certain entities, there must be some property, or set of properties, common to these entities, which justifies the term's being so applied. More technically, if *a*, *b*, and *c* fall within the extension of a term *t*,

we assume that there is some property, or set of properties, p, such that a, b, and c each possess p, and 'possesses p' is the intension of t. If a, b, and c are works of art, therefore, and t is the term 'work of art', we assume there is some p, possessed by a, b, and c, which serves as the condition for their being termed 'works of art'. To understand what it is to be a work of art, therefore, all we seem to require is a specification of the relevant p. The importance of providing a definition of art in terms of the relevant p is also recognised at the level of the 'working theory', since it is by reference to such a definition that we might hope to resolve our artistic puzzlement concerning the arthood or non-arthood of forgeries, non-artifacts, and 'Readymades'.

It has been argued in this chapter that the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance' and the 'Essentialist Principle', when suitably explicated, reflect certain assumptions that might reasonably be made, at the 'working' level, on the basis of features of artistic practice and discourse. These principles, if acceptable, suggest the following methodological programme for the philosophy of art. Firstly, one must clarify the nature of the mode of 'aesthetic experience' elicited by works of art, distinguishing it, if necessary, from other modes of 'aesthetic experience'. Secondly, one must determine those perceptible properties of artworks that enable them to elicit such experience in receivers; the properties necessary for an object's having this capacity will be its 'aesthetic properties'. Finally, one should attempt to define 'art', or 'work of art', by specifying necessary and sufficient conditions of arthood, at least one of which will be the capacity to elicit 'aesthetic experience', in the specified sense, by virtue of possessing

'aesthetic properties'.

One might, perhaps, espouse the principles without adopting the programme; but one could not, I think, adopt the programme without thereby implicitly or explicitly espousing the principles. If a theory of art can be analysed in terms of the methodological programme, therefore, it may reasonably be inferred that the methodological principles are at least implicitly accepted by the theorist. In the following chapter, I shall examine certain traditional (i.e., pre-metatheoretical) theories of art, and attempt to determine whether they are so analysable, and whether one is thereby justified in imputing to the theorists an at least implicit commitment to the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance' and the 'Essentialist Principle'. I shall not, of course, attempt the formidable task of examining all traditional theories of art in such a fashion. Rather, I shall select for examination what I hope will be recognised to be a representative sample. Even in the case of those theories selected, my presentation will necessarily be somewhat schematic, focussing only on those aspects of the theories that are germane to the matter in hand. Nonetheless, if it can be shown that the theories examined are wholly or partially characterisable in terms of the given programme, and thus involve a total or partial commitment to the two methodological principles, this will serve for the purposes of this paper. For, in this case, any argument purporting to show that either one or both of the traditional methodological principles is untenable would represent a serious challenge to the philosophy of art as it has traditionally been conceived.

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Chapter Five Traditional Theories of Art

Writers who have chronicled the historical development of the philosophy of art have frequently employed a somewhat arbitrary dichotomy between 'Imitation' and 'Expression' theories of art. This method of sorting, it might be argued, scarcely does justice to the considerable ingenuity of the theorists and the consequent diversity of the theories that have been advanced, but it does reflect a rough distinction that might be drawn, based upon the sort of relational properties of artworks that have served as the initial focus of attention. Works of art function in the context of a series of causal and referential relationships linking works to things existing external to them, such as the artists who create them, the receivers who appreciate them, and those items in the world to which they make reference in some fashion. 'Imitation' theories, so called, begin by focussing upon the relationship between a work and something which it may be said to 'imitate' or represent; the 'relationship', here, is referential. 'Expression' theories, on the other hand, begin with a 'causal' relationship of some kind between a work and the subjective experiences of the artist, and possibly also those of the receiver. Writers employing the 'Imitation'/'Expression' dichotomy usually apply it to the field in question by means of a further distinction, of a temporal nature, between theories advanced prior to the end of the eighteenth century and those advanced since that time. The earlier group of theories are to be regarded as 'Imitation' theories and the later group as 'Expression' theories. It is not difficult, however, to find counter-examples to such a classification: some writers of the earlier period seem to hold versions of the 'Expression' theory,

while some later writers, such as Susanne Langer, are more appropriately classified as 'Imitation' theorists. I am not suggesting, of course, that those philosophers who employ the 'Imitation'/'Expression' distinction in the described fashion are unaware of such apparent counter-examples. Rather, the point I am making is simply that the distinction is to be understood as a simplification which may be acceptable in contexts where some rough classification is required and where nothing significant hinges upon the more precise distinctions which the simplification ignores.

Since the present context is of this type, I shall adopt the above taxonomy, indicating where necessary its limitations. Under the heading of the 'Imitation' theory, I shall examine, firstly, the classical formulations of this theory, as found in the writings of Plato and Aristotle, and, secondly, the modulations on these classical themes performed by writers of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. Under the heading of the 'Expression' theory, I shall examine, firstly, its origins in the writings of Kant and the 'Romantics', secondly, its development in the writings of Tolstoy and Dewey, and, finally, those more contemporary accounts of art offered by Clive Bell and Susanne Langer. Given the motivation behind such examinations, namely, the attempt to determine the degree of adherence to the methodological programme and principles outlined in the previous chapter, I shall endeavour to clarify, for each of the theories examined: (1) the extent to which works of art are assigned a function which depends upon an experiential encounter with a work productive of a form of 'aesthetic experience'; (2) the extent to which the capacity to perform this function is characterised in terms of the possession of 'aesthetic properties' available in such an en-

counter, and (3) whether the theory in question offers, in more or less explicit form, a definition of 'art' or ' work of art' at least partly in terms of 'aesthetic experience' and/or 'aesthetic properties'.

One point should perhaps be made here, concerning the applicability of '3', and to some extent '1' and '2' also, to the earlier versions of the 'Imitation' theory to be examined. Our current conception of 'art', or of 'the Arts', as encompassing the 'plastic' and literary arts, music and dance, and, more recently, film and photography, seems to be of fairly recent origin, developing in the Renaissance and becoming crystallised in the eighteenth century.(1) We should not, therefore, expect to find either definitions of, or attempts to otherwise account for, 'the Arts' in this sense in the writings of earlier philosophers. What we may look for, rather,are accounts of individual art-forms, or groups of such art-forms. Where such accounts occur, we should attempt to ascertain whether they are analysable, mutatis mutandis, in terms of the given methodological programme and principles.

i) 'Imitation' theories of art

'Imitation' theories of art are prima facie rather unpromising candidates for analysis in terms of our methodological programme. For, if art is to be characterised by reference to certain referential relationships which are held to obtain between artworks and an independently existing 'reality', it is not immediately apparent how either 'aesthetic experience' or 'aesthetic properties' are to fit into the picture. We might expect to establish, at best, that there is an adherence to the 'Essentialist Principle', if the theories attempt to define art in terms of such referential relationships. However, as I hope to show, even the

most uncompromising 'Imitation' theorists are committed, by elements in their own theories, to a recognition that 'imitation', insofar as it is a characteristic of artworks, has to be understood in a special sense. In specifying what this sense is, such theorists, I shall argue, fall back, explicitly or implicitly, on a form of the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance'.

A suitable test-case for this claim might be Plato's account of art, as presented primarily in the Republic and the Ion. Popular expositions of Plato's views, concentrating on certain passages in Book X of the Republic, portray him as being indeed the most uncompromising of 'Imitation' theorists. In these passages(2), he condemns painters and poets as 'mere imitators' whose products are simply copies of the appearances of things. Since, according to Plato's metaphysical theory, the 'things' whose appearances they copy are themselves only 'appearances', such products are twice removed from true 'reality'. In a famous analogy Plato contrasts the craftsman and the artist, who are both, in a sense, 'imitators'. The craftsman, making a physical bed, copies the 'Form' of 'bed', but in so doing he requires certain knowledge of that 'Form' if his product is to be capable of functioning as a bed. His product, as the embodiment of that 'knowledge', may thus be said to have a certain 'cognitive value'. The artist, copying the physical bed as it appears to him, need have no knowledge of the function of the object whose appearance he is copying. His product, therefore, is held to lack even the limited 'cognitive value' attributable to the product of the craftsman. The poet is similarly characterised as one who copies the appearances of human action. On these basis of these arguments, Plato attempts to discredit the poet's claim to be a provider of wisdom.

That this account of Plato's views on art is oversimplified in at least one crucial respect is readily apparent when we attend to a second criticism levelled against the artist in Book X of the Republic.(3) Artworks are held to be undesirable in the Republic not simply because they lack 'cognitive value', but also because they are psychologically harmful. Drawing upon his tri-partite analysis of the 'soul', Plato argues that attention to the works of the painters and poets may strengthen the 'irrational' elements in the 'soul' and thereby weaken reason's capacity to control such elements. The psychological effects imputed to the encounter with artworks are not, it would seem, consequences simply of the 'imitative' nature of such works. Mirrors and other natural reflections present copies of the appearances of physical objects, yet Plato does not attribute such psychologically harmful effects to our attending to these objects.

The potential to produce undesirable psychological effects (undesirable, that is, for citizens of the Republic) which Plato attributes to the artist's creations is a consequence, rather, of a certain potency which they possess, but which is lacking in either the 'appearances' which they supposedly 'imitate' or other things, such as mirror images, which might be said to 'imitate' these appearances. In his discussion of poetic artworks, Plato characterises this potency as the power to evoke, in the receiver, the feelings and emotions of the character 'imitated', such that he experiences those feelings as if they were his own. Even the 'good man', he whose 'soul' is properly ordered, is not immune to the seductive wiles of the poet's creations; he too, so Plato claims, will respond to the work with the 'irrational' part of his soul. The poet's creations, therefore, are clearly not mere 'imitations' in

the sense that mirror images are, but 'imitations' having the capacity to elicit a particular type of experience in receivers. We might ask, then, whether this experience is 'aesthetic' in the sense specified above. Clearly, it is attended by a sort of pleasure - indeed, if it were not, Plato would have little cause to worry about its harmful effects. And, given the universal efficacy of poetic works on Plato's account, the pleasure does not seem to depend upon any interest or concern of the individual receiver. The only remaining question, therefore, is whether the pleasure is grounded in qualities of the perceptual encounter with the work, qualities experienced in attending to the perceptible 'aesthetic' properties that the work possesses.

Plato has little to say, in this context, as to how the poet's creations are able to function in the way that they do. In the Ion, however, he attributes the potency of poetic artworks to a 'magnetic chain' of divine 'inspiration', which passes from the Gods through the poet to his works, and from the works to the audience.(4) He does not discuss the manner in which this 'inspiration' is conveyed from the work to the audience, nor whether it is made available through certain perceptible properties of the work itself. His discussion of other art-forms, however, suggests that the mechanism whereby 'inspiration' endows poetic artworks with their affective potency might involve certain 'formal' properties of the works. In his discussion of music in the Republic(5), Plato proposes that 'formal' properties of music, such as its rhythmic and harmonic structures, endow musical compositions with the capacity to 'mould' the 'souls' of receivers in particular ways. The different musical 'modes', he suggests, 'imitate' the different types of human character. Frequent listening to music in a particular mode

will 'mould' the listener's 'soul', until it exemplifies that type of human character 'imitated' by the musical mode in question. Formative powers over the 'soul' of a less specific and less powerful nature are also attributed to architecture and the 'landscaping' of the urban environment; an environment that is ordered, graceful, 'proportioned', will bring about, in those who live in it, an unconscious affinity to that order which reason may impose upon the passions and appetites. It is tempting to ascribe to Plato, on such a basis, the view that artworks evoke feelings of beauty in beholders by virtue of their 'formal' properties. While Plato rarely connects art with beauty (though he does claim that the artist should be one gifted to discern the true nature of the beautiful), his discussion of the affective powers of music and architecture suggests that they resemble the powers of natural phenomena to elicit feelings of beauty, in that they are dependent upon 'formal' properties possessed by objects, which properties themselves involve a 'participation' in certain purely intelligible mathematical principles. If this is so, it seems reasonable to term the experiences elicited in the experiential encounter with music and architecture 'aesthetic', and to term the 'formal' properties to which we attend in such an encounter 'aesthetic properties'. It might also be reasonably suggested that the potency of the poet's creations, even if it is ultimately traceable, on Plato's theory, to a form of 'divine inspiration', is to be regarded as embodied in the work by virtue of certain 'formal' 'aesthetic properties' which it possesses. Aristotle, as we shall see, develops such an account, while also integrating the 'imitative' and 'structural' aspects of artworks whose inter-relationship is left largely unexplained and unexamined in Plato's account.

Like Plato, Aristotle does not offer a general theory of art, but restricts his attention to particular art-forms. While he provides a brief discussion of music which is little more than a reaffirmation of Plato's views on the subject(6), his most influential and significant contribution to the philosophy of art is contained in the Poetics, where he limits his attention to poetic art, and, in particular, to tragedy. It is the account of tragedy formulated in the Poetics(7), therefore, that will serve as the basis for an examination of Aristotle's theory of art. I shall attempt to determine whether his discussion of this particular art-form is susceptible to analysis in terms of the given methodological programme.

Aristotle begins by affirming the view that art is 'imitation'(8), but, even more than was the case with Plato, 'imitation' functions as the explanans rather than as the explanandum. The different art-forms, according to Aristotle, are distinguished from one another by their means, manner, and objects of imitation. In the case of tragedy, these 'modes' of imitation are taken to be, respectively: rhythm, language, and harmony; dramatic presentation, and actions of a particular type.(9) An understanding of tragedy is not to be attained, however, simply by making the relevant distinctions of this type. Rather, what must first be determined is the function which tragic artworks perform, and then, by further examination of their performance of this function, those characteristics of tragic works the possession of which is a necessary condition for their functioning efficiently. This is consistent with Aristotle's more general principle, grounded in his metaphysics, that proper understanding of a given entity requires a determination of the function, or 'end', appropriate to that entity, and, thereby, of the

characteristics or properties of that entity which are essential for the performing of that function or the achieving of that end.

Aristotle's conclusions as to the function and essential characteristics of tragedy are summarised in his definition of tragedy, as "the imitation of an action that is serious, has magnitude, and is complete in itself; in language with pleasurable accessories, each kind brought in separately in the various parts of the work; in a dramatic, not in a narrative form; with incidents arousing pity and fear, wherewith to accomplish its catharsis of such emotions".(10) The function of tragedy, according to Aristotle, is to bring about what he terms a "catharsis" of the emotions of pity and fear in the spectator. The spectator experiences "catharsis" as a consequence of his attending to the play being performed before him. Aristotle offers no direct elucidation of the nature of 'catharsis', although the use of the term in other contexts suggests that what is involved is a 'purging' or 'purifying' of the relevant emotions.(11) It is clear, however, that 'catharsis' requires an experiential encounter with the tragic work, and that the experience of 'catharsis' is pleasurable in some way. 'Catharsis' is described as the 'proper pleasure' of tragedy, and one of the problems which Aristotle faced was to explain why we should derive pleasure from watching the dramatic presentation of fearful and pitiful events. The notion of 'catharsis' is the means by which Aristotle attempts to resolve this puzzle. Lacking any direct account of this notion, we may nonetheless achieve a measure of understanding as to the nature of 'catharsis' by examining those characteristics of tragic works specified by Aristotle as necessary conditions for the 'tragic effect' to occur.

The definition of tragedy given in the preceding paragraph sets

out two requirements which the 'action' imitated in a tragic work must meet. Firstly, it must contain incidents of a certain sort, having the capacity to arouse pity and fear in the spectator. Aristotle later considers which sorts of incidents will meet this requirement, but this need not concern us here. What should be noted, however, is that incidents of the specified sorts will, by definition, arouse pity and fear, but they will not, by themselves, produce a 'catharsis' of these emotions. The capacity of a tragic work to produce 'catharsis', then, must depend upon other features of the work. More precisely, the 'action' imitated in a tragic work must meet the further requirements specified in the definition; it must be serious, have magnitude, and be 'complete in itself'. The demand that the action be 'serious' belongs, perhaps, to the first requirement pertaining to the sorts of incidents to be imitated. For the action of a play to have 'magnitude' and be 'complete in itself', however, it must possess certain 'structural properties', and Aristotle devotes a considerable portion of the Poetics to an elucidation of the 'structural properties' necessary for a tragic work.(12) It is clear from his discussion that an 'imitation of an action' is not achieved by merely 'copying' or re-presenting on stage a sequence of events that has actually occurred. If the action or 'plot' of the play is, as Aristotle defines it, "the combination of the incidents or things done in the story"(13), not just any way of combining incidents in a story will do if the play is to produce the 'tragic effect'. To clarify the nature of 'catharsis', we must determine what features the plot must possess if a play is to function as a tragedy, and why such features are necessary for a play to so function.

Apart from the requirement that the incidents in the plot are piti-

ful and fearful, the conditions which Aristotle prescribes for the tragic plot are, as I have already indicated, 'structural' in nature, pertaining to the manner in which the incidents or events are combined. Further, the conditions are formulated in terms of the perception of structure, as conditions governing the spectator's ability to perceive a certain structure in the work. The 'magnitude' requirement simply states that the plot should be of such a size that the spectator is able to grasp whatever structure it has; too brief a plot may seem to the spectator to lack any internal differentation, while a plot of excessive length may prove too complex for its structure as a whole to be grasped.(14) The 'completeness' requirement specifies the sort of structure that the plot should manifest to the spectator. The plot should begin and end with situations that seem self-sufficient, in that they do not strike the spectator as being in need of further explanation or development.(15) The sequence of events from the beginning to the end of the play should proceed in a "probable or necessary" fashion.(16) 'Probability' or 'necessity', here, is in the 'eye', or mind' of the beholder; what matters is that the events strike the spectator as being so related.(17) What the spectator will accept as being 'probable' or 'necessary' as a sequence of events will depend, of course, upon the laws which he takes to govern the universe in which the portrayed events are occurring. Normally, for instance, a play in which one of the characters suddenly takes flight, in a literal sense, would strike one as being highly improbable unless otherwise justified; if, however, in watching the film Superman, I accept the pseudo-avian abilities of Superman within the universe of the film, his failure to take flight when Lois Lane is in danger will strike me as highly improbable unless otherwise justi-

fied.

The spectator who views a tragic work the plot of which meets these 'structural' requirements will not only feel pity and fear (on account of the sort of incidents presented), but will also (in grasping the structure of the plot) recognise that the events arousing such pity and fear occur in the context of a lawful and intelligible world, where actions are lawfully related to the consequences ensuing from them. Pity and fear, according to Aristotle, are only harmful to the individual when they are 'irrational', out of gear with one's rational understanding of the moral and physical order of the universe.(18) The virtuous man will not lack such emotions, but will feel them in the 'appropriate' circumstances; he will pity those properly deserving of pity and fear those things properly meriting fear. It is such 'rational' emotions that are elicited in the spectator by the tragic work, through the presentation of pitiful and fearful events structured in such a way that the spectator's responding emotionally to those events is necessarily accompanied by the recognition of the intelligible universe in which they occur. 'Catharsis', therefore, may be understood as the 'purifying' of pity and fear from their undesirable 'irrational' states into their desirable 'rational' ones. The value of tragedy is that it can act directly upon our emotional 'dispositions' by producing in us 'rational' emotions, while the philosopher, although he may tell us what the moral and physical orders of the universe are, and what things or persons are properly to be feared or pitied, can only affect our beliefs.

The function of tragedy for Aristotle, then, is to elicit in receivers a particular experience, 'catharsis', which is only available in an experiential encounter with a tragic work. The capacity of the work

to elicit such experience depends upon certain 'structural' properties possessed by the work, attention to which by a receiver brings about an experience of 'catharsis'. The obvious question, in the present context, is whether the experience elicited and the properties eliciting it are properly classifiable as 'aesthetic' in the specified sense. The experience, as we have seen, is attended by a form of pleasure which might be termed 'disinterested' in that it does not seem to depend upon the interests and concerns of the individual receiver. Further, in discussing the structural requirements for the tragic plot, Aristotle compares these requirements with those which he takes to govern an object's appearing beautiful to an observer. The beauty of any whole composed of parts, he claims, requires 'completeness' and 'magnitude' such that it can be perceived as a structured whole whose parts are ordered in a certain way.(19)

Nevertheless, it might be questioned whether one can be said to 'perceive' the structure of a tragedy in the same sense that one 'perceives' the structure of, say, a flower. To perceive the structure of a play is to grasp the action as an intelligible whole, but this clearly requires more than an act of 'perception' in the standard sense. While we might be said to 'perceive' the structure of the play once we have grasped it, our grasping it requires that we relate the events in the play to those laws which we take to govern the universe of the play, and such activity can hardly be characterised as perceptual. The problem here is not a local one, as we shall see later, but concerns the more general applicability of the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance', in its traditional interpretation, to literary art-forms, and perhaps to other art-forms as well. The relationship between properties of artworks and

the experiences elicited by those works may not prove to be as analogous to the relationship between 'aesthetic properties' and 'aesthetic experience', in the narrow sense of these terms, as has been claimed. I note this problem here in order to postpone it for further consideration later in this paper.

Classical 'Imitation' theories of art, it has been argued, explicate the functioning of works of art in terms of their capacity to elicit a particular type of experience in receivers who engage in an experiential encounter with a work, where this capacity depends upon certain properties, and, in particular, certain structural properties, which artworks possess. Further, artworks are distinguished from non-works in terms of their capacity to so function on the basis of such properties. I have also argued that the experiences elicited and the properties which elicit them might be termed 'aesthetic', although I have expressed certain reservations as to the acceptability of such a characterisation. Such reservations seem to be less in order, however, when we turn to later formulations of the 'Imitation' theory in the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. The elucidation of art in terms of the 'aesthetic' and of artistic experience in terms of 'aesthetic experience' in the narrow sense becomes increasingly explicit in these theories, as we shall see, and 'imitation' is taken to be essential for art only insofar as it provides the most effective means of producing objects capable of eliciting 'aesthetic experience' in receivers. This conception of art, captured in Batteaux's definition of art as the "imitation of beautiful nature"[20], has its roots in the philosophy of Plotinus, but its permeation of 'modern' philosophy may be traced more directly to the Neo-Platonism of the Italian Renaissance. I shall begin by brief-

ly outlining the Neo-Platonist philosophy, as a means to understanding how the Renaissance conception of 'ideal imitation' reconciled the apparently incompatible artistic goals of 'truth' and 'beauty'. I shall then discuss the ascendancy of the 'aesthetic' over the 'cognitive' in the artistic theories of the Enlightenment, as exemplified in the Rationalist theory of Lessing and the 'inner sense' theories of the Empiricists. In all of these theories, as we shall see, there is a clear commitment to a strong form of the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance'.

The Renaissance Neo-Platonists accorded a central place to Beauty and the 'aesthetic experience' in their metaphysical scheme of things. Beauty, it was claimed(21), had been a distinguishing characteristic of the universe as God had originally created it, serving as a sort of 'signature' of the Creator on his works, and man, as God's supreme creation, had lived in a state of glory in this terrestial paradise. Man had since become separated from the Divine, but, in his fallen state, he could still be moved to a vague recollection of his former glory in the presence of physical beauty. The prime human impulse was for a reunion with the Divine, and man's yearning for beauty was, in fact, an unconscious yearning for such a reunion. Within this metaphysical framework, the 'potency' of the 'aesthetic experience' became intelligible. The key to understanding the nature of beauty, according to the Neo-Platonists, lay in mathematics. There were, they held, different levels of beauty, each dependent on certain simple mathematical principles; the higher the level, the more it was intelligible purely in terms of these principles. The Beauty of God himself was purely intelligible, and the levels of beauty descending from this pinnacle were characterised by an increasing dependence upon the embodiment of the

constitutive principles in material substance. Physical beauty lay at the lower end of this scale, but at a higher level was the beauty of the universe, as God's creation. This beauty, it was claimed, consisted in the harmony of the cosmos, the organisation of a multiplicity of phenomena according to simple mathematical laws. While these laws were now 'hidden', they could be revealed through study of the universe, thereby rendering the 'harmony' of the cosmos intelligible for man's contemplation.

Neo-Platonism influenced Renaissance conceptions of art in at least two ways, one direct and the other indirect. Directly, it suggested that the role of the artist was to create objects the contemplation of which would elicit in the perceiver an experience of beauty, thereby facilitating his attempts to achieve 'self-purification' and attain reunion with the Divine. Such 'self-purification', the Neo-Platonists claimed, was possible if one could 'liberate' oneself from one's fallen state and ascend the 'ladder of beauty' to the purely intelligible realm of the Divine. Contemplation of physical beauty and of the 'harmony' of the cosmos were regarded as means to initiate such 'self-purification'. The artist might supplement these means if, as Michaelangelo suggested, he aimed to 'imitate' the 'eternal Form' of Beauty in his works, thereby creating the most perfect physical embodiment of that 'Form'. The physical form best fitted for this task, it was held, was the human body, since man, as God's finest creation, would most perfectly embody in physical form those mathematical principles governing physical beauty. Artists set themselves the task of determining what these principles were, scrupulously measuring the physical proportions of those human bodies held to be the most beautiful, and setting forth their findings

in 'canons' of ideal proportions to be employed not only in the artistic rendering of the human body but also in architectural design.

Neo-Platonism also had an indirect influence in the theory of art by way of its influence on science.(22) Astronomers such as Copernicus and Kepler were motivated by the Neo-Platonist philosophy to search for simple mathematical principles regulating the motions of the 'heavenly bodies'. More generally, it was believed that the scientist could discover 'hidden' laws in nature, laws exhibiting mathematical elegance and simplicity. Leonardo, drawing on this development in science, conceived the painter to be a sort of 'natural philosopher' whose business was to study nature, determine the 'hidden' laws or principles governing the movements and forms of things, and embody his 'knowledge' of these principles in a work that would function as a 'commentary' on nature.(23) The artist, so conceived, creates a 'second nature' in which the 'hidden' principles operative in natural phenomena are made manifest.

The connection between these two conceptions of the artist, as 'imitator of beauty' and as 'natural philosopher', becomes clear if we look at the notion of 'ideal imitation'. According to the doctrine of 'ideal imitation', the artist should 'imitate', or represent, in his work not particular things as they actually exist, but, rather, 'general nature', 'types', 'ideals', etc. This doctrine, persisting through the Renaissance into the Enlightenment and the Neo-Classical movement, is well exemplified in Johnson's observations concerning poetry: "the business of a poet", he claims, is to provide "just representations of general nature", and "to examine, not the individual, but the species; to remark general properties and large appearances".(24) Within the Renaissance framework under consideration, 'ideal imitation' involved

the creation of a 'second nature' manifesting, in a purer form, the 'hidden' laws and principles operative in natural phenomena. The artist, as 'ideal imitator', resembled the philosopher in his concern with revealing the underlying 'truth' of things. On the Neo-Platonist view of things, however, the 'truth' of an artist's creation, at least in the visual arts, implied its being beautiful also. For the 'hidden' principles sought by the artist were the 'harmonious' principles employed by God in his original creation, and the artist, in manifesting these principles in his imitation of the 'ideal', might be regarded as emulating that creation and making re-available its beauty. For the Neo-Platonists, therefore, truth was indeed beauty, and beauty truth.

For the Renaissance theorists of the visual arts, influenced by Neo-Platonism, the function of artworks was to elicit 'aesthetic experience' in receivers on the basis of 'aesthetic properties' possessed by works, where both the experience and the properties are 'aesthetic' in the narrow sense. The literary arts require a slightly different analysis, but one which supports similar conclusions. Analogous to the view of the visual artist as a 'natural philosopher', there was the view of the poet as 'moral philosopher', one who could reveal the moral order of things by producing a 'second nature' where this 'moral order' was made manifest. 'Ideal imitation' here is, as Johnson asserted, the representation of human action and human nature in their general or 'universal' aspects. As with the visual arts, again, the function of such 'imitation' was taken to be the production of a particular experiential response in the receiver. The desired response, in the case of poetic art, involved the reader or spectator being 'moved' in such a way that he would accept the moral 'message' of the work. Poetry or drama were

to strive to present their 'imitations' in the form of 'ideals' powerful enough to move the receiver to either emulate them or avoid them, whichever was appropriate. The conception of 'audience response' here, it might be noted, resembles that to be found in Plato, with its stress on the audience's 'imitating' the characters before them, rather than the more complicated psychological mechanisms of Aristotelian 'catharsis'. The Aristotelian requirements for dramatic structure, however, are carried over into the Renaissance and Enlightenment theories of poetry, and especially into the Neo-Classical conception of drama, but they are now interpreted as devices for securing the desired assimilation of the 'message' of the work by the audience. The structural and linguistic devices employed by the artist function as a sort of 'sugar coating' on the pill of morality which the audience is desired to swallow; poetry, in Sidney's words, is a "medicine of cherries".(25) The experience elicited in the receiver in an experiential encounter with a work is attended by a 'disinterested' pleasure, produced by such devices, which brings about a painless ingestion of the 'message' of the work.

Philosophy of art in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries manifests an even greater concern for the 'aesthetic', rather than the 'cognitive', value of artworks, in the context of a developing conception of 'the Arts' in the modern sense of the term. The function of art, it was held, was to move the receiver in worthwhile ways through the eliciting of 'aesthetic experience'. The value of an individual work was to be measured in terms of its effect on the receiver. The realm of the 'aesthetic' was progressively widened to incorporate such categories as 'the sublime' and 'the picaresque', so that the 'aesthetic experiences' available in the appreciation of artworks might encompass, among other

things, the sublime effect of certain Baroque paintings which sought to overwhelm the beholder, the beauty found in classical or Neo-Classical sculpture, and the elegance and refinement of the Rococo. While lip-service was still paid to the idea that the essence of art is 'imitation', 'imitation' was strictly subservient to the eliciting of 'aesthetic experience. The artist was to imitate nature only because it was by this means that the receiver could be most powerfully moved. To imitate nature was to select from the ranks of natural things the most beautiful elements and recombine them for aesthetic effect, or it was to shun direct recourse to nature altogether and draw upon the works of classical artists who, it was assumed, had a better understanding of such matters than contemporary man.

The above generalisations may be supported by a brief examination of the theories of art advanced by certain Rationalist and Empiricist philosophers of this period. While philosophers of both schools accepted the general framework of assumptions about art sketched in the preceding paragraph, their conceptions of the proper task for the philosopher of art differed, in line with their differing conceptions of 'proper' philosophical methodology in general. While there was agreement that the central concern for the philosopher of art should be the determination of the conditions governing the occurrence of 'aesthetic experience', there was disagreement as to how these conditions were to be determined. Rationalists, focussing upon the 'aesthetic experience' of art, sought to deduce, from a definition of art or of a specific art-form, those rules which, if followed by the artist in the creation of an artwork, would guarantee that the work would elicit the desired response in receivers. Empiricists, on the other hand, while accepting the efficacy of

the rules proposed by the Rationalists, were more interested in providing an explanation of how these rules worked, and sought such an explanation in an empirically-based account of the psychological mechanisms involved in the creation and appreciation of works of art, and in the 'aesthetic experience' of non-artistic phenomena.

Seventeenth century Rationalists, while finding the 'tertiary' qualities of natural entities little more deserving of philosophical attention than their 'secondary' qualities, were unable to ignore the philosophical pretensions implicit in the Renaissance conception of the artist as one who discovers and presents in his works 'truths' about the moral and physical order of things. If artistic creation were truly an intellectual activity of this sort, then, on Rationalist principles, there must be formulable 'rules of method' for the effective performance of such activity. Two types of rules seemes to be required: firstly, there must be rules which would enable the artist to 'discover' the 'truths' to be presented, and, secondly, there must be rules for presenting these 'truths' in such a way that their 'aesthetic' impact on the audience would be maximised. The French Academy, under Le Brun, set out to determine the rules appropriate to the individual arts, attempting to deduce such rules, for a given art-form, from 'knowledge' of the 'essence' of that art-form, its proper aims and the means available for achieving them.(26)

Later philosophers in the Rationalist tradition, stressing the artist's ability to aesthetically affect or move the audience rather than his ability to discover hidden 'truths', concentrated their attention on 'presentational' rules. The methodological approach of the later Rationalists, and, indeed, the methodological approach of traditional

philosophy of art in general, is well exemplified by Lessing's Laocoön. Lessing's reflections on art begin with an artistic puzzle raised by two works of art, both portrayals of the torment of Laocoön.(27) In a sculptural rendering of the subject by a Greek artist, Laocoön bears his suffering mutely, but, in Virgil's account of the same incident, he is described as having raised 'a terrible cry'. Winckelmann, discussing the two works, explains the discrepancy in terms of the differing temperaments of the Greek and Roman peoples, contrasting the 'noble simplicity and quiet grandeur' of Greek art with the more histrionic character of its Roman counterpart. Lessign, however, explains the difference between the two works by reference to a difference in the 'presentational' rules obtaining in the respective art-forms. The function of both visual art and poetry, he claims, is to move the receiver through arousing the feeling of beauty. While both art-forms perform this function through 'imitation', the means of 'imitation' differ in a way that necessitates that their objects of 'imitation' differ also. Lessing argues from a difference in the nature of visual and poetic art to a rule concerning the proper objects of 'imitation' in the two art-forms:

> If it be true that painting employs wholly different signs or means of imitation from poetry - the one using forms and colours in space, the other articulate sounds in time - and if signs unquestionably stand in convenient relation with the thing signified, then signs arranged side by side can only represent objects existing side by side, or whose parts so exist, while consecutive signs can express only objects which succeed each other, or whose parts succeed each other, in time. (28)

The rule, therefore, is that "succession in time is the province of the poet, coexistence in space that of the artist".(29) This has important implications concerning the ways in which the poet and the visual

artist are to achieve their common goal of eliciting 'aesthetic experience' in receivers of their works. Since the experience of physical beauty depends, according to Lessing, upon "the harmonious action of various parts which can be taken in at a glance"(30), and since a verbal description of a beautiful object or scene, describing its parts in a temporal sequence, cannot produce this experience, the poet must arouse 'aesthetic experience' in the receiver by indirect means. He may, for instance, describe the effects of physical beauty on an observer, as a means of producing an image of beauty in the receiver. The visual artist, on the other hand, may elicit the feeling of beauty directly, through the perceptible properties of his work. This, so Lessing claims, accounts for the greater vividness and immediacy of 'aesthetic experience' in the appreciation of visual artworks. Such advantage, however, carries with it a corresponding limitation on the objects and scenes available for the visual artist to imitate. Since the aesthetic effects produced by visual artworks are so overpowering and permanent, the visual artist may not portray ugly or painful scenes, since these will elicit correspondingly painful and unaesthetic experience in the receiver.(31) It is for this reason, so Lessing argues, that the sculptor of the "Laocoön" portrays his suffering without manifesting his agony. The object of imitation is to be determined not by reference to the 'truth' of the matter - whether Laocoön actually cried out - but, rather, by reference to the conditions governing the eliciting of 'aesthetic experience' in the visual arts.

Lessing's account of poetry, it might be noted, manifests a particular way of responding to a problem, raised above in the context of the discussion of Aristotle's theory of 'catharsis', concerning the applic-

ability of the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance' to the literary and dramatic arts. To what extent, it might be asked, can the experience elicited in the experiential encounter with poems, novels, and plays be properly characterised as 'aesthetic'? Lessing, and also Baumgarten, attribute to the literary arts the capacity to elicit 'aesthetic experience' not directly, through attention to the perceptible properties of works, but indirectly, through the capacity of works to produce images in the receiver, attention to which elicits appropriately 'aesthetic' experience. Baumgarten defines poetry as "perfect sensuous discourse" having the capacity to produce images of unusual qualitative richness in readers of poetic artworks.(32)

Commitment to the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance' is equally apparent in the treatment of art by traditional Empiricist philosophers. The assumption that artistic appreciation and the 'aesthetic experience' of natural phenomena are explananda requiring the same framework of explanation is, indeed, implicit in their conception of their task. The problem, as they conceived it, was to elucidate the nature and epistemological status of 'aesthetic experience', in the wider sense, by determining the psychological mechanisms, or 'faculties', involved and the objectivity or subjectivity of 'judgements of taste' referring to such experience. The early Rationalists had assumed that such judgements could be explained, and their objectivity established, in terms of an unconscious recognition, by reason, of certain principles of order and proportion embodied in an artwork or a natural object. Leibniz, for instance, attributed our perception of musical harmony to the soul's unconscious computation of the mathematical ratios obtaining between the notes.(33) The 'rightness' of a particular perceived configuration

of elements was determined by comparing the mathematical principles it embodied with an 'innate' standard of beauty.

Such explanations were hardly satisfactory to the Empiricists, of course. Hutcheson[34], for example, rejected the idea that the perception of beauty or harmony depended upon the activities of reason, arguing that no innate principle was possible and that no learned principles were necessary. Further, he argued that such perception could not be attributed to the operation of the normal senses, since people whose senses were otherwise in excellent condition were not infrequently 'blind' to the 'aesthetic' qualities of things. On the basis of such arguments, Hutcheson, along with other Empiricist philosophers, was led to postulate a special 'inner sense', or 'faculty of taste', the operation of which was a necessary condition for the occurrence of the 'aesthetic experience' of art and nature. The operation of 'inner sense' being a subjective condition for such experience, the problem was then to specify those objective properties of things having the capacity to trigger such operation. The identification of the 'aesthetic properties' of objects would provide the basis for establishing a standard against which individual judgements of 'taste' could be assessed, thereby establishing also the objectivity of aesthetic judgement. The assumption that 'taste' could account for the experiences elicited by works of art as well as those produced by natural beauty is well illustrated in David Hume's dissertation, "Of the Standard of Taste", where the having of, or the failing to have, both sorts of experience is explained in terms of the healthy, or diseased, state of the 'faculty of taste'. Hume's conclusions as to the conditions governing 'aesthetic experience', of nature or of art, have already been cited in chapter four above.[35]

ii) 'Expression' theories of art

At the beginning of the present chapter, I characterised 'Expression' theories of art as theories which take, as their starting point, a causal relationship of some kind between the work of art and the subjective experiences of the artist, and possibly also those of the receiver. Of the theories that I shall examine below, only three are properly classifiable as 'Expression' theories in this sense. The remaining theories, those advanced by Clive Bell and Susanne Langer, are perhaps best regarded as developments of the 'Imitation' theories examined in 'i' above; I have included them in the present section largely in the interests of historical continuity. In fact, the five theories that I shall consider might more accurately be characterised as 'Kantian and Post-Kantian', in that, aside from the first theory which was advanced by Kant himself, each may be regarded as a development of themes in the Kantian philosophy. Bell, for instance, develops elements in the Kantian account of beauty into a fully-fledged theory of art. In a spirit of taxonomical conservatism, however, I have retained the label 'Expression theories' as the heading for this section.

In considering whether 'Imitation' theories of art might be analysed in terms of the methodological programme outlined in chapter four, we faced an initial puzzlement as to how such theories might involve a commitment to the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance'. In the case of at least some formulations of the 'Expression' theory, however, the relevance of this principle appears more readily comprehensible. If art is explicated at least partly in terms of a causal relationship between artworks and the subjective experience of receivers of these works, it seems that we need only establish that the experience elicited by works

is properly characterised as 'aesthetic', and that the capacity of works to elicit such experience depends upon the possession of 'aesthetic properties', in order to justify an ascription to the 'Expression' theorists of an explicit or implicit commitment to the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance'. There are two obstacles in the way of such rapid progress in our enterprise, however. Firstly, 'Expression' theorists have tended to stress, even exclusively, the relationship between artworks and the subjective experiences of artists, rather than those of receivers. Secondly, those writers, such as Tolstoy, who have stressed the relationship between artworks and receivers of those works have often denied that art is a matter of eliciting 'aesthetic experience' in the sense in which this term might be applied to the experiences elicited in the contemplation of natural phenomena. Such problems notwithstanding, I shall argue that the 'Expression' theory, when fully spelled out, involves a commitment to those methodological principles of traditional philosophy of art proposed in chapter four.

I shall begin by looking at the theories of art and 'aesthetic experience' to be found in Kant's Critique of Judgement.(36) The latter text is both a seminal and a transitional work in the philosophy of art. It is seminal in that it prefigured, and directly or indirectly fostered the development of, both the nineteenth century 'Expression' theories of art and the twentieth century 'Formalism' of Bell and Fry. It is also transitional, however, referring not only forward to these later developments but also backward to the eighteenth century 'Beauty' theories of art. In the Critique of Judgement, Kant offers a lengthy and much-discussed account of the nature of 'aesthetic experience' in the narrow sense, and a briefer, cryptic, and little -discussed account of art.

The stress which many commentators place upon Kant's theory of the 'aesthetic'[37] may leave the unwary reader with the impression that Kant held to a 'Beauty' theory of art, although, as we shall see, this was not in fact the case. Indeed, the significance of Kant's work in philosophical aesthetics may be taken to reside largely in his attempts to distinguish the appreciation of artworks from the exercise of 'taste' in the aesthetic appreciation of nature and of non-artistic artifacts. While he holds that both forms of activity involve an interaction between the 'faculties' of the Imagination and the Understanding which differs from their interaction in the cognitive employment of these 'faculties' in that it does not involve the subsumption of a representation of the Imagination under a concept of the Understanding, he also argues that the two forms of activity differ from one another with respect to the sort of interaction between the faculties that they involve. In spite of this, however, I shall try to show that Kant's conception of artistic appreciation sufficiently resembles his conception of the 'aesthetic experience' of nature to justify imputing to him the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance'.

Kant's treatment of the 'aesthetic experience' of beauty need concern us only briefly here. Like the Empiricists, Kant attempts to determine the nature of, and the conditions governing the occurrence of, 'aesthetic experience' which issues in 'judgements of taste' ascribing beauty to some object of attention. More specifically, he seeks to determine the logical status of such judgements. He agrees with the Empiricists that these judgements do not involve the application of a <u>concept</u> of beauty, innate or otherwise, to an object of attention on the basis of some objective property which it possesses. He agrees, also, that

the 'judgement of taste' is subjective in its reference, referring to the experience of pleasure in the receiver. But he maintains, contrary to the Empiricists, that taste is not merely a contingent matter for which standards may be established on the basis of observed correlations between certain properties of objects and the experienced pleasure, and consequent 'judgements of taste', of perceivers. Rather, he claims that a transcendental justification can be given for aesthetic judgements, that the pleasure which attends aesthetic experience is necessarily related to the conditions which elicit such experience, and that the 'judgement of taste' justifiably demands the concurrence of all other men. Kant argues for these conclusions on the basis of an analysis of the pleasure which attends 'aesthetic experience'. Such pleasure, firstly, is 'disinterested', not dependent on the satisfaction of some personal interest or desire. It derives, rather, from an experienced harmony of the 'faculties' of the Imagination and the Understanding. Kant argues, on the basis of his 'faculty' theory of mind developed in the Critique of Pure Reason(38), that such a harmony is possible for all men. Harmony of the faculties occurs when a representation of the Imagination exhibits what Kant terms 'purposiveness without purpose', or, in other words, when it exhibits that formal order and structural inter-relatedness characteristic of things designed for a purpose, without its being referred to any specific purpose.

Kant claims, therefore, that the 'judgement of taste' refers to the disinterested pleasure which we feel on the occasion of an experienced harmony between the faculties of the Imagination and the Understanding, where this harmony is brought about by the contemplation of a representation of the Imagination which is purposive in form although referred

to no specific purpose. We might ask, then, firstly, why such harmony should be brought about by the contemplation of representations of this sort, and, secondly, why we should necessarily derive satisfaction from the experience of such harmony. In attempting to answer these questions, Kant draws once again on the account of human mental functioning argued for in the Critique of Pure Reason. According to that account, the mind is active in experience not only in imposing a unified spatio-temporal framework upon the manifold given in intuition, through the 'transcendental synthesis of apperception', but also in seeking intelligible order or system in the representations of the Imagination produced by this synthesis. The Understanding, guided by the demands of Reason, seeks such intelligible order or system in the phenomena through empirical judgements, which bring representations under concepts and relate these concepts in empirical generalisations. Science is the attempt to bring these generalistaions into systematic inter-relation with one another. The success of the scientific enterprise, however, is not guaranteed by the spatio-temporal unity imposed by the mind in the synthesis of apperception; it requires, rather, that 'things-in-themselves' conform to Reason's demand for system. Knowledge of such conformity is not derivable from experience, but the assumption that nature is purposefully ordered in such a way as to conform with such demands is pragmatically necessary for science. Those representations of the Imagination which manifest 'purposiveness without purpose' produce a harmony between the faculties of the Imagination and the Understanding because they exhibit, in their form, the systematic order sought by the Understanding in its empirical employment. Further, such harmony necessarily pleases because it gratifies the desire for purposeful and intelligible order in exper-

ience.

After expounding his theory of beauty, Kant turns his attention to art. He draws a distinction between 'mechanical art' and 'beautiful art'. The former is equivalent to our notion of 'craft', involving the production of objects designed to fulfil a particular purpose; the skills required for 'mechanical art' are teachable by means of formulable rules. 'Beautiful art', it might be thought, will involve the production of objects designed to give aesthetic pleasure of the sort discussed in the preceding paragraphs; the skills required to produce works of 'beautiful art' might then also be teachable by means of rules similar to those proposed by Rationalists such as Le Brun. It is clear, however, that this is not what Kant has in mind. Works of 'mechanical art', he claims, may be so designed that they will not only fulfil their intended function, but will also be aesthetically pleasing to perceivers. The production of such works presupposes only that the artist possesses 'taste' and exercises it in the successive refinemant of his product until he finds it aesthetically pleasing.(39) The production of works of 'beautiful art', on the other hand, requires that the artist possess not only 'taste' but also 'genius', an innate and unteachable talent involving a 'happy relation' between the faculties of the Imagination and the Understanding.(40) This 'happy relation' involves the capacity of the Imagination, as a productive faculty, to provide representations which, while not subsumable under any specific concept of the Understanding, are nonetheless related to certain such concepts in a special way. These representations, produced by the 'free play' of the Imagination, Kant terms "aesthetical ideas", which term he explicates thus: "By an aesthetical idea I understand that representation of the Imagination which

occasions much thought, without however any definite thought, i.e. any concept, being capable of being adequate to it; consequently it cannot be completely compassed and made intelligible by language".(41)

The 'aesthetical ideas' are related to certain concepts which derive from Reason's desire for a purposeful order and wholeness in experience, which desire experience cannot ever satisfy; thus these concepts are either never realisable in sense-experience (the so-called 'rational ideas of 'invisible beings', Heaven, Hell, etc.), or are never adequately so realised (e.g. true love, perfect justice, etc.).(42) The artist, by presenting his 'aesthetical ideas' in a work of 'beautiful art', compensates for the inability of nature, qua phenomenal world, to satisfy the desire that these concepts should be experientially instantiated in representations of the Imagination. The artist cannot, of course, provide such instantiations directly in his works, but he gives the concepts 'experiential content' of some sort. This is achieved, according to Kant, through the presentation of the 'aesthetical attributes' of a concept, which "express the consequences bound up with (a concept), and its relationship to other concepts".(43) An 'aesthetical idea', then, is a representation, produced by the Imagination of one who possesses 'genius', which is related to a concept through its presentation of an 'aesthetical attribute' of that concept. The 'aesthetical idea', furthermore, has the capacity to elicit, in one for whom it is a representation, many other representations which are related to it, thereby serving to "enlarge" the concept whose 'aesthetical attributes' it presents.(44) The artist, whom 'genius' has endowed with the ability to produce 'aesthetical ideas' which thus provide 'experiential content' lacking any other form of representational instantiation, communicates

his experience to others through the works of art that he creates. Artworks, therefore, are "the expression by means of which the subjective state brought about by the aesthetical ideas, as an accompaniment of the concept, can be communicated to others".(45)

As may now be clear, Kant's theory of art differs quite radically from the 'Beauty' theories of art which preceded it. On Kant's theory, the experiences elicited in receivers of artworks are not available in the 'aesthetic experience' of nature. The latter involves the harmony of the faculties of the Imagination and the Understanding, whereas the former involves a form of disharmony between these faculties in that the 'aesthetical ideas', as representations of the Imagination, resist the attempts of the Understanding to subsume them under a specific concept. In both types of experience, however, the faculties are employed in a manner different from their use in empirical cognition, where representations are subsumed under particular concepts of the Understanding. There is resemblance also in respect of the nature of the pleasure attending the two types of experience; in both cases, the pleasure is 'disinterested' in that it depends not upon the particular interests and concerns of the individual, but rather upon the satisfaction of the 'desires' of Reason itself. Finally, the experiences elicited by both works of 'beautiful art' and representations manifesting 'purposiveness without purpose' depend upon certain properties of representations of the Imagination the perception of which initiates an interaction between the two faculties productive of a form of 'disinterested' pleasure. While Kant makes a clear distinction between artistic appreciation and the 'aesthetic experience' of nature or of products of 'mechanical art', therefore, his account, and his terminology, indicate that he regards

artistic experience as 'aesthetic' in the wider sense, and that the properties which distinguish works of 'beautiful art' are those 'aesthetic properties' with which their creators have endowed them, and which enable them to serve as a means of communicating the 'subjective states' of the artist to receivers of his works.

It is, of course, the notion of an artwork as a means of communicating 'subjective states' which most radically distinguishes Kant's theory of art from the 'Beauty' theory, and it is this notion which is developed in the 'Expression' theories of art formulated in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In certain of these theories, developed by those artists and philosophers loosely labelled as the 'Romantics', the 'subjective states' expressed by the artist in his works acquire a special 'cognitive' value and the artist himself comes to be regarded as a seer or visionary possessed of 'knowledge' unavailable to other men. The 'cognitive' value of art, on such theories, is quite different from the 'cognitive' value accorded to art by certain of the 'Imitation' theorists. For the latter, the 'truths' presented by the artist in his works were derivable through rational inquiry, and did not presuppose any particular mental facility peculiar to the artist. The artist was to be distinguished, rather, by his ability to present such 'truths' in a manner more easily and pleasantly assimilable than in the case of mere discursive formulation, by virtue of the 'aesthetic experience' elicited in the receiver in the course of his attending to the works. For the 'Romantic' theorists in question, however, the artist's 'knowledge' is not derivable by rational inquiry, but depends, rather, upon imaginative capacities which distinguish the artist from other men. In this respect, they follow Kant in referring artistic

creation to a special 'genius' of the artist. For Kant, as we have seen, 'genius' does not furnish the artist with any special 'knowledge', but only provides 'aesthetical ideas' for certain concepts lacking any other representational instantiation; neither the artist's experiences nor the works which express them give 'knowledge' of, or evidence for, the existence of 'things-in-themselves' corresponding to these concepts. According to the 'Romantic' theory, on the other hand, the artist's special powers do give him 'knowledge' of the 'true' nature of things; this 'knowledge' is given to him in states of heightened subjective awareness of a quasi-mystical nature, and it is these states, and the 'knowledge' embodied in them, which the artist expresses in his works.

While we may note these features of the 'Romantic' account of art, the further discussion of them clearly falls outside the scope of this paper. What does concern us, however, is the stress which such theories place upon the relationship between an artwork and the subjective experiences of the artist, rather than those of receivers of the work. Artworks are created, it is claimed, not in order to make certain experiences available to receivers of these works, but as a result of the artist's need to express his own subjective experience. Wordsworth, for instance, characterises poetry as the "overflow of powerful feelings".(46) Since, according to our methodological programme, the function of art is to be conceived in terms of the eliciting of experiences in receivers of artworks, it might be asked whether theories which stress the artist's need for 'self-expression' are analysable in terms of this programme.

We might respond in a number of ways to this question, which arises not only in connection with 'Romantic' theories of art but also, in a more philosophically sophisticated context, in respect of John Dewey's

conception of artworks as 'expressive objects', to be examined below.(47) We might, of course, simply accept that 'self-expression' theories fail to conform to the programme; given that the purpose of the present chapter is to provide substance for the claim that the methodological principles underlying the programme pervade traditional philosophy of art to a sufficient extent to render challenges to such principles significant assertions, it is surely not necessary to show that every traditional theorist has espoused these principles and embraced this programme. Alternatively, we might try to show that 'self-expression' theories, in spite of the stress they place on the relationship between the artwork and the artist, have also recognised the importance of the relationship between the artwork and the receiver, and that, in characterising this relationship, they have adopted the methodological programme in question. Wordsworth, and even more so Shelley, regarded poetry as a morally valuable force in society through its effects upon receivers of poems. Finally, we might try to show that 'self-expression' theories, even when formulated without any reference to the experience of the receiver, do not constitute an exception to the given methodology. The third of these options is clearly the most challenging of the three, and I shall restrict my remarks, here, to a few suggestions as to how one choosing this option might proceed.

Firstly, it should be recalled that analysability in terms of the methodological programme is a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for imputing the two methodological principles distinguished in chapter four to a theory, or to the theorist advancing a theory. It is therefore quite possible that 'self-expression' theories will be analysable in terms of an alternative programme which nonetheless involves an equal

commitment to the two principles. All that the principles require is that art be regarded as definable in terms of the notions of 'aesthetic experience' and 'aesthetic property'. If it could be shown that the experience of the artist, on 'self-expression' theories, is properly termed 'aesthetic' when it involves the creation of a work, and that the properties of the nascent artwork to which the artist attends in the eliciting of such experience are properly termed 'aesthetic properties', we might justifiably attribute the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance' to those advancing such theories. And, if it could also be shown that the creative circumstances's being of this nature is taken to be necessary and sufficient for that which is created to be a work of art, we could attribute the 'Essentialist Principle' also. Nothing of importance rests upon the analysability of theories in terms of the specific methodological programme outlined in chapter four; the programme simply serves as a useful heuristic device for determining whether certain theories adhere to the principles on which the programme is based.

Tolstoy's formulation of the 'Expression' theory(48) raises no problems of the sort discussed above. Indeed, it is questionable whether he would allow that objects created purely in response to a need for 'self-expression' are artworks at all, since he specifies, as a necessary condition of arthood, that the artist's motivation should be the desire to transmit his subjective experiences to others through his works.(49) There is also no difficulty concerning the imputation to Tolstoy of a commitment to the 'Essentialist Principle', since he offers an explicit definition of art in terms of such transmission of subjective experience:

> To evoke in oneself a feeling one has once experienced and having evoked it in oneself then by means of movements, lines, colours, sounds, or forms expressed in words, so to transmit that feeling that others experience the same feeling - this is the activity of art.
> Art is a human activity consisting in this, that one man consciously by means of certain external signs, hands on to others feelings he has lived through, and that others are infected by these feelings and also experience them. (50)

Tolstoy clearly characterises the function of art to be the eliciting of a particular type of experience in receivers, and this experience is unique to art, at least insofar as the feelings elicited are those of other persons which, in the absence of telepathic communication, are not otherwise available. Further, the eliciting of these experiences involves an experiential encounter with a work in which attention is focussed upon certain of its perceptible properties ('movements, lines, etc.). We only need to ascertain, therefore, whether the experiences and properties in question are 'aesthetic' in the required sense.

Tolstoy's adamant rejection of the traditional association between art and beauty might be the principal obstacle to an attribution to him of the'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance'. A proper understanding of the true nature of art, he claims, has been obstructed by the belief that art is to be defined in terms of the pleasure which it provides through its beauty.(51) To understand a human activity like art, according to Tolstoy, we need to determine its function, and the function of art is the transmission of human feelings. While Tolstoy is more forceful than Kant in urging the separation of artistic experience from the experience of the beautiful, however, his characterisation of the mode of experience elicited by artworks presents that mode of experience as no less 'aesthetic' in the wider sense. Although art may not be definable in terms of the pleasure that it gives, artistic experience is attended by

pleasure and such pleasure seems to be 'disinterested' on Tolstoy's theory. It is not dependent on any individual interests or concerns - indeed, the value of art is held to reside in its capacity to transmit feelings between individuals whose interests and concerns differ, thereby serving to further the 'religious perception' of the Christian age by binding together in common humanity those whose subjectivities would otherwise be eternally isolated from one another. Furthermore, as noted above, the experience elicited depends upon attention to the perceptible properties of an object of attention.

One problem which arises in attempting to determine whether the formulations of the 'Expression' theory proposed by Tolstoy and the 'Romantics' conform to the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance' is that these theorists offer little in the way of explanation regarding the mechanisms involved in the reception of artworks. If works of art express or transmit subjective experiences of the artist, it is not immediately obvious how they accomplish this feat. Tolstoy is especially elusive on this question. His only concrete example of the transmission of feelings is that of a boy who transmits his fear of a wolf encountered in a forest by recounting his experiences to an audience.(52) In this case, it is not difficult to understand how the subjective experience of the boy might be 'objectified' for the audience, since the boy can simply <u>describe</u> his sensations and the audience, sharing with him linguistic conventions, can experience what his encounter must have been like by associating the sensations he describes with elements in their own experience. This hardly illuminates, however, the nature of the artistic transmission of feelings in situations where there seems to be no such shared 'language' to serve as a medium for the description of sen-

sations, as in the case of transmission "by means of movements, lines, colours, (and) sounds", i.e. in the visual arts and in music. Further, it is difficult, in the absence of a clearer specification of the relationship between properties of artworks and the experiences which they elicit in receivers, to ascertain whether such properties and experiences are sufficiently analogous to those which characterise the 'aesthetic experience' of natural phenomena and non-artistic artifacts to justify classifying them as 'aesthetic'. In attempting to determine whether these versions of the 'Expression' theory conform to the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance', therefore, I have had to confine my attention to those features of artistic functioning that are made specific in these theories. The conclusions I have drawn are, to this degree, of a tentative nature. A more satisfactory formulation of the 'Expression' theory for the present purposes is that of John Dewey who, as we shall see, does specify the mechanisms whereby 'expression' is held to operate. I shall now turn to his theory in the hope of reaching conclusions of a less tentative nature.

In his treatment of art(53), Dewey is less concerned with distinguishing artworks from non-artworks than with exhibiting continuities between the creation and appreciation of works of art and other modes of human activity and experience.(54) It would thus be a misrepresentation of Dewey's position to impute to him an acceptance of the 'Essentialist Principle' in any strong sense. Nevertheless, he is committed, as I shall try to show, to the view that the capacity to elicit 'aesthetic experience' through the possession of 'aesthetic properties' is a necessary condition for something's being a work of art. Such a commitment follows from two elements in Dewey's theory: firstly, his concept-

ion of the nature of 'aesthetic experience', and, secondly, his conception of artworks as 'expressive objects'. In the examination of these conceptions, below, it will be seen that not only the experiences elicited by completed works of art but also the experiences of the artist in the creation of such works are 'aesthetic' on Dewey's account. Thus, while Dewey adheres to a form of the 'self-expression' theory, he is clearly committed to the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance' even if he does not espouse the methodological programme outlined in chapter four.

Artworks, according to Dewey, are 'expressive objects'. 'Expressive objects' are the products of, and have distinctive properties which derive from the performance of, 'acts of expression'. Since Dewey's conception of an 'act of expression', and also his conception of 'aesthetic experience', are based upon his account of the nature of human experience in general(55), we must briefly consider the latter in order to clarify the former. Human experience, it is claimed, has a certain structure characteristic of the experience of all organisms. The continued existence and development of any creature depends upon an ongoing interaction with an environment. It is only through such an interaction that an organism can fulfil certain vital 'needs' whose satisfaction depends upon the appropriation of resources existing external to it. An unsatisfied 'need' of an organism may thus be represented as a state of disequilibrium between the organism and its environment. Such states give rise to what Dewey terms "impulsions"(56) of the organism, whereby the organism reaches out into its environment in an attempt to remedy its 'need' and restore equilibrium. The successful conclusion of an 'impulsion' in the satisfaction of the impelling 'need' may require that certain obstacles in the environment be transformed into 'means' or other-

wise overcome; and, in dealing with these impediments to its progress, the organism draws upon resources of 'knowledge' accumulated in previous experience. Through such a process, the organism clarifies for itself the nature of its originating 'impulsion', and also endows objects in its environment with 'meaning' relative to its own purposes and the means by which they may be furthered through such objects. The restoration of equilibrium, through the satisfaction of the original 'need', completes the experiential cycle and leaves the organism 'enriched' by its experience, in that it has both acquired a greater self-awareness of its own purposes, and also ordered its resources relative to the realisation of such purposes.

On Dewey's account, therefore, there is a characteristic structure to experience: a state of disequilibrium between an organism and its environment produces an impulsion; the furtherance of the impulsion involves the transformation of obstacles into means, and the satisfaction of the original 'need' leads to a return to equilibrium with a consequent enrichment of the organism. The 'consummatory' phase of this cycle, when equilibrium is restored, is gratifying in its satisfaction of a 'need' of the organism. The pleasure which attends such satisfaction is clearly 'interested', in that it depends upon the individual interest which is satisfied. But, so Dewey claims(57), we may also derive pleasure from the process of moving from a state of tension and disequilibrium to one of harmony. Such pleasure, grounded in the experienced qualities of the movement to consummation, does not depend upon the particular 'need' which is thereby gratified, and is consequently 'disinterested'. 'Aesthetic experience', according to Dewey, is the enjoyment of such consummatory movements in experience. While the rhythmic

structure of experience is normally obscured by the ongoing nature of our interaction with the world, there are certain occasions when this structure manifests itself to an experiencer, who may then derive 'aesthetic' pleasure from the 'formal' qualities of the experience. Such occasions Dewey terms "having an experience".(58) 'An experience' has a distinctive unity (similar to the unity, or 'completeness', required of an action in Aristotle's theory of tragedy), in that there is an uninterrupted movement to 'consummation' through the progressive development of those forces implicated in the initial state of tension or disequilibrium. The unity of 'an experience', for one who is 'having' it, is given as an 'emotional quality' which permeates the sequence of events from initial disharmony to consummatory harmony. The objective condition for the occurrence of 'an experience' is the presence of what Dewey terms 'form', explicated as "the operation of forces that carry the experience of an event, object, scene, or situation to its own integral fulfillmant".(59)

Dewey's account of art draws heavily upon the conceptual framework in terms of which he elucidates the nature of 'aesthetic experience'. Both the appreciation and the creation of works of art involve 'having an experience'; the work of art, qua 'expressive object', elicits 'aesthetic experience' in receivers through its artistic 'form'; emotion occurring in the appreciation of artworks is characterised as 'aesthetic emotion', and, finally, it is the operation of the pervasive 'emotional quality' in the artist's creation of a work which endows his product with the artistic 'form' that enables it to function as an 'expressive object'. To understand how all of this works, it is necessary to examine, firstly, Dewey's account of the 'act of expression', and, secondly, his

conception of the 'expressive object', as the product of such an act possessing special properties derived therefrom.

The creation of works of art, on Dewey's account, may be analysed in terms of the structure obtaining in other modes of human experience. Here, no less than elsewhere, we have the rhythmic cycle of disequilibrium - interaction with environment - consummation and return to equilibrium. Artistic expression begins with a state of inner turmoil which Dewey terms "inspiration".(60) The need to resolve this turmoil produces an 'impulsion' which initiates the 'act of expression' itself. The latter involves an ongoing interaction between the artist and some physical medium. The 'act of expression' is complete, and consummation of the process is achieved, when the work of art is finished and, at the same time, when the original turmoil of 'inspiration' is clarified.(61)

'Inspiration' begins as a profound excitement concerning some object of attention which is experienced as possessing great significance, value, or meaning. This initial, emotionally-charged state occurs in the presence of objects of attention that stir the deepest and most unconscious levels of the individual's personality, those elements so thoroughly introjected, in the sedimentation of past experience, that the individual is unaware of their existence. As a result of this 'stirring' other images and fragments of past experience, having a felt affinity with the original subject-matter in their significance, are raised to the level of conscious attention.(62) The developing 'inspiration', however, while it is intense and charged with emotion, remains unclear and confused, in that, while the experience is felt to be highly meaningful, its precise meaning or significance is obscure. This inner turmoil creates a desire to clarify and comprehend the 'inspiration', which, in

turn, issues in an 'impulsion' to achieve such clarification through an interaction with the environment. The artist, according to Dewey, is one who has the ability to carry the 'impulsion' to a consummatory conclusion in an 'act of expression'. While other men are condemned to their painful state of incomprehension, the artist amy clarify his 'turbid emotion' in the creation of a work of art.(63)

The 'act of expression', however, is not a mere discharge of emotion, as suggested by the 'Romantic' theorists, nor is the artist's special capacity a matter of his experiencing heightened subjective states denied to other men. The artist's power, rather, is manifested in his ability to engage in a prolonged interaction with a physical medium, whereby there is a simultaneous ordering and articulation of both the medium and the artist's mental state of 'inspiration'.(64) The 'act of expression' thus involves the reciprocal transformation of an objective medium and of the ideas and feelings of the artist, in the course of which each moves from an initial state of formlessness and disorder to a 'consummatory' state of form and order. This movement from tension and disequilibrium to consummation is accomplished through the development of the potentialities of the interacting elements - the capacity of the medium to objectify or represent in physical form elements in the artist's consciousness, and the capacity of the 'inspiration' in the artist to stir up images, ideas, and desires sedimented in the artist's subconscious mind. The entire process is guided, so Dewey claims, by the emotion which accompanies the state of 'inspiration'. The creative process, therefore, involving a continuous movement to 'consummation' through the progressive development of forces implicated in an original state of disequilibrium, and characterised by a pervasive 'emotional

quality', constitutes '<u>an</u> experience' for the artist.

It is crucial to clarify the role assigned to 'emotion' in this process if we are to understand Dewey's conception of expression and the capacities to be ascribed to the 'expressive object', as the product of an 'act of expression'. Emotion, it is claimed, "must operate". But, Dewey adds, "it is not <u>what</u> is expressed".(65) To grasp how emotion is supposed to operate, on Dewey's account, is also to understand why it is not <u>emotion</u> that is expressed, and, further, what it is that <u>is</u> expressed. And only if one grasps the latter point can one understand how 'expressive objects' are capable of eliciting 'aesthetic experience' in receivers. Since our examination of Dewey was at least partly motivated by the hope that he would elucidate the sort of mechanisms involved in the expression of subjective states by works of art, we must look more closely at the operation of emotion in the 'act of expression'.

'Inspiration' exemplifies, albeit in an extreme form, Dewey's conception of the nature of human emotions. Emotions are not to be understood as 'internal' feelings, adequately classifiable on the basis of phenomenological resemblance as 'fear', 'joy','love', etc. Rather, emotions are highly individualised through their being necessarily "implicated in a situation".(66) Emotional involvement, in other words, is 'intentional', involvement <u>with</u> some object, person, or situation. Further, the object of an emotion is represented, in that emotion, as having significance or value for the person experiencing that emotion. We only become emotional, that is, about what seems to 'matter' to us. And, as was seen with 'inspiration', Dewey holds that what 'matters' to an individual depends upon the more general framework of beliefs and values of that individual. The artist's 'impulsion' to clarify the signif-

icance or meaning of his state of 'inspiration', therefore, requires, for its 'consummation', the clarification of the relationship between the subject-matter of the 'inspiration' and those underlying values and beliefs which render that subject-matter 'significant' or 'meaningful' for the artist. The role of emotion in the 'act of expression', according to Dewey, is to bring about this clarification by acting in a 'selective and directive' capacity.(67) Emotion is 'selective' in its exclusion of the uncongenial and its selection of that which is congenial to it. The 'emotional quality' attending the artist's 'inspiration' operates, it is claimed, "like a magnet", selecting from the images and ideas available to the artist's consciousness those having the greatest emotional affinity to the subject-matter of the 'inspiration'. Emotion is 'directive' in that it guides the artist's manipulation of the physical medium, determining how the selected elements in the artist's 'consciousness' are objectified, or represented, in the medium, and the order in which they are so represented. The artist, guided in this fashion by the emotional 'feel' of the work, continues until the originating state of 'inspiration' has been articulated and clarified, and the more general values and 'meanings' implicated in its felt significance have been revealed. The work then "mirrors" back to the artist his newly acquired understanding, and the emotion which he feels on contemplating the finished work is 'aesthetic'.(68)

Dewey's account of the 'consummation' of the act of expression', given in the preceding sentences, requires further elucidation, as does the notion of 'aesthetic emotion' contained therein. The clarification of the state of 'inspiration', it would seem, is brought about through the objective exemplification, in the 'expressive object' which is the

work he is creating, of the values or 'meanings' implicated in the original emotional involvement. An emotion, it will be recalled, is held to involve a relationship between an object of attention and certain more general values and beliefs which endow the object with an experienced value or significance. The problem for the artist is to clarify the nature of that significance or value by revealing those underlying values and beliefs on which it depends. The 'selective and directive' emotion, selecting elements and arranging them in the physical medium, works to produce an object which, through its objective presentation of elements felt to have the same emotional significance as the original subject-matter of the 'inspiration', epitomises the underlying values and 'meanings' implicated in that 'inspiration'. In a sense, then, these values are exemplified, or extensionally defined, by the work. The artist, contemplating the completed work, can recognise in it the original subject-matter represented as having the value which is exemplified by the work. The emotion that he feels is 'aesthetic' in that his contemplation of the object of emotional attachment as represented in the work leads to a consummatory experience of the value implicated in that attachment.

Having clarified the role of emotion in the 'act of expression', we may turn to the product of such an act, the 'expressive object', and to the question, raised above, as to <u>what</u> is expressed by such an object. What is expressed, it may now be clear, is the value or significance of that which the object represents. Expression, therefore, presupposes representation, or, as Dewey puts it, an artwork, or any other 'expressive object', "must be representative in a sense if it is to be expressive".(69) Dewey is not saying that all artworks must be 'representational', in the usual sense of that word in the context of art, for

he allows that representation may be "highly abstracted" and give "a generalised representation of the formal sources of ordinary emotional experience".[70] This suggests, although the matter may not be further pursued in this context, that Dewey holds that certain artworks function in the manner described by Susanne Langer, as "forms symbolic of human feeling" (see below). However this may be, an obvious question seems to arise if expression is characterised as the representation of something as having a particular value or significance. Wherein lies the difference, we might enquire, between expressing the value or significance of something and describing that thing as having that value or significance? Even if we grant that an 'act of expression' is necessary for an artist to determine the value or significance of the subject-matter of his original 'inspiration', why do we need the 'expressive object' once the 'act of expression' is completed? Why cannot the artist simply give an account of his discovery in plain discursive language? This is, in fact, a reformulation of the argument, attributed to the 'philistine' in chapter three, that, if the artist has something to tell us, he should state it clearly instead of obscuring it in art. The answer that was given to the 'philistine' is essentially the same as the answer which Dewey gives to the preceding questions. The importance of the 'expressive object', he claims, resides in its capacity to elicit in receivers valuable experience not obtainable from a mere description of what is expressed in the work. A description of the value or significance found in the experience of a particular object does not produce, in hearers of that description, an experience, comparable to that described, of that object as having that value. A poem, or some other 'expressive object, in which an artist expresses the experienced value or significance

of some object or event, does have the capacity to elicit a comparable experience in receivers of that poem.(71)

The mechanism whereby the poem produces such an experience in receivers is similar to that outlined above in connection with the 'aesthetic emotion' of the artist. The artwork, qua 'expressive object', not only functions as a representation, but also exemplifies a particular significance or value as belonging to that which it represents. The receiver, engaging in an experiential encounter with the work, is guided, through his attention to perceptible properties of the work (or to those images and ideas elicited by such properties), to a consummatory state, in which he experiences the represented content of the work as possessing the value or significance expressed. The process of moving from an initially confused apprehension of the 'meaning' of the work to the consummatory experience in which this 'meaning' is clarified involves an interaction between the 'expressive object' and the receiver, in which the potentialities of each are developed. Appreciating the work, therefore, involves 'having an experience', and is properly characterised as 'aesthetic'. The capacity of a work to elicit 'aesthetic experience' in a receiver depends upon those properties with which it was endowed through the 'act of expression' of the artist, and the primary force operative in this expressive act is, as we have seen, the 'emotion' attending the artist's state of 'inspiration'. It is this 'emotion', as the 'selective and directive' principle in the creation of the 'expressive object', which determines the structure, or artistic 'form', of an artwork. As was stated above, Dewey characterises 'form' as "the operation of forces that carry the experience of an event, object, scene, or situation to its own integral fulfillment". Thus, on Dewey's theory,

expression and the creation of 'form' are inseparable, as the simultaneous products of the operation of 'emotion' in the 'act of expression'.(72)

In the preceding discussion of Dewey's theory of art, my approach, as elsewhere in this chapter, has been exegetical rather than critical. In explicating his conception of artworks as 'expressive objects', I have sought to determine whether we may correctly impute to him an adherence to the methodological programme and principles outlined in chapter four. In the context of such an inquiry, Dewey's theory, as a formulation of the 'Expression' theory of art, has the merit of providing a fairly precise account of the mechanism whereby artworks can 'express' subjective states of the artist and elicit comparable states in receivers. I have argued that the 'Expression' theory, when explicated in this fashion, manifests a clear commitment to the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance'. There is also a partial acceptance of the 'Essentialist Principle', in that the capacity to elicit 'aesthetic experience' by virtue of the possession of 'aesthetic properties' is taken to be a necessary condition for something's being an 'expressive object', and thus for its being a work of art. Such a capacity may not be a sufficient condition of arthood, however, for Dewey seems to recognise the existence of certain 'expressive objects' which are not artworks.

In those versions of the 'Imitation' and 'Expression' theories examined thus far, commitment to the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance' has perhaps been more evident than commitment to the 'Essentialist Principle'. This is partly because, as I noted above, that unified conception of 'the Arts' to which the latter principle appeals is of comparatively recent origin. Earlier theories, such as that of Aristotle,

offer explicit definitions of specific art-forms rather than of art in the generic sense. It should also be noted that the absence of an explicit attempt to define art in certain of the theories examined does not entail that no such definition is contained implicitly in the accounts which these theories give of the creation and functioning of artworks. If commitment to the 'Essentialist Principle' is at least questionable in the case of some of these theories, however, we may have fewer reservations in attributing the principle to the two theorists with whom I shall conclude this section, for both Clive Bell and Susanne Langer explicitly commit themselves to the possibility of defining art. Bell's theory, indeed, is in certain respects the most complete exemplification of the methodological programme and principles outlined in chapter four.

In many respects, Bell's conception of art is diametrically opposed to that of Dewey. Whereas the latter stresses continuities between the creation and appreciation of artworks and other modes of human activity, Bell takes art to be sui generis and artistic appreciation to be radically different from experiences obtainable outside the realm of art. Again, while Dewey characterises 'aesthetic emotion' in 'naturalistic' terms, as being continuous with emotional experience occurring outside of art, Bell regards the 'aesthetic emotion' as an almost supernatural phenomenon, a state of "ecstacy". Art, he claims, "transports us from the world of man's activity to a world of aesthetic exaltation...We are lifted above the stream of life...The feelings that (great art) awakens are independent of time and place, because its kingdom is not of this world".(73) In spite of such differences in their positions, however, both writers, as we shall see, accept the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relev-

ance', an indication, perhaps, of the pervasiveness of this principle in traditional theorising about art.

Bell is not an 'Expression' theorist, as was pointed out earlier in this section. Although he expounds his view of art in terms of an 'aesthetic emotion', his theory is perhaps best regarded as a development of the eighteenth century 'Beauty' theory of art. His method of procedure is strongly reminiscent of that adopted by Hume in his dissertation "On the Standard of Taste", but his account of 'aesthetic experience' in the context of art more closely resembles the Kantian treatment of the 'aesthetic experience' of natural beauty. His rejection of the 'representational' content of visual artworks as aesthetically irrelevant or even harmful, for instance, might be compared with Kant's insistence that 'aesthetic experience' does not involve the bringing of a manifold under a concept. Similarly, both Kant and Bell stress the exclusively 'formal' nature of the objective conditions governing the occurrence of 'aesthetic experience'. The principal difference between Kant and Bell, of course, is that Kant does not extend his analysis of 'aesthetic experience', so understood, to the appreciation of works of art but advances, instead, a form of the 'Expression' theory.

The structure of Bell's argument closely reproduces the structure of the methodological programme outlined in chapter four. He begins by distinguishing a particular experience elicited in the experiential encounter with all and only works of visual art. This experience he terms the 'aesthetic emotion'. While he recognises that the 'emotions' elicited by visual artworks may differ from one another in certain respects, he claims that "all these emotions are recognisably the same in kind", and that this 'sameness' consists in their all being 'aesthetic'.(74)

His justification of his procedure thus far is worth quoting, for it illustrates clearly the first step of the methodological programme:

> The starting point for all systems of aesthetics must be the personal experience of a peculiar emotion. The objects that provoke this emotion are what we call works of art. All sensitive people agree that there is a peculiar emotion produced by works of art. (75)

The next step in Bell's argument is a direct appeal to the 'Essentialist Principle':

> If we can discover some quality common and peculiar to all the works that provoke (the aesthetic emotion), we shall have solved what I take to be the central problem of aesthetics. We shall have discovered the essential quality in a work of art, the quality that distinguishes works of art from all other classes of objects...(If our talk of art is to be meaningful), there must be some essential quality without which a work of art cannot exist. (76)

The problem, according to Bell, is to determine what properties possessed by works of art endow them with their capacity to elicit 'aesthetic emotions' in receivers. A solution is to be sought in an examination of the works themselves, to determine what property or properties they share. On the basis of such an examination, Bell concludes that the essential quality distinguishing artworks from all other things is 'significant form'. He restricts himself to the field where he feels himself most qualified to judge, namely the visual arts, although he suggests that his conclusions would also hold true for musical compositions. He argues as follows:

> What quality is common to Santa Sophia and the windows at Chartres, Mexican sculpture, a Persian bowl, Chinese carpets, Giotto's frescos at Padua, and the masterpieces of Poussin, Piero della Francesca, and Cezanne? Only one answer seems possible - significant form. In each, lines

> and colours combined in a particular way, certain forms and relations of forms, stir our aesthetic emotions. These relations and combinations of lines and colours, these aesthetically moving forms, I call 'significant form', and 'significant form' is the one quality common to all works of visual art. (77)

It is, therefore, the purely 'formal' properties of visual artworks, those properties which are 'directly perceptible' in the experiential encounter with a work, that are relevant for the artistic appreciation of such works. Representational content is not only irrelevant for such appreciation; it may even be harmful in that it will distract the perceiver from the 'formal' properties of a work, thereby weakening, or preventing altogether, the occurrence of the 'aesthetic emotion'. Only the representation of three-dimensional space is admitted as being artistically relevant. All other modes of representation "leave untouched our aesthetic emotions because it is not their forms but the ideas or information suggested or conveyed by their forms that affect us".(78) Since the appreciation of artworks is hindered, rather than helped, by a concern with things extraneous to 'the work itself', we must approach works of art in the greatest possible innocence of all worldly knowledge and interests: "To appreciate a work of art we need bring with us nothing from life, no knowledge of its ideas and affairs, no familiarity with its emotions...For a moment we are shut off from human interests; our anticipations and memories are arrested; we are lifted above the stream of life".(79) It need hardly be added, as a commentary on the preceding passage, that the pleasure, or 'ecstacy', attending the appreciation of artworks, so construed, is 'disinterested' in the strongest sense of the word.

To conclude this section, I shall briefly consider certain aspects

of Susanne Langer's theory of art, as presented in her book, Feeling and Form.[80] Langer's theory proves particularly elusive to classification in terms of the 'Imitation'/'Expression' distinction. On the one hand, she resembles the 'Expression' theorists in her attempt to explicate the nature of art in terms of a relationship between artworks and human emotions. She departs from such theorists, however, in her rejection of the idea that works express particular subjective states of the artist. The relationship between artworks and human emotions is to be construed, rather, as a form of representation or 'imitation'. In characterising art in terms of a referential, and not a causal, relationship, therefore, she resembles the 'Imitation' theorists. The referential relationship obtaining between artworks and emotions is described by Langer as a form of 'symbolisation', and her theory may thus be termed 'semiotic'. I shall have more to say about 'semiotic' theories of art in chapter twelve of this paper, and I shall consider Langer's notion of artistic symbolisation more fully in that context, For the present, however, I shall consider only how her theory relates to the methodological framework of traditional philosophy of art, as sketched in chapter four.

We may reasonably impute an acceptance of the 'Essentialist Principle' to Langer on the basis of the following passage, although it should be noted that she characterises the definition of art which she offers as "tentative": "At this point I will make bold to offer a definition of art, which serves to distinguish a 'work of art' from anything else in the world...Art is the creation of forms symbolic of human feeling".[81] Whether we may also impute to her an acceptance of the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance' will depend upon how the foregoing definition of art is to be understood. Since Langer develops her definition

at least partly in response to purported inadequacies in Bell's account of art, we may begin to clarify that definition by examining her criticsims of Bell.(82) She accepts his claim that the appreciation of artworks is attended by a distinctive feeling which might be termed the 'aesthetic emotion', and she also agrees that it is through an attention to the 'formal' properties of works that the 'aesthetic emotion' is aroused, and that artworks may thereby be distinguished from other things by their possession of 'significant form'. These claims, however, which Bell regards as the terminus for the theory of art, are for Langer simply a statement of the problem that a satisfactory theory of art must solve:

> Bell is convinced that the business of aesthetics is to contemplate the aesthetic emotion and its object, the work of art, and that the reason why certain objects move us as they do lies beyond the confines of aesthetics. If that were so, there would be little of interest to contemplate. It seems to me that the reason for our immediate recognition of 'significant form' is the heart of the aesthetical problem...The question of what gives one the emotion is exactly the question of what makes the object artistic; and that, to my mind, is where philosophical art theory begins. (83)

The problem with 'significant form', then, is to determine why the form of certain objects is 'significant'. The answer to this problem, according to Langer, is that these objects, which we call 'works of art', symbolise, in their form, what she calls "the forms of human feeling". This symbolic relation, which Langer characterises as an "isomorphism", is illustrated by reference to musical works of art:

> The tonal structures we call 'music' bear a close logical similarity to the forms of human feeling - forms of growth and of attenuation, flowing and stowing, conflict and resolution, speed, arrest, terrific excitement, calm or

> subtle activation and dreamy lapses - not joy or sorrow, perhaps, but the poignancy of either and both - the greatness and brevity and eternal passing of everything vitally felt. Such is the pattern, or logical form, of sentience; and the pattern of music is that same form worked out in pure measured sound or silence. Music is a tonal analogue of emotive life. (84)

In stressing that what an artwork symbolises is 'forms of human feeling', rather than particular individualised emotions, Langer differentiates her theory from the 'self-expression' theories advanced by the 'Romantics'. Art is not "the symptomatic expression of feelings that beset (the artist) but a symbolic expression of the forms of sentience as he understands them".(85) This differing conception of the genesis of artworks implies a correspondingly different account of the experiences which works elicit in receivers. If works do not express the individualised subjective states of their creators, they cannot bring about an experience of those states in those who receive them. Artistic appreciation, on Langer's theory, involves the recognition of an 'isomorphism' between the structure of a work and the 'structure' of human feeling. It is not 'the forms themselves', but rather "our perception of their rightness and necessity", that causes the 'aesthetic emotion'; this distinction is held to be of great importance:

> To recognise that something is right and necessary is a rational act, no matter how spontaneous and immediate the recognition may be; it points to an intellectual principle in artistic judgement, and a rational basis for the feeling Bell calls the 'aesthetic emotion'. This emotion is, I think,...a personal reaction to the discovery of 'rightness and necessity' in the sensuous forms that evoke it. (86)

In characterising the act of 'recognition' in artistic appreciation as a 'rational act', Langer employs the term 'rational' in what she

calls the 'broader sense', whereby "any appreciation of form, any awareness of patterns in experience, is 'reason'".(87) Recognition is not 'rational' in the 'narrower' sense, in that it does not depend upon the "logical discrimination" of 'significance' in a form, but rather upon a felt quality of the experiential encounter with a work. Langer draws, here, on a distinction between two types of symbols which she terms 'discursive' and 'presentational', or 'non-discursive'.(88) In 'discursive' modes of symbolic functioning, such as natural languages, meaningful or 'significant' utterances are generated through the combination of units having an independent semantic interpretation. Such utterances 'articulate' their meanings by relating these units, through the discursive order of presentation, according to syntactical rules; to grasp the meaning or 'significance' of an utterance requires the 'logical discrimination' of what is thus articulated. 'Presentational' modes of symbolic functioning, as employed in art, also involve the 'articulation' of 'meaning' or 'significance', but the elements which compose the artistic symbol lack an independent semantic interpretation. 'Significance' is 'articulated', rather, through the relationships between the elements which constitute the structure, or 'form', of the symbol as a whole. A musical composition is 'articulated' in that "its internal structure is given to our perception" in an experiential encounter with the work. The 'significance' of the composition, that which it 'articulates', is apprehended as a quality of the work by means of the quality of the experience which it elicits:

> The basic concept (for the philosophy of art) is the articulate but non-discursive form having import without conventional reference, and therefore presenting itself not as a symbol in the ordinary sense, but as a 'signif-

> icant form', in which the factor of significance is not logically discriminated, but felt as a quality rather than recognised as a function. (89)

The preceding explication of Langer's theory of art not only indicates her acceptance of the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance', but also brings out, when contrasted with Bell's account, an interesting disagreement as to how 'aesthetic experience' is to be understood in the context of this principle. Langer's acceptance of the principle is clearly indicated by the role which she assigns to qualitative features of the experiential encounter with an artwork in the eliciting of 'aesthetic experience' whose distinguishing feature, phenomenologically speaking, is the occurrence of the'aesthetic emotion'. The distinguishing characteristic of artworks is their possession of those 'formal' properties constituting the 'internal structure' which is 'given in perception'. Langer's understanding of the nature of 'aesthetic experience' differs from that of Bell, however, in that the 'aesthetic emotion' is not elicited directly by the formal properties of the artwork, but indirectly, through the 'rational' recognition of the 'significance' of these forms as 'presentational symbols'. For Bell, on the other hand, the possession of 'significant form' by an artwork is immediately registered by the 'sensitive' receiver in his feeling of the 'aesthetic emotion'. This difference between Bell and Langer concerning the 'aesthetic experience' elicited by works of art closely parallels the difference between the Empiricists and Kant concerning that 'aesthetic' mode of pleasure to which the 'judgement of taste' refers. For Empiricists such as Hutcheson and Hume, the presence of beauty in an object is directly registered by an 'inner sense', and 'aesthetic pleasure' is an immediate consequence

of this act of registering. For Kant, and also for the earlier Rationalists, 'aesthetic pleasure' derives not directly from the contemplation of a sensuous manifold, but, rather, from the recognition of the 'rightness' of this manifold in virtue of its structure. For the Rationalists, the recognition of such 'rightness' involved referring the structure of the manifold to a rational 'standard' of beauty; for Kant, as was seen above, the 'rightness' is recognised through the harmonious interplay between the faculties of Imagination and Understanding in the presence of a given representation of the Imagination. Both the Empiricist and the Kantian conceptions of 'aesthetic experience' are, of course, compatible with the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance', since this theory does not prescribe a particular theory as to the nature of the 'aesthetic' but only asserts that the theory of the 'aesthetic' and the derivative concepts of 'aesthetic experience' and 'aesthetic property', however explicated, constitute the proper framework for the development of a philosophical account of art. Similarly, that Bell and Langer hold to differing conceptions of the mechanisms whereby the experiences characteristic of artistic appreciation are elicited in receivers does not imply that only one of their theories complies with the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance', nor that only one of them accepts that principle.

This last point might seem sufficiently obvious to have hardly merited mention. It has been suggested, however, by a commentator on Langer(90), that her characterisation of the relationship between the perceptible properties of artworks and the experiences elicited in receivers of such works as 'indirect' renders unacceptable any attempt to classify this experience as 'aesthetic'. Clearly, if this claim is true, then, even if Langer were explicitly to espouse the 'Principle of Aes-

thetic Relevance', her theory would fail to comply with the requirement that the functioning and being of artworks be explicated in terms of bona fide concepts of the 'aesthetic'. Richard Rudner, the commentator in question, discusses Langer's theory in the context of a more general consideration of 'semiotic' theories of art, and, in particular, the 'semiotic' theory of Charles Morris. His argument, as it applies to Langer, might be briefly summarised as follows. As was seen in chapter four, it has traditionally been taken to be a distinguishing mark of 'aesthetic experience' that such experience is attended by a form of pleasure grounded not in the satisfaction of any interests or concerns of the individual, but, rather, in qualities of the perceptual encounter with an object of attention. The idea that 'aesthetic experience' is attended by 'disinterested' pleasure of this sort is sometimes formulated in slightly different terms, as in the claims that such experience is 'immediate', or that the object of attention in such experience is 'valued in and for itself' or is 'immediately and immanently consummatory'. The basis for such claims is largely phenomenological, the 'felt' immediacy of aesthetic satisfaction. It has also been held that it is only by reference to these distinguishing marks of the 'aesthetic' that 'aesthetic value' can be distinguished from 'moral value'.

Rudner claims that the 'semiotic' aspects of Langer's theory are incompatible with the claim that the experiences elicited by artworks are 'aesthetic' in the above sense. Following Morris, he takes 'semiosis' to involve a "mediated taking account of" something.(91) In Langer's theory, the structure of an artwork mediates our taking account of those 'forms of human feeling' with which it is 'isomorphic', and which it thereby 'presentationally' symbolises. It is held to be the recognition

of this 'isomorphism', endowing a structure with its experienced 'rightness', that arouses the 'aesthetic emotion' in a receiver. Rudner argues that if artistic appreciation is so construed, so that the 'significance' or 'meaning' of a work is what it symbolises, the experience elicited through attending to the work in respect of its 'meaning' is not properly 'aesthetic' since it is 'mediate' rather than 'immediate'; and the artwork is not functioning as an 'aesthetic object' since it is not valued 'in and for itself' and is 'mediately', rather than 'immediately', consummatory.

I shall return to Rudner's criticism of 'semiotic' theories of art in chapter twelve, where I shall argue that his argument rests upon an inadequate conception of symbolic functioning in the arts. In the present context, I shall merely suggest the sort of direction that such a response to Rudner might take. Firstly, it should be remembered that the grounds for characterising 'aesthetic experience' as 'immediate', etc., are phenomenological in nature. We experience the 'aesthetic object' as being 'immediately consummatory' or 'valuable in and for itself'. Langer does not, it should be noted, dispute the phenomenological 'evidence'. The recognition of the 'rightness' of certain forms is characterised as "spontaneous and immediate", and the 'significance' of a form is "felt as a quality" rather than being "logically discriminated". What she denies, rather, is that the psychological mechanism underlying such experienced 'immediacy' is also 'immediate', i.e., that artistic 'taste' is, like gustatory pleasure, an immediately consummatory registering of the perceptible properties of objects. She conceives the proper business of the philosopher of art to be, not merely to contemplate, or to give a phenomenological description of, the 'aesthetic pleasure' which att-

ends the appreciation of artworks, but to explain why that emotion occurs. She offers such an explanation in terms of an underlying 'semiotic' process involving the recognition, in perceptually attending to an artwork, of an 'isomorphism' between the structure of the work and the 'structure' or 'form' of human feeling. This recognition, however, is not held to involve the 'logical discrimination' of the 'significance' of a symbol, as is the case with 'discursive' modes of symbolism; rather, the 'significance' of a work, its being 'isomorphic' with human feeling, is 'felt' as a quality of the work itself. It is in such terms that Langer tries to account for the custom of predicating, of artworks, terms normally used to denote human affective states. The music is correctly describable as 'sad', or 'joyful', not because it evokes sadness or joy in receivers (although it may do this), but because we perceive, in its structure, an 'isomorphism' with the structure of human joy or sadness.

Artworks, as 'presentational symbols', are thus to be regarded as entities which both function as symbols and, at the same time, are experienced as being 'immediately consummatory' and 'valuable in themselves'. We may, I think, be rightly puzzled as to how an entity can operate in such a fashion. In other words, we might require a fuller account of the way in which something can function as a 'presentational symbol'. But it is clearly precipitate to reject such a possibility as Langer suggests on a priori grounds of the sort which Rudner offers. We cannot invalidate a theory which purports to explain the experienced 'immediacy' of 'aesthetic experience' in terms of an underlying mode of symbolic functioning, by arguing, as he seems to do, that such a theory is inadequate because the mechanism in the explanans is not 'immediate'

whereas the experience in the explanandum is.

iii) Theory and Metatheory

In this chapter, I have argued for the pervasiveness of two methodological principles in traditional philosophy of art. Although I have attempted to demonstrate a commitment to both principles in the writings of the theorists examined above, it should be noted that the principles are logically independent of one another, and that one might hold to either principle without the necessity of holding to the other. The 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance', while it requires that a thing's functioning as, or being, a work of art be explicated in terms of concepts of the 'aesthetic', does not require that necessary and sufficient conditions for so functioning, or so being, be specifiable in such terms or, indeed, in any other terms; and, while it might be the case that the principle establishes the capacity to elicit 'aesthetic experience' through the possession of 'aesthetic properties' as a necessary condition of arthood, it does not require that either the capacity to elicit any specific 'aesthetic experience' or the possession of any specific 'aesthetic properties' be so necessary. Similarly, the 'Essentialist Principle' requires that necessary and sufficient conditions be specifiable for something's being an artwork, but it does not require that these conditions make reference to any concept of the 'aesthetic'. Dewey's theory might be taken as an example of an account of art which complies with the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance' but not with the 'Essentialist Principle' in the strict sense, since he only concerns himself with necessary conditions of arthood. None of the theories so

far examined complies with the 'Essentialist Principle' alone, unless we regard the mechanisms involved in Aristotelian 'catharsis' as being insufficiently 'immediate' for the 'tragic effect' to qualify as a mode of 'aesthetic experience'. As the above reflections on Rudner's criticisms of Langer might indicate, however, the lack of 'immediacy' in the mechanisms underlying an experience is not, by itself, sufficient to disqualify that experience from being properly classifiable as 'aesthetic'.

In the remainder of this paper, my primary concern will be with metatheoretical questions relating to these methodological principles. One such question concerns the acceptability of the principles themselves, and thus, indirectly, of the theories which comply with them. A second question pertains to the criteria which might be employed to assess the relative merits of theories which comply with these principles but which are not compatible with one another. The principles, as we have seen, provide a methodological framework for the formulation of theories of art and of artistic appreciation, but there is sufficient latitude within this framework to permit considerable diversity in the explanations given of the phenomena in question. Bell and Langer, for example, while both manifest their commitment to the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance' in their recognition of an 'aesthetic' element in the experiences elicited in the appreciation of works of art, offer incompatible explanations of the psychological mechanisms involved in such experience. The criterion for choosing between such accounts cannot be simply their respective adequacy to the phenomenological 'facts', since both theorists recognise these 'facts' and their theories are equally adequate to them. What are needed, rather, are criteria for ev-

aluating proposed explanations of the phenomenological 'evidence'. Since 'aesthetic experience' is a mode of human experience, involving perceptual, and possibly non-perceptual, capacities which we may reasonably presume to be at least analogous, if not identical, to capacities exercised in non-aesthetic activities, we might require that theories of 'aesthetic experience' be accountable to the same criteria of evaluation as apply to theories pertaining to other modes of human experience. In other words, an acceptable account of 'aesthetic experience' must comply with the current state of knowledge in those sciences pertaining to human experience in general. A theory of the 'aesthetic', no less than an epistemological theory or a philosophical account of the workings of the human mind, must be ultimately accountable to a 'naturalistic' account of the phenomena with which it is concerned. In part IV of this paper, I shall re-examine certain theories of 'aesthetic experience' implicated in the traditional theories of art, and attempt to evaluate them against such criteria.

The above reflections pertain to the evaluation of theories which comply with the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance'. Clearly, however, such evaluations will be of merely academic interest if the principle itself is unacceptable. In part III, therefore, I shall consider the arguments that have been raised against this principle, and against the 'Essentialist Principle', by recent contributors to the philosophy of art. Consideration of these arguments will, in turn, lead us to seek a more adequate account of the 'aesthetic'.

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Part Three

Chapter Six Practical and Theoretical Puzzlement

In chapter two, I introduced four 'puzzles' arising out of artistic and critical practice. Three of these puzzles concerned the status of certain objects as artworks or non-artworks, and the fourth concerned the relevance or irrelevance of certain considerations to the appreciation and understanding of works of art. I argued that puzzlement about such matters is grounded in an apparent incompatibility between features of artistic practice and those assumptions about the nature of art and artistic appreciation contained in the unsystematic 'working theory' of art manifest in the discourse and more general practice of practitioners of the arts. Resolution of such puzzlement, therefore, would seem to require either i) a change in the perplexing features of practice, or ii) the rejection or amendment of the 'working theory', or iii) the clarification of those assumptions contained in the 'working theory' in a more systematic theoretical account of art. These courses of action are not, of course, mutually exclusive, since the clarification of the 'working theory' might lead us to amend our practice accordingly; indeed, insofar as the reasonable adoption of either of the first two alternatives would require justification of a theoretical, rather than of a purely practical, nature, any method of resolving our puzzlement will involve recourse to theoretical reflection on art. The question, then, is whether the theoretician should attempt to refurbish the 'working theory' or to replace it. Traditional theorists in the philosophy of art have adopted the former alternative. They have done so through their espousal of two methodological principles which formulate, in more technical terms, those general assumptions about art which

structure the 'working theory' of the practitioner. Within the methodological framework established by these principles, they have attempted to clarify the 'essential' nature of art and of the experiences elicited in the appreciation of artworks. Having examined a representative sample of the resultant theories in the previous chapter, we may now enquire whether such theories do, in fact, provide us with any resolution to the puzzlement with which we began.

For the sake of brevity, I shall restrict my attention to the theories advanced by Tolstoy and Bell, although an examination of other theories would, I think, support similar conclusions to the ones that I shall draw below. I shall begin by looking at how each writer might respond to the puzzles on the basis of his more general account of art. If, as I shall argue, the two theorists offer conflicting 'solutions' to the puzzles, we will require some means of deciding between their respective theories if a resolution of our puzzlement is to be forthcoming from their accounts of art. This, I shall further argue, proves to be more problematic than it might at first appear.

According to Bell, we may recall, artworks (or, at least, works of visual art) are distinguished from non-works by their possession of those formal properties which he terms 'significant form'. It is by virtue of such possessed properties that works have the capacity to elicit, in suitably 'sensitive' receivers, the 'aesthetic emotion', that unique and valuable form of 'aesthetic experience' made available by works of art. If a forgery is, _ex hypothesi_, perceptually indistinguishable from an original painting, then the two paintings will possess identical perceptible properties, and, _a fortiori_, identical perceptible _formal_ properties. If the original possesses 'significant form', then so will the

forgery; and, since their formal properties are identical, they will elicit identical 'aesthetic emotions' in appropriate receivers. In the terminology introduced in chapter three, the two paintings have identical 'A-relevant$_1$' properties and, given Bell's theory, they have identical 'A-relevant$_2$' properties also. The difference between them in respect of their provenance is neither 'A-relevant$_1$' nor 'A-relevant$_2$'. Both paintings are works of art, and are equally valuable as works of art. Our practice of treating only the original as an artwork is thus misguided, based upon artistically irrelevant considerations. As Bell himself puts it, "to those who have and hold a sense of the significance of form what does it matter whether the forms that move them were created in Paris the day before yesterday or in Babylon fifty centuries ago?".(1) Thsi question, it need hardly be added, is a purely rhetorical one for Bell. Further, if the provenance of the paintings is irrelevant to their being, and being appreciated as, works of art, the intentions of the artist, and indeed anything else extraneous to the perceptible properties of a painting, are equally irrelevant to our appreciation and understanding of a work.

The arthood of certain non-artifacts seems to be easily accounted for on Bell's theory. Such non-artifacts, we might presume, possess, through the random action of natural forces rather than through the shaping hand of an artist, those formal properties which constitute 'significant form', and are thus capable of "stirring our aesthetic emotions" in the same way as artifactual artworks. Artists, sensitive to such things, have presumably noted the 'arthood' of these natural objects, and have exhibited them for the greater aesthetic pleasure of others. The arthood of 'Readymades', however, is more difficult to

comprehend. Since the 'Readymade' tradition post-dates the formulation of Bell's theory, he offers no explicit treatment of such putative artworks. If 'Readymades' resemble non-artifacts, in that they qualify as art through their possession of an unintentionally conferred 'significant form', one faces, as a consequence, a possibly unwelcome engrossment of the ranks of artworks, since all other snow shovels, hat-racks, urinals, etc., of the same design are equally qualified to be works of art (cf. the status of forgeries, above). If, on the other hand, 'Readymades' do not possess 'significant form', then, on Bell's theory, they are not properly classified as artworks, and our practice, as with forgeries, is misguided. If this latter alternative is more plausibly attributed to Bell, his theory implies that the pre-theoretical class of artworks should be both augmented, by the inclusion of forgeries, and depleted, by the expulsion of 'Readymades'.

For Bell, therefore, our troubles stem not from the unsystematic nature of our 'working theory' but rather from the misguided nature of our practice. For Tolstoy, however, the converse is true. Our practice only appears puzzling, he might argue, because we falsely assume that, since artworks function through the eliciting of particular experiences in receivers by virtue of the perceptible properties which they possess, art is definable simply in terms of the 'aesthetic' pleasure it produces and artworks are distinguished simply in terms of their possession of those perceptible properties which may elicit such pleasurable experiences in receivers. We assume, in other words, that, since the possession of certain perceptible properties ("movements, lines, colours, sounds, or forms expressed in words") is a necessary condition of arthood, it is also a necessary and sufficient condition. According to

Tolstoy, however, the 'A-relevant$_2$' properties of an object are not merely its perceptible properties, as specified above, but also the use which is being made of the object in virtue of these properties. The perceptible properties must function as a means of transmitting feelings experienced by the artist to the receiver if the object is to be a work of art. In the case of a forgery, the painter who copies the original work has presumably not experienced the feelings which the original artist, if his product is to qualify as art on Tolstoy's theory, had both experienced and was attempting to transmit through the work. The forgery, then, while it shares, ex hypothesi, all the perceptible properties of the original painting, does not share with it all 'A-relevant$_2$' properties, since the perceptible properties of the forgery are not being used as a means of transmitting the experienced feelings of the person who painted it. Since the forgery lacks a necessary 'A-relevant$_2$' property, therefore, it is not an artwork, and our practice is vindicated.

If the provenance of an object is an 'A-relevant$_2$' property, is it also an 'A-relevant$_i$' property? In other words, does Tolstoy's theory also imply that the artist's intentions are relevant to the appreciation of his works? Our initial response might be that, at least in the case of perceptually indistinguishable copies, the artist's intentions cannot be so relevant since it is impossible to tell, in appreciating the two pictures, whether one is looking at the forgery or the original. If artworks transmit feelings through their perceptible properties, therefore, the two pictures will surely elicit identical feelings in a given receiver. Again, however, Tolstoy might respond that we are incorrectly moving from the true premiss, that the perceptible properties of an

artwork are 'A-relevant$_i$', to the false conclusion, that only these properties are so relevant. The experiences elicited by the two pictures in a receiver ignorant of their respective status differ in that, while the original genuinely conveys the sincere feelings of the person who painted it, the forgery does not, thereby deceiving the receiver insofar as he believes that a genuine transmission of feelings is taking place. Since it is undesirable to be so deceived, we have good reason to take every possible precaution to ensure that the work we are appreciating is an original and not a forgery. If we do ascertain that the picture before us is a forgery, our experience will be radically affected by this knowledge, in that we will not experience that "union with the author" and that "freeing of (one's) personality from its separation and isolation" which Tolstoy takes to be the supreme virtue of the appreciation of works of art.(2) Thus knowledge of the artist's intentions, even if it is not derivable from direct inspection of the perceptible properties of an artwork, may affect the experience elicited in the appreciation of the work, and is therefore 'A-relevant$_i$'. In fact, Tolstoy holds that, in cases other than forgeries, the artist's intentions may be determinable in the experiential encounter with the work itself, in that the 'sincerity' of the artist, i.e., his desire to transmit a feeling he has actually experienced, will manifest itself in the 'infectiousness' of the work, i.e., the degree to which the receiver experiences an emotional 'union' with the author.

A Tolstoian resolution of the remaining two puzzles, concerning the artistic status of non-artifacts and 'Readymades', is easily provided. Such entities presumably qualify as art when they are used, in virtue of their perceptible properties, to transmit experienced feelings

from one individual to others. The merit of this position is that it can account for the fact that only Duchamp's urinal, and not any other urinal of the same design, is considered to be an artwork. The difficulty, on the other hand, is to comprehend what experienced feelings one might attempt to transmit by means of such entities as urinals, snow shovels, and hat-racks; or, put slightly differently, if it is a necessary condition of arthood that the artist is impelled by a sincere desire to transmit experienced feelings to others, what kind of artist, with what kind of feelings, could resort to such means with any hope of success?

The theories of art advanced by Tolstoy and Bell suggest possible ways in which we might relieve ourselves of our artistic puzzlement - either through a change in artistic and critical practice, or through an acceptance of the artistic relevance of the artist's intention to transmit feelings which he has actually experienced. Since we cannot adopt both alternatives, which course of action, and thereby which theory, should we accept? Of course, we need not restrict ourselves to the proposals stemming from these two theories, since alternative remedies may be forthcoming on the basis of the other theories of art examined in chapter five. Nonetheless, however many possible courses of action we entertain, there is still the problem of choosing between them. What criteria of selection should we adopt? Tolstoy's theory might seem preferable to Bell's as a means of resolving artistic puzzlement, in that it does not require that we amend our practice. But the ability to remedy apparent anomalies of practice, while it may be a desirable characteristic in a theory, is clearly not, by itself, sufficient reason to accept that theory. We require that a theory not only provide some explanation of such anomalies, but also do justice to the other phenomena in

the field. More specifically, while an acceptance of the artistic relevance of the artist's intention to transmit his feelings may justify certain puzzling aspects of artistic practice, we must also enquire whether such an acceptance is compatible with other features of our practical commerce with and discourse about works of art.

One obvious criterion for evaluating traditional theories of art, therefore, would seem to be the truth or falsity of the proposed necessary and sufficient conditions for something's being a work of art, i.e., their encompassing, or failing to encompass, all and only works of art. I shall term this criterion the 'compliance criterion'. In applying the compliance criterion to a definition of art implicit or explicit in a traditional theory of art, we should seek 'counter-examples' to the definition, either artworks which it excludes from, or non-works which it includes within, the realm of art. In the case of Tolstoy's theory, apparent counter-examples are not difficult to come by. Firstly, there are apparent artworks which his theory excludes. He explicitly requires that the intention of the creator of an artwork should be the transmission of experienced feelings to others, asserting that "art begins when one person <u>with the object of joining another or others to himself</u> in one and the same feeling, expresses that feeling by certain external indications".(3) Any object produced by one whose sole motivation is 'self-expression' will thereby be excluded from the realm of art. If the Romantic poets practiced what they preached, therefore, much of their poetry will not qualify as art on Tolstoy's theory. Another problem concerns the arthood of fictional works, given the requirement that the artist must transmit feelings which he has actually experienced. While Tolstoy might respond that fictional means may be employed to

express the feelings of actual experiences of the artist, it is at least questionable whether such a mechanism is compatible with Tolstoy's insistence that the feeling transmitted should be as 'individual' as possible; for the individuality of a feeling would seem to consist in its being the feeling of a unique and 'individual' experience, hardly compatible with the notion of 'feeling universals' that may characterise a number of different experiences.

Secondly, there are apparent non-artworks which his theory includes. Consider, for example, the following scenario. Lefty, a man of moderately radical political leanings, receives in the mail an election pamphlet from a right-of-centre political party. As he reads the pamphlet, Lefty is moved to experience feelings of anger. He is angered by what he perceives to be the complacent and uncaring attitude of the party in question towards the socially underprivileged and the unemployed. A few days later, Lefty is discussing the forthcoming election with his friend Middleton, a man lacking any strong political inclinations. Middleton opines that it makes little difference who wins the election since all political parties are basically the same. Lefty, recalling his earlier feelings of anger and wishing to communicate these feelings to his friend, produces the political pamphlet from a drawer and gives it to his friend to read. Middleton, reading the pamphlet, is also aroused to a state of anger, and for the same reasons. If we accept Tolstoy's definition of art, the political pamphlet is an artwork, since it is being used, in virtue of its perceptible properties ("forms expressed in words"), to transmit the experienced feelings of one person to another. Since the only restriction which Tolstoy places upon the means of transmitting feelings is that it should be by certain external

signs of specified sorts ("movements, lines,..."), and since these requirements seem wide enough to encompass almost any means of external transmission, it is possible, given sufficient time and ingenuity, to generate a multitude of apparent counter-examples like the one above.

In the present context, however, I shall not further pursue the quest for counter-examples, nor shall I examine other possibly problematic aspects of Tolstoy's theory, such as the intelligibility of the claim that our correctly ascribing arthood to an object requires our ascertaining that the feelings elicited in the receiver are the same as the feelings experienced by the artist, as transmitter. I am concerned, rather, to exhibit, by reference to the preceding discussion, certain characteristics of the compliance criterion, as a means of evaluating traditional theories of art. Definitions of art implicit or explicit in such theories, it was suggested, should comply with the 'facts', that is, they should encompass all and only those things that are works of art. Bell's theory fails to meet the compliance criterion, since it does not comply with our practice in respect of forgeries and 'Readymades'. In view of the puzzling nature of such practice, however, we might be prepared to accept a theory which violates the 'facts' only in this respect if it possessed other qualities desirable in a theory. We might modify our requirement, that is, to the demand that proposed definitions of art comply with the 'undisputed facts', i.e., that they include all 'clear-cut' cases of art and exclude all 'clear-cut' cases of non-art. Tolstoy's theory, however, seems not to meet even this weakened form of the compliance criterion, given the counter-examples discussed above. May we, then, dismiss his theory from consideration and turn to alternative accounts of art, determining which of them are similarly

deficient and depleting the ranks of possibly acceptable theories accordingly?

Before embarking on such an enterprise, however, we might pause to consider what the arguments advanced against Tolstoy have established. How might he respond to the putative counter-examples? Suppose, for instance, that he does not dispute the asserted implications of his theory as to what is, and what is not, art, but that he finds these consequences quite acceptable. Those entities which his theory classifies as art are art, he might claim, and those entities classified as non-art are not art; and, if this goes against existing practice or offends our intuitions, so much the worse for both our practice and our intuitions! The proposed 'counter-examples' are only counter-examples if they are artworks, but are excluded by his theory, or if they are not artworks, but are included by his theory. But the asserted arthood or non-arthood of the 'counter-examples' rests only upon our practice and our intuitions, which, in turn, reflect the assumptions of our 'working theory' of art. It is Tolstoy's claim that this 'working theory' is inadequate in that it fails to recognise the 'A-relevance$_2$' of the artist's intention to transmit experienced feelings in his work. The arthood or non-arthood of the 'counter-examples' thus depends upon the truth of the very theory which Tolstoy is rejecting. To classify the examples as counter-examples is therefore to beg the question, since they will only be properly so classifiable if Tolstoy's theory is false.

The preceding objection, placed into the mouth of Tolstoy, might be generalised into an argument against the compliance criterion as a means of evaluating traditional theories of art. Suppose we have a theory of art which asserts that all and only works of art possess

property p. Using the compliance criterion, we might argue for the rejection of this theory (T1) on the grounds that x, which possesses p, is not an artwork, or, conversely, that y, which does not possess p, is an artwork. Such an argument will only weigh against T1 if there is some accepted class of artworks which includes y and excludes x. But is there such a class, and, if so, on what grounds, and to whom, is it acceptable? Is this 'accepted class' defined and justified by anything more than an alternative theory of art (T2) upheld by the objector? If not, the argument agianst T1 appears to beg the question, since x and y are only counter-examples to T1 if T2 is true and T1 is false. Since it is the truth of T1 that is in question, therefore, x and y cannot, by themselves, constitute an argument against T1 without begging the question. The compliance criterion, which proposes that we evaluate theories of art in terms of their compliance with the 'facts' as to what is or is not art, is therefore unacceptable, since there are no independent 'facts' against which theories can be measured.

This conclusion is a little disturbing, to say the least. A theory of art, it was assumed, might relieve our puzzlement concerning certain aspects of artistic practice by clarifying the 'essential' nature of art and artistic appreciation. Given a clear formulation of the necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing's being a work of art, we might be able to understand the 'arthood' of 'Readymades' and certain non-artifacts and the 'non-arthood' of forgeries. The task of the theorist, it was further assumed, is to explain the arthood of those things clearly classified as artworks in artistic practice, and to thereby clarify the artistic status of more puzzling cases. The theorist, it would now appear, may regard himself as being under no such obligation, but as

having the freedom, if he so wishes, to override our existing classifications and to decree that certain accepted 'artworks' are not really art at all. How, then, are we to choose between alternative theories, if each theorist is at liberty to determine the field of 'genuine artworks' to which his theory must comply? It seems as if we have exchanged our puzzlement about artistic practice for an equally puzzling problem concerning artistic theory.

Puzzlement about artistic practice was seen to involve an apparent conflict between aspects of such practice and the unsystematised assumptions about art contained in the 'working theory' of the practitioner. The resolution of such puzzlement seemed to require the clarification of these assumptions in a more systematic theory of art. Analogously, puzzlement about artistic theory seems to involve a conflict between aspects of the practice of theoreticians - the formulation of definitions of art which do not comply with the pre-theoretical distinction between art and non-art - and certain assumptions about the nature of artistic theory - that the task of the theoretician is to determine the essential properties of those things which are pre-theoretically classified as 'clear-cut' cases of art, and that one criterion for evaluating artistic theories is their compliance with such pre-theoretical classifications. We might hope to resolve <u>this</u> form of puzzlement, therefore, by clarifying <u>these</u> assumptions, concerning the formulation and evaluation of theories of art, in a more explicit metatheory for the philosophy of art.

In the following two chapters, I shall examine the contributions of Morris Weitz to the problems under consideration. As we shall see, Weitz holds that our pre-theoretical classification of certain objects as artworks does provide an independent standard for the evaluation of

theories of art. His reasons for holding this, however, lead him to the more radical conclusion that all of the traditional theories of art - and, indeed, all other theories conforming with the traditional methodology - are unacceptable when measured against such a standard, not simply because they can be individually disqualified through the production of counter-examples, but because they involve a commitment to an unacceptable methodological principle, that principle that I have termed the 'Essentialist Principle'.

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Chapter Seven The 'Indefinability' of 'Art'

I shall begin this chapter by presenting the arguments against traditional methodology in the philosophy of art advanced by Morris Weitz in his paper, "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics".(1) While Weitz is neither the first nor the only contemporary philosopher(2) to question the 'essentialist' pretensions of traditional theories of art, his treatment of the issue has undoubtedly been the most influential, and is especially germane to an understanding of the views of George Dickie, to be examined in detail below. For these reasons, therefore, I shall concentrate on Weitz's paper, making reference to other writers who hold similar positions only where their differences from Weitz may help to clarify aspects of his position.

Weitz, although he is to argue against generalisation in the philosophy of art, is clearly unperturbed about generalisation at the metatheoretical level. He begins his paper by imputing the 'Essentialist Principle' to all of "the great theories of art":

> Theory has been central in aesthetics and is still the preoccupation of the philosophy of art. Its main avowed concern remains the determination of the nature of art which can be formulated into a definition of it. It construes definition as the statement of the necessary and sufficient properties of what is being defined, where the statement purports to be a true or false claim about the essence of art, what characterises and distinguishes it from everything else. Each of the great theories of art...converges on the attempt to state the defining properties of art. (3)

He then proceeds to survey a representative sample of these theories, not, it might be noted, in order to justify his generalisation, but, rather, "in order to see if they do incorporate correct and adequate

statements about the nature of art". His conclusion is that they do not, due to various forms of inadequacy. Some are "circular", or "rest on dubious principles". Others, he claims, are too broad or too narrow:

> Some of them, in their search for necessary and sufficient properties, emphasise too few properties, like (Bell's theory) which leaves out subject-representation in painting...Others are too general and cover objects that are not art as well as works of art. (4)

Given the observations in the previous chapter as to the problematic nature of the 'appeal to counter-examples' as a means of evaluating theories of art, we might question Weitz's reasoning in the preceding passage. To what 'theory-neutral' class of artworks is he appealing in characterising traditional theories as being thus inadequate? Weitz, however, believes he has an answer to this objection. Firstly, he claims, the proper task for the philosopher of art should not be construed as the search for the 'essence' of art, to be captured in a definition, but rather as the attempt to elucidate the 'logic' of the concept 'art' through the formulation of those conditions under which the concept is correctly applied:

> The problem with which we must begin is not 'What is art?', but 'What sort of concept is "art"?'. Indeed, the root problem of philosophy itself is to explain the relation between the employment of certain kinds of concepts and the conditions under which they can be correctly applied... Thus, in aesthetics, our first problem is the elucidation of the actual employment of the concept of art, to give a logical description of the actual functioning of the concept, including a description of the conditions under which we correctly use it or its correlates. (5)

If the philosopher's task is to elucidate the 'actual usage' of the concept 'art', then clearly any account of art which conflicts with such

usage will be unacceptable. Even if our discourse about art does contain an implicit theory of art, the demand that an account of art comply with this discourse does not unfairly beg the question against theories which fail to meet this demand; for, in this case, it is precisely this underlying theory which must be elucidated by an adequate philosophical account of art.

None of the foregoing, however, implies that we cannot arrive at an acceptable account of art while remaining within at least the spirit of traditional methodology. Weitz's thesis, as thus far examined, might only serve to justify the compliance criterion as a means of evaluating theories of art. If the compliance criterion can be so justified, it seems that we might return to that enterprise abandonned in the previous chapter, namely, the evaluation of traditional theories of art by reference to this criterion. Our task, reformulated in Weitz's terminology, will be to determine which theory, if any, correctly elucidates the conditions under which the concept 'art' is correctly applied in 'actual usage'. A satisfactory theory, then, will specify those properties the possession of which by an object is a necessary and sufficient condition for the term 'work of art' to be correctly applied to that object.

According to Weitz, however, the consequences of accepting his thesis as to the proper business of the philosopher of art are much more radical. For, he claims, once we attend to the 'logic' of the concept 'art', we will discover that traditional theories of art not only suffer from the sorts of individual failings specified above, but that they are also collectively guilty of accepting a false methodological principle, namely, the 'Essentialist Principle'. The 'logic' of the concept 'art' is such that it is "logically impossible and not merely factually diff-

icult" to give necessary and sufficient conditions for something's being a work of art:

> Aesthetic theory - all of it - is wrong in principle in thinking that a correct theory (of art) is possible because it radically misconstrues the logic of the concept of art. Its main contention that 'art' is amenable to real or any kind of definition is false...Art, as the logic of the concept shows, has no set of necessary and sufficient properties...Aesthetic theory is a logically vain attempt to define what cannot be defined. (6)

Weitz's analysis of the 'logic' of the concept 'art', from which his anti-essentialist conclusions follow, is a specific application of a more general thesis about linguistic functioning originating in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. In the relevant passages(7), Wittgenstein is arguing against an established conception of philosophical methodology which, he claims, is founded upon an inadequate theory of the functioning of language. The methodology in question might be characterised as a generalisation of the 'Essentialist Principle' to a wider range of philosophical problems, and the theory of language supporting it as a generalisation of those arguments advanced in chapter four to establish the prima facie plausibility of that principle. The basic assumption, phrased in the language of ordinary discourse, is that, if we call a number of different entities by the same name, this must be on account of something which these entities have in common. More technically, it may be claimed that language operates through the classification of individuals under concepts by reference to common properties possessed or common functions served by those individuals. The 'meaning' or 'intension' of a given term is thus taken to be some characteristic, or set of characteristics, which anything properly den-

oted by that term must possess. One's understanding of a term or concept is demonstrated in one's ability to specify its 'meaning', so characterised. Knowledge, therefore, involves a grasping of 'essences'; to know what x is is to grasp those essential characteristics possessed by all and only x's in virtue of which they are correctly denoted by the term 'x'. On this view of linguistic functioning, then, the task of the philosopher, concerned with giving an adequate philosophical account of a given class of entities correctly denoted by the term 'x', is to capture the 'essence' of x-hood in a definition of 'x' stating necessary and sufficient conditions for the correct application of the term.

Wittgenstein argues that the assumption that denotative terms in a language are applied on the basis of properties, or sets of properties, common to all their denotata is false. He claims that, if we examine the denotata of a denotative term such as 'game', we will discover no property, or set of properties, common to all games, but, rather, "a complicated network of similarities over-lapping and criss-crossing". Such similarities he terms 'family resemblances':

> I can think of no better expression to characterise these similarities than 'family resemblances'; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colours of eyes, gait, temperament, etc., etc., overlap and criss-cross in the same way. - And I shall say: 'games' form a family. (8)

According to Weitz, the 'logic' of the term 'art' is like that of the term 'game', in that "if we actually look and see what it is that we call 'art', we will also find no common properties - only strands of similarities".(9) There is thus no essence of art, and traditional methodology in the philosophy of art, oriented towards the formulation of a

definition of 'art' encapsulating its 'essence', is misconceived: "knowing what art is is not apprehending some manifest or latent essence but being able to recognise, describe, and explain those things we call 'art' in virtue of these (strands of) similarities".(10) The business of the philosopher of art is to elucidate the actual functioning of the concept 'art' by making specific those 'strands of similarities' existing between works of art, and by explaining how we correctly apply the concept to novel instances on the basis of such similarities.

Deciding about the 'arthood' of novel instances might seem to present a problem for Weitz, in that a prominent argument for the importance of providing a definition of art has been that such a definition is necessary if we are to justify our 'intuitive' distinction between art and non-art, and thereby justify decisions as to the 'arthood' of novel instances. Weitz, however, claims that there is no problem in justifying such decisions once we grasp the 'logic' of concepts which, like 'game' and 'art', have what he terms 'open texture'. In elucidating such concepts, we can give certain 'paradigm' cases of instances falling under the concept, and we can also state some of the conditions relevant to whether a given instance falls under the concept, but we cannot list <u>all</u> the instances or give <u>all</u> the conditions "..for the all-important reason that unforeseeable or novel conditions are always forthcoming or envisageable".(11) In such cases we do not refer to a <u>definition</u> of the concept, but, rather, we make a <u>decision</u> as to whether the concept should be extended to cover the novel instance on the basis of similarities between the instance and those things already properly included within the extension of the concept:

> A concept is open if its conditions of application are emendable and corrigible; i.e., if a situation or case can be imagined or secured which would call for some sort of decision on our part to extend the use of the concept to cover this, or to close the concept and invent a new one to deal with the new case and its new property. If necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of a concept can be stated, the concept is a closed one. But this can only happen in logic or mathematics where concepts are constructed and completely defined. It cannot occur with empirically-descriptive and normative concepts unless we arbitrarily close them by stipulating the ranges of their uses. (12)

'Art', according to Weitz, is an 'open concept' in the sense just defined. He offers two arguments in support of this claim, which, following Dickie[13], I shall refer to as the 'generalisation argument' and the 'classification argument'. The 'generalisation argument' purports to show, by reference to examples drawn from the sub-concepts of art, that the generic concept 'art' is necessarily amenable to extension by decision on the basis of 'family resemblance' between novel instances and 'paradigms'. The 'classification argument' attempts to elucidate, through an examination of the 'logic' of the assertion "x is a work of art", those 'strands of similarities' by reference to which the term 'work of art' is correctly applied to 'paradigm' cases and extended to novel ones.

The extension of concepts by critical decision, as it occurs within the context of the arts, is illustrated by reference to the sub-concept of 'the novel'. If we wish to determine whether a new literary work, differing in significant respects from those things already classified as novels, should also be classified as a novel, we do not, according to Weitz, compare this work with some definitional 'standard' stating necessary and sufficient conditions of 'novelhood'. Rather, we compare it to our existing stock of novels, and make a decision "as to whether the

work under examination is similar in certain respects" to those other works, and thus "warrants the extension of the concept to cover the new case". The same sort of procedure is applied not only in respect of the other sub-concepts of art but also in respect of the concept of 'art' itself:

> 'Art' itself is an open concept. New conditions (cases) have constantly arisen and will undoubtedly constantly arise; new art forms, new movements will emerge, which will demand decisions on the part of those interested, usually professional critics, as to whether the concept should be extended or not. (14)

That novel instances calling for such decisions will arise is, according to Weitz, not simply a contingent matter but a consequence of the essentially dynamic nature of art, qua activity. The attempt to 'close' the concept 'art' by laying down necessary and sufficient conditions of arthood is therefore a "logically vain" endeavour:

> The very expansive, adventurous character of art, its ever-present changes and novel creations, makes it logically impossible to ensure any set of defining properties. We can, of course, choose to close the concept. But to do this with 'art'...is ludicrous since it forecloses on the very conditions of creativity in the arts. (15)

In setting out the 'classification argument', Weitz begins by distinguishing two uses of the expression 'x is a work of art', which he terms the 'descriptive' use and the 'evaluative' use. Used descriptively, the expression serves to predicate arthood of an object, without thereby ascribing any value to that object; it is this use of the expression that traditional theories of art have purported to elucidate. Used evaluatively, the expression predicates value of its subject, and is used to praise something on the basis of the 'aesthetic' value which is found in

it by the speaker. The expression is correctly employed, in its descriptive use, by reference to what Weitz calls 'criteria of recognition', those 'strands of similarity conditions' which constitute the 'family resemblance' structure of the concept 'art'. These criteria refer to those properties taken to be defining conditions of arthood within traditional theories of art:

> Mostly, when we describe something as a work of art, we do so under the conditions of there being present some sort of artifact, made by human skill, ingenuity, and imagination, which embodies in its sensuous, public medium - stone, wood, sounds, words, etc. - certain distinguishable elements and relations. (16)

Other defining conditions of arthood proposed by traditional theorists, such as the expression of emotion, are, so Weitz claims, "quite adventitious, present to some but not to other spectators when things are described as works of art".(17) Neither these conditions nor the basic criteria of recognition, however, are to be taken as either necessary or sufficient conditions for something's being a work of art in the descriptive sense, since, it is claimed, "we can sometimes assert of something that it is a work of art and go on to deny any one of these conditions".(18) This even applies to what has traditionally been regarded as the most basic condition of all, namely artifactuality, since we can quite sensibly assert such things as "This piece of driftwood is a lovely piece of sculpture".(19) While at least one of the conditions must be present for a thing to be correctly described as a work of art, therefore, "no one of these or any collection of them is either necessary or sufficient".(20)

Corresponding to the 'criteria of recognition', the presence of

at least one of which is held to be a necessary condition for the correct employment of 'work of art' in the descriptive sense, there are 'criteria of evaluation' which, so Weitz claims, are conditions governing the correct employment of the term in the evaluative sense. 'Criteria of evaluation' are certain characteristics of artworks the possession of which is held to confer value on that which possesses them. Weitz offers, as an example of such criteria, the property of being a "successful harmonisation of elements". He further claims that the error of many traditional theorists of art was their failure to properly distinguish between 'criteria of evaluation' and 'criteria of recognition'. Having specified a particular 'criterion of evaluation', i.e., a property the possession of which by an artwork is a sufficient condition for praising that work, they have then treated this criterion as a 'criterion of recognition', offering a definition of art, in the descriptive sense, in terms of the possession of the given value-property. While such 'honorific definitions' are unacceptable as "true and real definitions of the necessary and sufficient properties of art", nonetheless, so Weitz claims, the corpus of traditional artistic theory is far from valueless. Its value lies, however, in the reasons offered for and against proposed 'criteria of evaluation' by competing theorists:

> In each of the great theories of art,...what are of the utmost importance are...the reasons given for the chosen or preferred criterion of excellence and evaluation. It is the perennial debate over these criteria of evaluation which makes the history of aesthetic theory the important study it is. The value of each of the theories resides in its attempts to state and to justify certain criteria which are either neglected or distorted by previous theories...To understand the role of aesthetic theory is not to conceive it as definition, logically doomed to failure, but to read it as summaries of seriously made recommendations to attend in certain ways to certain features of art. (21)

Weitz, as we have seen, argues that traditional theories of art are misconceived in that i) they involve a commitment to the 'Essentialist Principle' and ii) this principle is unacceptable. The case presented against the 'Essentialist Principle' may be analysed in terms of two claims made by Weitz. The first claim, pertaining to methodology in the philosophy of art, is that the philosopher's task is not to determine the 'essence' of art but to elucidate the 'actual employment' of the concept 'art' and to describe those conditions under which the concept is correctly employed. If this claim is accepted, then we may reasonably require that a theoretical account of art comply with those pre-theoretical classifications of things as art and non-art established by 'actual usage'. The second claim, pertaining to the conclusions to be reached by one pursuing the 'proper business' of the philosopher of art, is that 'art' is an 'open concept', not susceptible of definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions of arthood, and that those things correctly classified as artworks share no common 'essence' but are related by those 'strands of similarity' which Wittgenstein termed 'family resemblances'. This claim is supported by the 'generalisation argument' and the 'classification argument'.

There would seem to be two possible strategies which one wishing to defend the 'Essentialist Principle' against Weitz's arguments might adopt. One might argue that Weitz's first claim, as to the proper methodology for the philosophy of art, is incorrect; that an adequate account of art is not available through the elucidation of 'actual usage', and that, consequently, failure to comply with such usage is not an acceptable criterion for the rejection of theories of art. Even if Weitz's second claim were correct, then, this would not show that 'art' cannot

be defined, but only, perhaps, that 'actual usage' requires clarification in a more systematic theory of art. Alternatively, one might accept Weitz's first claim, but argue that his second claim, as to the 'logic' of 'actual usage' of the concept 'art', is incorrect; that 'art' is not an 'open concept', and that those things classified as artworks in 'actual usage' are not related to one another by 'family resemblances' but share some common property, or set of properties, which constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for their being works of art. These conditions of arthood might then be formulated as a definition of art, in accordance with the 'Essentialist Principle'.

In the following chapter, I shall attempt to evaluate the arguments that might be advanced against Weitz in pursuance of each of the above strategies. I shall argue that the acceptability of Weitz's first claim depends upon that of his second claim, and that, consequently, an adequate defence of his position against the first strategy presupposes an adequate defence against the second strategy. More specifically, I shall argue that both the methodological thesis contained in the first claim and the 'classification argument', as an argument in support of the second claim, presuppose the existence of a criterion for 'correctness' of usage, and that the only possible basis for such a criterion, within Weitz's paper, is the 'generalisation argument'. If, as I shall further argue, the latter argument is inconclusive, then neither the 'classification argument' nor the claim as to the proper methodology for the philosophy of art will be acceptable without additional arguments to support them. Since Weitz does not provide any such additional arguments, I shall conclude that he fails to show that the 'Essentialist Principle' is untenable. The definability of 'art', therefore, remains an open question.

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Chapter Eight Arthood and the 'Imperceptible'

In claiming that the proper business of the philosopher of art is the elucidation of the 'actual usage' of the concept 'art', Weitz is simply extending to a particular field of philosophical inquiry a methodological programme which he believes to be a panacea for diverse forms of philosophical discomfort. The 'ordinary language' school of philosophy, taking its lead from the later Wittgenstein, views philosophical problems as products of linguistic confusion, misconceptions of the 'logic' of concepts, which are to be resolved through attention to the ways in which the problematic concepts are 'actually employed' by users of the language. Weitz, explicitly espousing this more general programme for philosophy, holds that the search for a definition of art is a philosophical problem of this sort, and that proper attention to the 'logic' of the concept 'art' in its actual employment will relieve the discomfort we might feel given the conspicuous elusiveness of such a definition. I shall not consider, in this context, the more general adequacy of the 'ordinary language' programme as a means of dealing with philosophical problems, but, rather, I shall consider the acceptability of such a programme for specific problems arising in the philosophy of art. It is reasonable to assume, of course, that any difficulties encountered in applying the programme to this more limited area will have implications as to its applicability to a wider range of problems.

It will prove instructive, I think, to begin by examining an argument directed not against Weitz himself, but against another philosopher who has advanced similar criticisms of the methodology espoused by traditional theorists of art. William Kennick, in a paper(1) which

appeared a few years after that of Weitz, argues that traditional theorists of art have misconstrued the 'logic' of the concept 'art', and that the assumption that art can be defined rests upon this misconstrual. His arguments, as we shall see, resemble those of Weitz, save in the absence of anything equivalent to the 'generalisation argument', an omission that may prove to be significant. Guy Sircello has argued(2) that Kennick's use of the 'appeal to usage' in his paper is unacceptable, and that theories of art should be regarded not as attempts to account for "a common class of objects" but, rather, as "conflicting ways of determining what belongs and what does not belong to the class of art objects".(3) This suggests the view, outlined in chapter six, that any distinction between artworks and non-works involves an implicit or explicit theory of art, and that there is no 'theory-neutral' class of artworks against which competing theories can be compared. Further, Sircello's attack on the 'appeal to usage' in Kennick's paper might have implications for Weitz's use of such an appeal to establish those pre-theoretical classifications effected by usage as a criterion for evaluating theories of art. The similarities between the conclusions argued for by Kennick and those argued for by Weitz also suggest that Sircello's criticisms of Kennick, if valid, may reflect upon Weitz's position as well. Given the concerns of this chapter, I shall not be concerned, in presenting Sircello's arguments, with the accuracy of his characterisation of Kennick's position (although I believe that his characterisation is indeed quite accurate), but, rather, with the degree of resemblance between the position attributed to Kennick and the views of Weitz, as outlined in the previous chapter.

Kennick, like Weitz, imputes to traditional philosophers of art

an acceptance of the 'Essentialist Principle', which he characterises as the assumption that all works of art have "some common nature, some distinctive set of characteristics, which serves to separate art from everything else".(4) The elusiveness of this 'common nature' has led, he claims, to the view that the 'essence' of art must either be 'hidden' or else extremely complex. He rejects this view, however, and sees the problem as residing rather in a failure to grasp the complex 'logic' of the concept 'art'. Although we apply the term 'art' to a wide range of objects, traditional theorists have assumed that our ability to discriminate between art and non-art requires some central core of 'art proper', artworks possessed of some common 'essence', by reference to which the term 'art' is extended analogically or honorifically to other things. Against this view, Kennick argues that the ability to distinguish artworks from other things presupposes only that "we know English", i.e., that we know those 'language-rules' governing the correct employment of the concept 'art':

> 'Art proper' is simply what is properly called 'art'. The 'correctly' and 'properly' here have nothing to do with any 'common nature' or 'common denominator' of all works of art; they have to do merely with the rules that govern the actual and commonly accepted usage of the word 'art'. (5)

Again following Weitz, Kennick maintains that artworks share no common property (or set of such properties), but only exhibit 'family resemblances'. The argument offered in support of this conclusion is analysed by Sircello as follows:

a) We know how to apply the term 'art' in English, because we know the language-rules governing the use of the term;

b) these rules determine a single class of entities, as central cases

of art, and

c) when inspected in an unbiased way, these entities reveal no common and unique properties.

This argument, it may be noticed, closely resembles Weitz's account of the descriptive use of the term 'work of art' in the context of the 'classification argument'. The 'language-rules', knowledge of which is required for the correct employment of the concept 'art', correspond to Weitz's 'criteria of recognition'. The 'central cases of art' correspond to Weitz's 'paradigm' cases about which, so he claims, "there can be no question as to their being correctly described as 'art'".(7) The claim that these 'central cases', when properly inspected, reveal no common properties corresponds to Weitz's claim that none of the criteria of recognition is a defining condition of arthood, since it is possible to correctly describe something as an artwork while denying that it meets any particular criterion, although it must meet at least one of them. Given this correspondence, we may assume that Sircello's arguments, if they tell against Kennick's position as analysed above, will tell against the 'classification argument' also. As will be seen, however, they may constitute a challenge not only to the latter argument but also to the methodological programme which underlies it.

Sircello considers the possible implications for Kennick's position, and particularly for step 'b' above, of disagreements as to the arthood of a given entity. Kennick allows that there may be a measure of indeterminacy in the rules governing the application of a term, such that, around the 'central cases', there will be a hinterland of 'disputed cases' with respect to which the term is 'systematically vague'. Certain disagreements, therefore, may relate to disputed cases of this

sort.[8] If the case in question is not 'disputed', however, one or both of the parties in question must be using the term incorrectly. Discounting situations where incorrect use is clearly attributable to ignorance, there remain, it is claimed, "more important disagreements" such as might occur between such persons as Bell and Tolstoy over the arthood of something which communicates feelings but lacks any interesting formal properties. On what grounds can we characterise the use of the term 'art' by one or both of the parties in such a dispute as 'incorrect'? Noting Kennick's suggestion that such uses are incorrect in being attempts to 'change' the way in which the term is applied, Sircello claims that we need to examine the underlying thesis that there is an 'incorrect' use of the term 'art' in such cases. To characterise the use of a term as 'incorrect' presupposes some standard of correct utterance against which the given use is being measured. What, then, is the standard of correctness by reference to which certain uses of the term 'art' are deemed 'incorrect'? Sircello maintains that no person can qualify as a 'standard-maker' unless he is unbiased by exposure to the "possibly incorrect" theories of Bell, Tolstoy, etc. Until we have determined which, if any, of these theories is correct, we cannot determine which sorts of exposure might lead us to disqualify a potential 'standard-maker' as 'biased' through exposure to an incorrect theory of art. But if an individual has not been exposed to any of the principal theories of art, it would seem that his knowledge of the term 'art' and its uses will be inadequate for his use to serve as the standard of correctness. Thus, Sircello argues, Kennick is committed to the existence of 'incorrect' uses of the term 'art' in the absence of a standard of correct usage by reference to which such 'incorrect' uses

could be identified. He further argues that disagreements of the sort in question cannot be explained in terms of 'systematic vagueness', since this could lead to the conclusion that the term 'art' is vague in respect of every individual to which it may be applied. There are, he claims, no 'central cases' determined by rules for applying the term 'art', for there are no cases to which arthood might not be denied, "without misuse of language", by some theorist actual or imagined. Theories of art, he concludes, are not attempts to account for an accepted class of artworks, against which they may be tested for compliance, but competing suggestions as to "what belongs and what does not belong to the class of art objects".(9)

The significance of Sircello's paper, I think, lies not so much in the strength of his arguments against Kennick, and, indirectly, against Weitz, but rather in what his arguments reveal about the structure of the positions which he is attacking. There are clearly two claims, argued for in his paper, which, if correct, would seriously undermine the arguments against the 'Essentialist Principle' thus far considered. Firstly, the truth of the claim that there are no 'central cases' of art would invalidate any attempt to show that an inspection of such 'central cases' reveals no common property of set of properties. This would count not only against the argument attributed to Kennick but also against Weitz's notion of paradigm cases of art and, indirectly, his 'classification argument'. The latter argument, while it makes no explicit appeal to a 'central class' of artowrks, clearly implies the existence of one in its appeal to 'correct uses' of the term 'work of art' in the descriptive sense. The assertion that the term 'work of art' may be correctly applied to instances which lack any one

of the 'criteria of recognition' implies that these instances are correctly classified as artworks on the basis of the 'language-rules' for the employment of the concept 'art', and thus that they are constituents of a 'central class' of artworks determined by such rules. If there is no such 'central class', then neither will there be that class of 'correct applications' required for the 'classification argument'.

Secondly, the truth of this first claim together with the truth of the further claim that theories of art are not attempts to describe the conditions governing the correct employment of the concept 'art' with respect to an accepted class of artworks, but, rather, are prescriptions as to how the class of artworks should be determined would seem to invalidate Weitz's claim that the proper business of the philosopher of art is to elucidate the 'actual usage' of the concept 'art'. The precise implications of Sircello's arguments for Weitz's methodological claims, however, may be less radical than they appear. What does seem clear is that, if Sircello is correct, the criterion for evaluating theories of art cannot be their compliance with a pre-theoretical classification of artworks established by 'actual usage', since such a classification simply represents an alternative proposal as to how the concept 'art' should be understood. As Sircello points out, if his view is correct then Kennick's stance, or indeed Weitz's, is simply another part of the battle between competing prescriptions.

In a sense, however, Sircello himself is purporting to give an account of the 'actual usage' of the concept 'art'. He differs from Weitz and Kennick only in characterising the 'logic' of this concept as essentially prescriptive rather than descriptive. Since the concept 'art' is essentially prescriptive, the conditions governing its correct

employment do not involve any reference to an independent 'central class' of artworks. Rather, the concept 'art' is correctly used when it involves a recommendation as to what should count as art. Such recommendations are not to be evaluated in terms of their compliance with accepted classifications, but, rather, in terms of the pragmatic considerations that can be offered to support them. It is Sircello's contention that this is the way in which the concept 'art' is actually used when the arthood of an object is in question. It might thus be said that he disagrees with Weitz not over the tenability of the methodological principle that the philosopher's task is to elucidate the 'actual usage' of a term, but over the 'logic' of the concept 'art' as revealed in an examination of 'actual usage'. His strategy, then, would seem to be the second of the two distinguished above.(10)

The extent of the disagreement between Sircello and Weitz, however, might give us cause to question the foregoing analysis of their differences. If both philosophers are attempting to elucidate the 'actual usage' of the concept 'art' within the same linguistic community, it seems strange that they should disagree so radically as to what the 'logic' of that concept is. This might suggest that the imputation to both writers of a common conception of the proper business of the philosopher of art - namely, the elucidation of the 'actual usage' of the concept 'art' and the conditions under which it is correctly employed - conceals more than it reveals. That this is so becomes apparent, I think, when we enquire how Weitz or Kennick might respond to Sircello's criticisms.

The focal point for such a response, it would seem, must be the claim that there is no 'central class' of artworks determined by ling-

uistic 'rules' governing the correct employment of the concept 'art'. It is this claim, as we have seen, that provides the basis for Sircello's rejection of both i) the arguments for the 'indefinability' of art in terms of some common 'essence', and ii) the compliance criterion as a means of evaluating theories of art. The argument offered for this claim is that there is no standard of 'correct usage' to resolve 'important disagreements' as to the arthood of objects, and that such disagreements may extend to every object that might be proposed as a 'central case' of art. One obvious way to invalidate this claim, therefore, would be to show that there is, in fact, an acceptable standard of 'correctness' for the employment of the concept 'art'. Given such a standard, we might resolve the troublesome disagreements and establish a class of 'central cases' of artworks, whose arthood could only be denied through incorrect usage of the concept 'art'.

The unavailability of a standard of 'correct usage' and the extent of possible disagreement about art follow, according to Sircello, from the influence and application of the "possibly incorrect" theories of such writers as Tolstoy and Bell. Until we determine whether these theories are correct, he claims, we can neither determine which potential 'standard-makers' are 'biased' nor rule out any ascription or denial of arthood to an object on the basis of one of the theories; but, on the view attributed to Kennick, our ruling such theories incorrect depends upon the prior determination of a central class of artworks. Faced by this apparent impasse, however, we might recall Kennick's original suggestion, noted but then ignored by Sircello, that the 'incorrectness' of the employment of the concept 'art' by such writers as Bell and Tolstoy resides in their attempts to change the meaning of the

term. In employing the term 'prescriptively', they are misconstruing the 'logic' of the concept 'art'. Their theories of art, which attempt to prescribe necessary and sufficient conditions of arthood, are not 'possibly correct', as Sircello claims; rather, they are incorrect by virtue of their 'logically vain' attempt to give a definition of art when no such definition is possible. If Bell and Tolstoy, on the basis of their respective theories of art, disagree as to the arthood of an object x, or even if they agree, both of them are employing the concept 'art' incorrectly since both of them are referring the object x to certain supposedly necessary and sufficient conditions of arthood. 'Correct' usage is usage according to the established 'linguistic rules' or 'criteria of recognition', and any usage by reference to a definition of art is incorrect, as usage, even if the object of which arthood is predicated is, in fact, a work of art.

Such a response, as it stands, quite clearly begs the question against Sircello, since it presumes the truth of the very claim about the 'logic' of the concept 'art' which is under dispute. Nevertheless, it clarifies, I think, the nature of his disagreement with Kennick and Weitz, and, in so doing, it also justifies our misgivings concerning the imputation of a common conception of the philosopher's task to Sircello and Weitz. Weitz, we may recall, formulates this task as "the elucidation of the actual employment of the concept of art, to give a logical description of the actual functioning of the concept, including a description of the conditions under which we correctly use it or its correlates".(11) The philosopher's task, then, is to determine standards of correct usage by attending to the 'actual employment' of the concept 'art'. 'Actual usage', if taken to refer to all of the occas-

ions on which a given concept is employed by speakers of the language, will obviously include both correct and incorrect uses. How, then, are we to determine, simply by attention to usage, which uses are the correct ones? In the case of a concept like 'game', this might not prove too difficult. Following Wittgenstein, we might begin by distinguishing certain 'paradigm cases' of instances falling under the concept. Such cases, we might reasonably assume, would be accepted by all speakers of the language as indeed being games. If, on inspecting these cases, we determine that there are no properties common to all of our paradigms, we might conclude that anyone employing the concept 'game' by reference to supposedly necessary and sufficient conditions of 'gamehood' is employing the concept incorrectly. We might then proceed to elucidate the correct employment of the concept by attending to the ways in which it is employed by other speakers of the language on the basis of those 'strands of similarities' found to exist between our 'paradigms'.

When we turn to the concept 'art', however, we may notice a disanalogy with the preceding example. 'Actual usage' of the concept will again presumably include both correct and incorrect uses. Viewed from a different perspective, it will also include the use of the concept by 'common men', practitioners, and philosophers of art. If Weitz and Kennick are correct in their generalisations concerning traditional philosophy of art, at least some of these individuals employ the concept by reference to definitions of art stating necessary and sufficient conditions of arthood. Other individuals, if we are to believe the account given by the same philosophers of the 'logic' of the concept 'art', employ the concept by reference to 'criteria of recognition' which do not provide necessary and sufficient conditions for some-

thing's being art but, rather, specify those 'family resemblances' which exist between artworks. According to Weitz and Kennick, the latter group, but not the former, employ the concept 'art' correctly, and it is the conditions governing their use of the term that must be elucidated by the philosopher. Since the discourse of both groups falls within the confines of 'actual usage', we might enquire as to the justification that can be given for regarding the usage of the first group as incorrect and that of the second group as correct. If the philosopher is to elucidate the conditions under which the concept 'art' is correctly employed by attending to the 'actual employment' of the concept, by what means is he to determine whose usage is to be elucidated? With a concept like 'game', as we saw, we might reasonably appeal to certain 'central cases', but, if Sircello is correct in his claim that there are no purported 'artworks' the arthood of which might not be denied by a competent speaker of the language, there would seem to be no 'central cases' of the concept 'art'. If there are no 'central cases', we cannot determine, by reference to such cases, that there is no property, or set of properties, common to all artworks. What argument can be offered, then, for rejecting any employment of the concept 'art' by reference to a definition as 'incorrect'?

Sircello, like Kennick and Weitz, adopts the Wittgenstinian dictum that the philosopher should 'look and see'. He also agrees that what we should 'look' at is the 'actual employment' of concepts. 'Actual employment' is taken to encompass all those occasions on which a concept is actually used. Certain of these uses may be disregarded, as attributable to simple ignorance of the language. When Sircello examines the remaining uses of the concept 'art', however, he finds no basis in

'actual usage' for any further distinction between 'correct' and 'incorrect' modes of employment. Weitz and Kennick, on the other hand, clearly feel that there is a basis for such a distinction for, while they recognise that the concept 'art' has been employed by reference to a definition of art by certain competent speakers of the language, they disregard such employment when attempting to elucidate conditions of correct usage from the 'actual employment' of the concept. The methodological claim that the philosopher's task is to elucidate the conditions governing the correct employment of the concept 'art' by reference to the 'actual usage' of the concept presupposes, as a condition of its intelligibility, the existence of some criterion for distinguishing between the class of 'correct actual usages', from which the conditions governing correct usage can be elucidated, and the class of 'incorrect actual usages', which the philosopher may justifiably ignore in such an elucidation. The question, then, is what this criterion can be.

If the arguments advanced by Kennick and Weitz are to succeed, the criterion for distinguishing between 'correct' and 'incorrect' usage of the concept 'art' which they require seems to be one that will classify as 'incorrect' any employment of the concept by reference to defining conditions of arthood. Such a criterion would permit them to eliminate from consideration precisely those instances of 'actual usage' which are disregarded in their accounts of the 'logic' of the concept 'art'. But how is this criterion to be justified? If Sircello is correct in his claim that there are no 'central cases' of art, neither the argument attributed to Kennick nor Weitz's 'classification argument' are available. One option, of course, would be to dispute the claim that there are no purported 'artworks' whose arthood might not be denied by com-

petent speakers of the language. Surely, it might be argued, there are some proclaimed 'works of art' whose arthood has never been denied, even by the most radical of theorists, and could never be denied without thereby misusing the concept 'art'. Clearly, the significant claim, here, is the second one, that there are certain purported 'artworks' to which arthood could not be denied without 'misuse of language'. If this claim could be established, we could justifiably disregard any actual denials of arthood to such entities. If, on the other hand, this claim cannot be established, the absence of an actual denial of arthood to certain entities would not confer upon these entities the status of 'central cases' or 'paradigms' in the sense required by Kennick and Weitz; for, if it were claimed, on the basis of an examination of these entities, that there are no properties common to all artworks, it might reasonably be objected, without 'misuse of language', that some of these entities are not, in fact, works of art, and that the remainder, when examined, do share some common property or set of properties. If, however, we have to establish that there are certain entities whose arthood cannot 'correctly' be denied, we run up against the very problem that we are trying to solve, namely, the justification of a criterion of 'correct usage'.

If the preceding argument sounds somewhat sophistic, a more concrete illustration of the problem may make the issue clearer. Suppose that an entity A is offered as a 'central' or 'paradigm' case of art. If A is indeed such a case, then any assertion of the form, 'A is not a work of art', will involve incorrect employment of the concept 'art'. But how is the imputation of 'misuse of language' to one making such an assertion to be supported? Clearly, there would be a misuse of

language if it were a condition for correct employment of the concept 'art' that it should be applicable to certain 'central cases', but to assume that this is so is to beg the question against Sircello, who claims that the 'logic' of the concept involves prescription for, rather than description of , usage. If 'art' is properly used prescriptively, there will be no 'central cases' of art in the required sense, nor will particular ascriptions or denials of arthood be individually accountable to such cases for their 'correctness'. The acceptability of a particular ascription or denial of arthood will depend, rather, on the acceptability of the more general prescription for the employment of the concept 'art' which underlies it. The acceptability of such prescriptions, in turn, will not depend upon their compliance with any specific 'central cases' of art, but upon the reasons that can be offered in support of them. These reasons, pragmatic in nature, must include, perhaps, the applicability of the concept 'art', when employed as prescribed, to at least some of those cases classified as art by alternative prescriptions. If there is no 'overlap' between a proposed prescription and existing alternatives with respect to their compliance-classes, we might justifiably claim that the prescription involves a 'misuse' of the concept 'art'. To appropriate the Wittgenstinian terminology, we might require that an acceptable prescription for the use of the concept 'art' exhibit 'family resemblance' to alternative prescriptions with respect to their respective compliance-classes. But, just as the purported 'family resemblance' between artworks involves no property or properties common to all works, so such 'resemblance' between compliance-classes of prescriptions for the use of the concept 'art' will imply no common members of such classes that might serve as 'central

cases' of art.

If the concept 'art' is correctly employed prescriptively, as Sircello maintains, there will be no entities whose arthood is only deniable through 'misuse of language', and thus no 'central cases' of art. But is the claim that 'art' is correctly employed as a prescriptive term acceptable? Sircello argues for this claim by reference to the 'logic' of the concept as employed by traditional theorists of art. He maintains that such employment is prescriptive in force and that there are no good grounds for rejecting such employment as somehow involving 'misuse' of language. It may be instructive, here, to compare the concept 'art' with the concept 'game'. Proposed 'central cases' for the latter concept - e.g., chess, bridge, and hockey - do seem to be 'central' or 'paradigmatic' in the required sense, in that any theory of the nature of games which could not account for the 'gamehood' of these cases might be rejected for this very reason. When we look at the theory of art, however, we find no such reluctance to accept, and indeed to propose, theories which play equally loose and free with our pre-theoretical classifications. This lends credence to the claim that such theories involve prescriptions for the use of the concept 'art', rather than descriptions of existing usage. The claim that 'game' is a prescriptive concept would have no such credibility. Unless it can be shown that theorists, insofar as they are prescribing a usage for the concept 'art' through a definition of art, are guilty of incorrect employment of the concept, therefore, we cannot reject Sircello's account of the 'logic' of the concept 'art'. We are thus brought back once again to our original problem - how is a criterion of 'correctness' of usage to be established and justified?

If the existence of 'central cases' of art can only be established on the basis of a criterion of 'correct usage', then neither Kennick's argument nor Weitz's 'classification argument', which both require the existence of a class of 'central cases', can be used to justify such a criterion. Kennick, who offers no other argument that might serve as the basis for such a justification, is thus unable to prove that the attempt to provide a definition of art, as found in traditional theories of art, is misconceived. Even if his analysis of the 'logic' of the concept 'art' accurately elucidates the usage of the concept by certain speakers of the language, he cannot justify the claim that this usage, rather than the 'prescriptive' usage described by Sircello, is correct. The tenability of the 'Essentialist Principle', therefore, remains an open question. Weitz, however, has further resources on which he might draw, for he offers not only the 'classification argument' but also the 'generalisation argument' and a more general theory of linguistic functioning, both of which are adduced in support of his contention that 'art' is an 'open concept'. Since an 'open concept' is, by definition, one for which we cannot state necessary and sufficient conditions of application, the 'openness' of the concept 'art' would imply that any employment of the concept by reference to supposedly necessary and sufficient conditions of application would be incorrect. This, of course, is precisely the criterion of 'incorrect usage' that is needed to defuse Sircello's arguments against the existence of a 'central class' of artworks. The required criterion might be justified, therefore, if either the 'generalisation argument' or an argument based upon the more general theory of linguistic functioning could establish the 'openness' of 'art' without appealing to the existence of a 'central class' of works.

It is to a consideration of these other arguments that I shall now turn.

If we exclude the currently inadmissible 'classification argument', the considerations adduced by Weitz in support of the claim that 'art' is an 'open concept' consist of i) the 'generalisation argument', which argues from the 'openness' of certain sub-concepts of art to the 'openness' of the generic concept 'art', and ii) a general theory of linguistic functioning which underlies the definition given of 'openness' as this pertains to concepts. There is, as we shall see, a certain ambiguity in Weitz's notion of conceptual 'openness', and an understanding of his arguments is not facilitated by his failure to distinguish clearly between two senses of this notion. I shall attempt to remedy this deficiency, and then proceed to an examination of the 'generalisation argument'.

I have already quoted Weitz's definition of conceptual 'openness' in outlining the argument of his paper, but, for the purposes of exposition, I shall quote it once again:

> A concept is open if its conditions of application are emendable and corrigible; i.e., if a situation or case can be imagined or secured which would call for some sort of <u>decision</u> on our part to extend the use of the concept to cover this, or to close the concept and invent a new one to deal with the new case and its new property. If necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of a concept can be stated, the concept is a closed one. But this can only happen in logic or mathematics where concepts are constructed and completely defined, It cannot occur with empirically descriptive and normative concepts unless we arbitrarily close them by stipulating the ranges of their uses. (12)

We should, I think, find certain aspects of this definition slightly puzzling. How extensive, for instance, is the field of 'closed' concepts? Does it only encompass concepts in 'logic or mathematics', as is

initially stated, or does it also encompass those empirical concepts which are 'arbitrarily' closed? If it does include this latter class of concepts, how extensive is this class? Whose decision is necessary for such 'closure' to occur? What are the 'conditions of application' of 'open' concepts, if they are not necessary and sufficient conditions? If they are 'criteria of recognition' of the sort described by Weitz, and if a concept, when 'open', is extended by reference to such 'criteria of recognition', in what sense is there the need to 'extend' the conditions of application to incorporate a new entity, since the conditions of application already permit the subsumption under the concept of entities having novel properties, providing that they also share 'family resemblances' with existing instances of the concept?

In the absence of some clarification of these matters, Weitz's claim that 'art' is an 'open concept' seems vulnerable to the sort of criticism levelled against it by Timothy Binkley. According to Binkley, "Weitz's claim turns out to say surprisingly little since he believes only the concepts of logic and mathematics are closed. The indefinability of art is the indefinability of almost every concept we use".(13) Indeed, if 'closed' concepts are to be found only in logic and mathematics, the 'generalisation argument' would seem to be quite redundant, since the 'openness' of the concept 'art' would follow simply from its being an empirical, rather than a logical or mathematical, concept. Weitz's inclusion of the 'generalisation argument', conversely, would seem to indicate that he does not believe that the 'openness' of the concept 'art' is established solely on the basis of a more general thesis that all empirical concepts are 'open', and that Binkley's criticism is therefore misdirected. To clarify Weitz's position, we need to dis-

tinguish between two senses in which a concept might be said to be 'open':

i) The first sense of 'openness' pertains to the possibility that the conditions under which a concept is correctly applied within a given linguistic community, whatever these conditions may be, may require emendation in the face of some instance, the applicability or non-applicability of the concept to which cannot be determined by means of the existing conditions of application. Suppose that we have a concept C which is applied within a given linguistic community by reference to the conditions of application A. If we can 'imagine or secure' an instance n such that it is impossible to determine, by reference to A, whether or not C is correctly applicable to n, the concept C may be said to be '$open_i$'. Any concept for which no such instance n is available will then be describable as '$closed_i$'. If all empirically descriptive and normative concepts, whatever their conditions of application may be at a given time, are vulnerable to the production of such instances, by reference to actual or hypothetical experience, then all such concepts will be '$open_i$'. On the other hand, if the 'constructed and completely defined' concepts of logic and mathematics are non-empirical, and not accountable to the vicissitudes of actual or possible experience, they may not be vulnerable to the production of instances of type n, and will thus be '$closed_i$'. It is in this first sense of 'openness', therefore, that it might be said that only logical and mathematical concepts are closed (i.e. '$closed_i$').

ii) The second sense of 'openness' pertains to the conditions under which a concept is correctly applied within a given linguistic community. A concept C may be said to be '$open_2$' if the conditions of applic-

ation A, governing the correct employment of C within a given linguistic community, do not involve a set of necessary and sufficient conditions which any instance m must meet if C is to be correctly applicable to m. If Wittgenstein is correct in his claim that the concept 'game' is applied to existing games and extended to new ones, not on the basis of any necessary and sufficient conditions of 'gamehood', but on the basis of 'family resemblances', then the concept 'game' will be '$open_2$'. When the conditions of correct application for a concept do refer to necessary and sufficient conditions, on the other hand, the concept may be said to be '$closed_2$'. Those 'empirically descriptive and normative' concepts which are 'arbitrarily' closed by stipulation will thus be '$closed_2$', even if they are '$open_1$'. Consider, for example, the hoary case of the concept 'bachelor'. Leaving aside the alternative meaning of the concept in an academic context, the conditions governing the correct application of 'bachelor' refer to certain necessary and sufficient conditions which anything to which the concept is correctly applicable must meet; a bachelor, as any reader of introductory logic texts will know, must be unmarried, adult, and male. The 'logic' of the concept 'bachelor', in its normal employment by speakers of the language, clearly involves the referring of putative bachelors to a definition of the concept stating these conditions. The concept, then, is not '$open_2$' but '$closed_2$'. It is not '$closed_1$', however, in that it is not difficult to imagine an instance n which would call for some decision as to whether the conditions governing the application of the concept should be emended. Consider, for instance, the 'bachelorhood' or 'non-bachelorhood' of an unmarried, adult hermaphrodite, were one to be produced.

The relevance of the foregoing to Weitz's attempts to show that

'art' is an 'open concept' may already be apparent. That 'art' is '$open_1$' might be established on the basis of arguments for the more general thesis that all empirical concepts are '$open_1$' as a direct consequence of their being empirical. If a philosophical account of the 'logic' of the concept 'art' requires an elucidation of the conditions under which the concept is correctly applied by speakers of a linguistic community, however, the crucial question is not whether 'art' is '$open_1$' but whether it is '$open_2$'. Since some empirical concepts are '$closed_2$', the claim that 'art' is '$open_2$', if this is indeed what Weitz is claiming, would not be inconsequential in the manner suggested by Binkley. Further, the claim that 'art' is '$open_2$' cannot be justified simply on the basis of a more general thesis as to the '$open_1$ness' of all empirical concepts, but requires a consideration of features specific to the functioning of the concept 'art' - hence, it would seem, the need for the 'generalisation argument'. Another point worth noting here, I think, is that the sort of considerations relevant to whether or not a given concept is 'open' seem to differ according to whether one is concerned with '$open_1$ness' or '$open_2$ness'. If an empirical concept's being '$open_1$' is a necessary consequence of its being empirical, it might reasonably be claimed that it is logically impossible for such a concept to be '$closed_1$', and that any attempt to close the concept, by stating necessary and sufficient conditions of application which would be immune from possible emendment, is 'logically vain'. Whether a concept is '$open_2$', on the other hand, would seem to be a pragmatic, rather than a logical, matter. In the case of certain concepts, or in the case of certain contexts where a given concept is employed, it might be desirable to establish with some precision the conditions under which the concept can be

correctly applied. The legal implications of bachelorhood might be adduced as a reason why the concept 'bachelor' is 'closed$_2$'. Even if the 'open$_1$ness' of the concept led us to emend the conditions governing its correct application, we might require that the new conditions, like the old ones, specify necessary and sufficient conditions of application, and that the concept remain 'closed$_2$'. In the case of a concept such as 'game', on the other hand, no such precision is usually required, and thus it might serve our purposes better, as regards the use to which the concept is put, to leave the concept 'open$_2$' and apply it on the basis of 'criteria of recognition' of the sort which Weitz attributes to the concept 'art'.

The 'generalisation argument' purports to show that 'art' is 'open$_2$', and to explain why this is so. In the case of sub-concepts of art, such as 'the novel', it is argued, whether a new 'work' properly falls under a given sub-concept is determined not by reference to necessary and sufficient conditions of 'novelhood', but by reference to 'family resemblances' between existing members of the class of novels and the new 'work' which aspires to membership of that class. The sub-concepts of art are therefore 'open$_2$'. George Dickie has claimed(14) that the 'generalisation argument' is unacceptable because no justification is given for the generalisation from the 'openness' of the sub-concepts of art to the 'openness' of the generic concept 'art'. The generalisation, however, is made on the basis of a purported analogy between the latter and its sub-concepts, and the relevance of this analogy resides in the fact that the respect in which the two are purportedly analogous pertains to precisely that feature of the sub-concepts of art which is taken to explain their 'open$_2$ness'. The reason why a concept

such as 'the novel' is 'open$_2$', according to Weitz, is that 'works' are continually being created which, while they resemble those works already classified under the concept in significant respects, differ from them in significant respects also. That this is so is not, he claims, a merely contingent matter, nor one that might be considered undesirable. It follows, rather, from the very nature of the artist's activity. The artist is not concerned with repeating what has already been done, either in spirit or in letter, but with exploring the possibilities of his medium and expanding the range of artistic achievement within that medium. The artist is essentially a creator, and his creativity consists, at least in part, in the transformation of the art-form of which he is a practitioner. To 'close' a concept such as 'the novel', therefore, would be a singularly futile and possibly harmful endeavour. Suppose, for instance, that an examination of all those works correctly classified as novels at a given time did reveal some common property or properties, and that the possession of this property, or these properties, was taken to be a necessary, or a necessary and sufficient, condition for a work to be correctly classified as a novel. The artist, exercising his creativity, might create a 'work' which, while resembling the existing stock of novels in other respects, did not possess the defining property or properties. If we adhered to our definition and refused to accept the new 'work' as a novel, we would not only frustrate the properly creative endeavours of the particular writer in question, but would also prevent the further development of the artistic possibilities of the medium. If, on the other hand, we emended our conditions of application and attempted to formulate a new set of necessary and sufficient conditions that would incorporate not only existing works but the new 'work' as well,

then, even if such a definition were formulable, we would be faced with the task of further emendation by the very next writer who exercised his creativity in a manner analogous to the first.

It is Weitz's claim that the same factors which render 'ludicrous' the attempt to 'close' any of the sub-concepts of art are operative in the case of the generic concept 'art':

> New conditions (cases) have constantly arisen and will undoubtedly constantly arise; new art forms, new movements will emerge, which will demand decisions on the part of those interested, usually professional critics, as to whether the concept should be extended or not...The very expansive, adventurous character of art, its ever-present changes and novel creations, makes it logically impossible to ensure any set of defining properties. (15)

To 'close' the concept 'art', no less than that of the novel, is therefore "ludicrous, since it forecloses on the very conditions of creativity in the arts".(16) This argument, let it be immediately admitted, is emotionally compelling. In a conflict between Weitz, as the champion of the artist's right to create, and the traditional philosopher of art, wielding his definitions to keep the unruly artist under control, there is little doubt as to which side one's heart, if not one's head, would be on. To take issue with such sentiments as Weitz expresses seems almost churlish. But, since our proper concern is with the logical, rather than the emotional, compulsion of his arguments, take issue we must.

We might begin by questioning the assertion that it is 'logically impossible' to ensure a definition of 'art'. That it is logically impossible for the concept 'art' to be 'closed$_i$' might indeed be reasonably maintained, as we have seen, if it could be shown that all empirical concepts are 'open$_i$'. The considerations adduced by Weitz in support

of his claim, however, indicate that it is the 'closed$_2$ness' of 'art' that concerns him. On what grounds, then, might one hold that a concept's being 'closed$_2$' or 'open$_2$' is a matter of logical, rather than pragmatic, considerations? Clearly, it would seem, the very meaning of the concept in question would have to preclude the concept's being 'open$_2$' or 'closed$_2$' respectively. Weitz's claim, it appears, is that the 'essential open$_2$ness' of the concept 'art' follows from the fact that art is essentially expansive and adventurous, necessarily involving the creation of new works and new art-forms which differ from existing works and art-forms in both the presence of newly significant properties and the absence of those properties previously taken to be central.

But, we might ask, is art <u>essentially</u> 'adventurous' in this sense? We might grant that creativity of this sort, consisting in the challenging of existing conventions in the arts, has been a conspicuous, not to say ubiquitous, feature of the art of the present century. But artists of earlier centuries seem to have manifested such creativity to a lesser extent, and, at times, not at all. Artistic creativity, it would seem, can manifest itself not only in the expansion of the possibilities of a given medium through departures from conventions, but also through the development of the potentialities that exist within existing conventions. Neo-classicist dramatists, such as Racine, working within the strict prescriptions of a neo-Aristotelian theory of tragedy, were nonetheless able to exercise their creativity in producing artworks whose artistic value is a matter of general critical concensus. The 'representational convention' in Western painting from the early Renaissance to the nineteenth century, to give another example, was clearly quite compatible with creativity on the part of those artists working within

this convention. It is not necessary for the point which I am making here that the concept 'painting' was actually 'closed$_2$' during the period in question, nor that being 'representational' was actually taken to be a necessary condition for the concept to be correctly applicable to an entity. The point, rather, is that there seems to be no incompatibility between the concept's being 'closed$_2$' in such a fashion and the capacity of artists to exercise their creativity. Of course, it is a necessary condition for an artist to be creative that what he produces exhibits some form of novelty, some development over what has already been achieved. A painter, working within the representational tradition, might manifest his creativity in his choice as to what should be represented, or as to the artistic materials employed in the representation of an existing subject-matter. If an attempt were made to 'close' the concept 'painting' in all such respects, it might make sense to talk of an incompatibility between such closure and artistic creativity. But this does not support the conclusion that any attempt to 'close' a sub-concept of art will "foreclose on the very conditions of creativity in the arts".

Mutatis mutandis, what has been said concerning the sub-concept of art 'painting' applies also to the other sub-concepts of art and to the concept 'art' itself. If art is essentially creative, the exercise of creativity in the arts need not involve the challenging of those conditions taken by the linguistic community to be central to the arthood of those things already classified as works of art. And if art is not essentially creative in this sense, there is no 'logical impossibility' involved in the attempt to 'close$_2$' the concept 'art'. Whether the concept is 'closed$_2$' within a linguistic community, or whether it

should be 'closed$_2$', will depend upon pragmatic considerations. If, for instance, the concept's being 'closed$_2$' does inhibit the sort of radical creativity that seems to concern Weitz, and if this sort of creativity is held to be of great value, then it might be maintained that the concept should not be 'closed$_2$', even if it is actually 'closed$_2$' in the actual usage of the community. This suggests a further criticism that might be levelled at Weitz's methodological programme for the philosophy of art. If the philosopher's terms of reference only permit him to elucidate conditions of 'correct usage' through the examination of the 'actual employment' of a concept within a linguistic community, it is clearly outside his authority to recommend <u>changes</u> in the usage of that concept, other than changes from 'incorrect' to 'correct' usage on the part of those whose usage departs from the 'logic' of the concept as revealed in the examination of its 'actual employment'. He cannot recommend, as in the example above, that our purposes in respect of a given concept would be better served if we changed the conditions under which the concept is correctly employed. For this reason, Weitz cannot avail himself of the pragmatic argument offered above for the 'open$_2$ness' of 'art'. He avails himself, instead, of the argument from 'logical impossibility' which, as I have argued, is unacceptable.

Suppose, however, that Weitz were to argue that, whatever may have been the case in the past, artistic activity as it occurs in the context of Western culture in the twentieth century <u>is</u> essentially radically creative in the sense discussed above. If the conditions of application of empirical concepts are necessarily 'open$_1$', the philosopher's task of elucidating the 'actual employment' of certain concepts and describing the conditions under which these concepts are correctly employed is

an ongoing one. His task is to elucidate the usage of a given linguistic community at a given time, but the essential mutability of the linguistic practices of a community makes it 'logically impossible' to ensure that any such elucidation will be adequate for all future 'usage' of those concepts with which he deals. It might be admitted that traditional theorists of art, insofar as they were elucidating the usage of the concept 'art' within their own linguistic communities, were correct in specifying necessary and sufficient conditions of application, since the concept 'art' was indeed 'closed$_2$' within those communities. Their error, then, might have been the supposition that these same conditions guaranteed that the concept was not only 'closed$_2$' but also 'closed$_1$'. The 'radical creativity' of modern art, it might be argued, precludes the possibility that 'art' could be 'closed$_2$' within the existing linguistic community; the concept is, in fact, necessarily 'open$_2$' within this community. The very nature of modern art renders 'ludicrous' the attempt to define the concept 'art', since a definition would foreclose on that very form of creativity which is the 'essence' of contemporary artistic achievements.

I am not claiming that Weitz intends his argument to be taken in such a manner, nor even that he would endorse such an argument if it were proposed to him. The question which concerns me is whether 'radical creativity' is indeed incompatible with the concept 'art' being 'closed$_2$', and whether one might thereby justifiably infer, from the claim that art is essentially 'radically creative', the further claim that the concept 'art' is necessarily 'open$_2$'. An answer to this question is of interest, not only in the present context, but also for an evaluation of the position argued for by Timothy Binkley, to be examined

below.[17] Binkley's claim that 'art' is not merely 'open' but 'radically open' will be seen to closely resemble the position which I have just outlined in the name of Weitz.

In attempting to answer the preceding question, I shall make use of a criticism of Weitz's 'generalisation argument' advanced by Maurice Mandelbaum.[18] Mandelbaum's argument , as will soon be apparent, is quite similar to the one developed above against Weitz. It will be convenient to introduce Mandelbaum's treatment of the issue, however, since he develops his criticism on the basis of a more general critique of the Wittgenstinian notion of 'family resemblance', and it is to the implications of this critique for Weitz's elucidation of the 'logic' of the concept 'art' that I shall turn in the subsequent pages. Mandelbaum argues that the 'generalisation argument' is inconclusive because "the question of whether a particular concept is open or closed (i.e. whether a set of necessary and sufficient conditions can be offered for its use) is not identical with the question of whether future instances to which the very same concept is applied may or may not possess genuinely novel properties".[19] What Weitz needs to show, and what he has not shown, is that "every novelty in the instances to which we apply a term involves a stretching of the term's connotation".[20] It is, of course, quite possible to define 'art', or any one of the sub-concepts of art, in such a way that the capacity of an artist to exercise his creativity while remaining within the confines of the definition is severely restricted or, in the limiting case, negated altogether. The extent of the restriction imposed by a definition, as we have seen, will depend upon the degree of specificity involved in the formulation of the conditions governing the correct employment of the concept. If a definit-

ion of 'art' only specifies certain respects in which an artist's product must conform in order to qualify as an artwork, or if those respects in which a putative 'work' must conform are specified in such a way as to allow considerable freedom to the artist, there would seem to be no incompatibility between creativity and definition.

Mandelbaum does not address himself explicitly to the problem of the 'radically creative' artist, but an answer to this problem may perhaps be developed on the basis of certain of his remarks. The 'novelty' of the 'radically creative' artist, it might seem, cannot be encompassed within a definition of 'art' bacause, however unrestrictive the definition may be, it must specify <u>some</u> necessary and sufficient conditions of application, and it is in the violation of precisely these conditions that the creativity of the 'radically creative' artist resides.(21) Mandelbaum suggests a way in which we might reconcile 'radical creativity' with the thesis that 'art' is a 'closed$_2$' concept in observations which he makes on the rationale for including within the arts such activities as photography and the making of motion pictures.(22) Our classifying the latter as art-forms, he claims, is a consequence of their sharing certain characteristics with those things previously classified as art. He enquires, rhetorically, whether they would have been so classified if they had not developed so as to satisfy the same sorts of interests satisfied by the other arts, and if the same standards which are applied to the other arts were not seen to also be relevant to film and photography. The 'shared characteristics' to which he refers are not properties which are, as he terms it, "directly exhibited" by the things possessing them.(23) The property of satisfying a certain sort of interest, for instance, is not a directly observable property of that

which possesses it - indeed, different objects may share such a property while sharing no directly observable properties - but, rather, a property which an object may be said to possess in virtue of the use to which it is put within a culture or community. We can, of course, determine that an object possesses such a property through observing the way in which it is used, but the property is not 'directly exhibited', that is, we cannot determine its presence or absence through an inspection of the object in isolation from such use. Such properties might be termed 'non-exhibited' properties, with the preceding proviso kept in mind.

If a definition of 'art' were to specify conditions of correct application by reference to one or more 'non-exhibited' property of this kind, such a definition might be able to accomodate even the most radical form of artistic creativity. To understand how this might be so, we must recall certain of the conclusions argued for in the examination of traditional theories of art. The formulation of such theories, it was argued, occurred within a methodological framework the constitutive principles of which I have termed the 'Essentialist Principle' and the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance'. The latter principle asserts that a necessary condition for something's functioning as, or being, a work of art is its possession of 'aesthetic properties' capable of eliciting 'aesthetic experience' in receivers. 'Aesthetic experience', in turn, is distinguished by the mode of 'disinterested pleasure' which attends it. Such pleasure, grounded in qualities of the experiential encounter with an object of attention, does not depend upon any particular interests or concerns of the receiver which are satisfied by the object. If 'aesthetic properties' are to elicit experience of this sort, it would seem that they must be properties available in the experiential encoun-

ter with an object, or, in other words, that they must be perceptible properties of the objects which possess them. In Mandelbaum's terminology, then, the 'aesthetic properties' of an object must be 'directly exhibited'. If the possession of 'aesthetic properties' is taken to be at least a necessary condition of arthood, the concept 'art' will be defined at least partly in terms of 'directly exhibited' properties of objects. Traditional theories of art, through the commitment of their authors to the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance', have proposed that theclass of artworks be restricted to those things which 'directly exhibit' certain specified properties. This proposal may be explicit in the definition given of 'art', as in Bell's theory which makes the possession of 'significant form' a defining condition of arthood, or it may be implicitly contained in a definition which refers to the relational properties of artworks, as in certain versions of the 'Imitation' and 'Expression' theories examined in chapter five.

Proposals that the extension of the concept 'art' be restricted to those objects possessing 'directly exhibited' 'aesthetic properties' of a certain kind are clearly incompatible with 'radical creativity' in the arts, but it is not obvious why proposals phrased in terms of 'non-exhibited' properties, and lacking any implicit restrictive force on the 'directly exhibited' properties which an artwork may possess, should also be so incompatible. In the first place, it should be noted that, if artistic appreciation is taken to involve the eliciting of 'aesthetic experience', the 'aesthetic properties' of an artwork will be 'A-relevant$_i$' properties, although it does not necessarily follow that <u>all</u> 'A-relevant$_i$' properties will be 'aesthetic properties'. The claim that possession of 'aesthetic properties' is a necessary condition of art-

hood thus amounts to the claim that possession of certain 'A-relevant$_i$' properties is a necessary 'A-relevant$_2$' property. Traditional theorists, accepting the truth of this claim, have differed in their specifications of <u>what</u> properties are 'A-relevant$_i$' and, thereby, 'A-relevant$_2$'. Secondly, it would seem that 'radical creativity', if its nature and value are to be at least continuous with the nature and value of less radical forms of creativity in the arts, must involve not merely an extension of the class of artworks for its own sake, but also an attempt to secure, through such an extension, the realisation of possibilities for artistic values unobtainable within the conventions which the creative artist transcends. If novelty is a necessary condition of creativity, it is not a sufficient one. Rather, creativity requires significant novelty, and the significance of a novel work, artistically speaking, resides in the appreciative possibilities which it makes available, both in itself and through its influence on the work of other artists. Since the possibilities for appreciation which a work makes available depend upon the 'A-relevant$_i$' properties which it possesses, it is the conventions relating to these properties which the creative or 'radically creative' artist must challenge if his works are to expand the range of artistic experience and not simply engross the ranks of artworks. Any definition of art legitimating these conventions as necessary conditions of arthood will thereby impose certain limits on the creativity of the artist. In an age of 'radical creativity', such limits might reasonably be regarded as unacceptable. Since traditional theorists proposed to restrict the class of artworks to those things possessing certain 'aesthetic properties', and since all 'aesthetic properties' of artworks are, by definition, 'A-relevant$_i$' properties[24], the definitions

of 'art' offered by such theorists might thus be regarded as incompatible with 'radical creativity'.

What, however, of definitions which specify, as 'A-relevant$_2$' properties, not 'directly exhibited' characteristics of objects but properties which are 'non-exhibited'? Suppose that it is claimed that it is a defining condition of application of the concept 'art' that anything correctly classified as art must possess the 'non-exhibited' property n. Is such a definition of 'art' compatible with 'radical creativity'? We might distinguish at least one situation where incompatibility would still seem to exist. It might be the case that, for an object to possess the 'non-exhibited' property n, it must also possess certain specific 'directly exhibited' properties which are themselves 'A-relevant$_i$'. This situation obtains in many of the traditional theories, where 'art' is explicitly defined in terms of 'non-exhibited' relational properties of objects, but the possession of these properties implies the possession of 'aesthetic properties' which are 'directly exhibited'. In Dewey's theory, for example, the defining property of being the product of an act of expression is not 'directly exhibited', but any such product, as an 'expressive object', must possess certain specific 'directly exhibited' properties - it must be a representation of something, for instance, and it must possess 'artistic form'.(25) There is no reason to suppose that the situation in respect of such definitions will be any different from that which was argued to obtain in respect of definitions which explicitly stipulate the possession of 'directly exhibited' 'A-relevant$_i$' properties as a defining condition of arthood. Any restriction placed upon the 'A-relevant$_i$' properties of artworks is, ipso facto, a restriction on the freedom of the artist to create works offering novel possib-

ilities for artistic appreciation. The 'radically creative' artist, as one who seeks to expand the realm of possible objects of artistic appreciation through challenging, rather than working within, existing artistic conventions, will thus be restrained, in the exercise of his creativity, by any attempt to legitimise these conventions as defining properties of art. If, however, a definition of 'art' could be given in terms of some 'non-exhibited' property which neither is itself an 'A-relevant$_i$' property(26), nor implies the possession of any specific 'A-relevant$_i$' property or properties, there would seem to be no restriction placed by such a definition on artistic creativity of even the most radical kind. If the defining conditions of application of the concept 'art' impose no restrictions on the 'A-relevant$_i$' properties which a work may possess, and thus in no way inhibit the artist's exercise of his creativity in the production of works possessing novel 'A-relevant$_i$' properties and thereby offering novel possibilities for appreciation, there would seem to be no good reason for the artist to challenge such conditions. Violation of defining conditions simply for the sake of violation is not creativity.

A number of questions arise at this point. Firstly, can such a definition of 'art' be formulated? Whether it can or not clearly depends upon whether there is any 'non-exhibited' property, or set of properties, which is not 'A-relevant$_i$' and does not imply possession of any specific 'A-relevant$_i$' properties, and which is a necessary, or a necessary and sufficient, condition of arthood. Secondly, if such a definition can be formulated, how is it related to the 'logic' of the concept 'art' as elucidated by Weitz, or to the notion of 'art' as a prescriptive concept advanced by Sircello? Will such a definition be an elucid-

ation of the 'actual usage' of the concept 'art', and, if so, whose usage will it elucidate? Finally, will such a definition, in rescuing the 'Essentialist Principle', compel us to abandon the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance', with which it appears to be incompatible? How could we reconcile the claim that the distinguishing characteristic of artworks is their possession of a 'non-exhibited' property having no bearing on the appreciation of particular works, with the claim that artworks are to be distinguished in terms of the particular mode of 'aesthetic experience' which occurs in the appreciation of individual artworks, and of the 'directly exhibited' 'aesthetic properties' which such artworks possess? Answers to some of these questions will emerge when we examine the 'Institutional Theory' of art in the following chapter, and answers to the others may be forthcoming when we turn to a re-examination of the concept of the 'aesthetic' in part IV below. Prior to this, however, I should like to conclude the present chapter, and prepare the ground for the one following, by examining more closely Mandelbaum's account of definition by 'non-exhibited' properties. This account, developed in the context of a critique of the Wittgenstinian notion of 'family resemblance', has obvious implications for Weitz's attempt to elucidate the 'logic' of the concept 'art' by reference to the conditions under which it is correctly employed. In drawing out some of these implications, I shall fulfil the promise given earlier in this chapter to examine both of the possible 'strategies' that might be employed against Weitz. Thus far I have dealt with the first strategy, and have argued that the methodological programme of elucidating the conditions of correct application of the concept 'art' by reference to the 'actual employment' of the concept is only intelligible on the

assumption that there is some acceptable criterion available for distinguishing between correct and incorrect usage of the concept 'art'. Neither the 'classification argument' nor the 'generalisation argument', so I have argued, can conclusively establish the criterion which Weitz requires to substantiate the claim that the 'actual employment' of the concept 'art' by traditional theorists of art, by reference to defining conditions of arthood, is incorrect, and that the 'actual employment' of the concept by other individuals, by reference to 'criteria of recognition' exhibiting the family resemblance structure of the concept 'art', is correct. The 'classification argument' cannot be utilised in this context without circularity; and the 'generalisation argument' rests upon a conception of art, as essentially 'radically creative', which is neither adequately argued for nor sufficient, even if it could be established, to prove the indefinability of art in the absence of some further argument to show that no adequate definition of 'art' will be forthcoming in terms of 'non-exhibited' properties. I shall now examine a form of the second 'strategy' against Weitz, namely, the claim that his elucidation of the 'logic' of the concept 'art', as it is 'actually employed' outside the context of traditional philosophy of art, is unacceptable.

According to Weitz, the concept 'art' is 'open$_2$' in that no set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the correct employment of the concept can be given. Those things to which the term 'work of art' may be correctly applied share no common property or properties, but are related to one another through those strands of similarity which Wittgenstein termed 'family resemblances'. The 'family resemblance' struct-

ure of the concept 'art' can be explicated in terms of certain 'criteria of recognition', properties the possession of which by an object is relevant to a determination of whether the object is a work of art, in the descriptive sense. While it is a condition of correct application of the concept 'art' fo an entity that the entity meets at least one of these 'criteria', neither any single criterion nor any collection of them is a necessary or a sufficient condition of arthood. If someone ignorant of the correct usage of the concept 'art' were to ask for instruction in the correct employment of the concept, we could not furnish him with any defining conditions of application. We could only proceed by, firstly, attempting to explain the 'family resemblance' structure of 'art' by presenting 'paradigms' of art and pointing to those resemblances between them relevant to their being artowrks, and, secondly, advising him that the applicability of the concept to other entities was to be determined through a comparison with such 'paradigms' in respect of such resemblances. "Knowing what art is", according to Weitz, is having those capacities that we might thereby seek to foster in one professing ignorance about art, the capacities to "recognise, describe, and explain those things we call 'art' in virtue of (their family resemblances)".(27) For most of us, of course, the acquisition of these capacities occurs gradually, and without overt instruction, through exposure to the employment of the concept 'art' within our linguistic community. Coming to know 'what art is', therefore, seems to be equivalent to, or at least a part of, that process described in chapter two as the acquisition of a 'working theory' of art. Through our practical commerce with artworks, and through learning to employ certain terms used within the linguistic community in discourse about such works, we assimilate a framework of

beliefs as to what it is to be, or function as, a work of art. If Weitz is correct, the 'working theory' of art, so acquired, is not an unsystematic and imprecise understanding of the 'essence' of art, requiring clarification through a more systematic theory of art. Rather, in acquiring the 'working theory', one is learning the conditions of correct application of the concept 'art', learning how to identify artworks by reference to the 'family resemblance' structure of 'art', and thus coming to know 'what art is'. The only reason for having recourse to a philosophical account of art, then, might be one's desire to become more explicitly aware of those 'criteria of recognition' that one was already applying.

We might enquire whether the 'knowledge' about art which Weitz attributes to the competent speaker of the language is compatible with the 'working theory' attributed to the 'practitioner' in chapters two and three above. Rather than enter into a necessarily speculative discussion of what the ordinary user of the concept 'art' 'really' believes about art, however, I should like instead to examine a related problem which arises out of Weitz's account of the 'logic' of the concept 'art'. It was argued in chapter three that certain puzzles relating to aspects of artistic and critical practice arise in the context of the 'working theory' attributed to the practitioner, and that the resolution of such puzzles seems to require a more systematic theory of art which will either clarify the assumptions of the 'working theory' or show that one or more of those assumptions is incorrect. If, as Weitz claims, an adequate understanding of 'what art is' can be obtained through an elucidation of the conditions of correct application of the concept 'art' as it is 'actually employed' in the discourse of the linguistic community

we might enquire in what manner such an 'adequate understanding' will resolve the puzzles of artistic practice. Since the classification of such things as forgeries as 'non-artworks' is a feature of the actual employment of the concept 'art' within the artistic community, it is not open to Weitz, as it was to Bell, to reject the problematic aspects of practice as mistaken. Nor can he argue that those assumptions about art implicated in the linguistic practice of members of the artistic community are incorrect, since this would again require that the philosopher go beyond his proper terms of reference in criticising the way in which the concept 'art' is 'actually employed' by the community as a whole. Nor, of course, can he attempt to clarify the assumptions about art implicated in the 'actual employment' of the concept by means of a more systematic theory which renders explicit the underlying 'essence' of art. His strategy, quite obviously, is to deny that the 'actual employment' of the concept 'art' does imply a commitment to those assumptions about the nature of art and artistic appreciation constituting the 'working theory' outlined in chapter three. These assumptions, it will be recalled, were characterised as pre-theoretical formulations of the two methodological principles of traditional philosophy of art. Weitz, whose principal concern is to show that the 'Essentialist Principle' is untenable, is clearly also committed to the view that a pre-theoretical formulation of this principle is not implicit in the 'actual employment' of the concept 'art' in the discourse of the artistic community. Whether he accepts the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance', in either its philosophical or pre-theoretical formulation, is a question still to be examined. It is apparent, however, that the assumptions about art and artistic appreciation implicit or explicit in the 'actual

employment' of the concept 'art' by one who knows 'what art is', on Weitz's account, will differ from those assumptions which were attributed to the practitioner as elements in his 'working theory' of art. The question, then, is whether Weitz's elucidation of the conditions of correct application of the concept 'art' enables us to resolve the artistic puzzlement which was found to arise in the context of the 'working theory'.

'Knowing what art is', it is claimed, is being able to correctly apply the concept 'art' on the basis of 'family resemblances'. The idea that concepts may be applied on such a basis, rather than by reference to any common property or properties taken to be defining conditions, derives from Wittgenstein's discussion of the concept 'game' outlined earlier in this chapter. In attempting to evaluate Weitz's proposal, therefore, we might begin by examining the more general thesis that 'family resemblance' can adequately explain the relationship between different entities classifiable under a common term. A critical examination of this thesis is to be found in the paper by Maurice Mandelbaum to which I have already referred(28); indeed, his arguments against Weitz, outlined above, are specific applications of his more general argument against the 'family resemblance' thesis. 'Family resemblance', in the literal sense, is not, he claims, a matter of simple resemblance in exhibited characteristics of the sort listed by Wittgenstein. Resemblance between different individuals in such exhibited characteristics as "build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc." does not, by itself, constitute a family resemblance. Rather, it is a necessary condition for the application of the term 'family resemblance' that the individuals in question are also genetically related to one another

through biological kinship of a certain degree of proximity. 'Family resemblance' is resemblance in 'directly exhibited' characteristics between individuals who also share the 'non-exhibited' property of being related in such a fashion. Thus, while such individuals may indeed share no common 'directly exhibited' property, they must share a common attribute which is 'non-exhibited'. Mandelbaum suggests that the same situation may obtain with respect to games. 'Family resemblance' between two activities, one of which is a game, is not, by itself, sufficient to establish the 'gamehood' of the other activity. Fortune-telling by means of laying out cards, for instance, exhibits strong 'family resemblance', in its 'directly exhibited' characteristics, to such card games as solitaire, but only the latter activity is properly classified as a game. We might, then, look for some 'non-exhibited' characteristic, analogous to genetic connection in the case of literal family resemblance, which all things properly classified as games must possess. The concept 'game' would be correctly applicable to those things meeting this necessary condition of 'gamehood' and also bearing to one another a relation of 'family resemblance' in their 'directly exhibited' characteristics. The common feature shared by all games, as a necessary condition of application of the concept 'game', might be the purpose for the sake of which games were formulated by their inventors or modifiers. This 'non-exhibited' property, Mandelbaum suggests, might be "the potentiality...to be of absorbing non-practical interest to either participators or spectators".(29)

We may briefly deal with two possible objections to Mandelbaum's argument. In the first place, it might be argued that the tenability of Wittgenstein's thesis as to the 'logic' of the concept 'game' does

not depend upon there being no common attribute of all things which are, or could be, correctly classified as games. Common attributes, even 'directly exhibited' ones, are not difficult to produce. A 'directly exhibited' common attribute of all those games which Wittgenstein himself considers, for instance, is that they are all activities taking place on Earth. However, as Wittgenstein pointed out in his lectures on Aesthetics, "even if there is something common to all games, it does not follow that this is what we mean by calling a particular game a 'game'".(30) The existence of a common attribute of all things classified as 'games' will only count against Wittgenstein if it can be shown that possession of that attribute enters into the 'logic' of the concept 'game' as a necessary condition for the correct application of that concept. This line of reasoning cannot save the 'family resemblance' thesis from Mandelbaum's attack, however, since his argument does not rest merely upon the specification of a common attribute of all things classified as 'games'; indeed, the 'non-exhibited' property which he does specify is only offered as a tentative suggestion as to the common attribute shared by all games. He argues, rather, that the 'logic' of the concept 'game' cannot be elucidated simply in terms of 'family resemblance' in 'directly exhibited' characteristics, since such an elucidation is unable to account for the manner in which the concept is actually employed; for, "if we were to rely exclusively on (directly exhibited characteristics) we should...be apt to link solitaire with fortune-telling, and wrestling matches with fights, rather than (say) linking solitaire with cribbage and wrestling matches with weight-lifting".(31)

A second possible objection to Mandelbaum's argument might be that

he makes the unjustified assumption that 'family resemblance' must relate to 'directly exhibited' characteristics. As Mandelbaum himself notes, however, while Wittgenstein does not explicitly commit himself to such a position, his search for a common attribute of all games is restricted to those characteristics which are 'directly exhibited'. The same applies, as we have already seen, to those characteristics adduced as possible common attributes of individuals possessing family resemblance in the literal sense. Whatever Wittgenstein's position on this matter, however, there seems to be no reason why we should exclude the possibility that 'family resemblance' relationships might exist between a class of entities in respect of certain of their 'non-exhibited' characteristics, although the metaphor of 'family resemblance' might become a little strained in such a context. Such a possibility is not excluded by Mandelbaum, however. His claim is only that, firstly, the absence of any 'directly exhibited' common attribute of all games does not establish that games have no property, or set of properties, in common; and, secondly, 'family resemblance' in 'directly exhibited' properties cannot, by itself, provide an adequate elucidation of the 'actual employment' of the concept 'game'. An adequate account of the 'logic' of the concept must make reference to 'non-exhibited' characteristics, but whether these conditions operate as defining conditions of 'gamehood', or whether they operate through the mechanism of 'family resemblance', is a matter for future analysis to determine.

What implications does Mandelbaum's argument have for Weitz's attempt to elucidate the 'logic' of the concept 'art' in terms of 'family resemblances'? If 'family resemblances' are restricted to 'directly exhibited' characteristics of artworks, there will be obvious problems

analogous to those which attend Wittgenstein's treatment of the concept 'game'. The perfect forgery and the original of which it is a copy share all of their perceptible properties, and thus all of their 'directly exhibited' characteristics. Yet the actual employment of the concept 'art' only classifies the latter painting as a work of art. Exactly the same situation obtains between a 'Readymade' and any other mass-produced artifact of the same design. If 'family resemblance' is a matter of 'strands of similarities' between objects in respect of their 'directly exhibited' characteristics, and if arthood involves 'family resemblance' so defined, then it would seem that both a forgery of the "Mona Lisa" and a snow shovel identical in design to Duchamp's 'work' will be correctly classified as artworks. Our hypothetical 'artistic innocent', following our instructions concerning the proper employment of the concept 'art', would unhesitatingly classify both the forgery and the snow shovel as artworks on the basis of their 'family resemblance' to 'paradigms' of art; yet, if 'actual employment' is the standard of correct usage, he would be misapplying the concept. "Knowing what art is", it would appear, is not as simple a matter as it seems. As Binkley observes, in his criticism of Weitz, "similarities among objects are at best a tenuous guide to arthood. A reproduction of the "Mona Lisa" looks more like 'art' than Duchamp's urinal, but the former is not an artwork, while the latter is".(32)

If the task of the philosopher of art is to elucidate the 'actual employment' of the concept 'art', it would seem, given the above, that an adequate elucidation cannot be given purely in terms of 'family resemblances' in respect of 'directly exhibited' characteristics, since any such account will be unable to explain some of the classifications

which we actually make. Whether this point weighs against Weitz will depend, of course, upon whether he is proposing to elucidate the 'logic' of the concept 'art' in such a fashion. Is Binkley correct in taking the 'strands of similarities' to which Weitz refers to be resemblances in 'directly exhibited' properties? An answer to this question may also help to answer another question raised earlier, namely, whether Weitz accepts the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance'. If arthood is taken to depend upon 'family resemblance' in 'directly exhibited' properties, and if these properties are 'A-relevant$_i$' and are held to operate through their capacity to elicit 'aesthetic experience' in receivers, then artworks would be distinguished from non-works by their possession of 'aesthetic properties'. Such an account would differ from traditional theories of art not in denying that possession of 'aesthetic properties' of some sort is a necessary condition of arthood, but in denying that there are any specifiable 'aesthetic properties' which all artworks possess. The 'aesthetic properties' of a given work will be those 'directly exhibited' properties possessed by the work which are relevant to its functioning as an artwork, i.e., to its eliciting, in receivers engaging in an experiential encounter with it, some experience properly characterisable as 'aesthetic' in the sense distinguished in chapter four. Since artworks will differ in their appreciatable properties (and will differ even in the types of properties offered for appreciation, in the case of 'radically creative' works), there will be no specific 'aesthetic property', or set of such properties, possession of which is either necessary or sufficient for an object to be an artwork. Rather, there will be 'strands of similarities' between members of the class of artworks in respect of those appreciatable properties ('aesthetic prop-

erties') which they possess. If Weitz holds to a position of this sort, he will be committed to the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance', though not to the 'Essentialist Principle'. If, on the other hand, he holds that 'family resemblance' may involve 'non-exhibited' properties, and that an object resembling 'paradigm' artworks in respect of such properties but lacking any 'aesthetic properties' may still qualify as art on the basis of 'family resemblance', then he will be committed to neither of the methodological principles of traditional philosophy of art.

Two considerations might be adduced in support of the claim that Weitz restricts 'family resemblances' between artworks to 'directly exhibited' properties of such works. Firstly, in arguing for the 'family resemblance' structure of the concept 'art', he explicitly identifies his use of the notion of 'family resemblance' with that of Wittgenstein in the latter's analysis of the concept 'game'. As we have seen, Wittgenstein, in this analysis, considers only 'directly exhibited' properties as possible common attributes of all games, and concludes that it is in respect of these properties that games are related through 'strands of similarities'. If Weitz is indeed operating with the Wittgenstinian notion of 'family resemblance', he might also consider that the only relevant similarities are 'directly exhibited' ones. Secondly, Weitz's illustration of the operation of 'family resemblances' in the context of art, in the making of decisions as to whether the purportedly '$open_2$' concept of 'the novel' should be extended to encompass a novel instance, refers only to 'directly exhibited' properties of existing and putative novels.

These two considerations are, of course, hardly conclusive evidence as to Weitz's position. A surer indication may be provided by his

discussion of the 'criteria of recognition', as those conditions of application to which one must refer if one is to correctly employ the concept 'art'. These 'criteria' present, in schematic form, the 'family resemblance' structure of the concept 'art', by specifying the sorts of similarities between objects that are relevant to their being, or not being, works of art. The importance of providing such criteria is immediately apparent when we consider the consequences of leaving unstated the sorts of 'resemblances' relevant to arthood. Put crudely, everything resembles everything else in at least some respects (or, if one espouses a Goodmanian nominalism, in the same number of respects[33]). The claim that the concept 'art' is correctly applied on the basis of 'resemblances' between artworks, and that the arthood of a putative work is to be determined by its resemblance to existing works, is therefore scarcely illuminating unless it is also specified which sorts of resemblances are relevant. The 'criteria of recognition' are intended to provide such a specification for the 'family resemblance' structure of 'art'. They specify the sort of properties which are 'A-relevant$_2$', although none of them is to be regarded as either a necessary or a sufficient 'A-relevant$_2$' property.

Weitz sets out what he takes to be the basic 'criteria' as follows:

> Mostly, when we describe something as a work of art, we do so under the conditions of there being present some sort of artifact, made by human skill, ingenuity, and imagination, which embodies in its sensuous, public medium - stone, wood, sounds, words, etc. - certain distinguishable elements and relations. (34)

It is 'family resemblance' in those respects specified by these 'criteria that is relevant to an object's being a work of art, it is claimed.

Do such resemblances relate to 'directly exhibited' properties of artworks? We may notice, firstly, that the 'resemblances' prescribed by the basic criteria fall into three categories. Artworks resemble one another in: a) being artifacts; b) being made by human skill, ingenuity, and imagination, and c) embodying in their sensuous, public media certain distinguishable elements and relations. We may examine each of these categories of 'resemblance' in turn.

Is artifactuality a 'directly exhibited' property? Dickie(35), as we shall see, claims that it is 'non-exhibited'; but, since Dickie, as we shall also see, holds a somewhat unconventional view of artifactuality, his opinion on the matter may be misleading. It might be argued that artifactuality is 'directly exhibited', since we can easily classify objects as artifacts and non-artifacts on the basis of visual inspection alone. We do not need to observe the process whereby such objects are made to be able to recognise the artifactuality of books, telephones, and clover-leaf intersections; and the non-artifactuality of rocks, plants and insects is equally immediately apparent. Such 'immediate recognition', however, clearly depends upon 'background knowledge' not derivable from direct inspection of the objects in question. It is because we know that books, telephones, and highway intersections are objects designed and constructed to perform specific functions that we are able to 'immediately' classify such objects as artifacts once we have recognised that they are books, telephones, and highway intersections. The important question, then, is whether there are any 'directly exhibited' indications of artifactuality which would permit us to distinguish between artifacts and non-artifacts in a situation where such 'background knowledge' was lacking. Jacques Monod, in his book Chance

and Necessity, has convincingly argued that no "objective and general standards" in terms of 'directly exhibited' properties are available for making such a distinction.(36) Since 'background knowledge' is to be excluded, no assumptions can be made as to the sorts of functions an artifact might be intended to perform; the properties which might serve as a criterion of artifactuality must therefore be structural properties. The obvious candidates, namely, the structural properties of 'regularity' and 'repitition', are inadequate in that they would classify as artifacts such non-artifacts as crystals. Monod concludes his analysis as follows:

> On the basis of structural criteria, macroscopic ones, it is probably impossible to arrive at a definition of the artificial which, while including all 'veritable' artifacts, such as the products of human workmanship, would exclude objects so clearly natural as crystalline structures, and, indeed, the living beings themselves which we would also like to classify among natural systems. (37)

Monod argues for this conclusion by reference to natural objects which resemble 'paradigm' artifacts in those respects taken to be necessary and sufficient conditions of artifactuality. The realm of art, it might be noted, provide further support for Monod's position in the form of artifacts which resemble 'paradigm' natural objects in lacking the supposedly defining conditions of artifactuality. If artifacts are to be distinguished from non-artifacts by reference to the former's possession of the 'directly exhibited' properties of 'regularity' and 'repitition', certain sculptures by Henry Moore, for instance, will clearly be classified as non-artifacts, along with those elementally carved rocks which they perceptually resemble.

If artifactuality is a 'non-exhibited' property, then so is 'being

made by human skill, ingenuity, and imagination'. That a sculpture by Henry Moore possesses the latter property, and that a rock shaped by elemental forces does not, is no more determinable by simple inspection of these objects in isolation from their 'provenance' than is the artifactuality of the one and the non-artifactuality of the other. The first two categories of 'A-relevant$_2$' properties, therefore, specify 'non-exhibited' properties, the possession of which by an object can be adduced in support of the object's being classified as a work of art. Weitz claims, as we have seen, that neither of these properties is to be regarded as either a necessary or a sufficient condition of arthood. I shall examine the argument offered in support of this claim in respect of the 'artifactuality' condition in the following chapter. What should be noted here, however, is that an object's resembling 'paradigm' artworks in respect of these properties alone is clearly not sufficient to justify the extension of the concept 'art' to include that object, if the 'actual employment' of the concept is to be our guide. Any product of human workmanship the production of which requires more than a mere blind following of rules will resemble 'paradigm' artworks in being an artifact produced by human skill, ingenuity, and imagination. This suggests that, even if resemblance to other artworks in respect of the 'non-exhibited' properties prescribed by the first two categories of 'resemblance' is not a necessary condition of arthood, resemblance in respect of those properties prescribed by the third category <u>is</u> necessary. If the third category of 'resemblances' which are 'A-relevant$_2$' prescribes 'directly exhibited' properties which are also 'A-relevant$_i$' and 'aesthetic' properties, Weitz may indeed be committed to the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance' in the manner suggested above.

An object's embodying "in its sensuous, public medium...certain distinguishable elements and relations" is clearly a 'directly exhibited' property of that object. Given what was said in the previous paragraph, It might appear that possession of such a property must be taken to be a necessary condition of arthood if Weitz's 'criteria of recognition' are to elucidate the conditions under which the concept 'art' is correctly employed in its 'actual usage' within the artistic community. For all manner of things which are not classified as artworks in 'actual usage' resemble those things which are so classified in respect of the first two categories of resemblance. If inclusion in, or exclusion from, the class of artworks is determined on the basis of 'family resemblance', and if the relevant resemblances are those prescribed by the 'criteria of recognition', the exclusion of certain things which qualify as artworks in respect of the first two categories of 'resemblance' can only be explained in terms of their failure to qualify in respect of the third category. It follows, then, that if failure to qualify in respect of the third category of 'resemblance' is a sufficient condition for excluding an entity from the class of artworks, qualifying in respect of this category is a necessary condition for being included in that class. This consequence of Weitz's position could only be avoided if there were some further 'criterion of recognition' by reference to which we could explain the exclusion from the class of artworks of entities which qualify in respect of the first two categories of 'resemblance. We might try to utilise, here, those further 'criteria' which Weitz characterises as "quite adventitious", such as the objectification or expression of emotion; but, as was argued in chapter five, theories of art which have proposed such 'criteria' as defining conditions

of arthood seem to require properties of the sort prescribed by the third category of 'resemblance' as the mechanism whereby objectification or expression of emotion is effected.

On what grounds, we might enquire, does Weitz maintain that an object's possessing those properties prescribed by the third category of 'resemblance' is not a necessary condition for that object's being a work of art? The argument offered is the same as that offered for the other 'criteria of recognition', namely, that "we can sometimes assert of something that it is a work of art and go on to deny any one of these conditions", from which it follows that "no one of these (conditions) or any collection of them is either necessary or sufficient".(38) As an example of an assertion of arthood which denies that the entity in question possesses those properties prescribed by the third category, he offers the following: "'X is a work of art and...exists only in the mind and not in any public observable thing'...(is) sensible and capable of being true in certain circumstances".(39) This example is a little perplexing, however. The general thesis of Weitz's paper, as we have seen, is that the business of the philosopher of art is to elucidate the 'actual employment' of the concept 'art' and to describe the conditions under which it is correctly applied. The intelligibility of this programme, it has been argued, presupposes that there is some criterion for distinguishing between correct and incorrect usage. Whether justifiably or not, Weitz rejects, as incorrect, the employment of the concept 'art' on the basis of supposedly defining conditions of arthood, as found in the writings of traditional theorists of art. The standards of correct usage, he claims, are to be found in the 'actual employment' of the concept 'art' within the artistic community. But can we find, in

the artistic community's employment of the concept, any usage of 'art' to refer to something existing 'only in the mind'? Of course, 'art' is used in this way by such traditional theorists as Croce, but this is hardly relevant to Weitz's argument. Traditional theorists, he claims, employed the concept 'art' incorrectly in certain respects. On what basis can we assume that Croce's use of the concept to refer to things existing 'only in the mind' is correct? Such an employment would surely be regarded as incorrect, or at best as an unfortunate way of saying something correct, by those members of the artistic community to whom Weitz is appealing for his standards of 'correct' usage.(40)

Furthermore, it is difficult to see how the concept 'art' could be applied on the basis of 'family resemblances' to things existing 'only in the mind'. In what respects would such 'works' resemble artworks existing in a physically embodied form, if such be admitted? Clearly, if existing in the mind is not to be a necessary condition of arthood, some artworks must be physical entities. The only obvious 'family resemblance', given Weitz's 'criteria of recognition', might be that both physical and 'mental' artworks are products of human ingenuity, skill, and imagination. But resemblance in this respect, as we have already seen, is insufficient to account for those distinctions made in the 'actual employment' of the concept 'art'. The only way to resolve this difficulty within Weitz's framework, I think, is to argue that 'mental' artworks are distinguished from other physical and mental products of human ingenuity, etc., by their embodiment, albeit in 'mental' form, of "certain distinguishable elements and relations". Such embodiment, then, whether physical or not, appears once again to constitute a necessary condition of arthood. The 'distinguishable elements and relations'

which a work embodies, whether 'directly exhibited' in a physical artwork or, presumably, 'directly exhibited to introspection' in a 'mental' work, would seem to be those properties to which one attends in appreciating the work. If Weitz holds that appreciation involves some form of 'aesthetic experience', then these properties will be 'aesthetic properties'. Since, as I have argued, Weitz's position is only defensible if it is assumed that possession of some 'aesthetic properties' of this sort is a necessary condition of arthood, he would seem to be committed to the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance' in the form suggested above. Although his 'criteria of recognition' include certain 'non-exhibited' characteristics, the 'family resemblances' which serve to distinguish artworks from other things in the 'actual employment' of the concept 'art' must include 'directly exhibited' 'aesthetic properties' of objects.

Binkley's criticism of Weitz, then, while it oversimplifies the latter's conception of 'family resemblance', is essentially correct. That this is so is readily apparent when we consider whether Weitz's 'criteria of recognition', as elucidated above, enable him to account for those classifications which are made in 'actual usage' with respect to such puzzling cases as forgeries, non-artifactual artworks, and 'Readymades'. Non-artifactual artworks, it would seem, present little difficulty, since artifactuality is not taken to be a necessary condition of arthood. Non-artifacts may qualify as artworks through their resemblance to other, artifactual artworks in respect of the third category of resemblance. In the case of forgeries, however, Weitz's inclusion of 'non-exhibited' characteristics among his 'criteria' is of little help in overcoming the problems faced by a 'family resemblance'

account explicated purely in terms of 'directly exhibited' properties. In respect of the latter, the forgery clearly resembles the original in the strongest possible sense. The two paintings also resemble one another in respect of artifactuality. The second category of 'resemblance' seems to offer a more promising basis for distinguishing between the paintings in 'A-relevant$_2$' respects, since it would seem that, even if both 'works' require skill for their execution, the original, but not the forgery, requires ingenuity and imagination on the part of the painter. Of course, producing an indistinguishable copy of a given painting poses problems of its own, and solving these problems will require ingenuity and imagination on the part of the forger. But even if the two paintings could be distinguished in terms of the second category of 'resemblance', this would not, by itself, necessarily justify excluding the forgery from the class of artworks, since resemblance of this kind is not held to be a necessary condition of arthood on Weitz's analysis. Given the resemblance in other relevant respects, should we not accept the forgery as an artwork anyway?

The difficulties facing Weitz's account are most glaringly apparent when we attempt to account for the arthood of 'Readymades'. Duchamp's urinal and another urinal of the same design are both artifacts, the making of which required equal skill, ingenuity, and imagination. Furthermore, they possess identical 'directly exhibited' properties and embody identical 'distinguishable elements and relations'. One urinal is an artwork, however, and the other is not. If the term 'work of art' in the descriptive sense is applied or withheld by reference to those 'criteria of recognition' specified by Weitz, such a distinction seems quite unintelligible. It would appear that, as Binkley asserts(41),

"two things can differ in nothing but the presence of arthood". What, then, is the 'logic' of the concept 'art', that it permits of such application? What is the property of 'arthood' which Duchamp's urinal possesses and the other urinal lacks? Reflection on such questions, and on the possibility of defining 'art' in terms of some 'non-exhibited' property of artworks, underlies the 'Institutional Theory' of art advanced by George Dickie. In the following chapter, therefore, I shall turn to an examination of this theory.

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Chapter Nine The 'Institutional Theory' of Art

Goodman's observations on artistic puzzles, quoted in chapter one, that "answers to them do not amount to an aesthetic theory...(but) failure to answer them can well be the end of one", begin to have an ominous ring of truth, given our findings thus far in this paper. Weitz, in spite of his methodological heresy, seems no better equipped to deal with our puzzlement concerning the artistic status of forgeries and 'Readymades' than traditional theorists such as Bell. Tolstoy, as we saw, can at least provide a measure of explanation of our treatment of forgeries, by reference to the 'non-exhibited' 'A-relevant$_2$' property of the artist's intention to transmit experienced feelings, but this 'solution' to the puzzle of forgeries requires considerable revisions in other aspects of our pre-theoretical classifications, and also seems unable to render intelligible the arthood of 'Readymades'. Of course, if we adopt Sircello's view that 'art' is an essentially prescriptive concept and that, consequently, there is no theory-independent class of judgements about arthood to which an acceptable account of art must conform, then it might be no more permissible to demand that an artistic theory explain the arthood of 'Readymades' and the non-arthood of forgeries than to demand that it complies with any other of our specific pre-theoretical classifications. This might even be extended to Weitz's account of art, if we take him, as Sircello takes Kennick, to be merely part of the 'battle' he purports to describe, offering a 'covert' prescription disguised as a description of correct usage. There is reason to think, however, that, at least in respect of the puzzles concerning forgeries and 'Readymades', the suggestion that such problems be dis-

missed on the basis of a Sircellian conception of the 'logic' of the concept 'art' is really a counsel of despair. In the first place, the consequences of a theory's failing to exclude forgeries from the class of artworks are much more radical than those which might be expected to attend any other 'prescription' which it might reasonably make. The 'reasonableness', or acceptability, of a prescription, it will be recalled, depends upon its exhibiting 'family resemblances' with other prescriptions in respect of those things pre-theoretically classified as art. A theory which countenances forgeries as bona fide artworks threatens to engross the class of visual artworks with the duplicates, triplicates, etc., of all those things pre-theoretically classified as visual works of art. If such radical variance from pre-theoretical classifications is deemed 'reasonable', we might enquire what sort of prescription could be rejected as 'unreasonable'. 'Readymades, it might seem, pose less of a problem, since the exclusion of such putative works requires only marginal revisions in the 'accepted' class of artworks. The difficulty here, however, is that, as will be seen, none of the prescriptions thus far examined seems able to account for the arthood of 'Readymades. While it might reasonably be claimed that there are no 'central cases' of art with which every acceptable theory of art must comply, the existence of certain presumed 'works' with which none of the proffered 'prescriptions' comply suggests that there may be something wrong with the 'prescriptions'. With this possibility in mind, we might enquire why, if it is indeed the case, the arthood of 'Readymades' proves to be so elusive for the theories thus far considered.

A reasonable, if somewhat uninformative, answer to the question, 'What is Art?', might be that art is a human activity productive of a

certain type of object. From this admittedly unpromising beginning, one might attempt to develop a more adequate account of art by distinguishing it from other human activities in terms of the kind of object which is produced. An answer to the question as to what art is, one might assume, is to be arrived at through a specification of what it is to be a work of art. Artworks might be distinguished from non-works by reference to a particular function which they perform, or to particular properties which they possess relative to the performance of such a function. This, as we have seen, is the methodological approach adopted by traditional theorists of art. Such theorists have sought to define art in terms of some essential functions performed, or some essential properties possessed, by all and only works of art. The functioning of artworks has been taken to involve the eliciting of a mode of 'aesthetic experience', and the capacity to perform this function has been taken to depend upon the possession of certain 'directly exhibited' 'aesthetic properties'. Any attempt to elucidate the nature of art in such a fashion involves an explicit or implicit commitment to the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance' and the 'Essentialist Principle'. Weitz, arguing that there are no defining conditions of arthood, rejects the 'Essentialist Principle' but, as was argued in the previous chapter, he seems to retain a commitment to the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance'. Artworks are to be distinguished from non-works by reference to the 'directly exhibited' 'aesthetic properties' which they possess, but there are no specific 'aesthetic properties' which are either necessary or sufficient conditions of arthood. Artworks are related to one another through 'family resemblances' in respect of both 'directly exhibited' and 'non-exhibited' properties, but, given the 'non-exhibited' proper-

ties specified by Weitz, resemblance in respect of at least some 'directly exhibited properties' appears to be a necessary condition of application of the concept 'art', if Weitz's 'criteria of recognition' are to have any hope of elucidating the 'actual employment' of the concept within the artistic community.

If puzzlement concerning the artistic status of 'Readymades' and forgeries is not resolved through a rejection of the 'Essentialist Principle', we might consider the possibility that the trouble lies in that other methodological principle espoused by both the traditional theorists and by Weitz himself, namely, the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance'. Indeed, as we may recall, it was those 'working' assumptions about art underlying the latter principle that were found to be implicated in artistic puzzlement through their apparent incompatibility with those aspects of practice deemed to be puzzling. It might be that the hope, expressed earlier, that our puzzlement could be resolved through a clarification of these assumptions in a more systematic theory of art was over-optimistic. For, we might now ask, in what manner could the arthood of 'Readymades', or the non-arthood of forgeries, be accounted for if the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance', as the technical formulation of these assumptions, is accepted? According to this principle, as traditionally understood, artworks are to be distinguished from other things by reference to those 'directly exhibited' 'aesthetic properties' which they possess. The significant 'A-relevant$_2$' properties, on this account, are certain 'directly exhibited' 'A-relevant$_i$' properties. These properties are the 'significant' ones, in respect of 'A-relevance$_2$', in that, while other properties, such as artifactuality, may be necessary 'A-relevant$_2$' conditions, it is the possession of 'aesthetic

properties' which is held to differentiate artworks from other things belonging to the genus 'artifact'. Possession of such properties, as the 'essence' of arthood, is thus the proper focus of attention for the philosopher seeking to explain what it is to be a work of art. In the case of 'Readymades' and forgeries, however, we appear to have differences in arthood co-existing with sameness in 'aesthetic properties'. Even if the possession of 'aesthetic properties' were to be a necessary condition of arthood, therefore, it would seem that it cannot be the 'essence' of arthood in the required sense. If this is so, then the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance', which explicitly asserts the contrary, must be incorrect.(1)

In the remainder of this chapter, and in the following chapter, I shall examine the views of two writers who have maintained that an adequate account of what it is to be a work of art can only be given if we reject the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance' and concentrate, instead, on certain 'non-exhibited' characteristics of artworks. George Dickie, as we shall see, argues that, by giving up this principle, it becomes possible to reinstate the 'Essentialist Principle' rejected by Weitz. Timothy Binkley, on the other hand, argues for the rejection of both principles of traditional methodology. Both writers, in arguing that arthood is a matter of 'non-exhibited', rather than 'directly exhibited', properties of artworks, draw heavily upon those problematic aspects of certain recent works, such as 'Readymades', which I have already touched upon a number of times in the preceding pages. Binkley is the more forthright of the two in advocating the rejection of the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance' on the basis of such considerations:

> Since (Baumgarten), 'aesthetics' has become almost a synonym for 'philosophy of art' and the philosophy of art has become handmaiden to aesthetics. The focal point for philosophy of art under the rule of aesthetics is the perceptual object (or at least the experienced aesthetic object, since literature is not perceived)...Aesthetics is a study of aesthetic qualities, and aesthetic qualities are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of arthood. Aesthetic qualities can be ascertained in things which are not works of art. They underlie the pursuit of Beauty in both art and nature, and hence establish no guarantee of the presence of arthood. They are not a sufficient proof of art status. Neither are they necessary, as Duchamp has demonstrated with the Readymade. When he removed an ordinary snow shovel from the hardware store and titled it "In Advance of the Broken Arm", no aesthetic qualities were changed. The work of art and the work of industry preceding it have identical aesthetic qualities which have nothing to do with the emergence of art...The family resemblance approach to art falters at the same step which brings down definitions: both make the fundamental error of aesthetics, which is to suppose that arthood is a function of (aesthetic) properties of objects. (2)

If arthood is not a function of 'aesthetic properties' of objects, we might enquire what it is a function of, according to Dickie and Binkley. If we rule out the unlikely possibility that it is a function of some 'directly exhibited' but non-aesthetic property, we may conclude that the distinguishing feature of artworks is to be taken to be a 'non-exhibited' characteristic analogous to that which Mandelbaum offers as a defining condition of 'gamehood'. We might then enquire further what sort of 'non-exhibited' characteristic Dickie and Binkley are proposing in the case of art, and whether this characteristic is intended to elucidate the 'logic' of the concept 'art' as that concept is 'actually employed' within the artistic community. Taking the second point first, both writers explicitly commit themselves to a Weitzian conception of the proper business of the philosopher of art. The philosopher's task is to elucidate the 'actual usage' of the concept 'art', and to account

for those judgements of arthood and non-arthood, and the resultant classes of artworks and non-artworks, to be found in the linguistic practice of the artistic community. Dickie asserts that "a theory of art must preserve certain central features of the way we talk about art"(3), while Binkley, having argued a point by reference to certain works of 'conceptual art', justifies his classification of such pieces as art on the following grounds:

> They are made (created, realised, or whatever) by people considered artists, they are treated by critics as art, they are talked about in books and journals having to do with art, they are exhibited in or otherwise connected with art galleries, and so on...When we philosophise about art, we initially decide what to talk about by looking to artists, critics, and audiences, just as in the philosophy of science we initially decide what to study by looking to scientists. (4)

As to the sort of 'non-exhibited' characteristic which is to account for the arthood of an object, both Dickie and Binkley propose that the difference between artworks and non-works is that the former, but not the latter, have been 'made' art by the performance of what might be termed an 'artistic act'. If art is a human activity productive of a certain kind of object, then, so it is claimed, an understanding of what it is to be a work of art requires a clarification of the activity which produces artworks, rather than an attempt to determine some common property or purpose in the things produced. Of course, certain traditional theorists have focussed their attention on the activity of the artist. Dewey, for instance, distinguishes artworks from non-works in terms of the 'act of expression' necessary for the production of an 'expressive object'. While the act of 'expression' which produces an artwork is not itself a 'directly exhibited' properyt of the object,

however, the 'non-exhibited' property of having been produced by such an act implies the possession of those 'directly exhibited' properties characteristic of the'expressive object'. Clearly, if artworks are taken to result from the performance of a certain kind of 'artistic act', and if the performance of such an act endows its product with specific 'directly exhibited' properties, the philosopher seeking to elucidate the nature of arthood may justifiable choose to focus on the 'directly exhibited' properties of the products, rather than on the 'non-exhibited' 'artistic acts' which produce them. Further, any theory construing 'artistic act' in this fashion will be unable to account for the arthood of 'Readymades', which, as Binkley points out, are endowed with no 'directly exhibited' properties by the actions of the artist.(5)

If an elucidation of the nature of arthood in terms of 'artistic acts' involves a rejection of the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance' as a means to resolving the puzzle of 'Readymades', therefore, 'artistic acts' cannot be explicated in such a way that the 'non-exhibited' property of 'being the product of an artistic act' implies the possession of any specific 'directly exhibited' characteristics. What Dickie and Binkley have in mind, rather, is the kind of 'artistic act' implicated in Donald Judd's assertion that "if someone calls it art, it's art".(6) Judd's assertion is clearly unacceptable as it stands, if it is intended as a description of the 'actual employment' of the concept 'art'. We require at least a clarification of what is involved in 'calling it art', and of whether 'calling it art', so clarified, is being proposed as a necessary and sufficient, or merely as a sufficient, condition of arthood. If 'calling it art' requires an explicit assertion of the form, "This is art", in respect of an object, many accepted artworks would

either fail to be art or would only become art some time after their creation, when someone happened to utter the magic formula. 'Calling it art', construed in this sense, would not even be acceptable as a sufficient condition of arthood, it would seem, since one who was in the process of learning the language might utter the art-making formula by mistake, confusing the term 'art' with some other term in the language. We might stipulate that the formula only works for speakers who know 'what art is', or who correctly grasp the meaning of the concept 'art', but this will hardly be helpful since 'what art is' is precisely the issue in question. Knowing 'what art is' can hardly be knowing that 'art' is whatever anyone calls 'art'. Nor is the situation much better if 'knowing what art is' is taken to involve a familiarity with the 'actual employment' of the concept 'art' within the artistic community. If I am reasonably familiar with the sort of things to which the term 'work of art' is correctly applied within the artistic community, and I now assert "This is art" of the paper on which I am currently typing, do I thereby create a work of art? Is it a matter, perhaps, of the tone of voice employed (hushed and reverent), or of my mental state (fixed attention on the piece of paper, willing it to transmute from base matter into art)? Or does the formula only work if I am an artist? Does an artist like Duchamp possess a sort of 'Midas touch', such that everything of which he says "This is art" becomes art? If so, how does one acquire this marvellous capacity? One cannot become an artist <u>by</u> producing a work of art, it would seem, since one can only create art, on this account, if one is already an artist.

If arthood is taken to depend upon the performance of 'artistic acts', and if an 'artistic act' is an act of 'calling it art' such that,

as Binkley asserts[7], "'calling it art' makes it so", then, as the preceding barrage of questions may suggest, the notion of 'calling it art' will require considerable clarification if we are to resolve, rather than compound, our artistic puzzlement. In the following pages, I shall examine the attempts of Dickie and Binkley to provide such clarification. Since Binkley develops his position partly through a critical discussion of certain aspects of Dickie's theory, I shall begin by outlining the latter. After considering certain problems arising out of Dickie's position, soem of which are raised by Binkley, I shall turn, in the following chapter, to Binkley's alternative conception of the nature of those 'artistic acts' held to be constitutive of arthood. I shall then conclude this part of the paper by considering whether 'artistic acts', as conceived by Dickie and Binkley, can adequately account for the arthood of works of art, and whether the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance' can be dispensed with as easily as they suggest.

In his book, Art and the Aesthetic, and in a number of earlier publications, Dickie develops an 'artistic act' theory of art which he terms the 'Institutional' theory.[8] As Dickie explicitly indicates, the roots of the Institutional theory are to be found in the writings of two other contemporary philosophers, Maurice Mandelbaum and Arthur Danto. Mandelbaum, as was seen in chapter eight, argues that Wittgenstein's 'family resemblance' thesis fails to take proper account of 'non-exhibited' properties of objects, and suggests that Weitz's 'family resemblance' account of the'logic' of the concept 'art' may suffer from similar inadequacy. Dickie, who himself engages in critical combat with Weitz's anti-Essentialist arguments, adopts Mandelbaum's suggest-

ion that 'art' may be definable in terms of some 'non-exhibited' property, and attempts to specify what that property is. In so doing, he appropriates from Arthur Danto the term 'artworld'. Danto coined the term 'artworld' in a paper appropriately titled "The Artworld", and has developed the notion in his subsequent writings.(9) In his original paper, Danto's principal concern was to explain the arthood of certain contemporary artworks, such as Warhol's "Brillo Boxes", and to throw light on the difficulty we might have in appreciating such 'works' as art. Appreciating contemporary artworks of this kind, he claimed, is not simply a matter of 'looking and seeing'. Rather, "to see something as art requires something the art cannot descry - an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art: an artworld".(10) Further, Danto claimed that the existence of an 'artworld', so defined, is not only a necessary for our appreciating certain modern artworks, but also a necessary condition for the existence of artworks in general:

> Telling artworks from other things is not so simple a matter...and these days one might not be aware that he was on artistic terrain without an artistic theory to tell him so. And part of the reason for this lies in the fact that terrain is constituted artistic in virtue of artistic theories, so that one use of theories, in addition to helping us discriminate art from the rest, consists in making art possible. (11)

I shall not pursue, in the present context, the implications of Danto's conception of the role which theories play in the creation and appreciation of works of art, although it should be immediately apparent that the truth of Danto's claims would have profound repercussions not only for the problem of 'Readymades' but also for the notion of 'aesthetic experience' and, thereby, for the 'Principle of Aesthetic

Relevance'. Postponing such considerations, I shall merely note an important respect in which Danto's conception of the 'artworld' differs from that of Dickie. For Danto, the term 'artworld' refers primarily to the ambience within which artworks are appreciated and created. The principal denizens of the 'artworld' are theories of art and artworks which testify to what has already been achieved. Persons inhabit the 'artworld' primarily in their capacity as epistemological subjects, knowers of art history and of theories of art. For Dickie, on the other hand, the term 'artworld' refers to "the broad social institution in which works of art have their place", where 'institution' is to be understood in the sense of 'established practice' rather than that of 'established society or corporation'.(12) The 'artworld' is composed of a number of 'systems', corresponding to the various art-forms, each of which functions, through its established social practices, as "a framework for the presenting of particular works of art".(13) The principal denizens of the 'artworld' are those persons in whom these presentational practices are embodied, referred to by Dickie as the 'presentation group' and consisting of "artists whose activity is necessary if anything is to be presented, the presenters (actors, stage managers, and so on), and the goers whose presence and cooperation is necessary in order for anything to be presented".(14) The knowledge required to be a member of the 'presentation group' is not, it would appear, a knowledge of art history or artistic theory, but, rather, that knowledge necessary to perform a particular role within the institutional framework:

> All of these roles (i.e. those pertaining to the presentation group) are institutionalised and must be learned in

> one way or another by the participants. For example, a theatre-goer is not just someone who happens to enter a theatre; he is a person who enters with certain expectations and knowledge about what he will experience and an understanding of how he should behave in the face of what he will experience. (15)

Dickie, like Danto, holds that the existence of an 'artworld' is a necessary condition for the creation and appreciation of works of art. Given his conception of the 'artworld' as a social institution, it follows directly that art is 'essentially institutional', i.e., that there can be no artworks in the absence of an institutional framework of the sort which he describes. Danto, on the other hand, is only indirectly committed to such a view, to the extent that he conceives an institutional framework to be a necessary condition for the formulation and transmission of artistic theories and the preservation of an artistic heritage. Dickie argues for the 'essential institutionality' of art by reference, firstly, to practice in the theatre, and, secondly, to the 'Readymade' tradition initiated by Duchamp. He claims that the theatre, conceived as "an established way of doing and behaving", has retained its identity from Greek times to the present day, in spite of its being associated with different institutions within society at different times in its history. Plays exist within, and only within, those social practices which constitute the theatre, so conceived:

> The roles of the actors and the audience are défined by the traditions of the theatre. What the author, management, and players present is art, and it is art because it is presented within the theatreworld framework. Plays are written to have a place within the theatre system and they exist as plays, that is, as art, within that system. (16)

It might be objected that, in drawing upon the theatre to illust-

rate the 'essentially institutional' nature of art, Dickie is attempting to generalise on the basis of an unrepresentative sample. Theatre, by its very nature, requires a 'presentation group', and thus an institutional framework, in order to exist, but it is not obvious why other art-forms, such as painting, sculpture, and literature, could not exist in the absence of either such a group or such a framework. Possibly aware of the questionable validity of any attempt to generalise from theatre to the other arts, Dickie argues for the 'institutional essence of art' by reference to the visual arts, and, more specifically, the Dadaist exploits of Duchamp and friends. Reflection on Duchamp's 'Readymades', it is claimed, reveals "a kind of human action which has until now gone unnoticed and unappreciated - the action of conferring the status of art".(17) It is the possession of the 'non-exhibited' property of status as a work of art, conferred upon an object by an 'artistic act' of status conferral, which constitutes the arthood of an artifact, and which differentiates Duchamp's 'Readymades', which are works of art, from other mass-produced artifacts of the same design, which are not. Possession of 'directly exhibited' 'aesthetic properties', while it may be a universally accompanying characteristic of all traditional and many modern works of art, is not a defining condition of arthood, a fact which only becomes apparent in the presence of works such as those of Duchamp. By creating art without, at the same time, creating an object with manifest 'aesthetic properties', he revealed the 'non-exhibited' property of status, and the 'artistic act' of status-conferral, normally obscured by the more obvious 'directly exhibited' properties of artworks, as the true 'essence' of arthood:

> Painters and sculptors...have been engaging all along in the action of conferring (the status of art) on the objects they create. As long, however, as the created objects were conventional, given the paradigms of the times, the objects themselves and their fascinating exhibited properties were the focus of attention of not only spectators and critics but of philosophers of art as well. When an artist of an earlier era painted a picture, he did some or all of a number of things: depicted a human being, portrayed a certain man, fulfilled a commission, worked at his livelihood, and so on. In addition he also acted as an agent of the artworld and conferred the status of art on his creation. Philosophers of art attended to only some of the properties the created object acquired from these various actions, for example, to the representational or to the expressive features of the objects. They entirely ignored the non-exhibited property of status. When, however, the objects are bizarre, as those of the Dadaists are, our attention is forced away from the object's obvious properties to a consideration of the objects in their social context. (18)

The "bundle of systems" which constitute the 'artworld', therefore, as frameworks for the presenting of particular artworks, furnish the essential "institutional background for the conferring of the status (of art) on objects within (their) domain".[19] It might still be unclear why an "institutional background" is necessary, and why art is thereby 'essentially institutional', even if it be admitted that the 'non-exhibited' property of 'status' as art is the defining condition of the arthood of an object. Why is it that the artist cannot confer this status on his creations in the absence of the sort of framework of social practices specified by Dickie? To answer this question, we need to clarify Dickie's conception of the 'status of art' which is conferred. The 'status of art', he claims, is the status of 'candidate for appreciation'. 'Appreciation' takes place within the context of the social practices of a given system of the 'artworld', and, more specifically, within the context of a presentation group which functions as a framework for presenting artworks <u>for</u> appreciation. To be a 'candid-

ate for appreciation' is to be eligible for presentation within such a context. Since the notion of the 'status of art' cashes out in terms of eligibility for presentation within the 'artworld', the existence of an 'artworld', as 'institutional background', is a necessary condition for the conferral of artistic 'status' to occur, and thus for something to possess that 'status'. Art is thus 'essentially institutional'. To act as a conferrer of artistic 'status', furthermore, one must have knowledge of the social practices governing the presentation of artworks within the relevant system of the 'artworld'. According to Dickie, only one person, usually the artist himself, is required to perform the 'artistic act' of status-conferral, but a number of persons are needed to constitute the institutional framework necessary to define the status which is thereby conferred.(20)

On the basis of the preceding considerations, and of further arguments, to be examined below, for the necessary artifactuality of artworks, Dickie offers a definition of 'work of art', in the 'classificatory sense' (Weitz's 'descriptive' sense), in terms of two non-exhibited properties taken to be individually necessary and collectively sufficient conditions for an object's being a work of art:

> A work of art in the classificatory sense is (1) an artifact (2) a set of the aspects of which has had conferred upon it the status of candidate for appreciation by some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the artworld). (21)

We may note here that Dickie's formulation of his second condition is slightly amended in the version quoted above (from Art and the Aesthetic) from that given in his earlier work, Aesthetics: an Introduction. In the latter work, he proposes that 'work of art' in the classificat-

ory sense be defined as "(1) an artifact (2) upon which some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the artworld) has conferred the status of candidate for appreciation".(22) The two definitions differ in that, in the later version, it is a 'set of aspects' of an artifact, rather than the artifact itself, which receives the status of 'candidate for appreciation'. The significance of this distinction will emerge when we examine the second condition below. Before doing this, however, I shall consider the 'artifactuality' requirement established by the first condition in Dickie's definition, and the arguments which Dickie offers for such a requirement.

Dickie's 'artifactuality' condition is developed and defended almost entirely as a response to Weitz's argument, cited in the previous chapter, that artifactuality is not a necessary condition of arthood. In fact, as I shall try to show, the philosophical exchange between Weitz and Dickie on the question of the artifactuality of artworks is conspicuously inconclusive, with neither party really coming to terms with the problems involved.(23)

Weitz's argument against an 'artifactuality' requirement for art, it will be recalled, is part of the 'classification argument', which purports to show that there are no necessary or sufficient conditions for the correct application of the concept 'art'. 'Artifactuality' is one of Weitz's 'criteria of recognition', the denial of any of which to an object, so it is claimed, is compatible with its being correctly classified as a work of art. That arthood can sometimes be correctly predicated of non-artifacts is demonstrated, according to Weitz, by the fact that we can sometimes say, quite sensibly and truthfully, such things as "This piece of driftwood os a lovely piece of sculp-

ture".[24] Dickie offers two arguments against Weitz's claim. Firstly, in his earlier book[25], he accuses Weitz of making the very same error which Weitz himself attributes to traditional philosophers of art, namely, the error of failing to properly distinguish between the 'descriptive' (or, as Dickie terms it, the 'classificatory') and the 'evaluative' senses of the term 'work of art'. He compares Weitz's statement about the piece of driftwood to such assertions as: "This Rembrandt is a work of art". Given the information contained in 'this Rembrandt', as a description, the assertion would be merely tautologous if the predicate 'is a work of art' were to be understood in the classificatory sense of 'work of art'. Such an assertion is clearly intended evaluatively. Similarly, if 'piece of sculpture' in the statement about the piece of driftwood is given a classificatory interpretation, then, Dickie claims, the statement becomes a contradiction. If we reflect upon our usage of the classificatory sense of the term 'work of art', or the term 'piece of sculpture', then, he argues, we will realise that part of what we mean, in classifying an object under one of these terms, is that the object so classified is an artifact.

Dickie's argument, as it stands, seems quite clearly to beg the question against Weitz. The statement about the piece of driftwood will only be contradictory, given a classificatory interpretation of 'piece of sculpture', if artifactuality is a necessary condition for something to be correctly classified as a work of art, or as a piece of sculpture. The only argument which Dickie offers for artifactuality's being such a condition is that reflection on our usage of the term 'piece of sculpture', or the term 'work of art', will reveal that this is in fact the case. Since Weitz is arguing that reflection on usage reveals precisely

the contrary. Dickie's argument is hardly admissible in the absence of some further evidence for the truth of his construal, or the falsity of Weitz's construal, of actual usage.

Nonetheless, Dickie's objection to Weitz's argument does indicate the problematic nature of the latter. Weitz assumes that since the term 'piece of sculpture', as it is normally used, carries the implication that anything to which it is correctly applicable is a work of art, in the classificatory sense, the use of the term to characterise the piece of driftwood, if acceptable, must carry the same implication. That the statement about the piece of driftwood is acceptable seems to be established by the fact that such statements are made within the linguistic community and are not challenged as being incorrect on semantic grounds. If, however, the term 'piece of sculpture', when applied to the driftwood, is being used evaluatively, and not in its normal descriptive sense, there is no reason to believe that the implication of arthood, which attends the normal use of the term, will still hold. The question, then, is whether we have good grounds for thinking that the term is being used evaluatively in Weitz's example. One problem, here, is that no context is given for the utterance of the statement, but we may surmise that the driftwood in question is intended to be located on a beach rather than, say, in an art gallery. On Weitz's account of the 'logic' of the concept 'art', our correctly describing the driftwood as a piece of sculpture, and hence as a work of art, will presumably rest upon its resembling 'paradigm' artworks in its 'directly exhibited' properties, though it fails to resemble them in its relevant 'non-exhibited' properties. As the problem of forgeries indicates, however, the 'actual employment' of the concept 'art' does not support the view that resem-

blance to 'paradigm' artworks in 'directly exhibited' properties is a guarantee of arthood, even in cases, unlike the driftwood, where there is resemblance in relevant 'non-exhibited' properties as well. Does 'actual usage' support the view that resemblance in 'directly exhibited' 'aesthetic properties' is sufficient to justify the extension of the concept 'art', in the descriptive sense, to non-artifacts such as the driftwood? Here, I think, we must agree with Dickie that it does not. If it did, one counter-intuitive consequence would be the probable existence of thousands of as yet undiscovered artworks festooning the beaches and forests of the world. Since, for Weitz, it is the resemblance in relevant respects, rather than someone's 'calling it art', that would justify the application of the term 'work of art' to the piece of driftwood, there seems to be no obvious way for Weitz to avoid this consequence, once he grants the correct applicability of the term to the driftwood. I shall consider below how the situation might differ if the context of utterance of the statement about the driftwood were other than we have been supposing.

The discussion of Weitz in the preceding paragraph does not show, of course, that the terms 'piece of sculpture' and 'work of art' can never be correctly employed in their classificatory senses with reference to objects which are non-artifacts. I am only claiming that Weitz's example, if it is intended to be construed in the manner suggested, seems to involve an evaluative use of the term 'piece of sculpture' (or 'lovely piece of sculpture' as an unbreakable predicate) on the basis of what Weitz calls 'criteria of evaluation', rather than a classificatory use. As Richard Sclafani has pointed out, and has Dickie has now accepted, the most that can be established by disputing Weitz's

example in this manner is that the argument offered against an 'artifactuality' requirement for art is inconclusive.[26] What cannot be thus established is that Weitz is wrong in claiming that non-artifacts can be correctly classified as artworks. In his more recent book, therefore, Dickie offers a second argument, originally formulated by Sclafani, against Weitz.[27] There are, it is claimed, not merely two but three sense of the term 'work of art' - the 'primary' classificatory sense, the evaluative sense, and what Dickie and Sclafani term the 'derivative' sense. The derivative sense differs from the evaluative sense in that it imputes no value or interest to those things to which it is applied. It differs from the 'primary' sense in that, while it is also 'classificatory', it does not require artifactuality in those things to which it is correctly applicable, whereas the 'primary' sense does. The derivative sense is applicable to objects which strongly resemble 'paradigm' works of art. If, for instance, the piece of driftwood cited by Weitz were to bear a remarkable resemblance to a sculpture by Brancusi, it might be termed a work of art in the derivative sense because "it has so many properties in common" with a 'paradigm' work of art, in the 'primary' sense.[28] Dickie claims that, although the term 'work of art' when used derivatively usually functions in the evaluative sense as well, one may find examples of "purely derivative use"; and he offers, as an example, the application of the term 'work of art' to a sea-shell which resembles a man's face but is otherwise uninteresting.[29]

I find this argument singularly unconvincing, and, indeed, unnecessary. The proposed 'derivative' sense of the term 'work of art' is, I think, completely spurious. In the case of the sea-shell hypothesised by Dickie, we might <u>compare</u> the shell to a piece of sculpture, or rem-

ark that it looks as if it has been carved, but we would not thereby classify it, even 'derivatively', as a work of art. Resemblance in 'directly exhibited' properties no more justifies a 'derivative' classification than it does a 'primary' classification of a non-artifact found in its natural environment as a work of art. Those cases in which we might reasonably affirm, of such a non-artifact, that it is a 'work of art' are all quite satisfactorily taken care of by the evaluative sense as utilised to account for Weitz's driftwood.

Even if the 'derivative' sense were admissible, it would not, I think, do the job for which it was intended. The 'derivative' sense is supposed to cover 'troublesome' non-artifacts, thereby saving the 'artifactuality' requirement in the case of the 'primary' sense. There is, however, a further class of non-artifactual 'works of art', different in kind from those thus far considered in this context, which may prove too 'troublesome' for even the 'derivative' sense to handle. Neither Weitz, in his original argument, nor Dickie, in his critical discussion of this argument, addresses himself to the problem of the arthood, or lack of it, of non-artifacts of the sort which generate the puzzle of non-artifactual artworks sketched in chapter two above. Let us suppose that the utterer of Weitz's statement about the piece of driftwood is not contemplating some specimen found lying on a beach, but, rather, that he is in an art gallery, and that the piece of driftwood is part of the exhibited 'works' of an artist. Or, to vary the example, consider the following situation hypothesised by Paul Ziff:

> Suppose we have a naturally formed stone object that has the shape of a woman reclining. Indeed, it looks as though some sculptor has fashioned it, though we know that this is not the case. What is more, it is worth contemplating,

> studying, and observing in a way analogous to the way (in which a Poussin painting is worth contemplating, etc.). Further, suppose that people do in fact contemplate, study, and observe it, and that it is displayed in a museum, and so forth. (30)

Ziff, who holds a position similar to Weitz in respect of the 'logic' of the concept 'art', claims that this object can correctly be said to be a work of art "in virtue of its similarities" to 'paradigm' artworks. The important question here, as we have already seen, is which similarities are relevant to the attribution of arthood to such an object. Ziff, like Weitz, holds that all of the features mentioned are relevant, as 'criteria of recognition' for the application of the concept 'art'. Clearly, however, given the reservations already expressed concerning 'similarity' as a criterion of arthood, the arthood of the stone in question cannot be justified by reference to its 'directly exhibited' properties, since these might be found in many stones existing in their natural state and location. What distinguishes this stone from other stones, or the piece of driftwood in the second scenario from that in the first, it would seem, is that in each case the former, but not the latter, is exhibited by an artist (assuming this is the case in Ziff's example) in a context where the other things so exhibited are recognised as being works of art. To employ Dickie's terminology, they are being presented for appreciation within the context of the 'artworld'. If they are being presented, then presumably they are eligible for presentation, and such eligibility must derive from their having had conferred upon them the 'status' of 'candidate for appreciation' by some person (the artist who is exhibiting them) acting on behalf of the 'artworld'. Granted, the artist is not personally res-

ponsible for the 'directly exhibited' properties which the stone and the piece of driftwood possess, but, analogously, Duchamp was not personally responsible for the 'directly exhibited' properties of his 'Readymades'. If Duchamp's creations are artworks, then so, it would seem, are these non-artifacts. Why, therefore, does Dickie wish to maintain that artifactuality is a necessary condition of arthood?

Dickie belatedly turns his attention to non-artifacts of the sort discussed in the preceding paragraph when he is considering possible objections to his definition of 'work of art'. His attempt to salvage the 'artifactuality' condition from apparent shipwreck is illuminating, and merits reproduction in full:

> If Duchamp can convert such artifacts as a urinal, a snow shovel, and a hat-rack into works of art, why can't natural objects such as driftwood also become works of art in the classificatory sense? Perhaps they can if any one of a number of things is done to them. One way in which this might happen would be for someone to pick up a natural object, take it home, and hang it on the wall. Another way would be to pick up a natural object and enter it in an exhibition. Natural objects which become works of art in the classificatory sense are artifactualised without the use of tools - artifactuality is conferred on the object rather than worked on it. This means that natural objects which become works of art acquire their artifactuality at the same time that the status of candidate for appreciation is conferred on them, although the act that confers artifactuality is not the same act that confers the status of candidate for appreciation...Of course, being an artifact and being a candidate for appreciation are not the same thing - they are two properties which may be acquired at the same time. Many may find the notion of artifactuality being conferred rather than 'worked' on an object too strange to accept and admittedly it is an unusual conception. It may be that a special account will have to be worked out for exhibited driftwood and similar cases. (31)

I must confess myself to be one of the 'many' who find the notion that natural objects are somehow 'artifactualised' in the process of

becoming art too strange to accept, at least in the absence of a clearer account of what such 'artifactualisation' involves.(32) In the first place, since the artifactuality of conventional artworks, and even 'Readymades', is presumably the result of human workmanship rather than some act of 'conferral', we would seem to require some special act of 'artifactualisation' which is performed by all and only those artists who choose to 'make' art out of natural objects. This special act is not required of artists who 'create' 'Readymades', does not involve any material transformation of the object in question, and is not the same as the 'artistic act' of conferring the status of 'candidate for appreciation', although it is apparently performed simultaneously with this act. What, then, does the act of 'artifactualisation' involve? Dickie characterises it as an act of 'conferral'; what is conferred, he claims, is 'artifactuality'. But what is conferred by an act of conferral, as normally understood, is a 'status' of some kind, and to acquire a status is to acquire certain rights, privileges, duties, etc., within a social framework. If 'artifactuality' is a status conferred upon a natural object by an artist, what does this status amount to, and what rights or privileges are acquired which are not acquired through the simultaneous conferral of the status of 'candidate for appreciation'? What Dickie might mean, of course, is that having the status of 'artifact' is a necessary condition for being eligible to acquire the status of 'candidate for appreciation'; but this would be merely to reassert the 'artifactuality' requirement for art in the face of apparent counter-evidence. If being an artifact <u>is</u> a necessary condition for acquiring the status of 'candidate for appreciation', in Dickie's opinion, we require some form of argument in support of this

claim. No argument, however, is offered.

In the face of these difficulties, it is hard not to concur with Binkley in his assertion that Dickie's concept of 'artifactuality', and his notion of 'artifactualisation', serve "no apparent purpose outside securing a place for an artifactuality requirement in a definition".(33) That Dickie is unwilling to surrender such a requirement is apparent in the lengths to which he is prepared to go to defend it. In suggesting that a 'special account' may be required to deal with 'exhibited driftwood and similar cases', for instance, he seems unwilling to recognise that what such an account would seem to require is the rejection of the 'artifactuality' requirement itself. We might enquire, I think, as to the reason for his reluctance to accept the possibility of non-artifactual works of art. While any answer to this question must be speculative, in the absence of any clarifying remarks by Dickie himself, the following considerations may perhaps be relevant to his stance. It might be claimed that non-artifacts exhibited as artworks differ significantly from non-artifacts not so exhibited, in that, while they have undergone no physical transformation, they somehow come to function <u>as if</u> they were artifacts, and, more specifically, as if they were the artifactual creations of the artist exhibiting them. The experiences which a piece of driftwood may elicit in a receiver who experientially encounters it as an artwork exhibited in a gallery will differ, therefore, from the experiences elicited by the same piece of driftwood in one who finds it on a beach and appreciates it for its 'aesthetic properties' in the narrow sense. If these claims are phenomenologically accurate, the difference seems to stand in need of some explanation. There is clearly no alteration in the 'directly exhibited' properties possessed

by the object when it is transported from the beach to the art gallery. How might Dickie account for this difference in functioning, if he recognised it to exist?

What he should do, I think, is try to explain this difference as a consequence of the 'artistic act' of 'status-conferral' whereby the piece of driftwood acquires the status of 'candidate for appreciation' and becomes eligible for presentation within a system of the 'artworld'. Whether his conception of the nature of this 'artistic act' permits such an explanation to be given, however, remains to be seen.(34) If it does not, this may be indicative of more general difficulties concerning the notion of 'status-conferral' contained in Dickie's second condition of arthood. What Dickie may think he can do, however, is to account for the difference in functioning in terms of the act of 'artifactualisation' to which he refers in his discussion of exhibited driftwood as art. If this is, at least in part, the motivation behind the 'artifactuality' requirement, as a condition applicable even to such 'works' as exhibited driftwood, there is an obvious problem. For, just as it might be claimed that there is a difference in the way in which the piece of driftwood functions for a receiver when it is exhibited as art rather than encountered on a beach, so, it would seem, it might be claimed that there is an analogous difference with respect to a snow shovel and a urinal when they are exhibited as 'Readymades' rather than encountered in their normal places of habitation. And, whatever this latter difference might be, it is difficult to see how it could be attributed to an act of 'artifactualisation' on the part of the artist, since the objects in question are already artifacts. The explanation, it would seem, must be sought in the 'artistic act' which is held to confer the status of 'art'.

Whether such an explanation is forthcoming, in the case of 'Readymades' as of artifacts, we may determine by turning our attention to the second of Dickie's proposed defining conditions of arthood.

In examining the second condition of arthood specified in Dickie's definition of 'work of art', I shall separate, for the purposes of analysis, two inter-related elements within that condition, the first of which concerns the purported distinguishing characteristic possessed by all and only works of art, and the second of which concerns the way in which such a characteristic is acquired. According to Dickie, artworks, as artifacts, are distinguished from other non-artistic artifacts in that they, or (in Dickie's later formulation) a set of their aspects, possess the 'non-exhibited' property, or status, of being a 'candidate for appreciation' within the context of the 'artworld'. Such a property or status is acquired, it is claimed, through an act of 'status-conferral' performed by some person or persons acting on behalf of the 'artworld'. I shall begin by outlining and evaluating several objections that have been raised against the claim that the distinguishing characteristic of artworks is their possession of the 'non-exhibited' status of 'candidate for appreciation'. I shall argue that the vulnerability of Dickie's position to such objections can only be determined when the nature of the status in question is clarified, and that such clarification awaits a clearer understanding of what is involved in the 'artistic act' of conferring such 'status'. In the following chapter, therefore, I shall turn to an examination of Dickie's notion of 'status-conferral' and an alternative version of the 'artistic act' theory advanced by Timothy Binkley.

To be a 'candidate for appreciation', on Dickie's theory, is to be

eligible for presentation within a system of the 'artworld'. It is because the status of being a 'candidate' cashes out in this way that Dickie can characterise art as being 'essentially institutional'. Since being a 'candidate for appreciation' only involves an eligibility to be presented for appreciation, Dickie is not committed to the highly dubious claim which Beardsley ascribes to T. J. Diffey's version of the 'Institutional Theory', namely, the claim that something only becomes a work of art when it is actually presented to the public for appreciation.(35) Nor is he committed to the view that something's being a work of art requires that it is at some time actually appreciated by someone. Indeed, as Dickie himself notes, to build such a requirement into a definition of 'work of art' in the classificatory sense "would make it impossible to speak of unappreciated works of art".(36) We should also note, here, that Dickie rejects the idea that the term 'appreciation' as it occurs in his definition should be construed as an elliptical reference to some "special kind of aesthetic appreciation":

> All that is meant by 'appreciation' in the definition is something like 'in experiencing the qualities of a thing one finds them worthy or valuable', and this meaning applies quite generally both inside and outside the domain of art. The only sense in which there is a difference between the appreciation of art and the appreciation of non-art is that the appreciations have different objects. The institutional structure in which the art object is embedded, not different kinds of appreciation, makes the difference between the appreciation of art and the appreciation of non-art. (37)

One possible objection to Dickie's 'candidacy' requirement, to which Dickie himself responds, is to be found in the paper by Kennick which was discussed earlier in connection with Weitz's thesis.(38) As stated above, Dickie's definition of art is an attempt to capitalise

on Mandelbaum's suggestion that 'art' might be definable, not in terms of 'directly exhibited' properties, but in terms of some 'non-exhibited' property relating to the way in which certain objects, namely artworks, are treated or used within society. 'Eligibility to be presented for appreciation within the artworld' is eligibility to receive a certain form of treatment within an institutional framework. Kennick argues, against such an approach, that "the attempt to define Art in terms of what we do with certain objects" is futile, since "the proper treatment of works of art differs from time to time and from place to place".(39) He supports this assertion by reference to the 'proper' practice, in Egyptian culture, of sealing up paintings and sculptures in tombs along with the dead. "Such treatment", he claims, "does not render the object thus treated not a work of art". Dickie offers two responses(40) to this argument. Firstly, as he correctly points out, the fact that the Egyptians treated artworks in this way does not prove that they regarded them in a manner essentially different from our own, since, given their beliefs as to 'life after death', they may have placed artworks in tombs in order that the 'dead' could appreciate them. It might be added, here, that, if such entombment were the <u>only</u> way of treating sculptures and paintings which was regarded as 'proper' by the Egyptians, we might not be justified in classifying these artifacts as artworks. Resemblance in 'directly exhibited' properties to 'paradigm' artworks within our own culture is surely not, by itself, sufficient to justify such a classification. Certain highway intersections, viewed from the air, exhibit formal patterns resembling those found in oriental art, but any anthropologist from the future who, knowing nothing of the use to which such artifacts were put, classified them as artworks on the basis of resem-

blance in 'directly exhibited' properties would be simply mistaken.

Dickie's second counter to Kennick's argument is that it is not necessary to assume that we share a common conception of art with the Egyptians, since it would be achievement enough to specify necessary and sufficient conditions of application for our concept of art. The extension of 'our', he claims, might encompass 'present-day Americans', or 'present-day Westerners', or 'Westerners since the 18th century'.(41) Dickie is correct, at least to the extent that the elucidation of the 'logic' of the concept 'art', for any of these populations, in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions of application would be sufficient to refute Weitz's claim that 'art' is necessarily '$open_2$'. Clearly, however, the significance of a proposed definition will vary directly with the size of the linguistic community to which it is held to apply. That all American-born philosophers currently teaching Aesthetics at the University of Illinois at Chicago Circle employ the concept 'art' by reference to defining conditions of arthood, for instance, would not be a particularly significant, or interesting, claim. Nevertheless, the use which Dickie makes of historical 'evidence' to support his position would seem to imply that he believes his definition of 'art' to elucidate the 'logic' of the concept for atleast the largest of the three linguistic communities specified, and perhaps for one which is even larger than that. Whether such a belief is justifiable remains to be seen.

Another objection to the 'candidacy' requirement to which Dickie himself has responded is advanced by Ted Cohen.(42) Cohen argues that the status of 'candidate for appreciation' can only be conferred upon, and thus possessed by, something which it is possible to appreciate.

If this is so, then, he claims, Dickie must include an 'appreciatability' requirement as a further necessary condition for something's being, or becoming, a work of art. He also claims that there are certain things which cannot be appreciated, and which would thus be excluded from the realm of possible artworks by such a requirement. Those things failing to meet the 'appreciatability' requirement would include "ordinary thumbtacks, cheap white envelopes, plastic forks given at some drive-in restaurants", and, most significantly, Duchamp's 'Readymade' work, "Fountain".(43) The reason why the latter cannot be appreciated, according to Cohen, is that it is not "Fountain" itself, i.e., the urinal exhibited by Duchamp, but rather the gesture made by exhibiting it, that is artistically significant and is thus the proper object of artistic appreciation. Cohen concludes that, since "Fountain" and other Dadaist works cannot possibly be appreciated, they cannot be classified as art on Dickie's definition. Dickie explicitly commits himself to the view that such 'works' must be considered artworks, given the way in which they are treated in artistic practice and critical discourse. His "basic reason" for taking Dadaist works such as "Fountain" to be artworks, he states, is that they "seem to occupy a position within our artworld similar to the "Mona Lisa", "Nude Descending a Staircase", and the like", i.e., they are "written about in art history books" and "displayed in art galleries".(44)

Dickie, as we have seen, is committed to the more general Weitzian thesis that the philosopher's task is to elucidate the 'actual employment' of the concept 'art' within the artistic community. If Cohen's conclusion is correct, therefore, it would seem that Dickie must accept that his definition is inadequate to the role for which it is proposed.

Cohen's argument is, I think, somewhat confused, but, in unravelling the confusion, we may reveal important aspects of Dickie's theory which are in need of further clarification, Firstly, we may look at how Dickie responds to Cohen's objection. He accepts the claim that his definition of art implies an 'appreciatability' requirement for anything that is to be an artwork: "the possibility of appreciation is one constraint on the definition: if something cannot be appreciated, it cannot become art".(45) He suggests, however, that such a constraint may well be vacuous, since "it seems unlikely...that any object would not have some quality which is appreciatable".(46) This would seem to apply to mass-produced artifacts of the sort cited by Cohen:

> (They) have qualities that can be appreciated if one makes the effort to focus attention on them. One of the values of photography is its ability to focus on and bring out the qualities of quite ordinary objects. And the same sort of thing can be done without the benefit of photography by just looking. (47)

Similarly, we may appreciate in "Fountain" qualities similar to those found in works of sculpture by Brancusi and Moore, if we focus on "its gleaming white surface, the depths revealed when it reflects images of surrounding objects, its pleasing oval shape".(48)

Dickie's claim that there are probably no objects which are completely without appreciatable qualities is, I think, quite correct, given his notion of 'appreciation'. If appreciation involves finding worth or value in the experienced qualities of a thing, there would seem to be no way in which it could ever be established, for any object having experiencable qualities, that no-one could, either now or in the future, find value or worth in experiencing at least some of the qual-

ities of that object. It would be necessary to show that certain objects or certain qualities of objects are, by their very nature, incapable of being appreciated. Such a task might be possible if the notion of appreciation were limited in some way, through qualification by an adjective such as 'aesthetic'. If only certain kinds of qualities of objects were 'aesthetically appreciatable', we might try to find examples of objects necessarily lacking all such qualities. Since Dickie does not limit appreciation in any such fashion, however, it would seem to be impossible to determine any class of 'necessarily unappreciatable' objects. Insofar as Cohen is claiming that there are certain members of this class, therefore, he is either drawing a false conclusion with reference to Dickie's conception of 'appreciation', or else he is operating with a different conception of 'appreciation'. In either case, his argument does not carry any weight against Dickie's position.

It may be, however, that Dickie's response, while correctly identifying a flaw in Cohen's argument, evades the force of his objection. The reason why "Fountain" cannot be appreciated, according to Cohen, is not that the exhibited urinal lacks appreciatable qualities, but rather that what should be appreciated is not the physical object itself and its 'directly exhibited' properties but the gesture of protest made by exhibiting it. Dickie does not, in fact, dispute this claim as to the 'proper' object of appreciation, but agrees that "Fountain" has the significance Cohen attributes to it, namely, "that it was a protest against the art of its day".(49) This concession, however, once made, stirs up a nest of problems of which Dickie, at least in his response to Cohen, appears to be quite unaware. An artifact becomes an artwork, according to Dickie, when either it (in his earlier formulation) or a set of its

aspects (in his later formulation) receives, through an act of conferral, the status of 'candidate for appreciation' within the 'artworld'. 'Appreciation' involves finding worth or value in the experienced qualities of a thing. "Fountain" supposedly owes its arthood to the 'artistic act' of Duchamp which conferred the requisite status upon the urinal or a set of its aspects. But can such an act be attributed to Duchamp if the work has the significance suggested by Cohen and Dickie? Clearly, it would seem, Duchamp did not intend that anyone should find value or worth in experiencing 'directly exhibited' qualities of the urinal of the sort to which Dickie refers in arguing that the artifact is 'appreciatable'. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that he conferred the status of 'candidate for appreciation' upon this 'set of aspects' of the urinal, or upon the urinal itself qua possessor of these qualities. Did he then confer such status on certain 'non-exhibited' aspects of the urinal, or upon the urinal qua possessor of those qualities?

One 'non-exhibited' property which we might attribute to the urinal is that of being used to make a particular gesture, and this, in turn, might be taken to depend upon a further 'non-exhibited' or relational property of the object, namely, its being a mass-produced artifact exhibited in the company of other artifacts which were not mass-produced. If it is these properties of the urinal that Duchamp intended receivers of the work to appreciate, could we not say that "Fountain" qualifies as an artwork by virtue of Duchamp's conferring the status of 'candidate for appreciation' upon these 'non-exhibited' properties of the object in question? We might dispute whether such 'non-exhibited' properties can correctly be classified as 'aspects' of the object possessing them. Even if this point of terminology were granted to Dickie,

however, we might balk at the claim that an object can be 'appreciated', in Dickie's sense of the term, in virtue of such aspects. The 'non-exhibited' or relational properties, or 'aspects', relevant to the appreciation of Duchamp's work are surely not 'qualities' of the exhibited urinal, for the term 'qualities' would seem to apply only to monadic, and not dyadic, properties of objects. Grasping the significance of Duchamp's work, again, is surely not a matter of finding worth or value in such properties as experienced qualities of an object. Dickie's conception of 'appreciation', it may now be noted, does appear to involve some mode of 'aesthetic experience', despite his avowals to the contrary. For 'appreciation' is characterised as an experience of value elicited in an experiential encounter with an object, where the value is taken to reside in the experiencing of qualities of the object rather than in some individual interest or concern that such qualities satisfy. The pleasure attending 'appreciation' would thus seem to be 'disinterested' in the sense required for the experience elicited to be properly characterisable as 'aesthetic'. Further, while Dickie does not place any restrictions on the sorts of 'aspects' of objects that can receive the status of 'candidate for appreciation', his discussion of the 'appreciatability' of "Fountain" and the mass-produced artifacts cited by Cohen refers only to 'directly exhibited' properties of these objects. If the properties of "Fountain" relevant to the reception of the work are 'non-exhibited', or relational, properties of the sort suggested above, therefore, Cohen may be right in asserting that "Fountain" cannot be appreciated, in Dickie's sense of the term, and that it cannot acquire the status of 'candidate for appreciation' necessary for its being an artwork.

It would seem, then, that Dickie's response to Cohen misses the point of the latter's objection. While the urinal exhibited by Duchamp may indeed be appreciatable in virtue of its 'directly exhibited' properties, Duchamp did not confer the requisite status upon these 'aspects' of the artifact. Those 'aspects' upon which he might be thought to have conferred this status, on the other hand, appear to be incapable of receiving this status in their capacity as 'aspects' of the urinal, because they are not experiencable qualities of the artifact. How, then, can "Fountain" qualify as a work of art on Dickie's criteria? I shall briefly consider three possible answers to this question. If, as I shall argue, it is the third of these alternatives that Dickie should have offered in response to Cohen's objection, then it will become apparent that the notion of 'status-conferral' to which Dickie is thereby committed is considerably more complex than might initially be supposed.

One option, to which Dickie might be sympathetic, would be to deny the relevance of Duchamp's intentions as to how his work should be appreciated to the actual appreciatability of the work. Dickie, as will be seen, agrees with Beardsley that reference to the artist's intentions, independent of what can be discovered through attention to the work itself, has no legitimate place in artistic criticism, either as a standard for evaluating a work or as a means to understanding the 'meaning' of a work in situations where the work itself is open to divergent interpretations:

> Meaning is a public matter, not a matter of what an author or, more generally, a speaker, intended in the privacy of his mind. So if an author tells us what his poem means but it is not possible to discover that meaning in the poem independently of the author's statement, then it cannot be claimed that the poem means what its author intends it to mean. (50)

Mutatis mutandis, the same is taken to apply in the case of the other arts, so that what a given pictorial design represents, for instance, is determined by "the properties of the design itself", not by the representational intentions of the artist. It might be argued, then, that, insofar as it is impossible to discover the significance which Duchamp intended "Fountain" to have through attention to the exhibited urinal independently of the artist's statements, we are quite justified in appreciating the work for its 'directly exhibited' properties alone. If authorial intention provides no independent standard of 'correct understanding', then one who appreciated "Fountain" in this way could not be accused of failing to grasp the 'meaning' of the work, since there is no single correct 'meaning' to grasp. If "Fountain" can be properly appreciated for its 'directly exhibited' properties, then it is 'appreciatable' in Dickie's sense of the word, and may thus possess the status of 'candidate for appreciation' necessary for its being a work of art.

I shall postpone until chapter eleven a discussion of the more general acceptability of the 'anti-intentionalist' thesis, although it might be noted, in passing, that it is in respect of works such as Duchamp's that this thesis seems most questionable. In what sense, after all, could someone who admired "Fountain" purely for its 'directly exhibited' properties, as set forth by Dickie, be said to be appreciating the work at all? Consider, for instance, the case of another artist who exhibited a urinal similar to Duchamp's but with the intention that it be appreciated for its 'plastic' qualities. If the 'anti-intentionalist' thesis is correct, the critic, confronted by this work and that of Duchamp, may quite reasonably treat them as similar works, and simply

compare them in respect of their 'directly exhibited' properties. Any critic who did so treat them, I think, could be justly accused of failing to note a relevant artistic difference between the two works. If this difference is artistically relevant, and if it is only intelligible in terms ofthe difference in the respective intentions of the two artists, then the artist's intentions, at least in certain cases, must be relevant to the appreciation and criticism of artworks, and the 'anti-intentionalist' thesis must be false.

Even if this argument be disputed, however, the 'anti-intentionalist' thesis does not seem to be available to Dickie as a means of explaining the arthood of "Fountain". For the arthood of an object does not depend upon whether, and in what ways, that object can be appreciated (save in the negative sense that an unappreciatable object, if such exist, cannot become art), but upon whether that object has acquired the requisite status, as 'candidate for appreciation', through an act of 'status-conferral'. The urinal in its natural habitat can be appreciated for its 'directly exhibited' properties, but that does not make it a work of art on Dickie's theory. Unless we are prepared to accept the possibility that artworks can be created by accident or mistake (not in the sense that the work should never have been created, but in the sense that the artist was not intending to create a work), the artist's having the intention to confer status as art, whatever such conferral is taken to involve, must be a necessary condition for his actually conferring such status. If Duchamp's intention, in exhibiting "Fountain", was to draw attention to properties of the urinal which are not experiencable qualities of the artifact, and thus not appreciatable, he cannot be credited with the intention to confer the

status of 'candidate for appreciation' on the urinal, and thus he cannot have performed the necessary act of status-conferral.

A second option open to Dickie might be to deny that the 'work' in question is, in fact, the urinal itself; rather, it might be claimed, the 'work' is the gesture made by exhibiting the urinal in an art gallery. The problem concerning the appreciatability of "Fountain" arises because those properties of the artifact relevant to the reception of the work are 'non-exhibited' or relational properties, and thus not experiencable qualities of the work, qua physical object. The 'A-relevant$_i$' properties are, however, 'non-relational' properties of the gesture made by Duchamp, and might thus be said to be 'experiencable qualities' of that gesture, in some sense. Clearly, such qualities cannot be experienced in a perceptual encounter with the 'work', so characterised, save, perhaps, at the original time of exhibition. I shall defer the question as to whether the qualities can be 'experienced' in a manner compatible with Dickie's notion of 'appreciation', since the same problem arises in respect of the third option to be examined. This option differs from the one currently under consideration in that it does not require the rejection of the idea that the 'work' is the urinal itself, rather than the gesture of exhibiting it. Since this seems preferable to the more radical alternative offered by the second option, and since the latter alternative might well be unpalatable to Dickie, who holds, as we shall see, that artworks are physical objects, I shall turn immediately to a consideration of the third response that might be made to Cohen's objection.

The third option is open to Dickie on the basis of his later, but not his earlier, formulation of the 'candidacy' requirement. On the

earlier formulation, it will be recalled, it is an artifact which receives the status of 'candidate for appreciation', while, on the later formulation, it is a set of aspects of an artifact that it a 'candidate'. The significance of this distinction becomes apparent when we examine the implications of thetwo accounts for the arthood of "Fountain". On the earlier account, the arthood of "Fountain" depends upon Duchamp's having conferred the status of 'candidate for appreciation' on the artifact in question, i.e. the urinal. If 'status-conferral' requires intention to confer status on the part of the conferrer, then, given Dickie's conception of 'appreciation', Duchamp's having performed the requisite act of conferral requires his having intended that worth or value be found by receivers in the experiencable qualities of the artifact. The problem, as we have seen, is that Duchamp seems to have had no such intention, and could not, therefore, have conferred the required status. On the later account, on the other hand, the arthood of "Fountain" depends upon Duchamp's having conferred the required status on a set of aspects of the artifact in question. If 'non-exhibited' or relational properties can be said to be 'aspects' of an object. then Duchamp clearly did intend that certain aspects of the urinal should be appreciated in sense. But did he confer upon these aspects the status of 'candidate for appreciation' in Dickie's sense? It was argued above that he could not have done so, because the aspects in question are not experiencable qualities of the artifact. But, as may now be clear, it is not necessary that the artifact be appreciatable in virtue of the relevant aspects, but only that the aspects themselves, as recipients of the status of 'candidate for appreciation', be appreciatable. It is the qualities of the aspects, not those of the artifact,

that are experienced as being worthy or valuable if the work is actually appreciated. In the case of "Fountain", therefore, the aspects of the urinal receiving the status of 'candidate' are the 'non-exhibited' properties of being a gesture of a particular kind, etc., and it is the qualities of these properties which are found to be worthy or valuable by one who appreciates the work.

This, it seems to me, is the way in which Dickie should meet Cohen's objection, given his theory, but his capacity to utilise such a strategy will depend upon the answers which he offers to certain questions arising out of the foregoing 'solution' to the problem which Cohen poses. Firstly, as was suggested in discussing the second option, it might be asked whether the qualities of 'non-exhibited' aspects of artifacts can be 'experienced' in a sense compatible with Dickie's conception of 'appreciation'. Secondly, it might be asked whether the identification of the artwork with an artifact, as in Dickie's definition, is tenable in situations where it is not the 'directly exhibited' properties of an artifact, but the 'non-exhibited' ones, which are 'A-relevant$_i$'. If artworks are taken to be physical objects, and if the appreciation of certain artworks, so understood, involves attending only to their 'non-exhibited' properties, the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance' would seem to be incorrect not only in its characterisation of what it is to be a work of art, but also in its characterisation of what is involved in the appreciation of artworks; for in neither case, it would seem, do 'aesthetic properties' play any necessary role. Thirdly, if Dickie does hold that 'candidacy for appreciation' can be conferred upon 'non-exhibited' aspects of artifacts, such as those implicated in the arthood of "Fountain", we might enquire as to the sort of act of

status-conferral which is required to accomplish this feat. Indeed, how does one confer the required status on a set of aspects of an artifact anyway, whether such aspects be 'non-exhibited' or otherwise? How are the relevant aspects singled out in the act of conferring status? 'Calling it art', it would seem, is more complex than it at first appears.

An examination of Dickie's answer to the third of these questions must await the consideration of the notion of 'status-conferral' in the following chapter. The problems which he faces in respect of the first two questions, however, may become clearer if we examine certain objections which Binkley raises against the 'candidacy' requirement. Binkley, like Cohen, argues that certain accepted works of modern art are not appreciatable in Dickie's sense of the term, but he addresses himself more explicitly to the apparently 'aesthetic' character of 'appreciation' as defined by Dickie. He argues that, while "most art requests our 'appreciation'", 'appreciation' need not involve the "experience of valuable qualities", and that, in cases where the proper reception of an artwork either does not or cannot involve such experience, the work in question cannot be a 'candidate for appreciation' in the required sense.(51) Binkley offers examples of three sorts of accepted artworks which, he believes, cannot be classified as 'art' on Dickie's definition. The first two examples fail to meet the defining conditions because they are not intended to be, or cannot be, 'appreciated' in the required sense, while the third example fails to be 'art' because it is not intended to be appreciated at all.

Firstly, there are works such as Andy Warhol's Chelsea Girls:

> The experience of boredom while watching one of Andy Warhol's early films may be valuable in the absense of any

> experienced qualities which are found to be valuable. And then again, maybe the boredom lacks value altogether. There may be nothing of value in the experience of qualities of "Chelsea Girls" without the film thereby lacking both interest and importance as a work of art. In other words, an artist need not show his art with the implicit hope that someone will appreciate valuable qualities lodged in it. (52)

The significant point, here, is made in the final two sentences. The fact, if fact it be, that most viewers of Chelsea Girls fail to find any worth or value in the experienced qualities of the film does not count against its being classified as an artwork on Dickie's definition, since something may have the status of 'candidate for appreciation' without anyone actually appreciating it. Insofar as Warhol's film possesses experiencable qualities, there is no reason to think that someone might not, at some time, find worth or value in experiencing these qualities. The film, then, is 'appreciatable' in virtue of its 'directly exhibited' properties. Yet Binkley suggests that, as with "Fountain", the proper reception of Chelsea Girls requires that we attend not so much to the experiencable qualities of the film as to the point which the artist is making. It is in regard to the latter that the film is interesting and important as art, and it is the 'non-exhibited' gestural properties of the film that Warhol intends us to appreciate. Thus, as with Duchamp's work, the 'aspects' of an artifact upon which the requisite status has been conferred are not qualities of the artifact, but 'non-exhibited' aspects whose qualities cannot be perceptually experienced and thus cannot be so experienced as having value or worth.

Secondly, there are works of 'conceptual art' such as Robert Barry's "All the things I know of but of which I am not at the moment thinking - 1:36 P.M.; 15 June 1969, New York". Such a work demonstrates

more clearly the difficulties inherent in the view that the appreciation of artworks involves finding value in the experienced qualities of an artifact, for there would seem to be no qualities of Barry's work that could possibly be experienced, save, perhaps, by Barry himself. Binkley poses the problem as follows: "Can we experience the knowledge making up Robert Barry's piece? - How could we experience what he knows but is not thinking about at a particular moment?"(53)

Thirdly, there are works which are not intended to be appreciated at all, and thus do not have conferred upon them, by the artist, the status of 'candidate for appreciation', either in respect of their 'directly exhibited' properties or of their 'non-exhibited' ones. For instance, "if an artist has contempt for his audience and purposely tries to create art which frustrates attempts to experience valuable qualities, he may be immoral, but his ability to create art is unaffected".(54) Works of this sort are problematic for Dickie in a way in which works of the other two sorts are not. While the arthood of Chelsea Girls and Barry's piece, like the arthood of "Fountain", challenges Dickie's conception of the nature of appreciation, it does not undermine his more fundamental claim that artworks are distinguished from non-works as the recipients of the conferred status of 'candidate for appreciation' in some sense of the term. Since the 'essential institutionality' of art, on Dickie's account, depends upon the notion of 'candidacy', as eligibility for presentation within a system of the 'artworld', rather than upon the nature of the 'appreciation' accorded to things so presented, his basic thesis that art is essentially 'institutional' might withstand a successful attack on his conception of 'appreciation'. The arthood of works produced by the 'contemptuous artist',

however, represents a more radical challenge to Dickie's position, in that such works appear capable of being art without acquiring the status of 'candidate for appreciation', and thus, presumably, without any necessity for the existence of that institutional framework which such candidacy presupposes. The problem is, in fact, somewhat broader in its ramifications than the example of the 'contemptuous artist' might suggest. It would seem to encompass not only such misogynistic creations but also works produced by artists whose sole motivation is 'self-expression' of the sort advocated by the Romantic theorists of art. It is by reference to such works that Beardsley argues against the thesis that art is 'essentially institutional'.(55) According to what Beardsley terms the 'Romantic' view of the artist, the latter is one who works at his art in isolation from other men, and who shuns all contact with social institutions: "Later, of course, he may decide to compromise with reality, to sell, publish, exhibit, or whatever. But until he does so (according to this account) his action is not institutional, nor is what he produces".(56) While the artist, so characterised, may depend upon certain institutions for the materials with which he works, or for the essential supplies needed to sustain his own existence, "he can make a work of art, and validate it as such, by his own free originative power".(57)

If such an artist is not concerned with producing something for the appreciation of others, in what sense can he be said to confer the status of 'candidate for appreciation'? Of course, he may be passionately concerned that his product will be something that he himself will appreciate, but this will not involve a conferral of 'candidacy', if the latter is to be understood in terms of eligibility for presentation

within the 'artworld'. If, as was suggestd above, a necessary condition for conferring the status of 'candidate' is the intention to so act, the 'Romantic' artist cannot be said to confer upon his creations the status necessary, on Dickie's account, for these creations to be works of art. The possibility that his creations become art when he decides to'compronise with reality', which seems to be the only other explanation of their arthood open to Dickie, is surely too counter-intuitive to be acceptable, if the 'actual employment' of the concept 'art' is the standard against which proposals are to be measured.

If Dickie's theory is to be able to handle such apparent counter-instances as the works produced by the 'contemptuous artist' and the 'Romantic artist', the notion of status-conferral will clearly need to be explicated in terms quite different from those employed thus far. Not only will it be necessary to explain how status can be conferred upon a set of aspects of an artifact, but, as it now appears, the act of conferral will have to be performable without the conferrer's having the intention that the entity receiving the status in question should have that status. The notion of 'candidacy', further, would seem to require construal in the manner employed thus far if it is to support the claim that art is 'essentially institutional'. The question, then, is how 'candidacy', in this sense, can be conferred upon an object by one not desiring that the object be such a 'candidate'.

The problems posed for Dickie's theory by the arthood of Chelsea Girls and works of 'conceptual art' such as Barry's piece are, as I have said, of a less serious nature. It is also easier to see how he might try to deal with them, given the conclusions reached above concerning the arthood of "Fountain". It was suggested that Dickie might

explain the 'appreciatability' of "Fountain", in a sense relevant to Duchamp's intentions concerning the reception of the work, in terms of the possibility of finding value or worth in experiencing the qualities, not of the urinal itself, qua artifact, but of those 'non-exhibited' aspects of the artifact pertaining to the gesture made in exhibiting it. Similarly, it might be claimed that the appreciation of Warhol's and Barry's works involves finding value in experiencing qualities of the 'non-exhibited' aspects of these works, where such aspects might again pertain to the gestures which the artists are thereby making. In the case of Barry's work, of course, Dickie might face the additional problem of specifying the artifact of which the gesture can be taken to be an aspect. Nevertheless, I am more concerned here to evaluate the strategy involved in such a defence of Dickie's position, as a means whereby he might account for the arthood of the works in question without surrendering his conception of 'appreciation'. The obvious question is whether appreciating a gesture such as Duchamp's can properly be characterised as a finding of value in the experiencing of qualities of that gesture. Only if it can properly be so characterised will it qualify as 'appreciation' in Dickie's sense of the term. Whether it can properly be so characterised, however, depends upon how we resolve the much broader question as to the nature and limits of 'aesthetic experience'. This being so, an evaluation of Dickie's conception must await the consideration of this broader question in the final part of this paper. To understand why this is so, we should recall what was said above about the 'aesthetic' character of Dickie's notion of 'appreciation'. While he explicitly denies that the notion has any such character, the locating of value in the experiencing of qualities of things,

as the defining characteristic of 'appreciation', clearly indicates that it does. In the language of traditional aesthetic theory, a thing 'appreciated', in Dickie's sense, is 'immediately', rather than 'mediately', consummatory. The question whether Duchamp's gesture can be 'appreciated' in this sense is thus equivalent to the question whether 'aesthetic experience' can be elicited in receivers either by entities altogether lacking in 'directly exhibited' properties, or by the 'non-exhibited' properties of entities which also possess 'directly exhibited' perceptible properties. If we answer both of these questions in the affirmative, we commit ourselves to the existence of 'aesthetic properties' which are not perceivable properties, a clear departure from traditional conceptions of the 'aesthetic' and from the etymological roots of the term itself.

We might, of course, attempt to restrict the use of the term 'aesthetic' to those contexts where the qualities experienced as valuable <u>are</u> perceptual in nature, and it may be in the interests of such restriction that Dickie wishes to deny that 'appreciation' is to be understood in any special 'aesthetic' sense. It is clearly such a restricted sense of 'aesthetic', and consequently of 'aesthetic experience', which Binkley has in mind in the following passage:

> Because of its initial orientation towards perception, aesthetics assumes that a certain kind of experience is essential to art...But for a great deal of contemporary art, experience is but a mode of access to the art, much as the experience of reading a calculus book is a mode of access to the mathematics. This non-experiential facet of art has been especially prominent since Duchamp. Whether the experience of the art is discomforting or pleasurable matters only secondarily, as it does in mathematics. If we grant that thinking is a kind of experience, then perhaps experience is essential to all art, just as it is to all mathematics. This would be an admission of the failure of aes-

> thetics to cope with art, however, since such experience is not an ingredient in the art, but merely a handle on it. (58)

There are two points which need to be made here, I think, the first pertaining to Dickie's position, and the second to the way in which the concept 'aesthetic' should be employed. Firstly, Binkley's remarks occur in the context of his criticisms of Dickie's 'candidacy' requirement, and are supported by the 'counter-examples' to that requirement cited above. According to Binkley, Dickie is committed, through his conception of 'appreciation', to the belief that there is an essentially 'experiential' character to the appreciation of artworks. This belief, which can be traced to the pernicious influence of Aesthetics upon the philosophy of art, is shown to be false, it is claimed, by the existence of modern artworks to the appreciation of which experience is only incidental. "Experience', here, is clearly to be understood as perceptual experience. The claim that modern art is frequently 'non-experiential', then, is simply the claim that works such as "Fountain" are not properly appreciated for their 'directly exhibited' qualities. The analogy with mathematics makes the same point; one no more 'appreciates' "Fountain" by admiring the appearance of the urinal than one 'appreciates' a mathematical proof by contemplating the arrangement of ink-marks on the page. But none of this will weigh against Dickie's position unless the reference of the term 'experiencing', as it occurs in the definition of 'appreciation', is limited to perceptual experience, and the qualities in which value or worth is found are thereby limited to perceptible qualities. If, as I have suggested, Dickie intends no such limitations to apply, Binkley's arguments are

inconclusive. What he would need to show, if his 'counter-examples' are to count against Dickie's definition, is that the proper reception of such works cannot be coherently described as a finding of value in the non-perceptual experience of non-perceptible qualities. The coherence of such a description, I have suggested, will depend upon the account given of the nature and limits of 'aesthetic experience' in general.

This leads into the second point, which concerns the use of the term 'aesthetic' by both Dickie and Binkley. Binkley explicitly identifies 'aesthetic experience' with perceptual experience, and Dickie appears to be making the same identification in his denial that 'appreciation is to be understood as 'aesthetic appreciation'. Dickie may be doing his own position a dis-service, however, in that one way in which he might support the claim that his notion of 'appreciation' can encompass both traditional artworks and modern works of the sort cited by Binkley would be by arguing that, in both cases, the experience elicited, in receiving the works, is 'aesthetic'; and that what is significant is not whether the experience of the work is perceptual or non-perceptual, but that the experience is 'immediately' consummatory in some sense. Aside from Dickie's possible interests in the matter, there is a further consideration which might lead one to question the restriction of the 'aesthetic' to the 'perceptual', and of 'aesthetic properties' to perceptible properties. There would seem to be a class of 'aesthetic experiences' the eliciting of which cannot be accounted for by reference to the 'directly exhibited' perceptible properties of objects, namely, those which attend the 'appreciation' of such things as mathematical and logical 'proofs', solutions to chess puzzles, etc. In such cases, it might be said that 'appreciation' involves a finding of

value in experiencing qualities of a particular proof or solution, but, clearly, neither the experience nor the qualities are perceptual in nature. If we admit such cases as examples of 'aesthetic experience', and if 'appreciation' in such cases is properly characterisable by reference to Dickie's definition of the term, we might also allow that the proper reception of "Fountain" and similar works involves an analogous form of 'appreciation', and that the experience elicited in receiving such works is analogously 'aesthetic'.

I shall conclude this chapter by examining one further objection that has been raised against Dickie's candidacy requirement by a number of commentators. The objections thus far examined have been primarily concerned with establishing that Dickie's notion of 'candidate for appreciation' is too restrictive, in that it excludes certain accepted artworks. It may also be argued, however, that the notion is not restrictive enough, in that it will classify as art certain things not accepted as being artworks. Having the status of 'candidate for appreciation' within the 'artworld', it has been claimed, is not only not a necessary condition of arthood, it is not even a sufficient condition. Two examples may serve to illustrate the problem which Dickie faces in respect of the 'sufficiency' of the 'candidacy' requirement. The first of these is provided by Binkley:

> A brief biography of an artist mounted on the gallery wall beside his works is 1) an artifact 2) a set of aspects of which has had conferred upon it the status of candidate for appreciation by some person or persons acting on behalf of the artworld. The director of the gallery is acting in his or her capacity as a member of the artworld in 'exhibiting' the biographical sketch to be appreciated by visitors to the gallery. We appreciate knowing something about the person who made the art. But the biographical sketch is not a work of art. (59)

It might be objected here that, while the gallery director is indeed acting on behalf of the 'artworld', he is not acting in the capacity necessary to produce a work of art. Dickie, it will be recalled, distinguishes various roles within what he terms the 'presentation group', where the latter represents the 'core personnel' of any system of the 'artworld'. Within the 'presentation group', there are 'artists', who produce the works to be presented, 'presenters', who present them, and 'goers', who receive the the works thus presented. Each of these roles, it is claimed, is 'institutionalised' in that a certain knowledge of the social practices of the 'artworld' is required in order to perform a given role. The director in Binkley's hypothetical example, it would seem, is acting in the role of presenter, and thus his actions do not result in the production of a work of art.

While Dickie might try to meet Binkley's objection in this manner, his definition of 'work of art' might not allow him to make the requisite distinction between the different roles performable within the 'artworld'. The director is clearly acting on behalf of the 'artworld', and he is also clearly conferring the status of 'candidate for appreciation' in some sense. If his so acting is to be distinguishable from the artist's performance of <u>his</u> role within the 'artworld', we seem to require, once again, a more specific account of the nature of the 'artistic act' of 'status-conferral' which <u>does</u> result in the production of a work of art. What, we might enquire, is the 'role-specific knowledge' necessary to perform the 'institutionalised' role of 'artist'?

That Binkley's example is not an isolated case, and that it exemplifies a more general problem with Dickie's definition of 'work of art', may be shown by means of a second example in which the person

conferring the status of 'candidate' is an artist, and the artifact on which this status is conferred is something which the conferrer has himself created. Among the social practices of the 'artworld' pertaining to the presentation of artworks for the 'appreciation' of receivers is the 'practice' of holding an 'opening' for an exhibition of works by a given artist, or group of artists. At such an opening, it is an accepted practice to offer refreshments of various sorts to those attending. Consider the case of an artist for an exhibition of whose works such an opening is being held, who, being a man of varied talents, concocts, by dint of skills perfected through long experience, a punch of a singularly potent and flavourful nature. This punch is then offered to those who attend the opening, in the hope that they will find value or worth in experiencing those singular qualities which it possesses. The punch is 1) an artifact 2) a set of the aspects of which has had conferred upon it the status of candidate for appreciation by some person acting on behalf of the artworld. That the artist is acting on behalf of the 'artworld' seems indisputable, given Dickie's characterisation of the 'artworld' as a bundle of systems of social practices for the presenting of artworks, since the serving of refreshments at openings is a recognised social practice of this sort. Clearly, as with Binkley's example, what Dickie must say about such a case is that the person 'conferring the status of candidate for appreciation' in this situation is not acting in the role of 'artist', even though he may act in this role at other times, and that his act of 'status-conferral' is therefore not of the sort required to produce a work of art. Again, however, it is difficult to see how Dickie can make the requisite distinction with the resources which his definition makes available. The

artist's paintings and his punch are both artifacts which he has created and both are offered as 'candidates for appreciation' within the 'artworld', and, indeed, within the same setting within the 'artworld'. Yet the first are artworks and the second is not. Wherein, then, lies the difference between them? While they seem to call for different kinds of appreciation, both kinds of appreciation seem to fall within Dickie's definition of the term.

The preceding examples confirm, I think, the conclusions reached in respect of the other objections to Dickie's 'candidacy' requirement considered above. The 'actual employment' of the concept 'art' within the artistic community, it would seem, cannot be adequately elucidated in terms of the conferred status of 'candidate for appreciation' if this status is itself elucidated simply in terms of eligibility to be presented for appreciation within the 'artworld'. When so construed, the possession of such status seems to be neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of arthood. It is not a necessary condition since the creations of the 'contemptuous artist' and the 'Romantic artist' fall within the class of accepted artworks, yet the required act of status conferral cannot be attributed to the artist in either case. It is not a sufficient condition since the requisite status is possessed by both the director's biography and the artist's punch, yet neither of these is included in the class of accepted artworks. If Dickie's theory is to account for the 'actual employment' of the concept 'art', therefore, the acquisition and possession of the status of 'candidate for appreciation' must be elucidated in terms different from those thus far considered. Dickie must argue, in other words, that the objections rest on a misconception of what is involved in the 'candidacy' requirement.

What elements in his definition, then, might be the objects of such an act of misconstrual? While certain objections to his definition may arguably rest upon a misinterpretation of his notion of 'appreciation', it would seem that no such misinterpretation can be involved in the objections currently under consideration. The notion of 'candidacy' seems to be similarly unproblematic in these contexts. What objectors to Dickie's theory may be misconstruing, however, is his conception of the nature of the 'artistic act' necessary for the production of works of art, namely, the act of 'status-conferral'. 'Status-conferral', as the means whereby artistic status is acquired, seems to be an especially elusive notion in the context of Dickie's later formulation of the 'candidacy' requirement; for while it is not too difficult to imagine mechanisms through which the status of 'candidate' might be conferred upon an artifact, the mechanisms that might be involved in conferring this status upon a 'set of aspects' of an artifact are considerably more mysterious. To meet the objections to his 'candidacy' requirement, then, it seems that Dickie must show that 'status-conferral', when properly understood, can occur in the absence of any intention by the artist that his product should be presented for appreciation within the 'artworld', and that it does not occur in respect of cases like the director's biography and the artist's punch. What is required, in short, is a detailed elucidation of the nature of that 'artistic act' the performance of which is held to be a necessary condition of arthood, and thus a specification of the 'knowledge' which is necessary for one to perform the 'institutionalised' role of 'artist', and of the mechanism whereby such 'knowledge' is operative in the conferral of the status of 'candidate' upon an artifact or upon a set of its aspects.

In the following chapter, I shall argue that Dickie provides no such elucidation, either in his earlier book, Aesthetics: an Introduction, nor in his discussion of the 'Institutional Theory' of art in the first chapter of his later book, Art and the Aesthetic. I shall also consider Binkley's claim that the notion of 'status-conferral' does not provide an adequate description of the mechanism involved in the 'artistic act' of 'calling it art', and his alternative conception of 'artistic acts' as acts of 'piece-specification'. I shall argue that both 'status-conferral', as explicated by Dickie in the aforementioned contexts, and 'piece-specification', as explicated by Binkley, are inadequate, and that their inadequacy stems from a misconstrual of the role of 'artistic acts' in the creation of works of art. In the final part of this paper, I shall consider whether Dickie can provide an adequate elucidation of his notion of 'status-conferral' in terms of the notion of the 'aesthetic object' which he develops in the remaining chapters of Art and the Aesthetic.

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Chapter Ten The Function of 'Artistic Acts'

In the preceding pages, I have frequently had occasion to refer to the views of Timothy Binkley, as expressed in his paper, "Deciding About Art".(1) Binkley advances a more radical metatheoretical thesis than either Dickie or Weitz, in that he maintains that an adequate philosophical account of art must dispense with both of the methodological principles of traditional philosophy of art. Weitz, as I have argued, appears to be at least implicitly committed to the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance', while Dickie explicitly espouses the 'Essentialist Principle'. In developing his thesis, Binkley engages in a critical dialogue with the views of the other two theorists, and it is largely in this capacity as critic that he has thus far been relevant to the concerns of this paper. Binkley's radicalism, however, is not dedicated to a purely critical cause, but also operates in the service of a more positive thesis. In criticising Dickie's notion of 'status-conferral', he proposes an alternative account of the nature of the 'artistic acts' whose performance is held to result in the creation of artworks. Such acts, he claims, are to be regarded as acts of 'piece-specification', and a work of art "is a piece specified within artistic indexing conventions", although "this is not a definition of 'work of art'".(2) Clearly, it would seem, it cannot be such a definition if Binkley's positive thesis is to be consistent with his methodological radicalism. Why he denies that it is a definition, and whether his denial is justified, are questions to which I shall return later. What is significant in the present context, however, is that Binkley's reasons for rejecting Dickie's notion of 'status-conferral' are essentially

the same as those which he offers in support of his own notion of 'piece-specification'. Before examining his criticisms of Dickie's notion, therefore, it will be necessary to sketch briefly the argument of his paper as a whole, insofar as it relates to the postive thesis which he proposes.

Binkley begins by describing a situation in which we might be uncertain as to whether a given object is, or is not, a work of art. If we find such uncertainty discomforting and wish to resolve the issue, how might we go about deciding as to the arthood or non-arthood of such an object? The consideration of 'artistic puzzlement' earlier in this paper suggests two possible decision-procedures. We might refer the recalcitrant object to a definition of art, if one is available, or we might compare it to 'paradigm' artworks to see if it exhibits sufficient 'family resemblance' in relevant respects to merit our extending the concept 'art' to encompass it. Binkley, however, argues that neither of these procedures is acceptable. He offers an argument which purports to show that "art cannot be defined", and thus that no definition of art is available as a standard for 'deciding about art'. While this thesis may appear to be equivalent to Weitz's claim that 'art' is an 'open' concept, Binkley denies such an equivalence, and argues that Weitz's 'family resemblance' account of art suffers from the same inadequacy as traditional definitions of art, namely, that both types of account "make the fundamental error of aesthetics, which is to suppose that arthood is a function of (aesthetic) properties of objects".(3) The concept 'art' is not properly characterised as 'open'; rather, he claims, it is 'radically open'. Having dispensed with Weitz, Binkley turns his attention to Dickie's definition of art, which, as he recog-

nises, manages to evade his 'anti-definition' argument by defining art in terms of 'non-exhibited' characteristics, and, more specifically, in terms of the performance of 'artistic acts'. He argues that Dickie's theory is inadequate for a different reason, namely, that it misconstrues the nature of the 'artistic act' necessary for the creation of artworks. Binkley's alternative conception of 'artistic acts', as acts of 'piece-specification', is central to all three stages of his argument - his 'anti-definition' argument against traditional theories of art, his argument from the 'radical openness' of art against Weitz, and his rejection of Dickie's notion of 'status-conferral'. I shall attempt to clarify this conception by examining its use in each of these stages.

Binkley outlines his strategy against traditional theories of art as follows: "A formula will be given for producing artworks which stand as counter examples to specific definitions of art claiming to distinguish art from what is not art. Any proposed definition is disproved by being subjected to the formula".(4) The 'formula' which he gives employs the notion of 'specifying something as a piece', and Binkley introduces this notion, in a manner reminiscent of Dickie's introduction of the notion of 'status-conferral', by reference to Duchamp's 'Readymades':

> One thing Duchamp demonstrated with these artworks is that in order to 'create' a work of art it is necessary only to <u>specify</u> what the artwork is. An artist may specify as a piece an object he has designed, but that is not a <u>sine qua non</u> of arthood. (5)

One way of specifying a piece is by bringing into being "aesthetic qualities", which Binkley characterises as "aspects of the appearance of an object or event" such as beauty or expressiveness, but this is not the only way; indeed, "all one need do is to make clear what he intends the

piece to be".[6] Binkley then sets out his 'anti-definition' formula in the following manner:

> The formula gives instructions for making a piece, Pi, with reference to a definition of art, Di. So let Di be any definition of art. Appeal to a defender of Di to exhibit an example of something which, according to the definition, is not art. If no defender can be found... you may do it yourself. The piece, Pi, will consist of this example of non-art.
> The formula has roughly three steps for arriving at the artwork Pi: (1) Secure a definition of art; (2) Find an example, Ei, of non-art on the basis of criteria articulated by Di; (3) The piece, Pi, is specified to be the example, Ei: Pi = Ei. (7)

Does Binkley's 'formula' prove, as it is claimed to do, that art cannot be defined? If Binkley's anti-definitional argument is to succeed, it will require the support of further arguments in at least two respects. Firstly, it must be shown that actual pieces might be created corresponding to 'Pi' in his formula for any given definition of art, and that such pieces, if created, would be works of art. Clearly, if no such actual pieces could exist, or if they would not be artworks, a definition of art cannot be criticised for excluding such pieces from the class of actual or possible artworks. Binkley, however, claims that his argument is not open to this kind of objection. Pieces corresponding to 'Pi' for any given 'Di' could be successfully 'executed', or 'created', if, for instance, such 'execution' were performed by a recognised artist by means of methods which artists have already employed successfully in the creation of works of art:

> One method would be to publish the pieces somewhere... One could explain the pieces, specify the definition, and list the examples of non-art which constitute the (pieces). Another method would be to convince the director of a gallery to allow space and time for the documentation

> of the pieces. Pictures or descriptions of each piece could be mounted on the gallery walls, along with an explanation of the project...Either of these two methods, I claim, would be sufficient to establish the proposed pieces as actual works of art, because these methods have already been successfully employed by artists. (8)

That such pieces would be genuine works of art could only be disputed, he claims, if we were also prepared to reject, as art, 'conceptual' artworks such as Barry's piece referred to above. The only relevant difference between 'conceptual' pieces and the counter-definitional pieces is that the latter are created "with an ulterior philosophical motive", but "it would be simple enough to imagine them occurring in a more artistic context and serving a more artistic purpose".(9) Binkley also discounts the suggestion that 'conceptual' pieces are not art on the grounds that the practice and discourse of the artistic community clearly indicates that they are.

There is a further respect, however, in which Binkley's argument, as it stands, is insufficient to establish the conclusion which he desires to reach. In examining Weitz's claim that 'art' is an 'open concept', I distinguished two senses of 'openness'. A concept is '$open_1$' if the conditions under which that concept is correctly applied within a linguistic community are emendable, in the sense that some instance n can be imagined or secured such that the applicability or non-applicability of the concept to n cannot be determined by reference to these conditions of application. A concept is '$open_2$' if the conditions of correct application of that concept within a given linguistic community do not specify a set of necessary and sufficient conditions which any instance m must meet if the concept is to be correctly applicable to it. Since it is arguable that all empirical concepts are '$open_1$', the claim

that the concept 'art' is '$open_i$' is neither particularly significant nor particularly interesting. Weitz, as we have seen, argues that 'art' is necessarily '$open_2$', on the grounds that its being '$closed_2$' would be incompatible with the essentially adventurous and expansive nature of artistic activity. If Binkley's 'anti-definition' argument is to be of interest, then, as with Weitz, it must establish, or at least purport to establish, the '$open_2$ness', and not merely the '$open_i$ness' of the concept 'art'. The argument as thus far examined, however, seems only to establish that 'art' is '$open_i$'. The fact that a piece n can be imagined for any definition of 'art', such that we would wish to classify n as an artwork and such that we could only do so by emending the conditions of application of the concept as prescribed by that definition, does not, by itself, establish that the concept either is, or should be, '$open_2$' within any particular linguistic community. It is possible, as we saw, to provide such an instance n for the concept 'bachelor', yet the concept is '$closed_2$' within our linguistic community, and the existence of such an instance n provides no good reason for emending the existing conditions of application until this instance is actually produced for classification. The relevance of instances of this sort for the '$open_2$ness' of a concept, be it 'art' or 'bachelor', lies not in their being producible, given sufficient imagination, but rather in their being continually or frequently produced within the linguistic community in which the concept is employed. It is this which Binkley needs to show, in respect of those instances n producible by means of his 'formula', if he is to establish that the concept 'art' either is or should be '$open_2$' within some specified linguistic community.

Binkley's arguments pertaining to the relevance of his 'anti-

definition' formula for the 'open$_2$ness of 'art' are contained in his account of the 'radical openness' of 'art'. This account is advanced as a criticism of Weitz's conception of 'art' as an 'open concept', although, as has already been suggested and as will be further seen, the critical force of his objections to Weitz is somewhat blunted by his failure to recognise, in Weitz's 'generalisation argument', a conception of 'openness' very similar to his own. Binkley takes Weitz's claim that 'art' is an 'open concept' to be no more than a particular application of the more general thesis that all concepts, save those of logic and mathematics, are 'open' in that situations can arise calling for the emendation of their conditions of application. On the basis of this interpretation of Weitz's position, he argues that Weitz has failed to capture "the unique way in which art is indefinable":

> (On Weitz's account), the indefinability of art is the indefinability of almost every concept we use. By contrast, the indefinability (argued for on the basis of the 'anti-definition' formula) is unique to the concept 'art'... The concept 'art' is not just open, along with most other concepts; it is radically open, radically indefinable. (10)

He attempts to elucidate the 'radical openness' of 'art' by contrasting it with the concept 'game'. In the case of the latter, he claims, its 'openness' is quite adequately elucidated in terms of those considerations which Weitz adduces to justify the 'openness' of 'art', namely, that "new conditions (cases) have constantly arisen and will undoubtedly constantly arise" calling for decisions as to whether or not the concept should be extended.(11) Such an account, however, cannot adequately elucidate the 'openness' of 'art':

> What makes art different is that cases do not simply arise which force us to shuffle about trying to update our system of concepts. The artist is free consciously to create a work - an artwork - which calls into question or flagrantly violates some salient feature of the concept 'art' as it stood prior to the creation of the work. If art can be conceptual, the concept 'art' is grist for its mill. The history of recent art is the pyrotechnic pageant of one after another familiar feature of art being purposely called into question and deleted or exalted in the creation of works of art. The radical openness of the concept 'art' is the artist's freedom to discuss and challenge the concept itself in his artworks. (12)

The difference between a concept like 'game' and the concept 'art' is reflected in the fact that no 'anti-definition' argument analogous to the one provided for art could be formulated for the concept 'game':

> There is nothing about games, nothing about making up and playing games, which demands that the concept be open. The concept 'game' could be applied to a more restricted set of things and defined with necessary and sufficient conditions without thereby seriously affecting our ability to do what we now do with the concept...The only reason the concept is open is that it takes in too wide a variety of things for there to be a single feature found in them all. This is undoubtedly true of art too, but it does not tell us anything about the unique indefinability of 'art'. What makes 'art' different is that it is centrally involved with the creation of new instances of the concept, while it is possible that no new games be invented in the future without seriously harming the concept 'game'. In other words, unlike 'game', there is something about 'art' which makes it really an open concept. This is what I am calling radical openness...Artists are not bound by definitions of art. They have the license to violate them if only they have the ingenuity. Extending and changing the concept 'art' is the business of art today, and not merely the by-product of the creative genius of a few people. (13)

I have reproduced Binkley's argument at some length in order to bring out the degree to which it resembles the argument from 'radical creativity' outlined in the discussion, above, of Weitz's 'generalisation argument'. Binkley's claim might be rephrased, in the terminology

of that argument, as the claim that the 'radically creative' nature of modern art is incompatible with any attempt to define 'art', since any such definition will prevent the artist from exercising his creativity and thus from pursuing his art. 'Art' differs from 'game' in being not simply 'open$_2$' within our linguistic community, but necessarily 'open$_2$' within that community. While certain empirical concepts may be arbitrarily 'closed$_2$', 'art' is not one of them. It will be recalled, however, that the argument from 'radical creativity' was put forward as a possible elucidation of Weitz's claim, in the 'generalisation argument', that "the very expansive, adventurous character of art...makes it logically impossible to ensure any set of defining properties".(14) In view of this, it is somewhat uncharitable of Binkley to accuse Weitz of failing to distinguish between the 'radical openness' of 'art' and the 'openness' of 'game', since this distinction is clearly to be found in Weitz's paper, albeit in a much less developed form.

While both Binkley and Weitz offer arguments for the necessary 'open$_2$ness' of 'art', there are, nonetheless, important differences between their positions in respect of the 'logic' of the concept 'art', and it is upon these differences that Binkley focusses in his other criticisms of Weitz. According to Weitz(15), the arthood of novel entities is determined by means of "decisions on the part of those interested, usually professional critics", to either extend or not extend the concept 'art' to incorporate such entities. Such critical decisions are made on the basis of 'family resemblances' between candidates for arthood and existing 'paradigms' of art, where the relevant resemblances are those prescribed by the 'criteria of recognition'. Binkley, however, rejects both the idea that it is critics who 'decide about art', and the

idea that such decisions are made on the basis of 'family resemblances'. In the first place, it is artists, not critics, who extend the concept 'art' through the exercise of their 'radical freedom' to specify new pieces: "By the time an artist proffers something as an artwork, the decision about its art status has already been made...The concept 'art' changes because it is changed by artists, and not by professional critics as Weitz would have it".(16) Whether a given entity is an artwork depends upon whether it has been 'created' as art by an artist's performing an 'artistic act' of 'piece-specification', and our uncertainty as to the arthood of certain entities is a function of our being unsure as to "what the intentions of its author(s) were regarding art status".(17) This is not to say that there is a special class of persons, namely artists, who are somehow empowered to create artworks as and how they will:

> Anyone can be an artist, even in his spare time. What is crucial is the act of specifying a piece, and the artist is simply the specifier. Success at specifying is not a question of whether you're an artist, but rather of whether you know and can use existing specifying conventions, or else can establish new ones. (18)

The reference to 'specifying conventions', here, is interesting, in that we might expect such conventions to impose some limitations on the types of entity that can correctly be specified as pieces. More specifically, we might expect that a given convention would prescribe certain properties, or types of property, which any piece specified by means of that convention must possess. The pieces specifiable within a given convention might then share some common property, or set of properties, or exhibit 'family resemblance' in respect of certain types of

property, and the artist, in performing acts of 'piece-specification, would be guided by defining conditions of arthood, or 'criteria of recognition', implicit in the specifying conventions employed. In such a case, an adequate account of art might be given, not in terms of the 'artistic act' necessary to create an artwork, but in terms of those properties possessed by all artworks so created by means of the 'specifying conventions' maintained within a given linguistic community. Binkley, however, rejects any attempt to account for arthood by reference to the properties possessed by artworks, whether these properties be construed as defining conditions or as 'strands of similarities' constituting 'family resemblance'. Even if a given 'specifying convention' were to prescribe certain properties for all pieces specifiable within it, there may be a number of acceptable 'specifying conventions' maintained within a given artistic community, and, in any case, the artist is at liberty to evade any limitations imposed by existing conventions by simply establishing new ones. The act of 'piece-specification', therefore, is not governed by either implicit 'defining conditions of arthood' or implicit 'criteria of recognition', and the 'family resemblance' account of art succumbs just as readily to the 'anti-definition' argument as do traditional definitions of art:

> Presumably the family resemblances structuring the concept of art act in some way to discriminate clear cases of non-art: some entities will conspicuously fail to be members of the art family. Suppose one of these entities is E<u>i</u>. My piece will be E<u>i</u>. Q.E.D. Family resemblances have no more power than necessary conditions to distinguish art from what is not. The artist in the house has license to lodge any vagabond or renegade he takes a liking to. This is because properties of objects are fundamentally irrelevant to art status, a point which might be made by saying that arthood is a relation, not a property. (19)

The point which Binkley is making in the final sentence of the passage cited is presumably that arthood is, or is a function of, a relational property of objects, rather than being, or being a function of, a 'directly exhibited' property of objects. 'Being specified as a piece' is clearly a property of artworks, on Binkley's account, although it is a property of the former, rather than the latter, kind. This terminological discrepancy does not affect the case against Weitz, however, insofar as the 'family resemblances' to which he refers relate to the 'directly exhibited' and not to the 'non-exhibited' or 'relational' properties possessed by artworks. And, as was argued in chapter eight, while certain of Weitz's 'criteria of recognition' relate to 'non-exhibited' properties, he seems to be committed to the view that 'family resemblance' in respect of some 'directly exhibited' properties to 'paradigm' artworks is a necessary condition of correct application of the concept 'art'. It is the commitment of both Weitz and the traditional theorists to the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance' as it pertains to the 'A-relevant$_2$' properties of objects that renders them equally vulnerable to the 'anti-definition' argument, and equally incapable of accounting for the 'radical openness' of the concept 'art'.

Dickie, on the other hand, appears to be neither explicitly nor implicitly committed to this principle, at least insofar as 'aesthetic properties are limited to the 'directly exhibited' properties of objects as Binkley himself maintains. He, like Binkley, proposes to account for the arthood of an entity by reference to an 'artistic act' performed by the artist, and thus by reference to a 'relational' property of an entity rather than a 'directly exhibited' one. Dickie thus manages to evade both the 'anti-definition' argument and the argument

from the 'radical openness' of art. The argument from 'radical openness' is essentially the same as the argument from 'radical creativity' presented in chapter eight, and, as was seen in the examination of the latter argument, 'radical creativity' is only incompatible with definitions of art whose defining conditions refer to 'A-relevant$_i$' properties of artworks. Dickie's definition in terms of 'status-conferral' appears to impose no limitations on the properties that can be 'A-relevant$_i$'; in this respect, it resembles Binkley's account of the arthood of an object, as a function of the performance of an act of 'piece-specification'. Nor will the 'anti-definition' argument defeat Dickie's definition of art. There will, of course, be examples of type E$\underline{i}$ for Dickie's definition, namely, those things which have not had conferred upon them the requisite status. It would seem, however, that the performance of the 'artistic act' of specifying E$\underline{i}$ as a piece will suffice to confer upon E$\underline{i}$ the status of art. The piece, P$\underline{i}$, therefore, cannot stand as a counter-example to the definition since, once specified, it <u>is</u> an artwork according to Dickie's theory. As Binkley himself realises, "Dickie circumvents the logic of the anti-definition argument by characterising art in terms of what seems to be the act required to transform the examples of non-art into art"; it follows that "any definition relevantly similar to Dickie's is not defeated by the matrix of counter-definition pieces".(20)

Indeed, we may wonder whether Binkley has any cause to quarrel with Dickie's account of art. Dickie, after all, agrees with Binkley that arthood is not a matter of 'directly exhibited' properties, but results, rather, from an 'artistic act' performed by the artist. Both writers, further, claim that the 'artistic act' in question, while going unnot-

iced in the company of the more apparent 'aesthetic' properties of traditional artworks, was made manifest by Duchamp in the creation of his 'Readymades'. Might not 'status-conferral' and 'piece-specification' be the same act going under different names? And might not the 'specifying conventions' to which Binkley refers be those 'social practices' of the 'artworld' of which the artist must have knowledge, on Dickie's theory, in order to confer the status of art? What is puzzling, in the face of such apparent agreement, is Dickie's adamant assertion that art can be defined in terms of 'non-exhibited' properties, and Binkley's equally adamant assertion that no definition of art is possible. Might this also be an overt difference disguising a covert agreement?

Whatever Dickie's views might be on such questions, Binkley firmly rejects any suggestion that their positions are essentially the same. He argues that there are significant differences between the notion of 'piece-specification' and the notion of 'status-conferral', and that it is the former rather than the latter that accurately describes the nature of the 'artistic act' involved in the creation of works of art. His strategy, in criticising Dickie's definition of 'work of art', is to argue, firstly, that the most crucial element in the 'Institutional' definition is the notion of 'status-conferral', and, secondly, that the notion of 'status-conferral' gives an inadequate description of the mechanism whereby artworks come into existence. The arguments which he offers for the first of these conclusions have already been examined in chapter nine. Briefly, his claim is that neither the 'artifactuality' requirement nor the 'candidacy' requirement, nor, indeed, the two taken together, can adequately elucidate the 'actual employment' of the concept 'art'.Since Dickie allows that natural objects may become artworks

through simultaneously acquiring both the status of 'art' and the status of 'artifact', the 'artifactuality' requirement does not serve to exclude anything from the class of actual or potential artworks, and thus makes no substantial assertion. The 'candidacy' requirement fares little better, since being a 'candidate for apprecaition', in the sense which Dickie seems to intend, is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of arthood.

If the 'inadequate' requirements for 'artifactuality' and 'candidacy' are removed from Dickie's definition, then, Binkley claims, we are left with the obviously circular thesis that "a work of art is something upon which some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the artworld) has conferred the status of work of art".(21) Dickie, in fact, explicitly recognises an element of circularity in his definition, even as it stands before Binkley's radical surgery, but he contends that this circularity is not "vicious" since the 'circle' in question is neither small nor uninformative. Rather, "the whole account in which the definition is embedded contains a great deal of information about the artworld".(22) He further suggests that a similar problem of circularity "will arise frequently, perhaps always, when institutional concepts are dealt with".(23) I shall return below to the problem of circularity in Dickie's definition. Binkley, however, is prepared to accept that Dickie's circle is informative, though not for the reasons which Dickie specifies. Rather, "the circle is indeed informative since it displays the material vacuity of the indexical concept 'artwork'. To be an artwork is like being thought about by someone; artworks share no common properties or even a network of similarities, but only a 'place' in the artworld".(24) Given this assessment

of the situation, the only thing that remains to be determined with respect to Dickie's definition is whether the notion of 'status-conferral' accurately describes the way in which such a 'place' is secured.

Binkley claims that the notions of 'status-conferral' and 'piece-specification' differ in two respects relevant to their relative adequacy as descriptions of the way in which artistic status is acquired. Firstly, there is a difference in the number of distinct actions required to create an artwork. A conferral of status requires two distinct actions, one to identify the thing upon which status is to be conferred, and a second to actually confer status upon that thing. Specifying a piece, on the other hand, requires only one action, namely, the act of specification itself. It is not necessary, or even possible, to perform a preliminary act of isolating or identifying something to be specified as a piece, since the isolation of the piece is accomplished by the very act of specification. The creation of artworks, it is claimed, is accomplished through a single act of 'piece-specification'. Once the piece has been specified by means of a 'piece-specifying convention' there is no need to perform an additional act to confer the status of 'art', since the use of such a convention guarantees that the piece which is so specified will be art:

> Artworks are created, not by christening things to be art, but rather by specifying pieces...One can make a piece without explicit conferral, but one cannot confer art status without explicitly making (specifying) a piece. Endowing something with a status is not enough; one must create by bringing a new piece into existence. The artist does not 'make this X into an artwork', he 'makes this artwork Y', where 'Y' tells what the piece is. (25)

If we are to properly evaluate Binkley's claim that artworks are

created by a single act of 'piece-specification', we will require further clarification as to the nature of the 'conventions' within which such acts are performed and the nature of the acts which comply with such 'conventions'. I shall defer consideration of these matters, however, pending an examination of the second purported difference between 'conferral' and 'specification'. What may be noted here, though, is that the first purported difference between these two notions rests upon a particular interpretation of Dickie's notion of 'status-conferral', namely, that it involves an explicit, and presumably intentional, act whereby the artist confers the requisite status upon a pre-identified object. We have already seen, however, that if 'status-conferral' is construed in this way, and if the status in question is taken to be that of 'candidate for appreciation', then Dickie's theory seems to be unacceptable for the more basic reason that it cannot account for artworks produced by the 'Romantic artist' and the 'contemptuous artist'. Binkley, having argued on such grounds for the rejection of the 'candidacy' requirement, now takes Dickie's primary claim to be that arthood is a conferred status of <u>some</u> sort, where 'conferral' is still taken to require some explicit and intentional act of conferring status upon a pre-identified entity. It is Binkley's claim that no such act of conferral is required to create art. However, if Dickie's conception of the mechanism of 'status-conferral' were to differ from the view attributed to him, in that the status of art could be conferred without the conferrer's intending that his creation be a 'candidate for appreciation' in the specified sense, this might enable Dickie to deal not only with Binkley's objections to the 'candidacy' requirement but also with his objections to the notion of 'status-conferral' as an adequate

description of the 'artistic act' necessary to impart arthood to an entity. Binkley's argument against 'status-conferral' on the grounds that it is a 'two-stage' activity, therefore, does not really provide any fresh insights into the nature and tenability of Dickie's position, but only points out further difficulties in a position already seen to be problematic.

The second difference between 'status-conferral' and 'piece-specification', according to Binkley, is that the former occurs within an extensional context whereas the latter does not. Binkley supports this claim by reference to those analogues which Dickie offers to explain the notion of 'status-conferral' as it figures in his definition of 'work of art'. Dickie asserts that,

> ...in a way analogous to the way in which a person is certified as qualified for an office, or two persons acquire the status of common law marriage within a legal system, or a person is elected president of the Rotary, or a person acquires the status of wise man within a community, so an artifact can acquire the status of candidate for appreciation within the social system called the 'artworld'. (26)

Binkley points out that one feature of 'status-conferral', as exemplified in these analogues, is that it singles out objects extensionally, so that, if a given status in conferred upon x, it is also conferred upon anything extensionally equivalent to x. For example, "if Harry Haller is certified or elected, and if Harry Haller happens to be the loneliest man in the country, then it is true that the loneliest man in the country is certified or elected".(27) He claims that 'status-conferral' cannot adequately describe the way in which arthood is acquired because "artworks...need to be designated intensionally". He

offers two sorts of example to justify the latter claim. Firstly, there are cases where x is an artwork but something co-extensional with x is not:

> Suppose that at 1:36 P.M. on the 15th June, 1969, Robert Barry was not thinking about anything he knows. Then the following two declarations made by Barry will be equivalent:
> (1) I hereby confer art status on everything I know but am not at the moment thinking - 1:36 P.M., 15 June, 1969, New York.
> (2) I hereby confer art status on everything I know.
> If Barry was, for example, daydreaming at the specified moment, (1) and (2) should establish the art status of the same entity, and one merely duplicate the other. However, (2) cannot be used by Barry to create the piece discussed earlier. This is because "Everything I know but am not at the moment thinking..." and "Everything I know" specify two different pieces. The former piece contains reference to a specific moment in time, while the latter does not, and this could be a major artistic difference... The following two declarations are not equivalent:
> (3) I hereby specify my piece to be everything I know but am not at the moment thinking - 1:36 P.M., 15 June, 1969, New York.
> (4) I hereby specify my piece to be everything I know.
> From the fact that someone has created the piece specified in (3), it does not follow that the piece specified in (4) is also a work of art, even if the two are extensionally the same. (28)

Secondly, there are cases where the same extensional entity 'houses', or contains, two or more different artworks. Binkley gives a number of actual or hypothetical examples where this is, or would be, the case. The ubiquitous Duchamp, for instance, painted two pieces on opposite sides of the same canvas. Alternatively, one might hypothesise an artist such as Warhol specifying as a piece, "All the things Robert Barry knows but was not thinking about at 1:36 P.M., 15 June, 1969, New York". If arthood is conferred in an extensional context, Warhol could not make such a piece since the object in question would have

already had the status of art conferred upon it by Barry himself. According to Binkley, however, Warhol can make the piece, and it will be a different artwork from that made by Barry:

> For one thing, it is Warhol's, not Barry's. For another, the two pieces were created at different times. Most important, the two works of art can hardly avoid having entirely different meanings. The interpretation of one will be read in the context of Barry's oeuvre, the interpretation of the other in the context of Warhol's. (29)

Binkley's claim, then, is that cases of either of these sorts cannot be accounted for if the creation of artworks is characterised in terms of 'status-conferral', since the latter identifies its objects extensionally rather than intensionally. Thus, "unless we are willing to give up the concept of an author as a person whose intentions are relevant to what we understand the piece to be, something other than status conferral must serve as a model for artistic creation".(30) There are of course those who would be only too willing to give up the idea that the author's intentions are relevant to our appreciation and understanding of the pieces which he creates. Such persons, as we have seen, would argue that the only properties of an object which are 'A-relevant$_i$' are its 'directly exhibited' 'aesthetic properties', and that the author's intentions, insofar as they cannot be determined from inspecting the work itself, are not 'A-relevant$_i$'. In so arguing, they would manifest their commitment to the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance' in its traditional interpretation, where 'aesthetic properties' are 'directly exhibited' properties of objects. Binkley, in advancing the case for the 'A-relevance$_i$' of the author's intentions, is simultaneously rejecting the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance' as it bears

upon the appreciation of artworks; he has, of course, already rejected that principle as it bears upon something's being an artwork. The most important difference between Barry's actual piece and Warhol's hypothetical one, for instance, is taken to be the different contexts in which the pieces are to be read, and these contexts, constituted by the artists' other works, are clearly not 'directly exhibited' properties of the pieces themselves. Indeed, both pieces lack any such properties. There is an important question here, however, which will increasingly concern us in the pages ahead. If the author's intentions in specifying a piece are relevant, and sometimes even crucially relevant, to our appreciating the piece, or even to our identifying the piece, how are these intentions made available to us, as potential receivers of the work? This question is analogous, if not identical, to one raised a few pages previous, namely, what is the mechanism involved in specifying a piece within a 'piece-specifying convention'? The question is also analogous to one which was raised in connection with Dickie's theory, namely, how is the status of 'candidate for appreciation' conferred upon a set of aspects of an artifact, and, we might now ask, how is a receiver to know which set of aspects of a given artifact the artist wishes him to appreciate, if he does indeed so wish?

That Dickie's reference to a 'set of aspects' of an artifact, in the later formulation of his definition, should be problematic in the same way as Binkley's notion of specifying a piece within 'conventions' is perhaps not merely coincidental. It is, indeed, by means of this addition to his definition that Dickie might be able to deal with those problem cases whose 'intensionality', so Binkley claims, can only be accounted for in terms of 'piece-specification'. Binkley himself rec-

ognises this possibility, although he claims, quite justifiably, that the precise role of the 'set of aspects' in Dickie's account is somewhat unclear. It is indeed unclear, at least in the context of Dickie's discussion of the 'Institutional' theory of art in the first chapter of Art and the Aesthetic. Nonetheless, one might expect Dickie to argue somewhat as follows: "Dickie would presumably try to differentiate the Warhol piece from the extensionally equivalent Barry piece by saying that different sets of aspects of the same entity (All the things Barry knows...) receive a conferred status, thereby allowing two works to have a common basis".(31) Binkley claims that Dickie's adoption of such a strategy would result in a violation of the model of 'status-conferral':

> The sets of aspects singled out to differentiate the two artworks would have to refer in some way to the particular circumstances of the purported 'status-conferral'. In other words, the aspects which separate the Warhol and Barry works are determined in part by the fact that one was done by Barry and the other by Warhol. This means that what receives the conferred status would be identified through details of the individual acts of conferral. (32)

Such features, he argues, are not to be found in those analogues of 'status-conferral', such as christening, which Dickie provides:

> What or who is christened in no way depends upon the particulars of the christening act itself - upon whether, for example, the individual is christened by one person or another, or whether he is christened at one time or another. Moreover, once christened is enough. Persons are christened, not aspects of persons; a person cannot be christened again under some other aspect unless a different status is conferred. Christening has an extensional logic. In response to 'Who was christened?', any reply extensionally equivalent to a true response will fit. This is not true of questions such as, 'What is the artwork?', or 'What became an artwork?'. (33)

Binkley's argument here seems to be somewhat muddled. There is, I

think, nothing unacceptable about the claim that status may be conferred upon the aspects of an artifact rather than upon the artifact itself, although the mechanism involved in the former case may be more difficult to conceive than that involved in the latter. According to Binkley, two distinct actions are required to accomplish an act of 'status-conferral', the first to identify the recipient of status and the second to actually confer status on this recipient. If status is being conferred upon an artifact, the first action will identify the artifact; if the recipient of status is a set of the aspects of an artifact, the first action will identify that set of aspects. In neither case will the second action, the actual conferral of status, affect in any way the identity of the thing receiving status, as identified by the first action. While it might be true that the set of aspects on which status is conferred in the case of the Warhol and Barry works would involve some reference to the date or place of specification, or to the identity of the person conferring status, there is no reason why such aspects cannot receive a given status, unless restrictions are placed upon the possible recipients of that status. Unless there are any 'necessarily unappreciatable entities', no such restriction will apply in the case of the status of 'candidate for appreciation'. It is true, in a sense, that what receives the conferred status, on Dickie's account, "will be identified through details of the individual acts of conferral", if an act of conferral is taken to incorporate the two distinct actions specified in Binkley's analysis; but in this sense, of course, any act of status-conferral will be so characterisable. Nor does the fact that the recipients of status, in the case of christening, are persons, rather than aspects of persons, provide any basis for rejecting the

idea that the recipients of status, in the case of art, are aspects of artifacts, rather than artifacts. And, finally, the 'extensional logic' of acts of status-conferral will pose no problems if the recipients of status are aspects of artifacts and not artifacts themselves. If Dickie has a problem accounting for the works by Barry and Warhol, it is not because there is an incoherence in the notion that status can be conferred upon 'sets of aspects' of artifacts, but because he might have difficulty specifying what the artifact is, different aspects of which are recipients of status in the two cases.

It might appear that the difference between Binkley and Dickie on this issue is purely terminological. Binkley seems to be arguing that, since the recipient of status, on Dickie's 'set of aspects' account, depends upon the act of status-conferral itself, and since all of the analogues of conferral are two-stage activities where the recipient of status is not so dependent, what Dickie is describing is not true 'status-conferral', but rather a one-stage activity better described as 'piece-specification'. There is , however, another difference between their two accounts, in this context, which Binkley fails to notice. The artwork, according to Binkley, is the piece which is intensionally specified, and this seems to be equivalent to the 'set of aspects' which receives the status of 'candidate for appreciation' on Dickie's account. For Dickie, on the other hand, it is not the 'set of aspects' which is the 'artwork', but the artifact to which the set of aspects belongs. Dickie might, therefore, experience greater difficulty than Binkley in giving an intelligible description of a situation where two 'artworks' are lodged in a single artifact. More importantly, Dickie is committed to a distinction between the work of art, on the one hand, and the

proper object of appreciation, on the other. As will be seen in chapter eleven, this distinction cashes out, in Dickie's theory, as the distinction between the physical object, or 'artwork', and the 'aesthetic object'. Binkley, on the other hand, seems to be committed to no such distinction, since the proper object of appreciation is presumably the piece itself. This difference in their positions will prove significant if there are good reasons for rejecting the 'artwork/aesthetic object' dichotomy.(34)

There is one further difference between Binkley and Dickie which must briefly be considered. As has already been pointed out, Binkley rejects the idea, espoused by Dickie, that 'art' can be defined. In part, of course, his reasons for rejecting Dickie's proposed definition of 'work of art' relate to the specific features of Dickie's proposal, but he is also unprepared to accept the more general assumption underlying that proposal, namely, that a definition of art can be given in terms of 'non-exhibited' properties of objects. This is a little surprising, since we might expect that he would offer a definition of 'art' or 'work of art' in terms of the notion of 'piece-specification', corresponding to Dickie's definition in terms of 'status-conferral'. He explicitly rejects such a possibility, however:

> A work of art is a piece specified within artistic indexing conventions. This is not a definition of 'work of art', however. It is a description of the current state of artistic institutions. A priori limits cannot be set for creativity, especially when the materials of creation are the concepts and conventions of art itself. (35)

It is difficult to see quite what Binkley is afraid of here. In what way could a definition of 'work of art' as 'a piece specified

within artistic indexing conventions' set limits upon the creativity of the artist? Clearly, there would be some restriction on the artist's creative freedom if it were held to be necessary that acts of 'piece-specification' comply with existing 'specifying conventions', but Binkley holds to no such thesis. Success at specifying, he claims, is simply a question "of whether you know and can use existing specifying conventions, or else can establish new ones".(36) Nor is it apparent that there are any restrictions upon what can count as a 'specifying convention':

> The history of art since the Renaissance, and especially since Duchamp, has been gradual liberalisation of the conventions for piece-specification, until artists embraced the idea that it is nothing other than specification, by whatever means, which assures arthood. This realisation freed art of aesthetics by making it unnecessary to specify a piece using aesthetic qualities. Any means of (intensional) specification will work. (My stress) (37)

Thus, even if particular 'specifying conventions' impose certain limits upon the things that can be properly specified as pieces, the artist is free to specify anything he likes as a piece by simply adopting an appropriate convention. The requirement that the artist exercise his creativity within a 'piece-specifying convention', therefore, seems to impose no limits upon the artist's creativity, since it imposes no limits upon the works he can create and the 'A-relevant$_i$' properties which they can possess. Granted that "the materials of creation are the concepts and conventions of art itself", these 'concepts and conventions' surely relate to particular 'specifying conventions', which the artist is free to violate, rather than to the 'convention' that pieces must be specified within 'specifying conventions'. Fyrther, even if it were

possible to imagine an instance n which might cause us to emend a definition of 'work of art' in terms of 'piece-specification', this would only show that the concept 'art' is '$open_1$', not that it is '$open_2$', and Dickie, as we have seen, does not claim that his definition of 'work of art' holds for all possible, or even all actual, linguistic communities. The argument for the '$open_2$ness' of 'art' is the argument from 'radical creativity' and this argument carries no weight against definitions of art which impose no limitations upon the creativity of the artist. Since a definition in terms of 'artistic acts' such as 'status-conferral' or 'piece-specification' is of this kind, Binkley's claim that 'work of art' cannot be defined seems to lack foundation.

Binkley may, however, have a different reason for eschewing a definition of 'art', or 'work of art', namely, that even if such a definition can be given, it will serve no useful purpose. In the final section of his paper(38), he offers a further criticism of traditional methodology in the philosophy of art. This criticism is essentially a corollary to his more general objection, against such methodology, that it involves a commitment to the unacceptable 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance'. A basic assumption, not only of traditional theorists of art but also of contemporary writers such as Dickie and Wollheim, has been that the nature of 'art' is to be discovered through an investigation of what it is to be a work of art. It is this assumption that has motivated the search for a definition of 'work of art' specifying defining conditions of arthood. Further, so Binkley claims, the roots of this assumption are to be found in the traditional subservience of the philosophy of art to Aesthetics. The interesting facets of art, from the point of view of Aesthetics, are artworks, as presumed bearers

of 'aesthetic qualities', and the appreciation of such artworks, insofar as this is taken to involve the perception of those 'aesthetic qualities' which the works possess. However, as Binkley has argued, possession of 'aesthetic qualities' appears to be neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of arthood. Indeed, it is his contention that the class of artworks is not distinguished from the class of non-works in terms of <u>any</u> properties possessed by members of the former, but not the latter, class, but only in terms of that 'place' in the 'artworld' which members of the former class have secured through their being specified as pieces. The concept 'art' cannot be elucidated through an attention to the properties of artworks, therefore; rather, the concept 'artwork' can only be elucidated in terms of the concept 'art', where art is construed as "a cultural activity like philosophy or mathematics"(39), one aspect of which is the production of works of art. Thus, "the concept 'artwork' is subordinate to the concept 'art' since artworks have nothing in common except being granted a certain position through the activity art".(40) Art, as an activity, is no more "defined by explaining membership in the class of artworks" than philosophy, as an activity, is defined "by telling you how to find the philosophy books in the library or the philosophy lectures in the university".(41) To <u>define</u> art as an activity, therefore, would be no more useful or interesting than to define philosophy in an analogous manner, since "it would not produce criteria for deciding about works of art".

If this is Binkley's reason for eschewing definition, however, his reasoning seems no sounder than in his argument for the 'indefinability' of 'art'. If art is correctly construed as a form of cultural activity, then at least one of its constituent activities, if Binkley's conception

of 'artistic acts' is correct, is the activity of creating artworks by means of acts of 'piece-specification' within 'artistic indexing conventions'. While a definition of 'art' may not help us to decide whether a given entity is a work of art, a definition of 'work of art', as something created by the appropriate means, will clearly be relevant to such decisions. Such a definition will not, of course, enable us to determine the arthood of an entity through a simple inspection of its 'directly exhibited' properties, but it will give us a criterion for 'deciding about art'. Something will be an artwork if and only if it has been specified as a piece within an appropriate convention, and the arthood of a given entity is theoretically, and often practically, determinable by reference to this criterion. As Binkley himself says, regarding the problematic instance of the spiral notebook with which he introduces his paper, "the reason it is hard to say whether the notebook is a work of art is that it is unclear what the intentions of its author(s) were regarding art status, making it difficult for us to 'read' the piece".(42) Insofar as we can determine these intentions, therefore, we can determine the arthood or non-arthood of an entity. The reference to the need to 'read' the piece is also significant here. To 'read' the piece properly, what we need to know is not merely whether the piece has been specified within an 'artistic indexing convention', but also the convention within which it has been specified. I shall return to this point later in this chapter, but it may be noted here that another non-trivial aspect of a definition of 'work of art' in terms of 'piece-specification' within 'artistic indexing conventions' is that it points out the role which such conventions play in the creation and appreciation of works of art. We must now attempt to determine more

precisely what this role is.

Dickie and Binkley both advance versions of what I have termed the 'artistic act' theory of art. According to the 'artistic act' theory, something's being a work of art is not a function of its possessing any specific 'directly exhibited' or 'aesthetic' properties or qualities, but, rather, a function of its possessing the 'non-exhibited' or 'relational' property of having been constituted as an artwork through the performance of a specific act on the part of the artist. This act is to be construed as in some way analogous to what Judd terms 'calling it art'. The aim of an 'artistic act' theory of art is to specify more precisely what 'calling it art' involves. Dickie and Binkley, as we have seen, attempt to provide such a specification in terms of the notions of 'status-conferral' and 'piece-specification' respectively. What remain unclear, however, are the precise mechanisms involved in 'specifying a piece within artistic indexing conventions' or 'conferring the status of candidate for appreciation upon a set of aspects of an artifact'. In the absence of a clear understanding of these mechanisms, it is impossible either to determine the extent of the real, rather than purely terminological, difference between the alternative accounts given of the nature of 'artistic acts', or to evaluate the adequacy of these accounts in the face of possible objections.

The difficulty, here, may be illustrated by reference to the claim, made by both writers, that 'artistic acts' are, in some sense, 'infallible. Dickie makes this claim, and attempts to explain such 'infallibility', in the following passage:

> Some may find it strange that in the non-art cases discussed, there are ways in which the conferring can go wrong, while that does not appear to be true in art. For example, an indictment might be improperly drawn up and the person charged would not actually be indicted, but nothing parallel seems possible in the case of art. This fact just reflects the differences between the artworld and legal institutions: the legal system deals with matters of grave personal consequence and its procedures must reflect this; the artworld deals with important matters also but they are of a different sort entirely. The artworld does not require rigid procedures; it admits and even encourages frivolity and caprice without losing serious purpose. (43)

This, I think, is a rather strange argument. It might be noted in passing, for instance, that the 'seriousness' of the matters dealt with by the legal system hardly requires that a person considered indictable should fail to be indicted simply on account of a clerical error - indeed, it might almost require the contrary. A more substantial difficulty with the argument is that Dickie's claim as to the 'infallibility' of 'status-conferral' within the 'artworld' seems to be either trivial or false. If the claim is that any act which is a genuine act of 'status-conferral' within the 'artworld' cannot fail to confer the appropriate status, this seems to be true to the point of triviality. If, on the other hand, the claim is that any attempt to confer art status necessarily succeeds in conferring that status, or that any purported act of conferral is a genuine act of conferral, then the falsity of the claim seems to be demonstrable on the basis of elements from Dickie's own theory. In trying to come to terms with the problem of forgeries, Dickie maintains that "originality is an analytic requirement of being a work of art"(45), and concedes that his definition of 'work of art' should really be supplemented by an 'originality requirement'. As a response to the puzzle of forgeries, this seems a little ad hoc;

what concerns us here, however, are the implications of such a requirement for the proposed 'infallibility' of 'status-conferral' within the 'artworld'. According to Dickie, one consequence of the 'originality' requirement will be that "there are many works of non-art which people take to be works of art, namely, fake paintings which are not known to be fakes". In such cases, the requisite status has not, in fact, been conferred: "When fakes are discovered to be fakes, they do not lose the status of art because they never had that status in the first place, despite what everyone had thought".(45)

In such cases, it would appear, a person (the forger) has attempted to confer artistic status upon an artifact but has failed to do so. His action, we might say, is not a genuine act of art-status-conferral because it infringes upon the 'originality' requirement. But, analogously, a marriage service can fail to confer the status of marriage upon the parties in question if one of them, being already married, infringes upon the 'originality' requirement for marriage, and, again, the acts performed in the church do not constitute a genuine conferral of the relevant status. Similarly, the writing up of a 'charge-sheet' by an officer of the legal system may fail to be a genuine conferral, on the person to be charged, of the status of 'indicted person'. If there is a sense in which artistic 'status-conferral' is 'infallible' in a way in which these other examples of 'status-conferral' are not, I must confess that it eludes me.

The important question which needs to be answered, in respect of any of these forms of 'status-conferral', is, when is an act a <u>genuine</u> act of conferral. We have seen one way in which an attempt to confer the status of art can fail to be a genuine act of 'art-status-conferr-

al', and there will presumably be others, relating to the 'role-specific knowledge' necessary to perform the 'institutionalised' role of artist. Clearly, however, until the conditions under which an action can count as an act of 'status-conferral' are made specific, our understanding of the nature of the 'artistic act' required to create an artwork, on Dickie's theory, will be seriously inadequate.

Similar remarks apply to Binkley's treatment of the proposed 'infallibility' of 'piece-specification'. Binkley believes that his account allows him to explain the impossibility of 'malfunction' in the creation of artworks in a more satisfactory manner than Dickie:

> Status-conferral is a <u>changing</u> convention, piece-specification is a <u>creating</u> convention...The reason piece-specification cannot fail in the way status-conferring can is that once the piece is specified with the appropriate means of specification, it is a piece; but status -conferring requires something beyond specification - a procedure for conferring status on the antecedently identified (specified) entity. This mechanism of conferral can malfunction. No corresponding fallible procedure is a component of piece-specification. (46)

Binkley may be right in claiming that the 'infallibility' of 'piece-specification' is less problematic than that of 'status-conferral', but it is problematic nonetheless. The claim that "once the piece is specified with the appropriate means of specification, it is a piece" is simply the claim that a <u>genuine</u> act of piece-specification cannot fail to specify a piece. But, again, the important question is, when is an act of 'piece-specification' genuine, or, what is necessary for a genuine act of 'piece-specification' to be performed. Can one, for instance, specify with <u>in</u>appropriate means of specification, and thereby fail to create an artwork?

The questions which need to be answered with respect to both 'status-conferral' and 'piece-specification' are, firstly, under what circumstances can an action count as a genuine instance of such an 'artistic act', and, secondly, what is the mechanism involved in the performance of such an action. An answer to the first question may be expected to provide at least a partial answer to the second question. We may begin by looking at Dickie's notion of 'status-conferral', in an attempt to determine how he might answer these questions.

We may presume, I think, that what is not required is a vocal or tacit assertion of some 'conferring formula' analogous to that hypothesised in the discussion of Judd above. There are problems enough for Dickie's theory on the simple assumption that the person conferring status must intend his creation to be a 'candidate for appreciation' without imposing the additional requirement of a ritualised incantation. One requirement which Dickie does make explicit is that, in order to perform an 'artistic act' of 'status-conferral', one must be able to conceive of oneself in such a way "as to be a member of the artworld". This requirement suffices to rule out, as potential or actual artists, creatures, such as Betsy the chimpanzee, that presumably lack such powers of self-conceptualisation.(47) It fails, however, to exclude many human beings, unless more explicit limits are placed upon the sort of self-conceptualisation involved. If such limits are placed, so that it is necessary for a conferrer to conceive of himself as a member of the 'artworld' during the act of conferral, the problem of the 'Romantic artist' arises once more. In the absence of some more precise indication of the sort of self-conceptualisation which Dickie has in mind, the requirement that one must have the capacity for such self-concept-

ualisation does not really help to illuminate Dickie's notion of 'status-conferral'

We might hope that the section of his chapter on the 'Institutional theory' in which he addresses the question of "how the status of candidate for appreciation is conferred" would prove more enlightening, but, as we shall see, it does not. Consider, for instance, the following passage:

> A number of persons are required to make up the social institution of the artworld, but only one person is required to act on behalf of the artworld and to confer the status of candidate for appreciation. In fact, many works of art are seen only by one person - the one who creates them - but they are still art. The status in question may be acquired by a single person's acting on behalf of the artworld and treating an artifact as a candidate for appreciation. (Dickie's stress) (48)

Dickie's use of his own terminology, here as elsewhere, is somewhat lax. If we are to take his definition of 'work of art' as a correct statement of the position he wishes to advance, the person referred to in the final sentence quoted should be characterised as treating a set of aspects of an artifact, rather than the artifact itself, as a candidate for appreciation. Even when so emended, Dickie's description of 'status-conferral', in the foregoing passage, is not particularly informative. What, we might enquire, is involved in "treating a set of aspects of an artifact as a candidate for appreciation"? If something can be an artwork without being 'seen' by anyone save the artist himself, the 'treatment' required to confer arthood cannot involve the actual presentation of the 'work' within a system of the 'artworld', nor even the attempt to get the work so presented by, for instance, showing it to the director of a gallery or submitting it to a poetry

journal. In answer to the question, "How can one tell when the status has been conferred?", Dickie asserts that "an artifact's hanging in an art museum as part of a show and a performance at a theatre are sure signs".(49) Such situations may indeed indicate that the requisite status has been conferred upon a given artifact, but this does not explain how the status was conferred. A painting is exhibited in an art gallery because it is a work of art; it does not become an artwork by virtue of being so exhibited, nor does it fail to be an artwork through being denied a place in an exhibition. While Dickie's remarks throughout his discussion of the 'Institutional Theory' indicate that he does not wish to dispute these 'facts', the example which he offers to clarify the above description of 'status-conferral' reveals a certain confusion about such matters:

> It may be helpful to compare and contrast the notion of conferring the status of candidate for appreciation with a case in which something is simply presented for appreciation: hopefully this will throw light on the notion of status as candidate. Consider the case of a salesman of plumbing supplies who spreads his wares before us. 'Placing before' and 'conferring the status of candidate for appreciation' are very different notions, and this difference can be brought out by comparing the salesman's action with the superficially similar act of Duchamp in entering a urinal which he christened "Fountain" in that now famous art show. The difference is that Duchamp's action took place within the institutional setting of the artworld, and the plumbing salesman's action took place outside of it. The salesman could do what Duchamp did, that is, convert a urinal into art, but such a thing probably would not occur to him. (50)

What Dickie seems to be saying here is that artistic status was conferred upon "Fountain" by the act of entering it in an art exhibition, and that it was therefore not an artwork prior to being so entered. But, if this is the case, it appears as if 'status-conferral' does

require the actual presentation of the 'work' within a system of the 'artworld', or at least an attempt to have the 'work' so presented; and this has the consequence of artistically disenfranchising those 'works' whose creators do not make any such attempt, and also 'works' which are submitted for presentation prior to the moment of such submission. Dickie might intend the Duchamp example to illustrate one way in which art-status can be conferred, but it is difficult to see how anything even analogous is involved in the case of 'unsubmitted' 'works', and thus how any analogous form of 'status-conferral' could explain the arthood of such creations. Further, if the occurrence of Duchamp's action 'within the institutional setting of the artworld' explains why "Fountain" is an artwork and the plumber's materials are not, it does not explain why the director's biography and the artist's punch fail to be works of art, for they, or a set of their aspects, are presented for appreciation within the requisite institutional setting.

If Dickie does hold that 'status-conferral' requires the submission of a 'work' for presentation within a system of the 'artworld', his position is quite intelligible but certainly false, for it cannot even account for his own example of the work 'seen' only by the artist himself. Despite his remarks on Duchamp, however, it seems that this is not what Dickie wishes to say; what he does wish to say, however, is far from clear. How can an individual act on behalf of the 'artworld' and 'treat' an artifact, or a set of its aspects, in the required fashion, while, at the same time, not submitting the 'work' for presentation within a system of the 'artworld'? We might try to answer this question by focussing, initially, upon the notion of "treating a set of the aspects of an artifact as a candidate for appreciation". Consid-

er a situation where an individual creates an artifact by manipulating or otherwise transforming some physical medium. 'Treating' the artifact in the appropriate sense might involve performing such manipulations with the intention that value or worth should be findable in experiencing qualities of the aspects of that artifact. Of course, not all artifacts treated in this way will be works of art. We might note, as examples of non-artworks so describable, the artist's punch, food prepared by a conscientious chef, and a term-paper written by a conscientious student. If Dickie's notion of 'treatment' is to be understood in the manner suggested, artworks might then be distinguished from other artifacts so 'treated' in terms of the further condition that the individual in question must be "acting on behalf of the artworld". This condition, if it can be made intelligible, will exclude from the class of artworks artifacts such as those produced by the chef and the student, but not the artist's punch.

It might be objected herethat the suggested interpretation of 'treatment' cannot be what Dickie has in mind, since the requirement for some manipulation or transformation of a physical medium will exclude those very artworks which Dickie is most concerned to account for, namely 'Readymades'. On the contrary, however, I think that it is only when 'treatment', and thus 'status-conferral', are interpreted in this way that Dickie's remarks concerning the arthood of 'Readymades', and also that of non-artifacts, become intelligible. In the case of a work like "Fountain", the 'physical medium' which is manipulated is the original urinal, and the 'manipulation' of the medium involves, not an alteration in the 'directly exhibited' properties of the urinal itself, but rather the exhibiting of the urinal in an art gallery. The 'artifact'

created by Duchamp is the original urinal so 'manipulated'. Further, in 'manipulating' the urinal in this fashion, Duchamp's intent was that receivers should experience value in qualities of 'aspects' of the created 'artifact', where these aspects relate to the 'manipulations' carried out by the artist. 'Readymades', so construed, are artifacts not in virtue of their original manufacture but in virtue of having been 'artifactualised' in a manner analogous to the purported 'artifactualisation' of natural objects. This analysis of the arthood of 'Readymades' may, in turn, throw a new light on Dickie's account of the arthood of 'natural objects'. Such entities, he claims, can become art if 'treated' in certain ways:

> One way in which this might happen would be for someone to pick up a natural object, take it home, and hang it on the wall. Another way would be to pick up a natural object and enter it in an exhibition...Natural objects which become works of art in the classificatory sense are artifactualised without the use of tools - artifactuality is conferred on the object rather than worked on it. This means that natural objects which become works of art acquire their artifactuality at the same time that the status of candidate for appreciation is conferred upon them, although the act that confers artifactuality is not the same act that confers the status of candidate for appreciation. (51)

In considering this account in chapter nine, I argued that it was problematic for a number of reasons. One problem is understanding how 'artifactuality' can be a conferred status, and how two acts of status-conferral of the specified sorts can occur simultaneously and yet remain distinct acts. While the idea that artifactuality can be conferred upon an object still seems counter-intuitive, the idea that 'natural objects' can become artifacts without being physically transformed by the use of tools becomes intelligible in the light of the foregoing account of the

arthood of 'Readymades'. The 'artifact' is the natural object 'manipulated' through being moved from its natural environment to another context with the intention that its qualities, or the qualities of a set of its aspects, should be found to be worthy or valuable. The 'artifact' so produced will only be an artwork, however, if the person who so 'manipulates' the natural object is acting on behalf of the 'artworld'. If I pick up the piece of driftwood and hang it on the wall of my house simply because I like to look at it, I might be said to 'artifactualise' the driftwood without creating an artwork. If, on the other hand, I pick it up and exhibit it in an art gallery, I will have both created an 'artifact' and created a work of art. Furthermore, in the latter case, the 'set of aspects' upon which the status of 'candidate for appreciation' is conferred may not be its physical properties, as in the former case, but perhaps the 'non-exhibited' property of having been 'manipulated' in a manner analogous to the urinal in the case of Duchamp's "Fountain". The two 'acts' to which Dickie refers in the passage above can now be seen to be independent of one another, since it is possible to perform the one act ('artifactualisation') without performing the other (creating an artwork through a conferral of 'candidacy' on behalf of the 'artworld').

If the foregoing account of 'treating (a set of the aspects of) an artifact as a candidate for appreciation' adequately represents Dickie's understanding of this notion, a number of important questions remain to be answered. If Dickie holds that artworks are created by persons acting on behalf of the 'artworld' and 'treating' artifacts in the manner specified, can he deal with such apparently problematic cases as the 'Romantic' artist and the artist's punch? The 'Romantic artist'

might be said to 'treat an artifact as a candidate for appreciation', in that his activity is guided by the intention that certain aspects of the artifact he is creating should be 'appreciatable' by himself, if not by others, but can he be said to act 'on behalf of the artworld'? The artist, in making his punch, is clearly 'treating an artifact as a candidate for appreciation', and he is also acting 'on behalf of the artworld', in a sense. Can this sense of so acting be distinguished from the sense necessary for the creation of works of art? As may by now be apparent, an elucidation of what it is to 'treat an artifact as a candidate for appreciation', in a general sense, only partially clarifies the nature of the 'artistic act' of 'status-conferral' which Dickie holds to be necessary for the creation of works of art. It is not being 'treated' as 'candidates for appreciation', in the general sense, which distinguishes artworks from non-works, for 'appreciation' is construed in a manner which allows artifacts other than artworks to be so 'treated'. Dickie's remarks on 'appreciation', already quoted, may illuminate this point:

> The only sense in which there is a difference between the appreciation of art and the appreciation of non-art is that the appreciations have different objects. The institutional structure in which the art object is embedded, not different kinds of appreciation, makes the difference between the appreciation of art and the appreciation of non-art. (52)

If artifacts other than artworks can be 'appreciated', in Dickie's sense of the word, then they can also be 'treated' as 'candidates for appreciation', as the examples given above serve to illustrate. What distinguishes artworks, rather, according to Dickie's theory, is their being so 'treated' by persons acting 'on behalf of the artworld'. What is

involved, then, in 'acting on behalf of the artworld'?

The 'artworld', according to Dickie, is a bundle of systems which exist for the purpose of 'presenting' particular works of art. As such it provides "an institutional background for the conferring of the status (of art) on objects within its domain".(53) To act 'on behalf of the artworld' in 'treating an artifact as a candidate for appreciation', therefore, is presumably to create an artifact with the intention that qualities of that artifact, or a set of its aspects, should be found to be valuable by those who experience them when the artifact is presented in the context of the relevant system of the artworld. And in this case, it would seem, Dickie cannot account for the arthood of the 'Romantic artist's' creations, nor for the non-arthood of the artist's punch. Rather than pursue this question any further, however, I shall turn to a different problem arising out of this aspect of Dickie's theory. According to Dickie, 'artistic acts' conferring the status of art are distinguished from other acts involving the treatment of artifacts, or sets of their aspects, as 'candidates for appreciation', in that the former, but not the latter, are performed by persons acting on behalf of the 'artworld'. The 'artworld' consists of a bundle of systems which form the institutional background for the performance of such 'artistic acts' and the presentation of those things constituted as artworks by the performance of these acts. This, as Dickie himself realises, appears to be suspiciously circular. He denies, however, that there is any vicious circularity involved:

> If I had said something like 'A work of art is an artifact on which a status has been conferred by the artworld' and then said of the artworld only that it confers the status of candidacy for appreciation, then the definition would be

> viciously circular because the circle would be so small and so uninformative. I have, however, devoted a considerable amount of space to describing and analysing the historical, organisational, and functional intricacies of the artworld, and if this account is accurate the reader has received a considerable amount of information about the artworld. The circle I have run is not small and it is not uninformative. If, in the end, the artworld cannot be described independently of art...then the definition strictly speaking is circular. It is not, however, viciously so, because the whole account in which the definition is embedded contains a great deal of information about the artworld. (54)

It is true that Dickie says more about the 'artworld' than that it is the means whereby art status is conferred, but, even so, he may not say enough to justify his apparent equanimity in the face of circularity. The 'more' that he does say relates almost entirely to the functioning of the artworld as the context in which artworks are presented, for the potential appreciation of receivers. There are, of course, other contexts in which artifacts are presented as 'candidates for appreciation', such as the 'restaurantworld', the 'universityworld', and possibly the 'sportsworld'. The question we might ask, then, is whether Dickie's description of the 'artworld', however informative it might be in other ways, suffices to distinguish those 'artworld' contexts, where artifacts presented for appreciation, or acquiring 'candidacy' to be so presented, are works of art, from those contexts outside the 'artworld', where artifacts so presented, or eligible to be so presented, are not artworks. In other words, if the 'artworld' is made up of a bundle of systems the function of which is to confer status upon and present works of art, we might enquire on what grounds a particular system for presenting artifacts for appreciation, such as the 'theatreworld', is included in the 'artworld', whereas another system, such as

the 'restaurantworld' is not.

We might distinguish four features which Dickie offers as characteristic of the systems of the 'artworld'. Firstly, insofar as the 'artworld' is an institution in the sense of being an 'established practice', a constituent system of the 'artworld', such as the 'theatreworld', is "an established way of doing and behaving".(55) Secondly, a central feature common to all the constituent systems of the 'artworld' is that "each is a framework for the presenting of particular works of art".(56) Thirdly, each system "furnishes an institutional background for the conferring of the status (of art) on objects within its domain".(57) Fourthly, while "every person who sees himself as a member of the artworld is thereby a member", there exists a minimum core of personnel without whom no system of the 'artworld' is possible, namely, the 'presentation group' consisting of 'artists', 'presenters', and 'goers'. Can we then distinguish systems of the 'artworld' from non-systems in terms of these features, taken either individually or collectively?

Consider, as examples of the sort of 'systems' which we would presumably wish to exclude from the 'artworld', the three 'systems' mentioned in the preceding paragraph, namely, the 'restaurant-world', the 'university-world' (as the context in which students submit papers for 'appreciation' by instructors), and the 'sports-world'. Each of these 'systems' clearly possesses the first feature, in that each might be described as 'an established way of doing and behaving'. Further, each system exists as a framework for the presenting of artifacts for the 'appreciation' of receivers.(59) The description of the second feature, of course, makes reference not to the presenting of artifacts for app-

reciation, but to the presenting of 'particular works of art'. In the three systems under consideration, the artifacts presented for appreciation - meals, term-papers, and sporting events - are not among the members of the accepted class of artworks. But this fact cannot be used, without circularity, to distinguish systems of the 'artworld' from other 'systems', unless the arthood of an entity can be determined independently of its having a particular status within a system of the 'artworld'. If, as Dickie maintains, a theatrical performance "is art because it is presented within the theatre-world framework"(60), we cannot justify the theatre-world's being a system of the 'artworld' on the grounds that the artifacts presented within it are works of art.

Similar considerations apply to the third feature which Dickie takes to be characteristic of the systems of the 'artworld'. A given system of the 'artworld' provides an institutional background for the conferral of art-status in that it enables a person to act on behalf of the system in 'treating' an artifact as a 'candidate for appreciation'. If acting on behalf of the 'artworld' involves acting with the intention that a set of the aspects of an artifact one is creating should be appreciatable within a system of the 'artworld', then it would seem that the chef in a restaurant could be analogously described as 'acting on behalf of the restaurant-world'. The chef will not, of course, confer the status of 'art' upon his creations, unless the 'restaurant-world' is a system of the 'artworld' such that acting on behalf of the former can count as acting on behalf of the latter. But, again, we cannot, without circularity, justify the exclusion of the 'restaurant-world' from the 'artworld' on the grounds that the status conferred upon artifacts within the 'restaurant-world' is not the status of 'art'.

The final distinguishing feature of systems of the 'artworld', namely the necessity for the existence of a 'presentation group', is as inconclusive as the preceding three features, save with reference to the 'university-world'. Here, it might be claimed, there are no 'goers', or only a single one, namely the instructor to whom the paper is submitted. If this difference does serve to distinguish the 'university-world' from systems of the 'artworld', we need only vary the example slightly to eradicate this difference. Let the artifact in question be not a term-paper but a PhD thesis which is to be subject to an oral defence before a general audience. In the case of the other two 'systems', the requirement for a 'presentation group' presents no difficulties. There will not, of course, be an 'author' or 'artist' within these 'systems', unless they are systems of the 'artworld'; but this, as with the second and third features, cannot be taken to be a relevant difference without circularity.

I have argued that the features cited by Dickie in his description of the systems of the 'artworld' are insufficient to distinguish such systems from other 'systems', existing for the purpose of presenting artifacts for appreciation, which we would presumably wish to exclude from the 'artworld'. Since artworks are only to be distinguished from artifacts produced within these other systems in terms of their being created within the context of a system of the 'artworld', by a person acting on behalf of such a system, the lack of a criterion for distinguishing 'artworld' systems from other 'systems' implies the lack of a criterion for distinguishing artworks from other things. Dickie's 'circle', therefore, does seem to be vicious if his definition of 'work

of art', together with the account of the 'artworld' in which it is embedded, is intended to function as a definition, i.e., if it is intended to distinguish artworks from other things.

I shall briefly consider two responses which Dickie might make to the preceding argument. Firstly, he might admit that his account fails to provide any criterion for distinguishing systems of the 'artworld' from other 'systems' which are in certain ways analogous, but point to the fact that we do regard certain systems, and not others, as systems of the 'artworld'. His thesis, then, is simply that, within those systems which are so regarded, artworks are created by means of acts of 'status-conferral' of the sort which he describes. To be an artwork is to be an artifact possessed of a certain status, acquired through an act of 'status-conferral' occurring within one of those systems which happen to make up the 'artworld'. If the criterion for distinguishing systems of the 'artworld' from other 'systems' is simply our practice of classifying certain systems are 'artistic' and the artifacts created and appreciated within them as 'artworks', however, it might be asked whether we have any means of identifying 'artworlds', or systems thereof, in cultures other than our own. Consider, for instance, the following claim made by Dickie:

> There is a long tradition or continuing institution of the theatre having its origins in ancient Greek religion and other Greek institutions. That tradition has run very thin at times and perhaps ceased to exist altogether during some periods, only to be reborn out of its memory and the need for art. The institutions associated with the theatre have varied from time to time...What has remained constant with its own identity throughout history is the theatre itself as an established way of doing and behaving. (61)

Dickie is assuming that, because the methods of presenting artif-

acts for appreciation within the 'theatre-world' of ancient Greece resemble, in certain respects, the methods of so presenting artifacts within our own 'theatre-world', the Greek 'theatre-world' can be taken to be a system of the Greek 'artworld' and the artifacts presented within it can be classified as works of art. If systems of the 'artworld' cannot be distinguished in terms of any features of the systems themselves, but only by reference to our own practices of classification, however, no degree of resemblance, in respect of the features of presentation, between the Greek 'theatre-world' system and our own system can establish that the Greek 'theatre-world' was a system of the Greek 'artworld'. Indeed, on what grounds could we establish that there was an 'artworld' in ancient Greece? The question, 'Did the Greeks share our concept of 'art', or of an 'artworld'?', while it might be meaningfully asked if our concepts were cashable in terms of some features common to all artworks or to all systems of the 'artworld', seems to be almost meaningless if our concepts are only cashable in terms of the ways in which we happen to use them. Furthermore, the Greek 'theatre-world', while it might have resembled our 'theatre-world' in certain respects, also resembled our 'sports-world', or certain systems within it, in that the context within which plays were performed was a competitive one. Why, then, should we not classify the Greek 'theatre-world' as a system of the Greek 'sports-world', and the artifacts presented within it as non-art?

A second response to the accusation of circularity is offered by Dickie himself, who suggests "that the 'problem' of circularity will arise frequently, perhaps always, when institutional concepts are dealt with".(62) Dickie may be correct in claiming that accounts of institut-

ional concepts will tend to exhibit a certain measure of circularity, but such circularity may be vitiated to the extent that some rationale can be given for the existence of the institutional context within which an institutionally defined entity has its place. Consider, for example, the institutional concept of 'money'. The things correctly classifiable as 'money' in various cultures seem to share no common 'directly exhibited' properties. Rather, 'moneyhood' is a status which certain things acquire in the context of certain social practices. These practices constitute an institutional framework which might be termed the 'Commerceworld'. A 'Commerceworld', in turn, is a collection of social practices carried out by means of money. We seem to have a mode of circularity, here, similar to that which characterises Dickie's account of 'work of art' as a status acquired in the context of the social practices constituting the 'artworld'. In the case of the concept 'money', however, we can to some extent escape the circle by providing an explanation for the existence, within a society, of the institutional entity and the institutional framework within which it is defined. Such an explanation might refer to the need for, or the advantages of, a division of labour within a society, the resultant need for some system of exchange, and the development of the institution of 'money' and the the institutional framework of the 'Commerceworld' as a way of fulfilling this need. It is by reference to such an underlying rationale for the existence of the institutional entity, 'money', and the framework of social practices in which it is embedded, the 'Commerceworld', that we might hope to classify otherwise diverse sets of social practices as 'Commerceworlds', and otherwise diverse types of entity playing a central role in such sets of practices as 'money'.

In Dickie's formulation of the 'Institutional' theory of art, however, we are offered no indication as to the underlying rationale for the existence of the institutional framework of the'artworld', or of the institutional entities, 'artworks', upon which the social practices of the 'artworld' are focussed. It is in this respect, I think, that Dickie's theory is uninformative in a crippling sense, despite his protestations to the contrary. Artworks, on Dickie's account, are artifacts 'treated' as 'candidates for appreciation' by persons 'acting on behalf of the artworld'. As we have seen, however, the distinguishing characteristic of those artifacts which are artworks is not that they have been 'treated' as 'candidates for appreciation', or that a set of their aspects has had conferred upon it the status of 'candidate for appreciation', but, rather, that such 'treatment', or conferral of status, has occurred in the context of the 'artworld', through a person's acting on behalf of that institution. The 'artworld', in turn, is a bundle of systems of established practices pertaining to the presentation of artworks for appreciation. The creation of artworks, through the performance of acts of 'status-conferral', is not itself an established practice of the 'artworld', however, but is logically dependent upon the existence of the practices of the 'artworld', which furnish the 'institutional background' necessary for acts of 'status-conferral' to occur. The dependence of artistic creation upon the existence of the 'artworld' cashes out in terms of the need to act 'on behalf of the artworld' in conferring status, and this, in turn, cashes out in terms of the need to 'treat' an artifact, or a set of its aspects, as a 'candidate for appreciation' within the presentational practices of a system of the 'artworld'.

There is something rather odd about all of this, however. Artworks, it would seem, are artifacts created to meet the purposes of the presentational practices of systems of the 'artworld'. It is in such terms that Dickie argues for the 'essential institutionality' of art. Yet surely this is to reverse the order of logical dependence. The 'artworld' is not that for the purposes of which artworks are created, but, rather, it is that which has been created for the purpose of presenting artworks. The 'established practices' for presenting artworks which constitute the various systems of the 'artworld' are a means of mediating two logically prior activities, namely, the artist's creation of a particular artifact and the receiver's appreciation of that artifact. That the interaction between artist and receiver is mediated in such a fashion may well be a fact about art as it exists within our culture, and perhaps as it exists in other cultures. The institutionality of art in such contexts, however, seems to be only a contingent matter, possibly explicable by reference to factors extrinsic to the nature of the activities so institutionalised. The claim that art is 'essentially institutional' cannot be established by reference to the fact, if fact it be, that the interaction between artist and receiver within certain cultures <u>happens</u> to be mediated by an institutional framework for the presentation of artworks. It could only be established if it could be shown that certain features of the activities of creating and receiving works of art, or of the interaction between these activities, <u>necessitate</u> that there be an institutional framework if such activities are to occur. Such a conclusion could only be drawn on the basis of a detailed analysis of the activities in question. Dickie offers no such analysis in his account of the 'Institutional' theory of art, and is thus entit-

led to no such conclusion.

Dickie might respond that he is simply concerned to elucidate the 'logic' of the concept 'art' for a given linguistic community, and that, within the linguistic community with which he is dealing, the concept 'art' is 'essentially institutional' in the way in which he specifies. For this reason, he might claim, there is bound to be a certain element of circularity in his definition. To say that a concept, or an activity to which that concept refers, is 'essentially institutional' within a given culture, however, is only to say that the concept or activity in question is institutionalised within that culture. The fact that an activity is institutionalised within a given culture may tell us much about that culture, but it tells us little about that activity unless the activity in question is 'essentially institutional' for all cultures. Furthermore, a description of the institutional framework within which a given activity occurs within a culture, while it may be of sociological interest, is philosophically uninteresting in the absence of some explanation as to why such an institutional framework should be necessary in the first place. The existence within our culture of an 'artworld', as a bundle of systems of established practices for presenting artworks, is something which itself stands in need of explanation; a description of such an 'artworld', however thorough, is an explanandum, not an explanans, for the philosophy of art. What function or value does the creation and reception of artworks have within a culture, that might explain the development of such institutional machinery to further such activities? By failing to answer, or even ask, such questions, and by thereby failing to establish any link between the creation and appreciation of artworks and other modes of human activity, the

'Institutional' theory of art, as proposed by Dickie, places art in a hermetic realm as isolated from other domains of human interest and practice as the transcendent realm of 'aesthetic experience' to which it is consigned by Bell.

The inadequacies of Dickie's theory can, I think, be traced to the belief that 'art' can be defined, and its 'essential institutionality' be established, in terms of 'established practices' governing the presentation of artworks. Arthood is taken to be a status conferred upon an artifact by an artist insofar as his creative activity aims at the production of something appreciatable within a system of the 'artworld', and is thus guided by a knowledge of those practices governing the presentation of works within that system. The 'essential institutionality' of art then follows from the fact that the presentation of artworks for appreciation requires an institutional framework of 'established practices' embodied in the knowledge and actions of a 'presentation group'. Dickie's belief that presentational practices are central to arthood may perhaps be traced to his having generalised from that particular art-form which he favours as an illustrative source, namely, the theatre. This art-form seems to fit very well the model of 'arthood' sketched above. The creative activity of the playwrite aims at the production of an artifact presentable and appreciatable within the 'theatre-world', and his construction of that artifact is guided by his knowledge of the presentational practices of the theatre. Furthermore, the play, as a dramatic rather than as a literary artwork, can only be 'realised' through the co-ordinated activity of other individuals - actors, technicians, stage-designers, etc. - and such co-ordination requires an institutional framework within which the necessary skills

can be deployed. A similar analysis might be given for motion pictures and for much musical art. In other art-forms, however, there would seem to be no such necessary connection between the creation of artworks and the existence of an institutional framework for the presentation of such works. In what way, we might ask, is the existence of such a framework a necessary condition for the creative activity of the 'Romantic artist' who creates out of an inner need for 'self-expression', or even that of the artist who creates for the benefit of a small circle of friends? If some sort of institutional framework is necessary for such artists to exercise their creativity in the production of works of art, the relationship of dependence does not seem to be analysable by reference to the same sort of 'established practices' for presenting works as might be relevant to the creation of dramatic artworks.

Further, the attempt to distinguish artworks from non-works in terms of a relationship to the presentational practices of the 'artworld' faces the additional problem, discussed above, that such practices, and the systems which they constitute, seem to possess no common features which might serve to distinguish them from other practices and 'systems' which exist for the purpose of presenting artifacts for appreciation. Those practices and systems belonging to the 'artworld' seem to be distinguished only by the fact that we happen to so classify them. One curious consequence of this is that Dickie's definition of 'art', while it may be able to incorporate radical innovation in the arts, cannot explain how it comes about. Consider Dickie's response to Weitz's claim that a definition of 'art' will foreclose on creativity in the arts:

> Today, if a new and unusual work is created and it is similar to some members of an established type of art, it will usually be accomodated within that type, or, if the work is very unlike any existing works, then a new sub-concept will probably be created...The second requirement (in the definition of 'work of art') involving the conferring of status could not inhibit creativity; in fact it encourages it. Since under the definition anything whatever may become art, the definition imposes no restraints on creativity. (63)

Dickie may be correct in his claim that his definition imposes no restraints upon the things that can be created as artworks <u>within established systems of the artworld</u>, although even here, it would seem, there may be a problem with works the presentation of which requires some change in the presentational practices of the relevant system, e.g. certain modern theatrical artworks which break down the traditional separation between actors and audience. If artworks can only be created by persons acting 'on behalf of the artworld', and if so acting requires that the creative activity of the artist be guided by his knowledge of the established practices pertaining to the presentation of works for appreciation within the relevant system of the 'artworld', those very practices would themselves seem to impose certain limits upon the artist's creativity. Furthermore, we might enquire how the presentational practices of a system of the 'artworld' are changed, if not by the 'radical creativity' of the artist; yet it might be questioned whether 'works' that cannot be presented within the existing presentational practices of a system of the 'artworld' will qualify as artworks on Dickie's account. Even if he allows that one can act 'on behalf of the artworld' in changing the presentational practices of a given system as well as in working within them, there is a more serious problem concerning the addition of new 'systems', such as film, to the bundle of

systems constituting the 'artworld'. Dickie claims that this presents no problem for his theory:

> No limit can be placed on the number of systems that can be brought under the generic conception of art, and each of the major systems contains further sub-systems. These features of the artworld provide the elasticity whereby creativity of even the most radical sort can be accomodated. A whole new system comparable to the theatre, for instance, could be added in one fell swoop. (64)

Certainly, the 'artworld' appears to have an almost infinite elasticity in respect of its capacity to embrace new systems, since the criterion for a system's belonging to the 'artworld' seems to be only our willingness to so include it, and not any specific features which that system possesses. Any 'system' whose function is to facilitate the presentation of artifacts for 'appreciation', in the relevant sense, might be incorporated within the 'artworld', it would seem, but this provides no insight into why a system like film should have been so incorporated while other 'systems', such as those of the 'sports-world', should not. Mandelbaum suggests(65) that film and photography have been included within the arts because they are seen as satisfying the same sorts of interests and being amenable to the same sorts of evaluative criteria as those things already classified as art-forms. Dickie's theory, however, allows no such explanation to be given, since 'appreciation' is not restricted to the satisfaction of a specific kind of interest. A definition of 'art' solely in terms of the institutional framework within which artworks are presented fails to provide an explanation of why only certain systems for presenting artifacts are properly included within that framework, just as it fails to explain why such a framework should exist in the first place.

Dickie, attempting to defend his account against charges of circularity, endeavours, perhaps wisely, to deflect critical attention away from his definition and towards the more general 'Institutional' thesis which underlies it. He claims that "one must not focus narrowly on the definition alone: for what is important to see is that art is an institutional concept and this requires seeing the defintion in the context of the whole account".(66) As I have argued, however, the problems with Dickie's theory are not limited to the inadequacies of his definition of 'work of art', taken either in isolation or in the context of his other remarks, but extend to his entire account insofar as it manifests the underlying belief that art can be defined, and its 'essentially institutional' nature demonstrated, in terms of the institutional framework within which works are presented. Against this view, I have maintained that an adequate philosophical account of art must focus upon those logically prior activities mediated within such a framework, namely, the creative activity of the artist and the 'appreciative' activity of the receiver. Only on the basis of such an account can it be determined whether, and, if so, in what way, art is 'essentially institutional'.

If the foregoing remarks are accepted, Binkley's formulation of the 'artistic act' theory of art, in terms of the notion of 'piece-specification', might appear more promising than Dickie's formulation in terms of the notion of 'status-conferral'. Binkley, in focussing upon the creative activity of the artist, seems to characterise such activity without explicit or implicit reference to the existence of an institutional framework for presenting the 'pieces' so created. Further,

the requirement that the artist specify a piece within 'artistic indexing conventions' might provide the basis for an alternative argument for the 'essential institutionality' of art, in that the term 'convention' is customarily applied to 'established practices' existing within a given social framework. The existence of an 'artworld', conceived not as a bundle of systems of 'established practices' for presenting works but as an institutional framework in which 'piece-specifying conventions' are somehow embodied, might be taken as a necessary condition for the creation of works of art. This conception of the referent of the term 'artworld' seems to be more closely related to Danto's original sense of the term, and it is interesting to note that Binkley quotes, with approval, Danto's dictum that "to see something as art requires... an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art: an artworld".(67) Despite its promise, however, Binkley's theory, as we shall see, is beset by difficulties analogous to those facing Dickie; although, in Binkley's case, the difficulties stem not from an overemphasis on the context in which artworks are appreciated, but from a relative neglect of this context.

In the attempt to evaluate Dickie's theory, one problem which was encountered was a certain vagueness as to the precise nature of the mechanism involved in the performance of an 'artistic act' of 'status-conferral', and a consequent uncertainty as to the conditions under which an action could count as an act of 'conferral' in the sense necessary to confer the status of art. An analogous problem arises when we turn to Binkley's notion of 'piece-specification'. To make a work of art, according to Binkley, "is to specify a piece within an artistic indexing convention"; such conventions "provide means for intensionally

specifying pieces",[68] The questions which seem to require answering here are: firstly, what sort of thing is an 'artistic indexing convention'; secondly, what sort of mechanism is involved in specifying a piece within such a convention, and, thirdly, how does such an act of 'piece-specification' single out a piece 'intensionally'. The answers to these questions , as we shall see, are far from clear.

If we are to clarify the notion of an 'artistic indexing convention', it will obviously be helpful to have at least one example of such an entity to serve as a basis for investigation. Binkley obligingly provides such an example in his elucidation of the procedure whereby pieces are specified under the 'anti-definition' formula:

> In making the pieces P<u>ij</u>, I do not engage in an explicit act of conferral; rather, I avail myself of a versatile convention for making artworks which is widely countenanced by artists today. This convention might be termed the 'Specification Rubric', and its general form is 'I hereby specify the piece (I am now making) to be _____', where the blank can be filled in by a specification of anything whatever as the piece. Methods of specification are varied, but they are all used to 'create' and identify specific pieces. The Rubric established a piece-making or piece-specifying convention, and not a status-conferring convention. (69)

Binkley offers a number of examples of pieces that might be specified by means of the 'Specification Rubric'. 'Counter-definition' pieces are 'made' by specifying, in the blank in the Rubric, entities which are classified as non-art by given definitions of art - entities such as the number one, the Black Forest, and the definer's grandmother's arthritis. Further, as a parting flourish, Binkley proposes an even more radical application of the Rubric: "For those who feel uneasy about the lack of any criteria for deciding about art, the following solace is

offered: I hereby create a prodigious class of pieces by specifying everything to be art, (x)(x is specified as a piece)".[70]

Binkley may intend these remarks to be merely provocative, or to illustrate the relative unimportance of 'deciding about art', but they serve nonetheless to focus certain vague misgivings which we might have concerning even the less radical examples which he offers. In the first place, 'specification', in the passage quoted, seems to amount to 'calling it art' in the literal sense, and this, as we have seen[71], is unacceptable as an account of the nature of the 'artistic act' necessary to produce artworks. Further, Binkley's remarks elsewhere in his paper indicate that he does not hold to such a crude form of the 'artistic act' theory. To establish the 'counter-definition' pieces as artworks, for instance, it seems to be necessary to do more than simply assert something of the form, 'I hereby specify x as the piece I am making'. Binkley suggests, as possible methods of 'execution'[72], either publishing it, together with an explanation, in a public journal, or exhibiting it in a gallery with appropriate documentation. The 'Specification Rubric', as Binkley indicates, is intended to capture the 'general form' of such methods of execution, and 'hereby', in the phrase 'I hereby specify....', will refer to the particular method of execution employed. If Binkley is to succeed in creating his 'prodigious class of pieces', therefore, he will require some method of specification over and above a simple assertion of the Rubric with the blank filled in by the term 'everything'. Even if such a method were to be indicated by Binkley, the enterprise seems problematic in at least two respects. Firstly, if a class of pieces is to be created, it will presumably be necessary to 'execute' each piece separately. If the class of

pieces is to include everything, the task of execution seems to be beset with insurmountable difficulties of both a practical and a theoretical nature. The practical difficulties are obvious, but the task is further complicated by the need to perform an act of ontological individuation prior to the execution of pieces corresponding to the entities thus individuated. Since an ontological individuation of the contents of the universe presupposes a metaphysical, or physical, theory concerning 'the way the world is', and since there exists a plurality of such theories, there will also be a plurality of possible ontological individuations. Will it be necessary, then, to perform an act of execution for each of the entities within every possible ontological individuation of the contents of the universe, in order to succeed in creating the class of pieces proposed by Binkley? What of those entities which have already been specified as pieces by other artists? Would the achievement of Binkley's creative goals foreclose on any future creation in the arts? If the entities to be specified as pieces have to be individuated prior to being executed as artworks, in what sense is the creation of such pieces a 'one-stage', rather than a 'two-stage', activity?

Something is clearly wrong here, and what it is that is wrong becomes apparent when we notice a further problematic aspect of the enterprise of 'specifying everything to be art'. In what sense, we might ask, is 'piece-specification', in such a context, properly described as 'intensional'? The problem of 'deciding about art', as it is set out by Binkley, is the problem of determining the arthood or non-arthood of a given object, whether this object be the small brown spiral notebook encountered in the exhibition of conceptual art or the Yosemite Falls as contemplated by the bemused tourist. To 'specify everything to be

art', as a means of resolving the problem of 'deciding about art', then, is to specify, as pieces one is 'creating', all existing objects. But if what are specified as pieces are objects, 'piece-specification', like 'status-conferral', occurs in an extensional context; and, if this is the case, Warhol cannot make the piece "All the things Robert Barry knows...", since the 'object' in question has already been specified as a piece by Barry himself. Nor is the apparent extensionality of 'piece-specification' limited to the case of 'specifying everything to be art'. If I specify the Black Forest as a piece which I am making, and if the Black Forest is thereby created as an artwork, it will also be true that the largest forest in Germany is an artwork. If the blank in the 'Specification Rubric' is to be filled by the specification of an object, such as the Black Forest, then 'piece-specification' cannot be intensional, as Binkley claims, since, if an artwork is an object, it is that object under any extensionally equivalent description.

The purported 'intensionality' of 'piece-specification' is, of course, quite crucial to Binkley's position, since it is this feature of 'specification' which is held to distinguish it from 'status-conferral', and it is the 'extensionality' of 'status-conferral' which renders it inadequate as a description of the 'artistic act' whereby artworks are created:

> Dickie's definition, though not explicitly defeated by the matrix of pieces, is implicitly countered by the means of creation employed. If I had conferred status in making "P-One" (the number one), it would automatically be true that "5/5" is a work of art. But since I specified a piece, "5/5" is not the artwork I created. (73)

If 'piece-specification' is to be intensional, it cannot be the case

that what is specified as a piece is an object, in the sense considered above, and Binkley's apparent indications to the contrary must be regarded as unfortunate lapses in the presentation of his position. A clearer understanding of his conception of 'piece-specification' might be obtained if we focus upon those passages in which he explicitly deals with the 'intensional' aspects of the creation of artworks. The difference between Barry's piece and the piece which might be created by Warhol appears to be that, while both pieces relate to the same 'object' - all the things which Barry knows but is not thinking of at the stated time and place - they identify the 'object' under different descriptions. The same difference obtains between Barry's piece. as specified, and an alternative piece specified as "Everything I know" in the event that Barry was not actually thinking about anything which he knew at the time and place specified in the piece which he actually created. To specify a piece, then, is not to single out an object extensionally, but, rather, to identify an object under a particular description, or to label an object. Labelling occurs in an intensional context, in that two labels may have identical extensions and yet differ in meaning. While the Black Forest is identical with the largest forest in Germany, the label 'the Black Forest' is not identical with the label 'the largest forest in Germany', since labels are sorted, or 'indexed', according to their intensions rather than their extensions. If 'piece-specification' is to be understood as a form of labelling, this would explain why Binkley terms the conventions governing acts of 'specification' 'artistic indexing conventions'. The blank in the 'Specification Rubric', then, is to be filled not by the specification of an object, such as the Black Forest, but by the specification of a label, such as 'the Black Forest'.

The piece is not the object, but the object as labelled, and appreciation of the piece does not involve travelling to Germany to contemplate the 'directly exhibited' properties of the Black Forest, but, rather, it involves reflecting upon aspects of the act of labelling the object in a certain fashion, and upon the meaning of the label itself. Thus the Barry piece is distinguished from the hypothetical alternative piece "Everything I know" in that "the former piece contains reference to a specific moment in time, while the latter does not, and this could be a major artistic difference".(74)

This interpretation of Binkley's conception of 'piece-specification' is further borne out by two other examples which he offers. Consider, first, the following passage: "If a DeKooning can be art, so can an erased DeKooning. And if an artist presented a DeKooning painting as an 'unerased DeKooning', the piece would be different from the painting 'unerased' to make the work".(75) The DeKooning painting, exhibited under its original label, say "X", is the same object as the painting exhibited under the label "unerased DeKooning". Further, the two labels refer extensionally to the same object, but the object identified under the label "X" will differ from the object identified under the label "unerased DeKooning", and, consequently, there will be two distinct pieces. While both paintings, qua objects, possess the property of being 'unerased', this property is only 'A-relevant$_i$', and indeed crucially so, for the second piece - in fact, the original DeKooning, qua piece, does not possess this property at all. The function of the label, therefore, is to identify the piece and, thereby, to identify those properties of the painting, qua physical object, which are 'A-relevant$_i$'. A similar analysis might be given of another example to which Binkley

refers.[76] The example, offered by Arthur Danto in his paper "The Art-world"[77], is cited by Binkley as being relevantly similar to his example of the pieces by Barry and Warhol. Danto hypothesises two paintings by different artists which are identical in their 'directly exhibited' properties but are exhibited under different labels. Our appreciation and understanding of the two works will differ, according to Danto, in that the label under which each canvas is exhibited will lead us to 'read' the canvas in a particular way, noticing some, and ignoring other, potential relationships between pictorial elements of the paintings. Again, it would seem, the piece is not to be identified with an object, but with an object classified under a particular label, where the label serves to identify the 'A-relevant$_i$' properties of the object.

The 'Specification Rubric' has served to exemplify Binkley's conception of 'artistic indexing conventions' and the mechanism whereby a piece can be specified within such conventions. More precisely, the 'Specification Rubric' gives the 'general form' for a number of particular methods of specifying pieces, where what is specified is not an object but an object under a description. Specification is thus conceived as a form of 'labelling', occurring in an intensional, rather than an extensional, context. The label functions as the means whereby the 'A-relevant$_i$' properties of an object are identified as a piece. Clearly, however, the model of 'piece-specification' outlined above, in connection with those specifying conventions falling under the 'Specification Rubric', is only applicable to the creation of a limited class of artworks. While it may elucidate the manner in which 'conceptual' pieces are created, it seems highly questionable whether it can give an adequate account of the creative practice of traditional artists and,

indeed, of many modern artists. While the artworks created by such artists are characteristically artifacts possessing some form of explicit label, the label in question often performs a purely taxonomic function (e.g. musical compositions catalogued according to opus number, poems indexed only by their first lines) and is only acquired some time after the work, qua artifact, has been completed (e.g. the labels according to which many traditional paintings are indexed). Further, while such labels may be helpful aids to the appreciation and understanding of certain works, many works seem quite capable of existing, and of being fully appreciated, in the absence of any label whatsoever. It is unclear how the act of labelling a canvas "Untitled", for instance, could serve to identify a piece, or to identify the 'A-relevant$_i$' properties of an object; or how a failure to perform such an act of labelling could result in a failure to create an artwork, even though the actual painting of the canvas was completed.

Binkley, of course, is perfectly aware of the limited applicability of the 'Specification Rubric' as a model of 'piece-specification'. In a number of passages, he contrasts this model with traditional methods of specification which require that a piece be specified by means of 'aesthetic qualities'. But in what manner is a piece 'intensionally' specified by means of 'aesthetic qualities', and how does specification of this sort resemble specification within the framework of the 'Specification Rubric'? Clearly, the second question cannot be answered by reference to the fact that both species of specification occur within 'artistic indexing conventions', unless such conventions can be identified independently of their being used to specify pieces. If no such independent criterion can be given for something's being an 'artistic

indexing conventions'. Binkley's theory will face a problem of circularity similar to that which was seen to beset Dickie's notion of 'status-conferral'. Consider, for instance, the following claim:

> What is crucial is the act of specifying a piece, and the artist is simply the specifier. Success at specifying is not a question of whether you're an artist, but rather of whether you know and can use existing specifying conventions, or else can establish new ones. (78)

The significance of Duchamp, according to Binkley, is that, rather than specifying a piece within existing conventions, which required that a work be identified by means of 'aesthetic qualities', he "avowed new conventions" which imposed no such requirement: "Duchamp demonstrated that an artist's intention need not be imprisoned in the aesthetic qualities of a medium and that a simple piece-specification convention is sufficient for artistic creation".(79) Certainly, if an artwork is "a piece specified within artistic indexing conventions", then a simple 'piece-specification' convention will do as well as a complex one, but the important question here is, by virtue of what features, or according to what criterion, did Duchamp's method of 'specification' count as an 'artistic indexing convention', if it differed so radically from traditional methods of specification. If it be answered that Duchamp's method resembled traditional methods in that it functioned as a means of creating an artwork, there will be obvious circularity, given Binkley's 'définition' of 'work of art' quoted above.

If Binkley is to meet this sort of objection, he must show there to be resemblance of a more significant kind between 'piece-specification', as the method whereby traditional artworks were created, and 'piece-specification' as it occurs within the framework of the 'Specif-

ication Rubric'. In what way, then, might specification by means of 'aesthetic qualities' resemble specification as a species of 'labelling'? Binkley's discussion of the former type of specification is somewhat vague, but the following passages may indicate the sort of thing he has in mind:

> Aesthetics presupposes that to create an artwork is to bring into being aesthetic qualities, such as beauty and expressiveness, which are aspects of the appearance of an object or event. These qualities are found in the look of a painting, the sound of a sonata, etc., and they do secure one way of specifying an artwork. (80)
>
> Artistic indexing conventions provide means for intensionally specifying pieces. These conventions have existed at least since the Renaissance, when our current conception of 'art' was born. When Leonardo took up palette and brush, he did not first make a painting and then christen it art if he liked it. The mere fact that he used the artistic convention of painting on canvas assured that what he specified as the piece would be art. With this convention, the piece is specified when Leonardo stops painting and says 'that's it' (as opposed to stopping painting and throwing the thing out or setting it aside for completion at a later time). (81)

Binkley's description of 'piece-specification' in the case of an artist such as Leonardo is ambiguous, in that the act of specifying the piece might be taken to be either (i) the artist's assertion, "that's it", where 'that' refers to the completed painting, or (ii) the act of applying the paint to the canvas terminating in the artist's assertion, "that's it". While the first of these alternatives seems to more closely resemble the model of 'piece-specification' within the 'Specification Rubric', it is difficult to see how 'specification', so interpreted, would differ from making a painting and then christening it art. If the 'indexing convention' in question involves "painting on canvas", it would seem that Binkley intends his description to be taken in the

sense of 'ii' rather than that of 'i'. In either case, however, there would appear to be a problem accounting for the arthood of works which are 'unfinished', either because the artist dies before the work can be completed or because the artist intends to revise or polish the work but never actually does so. If the "Unfinished Symphony", Dicken's Edwin Drood, Proust's A la Recherche..., Coleridge's "Kubla Khan", and even certain paintings by Leonardo himself, for example, are properly classified as works of art, the creation of artworks by means of traditional methods of 'piece-specification' cannot require an explicit or implicit assertion of the form, "that's it", on the part of the artist. Further, it is not clear that an artist's rejection of a completed 'piece' should disqualify that 'piece' from being an artwork, although the knowledge that the artist rejected a given piece might influence our appreciation and understanding of that 'piece' as a work of art. Finally, if 'specification', within traditional conventions, requires that the artist validate his activity by asserting, in whatever form, "that's it", the artist presumably has the right to decide, in retrospect (the cold light of morning), that "that's not it", or, in other words, that the 'piece' requires further work. But, in this case, Binkley is wrong in claiming that 'piece-specification', as a 'creating' rather than a 'changing' convention, is infallible in that "once the piece is specified with the appropriate means of specification, it is a piece".(82)

If the creation of traditional artworks is to be elucidated in terms of the notion of 'piece-specification', therefore, 'assertion', in the sense discussed above, cannot be a necessary condition for the specification of a piece to occur. Nor is it a sufficient condition, if the indexing conventions in question are characterised in the manner

suggested by Binkley. If Leonardo had simply applied some paint in a random fashion to a canvas and had then asserted "that's it", he would not have created an artwork, given the conventions of the time, since these conventions demanded not merely that paint be applied to a canvas, but that the paint be applied in a certain way. More specifically, the conventions demanded that, for a piece to be specified by an act of painting on canvas, the paint had to be applied in such a way that the painting could be 'read' as a representational design. To specify a piece within the 'artistic indexing conventions' employed by artists of Leonardo's time, it was necessary to apply paint to canvas, or to some other appropriate material, in such a way that the resultant piece possessed representational, and possibly formal, properties of certain kinds. It was these properties of the painted canvas which the act of specification identified as the piece; and it was these properties of the painted canvas, qua physical object, which were thereby identified as the 'A-relevant$_i$' properties of the object. The 'artistic indexing conventions' within which pieces were specified by traditional artists did not merely require that a piece be specified by means of 'directly exhibited' 'aesthetic qualities'; they also established which 'directly exhibited' properties were relevant to the arthood of an object, or of a piece 'embodied' in an object, and thus which 'aesthetic qualities' of the object were relevant to the appreciation of the piece as a work of art.

Only if the 'indexing conventions' operative in the creation of traditional artworks are characterised in the manner suggested above, rather than in the manner suggested by Binkley, can the thesis that artworks are created by acts of 'piece-specification' within 'artistic

indexing conventions' be defended against the 'circularity' objection to which Dickie's version of the 'artistic act' theory has already fallen prey. In the first place, it is now possible to see the continuity between traditional methods of 'piece-specification' and those methods falling under the 'Specification Rubric'. 'Artistic indexing conventions' provide the means whereby artworks can be created through acts of 'piece-specification'. To specify a piece is to identify an 'object' under a 'description', where the 'description' isolates those properties of the 'object' which constitute the piece. The properties so isolated are the 'A-relevant$_i$' properties of the 'object', those properties relevant to the appreciation and understanding of the piece. In those methods of specification falling under the 'Specification Rubric', the 'indexing conventions' allow pieces to be specified by explicit acts of 'labelling' performed by the artist. The 'A-relevant$_i$' properties constituting the piece are identified, and the piece itself is 'created', by the act of specifying the piece according to a given method of specification. No physical transformation is wrought upon an object, but certain physical or relational properties of an 'object', physical or otherwise, are isolated through the act of specification, and it is these properties which constitute the piece. Specification within traditional 'indexing conventions', on the other hand, does require that the artist manipulate a medium of some sort, such that the 'A-relevant$_i$' properties required by the 'indexing convention' in question are brought into being. Such conventions, in other words, specify what 'directly exhibited' or 'aesthetic' qualities must be brought into being in order for an artwork to be created within a given convention. To specify a piece within a traditional 'indexing convention', it is simply necessary

to create an object possessing properties of the sort specified by the convention. The piece, or artwork, will be the object under the 'description' dictated by the convention, i.e., the object qua possessor of those of its properties which are of the sort specified by the convention as necessary conditions of arthood.

'Piece-specification', so conceived, possesses two characteristics which may help to distinguish it from other acts of 'specification' or 'identification' which do not serve to create artworks. Firstly, as Binkley points out, it is intensional rather than extensional in nature, since what is specified by an act of 'piece-specification' is not an object but an 'object under a description', where the 'description' is established by the requirements of an 'artistic indexing convention', either through explicit labelling or through the specification of certain kinds of properties as 'A-relevant$_i$'. Secondly, and more importantly, 'piece-specification' occurs in a public context, and serves as a means of making a piece inter-subjectively available. To make a piece so available is not, of course, to actually exhibit or present it in a public context, but, rather, to establish the identity of the piece in such a way that the piece may be located, and possibly appreciated, by receivers. Since a piece is not an object but an 'object under a description', a receiver will only be able to locate the piece if he can grasp the object under the appropriate 'description', or, in other words, if he can recognise which properties of the object are 'A-relevant$_i$'. The 'A-relevant$_i$' properties constituting a particular piece will depend upon, firstly, the 'indexing convention' within which the piece is specified, and, secondly, the particular act of 'piece-specification' performed by the artist within this convention. To identify a

piece in such a way that it is inter-subjectively available, therefore, it is necessary, firstly, that the 'indexing convention' employed should be known or knowable by receivers, and, secondly, that the piece should be adequately specified within that convention. In the case of traditional artworks, the conventions employed were, and remain, sufficiently well established that the artist need only concern himself with the task of clearly specifying a piece within those conventions to ensure that the piece will be inter-subjectively available. In the case of artworks created by methods of specification falling under the 'Specification Rubric', however, the artist faces two additional problems. Firstly, he may need to establish the 'indexing convention' which he is employing, and this may require considerable explanation, documentation, and even propagandising on his behalf. Artists who take it upon themselves to 'avow new conventions' are customarily greeted by an initial incomprehension owing to the inability of receivers to locate the piece created, and thus their inability to appreciate the same. Establishing a new 'indexing convention' is by no means as easy and cavalier a matter as Binkley seems to believe.

Secondly, the very liberality of conventions falling under the Rubric may necessitate that the artist support his piece with a considerable amount of documentation and explanation, even when the convention in question is already established. Methods of specification of the sort suggested by Binkley in connection with his 'counter-definition' pieces, for instance, allow a piece to be specified but impose no restrictions upon the 'A-relevant$_i$' properties which the piece may possess, unlike traditional 'indexing conventions' which do impose such restrictions. The artist, therefore, is required to do some of the work

of 'identification' which might otherwise be done by the convention itself. To generalise, the less artistic creation is carried on within established conventions, and the less restrictive are the conventions which are actually employed, the more we may expect the task of inter-subjectively identifying pieces to be carried out by means of explicit labelling and the accompaniment of pieces by verbal explanations and documentation.

At this point, however, it might be asked whether the 'artistic act' of 'piece-specification', as construed above, really differs in any significant fashion from the 'artistic act' of 'status-conferral' as proposed by Dickie. To specify a piece within an 'artistic indexing convention', I have argued, is to identify, as the piece, an 'object under a description', in such a way that the piece is inter-subjectively available. To confer the status of art, according to Dickie, is to act on behalf of the 'artworld' in conferring the status of 'candidate for appreciation' upon a set of the aspects of an artifact. An 'object under a description' seems to be equivalent to 'a set of aspects of an artifact', given Dickie's conception of artifactuality. Further, in the case of both 'piece-specification' (as construed) and 'status-conferral', an artwork is created by (i) a person's acting within 'established practices' of the artistic community ('artistic indexing conventions'; 'on behalf of the "artworld"') (ii) in such a way as to isolate certain properties of an object ('identifying an object under a "description"'; 'conferring a status upon a set of aspects of an artifact') (iii) so that these properties are available for the appreciation of receivers ('making the piece inter-subjectively available'; 'conferring the status of "candidate for appreciation"'). If, as I have argued, Dickie's ver-

sion of the'artistic act' theory in terms of 'status-conferral' suffers from serious defects, including a vicious form of circularity, will not the same difficulties beset the version of the 'artistic act' theory in terms of 'piece-specification' proposed above?

There is a measure of truth in the claim that 'piece-specification' and 'status-conferral' are simply different names for the same 'artistic act'. Once one recognises the function of an act of 'piece-specification', as a means of making a piece inter-subjectively available, and once one takes adequate account of the role of the 'set of aspects' in Dickie's later formulation of his definition of 'work of art', it becomes apparent that the two versions of the 'artistic act' theory are not as radically different as Binkley would have one believe. Nonetheless, there are important differences, one of which is crucially relevant to the question as to whether the 'piece-specification' theory is vulnerable to the same objections that have been raised against the 'status-conferral' theory espoused by Dickie. Firstly, as has already been noted, the two theories differ concerning the ontological status of the 'work of art', Dickie taking it to be the artifact, or 'object', while Binkley, and the revised version of the 'piece-specification' theory presented above, take it to be the 'object under a description', or the 'set of aspects' of an artifact. Secondly, and more significantly in the present context, the two theories differ in their conceptions of what it is to act within 'established practices' of the artistic community. According to Dickie, the 'established practices' in question are those governing the presentation of artworks for appreciation, and such 'practices' constitute the various systems which, taken together, constitute the 'artworld'. To create an artwork by acting within the

'established practices' of the 'artworld', then, is to regulate one's 'treatment' of a set of aspects of an artifact as a 'candidate for appreciation' by reference to the presentational practices of the relevant system of the 'artworld'. This conception of artistic creation, as we have seen, is problematic in a number of respects. Firstly, it is unclear how this analysis applies to art-forms such as painting and literature, where the creation of individual artworks seems in no way essentially dependent upon the existence of an institutional framework for the presentation of artworks for appreciation. Even if such a framework does exist for such art-forms, there appears to be no need for the artist to regulate his creative activity by reference to the presentational practices maintained within that framework, as the case of the "Romantic artist' serves to illustrate. Secondly, and relatedly, the existence of an institutional framework for the purpose of presenting artworks seems to be a purely contingent matter, save, perhaps, in the case of art-forms such as theatre. The fact, if fact it be, that artworks happen to be presented for the appreciation of receivers within an institutional framework cannot establish that art is '<u>essentially</u> institutional'. Finally, there seems to be a vicious circularity involved in Dickie's theory, in that the presentational practices of the 'artworld', by reference to which a person's 'treatment' of a set of aspects of an artifact as a 'candidate' can constitute an act of artistic creation, are only distinguishable from other 'systems' existing for the purpose of presenting artifacts so 'treated' by reference to our linguistic practice of classifying those things created in the former systems, but not those created in the latter, as works of art. The circularity is 'vicious' in that no explanation is given either of the

needs or interests satisfied by the creation and appreciation of artworks, and hence the need for an institutional framework for presenting works, or of the way in which new systems such as film can be added to the 'artworld'.

According to the 'piece-specification' theory, on the other hand, the 'established practices' within which a person may act to create a work of art are 'artistic indexing conventions' pertaining to the creation of artworks. The 'artworld', on this account, is not an institutional framework for presenting artworks, but the institutional framework in which existing 'indexing conventions' are somehow 'embodied' and in which new conventions can become established. This conception of the 'artworld' resembles that of Danto, who introduces the term as follows: "To see something as art requires something the eye cannot descry - an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art: an artworld".(83) 'Artistic indexing conventions' are much more closely allied to the components of Danto's 'artworld' than they are to those of Dickie's. Traditional 'indexing conventions', insofar as they specify which sorts of properties are 'A-relevant$_i$' and must therefore be brought into being if a piece is to be specified within them, imply a particular theory as to what it is to be, and to be appreciated as, a work of art. 'Indexing conventions' falling under the 'Specification Rubric', while they do not impose any restrictions upon the properties which may constitute a piece, also imply a particular theory of art, namely, that an artwork is any piece whose constitutive 'A-relevant$_i$' properties have been adequately identified so as to make the piece inter-subjectively available. To paraphrase Danto, to create or appreciate a piece requires a knowledge of the relevant 'indexing conventions'

and thus an institutional framework which may serve as a repository of such knowledge as well as of knowledge of artistic theory and the history of art.

I have argued that the problems that beset Dickie's theory derive from his attempt to define 'work of art' in terms of 'established practices' for the presentation of artworks for appreciation. If this claim is correct, we might expect that the 'piece-specification' theory, which attempts to distinguish artworks in terms of 'established practices' for creating rather than for presenting works of art, will not be beset by such problems, or will at least be troubled by them to a lesser extent. This indeed turns out to be the case.

Firstly, while it seems to be possible for persons to create artworks in the absence of an institutional framework for the presentation of such works, or without regard for the presentational practices of such a framework, it does not seem possible for works to be created by one who lacks a concept of what it is to create an artwork. This is simply to reassert a point made in the discussion, above, of Judd's notion of 'calling it art', namely, that 'calling it art', however elucidated, can only be a sufficient condition for the creation of an artwork if the 'caller' knows what it is to 'call something art'. To have a concept of 'what it is to create an artwork', on the 'piece-specification' theory, is to know how to use an 'artistic indexing convention', as a means of specifying a piece by identifying an 'object' under a 'description'. The 'Romantic artist', no less than the artist who creates for the salon, cannot create an artwork without some means of specifying his piece by bringing into being those 'A-relevant$_i$' properties constitutive of it, and his understanding of the nature of his enter-

prise, and of the goal towards which he is working, will reflect the particular 'indexing convention' within which he is working. Even the artist who creates purely for his own benefit needs to identify his piece, and will thus be guided in his creative activity by knowledge of an 'indexing convention'.(84)

The preceding line of reasoning might also serve as an argument for the 'essential institutionality' of art, if it could be shown that 'indexing conventions' can only exist in the context of an institutional framework constituting an 'artworld', in a sense analogous to that proposed by Danto. Danto claims that the creation and appreciation of artworks is only possible in the context of a theory of art, and that the maintenance and transmission of such theories requires an institutional framework. As Richard Sclafani has pointed out(85), however, the nature of such 'theories of art', on Danto's account, is somewhat unclear, nor is it clear that either the creation or the reception of artworks requires knowledge of an explicit theory of art. Sclafani further suggests that the role which Danto assigns to 'theories of art' is better assigned to actual artworks functioning as 'paradigms' or 'exemplars' of the conception of art within an artistic community. If we combine Sclafani's suggestion with the 'piece-specification' theory outlined above, it might be said that what such 'paradigms' will exemplify will be the 'indexing conventions' of that community. The 'indexing conventions' are thus maintained and transmitted by means of the 'paradigm' artworks which exemplify their application. 'Indexing conventions' thereby function as mediators between actual artworks and theories of art, in that they are embodied, or exemplified, in the artistic achievements of a community, while they also imply theories as to what it is to be, and

to be appreciated as, a work of art.

Whether the 'piece-specification' theory is open to the 'circularity' objection levelled at the 'status-conferral' theory is a more complex question. If 'indexing conventions' are construed in the manner suggested by Binkley, the answer would seem to be in the affirmative. If the 'conventions' are characterised as modes of activity, such as 'painting on canvas', it might be asked why these activities, and not others, result in the specification of pieces, and thus the creation of artworks. 'Artistic indexing conventions', it would seem, are only distinguished in terms of their being usable to create artworks, and artworks are simply those pieces specified within 'artistic indexing conventions'. If 'indexing conventions' are construed in the manner which I have suggested, however, not as diverse modes of activity but as means of identifying certain properties of an 'object' as 'A-relevant$_i$', or of identifying an 'object under a description', it may be possible to obviate this circularity or at least render it less vicious in nature.

How this might be done may become apparent if the 'circle' is set out in terms of this version of the 'piece-specification' theory. 'Artistic indexing conventions' are usable to create artworks, in that they provide the means whereby a piece may be inter-subjectively identified by the identification of those 'A-relevant$_i$' properties of an object which constitute the piece. An artwork, conversely, is a piece the constitutive properties of which are 'A-relevant$_i$' properties of an object identified through an act of 'piece-specification' within an 'artistic indexing convention'. The 'circle', in this case, contains not only 'artistic indexing conventions' and 'artworks', but also "'A-relevant$_i$' properties of an object", or, as I have also termed it, "an

object under a 'description'". This third element in the 'circle' serves to link the other two, in that 'indexing conventions' function as means of inter-subjectively identifying 'A-relevant$_i$' properties of an object, and it is these properties which constitute the piece as an 'artwork'. We might escape the 'circle', therefore, if we could find some way of characterising this third element independently of its relationship with the other two elements. Is there, then, any such independent distinguishing characteristic of 'A-relevant$_i$' properties of objects, or, again, of the 'descriptions' under which objects are works of art?

Traditional philosophers of art, espousing the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance', would claim that there is indeed such a characteristic, namely, that 'A-relevant$_i$' properties are 'aesthetic properties', where the latter are 'directly exhibited' properties capable of eliciting 'aesthetic experience' in receivers who engage in an experiential encounter with the objects possessing them. Binkley, as we have seen, rejects both the view that artworks are distinguished from non-works by their possession of 'aesthetic properties', so characterised, and the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance' which underlies this view. He argues that, while pieces may be specified by means of 'aesthetic qualities', they need not be, and that certain artworks possess no 'aesthetic qualities' whatsoever. That arthood is not a matter of the possession of 'directly exhibited' 'aesthetic qualities' is demonstrated, so he claims, by the fact that "two things can differ in nothing but the presence of arthood".(86) It is this argument, insofar as it applies to such artworks as Duchamp's "Readymades', which seems to show the inability of any artistic theory adhering to the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance' to adequately account for the accepted class of artworks as

established by the 'actual employment' of the concept 'art' within the artistic community.

But this argument may be less conclusive than it has thus far appeared. Firstly, we might note that 'things', in the preceding quotation from Binkley, refers to objects; but, as we have seen, the 'intensionality' of piece-specification implies that it is not objects that are artworks, or pieces, but 'objects under a description', where the description isolates those 'A-relevant$_i$' properties of the object which constitute the piece. While arthood is not a matter of the properties possessed by an object, therefore, it is a matter of those properties of an object inter-subjectively identified as 'A-relevant$_i$' to constitute a piece. Duchamp's urinal and another urinal of the same design may not differ in respect of their 'directly exhibited' properties, but they will differ in that certain ('non-exhibited') properties of the former have been identified as 'A-relevant$_i$' to constitute the piece "Fountain". The question which needs to be answered, here, is whether the 'A-relevant$_i$' properties of an object which constitute a piece are related in any distinctive way to the object which possesses them.

'A-relevant$_i$' properties cannot be 'aesthetic properties', if the latter are construed in the manner of traditional artistic theory, as set out above. But, if the 'piece-specification' theory is correct, the traditional view of 'aesthetic experience' in the context of art, and thus the notion of 'aesthetic properties' defined in terms of this view, appears to be unacceptable even as an account of what it is to appreciate traditional types of artwork. Traditional artworks, as pieces, cannot be identified with objects in the fullness of their properties; rather, a traditional artwork is an 'object under a description', where

the 'description' isolates those 'A-relevant$_i$' 'aesthetic qualities' which the artist has brought into being to create the piece within a given 'indexing convention'. Such works, no less than the works of artists such as Duchamp, must be 'read' according to the appropriate 'indexing convention' if the piece is to be located by a receiver. Thus 'aesthetic experience', even in the case of traditional artworks, cannot be elucidated simply in terms of the experiences elicited in a receiver in an experiential encounter with an object, since the receiver must first locate the piece, by reference to the 'indexing convention' employed by the artist, before he can engage in an experiential encounter with it. The essential role which knowledge of 'indexing conventions' plays in the appreciation of artworks has been overlooked by traditional theorists of art, largely because the stability, and hence the familiarity, of the 'indexing conventions' employed by artists obscures the fact that appreciation of a work is mediated by knowledge of such conventions and not 'immediate' as such theorists have assumed.

At the beginning of this chapter, the acceptability of the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance' was questioned on the grounds that, because of the requirement that the 'A-relevant$_i$' properties of an object should be those 'directly exhibited' 'aesthetic properties' possessed by the object, the 'Principle' could not account for the 'arthood' of 'Readymades' and the 'non-arthood' of forgeries. The reflections of the preceding paragraph suggest, however, that such difficulties may derive not from the 'Principle' itself but from an incorrect conception of the nature of 'aesthetic experience'. In the case of both traditional artworks and modern works of the sort discussed by Binkley, appreciating a piece presupposes the ability to locate those 'A-relevant$_i$'

properties which constitute the piece in question, and this, in turn, presupposes knowledge of the relevant 'indexing conventions'. If the 'aesthetic experiences' attending the appreciation of traditional art-works are elicited in an experiential encounter with the 'A-relevant$_i$' properties so isolated, it might be asked whether the appreciation of the 'A-relevant$_i$' properties constitutive of modern works also involves a mode of experience which might be termed 'aesthetic'. Whether this is so will clearly depend, in part, upon the account of 'aesthetic experience' which is offered as a replacement for the discredited conception of such experience adhered to by traditional theorists.

In the final part of this paper, I shall briefly outline an account of 'aesthetic experience' compatible with the 'piece-specification' theory developed above. Such an account might justify the reinstatement of the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance' as an acceptable methodological principle for the philosophy of art, insofar as it also provides a means of dealing with artistic 'puzzlement' within the confines of that principle. It may also enable us to characterise the 'A-relevant$_i$' properties of objects in such a way that the 'piece-specification' theory, as construed above, can avoid the circularity that has been argued to attend those versions of the 'artistic act' theory of art proposed by Dickie and Binkley.

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Part Four

Chapter Eleven The Context of Reception

In chapter ten, it was argued that an adequate account of art, and an adequate argument for the 'essential institutionality' of art, cannot be given simply in terms of 'established practices' for presenting art-works for appreciation, but requires an elucidation of the 'logically prior' activites of creating and appreciating individual works of art. An elucidation of the creative activity of the artist was attempted, as a development of Binkley's conception of 'artistic acts' as acts of 'piece-specification'. To specify a piece within an 'artistic indexing convention', it was claimed, is to identify and make inter-subjectively available an 'object under a description', where the 'description', established by the 'indexing convention' employed, serves to isolate those 'A-relevant$_i$' properties which constitute the piece. In the final part of this paper, I shall attempt a compatible elucidation of the other activity mediated by the presentational practices of the 'art-world', namely, the reception and appreciation of works of art by receivers. The concept which links the account given of artistic creation and the account, to be developed, of artistic appreciation is that of 'A-relevant$_i$' properties, which are both the constitutive elements of the pieces created by artists and, by definition, the properties of objects relevant to their being appreciated and understood as works of art, i.e., as objects 'under a description'.

The manner in which the appreciation of artworks is elucidated will also have a crucial bearing on the acceptability, or otherwise, of the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance', which asserts that artworks are distinguished from non-works by their possession of 'aesthetic

properties', properties having the capacity to elicit 'aesthetic experience' in receivers who engage in an experiential encounter with a work. The 'piece-specification' theory developed in chapter ten implies that all works of art, as pieces specified within 'artistic indexing conventions', will possess certain 'A-relevant$_i$' properties, as those properties inter-subjectively identified as constitutive of the piece. If the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance' is correct, at least some of the 'A-relevant$_i$' properties constituting any given piece must be 'aesthetic properties'. Since 'aesthetic properties' have been defined in terms of their capacity to elicit 'aesthetic experience' in receivers, it would be necessary to show that at least some of the 'A-relevant$_i$' properties constituting any given piece are distinguishable in terms of their capacity to function as eliciters of 'aesthetic experience' in receivers engaging in the activity of appreciating the piece as a work of art. If this could be shown, a non-circular formulation of the 'artistic act' theory of art might be available, in terms of the modified notion of 'piece-specification'. The circle of inter-definition, in respect of 'specifying within an artistic indexing convention' and 'creating an artwork', might be broken by elucidating either the notion of an 'artistic indexing convention' or the notion of an 'artwork' in terms of the identification, or the possession, of 'A-relevant$_i$' properties which are also 'aesthetic properties'.

It might be objected, however, that the attempt to reconcile the 'piece-specification' theory with the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance' is misconceived from the start. Binkley, after all, develops his version of the theory on the basis of arguments which also, so he claims, demonstrate the falsity of the 'Principle'; and the modified version of

Binkley's account presented in chapter ten does not seem to negate the force of his anti-aesthetic arguments. Clearly, if 'aesthetic properties' are construed, in the traditional fashion, as 'directly exhibited' perceptible properties of objects, and if 'aesthetic experience' is construed as experience elicited by such properties, the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance', and any theory of art committed to it, will be unable to account for the arthood of works such as Barry's piece, cited in chapter ten, for such works lack any properties of this sort relevant to their being appreciated as art. Any possible reconciliation between the 'piece-specification' theory and the 'Principle', therefore, will require a reconstrual of the nature of 'aesthetic properties' and 'aesthetic experience'. But, it might be asked, on what basis can the 'experience' elicited by a work such as Barry's, and the properties it possesses relevant to such experience, be characterised as 'aesthetic' if they lack the apparently defining relationship to acts of perception?

The answer to this question, I think, is that such characterisation will be justifiable to the extent that the 'experience' involved in the appreciation of 'conceptual' artworks such as Barry's exhibits those features which seemed to justify the extention of the notion of 'aesthetic experience' from non-artistic phenomena to artworks in the first place.(1) These features, we may recall, were, firstly, our pre-theoretical recognition of the essentially experiential nature of artistic appreciation and the impossibility of 'vicarious' appreciation of an artwork, and, secondly, our conviction that, in some sense, the pleasure which artworks afford us is 'disinterested', that artworks are 'immediately or immanently consummatory', that an artwork is valued 'for itself', etc. The claim that 'aesthetic experience' is necessarily

perceptual, and that 'aesthetic properties' are necessarily perceptible qualities of objects, however unquestioned this claim may have been within a particular aesthetic tradition, is better regarded as a tenet of a specific theory of the nature of the 'aesthetic' than as an 'analytic' truth about the 'aesthetic' which any aesthetic theory must recognise. There is , indeed, no absence of aesthetic theories in which the 'aesthetic' is not identified with the perceptual - the Platonic and Neo-Platonic theories of beauty, wherein beauty is taken to be essentially intelligible and only contingently embodied in perceptible form, might be cited here. Further, as has already been noted, the thesis that 'aesthetic experience' is elicited only by perceptible properties of objects seems as odds with the widely recognised 'aesthetic' character of the experiences elicited in the non-perceptual contemplation of logical amd mathematical proofs. Finally, as was mentioned in chapter five, if 'aesthetic experience' is essentially perceptual, the thesis that the appreciation of artworks involves a mode of 'aesthetic experience' becomes distinctly problematic in the case of literary artforms. This might be taken to indicate the inadequacy of the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance', of course, or, even more radically, the non-arthood of literary 'works'. Traditional theorists, however, wishing to preserve both the 'Principle' and the practice of classifying literature as art, have been driven, by their conception of 'aesthetic experience', to such expedients as that of Baumgarten, who took the 'aesthetic qualities' eliciting 'aesthetic experience' in the case of literary artworks to be the 'mental images', 'internally' perceived, which a work may arouse in a receiver.

The claim that at least some of the 'A-relevant$_i$' properties con-

stituting any given piece will be 'aesthetic properties', therefore, may be understood as the claim that the appreciation and understanding of works of art is an 'aesthetic' activity, in the sense distinguished above; that is, appreciating and understanding an artwork involves an experiential encounter with the work itself, in which the work is experienced as being, in some way, 'immediately consummatory', 'a source of disinterested pleasure', 'valuable in and for itself', etc. Whether this claim is acceptable will depend upon the analysis given of artistic appreciation and of the conditions under which a receiver may be said to appreciate and understand an artwork. One such condition, as we have already seen, is that the receiver must be able to locate the work, as an 'object under a description', and this, in turn, presupposes the receivers knowledge of the 'indexing convention' within which the 'A-relevant$_i$' properties constituting the piece were identified. If the appreciation of artworks involves 'aesthetic experience', therefore, the mechanism whereby such experience is elicited must be more complex than traditional theorists have supposed it to be. Bell, for instance, construes the appreciation of artworks as an essentially passive or reactive matter; the 'aesthetic experience' is elicited in receivers as a response to the 'significant form' possessed by an artwork, qua object. Such an account follows in the footsteps of the aesthetic theories proposed by traditional empiricists such as Hutcheson and Hume. According to these theorists(2), the 'Judgement of Taste' is grounded in the operations of an 'inner sense' which registers the 'aesthetic qualities' of things. The idea that 'aesthetic experience' is a passive response to the 'aesthetic qualities' of things, while it may be plausible in the case of the 'aesthetic experience' of non-artistic' phenom-

ena, is clearly inadequate as an account of the processes involved in the appreciation of artworks, if artworks are construed, in the manner of the 'piece-specification' theory, as 'objects under a description'. Any account of artistic appreciation which is to be compatible with the 'piece-specification' theory of artistic creation must elucidate not only the conditions under which a receiver can be said to appreciate and understand a given piece, but also the conditions under which he can locate a piece that may be appreciated and understood.

The import of the preceding observations may become somewhat clearer if we examine the attempts of two theorists, Monroe Beardsley and George Dickie, to elucidate the conditions governing the appreciation and understanding of artworks in terms of the notion of the 'aesthetic object'. The term 'aesthetic object' has its origins in what Dickie calls 'aesthetic attitude' theories of the 'aesthetic'. According to 'aesthetic attitude' theorists, the occurrence of 'aesthetic experience' is to be explained not by reference to properties of objects having the capacity to elicit such experience in a passive receiver, but by reference to the exercise of certain capacities in the subject. These capacities have been variously characterised(3) as the capacity to perform an act of 'psychical distancing', the capacity to engage in a distinctively 'aesthetic' mode of attention to an object, and the capacity to perceive things in a distinctively 'aesthetic' manner. An 'aesthetic object', then, is simply an object as it is apprehended by one adopting an 'aesthetic attitude', however the latter is construed. Dickie devotes the central chapters of his book, Art and the Aesthetic, to a critique of 'aesthetic attitude' theories.(4) He argues that the arguments offered in support of these theories fail to establish the existence of those

subjective capacities held to be operative in 'aesthetic experience', and that no alternative arguments for the existence of such capacities seem to be forthcoming. If the 'aesthetic attitude' is a myth, then the conception of the 'aesthetic object' as the object apprehended when one adopts the 'aesthetic attitude' will also be unacceptable.

Having dismissed 'aesthetic attitude' theories, Dickie considers an alternative conception of the 'aesthetic object' proposed by Beardsley.(5) While in agreement with Beardsley as to the way in which the 'aesthetic object' should be conceived, Dickie maintains that Beardsley's account is flawed as a result of the latter's failure to recognise the essentially institutional nature of the 'aesthetic object'. Amending Beardsley's account so as to remedy this failing, Dickie offers "an institutional analysis of the notion of the 'aesthetic object'", to complement the 'institutional analysis of art' outlined in the first chapter of Art and the Aesthetic. In the remainder of this chapter, I shall present and attempt to evaluate the accounts of artistic appreciation which Dickie and Beardsley propose on the basis of their respective conceptions of the 'aesthetic object'. For both writers, as will be seen, the appreciation and understanding of an artwork requires that one attend to the 'aesthetic object' of that work. Their accounts differ, however, with respect to the mechanism whereby the 'aesthetic object' of an artwork is identified for the appreciation of receivers, and, consequently, with respect to the sorts of properties which 'aesthetic objects' of artworks possess. In examining their accounts, I shall be concerned not only with their general adequacy as elucidations of artistic appreciation, but also with their more specific adequacy, as such elucidations, relative to the enterprise outlined at the begin-

ning of this chapter, namely, the development of an account of artistic appreciation compatible with both the 'piece-specification' theory of artistic creation and the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance'. It will be seen that Beardsley's theory, while compatible with the 'Principle', is incompatible with the 'piece-specification' theory because the 'aesthetic properties' which constitute the 'aesthetic object' are restricted to the perceptible properties of objects. The general adequacy of his theory is therefore also questionable, since it is open to those objections which Binkley raises against any theory which takes the possession of perceptible 'aesthetic properties' to be a necessary condition of arthood. Dickie's theory, while it might appear more promising, will also be seen to be inadequate, for reasons closely related to those pertaining to the inadequacy of his account of the creation of artworks in terms of 'status-conferral'. In the following chapter, I shall develop an alternative conception of the nature of artistic appreciation, which, it will be argued, provides a more adequate elucidation of such appreciation, and, further, is compatible with both the 'piece-specification' theory and the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance'.

According to both Beardsley and Dickie, an 'aesthetic object' is defined as "an object of criticism and/or appreciation".(6) The 'aesthetic object' of a work of art, therefore, consists of "the aspects of a work of art belonging to the object of criticism and/or appreciation". These 'aspects' are also referred to as "the aesthetic aspects of a work of art".(7) As Dickie points out(8), if 'aesthetic object' is conceived in this manner, the claim that appreciation of artworks involves attention to their 'aesthetic objects' is true by definition, and not

a merely contingent matter as is the case when 'aesthetic object' is conceived in the manner of the 'aesthetic attitude' theorists. In this respect, the notion of the 'aesthetic object of an artwork' resembles that of the "'A-relevant$_i$' properties of an object". These notions differ, however, in that, on the 'piece-specification' theory, the 'A-relevant$_i$' properties of an object constitute the piece itself, as an artwork, whereas, for Beardsley and Dickie, the artwork is not the 'aesthetic object' but the physical object a set of the aspects of which constitute the 'aesthetic object'.

Clearly, if 'aesthetic object' is defined in this way, the claim that artistic appreciation involves attention to the 'aesthetic object of a work of art' will tell us nothing about the nature of artistic appreciation unless those aspects of artworks which constitute their 'aesthetic objects' can be characterised in some way independently of their being so constitutive. What principles serve to distinguish the 'aesthetic aspects' of artworks from their 'non-aesthetic aspects'? According to Dickie(9), Beardsley proposes two such principles, together with a further argument which operates as a qualification on the range of the second principle. The first of these principles, which Dickie terms the 'principle of distinctness', asserts that "in order for something to be an aspect of an aesthetic object of a work of art, it must be an aspect of a work of art".(10) Strictly speaking, of course, this principle does not serve to distinguish between the 'aesthetic' and the 'non-aesthetic' aspects of artworks, but to exclude, as aspects of 'aesthetic objects' of artworks, those things which are not aspects of artworks. Beardsley employs the 'principle of distinctness' as a means of excluding from the 'aesthetic objects' of artworks

the intentions of the artists who create such works. The artist's intentions with respect to a particular work which he creates, while they are related to the work, are not properly regarded as aspects of that work, and are therefore excluded from the work's 'aesthetic object'. Since the 'aesthetic aspects' of an artwork are, by definition, the only aspects properly attended to in the appreciation and criticism of that work, 'intentionalist' criticism is to be rejected.

The second principle, which Dickie terms the 'principle of direct perceptibility', asserts that "in order for something to be an aspect of an aesthetic object, it must be directly perceptible".(11) An aspect is 'directly perceptible' when it is "perceptible under the normal conditions of experiencing the (object) in question".(12) This principle serves to exclude, from the 'aesthetic object' of an artwork, those aspects of the physical work of art whose existence, as aspects of the work, cannot be verified by means of "direct perception of the (work) itself", either because they are not <u>perceptible</u> aspects (e.g. a painting's being an oil painting) or because, while perceptible, they are not <u>directly</u> perceptible (e.g., a painting's having been painted on a certain date; the colour of the back of a painting).

The two principles discussed in the preceding paragraphs are clearly insufficient, by themselves, to distinguish the 'aesthetic aspects' of artworks. Even if it were true that all 'aesthetic aspects' of artworks are 'directly perceptible' aspects of artworks, it is obviously not the case that all 'directly perceptible' aspects of artworks are aspects of their 'aesthetic objects'. Two examples offered by Dickie may serve to establish this point. Firstly, the ink marks constituting the text of a printed poem are 'directly perceptible' aspects of the

physical work of art, but they are not (save in the case of 'graphic' or 'concrete' poetry) properly included in the 'aesthetic object' of that poem. Secondly, the property man in traditional Chinese theatre, who appears onstage during the performance to rearrange the props, is 'directly perceptible' and is also an aspect of the physical work of art, if the play, qua physical event, is taken to comprise not only the action on stage constituting the 'drama' but also the actions of stage-hands, lighting technicians, etc., and the physical environment in which such actions occur. Again, however, the actions of the Chinese property man are not properly included in the 'aesthetic object' of the play. Beardsley requires a further principle, or a restriction on the range of the 'principle of direct perceptibility', if he is to exclude such things from the 'aesthetic objects' of artworks. He offers, as a means to such exclusion, what Dickie terms 'stage two' of his analysis of the notion of the 'aesthetic object'.(13) In 'stage two', 'aesthetic objects' are distinguished from other perceptible objects, and the 'aesthetic aspects' of artworks from their other perceptible aspects, by reference to the 'basic properties' of the various perceptual fields. The 'aesthetic object' for fields in the visual mode of perception, for example, is taken to be a 'visual design', which is defined as "a bounded visual area containing some heterogeneity".(14) Given a similar analysis for the other modes of perception, we may arrive at a disjunctive definition of 'aesthetic object of an artwork' as "anything that is either a visual design, musical composition, literary work, and so on".(15),(16)

According to Beardsley, therefore, the 'aesthetic aspects' of an artwork are those of its 'directly perceptible' aspects constitutive of an 'aesthetic object' for the appropriate perceptual mode. These 'aes-

thetic aspects' are also 'aesthetic properties' of the object, in the sense distinguished in chapter four above, i.e., properties capable of eliciting 'aesthetic experience' in receivers. Beardsley claims that there are "certain features of experience that are peculiarly characteristic of our intercourse witn aesthetic objects", and that these features, as the distinctive features of 'aesthetic experience', may be characterised as follows:

> I propose to say that a person is having an aesthetic experience during a particular stretch of time if and only if the greater part of his mental activity during that time is united and made pleasurable by being tied to the form and qualities of a sensuously presented or imaginatively intended object on which his primary attention is concentrated. (17)

Beardsley also holds that the worth of an artwork is to be measured by the 'magnitude' of the 'aesthetic experience', so defined, that it is capable of eliciting in receivers. His conception of artworks, as physical objects certain aspects of which are 'aesthetic properties', and of artistic appreciation, as the eliciting of 'aesthetic experience' in receivers of artworks so conceived, indicates a clear commitment to the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance'. Since he also restricts 'aesthetic properties' to perceptible properties of objects, and 'aesthetic experience' to perceptual experience, his account will be open to the sort of objections which Binkley raises against any account of art and artistic appreciation committed to the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance' in this sense of the term 'aesthetic'.

As we might expect, Dickie's criticisms of Beardsley focus on the 'principle of direct perceptibility' and the qualification of that principle effected by the analysis of the 'basic properties' of perceptual

fields. In the first place, so he argues, the attempt to distinguish between 'aesthetic aspects' of artworks and other perceptible aspects of such works in terms of the 'basic properties' of perceptual fields is unsuccessful, since the 'basic properties' requirement fails to exclude all of those non-aesthetic perceptible aspects which it is intended to exclude.(18) While Beardsley might be able to meet the 'counter-example' of the ink marks constituting the text of a poetic artwork by arguing that the 'visual design' which such ink marks compose belongs to a different perceptual modality from that of the poem, qua 'aesthetic object', he is unable to exclude the Chinese property man, since the latter, being clearly visible among the actors on the stage, is simply one further element in the 'visual design' defined by the boundaries of the stage.(19)

A more serious problem for Beardsley, however, is the existence, not of 'directly exhibited' 'non-aesthetic' aspects, but of non-perceptible (i.e., not directly perceptible) 'aesthetic aspects', that is, aspects of artworks which are not 'directly perceptible' but which are relevant to the appreciation and understanding of the artworks of which they are aspects. Dickie offers a number of examples of 'aesthetic aspects' of this kind. Firstly, as was noted above, the thesis that the 'aesthetic properites' of artworks properly attended to in the appreciation of those works are perceptible properties seems to be untenable with respect to literary artworks, in that the meanings of the words of which such works are composed are clearly relevant to the appreciation and understanding of such works but are not among their perceptible properties. As Dickie points out, "one understands or fails to understand the meaning of a poetic statement; one does not perceive or fail

to perceive the meaning in the same sense of 'perceive' that one perceives the design and colours of a painting or the tones of a piece of music".[20] Secondly, the appreciation and understanding of certain works in the performing arts presupposes an awareness of certain aspects of the works which are not 'directly perceptible'. The exhibited skills of actors and dancers, for instance, may depend upon the presence of 'invisible' wires not 'directly perceptible' to the audience, and the proper appreciation of the performances of such artists requires knowledge of the presence of such wires. Finally, the proper appreciation of certain paintings may require knowledge of such things as the medium employed by the artist or the date at which the work was created. Dickie claims that we cannot easily separate such considerations, relating to the 'skill' of the artist, from the value of the work produced through the exercise of such skill. He concludes that the 'principle of direct perceptibility' is unacceptable, in that, "while it would perhaps be impossible to have an aesthetic object with no directly perceptible aspects, aesthetic objects with some aspects that are not directly perceptible do seem to exist".[21]

If the 'aesthetic aspects' of a work of art cannot be distinguished by reference to the principles proposed by Beardsley, how are they to be distinguished? Dickie maintains that "the aspects of a work of art which belong to the aesthetic object of that work of art are determined by the conventions governing the presentation of the work".[22] The 'aesthetic object', like the 'work of art', exists within an institutional context, and can only be adequately elucidated by reference to that context. Beardsley's error, then, is his failure to recognise the 'essentially institutional' nature of the appreciation of artworks.

This error, Dickie argues, infects not only the 'principle of direct perceptibility' but also the 'principle of distinctness', since the latter "is not a principle that can be wielded in connection with a particular work of art by someone ignorant of the artform within which the work has a place".(23) 'The artform within which a work has a place', on Dickie's 'Institutional Theory' of art, is that system of the 'artworld' to which the work belongs, and the 'knowledge' necessary to wield the 'principle of distinctness' is of the way in which works of this kind are ordinarily received by receivers, as a function of the 'established practices' for presenting works within that system. Someone's being able to apply the 'principle of distinctness' to distinguish the artist's intentions from the 'aesthetic object' of an artwork, he claims, requires prior knowledge as to the contents of 'aesthetic objects' for artworks of that kind, and thus prior knowledge of the presentational practices of the relevant system of the 'artworld'.

Dickie's position is slightly ambiguous, here, concerning the acceptability of the 'principle of distinctness'. Robert Yanal, for instance, has argued that Dickie does not wish to reject this principle, but merely to point out the conditions under which it can be used:

> What is required, according to Dickie, is background knowledge of the conventions governing the presentation of the artwork; but such knowledge is only required for someone to <u>wield</u> the principle of distinctness, to <u>recognise</u> its validity. It does not, and I think was not intended to, <u>supplant</u> the principle. (24)

While certain remarks made by Dickie might support this interpretation of his position, it appears that the 'principle of distinctness' will be at best redundant and at worst false if Dickie's general thesis

concerning the identification of the 'aesthetic object' is accepted. If the 'aesthetic aspects' of an artwork are determined by the 'conventions governing the presentation of the work', the 'principle of distinctness', which is intended to exclude from the 'aesthetic object' of an artwork those things which are not aspects of the artwork itself, seems to serve no purpose, since such things, if they are indeed 'non-aesthetic aspects', will be excluded from the 'aesthetic object' by the presentational conventions for artworks of that kind. Furthermore, there seems to be no reason to rule out, on a priori grounds, the possibility that the 'aesthetic object' of an artwork, as determined by the relevant 'presentational practices', might include certain aspects which are not aspects of the physical work of art. Indeed, one such 'aesthetic aspect' might be the intentions of the artist, which, according to Beardsley and also to Dickie, are not an aspect of the physical artwork. Certainly, it would seem, the presentational practices of certain systems or sub-systems of the 'artworld' do treat the artist's intentions as relevant to the appreciation and understanding of the artworks which he creates. The programme notes handed out at the theatre, which Dickie includes among what he terms the 'secondary conventions' of presentation, frequently make extensive reference to the context in which the artist was writing, his aims in writing the play, biographical elements to be found in the work, etc. Similarly, the catalogues which may be purchased at art galleries contain information about the intentions of artists embedded in discussions about the perceptible aspects of their works. Such information would seem to be particularly pertinent in the case of artists such as Duchamp, for, it would seem, knowledge of Duchamp's intentions in 'creating' his 'Readymades' is quite essential for

a proper appreciation and understanding of these works. These features of the 'conventions governing the presentation' of artworks raise a particular problem for Dickie, who wishes to maintain, with Beardsley, that the artist's intentions are not an aspect of the 'aesthetic objects' of artworks, and are therefore not properly attended to in the appreciation and understanding of these works. Dickie devotes an entire section of his earlier book(25) to a defence of this thesis, arguing that the meaning of a poem or the representational content of a picture are determined by the "properties of the (work) itself" and not by the artist's intentions, and that the only proper grounds for an assertion as to the meaning of an artwork are features that can be "independently discovered in the work". His remarks on the subject of 'intentionalist criticism' in Art and the Aesthetic indicate that his position on the subject has not changed. While the anti-intentionalist arguments which he advances are compatible with Beardsley's analysis of the 'aesthetic object', they do not seem to be compatible with the 'institutional analysis' of the 'aesthetic object' proposed by Dickie himself. More specifically, the 'principle of distinctness', which might establish that the artist's intentions are not an aspect of the 'aesthetic object' of an artwork, seems to be incompatible with Dickie's analysis of the 'aesthetic object'. While he may wish to retain this principle, therefore, as a means of excluding the artist's intentions, it is not clear that such an option is open to him.

Whatever Dickie's position may be on the 'principle of distinctness', his 'institutional analysis' of the 'aesthetic object' is clearly intended to supplant the 'principle of direct perceptibility' and the attendant analysis of the 'basic properties' of perceptual fields.

The 'aesthetic aspects' of an artwork are distinguished not by reference to their perceptual availability or their perceptible properties, but by reference to the conventions governing the presentation of artworks for appreciation. We might enquire, therefore, as to the nature of these conventions and the manner in which they operate to locate the 'aesthetic object' of an artwork for the appreciation of receivers.

Dickie distinguishes between two types of presentational conventions, which he terms 'primary' and 'secondary' conventions.[26] 'Secondary' conventions function as devices that "locate the aesthetic object for the spectator", or for the receiver in the case of non-visual art-forms. To appreciate and understand the 'aesthetic object' so located, however, it is necessary that one grasp the 'primary' conventions pertaining to the art-form in question. Dickie illustrates his conception of 'primary' and 'secondary' conventions by reference to the traditional theatre, literature, and painting. The 'secondary' conventions of the theatre are of two kinds. Firstly, there are devices that direct the spectator's attention towards those possible objects of perceptual attention that are aspects of the 'aesthetic object'. Such devices include 'spatial practices' (the arrangement of seats, the elevation of the stage, etc.), 'temporal cues' (the dimming of the house lights, the raising and lowering of the curtains), and the information provided in the programme concerning the "parts of the aesthetic object of the play". In the realm of literature, 'secondary' conventions of this type would include such devices as changes in pagination which serve to set apart "the non-aesthetic text...from the aesthetic text". Secondly, there are conventions whereby certain non-aesthetic aspects of the play, qua physical work of art, are hidden from the audience so that they cannot

be possible objects of perceptual attention. Such conventions "help locate the aesthetic objects of plays by concealing things that might interfere or be confused with aspects of aesthetic objects".(27) Such imperceptible aspects of artworks, within the presentational practices of traditional theatre, include the actions of stage-hands and the backs of stage flats. An analogous form of secondary convention, in the case of paintings, is the concealment of the backs of pictures, as non-aesthetic aspects of the physical artworks, when the pictures are presented for appreciation in art galleries.

Neither sort of 'secondary' convention is necessary for the 'knowledgeable' receiver, it is claimed, the latter being one who grasps the 'primary' conventions for the presentation of artworks of the relevant kind. The 'primary' convention of the theatre, according to Dickie, "is the understanding shared by the actors and the audience that they are engaged in a certain kind of formal activity".(28) Knowledge of this 'primary' convention controls the behaviour and attention of the audience, and enables the members thereof to locate and appreciate the 'aesthetic object' of the artwork which is being presented. In the case of literature and painting, also, the 'primary' convention is characterised as an understanding of the nature of the 'formal activity' in which one must engage in order to properly appreciate and understand a work. It is knowledge of such 'primary' conventions, Dickie claims, that enables receivers of traditional Chinese theatre to 'screen out' the property man, despite his being part of the perceptible 'visual design' on the stage, and receivers of Western theatre to 'screen in' the 'invisible' wire supporting 'Peter Pan' as 'he' flies effortlessly through the air. It is also knowledge of such 'primary' conventions which leads

receivers of literary artworks to disregard the perceptible ink-marks, qua visual design, and attend to the imperceptible meanings of the words constituted by these marks.

According to Dickie, therefore, the 'aesthetic aspects' of artworks are distinguished from their 'non-aesthetic' aspects, and the 'aesthetic object' of an artwork from the physical work of art and from other things, by the presentational conventions of the 'artworld'. The receiver's ability to locate the 'aesthetic object' of a given artwork depends upon his being guided by the relevant 'secondary' conventions and his grasping the relevant 'primary' convention. Knowledge of the presentational conventions for particular kinds of artwork is gained in a fairly non-systematic way; Dickie compares the learning of such conventions with the learning of a natural language by a native speaker of that language.(29) He concludes his account of the "institutional theory of the aesthetic object" by relating this account to the 'Institutional Theory' of art presented in the first chapter of Art and the Aesthetic. The 'institutional' definition of 'work of art', as we have seen, asserts that the creation of artworks involves the conferral of the status of 'candidate for appreciation' upon a set of aspects of an artifact by one acting on behalf of the 'artworld'. As Dickie recognises, and as was apparent in the examination of Dickie's definition in chapter ten above, the definition and the account in which it is embedded do not make clear what is involved in the conferral of the status of 'candidate' upon a set of aspects. More specifically, it is unclear how certain aspects of an artifact receive the appropriate status, and how such aspects are made inter-subjectively available for appreciation by receivers. These questions, Dickie claims, are clarified by the 'institutional' account

of the 'aesthetic object', in that "the aesthetic object is the aspect of the work for the sake of which the art is created".(30) The 'set of aspects' of an artifact which receives the status of 'candidate for appreciation' is determined by the conventions governing the presentation of such artifacts, as artworks, within the relevant system of the 'artworld', and is thus equivalent to the set of 'aesthetic aspects' constituting the 'aesthetic object' of the artwork in question. This analysis, it might be noted, bears out the interpretation given, in chapter ten, to Dickie's notion of 'treating an artifact as a candidate for appreciation' while acting on behalf of the 'artworld'. The artist confers the requisite status upon a set of aspects of an artifact insofar as his creative manipulation of a medium, in the 'making' of that artifact, is guided by his knowledge of the presentational conventions of the relevant system of the 'artworld'.

It might be thought that Dickie's explication of the notion of 'conferring the status of candidate for appreciation on a set of aspects of an artifact on behalf of the artworld' in terms of the identification of 'aesthetic objects' saves his 'Institutional Theory' of art from the 'circularity' objection advanced against it in chapter ten. For, if the creation of artworks by means of 'status-conferral' involves the identification of 'aesthetic objects', this would seem to provide a means of characterising 'work of art' independently of 'system of the artworld', or vice versa. The 'status-conferral' theory might thus be saved from circularity by means of a strategy analogous to the one suggested, at the beginning of this chapter, as a means of saving the 'piece-specification' theory from similar difficulties; namely, by showing that the entity identified by the performance of an 'artistic

act' (the 'A-relevant$_i$' properties constituting a piece; the 'set of aspects' upon which the status of 'candidate' is conferred) can be independently characterised in terms of the way in which it functions in artistic appreciation (as an eliciter of 'aesthetic experience' by means of its 'aesthetic properties'; as an 'aesthetic object'). The salvability of Dickie's theory by means of such a strategy may appear more questionable, however, if we recall that the features of artistic appreciation to which Dickie draws attention in his discussion of the 'aesthetic object' were already allowed for in the interpretation given to his theory in chapter ten. We might expect, therefore, that the same difficulties found to beset his theory in that context will continue to beset it when it is 'augmented' by his account of the 'aesthetic object'. Our expectations, as we shall see, will not be disappointed.

We might begin by looking more closely at the distinction which both Dickie and Beardsley make between the work of art, as a physical object, and the 'aesthetic object', as the 'object of criticism and/or appreciation'. This distinction, as has already been noted, is not made within the 'piece-specification' theory, either in its original or its modified form; on this theory, the artwork is not an object but a piece, as an 'object under a description', and it is the piece that is the 'object of criticism and/or appreciation'. I do not wish, in this context, to examine in any depth the problem of determining the 'ontological status' of works of art, but I would like to suggest certain difficulties which might attend any attempt to impose the sort of distinction proposed by Dickie and Beardsley upon the arts as a whole. While I shall restrict my attention to Dickie's theory, I think that the arguments that may be advanced against Dickie are, <u>mutatis mutandis</u>, applicable to

Beardsley as well.

In a recent commentary(31) on Dickie's 'Institutional' theory, Michael Mitias has argued that the 'work of art'/'aesthetic object' distinction is particularly problematic for Dickie, in that his theory allows no such distinction to be drawn:

> For Dickie, the aspects which are essential for understanding and appreciating a work of art are what confers on the work the status of art in the classificatory sense of 'work of art'. Thus since the aesthetic object is made up of the aesthetic aspects, and since these aspects are what makes the object art, i.e., a work of art, it follows that the two concepts are in effect identical...We cannot, according to Dickie's analysis, isolate any aspect which belongs to the painting but not to its aesthetic object. (32)

Robert Yanal, in a reply to Mitias(33), claims that Dickie can make the necessary distinction, and that the concept 'work of art' differs from the concept 'aesthetic object' in both its extension and its intension. That the two concepts are not cointensive is demonstrated, he claims, by the following argument:

> Dickie says, "The aesthetic object is the aspect of the work for the sake of which the art is created", but what makes something an artwork is not the fact that it has an aesthetic object but the fact that it assumes a certain place and role in the artworld. Someone may be made a knight for the sake of his virtue and accomplishments, but what literally makes him a knight is being knighted, i.e., assuming a certain place and role in a certain social institution. (34)

Yanal's analogy fails to establish the distinction which he intends it to, however, because there is a disanalogy in precisely the question at issue. The knight does not become virtuous and accomplished through the act of being knighted, nor does he become knighted through the performance of virtuous acts. The conferral of the status of 'knight'

is logically and temporally distinct from those acts for the sake of which the status is conferred. The 'aesthetic object' for the sake of which an artifact acquires the status of 'artwork', on the other hand, is brought into being by the performance of the very act which confers the status of 'art'. To confer the status of 'art' is just to bring into being an 'aesthetic object', and to bring into being an 'aesthetic object' is to confer the status of 'art'. Yanal's argument, therefore, does not seem to establish a difference in intension between 'aesthetic object' and 'work of art' on Dickie's theory.

That the two concepts differ in extension is argued for on the following grounds:

> Artworks have properties such as 'being one of twelve variations on Delacroix's "Femmes d'Alger"' or 'being painted on December 13, 1954', properties which...their aesthetic objects lack. So, 'Picasso's "Women of Algiers, A"' and 'the aesthetic object of Picasso's "Women of Algiers, A"' are not coextensive...Dickie's analysis of the aesthetic object can be framed as follows: A is an aspect of the aesthetic object of an artwork WA if and only if (1) A is an aspect of WA and (2) A is conventionally given as an appreciatable aspect of WA's...'Being painted on December 13, 1954' is an aspect of Picasso's painting, "Women of Algiers,A", but not conventionally presented as an appreciatable aspect and so is not an aspect of the aesthetic object of this painting. (35)

Yanal, as was noted above, attributes to Dickie the 'principle of distinctness' which, I have argued, he cannot consistently hold. More significant in the present context, however, is the second condition of Yanal's explication of Dickie's analysis of the notion of 'aesthetic aspect of an artwork'. If Dickie holds, as Yanal claims, that the 'aesthetic aspects' of artworks are those aspects conventionally given as 'appreciatable', it will indeed be true that 'being painted on December

13, 1954' will not be an 'aesthetic aspect' of Picasso's painting on Dickie's theory, since the date on which a work was created is not conventionally given as an appreciatable aspect of that work (excluding, of course, such works as Barry's, cited above). But, as we have seen, Dickie holds that the date on which a work was created may be an aspect of the 'aesthetic object' of that work.(36) It seems, then, that either Dickie is mistakenly applying his own theory or Yanal's second condition misrepresents Dickie's position. That the latter alternative is in fact the case becomes clear when we reflect upon another of Dickie's examples of 'aesthetic aspects of artworks', namely, the 'invisible' wire supporting the aerobatic activities of 'Peter Pan'. The wire is not an appreciatable aspect of the play, but it is, according to Dickie, an 'aesthetic aspect' of the play. Dickie's position may be clarified by reference to the following passage:

> Perhaps the most general thing that can be said about whether an aspect of a work of art is included in the aesthetic object of that work is: if one must know of the aspect in order to understand what is presented through a primary convention, then that aspect of the work is also an aspect of the aesthetic object of the work. (37)

Dickie's position, it would seem, is that the 'aesthetic aspects' of an artwork are not simply those aspects conventionally given as appreciatable, but also those aspects knowledge of which is necessary in order to understand and appreciate what is conventionally given as appreciatable. But this would allow the date of creation of an artwork to be an 'aesthetic aspect' of that work, if, as Dickie himself suggests, knowledge of this date is necessary to evaluate and appreciate the painting, as an artistic achievement. The other aspect of the Picasso

painting which Yanal classifies as 'non-aesthetic', namely, 'being one of twelve variations on Delacroix's "Femmes d'Alger"', might also be an 'aesthetic aspect' of the artwork, on Dickie's theory, if knowledge of this aspect were necessary for an understanding of the artwork as 'conventionally presented'. This raises interesting questions, to which I shall return below. What is clear is that Yanal's examples fail to establish that Dickie's conceptions of 'work of art' and 'aesthetic object' are different in extension.

This does not show that Mitias is correct in holding that the concepts do not so differ, however. That Mitias is, in fact, incorrect is quite easily shown by reference to examples which Dickie himself provides. The stage-hands working behind the scenes in a traditional theatrical production are classified, on the Beardsley/Dickie conception of 'artwork', as aspects of the play, qua physical work of art, but they are excluded, by means of a 'secondary' convention, from being 'aesthetic aspects' of that play. Similarly, the backs of paintings, the dust-covers of books, and the Chinese property man are all aspects of artworks which are not, however, 'aesthetic aspects' of those works. Mitias's error is the quite simple one of assuming that, since an artifact acquires the status of 'work of art' through the bringing into being of an 'aesthetic object', the 'artwork' and the 'aesthetic object' are identical. They are not identical, either in intension or in extension, because the 'aesthetic object' is constituted by a set of aspects of the artifact (that set of aspects receiving the status of 'candidate for appreciation'), whereas the artwork is the artifact in the fullness of its properties.

While Dickie can make the distinction between 'work of art' and

'aesthetic object', given his theory, it is arguable that he should not make this distinction. In the first place, if artworks are identified with physical objects in the fullness of their properties, Dickie is unable to deal with the problem which Binkley raises concerning physical objects which 'house' more than one piece. The original DeKooning and the "Unerased DeKooning", for instance, are clearly seperate pieces, and, presumably even on Dickie's account, different artworks. There are two 'aesthetic objects', in that a different set of aspects of the painting, qua physical object, is the proper object of criticism and appreciation in the case of each 'work', but, if artworks are identified with physical objects, there is only one work of art on Dickie's theory. Dickie can only avoid this conclusion, it would seem, if he takes the work of art to be something like 'the physical object in virtue of a set of aspects which have acquired the status of 'candidate for appreciation'', but, if he adopts this option, he obliterates the distinction, at least extensionally, between the work of art and the 'aesthetic object', and is open to Mitias's objection.

Further, in the case of such pieces as Barry's "All the things...", there seems to be no physical object with which the work might plausibly be identified. Even where physical objects exist, as possible candidates for the role of 'artwork', the identification of the artwork with such objects is often questionable. Dickie takes literary works to be books and other inscriptions, qua physical objects, yet there is something strange, surely, in saying that the destruction of an individual book involves the destruction of a work of art, save in an elliptical sense. There are even problems regarding Dickie's favourite artform, as exemplar of his theory, namely theatre. A play, qua physical

artwork, is taken to include not only the action performed upon the stage but also the action going on behind the scenes, and, one presumes, the actions of the lighting technicians, curtain operators, prompters, etc. But where does one stop? What about the stage manager, the usherettes, the ticket salespersons, the costume designers, etc.? These persons, and their activities, might be excluded from the play, as an artwork, on the grounds that they contribute towards the presenting of the artwork, rather than being aspects of the artwork itself. But might the same not also be said concerning some of the activities and entities which Dickie wishes to include in the physical work of art? Consider, as a comparison, the use of lighting to focus attention upon certain paintings in art galleries. The lighting, and the activities of those who arrange the lighting, clearly contribute to the presentation of artworks, but they are hardly aspects of the artworks themselves. Similarly, I think, the activities of the stage-hands, page boys, etc., behind the scenes are not aspects of the play, as an artwork, but activities which contribute to the presentation of the play, as artwork.

Identifying the artwork not with a physical object but with an 'object under a description' enables one to avoid these difficulties, and, further, to steer a middle path between the Scylla of taking the artwork in the manner of Dickie and Beardsley, and the Charibdis of identifying the artwork with the 'phenomenological experience' of the receiver, thereby alloting to works a shadowy and solipsistic mode of existence. Artworks, as objects 'under descriptions', exist inter-subjectively by virtue of the 'artistic indexing conventions' which serve to establish the 'A-relevant$_i$' properties which constitute the piece. It might be objected, however, that the 'ontological status' of an

'object under a description', if not solipsistic, is at least somewhat shadowy. Some balm for those troubled by such an objection may be offered in the following chapter.

Even if Dickie were to either adequately counter these objections or amend his theory with respect to the 'work of art'/'aesthetic object' distinction, his 'institutional account of the aesthetic object' would not provide an adequate elucidation of the nature of artistic appreciation, nor could it save his 'Institutional Theory' of art from the circularity objection. As we have seen, Dickie takes the 'aesthetic aspects' of an artwork to be not merely those aspects conventionally given as appreciatable but also those aspects of which one must have knowledge in order to understand and appreciate what is so given. This, however, seems to raise more questions than it answers. For we might enquire as to which aspects of an artwork, qua physical object, we require knowledge of in order to appreciate and understand what is 'conventionally given' for appreciation. Take, for example, the painting by Picasso cited by Yanal. According to Dickie, the 'primary' and 'secondary' conventions governing the presentation of paintings relate to the 'display' of paintings and the manner in which they are displayed. The 'secondary' conventions may indeed serve to locate the appreciatable aspects of the painting,i.e., the pictorial properties as distinct from the colour of the back of the canvas, but neither the 'primary' nor the 'secondary' conventions seem to provide the necessary guidance as to the other 'aesthetic aspects' constitutive of the 'aesthetic object' of the painting, i.e., those aspects of the physical painting knowledge of which is necessary for a proper appreciation and understanding of those 'appreciatable' aspects. Is it necessary, for instance, to know of the

date on which Picasso painted the work; or of the medium employed by the artist; or of other works by the artist related to the work in question (such as the other eleven variations on the painting by Delacroix); or of works by other artists related to the work in question (the original work by Delacroix, upon which this work is one of twelve variations); or of the artist's intentions in painting the picture; or of the state of the artist's social life at the time when he painted the picture, or....?

It is only slightly facetious to say that Dickie's answer to these questions is that it is necessary to know what it is necessary to know. The 'primary' conventions of presentation, which we might expect to resolve such difficulties, are characterised in so vague a fashion that they can offer no illumination whatever. To grasp a 'primary' convention is to know that one is engaging in "a certain kind of formal activity". But what does such knowledge involve? If it is merely the knowledge that, to appreciate a painting, one must attend to its perceptible pictorial properties rather than, say, engage in a tactile exploration of the surface of the canvas, such knowledge may indeed be a minimal requirement for appreciation but it is hardly sufficient to ensure a proper appreciation and understanding of a painting. It is not enough to know that one should look at the painting; one also needs to know what to look <u>for</u>, i.e., <u>how</u> the painting is to be looked at, and what knowledge not derivable from an inspection of the canvas is necessary to properly appreciate and understand those 'aspects' of the work that are so derivable. If, on the other hand, the 'knowledge' possessed by one who grasps a 'primary' convention is supposed to include not only such 'minimal knowledge' but also knowledge as to what must be known

for the proper appreciation and understanding of a work, where the nature of this 'higher knowledge' supposedly depends upon the presentational conventions obtaining in particular systems of the 'artworld', we seem to have passed beyond what might properly be regarded as general conventions for presenting types of artworks to something of a different nature altogether. For the knowledge necessary to appreciate and understand individual artworks will surely vary considerably, not only in detail but also in type, according to the particular work with which one is dealing. The films of Jean-Luc Godard, for instance, may be almost unintelligible when viewed in isolation from one another, and are only understood and appreciated when viewed in relation to one another. A film such as "Citizen Kane", on the other hand, may be both appreciated and understood by one having no acquaintance with, or knowledge of, Welles's other works. Yet the 'primary' conventions that obtain with respect to cinematic artworks are surely the same with respect to both films. The knowledge required to appreciate and understand a given artwork depends not upon general presentational conventions of a system of the 'artworld', but upon the 'artistic context' in which the work was created. This 'artistic context' will resemble Danto's conception of the 'artworld', in that it will be composed of actual artworks, 'indexing conventions' exemplified in these works, and theories of art implicit in these conventions, rather than by established practices governing the presentation of artworks for appreciation. It is the 'artistic context' in which Duchamp 'created' the piece "Fountain" that determines what one must know in order to properly appreciate and understand the piece, and not the 'primary' or 'secondary' conventions relating to the presentation of visual artworks. One who came to "Fountain" armed only with

the knowledge afforded by such presentational conventions would presumably take the 'aesthetic object' to consist of the perceptible 'aesthetic qualities' to which Dickie himself refers, and this, surely, would be to misidentify, and hence fail to appreciate, the piece in question.

It might be objected that, in claiming that the 'knowledge' required to 'properly' appreciate and understand an artwork depends upon the 'artistic context' in which the work was created, one is making a substantial, and highly debatable, assumption as to what should count as 'proper appreciation and understanding' of a work. Beardsley, and perhaps Bell also, might argue that such 'knowledge' is of matters extraneous to 'the work itself', and is thus irrelevant, and even harmful, to the 'proper appreciation' of an artwork as an 'aesthetic object'. In response to such an objection, we might admit that an assumption as to the nature of 'proper appreciation and understanding of artworks' is being made, but argue that that assumption is to some degree justifiable on the basis of certain features of artistic appreciation already adduced. Whatever other aspects of an artwork may be relevant to appreciating it as a work of art, it is clearly a precondition for appreciation and understanding to occur that a receiver should be able to locate the 'piece', or the 'aesthetic object' of the artwork, and this, in turn, cannot be accomplished by 'simply looking' at the object which 'houses' the piece, or the 'aesthetic object'; rather, locating the piece, or the 'aesthetic object', requires familiarity with the 'indexing conventions' employed by the artist. An object, we might say, does not wear its 'art' on its sleeve. Further, as Dickie himself argues, a 'proper' appreciation and understanding of at least some artworks,

qua 'aesthetic objects', is only possible if we possess knowledge of certain aspects which are not 'directly perceptible', such as 'invisible' wires.

More important, however, the preceding objection misses the point of the discussion of the 'knowledge' necessary for 'proper' appreciation, which is not intended as an argument for a particular conception of what counts as 'proper appreciation and understanding' of artworks, but as an argument against such a particular conception, namely, that proposed by Dickie. Dickie, as we have seen, holds that knowledge of certain imperceptible aspects of an object, qua artwork, may be necessary for 'proper appreciation and understanding' of that artwork, and that such aspects are thereby included in the 'aesthetic object' of the artwork. What we might ask, therefore, is, by reference to what principle or criterion are imperceptible 'aspects' of objects included in, or excluded from, the 'aesthetic objects' of those objects. Since the 'aesthetic object' is the proper object of appreciation, what we are asking for, here, is an analysis of what is involved in 'properly appreciating and understanding' an artwork. Dickie's answer is that the 'principle' or 'criterion' in question is simply the 'established practices' of systems of the 'artworld', i.e., the 'primary' and 'secondary' conventions governing the presentation of different kinds of artworks. These conventions, it is claimed, determine which aspects belong to the 'aesthetic objects' of artworks, and thus which aspects we require knowledge of in order to 'properly' appreciate and understand such works. I have argued, against Dickie, that 'presentational conventions' for different types of artworks cannot function as the 'principle' whereby the 'aesthetic aspects' of artworks are determined, since the sorts of

'aspects' included in 'aesthetic objects' may differ in circumstances where the 'presentational conventions' are the same. The thesis that the 'aesthetic aspects' are determined by the 'artistic context' in which the work was created is offered as an alternative to Dickie's account which might more adequately elucidate the nature of 'aesthetic objects' and of artistic appreciation.

There is a further problem with Dickie's account of the 'aesthetic object', however, which closely parallels the 'circularity' problem attending his account of the 'work of art'. To 'properly appreciate and understand' an artwork, according to Dickie, is to attend to an 'aesthetic object'. Those 'aspects' of an object, or 'artwork', which are included in its 'aesthetic object' are determined by the 'presentational conventions' of a system of the 'artworld'. Neither 'artistic appreciation' nor the 'aesthetic object', as the proper object of such appreciation, is characterisable independently of its relationship to these 'presentational conventions'. But in what sense, we might ask, is the 'aesthetic object' an aesthetic object? Only, it would seem, in the sense that the term 'aesthetic' has traditionally been applied to the proper object of appreciation in the arts. There is no reason to think that the 'aesthetic aspects' of an artwork, on Dickie's theory, are either wholly or partly 'aesthetic properties', in the sense defined above, nor that the appreciation of 'aesthetic objects' involves the eliciting of 'aesthetic experience', again in the sense defined above. There might be such a reason, of course, if it were the case that the 'presentational conventions' of systems of the 'artworld', or those systems themselves, possessed some distinguishing characteristic, such that the appreciation of the 'aesthetic objects' determined by such conventions, or within

such systems, would be distinctively 'aesthetic' in nature. But, as we have seen, the systems of the 'artworld', and the 'presentational conventions' which constitute them, are only distinguishable by reference to our practice of so classifying them. Dickie's account of the 'aesthetic object' cannot, therefore, save him from the 'circularity' objection advanced against his 'Institutional Theory' of art, since the identification of the 'set of aspects' receiving the status of 'candidate for appreciation' with the 'aesthetic object' does not provide a means of characterising that 'set of aspects' independently of the 'presentational practices' of systems of the 'artworld'.

What Dickie's analysis of the 'aesthetic object' does suggest, however, is that the 'aesthetic aspects', or the 'A-relevant$_i$' properties, of objects cannot be restricted to their 'directly perceptible' properties, or to those properties 'given' in an experiential encounter with them. Rather, the appreciation and understanding of artworks requires not only that one locates certain 'perceptible' or 'experiencable' properties of objects, but also that one experiences the elements so located as 'meaningful', both individually and in their inter-relationship to compose the work. By 'meaningful', here, I do not mean 'significant' or 'important'. The point, rather, is that artistic appreciation, like other modes of human perceptual and experiential activity, is not merely a passive registering of the properties of objects, but involves an active 'interpretation' on the part of the receiver of a work. The process of 'interpretation' occurs not only at the conscious level, with respect to what we actually perceive or experience, but also at an unconscious level, as a determining factor in what it is that we perceive or experience.(38) The interpretations made, in either case,

are a function of the 'knowledge base' of the subject, either those beliefs consciously held or the 'knowledge' embedded in the neuro-physiological make-up of the individual. The experiences of different receivers who experientially encounter a given artwork, therefore, may vary considerably in proportion to differences in the 'knowledge' which such receivers bring to their encounter with the work. Differences in the way in which the work is experienced will involve differences in the appreciation and understanding of the work. The experiences of two receivers viewing Godard's Weekend, for instance, may differ quite radically if one of them is familiar with the director's oeuvre and the other has no previous acquaintance with his work; and their appreciation and understanding of the film may also differ radically. The question as to whether one of these receivers, and not the other, may be said to 'properly' appreciate and understand the work is essentially the question as to whether one 'knowledge base' is preferable to the other; or, again, whether those 'aspects' of the film of which only the first receiver has knowledge are 'aesthetic aspects', or 'A-relevant$_i$' properties, of the film. Reference to presentational conventions, we might note, is of little help in answering these questions, since the two receivers may be expected to share a knowledge of the 'primary' and 'secondary' conventions governing the presentation of cinematic artworks.

There are some who would deny that any one way of 'appreciating and understanding' an artwork is preferable, in any objective sense, to any other way of 'appreciating and understanding' it. Peter Jones, for instance, has advanced a theory of what he terms 'creative interpretation' whereby any interpretation of a literary artwork which can be justified by reference to at least some of the textual properties of the work is

acceptable.[39] Different interpretations are to be evaluated not by reference to any objective standard of 'correct understanding', but by reference to the value that can be found in the work by one who 'reads' it in the prescribed fashion. A similar theory, though not quite so radical, has been advanced by C. L. Stevenson.[40] We might term this thesis the 'Rorschach Blot' theory of artistic appreciation. There are at least two things that I find troubling in this theory. Firstly, it seems questionable whether certain 'interpretations' which the 'Rorschach Blot' theory would accept as legitimate are really interpretations of the artwork at all. If someone appreciates "Fountain" purely for its 'aesthetic' qualities, he is not appreciating the artwork "Fountain", as an object 'under a description', but the physical object as it existed prior to Duchamp's 'creative' activity. Secondly, an artwork is the result of an artist's 'manipulating' a medium in a particular way so as to produce a particular 'artifact'. If, in approaching an artwork, we are to credit the artist with a modicum of professional ethics, we must assume that every constituent element of the work is there for a purpose. Jones, however, argues that we may disregard certain elements in a work, and even contradict them, in formulating our 'interpretation', if the 'interpretation' we thereby produce is itself coherent and useful. Criticism and appreciation of a work, he claims, is "necessarily aspectival", since it is always from a certain viewpoint and of a selection of the textual properties of a (literary) work. To talk of seeing "the work as a whole", therefore, is simply to refer to "the unity of a given interpretation of the work, according to some criterion of unity".[41] But this is surely a counsel of despair. By renouncing the attempt to reconcile elements in a work that may seem incompatible, we

may be denying ourselves a more valuable and enriching experience of the work available only when we realise how such elements are to be reconciled.

An artwork is only 'properly appreciated and understood', I would argue, when it is appreciated and understood as the piece which the artist created. Advocates of the 'Rorschach Blot' theory maintain that the only possible objective standard for measuring the validity of interpretations of the 'meanings' of artworks is the artist's intention, "what the artist intended the work to mean", and that this 'standard' is unacceptable because, firstly, the 'mental states' of the artist are not available to us, and, secondly, the artist's intending his work to mean x cannot make his work mean x since what something 'means' is 'a public matter' and an artist may fail to create an object which 'means' what he intended it to 'mean'.(42) Dickie draws an analogy between 'understanding the meaning of a work' and 'understanding the meaning of a remark'. If a person says 'x' while intending to say 'y', the meaning of his remark is nonetheless 'x' rather than 'y', since what a remark means is determined by the inter-subjective conventions governing the meanings of utterances. The 'meaning' of an artwork such as a novel, he claims, is similarly a matter of the meaning of the text, not of the meaning which the artist intended the text to convey.

For an artwork to be 'appreciated and understood as the piece which the artist created', however, no telepathic insight into the artist's psyche is required. What is required is knowledge of the 'artistic context' in which the piece was created. The situation is precisely analogous, in fact, to the one which obtains in respect of 'appreciating and understanding a remark'. The latter requires not merely the locating of

the remark, as an auditory event, nor even as a sequence of meaningful noises, but also a knowledge of the context in which the remark is, or was, uttered. The meaning of a remark is not simply the meaning of the utterance taken out of context. Similarly, the 'meaning' of an artwork is not simply the publicly available aspects of an object, nor even a sub-set of those aspects selected by the 'presentational conventions' of a system of the 'artworld'. The 'meaning' of an artwork, as a specific piece created by an artist, can only be properly understood, and the piece properly appreciated, if we know the 'artistic context' in which the piece was created. The 'aesthetic aspects', or 'A-relevant$_i$' properties, of an object, therefore, will include not only the 'physical' properties brought into being by the artist but also those 'contextual' properties of the object knowledge of which is necessary for an understanding of the 'meaning' of the piece.

The appreciation and understanding of artworks, therefore, like the appreciation and understanding of remarks, depends upon knowledge of the relevant context. Artworks, as Richard Wollheim(43) has rightly pointed out, are historical entities, and the 'A-relevant$_i$' properties constitutive of a given piece will include 'non-exhibited' properties relating 'directly exhibited' aspects of the piece to the 'artistic context' in which the piece was created. If the appreciation of artworks is only distinguished from the appreciation of other things, such as remarks or sporting fixtures, by reference to the fact that the 'context' of which knowledge is required is an 'artistic context', however, we appear to be no nearer to a non-circular theory of art than we were with Dickie's account. Artworks, it seems, are those things created and appreciated within the 'artworld', where the latter is construed after

the manner of Danto rather than that of Dickie. While the preceding account of artistic appreciation, as a mode of cognitive activity, may provide a more adequate elucidation of the nature of such appreciation than the account, in terms of 'direct perceptibility' offered by Beardsley, we have, as yet, no basis for distinguishing the cognitive activity involved in the appreciation of works of art from other modes of cognitive activity, or for characterising the former mode of cognitive activity as 'aesthetic' in the required sense. In the following chapter, I shall suggest a way in which these deficiencies might be remedied.

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Chapter Twelve Artistic Acts and Aesthetic Symbols

Artistic appreciation, it has been suggested, is a mode of cognitive activity. To appreciate and understand an artwork is not to engage in a passive 'act' of reception, an 'opening' of oneself to the work without preconceptions or conceptions, but, rather, it involves grasping the 'meaning' of a work through an act of 'interpretation'. All 'receptions' of a work are 'interpretations', and all interpretations are relative to a particular 'knowledge base' which mediates the experience of a work. The adequacy of a particular interpretation, as an interpretation of an artwork, may be guaged, I have maintained, according to the degree of correlation between the 'meaning' ascribed to the work on that interpretation and the 'meaning' of the work, as the piece created by the artist within a given 'artistic context'. The act of 'piece-specification' performed by the artist within an 'artistic context' determines the 'A-relevant$_i$' properties constitutive of the piece, and thus the 'knowledge' which a receiver requires if he is to 'properly appreciate' the work. If an artwork is an 'object under a description, and if the appreciation and understanding of a work involves 'reading' or 'interpreting' an object by reference to a 'knowledge base', we might construe artistic appreciation as a mode of 'semiotic' activity, and artworks as 'signs' or 'symbols' of some sort. The 'meaning' of an artwork might be symbolised, in some way, by its 'directly perceptible' or otherwise experiencable properties, and the 'meaning' sosymbolised might be graspable by one possessing the requisite knowledge of the semiotic 'conventions' employed by the artist. The appreciation of artworks, so construed, might then be subsumed under a more general 'cognitive' theory of

human experience, and the creation of artworks, as the creation of objects intended to function as symbols, might be elucidated by reference to the functions and values of symbols for human experience in general.

Such a programme, while it promises to deliver artistic creation and appreciation from the inglorious isolation conferred upon them explicitly by Bell and implicitly by Dickie, cannot provide an adequate account of art unless it not only subsumes it under a more general framework but also differentiates it from other entities subsumable under that framework. Even if we grant that the appreciation of artworks is a mode of cognitive activity, involving the interpretation of signs, we might still wish to know what, if anything, distinguishes artistic appreciation from other such modes, and how, if at all, the experiences which attend the appreciation of artworks are distinctively 'aesthetic'. If artworks are objects functioning as symbols, does their symbolic functioning possess any distinguishing characteristics? One answer to the latter question, mentioned in chapter five, is offered by Susanne Langer in her 'semiotic' theory of art. Artworks, she claims, are 'presentational' rather than 'discursive' symbols, in that they 'articulate' their 'meaning' through the relationships existing between the elements which constitute their structures, rather than through the combination, according to syntactical rules, of elements having an independent semantic interpretation. Artworks, as 'presentational' symbols, symbolise, through 'isomorphism', the 'forms of humsn feeling'. Langer's theory, however, seems unsatisfactory in a number of respects. Her conception of the discursive symbolism involved in natural languages, for instance, involves a 'picture theory' of linguistic meaning which most philosophers would now regard as unacceptable.(1) Furthermore, the idea that

artworks are 'symbols of human feeling', while it might be plausible in the case of certain art-forms, such as music, and certain artworks in other art-forms, seems to be quite unacceptable when weturn to the works of contemporary artists such as Duchamp, Donald Judd, and Andy Warhol. In what sense, we might ask, could Duchamp's "Fountain", Warhol's "Brillo Boxes", or Barry's "All the things..." be 'symbols of human feeling'?

There is another sort of objection which might be raised against Langer's theory, and, indeed, against 'semiotic' theories of art in general. This objection has already been outlined, and partially countered, in the discussion of Langer's theory in chapter five. Richard Rudner has argued(2) that there is an incompatibility between the thesis that artistic appreciation is a form of 'semiotic' activity and the thesis that such appreciation involves 'aesthetic experience', in the sense of 'aesthetic' distinguished in chapter eleven (i.e., 'necessarily experiential', 'immediately consummatory', 'valuing something in and for itself', etc.). If 'semiosis' is a 'mediated taking account of'; and if the 'meanings' of artworks, on a semiotic theory, are things which are 'mediately taken account of' in attending to a work; and if the 'proper appreciation' of an artwork, on a semiotic theory, involves grasping its 'meaning' in this sense, then 'artistic appreciation', on a semiotic theory, cannot be 'immediately consummatory', nor does it involve the valuing of an object 'in and for itself'. This argument is taken to count against semiotic theories of art on the grounds that the appreciation of artworks <u>does</u> seem to involve 'aesthetic experience', and that it is only by reference to the 'aesthetic' features of artistic appreciation that the latter can be distinguished from other modes of experience, and the 'value' adhering in the appreciation of artworks from

other modes of value. While artworks may function as symbols, therefore, such functioning is not relevant to the 'proper appreciation' of objects as works of art. Bell, we may recall, espouses a similar position, claiming that the representational content of paintings is irrelevant to the appreciation of paintings as works of art.

In considering this type of argument in chapter five, I argued that the grounds for characterising 'aesthetic experience' as 'immediately consummatory' are phenomenological in nature, and that Langer does not dispute the phenomenological immediacy of artistic appreciation, but attempts, rather, to explain it. The significance or 'meaning' of artworks, she claims, is something which is "felt as a quality" rather than "logically discriminated", and this 'immediate' experience of the 'value' or 'meaning' of a work is the result of an underlying 'semiotic' process whereby we recognise, in attending to an artwork, an isomorphism between the structure of the work and the 'forms' of human feeling. If this is an accurate construal of Langer's position, then she is not open to objections of the sort advanced by Rudner. But, as I suggested in chapter five, we may still be puzzled as to how something can both function as a symbol and, at the same time, be valued 'for itself'.

In what manner can the 'meaning' of a symbol be 'felt' as a property of the symbol itself? The meanings of symbols, it would seem, are not 'felt' but cognitively discriminated through an act of 'interpretation' relative to a 'knowledge base'. While it seems that the 'meanings' of symbols cannot be 'felt', what can be felt, clearly, is the meaningfulness of an object or event. It is possible that Langer is confusing the question, 'Why do we find certain artworks meaningful?', with the question, 'What is the meaning of these artworks?'. That I find a particular

poem 'meaningful', for instance, may be explained by reference, firstly, to particular facts about my own personality and biography, and, secondly, to what I take the meaning of the poem to be. The meaning of the poem, as I interpret it, is a factor determining whether I find the poem to be meaningful. Furthermore, as I have argued, my 'reading' of the poem may constitute a more or less adequate appreciation of the poem, as a specific artwork, according to the degree of correlation between the meaning I ascribe to it and the meaning of the poem as the piece created by the poet within a particular 'artistic context'. What Langer's theory explains, perhaps, is why we find certain structures 'meaningful' or otherwise appealing. Her analysis might apply not only to the structural properties of artworks but also to the structures which we may find in non-artistic phenomena. But to explain what makes certain structures meaningful is not to explain what such structures 'mean'. A given artwork, qua object of experience, does not possess a single structure, but may be 'structured' in different ways by different receivers according to the 'knowledge base' which they bring to the appreciation of the work. The 'meaningfulness' of a given artwork for a receiver will thus depend upon the 'meaning' which he ascribes to the work through 'structuring' it in a certain way. And, again, the extent to which a receiver may be said to adequately appreciate an artwork will depend upon the degree ofcorrelation between the 'structure' which he ascribes to the work and the 'meaning' of the work as a specific piece within an 'artistic context'. On Langer's theory, however, there would seem to be no way of evaluating different ways of structuring a work, save, perhaps, by reference to the subjective 'meaningfulness' which the work is thereby felt to have. If, however, as I have argued, the 'Rorschach Blot'

theory of artistic appreciation is unacceptable, and the 'meaning' of an artwork is objectively available as a criterion for measuring the adequacy of a reciever's appreciation and understanding of that work, the question, 'What does this work mean?', is independent of, and logically prior to, the question, 'What makes this work meaningful (to me)'.

The essential point here, I think, is that, even if there is an 'isomorphism' between structural properties of artworks and the 'forms of human feeling', and even if our finding certain structures 'meaningful' is to be explained by reference to an 'unconscious' recognition of such 'isomorphism', it does not follow that all artworks, as specific pieces, are 'symbols of human feeling', nor that such 'isomorphism' is an 'A-relevant$_i$' property of those works that possess it. The proper appreciation and understanding of an artwork involves grasping the 'meaning' of that work, as a specific piece created within an 'artistic context'. If it is the case that all artworks are symbols of some kind, this 'meaning' will be symbolised by the work, and appreciating the work will involve 'interpreting' it as a symbol. But not everything that a work may be taken to symbolise is part of the 'meaning' of that work, and while the 'meaning' of some works, as specific pieces, may include certain 'forms of human feeling' that the structure of the work is used to symbolise, many other works have their 'meanings' <u>as</u> structures, and are properly appreciated and understood through attention to their structural properties, rather than through a relating of these properties to 'forms of human feeling' with which they may be 'isomorphic'. Further, there are many artworks the appreciation and understanding of which seem to require that we attend not only to their structures but also to certain non-structural properties. If artworks are essentially

'symbols of human feeling', and if they are such symbols by virtue of their structural properties, then the representational properties of artworks, and their relational properties in respect of the 'artistic context' in which they were created, would seem to be irrelevant to their being 'properly' appreciated as works of art.

That such properties are 'A-relevant$_i$' is not, of course, an assumption that has gone uncontested. Bell denies the relevance of representational properties to a proper appreciation of visual artworks. Beardsley's 'principle of direct perceptibility' excludes 'contextual' properties of artworks from their 'aesthetic objects'. Rudner, we might also note, denies that the authenticity of an artwork - its being an 'original' rather than a copy or a forgery - is an 'A-relevant$_i$' property of that work; authenticity, he claims, relates to the moral appraisal of artists rather than to the 'aesthetic appraisal' of artworks.(3) That such properties are not 'A-relevant$_i$' is argued for on the grounds that they are 'extraneous' properties, not properties of 'the work itself', and that only 'intrinsic' properties of 'the work itself' are 'A-relevant$_i$'. This argument, as wehave seen, is also used to deny the relevance, for a proper appreciation of an artwork, of those things which a work may be taken to symbolise. Langer's 'semiotic' theory, as a response to such arguments, purports to show that, even if the appreciation of artworks involves attending only to the structural properties of objects, and not to their more obviously symbolic 'representational' properties, artworks, so appreciated, are still functioning as symbols. If Langer's theory fails to establish this conclusion, as I have argued, we are left with the question as to how artworks whose 'A-relevant$_i$' properties do seem to be structural properties can be

said to function as symbols for receivers who 'properly' appreciate them. That is, even if it can be argued, against Bell, that the representational properties of artworks are 'A-relevant$_i$' properties of the works that possess them, and that, insofar as representation is a mode of symbolisation, such works function as symbols for those receivers who 'properly' appreciate them, this does not show how works that lack such 'A-relevant$_i$' representational properties can be construed as functioning symbolically in the 'proper' appreciations of those works by receivers.

It is this problem that Nelson Goodman addresses, both in his book, Languages of Art, and in a more recent paper, "When is Art?".(4) Since his arguments in the latter context are both more succinct and more specifically directed to the problem in hand, it is upon this context that I shall principally draw in setting out his position, making reference to the former context, in which his 'semiotic' theory of art is more systematically developed, where necessary. Goodman begins his paper by setting out, for consideration, a 'Formalist Manifesto', as "a composite statement of a currently much advocated program or policy or point of view":

> 'What a picture symbolises is external to it, and extraneous to the picture as a work of art. Its subject if it has one, and its references, subtle or obvious, by means of symbols from some more or less well-recognised vocabulary, have nothing to do with its aesthetic or artistic significance or character. Whatever a picture refers to or stands for in any way, overt or occult, lies outside it. What really counts is not any such relationship to something else, not what the picture symbolizes, but what it is in itself - what its own intrinsic qualities are. Moreover, the more a picture focuses attention on what it symbolizes, the more we are distracted from its own properties. Accordingly, any symbolization by a picture is not only irrelevant but disturbing. Really pure art shuns all

> symbolization, refers to nothing, and is to be taken for just what it is, for its inherent character, not for anything it is associated with by some such remote relationship as symbolization'. (5)

There is, as Goodman recognises, a certain appeal in such a manifesto. If we are to appreciate an artwork, rather than something extraneous to the work, then our attention should presumably be restricted to the work 'itself', rather than being allowed to range over things externally related to the work. And if what a symbol symbolises is something external to that symbol to which it is so related, the symbolic functions of artworks are presumably irrelevant, or even harmful, to their being 'properly' appreciated as artworks. On the other hand, the representational content of many artworks seems to be a central part of the 'meaning' of those works. This presents us with a dilemma:

> If we accept this doctrine of the formalist or purist, we seem to be saying that the content of such works as "The Garden of Delights" and the "Caprichos" doesn't really matter and might better be left out. If we reject the doctrine, we seem to be holding that what counts is not just what a work is but lots of things it isn't. (6)

To resolve this dilemma, according to Goodman, we require a clearer understanding of the sorts of symbolic functions that objects can perform, and of the mechanisms involved in the appreciation of artworks of the sort advocated by the 'purist'. Given such an understanding, he claims, it will become evident that even 'purist' works function as symbols for receivers who 'properly' appreciate them. We might begin by asking as to the sort of work that would meet the 'purist' demands, and the sort of 'A-relevant$_i$' properties which such a work would possess. The ideal artwork, it would seem, will be one which lacks any

'symbolic' properties relating it to things external to itself, and which possesses only 'its own intrinsic qualities'. Where a work does possess 'symbolic properties', it is not these properties but only the 'intrinsic qualities' of the work that will be 'A-relevant$_i$'. For an artwork to be an instance of 'pure art', it is not sufficient that it 'represents nothing', since pictures of unicorns, for instance, while 'representational' in character, do not symbolise anything existing external to the work. To account for such works, the 'purist' position will require some reformulation. Further, even if a work is entirely non-representational, it may still symbolise something existing external to it:

> An abstract painting that represents nothing and is not representational at all may express, and so symbolise, a feeling or other quality, or an emotion or idea. Just because expression is a mode of symbolization of something outside the painting - which does not itself sense, feel, or think - the purist rejects abstract expressionist as well as representational works. (7)

If a 'pure' artwork is one that lacks representational and expressive properties, we might enquire how the properties that such a work does possess are to be characterised, and how the work is to be described. Goodman argues(8) that none of the characterisations and descriptions usually employed by the 'purist' are sufficient to distinguish 'pure' artworks and their properties from the 'impure' works that the 'purist' wishes to reject. It cannot be said, for instance, that a 'pure' artwork is one that possesses only 'its own properties', since all the properties that an artwork, or anything else, possesses are its own properties - the 'representational' and 'expressive' properties of an artwork are no less properties that belong to the work than are its

so-called 'formal' properties. Nor can it be said that a 'pure' artwork is one that possesses only 'internal' or 'intrinsic' properties, i.e., properties that do not relate it to other things, since any artwork, qua object, will possess both 'external' and 'internal' properties. Even a non-representational, non-expressive painting, for instance, will possess such 'external' properties as 'having been painted in Duluth'. It is of no use here, we might note, to argue that a 'pure' artwork is one all of whose 'A-relevant$_i$' properties are 'intrinsic' properties. For, if, on the one hand, it is admitted that properties other than 'intrinsic' ones can be 'A-relevant$_i$', the 'purist' case against 'impure' art is thereby destroyed. If, on the other hand, this is not admitted, any artwork will possess only 'intrinsic' 'A-relevant$_i$' properties, and thus all artworks will qualify as examples of 'pure' art. Further, as Goodman points out, the distinction between 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' properties of objects is singularly unclear:

> Presumably the colours and shapes in a picture must be considered internal; but if an external property is one that relates the picture or object to something else, then colours and shapes must be counted as external, for the colour and shape of an object not only may be shared by other objects but also relate the object to others having the same or different colours or shapes. (9)

Nor is it of any use to attempt to retreat from the term 'intrinsic' to the term 'formal'. We are no more able to delimit the 'formal' properties of artworks than we are able to delimit the 'intrinsic' ones, unless we have some criterion for a property's being a 'formal' one. The obvious criterion here, 'not relating an artwork to something outside it', is no more available in the case of 'formal' properties than it was in the case of 'intrinsic' ones. Thus, "we are still faced with

the question what if any principle is involved - the question how the properties that matter in a non-representational, non-expressive painting are distinguished from the rest".(10)

The answer to this question, according to Goodman, is that the properties that are 'A-relevant$_i$' in a 'purist' work are distinguished in a manner analogous to that which serves to distinguish which of its properties a sample is a sample of: "A sample is a sample of - or exemplifies - only some of its properties, and...the properties to which it bears this relationship of exemplification vary with circumstances and can only be distinguished as those properties that it serves, under the given circumstances, as a sample of".(11) What a sample exemplifies, in other words, will depend upon the use to which the entity serving as the sample is being put. A sample can only be used to exemplify properties which it actually possesses, but not all of the properties which it possesses are properties which it exemplifies in a given set of circumstances. Similarly, the properties that are 'A-relevant$_i$' for a 'purist' artwork are distinguished from other properties possessed by the work by the fact that the former properties, but not the latter, are exemplified by the work:

> The properties that count in a purist painting are those that the picture makes manifest, selects, focuses upon, exhibits, emphasises, heightens in our consciousness - those that it shows forth - in short, those properties that it does not merely possess but exemplifies, stands as a sample of... Even the purist's purest painting symbolizes. It exemplifies certain of its properties. But to exemplify is surely to symbolize. Exemplification, no less than representation or expression, is a form of reference. A work of art, however free of representation and expression, is still a symbol even though what it symbolizes be not things or people or feelings but certain patterns of shape, colour, texture that it shows forth. (12)

All artworks, then, function as symbols, and the 'A-relevant$_i$' properties of an object are not simply the properties it possesses, nor those of its properties which are 'directly perceptible', but, rather, those of its possessed properties relevant to its functioning as a symbol. To appreciate and understand an artwork, therefore, requires not that one passively contemplate what is 'given' in a perceptual, or otherwise experiential, encounter with a work, but that one actively engage in an act of 'interpretation' so as to grasp the 'meaning' symbolised by a work - what it represents, expresses, or exemplifies. Given what was said in the previous chapter concerning the existence of an objective 'meaning' for any given artwork, as a specific piece, we might expect that the adequacy of one's 'interpretation', and one's ability to 'correctly' grasp the 'meaning' of an artwork, will depend upon the 'knowledge base' that one brings to the encounter with a work. In Languages of Art, Goodman argues persuasively that 'representation' is not reducible to 'resemblance', and that the ability of a receiver to recognise what a picture represents depends upon his familiarity with the representational conventions employed by the artist.(13) To 'see' a two-dimensional canvas as a representation of a three-dimensional landscape, for instance, is a cognitive, and not a simple perceptual, achievement. What we taketo be 'realism' in a representation is no more reducible to resemblance, in any objective sense, than is representation itself. Realism cannot be explained in terms of 'resemblance' or 'similarity' between a representation and what it represents because it is a conventional standard of 'representational realism' that establishes the criteria of 'resemblance' by reference to which a picture is taken to 'resemble' what it represents. In other words, it is particular rep-

resentational conventions which serve to establish 'resemblance in certain respects' as constitutive of 'realism' in representation. Since 'resemblance' and 'realism' are both functions of a given representational convention, we cannot explain 'realism' in terms of 'resemblance', in any objective sense, nor can we establish any absolute standards of representational realism:

> Realism is relative, determined by the system of representation standard for a given culture or person at a given time...Realism is a matter not of any constant or absolute relationship between a picture and its object but of a relationship between the system of representation employed in the picture and the standard system. (14)

While Goodman indicates clearly the sort of 'knowledge base' required for one to adequately 'interpret' the representational 'meaning' of an artwork, he says little concerning the 'knowledge base' required for one to adequately appreciate the 'expressive' or 'exemplificational' 'meaning' of a work. The 'representational conventions' which must be known for an adequate appreciation of representational 'meaning' would seem to be elements in the 'artistic context' in which a given piece is created, and Goodman's account is thus far compatible with the conception of 'proper appreciation' argued for above. We might enquire, however, whether he conceives the 'expressive' and 'exemplificational' 'meaning' of artworks to be similarly determinate. Since he holds that 'expression' is a form of 'exemplification', differing only in that the properties which an object expresses are not literally possessed by that object but are possessed 'metaphorically', we may focus our attention upon his account of exemplification.

In the passage quoted above, Goodman characterises the properties

which an artwork exemplifies as those which it "makes manifest, selects, focuses upon, exhibits, emphasises, heightens in our consciousness". Clearly however, those properties which an artwork 'heightens in the consciousness' of a given receiver, and thereby exemplifies for that receiver, will not depend purely upon the properties of the object, nor can Goodman mean us to understand him in this way, given his view of artistic appreciation as an active 'interpretation', rather than a passive reception, of a work. What a given work exemplifies, for a given receiver, will be partly determined by the 'knowledge base' which that receiver brings to his encounter with the work. There is no single way of 'structuring' a work, and thus no single 'structure' which it will exemplify for all receivers, as Goodman himself explicitly recognises:

> The notion of the structure of a work is as specious as the notion of the structure of the world. A work, like the world, has as many different structures as there are ways of organising it, of subsuming it under categorial schemata dependent upon some or other structural affinities with and differences from other works...Understanding a work involves the discovery, the recognition, of unobvious patterns. (15)

While there may indeed be as many ways of structuring an artwork as there are ways of structuring the world, it does not follow that the criteria by reference to which we evaluate possible 'structures' are the same in both cases. In the case of alternative ways of structuring the world, our reasons for preferring one 'structure' over another may be largely pragmatic, relating to the relative utility of competing 'structures' for the furtherance of our biologically and culturally determined interests. We do not, unless we are Creationists, assume that the world was created in a particular context by reference to which it can

be 'properly' understood. If we apply these criteria to the 'structures' of artworks, however, we get a form of the 'Rorschach Blot' theory of artistic appreciation, whereby the acceptability of a given way of structuring an artwork is a function of the 'utility' of that 'interpretation' for a receiver. This theory, I have argued, is unacceptable because it confuses the conditions under which something is 'meaningful' with the conditions under which something has a specific meaning. In the case of possible ways of structuring an artwork, but not in the case of possible 'structures' of the world, there is an objective standard against which the relative adequacy of alternative 'structures' can be guaged, namely, the 'meaning' of the artwork as the specific piece created within a given 'artistic context'. 'Understanding a work' involves grasping this 'meaning', and not the "discovery...of unobvious patterns". Indeed, it is difficult to see why the ability to find _unobvious_ patterns in an artwork should count as a measure of one's understanding of the _work_. I would hold, against Goodman, that what an artwork exemplifies, _as_ a specific artwork, is not whatever properties one can find 'exhibited' in it, given sufficient application and ingenuity, but those properties which it exemplifies as a specific piece created within an 'artistic context'. To 'properly' appreciate and understand an artwork as an exemplificational symbol, therefore, no less than to 'properly' appreciate and understand it as a representational symbol, requires knowledge of the 'artistic context' in which it was created as a piece.

Mutatis mutandis, similar remarks apply to the 'expressive' properties of artworks. According to Goodman, what a work expresses is intimately related to, and even determined by, what that work exemplifies.

He claims that "the feelings a work expresses are properties it has, not because the work literally has feelings, but because the feeling-terms applied are metaphorical descriptions of structural (or other) properties the work has and exemplifies".(16) If there are held to be no objective standards against which possible ways of structuring a work can be assessed, as more or less adequate appreciations of what a given artwork exemplifies, it follows, on Goodman's view of expression, that there will be no objective standards pertaining to what a given work expresses either. Again, I would argue against Goodman that such standards do exist, and that the ability of a receiver to 'properly' appreciate and understand an artwork as an expressive symbol depends upon his possessing knowledge of the 'artistic context' in which the work was created as a specific piece. This would apply especially in the case of such expressive properties as irony, in literature, and also in the case of the expressive qualities of artworks created in cultures different from one's own. The emotional qualities of Indian music, for example, are generally elusive to those attuned to Western music. A joyful raga may sound mournful to the Western ear. If one is unfamiliar with the 'artistic context' in which such a raga has its place, and if one takes the raga to be expressive of sorrow, one is not 'properly' appreciating the emotional properties of the work, and one is not 'properly' 'interpreting' the work as an expressive symbol. I might add, to avoid misunderstanding, that I am not advancing the obviously unacceptable thesis that an artwork 'really' expresses what its creator 'intends' it to express, where this 'intention' is construed as a mental state of the artist, but am claiming, rather, that what a work expresses for a given

receiver may vary according to the 'knowledge base' which the receiver brings to the appreciation of the work, and that the expressive properties of a work, qua expressive symbol, will only be adequately appreciated by those receivers who possess relevant knowledge of the 'artistic context' pertaining to a given work.

There is a related problem with Goodman's theory, I think, which arises in the context of his attempts to distinguish artworks, as symbols, from other things which function as symbols, and, indeed, from other things which do not function as symbols. The second of these distinctions pertains particularly to a problem with which we are already familiar, namely, the problem of the 'arthood' of non-artifacts and 'Readymades'. Goodman considers a number of examples of 'artworks' whose 'arthood' is a source of potential puzzlement - "a stone picked out of the driveway and exhibited in (an art) museum", 'environmental art', and the infamous work by Oldenburg often referred to as 'Oldenburg's Grave' which consisted in the digging and filling-in of a hole in Central Park, New York, according to the prescriptions of the artist.(17) He then raises the obvious question: "If these are works of art, then are all objects and occurrences works of art? If not, what distinguishes what is from what is not a work of art?".(18) He rejects, as carrying "no conviction", answers of the sort offered by Dickie and Binkley, e.g., that artworks are things an artist has called art, or things exhibited in an art museum or art gallery. Rather, according to Goodman, arthood is not so much a question of what a thing '*is*', what properties it possesses, as it is of what a thing '*does*', whether it functions as a symbol of certain of its properties. While we tend to define what a thing is by reference to the way in which it usually functions, or the way in which

it was designed to function, so that, for instance, a chair remains a chair even when it is not being used as a chair, 'arthood', strictly speaking, is something an object possesses only when it is functioning in a certain way. Recognition of this fact is crucial if we are to understand the arthood of the problematic cases cited above:

> A thing may function as a work of art at some times and not at others...Just by virtue of functioning as a symbol in a certain way does an object become, while so functioning, a work of art. The stone is normally no work of art while in the driveway but may be so when on display in an art museum. In the driveway it usually performs no symbolic function; in an art museum, it exemplifies certain of its properties - e.g., shape, colour, texture. The digging and filling of a hole functions as a work insofar as our attention is directed to it as an exemplifying symbol. On the other hand, a Rembrandt painting may cease to function as a work of art when used to replace a broken window or as a blanket. (19)

The proper question to ask, therefore, is not 'What is art?', but 'When is art?'.

Even if Goodman is correct in his claim that all artworks are objects functioning as symbols, however, it is clearly not the case that all objects functioning as symbols are artworks. The second distinction that needs to be drawn, therefore, is that which exists between artworks, as objects functioning as symbols, and other things which so function. If such a distinction cannot be made by reference to any criteria of 'artistic functioning' of symbols, we will be forced back to the claim that artworks are objects which function as symbols 'within the artworld', and this, while it may be more informative than Dickie's position concerning the interests underlying the creation and appreciation of artworks, will not be any the less circular. Goodman recognises that he needs not only to subsume artworks under the larger class of objects

functioning as symbols but also to differentiate them from other members of that class. "Things function as works of art", he claims, "only when their symbolic functioning has certain characteristics".[20] These 'characteristics', which he terms 'symptoms of the aesthetic', are to be elucidated by reference to properties which symbols possess by virtue of their belonging to 'symbol systems' of certain types. A 'symbol system' is defined as "a symbol scheme correlated with a field of reference"[21], where a 'symbol scheme' consists of 'characters', as "certain classes of utterances or inscriptions or marks", and also, in most cases, modes of combining such characters in order to form other characters of the symbol scheme.[22] In Languages of Art, Goodman develops a general taxonomy of symbol systems in terms of their satisfying, or failing to satisfy, five requirements for being a 'notation'. An example of a notational symbol system is the system employed in musical scores. The primary purpose of a score, as a character in a notational symbol system, is "the authorative identification of a work from performance to performance".[23] A symbol system is notational, and thus able to perform the primary function of a score, "if and only if all objects complying with inscriptions of a given character belong to the same compliance-class and we can, theoretically, determine that each mark belongs to, and each object complies with inscriptions of, at most one particular character".[24] This, in turn, requires that a system possess the properties of "unambiguity and syntactic and semantic disjointness and differentiation".[25]

A full explication of Goodman's requirements for notationality and of his classification of different symbol systems by reference to these requirements clearly falls beyond the scope of this paper. I shall

restrict my attention, therefore, to Goodman's proposed 'symptoms of the aesthetic', and, more especially, to the rationale for classifying symbols whose functioning exhibits such 'symptoms' as 'aesthetic' symbols. There are, he claims, four such symptoms:

> (1) syntactic density, where the finest differences in in certain respects constitute a difference between symbols - for example, an ungraduated mercury thermometer as contrasted with an electronic digital-read-out instrument; (2) semantic density, where symbols are provided for things distinguished by the finest differences in certain respects - for example, not only the ungraduated thermometer again but also ordinary English, which is not syntactically dense; (3) relative repleteness, where comparatively many aspects of a symbol are significant - for example, a single-line drawing of a mountain by Hokusai, where every feature of shape, line, thickness, etc. counts, in contrast with perhaps the same line as a chart of daily stock-market averages, where all that counts is the height of the line above the base; and finally (4) exemplification, where a symbol, whether or not it denotes, symbolizes by serving as a sample of properties it literally or metaphorically possesses. (26)

While he is careful to point out that these four 'symptoms' are <u>only</u> symptoms, and not defining conditions, and that whether an object or experience is 'aesthetic', and the extent to which it is 'aesthetic', are not necessarily determined by, and do not vary proportional to, the extent to which such symptoms, taken individually, are present, he nonetheless offers the "hesitant" conjecture that "these four symptoms may be disjunctively necessary and conjunctively (as a syndrome) sufficient" for a symbol to function 'aesthetically'. But, we might enquire, why should symbols possessing these 'symptoms' be characterised as 'aesthetic' symbols? Are the symbolic properties of objects functioning as such symbols 'aesthetic properties' in the sense defined above, and does the 'appreciation' of such objects, as symbols, involve 'aesthetic exper-

ience'? We may recall again Rudner's argument that, insofar as an object functions as a symbol for a receiver, the receiver cannot appreciate the object 'for itself' and his appreciation of the object cannot be an 'aesthetic' appreciation. Does the term 'aesthetic' play, for Goodman as for Dickie, a purely nominal or honorific role, employed only because its referent is that class of entities traditionally termed 'aesthetic'? Goodman clearly believes otherwise. The 'interpretation' of symbols which exhibit, in their mode of functioning, the 'symptoms' that he distinguishes, will tend to have distinctive characteristics that merit the application of the term 'aesthetic' to such symbols:

> Notice that these properties tend to focus attention on the symbol rather than, or at least along with, what it refers to. Where we can never determine precisely just which symbol of a system we have or whether we have the same one on a second occasion; where the referent is so elusive that properly fitting a symbol to it requires endless care; where more rather than fewer features of the symbol count, and where the symbol is an instance of properties it symbolizes, we cannot merely look through the symbol to what it refers to, as we do in obeying traffic lights or reading scientific texts, but must attend constantly to the symbol itself, as in seeing paintings or reading poetry. This emphasis on the non-transparency of a work of art, upon the primacy of the work over what it refers to, far from involving denial of symbolic functions, derives from certain characteristics of the work as a symbol. (28)

Rudner is wrong, therefore, in holding that we cannot both appreciate an artwork 'for itself', as 'immediately valuable', and appreciate it as a symbol, for, in appreciating an object as an 'expressive' or 'exemplificational' symbol, we are appreciating it for properties which it actually possesses, either literally or metaphorically, and are valuing the object <u>qua</u> possessor of those properties which it 'shows forth'. Similarly, in the case of artistic representation, in appreciating a

work as a representational symbol we are appreciating it as a representation, rather than for what it represents, as something existing 'external' to, and independently of, the work. Just as representation does not reduce to 'resemblance', so the making of a representation does not reduce to a mere copying of what already exists:

> In representation, the artist makes use of old habits when he wants to elicit novel objects and connections. If his picture is recognised as almost but not quite referring to the commonplace furniture of the everyday world, or if it calls for and yet resists assignment to a usual kind of picture, it may bring out neglected likenesses and differences, force unaccustomed associations, and in some measure remake our world...Effective representation and description require invention. They are creative. They inform each other; and they form, relate, and distinguish objects. That nature imitates art is too timid a dictum. Nature is a product of art and discourse. (29)

The appreciation of artworks, as symbols of a certain kind, is thus an 'aesthetic' activity, in that it necessarily involves an experiential encounter with an artwork, in which the work itself is found to be valuable in virtue of those properties which it not merely possesses but which it also symbolises. The 'meaning' of a work is not something 'given' in a passive reception of the work, nor is it something that can be simply 'read off' by one knowing the symbolic conventions employed. Rather, determining what an artwork 'means' requires that we engage in an extended process of 'interpretation' which focuses upon the precise details of the work itself:

> Aesthetic experience is dynamic rather than static. It involves making delicate discriminations and discerning subtle relationships, identifying symbol systems and characters within these systems and what these characters denote and exemplify, interpreting works and reorganising the world in terms of works and works in terms of the world. (30)

Goodman's conception of artworks as objects functioning as 'aesthetic' symbols not only answers Rudner's objection against 'semiotic' theories of art, but also provides a means of answering those questions raised in chapter eleven concerning the distinguishing characteristics of 'A-relevant$_i$' properties of objects, held to be constitutive of pieces on the 'piece-specification' theory, and the 'ontological status' of an 'object under a description'. Firstly, if the act of 'interpretation' required for the 'proper' appreciation and understanding of an artwork, as a piece created within an 'artistic context', is construed as an act of interpreting an object as an 'aesthetic symbol', the 'A-relevant$_i$' properties of an object constitutive of a given piece will be those of its properties relevant to its functioning as a particular 'aesthetic symbol'. As such, they will be 'aesthetic properties' of that object. It should be noted here that, if 'aesthetic experience' is not simply 'receptive' but involves an 'interpretation' of an object to determine the particular 'meaning' that it symbolises, the 'aesthetic properties' of an object will not be restricted to those of its properties which are 'directly perceptible' or otherwise 'directly experiencable', but will also include those 'non-exhibited' aspects of an object knowledge of which is necessary for a receiver to grasp the 'meaning' of what is 'directly experiencable'. As Goodman points out, if 'aesthetic experience' is active, and involves the discrimination of what an artwork, such as a picture, symbolises, then "since the exercise, training, and development of our powers of discriminating among works of art are plainly aesthetic activities, the aesthetic properties of a picture include not only those found by looking at it but also those that determine how it is to be looked at".(31)

Secondly, to be an 'object under a description' is simply to be an object functioning as a symbol. The 'description' serves to isolate, as the 'A-relevant$_i$' properties of the object, those among its possessed properties relevant to its functioning as a particular 'aesthetic symbol'.

While, in many respects, Goodman's theory of art seems to provide that elucidation of artistic appreciation required to reconcile the 'piece-specification' theory of artistic creation with the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance', and thereby save the 'piece-specification' theory from the 'circularity' seen to attend the 'status-conferral' theory advanced by Dickie, Goodman's theory differs from the 'piece-specification' theory in one important respect to which I have already alluded. On the 'piece-specification' theory, something's being an artwork, and its 'meaning' as a specific piece, are a function of its origins, as the piece created by an artist within an 'artistic context'. On Goodman's theory, on the other hand, something's being an artwork depends upon the way that it functions, as an 'aesthetic symbol', and the 'meaning' of a work is the 'meaning' that it has for a receiver when so functioning. The link between these two conceptions, as I have argued, is that an artwork's ability to function as a specific 'aesthetic symbol' derives from the 'artistic act' of the artist who created the work, as a specific piece, within an 'artistic context'. On this view, an 'aesthetic symbol' has a determinate 'meaning', and an artwork, as an 'aesthetic symbol', is 'properly' appreciated and understood by a receiver to the extent that he grasps this 'meaning'. Goodman, however, while he seems to hold that representational 'meaning' is to some extent determinate by reference to given representational conventions employed by the artist, takes the 'exemplificational meaning, and thus the 'expressive

meaning', of a work to be a function of what a receiver can find in that work. This position, I have argued, is unacceptable. Goodman's position here, however, is closely related to his more general approach to the 'arthood' of objects, as a matter of how they function for receivers, and this more general approach seems to have unacceptable implications of its own. Goodman claims that "just by virtue of functioning as a symbol in certain ways does an object become, while so functioning, a work of art".(32) 'Functioning in a certain way' is to be cashed out in terms of the four 'symptoms' of the 'aesthetic'. But, as we have already noted, the 'symptoms' are only to be regarded as indications, or 'clues', that an object is functioning as an 'aesthetic symbol'. Except in the limiting case where an object, functioning as a symbol, exhibits all of the symptoms, the presence of the symptoms is not sufficient to establish that an object is functioning as an 'aesthetic symbol', and is thereby a work of art. Goodman explicitly notes that it is not an implication of his account of the 'symptoms of the aesthetic' "that poetry, for example, which is not syntactically dense, is less art or less likely to be art than painting that exhibits all four symptoms"; and, he adds, "some aesthetic symbols may have fewer of the symptoms than some non-aesthetic symbols".(33)

There is clearly a problem here, I think. As the preceding passage makes apparent, Goodman identifies 'being an aesthetic symbol' with 'being a work of art'; something is an artwork if it functions as a symbol in a certain way, and it is such functioning that constitutes 'aesthetic symbolisation'. But, we might ask, how is that particular mode of symbolic functioning that constitutes 'aesthetic symbolisation' to be distinguished from the functioning of those 'non-aesthetic' symbols that

exhibit some of the 'symptoms of the aesthetic'? Not, obviously, by reference to the presence of such 'symptoms', nor even to the number of such 'symptoms' present. Rather, it would seem that 'aesthetic symbols' are those objects, functioning as symbols, which exhibit at least one of the 'symptoms' and which are also works of art. No other means of distinguishing 'aesthetic symbols' seems available to Goodman. But, in this case, 'being a work of art' cannot be explained in terms of 'being an aesthetic symbol' without falling into patent circularity. Goodman's dilemma may perhaps be illustrated more clearly by means of an example. Take the case of the stone, found in the driveway, which is exhibited in an art gallery. According to Goodman, the stone is an artwork because and to the extent that it is performing a particular symbolic function, namely, that of exemplifying certain of its properties. But its exemplifying certain of its properties is not, on Goodman's theory, a sufficient condition for its functioning as an 'aesthetic symbol', and thus qualifying as a work of art. The 'arthood' of the stone cannot, therefore, be explained simply by reference to the particular symbolic function that it is performing. Further, the stone may perform the same symbolic function in other circumstances where we would surely wish to deny that it is an artwork. If I find the stone in the driveway, admire it for its shape, colour, and texture, but then leave it lying on the driveway, the stone's functioning as an 'exemplificational' symbol for me while I admire it is surely not sufficient for the stone to be a work of art while it so functions. While, as Goodman states, 'arthood' may "come and go", and is not a stable property of those objects that possess it, it does not 'come and go' simply on the basis of the way in which an object functions for a receiver as an 'aesthetic symbol',

unless, as seems to be the case with Goodman's theory, 'aesthetic symbol' is defined in such a way as to make the arthood of an object functioning as an 'aesthetic symbol' 'analytically' true.

These difficulties may be obviated, I think, if we combine Goodman's insights into the 'aesthetic' functioning of symbols in artistic appreciation with the 'piece-specification' theory of artistic creation. Any object whose functioning as a symbol exhibits one or more of the symptoms of the 'aesthetic' may be termed an 'aesthetic symbol', in that the 'interpretation' of such a symbol will involve 'aesthetic' activity through the need to "focus attention on the symbol rather than, or at least along with, what it refers to". All artworks function as 'aesthetic symbols', in this sense, but not all 'aesthetic symbols' are artworks. Artworks may be distinguished from other 'aesthetic symbols' by the fact that their functioning as such symbols, and the 'meaning' which they have when so functioning, depends upon an act of 'piece-specification' performed by an artist within an 'artistic context'. There is still a measure of circularity in this account, in that artworks are characterised as 'aesthetic symbols' having a certain place within the 'artworld', in Danto's sense. But this account, despite such 'circularity', is not 'uninformative', as was the case with Dickie's theory, since, by characterising the 'A-relevant$_i$' properties constitutive of a piece as those properties relevant to an object's functioning as an 'aesthetic symbol', we have both placed the creation and appreciation of artworks within the context of a more general theory of human activity and also, to some extent, differentiated such artistic activities from other modes of human activity to which they are related. While Goodman is correct in claiming that the arthood of non-artifacts and

'Readymades' cannot be adequately explained purely in terms of such facts as their having been 'called' art by an artist, or their being exhibited in an art gallery, he is wrong in thinking that such 'facts' have no part to play in an adequate solution to such artistic 'puzzles', and that an adequate solution is forthcoming purely in terms of the way in which such entities function for receivers. While Duchamp's "Fountain" is distinguished from other urinals of identical design by the properties which it symbolises, when functioning as an 'aesthetic symbol', rather than by the properties which it possesses, it only qualifies as an artwork because its functioning as a specific 'aesthetic symbol' derives from the 'artistic act' of its 'creator'.

In this chapter and the one preceding, I have suggested how we might resolve three of the four artistic 'puzzles' introduced at the beginning of this paper. As yet, however, no such resolution has been offered for the puzzle of the 'non-arthood' of forgeries. I shall conclude this chapter, and indeed this paper as a whole, by briefly presenting and evaluating Goodman's proposed solution to this puzzle as found in his book, Languages of Art.(34)

One thing that soon becomes apparent when one examines Goodman's discussion of forgeries is that there is not simply one 'puzzle' concerning such entities but a number of related puzzles. Firstly, there is the problem formulated in chapter two above, concerning the difference, in terms of 'A-relevant$_2$' properties, between an original painting and an indistinguishable forgery which might justify our treating the former, but not the latter, as a work of art. Secondly, there is the problem of forgeries which are not copies of existing works but copies of the 'style' of an artist passed off as the work of the artist whose

'style' they copy. The most notorious example of forgeries of this second type are the paintings by Van Meegeren in the style of Vermeer. The crucial question, in the case of both types of forgery, seems to be whether the authorship of a work, its being the 'authentic' creation of the artist to whom it is attributed, is either an 'A-relevant$_1$' or an 'A-relevant$_2$' property of that work. A third puzzle arises when we reflect upon the fact that forgeries of the first type only seem possible in certain art-forms - in painting and sculpture, for example, but not in music and literature.

The third of these puzzles is perhaps the most easily resolved. As Goodman notes, forgeries of the first type only occur in art-forms where the identity of a work cannot be divorced from its history of production. Works can only be divorced from their history of production if there is some way of delimiting the properties constitutive of the work such that an object can be judged to be, or not to be, an instance of the work by reference to its possession, or non-possession, of these properties. The means for so delimiting the constitutive properties of a work are provided by a notation, and the establishment of a notation for identifying works within a given art-form depends upon a prior practice of classifying objects or events as instances of works which 'cuts across' classification by history of production. Such a notation exists in music, and also in literature:

> The fact that a literary work is in a definite notation, consisting of certain signs or characters that are to be combined by concatenation, provides the means for distinguishing the properties constitutive of the work from all contingent properties - that is, for fixing the required features and the limits of permissible variation in each. Merely by determining that the copy before us is spelled correctly we can determine that it meets all requirements for the work in question. (35)

In the case of paintings, on the other hand, none of the pictorial properties are distinguished as constitutive, and the identification of works can only be made by reference to the history of production.

The first two puzzles, however, are less easily dispensed with. Indeed, as we have seen, they have proved to be a stumbling block for many theories of art. On Beardsley's conception of the 'aesthetic object, for instance, the authorship of a painting, since it is not a 'directly perceptible' property of that painting, cannot be an 'aesthetic aspect' of a work of art, and is therefore not a proper matter for the attention of those engaging in the criticism and appreciation of that artwork. Dickie attempts to deal with the problem of forgeries by proposing that "originality is an analytic requirement for being a work of art" and admitting that his definition of 'work of art' requires supplementation to deal with this 'fact'.(36) In cases of the second type of forgery, such as the paintings by Van Meegeren, he claims that such paintings are not works of art if accompanied by a forged signature but would be artworks if the copyist signed them with his own name. This 'solution' to the problem of forgeries strikes one as being somewhat ad hoc, since the very question at issue, namely, why the authorship of an 'artwork' should be relevant to its being, and being appreciated as, a work of art, is answered by a simple assertion that this is true by definition. It may indeed be the case that we exclude forgeries from the extension of the term 'work of art', but this is scarcely an explanation or a justification of our linguistic and artistic practice. Further, given Dickie's notion of 'status-conferral', it is difficult to see why a forger cannot confer the requisite status upon his creation.

Goodman, consonant with his view that the 'A-relevant$_i$' properties of an object are those properties pertaining to its functioning as an 'aesthetic symbol', attempts to show that the 'A-relevant$_i$' properties of an original artwork and a forgery differ by reference to the way in which the paintings function as 'aesthetic symbols' for receivers. The important question with respect to the first type of forgery, he claims, is whether, given a receiver, x, and two paintings which are perceptually indistinguishable for x at a given time t, it is the case that "anything that x does not discern by merely looking at the pictures at t (can) constitute an aesthetic difference between them for x at t".(37) An 'aesthetic difference', for Goodman, will be a difference with respect to the functioning of the paintings as 'aesthetic symbols' for the receiver x. That there is an 'aesthetic difference' follows, he claims, from the fact that the ability to distinguish features of a thing by 'merely looking' is not merely a matter of native visual acuity but also a function of practice at, and training in, the making of such distinctions:

> Although I cannot tell the pictures apart by looking at them now, the fact that the left-hand one is the original and the right-hand one a forgery constitutes an aesthetic difference between them for me now because knowledge of this fact (1) stands as evidence that there may be a difference between them that I can learn to perceive, (2) assigns the present looking a role as training towards such a perceptual discrimination, and (3) makes consequent demands that modify and differentiate my present experience in looking at the two pictures. (38)

While the perceptual differences that one might thereby learn to discriminate might seem too minute to be of any real significance, Goodman maintains that such differences may bear enormous aesthetic weight;

one's ability to discriminate, and thus to respond to, such differences may considerably affect the way in which objects function for one as 'aesthetic symbols'.(39)

A parallel solution is offered to the puzzle concerning the second type of forgery. In this case, however, what a receiver may learn to discriminate between is not individual paintings but classes of paintings: "Knowledge of the authorship (of a painting), no matter how obtained, can contribute materially towards developing my ability to determine without such apparatus (as X-ray photography) whether or not any picture, including this one on another occasion, is by Rembrandt (rather than by Lastman)".(40) That the differences we can learn to discriminate in the case of forgeries of both types are aesthetic differences is argued for on the grounds, cited earlier, that "since the exercise, training, and development of our powers of discriminating among works of art are plainly aesthetic activities, the aesthetic properties of a picture include not only those found by looking at it but also those that determine how it is to be looked at".(41)

Clearly, if artworks are identified with physical objects, this claim will be unacceptable, since certain of our powers of discriminating between works of art, so construed, are plainly not aesthetic activities - e.g., our ability to discriminate between novels in respect of their weights, or between pictures in terms of their market value through learning how to locate particular works in an 'Investor's Guide to Fine Art'. What Goodman intends here, obviously, is our power to discriminate between artworks construed as objects functioning as 'aesthetic symbols'. Even if 'work of art' is interpreted in this sense, however, it might be questioned whether Goodman's position permits him to say

that the authorship of a painting is a factor determining how the painting "is to be looked at", and thus an 'aesthetic property' of the painting. For if the 'proper' appreciation of the 'meaning' symbolised by an 'aesthetic symbol' is not constrained by reference to an 'objective' 'meaning' of the work, as a specific piece created within an 'artistic context', those properties of a painting by Rembrandt that might be revealed by viewing that painting in the context of other paintings by the same artist would seem to be no more significant than those properties of the painting revealed by viewing it in the context of any other set of works. If 'proper' appreciation of the 'meaning' of an 'aesthetic symbol' is so constrained, however, the 'A-relevance$_i$' of the authorship of a painting is immediately apparent, since the other works created by an artist form a very significant part of the 'artistic context' in which a given work was created, and knowledge of authorship, as of other elements in that 'artistic context', is essential if one is to 'properly' appreciate and understand the painting, as a specific piece.

Goodman's treatment of forgeries is further undercut by his more general thesis that something is a work of art insofar as it functions as an 'aesthetic symbol'. His arguments with respect to forgeries attempt to establish that there is an aesthetic difference between an original work and a forgery of that work, or, in other words, that there is a difference pertaining to their functioning as 'aesthetic symbols'. But, clearly, since both the original and the forgery are functioning as 'aesthetic symbols' for a receiver insofar as he attempts to distinguish between them in terms of their so functioning, both paintings thereby qualify as works of art. His arguments, while they may establish an 'A-relevant$_i$' difference between the two 'works', not only fail

to establish an 'A-relevant$_2$' difference between them but actually imply that no such difference exists. Thus Goodman's theory cannot account for our practice of treating forgeries as non-artworks. This practice can be accounted for, I think, if we view 'arthood' in the manner suggested above, namely, as a property which something possesses insofar as its capacity to function as a specific 'aesthetic symbol' derives from an act of 'piece-specification' performed within an 'artistic context'. Once we know of the context in which a forgery of the first type was produced, it cannot function for us as an 'aesthetic symbol' in this sense, since it is not a piece created within an 'artistic context'. The forger's productive activity is not regulated by a knowledge of 'artistic indexing conventions', nor by knowledge of other artworks existing in the 'artistic context' of the time, but only by his knowledge of the techniques necessary to produce an indistinguishable copy. His product fails to be an artwork, therefore, because his activity fails to satisfy the conditions for being an act of 'piece-specification'. Where a copyist's activity is, to some extent, regulated by knowledge of the 'artistic context' of his time, as in the case of Roman copies of Greek sculptures which exhibit a 'polish' expressive of Roman; rather than Greek, tastes, we tend to accept the products of his labour as artworks in their own right, though usually inferior to the originals. Their 'inferiority' is a function of the impoverishment of artistic 'meaning' in such works, for their 'meaning', as specific pieces, derives only from the limited contribution made to their production by the 'artistic context' in which their creators worked.

Forgeries of the second type remain artworks even when we know of the circumstances of their provenance. When falsely taken to be the work

of the artist whose style they copy, such works cannot be properly appreciated and understood, since they are mistakenly viewed in the 'artistic context' of the original artist, and more especially in the context of his bona fide works. The pernicious nature of this type of forgery is that it not only deceives us in our belief that we are properly appreciating it, as a specific work, but also leads us to an imperfect appreciation of the works of the original artist, which we view in an artistic context' that includes the spurious paintings of the forger. The forgery is an artwork, however, since it is an object capable of functioning as an 'aesthetic symbol' by virtue of an act of 'piece-specification' performed within an 'artistic context'. Once its provenance is known, it can be properly appreciated as the work of the artist who produced it. Its aesthetic value will be diminished, however, due to the impoverishment of the 'artistic context' in which it is viewed.

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Chapter Thirteen Conclusions

I began this paper by distinguishing four puzzles and two principles. The puzzles, arising out of artistic practice and discourse, concern the artistic status of forgeries, non-artifacts, and 'Readymades', and the relevance of knowledge of an artist's intentions to the appreciation and understanding of the works which he creates. The principles are the 'Essentialist Principle' and the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance' which, as I have argued, constitute the methodological framework within which traditional theorising about art has occurred. Insofar as artistic puzzlement arises in the context of certain pre-theoretical assumptions which receive a more technical formulation in the two methodological principles of traditional philosophy of art, a resolution of such puzzlement might be achieved either through the clarification of our pre-theoretical assumptions in a more systematic theory of art developed within these principles, or through the rejection of one or both of these principles.

In the preceding pages, I have examined both the theories proposed by philosophers working within the traditional methodological framework and the arguments advanced against that framework by contemporary writers. I have held, with the latter writers, that a satisfactory resolution of artistic puzzlement, and an adequate philosophical account of art, cannot be developed within the traditional framework if the methodological principles constitutive of that framework are interpreted in the manner of traditional philosophy of art. I have argued, however, that the problem resides in the interpretation rather than in the principles themselves, and that the arguments offered against these principles by

the writers in question fail to establish the desired conclusions.

The only cogent argument offered against the 'Essentialist Principle', it has been argued, is the argument from 'radical creativity', and this argument only counts against proposed definitions of art which would impose certain limitations upon those properties of objects which can be 'A-relevant$_i$'. As such, it does count against those definitions explicitly or implicitly proposed by traditional philosophers of art, since such writers have assumed that arthood is definable in terms of the possession of 'directly exhibited' 'aesthetic properties', which are, by definition, 'A-relevant$_i$' properties of artworks that possess them. It does not count, however, against definitions of art which are formulated purely in terms of 'non-exhibited' properties, if these properties do not themselves imply the possession of certain specific 'directly exhibited' 'A-relevant$_i$' properties in those things which possess them.

The 'artistic act' theories of art expounded by Dickie and Binkley characterise the arthood of entities in terms of the possession of such 'non-exhibited' properties. According to both writers, arthood is not a matter of the 'directly exhibited' properties which an object possesses and which a receiver may attend to in appreciating a work, but rather of the 'context' in which an entity has a 'place'. This 'context' is the 'artworld' and, according to Dickie and Binkley, a 'work of art' is something that has acquired a particular place in the 'artworld' as a result of the performance of an 'artistic act' of 'status-conferral' or 'piece-specification' respectively. The 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance' is therefore false, it is claimed, since something's being an artwork, and, for Binkley, its being appreciated as a work of art, is prop-

erly elucidated without any essential reference to concepts of the 'aesthetic'. I have argued, against both writers, that, although arthood is indeed a matter of the performance of 'artistic acts', they have failed to adequately elucidate the nature and function of such acts; and that, when the nature and function of such acts is adequately elucidated, it becomes apparent that the 'artistic act' theory of art, far from being a refutation of the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance', depends crucially upon certain concepts of the 'aesthetic' for its tenability in the face of otherwise crippling objections.

Dickie's account, in terms of 'status-conferral', suffers, I have argued, from at least two serious problems. Firstly, by taking artworks to be physical objects, he is unable to give an adequate account of either the 'artifactuality' of 'non-artifactual' artworks or the co-existence of two 'artworks' in one object. Secondly, in taking the constitutive elements of the 'artworld' to be systems of 'established practices' for presenting artworks for appreciation, he provides an definition of 'work of art' which is both too broad and too narrow, and which also suffers from a circularity whose 'viciousness' resides in the failure to provide any explanation of the interests, values, or concerns underlying the creation and appreciation of works of art, and thus also underlying the 'institutional' framework of the 'artworld'. Further, Dickie's stress on 'presentational practices' vitiates his argument for the 'essential institutionality' of art. An adequate account of art, and an acceptable argument for its 'essential institutionality', I have argued, requires more close attention to those activities which are mediated by the 'presentational practices' of the 'artworld', namely, the creation and appreciation of individual works of art.

Binkley's account, in terms of 'piece-specification', goes part way towards remedying these deficiencies in Dickie's theory, in that the 'artworld' is defined in terms of 'indexing conventions' for the creation of artworks rather than 'established practices' for presenting them. Furthermore, by taking artworks to be pieces specified in an 'intensional' context, he avoids the first problem attending Dickie's account. He fails to avoid the problem of 'circularity', however, through neglect of, rather than over-attention to, the reception and appreciation of artworks and the context in which this occurs. He thereby misconceives the function which 'artistic acts' of 'piece-specification' perform and the nature of the 'indexing conventions' within which they occur. The function of an act of 'piece-specification', I have maintained, is to isolate those 'A-relevant$_i$' properties constitutive of a particular piece, and thereby to identify an 'object under a description'. 'Artistic indexing conventions' provide the means whereby a piece, so conceived, can be identified in such a way as to be inter-subjectively available. The 'artistic act' theory, so construed, is saved from circularity, in any vicious sense, if the 'A-relevant$_i$' properties constitutive of a specific piece are taken to be 'aesthetic properties', those properties relevant to an entity's functioning as an 'aesthetic symbol' in the sense discussed in chapter twelve. Such 'aesthetic properties' are not restricted to the 'directly exhibited' properties of objects, as on the traditional interpretation of the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance', nor is the appreciation of artworks, as 'aesthetic symbols', a matter of the passive reception of an object in virtue of such 'directly exhibited' properties. Rather, as Goodman maintains, 'aesthetic experience' is an active and dynamic affair, involving the grasping of the 'meanings' of

'aesthetic symbols' through acts of 'interpretation' occurring relative to a 'knowledge base', and the 'aesthetic properties' of an artwork are those properties knowledge of which is necessary for the 'meaning' of the work, as an 'aesthetic symbol', to be grasped.

The 'artistic act' theory of art developed in chapter ten is thus saved from circularity of a vicious kind through supplementation by the notion of 'aesthetic symbolisation' advanced by Nelson Goodman, since the creation and appreciation of artworks can be integrated within, and explained by reference to, a more general theory of symbolic functioning in human cognition. Goodman's theory, conversely, requires supplementation by the 'artistic act' theory developed in chapter ten. The relationship between 'being an artwork' and 'being an aesthetic symbol' can only be adequately elucidated if the symbolic functioning of artworks, qua 'aesthetic symbols', is related to an 'artistic act' of 'piece-specification' from which an artwork, as a specific 'aesthetic symbol', derives its 'meaning'. The 'meaning' of an artwork, I have argued, is its 'meaning' as a specific piece created by an artist within an 'artistic context'. It is the 'artistic context' within which an artwork was created that determines what a receiver must know in order to grasp its 'meaning', as a specific piece, and thus to 'properly' appreciate and understand it as a work of art. Things functioning as 'aesthetic symbols' are only artworks when the 'meaning' that they symbolise is so determined.

The account which I have developed in this paper of the creation and appreciation of artworks permits the resolution of artistic puzzlement without necessitating the rejection of one or both of the methodological principles of traditional philosophy of art. The 'Essentialist

Principle' may be satisfied by a definition of 'work of art' as a piece specified within an 'artistic indexing convention'. This definition also satisfies the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance' since to so specify a piece is to make inter-subjectively available those constitutive 'A-relevant$_i$' properties relevant to the 'meaning' of the piece as a specific 'aesthetic symbol'; and since the appreciation of artworks, so defined, involves the eliciting of 'aesthetic experience' in the act of 'interpreting' the 'meanings' which they 'aesthetically symbolise'. Forgeries fail to be artworks since they have not been specified as pieces in the required sense. Exhibited driftwood and 'Readymades' differ from driftwood and urinals in their natural environments in that the latter are physical objects in the fullness of their properties, whereas the former, as specific pieces, are 'objects under descriptions' having determinate 'meanings' as 'aesthetic symbols' created by the 'artistic acts' of their authors. Knowledge of the artist's 'intentions' is relevant, and often crucially relevant, to the 'proper' appreciation and understanding of the artworks which he creates, if such 'intentions' are taken to refer to the 'artistic context' in which the artist was working and not to 'mental occurrences' in the consciousness of the artist.

Art is both an individual and a cultural achievement. An adequate theory of art can ignore neither the cognitive capacities of those individuals who engage in the creation and appreciation of works of art, nor the cultural framework necessary for the development and exercise of these capacities. Both the 'semiotic' theory of Goodman and the 'Institutional' theories of Dickie and Binkley offer valuable insights into one or other of these facets of artistic functioning. In this paper I

have tried to show how these insights might be developed to yield a more adequate theory of art, one that might deliver us from puzzlement without also leading us into circularity.

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Footnotes

Chapter One

1. See, for instance, Morris Weitz, "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics", Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism (henceforth J.A.A.C.) vol. 15 (1956), pp. 27-35; Paul Ziff, "The Task of Defining a Work of Art", Philosophical Review (henceforth Phil. Rev.) vol. 62 (1953), pp. 58-78; W. E. Kennick, "Does Traditional Aesthetics Rest on a Mistake?", Phil. Rev. vol. 66 (1957), pp. 329-362, and Teddy Brunius, "The Uses of Works of Art", J.A.A.C. vol. 22 (1963), pp. 123-133.
2. The development of Dickie's position may be traced in the following publications: "Defining Art", American Philosophical Quarterly (henceforth Am. Phil. Q.) (July 1969), pp. 253-6; "The Institutional Conception of Art", in B. Tilghman, ed., Language and Aesthetics (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1973), pp. 21-30; Aesthetics: An Introduction (Indianapolis: Pegasus, Bobbs-Merrill, 1971); "Defining Art II", in M. Lipman, ed., Contemporary Aesthetics (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1973), pp. 118-131; Art and the Aesthetic (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974).
3. Timothy Binkley, "Deciding About Art", in Lars-Aagaard Mogensen, ed., Culture and Art (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1976), pp. 90-109.
4. Binkley, op. cit., p.98.
5. Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968), p. 123.

Chapter Two

1. Morris Weitz, "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics", reprinted in Monroe C. Beardsley and H. Schueller, eds., Aesthetic Inquiry (Belmont, California: Dickenson, 1967), p. 11.

Chapter Three

1. The characterisation is 'tentative' in that it will later be necessary to distinguish between two senses in which a property of an object might be said to be 'artistically-relevant'.
2. See Cleanth Brooks, The Well Wrought Urn (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1947).
3. I am assuming here that the book carries no perceptible indications of its origins, e.g. a price-tag.
4. Clearly, this statement would require modification if the circumstances of the experiment were to be varied in certain ways. If, for example, the paintings were displayed side by side on the gallery wall, there would be perceptible properties which were not shared - e.g., spatial orientation with respect to other objects in the room.

5. Dickie, as we shall see, assumes, without further argument, that 'originality' is a necessary condition for something's being a work of art. See chapter eleven.

6. There is another possible difficulty with non-artifactual 'artworks', arising out of the earlier consideration of the possibility of defining art in terms of the possession of 'A-relevant$_i$' properties. It was suggested that it might be necessary to have an 'artifactuality' condition for something's being a work of art if the notion of 'artistic' experience were explicated in too broad a fashion to permit the exclusion of certain non-artworks by reference to the possession of 'A-relevant$_i$' properties. Clearly, such an expedient is incompatible with the inclusion of certain non-artifacts in the class of artworks.

7. Or even properties at all, it might be claimed. See the discussion of Monroe Beardsley's theory of the 'aesthetic object' in chapter eleven.

Chapter Four

1. Alexander Baumgarten, Aesthetica (Frankfurt a. O., 1750). The following account of Baumgarten's conception of 'Aesthetics' is based upon the discussions of Baumgarten's writings to be found in K. Gilbert and H. Kuhn, A History of Aesthetics 2nd ed. (New York: Dover Publications, 1972), pp. 289-295, and Monroe C. Beardsley, Aesthetics From Classical Greece to the Present (New York: Macmillan, 1966), pp. 156-9.

2. Mutatis mutandis, a similar account might be given of 'disinterested displeasure', accompanying the 'improper' operation of the perceptual faculty, and characteristically involving a desire to shorten the perceptual encounter.

3. See Jerome Stolnitz, "On the Significance of Lord Shaftesbury in Modern Aesthetic Theory", Philosophical Quarterly (henceforth Phil. Q.) (April 1961), pp. 97-113.

4. See chapter five for further discussion of Empiricist theories of the 'aesthetic'.

5. See chapter five for further discussion of Kant's theory of the 'aesthetic'.

6. For a critical discussion of 'aesthetic attitude' and 'aesthetic attention' theories, see George Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic, chapters 4-6. See also chapter eleven below.

7. See Gilbert and Kuhn, op. cit., pp. 130-133.

8. David Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste", in Four Dissertations (London, 1757), reprinted in Jerome Stolnitz, Aesthetics (New York: Macmillan, 1965), p. 88.

Chapter Five

1. See, for example, P. O. Kristeller, "The Modern System of the Arts", Journal of the History of Ideas, 12 & 13.

2. Plato, Republic, Book X, 595-601, in Francis M. Cornford, trans., The Republic of Plato (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 324-333.

3. Plato, Republic, Book X, 602-607, in Cornford, op. cit., pp. 334-340.
4. Plato, Ion, 533e, trans. Benjamin Jowett, in Jowett, ed., The Dialogues of Plato 4th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953).
5. Plato, Republic, Book III, 398-402, in Cornford, op. cit., pp. 86-90.
6. See Aristotle, Politics, Book VIII.
7. Aristotle, Poetics, trans. I. Bywater, in W. H. Fyfe, ed., Aristotle's Art of Poetry (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940). All references are to this edition.
8. Aristotle, Poetics, p.3.
9. Ibid., pp. 3-8.
10. Ibid., p. 16.
11. See, for instance, Aristotle, Politics, Book VIII, Chapter 7, 1341b33-1342a17, where the term 'catharsis' is usually translated as 'purgation of' or 'purification from'. For an insightful discussion of the problem of interpreting the term 'catharsis' in the context of the Poetics, see Eva Schaper, Prelude to Aesthetics (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1968), pp. 102-118. Schaper argues that a proper understanding of the notion of 'catharsis' in the Poetics requires close attention to textual evidence internal to that work: "My aim is to arrive at a reading of the catharsis passage which is textually plausible, and confirmed by Aristotle's formal analysis of art, his analysis of artistic unity, and his proposals for a theory of fiction based on the conception of the mimetic function of poetic art". (Schaper, op. cit., p.102). This might also be taken as a characterisation of my own aims in the following discussion of the Poetics. My conclusions are not, I believe, incompatible with those reached by Schaper herself.
12. Aristotle, Poetics, pp. 24-28.
13. Ibid., p. 17.
14. Ibid., pp. 21-23.
15. Ibid., p. 21.
16. Ibid., p. 25.
17. Ibid., pp. 71-78, especially p.73 and p.77.
18. On 'catharsis' as the purification of 'irrational' emotions into 'rational' ones, see Gilbert and Kuhn, op. cit., pp. 74-79.
19. Aristotle, Poetics, pp. 21-22.
20. Abbe Charles Batteaux, Les Beaux Arts Reduits a une Meme Principe (Paris, 1746).
21. On the aesthetic theory of the Renaissance Neo-Platonists, see Gilbert and Kuhn, op. cit., Chapter VI, passim; Beardsley, op. cit., pp. 118-121; John Ives Sewall, A History of Western Art (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), pp. 529-534.
22. For a discussion of the influence of Neo-Platonism on scientific thought in the Renaissance, see Thomas Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), chapters 4 and 5.
23. See Gilbert and Kuhn, op. cit., pp. 174-5.
24. Samuel Johnson, Rasselas, quoted in Gilbert and Kuhn, op. cit., p.265.
25. Sir Philip Sidney, Sidney's Apologie for Poetry, ed. Collins, (Oxford, 1907), p. 27.
26. See Sewall, op. cit., pp. 787-791.

27. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, 'Laocoön', An Essay upon the Limits of Painting and Poetry, trans. Ellen Frothingham, (Boston: Roberts Bros., 1874).
28. Ibid., p. 91.
29. Ibid., p. 110.
30. Ibid., p. 126.
31. Ibid., pp. 153-156; 160-161, and 167.
32. Alexander Baumgarten, Reflections on Poetry , trans. Karl Aschenbrenner and William B. Holther, (California University, 1954), pp. 37-9.
33. Baron Gottfried W. von Leibniz, Principles of Nature and of Grace (1714), trans. George Martin Duncan, in Duncan, ed., The Philosophical Works of Leibniz (New Haven, 1908), pp. 306-7.
34. Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725), discussed in Beardsley, op. cit., pp. 185-7.
35. David Hume, op. cit.
36. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, trans. J. H. Bernard (New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1951), reprinted in part in Frank A. Tillman and Steven M. Cahn, eds., Philosophy of Art and Aesthetics (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), pp. 145-203. All references are to the latter text.
37. See, for example, Gilbert and Kuhn, op. cit., chapter XI; Beardsley, op. cit., chapter 9; S. Körner, Kant (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1955), chapter 8.
38. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp-Smith (London, 1929).
39. Kant, Critique of Judgement, pp. 178-180.
40. Ibid., p. 176; p. 183.
41. Ibid., p. 180.
42. Ibid., p. 181.
43. Loc. cit.
44. Loc. cit.
45. Kant, Critique of Judgement, p. 183.
46. William Wordsworth, "The Preface to Lyrical Ballads", in Knight, ed., Prose Works 2 Vols. (London, 1896), vol. I, p. 68.
47. See below.
48. Leo Tolstoy, What is Art?, trans. Almyer Maude (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell & Co., 1899), reprinted with an introduction by Vincent Tomas (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960). All references are to the latter publication.
49. Tolstoy, op. cit., p. 50.
50. Ibid., p. 51.
51. Ibid., chapters 2-4.
52. Ibid., p. 50.
53. John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: Capricorn Books, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1958), and Experience and Nature (New York: Dover Publications, 1958), chapter 9.
54. Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 3.
55. Ibid., chapter 1 and pp. 58-60.
56. Ibid., p. 58.
57. Ibid., p. 15.
58. Ibid., chapter 3.
59. Ibid., p. 137.
60. Ibid., p. 65.

61. Ibid., pp. 65-71.
62. Ibid., p. 71.
63. Ibid., p. 75.
64. Ibid., p. 65; p. 75.
65. Ibid., p. 69.
66. Ibid., p. 67.
67. Ibid., p. 69.
68. Ibid., p. 77.
69. Ibid., p. 83.
70. Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 317.
71. Dewey, Art and Experience, pp. 84-5.
72. Analogously, we might note, Aristotle's theory of tragedy identifies 'imitation of an action' with the creation of form, in that it is by virtue of its structure that a plot qualifies as an 'imitation' of the required sort.
73. Clive Bell, Art (London: Chatto and Windus, 1949), pp. 25 and 37.
74. Ibid., p. 6.
75. Loc. cit.
76. Bell, op. cit., p. 7.
77. Ibid., p. 8.
78. Ibid., p. 17.
79. Ibid., p. 25.
80. Susanne K. Langer, Feeling and Form (New York: Charles Schribner's Sons, 1953).
81. Ibid., p. 40.
82. Ibid., pp. 32-34.
83. Ibid., p. 33; p. 34.
84. Ibid., p. 27.
85. Ibid., p. 28.
86. Ibid., pp. 33-34.
87. Ibid., p. 29.
88. Ibid., pp. 29-32. In this context, Langer employs the term 'non-discursive' to characterise the symbols found in art. The term 'presentational symbol' is used in her more extended treatment of modes of symbolic functioning in her earlier book, Philosophy in a New Key (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942).
89. Ibid., p. 32.
90. Richard Rudner, "On Semiotic Aesthetics", J.A.A.C. (1951), reprinted in Beardsley and Schueller, eds., Aesthetic Inquiry, pp. 93-102. All references are to the latter publication.
91. Charles Morris, "Esthetics and the Theory of Signs", Journal of Unified Science, vol. 8 (1939), p. 132.

Chapter Six

1. Bell, op. cit., p. 37.
2. Tolstoy, op. cit., p. 140.
3. Tolstoy, op. cit., p. 50.

Chapter Seven

1. Morris Weitz, "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics", reprinted in Beardsley and Schueller, op. cit., pp. 3-11. All references are to the latter publication.
2. See chapter one, footnote 1.
3. Weitz, op. cit., p. 3.
4. Ibid., p. 5.
5. Ibid., p. 6.
6. Ibid., pp. 3-4; p. 6.
7. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1953). See, especially, Part I, sections 65-75.
8. Wittgenstein, op. cit., section 67.
9. Weitz, op. cit., p. 7.
10. Loc. cit.
11. Loc. cit.
12. Loc. cit.
13. Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic, p. 21ff.
14. Weitz, op. cit., p. 8.
15. Loc. cit.
16. Weitz, op. cit., p. 9.
17. Loc. cit.
18. Loc. cit.
19. Loc. cit.
20. Weitz, op. cit., p. 10. While I am at present concerned to give an exposition, rather than a critical evaluation, of Weitz's position, it is perhaps worth noting at this point that Weitz's claim here seems to be stronger than his arguments justify. On what grounds, it might be asked, could we deny the applicability of the term 'work of art' to an entity which satisfied all of the 'criteria of recognition'? If these criteria are the ones by reference to which we decide whether something is a work of art, then presumably they are also the criteria by reference to which we would justify excluding something from the class of artworks. If, that is, we determine the 'arthood' of an entity by comparing it with 'paradigm' artworks in terms of those features singled out by the 'criteria of recognition', our ruling something to be non-art presumably rests upon some dissimilarity between it and 'paradigm' works in terms of these features. If an entity meets all of the criteria, therefore, there seem to be no grounds available to us for denying arthood to that entity. This surely indicates that at least one collection of the criteria - viz., the collection which includes all of them - does provide sufficient conditions for something's being a work of art.
21. Weitz, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

Chapter Eight

1. William Kennick, "Does Traditional Aesthetics Rest on a Mistake?", Mind (1958), reprinted in Francis Coleman, ed., Contemporary Studies in Aesthetics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1968), pp. 411-427. All references

are to Coleman, op. cit.

2. Guy Sircello, "Arguing About Art", in Benjamin Tilghman, ed., Language and Aesthetics (Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1973), pp. 65-86.

3. Sircello, op. cit., p. 77.

4. Kennick, op. cit., p. 413.

5. Ibid., p. 415.

6. Sircello, op. cit., p. 67.

7. Weitz, op. cit., pp. 7.

8. Kennick, op. cit., p. 416.

9. Sircello, op. cit., p. 77.

10. See chapter seven.

11. Weitz, op. cit., p. 6.

12. Ibid., p. 7.

13. Timothy Binkley, "Deciding About Art", in Mogensen, op. cit., p. 96.

14. Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic, pp. 21-22.

15. Weitz, op. cit., p. 8.

16. Loc. cit.

17. See chapter ten.

18. Maurice Mandelbaum, "Family Resemblances and Generalisation Concerning the Arts", Am. Phil. Q., vol. 2 (1965), reprinted in Melvin Rader, ed., A Modern Book of Esthetics, 5th ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), pp. 444-455. All references are to Rader, op. cit.

19. Mandelbaum, op. cit., p. 452.

20. Loc. cit.

21. This argument is essentially the same as the one which underlies the 'anti-definition' formula proposed by Timothy Binkley in his paper, "Deciding About Art". For a discussion of Binkley's position, see chapter ten below.

22. Mandelbaum, op. cit., pp. 452-3.

23. Ibid., p. 446.

24. If, that is, the appreciation and understanding of artworks involves the eliciting of 'aesthetic experience' in receivers, i.e., if the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance' correctly describes what it is for something to be appreciated as a work of art.

25. It might also be the case that the 'non-exhibited' property N, while not implying possession of any 'directly exhibited' 'A-relevant$_i$' properties, is itself an 'A-relevant$_i$' property. Consider, for example, a theory similar to Tolstoy's, whereby a necessary and sufficient condition for something's being a work of art is that the person creating it has a specific intention. Suppose, further, that this theory differs from that of Tolstoy in that no restriction is placed on the 'directly exhibited' properties possessed by the products of such a creative act, and in that the creator's having had the intention in question is in no way determinable by reference to the 'directly exhibited' properties which the product in fact possesses. Suppose, finally, that it is held that the appreciation of artworks involves the direct experiential encounter with entities known, from external sources, to have been created by persons having the specified intention. This theory, whatever its merits qua theory of art, exhibits certain interesting characteristics. The property N in terms of which the concept 'art'

is defined is clearly 'non-exhibited' and does not imply the possession of any specific 'directly exhibited' properties by those things properly classifiable as artworks. The property N, however, is not only a defining 'A-relevant$_2$' property, but also a necessary 'A-relevant$_1$' property, in that knowledge of N is no less essential than 'knowledge'^{1} of the 'directly exhibited' properties of the work for appreciation to occur. The theory violates the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance' if we take that principle to require that artworks be distinguished by reference to some specific mode of 'aesthetic experience' and some specific 'aesthetic properties' characteristic of the functioning of artworks. Possession of some 'directly exhibited' properties is a requirement of this theory, however, and if appreciation, as characterised above, were to involve the eliciting of a distinctive mode of experience attended by a 'disinterested' pleasure grounded in the qualities of an experiential encounter with objects known to have the requisite provenance, the experience elicited might be termed 'aesthetic' and the 'directly exhibited' properties of artworks, whatever such properties might be, might be termed their 'aesthetic properties'.

26. See the preceding footnote.
27. Weitz, op. cit., p. 7.
28. Mandelbaum, op. cit., pp. 444-447.
29. Ibid., p. 446.
30. G. E. Moore, "Wittgenstein's Lectures on Aesthetics, 1930-33", Mind vol. 64 (1955), reprinted in Matthew Lipman, ed., Contemporary Aesthetics, pp. 110-114. Pp. 110-111.
31. Mandelbaum, op. cit., p. 447.
32. Binkley, op. cit., p. 97-98.
33. Nelson Goodman, "Seven Strictures on Similarity", in Problems and Projects (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972).
34. Weitz, op. cit., p. 9.
35. See chapter nine below.
36. Jacques Monod, Chance and Necessity, trans, Austryn Wainhouse (New York: Vintage Books, 1972), chapter 1.
37. Monod, op. cit., p. 7.
38. Weitz, op. cit., p. 9.
39. Loc. cit.
40. The 'something correct' that might be unfortunately expressed by such a locution is that artworks function through eliciting a particular mode of experience in receivers, and that the 'meaning' of a work exists only 'in the mind' of such receivers. The expression is 'unfortunate' in that it obliterates the distinction between the work, as eliciter of the 'artistic' experience, and the experience, as that which is elicited; and also in that it commits us to a form of artistic solipsism, with as many different works as there are acts of reception. The alternative possibility, that the work exists only 'in the mind' of the artist, is also paradoxical in its implications, since it commits us to the existence of a multitude of possible 'works', 'in the minds' of recognised artists and of practically everybody else, which have never manifested their presence in any external form, nor ever need to. This may, of course, be comforting to those who know that they are 'really' artists but have never actually produced any publicly available works. Dewey's discussion of the 'act of expression' (see chapter five above), which stresses the need to clarify an inchoate 'inspiration' in an inter-

action with a physical medium of some kind, is a healthy antidote to such a view.

41. Binkley, op. cit., p. 109.

Chapter Nine

1. The preceding argument might appear to conflict with the account given of Tolstoy's theory above. If, as was claimed in chapter five, Tolstoy is committed to the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance', and if, as was claimed in chapter six, Tolstoy's theory provides a means of resolving the puzzle of forgeries, how can it now be asserted that the resolution of the puzzle of forgeries is incompatible with the acceptance of the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance'? To understand this apparent contradiction, it should be recalled that Tolstoy himself held that the 'sincerity' of the artist, which he took to be a necessary condition for the artist's product to be art, is 'directly exhibited' in the work, in the clarity of expression and the 'individuality' of the feeling transmitted to the receiver. If 'sincerity', as the characteristic differentiating art from non-art, is taken to be 'directly exhibited' in this fashion, and if it thereby enters into the eliciting of 'aesthetic experience' in receivers, the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance' is not violated. 'Sincerity' functions, here, as a 'non-exhibited' property which implies certain 'directly exhibited' properties.

If 'sincerity' is taken to be a necessary 'A-relevant$_2$' property, the puzzle of forgeries is resolved, in that the forgery and the original do differ sufficiently in some relevant respect to justify the exclusion of the former from the class of artworks. There is, of course, a problem here for Tolstoy, since the forgery and the original do not, ex hypothesi, differ in any 'directly exhibited' properties. If he retains 'sincerity' as a necessary condition of arthood, he can resolve the puzzle of forgeries, but he must give up the claim that 'sincerity' is necessarily 'directly exhibited', thereby also violating the 'Principle of Aesthetic Relevance'. If, on the other hand, he retains the claim that 'sincerity' is necessarily 'directly exhibited', he must allow that the perfect forgery transmits the feelings of the original artist in the same manner as the original work, in which case, of course, he no longer has available any relevant respect in which to differentiate the two paintings, and thus cannot resolve the puzzle of forgeries.

2. Binkley, op. cit., p. 108; p. 98; p. 97.

3. Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic, p. 40.

4. Binkley, op. cit., p. 95.

5. Further, any 'artistic act' theory of this kind will also face the problem of 'radical creativity' discussed in chapter eight above.

6. Quoted by Binkley, op. cit., p. 99.

7. Binkley, op. cit., p. 109.

8. See chapter one, footnote 2.

9. The original statement of Danto's position is to be found in his paper, "The Artworld", Journal of Philosophy (henceforth J. Phil.) (1964), pp. 571-584. He further develops his position in two later papers: "Artworks and Real Things", Theoria vol. 39 (1973), pp. 1-17, and "The Transfiguration of the Commonplace", J.A.A.C. (1974), pp. 138-148.

10. Arthur Danto, "The Artworld", reprinted in Mogensen, ed., op. cit., pp. 9-20. P. 16.
11. Ibid., p. 10.
12. Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic, p. 29, p. 31.
13. Ibid., p. 31.
14. Ibid., p. 36.
15. Loc. cit.
16. Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic, p. 30.
17. Ibid., p. 32.
18. Loc. cit.
19. Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic, p. 33.
20. Ibid., pp. 37-38.
21. Ibid., p. 34.
22. Dickie, Aesthetics: An Introduction, p. 101.
23. For further reflections on Dickie's 'artifactuality' requirement', see the discussion of his notion of "treating an artifact as a candidate for appreciation" in chapter ten below.
24. Weitz, op. cit., p. 9.
25. Dickie, Aesthetics: An Introduction, pp. 98-100.
26. Richard Sclafani, "Art and Artifactuality", Southwestern Journal of Philosophy (Fall, 1970), pp. 105-108, cited by Dickie in Art and the Aesthetic, pp. 24-25.
27. Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic, pp. 25-6.
28. Ibid., p. 25.
29. Ibid., p. 26.
30. Paul Ziff, "The Task of Defining a Work of Art", Phil. Rev. vol. 62 (1953), pp. 58-78, reprinted in Francis Coleman, ed., Contemporary Studies in Aesthetics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1968), pp. 94-111. P. 100.
31. Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic, pp. 44-5.
32. It should be noted that I am not rejecting the idea that 'artifactuality', in some sense, is a necessary condition of arthood. Indeed, an 'artifactuality' requirement is implicit in the 'piece-specification' theory of art that I shall develop in chapter ten. What I am rejecting, rather, is Dickie's account of the 'artifactuality' of apparently non-artifactual artworks. The problem Dickie faces is a consequence of his assumption that artworks are physical objects; the 'puzzle', on such an assumption, is how an apparently non-artifactual object can also be, when it is an artwork, an artifactual object. The puzzle dissolves when artworks are conceived to be 'objects under descriptions' rather than physical objects in the fullness of their properties, in which case neither natural objects nor physical objects, qua objects, can be works of art. Rather, exhibited rocks and pieces of driftwood, no less than 'Readymades' and paintings by Rembrandt, are artifacts by virtue of the act of 'piece-specification' necessary to 'create' them as specific pieces, or as 'objects under descriptions'. See chapter ten, below, for further discussion of Dickie's'artifactuality' requirement and of his notion of "treating an artifact as a candidate for appreciation".
33. Binkley, op. cit., p. 100.
34. See chapter ten, below, for further discussion of this point.
35. T. J. Diffey, "The Republic of Art", British Journal of Aesthetics (1969), pp. 145-156, discussed on pp. 199-200 of Monroe C. Beardsley, "Is Art Essentially Institutional?", in Mogensen, ed., op. cit., pp. 194-209.

36. Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic, p. 40.
37. Ibid., pp. 40-41.
38. Kennick, op. cit.
39. Ibid., p. 423.
40. Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic, p. 28.
41. Loc. cit.
42. Ted Cohen, "The Possibility of Art: Remarks on a Proposal by Dickie", Phil. Rev. vol. 82 (1973), pp. 69-82.
43. Ibid., p. 78.
44. George Dickie, "The Actuality of Art: Remarks on Criticisms by Cohen", The Personalist vol. 58 (1977), p.169.
45. Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic, p. 41.
46. Ibid., p. 42.
47. Loc. cit.
48. Loc. cit.
49. Loc. cit.
50. Dickie, Aesthetics: An Introduction, p. 119.
51. Binkley, op. cit., pp. 100-101.
52. Ibid., p. 100.
53. Ibid., p. 101.
54. Ibid., pp. 100-101.
55. Beardsley, "Is Art Essentially Institutional?"
56. Ibid., p. 196.
57. Loc. cit.
58. Binkley, op. cit., p. 101.
59. Loc. cit.

Chapter Ten

1. Timothy Binkley, "Deciding About Art".
2. Ibid., p. 107.
3. Ibid., p. 97.
4. Ibid., p. 92.
5. Loc. cit.
6. Loc. cit.
7. Binkley, op. cit., p. 93.
8. Ibid., p. 94.
9. Ibid., p. 95.
10. Ibid., p. 96.
11. Weitz, op. cit., p. 8.
12. Binkley, op. cit., p. 97.
13. Ibid., pp. 98-99.
14. Weitz, op. cit., p. 8.
15. Loc. cit.
16. Binkley, op. cit., p. 98.
17. Loc. cit.
18. Loc. cit.
19. Binkley, op. cit., p. 97.
20. Ibid., p. 100.
21. Ibid., p. 102.
22. Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic, p. 44.

23. Loc. cit.
24. Binkley, op. cit., p. 102.
25. Ibid., p. 103.
26. Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic, p. 37.
27. Binkley, op. cit., p. 103.
28. Ibid., pp. 103-104; p. 106.
29. Ibid., p. 104.
30. Ibid., p. 106.
31. Ibid., p. 104.
32. Loc. cit.
33. Binkley, op. cit., p. 105.
34. See chapter eleven for further discussion of this point.
35. Binkley, op. cit., p. 107.
36. Ibid., p. 98.
37. Ibid., p. 106.
38. Ibid., pp. 108-109.
39. Ibid., p. 109.
40. Loc. cit.
41. Loc. cit.
42. Binkley, op. cit., p. 98.
43. Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic, p. 49.
44. Ibid., p. 46.
45. Ibid., p. 47.
46. Binkley, op. cit., p. 105.
47. Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic, p. 46.
48. Ibid., pp. 37-38.
49. Ibid., p. 37.
50. Ibid., p. 38.
51. Ibid., pp. 44-45.
52. Ibid., p. 41.
53. Ibid., p. 33.
54. Ibid., pp. 43-44.
55. Ibid., p. 30.
56. Ibid., p. 31.
57. Ibid., p. 33.
58. Ibid., pp. 35-36.
59. If one balks at the idea that sporting events, such as football matches or gymnastic displays, are 'artifacts', one should presumably also balk at the idea that plays or ballet performances are 'artifacts'. It might be argued that the 'artifact' in the latter cases is not the performance but the play or ballet of which it is a performance, and that, in the case of sporting events, no such distinction can be drawn. However, in this respect sporting events seem to resemble improvisational theatre, or, indeed, improvisational music such as jazz. If improvisational 'art' is properly classified as art, then, on Dickie's account, the performance which is 'appreciated' must be considered to be an artifact, or a set of the aspects of an artifact; and, if this is the case, a similar analysis can presumably be given of sporting events.
60. Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic, p. 30.
61. Loc. cit.
62. Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic, p. 40.
63. Ibid., pp. 48-49.
64. Ibid., p. 33.

65. Mandelbaum, op. cit., pp. 452-3.
66. Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic, p. 44.
67. Binkley, op. cit., p. 107.
68. Ibid., p. 106.
69. Ibid., p. 102.
70. Ibid., p. 109.
71. See the discussion of Donald Judd's dictum that "It's art if someone calls it art" in chapter nine above.
72. Binkley, op. cit., p. 94.
73. Ibid., p. 107.
74. Ibid., p. 104.
75. Ibid., p. 99.
76. Danto, "The Artworld", pp. 15ff.
77. Binkley, op. cit., p. 104.
78. Ibid., p. 98.
79. Ibid., p. 107.
80. Ibid., p. 92.
81. Ibid., p. 107.
82. Ibid., p. 105.
83. Danto, "The Artworld", p. 16.
84. It might be objected here that, insofar as the function of 'indexing conventions' is to enable pieces to be specified in such a way that they are inter-subjectively available, such conventions are not, in fact, independent of 'established practices' for presenting artworks, but that, rather, the conditions under which a piece may be 'inter-subjectively available' will be dictated by the presentational practices of the 'artworld'. There is, indeed, an intimate relationship between 'indexing conventions' and 'presentational practices', but this objection has the relationship inverted. The 'presentational practices' will reflect the 'indexing conventions', and not vice versa, in that the former will be shaped by the need to make available for appreciation the 'A-relevant$_i$' properties constitutive of pieces within the 'indexing conventions$_i$' which obtain in particular systems of the 'artworld'. The 'indexing conventions' of traditional painting which specified, as 'A-relevant$_i$' properties constitutive of a piece, pictorial properties of certain sorts brought into being by applying paint to one side of a canvas (or other suitable surface) were not dictated by the 'presentational practice' of hanging paintings with their backs to the wall, but vice versa.
85. Richard Sclafani, "The Theory of Art", in Mogensen, ed., op. cit., pp. 146-170. See also Richard Sclafani, "Artworks, Art Theory, and the Artworld", Theoria vol. 39 (1973), pp. 18-35.
86. Binkley, op. cit., p. 109.

Chapter Eleven

1. See chapter four above.
2. See the section on "'Imitation' theories of art" in chapter five above.
3. The notion of 'psychical distancing' is advanced by Edward Bullough in "'Psychical Distance' as a Factor in Art and an Aesthetic Prin-

ciple", reprinted in M. Levich, ed., Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Criticism (New York: Random House, 1963), pp. 233-254. 'Aesthetic attention' theories have been advanced by Jerome Stolnitz, Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art Criticism (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960); and by Eliseo Vivas, "A Definition of Esthetic Experience", Journal of Philosophy (1937), pp. 628-634, and "Contextualism Reconsidered", J.A.A.C. (1959), pp. 222-240. A theory of 'aesthetic perception' is to be found in Virgil Aldrich, Philosophy of Art (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 19-27.

4. Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic, chapters 4-6.

5. Ibid., chapter 7. Beardsley develops his conception of the 'aesthetic object' in his book, Aesthetics (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1958).

6. Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic, p. 148.

7. Ibid., p. 156.

8. Ibid., p. 148.

9. Ibid., pp. 150ff.

10. Ibid., p. 152.

11. Ibid., p. 154.

12. Ibid., p. 155.

13. Ibid., pp. 164ff.

14. Beardsley, Aesthetics, pp. 88-97.

15. Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic, p. 164.

16. Robert Yanal, in a recent paper ("The Institutional Theory of the Aesthetic Object: A Reply to Michael Mitias", The Personalist vol. 58 (1977), pp. 156-160.), claims that Dickie is mistaken in characterising 'stage two' as part of Beardsley's analysis of the 'aesthetic object': "Dickie talks about a second stage to Beardsley's analusis of the aesthetic object, the purpose of which 'is to distinguish the perceptual objects that are aesthetic objects from those that are not'...Stage Two, however, is not actually part of the analysis of the notion of the aesthetic object, but is an investigation of some common sorts of aesthetic objects. Aesthetic objects, we might say, are essentially directly perceptible aspects of artworks, and accidentally visual designs, musical compositions, etc." (Yanal, op. cit., p. 157.)
If Beardsley were intending that the two principles, of 'distinctness' and 'direct perceptibility', be taken as an adequate analysis of the notion of the 'aesthetic object', the inadequacy of his proposed analysis could quite easily be demonstrated by reference to those examples, offered by Dickie, of 'directly perceptible' aspects of artworks (qua physical objects) which are not aspects of their 'aesthetic objects'. That Beardsley does not intend the two principles to be taken as an adequate analysis of the notion of the 'aesthetic object' is apparent from his observation, following his discussion of the two principles, that, while all 'aesthetic objects' are perceptual objects, not all perceptual objects are 'aesthetic objects'. (Beardsley, Aesthetics, p. 58.) Yanal, it would seem, is incorrectly attributing to Beardsley a position which is clearly untenable.

17. Monroe C. Beardsley, "Aesthetic Experience Regained", J.A.A.C. (Fall 1969), p. 5. Quoted in Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic, p. 187.

18. Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic, pp. 166-7.

19. Dickie also claims that Beardsley is unable to exclude, from the 'aesthetic object' of a play, such things as the backs of spectators's heads and the stage curtains, which can also be elements in a 'visual

design' which includes elements of the 'aesthetic object' of the play. In such cases, however, Beardsley might exclude the perceptible non-aesthetic elements from the 'aesthetic object' of the play by means of the 'principle of distinctness', since neither the backs of the spectators' heads nor, perhaps, the stage curtains, are aspects of the physical work of art, and thus they cannot be 'aesthetic aspects' of the play.

20. Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic, p. 157.
21. Ibid., p. 163.
22. Ibid., p. 147.
23. Ibid., p. 171.
24. Robert J. Yanal, "The Institutional Theory of the Aesthetic Object: A Reply to Michael Mitias", The Personalist vol. 58 (1977), p. 157.
25. Dickie, Aesthetics: An Introduction, chapter 12.
26. Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic, pp. 171-179.
27. Ibid., p. 175.
28. Ibid., p. 174.
29. Ibid., p. 178.
30. Ibid., p. 181.
31. Michael Mitias, "The Institutional Theory of the Aesthetic Object", The Personalist vol. 58 (1977), pp. 147-155.
32. Mitias, op. cit., pp. 150-1.
33. Yanal, op. cit.
34. Ibid., p. 156.
35. Ibid., pp. 156-7.
36. Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic, p. 162.
37. Ibid., p. 179.
38. See, for example, R. L. Gregory, Eye and Brain 3rd. ed. revd. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978).
39. Peter Jones, Philosophy and the Novel (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), chapter 5.
40. C. L. Stevenson, "On the Reasons that Can Be Given for the Interpretation of a Poem", in Joseph Margolis, ed., Philosophy Looks at the Arts (New York: Charles Schribner's Sons, 1962), pp. 121-139.
41. Jones, op. cit., p. 193.
42. See, for example: W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley, "The Intentional Fallacy", Sewanee Review (1946), pp. 468-488; Beardsley, "Textual Meaning and Authorial Meaning", Genre (1968), pp. 169-181; Dickie, Aesthetics: An Introduction, chapter 12; Jones, op. cit., chapter 5.
43. Richard Wollheim, Art and its Objects (New York: Harper Row, 1968).

Chapter Twelve

1. See, for instance, Welsh, "Discursive and Presentational Symbols", Mind vol. LXIV (1955).
2. Richard Rudner, "On Semiotic Aesthetics".
3. Richard Rudner, "On Seeing What We Shall See", in Rudner and Israel Scheffler, eds., Logic and Art: Essays in Honour of Nelson Goodman (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972).
4. Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968); "When is Art?", in David Perkins and Barbara Leondar, eds., The

Arts and Cognition (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1977), pp. 11-19.

5. Goodman, "When is Art?", p. 12.
6. Ibid., pp. 12-13.
7. Ibid., p. 13.
8. Ibid., p. 14.
9. Loc. cit.
10. Loc. cit.
11. Goodman, "When is Art?", p. 15.
12. Ibid., p. 16.
13. Goodman, Languages of Art, chapter 1.
14. Ibid., pp. 37-38.
15. Nelson Goodman, "Some Notes on 'Languages of Art'", Journal of Philosophy (August, 1970), p. 568.
16. Loc. cit.
17. Goodman, "When is Art?", pp. 16-17.
18. Ibid., p. 17.
19. Loc. cit.
20. Loc. cit.
21. Goodman, Languages of Art, p. 143.
22. Ibid., p. 131.
23. Ibid., p. 128.
24. Ibid., p. 156.
25. Loc. cit.
26. Goodman, "When is Art?", pp. 17-18.
27. Ibid., p. 18.
28. Loc. cit.
29. Goodman, Languages of Art, p. 33.
30. Ibid., p. 241.
31. Ibid., pp. 111-112.
32. Goodman, "When is Art?", p. 17.
33. Ibid., p. 19 n.8.
34. Goodman, Languages of Art, chapter III, "Art and Authenticity".
35. Ibid., p. 116.
36. Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic, p. 47.
37. Goodman, Languages of Art, p. 102.
38. Ibid., p. 105.
39. Ibid., p. 108.
40. Ibid., p. 110.
41. Ibid., pp. 111-112.

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