Subject for Discourse Ethics

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Boswick, Daniel
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This thesis examines subjectivity within Jürgen Habermas’ theory of discourse ethics by overview of discourse ethics, the positions of two of its more prominent critics, and an evaluation of the arguments and disjunctions subsequent to these exchanges. The results from Seyla Benhabib suggest discourse ethics subject could benefit from more intersubjective empathy primarily through her concept of the concrete other while the John Rawls comments suggest additional precision for the description of Habermas’ procedure could ameliorate abstract uncertainties of the exact procedure itself as well as in the anticipated outcomes for the norms of discourse ethics. For discourse ethics, the subject is found to be the discursive participant that is founded upon communicative ethics and in the terms of moral cognitivism. Discourse ethics iterates subjects in communication. The speaker and their reasoning are indistinguishable in theory. The permissions and exclusions contoured by discourse ethics iterate self-evident truths about how rational communication develops into consensus. These contours illustrate both the framework of discussion and the character of subjectivity therein because of the presupposed unity of the two in communicative ethics and cognitivist morality. The ideas of Benhabib and Rawls accrue to show that there are more factors that can be accounted for and more worthwhile detail for factors already considered in Habermas’ theory.
Morality, Justice, Communication, Ethics, Habermas, Benhabib, Rawls