

RELIGIOUS BELIEF AND MORAL OBLIGATION

by

Alexander Cox B.A. 1926

**A Thesis presented to the Faculty of Graduate School
of the University of Manitoba in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.**

University of Manitoba

December 1932

Religious Belief and Moral Obligation

In preparing this thesis I have read carefully the following books, and while I have not seen fit to quote from them all I have made myself familiar with the thinking of each man.

S. Alexander - Space Time and Deity. (2 vols.)

E.S.Ames - The Psychology of Religious Experience.

The New Orthodoxy.

Religion.

H.E.Barnes - The Twilight of Christianity.

O.A.Coe - The Psychology of Religion.

H.W.Curti - Child Psychology.

L.T.Hobhouse - Morals in Evolution.

H.Höffding - The Philosophy of Religion.

Wm. James - Varieties of Religious Experience.

Sir Henry Jones - A Faith that Enquires.

J.H.Leuba - A Psychological Study of Religion.

C.Lloyd Morgan - Emergent Evolution.

Life Mind and Spirit.

J.Pratt - The Religious Consciousness.

A.S.Pringle-Pattison - The Idea of God.

H.Nashdall - The Theory of Good and Evil. (2 vols.)

A.B.Taylor - The Faith of a Moralist. (2 vols.)

J.B.Turner - The Philosophic Basis of Moral Obligation.

Personality and Reality.

The Nature of Deity.

Religious Belief and Moral Obligation

C.J.C. Webb - God and Personality.

Divine Personality and Human Life.

A.H. Wieman - The Wrestle of Religion with Truth.

H.W. Wright - The Religious Response.

Alley Coy

Religious Belief and Moral Obligation

Table of Contents

Chapter I

Introductory	1
-------------------------------	----------

Chapter II

Development of Religion and Morals	12
---	-----------

Chapter III

Faith and Value	31
----------------------------------	-----------

Chapter IV

God and the Physical World	39
---	-----------

Chapter V

God and the Moral World	49
--	-----------

Chapter I

Introductory

As far back as we can possibly go in our investigations we find man striving to understand and interpret the world in which he lives. There may have been a time when he merely reacted to his environment without any attempt so to understand and interpret it, but aside from very young children we have no knowledge of people at that stage of development. The extensive experimental studies of Jean Piaget and his fellow-workers of the Geneva school have thrown considerable light on the method by which thinking develops in children. In his findings as interpreted by Mrs. M. C. Curti in her "Child Psychology", Piaget distinguishes three stages of development. The first covers the period up to seven or eight years of age, the second from that to the age of eleven or twelve, and the third from then on to maturity. In speaking of the first stage Mrs. Curti says, "Piaget concludes that the reasoning of the young child before seven or eight is a mental experiment, consisting of a series of discontinuous judgments which follow one another like overt movements, so that the child is not aware of the relation between them. The reason for

this 'unconsciousness', Piaget says, lies in the egocentrism of childish thought." In this earliest stage the child is reacting to his environment with little consciousness of what he is doing, but of what consciousness he has he is the centre. "The child is the centre of his own universe, the point of reference for every judgment, and it is with difficulty that he learns to think of objects in relation to other people and to each other."²

There are two outstanding characteristics of children in this period. In the first place, they put things side by side without any clear idea of their relation. For instance, in one of the Geneva experiments a child of eight, while answering correctly that Geneva is in Switzerland, when shown a drawing of a circle representing Geneva, and asked to make another to show Switzerland drew another circle beside the first. This tendency to juxtapose things is accompanied by the habit of syncretism. "Piaget suggests, in fact, that in the first thought of the child there is nothing but connectedness - everything is connected with everything else, not in a logical way, but because things simply are given together, belong together. This is true because of the child's egocentrism, which makes him assimilate all his experience to his own point of view."³ Again,

1. Child Psychology p. 259. (Curti).

2. Ibid. p. 261.

3. Ibid. p. 265.

"Common observation indicates that to the child events which occur at the same time obviously belong together.

--- Piaget suggests that some of the superstitions or magical beliefs of children are partly explained by this syncretism."⁴ A rather striking example of the operation of this same principle in the minds of the pagan natives of Africa is the case of naming Dr. J.T. Tucker, a United Church missionary, "Rain-maker" because when he returned to Africa in 1927 rain fell in the midst of a dry season, and again this year (1932) when he left during a rainy season the rain mysteriously ceased.⁵ The two events occurred together and so in the minds of the natives they were connected causally. One can easily understand that many of the beliefs and superstitions of man have arisen in this way.

To get clearly before us the manner in which Piaget considers that these weaknesses of early childhood are corrected I cannot do better than quote Mrs. Curti at some length. She says, "We may interpret Piaget's treatment of juxtaposition and syncretism about as follows. Between the years of seven and eleven, on the average, the early syncretism of the child's experience gives way, under the pressure of individual experience and especially of social stimulation, to more analytical habits of thinking.

4. Child Psychology p. 266. (Curti)

5. Reported in Manitoba Free Press August 27th 1932.

He is forced by the conditions of experience to learn to react differentially to differing and changing aspects of the situations which he encounters; and as he does so he gains 'insight' into their essential features, and is able to make general statements about them which are more reliable, that is, more useful in effecting adaption, than the vague subjective schemas which formerly prevailed. Thus the world of the child's experience is being continually broken up into more discrete groupings, and shaped again into more effective forms, as he learns to adapt himself to his changing environment of things and of persons. The juxtaposition and syncretism which are characteristic of early thought give way to analysis and synthesis; intuitive thinking tends to become rational thinking. But this development is not, we may assume, completed in all children; and in no child, probably, is it completed for every aspect of his thought. There still remain, for almost every adult, certain regions of his thought which are as 'impervious' to his experience' as the ordinary thought of the little child, - regions in which the original syncretism still, as it were, holds sway."⁶

And again, "It is when the child is stimulated by the questions, doubts, and attitudes of others that he pays attention to the implications of his statements in an ef-

6. Child Psychology p. 268. (Curti).

fort to justify them. Thus he is stimulated to observe sequences of events; and becomes able when dealing with observed facts, or remembered or imagined facts, to see them in their correct logical relationships. But, Piaget says, during this middle period of steady growth in the ability to deal logically with observed or remembered data, there is still lacking the capacity to carry on formal reasoning. The child is only able to deal with situations in which he believes - situations, that is, which stand for actual or possible experience."⁷

The final stage according to Piaget is the only one which can properly be called reasoning. In this stage the maturing child can take hypotheses and deal with them whether they are true or not. He can take premises which he doubts or which he may even believe to be false and build on them a system which is faultless if the premises are correct. Mrs. Curti, while not questioning Piaget's outline of the development of reasoning, contends that the word itself should receive a broader definition so as to cover all "ideational problem-solving" and that the term formal reasoning should be applied to this last stage.

While the recapitulation theory of G. Stanley Hall has been severely criticised by many investigators and is now rejected by perhaps the majority of present day

7. Child Psychology p. 269. (Curti)

psychologists, and while no doubt in its details it is incorrect, still there is a marked similarity between the child and the primitive man, both in their immaturity and in their method of development. Both are at first egocentric and only gradually become socialized. Both tend to juxtapose and syncretise. Neither is able to reason abstractly until he is passing into the world of civilized adulthood. For our purpose they are sufficiently alike for us to treat them in a similar way.

Although his understanding may be very limited and his interpretation quite faulty still the life of each individual is influenced to quite a large extent by what he believes about the universe of which he is a part. As far as we can tell, primitive man treats the various objects of nature with which he has to do as though they were similar to himself and responsible for their response to and influence upon him. So too, the child who has learned to hide in play from her daddy means it quite literally when she says, "Dolly's hiding from me."

Professor Ames asks, "Does the savage make a distinction between an object and its spirit; for example, between a tree and the spirit of the tree?" And he answers, "In the simplest and most immediate experience he probably makes no such distinction. At this level nothing is carefully analysed or abstracted from the living stream of in-

terest and action. --- At this stage all objects are spirits and all spirits are objects."⁸ This is a comparatively low level of development.

Professor Ames again says, "In the next stage the spirit is regarded as separable from the object. --- The development of the dualism of the thing and spirit, of body and soul, of natural and supernatural, is gradual and uneven. --- As this differentiation is more clearly marked, the distance widens between the material object and the spirit. But this separation never becomes complete, the object becomes more or less animated and the spirit continues to be to some extent corporeal and spatial."⁹ Professor Ames then passes directly from this stage of animism to the point where the tribal god represents the socialised life of the tribe and does not explain very clearly the method by which, in his consideration, primitive man makes this transition.

Professor L.T. Mohhouse expresses the difference between the spirits of animism and the gods of theism, thus, "The spirit of a tree strictly regarded is limited to that tree and functions only in this spot. A tree-god controls all the trees. Similarly all the great gods control either large provinces of nature - sea, earth, sky (Zeus, Poseidon,

8. The Psychology of Religious Experience pp. 111-2. (Ames)

9. Ibid. pp. 112-3.

Rades), or are protectors of the people, national gods (Yahweh, Ashur, Athens), or preside over one or more of the main human functions (Ares, Aphrodite). --- The gods, then, as opposed to the spirits, are clearly distinct from the natural objects which they govern, or the functions which they direct. They are anthropomorphic, and so tend to be connected by families and political relationships. They control the great powers of nature and the main functions of life. And while human they are also superhuman, and at their best lend themselves to ideal forms of beauty and of ethical thought."¹⁰

Thus we see that only gradually does primitive man come to separate the spirit from the body which it is supposed to inhabit, just as he does not interpret death as a separation of that which controls and directs his own body from the body itself until he has developed considerable reasoning power. Life and the world, as soon as he becomes conscious at all, present many mysterious aspects. It is doubtful whether primitive man forms the exact concepts of spirits for which many anthropologists give him credit. He, however, does have some vague idea of the non-visible, and he does have an attitude toward the unknown and the invisible and the mysterious, and he does try to appease and gain the favor of these beings or powers of

10. *Morals in Evolution* p. 405. (Hobhouse).

of which he has a vague concept. To these vague concepts of unseen powers, to this attitude, usually of awe and wonder, and to these acts of worship we give the name religion. The name is retained as the vague concepts develop into more definite dreads and the attitudes and forms of worship change with the changing concepts.

But man has more than the objects and forces of nature to which he must make adjustments. His fellowmen present him with another problem. As a child, even in the primitive tribe, he is for a considerable time completely dependent on others for all his needs. He soon learns some of the ways of securing the reactions he desires from those about him, and before long he learns that all individuals do not respond in the same way, and even the same person is more attentive at some times than at others. He soon learns, too, that there are certain things which he must not do; some because he receives a direct injury if he does them, others because people bigger than himself say he must not and they have the power to enforce their commands. At first it is perhaps almost entirely desire for his own personal comfort which determines his actions, but very soon he learns to respect the authority of tribal customs which protect the interests of others and safeguard the welfare of the group. "Must" is giving place to "ought". Moral ideas and moral obligations are making their appearance.

We give the name morality, in its wider meaning, to concepts of, attitudes toward, and actions affecting persons, including himself.

In this thesis I shall deal with these two ideas, religious belief and moral obligation. As it would be difficult to find two terms with more varying content than these, and as it will evidently be impossible to deal with all the phases of either within the limits of such a thesis as this, I shall confine myself to theistic religion and largely to Christianity, on the one hand; and to the ideas of moral obligation which naturally arise in connection with a belief that the whole human race is bound together in a unity for which each has some responsibility, on the other. Again, I shall confine my attention to those phases of each of these ideas which have some bearing on the other. Still further, I would like, in this connection, to consider chiefly the attitude of two schools of thought, i.e., the idealist school of which Professors J.E. Turner and A. E. Taylor are leading representatives, and the Chicago school derived from Professor Dewey and the Pragmatists and of which Professor E.S. Ames is perhaps the best exponent.

I do not mean to imply that idealist philosophers and liberal theologians represent all or even the majority of the people who have retained a religious attitude

towards the supernatural. Professor H. D. Barnes is no doubt correct when he claims that the majority of religious people are fundamentalists.¹¹ So, too, the majority of those who discard supernatural theology go far beyond the views of Professor Ames and the group he represents, and become, religiously, out and out atheists or at least agnostics, and philosophically, materialists. The two groups in which we are interested include those persons who are making a real attempt to conserve the values of the past and at the same time to incorporate with these values the newer discoveries. Their task from the standpoint of logical consistency and synthesis is much more difficult than that of either group of extremists, but at the same time they are trying to take into consideration all the facts. It is sometimes difficult to find a place for them all and also present an interpretation which is consistent, reasonable, and capable of being understood by the ordinary thinking individual. I make no apologies for disregarding the extremists as I am convinced that the truth lies with the moderates. I shall endeavor to show that religion and morality are each integral parts or aspects of life and develop together; that fact and value are inseparable; that the evolution of the physical world is best explained by the activity of a directing mind; and that a moral universe demands a spiritual divinity worthy of worship.

11. The Twilight of Christianity. (Barnes).

Chapter II

Development of Religion and Morals

Both of the schools mentioned above accept the idea of orderly development commonly designated as evolution, and some at least of each of these schools accept Lloyd Morgan's theory of "emergent" evolution^{12,13,14} so that it will not be necessary to compare or contrast them in this respect, and I shall simply outline the general position.

According to the recapitulation theory (which while unacceptable in detail has still sufficient truth in it to be worthy of consideration), and to a lesser degree according to the culture epochs theory, each individual lives over again the life of the race. This is as true in the fields of religion and morality as anywhere else. One must, of course, make due allowance for the influence of an environment which may differ considerably from that of earlier generations. Developing culture may place around a boy who is passing through the savage stage an

12. Religion p. 164. (Amen).

13. Personality and Reality pp. 76, 134, etc. (Turner)

14. The Nature of Deity p. 114. (Turner).

entirely different environment from that which his forefathers enjoyed in freedom of the wilds. There may even be a considerable difference in one generation. For instance, a child may move to a different community, or into a different social stratum, or into the midst of people following a different line of work. He may thus meet people who hold entirely different religious views, follow entirely different religious customs, and have entirely different moral standards from those of his parents and grandparents. To be more specific, take the case of a Hindu boy in England or an Armenian refugee in Canada. There will necessarily be a conflict here between inherited tendencies and environmental pressure. But after making due allowance for these cases, we find in the majority of cases and in general that social heredity enforces and strengthens physically inherited tendencies.

We shall deal first with the development of religion. The child begins life with much the same instinctive background as did his ancestors, and he enters into much the same relations. He is a tiny, helpless infant in a big unknown world. That world is his world to a very limited degree. Sometimes it seems friendly, as when he cries and his needs are met. At other times it appears to be most unfriendly, as when he falls or touches very cold or very hot substances, or again, when he finds that other beings

like himself, but bigger, take from him the thing he wants.

However, on the whole, he usually finds the world friendly. His inborn curiosity leads him to explore that world as opportunity presents itself. His increased knowledge and ability give him increased control, and the world becomes more and more his world. There are, of course, many forces which he cannot control, and to these he learns to adapt himself. Before he has heard of law he takes it for granted that the same conditions produce the same results, and it is quite a shock to him when he finds that all big people do not treat him alike, and that even the same person does not always respond in the same way to his advances. From that time on he is faced with the ever growing problem of his relation to an ever larger world. The unknown appeals to his curiosity, arouses his wonder, inspires his awe, and may command his worship. The latter is especially true if he finds others about him worshipping likewise. We must not think, however, that the child as a child seeks to know all things and to relate the whole universe to himself, for we find that his interests are much more limited, and are confined to a large extent to his immediate surroundings. He is satisfied to enjoy for a time a new discovery without troubling about a further one. But if two children are interested in a recent discovery and one of them finds something still

more now than the other will be immediately interested in this later discovery.

The religious beliefs of a child are apt to be just as contradictory and strange as were those of his primitive ancestors and will not likely differ much from them except insofar as adults have forced upon him their phraseology, and have by their own lives imparted to him their attitudes. God is not nearly as interesting to him as his father. He has no love for the heathen. Of course, if someone tells him that another boy in China or India is hungry or has no toys he will probably agree to send him a nickel or a dime. But he is far more apt to forget it than he would be if the idea were to buy a new baseball for his team. Even his team loyalty is apt to come second to his desire to be pitcher, catcher, or captain.

On the other hand, as he kneels and repeats his evening prayer God may be very near to him. This is not always true any more than it is true that adults always worship when they attend a church service. Strange and wonderful are the ideas children get of God - as, for instance, the boy who broke out in a tirade against God, saying, "I don't think it's fair that God should always be spying on us kids." His parents had made of God a sort of All-seeing monster who was continually trying to catch boys doing wrong. This lad's moral concept of justice had out-

run his parents' interpretation of God. Contrast this with the attitude of the little girl who, seeing a dead bird, said, "Why did God let it die?" Here the child had been taught that God takes care of the birds and all the helpless things of the world, and she was beginning to question the wherefore of suffering in the light of that concept. In these two instances we see partial truths concerning God being challenged. In each case God must be at least as good as the best the child knows in order to satisfy his inherent sense of fitness.

Professor J.B. Pratt, in speaking of the gradual development of the religious consciousness in childhood, says, that there are three particularly potent factors in the formation of the child's ideas of and attitudes toward God, "(1) the indirect influence of the actions of older persons, (2) direct teaching on religious subjects, (3) the natural development of the child's mind."¹⁵ These factors work together and each affects the others. The first and last act continuously and more or less unconsciously while the second is the specific attempt of elders to impart to the child those religious ideas and attitudes which they desire him to acquire. Professor Pratt is undoubtedly correct in giving a large place to the indirect influence of older persons. As he says, the child is a great imitator

15. The Religious Consciousness p. 94. (Pratt).

and is deeply and frequently impressed by the actions and attitudes of those about him who are older than he is and who have authority over him, but there are two other sources of influence which cannot be overlooked here, namely, the child's playmates and the physical universe about him. Subjects which a child will not mention to an adult are freely discussed with his chums especially if the child is just feeling his way to a new idea, and since religion has not yet been separated from the rest of life and presents much that is unfamiliar it receives its share of attention. Again, if the child lives among people who are responsive to the beauty and majesty of nature as a revelation of God, he not only absorbs their attitude but also soon responds directly to the influence of nature.

Definite religious instruction depends very largely on the indirect influence of elders and on the development of the child's mind. According to Professor Pratt, the child mind is very open to the influence of suggestion and accepts without questioning any suggestion whatsoever until two ideas which are to the child incompatible present themselves together - one, or even both, of these may be in the form of an earlier experience or idea recalled, but they must both be present in the child's mind at nearly the same time before a doubt is aroused. Professor Pratt does not, however, make the mistake of con-

sidering the child to be merely passive. He gives an important place to the "natural development of the child's mind." More and more allowance must be made for the fact of the child himself.

As the child comes to the place in life where the fact that the earth is round has real meaning for him, and he begins to appreciate the fact that our sun is the centre of a system similar to thousands of others, he begins to have some notion of the greatness of a God who is the spirit guiding and controlling all that. Yet as the world becomes more and more his world he realises to an ever increasing degree the greatness and incomprehensibility of the universe of which he is a part. If his increasing knowledge becomes better co-ordinated the system and unity of the whole become more evident to him. Hence God must have a place in it and not outside of it, or at least not separated from it. Even if he thinks of God as an absent creator still the world is His creation, and as such is related to Him.

In the meantime his moral code has been taking form and has perhaps undergone considerable modification. Dr. Rashdall says, "In the present state of ethical thought it will perhaps be unnecessary further to labour the point that our moral ideas are gradually developed in exactly the same sense, and in exactly the same way, as any other of the capacities of the human soul, and that this forms

no more reason for doubting their validity than in the parallel case of the multiplication table.¹⁵ Adults about the child in the person of parents, older brothers and sisters, teachers, perhaps employers, and especially neighbors have been communicating to him both directly and indirectly their moral codes and standards. Very often these have agreed with his inherent tendencies and have been accepted with little question unless challenged by some other adult, or unless two conflicting codes have come before his attention at the same time for acceptance or rejection. There have been other times, however, when his whole soul and body have cried out against the code he was asked to accept. For instance, his mother has insisted that he should weed the garden while his chums are playing ball on the adjoining lot. Ordinarily he has no objection to doing as his mother asks him, but here he has very decided desires of his own which clash with his willingness to obey. He may not consciously decide which he will do, but the fight is on between his obligation to his mother and the fulfilment of his own wishes. Whichever wins has not only gained the point for that time but has also begun a method of reacting ^{which} may easily grow into a habit.

At first sight we might be led to think that it was, in the case of the boy, merely a clash of two forces working on his nature, that is the amount of restraining in-

15. The Theory of Good and Evil II p.357. (Rashdall).

fluence his parents will have depends on how insistent they are on his obedience. But we find that very early in life there appears in every person a desire to do what is right because it is right, rather than because of any consequences which will follow. The child, for instance, feels that he must follow a certain course of action because his parents expect him to do so, rather than because they apply compulsion. The response of personality to personality is beginning. If the parents have taken the trouble to discuss with their child the problems which face him in adjusting himself to the home and its occupants, he will soon form general ideas which in turn will affect all his actions.

When he passes out into the wider world of school and society he will find these general principles and ideas a great help to him. Here he finds that others are not always as considerate of him as were the members of his immediate family. Less allowance is likely to be made for his failures. The moral codes of others differ more from his than did those of his parents. New knowledge brings up questions of ever-widening implications. Clashes arise between his desires and those of other individuals, between his will and the will of the small groups of which he is a part, and between his desires and will and the plans and purposes of the gradually larger groups with

which he becomes associated. His horizon widens and his world grows until, finally, he is faced with his own relationship to the whole universe and deity. In other words, his moral code, his religious beliefs, and his knowledge have grown up together.

Ancestors, elders, and comrades have all contributed to his general attitude toward life, including his religious beliefs and his sense of moral obligation. They have given him of what they possess. What he received was perhaps different from what they had, for it seems impossible to express accurately and exactly the deeper things of life. Even if they were expressed perfectly, only a perfect understanding would be capable of assimilating them. In actual life beliefs and emotions can be only imperfectly expressed in word, gesture, or action, and this imperfect expression, in turn, is never perfectly interpreted, and so the transmission from one person to another is always inexact, and sometimes there is a vast difference between the original belief or emotional attitude and the belief or attitude of the person affected. But, in general, the central beliefs and attitudes of one generation are communicated to the next with only slight modifications. However, no individual or group can communicate to others more than they themselves possess.

Any advance in insight or understanding, whether re-

religious, moral, economic, social, or scientific, comes only when a new idea finds a home in the mind of an individual. It may require sharing with others before it becomes valuable, but before it can even be shared it must be possessed by one or more individuals. It is at this point that we note the first and perhaps the most important difference in the approach of the two schools we are studying. The idealists claim that God, to use the religious term, communicates to the person prepared to receive it a new appreciation of reality either by direct revelation¹⁷ or through the medium of the ordinary laws of nature.¹⁸ The Chicago school hesitates to postulate God in this sense, and its supporters attempt to account for the new ideas solely through the development of the individual in contact with his environment - refusing to admit that God, or the supernatural, is part of that environment.¹⁹

In the actual experience of the race it appears that as soon as primitive man was able to form a definite idea of the mysterious unknown which surrounded him and to interpret the more familiar facts in their wider bearing, he thought of the world as peopled by spirits whose usual abode was some particular object or whose usual manifest-

17. The Faith of a Moralist I p. 223. (Taylor).

18. The Nature of Deity p. 137. (Turner)

19. Religion p. 166. (Ames).

ation was in some particular event. Naturally those objects and events which affected his own welfare came in for most consideration. Objects such as those from which he secured his food supply, the fruit of the ground and the products of the hunt; events such as the coming of spring with its new life; storms, thunder, earthquakes all caught his attention and aroused his wonder. Events in life such as birth, sickness, and death also demanded interpretation. He conceived of all these as being the effects of the influence of some spirit or spirits. It is only natural that he should treat such beings as influenced by the same things which influenced him, and so the gods were necessarily "men writ large."

Mrs. Curti in speaking of the way in which children acquire religious ideas says, "Piaget has shown that the young child is not only illogical in his general manner of thinking, but that the special concepts which he has are vague, unanalyzed, and contradictory. He does not at first even distinguish between himself and the world, or realize that his thought is merely subjective activity of his own, powerless to affect objects except through action. He thinks at first that his thought can influence events, that the sun and moon and wind, the rivers, trees, and rain, exist for his benefit. Later, leaving the stages of animism, he believes still in an artificialist explan-

ation of the world- that all things were made by men and for men. And when he acquires religious ideas he endows God with the power of human beings. It is only with great difficulty that the child finally arrives at the notion that objects and events are related independently of human beings.²⁰

In the meantime, to return to our study of the race, tribal customs had been established, and it was usually as a member of the group rather than as an individual that he took part in the performance of the sacred rites through which the tribe attempted to establish contact with the gods or to appease them. It was more often than not the tribal rather than his own individual interests which were sought, and sometimes the gods were invoked to decide whether he as an individual had fulfilled all his obligations as a member of the tribe. Or again, a decision as to the rights of one individual in reference to another was sought from the god or gods. Thus early we find religion and morality overlapping.

In both religion and morality the standards of the group became to a very large extent the standards of the individual, but even in the days when tribal solidarity was most pronounced there were times when certain individuals were convinced that they should not or would not obey

20. Child Psychology p. 508. (Curti).

the tribal mandate or custom. Sometimes this rebellion was the result of mere personal whim which produced painful reactions with consequent submission; sometimes it was recognised by others that the opposition was well founded and they accepted the new idea and supported the rebel. Advance lay along this line, and again the central question arises. Is this merely a question of trial and error, or is there direction by an unseen influence? Is it merely materialistic evolution or does a spiritual force guide it?

When animism gave place to theism and the spirits of particular trees became tree-gods, the gods were very anthropomorphic and were often considered to be related in families or in political units. Out of these ideas arose the thought of a hierarchy of gods and by varied routes the idea of one chief god and finally of one god only was reached. In some cases the other gods took subordinate positions and then were gradually degraded until they became mere agents or modes of expression of the one great spirit. In other cases the hopes and aims of the tribe became centred in its god. While they admitted that other tribes had, and, indeed, should have their own gods, still they themselves could have but one god. This god was usually as in the case of the Hebrews, at first confined to the land of the people. Gradually he came to be conceived as

having power beyond that land and over people other than his own, especially in matters which affected his own people. For instance, other nations were spoken of as sent by Jehovah to invade the land of Palestine to punish the Hebrews for their forgetfulness of Him. From this point the extension of the domain of the tribal god to the whole world was not difficult, and the god of the Hebrews became the God of all the universe.

While these advances in religious concepts were taking place the tribes were, in many cases, being consolidated into nations, and tribal morality was giving place to national morality. Nations met nations in both war and peace, and codes of international ethics arose. Often these differed materially from the ethics within the nation as applied to its own citizens, but gradually we are seeing the emergence of universal ethics.

Side by side with this widening of the sphere of religion and morality we find the growth in importance of the individual. At first he was almost entirely a part of his clan or tribe with few individual rights or privileges. As he gained more independence and developed more individual personality, the question of his rights and obligations became a live one. The question was not merely that of his relation to his tribe or nation, but was also that of his relation to his god or gods. Was he free to choose

his own course or "ought" he to be loyal to his country was a question which called for a decision under a variety of circumstances where his own interests and the welfare of his nation were not seemingly coincident. Again, when he became conscious of his own failure to meet the requirements of his religion or measure up to his ideals the question arose. Could he have done otherwise? Or can he regain his lost religious status through his own actions; or is it entirely a matter of God's favor; or is a combination of the two necessary?

In Homer's Iliad the various humors of the actors are accounted for by the intervention of the various gods, and the success or failure of a particular warrior is accredited to the presence or absence of a particular god. The Persians explained the struggle between good and evil in the world as the struggle between Ahura Mazda, the god of righteousness, and Ahriman, the god of evil. Each of these had their followers in the spirit world as well as on the earth. To those who placed their faith in monotheism this solution was debarred, and increased difficulty was encountered when the one god was conceived as omnipotent and omniscient, and, especially, when the Platonic doctrine that God is good and as such can be the author of no evil had also been accepted as basic. Professor Hobhouse, in speaking of this, says there were two methods

of solution open. "The first was to deny the reality of evil, the second was to insist on the absolute right of the Creator to do what he would with his own. --- Both explanations have held an important place in dogma. According to Augustine, evil has no positive and substantial existence. It is only 'a privation of good', or, by a swift change of thought, it is the dark color that throws up the light, --- It is well to remark that these two views are in essence quite opposed. In the one, evil has no positive character. It is a void, where good might be, but is not. In the other, there are things or persons that are evil in themselves - evil is so far positive; but their badness when viewed in connection with the whole scheme of things is held to have a good effect."²¹

Coupled with this question is that of human freedom. Did God create man and leave him free to err? If so, does not that freedom limit God? If, on the other hand, man is completely determined by God, and he sins, God is the author of sin. The contrast between God's greatness and man's feebleness made way for the idea that sin could be atoned for and forgiven only through God's free gift or the atonement offered by the death of Christ, who in some way was both God and man. Various interpretations of this atonement were offered. At one extreme was the idea that

21. Morals in Evolution p. 429. (Hobhouse).

Satan had, through man's sin, gained a certain control over the human race, and the death of Jesus was a ransom paid to him. Then there was the idea of a grieved God who had to be placated. And finally, the idea that God was in Christ, striving to reveal to man His infinite love. But whatever the specific interpretation, one thought was central - the initiative was from God. Man was given so little part at one time that he could not even accept the free gift of God unless the Spirit of God led him to do so. But man has become gradually more insistent upon his own ability until in some quarters God is left out of account altogether and His existence denied.

In the meantime, many of the best minds had been wrestling with the question of the basis of religious beliefs and the ground of moral obligation. For many generations the arguments were largely formal, but recent scientific investigations have discovered so many new facts about human beings and the world in which they live that an almost completely new approach has been made available and, indeed, necessary. A better understanding of the details of natural causation made the old naive interpretations untenable in the form in which they were held. Two methods of dealing with these older interpretations have been open. They could be discarded entirely, or they could be modified and perhaps enlarged so as to make room for the later sci-

entific discoveries. The idealist schools chose the latter while the Chicago school decided to try a new start from the discoveries made, but seem to have kept in mind the values appreciated by clear thinkers of every shade of opinion and have tried to conserve or reach these by a different route. The two schools are agreed that the findings of scientific investigations must be accepted if properly authenticated. They also agree that the values of religion should be conserved. They differ widely, however, in the method by which they would accomplish this end. The difference in method is based on a difference in interpretation of the basic facts of science, religion, and morality. To one the world is the expression or manifestation of God, to the other God is the idealization of discovered and accepted values.

Chapter III

Fact and Value

Before proceeding to a study of the relationship of God ^{to} the physical and moral universe it will be necessary to consider the relationship of fact and value. At the outset of such an enquiry we are faced with the question as to the criterion by which we are to judge what is fact. In the physical world, "sense furnishes a standard of appeal which seems to be external to thinking, and by which the results of thinking have to be corrected."²² The finest theory may come to grief because the actual experience of sense presents data which contradict it. On the other hand, "in any bit of what we call sense-experience --- we find the given, or received, and the interpretative work of mind on the datum inextricably complicated."²³ This latter is plainly illustrated when we look at a picture which is really an arrangement of colour on a flat surface, but we see, it may be, beautifully moulded features and perfect form. We see, subject of course to faulty interpretation, what the picture was intended to represent - the

22. The Faith of a Moralist II pp. 214-5. (Taylor).

23. Ibid. pp. 217-8.

actual before it was conveyed to canvas or paper. It is only a few years since there was a very heated controversy over the objective existence of secondary qualities. Did color, for instance, actually exist in the object? Or was it merely an effect produced on the organs of sight? It seems to be generally admitted now that primary and secondary qualities are inseparable; that one is fact as much as the other, and that both are found in the object by the percipient.

When we come to the question of such qualities as beauty a new division arises. Allowing that color, odor, form, etc. are there as witnessed by the senses, are we justified in saying that the beauty which is a part of what we attribute to the flower is actually a part of the flower, or is it something which we bring to the interpretation? In other words does value inhere in objects, or is it something purely subjective which the subject adds to his interpretation of the object more or less at will?

Perhaps a definition of value would help us here. Professor Turner says, "That has value which in the first instance is capable --- of satisfying desire."²⁴ And again, "Subjectively, in the first place, value is the attribute of whatever yields satisfaction in itself, or is a means thereto; objectively, on the other hand, since we inter-

24. The Philosophic Basis of Moral Obligation p.141. (Turner)

pret desire always as an indication of some defectiveness, value is the capacity to produce or to offer completion or perfection either wholly or in part.²⁵ Thus the term value indicates a relation. It is value for some one or for some purpose. Hence value implies a subject for whom it is valuable. It would appear then that value must be inherent in something outside of that subject, since a subject could scarcely bring to a situation that which would without outside aid complete itself if it were previously incomplete.

Turning again for a moment to our illustration of the flower, we find that there are persons who are color blind and to whom the different colors bring no sense impressions. We do not on that account say that the colors do not exist. We rightly conclude that the organs of sight in a few particular individuals are defective. So, too, with beauty - everyone has not the same power of appreciation. Very often an individual brings to a situation a host of memories and associations which affect the interpretation and appreciation. Some of us, on the other hand, seem strangely lacking in our powers of appreciation of beauty, music, etc. This does not say that those who see more than we do have brought to the situation that which they see. It will not perhaps be out of place here to

25. The Philosophic Basis of Moral Obligation p. 179. (Turner).

remind ourselves that it is, after all, very difficult, in fact, impossible to draw a sharp line between what a person brings to a situation and what he finds there. Every event is an interaction. All I am anxious to do here is to insist that value as a part of the situation is dependent on the objective fact, as well as upon the subjective appreciation. If there were no objective fact there could be no value. Someone might ask, what about the beauties of a mirage? The mirage is plainly a delusion. That which appears to be there is not actually there. Nevertheless the mirage is an objective fact in that it can be seen by most people under the same conditions. The delusion, in so far as it is a delusion, is a delusion of the senses rather than a misjudgment of value.

Is value, then, some quality added to the other qualities of the object? Is beauty, for instance, something other than, and added to, the color, arrangement, and form of the flower? No, beauty in this case, or value in general, is not an added quality in the same sense that color, shape, and odor and qualities. Value is inherent in the object in virtue of its "capacity to produce or to confer completion of perfection." It is functional rather than qualitative. Nor are the commonly accepted values such as truth, beauty, mercy, love, etc. valuable as abstractions or universals. It is as these are embodied in objects - active

in situations that they are valuable. "What is really meant when truth is called a value is that knowledge of the true is good, and lack of that knowledge is bad, and false conceit of it, acceptance of the false as true, worst of all."²⁶

The subject which needs completion and the object which possesses the capacity to complete it must come together before value can come into its full actuality.

In another sense values are universals and the existents in which they inhere are valuable because these values are present, and we are justified in speaking of the values as such. As Professor Taylor says, "'Mercy is good' does indeed mean more than 'this, that, and the other merciful acts are good'; it means that these acts are good not incidentally, because, for example, they happen to have been also pleasant or profitable, but because they are merciful, and for no other reason. But the statement does not mean that mercy is good, apart from its exercise in act."²⁷ Thus one might say that mercy is good wherever found, but is never found apart from some act.

Again, I believe that Professor Taylor is right in claiming, "that in all such judgments of value the reference \propto to personal activity is always more or less explic-

26. The Faith of a Moralist I p. 39. (Taylor).

27. Ibid p. 42.

itly present."²⁸ That is, in addition to being always found conjoined with some existent, value is value for some person or persons. It might be claimed that an improvement on, or a part for, a machine contributed to its completion, and this is indeed true, but the completion of the machine in turn is measured by its capacity for supplying the needs of persons. Now persons vary exceedingly and what would be of utmost value to one might be of little value to another because the other did not require that particular contribution toward his completeness. There are some values such as, truth, beauty, moral integrity, and love which seem almost always appropriate, but even for these there may be occasions when their absence is better than their presence. For instance, a rogue or mentally deranged person is often more dangerous in the degree to which he possesses these qualities which in the ordinary person would add to his usefulness. Even in such cases the values are real but misused. Thus when we speak of the "conservation of values" we are faced with the question of meaning. If we say that by values we mean that which will complete some personality, we may be given the reply that the completion of one particular personality may mean the depletion of another, or may even endanger a whole group. While I doubt very much whether the completion of one individual,

28. The Faith of a Moralist I p.46. (Taylor).

in the highest sense of the word "completion" will ever eventually injure anyone else, still, in actual life we are frequently forced to decide which of two persons shall be benefited in a particular way, and sometimes it seems as though our own personal development must be sacrificed in order that a particular need in social advancement may be met. In our reasoning we are at length driven to the point where we must take the stand that ultimate value is that which will add to the development or completion of the whole. In addition, we will have to admit that there are times when one value has to be sacrificed to retain or acquire another. The importance of individual values as they inhere in objects depends on the degree of their "capacity to confer completion" and on the degree to which the completion of a particular individual will add to the welfare of the whole.

We do find many important values in life which contribute to the completion of personality in all its phases, physically, intellectually, aesthetically, morally and religiously. These values are inextricably bound up with the facts of life, and any explanation of the universe must take them into account. As Professor Taylor contends, "We are from the first creatures with a moral²⁹ as well as a physical 'environment', and the values of the moral

29. I would add religious as well.

life are themselves constituents of the environment, not afterthoughts, or 'psychic additions', of our own personal creation.³⁰ We cannot accept the universe as a physical system merely and leave out of account that which gives meaning to it. Nor can that meaning be interpreted in terms of mere physical well-being alone. The, as we consider, "higher" values must be accorded a place, and receive an explanation.

30. The Faith of a Moralist I p.86. (Taylor).

Chapter IV

God and the Physical Universe

Professor Turner, an idealist, invades the realist field and accepts the latest findings of science regarding the mechanical determination of the physical world. He points out³¹ that the concept of the "atomic units of the material world as infinitesimal spheres of almost infinite hardness immersed as it were in an ocean of fluid energy" has been superseded by the idea that there is nothing static in the universe in the sense of being void of energy. He says, "The passivity of the static condition is altogether illusory; for it is due not to the absence or the suspension of active forces, but to their continuous (though for the time being exactly balanced) opposition. The static, i.e., in any ultimate sense of the term implying total absence of force or energy never exists; no element in the whole of reality is ever at bottom passive or inert. Reality is dynamic, and abhors a sinecure."³² Beginning with the smallest particle of matter as dynamic and continually interacting with the whole of nature, he develops his theory of the relationship of each individual to the whole. He

31. *The Philosophic Basis of Moral Obligation* p. 101. (Turner)

32. *Ibid.* p. 101.

accepts Dr. Whitehead's statement that "each object is in some sense ingredient throughout nature,"³³ The simplest unit yet discovered is exceedingly complex and is dynamic. Into every combination which it enters it takes this dynamic. As these combinations of the simpler units become more complex they include more of the dynamic.

Each unit includes a part of the whole and is related to all the rest externally. As simpler units become organised into more complex bodies more of the whole is included in the more complex body. In the interaction between the simpler unit and the whole the simpler unit is almost entirely determined from without. While it influences the whole, its influence is almost infinitesimal. The more complex the organisation becomes, the more it becomes self-determined and the greater the share it has in determining the remainder of the whole. Below the level of life the organisation is comparatively simple and the outer determination almost complete. In the lower living organisms the organisation is still quite simple. Professor Turner insists that there is no break between so-called inert matter and the lower living organisms. It is simply that, as the organisation becomes more complex, the elements which all along tended to become stable in each organis-

33. The Concept of Nature p. 145. Quoted by Professor Turner in The Philosophic Basis of Moral Obligation. p. 104.

ation have reached such a complexity that the organism shows that it is looking after itself to some extent. As the organisation proceeds still farther, the living organism displays more and more self-directing characteristics and exhibits more complete dominance over its parts. It is still determined by the whole, but more of the whole is contained within itself and thus it is becoming more self-determined with each addition to its complexity.

There is throughout the whole universe law which is inexorable. It is the presence of law which makes the universe itself and all the subordinate systems possible. The rule of law is not evaded as the systems become more complex. The more complex they become the more dependent they are on law. It gives them internal control and makes it possible for them to adjust themselves to the determination from without. Law simply signifies that the whole continuously functions in a specific way. It is reliable and not capricious.

Complexity of organisation increases and new elements appear as a result, until the level of consciousness, and finally, of self-consciousness is reached. At the latter level one or two things appear which mark it off from all others. In the first place, we have here the power to "look before and after". That is, both past and future can to some extent be brought into the present. The indi-

viduals' response to a certain situation is not necessarily a mere spontaneous reaction to the one circumstance. He can compare this with other occasions in the past and can judge the probable effect of a present action on the events of the future. He can also, in the second place, through communication with his fellows, gain by their experience. The records of history open out a great field of study to him. His understanding of the laws of nature make it possible for him to use them for his own purposes. In other words, he is able partially to dominate his environment. The lower organisms dominate the parts within their own organisation, but now through the power of ideation man is able to understand and control to a limited extent not only himself but also his environment. He is still limited and subject to determination by the whole, but he has acquired a degree of self-determination and freedom entirely foreign to the lower organisms.

Thus far in this chapter I have given a brief and I fear a quite inadequate outline of Professor Turner's general position on this question. Up to this point, I am sure that Professor Ames would raise very little, if any, objection to the hypothesis as put forward by Professor Turner, but Professor Turner advances a further argument with which Professor Ames certainly would not agree. He points out that the simple mechanical devices

of everyday life are quite easily seen to be mechanical and the product of human mind and skill, but as they become more complex and autonomous the fact that they are the result of man's thinking and skill is less self-evident. At the same time, when it is understood that they are the product of man's ingenuity, we are all the more deeply impressed with the ability of the mind or minds which could have planned and produced such delicate and intricate devices. The more marvelous the machine the greater must have been the intelligence responsible for its production.

Professor Turner again points out that to the minds of savages "all complex autonomous mechanism must appear to be finally self-explanatory and self-maintaining, not because it is really so, however, but simply because the task of tracing the actually dominant mind is far beyond their ability."³⁴ He uses these as arguments to support his contention that the universe implies a dominating mind. The universe in its working is subject to law. It is vast and, to us, apparently self-explanatory and self-maintaining, but that is only because it is so far beyond our comprehension that we are unable to see the dominance of mind, in the same way that the savage or child fails to detect the mind behind the mechanism of one of our great

34. *Personality and Reality* p. 148. (Turner).

machines. This argument differs from that of design, as traditionally formulated, in that the more perfect and explicit the design the more easily the hand of the designer is detected, whereas, in the case of the machine, the more nearly the machine is autonomous the less the dominating mind is revealed; and so it is to be expected that, in the case of the universe which so far surpasses any man-made mechanism, the presence of mind would not be easily detected, but this at the same time testifies to the greatness of the mind responsible for it.

This argument supports the view, that there is a dominant mind in the world somewhat in the sense that mind is dominant in persons, except that the "Supreme Self is the irresistibly dominating factor"³⁵ in the universe, whereas, the dominance of the human mind over even the actions of the person himself is never complete. Professor Ames, on the other hand, while he speaks of God as 'personal' means something quite different from what the idealists mean by personal. He says, "The conception of God as personal is the same in principle as the conception of a group as personal, for example, a corporation or a state."³⁶ And again, "Each class in a school possesses an individuality to which the members manifest loyalty

35. The Nature of Deity p. 26. (Turner).

36. Religion pp. 166-6. (Ames).

and reverence. That individuality has a certain objectivity and permanence above and beyond any particular persons within it. In a sense it transcends them. If this be the nature of God as the Ideal Socius, then he too has at least such reality and objectivity. He is the Soul of the world in which all other selves live and move and have their being."³⁷ It is evident that for Professor Ames the personality of God depends on the personality of humans, while for Professor Turner the personality of humans is the highest known result of the personality of the Supreme Self, or God. Professor Ames takes the discovered values of the world, and grouping them together, he personifies them, and calls them God, but for him the world is basic; God depends on the world. Professor Turner also begins with the world as the material from which we must begin our investigation and which we must ever take into consideration, but to explain the world he finds the concept of a supreme, dominating self as the guiding spirit the most satisfactory.

Personally I believe that Professor Ames and those who agree with him are, in their attempt to keep close to life and to admit nothing which cannot be discovered through scientific investigation, shutting themselves out from an explanation of the facts of life which has enriched

37. The New Orthodoxy p. 53. (Ames).

both religion and morality in the past, and which is still capable of making room for all the fact discovered by empirical investigation and at the same time is capable of giving a deeper meaning to our present day religious beliefs and a firmer ground for our sense of moral obligation.

There is only one point in Professor Turner's argument which seems to me questionable, and that is where he says, "Now with regard to the physical universe I have argued that the divine transcendence is absolute. The perfection of its automatic mechanism eternally maintains its intricate processes, without any intervention or guidance being necessary other than that implied by its evolution; while its materiality precludes any participation in the divine nature as such."³⁸ I see no reason why he should take this ground. As I understand his argument, the Supreme Self is the principle in the universe which dominates the whole. It is within the universe and an integral part of it. The universe is for Professor Turner a real unity. The physical world is what it is because of the influence of the dominant Supreme Self. He says, in speaking of the "relation between the dominant personality and its physical environment," that "it implies that every material mechanism as such and in its essential characters, is in the end the expression of the activity of mind - the manifestation

38. The Nature of Deity p. 227. (Turner).

Of a form of reality which is, in principle if not in detail, one in its nature with the highest types of human experience."³⁹ In making the Supreme Self absolutely transcendent of the physical world he surely makes the division more marked than he himself considers it to be. The only sense in which such a sharp division is at all justifiable is that the physical world is incapable of apprehending itself, deity, or its relation to the universe of which it is a part. My own conviction is that God, or the Supreme Self, is immanent in all the universe, and is transcendent only in the sense of being dominant and as far surpassing any finite creature in goodness wisdom and love. To use Professor Turner's own phrase, He is "transcendent in"⁴⁰ these and other virtues.

39. Personality and Reality p. 125. (Turner).

40. The Nature of Deity p. 228. (Turner).

Chapter V

God and the Moral World

If the perfect mechanism of the physical world points to a Supreme Self as Creator, what shall we say of the evidence of the moral world? Throughout the last chapter we accepted the concept of the determination of the parts by the whole; each part at the same time shares with the remainder of the whole in the determination of each other part. "Determination, then, is universal; there is no escape from it in any way whatever; everything exists, and every process goes on, under its sway and as its manifestation. Attributed to the whole as such, it is absolute self-determination, - absolute freedom. Every finite real, on the other hand, is never more than partially self-determined; there is always present some degree of external determination, arising and proceeding from the action of the whole."⁴¹ The more complex and highly developed the organisation of the individual being, the more of the whole it contains within itself, hence the greater the degree of its self-determination.

The determination which is so evident below the level

41. *The Philosophic Basis of Moral Obligation* pp. 263-4. (Turner).

of consciousness still holds, in so far as the physical body with which every mind is so intimately associated is concerned. There is no difficulty in extending the idea of the dominance expressive of the Suprem Self throughout the realm of the living and human body including the brain and nervous centres. Some of our psychologists would claim that this assures us of complete determination since mind is merely a name for the systematic organisation of the higher responses of the more highly organised and developed regions of the brain and nervous system. But regardless of what may be the connection between brain and mind, or between body and spirit, there is no doubt that we all recognise in everyday practice the control of mind and will over the actions of the body, and as a result we assume that each individual is morally responsible for his choices and decisions and the actions arising therefrom.

A man who wilfully injures another is held to be morally culpable. If, on the other hand, he has been instrumental in injuring another through circumstances which were beyond his control, say, through the carelessness of the other, he is freed from blame although the results may be equally disastrous. As we saw in an earlier chapter the moral standards of the individual have grown up in contact with, and largely as the result of the influence

of, a social environment. As time passed the standards of the group gradually developed. The ethics of the cave-man were largely individualistic. Such standards were possible for him as long as he had plenty of room so that he did not need to have much intercourse with his neighbors. As population increased contacts with others became more frequent. Gradually man has learned to live with his neighbors, and while there are still many problems unsolved in our present civilization we must remember that caveman ethics in the midst of our present density of population would be unthinkable. As the occasion arose for man to learn to live with his fellows he seems to have risen to the occasion, even if, as yet, the lesson has not been completely mastered.

Not only has individualistic and tribal morality been displaced to some extent by a morality more suited to the changed conditions of life, but religious beliefs have also undergone a change. Theoretically at least, the highest ethical and religious standards of today accept a universe and a universal community of personal human fellowship. In practice we have sometimes lost sight of these ideals. This sets us a problem. While progress would point to the dominance of a Supreme Self who is guiding a moral universe, the failures in personal and social adjustment seem to signify either indifference on the part of the Supreme

Self, if there be one, or inability on his part to control the universe he has created, or the entire lack of any such Supreme Self.

Self-conscious human beings through their powers of ideation and reason are able, to a limited degree, to dominate their environment as well as to determine, again to a limited degree, their own actions. They are akin to the Supreme Self. They share with that Self, very partially of course, the capacities to understand truth, appreciate beauty, and love goodness. These capacities can be used to determine the actions of the individuals themselves, to influence those about them, and to increase their own freedom. The possession of these capacities and this freedom brings with it moral obligation to use it properly. In the simpler physical units, as we saw, determination is almost entirely from without, and until consciousness appears self-determination is very limited. With the appearance of self-consciousness determination takes partially the form of moral obligation. Within ever widening limits the developing human being chooses what he will do. This freedom of choice is always conditioned by the capacities of the individual and by the environmental circumstances, both of which are in turn partially determined by his own past actions. If I have never taken music lessons I cannot sit down at the piano and play the

compositions of Beethoven or Bach. But even if I have the ability to play I cannot use that ability if there is no piano available for my use. But having the ability and the instrument at hand I may exercise my freedom of choice by accepting the invitation to provide entertainment for the assembled guests or by declining to do so.

This power of self-determination makes it possible for human beings to disobey the known laws of both the physical and the moral universe. In addition to the wilful disobedience, we are quite sure that there is a lack of complete understanding of many of the laws of the physical world, to say nothing of the almost complete ignorance of the laws of mind and spirit. Freedom and the moral code grow up at the same time and in much the same way. The sense of responsibility makes itself felt as the consciousness of ability increases. As mentioned previously, much of our personal understanding of the facts and many of our attitudes toward these facts come indirectly or directly from other human beings who have already acquired certain knowledge and skill as well as experience of life which they are willing to share with others less advanced, sometimes because of affection for the learner, sometimes because they look upon such a task as part of their life-work, and sometimes for a pecuniary consideration. Often, no doubt, there is a combination of these motives. But,

whatever the motive, the fact remains that the knowledge and attitudes acquired in the evolution of the race are imparted to and engendered in each rising generation. Every individual is a part of the universe and as such is still determined by the whole, even although that determination is with humans not so apparent. The Supreme Self still dominates, but in a different way. Physical determination is gradually displaced by mental guidance and spiritual fellowship. The energy which has been present from the simplest unit has been developed and guided through instincts to desires disciplined by reason. The same tendencies which caused the simpler organisms to preserve and propagate themselves are still present and find expression in the desire not merely to preserve but also to better the individual, And also in consideration for other individuals as part of a larger unit. Physical limitations guide the expression of mental activity to some extent, but it would seem that there are other determining factors as well.

Let me quote again Professor Taylor where he says, "We are from the first creatures with a moral as well as a physical 'environment', and the values of the moral life are themselves the constituents of the environment, not afterthought, or 'psychic additions,' of our own personal creation."⁴² The world in which we live is not merely a

42. The Faith of a Naturalist I p. 20. (Taylor).

physical world. It is a world of moral struggle and of moral values. "The universe is not perfect in the sense that it contains nothing but undiluted enjoyment. We degrade it to a child's paradise in so conceiving it. It is not perfect in the sense that there is no evil in it; for it is equally childish to imagine that good can exist for a finite creature except as the conquest of evil."⁴³ Even Sir Henry Jones, who suggests that the progress of the world is a "movement not from imperfection to imperfection - the pursuit of a receding ideal with which ethical teaching has made us familiar - but from perfection to perfection" a movement which is positive attainment all the way,"⁴⁴ argues thus, "God has called into being the best possible world: the best possible world is a world in which the conditions of moral choice and therefore of moral evil exist."⁴⁵

Professor Ames says, "The religious man knows there are evils in the world, that justice is not complete, that tragedy and suffering exist."⁴⁶ Professor Turner, after admitting the existence of moral evil, states, "Moral evil, in the first place, - the deliberate choice of evil ends

43. The Idea of God p. 407. (Pringle-Pettison).

44. A Faith that Enquires p.208. (Jones)

45. Ibid. p. 189.

46. Religion p. 146. (Ames).

and the performance of evil acts - is the logical corollary of moral freedom."⁴⁷ A world would not be a place where morality was possible without the freedom of choice which implies the freedom to choose wrongly. It seems to me that it takes little observation to impress upon us the fact that we do sometimes choose wrongly - I mean not merely through ignorance, but wilfully. It is this power to choose - to make mistakes as well as to choose wisely - which makes the difference between mechanical determination and the "ought" of moral obligation. While we have this power to choose wrongly there are about us many influences which tend to assist us to act wisely. Professor Ames holds, "It is well known that the approval or disapproval of the group is the most controlling influence in human behaviour."⁴⁸ This approval or disapproval is the result of the experience of the race, and if Professor Turner is right in saying, "all evil is in the long run self-destructive,"⁴⁹ then the approval of the group will eventually attach to the good and disapproval to the bad.

The experience of the race would lead to the "finding" of moral values, as Professor Taylor expresses it, in deeds of moral worth in the same way that the eye and mind trained

47. The Philosophic Basis of Moral Obligation p. 273. (Turner).

48. Religion p. 293. (Ames).

49. The Nature of Deity p. 109. (Turner).

to appreciate beauty find it in the rose or the sunset. 50
Now if these moral values are to be found in the world as we know it, and if evil is self-destructive, we are forced, in our explanation of that world, to take account of these facts. The physicist may deal with matter and motion, and as far as the simpler units are concerned he may be able to offer a fairly satisfactory explanation, but the biologist who has discovered organisms exhibiting special characteristics which are best expressed under the name life, and which the findings of physics do not explain, cannot leave these out of account. They cannot be placed on one side as though they did not exist. Their very presence demands an explanation. Their presence shows that the environment in which they exist is an environment which probably favors their existence, or to say the least, which tolerates their presence. So with moral values - if our world favors their existence then that characteristic of our world requires an explanation.

It would appear that what is true regarding the existence of moral values in our world is also true of religious beliefs and practices. Religion seems to have been a part of man's reaction to his universe since earliest times and continues to be so today among all classes of people, learned and ignorant, rich and poor, those living

in crowded cities and those in lonely places, those whose skins are white and those whose skins are red, or black, or yellow, or brown. Occasionally an individual or even a group will declare that he or they have no religion, but usually investigation shows that the revolt is against some particular form of religion or some particular religious organisation rather than against religion as such. These are facts which cannot be merely pushed aside if we wish to give a reasonable explanation of the world as we know it.

The existence and development of moral standards and religious beliefs and attitudes in the world as we know it demand an explanation just as much as the existence and development of law and organisation in the physical realm, or the existence of sin in the moral realm do. And as Professor Taylor says, "There must be at least as much to learn about the inmost character of the real from the fact that our spiritual life is controlled by such-and-such definite conceptions of good and right, such-and-such hopes and fears, as there is to learn from the fact that the laws of motion are what they are, or that the course of biological development on our planet has followed the lines it has followed."⁵¹

The explanation I am offering is that the Supreme
51. The Faith of a Moralist I p. 66. (Taylor)

Self, of whose existence and dominance we have seen evidence in the physical world, is also present and dominant in the moral world. Now, instead of a perfectly adjusted mechanism, we have self-determining individuals capable, to a limited degree, of understanding and responding to the Supreme Self and its manifestations. The dominance of the Supreme Self is still complete, but it acts in a different way. Professor Turner uses the familiar illustration⁵² of an expert chess player and an ordinary player to show how the Supreme Self determines the actions of human beings. There are rules of the game which each must observe. At the beginning of the game each is free to move as he wills in accordance with those rules, but as the game progresses the freedom of the expert increases while that of the ordinary player becomes more restricted as each move of his opponent and often of himself brings his defeat nearer. The expert dominates the play because of his superior understanding of the game. This no doubt illustrates the difficulty of finally frustrating the will of the Supreme Self, and shows that the Supreme Self, by closing one avenue, may force the human into another. But it also seems clear that the development of mind and reason in the finite self gives to the dominant Supreme Self an added opportunity and avenue through which to influence

52. The Nature of Deity pp. 187f. (Turner).

the finite self directly. The power of ideation and reason enables the finite individual to "think God's thoughts after Him." If the Supreme Self created or caused to evolve a mechanically perfect physical universe, it would be comparatively easy to assume, that he could make it possible for man to "find" values and discover reality in such a way that these values and this reality would guide men to an ever fuller participation in them, and I would like to suggest that the very point at which sin, the great disturber, enters is the point where we can find a clue to our solution.

Sin is the deliberate departure from our moral standards in actual practice. Its beginning is usually prefaced by the mental argument that what is contemplated is only a small departure. The small beginning may lead to straying far from the path acknowledged to be right. But whether that be true or not, any departure leads to self-condemnation. I am speaking now of sin in the sense of a moral lapse, either through doing what one knew to be wrong, leaving undone what he knows he ought to do, or choosing a second best course of action where a better was possible. Professor Taylor says, in this regard, "It is characteristic of the human sense of moral guilt that it involves condemnation of our own selves and of our own doings, and is thus radically different from any discontent with our sur-

roundings."⁵³ This implies that although it may be through the results which follow an act that we realise the fact of our sin, still it is not the results which are condemned but the act which led to these results. This is further evidence of the fact that the moral law is an actual part of our environment. Our concepts of it may differ, but its existence we must admit. It is sometimes argued that it is foolish to insist that such a moral law does exist because it is impossible to find any single act which is universally accepted as right or wrong. It would surely be equally permissible to argue that no such thing as ^{beauty} exists because there is no single expression of it which would be accepted as beautiful by every individual in every age. The fact that there is no normal human being without a moral code, and without a sense of moral obligation is surely sufficient evidence that a moral law exists.

The very presence of such a sense of moral obligation in the case of each individual points to the existence and influence of the Supreme Self as basis and guide of the moral universe in something the same way that order, progress, and self-maintaining mechanism in the physical world point to the existence of mind as its creator. It is not necessary, for this argument, that the persons guided in this way should be conscious of such a Supreme Self

53. The Faith of a Moralist I p. 171 (Taylor).

or acknowledge his existence.

However, "for the work of life we need not only a vision of the good, but adequate motivation to live by that vision."⁵⁴ Wm. James has contended that Absolute Idealism affords an opportunity for taking a "moral holiday", on the grounds that if there is a Supreme Being who controls and guides the world, and if that world is "the best possible world", then man has neither need nor ability to work for or against moral progress. This charge is valid only if man is degraded to the level of a mechanism or an automaton. There is always a danger when stressing the greatness of the infinite, of losing sight of the freedom of man. Professor Pringle-Pattison, in speaking of freedom, says, "This freedom belongs to a self-conscious being as such, and is the fundamental condition of the ethical life; without it we should have a world of automata."⁵⁵

Wm James, in his endeavor to give reality to the moral struggle, turns to Pluralism as a solution. Life then becomes a struggle in which man can take sides, but in which victory for neither side is assured. It is a real struggle. This concept has been gradually modified by James' successors until Professor Ames can say, "The idea of God,

54. The Faith of a Moralist I pp. 213-4. (Taylor).

55. The Idea of God p. 292. (Pringle-Pattison).

when seriously employed, serves to generalize and idealize all the values one knows.⁵⁶ These values which we know and the ideals toward which we strive have, according to the Chicago school for whom Ames speaks, been evolved in the history of the world, and further development will come only through man's striving. Future progress is thus placed squarely on man's shoulders, and if responsibility is sufficient dynamic to elicit the necessary response we certainly have sufficient responsibility here. Some assurance that the task is not an impossible one will surely also be needed, especially as the values which are recognized by these and almost all other thinkers are such that many of them cannot be realized through long struggle and often after a long period of time. The fact that the values we now possess have evolved would go to show that the world has a place for them, but this same school does not hesitate to point to the pain and sin and evil in the world as evidence that the faith in an all wise and all loving God is not well founded. The same argument would apply to the evolution of values. Pain, suffering, sin, and death are all part of life and the world as we know it, and if their presence is sufficient reason for abandoning faith in a Supreme Being they also offer a severe challenge to the faith that the values we esteem are safe in such

56. The Psychology of Religious Experience. (Ames).

a world.

It is possible that the belief in a Supreme Being has been abandoned on other grounds than the presence of suffering and evil, and there are those who hold to a faith in the 'conservation of values' without a faith in a Supreme Being. Such a faith is no doubt tenable, and there are many influences in the world which tend to support the moral standards we have, but if Absolute Idealism affords an excuse for a moral holiday, surely a belief that God is merely the generalization and idealization of the values we know affords an occasion for temporal self-indulgence.

One might place side by side with this contention of Mr. James the words of Sir Henry Jones, an outstanding exponent of Absolute Idealism, who says, "Religion has always impassioned the spirit of man, and added consequence to the things which he sanctions or condemns. It concentrates man's faculties, rouses them to the utmost exercise of their power, excludes hesitation and expels alternatives. Not only does it possess the whole man, but it leads him onward under the belief that the ultimate forces of his world are at his back. Hence, when he acts 'in the name' of religion he knows neither inner nor outer restraint. The impelling, propulsive power of religion is supreme: the passions are at its service."⁵⁷ While Sir Henry Jones here qualifies religion in no way, and while in the par-

57. *A Faith that Enquires* p. 29. (Jones).

agraphs which follow the above quotation he mentions some of the errors religion has made, still in the expression "the belief that the ultimate forces of his world are at his back," he indicates one of the central tenets of his own faith, and it would seem that the lack of this very faith is one of the weaknesses of a religion such as that of Professor Ames and his associates.

There is a wide gulf between the idea of an Absolute or Supreme Self who so determines the progress of the world that man loses all freedom and thus all responsibility and that of man as the only determiner not only of his own destiny but of that of the world as well. Surely there is room here for faith in a Supreme Self and also belief in man's freedom and moral responsibility. Sir Henry Jones expresses it thus, "Man is free but not isolated; he loses himself in his God, but only because in that act he has found himself. At the heart of morality there is a positive relation to the universe and its divine principle; at the heart of religion there is a limitless exaltation of the value of the finite personality and a deepening of the effective powers of individuality."⁵⁸ The position of the group of idealists we are studying is that with the appearance of consciousness a new relationship evolved, and that human beings share in the divine attributes in a way

58. A Faith that Enquires p. 125. (Jones).

that makes it possible for them to respond in a manner entirely different from the response of a mechanical device. Moral freedom, if misused, leads to moral degeneration and often to physical loss and suffering, but that does not do away with moral freedom. Moral freedom, if properly used, also leads to moral growth and, probably, in the long run, to physical and temporal well-being, although this does not necessarily follow, but man is still morally free. He "ought" to follow certain course, but he himself chooses whether he will do so or not. By this I do not mean to say that at any particular moment a man may do anything he desires, but rather that within a limited range, set largely by his own previous actions, he can make his choice. Our contention all along has been that while ultimately the Supreme Being guides and controls all human progress as well as the evolution of the physical world, still that guidance and control, in the case of human beings, is secured largely through the free and definite response of the individual himself.

But that response must be a response to some thing, or person, or spirit. As Professor Taylor expresses it, "A man cannot receive the power to rise above his present level from his own inherent strength, because the process is one of rising above himself, and, in the moral as in the physical world, you cannot lift yourself by the hair

of your own head."⁵⁹ Professor-Pringle-Pattison puts it even more positively when he says, "What I am concerned to emphasize is simply that, according to a doctrine of immanence rightly understood, Man's 'reach' as well as his 'grasp' must be taken into account; for the presence of the ideal in human experience is as much a fact as any other. It is, indeed, much more; it is the fundamental characteristic of that experience."⁶⁰ And again, "Whence, then, are these ideals derived and what is the meaning of their presence in the human soul? --- The presence of the ideal is the reality of God within us."⁶¹ It is true that the ideals of any one individual are acquired largely from his contacts with others, but any advancement in ideals must come from some source other than those individuals who are on the level from which the advance is made. It is a remarkable fact recognised by practically all psychologists that solutions to different problems which have defied the searcher, and new insights (in any field) often come suddenly and at times when active search has been abandoned. Regardless of the mechanism by which these may come there is no reason why, when on other grounds we are led to accept the idea of a Supreme Being, we should not

59. *The Faith of a Moralist* I p. 229. (Taylor).

60. *The Idea of God* p. 244. (Pringle-Pattison).

61. *Ibid.* p. 246.

conclude that these flashes of insight are a part of His method of guiding human beings to a more complete understanding of Himself and the universe. The mere presence of these wider visions does not compel those to whom they appear to accept them or be guided by them, but it does make possible a step forward which would otherwise have been impossible.

The Idealist position, if tenable, seems to offer a support to moral endeavor which cannot be found anywhere else, and throughout this thesis I have contended that such a position is tenable. The position I have taken is that the moral and religious as well as other values known to us have been discovered, not made, by man; that all lower forms are the basis on which higher ones evolve; that the physical world is the expression or manifestation of the Supreme Self and the necessary environment in which moral and religious values develop; that the physical world is directly and mechanically determined by the Supreme Self, but that when the level of self-consciousness is reached determination, while eventually complete, is secured through the development of self-determination whereby the finite individual partakes more and more of the infinite, and through an ever more fully developed personality responds willingly to the guidance of the Supreme Self through being attracted by that Self. This carries with it the

conviction that the values we have discovered are real values and their permanence, or the evolution from them of still higher values, is assured by the fact that "the ultimate forces of the universe are at their back." But these values become universally recognised and higher values appear only as we humans willingly and consistently follow the leading of the Supreme Self and appropriate those values which are within our grasp. Evidently we "ought" to co-operate with the Supreme Self, and so live that all may ever more fully share in the fellowship with that Self, and if we do co-operate we have the assurance that we do not labour alone.

The gradual and consistent increase in the value placed on the individual has, however, raised the problem of the "ultimate failure of some human lives."⁶² That is, there are some persons who wilfully and persistently refuse to respond to the wooing of the Supreme Self. Then there are those who have consistently followed the guidance of the best they knew, and who have met almost continuous disappointment and suffering, and some others who have persistently disregarded what they knew to be right and yet have prospered. Sir Henry Jones, in dealing with the first of these difficulties, says, "All would be well if, like some writers, we could be satisfied with a God

62. *A Faith that Enquires* p. 260. (Jones).

who, while not caring for the individual, cared for the species; or with a general triumph of the good. The conception of a God whose goodness, or power, or both, is limited might also satisfy. But we have rejected this facile solution of the difficulties. On the contrary, the scientific man would affirm that one genuine failure of the good, in any single life, deprives us of the right to be convinced of the divine perfection which we deem so essential to religion.⁶³

Sir Henry Jones does not hesitate to offer as a solution to this problem a faith in immortality. He even goes farther than that when he says, "It is not possible to maintain the limitless love and power of God if the soul be not immortal."⁶⁴ In so doing he bases his whole faith in his concept of God on the belief in immortality. He supports this contention as follows, "Man's rights spring neither from his discontent nor from his desires. They arise from his intrinsic nature, the final purpose of his life and of his world - namely, moral progress. This is the conception which we have throughout made our standard of values and source of rights. And here we come upon the crowning use of it. It means that man is immortal if immortality is a condition of the fulfilment of the purpose

63. A Faith that Enquires p. 260. (Jones).

64. Ibid. p. 267.

of God, as expressed in man's moral life and the world process."⁶⁵ Sir Henry Jones is quite/ convinced that immortality is such a condition. In closing the chapter he says, "God is. God is perfect. His lovingkindness and power are unlimited; and his greatest gift to man is the gift of the power, tendency, and opportunity to learn goodness. God's goodness being unlimited, the opportunity not made use of by man in the present life is renewed in another life, and in still another; till, at last, his spirit finds rest in the service of the God of Love. For my part, I wish for no stronger proof of the permanence of the spiritual process, and I ought not to care for aught beside; that supreme good involves every good."⁶⁶

While everyone would not care perhaps to go as far as Sir Henry Jones still we find Dr. Rashdall confirming such a claim in the words, "Only if we suppose that the present life of human beings has an end which lies in part beyond the limits of the present natural order, in so far as that order is accessible to present observation, can we find a rational meaning and explanation for human life as we see it; and by far the most natural and intelligible form of such a world end is the belief in immortality for

65. *A Faith that Enquires* p. 264. (Jones).

66. *Ibid.* p. 268.

the individual souls which have lived here."⁶⁷ And again, he says, "To those who have once accepted the rationality of things, and most emphatically to those who have once accepted faith in a personal God, the improbability that a being of such capacity should have been created to be simply the creature of a day, that 'cometh up, and is cut down, like a flower, and never continueth in one stay', has always invariably amounted to an absolute impossibility."⁶⁸ And once more, "For God to be loved he must be thought of as worthy of love, and it is difficult to believe that he is worthy of love if he wills such a world as ours except as a means to a better one, for those at least of his creatures who are worthy of it."⁶⁹

Professor Turner, too, supports this contention. "Alike in emotion, in knowledge, and in their resultant activities, there seem to be no bounds to the evolution of consciousness, once this has assumed the form of the rational self: so that it appears possible, or even necessary, for its ideational grasp of the nature of reality to develop further and further without meeting any insuperable barrier, apart of course from the final mystery of the how and why of the universe as such. Obviously this principle

67. The Theory of Good and Evil pp. 215-6. (Rashdall).

68. Ibid. p. 265.

69. Ibid p. 267.

cannot hold true of any individual self, unless that self is immortal; but apart from this consideration it is, I believe, fully justified both by the past history of knowledge and still more by the future promise and tendency of modern science."⁷⁰

Professor Pringle-Pattison, however, takes a slightly different view when he refers to George Adam Smith and says, "After arguing for the truth of the doctrine (personal immortality) as the outcome of the highest religious experience, he continues; 'Yet while this is true, it is well for us all sometimes to pitch our religious life in terms which do not include the hope of a future. Most of the crises of religious experience may be achieved, as some of the grandest Psalms fulfil their music, without the echo of one of the far-off bells of Heaven. A man may pass through the evangelical experiences of conversion, regeneration and redemption, without thinking any more of the future than a little child thinks, but only sure and glad that his Father is with him. The Old Testament is of use in reminding us that the hope of immortality is one of the secondary and inferential elements of religious experience.'"⁷¹

While each member of this group of idealists exhibits

70. *Personality and Reality* p. 94. (Turner).

71. *The Idea of God* p. 434. (Pringle-Pattison).

a slightly different attitude toward immortality, still the all accept the idea.

One might think that a belief in a Supreme Self dominating the world as we have outlined, and a belief that ultimately "good would triumph", if not in time, then in eternity, would furnish sufficient motivation to secure the desired response from human beings to the Supreme Self, but religion introduces another incentive through the idea of sin as a personal offence against a personal and loving God. If the order and mechanical organization of the physical world, and the presence of freedom and a sense of moral obligation in the moral world, both point to the influence of a Supreme Self, we are surely justified in testing this hypothesis by the pragmatic test of its results in life as well as by its logical consistency with the facts as we know them. If the moral law is the expression of the will of the Supreme Self, any infraction of that law is a sin against that Self, and if the whole evolution of the universe is the purpose of God working itself out, any failure to co-operate is a personal slight. Sin is, in this conception, not merely an infraction of an impersonal law, but is an offence against a personal deity. If we add to that the idea prevalent in many religions, and especially in Christianity, that the purpose of God includes the development and welfare of human beings,

sin is not only a breach of the will and command of a sovereign Being, but is also an act of the basest ingratitude. If we consider also the common idea that has received widespread acceptance, that sin is especially abhorrent to God because of His own purity and sensitivity to any departure from the best, sin takes on a still more heinous connotation. I quite agree with Professor Taylor that, "it is not --- theology which has contaminated ethics with the notion of sin; it is morality which has brought the notion into theology."⁷² But theology has given to the idea a new and deeper significance.

Here consciousness of sin or grief for it is insufficient unless that sin can be atoned for and forgiven. Man is already under obligation to live the best life he possibly can and so he can make no possible atonement for past failures. The Christian doctrine is that God freely forgives the sinner and assists him to overcome any effects the sin may have produced. He does this because He loves the sinner. This is not a mere overlooking of faults or failures. True forgiveness is only possible when the enormity of the offence is realised. As Professor Taylor expresses it, "We measure the moral nobility of the forgiveness by the magnitude of the fault to be forgiven. Forgiveness of injuries, prompted by love, is one thing;

72. The Faith of a Moralist I p. 169. (Taylor).

easy condonation based on contempt, a very different thing."⁷³ And he adds, "thus the Christian paradox that God is at once the supremely just and also the great forgiver of iniquities, so far from creating an ethical difficulty, is exactly what we should expect to find in a religion which has one of its roots in the ethical conviction of the absoluteness of moral 'values'".⁷⁴

His concept of God found expression in a form which man could understand and appreciate in Jesus of Nazareth, who lived in such a manner as to be at once a revelation of human possibilities, and at the same time a revelation of God's attitude toward man. He claimed to speak for God, whom he called and taught us to call Father. His attempt to interpret God as universal Love to all men met with opposition which led to his crucifixion. In his death, brought on by the hatred of his contemporaries who failed to appreciate his message, he prayed for the forgiveness of those who were putting him to death. No matter to what extent we may accept or reject the records of the facts of Jesus' birth, life, death and resurrection, and no matter what interpretation we may put on the facts, his claim that the Supreme Being is best characterised by the word "love" has been widely accepted, and is proving to be the

73. *The Faith of a Moralist* I p. 188. (Taylor).

74. *Ibid.* p. 191.

leaven which is gradually leavening our whole attitude toward both God and our fellowmen.

In the religious attitude toward the God who so loved that He spared no effort, and gave of the best He could give that man might know that love, and who freely forgives because He so loves, we seem to have a dynamic which is capable of inciting men to do what they "ought" to do. It is a faith or conviction that God is, that He is interested in our welfare, and that He is continually ready to help us to realise our highest ideals, which in turn have come from Him. In Him we and all else live and move and have our being. In Him are to be found in their most perfect form all values. The individual human being finds in Him that which will mean full completion. Perfect freedom is the possession of that degree of knowledge which would enable us to understand fully the mind and will of God, and the possession of a love which would inspire us to do that will, as we work with God in carrying out his eternal purpose. Physical determination and moral obligation would then be absorbed in loving fellowship.

Thus it ~~would~~ appear that there is nothing in the physical world, in morality, or in religion which is incompatible with the idea of a Supreme Self as the dominating Spirit of the universe; that such a concept does offer an explanation which promises to make room for all

the facts even if we do not understand all the details; and that a religious attitude toward such a Supreme Self, conceived as embodying Divine Love, unleashes an emotional dynamic which makes not only a moral life probable but moral regeneration possible. I thoroughly agree with Professor Taylor "that because our intellect is not creative of the universe, but receptive of a reality which it has to understand but does not freely create, our problem of interpreting that reality by theory is in principle like the evaluation of a 'surd'. We may, and should, make persistent efforts to carry the evaluation to a 'place' further than we have actually reached, but we can never expect to write down the 'last decimalfigure', or the 'last convergent'".⁷⁵

75. The Faith of a Moralist II pp. 411-2. (Taylor).