

RATIONALISATION, EDUCATION
AND SOCIAL MOBILITY

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to consider some of the consequences of rationalisation for stratification in Western industrial society with special reference to social mobility. The trend to rationalisation was first noted by Max Weber in his consideration of the development of capitalism. My aim is to show that this trend which has usually been seen as the basis for removing barriers to social mobility is itself the basis for the construction of new barriers to social mobility. This will necessitate a consideration of the general sociological orientation to social mobility, particularly as it has developed within the sociology of education in North America and Britain where education has come to be seen as the main avenue to movement within the social hierarchy.

To consider social mobility one must start with the fact of the high degree of inequality of opportunity in Western industrial societies. Natalie Rogoff has drawn up three patterns of opportunity: radical, moderate and conservative. (1) The radical pattern corresponds to a society where people of equal capacity are treated alike regardless of social origins. The conservative pattern corresponds to a society where opportunity shows no sensitivity to ability but rather decreases successively for less favourable class positions. The moderate pattern is,

(1) Rogoff, Natalie, "American Public Schools and Equality of Opportunity" in Education, Economy and Society, eds. Floud, Halsey and Anderson (Free Press, N. Y., 1961) pages 140-147.

of course, between the two where both ability and social class background have an influence. The patterns of opportunity in industrial countries are moderate but tend towards the conservative rather than the radical pattern. (2) Why should this be? Why is it that the influence of social origins are so hard to eradicate even from modern technological societies?

Before I attempt to give some of the answers one point should be made about the question asked. The whole idea of 'equal opportunity' stems largely from the rise of liberalism in the history of Western society. Before that time the 'natural order' was one in which ascribed status, as opposed to achieved status, was the basis of social life. In societies where vertical mobility was well nigh impossible it follows that an ideology such as the 'divine right of kings' would be largely accepted. With the rise of liberalism came the new ideology of the basic equality of all men and thus the stress on equality of opportunity as an ideal in this new society. We can go further than this and say that the concept of equality of opportunity reflects the individualist basis of liberalism. It is a view of man transcending his repressive social conditions and making his own life. Thus the American frontier can be seen as approximating the liberal ideal of equality of opportunity, especially as

(2) Halsey, A.H., "The Sociology of Education" in Sociology - An Introduction Ed. Smelser N.J. (John Wiley and Sons, N.Y. 1967) p.431.

those involved were escaping the repressive social background of Europe. It is necessary to bear in mind the liberal roots of this human ideal.

It is possible to answer the questions posed on two levels. First, it is possible to show that social institutions do not allow full equality of opportunity and second, it is possible to show that individual psychology does not allow it. This is basically the distinction between the structural and individual levels in society; the interaction between the two is the subject matter of social psychology. To consider one at the expense of the other can only lead to psychologism or a mechanical form of determinism.

The most obvious of the structural blocks to equality of opportunity is the material differences between different levels in society. In early capitalist society ownership of, or access to, capital resources was a pre-requisite to social mobility. (3) In Europe, at least, this was limited to the upper reaches of society and so mobility was limited to the rising bourgeoisie. Today when, as Geiger maintains, educational

(3) I mean by 'early capitalist society' the period beginning with the establishment of a market economy, which coincides with the rise of social mobility, on any scale; in Europe this occurred after the various industrial revolutions (e.g. in Britain the period 1820-50 can be considered 'early capitalism'), in North America a market economy preceded industrialisation and thus early capitalism refers to a period beginning at approximately the same time as in Britain but extending through to the end of the nineteenth century.

qualifications have become the decisive 'means of production' in modern society (4) the lack of money to buy education becomes just as effective a barrier to social mobility. This works directly and indirectly. Directly, parents simply cannot afford to send their children to school, or to higher levels of education, or to the 'better' schools. Indirectly, in terms of the theory of diminishing marginal utility, poorer parents require their offspring to go out to work earlier than richer parents. The money that the children can earn is valued relatively more by poorer parents. Thus, there is a material basis for the instant/deferred gratification dichotomy developed by Schneider and Lysgaard. (5)

However, the material basis for inequality of opportunity has been stressed less and less in recent years, especially since the second world war; the growth of free education and the 'affluent society' largely account for this. Though there are differences between the various Western industrial societies, the 'Welfare State' tendencies of all of them have included the growth of free education up to university level and scholarships are more available than before at the university level. The growth of the 'affluent society' has to be treated

(4) in Schelsky, h., "Family and School in Modern Society".
op. cit. Floud et al. p.419.

(5) Schneider, L. & Lysgaard, S. "The Deferred Gratification Pattern: a Preliminary Study" in American Sociological Review Vol. XVIII 1953 pp. 142-9.

warily for two main reasons. First it has not affected all levels of society; there is still dire poverty in all Western industrial countries though this tends to be more hidden than in previous eras. It must not be assumed, as has often been done, that affluence means a decline in inequality of either wealth or income. This has remained remarkably stable in the twentieth century and has even showed some signs of increasing since the second world war. (6) Secondly, as affluence has increased so presumably has the attractiveness of early school-leaving for the wages are higher than in previous times. This is especially so as 'consumer capitalism' has particularly aimed at the young as an important consumer group. However, despite both these qualifications, the point must still hold that the growth of overall affluence since the second world war has meant a decline in the importance of material factors as an explanation for inequality of opportunity for the mass of society (i.e. all except those who remain in dire poverty).

To consider the influence of material factors does not necessarily include the view of society as consisting of various social groups. It is possible, at least theoretically, to have

(6) See such books as Kolko G., Wealth and Power in America (Frederick A. Praeger, New York 1962) Harrington, M., The Other America (Macmillan, New York 1962). And for Britain, Titmuss, R.M., Income Distribution and Social Change (George, Allen and Unwin, London 1962)

a highly stratified society in terms of wealth and income, but to have 'one society' in that norms and values are universal at all levels. This is, of course, the American ideal and is expressed by the term 'open-class society'. On the other hand, it is possible to conceive of society as split into two or more groups which have different if not conflicting values and norms. Whether a society is stratified according to class or status (however these are defined) it is thus possible to talk about status position or class position in a single hierarchy, but also about membership in a social class or a status group. The socialist tradition stemming from Marx has been the main influence stressing separate social groups in one society; more generally this view is emphasised by a conflict model of society as opposed to the consensus model.

This latter way of looking at society has been emphasised within the sociology of education especially as it has developed in Britain. The sociology of education in Britain stems from the Fabian tradition and has been developed furthest at the London School of Economics. (7) The socialist background of the sociology of education led to a great emphasis on the effect of social class on educational achievement and has accepted the working class/middle class distinction with much

(7) Floud, J. and Halsey, A.H., "The Sociology of Education", in Current Sociology Vol. VII No. 3.

greater ease than other areas in sociology. However, the idea of society split into two parts is not the monopoly of socialists; it was Disraeli who coined the phrase "Two Nations" in reference to Britain of the late nineteenth century. Also, the idea of different value systems does not have to follow directly from the concept of class alone. Strodbeck's study of Jews and Italians in the U.S.A. uses the idea of different value systems stemming from different ethnic and cultural backgrounds to show the effect on educational achievement. (8) Also, John Porter has argued that the diversity of the cultural and ethnic groups that make up the Canadian 'Vertical Mosaic' is an important factor in different achievement levels; as a result, ethnic differences tend to harden into class differences. (9)

Usually, however, the basic social groups, working class/middle class, have been seen to be important sources of differing value systems. This distinction has been the basis of the work on educational opportunity by Floud, Halsey, Jackson, Marsden and Douglas in England, and by Hyman, Schneider and Lysgaard, Sexton, Kahl and others in the United States. The position in North America is rather strange in that there was no socialist tradition on which the class basis of society

(8) Strodbeck, Fred L., "Family Integration, Values and Achievement" in Floud et al., op. cit.

(9) Porter, John, The Vertical Mosaic (University of Toronto Press, Toronto 1965).

could draw. This has been no major problem however, because of the overwhelming empiricism of most of the work done in this field. It is a field where those sociologists who like to find relationships between obscure variables have had a heyday. Much of this has been done within the general working class/middle class dichotomy but it is almost as if this dichotomy is given and then it is a question of how many correlations can be found. After reading some of these studies one is left with the feeling of unfinished work; for very rarely are the conclusions related back to the structural level of society or placed within a historical perspective. This style of research, 'abstracted empiricism', as Mills showed can only lead to psychologism. (10) It has led much of the work within the sociology of education in the United States to assume a class-divided society, but to be relatively unconcerned with the implications of their findings. The position on England is much the same in that the Fabian tradition has been of major importance in encouraging an empiricist approach to society. Following from this, within all the work on the sociology of education there is very little that goes as far as explaining the basic questions of the relation of education as an institution to the wider institut-

(10) Mills, C.W., The Sociological Imagination (Grove Press, New York 1961) pp. 67-68.

ional structure, either comparatively or historically.

Much of this work which is based on the different value systems of the working class/middle class is centered on the idea of the achievement syndrome. It has been found that the working class are less ambitious both for themselves and for their children, and that these lower aspirations are internalised by their children. Thus, Hyman has been able to conclude that the beliefs and values of the lower classes actually reduce "the very voluntary actions which would ameliorate their low position." (11) Joseph Kahl makes much the same point in the conclusion to his study of 'Common Man Boys':

The American creed is supposed to teach everyone he can become President--if not of the United States, then of U.S. Steel. Yet these interviews showed that the Creed is by no means universal. Some common man families do not think in such terms, and do not try to push their children up the ladder. The Horatio Alger myth is a middle class myth which percolates down to some, but not all, members of the common man class (12)

There are basically two ways of looking at working class norms and values that cause lower achievement levels. First, it is possible to argue from Marx, that the working class is "a class in but not of civil society". This view stresses the

(11) Hyman, H.H., "The Value-Systems of Different Classes" in Bendix and Lipset, Class, Status and Power (Free Press, New York 1966).

(12) Kahl, Joseph, "Common-Man Boys" in Education, Economy and Society. Floud et al., op. cit. pp. 364-5.

different historical roots of the working class, the existence of a separate working class culture, and following from this view, the existence of social mobility, rather than the lack of it, is something to be explained. On the other hand, it is possible to argue, as Caro and Scanzoni did recently (13) that there is little difference between classes as to aspiration levels. They argue that there is a common culture which determines norms and values for all levels of society. Scanzoni explains the discrepancy between the achievement levels of the classes by saying that the working class see the path to occupational success closed to them; similarly, Caro argues that the acceptance by working class people of a lesser degree of success is a process of adjustment to their circumstances. The essential point is that both argue that there is no a priori existence of different value systems but rather that the objective position each family finds itself in results in 'realistic' achievement levels.

This view clearly fits better with the North American conception of an open-class society. However, this view would seem to be lacking in two respects. First, even if we assume

(13) Scanzoni, J., "Socialisation, Achievement and Achievement Values", American Sociological Review Vol. XXXII 1967.
Caro, F.G., "Social Class and Attitudes of Youth Relevant for the Realisation of Adult Goals", Social Forces Vol. XLIV 1966.

that there is no a priori existence of different value systems at any one point in time it would seem likely that 'being realistic' will become built into group norms and thus transmitted historically within the group culture. Second, at the present point in history, the stumbling blocks to the working class that are neither simply material nor due to different value systems would seem to be so complex that it is very unlikely that they would be 'realised' by the working class (e.g. the influence of language as studied by Bernstein).

This idea of 'being realistic' would seem to have a more limited application as one factor that operates in restricting the mobility of minority ethnic groups who learn to expect discrimination.

To sum up, both the British and American analyses of inequality of opportunity have centered on the conception of social class, though the idea of social class as rooted in the structure of society and changing historically is rarely explored. Most of the work has tried to show how the existence of social classes results in different aspiration levels, either through the existence of a priori different value systems, or through the working class being more 'realistic' about their possibilities. Following from this work has been the (usually) implicit belief that if social classes cease to exist as coherent groups and if the remaining material obstacles to mobility are removed then we will be approaching

equality of opportunity in Western industrial societies. Precisely because there is precious little evidence for this assumption I want to approach the problem from another side and see if there are not other forces that are leading to inequality of opportunity; not on the individual level in terms of behaviour patterns but rather on the structural level of society.

My choice of topic, the consequences of rationalisation or bureaucratisation of modern Western societies for social mobility came from a consideration of the assumptions of much of the British tradition in this field. I think it is fair to say that Jean Floud and A.H. Halsey as the leading exponents of the sociology of education in Britain fit well into the Fabian tradition of the sociology of education. This also fits well with the Labour party view of education. As I have pointed out already a characteristic of Fabianism is empiricism; another is a utilitarian conception of society. As I hope to show later in my theoretical discussion, this corresponds to Weber's conception of rationalisation. Such a view argues that inequality of opportunity is a source of inefficiency in the system in that the scarce intelligence resources are not utilised to the maximum. It further argues that the educational system should be a selection agency and that selection should be based on rational criteria. Rational is here used to mean the logical conjoining of means and ends,

both of which should be calculable. The only rational criterion that an educational system can measure is ability, or intelligence; how these are defined being dependent on what the 'ends' of the educational system are defined to be. If other factors such as social class can be shown as being positively correlated with educational achievement levels then this must either mean that irrational factors are somehow entering the selection process or that ability is differentially distributed according to social class. A basis for criticism which arises here is expressed by G.H. Bantock when he accuses sociologists of emphasising 'equality of opportunity' without ever asking 'opportunity for what?'. (14) This problem of 'ends' is common to both a utilitarian conception of society and to Weber's idea of rationality (as I will discuss later).

What is needed then, it is argued, is a rationalisation of the system; this can take place within the educational system or more generally within the wider society. As has been noted, irrational barriers have been removed as education has become state-supported and as schools formerly serving select social groups have become integrated into the main educational system. Clearly in these terms the U.S. educational system is more rational than the English one. Furthermore, the British class

(14) Bantock, G.H., "Education, Social Justice and the Sociologists" in Education and Values (Humanities Press, New York 1965) pp. 144-5.

structure is more irrational than the American class structure in that the former results in value-orientations in the working class which are radically different from those in the middle class. The rather paradoxical position of British socialists using the United States social structure in general, and the educational system in particular, as a model becomes evident when it is realised that rationality has been the main basis for the sociological analysis of British education.

A particular view of the development of capitalism has grown out of these observations of increasing rationalisation. This view, expressed in the slogan 'end-of-ideology' and developed by Daniel Bell in the U.S.A. and C.A.R. Crosland in Britain, (15) is briefly summarised below. The U.S.A. is the shining example of the 'fast, modern, technological society' in which irrational hangovers from the past, such as sharply separated classes have ceased to exist. These irrational hangovers were expressions of nineteenth century capitalism which was based on the exploitation of one class (the proletariat) by another (the bourgeoisie). This was irrational because to be born into one class meant that one's life chances were determined by that fact. But the accident of birth is no basis for the placing of man within society and the awarding of material rewards. This should be done on the basis of maxim-

(15) See Bell, Daniel, The End of Ideology (Free Press, New York 1960); Crosland C.A.R., The Future of Socialism (Schocken Books, New York 1956).

ising the efficiency of the system; this has only come about in the twentieth century with the abolition of qualitative differences between classes so that there is rather a hierarchy of statuses. Man can move up or down this hierarchy on the basis of merit which thus allows the best allocation of scarce resources. Though all capitalist countries are coming closer to this new society, the U.S.A. is the one that most closely approximates it. It is no accident that this view is expressed by ex-socialists. This is because as socialists they emphasised the class basis of nineteenth century capitalism and, as rationalisation has grown in the twentieth century, they have been most impressed by the contrast.

According to this view then, it is the irrational hangovers from capitalism which are the cause of inequality of opportunity. But why is it, given that Britain lags behind the U.S.A. in rationality, that the degree of social mobility in Britain and North America is remarkably similar? Several studies have shown that the U.S.A. does not have a rate of mobility significantly higher than that of other industrial countries. (16) Furthermore there is a remarkable similarity in the proportions of university students drawn from the various class levels in both the U.S.A. and England.

(16) See in particular Lipset, S.M. and Bendix, R., Social Mobility in Industrial Society (University of California Press, Berkeley 1959).

SOCIAL STATUS OF UNIVERSITY STUDENTS (17)
% DISTRIBUTION OF STUDENTS

<u>SOCIAL STATUS</u>	<u>U.S.A.</u>	<u>ENGLAND</u>
Upper	10	15
Upper Middle	30	26
Lower Middle	30	32
Upper Working	25	21
Lower Working	5	6

In terms of both general social mobility and educational achievement it does seem that the elite positions are more open in the U.S.A. than in Britain. (18) However, in terms of the crucial manual/non-manual split (crucial in that it roughly corresponds to the working class/middle class split) the movement between the two is remarkably similar. Does not Britain's well-defined class structure count for anything? Does not the grammar/secondary modern school split count for anything? (which means to a large degree, that the grammar school educates the middle class and the secondary modern school the working class). Why does not the rationalised educational system make a greater difference? If the U.S.A. has

(17) Table 7, in Havighurst, R.J., "Education and Social Mobility in Four Societies" in Floud et al., op. cit. p.116. It should be noted that the percentage of university students in their age-group is much smaller in England than in the U.S.A. If all students in higher education in England were compared with university students in the U.S.A. this would be a more meaningful comparison. However, if this were done it is likely that the English figures would show a higher proportion of working class students; this would only serve to emphasise my point.

(18) See Miller, S.M., "Comparative Social Mobility", Current Sociology Vol. IX (1), 1960.

reached the 'end-of-ideology' why does not the pattern of opportunity approach more closely Rogoff's radical pattern? Of course, no-one argues that the class structure is fully rational (there is still the need for mopping-up operations) or that there are not other variables (e.g. race in the U.S.A.) but even so, it is after all, class differences which have been emphasised as lying at the base of inequality of opportunity, as it expresses itself in educational achievement.

Considerations such as these led me to ask whether there were not factors WITHIN the rationalisation trend in Western industrial societies that lead to a perpetuation of inequality of opportunity. As I have tried to show, this very trend has usually been seen as the promoter of equality of opportunity though this has usually been implicit rather than explicit within the sociology of education. To explore this idea requires first, an analysis of the meaning of the concept 'rationalisation' and second, an analysis of the effect of rationalisation on the various areas of society that affect educational achievement. For the first requirement, a critical analysis of Max Weber's use of the concept is necessary; for the second I want to consider the effect of rationalisation in two parts:

- (i) The rationalisation of the stratification system.
- (ii) The rationalisation of the educational system.

PART II

THE THEME OF RATIONALISATION

INTRODUCTION

The theme of rationalisation, though developed in a variety of ways by numerous scholars, must be seen as primarily stemming from the work of Max Weber. In this section, I intend to base my discussion of rationalisation on the various elements which Weber saw as making up the rationalisation trend. The inter-relationship of capitalism, bureaucracy, and rational-legal authority are central to an understanding of Weber's world-view.

After establishing the basis of Weber's position, I will turn to Marx to provide a theoretical basis from which to criticise Weber. It is my view that the Marxist concept of reification is directly related to the Weberian concept of rationalisation. Both are describing the same trends but from differing theoretical positions. To understand the concept of reification, it is necessary to discuss the basic elements of the Marxist dialectic of history; this I will do by basing my discussion on the central Marxist concept of praxis. The fundamental difference between Weber and Marx lies in the positivistic framework of the former as opposed to the dialectical framework of the latter.

Following a Marxist position, I will argue that society, in general, and the idea of rationalisation specifically has to be understood in the light of the 'possibilities' of a society at any

one point in time. At the time of Weber's writing this dispute over the meaning of rationalisation was largely theoretical; however, to consider rationalisation in the twentieth century solely in the terms of Weber is to ignore certain important aspects of rationalisation. This is not, however, to argue that a pure Marxist perspective is sufficient to understand rationalisation in the twentieth century. In part, these new trends that demand going beyond Weber have only occurred on the basis of the overcoming of many of the 'opposites' which Marx saw as fundamental for the coming of socialism. Paradoxically, however, these new trends can be understood within the framework of the Marxist dialectic (as opposed to Weber's theory).

Following the work of Marcuse, I will argue that rationalisation has proceeded on the basis of growing irrationality. Capitalism has been able to incorporate its own negation as a basis for maintaining the status quo. This theoretical position provides a basis for understanding the tendency for bureaucracies to become based on 'personal relations' as opposed to the purely formal rationality conceived by Weber. Secondly, it provides a basis for understanding the form and content of social mobility in advanced capitalist society.

THE THEME OF RATIONALISATION

Rationalisation is the connecting thread between the diverse sociological work of Max Weber. A comprehensive understanding of the idea requires a reading of much of his work, because Weber was pursuing a search for rationality in its manifold (and often contradictory) manifestations throughout his life's work. A simple explanation of this complex idea, suggested by Gerth and Mills, is

"The extent and direction of rationalisation is.....measured negatively in terms of the degree to which magical elements of thought are displaced, or positively by the extent to which ideas gain in systematic coherence and naturalistic tendency." (19)

This idea is central to Weber's work on power, to his comparative work on Occidental and Eastern civilisation, and to all his work on capitalism. Though Weber's positivism led him to scorn a view of history as developing in either a cyclical or unilinear fashion, it is clear that Weber did conceive of rationalisation as a unilinear trend (20).

The idea of bureaucratisation relates directly to rationalisation; indeed, the growth of bureaucracy in twentieth century Western capitalist society represents one of the main elements of

(19) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. Gerth, H. H. and Mills, C. W., page 51 (Oxford University Press, New York, 1946)

(20) *ibid*, page 51.

the rationalisation trend. In his development of the ideal type of bureaucracy, Weber listed the following main principles -- each official is responsible for a particular task, there is a hierarchy of supervision, work proceeds with the use of records of files, officials receive training in their jobs, the job constitutes the full-time duty of every official, and all officials know and follow general rules (21). Weber developed these principles primarily from observations of the Prussian civil service of his time, but bureaucracy in being a form of social organisation, can exist in many, if not all, social institutions. Weber conceived of the growth of bureaucracies as a general trend in the West and, apart from government, particularly noted its growth in economic and military organisations. Since Weber's time, bureaucratisation has become, as Peter Berger says, "the leading motif of modern history" (22), and has grown in the institutions of religion, education, law and the family.

In terms of the primary-secondary group distinction, bureaucracy, in its ideal-type form, is the secondary group par excellence. Following from this, a bureaucracy exists only as a means to an end outside of itself, in other words it is entirely instrumental; bureaucratic relations are impersonal and do not have to be face-to-face. A bureaucratic role is entirely pre-defined before any

(21) *ibid*, pages 196-204.

(22) Berger, P. L. "Religious Institutions" in Sociology: an Introduction, ed. Smelser, N. J., page 352 (John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1967)

particular individual steps into it; thus freedom of action is ruled out. The complete impersonality of the ideal-type bureaucracy is expressed by Weber in the following passage:

"(The calculability of decision-making) and with it its appropriateness for capitalism(is) the more fully realised the more bureaucracy "depersonalises" itself, i.e. the more completely it succeeds in achieving the exclusion of love, hatred, and every purely personal, especially irrational and incalculable, feeling from the execution of official tasks. In the place of the old-type ruler who is moved by sympathy, favour, grace and gratitude, modern culture requires for its sustaining external apparatus, the emotionally detached, and hence rigorously "professional" expert." (23)

The more the "human" elements are removed from the bureaucracy, the closer it comes to approximate a physical machine and then, Weber argues, the more efficient and the more rational it will be.

The limits of Weber's rationalisation would be reached in a totally bureaucratic society; rationalisation then could only advance if scientific discoveries made possible technological advances. Bureaucratisation is, however, only the end of the rationalisation trend; prior to the growth of bureaucracies in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, other trends had laid the pre-requisites for the establishment of bureaucracies. Most of Weber's work was concerned with the development of Western civili-

(23) Weber, Max "On Law in Economy and Society", quoted in Max Weber: an Intellectual Portrait, Bendix, R., (Anchor Books, New York, 1962), page 427.

sation prior to the bureaucratisation trend. Though Weber noted the existence of bureaucracies in many early civilisations, it is clear that he considered the modern trend as part of much bigger changes in the whole social structure.

Weber developed three ideal types of domination: he conceived of power being legitimated in these three systems by tradition, charisma and rational-legal factors. Though he conceived of all three types of domination existing in all real forms of domination throughout history, in the terms of the rationalisation trend, there is a shift from traditional to rational-legal forms of domination in the history of Western civilisation. Also, as charismatic authority is based on irrational, emotional factors, this form of authority declines with the growth of rationality (there is an important exception to this, as a rule, which I will return to in my critique of Weber). Because Weber here based his theory on historical fact, the point should now be made that the emphasis on rationality, as Weber considered it, is the basis of the distinction between the West and the rest of the world. For Weber, Western capitalism was the embodiment of rationality; rationality found its highest expression in Western capitalism. As rationalisation has so far been defined it would not seem to be a trend specific to the West, though in Weber's time it had clearly reached its furthest stage of development in the West. Weber did note rational elements in other civilisations but considered that rationality in its 'true' form could not emerge because its development was blocked by irrational

factors. Only in the West did the plurality of factors come together in the right sequence so that rationality could develop. The 'inner-worldly asceticism' of Protestantism was considered so important by Weber because he thought it was a necessary cause (though not on its own sufficient) for the growth of capitalism that was unique to the West.

In the shift from traditional to rational-legal domination, Weber outlined two main pre-requisites for the establishment of capitalist rationality. First, the development of a money economy allows the comparison of different material artefacts on one standard -- that of exchange value. Thus, a money economy allows calculability which is one requirement of rational judgement. In the development of capitalism, at the time of the industrial revolution, one of the key factors in the establishment of a market economy was that of the establishment of a labour market thus allowing rational calculation of all costs of production. Also, as Weber notes, a bureaucratic organisation needs payment in money for its officials if it is to continue in operation. Bureaucratic organisations developed in many different civilisations (e.g. in ancient Egypt, in China after the decline of feudalism, in the Roman and Byzantine empires) yet, in that many paid their officials 'in kind' the organisations tended to break down as the officials sought to appropriate the sources of revenue as their private property and to use them accordingly. Secondly, Weber considered the quantitative and qualitative profusion of tasks to be important as a force for

rationalisation; this may take many forms, in pre-industrial times quite often preparation for war led to the development of an army and the need for more public finance and thus heavier taxation. In the development of capitalist rationality the growth in technology, especially in transport and communication, laid the foundations. Technological innovations and the establishment of a market economy, though developing in relationship with each other were both necessary in the plurality of factors that led to the establishment of capitalist rationality.

I have so far simply stated Weber's position on rationalisation and bureaucratisation. Before explaining the theoretical position underlying these concepts, I want to consider two alternative concepts put forward by Marx. In Marxism the two concepts of 'praxis' and 'reification' are similarly central as 'rationalisation' and 'bureaucracy' in Weber's theory. The complex concept of praxis was clarified by Marx in the 'Manuscripts of 1844', the 'Theses on Feuerbach' and the 'German Ideology'.

Praxis is at the very heart of Marx's thought in that it expresses the basic contradiction within society -- the relation between human activity and its accomplishments (24). Praxis can be defined simply as human action, but it represents a specific view of the meaning of human action. The 'subject' of Marx's thought

(24) Lefebvre, H., The Sociology of Marx (Vintage Books, New York, 1969), page 8.

was always social man, the individual viewed in relationship to groups, classes and society; the 'object' is the products of nature, productions of mankind, including techniques, ideologies, institutions, and cultural works. The unity of subject and object is expressed in the fact that man only finds himself in what he produces: to be human is to act, and there is no action that does not give form to some object. The contradiction between subject and object is expressed in the fact that by human action man objectifies himself, alienates himself; by human action man creates social forms that come to enslave him.

Fundamental to the Marxist concept of praxis is the position that the contradiction in human action can be overcome, that subject and object can be reconciled, on the basis of the "abolition of material needs". As opposed to the Hegelian view that the contradiction can only be overcome by philosophical awareness, Marx emphasised that only through praxis (i.e. action in the physical and social world) can man abolish material need and so provide the basis for the overcoming of the contradiction. Through this idea of praxis, Marx gave a fundamental meaning to all history; the freedom of man is expressed in the "struggle with nature", in man's struggle to overcome the control exercised by material need, and his own social forms.

To choose praxis as the basic concept of Marx is only one of several approaches but it is important to see that it is not contradictory with his more well-known concepts of class, class con-

flict, stages of history, etc. In as much as there is a human world of material need there is both a force for overcoming this need, and a force for exploiting man's needs. Through praxis, man tends to overcome material needs and to develop himself by appropriating nature within himself. But praxis is not only development of man, it is not only appropriation of nature within man, it is also the growth of an external world that comes to control him. Through the growth of the material "means of production" it becomes possible for one section in society (one class) to claim "ownership of the means of production" and to exploit other classes for their own ends. The social institutions that become the means of domination of man by man are ideological to their core because they are not "natural" as the exploiting class tries to argue but only made by man through praxis. Though history is inevitably the history of the domination of man by man, this can only lead of the overthrow of the dominating class at any stage of history. It is either possible that out of the growth of the domination of external nature will come the basis for true development, i.e. out of quantitative growth a qualitative development will occur; or it is possible that the domination over external nature will result in a decline in even this growth. In either case, "that-which-is-not" will inevitably negate "that-which-is" for a new class will grow out of the dominated on the basis of the "possibilities" of the society. Unless this class represents "the abolition of material need", then the domination of man by man

will not be abolished but a new level of growth will have been reached.

Just as capitalism was special for Weber in being the 'embodiment of rationality', so it was also special for Marx in that it represented the 'means' to the abolition of the contradiction between man and nature. Capitalism in being the means to 'history' has some specific features that set it off from previous eras. The contradiction expressed in praxis reaches its highest extent in capitalism. Capitalism represents a society totally mobilised for material production, a society in which the social restraints for the 'struggle against nature' are removed -- a society based totally on the law of the market. The pre-condition for capitalism is setting up of the market and of greatest importance the labour market. Capitalism is based on commodity production -- a commodity being something produced only for the market -- this is not only material commodities but also human commodities, i.e. labour. A necessary pre-requisite of the labour-contract is 'freedom, equality, and justice'. Marx expresses this as follows:

"(The area) within whose boundaries the sale and purchase of labour-power goes on, is in fact a very Eden of the innate rights of man. There alone rule Freedom, Equality, Property, and Bentham. Freedom because both buyer and seller of a commodity, say of labour power, are constrained only by their own free will, They contract as free agents, and the agreement they come to, is but the form in which they give the legal expression to their common will. Equality, because each enters into relation with the other, as with a simple owner

of commodities, and they exchange equivalent for equivalent. Property because each disposes only of what is his own. And Bentham, because each looks only to himself. The only force that brings them together and puts them in relation with each other is the selfishness, the gain and the private interests of each." (25)

It is important to note that Marx based his analysis of capitalism on what is inherent in the pure form of the market economy as laid down by the classical economists. Though Marx based his analysis of capitalism on empirical observations from England, the U.S.A. embodied a purer form of capitalism because of the existence of liberal democracy in the U.S.A. at the time of industrialisation.

Thus, capitalist society embodied the total struggle against nature; but it also embodied the most extreme form of the objectification of man, of the alienation of man, of the enslavement of man by what he produces. This latter conception is expressed in Marx's conceptions of "commodity fetishism" and the thesis of "reification". Marx shows how under capitalism products take on the form of a commodity; without losing their material reality and use value, they become, in terms of the system, solely exchange value. The commodity form reaches its purest stage when every single commodity can be evaluated by one single universal equivalent: money (26). This has importance for man in that when products become commodities

(25) Marx, Karl, Capital, VOL. I, page 195, quoted in Marcuse, H. Reason and Revolution, page 309 (Beacon, Press, Boston, 1960)

(26) Lefebvre, op.cit., page 47.

this form conceals its true contents and origins from humans. It appears to be a thing endowed with boundless powers and, thus comes to control man, to turn man into its thing. The commodity form of production implies reification for all society and most important, the contractual form of human relations is set up.

The Marxist concept of reification describes much the same trends as Weber's concept of rationalisation. Just as Marx saw capitalism as inevitably involving the highest degree of reification, so Weber saw capitalism as representing the embodiment of rationality. Yet, there are notable differences between the meanings given to these trends. Weber argued that bureaucratisation was inevitable; it is as if the rationality of capitalism and bureaucracy demanded the domination of things over men. This view contrasts with that of Marx: the domination of things over man (i.e. reification) although inevitable within capitalism would provide the basis for the overthrow of reification with the 'abolition of material need'. Thus, Marx saw socialism as coming out of the womb of capitalism. Weber's view of the future was different:-

"Together with the machine, the bureaucratic organisation is engaged in building the houses of bondage of the future, in which perhaps men will one day be like peasants in the ancient Egyptian state, acquiescent and powerless, while a purely technical good, that is rational, official administration and provision becomes the sole, final

value, which sovereignly decided the direction of their affairs." (27)

Underlying these contrasting views of the future is the positivism of Weber and the dialectical materialism of Marx. The age-old dispute over fact and value can be used to make clear the difference between Weber and Marx. Weber had a sophisticated form of positivism in that he distinguished between the natural and social sciences, and argued that the importance of values must be recognised in the human as opposed to the physical world. Weber saw that to be truly scientific, that is to consider all aspects pertinent to any social situation, one must consider the value-orientation of the actors on that social stage. Thus, to explain the Greek city states sociologically, one must be aware of the value-orientation of the Greeks and the meaning that they attached to the city states. Weber notes that it is not simply that to leave this area unexamined would be less complete but that it leads to further distortion because we will interpret the Greek city state through our value-orientation. To conceive of anything sociologically requires the added fact that human societies have meaning for themselves whereas physical objects only have meaning in themselves. It is from this conception that Weber's stress on "verstehen" becomes clear. However, for Weber the importance of values does not mean that sociology cannot be

(27) Weber, Max, Gesammelte Politische Schriften, page 151, quoted in Marcuse, H. "Industrialisation and Capitalism" in New Left Review, 30, March/April, 1965, page 15.

scientific; he emphasised strongly that facts and values have to be rigidly distinguished if sociology is to remain scientific. By this, Weber means that sociology has no basis on which to judge values, it can only explain and not proclaim itself for any absolute value. In fact, in as much as it looks at all societies through the distorted vision of value-laden glasses it can only get a distorted picture of society and so cannot even explain society.

This contrasts with a dialectical approach to society. A dialectical approach to society is by necessity holistic, conceiving of society as a total system rather than the sum of the parts; and it is also based on the opposition of the parts within the system. A dialectical relationship is one that is full of conflict and, at the same time, unity; in fact, the conflict is an expression of the basic unity (28). The "unity of opposites" can only be understood in that time is the fundamental object of investigation and knowledge. The opposites are based on the idea of "becoming"; there are two contradictory aspects of any society -- "that-which-is" and "that-which-is-not". This is saying a lot more than that societies change; for the change in society derives directly out of the contradiction between "that-which-is" and "that-which-is-not". That which is, the positivistic facts of social

(28) Lefebvre, op.cit., page 25.

reality are incomplete at any one point in time for the facts are in reality made up of two elements -- that which is apparent and the negation of this. Negation is the central idea of dialectical thought but negation is also a positive act; for "that-which-is" repels "that-which-is-not" and, in doing so, repels its own real possibilities." (29) In other words, the negative is just as real as the positive. Dialectical thinking removes the a priori opposition between both fact and value, and object-subject, which was laid down by positivism. It recognises the unity of these opposites in that both the knower and the doer are necessary to translate the past into the present. Objects thus "contain" subjectivity in their very structure (30). The argument against "value-free" sociology is, thus, not one concerning the moral duties of sociologists but that "truth" itself can only be found within a "value-laden" dialectical approach. Marx's dictum that the aim of science should be to change the world rather than explain it is not based on moral outrage with capitalism, though Marx clearly felt this too, but follows directly from his method of analysis.

To understand both the growth of Weber's thought into pessimism and his view that there would be inevitable domination of

(29) Marcuse, H., "A Note on Dialectic", page x, preface to op.cit.
Reason and Revolution.

(30) ibid, page viii.

things over man, it is necessary to see that Weber thought that facts could be understood apart from the subjective orientation of the actors involved. Though Weber did not disregard values, he considered that some social actions and some forms of social structure could be understood apart from values. This was the basis of Weber's distinctions between Wertrationalitat and Zweck-rationalitat, and secondly between substantive and formal rationality. Weber distinguishes between the latter pair of concepts in the following way:-

"A system of economic activity will be called "formally" rational according to the degree in which the provision for needs which is essential to every rational economy, is capable of being expressed in numerical, calculable terms, and is so expressed.....On the other hand, the concept of substantive rationality is full of difficulties. It conveys only one element common to all the possible empirical situations; namely that, it is not sufficient to consider only the purely formal fact that calculations are being made on grounds of expediency by the methods which are, among those available, technically the most nearly adequate. In addition, it is necessary to take account of the fact that economic activity is oriented to ultimate ends of some kind, whether they be ethical, political, utilitarian, hedonistic, the attainment of social distinction, of social equality, or of anything else. Substantive rationality cannot be measured in terms of formal calculation alone, but also involves a relation to the absolute values or to the content of the particular given ends to which it is oriented. In principle, there is an indefinite number of possible standards of

value which are 'rational' in this sense." (31)

The former pair of concepts correspond to this distinction on the individual level of society. In general terms, Zweckrationalitat (goal-rationality) can be seen simply as expediency, whereas Wertrationalitat (value-rationality) involves the added consideration of values and ends (32). A closer definition is not possible for, as Parsons notes, the meaning of the terms shifts as Weber's analysis proceeds.

Weber saw the rationalisation trend as involving a shift to formal rationality and to Zweckrational action. Though Weber emphasised the importance of values in the growth of capitalism (e.g. the Protestant work ethic) he thought that capitalism and bureaucracy, as established systems, could be understood apart from values. Though Weber did note the role of ideology in the legitimisation of capitalism his concept of rational-legal authority implied that capitalism needed no further legitimisation than its own existence. The following is Weber's attempt to define capitalism in formally rational terms:-

"Capital accounting is the calculation and verification of opportunities for profit and the success of profit-making activity, through the valuation of the total assets

(31) Weber, Max, The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation, trans, A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), page 185.

(32) ibid, page 115n.

of the enterprise, whether these consist in goods in kind or in money, at the beginning of a period of activity, and the comparison of this with a similar valuation of the assets still present or newly acquired, at the end of the process -- or, in the case of a profit-making organisation operating continuously, it is a matter of accounting periods, which draw a balance between the initial and final state of the enterprise." (33)

As Marcuse notes:-

"The tortured syntax itself testifies to thedetermination to define capitalism in 'purely scientific' terms, to purge it of everything human and historical." (34)

By the exclusion of values Weber is able to argue that capitalism is technologically necessary. The domination of things over man comes to its highest form in bureaucratic organisation in which social relations must take on a bureaucratic form to satisfy the demands of formal rationality. Weber's was the forerunner of a type of theory which has gained adherents in the twentieth century -- that of technological determinism.

In the terms of the Marxist dialectic both Weber's concepts of formal rationality and Zweckrationalitat are untenable. If social actions and social structure are viewed historically, in the process of 'becoming', then all actions and all social structures

(33) Weber, Max, Wirtschaft and Gesellschaft, page 48, quoted by Marcuse, H., op.cit., "Industrialisation and Capitalism", page 9.

(34) ibid, page 9.

involve values. Just as fact and value are ultimately inseparable, so are the products of man's labour inseparable from man. Weber's concepts of formal rationality and Zweckrationalitat involve the reification of Reason for it sets up material ends as ends-in-themselves, irrespective of their use-value to man. In Marxist terms, Weber abstracted from the irreducible social material. The abstraction was justified in showing how capitalist rationality abstracted from man but Weber fell into the trap of seeing this as inevitable by making his analytic category of rationality involving material 'ends' as existing in its own right. To Marx, human products cannot exist in their own right; they only have meaning to man through praxis. Through praxis, man transforms things into human products; they then have use-value for man. Yet, through the concept of reification, Marx goes further and shows how social forms seem to be rational in their own right and how people come to think they act rationally (in Weber's sense). Another way of describing reification is that 'means' and 'ends' are reversed. The highest degree of reification was thus expressed in capitalism in which material goods became the end of the system and man was reduced to means, to instrument. This same logic was expressed in Weber's concepts of formal rationality and Zweckrationalitat in which the calculability of the 'ends' limited the 'ends' to material ones.

Though Weber did argue that there could be formally rational ends, with reference to both capitalism and bureaucracy he emphasised that both are instrumental to something outside of themselves. Weber was aware that the rational administration of masses cannot do away with an irrational charismatic apex. This is the important exception to the general shift from both traditional and charismatic authority to rational-legal authority (mentioned above). Though this point was recognised by Weber (he stressed the danger of a bureaucratic organisation being 'taken over' at the top), it surely shows the limits of formal rationality, for bureaucracy was to Weber the end product of capitalism, which embodied rationality. With reference to capitalism, Weber argued that the aim of capitalism was 'provision for human needs'. This concept is general enough to be value-free; in fact, it can only gain meaning in terms of some absolute human end (i.e. value end). The concept is similar to that of 'happiness' in utilitarianism; both Weber's system and utilitarianism try to reduce rationality to quantification. In doing this, both systems result in relying on an 'outside' criterion.

What then is rationalisation in Marxist terms? Rationalisation represents the necessary domination of form over content that finds its highest expression in the commodity production of capitalism. It is necessary, for capitalism represents the total "struggle with nature" and thus the highest degree of reification. As with Weber's unilinear development of rationalisation, Marx emphasised the unilinear develop-

ment of praxis based on man's increasing control over nature. For Marx, the labour contract is the last link in the chain of formal relationships necessary for commodity production. The Napoleonic "Code Civil" gave coherent, quasi-logical form to these contractual relations (35). This code, derived from Roman law, Marx emphasised as of great importance. Roman law persisted through a number of modes of production, thus, showing it to be more than a mere "super-structure". A formal system of law is necessary as long as society is dominated by commodity exchange, i.e. until contradictions between man and nature have been removed.

Thus, despite Marx's "stages of history", the unilinear growth of rationalisation is implicit in Marx as well as Weber. But for Marx, this is only to be understood in terms of the coming of socialism, the overcoming of the contradictions. Thus, rational has another meaning for Marx; social actions and forms can be judged rational in as much as they further development towards socialism. Then the whole idea of rationality becomes relative to historical development. A rational social form or action is that which contributes to the growth of control over nature or the development of man by appropriation of nature within man. Rationality is always identified with the negation, for the negation can only operate given the "possibilities" that arise out of "that-which-is". In this sense "early capitalism" embodied rationality in being the negation of the earlier mode of production.

(35) Lefebvre, op.cit., page 113.

However, as capitalism developed the possibility of socialism so the negation shifted to socialism and the rationality of capitalism became obsolete. Rationality, in this sense, is the rationality of "ends" and outside Weber's frame of reference, but to Marx is essential.

How then was capitalism rational for Marx and how was it irrational? First, early capitalism in being the negation of feudalism was rational in terms of the development of man, in terms of "ends". Also the rationalisation of means (Weber's concern) was rational in that it was necessary to overcome material needs. Thus, early capitalism was rational in terms of both means and ends, with the important qualifying statement that both 'means' and 'ends' are historical, i.e. based on the possibilities of the system (36). But the possibilities of the system are transformed by the very success of capitalism, with the result that the "total struggle against nature" becomes irrational in

(36) By the "labour theory of value", Marx was able to identify "exploitation" as the "other side of the coin" of the "freedom" of market capitalism. This theory tries to see the value of production stemming only from labour, and thus as labour is removed from production profit (which is "stolen" from labour) must fall. As Joan Robinson argues in Economic Philosophy (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1964, pages 36-47) this theory is false in trying to use value in this sense as a basis for quantification. The more general point can be made that, in a sense, it is un-Marxist in being ahistorical; exploitation does arise out of the freedom of the market but historically, not by an analysis of the abstract workings of the market. This theory led Marx to be unduly optimistic as to the contradictions within capitalism that would lead to its overthrow; as Robinson argues it is not essential for his theory and also tends to de-emphasise the overall rationality of early capitalism.

terms of ends. Rationality now becomes identified with socialism as man has the material basis to create a truly human society. But what of the rational means, the social forms and actions that were necessary to overcome the contradictions? These rational means become repressive, first, as the "possibilities" are transformed and second, as it becomes increasingly necessary to overcome this contradiction. Rationalisation is functional for capitalism, as an obsolete system, in causing increasing domination of form over content. Capitalism needs to separate man from his creations so that they appear to be "natural", to be inevitable. By greater and greater rationalisation capitalism does not overcome its contradictions, rather it only increases the gap between "that-which-is" and that which is possible; however, it is able, contrary to Marx's predictions, to contain its own negation, to make qualitative change appear more and more utopian.

The purpose of the above discussion of rationalisation has partly been to provide a theoretical understanding of the term. However, it is my view that to understand the form that rationalisation has taken in the twentieth century, it is necessary to have a theoretical position that goes beyond that of Weber. Paradoxically, the Marxist dialectic provides this perspective. I say 'paradoxically' for Marx's conception of the future appears to be considerably inferior to Weber's in the light of the second half of the twentieth century. Bureaucratisation has continued to build the 'houses of bondage', and the possibility of socialism (in a Marxist sense) seems to fade into the distance.

Yet, it is my view, following the work of Marcuse, that this has only occurred on the basis of the 'overcoming of the negation'; capitalism has only continued to exist on the basis of using its own negation. Thus, the negation has ceased to be negative for it acts as the basis for "that-which-is". This trend requires going beyond a pure Marxist position but is unexplainable in terms of Weber. As I understand it, the theoretical position of Marcuse provides a basis for understanding how rationalisation has proceeded on the basis of growing irrationality. The primary relations that Weber considered to be value-rational elements have proved in the twentieth century to be the basis for increased efficiency in bureaucracies. These primary group relations are irrational, as opposed to value rational, for they occur within a previously defined bureaucratic structure (i.e. an organisation designed for efficiency of material good production, as opposed to true human relations). In one sense, this involves an overcoming of the contradiction expressed by Marx; in another sense, it involves an accentuation of the contradiction. The very success of advanced capitalism (37) in mobilising its negation for its own purposes effectively makes capitalism more and more obsolete, for it makes it more and more possible to fulfil material needs every day. Marcuse has expressed this as follows:-

"The most advanced areas of industrial society exhibit throughout these two features: a trend towards consummation of technological ration-

(37) I use the term 'advanced capitalism' to refer to this form of society which goes beyond a pure Marxist conception of capitalism but can only be understood in terms of the Marxist dialectic.

ality, and intensive effort to contain this trend within the established institutions. Here is the internal contradiction of this civilisation: the irrational element in its rationality. It is the token of its achievements. The industrial society which makes technology and science its own is organised for the ever-more-effective domination of man and nature, for the ever-more-effective utilisation of its resources. It becomes irrational when the success of these efforts opens new dimensions of human realisation. Organisation for peace is different from organisation for war; the institutions which served the struggle for existence cannot serve the pacification of existence. Life as an end is qualitatively different from life as a means." (38)

The Marxist dialectic provides a theoretical basis for considering society on the basis of 'the possibilities' inherent in the social structure at any one point in time. Marcuse adds to this perspective a view of rationalisation as proceeding on the basis of the 'repression of the possibilities' inherent in contemporary Western society. The relevance of this approach is to be seen in the form that bureaucratisation and capitalism have taken in the twentieth century.

If we consider bureaucratic organisations, they differ from Weber's model not only because the latter was an ideal type but because they differ in fundamental characteristics. Bureaucracies have not become more formal, more impersonal during the twentieth century, but rather the reverse. To understand why this is so it is

(38) Marcuse, H., One-dimensional Man (Beacon Press, Boston, 1964), page 17, Emphasis added.

necessary to see bureaucratisation as a historical development. In early industrial society the primary group influences that Weber saw as a block to efficiency were just that; they were a block because primary group relations represented pre-industrial society (Gemeinschaft). It was necessary to force the people to work in the new industrial society; people whose whole way of life was opposed to capitalism. In Europe at least, it seems logical that in early capitalism the 'whip of hunger' was essential, even for those workers whose standard of living rose immediately following industrialisation. The idea of 'rational' authority would have meant little to a worker in a cotton mill in Lancashire in 1830.

Though the pure bureaucracy was the most efficient organisation in early capitalism, it has become less and less rational measured against the maximum efficiency at any historical point. Largely due to the rationalisation trend since Weber's time, it has become possible to remove some of the inefficiencies of bureaucracy by the development of primary relations within bureaucratic organisations. In industry, in the twentieth century, there has been the rise of the 'human relations' approach; the managerial elite has encouraged primary relations for with this comes loyalty to the organisation and greater efficiency. The aim of 'human relations' has essentially been to make workers internalise the norms of the organisation thus cutting out the need for rigid external control. The success of this approach as opposed to Weber's purely formal organisation can be seen in the rise of William H.

Whyte's 'organisation man'. Yet, as Whyte showed the 'other-directed organisation man' though an improvement on Weber's bureaucrat is still inefficient in some respects. His very conformity becomes a new source of inefficiency. Thus, recently a new approach has been argued which is laughable in Weber's terms. Authority has turned into manipulation but now manipulation has come under attack. This occurred with the publication of 'The Human Side of Enterprise' by McGregor of M. I. T.'s School of Industrial Management in 1960.

McGregor argued that

"The modern industrial organisation is a vast complex of interdependent relations, up, down, across and even 'diagonally'... only collaborative team efforts can make the system work effectively.....a series of linked groups rather than.....a hierarchical structure." (39)

McGregor and others are arguing that industrial organisation must become "truly democratic"; only then will organisation men not lose their creativity to a sterile conformity. These theorists are using such ideas as "participatory democracy", "self-actualisation" and creativity; they accept the failure of pseudo-Gemeinschaft and argue for true community. Whether this is possible under an organisation whose overriding aim is still efficient production of material goods is not important here; what is important is that theorists with the same conception of technical rationality in mind are arguing in terms directly opposed to Weber's conception of bureaucracy.

(39) McGregor The Human Side of Enterprise, page 175, quoted in Oppenheimer, M. "Participative Techniques of Social Integration" in Our Generation, VOL. 6, NO. 3, page 102.

Thus, in considering the rationalisation trend in the twentieth century one has to consider two complementary aspects. First, the growing rationality of the social structure and, secondly, the growing irrationality of individual action within these social structures. Both of these trends are only to be understood in terms of the other, and each can only exist with the other. I will develop these themes in my later discussion of stratification and education.

With reference to the rationalisation trend, social mobility has to be considered in terms of both the possibilities of the present society and the repression of these possibilities within the established system. It is not enough to show that the rate of social mobility has been essentially stable during the twentieth century; social mobility can change both in quantity and in quality. It is my view that there has been a shift from social mobility as a release from social chains in early capitalism to social mobility as a major means of social control in advanced capitalism. There has been a shift from mobility representing the freedom of the individual to mobility representing envy and greed; there has been a shift from the 'open society' to the 'status seekers'. In my view the answer to Bantock's question of 'opportunity for what?' in reference to advanced capitalism is the opportunity to become the same as everyone else, though with always the chance of having a little more of the same thing -- money.

To understand this shift it is necessary to see that social mobility represented the 'possibilities' of early capitalism. It allowed the intensification of the 'struggle with nature' and corresponded to the setting up of the market. The 'struggle' was with physical nature in early American society as opposed to competition between men, but even in Europe, where this was not so social mobility was an essential part of a society in which technological growth was greater than at any previous period in history. This is to be contrasted with the situation to-day, in which the 'struggle with nature' is obsolete (in that material need can effectively be abolished) and social mobility is used to bind man further to the repressive society. This is done by using man's need for (truly) human relations which takes the irrational form of status seeking.

This change in the 'quality' of social mobility, I will later argue, has come to affect the possibility of achieving a high degree of social mobility in terms of quantity. The form that rationalization has taken, while removing external barriers to social mobility, inevitably constructs internal barriers to social mobility. This I consider to be a contradiction within the advanced capitalist system.

PART III

RATIONALISATION AND STRATIFICATION

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this section is to show the twofold effect of rationalisation on stratification:-

- (i) To show that the barriers to social mobility are being eroded i.e. those barriers traditionally considered by sociology (and discussed in the introductory section),
- (ii) To show that, by this very process, new barriers are arising which tend to restrict social mobility.

As I see it, rationalisation tends to remove 'external barriers' to social mobility while inevitably constructing 'internal barriers'. Social mobility has always had two main functions within capitalist society: that of placing people according to ability to perform social roles, and second, that of a socialising agent to maintain stability. As I hope to show, there is, increasingly, a contradiction between these two functions in advanced capitalist society; to fulfil the latter means a restriction of the former. This is a development that derives from the nature of capitalism; it is an inherent contradiction that cannot be overcome by adjustments to the system. This, however, is not to deny the general compatibility between efficiency and stability within advanced capitalism. But, if capitalism is an obsolete system that has outlived its usefulness, it

continues at a cost. Man, as an individual, pays the cost of the increasing repression of his possibilities. This can be seen in the destruction of liberal ideals, or rather the use of liberal ideals to attain their opposite in advanced capitalism. Social mobility, as an expression of individualism, is one example of this.

To consider the effect of rationalisation on the individual requires first a consideration of the effect of rationalisation on the stratification system within which social mobility occurs. I will consider two major dimensions of stratification -- class and status -- as a theoretical basis for considering the changes in the stratification system. As Marx and Weber have been the two major influences in developing stratification theory, I will continue my earlier discussion of their theories in terms of class and status. As I will show, this relates directly to rationalisation in that Weber's separation of class and status is based on the same distinction that allowed him to distinguish between Zweck/Wertrationalitat and between formal/substantive rationality. After putting the class/status split into a dialectical framework, I will argue that rationalisation has developed to an extent such that one must go beyond a pure Marxist position. In fact, rationalisation has increasingly taken the form of the 'coming together' of what Marx thought would be 'opposites'. In this light I will discuss two main pairs of 'opposites': the bourgeoisie/proletariat and function/acquisition; underlying both of these is the class/status 'split'. This will allow

me to discuss the trend towards a 'rational' stratification system -- which I see as a hierarchy of statuses. In that the differentiation within the 'new' middle class represents this tendency towards a 'rational' stratification system the discussion will concentrate on this collectivity.

Up to this point, my discussion will be concerned primarily with my first purpose but in that a rational stratification comes to be a hierarchy of statuses, this becomes an irrational aspect within the rationality of advanced capitalism. This, as I have emphasised, requires a consideration of rationalisation as reification. Reification requires a consideration of another aspect of stratification, i.e. the degree of legitimation of the criteria on which stratification is based. A discussion of the applicability of the recent 'functional theory of stratification' to advanced capitalism will then be the basis for combining rationality and reification. This leads back to social mobility and the 'internal barriers', which can then be discussed more fully as they apply to education.

RATIONALISATION AND STRATIFICATION

The sociology of stratification has to decide what is important as a basis for classification of people from the numerous criteria that could be used. However, whatever is chosen, it would seem that, following Weber, stratification is dealing with the distribution of power in society. Power is defined broadly as,

"the chance of a man or of a number of men to realise their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action." (40)

Once power in this sense is seen as the basis for study, an analytic distinction can be made as to the two elements in stratification: first, the foundations of power, i.e. what criteria should be used as a basis for classification, and second, the degree to which any criterion is legitimated.

The problem of the 'foundations' of power revolves around the discussion of class and status. Though different sociologists emphasise one over the other, it is to-day generally agreed that to understand any stratification system, it is necessary to consider both stratification by class and by status. Weber's third category of party has not been developed by sociologists to the same extent as either class or status. In any case, party is only incidental to my discussion in that I am not concerned specifically with the manipulation of political power, per se. The Marxists have been able to

(40) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, op.cit., page 180.

ignore the importance of status to social action by the use of the concept of 'false class consciousness'; however, the usual position taken by sociologists is that though the importance of class is not to be underestimated, as Marx emphasised, status considerations are also essential, as Weber emphasised. How true is it that Weber's analysis of status can be viewed as an important addition to Marx's analysis of class? To answer this requires a discussion of, first, the meaning of class as used by Marx and Weber, and second, the meaning of status as used by Weber and what this means within a Marxist framework.

The first line of the Communist Manifesto: "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles" represents one meaning of class to Marx, the distinction between oppressor and oppressed that Marx saw as fundamental to all modes of production. (41) Elsewhere Marx recognises the distinctive feature of capitalism as a class society as opposed to earlier modes of production. In the German Ideology, he contrasts a class system with a system of estates and continues,

"The distinction between the personal and the class individual, the accidental nature of conditions of life for the individual, appears only with the emergence of class, which itself is a product of the bourgeoisie." (42)

Thus, Marx recognised that class could only be defined historically, depending on the mode of production.

(41) Bottomore, T. B., Classes in Modern Society (George, Allen and Unwin Limited, London, 1965), page 23.

(42) ibid, page 23.

Also, Marx argues that within any particular mode of production classes only polarise into opposing groups as the contradictions within the system develop. Though in one sense there are always oppressors and oppressed, class conflict can only be sustained when the possibilities of the system allow an alternative definition of society to exist for the oppressed. (43). Thus, feudalism did not polarise into class conflict between the aristocracy and the rising bourgeoisie (supported by the peasants) until the contradictions within feudalism developed (44). Likewise, Marx did not see class conflict developing in capitalism until capitalism was 'pregnant' with socialism. The early capitalist society in the U.S.A. approximated to what Marx called 'simple commodity production', and was thus, classless. (45) Even with the separation of owners from non-owners of production,

(43) This point refers to the objective development of society as opposed to the subjective development of class consciousness (i.e. the basis for Marx's distinction between a 'class-in-itself' and a 'class-for-itself'). This latter distinction has been stretched to ridiculous lengths by contemporary Marxists, to describe the contemporary situation in which the 'problem' of an almost totally passive working class is said to be just one of 'false class consciousness'. To argue this requires a separation of the subject and object which goes far beyond the 'unity of opposites' of a dialectical framework. The subjective element is viewed as coming from the outside (usually from the Party); the logic of this leads to the position in which a dictator can justify total oppression on the basis of acting in the 'true' interests of the working class. For Marx, on the other hand, the working class contained their subjectivity by their very existence. This would only have developed to revolutionary class consciousness as the objective conditions also developed.

(44) Lefebvre, H. op.cit., page 92.

(45) Sweezy, P. The Present as History (Monthly Review Press, New York, 1953), page 58.

capitalism does not immediately polarise into two opposing groups. Apart from pre-capitalist groupings that continue on into capitalism (e.g. aristocracy and peasants) Marx emphasises the divisions within both the bourgeoisie and proletariat.

It has been necessary in recent years to stress the similarities between the work of Marx and Weber due to the tendency in sociology (particularly American) to use Weber as a device to discredit Marx. In the field of stratification contemporary sociologists have stressed the importance of 'objective' factors to Weber (46) to counteract the influence of sociologists such as Lloyd Warner who have used the 'subjective' approach, in the name of Weber, to the neglect of objective factors. Yet, class does not have the same meaning for Marx and Weber, in spite of the fact that both emphasised the objective factors in class formation. It is true that for both, class was based on economic factors but the meaning of 'economic factors' differs greatly.

The crucial point is that, for Marx, social class is always an historical category; it is not possible to define social class simply as a social stratum based on economic elements. (47) The existence of a social class at any one time represents man's struggle with nature, through which man develops historically. Classes, though existing as objective fact for individuals at any one time,

(46) See Tumin, Melvin. Social Stratification (Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1967), page 6; and Mills, C. W. "The Sociology of Stratification" in Power, Politics, and People, ed. Horowitz, I.L. (Oxford University, New York, 1963), page 317.

(47) Lichtheim, George. Marxism (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1961), page 387.

can only be considered in terms of their past creation by man and their future destruction by man. The subjective action of the bourgeoisie was necessary for the establishment of the capitalist mode of production from which flowed the growth of the bourgeoisie and the setting up of the proletariat as objective fact. But even the proletariat existed objectively for Marx only in terms of their future subjective role as the revolutionary class. As stated earlier in a dialectical analysis, the object and subject exist in unity, though it is a unity of opposites within capitalism.

For Marx, social class includes 'style of life' but this cannot be explained in terms of crude economic determinism, anymore than substructure determines superstructure in a simplistic fashion. In both, the relationship is dialectical. In non-dialectical terms, style of life (or similarly superstructure) can only be a reflection of objective economic factors. In dialectical terms both exist together; one can only be understood in terms of the other. Historically, class exists only for man's possible freedom; class is an expression of man's need for a higher style of life.

How does this differ from Weber's conception of class?

"We may speak of class when 1) a number of people have in common a specific causal component of their life chances, in so far as 2) this component is represented exclusively by economic interests in the possession of goods and opportunities for income, and 3) is represented under the conditions of the commodity or labour market." (48)

(48) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, op.cit., page 181.

From this initial definition Weber goes on to argue that,

"'Property' and 'lack of property' are therefore, the basic categories of all class situations." (49)

The seemingly Marxist nature of this definition is illusory in that ownership/non-ownership are important for Weber only in as much as they lead to accumulation of wealth and possibilities of future accumulation (i.e. category 2 above). At the time of writing, Weber was correct to see ownership as the most important factor; he probably assumed (as Marx did before him) that it would continue to be the most important factor. However, theoretically, Weber would have no difficulty in adapting to the present-day situation when a large mass of small entrepreneurs receive considerably less than many who own no property. Weber was concerned first and foremost with the distribution of material goods; and defined class in this way (50). For Marx, class flows from the production of material goods, distribution though important is secondary. As already pointed out, the production is important for it is the means to the development of man; for Marx ownership is a question of power over the development of man. As long as the process of material accumulation is external to man, as long as material accumulation is the end of human society, it cannot lead to his development; man may have more but he cannot be more.

(49) ibid, page 182.

(50) Cox, Oliver C. "Max Weber on Social Stratification: A Critique" in A.S.R. vol. 15, 1950, pages 223-227.

Another way of putting this point is that Weber's concept of class is materialistic but is not dialectical. It may seem that dialectics are a form of mental gymnastics that allows one to exonerate Marx from failing to consider all the 'factors' involved. But it must, at least, be recognised that Marx's thought only makes sense in a dialectical perspective. From Weber's concept of class comes a picture of man who is a materialist, similar to the 'economic man' assumed by the classical economists. Unless we are to assume that Marx was inconsistent in both criticising the classical economists on this point AND in basing his own analysis on the same premise, then we must concede the importance of the word 'dialectical' before materialism.

Of course, this is not to argue that Weber was a materialist for he also emphasised the sphere of operation of values in addition to the class sphere of material interests. This can be seen in Weber's distinction between types of class action -- i.e. societal or communal. Societal class action was to Weber purely formally rational whereas communal class action involved the introduction of values from outside the market sphere. To Marx, the concept of class can only be understood in terms of the class struggle leading to the overthrow of the social order. To Weber, class action of this type, though possible, must be of the communal type i.e. involve the introduction of values from outside the class sphere.

For a class to exist as a community requires the introduction of values; these must come from outside the market, for class, in flowing from the market, is formally rational. Values, for Weber, result in another dimension of stratification, that is separate from class - that of status. Weber defines status situation as

"every typical component of the life fate of men that is determined by a specific, positive or negative, social estimation of honour." (51)

and emphasises that status groups are usually communities. Though recognising that status can be built on a class basis (giving the example of certain Swiss cities where only members of the same tax group dance with each other) he goes on to point out that,

"(status honour) normally stands in sharp opposition to the pretensions of sheer property." (52)

In this sense status groups cut across class lines; the emphasising of hereditary factors is the most common example. As Weber emphasises, 'style of life' is the basis of distinction and this cannot be bought. The 'nouveaux riches' are the best example of the opposition of class and status; families with recently acquired material wealth are refused admittance to

(51) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. op. cit. pp. 186-187.

(52) *ibid*

'high society' on the basis of inappropriate life-styles.

Weber notes the opposition of status to the market in his comment on the effect of the status order.

"The hindrance of the free development of the market occurs first for those goods which status groups directly withheld from free exchange by monopolisation."
(53)

and again,

".....the market and its processes 'knows no personal distinctions': 'functional' interests dominate it. It knows nothing of 'honour'."
(54)

It is necessary to comment on the relationship between status and bureaucracy, as this not immediately clear from Weber's writings. At one point, Weber says,

"A consistent execution of bureaucratic domination means the levelling of status 'honour'. Hence, if the principle of the free market is not at the same time restricted, it means the universal domination of the 'class situation'."
(55)

(53) *ibid*, pp. 192-193

(54) *ibid*

(55) *ibid*, p. 215

Yet, at another point,

"The salary (of the bureaucrat) is not measured like a wage in terms of work done, but according to 'status', that is, according to the kind of function (the 'rank') and in addition, possibly according to the length of service."

(56)

Weber also points out that the growth of educational qualifications as the basis for entry into a bureaucracy leads to 'status' claims being made on the basis of holding these qualifications. Though this is undoubtedly true in reality, it seems to me that in Weber's terms (i.e. given his assumptions over the possibility of formal rationality) an 'ideal type' bureaucracy should be a hierarchy of class positions rather than a hierarchy of statuses. The rationalisation of education that Weber describes leads to education becoming solely a means to material ends. As long as education is related to the work to be performed (i.e. it is vocational) it is rational for the bureaucracy, and equivalent to other forms of labour sold on the market. It seems to me that if bureaucracy is to embody formal rationality, certain aspects of Weber's ideal type are 'irrational'.

These are:-

- (i) Tenure for life
- (ii) Salary according to rank and length of service
- (iii) A 'necessary' career up the hierarchy.

(56) *ibid*, p. 203

On the contrary, there should be competition for all positions based on ability to perform the role; secondly this ability should be constantly tested. Also wages should be based purely on market criteria. This corresponds more closely to Michael Young's fictional meritocracy in which a career might be office-boy to president, and back to office-boy as age takes its toll. (57)

From Weber's conception of the nature of status and class, plus his conception of capitalism and bureaucracy it follows that to an increasing extent, in advanced capitalism,

- (i) Class and status should exist only in separate areas

and

- (ii) Status stratification should be subordinated to class stratification.

For Weber, market capitalism is qualitatively different from previous areas for capitalism can be defined in purely formally rational terms; or to put it another way, status considerations have been totally removed from the economic sphere. Capitalism needs no further legitimation than its own existence; it embodies rational-legal authority. In pre-capitalist societies status claims were used as a basis for legitimation of monopolistic class positions. But the pure market system rejects such status claims and so status groups are increasingly removed from the economic sphere. As Weber made it clear that he considered

(57) Young, Michael, The Rise of the Meritocracy (Penguin Books Ltd., Harmondsworth, 1961)

rationalisation inevitable, the dominant basis of stratification within capitalism should be class. A rational stratification system in Weber's terms should be a hierarchy of class situations.

As has already been implied, for Marx status (or style-of-life) exists in dialectical relationship with class. It is never separate from class, but it is not a mere reflection of class. With Weber, Marx recognised the ideological role of status as a legitimisation of economic power but also status is essential in a more fundamental way. Life-styles exist for class; the bourgeoisie set up the market not as an end-in-itself but as a means to a better way of life. Liberalism was an ideology but not just as a means to hide the 'real' nature of the bourgeoisie; liberalism was essential for the setting up of capitalism, i.e. as an end-in-itself. Weber cannot see this due to his emphasis on the formally rational nature of capitalism and his non-dialectical conception of class; thus, in capitalism status and class must be separate. For Marx, 'style-of-life' must also exist for the proletariat to exist as a class. The proletariat, unlike the bourgeoisie, did not exist for a style-of-life; on the contrary, they were forced to sell their labour on the market. However, 'style-of-life' is of fundamental importance for the proletariat in a different way; it provides a necessary basis for the proletariat to realise their role as the negation of capitalism. It is the contradiction between their lives as instrument in the prod-

uction sphere with their lives as ends-in-themselves in the status sphere that provides the basis for the class struggle. Only by living in a sphere which is not defined by capitalist rationality can the proletariat realise the repressive nature of their role within the production sphere. Thus, Marx's description of the proletariat as "a class in but not of civil society" is central to an understanding of Marx's concept of class.

If the history of capitalism is considered in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the relevance of both Marx's and Weber's theories of stratification become clear. To understand the growth of class conflict between the owners and non-owners of capital requires a consideration of Marx's perspective, if this conflict is recognised as being inextricably linked with a political conception of society. The fact that the bourgeoisie as a class developed means of legitimation of their position, also needs Marx's views, if this is seen as an inherent need for their continued existence. On the other hand, the continuation of pre-capitalist styles-of-life long after the establishment of a market economy provides numerous examples of the need for the consideration of class and status as separate spheres. Of course, Marx recognised the existence of 'estate-hangovers' within market capitalism; but, ultimately, he considered it unimportant for the development of capitalism into socialism. At least with the classic case of Britain, it would seem doubtful this is true; since the rising British bourgeoisie combined with the old aristocracy to form the new

ruling class and for various historical reasons remained subservient to the aristocratic tradition up to very recent times (58). Though Weber's analytic category of status is clearly applicable to the British bourgeoisie's life-styles, it is to be remembered that Weber thought that status considerations would be removed from the economic sphere as market capitalism and rationalisation developed. Contrary to this, British capitalism developed with status elements within the economic sphere: The belief in the value of "amateurism" has resisted the growth of bureaucratisation (compared to other countries, notably Germany) in both industry and government (59).

Of greater importance to my argument is the development of the styles-of-life of the bourgeoisie and proletariat, without imitation of pre-capitalist styles-of-life. As argued earlier this is an essential element for both Marx (for whom it exists in dialectical relationship with purely economic class factors) and for Weber (for whom it exists as a separate sphere from purely economic class factors). As Weber emphasises status groups exist as communities i.e. on the basis of the members feeling they belong together. To put this another way, the relations between the members must exist, to some extent, as ends-in-themselves. Capitalist society is, as Tonnies showed, an expression of the shift from Gemeinschaft to

(58) See Anderson, Perry, "Origins of the Present Crisis" in Toward Socialism (Collins, London, 1965), Anderson, P. and Blackburn, R. eds., pages 11-52.

(59) ibid, page 43.

Gesellschaft. However, community continued to exist in capitalism in the area of private life; a separate style-of-life only existed on the basis of the existence of human relationships within communities. The tendency was for the proletariat and bourgeoisie to develop different styles-of-life, as the split between the classes grew; but, this did not always occur. Particularly in the U.S.A. it is difficult to see a style-of-life specific to the proletariat at the end of the nineteenth century; communities clearly cut across class boundaries. Thus, the existence of communities is an insufficient basis for class conflict but it is a necessary prerequisite.

The preceding theoretical considerations have been necessary as a basis for considering the effect of rationalisation on the stratification system in the twentieth century. In my view, neither the work of Marx or Weber is sufficient to understand the stratification system that has developed since they wrote. Modern society tends towards a hierarchy of statuses, with less and less clear-cut boundaries between levels. Ranking can be done on a variety of criteria but these tend to be 'consistent' with each other and so arrive at similar results. This is clearly not Marx's image of the future but neither does it flow from Weber's work. Marxists have always had a tendency to see the revolution as just around the corner; at the end of his life, Marx, himself, was surprised at the durability of capitalism. Marx overestimated the importance of the material contradictions that he saw as leading

to the impoverishment of the proletariat; he underestimated the ability of the bourgeoisie to act as a group to overcome these contradictions.

The reification that Marx saw as greater in capitalism than in any previous 'stage' has extended even further than Marx could perceive. The problems of surplus that Marx conceived as leading to capitalism destroying itself, rather produced social forms (in particular, imperialism and consumer capitalism) that have enabled capitalism to survive. The rationalisation of social relations has proceeded to the extent that the negation has little basis by which to perceive itself as separate from 'that-which-is'; to the extent this occurs the proletariat cease to exist as a class (in a Marxist sense). Class is replaced by status, in the form of status-seeking (most clearly described, empirically, by Packard).

(60)

However, status in its modern form cannot be explained by a Weberian analysis. It is status in that it is based on honour and attempts to exclude others. However, status is no longer rooted in communities but rather the rise of status-seeking is linked with the decline of communities. To understand both these trends it is necessary to see there has been a 'take-over' of the 'private, status, style-of-life' sphere of life by the market criterion of money. As status is increasingly derived from ownership of material goods so status is effectively bought on the market.

(60) Packard, Vance, The Status Seekers (Pocket Books, Inc., New York, 1961)

In that the market reduces qualitative differences to quantitative differences there is no basis on which communities can grow up. 'Community' was central to Weber's conception of status in that some relationships of equality were necessary as a basis for establishing a style-of-life. These relationships of equality allowed life to exist, at least partially, as an end-in-itself, for even if status-equals wished to emphasise their status, this would be outside their original status groups - in these groups their status was assured. In that status is reduced to quantitative differences to-day no status is assured. Another way of putting this is that status is never achieved but only sought.

The irrationality of modern status seeking (irrational in that the means are not related to the end sought) has been expressed well by Maurice Stein in his description of to-day's 'organisation men' (who, it should be noted, work in the most rationalised areas of modern capitalism):-

"Social roles and role transitions become occasions for anxiety rather than vehicles for human fulfillment. There is an unfortunate inner dynamic in modern 'specious' community life wherein the very spuriousness creates anxiety which propels the climb to new levels of status in the hope that the gnawing will cease, yet this upward movement only leads to further anxiety aroused by the insufficiencies of the new level." (61)

(61) Stein, Maurice, The Eclipse of Community (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1960), page 247.

Honour is derived from membership of groups but this is derived 'in passing'; the group is viewed by the individual as a means to affirm his self-identity so that he can 'move on'. Thus, the relationship between the individuals are ultimately instrumental; the group is a pseudo-community.

Status-seeking takes place not only in the private sphere but also in the public sphere, particularly within the bureaucracies; the distinction between the public and private spheres is removed as bureaucracies take on pseudo-community form. Furthermore, as opposed to the necessary separation of Weber's class and status within capitalism, status-seeking is, in Marxist terms, required for the continued existence of capitalism. Not only does status-seeking often simply take the form of ownership of material goods, but this is brought about by manipulation, through advertising, by class interests for profit. Expanding consumption is necessary for the growth of capitalism; with the alternative of an economic slump and possible political insurrection. Weber's 'rational' capitalism requires to be sustained by 'irrational' status to continue to exist!

Status-seeking is one example within modern capitalism of the 'irrational element in its rationality' (62) , and the dialectical 'unity' between irrationality and rationality. However,

(62) See page 43 , above.

in that this development exists due to the partial overcoming of earlier contradictions (expressed in class conflict), there has also been a trend towards the 'coming together' of various 'opposites'. The rise of status-seeking, within a Marxist framework, does not represent the replacement of class by status but rather the partial overcoming of the contradiction between economic position and style-of-life. Yet at the same time, the existence of status-seeking shows that this trend cannot be total. If it were total, reification would be complete and human beings would exist only as things. Status-seeking, on the other hand, is a human response even though it is so blind that it binds man even further to the source of his anxiety, and so can never satisfy him.

Directly related to the 'coming together' of class and status is the 'coming together' of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. 'Embourgeoisement' has been the subject of much sociological work, particularly in Europe where sociology does not suffer from too many difficulties in recognising the existence of a 'separate' working class, at least in the past. From the widely differing emphasis, both in terms of the relevant facts and how these are interpreted theoretically, certain points are important within my theoretical position. First, the term embourgeoisement does not imply the absorption of the working class into an already existing middle class. The changes in the working class are part of much bigger changes that have also transformed the middle

class (63); there has been a rise of both a 'new' working class and a 'new' middle class which have tended to converge. Second, factors such as the growth of material affluence, or the changing nature of labour, though important by themselves must be understood in terms of the relation between the sphere of economic production and the sphere of style-of-life.

For my interests, in terms of the changed nature of social mobility, the transformation of the middle class is of greater importance than the absorption of the working class to be a part 'of' society. The new middle class are the increasing group of workers who are educated, whose work involves servicing, distributing or co-ordinating, who work for large, bureaucratic organisations in various institutional spheres, who tend to be both geographically and socially mobile, who tend to live in the expanding suburbs of large cities, etc. Though this group is easily visible in modern society, it is difficult to define; it has been variously described as composed of 'white-collar' workers (64), 'black-coated' workers (65), and 'organisation men'. (66)

(63) Goldthorpe, J.H. and Lockwood, D., "Affluence and the British Class Structure" in The Sociological Review Vol. XI (2), July 1963, pp. 151-155.

(64) Mills, C.W. White Collar. op.cit.

(65) Lockwood, D. The Black-coated Worker: a Study in Class Consciousness (Allen and Unwin, London, 1958).

(66) Whyte, W.H. The Organisation Man (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1961).

The reason for this is,

"White-collar people cannot be adequately defined along any one possible dimension of stratification -- skill, function, class, status or power. They are generally in the middle ranges of each of these dimensions and on every descriptive attribute. Their position is more definable in terms of their relative differences from other strata than in any absolute terms." (67)

The major difference that distinguishes them from the old middle class (or bourgeoisie) is non-ownership of the means of production. They work for those who own capital and sell their labour-power on the market with the working class. The wage (or rather salary) is the form of income, not profit. The major difference that distinguishes the new middle class from the old working class (or proletariat) is that the former are not involved in producing or extracting things; rather, as stated, they are involved in servicing, distributing or co-ordinating.

An historical perspective is required (as always) to understand the new middle class. As a group, they flow directly out of the rationalisation of modern society. The removal of work from direct production or extraction has occurred, first, as the size of economic units has increased and, second, as industry has shifted from the secondary to the tertiary type (68). Thus,

(67) Mills, C. W. White Collar, op.cit., page 75.

(68) This distinction refers to the shift from manufacturing industry (i.e. secondary type) to service industry (i.e. tertiary type). Examples of the latter type include banks, broadcasting companies, advertising agencies, universities, etc. (i.e. industry where no material product is made). This is primarily a shift that has occurred in the twentieth century; the shift from primary (i.e. extractive) industry to secondary type occurred mainly at the time of the industrial revolution.

both the relative number of individuals involved in producing things within economic organisations, and the relative number of organisations based on manufacturing, have decreased. Rationalisation in the form of mechanisation or automation is at the basis of much of this changeover. Mills quotes J. F. Newhurst's figures in estimating that, in the U.S.A. in the middle of the nineteenth century, 17.6 billion h.p. hours were expended in industry -- only 6% by mechanical energy; by the middle of the twentieth century this had risen to 410.4 billion h.p. hours -- 94% by mechanical energy. (69) However, this trend has also been paralleled by bureaucratisation i.e. the mechanisation of human organisations.

It seems clear that Mills came to his conception the 'white-collar' group primarily by comparison with the old middle class; and the basic difference between the two was based on the question of dependence. Mills's despair with American society derived out of his identification with the values of early American democracy, when, "perhaps four-fifths of the free, white population were in one sense or another independent proprietors." (70) At this time the "self-made man", the "rugged individualist", or Riesman's "inner-directed" man was not just an ideological justification of the status

(69) ibid, page 66.

(70) Mills, C. W. The Power Elite (Oxford University Press, New York, 1956), page 260.

quo; success was measured in terms of one's ability to acquire property, those who did succeed were those who were the best innovators, those who could remain one step in front of the rest. Thus, success in early American society demanded independence. With this image of the old middle class, Mills contrasted the new middle class:-

"The white-collar man enters the public view as a tragic figure. He takes up where the little businessman ended; the powerless, little-man aspect engulfs whatever heroic features might be thought up for him. The white-collar people, it would seem, are not being heroised by the old middle class; indeed, they can only be heroised collectively, as they join unions or fight inflations or patiently live out their slow misery. As individuals, they are only insecure and tortured creatures, being pushed by forces or swallowed by movements that they do not understand, and that senators do not have to face. At the centre of the picture is business bureaucracy with its trained managerial staff and its tamed white-collar mass. And it is within these structures of monopoly that the bulk of the middle class men and women must make their prearranged ways." (71)

Success for the white-collar man is fundamentally different; the organisation exists as a fixed entity for him, he cannot change it, he can only change his position within it. This depends first, on objective criteria and, second, on his conformity to the organisation's demands. It is the one who is out of step with the organisation that is a threat; all innovation must be through the group

(71) Mills, C. W. "The Competitive Personality" in Power, Politics, and People, op.cit., page 268.

in order not to upset the smooth running of the organisation. But this does not mean competition is replaced by co-operation; rather togetherness hides a seething competition, even more intense, because it has to take place within such narrow boundaries.

Mills was well aware of the paradoxical relationship between the individual and the social group. The individualism of early U.S. society corresponded to the existence of numerous communities which formed the basis of U.S. democracy. Despite the fact that early U.S. society was based totally on individual aggrandisement, it was possible for communities to exist in the private sphere of style-of-life. These existed partly as associations rather than communities in that they were instrumental for setting up the government to allow free-play of market forces. But, in as much as the government and other institutions (e.g. family, religion) existed, to some degree, apart from the economic sphere of individual competition then some communal relations existed. Paradoxically, it would seem that, in one sense, Puritanism added to the existence of communal relations. In de-emphasising material consumption, the private life could be removed from the sphere of individual competition. This differs fundamentally from the pseudo-communities of to-day where the underlying relationship is one of competition, for material consumption underlies style-of-life. At the same time, the early communities existed in an alienated form for the communal relations of private life had to exist separately from the individual

competition of public life. The paradoxical relationship of the individual and community was expressed in the fact that individualism has declined with the 'eclipse of community'. Inevitably, the development of market economy led to monopolisation of the means of production and a problem of surplus. The twentieth century has seen the rise of consumer capitalism with the necessity to both stimulate and control demand. The incorporation of the private sphere into the economy increasingly removed communal relations and made competitive, instrumental relations characteristic of all areas of life.

"We face the curious and probably unprecedented situation here: a society of material comfort and apparent security in which the most fundamental of human relationships -- that between mother and child -- has become at the very least problematical. No one is surprised to discover that businessmen treat each other in impersonal and manipulative terms; but surely it should be some cause for some dismay to find it habitual, as the authors of Crestwood Heights report, that mothers regard suburban children as "cases" the moment they lag behind the highly formalised routine of their peers, or still worse, show signs of distinctive individuality." (72)

The circle becomes very dangerously near to being closed when the anxiety, insecurity and lack of self-identity, that results from the decline of communal relationships are used to incorporate man further into the economic sphere i.e. production and consumption.

(72) Stein, Maurice R., op.cit., page 283.

Embourgeoisement of the working class follows directly from the factors discussed in reference to the 'new' middle class. However, in most discussions the additional factor of the degree of inequality of wealth and income is usually considered. Quite often those who have supported the thesis have tended to assume a decrease in inequality while those against have been quick to point out the reality of continuing inequality. (73) Though the latter position is more accurate, the whole question does not seem to be directly relevant to whether the working class exists as a separate group. In as much as inequalities remain large the question is rather why has not the class struggle developed in the way predicted by Marx? It would seem that in political terms the maintenance of steadily rising material levels is the basic requirement of stability, for this allows all levels of society to stave off the nagging pain of status anxiety.

As with the middle class the rationalisation of economic production (i.e. mechanisation and bureaucratisation) has tended to remove the worker from the sphere of actual production and provided the basis for material affluence. Unskilled labour is increasingly redundant in modern society; following from this, gradations have grown up on the basis of different levels of skill even for those who do physical work. But physical work, in general, is on the de-

(73) See Westergaard, J. H., "The Withering Away of Class -- a contemporary myth" in Towards Socialism, op.cit., pages 80-85.

cline so that the relative status of white-collar work is on the decline. Growing efficiency has provided the basis for material affluence and increased the problem of surplus. The capitalist answer to this problem of surplus has been a mass-consumption society. Production aimed at serving the largest market -- the lower-income groups. These changes have, of course, taken place at different times and at different speeds in the various Western societies (74).

As with the new middle class, the above only becomes relevant in terms of the coming together of class and status; for the working class can only exist as separate if it has a separate style-of-life. Working class culture (especially Britain's) has been the subject of much sociological study in recent years, due to its changing nature. British community studies have provided evidence of the breakdown of communal relations, based on extended kinship ties (75), and expressed in such working class institutions as the pubs, football, and the labour movement. These studies show well the shift from status

(74) E. J. Hobsbawm (Industry and Empire, Random House, New York, 1968, pages 233-251), noting the sluggishness of Britain in terms of this trend, puts forward an interesting thesis in terms of the predominance of Britain in fields such as fashion, pop music, entertainment in general, in recent years. He suggests that this represents the cultural vitality of Britain's relatively homogeneous working class as they become, for the first time, the focus of economic production.

(75) Young, M. and Willmott, P., Family and Kinship in East London (Routledge, Kegan and Paul, London, 1957).
Mays, J. B. and Vereker, Charles, Urban Redevelopment and Social Change (Liverpool University Press, Liverpool, 1961).

as it exists in communal relations to status-seeking based on material possessions,

".....Bethnal Greeners are not, as we see it, concerned to any marked extent with what is usually thought of as "status". It is true, of course, that people have different incomes, different kinds of jobs, different kinds of houses -- in this respect there is much less uniformity than in Greenleight -- even different standards of education. But these attributes are not so important in evaluating others. It is personal characteristics that matter. The first thing they think of about Bert is not that he has a 'fridge' and a car. They see him as bad-tempered, or a real good sport, or the man with a way with women, or one of the best boxers of the Repton Club, or the person who got married to Ada last year. In a community of long-standing, status, in so far as it is determined by job and income and education, is more or less irrelevant to a person's worth. He is judged instead, if he is judged at all, more in the round, as a person with the usual mixture of all kinds of qualities, some good, some bad, many indefinable. He is more of a life-portrait than a figure on a scale." (76)

To this account of the lack of status-seeking in old working class communities should be added the fact that these communities existed as status groups and also smaller status groups existed within them based on different life-styles. There is no need to imply some idyllic conception of equality of status within a community (as is implied in the above) to make the distinction between status-groups and status-seeking. The point is that man in these communities derived prestige from a variety of stable status groups and also from just belonging to the community as a whole. Material

(76) Young, M. and Willmott, P., op.cit.

status-seeking, on the other hand, reduces status to one scale and removes any relationships of equality.

The convergence of the new middle class and new working class can also be seen in terms of the decline of 'true' communities. Lockwood and Goldthorpe argue for convergence (77) (as opposed to assimilation of the working class) in that the "solidaristic collectivism" and "radical individualism" have been converging into 'instrumental collectivism'. They argue that the collectivism of the working class has ceased to exist as an end-in-itself and has become instead a "utilitarian attachment of a specific economic association". (78) At the same time the radical individualism of the old entrepreneurial middle class has been replaced by an instrumental collectivism. This point can be most clearly seen in the changing nature of trade unions (of the working class) and the growth of white-collar unions in recent years. To this analysis should be added the fact that the radical individualism of the old middle class in the economic sphere existed with communal relations in the sphere of style-of-life, and the decline of communities is directly related to the decline of individualism.

As well as the 'coming together' of class and status, and of the working class and the middle class, a third pair of 'opposites' can be considered. In 1921, the English socialist, R. H. Tawney,

(77) op. cit., Lockwood and Goldthorpe, page 153.

(78) ibid.

wrote a little book called "The Acquisitive Society" (79) which amounted to a critique of capitalism as it existed in England at that time. He laid down two types of society -- the acquisitive society, and the functional society -- which he considered must be in opposition. Tawney called capitalism acquisitive,

"because the whole tendency and interest and preoccupation is to promote the acquisition of wealth." (80)

The functional society is the socialist alternative to capitalism; it is functional in that rewards are distributed only on the basis of usefulness to the system. The functional society would abolish privilege,

"for the definition of a privilege is a right to which no corresponding function is attached." (81)

Tawney considered that the acquisitive society could not be functional for, following Marx, he believed that the growth of privilege was inevitable as the inherent contradictions developed within capitalism. Both these writers thought that as irrationality of ends came into contradiction with the rationality of means the resulting growth in monopoly, exploitation and privilege would result in a decrease in even the rationality of means. Thus, socialism would not only be more rational in terms of ends but also

(79) Tawney, R. H., The Acquisitive Society (Collins Press, London, 1961).

(80) ibid, page 32.

(81) ibid, page 28.

in terms of means.

It is important to note that Tawney, unlike his Fabian colleagues, was not a utilitarian and following from this his emphasis on 'function' (i.e. means) was not due to a neglect of ends. He saw that to ignore human ends was representative of capitalist rationality and that socialism must be first and foremost a transformation of the ends of society. This is to be seen in his attack on those who put forward 'productivity' as the basis for curing economic ills (82) for in doing so they accept the social relations through which productivity is achieved. Despite this, Tawney based his critique of capitalism around the idea of function. The failings of both Tawney and Marx can be seen in advanced capitalist society when growing efficiency is based upon growing acquisitiveness. Rationalisation has proceeded to such an extent that the existence of privilege (in Tawney's terms) is difficult to ascertain.

Before bringing the above trends together in a discussion of rationalisation as reification, it is necessary to consider the other element in stratification i.e. the degree of legitimation of power. The generalisation can be made that a high degree of legitimation, in increasing the acceptance of subordination, increases the possible use of power. At the same time, power is limited in the sense that it can only be exercised in the ways that are legitimated

(82) ibid, page 11.

by society. To understand why this is so requires a fuller consideration of legitimation.

Men define power; and come to be defined by their own definitions. There are three 'moments' in this process: externalisation, objectivation and internalisation (83). This process, of course, is basic to all aspects of the social world but to take a hypothetical example in the context of power -- A society may in time of war decide by majority decision to give a large amount of power to one man (i.e. they externalise their own power). A minority, however, may object and be forced into submission by physical force. Once established, this leader exists as objective reality for all society and men tend to obey his work not only because of the function he plays but also just because he exists. Thus, it may be possible for the leader to retain power even after the end of the war. He may even be able to pass on power to his son and establish a link between a large amount of power and his family name. As new generations are born into that society it may be possible to socialise the young so that they internalise the relationship between absolute power and the leader's family name. This may even occur to such an extent that absolute power becomes synonymous in that society's language with the name of the family. This social institution then becomes both objectively and subjectively natural.

(83) Berger, Peter L. and Luckmann, Thomas, The Social Construction of Reality (Anchor Books, New York, 1967), page 61.

Both Marx and Weber were concerned with authority rather than naked power; however, neither emphasised sufficiently the differences between objective reality and internalised objective reality (i.e. the difference between authority and manipulation). Manipulation introduces a new dimension to power. As C. W. Mills describes it:-

"Manipulation is a secret or impersonal exercise of power; the one who is influenced is not explicitly told what to do but is nevertheless subject to the will of another Impersonal manipulation is more insidious than coercion precisely because it is hidden; one cannot locate the enemy and declare war upon him." (84)

Because the possibilities of power are much greater when authority is transformed into manipulation, it is possible for Herbert Marcuse to say:

"'Totalitarian' is not only a terroristic political co-ordination of society, but also a non-terroristic economic-technical co-ordination which operates through the manipulation of needs by vested interests." (85)

and that the unhappiness of the manipulated can co-exist with a state of euphoria (86).

Both Mill's and Marcuse's comments on manipulation come from works concerned with modern-day man. With these authors, I see the transition from authority to manipulation as characteristic of advanced capitalism. If man has no sphere of life in which he stands

(84) Mills, C. W. White Collar (Oxford University Press, New York, 1951), pages 109-110.

(85) Marcuse, H. One-Dimensional Man, op.cit., page 3.

(86) ibid, page 5.

apart from reified society, then he has no basis to see the power that controls him as anything but natural and comes to identify his interests with those that control his very existence. The agents of the new form of control have been the social sciences which have developed the techniques that vested interests have put into effect in the 'human relations' approach in industry, in advertising, in politics, etc.

As I have tried to show, these developments have had consequence far beyond those envisaged by Marx or Weber. As Marcuse has argued, advanced capitalism has developed in such a way that both Marx's concepts of alienation and false class consciousness are increasingly untenable. (87) With increasing manipulation the subjective and objective spheres are joined together; self-alienation becomes absurd if man cannot envisage a non-alienated self, if the self is controlled by outside interests, and further if he derives satisfaction from the society that caused his former alienated state. As with self-alienation, so with false class consciousness; they both assume areas of freedom within capitalism. Also Weber's definition of power in terms of the 'ability to realise one's will' becomes untenable if man has no will other than that of society. C. W. Mills described the lower levels of society as increasingly passive, increasingly powerless. This description referred to not only the 'bottom of the pile' but also to those in

(87) ibid, pages 11-12.

the middle who possess the foundations of power i.e. status, largely through ownership of material goods. In particular, the white collar workers have status but have no power, in that they are manipulated from above.

The question of the power of the manipulators arises here. This is not directly my concern in that I am interested in the social mobility of the powerless mass of society. However, it is necessary to get away from a conspiracy view of history, especially to-day when, as I have argued, the control of man comes to be total. Though it is true that, in one sense, the "Power Elite" of the U.S.A. probably has more power than any other small group in history (as Mills (88) argued) in another sense, they are also controlled by their own power. Even at the top, power tends to reside in social roles, not in individuals; power tends to be functional as opposed to being exploited as a basis for privilege. More generally, when it is argued that total manipulation becomes 'necessary' for society this does not imply a revolutionary situation that the 'manipulators' overcome by consciously inaugurated policies. It seems to me that more and more capitalism represents an engine driving itself; total manipulation is necessary for the continued existence of capitalism in terms of objective tendencies. As I have argued, the development of a mass consumption economy has had ramifications in terms of social relations which tend to maintain

(88) Mills, C. W. "The Structure of Power in American Society" in Power, Politics, and People, op.cit., page 38.

the status quo; yet, it grew because of the profit needs of capitalism as opposed to any political conspiracy.

It is now necessary to bring together the earlier part on the changing foundations of power and the above part on the changing degree of legitimation of power. This requires a consideration of rationalisation as reification, which I intend to discuss through a consideration of the 'Functional Theory of Stratification'.

(89) As I conceive it, this theory is increasingly applicable to advanced capitalist society.

This theory argues that inequality of rewards is inevitable in all forms of society because inequality is 'functionally necessary' to motivate the 'proper' individuals both to fill the most important positions and to perform the duties attached to these positions. Though, in my view, this argument is hopelessly inadequate as an explanation of inequality in all periods of history (even as one of the universal reasons for inequality) it is useful in consideration of stratification in modern capitalist societies. First, the theory de-emphasises the importance of power as a basis for privilege and exploitation of those in lower positions. With reference to the great mass of wage-earners to-day, this would seem to apply; those high in the bureaucratic hierarchy have power over others only in terms of the office. Power does not extend to the freedom to define one's own power; power only exists if one's

(89) As developed by Davis, K. and Moore, W. E., in Bendix, R. and Lipset, S. M. Class, Status and Power, op.cit., pages 47-53.

functions are performed. Second, the theory implies a consistency between material rewards and prestige rewards in that both are used as motivating factors to induce the 'right' people into the 'right' jobs. This occurs if class and status 'come together' as, as has been argued, they tend to in modern society. Third, the theory is based on a hierarchy of individual statuses which individuals may climb or descend according to their abilities. This assumes agreement as to high/low reward positions having high/low status and, thus, rules out a society with differing cultural definitions of high/low status. Related to this the desire for material goods should be equal amongst all members of the society. It also assumes that there should be no objective material barriers to mobility i.e. there should be equal opportunity. As I have argued, this is increasingly the case with increasing rationalisation -- the 'coming together' of the working class/middle class and the rationalisation of education as the major means to mobility being of primary importance. Fourth, the theory sees stratification as functional for society; individuals must be adapted to the needs of society.

This last point is of primary importance; the reason the functional theory of stratification is applicable to modern capitalist society is that both are rational-reified systems. It is necessary to briefly re-state the relationship between rationalisation and reification, as developed in the earlier discussion of Weber and Marx. In summary form, what Weber saw as formally rational

Marx saw as reified; market capitalism was seen as the highest stage of rationality/reification. There are two main elements in Marx's concept of reification: first, the externalisation of man's power on to his products, so that they are perceived as existing in their own right; second, following from this, the reduction of man to a thing as he comes to be controlled by his own externalised power. Another way of putting this is that means are perceived as ends, with the result that real ends, i.e. human ends, exist as means. This logic was expressed both in commodity production and in Weber's formal rationality: material production was seen as an end existing in its own right, and man was reduced to a quantifiable means in existing as a commodity on the labour market.

Functionalism, in general, is a reified system of thought in that it ignores the first 'moment' (i.e. man makes society) (90), and, as a result, starts with society not with man. This can be seen in the functional theory of stratification in its assumption of alienated labour. It is assumed that man's work is of no value to him in itself, but that he works only for the reward offered by society (i.e. material goods, or prestige). Thus it ignores that work exists, in the last resort, only for the satisfaction of human need. Likewise, education is viewed in a purely instrumental fashion; it is argued that a long period of training is a burden which must be rewarded in later life for it to be initially under-

(90) Berger, P. and Luckmann, T. Social Construction of Reality, op.cit., pages 197-198, footnote 29.

taken. Thus it ignores that education allows the development of man and can exist as an end-in-itself. However, in that both work and education objectively do exist in an instrumental fashion in capitalism, the functional theory is applicable.

Yet to understand advanced capitalism it is necessary to go beyond the rational/reified system described by Marx and implicit in the functional theory of stratification. Rationalisation has extended far beyond that conceived as possible by Marx. For Marx, the irrationality of capitalism expressed in reification would lead to the destruction of capitalism as its efficiency created the possibility of a qualitatively different form of society. Marx thought that the irrationality and rationality of capitalism would increasingly come into contradiction; the irrationality of capitalism, as expressed in the proletariat, would destroy even the rationality of capitalism i.e. its historical function of abolishing material need. As I have argued, though this tendency did exist within nineteenth century capitalism, a counter tendency has developed in the twentieth century. But this is not to say the contradiction between the actual and the potential has been overcome; on the contrary, it has been contained on the basis of increasing rationalisation i.e. it becomes more and more acute. What is new about advanced capitalism, as Marcuse has shown, is that the irrationality that derives from obsolete capitalism has been made functional for the continued existence of capitalism. This unforeseen development (i.e. by Marx) both explodes and contains

the fundamental contradiction of capitalism. This development corresponds to the third moment of internalisation of objective reality, and to the replacement of 'rational' authority by manipulation. By this development reification has, in one sense, become total, and, in another, been overcome. Objectively, reification has become increasingly total as man exists as an instrument, as a thing, in more and more spheres of life. Subjectively, reification is overcome as man becomes totally manipulated, for society is only oppressive if there is an alternative.

As reification has become obsolete as material needs have been satisfied so a new form of reification has taken its place. The transposition of means and ends, or of things and man, was described by Marx as reification but to-day these distinctions are increasingly removed. When the human means come to be perceived as ends-in-themselves then it is possible for man to derive satisfaction from relationships that have previously been defined on the basis of man existing as a thing. It is important to realise that man does derive satisfaction from the pseudo-communities that exist in both the suburbs and in the bureaucracies due to the work of the 'human relations' analysts. As opposed to Marx's belief, reification has remained functional for the growth of capitalism; but, the growth of material production is no longer necessary and is purely a form of repression of the true possibilities of society.

In the light of this new form of reification, the functional theory of stratification makes certain assumptions about man's behaviour that are inapplicable in advanced capitalism. The theory assumes that man acts on the basis of either Zweckrationalitat or Wertrationalitat. This is essential to the theory in that man makes a rational choice whether to be mobile on the basis of either the amount of material goods (i.e. Zweckrationalitat) or the amount of status offered as a reward (Wertrationalitat). The form that reification has taken in advanced capitalism makes rational actions (of either type) increasingly unlikely. Social mobility is perceived as an end-in-itself rather than a means to an end and people derive satisfaction from being mobile rather than 'arriving'. Davis/Moore, on the other hand, imply that satisfaction is derived from a position after it has been achieved. As was noted earlier, status seeking is an endless search and stability is a source of anxiety rather than satisfaction. The irrationality of social mobility is emphasised in that it is more than a source of satisfaction, it is also a source of self-identity; thus, the element of choice is removed.

Thus, rationalisation has come to create, first, an increasingly formally rational society (and system of stratification) and, second, increasingly irrational individual actions within this type of society. It is possible to see the influence of these two, interwoven developments on social mobility. In terms of the first, society is seen by the individual as placing him on the basis of rational criteria. This

rationality has little to do with his actions; although society uses him in a rational way i.e. decides his fate on the basis of his abilities. Thus, if the individual fails in society, it is his own fault, his own failure. By this process, the individual comes to perceive 'social problems' as 'individual problems'. If the individual fails to achieve as well as others, it is because he is a failure; he just is not as good as those that succeed. However, this cannot be admitted on a conscious level for failure to achieve is total rejection by society. The individual has no alternative sources of identity for status is reduced to economic factors and the stable identity, previously derived from the community, has been destroyed. Identity can only be 'bought' in the market place. As mobility is a source of self-identity, the 'rational' definition of one as a failure tends to result in continued status-seeking either through status escapism (91) or through continued attempted mobility but with increased anxiety. In terms of the hierarchy of statuses that make up the stratification system, there is the tendency for those at the bottom to feel greater failures than those at the top, though even the latter have to continue to strive.

In terms of the second, i.e. the irrationality of individual social action, social mobility will be seen as an end-in-itself.

(91) By this is meant such things as the practice of white-collar girls, as described by Mills, buying prestige once a year in a luxurious vacation, in which their whole style-of-life took a different form.

Thus, a high degree of mobility is not as important as mobility, per se. Status, self-identity is derived from the struggle and so mobility will tend to be valued in terms of one's initial position. Thus, there will tend to be a large amount of small jumps in status. Also, in that man has no stable identity, the increasing anxiety will tend to result in increasing conformity, as characterised by Riesman's 'other-directed man'. Mobility will tend to conform to the rate set by the peer group. If, as I have argued, aspiration levels tend to become common to all levels of society then conformity to the peer group will involve leaving the peer group. (92) This point characterises the changed nature of mobility in advanced capitalism. The emphasis on conformity stands in stark opposition to the individualism embodied in the entrepreneurial form of social mobility. Now the 'true' entrepreneurs, that are left, use crime as a non-conformist vehicle for social mobility (as Merton has pointed out). Of course, this conformity is demanded by the bureaucratic nature of society but this is also reflected in individual conformity to established, secure means of mobility (93). There would also seem to be a direct effect of anxiety on mobility, in that it simply makes the individual unable to perform to his full abilities. This is relevant for a

(92) Whyte, W. H., op.cit., page 282.

(93) ibid, page 63.

concern with differential social mobility in that the amount of anxiety tends to be greater in the lower regions (i.e. the 'failed' regions) of society. These themes will be developed in reference to educational achievement, as education has become increasingly important as the vehicle to social mobility.

PART IV

RATIONALISATION AND EDUCATION

INTRODUCTION

Education is increasingly relevant to social mobility as educational qualifications become a necessary basis for more occupations. Within the bureaucratic corporations the ceiling is steadily lowered for those with poor educational qualifications; even for those with good qualifications mobility tends to be pre-determined. In other words, there has been a formalisation of intra-generational mobility (i.e. career mobility within one generation). Though it is theoretically possible to have this formalised intra-generation mobility and a high degree of inter-generational mobility (i.e. between generations) it is my view that the formalisation of the former corresponds to the same rationalisation trends that tend to restrict the latter. The new role of education as a selection agency allows quantitative separation of individuals which is seen as rational in that it allows individuals to be placed in later life according to their capabilities.

The thesis is that the rationalisation of modern society results in the destruction of external barriers while at the same time constructing internal barriers to social mobility. As I previously argued, this can be stated in terms of a rational social structure and irrational individual action. Education can

be considered in these terms. The rationalisation/reification of education can be understood theoretically in terms of Weber and Marx. However, the irrationality of individual action, expressed in the 'quest for identity' by striving for educational qualifications (i.e. the child parallel of adult status seeking) requires a dialectical perspective that goes beyond a pure Marxist position. As I see it, it requires a position which emphasises the 'internalisation of objective reality'; this provides an explanation of why man submits to the present repressive society.

These two sets of trends are partly complementary and partly contradictory. The 'internalisation of objective reality' can only occur after the rationalisation/reification trend that has occurred within capitalism. However, in the sense that extra-reification overcomes reification, and in the sense that the rational structure becomes based upon irrational action the trends are contradictory. This is to be seen generally within capitalism in the separation of the 'public' and 'private' spheres; and in terms of education the separation of 'formal education' from 'primary socialisation'. Within advanced capitalism there is the tendency for this distinction to break down again; there is a 'coming together' of the public and private spheres. However, this only occurs on the terms of an already existing bureaucratic structure. The relevance of both the separation of the private/public spheres and their 'coming

together' again implies a certain social psychological position which I will discuss.

Following a discussion of these two trends I will return to the question of social mobility and try to show specifically how inter-generational mobility is restricted within the present educational system.

RATIONALISATION AND EDUCATION

"Behind all the present discussions of the educational system, the struggle of the 'specialist type of man' against the older type of 'cultivated man' is hidden at some decisive point. This fight is determined by the irresistably expanding bureaucratisation of all the public and private relations of authority and by the ever-increasing importance of expert and specialised knowledge. This fight intrudes into all intimate cultural questions." (94)

Max Weber wrote this passage about fifty years ago; since then the struggle to which he refers has been to a large extent won, as bureaucratisation has extended in all areas of society. The 'cultivated man' Weber refers to only continues to exist as the goal of educational institutions in such 'backward' places as Oxford and Cambridge. Of course, throughout the history of elite education, the 'cultivated man' has taken a variety of forms:

"Such education aimed at a chivalrous or an ascetic type; or, at a literary type, as in China; a gymnastic-humanist type, as in Hellas; or it aimed at a conventional type, as in the case of the Anglo-Saxon gentleman." (95)

These various types have one thing in common which set them apart from the education of the 'specialist type of man'; the education was not directly functional for economic ends.

(94) From Max Weber, op. cit. p.243.

(95) *ibid*

The clearest example of this was in Greek civilisation when education was seen as a leisure pursuit; leisure, not in the Puritan sense of recreation (for work) but in the sense of self-realisation. The slaves who provided the economic base for Greek civilisation were by no means educated in the Greek sense of the word. Education, therefore, existed as an end-in-itself and not as a means to an end outside of itself. Though the Greek and other forms of aristocratic elite education are unproductive for economic purposes, they have played important functional purposes in an indirect manner. In pre-industrial times, education provided the basis for the legitimation of the status quo. Education of the young of the elite provided continuation of a characteristic life-style which was seen as the basis of authority. Religious education (in the form of training of priests) provides one of the clearest examples of this in pre-industrial times when it is remembered that religion was then the binding force for all areas of society. (96)

The shift from the 'cultivated man' to the 'specialist' refers to formal, institutionalised education. The forces of rationalisation can also be found in the changed nature of socialisation, in general. What is today learned in a specialised institution has, throughout most of history, been learnt within the family. The roots of rationalisation can be seen in

(96) Berger, Peter C., "Religious Institutions" in Sociology: an Introduction, Ed. Smelser, N.J., op. cit. p. 345.

the removal of some social functions from the family to secondary group (eventually bureaucratic) institutions. Thus, the setting up of education as a separate institution which has gradually come to serve all levels of society can be seen as an expression of the rationalisation trend.

With reference to education it was expressed in the limitation of formal education to socialisation in the sense of learning the skills, norms and values appropriate to the 'public' sphere. Socialisation, in the sense of the internalisation of norms and values that are required for the formation of the self, was removed from formal education and limited to the 'private' sphere. Whereas this tendency was characteristic of the rationalisation/reification trend described by Weber and Marx, in the twentieth century it has been increasingly contradicted by an opposite tendency which tends to combine both the public and private spheres, and the above two elements of socialisation. However, this combination is only to be understood in the light of the division that existed in earlier times. In my view, sociology, in general, has not recognised the basis of the earlier division and as a result has not been able to recognise the later combination of the two elements.

Education for the development of the 'cultivated man' type was socialisation in both senses. It involved preparation for a whole style-of-life in that there was not a separation of pub-

lic and private man. The educated Anglo-Saxon gentleman was a gentleman in a way that is different from the way a product of a business college at the end of the nineteenth century was a businessman. The latter form of school aimed only at producing businessmen i.e. man in terms of the public sphere, man as an instrument. The life-style of such businessmen did not follow directly from their education.

The above division of socialisation can be put in terms of the primary/secondary division common in sociology. However, the basis on which this division is made varies with the theoretical framework. My view, in terms of the Marxist dialectic, is that secondary socialisation is the moulding of people to work within a reified social structure. It produces man only as an instrument and in so doing destroys man's ability to create, to 'make history'. Primary socialisation, on the other hand, provides the underlying basis for man's freedom in that the child is provided with an identity which is not based on his existence as an instrument.

This differs from the common sociological view that recognises the primary/secondary socialisation split but not in terms of man's freedom to make society. The work of Berger and Luckmann can be used as an example of the basic difference between the Marxist view and a common sociological view of socialisation. Berger and Luckmann use the Marxist concept of reification

but remove it from the Marxist dialectic in terms of the possibilities of history. They mean by reification an inevitable process which is part of the definition of social reality, per se. This differs from the 'inevitability' of reification for Marx who saw it as inevitable only in terms of the possibilities of man at one point in time. Though Marx saw the existence of reification as inevitable for the capitalist society of his time, he also saw the overcoming of reification within socialism as just as inevitable. Following from this difference over the inevitability of reification is a different emphasis in the meaning of reification. Berger and Luckmann define reification in terms of man externalising his power into social forms that come to control him. (97) Though this is one essential element of a Marxist definition, another is the view of man in the same process reduced to an instrument, the reduction of man to a means. Following from this is a basic difference over the existence of reification within the 'private' sphere of primary relations. For Berger and Luckmann, primary socialisation in being the 'transmission of norms and values' involves the transmission of a reified social reality. For Marx, the fundamental difference between primary and secondary relations is that in the former man does not exist as solely an instrument, life

(97) Berger, P. and Luckmann, T., op. cit. p. 89.

exists primarily as an end-in-itself. Following from this the idea of 'internalisation of objective reality', which I took from Berger and Luckmann, may mean two separate things within a Marxist perspective. Internalisation in the sense of the formation of the self within the primary group can be separated from internalisation of the norms and values of the reified secondary group institutions.

This distinction is fundamental for an understanding of the situation within present advanced capitalist society with its emphasis on the internalisation of the norms and values of bureaucratic institutions. For the period preceding advanced capitalist society the distinction can be made between primary and secondary socialisation. The child has traditionally acquired an identity through primary socialisation, through the internalisation of norms and values. The idea of internalisation refers to the great extent to which the child is moulded by his environment, but underlying this control is the unconditional love of the primary group. In that life exists as an end-in-itself within the primary group the child is able to form an identity that embodies his individuality at the same time that it recognises his relationship to society. Secondary socialisation has traditionally involved the learning of skills, norms and values that apply outside the primary group situation. The secondary sphere is not centrally concerned with the formation

of 'self' nor with the 'identity' of man; rather it aims at developing man as an efficient instrument. Thus, the person has a much greater element of choice whether to conform to the norms and values; he can rationally decide on the basis of the rewards and punishments involved.

Underlying this emphasis on distinguishing between primary and secondary socialisation (or not emphasising the distinction as in the work of Berger and Luckmann) lies the broader theoretical problem of the freedom of man to make society. Sociology grew up in opposition to various views of 'human nature' that implied a deterministic view of man. Sociology as a discipline exists on the basis of the cultural variability of man. In particular sociology has found it necessary to argue against a view of man as biologically pre-determined. The importance of getting away from a view of a fixed human nature is emphasised in a sociological position that recognises not only that 'society makes man' but also that 'man makes society'. However, there is a danger that in trying to escape from a pre-determined view of man sociology sinks into total relativism. In my view, Berger and Luckmann have fallen into this trap. In trying to escape from the kind of determinism implied by biological man they sink into the social determinism described by Wrong's 'over-socialised conception of man' (98) Berger and Luckmann end up

(98) Wrong, D., "The Over-Socialised Conception of Man" in Readings on Modern Sociology Ed. Inkeles, A. (Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1966). pp. 88-96.

with a view of human action flowing totally from the 'internalisation of norms and values'. (99) This is inevitable, given their de-emphasis of the biological nature of man.

They argue that there is a dialectical relationship between man and nature that is fundamentally different from the relationship of other animals to nature. (100) Non-human animals satisfy their biological drives within structures which are pre-determined by the biological equipment of their specific species. Man's biological drives, on the other hand, are unspecialised and undirected and can only be given direction within society. (101) This is because,

".....in terms of organismic developments, which in the animal are completed in the mother's body, take place in the human infant after its separation from the womb. At this time, however, the human infant is not only in the outside world, but interrelating with it in a number of complex ways. The human organism is thus developing biologically while already standing in relationship to its environment. In other words, the process of becoming human takes place in an interrelationship with an environment." (102)

Though this is an essential part of the dialectic between man and nature it is not put within a historical perspective. The

(99) *ibid* p. 88.

(100) Berger and Luckmann, *op. cit.* p. 180.

(101) *ibid* pp. 47-48.

(102) *ibid* p. 48.

historical nature of the Marxist dialectic allows one to start with the position that there is a body with biological needs which have to be satisfied while, at the same time, escaping from a view of man that precludes 'man making his own history'. In rejecting the 'utopian' aspect of Marx i.e. that the contradiction between man and nature can be overcome, Berger and Luckmann reject the very heart of Marxism. Berger and Luckmann say that the human being must ongoingly externalise himself in activity (with resulting reification) and say that Hegel and Marx developed the reason for this necessity. (103) However, they do not follow up the logic of either Hegel or Marx. The crucial point is that for both these thinkers externalisation was an expression of man's freedom both in that man could externalise his powers and in that this represents man's 'struggle with nature'. It was only through the synthesis of the elements in the dialectical process of man and nature (for Marx, through the 'abolition of material need') that the 'struggle with nature' takes on meaning.

The Marxist dialectic stresses the unity of biological and social man without denying the conflict between the two. Not only does man fulfill his biological drives in culturally defined ways (as Berger and Luckmann stress) but the culture itself is to be understood in terms of man's struggle to be free from the

(103) Berger and Luckmann op. cit. p. 52 and p. 197 footnote 16.

basic material needs of his body. A Freudian-Marxist perspective, as developed by writers such as Marcuse, further emphasises the link between the body and culture by utilising the Freudian conception of culture involving the repression of bodily drives. This 'is necessary' in the same way that reification 'is necessary'; it provides the means for the coming of socialism. Socialism would be the first form of society that is not repressive of bodily drives as well as the first form of society to overcome reification. Marcuse has also stressed the unity of culture and biology in his emphasis on social needs, created by man through the 'struggle with nature', 'sinking down' into the biology of man. He argues that some social needs can become biological (in the sense that if they are not satisfied, there will be dysfunction to the organism). (104) This corresponds to the Marxist conception of the development of man (as opposed to growth) from one stage of history to the next.

By introducing biological man it is possible to emphasise that although there is internalisation of norms and values there is still a source of conflict in that these norms and values are a source of repression of bodily drives e.g. sex. Since these biological needs are partly formed culturally within history, internalisation of norms and values does not necessarily preclude man's freedom to make his own history. However, internalis-

(104) Marcuse, H., An Essay on Liberation, (Beacon Press, Boston, 1969) p. 10.

ation is only compatible with freedom if it occurs within the primary sphere. Due to the inevitable reification that occurs within the secondary sphere man cannot be a creative being. But man has to be free to become free. As Marcuse puts it:-

"The dialectical logic insists, against the logic of brute facts and ideology, that the slaves must be free for their liberation before they can become free, and that the end must be operative in the means to attain it." (105)

It is the private sphere, where man is not turned into a thing, that preserves man's power of transcendence. But it is misleading to say that man is free in this sphere and not free in the public sphere. It is only the interaction of the two that allows man to be free; for freedom is expressed in action, in praxis. The reified culture that exists in the public sphere provides the necessary change in the historical possibilities but man must be free enough to realise these possibilities.

In terms of the above theoretical discussion my view of the rationalisation of education, as it occurred within capitalist society prior to the twentieth century, was that it involved increasing reification together with decreasing emphasis on primary socialisation within the private sphere, as the developer of the 'self'. The importance of this point for understanding later developments in the twentieth century will be discussed after considering other aspects of the rationalisation/reification trend.

(105) Marcuse, H., One-Dimensional Man op. cit. p. 41.

One aspect of the rationalisation of education is the trend toward vocationalism at both the school and college level. Not only has Weber's 'specialist type of man' won out over the 'cultivated man' but the form of specialisation has become increasingly 'applied' as opposed to the 'pure'. Education has increasingly taken the form of direct training for the economic sphere; the rise of business schools and engineering faculties as large parts of modern universities are indicative of this trend. Though C. P. Snow's 'Two Cultures' would seem to have some relevance for Britain, in the U.S.A. the split is clearly between the pure and applied. As Whyte showed for the men graduating in 1954-5 all those majoring in mathematics, physical sciences, biological sciences, liberal arts and the basic social sciences only came to 26.6% of the total (106). Since this time, the split between the fundamental and applied has come out clearly with the rise of student radicalism to a much greater extent within the former group.

This vocational trend has to be treated with caution; it is neither a simple example of economic determinism nor does it reflect crude materialism on the part of parents and children. The latter point I will return to in my discussion of the irrationality of individual action. As to the former, education is often

(106) Whyte, W. H., op.cit. p. 134.

seen to-day as society's major capital resource (107), but it is not at all clear what the relationship between education and the economy is. The view which sees the technical skills learnt in education in one-to-one relation with economic growth seems clearly over-simplified; Britain at the time of the industrial revolution, and the Third World to-day are both examples of the fallacy of this argument. On the one hand, Britain completed an industrial revolution with a formal educational system that was notably anti-vocational and, on the other hand, the Third World cannot provide the jobs to employ the skilled manpower it educates. The 'business interest' is clearly well-represented in educational policy-making to-day but again it is necessary to look carefully at any conspiracy view of the take-over of educational institutions..

The institutionalisation of socialisation within formal education has, at one and the same time, led to a degree of institutional autonomy and to a dependence on the wider society. The growth of the division of labour, with the concomitant institutional differentiation, is an expression of rationalisation and has led to the setting up of sub-societies or different universes of meaning, within the wider society (108). But at the same time institutional differentiation leads to a uniformity of the various

(107) See, for example, Drucker, P., The Landmarks of Tomorrow (Heinemann, London, 1959).

(108) Berger, P., and Luckmann, T., Social Construction of Reality, op.cit. page 81.

institutions as they all take on a 'rational', bureaucratic structure. Also in that the formally rational structures can only be means, their 'direction' comes to be determined from the outside. Weber expressed the fear that an irrational alien apex would come to direct bureaucratic machines (109); the bureaucratisation of education has resulted rather in its 'direction' being determined by 'rational' economic criteria. (110)

The vocational trend within education and the basing of educational decisions on economic criteria are clear enough to-day and provide evidence enough of the rationalisation trend. However, the way in which education was 'taken over' by economic interests is important, in showing the effect of applying the criteria of formal rationality to a non-material area. A recent study of the U.S. educational system in the period 1910-30 has shown the effect of the application of 'formal rationality' to the educational system. (111) At the beginning of this period the U.S.A. was in the heyday of 'Horatio Alger' type individualism. This ideology was clearly anti-intellectual and reacted strongly against the educated, cultured elite that carried on European traditions in the educational institutions of New England (112). Yet, at the

(109) See page 38, above.

(110) This is not to deny the validity of Weber's point; a bureaucratic educational system can be used for 'irrational' purpose. The use of the German educational system by the Nazis is one example of this.

(111) Callahan, Raymond E., Education and the Cult of Efficiency, (University of Chicago Press, 1962).

(112) ibid, page 8.

same time, this ideology was just as adamantly anti-bureaucratic; even the vocationally trained, though more useful than those educated in the classics, were distinctly inferior to the 'self-made man' of this era. The attitude of Andrew Carnegie was typical,

"In my own experience, I can say that I have known few young men intended for business who were not injured by a collegiate education. Had they gone into active work during the years spent at college, they would have been better educated in every sense of that term. The fire and energy have been stamped out of them, and how to so manage as to live a life of idleness and not a life of usefulness has become the chief question with them." (113)

Thus, we have to consider the economic 'take-over' of education in the light of the puritan work ethic which de-emphasised the importance of formal education in any form, except for the 'lower orders'.

As Callahan shows, the transformation of the educational institutions of the U.S.A. occurred in the wake of the development of a new system of industrial management known as 'scientific management', whose leading proponent was Frederick W. Taylor. Taylor's basic principles of 'scientific management' were laid down in the form of the new duties of management:-

(113) Carnegie, Andrew, The Empire of Business (New York, 1902), pages 79-80, quoted in ibid, page 9.

- (i) They develop a science for each element of man's work, which replaces the old rule-of-thumb method.
- (ii) They scientifically select and then train, teach, and develop the workman, whereas in the past he chose his own work and trained himself as best he could.
- (iii) They heartily co-operate with the men so as to insure all of the work being done is in accordance with the principles of the science which has been developed.
- (iv) There is an almost equal division of the work and the responsibility between the management and the workmen. The management take over all work for which they are better fitted than the workmen while in the past, almost all of the work and the greater part of the responsibility were thrown upon the men. (114)

Taylor was clearly a man who would have approved of much of Weber's work; his whole system can be seen as an attempted application of Weber's formal rationality. The emphasis on laid-down rules, standardisation and calculability was at the heart of both Taylor's scientific management and Weber's bureaucracy.

Taylor, as opposed to Weber, received a tremendous amount of publicity, at the time of his writings, and was able to put his 'scientific' principles into practice. Taylor's main example was the lifting and loading of pig iron at the Bethlehem steel works (1897-1900) and due to the dramatic rises in productivity recorded, Taylor's system can to be widely praised in areas of society far removed from the handling of pig-iron.

(114) *ibid*, pages 36-37, quoted in Callahan, page 27. It should be pointed out in regard to point (iv) that Taylor did not have any notion of worker's democracy. The 'responsibility' of the worker was to carry out what the management 'scientifically' decided was most appropriate; for Taylor the beauty of his system was that the worker did not have to think at all.

In the years following 1910 (115), attempts were made to apply the principles of scientific management, by so-called efficiency experts to many social institutions; in particular, education. As Callahan shows, in the years following the rise of scientific management within the economy, education came under attack in the media. This attack was partly based on the 'classical' nature of the ends of American education but more common was criticism on the basis of inefficient means. Some educators protested at the attempted application of principles designed for the manufacturing of material goods to education but both 'public opinion' and the majority of the educators supported the critics. The presidential address to the schoolmasters' association of New York in 1912 was typical of the new mood:-

"The ideal of cultural ease in the classroom, of drawingroom quiet and refinement has to goIt must give way to an ideal of time-saving, through preparation for dealing expeditiously and variously with a variety of needs, to the end that maximum results may be attained under pressure of time and with economy of material. By better use of ground space, by better setting of machinery, by better placing of raw material, by the cutting down of labour motions, by producing harder and more lasting cutting tools -- by these and other means have factories increased their output, have lowered the cost of production, have met the demands of their very existence.

(115) Which, incidentally, the American historian, R. H. Gabriel, labelled the "Age of Efficiency".

.....And we teachers ought to do the same. We should be compelled to, were we, like members of other professions, as often under watchful critical adult eyes -- were our mistakes to carry as critically and quickly as do theirs, the penalty of almost immediate retribution. We are curiously protected in inefficiency." (116)

Despite numerous exhortations of this kind, practical problems remained in applying Taylor's principles. Taylor developed his system in terms of management, workers, raw materials, and finished product. Discussion revolved around the role of teacher and pupil in this system. As the whole system logically started with the material product as the basis of measuring the effectiveness of the application of the scientific principles, there had to be a product. Thus, the pupil was designated as product. (117) The teachers could be seen as either the workers or the managers of the enterprise; the teachers' organisations argued, understandably, that they should be seen as the managers, but, in practice, they ended up as the labourers. These problems of application all derive from the attempted application of a utilitarian system to a human organisation; calculability demands a standard of measurement. The problem of 'ends' was, of course, not new but as I argued earlier (in my discussion of Weber) there can be no such thing as formally rational ends. The problem is

(116) Mitchell, T. C. quoted in Callahan, op.cit., page 102.

(117) ibid, page 58.

magnified within education because the market (the means of reducing quality to quantity) had difficulty in making even what seemed to be formally rational judgements. At all levels problems arose -- how can we say one teacher is 'better' than another teacher? -- how can we say knowledge of one subject is 'better' than knowledge of another? -- how can we say one person is 'better' educated than another? It all depends on what the aims of education are; this depends on values which are not comparable on formally rational grounds.

Of course, these problems did not stop the application of scientific management to education. Due to the successful application in the economic sphere (and the generally high value placed on economic activity), it was argued that businessmen should run the schools. Thus, at this time there was a tremendous growth in educational administration and the power formally held by actual educators (or former educators) shifted to businessmen who had very little contact with the actual process of education. This was 'rational' in that there was increased division of labour, and in that the threefold split of management, workers and product could be seen in administrators, teachers, and pupil. These new administrators, though knowing little or nothing about education, per se, sought to improve production; the aim was 'the finest product at the lowest cost'. (118) As the problem of what was a

(118) ibid, page 244.

'fine product' still remained unsolved they, at least, tried to lower costs. This they did by such techniques as eliminating small classes and in attempting to cut teachers' salaries (119). More important than this, however, is that the introduction of administrators from the business world resulted in a change in the aims of education -- there was a decided shift towards vocationalism. Secondly, education was reified. As I hope I have made clear, this was not simply because the capitalist wanted to increase profits by having more productive labour but rather the economic 'take-over' of education occurred, so-to-speak, through the back-door. Rationalisation turned education into a 'means to an end' outside of itself; this allowed the economy to supply the 'ends'.

Rationalisation affected not only the content of education; calculability also demanded a quantitative measure of ability to profit from education. This was supplied by the growth of intelligence tests which were first used, on any scale, during the first World War as a speedy way of identifying those with above average ability (120). The tests used followed the lead of the French psychologists Alfred Binet who developed the Binet-Simon intelligence test in 1905. Since this time both the use of I.Q. tests and the number of alternative tests have mushroomed. Equalling this growth has been the argument within the social sciences as to

(119) ibid, page 223.

(120) Schwebel, Milton, Who Can be Educated (Grove Press, New York, 1968), page 45.

the validity of I.Q. tests, which revolves around different conceptions of ability. Is ability pre-determined by the genes of the individual members of society (i.e. heredity) or is ability determined by the social conditions (i.e. environment); or, if ability is both hereditary and environmental, what is the relationship between the two?

This debate is, of course, much older than the development of I.Q. tests. It was Plato who divided men into gold, silver, brass, or iron; according to Plato, this was pre-determined at birth and so the different types must be given differential education. Plato's view was that gold would procreate children of gold, and iron procreate iron; however, he accepted the possibility that this could not occur and argued that if it did not the child should be placed into his proper group (121). I.Q. tests, as they have developed in the present century, represent a different view of man. The qualitative difference that was expressed by Plato's distinctions is reduced to one of quantity as I.Q. is placed on a normal curve ranging from approximately 30 to 170 with 100 as the norm. However, the ideology expressed in the use of these tests shares with Plato an emphasis on the relatively fixed nature of ability.

At the present time, the debate has reached a kind of stalemate with psychologists emphasising the importance of I.Q. tests (while

(121) ibid, pages 19-20.

admitting that environmental factors do affect measured I.Q.) and sociologists arguing that I.Q. tests are really only measuring the effects of different environmental conditions. Theoretically, what is important is whether a perfect I.Q. test (i.e. one that only measures innate ability) could ever be devised; some psychologists argue that it can ("the social sciences are still in their youth" argument), whereas some sociologists argue that intelligence is cultural. This point relates back to the former discussion of socialisation and the prevalent sociological over-socialised view of man. If culture is set up purely in opposition to biology then the nature/nurture debate can go on endlessly each side trying to see any new empirical evidence as tipping the scales their way. But if, as I argued earlier, culture is seen as the means to fulfilling social needs which are ultimately based on biological drives then the mechanical relationship between biology and culture must be replaced with a dialectical relationship (122). Certainly, the two are not the same; the contradiction is expressed in the repression of biological drives as the basis of cultural development. But, at the same time, there is a basic unity in that culture, as the basis for fulfilling social needs provides the basis for a non-repressive culture. Innate ability, as expressed in the genetic structure of man is

(122) Though Berger and Luckmann argue that there is a dialectical relationship between biology and culture, their view cannot truly be seen as dialectical in that it is ahistorical. As argued earlier, a dialectical approach must have a conception of the negative of the possibilities inherent in 'what is'; this is notably lacking in Berger and Luckmann's so-called dialectic.

not biological in the sense that social needs 'sink down' into the biological structure of man (123). Thus, even innate ability must be seen as developing in response to the development of social needs as expressed in culture.

This view raises the possibility of intelligence being transmitted genetically. This would be especially true of man in different stages of history; so that, if a child could be removed from a primitive culture and socialised into a more advanced culture without strain then it seems quite likely that the child would not be able to develop the same kinds of abilities as a child of that culture. Furthermore, in as much as different social classes have different social needs, then it follows that the abilities of one class will be different from the abilities of another class. However, in this case the differences are likely to be more susceptible to environmental influences if the child is removed at birth.

The view that an intelligence test could be constructed that is culture-free (even if it did measure innate ability) is an expression of the rationalisation/reification trend. The I.Q. test is a pure bureaucratic measurement; it turns ability into a thing that is divorced from human needs. Characteristic of reification, it turns what is in reality only a means into an end-in-itself;

(123) See above, page 107.

also, what is in reality a human product is perceived as a 'fact of nature'. This reification of ability affects the child's ability to learn, though the damaging effects on children are hidden by the fact that learning theory is itself reified. Marcuse has related the development of 'one-dimensional man' to developments in 'scientific' theory. 'Operationalism' becomes the predominant modern view; Marcuse quotes Bridgman's analysis of the concept of length:-

"We evidently know what we mean by length if we can tell what the length of any and every object is, and for the physicist nothing more is required. To find the length of an object, we have to perform certain physical operations. The concept of length is therefore fixed when the operations by which length is measured are fixed; that is, the concept of length involves as much and nothing more than the set of operations by which length is determined. In general we mean by any concept nothing more than a set of operations; the concept is synonymous with the corresponding set of operations." (124)

The word ability could be substituted for length in the above passage; ability has become synonymous with the operations used to measure it in I.Q. tests. With I.Q. the degree of operationalism goes even further in that the word intelligence is reduced to the letters I.Q.; in this way, the meaning is fixed and ability "has lost all cognitive value and serves merely for recognition of an unquestionable fact." (125)

(124) Bridgman, P. W., The Logic of Modern Physics, page 5, quoted in Marcuse, H., One-Dimensional Man, op.cit., page 13.

(125) Marcuse, H., ibid, page 94.

Within learning theory, in general, operationalism is reflected in the fixed-ability theory which cannot deal satisfactorily with different types of ability or ability which cannot be previously defined. Much contemporary learning theory has rejected the work of Piaget as unimportant precisely because of this problem:-

"Piaget.....explained learning as a process of assimilation, with the individual assimilating only what he can accomodate at any particular time in life. Piaget's observations led to the observations of four periods in the origin of what we regard as mature or adult intelligence. Taken as a whole, intelligence tests really measure the level at which children or adults are performing in the use of several types of mental abilities such as the verbal or mathematical or perceptual. Each of these tests is one-dimensional; that is, each is like a ladder ranging from the simplest items at the pre-school age to the most complex on tests designed for candidates for graduate study, from the simplest problems in mathematics to the most complex.....It is fair to say that psychologists and educators regard the tests as designed for children as being easier than those for adults, or, stated differently, as being at an earlier point in a single continuum ranging from the easiest to the most difficult. Piaget's work has shown this up as primitive." (126)

The one-dimensionality that is to be seen in I.Q. tests corresponds to one aspect -- the rational aspect -- of education, and of society in general. So far, the trends in education I have

(126) Schwebel, M., op.cit., pages 176-177.

mentioned correspond to the rationalisation/reification trend described by both Weber and Marx. However, as I argued in my earlier discussion of stratification, other trends are visible in advanced capitalist society that demand going beyond either Marx or Weber. In dialectical terms, there has been a 'coming together of opposites'; opposites which Marx saw as the basis for the transition to socialism. The most striking example is the tendency for the proletariat to be absorbed into the (new) middle class. This, as with other related trends, is to be understood in terms of a system that continues to exist on the basis of the channelling of the forces that derive from its contradictions into 'functional' paths. This goes beyond the normal repressive aspect of culture within pre-history; there occurs 'surplus-repression' (127), repression in all areas of life so that man becomes one-dimensional. Put another way, the contradiction between the positive and the negative is normal (and so is the corresponding repression of the negative, until revolution occurs; what is new is that the negative is made to work for the positive, so it ceases to be negative. In terms of reification, this involves the 'overcoming of reification' through extra-reification.

I described this trend earlier in terms of the shift from authority to manipulation, the shift from objectivation (the

(127) A term coined by Marcuse - see "Agressiveness in Advanced Industrial Society" in Negations (Beacon Press, Boston, 1968), page 251.

second 'moment') to internalisation (the third 'moment'). In terms of the above dialectical logic, this trend cannot just be seen as the extension of reified social reality to such a degree that there is no turning back (which is Weber's view). It is necessary to add to Weber's view of the 'houses of bondage' that these only exist on the foundations of people striving for value ends by means that are not logically conjoined to the ends. This irrational action is a result of the incorporation of the community, status, style-of-life 'area' (i.e. the private) into the associational, class, market 'area' (i.e. the public) in the terms of (and because of) an obsolete bureaucratic structure which has become historically irrational. It is expressed in man trying to fulfill human needs (as opposed to material needs) but being doomed to failure in that he tries within a reified social structure, which increasingly comes to manipulate his real needs into 'functional' paths.

This trend implies a change in the nature of socialisation; the distinction between primary and secondary socialisation becomes problematic. There is a shift to the 'third moment' of internalisation; this refers not to primary socialisation (as argued earlier, internalisation is normal in this area) but to internalisation of the norms and values of the bureaucratic, secondary group institutions. This trend can be seen, generally, in the rise of manipulative authority relations expressed in the term 'human re-

lations', and, specifically, in terms of education in 'progressive education'. This trend, however, is to be understood only in relation to a change in the nature of primary socialisation. The secondary group has become primary; but the primary group has also become secondary.

First, let us consider the changing nature of bureaucratic education. Though education remains bureaucratic in many ways, there has been a rise in the use of 'affectivity' within the educational system. Speeches such as the one quoted earlier given in the heyday of scientific management (128) are no longer characteristic of the views of educationalists just as the old ideas of scientific management are no longer characteristic of the business world. As David Riesman argues,

"There is a.....curious resemblance between the role of the teacher in the small-class modern school -- a role that has spread from the progressive private schools to some of the public schools -- and the role of the industrial-relations department in a modern factory. The latter is also increasingly concerned with cooperation between men and men and between men and management, as technical skill becomes less and less of a major concern. In a few of the more advanced plants, there is even a pattern occasionally important because it affects piecework rates and seniority rules, but usually as trivial as the similar decisions of grammar-school government. Thus the

(128) See page 114 above.

other-directed child is taught at school to take his place in a society where the concern of the group is less with what it produces than with its internal group relations, its morale." (129)

Riesman's view is that progressive education has ceased to be progressive despite the outward appearance of a system that promotes 'individuality' and 'creativity'. R. D. Laing comments on the effect of 'love' techniques on children's abilities:-

"Children do not give up their innate imagination, curiosity, dreaminess easily. You have to love them to get them to do that. Love is the path through permissiveness to discipline: and through discipline, only too often to betrayal of self." (130)

In more general terms the paradox of a system that controls by means which seem to suggest freedom from manipulative control, Laing has expressed poetically as follows:-

"Love and violence, properly speaking, are polar opposites. Love lets the other be, but with affection and concern. Violence attempts to constrain the other's freedom, to force him to act in the way we desire, but with ultimate lack of concern, with indifference to other's own existence of destiny. We are effectively destroying ourselves by violence masquerading as love." (131)

(129) Riesman, D., The Lonely Crowd (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1950), page 64.

(130) Laing, R. D., The Politics of Experience and The Bird of Paradise (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1967), page 60.

(131) ibid, page 50.

The teacher has ceased to be the authoritarian figure that was characteristic up to the early twentieth century; the teacher is now a manipulator. As Mills showed (132), the fundamental characteristic of power that takes a manipulative form is that the 'enemy' is hidden. Jules Henry in his study 'Golden Rule Days: American Schoolrooms' (133) has shown that the power of the teacher takes precisely this form in education to-day. The power of the teacher is enhanced by the introduction of 'love' into the teaching situation; for the removal of this 'love' can be used as an instrument of control. As Henry observed, there has been an internalisation of norms and values for it is the group within the classroom that exercises control over the child rather than the teacher. Henry gives the example of the teacher who is so 'free and democratic' that he did not try to control the class even when the noise-level became so high that his voice could not be heard; in the end, the children 'shushed' each other (134).

Elsewhere, Henry shows the control exercised by the peer groups can be much more insidious. Henry relates the story of Boris:-

"Boris had trouble reducing 12/16 to the lowest terms and could only get as far as 6/8. The teacher asked him quietly if

(132) see page 83.

(133) in Culture Against Man, op.cit., pages 283-321.

(134) ibid, pages 314-315.

that was as far as he could reduce it. She suggested he 'think'. Much heaving up and down and waving of hands by the other children, all frantic to correct him. Boris pretty unhappy, probably mentally paralysed. The teacher quiet, patient, ignores the others and concentrates with look and voice on Boris. She says, "Is there a bigger number than two you can divide into the two parts of the fraction?" After a minute or two, she becomes more urgent, but there is no response from Boris. She then turns to the class and says, "Well, who can tell Boris what the number is?" A forest of hands appear, and the teacher calls Peggy. Peggy says that four may be divided into the numerator and denominator." (135)

The punishment received by Boris was given by the class; it is possible that Boris may even remember the incident as one in which the teacher was 'on his side', that the teacher acted as a restraining influence on the class. But the point is that the class was acting as they were, only because of the rewards that the teacher was offering. This fact distinguishes such actions from the cruelty which is common among groups of children in this culture.

Riesman noted the similarity of the role of the teacher in the modern school with the public relations department in the modern factory. Just as the 'co-operation' promoted by human relations in the economic sphere and the pseudo-communities of modern suburbs hide a seething competition, so competition is only inten-

(135) ibid, pages 295-296.

sified within the school. There are marked similarities between the status-seeking of the adult world and the competition that is hidden by the 'groupiness' of modern schools. As Henry emphasises in his discussion of the example of Boris, the child is not just learning arithmetic (in fact, he is not learning arithmetic at all, for his mind was paralysed); he was learning the 'essential nightmare' of contemporary culture:-

"To be successful in our culture, one must learn to dream of failure." (136)

This is characteristic of even the most successful child at school, just as it is characteristic of the irrational status-striving of the new middle class. Not only is success conditional on the failure of others but success is conditional on continued re-affirmation of doing better than others. As I pointed out in my discussion of status-seeking, this is irrational because it is bound to fail.

There is an intense 'fear of failure' in modern children which in paralysing the child's mind causes the failure. This point was also central to a recent book by John Holt (137) in which he shows the depths to which children sink in order to avoid failure; he argues that when the child learns something his feelings

(136) ibid, page 296.

(137) Holt, John, How Children Fail, (Delta Books, New York, 1964).

are those of relief as opposed to those of joy. Holt showed how children repeat a wrong answer given by another child rather than attempt an alternative answer because the fear of ridicule by other members of the class is so intense. Possibly the most classic example of the irrationality produced was Holt's example of the game of 'guess what number I am thinking of'. Holt told the children he was thinking of a number between 1 and 10,000 and the children had to ask questions so as to narrow the range. If a child asked, "Is the number between 1 and 5,000?", and it was, the class would react with murmurings of approval, and the child who asked the question would look pleased. But if the number was in fact between 5,000 and 10,000, the class groaned, the child look crestfallen -- despite the fact that exactly the same amount of information had been gained. (138)

Holt's little book raises the question of the depth of this process. Holt is clearly a gifted teacher who could not be classed as a manipulator yet as he showed his was an uphill battle against the intense fear of the children. The rare teacher who tries to maintain impersonal relations often finds that, apart from the confusion this creates in the children, the children resent him more than the manipulative teachers. The children also have a need for what most teachers provide.

(138) ibid, pages 32-34.

Before discussing the family and the changed nature of primary socialisation, it is necessary to comment on the teachers. It is important to see that most teachers think that their teaching methods are true to the 'free', 'democratic' traditions of Western civilisation; in other words, a conspiracy view must be rejected. However, the point should be made that teachers as a group have characteristics that represent some of the most advanced tendencies that I have been describing in modern society. Teaching is one of the main paths of mobility for those from the lower levels of society; thus, teachers are new middle class but with few hangovers from the old middle class traditions. It does not seem too far fetched to say that teachers' concern for status is reflected in their need for the approval of the children they teach. In that many teachers really do believe themselves to be part of the peer group of the children ("the teacher as 'buddy'") this tendency will be reinforced. On the other side of the coin, teachers have increased fear of losing control of children; the feelings of rejection are perceived as personal and thus more painful. Another factor which increases the teacher's fear of losing control of the class is the bureaucratic requirement of the quantitative measurement of the performance of teachers on the basis of the ability to control the class. This will tend to reinforce the use of manipulative methods of control.

Just as not all teachers are manipulators, not all children are susceptible to these methods of control. The 'affective'

approach is particularly vulnerable if the children do not accept the rules of the game. Teachers who attempt to use 'love' as a method of control tend to have a rude awakening when confronted with children of the old working class in Europe and children of the ghettos (particularly the black children) in North America. It is no wonder that the aim of most teachers is to get out of such schools as soon as their experience allows them to get jobs in the suburbs; it would be interesting to see if such movement has increased in recent years. How is it that these children will exploit the 'freedom' allowed by the teacher as opposed to the normal reaction of competing fiercely for the 'affection' of the teacher? The point would seem to be these children have an alternative identity which is independent of their status in school.

This brings us back to primary socialisation in which the 'self', the 'identity' of the child is formed. The scientific pretensions of sociology have not been able to hide the normal sociological view of the family as a 'success'. Sociologists have tended to be wary of the growth of bureaucracy but have been able to fall back on the family as a human haven in an impersonal world. Two of Britain's foremost sociological authorities on the family believe that,

"There is enough clear evidence to warrant its description as one of the twentieth century's great success stories." (139)

(139) McGregor, O.R., and Rowntree, G. 'The Family' in Society, ed. Welford, A.T., et al. (London, 1962), page 425, quoted by Blackburn, R., 'A Brief Guide to Bourgeois Ideology' in Student Power, ed. Cockburn, Alex, et al. (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1969).

It can be argued that as the family has been stripped of its functions through institutional differentiation the family is left with affection; here, at least, life exists as an end-in-itself. The alternative view of the family is given by R.D. Laing who describes it as a 'protection racket'. (140)

The loss of social functions that has characterised the changing family and the growth of alternative socialisation agencies using 'primary group methods' has removed the qualitative distinction between primary and secondary socialisation. The school is not the only competing agent of socialisation:-

"As early as the pre-school level gangs, radio and television set the pattern for conformity and rebellion; deviations from the pattern are punished not so much within the family as outside and against the family. The experts of the mass media transmit the required values; they offer the perfect training in efficiency, toughness, personality, dream and romance. With this education the family can no longer compete." (141)

The essential point is that the corollary to the use of manipulation by bureaucratic organisations is the removal of life as an end-in-itself even within the family. As Stein has noted, love within even the mother-child relationship has become conditional. Of course, the removal of love when the child has done something

(140) Laing, R. D., op.cit., page 55.

(141) Marcuse, H., Eros and Civilisation (Beacon Press, Boston, 1955), page 88.

'wrong' is normal, and the basis of learning, but underlying the anger of the parents, there still remains an underlying love (that is, if love is unconditional). Laing describes, in the form of a story, what he considers to be the normal form love takes within the family to-day:-

"A boy of three is held by his mother out of a sixth-story window by his neck. His mother says: 'See how much I love you.' The demonstration being that if she did not love him she would drop him. One would go through many speculations as to why a woman could be so warped as to terrorise her own son in such a way. When one has been through all that, one comes back to the obvious: the reason she is doing this to him was exactly the reason she gave him. It was to show him that she loved him.....This is an example of extreme normality. The normal way parents get their children to love them is to terrorise them...." (142)

Thus, the idea of the 'protection racket'.

This can be put in the sociological terms of Mead and Cooley in terms of the formation of the 'self' through the 'significant other' or 'looking-glass'. The psycho-analyst D. W. Winnicott recently posed the question: 'One looks into the mirror to see oneself -- what antecedes the mirror?' (143) Laing continues:-

"(Winnicott) suggests that what comes before the mirror is one's mother's face. So that, if one's mother's face is a mirror, when one looks in one's mother's face, one

(142) Laing, R. D., 'The Obvious' in The Dialectics of Liberation, ed. Cooper, D., (Penguin Books, 1968), page 27.

(143) Winnicott, D. W., 'Mirror role of Mother and Family in Child Development' in The Predicament of the Family, ed. Lomas, Peter (Hogarth Press, London, 1967), quoted in ibid, page 28.

see oneself. What else can one see?
 That is fine so long as one's mother,
 in looking at oneself, sees oneself.
 But if in looking at oneself, she sees
 herself -- sees oneself as an extension
 of herself, but in so doing is unaware
 of so doing so that she thinks she sees
 oneself -- out of that deep spiral of
 misapprehension however is one to find
 oneself again?" (144)

This comes back to Laing's comment on love as 'letting the other be'; what is in question is whether modern man (or woman) can do this at all for his own needs are too great. In the true meaning of the word modern man is too selfish.

My view of the 'problem of identity', which follows from the above, is that man does not get an identity within primary socialisation; the child fails to develop as an individual, and remains entirely the extension of others (145). Thus, life becomes truly a 'quest for identity' which the bureaucratic organisations are only too eager to provide, though not fulfill. Modern sociology fails to take note of this truly revolutionary development (and one might add terrifying) for as Wrong notes man as

(144) ibid, page 28.

(145) This contrasts with a common sociological view of the 'problem of identity' deriving from the increased number of competing socialising agents. This view which is essentially one of 'role conflict' has been related to social mobility by Berger and Luckmann. See Berger, P. and Luckmann, T., 'Social Mobility and Personal Identity', in European Journal of Sociology. Vol. V (2) 1964 pp. 331-344.

'acceptance-seeker' is seen as normal by an 'over-socialised conception of man'. (146) Riesman's concept of 'other-directedness' which corresponds to man who has failed to develop a self 'apart from' society also corresponds to the sociologist's 'acceptance-seeker' (147). Marcuse takes note of the changed nature of internalisation (which corresponds to the term introjection) in the following passage:-

"....The term 'introjection' perhaps no longer describes the way in which the individual by himself reproduces and perpetrates the external controls exercised by his society. Introjection suggests a variety of relatively spontaneous processes by which a Self (Ego) transposes the 'outer' into the 'inner'. Thus, introjection implies the existence of an inner dimension distinguished from and even antagonistic to the external exigencies -- an individual consciousness and an individual unconsciousness apart from public opinion and behaviour..... today.....most production and mass distribution claim the entire individualThe manifold processes of introjection seem to be ossified in almost mechanical reactions. The result is, not adjustment but mimesis; an immediate identification of the individual with his society and, through it, with the society as a whole." (148)

Thus, as with the functional theory of stratification so with the over-socialised conception of man: it has become true. But this must be seen in terms of the failure of man to develop a self, an identity; the reduction of man to pure instrument.

(146) Wrong, D., op.cit., page 90-94.

(147) ibid, page 91, footnote 11.

(148) Marcuse, H., One-Dimensional Man, op. cit., page 10.

It is now necessary to return to the discussion of social mobility, and the thesis that the form that rationalisation is taking is replacing 'external barriers' to social mobility by 'internal barriers'. As I argued at the end of PART II this has to be considered in terms of the combination of a rational social structure and irrational individual action. I argued that the irrationality of individual action is to be seen in status-seeking; mobility in this form is an 'end-in-itself', which is itself an expression of 'extra-reification'.

Similarly educational qualifications are increasingly perceived as ends-in-themselves despite the fact that objectively they are increasingly only means. This is to be understood in terms of the changed nature of socialisation; educational qualifications become a source of identity in the eternal quest for identity. Of course, it is not the qualifications themselves that are the source of identity but rather the status that has been inextricably linked with them by manipulative teachers. This has implications for the instant/deferred gratification dichotomy mentioned earlier as a source of explanation of low achievement by working-class children. This scheme has become increasingly irrelevant as the working-class have been absorbed into the wider society but this is not to say that the 'deferred

gratification pattern' has become universal (149). Just as adults derive satisfaction from mobility, per se, so children derive satisfaction from each step of the educational ladder, however small or trivial. In fact, children need instant (or rather constant) gratification to stave off the nagging fear and anxiety. The fact that educational qualifications are perceived as ends-in-themselves may also help to explain the lack of correspondence between market demands and student preference (150) in terms of speciality. This reflects the illusory nature of contemporary 'materialism'.

Another dichotomy which has been used to help understand social mobility is Ralph Turner's distinction between sponsored and contest mobility (151). As Turner defines his concepts:-

"Applied to mobility, the contest norm means that victory by a person of moderate intelligence accomplished through the use of common sense, craft, enterprise, daring, and successful risk-taking is more appreciated than victory of the most intelligent or the best educated.

Sponsored mobility, on the other hand, rejects the pattern of the

(149) In as much as this pattern was characteristic of the Puritan belief in 'self-denial', this has clearly been transformed (in its many forms) in modern society. The so-called sexual freedom of modern society is characteristic of the new form of denial. The paradox of gratification and denial at the same time has been called by Marcuse 'repressive tolerance'.

(150) For example, the shortage of engineers in the U.S.A.

(151) Turner, Ralph, "Modes of Social Ascent through Education" in Education, Economy and Society, op. cit. pp. 121-139.

contest and substitutes a controlled selection process. In this process the elite or their agents, who are best qualified to judge merit, call those individuals to elite status who have appropriate qualities. Individuals do not win or seize elite status, but mobility is rather a process of sponsored induction into the elite following selection." (152)

Turner's approach is unusual among sociologists in that he tries to draw distinctions between different types of mobility. Turner developed this distinction as a means of distinguishing between mobility in England (sponsored) and the United States (contest); what Turner describes is the marked aristocratic influence in the English system as opposed to the 'free enterprise' basis of the American system.

The form that rationalisation has taken in modern society severely modifies the applicability of this distinction today (as opposed to the situation at the beginning of the twentieth century). This is partly to be understood in terms of Turner's own qualifications. He notes that the contest system in the U.S. is being modified by both the need for educational qualifications and in that mobility takes place within bureaucratic hierarchies. (153) Secondly, he notes that the English sponsorship system is being modified by the introduction of comprehensive schools and increased demand for education. (154) However, in reference

(152) ibid p. 123.

(153) ibid p. 136.

(154) ibid p. 137.

to the situation in the U.S. he notes:-

"The prospect of a surplus of college-educated persons in relation to jobs requiring college education tends to restore the contest situation at a higher level, and the further fact that completion of higher education may be more determined by motivational factors than by capacity suggests that the contest pattern continues within the school." (155)

By saying this Turner is recognising that mobility according to measured I.Q. is a form of sponsored mobility, but he argues that the importance of motivation over and above measured I.Q. maintains the fundamentals of contest mobility. However, it is my view that rationalisation will tend to result in a correspondence of levels of achievement and measured I.Q. This will occur despite (or rather because of) intensified competition (i.e. contest).

Before explaining this, it is to be noted that my argument parallels the development within Young's (fictional construction) of a meritocracy (156). Merit was defined as I.Q. plus EFFORT. However, the EFFORT part came to be increasingly irrelevant as increasing equality of opportunity resulted in decreasing social mobility. This development was explained by the sociologists as showing the accuracy of I.Q. tests and the tendency for intelligence to be transmitted in a hereditary way. It seems to me that

(155) ibid p. 138.

(156) Young, M., The Rise of the Meritocracy, op.cit.

if this development occurs in reality it will be explained in the same way. As sociologists have shown through numerous studies of aspiration levels, EFFORT (or motivation) is not just an individual element based on choice. But, on the other hand, it is not totally socially defined. It is my view that the tendencies that have set up I.Q. tests as valid measures of ability also tend to make EFFORT totally socially defined. The idea of EFFORT assumes some element of freedom; it is doubtful if this assumption can be made in contemporary society. The change is reflected in a change from 'enterprising risk-taking' to 'neurotic status-seeking' in the mode of social mobility.

The 'coming together' of sponsored and contest mobility is reflected in the way social mobility is used as a method of social control. Turner shows how the two types of mobility perform this in different ways:-

"Under a system of contest mobility this (i.e. loyalty of disadvantaged classes) is accomplished by a combination of future orientation, the universal norm of ambition and a general sense of fellow feeling with the elite.....To forestall rebellion among the disadvantaged majority, then, a contest system must avoid any absolute points of selection for mobility and immobility and must delay clear recognition of the situation until the individual is too committed to the system to change radically." (157)

(157) ibid, pages 125-126.

Social control under the system of sponsorship is maintained,
on the other hand,

"by training the masses to regard themselves as relatively incompetent to manage society, by restricting access to the skills and manners of the elite and by cultivating belief in the superior competence of the elite." (158)

To this analysis must be added that the type and degree of social control varies with the ability of the social structure to fulfill social needs. In my view, both the type of social control has changed and the degree of social control has increased with the increasing obsolescence of capitalism. As social mobility has increasingly been turned into status-seeking, so it has provided the basis for the increased need for legitimation. It has done this by combining Turner's two 'alternative' methods of legitimation. The liberal ideology of contest mobility remains and is reflected in a 'universal norm of ambition' but this is reinforced by the sponsorship ideology which is reflected in that the 'massesregard themselves as relatively incompetent.' (159)

The combination of the two ideologies is a reflection of the rationality/irrationality of advanced capitalist society. To re-

(158) ibid, page 126.

(159) One example of the sponsored nature of mobility in the U.S.A. is the 'cooling-out' method as described by B. R. Clark in "The Cooling-out Function in Higher Education" in Education, Economy and Society, op.cit., pages 513-523. At the same time, however, this is only necessary because of the continuation of the ideology of contest mobility.

turn to the point that measured I.Q. will tend to correspond with achievement levels, this is because of the self-fulfilling prophecy tendency of I.Q. tests. This point has often been made by sociologists in terms of 'people tend to become what they are socially defined to be'. I conceive of my analysis as a theoretical basis for understanding why this is and for understanding why it will tend to be on the increase in modern society. First, I.Q. is one example of man externalising his power and coming to be defined by his own creations. The tendency for man to accept the social definition is increased as rationalisation/reification removes other external barriers to mobility and as one's social definition in the private sphere comes to more closely correspond to the public sphere's (i.e. school) definition.

However, by this very process, I.Q. comes to approach total identity; the child cannot consciously admit the rationality of a social definition which sees him as a failure. Thus, instead of passively accepting his rationally determined fate, he intensifies his efforts to escape that fate. He partly seeks refuge in the peer group but even here status remains in the same terms for the teacher manipulates the children to internalise the same social definitions of reality. The child also tries to learn but the situation is so bound up with fear and anxiety that EFFORT may be a negative factor and destroys the child's ability to learn. This contrasts with the usual view of EFFORT as a positive factor that

needs to be added to I.Q. in order to understand achievement (160). If this occurs one can imagine the psychologists reaction: they will say even with high 'motivation' those with low I.Q.'s cannot achieve; therefore, our I.Q. tests must be an accurate measure of ability.

Another irrational reaction to the fear and anxiety is that children tend to respond to the learning process with mechanical reactions. Apart from the tendency for education to be turned into rote learning due to the rationalisation trend, the children also tend to be unable to learn in any other way. The prevalence of rote learning even up to university degree level is evidence of both the inability of some children to learn in any other way and of their tremendous need for educational qualifications (i.e. status) in that rote learning makes the process incredibly laborious. This reaction tends to further reify education and ability; and so reduce the child's belief in his own power. The vicious circle takes another turn.

To put the argument in other terms, it is not clear how relevant the achieved/ascribed status dichotomy is in advanced capitalism. This distinction assumes the individual can 'achieve' a status by

(160) The logic of this argument stresses the need for an alternative identity to that given in school. It is similar to that of Black Power advocates in terms of the need of an alternative identity in a racist society. In these terms, it might be possible to argue that the relative high achievement levels of Jews does not only result from an ethnic emphasis on the importance of education but also exists because Jewish parents are less likely to accept the "WASP" school's definition of their child's ability.

his own efforts which are not totally determined by social definitions. It assumes an area of freedom. If, one does not start with an over-socialised conception of man, then this distinction is relevant; however, it is not clear that one can say that the contemporary other-directed individual achieves a status. Rather, he ascribes himself a status.

The reasons for a continuation of a low degree of inter-generational mobility are implicit in the previous argument. The present society based on the 'failure' of one sector so that those 'above' need those below to fail to feel their success. The tendency is for rationalisation to destroy any other definition of social reality in those members of the 'failed' section of society. In doing this, it will tend to increase their fear and anxiety as they come to feel that their 'failure' is their own fault. This fear and anxiety will likely be transmitted to their children, and affect their ability to learn in pre-school years. However, the main point is that once at school and once defined as failures by I.Q. tests the self-fulfilling prophecy aspect will take over. The difference between their measured I.Q. and those of children of parents of higher status need only be minimal for one child to be set on the road to 'middle-management' and the other to 'janitor'. Also, if success (or failure) is increasingly determined by one's fears of failure and then to be defined a failure in a 'high ability' school will probably have a worse effect on the child's ability to learn than if he is de-

fined a success (relatively, of course) in a 'low ability' school (161). It is also possible that an ideology of biologically inherited ability may tend to grow up in future years, if, as I have suggested, measured I.Q. does come to approximate more closely to achievement levels. This would more than likely act as a self-fulfilling prophecy. If this does occur, we will see once again how the social 'sciences' have contributed to making man an object of study. Also, when we consider what is happening to man in this age we must not rule out the possibility that his genetic make-up will be affected.

As Rene Dubos has stated,

"There may emerge by selection a stock of human beings suited genetically to accept as a matter of course a regimented and sheltered way of life in a teeming and polluted world, from which all wilderness and fantasy of nature will have disappeared. The domesticated farm animal and the laboratory rodent or a controlled regimen in a controlled environment will then become true models for the study of man." (161)

(161). This has implications in terms of the setting-up of comprehensive schools in Britain; the results may be the opposite of that intended.

(162) Dubos, Rene, Man Adapting (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1965), pages 313-314, quoted in Marcuse, H., An Essay on Liberation, op.cit., page 18.

SUMMARY

The thesis is:-

Rationalisation has led to the destruction of 'external barriers' to social mobility while at the same time constructing 'internal barriers' to social mobility.

Rationalisation is a trend that can be traced back many centuries within Western civilisation and which can be seen as characterising many of the tremendous changes that have occurred in the last two centuries. Social mobility has also been characteristic of industrial societies for these past two centuries.

"The term 'social mobility' refers to the process by which individuals move from one position to another in society -- positions which by general consent have been given specific hierarchical values. When we study social mobility we analyse the movement of individuals from positions possessing a certain rank to positions either higher or lower in the social system." (1)

An 'objective' definition such as the above, though correct, tends to hide more than it elucidates for it leads to a view that comparisons can be made between the amount of social mobility in different historical periods. It is my view that such comparisons are misleading for social mobility can be many different things. My position derives from a view of society which is holistic: the parts

(1) Lipset, S. M. and Bendix, R. Social Mobility in Industrial Society (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1959), pages 1 - 2.

can only be understood in relationship to the whole. Social mobility is only a part and it is necessary to understand both the directly related areas of society (at the present time, the stratification system and educational system) and more generally the 'nature' of the whole society.

It is my view that the necessity of a holistic approach to society is particularly true in reference to social mobility, for within the course of the last two centuries, social mobility has been transformed from something which expressed the freedom of man to something which is a means to denying that freedom. The importance of social mobility in this sense was first emphasised within the liberal, individualistic ideology that grew up at the time prior to and during the industrial revolution. Both social mobility and the ideology remain but the society has been transformed. Social mobility within early capitalism, though limited to the bourgeoisie, represented a loosening of the chains that constrained man's freedom. Social mobility within advanced capitalism has become one of the major means of social control in an obsolete system. Social mobility has become one of the links of the chain that are being pulled tighter. In fact, it is no longer clear whether man possesses the ability to shake off the chains. Thus, social mobility has changed from being evidence of the freedom within early capitalism to a means to the negation of that freedom, or any other form of freedom, within advanced capitalism.

Stated in this bald, polemical form, this statement begs many questions, in particular what I mean by 'freedom'. Weber's theme of rationalisation can be of great use in understanding some of the changes in the social structure since early capitalism that have led to the changed nature of social mobility. In particular, Weber's stress on the need for bureaucracies as providing the most efficient form of organisation has clearly been a major trend in the twentieth century. As Weber saw, these bureaucracies would be the future 'houses of bondage' for they would turn man into a slave to the machine (in this case, a human machine, but a machine nevertheless).

Though I share Weber's pessimism, I think that Weber's analysis can only go part way in understanding contemporary society. This is because Weber fell into the trap of seeing the demands of capitalist rationality as inevitable. With efficiency as his measure of 'rationality' Weber fell into a form of technological determinism in arguing that things (material goods) demand an enslaving form of human organisation. This is what Marx described as reification. Reification, according to Marx, inevitably reached its highest stage within capitalism as the 'struggle with nature' reached its highest stage. I say 'inevitably' because to Marx the essential point about man's development was its contradictory nature. The more man struggled to control nature, the more he came to be controlled by his own creations. But, in that the

highest degree of reification that was reached within capitalism also corresponded to the most efficient form of material production this would lead to a position in which reification was no longer necessary. Thus, Marx argued that by its own dynamic capitalism would lay the pre-conditions for socialism. Weber did not recognise that capitalism was only a means to socialism, as Marx argued. For Weber, capitalism embodied the highest form of rationality -- 'formal rationality'. His reference was to the rationality of the market which in allowing calculability on the one standard of money was rational in terms of both means and 'ends'. This reification of Reason involves the transformation of material goods from being 'means to human ends' into 'ends-in-themselves'.

The Marxist dialectic does not fall into the same trap as Weber did, but still recognises the inevitability of 'formal rationality' with the central concept of reification. For Marx, what is rational becomes historically variable for it has to be considered in terms of the 'possibilities' inherent in the society. Thus, in one sense, early capitalism can be seen as the most rational form of society for both Weber and Marx. The setting-up of the market allowed the intensification of the struggle with nature and also freed man from the chains of feudal society. The growth of social mobility into a widespread phenomenon corresponded to the setting up of the market; men could freely compete on the market for the material rewards in the form of land and capital. Yet,

the setting up of the market also corresponded to the highest degree of reification in the reduction of man to the level of a thing. Labour had to be made quantifiable in terms of money, just as everything else. Thus, from the start the freedom expressed within social mobility was limited to the bourgeoisie with a steadily growing proletariat reduced to the level of things. This division of society into two classes was accomplished by the increasing division between the public and private spheres of life. Even the bourgeoisie did not escape the effects of reification as life in the public sphere was judged only in terms of efficiency of material production. Man became an instrument within the public sphere from the start; the seeds for later bureaucracies were already sown. Only within the private sphere (of both the bourgeoisie and proletariat) did human relations remain as ends-in-themselves. The private sphere was also devalued in relation to the public sphere by the ideology of the 'work ethic' as expressed in Puritanism.

To say that early capitalism was also rational for Marx brings me back to the question of freedom. Following Marx, I see freedom as expressed within man's 'struggle with nature'. Freedom must go beyond the liberal conception of 'freedom from' which was emphasised by Weber to 'freedom to' which was emphasised by Marx's concept of praxis. The 'utopian' aspect of Marx embodied in the idea of the overcoming of the contradiction between man and nature is

central to Marx for the freedom of man is expressed in man's struggle to achieve this state. Thus, the freedom of early capitalism was the highest possible at that time but the very success of capitalism in terms of material production has made a liberal conception of freedom obsolete.

Yet, for Marx, social mobility should only have played an important role within early capitalism; it was Marx's belief that capitalism would polarise into two classes with little mobility between the two. Within socialist society individualism would not take a form that depended on the failure of others and so social mobility would become obsolete. But, social mobility has remained an important element within capitalist society which fact, I believe, is much more than a slight aberration from Marx's conception. Rather it is central to understanding the durability of capitalism beyond that predicted by Marx. This is not to deny the validity of Marx's central point that capitalism produces by its own dynamic the pre-conditions of socialism. In my view, contemporary society must be understood in terms of the repression of the 'possibilities' inherent within it.

This brings me to my third major theorist -- Marcuse. Marcuse has tried to understand advanced capitalist society in terms of the Marxist dialectic but going beyond a pure Marxist approach. He argues that various pairs of 'opposites' which Marx conceived of as expressing the contradictions within capitalism (and providing the

birth of socialism) have come together. Capitalism has been able to contain its negation (i.e. socialism) by employing it as the basis for its own continuation. In one sense, this overcomes the contradiction within capitalism for in that capitalism needs its negation the negative becomes positive. In another sense, the contradiction is accentuated for the increasing efficiency of capitalism in abolishing material need effectively increases the need for socialism. Marcuse expresses this paradox by arguing that development explodes the contradiction. Corresponding to this shift in the dialectic are trends that go beyond both rationalisation and reification as understood by Weber and Marx. There has been a shift from this to the 'internalisation of objective reality',

to manipulation. In one sense, this is a reversal of the rationalisation/reification trend. To take one example, capitalism has been able to incorporate 'human relations into a reified, bureaucratic structure which both Marx and Weber saw as the antipathy of 'personal relations'. Yet, in another sense, there has been a continuation of the rationalisation/reification trend for this has been able to occur only by the reduction of man to a thing, to an instrument in all areas of life.

Given this theoretical background, it is possible to see these trends within both the stratification and educational systems of contemporary society. The rationalisation of the stratification system can be seen in the establishment of a single hierarchy of positions; these positions are attained on the basis of the ob-

jective ability of the individuals (as determined by educational qualifications) to perform their role in society. In other words, rational market criteria have increasingly become the basis of stratification. In my view, the functional theory of stratification as expounded by Davis and Moore, though of little historical use, is of relevance for an understanding of the hierarchy of positions which exists in advanced capitalism to-day. At the same time that stratification has become more rational, individual action in the form of status-seeking has become more irrational. The unsatisfying nature of materialism to people in a seemingly materialist society (in that status comes to parallel money income), is expressed in modern man's need for human acceptance which is expressed in the form of status seeking.

The paradoxical nature of stratification expressed in the combination of rationality/irrationality of the system is to be understood in terms of the 'coming together' of various pairs of 'opposites'. It is clear that the 'class struggle' is not on the increase in advanced capitalist society; at least, not in the form predicted by Marx. There has been a 'coming together' of the proletariat and bourgeoisie; there have been changes in both to form what has been called the new middle class. Though this group is propertyless there is little evidence that they can any longer be considered as 'the proletariat'. As opposed to being in transition from the bourgeoisie to the proletariat (as a pure Marxist view

would have us believe) this group has developed as characteristic of the most advanced trends within capitalism. They work for the most rationalised sectors of the economy and tend to be bureaucrats. Though they are increasingly within trade unions, these unions are usually simply competing for a larger 'slice of the cake' and will combine with whoever best serves their material interests.

In my view, to understand this trend fully one must see it in the light of a parallel trend - the combination of 'class' and 'status'. Weber developed this dichotomy to distinguish between stratification as determined by market considerations and stratification based on extra-market considerations. Though this was of relevance in nineteenth-century capitalism, it is to-day of doubtful importance. First, as was mentioned, there is a correspondence between income and status to an increasing degree. Underlying this are a number of related trends. Capitalism has shifted from 'production capitalism' to 'consumption capitalism' and so must control not only man as worker but man as consumer. Increasingly, status tends to be based on market considerations in terms of the amount of consumption of material goods. The status group is no longer limited to the community but tends to become society wide. This contrasts with Weber's view of status groups qualitatively different communities. More generally, the distinction between the public and private spheres of life tend to be removed when status is reduced to market criteria because man exists as instrument in both spheres and no life exists as an end-in-itself. If this

occurs then Marx's designation of the proletariat as 'in but not of civil society' becomes no longer true; all spheres of life are defined by market criteria.

Weber's observations on education are clearly relevant to-day with the increasing importance of educational qualifications for social movility. As with the stratification system and society, in general, there are two trends within education which are complementary but also amount to a marked change in the rationalisation trend. In the terms of Weber and Marx, it is possible to see how education has become increasingly vocationally oriented, how it has become bureaucratic and how the ideology of I.Q. and I.Q. tests has arisen. At the same time, education has paralleled the economy in the development of 'human relations' in the guise of 'progressive education'; and the division between socialisation within education and socialisation in the family has increasingly been removed. This latter trend can be seen as fundamental to the rationalisation of education and central to the repression of the 'possibilities' of the present society if viewed in the terms of Marcuse.

The first trend represents a shift from education of the 'cultivated man' type to the 'specialist' type. Educational institutions have become producers of specialists that are of direct use to the bureaucracies of the economy and other institutions. This 'take-over' of educational institutions in the twentieth century has paralleled the need for skilled manpower to serve the bureaucracies. However, this is not simply an example of economic determinism but

rather is a complex development following demands for greater efficiency within educational institutions. The bureaucratisation that followed inevitably resulted in the need for outside 'ends'; this was supplied by the economy.

The emphasis on I.Q. fits in with the need for measurement and the vocational trend within the twentieth century. The reduction of human ability to I.Q. is a good example of the reification implicit in rationalisation. Ability is removed from any conception of 'human need' which is culturally defined and psychologists dream of a perfect I.Q. test. Following a Marxist position it can be argued that ability is a response to 'human needs' which develops both culturally and biologically within man.

The growth of 'progressive education' must be understood in terms of the changing nature of socialisation and more generally in terms of the 'coming together' of the public and private spheres of life. The relevance of this point, and of the whole idea of human freedom as expressed in the Marxist concept of praxis, only makes sense if one does not start with an 'over-socialised conception of man'. The freedom expressed in the ability of man to make society requires the existence of one area of life in which man can realise his own power i.e. one area of life which is not reified. This emphasises the importance of the private sphere in which some relations exist as ends-in-themselves. The take-over of the private sphere by capitalist rationality in destroying any non-instrumental relations effectively destroys man's freedom. Thus, we have a strange

combination of primary-secondary group relations in both 'primary' and 'secondary' groups. Just as love in the mother-child relationship becomes conditional so 'affectivity' has grown as an instrument within bureaucratic relations.

The destruction of the freedom of man parallels the growth of the 'quest for identity'; a function which is now intimately bound up with the process of social mobility. Mobility as status-seeking takes on a new dimension when it is realised how deeply man has been made to need status. Status is gained in the adult world largely by ownership of material goods; in the child world it is gained by academic achievement which is a preparatory step for adult status-seeking. Corresponding with the intense need for academic achievement is intense fear and anxiety for the child is told of his ability through I.Q. tests and tends to believe this, since he/she has no counter social definition as would have been provided formerly by the private sphere. Intense fear of failure is combined with a society that defines one as a failure unless one continually proves one's success.

Thus, there is a built-in self-fulfilling prophecy aspect to I.Q. tests which will tend to be exacerbated as 'individuals' identify totally with their social definitions; clearly, this is a situation not conducive to learning. Consequently man becomes incapable of social mobility of the individualistic, enterprising type. There will be a tendency for the rate of social mobility to be limited to

that expected in the peer group, although the individual strives desperately to derive status by doing better than his peers. The barriers to social mobility are even more powerful to-day when man doubts his own powers than before when man could blame his failure on an irrational social structure, and when failure did not involve a total rejection of oneself. As well as being expressed in a restriction of inter-generational mobility these barriers will likely affect intra-generational mobility as children of lower status parents are made to experience more intense feelings of failure, and fear of failure. If an ideology of hereditary ability becomes established, as would seem quite likely in this rationalisation trend, the self-fulfilling prophecy will become entrenched. Man would have constructed a new form of aristocracy based on 'merit' which would be even more powerful than previous forms because it exists on the basis of a 'rational' criterion.

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