Philosophy Theses and Practica

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    The rights of non-sentient beings
    (2024-01-23) Tomovski, Dimitar; Leland, Robert J. (Philosophy); Lecce, Steven (Political Studies); McArthur, Neil
    In this thesis, I propose certain non-sentient entities ought to be considered rights-bearers. I adopt Wesley Hohfeld's view that rights and duties are correlative and argue that we have duties toward certain non-sentient entities. I claim that the two criteria that need to be fulfilled by a non-sentient entity for there to be duties toward it are intrinsic value and moral standing. I then provide examples of non-sentient entities that would be considered rights-bearers according to my view and provide positive implications for my view's adoption.
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    Open Access
    Is the Metaverse a new world? Interpreting the Metaverse from the perspective of Heidegger’s philosophy
    (2023-12-04) Moradi, Moein; McArthur, Neil (Philosophy); Dubois, Danielle (Religion); Mahrenholz, Simone
    This thesis examines the phenomenon of the Metaverse from Martin Heidegger’s perspective, focusing on the concepts of Dasein, reality, truth, and the world. The main focus of the thesis is the reality and the worldhood in the Metaverse. The first two chapters will explain the main relevant concepts in Heidegger’s philosophy for this topic. This starts with Dasein, which refers to the human existence, and world, which involves the overall network of the significance of meaningful relationships and context. The understanding of truth and reality is also highlighted and emphasized to clarify the existential nature of the network that all these concepts form. In Chapter 3, based on Heidegger’s theories, the relationship between technology and the world is inquired. Heidegger argues that technology is not only a tool, rather, it has the capacity to reveal the world as a standing-reserve, reducing the entities to mere means for certain aims, by way of instrumentalization of the resources that are supposed to be ready for human beings when they need them. Through this preparation, the thesis provides a foundation to explore the ontological concept of the Metaverse. Based on Heidegger’s philosophical framework, chapter 3 of the thesis then concludes that the Metaverse is indeed a new world. The Metaverse, by providing an immersive experience and a variety of new experiential and interactive possibilities provides environments in which people can interact and get involved with visual and digital entities. Dasein through this involvement allows the entities to refer, and in Heidegger, this means for them to be real. The entities in the Metaverse are real, although not in the same way as the entities in the physical world are. The thesis then suggests that the difference between the reality of entities in the Metaverse and the ones in the physical world can be explained by the fact that the kind of references they make in the Metaverse are different from those of the physical world. This means that the virtual representations and experiences within the Metaverse lack some ontological aspects of the physical realm.
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    Open Access
    Depression, judgment, and belief
    (2024-01-02) Hildebrand, Christine; Tillman, Christopher (Philosophy); Martens, Rhonda (Philosophy); Leland, RJ
    This paper proposes a puzzle about an agent’s beliefs that arises in certain cases where a person suffering from depression makes sincere assertions of negative self-evaluations because of her depression whilst also judging that her overall evidence supports the negation of her negative self-evaluations. I argue that the assertions of negative self-evaluations and the agent’s judgments about overall evidence each exhibit attributes that are characteristic of belief. I argue that the puzzle arises in cases where the agent in question is aware of each of her beliefs and is rational enough to prefer, not only avoiding conflicting beliefs, but also to prefer that her beliefs be based on relevant overall evidence, as opposed to depressive thought patterns. I consider a variety of theories that may map on to my case, and I discuss challenges or objections to each theory as it applies to the case. I think there are reasons to favor a theory that rejects the claim that the agent straightforwardly believes that her negative self-evaluations are true, so, after ruling out some unsatisfying accounts, I spend the first major portion of the paper discussing views that take this approach. The latter portion of the paper is spent discussing theories that put pressure on other premises or assumptions of the puzzle. My intention is to discuss the relationship between depression, belief, judgment, and rationality in a somewhat narrow context. I do not intend to speak to the relationship between belief, judgment, and rationality as it applies to depression in general. I leave it up to further inquiry to discuss depression more generally as it relates to the issues raised in this paper, and I leave it up to further inquiry to determine whether my proposed puzzle or its potential solutions have novel or interesting therapeutic implications.
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    Open Access
    Form matters: an ontology of music
    (2022-02-04) Dyck, Harley; Matheson, Carl (Philosophy); Mahrenholz, Simone (Philosophy); Murray, Adam (Philosophy)
    In this thesis, I develop a hylomorphic view of musical works and argue that it proves more explanatorily successful than rival metaphysical accounts. I begin by presenting general concepts of hylomorphism, before tackling the question of specifically musical hylomorphism. Some candidates for the matter and form of musical works are rejected; I propose that the matter of musical works is note-types, and that the form is "semblance," a specific notion developed by Susanne Langer. I end by presenting the benefits of this view, namely its avoidance of difficulties faced by competing metaphysical accounts and its corresponding elegance in explaining various facts about musical works, such as their repeatability, creatability, and expression.
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    Open Access
    MDR theory and the problems posed by nonreferring names
    (2022) Bithy, Tumpa; Murray, Adam (Philosophy); Dentsoras, Dimitrios (Philosophy); Tillman, Chris (Philosophy)
    I begin by explaining the MDR theory by which I mean Millianism, Direct reference theory, and the theory of Russellian structured proposition. In the first chapter, I have also discussed what nonreferring names are and some of the problems nonreferring names pose for MDR theory, namely the problem of no proposition expressed, the problem of nonsense, the truth-value problem, the problem of the proposition believed, and the problem of differing cognitive values. All these problems arise for MDR theory because of the claim that the sole semantic content of a name is its referent (if any), and nothing else; and on the basis of these problems, one can reject MDR theory. In order to understand which names are genuinely nonreferring and how serious the problems of nonreferring names are for MDR theory, in the second chapter, I have discussed different versions of the theory of abstract artifacts. I close this chapter with the conclusion that along with the other genuinely nonreferring names, some uses of the names like ‘Alice’ and ‘Vulcan’ are also genuinely nonreferring; and hence, a proper solution is required that can solve the problems nonreferring names pose for a semantic theory like MDR theory. In the last chapter, I have examined a proposition-based solution, namely gappy propositions theory, to solve the problems, which later turns out insufficient as it cannot solve the problem of differing cognitive values. At the end of this chapter, I have presented a rough sketch of a theory that can replace MDR theory without encountering the problems posed by nonreferring names. In this proposed theory, I claim that every name has a semantic content, which is not its referent. I further suggest that the semantic content of a name is its nondescriptive sense attached to it and that every name comes with it regardless of the name’s referential status. This proposed theory does not encounter any of the above-mentioned problems nonreferring names pose for MDR theory.