

LORING CHRISTIE AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC COMMUNITY, 1913-1941

BY

MICHAEL FRANK SCHEUER

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FOR THE DEGREE OF

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Department of History

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Introduction

Since his death in April, 1941, Loring Christie has been a much talked about but little understood figure in Canadian history. Most frequently, Christie has been portrayed by historians as a brilliant but erratic individual whose views changed between 1913 and 1941 from being those of a champion of imperial federation to those of an advocate of an independent, isolated Canada. Along the way his views on foreign policy are reputed to have done a complete about face -- changing from ardent support for a common imperial foreign policy to bitter truculent advocacy of a neutralist, isolationist external policy for Canada.

Christie is generally seen by historians to have been the power behind the throne in external policy matters during the prime ministerships of both Sir Robert Borden and Arthur Meighen, and to have been purged from the civil service in 1923 by Mackenzie King's policy of more or less malign neglect predicated on a belief that Christie's long association with the Tories had made his advice unfit to guide foreign policy in the Liberal era. Upon returning to the Department of External Affairs in September, 1935 -- after a heretofore largely unexamined 12-year absence spent working for Sir James Dunn's investment banking house in London, the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario, and the Beauharnois Power, Heat and Light Company in Montreal -- Christie traditionally is described as an intensely anglophobic and isolationist policy adviser who is disillusioned with the

post-war world, fairly reeking with cynicism, but shed of his former imperialistic inclinations and therefore acceptable to Mackenzie King. Christie then completes his career as Canada's Minister to the United States, dying of a heart ailment in a New York City hospital in April, 1941.

The factual side of Christie's life -- the dates, names, events, and places -- has been covered fairly accurately, if in a somewhat sketchy manner, by historians to date. The intellectual aspects of Christie's career, however, have been treated in a much less rigorous and satisfactory manner. The story thus far told about Christie's apparently radical transition from centralizing imperialist to neutralist isolationist is excessively one-dimensional, and constitutes a superficial and inaccurate analysis of the substance and consistency of his thought. Neither imperialism nor isolationism was ever the dominant characteristic of Christie's attitude toward or writings about Canadian external policy. The fact that Christie's thought and career are not understandable through the use of these two simplistic and diametrically opposed labels likewise makes suspect -- and, indeed, unnecessary -- earlier speculations and judgments that he was in some way psychologically erratic, strange, or, more colloquially, even slightly unhinged.

Among the dominant and interwoven characteristics of Christie's thought between 1913 and 1941 the most important are a belief in the central importance of the constitution to Canada's development and survival as a nation, a faith in the value of applying the tenets of American progressivism to the governing

process in Canada, and a growing knowledge of and affection for Canada as a nation. Followed through the course of his career, these inter-related themes reveal a sensitive and at times a passionate man whose concerns focused on facilitating the survival of his country as a state distinct from either of its more powerful North Atlantic neighbors. In a large number of cogently and persuasively -- if, at infrequent intervals, naively -- argued letters, notes, and memoranda, Christie sought to explain various situations in the domestic and external realms threatening Canadian survival, review the options open to the country in seeking solutions, account for the rational and irrational influences impinging on those situations and options, and offer suggestions as to what method of procedure might best serve the national interest, which he came after the Great War to increasingly define as the maintenance of national unity. The issues addressed by Christie were not limited to foreign policy concerns; indeed, after 1923 subjects that covered a spectrum running from the regional economic inequalities caused by Canada's tariff system through the need to maintain control of Canadian resources in Canadian hands to the desirability of abandoning laissez-faire in favor of direct government action to combat the Great Depression were often of as much or more concern to him as were such foreign policy items as the Locarno Pact, the Statute of Westminster, or Ramsay Macdonald's policy toward the Dominions. The federal-provincial balance of power interested Christie as much as did the Anglo-Canadian and Canadian-American relationships, and he can be only superficially understood if

note is not taken of the catholicity of his interests when it came to the affairs of Canada.

It probably is not surprising that as a product of the Harvard Law School -- and an editor-in-chief of the school's prestigious law review -- Christie should display in his writings a consistently legalistic turn of mind. Throughout his career Christie believed that Canada's future, both as a sovereign international entity and as a cohesive nation-state must be based upon the system of federalism established by the provisions of the British North America Act. Ironically, his educational experience in the United States and his activities as an attorney for the United States Department of Justice gave Christie his first working experience with federalism and it seems likely that this contact with the American variant of this system of government, through its stress on establishing a dominant central government at the expense of some of the prerogatives of the several state governments, slowed his ability to appreciate the more approximately equal role of the federal and provincial governments in the Canadian system. In any event, Christie's reverence for the British North America Act and the federal system of government it created led him to believe that a more or less absolute fidelity to the constitution was the soundest basis upon which to build the nation.

For Christie, however, the constitution clearly was not an inhibiting instrument of government designed to enshrine the political, social, and economic status quo in Canada. It was, rather, a framework that could and should be altered so as to

meet the changing needs of the Canadian nation and society. His emphasis, after the early 1920s, on the need for a Canadian constitutional convention to amend the British North America Act in a manner explicitly establishing the right of Canadians to control both external and domestic affairs bears witness to his belief that the constitution lay at the very heart of the nation's affairs. Likewise, Christie's later rejection of both isolationism and neutralism as foreign policy options for Canada in the 1930s, because he believed that neither was a valid policy under the existing constitution, lends even more eloquent testimony to his belief that the British North America Act was not only the foundation upon which the nation was built but the glue upon which national unity ultimately depended.

Christie never believed that full responsible government -- which he defined as complete control over both domestic and external affairs -- would come about through a process of Whiggish inevitability. Indeed, Christie the lawyer believed that human experience and its application to the legal structure of society, rather than God's grand preordained design, permitted society to adapt and survive in an unpredictable world. He argued relentlessly after the mid 1920s that Canadians could only secure the right to exercise full responsible government through a deliberate, non-partisan exertion of their will -- in the forum provided by a constitutional convention -- aimed at that very goal. That he could never persuade, argue, or cajole prominent Canadians into adopting such a belief as their own, and, in turn, taking the case to the Canadian public, did not in the least

deter his faith in the necessity of taking such constitutional action or in the benefits to the nation that would accrue from it. Indeed, the depth of his belief in the centrality of the constitution to the nation's continuing existence is shown by his insistence on following to the letter the requirements which he believed arose out of it. He argued in the late 1930s, for example, that because the constitution had not been amended formally after the Great War vis-a-vis the questions of war and peace, Canada, as in 1914, would go to war automatically if the United Kingdom went to war. For Christie, such a course of action was clearly preferable to risking perhaps fatal damage to national unity by ignoring standing constitutional requirements.

The tenets of American progressivism were also a pervasive and enduring influence on Christie's thought and attitudes. In many ways, Christie came to the United States in 1906 to attend law school from a country that had, since 1867, been practising some of the principles and procedures destined to become the stock-in-trade of American progressives. The British North America Act's stated purpose of establishing "peace, order, and good government," for example, is as good a thumbnail sketch of progressive aims as any available. Likewise, in the age of Sir John A. Macdonald Canada had, under the aegis of the National Policy, indulged in the type of government-directed national planning and nation-building projects that latter-day progressives in the United States would champion. Macdonald's concern to shunt the complaints and animosities of the working class into peaceful and politically acceptable channels through

the imposition of rudimentary laws to permit labor organizations likewise anticipated the progressives' overriding concern to divert potential social radicalism into the political mainstream. Macdonald's unparalleled ability to craft compromises between conflicting and/or competing interests in society, as well as to accommodate the changes in society caused by industrialization and urbanization without violence, would also have qualified him -- in goal and method if not in ideology -- as a politician of the progressive type. In addition, the optimism and faith in the inevitability of progress with which Sir Wilfrid Laurier embellished his own flexible and pragmatic approach to Canadian politics were also essential components of American progressivism.

Christie, then, came to the United States from a country that might justifiably be termed -- at least in terms of accepting a central, directing role for the state in society -- pre-progressive in nature. He fitted not only comfortably but enthusiastically into the heyday of American progressivism that surrounded Theodore Roosevelt's "Bull Moose" presidential campaign of 1912. Through his association with such men as Herbert Croly, Walter Lippmann, and, most importantly, Felix Frankfurter, Christie gained access to the mainstream of American progressive thought and adopted as his own many of the characteristic attitudes -- such as a dread of social disorder, an acceptance of the indispensable role of the state in national development, an abiding respect for the ability of highly educated and non-partisan experts and a faith in their capacity

for crafting a more equitable society and a more efficient government, a predisposition to support arbitration and oppose military force in the resolution of international disputes, and a craving for strong, charismatic, and innovative political leadership -- that were intellectual mainstays of the era and which thereafter would dominate his thought and writings regarding domestic economic and political issues in Canada as well as its foreign policy concerns. It is also worth noting that several of Christie's major personal associations during his Progressive-Era residence in the United States were lawyers and judges -- among them Frankfurter, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Henry Stimson, Louis Brandeis -- who complemented and strengthened Christie's belief that society could be made more united and equitable by adapting the legal system to meet the changes caused by modernization. Thus the particular brand of progressivism with which Christie had the most intimate and lasting contact -- he maintained friendships with these four men after his return to Canada -- tended to reinforce his legal education and legalistic bent of mind.

The final dominant theme of Christie's thought between 1913 and 1941 was an ever-growing appreciation for the complexity and fragility of the Canadian nation. From the date on which he took up his duties as Legal Adviser in the Department of External Affairs in April, 1913 until his death in 1941, Christie's sense of nationalism -- that is, his concern for the survival of Canada as a distinct and cohesive nation-state in North America, independent from both Great Britain and the United States -- grew

as his involvement in many diverse aspects of the country's internal and external affairs broadened.

From being a minor component of his thought in 1913 which focused on the use of theoretical notions of international law to define Canada's status as a member of the British Empire and, after the Great War, as a fledgling state in the international political system, Christie's sense of nationalism came, by the 1930s, to dominate his attitudes. Experience in dealing with instituting conscription in 1917 had driven home to him the potentially lethal quality of French-English confrontations, and, more importantly, the divisiveness inherent in pursuing foreign policy goals not recognized by most Canadians as being in their own and the country's interest. A sojourn in Britain between 1923 and 1926 taught him that British foreign policy could and would look only after British national interests, goals with which Canadian interests were often incompatible. Posts with the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario and the Beauharnois Heat, Power and Light Company afforded a thorough-going lesson in the difficult, sometimes acrimonious nature of federal-provincial relations, as well as the great variety in and complexity of the relationship between Canada and the United States. Witnessing the ravages caused by the Great Depression from a vantage point in the industrially and financially powerful provinces of Ontario and Quebec confirmed and reinforced his Maritimer's concern over the potentially disrupting quality of the regional economic disparities inherent in confederation. Finally, dealing with the United States from both public and private positions inculcated a

realization of that country's growing, almost unlimited political and economic power and a corresponding wariness of what that growth might mean for Canada's survival in North America. The wide range of Christie's personal experience led him to a deep appreciation for the sometimes stark differences in the political, economic, and social interests of Canada's several linguistic groups and regions, an appreciation that bred in him a practice of analyzing foreign policy issues with a steady eye toward the impact each would have on the primary national interest of maintaining an always fragile, and sometimes brittle, national unity.

What follows, then, is an attempt to present a full portrait of Loring Christie's life and work by tracing the dominant themes of his thought over the course of nearly thirty years. Given the nature of his profession the bulk of the study is devoted to issues traditionally consigned to the field of foreign policy. Christie, however, seldom examined such issues without an eye toward their potential influence on the political development and social life of Canada. When Christie's efforts to relate the events of the external realm to those of the internal, and vice versa, are examined, an individual of great sensitivity, complexity, and, at times, passion is revealed. It is hoped that this study may serve to acquaint the reader with that individual and, at the same time, give pause for reconsideration to those who have previously offered a somewhat harsher and a certainly too simplistic view of his life and thought.

Table of Contents

Introduction	i
Chapter I - 1885 - 1913	1
Chapter II - 1913 - 1916	34
Chapter III - 1917 - 1920	71
Chapter IV - 1921 - 1923	133
Chapter V - 1923 - 1926	219
Chapter VI - 1926 - 1935	332
Chapter VII - 1935 - 1939	451
Chapter VIII - 1939 - 1941	601
Conclusion	726
Bibliography	740

Chapter I: Background and Early Experiences, 1885-1913

Loring Cheney Christie was born in Amherst, Nova Scotia on 21 January 1885, the the son of James Alexander Christie and Evelyn Read Christie. Christie's family was of Scottish and English descent, although both of his parents were native Nova Scotians. His grandfather had emigrated from Scotland and settled at Pictou, Nova Scotia and his mother was of United Empire Loyalist stock. His family was involved in the manufacture of furniture and coffins and was active in the affairs of the Baptist Church.¹ Christie lived with his family in Amherst during the school year and apparently spent the months of his summer vacations in the surrounding countryside. He would later recall that one of the things upon which "my nostalgias, the occasional times I weaken into pictures of the halcyon days" centered were "boyhood days on my uncle's and grandfather's farm and lumber woods where I pulled my weight as a farmhand and a woodsman in all the things they do and learn but still had privileges for all the simple unalloyed, unthinking delights of the countryside, the seaside and forest...."² As was probably to be expected on the basis of their ethnic background and loyalties, the Christies easily identified with things British but resented the colonial snobbery they detected in the cities of the Maritimes. This was particularly true of Halifax which Christie once told a friend his family always referred to as "The Garrison".³ Throughout his life Christie would exhibit an affinity for Canada's rural areas, especially those of the

Maritimes and the Gatineau Hills outside Ottawa, and an aversion for such urban areas as Montreal and Toronto.⁴ Paradoxically he seems to have thrived in such American urban centers as New York and Washington, D.C.⁵

After completion of grammar school, Christie's education took him to the Amherst Academy and subsequently to Acadia University. He produced an excellent academic record at Acadia, captained the hockey team, was the university's tennis champion, and graduated in the spring of 1905 with an honors B.A. in mathematics.⁶ During his summer vacations from Acadia Christie served as an assistant editor on the staff of the Amherst Daily News. After graduation from Acadia, Christie worked for a year with the Bank of Nova Scotia in Amherst and then applied for admission to the Harvard Law School early in 1906. He was accepted and began classes in September.

Before addressing Christie's years at Harvard some mention must be made of an essay which he wrote while at Acadia and which was published in the university's student newspaper -- the Atheneum -- in May, 1904. The essay deals with the Russo-Japanese War, which had started in February, 1904, and it is primarily notable because in it Christie manifests several characteristics which were to remain a part of the intellectual paraphernalia he would bring to the subject of international affairs throughout his career. The first involves a belief in the inherent superiority of western civilization over that of the east. "And not only have the Aryan nations been successful in maintaining their European integrity," Christie wrote,

But more than that, they have been able to reverse the current, so that the tide of conquest which once ran to the west, having reached the full, is now flowing back. Chained to themselves by absurd superstitions, naturally apathetic in a tropical climate, and unable to cope with strong Western ambition, the yellow races have been in every case to date been trampled under foot until the only reasonable outlook for Asia seems to be that it will become, bit by bit, but the fief of some European or American power.

One would hesitate to describe this belief as outright racism, but it is clear, both in this and later instances, that Christie often brought this opinion to bear when focusing upon an east-west issue.⁸

The second characteristic attitude demonstrated by Christie in this essay involves his predilection to view world affairs in the clear, cold light of realpolitik. In "The Situation in the Orient", Christie discusses imperialism as it was practiced by the nations of Europe generally and by Russia in particular. Present in this discussion was not a single note of sentimentality, romanticism, obligation, or resignation at having to pick-up the "white man's burden". "Having once gained recognition as a factor in the world's politics," Christie's analysis of Russian imperialism began,

The subsequent policy of the Slavic nation [Russia] has been one of continuous expansion. She has become a strong exponent of the imperialistic idea in every sense of the word. Slowly but surely, interrupted at times perhaps, but never turned aside from their main purpose, Russian soldiers, and, more important still, Russian merchants and promoters have advanced across the Asian continent. ...

The process is simple. Of course, the first step is to choose the victim, and this is usually well done. Russian capital is brought into the country, Russian railroads are built and Russian banks and industries are established, so that, in a few years the whole country is dominated by her influence. These strong interests

in the territory having once been created and developed to a considerable extent, it is a natural consequence that they will have to be protected by their own government. Accordingly permission is obtained, or if not granted, is taken, to place troops at certain strategic points, which, we may be very certain, are well chosen. Thenceforward, on the slightest pretext more troops are poured in, and it only becomes a matter of time when Russian absorption of the territory in consideration is complete.

For Christie, European and Russian imperialism was simply a matter of money and power, the goal of the operation was material and territorial gain and the vehicles through which they were attained were those of political influence and intrigue and/or military power. Christie was never to lose this capacity to produce chillingly realistic analyses of international affairs.¹⁰

Christie enjoyed a very successful career at the Harvard Law School, achieving both excellent grades and a leading position on the prestigious editorial board of the Harvard Law Review. In Christie's time, as in the present day, the Harvard Law School prided itself upon its ability to select only the finest individuals from among its many applicants. The members of the editorial board of the Review were, therefore, the cream of a very exemplary crop. Christie served as an associate editor in 1907-1908 and as editor-in-chief, certainly the most coveted of all positions available to the students of the School, in 1908-1909. He apparently was a popular choice for the top post as even one of the individuals who he had defeated in the election told his parents that "he is the one I would have chosen."¹¹ While the post of editor-in-chief was a prestigious one, it also involved a good deal of work. In addition to his legal studies, Christie was responsible for assigning topics for associate

editors to write upon, arranging for book reviews and articles from the faculty, procuring essays from prominent legal scholars and judges from outside the School, and bringing all of these components together in time to go to press.¹² Christie graduated from Harvard in the spring of 1909 with an LL.B. degree.¹³

After graduation Christie visited several of the leading law firms in Toronto and Montreal but was unable to secure a position. He returned to Amherst and began the process of articling with an attorney named T.S. Rogers.¹⁴ Before completing the necessary requirements for entry to the bar in Nova Scotia, however, Christie decided to return to the United States. In the late summer of 1909 Christie accepted a position with the New York City firm of Winthrop and Stimson.¹⁵ It was while working with this firm that Christie first met Felix Frankfurter.¹⁶ Frankfurter had recently returned to private practice with one of the firm's partners, Henry L. Stimson, after the latter's resignation as the United States Attorney for the southern district of New York.¹⁷ Christie also formed a lasting friendship with Stimson at this time.¹⁸

Before completing a year with Winthrop and Stimson, Christie resigned and went to Washington, D.C. where he gained employment as an attorney in the United States Department of Justice at an annual salary of twenty-five hundred dollars.¹⁹ Christie had attended the Harvard Law School with the son of George Wickersham, who was at this time the Attorney-General of the United States in President Taft's administration, and apparently this connection was very important in his acquiring a position in

the Justice Department. It appears that Wickersham's son told his father of Christie and his abilities and, in turn, the Attorney-General offered Christie a post without his ever having applied for it. Wickersham's only stipulation was that Christie begin the process of becoming a naturalized American citizen. Christie complied and made the initial declarations of intent.²⁰ He was promoted in 1911, becoming an assistant to the Solicitor-General of the United States,²¹ a post he held until he left the American civil service in 1913. Christie also served as the chairman of the "Joint Board of Selection" for civil service applicants for the position of attorney in the Justice Department in 1911 and 1912.²²

Christie's activities during his employment in the Department of Justice seem to have run the gamut of what would be normally expected of a junior attorney; his tasks increased in complexity as he gained in experience. Among his assignments during the year he spent in the office of the Attorney-General was one that amounted to a routine compilation of the "Recent utterances of the Supreme Court bearing on the extent of the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under the Constitution and Acts of Congress."²³ Another of his efforts involved the preparation of an answer for a question asked by the War Department. An act passed by Congress in June 1910 had authorized the War Department to maintain only one road to each National Cemetery in the United States. The National Cemetery in Cairo, Illinois had three roads leading to it and the War Department was asking if it was free to decide which of the three was to be maintained. Christie wrote

that he doubted that the Congress meant to leave the choice to the War Department and assigned responsibility for the dilemma to the vague and ambiguous wording of the statute. He recommended that "the War Department should await, or secure, a more explicit direction from Congress before it may proceed to the formal abandonment" of the two roads in question.²⁴

A final example of Christie's work for the Attorney-General focuses upon the preparation of a brief in which he recommends the federal prosecution of the Railway Educational Association for falsely advertising a training course in which it "guaranteed" to find positions for those individuals who enrolled and completed the course. Christie wrote that the "method of the Association as outlined in the case ... was quite admirably calculated to deceive the unwary." He found that once the enrollee had submitted the application fee of five dollars the Association altered its pledge from a formal guarantee to a simple promise to "recommend" its graduates to various railroads. In recommending prosecution, Christie concluded that "this shifting of ground by which the applicant is induced to pay his money and sign an agreement obviously to the disadvantage of the applicant, is so well designed to leave him without any redress whatever that I find it difficult to view the scheme in such a way as to distinguish the state of mind of the officers of the Association from that of conscious fraud."²⁵

In these three productions for the Attorney-General, Christie manifested attitudes which would govern his work for the remainder of his career. In whatever field of work he would

later be involved in, Christie was always a stickler for gathering together the most recent and creditable materials pertaining to the subject under consideration.²⁶ Secondly, he consistently urged, especially when he was in government service, that legislation, state papers and, indeed, all government publications say exactly, and only, what they were intended to say and to say that in the most precise manner possible.²⁷ Thirdly, Christie always argued for directness and frankness in both popular and governmental publications. He maintained that anything else either misled the public or aroused in them unjustified and generally unattainable expectations.²⁸ Christie's career-long concern for the accuracy of facts and statements, the precision of language, and the simplicity and frankness of presentation was the product of his academic training and early professional experience. He was, in sum, a lawyer, first, last, and always.

During the years in which he worked in the office of the Solicitor General, Christie prepared several briefs addressing the question of whose interests were paramount in the use of navigable waters, those of the several states or those of the federal government. In a memorandum written in February, 1912, Christie argued that in all cases the jurisdiction of the federal government over navigable waters was complete and that its decisions on matters pertaining thereto were quite simply final.

It is thus a fundamental misnomer to speak of the States as having a "property" in the water, and then to argue that the National Government has nothing but a mere casement against the state, and nothing at all to do with water power. The truth is that one must speak, not of "property in the water", but of its right to

continued flow in the stream. Concededly each state has an interest in the continued flow; but it is equally true that the United States has an interest in the flow of the stream -- an interest, moreover, which is paramount to any the several states may have. The right of navigation, when exercised, is supreme and overrides all others. The needs of navigation must control, and it is for the Federal Government to say what these needs are. This involved a discretion as to where navigable works should be built, the disposal of the surplus water so created, and the method of financing the enterprise. In such matters, in the language of the Supreme Court, "there can be no divided empire".²⁹

In a second memorandum on the same subject, Christie argued just as bluntly that "the regulation of the use of the water in navigable rivers is an incident of the power over navigation and that, the latter being clearly in the Congress, the Congress may in the exercise of the former impose what conditions it will on its permission for the erection of any structure in a navigable stream."³⁰ In both of these memoranda Christie demonstrates a firm personal belief in the paramountcy of federal interests in regard to the regulation of navigable waters. These expositions on navigation give only a slight indication of the passionate belief he was to gradually develop in the efficacy of a federal system based upon a central government endowed with powers sufficient to administer to the needs of the nation as a whole.³¹

Probably on a par with the importance of the professional experience he acquired in Washington was the experience Christie gathered in the sphere of his non-professional activities. Christie came to Washington during the high tide of the progressive movement in the United States and quickly became involved professionally, politically, and socially with the coterie of young civil servants and professionals who were to

form the cadre of Theodore Roosevelt's "Bull Moose" revolt which split the Republican Party in 1912. This group of young men had been intellectually reared on Roosevelt's "Square Deal", a program featured as its centerpiece an active and powerful central government dominated by its executive branch. Roosevelt's policies, and probably to a greater extent his dynamic personality, attracted able and well-educated young men to government service in numbers which would not be approached again until his cousin ascended to the presidency. Although coming from different regions of the country and diverse educational backgrounds these young civil servants shared a common belief in the worthiness of a career in the public service. Felix Frankfurter, who had met and befriended Christie while they were both employed by Winthrop and Stimson in New York and who now labored as a legal adviser in the War Department's Bureau of Insular Affairs, recorded in his diary a conversation he had with Christie on the topic of a career in the public service.

Had a good talk with Christie about our line of work. Shared experience that our friends think us damned fools but agreed that there is going to be increasing opportunity for public work and that the ordinary practice [of law] is spiritless without real service and mainly impelled by money-making. If you like it, all right -- but it doesn't begin to satisfy a fraction of the interest public work calls for.³²

Between his work within the government and his social and political activities outside of it, Christie formed, during his three years in Washington, a web of friendships, acquaintances, and contacts which would provide him with ready access to the upper levels of both the federal bureaucracy and east coast

opinion-makers for the remainder of his life. During his Washington years, Christie resided in a house at 1727 Nineteenth Street which was owned by Robert G. Valentine, Commissioner of Indian Affairs in the Taft administration, and which "served as a kind of commune for young men in government."³³ A good many of Christie's most important friendships and contacts were to develop from the social activities that took place in Valentine's home. In addition to Christie and Valentine, the other permanent residents of the house included Felix Frankfurter, Winifred Denison, Christie's immediate superior in the Justice Department, and Lord Eustace Percy, a member of the staff of the British ambassador in Washington. Walter Lippmann's most recent biographer has noted that the "resident bachelors hired a housekeeper, gave continuous parties, and invited everyone who was famous, important or interesting. They argued about politics and took themselves so seriously that Justice Holmes, a frequent visitor, dubbed the place the 'House of Truth'.³⁴ Valentine's home apparently hummed with activity and was one of the leading intellectual salons of the era in Washington.

"The House of Truth" bubbled with heated political debates and endless discussions about the law, art, journalism, European diplomacy, and the relative merits of socialism versus liberalism. Its good wine, pretty girls, and intense conversation attracted an eclectic band of politicians, bureaucrats, judges, writers, and philosophers, many of them already celebrated within their fields and those who aspired to be so. Gretzon Borglum, the sculptor, came and drew a sketch of his proposed monument in the Black Hills. Arthur Willert, the Washington correspondent for the London Times, became a regular dinner guest, in addition to such lawyers as Stanley King, the future president of Amherst College, and the courtly John Lord O'Brien. They also entertained Justice Horace Lurton, who politely told Frankfurter that he mixed drinks better than he argued

cases. From New York, Learned Hand sent his friend, Herbert Croly, an architect turned political theorist, whose 1909 book, The Promise of American Life, formed the basis of Roosevelt's New Nationalism and raised the ideals of many young men and women with its blistering attack upon America's aimless commercialism. With Croly came a younger man. Walter Lippmann, who had absorbed both Marx and Freud, and who was then writing two of the most remarkable books of the era - Preface to Politics and Drift and Mastery - the latter a ringing affirmation of Roosevelt's policies and a plea for expanding the role of experts in American society.³⁵

In addition to the individuals mentioned above, Christie also met and formed lasting friendships with Louis Brandeis, Harold Laski, and Philip Kerr, later Lord Lothian, under the roof of the "House of Truth".

One of the major topics of conversation at the "House of Truth" in the years between 1910 and 1912 focused upon the animosity which its inhabitants harbored toward Taft's administration and policies. Taft had neither Roosevelt's personal flair nor his desire to aggrandize power for the executive and, as a result, the atmosphere in Washington grew unusually quiet and tame in comparison to the tumultuous and exhilarating years of the tenure of the hero of San Juan Hill. Taft also appeared to be backing away from Roosevelt's trust-busting legacy -- although in truth Taft's administration undertook more anti-trust suits than had Roosevelt's -- and after the Pinchot-Ballinger controversy he seemed to be squarely in the hands and camp of what the later Roosevelt would term the "economic royalists". Robert Valentine had been a fervent supporter and admirer of Theodore Roosevelt and, when Taft appeared to be reversing the policies of the Square Deal, he became one of the leaders of an incipient anti-Taft revolt within

the administration.³⁶

Christie agreed with much of the criticism of Taft but he was not among those who favored a split within the Republican Party in 1912. Michael E. Parrish has written that during the years in which Christie and Frankfurter attended the Harvard Law School the student was expected not only to learn the law but also to absorb an "essential social conservatism, good manners and intellectual snobbery."³⁷ Christie absorbed a full share of all these things, he was always known for his personal charm and he never suffered fools gladly, but he drank especially deeply of the social conservatism. In the political realm this conservatism expressed itself in an abiding belief in the desirability of a two-party system. Christie attended the Republican National Convention in Chicago in 1912, indeed, he may have been a delegate, and although he was attracted by Roosevelt's past accomplishments and agenda of future plans, he did not favor the creation of a third-party if Roosevelt failed to win the Republican nomination. "I have but a moment before the afternoon session begins," he wrote Frankfurter from Chicago.

It may be the fateful session. If they shove the credentials committee report through -- and they evidently intend to -- I don't see anything but a bolt unless we are ready to compromise pretty far. But what is there in that? It will simply mean that we think it worth while trying to prolong the life of a political hybrid. I don't see why it is. Why not try to clear the air now -- today? I don't think we have to look far among our own acquaintances to see that it's got to come before long. It may, and the big chance is, of course, it will -- mean defeat but that's not a fundamental thing. Though on that there's one thing I seem to feel: I don't know how a defeated T.R. would act, and even if he didn't act, it may be hard to see the clear air for the dust that would surely be kicked up in the scramble

of kicking him. But I'd chance that.³⁸

Christie was ready to brook dissent within the Party, but once a majority decision had been reached, and in the case of 1912 the acceptance of the credentials committee report would constitute such a decision, he clearly favored a solidifying of party lines rather than a split. This predilection for the two-party system would remain a fixed facet of his political thinking throughout his career. Christie would always identify third-parties with a tendency to disrupt and disorder the community³⁹ and would attribute to them an inability to govern because of the internal dissensions generated by the diversity of the elements that generally form a third-party, a general lack of governing experience and ability, and with a penchant for expounding an insincere and unattainable, and therefore a dangerous, brand of radicalism.⁴⁰

It appears that shortly before the 1912 Republican Convention, Christie had begun to become somewhat disenchanted with his residence in the United States. He had never initially intended to leave Canada after graduation from law school, but the indifferent receptions which greeted his applications in Toronto and Montreal had angered him and he left for New York more or less in a fit of pique. While living in Washington Christie became close friends with two members of the British Embassy's staff, Lord Eustace Percy and A. Mitchell Innes. To these two men Christie apparently related his post-graduation experiences in Canada and also made it clear that he eventually wished to return to Canada on a permanent basis. Acting on the

information, Innes wrote on behalf of himself and Percy to Robert L. Borden, then Canada's prime minister, requesting some assistance in securing a position for Christie in Canada.

If possible, should much like to interest you in a young Canadian lawyer, who is in the Department of Justice here. He was the most brilliant graduate of his year in the Harvard Law School, and went to Toronto to try to get into a lawyer's office. But Canadians are evidently very English, for, far from showing any eagerness to take him, they greeted him with British coldness, and he, much nettled, went to New York, where he had no difficulty in getting good offices.

Now that his anger at the coolness of his compatriots has spent itself, he does not at all want to become a Yankee and would, so Percy tells me, much like to return to Canada. His name is Christie and is from New Brunswick [sic], and in my opinion is one of the two cleverest young men in Washington and is a particular friend of mine and Percy's.

I should be very sorry to see him abandon his British nationality and write to ask if it would be possible for you to help him in the way of letters to a few of the leading lawyers in Toronto and Montreal. Once he got a footing, he would do well, of that I am sure. He is thought of highly by all who know him, and is worth a little help. I resent seeing our clever young men leave their own country, where there are so many opportunites.⁴¹

Borden was indeed interested in Christie and wrote to Innes requesting his age, the date of his admittance to the bar and what type of work he had been doing in the Justice Department. "I fear that I am not very much in touch with the openings in private practice...", Borden added. "However, we require the services of lawyers in several of the public Departments and we might be able to give Mr. Christie an opportunity in the Canadian Government service."⁴² Innes quickly responded with the required information⁴³ and Borden then proceeded to schedule an interview with Christie for late December, 1912 in New York. "I had a

short interview with Mr. Christie in New York on Monday last," Borden informed Innes shortly thereafter,

and was very favorably impressed. It is quite possible that we may be able to offer him something in Canada in the early future. It occurs to me that possibly he may be a naturalized American citizen. I forgot to make enquiry into this. Perhaps you could give me the information. There has been some trouble created in the House of Commons⁴⁴ respecting such appointments to our Public Service.

Innes replied that "Christie is still a British subject. All he did on entering the U.S. service was to make preliminary declaration of intention to naturalise, but he has taken no further step and does not wish to do so."⁴⁵ This information apparently settled any qualms Borden may have had and shortly afterward he offered Christie the post of legal adviser in the Department of External Affairs.⁴⁶ Christie accepted the offer, resigned his position in the Justice Department,⁴⁷ and left for Ottawa at the end of March, 1913.

Just what sort of a man was Borden bringing into the Department of External Affairs in 1913? It seems safe to say that Loring Christie was a mature, if somewhat peripatetic, twenty-eight year old individual who had made the most of his educational and early professional experiences. After earning an honors degree in mathematics at Acadia, Christie proceeded to the Harvard Law School where he was the recipient of what was probably the best legal education then available in North America. The Harvard experience blended the logical approach of the mathematician with its own pragmatic approach to the law to produce in Christie a mind that was incisive, coolly analytical, pervasively legalistic, and largely dispassionate. Throughout

his career, both in private business and government service, his work would be consistently marked by these characteristics. This is not to say that Christie was not a passionate man for, as Frankfurter noted early on in their friendship, he has a "deeply emotional side". He did, however, have the ability to almost entirely isolate his emotions and thereby prevent them from infringing upon his other calculations. The elements of Christie's approach to whatever business was at hand would always produce a paradoxical response in his colleagues, an admiration for an obviously lucid and penetrating intelligence and a certain exasperation and even anger with a mind apparently unwilling, although clearly not unable, to take into account the emotional and irrational aspects of various situations.⁴⁹

Borden was also getting an individual who had been considerably influenced by American progressivism. While never a radical reformer like those who followed Eugene V. Debs or helped Theodore Roosevelt fracture the Republican Party, Christie was as one with those progressives who looked upon society as a complex machine and themselves as the expert technicians whose duty it was to adjust or repair the machine as needed. As it did in many other progressives, this view of society and the expert's place in it produced in Christie both a sophistication and an idealism. The progressives shared a sophisticated and, they liked to think, a scientific analysis of society and how it operated and an idealistic faith that suitably trained specialists would be able to disinterestedly perfect the mechanism. The idealist in Christie, the part of him, for

example, that believed in the inherent value of a career in the public service and which would later cause him to regret bitterly not having enlisted in 1914, was never the dominant part of his personality, but it was, for a time, unquestionably active. The sophistication he derived from his contact with progressivism would endure; he would always view the affairs of men and those of the world and its nations in a quasi-scientific, almost mechanical manner. Christie's residue of progressive idealism would, however, largely disappear, along with that of many other progressives, as a consequence of the events of the Great War and the period of peacemaking that followed it.

Christie also shared to some extent the progressives' propensity for tinkering and experimenting with society, but he was not willing to endorse and, in fact, did not ever see a need for a social revolution. Revolution or violent, uncontrolled change of any sort was always anathema to Christie. He was never sympathetic to the left-wing of American progressivism, to those individuals who, like John Reed and Max Eastman, found society's salvation in the writings of Marx and Freud, reveled in the uncompromisingly iconoclastic and free thinking atmosphere of Greenwich Village, supported the direct action techniques of the Wobblies, and took their intellectual sustenance from the Masses. One of his colleagues in the Department of External Affairs would later remark that Christie's politics actually bordered on republicanism.⁴⁸ This judgment certainly is far wide of the mark. Christie may have been a democrat, although even this conclusion must be qualified, but his political attitudes never

approached the level of republicanism. He was always more comfortable with and confident in the Canadian and British parliamentary systems of responsible government than he was with the congressional system of the United States. Christie's progressivism was, therefore, largely tempered by his political conservatism and he was much closer intellectually to those progressives like Croly, Lippmann, and Frankfurter who theorized about the future of federalism and sought to adjust American society to the modern age in the pages of the New Republic. Christie was a staunch federalist who fervently believed in the necessity of a powerful central government and a two-party political system. For Christie progressivism was based upon the spirit of accommodation, of finding a workable procedure with which to resolve the unavoidable conflicts between the tenets of traditional society and the substantive changes being wrought by industrialization and urbanization.⁵⁰

As for the background one would think necessary for the post of legal adviser on foreign affairs, Borden was getting in Christie an individual with practically no formal training or experience in the field of diplomacy and international law. There is virtually no evidence, aside from his student essay at Acadia, to suggest that Christie had done any serious or sustained thinking before 1913 in regard to Canada's external relations or her status as a distinct international entity. Although certainly conscious of Canada being a British nation and an integral part of the Empire, which was, in view of his family's background, a realization he hardly could have avoided,

Christie seems not to have put pen to paper on the subject. Likewise, he also seems to have had very little to say about the foreign relations of the United States. In view of his scanty credentials in the area of international relations, the question arises as to what prompted Borden to bring Christie into the Department of External Affairs? Aside from an attractive personality and an excellent academic record, it seems reasonable to assume that Christie's experience in the United States Government was the factor that most interested the Prime Minister, who was also the Secretary of State for External Affairs. Christie had been intimately involved in the day-to-day operations of the American government and it must have occurred to Borden that this experience might prove invaluable in the conduct of Canada's myriad relations with the United States. As has been shown above, Christie, in the course of his three year stay in the United States, developed a wide network of contacts among important and prominent individuals both in and out of government. Christie's easy and surefooted familiarity with the federal bureaucracy, important American editors and journalists, and leading figures of New York's legal community must surely have impressed Borden as a potential asset upon which the fledgling Department of External Affairs could not afford to turn its back. Borden did not; Christie returned to Canada and took up his duties as legal adviser in the Department on 15 April 1913.⁵¹

Chapter I: Notes

1.) J.L. Granatstein. The Ottawa Men. The Civil Service Mandarins, 1935-1957. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1981, p.64. It is exceedingly difficult to accurately pin down Christie's attitude toward religion. It seems very doubtful whether he ever fully shared his family's enthusiasm for or devotion to the Baptist Church. In 1913 he expressed his admiration and "fascination" for a book in which the author presented "a pitiless indictment . . . of evangelical religions or religion in a violent form." At the same time, however, Christie seems to have maintained a belief in Christianity and, in particular, a belief in the positive results which might accrue from an application of Christian principles to the conduct of political and societal relations. In a December, 1916 letter to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Harold Laski railed against the editorial policy of the New Republic in regard to World War One. The journal's position, Laski wrote, "sounds like a methodist tract on the 'cruciality of the cross'. I don't believe in introducing Christian endeavor into politics. I can imagine how this would irritate Eustace Percy or Loring Christie -- and I who know they mean well have to cover up my frowns with a yawn." While hardly a conclusive document, Laski's letter seems to indicate that Christie, in 1916, was not adverse to applying Christian principles to the conduct of international relations and politics. Perhaps the most that can be said in regard to Christie's attitude toward religion is that he tended to see Christianity as being inextricably involved in the construction and maintenance of a democratic society. Throughout his adult life Christie placed a special value upon a speech made by Mr. Justice Holmes in February, 1886. Christie frequently referred to the speech, entitled "The Puritan", as something that "has always struck me as a thing of great power and eloquence." He intermittently sent copies of it to many of his friends and correspondents, including Lord Lothian, Arthur Meighen, and Sir Robert Borden. In this speech Holmes clearly delineated the important part he saw for Christianity in the development of a democratic society and Christie apparently fully shared the Justice's view in this regard. The relevant portions of the speech follow below.

"Two hundred and fifty years ago a few devout men founded the First Church of Cambridge. While they lived, I doubt not, hundreds as good as they fell under Fairfax at Marston Moor, or under Cromwell at Naseby, or lived and died quietly in England and were forgotten, Yet is only the monuments of those founders were mythic bronzes, such as stand upon the Common and the Delta, - if they were only the lichened slated in yonder churchyard - how much greater are they now than they were in their life! Time, the purifier, has burned away what was particular to them and individual, and has left

only the type of courage, constancy, devotion, - the august figure of the Puritan.

Time still burns. Perhaps the type of the Puritan must pass away, as that of the Crusader has done. But the founders of this parish are commemorated, not in bronze or in alabaster but in living monuments. One is Harvard College. The other is mightier still. These men and their fellows planted a Congregational Church, from which grew a democratic state. They planted something even mightier than institutions, whether they knew it or not, they planted the democratic spirit in the heart of man. It is to them we owe the deepest cause we have to love our country, -- that instinct, that spark that makes the American unable to meet his fellow man otherwise than simply as a man, hand to hand and foot to foot, wrestling naked on the sand. When the citizens of Cambridge forget that they too tread a sacred soil, that Massachusetts also has its traditions, which grow more venerable and inspiring as they fade, -- when Harvard College is no longer dedicated to the truth, and America to democratic freedom -- then perhaps, but not till then, will the blood of the martyrs be swallowed in the sand, and the Puritan have lived in vain. Until that time he will grow greater, even after he has vanished from our view.

The political children of Thomas Shepard we surely are, we are not all his spiritual children. ... But even if we are not all of us the spiritual children of Thomas Shepard, even if our mode of expressing our wonder, our awful fear, our abiding trust in face of life and death and the unfathomable world has changed, yet at this day, we New Englanders are still livened with the Puritan ferment. Our doctrines may have changed, but the cold Puritan passion is still there. And of many a man who now hears me, whether a member of this church or not, it may be said, as it was said of Thomas Shepard by Cotton Mather, "So the character of his daily conversation was a trembling walk with God."

See Library of Congress, Felix Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 6 October 1913; Harold J. Laski to Oliver Wendell Holmes, 16 December 1916 in M.D. Howe (ed.). Holmes-Laski Letters. The Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes and Harlod J. Laski, 1916-1935, Volume I. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1953, p.43; Public Archives of Canada (hereafter PAC), MG 30 E44, L.C. Christie Papers, Volume 26, Folder 106, pp. 23958-23964, L.C. Christie to Lord Lothian, 20 October 1936, a copy of Holmes's speech is included with this letter.

2.) Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 11 November 1938.

- 3.) See A.R.M. Lower, "Loring Christie and the Genesis of the Washington Conference," Canadian Historical Review, XLVII, 1 (March, 1966), p. 40.
- 4.) Christie particularly disliked Toronto, telling Frankfurter at one point "I loathe Toronto and all its ways." See Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 11 May 1928.
- 5.) Christie was especially fond of New York City, noting that it affords "rest and change and relaxation because it has that quality of indifference to the individual that nature has". L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 11 November 1938, op. cit.
- 6.) Throughout his life Christie always moved easily and effectively among Americans and their institutions. Professor Lower attributes Christie's early development of a capacity to always feel at home in the United States to the influence of Acadia University's "strong American affiliations". Lower apparently hits the nail on the head in regard to significant American influences at Acadia as Christie himself testified late in his life. In a letter discussing a luncheon he had attended with John D. Rockefeller, Jr., Christie noted that it had been a pleasure to meet and speak with Mr. Rockefeller and remarked that the Rockefeller name was very "well known to my college in Nova Scotia - Acadia -" See A.R.M. Lower, "Loring Christie and the Genesis of the Washington Conference", op. cit., p. 40 and Harvard University, Baker Library, Winthrop Aldrich Papers, L.C. Christie to Winthrop Aldrich, 23 December 1939.
- 7.) L.C. Christie, "The Situation in the Orient," Acadia Atheneum, XXX, 7 (May, 1904), p. 257.
- 8.) In a later example of this attitude, Christie may have crossed the line between prejudice and racism. While working with the editorial board of the Round Table in 1925, Christie offered the following opinion after reading an article on Asian immigration which was being considered for publication in the journal. "Individual Asiatics who go to the Dominions or to America," Christie wrote, "really go because they prefer to be parasites upon Western civilization and upon the Western economic system. They prefer that to building up the regions at their own doors but I know of no reason why their preference should be encouraged." PAC, Newton W. Rowell Papers, MG 27 II D13, Volume 1, Folder 2, p. 115., L.C. Christie to John Dove, 16 October 1925.
- 9.) L.C. Christie, "The Situation in the Orient", op. cit., pp. 257-258.
- 10.) The following portion of a cable written by Christie from the Canadian Legation in Washington in early 1940 on the general subject of the Far Eastern conflict, but with particular

reference to United States policy in the region, amply demonstrates the continuity of his capacity for assessing the development of international affairs in a coldly realistic and dispassionate manner. "It seems to me most difficult," he told Mackenzie King,

"to see any basis for expecting anything in the nature of a stable 'settlement' in the Far East any more than in Europe. The disorder seems far from having spent itself, and no one can forecast the time when any comprehensive negotiation between the various parties concerned may be practicable, whether upon the regional problem between Japan and China, to say nothing of Russia, or upon the relationships between this region and the Western Powers. The [United States] State Department will continue to think strictly in terms of what United States interests in the Far East require. They have their economic interests -- their trading and investment position, the 'open door', 'equality of opportunity', and so on. Their political interests they conceive as best served by the maintenance of a certain balance as between the existing Powers in that region -- Japan, China, and Russia -- and it would not be in their interest that any one of these should dominate one of the others. Their fleet is concentrated in the Pacific, but they have to keep the Atlantic in mind, and presumably this is a factor they have to weigh. On the other hand, the succession of Japanese Cabinets, the prolonged gestation of the new 'puppet' Chinese Government -- I do not recall how many dates have been announced -- and other signs seem to suggest that the Japanese are somewhat baffled and not sure of what they are doing. So far as Japanese relations with the United States are concerned, these will continue to 'depend on future developments', as the formula goes, and it will, I believe, be left to the Japanese to keep on trying with initiatives and proposals. The United States are now in a position where they can conveniently treat their economic as well as political relations with the Japanese on a day-to-day basis. However long the process, the United States feel they can afford to wait it out. No one can say to what lengths this may lead, but what underlies their present posture toward the Far East represents a long historic line which they could hardly sell out or voluntarily surrender. There may arise some divergences between the United States and the United Kingdom since the circumstances of their respective interests are not in all respects similar. The British on occasion may be inclined or obliged to discuss the possibility of yielding some ground as in the Tientsin case; whereas, the United States advisers feel that, as they put it, they 'do not have to'. But any serious or critical divergence in this field between the two seems unlikely. As you have indicated in the

end of your depatch under reference, it would appear that British interests in the Far East may profit by the United States attitude, and it is difficult to believe that British interests would be served by such a recognition of Japanese claims as in effect might bring the British into a serious conflict with what are conceived to be the interests of the United States."

See PAC, RG 25 G1, Department of External Affairs Papers (hereafter DEA Papers), Volume 1755, File 804 - XV, Canadian Minister in the United States to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, No. 353, 17 February 1940.

11.) In a letter to his parents dated 18 March 1908, Austin Wakeman Scott, who was to become a member of the faculty and ultimately something of an institution at the Law School, wrote, "This afternoon likewise another event took place, namely the election of the President of the Review Board for next year. I was a 'prominent candidate' for the office but was defeated. The vote was I believe at one time a tie. There were two other candidates, but one I think did not count for he was not recommended by the heads of departments who alone are familiar with our work. A Canadian by the name of Christie got the job. I think he will do very well. He is the one I would have chosen." Austin W. Scott, Letters From a Law Student to his Family, 1906-1908. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Law School, 1974, p. 58.

12.) If the letters in Learned Hand's papers are any indication of Christie's usual experience in arranging for articles for the Review from sources outside the School, it can be safely assumed that he had his hands full in this direction. The letters indicate that Christie had to charm, cajole, prompt and show more than a little deference to the always volatile Hand in the process of securing an essay from him on the commodities clause of the Constitution. It probably was to be expected that judges, lawyers, and legal scholars would manifest some dissatisfaction, if not resentment, toward editorial advice being offered by an editor who was, after all, still a student. See Harvard Law School Library, Learned Hand Papers, Box 3, File 1, L.C. Christie to Learned Hand, 6 December 1908, 10 December 1908, 7 January 1909, and 14 January 1909.

13.) Christie graduated from the Law School with a rather hard-nosed and coldly realistic approach to the law. In his legal attitudes Christie could be accurately depicted as an advocate of the position expressed by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., in an 1897 speech entitled "The Path of the Law". After graduation Christie continued to solidify his Holmesian inclinations, in fact becoming something of a disciple of the Justice. "Holmes is the only one I have heard," Christie wrote, "who achieves that absolutely impartial tone, the glacially scientific and judicial attitude, as if to say, 'True, this is my opinion and I of course believe in it, but what the hell has that got to do with it; it's

the law and there's no use getting worked up about it, and besides it doesn't matter a damn whether you believe it or not.'" Christie was not given to hero-worship in any guise; Holmes was one of the few men he regarded as such. See Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 25 February 1911, and for Holmes's speech see Ray Ginger (ed.), American Social Thought. New York: Hill and Wang, 1961, pp. 55-74.

It is interesting to note that, in what must have been a unique occurrence among the Harvard Law School's class of 1909, Christie did not find it convenient to enter the bar in either the United States or Canada until August, 1936. At that time he was called to the bar in Nova Scotia. See Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 5 December 1936.

14.) PAC, MG 26 H, R.L. Borden Papers, Reel C-2140, p. 8288, A.M. Innes to R.L. Borden, 9 June 1912.

15.) L.C. Christie to Winthrop Aldrich, 18 December 1938, op. cit. See the vita Christie enclosed with this letter.

16.) J.L. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men, op. cit., p. 64.

17.) For information regarding Stimson's firm and his association with Frankfurter see Michael E. Parrish. Felix Frankfurter and His Times. The Reform Years. New York: The Free Press, 1982, pp. 25-35.

18.) Christie's friendship with Stimson lasted until the former's death in April, 1941. At the time Christie was attempting to secure a position with the Canadian government in 1913, Stimson was one of the individuals he listed as a reference on his application to the Canadian Civil Service Commission. Responding to a letter of thanks from Christie, Stimson wrote, "It gave me great pleasure to answer the inquiries of the Civil Service Commission and I sincerely hope, both for your sake and for the Government whose service you are entering, that you obtain the position you are seeking." See Yale University Library, Henry L. Stimson Papers, Box 40, L.C. Christie to H.L. Stimson, 3 July 1913, and Ibid., H.L. Stimson to L.C. Christie, 8 July 1913.

19.) J.L. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men, op. cit., p. 64.

20.) For the scattered pieces of this story see Queen's University Archives, Collection 2167, John A. Stevenson Papers, Box 1, Folder 4, Stevenson's manuscript autobiography, and PAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Reel C-2140, A.M. Innes to R.L. Borden, 9 June 1912.

21.) L.C. Christie to Winthrop Aldrich, 18 December 1938, and attached vitae, op. cit.

- 22.) For the announcement of Christie's appointment to this position see PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 19, File 61, p. 18015.
- 23.) United States National Archives (hereafter USNA), Justice Department Papers, 72868-21, L. C. Christie, Memorandum for the Attorney-General, 2 February 1911.
- 24.) Ibid., 153694-1, L.C. Christie, Memorandum for Mr. Denison, November, 1910.
- 25.) Ibid., 156634-11, L.C. Christie, Memorandum for the Attorney-General, 1 May 1911.
- 26.) Christie's own papers and those of the organizations for which he worked are replete with compilations he prepared. See, for example, the compilation and analysis of the correspondence which had passed between the United States and Canada on the subject of the St. Lawrence Seaway project he prepared in the spring of 1928 for the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario and the Ontario Government. He was then working for the chairman of Ontario Hydro. The correspondence had been published by both governments on 17 April 1928. At that time the Government of Ontario was about to begin discussions with Ottawa and the Government of Quebec in regard to the ownership of the water power that was expected to become available as a result of the development of the St. Lawrence waterway. Christie's paper can be found in Public Archives of Ontario, G.H. Ferguson Papers, Vol. MU 1020, Series 3 and 4, Box 4, C.A. Magrath to G.H. Ferguson, 10 May 1928.
- 27.) Fearing that a fractious public debate might develop in Canada over the subject of the Spanish Civil War, Christie prepared a memorandum in which he urged the government to make a public statement in regard to the conflict if it appeared that the debate was "likely to become significant and bothersome". The statement he drafted was simply and precisely phrased and laid out Canada's position in a clear and unmistakable manner. The crux of the statement noted that, "It never has been the custom of Canadian Governments to take actions or countenance activities in Canada having the character of political intervention in the domestic affairs of other states -- a rule which has been observed whether those affairs were in a state of order or disorder...." In this statement Christie said only what he felt was necessary and he said it precisely. See PAC, RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 1801, File 631-A-1, L.C. Christie, Re Spanish Conflict, 22 September 1936.
- 28.) After considering a portion of Ray Stannard Baker's work on Woodrow Wilson at the Paris Peace Conference in which the system of mandates was discussed, Christie had some harsh words for Baker's inexact, misleading and inflammatory language. "Red-hot controversy' is good journalese, " he wrote, "but poor stuff on which to feed the public if you want to form helpful and friendly

feelings toward peoples of another country who are, I dare swear, on the whole decent folk and willing to be friendly and helpful whenever a workable proposal is put before them." Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 11 February 1920.

29.) PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 19, File 61, p. 17522. L.C. Christie, Memorandum as to the Federal Government's Exclusive Power of Control over Water Power incidentally created by Public Works owned and operated by the United States, 15 February 1912.

30.) Ibid., p. 17497, L.C. Christie, The Regulation of the Use of Navigable Streams for Water Power, no date, but almost certainly early 1912.

31.) It is interesting to note that toward the end of the second memorandum mentioned here, Christie gives an early indication of his later willingness to give the federal government the benefit of the doubt in so far as actions he considered to be in the national interest were concerned. Although he is speaking here on the subjects of navigation and water power, one can detect a clear hint of his fierce opposition to and hatred for any court action or decision that meddled with federal powers and thereby reduced the ability of the central government to govern effectively. "All this simply shows," he wrote, "that the subjects of navigation and the incidental uses of these rivers are so inextricably interwoven that it is impossible to be sure that the regulation proposed is invalid. And it is a trite maxim of Constitutional law that the only concern of the courts is with the reasonableness of the determination of Congress -- whether there can be found any possible relation between the means and the end to which Congress may direct its acts; for only when it is clear and beyond a doubt that Congress has overstepped the limits of its powers may the courts declare its acts void."

Christie's interest in federalism also provided one of the touchstones upon which his friendship with Frankfurter was grounded. "Among other common intellectual interests," Max Freedman has written, "they [Christie and Frankfurter] shared a profound concern with the history and problems of federalism as a system of government." For the above see Ibid., pp. 17513-17514, and Max Freedman (ed.) Roosevelt and Frankfurter. Their Correspondence, 1928-1945. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967, p. 595.

32.) Joseph P. Lash (ed.). From the Diaries of Felix Frankfurter. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1975, p. 114, diary entry for 29 October 1911. In the same entry Frankfurter offered a capsule but very accurate estimate of his friend's personality. "Christie is an attractive fellow with a fine mind;" he wrote, "still rather restless. He seems to have a deep emotional side which is not always administered to."

33.) Ronald Steel. Walter Lippmann and the American Century.

Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1981, p. 121.

34.) Ibid. In his memoirs, Sir Arthur Willert, then resident correspondent for the the London Times in Washington, provides the following evocative description of the atmosphere pervading the "House of Truth," and, in so doing, gives a good sense of the high quality political education that Christie derived from living there.

"We (Willert is speaking of himself and his wife) were happy and lucky, too, in our social relationships. The hospitality of many houses remains gratefully in my mind. In some of them education mingled with social pleasures. This was particularly the case in the bachelor establishment Felix Frankfurter presided over. ... It was called the House of Truth and was a small house in an obscure red-brick street with a large room built into the back garden. In that room the company ate, drank, and talked into the small hours of the morning. We were very often there. Felix relates in his book [of memoirs] how F. [Willert's wife] tried in vain to persuade him to bring more method into his housekeeping. But if the housekeeping was haphazard the talk was good. It was predominantly that of questing youth at a time when the country was seething with problems, social, economic, and political. It opened to me a window upon the American scene other than those through which I had been attempting to view it. ...

Most of its participants were liberal or radical in outlook. Herbert Croly, who founded the New Republic after writing the Promise of American Life, Walter Lippmann, already known, like Croly, as the precocious author of forward-looking, thought-provoking books -- both of whom I probably first met and learned to like in that back room, with its table at the near end and sofas beyond by the windows.

It was in the House of Truth that Eustace Percy lived for a time to escape the diplomatic round and learn about America. All passing visitors thought likely to contribute something were invited to its parties. I recall among them Lowes Dickinson and Harold Laski as representatives of British radicalism and John Galsworthy of British conservatism. One of its members was the Canadian, Loring Christie, then I think doing something for some branch of the American government but soon to join the Canadian Foreign Service and destined years later to rise to be his country's ambassador (sic) in Washington, where he died. He was well up to the average of the House of Truth for brains, and raised its average for good looks."

See Sir Arthur Willert. Washington and Other Memories. Boston:

Houghton Mifflin Comapny, 1972, pp. 64-65.

35.) Michael E. Parrish, Felix Frankfurter and His Times. The Reform Years, p. 52. Christie also appears to have become acquainted with a soon-to-be prominent Canadian at the House of Truth when he and Vincent Massey spent Christmas week their in 1913. See Claude Bissel. The Young Vincent Massey. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981, pp. 132-133.

36.) Michael E. Parrish, Felix Frankfurter and His Times. The Reform Years, op. cit., p. 51.

37.) Ibid., p. 20.

38.) Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 20 June 1912.

39.) Ibid., Christie noted in this letter that his fears regarding a defeated Theodore Roosevelt were "colored by what I saw of him last night (sticking his head out the window to a raving mob below)...." Professor Robert Wiebe has characterized the Progressive Era in the United States as a "search for order" and there certainly was a strong strain of this in Christie's ideas and attitudes. Christie favored a two-party system because he believed that such a system produced a stable and orderly political climate. In times of serious political, social, and economic distress, say during the conscription crisis of 1917 or in the depression-ravaged Canada of the 1930s, Christie's thinking moved not in the direction of a third-party but rather toward a single party system of national government. "Just now I am preaching National Government for Canada, -- i.e. a coalition," he wrote in 1935. "We're in a mess. The chances of getting a union of some steady forces before the election (which must come this summer of fall) are thin: Willie King thinks he's the man of the hour alone; but people are fools to wait till chaos gets worse and more unmanageable." See Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 4 June 1935.

40.) In a 1924 letter to Frankfurter from London, Christie neatly summarized his dislike for and fear of third-parties in the midst of a scathing denunciation of Ramsay Macdonald's first Labour Government.

"We are now indulging in the frivolity of a third general election within 2 years. Such abuse of flexibility is fantastic. More and more people are seeing this, and as they are unlikely to change the constitution, they will have to face the fact that the only other cure is to get back to the two-party system....

Their [Labour's] calculation is in the long run to destroy the Liberal Party. Prehaps it's sound. I

wonder if Labour is itself as yet a sufficiently close knit affair to undertake such an operation. Baldwin the other day in a meeting blurted out one of his speculations to the effect that Ramsay really got his dissolution because of the burden of internal dissensions in his party was so great that he took the plunge partly in despair, partly with the idea of pulling them together by his declaration of war. There's no doubt of the internal differences: one lot with Snowden and Haldane at their head have been at odds with Macdonald's actions on practically every major issue of the year. I will believe that Liberalism in this country is dead when I see the corpse and not before.

I would have been content, in spite of their incompetency, to let Ramsay and his Gov't go on another year or so, but now that they have invited the issue, my vote goes against them.... I am not very well informed on their activities on domestic matters in England; but I would start with an objection to people who make such wild promises as they did last year nor can I support their manifesto of this year. I think it wholly unwise in the present economic crisis of this country to talk of vast schemes of nationalization. I understand they regard it mainly as talk and are prepared in the end to abandon many of their projects as the German socialist have done; but I don't believe that the minds of men in such a position can tackle the job a Government here has to tackle."

See Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 20 October 1924.

41.) PAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Reel C-2140, pp. 8277-8278. A. Mitchell Innes to R.L. Borden, 22 May 1912. It is quite possible that Innes struck a responsive chord in Borden with the last sentence of his letter. As Professor Brown has shown, Borden himself had felt compelled to leave Canada early in his career in order to find satisfactory employment. Borden's 1873 destination was Matawan, New Jersey and a teaching position. See R.C. Brown. Robert Laird Borden. A Biography. Volume I: 1854-1914. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1975, pp. 9-12.

42.) PAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Reel C-2140, p. 8281, R.L. Borden to A. Mitchell Innes, 28 May 1912.

43.) Ibid., pp. 8288-8289, A. Mitchell Innes to R.L. Borden, 9 June 1912.

44.) Ibid., p. 8343, R.L. Borden to A. Mitchell Innes, 3 January 1913.

45.) Ibid., p. 8344, A. Mitchell Innes to R.L. Borden, 4

January 1913.

46.) It seems unlikely that the position of legal adviser in the Department of External Affairs was the one that Borden originally had in mind for Christie. In his answer to Innes's first letter, Borden intimated that he was looking for someone with experience in drafting statutes. Innes responded that Christie had virtually no experience in this regard. It was apparently not until the New York interview that Borden broached to Christie the possibility of bringing him into his own office in External Affairs. When Innes learned of this idea he wrote to Borden saying that "my impression is that if you take him into your own office, you would find him of the greatest value to you. He is the sort of fellow you can trust to do his work without supervision, and to carry through a job on his own responsibility. He would not always be coming to you for advice and guidance." In this light, it may be that the recommendations of Innes and Percy along with the interview Borden conducted had as much to do with Christie's getting the post as did his technical expertise. See R.L. Borden to A. Mitchell Innes, 28 May 1912, op. cit.; A. Mitchell Innes to R.L. Borden, 9 June 1912, op. cit.; and, PAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Reel C-2140, pp. 8340-8341, A. Mitchell Innes to R.L. Borden, 2 January 1913.

47.) While Christie's career in Washington was not quite the stuff that legends are made of, it did have a certain specialness to it. "Christie's career, I suppose, is unique in the history of the U.S.," Felix Frankfurter recalled toward the end of his life, "because he was for a period Acting Solicitor General, though a Canadian citizen...." See Harlan B. Phillips, (ed.). Felix Frankfurter Reminiscences. New York: Reynal and Company, 1960, pp. 105-106.

48.) PAC, MG 30 E148, John Read Papers, Volume 10, Interview of John Read, undated.

49.) Major General H.D.G. Crerar provides an estimate of Christie's mind which reflects this mixture of respect and contempt. "I have seen quite a lot of Christie." Crerar wrote in 1936, "I admire his brain, but his reasoning is cold and his conclusions, on such matters as I know about, always seem to ignore the human factors such as sentiment." See PAC, MG 30 E157, H.D.G. Crerar Papers, Volume 10, Folder - Liasion 2, File-M. Pope, H.D.G. Crerar to Lt. Col. M. Pope, 11 April 1936.

50.) It is interesting to speculate that Christie's progressivism may have been another factor which attracted Borden. In a speech delivered on 20 August 1907, Borden had delineated a program for the Conservative Party which came to be known as the "Halifax Platform". In several respects the planks of this platform closely parallel many of those concerns which were closest to the hearts of American progressives. Included in the platform were calls for civil service reform, centering around the principle of advancement on merit, electoral reforms,

rural free mail delivery and a public utilities commission to regulate the rates of telegraph, railroad and telephone companies. Professor R.C Brown has also pointed out that while they did not find their way into the platform, Borden personally believed in such progressive precepts as the election of senators and the principle of government ownership. Pervading this program was what Professor John English has described as "a willingness to widen the compass of state action". Borden, like Christie, was an ardent federalist who believed in the necessity of a central government equipped with powers sufficient to effectively govern the nation. Professor English has also noted that Borden believed that modern government would not be administered by politicians but rather "by men with vision and detachment" men with what Borden himself called "moral earnestness". Certainly Borden's concern for and belief in the role of the non-partisan expert in modern government was very much in step with the position supported by Christie and his brethren at the New Republic. Whether Borden was a progressive in the American sense is a question which is open to further debate. What seems clear, however, is that there were numerous points at which Borden's progressive ideas, as they were expressed in the "Halifax Platform" and in the reforms the Conservatives proposed after they came to power in 1911, touched upon those of Christie and that this series of contacts probably made for a considerable meeting of minds between the two men. For Borden's progressivism and the substance of the "Halifax Platform" see R.C. Brown, Robert Laird Borden. A Biography, Volume I, op. cit., pp. 129-135, and John English. The Decline of Politics. The Conservatives and the Party System, 1901-1920. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977, pp. 45 and 163. For an excellent, short analysis of the Progressive Era in Canada see J.L. Granatstein, et. al., Twentieth Century Canada. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, Limited, 1983, pp. 71-74.

51.) Christie's appointment, without examination, was approved by the Civil Service Commission on 18 March 1913. On that date, Commissioner Adam Shortt advised Borden that the Commission had decided that "in view of his educational qualifications and special experience, and in view of his personal characteristics to which you referred, Mr. Christie is evidently admirably suited for the position to which it is proposed to appoint him." The Commission also approves a salary of \$3,000 per year, \$200 above the standard for other civil service posts equivalent to Christie's. See PAC. RG 32 C2, Civil Service Commission Papers, Volume 310-311, File 1184, Adam Shortt to R.L. Borden, 18 March 1913.

Chapter II: Initial Years in the Department of External Affairs, 1913-1916.

A number of historians have speculated about Loring Christie's rapid rise to a position of influence in the Department of External Affairs. Colonel C.P. Stacy has noted that Christie was "very good on paper" and that he was therefore "well-equipped to turn Borden's firm but general notions on policy into pungent, closely argued memoranda."¹ Professor S.F. Wise has said that Borden came to lean heavily on Christie's "incisive intelligence;" Professor J.L. Granatstein has concurred, adding that Borden valued his Legal Advisor's opinion not only because it was sound, but, also, because it had a "Tory cast to it."²

As Professor R.C. Brown has indicated, the Canadian civil service was quite small at this time and had virtually no responsibility for policy initiation or implementation. Given this situation, and the fact that he was entering a government department that was barely four years old, Christie more or less filled a bureaucratic vacuum and his abilities and ambitions insured his rapid advancement, especially as the burden of administering the Canadian war effort weighed ever more heavily on Borden after 1914.³ Professor Gaddis Smith accurately summed-up the consensus when he wrote that Christie was the Prime Minister's "general right hand man on external affairs" and was, by himself, "Borden's Foreign Office."⁴

Along with these factors, Christie's rapid advancement also was due in part to the close personal relationship he quickly

developed with Sir Robert Borden. In addition to sharing sympathies for the intellectual and political currents of the Progressive Era and a common educational background in the law, it seems likely that something resembling a teacher-student, if not a father-and-son, relationship developed between Christie and the childless Borden. Even before Christie had arrived in Ottawa, A. Mitchell Innes had written to Borden that the young Nova Scotian was very impressed with him and that "in him [Christie] you have a devoted follower."⁵

That Borden reciprocated this affection became evident shortly after Christie had taken up his duties. Just after his arrival in Ottawa, Christie was taken ill and confined to the hospital for a period. In a letter to Felix Frankfurter written during his convalescence, Christie indicated that his relationship with the Prime Minister was already a close one. "I tell you to give you a sidelight on him," Christie wrote, "that Mr. Borden called every morning the first week and then sent a telegram home [to Christie's parents in Amherst, Nova Scotia] after each call."⁶ It seems likely that Borden considered Christie a friend as well as an adviser and that this regard probably aided Christie's adjustment to his new employment.⁷

Christie's personal friendship with Borden may have eased his entry into both government and social circles in Ottawa, but it was ultimately his talents that allowed him to make the most of the opportunities he encountered. Although he apparently had done little systematic thinking or writing on the subject of international affairs before arriving in Ottawa, the

circumstances of his employment and the state of Canadian, imperial, and international affairs forced Christie to act quickly to rectify this deficiency.⁸ During ensuing years Christie addressed himself to questions that would concern him for the remainder of his career, questions involving such matters as the formulation of an external policy adequate to meet the needs and insure the security of the Canadian nation, the nature and organization of the British Empire and Canada's proper role and place in it, and the relationship of the United States to Canada and to the Empire. In addition, Christie's view of the causes of the Great War, and his slowly changing reactions to it, evolved in this period and these judgments would likewise color, and, at times jaundice, his perceptions and attitudes on politics and diplomacy for the rest of his life. In sum, the period between 1913 and 1916 was for Christie both a practical learning experience and an opportunity to develop and hone his talents and attitudes.

* * * * *

Christie's arrival in Ottawa roughly coincided with the final stages of the controversy that had resulted from the introduction of the Conservative government's Naval Bill of 1912. During a visit to London early in that year, Borden had decided that the "emergency" British authorities claimed the Empire was facing as a consequence of the rise of German naval power was genuine. Since he judged that there was no time to create, equip, man, and train an independent Canadian naval force, Borden decided that the most effective response for the

Dominion to make would be to immediately contribute an amount of cash sufficient --a figure set at \$35 million -- to fund the construction of three battleships, or "dreadnaughts," for the Royal Navy.⁹ After a fierce battle in the House of Commons Borden's plan was passed on 5 May 1913, only to be thrown out by the Liberal-dominated Senate on 29 May 1913. Borden then adopted a policy whereby he intended to introduce legislation at a later date that would provide money to pay for ships already under construction in British dockyards. Although nothing ever came of this latter plan -- and, indeed, no Canadian contribution for Royal Navy construction was ever made -- Christie, in December 1913, prepared a memorandum for the prime minister in which he supported Borden's plan and declared that "the immediate expenditure of this money will do more than anything to shore up the imperial structure...."¹⁰

In the memorandum, Christie argued that there was much more at stake than simply a matter of assisting the Royal Navy to become a more effective fighting force. The issue involved nothing less than a step on the road toward deciding Canada's future as a sovereign nation. Christie wrote that Canadians "must sooner or later assume control over foreign policy (i.e. over the issues of peace and war) no less effective than that now exercised by the people of Britain or by the U.S.A." The naval contribution would signify, according to Christie, which path Canada would travel toward nationhood, whether toward closer association with the Empire or independence from it.¹¹ "The vast majority [of Canadians]," Christie wrote, "do not grasp the

reality of these alternatives, neither of which is palatable, nor do they understand that it is impossible to evade one or the other."¹² The proposed Canadian contribution¹³ would therefore both aid Imperial defense and "prolong the time in which the ultimate relations of Canada to the Empire can be studied."¹⁴

Christie argued that, given the time necessary for study and reflection on the dilemma posed by the imperial naval crisis, the great majority of Canadians, "Liberals as well as Conservatives," would decide that they desired to maintain their status as British subjects. "If once they [Canadians] grasp the fact that it will become lost to them," Christie wrote, "unless they assume in time a full and equal responsibility for the maintenance of the Empire they will choose organic union with all the sacrifices it involves."¹⁵

Theorizing that the proposed contribution would help ease European tensions by establishing a better balance between the British and German fleets -- thereby eliminating the crisis atmosphere and allowing Canadians time for reflection -- Christie proposed to Borden a course of action that seems to reflect the progressive attitudes he had brought with him from the United States. A prominent aspect of American Progressive thought during Christie's residence in Washington involved a belief, perhaps even a faith, in the ability of highly-trained, non-partisan experts to rid the operations of society of their imperfections and uncertainties and thereafter maintain it in efficient running order. Christie viewed the problem of nuturing a consensus of opinion among his countrymen regarding Canada's

future national status as just the sort of issue that required expert, non-partisan attention and coordination. "The greatest need," Christie told the Prime Minister,

therefore is a calm dispassionate atmosphere and sufficient time for reflection, during which the work of educating public opinion may be carried on. The object of public policy should therefore be to keep this ultimate issue from becoming a party question and also to secure the Empire from destruction during the time necessary for enabling the electorate to grasp the issues at stake. To secure this atmosphere and this time should be the objective of policy.¹⁶

Warning against the involvement of party politics in the question, Christie advised Borden that the situation required cooperation between the Conservatives and the Liberals of a type designed "to lay some foundation now such as may enable Canadian party leaders in time to come to settle the fate of the Empire by such a conjunction as enabled Macdonald and Brown to settle the fate of the Dominion." Finding public opinion "badly in want of a lead," on the naval issue, Christie urged Borden -- in tones which conjure up images of Theodore Roosevelt's "battling for the Lord" in 1912 -- to undertake a "heroic effort to lift the whole question out of the public arena" and thereby provide for "a Canadian as opposed to a party settlement."¹⁷

* * * * *

The calm atmosphere Christie sought for careful and prolonged reflection on Canada's place in the Imperial order never had a chance to develop.¹⁸ Eight months after he had drafted the memorandum on the naval question, Canada entered World War One at the side of Great Britain and the other dominions. That Christie would support the British declaration

of war was really a foregone conclusion, and, typically, his reaction to the war was not an impulsive rallying to the colors but rather one that brought his legal education and progressive proclivities to bear.

Christie's analysis of the causes of the war found that Germany was culpable legally and morally for initiating the conflict. In the first place, Christie wrote, Berlin had deliberately violated the Anglo-German treaty guaranteeing Belgian neutrality. Secondly, the Kaiser's government also refused Sir Edward Grey's offer of his services for mediation and arbitration, perhaps the most popular of the Progressive Era's diplomatic innovations and one that United States President William Howard Taft had pursued vigorously during Christie's stint in Washington. Finally, because he refused to believe that in the progressive age in which he lived, an era supposedly dominated by reason and rationality, the nations of Europe could have deliberately chosen warfare as the method of resolving their quarrels, Christie concluded that Europe had been plunged into conflict by the actions of an immoral, reckless, and anti-democratic German "military autocracy" headed by the Kaiser.¹⁹ He believed that the German peoples' view of their nation's rightful place in the world order was a "great one," like that of the British peoples, in fact, and that it was only as a result of the chauvinistic ambitions of their military leaders that Germany had become a "great soul gone wrong."²⁰

During the first stages of the conflict, Christie's view of the Empire and its organization took on something of what

Professor Bothwell has referred to as the "mystical side of the Round Table Movement."²¹ In the spring of 1915, Christie described to Conservative Member of Parliament C.A. Magrath his concern that unless Great Britain and the self-governing dominions "deliberately join their destinies, the thing that is the British Commonwealth is, like all aspirations that are merely of the lip and not of the heart convinced to the point of effort and sacrifice, destined ultimately to fade slowly out into the pale irony of the void.'" He argued that the dominions were growing and that their participation in the Great War would unavoidably hasten this maturation process and that as each dominion developed a more sophisticated national consciousness their local preoccupations would come to predominate. As a result, Christie wrote, there would occur a "corresponding subordination of common interests and aims" which would make imperial cooperation much more difficult. The dangers of separation engendered by the war had another, more positive dimension, however. Christie said that the war would force the British peoples to pause, consider their future, and demonstrate "the crying need of coming together." In Canada's case, at least, Christie wrote, an "organic union" between Great Britain and the self-governing dominions offered "a destiny finer than any of our narrower dreams."²²

This was about as far, however, that Christie's "mystical side" went and, after having had his say about Canada's "dreams" he turned to examine the situation with a more realistic eye.²³ Failure to achieve some form of closer union would not only be a

faltering of spirit, Christie wrote, but it also would amount to "nothing short of a crass failure of imperial statesmanship." He argued that new, clear, and definite constitutional arrangements for the Empire were clearly needed and that they could not wait until the conclusion of hostilities. In the Round Table, Christie argued that an imperial conference should be convened during 1915 to plan for postwar imperial organization. The mechanism of the imperial conference was the most legitimate method of addressing the task because it was an approach that fell within the traditional parameters of the British constitutional system and would, Christie felt, therefore carry the most weight in the eyes of the British peoples.

... the imperial conference is the natural medium for direct consultation between Governments upon the larger questions raised by the war and the settlement.... The Conference would naturally discard all ceremony, postpone all but urgent business, and confine itself to the single matter of the war and the coming settlement. It would thus make possible, with the maximum of effect and in the minimum of time, just such an exchange of views as took place between the Foreign Secretary and Dominion Ministers in 1911, at a moment when close understanding between the Governments of the Empire is more important than ever before. Dominion Ministers, who testified so warmly to the value of the departure four years ago, have even stronger reason now for deciding to share the mind of the British Government and for enabling it to share their own. Less than ever before can the British Government afford to be without the fullest possible understanding of Dominion views. Nothing else will ensure the unity of the British world, not merely in the struggle -- there is no fear in regard to that -- but in the far more critical period when at last diplomacy begins to supersede the clash of arms. It is then that our future responsibilities for an unknown period of years will be suddenly defined; it is then that our position in the world, individually and collectively, will be made clear; it is then that our future relations with each other will be marred or confirmed.²⁴

In addition to drafting formal constitutional arrangements,

the conference also would facilitate the taking of decisions regarding the disposition of the territories taken from Germany during the war, intra-Imperial trade agreements, and immigration regulations within the Empire. Christie was adamantly opposed to territorial acquisitions by members of the Empire. The Empire wants no territory, he wrote, dismissing Australian and South African desires out of hand. He viewed such acquisitions as simply the taking of "spoils" which would be seen by the rest of the world as a stark "piece of cynicism" and which would have the effect of turning "this war on our part into a war of aggression."²⁵

Christie's writings on imperial affairs in the 1913-1916 period are clearly the work of an individual who favors close imperial cooperation, but they fall a bit short of being the labor of an out-and-out imperial federationist. In his doctoral thesis, Professor Bothwell designates Christie's sense of nationalism as being of a "sentimental" variety having "little connection with life in his own country."²⁶ In sum, Bothwell suggests that Christie's imperial faith probably was stronger than his sense of nationalism.

Quite to the contrary, however, Christie's work and ideas in the period under consideration here seem to have been shaped less by emotionalism and sentiment than by his pragmatic legal education and his propensity to view political affairs, both domestic and foreign, through lenses filtered by a sense of realpolitik. It seems, therefore, more plausible to suggest that Christie's attitude toward developing Canada's individual status

as a distinct nation within the Empire was that of a practical nationalist. Quite simply, Christie favored Canada doing what it could do, and do well, within the imperial framework, and letting the rest await a more auspicious moment. In this period, Christie surmised correctly that Canada had neither the national will, the experience, nor the material wherewithal to survive alone as a nation, and so judged that the Empire was the vehicle through which, at least for the time being, Canada could most fully realize her aspirations as a nation. Christie, in short, seems to have manifested a realistic rather than a sentimental strain of nationalism.²⁷

Although fully supporting the spirit and ultimate goal of the Imperial war effort, Christie was not uncritical about the manner in which Britain conducted it in the early stages of the war. In particular, he urged the adjustment of imperial policy so as to make allowances for the interests and sensibilities of the United States. Professor Bothwell has suggested that the idea of Canada serving as an intermediary between London and Washington became for Christie "the foundation of an international role for Canada -- a mediating part that could compensate for the limitations that Canadian life imposed."²⁸ The result of Christie's exertions in this direction, Bothwell maintains, was at best an "attempt to insert a Canadian bit part into the high drama of transatlantic collaboration and was an attempt to transform too many peoples frames of reference. There was no obvious reason to accept Canadian interference."²⁹

Once again, however, exception can, and should, be taken to

Professor Bothwell's interpretation. The argument can be made that Christie's view of what Canada's role in Anglo-American relations could and should be, may have been somewhat less grandiose than that suggested by Bothwell. Given his education and professional experience in the United States it seems reasonable to conclude that Christie might merely have perceived a functional part that Canada could play effectively in bettering relations between its two North Atlantic partners.³⁰ In January and February, 1916, for example, Christie visited Washington and New York, partly on vacation and partly on government business. During his stay in the American capital, Christie met on several occasions with British Ambassador Sir Cecil Spring-Rice and, as a consequence of these conversations, he came away believing that he had found a way in which Canada could assist in calming the then troubled Anglo-American relationship.

The crux of Christie's talks with Spring-Rice involved the Ambassador's fears that anti-British sentiment was growing in the United States as a consequence of Britain's use of her sea power to blockade Germany and halt neutral ships on the high seas for search and seizure operations. Spring-Rice realized that self-righteous outrage was the standard American reaction to the strict application of British sea power in wartime, but he feared that in this particular instance the result of the unconditional pursuance of the economic war might be a complete ban on the export of munitions from the United States. Since Great Britain and France were the major customers of America's munition-makers, a full embargo would threaten to cripple the Allied war effort.

The Ambassador felt that the American people and their congressional representatives did not appreciate the fact that Britain was involved in a "war-to-the-death" against a foe that was inherently "evil." Spring-Rice believed that the Foreign Office should undertake a publicity campaign in the United States to acquaint the American citizenry with the rectitude of Great Britain's "moral position" in the war.³¹

Christie's reaction to the ambassador's attitude probably amounted to a knowing shudder. He told Spring-Rice, and later Sir Robert Borden, that on the basis of his personal contacts with several members of the House of Representatives there were almost certainly more congressmen in favor of an embargo than there had been only a few months earlier. He felt, however, that the attitude of the Congress was not representative of that of the country as a whole, and, indeed, the apparently anti-British attitude of the House probably was not even representative of the entire federal government.

Christie told Spring-Rice that he had spoken with Henry L. Stimson and that Stimson had indicated that he "couldn't believe that anything like an embargo was possible." Stimson also had said that he and others in the government had little objection to the actions of the Royal Navy and that, as further evidence of the country's sympathy for the Allied cause, there was growing support for conscription in the United States. Stimson further intimated that President Wilson was coming around to a pro-conscription viewpoint.³² To buttress Stimson's opinions, Christie suggested to Spring-Rice that the business and banking

interests in the United States that facilitated Allied purchases of war materials were clearly opposed to an embargo that could only hurt them financially. Lastly, Christie argued there was even a chance that all of the noise about such a course of action was possibly nothing more than the historic tendency of American politicians to give a twist to the lion's tail during the presidential election year then in progress.³³

Christie went on to explain to Spring-Rice that he recently had attended a dinner in New York City with the editorial board of the New Republic. He reported that the focus of the dinner's discussion was an attempt by the editors to settle on a candidate they could all agree to support against President Wilson in the upcoming election. The editors, Christie explained, had failed utterly in this task and he believed that their failure was symptomatic of the general state of public opinion in the United States, i.e., that "unity was in abeyance" in the United States and this could not help but affect the manner in which American foreign policy was conducted. In short, Christie told Spring-Rice, America was entrapped by a "sprawling uncertainty of opinion," particularly in the western states, and that London's strict sense of legalistic rectitude in publicly justifying its contraband control policies, together with its angry criticism of American responses to those exercises, was undercutting the ability of anglophiles in the United States to short-circuit anti-British measures and sentiment and appeal to the basically sympathetic but largely undecided populace.³⁴

Christie also told Spring-Rice that although American public

opinion was in a state of flux, the pressure of the Royal Navy's operations against neutral shipping were not, in and of themselves, enough to push it into a wholeheartedly anti-British reaction. In fact, the current consensus of opinion seemed to indicate that the population of the United States generally would object to an embargo because it would amount to, in effect if not in fact, a de facto alliance with the Central Powers. Christie maintained that so long as American public opinion was unsettled, the Allies generally, and Britain's Foreign Office in particular, should refrain from "preaching" to the Americans. Pro-embargo spokesmen, Christie speculated, might be able to convince a large segment of American opinion that such foreign rhetoric was a direct attempt to manipulate domestic politics in the United States. This might, Christie warned, just provide the until-then-missing lever with which to pry Congress into initiating an embargo -- an action that was most unlikely in the absence of solid evidence of direct foreign interference.³⁵

On his return to Ottawa, Christie detailed his conversations with Spring-Rice and others in the United States for Borden. Christie said that from these discussions he felt that there was a distinct possibility of very strained relations developing in fairly short order between the United States and Great Britain. The Royal Navy's economic blockade was at the center of the problem, Christie told the prime minister, and while the danger of a rupture was not imminent, the blockade was quite possibly laying "the seeds of possible vexatious difficulties in the future." Christie also warned Borden that the harsh British

criticism of the American reaction to the blockade "is beginning to hurt, and it is cutting most deeply into those who have the least to say about it -- those who are most wholeheartedly for us."³⁶

Christie also told Borden that his talks with Herbert Croly, editor-in-chief of the New Republic, and other of the journal's editors, had brought him to the conclusion that there was a current of opinion in the United States that believed that Canada might be able to aid in ameliorating tensions between Washington and London. Christie said that the New Republic editors had stressed to him their belief that it was crucial for the world to enter the postwar era with the United States having a "solid understanding with the British Empire" and that Canada "is destined to prove more and more the great mediator" in the Anglo-American relationship.³⁷

Given this perception, Christie outlined a course of action that he thought might be helpful in smoothing currently ruffled transatlantic feathers. Christie recommended that Borden suggest to the British government that they arrange for Sir Edward Grey to deliver a speech indicating that Britain, after the war, would be eager to confer with all neutral nations and hold discussions aimed at reaching an understanding on the disruptive influence of employing sea power to prevent contraband trade on neutral shipping in wartime. Grey, Christie claimed, was very "popular and well-trusted" in the United States and that therefore a well-intentioned, fair-minded speech probably would go far toward preventing further slippage of American public opinion in the

direction of support for an embargo. As he had earlier told Spring-Rice, Christie advised Borden that public opinion in the United States "was the most intelligent element in American life" and that it was, at the present time, travelling a sound pro-Allied path. In its present confused state, Christie believed that American public opinion should be given a lead -- similar to the one he had suggested Borden give to the Canadian public during the naval controversy in 1913 -- so as to help it shed its "traditional fetish of isolation" and a helpful speech by Grey might just turn the trick.³⁸

Borden apparently never found an opportune moment to approach either Whitehall or Grey with his Legal Adviser's suggestion. Nevertheless, Christie's recommendation hardly was an indication that he was, in Professor Bothwell's words, attempting "to insert a [Canadian] bit part into the high drama of transatlantic collaboration."³⁹ In the two memoranda resulting from his visits to New York and Washington in early 1916, Christie clearly described a legitimate Anglo-American problem he had encountered; a problem that was called to his attention by both the British Embassy and from sources within and outside the United States government. In addition, the course of action he proposed to resolve the difficulty, an approach by Borden to the British government or Sir Edward Grey, was certainly within the realm of Canada's capabilities -- both in his own eyes and those of influential and knowledgeable Americans. The part that Christie played in this matter also seems to suggest that Professor Bothwell overestimates his

unquestioning and uncritical support for British policies.⁴⁰ Christie obviously was very critical of the excessively legalistic and sermonizing path that Spring-Rice and the Foreign Office appeared ready to follow in early 1916, as he was of any suggestions that Britain might undertake a propaganda campaign in the United States aimed at building public support for the Allied cause. The mediative effort he proposed for Sir Edward Grey was one that might have been legitimately expected to aid the Allied cause and one which might also have been recognized as a peculiarly "Canadian" policy initiative.

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In the years between 1913 and 1916, Christie also was called on by Borden to offer a good deal of advice regarding Canada's relations with the United States. Indeed, as Professor Bothwell has correctly noted, the prime minister allowed Christie to "utilize his American connections, suggesting first a personal and then an institutional role."⁴¹ Fortunately, Christie and Borden were very much like-minded in regard to the Canadian-American relationship. As Professor Gaddis Smith has pointed out, Sir Robert was never enamored of "tweaking Uncle Sam's whiskers," a practice that had long been a stock-in-trade for many Conservative politicians in Canada.⁴² Both Borden and Christie fully understood Washington's predicament in appearing to take one side or the other in the Great War and neither man ever showed any public resentment or made any public criticism of America's prolonged neutrality.⁴³ In addition, both men were anxious to demonstrate to officials in the United States that

Canada was not "the diplomatic puppet of Great Britain."⁴⁴

As early as 1913, Christie had made an effort to persuade Borden to play a bit of a mediating role between Great Britain and the United States -- a role very much like the one he urged the prime minister to play with Sir Edward Grey over Britain's conduct of the economic war. During a visit to New York in June 1913, A. Mitchell Innes brought to Christie's attention a problem posed by the irate British reaction to the imposition by the United States of tolls on foreign shipping passing through the Panama Canal. Innes did not feel that the British Foreign Office fully understood the nature of the problem it was preparing to complain about and that a possible Anglo-American controversy might result from this lack of understanding. The crux of the problem, for London, was that the United States was planning to award an exemption from the tolls for its own merchant marine. Foreign Office officials claimed that this discriminatory practice was in violation of earlier Anglo-American agreements on the use of the canal and they were considering referring the matter to the International Court of Justice at The Hague for arbitration.⁴⁵

In Innes's opinion, there was no way to prevent the exemptions planned by the United States for even if they could be proven illegal Washington would simply offer its own merchant marine some other form of subsidy -- a practice which the Foreign Office itself already had decided would be legal -- and so the overall effect would thereby remain the same. In this light, trying to force an arbitration would in the end not only be

pointless, but would surely offend the United States and possibly lead the Senate to refuse to give its advice and consent to the Anglo-American general arbitration treaty when it next came up for renewal. For this reason, Innes urged Christie to suggest to Prime Minister Borden that he broach the topic with British officials since, Innes noted, Borden "understands the Americans and the Foreign Office does not." Christie accepted his friend's suggestion and told Borden in a memorandum that in his view the matter was a "question of whether the 'high moral' attitude of the Foreign Office is higher than the one of real friendship (with the United States) proposed."⁴⁶ Again, Borden apparently never found an occasion to implement the suggestion but that failure does not negate the fact that Christie's proposal was timely, practical, and well within the limited scope of Canada's external capabilities.

*** * ***

In addition to being a problem in imperial affairs, Canadian-American relations, and domestic Canadian politics, the Great War presented a personal challenge to Christie's view of the world and his moral outlook. Regarding the war itself, Professor Bothwell has written that "the important criteria for Christie was moralistic: his use of rhetoric once again showed a commitment to morality over reality -- 'worthy' and 'loftier' not to mention 'worthiest'."⁴⁷ Although it can hardly be denied that Christie viewed the war in terms that were often emotional and heavily weighted with moral considerations, the key to his position is more than just a romantic attachment to a virtuous

and righteously ascendant Allied cause. It involves also the troubling sense of intellectual unease he experienced as the war seemed to increasingly invalidate many of the tenets of his progressive faith, and the abiding sense of resentment and personal humiliation he felt over his failure to participate with the Canadian forces overseas.

Christie was a thorough-going product of the Progressive Era in North America and had imbibed deeply of the era's spirit of moral rectitude. Specifically, he believed fully in the Era's stringent emphasis on the moral importance of adequately performing one's duty. Christie apparently was desperately unhappy and embarrassed -- ashamed, perhaps, might not be too strong an adjective -- at his inability to participate militarily in the conflict, his failure "to be allowed to find the Soldier's Faith"⁴⁸ "This thing [the war] crowds everything else to one side," he wrote to Frankfurter in September 1914 and, although the prime minister has assured him that it was his clear responsibility to remain at his post in the Department, he added that "it isn't a pleasant thing to be staying here."⁴⁹ Six months later he wrote to the same correspondent that he still could not decide finally whether to enlist or abide by Borden's wishes and remain in Ottawa.⁵⁰ Christie's personal dilemma extended into the third year of the war and in the fall of 1916 he again wrote to Frankfurter that, while he was adhering to Borden's decision, he did "not know the words to tell you how I hate my job."⁵¹

Christie's intense disappointment over not being able to get

to the fighting in France may be one reason he developed such an emotionally charged and highly patriotic response to the war. He came to believe that a complete and final victory was the only acceptable outcome for the war and that "one feels in himself and in the air the temper that makes peace (qua peace) talk so much impertinent twaddle."⁵² Christie constantly railed against the arguments in favor of an "inconclusive peace" being made by his former colleagues in the pages of the New Republic.

I see the New Republic is urging the merits of an inconclusive fight. It may not be fantastic but it sounds so. If it means an actual prophecy of what the actual outcome is to be I am afraid we disagree. If it means at a certain point short of an attainable victory we should deliberately desist because of an intellectual calculation as to the various effects on the German mind of the various alternative outcomes, it isn't merely a voice crying in the wilderness; it's intellectualising a situation that doesn't admit of that process at all. On all sides and in all sorts of ways one hears from the trenches that on the part of the men there it would involve a complete mental overturn to enable them to conceive any outcome short of recognized victory. And that I know correctly describes the feeling here and I'm certain it does in England and the other Dominions -- and in France. There would be an instant and effective resentment manifested towards any statesman who attempted to dally with anything else. I know my resentment would be instant enough.⁵³

Damning noncombatants like himself, Christie said that the world would be "saved by love and sacrifice -- not by science and thought" as advocated by the New Republic.⁵⁴ The soldiers, Christie believed, were showing the way for all to follow, "the simple clear cut solution of the chap in khaki," and that and only that, and not the "irrelevant partisan displays" of politicians, or the "twaddle" of theorists, would save the world.⁵⁵

The war also stamped a new reverse side on the coin of Christie's progressive beliefs. The war caused the first faltering of his faith in the ability of an educated, non-partisan elite to conduct, govern, and improve the operations of society. His disagreements with former associates at the New Republic throughout the war years provides ample evidence of this disillusionment. The pre-war progressive had certainly undergone some sort of transformation when he could write in February 1915 that the issue of the war could only "be settled by faith in blood and sacrifice and suffering in quietude as well as in heroic blood."⁵⁶

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Between 1913 and 1916 Christie carved an important niche for himself in the inner circle of Borden's government. Because of his education and professional background, he was able to undertake many of the tasks he was hired to perform immediately upon his arrival in Ottawa with little or no training. In addition, the pressure of developing events -- the aftermath of the Naval Bill controversy, the start of the Great War, and the manifold problems of coping with a neutral America -- quickly rectified any deficiencies Christie might have had in his knowledge of the workings of international politics and, although to a much lesser extent, domestic politics as well. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, Christie's close personal relationship with Borden provided him with the opportunity to work very close to the center of power and to learn to be comfortable and self-confident in that environment.⁵⁷ At the end of 1916, therefore,

Christie was well prepared to assist Borden in his forthcoming efforts to build a stronger international identity for Canada within the confines of the British Empire.

Chapter II: Notes

- 1.) C.P. Stacey. Canada and the Age of Conflict, Volume I: 1867-1921. Toronto: Macmillan Company, Ltd., 1977, p. 167.
- 2.) S.F. Wise. The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force, Volume I: Canadian Airmen and the First World War. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980, p. 37 and J.L. Granatstein. The Ottawa Men, op. cit., p. 65.
- 3.) R.C. Brown. Robert Laird Borden, A Biography. Volume II: 1914-1937. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1980, p. 6.
- 4.) Gaddis Smith, "Canadian External Affairs During World War One," in H.L. Keenleyside, (ed.). The Growth of Canadian Policies in External Affairs. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1960, pp. 47-48.
- 5.) PAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Reel C-2410, pp. 8298-8299, A. Mitchell Innes to R.L. Borden, 18 June 1912.
- 6.) Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 6 October 1913.
- 7.) Chritie's regard for Borden, and the latter's for Christie, is obvious in their long and detailed correspondence. This mutual affection continued long after the two men had parted company intellectually over such matters as Imperial organization and the content of Canadian external policy. As Colonel Stacey has noted, Christie "seems to have never lost his regard for Borden or his respect for his judgment." See C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, Vol. I: 1867-1921, op. cit., p. 168.
- 8.) Gaddis Smith has noted that Christie was deluged with work once war was declared. "It was Christie," Smith wrote, "who analyzed messages from abroad, who drew up key memorandums, and drafted the cables that often set the tone and pattern of Canadian policy. Except for Borden no one played a larger part in external affairs.... It is difficult to give him too much credit." See Gaddis Smith, "Canadian External Policies During World War One," op. cit., pp. 47-48.
- 9.) For good discussions of the Naval Bill controversy see Ramsay Cook. The Politics of J.W. Dafoe and the Free Press. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963, pp. 56-65, and especially RC. Brown, Robert Laird Borden. A Biography, Volume I, op. cit., pp. 142-169 and 235-243.
- 10.) For Borden's plans after his Naval Bill was defeated by the Senate see C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, Volume I: 1867-1921, op. cit., pp. 159-161. For the Christie memorandum referred to here see PAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Volume 126, p.

67877, L.C. Christie, Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 10 December 1913.

- 11.) Ibid., p. 67875. "If this view be correct," Christie wrote, "it follows that in assuming control of foreign affairs, Canadians will either commit their country to final separation from the Empire or to becoming an organic part of it. The construction of armaments cannot be effected without approaching nearer to the alternatives of independence or a federal union of the self-governing dominions with Britain." Ibid.
- 12.) Ibid.
- 13.) Christie agreed with Borden that an effort to immediately create a creditable Canadian navy would be, in the short term, an exercise in futility. He argued that a Canadian navy was not Canadian until it was manned by Canadians and that there was no way to do that in time to meet the emergency described to the Prime Minister by the Admiralty. The only realistic approach to the problem was to make a financial contribution to the Royal Navy and then undertake the necessarily time consuming process of building a Canadian naval force as "no one wants to see everything centralized in Britain." Later, during the Great War, Christie adopted the same attitude toward proposals for the creation of a Canadian air force. In May 1916, he argued that there were no experienced Canadian officers to train or command a Canadian air force and that to insist on the formation of such a force would place an unnecessary drain on the resources of Britain's Royal Flying Corps (RFC). He held that the best contribution Canada could make to the aerial war effort was to continue to assist the RFC recruit in Canada. In regard to both the naval and air services, Christie's attitude seems to have been as much nationalist and pragmatic as it was imperialist. He clearly saw the desirability of Canada possessing the two services autonomously, but, at the same time, he believed that a drive to create them at once would amount to nothing more than a grandstand effort made more in the name of simply waving the flag than for military effectiveness. Christie's nationalism was strong but never jingoistic, and it was never applied without reflection. See Ibid., p. 67878, and S.F. Wise, The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 38 and 591.
- 14) PAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Volume 6, p. 67877, L.C. Christie, Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 10 December 1913.
- 15.) Ibid., p. 67875A.
- 16.) Ibid.
- 17.) Ibid., pp. 67875A-67880.
- 18.) In a 1935 letter to Lord Lothian Christie provides an evocative glimpse of diplomatic life in Ottawa in the months

before the war. "I hope you are well and thriving," Christie wrote.

"Your interviews with Hitler must have been interesting. I wonder if you met his man von Ribbentrop. I used to know him when he was in Ottawa for the year or two before the war -- in fact, I once took some money out of him throwing dice and later flattered myself that it came from the Kaiser's pocket. He was an agreeable young chap who used to play tennis and skate with the rest of us and became a favourite at Rideau Hall where he would play the violin to the Duchess of Connaught and the Princess Pat and also please the Duchess by talking German to her. Probably he was one of the lads who told Berlin that the Dominions wouldn't fight. He beat the Dominion police to it by an hour and got over the frontier to Buffalo. I well remember the day -- Saturday August 1, 1914 -- as I think some of us were going to play tennis with him but the pro told us he had cleaned out his locker in the morning in a great hurry and had left...."

See PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 12, Folder 40, p. 11565, L.C. Christie to Loerd Lothian 30 May 1935.,

19.) L.C. Christie, Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 19 August 1914, quoted in R.C. Brown, Robert Laird Borden, A Biography, Vol. II., op. cit., p. 10.

20.) Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 11 November 1914.

21.) Robert Bothwell, "Loring Christie and the Failure of Bureaucratic Imperialism, 1910-1926," Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University, 1972, p. 44 (hereafter "Bureaucratic Imperialism"). In regard to his official connection with the Round Table Movement, Carroll Quigley has written that Christie "was one of the leaders of the Round Table Movement in all three countries [Great Britain, Canada, and the United States] for almost thirty years...." Quigley's assertion seems to be a bit wide of the mark. It is true that he was connected with the movement in one way or another for nearly thirty years, having probably been induced to join it by Eustace Percy when both men were serving in Washington during 1910-1913, but Christie probably could only be counted among the leaders of the Movement between the publication of his first article in the Round Table in March, 1915 and his parting company with the journal's editorial board in the spring of 1926. See Carroll Quigley, "The Round Table Groups in Canada, 1908-1938," Canadian Historical Review, XLIII, 3, (September, 1962), pp. 205-244. For Christie's first Round Table article see (Loring Christie and Eustace Percy,) "The Dominions and the Settlement. A Plea for Conference," Round Table, No. 12, (March, 1915), pp. 325-344. For Christie's less than amicable departure from the Round Table's editorial board

see PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 26, Folder 106, pp. 23751-23763, Loring Christie to Philip Kerr, 14 March 1926 and PAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Volume 264, Folder 59, pp. 148319-148321, Philip Kerr to Loring Christie, 22 March 1926. Christie's last formal discussions with the Round Table group appear to have taken place while he was in England for the Imperial Conference of 1937. During that event he and other prominent Round Tablers spent a weekend of conversation at Blickling, Lord Lothian's country home. Earlier Christie had also sent Lothian, in May, 1935, a copy of the address he had made at the Canadian Institute of International Affairs annual meeting in Kingston, Ontario. In the covering letter, Christie said he would not mind if Lothian circulated the address among members of the Round Table or the Royal Institute of International Affairs for comment and debate. Lothian distributed it to the Round Table's editors. See L.C. Christie to Lord Lothian, 30 May 1935, op. cit., and Edinburgh, Scottish Record Office, GD 40/17/300, Lothian to L.C. Christie, 28 June 1935.

22.) PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 2, Folder 3, pp. 1198-1209, L.C. Christie to C.A. Magrath, 1 March 1915. Although Christie did not define what he meant by "organic union," it is very doubtful that he had any scheme in mind that would have submerged Canadian nationality within a more centralized or federated imperial structure. Professor Kendle's description of the dominant sentiment of dominion Round Tablers toward closer imperial cooperation can also be taken as a good estimation of the position from which Christie was approaching the imperial problem in the first years of the Great War.

"One important point should be made about the dominion members of the Round Table Movement, especially the Canadians; most of them, while committed to the pan-Britannic ideal, were deeply concerned with the status of the dominions. All had a strong belief in the role Great Britain could play in the world, but even more they realized that the dominions had to be given the opportunity to voice their opinions in the inner councils of the Empire. ... it would be wrong to assume that the dominion members of the movement were arrogant imperialists interested in nothing but the strengthened power and unity of the race."

The sentiment and outlook described here by Professor Kendle were those that Christie would later bring to bear in the Canadian contribution to the drafting of Resolution IX of the Imperial War Conference of 1917. See John Kendle. The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975, pp. 103-104.

23.) During the naval debate Christie also had tempered his discussion of the Empire's future and Canada's place in it with a realistic assessment of the immediate cause of the crisis. "The

real emergency," he wrote, "arises out of the fact that till recently Britain was the only industrialized and really wealthy country in Europe. Europe has now become industrialized, especially Germany, and the financial superiority of Britain is fast vanishing, and with it her ability to maintain the margin of safety. The naval emergency is a pressure steadily increasing and more rapidly than the British power to resist it." See PAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Volume 126, pp.67877-67879, L.C. Christie. Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 10 December 1913.

24.) See PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 2, Folder 3, pp. 1198-1209, L.C. Christie to C.A. Magrath, 1 March 1915 and (L.C. Christie and Eustace Percy), "The Dominions and the Settlement. A Plea for Conference," Round Table, No. 12, (March, 1915), pp. 341-342. Christie and Percy went on to stress that the mechanism rather than its formal name was what was important. "What is essential, therefore," they wrote, "is that direct personal consultation should be provided for some time this year, before peace negotiations are entered upon. If this be done, it matters little in what particular month Ministers meet, or whether this meeting be regarded as a formal meeting of the Imperial Conference. The Imperial Conference is now the established method of inter-Imperial deliberation, and it is usually better to use the established routine than to depart from it; but the principle of direct consultation is the vital thing, and the name is of no consequence provided that it stands for a personal exchange of views before peace is negotiated." In stressing the value of the Imperial Conference as an institution that had legitimacy in the eyes of the British peoples, Christie was returning to a position he had taken during the Naval Bill controversy in 1913. At that time Christie had told Borden that whether the future naval defence of the Empire was to be handled by an Imperial navy or by the Royal Navy and the individual navies of the four self-governing dominions was a question "which ought to be thoroughly discussed in the Imperial Conference before committing action is taken." See Ibid., pp. 341-342 and PAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Volume 126, p. 67878, L.C. Christie, Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 10 December 1913.

25.) PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 2, Folder 3, pp. 1198-1209, L.C. Christie to C.A. Magrath, 1 March 1915. In regard to captured territories, Christie also told Magrath that, speaking realistically, the Empire might prove ungovernable if it was augmented by large territorial acquisitions. The desires of the Australians and the South Africans, desires he described as bordering on "obsessions," Christie wrote, "must inevitably cut squarely across the course dictated by broader Imperial interests. Great Britain -- the British Commonwealth, if you like -- from its own immediate viewpoint does not want more territory: it has in all conscience burden and responsibility enough already." See Ibid.

26.) Robert Bothwell, "Bureaucratic Imperialism," op. cit., p. 5.

27.) In the 1913-1916 period Christie's "sense of nation" surfaced again and again in the documents he wrote and the opinions he offered on both domestic and international relations. On the whole, both were aimed at strengthening Canada's central government so as to enable it to successfully promote the development of the nation and to protect its viability as an entity in the international arena. Christie's arguments were based on the concept of parliamentary supremacy which he saw as the primary factor allowing Ottawa to control national development. In response to an article by Professor James Mavor in the Financial Post for 15 July 1916 in which he argued that the legislature of Ontario could not change an agreement earlier concluded with private sector companies for the development of power at Niagara Falls, Christie argued that such a finding ran counter to British constitutional practice.

"In other words it is simply and baldly contended [by Mavor] that a government of legislature in Canada has the power, by agreement with private interests, irrevocably to bind itself and its successors to refrain from the exercise of undoubtedly what could otherwise be assumed as a governmental function and what indeed, by reason of changing conditions, became a governmental duty imposed by clear considerations of public policy.

At this time and stage in development of British institutions and conceptions of state, such a case merely needs to be stated to show its impossible character. It might as well be suggested that the Government of Canada, through a clause in the Charter of the Canadian Pacific Railway Company, could tie the hands of itself and its successors in such a way that there could be no Government-owned or operated railway in Canada."

Viewing parliamentary supremacy as an irrevocable facet of British constitutionalism, Christie went on to assert that the federal parliament was supreme over those of the provinces in those areas defined as its exclusive venue by the British North America Act. What was more, he argued, "a question prima facie falling within one of the enumerated powers of the Provincial Governments may and frequently does ... have another aspect touching the relations between the Dominion and a foreign nation." When this occurred, Christie wrote, the federal concern became paramount.

"The real truth behind the form is that the question is then in fact of vital concern to the Dominion -- nothing more so -- however much it may seem to the Provincial officers a merely local affair. That being so, the spirit of the British North America Act as well as the public interest would be best served by admitting that the Dominion Government has a

jurisdiction in the case. ... So far, it is true, no great crises of this sort have arisen; possibly the matter is a question of emphasis rather than anything else; but from the view point of the future relations with foreign nations it is submitted that the emphasis should be in the direction here indicated and not in that of a blank non possumus."

Christie's views in the period are undeviatingly those of a centralist and a nationalist and to imagine that he would have been willing to submerge Canada's individual identity within an "imperial federation" seems somewhat far-fetched.

Likewise, Christie also was cognizant of the threat posed by the proximity and economic, political, and cultural power of the United States to the survival of the Canadian nation. In this regard, Christie, in a memorandum he prepared for Borden in 1916, foreshadowed some of the arguments made by more recent Canadian nationalists. "Canada has to depend," he wrote,

"to a very large extent upon American agencies for her foreign and Imperial news. It may be putting it too strongly to say that the Associated Press, for instance colours its cables, but it is certainly true to say that in its selection of matter to be cabled it is the business of the A.P. to think of the American public and there must often be, all unconsciously perhaps, a certain tendency to write and phrase what is cabled with an eye to its effect on the peculiar American public. The result is, so far as Canada is concerned, that much is omitted in which we would be greatly interested, while what is included is written from a viewpoint in which we are not heartily concerned. This has been frequently noticeable during the war....

In short, it may not be going too far to say that a policy of east and west news is as vitally important to the national welfare and spirit of the Dominion as the policy of 'east and west' trade; and a similar principle would hold true for the whole British Commonwealth."

For the above see PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Reel C-3877, p. 1841, L.C. Christie, Memorandum on "An Act Requesting the Public Development of Water Power in the Vicinity of Niagara Falls," Ont. Stat., 6 George V, c. 20, 1 August 1916; PAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Reel C-4242, pp. 27233-27234, L.C. Christie, Memorandum, 11 March 1916; and, Ibid., Reel C-4369, pp. 86606-86607, L.C. Christie, A Suggestion for the Imperial Conference, 10 January 1916.

28.) Robert Bothwell, "Bureaucratic Imperialism," op. cit., p.59.

29.) Ibid., p.62.

30.) Christie indeed seem to have considered a quiet and behind-the-scenes role for Canada in Anglo-American affairs; one which would come into play in instances where Canada's greater experience in coping with American sensitivities might smooth the course of the North Atlantic relationship. Such was the case in early 1915 when Christie suggested to Borden that Canada might help to temper British press criticism of the American response to London's conduct of the economic side of the war. "A section of the English press," Christie wrote,

"notably the Northcliffe papers, have taken a very provocative attitude over the American Note and policy in the matter of search and seizure, etc. It seems foolhardy and not very nice business. If anything is calculated to cause trouble it is just such an attitude. The Americans -- in a sense like the Germans -- are over truculent in foreign relations; they are -- like the Germans -- a comparatively new member of the family and perhaps apt to be sensitive in thinking their voice is not seriously enough listened to. It cannot do the slightest good to meet them on their own level; it might do vast harm. And we are most likely to retain our own self-respect if we go ahead with our programme with as little talking as possible -- our moral position will take care of itself, and in its own good time their moral position will work out its own results.

I have broken loose at this length because I think that Canada might well speak a remonstrance to the English papers referred to -- we understand the States better and we are at least equally interested in the matter...."

Christie's suggestion in this instance seems well within the realm of feasibility and smacks not at all of the grandiose. See PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 2, Folder 3, p. 1171, L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 26 January 1915.

31.) PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 2, Folder 5, pp. 1741-1747, L.C. Christie, Memorandum for the Prime Minister, January, 1916.

32.) Ibid.

33.) Ibid

34.) Ibid.

35.) Ibid.

36.) PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 2, Folder 5, pp. 1726-1729, L.C. Christie, Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 27 January 1916.

37.) PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 2, Folder 5, pp. 1741-1747, L.C. Christie, Memorandum, January, 1916.

38.) Ibid. In making this suggestion to Borden, Christie was not urging special considerations for or concessions to the United States; indeed, he warned the Prime Minister that the Allies should steadfastly resist such a course of action. "Nothing should be done, it is assumed," Christie wrote,

"to make the Americans think they are to have some sort of voice, irresponsible but influential, in terms of peace and the future generally. Nothing should be done to pander to what seems to be their appetite for dealing in mere words that carry with them a very rudimentary sense of responsibility. Germany has taken this course with them, and so far with success, but it will do no good in the end. It probably would be difficult enough to meet the case and at the same time guard us against committing ourselves to vital concerns. It would have to be coupled with a clear intimation to the United States that they must be prepared to confer, if at all, only with a complete sense of responsibility for the result and its enforcement. They would have to understand that they must accept some responsibility for the preservation in the world of conditions under which people can live securely and fully."

See PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 2, Folder 5, p. 1727, L.C. Christie, Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 27 January 1916.

39.) Robert Bothwell, "Bureaucratic Imperialism," op. cit., p. 62.

40.) Ibid., p.53.

41.) Ibid., p.56. After his return from Washington in early February, 1916, Christie had the opportunity to repay Stimson for the information the latter had given him on American attitudes toward the war. At Stimson's request, Christie forwarded him from Ottawa information on the "Australian Universal Military Training Act" and the debate over conscription that had occurred in the Australian parliament. Christie's receptivity to Stimson's request probably helped to solidify for Canada a fairly high level channel of information with the foreign policy community in the United States -- a channel which became possible in the first place because of Christie's professional and personal relationships with Stimson. For the correspondence on this matter see Yale University Library, H.L. Stimson Papers, Box 54, L.C. Christie to H.L. Stimson, 4 February 1916; H.L. Stimson to L.C. Christie, 7 February 1916; H.L. Stimson to L.C. Christie, 21 February 1916; L.C. Christie to H.L. Stimson, 24 February 1916; and, H.L. Stimson to L.C. Christie, 26 February 1916.

42.) Gaddis Smith, "Canadian External Affairs During World War One," op. cit., pp. 50-51.

43.) In several letters to Felix Frankfurter and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. early in 1915, Christie indicated that he had, at times, been aggravated by President Wilson's public assertions that the war had nothing to do with the United States but added that he "knew" that there was a difference between what the president publicly said, for political purposes, and what he personally believed. "I suppose you hear from people," Christie wrote,

"about what the U.S. should or should not do. My silence -- if you have thought about it at all -- has not been dishonest. I have heard from people that the Administration has not inspired great sympathy. I do not know clearly what else they could have done. I know enough of the States I think to understand some forces that are at work and are making for the Administration an enormously difficult task; I think I understand the Head of the Administration [Wilson] well enough to weigh what he has said at times -- to take him personally into consideration for instance when he speaks of 'a war with which we have nothing to do, whose causes cannot touch us'... and discount that by looking at the fact that you have something to do with the war -- are profoundly moved by it -- are human like the rest of us -- have given, so many of you, such splendid voice to what in it has moved you"

In March, Christie wrote to Justice Holmes in the same vein.

"And will you let me wish your country well in the perplexities that are being thrust on it. It seems an utterly thankless business being in your predicament. Heaven knows you must be anxious enough to find the right thing to do and say, and yet we all of us, who are professing that we are so devoted to the right thing that no sacrifice is enough for it, seem to have no patience with your anxiety for it. It seems you have to be for us and nothing else. Well I can only wish you well and hope that if we are to learn anything from it all, you too may -- I do not see how one friend could dare say more to another and I think what more has been said in some quarters will be regretted.... And I do know that the private voice of your country has said that you may have something to do with it. I have faith that you will make a good guess at the way out."

See Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C.Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 22 February and Harvard Law School Library, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Papers, Box 41, File 12, L.C. Christie to O.W. Holmes, Jr., 6 March 1915.

44.) Gaddis Smith, "Canadian External Affairs During World War One," op. cit., p.51.

45.) PAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Volume 231-232, pt. 2, File 2037 (2) (A), pp. 129499-129505, L.C. Christie, Memo on the Panama Canal Tolls, 12 June 1913.

46.) Ibid.

47.) Robert Bothwell, "Bureaucratic Imperialism," op. cit., pp. 59-61. In what should have been a golden opportunity to give full vent to the "criteria" Professor Bothwell describes, Christie was curiously muted and instead chose to let the deed he was writing of speak for itself. In Sir Robert Borden's Papers there is an item dated 28 December 1916 that is entitled "Press Release" and which apparently was prepared by Christie, although his name is nowhere on it. The piece discusses the sinking of the Lusitania and the German reaction to it in an understated but quite effective fashion.

"A replica of the iron coin or medal struck and distributed in Germany to commemorate the sinking of the Lusitania has been received in Ottawa. In spite of the strenuous care taken to prevent any of these infamous medals leaving Germany one at last recently reached England and a private committee was formed to manufacture and distribute exact replicas. Any profits resulting from the sale will be handed to the Red Cross.

The medal has been struck in Germany with the object of keeping alive in German hearts the recollection of the glorious achievement of the German Navy in deliberately destroying an unarmed passenger ship, together with 1,198 non-combatants, men, women, and children.

On the obverse, under the legend "No Contraband" (Keine Bannware), there is a representation of the Lusitania sinking. The designer has put in guns and aeroplanes, which (as was certified by United States Government officials after inspection) the Lusitania did not carry, but has conveniently omitted to put in the women and children, which the world knows she did carry.

On the reverse, under the legend "Business above all" (Geschäft Über Alles), the figure of death sits at the booking offices of the Cunard Line and gives out tickets to passengers who refuse to attend the warning against submarines given by a German. The picture apparently seeks to propound the theory that if a murderer warns his victims of his intention, the guilt of the crime will rest with the victim, not with the murderer.

The Lusitania, it will be recalled, was sunk on May 5th, 1915. A typical comment in German newspapers was that in the Kolnische Volkszeitung of May 10th, 1915, which said "With joyful pride we contemplate the latest deed of our Navy."

When Christie fails to give full rein to his "moralistic criteria" in the foregoing example, perhaps it was because his view was a bit more complex than Professor Bothwell has suggested. See PAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Reel C-4230, p. 15187, (L.C. Christie?), Press Release, 28 December 1916.

48.) L.C. Christie to O.W. Holmes, Jr, 6 March 1915, op. cit.

49.) Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 10 September 1914. In a letter to Frankfurter, Christie's fiancée also testified to his intense dissatisfaction with being left behind. "It has been disturbing Loring deeply," Jane Armstrong wrote, "to think that he stays while others go, and I know in many ways it is harder for him to remain here, but I begin to hope he is less troubled now. To those who know and appreciate his work, his duty is very plain and I believe he feels that himself now and is comforted." See Ibid., Jane Armstrong to Felix Frankfurter, 15 November 1914.

50.) Ibid., L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 3 May 1915.

51.) Ibid., L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 6 November 1916. Christie's personal torment was no doubt sharpened by the death of his wife's brother in France in the fall of 1916. See Ibid.

52.) Ibid., L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 3 May 1915.

53.) Ibid., L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 21 December 1915.

54.) Ibid.

55.) Ibid., L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 10 April 1916.

56.) Ibid., L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 22 February 1915. Shortly after writing this letter, Christie told Magrath that the Commonwealth would not develop as the result of employing political theory, but, rather, for the Commonwealth "the price of progress and liberty and peaceful decent living -- to put our aims no higher -- is sacrifice." Christie wrote that "unless somehow with these things in our hearts we can come together willing to make the mutual sacrifices and surrenders needed for the greater end -- unless somehow we can find such strength the future holds nothing but ever growing frictions, conflicting necessities, and estranging sympathies ending all to surely in disillusionment and separation." See L.C. Christie to C.A. Magrath, 1 March 1915, op. cit.

57.) In this regard, Professor Lower has written, "I remember particularly how he [Christie] impressed me as being at home in the great world. He might be Mr. Meighen's subordinate, but his letters to him began 'My Dear Meighen.' 'This fellow Roosevelt,' he once said to me, 'has been back-seat driving all over the world.' This quality of independent, objective appraisal, without respect to personal magnitudes, was one of his major traits. It, and the clear-sighted, wide-ranging world view which it informed, was seldom found in Canada in those days." See A.R.M. Lower, "Loring Christie and the Genesis of the Washington Conference, 1921-1922, op. cit., pp. 40-41.

Chapter III: Taking Advantage of the Wartime Opportunity:
Acquiring International Status, 1917-1920

Colonel C.P. Stacey has written that a major theme of Loring Christie's life and career involved a "struggle to find some institutional solution for the Canadian dilemma" of ill-defined nationality -- that is, to find some means through which Canada could clearly, and in precise legal terms, define her status as an independent international entity.¹ Although Christie placed great stock on the need to formally revise the Anglo-Canadian constitutional relationship, his efforts are misunderstood if they are seen as a one-dimensional quest toward a single, culminating act, such as the "formal act of separation" or "constitutional convention or conference" mentioned by Colonel Stacey.² Christie did not believe that constitutional change in itself was enough to provide Canada with unique international status. Gradual increases in the country's diplomatic representation abroad and active participation in international organizations were, for example, indispensable, status-enhancing complements to constitutional change. Colonel Stacey's identification of the legalistic nature of Christie's approach to resolving the "Canadian dilemma" is accurate, but it is only one aspect of his approach to the problem. Christie's "struggle," in other words, was indeed a striving toward a well-defined legal solution to the problem of status, but it was also a process of working with the world as it was and trying to move Canada along a path that had, of necessity, to be largely of its own making.

During the period between 1917 and Arthur Meighen's

assumption of the prime ministership on 10 July 1920, Christie worked toward gaining recognition for Canadian sovereignty by seeking roles for Canada which provided the highest possible level of international exposure and which were emblematic of a nation responsible for the conduct of its own external affairs. In this on-going effort, international organizations were of crucial importance. Three of these organizations were particularly useful to Christie's plans for advancing Canada's national interests. First, Christie sought to achieve enhanced autonomy for Canada within the imperial framework. Progress in this direction would be marked most clearly by the formalization -- under the auspices of an imperial constitutional conference -- of the constitutional advances recognized by Resolution IX of the Imperial War Conference of 1917. Second, Christie believed that in the immediate postwar years the League of Nations could provide Canada with a much-needed international arena in which to undertake its first external activities outside of the imperial context. Third, and perhaps most important, Christie sought to establish for Canada a diplomatic relationship with the United States. Such a relationship with the Americans, he believed, would give Ottawa a bigger role in the imperial system -- i.e., as an interlocuter between London and Washington -- and, at the same time, would gain international recognition for Canada's autonomy and allow Ottawa to secure unfettered control over its most extensive and important set of bilateral relations. As will be seen, Christie's program was an innovative effort designed to enhance and institutionalize Canada's status as, in the words of

one of his more famous memorandums, an "international person."³

Grounds for Asserting Status: Military Effort and Legal Precedent

The question of Canada's status within the imperial system was, of course, the matter of most immediate concern to Christie in this period because it was within the framework of the Empire that Canada would have to establish its unique international identity before it could make any claim on the attention and respect of the other nations of the world. He believed that one of the major ways in which Canada could carve out this enhanced status within the Empire was by making an immense military contribution to the Allied war effort. During the conscription election in December, 1917, for example, Christie argued that a victory for the Unionist Party would once and for all insure the continuation of Canada's massive military role in the war and thereby help to validate its claim to a distinct international identity. Christie saw the election of 1917 as a conscious move toward national maturity, one that, even though it threatened French-English unity in Canada, was necessary because "principles were more vital than unity" and only full national support on "the supreme, fundamental issue of conscription" would permit the government to follow "the just national ideal and duty of active, vigorous prosecution of the war."⁴

In support of the Unionist position, Christie apparently wrote an editorial essay -- which was published unsigned in the Montreal Gazette -- justifying the resort to conscription. The article was a blunt assertion that to oppose the sending of

forces, and the establishment of the system of conscription that was necessary to maintain them, was to deny Canadian nationality and to reject the vision of the Canadian nation with which "the fathers of Confederation framed our constitution."

In essence, of course, the Canadian who advances the contention [that the Government cannot send troops abroad] is engaged in nothing less than the degradation of our national status. Whatever designs he might have for the future, his action at present constitutes a shameful and undignified abasement. The real effect of the contention is to relegate Canada to the mere status of a subordinate colony, or dependent possession having no individuality, no will or power apart from that of its master or owner, no national consciousness, no concern with the outside world, no responsibility, and consequently having neither reason for self-respect nor claim to the respect of others.

Canada is not a colony; she is mistress of her own destiny. Canada is not a possession; the Canadian people and no one else are the owners of Canada, with all the powers of disposition which that conception involves. Canada has a separate individuality, a will and a power of her own, a self respecting national consciousness -- all manifested in a determination to recognize and shoulder her responsibility in the affairs of the world as a member of the family of nations that constitute the British Commonwealth.⁵

In addition to the part played by the Canadian forces in the overall Imperial war effort and their resulting contribution to Canada's evolving international status, Christie saw Canada's war effort as an opportunity to wrest some degree of military control away from Britain and to begin building a military organization oriented toward the defense requirements of Canada. Christie felt that the naval service was a particular case in point and argued that wartime experiences had demonstrated the necessity of establishing a more uniquely Canadian navy. "It is a striking fact," Christie wrote just before the end of the war,

that throughout the whole discussion of the question of a Canadian coastal patrol there is nothing to show that the naval staff in Ottawa ever once had a policy or opinion.

Whenever anything serious was afoot the opinion of the Admiralty was sought and followed; and it seems never to have occurred to the naval staff here to subject the Admiralty opinion to any test or examination. This in turn lends significance to two other impressions that stand out from the correspondence: (1.) that successive senior naval officers stationed by the Admiralty at Halifax seemed always to be in advance of the Admiralty opinion as to the measures necessary for our local defense, and (2.) that the Admiralty consistently discouraged every impulse on the part of the Canadian Government to undertake here the construction of naval craft, such as light cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, for use in either Canadian waters or elsewhere.⁶

Christie went on to say that Canada's naval service was in need of a "radical reorganization" which should be aimed at establishing in Ottawa "a naval staff of the most capable and experienced naval men available" so that the "Government should have immediate access to naval advisers in whom it may feel confidence." For Christie, the British Admiralty was simply "too far away from the Canadian Government" and therefore it was incumbent upon Ottawa to "fortify the policy of a distinctive Canadian Navy."⁷

In sum, Canada's military involvement in the Great War was for Christie an indispensable component of its development toward sovereignty. In the first instance, the sheer size and cost of the contribution forced the directors of British policy, however reluctantly, to afford Ottawa's views some notice within their deliberations. Secondly, the experience of raising, equipping, training, and maintaining Canada's armed forces at home and abroad provided the occasion for the creation of a bureaucratic organization and expertise aimed directly at dealing with foreign nations that had not existed in Canada before the war.⁸ For Christie, the military effort was an essential prerequisite -- an

anteing up, as it were -- to get Ottawa to the diplomatic tables at London, and eventually to those at the postwar peace conference, where additional recognition of Canada's unique international status might be obtained.

If a massive military contribution paved the way for the recognition of Canada's unique international status, Christie did not believe that it was enough, in and of itself, to resolve the question of status in its favor permanently. During the 1917-1920 period, Christie appears to have seen his job as Legal Adviser as being one which complemented Canada's war effort in a two-fold manner. First, it was up to him to draft a strong legal brief establishing the possibility and desirability of developing Canada's national status within the imperial system upon which Prime Minister Borden could base his firm but sometimes vague notions in that direction. Second, after creating this legal justification for his superiors, it was incumbent on him to assist -- and sometimes to lead and/or push -- them to make the legal potential an actuality by participating in international affairs and institutions at the highest level and to the most effective extent possible. In the period between 1917 and 1920 Christie concentrated on making Canada's presence felt and recognized in the proceedings of the Imperial War Conference, the Imperial War Cabinet, the British Empire Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, and the League of Nations. He also pushed relentlessly after the war for the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with the United States.

Underlying Christie's basic legal argument in favor of

status was his belief that by the time the Great War began Canada already had developed all of the attributes of a sovereign state, but that they remained latent because Ottawa had never chosen to assert them. In his opinion, all that remained to be done to make these latent properties real was to exercise that right of legation by sending a Canadian diplomatic envoy to a foreign power. Christie maintained that much of Canada's problem in regard to having its unique international status recognized resulted from the arcane definitions of the word "sovereign" that had been formulated by the various authorities on international law. He argued that despite these complex definitions there was "no magic in the word sovereign or, if there is, there is no inherent reason why a portion of the wand may not be waved over Canada if such a proceeding would help to save the proprieties."⁹ Leaving the formalities aside, Christie said that, in essence, sovereignty was Canada's for the taking.

As [the international law scholar L.F.L.] Oppenheim says, on the point whether part-Sovereign member-States of a Federal State have the right of Legation, "It is the constitution of the Federal State which regulates the point." The British Commonwealth may not accurately be described as a "Federal State"; though indeed in some respects it seems to be approaching more closely to Oppenheim's description of what he calls "Confederated States", that is, a linking of a number of full-sovereign States for the maintenance of their external and internal independence -- an analogy, be it noted, which makes the case for the right of Legation on the part of the member States even stronger. But in any case it is unnecessary to settle exactly what the British Commonwealth is; the status of the members of it and the question as to their right of legation is purely a matter of internal arrangements among themselves. It is enough to say that there is abundant precedent ... and that there is no objection on the ground of international legal principle to the recognition of Canada as having the right of legation. This would doubtless imply, as Oppenheim suggests, that Canada has become, "in some respects a sovereign State," and by this he presumably means what he

calls a "part-sovereign State."

Clearly, "if we look at the matter as it really stands", under British constitutional law or convention, Canada has grown beyond the status of a Colonial State as Oppenheim defines it. Today the Governor does not have the veto, nor is it true constitutionally as to Canada that "the Parliament of the mother-country could withdraw self-government from its Colonial States and legislate directly for them." The Dominion in reality quite satisfies the tests for a partial character of International Person: and she would assume the outward form of such an International Person by the act on her part of sending a diplomatic envoy to a foreign State. As already seen there is no international question involved in the decision whether Canada should assume such a status; it is purely a matter of constitutional development within the British Commonwealth. It is not until Canada takes such a step that International Law is concerned with her; once she has taken it she becomes a part-Sovereign State and an International person for some purposes. There would be no lack of precedent in International Law for dealing with her.¹⁰

Christie believed that Resolution IX of the Imperial War Conference of 1917 had given the Dominions' autonomy sufficient recognition -- at least until a formal constitutional conference could be convened to codify wartime developments -- and that the necessary "act" mentioned in his above exposition on the right of legation was fulfilled, in part, by Canada's participation in the Paris Peace Conference.¹¹ In a long memorandum for Borden, Christie reiterated his belief that for "a good many years Canada has been in a position, should the occasion warrant it or should she so desire, to affirm herself definitely as an international person or entity."¹² He noted that before the war Canada had not been lacking in "direct international relationships" but that they had been mostly economic in nature and their "political or constitutional implications had not been expressly defined."¹³ Canada's participation in the Paris Peace Conference, however, was not an activity that was similarly lacking in specific

implications and importance. "The settlement of the results of the war," Christie wrote,

provided the first occasion on which Canada became conscious that she was directly and vitally concerned in a world political conference. The occasion was met and Canada through her representatives has definitely declared herself as in some degree an international person. Representatives of the Canadian Government sat at the peace table with those of other countries; they presented their full powers and signed in the same way; Canada becomes a member of the League of Nations and the International Labour Organization on the same footing as the others. In all this the Dominion has appeared directly, in person not through another; in everything that met the eye, in the method in which they appeared and entered into relationships, contractual or otherwise, in fact in all their functioning, the Canadian representatives were nearly indistinguishable from the other international representatives present. All of this is unmistakable evidence of a new position in the world definitely assumed.¹⁴

In sum, then, by the conclusion of the Paris Peace Conference, Christie was arguing that Canada was well on the way to establishing itself as an autonomous member of the international community¹⁵ and he was eager to push that process to completion as quickly as prudence permitted.

Sorting Out Imperial Relations: The Case for a Postwar Constitutional Conference

Christie continued to envision Canada as part of the Empire, indeed as an integral part of the imperial system, but there is virtually no indication, outside of his sporadic sentimental and moralizing moments, that he pictured the Canadian role as anything even remotely resembling participation in an imperial federation. Quite to the contrary, Christie's attitudes toward Canada's participation in the League of Nations and the conduct of its bilateral relations with the United States seem to

indicate that his thinking was directed much more toward strengthening the individual identity of the Canadian nation rather than toward the federation of the Empire. Christie wrote of the Empire and Canada's place in it as a process of national development whereby the new constitutional relationships between Britain and the Dominions -- together with the distinct international status of each Dominion -- that had emerged as a consequence of the war would be defined and made intelligible to the world.

What this [the new status of Canada and the other Dominions after Paris] will ultimately mean in its relation to the British Commonwealth lies in the realm of speculation. But as it stands at present the British Commonwealth has clearly become before the world something different from what it was. For our own purposes we had regarded ourselves as made up of distinct political units; but we had not made that clear in our relations with others. Now we have done so; the Dominions have asserted a sovereign status of some sort and for some purposes have entered the Family of Nations. There were at Paris, and will be, anomalies; but the history of international law and custom is itself full of anomalies; it is also not without material for guidance in considering what may be done with such an International Person, or combination of International Persons, however unprecedented, as the British Commonwealth has now definitely resolved itself into. ... The development has proceeded in the direction contemplated by the Resolution on the Constitution of the Empire [that is, Resolution IX] agreed to by the Imperial War Conference, 1917; it remains for the special Imperial Conference contemplated therein to deal with whatever further readjustments of the constitutional relationships of the Empire are necessary; and to suggest "effective arrangements for continuous consultation in all important matters of common Imperial concern, and for such necessary concerted action, founded on consultation, as the several Governments may determine."¹⁶

The Resolution to which Christie referred was the most important formal development in imperial affairs that had occurred during the war years. Resolution IX of the Imperial War Conference of 1917 bore witness to the conferees judgment

that the adjustment of the constitutional relations of the component parts of the Empire is too important and intricate a subject to deal with during the war, and that it should form the subject of a special Imperial Conference to be summoned as soon as possible after the cessation of hostilities.

They deem it their duty, however, to place on record their view that any such readjustment while preserving all existing powers of self-government and complete control of domestic affairs, should be based upon a full recognition of the Dominions as autonomous nations of the British Commonwealth, and India as an important portion of the same, should recognize the right of the Dominions and India to an adequate voice in foreign policy and foreign relations, and should provide effective arrangements for continuous consultation in all important matters of common Imperial concern, and for such necessary concerted action, founded on consultation, as the several Governments may determine.¹⁷

As has been noted, Christie considered that the autonomy of the Dominions had been a given even before Resolution IX was issued, but he was certainly pleased to have it reaffirmed formally by the Imperial Conference. The more important part of the resolution for Christie was its recognition of the need for an imperial constitutional conference. Such a conference, Christie thought, was needed to institutionalize the developments that had occurred in the imperial system during the war and to formulate methods and perhaps a minimal amount of machinery to facilitate "continuous consultation in all important matters of common Imperial concern" Christie had long seen the desirability of such a conference but also had thought that wartime exigencies precluded its meeting during the conflict. "It would be equally absurd to suggest," he had written with Eustace Percy in 1915,

that in this time of abnormal strain the Imperial Conference should meet to discuss any of the larger problems of Imperial partnership, such as naval co-operation or the control of foreign affairs, or a change in the constitutional relations

or machinery. It is quite true that the circumstances of the war have thrown new light upon the Imperial system as it stands; and probably the consciousness of this fact is responsible for the idea, put forward here and there, that the Imperial Conference should make haste to take the experience of war to heart. Well meant as the suggestion may be, it is clearly a mistaken one. Whether our machinery be perfect or not, it is at present set at racing speed. It will be time enough to overhaul it when the strain is relaxed and peace is attained.¹⁸

In Christie's view the war had provided what probably would be an opportunity of only brief duration for codifying and institutionalizing the constitutional changes that had occurred both before and during the war. He felt that the war had created an atmosphere in which the Dominions -- because of their massive commitments to the Empire's war effort -- and Great Britain -- because of its dire need for the men, money, and materials the Dominions were providing -- were both focused on imperial concerns and had shunted aside, at least for the moment, matters of a purely local or national concern. For Christie the momentary absence of narrowly focused concerns in Britain and the Dominions was the key to insuring that the wartime developments in the Dominions' status and in imperial relations generally were made permanent by integrating them into the constitution. To do this, however, speed was of the essence once the war was over. Christie feared that the end of hostilities would eliminate the sense of danger and urgency -- and with it the receptivity toward suggestions and plans for imperial co-operation and united action -- that had been generated by the demands of the war and that, as a consequence, Britain and the Dominions would lapse back into a near-exclusive focus on the local interests that had characterized the prewar era.¹⁹ "During the war there was plenty

of actual immediate business," Christie wrote to George Wrong in late 1919.

These were matters for the executive branch of the different Governments of the Empire; responsibility was continuously pressing on the ministers; the necessity for joint action was easily apparent. So that once the responsible heads [of government] got together in person agreement was easy; and since they were the responsible heads action followed as a matter of course.

I wonder whether in peace anything like this will obtain. There certainly will be foreign business and there ought to be more economic business. I have a feeling, though, that people are going to be recklessly absorbed in domestic business and impatient of anything else.²⁰

Christie's foreboding turned out to be well placed and after the Armistice local affairs again began to predominate in the United Kingdom and the Dominions. Even as early as the Paris Peace Conference Christie felt that the members of the Empire were being "swept on by currents" that they did not really control and were "inevitably converging on that - what? Haven or a sunken reef?"²¹ Christie said that he himself was not sure of the destination but -- after the tumultuous years of "the Peace Conference and the [International] Labour Conference and the Yankee mess [America's failure to join the League]" -- he was sure that the Empire needed some order imposed upon it through the codification of the changes wrought by the war and its aftermath.²² "Well, I am surer than ever . . .," he told Philip Kerr,

that we've got to tie the British Empire together as tightly as we can. There has been enough talk in the Dominions about their status etc. -- I don't mean it wasn't necessary; it probably was; but it has served its purpose, and it's now time to begin thinking like human beings, who live in a world where power and prestige still count. It's Canada's only escape from the unlovely miasma that's drifting up from the south.²³

Although Christie continued to view a constitutional conference as being essential to the longterm welfare of the Empire throughout the 1917-1920 period, he realized that interest in the project was waning in both Britain and the Dominions. Despite the obvious need for such a conference, he wrote to his friend George Brebner in the office of the South African prime minister that the Pacific Dominions seemed particularly uninterested. "But neither Dominion," he noted,

seemed to have much interest at all in the constitutional question on the problem of our status; the New Zealand debate consumed part of an afternoon and evening without any copies of the [Versailles] treaty being available, while in Australia the discussion centered around the Pacific islands and the claim that [Australian Prime Minister] Mr. [W.M.] Hughes had saved his country by incorporating in the Peace Treaty the policy of "White Australia."²⁴

Christie slowly came to resign himself to the reality that no early conference was possible. He never abandoned his belief, however, that it was, in the long run, the only way in which to insure the survival of the imperial system. "I gather there is no likelihood that the Conference can come this year [1920]," Christie concluded. "But I'm afraid we'll get recklessly absorbed in domestic affairs as to become more and more impatient of anything else, and I'd like to see something doing to keep the subject alive."²⁵

Christie believed that the Empire could be made into a effective international organization and considered a cooperative and consultative imperial foreign policy a realizable goal, but only after a constitutional conference had statutorily regularized the de facto constitutional changes that had occurred

during the war. He was not, however, prepared to see Canada sit by idly and wait for such a convention to convene and do its work. Participation in the affairs and the subsidiary organizations of the League of Nations and completing the formalization of diplomatic relations with the United States presented Canada with other opportunities to build upon and enhance its wartime gains in status by further developing its international personality -- in the eyes of Canadians as well as those of the world generally -- and Christie was eager for Ottawa to take up the challenge. By the time he again considered the plausibility of a constitutional conference -- in the period preceding the Imperial Conference of 1921 -- the opportunity for codifying wartime changes was fast slipping away and Canada was, in Christie's view, developing with increasing rapidity away from an imperial future in terms of both national self-consciousness and the dictates of its national interests.

Seizing an Opportunity: Canada and the League of Nations

Christie had few illusions about the League of Nations. Indeed, he probably valued it more as a forum in which Canada could strive for international recognition of its status as a nation, than as an organization likely to impose order and stability on a chaotic world. In the 1917-1920 period, Christie viewed Canada's membership in the League as a complement rather than as an alternative to its association with the British Empire. As has been noted, Christie quickly became frustrated with the unwillingness of Britain and the Dominions to regularize

their constitutional relationships and, while he was not yet ready to judge the postwar imperial system unworkable, he clearly responded to the Empire's inaction in this regard by beginning to cast about for other, more effective means through which Canada's international personality could be expressed. In this light, he believed that the League presented Ottawa with an opportunity to get in on the ground floor of a new international organization that -- unlike the Empire -- did not appear to be hamstrung by hoary tradition, unwritten agreements, and dated attitudes. The League, in other words, offered Canada a chance to demonstrate its individuality to the satisfaction of many of the world's nations and Christie recommended that the opportunity be exploited fully.

For Christie, the League of Nations was created quite simply because it was a political necessity to do so. "The principal Allied Governments have pledged themselves to it," he wrote, "and moreover, in view of public opinion in Europe it is inconceivable as a matter of practical politics that the Allied Statesman should come out of the Peace Conference without a League of Nations in their portfolios."²⁶ From its inception, therefore, Christie appears to have seen the League solely as a political instrument that was not a supra-national organization for enforcing the Versailles settlement through coercion, but rather was a method of diplomacy by conference designed "to prevent, or rather to diminish, the occasions for war...."²⁷ He believed that the League should divide the international problems with which it was concerned into two categories, justiciable and non-justiciable. The justiciable matters were a "minor matter for

which provision already exists in the shape of the Hague Tribunal and the now large number of arbitration treaties." Christie felt that all of these organizations should be placed under the control of the League and should be made to follow some of the patterns and policies -- such as physically visiting the sites of various disputes -- established by the International Joint Commission in North America.²⁸

The other, or non-justiciable, category of disputes Christie believed should be addressed and settled by the Council, the League's main body. He argued that this group should be composed of "the Prime Ministers of the Member States or their fully empowered delegates." He felt that in the organizing of the League this provision -- together with one requiring all League decisions to be unanimous -- was the "most vital point of all" and that without it "there can be no successful League of Nations." Christie believed that the experiences of the Supreme War Council and the Imperial War Cabinet during the late war had proven that only the heads of government could handle the non-justiciable matters effectively.²⁹ With the full participation of these responsible political leaders, Christie argued, the members of the League should agree "to go to war with any state who refused to admit a dispute to the investigation of the League in either of its branches [justiciable of non-justiciable]" but that there should be no agreement to enforce an award or report of the League by resort to warlike measures.³⁰

For Christie then, the League of Nations was an experiment in conference diplomacy that grew out of the wartime experiences

of the Allied governments and the governments of the Empire. He was convinced that no such approach to international relations could work effectively unless the responsible, elected heads of government or their representatives were directly and continuously involved. In this respect, he saw great similarities between the League and the Empire in that both required continuous consultation among the members at the highest political levels in order to insure their viability and survival. In this vein, Christie wrote that although the League had been designed to prevent wars "it can be scarcely said that that object is fulfilled by a machine that is only set in motion after the occasion has actually arisen or begun to arise." Continuous consultation -- "a definite agreement that the body should automatically convene at stated periods" -- and the involvement of political leaders accountable to their electorates were for Christie essential to the success and survival of both the League and the Empire.³¹ There was no magic involved in the League, it was only a highly visible political experiment that might or might not function better than prewar international political organizations and arrangements.³² "The League of Nations can only be understood," Christie wrote,

by keeping steadily in mind its distinctly political character. That is really the first and indispensable condition for understanding. The Covenant is nothing if not almost purely the embodiment of a political arrangement. It is almost exclusively concerned with matters of a highly political character; its organs will always be composed of men of political status -- the responsible political members of the League; its meaning and operation will be determined by these men according to the way in which public opinion at any given time moves them. It rests on public opinion. It will operate as a political not a judicial instrument. No rigid clear cut groove can be predicted. If public opinion

is apprehensive about the Covenant this means that public opinion fears its own motives.³³

Because the League was in essence a political experiment, it was a good arena for Canada to attempt to further develop its international identity. Christie saw a logical progression in the development of Canada's international status from its growth within the imperial system before and during the war, to its attendance at the Paris Peace Conference and signature of the Versailles Treaty, and, finally, to full membership in the League of Nations. Because of this pattern of development, Christie, when a question arose in the late summer of 1919 as to whether Canada and the other Dominions could sit on the Council of the League, saw no need to construct a technical argument grounded in international law to defend the Dominions' rights in this regard. He felt that a simple review of recent events would serve to show that Canada and the other Dominions had achieved an unquestionable right to membership based upon the series of political decisions and events in which they had played a full part in their own right. For Christie separate status at the Paris Peace Conference necessarily entitled Canada to a separate status in the League and therefore eligibility to sit on the Council.

Certainly there could have been no delusions. The organization of the League was obviously closely modeled on that of the Paris Conference.... Now the Dominions had been admitted to the Peace Conference separately on the same terms as smaller Powers. This meant that they appeared in the Plenary Sessions as a matter of course, and in the Council of Ten when questions affecting them arose. Of course there could be no recession from that position when it came to the organization of the League. So from the outset no one from the League of Nations Commission or elsewhere ever questioned that the Dominions should be in the Assembly always and in

the Council of the League whenever their interests were specially affected. Then a new factor was grafted on to the Council, something that was hoped to improve the Council of Ten method. The small Powers were to be given a permanent voice in the Council of the League. Four of them were to be selected by the Assembly to send representatives to the Council. It constitutes a curious monstrosity, but nevertheless it is at least a nominal advance in the status of the smaller Powers. Now since the Peace Conference had always up until that point been governed by the principle that the Dominions were to be regarded and treated as small Powers, it follows that the Dominions must be regarded as partaking of whatever advantages there might be in this further step. ...

How could there be any doubt; we have accepted the same responsibilities as other members; we must be accorded an equal status. The League is a political rather than a legal arrangement, and the meaning of the Covenant can only be understood in that light. The point in question, if anyone ever raises it, will be settled by men of political status, thinking and acting as they did at the Peace Conference, on broad considerations of high policy, not in legalistic technicalities, on which alone can the point in question be based.³⁴

Having argued that Canada must proceed on the basis that the status it had attained at Paris and in the League was now unquestionable and, more importantly, irrevocable, Christie also stressed the importance of the League as a forum in which Canada could continue to develop her international personality. During preparations for the first session of the League's Assembly in the summer of 1920, for example, Christie urged Prime Minister Arthur Meighen -- who had assumed the prime ministership on 10 July of that year upon Borden's retirement -- to send the largest possible delegation to represent Canada. Such a delegation, he maintained, would take full advantage of the representation to which Canada was entitled under the provisions of the Covenant, would burnish the League's "send off," and would increase international recognition of Canada's growing presence

in the world community. "Canada, like other Members of the League," Christie told Meighen,

is entitled to three Representatives. It would seem desirable at the First Meeting of the Assembly that Canada should be represented by the full number. In the first place this will strengthen the general impression of the League in the sense of giving it a good send off. Moreover it will indicate Canada's intention of doing all that may be reasonably done to support the League and its methods. Finally, since the United States is not yet in the League, Canada will be the most important member represented at the Assembly from the North American Continent, and, indeed, from the Western Hemisphere; and there is accordingly a special case for a strong Canadian representation at this Meeting. These conditions may appear to be somewhat intangible; but it is submitted that particularly at this stage of the League's existence the imponderable elements are of the greatest importance in any estimation of the future prospects of the League and in any effort to further its chances.³⁵

Although cloaked as "intangibles" and in terms of helping the League, Christie's arguments nevertheless all were aimed at the same goal, namely, to increase and refine Canada's status as a unique international entity. First, as has already been seen, Christie thought of the League as a theater in which Canada could enhance her international role, and, therefore, if the League got off to a good start it would necessarily be a better place in which to develop. Second, a full delegation would not only indicate Canada's desire to help make the League work but also would serve notice that Ottawa intended to take consistent and complete advantage of the rights due to Canada under the provisions of the Covenant. Finally, albeit with rather subdued prose, Christie explained to Meighen what a superb opportunity the Assembly was for Canada to appear in a major world forum without the overwhelming and eclipsing presence of the United States. Christie wanted the Americans in the League -- and

believed that it would not remain viable for long without their active participation³⁶ -- but saw no reason to forego the opportunity of getting out from under the shadow which the power and wealth of the United States cast over the entire Western Hemisphere and, in doing so, nurture the world's recognition of Canada as a distinct nation on the North American continent.

In sum, then, Christie saw the League as an instrument for both validating and expanding the international status Canada had secured as a consequence of its participation in the military and diplomatic events of the Great War and the postwar period of peacemaking. After attending the first meeting of the League's Assembly in the fall of 1920, Christie returned to Ottawa pleased with the part Canada had played at Geneva and mildly surprised with how well the League appeared to have worked as an organization. "The Assembly, simply as a machine," he told Sir Robert Borden, "has worked better I think than I had expected."³⁷ Nevertheless, Christie's positive impression of the League's opening session was dampened a bit by what he saw as its excessive and unnecessary concentration on matters of a predominantly European nature.

The effort to set up a number of other technical organisations ... involving further annual conferences, permanent commissions and secretariats, brought into high relief a difficulty and a divergence that seems certain to arise again and again in the future, and it seems to me very serious and baffling. Europe is ready and anxious to set up all kinds of bodies of this sort. Her countries are sick and sore and tired and afraid, and perhaps for that reason ready to huddle together for comfort and relief. And these proposed machines are to be centered in Europe. On the other hand the other world, especially the New World and more especially North Americans, doesn't feel the need. And is it possible to expect North America to join cheerfully in shows run at such a distance where it is so difficult to keep in

touch with them, especially when North America feels that the seat of power is moving west if it has not already definitely moved.³⁸

Christie's hesitation and self-professed bafflement on what he regarded as the League's pronounced Euro-centrism did not immediately turn him against the Geneva experiment. "It goes," he told Borden, and what it produces "depends on what people want it to produce."³⁹ In late 1920, it was providing a good opportunity for Canada to develop its international personality and for that reason -- but perhaps for few others -- Christie supported it.⁴⁰

Keystone of Status: Representation in the United States

"I have a fortnight's complete leisure now," Harold Laski wrote to O.W. Holmes, Jr. early in 1917, "while the students prove the value of the examination system. Next week I go to Ottawa to comfort Loring Christie whom each presidential note sends into a more abysmal gloom."⁴¹ Christie's unhappiness with the United States was at times palpable during the Great War and the making of the peace. Christie often was exasperated and not infrequently infuriated by America's delay in entering the war and by what he considered to be its selfish and arrogant conduct during the period of peacemaking. At times, he was led to despair of the nation and its ineffective leadership; he was especially distressed over the lack of leadership being shown by such men of his own generation as his former colleagues at the New Republic. Nevertheless, Christie considered the United States to be the vital agent for stability and progress in the

postwar world. Moreover, because of its pivotal role in world affairs, he saw the United States as an important tool with which Canada could more fully develop her international personality.

Christie believed that the United States had waited too long to get into the war and that it had never really understood the questions -- either moral or political -- that were involved in it. He felt that Woodrow Wilson had so excessively cloaked America's war effort in a tone of high moral superiority that it appeared to many foreigners -- friends and foes alike -- that the United States was trying to dominate the world stage with its view of things to the point of the excluding the opinions of others. In October, 1918, for example, Christie had a heated argument with Walter Lippmann and Herbert Croly of the New Republic over his description of the United States as a power bent on domination. "Then there's the little affair of the use of the word 'domination' [in his argument with Lippmann and Croly]," he wrote to Frankfurter.

I confess that I was somewhat bewildered and felt at cross purposes. I shall merely refer to two slogans - "the world must be made safe for democracy" and "prohibition" - I need not tell you there is no sneer in this; they hold the field in Canada too; but if what's behind them isn't a dominating spirit and intent, and with much ruthlessness, than I am sadly deficient in the use of the King's English.⁴²

In the same letter, he told Frankfurter that he had "struck to hurt" at the attitudes expressed by their mutual friends but had not meant to defame the "nation (save the mark!)."43

Christie basically considered the United States an immature power and therefore believed that other nations -- and in particular Britain and the Dominions -- would have to exhibit

great patience in dealing. In the aftermath of the Paris Peace Conference and the Senate battle over reservations to and the ratification of the Versailles Treaty, Christie attributed American petulance to the fact that Washington had not been able to get its own way. "Of course their [the United States] initial mistake that has caused all the trouble and made them look ridiculously like a spoiled child," he told Philip Kerr, "was their delay in coming into the war. Given their late entry, the character of their contribution and their conception of themselves, it was almost inevitable that the Peace Conference should strike them as it has done."⁴⁴ The metaphor of the spoiled but slowly maturing child appeared again and again in Christie's writings on the United States in this period and on most occasions he simply would prescribe more patience as the longterm remedy. At times, however, patience wore thin, especially if American truculence was focused on the gains in status that the Dominions had secured during and after the war. For example, during the Senate's acrimonious debate over ratification -- a discussion that was marked by repeated objections to individual membership for each Dominion in the League -- Christie exclaimed that "I am bound to say that I cannot understand why the United States should be so keen to slap the Dominions in particular; for apparently the country is behind the Senate in a reservation of this sort. If it goes through it will, I fear, leave a sting for many years."⁴⁵ In the same vein, Christie later complained that the Americans looked with "suspicion on the somewhat prominent part that Canada took at the

[International] Labour Conference [at Washington in the fall of 1919]"⁴⁶ and maintained that "the very frigid atmosphere Washington has succeeded in throwing about the Conference bids fair to do more harm than can be balanced by any possible concrete results...."⁴⁷

Nevertheless, Christie continued to see the United States as vital to Canada in three distinct ways. First, because the United States was its closest and most powerful neighbor Canada had, as a matter of necessity, to get along with the Americans. This was a strong argument in favor of Ottawa gaining full control over its relations with the United States.⁴⁸ Secondly, as noted above, Christie viewed the continued involvement of the United States in world affairs as being essential for keeping the peace, making the League of Nations an effective organization, and for strengthening the security of the Commonwealth through close collaboration with London and the Dominions in international affairs.⁴⁹ Third, Christie continued to see a legitimate role for Canada in facilitating the growth and maintenance of amicable Anglo-American relations.⁵⁰ In the period presently under consideration, then, Christie saw Ottawa's relations with Washington as a means of augmenting Canada's status as a fully recognizable international entity. Through its war effort Canada had gained some voice in imperial affairs and had won the right to attend the the Paris Peace Conference. At the Conference it had attained full membership in the League of Nations and its various organizations and commissions, such as the International Labor Organization. All of these steps toward

status, Christie believed, would be topped off by establishing a distinct Canadian diplomatic presence in Washington. Once this presence was arranged and formally recognized by the United States government, the recognition of the validity of Ottawa's claim to a distinct international status would be accomplished in practical political terms and no longer need to rely almost solely on the basis of legal argument and activities at the new Geneva forum.⁵¹

For Christie, therefore, the sending of a Canadian diplomatic representative to the United States was a culminating step on the road to a distinct international personality upon which Canada had embarked in 1867 and which had been greatly accelerated by its participation in the Great War. In December, 1918, Christie had urged Borden to go slow on the matter of permanent representation at Washington because Canada's attendance at the Paris Peace Conference made "adequate discussion" with all concerned groups in Ottawa impossible.⁵² More importantly, Christie wrote, "there are other reasons for delay connected with relations between the Britannic Commonwealth and the United States during the peace negotiations and also possibly with the proposed Constitutional Conference after the war."⁵³ For the time being, therefore, the "present machinery of the [Canadian War] Mission in Washington can be simply retained as it is."⁵⁴

Once the Peace Conference was concluded and the position of Dominions as individual states in the League was recognized as a result of their invitations to membership being "on the same

platter as that held out to full blown States," however, Christie began pursuing the issue of formal diplomatic representation in the United States with vigor.⁵⁵ By early August, 1919, for example, he had seized on the mishandling of a Canadian-American matter by the British Embassy in Washington to argue the case for establishing a permanent Canadian diplomatic presence at the earliest possible date. The incident involved a prolonged delay by the Governor General's Office and the Embassy in Washington in delivering to the United States State Department a Minute of Council -- dated 11 March 1919 -- commenting on a Canadian-American fishing conference that had met earlier in the spring. Christie used the lapse to argue that it was illustrative of "two evils" in the way the country's external relations were currently being conducted:

(a.) The evil of divided control between the Governor General's Office and the Department of External Affairs. This evil might to some extent be remedied by making it a rule that Minutes of Council intended for transmission to other Governments should go from the Privy Council Office to the Department of External Affairs, and this Department should then pass them on to the Governor General's Office with the necessary advice as to what should be done with them.

(b.) The lack of adequate Canadian diplomatic representation at Washington. The Canadian War Mission at Washington has been admirable for its purpose; but it was not intended to handle such cases, and in its present form and status it could not efficiently handle them.⁵⁶

The fisheries miscue was a small one, but it was, for Christie, indicative of the problems posed by the lack of adequate external affairs machinery in general and of representation in Washington in particular -- if such a mistake was possible on a small matter might it not likewise be possible on matters of considerably more importance? As a solution to this sort of mix-up, Christie

argued for the the further expansion and professionalization of the Department of External Affairs⁵⁷ and the establishment of Canada's own diplomatic agent in the United States.

Throughout the remainder of 1919 and all of 1920, Christie was concerned continuously with the question of Canadian representation in Washington. Before Ottawa approached the British government on the matter, Christie outlined for Borden the elements he thought to be essential in the process of providing for a diplomatic agent in the United States. It was of primary importance, according to Christie, to give the Canadian diplomatic representative a high enough rank to insure that he would be recognized by the American government -- and the diplomatic corps resident in Washington -- as a representative who was "a diplomatic agent accredited to the President of the United States" and who was "appointed by and [would] be directly responsible to the Government of Canada."⁵⁸ In order to insure that Canada's representative would not be seen as a subordinate to or an agent of the British Ambassador in Washington, Christie argued that he should be given the title "Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary."

He should have this title in full, not merely the personal rank of Minister Plenipotentiary (Minister Plenipotentiary en titre) on the analogy to the Counselors [earlier in this memorandum Christie had noted that some of the British Embassy's Counsel had the personal rank of Minister Plenipotentiary]; for in contradistinction to them he will in fact be an envoy; i.e., with representative capacity. He will be the actual representative of a distinct government, of a distinct political unit under the British Crown, and he will receive credentials as such. He will be an agent of a Member of the League of Nations. In the Assembly and the Council of the League there will be in respect of their rank and capacity no difference between the representatives of the Dominions and those of other Powers.

It would be an anomaly without any practical justification to make a difference here.⁵⁹

For this same reason, Christie objected to suggestions that the Canadian representative in Washington be titled "High Commissioner," maintaining the title "in itself has no diplomatic meaning" and, more importantly, because it "has usually been confined to offices in British territory or under British jurisdiction or protectorate." He cited, in particular, such recent British usage of the title as "H.M. High Commissioner in Egypt, in South Africa [after the Boer War], [and] in the Pacific Islands."⁶⁰

Finally, Christie did his best to portray the whole process of establishing Canadian representation in Washington as not being out of step with the general pattern of the development of imperial relations during and after the war. He described the sending of a Canadian envoy to the United States as being, in fact, one of the most effective methods possible for insuring that the development of intra-Empire relationships would continue in as smooth a manner as possible. "To appoint a Canadian Minister," he wrote,

does not mean the break up of the Empire as has been suggested. Quite the contrary. There is nothing startlingly novel about the proposal; history -- recent history -- is not without analagous cases. The proposal accords with the political realities of the position; that is its true justification and why it is the sort of thing to prevent (an imperial) disruption.⁶¹

Indeed, Christie proposed that the Order in Council appointing a Canadian Minister should note clearly that

[w]ith the object of promoting the most complete co-operation and unity of purpose, effective arrangements, to be agreed upon between the Canadian Minister and His Majesty's

Ambassador, shall be made for continuous consultation in all important matters of common concern and for such necessary concerted action, founded on consultation, as they may determine.⁶²

Always conscious that distinct Canadian representation in Washington offered both promise and danger to the imperial system, Christie nonetheless wanted to press ahead with the project quickly and to use it as a means of gaining as much recognition as possible for Canada's increasing international status. He accepted the political desirability and expediency of securing London's concurrence at every step,⁶³ and yet he consistently advised Borden to resist London's attempts -- both subtle and forthright -- to maintain British control over the proposed Canadian diplomatic agent.

On 3 October, 1919 Ottawa despatched a telegram to Lord Milner, the Colonial Secretary, suggesting that a Canadian Minister to Washington be appointed by the King on the recommendation of the Government of Canada.⁶⁴ In his reply, Milner attempted to put a fairly short leash on the proposed Canadian Minister and in effect negate much of his distinctiveness by making him clearly subordinate to the British Ambassador in Washington.⁶⁵ The difference between Ottawa's suggestion and Milner's response, Christie wrote,

is that the first proposal treats Canada rather definitely as a separate State for diplomatic purposes; while the second, recognising that there should be a distinctive Canadian representative, at the same time treats the British Empire as a unity for diplomatic purposes and weaves the proposed new Canadian diplomatic service, so to speak, into the fabric of the present diplomatic service of the Empire. (In effect there would seem to result a new Empire diplomatic service.) Under the first the Canadian Minister would speak simply as a Canadian; under the second he would speak also as a representative of the Empire, though primarily as a

Canadian. ...

There is one other point of importance on which the London proposal is somewhat obscure. The Ottawa proposal of October 3rd did not say so in express words, but it implied that the Canadian Minister would not be subordinate to the (British) Ambassador in the sense of taking orders from him, and they would work through the method of consultation. Perhaps the London proposal means the same thing. It speaks of "a constant interchange of views on matters of common concern". It also proposes that the Canadian Minister "Would be next in the Embassy to the Ambassador. ...would take charge of the Embassy in the absence of the Ambassador." If this means he would be next in rank simply in the sense that Ambassadors form a higher class in the diplomatic body than Ministers, there is nothing to be said. If it is intended to mean that the Canadian Minister would be subject to the direction of the Ambassador, there would seem to be real difficulty. But it can hardly have the latter meaning since it is agreed that the Canadian Minister shall "act upon instructions from and report direct to the Canadian Government." It is for consideration whether it is necessary to make this point any clearer in subsequent correspondence.⁶⁶

Although Christie suggested that Milner's reply was "for practical purposes" the same as Ottawa's, he recommended that it be accepted only if it could be made clear that the Canadian Minister would have diplomatic precedence equal to that of other ministers in Washington and if it was made clear that he would not be subordinate to the British Ambassador. Finally, Christie disliked Milner's idea that the Canadian Minister's official letter of accreditation should be issued solely by the British Foreign Secretary. He instead could see no reason "why the letter should not be framed [so] that it would read as coming from the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada as well as the Foreign Secretary and would require the signature of both."⁶⁷

Throughout this memorandum there is a discernible sense that Christie is dissatisfied with the conditions and restrictions

inherent in Milner's proposal, but that, at the same time, he is being careful to couch his comments in a way that will not give them an impatient, much less an anti-British tone. In regard to Milner's obvious attempt to blur the distinctiveness of the proposed Canadian diplomatic agent, for example, Christie says that it might not have been Milner's intention at all because it "is difficult of course in long range telegraphic discussion to be sure of shades of meaning." And to reassure Borden that what Canada was seeking could not be considered excessive or disruptive he added that diplomatic representation at the ministerial level while "constituting a real development ... involves no radical readjustments, but is in the tradition of the growth of our constitution." In any event, Christie concluded, the appointment would be "subject to review and alteration in the light of experience" and therefore could not be seen as a threat to imperial cohesiveness.⁶⁸

In all of these instances, Christie seems to have been out in front of Borden -- much as he had consistently been in the lead in urging the Prime Minister to seek an effective role in ameliorating Anglo-American relations -- in regard to the development of Canada's international status. In addition, he appears to have been conscious of being in the lead and pushing.⁶⁹ In an attempt to insure that the process of obtaining international status for Canada continued steadily, therefore, Christie was careful to not to appear as desiring radical alterations in the imperial system and accepted a pace which he probably personally believed was inadequate. In this way he was

able to keep the Prime Minister up to mark -- and avoided alienating the more imperially oriented members of Borden's cabinet such as Sir George Foster⁷⁰ -- in asserting Canada's legitimate prerogatives in external affairs.⁷¹

Conclusion

By the end of 1920, Christie believed that Canada could justly consider itself to be an autonomous international entity in respect to the canons of international law. He consistently urged his superiors to begin their consideration of Canada's external relations by recognizing that Canada had established itself irrevocably as a unique member of the community of nations. The Canadian government must always assume, he told Borden,

that our right to legation will not be challenged. Canada, having been accepted as a member of the League of Nations, has thus been recognised as belonging to the Family of Nations, as an International Person entitled to the rights and privileges, as she has accepted the obligations, of the rules that govern intercourse between civilized states. Other states, having agreed to recognise and treat with her delegates in the organs of the League, can scarcely decline to recognise and treat with any agents she may send to their capitals.⁷²

Believing that a solid legal basis for Canada's status had been built, Christie sought to devise practical means through which that status could be demonstrated to the world. In the years between 1917 and 1920, he devoted a great amount of effort toward clarifying Canada's place within the British imperial system. Straightening out the constitutional relationships between and among the constituent components of the Empire was clearly a matter of first importance for him. Likewise,

effective consultation and cooperation also were essential. The question remains, however, as to whether Christie viewed the postwar Empire as the primary vehicle through which Canada would make itself recognized in the world, or, rather, regarded it as a base from which Canada would step into the broader world with an international personality that was not merely a reflection of its membership in the Empire but was rather based on considerations of national interest.

In the three-year period under consideration here Christie did not make a stark choice between these two options. He assumed that the two were in fact compatible, that membership in the imperial system did not necessarily preclude Ottawa from acting in Canada's national interests. The most that can be said is that Christie, at this point in time, had rejected any idea of Canada's participating in an imperial federation; indeed, he probably never considered such a system to be practicable or desirable for Canada either before or after 1917. He also had begun to entertain a certain resentment toward London for its machinations vis-a-vis the despatch of a Canadian diplomatic representative to Washington and its failure to take hold of the chaotic imperial situation and try to impose order on it by arranging for the constitutional conference called for in 1917.⁷³

This resentment did not alienate all of Christie's affection for the Empire, but it unquestionably led him to look for other non-imperial avenues -- i.e., the League of Nations and relations with the Americans -- along which to seek the development of Canada's international status and through which to protect its

national interests. Perhaps in this period, and in the years that followed, then, Christie should not be seen as attempting to find some way to define Canada's international status -- as has been shown he considered it adequately defined in the legal sense even before the Imperial Conference of 1917 adopted Resolution IX -- but rather as seeking the means though which that status could be expressed, expanded, and protected. In this sense, it hardly seems possible that his struggle to find some solution to Canada's ill-recognized status -- despite Colonel Stacey's estimate to the contrary -- could be considered as anything other than an effort that was intensely relevant to the facts of the modern world.

Chapter III: Notes

- 1.) Charles P. Stacey, "Nationality: The Experience of Canada," Canadian Historical Association Historical Papers, 1967, p. 17.
- 2.) Ibid., and p. 15.
- 3.) PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 6, Folder 18, L.C. Christie, Notes on the Development at the Paris Peace Conference of the Status of Canada as an International Person, 1 July 1919.
- 4.) Metropolitan Toronto Library, Canadian History Department, Main Johnson Diary, entry for 27 December 1917. Johnson's record of lunch with Christie depicts an individual who apparently was quite overwhelmed with the emotion of the conscription issue and who betrayed an intense degree of francophobia. "His [Christie's] view of the election," Johnson recorded,

"is that it shows that the English-speaking people are going to dominate the country, as he thinks they should.

Christie, however, liked the Franchise Act because it foiled the schemes of the French, who, he contended, would have used the foreign vote to buttress their own opposition to conscription and to the other vigorous ideals of the rest of Canada.

Christie is quite pessimistic over the situation. There was no essential unity between the French and the English, he did not think there ever would be, and was inclined to think that it was not worth trying to secure."

Johnson also recorded that Christie said that "national" support for the adoption of conscription translated into English-speaking support and that he for one was not prepared to shy away from "the actuality of disunion between Quebec and the other provinces" to attain the goal.

While sounding rather bloodthirsty, Christie's attitude toward the election almost certainly was less racist and intemperate than Johnson made it sound. Christie looked on politics as a rather pragmatic and cynical business which, at their best, just might keep society's passions in check to a degree sufficient to provide for the maintenance of order. He apparently viewed elections such as the conscription election of 1917 in this light, and felt that the divisiveness inherent in the election was better than the more violent divisiveness that probably would erupt if such issues were not settled by the electoral process. "I do not fear the poison [of such elections]," Christie wrote.

"Life itself is a very vulgar and violent business. One may utter prayers in that direction; but as it stands the

deadliest diseases may spring from violence and vulgarity running loose in the dark and obscure recesses of the system, and there comes a stage when the anti-toxin of open, frank and regularized violence and vulgarity is the only treatment. Is our system of representative gov't through elections -- our democracy -- yet much more than this? A black picture perhaps, but by no means one for black despair."

Having offered that far-from-mitigating apologia for Christie's lack of tolerance, it should be noted that his venomous outburst to Main Johnson -- N.W. Rowell's chief assistant -- is most significant in that it betrays how very little appreciation Christie had at this point in his career for the fragility of Canadian society and the potentially disastrous consequences regional and racial controversies had for the country's future. Christie's overcoming of this rather profound ignorance of his own country constitutes one of the main themes of his post-1913 career. Moreover, as will be seen, his continuing education in this regard was destined to play a primary role in shaping his thinking on Canada's external relations after the Great War. It also explains, in part, the changing nature of his approach to external policy. See L.C.Christie to Philip Kerr, 9 October 1918, quoted in Robert Bothwell, "Bureaucratic Imperialism," op. cit. p. 139.

5.) PAC, MG 30 E44, L.C. Christie Papers, Volume 2, Folder 3, p. 1423, L.C. Christie, The Defense of Canada, Montreal Gazette, 7 December 1917. The editorial is unsigned, but the style and argument are clearly Christie's.

6.) Ibid., Reel C-3876, pp. 1355-1356, L.C. Christie, Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 6 October 1918.

7.) Ibid. Besides gaining control over the naval service and over the orientation of its policies, Christie believed that it probably never would evolve into a first-rate organization as long as the Admiralty continued to designate its top officers. "It ought not to be a by word in the British Navy," Christie advised Borden, "that the Canadian Naval Service (along with Australia and the RNAS) is a sort of a convenient dumping ground for officers whom the Admiralty is glad to get rid of. Doubtless the Admiralty would not admit this; very likely it represents a more or less unconscious tendency never definitely formulated among the heads of the Navy; but such gossip usually affords the most reliable and significant index of professional opinion."

While on the subject of Canada's armed forces, it is interesting to note that those historians like Colonel Stacey who argue that Christie was an imperial federationist seem to ignore the point that throughout the period under consideration in this study -- 1913-1941 -- Christie adamantly opposed any plan that threatened to place Canada's forces under a centralized imperial authority or command. If, then, as Professor Preston points out, imperial federation "seemed the ultimate objective for all

imperial defense planning" it seems surprising that Christie never embraced military centralization as sort of a half-way house on the road to the federation of the Empire. Christie's opposition to handing over any degree of control over the command of Canadian forces to imperial authorities may indicate that he was somewhat less acutely a federationist than has heretofore been thought, especially if it is true, as Preston contends, that military cooperation was thought to be the handmaiden of political cooperation. See Charles P. Stacey. Canada and the Age of Conflict, Volume I: 1867-1921, op. cit., p. 167, and Richard A. Preston. Canada and "Imperial Defense". A Study in the Origins of the British Commonwealth Defense Organization, 1867-1919. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1967, pp. xx-xxi.

8.) For a fascinating and insightful -- if much too brief -- account of this bureaucratic development see Desmond Morton. A Peculiar Kind of Politics. Canada's Overseas Ministry in the First World War. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982.

9.) PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 2, Folder 1, pp. 1039-1049, L.C. Christie, Notes on the Right of Legation and International Personality in Relation to Canada, 16 March 1918. See also the brief but interesting discussion of this memorandum in Professor Robert J. Gowen, "Loring Christie Charts Canada's Emergence as an International Person, March 1918: A Documentary Glimpse into the Rationalization of Canadian Sovereignty," Canadian Historical Review, LIII, 2 (June, 1972), pp. 227-228.

10.) Ibid., pp. 1040-1041 and 1044. The message here that Canada could do a great deal on its own to attain status was based on Christie's belief that the British constitution was flexible enough to provide ample opportunity for the Dominions to develop their international responsibilities, and that, indeed, Canada had been taking advantage intermittently of that opportunity since 1867. "Any how the British Constitution is a fascinating device," he told Frankfurter in 1920, "and tinkering with it is still more fascinating. You may do your tinkering in a hotel room in London, in Paris, in Washington, in Timbuctoo; you may do it by means of a casual memorandum or a few telegrams shot off in a hurry, by means apparently of anything save a formal statute, and you might not quite realise you have done it until months afterward." This very flexibility would later cause Christie much frustration, however, when because of it few of his contemporaries saw the need to codify wartime constitutional developments into formal, written constitutional provisions. The phrase about the British constitution being able to be amended by "anything save a formal statute" which he threw off jocularly to Frankfurter later proved to be, much to Christie's chagrin, only too true. See Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 26 December 1920.

11.) Christie again tied the changes ushered in by Resolution IX and the Dominions' attendance at the Paris Peace Conference to the military efforts of Canada and the other Dominions.

According to Christie, the Dominions were present at Paris in their own right because "of the decisive force they had exerted in the actual determination of the issues of the war." See L.C. Christie, Notes on the Development at the Paris Peace Conference of the Status of Canada as an International Person, 1 July 1919, op. cit., p. 5460.

12.) Ibid., p. 5464. Christie believed that Canada had been developing its sovereignty on the basis of actual experience rather than formal declarations since Confederation in 1867. It was, in his view, only the imperviousness of traditional conceptions and loyalties and the legal system to change that prevented many Canadians from recognizing that large steps toward autonomy that had already been taken successfully. "It is characteristic of our legal system," he wrote, "to retain to the last extremity any fiction that has proven useful and convenient, while at the same time as experience demands, making exceptions whose cumulative effect is often in many cases finally to leave the fiction itself a mere skeleton." Christie considered the idea that Canada and the other Dominions remained dependencies of Britain as one of those fictions that actual experience had rendered a lie and that their war efforts and the manner of their attendance at the Paris Peace Conference would soon make it obvious to all that only the "skeleton" of their earlier status remained. See PAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Volume 141, Part I, File OCA 115, p. 7525, L.C. Christie, Notes on the Women's Franchise and Naturalization, 29 August 1917.

13.) L.C. Christie, Notes on the Development at the Paris Peace Conference of the Status of Canada as an International Person, 1 July 1919, op. cit., p.5464.

14.) Christie's nationalism and national pride were apparent in his analysis of the leading role Canada played in solidifying the Dominions' individual status at Paris. "In recalling the successive stages of the advance in status attained by the Dominions at the Peace Conference," he wrote, "it is to be noted that in every instance the initiative was taken by Canada; and whether or not the other Dominions at all times joined in pressing these steps, nevertheless each one in the final result received the full benefit of the advance." See Ibid.

15.) Ibid.

16.) Ibid. That the Empire was indeed becoming "something different from what it was" apparently was recognized by even the most ardent proponents of imperial federation. By the summer of 1917, for example, Philip Kerr -- who John Turner contends was then favoring imperial federation with imperial ministers responsible to an imperial parliament -- warned Lionel Curtis that the Dominions would attend the eventual peace conference after the war

"in the spirit which will more and more resist the assertion

of any superior authority or influence on the part of the British government. They are tending more and more to conceive of the Empire as five nations deliberating on equal terms round a table"

See John Turner. Lloyd George's Secretariat. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980, p. 130 and Philip Kerr to Lionel Curtis, 21 July 1917, quoted in John Kendle. The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975, p. 221.

17.) Text of Resolution IX as quoted in C.P. Stacey, (ed.). Historical Documents of Canada. Volume V: The Arts of Peace and War, 1914-1945. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972, Document 152, pp. 368-369. For the central role of Sir Robert Borden, and the assistance and advice rendered to him by Christie, in the drafting of Resolution IX see the minutely detailed and finely crafted essay by R.C. Brown and Robert Bothwell, "The 'Canadian Resolution'," in Michael Cross and R. Bothwell, (eds.). Policy By Other Means. Essays in Honour of C.P. Stacey. Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Company, Ltd., 1972, pp. 165-178.

18.) Eustace Percy and L.C. Christie, "The Dominions and the Settlement. A Plea for a Conference," Round Table, 12, (March, 1915), p. 340. Christie later fleshed out his expectations regarding a constitutional conference, making it clear that such a conference could in no way be envisioned as a precursor to a centralized imperial system. "The outstanding feature of the Resolution [IX]," Christie wrote, "is that it contemplates consultation between Governments of equal and equally autonomous nations. The first inference is that this excludes at once any idea of centralisation of government, either in its executive or legislative aspect, and also any idea of novel or complicated devices in state organisation. It assumes as a starting point the existing Governments, and simply looks to methods of consultation. Any 'action' taken, though it may be 'concerted', is always to be such action 'as the several Governments may determine.'" No one else, no other body, can determine action. The existing relation of responsibility as between citizen and ruler is therefore not disturbed. In other words, such a (Constitutional) Conference cannot accurately be said to be concerned primarily with the mechanism of government at all, but rather with the question of voluntary co-operation as between existing mechanisms." See PAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Volume 41, pp. 18130-18131, L.C. Christie, Memorandum. June Meeting of Prime Ministers, 23 April 1921.

19.) Christie's apprehension over the possibility of a quick return to "business as usual" was aroused even before the war was over. In a letter to Philip Kerr addressing the partisan political problems Lloyd George was encountering in England in the spring of 1918, Christie warned that excessive attention to such partisan concerns carried with it the threat of a concentration on domestic affairs that would preclude the

formulation of policies capable of promoting cooperation within the Empire.

"I have just read the morning paper's story of the debate on the Maurice affair [the controversy between Lloyd George and General Frederick Maurice over British troop strength in Europe before the German's offensive in the spring of 1918]. Cheers for your Chief! Damn the poisonous snakes and quitters who are after him! Does no one ever stop to think over there that we in the Dominions are above all people peculiarly interested in having a non party win the war -- Imperial Government?

Apparently not, if one is to judge from the parliamentary and newspaper discussion. Is the profession of 'trusteeship' all camouflage? Until the war is over, we are as a practical matter at the mercy of the principle. But no one need suppose that the 'beneficiaries' are not watching the account and will not 'weigh your gods and you'! Is it impossible to drive some glimmering of this into the heads of the mugwumps who are disgusting everyone with their chatter and intrigues.

I am quite sure that Canada at all events has more confidence in Lloyd George than in any other man you have. I think his downfall would be a disaster so far as imperial relations go. It is just because he represents no party, has no party machine, no party organisation, no platform but to win the war for the British people with no reservation of any sort (whether labour, 'cocoa', or Lansdowne) and because he has guts that we are for him to the hilt. Also because he has more imagination about the rest of the British world than any other man in sight."

Because we have gone to war in the way we have the British Commonwealth appears a wonderful and hopeful affair; but it is also ... for that very reason, because of the extent of our commitment and stake, [that] the British Commonwealth while a strong vessel is infinitely more brittle and delicate. I am not a prophet but I would bet a good deal that there would be a serious danger of a crack if any Government with an Asquith-Lansdowne Henderson flavour should land in the saddle. To me -- I suppose I am a mere long distance observer but there are perhaps some advantages in observation from a distance -- the ferocity and indecency of the attacks on L.G. appear to be almost altogether due to the fact mentioned above, that he has no party machine, no traditional party following in the country and that he has had the guts to back all parties.

It may be human nature for the party hacks and some of their mob to turn on him and attempt to rend him but for God's sake can't someone tell them at this hour that it's sheer blockheaded, indecent, fantastic madness, and one day

they may pay a price for it."

See Scottish Record Office, Lothian Papers, GD 40/17/1059. L.C. Christie to Philip Kerr, 10 May 1918. Also, for a good discussion of Christie's perceptions of how the structure of the Empire had changed during the war see Alex Inglis, "Loring Christie and the Imperial Idea, 1919-1926," Journal of Canadian Studies, VII, (May, 1972), pp. 20-21.

20.) PAC. MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 3, Folder 6-7, p. 2463, L.C. Christie to George M. Wrong, 30 December 1919.

21.) Ibid., pp. 2361-2362, L.C. Christie to Clement P. Jones, 16 September 1920.

22.) Ever the lawyer, Christie was anxious to see a solid factual base prepared to provide the groundwork for the eventual conference. "In the prevailing conditions it is almost impossible to speculate about the date [of the conference]," Christie wrote to Kerr,

"but I am wondering if anyone is even thinking of the affair at all or of preparation. For example, the delegates ought to have before them some kind of picture of just what the Empire is, so far as it can be seen from Statutes, orders in council, procedures, etc. The conference may not decide upon much more than an Imperial Cabinet or Council (analogous to the Council of the League of Nations) plus some tinkering with existing constitutional acts and forms of procedure. It ought to have before it precisely what it is going to tinker with. What about some kind of committee -- not of Ministers or High Commissioners but of officials from the Mother Country and the Dominions -- to dig out and digest this sort of thing."

See Scottish Record Office, Lothian Papers, GD 40/17/207. L.C. Christie to Philip Kerr, 12 January 1920.

23.) Ibid., Christie was always willing to use the Empire as a makeweight for Canada against what he saw as the Americans' overweening sense of self-importance. "There has been some suggestion," he wrote, "that the [Constitutional] conference might be held in Ottawa. There is much to be said for it Of course it would have its good points vis a vis the '100% American' Republic to the south of us."

24.) PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 3, Folder 6-8, p. 2494, L.C. Christie to George Brebner, 17 February 1920.

25.) L.C. Christie to Philip Kerr, 12 January 1920, op. cit. Alex Inglis also has noted that Christie fully realized that the imperial system he deemed necessary did not exist. "It is important to note," Inglis wrote, "that he [Christie] did not understand the co-operative Empire as an existing entity but as a

concept accepted in principle with the promise of an effort to create the machinery which would make it a reality."

It also is interesting to note the rather stark differences which had developed between Christie's thinking and that of the Round Table regarding the future of the Empire. For example, in the spring of 1920 Philip Kerr wrote to Sir Edward Grigg that

"The only method upon which the Empire can be run at present is that Great Britain should be responsible for foreign policy, keeping the Dominions informed mostly after the events, and consulting them about matters directly affecting their interests. Directly the Dominions begin to have strong feelings about general foreign policy we are up against the fundamental issue because no Government which is responsible for foreign affairs can possibly undertake to subordinate its views to those of other people unless those people are willing to share responsibility for the consequences of policy."

Clearly, Kerr's view differed radically from Christie's and this divergence in 1920 foreshadows the split that would occur between Christie and the Round Table in 1926. See Alex Inglis, "Loring Christie and the Imperial Idea, 1919-1926," op. cit., p. 21 and Philip Kerr to Sir Edward Grigg, 15 April 1920, quoted in J.R.M. Butler, Lord Lothian, Philip Kerr, 1882-1940. London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1960, p. 79.

26.) PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 5, Folder 16, p. 4583, L.C. Christie, The League of Nations, 19 December 1919.

27.) Ibid.

28.) Ibid., pp. 4583-4584. When the League of Nations concentrated some of the forums for justiciable matters under the auspices of the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1920, Christie judged it to be "the most important achievement of the First Assembly of the League." See L. Clark, (ed.), DCER, III, Document 408, p.473, L.C. Christie, Notes on the First Assembly of the League of Nations, 1 February 1921.

29.) L.C. Christie, The League of Nations, 19 December 1919, op. cit., p. 4583. Throughout his career, Christie believed that negotiations between elected heads of government, or at least between elected ministers, was "the best possible method of negotiations between Governments." Christie always put a premium on involving elected officials in international negotiations, much preferring that practice to the exclusive use of diplomats who were appointed rather than elected. In later years, Christie's reluctance to rely on diplomats developed into a distinct distrust of their activities, a disposition which he shared fully with Mackenzie King and O.D. Skelton. For the above judgment regarding agents of negotiation see L. Clark, (ed.), DCER, III, Document 29, p.22, L.C. Christie, The High Commissioner's Office, 11 May 1920.

30.) L.C. Christie, *The League of Nations*, 19 December 1919, op. cit., p. 4584. Christie's insistence in this memorandum that no League report or decision be implemented through the use of collective force indicates his continuing opposition to Article 10 of the Covenant. As it stood, Article 10 troubled Christie because it provided a guarantee to "uphold the status quo" and an "agreement to communicate with one another" before proceeding to implement the guarantee, caveats which he believed made the article unlimited in regard to the commitment it demanded from every nation and too susceptible to varying and possibly politically expedient interpretations.

"One may compare with Article 10 the proposed American French Treaty by which in the event of any unprovoked movement of aggression made by Germany against France, Great Britain and the United States would 'come in immediately to her assistance'. Here the measures by which the guarantee is to be fulfilled are expressly stated But the condition upon which the guarantee is operative is also expressly and rigidly defined. It is because of this fact, among other reasons, that the measures for carrying out the guarantees can be stated and agreed upon in advance. The objects of Article 10 on the other hand are so general in character that no such explicitness in defining the measures to be taken is possible. This must be left to the future and the mutual good faith of the parties, upon which the whole Covenant rests and upon nothing else."

Colonel Stacey and R.C. Brown also have described the concern expressed by both Christie and Borden over Article 10's vagueness, which they felt was inconsistent with the explicitness of the articles following it, while the Covenant was being drafted at the Paris Peace Conference. See PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 5, Folder 16, pp. 4448-4454, L.C. Christie, Article 10 of the League of Nations Covenant, 6 September 1919; C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict. Volume I: 1867-1921, op. cit., p. 264; and, R.C. Brown, Robert Laird Borden, A Biography. Volume II: 1914-1937, op. cit., p. 156.

31.) L.C. Christie, *The League of Nations*, 19 December 1918, op. cit., p. 4583

32.) Christie believed that too much was being expected from the peace settlement crafted at Paris and that in the short run many people were bound to be severely disappointed. "Keynes's book [The Economic Consequences of the Peace]," Christie wrote,

"is only an incident in the process of disillusionment that is as inevitable as the settlement itself was inevitable. Where it is impracticable the Treaty will naturally have to adjust itself to circumstances. But talk about some new world Areopagus [the supreme tribunal of ancient Athens] to

take a clean sheet and hand down some newly inspired Word (were'nt [sic] there 500,000 words) is foolish, and hope of such a childish device is as futile as the hope that the Treaty itself would bring about a new heaven and a new earth. It is worse than foolish; it is criminal. It leads to the sterility of decent men who are needed -- the sterility of a man who downs tools because of a superstitious faith in an immediate Second Coming."

Christie said that he considered "the leaders of the Paris Peace Conference as a group of able men earnestly trying to find the best possible thing, driven back time after time by the temper of their constituents to accepting the best thing that would go down" The settlement, the League, and the Covenant were for Christie political expedients which deserved a chance and their short-comings were those of political necessity and not the failures of the leaders who drafted them.

In addition, Christie seems to have had few grandiose expectations regarding the possible accomplishments of the League, and, instead, seems to have been content to let it develop as it would and fully realizing that failure probably was just as likely as success in the long run. In this light, Professor Bothwell probably overstated his case when he wrote that

"Christie's attitude to the League assumed the most efficient mechanical functioning. The statesmen would mesh with the politicians, the people would support the politicians, and the civil service would inform their steps toward a new millenium."

From the available evidence, Christie did not expect the League to usher in the millenium, and, indeed, criticized those who did. He did view the League as a piece of political machinery, but he never imagined that it would work perfectly or, for that matter, even adequately. See Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 11 February 1920, and R.Bothwell, "Bureaucratic Imperialism," op. cit., p. 238.

33.) PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 5, Folder 16, p. 4582, L.C. Christie, The League of Nations, - Its Political Character - Notes, 8 September 1919. Throughout this period Christie harped on the dangers of viewing the Covenant and the League as a legal rather than as a political experiment. In this memorandum, Christie remarked that much of the Americans' hostility to the League was based on precisely this failure in perception. "Much of the confused agitation in the United States," he wrote,

"has arisen from the neglect of the political character of the document. The Americans are traditionally given to an intense legalism in operating their own institutions and they have approached the Covenant as if were an Act of Congress or

a new section of their own much bedevilled Constitution.

It is most instructive to observe the wholly different attitude with which the English have approached the question. The practical Englishman with his own great fund of political sense, his instinct to look to substance rather than written forms and constitutions, realizes that the important thing is to get the League going."

34.) PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 755, File 243 - Volume 1, L.C. Christie, Memorandum for the Prime Minister: The Dominions and the Council of the League, 6 September 1919.

35.) PAC MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 6, Folder 17, L.C. Christie, Canadian Representation at First Meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations - 15 November 1920, 17 August 1920.

36.) Christie believed that a strong United States -- in terms of military and naval power and a determination to be active and cooperative internationally -- was essential to postwar international organization and that without it "the League will have slight chance." He interpreted the intensely bitter debate in the Senate over the Versailles Treaty and the Covenant as much more than just a political battle between President Wilson and the American internationalists on the one hand, and the opponents of the Treaty and the League on the other. He understood the domestic political nature of the debate -- indeed, he thought that the "Republicans are very apt to win the presidency and come into power" because of their opposition to Wilson's plans -- but felt that it also reflected the process whereby the United States was beginning to realize that it was a major, perhaps the major, power in the postwar world. In a prescient letter to Kerr, Christie described his view of the American scene and inferred that the best that the rest of the world could do was to avoid alienating the Americans until they had sorted out their attitudes toward the peace settlement.

"The Americans are in a most unlovely mood -- I have never seen them worse. I spent 5 weeks in Washington at the International Labour Conference and was damn glad to get out of town. The Republicans' hatred of Wilson is quite beyond description and their frankness is appalling. But there is more than lobby politics in the whole affair: the country is '100% American and to hell with the rest of the world.' They think they have all the money and power in the world and they're going to do as they damn well please, and if the world wants anything of them at any time it can get it only on their terms and no discussion about it either. They wouldn't admit it, but they are thinking in terms of problems of power with themselves as the coming masters of destiny"

See PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 2, Folder 1, p. 1065, L.C. Christie, The League of Nations and Its Consequences in

National Policy, 16 January 1920; L.C. Christie to George Brebner, 19 December 1919, op. cit.; and, L.C. Christie to Philip Kerr, 12 January 1920, op. cit.

37.) PAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Volume 264, Folder 58, p. 148051, L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 12 December 1920.

38.) Ibid., pp. 148052-148052A.

39.) Ibid., p. 148051.

40.) Professor Bothwell has written that Christie "did not spend time on a special or privileged Canadian position [in the League of Nations]." In the sense that Christie did not intend a role for Canada in the League superior to that of any other member this is certainly true. Nevertheless, by claiming a status in the League equivalent to that of the other small powers, Christie was indeed claiming a special place for Canada when its prewar international status is kept in mind. For Christie, Canada's participation in the League represented an important enhancement of its status and the available evidence does indicate that he spent considerable amount of effort justifying and urging the fullest possible role for Canada at Geneva. See R. Bothwell, "Bureaucratic Imperialism," op. cit., p. 178.

41.) Harold Laski to O.W. Holmes, Jr., 24 January 1917, printed in Mark DeWolfe Howe. Holmes-Laski Letters. The Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes and Harold J. Laski, 1916-1935, Volume I. op. cit., p. 58.

42.) Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 8 October 1918.

43.) Ibid. Christie's falling out with the editors of the New Republic over what he saw as the determination of the United States to either have its own way -- the Americans "dominating spirit" as he termed it -- or withdraw from the process of postwar settlement altogether continued into the postwar period. It resulted in his assumption of an attitude toward his former colleagues that marked them as opponents to be converted or defeated rather than as friends to be supported. When the magazine backed away from support for the Versailles settlement, for example, Christie believed that the editors had failed to recognize it as a pragmatic political effort and had deserted the settlement because it did not immediately provide a new and better world from the ashes of the war. "I simply cannot understand, for example, the position of the New Republic," he told Frankfurter.

"It certainly isn't practical politics or statecraft (which they are fond of talking about at times). What can it be? I was in New York about two weeks ago and had lunch in their office. I asked some questions about the Treaty's chances for ratification -- something of the sort. The answer,

delivered with a superior contemptuous laugh, was 'O, we've lost all interest in the Treaty long ago'. I do not like to think those chaps are lacking guts; but I have a good deal of sympathy with Americans who call them parlor Bolsheviks and who instinctively want to put a heel on them as on some repulsive worm."

While Christie was repulsed by the New Republic's essentially negative attitude toward the Versailles Treaty and the League, it does not necessarily follow, as Professor Bothwell has indicated, that he almost blindly believed in the final triumph of the League method. In his thesis, Bothwell wrote that,

"Versailles had nothing like the same drastic effect on Christie as it did on the soul-searchers of the New Republic. The League could be justified on the grounds of expediency no doubt, but it still could be idealized even after serious criticism had taken the bloom off the flower of international cooperation. The end of the war produced nothing more than the expectation that the exalted public spirit of the war years, as viewed from official Ottawa, would continue. The techniques learned in the war were too valuable to be abandoned in time of peace. There was no question of their appropriateness and little worry about their application in the future.

The war was still seen as a rational and justifiable event. It had a comprehensible cause, and it had a favorable conclusion. The war was still a crusade, and the emotion of crusading justified the most extravagant exaggerations of the post-war world. Christie was sufficiently realistic to accept the imperfections of the Treaty, and to remain unaffected by the shock expressed by the liberal-minded advisers at the Conference; but he declined to believe that the idealistic purpose of the document could have been tarnished by the criticisms levelled at it."

This description surely makes Christie much more of a starry-eyed optimist than he ever was. He did indeed see the methods of diplomacy, conference, and consultation developed during the war as valuable and worthy of preservation and extensive postwar use. He was, however, in no way sure that they would work and, as his writings show, the most he was arguing for was that they deserved a full chance to prove themselves one way or the other. See L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 11 February 1920, op. cit., and R. Bothwell, "Bureaucratic Imperialism," op. cit., p. 239. For the basis of the New Republic's opposition to the Versailles Treaty see D.W. Levy, Herbert Croly of the New Republic. The Life and Thought of an American Progressive. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985, p. 265.

44.) L.C. Christie to Philip Kerr, 12 January 1920, op. cit.

45.) PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 3, Folder 6-7, pp. 2313-2314, L.C. Christie to Manley O. Hudson, 17 February 1920. Manley O. Hudson was an expert on international law and an acquaintance of Christie's from the Harvard Law School. At the time of this letter Hudson was serving with the League's secretariat and assisting in the creation of the League's many organizations and commissions. In response to Christie's letter Hudson wrote,

"The Dominion is entirely right in its stand on the Treaty Reservation, and in the Canadian-American incident you mention [Christie had noted the potential for a flap because of Ottawa's determination not to allow the Senate to impair its status at the League], I am all Canadian, but why don't you organize a decent publicity service which will make the American people know that you are something more in Canada than office boys for the British Secretariat for the Colonies. I think you cannot hope to have appreciation of your position in the latter until you have put over this conception in America."

In this letter, Hudson drew the same conclusion that Christie had but suggested a solution the latter considered at best a temporary expedient. Christie's view was that the job Hudson called for would be best done by a permanent diplomatic representative in the United States rather through a publicity service. For Hudson's letter see Harvard Law School Library, Manley O. Hudson Papers, Box 74, File 6, M.O. Hudson to L.C. Christie, 7 April 1920.

46.) L.C. Christie to Philip Kerr, 12 January 1920, op. cit.

47.) Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 19 October 1919. "I am, to be candid," he also told Frankfurter, "getting a bit bewildered about the U.S. I think I understand the position here better than most people at the Conference; but when I try to put together all my understandings on the various heads and see where they all come to, I hesitate."

48.) Christie believed that it was absolutely necessary for Ottawa -- rather than London -- to be in control of Canada's bilateral relations with the United States. In setting up the Canadian War Mission to the United States, for example, Christie was sent by Borden to Washington to smooth the ground with the British Embassy. Ottawa felt that Canadian purchasing activities could best be done by Canadians and it appears that Christie's assignment was to insure that this was provided for. During his talks with British officials in Washington, Christie successfully dissuaded the Embassy's Charge d'Affaires from informing the "State Department that the Chairman of the Canadian War Mission would act 'under' the [British] Ambassador" and convinced him to drop the point altogether and answer "in some vague fashion" if the Department asked a question in that regard. Christie

suggested to Borden that he could best avoid the problems of British control by making the Mission's chairman "directly responsible to the Cabinet" and noted that the Embassy had agreed to Borden's request not to mention the matter to the Foreign Office in order to permit Ottawa to inform London through its regular channels of communication.

Having helped to establish the basis on which the Mission would be established in Washington, Christie described the type of work that the Mission probably would undertake and why it was important for Ottawa to have control of those matters rather than letting them be handled by the British as ancillary concerns.

"In carrying out the objects of the Mission the members are obliged to be in frequent and constant communication with the officials of the various departments, branches, bureaus, committees, commissions, boards, and other official bodies which have been set up by the United States Government. They are very numerous and extensive and much confusion and delay would arise in dealing with them at long distance. The members of the Canadian War Mission, however, have become familiar with the Government organization in Washington and in many cases of course they become personally acquainted with men in charge of the various official bodies there. These are apt to be men of large business interests who have accepted these positions in Washington without remuneration with the purpose of assisting in the prosecution of the war. This is true also of the members of the Canadian War Mission. The subjects of negotiations are very largely of a business, financial or industrial character. Thus, since the parties to these negotiations are on both sides business men thoroughly familiar with business and economic conditions in their respective countries, it will be seen that such negotiations are conducted with a maximum of mutual understanding and a minimum of that kind of delay that often results from the formalities and rigidities of conventional official procedure."

Christie, of course, realized that the Mission would not provide Ottawa with complete control over its relations with the United States -- only the establishment of formal diplomatic representation would permit that -- but he believed it was important for Canada to take the initiative in bilateral relations with both British and American officials whenever circumstances were amenable to such action. In July, 1919, for example, Christie urged Borden to proceed with a reference of a question concerning the manner in which the St. Lawrence River was to be developed to the International Joint Commission. The reference, which had been proposed by Canada before the start of the war, had been pressed on the Americans ever since and as recently as 1918. Christie saw the reference as a means of "opposing a special private development on the American side" To abandon this course of action now, Christie wrote, would have the unfortunate consequences of (a) convincing Washington that Ottawa was insincere and had been dealing in "bad

faith" since the beginning, and, more importantly, (b) probably facilitate greater American control of St. Lawrence development.

"On the other hand, what will be the position if we dropped the project? We shall certainly be unable to urge it again as a ground for special developments under private auspices -- certainly on the American side, and very likely on this side. The private developments will proceed one by one, without the advantages of a considered scheme; and much of the capital will doubtless be American. So in the end the expenditures will be made, and there will be this additional hold of American private capital on the St. Lawrence system.

In short the choice seems not to be between action and inaction with respect to this project, but between development under private financial auspices and control and development under private auspices difficult to control."

For good overall discussions of the Canadian War Mission's role and activities see R.D. Cuff and J.L. Granatstein. Ties That Bind. Canadian-American Relations in Wartime from the Great War to the Cold War. Toronto and Sarasota: Samuel Stevens and Company, 1977, Chapter III, "Lloyd Harris and the Canadian War Mission to Washington," pp.43-68, and H. Gordon Skilling. Canadian Representation Abroad. From Agency to Embassy. Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1945, pp. 196-200. For Christie's view of the Mission and its role see L. Clark, (ed.), DCER, III, Document 30, pp. 23-27, L.C. Christie, Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 30 January 1918, and PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 799, File 522, L.C. Christie, Memorandum Concerning the Canadian War Mission, 23 April 1918. For the general background to this phase of St Lawrence affairs see William R. Willoughby. The St. Lawrence Seaway. A Study in Politics and Diplomacy. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961, pp. 84-96. For Christie's view of the IJC reference as a means of keeping private American interests at bay see PAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Reel C-4419, pp. 139279-139281, L.C. Christie, St. Lawrence River Development. Proposed Reference to the International Joint Commission, 15 July 1919.

49.) For these points see L.C. Christie, The League of Nations and Its Consequences in National Policy, 16 January 1920, op. cit., pp. 1065-1066. In particular, this memorandum stresses the desirability of consultations between the United States and the British Empire aimed at maintaining "adequate military and naval fitness."

50.) Christie in the 1917-1920 period continued to believe that Canada had a legitimate and constructive role to play as an intermediary between London and Washington -- not only for the purpose of promoting Anglo-American amity but as a means of furthering Canada's national interests. After a discussion with United States Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis in the fall of 1918, for example, Christie suggested to Borden that he pass

along to the British government the recommendations that Brandeis had made. "He [Brandeis] spoke of the 'freedom of the seas'," Christie wrote,

"and he spoke in such a way as to leave an impression that the subject was being explored a good deal in whatever circle he had been moving in. His attitude was what might be called practical. He was apprehensive lest the Peace Conference result in some pious and meaningless declaration on the subject and thought there should be discussions beforehand between Great Britain and the United States. ... he thought 'freedom of the seas' must remain a doubtful phrase unless some understanding could be reached on that point. His conversation on the subject was rather pointed ..., and I strongly suspect that his attitude is representative enough to make it worthwhile for the Admiralty to have our side of the case on this subject well prepared, with an especial eye to American prejudices and lack of knowledge of the principles that have animated our use of seapower.

These points seem worth passing on because Mr. Justice Brandeis is highly regarded by the President, is understood to be fairly close to him, and it is known that the president has sought his advice on various topics during the war...."

From the evidence at hand, it does not appear as though Borden chose to pass on this information to the British authorities. Professor R.C. Brown has written that Borden believed that Anglo-American understanding and cooperation after the war was the best possible guarantor of peace, and that, indeed, he believed that had such trans-Atlantic harmony existed before 1914 there probably would not have been a war. Paradoxically, however, Borden seems to have ignored most of Christie's practical wartime suggestions that Ottawa try to smooth Anglo-American relations by attempting to explain Washington's positions and concerns to London. For whatever reason Borden chose not to act on Christie's not infrequent recommendations, it seems possible that he missed an opportunity to assist in the development of Britain's policies toward the United States. A letter from Philip Kerr to Lloyd George seems to suggest that the British might have been willing to hear Borden out on the subject of relations with America. "It has occurred to me," Kerr wrote,

"that we ought to make a point of asking Sir Robert Borden to attend the meetings of the War Cabinet whenever the questions of our relations with America are under discussion, and this independent altogether of the special meetings of the Imperial War Cabinet.

As he is over here I think that both the Canadian people and the Canadian government would resent it if he were not asked to be present whenever a matter which affects so vitally their own national interests is under discussion.

Kerr's proposal does not, of course, indicate absolutely that the British were anxious to have Canadian input or that they would have abided by whatever advice was rendered. They may simply have listened to Ottawa as a means of defusing Borden's anger over the lack of consultation and communication during the war. Nevertheless, Kerr's letter indicates that there was at least a chance that the role Christie envisioned for Canada in Anglo-American relations might have been possible had Borden pursued his suggestions with a little more vigor. See PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 2, Folder 5, pp. 1768-1769, L.C. Christie, Memorandum for the Prime Minister - Re: Talk With Louis Brandeis, 10 October 1918; R.C. Brown, Robert Laird Borden. A Biography, Volume II: 1914-1937, op. cit., p. 79; and, Philip Kerr to David Lloyd George, n.d., quoted in John Turner, Lloyd George's Secretariat. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980, p. 126.

51.) In the period being considered here, Christie showed little interest in establishing Canadian representation abroad other than a formal diplomatic presence in Washington. On the available evidence, Christie suggested that Canada establish additional representation in only two places, namely, the United Kingdom and the United States -- according to Christie, the "only 2 places [tha] have any importance" for Canada and the other Dominions -- and recommended that they be rather more commercial than diplomatic in their orientation. In October, 1918 he suggested establishing a Canadian War Mission in London, similar to that in Washington, to secure industrial orders because the need of Canadian businesses for work "will increase very sharply when the war munitions orders begin to fall off" He also suggested that such a Mission might "develop as to become a connecting link between the Canadian Government and the various Inter-Allied Councils that are being set up."

Christie also recommended that the Canadian Bureau of Information, which had been set up during the war in New York City, be converted into a permanent trade mission "to promote relations with the United States." He also thought that "a Canadian official with the rank of Consul, responsible to and act[ing] under the instructions of the Canadian Government" should be attached to the British consular district in New York City, and, at a later date, to the consular districts in Boston, Chicago, San Francisco, and New Orleans as well. See PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 9, Folder 30, p. 9425, L.C. Christie, Undated Notes but probably c. 1923; Ibid, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Reel C-4306, pp. 27918-27919, L.C. Christie, Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 15 October 1918; and, Ibid., MG 26 I, Meighen Papers, Volume 54, Folder 222, pp. 029857-029859 and 029860-029861, L.C. Christie, Report Upon the Canadian Bureau of Information, New York City, and the Canadian War Mission, 27 October 1920, L. Clark, (ed.), DCER, III, Document 30, pp. 23-27.

52.) Ibid., MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Reel C-4330, p. 52467, L.C. Christie, Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 12 December 1918.

53.) Ibid. Christie believed that one of Canada's most important objectives was to insure its full membership in the League of Nations and that the best means to this end was to remain, at least for the time being, closely associated with the British imperial system. "There is an advantage," Christie argued,

"in retaining the words 'British Empire'. It does preserve for the present the idea so far as possible that in foreign affairs the Empire acts together; and it does for the present give us [Canada] a hold through the Imperial War Cabinet over the British Empire Representative. Possibly all this cannot last much longer; but Paris is scarcely the place and the Peace Conference scarcely the forum to debate the point. There has been no clear cut mandate to the Canadian delegates to make the change; and while perhaps there is a separatist feeling in Canada to satisfy there also is another body of feeling that would prefer that nothing more than is necessary be done here to give colour to an agitation in that direction."

Christie realized that nationalist sentiment was outweighed in Canada -- and perhaps in Borden and his Cabinet as well -- by affection for and loyalty to the Empire and he probably feared that full membership in the League would be opposed at home if it was presented as a step toward independence. See PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 5, Folder 16, p. 4299, L.C. Christie, Pencilled Notes on the League of Nations, undated but apparently c. March, 1919.

54.) L.C. Christie, Memorandum for Sir Robert Borden, 12 December, 1918, op. cit., p. 52467. Christie felt that it was vital not to confuse the representation issue with the peacemaking activities, and believed that the maintenance of the Mission was precisely correct "on the ground that this course avoids an occasion for someone to raise the larger question of permanent representation at this time." See Ibid., pp. 52467-52468.

55.) L.C. Christie, Memorandum for the Prime Minister: The Dominions and the Council of the League, 6 September 1919, op. cit. Interestingly, once the peacemaking was concluded and Canada's membership in the League was assured, Christie rapidly lost his affection for the Canadian War Mission. "I am convinced that the Mission, as a permanent, or anything like a permanent, form of representation," he maintained,

"would not justify its expense. ... what is really needed is some form of diplomatic representation; for it shows that where the important questions affecting Canada arise and require negotiation with the political authorities in Washington the Mission itself cannot act at all. In such cases the Embassy must act. A large portion of the work of the Embassy concerns Canada; Lord Bryce said it was two

thirds of their work before the war. There is therefore a real case on practical grounds for diplomatic representation; and in addition there would be indirect, intangible, but nevertheless valuable advantages in the way of prestige and prominence accruing to Canada that would justify the expenditure. But as a permanent thing there seems to be no convincing case on practical grounds for the expense of the Mission; while its lack of status and importance makes it so obscure that there are no direct benefits whatever."

Whereas the existence of the Mission had once been a reason not to push immediately for establishing distinct Canadian diplomatic representation in Washington, it was now -- with the matter of membership in the League settled favorably -- a reason to secure representation as quickly as possible. See, L.C. Christie, Report on the Canadian Bureau of Information, New York City, and the Canadian War Mission, 17 October 1920, op. cit.

56.) PAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Reel C-4329, pp. 50739-50740, L.C. Christie, Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 2 August 1919. The strengthening of the Department of External Affairs by enhancing its ability to control the conduct of Canada's foreign relations was part and parcel of the steps Christie thought had to be taken on the road to international status. In this case, the Prime Minister accepted and implemented the Privy Council to the Department of External Affairs to Governor General's Office route suggested by Christie. See Ibid., pp. 50810-50811, R.L. Borden to N.W. Rowell, 1 October 1919.

57.) Christie consistently was concerned with expanding the role and capabilities of the Department of External Affairs, especially by increasing its access to relevant information. He was sent to London in the spring of 1920, for example, to find remedies for what was termed Ottawa's lack of "adequate information on important points of high policy." As a result of the trip Christie recommended "as a possible basis for discussion" the establishment of a post in London for a Department of External Affairs officer who would serve as a liaison between Ottawa and London and also would act in a similar capacity with the Secretariat of the League of Nations and the other British members of the League. This officer's duty would be to gather information from all of these sources, but in particular he would "transmit to Ottawa copies of the Cabinet and Foreign Office reports, memoranda and papers on foreign affairs which are circulated to the Cabinet. Christie also suggested that Ottawa should study the organization of the Foreign Office as a model for its own external relations machinery and develop cyphers to use in communication between Ottawa and London and Ottawa and Washington.

Christie also suggested that Ottawa begin to use its High Commissioner in London to more advantage and in a quasi-diplomatic manner. "I would suggest," Christie wrote,

"that more use of the High Commissioner be used in dealing

with the League of Nations, so long as at all events the Secretariat of the League is maintained in London. In particular he might well be designated as the medium of communication between the Government and the League; that is to say, while communications should be formally addressed as heretofore to the Prime Minister, they should be transmitted and replied to through the High Commissioner. The course proposed would simply be in accord with this practice. It also should result in greater expedition and better knowledge of what the League is doing; for the High Commissioner with the support implied in this method of procedure will have a higher standing in meeting those concerned with the League and should therefore be in a position to acquire in an informal way and transmit to Ottawa much information of use to the government. Nothing in this proposal need in any way lead to divergences in view between different parts of the Empire nor prevent the sort of consultation suggested in the Colonial Secretary's telegram of January 22nd. Finally it is submitted that anything which increases the High Commissioner's responsibilities and influence in London is of distinct advantage to the Dominion Government."

See PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 2, Folder 1, pp. 1075-1084, L.C. Christie, Report No.1 on Visit to England, March April, 1920, 6 May 1920.

58.) PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 799, File 522, L.C. Christie, Canadian Diplomatic Representation at Washington - Draft Clauses for an Order in Council, 30 September 1919. These draft clauses indicate that Christie wanted the Canadian Minister to hit the ground running in Washington and immediately assume control of negotiations then in process with the United States, be the sole channel of communication between the United States government and Ottawa, and be the sole channel of communication between the British Embassy in Washington and Ottawa.

59.) Ibid. L.C. Christie, Notes on the Title and Status of the Proposed Canadian Representative at Washington, 19 September 1919.

60.) Ibid. Christie also added that the traditional manner in which the term was used in intra-imperial relations was a point against its use in the case of representation at Washington. "The use of the title High Commissioner for the Canadian representative in London" he argued, "can scarcely afford a special reason for its use in Washington. Indeed its use in London, considering that it carries no diplomatic status, might be said to afford a reason for not using it in Washington. Ill disposed persons in Canada and elsewhere might make the point of it that it would be just as well to avoid."

61.) Ibid.

62.) L.C. Christie, Canadian Diplomatic Representation at

Washington - Draft Clauses for an Order in Council, 30 September 1919, op. cit. Even while professing the need for such intimate collaboration, however, Christie felt it necessary to again refute any possible basis for anyone to assume that the Canadian Minister was subordinate to the British Ambassador. "Any matter which they would be unable to adjust between themselves," Christie wrote in the last sentence of the clause quoted here, "shall be referred to their respective Governments for settlement."

Christie did his best in this clause to invoke the spirit of imperial cooperation that had developed during the war. "The first paragraph of clause 6," he explained to Borden, "is modelled on the language of the last part of the constitutional Resolution [Resolution IX] of the Imperial War Conference, 1917. There may perhaps be a certain advantage and convenience in adapting this formula to the present case." It is open to question whether Christie was seeking to promote imperial cooperation with this formulation, or was, instead, employing the usage in an attempt to put pressure on London to follow the pledge it had suscribed to in 1917. See PAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Reel C-4336, p. 58188, L.C. Christie, Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 30 September 1919.

63.) Christie continued to see imperial cohesiveness -- not amalgamation -- as a necessary political goal for Canada and believed that the appointment of a Canadian Minister should be done in a matter that did not make the goal of imperial cooperation more difficult to attain. Close cooperation with London in establishing a diplomatic presence, Christie wrote, "emphasizes the solidarity of the Empire and is calculated to avoid giving the Americans opportunities to play off one part of the Empire against another. They would be inclined to try this -- in a spirit of puck if for no other reason." See PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 799, File 522, L.C. Christie, Canadian Representative at Washington - Memorandum on Proposal made in Colonial Secretary's Telegram of October 28, 1919, 6 December 1919.

64.) L. Clark, (ed.), DCER, III, Document 8, pp. 7-9, Governor General to Colonial Secretary, 3 October 1919. The content of this telegram is almost identical to the suggestions Christie made in his Draft Clauses for an Order in Council, 30 September 1919, op. cit.

65.) L. Clark, (ed.), DCER, III, Document 9, Colonial Secretary to Governor General, 28 October 1919. In reality, Milner barely made an effort to disguise what he was up to in so far as independent Canadian representation in Washington was concerned. After suggesting that the Canadian Minister take charge of the British Embassy in the absence of London's envoy, Milner wrote that,

"In order to carry out this policy it would be essential that the Minister should reside and have his offices within

the precincts of the Embassy and that his Canadian staff, appointed like himself on the recommendation of the Canadian Government, should have diplomatic status and be regarded as part of the diplomatic staff of His Majesty's Embassy with rank equivalent to that of their British colleagues of corresponding grades. In this way the solidarity of the Empire would be maintained and emphasized which could hardly be the case if a diplomatic agent for the Dominion of Canada were accredited independent to the President of the United States"

It should also be noted that Christie wanted no part of Milner's idea that the Canadian Minister should act in place of the British Ambassador and for the Empire as a whole when the latter was absent from Washington. "To be frank," Christie wrote to Eustace Percy early in 1919,

"I do not quite understand what you mean by suggesting that a Dominion envoy 'would claim the right to go to the Government to which he was accredited and to urge upon that Government the views of his Dominion with the whole force of his status as a representative of the British Empire as a whole.' I know of nothing in past experience to justify this apprehension, and I cannot imagine a Canadian posing as anything but a Canadian for the purpose of pressing the views of the Canadian Government. Many Canadians would indeed feel that they might even be more effective by confining themselves rigidly to that role."

See L.C. Christie to Eustace Percy, 18 February 1919 as quoted in Alex Inglis, "South By East. A Few Steps on the Road to Washington," External Affairs, XX, 12 (December, 1968), p. 531.

66.) L.C. Christie, Canadian Representative at Washington - Memorandum on Proposal made in Colonial Secretary's Telegram of October 28, 1919, 6 December 1919, op. cit. Christie was anxious to get out from under British control in external affairs and avoid circumstances in which Canada would be bound by decisions made and taken by a representative of the United Kingdom. The two questions involved -- status and responsibility -- were central for Christie and he deemed them unattainable for Canada if its representatives were always under London's diplomatic jurisdiction. For this reason, for example, he argued in early 1920 against Ottawa participating in the selection of the British member of the Council of the League of Nations because it would unavoidably blur Canada's international personality and entangle her in foreign commitments that she neither wanted nor was equipped to handle.

"The 'British Empire' is named as one of the Members of the League of Nations entitled to permanent representation on the Council. At first sight therefore it might be said that all parts of the Empire should join in the naming of the Representative who will from time to time sit on the

Council. This simple solution has however far-reaching consequences that demand careful consideration before any step is taken.

If we [Canada] demand the right to join in the selection of the representative, we admit that he represents Canada, and we become responsible to that extent for any action he might take. It may be said that he will only be at the Council to give his assent to any proposal ad referendum. Possibly the Council will work that way at times; but it will not do so always. And even so the consideration that we have in fact deputed him will make it exceedingly difficult for us to avoid responsibility for what he may do.

Hitherto our attitude has been, broadly speaking, that we are like a small Power; that we have only special interests; that we do not desire to assert that we have a general interest; that we do not interest ourselves in everything that happens anywhere in the world. The proposal to demand a voice in the selection of the Representative on the Council implies a complete reversal of this attitude.

We secured the right under Article 4 (paragraph 5) of the Covenant to a Canadian representative at the Council when Canadian interests are under consideration. If we join in appointing the permanent British Representative, he becomes our Representative and we imperil our right to send a Representative. ...

It must be apparent that even if it were agreed that the Dominions should join in the nomination of the British Representative, yet in practice it would be a highly formal and perfunctory affair in the present state of Imperial political machinery. It is difficult -- indeed, one might say impossible -- to conceive circumstances in which a Dominion would propose to veto the nominee of the United Kingdom. There are no real practical advantages to be gained from the step; while it has possibilities of real disadvantage; it weakens our position in respect of distinctive representation among other nations in the League, and it commits us (if we are really to be in earnest about the matter) to worldwide responsibilities with which under present conditions of Imperial organization we are not prepared to cope...."

See PAC, MG 27 II D13, N.W. Rowell Papers, Volume 8, Folder 38, L.C. Christie, Memorandum for the Cabinet: British Representation on the Council of the League of Nations, 9 February 1920, and L. Clark, (ed.), DCER, III, Document 349, pp. 395-396.

67.) L.C. Christie, Canadian Representative at Washington - Memorandum on Proposal made in Colonial Secretary's Telegram of October 28, 1919, 6 December 1919, op. cit. Christie's commentary and suggestions on Milner's telegram -- especially

regarding the possibility of the Canadian Minister representing the Empire in the British Ambassador's absence -- are not unlike those expressed by Liberal Party leader Mackenzie King in Parliament in mid-May, 1920. This is an early indication of a certain similarity of views on some aspects of foreign relations between the two men. It also suggests that had not King distrusted Christie's Tory associations, they may have been able to work together effectively on external matters after the former became prime minister. For King's attitude regarding the suitable role for a Canadian diplomatic representative in Washington see C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, Volume I: 1867-1921, op. cit., pp. 316-317.

68.) L.C. Christie, Canadian Representative at Washington - Memorandum on Proposal made in Colonial Secretary's Telegram of October 28, 1919, 6 December 1919, op. cit.

69.) Another argument used by Christie to keep Borden moving ahead was to assure him that the British were not reacting negatively to either the idea of distinct Canadian representation or to the pace at which its establishment was progressing. After a visit to Washington in October 1919, for example, he related the British Embassy's reaction to the idea of a Canadian diplomatic agent in a memorandum saying,

"I had some informal conversation with Sir William Tyrell [Ambassador Grey's private secretary] and Mr. Lindsay [Charge d'Affaires] on the subject. Neither of them seemed in the least startled by the proposal; nor did they suggest in any way that there would be any difficulty either legally or practically. Both thought the scheme workable provided there was good will on both sides and the right men were appointed. Sir William Tyrell entirely recognized that the importance and political status of Canada made the step necessary; and he argued it ought to be tried. ..."

See PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 799, File 522, L.C. Christie, Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 15 October 1919.

70.) For the antipathy among some members of Borden's Cabinet toward creating Canadian diplomatic representation at Washington see John S. Galbraith. The Establishment of Canadian Diplomatic Status at Washington. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1951, p. 72, and Robert Bothwell, "Canadian Representation at Washington: A Study in Colonial Responsibility," Canadian Historical Review, LII, 2 (June, 1972), p. 143.

71.) Another factor which probably moved Christie to be careful to keep things on an even keel and at a steady pace was the uncertain status of Borden's health and personal political future after he suffered a physical and emotional breakdown of sorts late in 1919. "Sir Robert's breakdown is a most unfortunate affair," Christie wrote to Philip Kerr.

"He's worn out; I could see it coming. But I think he has stopped in time. He took the best medical advice going and was told if he went on even a few months longer he would end in a complete nervous collapse, that only his splendid heredity had saved him so far, and that he must quit entirely. So he told the Cabinet he would have to resign. After much discussion and the discovery of the fact that they couldn't agree on anyone else without a possible split and a general mess they united in asking him to remain as nominal head for 5 or 6 months on the condition that he should have this much rest and then come back and decide himself whether he could go on. I don't believe myself that he will be able to take on such duties, though I think he could manage a non-political office perfectly well. The Cabinet and Unionist party certainly needed a breathing space in which to take stock and make up their minds, and it would be hard to find any other way to get it; but it might by some chance result in a situation that would be very awkward and unfair to him."

Given the uncertain future of both Borden and his government, Christie may have seen the duration of the Borden's personal tenure as the remaining period in which forward strides toward enhanced international status for Canada could be made quickly. In addition, Christie probably felt that Borden's popularity among Canadians generally -- "his character has commanded a remarkable confidence on the part of his country" he wrote on one occasion -- also would help smooth the acceptance of the more independent status that was being sought for Canada. He therefore presented Borden with as non-contentious a package as possible, but presented it at the fastest reasonable pace for, as he told Frankfurter, what would happen after Borden's recuperative period had given "his supporters a breathing space to collect their woolly wits" was "altogether in the lap of the gods." See L.C. Christie to Philip Kerr, 12 January 1920, op. cit. and Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 13 May 1921 and L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 22 December 1919.

72.) L.C. Christie, Notes on the Title and Status of the Proposed Canadian Representative at Washington, 19 September 1919. op. cit.

73.) It must be admitted that several of the other Dominions -- particularly Australia and New Zealand -- and Prime Minister Meighen himself showed little if any enthusiasm for convoking a constitutional conference, and so the British did not bear all of the responsibility for the failure in this regard.

Chapter IV: Drift and Frustration: Loring Christie and Canadian External Policy, 1921-1923

"The rub is they won't decide," Christie wrote to Frankfurter in the fall of 1921.¹ Christie was speaking here, in part, of the refusal of Dominion statesmen to finally settle the future course of imperial relations by convening the constitutional conference called for in Resolution IX of the Imperial War Conference of 1917. More especially, however, he was deploring his own government's failure to step out smartly after the completion of the Versailles settlement and take better advantage of all available opportunities for assuming full responsibility for the conduct of its own external relations.

Christie began the period between 1921 and 1923 with great expectations, but several significant disappointments in these years left him with an overall sense of frustration. Christie's faith in the longterm viability of both the British imperial system and the League of Nations slipped considerably; the former for the reason noted above and the latter for what Christie considered to be its increasingly Euro-centric focus. At the same time, he feared that Ottawa's failure to establish diplomatic representation in the United States and build an organization and machinery in the Department of External Affairs competent to carry on the nation's foreign relations had seriously limited Canada's ability to protect adequately its national interests. By the spring of 1923 a combination of all of these factors, together with Mackenzie King's unwillingness to use him to the extent and in the manner that Borden and Meighen

had, led him to resign from the Canadian public service and enter the employ of Sir James Dunn in London.

In the National Interest: Christie and the Imperial Conference of 1921 and the Washington Conference

On his way back to Canada after attending the League of Nation's Assembly in Geneva, Christie visited England in early January 1921 during which he held discussions to discuss the organization of the Foreign Office and imperial foreign policy matters with Lord Curzon and Lloyd George. As a result of these conversations Christie was prompted to turn his attention to the problem posed for both Canada and the Empire by the upcoming decision regarding the future of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Christie held that decision to be "one of the most important now confronting the Empire"² "The Alliance," he wrote,

as time goes on and the significance of the recent new distribution and shifting of forces and interests in the world becomes more sharply realised I venture to think that no decision will appear to have been more vital than the decision to be taken this year on the renewal or termination of the Alliance, for on the one hand it has a direct bearing on the possibility of an English speaking concord and on the other it may have incalculable effects on the bonds of sympathy and understanding within the Empire itself....³

When he first began to consider the future of the Alliance Christie's ideas turned on the welfare of the Empire; that is, how the renewal or termination of the Alliance would affect the unity and viability of the imperial system. Not far into the process, however, his estimations and advice began to change in regard to the ultimate goal toward which Ottawa should aim in its consideration of the Alliance. The Empire and its future

continued to bulk large in Christie's analysis, but, at bottom, the object of his deliberations regarding the Alliance -- as well as the Imperial Conference of 1921 and the Washington Conference that followed it -- were all aimed at securing what was in the best interest of the Canadian nation, whether or not that interest coincided with those of Great Britain and the other Dominions. Whereas Professor Michael Fry has written that "to be a junior partner in the North Atlantic Triangle" was the "summit of Canadian desires," it seems that for Christie -- who Fry categorizes as a dedicated "Atlanticist" -- the intention was not to blur the distinctiveness of Canada in the role of a "junior partner" but to express and protect the nation's interests as completely as possible.⁴

In a memorandum of February 1, 1921, Christie told Meighen that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had been formed in 1902 in the interests of preserving peace and maintaining the status quo in the Far East, of protecting the independence and territorial integrity of China and keeping the "open door" there, and of isolating "the pending struggle between Russia and Japan and the prevention of Armageddon in Europe." The Alliance was renewed in 1905 with the first two sets of considerations remaining intact, but with the strategic emphasis of the Alliance, from Britain's point of view, altered. The Alliance now concentrated on maintaining British friendship with Japan in order to counter the Russian threat to Britain's interests in India and to foreclose the possibility of a Japanese-German combination. In 1911, the Alliance was once again renewed with the two original objectives

still in place, but with yet another revision of its strategic purpose. By 1911, Russia and Japan had come to a working agreement over Manchuria and Britain had protected its interests in India by concluding a modus vivendi with Russia in regard to both Persia and Afghanistan. Britain's aim in the 1911 renewal therefore was to free its strategic hand by reducing British naval and military liabilities in the East in order to meet the developing crisis in Europe. The Dominions concurred in the last renewal of the Alliance at the Imperial Conference of 1911 -- with Australia abstaining -- after a stipulation was included in the treaty stating clearly that that the British Empire "in no sense contemplated a war against the United States as being in any way involved in the Alliance."⁵

After this brief sketch of the Alliance's history, Christie concluded that in so far as the deepening European crisis was concerned "the Alliance may be said to have served its purpose well," but that "because of the radical changes in the position of the world brought about by the events of the past six years" the value of the Treaty must be reevaluated thoroughly. The most prominent of these "radical changes," according to Christie, was the disappearance of the threat posed to Britain by the Russian and German empires and the consequent lack of "convincing reasons for it [the Anglo-Japanese Alliance] in the European situation." "On this score," he wrote, "... it is better to hold to the traditional British attitude, to avoid alliances until driven to them by the practical necessities of a clearly felt crisis."⁶

Christie also found considerable fault with the Alliance's basic Far Eastern aspects and goals in the postwar international environment. He argued that the Alliance had never had much influence on restraining Japanese designs on China -- "the Chinese certainly do not think so," he wrote -- and that such a goal was in itself "a weak and uncertain basis for an Alliance" Because Japanese designs on China and other areas of the Asian mainland were unlikely to abate, Christie warned that

(t)he danger is therefore that we may really, because of the Alliance, find ourselves in some sense implicated in a spoliation of China; for the thing cuts both ways; we cannot always be restraining our Ally, and by yielding here and there we may gradually become party to a complete Japanese hegemony in the Far East over which our influence will be of the most illusory sort

Beyond Britain's inability to control or even limit Japan's Chinese ambitions through the Alliance, and the resulting danger of complicity through association, Christie believed that the renewal of the Alliance would have unfortunate repercussions on the interests of other powers in the Far East. In this regard, he thought that the attitude of the United States toward the Alliance was a matter of paramount concern for both Canada and the Empire. The United States, Christie explained to Meighen,

is concerned in the Far East, greatly concerned and in a special way. It is not merely an academic concern; there is a great body of feeling and opinion in the United States that has made her interest in this part of the world, and especially in China, political in a real sense, however uncertain and ineffective it has been in practice. This is indeed the only sphere outside the Western Hemisphere in which she has ever manifested such an interest, and she now regards it as part of her traditional foreign policy. If there is to be balancing we must admit that her interest there is at least equal to ours. We may be certain that her interest will not abate. And the Alliance, always something of a stumbling block in the way of British-American concord, will not prove less so now that Armageddon has removed the

bases of the extra-Eastern motives -- i.e., Germany, Russia, the European crisis generally -- that made it in the event sufficiently intelligible to Americans. In these circumstances the case for renewal becomes still more doubtful.

Besides possibly being perceived as a threat to the Far Eastern political and commercial interests of the United States, Christie also said that the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance also might be viewed by Washington as an attempt by two of the three vigorous powers remaining in the postwar world -- the United States being the third -- to form a "special confidential relationship" in the Far East threatening to it militarily. This interpretation was made especially possible because of the "growing lack of cordiality" in postwar Japanese-American relations. Even though renewal in any form would have to be made so as to include a disclaimer explicitly stating that the Alliance "could never be interpreted to involve us in any opposition to the United States," Christie did not believe that this would placate American sensitivities.

One may doubt the real effectiveness of such a stipulation; our joint policy with the Japanese might well in the course of years land us insensibly in a state of opposition; the Japanese of course would see to that as far as they were able. But in any case, whatever formal stipulation of this sort may be made, it would never in its effect upon public opinion equal the weight of the Alliance itself; the mere fact of the special relationship would remain; always we should be on the defensive in the arts of explanation even with our well-wishers in the United States. In time they might indeed be found saying to us: "Given the choice of friendships in this new state of the world you chose the yellow man rather than us." We constantly say that the cardinal feature of our [the Empire's] foreign policy is our desire for an English speaking concord. It deserves every consideration whether the decision on this question to be taken this year may not, in reality prove to be a turning point in our relations.

Having spelled out for Meighen the dangers he considered to

be inherent in renewal, Christie suggested that the most workable solution for the dilemma posed by the uncertain future of the Alliance would be to arrange for a conference of all Pacific powers -- Japan, China, the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand -- to discuss security concerns in the region. Such a conference would allow the Empire to "reconcile our position in respect of the United States" and at the same time "enable us to terminate the Japanese Alliance with good grace." In order to discover if such a conference was feasible, it was important to establish in the period of weeks remaining before the convening of the Imperial Conference in London in June, 1921 whether the United States would agree to participate.

How should the matter be approached? Obviously since the proposal involves the termination of the Alliance, the soundings must commence on the part of the British Empire. But more specifically, since the Pacific Dominions are really more vitally concerned than Great Britain or the other parts of the Empire, and since Canada by association and outlook seems better equipped to talk to the United States than others are, the initiative should come from Canada and the approach to the American Government be made by His Majesty's Canadian Government.

In short it is submitted that as soon as the new President and his Secretary of State [Warren Harding and Charles Evans Hughes, respectively] are installed, a representative of the Canadian Government should get in touch with them, place the whole position before them in conversations of the greatest frankness, and endeavor to discover whether some such course as that sketched above [that is, a Pacific Conference] is feasible. That having been done, the meeting of the Prime Ministers in June would be in a position to discuss realities.¹⁰

It is interesting to note that Christie's first approach to Meighen on the matter of the Alliance was phrased almost exclusively in terms of the Empire's best interests, and not solely in terms of Canada's national interests, aside from the

definite inference that as a Pacific Dominion Canada's interests were greater than those of the "other parts of the Empire."¹¹ Clearly, Christie was saying by implication that such a course of action by the Empire also was in Canada's national interest, but overall the effort he suggested seems to have been aimed at making a consultative and cooperative imperial foreign policy workable. The closest he came to discussing Canada's individual interest in seeing the Alliance terminated was to remind Meighen -- as he would do again later in regard to his opinion that Canada was becoming too closely tied to the exclusive affairs of Europe by its obligations to the League of Nations -- that Canada and the other Dominions "have an instinctive reluctance to committing themselves to the largely incalculable liabilities and consequences of such a partnership [as the Anglo-Japanese Alliance]." He believed that Britain was "somewhat less" reluctant to be committed to an alliance, but said that through cooperation and consultation the differing positions of Britain and the Dominions could be reconciled.¹² As will be seen, however, London's attitude, as it was expressed in trans-Atlantic cable communications, quickly brought Christie to reevaluate the imperially oriented manner in which he was approaching the question of renewal.

Christie's long memorandum on the Alliance persuaded Prime Minister Meighen that it should be terminated, and convinced him that the United States should be approached prior to the Imperial Conference concerning the possibility of its participation in a conference of Pacific powers.¹³ In a telegram to Lloyd George on

15 February 1921, Meighen outlined his Christie-inspired objections to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty and said that Canada believed, in the interest of Anglo-American amity, that the Alliance should not be renewed and in its place a Pacific conference should be convened for "the purpose of adjusting Pacific and Far Eastern questions."¹⁴ "In any case," Meighen continued

it seems highly important to know in advance of the June meeting [of the Imperial Conference] what is possible in this direction in order that the whole program may be fairly considered then. Accordingly we suggest that a representative of the Canadian Government should get in touch with the new President and his Secretary of State as soon as possible after their inauguration and discover through informal confidential conversations whether any such policy is feasible. For this purpose I nominate Sir Robert Borden who has agreed to act.

This method of approach seems most appropriate, first, because the concern of the Pacific Dominions in the question is more vital than that of the other parts of the Empire, and, second, because the proposal seems best calculated to succeed in Washington if put forward by Canada. We attach importance to the idea of putting it forward as looking to a Pacific Conference.¹⁵

Lloyd George's response to the Canadian initiative proposed by Meighen was, to say the least, not encouraging. After somewhat patronizingly reassuring the Canadians that London too was in the midst of considering what action to take regarding the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the British Prime Minister argued that "there are certain considerations to be urged against the immediate adoption of your proposal" He suggested that to consult the United States beforehand, for example, might "prejudice [the] complete liberty of action of the forthcoming Imperial Conference ... especially if it was favourably regarded by Washington."¹⁶ Overall, Lloyd George

wrote, it was his government's opinion that

while there is much to be said for a [Pacific] Conference of this description as a possible ultimate solution there are very many questions to settle before the decision to make such a proposal could be reached. Questions at issue affect [the] international position of Great Britain and the general foreign policy of the Empire. They are inseparably bound up with disarmament, Naval Shipbuilding, [and] future of the League of Nations and its disarmament programme. Various expert committees have been sitting for some months in this country considering various political, economic, military and naval issues involved with the object of placing members of the Imperial Cabinet in possession of all the considerations necessary to enable them to arrive at a judgment.¹⁷

In this light, Lloyd George contended that the Canadian proposal be shelved until the matter could be discussed at the Imperial Conference by all the governments of the Empire. In the meantime, and as a bit of a sop, he invited Meighen to send Sir Robert Borden to London for "an interchange of views."¹⁸

The obvious inference in Lloyd George's telegram was that London had not yet decided that it was in Britain's best interest to abrogate the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. This message -- plus, one suspects, the arrogant and superior tone of the cable -- caused Christie to abandon his attempt to view the question of renewal solely from the imperial perspective and instead to substitute what he considered to be Canada's national interests in the matter. In the first instance, he rejected the British contention that prior consultations with the Americans might limit the freedom of action of the Imperial Conference, and argued that, quite to the contrary, it would be the failure to consult Washington before the June meeting that would limit the conferees' scope of action by leaving renewal as the only option available to them. To know the Americans' attitude beforehand,

Christie wrote, would allow events at the conference to be "so shaped that when the turning point is reached the meeting may be freer to go in one direction than in the other; and the real question is whether the one is more desirable than the other -- whether, to be specific, it is more desirable to move toward a policy of British-American co-operation or away from it."

Christie said that the notion that increased Anglo-American friendship and cooperation must be facilitated was precisely the position that Canada should be defending, and he rejected the telegram's intimation that it would be a cause for regret if the actions of the Imperial Conference were limited by a favorable response from Washington to a proposal for a conference of Pacific powers.¹⁹

Christie also rejected Lloyd George's contention that discussions and cooperation with the United States had to await international agreements on disarmament, naval shipbuilding, and the future of the League of Nations and its disarmament program. He wrote that agreement on any of these topics in the next year was "impossible to imagine" and if the Empire's Prime Ministers were to delay action on either the Alliance or a Pacific Conference on account of the unsettled nature of these factors "they will wait long indeed." Christie maintained that this position was simply another that would have the effect of failing to prompt the Americans in the direction of international involvement and cooperation with Britain, and, worse yet, of allowing the alliance with Japan to continue indefinitely.²⁰

An even more basic problem for Christie was the fact that he

discerned no necessary connection between the issues enumerated by Lloyd George and a decision concerning the future of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance unless the British meant to infer that "the decision on the Alliance is to depend on whether the United States goes in for a policy of disarmament, co-operation with the League of Nations and so on." Lloyd George's telegram seemed to be saying, Christie wrote, that

If they [the United States] do, it is possible to consider termination of the Alliance and to promote British-American co-operation. If they do not, we had better hold on to the Alliance. In short we may need the Japanese to throw in our balance against the power of the United States. If this is not what is meant by the posing of these questions it is difficult to see what bearing they have. And if this is meant, it must be realized at once that we are faced with an utterly new reason for the Japanese Alliance and with an utterly new outlook on our relations with the United States. First it was the Russian menace that gave the real motive for the Alliance; next it was the German menace; now it is to be the American menace. The Alliance is to be lifted out of its character of a Far Eastern arrangement and it is to be the pivot of a new world alignment. The Japanese are to be brought West.²¹

In addition, Christie noted, the British seemed to be indicating that they alone were competent to decide what course of action should be adopted by the Empire in regard to renewal. This idea he rejected out of hand, arguing that Ottawa was well aware of the issues and dangers involved in the question of renewal and that it neither needed nor desired the guidance of anyone else in deciding what was in the Canadian national interest.

The telegram states that "various expert committees have been sitting for some months in this country ... with the object of placing the members of the Imperial Cabinet in possession of all the considerations necessary to enable them to arrive at a judgment." This is offered as a reason for delay. It is for consideration whether "expert committees" sitting in London are likely to hit upon all the considerations essential to a judgment upon our relations with the United States and upon American opinion and

tendencies, or even to hit upon any of the important considerations. It is for consideration whether the Canadian Government need wait to discover elsewhere than in Canada the information upon which to judge the question and whether any encouragement should be given to a tendency that involves a complete reversal of our century-old foreign policy toward the United States....²²

It seems apparent that Lloyd George's response to Meighen's initial telegram undercut much of what Christie had thought had been established in regard to intra-imperial consultation as a result of wartime experience and the declaration of the Imperial War Conference of 1917. The response, he wrote, ignored both the need for actively promoting Anglo-American cooperation and the valid point that the Dominions were more vitally concerned with events in the Pacific region than was the United Kingdom and that their views should therefore be heeded by London. Likewise Lloyd George gave no recognition whatsoever to Meighen's claim that Canada had both a special concern for facilitating British-American friendship and a unique potential for serving as a interlocuter between London and Washington. "From these considerations," Christie asserted that, "the impression arises that it is the desire and intention [of the British Government] if possible to confine the control of all policy and all operations in this matter to London." The desire to establish policy for the entire Empire amounted for Christie to the throwing down of a gauntlet. He insisted that none of Lloyd George's objections to the Canadian initiative were relevant, and said that, indeed, as a result of the British response and "in view of the tendencies now disclosed, it has become all the more important to go ahead along the lines of that [Meighen's]

proposal."²³

Livid at Lloyd George's response to Meighen -- probably particularly so because he had always judged Lloyd George to be the best informed and most innovative of British statesmen on the subject of imperial relations -- Christie now began to phrase Canada's dilemma regarding the Alliance strictly in terms of the country's national interest. "Canada's interest in the question," he wrote,

as a Pacific Dominion, is certainly more vital than that of Great Britain (for in this comparison we are entitled to weigh the welfare of the Canadian people against that of the people of Great Britain, rather than against the value of Great Britain's possessions); Canada's interests, as the next door neighbour of the United States, is overwhelming as compared to that of Great Britain or of any other part of the Empire; and her knowledge and qualifications for dealing with the Americans are by the same token superior to those of the other parts of the Empire and should be called into play. On these grounds the Canadian Government is entitled to take a very strong line.

The suggestion is made [by Lloyd George] that the other Dominions should be consulted before the proposal is "approved". But this misconceives the real nature of the [Canadian] proposal. The actual proposal is that the Secretary of State and the President of the United States should be sounded, purely informally, by a Canadian representative, not on behalf of the Empire, but on behalf of the Canadian Government or the Prime Minister, for the latter's information, in order that he may be able at the June meeting to discuss the question of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance adequately and with some chance of avoiding an outcome that would commit Canada by default to an undesirable arrangement. There is therefore no obligation to consult the other Dominions or Great Britain; and there is no compelling reason why the Canadian Government should not act according to its own judgment. On practical grounds and in view of the tendencies disclosed it would seem best to act without further consultation.²⁴

Although Christie argued that this was indeed a chance to draw the United States into cooperation with the British Empire in perhaps the only extra-Western Hemisphere region in which

Washington was interested, namely the Pacific, his memorandum amounted to nothing less than a bald assertion that Canada's national interest, that is the termination of the Alliance and the opening of discussions with the United States about Pacific affairs, should be proceeded with despite London's disapproval and opposition and without the concurrence of the other Dominions. In almost the first instance since the end of the war in which London called on Ottawa to engage in consultations with it and the other Dominions -- the raison d'être of Resolution IX -- Christie balked at the request because he saw it as a denial of Canada's national interests and not as an attempt to facilitate the formulation of a common imperial foreign policy. In his enraged reaction to London's call for consultation almost certainly lies the first break -- a disconnection that was prefaced by the failure to convene an imperial constitutional conference in the immediate postwar period -- in Christie's allegiance to plans for developing a new, modernized, and consultative imperial system. Significantly, when it came down to a choice between consultation that might lead to the formulation of a common imperial foreign policy and the protection of Canada's national interests, Christie clearly chose the latter without hesitation.

As matters worked out, however, Christie was unable to persuade Meighen to communicate to Lloyd George and his colleagues the points he made in his memorandum with anything approaching their original vigour, or with their stark and uninhibited description of Canada's national interests. Meighen

did indeed rehearse the list of objections to Lloyd George's telegram that Christie had enumerated -- i.e., early discussions with Washington would preserve not deny the Imperial Conference its freedom of action, the necessity of settling the future of the Alliance before disarmament and naval shipbuilding could be addressed, the implicit and for Canada totally unacceptable idea that London intended to use the Alliance as a lever against the United States, which Meighen rather lamely termed a "radical departure"; and Canada's unique interest in the whole matter -- but he did it without emphasis, and, indeed, in the tone of a schoolboy who was having difficulty getting his point across. Ottawa's return telegram contained no more of an ultimatum than to strongly suggest that it "might become necessary [for Canada] to consider an alternative solution by which only those parts of the Empire desiring to should join in the renewal"²⁵

Meighen's response arrived in London in the midst of the labour crisis of 1921 and Churchill, the Colonial Secretary, wired that a response would have to be delayed because of the domestic turmoil.²⁶ When the reply did come on 26 April, it was an even more complete rejection of the Canadian position than had been sent earlier. After another matter-of-fact reassurance that renewal "in any form will be left open until the June Meeting of the Imperial Cabinet, "²⁷ the cable noted that the

Proposal as to [a] Conference of Pacific Powers is one which may well be discussed by [the] Imperial Cabinet, but it is impossible for us to prejudge at this stage in view of the attitude adopted by Australia. Mean while we would simply urge [that the] Canadian Government should not approach [the] Government of the United States independently at this stage; later on, if consultation with America becomes necessary we shall be glad to profit by [the] offer of [the]

services of your Government, when definite policy has been decided upon.²⁸

Christie clearly was outraged over the Colonial Secretary's refusal to more than barely recognize the points that Ottawa was making in its telegrams, but it also is clear that he recognized that Meighen was not willing to carry the matter forward in the strictly Canadian-oriented manner that he had been urging.²⁹ After the receipt of Churchill's telegram in April, Christie again altered his tack in advising Meighen and once again began stressing the Empire's interest in terminating the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and to begin seeking, in lieu of the Alliance, to cultivate cooperative relations with the United States in the Pacific region. His effort to convince Meighen that termination was an imperial necessity was reminiscent of his attempt to underscore for Borden the notion that a distinctive Canadian diplomatic representative at Washington would be an acceptable and consistent development within the imperial framework. In both cases, Christie cloaked his arguments for the national interest in the garb of Empire. During the six weeks prior to the opening of the Imperial Conference in London, Christie repeatedly emphasized for Meighen the argument against renewal from the imperial perspective. "Nothing can be of more importance," he told the Prime Minister,

than the promotion of a policy and habit of co-operation between the British Empire and the United States. The way to begin such a policy is to begin it or at least to try, and to do so as soon as possible. The United States are -- quite naturally -- showing their disinclination to participate in European politics; and there seems little likelihood that their relation to any universal association will for a long time be of more than a superficial nature. On the other hand they are actually taking, and undoubtedly

will continue to take, an active part in Pacific affairs. This is a region in which the British Empire is naturally deeply concerned; it has indeed often been said that it will be the chief theatre of our action in the future. Practically therefore it offers the only present field of co-operation; while this question of the Japanese Alliance provides an occasion for practical steps in the immediate future. It would seem the part of wisdom to recognise these considerations and make every effort to seize the opportunity. This cannot prejudice the chances of wider co-operation in the future, but on the contrary may further them. The proposal is in the direct line of our dealings and methods so far as Canada and the United States are concerned. The issue raised seems fairly plain, and it seems not too much to say that everything considered no issue today can be graver. The decision taken will be the first definitely significant step taken on our side along the road of postwar British-American relations; and its full import will consist in the indispensable effect it will have upon our future direction.³⁰

In the end, Meighen performed very well at the London conference -- indeed, he was nothing short of superb in the debates on renewal -- but he did not succeed in persuading the assembled Prime Ministers to abrogate the Alliance outright; as Professor Fry has written, the Imperial Conference of 1921 was a "partial defeat" for Meighen and had proved that "Canada could deflect but not reverse policy."³¹ Out of the conference, however, came the basis for the Washington Conference which would ultimately provide the umbrella under which the Pacific conference Meighen and Christie had been touting would take place. "So the Pacific question has on the whole gone very well," Christie wrote Borden from London. "President Harding's invitation [to a conference at Washington] seems to me to offer a great opportunity. Much depends now upon proper management, and one can only hope this will be forthcoming. ... If the Imperial Conference does nothing else its actions in this matter will more than justify its meeting this year."³² Christie also was pleased

that no major confrontation had occurred over the conduct of the naval defense of the Empire -- aside from some discussion and a bit of argument between the Admiralty and Ottawa's Naval Service on closer cooperation in the training and posting of personnel -- but was disappointed that "so many people seem inclined to go slow on the constitutional question."³³

For Christie, the Washington Conference did not have to accomplish very much substantively in order to be considered a success. What he wanted out of the Conference was an arrangement whereby the major Pacific powers would agree to consult about affairs in the region, an outcome that would permit the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and, most importantly, a start on the process of reinvolving the United States in world affairs with an accompanying habit of British-American cooperation. "I am hopeful," he wrote to N.W. Rowell just before the Conference opened,

that it [the Washington Conference] will result in some appreciable advance toward a fair and peaceful resolution of the problems with which it will deal. I do not look for any substantial advance, and on this score I am a little worried about some of the high-pitched expectations that are being indulged in by some of the publicity organs in the United States. For myself I should feel that a great deal had been done if the Conference adjourned with some appreciable result, however moderate, and with an agreement or understanding that all great questions between the Powers concerned in the Pacific would continue to be dealt with in the future by this open conference method, rather than by the older method of alliance and long distance diplomacy. It seems to me indeed, especially in view of the fact that it was the United States that have taken the lead, that the very calling of the conference constitutes in itself a great advance.³⁴

In all these hopes Christie was not disappointed and was in a particularly good position -- as Sir Robert Borden's assistant

and later, after M.P.A. Hankey was recalled to London, as the head of the British Empire Delegation's secretariat³⁵ -- to view the events of the Conference. He judged the conference to have been in sum a profitable exercise that had witnessed the "increased spirit of co-operation between the English speaking nations,"³⁶ had helped restore China to a degree of international respectability,³⁷ had created an environment in which the Anglo-Japanese Alliance could be terminated,³⁸ and began -- "for the first time in history," according to Christie -- the process of disarmament.³⁹

A second important aspect of the Washington Conference for Christie involved the status of Canada and the other Dominions at the meeting. When the United States government despatched invitations for the conference in mid-August, 1921, an invitation was sent to Great Britain but none was sent to the individual Dominions. Christie believed that this was an unintended slight, and that, in addition, London would never have considered attending the conference without Dominion participation. Despite the apparent exclusivity of the American invitation, he believed that Canada would be granted the appropriate status at the gathering "without any fuss."⁴⁰ Christie accepted the necessity of forming a British Empire Delegation for the Washington Conference similar to the one that had operated at Paris, and argued that the use of such a device would in no way detract from the status that the Dominions had attained at the Peace Conference because that status was now "an established part of our constitution and must be followed here." He concluded that

the manner in which Canada was participating in the British Empire Delegation in the case of the Washington Conference could in no way be seen to "constitute a recession from the status there [at Paris] created."⁴¹ Near the conclusion of the Washington Conference, Christie wrote that,

There has been no change in status from Paris or Versailles. The procedure has been the same as there. Thus the preamble of the Quadruple Treaty is the same as that of the Treaty of Versailles, and, as before, the Treaty was signed by the Dominion representatives on behalf of their respective Dominions. Before the King's ratification can be deposited the assent of each Dominion Government must be formally signified. In short this is the only way the British Empire can now enter into engagements. (Whether the Treaty shall be put before the Dominion Parliaments depends in each case upon the view which the Government concerned takes of the matter -- Ottawa might decide to get the approval of Parliament, while Melbourne and the rest might think it unnecessary.) The Full Powers held by the Dominion representative here follow the formula used at Paris and are based upon the same authority. Sir Robert Borden's Full Power issues to him from the King and authorises him to treat and sign "in respect of the Dominion of Canada." It is signed by the King on the authority of an Order in Council passed by the Canadian Government. So I can see no change.⁴²

Nevertheless, the debate and commentary aroused by the form of invitation issued by the United States for the Washington Conference, underscored for Christie yet again the unsettled and thus unsatisfactory state of the constitutional relationship between the United Kingdom and the Dominions. In commenting upon the draft of some lectures prepared by N.W. Rowell in the spring of 1922, for example, Christie took the author to task for criticizing the Americans for not having issued a separate invitation to the Canadian government. "About the invitation to the Washington Conference," he remarked to Rowell.

I cannot help but feeling that the matter is not quite so simple as you would suggest and that it needs a lot of

thinking out. Are you on perfectly sure ground in putting the onus on the United States Government? Has anything occurred between the British Empire and the United States that would justify them in changing the mode and channel of addressing us? Remember we are on a very formal ground, where nations always play according to the rules, and if a nation doesn't follow the rules it gets into trouble. So far as the niceties go the United States had nothing else to go on. We have never agreed with them on anything else; we have never formally notified them that there is any other way of addressing communications to the British Empire. I doubt whether we can say we have ever notified the other nations of the world to that effect. We have a formal arrangement about summonses to League meetings, about communications with the Secretariat [of the League], but the League Covenant leaves untouched the laws of diplomatic practice as they have grown up and I doubt whether any nation would feel properly justified in inviting us direct to a Conference held outside the League. I don't think they ought to until we get together and work out a new formula or method and notify them of it. I don't think we ought to permit them to do it until we make up our own minds; our constitution should grow from our own design, not from their whims. So I think the onus is on us and I don't really think we have met it. ...⁴³

Christie's letter to Rowell brought him just about full circle for the 1921-1923 period in regard to imperial relations and Canada's relations with the United States. Even after the Imperial Conference of 1921 and the Washington Conference that followed it, the Empire's constitutional relationships were not better or more permanently defined than they had been in 1919. Moreover, although agreement had been reached with both London and Washington regarding the establishment of Canadian diplomatic representation in the United States, Ottawa continued to refuse to despatch an agent. At the close of the Washington Conference, therefore, Canada was still in the position -- a position utterly unacceptable to Christie -- of being uncertain as to the course of its development as an international entity because of unresolved ambiguities in regard to its relations with the Empire

and with the United States.

A Double-Edged Sword: Christie's Growing Wariness of the League

As has been noted, Christie was pleased, and, apparently, mildly surprised at how well the League had functioned simply as an organization at its first Assembly in the fall of 1920. He had been troubled by the Euro-centric orientation of the League, however, and this apprehension deepened rapidly after he returned to Canada and reflected further on what he had observed at Geneva. "I want a talk with you about things," he wrote to Frankfurter early in 1921,

including Geneva on which several times there, in London, and here [in Ottawa] I have started to write you but each time have concluded that what I would have to say would sound so pessimistic that I had better count ten and think it over again. On the whole I rather think my present feeling is that it would be a waste of time to go there again, that there are much more vital things to bother about -- concrete things which Geneva cannot even flirt with.⁴⁴

At the time he wrote this letter, Christie had just returned from talks with British officials in London regarding the upcoming Imperial Conference upon which basis he had drafted his memorandum opposing the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. These probably were the "concrete things" that were occupying his mind and which relegated the League and its activities to the background. Nevertheless, Christie clearly saw trouble ahead regarding Canada's position in the League, and he was coming to feel that, on balance, the pluses and minuses of membership -- in so far as the international responsibilities accruing to Canada as the result of its membership were concerned -- favored continued Canadian participation only slightly.⁴⁵

Christie expressed some of his concerns before the Governing Body of the International Labour Organization (ILO) while he was in Geneva in the fall of 1920 for the League's Assembly. He prefaced his remarks by saying that the ILO had been designed to elevate working conditions throughout the world to a uniform standard.⁴⁶ He intimated that because of varying international conditions the ILO would have to discern and establish broad principles for improvement, and that those principles would have to be implemented through conventions "that should be conceived on the broadest lines, in directions that would make the most universal appeal." Instead, Christie remarked, the ILO was considering questions which had not been "sanctioned by the scope and interest of our [the ILO's] constitution." He then mentioned, as examples, such matters as primary education, Russian refugees, and inquiries into industrial production and the availability of raw materials, none of which, he contended, could "by any possibility be said to be related to any proposals for universal labour legislation" or related "to any practicable or workable international convention of universal application" Christie argued that the organization's consideration of such extra-constitutional matters threatened to dissipate the ILO's energies and decrease its power and effectiveness.⁴⁷

More dangerous than this useless diffusion of the ILO's activities, however, was the nearly exclusive focus of the organization on the affairs of Europe. The matters to which the ILO currently was devoting its attentions were, Christie said, causing it to concentrate on

one part of the world only, that is to say, the part within reach of Geneva; and this in reality means Europe, for you cannot carry on these special local activities in distant parts. It will be noticed -- and I wish especially to emphasize this -- that all these special activities really concern Europe. Finally, by so changing the orientation of the Organisation you are in danger of alienating the sympathies of nations which willingly entered into it on a definite basis.

The truth is, we are here concerned with a question of policy. Politics has been defined as the science of what is possible. My real concern is that the activities of the International Labour Organisation should be conceived on such broad practicable lines that their relation to the purposes of the Treaty may be intelligible to the Parliaments and the electorates of every part of the world
.....
48

As preparations were being made for the Third Assembly of the League scheduled for the fall of 1922, Christie also was concerned with finding some means of eliminating the automatic and openended provisions of Article 10 of the League Covenant. Believing along with most other members of the League that it would be unwise to make fundamental changes in the organization early in its existence -- and probably calculating that there were not enough votes to adopt the changes Canada wanted in any event -- Christie continued to argue that Canada had a "distinct interest" in seeing Article 10 amended. Although he pointed out that there were two sides to the guarantees provided by the Article -- indicating that he understood, if not sympathized, with French concerns that all possible measures be taken to protect France against renewed German aggression -- and that they might be adaptable to the conditions of the world as it existed, Christie's tone nevertheless indicated that he considered the Article to be potentially disrupting and dangerous to Canada's interests.

... In varying forms the objections have been that the effect [of Article 10] is to stereotype the existing state system of the world and to prejudge unheard what might be legitimate cases for a reallocation of territory; that there is an obligation to go to war; that such an undertaking in advance of the occasion, whose circumstances cannot be foreseen, is inherently impossible under modern representative institutions and therefore is futile and indeed dishonest; and that the advisory power conferred upon the Council is inconsistent with the conception of state sovereignty and parliamentary supremacy.⁴⁹

Despite the difficulties present in Article 10, Christie thought that "it seems scarcely necessary to go to the length of eliminating the Article altogether. Rather ... the [League's] enquiry should be directed to discovering the minimum change in the text that will produce the desired result; and on the other hand it should be the object to retain whatever is of value in the Article."⁵⁰ In this regard, Christie suggested that the obligation of League members to "respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members" be amended by deleting the word "preserve" while retaining the word "respect." In addition, he recommended maintaining the use of the Council of the League as the medium in which members could consult if a case of "external aggression" did arise.⁵¹ As the result of these changes, Christie suggested that Canada propose amendments to Article 10 that would make it read in the following manner.

Article 10 (proposed amendment)

The Members of the League undertake to respect the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any external aggression directed against these rights, or in the case of any danger or threat of such aggression, the Members of the League (concerned) shall consult one another fully and frankly by means of a meeting of the Council in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient measures

to be taken jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of the particular situation, and the Council shall advise upon these measures.⁵²

Christie's suggested revision would have rid Article 10's sanctions of the openended and automatic nature that both he and Borden had abhorred from its implementation in 1919. Taking the teeth out of the Article in this way was not enough for Christie, however. Fed up with both the actions of the Europeans and the European focus of the League, Christie inserted the word "concerned" in brackets in his revision of Article 10 in an attempt to segregate different regions of the earth. In this way, he sought to arrange a system in which each of the world's regions would look after its own ills, and, at the same time, to keep the world's non-European regions -- especially North America -- from being drawn into the turmoil of Europe. The effect of adding the word "concerned", Christie explained, would be

to exclude from the necessity to join in the consultation those Members of the League who, by reason of their geographical position, their political position at the moment, or for other reasons, might as a practical matter be fairly regarded as not being concerned in the particular situation. The particular situation might in essence at the time involve only a fairly well defined region of the earth, and it might appear probable that the scope of the threatened disturbance could be confined to that region. In such a case it would not seem essential to call in Members from other continents or regions; these indeed might be legitimately reluctant to intervene on the ground that they could make no useful contribution. If later the arena of the disturbance threatened to widen, or if for example it became necessary to propose a wide or universal application of the economic weapon, other Members could be called into consultation as the necessity arose. The idea is in harmony with, or perhaps is a variation of, the proposal that was mooted among certain representatives at the First Assembly and was formally proposed at the Second Assembly to the effect that the League might work through regional associations to carry out its purposes. Different groups of nations might be regarded as primarily concerned with the affairs of the different regions of the earth; hence, it is

agreed, it would be more practicable to throw on them in the first instance the responsibilities for regional matters, allowing the universal League, under whose sanction and authority they would operate, to remain in the background as a final resort.⁵³

In sum, the period between 1921 and 1923 was one in which Christie began to seek limits to Canada's international responsibilities as they were defined through membership in the League of Nations. Too much concentration on the affairs of Europe was one of Christie's main criticisms of the League, but the "automatic" nature of participation in the sanctions provided for in Articles 10 and 16 was the most fundamental and serious of his objections to the League. Just as he could not tolerate a Canadian foreign policy -- and therefore the decisions of war and peace -- designed and administered from London, Christie could not accept the idea of such a policy being run by and from Geneva. In this light, the effects of Canadian membership in the League cut two ways. The benefits in terms of international status which Canada derived from League membership were, for Christie, being quickly overshadowed by onerous and increasingly intolerable responsibilities -- such as those outlined in Articles 10 and 16 -- which might ultimately involve not only a cost in terms of men and treasure, but also in the loss of national sovereignty inherent in the automatic nature of League commitments.

Defining the National Interest: The Issue of Canadian Sovereignty in the Arctic Islands

One of the first problems that Christie dealt with after the

war which did not deal directly either with Canada's relations with the United States or with Britain and the Empire concerned the status of the islands in the Arctic Ocean claimed by Canada. In the fall of 1920, Christie was bombarded with a series of letters and memoranda from the famous Arctic explorer Vilhjalmur Stefansson discussing the legal status of Canada's Arctic islands. The explorer was, in fact, interested in more than protecting the sovereignty of the islands Canada had previously claimed; indeed, in his expositions he was attempting to persuade Ottawa to claim islands -- especially Wrangel Island -- outside of its traditional territorial waters. Stefansson considered Wrangel Island to be valuable as a location from which to trap furs, to hunt wolves for the purpose of selling their meat commercially, and as a point from which airplanes could fly further north. He also waxed eloquent over Wrangel's potential as a base for additional exploration as there "may very well be other undiscovered islands north of Wrangel Island."⁵⁴ "I should suppose then," he told Christie,

that if we have the wisdom to realize the value of Wrangel Island a little earlier than other countries, and if we follow up our original discovery [the Canadian Arctic Expedition had landed there in 1914] by exploration and preferably commercial development, such as the placing of a Hudson's Bay Company post, for instance, or other trading enterprise we would be conceded to have the best claim to the island.⁵⁵

Stefansson also was anxious for Ottawa to take action to maintain its sovereign claims over the islands north of Lancaster Sound, including Ellesmere Island, Heiberg Island, North Devon Island, Bathurst Island, the Ringnes Islands, Melville Island, Prince Patrick Island, and many of the smaller islands in the

vicinity that had been discovered by the Stefansson-led Canadian Arctic Expedition of 1913-1918. Stefansson said that these islands could be claimed by Canada on the basis of the activities of the expedition he had led, and by the earlier exploration and discoveries of various British navigators.⁵⁶ Despite what appeared to be a solid legal basis for title to the islands, however, he believed that Canada would have to act quickly to retain its claims. "What I want to call particularly to the attention of the Government [of Canada]," Stefansson warned both Prime Minister Meighen and Christie,

is that I have recently received information from Denmark indicating that the Danes do not concede the authority of Canada over the territory north of Lancaster Sound and that they are going to launch next year an exploratory expedition which will work among these islands for several years. In addition to the ordinary operations of exploration, it appears they intend to take over with them into these rich but uninhabited islands Danish Eskimos from Greenland as sort of colonists. I should take it for certain that there will be trading stations established.⁵⁷

Stefansson said that he feared that should Canada do nothing in the face of these Danish initiatives, he would expect that "Denmark's claim to these islands would probably be preferred to Canada's claim should the matter come before the Court of the League of Nations."⁵⁸ He concluded his estimate of the current situation in the Arctic pointedly by saying that even though "... most people are now convinced that the Canadian islands north of Lancaster Sound will never be of value ..."

I want to urge that as everybody has always been wrong in the past who has considered any part of the earth of no value, so will those be found wrong now who consider these islands worthless. It is therefore important that we [Canada] take steps to maintain our rights and to gain additional ones in this area.⁵⁹

Because Meighen was away from Ottawa, Stefansson met with Christie and Sir Robert Borden on 30 September 1920. The explorer outlined his concerns to the two men, and, at the close of the conversation, Christie asked Stefansson "to offer suggestions as to practical ways by which Canada could make good her claim to those territories [in Lancaster Sound]." ⁶⁰ In a short memorandum in reply, Stefansson urged Ottawa to underwrite an expedition "to explore these islands and the channels between them thoroughly, as well as the waters to the west and the north, to determine the configuration, resources, etc. both of the islands known to exist and of others that may exist as yet undiscovered." Stefansson also recommended that Ottawa enforce its "game protective laws" in the region by the use of a revenue cutter or establishing police posts, and by facilitating the development of the commercial resources -- especially furs, fish, and game -- in the area. ⁶¹

Christie's positive initial reaction to both of Stefansson's suggestions -- that is, those regarding the acquisition of Wrangel Island and protecting Canadian sovereignty over the islands north of Lancaster Sound -- was based upon his view of Canada's national interests. He had no desire to see Canadian territory expanded simply because it seemed possible to do so easily, but he did want to see Ottawa use all of the powers available to it to assert definite control over the Arctic areas to which previous Canadian claims of sovereignty had been legally incomplete. He apparently held Stefansson in only very light regard, and, in fact, later came to consider him as something of

an adventurer and buccaneer who was out to get Ottawa to provide the funding for his desire to conduct further exploration in the Arctic.⁶² Notwithstanding his personal aversion to Stefansson, however, Christie did view the suggestions tendered by the explorer as being important steps toward insuring the legality of Canada's territorial claims in the Arctic archipelago.

In regard to Wrangel Island, Christie initially urged Meighen to consider ordering efforts to bring the island under Canadian control. He suggested that the technical departments of the government -- especially the Ministries of Justice and Interior -- be directed to study "the feasibility of encouraging the quiet, unostentatious settlement of Wrangel Island by some Canadian development company, such as the Hudson's Bay Company." Such commercial activity, Christie contended, "would establish a basis for a subsequent assertion of Canadian title to the island; an asset that might prove of value in the future."⁶³

Christie soon lost his enthusiasm for Stefansson's plans for acquiring Wrangel Island, however, both because of his personal disaffection for the explorer and because he came to believe that such an acquisition would not be in Canada's national interest. After noting that he had earlier speculated on the possible benefits of acquiring Wrangel, Christie told Meighen that after "further reflection it is submitted that [the acquisition] would be very unwise."

The British Empire is already so large, the burden of development on our white population so great, and the envy and suspicions of foreign powers on account of our great possessions so active, that it seems clearly in our own interest to be careful to refrain from further acquisitions unless in any given case there are compelling practical

reasons for the addition. It is difficult to discover any such reason in this case. Wrangel Island does not fall into what may be regarded as the regional Canadian system. It does not appear that our naval or military authorities have ever recommended its acquisition or worth on strategical grounds. Its commercial value is speculative and apparently no detailed study has been presented to support the case for acquisition. In this connection it must be remembered that under modern international relations the ownership of territory does not confer exclusive commercial privileges. No nation can expect to pursue a permanent policy of exclusion, especially in respect of its undeveloped colonial possessions. We could not expect to make Wrangel Island a private preserve of our own. And on the other hand we could expect that our traders would get fair commercial privileges even if the Island were eventually occupied by another Power. Again by attempting to occupy the Island we should run the risk of arousing the susceptibilities of both Russia and Japan.⁶⁴

In sum, Christie quickly came to view the prospect of acquiring Wrangel Island as offering little in the way of commercial or strategic advantage and as an action that could potentially cause problems for Canada by prompting the resentment of Russia and Japan.⁶⁵

At the end of his memorandum on Wrangel Island lay Christie's stongest objection to its acquisition by Canada; that is, the more important priority he attached to securing for Canada unquestionable legal title over the islands located to the north of Lancaster Sound. "Finally, by wandering outside our own hemisphere and region [to claim Wrangel Island]," Christie told the Prime Minister, "we would inevitably detract from the strength of our case for the ownership of the islands immediately north of Canada which we really need and desire."⁶⁶ Calling attention to Stefansson's reports regarding Denmark's purported intentions in the Canadian Arctic, Christie argued that the "necessity for taking concrete steps to confirm the Canadian

assertion of sovereignty over the northern Arctic islands has now become more urgent"⁶⁷ Claiming that although in regard to the islands south of Lancaster Sound there was little "likelihood that our claim will be disputed," Christie warned that Stefansson made a good point in observing that the legality of Canada's claim to the islands north of the Sound was somewhat tenuous.

The position is that we have at various times asserted a claim of sovereignty broad enough to cover these islands; that in respect of some of them our case on grounds of discovery and exploration seems better than that of other nations, but that in respect of a number of them other nations probably could make a better case on these grounds than we could. But the important point is that mere discovery and exploration, even accompanied by a formal assertion of sovereignty, are not enough, without more to create a permanent perfect title. At best such acts give rise only to what is described in international law as an inchoate or imperfect title.⁶⁸

Christie said that such an inchoate title served only "as a temporary bar to occupation by another state" and urged Meighen to order additional acts of exploration and, if possible, occupation and settlement which would reinforce and complete Canada's legal title to the islands.⁶⁹

Christie told Meighen that although Ottawa's "geographical authorities" claimed that Denmark had nothing to do with the discovery or exploration of the islands in question, the fact that Denmark had sent an expedition to the area in the summer of 1920 should prompt Ottawa to take steps to perfect its inchoate title.⁷⁰ In this regard, Christie accepted some of Stefansson's suggestions as his own, recommending that Ottawa send a new "Canadian Government Arctic Expedition" -- perhaps under Stefansson's command -- to complete the mapping begun by the earlier Stefansson and Bernier expeditions and to discover any

yet undiscovered lands. The expedition should be announced, he said, as a "continuation" of the earlier expeditions "since these expeditions were designed and announced as an integral part of the policy of making good the Canadian claim to the northern islands.... Thus striking notice of the continuity of our policy in this respect would be given the world -- an important point." He also suggested that steps be taken to establish and enforce Canadian game and customs laws in the region.⁷¹

Having laid out this course of action, Christie stressed to Meighen -- as he had to both Meighen and Borden over the matter of establishing permanent Canadian diplomatic representation in the United States -- that the resolution of the problem lay squarely in Ottawa's hands, and that it was solely up to Ottawa to protect and, indeed, enhance Canada's interests in the Arctic. The background preparations for Canada's case, he told the Prime Minister, were well underway. The Department of Justice, for example, was examining the legal questions involved and that "the meaning of certain instruments (i.e., treaties, international conventions, etc.) of the Imperial Government have, it is understood, been referred for investigation to appropriate agencies in London." Christie argued that the outcome of these studies might be important in the event of "a conceivable future arbitration," but that they "do not seem to bear upon the policy or line of action to be adopted now." Christie also maintained that Canadian governments had "for many years consistently asserted the sovereignty of the Crown [on behalf of Canada] over the islands of the Arctic Archipelago, and have never, it is

believed, by word and deed, made any admission in derogation of this assertion." Because of this record, Christie said that the proposed Canadian Arctic expedition must be instructed to "refrain from acting in such a way that their action or inaction could in the future be addressed as evidence against our assertion of sovereignty."⁷²

In preparing its effort to perfect its legal title to the Arctic islands, Christie said that Ottawa's "fundamental starting point" should be an assumption of unquestionable sovereignty in the area. From this base, Christie contended that immediate and aggressive action by Ottawa would thwart Danish designs on Canada's Arctic territories.

The Danish Government are evidently proceeding cautiously and it may be gathered from the course of the correspondence that if we proceed firmly and without hesitation they will not be disposed to dispute us. So long as we had not actually occupied the territory, their Government could feel on fairly sure ground in speaking by indirection of "No Man's Land" [in regard to the islands north of Lancaster Sound]; but once we have undertaken definite action sufficient in the circumstances to amount to occupation one may suspect they will not attempt to oppose us seriously. ...

Furthermore if [Arctic explorer Knud] Rasmussen's instructions [from the Danish government] really look to an attempt at official occupation on the part of Denmark she is putting herself in the wrong. So far as she is concerned we have clear rights based on discovery and exploration stretching back over years, for we succeed to any rights based on the acts of British explorers; and through the Low and Bernier Expeditions we have kept our right alive by repeated local acts. Only the war has caused some interruption. Denmark has nothing on which to base any such right. Our present title in the circumstances might not be higher than what is known as an inchoate title, but it is clearly superior to hers and acts as a temporary bar to occupation by her; for it cannot be said that the time elapsed since our last act is unreasonably long.

But even if our case was in any way doubtful it is submitted that we could not afford to hesitate in the face

of the possibility that an European Power might gain rights or interests in this part of the world, and in the face of our repeated assertions of sovereignty in the past.

On every ground therefore we should proceed without hesitation so far as Denmark is concerned. As already indicated the instructions should be clear that the expedition is at no time to do any act, or to refrain from acting, in such a way that their action or inaction could in the future be addressed as evidence against our assertion of sovereignty. The members of the expedition should at all times act with the same attitude and certainty of authority as though they were acting within their respective jurisdictions in continental Canada.⁷³

Christie looked on the matter of securing the islands north of Lancaster Sound for Canada as one that lay entirely in the hands of the Canadian government. Although he initially saw benefits coming to Canada from the acquisition of Wrangel Island he soon discarded this notion not only because Canada had no plausible claim to it in terms of international law, but also because it threatened to earn the animosity of other nations -- especially Russia and Japan. More importantly, however, Christie opposed the acquisition of Wrangel because it threatened to block what he considered a more legitimate and attainable foreign policy goal.⁷⁴ As in the case of establishing diplomatic representation at Washington, Christie saw the securing of Canadian sovereignty over the islands north of Lancaster Sound as something that could and should be done on its own without reference to London; the acquisition of Wrangel Island, on the other hand, was an action that might earn the hostility of other nations and promote challenges from those nations that Ottawa probably would not be able to handle on its own. Perhaps most importantly, therefore, the assertion of sovereignty in the Arctic would, Christie wrote, not only provide "striking notice"

to the world of the continuity of Canada's claims in the region,⁷⁵ but -- although he did not write it down in explicit terms -- it would imply that those claims to sovereignty were being made by a sovereign nation. In addition, Ottawa's claims in the Arctic archipelago were of a type which, in the unlikely event that they were challenged by a country like Denmark, probably could be defended entirely through the use of Canadian resources.

Drifting Out of External

"I do not know the words to tell you how I hate my job . . .," Christie told Frankfurter in 1916, "I ought to rewrite this page and leave that out but forgive me -- there is no one else I can take it out on."⁷⁶ Christie wrote that letter just after his wife's brother Paul had been killed in France and part of his dissatisfaction almost certainly was the result of his inability to procure permission from Borden to enlist. As has been shown, Christie continued to be unhappy over Borden's decision to keep him at his post in Ottawa. Indeed, he admitted to a former law school colleague that

I spent much time in the war cursing the fate that landed me here. If it weren't for the circumstance that there was a better job going in France, I suppose I should have thought of my work as intensely interesting. It took me to England and France four times on visits of from 3 to 7 months.⁷⁷

By the end of 1919, he was home from Versailles with the greatest part of the peacemaking era completed. In the immediate aftermath of the war he judged himself to have "lost what few illusions I may have had about Great Statesmen"⁷⁸ and was, by his

own admission, "as restless as hell."⁷⁹

The breakdown of Borden's health and his de facto retirement do not seem to have adversely affected Christie's attitude toward remaining in the employ of the Department of External Affairs. Indeed, after Arthur Meighen's formal assumption of the prime ministership on 10 July 1920, the importance of Christie's role in the Department probably increased markedly as Meighen was virtually unacquainted with foreign affairs and was quickly confronted with domestic political and economic issues that took up most of his time. As Colonel Stacey has written, Christie became Meighen's "general external adviser even more than he had been Borden's. ... Such 'foreign policy' as Canada had under Meighen was largely of Christie's making."⁸⁰ Under Meighen, Christie not only handled much of the Department's day-to-day work, but also took trips to London to discuss the organization and operation of the Foreign Office with an eye toward reorganizing Canada's external affairs machinery and to the United States to evaluate the status and accomplishments of the Canadian establishments -- that is, the Canadian Bureau of Information and the Canadian War Mission -- in New York City and Washington. Finally, and most importantly, he formulated the Canadian positions prior to the Imperial Conference of 1921 -- providing Meighen with the chapter and verse of his arguments -- and served as Sir Robert Borden's assistant at the Washington Conference of 1921-1922.

The defeat of Meighen's government in the election of December, 1921 does not seem to have sparked any immediate desire

in Christie to resign from the Department. "As a matter of fact I have little to say about our elections," he told Frankfurter.

For Meighen I am personally deeply sorry but beyond that -- well I am afraid that I am not much of a party man and I find that Ottawa has no special tendency to make one more so. Quite the reverse perhaps -- "familiarity breeds etc." I do not see in the result anything fundamental to our national life or that a good Canadian or Britisher need worry about.⁸¹

He accepted the result of the election with equanimity, expecting the new Parliament to produce "no new world -- nor do I see its discoverer. He was not in the old parties and he does not happen to have turned up in the two new bands of disciples sent to us from the farm and the factory."⁸² Prime Minister Mackenzie King, however, had several ideas about the running of the Department of External Affairs which would, along with several other factors, quickly cause Christie to begin to consider resigning from the civil service.

Soon after taking office, King confided to his diary that he considered the external affairs "department as at present constituted [to be] a Tory hive."⁸³ Acting on this estimation, one of King's first actions as Secretary of State for External Affairs was to revoke the Order in Council Meighen had put through just before he resigned which had created the permanent post of Assistant Legal Adviser for Christie's brother-in-law C.H.A. Armstrong. Armstrong had been serving in the post on a year-to-year basis.⁸⁴ King noted in his diary that he talked the matter over with Christie who "agreed that there are difficulties in the way of appointing his brother-in-law Armstrong to be his assistant,"⁸⁵ but it seems most likely that he cancelled the

creation of the post, as journalist John A. Stevenson noted at the time, because he was "determined to have no one about him who had any connection with Meighen."⁸⁶

Christie's personal opinion of King was never very high -- indeed, as Colonel Stacey has recorded, Christie once wrote that the Prime Minister was "such a pompous ass that an orang-outang that would flatter him could chose his own reward"⁸⁷ -- and the turning out of Armstrong could hardly have enhanced his opinion. Nevertheless, the difficult working relationship between Christie and King⁸⁸ was only one of several factors that finally moved Christie to decide to leave the Department. First, there was the combination of Christie's personal restlessness that throughout his life made him edgy whenever he was in one place or post for an extended period, and the natural letdown he felt after the fast pace and immediate importance of the his wartime work ended and was replaced by a more work-a-day schedule.⁸⁹ Second, was a deep, even bitter, sense of dissatisfaction with the government's failure to take the necessary steps to improve the machinery for conducting Canada's external relations by expanding the Department of External Affairs and establishing representation abroad, particularly in the United States.⁹⁰ Third, was a certain feeling of resentment that Christie harbored over the fact that he had not been advanced as far financially in his post as had others in similar positions elsewhere in the bureaucracy.⁹¹

Christie apparently began to think seriously of leaving the public service in the summer of 1921⁹² and during 1922 he appears

to have turned down several offers of employment from private firms.⁹³ In addition, in the fall of 1922 at Christie's request Arthur Meighen had written to Britain's Secretary of State for the Colonies to inquire about the possibility of an opening for him in either the Colonial or Foreign Offices. Lord Devonshire's response, however, had been quite unpromising.⁹⁴ In any event, Christie apparently had decided to resign from the Department by early October, 1922 and was set to take leave from his post and sail to England to look for a position late that month. He had determined that he would seek a post in business or finance and also would -- despite the Colonial Secretary's gloomy prognosis -- explore possibilities in the British civil service as he felt that he would be "more satisfied intellectually doing that sort of work"⁹⁵ Before he could get away, however, Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer Stanley Baldwin requested Mackenzie King to provide Christie's services for the use of the British Debt Funding Mission to the United States.⁹⁶ King agreed and Christie delayed his personal plans and joined the Mission.⁹⁷

Christie took up Baldwin's mission eagerly because he felt that another close working relationship with M.P.A. Hankey and other British civil servants might stand him in good stead when he got to England to look for a post; as he told Frankfurter "you can never tell what's around the corner"⁹⁸ More importantly, however, Christie apparently was eager to take advantage of the opportunity because it was a chance to examine at close quarters the manner in which economists operated. "I must confess I'm rather keen to have a crack at it," he wrote.

I want to see these financial pundits at close quarters and have a try at guessing how they do it. They are the real rulers of the world for the next generation -- politics is/are flat; economics is/are king -- and it's intriguing to see one's rulers on the job. I suspect these fellows like the devil. I've been trying to get on to their lingo. So far, I'm bound to say, they've got me almost completely buffaloed. I don't believe that 99 out of a hundred of them really understand it themselves, but the few that do will rule the roost. Practically all the politicians I have seen are helpless in their hands when they turn loose their incantations.⁹⁹

Christie apparently did an exemplary job at the conference and was commended for his services by the British government; he also may have provided an insider's view of the debt negotiations for the readers of the New Republic.¹⁰⁰

Christie returned to Ottawa after completing his duties with the Debt Mission and Mackenzie King assigned him some work dealing with the apportionment of the waters, and the maintenance of water levels, in the Lake of the Woods. While working on this matter in Washington in late February, 1923, Christie was advised by his sister that their father was very ill and was "not expected to live more than a few days."¹⁰¹ He arrived home to Amherst, Nova Scotia, too late, however, his father had already died. After tidying up family affairs -- his mother had died just a few months earlier -- he returned to Ottawa and informed the Prime Minister that he had decided to resign and go to England to find employment. Although he offered to resign at once, King suggested that he take his regular leave of absence and decide finally on the resignation when he returned from England. Christie accepted the Prime Minister's offer and sailed on 16 March 1923.¹⁰² While in England he apparently enlisted the help of M.P.A. Hankey, Andrew Bonar Law, and Lord Beaverbrook in

seeking employment and eventually accepted a post with the financial house of the Canadian Sir James Dunn after being unsuccessful in finding a job in the British civil service.¹⁰³

Christie returned to Canada in mid-May, 1923 and submitted his resignation to King "with much reluctance" on 28 May. King accepted Christie's "regretfully" and said that "I should like to express my appreciation of the exceptionally valuable service you have rendered the Department during your connection with it." Christie sailed with his family for London on 20 June and took up his duties with Dunn almost immediately upon his arrival.¹⁰⁴

Conclusion

Perhaps the phrase "the onus is on us," which Christie used in a letter to N.W. Rowell in the spring of 1922,¹⁰⁵ best sums up his attitude toward Canadian nationhood at the time of his resignation and departure for England in 1923. The two major events in which he had participated during the 1921-1923 period -- the Imperial Conference of 1921 and the Washington Conference of 1921-1922 -- had left him hopeful, but undoubtedly frustrated. He had been unable to persuade Meighen to fight for London's official recognition of Canada's overwhelming interest in the matter of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the calling of a conference of Pacific powers, and instead had been forced to be satisfied with influencing the Prime Minister to oppose the Alliance in terms that blurred the differences he saw between the Empire's interests and those of Canada. In the end, the Imperial Conference of 1921 did not renew the Alliance,

but neither did the assembled Prime Ministers decide to terminate it; as Professor Fry has written, the Conference's failure to abrogate the Alliance must be considered at least a "partial defeat" for Canada and perhaps somewhat more than that for Christie personally.¹⁰⁶ Adding to this dissatisfaction, was the fact that although a conference of Pacific powers was indeed called, it was convened because of Washington's initiative and not because of Ottawa's recommendations. The most important upshot of the Conference for Christie was the ultimate abrogation of the Alliance, the groundwork for Anglo-American cooperation, and the start of the process of reinvolving the United States in international affairs. Still, however, the discontent remained palpable for Christie as the status undeniably obtained by Canada's war effort and participation at the Paris Peace Conference and the League of Nations had not been put to full use to cement Canada's place in the world community.

In addition, the necessary work to attain this status, and it was work that was easily within Ottawa's capacity to perform, was not being done. Christie became thoroughly dissatisfied with the lack of progress in developing the professional personnel and machinery needed to conduct Canada's external relations. In discussing the matter of invitations to the Washington Conference, for example, he saw a very basic problem standing in the way of countries being able to address invitations or other diplomatic communications directly to Canada.

... we are not adequately equipped with a diplomatic establishment to provide a decent channel of communication -- to provide for courteous and correct treatment for their invitation. In other words, I doubt whether we are prepared

to cut a presentable figure in society in these matters
.... It's an awkward business and you can never tell how it
may be handled sometime or other. It [a communication]
might get chucked in the Prime Minister's waste basket;
certainly we're not organized for it.¹⁰⁷

Likewise, Christie was deeply troubled by his government's unwillingness to grasp the nettle and establish permanent Canadian diplomatic representation in the United States, an act which would at once both enhance Ottawa's ability to handle its most important set of bilateral relations¹⁰⁸ and give Canada a very visible place in the diplomatic community of one of the world's most important capitals. While preparing Meighen for the Imperial Conference in the spring of 1921, for example, Christie continued to argue for the need for Canadian representation in Washington and to rail against Ottawa's failure to establish it. "It is not merely admitted, it is asserted on all sides," he lectured the Prime Minister, "that Canada in fact is and has for years been responsible for the conduct of its relations with the United States. That is to say there is really no new principle whatever involved here."

No one who has not had experience in conducting our external affairs can realize how crippled Canada really is in dealing with the United States. We lack the great advantages arising from direct and personal intercourse with the American authorities. We are hampered by the inevitable difficulties that are involved in any effort to explain or discuss a complex question solely by means of correspondence. Formal exchanges of views in writing there must always be, but the negotiation of many questions is subject to prolonged and utterly unnecessary delays simply because we have no man on the spot with an intimate knowledge of our conditions who could make informal explanations or representations that would expedite and facilitate the negotiation. We are sometimes without information concerning projects or matters in the United States that might affect Canada, or we get that information through the channel of the press....

It is somewhat bewildering to find such a position [that is, the ability to send an envoy to Washington but refraining from doing so] taken in a country that prides itself on a Constitution flexible and adaptable enough to meet all practical needs as they appear. The objection seems to arise from undue apprehensions or obsessions connected with the philosophical mysteries of such conceptions as sovereignty, or with the idea that there is something occult about the whole business of diplomacy, whereas it is simply the application to government of the practical art of agency which is known to every business man. The objection is a good example of the incongruities or even absurdities that may result from using an abstract legal conception or fiction -- adopted only for purposes of convenience in a logical system -- without at the same time keeping clearly in mind the facts of experience that the fiction is designed to represent. Such conceptions, such ideas, our whole Constitution itself, should be regarded as our servants rather than as our masters. ¹⁰⁹

The failure to take decisive action in regard to representation in the United States almost certainly tended to sharpen Christie's dissatisfaction with the progress or, rather, the lack thereof in imperial relations. The results of the Imperial Conference of 1921 and the Washington Conference that followed it, were by and large to Christie's liking in that the first did not renew the Anglo-Japanese Alliance -- although it did not clearly call for its abrogation -- and the latter provided the basis on which it could be terminated and ushered in, or at least so he thought, a new era of British-American cooperation in international affairs.

Nevertheless, out of neither of these conferences came the recognition of Canada's national interest that Christie had urged Meighen to pursue; out of the Imperial Conference, for example, there came no explicit recognition of Canada's views or a willingness to concede a primary role in determining the course of the Empire's relations with the United States. In fact,

Meighen's efforts in London in 1921 probably were viewed by the British government and the Prime Ministers of the Pacific Dominions as obstructive rather than constructive, and as an obstacle to the formulation of a common foreign policy for the Empire. This probably is a fairly accurate judgement, in that Meighen's Christie-inspired intransigence at the Imperial Conference almost certainly ended the chance of forming a common imperial foreign policy, for it seems unquestionable that had such a common policy been formed in 1921 it would have coalesced around the renewal, not the termination, of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In effect, Canada's influence on the course of imperial affairs between 1921 and 1923 was the largely negative one of preventing actions that would have hurt Canada's national interests, and, in this light, Christie's influence on the development of Canadian external policy in the 1921-1923 period was to make a common imperial foreign policy impossible to achieve. Christie, through his influence on Meighen's position and actions, had made it clear that Canada's national interest would take precedence over imperial interests and that a common foreign policy for the Empire was possible only when the two coincided.

Christie also continued to fret over the Empire's catch-as-catch-can approach to imperial affairs and focused his animosity on the failure to convoke the constitutional conference called for by Resolution IX.¹¹⁰ The lack of an imperial constitutional settlement led to a policy of drift that not only made it impossible for the Empire to act in a united manner, but also put

a strain on domestic politics in Canada and hamstrung Ottawa's ability to build a foreign policy that attended to Canada's national interests effectively. "You can plausibly argue anything you damn please about the constitution of the British Empire and Commonwealth in its present state," Christie wrote to Frankfurter in the fall of 1921.

Of course that suits the politicians down to the ground. For myself I am fearfully weary of these fine spun legal calisthenics and have given them up. ... I don't wonder you get bewildered. Since 99 out of 100 of our own people are in a state of bewilderment when they think of the thing at all, other people must feel horribly confused. How long will the business go on? I don't know. A long while I suspect. Of course it puts a strain on our [Canada's] external relations. We can't have everything both ways. But of course it's equally the bearing of the whole question on our external relations that makes people ponder and hesitate and delay to do anything at all for fear of unimagined consequences. At the end of the war everyone imagined a new world. Political thought in the Dominions stepped out strongly and confidently. It met some rebuffs. That wouldn't have deterred it. On the contrary. But as time went on the picture of the new world grew shabbier. People began to wonder whether the steps they had taken might not land them in an isolated, scattered and helpless condition surrounded by a world that was none too friendly after all. Among many there is perhaps a tendency to retrace. For myself I should have had faith enough to go on, but I think I understand the sort of thing that is at work in the peoples' minds and I think it is something like what I have tried to sketch. I don't particularly like the position, undefined and anomalous as it is -- not that I feel in any sense "oppressed" or sensitive, for the matter is in our own hands -- anything the Dominions decide on will go -- the rub is that they won't decide -- nor that I see any immediate cause for worry --but that with our growing foreign activities and interests something might happen some day in which this question might on a wave of popular emotion take on a wholly unnecessary and fictitious importance with unfortunate results. And I suppose in my position I am forced to see rather more clearly than others do its bearing on our external relations and that other countries are entitled to some consideration in the matter....¹¹¹

For Christie the phrase "the rub is they won't decide" was a testament to the frustration he felt by 1923. The Dominions and

London would not decide what they wanted in terms of imperial relationships,¹¹² Ottawa would not decide to go ahead and build a suitable external affairs organization and send a diplomatic agent to Washington, and Mackenzie King would not decide whether to use Christie properly, leave him maddeningly half occupied, or ask him to leave the civil service.¹¹³ All of these cases of drift combined with the resentment he felt regarding what he considered to be an inadequate, even a demeaning, salary and his deep sorrow over the death of both of his parents within a few months of each other, moved Christie to resign and leave for England. "Yesterday, with a good deal of reluctance," he wrote N.W. Rowell on 29 May 1923, "I sent in my resignation. I am going into business with a financial house in London for four or five years at least, and I am sailing about the 20th of June. I am sorry to leave the work I have been doing the last eight or nine years but in reality the work has left me, and I see nothing else for it but to take the step I've taken."¹¹⁴

Chapter IV: Notes

- 1.) Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 21 September 1921.
- 2.) See Max Beloff. Imperial Sunset. Volume I: Britain's Liberal Empire, 1897-1921. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970, p. 319, and PAC, RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 1270, File 680-I, L.C. Christie, Rough Notes Written at Sea on Return from Geneva and England, January 1921.
- 3.) Ibid.
- 4.) Michael Fry. Illusions of Security, North Atlantic Diplomacy, 1918-1922. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972, pp. 10-11. Professor Fry defines "Atlanticism" as a policy that urged the "creation of global hegemony enjoyed by the United States and the British Empire, expressed in maritime and financial terms. Drawing the United States into sustained and complete cooperation with the Empire was a panacea for the world's ills." In the sense that he saw Anglo-American cooperation as a necessary tool for maintaining peace in the postwar world, Professor Fry surely is correct in identifying Christie as an "Atlanticist." To describe him thusly, however, is to tell only half the story. Christie, for example, saw a North Atlantic accord primarily as a security arrangement benefiting the Empire and the United States and did not really believe that such cooperation would usher in the millenium worldwide, although he certainly saw it as one of the important factors in providing for a durable peace. "Isn't the bottom truth this:," he asked Frankfurter, "that we are facing a condition so big, forces so implacable, that the suggestion, made so facilely in many quarters, that Britain or Britain and America together can 'do' something to cure it [that is, the world] by 'strong' measures, is irresponsible nonsense?" Indeed, there is little evidence in the record to indicate that Christie believed in political, economic, or spiritual panaceas of any sort. Moreover, in this more limited sense, "Atlanticism" also amounted to a functional goal for Christie in that he thought that British-American concord would help to create an international environment which would permit the maximum development of Canada's international personality. See Ibid., p.6, and Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 16 November 1923.
- 5.) PAC, RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 1270, File 680-1920, L.C. Christie, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1 February 1921. Also printed in A.R.M. Lower, "Loring Christie and the Genesis of the Washington Conference," op. cit.
- 6.) Ibid.

7.) Ibid. Although the view from Ottawa in the early 1920s may not have been as informed about and as sensitive to events in the far corners of the world as was that in London, Paris, and Washington, Christie did show some appreciation for the far-reaching events that might result from the renewal of the Alliance. When warning of the possible negative aspects of renewal for Canadian and imperial relations with China, he also intimated that it might have the effect of bolstering Bolshevik Russia. "Intelligent Chinese," he wrote,

"do not feel that the Alliance has helped China. Indeed they feel its effect has been precisely the contrary, and according to all information the Chinese Government would regard its renewal as an unfriendly act China's experience at the hands of the Western Powers, moreover, is said to be leading her to ask whether it would not be better for her to do business with Moscow, since the Soviets have so far shown a liberal and considerate attitude toward her. Recent experiences with Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan suggest the question whether the renewal of the Alliance would not have the effect of driving China into the arms of Russia."

See PAC, RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 1270, File 680, volume 1, L.C. Christie, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: A Recapitulation of Points, 1 June 1921.

8.) L.C. Christie, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1 February 1921, op. cit.

9.) Ibid. Christie also was urged to resist renewal by several of his American friends who saw the Alliance as a stumbling block in the path of more cordial Anglo-American relations. While he clearly did not take his cue from this advice, it no doubt lent a heightened sense of urgency to his own concerns. Frankfurter's thoughts on the subject, for example, meshed nicely with his own.

"A little plain speaking is needed (regarding the Alliance). Let the Dominions say that any playing of forces that makes against the greater friendliness with the U.S. is sheer madness, because if English speaking peoples cannot live in peace what chance is there for any two peoples living in peace. And the way to have peace is to will peace with understanding of the difficulty of its attainment, not smug talk about the King James version and Shakespeare and the Common Law.

There is real fear about Japan (in the United States), but it's the fear of the unknown and the fear of racial contact, when we have our hands full as it is in this country. Why should Great Britain have any alliance any how -- or certainly any that is not conditioned on friendship between U.S. and Great Britain that is deeper than alliances. These are not words with me, dear Loring, I feel

what the world needs is refreshment of its faith that isn't all blind mans bluff and devil take the hindmost; and you, of the Dominions, have it in you to give that faith and give that new stimulus to sanity and labor, by saying some plain brave things to which people will respond."

See PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 3, Folder 6-1, pp. 1925-1928, Felix Frankfurter to L.C. Christie, June 1921.

10.) L.C. Christie, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1 February 1921, op. cit.

11.) Ibid. At this time, the matter of the Empire's practical foreign policy interest was for Christie the pivotal determinant in the case for or against the renewal of the Alliance. He had little patience with concerns for appearances or for whether the Commonwealth should feel itself obligated to factor in American opinion when formulating its policies. "It may conceivably be objected," he wrote,

"that the case against the Alliance indicated above leans too tenderly toward American susceptibilities, that it would mean a subordination of British policy to that of the United States. The attempt has been, however, to consider the question simply from the point of view of the interests of the British Commonwealth, taking into account of course the possible effects upon British-American relations as constituting a very important factor in estimating what is in our interest. The simple question is whether it is in our interest on the whole to renew the Alliance. Thus if we reject the Alliance on the basis here suggested there may quite possibly be Americans to utter boasts about dictating British policy, particularly the policy of the Dominions, or about assuming the moral leadership of the English speaking world. Let them. If our policy is sound from our view point such things cannot injure it; nor does one become a moral leader by asserting that he is one. We can afford to 'take the cash and let the credit go'"

12.) Ibid.

13.) In his retirement years, Arthur Meighen was prone to give Christie less credit than he was due for formulating the position Meighen assumed at the Imperial Conference of 1921. In response to a request from his biographer for an appraisal of Christie's role and influence at the time, for example, Meighen said only that Christie had "heartily concurred" in the positions he had taken at London in 1921, and that Christie was a "competent official." Closer to the mark certainly are T.A. Crerar's opinion that Meighen "was influenced considerably by Christie" and J.A. Stevenson's blunt assertion that Meighen

"... owed a tremendous lot to Christie. He himself was not very familiar with the international and Imperial affairs,

in fact, was very weak on them but Christie had the goods and Meighen delivered them. ..."

It seems reasonable to assume, while giving Meighen full marks for his superb debating skills and personal courage in putting forth his arguments at London in 1921, that the substance of Meighen's position was almost entirely the product of Christie's pen. See PAC, MG 26 I, Meighen Papers, Reel C-3597, Roger Graham to A. Meighen, 10 February 1953 and A. Meighen to Roger Graham, 16 February 1953; QUA, Collection 2117, T.A. Crerar Papers, Series III, Box 137, T.A. Crerar to J.A. Stevenson, 8 September 1921; and PAC, MG 27 II D15, Sir Clifford Sifton Papers, Volume 208, pp. 162823-162824, J.A. Stevenson to J.W. Dafoe, 16 September 1921.

14.) PAC, RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 1270, File 680-1920, Governor General to Colonial Secretary, 15 February 1921. Also printed in L. Clark, (ed.), DCER, III, pp.162-163.

15.) Ibid.

16.) Ibid., Secretary of State for the Colonies to Governor General, 26 February 1921. Also printed in L. Clark, DCER, III, pp. 163-164.

17.) Ibid.

18.) Ibid. The ultimate reluctance of the British to involve the Dominions in the process of renewal or termination -- despite Lloyd George's assertion to the contrary in his telegram of 26 February -- is hinted at in the last paragraph of the telegram. After reviewing the Canadian case as presented by Borden, Lloyd George wrote, "he could then place before you and if necessary we could place before [the] other Dominion Governments the tentative conclusions at which we had arrived during our considerations." [The above underlining is the present author's emphasis.]

In fact, there is an oddity about both Lloyd George's response to Meighen and Christie's reaction to the British Prime Minister's telegram, in that while both phrased their positions as arguments in favor of a common imperial foreign policy, both were, in reality, arguing in support of their country's national interest. It seems obvious from the tone of Lloyd George's telegram that what London wanted to avoid at all costs was the undertaking of the initiative suggested by Meighen. Lloyd George's suggestion of involving the other Dominions, therefore, was merely a means with which to dissuade the Canadians from acting; in essence, the British were arguing for delay not consultation. There also is, in this case, the chance that Lloyd George felt that there was no danger in playing the consultation card in that he knew that the Pacific Dominions favored the renewal of the Alliance. Christie, on the other hand, who traditionally has been viewed as a diehard advocate of a cooperative and consultative imperial foreign policy, did not hesitate a second to refuse to consider an all-Dominion

consideration of the question of renewal once it began to appear that his view of Canada's national interest in the matter -- that is, immediate abrogation of the Alliance -- was going to be frustrated by Lloyd George.

19.) Ibid., L.C. Christie, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Notes on Mr. Lloyd George's Telegram of February 26, 1921, 3 March 1921.

20.) Ibid., Indeed, Christie maintained that this laundry list of items could be settled only after the Commonwealth had achieved "in all directions such a policy of frank and friendly co-operation with the United States as the Canadian Government have proposed."

21.) Ibid. Christie apparently was at least partially correct in estimating that the British government was trying to bring the power and ambitions of the Japanese in the Pacific to bear as a makeweight against the United States. Professor Fry, for example, has noted that Lloyd George favored the continuation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance because it aided Britain's security by forcing the United States to keep a large fleet in the Pacific. For Lloyd George's views of the strategic importance of the Alliance see Michael G. Fry, Illusions of Security, North Atlantic Diplomacy, 1918-1922, op. cit., pp. 43 and 75.

22.) L.C. Christie, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Notes on Mr. Lloyd George's Telegram of 26 February 1921, 3 March 1921, op. cit.

23.) Ibid.

24.) Ibid.

25.) Ibid., Governor General to Colonial Secretary, 1 April 1921. Also printed in L. Clark, (ed.), DCER, III, pp. 166-167. The reasons as to why Meighen did not continue to accept Christie's rather forthright ideas are unclear. It may be, as J.A. Stevenson suggested at the time, that Christie's position was just too unTory for Meighen to accept wholeheartedly, especially after Lloyd George had poured cold water on their first exposition. "Under Christie's and Borden's influence," Steveson wrote,

Meighen started off as a keen nationalist at the beginning of the [1921 Imperial] Conference but he was deluged by cables from people like [Sir John] Willison, Mrs. Redford, etc. warning him that he was too pro-American and compromising the Tory Party for the future. He took fright and was from a certain date quite complaisant to the English Imperialists. I am not sure but that he has an idea it might be useful for an opposition leader to be able to pose as the champion of the old ties and the foe of nationalist innovations."

In addition, both Colonel Stacey and James Eayrs have noted that Meighen was not at all inclined to push the idea of a autonomous Canadian foreign policy too far, and certainly not to the point of disrupting the Empire. See QUA, Collection 2130, Norman P. Lambert Papers, Box 1, J.A. Stevenson to N.P. Lambert, 28 October 1921 and C.P. Stacey. Canada and the Age of Conflict. Volume I: 1867-1921. Toronto: Macmillan, 1975, pp. 332-333, and James G. Eayrs. In Defence of Canada. From Great War to Great Depression. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964, pp. 18-20.

26.) PAC, RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 1270, File 680-1920, Secretary of State for the Colonies to Governor General, 22 April 1922. Also printed in L. Clark, (ed.), DCER, III, p 168.

27.) Ibid., Secretary of State for the Colonies to Governor General, 26 April 1921. Also printed in L. Clark, (ed.), DCER, III, p. 168.

28.) Ibid. In almost a mocking tone the cable said that in "deference" to Canadian wishes, London had informed Tokyo that no decision would be taken on the future of the Alliance before the Imperial Conference convened. What probably was worse, was that the message completely failed to recognize any special Canadian interest in the matter, and in regard to a Pacific Conference and pre-Imperial Conference consultations with the United States London said only that the former "may well be discussed" at the Imperial Conference and that talks with Washington would be held only "if consultation .. becomes necessary."

29.) As Christie backed away from his previously shrill recommendations that Meighen insist on the abrogation of the Alliance in Canada's national interest, he began emphasizing two other matters he considered to be in the national interest and which he felt would undermine, or at least fail to confirm, Canadian autonomy if they were not addressed, namely, the constitutional conference and naval defense. Although Professor Bothwell asserts that Christie had rejected the idea of an imperial constitutional conference by the end of 1919, his pre-Imperial Conference memoranda stress his continuing belief in the importance of calling such a conference into session. Christie believed that a "preliminary discussion" at the June 1921 conference would prepare all of the Dominions for the direct consideration, based on Resolution IX of 1917, of the existing constitutional relationships. "Since that Resolution was passed," Christie wrote,

"a number of events bearing upon the question have happened. Certain events happened at the Paris Peace Conference. The Dominions have become members of the League of Nations. What the exact bearing of these recent events [is] upon the Resolution need not be argued here. There has been much debate and even controversy upon them. The controversy, though it may have its factitious phases, is

often the result of genuine uncertainty and concern in a sphere where men's instincts are apt to be peculiarly sensitive. It is enough here to refer to the controversy; for this in itself is an important, and at times even a dominating, factor in the political life of the Dominions. In this at least the Dominions may be said to be unique; for other Western countries, whose constitutional position is fixed and universally taken for granted, enjoy or endure no such speculative exercises. The result has been distraction and strain upon the conduct of public affairs. It seems desirable that the Dominions should consider [at the Imperial Conference of 1921] publicly whether this is desirable or necessary, whether anything should be done about it, and whether particularly some such special conference on constitutional questions as proposed by Resolution 9 should be held."

Christie concluded that the meeting in June would be a most appropriate occasion to "induce such public consideration and discussion" directed toward "what may be feasible" regarding a constitutional conference.

Christie also sought to steel Meighen against any attempt that might be made by British representatives at the Imperial Conference to tie Canada into some sort of centralized naval defense plan for the Empire. He warned that the Admiralty seemed intent upon ignoring the statement that the Dominion Prime Ministers had made in August, 1918, to the effect that they were not prepared to consider the establishment of a "central naval authority." In preparation for the 1921 conference, for example, the Admiralty had recommended that the Dominions consider "the creation of an Imperial Council to consider questions of policy, and the representation of the Dominions on the Admiralty Naval Staff with a view toward co-ordinating the higher strategy of Imperial Naval Defence." Christie told Meighen that in this matter the Admiralty clearly was "overstepping" its authority.

"In speaking of Empire naval defence one doubtless has in mind not only the Dominions but also India, Egypt, all the Crown Colonies, and the lines of communication to and from these portions of the world. But Canada, for example, has no responsibility for the government of these territories, and it is not suggested by the people of these countries or of Canada that she should undertake such a responsibility. Nor can it be said that Canada derives any special advantage from the fact that these territories are within the system of the Empire.

In the meantime it would seem that the only principle upon which we [Canada] can safely depend is to leave the question where to-day it in fact stands -- that is, each Government determines for itself, upon the advice of its naval department and upon the best information it can get, what its naval programme should be. Each one, knowing that its Dominion forms part of a wider whole, which it is

determined to preserve, will doubtless take that fact into consideration when forming its estimates, but the responsibility for calculating the weight of this consideration must be left to each Government. This is no more than to assimilate the position of the Dominions to that of the United Kingdom, which to-day as always determines for itself the extent of its naval programme after taking into account not only the defence of the shores of the Kingdom but also the position arising from its imperial connections."

In regard to both of these matters -- the constitutional conference and naval defense -- Christie, in his recommendations to Meighen, clearly placed the well being and interests of Canada before those of the Empire. See R. Bothwell, "Failure," p. 262; PAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Volume 41, pp. 18123, 18128-18129, and 18145-18146, L.C. Christie, Memorandum. June Meeting of the Prime Ministers, 23 April 1921; *Ibid.*, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 3, Folder 6-5, pp. 2164-2165, L.C. Christie to M.P.A. Hankey, 29 April 1921; and, *Ibid.*, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Reel C-3888, pp. 19009-19010, L.C. Christie, Naval Defence, June 1921.

30.) L.C. Christie, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: Recapitulation of Points*, 1 June 1921, *op. cit.* Also printed in *External Affairs*, (September, 1966), pp. 402-413. Despite this change in emphasis, however, Christie urged Meighen to make it clear to the Imperial Conference that if the Alliance were renewed Canada would demand that an article be inserted stating that "the agreement shall not be binding upon the Dominions without the approval of their Parliaments." This was the same sort of reservation that had been included in the abortive treaty drafted at Versailles guaranteeing assistance to France if it were to fall victim to unprovoked aggression by Germany. Christie believed that such a clause would protect Canada's interests vis-a-vis the United States because the "unmistakable trend of the whole debate in the House of Commons [in April, 1921] was indeed against the renewal of the Alliance." See *Ibid.*

31.) For evidence of Meighen's stout and courageous performance at the Imperial Conference of 1921 see the extensive extracts from the stenographic notes of the meeting in L. Clark, (ed.) *DCER*, III, pp. 174-194, and C.P. Stacey. *Historical Documents of Canada, Volume V. The Arts of War and Peace, 1914-1945*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972, pp. 389-410. From the writings on the substance of the Imperial and Washington Conferences and Canada's part in them see particularly, C.P. Stacey, *Canada and the Age of Conflict. Volume I: 1867-1921, op. cit.*, pp. 332-335; Ramsay Cook. *The Politics of John W. Daffoe and the Free Press*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963, pp. 134-136; Michael G. Fry, *The Illusion of Security. North Atlantic Diplomacy, 1918-1922, op. cit.*, pp. 47, 63, and 68-153; Philip G. Wigley. *Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth. British-Canadian Relations, 1917-1926*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977, pp. 123-141;

J.B. Brebner, "Canada, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and the Washington Conference," Political Science Quarterly, L, 1 (March, 1935), pp. 45-58; and John S. Galbraith, "The Imperial Conference of 1921 and the Washington Conference," Canadian Historical Review, XXIX, 2 (June, 1948), pp. 143-152. For an amusing, if unconvincing, attempt to portray the mercurial and vitriolic Australian Prime Minister W.M. Hughes as a temperate conciliator see J. Chalmers Vinson, "The Imperial Conference of 1921 and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance," Pacific Historical Review, XXXI, (August, 1962), pp. 257-266.

32.) PAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Volume 264, File 58, pp. 1458058-148059, L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 14 July 1921. That the results of the Imperial Conference were not all that Christie wanted is obvious, but just as obvious is his delight in seeing Canada accomplish what was possible politically at the time. "The Conference has been the most extraordinary affair I have ever gone through," he told Frankfurter.

"Even Paris pales in point of view of interest -- i.e. for me personally. I suppose I am of the New World in every bone and fibre -- for generations -- and this Conference has been the first real coming to grips of the Old World and the new, with that other world of mystery -- the East -- thrown in.

And then out of it and at the best moment Harding did a big thing. There have been some difficulties and there will be more, but the thing must be made to go. Nothing can be allowed to stand in the way. We are doing what we can. Meighen was to have sailed today. At 5 o'clock yesterday afternoon he cancelled his passage to stay longer -- at the greatest political inconvenience -- that it could never be said that he omitted anything he might have done.

Some day -- soon -- we must have a talk. Perhaps it will be in Washington for I suppose I shall go to the Conference. To me personally it is rather an amazing dream. I have been thinking of nothing else since last November when at Geneva I really began to think about this whole business."

See Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 21 July 1921.

33.) L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 14 July 1921, op. cit. Christie was well satisfied that as a result of the Imperial Conference of 1921 "every Government of the Empire has a free hand on that question [cooperation in imperial naval defense] and can determine the extent and manner of that co-operation at the next Imperial Conference or in any other way that may be agreed." See PAC, RG 25 F1, DEA Papers, Volume 916, File 19, L.C. Christie, The Naval Treaty, n.d. but probably January of February, 1922.

Christie's point that the outcome of the Imperial Conference of 1921 left every member of the Empire with a "free hand" regarding imperial naval cooperation is a good one, and it might also be said that the Conference left each country with a free hand in regard to foreign policy as well. Several historians, including James Eayrs, Alex Inglis, and J.L. Granatstein, have contended that the idea of a common foreign policy for the Empire was proven to be feasible, and that Christie believed that to be the case, at the Imperial Conference of 1921. Professor Eayrs, for example, has written that "the group-unit concept of Empire emerged unscathed from the Imperial Conference of 1921. The Empire, it was now recognized, was composed of partners who on major issues of high policy would move as one, all partners contributing to the final solution." This sort of contention seems to fly in the face of the facts of the Conference, given the acrimony and venom that marred so many of its sessions. Britain and the Pacific Dominions were looking for something from the Conference that was very different from what Canada was looking for, while South Africa differed somewhat from each of those points of view. In the end, the conferees agreed only to pack up and move along to Washington to begin to discuss many of the Imperial Conference's subjects all over again. It seems almost certain that had not President Harding's announcement of his intention to call a conference of Pacific powers given the Empire an out, Britain and the Dominions would have remained at each other's throats for a good while longer without accomplishing anything other than proving graphically that a common imperial foreign policy was an impossibility. Rather than proving the possibility of such a policy, the sessions of the Imperial Conference of 1921 amply demonstrated that the wartime dreams of cooperation and consultation had been shattered upon the hard rock of each imperial component's individual national interests. In this sense, the "material if not ... complete victory" that Colonel Stacey claims that Canada won at the Conference was a victory for its national interest and not for the unity of the Empire. If anything, Canada's "victory" at the Imperial Conference of 1921 proved that the "group-unit concept of Empire" of which Professor Eayrs speaks was never much more than a will-o-the-wisp. See James G. Eayrs, In Defence of Canada. From Great War to Great Depression, op. cit. p. 20; Alex Inglis, "Loring Christie and the Imperial Idea, 1919-1926," Journal of Canadian Studies, VII, 2 (May, 1972), p. 22; J.L. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men, op. cit., p. 67; and, C.P. Stacey, "From Meighen to King: The Reversal of Canadian External Policies, 1921-1923," Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada, VII, (1969), p. 239.

34.) PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 3, Folder 6-4, pp. 2088-2089, L.C. Christie to N.W. Rowell, 28 October 1921. Christie especially was pleased with the leading part played by Washington in the Conference. He believed that "American post-war 'neutrality' seems to be going through the same sort of agony their neutrality went through during the war" and that the "Americans who are in charge of affairs are thinking just now

much more about British-American co-operation than about the broader idea of the League." At this point, he probably would have preferred American participation in the League as well, but from Canada's point of view Anglo-American cooperation was essential and the outcome of the Washington Conference in this regard "was the exact thing I have been hoping for for over a year." As a tactical measure, and in hope of furthering the willingness of the United States to participate in world affairs, Christie urged Prime Minister King -- and King acted on the advice -- "to recognise briefly the service performed by the United States President and Government in calling the Conference and in entering whole-heartedly into co-operation with the other Powers" when he addressed the outcome of the Conference and its treaties in Parliament. See *Ibid.*, MG 30 D45, J.W. Dafoe Papers, Volume 2, Folder 1923, L.C. Christie to J.W. Dafoe, 9 February 1923; MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Volume 264, Volume 58, pp. 148075-148076, L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 1 February 1923; Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 11 December 1921; PAC, MG 26 J4, W.L.M. King Papers, Volume 144, Folder 1178, p. C-105770, L.C. Christie, Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 19 June 1922; and *Ibid.*, Reel C-2729, p. C-105023, L.C. Christie, Memorandum of Suggestions for the Prime Minister. Washington Conference, June 1922.

35.) Christie succeeded Hankey on 26 January 1922, saying that the job was one that "intrigues me from dawn to dewy eve." See Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 28 January 1922.

36.) L.C. Christie, Memorandum of Suggestions for the Prime Minister. Washington Conference, June 1922, *op. cit.*, p. C-105023.

37.) From the beginning of his struggle against the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Christie was concerned with its implications for the international system generally, not merely those related to Anglo-American relations and Canada's national interests. In the wake of the Washington Conference, he believed that,

"The fundamental principles of the integrity of China, of respect for China's sovereign rights, of the 'Open Door' and of equal opportunity have been affirmed. This is the first occasion on which such an affirmation has been made collectively by all the chief Powers concerned: hereafter these Powers will be jointly responsible for preventing the violation of these principles More generally, but perhaps still more important, the position of China must be regarded as having been distinctly improved through the improved atmosphere in the Pacific and Far Eastern region which the Conference has promoted."

See PAC, MG 26 J4, WLM King Papers, Volume 144, Folder 1178, pp. C-105722-C-105723, L.C. Christie, Benefits to China Resulting

from the Washington Conference, 19 April 1922.

38.) Ibid., p. C-105785, L.C. Christie, Notes on the Washington Treaties, 19 June 1922. Christie was pleased not only that the Washington Conference had set the stage for the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, but also because it had set up a process based on consultation rather than force to take its place. "The underlying idea of the Washington Agreements was somewhat as follows," Christie wrote.

"On the 'security' problem the Empire, the U.S. and Japan found a basis whereby the reasonable necessities of each were asserted and recognised and each went as far as possible in demonstrating its self-denial and lack of aggressive intent toward the others. ...

The Washington Conference thus conceived a regime for consultation and co-operation on common economic and political affairs in the Pacific and the Far East with the question of 'security' and force put as far to the background as possible. ..."

In later years, Christie would use the example of the Washington Conference in his arguments that the League of Nations should confine itself to promoting consultation rather than concerning itself with the maintenance of security through the automatic use of economic and/or military force. See PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 10, Folder 31, p. 9580, L.C. Christie, unaddressed letter, 12 January 1925.

39.) For Christie's evaluation of the effects of the Washington Naval Treaty on Canada see L.C. Christie, The Naval Treaty, n.d. (but almost certainly January or February, 1922), op. cit. As was the case when he noted that the League of Nations could learn how to settle justiciable questions from the example set by the Canada-United States International Joint Commission, Christie also thought that North America offered an example of how to proceed on the question of naval disarmament, and a reason for some optimism about the peace being preserved once such an agreement was in place. "Here we may recall," he wrote, "that for a century on our own continent there has existed, in the Great Lakes Naval Disarmament Act and in the understanding in fact observed along the whole Canadian-American boundary, a similar self-denying ordinance and repudiation of force; and it is impossible to doubt the influence of this condition upon the relations between the two countries and upon their unquestioned habit of solving their conflicts of interest by civil means." See L.C. Christie, Notes on the Washington Treaties, 19 June 1922, op. cit., p. C-105785.

40.) PAC, MG 27 II D15, Sir Clifford Sifton Papers, Volume 209, p. 163251-21, J.W. Dafoe to C. Sifton, March 1922. Although Christie did not believe that London would take advantage of the American invitation to act alone in the name of the Dominions, he

successfully urged Meighen to include in his telegram announcing Canada's willingness to participate in the British Empire Delegation the sentence, "It is essential that Dominion representatives should hold [the] same status as at Paris and [that] proceedings at [the] Washington Conference must not be allowed to prejudice it." Christie also was prepared to accept the arrangement in order to avoid irritating American sensitivities regarding the British Empire. "If we had raised it [the issue of individual invitations for the Dominions] last summer [that is, at the time of the Imperial Conference] formally and precisely -- and if we had raised it at all we should have been obliged to press it very strongly --," Christie explained to Rowell,

"the Americans might well have suspected us of obstructiveness even then. It might have embarrassed them. Or they might have said that it wasn't a fair thing to put up to them; that it was really a matter for the Conference. They might have said a dozen things. And I am bound to say that for myself, in view of their treatment of us in the matter of our position in the League, I should not like to have seen us put ourselves in the attitude of seeming to ask a favor of them in such an open and crucial way."

See *Ibid.*, MG 26 I, A. Meighen Papers, Reel C-3435, pp. 030801-030802, L.C. Christie to A. Meighen, 27 October 1921 and Telegram from Governor General to the Colonial Secretary, 27 October 1921; and, Toronto, Mrs. C.H.A. Armstrong Papers, L.C. Christie to N.W. Rowell, 10 November 1921.

41.) *Ibid.*, RG 25 F1, DEA Papers, Volume 915, Folder 11, L.C. Christie, Washington Conference - Status of Dominions, 14 November 1921. As Colonel Stacey has noted, General Smuts of South Africa raised the issue of the nature of Dominion representation at the Washington Conference in order to impress on the Americans the enhanced international standing with which the Dominions had emerged from the war. Christie regretted Smuts action -- although he recognized that Smuts had to do what he could to appease an incipient separatist movement in South Africa -- because he was afraid that it would inject the question of status in a partisan manner into the Canadian election campaign that was then in progress. Christie consistently maintained that a final decision about Canada's international status could only be made by the Canadian people after a frank and open non-partisan debate had rendered a consensus opinion. As he had at the time of the naval crisis in 1913, Christie continued to refuse to view foreign policy as a matter on which one or the other of Canada's political parties had the "right" position. In a letter to Harold Armstrong, Christie said that he recently had informed Rowell that despite Smut's assertions the manner in which Canada was to participate in the Washington Conference did not denigrate its national status in the hope that Rowell would pass the information along to Meighen's opponents and thereby

perhaps foreclose the possibility of the matter becoming a campaign issue. Christie also was anxious at this time to avoid giving those Canadians who were opposed to a more independent international status for Canada an occasion for claiming that the country was moving too quickly away from the Empire.

"Sir Robert told Mr. Rowell about Smuts's communications and what followed and R. [owell] wrote me asking my views. I decided to give them 'privately and confidentially'. I have an idea that he may be seeing [T.A.] Crerar or [W.L.M.] King or at least intimates of one or the other. He won't break any confidence, but the point is that it may be useful to have him [Rowell] armed, so that he will prevent people from making damn fools of themselves in the campaign. Doubtless the Chief [Meighen] would like nothing better than that C. [rerar] or K. [ing] should make a damn fool of himself, but this is a matter that ought to be kept out of the campaign as much as possible. I hear [Charles] Murphy has opened up on it. I hope the chief will ignore it unless Crerar or King opens up. From what [Journalist J.A.] Stevenson says I gather Crerar had decided that it might be risky to touch it. I don't know whether he has or not.

Even if Crerar or King should open up on it I hope the Chief will do no more than repudiate whatever charge they make and do it in the briefest fashion -- with perhaps a shade of contempt. He can say in a sentence that Canadians need not fear that our status is imperilled and that he doesn't propose to be a party to injecting the Washington Conference into the campaign. But unless it becomes absolutely necessary I hope he will think it better to say nothing."

See C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, Volume I: 1867-1921, op. cit., p.348, and Toronto, Mrs. C.H.A. Armstrong Papers, L.C. Christie to C.H.A. Armstrong, 10 November 1921.

42.) Library of Congress, Frankfurter Paper, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 29 December 1921. It is interesting to note that throughout the 1913-1923 period, Christie consistently urged his superiors to limit the Parliament's role in the ratification of treaties signed by Canada. In the field of foreign affairs Christie believed that the executive's prerogative had to be preserved and that "if the definite rule is laid down that all international agreements, of whatever character, must be approved by Parliament before the Government can advise their ratification -- the result in actual practice is that the Senate is given a power it did not have before, and is put in a position where it may obstruct a course of action that is desired by the peoples' representatives, and that under the existing operation of the prerogative is entirely under their control." Christie at this point in his career showed little sympathy for Mackenzie King's predilection for

"letting Parliament decide" in regard to Canada's external commitments and fully supported Borden in his attempt to dissuade King from submitting the Washington Conference's treaties to the parliament for sanctioning. For the foregoing see PAC, MG 26 J4, W.L.M. King Papers, Volume 112, Folder 801, p. C-82719, L.C. Christie, Additional Notes on the Submission of Treaties to Parliament Before Ratification, 15 May 1922. For similar advice offered by Christie in regard to the Versailles Treaty and the appointment of a Canadian diplomatic representative to the United States see Ibid., MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Reel C-4343, p. 63446, L.C. Christie, Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 21 August 1919; and, MG 27 II D13, Rowell Papers, Volume 17, Folder 75, pp. 12361-12367, L.C. Christie, Canadian Representation at Washington -- Notes on the Prerogative of the Crown and the Necessity for Legislation, April 1921.

43.) PAC, MG 27 II D13, Rowell Papers, Volume 1, Folder 4, p.271, L.C. Christie to N.W. Rowell, 19 March 1922.

44.) Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 23 February 1921.

45.) Despite Christie's growing concerns about the nature of the League's activities, he continued to value the opportunities that membership gave Canada for enhancing its international status and developing its external affairs machinery. For example, Christie suggested that Canada's High Commissioner in London be sent to the Third Assembly of the League in 1922, as he had been to the second, not only because it would provide for "continuity in Canadian representation from year to year." but because other members of the League "send to the Assembly one or more of their diplomatic representatives in Europe." The attendance of the Canadian High Commissioner therefore would permit him to keep "in touch with the [League's] work" and keep Canada visible at a high diplomatic level on the Geneva stage.

Christie also considered it important that an officer of the Department of External Affairs accompany the Canadian delegation to each Assembly of the League. "It seems to me that it would be unfortunate," he told Mackenzie King,

"if the Department of External Affairs was excluded from this direct contact with the League meetings. The Foreign Offices of practically all the other members of the League are always represented by officials at the Assembly meetings, and the arrangement has a practical and useful result in many ways in the work of these offices. For us it seems still more useful, since having no diplomatic agencies in Europe to maintain contact, we have no other way of getting the direct connection with the work of the League."

Finally, Christie saw membership in the League as an avenue through which -- in certain circumstances -- the Canadian government could underscore its distinctness from the imperial system in general and from London's direct control in

particular. In regard to Canada's ratification of some draft conventions that had been adopted by the International Labor Conference, for example, Christie suggested that,

"it seems quite unnecessary to go through the elaborate procedure of ratification by His Majesty in person, as was done in the case of the Treaty of Versailles. The Government have heretofore followed the principle of having direct relations with the League of Nations, and the attached draft simply carries out that principle. Canada having been accepted as a Member of the League and of the International Labour Organisation in her own right, the machinery of her own Government is adequate for the present purpose. This being so it seems better, in view of the effect on the attitude of the other nations Members of the League, to avoid any unnecessary use of the machinery of the Government of the United Kingdom."

See PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 23, Folder 87, p. 21536, L.C. Christie, Memorandum for the Prime Minister. Third Assembly of the League of Nations - Canadian Representation, 31 March 1922; MG 26 J1, W.L.M. King Papers, Reel C-2243, pp. 60953-60954, L.C. Christie to W.L.M. King, 21 July 1922; and, L.C. Clark, (ed.), DCER, III, p. 469, Document 402, L.C. Christie, Notes on the Ratification of Draft Conventions Adopted by the International Labour Conference, 14 April 1921.

46.) L.C. Clark, (ed.), DCER, III, p. 466, Document 401, L.C. Christie, Report of the Director: Enquiries, 11 January 1921.

47.) Ibid., p. 467.

48.) Ibid., pp. 467-468. Christie was disturbed deeply about the proliferation of League-sponsored organizations in Europe and began to consider means by which Canada could dissociate itself from them. In response to N.W. Rowell's complaint about this plethora of European-based League bodies, for example, Christie wrote,

"... I agree with you that it indicates an intention to proceed with the technical organisations in spite of the action of the Assembly. Personally, I have no doubt whatever that this is the real intention of the Europeans. The more I think of them the more I think the problems involved are really European problems, and Europe has a real need for such organisation. But I do not think that we could make any useful contribution to the solution of such technical European questions, and I think it would be a mistake to attach our problems to theirs, to say nothing of the very great difficulties arising from the facts that the Bureaus and Central Commissions of these organisations will be in Europe, and, therefore subject to European control. The question now is, I suppose, what shall we do about it? It seems to me that Canada should demand at the next

Assembly that the expenses of these organisations should be charged only against those members who participate in them. ...so if they proceed in these organisations in spite of the action of the Assembly we can perfectly well decline to support them."

See PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 3, Folder 6-4, pp. 2063-2064, L.C. Christie to N.W. Rowell, 30 March 1921.

49.) PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 21, Folder 73, pp. 19786-19795, L.C. Christie, Amendment to Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations - Item 6 of the First Agenda of the Third Assembly, 20 July 1922. As Professor Veatch has pointed out, Christie also sought to soften Article 10 by supporting amendments to Article 16 of the Covenant which would make possible the gradual or partial application of economic sanctions. One suspects that Christie was opposed to sanctions of any kind, but felt that anything that delayed the application of military force was a step in the right direction. See Richard Veatch. Canada and the League of Nations. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975, p.54.

50.) L.C. Christie, Amendments to Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations - Item 6 of the First Agenda of the Third Assembly, 20 July 1922, op. cit. Although Christie probably did believe that it was unwise to tamper too extensively with the evolving League, he also thought that something had to be done to alter Article 10. Partial changes were preferable by far to letting Article 10 stand as it was adopted in 1919. "The second conclusion [regarding the type of amendments to the Covenant Canada should sponsor]," he wrote, "is that in view of the reluctance to undertake amendments to the Covenant and especially to Article 10 already displayed by many Members of the League, nothing but a motion or proposal embodying such a minimum alteration will have any chance of success in the Assembly."

51.) Ibid. Christie also noted that dropping the word "preserve" might be a way in which to make membership in the League more attractive to the United States. He argued that the Quadruple Pacific Treaty that had come out of the Washington Conference had pledged the signatories to respect each other's territories and had bound them to "communicate with one another fully and frankly" in the event of an act of aggression. There was no duty to "preserve" the status quo in the Treaty -- as there was in the Covenant -- and the United States had signed it.

52.) Ibid.

53.) Ibid.

54.) Dartmouth College Library, Vilhjalmur Stefansson Papers, V. Stefansson to L.C. Christie, I, 25 September 1920, (There are two different letters from Stefansson of this date, one dealing with Wrangel Island and the other discussing the islands north of

Lancaster Sound. In these notes the former will be marked "I" and the latter "II"). Throughout his attempt to get Ottawa to claim ownership of Wrangel Island Stefansson stressed its potential importance to the Empire as a "British location for a world system of wireless and as a supply station for petroleum, etc. when commercial transpolar navigation develops. Either of these conditions would be sufficient to give us a motive for wanting to keep our rights in the island, even if there were no commercial possibilities." See Ibid., V. Stefansson to L.C. Christie, 9 June 1922.

55.) Ibid., V. Stefansson to L.C. Christie, I, 25 September 1920.

56.) Ibid., V. Stefansson to L.C. Christie, II, 25 September 1920.

57.) Ibid.

58.) Ibid., V. Stefansson to A. Meighen, 16 September 1920.

59.) Ibid., V. Stefansson to L.C. Christie, II, 25 September 1920.

60.) Ibid., V. Stefansson to L.C. Christie, 30 September 1920.

61.) Ibid.

62.) Richard J. Diuabaldo. Stefansson and the Canadian Arctic. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1978, p. 175. Also see the acrimonious exchange of letters between Christie and Stefansson in Dartmouth College Library, Stefansson Papers, V. Stefansson to L.C. Christie, 9 June 1922 and L.C. Christie to V. Stefansson, 12 June 1922. For Christie's description of the explorer-entrepreneur as someone who is "trying to force the hand of the Government" see PAC, MG 26 J4, WLM King Papers, Volume 147, File 1205, p. C-107378, L.C. Christie, Memorandum Submitted to the Prime Minister - Wrangel Island, 9 August 1922.

63.) PAC, MG 26 I, Meighen Papers, Volume 13, File 7, L.C. Christie, Memorandum for the Prime Minister. Exploration and Occupation of the Northern Arctic Islands, 28 October 1920. Also printed in L. Clark, (ed.), DCER, III, pp. 566-568. At this point, Sir Robert Borden supported Christie's position on Wrangel Island and urged Meighen to act accordingly. See Ibid., Reel C-3219, R.L. Borden to A. Meighen, 3 November 1920.

64.) PAC, MG 26 J4, WLM King Papers, Volume 147, File 1205, p. C-107379, L.C. Christie, Exploration and Occupation of the Arctic Islands - Wrangel Island, 28 February 1921. The Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, Sir Joseph Pope, supported Christie on this aspect of the issue, telling Meighen that Wrangel was essentially an "Asiatic island" and "any pretensions we might have to this island must be of a very unsubstantial

character." See L.C. Clark, (ed.), DCER, III, p.569, Document 535, Sir Joseph Pope, Memorandum for the Prime Minister. Claim to Certain Islands Within the Arctic Circle, 25 November 1920.

65.) For the tortuously convoluted story of Canada's flirtation with the idea of acquiring Wrangel Island see the admirable accounts in Richard J. Diuabaldo, Stefansson and the Canadian Arctic, op. cit., pp. 161-186, and the same author's "Wrangling Over Wrangel Island," Canadian Historical Review, XLVIII, 3 (September, 1967), pp. 201-226. For a good, recent analysis of American concerns about Wrangel Island -- accompanied by a lamentably ill- and mis-informed account of the Canadian position -- see Nancy Fogelson, "The Tip of the Iceberg: The United States and the International Rivalry for the Arctic, 1900-1925," Diplomatic History, 9, 2 (Spring, 1985), pp. 131-148.

66.) L.C. Christie, Exploration and Occupation of the Arctic Islands - Wrangel Island, 28 February 1921, op. cit. Sir Joseph Pope also shared these fears with Christie. To claim Wrangel Island, he told Meighen, "could only result in weakening our legitimate claims to the Arctic islands contiguous to our own territory, for if we can go so far afield as Wrangel to take possession of islands, unconnected with Canada, what is to prevent the United States or any other power, laying claim to islands far from their own shores but adjacent to our own." See Sir Joseph Pope, Memorandum for the Prime Minister. Claims to Certain Islands Within the Arctic Circle, 25 November 1920, op. cit.

67.) L.C. Christie, Memorandum for the Prime Minister. Exploration and Occupation of the Northern Arctic Islands, 28 October, 1920, op. cit., p. 007383.

68.) Ibid., pp. 007383-007384.

69.) Ibid., p. 007384.

70.) Ibid., p. 007385. In this memorandum, Christie also raised the possibility of Ottawa declaring something akin to a Monroe Doctrine of its own. "Another consideration may be suggested here," he wrote to Meighen. "Denmark is an European Power. Extensions of European power in the Western Hemisphere are presumably in conflict with the American Monroe Doctrine. Conceivably if the question ever came to an issue we might secure American support on this score. Canada however could scarcely afford to make such an appeal. But what might be worth considering would be to announce a similar doctrine of our own and then to base our claim and action in respect of the northern islands partly upon that ground." Christie's idea is interesting not because it would have been enforceable -- clearly Canada did not have the naval forces needed to make the threat good against a major power, and the proposed ban, like that of the Americans in 1823, would have had to rely on the force of foreign navies, i.e., that of the United States or Great Britain -- but because

he suggested it as something Ottawa could do for itself and by itself. See Ibid., p. 007386.

71.) Ibid., p. 007387.

72.) PAC, MG 30 B57, John Craig Papers, L.C. Christie, Exploration and Occupation of the Arctic Islands, 17 February 1921.

73.) Ibid.

74.) Christie argued this position effectively both to Meighen and Mackenzie King. To the latter, for example, he wrote in the summer of 1922 that "there are ... the clearest disadvantages to be faced [in pressing a claim for Wrangel Island]."

"Already we have seen the results from the steps taken by Mr. Stefansson [that is, a summer 1921 expedition to Wrangel Island during which, according to Christie, he "took the step of raising the flag on behalf of the Crown"]. The Russian Government has definitely protested and challenged the position he would have us assert. There are indications that the American Government look on it with a cool eye, and would indeed support Russia if the matter came to an issue. The Japanese have characteristically given no indication; but in view of their general situation and interests it can scarcely be doubted that they must be watchful and would have to be reckoned with. Still more serious, it seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that action on our part in Wrangel would result in weakening our case -- already none too strong -- for completing our ownership of the Arctic Archipelago immediately north of our mainland, which all agree to be clearly in our interest."

Christie's opinions apparently influenced King's attitude toward the matter of Wrangel for he used precisely Christie's argument when he laid the matter to rest in the spring of 1923. "Saw Stefansson the explorer at 3," King recorded in his diary, "told him the Gov't cld. not support claim to Wrangel Island, [it] is not in the Western Hemisphere, moreover the claim by which we would assert our right to it wd. defeat [the] claim we have to valuable islands off Greenland coast." See L.C. Christie, Memorandum Submitted to the Prime Minister - Wrangel Island, 9 August 1922, op. cit., and PAC, MG 26 J13, WLM King Papers, King Diary, File 1923, p. G-3851, Entry for 27 March 1923.

75.) L.C. Christie, Memorandum for the Prime Minister. Exploration and Occupation of the Northern Arctic Islands, 28 October 1920, op. cit., p.007387. Christie clearly saw this problem as an instance in which Ottawa might impress upon other nations Canada's developing international status. In a draft telegram requesting the British government to secure more information regarding Danish plans in the Canadian Arctic through its embassy in Copenhagen, for example, Christie suggested that

London make it clear that Ottawa believed it "would have seemed more appropriate had the Government of Denmark approached [the] Canadian Government before embarking on such a proposal [that is, sending a government-sponsored expedition to the Canadian Arctic]." In sum, Christie argued that this sort of assertiveness was both in the national interest physically -- that is, in securing incontrovertible legal title to the islands -- and as a mark of Canada's autonomy in external affairs. See PAC, MG 26 I, Meighen Papers, Reel C-3219, pp. 007460, L.C. Christie, Draft Telegram from the Governor General to the Colonial Secretary, 25 April 1921, and J.L. Granatstein, "A Fit of Absence of Mind: Canada's National Interest in the North to 1968," in E.J. Dosman, (ed.). The Arctic in Question. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1976, p. 19.

76.) Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 6 November 1916.

77.) Harvard Law School Library, Manuscript Division, A.W. Scott Papers, L.C. Christie to A.W. Scott, 11 July 1919. Scott recommended Christie to the Corporation of Harvard University as an excellent candidate to receive an honorary degree in recognition of his wartime service to Canada. In his supporting letter Scott noted that Christie was "in a peculiar sense a product of the Harvard Law School, where he received his training for his subsequent career. I know of no one among his contemporaries who has achieved such a marked success in such an important sphere." Scott solicited supporting letters from Borden and Meighen -- letters which give good personal estimates of the nature and value of Christie's wartime service -- but for some reason the award appears never to have been offered to Christie. See Ibid., A.W. Scott to A. Lawrence Lowell, 28 March 1922; R.L. Borden to C.S. MacInnes, 6 March 1922; and, A. Meighen to C.S. MacInnes, 15 March 1922.

78.) L.C. Christie to A.W. Scott, 11 July 1919, op. cit.

79.) Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 22 December 1922.

80.) C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, Volume I: 1867-1921, op. cit., pp. 320-321.

81.) Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 11 December 1921. Christie apparently did, however, hold Meighen in high regard personally and thought that he had handled Canada's external affairs effectively. Perhaps this last estimate is not surprising in view of the dominant role Christie played in shaping Meighen's policies. "It is not for me to account for the extraordinary result of Tuesday;" he wrote to Meighen just after the election,

"on that score I am not competent, though I do not see how such things can last. But I hope you will allow me to say

this personal word, that in the ultimate sense I feel that you personally should entertain no regrets, for it is quite plain to all that you have discharged every last ounce of your duty to your cause. No one whatever can fairly reproach you.

There is one other personal word if you will permit it. Your relinquishment of the Department [of External Affairs] -- even though it is only temporary -- gives me personally the greatest possible regret. It has been a great pleasure and privilege to work under you and I have appreciated your confidence very deeply."

While, as he told Frankfurter, he did not think that the overall course of government would change for the worse as a result of Meighen's ouster, he did feel that "the Department may be a good deal less pleasant a place than it was." This final estimate probably was in part due to an expectation that he would have less of a free hand under Mackenzie King than he had had under Meighen who had been under pressure almost continually from successive domestic political problems and had little time for foreign affairs. See PAC, MG 26 I, Meighen Papers, Reel C-3442, pp. 13388-13390, L.C. Christie to A. Meighen, 8 December 1921, and Ibid., MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 3, File 6-8, p. 2478, C.H.A. Armstrong to L.C. Christie, 23 December 1921.

82.) Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 15 March 1922.

83.) PAC, MG 26 J13, WLM King Papers, King Diary, Volume 1922, Entry for 21 January 1922. See also the brief discussion of how Mackenzie King "froze" Christie out of the public service in C.P. Stacey. Mackenzie King and the Atlantic Triangle. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1976, p. 26.

King's worries about the Department of External Affairs being a "Tory hive" probably were unwarranted at least in so far as Christie was concerned. In his unpublished autobiography, John A. Stevenson recalled that Christie had approached several journalists to discuss the new prime minister just after the election of 1921. "When Mackenzie King in 1921 became Prime Minister and Secretary [of State] for External Affairs," Stevenson wrote,

"Christie was so little the partisan that since his experience had shown him how hard a country Canada was to govern, he besought myself and a few other members of the parliamentary press gallery to let King find his feet and refrain from any serious criticisms of him for at least a year and to this suggestion we agreed."

Written long after the fact, and by a partisan and admirer of Christie and a bitter foe of Mackenzie King, Stevenson's recollection probably should be taken with a grain of salt. Nevertheless, the thrust of it is certainly true, Christie would

not have let his personal distaste for King interfere with the performance of his duties or undermine his loyalty to the government in power. QUA, Collection 2167, J.A. Stevenson Papers Box 1, Folder 4, J.A. Stevenson, Draft Autobiography, no date.

84.) For a description of the arrangements for Christie and Armstrong in the Department of External Affairs at the time of Meighen's departure see C.H.A. Armstrong to L.C. Christie, 23 December 1921, op. cit. In this letter Armstrong also indicates that Meighen may have been considering replacing Sir Joseph Pope with Christie, but had declined to do so after his electoral defeat.

85.) PAC, MG 26 J13, WLM King Papers, King Diary, Volume 1922, Entry for 14 February 1922. King also noted in this entry that his relations with Christie were "better than I had anticipated, as I feared the effect of changed administration upon him after his close association with Sir Robert Borden and Meighen." Nevertheless, despite King's words his innate distrust of one who had served Conservative prime ministers manifested itself in many ways. For example, whereas Christie had direct access to both Borden and Meighen it appears that he met with King only when he was summoned by the Prime Minister, and, instead, usually received and delivered his assignments through F.A. Macgregor, King's secretary. Three occasions of such long-distance association will suffice to indicate the walls King quickly erected between himself and Christie. In July, 1922, Christie had to consult with King regarding the composition of the Canadian delegation to the meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations that fall, and as to whether he should accompany it, through a written memorandum. Christie hurriedly prepared the memorandum because Macgregor had let him know that King was going away for an extended period and would not have time to see Christie before departing. On the second occasion, Christie prepared a memorandum regarding Canada's interest in Wrangel Island because, as he noted in its opening paragraph, Macgregor had given him an "intimation" that it was the Prime Minister's wish that he do so. In the third case, Christie used identical language to describe an intimation Macgregor had given him regarding King's wish for information on an American proposal regarding the control of water levels in the Lake of the Woods. See PAC, MG 26 J1, WLM King Papers, Reel C-2243, p. 60954, L.C. Christie to W.L.M. King, 21 July 1922; L.C. Christie, Memorandum Submitted to the Prime Minister - Wrangel Island, 9 August 1922, op. cit.; PAC, MG 26 J4, W.L.M. King Papers, Volume 111, File 791, p. C-81931, L.C. Christie, Proposed Lake of the Woods Treaty, 9 August 1922.

86.) QUA, Collection 2130, N.P. Lambert Papers, Box 1, J.A. Stevenson to N.P. Lambert, 20 January 1922. Stevenson, who hated King passionately, was an intimate of Christie, Armstrong, and Borden and so probably had some inside information regarding the activities in the Department of External Affairs after King replaced Meighen. "I see nothing in King's performances since

the election," he told Lambert in this same letter,

"that has not justified my contention that he is one of the least appetising figures that has ever been allowed to adorn a great office. He is taking for himself new accommodation in the East Block and has cleared Christie out to make room for his vast entourage. ..."

But his pettiness of spirit comes out worst in his treatment of Harold Armstrong. Soon after the election, the Cabinet (old) created a new office of assistant to Christie. It was badly needed as Christie has been away for seven months out of the past year and the amount of stuff which our External Affairs department has now to handle is enormous and piles up in his absence. Armstrong has really been doing it. One of Willie's first acts was to cancel his appointment and Armstrong has severed his connection with the civil service. ..."

87.) C.P. Stacey. Canada and the Age of Conflict. The Mackenzie King Era, Volume II: 1921-1948. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981, p. 7.

88.) King's lingering distrust of Christie and his Tory connections is again underscored in the following diary entry. "Today I reached my office a little after 11," King wrote in the spring of 1922. "Sir Robert Borden presented his report on the Washington Conference with treaties appended, etc. I was surprised to find it in printed form. Christie and he had gone ahead and getting it out in this shape, evidently that I might be prevented from making suggestions before [the] printing took place."

Although it seems almost certainly true that, as Colonel Stacey points out, King never really gave Christie a chance to prove his competence and loyalty it must be noted that there was some basis upon which King probably could have pinned his suspicions about his Legal Adviser. Some of this circumstantial and misleading evidence was supplied by J.A. Stevenson in articles written on the subject of King's handling of the Chanak affair in the fall of 1922. In articles for the Farmer's Sun and the New Statesman, Stevenson criticized King severely and suggested that part of the problem was that he had chosen to ignore the advice of a Department of External Affairs official "who has almost unique experience and knows more about international problems than the whole cabinet together." Stevenson had shown the article in draft to C.H.A. Armstrong and at his suggestion wrote to the editors of the respective journals in which it was to be published and requested them to delete the passage discussing Christie. He succeeded in the case of the Farmer's Sun -- although the London Free Press quickly identified Christie as the individual to whom Stevenson was alluding -- but the article was printed intact by the New Statesman. It seems reasonable to suspect that Stevenson's article may have been a factor in furthering the estrangement between Christie and King

which led to the former being denied access to Foreign Office cables.

Perhaps the most interesting part of this matter is that both Stevenson and the Prime Minister may have underestimated the similarity of Christie's foreign policy views with those of King. In response to a letter of apology from Stevenson, who had said that he hoped his articles had not made "Willie ... suspect you of propaganda," Christie wrote,

"Please do not worry. I quite realise how it all came about. The main thing is that I know your intentions toward me were of the best. Anyhow I do not anticipate any trouble. In any case I am resting quite easy as I had nothing whatever to do with the comments that have appeared recently in various newspapers in Ottawa and elsewhere about the Department of External Affairs in connection with the Near Eastern business. Indeed, quite apart from my feeling about personal publicity, I really do not believe that the position taken in these comments is a solid one, and I have said so to the few people who have mentioned the matter to me."

This is one of the few pieces of evidence in the record pertaining to Christie's view of Chanak and it seems to support the position King took in the matter. In addition, some close observers of the Canadian political scene thought that Christie's attitudes toward both foreign and domestic affairs were far from being typically Tory, and were, indeed, quite liberal in content. T.A. Crerar, for one, thought that Christie had "liberal views on questions of international policy," while J.A. Stevenson estimated that "Christie, [Grattan] O'Leary, and [C.H.A.] Armstrong are all natural liberals though they may label themselves Conservatives." It is interesting to speculate whether if King had not been cursed with so many preconceived notions regarding Christie's irredeemable Toryism -- notions probably strengthened by Stevenson's indiscreet pen -- he and Christie might not have proved to be an effective, if not always congenial, foreign policy team and whether ultimately King would have felt it necessary to recruit Skelton. See PAC, MG 26 J13, WLM King Papers, King Diary, Volume 1922-1923, p. G-3700, Entry for 1 April 1922. For King's never giving Christie a chance to prove himself and the background to Stevenson's articles see C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, Volume: 1921-1948, op. cit., p. 6 and PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 3, Folder 6-8, p. 2562, L.C. Christie to J.A. Stevenson, 30 October 1922 and a newspaper clipping entitled "Mr. King as Foreign Minister" from the London Free Press, 30 October 1922. For Christie's lack of access to Foreign Office cables see C.P. Stacey, Canada and the and the Age of Conflict, Volume II: 1921-1948, op. cit., p.6. For Christie's response to Stevenson's gaffe and his views on Chanak see PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 3, Folder 6-8, p. 2565, L.C. Christie to J.A. Stevenson, 2 November 1922. For the estimate of Christie's "liberal" tendencies see QUA, Collection 2117, Series III, T.A. Crerar Papers, Box 137, T.A.

Crerar to John A. Stevenson, 8 September 1921 and J.A. Stevenson to T.A. Crerar, 4 August 1921. For an interesting, if not altogether convincing, discussion of the psychological determinants of King's relationships with Christie and Skelton see Joy E. Esbrey. Knight of the Holy Spirit. A Study of William Lyon Mackenzie King. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980. pp. 62 and 181-184.

89.) In the summer of 1922, for example, Christie complained that he was feeling restless, "rather up in the air," and was beginning to feel a need to leave Ottawa in order "to get an opportunity to do some thinking from the outside." He was, at about the same time, also missing the activity of the war and immediate postwar years. Christie's weariness with his day-to-day responsibilities is evident in the following passage from a letter to a British correspondent.

"Our [parliamentary] session opens today. We are awaiting advice from your side about the time of submitting the Washington Treaties to Parliament. While they are still on the Order Paper I shall remain uncertain about the chances of meeting you at [the] Genoa [Conference]. As [the] Washington [Conference] recedes and the memories of hotel life fade with it I rather think I am becoming more receptive to the idea of a journey to Genoa. I suppose these Conferences get into ones blood. And the times when my job in Ottawa is actively interesting and absorbing are so comparatively few and spasmodic that I get restless and am always flirting with the notion of chucking it. I begin to suspect that as the world settles down the occasions for this state of mind will become more frequent and prolonged."

See QUA, Collection 2130, N.P. Lambert Papers, Box 1, L.C. Christie to N.P. Lambert, 10 June 1922, and, PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 3, Folder 6-5, p. 2177, L.C. Christie to M.P.A. Hankey, 7 March 1922.

90.) Christie wrote to J.A. Stevenson that Canada's external affairs organization was entirely inadequate and that he saw little chance for its improvement at an early date.

"Our existing machinery is no good, and is by its very nature incapable of helping the Government in such a crisis as that through which we have passed [that is, Chanak]. What is needed is a substantial and radical reorganization and development. I am not concerned with the question as to where the blame lies though, if I had to apportion it, I should feel that it must be placed quite as much upon the past administration as upon the present -- indeed in one way the late government are even more to blame. At bottom, however, the country as a whole is to blame for the position it has got itself into, and there is no use in saying one party is better than another in this respect. We are all hopelessly blind and apathetic about the whole business, and

I see no chances for any appreciable change in this respect for years to come."

In sum, Christie wrote, he felt that he should move on because "the chances of any development that would offer first class work in my field seems, in the present state of the public mind, to be highly remote." See L.C. Christie to J.A. Stevenson, 2 November 1922, op. cit., and PAC, MG 30 D45, John W. Dafoe Papers, Volume 2, Folder 1923, L.C. Christie to J.W. Dafoe, 9 February 1923.

91.) Christie felt that the financial aspects of his position as Legal Adviser were "and apparently always would be rotten," and he went so far as to prepare a chart for Mackenzie King showing how other government officers with responsibilities similar to his own had progressed in salary while his had remained constant. With that chart, Christie added a note saying that "the implication from the face of the document is that my services are not satisfactory." The primary importance of financial considerations in Christie's desire to find alternative employment is made obvious in his rejection of an offer of the post of Secretary to the Canadian Council of Agriculture. "I ought to say at once," Christie wrote,

"that I am not in the running. I do not believe that I should find the work congenial or satisfying while I doubt very much I have the peculiar sort of temperament that seems to be essential for that job. I must also think of the matter of salary. I am getting here what you estimate is the highest amount the Council of Agriculture would be prepared to pay [\$5,000]. During the past two or three years I have turned down more than one offer that went much higher than this amount and that held out attractive prospects in respect both of advancements and of the importance of the work. I did this because -- foolishly as I now see -- I clung to the hope that there might be enough enlightened opinion in Canada and enough enlightened politicians to see the necessity for some substantial development in our external affairs machinery. Now that this hope is gone, and that I can see no other course for me but to get out of the public service I really must think pretty closely in dollars and cents and try to sell myself at the best price."

Interestingly, O.D. Skelton was hired at the same \$5,000 per year salary as Christie was receiving when he joined the Department of External Affairs in 1924. See L.C. Christie to J.W. Dafoe, 9 February 1923, op. cit.; for Christie's salary chart and comments thereon see PAC, MG 26 J4, W.L.M. King Papers, Volume 60, Folder 396, pp. C-47198-C-47199; and Ibid, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 3, Folder 6-7, p. 2267, L.C. Christie to George F. Chipman, 11 October 1922.

92.) QUA, Collection 2117, T.A. Crerar Papers, Box 96, L.C. Christie to T.A. Crerar, 13 February 1923.

93.) For example, Toronto, Mrs. C.H.A. Armstrong Papers, L.C. Christie to Mr. Peacock, 8 August 1922. In this letter Christie notes that he had recently foregone "an opening with the Standard Oil interests."

94.) PAC, MG 26 I, Meighen Papers, Volume 64, Folder 28, pp. 036020-036022, Lord Devonshire to A. Meighen, 20 November 1922.

95.) Ibid., MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Volume 264, Folder 58, pp. 148069-148070, L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 11 October 1922. As to the type of employment he was looking for in the private sector, Christie was seeking to maintain as much continuity as possible with his previous experience.

"As I mentioned in Toronto, I have the feeling I should try for a position with some house specialising in American business or having American connections. While I can claim some familiarity with affairs touching other foreign countries, yet (outside Imperial affairs) it is with the United States that my experience has had most to do. I have put down some data on the enclosed sheet of paper as being perhaps useful in the illustration of this point. During my residence in the United States I happened to make associations that gave me a fairly close insight into their political and, to some extent, economic conditions, in addition to the knowledge of legal and constitutional conditions that my own work involved, while incidentally they gave me considerable acquaintance among public men there, more especially perhaps in the Republican Party. Frequent official visits to Washington and New York since my return to Canada have kept alive and extended these. This experience I feel is somewhat exceptional, and it seems to me wise to try in the first instance for a jumping-off place where there would be a chance of making something of it."

See L.C. Christie to Mr. Peacock, 8 August 1922, op. cit.

96.) PAC, MG 26 J4, W.L.M. King Papers, Reel C-2249, p 68792, Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General, 7 October 1922.

97.) Both Colonel Stacey and Professor Bothwell estimate that Christie was shut off from Foreign Office cables about March 1923, but it appears to be that this ban was invoked in the fall of 1922. In regard to his attachment to the Debt Funding mission, for example, Christie told Borden that he had received

"a cable from Hankey saying that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had asked the P.M. if I could be spared to assist in the British-American debt funding negotiations in Washington, and pressing me to accept if permitted. I learn that such a cable has in fact come from the Chancellor,

though so far nothing has been said to me about it."

As has been shown (see note 96 above) the request had come on 7 October, while Hankey's telegram came on 9 October, and Christie was writing Borden on 11 October. Apparently Christie was not seeing cables as matter of course as early as the fall of 1922. Christie's letter in this instance lends further support to Grant Dexter's claim, noted by Professor Granatstein in his The Ottawa Men, that Christie had not been seeing cables at the time of Chanak. In this last regard, Christie himself seems to confirm his lack of access to British cables in the final months of 1922. In a letter to Arthur Meighen discussing the events preceding the conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, Christie said he knew little of what had occurred pertaining to the treaty in the fall of 1922. "Incidentally his statement [that is, Mackenzie King's regarding Ottawa's communications with the British government prior to the conclusion of the Lausanne Treaty] had a certain personal interest for myself," Christie wrote. "I did not leave the Department until May, 1923. Until I read King's statement in the Hansard you sent me I did not even know of the existence of these telegrams. This is only another bit of evidence that I stayed too long." See C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, Volume II: 1921-1948, op. cit., p. 8; R. Bothwell, "Bureaucratic Imperialism," op. cit., pp. 324-334; L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 11 October 1922, op. cit.; J.L. Granatstein. The Ottawa Men. op. cit., p.66.; and, PAC, MG 26 I, Meighen Papers, Volume 136, Folder 177(2), p. 082085, L.C. Christie to Arthur Meighen, 24 April 1924.

98.) Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 23 October 1922.

99.) Ibid., L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 10 November 1922. On the whole, Christie took an optimistic view of the outcome of the debt funding negotiations. "I was very sorry," he told Frankfurter at the end of the proceedings, "that we couldn't make a definite deal before we left Washington, but it is much too soon to spell failure, and I have hopes. To my way of thinking the thing is extremely important -- as a first step in a journey of co-operation that may perhaps just succeed in getting the world somewhere. Anyhow, I don't see anything else that can; and without this first step it is damn hard to see much chance of progress." In regard to his personal desire to understand the machinations of economists, however, Christie seems to have been less than successful, remarking at the end of the talks that "the mystery of finance is pretty safe as far as I am concerned!" See Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, January 1923, and L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 10 February 1923.

100.) See PAC, MG 26 J1, WLM King Papers, Volume 85, Folder 1923-(Cecil-Copp), p. 71930, W.L.M. King to L.C. Christie, 6 March 1923, and MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 3, Folder 6-1, p. 1965, Felix Frankfurter to Loring Christie, 27 January 1923.

"May I say," Frankfurter wrote, "in the language of a distinguished colleague, that the leader in this week's N.R. on 'Two Views of the British Debt' is a beautiful piece and I suspect you had a hand in it."

101.) See PAC, MG 26 J1, WLM King Papers, Volume 85, Folder 1923-(Cecil-Copp), pp. 71928-71929, L.C. Christie to W.L.M. King, 28 February 1923.

102.) Ibid., MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Volume 264, Folder 58, p. 148073, L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 13 March 1923.

103.) Ibid. and J.L. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men, op. cit., p. 67. Christie also turned down a chance to work in the United States before he accepted a post with Dunn. In early March, Frankfurter, M.O. Hudson, and A.W. Scott offered Christie a teaching post at the Harvard Law School beginning in September 1923 which he refused. "You do not know how tempting the suggestion is," Christie wired in reply. "Doubtless I am foolish in putting it behind me but there is another possible venture I am exploring. It happens I am sailing [at the] end of this week or next for London on a voyage of discovery." Christie later explained to Frankfurter the type of position he had taken.

"My voyage of discovery has ended in a rather amazing adventure -- too long to tell here. I am going into the City -- not with a financial house (I am inclined to think that the idea of wearing a frock coat and striped trousers upset me! -- as it always did when I thought of diplomacy.... In our Canadian arm of the service I could set my own fashions!) -- but with what economists would call an entrepreneur and socialists probably worse! Anyhow he's [Dunn] a bold, courageous, powerful mind and I am told by the most respectable authority 'useful'."

He also told Frankfurter that he probably would be in Britain for "four or five years," but intended to return to Canada because during "this past nine months or so I have been rediscovering just how deep some roots are...." See PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Reel C-3877, pp. 1968 and 1970-1971, Jane Christie to L.C. Christie, 7 March 1923 and L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter and A.W. Scott, 12 March 1923; and, Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 24 May 1923, and L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 2 July 1923.

104.) PAC, RG 32 C2, Civil Service Commission Records, Volume 310-311, File 1184, L.C. Christie to W.L.M. King, 28 May 1923 and W.L.M. King to L.C. Christie, 6 June 1923. King also arranged to have the Civil Service Commission pay Christie three months leave with salary as a "retiring leave." The normal period of leave with pay at the time was two months, but King explained that he considered the additional amount to be in order because "during the whole of Mr. Christie's service in the Department he was

engaged in confidential work for the Prime Minister, necessitating much research and consequent long hours" The Commission agreed to King's request and Christie's resignation was made effective on 1 September 1923. See Ibid., W.L.M. King to L.C. Christie 6 June 1923; Sir Joseph Pope to Secretary, Civil Service Commission, 31 May 1923; and Secretary, Civil Service Commission to Sir Joseph Pope, 2 June 1923.

105.) L.C. Christie to N.W. Rowell, 19 March 1922, op. cit.

106.) Michael G. Fry, Illusions of Security, North Atlantic Diplomacy, 1918-1922, op. cit., p. 63.

107.) Ibid.

108.) Because of the press of wartime affairs Sir Robert Borden did not use Christie very extensively in regard to matters concerning bilateral relations with the United States. Under Borden, Christie's visits to the United States dealt mostly with matters that touched on the war or relations among the members of the North Atlantic Triangle. In addition, as Professor Bothwell has noted, Borden made much use of Sir Joseph Pope's extensive contacts with officials in the American bureaucracy in the conduct of bilateral affairs. During Meighen's tenure, Christie was involved more in bilateral affairs with the Americans but still functioned mostly in regard to imperial and Triangular matters. Under King, however, Christie was all but banned from issues of an imperial nature but was used very extensively indeed in the nuts-and-bolts aspects of relations with the United States. In a letter asking King for permission to accompany the Canadian delegation to the League's Assembly scheduled for September 1922, Christie himself noted the manner in which external affairs work had been divided by Borden and Meighen.

"... Though there has been no hard and fast division laid down in the Department [of External Affairs], yet in practice my field has been especially confined to foreign relations in the broad or general sense, including League of Nations matters. With special questions of a commercial, economic or technical nature arising from time to time with other countries, especially with the United States, I have had little to do. These, so far as the Department is concerned, mostly have been handled by others in the Department than myself (as they were before I came), but still more I think they have in reality been handled by the technical Departments concerned -- for example, boundary water questions by Interior, fishery questions by Marine, naval questions by Naval Service, etc. The other Departments are rather jealous in this regard, naturally enough I suppose. Occasionally I have been called in on the relatively minor work of drafting when other departments have done the real work, but even that has more frequently been done elsewhere."

King rejected Christie's request to go to Geneva and likewise ignored what he had said about the division of labor in the Department External Affairs. Instead, King expanded on Meighen's use of Christie in relations with the United States and employed him extensively in such standard bilateral issues as fisheries disputes, the wood pulp trade, the question of controlling water levels in the Lake of the Woods, and discussions concerning the renewal of the Rush-Bagot Treaty. Christie's greatly increased involvement in these matters -- together with prolonged sojourns in Washington for the International Labor Conference in 1920, the Washington Conference of 1921-1922, and the British Debt Funding Mission in 1923 -- almost certainly heightened not only his perception of the range of matters on the bilateral agenda, but the degree of importance to Canada of its relations with the United States. Added to the stronger awareness Christie derived from increased everyday experience in strictly Canadian-American issues, of course, was his belief that "in the new condition of the world resulting from the war our respective interests [that is, those of Canada and the United States] are likely to touch at many more points ... because of Canada's greater involvement in world affairs." Whatever else that can be said of Christie's tenure under Mackenzie King, it must be recognized that he was used quite extensively in bilateral affairs with the Americans, so that by the time he left the public service in 1923 he had made a much clearer and more realistic appraisal of the importance of Canada-United States relations than he had acquired under either Borden or Meighen. It may be that these experiences tended to add to his intuitive recognition of the growing divergence of Canada's national interests and the interests of the Empire a list of concrete examples that made it even more difficult for him to reconcile imperial interests with those of Canada. For reference to Sir Joseph Pope's American contacts see R. Bothwell, "Canadian Representation at Washington: A Study in Colonial Responsibility," *op. cit.*, pp. 128-129; for the division of external affairs labor see PAC, MG 26 J1, WLM King Papers, Reel C-2243, pp. 60952-60953, L.C. Christie to W.L.M. King, 21 July 1922; for Rush-Bagot discussions see *Ibid.*, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 23, Folder 85, pp. 21430-21435, L.C. Christie, Memorandum, 28 July 1923, L.C. Christie, Memorandum for the Prime Minister. Great Lakes Naval Limitation Treaty, 4 August 1922, and L.C. Christie, Draft Telegram Re Rush-Bagot Renewal, 4 August 1922; for Lake of the Woods matters see *Ibid.*, RG 25 G1, Volume 1284, File 30, L.C. Christie, Notes on the Lake of the Woods Control Board Bill, 30 March 1921 and MG 26 J1, W.L.M. King Papers, Volume 85, Folder 1923-(Cecil-Copp), pp. 71928-71929, L.C. Christie to W.L.M. King, 13 March 1923; for wood pulp problems see Toronto, Mrs. C.H.A. Armstrong Papers, L.C. Christie to C.H.A. Armstrong, 6 November 1921; for fishery problems see United States National Archives, Diplomatic Branch, State Department Papers, 711.428/629, R.L. Craigie to Bainbridge Colby, 16 February 1921; and, for Christie's discussion of the new points of Canadian-American contact in the postwar world see PAC, MG 26 I, Meighen Papers, Volume 55, Folder 232, p. 030752, L.C.

Christie, Canadian Representation at Washington. The Practical Need, 11 April 1921.

109.) L.C. Christie, Canadian Representation at Washington. The Practical Need, 11 April 1921, op. cit., pp. 030752-030753.

110.) Several years later Christie claimed that one of the major failures of the Imperial Conference of 1921 was that it "threw overboard the Special Constitutional Conference (or some members of it did and others acquiesced perforce). Looking back now this step seems really to mark the beginning of the end of the project [of a cooperative and consultative imperial foreign policy]." See PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 23, Folder 88, p. 21777, L.C. Christie, Notes on Discussion by the Dominions Foreign Policy Group, B.I.I.A., Chatham House, 8 February 1926.

111.) Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 21 September 1921. Christie also believed that the satisfaction of the politicians with constitutional ambiguities was encouraged by the fact that "we [the Dominions] have a very real opportunity for exerting influence on the foreign policy of the Empire -- that we have been doing it and that we can do it -- and do it in some senses more effectively than if the constitutional position was more clearly defined." The fact that Christie still supported constitutional regularization despite the chance that it might mean less rather than more influence for Canada over the course of imperial affairs is yet another indication of his fear of drift and the false position he believed that Ottawa was placed in relations with other nations by the ill-defined state of imperial relations.

112.) At this point, Christie was still not ready to see Canada act by itself in regard to its overall relationship with the rest of the Empire. In the fall of 1922, for example, T.A. Crerar apparently was arguing that it was time that Canada set about defining its own international status and state publicly that when Great Britain was at war, Canada was not necessarily at war. Although readily admitting that both of these matters needed further exploration and definition, Christie did not think that it was time for Canada to decide on them unilaterally.

"To take the step of defining-out status without reference to and consultation with the other members of the Empire would seem to me ... tantamount to a declaration of independence. Even to propose such a step, if the proposition is made deliberately and after full consideration, would seem a violent breach of the canons of confidence and courtesy ordinarily observed in an intimate partnership to amount to indecency.

On the second proposition [of Crerar] that when Great Britain is at war Canada is not necessarily at war, I have made a hurried search among the books

It occurs to me that it might be useful to elaborate the point that whatever individuals may have said from time to time, yet in practice our whole national life has undoubtedly been built and pursued on the unquestioning acceptance of the view that when Britain is at war we are at war. No Canadian Government has really ever thought of anything else. The whole series of defence consultations and conferences ... all these activities and many others like them were of course based on the complete acceptance of that view. My notion in making this suggestion is that such a concrete picturing of the situation might, perhaps, serve to throw into high relief the actual revolutionary character of Mr. Crerar's proposal. One cannot escape the feeling of many people, through sheer ignorance or thoughtlessness, are inclined to flirt with such views without having any conception that they are revolutionary in our national life and practice."

Christie rejected both of Crerar's proposals not because they were not legally tenable or because they were not within Ottawa's ability to do -- he obviously believed they were -- but simply because circumstances did not yet require such decisive action. He dismissed them as inappropriate at the time -- their "revolutionary" nature also probably disturbed his belief in the necessity of orderly national development -- but left open the possibility that they would not always be so. Indeed, in the years after 1923, Christie came to dwell more and more in his writings and letters upon the need for Canada to make some explicit statement about its national status and the unavoidable necessity of gaining complete sovereign control over the "levers of war." In 1923, however, drift in these affairs was frustrating but still tolerable -- albeit just barely -- and Christie was not yet prepared to urge unilateral Canadian decisions and actions. See PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 3, Folder 6-4, pp. 2132-2134, L.C. Christie to N.W. Rowell, 17 November 1922.

113.) Several years after his resignation, Christie explained the circumstances surrounding his resignation and the nature of his duties under Mackenzie King for Sir Robert Borden. The exposition was occasioned by Borden indicating that, according to J.W. Dafoe, King had been greatly saddened by Christie's departure, could not understand it, and thought that he had used his abilities to the full.

"The pathetic picture of the chieftain [Mackenzie King] mourning over my loss, if it moved Dafoe, ought perhaps to move me, but I fear that I am hardened to such suffering! The same picture was apparently shown elsewhere after I left, for it was described to me from various quarters. There were some artistic variations. It was, as I recall it, to Hance Logan that the kindly intimation was made that I had been bought by the 'big interests' -- which may be

supposed perhaps to have taken some of the edge off the mourning. Before I had considered leaving I use to hear of other pictures. One was through Sam Jacobs who had it direct from the artist that I had been too long associated with Conservative Prime Ministers to be really useful. From someone else there was another one about the impossibility of bringing Harold Armstrong into the Department because that would have meant too much family. It was through Charlie Murphy that the picture came of the Cabinet meeting when Mr. Fielding complained that your report of the Washington Conference had been printed without authority, and the valiant chieftain whose Department was thus attacked turned the blow by saying that it was Christie who killed cock-robin. Perhaps someday I may find the meaning of this cinematograph. All I could make head or tail out of at the time were the facts that I knew myself viz., that the first time I saw him after he had become Prime Minister -- just after returning from the Washington Conference -- he called me in to say to me at great length that my relations and work with him would be exactly the same as with you and Mr. Meighen; that during the year that followed I saw him on business probably a dozen times, including meetings in the corridor, and scarcely ever more than for a few minutes; that I had very little to do -- and though it was decided that I should not go to the Genoa Conference or Geneva on the ground that there was important work at home, the important work never turned up, and all I did through out the year might have been done in three weeks. Long afterward I recalled that at our original interview he had talked about his political creed at great length, contrasting it with Mr. Meighen and so on, and that at one or two appropriate pauses I had either been silent or had sought to talk about the Department. It was one of the most amazing and egotistical performances I have ever seen, and I do not doubt, though I could not prove it, that it was simply a crude invitation to declare myself his faithful slave and what a wonderful time we would have together."

See L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 15 March 1926, quoted in part in James G. Eayrs. The Art of the Possible. Government and Foreign Policy in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961, p. 39. For the full letter and the Borden-Dafoe correspondence on the subject see PAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Volume 264, Folder 59, pp. 148307-148307A, L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, and, MG 30 D45, J.W. Dafoe Papers, Volume 3, Folder 1926, January-May, J.W. Dafoe to R.L. Borden, 29 January 1926 and R.L. Borden to J.W. Dafoe, 1 February 1926.

114.) PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 3, Folder 6-4, p. 2153, L.C. Christie to N.W. Rowell, 29 May 1923. Christie's retirement did not go unnoticed at the time in the capital's press.

"Retirement of Mr. Loring Christie from the Department

of External Affairs to accept a position in the world of London finance is another reminder of the drain upon character and capacity from which this country suffers. Mr. Christie was a public servant of exceptional capacity. He had rendered service of a most distinguished character, and the experience which he had gained in the field of Imperial and Foreign relations was invaluable to Canada, particularly at a time when our relations with the rest of the Empire and with the world call for higher consideration."

See Ottawa Journal, 12 June 1923.

Chapter V: The Demands of National Interest: Loring Christie and Canadian Autonomy, 1923-1926

In his study of Loring Christie, Professor Bothwell quotes from a letter written by Christie's wife in late 1923 as follows.

This has been a hard year [1923] for the Byrd [Christie] -- full of shocks to his confidence in God, himself, and his fellow man. His parents' death began it, Mackenzie King's fair-speaking and evil-dealing with him aggravated it, and what he sees under the surface in foreign politics finishes it. I regard therefore his rather cynical frame of mind at present a phase through which he will undoubtedly pass, being the clear idealist he is under the skin¹

Bothwell then builds on Mrs. Christie's estimate to make the following generalization about Christie's post-1922 career.

... An interpretation of Christie's reactions of 1922 and 1923 must fall back on the murky science of psychology. It would seem that the most concise, and possibly the most coherent, explanation for his conduct was that set down by his wife at the time. It seems apparent that a great deal of his actions and writings after 1923 must be viewed in this context. And it is clear that above all his loss of faith went a great deal further than a mere reversal of position on the possibilities of Canadian participation in the formulation of foreign policy for the British Empire.²

This line of analysis oversimplifies the changes in Christie's attitude towards imperial affairs between 1913 and 1926, and, in the end, it does not come close to explaining them. The invocation of the "murky science of psychology" really explains nothing, and succeeds only in making the explicable seem inexplicable. At best, Bothwell's analysis of Christie's thought in the post-1922 period provides some support for Colonel Stacey's judgment in 1967 that "it probably would be fair to say that he [Christie] was unstable as well as brilliant," and for his further comment in 1981 that Christie's reaction to the Locarno treaties was "so strong that one wonders whether it did

not reflect some inborn instability."³ The motivation behind change, particularly radical change, in an individual's attitudes, beliefs, and loyalties is always difficult to account for; indeed, so many factors enter into such change that it probably is impossible to detect and measure all of them. Nonetheless, the difficulty of explanation in Christie's case is not so mystifying as to necessitate the throwing up of hands and taking shelter in the soothing but often vacuous incantations of psychologists, sociologists, or other practitioners of the more unreliable social sciences. The change in Christie's thought between 1913 and 1926 becomes quite understandable after a thorough review of how he looked at the world and Canada's place in it, and an examination of how he adapted that vision to accommodate the realities of Canadian politics and society to the workings of imperial and international events.

The basic theme of this chapter therefore is that the path along which Christie's attitudes and opinions on foreign affairs developed after 1923 is a difficult but far from impossible one to follow. One must always keep in view the state of mind in which Christie left Canada for England. At the time of his departure, Christie was bitterly disappointed that Canada's foreign policymakers had failed to take full advantage of the range of opportunities available in the immediate postwar period for enhancing Canada's international status. In addition, he was just as chagrined over Ottawa's refusal to develop in a serious way the machinery and personnel needed to make the Department of External Affairs capable of protecting Canada's national

interests in the external sphere. Sharpening Christie's bitterness were a number of specific failures: the unsettled state of the overall imperial relationship resulting from the failure to convene the constitutional conference called for by Resolution IX of the Imperial War Conference of 1917, Ottawa's refusal to exercise its prerogative and establish permanent Canadian diplomatic representation in the United States, and the development of the League of Nations not into the world organization that had been envisioned by the drafters of the Covenant, but into a Euro-centric body in which Canada's membership increasingly seemed to be less a means for gaining international recognition than a sure-fire method of incurring unwanted and potentially dangerous international responsibilities and commitments. Because of these factors, Christie arrived in England sick at heart over the opportunities to settle the imperial relationship constructively that Canada, Britain, and the other Dominions had let pass, and likewise severely disappointed over Ottawa's refusal to stand, internationally speaking, on its own two feet.

That said, however, one is still left with a pragmatic individual -- not an eccentric, erratic, unbalanced, or unstable one -- ready to confront events as he found them. Without question, Christie was a man endowed with strong preferences as to how he would like to see international events develop and political forces -- both at home and abroad -- be channeled. He was not, however, a person bent stubbornly on a career of trying to force square pegs into round holes. In Britain between 1923

and 1926 -- just as he had in Canada between 1913 and 1923 -- Christie was seeking to find and work with the best available means with which to express, enhance, and protect Canada's developing international personality. The recognition of this basic fact makes the heretofore inscrutable behavior attributed to Christie in the 1923-1926 period markedly less so, and, as well, provides an effective guide with which to analyse his reactions to and, more important, his solutions for the dilemmas faced by Canada in regard to its external affairs during the period.

The Coming Breakpoint: Canada, the Empire, and Europe, 1923-1926

"Can the thing that ails Europe be cured from the outside?," Christie asked Felix Frankfurter rhetorically in the summer of 1923, and answered, "I can't see it."⁴ Faced with what for him was the maddening dilemma of a Canadian government that refused to act as he thought necessary to enhance and protect the country's international status and determine definitively its place in the postwar Empire, Christie arrived in England believing that a breathing space had to be secured in which Canada, Britain, and the other Dominions could decide the future course and structure of imperial relations. Toward this end, he believed that it was absolutely essential that the Empire, and Great Britain in particular, avoid becoming entangled in the affairs of Europe either through direct bilateral alliances or as a consequence of arrangements made under the auspices of the League of Nations. While he did not identify it as such,

Christie seems to have been calling for a sort of "imperial isolationism"; a withdrawal from European diplomatic and political affairs in which the members of the Empire would be involved fully with the Continent in the economic and commercial sense, but would refuse to commit themselves politically to any European ties that might possibly involve them in any wars not of their own making. Perhaps rather naively, Christie seems to have expected that this self-imposed, semi-isolation would allow Britain and the Dominions time in which to settle their constitutional relationship unhurriedly, and to permit the Dominions to build their own external affairs machinery to the point where it would be capable of looking after their respective national interests. After this period of regrouping, the Empire would reenter the international hurly burly as a mature set of states, each independent in determining its international commitments, but ready to cooperate with each other when their respective national interests coincided. The one caveat Christie attached to imperial activities in the post-constitutional settlement era was that the Empire would continue to avoid binding political ties with Europe.

Christie's ideas on this subject were well outlined in several essays he published in late 1923 and early 1924. The first of these essays appeared in installments in Lord Beaverbrook's Sunday Express in the fall of 1923 under the overall title "Britain is Getting Out of Europe." The second essay appeared in the spring of 1924 in the Round Table under the title "A Basis for Imperial Foreign Policy."⁵ In these essays,

Christie laid out what he believed to be the only plausible course of action that would insure the survival of the Empire/Commonwealth as a viable international political system, while at the same time permitting the Dominions to fully develop their own unique international personalities. Once the underlying assumptions of Christie's position are examined in these essays, the vehemence of his reactions to the challenges to his beliefs -- challenges that arose in the varied forms of the Treaty of Lausanne, the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, the Geneva Protocol, and the Locarno Pact -- becomes readily understandable, and does not need to be explained by such a cause as "some inborn instability."

In his articles in the Sunday Express, Christie assayed the political chaos of postwar Europe and pointed out what he saw as the dangers for Britain and the Empire if they were to become involved intimately in continental political affairs.⁶ Underlying this discussion of British interests in Europe was a theme that stressed the fragility of the imperial system and his belief that a deep British involvement in European affairs would be a catastrophe for Empire. "Those who know the Empire, the Dominions as well as these islands," Christie wrote,

grasp instinctively the less Britain is entangled in Europe and the more she turns her eyes to the seven seas and the five continents the more certain is the safe future of the Empire. They realise as an everyday political maxim that it is quite impossible to carry the whole British Empire into a policy of special commitments and entanglements in Europe, and that should Great Britain attempt, leaving the position of the Dominions to one side or to chance, to follow such a policy for herself, she would be certain in the end to put the structure of the Empire to a strain whose effect would be incalculable and might be overwhelming.

For what has foreign policy to do with the Dominions? Little though it appears to be realised by themselves it has everything to do with them. What is called the problem of the British Commonwealth -- the problem of preserving its unity -- would have no meaning whatever apart from the existence of foreign nations, and the consequent necessities to find policies for dealing with those nations. The Dominions and India and their peculiar position and interests must be kept in view constantly and not merely at times of "crisis."

The first thing to realise in dealing with Europe to-day [is that] we are dealing with a new thing, a vastly different affair from what confronted us in the days of the nineteenth century when one could play with Europe regardless. The Dominions are becoming self-conscious and powerful. That they are becoming conscious of themselves those who recall the developments at Versailles, and the discussion of them overseas, can scarcely doubt; while their power was displayed during the war by the contribution of forces and material without which, it is not too much to say, the war could not have been won. These are factors that cannot be disregarded by anyone concerned with our future safety....

The task to be more specific, is to find a foreign policy as is calculated to meet with general acceptance, not only among the community at home [that is, in the United Kingdom], but among the six other communities, communities scattered throughout the continents of the world, peopled by various races, comprising every variety of circumstance and need, separated by great distances. OBVIOUSLY SUCH A POLICY CANNOT BE ONE WHICH IS ESPECIALLY PREOCCUPIED WITH THE AFFAIRS OF EUROPE, THE CONTINENT WHICH HAPPENS TO BE THE MOST REMOTE FROM THESE COMMUNITIES, THE ONLY CONTINENT IN THE WORLD IN WHICH THE BRITISH EMPIRE DOES NOT HOLD IMPORTANT POSSESSIONS.⁷

Having thus laid out the fragility of the imperial system, Christie assigned responsibility for the maintenance of its viability, at least for the time being, to the British government. The governments of the Dominions, Christie wrote, were preoccupied with local political issues and the pursuit of national development, and were likely to remain so involved for the immediately foreseeable future. As a result, they were not inclined to engage in, or even seek, extensive and effective

consultations with London on the direction and content of imperial foreign policy. For that reason, Christie maintained in the Sunday Express,

... the task and responsibility will continue to fall almost wholly upon the British Cabinet. If they are [even?] measureably successful in devising policies that demand the general assent of the people overseas as well as the people at home, no one need fear for the integrity of the Empire; but if they should miscalculate the trend of world forces on a major issue of policy the consequences for the Empire might easily be irreparable.⁸

In his Round Table essay in the spring of 1924, Christie clearly explained that he believed that the British Cabinet would "miscalculate the trend of world forces" if it chose to entangle the United Kingdom -- either through multilateral or bilateral treaties, alliances, or agreements -- in the political affairs of Europe. He began his essay by pointing out the mistakes of the past that had resulted in the Empire's immediate and unlimited participation in the Great War.

In the first half of the nineteenth century when the readjustment necessitated by the Napoleonic Wars was still in progress, Great Britain in 1839 gave a pledge which became and remained, though almost forgotten, an integral part of the succeeding political regime of the Continent. Three quarters of a century later in a wholly new scene the pledge came into its own; not that it was strictly the cause of what followed, for in any case the events then gathering required of us the gravest action, but this guarantee to Belgium in fact precluded any other valuation of our position whether in degree or kind than that actually reached in August, 1914; the British Empire now comprising communities at the ends of the earth unimagined in 1839, was committed to a struggle of unlimited liability on the Continent.⁹

On balance, Christie believed that Britain and the Dominions had to become involved fully in the Great War. German power had increased to the level where it threatened to dominate the entire Continent, thus threatening the security of the Empire. That

said, however, Christie wrote that the British objective in entering the war had been the defeat of Germany, and with that end accomplished it was time to rethink the desirability of making commitments in Europe that in any way resembled those that London had assumed regarding Belgium in 1839.¹⁰

Believing that the circumstances in which the nations of the Empires had found themselves in August, 1914 to be ones that must be avoided resolutely in the future, Christie argued that protection from the recurrence of such a situation could be had by simply recognizing that the Empire basically was a seapower and therefore should refrain from commitments which would ally it with land powers, which, of course, all of the European powers were. The pre-1914 arrangements between Britain and its allies had, in Christie's opinion, ignored this essential consideration and this failure of judgment had resulted in an automatic and full-scale involvement in the Great War. "For it is in the nature of things," Christie wrote, "that when our insular Empire is allied or aligned with a land Power, our land ally will in the long run be the arbiter as between us and the land Power against whom the alignment tends."¹¹ Britain must avoid, therefore, all commitments in Europe that would put the Empire, in the event of another war on the continent, in the same position of "unlimited liability" in which it had found itself in 1914. "The essence of this posture," he concluded, "is a resolute abstention from all alliances, guarantees, or promises of force that would link the Empire either to the European or to any other system."¹² Indeed, the only necessary political tie he saw for the Empire was one

with the United States which would be based on the premise that they were both sea rather than land powers and that their interests therefore were complementary.¹³ Even in this case, however, Christie thought that the commitment between the two powers should be one of cooperation based on mutual self-interest and not on a "firm contract" between them.¹⁴ In sum, Christie wrote in the Round Table, the foreign policy of the Empire must above all other things avoid being entangled in European politics.

But from its true independent position the Empire will naturally regard normal continental politics as primarily a thing for that region itself. To assert a decisive voice in every question, on some theory that this alone can forestall the abnormal condition [that is, the domination of Europe by on power] -- the only condition in which we have a vital interest -- is to court indeed the risk of precipitating that condition. Our true normal voice becomes the voice of the mediator, not authoritative but cautious and uttered when advice is acceptable to all concerned. If prudent and effective intervention in the affairs of others must be based upon interest as well as upon informed knowledge, the Empire has not in fact the proper degree of interest to justify active authoritative interference in any but a few great European developments of an exceptional kind, and we must be exceedingly careful about choosing the occasions. Must not our general tendency be to disinterest ourselves in the strictest sense in some disputes and even wars which in the past might have seemed of vital concern. ...

Thus the conclusion seems irresistible, that any policy of alliances or pledges yoking the Empire's forces to those of any Power or system is out of the question.¹⁵

Although Christie assigned to the British government the major role in making the foreign policy decisions that would protect the Empire's integrity during this interim period, he did not believe that this process necessarily entailed any abandonment by the Dominions of the international status they had acquired as a consequence of their participation in the Great War

and the period of peacemaking that followed it. During this interim era, Christie envisioned Britain's role as one of "holding the ring" for the Empire until London and the Dominions were prepared to meet to revamp the imperial constitutional relationship. Christie did not believe that Britain's diplomatic preeminence in what he thought would be a limited period necessarily had to result, for the Dominions, in a process whereby they would slide back into the status of semi-colonial dependencies. What Christie was prescribing was basically a negative policy in which London would not make any major foreign policy commitments; under the plan decisions by the Dominions on imperial affairs would not be necessary because Britain would refuse to accept major individual or imperial commitments that would impinge on the viability of the imperial system or on their respective national interests. Christie did, however, fully expect London to seek the Dominions' advice on routine imperial matters, and, just as importantly, he believed that the Dominions should be willing and eager to make their views available.

For this reason Christie was particularly agitated with the performance of Mackenzie King's government, and with that of the British government as well, during the negotiation and ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923-1924. The Treaty itself was the peace settlement between Turkey and the Allied Powers, and its major stipulations provided that Turkey would give up all claim to the non-Turkish lands it had lost during the Great War, that Turkey would pay no reparations, and that the Dardenelles Straits would be demilitarized with a neutralized

zone established on either bank. The agreement pertaining to the Straits -- also known as the "Straits Convention" -- permitted access to the waterway for the ships of all nations in time of peace, and, if Turkey remained neutral, in war as well. If Turkey was at war, on the other hand, its enemies would be excluded from the Straits, but neutrals would be permitted uninterrupted access. Britain and several other European powers undertook to guarantee the Straits Convention.¹⁶

The actual terms of the Treaty of Lausanne were of less concern to Christie -- although he regarded Britain's decision to join in guaranteeing the Straits Convention as decidedly unwise¹⁷ -- than was the method by which the Treaty was negotiated and ratified. In the first instance, Christie chastized Lord Curzon, the Foreign Secretary responsible for the British position at Lausanne, for failing to draw the Dominions into the negotiating process. In the case of Lausanne, Christie rejected outright the traditional Foreign Office contention that its officials had to be free to conduct British foreign policy as they saw fit, and to be able to make rapid decisions unhampered by complicated and time-consuming consultations with the Dominions. Christie believed that London's failure to consult the Dominions was the result of Curzon's "timid" nature and his desire to "placate the French,"¹⁸ not, as Curzon claimed, because of the Foreign Office's fear that "the French would insist upon representation for Algeria [if the Dominions were invited to Lausanne] and because time was pressing."¹⁹ "No such case really confronted us in this instance," Christie asserted.

Lausanne, if my memory is not at fault, was not the first time the French trotted out this preposterous claim about Algeria, Morocco, etc.; and I cannot understand why they were not sat upon in this case as before. In view of the Dominions' war effort, their present political character, power and resources, and their future possibilities, the suggestion that Algeria should be treated on a par with them is simply not sense. ...

The fact that a Foreign Secretary could be found to swallow the French claim in 1923 so soon after the days of Paris and Washington, and the fact that the Dominions took the pill without a murmur -- these two items each in their own way are perhaps the most significant and disturbing elements in the whole [Lausanne] business. The Dominions' acquiescence seems to have two aspects. So far as status goes, it is part of their vacillation between the "Crown Colony" and "equal partner" state of mind; but their existing mental confusion will not in the long run be resolved in the "Crown Colony" sense; so that any decision now taken in that sense will be bad because it will not correspond with realities. So far as the substance of foreign policy goes their performance seems indicative of their profound opposition to the Empire being drawn into the European system through special alliances, guarantees or such like; [the] Dominion governments will accordingly go to any lengths to avoid the appearance of having committed themselves to such a policy. ...²⁰

Christie felt that the circumstances surrounding the Treaty of Lausanne demonstrated that there was neither "an adequate grasp at Westminster" of the new status of the Dominions nor an accurate perception of their opposition to and fear of being involved in a commitment that might lead to events similar to those of 1914-1918.²¹ By failing to consult the Dominions, and by tying Britain more closely to Europe, Christie believed that Curzon was threatening the long-term survival of the Empire. "I think myself that it [that is, the danger inherent in Curzon's conduct] leads to the conclusion," Christie wrote, "that until at all events the Empire is politically better organized, we must resolutely refrain from all engagements whatever of that sort [that is, such as the guarantee in the Straits Convention]."²²

While chastizing Curzon and the British government for ignoring the arguments against joining European guarantees and alliances he had set out in the Sunday Express and the Round Table, Christie reserved a more withering scorn for the actions, or rather the inactions, of Mackenzie King's Liberal government. Christie wrote that although Britain's actions regarding the involvement of the Dominions in the Lausanne affair were negligent and unacceptable in the wake of the Paris Peace Conference and the Washington Conference, that "in no way touches or palliates Mackenzie King's extraordinary performance. His statement [regarding Lausanne] ... can scarcely be read except for the declaration of one who is unwilling to accept all the implications of membership in the Empire and yet dare not say so."²³ "As I see it now," he told Arthur Meighen,

both sides of the water are to blame. Curzon erred in not securing provision for Dominion representation at the outset, in failing later to recognize the significance of the telegrams from Ottawa (messages from King which, while they did not object to Canada's lack of representation at Lausanne, hinted that it might not abide by what was decided), and again in entering into commitments at Lausanne that were difficult or impossible from the Dominions' point of view. But so far as Canada is concerned, Mackenzie King is the responsible actor, and I do not see how he can avoid serious criticism for not protesting at the outset and for not demanding representation in the British Empire Delegation.... His failure means that he has acquiesced in a retrogression from our position. His disclaimer of any Canadian interest in the proceedings is nonsense, and his excuse that the lack of an invitation "had been regarded by us as evidence that in the opinion of the countries by whom invitations to the Conference were extended, Canada could not have been deemed to have that direct and immediate interest, etc." is either disingenuous or an astonishing confession of abdication. For is the Canadian Government to have no say as to where Canadian interests lie? Canada in truth had and has a direct and important interest, namely, to change the status of war to a status of peace and so to bring about all the consequences, commercial and otherwise, implied in such a change. It was his business to think of

that and to provide for Canadian participation in the operation if he means anything by his talk of self-government.

... On immediately practical grounds the result of his [King's] not following the Versailles and Washington precedents and his not pressing on His Majesty's Government, as a matter of Imperial (not foreign) concern, that the British Empire Delegation should contain a Canadian representative seems to be that either our interests have been handled as in colonial days solely by His Majesty's Government and we have been committed to various obligations, some of them undesirable, without our advice, or else we are in a position from which we can extricate ourselves only by some ridiculous sort of separate peace with Turkey involving something like secession from the Empire. The whole thing seems to me to disclose an astonishing dereliction of duty for which he (King) should be sharply dealt with."²⁴

Colonel Stacey has written that while the Lausanne episode "was undignified and in fact rather absurd" it was important in that it "[e]ffectively ... marked the end of the experiment of associating the British Dominions with British foreign policy that had been undertaken in 1918-1919. The responsibility for this result is shared between the governments of Britain and Canada."²⁵ It is clear that Christie, on the basis of the evidence available to him at the time, also laid blame at the doorsteps of both Ottawa and London, although because he believed that it was "Westminster and Whitehall that have the enormously important function of initiation in these matters" he may have placed a bit more of the fault on the heads of the British.²⁶ It is equally clear that Christie did not immediately see the embarrassment of Lausanne and the complicated and binding Straits Convention as the final end of the effort to formulate a cooperative and consultative foreign policy for the Empire; indeed, he believed that once Curzon's "stupidity" became fully

apparent the "Empire will be able to negotiate itself out of the thing [that is, the Straits Convention]," because the Dominions and a large section of influential opinion in Britain did not want it, and, moreover, the "French and Italians are really not interested in it, and the Turks didn't want it, so there ought to be a basis for a deal."²⁷ He did view it, however, as a clear example of the dangerous situations that could arise if the vigilance of either Britain or the Dominions in protecting the interests of the imperial system waned. Such a relaxation allowed London, through shortsightedness, Foreign Office arrogance, and/or excessive concentration on its local European affairs, and the Dominions, through their adherence to what Christie described as the "negative autonomy idea"²⁸ -- that is, the concept that held that because the Dominions were not consulted in advance of a foreign policy decision by Britain they were not responsible for the commitments made under it -- to permit matters to drift toward a situation where the policies or actions needed to protect their respective national interests would be incompatible if not contradictory. For Christie, the essence of the problem of Lausanne was Britain's decision to guarantee the Straits Convention -- thus committing the country to European affairs -- and, as noted above, he believed that the Empire would be able to extricate itself from the pledge eventually. Christie therefore considered Lausanne both a timely warning and an object lesson for London and the Dominions. "I am going to venture to suggest," Christie advised Meighen,

either in any debate you may have on this Treaty or on some other occasion, it would be most useful if you could take an

opportunity to deal with this point of Imperial commitments. The importance of the Treaty lies in the fact that it does not raise this broad question, and it is the more important because there are some broad elements here (in England) who strongly favor a wider policy of European guarantees and commitments. This will be seen shortly in relation to the Draft Treaties of Mutual Assistance ... and also in relation to a guarantee to France; perhaps the attempt will be to combine the two. I am apprehensive of the attitude of Labour and of many Liberals in this connection. Labour doesn't know the Dominions; it doesn't know America; it might swallow a programme that would in the end prove impossible for the Empire. ...

My own conviction is that the future of the Empire hangs on the decisions that will be taken in the near future (perhaps this year, perhaps next) with regard to the various guarantee and alliance proposals. Britain is indeed in the process of making her choice. On the one hand there is the policy of implicating herself in the European system through alliances, guarantees of assistance, neutrality and what not (whether it is done under the League or not the real effect and consequences are the same). On the other hand, there is the policy of resolutely avoiding such ties and of a growing identity of interest with the oceanic peoples, America and Japan. If she adopts the first, or -- what might be more likely -- if she attempts to compromise between the two, I feel sure that the attempt would in the end put an intolerable strain on our Imperial structure....²⁹

For Christie then, the Lausanne affair served almost as a suitable point of emphasis for underscoring what he had written in the Sunday Express and the Round Table. The Treaty and the Straits Convention committed Britain politically and militarily to the Continent in precisely the manner which he had argued against so cogently. For a number of reasons, however, he did not see this particular European attachment as a permanent one for Britain, but rather as one that was rapidly coming to be viewed as a mistake and which he thought London would remove itself from through negotiation at an early date. In the wake of the Lausanne episode, therefore, Christie was hopeful that a lesson had been learned by both Britain and the Dominions, and

that the policy he had sketched out journalistically would now carry the day.

At first blush, Christie's assignment of the primary role for securing the Empire's future viability to the British government seems to be a significant departure from the more Canadian-oriented policies he had urged on Borden and Meighen between 1919 and 1922. This retreat, however, was much more apparent than real. In the first place, by championing a policy whereby London would divorce itself from the political affairs of Europe, Christie hoped to create a situation in which the danger of a new European war involving Great Britain would not arise. The policy he urged was largely the negative one of semi-isolation -- whether through such measures as refusing to join alliances or make guarantees, or through the introduction of an imperial preferential tariff system -- in which Britain and the Dominions could insulate themselves from the overheated and chaotic politics of the postwar Continent.

Christie was not, however, advocating that the British government act unilaterally to regularize constitutional relations among the imperial partners. He believed that while the Dominions would, at the moment, tolerate and perhaps even cultivate the imperial status quo, any attempt by London to sort out the imperial tangle according to its own best lights could only cause further fragmentation. Likewise, he could see little promise in a policy of London pushing the Dominions to make a final decision as to the nature and future of the imperial relationship; from his own personal experience in Ottawa,

Christie well knew the extent to which the Dominions were preoccupied with local political and economic affairs and the problems associated with national development.

What Christie was looking for, it seems, was the best means with which to keep open as many options as possible for Canada and for the Empire. If Britain refused to become involved in European politics, and thereby avoid as best it could the possibility of becoming involved in a war on the Continent not of her own making, Christie believed that the resulting breathing space would permit Britain and the Dominions an opportunity for reaching a well-considered decision regarding the future of the imperial relationship. In a sense, he was still looking for an environment conducive to holding the imperial constitutional conference called for by the Imperial War Conference in 1917. Dissatisfied and frustrated with the drifting policy regarding imperial affairs that he had encountered first hand in Ottawa -- and which he felt held the day in Britain and the other Dominions as well -- Christie arrived in England with the hope of finding the British government willing to hold the ring for the Empire by following a policy of abstaining from European commitments until the period of drift had played itself out, and it and the Dominions were ready to make the decisions he believed necessary regarding the future of the imperial system.

Because Christie placed such great stock in Britain's staying out of European political affairs to the greatest extent possible, his reactions to London's increasing post-Lausanne tendency to accept, and even seek, commitments on the Continent

in the name of "European security" were necessarily shrill and strident ones. Christie's intense but entirely consistent negative reactions to Britain's halting moves toward European commitments, given the position and beliefs he had laid out in the Sunday Express and the Round Table and in letters to Meighen and Borden during the Lausanne episode, must be judged therefore as those of an individual who believed that he was witnessing a grossly misconceived, indeed perhaps a tragic, course of policy, and who, as a result, perceived an immediate need to formulate a new course of action for Canada which took these developments in British foreign policy into account. Christie's change in attitude in the post-Lausanne period, therefore, probably is best understood as his personal adaptation to unfolding events, and as additional steps in his on-going attempt to find a policy adequate for performing the task of protecting and enhancing Canada's international status and national interests.

The first post-Lausanne threat to confront Christie's plan to insulate Britain and the Dominions from Continental affairs surfaced in early 1924 in the form of the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance. The Treaty was intended to commit its signatories to come to the aid of any of their number in the event that one or more of them were the target of a war of aggression. The Treaty limited this duty, however, to those signatories located on the continent on which the conflict was occurring. Once a war commenced, the Treaty gave to the Council of the League of Nations the responsibility for identifying the aggressor nation, and for delegating intervention assignments to those treaty

signatories located in the appropriate geographical area.³⁰

Christie immediately opposed this Treaty. He believed that it involved Britain too closely in European affairs, and that it created the distinct possibility that parts of the Empire could be at war while others remained at peace. "Could the British Empire," he asked rhetorically in some notes he made after the Draft Treaty was discussed at a session of the British Institute of International Affairs (BIIA), "stand the strain of the idea that one part of it could be engaged in a European war and the others neutral?"³¹ Christie believed that the Draft Treaty amounted to nothing more than the revival of the system of alliances that had been the standard diplomatic arrangement in Europe prior to 1914, with only the new and, for him, dubious feature tacked on of installing the League's Council as the agent designated to oversee its development and management. His personal apprehensions to one side, Christie wrote that such a system might or might not work, and that "if the continent wishes to make the experiment for itself, it is not yet established that our [that is, the Empire's] interests require us to oppose it."³² He did believe, however, that there were obvious and irrefutable reasons why Britain and the Dominions should refuse outright to become associated with the Draft Treaty. "But for the British Empire," he wrote,

there is a whole set of distinctive considerations that Lord [Robert] Cecil did not even touch on [in his defense of the Draft Treaty before the BIIA meeting], or at least he merely recognised them verbally to brush them aside.

We know that in the face of conditions like those of the pre-war period any plans of alliances or guarantees implicating us as an island power in the continental system

is bad both for us and for Europe -- a thing to be resolutely avoided. (a) It compromises our world position in relation to other regions, notably America. (b) In actual practice the land powers would naturally become the arbiters -- the process takes place on the land; the resultant of their forces would control the issue. (c) The intrusion of our weight into the continental system is abnormal and disruptive, not deterring but encouraging the realigning of Europe -- East or West or what not -- and to promise it in advance is in effect to render us powerless to limit our liability when events arise requiring us to take grave action of some sort.

Now is there anything new to-day to alter these considerations in favour of the Draft Treaties? The only new factor is the new method of negotiation, the League. ... But -- and here is the essential difficulty -- this new factor does not and cannot alter the special circumstances -- (a), (b), and (c) above -- affecting the British Empire. Nothing can alter the distinction between a land power and a sea power, and it cannot therefore be ignored. The Draft Treaties being based, necessarily, on the idea of regulating armed force, the one thing each nation invited to join must look to first of all is the essential nature of its force and the conditions and limitations of its operation. If its force and position in the world present a distinctive nature, it will conclude it is in a different category and is therefore to be treated differently.³³

Because it threatened to place an unbearable political strain on the Empire -- which Christie believed was "the most vulnerable political system on earth"³⁴ -- by failing to recognize that Britain was a sea power rather than a land power, and because it enmeshed Britain inextricably in the web of European politics, Christie opposed the Draft Treaty vigorously. He also believed that London should reject the Treaty because the Empire "cannot accept further commitments alone or compromise our position by entering any negotiation until America is also present..." and the United States clearly would accept no part in the European arrangement projected by the Treaty.³⁵ Christie was relieved when the British government decided to reject the Treaty on the grounds that it threatened to

put a disproportionate share of the burden on the British Empire -- due to the Empire's geographical diversity -- and gave executive functions to the Council of the League in a manner that was contrary to British constitutional practice. Christie, however, apparently remained somewhat incredulous that London had even flirted with the idea of acceptance. "What a foolish scheme it was," he told Frankfurter.³⁶

The next challenge to Christie's view of the necessity of British disengagement from Europe came in the autumn of 1924 in the form of the Protocol for Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, or, more simply, the Geneva Protocol. The ambitious essence of the Protocol was nothing less than to provide the means for settling all of the international disputes that happened to arise. The plan of the Protocol's drafters was to establish an infallible test for identifying aggressors by using the simple formula which was encapsulated in the blunt question that Ramsay Macdonald devised for the leaders of disputatious nations, "Are you willing to arbitrate?" The Protocol envisioned the application of arbitral machinery to all disputes arising except those originating solely within the boundaries of an individual state's own jurisdiction. If, after being asked Macdonald's rather basic question, a particular state shunned the opportunity for arbitration and continued to pursue its aggressive ways, it would become subject to international sanctions identical to those enumerated in Article XVI of the Covenant of the League of Nations. On 2 October 1924, the League's Assembly recommended that all of the League's member

governments adopt the Protocol at the earliest possible date.³⁷

From the first, Christie was appalled at the universality of the Protocol, claiming that it was an instrument "of an avowedly comprehensive and water-tight character to which no so-called Imperialist would ever dream of aspiring...."³⁸ He also thought that the Protocol would lead inexorably toward war, warning that "whatever else it is, it is in the end an agreement to fight...."³⁹ Most importantly, however, Christie believed that if Britain and the Dominions decided to ratify the Protocol they would, in effect, inaugurate "a complete reversal of the Empire's course during the last five years," and would, as a result, endanger its ability to survive as an international political system.⁴⁰ Christie laid out his argument regarding the Empire and the Protocol more fully in an article he wrote in December, 1924 for the periodical Headway, the journal of the British chapter of League of Nations Union. "My primary concern here," Christie wrote,

is to discuss the Protocol in its special relation to the British Empire. The Empire is a world power. That is its dominant and inescapable characteristic. The Protocol envisages on the fighting side purely a European system and a partial European system at that, in view of the absence of Germany and Russia. We cannot permit ourselves to be involved in this Continental system in the strategic sense....

Thus, the political realities behind the verbiage of the Protocol mean that we are being asked to guarantee the territorial and political settlement of the Continent. Article 10 [of the League's Covenant] is tightened up with a vengeance. The French thesis of recent years that we must guarantee not merely their sea frontier and their eastern frontier, but also the frontiers of their Polish and other allies -- a thesis which British opinion has unanimously and unmistakably rejected -- is now put forward in another form.

That brings us to the parting of the ways. The

continental status quo may be good or bad. That is not the question. The point is that, whatever its merits, the British Empire, which is a world state and not a European state, cannot undertake to guarantee it. There is only one course for the British Empire. We must stick to the original conception of the League as being predominantly a simple conference system, with conciliation and arbitration machinery. We must resist the elaboration of the "sanction" idea. ...

...The moral for the British Empire is that it should refuse to ratify the Protocol; that it should announce its willingness to develop the mechanism of arbitration, conciliation and judicial settlement of disputes; but that so far as "sanctions" and warlike obligations are concerned it should declare, either by reservation to the Covenant or otherwise that until all regions of the earth are fully represented and consent seriously to discuss these problems, the Empire cannot even approach the problem officially.⁴¹

Christie was delighted in March, 1925 when British Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain told the Council of the League of Nations that Great Britain had decided not to adhere to the Protocol. Christie continued, nevertheless, to worry increasingly over European efforts to entangle Britain in Continental political affairs. To say that Christie had been shaken by the events surrounding the Draft Treaty and the Geneva Protocol probably would be too much. He was, however, undeniably dismayed that attempts to tie Britain to Europe continued and that there were influential groups in all segments of British society who seemed to favor just such a connection. The danger to the imperial system of such a British commitment was so apparent to Christie that he seems to have had trouble believing that anyone could entertain the idea seriously. With this attitude, and given his earlier condemnation of the Draft Treaty and the Geneva Protocol, it seems hardly surprising that he reacted in such an intensely negative manner to London's decision

to adhere to the Locarno Pact in the fall of 1925. The implementation of the Locarno system brought an end to the hopes that Christie had carried with him to England in 1923 that the British government would, through its foreign policy decisions, create the environment in which the Empire could sort out and regularize the imperial constitutional relationship.

Indeed, the advent of the Locarno system seems to have brought Christie up short, and appears to have convinced him that the line of analysis he had been pursuing since 1923 had been unrealistic, even naive, and that he had been mistaken to look outside the Canadian context for the means with which to define the country's international status. Locarno refocused Christie's views on international affairs, it moved him back, in fact, to an approach similar to the one he had employed in the spring of 1921 when had he urged Prime Minister Meighen, after Meighen had been rebuffed by Lloyd George, to assert the national rather than the imperial interest in regard to the question of renewing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. After Britain joined in the Locarno Pact, Christie's approach to international affairs began to manifest an almost exclusively Canadian orientation, and he transferred his previous preference for an imperial semi-isolationism to an advocacy of a position of semi-isolationism for Canada. In short, the process of fusing Britain with Europe that culminated in the Locarno Pact prompted the renewal of Christie's personal desire for dissociation of Canada from the imperial system -- a desire that had resided in his mind in a semi-suspended state since at least early 1921 -- and, more

importantly, it fixed his mind fully on the task of finding a solely Canadian solution for clearing up the ambiguity of the country's current international position.

In a sense, Europe seems to have been drifting toward a Locarno-type of settlement since late 1922 when Berlin first proposed that Germany and France enter into mutual pledges with the other Allied powers to guarantee Germany's western frontier. The French rejected the German overture at that time, however, because Paris believed that it had little to fear from a still-prostrate Germany. By 1924, on the other hand, Paris had derived little tangible benefit from its invasion of the Ruhr and was beginning to have some interest in securing an arrangement of the type Berlin had suggested two years earlier. In addition, the interests of Great Britain and Germany were similar enough to prompt London to consider joining in such an arrangement. By 1924, for example, Germany had abandoned hope of adjusting its western frontiers -- but not its other frontiers -- and Britain was prepared to offer a guarantee of Germany's western frontiers but not of the others. The upshot of this situation, which found the interests of Britain, France, and Germany complementing one another, was the conclusion of the Locarno Pact on 15 October 1925. The Pact consisted of several complex documents, the major provisions of which called for a treaty of mutual guarantee of the Franco-German and Belgo-German frontiers between Germany, Belgium, Great Britain, France, and Italy; arbitration conventions between Germany and Poland, and Germany and Czechoslovakia; arbitration treaties between Germany and Belgium,

and Germany and France; and Franco-Polish and Franco-Czechoslovak treaties of mutual assistance in the event of aggression by Germany. The Locarno Pact was signed officially on 1 December 1925 in London, and it seems, in the words of the historian E.H. Carr, to be best understood as "an expression of the power politics of a particular period and locality." Indeed, Christie anticipated Carr's view when he described Locarno as "a definite, elaborate, [and] permanent security plan avowedly restricted to the circumstances of Western Europe."⁴²

From strictly the point of view of the strategic interests of Britain and the Empire, Christie's reaction to Locarno was completely and vociferously negative. In regard to Great Britain's national interests, Christie thought that Locarno was a "disastrous strategic blunder" and on that basis, as he told Philip Kerr, the Pact "leaves me baffled."

... I entirely agree with those here [in England] who think that for Britain as a sea power Locarno is radically unsound. I think that it must make the General Staff shudder. Britain's strategic interest is certainly not necessarily identical with the land frontiers of France or Belgium or anyone else. Her real concern is to prevent the emergence of a great naval power on the Continent. Yet when war comes -- not over frontiers but for some now unforeseeable cause -- Locarno's impractical politics will have the effect of defining almost automatically the terms on which she will "sheathe the sword". One can imagine the Asquiths and Greys of that day putting the case in the House. It may well be, indeed it will almost inevitably so define the liability as to require an expenditure of men and money on the land far beyond the needs of the real object. Fifty years hence I believe people will be asking themselves whether something like this was not the real vice of Sir Edward Grey's pre-war diplomacy. You know yourself, perhaps better than any living man, after Lloyd George took charge of the war, he struggled against the madness of feeding millions into the trenches, how he cast about, all around the shores of Europe for an alternative. But he was in the coils. This is the time to think for the future Lloyd George. Britain as a land power is ridiculous; ships cannot

walk.

To-day the case is even stronger. There are now two new factors in the oceans -- America and the growing Dominions. It is time to reduce the land commitment. Yet Locarno does the exact opposite; it extends [it] to the land frontier of France indeed we do not even know if it stops there; nor have I seen anywhere a serious attempt to expound what the case of fighting with Germany against France might mean; and there's the Eastern network of Alliances.⁴³

Even more distressing for Christie was the disastrous influence he believed that Locarno inevitably would have on the imperial system. Although Article 9 of the Locarno Pact specifically exempted the Dominions and India from responsibility under the accords unless they volunteered their acceptance by becoming formal signatories, Christie thought that the provision was of virtually no practical use and dismissed it as being "in reality eyewash and a trap."⁴⁴ In regard to the relationship between Locarno and the Empire, Christie wrote bitterly that he was "wholly at sea." "What is to be the new imperial working hypothesis?," he asked Kerr.

We had the theory of "trusteeship". That was displaced by a theory of partnership and diplomatic unity, common foreign policy. That has now broken down. What next? At all events, one doesn't have to answer that question in the next ten minutes. There is however one point on which we can reckon; if the theory of partnership and unity have broken down it has left one permanent legacy in the shape of our friend "status". Not every one will talk about it with the zeal of the addicts but it will never be abandoned by any Dominion statesman.

But leaving theory and coming to practice. The Locarno procedure and results, coupled with the new definition of Article 16 of the Covenant, seem likely to affect adversely the hope of getting an "Effective System of inter-Imperial consultation about inter-Imperial affairs" which you urge on page 20 [in this letter Christie is commenting on a draft essay by Kerr for the Round Table]. It seems to me certain that the Liberal Party in Canada will say at once that this event [that is, Locarno] will do away with the case for such machinery or for any Canadian interest in Europe. And what

about the Conservative Imperialist? It won't anyhow be easy sledding for him. May he not still have to give more ground on the Imperial side and stiffen the nationalist side? Under the partnership theory he could make a coherent case for better Imperial machinery. But now, having been told that the vital relations between Britain and Europe are a matter for settlement without consulting him, he will, I think, be bound to re-examine his position pretty seriously. Where will he come out? Will he in the end say "Well, it looks as though we must look out for ourselves, as in London it must be 'Britain first', so in Ottawa it must be 'Canada first'; within those limits we'll do our damndest for the Empire; we'll send our agents to London, Paris, Geneva, to find out what Canada should do about all these matters, but as there's no common policy there's no great scope for consultation, and we'll have to do some stiff bargaining about preference and so on; and at Geneva we'll have to oppose nearly everything."⁴⁵

For Christie, Britain's decision to sign the Locarno Pact would "eventually be seen as a turning point in the structure of Empire."⁴⁶ He believed that it marked the final and complete breakdown of the plans for imperial diplomatic unity and a common foreign policy that had been developed as result of the relationship between Britain and the Dominions during the Great War. In the postwar period, the Dominions had shunned the plan by focusing their attention and efforts on local concerns, Christie wrote, and, with the acceptance of the Locarno system, Britain also had violated the plan "in [a] deliberate, unmistakable fashion" by deciding that it was necessary to proceed "alone and refraining from consulting [the] Dominions."⁴⁷ He accepted Britain's decision as one that the country's political leaders had made in what they saw as the national interest -- although he continued to regard Britain as a sea power rather than a land power, and therefore considered the land commitments Britain accepted under Locarno to be strategically unwise in the extreme -- but felt that it was one

that thoroughly invalidated the manner in which he had been approaching the problem of the imperial relationship. "Two years ago in the March, 1924 issue of the Round Table," he explained to Meighen,

I tried to outline "A Basis for Imperial Foreign Policy". I think I sent you the article. My thesis was that a common foreign policy, a common outlook and decision on security questions was conceivable only if it were possible for the members of the Empire to conceive the Empire's place relative to the other regions of the world in some such broad sense as there outlined. But from conversations with Englishmen, with fellow Canadians, with Australians, and so on, and from events themselves, I must now conclude that the condition I suggested was an impracticable one for any member of the Empire. Locarno is chiefly significant to me as definitive proof that Britain feels unable to proceed on any such basis, for Locarno is practically a consensus of all parties here. Even if Locarno itself shall chance to fall through, its definition of Britain's liabilities in Europe would be carried out in other forms, and indeed some parties here would be apt to go further into the Continent as soon as they got into power. In all the circumstances it seems to me essential to reconsider the whole position from Canada's view point.⁴⁸

Quite simply, Locarno dashed the ideas and guidelines that Christie had set out in his articles in the Sunday Express and Round Table late in 1923 and early in 1924. In signing the Pact, London had tied Britain voluntarily to the political affairs of Europe, and had shown that it could not reconcile Britain's national interests with the type of foreign policy that Christie considered indispensable for preserving the imperial system. Therefore it was time for Canada, Christie wrote, to "look for a new theory."⁴⁹

Britain's decision to participate in the Locarno system of guarantees and treaties brought Christie back to the position that he had been tentatively exploring and urging in the 1921-1922 period -- and particularly during the spring preceding the

Imperial Conference of 1921 -- namely, that Canadian foreign policy should be based first and foremost upon an estimate by the government in Ottawa of exactly what the national interests were and what policies were best designed to protect and enhance those interests. There was much disappointment in Christie's reaction to Britain's decision to join in the Locarno settlement, but very little anger or resentment. Locarno seems to have brought home to him the fact that any nation -- large or small -- must act in international affairs on the basis of what it sees as its national interests, and to do otherwise amounted to an abject abdication of political responsibility.⁵⁰ In the case of Locarno, which he saw as the culmination of "a process that has been going on over a long period [and] to which all the [European] Governments have now bowed without dissent," London and the other European powers were simply acting in what they perceived to be the best interests of their respective nations. "I think, after much bewilderment," Christie wrote,

and after saying some hard things about Draft Treaties of Mutual Assiatnce, Geneva Protocols, Locarno and the whole movement, that no Canadian has any business urging Canada's special case [on the British government], or even the particular legalities or symbols to which she has clung, as an obstacle in the way of efforts toward the security of Great Britain and toward stable European organisation, or applauding any government or party here if it should on its own initiative withhold its hand from such efforts because of the Canadian position...."⁵¹

Recognizing that its national security interests had prompted the British government to act at Locarno without consulting the Dominions, Christie concluded that henceforth Ottawa would have to behave internationally in exactly the same manner. "Every country," Christie wrote, "-- whatever

aspirations may be assigned to it -- in order to get its diplomatic position and avoid frustration and disaster, must and does make from its own place on the map an analysis of the physical factors -- land, water, space. population. Great Britain does, and Canada can be no exception."⁵² Christie noted that Canada was, however, at that time an exception to the formula. "When the King goes to war to-day all," he maintained in a letter to Philip Kerr, "his territory becomes instantly subject to the status of war. The position is virtually that Great Britain acts as a trustee for Canadian lives."⁵³

Such are the lines that prevail at present, and Canadians must ask themselves how long the thing can be risked. If anyone can offer some coherent scheme -- which would be intelligible to plain men all over Canada, which would meet the test and cure our false position, there might be some ground for a waiting policy. But nothing is offered -- and I shall indicate later my view that nothing can be offered under the existing legalities. ...

Now I come directly to what to do about it. I think that we [that is, Canadians] would be children -- wards indeed -- to let the craft drift, and I will put the broad lines of the view to which every thing has been steadily forcing my mind. ...

I do not suggest a revival of the Special Constitutional Conference that was abandoned in 1921. I see that it is out of the question. Even if anyone in Canada should urge it, at least two or three members of the Empire would have none of it. But the real point is, like you, I see no use in "wordy formulas" along this line; but, unlike you, I see that this is a precise description of the regime under which we live. We must have something simple and intelligible to plain men every where, and we cannot get it from Imperial Conferences. In an earlier paragraph, in discussing your policy of carrying on and waiting for something to turn up, I said that nothing more can be offered under the existing legalities to meet the test of principle and give Canada an incentive to play her game. The more you look at it the more you see that Locarno's Article 9 really empties the draftsmen's box of tricks, and that there's no use in making any more complaints in London. The method of constitutional "conventions" superimposed on the existing legalities has definitely reached the end of its resources in this field of

affairs. We do not even, any two of us, understand them ourselves. But the decisive reason is that here what we really have to deal with are not pure constitutional problems but problems with relationships with other communities of men in the world. Foreign affairs bring in other nations to whom our understandings mean nothing. No "reservation" or parliamentary resolution that Ottawa can imagine is any good either. The problems we are facing are really problems of international affairs; the existing legalities prevent us from dealing effectively with them as such; and that means danger.

It all means to me that the ball is really at our feet as Canadians, and we have to tackle the legalities -- as decently as possible but to whatever extent necessary to put us right. It seems to me that at this stage it is our game. Canadians, before they can hold any useful or effective talk with the rest of the Empire, about the future, ought to think out their play together.

The forum for all that is in Canada. What it seems to me to point to in practical terms is a Canadian Constitutional Conference -- a non party affair with the delegates chosen in some way from the different sections of the country. Such a conference seems to me the sanest thing to work toward in our whole political position to-day.

Such a conference would have to find the international status for Canada that will meet her actual position, that will define our true posture toward Europe, and that will assist and protect the part which we as a small North American community have to play in the English-speaking world.

In my view it means completing our international status. The first principle would be Canadian sovereignty as full and complete as that of any Western people, assumed by Canada and recognized by every other State.

When agreed on that, such a conference would study every possible way of preserving a political link with Great Britain -- whether by means of a joint crown or otherwise -- and of finding some simple working agreement for the future that would be compatible with our actual positions in the world. That of course would depend upon Great Britain's will as well as ours, and would be for negotiations; but I think that the whole of Canadian history shows that Canada would be anxious to make the effort.

Such a course may seem remote and academic in terms of Canadian politics to-day. I don't know. I have sketched it to illustrate clearly my own view of a practical goal for those who want to ensure there being any Canadian politics at all in North America.

The flexibility of our institutions has long been a standing boast. There seems to be no compelling reason in the nature of things why our most ancient legalities should serve the needs and conditions of a new Era. I think in fact that we have encountered a rigidity that will not yield to time and that demands the utmost exertion of inventive powers if we are to retain anything of the idea of a Britannic system in the world.⁵⁴

The advent of the Locarno system brought Christie back to the basic ideas that he had first formulated in the 1921-1923 period -- considerations concerning the pursuit of purely Canadian interests on the subjects of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and Canadian sovereignty over the islands of the Arctic Archipelago, for example -- and led him to realize that "the whole circumstances are such as to rule out altogether the essence of what was once contemplated, viz. [intra-imperial] discussions of the kind that looks to the acceptance of responsibility for a decision jointly reached."⁵⁵ After the spring of 1926, Christie looked with an increasing sense of urgency for a method for promoting a well-thought-out decision by Canadians in Canada about their country's future as a unique international entity. The matter, he felt, had to be addressed at an early date in order to foreclose the possibility of an event's arising that would "precipitate a more drastic solution than might have been discovered by frank and courageous deliberation."⁵⁶ Christie judged the conclusion of the Locarno Pact to represent the final breakup of postwar plans for a cooperative and consultative imperial system, and rejected any attempt to portray it "as some exceptional episode in the still enduring project of co-operation, some negligible temporary hitch

in consultations...."⁵⁷ Indeed, he formally dissociated himself from the Round Table's editorial board because of what he saw as attempts by the journal's editors to play down and paper over the significance of Locarno for the future of the imperial system, saying to Kerr that he no longer had "confidence in the advice you now publish."⁵⁸

Christie returned to Canada in June, 1926 and embarked immediately on an attempt to demarcate a path toward "national security" for Canada such as the one London believed that it had discovered in the Locarno Pact. Neither disillusioned nor unduly pessimistic, Christie, after his return to Canada, simply turned from what he believed was an imperial system discredited by practical political experience, and a failure of political will and courage on the part of both British and Dominion statesmen, toward the development of a definition of Canada's national interests based squarely upon the acceptance of the thesis that Canadian interests were not identical, indeed, were not even always similar, to those of Great Britain.⁵⁹ "I cannot escape the conviction," Christie told Sir Robert Borden early in 1926,

[that] in order to keep our eye on Canada's own ball, in order to play our unique part in the English-speaking world, we must assume a more independent and detached position than existing forms allow us; that we cannot afford to wait long in thinking it out; that we cannot expect the [other] Dominions from an entirely different position to see a similar need; that we must face it that we are a special case and go ahead alone to whatever extent is necessary to our future....⁶⁰

"More and more," Christie concluded, "I feel that Canada is in a position of quite extraordinary difficulty -- perhaps more difficult than any other Western community. It may well come to

a point in the period of my lifetime where it can no longer be buried. One clings to old symbols but more and more I believe that I am also a Canadian rooted in the soil of North America."⁶¹

A Growing Threat to the National Interest: Canada's Membership in the League of Nations

At the time of his move from Ottawa to London, Christie was becoming increasingly wary of the continued membership of Canada and the Empire in the League of Nations because of the organization's almost exclusively European orientation.⁶² On the whole Christie, in 1923, still favored membership because he felt that the Empire's withdrawal would dash what chance the League had for longterm survival, but he believed that urgent efforts at reform were mandatory. Christie expressed his apprehensions regarding the League succinctly in Beaverbrook's Sunday Express in the fall of 1923.

... The attempt to harmonize by means of the League the ancient European system with the new world created by the war is seen at once to have disclosed alarming weaknesses. The British Empire will always be ready enough to work through the League if the body is capable of the necessary reorientation that admits that Europe is not the world. Otherwise we shall have to look to other channels and such means as are open to the ordinary instruments of diplomacy.⁶³

Christie argued that the most that could and should be expected from the League was that it provide a new forum for negotiation, an alternate and complement to, not a replacement for, the old prewar style of diplomacy.⁶⁴

In addition to excessive Euro-centrism, Christie feared the potentially disrupting effect that the League might have on the

development and survival of the British imperial system. Because he believed that British abstinence from the politics of the Continent was essential if Britain and the Dominions were to have an opportunity with which to settle their constitutional relationship, Christie viewed the various plans for European security arrangements -- those of the early and mid-1920s such as the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the Geneva Protocol that were designed to operate under the League's auspices -- with intense dissatisfaction. Indeed, he wrote in late 1925 that "if the League and Locarno begin to look like a federation of Britain with Europe I am for smashing the League at once"⁶⁵ These European security plans amounted to the antithesis, in Christie's opinion, of what the drafters of the League's Covenant had intended, and as such threatened to involve Great Britain in Europe in a way that would ultimately destroy the already tenuous cohesion of the imperial system and "vitate our [the Empire's] influence in world affairs" by tying it too closely to Europe.⁶⁶ "We must keep a firm hold of the original League conception at Paris and before," Christie wrote in reaction to the Geneva Protocol.

First and fundamentally it was to be a world organisation and an organisation with two aspects: (1) A conference system with arbitration and conciliation machinery, (2) Article 10 and the elaborate sanctions provisions. Most of the English-speaking world liked (1) and disliked (2) from the outset. The British Empire, nevertheless, accepted (2) because it expected the whole world to be in the organisation. Gradually it became more and more evident that the whole world would not be in it. Three of the greatest powers [that is, the United States, Russia, and Germany] were, in fact, out of it. So the League to-day is in fact and reality not the organisation in contemplation of which our Parliaments were induced to ratify it. If it had been presented to the Empire's Parliaments with a statement that the League in 1924

would be in fact what it is, it is safe to say that ratification would never have been drafted.

The current arguments based on the essential identity of the Covenant and the Protocol are very dangerous so far as the welfare of the League is concerned. For they will go far to persuade the people of the British Empire that the only safe and honest course is to give notice of withdrawal from the League itself. ...⁶⁷

Christie also believed the increasingly widespread contention that the League should depend more heavily on the use of "compulsory arbitration" and "sanctions" provided additional evidence that "the wrong tack has been taken at Geneva."⁶⁸ He felt that these conceptions ran directly counter to the strong nationalist sentiment current throughout the world -- and especially in Europe and the Dominions -- in the aftermath of the Great War. "On the whole case then," Christie wrote, "I think it is too soon to approach the super-state idea for on our accepted ideas of political science we are quite literally brought right up to that idea by a project [such as the Geneva Protocol] that definitely proposes in some cases to commit the vital decision of peace and war to a body [that is, the Council of the League] whose members are not responsible to the Parliaments or electors of any one of us."⁶⁹ Christie's experience with and devotion to responsible government and the Canadian federal system caused him to view the "super-state idea" as an entirely unworkable one precisely because it operated in a way that denied to individual national governments the ultimate control over what he considered to be their most important tasks, namely, the decisions pertaining to peace and war.⁷⁰ Christie believed that in order to be effective and to insure its own survival the League had to

work with the worldwide current of nationalist aspirations and not against it. At best, therefore, the League should be thought of as no more than "a conference system, an alternative and often better method than our older methods of diplomacy, but based like the older on the principle of negotiation between free equals, who always remain responsible to their respective Governments or Parliaments."⁷¹

In the period between 1923 and 1926 Christie perceived that all of the trends which he had been worried about through the course of the League's early development -- e.g., its Eurocentrism, its stress on sanctions and compulsory arbitration, and its evolution toward the status of a "super-state" through the European security arrangements to be implemented under its auspices -- were gathering momentum, and, what was more disturbing to him, Britain had decided to involve itself with these trends. Just as Britain's willing participation in European affairs had forced Canada to reassess her position in the imperial system, Christie believed that London's willingness to join with other European states in making the League preeminently an organization concerned with Continental politics and determined to enforce European political settlements with military means likewise required Canada to review its membership in the League. "The broad European thesis [regarding the operation of the League] . . .," Christie wrote,

is that it is intolerable that at any moment some measure agreed upon by Europeans for maintaining European order should be at the mercy of an outside vote. . . . The fact that an outside vote or a number of votes in the Council or assembly might well operate disastrously on a European issue suggests that there is something wrong with the machine. It

raises questions for Canada as well as for any other non-European member. What shall we do with her vote? At what point can she intervene in an issue arising in Europe? At what point can the issues and her knowledge justify her intervening? Was the Canadian Government aware of all the arrangements that preceded the March [1926 League] meeting? Can Canada expect to do much in bringing about a change in the League machine if it is defective?⁷²

Christie's answer to questions of this type at the beginning of the 1923-1926 period was ambiguous, but that he was then leaning toward negative responses was signalled by his contention that ever since the Covenant was drafted in 1919 leaders from most of the signatory nations had thought it was necessary to consider "whether the Covenant ... does not need revision."⁷³ By 1925-1926, however, Christie's ambiguity had disappeared entirely, and he was urging Ottawa to reevaluate its participation in the League and formally redefine Canada's membership in terms that entailed the least possible degree of responsibility and liability. "What are Canada's real interests in being a Member of the League?," Christie asked rhetorically in 1926. "In a general sense," he answered in a memorandum showing that he had written off the League as nothing more than a European organization which could make no pretense to being a world body,

her [Canada's] Membership signalizes [sic] her adhesion to the idea of attempting to solve world political issues by political means rather than war. Then there are the more immediate practical interests. (a) It enables her to protect her position in regard to the various international arrangements on social and technical subjects that are proceeding. (b) It has a value as a means of securing information on foreign affairs in general -- though information got at Geneva should doubtless be checked as far as practicable at the source. (c) It may provide useful opportunities, through personal friendships, to facilitate special negotiations with individual States in which Canada may be engaged. (d) In so far as the League can establish

European order Canada must share the benefits accruing to the world from such a consummation, though here her contribution is largely negative: she cannot herself solve a problem which is for the Europeans themselves to solve, but she can try to refrain from putting obstacles in the way. As for her own immediate security she has not the interest in the League that say Dr. Benes of Czecho-Slovakia has when he looks at his next door neighbours.

Broadly all this seems to indicate for Canada, not ... [a] policy of fighting for an integral place in the prevailing European League, but a more moderate policy of trying to see what can be done by drawing necessary distinctions. She should stay in the League until she is forced out. On technical, economic and social arrangements affecting all nations and in regard to the Permanent Court she should try to play as full a part as she can. On political issues she should try to draw the proper line: thus on a local European political issue she should announce her inability to intervene in the discussion or to vote. To some extent a Canadian representative should regard himself as an "official observer". As regards the prevailing tendency of Geneva towards a European line on the political side she cannot expect greatly to influence such currents and she should welcome any device that seeks to prevent a non-European from interfering in a European affair....⁷⁴

By 1926, therefore, Christie had come to view the League -- in much the same way as he had come to see the British imperial system after the conclusion of the Locarno Pact -- as an international instrument that did not serve the national interests of Canada. As noted above, he excluded from this judgment only such juridical aspects of the League as the Permanent Court. Because Britain no longer considered the Empire as a single geographical or world system, and instead had chosen to associate itself closely with the single geographical unit that was Europe, Christie believed that Canada had to begin to look pretty closely at means with which it could keep itself distanced from both Britain and Europe. Ottawa could achieve this separation by refusing to make commitments to either Britain or the League that would put Canada in a position where the

decisions of war and peace would be largely outside an area that it had at least an ability to influence, if not control entirely. For Christie, in 1926, the League had become "a European league with non-Europeans tacked on" and the dangers implicit in this situation were "to anyone from the New World ... [a matter] of extraordinary interest."⁷⁵ "The March, 1926 meeting has disclosed the League as never before as getting into the real practical politics of the world or rather of Europe," Christie concluded.

One outstanding impression is that to all European countries where moderate men and parties are in control -- Great Britain, France, Germany and the important secondary powers -- the League has become a definite reality, a going concern, a thing known because operating in the common life to meet a commonly felt necessity, an institution that provokes keen competition for advantageous position in its structures. ... They [the nations of Europe] give the impression of men who have looked into a pit, vividly conscious that to let the League of Nations down would mean chaos. They will be driven also to mould it to their own immediate needs. When Germany gets in it will doubtless become an even more lively and real factor in the political life of Europe; experiments will be tried out; new rules and constitutional methods will grow up and the thing [will] become more and more consolidated. At all events there seems a fair prospect of this, though a Canadian onlooker conscious of his essential ignorance of Europe or a European League can only take a tentative view of any such generalisation, and his view may be coloured because the reflection inevitably occurs to him, "Either it will be something like this, or Europe will be something which the majority of the New World will do their utmost to keep away from; certainly Canada ought not take the responsibility of acting in any way to block the fairer prospect and if Canada's present position seems likely to impede it, an alteration that seems essential in her own local interest becomes all the more important."⁷⁶

The "alteration" Christie saw a need for in the spring of 1926 was the dissociating of Canada from any part of the League that involved compulsory arbitration or economic or military sanctions. For him, both of these mechanisms constituted

intrusions into Canadian sovereignty because if Ottawa subscribed to them the decisions of peace and war for Canada would, on some occasions, be made by non-Canadians, thereby making a mockery -- just as surely as would be the case if control over peace and war remained centered in London -- of the country's claims to self-government. London's decision to tie Great Britain to Europe politically by signing the Locarno Pact, in combination with the development of the League into an almost exclusively European organization, were events that Christie considered to be detrimental to Canada's national interests. After Locarno, Christie began to define Canada's interests solely within the North American context, and, in doing so, he came to see binding European commitments, either under the League's auspices or at Britain's side, as a sure-fire method of courting the eventual disruption or dissolution of Canada as a unique political entity.

National Realities and Foreign Policy: Christie's Perceptions of Canada and Their Influence on His Thought, 1923-1926

The tendency of the British government to tie itself increasingly to European political affairs and the almost complete Europeanization of the League of Nations, together with the aversion to deciding what Canada's place and role in the world should be existing in Ottawa, prompted Christie to do a great deal of thinking and writing about Canada's future as a nation in the years between 1923 and 1926. He had been, around the time of the Imperial and Washington Conferences of 1921-22, flirting with the idea of a Canadian foreign policy grounded

firmly on Canada's own national interests, with imperial considerations being assigned a clearly secondary role. Christie had found, however, that Prime Minister Meighen would not press Canadian interests past the point where they began to threaten imperial comity, and so he was forced to resume phrasing his advice in terms of the Empire's interests. When Mackenzie King became Prime Minister, on the other hand, Ottawa's interest in foreign affairs slackened generally, with King clearly wanting nothing to do with an active external policy in the imperial sphere or in any other. Under King, moreover, Christie's influence waned, and with it -- apparently as a consequence of his perception of King as being basically uninterested in the idea except in the negative sense of doing nothing to enhance or increase imperial commitments -- went his immediate enthusiasm for a more independent Canadian foreign policy.

In England, however, Christie seems initially to have developed a new enthusiasm for the concept of a "cooperative and consultative" foreign policy that had been current in imperial circles since 1917.⁷⁷ This new enthusiasm probably was in roughly equal measures, the result of his adverse reactions to Ottawa's propensity, toward the tag end of Meighen's administration and after the ascendancy of the Liberals, to do nothing in the field of international relations, a certain intoxication with being suddenly located at the "center of the Empire,"⁷⁸ an enduring, and not surprising, affinity for a plan of action that he and Sir Robert Borden had had much to do with framing between 1917 and 1920, and his usual predilection for

having Canada take the road that seemed at the moment to offer the best opportunity to develop and protect its international status. Christie's personal animosity toward a policy of drift in any field of human activity, together with his legalistic bent, also probably moved him to support the idea of a cooperative foreign policy in the hope of bringing order and constitutional regularity to the chaos of postwar imperial affairs.

The "spell" cast by living in Britain appears to have quickly ceased to influence Christie. London's budding desire to involve itself intimately in the affairs of Europe led him to reconsider his course and begin casting about for an alternative method through which Canada could protect and advance its national interests. By the time the Locarno Pact was concluded in late 1925, Christie's thinking had reassumed many of the characteristics that it had manifested in the spring preceding the Imperial Conference of 1921, namely, the formulation of ways and means whereby Ottawa, through its own decisions and actions, could define its international status and vital national interests.

One of the most powerful factors influencing Christie's return to a primarily Canadian-oriented approach to external policy lay in his increasing concern about the fragility of Canada's political and economic system. Indeed, the old saw about not being able to understand and appreciate your home until after you have left it seems to have rung especially true in Christie's case. Christie, in the 1923-1926 period, came to

apply to social and political affairs in Canada the same cold analytic eye he had always used when considering foreign policy matters. Determining a policy that would protect and enhance Canada's sovereignty and national interests henceforth became an effort that reflected not only Christie's judgment regarding the events of the outside world, but also his attempts to develop a policy that could accommodate, and not exacerbate, the strains and tensions present in Canadian politics and society.⁷⁹

As the result of a brief trip to Canada in late February and early March, 1925, and the discussions attendant thereto, Christie began to wonder whether "it is being discovered that Confederation is still very much in the experimental stage and that the real problem of to-day [for Canada] might well be described as one of reconfederation."⁸⁰ "A series of conversations," he explained to Sir Robert Borden after the conclusion of his trip,

that all happened without any probing of mine to raise the same theme has stuck in my mind. I went to see Sir Edward Kemp. He told me that the trouble was we had a situation which had never been anticipated by the Fathers of Confederation; there were now 2,000,000 people on the Prairies and they created problems very difficult to handle. By chance in the Senate that afternoon I heard Senator Dandurand say precisely the same thing in almost the same words. He added that if the position could have been foreseen the West would have been closed to settlement. The next evening during the meeting of a little dining club to which I belonged an interesting and lively discussion developed. At one point Justice Duff produced a somewhat vivid analogy. He said, "These fellows in Ottawa and Quebec, ever since Confederation have been trying to rule Western Canada in the same spirit that George III ruled the British Empire." This was fairly put on what I had heard from the two Senators, whose words seem to reflect a state of mind and spirit which would regard the Westerners, not as equal partners in a common concern, but rather as troublesome and rather obnoxious colonists whom regrettably it was necessary to appease from time to time by throwing them a sop from the

head table. The maritimes did not come up for especial notice but there may be a grain of truth in the view that policy toward them has sometimes been conceived in a similar spirit. This is not to attribute malign or oppressive motives to our fresh-water rulers of Central Canada; but one may recognize the fact that they possess the great preponderance of power, wealth and population in the Dominion and that it is difficult for them at a distance to see the case of the East or West as easily as their own.⁸¹

"I have put it for the purposes of perspective," Christie concluded, "that our problem is one of reconfederation. If there is any validity at all in that form of statement, it suggests a serious resurvey of many practices and policies that have been accepted more or less as a matter of course over the past fifty years."⁸²

In addition to the problems posed by the regional economic disparities and animosities he described to Borden, Christie also was concerned with the always difficult relations between Canada's French- and English-speaking populations. During a prolonged discussion with Philip Kerr over the meaning of Arthur Meighen's "Hamilton Speech" of 16 November 1925, for example, Christie made it clear that he thought that a good part of Meighen's message -- the crux of which was that Parliament should be dissolved and an election held before Canadian troops were dispatched overseas -- was simply a recognition of the tenuous racial balance that had to be preserved in Canada if the country was to survive as a national unit. The French-Canadian consideration, Christie wrote, was the "special aspect" of Meighen's speech.

It [Meighen's speech and the political formula contained therein] may or may not be ideal. But it may be getting at something workable for us. Different communities must have different ways of putting over their punches. If this way

frightens others there is really nothing in it to frighten Canadians. Practically it's what we did in 1917, and we can get away with it again.

... We are two nations. We have sort of a working basis for living together in North America, and we have constant differences as to its interpretation both in letter and in spirit. The French-Canadian has his outlook; the rest of us ours. He is more than a quarter of our population. The question of sending troops overseas instantly raises an extraordinary issue. It always will. Is it shocking to suggest that the decision may not be a proper one for the Parliament that happens to be in existence at the time, that came into existence on ordinary issues of internal economy that have nothing to do with the crisis that we are supposing to have arisen.⁸³

The continuing existence and troubling vitality of these regional, economic, and linguistic tensions and cleavages in Canadian society -- the dangers of which Christie saw exposed at first hand in the course of his experiences with Sir Robert Borden during the Great War⁸⁴ -- caused Christie to worry about the future of the Confederation and seek ways to ameliorate divisions and promote harmony. For Christie, the lack of a clearly defined international status, and an inability to control the country's external affairs were both matters that deepened and made more threatening the enduring fissures in Canadian society and politics. Linguistic, economic, and regional problems, although serious, could at least be addressed entirely within the context of a domestic political system wherein Canadian autonomy was complete. International status and the conduct of external affairs were, however, matters that lay incompletely in Canadian hands, thus leaving control over the crucial decisions regarding peace and war largely in foreign -- that is, British -- hands.⁸⁵

Christie had believed that Canada was approaching the

attainment of the requisite degree of autonomy through its own wartime actions and the on-going development of the cooperative and consultative approach to imperial diplomacy inaugurated in 1917. By 1926, however, he had come to believe that any chance for establishing such a system had been destroyed by the Dominions' general -- and Ottawa's specific -- refusal to insist on adequate consultation with Britain and their unwillingness to accept the responsibilities that would naturally accrue from such consultation. Exacerbating the detrimental influence of the Dominions' blatant disinterest was London's distaste for consulting the Dominions before making foreign policy decisions that bore direct consequences for the imperial system, and its willingness to become involved in European political affairs. Indeed, Christie thought that by the time of Locarno many political leaders in Britain had returned to their prewar attitude that "in all good faith the theory of trusteeship [that is, Great Britain acting as trustee for the Dominions' interests vis-a-vis foreign policy] is entertained as a natural function they are quite fitted to exercise."⁸⁶ After the Locarno Pact was signed, Christie simply abandoned any hope for establishing the imperial system envisaged after the war and turned toward finding a system that would give Canada complete control over its external affairs. He also felt that time was running short for that particular deed to be accomplished. "No one, I feel," he told Philip Kerr late in 1925, "outside a Dominion can quite appreciate the effects of the Imperial controversy on the Dominion's internal development. It creates divisions that cut

across what otherwise would be party lines based on considerations of internal economics."⁸⁷ Canada and the other Dominions, he continued,

may look upon themselves as the only Western countries where the answers to these fundamental questions of national life and status are not settled and taken universally for granted. The existence of the uncertainty consumes much time and mental energy that would otherwise be applied to social problems of immediate urgency; often indeed it cuts across the latter problems and perhaps bedevils them. I often wonder if a citizen of Mars would not conclude that however great the fascination, it is a somewhat expensive luxury....⁸⁸

In order to resolve this uncertainty, Christie believed that decisive action had to be taken to define Canada's international status and national interests, and that action had to be undertaken by Canadians as quickly as possible. "The exercise of responsibility is not something that can be conferred," he wrote, "it is one's own act, its essence [is] an exertion of one's own will."⁸⁹ Christie believed that the British were still laboring under the delusion that a situation that found Britain acting as a trustee for the Empire in foreign policy matters provided a "natural and sufficient basis" on which the Dominions could rest their futures,⁹⁰ and that "an eventual happy solution [would be found for the question of Dominion autonomy] through 'the inevitability of gradualness.'"⁹¹ "The invalidity of that idea needs no argument," Christie wrote,

... a Canadian public man, unable as he is to recognize that theory, and unprepared though he be today to disturb the present practice, must I suppose ask of himself such questions as these: "As a practical matter how long can Canada allow the present practices to go on? How long can Canada permit a regime under which in effect the lives and destiny of Canadians, perhaps of this generation, perhaps of the next, are disposed of outside Canada, whether by a trustee or by a friend or by a forefather?"⁹²

Christie concluded that this situation really should not be allowed to continue for any too long an additional period. He felt that the only remedy for the dilemmas he had outlined for Canada was the completion of responsible government, a process, he noted, "which must comprehend foreign affairs to be real...."⁹³ That definitive status, he asserted, could only legitimately and realistically be considered as having been attained when "the executive act and the stroke of the pen that put Canada into a state of war" resides in Ottawa rather than London.⁹⁴ From this point of view, Christie sketched, in the spring of 1926, what he thought was an immediately necessary and readily achievable goal for Canada as a nation:

1. The assumption by Canada of complete responsibility for her foreign affairs with the friendly agreement of Great Britain and with recognition of all other States.
2. An agreement with Great Britain to the following effect:
 - (a) That Great Britain and Canada are both concerned to observe their obligations under the Covenant to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security;
 - (b) That each desires (in the sense of the new definition of Article 16 of the Covenant) to co-operate loyally and effectively in support of the Covenant and in resistance to any act of aggression which is compatible with its military situation and takes its geographical position into account.
 - (c) That Great Britain and Canada will maintain the closest consultation in all matters affecting either the relations between the communities comprised in what is known as the British Commonwealth of Nations or of the peace of the world.
 - (d) That should a situation arise threatening to involve either of them in war, Great Britain and Canada shall communicate with one another fully

and frankly in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient means to take, jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of the particular situation....⁹⁵

In these few points Christie subtly but nonetheless effectively summarized the postwar development of his thought regarding Canada's international identity and external relations. There were no clarion calls for a declaration of independence in these recommendations, but, if followed, they would have had basically the same effect as such a declaration. In essence, Christie was urging that Canada publicly proclaim its complete external autonomy, promise to support the League in word, but, by the use of the geographical division of labor he had long recommended, to avoid responsibility for offering similar support in deed, and seek a type of association with Britain and the other Dominions that amounted to a system wherein each country paid lip service to the ideal of a united Commonwealth and a common heritage but where each would be free to resolutely pursue its own national interests both in time of peace and, more importantly, in time of war. According to Christie's recommendations, Canada would remain in the Commonwealth and the League officially. Henceforth, however, Ottawa's decisions as to what international obligations it would accept would be based on a frank recognition of the country's relative inability to influence international events and therefore would entail extremely limited external liabilities for Canada. "Canada's place in the solution of world problems seems limited; her interests and weight bring her into them only intermittently," Christie wrote. "[O]ur control of events,

certainly not unlimited in our region of the earth, is very shadowy in other regions."⁹⁶

The sum and substance of the four points listed under the second heading above signified Christie's judgement that the immediate postwar conceptions of the League as a "world organization," and the British Empire as a cohesive, cooperative, and consultative international entity in foreign policy matters, were both dead and gone in so far as Canada was concerned, and that Canada's continuing involvement in either would have to be limited to the extent that membership in each was estimated by the government in Ottawa as serving and not hindering the national interest. Christie's first point -- the "assumption ... of complete responsibility" for conducting external affairs -- was, in a nut shell, the crux of his strategy for protecting Canadian interests in the post-Locarno era. "But I do feel that if Canada is to hold together," he argued, "Canadians will be driven in the last ditch, as their fathers always were in other ditches, to the simplest elements of political science, and will find that responsibility for their region of North America and for its repercussions on others in a new age must somehow be faced by them before the world -- that responsibility must rest where interest and knowledge rest."⁹⁷ The only viable answer Christie saw was to start fresh and work toward developing a national consensus favoring full external autonomy. The "objective to work for in Canada," he wrote, "[is] a Constitutional Convention [of] all parties to study and work out the problem."⁹⁸

Christie believed that a Canadian constitutional conference called to decide once and for all on the nature of the country's international status and responsibilities was the only means of insuring the survival of Confederation. As he had when he wrote of the naval crisis just after joining the Department of External Affairs in the spring of 1913 -- and again reflecting, as he had in 1913, the ideas he had absorbed during the course of his educational and employment experiences in the United States during the height of the Progressive Era -- Christie urged, in a long memorandum entitled "Responsible Government in Canada. The Last Stage," the adoption of an all-party, non-partisan approach to finding a solution to the controversy over external autonomy that he believed contained the potential for breaking up the confederation. "To me the pith of the matter," Christie wrote, "is that we are up against the sort of a problem which the party system simply cannot solve and the attempt to solve it that way can do the country nothing but harm."⁹⁹ Canada must find, through the efforts of all groups, parties, and factions, an idea that would permit the country "to define her position."¹⁰⁰ "This is the sort of thing," Christie explained, "we actually mean when we say Canada is trying to find her feet."¹⁰¹

It must be kept in mind in every point of the search in which all are engaged -- the search for some simple coherent idea intelligible everywhere throughout this land to the man in the street who has little time for the niceties of political thought -- for some broad national platform on which these sections (that is, Canada's regions) may reasonably be expected to stand permanently together -- some cement for the managing minds of these diverse and widely separated peoples. Railways and other physical means of inter-communication, though indispensable are not enough in themselves. Co-operation among men means more than instincts; the human animal wants to know what purpose he is

to work for. So that, however absurd the conception might seem in some lights, we have to "define our position" if we are to stick together. ...¹⁰²

Christie believed that the basic theme in Canada's history and political experience was the country's development toward attaining complete responsible government. "No observer of our history," he wrote, "can doubt its reality or the momentum of the movement, nor indeed the plain practical necessity of it if there is to be effective government and the steady development of Canada's resources."¹⁰³ The present state of affairs in Canada, however, in Christie's opinion amounted to a denial of full responsible government because there were "many acts of state having legal significance in Canada which do not spring from Canadian authority and which no-one can be called to account for by the Parliament of Canada."¹⁰⁴ Christie, of course, had in mind one particular "act of state" which he believed all but made a mockery of Canadian claims to responsible government. "Our ultimate legal basis," he explained,

the vital core of our constitution, is that -- the executive act and the stroke of the pen that can put Canada into a state of war continue to reside in London. It means that the control of the hour and object of starting the terrific engine of mass emotion that is let loose by putting our modern democracy into a state of war will lie in the discretion of some body of men 3,000 miles away from our East Coast, 7,000 from our West -- the personnel of this body not familiar with us, their published reasons for their act not easily intelligible from such a distance, their strategy of the moment perhaps completely unknown to us. ... Once the engine is started it takes charge; the nation becomes a different thing; rulers can do little but bow to it. The problem of management becomes one that parliamentary institutions and party processes are none too well fitted to cope with; it is pure illusion to imagine that in such circumstances Canada could examine her own interest and decide her duty and attitude freely and intelligently. For this act of state, for its technical consequences under international law, and, above all, for its extraordinary

consequences in the public mind, no one can be called to account by the Canadian House of Commons or people. Nor can anyone be called to account there on a question of an armistice or a peace, the question of stopping the engine, once it had begun.¹⁰⁵

In such a situation, Christie claimed, "to argue ... that self-government, or 'responsibility' for her own destiny exists in Canada is a violent abuse of the word...."¹⁰⁶ "The real responsibility," Christie concluded rather bitterly,

is where the starting and stopping lever of the war engine is; those who pull it have at such a moment one dominating concern; they are bound as well by duty as by habit and sentiment to think first of all of the safety of the people who they are responsible to and who can call them to account; and this is what they have to think of in the years before. Beside all that what is left in Ottawa, whether you call it "a voice in foreign affairs" or a seat in the Imperial Conference, is now illusory. To say otherwise must be a pretence that can do Canada no good.¹⁰⁷

Christie believed that these constitutional defects were basic handicaps that greatly limited Ottawa's ability to control the decisions regarding war and peace, and that they should be detailed explicitly for the Canadian public to recognize and study. Once generally understood by the public, Christie maintained that a suitable program for attaining complete external autonomy should be drafted and presented for debate and discussion at the constitutional convention he proposed. Such a program should include provisions for establishing a Canadian sovereign state, for negotiating a treaty with Great Britain calling for "all practicable consultation; warlike action at all times being decided freely in the light of events," and for retaining Canada's membership in the League of Nations unless Ottawa came to believe that it was being "driven out by the momentum of its pre-occupation with primarily European affairs

... [but] always interpreting her obligations and interventions in regard to all regions of the earth in a sense compatible with her geographical position...."¹⁰⁸ Christie also argued that Ottawa should complement these foreign policy moves by an application for Canadian membership in the Pan-American Union in order "to protect her position in the Western Hemisphere," and by negotiating a treaty with the United States providing for consultation "on North American affairs -- for example, on Asiatic and possibly on European immigration and other extra-continental matters of concern, as well as Canadian-American economic and boundary problems."¹⁰⁹ "This is only a sketch to be filled in [at a constitutional conference]," Christie wrote.

But it seems to me to suggest a true picture of what as a community we have to come to in our now long occupation of our region of the earth. It respects what the map shows us, that we are of the New World; it respects the possibilities of our relationship with the other British countries and with Europe; it gives fair promise to the future of the English-speaking world; it conforms to another inescapable reality -- the momentum of our movement toward responsible government; it is in the spirit of the age.¹¹⁰

In sum, Christie believed that by 1925-1926 Canada, as a result of its participation in the Great War and what he called the "momentum" of its traditional striving toward complete self-government, had arrived at a point where it had the substance of sovereignty but did not possess the legal and constitutional forms that would make its claims to responsible government irrefutable before the rest of the world. He believed that substance clearly was not enough, and that the immediate formulation of new legal forms, and the subsequent entrenchment of those forms in a distinctively Canadian constitution, was an

indispensable necessity if the Confederation was to be preserved. Christie believed that too many Canadians underestimated the importance of the legalities involved in determining the country's international status, and that they were prone to generally adopt attitude that held "let us not take this legal business too seriously; let us be practical men, let well alone."¹¹¹ He considered such an attitude to be natural enough given Canada's great geographical distance from the everyday European diplomatic and political affairs that had led to the Great War and Canadian participation therein. Moreover, he recognized the tremendous strength of tradition in Canada and the resulting reluctance to think about substantive alterations in the country's constitutional inheritance, admitting that even for himself it was "no great pleasure to speculate on the disturbance of the symbols under which I have grown up...."¹¹² Nevertheless, Christie believed that Canada's legal symbols no longer were adequate to express and protect either the country's international status or its national interests, and that they therefore must be modified or replaced in order to address current circumstances effectively. Christie thought that it was much too dangerous for Canada's future to be satisfied with the constitutional status quo simply because it was the safest, most expedient course of political action; "when symbols reach the point where they no longer express the facts of our existence," Christie warned, "they still may retain a power to stir emotions, produce false perspectives, and lead men to futility, ridicule or disaster."¹¹³ To remedy this situation, to reform and modernize

the national legal symbols, and to allow Canada to attain complete self-government, Christie recommended that a non-partisan, all-party conference be convened to discuss and alter the constitution and thereby decide on Canada's future course of action as a unique and sovereign nation.¹¹⁴ "Somehow we will be driven," Christie wrote,

to something having the real nature of a National Assembly -- some body whose members are bound by the terms of their appointment to deliberate and act together not partly as party men but wholly as national men, approaching a national problem by attempting to pool and apply in something like the scientific spirit all the country's accumulated experience of political science and art; whose capacity by reason of its method of composition is commensurate with the realities of the problem. In principle is there any other alternative in our immediate political prospect that offers any hope of daylight?

As for the idea mentioned ... that Parliament might in some circumstances be conceived as acting ad hoc in this extraordinary capacity, is it not really a false conception? How would a Parliament elected on present lines act in such a matter -- in what mood? But that is not the only real question. You have to look at the mechanics of the problem. We are a federation of provinces and regions. The Constituent Assembly would have to be composed in accordance with that condition and all that implies. It has always been so both in our own experience and in that of all other federations. The House of Commons is composed, as regards the distribution of its membership, to reflect almost exactly the mathematical relation between the populations of the various provinces; its members are appointed by constituencies more or less arbitrarily carved out within the provincial boundaries. How could it be imagined as being competent to approach our fundamental problem of arriving at responsibility and of defining the terms on which it is to be exercised -- no matter what kind of solution is imagined?¹¹⁵

In a country riven by regional, economic, and linguistic divergences -- Christie wrote in early 1927 that Canada was "a geographical monstrosity and we are rent with sectionalism ... and our racial conflict is a nightmare"¹¹⁶ -- Christie believed that only a non-partisan effort to alter the constitution would

carry sufficient legal and moral force to allow Canadians to declare themselves fully sovereign and thereby assume complete responsibility for the country's future. His legal education and background led him to focus -- perhaps excessively, as Professor Stacey has suggested¹¹⁷ -- on the legal forms and symbols of Canadian nationality. It can be argued, and it was argued at the time,¹¹⁸ that Christie was too little the politician and too much the lawyer, and that this deficiency prevented him from formulating a politically practical method whereby the question of Canada's international status could be settled definitively.¹¹⁹

Be that assertion as it may, however, it seems nonetheless obvious that international and imperial events and his own personal experiences in the years between 1923 and 1926 caused a significant refocusing of Christie's attitudes about Canada, the Empire, and the course of international affairs. By 1926 Christie no longer used as his basic frame of reference the idea of Canada always acting internationally in conjunction with Britain and the other Dominions; instead, he had come to regard Canada as an individual actor on the world stage whose national interests and geographical location made her most important external ties those that she maintained with the United States, rather than those she retained with her former imperial associates. Indeed, for the remainder of his life and career Christie would attempt -- on the basis of the reorientation of his thought which occurred between 1923 and 1926 -- to discern and delineate for Ottawa avenues of advance along which it could

complete Canada's external autonomy and enhance its international status, while, at the same time, seeking to protect the country's national interests by defining foreign policy from what he considered to be the proper and irrefutable starting point of accepting the fact that Canada was geographically, temperamentally, and politically a North American rather than a European nation.

After 1926 Christie became single-mindedly concerned with what he perceived to be the necessity for Canadians to collectively proclaim in some fashion their sole "responsibility" for whatever was to become of their country. The strength and endurance of this belief gave to Christie's post-1926 work a tone of stridency, impatience, and, at those times when he sensed that his advice was going unheeded, a hint of cynicism that did not always characterize the nature of its substance. Christie's post-Locarno attitude was one that was starkly nationalistic and one that can be summarized in his simple, constant urgings that Canada must act on its own behalf and declare itself responsible for its own future. "If we are to act as a responsible community acts," Christie emphasized in the concluding section of his memorandum "Responsible Government in Canada. The Last Stage,"

we must, one way or another, first of all assume responsibility in the political sense and without equivocation. If we assume that our geography and our history have made us a distinctive, competent group we cannot escape the simplest principles which the art of managing relations between groups of human beings is based upon. If we are to play a part in the affairs of the world which we cannot escape from, there must be a Canada that is made intelligible to ourselves first and then, to the best of our ability to all others. If we are to act in international politics, both in the Britannic family and in the universal family, we must first become a fully self-conscious national

group organised to think and speak and act. Let us not permit this truism to be obscured or perverted by indiscriminate diatribes against "nationalism". No community ever acted with advantage to itself and others without this conscious communion of purpose and sense of integrity.¹²⁰

It is only in assuming full "responsibility" for the content and conduct of its external relations, Christie wrote, that Canada would find "the constant, natural, human force for our compass -- our true magnetic North. At all events, if we are not prepared to assume that much from our past, we can assume no constant whatever."¹²¹ For the next fifteen years, Christie would do his best to force Canadians to take what he deemed to be the final step toward full responsible government, urging them to "use the compass [that is, the desire for responsible government] that has always proved true whenever we have used it...."¹²²

Conclusion

Most previous studies of Christie have concluded that the period between 1923 and 1926 was a time of profound, even radical change in his thinking regarding the imperial system and Canada's place in it. Indeed, the changes in Christie's attitudes detected hitherto have led, as has been noted earlier, such thorough and careful scholars as Professors Stacey and Bothwell to estimate, respectively, that Christie was "unstable as well as brilliant" and that his post-1922 thought and writings could only be explained adequately through recourse to the "murky science of psychology."

It may be, however, that the "change" described by previous investigators appeared to be so radical only because they

believed too easily that Christie, before 1923, had never deviated from an uncritical and idealistic advocacy of a "common imperial foreign policy" and some form of a federated imperial state. More accurately, Christie should be viewed as a pragmatic and realistic individual who, having experienced the divisive domestic tensions caused by the Great War and beginning, as a result, to appreciate the fragility of Canadian unity, came to believe that Canada's external policy should be based on well defined national -- not imperial -- interests, aimed at establishing complete Canadian sovereignty, and carried out by almost ad hoc adaptations to the situations generated by the course of international events. In this light, the nature of the difference between Christie's thought in 1923 and that of 1926 becomes less a matter of radical or abrupt change and more one of consistent, incremental development. The influence of American progressivism on Christie's thought was never more evident than during the years between 1923 and 1926. Throughout these years he attempted consistently to accommodate Canada's domestic situation and prospects to the demands of the world as he found them; he was not one to linger sentimentally over imperial formulae, plans, traditions, and dreams that flew in the face of the realities that he had encountered personally.¹²³

On his arrival in Britain in 1923, Christie's attitude toward foreign policy for Canada and the Empire turned upon a single major point; namely, that the Dominions' preoccupation with local interests and postwar reconstruction required the British Cabinet to assume responsibility for creating a

diplomatic environment that would protect the national interests of both Britain and the Dominions and allow for a breathing space in which the intra-imperial relationship could be sorted out and regularized. While this assignment might at first glance seem a tall order indeed -- and one that for the Dominions nearly amounted to a retrogression from the international status they had achieved through their respective war efforts and their participation at Versailles -- Christie envisioned it as a process where Britain could hold the ring for the Empire through the largely negative policy of refusing to become entangled in European political affairs, either formally or informally, that might conceivably lead to a new war. By staging this holding action, Christie thought that Britain could provide for itself and the Dominions the time in which to complete the constitutional rearranging mandated by Resolution IX of the Imperial War Conference of 1917.

Christie laid out this plan in the Sunday Express and the Round Table in late 1923 and early 1924, only to see it almost immediately begin to unravel as a result of the fracas surrounding the conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne, and then be battered to the edge of extinction by the debates over the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the Geneva Protocol. Already reeling from these setbacks, Christie saw his scheme dealt a death blow in the shape of the Locarno Pact and Britain's signature thereto. For Christie, Locarno tied London inseparably to Europe, and, at the same time, ended once and for all whatever remaining chance there might have been for the initiation of the

consultative and cooperative imperial foreign policy planned for in Resolution IX. "To keep on chasing the idea of 'diplomatic unity'," Christie wrote after Locarno, "... is to chase the will o' the wisp.... For us in Canada it is gone."¹²⁴

Britain's foreign policy decisions regarding Europe between 1922 and 1925 -- that is between Lausanne and Locarno -- foreclosed any chance of realizing the plan that Christie had so carefully outlined in his journalistic endeavors of 1923-1924. London's decisions in and of themselves probably are enough to rationally explain the motivation behind the change in Christie's attitude without resorting, as some historians have done, to suggestions that mental or emotional instability provoked the alterations in his view. Indeed, given Christie's consistently non-ideological and pragmatic approach to securing full external autonomy for Canada, the events of 1922-1926 seem to provide ample explanation for the development of Christie's views in the period without the necessity of hunting for hidden motivational factors. The conclusion of the Locarno Pact, in Christie's opinion, threw Canada back on its own resources -- both physical and imaginative -- and made it incumbent on Canadians to take control of their own future by defining the country's international status and responsibilities solely on the basis of a clear and cold-blooded calculation of the requirements of the national interest. "Canada today, unlike every European country and every other American country," Christie concluded,

has no coherent state structure and idea [to] which her citizens unite in giving their obedience and allegiance. The one project ever entered upon to reach this end has broken down. The existing incoherence cripples the whole range of

our political activity. We must have a coherent,
intelligible project if there is going to be a Canada at
all.¹²⁵

Christie's answer for this dilemma was the calling of a non-partisan constitutional convention which would represent all of Canada's provinces, regions, political factions, and linguistic groups. This convention would decide on the precise terms and means for establishing Canada as a completely sovereign state. Thereafter, Christie believed, Canada could legitimately claim that it possessed full responsible government in both its domestic and external affairs, and, for better or worse, the country would be free to work out its own destiny. "The exercise of responsibility," Christie maintained, "is one's own act, an exertion of one's own will."¹²⁶ After 1926, an on-going effort to prompt his countrymen to undertake such an action would form the central theme for the remainder of Christie's career.

Chapter 5: Notes

- 1.) R. Bothwell, "Bureaucratic Imperialism," op. cit., p. 343.
- 2.) Ibid., p. 347.
- 3.) C.P. Stacey, "Nationality: The Experience of Canada," Canadian Historical Association Historical Papers, 1967, p. 16, and C.P. Stacey. Canada and the Age of Conflict, Volume II 1921-1948. The Mackenzie King Era. Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1981, p. 83.
- 4.) Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 18 September 1923.
- 5.) Christie's goal in these journalistic efforts was to put before the public -- and, he hoped, before the men responsible for the conduct of British foreign policy as well -- an estimate of how the interests of the Dominions should be factored into the formulation of Britain's external policies. "I suppose what I am driving at [in the Sunday Express and the Round Table articles]," he told Sir Robert Borden in the spring of 1924, "is the failure of many people here [in Britain] to realise that the Empire is more than Great Britain and the world more than Europe. Now that the French 'security' issue is bobbing up again we may expect as time goes on to have to define our attitude toward Europe fairly closely. There is talk of our giving guarantees of 'neutralising' the Rhineland and so on. Most of it proceeds as though the Dominions either did not exist or were mere counties of England...." See PAC, MG 26H, Borden Papers, Volume 264, Folder 58, p. 148077A, L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 17 March 1924.
- 6.) In two of his installments in the Sunday Express, Christie recognized the apparently unavoidable social and economic links that Britain had with Europe, and argued that these should and could be maintained in a manner which did not lead to political involvement.

"The phrase [that is, the overall title of Christie's newspaper articles "Britain is Getting Out of Europe"], of course, does not mean that we shall have no further relations whatever with the nations of the continent. We have always been in intercourse with them, and we shall always be. We shall continue to send there and receive therefrom Ambassadors, Consuls, and all the rest of the paraphrenalia of official intercourse; while, more important still, all the manifold and complex social and commercial associations that are the modern world will retain themselves whether Government wills it or not. But we shall strictly mind our own business and interests, and expect others to mind theirs. We shall give advice if it is sought and if it is in our own interest to do so. If and when some

new peril from that quarter threatens our territory we may perhaps again look to the ways and means, the combinations and arrangements, by which to save our skins."

Although for public consumption Christie posited the maintenance of Britain's traditional commercial and financial ties with Europe, he was in private somewhat less sanguine about the desirability of such a course of policy. Indeed, Christie's seems to have favored Lord Beaverbrook's plan for full imperial preference both as a means for deriving economic advantage for the members of the Empire and as a further method of isolating and insulating Britain from European affairs. "I have no 'principles' on fiscal affairs," Christie wrote to Frankfurter just before the British general election of 1924,

"The position on which I propose to follow the debate is that which says that in facing the existing world created by the industrial revolution of the last century, England is defenceless and needs a weapon [that is, Imperial Preference]. All I know is that the economic situation here is very, very grave. My general inclination is to get command of the weapon at all costs. It may be a dangerous weapon. All weapons are dangerous. But as a broad principle of strategy I'd say first get the weapon and then depend upon political skill for the wise and profitable use of it. ..."

After the election, Christie conceded that,

"Protection is dead for the moment, but I find it difficult to escape the conclusion, in all the circumstances confronting Britain and the Empire, that it is bound to come and will eventually be put through by a Conservative Gov't, with the enthusiastic support of Labour or vice versa...."

For Christie, a system of imperial preference was a means for protecting Britain and the Empire from destructive economic competition and an additional method of disengagement from the rest of the world while the imperial constitutional relationship was being righted. Christie's advocacy of semi-isolation for Britain in the middle 1920s, perhaps makes somewhat more explicable his fierce preference for a position of isolation for Canada after he rejoined the Department of External Affairs in 1935. The idea of isolating oneself from adversity and hostility while preparing a new course of action is a recurring theme in Christie's thought, and an examination of that tendency on several occasions in widely separated time periods gives to it an appearance of consistency that makes questionable earlier estimates of his thought being erratic and/or unstable. For the above see PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 9, Folder 29, pp. 9207-9213 and 9181, L.C. Christie, "Britain is Getting Out of Europe - The Fallacy of Political Intervention for Economic Ends," Sunday Express, 20 September 1923, and "Turn to the British Empire," Sunday Express, 30 September 1923; and Library

of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 16 November 1923, and L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 10 December 1923.

7.) PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 9, Folder 29, p. 9191, L.C. Christie, "Getting Out of Europe. The Dominions' Viewpoint," Sunday Express, 7 October 1923. In addition to the threat that involvement in Europe posed to the imperial system, Christie told Frankfurter that he believed that the Empire had been bled white during the Great War and now did not "have the resources to pacify Europe...."

Several of Christie's correspondents responded negatively, or at least with great skepticism, to his arguments favoring British withdrawal from the continent. The most effective of these rejoinders probably was that written by Herbert Croly, editor-in-chief of the New Republic. "I think you underestimate," Croly wrote,

"the effect of the purely psychological elements in the situation. After the intimacy which has existed between Great Britain and her continental allies for the last eighteen years I don't see how she can withdraw participation in Continental politics without implying by that withdrawal a much more emphatic and explicit condemnation on moral and political grounds of what is now happening than you yourself think advisable."

In the same vein, Lord Byng told Christie rather tersely that his ideas were interesting but probably not practical. "It is all quite clear if it could be made possible," the Governor General wrote after reading Christie's newspaper articles, "but the mesh of European politics is very tight." See Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 4 October 1923; PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 9, Folder 30, p. 9482, Herbert Croly to L.C. Christie, 29 December 1923; and, Ibid., Reel C-3882, pp. 9480-9481, Lord Byng to L.C. Christie, 27 March 1924.

8.) L.C. Christie, "Getting Out of Europe. The Dominions Viewpoint," Sunday Express, 7 October 1923, op. cit. As already noted, Christie defined the action that might do "irreparable" damage to the Empire as a decision by London to enter into an alliance or system of guarantees with any Continental power or powers. This was, in fact, his undeviating attitude after 1921, and it acted as a very real brake on his devotion to the Empire. Several authors, including Colonel Stacey, have remarked on Christie's continuing devotion to the goal of imperial unity and a common Empire foreign policy into the mid-1920s, often quoting a letter written by Christie to Meighen in December 1924 in which he said that he could not imagine how Canada's individuality could be "preserved in any shape at all except through the British Empire." This quotation does indeed sound as though it was written by an individual devoted to what Professor Inglis has called the "Imperial idea." Questions regarding this

interpretation of Christie's attitude arise, however, when the relevant section of a letter Christie wrote to O.M. Biggar at the same time is quoted. "Assuming as I do that there is something in Canada's individuality worth preserving," he explained to Biggar,

"I cannot on looking at the map of the world see how it can be preserved in any shape at all except through the British Empire; while looking again at the map, I do not see how the B. [ritish] E. [mpire] can give itself any decent chance of living except by insisting that it is not part of the intra-Continental system in the strategic sense, that it is an intermediary world system, and that it cannot usefully to itself or others talk about a pooling of power with other nations until the world comes to the table."

While willing to seek Canada's future within the Empire, Christie obviously was only willing to do so as long as certain criteria -- such as Britain's steering clear of continental political entanglements -- were met. Once those dangerous connections were made by London through its signature of the Locarno Pact, Christie regarded the existing imperial system as holding out few remaining benefits for Canada. Throughout the 1919-1926 period Christie supported continued Canadian involvement in the imperial system only so long as it was to the country's advantage to be so involved. Professor Inglis was somewhat closer to the mark than Colonel Stacey when he wrote that Christie was committed to an "Imperial idea" that was developing but not yet complete in the postwar years. An understanding that Christie's postwar attitude toward the Empire was pragmatic rather than unquestioning makes the difference between his pre- and post-Locarno estimates of the value of participation in the imperial system to Canada seem much less sharp. See C.P. Stacey, "Nationality: The Experience of Canada," op. cit., p. 14; Alex I. Inglis, "Loring Christie and the Imperial Idea: 1919-1926," op. cit., p. 21; and, PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 10, Folder 31, pp. 9544-9545, L.C. Christie to O.M. Biggar, 18 December 1924.

9.) L.C. Christie, "A Basis for Imperial Foreign Policy," Round Table, XIV, 52, 3 (March, 1924), p.272. By the mid-1920s, Christie clearly had concluded that military guarantees of the type that Britain had extended to Belgium and France before 1914 involved "too far-reaching liabilities" and should be avoided at all costs. For Christie's views of the pre-1914 guarantees and his opinion of military guarantees in general see PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 10, Folder 31, p. 9576, L.C. Christie, unaddressed letter, but almost certainly meant for Philip Kerr, 12 January 1925.

10.) L.C. Christie, "A Basis for Imperial Foreign Policy," op. cit., p. 281.

11.) Ibid., p.284. Christie believed that the absurdity of the Empire trying to act as if it were a land power was blatantly

obvious. "The truth is," he wrote, "that in attempting to behave as though we were a land power we become as ridiculous as a fish out of water. We went on the land perforce during the war, but it was expeditions we sent." See Ibid.

12.) Ibid., p. 285. Christie's essay in the Round Table marks another step in the development of his personal stress on the importance of geography, and each country's respective geographical position on the globe, as a vital determinant in the formulation of its foreign policy. In the 1921-1923 period, as has been seen, Christie suggested that Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations be modified so as to insure that the responsibility for applying military and/or economic sanctions against an aggressor nation fall in the first instance to the nations in the geographic area adjacent to the disturbance. Likewise, in Beaverbrook's Sunday Express, Christie noted explicitly that Europe was the only geographical region in which the Empire did not have a direct physical stake. In the Round Table, Christie expressed his opinions regarding the increasing "regionalization" of the world, and the ramifications which he believed that the process had for a country's international political involvements, in the following manner.

"We may conceive, too, of the world as consisting of several regions or systems of people. There is a European system which by reason of the Mediterranean includes the Near East and North Africa; there is an American system; there is an Asiatic system -- i.e., Eastern and Southern Eastern Asia beyond the great middle desert.

While to a considerable extent they are inter-related economically, these regions regard themselves as politically involved with one another only when the political processes of one region become so surcharged and active as actually to over-reach its own boundaries and impinge on another region."

Christie believed that the Empire, because of its geographical diversity, did not fit satisfactorily into any of the world systems, and for that reason its leaders should attempt to keep aloof from all of them. "One the other hand," he wrote.

in the true view, we see the Empire as an island Power, but also as a special system with a peculiar intermediary relation toward the other regions, bound therefore to scrutinise, though not necessarily in the exact sense to interest itself in developments in all of them. ...

...The Empire has its special intermediary role; its chief member, Great Britain, and certain Crown Colonies, are inescapably placed in constant contact with Europe; so with Canada and certain Crown Colonies with America; so with Australasia and the Asiatic region; while South Africa again as part of that great stretch of land is in touch with

Europe. Though we should not bind ourselves to any of these regions, we cannot ignore the problems arising from our contiguity to them."

In sum, therefore, Christie believed that the Empire was, because of both self-interest and geographical reality, a system unto itself and that its proper role was to look after its own security and to hold watching briefs over the affairs of those of the world's other regions that could have an impact on it. From this point of view, Canada was part of the Empire's regional system in 1923, and it was therefore within that system that its security and future rested. When Britain disrupted the imperial regional system between 1923 and 1926 by binding itself politically to Europe, Christie believed that Canada, for better or worse, was tossed off on its own to find security in one of the world's other systems, i.e., the American or North American system. What traditionally has been described as Christie's isolationism in the 1930s therefore must also be understood, in part, as an attempt to find and define a place for Canada in the American regional system, which, after the dissolution of the imperial regional system, was the one to which Canada's geographical location best conformed and the one from which it could best protect the country's national interests. The primacy of geographical considerations in Christie's ideas regarding the proper analytic method for determining the content of Canadian foreign policy cannot be overstressed. See Ibid., pp. 283, 285, and 287.

13.) At this point in time Christie continued to believe that Canada had a special role to play in keeping Anglo-American relations amicable. "Really the Canadian Government," he told Meighen in the spring of 1924, "is not fulfilling its duty to the Canadian people -- to say nothing of the Empire -- unless it watches every departure of British foreign policy with a special view to British-American relations and makes its opinion decisively felt at the Foreign Office or in any negotiations where British-American relations may be even indirectly involved...." See PAC, MG 26 I, Meighen Papers, Volume 136, Folder 177 (2), p. 082088, L.C. Christie to A. Meighen, 24 April 1924.

14.) Ibid., p. 286. Christie described his view of what the nature of the proper relationship between the United States and the British Empire should be at the time of the Geneva Protocol in the following manner.

"There is, it seems to me, just one posture for the B. [British] E. [Empire] to assume toward that enigma [that is, the United States]. Stand on our own feet. Recognise fully the rights and standing to which America's position and power entitle her. We can afford to: there's no necessary clash between her position and ours. Thus we have agreed [at the Washington Conference] to share sea-power equally with her; this implies honest co-operation and hence an

obligation not to commit our naval power in advance to important policies without carrying her judgment. I don't suggest that we are never to act alone; doubtless we should act on many occasions; but we ought to preserve our freedom of decision. If, as the naval staff men here say, these [the Geneva Protocol's] 'sanctions' will always tend to force increases in the British Navy, it would not be hard to start Washington on a naval competition. I cannot myself get over, in connection with the [Geneva] Protocol, the significance of the Washington Conference, and I have not once in the course of the whole discussion here seen any attempt to meet this point, which goes not merely to treaty conditions, but to the very decencies of understanding, and to one of the most sensitive points in American tradition and make-up. On the other hand, if we ever have any question up with her -- of if she makes unjustifiable demands on us -- make sure our case is good, then look her straight in the eye, and give it to her hard, spelling it out in simple a,b,c terms so that it would be intelligible to the public everywhere. All this may sound like mere words, but it would not be hard to turn up cases -- some of them in the files of the Department of External Affairs -- to prove that there's success in the attitude; and there are some failures in Canadian and British diplomacy due to a timid posture in the face of that enigma."

Throughout his career, Christie was always particularly conscious of the opinion of the United States government when he was considering the potential international "commitments" that should or should not be undertaken by Britain. Christie feared not only that special ties to Europe might compromise Britain's obligations to the United States undertaken at the Washington Conference, but that such ties would weaken the Empire's cohesion, thereby reducing its power in the rest of the world and allowing the United States to step in and fill the resulting power vacuum.

"What I mean ... about Locarno giving the game to America is this. Britain's foundation is sea power. Keeping free of too many intimate political ties with Europe, sea power has enabled Britain to exercise a veto power over Continental projects. America, another great extra-continental sea power, has now come into the picture. With America Britain could either compete or cooperate. The Washington Conference agreements of 4 years ago were a decision that the veto power of the sea might be shared. If Britain now attempts to tie herself intimately to Europe the danger is -- and its a very palpable one -- that the veto power will pass to America alone. Instead of Britain and America acting as the two arbiters over the Continent (not by agreement but because their interests would in that event bring them together on that basis) you would get America alone acting as arbiter over the Continent plus Britain. This it seems to me would be fatal for the

Empire -- for the Dominions. Either the Dominions would by instinct tend to share the American detachment from Continental affairs and so fall into the American orbit or if they tried to mix intimately with the Continent on Britain's lead, there might arise a clash that would have them at America's mercy, since she is in so strong a position across the lines of communication between the Dominions and Britain."

After the conclusion of the Locarno Pact in 1925, Christie argued that a concern for the United States and its attitudes, prejudices, and proclivities toward world events must always be a foremost consideration in the minds of those charged with the responsibility for formulating Canadian foreign policy. Christie concluded that an estimate of possible American reaction to Ottawa's foreign policy must play a large role in determining the manner in which Canada -- now making foreign policy on its own and for itself -- would define its relations with Europe. In formulating its policies toward Europe, Christie wrote, Canada would have to factor in much more than merely European considerations.

"... She has a 3,000 mile common frontier in North America with the Power that has emerged during the last century to alter the distribution of forces in the world. Here she comes to the heart of her future. She also has to consider her outlook across the Pacific. Her attitude toward a European or any other regional question -- toward a European League, a European Confederation, or any other European political arrangement -- must always take into account these facts of her political position. About Locarno, for example, or about any such grouping in Europe, a Canadian must ask whether it is altogether consistent with the basis of the Washington Conference by which Britain and America, agreeing to equal navies, agreed in effect to share the function of sea power in the world. Might a contingency arise under Locarno which, because of blockade measures or a war-time increase in the British and other European navies, would precipitate a crisis with the United States? We do not know. There has been no discussion of such questions. The Foreign Secretary's speech in the House of Commons had not a word to say about sea power from beginning to end. English students of politics and history realise that there is the risk that the alliance of Britain's power to that of Western Europe may in the long run mean that the United States will exercise toward the continent plus Britain the sort of veto role traditionally exercised by Britain toward the Continent. Is it clear that on balance of probability the security problem of the peoples of Britain, France, Germany and Italy as it appears to themselves will always appear in the same sense to the people of the United States? Englishmen looking at the long future of their homeland, separated by 3,000 miles of water from America, can afford to run risks of this order. Canadians can not.

They cannot enter upon speculations that would contemplate their being arrayed some day with Europe against America. If from the last decade there survives any validity in the idea of responsibilities, Canadians will always feel that relations between the branches of the English-speaking peoples is a question on which no one else is better fitted to form a judgment and they will view their responsibility on the basis of their own judgment. And if this order of judgment is disregarded they face the simple fact, which no General Staff ignores, that should Canada become involved in a conflict with the United States, no one either in the rest of the Empire or in Western Europe could bring to them any real assistance. ..."

See PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 10, Folder 31, pp. 9547-9548, L.C. Christie to O.M. Biggar, 18 December 1924; Ibid., MG 26 I, Meighen Papers, Volume 64, Folder 28, pp. 036104-036107, L.C. Christie to A. Meighen, 23 December 1925; and, Ibid., MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 23, Folder 88, pp. 21785-21786, L.C. Christie, Notes on Discussion by Dominions Foreign Policy Group, British Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 8 February 1926.

15.) L.C. Christie, "A Basis For Imperial Foreign Policy," op. cit., pp. 288 and 291. Christie defined the only time at which the Empire's intervention in Europe would be justified as one that found "the Continent substantially controlled against it...." See Ibid., p. 285.

16.) For the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne and the Straits Convention attached thereto see S.J. Shaw and E.K. Shaw. History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Volume II: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977, pp. 365-368; Anthony R. Deluca. Great Power Rivalry at the Turkish Straits: The Montreux Conference and Convention of 1936. New York: Columbia University Press, 1981, pp. 8-11. For an estimate of the effect of these two instruments on the overall imperial relationship see H. Duncan Hall. Commonwealth: A History of the British Commonwealth of Nations. London and New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1971, pp. 495-505.

17.) "For in my view," Christie wrote, "it is a huge mistake for the Empire to enter such commitments as are involved in the [Straits] Convention. ... I doubt if anyone here [in England], outside of a few of its authors, likes this Convention. It was forced on the Turks by Curzon under the delusion that he was securing the 'freedom of the Straits'. It will be futile for the purpose in any war to which Turkey is a party. The Empire would have got all it really could get if it had followed the method of the United States who simply declared that they would expect freedom and most favored nation treatment in the Straits but avoiding giving any guarantee. If some day this commitment obliges us, for example, to operate a blockade against American shipping its merits might not seem so obvious to the nations as

they now do." See L.C. Christie to A. Meighen, 24 April 1924, op. cit., p. 082081.

18.) Ibid., p. 082078. Christie would have been chagrined to discover, as Colonel Stacey has recently pointed out, that neither the British Foreign Office nor Lord Curzon wanted Dominion representation at the Lausanne Conference through the agency of a British Empire Delegation. See C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, Volume II: 1921-1948, op. cit., p. 36. For good overall discussions of Canada and the Lausanne episode see Ibid., pp. 35-44; Philip Wigley, Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth, op. cit., pp. 209-216; and Philip Wigley, "Whitehall and the 1923 Imperial Conference," Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, I, 2 (January, 1973), pp. 227-231.

19.) PAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Volume 264, Folder 58, p. 148084A, L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 10 June 1924.

20.) Ibid., MG 26 I, Meighen Papers, Volume 136, Folder 177 (2), pp. 082167-082168, L.C. Christie to Geoffrey Dawson, 11 June 1924.

21.) Ibid., p. 082169.

22.) Ibid., p. 082170.

23.) L.C. Christie to A. Meighen, 24 April 1924, op. cit., p. 082084. Christie detested what he saw as King's penchant for seeing a centralizing imperialist behind every action or suggestion of the British government. He believed that a centralized Empire was no longer a realistic possibility and that King's paranoia on the subject retarded the development of a practical Canadian foreign policy by focusing it on stopping the non-existent plots detected by the Prime Minister. "A friend wrote me," he remarked with disgust to Sir Robert Borden in the fall of 1925,

"that Mackenzie King was angling for Vincent Massey and Hume Blake with visions of the glorious battle he and they would fight together to build the new Jerusalem in which there should be no shadow of 'Imperialism', in which indeed there should be no devils of any hue. Whatever fearful context this word may once have had -- and may again -- I find it hard, in looking at the England of to-day and as she must be for long years, to understand the mentality of those that find reality in the noise of the sonorous syllables. Perhaps it's still a useful man of straw to them. But looking at the income tax here, the Navy, Army, and Air reductions, the clamour for which grows yearly, the steady recession of British domination in India, Egypt, etc., the implications of the Mandatory System, the whole aspect of the extraordinary readjustment of the relations between the white man and the man of colour everywhere, it seems to me to be a man of straw that events will prove to be less and

less useful...."

Christie saw King's actions at the time of the Lausanne Conference as just such an invocation of this particular straw man. King, he believed, was "a man determined to press the autonomy idea to its extreme limit and on the other [hand] to avoid any active effort toward real co-operation which seems distasteful to him." By invoking the then hollow threat of imperialism, Christie wrote, King and his Cabinet were able to sidestep "a proceeding that might eventually force them to make up their minds on a definite [foreign] policy ... [and] hide themselves behind irrelevant allusions to the rights of Parliament." See PAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Volume 264, Folder 58, p. 148156A, L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 29 September 1925, and L.C. Christie to A. Meighen, 24 April 1924, op. cit., pp. 082084 and 082078-082079.

24.) Ibid., pp. 082078-082086. Clearly, Christie believed that King's government, in the matter of the Lausanne Treaty, had broken faith with the efforts toward and attainments of enhanced international status and responsibility for Canada that had been achieved by its Conservative predecessors. "Historically Canada has always taken the lead among the Dominions," Christie wrote,

"both in terms of new developments in the Imperial constitution and in regard to the maintenance of the Dominions position at each stage of the structure. The truth of the present episode seems to be that she has now in effect taken the lead in bringing about a retrogression. That this has come under the auspices of a Party which has always made an especial boast of its championship of the Dominion position ought to be a succulent morsel for the Comic Spirit."

Christie's personal antagonism toward and lack of intellectual respect for King at the time no doubt also added a sharper edge to his substantive criticisms of the Liberal government. In regard to King's opposition to the Straits Convention, for example, Christie told Meighen that he too opposed it and "yet if I found that his [King's] position was in all respects the same as mine I should feel a re-examination of my position to be imperative." PAC, MG 26 I, Meighen Papers, Volume 136, Folder 177 (2), p. 082106, L.C. Christie to A. Meighen, 25 May 1924, and L.C. Christie to A. Meighen, 24 April 1924, op. cit., p. 082080.

25.) C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict. Volume II: 1921-1948, op. cit., p 42.

26.) L.C. Christie to Geoffrey Dawson, 11 June 1924, op. cit., p. 082619.

27.) PAC, MG 26 I, Meighen Papers, Volume 136, Folder 177 (2), p. 082126, L.C. Christie to A. Meighen, 29 May 1924, and L.C. Christie to A. Meighen, 24 April 1924, op. cit., p. 082081.

28.) L.C. Christie to A. Meighen, 24 April 1924, op. cit., p. 082085.

29.) Ibid., p. 082083. It is interesting to note that the advice offered to Meighen in this letter was typical of the advice given by Christie to his former superior throughout the 1923-1926 period. On each major international event of importance to the future of the imperial system during those years -- the Treaty of Lausanne and the Straits Convention, the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, the Geneva Protocol, and the Locarno Pact -- Christie sent the former Prime Minister long letters, indeed, almost policy memoranda, offering details of the agreements, his impression of what effects they would have for the Empire and Canada, and often some advice on how the Conservative Party should address the matters in Parliament. It also seems that the Leader of the Opposition welcomed, and, indeed, often solicited Christie's advice. On the issue of Lausanne, for example, Meighen on at least five occasions requested information, analysis, and judgments from Christie. It does not seem inappropriate to conclude, therefore, that between 1923 and 1926 Christie, although resident in London, served very nearly as the Tories' parliamentary foreign affairs critic on the basis of the materials and advice he forwarded to Meighen. For Meighen's requests to Christie regarding the Lausanne episode see PAC, MG 26 I, Meighen Papers, Volume 136, Folder 177 (2), pp. 082040, 082068-082070, 082099-082100, 082183-082139, and 082197-082199, A. Meighen to L.C. Christie, 3 April 1924, 14 April 1924, 12 May 1924, 5 June 1924, and 1 July 1924. For Meighen's requests to Christie for analysis of the Locarno settlements see Ibid., pp. 036111 and 036121-036121, A. Meighen to L.C. Christie, 24 December 1925 and 4 January 1926, and Ibid., MG 30 E44. Christie Papers, Volume 26, Folder 106, pp. 23706 and 23707, A. Meighen to L.C. Christie, 9 December 1925 and 12 January 1926.

30.) For a good discussion of the diplomacy preceding the Draft Treaty, its provisions, and its repercussions see G.M. Gathorne-Hardy. A Short History of International Relations, 1920-1939. Fourth Edition. London: Oxford University Press, 1950, pp. 67-69. (Hereafter cited as G.M. Gathorne-Hardy, A Short History, with the appropriate page number.)

31.) PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 11, Folder 36, p. 10888, L.C. Christie, Draft Treaties of Mutual Assistance, 19 February 1924.

32.) Ibid., p. 10886. Although the Empire and Canada remained his primary concerns, Christie also believed that the Draft Treaty would distort the natural course of the League's development. In regard to the League, he believed that the Draft Treaty was "impracticable and even dangerous ... an attempt to superimpose this elaborate structure upon the already sufficiently complex structure of the League would be calculated to do the League a great disservice...." See PAC, MG 30 E44,

Christie Papers, Volume 12, Folder 39, p. 11328, L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 4 July 1924.

33.) L.C. Christie, Draft Treaties of Mutual Assistance, 19 February 1924, op. cit., pp. 10886-10887.

34.) Ibid., p. 10888.

35.) PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 9, Folder 30, p.9452, L.C. Christie to O.M. Biggar, 29 February 1924, and, L.C. Christie, Draft Treaties of Mutual Assistance, 19 February 1924, op. cit., p. 10888. As the 1923-1926 period progressed, Christie tended to emphasize increasingly his contention that Britain should remain divorced from European affairs not only to preserve the possibility of imperial cooperation, but also to keep open the possibility of a working association with the United States should Britain at some point be threatened by a Continental power.

"In reality it comes to this: that the worst case we must consider, a combined threat from the Continent, will imperil also the interests of the other islanders [that is, the United States], thus obliging them, like ourselves, to consider the position as it develops, and in the end to resist it. Although America, for example, has withdrawn from participation in European political affairs, which no longer compel her intervention, she physically cannot withdraw from the world; and, as she had once to act decisively, so, in a comparable contingency affecting her world position, will she be forced to act again. ..."

Christie apparently believed that the Empire, in an emergency, would be a much more attractive partner to the United States if it was not seen as having willingly implicated itself in those European affairs that Washington had so acrimoniously turned its back on in the early 1920s.

In regard to Britain's willingness to cultivate continental commitments of a type dangerous to the Empire and odious to the Americans, Christie was concerned particularly over the British Labour Party's propensities in the field of foreign policy. "They [the spokesmen of the Labour Party] talk of their duty to save Europe," Christie complained.

"One must allow something for political rhetoric but behind it all there is in fact an idea apparently that such is literally their duty and their function. In any strict sense this is sheer nonsense. Our contribution to the 'salvation' of Europe and the world can only consist in trying ourselves to behave as decently as we may while pursuing our business of making a living. But many of these people envisage something much more -- a process and activity that involves our butting in all over the lot, knocking together the heads of those whom we consider to be bad boys and generally supervising their bringing up. ..."

Christie also added that he could not understand the readiness of "Labour and others ... to idealise anything," and warned that such a course of escalating involvement in Europe, whether under the League's auspices or otherwise, could conceivably be "some day to find Great Britain in effect tied up to a continental faction just as in pre-war days and the Empire subjected to the strain of an impossible idea." Christie believed that Labour's leader was a special threat in this regard. "Ramsay Macdonald is said to be a cocksure sort of person," he told Meighen, "and he has displayed impatience with the Dominions, who he is apt to think of as mere obstructionists, willful obstacles on his road to the millenium." See L.C. Christie, "A Basis for Imperial Foreign Policy," op. cit., p. 286; Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 3 January 1924; L.C. Christie to O.M. Biggar, 29 February 1924, op. cit., p. 9450; and, L.C. Christie to A. Meighen, 24 April 1924, op. cit., p. 082083.

36.) G.M. Gathorne-Hardy, A Short History, op. cit., pp. 68-69, and, Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 6 August 1924.

37.) See G.M. Gathorne-Hardy, A Short History, op. cit., pp. 69-70, and, E.H. Carr. The Twenty Years' Crisis. New York: Harper and Row, 1964, pp. 200-204. Before considering the effect of the Protocol on either British interests or those of the Empire, Christie expressed his professional contempt for it simply as a ridiculously complicated, contradictory, and confused piece of drafting. The Protocol offended Christie's taste for simplicity and clear logic in international documents, and he dismissed it as a "monstrous piece of obscurantism." "It [the Protocol] in fact admits," Christie wrote,

"the conception of 'national security' into its system, which is to admit that when the fight comes each State, in considering its own 'security', will in fact find its problem interdependent, not of that with all other States but only with one or more others selected by various imperatives of the time and only in some variable degree. At the same time it attempts, to introduce into its system the conception of 'municipal order' as the solution of 'international order', which is to assert that all States will fight for the 'security' of any one wherever it is. One or the other is stressed as convenient. The result is a hybrid with the qualities of both parents debased. It lacks the degree of specification essential to the efficacy of the first, and it ignores the state of mind essential to the second. It becomes unintelligible and the plain man rejects it."

Christie also objected to the Protocol removing the "levers of war" from each individual government and putting them instead into the hands of a foreign, supra-national group such as the

Council of the League of Nations. It was this feature of both the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the Geneva Protocol that provided the major focus of his personal opposition to each. For example, Christie, with Philip Kerr, argued that the Protocol must be rejected because it

"... proposes to give to a body of arbitrators appointed by the Council of the League, and acting by a majority, the right not only to give a final decision in every international dispute but to impose upon every member of the League the obligation to take sanctions -- financial, economic, naval and military, all of which involve the declaration of a state of war -- against any State that rejects the arbitral decision so given. This is to give to an unknown group of men, responsible to nobody, the power to legislate for the world and to decide when and for what purpose nations should go to war."

See L.C. Christie, unaddressed letter, probably for Philip Kerr, 12 January 1925, op. cit., pp. 9575-9576., and, Philip Kerr and L.C. Christie, "The British Commonwealth, the Protocol, and the League," Round Table, XV, (December, 1924), p. 2. For Christie's confirmation that he "collaborated" with Kerr in this Round Table article "to some considerable extent" see PAC, MG 27 II D13, N.W. Rowell Papers, Volume 1, Folder 2, p. 95, L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 19 November 1924.

38.) L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 19 November 1924, op. cit., p. 98. Christie believed that British leaders of all political affiliations were being singularly unwise in not considering what effect projects such as the Protocol would have on the Dominions specifically, and on imperial affairs generally. "Here is all this continental architecture going on," Christie fumed, "and the Dominions having next to nothing to do with it, though in the end they will help pay the bill. I repeat we [that is, the Dominions] ought to protest and do everything we possibly can to prevent it. If and when the Empire is faced with another menace as it was in 1914 we may be forced to think in other directions. That bridge we have not yet reached. For the years now ahead of us our policy should be to decline all further commitments. In existing conditions it's a policy we can well afford; nay, it is the only policy we can afford." See PAC, MG 26 I, Meighen Papers, Volume 136, Folder 177 (2), p. 082127, L.C. Christie to A. Meighen, 29 May 1924.

39.) L.C. Christie, "Geneva and the Empire," The London Times, 25 November 1924. (This item is a letter to the editor of The Times.)

40.) PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 10, Folder 31, p. 9603, L.C. Christie to L.S. Amery, 27 November 1924.

41.) L.C. Christie, "The Case Against the Protocol," Headway, (December, 1924), p. 227. Christie's overall attitude toward

alliances, guarantees, and sanctions of all sorts was always strongly negative because he felt that it was a mistake to tie a nation's hands prior to the onset of an emergency that could lead to war. "Alliances, though giving the illusion of security," he wrote,

"may become treacherous if the underlying truths are ignored. For any alliance, 'neutrality' guarantee, or other engagement of the sort, is in reality the anticipation of armed forces in action; and from the moment of its inception it sets in motion, in the minds of those against whom it either tends or may be conceived to tend, precisely those forces that reach their full strength at the sight of a threatening army actually on the march. It is on this basis that its ultimate consequences must be reckoned, however much its appearance of immediate value may be idealised."

Because such prior commitments were almost certainly a guarantee of automatic participation in the war that resulted therefrom, Christie believed that it was essential that the British Empire avoid such commitments at all costs. Until the constitutional relationships between Britain and the Dominions were reformed, and a definitive decision was made as to who had ultimate control over the "levers of war," Christie believed prior commitments to fight drastically decreased the Empire's chance to survive as a viable international organization. See L.C. Christie, "A Basis for Imperial Foreign Policy," op. cit., p. 287.

42.) E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, op. cit., pp. 105-106; G.M. Gathorne-Hardy, A Short History, op. cit., pp. 73-75; and, L.C. Christie, Notes on Discussion by Dominions Foreign Policy Group, 8 February 1926, op. cit., pp. 21780-21781. For a splendid recent analysis of Britain's interests in Europe at the time of Locarno see B.J.C. McKercher, "Austen Chamberlain's Control of British Foreign Policy, 1924-1929," International History Review, VI, 4 (November, 1984), pp. 570-591.

Christie reserved a special disdain for Austen Chamberlain because he believed that, as British Foreign Secretary, Chamberlain had no clear conception of or concern for the Empire's future, and only worried about the Dominions in so far as they could be used to assist in attaining British foreign policy goals in Europe. "I suppose that some of this sounds like grousing against Downing Street," Christie told Philip Kerr in a long letter describing the negative impact he thought Locarno would have on the imperial system. "It's true that anyone from a Dominion must feel a bit of a fool when he remembers that Austen Chamberlain in throwing out the [Geneva] Protocol, seemed to invoke the Dominions' objections and the idea of diplomatic unity, and that in his next diplomatic breath at Locarno he threw the idea overboard." See PAC, MG 26 I, Meighen Papers, Volume 64, Folder 28, pp. 036114-036115, L.C. Christie to Philip Kerr, 8 November 1925.

43.) PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 11, Folder 35, p.

10689, L.C. Christie to N.W. Rowell, 22 January 1926, and L.C. Christie to Philip Kerr, 8 November 1925, op. cit., pp. 036112-036113.

44.) PAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Volume 264, Folder 58, p. 148212, L.C. Christie to Philip Kerr, 14 December 1925. Christie believed that Article 9 of the Locarno Pact was worse than useless, and in a letter to Sir Robert Borden suggested that the Dominions should refuse to adhere to the Pact, and, in addition, should confront London on the subject in the following manner.

"Your Article 9 which purports to free the Dominions from obligation unless they adhere is either pure illusion or it verges on an attempt to force our hands. Today our only assurance of freedom from the consequences of the Pact is based on our freedom to secede from the Empire, while presumably you want to help us to preserve the Empire. This is not self-government as free citizens understand it. It is government by ultimatum. As regards the Covenant obligations, we can exercise our voice when the time comes through our representation. As regards the Locarno obligations -- which in spite of your Article 9 do as a practical matter affect us, and which are admittedly, some of them, operative outside the League machinery -- we have no assured means of exercising a voice or vote. The only way you can now give us this assurance of free citizenship is to give us the two understandings enumerated above."

The two "undertakings" spoken of above were described by Christie to Borden as "(1) in every case under the Pact His Majesty's Government is free to decide for itself whether a causus belli has arisen and whether to go to war; and (2) that no such decision will ever be taken without the definite consent of the Dominions." Christie, however, later withdrew this second point. "Some time ago," he wrote, "I suggested that Ottawa should ask an assurance from the British Government that no decision to go to war under Locarno should be taken without the formal consent of the Dominions. On reconsideration this seems an impracticable and unreal device. For just as Britain was forced to conclude the Pact without the Dominions' consent, so a situation could equally arise where she would be forced to fulfill it whatever views the Dominions have. So such a veto power could not fairly be asked. If this is so, the question of the still outstanding dilemma [that is, the placing of Canada in a state of war when Britain put itself in such a condition] will have to be sought in other directions." The inability of Canada to request, or Britain to offer, such a guarantee increased Christie's sense of urgency and sharpened his desire to see Ottawa decide on some sort of an arrangement whereby it would exercise exclusive control over the decisions of peace and war for Canada. See PAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Volume 264, Folder 58, pp. 148205-148206, L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 14 December 1925, and L.C. Christie, Notes on Discussion by Dominions Foreign Policy Group, 8 February 1926, op. cit., pp. 21787-21788.

- 45.) L.C. Christie to Philip Kerr, 8 November 1925, op. cit., pp. 036114-036115.
- 46.) PAC, MG 26 I, Meighen Papers, Volume 64, Folder 28, pp. 036126-036127, L.C. Christie to A. Meighen, 17 February 1926.
- 47.) Ibid, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 11, Folder 35, p. 10693, L.C. Christie, penciled notes, n.d., but probably January-February, 1926. Although Christie disagreed with the thrust of British foreign policy as it manifested itself at the time of Locarno, it had a rather stark simplicity which must have appealed to his taste for an external policy that was formulated in simple terms so as to be easily understood by all the citizens of the state. After Locarno, for example, Christie wrote that London had defined its foreign policy by making it clear that it "sees the world as a number of geographical sections, and it views the Empire not as a unit but as a number of different members, each of which must consider its own security problems in terms of its contiguous section of the world according to its own local needs and must make its own military pacts accordingly." Christie had long viewed the formulation of foreign policy based on the recognition of a country's geographical position as essential to its national interests. Likewise, since at least the 1921-1923 period, he had seen such a system as a means whereby the Empire could distance itself from the Euro-centric machinations of the League of Nations. He had not, however, definitely envisioned -- at least until after Locarno -- such a method being used by each component country of the Empire, but rather -- as he had outlined in the Sunday Express and the Round Table -- by the Empire as a whole to justify keeping itself free from commitments on the grounds that the needs of a single geographical area seemed unlikely to win the support of the entire Empire. Once Britain moved to take its own geographical position -- as distinct from that of the Empire -- into consideration by adhering to the Locarno settlement, Christie believed that it became incumbent on Canada to take note of its own individual locale and then proceed to formulate its external policy accordingly. Christie's later "isolationism" in the 1935-1939 period, therefore, should be seen, in part, as a manifestation of his belief that a country's foreign policy should be based on what might be called the "geographical imperative." See L.C. Christie, Notes on Discussion by Dominions Foreign Policy Group, 8 February 1926, op. cit., p. 21781.
- 48.) PAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Volume 264, Folder 59, pp. 148254-148253, L.C. Christie to A. Meighen, 24 February 1926.
- 49.) L.C. Christie, penciled notes, n.d., but probably January-February, 1926, op. cit. Immediately after Locarno, Christie appears to have at first thought that the Dominions and especially Canada should fight against Britain's involvement in Europe in the hope of redirecting the orientation of London's foreign policy. "So I say," Christie wrote to Meighen soon after

the Locarno Pact was signed,

"the Dominions must fight the Locarno tendency. They must fight any further elaboration of the League's military or fighting aspects. They must work for a free flexible League -- a League that is a method of diplomacy and is not an institution of fighting compacts. They must assert themselves in this direction on every possible occasion. It is in their interest. And it is the only possible direction leading to a World League. The other direction means a League lined up against America and Russia. In the end that would smash the League. It would certainly smash the British Empire if the Empire was foolish enough to fall in with it."

Present still in this late December, 1925 assertion are the remnants of Christie's allegiance to the postwar plan for working out the imperial relationship in a manner that would allow for cooperation and consultation in foreign policy matters. At this point, Christie's concern over Locarno focused on its effects on the interests of the Empire. In the space of only three months, however, Christie came to interpret the Pact as a legitimate expression of Britain's national interests and as the signal of the end of any hope of imperial development along the lines of commonality in external policy. "[T]he project of co-operative diplomacy designed eight or nine years ago to meet the test of principle under the existing Imperial legal structure has broken down," he told Kerr. "I see now that I was chasing an illusion...." The threat he perceived in the wake of Locarno was, by March, 1926, defined solely in terms of Canada's national interests.

"... We are all forced to admit that in diplomatic negotiations Great Britain's local necessities will prevail, and every Foreign Secretary in my memory has insisted on the practical rule that his day to day diplomacy is impossible without power to take instantaneous decisions himself. A Locarno war would presumably be a major European war; and you say such a war would necessarily be an Empire concern. Is this distinguishable from saying to a man in the street in Montreal, in Winnipeg, in Vancouver, that Great Britain must from her view point make the fighting pacts and conduct the day to day diplomacy that leads to fighting, and when the fight comes all the rest of us must join in? ...

You and I agree that it is only on world problems that the members of the Empire have a basis for dealing together. Then you say ... that a major European war would necessarily be an Empire "concern" -- a world problem. This is rather vague in relation to the specific thing we are getting at. We are discussing what day to day diplomatic interventions, what obligations to fight and what action Canada ought to contemplate and how they compare with Great Britain's. To be specific it is going much too far to say

to-day that a Locarno war would necessarily be a world war in which Canada must play precisely the part that Great Britain might have to play. Whether Canada in such a case ought to be at war at once or at all, what she ought to do and so on, are not questions that are calculable in the same sense that your [that is, Britain's] questions are calculable. A fight to guarantee the Franco-German frontier, to settle some other aspect of their feud, to do something to Poland or Czecho-Slovakia, might arise without presenting a world problem to the world as it will be 10, 20, 50 or 100 years hence. I am not for a moment predicting 'the decline and fall of Europe', which is nonsense; it is merely that the relative expansion of peoples and wealth in the coming years may be such that the rest of us in other regions are not necessarily bound to calculate on broad replicas of 1914-1918; and the broad principle of restricting the area of war so far as possible will always hold. It would be monstrous to suggest that Canada must declare herself forever bound to the orbit of the affair between the Frenchmen and the German."

See PAC, MG 26 I, Meighen Papers, Volume 64, Folder 28, pp. 036106-036107, L.C. Christie to A. Meighen, 23 December 1925, and Ibid., MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 26, Folder 106, pp. 23752 and 23753-23755, L.C. Christie to Philip Kerr, 15 March 1926.

50.) Christie asserted that after Locarno neither Britain, nor Canada, nor any of the other Dominions could or should be criticized for seeking to protect their national interests as well as they could according to their own best lights, no matter what such a modus operandi entailed for the imperial system. "Britain has been in a position of great difficulty," he wrote, "and if she has been forced singly to recognise a process [that is, the Locarno system] that seems destined to alter profoundly the structure of the Empire, there is no room for recrimination." According to Christie, however, there must be a quid pro quo inherent in this realization by Britain when it came to the actions which might be undertaken by Canada in the future. "Similarly Canada is in a position of great difficulty," he concluded, "and if she is in the end forced to take steps that will bring these structural changes more into the open, it may be hoped that she will be fortunate enough to act in such a manner as to avoid recriminations against her." See L.C. Christie, Notes on Discussion by the Dominions Foreign Policy Group, 8 February 1926, op. cit., p. 21789.

51.) L.C. Christie, Notes on Discussion by Dominions Foreign Policy Group, 8 February 1926, op. cit., p. 21782, and L.C. Christie to Philip Kerr, 15 March 1926, op. cit., p. 23759.

52.) L.C. Christie to Philip Kerr, 15 March 1926, op. cit., p. 23752.

53.) Ibid., p. 23754.

54.) Ibid., pp. 23755 and 23758-23763. Locarno gave Christie the occasion to take a crack at defining what Canada's attitude toward Europe should be in the aftermath of Britain's decision to commit itself militarily to the Continent. Christie's thoughts on this subject were destined to remain by and large consistent throughout the remainder of his life. "Clearly the physical difference between the English Channel and the Atlantic Ocean," he wrote,

must mean great differences between Britain's political and security relations with Europe and Canada's. Locarno is an example of Britain's relationship. She is now responsible for the Franco-German frontier and her cares do not stop there. They go into Eastern Europe. Legally the Locarno treaties may be separable, but in practical international politics they are obviously 'mutually interdependent' as the Final Protocol at Locarno quite soundly expressed it. Scarce a man child in Poland or Czecho-Slovakia can be born without it being an object of immediate concern to the British Foreign Office, Admiralty and War Office. The continental commitment is deeper than before the war. But if Britain can so explicitly admit such a risk and responsibility because from her distance and with her weight she can hope to watch and influence subsequent European tendencies, Canada from her distance and with her weight is an entirely different case. She may try and watch and keep herself informed, but in her circumstances there is no case for her people to undertake the engagement. The commitment taken to-day has the effect when the war comes in the future of fixing automatically the terms on which you 'sheathe the sword' and make peace. The guarantee of the Franco-German frontier might involve the expenditure of millions of men on land. Overseas Canada can only leave her position to be determined by events. ...

In short, as the security or destiny of 45,000,000 Englishmen is 'manifestly bound up' with that of the millions of Western Europe, separated from them only by 20 miles of water, so it is a truism that the security or destiny of 9 million Canadians is bound up with that of 100,000,000 Americans living on an adjoining plot of ground. As Western Europe can do nothing for Canada and as Canada has shown she can throw some weight into Western Europe, there is no case for binding herself in Western Europe to-day. She must await events and whatever she may do, she will doubtless fix her terms in the light of her real outlook over both oceans and to the south [that is, the United States] and of the consideration that any exertions abroad will inevitably weaken her home in North America."

See L.C. Christie, Notes on Discussion of the Dominions Foreign Policy Group, 8 February 1926, op. cit., pp. 21783-21784 and

21786.

55.) L.C. Christie, Notes on Discussion by Dominions Foreign Policy Group, op. cit., p. 21789.

56.) Ibid., pp. 21792-21793.

57.) Ibid., p. 21799.

58.) L.C. Christie to Philip Kerr, 15 March 1926, op. cit., p. 23763.

59.) Christie warned that although he did not then favor a total or final break with the imperial system, "time does not necessarily serve the situation" and that Canada would have to act before the pressure of events forced its hand. "Some are for clearing the chaos [of Canada's ill-defined international status] by a complete out and out cutting away from the Empire," Christie cautioned.

"They say what comes to this: that Canada cannot really in practice carry out the idea that she is an integral part of a Great Power: that all the facts of her position -- with her 9,000,000 (or even if it were 20,000,000) people occupying a homeland in the Western Hemisphere -- define her as belonging to the category of small Powers -- a small North American power with an attitude toward defence and security problems and commitments on land and sea analagous to that of Holland or Belgium in Europe; that it is vain to imagine her as a European Power. They would argue that it is healthier to recognise one's limitations and to assume an unambiguous attitude that would force the community to consider responsibilities; that the existing state of affairs hampers the task of assimilating and consolidating our various racial elements.

There is very great force in their whole position and the trend of events goes to strengthen it. But the forthright solution has the natural effect on men's minds and is apt to inhibit frank and coherent discussion. You do not come from a clear sky, and in the absence of some inescapable event to force you, suddenly break off such old and intimate associations, lift your hat and say thank you but I am through with you. You try to find wherein you can continue to work together and on what basis. In this case we have to ask whether the world would be well served by breaking completely the last important political tie between North America and Europe."

Even in the wake of Locarno and all that he perceived it as meaning for the imperial system, Christie still fretted over the possible loss of "the last important political link" between North America and Europe. The idea of Canada serving as a link between Britain and the United States consistently would play a

large part in the foreign policy Christie proposed for Canada after Locarno. See L.C. Christie, Notes on Discussion of the Dominions foreign Policy Group, 8 February 1926, op. cit., p. 21792.

60.) PAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Volume 264, Folder 59, p. 148281, L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 25 February 1926.

61.) Ibid., pp. 148282-148283.

62.) By the end of the 1923-1926 period, Christie believed that the League barely was providing the most elementary benefit that he had expected Canada to derive from membership, namely, consistent international recognition of and respect for Canada's international status. Reflecting at what he had observed during the League of Nations meeting in 1926, he wrote,

"... Apparently the life of the Canadian officer at Geneva is a steady series of battles to be heard at all or to get Canadian representation on the various committees that are going on. For example, an Immigration Committee being proposed, he [Canada's representative] suggested that the principle of equal representation as between the Old World and the oversea receiving countries -- a not unreasonable suggestion, one would think. Although a Canadian was ultimately appointed -- apparently because he made such a nuisance of himself -- the principle was not recognised, and important quarters in the organisation he was told in so many words that in this as in all other branches [of the League] Europe must predominate...."

Without this basic recognition of Canada's status and rights, or at least the provision of a ready arena in which that status could be demonstrated, Christie believed that the League lost much of its original appeal, especially since such onerous responsibilities of membership as assisting in the application of various forms of sanctions -- which Canada had opposed from the start -- seemed to be increasing. See PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 26, Folder 106, p. 23805, L.C. Christie, Notes on the League of Nations Meeting of March, 1926, 14 April 1926.

63.) L.C. Christie, "Turn to the British Empire," Sunday Express, 30 September 1923, op. cit. Christie's prognosis at this time for the ultimate fate of the League was very bleak. "As for the League," he told Frankfurter'

"all I can see is that some day we may be able, subject to the lessons we have learned, to start over again at some world system. The Versailles conception is not workable. Certainly the mechanics of it are fundamentally unsound; but, what is more vital, the architects made a false estimate of their raw material -- human passions, instincts, ambitions, impulses -- that vitiates the whole thing. Perhaps some day our descendants can start somewhere at a

lower rung of the ladder. Meanwhile, given our impulses, it is dangerous to attempt to balance oneself on the existing dizzying heights."

Because the League represented the hopes and dreams of so many people who had experienced the devastation of the Great War, Christie saw no reason for scrapping the League entirely. His goals in 1923 were more or less aimed at neutralizing the League by eliminating its use, or at least its potential for using, economic or military sanctions, and by attempting to limit it to being a forum for what he liked to call the "conference method of diplomacy" with no aspirations toward the status of super-state. By the middle 1920s, however, when the League appeared to be increasing its European orientation and sharpening its taste for sanctions, Christie began to seriously consider advocating the termination of Canadian membership. See Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 10 October 1923.

64.) In the postwar period, Christie believed, despite the presence of the new League of Nations, that the conduct of international affairs would have to be worked out through basically the same diplomatic channels and methods that had existed before the war. Diplomats of the postwar period found for their use, Christie wrote,

"the old established method of negotiation, to which is now added an alternative method known as the League. (It cannot be put higher: there is no new form of political organization; no new organic thing to engage men's loyalties as, for example, the American Federal Government or the Canadian Federal Government did; the members of the Council and the Assembly are responsible to precisely the same constituencies -- the same Governments, the same groups -- as Ambassadors are and always have been, and in the same sense. Nor can this condition change within any period for which we can usefully legislate). This alternative method may for some purposes be an improvement."

See L.C. Christie, Draft Treaties of Mutual Assistance, 19 February 1924, op. cit., pp. 10885-10866.

65.) L.C. Christie to Philip Kerr, 8 November 1925, op. cit., pp. 036115-036116. Indeed, Christie viewed those powers taking part in the Locarno Pact as having consciously decided "to alter the League's fundamental structure as a mere incident of a European arrangement...." See, L.C. Christie, Notes on the League of Nations Meeting of March, 1926, 14 April 1926, op. cit., p. 23808.

66.) L.C. Christie to O.M. Biggar, 18 December 1924, op. cit., p. 9572.

67.) L.C. Christie, "The Case Against the Protocol," op. cit.

68.) L.C. Christie to O.M. Biggar, 18 December 1924, op. cit., p. 9563. Christie believed that the escalating desire to use sanctions and compulsory arbitration would tend to expand rather than limit the potential geographical area engaged in conflict. He thought that the basis of the Covenant properly was the "obligatory submission of disputes to arbitration or conciliation with the obligatory postponement of warlike actions pending the results of the inquiry." Projects such as the use of the sanctions contained in Article 10 of the Covenant, the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, and the Geneva Protocol, on the other hand, threatened to give the League a much more expansive role because they demanded the "obligatory acceptance of the findings of a tribunal whose decision the parties in the dispute have in the end no effective voice." Since the nations of the world were obviously not done fighting amongst themselves, Christie concluded that once the fighting began the League's goal should be to confine the area of war and not to expand it by involving other nations, perhaps from other geographical regions, through the application of sanctions. "If on a strictly objective view," Christie wrote,

"it is admitted that the nations are not through fighting, and if as seems indisputable you cannot control the incidence of such forces once they are set loose, should we not deliberately seek to limit with the utmost strictness each Government's conception of its interest in affairs beyond its own boundary, thus limiting the occasions that might bring it into conflict with other Governments, (in reality in the spirit of the best exponents of the much despised 'old diplomacy'), rather than to deliberately go out of our way [through the League's use of sanctions] to provide a maximum of occasions for bringing them together and facilitating the natural itch of men to mind the other fellow's business, thus courting the maximum area of the struggle that eventually grows from inter-governmental conflicts? I cannot help feeling that the Covenant and much current propaganda on the idea of international co-operation tend too much and dangerously in the other direction."

See Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 20 October 1924, and, PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 9, Folder 30, p. 9458, L.C. Christie to Herbert Croly, 15 February 1924.

69.) L.C. Christie to O.M. Biggar, 18 December 1924, op. cit., p.9548.

70.) Ibid., p. 9552.

71.) In his response to Locarno in the fall of 1925, Christie underlined the importance he placed on the necessity of the League's methods and organizations respecting and abiding by the political realities inherent in the concept of responsible

government. "Again, on the ideas aspect," he told Philip Kerr, "I do not believe in 'sanctions' and 'compulsory arbitration' and vital decisions in other peoples hands, in any form whatever. The first time these things are really tried against a first- or second-rate Power the League will smash; and God only knows what they have done to the British Empire. They are unworkable, anyone who has lived with the federal idea in his bones knows it." By ignoring the inability of governments to surrender their control over the decisions of peace and war, the League, Christie believed, not only made continuing Canadian membership undesirable but threatened its own survival as a viable international organization. See L.C. Christie to Philip Kerr, 8 November 1925, op. cit., p. 036113.

72.) L.C. Christie, Notes on the League of Nations Meeting of March, 1926, 14 April, 1926, op. cit., pp. 23808-23809. Christie's travels in Europe on business for Dunn's firm did little to lessen his belief that Canada had no business in involving itself with European affairs over which it could not have any control. The attitude of the new Czech government toward Germany, he told Sir Robert Borden in the fall of 1924, portended nothing but trouble between those two countries, adding that there was nothing Canada could do about the situation except to possibly become involved in some future conflict resulting from it as a consequence of its membership in the League. "I can't say that what I saw of the Czechs, our beloved Allies, encouraged me," he wrote.

"Their consulate in Berlin refused German marks in payment of my visa, demanded Czech kronen or in lieu of that American dollars, and only accepted sterling after an argument and when I pointed out to them that they were glad a while ago to get a loan of sterling in the London market. They are sticking about allowing through trains from Germany so we had to get out at a small frontier town at 6:30 in the morning and change to a Czech train. There were at that hour (and square on the frontier) six military planes manoeuvring in the air and a good number of uniformed soldiers in sight in the streets. In Marienbad there were many signs of their policy of forcing the German speaking people of this district of Bohemia to use the Czech language in commerce. Doubtless they know their business, but to an outsider looking merely at their 13,000,000 and the Germans 65,000,000 it seemed folly."

In a later letter to Frankfurter, Christie related that the substance of his conversations with businessmen throughout Europe had been characterized by an almost resigned, matter-of-fact assumption that the nature of Continental politics would cause the Versailles settlement to break down and lead to renewed conflict. "Item: for over a year now," he told Franfurter,

"I have been meeting businessmen who have many connections with the Continent and whose affairs take them there

constantly. They are not politicians; but as continental politics may have a vital bearing on that or this business project and as they are usually dealing with other people's money they do their best to calculate the likely course of events. What has struck me is how universally -- quite dispassionately as becomes them -- these men take it for granted that this or that part of the recent European settlement must again go up in smoke. They put their fingers on the Baltic States and point to Russia; on the Polish Corridor; on Upper Silesia; on Bessarabia and so on. I cannot base much on the casual observation of five weeks [during a business trip], but what I did see gave me no reason to suppose that this was an unreasonable calculation. ..."

Christie found especially disturbing the matter-of-fact view of many Germans that renewed European conflict was likely. In speaking with a German businessman, who was also a former military officer, Christie told Sir Robert Borden that the man

"... quite openly, not in a blustering way but as a matter of course, regards the Transylvanian transfer to Romania a joke -- a temporary aberration; the same state of mind one encounters in regard to the Polish Corridor and Upper Silesia. It is taken for granted that somehow, someday these things will undergo a change. One feels that with the present generation the idea is fixed, a part of their make up, and one can imagine their children getting soaked in it very early. To me it is still a strange experience each time I encounter this order of idea and its calm method of expressing itself; its novelty does not wear off. But though it is so wholly outside the experience of a North American as not to be assimilated at its full strength or value, it is not hard to feel that it is a potent thing...."

Christie's personal acquaintance with the arrogance of the Czechs, the political analyses of a number of European businessmen, and extensive travel through and observation of Germany -- "What an impression of power Germany gives one - its countryside, its cities, its highways of all kinds - and its people sober, serious, intelligent," he told Frankfurter -- led him to conclude that renewed European conflict was likely in the future, and that he, for one, was ready to "confirm my unregenerate oath to have nothing to do with these alliances [Christie is referring here specifically to the Geneva Protocol] with distant peoples." It is also to be noted that when Christie rejoined the Department of External Affairs in 1935 he was the only member thereof to have had the benefit of direct and extended day-to-day experience with European political, social, and business life in the postwar period. The basis for his persistent, almost obsessive efforts after 1935 to limit Canada's ties to Britain because of British links to the unstable and conflict-prone European political system therefore may have been unique in official Ottawa at that time because it rested, in

large measure, on practical experience and not merely on theoretical, idealistic, or emotional judgments. See PAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Volume 264, Folder 58, pp. 148099A-148100 and pp. 148152-148153A, L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 22 September 1924 and L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 25 August 1925, and Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 20 October 1924.

73.) PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 10, Folder 31, p. 9665, L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 5 January 1925. Article 10 of the League's Covenant always stuck in Christie's throat. In late 1925, for example, he told an Australian correspondent that the "Canadian attack upon Article 10 [at the meeting of the Assembly of the League that fall] struck a warm chord with me for so long as I was in Ottawa I had a good deal to do with initiating the attack, while from this distance [that is, from London] I have done my best to stir up my friends against it and other rigid features of the Covenant. ... All these fancy stunts like 'sanctions', 'compulsory arbitration', and so on, are unworkable.... So I am working against all of these fancy stunts at any time, anywhere, and anyhow."

Christie also saw his efforts against Article 10 as an effort to promote international cooperation between the United States and Great Britain, a goal he pursued consistently throughout his career. In early 1925, Christie wrote that he believed that the British Empire "should in world affairs always co-operate with the United States to the greatest extent open to us...." He believed that one possible venue of Anglo-American cooperation could be in the economic aspects of the League of Nations if the League was shed of its taste for sanctions and compulsory arbitration. The existence of those features limited the degree of American participation in the organization. "In considering their relation [that is, the relation of the United States] to world affairs," Christie wrote,

I try to avoid stating the question in the form, Will they come into the League and when? - for to my mind that is too generalised a form in which to consider the future. There seem so many different ways in which as time goes on they may get into relation to other nations, and one way, as is now evident, is through some of the economic aspects of the League method. But on one aspect I am bound to say that I feel fairly definite: it seems to me that any calculation that takes them as adopting the 'compulsory' or 'sanctions' aspects of the League is wholly precarious for the purpose of any discussion required at this stage, and for myself I put out of my mind the prediction of any living American in this connection. Their geographical position, their distance from Geneva, their political institutions and method, their tradition, are in the way. I suppose everyone is influenced in this connection by his experience of the Americans he has happened to know. My own friends and acquaintances there -- in the law, in the universities, in official life, in politics, in the newspaper world, in

business -- are I feel fairly representative of the minds that shape American thinking; they have to a generous degree let me get under their skins; and I can only say that I have found almost without exception they regard the rigid 'sanctions' aspect of the League, in the form in which it has so far been conceived, as being unintelligible or unworkable or vicious. I find it hard to see how either the 100% American politician or the more advanced internationalist there can get very far without carrying this sort of element."

Besides involving Britain too closely in European affairs, tying Canada to automatic military commitments, and ignoring the realities of geography, therefore, Christie also saw Article 10 as an obstacle on the path to Anglo-American cooperation, a path he very much longed to see trod. See Ibid., Volume 11, Folder 35, pp. 10655-10656, L.C. Christie to J.G. Latham, 31 December 1925, and Ibid., Volume 10, Folder 31, p. 9666, L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 5 January 1925.

74.) L.C. Christie, Notes on the League of Nations Meeting of March, 1926, 14 April, 1926, op. cit., pp. 23814-23815.

75.) Ibid., p. 23802.

76.) Ibid., pp. 23802-23803.

77.) In a letter to Sir Robert Borden in the fall of 1926, J.W. Dafoe succinctly described Christie's dalliance with more imperially oriented ideas on his arrival in London and his eventual turning away from them. "I was very much interested," Dafoe wrote,

"in learning the present state of Christie's mind. In London three years ago it seemed to me that Christie had somewhat foresworn his earlier nationalist beliefs; he was then turning over in his mind the possibility of Great Britain withdrawing from Europe and in association with the Dominions forming some kind of entity which in possible association with the United States might serve as a sort of balance wheel for the world. ... And now he returns to Canada as the foremost nationalist of us all! The development is chiefly due, I think, to a conviction arising from observation and experience that the European mind (including the English) is fundamentally different than the North American mind in its attitude toward political and social relationships. ..."

Dafoe's last judgment about the difference Christie saw between the European and North American "minds" is a bit off the mark. Rather than anything so esoteric as judging the different ways that minds on different continents work, Christie simply saw a stark divergence between the national interests of Canada and those of Britain and the other European nations. See PAC, MG 30

D45, Dafoe Papers, Volume 3, Folder-1926: June-December, J.W. Dafoe to R.L. Borden, 16 October 1926.

78.) There seems to be little doubt that in 1923 Christie was pleased and excited to have the opportunity to live and work in Britain, and, as well, to see something of the Continent as part of his employment. "All my life," he told Sir Robert Borden, "I had had a hankering to see this side of the world, England and the Continent at close quarters." He seemed, in fact, to see something of a touch a fate in the events that brought him to England. "It's a curious affair," he commented to Frankfurter just before leaving for London, "long ago, I cannot quite put my finger on it, I said to myself I would spend part of my life in each of the three great English speaking countries...." Moreover, it appears that he almost immediately got caught up in the political life of his new home. In a letter to Frankfurter just after the British general election of 1923, for example, he indicated that he had very nearly been a candidate in the contest. "Here's a gesture," he wrote, "I had an indirect approach to stand [on] a policy of full Imperial Preference and run against Neville Chamberlain and his half policy. You as the keeper of my gestures ought to enjoy that! What a shame I hadn't impudence enough to do it." Obviously, Christie was quite taken by his new surroundings in the second half of 1923, and this probably goes part of the way in explaining his momentarily revived interest in a cooperative imperial foreign policy at this time. See PAC, MG 26 H, Volume 264, Folder 59, p. 148307A, L.C. Christie to Sir Robert Borden, and Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 24 May 1923, and L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 10 December 1923.

79.) In his doctoral thesis, Professor Bothwell concluded that on his return to Canada in 1913 Christie had manifested a "sentimental Canadianism" which was the result of the fact that until then "he had [had] little connection with life in his own country, and none at all with the powerful business and political community of Central Canada." Perhaps Christie's nationalism -- his concern for protecting and enhancing the nation's international status and interests -- in this period might be better described as one-sided rather than sentimental. There was, for example, nothing romantic or sentimental about his arguments supporting Ottawa's legal right to dispatch troops overseas in 1914 or his support for conscription a few years later. These positions were, in fact, marked by a rather austere sense of legalism and realistic political expediency.

What was perhaps missing in Christie's view of Canada in the Great War era was an accurate appreciation for the complexity of, and potential for disruption inherent in, the country's social, economic, and political life. Nevertheless, Bothwell's unfortunate choice of the adjective "sentimental" does not hide the perceptiveness of his judgment that Christie's nationalism was incomplete in that it was based only on Canada's external interests and commitments. During the war years and the postwar

period, however, Christie received a thorough-going education in regard to the domestic realities of Canadian society that alleviated the one-sidedness Bothwell defined. Such was the effectiveness of this education that, by 1926, his foreign policy views, judgments, and analyses were always conceived with an eye toward their potential affects on Canadian unity. See R. Bothwell, "Bureaucratic Imperialism," op. cit., p. 23.

80.) PAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Volume 264, Folder 58, p. 148135A, L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 17 March 1925.

81.) Ibid., pp. 148134A-148135A. The members of the "dining club" to which Christie refers in this letter included, at various times between 1913 and 1939,, besides Justice Duff, John Stevenson, O.M. Biggar, Robert Coates, Norman Lambert, Duncan Campbell Scott, Ottawa-lawyer Russell Smart, Norman Robertson, and C.S.A. Ritchie. For Christie's membership in and relations with this group see Queen's University Archives, Collection 2167, John A. Stevenson Papers, Box 1, Folder 4, Excerpt from J.A. Stevenson's unfinished autobiography.

82.) L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 17 March 1925, op. cit., p. 148137. Christie believed that the enduring economic inequality between Canada's several regions was one of the most dangerous threats to the future viability of the Canadian federal system, and the process of "reconfederation" he was recommending necessarily had to look at ways and means with which to spread economic benefits more evenly across the country. "Coming to Montreal from Ottawa with some notions [regarding regional economic disparities] beginning to sprout," Christie told Borden in the same letter,

"I got tremendously interested in a long conversation with Frank Jones, for he from a different and more practical line was getting on to the same track. It started with the idea that he is now urging that our tariff should be framed stictly on the basis of a uniform rate of duty (ad valorem) on all imports of whatever kind. His case for it on various grounds -- revenue, the protection of labor, the impossibility of a 'scientific tariff' on the present basis and so on -- was very interesting. But what especially struck me in relation to what I picked up in Ottawa was his strong insistence that the present system of variable rates necessarily results in monstrous discriminations as between different sections of the Dominion. He puts it, for example, that the real effect of the existing tariff is to protect the labourer in the cotton mills to the extent of 70% of the value of his labour, while the coal miner gets a protection of 10% or less on his labour value. This means a concentration of population and wealth in the textile towns of Quebec, and hard times in the coal mines of Nova Scotia. I should like to see a careful study done by some economist on this point, showing to what extent a variable tariff system has affected the distribution of industry and

population. I should like to know how far the Fathers of Confederation, particularly those from Nova Scotia, visualised the possible effects of a variable tariff in the way of discrimination between different regions of the country. One wonders whether it was much considered at all. At that time there would have been little in the way of experience and practice to suggest the possibilities of the thing in relation to the realities of modern history. Moreover, I think that it is true that before Confederation the various provinces did frame their tariffs on the basis of a uniform rate of duty for all imports; so that people may have had it in their minds that this system would continue indefinitely. One may note here that the object of the American constitutional provision forbidding export taxes was to prevent one section of the country discriminating against another.... It is a question whether this aspect of import taxes in relation to a federalized country like Canada, of vast extent and varied conditions, was actually considered at all at Confederation, whether it has been fully thought out since, and whether its consideration now might not be useful.

...I am not asserting that a uniform rate on all imports is the true line; I am not qualified to make such assertions about the tariff. I suppose such a change might startle and embarrass some industries at the outset, but there is so much to be said for it -- its avoidance of discrimination (formally at any rate, and very likely substantially as Frank Jones says) as between different regions, its tendency to bring about the development of only those industries that are naturally fitted to the country, its elimination of duplication ... that it seems to me worth the most careful study...."

In addition to the idea of tariff adjustments as a means of promoting nationwide economic equity in order to forestall bickering and animosities between the regions, Christie felt that such a tack was necessary to negate the argument of those few who maintained that Canadians would be "better off" economically by "going in with the United States." Christie believed that it was unlikely in the extreme that a majority of Canadians would ever choose "deliberately and voluntarily" to merge with the United States, but he did admit that for the less prosperous regions of the Confederation it was "a very hard case living next door to the most opulent family on earth." Christie believed that a more even distribution of wealth in Canada therefore probably would cancel whatever appeal formal association with the United States might hold. See Ibid., pp. 148135A-148137 and 148134A, and L.C. Christie to A. Meighen, 10 January 1925, op. cit., pp. 036065-036066.

83.) PAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Volume 264, Folder 58, pp. 148210-148211, L.C. Christie to Philip Kerr, 14 December 1925. Although Professor Bothwell in his thesis has cited a letter by

Christie in which he questions the viability of the plan contained in Meighen's Hamilton Speech on the basis that in time of war a momentum builds in society that sweeps away all such constitutional or electoral procedures as those suggested by the former Prime Minister, he clearly did not reject the idea totally. For Christie, Meighen's plan was valuable because it prevented the political views of one linguistic group from being imposed on the other without recourse to the democratic process. "As nearly as I can sum up the Hamilton idea," Christie told Sir Robert Borden,

"at present it seems to me to come to this. As a practical matter if a vital threat arises in the future no constitutional device will prevent the country from getting in its punch, [but] for it now [must] be taken as true as anything is humanly true (1) that conscription ought to begin at the beginning of a war and (2) that you can't have conscription in Canada without dissolution and (a) general election. On the other hand the effect of this device will be to act as a brake on H.M.G. and make them consider very carefully their policy with regard to such matters as Locarno involves -- and until the League has got better organization the Lord knows such brakes are not superfluous."

Christie always had trouble understanding the French-Canadian mind and the political behavior that resulted from the manner in which it worked. Christie did think, however, that one of the pivotal differences between French-Canadian and English-Canadian political behavior was the result of their differing religious orientations. "It seems to be rather hard for an Anglo-Saxon to get at the French mind," Christie wrote. "Their backgrounds are so different."

"Your Anglo-Saxon is not very clear about his God; he states him in many different ways; about the only thing that he is clear about is that whatever He is, he the free born Protestant Anglo-Saxon has direct access to Him. The heirs of the continental Rousseau tradition, on the other hand, seem to have a rather different method. The one thing they are sure about is that they do not have direct access; that they can get at Him only through certain annointed and duly appointed personages; that these interpret the law; and the followers have learned through the centuries that if, in the pursuit of their mundane activities they happen to come in conflict with the law, it is not necessarily a matter of great concern to them as individuals, for their system provides an immediate remedy. They can go to duly appointed personages and on rendering various duly prescribed services and such like they can obtain certain absolutions. A people whose being such a system and method is an intimate part will naturally reflect the method in their political life. What we [that is, Anglo-Saxons] may often be inclined to regard as corruption, nepotism and graft they may regard as

proper, just and in the order of things...."

Although, Christie's thought on Canada's French-English problem was at times confused, he nonetheless saw the complexity of the problem and clearly recognized the need for providing an atmosphere conducive to accommodation and compromise between the two linguistic groups. Christie did not view the French-Canadians either as obstructionist or unpatriotic, and he was not willing to impose political decisions on them unilaterally. Meighen's idea, with its full use of the democratic process in the matter of conscription, was therefore sure to win his support. See R. Bothwell, "Bureaucratic Imperialism," *op. cit.*, pp. 387-388; PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 11, Folder 35, p. 10593, L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 29 December 1925; *Ibid.*, MG 26 I, Meighen Papers, Volume 64, Folder 28, pp. 036071-036073, L.C. Christie to A. Meighen, 10 January 1925.

84.) Christie, for example, had a chance to witness in an in-depth fashion the effects that the Great War was having on the social and political life of the provinces that lay west of the Ottawa Valley when he traveled with Sir Robert Borden to Vancouver and back between 16 November and 24 December 1916. Because the Prime Minister included Christie so closely in all of the affairs in which he was involved -- both in his role as head of government and in his capacity as leader of the Conservative party -- he was afforded an education in Canadian domestic life that he had been unable to acquire during his education and employment in the United States. For Christie's tour of western Canada with Borden in the fall of 1916, see Library of Congress, Container 43, Jane Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 16 November 1916.

85.) Christie believed that the fact that this responsibility lay outside Canada deepened French-English tensions by making external policy appear as an issue that some French-Canadians interpreted as a matter of accepting dictation from a foreign power, and which some English-Canadians saw as a matter of fulfilling an obligation owed to the mother country. "As it seems to me," Christie told Borden,

there are two powerful elements in Canada whose state of mind always impeded your efforts and will continue to block the prospect of Canada's real assumption of responsibility [in external affairs] (from whatever direction the problem may be approached), and so will handicap all efforts to discover and protect her national position and play a part in the world. One is the Ontario Orangeman and the other the Quebecer -- each in his own dominated by 'nationalistic' aims -- or, what seems pretty much the same thing, each in his own way the stubborn guardian of the colonial state of mind -- each now dreaming in terms of an age past -- each now clinging to a conception of 'security' now falsified by the facts and spirit of a new age. (They suggest Ulster and Sinn Fein). They are both of them so numerous and strongly

entrenched in the structure of our community that one feels that the solution of our problem, whatever it may be, will be long, drawn out and trying. Perhaps they themselves cannot remodel their fixed ideas; perhaps they can be driven from them only by some shock administered by the contortions of an impersonal world which is indifferent to the particularist ideas of Ontario and Quebec."

Christie appears to have believed that Quebecers were more likely to change than Ontarians. "For I have come to take it for granted, as a working rule of my own," he wrote late in 1925, "that whenever Ontario looks at any problem -- and especially one of our external problems -- in terms of its Quebec obsession, the chances are a million to one that it is stupidly wrong." Christie's "hope" for a change in the attitudes of Quebecers in regard to external affairs probably also reflects the development of his own thought in the direction of an increasingly strident Canadian nationalism and away from his earlier, more imperially-oriented inclinations. See L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 29 December 1925, op. cit., and PAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Volume 264, Folder 59, pp. 148365-148366. L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 16 April 1926. For a recent and provocative analysis of the similarities in the attitudes of Christie and other officials of the Department of External Affairs and those of leading Quebec isolationists during the years between 1936 and 1939 see Peter B. Waite, "French-Canadian Isolationism and English Canada: An Elliptical Foreign Policy, 1935-1939," Journal of Canadian Studies, 18, 2 (September, 1983), pp. 132-148.

86.) PAC, MG 26H, Borden Papers, Volume 264, Folder 59, p. 148280, L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 25 February 1926.

87.) L.C. Christie to Philip Kerr, 8 November 1925, op. cit., pp 036116-036117.

88.) L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 10 June 1924, op. cit., p. 148085A.

89.) L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 16 April 1926, op. cit., p. 148365.

90.) L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 25 February 1926, op. cit., p. 148278. "One sometimes hears the curious question," Christie wrote to Philip Kerr, "After all what practical disabilities does Canada have under the existing regime? They have been pointed out time after time. It is enough to point to the conflict of duty involved in the prevailing practice of trusteeship -- issues vital to Canada in the hands of Ministers only responsible to the people of Great Britain, guided by a bureaucracy whose job is only to keep the Ministers out of trouble at Westminster, all necessarily dominated by European necessities -- their good will unquestioned -- but they are not superhuman -- no need to labour the point that all this momentum of the 'going concern' must be to the disadvantage of Canada.... It is perfectly clear that the

definition [of national interest and security] in your case does not meet our case and could not. It is unquestionably of practical account to us that we should be able, as freely and as definitely as others, to study our position; our inability to do so is a danger, but the existing legalities stand in the way. Again, for practical disabilities one need only to look at the confusion of Canadian politics; our ambiguous and false position prevents clear thinking, agreement and continuity among the parties in our foreign affairs and has a direct effect in impeding the alignments essential to our internal progress." See L.C. Christie to Philip Kerr, 15 March 1926, op. cit. pp. 23756-23757.

91.) L.C. Christie to A. Meighen, 24 February 1926, op. cit. p. 148256.

92.) L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 25 February 1926, op. cit., p. 148278.

93.) PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 26, Folder 106, p. 23944, L.C. Christie to A. Meighen, 8 July 1926.

94.) Ibid., MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Volume 264, Folder 59, p. 148376A, L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 4 June 1926.

95.) L.C. Christie, Notes on the League of Nations Meeting of March 1926, 14 April 1926, op. cit., pp. 23823-23824.

96.) Ibid., pp. 23818 and 23821.

97.) L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 4 June 1926, op. cit., p. 148376A.

98.) PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 23, Folder 88, p. 22010, L.C. Christie, undated notes, but almost certainly December, 1925 or January-February, 1926.

99.) Ibid., Volume 26, Folder 106, p. 23944, L.C. Christie to A. Meighen, 8 July 1926.

100.) Ibid., p. 23846, L.C. Christie, Responsible Government in Canada. The Last Stage, 15 June 1926.

101.) Ibid., p. 23848. As it had when he had earlier sketched out the problem of the Empire's correct role in international affairs in the Sunday Express and the Round Table, the geographical element and the considerations resulting therefrom bulked large for Christie as he set about defining Canada's international position in the post-Locarno period. "There is one factor at any rate," he wrote, "we [in Canada] cannot escape from even if any would imagine the effort. We have to respect what the map, if nothing else, teaches us; that we are of the New World. It is, of course, a factor that has always influenced us and perhaps most strongly when unconsciously; but since we may be

sure that if unconsciously we ever ignore it we shall come to futility we had better put it to conscious use...." "It is a simple truth of geography and history," as he once told Philp Kerr, "that Canadians are North Americans and not Europeans" and to follow a foreign policy that entailed intimate involvement in European politics could only mean "incalculable taxation and drains on manpower and capital. In short, it means weakening our position vis-a-vis the U.S." Christie believed that Britain had faced the geographical reality of her position and "seems to be finding one aspect of its solution in a rapidly deepening integration of her policies with those of the rest of Europe." Canada must obviously, Christie concluded, look toward a North American-oriented solution when "seriously consider [ing] our own case." See *Ibid.*, pp. 23848-23849, and L.C. Christie to Philip Kerr, 14 December 1925, *op. cit.*, pp. 148210-148211.

102.) L.C. Christie, *Responsible Government in Canada. The Last Stage*, 15 June 1926, *op. cit.*, p. 23848.

103.) *Ibid.*, p. 23850.

104.) *Ibid.*, p. 23852.

105.) *Ibid.*, pp. 23853-23854.

106.) *Ibid.*, p. 23854. Christie believed "that to Canadians it [a war involving Canada that was caused by London's unilateral decisions and actions] would probably mean immediate internal convulsion and conceivably the liquidation of their community." See L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 4 June 1926, *op. cit.*, p. 148377A.

107.) L.C. Christie, *Responsible Government in Canada. The Last Stage*, 15 June 1926, *op. cit.*, pp. 23854-23855.

108.) *Ibid.*, p. 23869. Christie admitted the tentative possibility of Canada maintaining some kind of association with some sort of a "Britannic 'League' or 'System'", but he thought that the Empire/Commonwealth could no longer be more than that sort of loose association. "[I]n my view," he wrote, "world developments have disclosed it [that is, an imperial federation] as an entirely illusory project out of all perspective with the practicalities for Canada." See *Ibid.*, p. 23868.

109.) *Ibid.*, pp. 23869-23870. As Britain tied itself ever more closely to European politics in the years between 1923 and 1926, Christie became increasingly sensitive to what he saw as potential problems regarding Canadian-American relations that might arise out of London's actions. Indeed, he believed that as the British government moved closer to Europe an antipathy toward the United States was developing in England. "There is here [in Britain] a growing dislike of the United States," Christie told Sir Robert Borden in early 1926. "No one can be sure of other people's motives and I will not go into them; but whatever the

motives the fact is inescapable. One meets it constantly in the prints, in conversations with all sorts. It is often intense. The pre-war attitude seems almost reversed." Because of "her place on the map," Christie wrote, Canada must dissociate herself from British policies and/or attitudes that might lead to Anglo-American frictions having potentially dangerous consequences for Canada. As the postwar plan for developing a cooperative and consultative imperial foreign policy disintegrated, and he turned increasingly toward favoring a Canadian external policy based squarely on accepting the political reality of Canada's geographical location in North America, Canada's relationship with the United States came, not surprisingly, to be a major focus of Christie's attention. In the aftermath of the breakdown of the imperial system, Christie believed that Canada would not only have to pay dramatically increased attention to its bilateral relations with the Americans, but that it probably would benefit Canada to develop a roughly similar approach to international events as that devised by Washington. "In pondering our position," Christie wrote,

"we often put it that the choice before Canada is between the British connection and the American connection. ... A point perhaps to be borne in mind is this: that while Canadians must and do have a faith that they have some how a distinctive contribution of their own to make to the world, the idea of some sort of an American connection is not necessarily a monstrous one. To some it may possibly be revolting, but as regards the great bulk of Canadians it is hard to say that they would regard an association with the Americans as being in itself a thing utterly alien to their make-up and ideas of civilized life. What might give the idea nasty colour comes from another direction. It is naturally felt by very many that it would be monstrous to set out deliberately to turn one's back on one's oldest ties and to form an exclusive association with another friend. This it is that bids us make every effort -- in our own interest to say nothing of higher considerations -- to avoid such a consummation; and so far as the matter is within our own control it is not to be doubted that Canadians will make the effort. But our control of events, certainly not unlimited in our own region of the earth, is very shadowy in other regions. There is conceivably another way of stating our choice. It might have nothing to do with the 'British connection' or the 'American connection'. In a world in which no disaster is inconceivable, events might someday arise to confront us with a choice of another sort -- a choice between the Old World and the New World. At such a crisis would we really have any choice at all? Quite apart from the question of saving our own skin, do our instincts tell us that we are of the Old World?..."

In 1926, Christie was not yet ready to renounce all ties with Britain. Nonetheless, the breakdown of postwar imperial cooperation, the growing anti-Americanism he detected in British

public and official opinion, his tendency to view foreign policy largely from a geographical perspective, and his desire to construct a foreign policy for Canada primarily based on its unique national interests were all combining to lead him increasingly to place more emphasis on building a strong and durable Canadian-American relationship. See L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 25 February 1926, op. cit., p. 148280, and L.C. Christie, Notes on the League of Nations Meeting of March, 1926, 14 April 1926, op. cit., pp. 23820-23821.

110.) L.C. Christie, Responsible Government in Canada. The Last Stage, 15 June 1926, op. cit. p. 23870.

111.) Ibid., p. 23856.

112.) L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 25 February 1926, op. cit., p. 148283.

113.) L.C. Christie, Responsible Government in Canada. The Last Stage, op. cit., p. 23871.

114.) Christie believed that the British North America Act as it stood offered no guarantee of complete responsible government. "Neither the B.N.A. Act nor anything else," he wrote, "has altered the legal circumstance that responsibility for foreign commitments or for putting Canada into a state of war does not reside in Canada -- that no-one there can be called to account for the act. The legalities contain the measure of Canadian responsibility and this responsibility remains fixed until the law is changed. Whichever alternative solution you envisage for the final stage of responsible government in Canada ... you cannot get it unless you change the fundamentals of the law of the Constitution." See Ibid., p. 23874.

115.) Ibid., pp. 23878-23879. Christie's reluctance to let a regularly elected Parliament deal with the alteration of the constitution flowed from the manner in which he viewed and interpreted the Canadian polity. Christie believed that Canada's problems derived not only from its political system, but also from its geographical location, its distinct regions, and its linguistic divisions. "The land is not a compact and simply manageable area like that of so many other national units," Christie wrote.

"It is a land of continental breadth, divided into three or four vertical sections by natural features whose intractable character magnifies the already great distances separating the various groups of men and women and renders inter-communication and communal thought a far from simple matter. The land is not compact; more than that, its owners are not homogeneous: we must live with more than one racial or cultural contrast. Our political sub divisions are also diverse in origin. East of the Central Ledge each Province in some degree still contains the colonial state of mind and

social ideas -- the mark of its origin as a colony of a European Power; while one of them, now a great distinctive racial or cultural group, presents the complication that it descends from a Power that capitulated on terms in their behalf to the Power from which the others mainly derive, and the terms are still faithfully remembered. West of the Ledge, however, the land only a short while ago was a clean sheet; it was opened up and peopled and stamped by North American descendants of the original Easterners, and it bears the mark not of the European-Colonial tradition but of something like what is called by American political students 'the pioneer tradition' or 'the frontier tradition.' The Western area is double the Eastern, and while the Western population is to-day less than half of the Eastern, it is increasing at a much rapider rate than the other."

Christie believed that each of these interests had to be represented not only in a non-partisan way but also in a roughly equal manner. A regularly elected Parliament could not provide for either. "[O]ur existing political institutions," he wrote in dismissing the idea, "are inherently incapable of solving our problems in Canada, ... [and] to pursue the attempt with them is to certainly pile up losses moral and material and probably to court worse." See *Ibid.*, pp. 23847-23848, and PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 23, Folder 88, p. 21973, L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 10 August 1926.

116.) PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 12, Folder 37, pp. 11017 and 11019, L.C. Christie, Notes on the Imperial Conference and the Consitution, n.d., but almost certainly December, 1926 or January, 1927.

117.) C.P. Stacey, "Nationality: The Experience of Canada," *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17.

118.) In response to Christie's paper on the last stage in the development of responsible government, for example, J.W. Dafoe estimated that the non-partisan approach urged by the author was not a realistic political possibility. "Unattainable also," Dafoe told Sir Robert Borden,

"is Christie's desire for a truce of God among Canadian factions while we meet in National Convention to endow ourselves with the full machinery of national life. The United States constitution was the outcome of a furious political controversy, and we, I fear, will have to steer the same course with all the dangers of ship-wreck. If the Conservative Party, which includes most of what might be called the pro-British element in this country, could bring itself to the point of seeing that the only choice is between a Canadian nation within a Britannic framework, and a Canadian nation outside of it, a settlement by consent might be possible; but I look for no such development. A course so sensible would lead to the disruption of the party

and the creation of a group primarily concerned to urge an anti-national solution to the problem."

In addition, the methodical and legalistic approach of Christie's paper disturbed several other readers. On two points, Hume Wrong wrote, "I am not in complete accord."

"First, I am not convinced that a positive sense of responsibility in Canada for external affairs, however it might come about, would have the far-reaching effect you anticipate on Canadian public opinion, or would help very greatly to solve the tremendous problems of welding our scattered and diverse population into a nationality conscious of itself. You are a 'positive' nationalist; I am rather inclined to be a 'negative' one. I cannot feel certain that, given our position on the map and the absence of external danger, a full sense of responsibility would give stimulus to 'Canadianism' ... much stronger than that possible under the present system...."

The second reason for my disagreement is perhaps more serious. ... Admitting all you say about the inadequacy of existing political methods, it [that is, the creation of a non-partisan constitutional assembly] would, I feel sure, require just such a sudden crisis and upheaval as you, and all who really think (instead of merely feel) on the problem, desire to avoid, to stimulate public feeling, break down the enormous power of vested interests in politics, and turn the people from dreams to realities. I know of no example in which a people, in peace and calm deliberation, has sought to plot a new course on the chart of the world. A federal state is here at double disadvantage for the vested interests are multiplied. It [a constitutional assembly] might well be the best way out (you have almost convinced me that it is); it might on the other hand precipitate a crisis and dissolve Canada...."

Finally, Sir Joseph Flavelle summed up the points made by Dafoe and Wrong nicely when he commented after reviewing Christie's paper that he had been "profoundly impressed by the logic of your arguments. I misread human history, however, if events develop only after this ordered manner." See PAC, MG 30 D45, Dafoe Papers, Volume 3, Folder-1926: June-December, J.W. Dafoe to R.L. Borden, 16 October 1926; Ibid., MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 23, Folder 88, pp. 21981-21983, Hume Wrong to L.C. Christie, 10 October 1926; and, Ibid., p. 21977, Sir Joseph Flavelle to L.C. Christie, 5 October 1926.

119.) Arthur Meighen had told Christie during their correspondence over Locarno that his solution to the problem of Canada's proper relationship with Britain was not practical politically. Christie had written to Meighen saying that the Locarno Pact had so clearly shown the unworkability of a cooperative and consultative imperial foreign policy that he

could see no reason why the Conservative Party should not join Mackenzie King's government in opposing it. "Should the [Liberal] Government propose a resolution that Canada has no appropriate place in the Locarno agreements," Christie advised Meighen, "I do not see why you should not second it yourself, provided it was framed and supported on the basis of the national interest and not a mere move in party tactics. Why shouldn't you confer with them on its terms and on the basis of discussion? And if they do not take the initiative why shouldn't you take it, and see if you could not get an agreed form of resolution?" In response, Meighen thanked Christie for his analysis of Locarno and for the suggestion regarding possible parliamentary tactics. He then went on to gently but clearly tell Christie that his advice was not practicable. "Sometimes one is tempted to think that you are too logical, but, of course, that is an absurd allegation," Meighen wrote.

"What I am in very great doubt of, though, is the condition of the mind of the Canadian people. Perhaps I should add as well that I have still greater doubt as to the condition of the mind of the Conservative party of Canada. To express an opinion rather than to merely express a doubt I think I would say this: that in my opinion those who form the Conservative party of this Dominion have not moved far enough in the thinking out of this question to put them in the mood to accept the conclusions to which you have come and the proposal which you make. My mind is now engaged in an endeavor to evolve a line of conduct which will stand a chance of being endorsed by those whom I am commissioned to lead, and which will not be in discord with realities. It is my judgment whatever that may be worth that the Canadian people (perhaps I should have said the Conservative section of the Canadian people) would demand another trial to work out a plan of Empire co-operation...."

See PAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Volume 264, Folder 59, p. 148312, L.C. Christie to A. Meighen, 17 March 1926, and Ibid., MG 26 I, Meighen Papers, Volume 64, Folder 28, pp. 036162-036163, A. Meighen to L.C. Christie, 5 April 1926.

120.) L.C. Christie, Responsible Government in Canada. The Last Stage, 15 June 1926, op. cit., p. 23881.

121.) Ibid., p. 23889.

122.) Ibid., p. 23890. It is interesting to note that Christie greeted the decisions of the Imperial Conference of 1926 with alarm and derision. He believed that the Prime Ministers gathered in London had taken it upon themselves, without proper authorization from their respective electorates, to change the imperial constitution. "They agreed upon," Christie wrote,

"a change in the title of the King, upon a change in the relation of the Governor General of Canada to the King and

to the Government of Great Britain, upon new channels of communication between the Governments, upon a new and an elaborate procedure as between the various administrations for concluding treaties with foreign countries, upon the method of representing Canada at international conferences, upon the division of responsibility between the Governments of Great Britain and Canada for the general conduct of foreign policy, and so on ... all of these readjustments so agreed upon, though they may be described as administrative or procedural in character, are nevertheless a contribution to our constitution in the exact accepted sense of the word; they 'affect the distribution or the exercise of the sovereign power in the state'. No man can foresee the whole of their significance on our future national life...."

More troubling still to Christie was the Conference's statement on the international status of the Dominions and the abandonment of their subordination. He believed that the statement was nothing more than a bit of "windowdressing" which might have the highly negative effect of forestalling the assumption of national responsibility in Canada. Christie wrote that despite the fact that the Conference's statement had been "seized upon by the public mind every where," he believed that the decisions of the Prime Ministers assembled in London did not really change anything at all for Canada in regard to its external autonomy.

"What did they [the Prime Ministers at the Conference] mean by arguing that Great Britain and the Dominions are 'in no way subordinate one to another in any respect of their domestic or external affairs'? We know at once -- to take the most vital aspect of our external relations -- that if the King on the advice of the Government of Great Britain should tomorrow declare war against another Power, the territory and people of Canada would instantly be subject to that state known in international law as a state of war and that the profound consequences in the public mind and regarding other countries appropriate to that status would instantly follow. A community which willy-nilly is thus subject to the will of another community is subordinate to that community, if words are to be taken in their accepted sense. ... In any case it is evident that the route to the goal on which we are invited by the famous agreed definition to fix our eyes ... must quite obviously involve a profound constitutional departure, an alteration by some means or other of those aspects of our present state structure affecting 'the distribution or exercise of the sovereign power in the state' as radical as communities of men ever make...."

For Christie, the Imperial Conference of 1926 had no authority to undertake the constitutional revision it attempted, and had, in his opinion, done nothing in fact -- "Is it conceivable," he wrote at the time, "that such fundamentals of

Canada or Australia or South Africa, should be arranged by a body of party politicians sitting thousands of miles away in London" -- because it left the "levers of war" in the hands of Great Britain, and without control over those levers any Canadian claims to complete autonomy were farcical. Christie asserted that the Conference had obscured, rather than resolved, the significance of the problems facing Canada, and, indeed, that it had made a mockery of responsible government and the historical development of the Dominion.

"Under this new contemplated [Constitutional] process who are the men who are to draw the deep, irrevocable lines of our national destiny and how are they to be elected? Two ministers, representative of a single party in the community, hurriedly appointed, self-appointed for the task, have done it this time. ... On the last occasion Canadians grappled with the 'fundamental principles' of their existence -- when they created their Confederation -- delegates from the constituent provinces were specially deputed for the purpose. They acted not as party leaders but as authorized plenipotentiaries. They had to strike a bargain between the different sections by negotiation. They drew up an agreed plan after long deliberation. Then they went to London and completed the final negotiations. The whole procedure was extraordinary -- outside the lines of ordinary party activity. Yet it now seems to be conceived that we can usefully attempt to solve, through the ordinary means, in the person of delegates based on a mere majority of the popular representation in Parliament, an issue which is in reality more serious and extraordinary than that which confronted the framers of our federal structure.

The new process and method now inaugurated contemplate that the solution of our 'fundamental principles' is to be first discussed and settled or initiated, not within our own borders, but thousands of miles away, and at any given moment, not necessarily at the behest of our own necessities, but according to the political necessities of some party in some Dominion still more thousands of miles away. ...

This is the process now clearly envisioned and proposed for building our Constitution. We can also picture exactly what, subsidiary to this new process, is involved as to the particular method and temper in which Canada is to participate in the new process; at each stage of the process a self-appointed Canadian delegation based on a single party majority and that majority conceivably dominated by one section of the Dominion; the chances, practically, all against their having opportunity for the hard thinking and preparation adequate to such negotiations; the chances, practically, against Parliament or the public having adequate notice and opportunity for discussion and fixing instructions, for at any stage in the process the new

constitutional changes may be precipitated in London at the instance of the party necessities of another Dominion about which we know nothing. ...

If there is any substance in the foregoing analysis the time has evidently come for considering serious questions in the region of practical politics. If the new protocol means what it says, it will present, whether immediately or at the next stage of the new process or at the next, those fundamental issues from which no community escapes without the hardest thinking and the most intense pain of mind and conscience. Let no one delude himself. These issues cannot and will not be carried through by a single party in the state: the least grain of political sense or of recollection of human experience will assure any one of this truth. Wherever these ultimate issues are presented they can be solved only by the consent and co-operation of all sections, all races and all creeds of the Canadian Confederation, acting as national negotiators and not as members of a party majority. Any man or party in Canada that in a moment of inflated sense of destiny should imagine and attempt the business of such issues through the exercise of the demagogic arts would deal to the community a most disastrous blow."

Christie believed that the consideration of the report of the Imperial Conference of 1926 by Parliament should be postponed, and that all of the proceedings of the Conference be published. The next step for Canada, as he saw it, was then to provide for "a responsible method of approaching such fundamental principles, a method which ... shall ensure that the reconstruction of the Constitution of Canada shall not be undertaken except by the co-operation of all sections of Canada." Christie went so far as to submit a draft parliamentary resolution to this effect to Hugh Guthrie, then interim leader of the federal Conservative Party. Christie's resolution called for the submission of all the Imperial Conference's proceedings to each of the provincial legislatures for their consideration. Christie wrote that such a referral to the provinces was the only thing that promised "safety for Canada in the long run." See PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 23, Folder 88, pp. 21640, 21645-21647, 21656-21657, 21659-21660, and 21662, L.C. Christie, Notes on the Imperial Conference, 1926, 9 December 1926; *Ibid.*, Volume 12, Folder 37, pp. 10961-10964, L.C. Christie to Hugh Guthrie, 16 February 1927; and, L.C. Christie, Notes on the Imperial Conference of 1926 and the Constitution, n.d., but almost certainly December, 1926 or January, 1927, *op. cit.*, p. 11016.

123.) The incisive and hard-nosed quality of Christie's thinking was noted by many of his associates as his most important personal asset. In the winter of 1924, for example, Frankfurter told Christie that, in his estimation, he had an "absolute honesty of mind."

"I don't know anyone who is more on his guard against fooling himself either by his past, through what might be called res judicata [that is, a thing decided by precedent], or by his hopes or fears of the future -- his emotional expectations. Not that you haven't preferences or desires. Of course you do, strikingly so; but you know you have them, and you have the rare talent for antisepticizing the instrument of your mind...."

Frankfurter's opinion in this regard is one that was shared by most of Christie's colleagues throughout his career -- generally with an equal mixture of admiration and exasperation. The existence of this consensus makes it all the more difficult to understand why historians have heretofore been reluctant to attribute Christie's change in attitude toward imperial relations during the years between 1923 and 1926 to his having made a realistic analysis of Canada's national interests, and have instead sought to assign the motivating force behind the alteration to some personal quirk or mental or emotional shortcoming. See PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 9, Folder 30,, pp. 9494-9495, Felix Frankfurter to L.C. Christie, 24 February 1924.

124.) L.C. Christie, Responsible Government in Canada. The Last Stage, op. cit., pp. 23883 and 23889.

125.) Ibid., pp. 23883-23884.

126.) Ibid., p. 23873.

Chapter VI: Troubled Times: Loring Christie, 1926-1935

During the years between his return from England in 1926 and his rejoining the Department of External Affairs in September, 1935, Christie's life and career were punctuated by abrupt changes in his employment and marital situations. In these years Christie's views of international affairs continued to sour, while his concerns about Canada's ability to survive as a unique political entity -- riven as he believed it was by sectionalism made more acrimonious by the the prolonged economic crisis after 1929 -- deepened apace. This combination of circumstances resulted in Christie, in regard to both his personal affairs, and, even more clearly, in his judgments as to Canada's role in the international political system, becoming markedly less willing to take risks or make commitments that would narrow his own or the country's options at a later date. In so far as domestic Canadian politics were concerned, Christie became increasingly distressed by the chaotic conditions arising out of the Great Depression -- true to his Progressive education he could never abide disorder in any sphere of his life -- and looked for a strong leader to protect national unity in the face of the fractured political and economic situation at home and abroad.

Returning Home: Career Choices and Marital Discord

Early in the spring of 1926, Christie told Sir Robert Borden that he was about ready to begin looking for the means of getting

back to Canada and finding a post that would keep him there permanently. "When I shall get back to Canada is still on the knees of the gods, though I try to keep my eyes open, Christie wrote.

The more I think of it the more I know that it was really curiosity that drove me here. ... I am glad I came, though I shall be extremely sorry if it ever meant not getting back, but that's up to me. It was a gamble on getting back. If one had Methuselah's expectations one might gamble on other parts of the world, but an ordinary fellow has to stop sometime. My curiosity in these parts is beginning to be satisfied and I am beginning to speculate on a return ticket. My position is that for two more years I would not feel free to arbitrarily leave Jimmy Dunn, but our relations are exceedingly cordial and we may work out some arrangement whereby I would be in Canada on some aspects of various enterprises in which the firm is interested. If that appears impracticable I may be lucky enough to find a connection with some house in Montreal or Toronto. I must admit that business does not wholly absorb me and I have sometimes flirted with the idea that I might fit in on the Board of some newspaper enterprise in Canada controlling a group of papers. But these are simply speculations and at the present I can only pursue a policy of "watchful waiting"¹

Christie apparently did approach Dunn on the chance of finding a position with one of his Canadian-based interests but without success. Indeed, Christie seems to have parted company with Dunn in a rather acrimonious manner long before the elapse of the two year period he had mentioned, believing, according to Professor Bothwell, that Dunn owed him about \$60,000.² Christie returned with his family to Canada in early July, 1926, without certainty of employment and apparently in quite dire financial straits. "The fact is," he later told Frankfurter, "I came back from England as near bust as doesn't matter...."³

On his arrival in Canada, Christie was offered a position with the International Power and Paper Company by A.R. Graustein,

the company's president. Borden apparently was responsible for putting Christie in touch with Graustein, and the post was one which was to involve work with the international aspects of the company's affairs.⁴ While Christie was mulling over the offer from International Paper he was approached by Charles A. Magrath -- then chairman of the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario and an individual whom Christie had known and corresponded with during the Great War when he had held several posts, including Commissioner of Fuel and later chairman of the Canadian section of the International Joint Commission, in Borden's government -- who asked him to join "the Commission to assist him (Magrath) in international and intergovernmental matters in which the Commission was concerned."⁵ Christie at last decided, in early February, 1927, to accept Magrath's offer largely, it appears, because he feared that the post with International Paper might result in his being forced to live in the United States rather than Canada.⁶

Before turning to Christie's career with Ontario Hydro something should be said briefly about his personal affairs. When Christie was engaged to Jane Armstrong in 1914 he had told Frankfurter that she "is only twenty-one but amazingly wise and has the sense of relevancies that covers everything and is very lovely. ... she has driven out a certain sense of loneliness that I have always been half conscious of in myself."⁷ During the twelve years between 1914 and 1926 Christie's marriage appears to have been a happy one, although punctuated by Jane's frequent illnesses and, as Professor Granatstein has noted,

Christie's tendency to be a loner and to hold his affairs closely against his chest.⁸ After his return from England, again as Granatstein has noted, Christie apparently began seeing another woman, and announced this fact to his wife in the spring of 1928.⁹ Shortly thereafter they separated -- and despite efforts to promote a reconciliation by both Sir Robert Borden and Christie's longtime friend, journalist John A. Stevenson -- they lived apart until Mrs. Christie's death in November, 1939.¹⁰

Leaving aside the questions of fault and fidelity, the last stages of the turmoil of Christie's marriage shed some light on two important facets of his personality. Throughout his life Christie craved activity, and even a cursory review of his normal routine indicates that it left little time for home life, vacations, or leisure time in general. While working for Borden, for example, he handled matters of external relations, wrote election manifestoes for the Unionist campaign in 1917, researched and drafted Canada's conscription law, and served as the secretary to the Cabinet War Committee and to the Federal-Provincial Conference in 1918. Then, while working for Dunn in England and travelling across Europe on the firm's behalf, Christie found time to be a founder and Member of the Council of the Royal Institute of International Affairs and to participate in the work of the editorial board of the Round Table. In addition to all of this activity, Christie managed to keep up a wide-ranging correspondence with politicians, editors, journalists, and influential civil servants in all three countries of the North Atlantic Triangle. Throughout the whole

of his correspondence and memoranda there is no more than the slightest hint that his personal and family life were a matter of primary importance to him. For a man who could put forth his arguments in powerful and at times passionate prose, he seems to have been singularly reluctant to give the same passion to his personal life, or, if he did, he managed to hide it fully. In a response to an offer from Frankfurter to try and help mend his marriage just after the separation, Christie covered the points just made in a rather matter-of-fact and dispassionate manner.

"You will know," Christie wrote,

I understand your suggestion as being simply a tender of friendly services from one who has never been anything but a real friend and I need say no more than that.

I had understood that the advice given Jane by her medical adviser and family that for her own sake the game better be halted and time taken out -- though I suppose I really know little of what is in their minds.

On my side I suppose I had better stick to the simple facts and above all to the one that in a practical world looms largest as the one I must in any event grip myself to deal with. Since it may turn out that all I can give to those dependent on me are the hard necessities of life like bread and shelter, I must first of all insure my position to do that. Without window dressing I must get in a position to make some money. ... My actual position here [with Ontario Hydro] is vague, impermanent and unstable. I took it on the basis to look around and from the moment of coming here have [been] pondering what and how next. ...

Another practicality, if to try and know oneself is a practical necessity: I have to have activity of some sort. This may come from sheer restlessness. Or it may be the chase of some elusive shadow. At night sleep does somehow banish the burden of existence. For daytimes it seems that the only escape is through some absorbing activity -- if in something one can do well with his powers at the highest pitch so much the better. But it doesn't matter whether it's called an escape or a toy, I have to have it, do not seem to find it domestically, haven't got it in this job, and am going to get on with the chase as soon as I can. ...

Perhaps another may be mentioned: in all this order of

things -- business activity and so on -- I can never get anything from consultation with a woman, Jane or any other. Women are curious baffling creatures. But I suppose they can't be abolished. I am told that the thing to do is to treat them as children, but to me that simply doesn't make sense. I don't even know how to treat a child as a child and I'd probably make a fool of it if I did.¹¹

As Professor Granatstein has noted, Christie had both a shattered world and a shattered marriage to contemplate upon his return from England,¹² but it seems that his attention focused much more closely on the former than on the latter. Throughout his career Christie kept a keen and passionate analytic eye on the political affairs of his country and of the world, without ever betraying in his writings -- personal or professional -- a similar propensity to examine his own life. The paucity of documentary evidence regarding Christie's private affairs makes any analysis in this area largely speculative; that which is available does, however, suggest that his highly legalistic turn of mind permitted him to compartmentalize his affairs in a way that kept his personal life from intruding on his professional affairs.

Toronto Sojourn: Foreign Minister for Ontario Hydro, 1927-1929

With Ontario Hydro Christie filled a post entitled "Special Assistant to the Chairman" which Magrath, who was the organization's chairman, created especially for him. "The Province of Ontario," Magrath later wrote, "has very large and important power interests in international waters -- the St. Lawrence River system, and to a lesser extent in the interprovincial system -- the Ottawa River. In the development

and use of these waters by interests under different governments, questions must arise from time to time, in my opinion, calling for a man specially trained with fine competence and outstanding integrity." In order to protect Ontario's interests in this external sphere, Magrath said that he believed that the Commission needed a man with Christie's "character and experience in international affairs" and therefore brought him into the organization.¹³ Christie's initial assignments from Magrath commenced in the first week of January, 1927, although the Commission did not formally hire him until early February.¹⁴

During his slightly more than two years with the Commission, Christie worked almost exclusively on Hydro's "external" water-power interests, including relations between Queen's Park and Ottawa, between the provinces of Ontario and Quebec, and between the Ontario government and state, federal, and private power interests in the United States. He was also involved in three-way negotiations among Ontario, Ottawa, and Quebec over power and navigational development in the Ottawa River, and five-way discussions among Ontario, Quebec, Ottawa, New York, and Washington about plans for exploiting the St. Lawrence River for both hydro-electric power and transportation.¹⁵ In all of these dealings, Christie brought to Ontario Hydro, as Professor Peter Oliver has noted, not only "a mind finely honed to the niceties of international negotiation and an ability to cut through a morass of detail to isolate and define broad issues,"¹⁶ but, perhaps just as importantly, a wide-ranging knowledge of the federal bureaucracies in both Ottawa and Washington that

permitted him to present Ontario Hydro's case effectively where it could do the most good.¹⁷ The issues that were confronted by Ontario Hydro during these two years were also ones that gave Christie an opportunity to press on responsible political officials his ideas regarding the nature of the Canadian federation and how he thought it should operate.

The first major problem assigned to Christie by Magrath involved the pending renewal of the Georgian Bay Canal Company charter by the federal government. The Company had been awarded its first charter by Ottawa in 1894, and under it the company was given the right to build canals on the Ottawa River and to develop and sell all of the water-power created by its works. Although the company was slow to develop canals along the Ottawa River its charter was renewed periodically by Parliament after 1894, and by the middle 1920s, as Professors Oliver and C.H.A. Armstrong have pointed out, it had become more interested in producing power than in facilitating navigation. The Company, by the time Christie came to work for Hydro, was arguing that it was legally able to develop and sell water-power at any site along the area of the Ottawa River leased to it under the federal charter. The Government of Ontario, on the other hand, maintained that the British North America Act gave to the individual provinces exclusive control over all of the waters lying within their boundaries that were not needed by the Dominion government to pursue its paramount right of providing for the safety of navigation. More troubling for Queen's Park and for Ontario Hydro than the Georgian Bay Canal Company's

claim, however, was the federal government's position in the 1920s -- one that was presented formally by Liberal Minister of Justice Ernest Lapointe in 1925 -- that water-power development was "incidental" to the development of navigation because the BNA Act granted to Ottawa control over "canals, with lands and water power connected therewith." By the early months of 1926, therefore, it appeared to officials at Queen's Park that Ottawa was about to preempt what they believed to be the province's constitutional prerogatives in regard to the public development of hydro-electric power in Ontario.¹⁸

Magrath assigned Christie the task of preparing a brief in support of the constitutional argument being made by Ontario,¹⁹ and it was an argument that fit in nicely with Christie's own attitudes regarding the proper relationship between the federal government and the provinces, and his view that Ottawa had for several decades acted as though the Canadian political system was unitary rather than federal in nature. "During the last quarter century of intense economic and material preoccupation," Christie wrote to interim Conservative Party leader Hugh Guthrie just after he joined Ontario Hydro, "we seem almost to have forgotten that we are a federation -- a lapse which has inevitably produced the 'sectionalism' about which we now grieve."²⁰ Christie thought that a reassertion of the provinces' legitimate constitutional prerogatives in regard to the production of hydro-electric power would go far toward redressing the imbalance he perceived existing between the federal and provincial governments, and, at the same time, serve as a stimulus for the

revitalization of the federal system.

In what Professor Oliver has called the "definitive statement" of Ontario's position in the water-power controversy,²¹ Christie prepared a memorandum for Magrath in February, 1927 in which he described the federal Parliament's upcoming decisions on whether to renew leases for the Georgian Bay Canal Company on the Ottawa River and the National Hydro Electric Company at Carillon Rapids as questions of great constitutional significance. "There will confront Parliament," Christie wrote, "not a simple administrative problem of deciding whom it shall grant a privilege to, but the fundamental question whether it has the privilege to grant. The real issue is a constitutional issue."²² He noted that in the original awarding and subsequent renewals of the charters in question, Ottawa had "purported to confer great water power privileges in the Ottawa river, treating them as being 'incidental' to the federal jurisdiction over navigation."²³ Christie rejected this assumption of authority by the federal government, arguing that the British North America Act created a situation which left "this vast estate [that is, the entire matter of water-power development in provincial waterways] in their [the provinces] keeping at the time of confederation -- the corpus, the royalties, the benefits, the duty and power to encourage and control its exploitation for industrial purposes."²⁴

Since confederation, however, Christie believed that the federal government through its development of Dominion waterways for navigation -- which was the primary use of waterways

envisioned by the drafters of the BNA Act -- had begun to deprive the provinces of some of their legitimate constitutional prerogatives regarding water-power. "It is in the nature of great impersonal administrative organizations," Christie wrote,

to conceive their authority at the widest stretch and to be intolerant of any others that may seem to overlap. In the circumstances of the time federal departments and governments might easily stretch navigation too far and it is probable that the habits they fell into have resulted in considerable invasions of what is properly the provincial field. In administering navigation they have assumed to grant power rights which are not theirs to grant.

The existing position is not in the public interest. To ignore the basic concepts of a federal system is to create 'sectionalism.' To confuse the jurisdictional question is to weaken the ability of all legislatures, governments, and departments to negotiate with powerful special interests; and this in the long run means that we do not get from our waterways the greatest possible contribution to our total national income. It is not unlikely also that the confusion has weakened Canada in her dealings with the United States.²⁵

Because the development of water power had become such a vital concern to the provinces in the years after 1867, Christie wrote, "the Provincial governments challenge anything like usurpation and insist that, while they will fully recognize every proper need of navigation, the true limit of this need must now be marked with all practicable exactitude for the guidance of administrators and must be observed by them and all others concerned."²⁶

Christie maintained that in some ways the present imbalance had resulted from the importance of providing for navigation in the immediate post-Confederation period, and the relative unimportance of water-power development during the same era. In 1927, however, both matters were plainly seen as being of equal

importance and that to continue to address the issue of water power in the prevailing manner would be to move Canada slowly from a federal system of government to a legislative union ruled from Ottawa. If Ottawa continued to treat water-power development as being 'incidental to its control over navigational development the rights of the provinces would be denied and the compact made in 1867 would be thereby repudiated.'²⁷ The water-power question therefore struck at the very heart of Christie's conception of the nature of Confederation. "Canada was created, he wrote,

by the act of the separate Provinces. They established a federal Union, yielding to the Union the rights and functions appropriate to a national endeavour, retaining to themselves what might be appropriate to local endeavour. Navigation went to the national authority in the interests of national trade and commerce. ... To assign its administration to federal authority was only natural. On the other hand it was only natural that the more local aspects, the more particular property rights, the more particular civil rights, the power, domestic and sanitary uses [of waterways], which are physically applicable only to local industry and endeavour, should be retained within the sphere of the Provinces.²⁸

Because he believed that this was the nature of the deal made among the provinces in 1867, it seemed clear to Christie that to describe water-power development as 'incidental' to navigation amounted to a perversion of the confederation compact.

It will not do to invoke here against this natural line between federal and provincial authority the various so-called doctrines of incidental powers, of ancillary legislation, of federal paramountcy and so on. Under these guises you could slowly convert Canada from a federal union into a legislative union under the supreme control of the Parliament at Ottawa. The federal scheme recognized that the federal Parliament, in order effectively to perform the legislative functions assigned to it under the various enumerated heads [of the BNA Act], might under some subjects to some extent have to deal with matters that would otherwise be clearly of a local or private nature for the

provincial legislatures. But this is not "paramountcy"; it is only common sense. It involves a certain derogation from the powers of the provincial legislatures, and for that reason it must be treated with great circumspection. All that the Provinces can be reasonably said to have yielded to the federal Parliament in this incidental or ancillary fashion were powers to deal with local or private matters only in such cases where such dealing is necessarily incidental to the specifically defined and enumerated federal powers and only to the extent of the necessity. If Parliament cannot adequately fulfill an enumerated power in the public interest without dealing with a local matter to some extent, to that extent it may act but no farther.

In the present case there is no such necessity. In order to protect and develop navigation it is not necessary that Parliament should assume jurisdiction over the water powers as such. It is not necessary either technically or financially. Federal authorities can perform their duties as regards navigation with complete adequacy without such a derogation from provincial authority. ...

Sovereign powers as regards navigation are to be exercised by the federal authorities. Sovereign powers as regards the hydraulic or electrical energy or other aspects which make a public stream a natural resource are to be exercised by the provincial authorities without exception, though subject always to their duty to co-ordinate their measures with all proper navigation measures. ...

In short all this perversion of our federal system must be swept away; a clean line must be drawn between the two uses of water so as to recognize unequivocally that water power belongs to the sphere of the Provinces, and can be developed independently of navigation though of course with due regard for the interest of navigation. ... ²⁹

Christie's work in this memorandum provided the legal basis for Ontario's case against the renewal of the leases in question. Prime Minister Mackenzie King's ultimate decision to let the leases lapse apparently had precious little to do with the various legal arguments that were being presented by the contestants. In an effort to avoid driving Ontario Premier Ferguson and Quebec Premier Taschereau into an even firmer alliance against the federal Liberal Party, King ignored the legal arguments -- including the public position that had been

taken by his own Minister of Justice -- and acted on the basis of what was politically expedient. The two premiers consulted on water-power problems throughout the period between 1926 and 1930, and worked together to oppose Ottawa's attempts to promote power development on the Ottawa River where both provinces were actively doing just that, albeit Ontario through a public enterprise and Quebec via private endeavors.³⁰ In order to defuse an alliance that might cost the Liberals the next federal election, King quietly let the leases lapse on 1 May 1927.³¹

Christie addressed three other major issues during his tenure with Ontario Hydro: the plans to develop the St. Lawrence River, the necessity of increasing the diversion of water at Niagara Falls for Ontario's use in producing hydro-electric power, and a study aimed at making the Ontario Hydro-Electric Power Commission a more effective organization and one that was at the same time less vulnerable to hostile partisan political attack. The first two matters -- the St. Lawrence development and the Niagara diversion -- again shed light on Christie's views on Canadian federalism. His efforts toward enhancing the effectiveness and survivability of Ontario Hydro as an expert organization and a tool of public policy provides further evidence of the enduring influence that American Progressivism had on his thought.

By the time Christie came to work for Ontario Hydro the question of developing the St. Lawrence River for power and navigational purposes already had a well-established place in the field of Canadian-American relations; indeed, Christie himself

had written at length on the matter during his years in the Department of External Affairs and the International Joint Commission had conducted a wide-ranging study of the feasibility of the project just after the end of the Great War. Because the province of Ontario was in need of more electricity to fuel its growing manufacturing sector -- overall Canadian demand for electricity grew by ten percent per year through the 1920s, and by 1926 Hydro's engineers were predicting a severe power shortage in Ontario after 1928³² -- Queen's Park looked forward to the development of the St. Lawrence for power purposes with an approving and somewhat hungry eye. Nevertheless, Ontario also tended to be wary of the St. Lawrence development because the river was under federal jurisdiction, and Queen's Park feared that Ottawa would permit the large-scale export of the electricity produced there to markets in the United States in an effort to secure funds with which to finance navigational improvements in the river.³³ Magrath assigned Christie to look at the St. Lawrence matter and draft a position paper for Ontario that would protect its interests -- namely the ability to secure adequate electricity from any potential St. Lawrence development project -- against federal encroachment.

"No Ontario Government could agree to oppose or refrain," Christie contended in the memorandum fulfilling Magrath's directive, "from supporting an international arrangement for a comprehensive navigation and power development of the St. Lawrence Waterway if such an arrangement was found by the Dominion Government to be economically feasible and

advantageous."³⁴ Because the St. Lawrence was an international waterway it was clearly the federal government's constitutional prerogative to decide in what manner and at what pace it was to be developed, and, so long as "no infringement of provincial rights was involved, the Ontario Government as such could not intervene."³⁵ Given the overriding nature of Ottawa's control of St. Lawrence development, Christie believed that Ontario's interests could best be served by bringing pressure to bear on the federal government to insure that the electricity produced along the Canadian shore of the river would not be exported to the United States.³⁶ He believed that this sort of pressure could be most effectively developed and delivered if the governments of Ontario and Quebec -- as they had in regard to the federal water-power leases on the Ottawa River -- cooperated in making their political and legal interests known to the federal government in an effort to prevent the export of electricity. Christie urged Magrath to consider recommending to Premier Ferguson that he adopt the idea of making an appeal for a united front between Ontario and Quebec by offering the following guarantees to his opposite number in Quebec City.

(a.) If the Dominion Government, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, should ever decide to join in the comprehensive development of the St. Lawrence Waterway, the Ontario Government recognizes that all fair and reasonable measures to protect or indemnify Quebec riparian interests against injury from flooding etc., should be taken, and that the interests of the Port of Montreal should be carefully considered in connection with the whole matter.

(b.) Ontario believes that the sister Province of Quebec would not object to the development of power anywhere if it were needed by Ontario and if proper measures were taken to protect Canadian interests. If the International section of the St. Lawrence should ever be developed for power

purposes, the Ontario Government recognizes --

- (1.) That Quebec should have an opportunity in advance to study any plans in that connection;
- (2.) That fair and reasonable measures should be taken to protect or indemnify Quebec riparian interests and water power developments and sites below the international section against damage; and the Ontario Government will abide by such measures of regulation to protect the interests of all concerned as may be arranged by the Dominion Government or through agreement between the two Provinces, or through agreement between the Dominion Government and the two Provinces. ...³⁷

Although it was expedient to cooperate with Quebec in order to try to insure that no power from the St. Lawrence development was exported, Christie believed that the development of the river -- because it was an international water course -- had to fall primarily under the federal government, and the Ontario government's role was more or less one of holding a watching brief. It is interesting to note that although Christie consistently championed the maintenance of the BNA Act's distribution of powers between the federal and provincial governments, he did so without rancor and with a resolute refusal to see either side poach in the field of the constitutional prerogatives belonging to the other. When he found one side encroaching on the other -- as in the case of the power leases on the Ottawa River -- he generally chalked it up to administrative aggrandizement rather than a conspiratorial usurpation. In fact, Christie did not hesitate to give the federal government high marks for protecting both national and provincial interests when he thought such praise was due. In dealing with the United States over the St. Lawrence, for example, Christie wrote, in a

memorandum based on his review of the correspondence that had passed between Ottawa and Washington on the subject as well as several engineering studies that had been done on both sides,³⁸ that Ottawa had established a position from which it could make a deal beneficial to all interested parties in Canada.

Preparations for the St. Lawrence development, he wrote, are

... a sustained record of patient, painstaking, practical investigation into the old problem of improving the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence System, coupled with the provision of opportunity at every stage to all interests who might be affected to present evidence and have their position taken into account. It is certainly safe to say at the least that the solution of no international problem has ever in any region of the world received more careful or responsible preparation.³⁹

Christie believed the St. Lawrence to be a "national" project, one of those issues -- like the naval controversy of 1912-1913 and the Canadian constitutional conference he proposed in 1925-1926 -- which required a united, non-partisan effort directed by the leaders of public opinion.⁴⁰ "What is proposed is a great international public work," Christie wrote,

Its success will depend not upon emotions but upon whether certain practical conditions of international agreement and certain economic imperatives have been or can be met. If a feasible way to meet these practical aspects can be shown, there is a strong chance that determined leaders can succeed in committing public opinion. Of course they have to recognise that there will initially be interjected into the consideration of any great public policy elements arising from ignorance, timidity, malice, the blind prejudice of faction and fixed ideas, self-interested sectional or individual opposition and so on. It is always difficult to estimate the weight of such elements. But the more the practical conditions are kept steadily within view and reasonably provided for point by point, the more these elements of prejudice and particularism will be clearly disclosed for what they are and the less weight that need be ascribed to them. ...

It will be seen at once that it [the proposed plan for St. Lawrence development] is a very great measure of

agreement, having regard for the magnitude and the historic aspects of the project. All this goes far. The fact of such a measure of agreement in an international affair is in itself a reality of great significance not lightly to be disregarded. Responsible men familiar with the whole matter, even though not in complete accord with all the items, will hesitate long before committing themselves to a course that might wreck such a measure of agreement and jeopardize the relations between the two communities whose economic life is so greatly and delicately interlaced. On the American side the whole matter has been kept studiously out of party politics. So has it to a large extent on the Canadian side. Party leaders will be restrained from the responsibility of making this a definite political issue, realising that in the long run a divided country gets the short end of an international negotiation and that a united front is especially imperative for a weaker country. ...⁴¹

Thus Christie's advice to Magrath and Ferguson, and indirectly to O.D. Skelton and Mackenzie King, on the St. Lawrence issue was his usual sound combination of legal and negotiating strategy -- the sorting out of constitutional responsibilities and prerogatives, a recommendation that Ontario and Quebec cooperate to protect their legitimate but limited interests in the project, and urging Ottawa to strive to keep public opinion united on the issue -- and his naivete regarding domestic politics. As had been the case with his desire to convene a Canadian constitutional conference after the conclusion of the Locarno Pact in 1925 and the Imperial Conference of 1926, Christie seemed unable to recognize that the multiplicity of domestic, American, and crossborder interests involved in the St. Lawrence development all but precluded a non-partisan handling of the affair by "determined leaders." Christie's consistently unrealistic perceptions of the workings and ramifications of Canadian domestic politics -- indeed, of domestic politics in the United States and Great Britain as well -- clearly did not blur

his ability to see the realities behind international affairs. This weakness did, however, curtail his ability to offer practical, usable advice to his various political masters on how to effectively marshal public opinion and political support for a contentious foreign policy goal, be it Borden's naval policy, Meighen's gropings toward external autonomy, or the bilateral development of the St. Lawrence seaway. This almost patent inability certainly contributed to his personal sense of impotence and disenchantment in cases, such as those just mentioned, where the foreign policy goals which he believed to be extremely desirable were impossible to attain because of domestic political considerations. Christie never seems to have been able to accept the fact that what J.W. Dafoe called "truces of the Gods" were very seldom obtainable in a vigorous democratic society, even if they were being sought in the name of the most laudable of foreign policy goals.

The second major issue Christie addressed at Ontario Hydro involved the problem of arranging for the province of Ontario to obtain an increased diversion of water from the Niagara River for use in its production of hydro-electricity. Since its inception, the Hydro Commission had found that the Niagara River provided it with the "cheapest and least complicated source of new power;" but by 1926 the Commission's main generating plant at Niagara -- the Queenston Station -- was producing at capacity.⁴² Because the demand for electricity soared in Ontario throughout the 1920s,⁴³ Hydro's commissioners naturally turned to the easiest source of additional power and sought to increase the diversion

of Niagara water into their production facilities.⁴⁴ Such an increased diversion, however, required a renegotiation of several of the provisions of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909.⁴⁵

Although Christie consistently applauded the overall importance of the Boundary Waters Treaty to Canada's national interests and to the maintenance of amicable bilateral relations, he did find fault with it as an instrument of public policy, describing it at one point as "one of the worst pieces of draftsmanship in modern international history."⁴⁶ Christie was of the opinion that the Treaty should have been completely general in nature -- to be filled out later by the judgments of the International Joint Commission it created -- and that "it would have been much better if in 1909 the negotiators had separated Articles 5 and 6 from the rest of the Treaty and dealt with Niagara Falls and the St. Marys and Milk Rivers in a separate convention or protocol -- , or better still, in two separate instruments."⁴⁷ "This is not a mere quibble of what is artistic or inartistic in drafting," Christie continued,

it has some practical significance as to the future method of dealing with Niagara. As a rule it will always be better to deal with separate subjects in separate treaties. If you mix a variety of subjects in the same treaty and it becomes desirable in the future to reopen one of them, you may hesitate for fear that such a course might present a pretext, difficult to answer, for reopening other subjects in the mixture which it is undesirable to reopen. ...⁴⁸

Christie believed that it was unnecessary to look any further than the power question at Niagara to find evidence to validate his thesis. "The 1909 Treaty in Article 5," he wrote,

fixes the Niagara diversions rigidly in stated figures; it leaves no discretion to the executive Governments and the International Joint Commission as at other points on the

boundary. The result is that today, when it is anticipated that more water may safely be diverted, it is necessary to go through the complicated business of negotiating a new agreement even for an experimental temporary additional winter diversion, all to be submitted to the U.S. Senate and to Parliament, and so on.⁴⁹

Christie warned that because the provisions for diversions at Niagara were embedded in the treaty it would take a new round of international negotiations to alter them. He suggested, however, that the matter could be approached in a way that would lay the groundwork for a successful renegotiation. Christie proposed that the Hydro Commission and the other interested parties discuss ways in which the revised treaty could be made to include provisions flexible enough to provide for expansion at Niagara without the need for future formal renegotiations. Claiming that development and further diversions at Niagara probably would proceed "only in stages, successive increments being added from time to time to the present total as the result of experiment," Christie asked whether it would "be necessary to follow precisely the rigid 1909 method; that is, to envisage the negotiation of a succession of treaties?"⁵⁰ He thought that that need not and should not be the case.

A more feasible and yet safe method could easily be worked out -- something between the rigidity of Article 5 and the great flexibility of Article 3 [which governs diversions at other boundary points]. For example, it might be agreed between the two Governments (a) to state a maximum total diversion -- say 100,000 c. [ubic] f. [eet per] s. [econd] above the Falls and 70,000 c.f.s. below, (b) to lay down clearly the rule of preservation of scenic beauty, and (c) to leave it to the discretion of the two Governments to authorise successive additional diversions over the present limits up to the stated maximum, but only upon the recommendation of the International Niagara Control Board and the approval of the International Joint Commission and only at each stage after observation and full report by the Board upon the effects of the preceding diversions, such report to have,

say, six months publicity, and any interested bodies to have the right to demand within that period a hearing by the International Joint Commission before its approval could be given. Such a procedure would provide a protection to all interests at least as good as the existing method. Some flexible method of this sort would obviously have great practical advantages. We believe that it would be desirable to urge the consideration of this question upon the two Federal Governments.⁵¹

The permanent revision of Article 5 of the treaty was not completed while Christie was at Ontario Hydro⁵² -- indeed, the matter of diversions at Niagara for power purposes was not settled finally until February, 1950 when Article 5 was terminated by a separate bilateral treaty governing Niagara diversions⁵³ -- nor did he expect it to be. Although he had worked closely with the Ontario government and with the federal departments of External Affairs and Interior on the subject, Christie believed that even their well-prepared case would barely start the ball rolling toward the acquisition of a larger diversion. The two countries initially agreed to increased experimental winter diversions to be supervised by the International Niagara Control Board, in order to determine if permanent increases were acceptable scientifically and to insure that Niagara's scenic beauty would be left unimpaired. Christie believed that this "first step taken at Niagara since the Treaty of 1909 ... [was] a necessary experimental step to enable the two Governments to determine whether it would be safe to authorise additional permanent all-year diversions which justify the construction of new power stations at Niagara."⁵⁴ The experiment worked well, Christie wrote, but the date of a final agreement "cannot be predicted with any accuracy" because the process

"might become prolonged if Canadian-American relations along the boundary and in other fields become for any reason specially difficult."⁵⁵ The process was underway, however, and Christie believed that a permanent arrangement was therefore inevitable because the "indispensable first step" of technical inquiry was complete and that the scientific basis for future diversions therefore would be provided for "whether the political solution turns out to be easy or prolonged."⁵⁶

Although afterwards Christie professed frequently that he had not been happy during his tenure with Hydro -- indeed, barely a year after he had taken up the post of Special Assistant to the Chairman he told Sir Robert Borden that he saw "nothing ahead in the Commission and Toronto is a stifling community"⁵⁷ -- it seems possible that he was just as or even more effective as Magrath's aide than in any other position he held during his career. At Ontario Hydro, Christie had almost the perfect mix of instruments and opportunities with which to implement the knowledge and opinions he had acquired from his education and earlier professional experiences. The fundamental constitutional issues involved in the development of water power along the Ottawa River challenged his legal education and turn of mind and were reminiscent of the matters he handled while working for the United States Department of Justice prior to the Great War. His part in the delicate negotiations among Hydro, the Ontario Government, Quebec, New York State, Ottawa, and Washington allowed him to practice his finely honed diplomatic skills. Likewise, the direct connection between the arrangements he

helped to foster and the production of hydro-electric power to fuel Ontario's burgeoning industrial sector provided the link between thought and action that he so often claimed to crave. Finally, his position under Magrath must be regarded as something approximating the Progressive's dream come true. From his post at Hydro, Christie was able to meld the knowledge of the specialist and the expert technician with the goals and tactics of the politician in order to improve the functioning, efficiency, and welfare of society. The third major task executed by Christie for Hydro involved what must have been the happy exercise of trying to devise means of enhancing the survivability of a public policy instrument -- that is, Ontario Hydro -- against the attacks of its many political and business opponents.

When Christie came to work for Hydro, the Commission, according to Professor Nelles, "had a preponderant influence over the Ontario Government, particularly in the definition of the Ontario interest in the [Canadian] federation."⁵⁸ The Commission's influence derived from the expertise it had developed "in all fields pertaining to the generation and distribution of hydro-electric power in the province."⁵⁹ "The requirement of expert technical and business knowledge," Nelles has written,

that justified and then established the autonomy of the Hydro-Electric Power Commission also increased the dependence of the political executive upon the integrity and good judgment of the Commission as its operations grew in magnitude and expense. ... [the Commission] possessed a degree of discretionary power unequalled by any other public agency."⁶⁰

Christie apparently had no qualms about the nature or

extensiveness of the Commission's powers, and, indeed, part of his duties at Hydro involved making recommendations as to how the organization could be developed and managed so as to insure that its powers and purview were protected from excessive criticism and or partisan political attempts to limit its authority. He seems to have found neither irony nor paradox in his personal situation which found the Progressive being assigned the task of shielding the status quo from the assault of critics and would-be reformers. In any event, it seems quite probable that for Christie, Ontario Hydro represented the quintessence of the Progressives' ideal of combining the specialist's expertise with the powers of government in order to produce tangible benefits for society as a whole. He, in fact, once described Hydro as representing "Ontario's special social policy in the electrical field...."⁶¹

Christie believed that by 1929 the Commission had proven itself to be a great boon to the people of Ontario and that it would continue to be so in the future so long as it was properly managed by personnel "chosen on grounds of capacity and ability ... [and who are] given full scope for the exercise of their ingenuity and skill,"⁶² and directed with the thought constantly in mind "that the operations of the Commission should be kept out of politics...."⁶³ "All I say," Christie wrote in the draft of a speech for Magrath that reads as if it were a Progressive's testament to the inevitability of the progress and public virtue resulting from the the application of innovative ideas by men armed with moral courage and scientific expertise,

is that this particular public undertaking [Ontario Hydro] has proved successful and advantageous to the people of the Province; and that, so far as my own observations go, I believe that this enterprise can and will be conducted successfully in the future with advantages to the Province more and more apparent as time goes on. Responsible men throughout the Province should now, I believe, take the ground that, having been driven early in the century to undertake this enterprise by the necessity of saving a great natural resource -- their substitute for fuel, of which the Province is so short -- from being unwisely frittered away or lost to a foreign country; having this enterprise with a vast investment and a great momentum actually on their hands; they cannot afford to let it down or do other than support it whole-heartedly with their action and sympathy and advice. They may do so now with a great measure of confidence that the benefits will increase as time goes on and that in the end they will have a magnificent plant and system which has worked its own way out of debt. I urge whole-hearted support for the enterprise in other industries in the Province, but as an associate and convenience to private enterprise. It may well be remembered also that this enterprise, so long as it is strengthened and expanded and perpetuated, will be in itself a complete guarantee so far as the limits of its own field is concerned, against the domination of this field in this Province by foreign capital. No other complete guarantee can even be imagined. The enterprise in its inception was an experiment, but a readiness to experiment seems to be the inevitable condition of any successful civilization in the twentieth century. As the individual experience of the Old World in the Nineteenth Century has landed it in immense difficulties, we in the New World may well consider it far from an academic exercise to speculate upon what alternative ways may be possible. Power is the indispensable factor of all production. The efforts being made through this Commission to bring this new power to farms throughout the countryside and to make it easily available to industry in the smaller towns, so as to reduce the necessity for great urban concentrations of population, will inevitably bear their fruit. The fruit may not be clearly visible now, but if the effort is persisted in who can doubt that the next generation will gather it?⁶⁴

Christie did realize, however, that the Commission did indeed have opponents who sought to have it disbanded in order to give free rein to private enterprise in the production of electricity in Ontario. Part of the problem in this regard, he noted, was that the Commission "still represents a somewhat new

idea on this continent, and new ideas are sometimes looked upon with suspicion. In certain quarters it will always be carefully watched."⁶⁵ The most threatening danger, however, came from those who opposed the presence of any public enterprise in the economy. "Presumably the opposition [to the Commission] arises," Christie surmised, "partly because an undertaking such as this is regarded as inimical to private enterprise. It is perhaps felt that, with this Commission as the 'thin edge of the wedge', there is a danger that the idea of public ownership may spread into other fields to the injury of private initiative."⁶⁶

Christie believed that one of the basic problems jeopardizing the Commission's future was the private sector's contention that Ontario Hydro was making a profit to which the province's business community was entitled. Another problem was that because the Commission existed in a position somewhere between the private business sector and the government, Hydro also had to defend itself from "the various taxing authorities (who) will be anxious to get more revenue from the enterprise."⁶⁷ "Between the two," Christie wrote, "the Commission has to stand."⁶⁸ In view of these negative factors, Christie argued that one of the best ways in which the Commission could insure its long-term viability was to be sure that it was financially sound and above reproach in so far as the manner in which its affairs were managed. Toward this end, he recommended that Magrath and the other Commissioners arrange for a study of Hydro which would be aimed at putting the organization in the best possible financial and managerial position. From such a

base, the Commissioners would be able to conduct Hydro's affairs efficiently, and, at the same time, protect it from partisan political or private sector attacks. "All this suggests," Christie wrote in his memorandum on the subject,

that nothing should be left undone to make sure that the financial structure and method of the system, its relation to public taxation, municipal, provincial and federal, and so on, are properly designed to meet the strain of the future. The present structure is the result of growth from the beginnings with various expedients added from time to time to meet immediate necessities. The various public investigations of the past have not shaken the underlying conceptions of that enterprise. But probably those close to the thing in operation have never had the time or opportunity to attempt a detached, bird's-eye view. The period of creation is now over; its magnitude and the growing momentum of the going concern are now visible. The period of consolidation has now begun. A cool, comprehensive, expert survey of the financial aspects of the enterprise -- to see what it means, where it is going, and how it is fitted to meet the strain of the future -- would be of the greatest value to the Government of the Province as well as the Commission itself.

There is no occasion whatever for a public investigation. What is suggested is a survey made on behalf of the Government and the Commission for their own purposes to assist them in framing in co-operation policies for the future.

Specifically the suggestion is that the British Treasury be asked to lend the Province and the Commission one of its expert officials (or to suggest someone of like calibre outside its own service -- preferably one of former experience in the Department), who would come here without formality and without publicity, who would be given every opportunity to examine the financial aspects of the enterprise in constant consultation with the Government and the Commission, and then give such advice and recommendations as occurred to him, for the consideration of those concerned.

The British Treasury is suggested in this connection for the following reason:

- (a) Its officials are probably the highest experts in the world in the field of public financial methods and taxation. The British Treasury has frequently been asked in the post-war reconstruction period to lend experts to other Governments. Recent cases

are Poland, Austria, and Brazil.

- (b) They are probably more highly imbued than others with the professional attitude of mind. Accustomed by experience to deal with many public ownership enterprises in Great Britain, they would be qualified to examine the implications of this enterprise in the field of financing and taxation.
- (c) The fact that an expert from this source would be outside the conflicts in Canada between public and private ownership, his future completely detached from it, would give a guarantee of detached advice. ...⁶⁹

Christie believed that such an expert inquiry -- conducted by the Progressives' ideal of a non-partisan technical specialist laboring in the public interest -- would provide recommendations and a scheme of action that would allow Hydro to protect itself from those "who are on the lookout for occasions to trip it up."⁷⁰

Despite the several interesting issues with which he had to deal, and the opportunity to build a public organization squarely in the Progressive mould, Christie apparently was never happy or intellectually satisfied at Ontario Hydro. He seems to have been dissatisfied with Magrath's rather uninspired and methodical leadership style⁷¹ and did not feel that there was enough activity to keep him occupied. He also disliked living in Toronto, and he almost certainly was looking for a larger salary. "For some time before I resigned," he later told Sir Robert Borden,

these matters [the Ottawa River leases, the Niagara diversion, etc.] had all been carried as far as they could be carried in the existing circumstances, and I seemed in the way of becoming a fifth wheel, as there was no other place in the organization opening up. I offered the Chairman my resignation in the Spring of 1928 and again in the fall of that year, but I was asked to remain.⁷²

Feeling that his duties with Hydro had" mainly petered out,"⁷³ Christie finally resigned in March, 1929 in order to take up the post of legal officer and assistant secretary with the Montreal-based Beauharnois Light, Heat and Power Company, a position he retained until the spring of 1935.⁷⁴ He was happy to get on with a new installment of his unsettled and rambling career, but his decision apparently left Hydro's Chairman sorely disappointed. "I still consider," Magrath remarked in the mid-1930s, "that Mr. Christie would be invaluable to that organization [Hydro] in connection with international and interprovincial questions, and [I] much regretted his decision to leave the Commission...."⁷⁵

The Need to Impose Order on Chaos: Christie and the Politics of the Great Depression

"At this time the people of Canada," Christie told Prime Minister R.B. Bennett in February, 1934, "I believe are ready for the truth and for almost anything in the way of drastic action and remedy of abuses in business that you may propose but I believe they will resent the kind of fractiousness the Opposition are said to have in mind."⁷⁶ Christie, quite simply, appears to have been exceedingly frightened by the political currents and actions brought on by the rapid decline of the Canadian economy after the fall of 1929. He was especially concerned with what he perceived to be the increasing power of corporate interests and the apparent inability of government at any level to check and regulate business in the interest of society as a whole. Christie came to believe that the only way to impose order on the

chaotic political and economic systems of Depression-era Canada was to provide for "more protection, more socialistic action by the State, executive government growing stronger -- in short, a stronger State."⁷⁷ "[T]he State is, actually and literally, for some purposes," Christie concluded in the summer of 1934, "the only instrument with a conscience which [can] ... cope with the conscienceless economic currents that have set in during the past century. The State must exert its conscience and will or in the end there will be no state."⁷⁸

Again true to his progressive experiences, Christie turned to the interventionist state to put right both the economy and the political system, as well as the nation's moral well-being. He believed that only the Conservative Party was capable of this action -- he felt that "the so-called 'left' and liberal elements" were hopeless because "they are not merely too woolly in their thinking; they are incapable"⁷⁹ -- and that it would be able to perform the task only under the strong and determined leadership of R.B. Bennett.⁸⁰ "Our politics are getting to be chaotic," Christie wrote to Lord Lothian in the summer of 1934. "People say that R. [Richard] B. [Bennett] will be beaten next year and I dare say he will be. But if he is there will be crises to follow and I hope he will be in the next Parliament. There is no one else here who can touch him for strength, courage and mastery in action and he is the only one of the lot who has a conscience."⁸¹

Christie applauded the measures Bennett had introduced into Parliament in the 1933-1934 session, and considered them

essential steps toward reordering the beleaguered Canadian economy and society. In doing so Christie laid bare the essence of his fears regarding the fate of the country if Bennett were not to lead the way to safety at the head of an interventionist federal government. In the spring of 1934, for example, Christie sent Bennett a copy of an article by an American author examining the political and economic ramifications of the Depression, an examination that he argued "touches our own and indeed universal realities."⁸² "But why I thought of sending it at this time," Christie explained in the covering letter,

is that it strikes me as revealing in an apt way the essence of the remarkable body of legislative measures which this Parliament and particularly this Session has brought forth -- namely their real justification as constructive conservative measures.

Taking what he [the American author] notes as one of the main pillars of conservatism -- the encouragement of the widest possible distribution of property, i.e., of independent property holders and producers; and its moral basis -- that it inculcates the widest diffusion of the sense of responsibility and enterprise, always adding to and steadying the moral resources of the community, there can be no doubt of its need at today's crisis. As for the current proposals -- the Marketing Board Bill, the farm mortgage bills, the other bills for primary producers and so on -- they appear clearly as enterprises in statesmanship which, while modern in conception, are yet in the true tradition. They tend to strengthen the individual producer and encourage others to enter the field. The Bank and Companies legislation should tend to fortify him against the excesses of Big Business and Finance Capitalism: while one may reasonably expect the new central bank to develop into an instrument that will deliberately seek, as one of its objectives, to play a like part. ...

If we cannot sustain and augment our independent propertied producer class it seems clear enough that we must prepare in the end for a different social and political system. Nothing but their sense of responsibility and citizenship can stand up to Finance Capitalism's mass momentum, which is neutral or indifferent in the moral or civic sphere. This thing with the capital letters may not always be properly defined, but like the elephant one knows

it when one sees it. The invention of the joint stock company and its growth were inevitable and it is here; but it presents a baffling problem for the State. Given their legal set up -- their internal scheme of responsibility and trusteeship -- their effect of splitting and confusing the individual's sense of responsibility as a citizen -- it almost necessarily follows that modern corporations must become amoral creatures. The shareholders and bondholders, remote from the seat of activity and decision, feel their consciences absolved from any responsibility for corporate acts touching the public welfare -- to say nothing of the fact that many of them are foreigners and so wouldn't care in any case. As for the managers, their first principle is their responsibility for the property of their shareholders, who are conceived to forbid the exercise by the managers of any instinct but the acquisitive; so actually the tremendous and growing power of these aggregations has no link in conscience with the State. The corporate thing itself is [an] amoral, non-citizen; while the natural civic instinct of the individuals, security holders and managers, becomes stultified, split and confused as regards many acts and policies of great moment to the whole community.

So we have a growing group of real imperia in imperio, which do not in any practice form part of any party purporting to explore and support as far as practicable the idea in the common realm, and which by their very nature can never do so. All they can do is to seek the completely amoral alliances that suit their purely economic necessities at any given moment. ...

If we cannot throw up ramparts against these streams of tendency, I do not see myself how in the end we shall possibly avoid more radical political choices than people dream of today in Canada. Elsewhere the choices are labeled communism and fascism. One need not attempt the academic task of painting the picture and giving it a label for Canada. But it is clear that if the stream goes on, Canadians -- who like other men have to feel that their acts and lives have some sort of moral purpose -- will move strongly in their own native fashion.

No one can swear that the conservative ideal and method can hold the fort; but certainly there seems nothing else that holds out any hope of a sane and steady handling of the modern scene. Liberalism as a concept that all civilized men can admit for its own value is one thing; but as the only keystone for the hard, practical job of governing it has failed. As a concept it has a place whether in politics or in science or in literature or in any other aspect of life; but it could not be a program of action nor sustain a political program. It has appealed most strongly to those who are by nature timid and prone to take flight from reality; and for them it had an attraction of almost

religious intensity. Someone has described Lord Robert Cecil as standing with one foot in the Middle Ages and the other in the League of Nations. One might describe the professional "liberal" as standing with both feet in Utopia and his head in the clouds. These were the people who got hold of the Liberal Party and gave it its colour. They conceived such monstrosities as laissez faire. Blinking human realities, they could preach themselves blind -- so blind that in the name of freedom they have in reality sold the pass time and again. ...

As he had in regard to the question of control of Canadian foreign policy, Christie focused on the issue of responsibility when addressing the manner in which the country's economic and political systems should be rehabilitated. In large part, he believed, the post-1929 economic and social disaster had occurred because many elements of society -- particularly governments -- had shunned their moral responsibility and let "amoral" finance capitalism carry the day. The moral agency of government therefore was confronted with the necessity of implementing reforms in order to preserve the existing political system from the radical alternatives that would become increasingly appealing as the excesses of capitalism became more and more apparent. Just as he felt that a Canadian constitutional convention should meet to assume responsibility for external affairs before an unforeseen international event forced a choice that might tear Canada's social fabric, Christie believed that the government should undertake such a preemptive action in order to forestall an attempt to impose one of the totalitarian ideologies loose in the world as a remedy for the economic crisis. In this light, Christie believed that the Conservatives' legislative program was just such an effort to implement reform at the right time and in the right measure to prevent radicalism. Clear evidence that

Bennett's government was on the right track was provided, Christie concluded, by the fact that in response to the Marketing Bill and other measures that gave the federal government a larger role in the management of the economy Mackenzie King and the Liberal Party could only blindly oppose the growth of the state by mouthing "some fantastic abracadabra about King John and Runnymede."⁸⁴ He urged Bennett to press ahead and provide the strong leadership needed to overcome both the Opposition and those in the Tory party who saw government intervention in the economy as the antithesis of the Conservative creed. "No one has ever barked up the wrong tree more absurdly," Christie commented in regard to the latter, "than have certain Conservative elements in Canada who have recently bemoaned some of the current legislation as looking too much to the 'left'."⁸⁵

Bennett's legislative program, and the introduction of his own version of Franklin Roosevelt's "New Deal" in January, 1935,⁸⁶ were not enough to satisfy Christie's desire for strong leadership and extensive federal intervention in the economy. The consequence of his continuing dissatisfaction was a decision that the troubled times called for the formation of a coalition or national-unity government in the spring of 1935. The issue that drove Christie to this conclusion was the repudiation by Premier Mitchell Hepburn's Liberal government in Ontario in early 1935 of contracts that had been concluded among G.H. Ferguson's preceding Tory regime, Ontario Hydro, and several private power companies in the Province of Quebec. One of these repudiated contracts was with Christie's employer, the Beauharnois Company

of Montreal. For Christie this act of repudiation was at once a great moral outrage and an attack on the nation's credit. In the wider sphere, he believed it was proof positive that the normal system of party government could not cope effectively with the problems caused by the Depression. "Before I left Beauharnois," Christie explained to J.W. Dafoe,

I was forced to witness a shocking collapse of morale in the face of a fundamental public issue, both on the part of our party machinery and on that of our financial and business community.... What I saw was this. In the richest and most powerful Province [Ontario] a small group -- headed by a man [Hepburn] with definite streaks of megalomania and delusions of power and grandeur -- having got control of one of the party machines, perpetrated with great audacity a violent assault upon a fundamental part of our polity -- i.e. they denied what is every citizen's right to have access to the courts, they undertook to seize the property of some citizens for the benefit of the Province and they denied the usual processes. They talked about the Province's incapacity to pay but they denied any impartial investigation into that question. These rights go right to the roots of the ancient constitutional common law of the land.⁸⁷

Christie feared that Ontario's actions, if they were not themselves overturned, would undermine the nation's credit⁸⁸ and call into question the value of the parliamentary system itself, perhaps leading to an even greater degree of instability in Canada's domestic politics.⁸⁹ He also believed that Hepburn's action raised the possibility of increased sectional animosities at a time when the country could least afford them. If Ontario, the most powerful province, was allowed to get away with what he perceived as a flagrantly unlawful act, Christie feared that some of the other smaller provinces would come to believe that there was one set of rules for Ontario and another more restrictive set for the others. Faced with Hepburn's maneuver, Christie wrote,

"it is the clear duty of the Federal Government to disallow Ontario's act of repudiation."⁹⁰ If Ottawa did not disallow Ontario's action at an early date, he warned ominously, the consequences for Canada might be dangerous indeed because "[i]t has not been the fashion in the English-speaking world to submit to arbitrary confiscation of rights by government without violent protest."⁹¹ Disallowance by Ottawa therefore was essential both as a means for rectifying Ontario's patently unconstitutional action, and as a method of negating the possibility of citizens protesting Hepburn's unilateral action by violent extra-parliamentary means. Christie was surely overreacting to this situation, but his response does serve to underscore the legalistic lens through which he consistently viewed the world, a factor which in itself explains more than a little of the motivation behind his unceasing arguments in favor of Canadians setting their legal house in order in regard to both domestic and external affairs.

Before Ottawa actually used its constitutional power of disallowance, and indeed in conjunction with it, Christie argued -- as he had in regard to the naval crisis in 1913, and the debate over the future of the imperial relationship in 1926-1927 -- that the federal government ought to take steps to insure that this and other important decisions designed to combat the ravages of the Depression be taken in a non-partisan manner in order to avoid widening the existing divisions among Canada's political factions, economic interests, and geographical regions. By the late spring and early summer of 1935, Christie had reversed his

earlier thinking and concluded that Bennett and his Conservative government were not capable of singlehandedly leading the country out of its economic and political crisis. Before disallowing Ontario's legislation therefore, Christie believed that it was the Tories' duty to enlist the assistance of the other federal political parties.⁹² "But disallowance by the Conservative's alone," Christie wrote, "without the support of the Federal Liberals raises the grave dangers of a fight on issues of provincial rights. Such issues might be successfully raised in such a way to obscure the national credit issue, and if the Conservatives were beaten, Hepburn and company would take the election as an endorsement of his position. In the upshot the national credit emergency would get out of control for an indefinite time."⁹³ The power of disallowance, he wrote, must never be avoided for the sake of party advantage, but "equally you must not attempt to use it for party purposes."

In the end you may be driven to exercise the power alone, but before doing that you must exhaust every effort to secure the widest and strongest base upon which it can be exercised -- that is, to bring in the other national parties to the greatest possible extent. The whole national financial position and the necessity of disallowance must be put to them. They too must be given an opportunity to sink party considerations, to act as national men, to share in the orderly solution of the whole emergency of which this [the Ontario repudiation] is just one manifestation.

That means a coalition -- a National Government -- as comprehensive as possible and as soon as possible before the election [due in 1935].⁹⁴

"To leave such fundamental issues to be solved within the existing party framework," Christie concluded, "is, in the first place, to surrender to party convenience, and that simply means you become the prisoner of the gangsters. To surrender to party

convenience without even a whimper, without even making the elementary demand for a free trial, would be the last folly."⁹⁵

Christie believed that a "National Government" was the only vehicle through which Canada's future as a nation could be safeguarded adequately. "[T]here is no real or sane remedy for the whole mess the Dominion is in," he maintained "save a coalition between the sane, steady men and indeed in all three parties."⁹⁶ Christie argued that those men should join together and go to the country for its sanction on the following basis.

The issue: Are we to solve our national debt and credit emergency by orderly means and at Ottawa, where it belongs, or are we to allow it to be immeasurably compromised by the provinces and municipalities, where it does not belong? Is Canada a nation or an anarchy?

The Platform: Broadly speaking, ask for a free hand -- a "doctor's mandate". Promise treatment as drastic as diagnosis may show to be necessary. A Royal Commission on the whole debt and financial problem -- federal, provincial, municipal -- or some other form of diagnosis -- immediately. Bring in outside expert advisers.... The reform programs now in progress to be examined together on the widest basis that can be agreed upon as desirable and workable.

The Personnel: This factor becomes relatively not so vital once agreement has been reached among steady men to co-operate with each other and with all the orderly elements of the country. That in itself is the keystone of confidence.

On such a basis you can practically guarantee an orderly solution of our problems and the preservation of our credit, and you can guarantee it in the quickest time. You base yourself upon sure ground -- upon realities of federalism -- upon the letter and spirit of our constitution. On any other basis you can guarantee nothing; you are in an incalculable [situation] both as to results and to time; you will not have government at Ottawa, you will have abdication.⁹⁷

In the end, of course, the election of 1935 was conducted along traditional party lines, with the Liberals handily

defeating Bennett's Depression-tainted Tories. Mackenzie King's return to power clearly did not bring to the fore the type of bold and decisive leadership that Christie yearned for, but neither did it usher in the "abdication at Ottawa so far as vital federal functions are concerned" that he feared would be the consequence of an election conducted along regular party lines.⁹⁸ As in the case of the naval emergency in 1913, and his worries over the "crisis" of Canada's international status in 1926, the country survived the crisis of the "national credit" that he saw in 1935 without resorting to a non-partisan, national effort by men of expertise, moral rectitude, and good will to restore to order and orthodoxy the country's political and economic systems. In all of these instances, it seems likely that Christie interpreted solutions arrived at through compromise, or ones achieved by simply delaying and awaiting new and perhaps more propitious circumstances, as nothing more than processes whereby Canadians were systematically giving a series of hostages to fortune. He believed that by following such tacks an event beyond their sight and control ultimately would make them regret their collective procrastination. It seems unlikely that he ever came to suspect that his view of how politics should work ideally -- a view that was littered with such hallmarks of early twentieth-century progressivism as non-partisanship, the use of specialists and experts, the education of public opinion by forceful leaders, and clear and simple policy prescriptions easily intelligible to the man on the street -- was more than a bit unrealistic and unworkable in a democratic system whose

dynamism was the product of efforts by several political parties to take partisan advantage of political and economic conditions as they found them, and whose best attainments -- in the political, economic, or social spheres -- were seldom much more than the best compromise attainable. It remains an inexplicable paradox that a man with Christie's ability to cut to the heart of a complex political or legal matter -- be it of a domestic or international nature -- was so seldom, if ever, able to translate that understanding into a practical course of political action.

A Stone-Hearted Sense of the National Interest: Christie and Canadian Foreign Policy, 1926-1935

Christie's view of the world, and of Canada's place in it, came between 1926 and 1935 to closely reflect his perception of domestic affairs in Canada. In view of the predominantly chaotic state of affairs both at home and abroad, Christie thought it best that Canada build as united a country as possible, while simultaneously setting its collective face and heart against any involvement in international affairs aside from encouraging normal trading relationships, participating in the technical and social operations of the League of Nations, and developing relations with the United States. During these years Christie sharpened and refined his view of the importance of Ottawa's policy toward the United States to the country's future, coming to believe that no aspect of Canada's foreign policy was more vital. At the same time, Christie's eye became even more jaundiced when he turned it toward Canada's other international

relationships, especially those involving the political and diplomatic affairs of Europe. The combination of the effects of the Great Depression and what he considered to be the misguided diplomacy of the post-Paris Peace Conference era were resulting in a world of deepening and increasingly unmanageable disorder. "These are the days," he told Dafoe at New Year's in 1932, "when we are seeing the Versailles Chickens coming home to roost! And what a flock! ..."99

In regard to Ottawa's relations with the United States, Christie's post-1927 concentration on Canada's internal problems seems to have bred in him an increasing preoccupation with maintaining equitable bilateral dealings as a means of promoting internal harmony and thereby insuring the survival of an independent Canadian nation in North America. When writing to Bennett in 1933 about the possibility of obtaining for himself the Canadian chairmanship of the International Joint Commission Christie enclosed a memorandum he had prepared for O.D. Skelton in 1927. In the paper he outlined not only his view of the role and importance of the Commission, but also the necessity for Canada to maintain good overall relations with the United States. "My conception of the Commission was put in the enclosed letter [to Skelton] which I wrote in 1927 ...," Christie told the Prime Minister, "... [and] it now strikes me as a bit utopian in spots, yet I believe that its main thesis of the special value of this institution to Canada is even stronger today. Our relations with the United States will become rather more than less critical."100 Christie had written in 1927 that he believed that

relations with the United States had to be Canada's first priority in developing external policy. "Given the simplest facts of our geographical position as a North American Power in a politically chaotic world," Christie argued,

our dominant concern has always been and must be to insure the orderly adjustment of our relations with the U.S. This of course is as axiomatic as, for example, that Great Britain's dominant concern is with her relations with France and Germany, or that Germany can never put Russia in a secondary place in her thinking. The truth in our case, because of the greater disparity in power, is even more striking. Canada's relations with the rest of the world are of course important, and naturally public opinion is naturally sensitive about relations with other English speaking countries, but in a vital sense all this is secondary; for, if we fail vis a vis the U.S. other concerns become utterly irrelevant, since in any practical sense the rest of the world can only be a slight factor, if any at all, in our relations with the U.S. I cannot recall an instance where Canada ever attempted to bring her relations with a non-North American Power into the picture as a factor or make-weight in her relations with the U.S. Nor have I myself ever been able to imagine how we could go about the business of causing or permitting the intervention of non-North American affairs into the affairs of this continent without ultimate disaster to all concerned. ... It comes to this: that Canada has to play the hand herself on this continent and will have her own responsibility for failure should failure come.¹⁰¹

Because of the disparity of power between the two countries, Christie argued that in regard to both the Commission and the overall bilateral relationship "it will always be up to Canada to shoulder the greater part of the burden" of keeping its concerns before American eyes and to assert itself whenever such action was necessary to protect the national interest.¹⁰² He believed that the threat to Canada posed by the United States often emanated far more from American ignorance of Canada than from deliberate ill-intent. Christie was entirely comfortable in the political context of North America and believed that the

diplomatic environment was such that Canada would almost always get a square deal in negotiating with the United States if its case was made accurately and forcefully. In the realm of bilateral relations, Christie demonstrated nothing approaching the aversion he had toward Canada's trying its hand in the political affairs of the League of Nations.¹⁰³ In this attitude, Christie was markedly different from a later generation of Canadian politicians and diplomats who sought to bring make-weights into the bilateral relationship through Canada's involvement in a variety of international organizations in which the United States also participated.

Christie believed that Ottawa could and should deal directly with Washington without any outside -- that is, British -- help and that it would invariably be equitably treated by the Americans if its case was sound and well prepared.¹⁰⁴ On balance, Christie believed that the importance of Canada's dealings with the United States far outweighed those it conducted with any other nation -- including those with Britain and the other Dominions -- and that they had to be attended to diligently and effectively through such agencies as the International Joint Commission if Canada was to survive as a nation. "Other excursions that Canada has made at Geneva and elsewhere on the globe," Christie wrote,

possibly have a greater glamour in the public eye and a greater "news value". They will get more publicity, but none of them is so vital as this thing, and none of them deserves such real care. In actual fact none of them ever got so much careful study and preparation in Canada as this system did at the time of its inception. "Foreign affairs" is a resounding phrase; to I do not know how many of the Canadian people it seems to mean most often some distant

mystery in Europe or Asia about which they can do nothing but wring their hands, hardly ever the plain facts staring them in the face at their front door about which they are equipped to do a great deal. If they keep this up long enough they will wind up by being not North Americans but simply Americans.¹⁰⁵

Until the closing years of the 1926-1935 period Christie wrote very little on non-North American international affairs or of Canada's relationship with Britain and the Empire. Indeed, his professional activities appear to have preoccupied him nearly full time, and it was not until 1934-1935 -- when he was a Member of Council and Vice-President of the Montreal branch of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs¹⁰⁶ -- that he again turned his pen to political affairs outside North America. Prior to that point, and before the ominous clouds of conflict began to shroud the European horizon, Christie limited himself to some 'sour and at times anglophobic comments on Canada's unwillingness to define her place in the world and assume full responsibility for maintaining and protecting it. When fulminating against Mackenzie King's decision to break Canada's relations with Russia in 1927,¹⁰⁷ for example, Christie told Sir Robert Borden that the entire affair was something akin to a comic opera, did nothing to clarify Canada's international status, and left the country in the lurch in so far as the questions of war and peace were concerned. "You may have heard that lately Canada has broken off relations with Russia," he wrote.

The Government's explanation was an interesting and curious document and someday when we get in a war with Russia the fellow in the front line who seeks to ask what it is all about will be entitled to a good deal of sympathy. It appears we needn't have busted relations because they would have been busted automatically by Great Britain's denunciation of the Trade Treaty. It was also admitted that

the Soviet agent had done nothing wrong in Canada at all. ... It all seems to come to this: we didn't have to do any relation busting and it's doubtful if we could anyhow; nevertheless let us bust to prove that we are solid with the Empire and let's bust the day before the British House of Commons acts to prove that Canada is independent and did it all by her lone. Several varieties of people must be able to get some comfort out of this episode. But it is an act that means that the country is expected to put itself into an attitude of hostility toward the other fellow, and for this grave act all the country has is not a reasoned explanation with full information of Russia's place in the world and Canada's, but this monstrous medley of jingoism and opportunism. I gather that there has been at least some information handed out in London to justify the British Government's act though it looks pretty thin and the Arcos raid sounded more in the tradition of a Chicago gang than in that of a Government concerned for the stability of Europe. Of course we are a long way off here and one gets little more than impressions, but one gets very distinctly the impression that the British Government is rattled with a bad case of nerves. If this rupture led to war, thus automatically putting Canada at war, I hate to think of what would happen here. Of course no one is looking for war and no one expects it, but that is the sort of perspective from which such ruptures ought to be contemplated and calculated and if they are so far removed in feeling from war as all that, the case for a rupture becomes a trifle thin and the case for our thinking out in Canada some way to avoid being tied up with all the obscure and doubtful ventures of rattled diplomatists in Downing Street becomes a bit stronger.¹⁰⁸

Christie's reaction to Canada's break with Russia typified his post-1926 attitude toward imperial relations, and what he considered as the country's foolish but nonetheless resolute refusal to address that question. "I still ponder -- though mainly solo --," he wrote to Lothian in 1934, "that great subject of our '25 and '26 discussions and still feel our [Canada's] inadequacy on the essential point of responsibility and feel that Canada is in for some great humiliation some day"¹⁰⁹

The humiliation Christie had in mind was the automatic involvement of Canada in another European war primarily because Great Britain had become involved, and because Canadian

politicians had not acted since 1918, at least in his own mind, to amend the constitutional relationship between Canada and Britain so as to give Ottawa sole control over the issue of declaring war for Canada. As has been seen, Christie rejected the idea that the Balfour Report of the Imperial Conference of 1926 had settled the relationship and there is scant mention of the Statute of Westminster in any of his writings. By 1935 Christie's personal world -- because of marital problems and changes in employment -- had narrowed drastically and his view of international affairs had done likewise. The world for him, in fact, was now a hostile and threatening place which had to be dealt with, but only on an arm's length basis. He never was an isolationist in the sense that he believed in or advocated some course of action whereby Canada could withdraw from world affairs and isolate itself in a water-tight North American compartment. He did, however, focus his suggestions primarily on means whereby Canada could reduce what he deemed unnecessary contacts with the outside world, as well as the commitments that grew naturally from such contacts. While not an isolationist, he put tremendous emphasis on the need for creating for Canada a foreign policy that would secure a permanent place for a Canada -- which he conceived of as being wracked by internal disunity and external uncertainty -- on the North American continent.

At work again in shaping his estimates of the international environment in this period were the same dominant geographical considerations that had so pervaded his thinking in the period between 1921 and 1926. "I am going to paraphrase something I

wrote in the 'Round Table' just over ten years ago," Christie told a session of the annual conference of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs at Kingston, Ontario in May, 1935, "and this geographical analysis in turn was largely based on the work of that stimulating geographer, Sir Halford Mackinder."

From all this line of approach the broad general question suggests itself. In what sense and in what degree can 10,000,000 Canadians enter successfully into a pooling of decision upon the problem of security with 300,000,000 Europeans 3,000 miles away? Must not our [Canada's] attitude toward the European process be radically different from that of a European state? It seems to me that Europe began to recognize the necessities of this regional distinction when at Locarno in 1925 the interpretation of Article XVI was adopted by which each member of the League is to measure its obligations only "to an extent compatible with its military situation and takes its geographical position into account". Could not our [Canada's] intervention, if misconceived, easily be harmful instead of helpful? Will not "good Europeans", when they reflect upon the years 1914-1918 and the devastating possibilities of further invasions of Europe, conclude that the wisdom of courting too intimate an association with the non-European world is to say the least doubtful.

If Europe is to go on to a new European order I feel the answer is clearly in the affirmative. Is it not equally affirmative even if you assume the other, the anarchic future? So long as you have your self-contained sovereign states, you are necessarily in the field, not of legislation, but of power politics, diplomacy and negotiation -- and the ancient rule of philosophy will hold good, that, if there is to be war, you must strive to the utmost to limit its area and duration. That is all you can do.¹¹⁰

Holding basically this same position in 1926 -- that is, that the world could be divided in a number of distinct and compact geographical units which, while not separated from each other by water-tight compartments, were located at distances from each other that afforded each a measure of security from the other -- Christie then believed that some close cooperation between regions and nations, perhaps in the areas of trade or

programs of social betterment, was still desirable and indeed beneficial. By 1935, however, Christie had come to take a markedly darker view about the nature of the sovereign nation-state, and this line of analysis caused him to look on relations between nations as still unavoidable but nonetheless fraught with dangers. His darkening view of the state -- and the unavoidable rights and characteristics he vested it with -- made the possibility of universal international cooperation appear to be little more than a pipedream, and this view, in turn, embittered his attitude toward the League of Nations to an unprecedented extent. Christie's argument was that it was purely and simply impossible to reconcile the political requirements and responsibilities of sovereign states with the concept of collective security as it was expressed in the Covenant of the League of Nations. "The material you must work with in trying to rear the political structure you have in mind is the sovereign state," he told the CIIA audience at Kingston,

and today you have the world parcelled out among such creatures. The question is can you really expect sovereign states to behave according to the scheme and intent of this notion of "Collective Security"? I shall not attempt to go into the refinements of the political philosopher. It is enough I think, for the present purpose to say that the sovereign state is a supreme being -- subject to no other human power -- accountable to no one else for its acts. From its very nature can you expect it to act altruistically for some common or regional world good? Must it not act only to the extent that its own interests are immediately and directly at stake? Consider how its human object is conceived and stated. In the American Constitution it runs, "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"; but this is only for the American people. In Canada it is "peace, order, and good government"; but it is good government only for Canada not for the world. Every sovereign state is conceived as having this same kind of exclusive object, whether written or unwritten, and as demanding the corresponding kind of exclusive obedience from its

citizens. Its ultimate instrument is power. Necessarily then you have in every agreement between states a reservation, either express or implied, that the honour, the safety and the integrity of this supreme creature must at all costs be preserved.¹¹¹

This being the case, Christie believed that each nation would and should look out for its own interests first, and foremost, and that this maxim was unalterably in conflict with any conception of sovereign nations' adhering to a binding scheme of collective security. Denouncing the advocates of collective security, Christie asked his audience if "you can really change the nature of war by merely calling it an enforcement? Do you by a phrase or an idea change the nature of the sovereign state?"¹¹² Christie answered both of these questions in the negative and closed his presentation with the assertion that Canada should take no step in the world and make no commitment without first clearly defining its own self-interest. In 1935 that self-interest, according to Christie, dictated a foreign policy orientation for Canada which more or less focused exclusively on measures aimed at insuring the preservation of a distinct Canadian polity in North America. "Canada cannot usefully or helpfully," Christie told his audience at the CIIA Conference,

conceive herself as a participant in the European security system. What remains, I suggest, is this: that, so far as Geneva is concerned, Canada can continue to regard it as a free, flexible conference method of diplomacy for world problems in which she is entitled to participate -- at least she can take this line until such time as she might be forced out of the League; that she cannot consider special commitments until it becomes universal, including particularly the United States; and, as already said, that she cannot enter the special European regional system. Since the [League's] business today and for a long time to come is bound to be mainly European, all this means that

Canada's true role is mainly that of an observer. ...

There seem to be some who think this is not a sufficiently enterprising attitude. In a world of sovereign monsters I think it better to remember Lord Salisbury's maxim: "Never let your diplomacy outrun your resources." We are 10,000,000 people whose task it is to preserve order and security throughout half a great island continent. We have resources, but can we assign any great or decisive weight to them at the international round table? ...

Put in its broadest sense, what I have to suggest comes to this. We cannot ignore the imperatives of geography. We cannot ignore the nature of the sovereign state. We have no business to assume that the word of a sovereign state, written or unwritten, can be taken as going a single inch beyond the limit set for it by a cool calculation of that state's immediate and direct interest. Alliances, mutual assistance or collective pacts -- whatever you call them -- between such states, though they may give the illusion of security, will become treacherous if the underlying truths are ignored. ... Non-Europeans must look with sympathy upon every effort of Europe to solve her own political problem, but, if they are political animals at all, they must equally conclude that their surest political contribution to the problem is a resolute refusal to inject their power and force, or the promise of it, into the European complex....¹¹³

Christie believed that such an attitude was necessary for Canada because the advocates of collective security had surrendered the option of political innovation as a means of solving Europe's problems, and had instead turned over control of Europe's future to the military strategists. This, in turn, made a new European war all but inevitable unless the politicians reclaimed the field and began to devise political methods of reconciling Europe's conflicts, or finding a means with which to accommodate society to new political and social forces. Any agreement to a collective security arrangement, in fact, amounted for Christie to "the anticipation of armed forces in action...."¹¹⁴ "[F]rom the moment of its inception," Christie wrote, "it [a collective security agreement] sets in motion in

the minds of those against whom it either tends or may be conceived to tend, precisely those forces which reach full strength at the sight of a threatening army actually on the march. It is on this basis that its ultimate consequences must be reckoned, however much its appearance of immediate value may be idealised."¹¹⁵ Christie believed that the advocates of collective security at the CIIA meeting and elsewhere failed to recognize fundamental and unalterable political realities and were

people who seem to believe that you can ignore equally the nature of the sovereign state and the geographical structure of the world -- who easily accept the whole business of automatic "sanctions", "aggressor", "enforcement of law", and the analogy that would liken a first class war to a policeman's baton....

As I listened and tried to envisage the real thing behind the facade of words, I had -- never before so vividly -- this kind of impression: that what they were really doing was sitting around the table as a General Staff planning the next war.¹¹⁶

To accept the position of the "Collective Security-ite," Christie wrote, would be pure defeatism."¹¹⁷

Man is a fighting animal and he is a political animal. The British races have been among the great martial races of mankind; they have also been among the great political discoverers. In times of peace the civilian -- the statesman -- holds the field: it is for him to invent and dare, and his General Staff has no final word in that order of creation; but only the right to assist in the discovery of the practicable. When you actually get into war political innovation ceases and the relationship is different. The current, orthodox notion of "Collective Security" stresses almost wholly the martial, the General Staff side, burkes the task of political invention. Europe -- the world -- is still at peace; the die is not yet finally cast; conversations are still going on; opportunity remains. If Europe and the world cannot go on to new political inventions they can only go on to anarchy and unimaginable prospects. A refusal by man -- for whatever reason -- to throw himself on his inner resources as a political animal means a degradation of the human spirit.

The current phrases -- "security", "peace", and so on -- negative phrases, so often fortified as they are by appeals to fear and hate -- are not the right ones to give point to human aspiration, which seeks creation and only wants order as its means. ...¹¹⁸

All of the discussions which centered on collective security at the CIIA's Kingston Conference led Christie to the conclusion that unless the Canadian government chose to do something, to undertake a measure of political innovation and act on its own to resolve the ambiguity of its standing as an international entity, disaster -- probably in the form of automatic entry into another European war as in 1914 -- was certain. Christie seems to have been almost resigned to such a fate at Kingston, cognizant of the dangerous path ahead but in no way certain that anything could or would be done to change the nation's course. "I asked the Conference to consider the position of people (like myself)," Christie explained to Lothian with a certain sense of hopelessness,

who (a) believe that the orthodox notion of "Collective Security" is a wholly unworkable notion and indeed disastrous and (b) recognise that when Britain is at war Canada is at war and that, having gone on with the Commonwealth, we cannot at the moment of danger simply say "Thank you very much, I have enjoyed your company, but now I have another engagement." This may really be a widespread view. I am inclined to think it is. From the plain, everyday words I have heard in many quarters in recent years, it may be that I have done no more than express at great length and in a technical sense what is the instinctive or intuitive position of a good many Canadians -- something in their bones. If the war comes they will be in it, but not enthusiastically, and will have no overwhelming conviction against those who may take the completely neutral line.¹¹⁹

Christie would react to this troubling situation in the years after 1935 and seek to convince his superiors, colleagues, and friends that it was absurd to allow the continuing existence

of a position wherein Canada would enter automatically a war in which Great Britain became involved. Indeed, his writings would grow increasingly shrill and desperate-sounding as war inched inexorably closer, and yet he never truly became an isolationist. Christie's target forever and always was what he viewed as Canada's ill-defined legal position in the world, a situation which prevented the country's political leaders from making decisions regarding peace and war unencumbered with the traditional obligations of constitutionality and sentiment. Until the constitutional matter was resolved fully, Christie believed that by far the safest course was to make no prior commitments and leave all options at least theoretically open. For Christie it was ultimately senseless to put the nation in harm's way by default, and automatic entry into a new war on the model of 1914 amounted to just such an abrogation of responsibility, and was a rejection of nationhood. Christie sought to protect Canada not from inherently evil foreigners or from the machinations of British and domestic imperialists, but rather from what he believed to be its own immaturity and indecision.

Coming Full Circle: Rejoining the Department of External Affairs

Christie ended his career in the private business community on 24 April 1935 when he resigned from the Beauharnois Company.¹²⁰ He apparently was moved to resignation as a consequence of his disgust with Premier Hepburn's actions regarding Ontario Hydro's contracts with several private power

firms in Quebec -- including Beauharnois -- and Ottawa's failure to disallow the actions. He was also unsettled by the mention of his name during debates at Queen's Park on the subject of the repudiated power contracts, and infected with a festering distaste for the business world generally. "My resignation from Beauharnois is too large a story for here," he wrote to Frankfurter rather breezily in the late spring of 1935.

The Company ran into a gangster-meglomaniac -- one "Mitch" Hepburn, Premier of Ontario -- who pulled a gun and so far has had on the run not only the fresh-water claims of his own Province, but all the party machines and also the business and financial community who conceived the bright idea that it would be fine statesmanship to throw the power security-holders to the wolves. Our party machines also went into a shocking collapse of morale. The swimming began to look so thick and muddy that all I could see was to get out and try to jump in somewhere else. ... Anyhow I have a sense of relief and have no regrets about Beauharnois. Some Dame! Everything happened to her that could happen to a business show -- "and I learned about business from her!" She would have made a good scenario and I may take her to Hollywood. She covers most of the standard motifs -- money, greed, vanity, political and financial corruption, big engineering stunt races against time, etc. etc. -- except, and this is serious, it is hard to find sex and snobbery; but Hollywood could fix that without trouble."¹²¹

Christie claimed to "have a sense of relief and keen anticipation for what may be ahead"¹²² after leaving Beauharnois, although he admitted to Lothian that "I do not know what I am going to do."¹²³ "My inclination is to take a good time in considering what lays ahead of me, to talk to various people and find out what's up, but to take no deliberate engagement in a hurry," he told Sir Robert Borden. "I should like to have a talk with Mr. Bennett before I tie up to anything."¹²⁴

Christie had been in touch with Bennett on and off between 1930 and 1935, and he had on at least one occasion expressed his

interest in returning to government service -- as the chairman of the Canadian section of the International Joint Commission in 1933. Moreover, O.D. Skelton had approached Christie about returning to the Department of External Affairs under Mackenzie King's administration in the late 1920s. It would appear that Christie's most important contact, and booster, in the government was not Prime Minister Bennett but rather the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. As Professor Hillmer has pointed out, Bennett was initially determined to get rid of Skelton because of his long association with King and Liberalism, but quickly discovered that his services were unbiased and indispensable.¹²⁵ Skelton well knew of Christie's abilities, after all he knew that Christie had been Borden's key assistant in the gains made in external autonomy during and after the Great War, and had been the recipient of a good number of Christie's letters and memoranda between 1926 and 1935. Furthermore, it is hard to imagine that anyone shared more fully than Christie Skelton's fear that Canadians would be "stampeded" into war by sentiment for Britain and maneuvers by Canada's domestic imperialists.¹²⁶

In any event, Bennett -- almost certainly with Skelton's opinion as an important impetus -- decided to invite Christie to return to government service. Professor Eayrs has written that because a general election was in the offing, Bennett conferred with Liberal party leader Mackenzie King "to ensure that his [Christie's] position would not be jeopardized by a Liberal Administration."¹²⁷ Likewise, in a long essay on Christie's life

and career which appeared the day after his death in April, 1941, J.W. Dafoe wrote in the Winnipeg Free Press that "[w]hen in 1935 Mr. Christie was asked by Mr. Bennett to re-enter the [civil] service, he took the position with the knowledge that Mr. King, whose return to power could be foreseen, was desirous that the country should again have the benefit of his abilities."¹²⁸ Although documentary evidence to support the claims of Eayrs and Dafoe is unavailable, it is doubtless an accurate description of the preliminaries to Christie's return to the Department of External Affairs. On 20 August 1935, Bennett passed an Order in Council appointing Christie "to the staff of the Canadian Legation at Tokyo as Counsellor at a salary of \$6,000 per annum, ... to be effective from the 1st September, 1935."¹²⁹ For his own part Christie seems to have been a bit surprised by the turn of events that brought him back to Ottawa, but at the same time he appears to have been well pleased and looking forward to the future. "I can scarcely believe that I was away from here for 12 years," he told J.W. Dafoe shortly after his appointment, "and I feel slightly surprised that I am back. I thought I had done with governments and all that -- but I suspect I got a still stronger dose of disillusionment with Business and all that -- so perhaps there has been sort of a cancelling out."¹³⁰

Chapter VI: Notes

1.) PAC, MG 26H, R.L. Borden Papers, Volume 264, Folder 59, pp. 148307-148307A, L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 15 March 1926. Although Christie's career with Dunn might not have been as fascinating as he had anticipated, he was nonetheless involved in several projects that smacked of more romance and adventure than those that had occupied his time in the Department of External Affairs. While working for Dunn, for example, Christie served as a member of the "Bondholders' Committee of [the] Mexico North Western Railway Company." On another occasion he was active in an even more exotic undertaking. "Loring Christie, a Canadian who was legal adviser to the Canadian Department of External Affairs and who is now in business in London, dined with me recently," R.G. Casey, then Australian Prime Minister S.M. Bruce's personal representative in London, wrote in 1926,

"and told me that the firm he is with (Dunn, Fisher and Co.) are investigating the proposal to purchase as a whole the ex-German plantations in the Territory of New Guinea. I understand that the head of the firm is Sir James Dunn, a Canadian. They are a house which finances and manages industrial undertakings in all parts of the world."

For Christie's activities with Dunn see Harvard University, Baker Library, Winthrop Aldrich Papers, L.C. Christie to Winthrop Aldrich, 18 December 1938 and attached vitae, and R.G. Casey to S.M. Bruce, 19 May 1925, in W.J. Hudson and Jane North. My Dear P.M. R.G. Casey's Letters to S.M. Bruce, 1924-1929. Canberra: Australian Government Printing Service, 1980, p. 40.

2.) R. Bothwell, "Bureaucratic Imperialism," op. cit., p. 349.

3.) Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 11 May 1928.

4.) See PAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Volume 264, Folder 59, pp. 148385-148385A, L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 1 July 1926, and Ibid., MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 29, L.C. Christie, Memorandum Re Beauharnois and Maclaren Power Contracts, 17 June 1935.

5.) Ibid.

6.) Ibid. On 9 February 1927, F.A. Gaby, Ontario Hydro's Chief Engineer, informed Magrath "that the services of Mr. L.C. Christie can be obtained by the Commission," and recommended that because he was "an expert on international affairs" the Commission should not hesitate to do so. Magrath received the permission of Hydro's other commissioners on the same day to hire Christie at a salary of \$750 per month. Christie apparently had been doing some work for Magrath since early January as his appointment was back-dated to 5 January 1927. See Toronto,

Ontario Hydro Archives, Bin 20-3-068, Folder 118: Loring C. Christie, 1927-1929, F.A. Gaby to C.A. Magrath, 9 February 1927, and Ibid., Extract from Commission Minutes, 9 February 1927.

7.) Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 10 September 1914.

8.) J.L. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men, op. cit., pp. 68-69.

9.) Ibid., p. 69.

10.) For the efforts of Borden and Stevenson to reconcile the Christies see PAC, MG 30 D45, J.W. Dafoe Papers, Volume 4, Folder 1928: July-December, John A. Stevenson to J.W. Dafoe, 1 November 1928, and J.W. Dafoe to John A. Stevenson, 15 November 1928.

11.) L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 11 May 1928, op. cit. Christie's peculiar reference to his separation as a "game that better be halted and time taken out" underlines his uneasy relationship with women. He appears to have consistently thought of the male-female relationship as something of a competition and perhaps this attitude offers some explanation as to why he was unable to get much out of "consultation" with women. His somewhat jaundiced view of women was summarized in a letter to Frankfurter on the topic of female suffrage. "Women's suffrage is a valid device," Christie wrote,

"not for its direct political effect, but as a sort of an anchor for the intellectual and moral emancipation which alone matters. For women can only get at the 'affairs' of the universe effectively through men, as muscle is the final arbiter -- not through their fathers who ignore them in this connection; not their husbands or lovers for they are caught too late and are valued anyhow only as a means; but their sons whom they alone value and whom they can mould as they will without fear of rivalry. (Daughters they tolerate or value if at all only for the sake of grandsons; and here it is man's only real chance to redress the balance, for he can get at the daughter's mind and make up and so get at the grandson!) Hence emancipate women not as voters but as mothers. ...

Foolish women might easily dish things by playing direct political action too hard -- we muscular brutes, as Coke showed, will only stand so much! Here again your women seem to have a deeper instinct.

Husbands are useful as an economic means! Women would be fools to trifle with marriage institutions too far unless they can see their way very clearly to some stable alternative means. They must learn to bargain if they are going to get into that game."

See Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C.

Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 18 January 1925.

12.) J.L. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men, op. cit., p. 69.

13.) PAC, MG 30 E82, C.A. Magrath Papers, Volume 5, Folder 17, C.A. Magrath to R.L. Borden, 5 July 1935. At a later date Magrath indicated that although he had brought Christie to the Commission to deal with the specific problems involving the Ottawa and St. Lawrence Rivers, he had had every intention of finding a permanent place for him in the organization. "In bringing Mr. Christie to 'Hydro' there was nothing accidental about it," Magrath wrote. "I knew of his fine capacity and experience in international work. I did hope to work him into some permanent position in 'Hydro', as soon as demands on us in that strenuous period lessened. See Ibid., C.A. Magrath, The Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario and the Quebec Power Contracts, 26 September 1939.

14.) From the start Christie obviously regarded his job with Ontario Hydro as a very temporary affair. As early as June, 1927 -- only five months after taking up his duties -- Christie told Sir Robert Borden that he was uncertain of his future with Hydro. "The Commission has a number of interesting problems which I am beginning to get familiar with," Christie wrote. "I have been fairly satisfied with one or two jobs I have managed to do, but I am not sure that I shall not turn out to be a fifth wheel or that there is full time work. However it is too soon to say and of course the association with Mr. Magrath is most pleasant and congenial. ..."

It seems that one of the options that arose for Christie during his stay with Ontario Hydro occurred just a year after he had arrived in Toronto and involved an offer from Mackenzie King to rejoin the Department of External Affairs. "I hope you have had time to think over the suggestion that I made to you the other day," O.D. Skelton wrote to Christie in the spring of 1928,

"and that there is a strong likelihood of your being able to accept. The Prime Minister spoke of it again to-day, and suggested that I write you again. ..."

If an appointment were made, it would be necessary, in order to avoid Civil Service red tape and to enable us to go to six thousand, that provision should be made in the supplementary estimates, which will be down pretty shortly. ..."

Because he was no longer very much taken by the business world, Christie probably was tempted to rejoin the Department of External Affairs. In view of his expressed desire to make some money it seems likely that he turned down Skelton's offer because it would have paid only \$6,000 per year -- he had been earning \$5,000 when he resigned in 1923 -- at a time when he was earning \$9,000 per year with Ontario Hydro. See Ibid., MG 26 H, R.L. Borden Papers, Volume 264, Folder 59, p.148400A, L.C. Christie to

R.L. Borden, 17 June 1927, and Ibid., MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 29, File: Beauharnois, O.D. Skelton to L.C. Christie, 26 April 1928.

15.) In a memorandum written in the summer of 1935, Christie listed the activities he undertook while working for Ontario Hydro in the following manner.

"I acted [between January, 1927 and April, 1929] as a Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Hydro within the scope agreed upon, dealing with such matters as these: putting forward the Hydro's case against the Georgian Bay Canal Bill in Ottawa, its case for the provincial ownership of water powers and for the development of the St. Lawrence waterway and water powers; negotiations with the Quebec Government for interprovincial co-operation all along the Ottawa River so as to permit the development of Ontario's half; negotiations with the [Federal] Department of Railways and Canals for the development of the Trent Canal water powers; attendance at Washington at hearings on the Chicago water diversion; negotiation at Washington of the Niagara Treaty concerning scenic beauty and further water power diversions for Ontario, this in co-operation with the Department of External Affairs and the Water Power Branch of Ottawa; negotiations with the Niagara Power Co. (U.S.) looking to the acquisition of the Canadian Niagara Power Co. and its water rights on the Ontario side; various studies of the legal and institutional aspects of the Hydro with a view to strengthening it as a public enterprise from possible partisan political interference. ..."

See L.C. Christie, Memorandum Re Beauharnois and Maclaren Power Contracts, 17 June 1935, op. cit.

16.) Peter N. Oliver. G. Howard Ferguson. Ontario Tory. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977, p. 295.

17.) For example, for Christie's discussion of the Chicago diversion project with Hume Wrong at the Canadian Legation at Washington see L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 17 June 1927, op. cit.; for Christie's use of Merchant Mahoney at the Washington Legation to acquire information for Hydro from the Federal Power Commission about power development in the United States see Toronto, Ontario Hydro Archives, Bin 20-3-070, Folder 191: Canadian Legation, Washington, U.S.A., 1925-1926, L.C. Christie to Merchant Mahoney, 20 January 1928; for written briefings provided for the Department of External Affairs and delivered to O.D. Skelton on the subject of power development in and around the Niagara area see PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 741, Folder 146, L.C. Christie, The Future at Niagara. A Program Proposed as a Basis for Discussion, 3 January 1928, and L.C. Christie, International Aspects of Power Diversions from Lake Erie Level of Welland Canal -- D.P. and T. Company Position, 20 December 1928; and, finally, for Christie's contacts with

Skelton, and through him with Mackenzie King, on the topic of the development of the St. Lawrence River for power and navigation, in at least one of which he provided Ottawa with confidential information on an intended action by the Ferguson government, see PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 12, Folder 38, pp. 11195-11201, L.C. Christie, The Great Lakes-to-the-Sea Waterway Negotiations -- Reciprocal Use of Canals and Rivers of St. Lawrence and Mississippi Systems - Chicago Diversion, 15 January 1928; Ibid., p. 11216, O.D. Skelton to L.C. Christie, 26 January 1928; Ibid., MG 26 J4, W.L.M. King Papers, Reel C-2722, p. c-96702, O.D. Skelton, Memorandum for the Prime Minister. Resolution No. 5 - Mr. Church - St. Lawrence Waterway, 21 February 1929; and, Ibid., Reel C-2701, p. c-70264, O.D. Skelton, Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 1 May 1929.

18.) To supplement this cursory review of the constitutional problems posed for Ontario by the question of renewing the Georgian Bay Canal Charter see Peter N. Oliver, G. Howard Ferguson. Ontario Tory, op. cit., pp. 293-296, and, especially, C.H.A. Armstrong. The Politics of Federalism: Ontario's Relations with the Federal Government, 1867-1942, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981, pp. 160-176. For a very interesting discussion of the problem as it was viewed by Mackenzie King's government in Ottawa see H. Blair Neatby. William Lyon Mackenzie King, 1924-1932. The Lonely Heights. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963, pp. 224-228.

19.) As Professor Oliver has pointed out Ontario Premier Howard Ferguson was pressing the province's case on water-power development both as a constitutional issue and as an issue of "the people versus the power barons." Christie almost certainly signed on to both ends of this argument. Clearly he supported Ontario's constitutional contentions and in the case of utilities he favored -- perhaps as an enduring consequence of his involvement with American Progressivism -- development by a state or a private monopoly in an ordered, regulated, and efficient manner rather than by permitting the willy nilly development of the resource through unfettered competition. In regard to power development in Northern Ontario, for example, Christie wrote in a memorandum for Magrath that,

"The experience of the times also shows that the supply of electric power for any given region is one of those services which had best be committed to a monopolistic agency: competition means certain waste -- waste of initial capital investment and waste of power and expense in operation: the solution is monopoly, either a public monopoly, or a private monopoly with rate regulation in the background to replace the check of competition."

Although apparently leaving the ground open for the possibility of private development of power in the northern part of the province, Christie demonstrated his personal preference for state-owned monopoly in one of the paper's final sections.

"... if the Government is not ready today to go in for such a policy of public ownership in the North, it can continue to stand aside, leaving the actual hydro-electric development there where it is today, in the hands of private capital, placing no obstacles in the way of the necessary leases, and indeed encouraging private development to the utmost. The Government should under this alternative, be prepared to see and even to encourage the acquisition and consolidation of the existing [northern] hydro-electric interests ... by some strong corporation, recognising that a monopoly regime is more economical and that such a strong corporation would in its own interest be more concerned to push the general development of the North than a number of scattered companies. ...

There seem only two main qualifications which the Government can legitimately place upon the regime of private development. If the Government does not find it expedient today to adopt comprehensive public ownership in the North, there remains its duty (a.) to satisfy itself of the adequacy of the rate-regulating machinery and (b.) to do what can be done today to ensure that if at a later period public ownership should become expedient private developments undertaken in the meantime can be taken over on terms fair to the public as well as to the owners."

Magrath used Christie's slightly veiled, yet effective arguments in favor of the Ontario Government undertaking the development of the hydro-electric potential of the northern part of the province in his successful attempt to persuade Premier Ferguson to allow the Commission to take the lead in the North. After reading Christie's memorandum, Magrath told Ferguson, "(i) t seems to me then there is only one method of procedure, and that is for the Government [of Ontario] itself to develop from this day forward, all power sites in that part of the province." As Professor Nelles has shown, Magrath's arguments converted Ferguson -- who had initially feared that such activities by the Commission would be seen as amounting to subsidies for northern mining and paper companies -- on the eve of the Ontario provincial election in 1929. See Peter N. Oliver, G. Howard Ferguson. Ontario Tory, op. cit., p. 294; Toronto, Ontario Hydro Archives, Bin 20-3-070, Folder 150: Premier of Ontario, Northern Ontario Properties, 1927-1940, L.C. Christie, Draft - Electrical Development of Northern Ontario, 24 August 1928; Ibid., Folder 147: Premier of Ontario, General No. 5, 1928-1929, C.A. Magrath to G. Howard Ferguson, 29 August 1928; and, H.V. Nelles. The Politics of Development. Forests, Mines and Hydro-Electric Power in Ontario, 1849-1941. Toronto: Macmillan, 1974, p. 468.

20.) PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 12, Folder 37, p. 10961, L.C. Christie to Hugh Guthrie, 16 February 1927.

21.) Peter N. Oliver, G. Howard Ferguson. Ontario Tory, op.

cit., p. 296. Although working for Magrath and Ontario Hydro, Christie apparently worked directly on several occasions with Premier Ferguson in the preparation of Ontario's constitutional brief. See L.C. Christie, Memorandum Re Beauharnois and Maclaren Power Contracts, 17 June 1935, op. cit.

22.) PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 13, File 41, pp. 12089-12090, L.C. Christie, Federal and Provincial Rights in Waterways. Georgian Bay Canal Charter and Dominion Lease of Carillon Rapids to National Hydro Electric Company, 24 February 1927.

23.) Ibid., p. 12090.

24.) Ibid., p. 12091.

25.) Ibid., p. 12092.

26.) Ibid., pp. 12092-12093. Christie believed that the provinces could press their water-power claims even more strongly if they would cooperate with each other when dealing with the government in Ottawa. If, in regard to the Ottawa River and the Georgian Bay Canal Company Charter, for example, the provinces of Ontario and Quebec acted in unison in making their case to the federal government their ultimate success would be much more likely. "Under our federal system," Christie wrote,

"the position of the two Provinces is identical as regards their jurisdiction over rivers: it is that the Dominion Government has jurisdiction only in so far as the waters are needed for navigation purposes, while beyond that, over any surplus water usable for power or other purposes, the jurisdiction of the Province or Provinces concerned remains effective. The agreement [to cooperate between Ontario and Quebec], by putting them shoulder to shoulder will strengthen each Province in maintaining its provincial rights intact."

"The Agreement," Christie told Magrath, "will in effect notify Ottawa that as regards the Georgian Bay Canal, Ontario and Quebec mean business in defending their provincial rights and stand together." See PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 13, File 41, L.C. Christie, Proposed Agreement Between Ontario and Quebec Respecting the Ottawa River, 21 January 1927.

27.) See C.H.A. Armstrong, The Politics of Federalism: Ontario's Relations With the Federal Government, 1867-1942, op. cit., p. 169.

28.) L.C. Christie, Federal and Provincial Rights in Waterways. Georgian Bay Canal Charter and Dominion Lease of Carillon Rapids to National Hydro Electric Company, 24 February 1927, op. cit., p. 12096.

29.) Ibid., pp. 12099-12100 and 12119-12120.

30.) See C.H.A. Armstrong, The Politics of Federalism: Ontario's Relations With the Federal Government, 1867-1942, op. cit., pp. 169-170; and Peter N. Oliver, G. Howard Ferguson. Ontario Tory, op. cit., pp. 293-294; and, H. Blair Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 1924-1932. The Lonely Heights, op. cit., pp. 227-228. That Christie was in full agreement with the tactic of having the premiers of Ontario and Quebec cooperate in forcing the federal government to recognize their views on water development and the constitutional issues involved therein is evident from the text of the following letter which he prepared for Magrath and which was later sent to Ferguson.

"The business of getting at the power of the Ottawa is becoming an old and somewhat discouraging story. Recent weeks, however, indicate that there is ground for hoping that the Dominion, if strongly pressed, will stand aside and allow the two Provinces to go ahead with the developments. If then the two Provinces themselves could agree upon a basis, the door would be open for the negotiation of definite agreements between the Commission and some one or more Quebec corporations to proceed with actual joint developments.

I would suggest, for your consideration, the following procedure: that you agree with Mr. Tascherau to meet him before the forthcoming conference with the Dominion Prime Minister recently announced to be held after the present session of Parliament; that you agree with Mr. Tascherau to bring up at that conference and press upon the Dominion that it recognize that the Provinces control Ottawa [River] power development (subject to any necessary reservation of rights on the part of the Dominion pending some further judicial decision) and that the Provinces may go ahead immediately with joint developments (subject, of course, to approval under the Navigable Waters Protection Act); and that Mr. Tascherau and yourself further agree to hold, immediately after the conference with the Dominion, an interprovincial conference to discuss and reach a basis between the two Provinces for defining and protecting their respective sovereign interests in the benefits and administration of this interprovincial stream, so that actual joint developments may proceed without further delay. ..."

See Public Archives of Ontario, G. Howard Ferguson Papers, Volume MU 1028, C.A. Magrath to G. Howard Ferguson, 27 March 1929.

31.) Professor Armstrong has noted that this indeed was happy ending for the province of Ontario because Premier Ferguson's legal counselors had advised him that it would be hazardous for Ontario to take Ottawa to court over the question of whether water-power development was "incidental" to navigation. Even if the federal government lost, they contended, Ottawa could still,

under the BNA Act, declare all water-power works for the "general advantage of Canada" and thereby eliminate provincial jurisdiction over water power altogether. It clearly troubled Christie that this ambiguity regarding federal and provincial jurisdictions existed, and he continued to call for the establishment of "a line, as precise and unequivocal as possible, ... between the Federal and Provincial spheres of action." Nonetheless, he seems to have concurred with Ferguson's other legal advisers, agreeing that a court challenge might well "risk a decision that might possibly authorize the Dominion to intervene at power sites - e.g. Niagara -- where hitherto it has made no claim." Christie especially feared that if litigation was brought forward by Ontario it would ultimately be decided by British jurists on appeal. "Assuming that the litigation," Christie wrote,

"however originated, eventually reached the Privy Council, that Court would presumably try to shape its view of the law to bring about what it would conceive to be a statesmanlike, workable governmental system so far as water courses are concerned. On this it may be noted that, unlike Canadians, English judges are not familiar with the federal system from actual everyday experience; so that it cannot always be easy for them to sense the practical consequences of the various alternative decisions they might make. Again, they are not familiar from actual experience with the significance of water power in the modern sense, and inland waterways must appear in their minds chiefly as instruments of navigation. Much will depend upon the background of the case presented to the Privy Council."

Christie clearly foresaw the potential for disaster if Ontario was forced to push its case for finding that the development of water power was not "incidental" to navigation all the way to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. One suspects also that he was loathe to let a British court tamper with the mechanics of Canada's federal system of government. In the end, he suggested to Magrath that Ontario avoid litigation and instead appoint a provincial royal commission "to examine the state of the law touching water courses, to consider whether improvements could be made [in Ontario law] to protect the public interest, and to consolidate the whole, including any improvements, in a draft Bill for the consideration of the (provincial) Legislature." See C.H.A. Armstrong, The Politics of Federalism: Ontario's Relations With the Federal Government, 1867-1942, op. cit., p. 171; PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 13, File 41, p. 12035, L.C. Christie, Notes on Draft Amendments Proposed For Insertion in Bill (if introduced at Ottawa) to Revive the Charter of the Montreal, Ottawa, and Georgian Bay Canal Company, 1 February 1927; and, Ibid., pp. 12081, 12083-12084, and 12086, L.C. Christie, Considerations Concerning the Course of Action to Protect the Provincial Position Regarding Water Rights, 11 May 1927.

32.) C.H.A. Armstrong, The Politics of Federalism: Ontario's Relations With the Federal Government, 1867-1942, op. cit., pp. 160 and 167.

33.) Ibid., p. 161.

34.) PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 13, Folder 41, p. 11960, L.C. Christie, Notes Respecting the St. Lawrence Question, 20 January 1927.

35.) Ibid., p. 11961.

36.) One of the factors that set the tone for Christie's writings at Hydro was the belief that Canada was too dependent on foreign sources of energy for its fuel supplies, a theme that appeared repeatedly in the memoranda he prepared for Magrath. During Ontario's fight against the renewal of the Georgian Bay Canal Company Charter, for example, Christie wrote that,

"Central Canada is already too dependent on foreign fuel for which heavy prices have to be paid. We need all the cheap power we can possibly get. The Provinces need to be able to get at it without impediment as fast as any region can consume it. The charter is simply a clog on the industrial development of Ontario and Quebec."

Again several years later, when reflecting on Ontario's options regarding the production of electricity for its cities and industries, Christie wrote that he had argued against coal-fired plants to produce steam for electricity because

"... no one ever seriously considered or would consider it as a real policy for primary power needs in Central Canada with its great water power sites and total lack of coal. It would have meant a great capital investment, to be scrapped when Ontario waters were eventually developed, as they would certainly be some day after a change in the international and interprovincial situation; as well as great importation of coal from the United States and transfers of Canadian funds in return. It would have put Ontario at the mercy of events in the American coalfields and of American prices and exchange fluctuations. ..."

Not surprisingly, therefore, the fear of seeing a portion of Canada's hydro-electric power resources developed only to be exported to the United States distressed Christie, and opposition to it formed a major point of the brief he prepared on the St. Lawrence question. See PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 13, File 41, p. 12005, L.C. Christie, Georgian Bay Canal Charter, 1 March 1927, and Ibid., MG 26 I, Meighen Papers, Volume 154, Folder 36, p. 094057, L.C. Christie, Notes on the Hydro-Quebec Power Contracts, 12 March 1935.

37.) L.C. Christie, Notes Respecting the St. Lawrence Question,

20 January 1927, op. cit., pp. 11961-11962.

38.) This memorandum was one of several lengthy efforts on the St. Lawrence issue prepared for Magrath and which were -- apparently with the Commission's approval -- forwarded to Ottawa for Skelton's use. In regard to this particular memorandum, Skelton replied that he found the analysis "extremely interesting" and added that he would like to discuss the matter with Christie before the Senate began its hearings on St. Lawrence development. See PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 12, File 38, p. 11217, O.D. Skelton to L.C. Christie, 10 May 1928.

39.) Public Archives of Ontario, G. Howard Ferguson Papers, Volume 1020 - Series 3 and 4, Box 4, L.C. Christie, St. Lawrence Waterway Project, 4 May 1928. The only point on which Christie thought Canada had a chance to make a little bit better of a deal for itself was by trying to secure access to the unrestricted use of the length of the Mississippi River system to the Gulf of Mexico by trading reciprocal access to the canals that were projected to be built in Canada in conjunction with the development of the St. Lawrence, i.e., those to be built below Cornwall, Ontario entirely within the Canadian waters of the St. Lawrence. In a paper he wrote for O.D. Skelton, Christie explained his idea in the following manner.

"One may expect that, if the U.S. enter negotiations requiring them to build and maintain some part of the Great-Lakes-to-the-Sea Waterway, they will ask some assurance that their nationals will be permitted full access to the sea through canals. If they already have this right under treaties now in force there is perhaps no more to be said. But if in the sphere of rights Canada has a position not yet wholly conceded by treaty, or if there is a doubt, she has something to concede. Assuming that she will put herself in line with the historic process and be ready to discuss an agreement, her negotiators, before conceding the full right, will be entitled to ask for an examination of the questions of reciprocity and equality. Reciprocity here presumably means reciprocity in kind. That is, they can ask for concessions not in the field of tariffs or immigration, for example, but in the field of U.S. canals and waterways. There is the New York Canal System giving access to the sea. There is the greater system -- the Great-Lakes-Mississippi-to-the-Gulf-of-Mexico Waterway -- now existing in a small way but likely to be greatly improved as the already congested transportation facilities of the U.S. feel more and more the strain of a rapidly increasing population and production of goods. ... If Canada is to recognize by treaty the right of U.S. nationals to use the St. Lawrence Canals, should she not get reciprocal rights for her nationals in these American waterways? Recalling the part played in the life of Europe by her internal waterways, one can imagine something of what the waterways of this

continent may mean to Canadian commerce of the future."

Christie's suggestions in this regard struck Skelton as apparently worth considering. "Many thanks for your notes," he responded, "on the various points which may ultimately have to be considered in any waterway negotiations with the United States. I am inclined to agree with all your conclusions" See PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 12, File 38, pp. 11197-11198, L.C. Christie, *The Great-Lakes-to-the-Sea-Waterway Negotiations - Reciprocal Users of Canals and Rivers of St. Lawrence and Mississippi Systems - Chicago Diversion*, 15 January 1928, and *Ibid.*, p. 11216, O.D. Skelton to L.C. Christie, 26 January 1928.

40.) These "national" questions always fired Christie's imagination and caused him to want to be involved in fighting them out. In 1925-1926, for example, he grew anxious to return to Canada from Britain, in part, in order to get in on the debate he expected to develop over the question of external autonomy. Likewise, he felt the same eagerness to get involved in the controversy surrounding the development of the St. Lawrence. "I have been in Ottawa and Montreal a number of times in the last two months," he told Borden in the spring of 1928, "and have heard in particular a great deal of the St. Lawrence waterway matter. The whole thing is I believe moving faster than could have been imagined six months ago. . . . I am tempted to keep an eye open for a foothold somewhere to horn in on the fight -- I mean on the side of pushing the waterway and power with all possible speed." More than a decade later the scope and the drama of the St. Lawrence project apparently still held Christie's imagination. "The Minister [Christie] observed that he had been familiar with the St. Lawrence waterway question for some twenty-five years," United States Assistant Secretary of State A.A. Berle wrote during a discussion about the St. Lawrence in the fall of 1939,

"and with the electric power phases, as well; that he had spent two years in the service of the Ontario Hydro-electric Commission, and that he had been continuously interested in the matter. He would consult his government and see what they wanted. I said that in view of the fact that he himself was familiar with the problem, we [the United States] should particularly welcome the Minister's personal assistance. (It was fairly obvious that the Minister wished to be part of the negotiations himself). . . ."

See PAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Volume 264, Folder 59, p. 148413, L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 26 March 1928, and, A.A. Berle, Memorandum of Conversation, 18 October 1939, in *United States Government. Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1939, Volume II: General British Commonwealth and Europe*. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1956, p. 334.

41.) PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 13, Folder 41, pp.

11782-11784, L.C. Christie, Draft Re St. Lawrence Waterway, n.d. but almost certainly April-May, 1928.

42.) C.H.A. Armstrong, The Politics of Federalism: Ontario's Relations With the Federal Government, 1867-1942, op. cit., and H.V. Nelles, The Politics of Development. Forests, Mines, and Hydro-Electric Power in Ontario, 1849-1941, op. cit., p. 465.

43.) H.V. Nelles, The Politics of Development. Forests, Mines, and Hydro-Electric Power in Ontario, 1849-1941, op. cit., p. 465.

44.) Christie's analysis of the options open to Ontario Hydro for further power development led him to conclude that it should move with all possible speed to exploit the possibilities available at Niagara. "The chief remaining provincial waters within reach of the settled industrial regions [of Ontario] are (1) the St. Lawrence, (2) the Ottawa, and (3) Niagara," Christie told the commissioners of Ontario Hydro.

"For all of them the outstanding fact is that control is divided with other Governments outside the Province: neither the Provincial Government nor the Commission can count on a free hand: the Commission can never approach the development of any of them except through agreement between the Commission or Provincial Government on the one hand and one or more outside Governments on the other. The Governments are subject in each case to considerations of political expediency, which means that in studying the prospects the Commission has to estimate and compare the political factors that will probably govern the action of the Governments concerned in these several cases.

The political factors touching the solution of the three cases are not identical: each has its own particular position. St. Lawrence is subject to such factors as (a) the discovery of a successful navigation policy in both Canada and the United States, (b) nationalistic jealousies and suspicions on both sides. Ottawa development is subject to such factors as (a) the solution of the constitutional issue between the Dominion and the Provinces, (b) the internal politics of Quebec and the relative need of that Province for further Ottawa power. Niagara development is subject to such factors as (a) scenic beauty requirements, (b) the principle of [equal] water division between Canada and the United States, (c) the application of the principle of maximum efficiency in the use of waters, (d) the political opposition to the export of power.

This brief indication serves to point the contrast between the cases. It is apparent that in both the St. Lawrence and the Ottawa cases the issues are more far-reaching, more complex, of much deeper concern to other peoples and sections outside Ontario, and hence more controversial. The issues at Niagara are not insignificant,

but they hardly compare for difficulty of solution with those involved in the other two cases. They are for the most part susceptible of exact scientific treatment. They are of major concern to this Province alone on this side and to New York State on the other. They do not confront any of the Governments concerned with the threat of first class national or international controversies. ...

The general preliminary conclusion which we believe is to be drawn from these observations is that the Commission, while not relaxing its interests in the other two cases, should in any event go after the Niagara position with the utmost urgency and should not fail to take any steps within its power to facilitate the acquisition of additional water rights there."

Christie also thought that developing additional water power for Ontario at Niagara "would strengthen the Commission's strategic position, [by] rendering it less dependent upon the will or whim of other interests on the Ottawa and the St. Lawrence." See Ontario Hydro Archives, Bin 20-3-077, File 399, L.C. Christie and Thomas H. Hogg, Report on Niagara Power Situation in Respect of Diversions from Niagara River, 29 October 1928, and PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 741, Folder 146, L.C. Christie, The Future at Niagara. A Program Proposed as a Basis for Discussion, 3 January 1928.

45.) Article V of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 allowed the United States to divert "for power purposes" twenty thousand cubic feet of water per second, while the entitlement on the Canadian side amounted to thirty-six thousand cubic feet per second. See International Joint Commission. Rules of Procedure and Text of Treaty. Ottawa and Washington, 1965, p. 15.

46.) L.C. Christie, International Aspects of Power Diversions from Lake Erie Level of Welland Canal - D.P. and T Company Position, 20 December 1928, op. cit.

47.) PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 13, Folder 41, p. 12176, L.C. Christie, The Proposed Increased Diversion of Niagara Waters for Power Purposes: The International Aspect, n.d., but probably January-March, 1928. Christie extended this general rule to include virtually all aspects of formal bilateral negotiations and agreements. He believed that it was always in Canada's interests to address problems with the United States one at a time and to try to avoid attempting to conclude umbrella-type arrangements covering many topics. "The principle here," Christie wrote,

"is analagous to that which governs our domestic legislative drafting practice: Acts of Parliament are rigorously confined to one subject. It is followed in international practice in other parts of the world. The United States are not likely to attach importance to it, as they are

accustomed in their legislative drafting to mix all sorts of subjects in the same Act of Congress -- a custom which is an essential part of the technique of 'log rolling'. But it seems clearly in Canada's interest to make every effort to hold to the practice of separate treaties for separate matters. It seems not only to be a Canadian interest, more than it is an American interest, to get as much as possible reduced to formal instruments of agreement -- whether they be treaties, exchanges of notes, or Orders of the International Joint Commission -- which create a condition or status whose alteration will appear serious to everyone. It appears further to be in Canada's interest more than in that of the United States to get the settlement of each specific problem firmly established on its own feet in a separate instrument of some sort and guarded against the danger of being compromised in the future by difficulties over other problems."

Christie took this point one step further by arguing that once a single problem had been settled in a formal bilateral agreement it was desirable, should it become necessary to alter a provision embodied in the agreement, to do so informally so as to avoid, at all costs, involving the United States Senate in the contemplated change. Christie had sufficient first-hand experience with the vagaries of the Senate's treatment of foreign relations -- during his employment in Washington, and later in the years following the Great War during the battle over ratifying the Versailles Treaty, the first meeting of the International Labor Organization, and the Washington Naval Conference -- to make him extremely wary of tempting the fates by involving that legislative body unnecessarily in bilateral affairs. A good example of Christie's reticence in this regard occurred in the spring of 1939 when it became necessary to alter certain provisions of the Rush-Bagot Agreement which dealt with the allowable caliber of guns on naval ships plying the Great Lakes. In a short, four-paragraph memorandum, Christie neatly summed up the importance he attached to single subject agreements and the avoidance of formal, Senate-sanctioned amendments to those agreements.

"1. In modern terminology it may be said that this was an Agreement for Quantitative and Qualitative Naval Limitation on the Great Lakes. It is over a century old and for a good while both sides have mutually recognised that the technical scheme and definitions do not fit the actual present day conditions and that in fact they can reasonably and safely be varied without vitiating the underlying political objective and spirit which both of them have invariably proclaimed must be maintained. They have in fact by informal interchanges mutually recognised certain variations from the technical scheme and definitions. Logically, recognition of such variations by means of formal revision of the Agreement might be in order, and there is a good deal that might be said for it; but so far both sides

have not felt clear about such a step at the same time. Definitions that would comprehend the various political and technical desiderata held on each side have not yet been discovered. But, while not taking this step, they have not failed to safeguard the underlying objective. There have been a few oversights, but in fact they have informally adopted and carried out with fair consistency a practice which is exactly equivalent to the formal device of the Advance Notification and Exchange of Information which has lately been employed in naval agreements between other states. They had in fact been informally employing this device a good while before the others took it up.

2. In any discussion in this field it seems, therefore, if they cannot see their way to some formal revision of the Rush-Bagot Agreement, both sides should firmly recognise the necessity of maintaining this practice or device. If they cannot mutually discover an appropriate technical scheme and definition for a revised Great Lakes Naval Treaty covering (1) Quantitative or (2) Qualitative Limitation or (3) Advance Notification and Exchange of information, or all three, they must at least not fail to keep (3) in full effect, however informally. This can be done simply by following the existing well grounded practice, notifications and requests for permission being put forward separately whenever one side has some specific step in mind, and being advanced only as and when the necessity for action has actually arisen, so that the exact particulars of numbers, tonnage and calibre of the vessels and armament will be known and can be definitely described.
...

3. Upon analysis the idea of 'unilateral negotiations' looks in effect like throwing overboard the whole of this Great Lakes self-denying ordinance, quantitative, qualitative, advance notification and all. It must be regarded as coming very close to that, if indeed there is any firm distinction at all. It would certainly be very difficult for the public to grasp any distinction.

4. Again, as between 'unilateral interpretations', on the one hand, and the maintenance of the existing informal practice of 'advance notification' and requests, on the other hand, it may be asked what are the differences in practical advantage and effect. Apparently 'unilateral interpretations' have been contemplated because of the difficulty arising from the fact the U.S. Senate ratified the Rush-Bagot Exchange of Notes; and it is not prepared to publish any such interpretations. On the other hand, it is not necessary to publish the informal 'advance notifications' and requests and answers involved in the existing practice. They have not been published in the past, and no difficulty has yet arisen, if there is some risk of difficulty with the Senate. In either case there

would always be the risk that some bright reporter or agitator, familiar with the Rush-Bagot technical provisions, might spot some actual existing variation and make a play. There is plenty of material for that already. But if that risk actually materialised, which alternative would put both sides in a position to make the best of it? In the one case both sides could say, 'We knew the Rush-Bagot Agreement was out of date in certain respects; we were not clear about the line of formal revision; practical necessity required some reasonable and safe technical variations; but we have always safeguarded the position by advance notifications and consultations upon each specific instance, taking occasion from time to time in that connection to reaffirm our mutual determination to maintain the underlying spirit and objective.' In the other case, both sides starting with the same preamble, could only say, 'Because of some technical legal difficulties, we thought it best for each of us to interpret the Agreement unilaterally on his own side according to his own idea of his reasonable requirements and without consultation' -- leaving it to the public to ask 'How does that really differ from throwing the Agreement aside altogether?' The existing practice surely represents the lesser evil. And, if some publicity did arise, it would not seem very difficult on the existing facts for the State Department, while admitting if necessary some technical legal laxity, to prove to the Senate that as a practical matter the Department has never given more than it received in this field and in fact had done pretty well.'

Once a formal bilateral agreement was signed, sealed, and delivered Christie believed that it was essential that both countries do their utmost to accommodate any changes to the instrument that might become necessary within the framework of the existing accord. "Do not treat this present instance as something new or special," he wrote in regard to the Rush-Bagot problem in 1939. "Let it be treated simply according to the practice which has in fact been pursued for a good many years." Because of the potential havoc involved in the Senate's consideration of any international agreement, Christie thought that once a deal was struck it was best to leave well enough alone. See *Ibid.*, pp. 12176-12177; PAC, RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 1999, File 1276, L.C. Christie, Re Rush-Bagot Agreement, Etc., Addendum, 23 May 1939; *Ibid.*, L.C. Christie, Re Rush-Bagot Agreement, etc., 29 May 1939; and, M.F. Scheuer, "Leaving Well Enough Alone: Loring C. Christie and the Rush-Bagot Agreement, May-June, 1939," Focus on Great Lakes Water Quality, 8, 4 (Fall, 1982), pp. 5-6.

48.) L.C. Christie, *The Proposed Increased Diversion of Niagara Waters for Power Purposes: The International Aspect*, n.d., op. cit., p. 12169.

49.) L.C. Christie and Thomas H. Hogg, *Report on Niagara Power Situation in Respect of Diversions from Niagara River*, 28 October

1928, op. cit. Christie thought that in the specific area of bilateral boundary negotiations it was well to keep in mind that there was no such thing as an absolutely definitive settlement. "A further observation that may have some bearing on the present inquiry [regarding water diversions at Niagara] may be noted here," Christie wrote in the spring of 1928.

"There is no finality in boundary diplomacy. As [Canada-United States boundary] dealings have gone on for over a century, so they will continue, and if at any moment negotiation fails to find the complete solution of an [sic] particular issue, there will still remain chances in the future. Governments will naturally try to settle what is ready for settlement; they will try to agree where agreement is calculated to promote actual economic benefits on both sides; and particularly they try to settle whatever may have happened to become an irritating public issue disturbing the whole course of their relations. But they usually have to proceed by stages from one problem to another: different problems do not automatically ripen at the same time like grapes on the same twig. They may have to proceed, not only from problem to problem, but from stage to stage within any given problem itself -- as, for example, European governments have had to do within the reparations problems. There is no principle that requires them to strive for completely logical comprehensiveness simply for the sake of being comprehensive and complete."

See L.C. Christie, *The Proposed Increased Diversion of Niagara Waters for Power Purposes: The International Aspect*, n.d., op. cit., p. 12178.

50.) L.C. Christie and Thomas H. Hogg, *Report on Niagara Power Situation in Respect of Diversions from Niagara River*, 29 October 1928, op. cit.

51.) Ibid.

52.) Christie, despite his disdain for the manner in which the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 was drafted, always firmly believed that it was substantively one of the best international arrangements that had ever been made for Canada. "For myself," he told Skelton just after joining Ontario Hydro,

"I feel without any hesitation or reservation whatever that in the realm of State machinery Canada has no more vital interest than the insurance of the full integrity of the system created by the Treaty of 1909; I do not except any aspect of our external relations; and I think Canadian Governments should never fail to measure the thing in this sense whenever a decision affecting it is required. Opinion generally throughout the country might perhaps regard this as a somewhat extravagant dictum. 'Opinion' has not always had very much to go on. ... Whatever the reason, I doubt if

the country realizes what a good deal it made and what a good thing it has on its hands, and I hope it won't fall for pretty illusions as the dog in the fable did. ..."

Christie remained interested in the Commission and sent a copy of his letter to Skelton to Prime Minister Bennett in 1933. At the time, he and Bennett apparently had been discussing the possibility of Christie's reentering government service and the subject of the Commission had come up. With the copy of his letter to Skelton, Christie included a note suggesting that one way to improve the Canadian section of the Commission would be to make its chairmanship "a whole-time position" and to raise the post's salary from \$7,500 to "say \$12,000; and the position to be given superannuation equivalent to that of the civil service." He also added that he would like to be considered as a candidate for the chairmanship. After outlining his educational and professional qualifications for the work, Christie wrote, "I believe that as time goes on I could do a real job in co-operation with Skelton for whom I have the highest respect and regard -- and I believe I could do it well because it is the sort of thing I should like to do well." See PAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Volume 264, Folder 59, pp. 148403-148404, L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 12 July 1927, and Ibid., MG 26 K, Bennett Papers, Reel M-1470, pp. 514938-514939, L.C. Christie to R.B. Bennett, 25 August 1933.

53.) International Joint Commission, Rules of Procedure and Text of Treaty, op. cit., p. 15

54.) Public Archives of Ontario, G. Howard Ferguson Papers, Volume MU 1028, Box 12, L.C. Christie, Memorandum for the Chairman. Proposed Temporary Additional Water Diversions at Niagara: Conference at Washington, 12-14 November, 20 November 1928. Christie notes in this memorandum that he and one of Hydro's chief engineers had been invited by the Department of External Affairs to accompany the federal government's representatives to the Washington meeting about Niagara "for purposes of consultation and to give any assistance that we could...." He also says that federal officials had consulted them "at every stage of ... [their] long preparation for the conference."

55.) Ibid. Christie was particularly aware of the difficulty of dealing equitably with boundary waters problems since there was always the possibility that a proposed development at one point along the boundary might well hold the potential for having an adverse impact -- politically as well as economically -- at another border locale. "It must also be observed," he wrote after returning to the Department of External Affairs,

"that the Great Lakes-Niagara-St. Lawrence waters present an intricate complex of problems related to one another practically, technically, politically. Within each country there arises a series of questions concerning, navigation,

power, scenic beauty, sanitation and other aspects, and regarding each item different domestic interests in each country may have different points of view. The mental pictures of the same item may differ widely as between the two countries or as between internal sections of the same country. To Ontario the Kenogami [River] diversion may appear as a simple and just means of developing some of Canada's own water power with incidental navigational advantages for all. But across the border it may perhaps be pictured as an important Niagara Treaty issue; to power interests, as a still further weighting, in favour of Canada, of the [Boundary Waters Treaty's] existing 36,000 c. [ubic] f. [oot per] s. [econd]: 20,000 c.f.s. allotment of water; to the scenic beauty guardians, as an entering wedge compromising their strongly held position that the Niagara power problem must not be handled without also handling the beauty problem. To Illinois, the Chicago diversion may appear as a sanitary necessity with some incidental power and navigation; to the Mississippi Valley as an improvement in navigation; to the Lake States as well as to Canada, as an attack on navigation. In approaching all these questions, the Canadian Government and the United States Government must therefore, each on its own side, endeavour to find solutions that will take account of the various special interests and bring them to something like agreement, or will be such as to prevent agreements being blocked. It may be found, as a result of the differing domestic situations on the two sides, that different items of the whole complex are more pressing on one side than on the other, and thus each Government may be in a position to proceed upon some one or two items when the other is not. Since no action can be taken except by agreement, attempts to solve one item separately from the complex naturally encounter difficulty."

This constant potential for bilateral controversy over boundary waters problems made Christie a staunch advocate of the International Joint Commission and its broad purview to handle any problem referred to it by both governments. Despite his dissatisfaction with the way the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 had been drafted and his reservations about including Articles 5 and 6 in it, Christie believed that the Treaty's "over-all general settlement" approach to the Great Lakes-Niagara-St. Lawrence waterway system, and its creation of the IJC to fairly administer that settlement, was the only sensible way to effectively protect the interests of both countries vis-a-vis the waterway. "If anyone will take the trouble to survey the whole picture, piece by piece, year by year, and reflect upon it," Christie concluded, "he will not be surprised or shocked when he sees that the piecemeal approach towards solving the boundary waters situation ... encounters a sticky and so far impassable road" See PAC, MG 26 J4, WLM King Papers, Volume 182, File 1665, pp. C-129006 - C-129008, L.C. Christie, Survey of Great Lakes-Niagara-St. Lawrence Waters Negotiations - (In Connection with

Bill Respecting Export of Electrical Power), 26 February 1938, and Ibid., RG 25 B3, Volume 2454, Folder: St Lawrence Seaway Agreements, L.C. Christie, Survey of Great Lakes-Niagara-St. Lawrence Negotiations, 23 March 1938.

56.) L.C. Christie, Memorandum for the Chairman. Proposed Temporary Additional Water Diversions at Niagara: Conference at Washington, 12-14 November, 20 November 1928, op. cit.

57.) L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 26 March 1928, op. cit., p. 148413.

58.) H.V. Nelles, The Politics of Development. Forests, Mines, and Hydro-Electric Power in Ontario, 1849-1941, op. cit., p. 464.

59.) Ibid. Christie fully supported the idea that Hydro's influence and authority did and should derive from its professional expertise and competence. In regard to the eventual development of power on the St. Lawrence River, for example, Christie said that there should be no question that the project should be "so organised that Ontario Hydro engineers and forces should carry out the Canadian half of the dams and power houses.... The reasons are obvious. The Ontario Hydro organisation has devoted for ten or fifteen years more study to the International Section [of the St. Lawrence River] than any other body. In ability and continuous experience in major power development jobs they are equal to anything on the continent." See PAC, MG30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 12, Folder 38, p. 11132, L.C. Christie to Charles P. Craig, 24 February 1930.

60.) H.V. Nelles, The Politics of Development. Forests, Mines, and Hydro-Electric Power in Ontario, 1849-1941, op. cit., pp. 464-465.

61.) Ontario Hydro Archives, Bin 20-3-077, File 399, L.C. Christie and Thomas H. Hogg, Report on Niagara Power Situation in Respect of Diversions from Niagara River, 29 October 1928, op. cit. It is also interesting to speculate that Hydro attracted Christie, in part, because it had been founded and initially developed through the will, determination, and political dexterity of Sir Adam Beck. Essential to the Progressives' creed was the need for a dynamic and strong-willed individual -- Theodore Roosevelt was, of course, the prototype -- to take charge of a particular and often chaotic situation and put theory into practice. In a paper he wrote just before resigning from Hydro, apparently as the basis for an address by Magrath, Christie noted the importance of Beck's leadership in the first of Hydro's developments at Niagara -- which he described as "a bold far-sighted first step" -- and the fruits that flowed from the decisive actions taken by the Commission's first chairman. "The stimulous given to industrial activity by the electric power policy of this province has been remarkable," Christie wrote.

"I may point out here that while within the region of the state of New York tributary to the Niagara River there was naturally a vastly greater field for the use of electric power than within the corresponding region of Ontario, yet the fact remains that under the Ontario policy of development this Commission is in a position to-day to produce and distribute 40% more power than is being produced and distributed on the New York side from the same quantity of water. To put the point in another way, public ownership can take longer views and can, therefore, take what are apparently greater chances than private enterprise can reasonably be expected to do. Unquestionably we had an example of this when the Commission, under Sir Adam Beck, took hold of the vast development at Queenston. The result is that, although a policy of leaving the development to private enterprise might have resulted in certain profits on power to be taxed, yet under the policy actually pursued a far greater amount of power has been harnessed and put at the command of industry in the Province than could have been expected had the development been left to private enterprise. Power readily accessible and properly applied under modern practice can multiply the productive capacity of each human being in industry thirty times. The investment of money in power breeds investment in productive industry dependent upon power at the rate of at least \$1000 for every \$100 invested in power. All this has meant greater activity and expansion on the part of the productive industries using such power in the Province as well as the greater attractions and conveniences of the domestic and rural uses of power."

Here is a success story that could not have been scripted any better to provide all of the essential elements of the Progressive credo: activist government, the advantages of public ownership over profit-oriented private ownership, strong heroic Roosevelt-type leadership, efficient industrial production, and social betterment for all. While working for Hydro as perhaps at no other point in his career, Christie stands out clearly as a product of his times. See PAC. MG30 E44. Volume 13, Folder 41, pp. 12398 and 12411-12412, L.C. Christie, Some Aspects of the Ontario Hydro-Electric System, January, 1929.

62.) Ibid., p. 12417. Christie gloried in the use the Commission had made of men of expertise, and, at the same time, found it the ideal challenge for highly trained specialists who desired to put their skills to use in the public interest. "The Commission has in its service engineers of great capacity," Christie wrote.

"I recall that when circumstances beyond its control forced the Commission to go into the market to buy electrical power, its engineers and officials were brought into close contact with those of various private corporations. I venture to believe that all of those corporations would

admit that the public of Ontario has men in its service equal in every way to those in any electrical power service anywhere on this Continent. Discussions in technical journals in this field show how they have from time to time led the way in the art of large scale production and distribution of electricity. In my short experience the Commission has had requests from private corporations for the use of its engineers -- in one case to go to Russia, in another to go to Shannon in Ireland, in others to assist in private developments in Canada. There is nothing unusual in such a situation; it is only as it should be; but I would venture to call attention to it because there are from time to time, indications that the capacity of the men connected with the work is not wholly appreciated in the Province. In view of the vastness of its scope and the variety of its problems, this organization probably provides greater opportunities than others for that rare and valuable type whose chief delight in life is found in the inner satisfaction that comes from the exercise of the mental faculties at their utmost reach...."

In the last sentence of the above quotation, of course, Christie described precisely the situation which he believed was necessary to satisfy his personal restlessness. See Ibid., pp. 12407-12408.

63.) Ibid., p. 12417. Although Christie believed that Hydro's role was to execute the plans of the Ontario Government and satisfy the electrical needs of the province's industries and citizens, he did not believe that the Commission should become involved in political activities that would give grounds for charges of partisanship. After advising Magrath that the Commission, in an agreement about to be signed in the federal Department of Public Works, ought make clear that its signature could not be pictured as prejudicing "the control and administration of water courses in the Province . . .," Christie said to push the point no further. "It seems to me," he wrote,

"that by doing this the Hydro would be going as far as it need go in the matter of protecting provincial rights. The responsibility and burden of actively defending such rights in the courts and elsewhere should mainly be borne by the Provincial Government.

I have always felt that in its own interest the Hydro, in its dealings with Ottawa, should carry this fight for only a certain limited distance. At the point of probable rupture with any Dominion Department I feel that the Hydro would be best advised to accept the best it can get, making such reservations as will leave the real burden where it properly belongs, that is, upon the Province. Otherwise the Hydro is almost sure to get itself in a position where it can be attacked for political activities. I think the Provincial Government should pull its own coals out of the

fire."

See PAC, MG30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 13, Folder 41, pp. 12654-12655, L.C. Christie to C.A. Magrath, 26 February, 1930.

64.) L.C. Christie, "Some Aspects of the Ontario Hydro-Electric System," January, 1929, op. cit., pp. 12401-12402. Two matters mentioned in this passage are of particular interest; namely, Christie's assertion that the Commission had helped to prevent foreign control of the province's water-power resources, and that it was helping to prevent excessive concentrations of population in urban areas. Throughout his tenure at Hydro, and indeed throughout his career, Christie was conscious of avoiding a situation in which American capital would gain control of Canadian resources. Christie believed that the maintenance of Canadian control over the country's natural resources was a major national interest. He did not, however, indulge in an irrational, go-it-alone sort of nationalism, but rather believed that the realities of geography had made Canada and the United States neighbors and that the resulting relationship could be managed fairly and to the benefit of each. His negative reaction, for example, to a suggestion by a federal official that Canada go ahead and develop the St. Lawrence alone without the cooperation of the United States shows his hard-headed, common sense approach to the bilateral relationship.

"Note: Running all through this memorandum, which purports to be a representation from a technical official whose scope of duty concerns water powers is a constantly reiterated theme that its cardinal principle is 'A National and All-Canadian Policy for the St. Lawrence Waterway,' which concerns navigation. In the upshot the scheme presented by the memorandum is really neither 'National' nor 'All-Canadian.' Labels of this sort may be useful for advertising foodstuffs or even political policies when ready for public consumption, but they are confusing and out of place in any serious calculation of a technical nature.

The memo is also weak in its appreciation of what the other side to the proposed bargain -- the U.S. -- need and are in a position to bargain for. Does not recognise realities."

It is interesting to note, that Christie never showed any sort of fear that Canada would be manipulated or ordered about by the United States which was in any way comparable to the distrust he permanently maintained regarding London's policies and intentions toward Canada. Christie's suspicion of and resistance to involvement in British diplomacy and European affairs was deep and at times almost irrational. In regard to the United States, on the other hand, he was already to deal on any issue, and just as important, he was confident that Canada could control the situation and would be fairly treated by the Americans.

On the second point, the potential dangers of excessive

urbanization, Christie had long been uneasy. "The more I see of England, Germany and the U.S.," he once wrote to Sir Robert Borden,

"the more I wonder where the 'industrialization of mankind is coming out, the more I recall Mr. Sastri's [Christie had escorted this official of the Government of India on a tour of Canada in 1919] shudder when I showed him around the industrial aspects of Montreal, Hamilton, and Niagara, the more I am prepared to admit the wisdom of looking very hard and above everything else for a policy that would start, not from the premises that industrial development is necessarily a good thing in itself, but is only a means, a dangerous means, to be used with the utmost vigilance and restraint. England so often presents the menacing face of what may come of it all -- a vast hive live with here and there a tame kitchen garden -- the land conquered or forgotten or put to outlandish uses. The assumption of the industrialist is that this process is to go on and on, the machine spawning these monstrous hives over the face of the earth, that human wit can always supervise the vast growing concern and human nerves tolerate its strain. It may be so, but I feel that there is enough ground for doubt here and elsewhere to justify the utmost skepticism on the part of every country that has a more or less clean slate. I fear that this would be heresy in Montreal -- or part of it, for I recall a talk with Frank Jones [a friend of Christie and a businessman and economist] on his tariff ideas and one attractive feature was that they did proceed on other assumptions; they looked rather to an industrialism that would be indigenous to the soil, the climate and its products, a fair field and nothing more for what might naturally stand on its own feet there, than to a conscious straining toward an impossible universality. It may be a dream to imagine such discriminations feasible, for the self-sufficient, self-contained state is the fashion, and fashions are hard to beat."

Christie's fear of excessive industrialization and urbanization led him to applaud the Hydro Commission's province-wide efforts to develop electrical power as a means of preventing in Canada what he had seen in England. Rejecting out of hand the private sector's contention that the Commission should be disbanded because some of its rates were higher than those that could be offered by private firms, Christie explained that,

"... no mere comparison of rates for this or that kind of service selected by a special pleader can ever provide an adequate test by which to judge the [hydro-electric] policy of this Province. Under that policy the underlying aim is that the benefits of the water powers of the Province shall be as widely distributed as practicable among the people of the Province. The industrial revolution of the nineteenth century has resulted in innumerable concentrations of

population in closely packed urban centres and in a concentration of effort in these centres, oftentimes in disregard of other elements of the population, and this process has gone on to an extent which has produced evils of the most baffling character. I need not enumerate the evils; they are so apparent to every thinking man in this modern age that to-day every country in the Western World is studying methods to redistribute its population. Canada's problems to-day include rural development and the avoidance while there is time of that congestion which has proved so fatal in other civilisations. The more widely power can be made accessible, the more easy it is to establish industry in smaller centres, the greater prosperity, the greater stability and the greater happiness will accrue to the Province as a whole. The policy under which this Commission was deliberately created and is operated tends to promote that distribution. ... The policy here [in Ontario] represents an effort toward a balanced economic policy for the whole Province, an effort toward long run betterment rather than a concentration upon quick profits to a few in this generation in disregard of the interest of many others in this and succeeding generations."

Christie, like many other Progressives, clearly believed that scientific and technical expertise could be harnessed to political will in order to provide legitimate and positive services to society. Ontario Hydro, in Christie's eyes, would both prevent the "evils" of urban concentration and protect as much of Canada's "clean slate" as was possible from the more malodorous aspects of modernization. For the foregoing see PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 13, Folder 41, pp. 11927-11928, L.C. Christie, Comment on a Paper by J.T. Johnston, Department of the Interior, Dominion Water Power and Reclamation Service, September, 1930; Ibid., MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Volume 264, Folder 58, pp. 148151A-148152A, L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 25 August 1925; and, L.C. Christie, Some Aspects of the Ontario Hydro-Electric System, January, 1929, op. cit., pp. 12414-12415.

65.) L.C. Christie, Some Aspects of the Ontario Hydro-Electric System, January, 1929, op. cit., p. 12399. Faithful to the progressive tradition, Christie believed that the ideological opposition to Hydro because it was a public enterprise ultimately would be dispelled as its opponents were "educated" to the benefits it brought to private industry and to Ontario society as a whole. "Ideas are in reality the strongest factor in human activity," Christie wrote, "and practical men, however much they may spurn the doctrinaire, are often unconsciously swayed in their decisions by what are really doctrinaire ideas. I think the prejudice against this organisation [that is, Ontario Hydro] very often arises from inaccurate and misleading information as to the basis on which it works. At time in conversations with men whom one would expect to be well informed, I have been astonished to find how far from the mark they have been lead

(sic). I dare say that there is less ignorance to-day than in earlier days, and in any case the now widespread actual use of the Commission's services is in itself a powerful education." See Ibid., p. 12417.

66.) Christie held no brief for broad government domination or ownership of the economy, but he did believe that the government was justified in regulating the activities of private enterprise in the interest of the state as a whole. Ontario Hydro "has no quarrel with private enterprise," he wrote.

"... on the contrary it must always be its endeavour in its own interests to render the supply of electrical energy so conveniently and economically accessible as to facilitate the greatest possible expansion of private enterprise in this Province. There is plenty of room for both in the provincial economic structure. If anyone imagines that the success of this undertaking may in itself imperil the hold which the practice of private enterprise and initiative has on this continent, I feel he must be an excessively timid believer in the resources of private enterprise or be lacking in a sense of proportion. ... No sensible man suggests that the public ownership could to-day be applied universally in industry and business. The great bulk of trade and industry will, for the present and for as long as we care to think, be left to private enterprise; though the experience of industrial nations shows that, as industry grows in magnitude and complexity, the dictates of self-preservation will always force the state or community to a certain measure of regulation of business."

As did most Progressives, Christie looked on the state to serve as an active referee that would keep the interests of private enterprise and those of the public in a rough balance by regulating the voracious appetites of the former. Ibid., pp. 12400-12401.

67.) Public Archives of Ontario, G. Howard Ferguson Papers, Volume MU 1028, L.C. Christie, Financial Structure of the Ontario Electrical System - Proposal for Confidential Expert Survey and Advice to the Government and Commission, 18 January 1928.

68.) Ibid.

69.) Ibid. Magrath fully endorsed Christie's plan and forwarded it to Premier Ferguson for his consideration, suggesting that "(i)f this idea appeals to you, you might conclude to speak confidentially to Mr. (Leopold) Amery (Secretary of State for the Dominions) about the possibility of getting a man from the British Treasury, so that later on should we decide ... to follow it up, then you could get in touch with Mr. Amery, and he would know exactly what we were trying to accomplish." See Public Archives of Ontario, G. Howard Ferguson Papers, Volume MU 1028, C.A. Magrath to G. Howard Ferguson, 19 January 1928.

70.) L.C. Christie, Some Aspects of the Ontario Hydro-Electric System, January 1929, op. cit., p. 12406.

71.) John W. Dafoe to John A. Stevenson, 15 November 1928, op. cit.

72.) L.C. Christie, Memorandum Re Beauharnois and Maclaren Power Contracts, 17 June 1935, op. cit.

73.) Ibid.

74.) The Beauharnois Company was formed in 1927 by Montreal financier R.O. Sweezy and was designed to develop power along the St. Lawrence River west of Montreal where the river lies entirely in Quebec's jurisdiction. The Company received permission from the Government of Quebec to begin the project in June, 1928. Christie had known Winfield Sifton, a member of the Beauharnois syndicate, during his residence in Britain and had renewed the acquaintance in 1928. Sifton introduced Christie to several of the Beauharnois managers and he was asked to perform some legal studies while he was still employed by Hydro. Magrath granted him permission to do so, but Christie decided against it. Christie joined the Beauharnois group in April, 1929 with the idea of eventually becoming the organization's secretary. According to his vitae, Christie was Beauharnois' legal officer from April, 1929 until April, 1935, and was its secretary-treasurer between 1932 and 1935. Christie resigned on 24 April 1935 when the financial affairs of the Beauharnois Company were falling apart.

In March, 1935, Christie's name began to be brought up in the Ontario legislature in connection with some contracts Ontario Hydro had signed with the Beauharnois Company and the James Maclaren Company. Several Liberal members of the Ontario legislature asserted that Christie had assisted former Premier Ferguson in persuading Ontario Hydro to sign deals with the two companies for power it did not need because of the slowdown in industrial activity in the province resulting from the Great Depression. Christie insisted that he had done nothing of the sort, but he did not choose to respond to the charges publicly because he had rejoined the Department of External Affairs while the controversy was going on at Queen's Park. He did prepare a memorandum for Magrath's use in case he was forced to reply publicly to questions concerning the Commission's activities during his tenure as chairman. In regard to Christie's part in these contracts, Magrath wrote,

"What are the facts? The Beauharnois Contract was executed on November 29th, 1929 and Mr. Christie had resigned from 'Hydro' about the end of March, 1929 -- eight months before the contract was concluded and two weeks before the negotiations were even begun. While with the Beauharnois Company, Mr. Christie, I understood, had some dealings for it with the McClaren [sic] Company and was

asked with the latter to [participate] ... in connection with some legal aspects of their proposed contract with 'Hydro'. Mr. Christie asked at that time if I had any objection to his taking part in the work and I at once said 'none'"

For a sketch of the background and experiences of the Beauharnois Company, and the manner in which Christie was recruited by Beauharnois and the nature of his duties with the organization see C.H.A. Armstrong, The Politics of Federalism: Ontario's Relations with the Federal Government, 1867-1942, op. cit., pp. 172-176; L.C. Christie, Memorandum Re Beauharnois and Maclaren Power Contracts, 17 June 1935, op. cit.; Harvard University, Baker Library, Winthrop Aldrich Papers, see vitae attached to L.C. Christie to Winthrop Aldrich, 18 December 1935; and, PAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, Volume 264, Folder 60, p. 148449, L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 24 April 1935. For the controversy in the Ontario legislature surrounding Ontario Hydro's contacts with Beauharnois and Maclaren and Christie's part therein see L.C. Christie, Memorandum Re Beauharnois and Maclaren Power Contracts, 17 June 1935, op. cit.; Public Archives of Ontario, G. Howard Ferguson Papers, Volume MU 1028, C.A. Magrath, Re Quebec Power Contracts, 21 October 1935; and, Ibid., C.A. Magrath to G. Howard Ferguson, 28 December 1935.

75.) C.A. Magrath to G. Howard Ferguson, 28 December 1935, op. cit.

76.) PAC, MG 26 K, Bennett Papers, Reel M-1404, pp. 440754-440755, L.C. Christie to R.B. Bennett, 6 February 1934.

77.) Ibid., Reel M-3167, pp. 585009-585010, L.C. Christie to R.B. Bennett, 1 August 1934. Although Christie saw the need for a much stronger and more active federal government in Canada, he never saw any danger in centralizing power in Ottawa and rejected contemptuously any suggestion that such a process might be a precursor to fascism in Canada. He simply believed that because of the country's geographical immensity and ethnic diversity a strong national government was necessary to hold the regions together and impart a degree of fairness in national affairs. At the same time, Christie believed that size and diversity were unbreachable safeguards against any displacement of the democratic process by facism or any other totalitarian political system. "I have heard ... from pink intellectuals ..." Christie wrote in the spring of 1935,

"people who apparently don't know a fact when it hits them in the face and can only think in terms of foreign phrases, like 'marxism' and so on, having no relevance to present Canadian life -- some chatter to the effect that you must beware of National Government, because it might be the beginning of 'fascism'. There is a thousand reasons why that is absurd, even if some fool dreamed such nonsense in this Confederation. I think I know one simple one. In

spite of the time I have spent in these parts [that is, Montreal, Ottawa, and Toronto] my outlook on our Confederation is still that of a Nova Scotian and a Maritimer. When one looks at this central mass that is Quebec and Ontario and realises how essentially indifferent it must be to the rest of the show and recalls how hard the sledding for the rest of us often is even under our present institutions, one can imagine how impractical the fascist's dream would be in Canada. His power would have to be based on this central region, but of course the rest simply would not have any of that sort of thing."

See PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 12, Folder 40, p. 11590, L.C. Christie to Cyrus J. Macmillan, 12 June 1935.

78.) L.C. Christie to R.B. Bennett, 1 August 1934, op. cit., p. 585010.

79.) Ibid.

80.) As was the case in most of instances in which he saw dangers or crises for the state, Christie looked for someone to provide strong and effective leadership to see it safely past the threat. For example, he saw the need for Sir Robert Borden to provide non-partisan, educative leadership during the naval crisis of 1912-1913, warmly applauded Borden's leadership in imperial and domestic affairs during the Great War, and appreciated the courage that Meighen had demonstrated in the debates on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance during the Imperial Conference of 1921. One of the reasons he left the Department of External Affairs in 1923, on the other hand, was because Mackenzie King would provide neither leadership nor initiative in trying to finally define Canada's international status. In this light, it is not at all surprising that Christie looked to Bennett for the leadership he thought was needed to insure that Canada weathered the dangers presented by the Depression. "I strongly hope you will be able to see your way clear to carry on for a long while," Christie besought Bennett in the summer of 1934.

"No one can tell what a modern electorate will do -- the big cities especially seem lost to decency. Such electorates go far to fulfill Madison's prophecy, and there seems little to be done about the franchise now. In these times the indecent instinct is to crack the Government, any Government. They may crack yours. But there is this to be said. We will have years of crisis ahead of us. The opposition has nothing to offer and is divided. It is a safe prophecy that the next Parliament, if not Conservative, will be chaotic and almost certain to result in a series of crises where strength will be needed. For that and for capacity to deal with the peculiar economic and international problems of this time there is no one else in the Party or in any other Party that can touch you. Not

long ago in Ottawa I happened to be at a small luncheon party to meet Mr. Bourassa. Someone asked him how this Parliament compared to his first one, in which as he pointed out there were still some survivors of the Confederation days. He said that the only one today who was the peer of those men was the present Prime Minister. I can understand what he means.

Because I mean this without reservation I feel I can write this and wish more power to you and your program. If you go on it will win through."

The Progressive Era's tendency to look for a "man on horseback" -- with Theodore Roosevelt as the preeminent exemplar -- was always a hallmark of Christie's thought and analysis in times of crisis. Ibid., pp. 585007-585008, L.C. Christie to R.B. Bennett, 8 June 1934.

81.) Edinburgh, Scottish Records Office, Lothian Papers, 6D40/17/281. L.C. Christie to Lord Lothian, 17 August 1934.

82.) L.C. Christie to R.B. Bennett, 8 June 1934, op. cit., p. 585003.

83.) Ibid., pp. 585003-585007. For a brief description of the measures introduced by Bennett's government during the parliamentary session of 1933-1934 to combat the Depression see J.R.H. Wilbur. The Bennett Administration, 1930-1935. Canadian Historical Association Booklet No. 24. Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1969, pp. 13-14.

By the mid 1930s, Christie was also coming to see federal intervention in the economy, especially in the field of longterm national economic planning, as an essential adjunct to a successful foreign policy. He believed that the age of *laissez faire* was finished and that nation-states around the world were, as a result, engaged in government-led economic planning so as to insure international competitiveness, and, more importantly, to make themselves as self-sufficient as possible. Christie argued that the state's intimate involvement in such planning was as much a matter of foreign as domestic policy, that such planning promoted equitable development at home and immunity from and advantage over foreign economic competitors. It was this attitude that led Christie to support Bennett's economic innovations and damn those Conservatives who opposed them and sought a return to what he called derisively "'the good old days' of the free capitalist economy...." "Might it not be truer, less startling and more persuasive [to say]," Christie wrote in this regard in the fall of 1936,

"that for a long while now the State has been intervening and planning; that what we need now is more conscious recognition of this and a more careful and deliberate planning.

Time and distance presents events in their true perspective. Looking back we now see that the 19th century conception and interpretation of a free economy had begun to crumble even before all its years had run out. At the moment when the capitalists and the entrepreneurs found it necessary to demand and in fact receive from the State the protection of tariff barriers; at the moment they found it necessary to create the great modern trusts and cartels whose power so rivalled that of the State so as to demand regulation or intervention of one kind or another and which are nowadays regarded, in their foreign dealings, as instruments of the State; at the moment when the workers found it necessary to form their vast combinations that demanded and received recognition and protection from the State; at the moment the farmers started to find that they could not get along without the great paraphrenalia of the Departments of Agriculture and Grain Commissioners -- at that moment laissez faire and the old free economy had gone. At that moment indeed it had gone beyond recall. At the beginning this was not admitted. Even yet there are those who refuse to admit it. So powerful is the human faculty of self-deception. So stubborn is the survival power of ideas that, that in fact dead or moribund, they, manage to retain the appearance of life long after they have ceased to respond to reality.

Who can doubt all this? During the war the State, in every region on earth, had to take over the economic and financial destinies of the country -- an enforced recognition of a necessity that had already happened, even though it was then visible to only a few. After the war some countries refused at first to recognise that anything had really happened. They thought they were bothered by only what they called the 'dislocations of war'. For a while they chased the will o' the wisp 'back to normalcy'....

We know now it was a dream, though the knowledge has come to us [in Canada] later than to others. For steadily, all over the earth, country after country has seen the writing on the wall, and each after his own fashion has set about the business of responding more accurately to reality.
...

Canada? Well, of course, we too have had state intervention and planning -- of a sort -- for years in the most vital parts of our national economy. Tariffs? Where would our industries be without them? And every tariff schedule has represented an attempt at national direction and planning of our economy -- for the worker, the farmer, the consumer, the capitalist. We have tried to plan and legislate for the development of our fisheries. And our mines. And where would our farmers -- the so-called last ditch individualist -- be today without the long story of

what our Departments of Agriculture have done through research, planning and guidance over almost the whole range of farm activities? And now we have a state controlled bank to manage such vital things as our currency and our rate of interest problem. ...

Of course the free economy of the 19th century has gone. As dead as Queen Anne. We have, many of us, refused to admit it; but fortunately we have in fact in many vital ways and by force of necessity, acted on the assumption of its being gone, like so many other countries have. ...

If there is anything in this interpretation of the events of this era of human affairs, the simple question for Canada is not whether we are to admit the principle of state intervention and planning. We have long since taken that step and acted on it, though partly sub-consciously only and always carelessly and indiscriminately. The question is, in a world scene where the question is not competition between individuals in a free world economy but competition and bartering between nations in a world approximating to a group of vast closed national economies, where the other nations are adopting all deliberate national planning, how long can Canada continue on a hand to mouth planning which depends upon how much pressure and how great a howl this or that section or interest in the community can bring to bear on government. How long can we in this anarchic world, afford to be indiscriminate and careless in our national thinking and planning? How long can we refuse to set up the means for a careful, scientific survey of our national economy and for long term, co-ordinated planning that takes into account all our problems. ..."

Because countries all over the world were moving toward "the greatest practical measure of national self-sufficiency" through government intervention and planning in the national economy, Christie wrote, Canada had to do likewise or face a future wherein it would be not an effective sovereign entity but "a mere geographical expression" at the mercy of better administered nation-states. See PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 21, Folder 74, pp. 19851-19859, L.C. Christie, Notes Re State Intervention and Planning in the National Economy, 16 October 1936.

84.) L.C. Christie to R.B. Bennett, 8 June 1934, op. cit., p. 585007.

85.) L.C. Christie to R.B. Bennett, 1 August 1934, op. cit., p. 585010.

86.) For brief descriptions of Bennett's "New Deal" see J.H. Thompson and Allen Seager. Canada, 1922-1939. Decades of Discord. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1985, pp. 261-266, and J.R.H. Wilbur, The Bennett Administration, 1930-

1935, op. cit., pp. 14-17.

87.) PAC, MG 30 D45, J.W. Dafoe Papers, Volume 8, Folder: 1935, June-September, L.C. Christie to J.W. Dafoe, 4 June 1935. Throughout his career Christie believed that strong leadership was essential to the accomplishment of a given public goal. The quality of leadership Christie believed to be basically amoral, and that without a specific moral good attached to it could just as easily be harnessed -- and be just as successful in attaining a particular object -- to an immoral goal. Such was the case in Ontario's repudiation of the power contracts. Christie believed that Hepburn and his associates were providing strong and effective leadership to an ignoble and immoral cause, and were succeeding because the moral side of the contest -- that is, in Christie's mind, the resistance to repudiation -- was not being led by men with equal vigor and resolve. "You have an extraordinary act by one group of politicians [Hepburn, et. al.] who are in a seat of governmental power," Christie asserted.

"They propose to use that power, that machinery of government, as a force, a club, a weapon -- and by force at least to whittle down the rights of certain elements in the country -- elements who are not all even in their own province. It is a completely arbitrary exercise of governmental power. No opportunity has been or is to be afforded to show cause in an orderly way why the thing should not be done. Every doorway to such an elementary remedy has been barred and bolted. It is a violent assault upon the most ancient constitutional aspects of the common law of the land. If allowed to continue such a process would be tantamount to revolution. ..."

Because strong and decisive leadership had allowed the forces of evil -- that is, repudiation -- to carry the day so far, Christie believed that only a similar leadership style which employed the traditional, orthodox political processes would in the end defeat the repudiators. "It is their boldness that has strengthened the position of the Hepburns ... and blinded people to the real viciousness of what they are doing," Christie argued.

"In Ontario Hepburn has got the Conservative opposition on the run and is sweeping off their balance many people who know better. This elemental, unilateral act, if carried off with audacity by one who has shown qualities of leadership, blinds peoples' judgment and Ontario is no exception. One has only to look around to see that the post-war world is a neurotic, hysterical world that craves bold action. The only possible course is to meet the Hepburns with equal boldness, but to stand uncompromisingly on correct constitutional principles, to employ every orderly means at your disposal, and above all not to fail to involve the guarantees in our state structure which were created for the preservation of orderly processes -- in other words to make people see and face unequivocally what they are really

drifting into, and to force them to choose. In the end their response will be sure."

In the face of what he perceived to be threats to the nation's existence, be they an ambiguous definition of Canada's international status or a challenge to constitutional orthodoxy, Christie consistently saw bold leadership tied to a moral good as the means of warding off the threat. Only this type of leadership could eliminate what he saw as the tendency of democracies to drift along in the face of threats until a final conflagration riveted the attention of the populace on a particular problem. In essence, Christie's mind was managerial and he believed that problems should be addressed at once as soon as they were detected, not in a manner that waited for the point at which a crisis was at its peak or when a consensus of opinion had been reached. Clearly, this mode of thought was one of the things that led Christie to find MacKenzie King lacking in so many ways as a leader, and, at the same time, made him susceptible to mistaking the bluster of R.B. Bennett for genuine leadership. For Christie's above views on the ability of leadership to be used for both good and evil ends see PAC, MG 26 I, Meighen Papers. Volume 154, Folder 36, p. 094975, L.C. Christie, Notes on the National Emergency, 16 April, 1935, and, Ibid., MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 26, Folder 107, p. 24185, L.C. Christie, Notes on the Political Crisis, 4 May 1935.

88.) Christie's view of the "nation's credit" encompassed much more than its determination to meet its financial obligations. Perhaps his interpretation of the concept may more accurately be described as the nation's determination to remain a distinctive and orderly entity and conduct its affairs according to the legal, consitutional, and moral rules it had established for itself at its inception, and to do so in a manner that would permit its own citizens as well as foreigners to observe it doing so and to have confidence that it would continue to do so. In a memorandum he wrote in the spring of 1935 -- and distributed to Meighen, Borden, Bennett, Skelton, Dafoe, and J.L. Ralston, among others -- Christie tried to describe his interpretation of the "national credit" and the risks at which it was placed by Ontario's actions. "Since the general thesis of these notes," Christie wrote,

"revolves around the conception of 'credit' -- particularly that of national credit -- and since in discussion one sometimes becomes aware of a hesitancy as to the realities of the conception, a word may be added for the sake of clarity -- the case of the power contracts and bonds again being used for purposes of illustration.

The realities of credit of course drive you to consider the simplicities of trust, confidence, belief. You get into the realm of calculation of intention and firmness of intention. In estimating a man's credit you have to ask what are the expectations, what [are] the probabilities, of

his acting or behaving firmly in a certain way as regards the particular relationship which is to be entered into between you, either on his proposal or on yours.

The conception of the national credit brings up similar calculations, but they are necessarily more complex than in the case of the individual. The nation is a complex. It is not merely the government, or the legislature, or the politicians, or the corporations, or their managers, or the universities, or their heads, or the churches or their heads. It is the thing that arises as the resultant from the interplay of the various behaviours of all these elements and others. To estimate the national credit you have to calculate what are the expectation, the probabilities, that out of this interplay there will always emerge a firm intent to keep the given word. You have to estimate the extent to which each element regards itself as part of the national complex, as well as its awareness of a sense of responsibility for the final resultant in any situation and its firmness in exercising that responsibility. In grave situations -- in any national emergency involving peace or war or orderly or disorderly ways of viewing the credit of the nation -- you always find in the end that, behind all the formal facades of governmental or political or business or financial organizations, the decision is made one way or another by a gradual process of interchange and calculation between the relatively few people who in each community across the country are informally recognized as leaders -- that is the resolute managing minds of the nation. They are men of all parties, some of them in active politics, some of them behind the public facade. ...

What, in these circumstances, will be the effect upon the national credit if the power companies and security holders, with the consent of the leading financial and business groups, surrender to this arbitrary act of government [that is, Ontario's repudiation], this loaded weapon -- if they simply place themselves in the hands of those who have loaded and pointed the weapon and through such a channel accept what is called a 'compromise' -- if they fail to demand the most elementary right known to the common law of the land, the right to have the case alleged against them publicly exposed and determined by some impartial process, free from the menacing shadow of this new [Ontario] legislation.

If an individual hands over his pocket book at the point of a gangster's pistol, his credit is not affected. If a bank messenger in such a crisis hands over a portfolio entrusted to him, there is always theft insurance to be reckoned in.

But in this case there is no insurance fund and cannot

be. The only insurance is the awareness and firmness of resolve and responsibility of all those elements who -- as we have seen -- by the interplay of their behaviour at any crisis express the national character.

Any 'negotiated' revision of the contracts -- any 'compromise' -- under the guns of this legislation is seen upon analysis to be equivocal to arbitrary repudiation. If this surrender is made -- if elementary rights are not insisted upon -- will not the people of other countries as well as this country be driven to the calculation that in a moment of crisis you cannot count upon the awareness and firmness of resolve of the business leaders of Canada who are entrusted with a part of the responsibility for the management of the nation's economy and the savings of the people of this and other lands. Will it not in the end be said that in effect, because they disliked unpleasantness, they sat down and became accomplices to this violent act of repudiation? ...

If such a surrender is made -- if the power companies finally find themselves without support and decide to accept 'compromise' -- if they fail to demand the orderly means by which alone they can hope to fulfill their simple covenant 'to maintain the security', which appears in every Trust Deed -- it seems clear enough that realistic observers inside and outside Canada will be forced to the calculation that Canada's credit is a most doubtful affair -- that she is in for a prolonged and incalculable emergency."

For Christie then, Ontario's repudiation of its power contracts with the Quebec companies was symbolic of what he saw as "the deep disintegration and irresponsibility that is corrupting both our political and economic machines." He basically believed that nothing less than Canada's future credibility as a nation was dependent upon order being imposed upon the political and economic chaos caused by the Depression, and that that order could be imposed only if the state allied itself with moral action and intervened to put matters right. The crisis of the Depression was for Christie a moral and ethical crisis as much as it was an economic one, and he likewise believed that the path to salvation lay in a determination to do the "right" thing and play the game by the traditional and generally accepted legal, moral, ethical, constitutional, and economic rules. "Today in an American weekly I happened to read this," he wrote Dafoe in the spring of 1935.

"A great political philosopher once said that there were certain kinds of political crises where the best politics were to forget politics and the statesman's only hope of escape was to take the counsel of his conscience; to do the thing he believed to be eternally right and to trust to fortune and to history for his verdict."

For the reasons I have indicated," he concluded, "and for other reasons which others know of better than I, I think we are today in the midst of precisely the kind of political crisis contemplated by this quotation." See L.C. Christie, Notes on the National Emergency, 16 April 1935, op. cit., pp. 094074-094077; L.C. Christie to J.W. Dafoe, 4 June 1935, op. cit.' and PAC, MG 30 D45, J.W. Dafoe Papers, Volume 8, Folder: 1935, June-September, L.C. Christie to J.W. Dafoe, 10 June 1935.

89.) Christie believed that if the political system was not made to work to solve the problems caused by the Depression it would lead to the progressive disillusionment of the Canadian people with their political institutions, a general belief that it was unworkable, and a resulting tendency to look for political answers and solutions outside of the orthodox system. He believed that he saw this line of thought developing in many Canadians, and was particularly concerned about its prevalence among members of the younger generation. "In recent years," Christie wrote, "I have been struck to find among my contemporaries, but even more among the younger men, an attitude toward our political processes and even personnel that practically amounts to contempt -- something very different anyhow from what I grew up under. You encounter it among all sorts and all degrees. About some public act they will shrug their shoulders and say contemptuously, "oh, that's politics". It's a disturbing perversion of the original fine meaning of the word." See PAC, MG 30 E44, Volume 12, Folder 40, pp. 11589-11590, L.C. Christie to C.J. Macmillan, 12 June 1935.

90.) L.C. Christie, Notes on the Political Crisis, 4 May 1935, op. cit., p. 24180. Ontario's act of repudiation was for Christie a threat to the nation's credibility, but also an opportunity for the federal government to reexert its authority and impose order on an increasingly disorderly polity. The problems caused by Hepburn, Christie wrote, "must be solved by orderly means and it must be solved at Ottawa, where it belongs under our federal system." The idea of the federal government disallowing Ontario's action was attractive to Christie because it reasserted the constitutional system and would end a period of drift in the country's economic and political affairs. "Let it be granted that this is an extraordinary power," he explained,

"to be exercised perhaps only in an emergency and for national purposes. But the emergency and national purpose plainly exist. This action by the richest, the most powerful province in Confederation, coming on top of like manifestations elsewhere in the Dominion, has profoundly shaken people's confidence inside and outside Canada. Ignore it officially and you have in effect invited the provinces and municipalities across Canada to do likewise.

This is the sole instrument of state by which you can take official note of it -- by which you can unmistakably assert Canada's will that her emergency will be solved by

ordinary means within the framework of our accepted economic system and that her credit shall be preserved intact. There is no other instrument for the purpose: the courts are barred: the Canadian Confederators in 1867 rejected the precedent of the American constitution. But they created this power, and if ever an occasion could be conceived demanding its exercise, this is it. They were creating a federal state, if ever a case could arise going to the root of such an institution's effectiveness, this is it. Section 90 is there for a plain purpose, and its existence undoubtedly imposes a responsibility. The Ontario Act has been or will be certified and submitted to Ottawa.

You cannot evade the responsibility by any resort to calculations of party advantage. There is only one question you can ask yourself -- a question of fact. Does a national necessity exist? You dare not assert that it does not. If the Federal Government fails to disallow this Act, and the general election proceeds on existing lines, you dare not assert to anyone, inside or outside Canada, that the present administration or anyone else can govern effectively, or can guarantee an orderly solution of our problem and the preservation of our credit. You can no more postpone your decision on disallowance till after the election than a court could postpone its decision on such a calculation. Section 90 cannot be read by the Governor-in-Council in any such sense.

The underlying conclusion, then, is that disallowance is an unavoidable and immediate duty: that is the starting point. ..."

See L.C. Christie to J.W. Dafoe, 4 June 1935, op. cit.; and L. C. Christie, Notes on the Political Crisis, 4 May 1935, op. cit., pp. 24180-24181.

91.) L.C. Christie, Notes on the National Emergency, 16 April 1935, op. cit., p. 094076. Christie's concern with legal symbols, relationships, and procedures dominated his view of Canadian domestic politics as much as it did his view of the country's external relations. In pushing very strongly for the federal government to exercise its constitutional prerogative and disallow Hepburn's repudiation of the power contracts, Christie believed that he was urging a course of action that would begin to restore the balance of power between the central government and the provinces that had been established by the Fathers of Confederation. Christie interpreted the BNA Act very literally and disapproved of Ottawa's invading the provinces' constitutional jurisdiction -- witness the papers he prepared for the Ontario government while working for Ontario Hydro -- as much as he did the reverse situation. In the main, however, Christie believed that the constitutional balance had tipped too far in the provinces' favor -- mainly because of decisions made by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Britain -- in the

period since 1867. "A more cockeyed mess than they [the Judicial Committee] have made of our constitution from the beginning would be difficult to imagine," he told Frankfurter at one point. A return to constitutional orthodoxy as it was originally expressed in the BNA Act, for Christie, would therefore have constituted a major step toward enabling the federal government to cope effectively with the national problems caused by the Great Depression. "It is a constitution," he wrote

'
"which our generation of Canadians must look to well and soon if they are ever to hope to build up a nation and people fitted to hold and manage half a continent in times like ours. We were fated to be born in an era which is dominated by dynamic ever growing concentrations of economic and political power -- whose distinctive characteristic is ever deepening violence.

The Fathers of Confederation seem to have known something of what was needed and did their best to pass it on; but the sons have missed the point. If anyone had deliberately set out to fasten on us a constitution which would divide and weaken and cripple us in the tasks that this age has thrust upon us, he could have scarcely invented anything better than the thing into which our fundamental charter has now evolved and been moulded by practice and judicial interpretations.

We are not one and united. We are half a score of jangling, jealous entities, all driven by their inner meaning and duty, as now judicially laid down, to balk and corrupt each other's efforts. The recurrent dream of voluntary co-operation is always easily shattered by legalism in the service of sectionalism or of those special interests to whom the present set up insures a definite strategic advantage.

And so it is that, out of this organic jealousy, created and sanctified by law, manipulated openly or secretly by sectionalism or special interest, we get our present twilight zone of near anarchy, where our new, vital, modern needs are left to the unregulated interplay of irresponsible forces, where the public conscience is baffled by the obscurity and enervated by the daily exhibition of its own impotence.

It is all the perfect set up for the practice of that powerful, well tested device, 'Divide and Rule' -- a device as old as the arts of human management, well known to masters of statecraft well before modernists began to talk about 'applied psychology'. Within our borders the ordinary plain man, disorganised, without facilities for pulling his weight, is left to the mercy of compactly organised people who know what they want and how to employ tough-minded, competent servants of their purpose. As a nation and a

people it exposes us to precisely the same kinds of calculation and manipulation from beyond our own shores and borders.

It is no accident that we are beginning to hear words of contempt, that the words tend to take on the tone of a by word. We sense this note especially perhaps among our younger people, but it does not stop there by any means. It is struck in our university classrooms; but it tends to become louder and more insistent in our public assemblies and public prints. When any vital part of a peoples' institutions begins to fall into this kind of disrepute and ridicule you know the flag of warning is up, to be disregarded at your peril.

It is no accident or mere coincident that, parallel with the deep fissures in our own constitutional field, we see so many signs of division, confusion and bewilderment among the Canadian people to-day when they attempt to grapple with the modern realities of their life and destiny. For another rule of human management, known to the few ages before the principles of psychology had been exposed to the many, tells us that a decisive factor in moulding a peoples' outlook is the purpose and character of their institutions. We have a constitution of a character calculated to breed disunity and confusion of conscience and effort and we have precisely that disunity and that confusion today.

It is completely futile and worse to go baying at the moon with preachments to Canadians about unity of purpose and effort, unless at the same time we set about the concrete job of reforming, when reform is shown to be needed, our constitutional instrumentalities that mould our nation and by means of which alone practical remedies for our troubles and dangers can be approached. The two -- the unity of purpose and constitutional means of action -- are as inseparable, interdependent, and interacting as Siamese twins."

Thus, for Christie, the answer to Canada's internal problems lay at least in part in the direction of reasserting the constitutional inheritance that he contended had been neglected in the decades since 1867. If such a reassertion was not made, the nation might well dissolve into a group of competing sections without even the semblance of unity. As he had in regard to the question of external autonomy, Christie maintained that the solution lay squarely in the hands of Canadians and required only conscious effort on their part to be made effectual. "Are Canadians content to go on listening," Christie asked, "to those who in effect insist on perpetuating our disunities, our organic jealousies, our impotencies, in the face of internal transition and external violence that will be indifferent to everything but competence and skill effectively employed?" He argued that they

were not and that the problems of the Great Depression offered the opportunity to undertake a period of "re-confederation" in which constitutional orthodoxy -- in the form primarily of a stronger and more effective central government -- would be restored, thereby giving Canadians the "confidence and strength to face whatever might come." See Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 30 January 1937; PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 21, Folder 75, pp. 19986-19988, L.C. Christie, Re the Constitution, 6 September 1937; and, L.C. Christie to J.W. Dafoe, 4 June 1935, op. cit.

92.) Christie's basic view of the political party as being not much more than a necessary evil was never clearer than in the instances when he saw Canada as being in the throes of a national crisis. Although he supported the Conservative Party for most of his life it seems that his support was based more on the type of leadership and decisiveness he believed it delivered than on any great affection for it as an institution. Indeed, by 1935 Christie felt that the party system had proven itself bankrupt of ideas with which to resolve the economic crisis and that it should therefore be abandoned for the duration of the emergency. "It is agreed," Christie wrote in June 1935,

"that party machines are as yet the best means we know for working our institutions, in spite of the fact that at all times they necessarily involve for party leaders and workers a divided loyalty and responsibility -- their loyalty to the machine and their loyalty to the country -- and therefore, theoretically, always some loss to the country. Whether there is in fact significant loss will depend upon the character of the personnel. In ordinary stable times the country stands the loss, whatever it may happen to be, as something that is balanced by other considerations -- intangibles touching our ideas of liberty and so on. In times of crisis it cannot stand the loss.

The conclusion that is reached at such times in the minds of political leaders may take two forms which really come to about the same thing. They may say to themselves, 'There is a crisis, and it is of such a character that I must agree to forget the machine for the time being and work with the others simply for the national interest.' Or they may say, 'There is a crisis, and it is of such a character that even if I have a majority, yet if the party warfare goes on I shall probably be unable to govern effectively, and so my party risks a damaging failure; therefore for the sake of both my party and my country I had better agree to a truce and to work with the other fellow for the time being. There are, for example, problems of fundamental finance to be tackled and solved. Unless this can be done it will be futile for me to think of my special political and social program. The only thing to do is to get together and try to straighten out the workings of the economic

system, which both of us accept as our starting point....

The political leaders must know the facts. I am certain that none of them cares to assert that an emergency does not exist. That being so, I cannot understand how, if they keep up the warfare, they will be able to escape the charge that they were willing to gamble against the country for the sake of some supposed party or personal advantage. I do not myself believe that any of them really wants to do that. ..."

Christie's belief in the necessity of political non-partisanship in addressing national emergencies was, from all appearances, absolutely immune from the lessons of reality. Time and again he expected to see the politicians declare what Dafoe called, in reaction to his suggestion in 1926 that a constitutional conference be called to deal with the question of external autonomy, "a truce of the Gods" in order to sort out and solve Canada's problem, and time and again he was disappointed and seemingly surprised when they failed to do so. How so sophisticated a mind as Christie's remained so utterly impervious to political reality -- in the 1930s alone he had seen Franklin Roosevelt steer clear of Hoover's floundering administration in the period between the Democrats' victory in November and his inauguration in March, and King's Liberals in opposition offering no assistance to Bennett in fighting the Depression -- is difficult to explain. The tenets of progressivism -- e.g., professionalism, nonpartisanship, nationalism -- perhaps provide the best clue to the riddle of Christie's lack of appreciation for the domestic political reality. See L.C. Christie to C.J. Macmillan, 12 June 1935, op. cit., pp. 11588-11589.

93.) PAC, MG 26 I, Meighen Papers, Volume 154, Folder 36, p. 094066, L.C. Christie, Notes on the National Emergency, 11 April 1935.

94.) L.C. Christie, Notes on the Political Crisis, 4 May 1935, op. cit., pp. 24180-24181. Along with nonpartisanship, came the necessities of firm and decisive leadership and the need to end the enervating sense of drift and malaise in the country by prompt and effective action. In the face of the chaos wrought by the Depression, Christie wrote that

"[to] me the final folly is that of so many people, irrespective of their party allegiance, whom I have heard say something like this 'Oh, yes, a National Government is necessary; but you have to wait until after the election, until the chaos is plainly exposed to the public eye, until something bad of some sort comes to light which the plain man can really understand.' That, I suggest, represents a complete perversion of the realities of our representative institutions and the principles and functions of leadership -- and leadership still does and must exist whatever the nature of your state institutions. That point of view, I

feel, is one of the things that if generally accepted would be calculated to discredit our parliamentary institutions altogether."

Again, Christie's schemes for political action in Canada came to grief because he failed to understand the nature of domestic politics, the tradeoffs and compromises necessary to make the system work. "The conclusion is inescapable," he concluded, "that we have definitely reached a point when all responsible men must empty their minds of party prejudice and bias and join together to form a coalition and a national government." He was bound, of course, to see his vision smashed by realistic politicians like Mackenzie King who knew that the essence of successful political leadership was to turn opportunities to the advantage of the party, and only thereafter address the nation's problems. See L.C. Christie to C.J. Macmillan, 12 June 1935, op. cit., pp. 11589-11590, and, L.C. Christie, Notes on the National Emergency, 11 August 1935, op. cit., p. 094068.

95.) L.C. Christie Notes on the National Emergency, 11 April 1935, op. cit., p. 094070. To fight an election under the conditions then extant would, Christie believed, lead inevitably to disaster.

"If Canada goes into the general election on the existing battle lines, what will you have. You now have steady, capable men on both and indeed on all three sides, with essentially the same outlook on most of our problems and certainly on our present emergency. You will see them divided -- arrayed against each other in an unreal fight -- driven to press party advantage to the limit -- wasting powder on each other over non-essentials -- vying with gangsters, demigods, and crackpots in all ranks -- insensibly giving ground here and there to subversive or unworkable proposals. You will see a House of Commons of a temper and character from which you can guarantee nothing, from which good can be extracted only by chance and at an expenditure of time and confusion that will drain still lower our reservoirs of confidence. The whole spectacle will be an exhibition of unreality, fantastic to the point of insanity, that can only set the country back to some incalculable extent. It will be an assault upon the finest values of our community life, values that to-day if ever ought to be enlisted and mobilised by every resource of leadership; for if this is not somehow done we shall have given away most of the battle, and we need not be surprised if other forces win large gains -- if values bred of misery, despair, and disillusionment are for a time seized and moulded to subversive ends in Canada as elsewhere in the world to-day. On what ground can Canada alone consider herself able to carry on through this crisis under banners of politics as usual, 'business as usual'? Practically every other community in the western world has been driven to drop such luxuries and turn to serious political thinking

and means of government. And a consideration of the gravest moment is this: that the chaotic political conditions that are likely to follow a general election fought on existing lines will be calculated to discredit democratic institutions themselves in this country."

See Ibid., pp. 24182-24183.

96.) L.C. Christie to J.W. Dafoe, 4 June 1935, op. cit. Christie also believed that such a coalition of "sane and steady" men would enable Canada to protect its interests against the threats posed by an increasingly chaotic international environment, "for in that context Canada is specially vulnerable." "All this [his proposal for a national government] is simply on the basis of the existing internal emergency," he explained to Dafoe in mid 1935. "If one looks abroad the case becomes complete. Set up a coalition government as a going concern returned by the electorate and you have the best possible guarantee that our Confederation shall withstand steadily and successfully the repercussions from (a.) the monetary and economic disruptions from the American presidential campaign which is already in its opening stages and (b.) the international tensions of the European and Asiatic scenes, which in the next five years will be hanging in the balance between chaos and order." See PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 26, Folder 107, p. 24185, L.C. Christie, Notes on the Political Crisis, Postscript, 16 May 1935, and L.C. Christie to J.W. Dafoe, 4 June 1935, op. cit.

97.) L.C. Christie, Notes on the Political Crisis, 4 May 1935, op. cit., pp. 24181-24182. Once again it was J.W. Dafoe who threw buckets of ice-cold water on Christie's arguments for the necessity of establishing a coalition government. "Now for a word or two about the movement for national government," Dafoe wrote July, 1935.

"So far as my observation goes, the movement amounts to really nothing as yet. It is regarded by the public, rightly I think, as a huge maneuver of the kind I indicated above, that is an attempt to protect invested capital at the expense of the poor sucker the tax-payer. ... A very considerable section of the public believes that the pressure for national government comes from this source (CPR) and that it is seconded by the powerful secondary industries who have protected themselves to some extent during the depression by increasing the burdens on primary producers, particularly those in the outlying provinces.

For these reasons the national government movement as it exists to-day will get nowhere. This does not exclude the possibility that a real movement for national government will emerge in two or three years if there is no substantial improvement in conditions, but I doubt whether even then, it will take the form of a coalition government. It instead

will be a union of the Liberal-Conservative and the Conservative-Liberal elements into a new party of the Right-Center to safeguard the country against changes and innovations pressed for by a radical party rapidly growing in strength.

If we have a development of this kind in Canada it will come about, I should say, by the Liberal Party opening its doors to the Liberal elements in the Conservative Party which appears to have been completely wrecked by the eccentric performance of its leaders."

It also seems probable that Dafoe's reference to the CPR being deeply involved in the agitation for a national government made Christie wince as he had also sent his memorandum "Notes on the Political Crisis" to Sir Edward Beatty, President of the CPR. In fact, in replying to Dafoe he tried to make clear that he knew about the plans being inspired by the CPR and to reassure him that he was not an agent for them. "As for national government," Christie wrote,

"I suppose [the general election] last week has put the dream into the realm of the academic and I dare say your prognosis of the future was right. So far as I poked my nose into such speculations, I entirely disassociated myself from the manoeuvre of which you speak (I refused several overtures looking to my taking part of some organization of financial interests to study and propagandise). I felt that all the party people had badly messed things -- R. [Richard] B. [ennett] certainly not least -- and hoped that there might be some way to combine and find strength to stand up to the greed and stupidity of which I had seen so much in Montreal. I felt the party machine to be especially vulnerable and pretty helpless in the face of all that."

See PAC, MG 30 D45, J.W. Dafoe Papers, Volume 8, Folder 1935: June-September, J.W. Dafoe to L.C. Christie, 6 July 1935; Ibid., Folder 1935: L.C. Christie to J.W. Dafoe, 22 October 1935; and, L.C. Christie, Notes on the Political Crisis, 4 May 1935, op. cit., p. 24187.

98.) L.C. Christie to J.W. Dafoe, 4 June 1935, op. cit. Since Mackenzie King was obviously unwilling, and probably unable, to provide the sort of leadership Christie was looking for, the question arises as to why the two men, just a few months hence, were able to enter into a working relationship that grew increasingly more effective with the passage of time. Indeed, such was the success of the cooperation that Hugh Keenleyside has written that King probably would have appointed Christie to succeed Skelton in January, 1941 if he had been in better health. The question is, of course, sharpened by the recollection of the distant and rather bitter relationship which had existed between the two men between King's election in December, 1921 and Christie's resignation from the Department of External Affairs in

May, 1923. In her book, Knight of the Holy Spirit. A Study of William Lyon Mackenzie King, Professor Joy Esbrey has, in regard to the new found compatibility between Christie and King, written that although in 1935

"... Christie still had his Tory connections he had shed his commitment to the imperial ideal in the meantime and that it was Christie and not King who had changed his stance. Further, with O.D. Skelton firmly in charge, it was unlikely that Christie's Tory leanings would have much effect on Department activity. King could thus avail himself of Christie's expert services and reassert his impartiality without in any way endangering Liberal policy."

While Christie had clearly renounced whatever limited allegiance he had at one time held for the "imperial ideal," it seems unlikely that this factor in and of itself would have been enough to reassure King. After all, Christie had been an important policy adviser -- through the agency of Ontario Hydro -- to G.H. Ferguson's Conservative regime in Ontario during its contests with King's Liberal regime over power development on the Ottawa and St. Lawrence Rivers between 1927 and 1929. Moreover, King knew full well that even after Christie had returned to External Affairs he kept up close associations with prominent Tories, among them some who had not made as nearly as clean a break with the "imperial ideal" as had Christie. In his diary in December, 1936, for example, King recorded that the Governor General's secretary

"spoke of a club His Excellency [Lord Tweedsmuir/John Buchan] had been at last night -- Loring Christie, Justice [Lyman] Duff, [Russell] Smart, John Stevenson, [O.M.] Biggar and one or two others (no name, just dinner at country club now and then) men who regard themselves as sort of a round table savant group. I suppose Bill Herridge is a member (and [Generals] McNaughton and MacBrien). I feel that the Governor would be wiser to keep out of groups of the kind, and perhaps a little nearer his Ministers, and their friends."

Clearly, the ideas that sprang to King's mind as a consequence of this bit of news from the Governor General's secretary indicates his continuing suspicion of and distaste for the Tory circles in which Christie continued to move. It also suggests that Christie's rejection of the "imperial ideal," while an important consideration, was not enough by itself to have brought him back within the Prime Minister's good graces.

Three additional factors, it seems, are necessary to consider to arrive at an explanation of why King and Christie were able to work well together between 1935 and 1941 after they had failed so utterly to do so in the 1921-1923 period. The first factor involves the respect each man comes to have for the other as a consummate professional in his given field. Professor Mansergh has called Mackenzie King "the Prime Ministers' Prime

Minister" in recognition of his absolute mastery of the Canadian political system and his record of accomplishing solid achievements in an impressive if decidedly unspectacular manner. Christie himself recognized King's skill and admitted his somewhat unwilling admiration for it. Likewise, throughout the years between 1927 and 1935, King had many occasions to become well acquainted with Christie's skill through the many memoranda and letters on the subjects of water power and federalism that reached his desk through Skelton. A certain degree of mutual respect between two highly-skilled professionals therefore must be counted as another factor promoting a King-Christie rapprochement.

Another, and often neglected, point of common ground between Christie and King is the lessons each took away from their educational and professional experiences in the United States during the Progressive era. Professor Cassidy in his essay "Mackenzie King and American Progressivism" reels off a list of attributes of American progressivism that were prominent features of King's attitudes and actions that includes: an emphasis on character and the individual's duties to society, a passion for order and a dislike and fear of social upheaval, a faith in experts and technicians, a belief in society's need for strong and elite leadership, and adherence to the concept of staying off radicalism through programs of reform. As has been shown herein, Christie shared all of these characteristics with King, although he probably was much more emphatically a Progressive than was King.

Finally, arguably the most important factor facilitating an effective relationship between Christie and King was each man's overriding concern with maintaining Canadian unity. As has been seen, Christie's thought after 1926 was dominated by the theme of Canadian unity, and from the variety of non-external affairs related jobs that were assigned to him by the Prime Minister after he rejoined the government it seems likely that King realized that he and Christie held identical views regarding national unity and that Christie's input into policy deliberations therefore was well worth having. Between the fall of 1935 and his appointment as Minister to the United States, for example, Christie was involved in formulating the federal policy that resulted in the disallowance of several measures passed by the Social Credit government of Alberta in 1937, and in the negotiations between Ottawa and the provincial premiers regarding the creation of an unemployment insurance scheme. So heavy were these domestic policy responsibilities that at one point Christie complained in a letter to L.B. Pearson that "the P.M. has also developed a nasty habit of dragging me into his internal affairs, like Aberhart, Hepburn, unemployment insurance etc. and I am fed up with it" On another occasion he told Skelton in the same vein that "(s)everal times recently I would have liked a word with you but the pressure has been too much (the P.M. and his office have been flinging a variety of things at me -- internal)." Perhaps the most eloquent testimony of King's recognition of and faith in Christie's commitment to national unity was the fact that he designated Christie as co-drafter,

along with A.D.P. Heeney, of the speeches to be made during the Royal Tour in the summer of 1939. One suspects that the goal of protecting national unity was the strongest bond between two men whose ideas in other areas differed significantly.

For the possibility of Christie succeeding Skelton after the latter's death and the importance of Christie's abandonment of the "imperial ideal" as an impetus for his rapprochement with King see Hugh L. Keenleyside. Memoirs of Hugh L. Keenleyside. Volume II: On the Bridge of Time. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982, p. 189; Joy E. Esbrey. Knight of the Holy Spirit. A Study of William Lyon Mackenzie King. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980, p. 182; and, PAC, MG 26 J13, King Papers, King Diary, Volume 1936, Entry for 9 December 1936. For the basis of the above discussion on the importance of mutual respect for each other's professionalism and expertise and the role of common experiences with American Progressivism see Nicholas Mansergh. The Commonwealth Experience. Volume II: From British to Multiracial Commonwealth, Revised Edition. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982, pp. 213-225; PAC, MG 26 N1, Pearson Papers, Volume 1, Folder: L.C. Christie, 1937, L.C. Christie to L.B. Pearson, 1 December 1937; and, Keith Cassidy, "Mackenzie King and American Progressivism," in John English and J.O. Stubbs, (eds.). Mackenzie King: Widening the Debate. Toronto: Macmillan, 1977, pp. 107-110. For Christie's close involvement in domestic policymaking and the Royal Tour see Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 21 August 1937; PAC, MG 26 J13, King Papers, King Diary, Volume 1937, Entry for 2 November 1937; L.C. Christie to L.B. Pearson, 1 December 1937, op. cit.; L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 21 November 1937, in John A. Munro, (ed.), DCER, VI: 1935-1937, Document 102, p. 104; and, Arthur D.P. Heeney. The Things That are Caesar's. Memoirs of a Canadian Public Servant. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972, p. 50.

99.) PAC, MG 30 D45, J.W. Dafoe Papers, Volume 6, Folder 1932: January-April, L.C. Christie to J.W. Dafoe, 11 January 1932.

100.) L.C. Christie to R.B. Bennett, 25 August 1933, op. cit., p. 514938. Christie's conception of the International Joint Commission was another prime example of the Progressive's faith in establishing institutions which would serve as instruments through which regularity and orderly predictability could be imposed on a chaotic or potentially chaotic situation. "So far as state machinery is concerned," Christie wrote in regard to the Commission,

"our relations with the U.S. in the last resort -- or rather in the next to last resort -- are wrapped up in maintaining the integrity of the system created by the Treaty of 1909 and studying its improvement as time goes on. In providing a set of general principles, an independent tribunal and a growing body of practice and habit, to which an important class of specific questions arising can be relegated with a fair assurance that they will be determined with something

of the certainty that municipal courts achieve in their sphere, the system has clearly shown an advance over the precarious method of sporadic inter-governmental negotiation. Upon these 'boundary water' or 'frontier' questions referred to it the International Joint Commission seems to have functioned, now as an arbitral tribunal, now as a board of inquiry, now as an administrative body -- and it has been a very successful experiment. ...

Our vital necessity to preserve the system at full strength is not lessened in the least degree by the reason of the establishment of our Legation at Washington. A diplomatist is simply an agent; his establishment no more than a convenient extension abroad of the departmental machine at home; his job more to bargain on the lay of the cards at the moment than to administer a set of rules and build an ordered regime. So far as this discussion is concerned, all that the establishment of the Canadian Legation meant was moving a set of files and office furniture across a Washington boulevard and changing the persons who manipulated them. It is an essential instrument, and I have not the least intention of belittling its great value; but diplomacy has its limitation as we discovered in 1914. The Old World found that it had to invent another system as well, and it is still busy with the League. Our own Treaty of 1909 can handle certain problems which diplomacy is physically incapable of handling: for example, where continuous joint administration of some property or work is required, as under the Joint Control Boards subject to the International Joint Commission -- the Lake of the Woods Control Board, the Niagara Control Board, and so on. ..."

Christie, in fact, thought that the duties of the Commission might be profitably expanded to include other topics of mutual concern. "For example," he wrote, "a method might be found to adapt it to the business of regulating the difficult rum-running problem on the boundary and sea coast -- or even to the immigration problem." He also had high hopes for the future utility of "the general arbitration function contemplated in Article 10 of the Treaty." A great many of the catch-words and phrases of Progressivism are present in this hymn of praise to the Commission -- the importance of regular institutionalized systems, the contrasts between the Old World and the New, the need to experiment and innovate when old procedures failed, the faith in arbitration -- and are a good indication of the depth of influence exerted on Christie's thought by his educational and professional experiences in the United States during the Progressive Era. See L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 12 July 1927, op. cit., pp. 148405-148407.

101.) L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 12 July 1927, op. cit., p. 148405.

102.) Ibid., pp. 148407-148408.

103.) Christie used the Commission's successful record as a means of underscoring his intense dislike of Canadian involvement in the League of Nations. The Commission, in proving that it could handle knotty bilateral issues equitably, he wrote, had also made it "evident that these North American problems could not possibly be handled through the League machinery at a distance of thousands of miles." Because the Commission's work had shown that North American disputes were "the responsibility of Ottawa and Washington on the spot," and because he believed that Canada's most important foreign policy concerns were with the United States, Christie could see little substantive merit in continuing political involvement in the League where the United States was not a member and North American problems could not be addressed effectively. See Ibid., p. 148405.

104.) Christie was, however, far from naive in his view of the willingness of the United States to be beneficent toward Canada, and, in fact, he always believed that issues with the United States should not be broached or reopened unless there was a most compelling reason to do so. In a memorandum in September, 1933 the federal government's Department of Railways and Canals engineers asserted that the Treaty of Washington of 1871 prohibited Ottawa from granting the Beauharnois Light, Heat and Power Company the authority to divert additional water for hydroelectric production from the St. Lawrence River because the United States was guaranteed navigation on the river and the diversion under consideration would make navigation at that point in the river impossible. The engineers argued that the Treaty did not give the United States the right to navigate side canals in Canada and they suggested that Ottawa might use access to these canals "effectively as a bargaining lever to extract some quid pro quo [from the United States] in return for the Americans being permitted to use such canals." Christie responded to the engineers' argument in a memorandum for R.B. Bennett and O.D. Skelton that stressed the common sense and wisdom of Canada -- because of the disparity of bargaining power between the two countries and the propensity of the Americans to drive an exceptionally hard bargain -- leaving well enough alone. He said that the canals on the Canadian side had always been assumed to be part of the Treaty's guarantee of access to navigation for both countries to and from the sea, and that to argue to the contrary would be to fly in the face of sixty years of experience under the pact, and, more dangerously, would give the Americans an opportunity to control Canadian policy. "The thing cuts both ways," Christie wrote,

"Although it [the engineers' position] might conceivably preserve for Canada some sort of position as regards the side canals, it equally at the same time concedes to the United States a definite right forever to use the river channel everywhere throughout the Canadian section of the river. It concedes them the power to demand that,

regardless of the side canal position, Canada must not block the river channel at any point without their consent. Thus, before developing the Soulanges and Lachine sections [of the St. Lawrence River] for hydro-electric power, Canada would have to ask the consent of the United States. The United States upon such a request would of course expect a quid pro quo. In the result Canada would have to give up power development or be drawn into some further treaty or formal international document touching wholly Canadian waters. The process might drag us to the extent of having to consult with the United States as to the actual plans and works by means of which we propose to alter or develop the river channel from the boundary down to the sea. The upshot of all this surely is that there is no effective bargaining lever left at this point. This [the engineers'] strategical conception appears indeed to be illusory. It cancels out."

Believing that Ottawa's pursuit of the engineers' scheme "might recognize American intervention into wholly Canadian waters or into the manner of their development," Christie told the Prime Minister "that it would be a great mistake internationally to adopt it." "To sum up," Christie wrote,

"[e]ither the river channel interpretation would impose a substantial burden upon St. Lawrence power development and the consumers for the sake of nothing real. Or, if the matter were broached at Washington, the best that could happen for Canada would be a cancelling out of the respective desiderata; to regain mastery of the river she would have to concede the side canal proposition. But by waking the sleeping dog, she would admit the principle of American intervention and invite new treaty claims into Canadian waters. And you never know where a dog may wander.

On the other hand, the other interpretation is diplomatically convenient and safe. It requires no approach to Washington; no new treaty clauses; no diplomatic initiation at all. Canada merely does not challenge this interpretation of the old treaty; but meanwhile continues to exercise the complete mastery of the river in all other respects. (This will rarely be disputed. Washington was notified of the Beauharnois project by Ottawa four years ago and made no such point. Why should we gratuitously make it for them?). This position is safe, too, because it recognizes the realities. Whatever the case in 1871, the untroubled development of hydro-electric power is to-day a major Canadian interest and our mastery of the river has a value. ..."

The issue, Christie concluded, "should be resolved by a balancing of the practical consequences and advantages; for it happens that in this case Canada is in possession and is in reality in a position to solve the matter simply herself without inviting international complications." See PAC, MG 26 K, R.B. Bennett

Papers, Reel M-1469, pp. 513238-513242, L.C. Christie, Memorandum Respecting Treaty of 1871 and increased water diversion required on October 1st, 1933, 9 September 1933, and Ibid., p. 513257, L.C. Christie to R.B. Bennett, 11 September 1933. For other instances of Christie's cautious attitude toward dealing with the United States see, for example, Michael F. Scheuer, "Leaving Well Enough Alone: Loring C. Christie and the Rush-Bagot Agreement, May-June, 1939, op. cit.

105.) L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 12 July 1927, op. cit., p. 148410.

106.) See the curriculum vitae attached to L.C. Christie to Winthrop Aldrich, 18 December 1938, op. cit.

107) For a very brief outline of this incident and the other highlights of interwar Canadian-Soviet relations see Aloysius Balawyder, "Canada in the Uneasy War Alliance," in Aloysius Balawyder (ed.), Canadian-Soviet Relations, 1939-1980. Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic Press, 1981, pp. 1-2.

108.) L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 17 June 1927, op. cit., pp. 148399-148401. This letter also contains a hint of Christie's lingering animosity and disdain for Mackenzie King. After commenting that Moscow's agent in Canada had been expelled by Ottawa although he had done nothing to merit such treatment, Christie gave Borden a brief description of the event in the following manner. "He [the Russian agent], poor fellow, on leaving," Christie told Borden a bit snidely, "rather pathetically expressed his bewilderment to the P.M. about the whole affair because he had understood from their heart to heart talks about the P.M.'s grandfather that Mackenzie King was the champion of the people everywhere. I hope he has a diary of those heart to heart talks and will take to authorship someday." See Ibid., pp. 148399A-148400.

109.) L.C. Christie to Lord Lothian, 17 August 1934, op. cit.

110.) PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 26, Folder 107, pp. 24167 and 24170, L.C. Christie, Notes on Canada and "Collective Security," 24 May 1935.

111.) Ibid., p. 24162. Christie feared war above all things because he believed it set loose passions that were uncontrollable and which made a fiction of parliamentary democracy. For Christie this was the darkest side of the state -- the condition that gave full play to what he described as "the anarchy inherent in the nature of the sovereign state" -- and the one that had to be avoided at all costs, even that of trying to limit Canada's involvement in international affairs. "To declare war," he told the CIIA, "to got to war, is to put your national existence at stake. We know from experience what kind of a lever this state declaration is: it starts the terrific engine of mass emotion which is let loose when our modern democracies are put

into the state of war. Once the engine is started it takes charge; something happens in the minds of men, and the nation becomes a wholly different thing; rulers can do little but bow to it, and the problem of management becomes one which parliamentary institutions and party processes are ill fitted to cope with. No one has been able to point out any difference in this respect between a plain, ordinary war and a 'League' war."

Seeing this dark side of the state was, for Christie, essential to gaining an understanding of why any sort of a collective security arrangement was hopelessly unrealistic. What set of leaders, he asked, would put at risk both the state they ruled and their own personal power and preeminence, to go to war in the name of a "collective security" system if their own specific national interests were in no way endangered. Christie's answer was that no set of leaders would or, in his own mind, should be expected to do so as long as the present system of sovereign states endured. "So when your Canadian Cabinet -- or the rulers of any state -- really face such a decision." he wrote

"is it not clear that, if they are to pull the lever that starts the war engine, they will be bound not only by habit and sentiment but by plain duty to think only and exclusively of the safety of the state, of the immediate and direct integrity of the people to whom they are responsible and who alone can call them to account? Before you can imagine them acting in such decisive terms on behalf of the peace and safety of other peoples, must you not have a radical revolution in the terms of their constitutional responsibility? Can you really get at your problem without some profound alteration of the state structures that are your material? Must you not really attempt to cope with this Frankenstein monster of state sovereignty? ..."

Christie rejected the idea of collective security, therefore, not primarily out of any inherent antipathy toward the Europeans, but because he feared the uncontrollable and unpredictable effects that war exerted on democratic society. Collective security, for Christie, always meant an abandonment of political responsibility for formulating ways of avoiding war and the adoption of a military mode of thinking that made war inevitable. The Progressives' fear of disorder and their faith in rationality and political innovation, mixed with his logical and increasingly nationalistic bent of mind to make Christie an inveterate opponent of collective security. See Ibid., pp. 24166 and 24163.

112.) Ibid., p. 24163.

113.) Ibid., pp. 24171-24173.

114.) Ibid., p. 24173. Christie regarded collective security arrangements as simply a more fashionably modern name for military alliances, and he damned both with equal vigour for

their replacement of human reason and innovative power with a reliance on force. "Military alliances may be the stuff of history;" Christie maintained,

"[but] they cannot be justified in the realm of political thought building for the future. They are only a sauve-qui-peut -- in themselves a tacit abandonment of political thinking and a definite acceptance of war as a necessity ... a device, that is to say, adopted in desperation and justifiable only on simple grounds of self-preservation -- essentially self-centered and indifferent. It never has been and never can be anything else."

This tirade against what he considered to be the denial of reason inherent in the adoption of military alliances highlights another progressive thread that endured in Christie's thought, namely, a certain faith in the possibility -- if not the inevitability -- of society progressing toward less conflict, better organization, more efficiency, and greater equity through the application of human knowledge, reason, and experience to its problems. Although he believed that the dominance of the sovereign state in international politics had to be accepted as a fact of life by all nations in their policy calculations, for example, he did not resign himself to believing that the sovereign state would last forever. Christie could not foresee the day when the sovereign state would be superseded, but he did believe that man was fully capable of devising a less brutal, war-prone, and chaos-producing form of international organization. In a letter to Escott Reid, Christie rejected the contention of a friend of Reid's that the sovereign state was an eternal given. "If Colonel Stuart thinks the conception of the sovereign national state is rooted in human nature, I do not agree," Christie wrote.

"One of our ancestors might easily have been heard to remark that the Holy Roman Empire was rooted in human nature. I do not see how it can be said that any workable system of government is incompatible with British ideals. British peoples spend half their day inventing systems of government and spend their nights dreaming about them. It surely does not need a change in human nature to invent and develop something politically new. The whole structure of government is, first of all, to take account of human nature as it is and then to devise a scheme calculated to canalise it along orderly lines."

While hardly holding out hope for the immediate advent of the millenium, the foregoing clearly reveals Christie's continuing belief in at least the possibility of human progress through the application of human reason on society's problems. See PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 764, File 284-volume 5, L.C. Christie, "Reform of the League": Canada's Position Addendum, 9 September 1936, and Escott Reid Papers, L.C. Christie to Escott Reid, 25 October 1935.

115.) L.C. Christie, Notes on Canada and "Collective Security," 24 May 1935, op. cit., p. 24173.

116.) PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 26, Folder 107, p. 24174, L.C. Christie to Lord Lothian, 30 May 1935. Christie also told Lothian that the two views into which the CIIA Conference divided itself were really the opposite side of the same collective security coin. Both, he wrote, treated a new war as if it was inevitable and argued that it was too late to try any political innovation to head off the catastrophe. "One view in fact asserted that war was inevitable;" Christie recounted,

"that indisputably it would be a world war; that Canada must necessarily plunge from the outset, because otherwise we might face the emergence of a dominant power somewhere that would leave Canada hopelessly exposed to an assault on her way of life; and that therefore we might as well go on with the 'collective security' notion on faith, since that might make the war more palatable to Canadians. Others did not accept the inevitability of war so boldly; they felt -- though they did not seem too confident -- that 'collective security' might hold the war off; but if it came they seemed to accept the rest of the first view -- that is to say, Canada must plunge at the 'aggressor' at once to prevent eventual disaster and that it would be easier to carry the country on a policy of 'collective security'. ..."

Christie accepted the notion that the likelihood of war was increasing and approaching the point of inevitability but he contended that a particular outcome actually became inevitable only when the human beings involved in it chose not to resist, or at least try to redirect, the onrush of events. Even the Great War, which had convulsed Europe between 1914 and 1918 had not sucked in every European nation. "We may recall, too," Christie told the CIIA Conference,

"that though the war of 1914 raised issues of public law in Europe, 50,000,000 Europeans -- 6 states of Western Europe -- took a cool view of the affair and remained neutral. Looking at this experience must we not conclude that sovereign states have not in fact acted as the notion of 'collective security' would have them act, but have acted along lines that might reasonably have been calculated from the nature of such creatures? Do events give any indication at all that they can or will behave differently?"

If a scheme of collective security was to be effective, Christie wrote, it "cannot ignore the imperatives of geography, of space and time; and, next, the exercise of responsibility must be coupled with the possession of direct interest and with the knowledge of things and people governed." The present League of Nation's system took into account none of these items, nor did it involve, in Christie's mind at least, problems of direct interest

to Canada. To enter into such an agreement then could only be viewed as an abject surrender of political responsibility and an ignoring of the national interest. See Ibid., pp. 24174-24175, and L.C. Christie, Notes on Canada and "Collective Security," 24 May 1935, op. cit., pp. 24164-24170.

117.) L.C. Christie to Lord Lothian, 30 May 1935, op. cit., p. 24178.

118.) Ibid., p. 24175. As was his general practice, Christie distributed his paper on Canada and collective security to a wide selection of friends and professional acquaintances. Several of the reactions the paper elicited go far to show the fragmented attitudes toward international affairs that existed in Canada in the mid-1930s. They also lend some credence to Christie's fear that the diversity of opinion on questions of external affairs in Canada could lead to disunity if the country was forced into war again. John W. Dafoe, for example, agreed with Christie as to the necessity of continuing political invention, but argued that that path led Canada in the direction of greater not less participation in the League of Nations system. "I read with deep interest," Dafoe wrote,

"your extraordinarily acute, most masterly discussion of the question of collective security which you presented at the Kingston Conference. I am not in sympathy with the development which you foreshadow [that is, one that would find Canada decreasing its involvement in European affairs], and I think it would be a world calamity if events should take that course, but I am not prepared to question the accuracy of your forecast. I think that it is highly probable that you are right, but feeling as I do on this question I am bound to do what I can to support the view that a real collective system is possible and that the country or countries that refuse to co-operate are putting their feet upon a slippery road that will lead them to ruin. Unfortunately, they will take the rest of the world with them. ...

If your forecast as to the course of events is verified I can foresee, at no great distance in time, a movement in Canada to have this country take steps by which she can -- as far as this is possible in the modern world -- withdraw herself from military and political associations that will involve her in wars arising from issues that have no direct association with North America. In a world from which the idea of peace by collective action is banished Great Britain will be thrown into what Laurier called 'the vortex of militarism'; and I don't think Canada will go along with her. I believe that Canada could be persuaded to accept responsibilities and discharge them, whatever this may involve, in connection with a world system directed towards maintaining and enforcing peace; to this system the United States would have to be related either integrally or by

association. Failing this, the only course of action giving Canada a remote chance of surviving in the inevitable debacle would be a North American isolation behind such bulwarks and defences as we could equip ourselves under modern conditions. This would, of course, [cause] change in [our] political relationship -- we should have to free ourselves from the moral and legal obligations that go with membership in the Commonwealth."

In short, Dafoe saw political invention leading toward two distinct goals: the establishment of an effective system of collective security, and the creation of an environment in which the Commonwealth relationship could be made effective for all of its member states by protecting each of their national interests. For Dafoe, the martial side would triumph only if Canada chose to shun political innovation and retreat behind the "bulwarks and defences" built on the North American continent.

At the other extreme of responses lay that of General H.D.G. Crerar who saw the use of martial forces to achieve political ends as a perfectly legitimate, and, indeed, desirable method of procedure. "War [is] inherent in the world of sovereign states," Crerar wrote, "[and the] League of Nations and [the] Peace Pact cannot end war or preserve peace." Crerar agreed with Christie that the adjustment of relations between states was an on-going process and that no event was inevitable. He believed, however, that in order to arrive at necessary changes "no means exist outside war!" Indeed, whereas Christie had contended that the "British Commonwealth survives not from its martial exploits but from the birth and continuous rebirth of political wisdom," Crerar maintained that such a "statement [would be] very difficult to justify historically. It is probably true to say that martial exploits have preserved the Commonwealth in spite of political blunders."

Recognizing that there existed a great variety of attitudes along the spectrum between those of Dafoe and Crerar was another factor that moved Christie to champion less rather than more involvement for Canada in international affairs. Always fearful that an international event could be the catalyst of widespread internal disunity in Canada, Christie believed that a reduction in the variety of Canada's international activities and commitments -- save only those that were clearly necessary to further and protect a narrowly defined statement of the national interest -- would save the country from a situation in which basically irreconcilable views would be pitted against each other. This danger, Christie wrote, was clearly manifested at the CIIA's Kingston Conference.

"There emerged two fairly clear views [at Kingston]. There were those who from the outset would plunge Canada into active participation into any war in which Great Britain became involved, assuming always that it took shape as a 'League' or 'Security' war against an 'aggressor'. And there were those who were for a declaration of neutrality at the outset, realising that this would really mean

secession. I imagine though I do not know -- as there were quite a few silent listeners -- that the latter were in the minority at Kingston. They were not cranks, nor pacifists, nor anything like that. I do not really know what the proportions are in the country, and, not having been across the country in recent years, cannot guess. Several of the delegates referred to the 31% French-Canadians and seemed to assume that they would take the neutrality line; while others mentioned other groups in a like sense. But most of those who ventured into such speculation seemed to agree, that, whichever of these views might win the field in the event of war breaking out tomorrow, a difficult condition of internal tension would arise in Canada."

Thus adding to Christie's distaste for collective security on purely logical and political grounds, was the fear that "automatic" involvement in another European war -- be it a "British" or a "League" war -- would unleash the ever present centrifugal forces in the Canadian polity and thereby threaten the nation's survival. See John W. Dafoe to L.C. Christie, 6 July 1935, op. cit.; PAC, MG 30 E 157, H.D.G. Crerar Papers, Volume 12, Folder 5K, H.D.G. Crerar, Observations on a Paper by Loring Christie (External Affairs), October, 1935; and L.C. Christie to Lord Lothian, 30 May 1935, op. cit., pp. 24179 and 24177.

119.) L.C. Christie to Lord Lothian, 30 May 1935, op. cit., p. 24177.

120.) L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 24 April 1935, op. cit., p. 148419A.

121.) Library of Congress, F.F. Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 4 June 1935.

122.) PAC, MG 26H, R.L. Borden Papers, Volume 264, Folder 60, p. 148421, L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 28 April 1925.

123.) Ibid., MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 12, Folder 40, p. 11563, L.C. Christie to Lord Lothian, 30 May 1935.

124.) L.C. Christie to R.L. Borden, 24 April 1935, op. cit., p. 148419A. Christie, as has been seen, maintained contact with Bennett throughout the 1930-1935 period in regard to the Beauharnois Company's relations with the federal government. After leaving Beauharnois in late April, 1935, Christie appears to have courted Bennet in an effort to return to the Department of External Affairs. He apparently discussed matters with him personally on several occasions, and made an effort to keep the Prime Minister informed of his latest thoughts on foreign affairs. "The enclosed papers might interest you ...," Christie wrote to Bennett when sending him a copy of the paper on "Collective Security" he had presented at Kingston. "I do not dream you will have time for them now, nor am I seeking to draw

you out in any way, but I think they have a bearing on some present activities even though they represent an attempt at a long-term calculation." See L.C. Christie to Lord Lothian, 30 May 1935, op. cit., and PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 12, Folder 40, p. 11539, L.C. Christie to R.B. Bennett, 30 May 1935.

125.) Norman Hillmer, "O.D. Skelton: The Scholar Who Set a Future Pattern," International Perspectives, (September/October, 1973), p. 49.

126.) Ibid. Professor Hillmer has also noted that Skelton, like Christie, made the direct connection between national unity and the country's commitment to the Empire.

"Skelton acknowledged that the most important factor in Canada's existence was its position within the British Empire. He knew that the British connection could unite Canadians as it had in 1914, but he believed that it was more likely to divide them and divert them from their goal of nation-building on the North American continent."

Again according to Professor Hillmer, Skelton, like Christie, saw the interwar period as an "opportunity [for Canada] to take stock of itself and to consider fully and relatively freely its own interests in the world." That this was not done was something that Skelton, no less than Christie, deeply regretted, and his bitter words written in 1939 eloquently echo the scenario Christie had sketched out at the CIIA's Kingston Conference in 1935.

"It is probable that those opposed to participation in British wars now constitute a majority of the people of Canada. But it is also clear that the imperialist minority have a weight behind their numbers because of their greater share of the wealth, influence, assurance, and public position; the greater number of men now in high positions, business or governmental, formed their opinions at a time when imperial or colonial views were dominant. The support for the next war comes largely from the people who howl loudest about their taxes, largely due, directly or indirectly, to the last war. The idea is sometimes based on the plea of rallying around the democracies, though that slogan has sounded a bit phony since Britain and France so callously threw overboard in September the finest democracy east of the Rhine. At bottom the attitude is based on instinctive racial sympathy, a force that is nonetheless real and strong because it illogically and arrogantly disregards the racial sympathies of other groups."

See Ibid., p. 47, and Norman Hillmer, "The Anglo-Canadian Neurosis: The Case of O.D. Skelton," in Peter Lyon, (ed.), Britain and Canada: Survey of a Changing Relationship. London: Frank Cass and Company, 1976, pp. 78 and 80.

127.) James G. Eayrs. The Art of the Possible. Government and Foreign Policy in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961, p. 39.

128.) Winnipeg Free Press, 9 April 1941. See also in this regard John A. Munro, "Loring Christie and External Relations, 1935-39," Journal of Canadian Studies, VII, (May 1972), p. 28. It appears, however, that if such a deal was made between Bennett and King news of it was held very tightly within the bureaucracy. In his cable reporting Laurent Beaudry's promotion to the post of Assistant Undersecretary of State for External Affairs and Christie's return as the Department of External Affairs Counsellor, United States Minister Norman Armour clearly implied that Christie's tenure might be a short one. "When the Liberals came into power again in 1921 he [Christie] suffered an involuntary eclipse," Armour explained to Cordell Hull. "He [Christie] is regarded as a very able man but his future in the Department may again depend entirely on the outcome of the forthcoming elections." See USNA, Diplomatic Branch, US State Department Papers, 842.021/3 GDG, Norman Armour to Cordell Hull, No. 55, 6 September 1935.

129.) PAC, RG 32 C2, Civil Service Commission Records, Volume 310-311, File 1184: Loring C. Christie, P.C. 2705, 20 August 1935. It is interesting to note that one of the factors that caused Christie to leave the civil service in 1923 was that his salary was only \$5,000 per year. In 1935, however, 12 years after his original departure, he returns to the Department of External Affairs for a salary only \$1,000 per year larger, and this after he had earned as much as \$9,000 per year while in the employ of Ontario Hydro. No records are available revealing what salary level Christie enjoyed while working for Beauharnois Power and Light. Although appointed officially in September, 1935 to the Counsellor's post in the Canadian legation in Tokyo, Christie, of course, never went to Japan. Christie's appointment was shifted formally from the Tokyo Legation to "Counsellor in Administrative - External Affairs" in the government's estimates in 1936-37. See PAC. RG 25 D3, DEA Papers, Volume 836, File 54, O-I-B, Pt. II, O.D. Skelton, Memorandum Re Administrative Official List, 18 February 1938.

130.) PAC, MG 30 D45, John W. Dafoe Papers, Volume 8, Folder 1935: October-December, L.C. Christie to John W. Dafoe, 22 October 1935.