### CITY HISTORY AND CITY PLANNING

The Local Historical Roots of

The City Planning Function in

Three Cities of the Canadian Prairies

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EARL A. LEVIN

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of

**Doctor of Philosophy** 

Faculty of Graduate Studies University of Manitoba Winnipeg, Manitoba

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BY

### EARL A. LEVIN

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of the University of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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### **ABSTRACT**

Counter to prevailing theories among urbanists which seek to explain urban phenomena on the basis of common characteristics of cities, this thesis argues that every city, because of its environment and its own peculiar history, differs from every other city in significant ways and that these differences are more revealing of the inner nature of cities than are their commonalities.

To confirm this proposition requires a comparison of the similarities and differences among cities and the demonstration that there are, indeed, essential differences among them which account for telling differences in their governance, development and outlook. Comparisons of cities in the same socio-economic and cultural milieu, the same time-period and the same geographic location would be most persuasive: significant differences among such cities are not normally to be expected and, if found, would support the thesis. Accordingly, three cities in the prairie region of Canada which meet these stipulated criteria - Winnipeg, Regina and Calgary - were chosen as the subject cities of this study.

The study examines the salient features of the physiography and history of the prairie region, the nature of the city planning function, the notion of a prairie regional personality, and the histories of the three subject cities. It finds that because of constitutional, statutory and historic factors, the common role of city government is administrative rather than policy-making; that the planning function is, in effect, an administrative instrument which simply expresses the city council's politico-economic orientation; and that the "master plan" is an ineffectual planning device. City government could become a true policy-making government if its statutory context were changed, but such a change is most unlikely. The planning function, however, could be made much more effective with some simple by-law changes. The study's principal finding is that although all three cities shared a common environment and had common characteristics at the outset, they diverged widely from each other during the course of their historical evolution until they became unlike each other, each with its own particular characteristics. These unique traits were embedded in the inner nature of each city and are expressed in its distinctive governance, communal ethos, planning function and development process. It surely follows, then, that the fullest understanding of any city, as well as solutions to its problems, must be sought in its own inner nature, not in synoptic urban theories or other cities' practices.

### **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

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# PART I: INTRODUCTION

# CHAPTER 1

SOCIETY. CULTURE AND THE FORM OF THE CITY: UNIFYING THEORIES AND DISTINGUISHING REALITIES

The requirement in urban research is for approaches that delineate common patterns of social life in cities and that isolate factors affecting these patterns. What emerges is a theoretical perspective. This should offer a conceptual framework which outlines how research should proceed. We acknowledge the unique features of cities. It is their commonalities, however, that provide the bases for research and planning.

- Leslie W. Kennedy<sup>1</sup>

Whilst there may, indeed, be certain properties of towns which occur irrespective of socio-political arrangements and to that degree are universal, these are of as much interest to urbanists as the fact that most people need a certain amount of sleep each day.

- Robert E. Pahl<sup>2</sup>

### CHAPTER I

# SOCIETY, CULTURE, AND THE FORM OF THE CITY: UNIFYING THEORIES AND DISTINGUISHING REALITIES

### 1. Commonalities and Differences - The Urbanists' Debate

Urban phenomena, indeed all social phenomena, may be seen in a variety of ways, often in ways which are widely divergent or even contradictory. The phenomena under observation are the same phenomena in each instance; it is the differences in the preconceptions comprising the intellectual or ideological context within which the observations are made which account for the differences in what the observers see, and the interpretations which they put upon what is seen. It is not uncommon among urban sociologists and historians to seek in urban phenomena evidence of common and recurring patterns which hold forth the promise of the ultimate disclosure of universal laws governing the genesis and development of cities and the social life which is lived in them. Such an expectation is consistent with the belief that all phenomena are causal in nature and therefore governed by laws which are knowable. The notion of universal underlying laws is the conceptual foundation on which rests the entire structure of Western scientific thought, and urban sociologists, and even historians (although the latter perhaps to a lesser extent) count themselves within the scientific community and embrace its concepts and methodologies.

In order that laws may be discovered, however, phenomena must exhibit consistent, recurring behaviour. Phenomena which are random and non-recurrent are not likely to be governed by universal laws which are knowable, except perhaps laws which say that such phenomena must be random and non-recurrent. But idiosyncratic behaviour is not predictable, and the essential quality of a natural law, the quality which makes it useful to human purposes, is that it is predictive. A law, of course, may say that the phenomena with which it deals are not predictable but this is not likely to be very useful in practical terms, nor indeed very illuminating in terms of understanding

the inner nature of these phenomena. Clearly, such a law is not what the urban sociologist or historian interested in predictive laws is looking for. There are urbanists, however who believe that urban phenomena are too idiosyncratic to be encompassed and explained by synoptic laws, and that it is the differences among cities rather than their commonalities which are likely to provide deeper insights into the nature of the city and which should engage the attention of the urbanist.<sup>3</sup>

Scholars of the city for the most part have been of the first type, seeking commonalities and theorizing about laws. Obviously the notion that cities in fact have little in common, or that their commonalities are of no greater significance than the fact that most people need a certain amount of sleep each day, would have little appeal in a scholarly discipline which sees itself as a science and dedicates itself to the search for synoptic, predictive laws governing the behaviour of urban phenomena.

Nevertheless the notion that a unifying urban theory is unlikely and that the differences between cities are of greater significance than any common characteristics they may exhibit is gaining acceptance. This notion arises out of the growing perception that cities are the result of a vast and complex congeries of forces - geographic, economic, social, political, historical and even accidental - and that these forces, in terms of the effects they have produced, are peculiar to each city. Moreover, these forces are not all external in origin but many are internally generated by the city itself. The city, thus, is not only made but makes itself, and moreover is made and makes itself in its own image and not in that of any other city. This concept has important implications for many aspects of urbanism but perhaps most important for city planning. If the genesis, development and character of each city is unique then the problems which beset it must also be peculiar to each city and the solution to these problems must be found in the context of each city's uniqueness and not in any general solutions equally applicable to all cities.

This notion has not been an established principle in Canadian planning thought. Traditional city planning approaches to the solution of local problems have assumed that what has been effective in one city will work in any other, that measures taken in distant places will succeed locally. It is an assumption which prevails not only among municipal officials but among provincial and federal officials as well.<sup>6</sup> The practice of inviting outside experts to address local meetings on how they dealt with their problems in other places is common, as is the reciprocal practice of locals visiting other centres to learn how to solve their own local problems. There is of course something to be learned from such exchanges, something which even may be helpful to the several parties in the process. But for the most part what is to be learned is how other places deal with their problems, not how to deal with one's own. Imported solutions may of course be effective on occasion, but only if they can be modified and adapted to fit the local circumstances.

If there are commonalities among cities, one should perhaps look for them among cities of the same culture, at a similar stage of economic development, of comparable size, and sharing a common history at least in its most general aspects. In the context of western Canada, the cities which probably come closest to representing those conditions are Regina and Saskatoon as a pair, and Calgary and Edmonton as a pair. But to anticipate and then discover common characteristics within these respective pairs and take this as evidence of a law of urban development would be merely a self-fulfilling prophecy. On the other hand, to look at cities such as, for example, Lhasa and Brazilia and predict that there are no significant commonalities between them would also be merely a self-fulfilling prophecy. In all of these cases there must be certain phenomena which are common, phenomena which arise out of the fact that these cities are the habitats of human beings and human beings share certain requirements and characteristics universally. Human beings must eat and sleep and reproduce and confer and be entertained and gain their livelihood and perform rituals and order their collective lives and they must have places in which to do these things. The form of each of these

activities varies from society to society, and the varieties are innumerable and of such widely differing character as to be unrecognizable as stemming from a common source in the universal emotional and psychic make-up of the human being. And the nature and form of the places in which these activities are pursued are as different from one another, from city to city, as are the activities which they house.

To urbanists such as R.E. Pahl, the common pool of human needs that require places in which they are to be satisfied is of relatively little interest. What is of primary interest is the differences in these places which each urban society creates and the underlying factors which have produced these differences. The nature of, and the underlying reasons for the creation of extensive shanty towns on the *outskirts* of the city by new urban immigrants in Mexican and Central American cities as contrasted with the creation of immigrant ghettos in the *inner* city in the United States is of greater interest to a growing number of urbanists than the fact that all immigrants to the city share a common need to find a place to sleep.<sup>7</sup>

The urban street system is another example. Movement corridors are obviously essential if there is to be movement in any type of social organization. If you can't move, if you can't communicate, then you can't have much of an organized society. Even primitive hunters and gatherers have established pathways in their villages, and recognized routes between villages. Every society develops its appropriate, even typical street pattern. But why do some societies develop a systematic grid pattern of streets in their cities and others adopt a random, haphazard pattern?

### 2. Evidence from the Past

For example, the city of Kahun in Egypt, dated by archaeologists at 2670 B.C., had a significant area laid out on a rectangular grid pattern, as did the later (14th Century B.C.) city of Tel-el-Amarna. In both these cases however the remaining and largest portion of the city was irregular in pattern, and archaeologists speculate that the gridiron enclave was purpose-built in order to construct as quickly and expediently as

possible a housing quarter for the accommodation of the work-force which was engaged on the building of the Pharoah's mortuary.<sup>8</sup> Those parts of these Egyptian cities which were occupied by the wealthier residents were built on a laissez-faire basis and their pattern is random and irregular.

In the cities of the Harrapan culture of the Indus valley (the name derives from Harrapa, one of the two principle centres of that culture), the grid pattern is a standard feature. The Harrapan culture reached its zenith around 2150 B.C. and disappeared suddenly around 1750 B.C. The people of the Harrapan culture settled in the Indus basin and their major centres were Mohenjo-daro near the mouth of the Indus River, and Harrapa some 1000-miles to the north-east, on the Ravi, a tributary of the Indus, in what is today the Punjab. Despite the enormous distance between them, their urban structure in the form of the grid pattern of their streets is strikingly similar. So is that of the minor centres of Kalibangan and Lothal. On this evidence one is disposed toward the view that unlike its manifestation in the Egyptian cities of Tel-el-Amarna and Kahun, the rectangular grids of Harrapa and Mohenjo-daro had their roots not in the urgency to meet a construction deadline but in the cultural "values" of that society.

Dan Stanislawski in "The Origin and Spread of the Grid-Pattern Town" argues that continuity of the grid pattern is in fact a cultural phenomenon spread over a broad geographical area and a variety of societies through cultural contact. It is an interesting point, but whether the continual recurrence of the grid pattern is due to cultural contact and acculturation or to independent invention is still an open question. The acculturation theory doesn't really offer a satisfactory explanation for the random, irregular patterns of most cities of mediaeval Europe where the legalistic, systematic, engineering-technological mind of Rome and the Graeco-Roman tradition of the grid system had been dominant for preceding centuries. One can argue that the physical pattern of urban development can be explained just as readily in terms of its being an expression of the

peculiar cultural dispositions of each particular society, independently arrived at, as it can in terms of a form rubbed-off from contact with another culture.

The grid-patterned quarters of Tel-el-Amarna and Kahun offer a suggestion which might support this notion. As already indicated, scholars think that these workers' quarters were built as quickly, cheaply and expeditiously as possible so as to take as little time as possible away from the real work of the labour force. That immediately suggests that the gridiron is a quick, cheap, and expeditious pattern for building a street system. Moreover the grid is probably the most efficient pattern for movement in all directions through the space of a city. The grid pattern endows no advantage or disadvantage of access on any one location over another. Movement along one axis and then along the other can bring the traveller to any point on the grid with maximum efficiency. It doesn't take too much imagination to assume that any society could discover these qualities of the grid for itself, without having to have its virtues demonstrated to it by others. It does however require that the society value the qualities of quickness of construction, cheapness, expediency and ease of movement. In that sense one may say that the values are "cultural values" and the gridiron pattern may accordingly be regarded as reflecting important "values" of that culture.

But the gridiron pattern reflects more than these utilitarian values. The gridiron is an organized and systematic form. And organization and system require authority. Such a street system imposed upon a city requires some central civic authority responsible for the imposition and maintenance of the system. Which tells us something about the urban social structure of that city. In the cities of the Middle East and mediaeval Europe the street pattern was random, uncontrolled and irregular. But more than that the streets were the garbage dumps and the waste receptacles of the population. There was no system for the disposal of either garbage or sanitary waste. In startling contrast, most homes in Mahenjo-daro in 2150 B.C.:

had bathrooms, connected by drainage channels to main drains with access manholes running under the streets. . . . In his work <u>Civilization of the Indus and Beyond</u>
Sir Mortimer Wheeler includes two intriguing photographs of elaborate sanitary installations and observes that 'the high quality of the sanitary arrangements at Mohenjo-daro could well be envied in many parts of the world today. They reflect decent standards of living coupled with an obviously zealous municipal supervision....'10

It would seem that the rectangular grid street system as a feature of urban form has as its basis a social and political system which chooses to exercise control over that urban form and to impose certain developmental disciplines upon it through the authority of some governmental agency.

At about the same time that Mohenjo-daro was building its rectangular grid street system and its astonishingly advanced underground waste disposal system, the city of Ur, an important centre in the Sumerian Culture of Mesopotamia<sup>11</sup> which flourished in the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers at about the same time as the Harrapan culture in India, was, by contrast, being established on its site through the random, uncontrolled proliferation of its streets, and making no provision for waste disposal.

About 1000-years after the Sumerian culture in Mesopotamia and the Harrapan in India, Greece emerged as the paramount civilization in Europe. Prior to about 900 B.C. Greece had experienced some 300-years of "dark ages" consequent upon the invasion by the Dorians. From about 900, however, city-states were evolving both on the mainland and in the Peloponnese with Sparta as the leading power. It was not until the strong and enlightened administration of Pisistratus (546-527 B.C.) that Athens emerged as a powerful *polis* of international significance. Between 750 B.C. and 550 B.C. the Greeks were very active colonizers, creating new city-states throughout the Mediterranean, mainly to reduce the pressure of population growth in the parent *polis*. For the most part the street pattern in the parent city at this time was generally unplanned, but almost invariably that of the new colony was a rectangular grid. And

from about the 6th Century, during the Hellenic period, the pattern even in the founding polis was typically "planned" as was the general development of the city, and invariably so in the Hellenistic period after the 3rd Century B.C.

About 1500-years after the Greek culture had achieved its highest expression the cities of mediaeval Europe began to emerge from the 'dark age' which had descended upon Europe after the collapse of Rome. The mediaeval European town's street system displayed the patterns of the societies which had built it. During the Roman hegemony the towns in which the Roman presence was dominant the Roman street-grid prevailed. With the fall of Rome some towns were simply abandoned, some towns continued, and with the revival of trade activity toward the end of the 9th Century some towns which had been dormant since the fall were re-occupied and re-built. The towns which had continued or were re-built during the five centuries of slow re-animation of the trading economy showed a mixture of patterns in their street system. Where the Roman imprint still remained the pattern was the rectangular grid; where new growth required new streets, those street were "organic" or "unplanned" in their pattern.

The Harrapan city's street system then, was "regular" or "systematic," or "planned"; the Egyptian city's was typically "organic" or "random," or "unplanned"; so was the Sumerian city's; the Greek city's again was "planned", particularly in the Hellenistic period; the Mediaeval European city's was generally "unplanned." The differences are not readily explained by the simple mechanism of imitation or acculturation through contact. They are more understandable as indigenous expressions of the cultural values and attitudes of the respective societies.

The random growth of the mediaeval European city and the customary use of its streets for garbage and sanitary waste disposal may well reflect the fact that during this period the Church was the effective authority and it was more concerned with The City of God than with the city of man. Undoubtedly it was very much concerned for and protective of the worldly welfare of the privileged classes, but for the masses of the

population it turned its eyes away from their earthly life and directed their gaze upward toward heaven. It seems that the grid system of street layout is most often found in cultures which are more secularly than theologically oriented; more concerned with practical affairs in the present life than with preparation for life in the hereafter; whose political structure provides for direct responsibility for the secular city and the built environment; and in which the imperatives of these cultural characteristics automatically express themselves in the urban environment in the form of the rectangular, ordered, gridiron street system.

But the street system is by no means the only element in the urban landscape which expresses the socio-cultural characteristics of a society. The public spaces, for example, are another important indicator. These varied widely from culture to culture in terms of their presence in the cityscape, public access, role and significance. These and other differences indicate that the cultural milieu of a city influences the city's form, and that even within a given culture local differences assert themselves and find expression in the salient features of the built environment.<sup>12</sup>

### 3. <u>Unifying Urban Theories</u>

In the search for the grand concept, the universal paradigm which will reveal the basic commonality of urban phenomena and express it in terms of a simple unifying theory, urbanists have speculated about not merely such component parts of the city as its street pattern or its open spaces, but about more comprehensive aspects, through which they have sought to explain the development of the city as a whole. In the United States there have been several such theories which have found recognition among those urban scholars who subscribe to the notion of an all-embracing theory of cities. The first, and perhaps the most celebrated of these was the Concentric Ring theory of city growth propounded by E.W. Burgess. 13 The theory stated that cities grow outward in a series of concentric rings from the central business district which is the place where the land has the highest economic value. Each ring contains its own typical set of land-

uses which essentially are determined by the land values. Adjacent to the central business district is a transitional zone which typically includes wholesale establishments, light manufacturing plants and rooming houses occupied by factory workers and transients. The next ring typically contains working-class homes and second-generation immigrant settlements. Next to this is a zone of better-class homes, and beyond that, farthest from the central business district is the commuter zone.

Burgess and his associates in the Sociology Department of the University of Chicago formulated their concentric ring conception of city growth on the basis of their studies of Chicago. And indeed the concept did describe the general form of that city at the time. Its explanation of the underlying forces which produced this pattern, however, is far less persuasive than its description of the pattern itself. But Chicago in 1925 was not the archetype of the American city at that time, and other investigators found other patterns and formulated other theories.

One of these which came to prominence was the Sector theory propounded by Homer Hoyt. 14 This theory held that the basic structure of the American city is that of a series of sectors in the form of wedges radiating from the central business district along major transportation routes. The wedges or sectors contain commercial and industrial uses as well as residential, but it is the high value residential locations which are the mechanism which determines the location of the other uses and the structure and location of the sectors.

Still another theory was the Multiple Nuclei theory developed by Chauncey
Harris and Edward Ullman. They found that in the cities they studied the land-uses
were disposed around a number of centres or nuclei. These nuclei were formed by the
coming together of certain complementary activities which benefitted mutually from
each other's proximity. Around these nuclei there were then disposed the broad range of
land-uses which comprised each of the component districts of the city.

There are two points about all of these theories that are noteworthy. The first is that they all were formulated in the context of the United States during the period 1925-1945. They are obviously time-bound and culture-bound. The second point to note is that although all of the cities from which the theories were derived shared the same context of time and culture and socio-economic system, they were sufficiently different from each other to provide the material for quite different theories about their structure and growth.

One may be struck by a certain irony in the fact that although all of these theories were seeking comprehensive and unifying explanations for the structure and development of cities based on their commonalities, and purported to have found them, in effect they demonstrated that even in the relatively narrow context of industrial capitalist America, in a relatively frozen time-frame, and on the basis of a relatively limited set of research concepts and variables (all of the theories are primarily economics-based) there were significant differences among the cities which they studied. And it is the differences among them, not the commonalities, which are the reason for the differences in the theories.

Gideon Sjoberg, the eminent urban sociologists, in The Pre-Industrial City 16 describes the characteristics of a variety of cities in the pre-industrial stage of development, drawing on evidence from a broad range of examples and data. The phenomena he describes are, indeed, characteristic of many cities whose socio-economic systems are not those of the industrial/technological model of the western world: for example, the gradients of density, value, status and location of the slums and the dwellings of the poor in these cities are almost diametrically opposite to those in the cities of North America. This has led some urban ecologists to postulate a continuum with the "Sjoberg Model" at one end and the "Burgess model" at the other end and to assume that all cities start out as "pre-industrial" with the Sjoberg model

characteristics, and evolve through industrialization toward the Burgess model with the industrial city characteristics.

One is easily led into this mode of thought if there is a predisposition to look for system and order and universality in urban phenomena. But this notion, like so many others in the social sciences, reflects the inclination to interpret general tendencies and directional pressures as specific systematic causal forces, to interpret these complex and ill-defined phenomena in simplistic terms, and moreover to interpret them in terms of one's own culture.<sup>17</sup> The "Sjoberg model" although it describes many characteristics of "pre-industrial" cities does not apply to all such cities. There are many cities which are pre-industrial in the sense that they developed before the industrial era in Europe, which do not conform to the Sjoberg model. Aix-en-Provence, for example, a city in modern France but dating from about the 14th Century, exhibits none of the characteristics of either the Sjoberg model or the Burgess model, although much of the 14th Century still remains in place with many original buildings still standing. There is no clear correspondence between the social structure of the city and its spatial structure. There is no emptying of the central area to provide suburban population. Much the same is true of Nimes, also in the south of France. 18 So Burgess' model is also not a universal model of the industrial city. There are any number of "industrial" cities which do not conform to it, even in America itself, where Hoyt, and Harris and Ullman have identified variant forms of urban organization and development.

It is manifestly a mistake to use terms like "the Sjoberg model" and "the Burgess model" as though they were exact representations of universal urban forms at particular periods of urban development. Such terms may be useful as a kind of shorthand, particularly to the initiated. But they can also be very misleading because as "models" they convey the impression that the form of cities in the pre-industrial and the late industrial stages of development all have the same characteristics respectively and cluster about each respective model, and that those in the Sjoberg cluster will

eventually merge into the Burgess cluster as they become industrialized. What is misleading about this notion is the implication of a "lawed" continuum through which urban development must inevitably proceed, in a series of predetermined phases, from one end to the other; that industrialization is the motive force in this process, and more than that, that it is industrialization as it has evolved in the capitalist society of America which is the determinant of urban form in its various phases. Since much of Western society is an industrial capitalist society, with much the same cultural values, one may expect to find among them forms which are similar to each other and even reminiscent of American urban forms. But the national history and culture and geography of each country will inevitably establish the special, if not indeed the unique basic form of its cities and will powerfully influence the course of their development.

Differences in the characteristics of cities, and in urban phenomena generally, on the basis of cross-national or cross-cultural comparisons are readily apparent. Even the same city, at two widely separated moments in its history, may not be recognizable as the same city. Julius Caesar's Londinium is not the same city as contemporary London, and Peter the Great's St. Petersburg is not the same city as the recently born-again St. Petersburg, although the development of the one into the other can be traced and vestiges and relicta of the earlier city can be found in the later. Neither Caesar nor Peter would be at home in his city today.

### 4. A Matter of Perception

Herein perhaps lies the distinction between those who seek the commonalities among urban phenomena and those whose interest focuses on the differences: the former tend to think about the city in terms of abstract concepts and general explanatory theories in the scientific/statistical mode; the latter see the city in terms of its people and their daily lives, in the context of a specific place and time, more in the descriptive/evocative mode. The former believe that it is the common characteristics of cities which hold the key to a fuller understanding of urban phenomena in general; the

latter believe that the common characteristics of cities are of minor significance for such an understanding but rather that it is their distinctive characteristics, their individual development and the differences among cities which afford the deepest insights.

There is something more to this divergence of views than simply a disagreement over methodology. Underlying these two approaches is a basic ideological difference over the nature of the city, a difference in the pre-conceptions which they bring to the study and therefore a difference in the way they perceive the phenomena of the city. Those who believe in timeless universal laws view the city as the product of impersonal forces which are inherent in the nature of all cities wherever and whenever they occur, not unlike the force of gravity which operates to bring falling bodies to earth at the same time (if the friction of the atmosphere is disregarded) even though such bodies may be very different from each other in size, weight, shape and in other characteristics. The mere fact of the city is the evidence which suggests to them the possibility that all cities are generated by and develop according to universal laws which operate beyond the reach of any city's individual, idiosyncratic nature. It is a view which sees the true reality of the city as its abstract statistical data rather than its people and the kinds of lives they live in it and what happens to those people and therefore to their city as they evolve through time. It is the "pathetic fallacy" of urban sociology.

In literature the "pathetic fallacy" is the literary device which credits nature with human emotions: the natural setting in which the protagonist finds himself or herself is depicted as sharing his or her mood and feelings. In the sociology of the city the pathetic fallacy is the notion that urban phenomena share or reflect or behave in accordance with the intellectual mood and expectations of the theorists. It is perhaps inevitable in an age which has traded the deeper wisdom to be found in the discourse of its sensibilities for the abstract mathematical relationships produced by the computerized manipulation of numbers that even those phenomena which are not

constant and recurrent and which therefore do not lend themselves to meaningful statistical ordering are nevertheless expected to reveal their deepest truths through the analysis of numbers.

Statistical information of course has its own place. It even tells its own kind of truth. It can tell us about demographic structure, mobility, employment, land-use, land-values, densities, and a lot of other interesting and important facts about cities. But it can't tell us very much about the human dynamics of a society of which the physical forms of the city are the material image. Common characteristics of cities are clues to the common needs of their inhabitants, differences in the characteristics of cities are clues to the different means by which their inhabitants have satisfied those needs. The means which a people chooses to satisfy its needs are not arbitrary nor are they selected freely from an unlimited display of choices set before them. The choices they make are conditioned by their culture and values. The cities which they build are therefore clues to the culture and the values of a people and the differences between their cities reveal the differences between the people. By studying the differences between cities one may gain insights into the differences between their peoples, the differences in their cultural attitudes and their ways of life.

There are of course various disciplines which are concerned with cultural attitudes and ways of life: sociology, anthropology, history, are examples that come readily to mind. There are even some among these, such as urban sociology and urban history, which make the city the special focus of their interest. It is also true, however, that even within these various city-focused specialities there are scholars who are disposed toward seeking the commonalities among cities and others who are instead concerned with their differences. Undoubtedly each approach yields information and theories which enlarge our understanding of the whole realm of urban phenomena. Does it really matter then which path a scholar follows in his study of urban phenomena? The answer will largely depend on the context and the goals of the study. If it is a cross-

cultural or cross-national study, or even a diachronic study within the same culture with the goal of finding a common basis for synoptic urban theories then the value of such a study is questionable. The data produced by such a study may be interesting in themselves and may even prove useful to other scholars but its theoretical constructs must be regarded with serious reservations. If however the study is a synchronic study of urban phenomena within the same culture, the findings and theoretical concepts may be of great value. Such an approach would be of particular interest in the field of city planning, as well as in any other field which is concerned with solving the problems of contemporary cities.

### 5. City Planning and City History

The term "city planning" is a generic term which seems to define its own realm of expertise. The concept of "city planning" is generally understood as having a substantive meaning apart from any context of place or time: it has its own being and identity quite distinct from that of any specific city of which it is a function. The conventional perception of the city planning function is comparable to that of the city engineering function. The building of a city street is carried out in accordance with engineering principles and practices which have their own validity and stand outside the milieu of the particular city's political life and historical roots. A street is built in one city in much the same way as it is in another city; the engineering principles are common to all. There is a right way and a wrong way to do it, no matter in which city. This is so because the basis of this work is an engineering technology, which is more or less universal, and its purpose is to produce a product of prescribed quality and characteristics. Certainly the location and timing, and even the type and quality of the road may be determined by political considerations (or by site conditions) but the road, as road, is indifferent to political ideology and policy and power, as it is indifferent to who may have been the traveller upon it in the past and who may ride upon it in the future.

City planning is commonly regarded as having these characteristics, that is to say as having its own fixed and recognizable identity and its own laws which are the same in all cities. Deriving from this is the belief that the scientific principles of city planning can deal with the problems of all cities on the basis of their universal validity. This view is not only very commonly held among the general public but it is also the basis on which city planning is taught in the planning schools. It also underlies much of government's urban policies and programs.

This view of city planning although widely held is misleading and is the cause of much of the confusion which attends the term "city planning." It fails to distinguish between city planning as an abstract concept in the realm of ideas and city planning as a concrete activity in the realm of city government functions. As an abstract idea city planning is a particular species of the universal abstraction of "planning" which essentially expresses the notion of taking action in the present to achieve an objective in the future; "city" planning derives its meaning from the fact that the city is the context within which the action and the objective occur. But in the form of this abstract expression neither the city nor the action nor the objective is specific and "city planning" is simply an amorphous idea in the realm of general conceptual categories. In the context of a specific city however and as a function of that city's government the phrase "city planning" takes on a concrete and specific meaning. It becomes those specific actions which that particular city takes in order to achieve the defined goals which it has set for itself.

But the goals which each city sets for itself and the actions which it takes to achieve those goals are peculiar to itself. They are conditioned by each city's own peculiar historical development and the particular forces and experiences which have made it the particular city that it is. The approach to civic problems and the solutions formulated for them inevitably vary from city to city. What is appropriate for one is inappropriate for another. This means that the planning function of city government

cannot be universally applicable and valid but must take on the colour and form given to it by the city in which it occurs. The plans which each city formulates and the implementation of those plans are peculiar to each city and very little in one is directly transferable or applicable to another. It means ultimately that the planning function in each city is simply an aspect of its own unique civic history, nature, and personality.

### 6. <u>The Thesis</u>

This is the premise of the present thesis. The thesis seeks to affirm the validity of this premise by examining and comparing not cities across time or across different cultures or across different socio-economic, technological-industrial systems, but rather by examining three cities in the prairie region of Western Canada as they are today and as they have developed over the same time period. The three cities are Winnipeg, Regina and Calgary, and there are two reasons for selecting these particular cities.

The first reason is to try to affirm the view that it is the differences rather than the commonalities among cities which can enlarge our understanding of urban phenomena. A quick glance at these three cities reveals obvious commonalities: for example, each of them has tall commercial office buildings in its central business district. This characteristic is common to all urban metropolitan centres in the western capitalistic world. It is just what one would expect to find in the three subject cities. All three cities are contemporaneous - they were all incorporated as municipalities at about the same time: Winnipeg in 1873, Regina in 1883, and Calgary in 1884. The economy of all three cities is the resource based staples economy of Western Canada. All three are located in the same geographic region - the great central plain of Canada - although Winnipeg is on the extreme eastern edge of that plain where it borders on the Canadian Shield and Calgary is on the extreme western edge of that plain, virtually at the foothills of the Rocky Mountains, where it borders on the Cordillera, while Regina sits squarely between them in the middle of the prairies. Regina is significantly smaller than the

other two - only about 187,000 in population. This undoubtedly accounts for some of the differences between it and them, although it makes some of Regina's accomplishments all the more remarkable.

Despite such important commonalities however there are dramatic differences among all of these cities. Why, for example, has Regina, a city on the flat, dry prairie with only a puddle of water and a trickle of a creek for a watercourse, turned that niggardly natural endowment into a magnificent public urban water-amenity, while Winnipeg, with the rich endowment of two major and historically significant rivers has done virtually nothing to bring them into the public domain as an enhanced amenity in the life of the community? Why has Winnipeg what may well be the most highlydeveloped regional theatre in the whole of Canada while Regina is theatrically undernourished? Why does Calgary have a light rail rapid transit system, considered an advanced transportation mode, while Winnipeg struggles to find ways of moving its diesel buses more efficiently on the traffic-congested transit routes? Why was Regina able to produce an important group of painters - "The Regina Five" - during the 1960's which won international attention and now has a place in the history of Canadian Art, while Calgary has produced no comparable school; and yet Calgary has a fairly rich supply of art galleries and museums while Regina has only one art gallery, a property of the University of Regina and in grave financial difficulties and yet the voters of the city have recently rejected, in a referendum, a proposal to build a new up-to-date gallery in Regina with generous assistance from the provincial government?

The explanations for these and other such differences among the three cities may provide a better understanding of what makes them what they are than do the economic theories and land-value explanations for the common show of tall buildings at their centres. The first reason, therefore, for choosing these three cities is to examine their differences with a view to finding such explanations.

The second reason for choosing these three cities is related to the first reason and inseparable from it. As indicated above the significance of the differences among cities is a basic premise of this thesis. But if one shifts one's focus ever so slightly this premise assumes a somewhat altered aspect: it now reveals itself as a proposition about the common roots of city history and city planning.

Every city develops in response to its own peculiar historical circumstances and accordingly each city is, at least to that extent, unique. But it is that very uniqueness, those characteristics moulded by its peculiar historical forces which determine the civic personality of a city's people and the nature and style and direction of its government. The attitude of the city council, and the policies which it adopts and the measures it takes to carry out those policies are all conditioned by the collective historical experience of that city.

There is then a causal relationship between a city's history and its policies and measures, between its historical roots and its planning function. The plans which a city formulates for addressing its present problems and its future prospects are in fact conditioned by and an expression of its past physical, social, political, economic, cultural, leadership, etc. experiences. This thesis then seeks to demonstrate not only the significance of the differences among cities for an understanding of urban phenomena but also to reveal as another facet of that significance, the essential bonding between a city's history and its planning function. Winnipeg, Regina and Calgary were chosen as the subject cities for this study because as contemporaneous cities in the same economic and geographic region of the same country, they have so much in common, and yet despite these compelling commonalities they are significantly different from each other and their differences are clearly apparent in the built environment of each and in the planning policies and practices which each has pursued. Urban identity, urban history, urban planning, urban government, are all aspects of the same phenomena in any given city. It is one of the objectives of this thesis to confirm the contention that these are

indeed variant aspects of the same phenomena as they interplay and dissolve into each other and re-appear, depending on the perspective from which they are seen.

In order to demonstrate that the differences rather than the commonalities among cities enlarge our understanding of urban phenomena, and to confirm that the identity, history, planning, and government of any given city are all variant aspects of the same phenomena in that city and peculiar to it, it will be necessary to differentiate those salient features of each of the three cities which are unique to it from those which are common to all, those which are externally derived from those which are indigenous. This differentiation accordingly must be one of the underlying themes in the methodology of the research and a leitmotif in the dissertation.

### NOTES.

<sup>1</sup>Kennedy, "The Urban Kaleidoscope, 11.

<sup>2</sup>Pahl, "Concepts in Context", in Fraser and Sutcliffe, eds., <u>The Pursuit of Urban History</u>, 372.

<sup>3</sup>See Goldberg and Mercer, <u>The Myth of the North American City</u> for a broad-based analysis of the differences between Canadian and American cities.

<sup>4</sup>H.J. Dyos' <u>Victorian Suburb</u> and <u>The Study of Urban History</u>, and Asa Briggs' <u>Victorian Cities</u> are ground-breaking works in this genre of urban historiography.

<sup>5</sup>See Artibise and Stelter, eds., <u>Canada's Urban Past</u>, "Introduction" for a discussion of their concept of "Urban as Process" which views the city as an independent variable, itself influencing what goes on inside its limits. In the same piece they also discuss their concepts of "Urban as Entity" which views the city as a dependent variable and "Urban as Setting" which views the city as simply the passive and uninvolved location where events and processes of interest to the historian occur.

<sup>6</sup>A notable illustration of this attitude in the federal government context is provided by Canada's Urban Renewal program during the 1950's and '60's. This program was inspired by the urban renewal program of the American federal administration but was inappropriate in the Canadian context. Inter-governmental relationships in Canada differed from those in America. Moreover, central area conditions in Canada were structurally different from those in the United States as were the public sector private sector mechanisms for carrying out the program. The Canadian program failed to fulfill its initial expectations and was abandoned.

A parallel illustration in the provincial context can be drawn from the Government of Manitoba's introduction of the District Planning concept into the provincial planning legislation. In this case the concept was borrowed from Alberta but the motivation here was less the search for solutions to pressing inter-municipal problems than the bureaucratic need to demonstrate that it was *au courant* with prevailing planning practice and the government's disposition, on grounds of political ideology, to support technical measures which seemed to encourage mutual concern and co-operative action among municipalities. For a discussion of this issue see Earl Levin, Comedy in Three Acts. See also Artibise and Kiernan, Canadian Regional Development: The Urban Dimension.

<sup>7</sup>See George Theodorson, ed., <u>Urban patterns: Studies in Human Ecology</u>, specifically Part III, for illuminating discussions of cross-national and cross-cultural differences. See also R.E. Pahl, "Instrumentality and Community in the Process of Urbanization", in Marcia Pelley Effrat, ed., <u>The Community: Approaches and Applications</u>.

<sup>8</sup>Morris, <u>History of Urban Form</u>, 13.

<sup>9</sup>Dan Stanislawski, "The Origin and Spread of the Grid-Pattern Town", in <u>Geographical Review XXXVI</u> (January, 1946), 105-120.

<sup>10</sup>Sir Mortimer Wheeler, quoted in Morris, <u>History</u>. 17.

<sup>11</sup>See Sir Leonard Wooley, <u>Excavations at Ur</u>. This is a revision of his earlier <u>Ur of the Chaldees</u>.

<sup>12</sup>See Lewis Mumford, <u>The City in History</u> and <u>The Culture of Cities</u> for account of the interplay between urban culture and urban form.

<sup>13</sup>E.W. Burgess with R.E. Park and R.O. McKenzie, <u>The City</u>. Also <u>The Urban Community</u>.

<sup>14</sup>Homer Hoyt, <u>Structure and Growth of Urban Areas</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>Chauncey Harris and Edward Ullman, <u>The Nature of Cities</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>Gideon Sjoberg, <u>The Pre-Industrial City</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>See E.P. Thompson, <u>The Poverty of Theory</u> for a brilliant discussion of the differences between theoretical constructs and empirical experience.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>See Theodore Caplow, "Urban Structure in France", in <u>American Sociological Review.</u> XVII (October 1952) 544-549.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>See Earl Levin <u>City Planning as Uropian Ideology and City Government Function</u> for a discussion of the difference.

# PART II: THE REGIONAL BACKGROUND

Chapter 2. THE REGIONAL SETTING

Chapter 3. THE REGIONAL PERSONALITY

The divisions of North America... present themselves not only in different kinds of terrains, produced by relief and climate, nor in different countrysides, stamped by agriculture and industry, but also in different human regions, existing (as Louis Wirth claims) each as a distinct 'state of mind, a way of life, a mode of collective consciousness.'

- J. Wreford Watson<sup>1</sup>

Despite the theoretical problems confronting the application of the concept of regional personality of the prairie west, the literature of and about the West abounds with expressions of regional identity - feelings, interests, actions definitions which are considered to reflect some basic image of the region and its characteristics with which the residents identify.

- M.L. Lautt<sup>2</sup>

#### **CHAPTER 2**

#### THE REGIONAL SETTING

### 1. Physiography and Paleoculture

One of the basic premises of this dissertation is that the differences among cities can provide deeper insights into the nature of urban phenomena generally than do their commonalities. It is also a premise of this study that the differences among cities are the result of the interplay of a host of factors, including the city itself as a factor. In the interplay of these factors one may assume that the region in which the city is placed exercises an important influence. Apart from certain obvious effects - a desert environment, for example, is most unlikely to bring forth a fishing fleet - the natural environment exerts an influence on the outlook and disposition of the individual and on the culture of the society, and affects the regional personality and the regional ethos; and the regional personality and the regional ethos in turn are reflected in the cities which the society builds. The cities selected to test these premises are Winnipeg, Regina, and Calgary, three urban centres on the Canadian prairies. It is important, therefore, to begin this examination by looking at the prairie region as the setting of these cities. (Fig. 1.)

As far as the average prairie-dweller knows them, the dimensions of the prairies extend westward until they are abruptly terminated by the Rocky Mountains virtually in the back yard of Calgary, and eastward until they suddenly end at the rocks and lakes and muskeg which seem to mark the boundary between Manitoba and Ontario. Northward the layman perceives the prairies as extending to the line where there is no more farming, to the line where the bush country marks the transition into the remote northland.

To the trained mind, however, what the layman thinks of as "the prairies" appears as something quite different. The geographer, for example, (Fig. 2.) sees the Canadian plains as

the northern extension of the central lowlands of the United States. It is part of a massive physiographic unit bounded by the Rocky Mountains on the west and by the Appalachians and Shield systems on the east. The plains between sweep northward from the Texas Gulf Coast to the arctic margins of the MacKenzie Delta. The international boundary which bisects the region along the 49th parallel divides the land politically, but physically it remains a cohesive unit. Differences in nomenclature - Great Plains and Prairies - cannot obscure the natural linkages wrought by geology and topography.<sup>3</sup>

In Canada the nomenclature identifying the region has indeed varied with the context within which the terms have been used and the purposes of the user. Initially in the era of the fur trade, the term "the North West" was used to designate the vast area lying north and west of Lake Superior from which the furs, the first harvest of the staples economy, were gathered. Today that term, when it is used, generally refers to the region of the MacKenzie basin and the Yukon, while the terms "Prairie Provinces" and "Western Canada" are used to denote the provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. As pointed out by Kaye and Moodie,<sup>4</sup> these terms are geographically illogical since Western Canada includes British Columbia, and prairie comprises only a very small part of the three provinces. Scientists and scholars have applied various labels to the three provinces as a conceptual unity in the attempt to be precise in their terminology. "The Western Interior of Canada," "Southern Prairies," "Canadian Great Plains," "Prairie West," and "Prairie Region" have all been used, particularly when referring to the southern settled part of the provinces. The acronym "ALSAMA" has even been suggested. 5 For our present purposes the term "Prairie Provinces" will serve quite nicely, recognizing however that these provinces are made up of very much more than merely prairie, but recognizing also the fact that the term "Prairie

Provinces" is in common usage and universally serves as the rubric under which Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta are subsumed, but recognizing perhaps above all that it is the prairie component of this region which is the milieu in which the three subject cities of this study arose, were nurtured and have evolved.

Nevertheless, one must acknowledge the other natural characteristics of the region. Indeed in many respects it is not one region but several. Perhaps the least perceptible characteristic is that the prairies are not one continuous plain but rather three separate plateaux, separated from each other by escarpments or ranges of low hills, and moreover that these plateaux rise continuously from the Ontario-Manitoba border to the foothills of the Rockies a vertical distance of about 960 metres. Regina sits about 335 metres above Winnipeg, and Calgary's elevation is about 500 metres higher than Regina's and some 840 metres higher than Winnipeg's. It is interesting to note, although of no particular political or physiographic significance, that the escarpments which separate the three prairie plateaux or steppes - the Manitoba Escarpment between the eastern and central plains, and the Missouri Coteau between the central and western plains - lie more-or-less along or not far from the provincial boundaries between Manitoba and Saskatchewan in the one case and Saskatchewan and Alberta in the other. The distance from Winnipeg to Calgary is about 750 miles or something over 1200 kilometres. If one adds to this the distance from Winnipeg to the Ontario Border - about 100 miles or 160 kilometres, and the distance from Calgary due west to the British Columbia border - some 60-odd miles or 100 kilometres - one arrives at a useful approximation of the east-west dimension of the region: about 950 miles or something over 1450 kilometers. The figures are only approximate because both the Manitoba-Ontario border and the Alberta-British Columbia border are irregular. Because of the splay in the line of both of these borders the east-west distance across the prairie provinces increases as one moves northward from the Canada-U.S. boundary. An illuminating insight into the scale of the region is afforded by the fact that the distance from its eastern border to its western border taken at its narrowest dimension along the Canada-U.S. boundary is about the same as the distance from Berlin to Moscow.

More perceptible, perhaps, than the subtle upward incline of the region from east to west are the variations in other features of the region as one moves from south to north. (Fig. 3.) The vegetation, for example, changes dramatically from zone to zone. Geographers have identified as many as seven such zones ranging from the Canada-U.S. boundary north to the 60th parallel which marks the boundary of the North-West Territories. Portrayed on a map, as on Fig. 3, these zones of vegetation are seen to bear a rough resemblance to a series of arcs lying one against the other in succession as they expand outward to cover the region. The zones identified as True Prairie, Short-Grass Prairie, Mixed-Grass Prairie and Aspen Grove comprise the region which contains the agricultural industry of the Prairie Provinces. Agriculturally the most productive and most stable of these zones is the Aspen Grove which is also customarily referred to as the Parkland zone, together with the True Prairie. The Mixed-Grass and Short-Grass zones together constitute the area which historically has been called Palliser's Triangle, named after Captain John Palliser who led a British expedition into the interior plains of Western Canada in the late 1850's for the purpose of assessing the agricultural potential of these lands.<sup>6</sup> Palliser reported that the Parkland belt was suitable for agriculture but the roughly triangular area formed by the Mixed-Grass and Short-Grass prairie zones received too little rainfall to sustain cereal crop cultivation.

Palliser was right in his assessment with respect to grain farming but the Short-Grass and Mixed-Grass prairie zones were eminently suitable for cattle grazing; and the introduction of extensive irrigation has brought much of the Triangle into productive cereal and other crop cultivation. The vegetation of course is a manifestation of the underlying soils and the even more deeply underlying geology, as well as the climatic regime. The changes in the vegetation from zone to zone reflect the changes in the earth beneath and the

air above and one can read in these changes the geographic basis for many of the differences among the three prairie provinces.

Geologically the prairie region was formed over hundreds of millions of years during which great seas covered the area and receded and advanced again, each inundation lasting for eons of time and leaving sedimentary deposits of silt, minerals, the remains of sea creatures and other detritus. Those ancient geological events established fundamental natural variations in the region which differentiated it into several quite markedly different subregions rather than a single homogeneous geographic continuum. Man came and populated those sub-regions, and the way of life in each departed from that in the others insofar as it was built upon the natural endowments in each sub-region laid down in those ancient times. For example it was during the Paleozoic Era (dating from about 600,000,000 years ago to about 175,000,000 years ago) that the great coal beds and oil pools were laid down and the vast volumes of natural gas were generated. These energy-rich resources, particularly oil, are the basis of Alberta's economy in the late twentieth century and the source of one of Canada's bitter inter-governmental political disputes. Saskatchewan too has inherited some of this ancient endowment of energy resources, although far less than Alberta, but Manitoba's inheritance has been negligible. The provincial economies of these latter two prairie provinces have been more heavily influenced by other natural endowments than Paleozoic oil and these have affected their economic and political relations with the central government and the other regions of Canada.

More important to both Manitoba and Saskatchewan than the Paleozoic deposits have been the much more recent events of the Quarternary Period of the Cenozoic Era, the period which began about 25,000 years ago and ended only about 10,000 years ago. This was the period during which the glaciers of the Ice Age melted and the climate began to grow warmer. As the glaciers retreated, the melt waters, trapped in pre-glacial troughs, began, about 12,000 years ago, to form an enormous glacial lake which reached its greatest extent about 10,000 years ago. This was Lake Agassiz. At its height, Lake Agassiz covered part of the

Lake of the Woods area in northwest Ontario, most of Manitoba, extended into east-central Saskatchewan, and into parts of Minnesota and North and South Dakota. Lake Agassiz never covered more than 80,000 square miles at any given time but in its episodes of advance and retreat which went on during the 4,000 years of its life-span it covered a total of about 200,000 square miles. Looked at from one particular viewpoint, the legacy of Lake Agassiz and the other large bodies of glacial melt waters may be regarded by many as most unfortunate because they were responsible for the typical prairie landscape, often regarded as flat, stark, and monotonous. From another viewpoint, however, this legacy was the basis for the settlement and the economic development of the prairies because the deposits left behind by these lakes, particularly Lake Agassiz as it retreated, now constitute some of the most fertile and productive farm lands in the region. The economies of Manitoba and Saskatchewan were to a significant degree shaped by this lacustrine residue from the Ice Age, just as the economy of Alberta was largely moulded by the geological events of much more ancient times.

The people of the prairie region are not directly conscious, in their daily lives, of the connection between their livelihood and the events of remote geological eras. Those events lie buried deep beneath the soil and under the layers of eons of time. They are the silent, unseen givens of the prairie economy and do not impinge upon the daily lives of its people; they are not the subject of their daily conversation. One element of the natural environment, however, which they do experience directly and constantly and which exercises an enormous influence on all aspects of life in the region is the climate.

The climate of the Western Interior is cool continental, marked by hot summers and extremely cold winters. Climate has been a major obstacle to the successful agricultural settlement of the region. Late and early frosts restrict the growing season from 120 days in the south to 100 or less in the north, a period which was insufficient to ripen wheat in the early years of settlement, even in the best regions. Today, despite the development of early maturing varieties, the growing season on northern margins of the region is barely adequate for cereal cultivation. Other climate hazards

include hail from severe convectional summer storms, the occasional tornado which wreaks havoc in the southern margins, and, of course drought, which is usually most serious in the water deficient areas of the prairies north and south of the Cyprus Hills.

The severity of the climate is tempered in the extreme west by chinooks that sweep down from the Rocky Mountains and raise temperatures dramatically over short periods, clearing the snow cover from the range lands which lie east of the mountains. Microclimatic variations assume importance in local agricultural endeavours, as, for example, at Morden, Manitoba, where apple orchards survive in the shelter of the escarpment.

The Western Interior is, as many prairie authors have observed, a stark land of haunting beauty, a land of contrasts and extremes in climate, vegetation, and topography; one which places a vertical man on a horizontal land and pits the puny skills of mankind against the immensity of the plain and the unpredictable vagaries of an unforgiving continental climate. Many perceptive writers of the prairie provinces have attributed the attitudes and opinions held by the region's inhabitants to the environment in which they live. This may be facile determinism but it is clear that the historical evolution of the Western Interior as a hinterland region has done little to dissipate the westerners' perception of themselves as a people beset by a harsh environment.<sup>7</sup>

The authors of the above quotation are careful to dissociate themselves from the possibly "facile determinism" of those writers who "have attributed the attitudes and opinions held by the region's inhabitants to the environment in which they live".

Environmental determinism is not seen by many scholars as a proper scientific basis for explaining behavioural phenomena. Economic determinism is equally suspect. Indeed, determinism of any kind does not enjoy widespread scholarly approval. And yet the authors acknowledge that westerners perceive themselves as a people beset by a harsh environment and there is no doubt that the environment is harsh and that many aspects of prairie society are in fact a response to that environment. One may question certain facets of deterministic theory, but the principle of causality can surely be accepted as valid. A particular force may not directly determine a particular result but causes do produce effects, beginnings are

causally linked to ends. It is a substantive premise of this dissertation that there is an affective relationship between the natural environment, the social environment and the built environment. This is not to argue environmental determinism. It is however to argue causality. It is to argue that the physical environment, the economy, the social ideology and social formations, the political system, the form and structure of government, the built environment, are all interwoven in a complex play of forces, each acting upon the other with greater or lesser impact but all causally interrelated and inducing accommodations and adjustments in each which affect the nature of the whole

In the aboriginal culture of the prairies these relationships were relatively simple. During the thousands of years before the Europeans appeared on the scene, the indigenous peoples of the prairie region were more a part of the natural environment than apart from it. Like all hunting and gathering societies they took from the environment only what they required for their daily sustenance and shelter and for their continuation as a people. In this they behaved like all other living creatures of the prairie biosphere and indeed were a closely integrated part of the natural ecological order. The rhythm of their lives responded to the rhythm of nature. Just as the buffalo herds migrated wherever they were led by the seasonal shifts in the abundance of grassland on which their lives depended, so did the Indians follow wherever the buffalo led, on which, in their turn, their own lives depended, Their values, beliefs, religion, rituals, customs, practices were all drawn and fashioned out of their primal, balanced place in the natural ecosystem of the prairies. During this era the image of "prairie man" was probably clearer and the term conveyed more precise meaning with reference to both the individual and society than it ever did again. Prairie people moved freely across what is now the international boundary and their realm extended far into what is now the central interior of the United States but their society and their view of the world was clearly different from that of such other ecologically integrated peoples as the Hopi of the deep south-west or the Haida of the Pacific coast or even the Iroquois nation immediately to the east.

#### 2. The Fur Trade and the Selkirk Settlers<sup>8</sup>

The single event which initiated the historic changes in this ancient ecosystem - if such change can truly be attributed to a single event - was the creation of the Hudson's Bay Company, the "Company of Gentlemen Adventurers Trading into Hudson's Bay", under royal charter from Prince Rupert of England in 1670.9 The change which this event wrought was the introduction into the prairie region of an utterly alien force which switched the rate of social evolution from its primeval position of "off" to the position of "on". The change did not occur immediately; it took a long time - about 200 years - to pick up speed from its initial condition of inertia and come to its full momentum.

The objective of the Hudson's Bay Company was the profitable exploitation of the resources of the New World, in particular the fur resources. The word "Trading" in the Company's title implicitly referred to the fur trade. At that time almost nothing was known about any other resources in the Canadian interior readily available for commercial exploitation and there was a lively European market for furs. The fur trade then marked the opening phase of this 200-year evolution of the prairie region. It was a phase of slow development characterized by the domination of the area by the Hudson's Bay Company not only in terms of commerce but also as a surrogate government.

The Company, however, did not hold unchallenged sway. Following the fall of Quebec in 1759 and Montreal in the following year, the French fur trade in eastern Canada was reorganized by a group of entrepreneurs in Montreal: some 16 companies banded together in a loose association under the style of the North West Company<sup>10</sup> for the purpose of pushing their enterprise into the north-west interior of the continent. Their appearance in the west presented a powerful challenge to the Hudson's Bay Company. The two companies became bitter rivals, their competition often leading to violence and bloodshed. This state of affairs continued until 1821 when the rivalry ended with their merger under the *aegis* of the Hudson's Bay Company. By that time, however, the fur trade was fading. The demand for

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furs was in serious decline and the supply was becoming scarcer. A new era was emerging the era of agriculture - in which wheat displaced furs as the economic staple of the region.

1812 was a landmark year in the history of the prairies. In that year the Selkirk Settlers arrived at Red River. Their arrival marked the beginning of the displacement of furs by wheat as the basic staple of the prairie economy; it thereby also marked the beginning of a new era. Up until that time the agricultural potential of the region had been both extravagantly praised and pessimistically dismissed but no steps had been taken to prove its potential. The fur trade occupied both the hands and minds of the Europeans in the region; there was nothing in their daily experience to suggest a possible change in their occupation or their life-style or their view of the world. The Selkirk Settlers were tangible evidence that such changes were possible. They set the prairie region off in a new direction.

Thomas Douglas became the fifth Earl of Selkirk in 1799.<sup>11</sup> He was then twentyeight years of age. When he came into his inheritance as a Scottish peer he became a wealthy landowner with large estates and many tenants. The condition of the landless agrarian peasant in Scotland, as in England at this time, was one of miserable poverty as a consequence of the rise of agrarian capitalism in the preceding century. Young Selkirk. historians seem to agree, was genuinely distressed by the dreadful conditions of poverty among the crofters on his lands, and felt that their only hope of escape and improvement lay in emigration. He experimented in 1803-4 with the establishment of colonies of his crofters in British North America - one near lake St. Clair in Upper Canada and one in Prince Edward Island. Now his thoughts turned to the western interior as a possible site for still another colony. In 1809, not necessarily with any direct connection to his notion of a western colony, although one cannot say with certainty how his thoughts ran, he acquired a large number of shares in the Hudson's Bay Company. Whether or not he had intended that the one would give him entry to the other, his influence as a very important shareholder in the Company enabled him to acquire for the nominal sum of 10-shillings an immense tract of 116,000 square miles of Hudson's Bay Company territory, 12 extending from the Lake of the Woods to the headwaters of the Assiniboine and the Souris Rivers, for the purpose of colonization (Fig. 4.). Apart from his feelings for his crofters, Selkirk was very interested in proving whether or not this land could produce field crops and support cattle; and there were members of the Hudson's Bay Company's governing committee in London who looked forward to the success of the agricultural experiment so that the food supply of their employees in the field would no longer have to depend on the precarious supply from the plains and expenditures on imported foodstuffs.

Thus it was that agriculture came into the prairie region through the back door, as it were, of the fur trade. It was to become, over the next half-century, the driving force in the development of the region and in the formation of the social and economic institutions and the cultural attitudes of its people. In 1812 however the colony at Red River was an adjunct of the Hudson's Bay Company and its agricultural occupation was regarded as ancillary to the company's fur trading activities. It was this identification of the colony with the interests of the Hudson's Bay Company which led to the continuous harassment of the colony by the men of the North West Company, specifically the Métis.

The employees of the North West Company, whose headquarters were in Montreal, were for the most part French Canadian, those of the Hudson's Bay Company in large proportion were Scottish, certainly so in the higher echelons of the organization. On that remote frontier of the European world, virtually the only women were native Indian women and from the union between them and the men employed in the fur trade, a new people emerged - the Métis. They developed a distinctive style of dress, a distinctive dialect, distinctive social customs and mores, and perhaps most important of all, a distinctive sense of self-identity, the conviction that they were a separate people.<sup>13</sup>

This did not happen among the people of mixed British-Indian origin. Those who hunted and trapped with the native Indians were regarded as Indian. Those who were brought up by their British fathers in the British tradition and were educated in the British educational system, and who perhaps found employment with the Hudson's Bay Company

were regarded as British. There was no formally recognized Métis people of British-Indian mixture in the network of trade of the Hudson's Bay Company.<sup>14</sup>

Red River at that time was at the leading edge of the movement of history through the prairie region. All of the ethnic, economic, social and cultural elements of the region were represented in the ill-assorted mix of people who had come together in that place. Of the various groups which comprised the population, only the Indians and the Métis had any strong sense of local identity. Both the employees of the Hudson's Bay Company and the Selkirk Settlers were displaced Britons whose interior landscape was still that of their homeland, and the figures which moved about in it were still those of its social classes still behaving in accordance with the rules and customs of the old world in which they no longer lived but which they still called home. They were in fact aliens in a foreign land.

#### 3. <u>The Métis Uprisina</u>

It was inevitable that friction should occur between the two culture groups - the British and the Métis. And cultural differences were exacerbated by the emergence of new uncertainties and threats over authority, security, land, and shifting loyalties. The Hudson's Bay Company's trade monopoly came to an end in 1859 when its royal licence of 1821 was allowed to lapse without renewal. The measure of authority which had been vested in the company and manifested in its monopolistic activities thereby came to an end. Moreover, in 1857 a detachment of the Royal Canadian Rifles had been posted to Red River and had provided the coercive power to support the Hudson's Bay Company's legal authority. In 1861, however, the detachment was withdrawn and the Company was left with virtually no power at all to back up the very tenuous legal authority it still derived from the original 1670 charter. Feelings among the English speaking settlers, who were farmers and committed to the land, were turning against the Company whose interests they now perceived were in the fur trade and basically opposed to the extension of agriculture. Moreover the governing body of the Company was in London, remote and inaccessible, and presumably with

little or no concern about the welfare of the settlement at Red River. Demands in Red River for annexation to Canada were growing under the zealous exhortation of Dr. John Schultz, a rabid anti-French Protestant. On the other hand the French component of the settlement was opposed to annexation. The opposing attitudes of the two groups were not centred merely on the political question of annexation but lay just beneath the surface of all of the relationships between them and constantly emerged in the form of fundamental antagonism over issues of religion, language, culture, and virtually every aspect of life in the community.

Forces were also pressing in on Red River from the outside. They came from three major sources - St. Paul, Toronto, and London. The Americans were preoccupied with their civil war during the first half of the decade of the 1860's, and what had formerly been a general eagerness to annex the north west part of the continent had gone into abeyance except for an enclave of this agitation which still remained active in St. Paul. Business interests centred in Toronto, under the vigorous leadership of George Brown, head of the Reform Party and owner of the Globe newspaper, demanded the annexation of the territory to Canada. 15 Neither the Canadians nor the Americans were particularly interested in the agricultural potential of the north west. They saw it rather as a vast area ripe for commercial exploitation, and in this the merchants of Toronto and the Ottawa Valley were not in the least disposed to give way to the shrewd Yankee trader. Politicians in Lower Canada however were less enthusiastic about westward expansion. In London, where the parliament at Westminster was the true seat of government of the colonies, there was conflict over what to do with the Canadian possessions. The British government was committed to the policies of free trade and colonial self-government, and there was considerable agitation in influential quarters for the protection and evangelization of native peoples, in both of which noble purposes the Hudson's Bay Company had been grossly remiss. But there was no concensus among Canadians on these and other critical issues.

Perhaps even more pressing than the matter of the disposition of the west was the growing demand in the east for the creation of a new politico-economic regime. A struggle was being waged there between the established mercantile interests of the old order with its trade lines to Europe, and the rising class of industrialists and their financiers <sup>16</sup> who saw a new era of opportunity and prosperity in manufacturing and who were oriented toward the domestic market. The centres of agitation were Toronto and Montreal, and after much public rhetoric and private political manoeuvering, crafty financial manipulations, alignments and realignments of power groups, a concensus was reached on the merits of, indeed on the need for, joining the colonies of British North America together in a union under a single jurisdiction with appropriate powers of self-government. Negotiations with the government in London finally led to the passing by the parliament at Westminster, of the British North America Act, and on the coming into force of this Act on July 1st, 1867, four of Britain's North American colonies - Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, the former Lower Canada now Quebec, and the former Upper Canada now Ontario - were united as a new nation - the Dominion of Canada.<sup>17</sup>

But the Canada created by the <u>British North American Act</u> comprised only four provinces, all of them in the east. The west was still to be brought into Confederation. It was still an unorganized territory in which the settlement at Red River, whose life was not entirely drawn from the fur trade, was the principle permanent centre of population. The Hudson's Bay Company still exercised some authority in the territory but its power was seriously debilitated; in Red River it was only nominal. In London, during 1869, British and Canadian officials conferred with the Hudson's Bay Company concerning the extinguishing of the Company's land rights and its future role in Canada. In Red River there was deep concern and frequent public discussions about the impending future of the settlement.

Red River was largely a Métis settlement, but there had been a steady trickle of new English-speaking settlers coming in from Upper Canada and the United States and the flow

increased somewhat after Confederation. The Métis feared that if absorbed into Canada they would be unable to participate fully in the affairs of the new nation. They were extremely uneasy about such matters as their right to retain ownership of the land they now farmed, whether they would be allowed to hold government office or to be employed in the businesses about whose advent there was much optimistic anticipation. But perhaps most of all they feared for the survival of their identity as a people - their language, religion, customs, kinship networks, cultural heritage - under the impact of English Canada. Their innermost apprehensions were made visible in the person of Dr. John Christian Schultz, a prominent figure in the English community of Red River who was violently anti-Catholic, anti-French, and pro-annexation. If he, or someone like him, should come to power in the new order it would certainly mean the destruction of everything the Métis held dear.

Through a series of incidents between October and December of 1869 the Métis, under the leadership of Louis Riel, <sup>18</sup> established armed control over Red River. On December 8 Riel proclaimed a provisional government with himself as the head. In doing so it was not his purpose to resist the annexation of the North West by Canada but rather to place the Métis in a position of strength from which they could negotiate favorable terms for their entry into Confederation. In February of 1870 a 'convention of forty' representing all the interest groups involved in the issue was held at which satisfactory progress was made toward a mutually agreeable solution. At this time a number of Canadians who had been taken prisoner by the Métis during the incidents of the preceding three or four months were still being held. Others who had been released or had escaped felt that they should try to free those still imprisoned. They met with Dr. Schultz to discuss the idea, and after considering the fact that Riel, at the 'convention of forty' had undertaken to release the prisoners as part of the agreement, they decided to disband. Unfortunately Riel was not aware of this decision and his horsemen intercepted the Canadians on their way home. A brief struggle ensued in which some of the Canadians were taken prisoner while others escaped. Among those who

escaped was Dr. Schultz who made his way to Duluth, Minnesota, and from there to Ontario where he embarked on a campaign of fiery agitation against the Métis at Red River.

Among those taken prisoner by Riel's men in the skirmish was a young labourer from Ontario named Thomas Scott. He had been involved in previous confrontations with the Métis and had been taken prisoner once before. He is said to have been bitterly contemptuous of the Métis and went out of his way to show his contempt and to provoke them. Whether for this reason, or to make an example of him, or because he plotted against the provisional government, he was court-martialled and executed before a firing squad. When news of the execution reached Ontario it inflamed the hatred of the Canadians and evoked their impassioned commitment to avenge the 'murder' and to destroy Riel and his Métis. A military force under Col. Garnet Wolseley was already on its way to Red River, having been organized months before to respond to quite other, earlier, pressures including the threat of annexation of the territory by the Americans. But when the Canadian government learned of Scott's execution Wolseley's expedition was given a new purpose - to bring the miscreants in the affair to justice. Wolseley's force of 60th Rifles regulars was augmented by a body of Ontario militiamen, most of them anti-Catholic Orangemen who were eager not only for revenge but also to seize this opportunity to inflict a mortal blow on their religious enemies, the hated Papists.

Following the February 'convention of forty' a delegation of three left Red River to present to Ottawa the list of rights agreed upon as a basis for negotiation of the entry of the territories into Confederation. The rights openly agreed upon at the convention were enlarged by additional items privately insisted upon by Riel, and further enlarged, it seems on his own initiative, by Bishop Tache, head of the local diocese. Included among the rights listed were such items as the admission of the North-West as a province rather than a territory of Canada, that Canada negotiate only with the provisional government of Riel, that the lieutenant-governor be bilingual, that the legislature have an upper house or senate as

well as an assembly, that there be denominational schools, and not least, that there be an amnesty for all those who had taken part in the violent conflict of 1869.

The Manitoba Act, creating Manitoba as a province of Canada was passed on the 12th of May and came into force on the 15th of July 1870. Riel was still installed in Upper Fort Garry as the nominal head of the provisional government but the Manitoba Act had extinguished the provisional government and negated Riel's legal authority. Moreover, Riel had already disbanded his armed forces on the advice of Bishop Tache who had assured him that the Act would contain an amnesty provision. Riel's military authority was therefore also dissipated. When Wolseley's troops landed at Point Douglas and began to advance upon Upper Fort Garry, word of the impending attack was brought to Riel, who, tradition has it, was sitting at breakfast. He immediately rose, leaving his breakfast unfinished, and fled across the American border. There he remained in exile for the next 15 years, until the North-West uprising brought him to Batoche to lead that insurrection.

The discontent which led up to the North-West rebellion was general throughout the territory drained by the Saskatchewan River but was sharply focused in the Fort Carlton - Prince Albert - Batoche area. Batoche is on the South Saskatchewan River about 35 miles almost due south of Prince Albert and Fort Carlton is on the North Saskatchewan River about the same distance south-east of Prince Albert. The population in these settlements was largely Métis, as it was in most of the settlements along the Saskatchewan. Many of these people had left Manitoba looking for a more peaceful and compatible environment and had established stable and even prosperous farm communities in their new locations. The government of the Territory consisted of a Lieutenant-Governor, appointed by Ottawa, and a Council of five members, also appointed by Ottawa. The appointed Council was gradually to be replaced by an elected Council of 21 members, as the growth of population warranted, but no more than five members were ever elected. The seat of government was originally in Battleford but in 1882 Lieutenant-Governor Dewdney moved it to Regina. Not only was Regina remote from the nodes of population but the Council rarely met and Dewdney

conducted the affairs of the Territory as though it were his own personal fiefdom. There was a serious economic depression in the Territory in the opening years of the 1880's; there was also great uncertainty about security of land tenure and there were conflicting land claims as there had been 15 years earlier in Red River. When conditions reached the point where the settlers couldn't get assistance to help them overcome their economic difficulties, and when their land rights became increasingly cloudy, and they couldn't make their requests or their grievances known to the government because of the latter's remoteness and indifference, they reached the end of their endurance and rose up in rebellion. There was no one in the Territory they felt had the qualities of leadership which were required. Riel was the obvious choice and they sought him out in his place of exile at St. Peter's Mission in Montana and brought him back to Batoche to lead the uprising there, which was in effect a continuation of the rebellion he had led in Red River a decade and a half ago, now having flared up again on another battleground. But he was no more successful at Batoche than he had been at Red River.

The Métis were defeated and Riel was taken prisoner. He was brought to trial in Regina where he rejected the plea of insanity which had been introduced in his defence and instead spoke with great eloquence about his divinely appointed mission as the saviour of his people. After a lengthy trial he was found guilty and hanged in Regina on the 16th November, 1885. Three weeks later his body was secretly transported by rail to St. Boniface where it was buried in the yard of the cathedral. Tache, now an Archbishop, officiated at the requiem mass. The ceremony was attended by a huge crowd of mourners who came from a wide sweep of the surrounding countryside. Since then Louis Riel has become a folk legend, a messianic hero whose personal life and death symbolized the life and death of his Métis people.

With the coming into force of the Manitoba Act in 1870, the Hudson's Bay Company's authority over the land of the North West passed to the Government of Canada. But the Province of Manitoba which was created was not what the Métis had had in mind when they

set out their list of rights for negotiating their entry into Confederation. Instead of the large area of provincial jurisdiction which they had envisioned, Ottawa created a small 'postage stamp' province, about 100 miles square, and designated the vast area lying outside it as the 'North West Territories'. (Fig. 5.) The Act also ensured that in both Manitoba and the outlying North West Territories, Ottawa retained control of the land and the natural resources. Such control was deemed essential by Macdonald in order to ensure that the development of Canada would be coherent and orchestrated in accordance with a centralized vision of the national destiny.

### 4. The National Policy

The Conservative government under Macdonald<sup>20</sup> immediately set about implementing their National Policy for the development of the nation. With Manitoba now a province, the top priority was to build a railway to the Pacific and secure British Columbia for the Dominion. As one of the conditions on which British Columbia would agree to become a province of Canada, the government was to begin the construction of the railway within two years of the signing of the Agreement and to complete it within ten. British Columbia became a province in 1871 and Macdonald lost no time in trying to put together a consortium to finance the railway project. After a number of failures and the 'Pacific Scandal' which temporarily put Macdonald and his party out of office, a Canadian syndicate was formed in the late 1870's. This group was well financed and its members were competent, experienced businessmen with international connections. The gigantic undertaking, the building of the Canadian Pacific Railway, was set in motion.

None of the policies to which the government was committed could be carried out free of the fear of potential legal challenge until Canada had the clear legal right to enter upon, use, and dispose of the lands which would be affected. This necessitated the extinguishing of any rights which the Indians might have or claim to have in the territories which they once roamed at will when there was no conception of land titles. To acquire and secure that entitlement the government entered into negotiations with the plains tribes which resulted

in a series of treaties in which the Indians were promised money, tools, equipment, food, and land reserves - economic and political support - in exchange for which the Indians gave up their aboriginal sovereignty and exclusive access to the environmental resources, except on the reserves. Today there is much serious debate, even litigation, over whether the terms of the treaties were understood to have the same meanings for the Indians as they had for the white man. However that may be, the treaties with the tribes on the southern plains were completed between 1871 and 1877; those with the more northerly tribes of the prairie provinces were completed in 1908. The Indian Act was passed in 1876 and the Indian as a major actor in the affairs of the prairies passed into history.

The CPR was incorporated as a Company in 1881.<sup>21</sup> The agreement between the Company and Canada for the construction of the railroad provided heavy public subsidies to the Company. An enterprise of this magnitude at this time in Canada's history probably required substantial public involvement not only to help provide the large amount of capital necessary but also to provide sufficient incentive to persuade the private entrepreneurs that the venture was backed up by the national government and that their own investments were adequately secured. But it also established the precedent for the kind of joint public-private enterprise system which has been characteristic of the Canadian economy ever since. The Company undertook to complete the railway line from Callander, Ontario to the Pacific Ocean, entirely in Canada, within ten years. In exchange the Company was to receive direct money grants of \$25 million and land grants of 265 million acres which were fit for settlement. Its railway property in the North West Territories was to be exempt from taxation in perpetuity. Its land grant property was to be exempt from taxation for twenty years after selection or until sold. It was to receive as an outright gift, several hundred miles of already completed railway. It was to enjoy duty-free importation of certain materials needed for the construction of the railway. And the government guaranteed that no other railway line would be permitted to be built south of the CPR mainline other than a feeder to the main line, and in any event no closer than 15 miles to the American border.

The railway line to the Pacific coast was completed with the driving of the last spike by Donald Smith at the place where the east and west lines met, in Eagle Pass, on 7

November 1885. It had taken somewhat longer to complete than had been originally agreed but it was a feat of incredible engineering skill and political and entrepreneurial virtuosity.

The CPR was not the only railway project that was under active development in the prairies at the turn of the 19th Century. This was the era of expansive railway proliferation. American and Canadian entrepreneurs speculated heavily in the creation of new railway lines. On the American side the Northern Pacific and its subsidiary, the St. Paul and Pacific, were created with links into Canada. In Canada the Canadian Northern was built with north-south links between the mainline and Edmonton, Saskatoon and the Manitoba Interlake; and there were numerous other enterprises. The economic boom on the prairies came to an end in 1913 and the inflated expectations of the railway speculators quickly collapsed. The federal government was forced to take over all the defunct railways under a specially created crown company - The Canadian National Railway. But there was now in place a railway network which was not only the necessary transportation complement of the wheat-producing capacity of the prairie wheat economy, now well established, but also was the communications web which bound together the far-flung reaches of the Dominion, realizing on the ground what had been Macdonald's vision in 1867.

Parallel with its railway policy the government pursued the other objectives to which it was committed and which comprised its National Policy. High on the list of priorities was the creation of a force to maintain law and order in the still largely unsettled and unorganized territories. The Bill creating the North West Mounted Police was passed in 1873.<sup>22</sup> The force became the Royal Northwest Mounted Police in 1904, and when its area of jurisdiction was extended from the North West to the whole of Canada in 1920 it became the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

The best known of Macdonald's national policies is probably the tariff and freight rate regimes imposed by the legislature in 1879. Indeed in many quarters this

particular legislation has in itself come to be know as "The National Policy" of the Macdonald government.<sup>23</sup> It may be that this has come to pass because much of Canadian history has been written by economic historians, particularly the early historiographers like Harold Innis and Donald Creighton whose studies were not merely deeply-probing but were brilliant seminal works which had a profound influence on much of the scholarship that was to follow. Moreover we live in an age which is enthralled by the belief that the economy is not merely the most powerful force in the life of society but is indeed the life-force itself and animates every part of society's being. Western Canada is traditionally perceived as economically disadvantaged relative to Central Canada and, as a consequence, as less favored in the distribution of the wealth, amenities, and general advantages of our national life. There is a deeply-rooted conviction that the West's economic woes and contingent inferior position in the Canadian scheme of things can be traced directly to the historic discriminatory tariffs and freight rates of the National Policy of 1879, and moreover that these discriminatory policies were deliberately imposed by the Macdonald government in order to benefit the Central Canada manufacturers at the expense of the Western farmer. In essence the tariff policy levied a tax on imported manufactured goods in order to give a cost advantage to the Canadian manufacturers, virtually entirely located in Central Canada at that time. This of course meant higher costs to western consumers. And the freight rate policy entrenched the CPR's schedule of differential freight rates which protected manufactured goods carried to the west but did not protect western agricultural products carried to the east. That is to say eastern manufactures could be transported to the west at cheaper rates than grain could be transported eastward. Recently, scholars have argued that the west's economic position is not due to the National Policy of 1879, but the issue continues to be hotly debated wherever it is perceived as a matter affecting Western Canada's fortunes in Confederation.

Three further measures of the National Policy profoundly affected the prairie region. These measures were closely interrelated; in effect they were three aspects of the same policy. The overarching goal was to populate the west with a farming population and the policies adopted to achieve that goal were the land survey, the land policy, and the immigration policy. Before there could by any large scale immigration on an organized basis, or a land settlement policy, it was first necessary to carry out a land survey so that all properties would be capable of identification and of registration of title. By an Order-In-Council in 1871, the survey of the west was instituted. With the exception of the river lots along the Red, Assiniboine, and a few other rivers, which had already been in existence for some time, the survey of the entire territory of the west proceeded on the basis of a unit of subdivision called a "section" which was one mile square and contained 640 acres. (Fig. 6.)

The Macdonald government's land policy followed in the footsteps of the Homestead Act of 1862, of the United States. Under that Act settlers could obtain title to 160 acres of farmland (a quarter-section) for the nominal fee of ten dollars. It was this offer of virtually free land that drew immigrants to the American mid-west from all corners of the globe. If Canada wished to attract settlers, it would have to match the American offer. In 1871 the Cabinet passed an Order-In-Council under which settlers were offered a quarter-section of land for ten dollars, on condition that they occupied the land for five years. At the end of the five year residency the settler would be granted clear title. The Dominion Lands Act of 1872 reduced the residency requirement to three years. However, there were some important exclusions from the homestead provisions of the 1871-72 legislation. Altogether about fifty-five to sixty million acres of land were excluded from the "free" homestead land category, much of it earmarked for sale on the open market with the proceeds going to finance the various developmental projects contingent upon some aspect or other of the National Policy. Nearly the same amount - about 56 million acres - was taken up under the homestead lands program.

The objective of Canada's immigration policy from the time of Confederation in 1867 until 1930 was to populate the west, but to populate it with a farming population which would bring the broad reaches of the prairies into agricultural production. It is not surprising then to find that from the time of Confederation in 1867 until 1892, the promotion of immigration was the responsibility of the Department of Agriculture. Its efforts, however, were not very successful. In the more than three decades between 1867 and 1899 only 1.5 million immigrants entered Canada. By contrast, during the decade of the 1880's alone, 5.5 million entered the United States and about 2.5 million entered Australia.<sup>24</sup> The first immigration program that was undertaken, apart from advertising campaigns and the establishment of immigration agencies in Canada, Britain and Europe, was the encouragement of settlement on the prairies by groups or colonies of the same ethnic or religious background. Blocks of land were set aside for Swiss, Germans and Scots; but the first significant colonies to settle in the prairies were Mennonites from Russia, French-Canadians from New England, and Icelanders, all arriving from 1874 onward; but the numbers were modest.<sup>25</sup>

The period of most rapid growth of the prairie region ran from the time that Canada's immigration responsibility was transferred from the Department of Agriculture to the Department of the Interior in 1892, to the onset of the economic depression in 1913, a period of some 21 years. It was during this couple of decades that the settlement of the farm land was at the peak of its momentum and the wheat economy was firmly set in place. The population of the region rose from something around 350,000 in 1897 to something around 1,330,000 in 1913, an increase of over 370 per cent. The largest part of this increase was due to immigration. And the immigrants came from many quarters to take up land and start a new life on the Canadian prairies. Many continued to come from Ontario, Great Britain, and the United States. They came into a prairie society which was already British in its cultural and political heritage and their added presence reinforced those ties with the Empire, with the English language and the Protestant church. Of the immigrants of non-

British background, the most numerous were from south-east Europe. These included peasants from Galicia (Halychyna) and Bukovina, who knew themselves as Ruthenians and who are know today as Ukrainians. There were also numerous German immigrants who came, not from Germany, but from the German-speaking provinces of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires. Immigrants also came from Iceland, Scandinavia, Italy, and in comparatively small numbers, from Quebec and other Francophone countries such as France, Belgium and Switzerland. Chinese had been brought in from China to work as labourers on the construction of the CPR. They were imported under conditions of the severest restriction - virtually as indentured labour - and were subjected to the most shameful racial discrimination. They were mostly males. During the period of construction of the railway the ratio of men to women was 25:1. After the railway was completed these Chinese found their way into the towns and cities across the prairie region where as much as 80% of them took employment in virtually the only two types of business which were open to them - restaurants and laundries.

The prairie region was never very attractive to the Francophones as a place to live. Those Quebecois who did emigrate from Quebec for the most part moved to New England where they were drawn by the prospect of employment in the mills and factories of Atlantic America. During the last two or three decades of the 19th Century the Catholic Church was the recruiting agency for French-speaking immigrants to the prairie region. The hope was to create a large, culturally homogeneous Francophonic community in the region, but the hope was never realized. The migrants who did come into the region, particularly those from the French-speaking countries of Europe, settled in scattered locations rather than *en bloc*. The result was a thin chain of small French-speaking communities stretched flimsily across the prairies. In the context of current concerns over the bilingual and bicultural issue in Canada, there is an obvious irony in not only the sparse Francophone population but also in the rejection of the region as a habitat by the Francophones. Sparse as it was, however, the French population was able to maintain its religious and cultural identity and

assert a French presence in the midst of the dominantly English-speaking Protestant, but nevertheless polyglot prairie society.

## 5. The Provinces and Social Change

As the territorial population swelled it was clear that the western interior could not continue on the basis of the rapidly obsolescent political structure, almost completely controlled from Ottawa. In 1905 both the Province of Saskatchewan and the Province of Alberta were created, and the prairie region entered an entirely new ere in its evolution.

With the entry of Saskatchewan and Alberta into Confederation the prairie region crossed over a political threshold. Prior to that event the region was politically underdeveloped, if not indeed amorphous. The Province of Manitoba had been created in 1870 but the rest of the interior was loosely organized in a number of Districts, and, notwithstanding the Territorial Council, was in effect under the political and legal jurisdiction of Ottawa. The new provinces were given a geographical identity: both Saskatchewan and Alberta were established, by the Acts of 1905, on their present boundaries. Although Manitoba had been created some 35 years earlier, its perimeter was still only the enlarged "postage stamp" boundaries of 1881. It was not until 1912 that its northern limits were extended to their present locations on Hudson's Bay and the 60th parallel of latitude, and the province assumed its present familiar "keystone" configuration. But even though its size in 1905 was diminuitive compared to Saskatchewan and Alberta, Manitoba was already far ahead of those two provinces in population, economic development, and urbanization. Because of the Red River settlement, Manitoba had become established very early in the development of the prairie region and led the region in population growth and general economic expansion until just before World War I. Saskatchewan overtook Manitoba in population at that time, but Manitoba continued to lead in economic development and urbanization until the end of the 1920's. Table 1 sets out the population growth of the region from 1871 to 1911.

During the nearly 220 years between the chartering of the Hudson's Bay Company and the completion of the CPR the character of the region had changed very little. The white man had made his appearance, but in 1881, in the year that the CPR Company was incorporated, there were only 118,000 of him in the prairie region. In 1891, six years after the CPR mainline was completed to the Pacific, the number had more than doubled but was still only about 251,000. The Indian had been effaced as a significant presence in the region; the Métis had had a brief efflorescence but subsided into anonymity after 1885; immigrants of British stock had become the dominant group and British-derived culture the dominant culture, although at the turn of the century there were also already various other ethnic communities, dispersed throughout the region; the fur-trade had finally petered out after a 200-year reign as the economy of the western interior and was replaced by agriculture which however did not come to its full flowering until the decade immediately preceding World War I.

By 1913 agriculture was firmly established as the economic base of the region although the failure rate among the early immigrants was high, due partly to insufficient capital to finance a successful operation, partly to unfamiliarity with the appropriate techniques for dry-land farming, partly to the unsuitability for the short growing season of the strains of wheat which were at first available. But many persisted, and out of necessity they developed attitudes and habits of neighbourliness, co-operation and egalitarianism. As the society and its economy developed, it changed. Living conditions were gradually much improved; techniques of dry-land farming were mastered; new strains of wheat, better suited to prairie conditions, were introduced; crop yields increased; exports grew; regional affluence increased and spread, buoyed along by flourishing national and world economies. All of this brought about changes in the social formations and cultural attitudes of the region. Class differences asserted themselves and a class structure was hardening. Leadership of church and community groups and organizations was passing into the hands of the wealthy and aggressive members of the community; so was political influence and power. The

Protestant religion prevailed; so did British attitudes and loyalties. Villages and towns and cities proliferated and burgeoned. And industry emerged as an important component of the economy.

World War I marked the end of an epoch in Europe. It also marked the end of an epoch in the prairie region. The war can serve conveniently as a marker dividing the western pioneer from the society which, at the outbreak of hostilities, was already assuming a new and different character. The pioneers had been immigrant farmers whose total energies were spent in overcoming the harshness of their environment, bringing the land into production and creating for themselves a new home. They came from various homelands, and they brought with them a variety of languages, cultures and customs. But overarching their differences were certain commonalities of experience which, at any rate on the surface, gave them the appearance, and the sense, of comprising a homogeneous community. Their society was a rural society; their outlook on life was a rural outlook. They were thinly dispersed over the enormous plains in isolated, widely separated homesteads. The endless demands on their energies left them time only for their traditional religious thoughts and practices but no time or energy for the contemplation of new political ideas. By 1913, on the eve of the European war, prairie society had changed. It was no longer homogeneous, even in its collective outward manifestations. It was no longer virtually totally rural in its place of residence. It was no longer virtually entirely farming in its occupation. Its population was no longer sparsely broadcast across the prairies. Its devotions were no longer entirely religious. 1905 marked the establishment of provincial governments throughout the region and the tripartite division of the formerly more-or-less homogeneous regional identity deriving from the common struggle with the natural environment, into three different communities of outlook and attitudes, deriving mainly from the differing political and economic interests which came to dominate each province.

The period from 1905 to the outbreak of the first World War was a boom period on the prairies and the vision of the new west as the land of promise, if not for the whole world,

then certainly for Canada, seemed to be coming true. Westerners who had come from all corners of the globe and were of all faiths and persuasions, were united in this one euphoric conviction. The creation of Saskatchewan and Alberta saw the entry of the national political parties into the prairie provinces, and some of the hope for a better life whose fulfillment had previously been sought through religious devotions was transferred to the realm of politics. But political action was not then seen as simply a matter of back-room machinations and deals for political power and short-term material gain. The westerners' embrace of political involvement had in it something utopian - the perception that their political participation was a parallel, in the mundane life of their secular affairs, to their religious commitment in the affairs of their spiritual life. Indeed the two worlds - the spiritual/religious and the secular/social - eventually became so entangled with one another that it was impossible to distinguish the one from the other and there emerged the strange political manifestations which are peculiar to the prairies and which distinguish them from the political norms of the rest of the country.

Provincial wings of the two national parties - the Conservatives and the Liberals - were organized soon after the provinces were created. In Manitoba the Conservatives were the party in power while in Saskatchewan and Alberta it was the Liberals who formed the government. Even at that early time there were sharp differences between the national and provincial parties on matters of policy and objectives. The national parties, based in Eastern Canada, saw the nation's future from that perspective. The provincial parties saw the nation from the perspective of the west, and fumed against the conservatism, smugness, and economic dominance of the east. But the provincial parties did not reject the fundamental ideological premises of the national parties. The differences between the provincial and national wings of the old-time parties were, in the main, differences over the advantages which would accrue, both nationally and regionally, if certain political and economic powers were in the hands of the western provinces. Essentially the conflict between them arose out of the position adopted by the provincial parties as defenders of

"provincial rights" against the imposition of federal authority by the party in power in Ottawa.

The tidal wave of immigrants flooding onto the prairies, with their babel of tongues and their myriad religions and customs was seen by the British-Canadian establishment as an opportunity rather than a threat, an opportunity to populate and build the new world of their cherished vision, to anglicize the polyglot language, to evangelize the deviant exotic religions to Protestantism, the only true and fitting religion for the new world of the prairies, to integrate the region into the commercial and industrial economy spreading outward from eastern Canada, to educate the ignorant newcomers into informed Canadians who would know where their loyalties properly lay - in the Dominion, Britain, and the Empire.<sup>27</sup> They were confident that they could achieve these worthy goals and so there was little if any inter-racial conflict or resentment against the immigrant strangers. The forces which were mustered to this inspiring task were not solely the political but also the religious in the form of the Methodist, Presbyterian and Baptist churches, and the school system.

With the depression of 1913 and the outbreak of war in the following year, immigration came to a halt. So did the tolerance of the British-Canadians for foreigners and the buoyant optimism which they had felt about transforming the raw peasant material into decent, patriotic, English-speaking Canadians made in their own image. On the national scene sentiment turned against foreigners, particularly those who were considered to be "enemy aliens" because their original homelands were now at war with England and the Empire. But the war had a more deeply uprooting effect on what had been the traditional attitudes and allegiances. In 1917 the Conservative government under Prime Minister Robert Borden formed a Union government with the Liberals under Laurier, and introduced conscription as a war measure. French Canada was opposed to Canada's participation in the war and to conscription, and Laurier, their former champion was now regarded as their betrayer. Western Canadians were incensed over Quebec's position on these issues and

lumped the French Canadians together with the other "enemy aliens". The French-English hostility over the war was simply a continuation of the racial and cultural hostility which has existed between French and English Canada since 1759. In the west, even before the turn of the century, there had been bitter conflict between the two groups on the issue of separate schools and the official status of the two languages. In 1890 the Liberal government of Manitoba, under Premier Thomas Greenway had abolished the two-school system and replaced it with a single-school system in which the language of instruction was English, and had abolished the use of French as an official language in the conduct of government business. In 1897 a compromise had been affected between Premier Greenway and Prime Minister Laurier under which education in a second language - but not restricted to French - would be allowed in the school system. Similar French-English conflict had plagued the school system and government institutions in the Territories, and had continued when they became provinces. And of course they are still with us today.

Other disturbances had been swirling beneath the calm surface of prairie society for some time around the turn of the century and were carried up into full view by the social turbulence stirred up by the war. Nineteenth century Protestantism had been a militant evangelical religion dedicated to the salvation of the individual soul from the sins of the earthly life. Fire and brimstone evangelists were popular performers on the rural gospel circuit as well as in the pulpits of the urban churches. In the years between 1874 and 1884 there were large-scale mergers of variant sects in both the Presbyterian and Methodist denominations which created very large congregations of unified persuasion and of great influence. These enlarged denominations created a variety of new institutions carrying the gospel to groups which formerly had not received separate, specific attention - women, youths, children, among both the rich and the poor. During the course of the work of these missions in western Canada a change in emphasis began to assert itself in their doctrine. Whereas the individual soul had formerly been the object of evangelical attention, there now began to emerge a concern with social conditions. The notion began to be expressed that the

sins of the individual were rooted in the sins of society and that it was futile to speak of individual salvation as long as the surrounding society was itself evil. These ideas were nourished not only by the theologians but also by philosophers, thinkers, writers, tractarians and others in various fields such as economics, politics, sociology, and in many countries of Europe as well as in America and Canada and even in Russia. The new doctrine came to be known as the Social Gospel<sup>28</sup> in western Canada and it had a profound affect on the political life of the region. One result was the acrimonious division within the Liberal and Conservative parties between those who were zealously inspired by their conviction that their vision of the west as the Promised Land would be more quickly realized through the social reforms advocated by the Social gospel, and those who were traditionally conservative in their ideology. It also divided the Church congregations in a similar way since not all of the faithful were persuaded of the virtues of the new doctrine.

Running in and out of and parallel with the Social Gospel ideology were a number of secular/religious issues which generated high levels of moral and ideological fervor during the war years. Prohibition and women's suffrage were two of the most hotly controversial proposals.<sup>29</sup> The motivation behind prohibition was the age-old highly complex mixture of religious objections on the grounds of sinfulness, and secular objections on the grounds of the social, family, and personal destructiveness of alcoholism. At the time of the war the arguments advanced were that prohibition of liquor would help Canada's young soldiers avoid the pitfalls inherent in drink and would improve the efficiency of the war effort. Opposition to prohibition was strongest among Catholics and the central and south-eastern European immigrants. In the heated atmosphere of the times such opposition was seen as anti-Canadian and proof that the opponents were indeed "enemy aliens". Opposition to women's suffrage was less ethnically and religiously weighted, but as it turned out, the government's action on this issue had an equally punitive impact on some minority groups.

The suffragette movement was led by English-speaking Protestants who argued, among other reasons, that British-Canadian women should have the vote, because it had

already been given to foreign males who had become naturalized citizens but whose political morality and patriotic loyalty were not always above question. After their election in 1917 the Borden government approved a new elections act which enfranchised female relatives of men who were serving or had served overseas. These new voters included the wives, widows, daughter, mothers, and sisters of such servicemen. However the act also disenfranchised Canadian citizens who were conscientious objectors or pacifists, as well as those who had come from countries which were now the enemy and had been naturalized after 1902, and all those who normally in their daily lives spoke a foreign language. Many members of minority groups, even though they had become Canadian citizens, were thus disenfranchised. Moreover they suffered further indignities, both direct and indirect, by the fervor of chauvinistic rhetoric and recruitment exhortation which heaped opprobrium on all those who were pointed to as laggard in the execution of their patriotic duties.

#### 6. Aftermath of World War I

It was, however, not until the war ended that the new lineaments of the altered prairie society became clearly manifest. The revolution in Russia in 1917 was a shattering event which sent its shock-waves throughout the western world. Those who had been sympathetic to the ideologies of radical social and economic reform hailed it as the new dawn of human equality and social justice; those who believed in the values of the established capitalist-imperialist society cursed it as the opening crack in the possible destruction of the world as God had meant it to be.

One of the first indications of the demise of the old regime of patronizing tolerance and optimistic evangelization of the foreign immigrant occurred in the autumn of 1918.

Because of the violent feelings of hostility against the "Hun" which had been inflamed by the war, and the anti-Bolshevik hysteria which had seized the established powers in the western world in the aftermath of the Russian revolution, the Canadian government had banned the printing of any publication in any of the "enemy alien" languages, principally German, Hungarian, Russian, Ukrainian, and Finnish, and had outlawed a number of left-wing

organizations including the Russian, Ukrainian, and Finnish Social Democratic parties and other organizations of similar socialistic persuasion. Thus by a kind of progressively changing illusory identity, like the changing images in the distorting mirrors in the "funhouse" at a carnival, Germans had become Prussians who changed into "The Hun" who was transformed into the "enemy alien", who then multiplied into the foreign immigrants, who then appeared as the black-cloaked, bomb-carrying Bolshevik who changed into everyone with even a pinkish tinge of socialist sympathy.

An even more definitive event marking the end of the evangelical vision of converting the polyglot prairie immigrants into a British-Canadian utopian society occurred a few months later, in January 1919. A public meeting had been called in Winnipeg by the city's socialists to commemorate the deaths of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, two German socialists who had been assassinated in Berlin. Anti-socialist forces, many of them returned soldier, gathered to disrupt the meeting. The meeting however was called off, and the disappointed vigilantes turned the occasion into a full-scale race riot. For two days they roamed the streets of the city's north end, smashing windows of residences and shops, breaking into homes, demanding proof of citizenship and patriotism, forcing people to go down on their knees and kiss the Union Jack. Police took no action against these atrocities and the Winnipeg Telegram commented that there are worse things than violence, citing treason and treasonable propaganda by members of hostile alien races. 30 But more was yet to come.

When the war ended in 1918, Canadians returned from the slaughter of Europe to a land that was considerably less than fit for heroes. Although certain aspects of the Canadian economy had been stimulated by the demands of war the west had benefitted mainly from the demand for grain whose production in Europe had been drastically reduced by the war. The very lucrative requirement for arms and other war material was of benefit almost exclusively to eastern Canada; the west received only about one percent of war production contracts.<sup>31</sup> With the end of hostilities European farming generally returned to normal and

the demand for Canadian wheat was correspondingly reduced. The economic depression of 1913 re-asserted itself and continued on into the first half of the decade of the 1920's. The depression had been brought on by the exhaustion of the great surge of western agricultural expansion. The wheat economy and its transportation, financial and institutional infrastructure were firmly in place, and most of the available land had been taken up and was under cultivation. The demand for new investment for the creation of the wheat economy abated and with the slow-down in the agricultural sector came the inevitably contingent slow-down in the agricultural service centres - the villages and towns and cities - whose services were no longer so much in demand and whose construction and development activities correspondingly abated.

Servicemen then returned to find the prairies in a state of economic depression.

Jobs were scarce and feelings were bitter. Many had been both physically and emotionally severely injured, maimed, deeply scarred. The Russian revolution had burst the chains of feudal oppression, exploitation, ignorance and misery which had been Tzarist society, and conditions on the prairies stirred sympathetic vibrations of protest among all those who felt cheated and deprived. Revolutionary ideology became more outspoken and political agitation more overt throughout the labour movement. Again the west saw itself as leading the march toward a new and better world. There were serious differences between the unions in eastern Canada which were mostly affiliated with the American Federation of Labour headed by Samuel Gompers, and those in western Canada. The eastern unions were organized on the basis of crafts, and thus had a vested interest in protecting the skilled workers. They concurred in Gompers' acceptance of the capitalist system and with his strategy of working within the established framework of political parties and of rallying labour's support behind that party which was most favourably disposed towards the interests of labour.

The western labour movement had quite different characteristics. One important difference was that it was not monolithic: at least four major groupings vied for the support of the workers.<sup>32</sup> Three of these were overtly Marxist in their ideology but there was a

gradation in their revolutionary fervor. On the extreme left were the International Workers of the World - The "Wobblies" as they were colloquially known. A second Marxist group was the Socialist Party of Canada. They were more intellectual than activist in their disposition. The third group of Marxists was the Social Democratic Party. They were more actively engaged in day-to-day political work than were the Socialist Party of Canada. A fourth group in the labour movement in western Canada comprised a variety of independent "Labour Parties". They were centred in the major cities of the prairies and they pursued immediate political goals such as election to municipal councils and the provincial and federal legislatures. They were "evolutionists" rather than "revolutionists" in their political philosophy, and sought the establishment of the just and equitable society through reforms achieved by the process of democratic elections.

In addition to these there were also unions of craft workers such as the metal workers, construction workers, machinists, railway running trades, printing shops, who represented about 70% of organized labour in western Canada, and who were members of the American unions organized under the American Federation of Labour. The leadership of these unions was adamant in its opposition to the labour "movements" and particularly hostile to the Marxist elements in those movements, endorsing, as they did, the attitude of the A.F. of L. leader Samuel Gompers towards capitalism and the role of the unions within that system. They were committed to the protection of the interests of the skilled workers through the existing organization of craft unions and resisted any notion of large scale unionization on an industry-wide basis. They were also opposed to the merging of their craft unions with any political party although they expected their members to exercise their franchise by voting for candidates from the old-line parties or even for candidates who ran as independents as long as they had no left-wing affiliations. The headquarters of the Canadian branches of the A.F. of L. were in eastern Canada, but the head offices of the unions and the Federation were in the United States, and negotiations on issues directly affecting the

workplace such as wages, hours of work, working conditions, and particularly the decision to strike were decided in the American offices.

In Canada the concerns of organized labour were voiced and debated in the forum of the Trades and Labour Congress. The T.L.C. was a national organization, made up of delegates from the union locals across the country, which met annually to air labour's views on matters affecting them and to adopt a formal position on such matters. But the T.L.C. was dominated by the craft unions which were centred in eastern Canada and which in turn were dominated by the A.F. of L. and its American leadership and policies. Tension and acrimony between the radical western labour movement and the conservative eastern craft unions was unavoidable.

Events moved to a crisis in the Spring of 1919. And it was probably inevitable that the critical event should occur in Winnipeg, which was the most radically politicized and class-conscious city in the west, if not indeed in the whole of Canada. From about February 1919, the unions belonging to the Building Trades Council had been negotiating with the Winnipeg Builders' Exchange for better pay and for a change in the collective bargaining system which would be patterned after the committee arrangement prevalent among the craft unions of the railway running trades. The Builders' Exchange were cool to the demands of the Building Trades Council and on May 1, 1919, all the unions comprising the Council went out on strike. On the following day, May 2, the Metal Trades Council called a strike of the metal trades workers against the three main metal contracting shops - Manitoba Bridge and Iron Works, Vulcan Iron Works, and Dominion Bridge. The metal shop employers categorically refused to negotiate with the strikers' representatives, and the Builders' Exchange, taking their cue from the metals employers, also refused to negotiate, even though there had always been a good relationship between the Exchange and the Building Trades Council. On May 6 the Building Trades Council and the Metal Trades Council advised the Winnipeg Trades and Labour Council of the employers' refusal to negotiate, and it was decided to poll all affiliated unions on the question of a sympathetic general strike. The poll

was overwhelmingly in favour of a strike - 8667 votes for and 645 against. On May 13 a Strike Committee was established, and on May 15, at 11:00 a.m. the strike went into effect, bringing the life of the city to a virtual standstill.<sup>33</sup>

At its height, it is estimated, as many as 35,000 strikers were involved, in a city of 175,000 people, with a Trades and Labour Council of only 12,000 unionized members. On May 16, a "Citizens' Committee of 1000" was organized at a meeting of prominent businessmen representing the Board of Trade, the Manufacturers Association, and the Bar Association, to oppose the strike and to try to maintain essential services and restore "law and order". Returned veterans and ethnic minorities were prominent in the strike. Soldiers played an active role on both sides of the confrontation, while the minorities were prominent as victims of racial persecution and anti-Bolshevik violence. The three levels of government carried out coercive and punitive measures against the strikers and worked closely with the Citizens' Committee of 1000 to defeat them. The strike lasted exactly six weeks to the day. It was broken by the arrest of ten of its leaders; the organization by the government authorities of a strong force of army units, special police, and Royal Northwest Mounted Police to use violence to clear the streets; a march of veterans on June 21 which ended in a riot with one person shot dead and thirty others wounded by the armed forces of the counter-strike. After these suppressive and violent events the Strike Committee recognized that the strike was lost and called it off, with the workers returning to work on June 26 at 11:00 a.m.

The jury trials of the arrested men began in December 1919, and ended in April 1920. Ten of them had had leading roles in the strike. Two - J.S. Woodsworth and F.J. Dixon - were charged with seditious libel, the eight others with seditious conspiracy. Three of the accused - Woodsworth, Dixon, and A.A. Heaps - were acquitted. Five - W.A. Pritchard, G. Armstrong, R.J. Johns, W.A. Ivens and J. Queen - were sentenced to one year. R.B. Russell got two years, and R.E. Bray got six months.

The labour uprising of 1919 was not confined to Winnipeg. By early June of that year a wave of strikes had spread across Canada. There were important walk-outs in Vancouver, Calgary, Edmonton, and Toronto, and smaller scale sympathy strikes in lesser centres such as Brandon, Manitoba, and Amherst, Nova Scotia. All of these failed to achieve their immediate objectives - the successful conclusion of the general strike in Winnipeg and the winning of a new status for organized labour and the recognition of its rights in the affairs of the nation. The reasons for the failure were many. On the side of the authorities can be counted the arrogant, aggressive, intractable character of the employers; the coercive power of the state which came down with heavy, uncomprising, repressive and punitive force on the strikers; the official resort to strike-breaking violence; the spread of anti-Bolshevik, anti-foreigner hysteria. On the labour side can be counted the fragmentation of the labour movement, not only along lines of ideology and strategy, which resulted in internal power struggles and "betrayals", but also along ethnic lines which emphasized the differences between the various groups and made it virtually impossible to forge a working-class solidarity. The differences between the "radical" west and the "conservative" east precluded any possibility of a common attitude toward any concerted program of action. And the lack of communication on a national level between the local centres of action assured the disintegration of any co-ordinated effort which may have unified the protest movement in its early stages.

The era of the Golden Age was over. Whether it had ever existed or was only a bit of mythology arising out of the euphoria of an earlier frontier experience is perhaps a matter of perception. If a community perceives something to exist and to be part of their daily lives, then for them it does exist and is a reality. Prairie society up until 1905 had been in fact still relatively unstructured and fluid. It was a farming community of scattered settlements on a vast plain; of extremely low density of population; of relative isolation and infrequent human contacts; of few regulations and restraints and little if any coercive state surveillance. For the immigrant from abroad the memory of oppression, economic

privation, and the virtually feudal social structure of Europe was a dark, harrowing contrast with the seemingly boundless personal freedom and spatial dimensions of the new world into which he had escaped. For the British Canadian settlers, the west, unfettered by the bonds of class and wealth and rigid social structure and customs which were already ensnaring eastern Canada, evoked a sense of unrestricted, teeming opportunity for both personal success and for moulding the future of prairie society to their hearts' desire. By 1913 the economic basis of that euphoria had collapsed. And in 1919 the social basis of that utopian vision of a new kind of society was destroyed.

Perhaps the defeat of the Winnipeg general strike and the supporting and sympathy strikes across the country did not destroy the social basis for an idyllic, egalitarian society but rather was the overt, if violent, proof that the possibility of such a society had never really existed except as a bit of folk mythology. What emerged after the passions of the short hot summer of 1919 on the prairies was the acknowledgement that prairie society was not a pastoral society but an urban industrial society; that it was dominated by the urban business interests; that it was not egalitarian but fraught with intolerance; that it was capable of minority persecution to assert its political power; that it was, in short, a capitalist society whose economic and class interests were parallel to those of the capitalist society of eastern Canada and the rest of the western world.

## 7. Politics. Poverty and The Great Depression

The defeat of the strikers, however, did not put an end to both the urban and rural westerners' sense of exploitation by the east nor to their search for economic and social justice. Their dilemma was where to find such redress. It was clear that no significant help would be provided by Borden's Unionist government. In the face of a steeply rising cost of living, the government had raised the freight rates immediately on being elected in 1917; no stronger evidence was necessary to demonstrate the difference in the regional interests of the east and the west. A Liberal government offered no better prospects. Westerners still

remembered with some rancour Laurier's position on the French language dispute and on the conscription issue. Disillusionment with the national Liberals had reached such a point on the prairies that prominent Liberals, such as John Dafoe, editor the the Manitoba Free Press openly advocated the establishment of a separate independent western Liberal party.

The alternative which emerged out of the confusion and exasperation over disillusioned political allegiances was the "Progressive" movement and the various parties which it spawned such as the provincial farmers parties.<sup>34</sup> The Progressive movement on the prairies was an amalgam of many elements. Farmers were a major component but it also attracted many followers who were agents and administrators in the prairie grain trade, civil servants and government employees, middle-class professionals, Protestant ministers of the Social Gospel,<sup>35</sup> and even members of their congregations and others who came under their influence and who felt that the new movement embodied some of their own attitudes and aspirations.

The movement, moreover, was not confined to the prairies. In Ontario, the Progressive movement, as represented by the United Farmers party, joined with the labour movement to form the provincial government in 1919. They held power for one term. In Nova Scotia and New Brunswick the Progressives were prominent in the politics of the Maritime region as activists in the cause of Maritime Rights, in 1919-20, after which they disappeared from the political scene. In Alberta, the United Farmers of Alberta formed the provincial government in 1921. And in Manitoba, the united Farmers of Manitoba formed the government in 1922. In Saskatchewan Progressive candidates were elected to the provincial legislature in 1921 and 1925 but never in sufficient number to form the government.

At the federal level the Progressives never formed the national government, but their presence was very powerfully felt. In the election of 1921 they won more seats than the Conservatives and had the second largest representation in the House. The seat-count after that election was Liberals 116, Progressives 65, Conservatives 50, Labour 2, Others

2.36 The Progressives declined the role of Official Opposition; knowing that they were too divided ideologically to function cohesively as a party or consistently as the Opposition. They preferred to sit not as a party but rather as a third parliamentary group whose members voted as individuals rather than in accordance with any caucus discipline. Their leader was T.A. Crerar, president of the United Grain Growers and a cabinet minister in the Union government. The influence of the Progressives waned quite rapidly after their initial success at both the federal and provincial levels in 1921 and 1922. Crerar resigned as leader in 1922, recognizing, no doubt, the growing ineffectiveness of the Progressive group in the House of Commons as well as of the movement itself in the country at large. In the election of 1925 they returned only 24 members to the Commons, and only 20 in the election which followed a year later. Not long after, the Progressives simply disappeared, not only as a parliamentary group but also as an identifiable popular movement.

The decade of the 1930's was one of those epochal periods in which the future is not merely foreshadowed but is given its substance. Two fateful catastrophes struck the region almost simultaneously and their traumatic affects continued on as a powerful, living force in the regional economy, its social forms, its demographic structure, its community psyche and political attitudes for decades to come. One was a man-made disaster - the market crash of October 1929 and the subsequent economic depression; the other was a natural disaster - the drought which in some parts of the prairies had begun in the summer of 1929, and the dust storms which began in the Spring of 1931, and the subsequent plague of grasshoppers and other pestilential infestations.<sup>37</sup>

The Depression was a world-wide phenomenon, at least western-world-wide. It slashed world trade and blocked capital flow and debased the value of money to the point where the consumer had woefully little purchasing power. The effect of this was to reduce drastically the effective demand for goods and services of every kind. The prairie economy was a one-product economy. That product was wheat, and the market for wheat (or the price of wheat) shrank to catastrophic proportions. The prairie farmer had no one to sell to, and

could earn no income. When the drought struck and the ceaseless winds started to blow his topsoil away, not only did he have no one to sell to, he had nothing to sell. He couldn't grow anything even if anyone had wanted to buy his product. But prairie farmers had gone into heavy debt in the preceding years to buy more land, new farm equipment, cars, homes and farm buildings, all in the expectation that good times lay ahead. Now they couldn't even pay the interest on their debts. They were plunged into desperate, grinding poverty from which there appeared no hope of escape. The prairie economy was devastated. During the 1920's the average wheat crop had yielded about 17 bushels per seeded acre; during the years 1933-1937 it yielded about 9.5 bushels per acre; and in Saskatchewan in 1937 it yielded only 2.6 bushels per acre. Farm income fell, step for step, with the reduced yields. In the late 1920's annual income from the sale of farm products was about \$500 million; for the 1930's it averaged about \$250 million; but in the opening years of the 1930's it barely reached \$180 million. In 1937 the crop failed utterly, and at the end of that year it was estimated that two thirds of the prairie farm population was destitute.<sup>38</sup>

Urban dwellers suffered as severely as the farmers. Unemployment in the cities was widespread and endemic. The only measure government could come up with to deal with the tragedy was "relief" - bread lines and soup kitchens augmented by the food and clothing, fuel and blankets, which churches and welfare organizations gathered wherever they could across the country and distributed among the needy.

The lot of single, able-bodied young men was most painful. Unemployment among them was widespread and at a very high proportionate level. As many as 70,000 of them were without work in any summer season during the depression years. Not content to sit idly by and watch their lives waste away, many went in search of something to do, travelling by whatever means of transport came to hand. Perhaps the most common means of transport was the railway freight train. Large numbers of these hungry, penniless, desperate young men rode the box-cars of the trains every day, many of them without expectation of finding work but rather simply to break the boredom of their lives and to change the locale where

they could scrounge a meal or a secondhand pair of boots, or find a different hostel where they could shelter for a few nights.

The Canadian government, partly because they could not escape some measure of responsibility toward this group, but perhaps mostly because they saw them as a potential source of violent political protest, established in 1932 a number of labour camps under the direction of the Department of National Defence. In these camps the single homeless "volunteers" were housed in army style bunk-houses and fed army rations and paid a wage of twenty-cents a day. In return they worked forty-four hours a week on public works such as road and airport construction and land reclamation. For the four years, from 1932 to 1936, it is estimated that an average of 20,000 per year lived in these camps and worked on such projects.<sup>39</sup>

The violence which the government of Prime Minister R.B. Bennett feared did in fact break out, on two memorable occasions. The first occurred in Saskatoon in 1933.<sup>40</sup> Conditions in the Saskatoon relief camp - as in all the camps - bred dissatisfaction and grumbling among the inmates. As might be expected, there were among the inmates those who were class-conscious political activists. Their open criticism of the system and the government was seen by the authorities as subversive Communist agitation and they acted to move some fifty of the most outspoken to a camp in Regina. The attempt to remove these men provoked a clash between the RCMP and the camp inmates in which one police officer was killed and several police and campers were injured. Twenty-six young men were arrested and brought to trial on charges of rioting and unlawful assembly.

The second episode occurred in Regina although it had its origins in British Columbia and Alberta. In April of 1935 the men in the relief camps of British Columbia went on strike for an improved national system of work and wages. In this they were aided and orchestrated by organizers from the Workers Unity league, which was an affiliate of the Red International of Unions. After two months of living on hand-outs from sympathisers they realized that they could not have the necessary influence on the government from such a

remote location and decided that pressure would have to be exerted in the capital itself. In June about 1000 of them set out for Ottawa, riding on box-cars and picking up more protesters as they moved through Alberta. They were stopped in Regina. Prime Minister Bennett ordered the Mounties to prevent any further movement eastward of the "on to Ottawa" trekkers. The men occupied the Regina Exhibition Grounds while their leaders negotiated with government officials on the strike issues. The strikers' demands were rejected and they were allowed two weeks of continued occupation of the Exhibition Grounds after which they were to disperse. At the end of that period Bennett ordered their leaders to be arrested. On July 1st, a meeting was held in the Market Square of Regina to decide on the course of action to be taken next by the strikers. The R.C.M.P. arrested seven of the leaders and a riot broke out. Some 3000 strikers and sympathisers clashed with steel-helmeted police. One officer and one striker were killed, over eighty were injured, about as many were arrested, and thousands of dollars of damage was done to surrounding buildings in the city's centre. But nothing came of the violence and the protest. A royal commission which was appointed to look into the matter found that the entire affair had been instigated and manipulated by communist plotters.

Population movements are generated by two types of force: one is the "pull" of places which seem more attractive than the place one is in; the other is the "push" of the place one is in, where conditions are repellant enough to drive one out. Up until the end of the 1920's the prairie region's population grew because of the "push" in the immigrants homelands and the "pull" of the vast lands and open society of Canada's western interior. During the decade of the 1930's the "push" of the economic depression and the drought and dust storms and pests on the prairies was sufficiently unbearable to drive a lot of people to seek a new life elsewhere, and to change permanently the demographic structure and trends of the central plains. Between 1933 and 1941 about 250,000 people moved out of the prairies. This was the first time since 1870 that people left instead of coming into and staying in the region. Manitoba and Alberta both grew at a rate that was less than their rate of natural increase,

and Saskatchewan, which was the most severely affected by the depression and the natural disaster suffered an absolute decline in its population. Saskatchewan had been the fastest-growing province in the decade before World War I. In the 1930's it fell to the bottom of the list and has not recovered since. About 250,000 people, urban and rural, left the region entirely, while a further 50,000 simply moved from the short-grass prairie of Palisser's triangle to the wooded parkland to the north, re-settling in the area around the Carrot River in Saskatchewan and the Peace River in Alberta. The exact number of families involved in the exodus cannot be established with certainty, but the 1936 census reported some 14,000 abandoned farms on the prairies of which 8,200 were in Saskatchewan and 5,000 in Alberta. The area of abandoned land was in the region of some three million acres.

As the depression continued, demands on the federal government grew increasingly frequent and pressing to do something to ease the lot of the prairie farmer. It was at the provincial level of government, however, that the political attitudes of the people were most directly and specifically expressed. Each province took a different path in seeking a way out of the oppressive conditions of drought and depression, but the divergences among them were not because of sudden decisions made in the urgency of economic and environmental crisis. The groundwork for their ultimate political differences had been laid much earlier, as far back as the first World War and the emergence of the Progressive movement. The Progressive movement, as already indicated, was an expression of the disaffection of the west and a cry for reform of the political system and the economic structure of the nation. It was a populist movement which although it embraced radical groups and ideas, did not advocate social revolution. There were important differences in the nuances of ideology among the three provinces. As they evolved through time the political configuration in each province became more peculiarly its own and more clearly differentiated from the others. Local economic conditions and social forces moved each province in its own direction. Not least among the social forces were the ideas and personalities of the outstanding leaders who emerged in each province and influenced that society, to whatever degree, in the direction of

his own personal convictions. Such men appeared in all three provinces and were among the prime movers in the creation of a third political party in each as an alternative to the two old-line parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, in which most of the prairie society had become disillusioned.

In Manitoba the outstanding figure in the movement towards a third political party with a new social ideology was J.S. Woodsworth, 41 although there were others of somewhat lesser stature such as F.J. Dixon42 and the leaders of the 1919 Winnipeg general strike. In Saskatchewan the chief figures were M.J. Coldwell43 and T.C. Douglas.44 Each of these three played a major role in the creation of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF)45 in 1933, which, some thirty years later (1962) became the New Democratic Party (NDP). In Alberta the most notable figure was William Aberhart, 46 who, virtually single-handedly created the Social Credit Party.47 True, there were other men and ideas which contributed to the tenets of Social Credit, such as H.W. Wood the populist gospel preacher/social philosopher from the southern states and Major C.H. Douglas, the English engineer who conceived the specious economic theory of social credit, but it was the evangelist Aberhart who fashioned these various elements into a political party in 1932.

For each of these political leaders the movement from his original vocation into the realm of politics was a natural one. Woodsworth was a Methodist minister whose experience among the impoverished immigrants in the north-end of Winnipeg and among the stevedores of Vancouver's waterfront led him to the Social Gospel. From there it was a natural step into the political arena. M.J. Coldwell was a school teacher in Regina who was led into political activism through his contact with the under-privileged schoolchildren of the city. T.C. Douglas was a Baptist minister who, like Woodsworth, moved along the path of the Social Gospel into the world of politics. Aberhart was a fundamentalist evangelical preacher who moved from the pulpit of his Prophetic Bible Institute in Calgary to the leadership of the Social Credit Party. The careers of all of these gifted, charismatic political leaders have been extensively covered in the scholarly literature and need no elaboration here other than

the recognition that each left a profound legacy not only in his respective province, but also in the prairie region and indeed in the nation as a whole.

When the provinces were first created there was little to differentiate one from the other in their political ideologies. They simply reflected the national parties: Manitoba was Conservative, Saskatchewan and Alberta were Liberal. In all three provinces the provincial parties soon distanced themselves from the national parties because they perceived that eastern economic and political power, represented by the Liberals as well as the Conservatives, was cynically exploiting western Canada. In all three provinces the new instrument of political action was a diffuse collection of Progressive reformers and dissidents out of which condensed the provincial Farmers parties. Although these Farmers parties, as the name indicates, drew the core of their membership from the farm population and addressed farm issues, they also attracted and made alliances with the reform groups, notably labour in Manitoba and Saskatchewan. The Progressive and Farmers parties disappeared in all three provinces, to be replaced by other organizations. And it is here that the divergence among the provinces becomes manifest and dramatic; from this point they go their separate ways.

Alberta went in the direction of right-wing Christian Fundamentalist economic and social ideology and Social Credit politics; Saskatchewan went in the direction of left-wing Social Gospel ideology and CCF politics. Manitoba hung suspended somewhere between the two. Alberta, for 36-years, from 1935 to 1971 was governed by the Social Credit party, and since 1971 by the Conservative Party which, in the context of contemporary conditions may well be regarded as simply an extension of the Social Credit ideological regime. Alberta then has had a one-party, or as it has been referred to, a "quasi-party"<sup>49</sup> system.

Saskatchewan in the post-World War II era has had a total of 31 years of CCF government (1944-1964; 1971-1982); seven years of Liberal government (1964-1971) and nine years of Conservative government (1982-1991). Although three parties have been involved, it must be regarded as essentially a two-party system because the Liberals have

virtually disappeared as a political party in Saskatchewan since 1968. Manitoba too has had a two-party system, fluctuating between the Conservatives and the NDP since the end of the second World War. The Liberals in fact have never formed the government in Manitoba, although they shared power with the Progressives in the years of Bracken's coalitions.

# 8. The Economy, Population and Urbanization

These were major divergences among the three provinces. With the discovery of oil at Leduc in 1947 Alberta diverged even further. Oil instead of wheat now became the major staple of the prairie economy. But the vast bulk of oil was produced in Alberta and so Alberta became the dominant sector of the prairie region. It took off in its own direction and left the other two provinces far behind economically and was separated from them by a wide gap ideologically and politically.

Oil was also discovered in Saskatchewan. So was potash; so was uranium. During the 1960's and 1970's the province enjoyed a prosperity based on a multiple-staple economy. But when the international markets for these raw materials shrank drastically, Saskatchewan again began to experience the old and familiar distress of a wheat economy whose staple was also in low demand in the world's markets. Saskatchewan has remained the smallest of the three provinces in population, mainly because a wheat economy cannot support a large and diversified population<sup>50</sup> and wheat has continuously been the basic staple of Saskatchewan's economy.

Meanwhile Manitoba's position in the region was carried largely by the diversity of Winnipeg's economic base and public investment in large-scale hydro electric development projects. But Winnipeg's relative position in the region has been steadily declining because of the ascendency of the metropolitan centres in the other two provinces, and Manitoba's economy has remained stabilized at approximately the national average.

Before the major discovery of oil at Leduc in 1947 agriculture drove the prairie economy and moulded the prairie society, and the flow and ebb of agricultural development was reflected in the fluctuations in the growth of the prairie population. Table 1 sets out the

changes in the regional and provincial populations for the census years 1871 to 1911. During the years between 1911, immediately preceding the first World War, and 1946, immediately following the end of the second World War, industrialization and urbanization were altering the distribution of the population and the nature of the economy. The population of the region had mushroomed in the decade 1901-1911 when land was being taken up and converted into new farmsteads with great rapidity. The prairie population during that decade grew from 419,,000 to 1,328,000 - an actual increase of 909,000 and a percentage increase of 217 percent. From 1911 however the rate of increase fell dramatically, and during the years of the depression and World War II, from 1936 to 1946, the region actually lost 53,000 people. (Table 2 and Table 3.)

Until 1911 Saskatchewan was the most populous of the three provinces, Alberta the least. Alberta overtook Saskatchewan sometime between 1946 and 1951, and went on to outstrip both Saskatchewan and Manitoba by a very substantial margin. Manitoba trailed behind Saskatchewan until sometime in the first half of the 1960's. Since then Manitoba has consistently had a larger population than Saskatchewan, although the difference between them has not been great. Alberta in 1966 had over half a million more people than Manitoba; and in 1986 Alberta was more than twice as large as Manitoba, with 2,375,278 people to Manitoba's 1,063,016. (Table 4 and Table 5.)

In the years between the outbreak of World War I in 1914, and the end of World War II in 1945, agriculture was still the leading activity in the prairie region. Over half of the regional labour force was employed in agriculture on the eve of the first World War, and over 40 per cent were still earning their living in agriculture when the second World War ended. Table 6 and Table 7 set out the distribution of the regional and provincial labour forces in selected years. It can be seen from the Tables that more people were employed in agriculture than in any other sector of the regional and provincial economies during these years. The Tables also show that agriculture in Saskatchewan employed not only the largest number of that province's workers, but employed more people than in either of the other

two provinces. Indeed in 1931 Saskatchewan's agricultural labour force was more than twice that of Manitoba's and Alberta's combined.

Tables 6 and 7 also indicate the relative importance of the non-agricultural sectors of the economy in the region and the provinces and the changes which occurred in their relative positions as the region evolved from 1911 to 1951. In Manitoba, a higher proportion of the labour force was employed in the Service and Clerical categories than in either of the other two provinces. The difference in the importance to the respective provincial economies between agricultural production and manufacturing production can be seen by comparing the data set out in Table 8 and Table 9. Prior to 1930 the value of agricultural production in Manitoba was greater than that of manufacturing. After that, however, the value of manufactures greatly exceeded that of agricultural products. In Alberta, agricultural production was more valuable than manufactures until about 1946 but after that the value of manufactures exceeded that of agricultural products. In Saskatchewan the value of agricultural production was always greatly in excess of that of manufacturing.

The first decade of the 20th century was one of rapid proliferation of urban places on the prairies. Towns and villages sprang up throughout the region in response to the influx of immigrants and the demand for goods and services. Urban places which were strategically located on the railway enjoyed a particular advantage. Those which were located at divisional points where train crews and engines were changed, grew to be large towns or even cities. Those which were located at divisional points which were also terminal points and the place where branch lines met, became the largest centres. Between 1901 and 1911 the number of centres increased from 65 to 397. The population living in those centres grew from 103,000 to 469.000, an increase of just about 355 percent. Not all of these centres were large. In 1901 only eight had more than 2,000 people. These eight centres, however, had 65 percent of the total regional urban population. Winnipeg, and the City of St. Boniface which adjoined Winnipeg, together accounted for over 40 percent of the

total urban population of the region at that time. Table 10 sets out the populations of the major urban centres of the prairie region from 1871 to 1916.

Manitoba was the most highly urbanized of the three prairie provinces until the end of the second World War. Table 11 and Table 12 set out the percentages of the regional and provincial populations which were urban in successive census years from 1911 to 1951, and the rates at which the urban component changed. From the Tables it can be seen that in 1911, 43.42 per cent of Manitoba's population was classed as urban. In the same year 26.68 per cent of Saskatchewan's population and 36.77 per cent of Alberta's was urban. By the end of World War II the proportion of urban dwellers had increased in all three provinces. Alberta now had the largest urban population of the three but that urban population did not represent as large a proportion of the total provincial population as did Manitoba's. Manitoba's urban population was 46.40 per cent of the provincial, Alberta's was 44.11 per cent. Some time after 1946 however Alberta's urban population surpassed Manitoba's as a proportion of their respective provincial totals.

In 1946 only 38 percent of Saskatchewan's population was urban, and that urban population was spread thinly and evenly throughout the province in a very large number of very small communities. Even the two largest centres, Regina and Saskatoon, were small. Regina had just over 60,000 people and Saskatoon only about 46,000. Their combined population was less than 13 per cent of the provincial total. In the forty years following the war Saskatchewan's population grew by only 177,510 or 21.3 per cent. (In the same period Manitoba's grew by 344,309, and Alberta's by 1,571,948). However, the combined total of Regina's and Saskatoon's population grew by 280,912 people or 264.32 per cent. This indicates a massive redistribution of the population of Saskatchewan during the four decades with a large number shifting from the rural area and the small urban places into the two metropolitan centres. But in spite of this major redistribution, the combined populations of the two major centres in 1986 only contained just over 38 percent of the

provincial population, a proportion which Calgary and Edmonton combined had achieved before 1951 and metropolitan Winnipeg had achieved by the end of the 1930's.

Since World War II profound changes have occurred in transportation technology, farming technology, communication technology, population distribution, labour-force distribution, financial institutions, the policies of government, and indeed virtually every aspect of society. These changes have had a powerful impact on the lives of people everywhere, no less on the people of Saskatchewan. They have altered the way they farm and the way they transport and market their harvest. Their farm homes are indistinguishable from those in the city. They watch the same television programs as the rest of North America; they are exhorted and enticed by the same advertisements; they travel widely and are as knowledgeable about the world and as wordly-wise. But the changes have not greatly affected the underlying staple economy of the province or the attitudes and concerns which are common to a farming community, not only to its rural components but also to its urban component whose livelihood is intimately bound up with and dependent upon the harvest of the land. Saskatchewan remains pre-eminently the grain-farming quarter of the prairie region; its economy is still driven by agriculture; its urban centres remain strongly linked to their rural hinterlands; its outlook and ethos still have the coloration of rural values and expectations; its behaviour and life-style are those of an agrarian society rather than an industrial society.

Manitoba is not an agrarian society - not when compared with Saskatchewan. On the other hand, neither is Manitoba an industrial society even to the extent that Ontario is industrialized. In Manitoba there are no international industrial giants employing tens of thousands of workers, like the automobile manufacturers in Ontario. Manufacturing in Manitoba is an industry made up of many small companies. The products they produce are greatly diversified ranging from food and beverages to highly sophisticated electronic equipment, from buses to farm machinery, from building materials to clothing, and much more, too numerous and varied to detail. It is the diversity of Manitoba's employment which

gives the province's economy a balance and enables it to avoid the depths of decline which other provinces experience when there is a general economic down-turn. On the other hand, Manitoba's economy is not large enough to enable the province to rise to the highest amplitude of any economic boom. As a result, Manitoba's economy rides along on a fairly even keel, at a level close to or just below the national average.

When oil was discovered at Leduc, near Edmonton, in 1947, there was a revolution in the region's economic regime. Oil replaced wheat as the staple of the regional economy and prairie society took a new direction. The basic building block of an agricultural society is the farm. The vast expanse of farm land in the prairie region, and the fertility of the soil, assured a very large number of farms, and the ready availability of farm land assured farms of large acreage which in turn meant a farm population spread thinly over a large area at a low density. All of the social and economic forms which are contingent upon and which supported the agricultural regime - the service centres, the transportation system, the marketing institutions, the financial institutions, the social life, the ethos of the society—were indigenous to the prairies. They arose out of the agricultural life and the agricultural way of thinking and feeling. Even the supply of funds for the day to day operation of the farms was very much under local control with bank branches widely dispersed throughout the entire region to serve the farmers directly.

The basic building block of an oil economy is the oil well. It is limited in location, fixed at the point where the subterranean pool exists and can be tapped most economically. It is independent of population. It uses a highly specialized and exclusive pipe-line system for transporting its product. It is capital-intensive rather than labour-intensive, and employs a small labour force. It is financed by multi-national corporations whose headquarters are in foreign countries. And it does not have the same atavistic power as agriculture: it cannot enthral the human psyche with the sense of man's oneness with the natural world. It can, however, evoke a different common outlook and a prevailing secular, materialistic value system in an entire society. And it can generate a great deal of wealth in

a society which has an abundance of oil when the price of oil is high in the international market.

In the Alberta provincial election of 1971 the Conservatives under Peter Lougheed<sup>52</sup> defeated Ernest Manning and the Social Credit party. Almost immediately upon Lougheed's assumption of office events in the international market sent the price of oil rocketing - from \$3 per barrel in 1973 to \$30 per barrel in the early 1980's. The oil companies became very rich; the province of Alberta skimmed off sufficient royalties to establish a fat Heritage Fund; the money put into circulation found its way into all the crannies of the province, making Alberta one of the richest in Canada, and it boosted Calgary and Edmonton into the position not only of the leading cities in the prairie region, but among the top urban centres in the nation.

Lougheed sought to diversify the Alberta economy. He encouraged the creation of a petro-chemical industry. He set up Pacific Western Airlines. He established the Alberta Heritage Fund into which was channelled 30 per cent of the province's annual revenues from non-renewable resources, to be used in support of the province's economic development. At first glance it would appear that the Conservative government of Alberta and the NDP government of Saskatchewan had much in common and pursued similar economic goals. 53 Saskatchewan had created a Crown Investment Corporation which although it had only one tenth of the financial assets of Alberta's Heritage Fund, was also intended to be used for economic development. Both provincial governments owned their provincial telephone systems. There were, in each province, an extensive credit union system, large wheat and dairy Pools, co-operative movements. But the two provinces were in fact more different than they were similar. In Saskatchewan, the NDP government intervened in the economy in the role of entrepreneur. It used government revenues to acquire the resources of the province and to own and operate the companies which extracted and processed them. In Alberta the Heritage Fund was used to acquire government interest in the communications industries and to provide mortgage funds to home owners and small businesses, not to give

government a major entrepreneurial role in the provincial economy. That role the Lougheed government left to the private entrepreneur, although it did not shrink from advancing large sums to private corporations such as Peter Pocklington's meat-packing company or Jack Gallagher's oil enterprises, or various others, when the occasion required. The essential difference between the two provinces was an ideological one. Both sought economic growth and diversification. Saskatchewan however believed that this could be achieved more equably and with greater and more evenly distributed benefits to the entire population through direct entrepreneurial intervention by the provincial government. Alberta believed that it could be achieved more rapidly and more efficiently if left in the hands of the private entrepreneur, with the generous assistance, as required, of the public treasury.

These two basically different approaches found correspondingly different expressions in the attitudes and values of the respective provincial societies. In Alberta the aggressive, high-rolling, free-wheeling entrepreneur became the popular hero who personified the ethos and aspirations of Albertans and reaped the just rewards of his smartness and his daring. In Saskatchewan, although oil and potash and uranium became important factors in the provincial economy, they did not displace agriculture as the primary staple, and the farmer remained the embodiment of the private entrepreneur. The concerns and values of an agrarian society then, continue to prevail among the people of Saskatchewan, in stark contrast to those of the people of Alberta in their new-found oilfuelled economy. Manitoba continues to occupy a position mid-way between those two provinces in terms of its economy and its attitudes and values. Its economic performance is at the median of that of the national economy and is still dominated by the mixed economy of Winnipeg. Nothing has occurred, comparable to oil in Alberta, to stimulate a new entrepreneurial regime; the role of agriculture remains as it has been in the past. Indeed Manitoba seems to be caught in a time-warp where little has changed in the last halfcentury. Political preferences fluctuate between Conservative and NDP, and attitudes and values are coloured by nostalgia for a by-gone era.

#### NOTES

- <sup>1</sup>Watson, North America Its Countries and Regions, 13.
- <sup>2</sup>Lautt, "Sociology and the Canadian Plains," in Richard Allen, ed., <u>A region of the Mind</u>, 130.
- <sup>3</sup>Brenton M. Barr and John C. Lehr, "The Western Interior: The Transformation of a Hinterland Region," in L.D. McCann, ed., <u>Heartland and Hinterland: A Geography of Canada</u>, 291.
- <sup>4</sup>B. Kaye and D.W. Moodie, "Geographical Perspectives on the Canadian Plains," in Richard Allen, ed., <u>A Region of the Mind</u>, 17.
- <sup>5</sup>Kay and Moodie. "Geographical Perspectives," 17.
- <sup>6</sup>See Irene M. Spry, <u>The Palliser Expedition</u>.
- <sup>7</sup>Barr and Lehr. "The Western Interior".
- <sup>8</sup>The Classic work on the fur trade is Harold Innis's <u>The Fur Trade</u>. For an account of the fur trade in western Canada see Arthur S. Morton <u>A History of the Canadian West to 1870-71</u>. See also E.E. Rich <u>The Fur Trade and the North West to 1857</u>.
- <sup>9</sup>See Rich, E.E. <u>The Hudson's Bay Company. 1670-1870</u>. 3 vols. See also Peter E. Newman, <u>Company of Adventurers</u> and <u>Caesars of the Wilderness</u>.
- <sup>10</sup>See Marjorie Wilkins Campbell, <u>The North West Company</u> for an excellent history of the North West Company and its principle personalities.
- <sup>11</sup>See John Morgan Gray, Lork Selkirk of Red River.
- 12 Friesen, The Canadian Prairies. 72.
- <sup>13</sup>Gerald Friesen, <u>The Canadian Prairies</u>. 68.
- <sup>14</sup>See Jennifer S.H. Brown, <u>Strangers in Blood: Fur Trade Families in Indian Country</u>.
- <sup>15</sup>See W.L. Morton, <u>The Critical Years</u>.
- <sup>16</sup>See H. Clare Pentland, <u>Labour and Capital in Canada 1650-1860</u>.
- <sup>17</sup>See Desmond Morton, <u>A Short History of Canada</u>. See also W.L. Morton, <u>The Critical Years</u>; also Donald Creighton, <u>The Story of Canada</u>, chapter 7.
- <sup>18</sup>See George F.G. Stanley, <u>Louis Riel</u>, for an excellent biography. See also A.S. Lussier, ed., <u>Louis Riel and the Métis</u>; also Thomas Flanagan <u>Louis David Riel</u>: <u>Prophet of the New World</u>.
- <sup>19</sup>See Bob Beal and Rod Macleod, <u>Prairie Fire: The 1885 North West Rebellion</u>.
- <sup>20</sup>See Donald Creighton, <u>John A. Macdonald: The Old Chieftain</u>, for a biography of Macdonald.
- <sup>21</sup>See W. Kaye Lamb, <u>History of the Canadian Pacific Railway</u>; also Pierre Berton (2 vols.) <u>The National Dream</u> and <u>The Last Spike</u>.
- <sup>22</sup>See R.C. Macleod, <u>The NWMP and Law Enforcement</u>. 1873-1905.
- <sup>23</sup>See Vernon C. Fowke, <u>The National Policy and the Wheat Economy</u>.
- <sup>24</sup>Fowke, "Canadian Agricultural Policy: The Historical Pattern," cited in Friesen, <u>The Canadian Prairies</u>. 185.
- <sup>25</sup>For a comprehensive overview of immigrant communities on the prairies see Friesen, The Canadian Prairies, chapter 11, "Immigrant Communities 1870-1940; The Struggle for Survival". 242-273.
- <sup>26</sup>Accounts of the two national political parties in the three prairie provinces at this time and in the ensuing decades are provided in W.L. Morton, <u>Manitoba: A History</u>; David

- E. Smith, <u>Prairie Liberalism: The Liberal Party in Saskatchewan 1905-1971</u>; and L.G. Thomas <u>The Liberal Party in Alberta: A History of Politics in the Province of Alberta 1905-1921</u>.
- <sup>27</sup>See Marilyn Barber, "Nationalism, Nativism and the Social Gospel," in Richard Allen, ed., <u>The Social Gospel in Canada</u>. 223.
- <sup>28</sup>Richard Allen, ed., <u>The Social Gospel in Canada</u>; also Allen, <u>The Social Passion: Religion and Social Reform in Canada</u>, <u>1914-1928</u>.
- <sup>29</sup>See John Herd Thompson, <u>The Harvests of War: The Prairie West 1914-1918</u>.
- <sup>30</sup>Winnipeg Telegram, January 1919, cited in Friesen, <u>The Canadian Prairies</u>. 354.
- 31 John Herd Thompson, Harvests. 95-114.
- <sup>32</sup>Gerald Friesen, <u>The Canadian Prairies</u>. 356-358.
- 33The fullest discussions of the 1919 strike in Winnipeg are David Jay Bercuson, Confrontation at Winnipeg: Labour Industrial Relations and the General Strike; Donald C. Masters, The Winnipeg General Strike. Norman Penner, Winnipeg 1919 presents the strike from the strikers' point of view. Kenneth Osborne, R.B. Russell and the Labour Movement focuses on the career of one of the strike leaders. An excellent short but comprehensive and graphic overview of the strike is presented by Gerry Berkowski and Nolan Reilly in the pamphlet 1919: The Winnipeg General Strike: a driving and walking tour.
- <sup>34</sup>See W.L. Morton, <u>The Progressive Party in Canada</u>.
- <sup>35</sup>See Richard Allen, "The Social Gospel as the Religion of the Agrarian Revolt," in Berger and Cook, eds., <u>The West and the Nation</u>. 181-185.
- <sup>36</sup>Cited in Gerald Friesen, <u>The Canadian Prairies</u>. 495. n.39.
- <sup>37</sup>James Gray provides vivid descriptions of weather and living conditions on the prairies during the depression in <u>The Winter Years</u> and <u>Men Against the Desert</u>.

  <sup>38</sup>Gerald Friesen, <u>The Canadian Prairies</u>. 388.
- <sup>39</sup>Friesen. 395-398. See also Michiel Horn, ed., <u>The Dirty Thirties</u>; also Blair H. Neatby, <u>The Politics of Chaos</u>.
- <sup>40</sup>See Victor Hoar, ed., <u>Recollections of the On To Ottawa Trek</u>.
- <sup>41</sup>For a biography of J.S. Woodsworth see Kenneth McNaught, <u>A Prophet in Politics</u>.
- <sup>42</sup>See Allen Mills, "Single Tax, Socialism and the Independent Labour Party of Manitoba: The Political Ideas of F.J. Dixon and S.J. Farmer," in <u>Labour/Le Travailleur</u> 5. (Spring 1980).
- <sup>43</sup>See Walter D. Young, "M.J. Coldwell, The Making of a Social Democrat". <u>Journal of Canadian Studies</u> 9.3. (1974). 50-60.
- <sup>44</sup>For a biography of T.C. Douglas see Thomas H. McLeod and Ian McLeod, <u>Tommy Douglas</u>.
- <sup>45</sup>See Lipset, <u>Agrarian Socialism</u>. See also Lewis H. Thomas, "The CCF Victory in Saskatchewan," in <u>Saskatchewan History</u>. 34.1 (Winter 1981), 1-16.
- <sup>46</sup>See Lewis H. Thomas, ed., <u>William Aberhart and Social Credit in Alberta</u>; see also Harold J. Schultz, "Portrait of a Premier: William Aberhart," in <u>Canadian Historical Review</u> 45.3 (1964). 185-211.
- <sup>47</sup>See C.B. Macpherson <u>Democracy in Alberta</u>; also John A. Irving, <u>The Social Credit Movement in Alberta</u>.
- <sup>48</sup>See Peter R. Sinclair, "Class Structure and Populist Protest: The Case of Western Canada," in Carlo Caldarola, ed., <u>Society and Politics in Alberta: Research Papers</u>.

  14.32. See also Carl F. Betke, "The United Farmers of Alberta, 1921-1935," in

- Caldarola. 14.32; also J.F. Conway, "The Prairie Populist Resistance to the National Policy: Some Reconsiderations," in <u>Journal of Canadian Studies</u> 14.3 (Fall, 1979), 77-91.
- <sup>49</sup>C.B. Macpherson, <u>Democracy in Alberta</u>; also John A. Irving, <u>The Social Credit Movement in Alberta</u>.
- <sup>50</sup>See Derek Hum and Paul Phillips, "Growth, Trade, and Urban Development of Staple Regions," in <u>Urban History Review</u> X.2 (October, 1981). 13-23.
- <sup>51</sup>Paul Phillips, "The Urban System 1911-1961: Specialization and Change," in Alan Artibise, ed., <u>Town and City</u>. 10.
- <sup>52</sup>See Allan Husack, <u>Peter Lougheed: A Biography</u>.
- <sup>53</sup>For a discussion of this issue see John Richards and Larry Pratt, <u>Prairie Capitalism</u>.

### **CHAPTER 3**

#### THE REGIONAL PERSONALITY

#### 1. The Sociological View

The overview of the historical development of the prairie region outlined in the foregoing pages is not intended to be read as a work of historiography in its own right, but rather as a background against which the central theme of this dissertation can be viewed and argued. Cities are a significant dimension of a society. They are as much an expression of the history of a people as any other social form, or custom, or institution. Winnipeg, Regina, and Calgary developed out of the historical circumstances of their regional milieu, and in order to understand how these cities got to be the communities they are, some understanding of the regional historical background is necessary. The overview provided in the preceding pages is, of course, merely an outline. But in that outline an attempt has been made to touch upon what seem to be the most important influences which shaped each of the prairie provinces, and hence which entered into the development of each of the three cities.

One of the ideas which this historical sketch suggests is that the harsh physical environment of the prairies, the agricultural way of life which predominated for generations, the twin calamities of depression and drought, the perception of being exploited by the vested interests of eastern Canada, the absorption of a flood of immigrants of a great variety of ethnic and religious backgrounds, and other such experiences shared in common throughout the prairies have produced a regional type of personality quite different from the personality types in the other regions of Canada. If this is so then one might expect to find some aspects of that personality expressed in a variety of ways in the life of the regional society; one might even expect to find some trait of that prairie personality expressed in some recognizable form in the major cities of the region. One would, of course, also expect to find that these peculiarities are overlain by the more common characteristics of the larger national or even

international cultures such as, for example, the ubiquitous streets designed for automobile traffic, the omnipresent shopping mall; the commercial towers and other high density development of the central area; the low density, affluent, residential suburbs. But beneath these dominant, universal characteristics one might expect to find some idiosyncratic trait which derives from the city's evolution in the context of its regional setting; one might expect to find in it somewhere a token of the prairie personality. Beyond the regional influence there are also the provincial and local influences which in certain respects are even more critical than the regional in moulding the peculiar identity of the city.

Before one can look for evidence of the regional personality in the city one must, obviously, have a fairly clear idea of what one is looking for, that is to say, a fairly clear idea of what is meant by the term "regional personality"; what are its characteristics; by what signs is it to be recognized. All of this begs the question of whether there is in fact such a thing as a "regional personality." This question has never been satisfactorily settled. Indeed, it is a question which has received only superficial examination by scientific investigators. References to the characteristics of various groups are common. One frequently hears allusions to the "national character", or "ethnic character," or even "regional character" of a people. Canadians, for example, are frequently described as conservative, stodgy, unenterprising, phlegmatic, docile, law-respecting and smug. The French are reported to be pragmatic, logical, venal, arrogant, and promiscuous. The Americans, sentimental, emotionally and intellectually immature, self-indulgent, chauvinistic, violent, and commercially aggressive. And so on. Every society has its stereotypical labels.

All such judgments are for the most part subjective in nature. In times of international crisis or even merely strained relationships, each antagonist sees the other's character as sly, or wily, or predatory, or fanatic, or barbaric, depending on the severity of the differences between them.<sup>1</sup> And when an accord is being sought, or put in

place, the national characters are industrious, or enterprising, or honourable, or hospitable, or in other ways admirable. Nor are such perceptions always merely a response to propaganda and the deliberate manipulation of public opinion.

Circumstances provoke reactions and mass emotions can arise spontaneously under given provocations. On such occasions there are often striking anomalies between the objective reality and the subjective perception of it. Perhaps the most difficult problem in understanding social psychology and communal behaviour is to sort out what aspects of these phenomena are the subjective delusions of the observer and what are the objective events which are being observed. Just as beauty is in the eye of the beholder, so character may be in the prejudices of those who judge it. It is a field of study fraught with hazards for the scientific investigator, mainly because of the difficulty of preventing the intrusion of his or her own cultural values or personal idiosyncrasies which distort the perception and interpretation of the observed facts. This danger of course exists in all sciences but is particularly troublesome in the social sciences where not only the perceptions of the investigator are culturally biased but the behavioural phenomena under study are also culturally influenced. The problem is stubborn even within a common culture, but it is virtually intractable where the observer and the observed have been conditioned by different cultures.

Regions and nations - indeed all communities - are an amalgam of a great variety of constituents. Even small and relatively homogeneous nations like Sweden or Japan, or regions like the Canadian prairies, or even the enclaves of cities contain a wide range of behavioural variations which reflect rural/urban differences, class and wealth differences, stage-in-the-life-cycle differences, ethnic differences, religious differences, etc. All of this adds the complication of a conceptual definition to the other problems of the study of community.

Some social scientists are keenly aware of all of these difficulties. Marcia Pelley Effrat, for example, in her book The Community - Approaches and Applications has this

to say with reference to the confusion in the field of community studies because of the conceptual, methodological and psycho-social complexities involved:

Trying to study community is like trying to scoop up jello with your fingers. You can get hold of some, but there's always more slipping away from you. When we talk about community research, we can - and often do refer to material on community organizing, acting, and planning as well as more traditional research on interaction patterns, institutions, norms, and roles within phenomena characterized as communities.

Not only is the range of subject matter broad but it is also divided into differing camps, whose debates with one another continue heatedly and underlie much of the research being done. But the jello analogy holds in this sense too, because in the process of debate the controversial issues have been mixed together in a gelatinous mess of hypothesis, research, and value judgments.<sup>2</sup>

In addition to these confusions resulting from the variety of approaches to the scientific investigation of the nature of community, Effrat is well aware of the hazards inherent in the personal judgments of the investigator as they affect not only the interpretation of the evidence but also the selection of the problem itself, and the relative weighting given to its various aspects:

In addition, all of these approaches suffer from three major methodological problems. The first is the general problem of field research - that the findings are strongly affected by the person(s) doing the research. The second is the question of the representatives of the community. The third problem relates to the implicit decisions made concerning which issues are considered empirical questions open to the investigation and which factors are taken as givens.<sup>3</sup>

The concept of "community" then is a very blurred one; the scientific community seems unable to agree on what the term means and what its characteristics are. Various studies have been carried out based on a variety of premises and assumptions about the concept, particularly in the United States and particularly in urban communities, but the concept of the Canadian prairie region as a "community" has not received serious attention

from the sociologists. The notion of a "prairie regional personality" then remains one which is felt intuitively rather than confirmed scientifically. Geographers, economists, meteorologists, historians, and other scholars have recognized the validity and the peculiar identities of the prairie region. There is a very substantial literature setting out their ideas and their findings on the subject. But the sociologists and other social scientists who work in the fields of social psychology, behaviour, and cultural phenomena are not persuaded of the validity of the concept of a prairie personality or the reality of the image of "prairie man". The feeling among many of these scholars is that not enough research has been done on these concepts to provide persuasive evidence of their validity. M.L. Lautt, for example, has observed that Sociology on the prairies was a "transplant" form the United States (as in fact it was in Canada generally) and brought with it the characteristics of the American discipline which did not dispose it toward large-scale synthesizing studies:

Having been formed to function in a different environment, it is not amazing, but quite obvious, why the discipline in the prairie West has not developed any basic picture of the West, but only a whole series of interesting, but rather unrelated empirical studies. Now it is understandable why rural studies concentrate not on developing a complete picture of the rural component in the structure of the West, but on discovering the best ways to help the rural component adjust to the urbanization and industrialization of the Canadian plains. It becomes obvious now also why ethnic studies have been essentially descriptive: sociologists have felt a duty to record the idiosyncrasies of different ethnic groups before they disappear in the standardization process of modernization....

Finally on the question of the study of regionalism, regional Sociology has at one time had reasonable success in the United States. With only an invisible political line separating the American plains from the Canadian plains, sociologists have inevitably assumed that the prairies (Canadian) were also a socio-cultural region, but, as it has been argued earlier in this paper, this may not be true. We have a long road ahead.<sup>4</sup>

To the outside observer, sociologists often seem to be at odds, even out of touch with each other, and Sociology seems to be not so much a coherent discipline as an assortment of

fragmented, almost idiosyncratic intellectual discourses each addressing its own special interests in the terms of its own particular internal imperatives. Perhaps it should therefore not be surprising to learn from Prof. Lautt that there is no sociological concensus on the matter of the Canadian prairies as a socio-cultural region, (or, by extension, on the validity of the idea of a "prairie personality") and to find plausible her explanation of why this is so.

If Sociology cannot confirm the authenticity of "prairie man" - the particular personality that has been shaped by and reflects the natural and social environment of the prairie region and is peculiar to it - perhaps some comfort for the idea can be found in a different field, but one which is also concerned with the relationship between the inner man and his outer world. The arts generally are society's great synthesizers and revealers. They gather up all the random, unrelated fragments of human life and create out of them an organized, coherent image which not only reveals their inner, hidden connections but invests them with meaning, and does so, moreover, in ways which can enlighten and move us profoundly. They have the power to evoke the sudden recognition of the essential truths about human nature and to illuminate the dark obscure corners of human relationships.

The arts also have the power to surprise us with new ways of seeing our surroundings and our place in them. Landscapes have always been among the most commonly painted subjects and have been greatly admired by the public. Their appeal for the viewer lies not only in the primordial attraction which nature exerts upon us but also because a well-painted landscape instantly arouses our feelings of empathy with nature and yet at the same time presents to us something which nature herself cannot - an idealized, ordered world in which each element is exactly right and in exactly the right relationship to every other element, and there are no meaningless irrelevancies or irritating annoyances. The city too, has been celebrated by many masters. Canaletto's paintings of Venice, for example, or Utrillo's paintings of Paris, or El Greco's View of

Toledo, or Whistler's Old Battersea Bridge are powerfully evocative images which reveal to us aspects of those places which never occurred to us before.

Literature is replete with evocations of both the natural and man-made environments. Poets have sung about the countryside from time immemorial. Virgil's Georgics, written 2000 years ago, is still admired as an eulogy on the virtues of the agrarian life. The city also has been a poetic inspiration. There is however, a subtle difference between the art of the countryside and the art of the city. The former finds its inspiration in nature generally. All nature, undifferentiated, generic, is its subject. Gertrude Stein's observation that "A rose is a rose is a rose" may be seen, not as pejorative of the beauty of the rose, but as a comment on the permanence and universality of the aesthetic of nature. Stein's rose, by any other name, or indeed in any other form - trees, water, grass, clouds, sunshine, hills - would smell as sweet. The subject matter of the art of the city, on the other hand, is not generic; it is specific.

Wordsworth's <u>Sonnet Composed Upon Westminster Bridge</u><sup>5</sup> is a paean to the beauty of London at sunrise on a clear, smokeless morning in 1802. Sandburg's <u>Chicago</u><sup>6</sup> and <u>The Windy City</u><sup>7</sup> written 120-years after <u>Westminster Bridge</u> are an exaltation of his native place. James Joyce's recreations of Dublin<sup>8</sup> give us new and profound insights into the unique character of that city. In all of these works, both the visual and the literary, whose subject is the city, it is the unique, the special character of each particular subject which the artist has caught and revealed on his canvas or in his words. Indeed the arts generally, unlike the sciences, seek the distinctive rather than the commonplace, the aberrant rather than the conformant, the inner, private, *genius loci* rather than the outward commonplace manifestations. The drive of science is to discover and define the characteristics which things have in common, the universal laws to which all things conform. The power of art is to discover and reveal the peculiar qualities of a person or place which transmute them from anonymity among all persons

and places into that particular, unique, living personality or that specific, uniquely significant place. William Carlos Williams praises

that power which discovers in things those inimitable particles of dissimilarity to all other things which are the peculiar perfections of the things in question.<sup>9</sup>

It has been said that the purpose of Science is to explain, the purpose of Art is to reveal. Perhaps the most perceptive and lyrically eloquent revelation of the idiosyncratic nature of each city, and of the city as not merely a physical construction but as a manifestation of its past history and its present life, is Italo Calvino's Invisible Cities. A typical passage will convey Calvino's insight into the complexity of what we call the city, and what makes each city unique.

In vain, great-hearted Kublai, shall I attempt to describe Zaira, city of high bastions. I could tell you how many steps make up the streets rising like stairways, and the degree of the arcades' curves, and what kind of zinc scales cover the roofs; but I already know this would be the same as telling you nothing. The city does not consist of this, but of relationships between the measurements of its space and the events of its past; the height of a lamppost and the distance from the ground of a hanged usurper's swaying feet; the line strung from the lamppost to the railing opposite and the festoons that decorate the course of the queen's nuptial procession; the height of that railing and the leap of the adulterer who climbed over it at dawn; the tilt of a guttering and a cat's progress along it as he slips into the same window; the firing range of a gunboat which has suddenly appeared beyond the cape and the bomb that destroys the guttering; the rips in the fish net and the three old men seated on the dock mending nets and telling each other for the hundredth time the story of the gunboat of the usurper, who some say was the queen's illegitimate son, abandoned in his swaddling clothes there on the dock.

As this wave of memories flows in, the city soaks up like a sponge and expands. A description of Zaira as it is today should contain all Zaira's past. The city, however, does not tell its past, but contains it like lines of a hand, written in the corners of the streets, the gratings of the windows, the banisters of the steps, the antennae of the lightning rods, the poles of the

flags, every segment marked in turn with scratches, indentations, scrolls. 10

Calvino here has touched upon a basic premise of this thesis, namely that each city is in essence unique and its uniqueness is to be found in its historical development and in the history of the milieu in which it evolved. The history of the prairie region constitutes the historical context in which the prairie city emerged. The history of the prairie city is part of the history of the prairie region. The prairie city then, in one way or another, embodies some aspect of the regional history. If, as Calvino asserts, the city is an expression of the lives of its people, then the prairie city must somehow express the lives of the prairie people. Which raises again the question of whether there is, in fact such a thing as a prairie people with a distinctive prairie personality. The arts, as it has been suggested above, have the power to discover and reveal the peculiar qualities of things, and if there is anything peculiar or distinctive in the character of prairie people, one may expect the arts to find it.

In many respects, literature is the most articulate of the arts. It speaks in the everyday common language of every society. Its vocabulary and grammar and idiom are the normal instrument of communication of the people. Other arts, such as painting, or the dance, or music frequently require the special cultivation of the sensibilities for their full understanding. In any case the range of expression of these other arts is more limited and the communication of their message is less direct and explicit than that of the spoken or written word. It is true that literary works can also be obscure and may require special cultivation not only to respond to the ideas or the emotions which the author intends to convey but even to understand the meanings of the words which are used in contexts unfamiliar to the reader. Generally however words are the most common and most effective medium of communication. And the most ancient and directly personal form of word communication is the art of story-telling, an art passed on from generation to generation as an oral tradition and still surviving in that form in many of

the world's cultures, but transformed into the form of literature with the invention of writing.

### 2. <u>The Literary View</u>

Literature has many facets and draws upon the entire universe of man's thoughts and feelings and activities to tell its stories; but whatever stories it may tell, the best stories are those which are told by people who know what they are talking about; stories which are told from the background of the story-tellers own experiences, knowledge and insights. The best literature is that which has about it the sense of truth, the feeling of authenticity. The images which literature creates, whether in terms of places or of characters or events, in order to compel our belief - our involvement - must be images which we are persuaded represent an existing reality, or else must be so compelling as to persuade us to willingly suspend our disbelief in their reality. It there really is such a thing as a prairie personality whose reality is embodied in the way prairie people think and act and perceive themselves, that personality surely should be found in the images of a particular way of life and of the distinctive characters depicted in the regional literature.

However, as among the sociologists, there is no concensus among literary critics about the nature of the prairie identity. The sociologists don't agree on the meaning of the term "community," and are sceptical as to whether the Canadian prairies constitute a community or "socio-cultural region" and therefore by extension whether the notion of "prairie man" has any valid scientific basis; the literary critics, while they acknowledge that there is something which can be referred to as a "prairie regional literature," don't agree on what are its formative influences and the sources from which it draws its characters and its imagery. There are those who hold that the physical environment of the prairie - even only the landscape itself - is the primary influence in moulding the prairie psyche and therefore the basic influence in the creation of the characters and imagery and even the settings of prairie literature. Henry Kreisel, for

example, asserts that "All discussion of the literature produced in the Canadian west must of necessity begin with the impact of the landscape upon the mind".11 Other respected critics share Kreisel's view of the environment as the primal force in the creation of the literature of the prairie region. E.A. McCourt observes that prairie fiction "possesses a characteristic flavour born of the artists' involvement with a physical environment."12 The phrase "a characteristic flavour" in McCourt's observation is important. It indicates the critic's recognition of the fact that the artist is not held in the grip of the environment and compelled to reproduce it literally, blade of grass for blade of grass and gopher hole for gopher hole in his work, but rather that the very nature of art requires that the artist create out of the physical facts of a place a landscape of the imagination which serves his artistic purposes. However, in spite of this refashioning of the environment by the creative mind, something of the environment - "a characteristic flavour" - inevitably remains and suffuses the work. Laurence Ricou holds the same view:

The prairie, for example, may in many instances not be as flat as it is described, but it is precisely this prairie - that seen by the artist and conceived to be necessary in his design - which is significant.<sup>13</sup>

Some literary historians have argued that a consciousness of the natural environment is a quality not merely of prairie literature but is a characteristic of all Canadian writing. Hugo McPherson has written:

In looking at the transcontinental sweep of Canadian fiction, critics from Northrop Frye to Warren Tallman have seen its development as a struggle against the violence, or the snowy indifference of nature - as an effort to humanize and give articulate shape to the vast landscape; to encompass it in imaginative terms, and in doing so, to discover the self.<sup>14</sup>

The impact of the landscape on the creative literary faculty across the nation is expressed in the variety of regional forms which reflect the local regional context. But no matter how dim or distorted that reflection may be, in the final literary work it

retains, in the view of these analysts, some quality endowed by the physical reality of the regional environment.

Other critics see the landscape in prairie literature in a quite different way.

They hold that this landscape is entirely a product of the literary imagination and draws its images from literature rather than from nature. It is, therefore, in this sense a mythical landscape. Eli Mandel is one of the principal proponents of this viewpoint:

Let me suggest the extreme limits of our discussion here: one limit seems to me to be what I would call the Sociological one; the other, mythical. The sociological sees literature and art as reflections of (or interactions with) environment....

If Hiebert and Lightall illustrate one extreme approach that sees literature as a reflection of the environment, Leslie Fiedler illustrates another extreme, one that sees environment as a creation of literature.

And perhaps, too, we should not be surprised to find that discussions of regional literature, especially prairie literature, tend to be sociological. It is my impression, admittedly based on scant knowledge, that regions get themselves defined in a variety of ways, all implying a certain determinism. Yet the interdisciplinary nature of a consultation like this one suggests that "prairie" means something different: a sort of complex conceptual framework within which various social inter-relationships can be viewed and understood. It is difficult to keep steadily in mind that "prairie" means nothing more than this, that it is a mental construct, a region of the human mind, a myth. 15

Insofar as all ideas or concepts are "mental constructs" Mandel's view of the literary prairie landscape has some validity. On the other hand, it is undeniable that the imagery of the prairie landscape as it is found in prairie literature is not the imagery of any other place or time; nor are its people, or the events of their lives or their view of the world. Jane Austen could not have written <a href="Pride and Prejudice">Pride and Prejudice</a> or any of her novels had she been born in Red River. She might have become a novelist but if so she would have written vastly different works. No novelist of the Canadian prairies, from Robert Stead to Frederick Philip Grove, to Martha Ostenso, to W.O. Mitchell, to Sinclair Ross could

have written anything like what they did if they had grown up in the natural and social environment of William Faulkner's Oxford, Mississippi.

The critical position of Mandel and those who share his views is essentially an aesthetic position. That is to say, their sphere of critical interest is the literary work itself. The life-experiences of the author, and the environment which produced those experiences, and out of which grew the literary work, are only of secondary interest to them, except perhaps their literary experiences. It is more important to them to identify the influences of other writers on a literary work than it is to discover its own indigenous sources. It is also an important tenet in their critical credo that all serious literature deals with the same subject - man's search for his identity in an indifferent or ambiguous, or hostile universe.

The distinctive element of prairie literature is not, surely, the creation of a new man, but the adaptation of images of the environment to a pattern that belongs to all men. One doesn't have to be extraordinarily perceptive in fact, to observe how frequently the determining pattern in prairie writing is literary....It is McCourt's curious blend of Conrad, Yeats, Hardy, and Wordsworth, designed to insist on the essential loneliness and loss in each human being; it informs the Wordsworthian view of childhood that Mitchell imposes on his Rousseauistic sense of the natural world; and it shows up in Ostenso's mixing of Scandinavian mythology and Freudianism. Such literary and academic overtones tell us that essentially the world being observed is a mental one. The images of prairie man are images of a search for home and therefore a search for the self 16

There is nothing particularly startling or questionable about these observations. If literature - indeed all art - didn't deal with the common human experiences and emotions what would it deal with? Would there be any art? Surely the issue is not that all literature deals with our common humanity, but, rather, how differently each writer deals with it, and in the context of the present discussion, how the particular influences of the author's environment are expressed in that treatment. Mandel argues that "the

distinctive element of prairie literature is ... the adaptation of images of the environment to a pattern that belongs to all men" but he seems to find little of interest or importance in the fact of the adaptation itself. For him "the patterns that belong to all men" are the constants and the substance of literature. The "images of the environment" are simply myths created by their authors to provide an appropriate context for the constant, universal patterns. But what is it that generates the myths, what lies behind the adaptation of the images? Surely it is the personal experience of the author, and surely it is not simply the vicarious experience of other authors' experiences, or the re-interpretation or adaptation of the images other authors have used. Why are the images of prairie literature - or any regional or genre literature - not the same as the images of every other region or genre? Even Mandel acknowledges that they are not, that they are different "adaptations" in each case. But as for the reasons for the adaptations, the influences involved in the creation or "adaptation" of the imagery, Mandel suggests they belong more properly to sociology than to literary criticism.

Perhaps he is right. But if one is looking for the fullest understanding it is self-defeating to say "my interest extends only to this line; beyond this line it becomes somebody else's interest." Moreover it is a dangerous notion that understanding can be divided in this way. The line between scientific understanding and aesthetic understanding is an arbitrary one, and indeed an insubstantial one. It is itself a mythical image which both scientists and literary academics have adopted, more for the purpose of defining and protecting their vested interests in their respective disciplinary territory than for the purpose of enlarging their understanding of phenomena which are essentially a continuum and extend across the boundaries of disciplinary expediency. Our understanding of ourselves and the universe we live in can only be enlarged and confirmed by constantly pushing outward the boundaries of our enquiries. We endanger our understanding by compartmentalizing our knowledge. The question of whether the notion of "prairie man" as depicted in the prairie literature represents a living reality

or only a myth - a "mental construct" - of the literary imagination cannot be resolved satisfactorily simply in terms of the adaptation of images. Even if one concedes that regional literature is simply a matter of adapted images, (and the validity of that idea is by no means certain) one's understanding of it is only rudimentary without understanding why the adaptations took the particular form which they did. One must, in effect, erase the conceptual boundaries between sociology and literary aestheticism.

The critic and author E.A. McCourt, in discussing Mandel's ideas about the environment as a mental construct, makes the following comment:

This view, impressively stated, does, however, evade a fundamental truth that when all due allowances have been made for the consequences of individual idiosyncrasies, the nature of art is profoundly affected by, and in part the product of, a communal mind and outlook which in their turn are shaped by many factors including race, heritage, family and community conditioning, and the physical environment within which they function.<sup>17</sup>

These observations are about art in general, but transposed into the context of prairie literature they say that the prairie literary art is influenced by more than the vast, flat, empty landscape and the "savage extremes of temperature." The social environment, and ethnicity, and religion, and the loneliness of the isolated farmstead, and the unrelenting struggle with the land to eke out a livelihood are also among the factors.

Some scholars have identified three periods in the history of prairie literature. The first period takes us up to World War I; the second corresponds to the inter-war years; and the third is the post-World War II period. The writing of the first period, in the commentaries and the literary bibliographies of many critics, is not restricted to fiction and poetry, but includes the narratives of travellers, the journals of explorers and surveyors, the reports of agents of both governments and private corporations, and other similar non-fiction writing. These writings swing through a

broad arc of impressions about the prairies, from the negative reactions of the first explorers like Henry Kelsey in 1690 and Anthony Henday in 1774, who were looking at the commercial fur-trade potential of the area, to the enthusiasm of H.Y. Hind, one of the leaders of the Hind-Dawson expedition in 1857-58, whose interest was in assessing the agricultural and settlement potential of the region.

As homesteading became the dominant interest in the prairies, fiction and poetry came to occupy a major place in the region's literary activity. The most characteristic novel of this period is the romance with its emphasis on action and adventure. Arthur Stringer, Gilbert Parker, John McLean are some of the writers in this genre. Their work is highly romantic, derivative, and often banal. McLean's stories (he was a church missionary) are more Christian sermons in the guise of superficial novels than they are literature. Ralph Connor is regarded as the best of the writers of this period. (Ralph Connor was his pen name; his real name was Charles W. Gordon).

Connor's west is a land of infinite possibility offering to even the most downtrodden the hope of a rich new life....There is just a hint in the opening paragraph of The Sky Pilot (1899) that Connor relates the physical vastness of the country to the untrammelled opportunity which it provides to both the individual and the Christian church. But landscape is seldom significant in Connor's highly didactic novels, and descriptions of it are characterized by shallow, romantic ecstasy. 19

In the writings of the period leading up to the first World War the west was seen as both an inhibiting, menacing wilderness and a beckoning, golden opportunity. But in the end the radiance of faith in the ultimate triumph of virtue almost invariably shone through the oppressive gloom of obdurate nature, primitive living conditions on the frontier, and the failings of the human spirit. Connor, a Presbyterian minister from Ontario, saw the west as the land where the fallen spirit could find redemption through the bounty of God and the uncorrupted nature of the prairie ambience. The west was a new unmarked land where a new kind of society could be created by a new breed of men.

It was vast and open; it was egalitarian; it was free of ancient, inhibiting social customs and oppressive class structures and the evils of political and financial power which were corroding the society of Europe and eastern Canada; it was rife with opportunity for honest men with faith in God and in the promise of the new land.

Connor's works enjoyed widespread popularity and are still regarded as readable, particularly by those whose literary tastes were formed by early exposure to the writings of Rudyard Kipling and others of the same genre which celebrated the virtues of Imperial Britain and the Empire, and whose religious education was that of Protestant Christianity. But in the early years of the 20th Century they were more than a literary genre curiosity. They caught something that was alive and real in the atmosphere of the west. They expressed a conviction and an attitude in the "communal mind and outlook" which was not an adapted image. Connor's imagery may perhaps be regarded as adapted, but the convictions and attitudes which stirred in the hearts of the people in the region at that time were indigenous and genuine. It was these profound popular feelings which nurtured Connor's creative imagination, and it is their "characteristic flavour" which suffuses his work. If one can speak of a "prairie personality" or a "prairie man" in that period, these convictions and attitudes must be counted among his salient characteristics. The fact that a large component of the prairie pioneers who came to western Canada between 1897 and 1913 were ignorant peasants spiritually and intellectually mired in fundamentalist religious bigotry does not appear as a leitmotif in prairie literature, although it does from time to time emerge as a minor theme. Henry Kreisel's short story The Broken Globe<sup>20</sup> is an excellent example of this aspect of the prairie personality of that period. It is an aspect which, in spite of the changes brought about by industrialization and urbanization, still manifests itself in prairie society.

The second period in the progression of prairie regional literature covers the inter-war years. The romantic novel continued to appear during these years in the works of Ralph Connor and Gilbert Parker, and of Nellie McClung and others, the most

notable of which were the novels of Robert Stead. But its appeal was greatly diminished. It no longer evoked its former empathetic response in the public, perhaps because in it the public no longer recognized itself and the changed circumstances of prairie life, and no longer believed that an idyllic Arcadian future would be the reward of their simple faith and hard labour in their own fields. The prairie economy, which had fallen into a depression in 1913 was temporarily buoyed up by the demand for prairie wheat created by the war. When the war was over, however, the economy sagged again and remained depressed for the first half of the decade of the 1920's before it began to recover. But the world-wide financial collapse of 1929, together with the drought and dust-bowl conditions of the 1930's produced a deep-seated dejection and pessimism in the spirit of the prairie people. Moreover, during this period, other changes were taking place in the prairie region which were altering the basic economic and social structure of prairie society so profoundly and irrevocably that the old perceptions and images were left as simply the sentimental memories of a faded idyll whose promise could never be fulfilled in the real world.

The emergence and growth of urban places was one of the forces that was reshaping the patterns of prairie life. The farmstead remained the site of the work-a-day life of the farm family, but the nearest village or town became the centre of community life. It was to the urban centre that the farm family came to satisfy a large part of both its spiritual and temporal needs, from Sunday worship, schooling, lodge meetings and socials, to medical care, furniture, clothing and farm machinery. The growing presence of the town in the life of the farm community, both as a physical mass interrupting the otherwise unrelieved flat monotony of the plain, and as the place to which it increasingly turned for the services which it required, had a marked effect on the communal mind and outlook.

Robert Stead's novels represent a certain ambivalence - perhaps even a transitional phase - in the perception of the prairie environment as expressed in the

literature. His work is still highly romantic. His prairies are still idealized, still benign and bountiful and full of beauty. The soil is the source of all nourishment, both physical and spiritual and for both rural and urban man. It elevates the mind and ennobles the soul and gives God's work into the hand of the farmer, makes him in effect the lord of the earth.

Stead's insight into character is often conventional, and shallow; his plots often hinge on extravagant coincidences and are therefore not entirely convincing. But novels such as Dennison Grant (1920), and Grain(1926), which is generally considered his best, show a surer handling of character and plot, and a serious attempt to deal realistically with the increasing encroachment of mechanization into prairie farming, the corruption of the moral value of the land by its value as the producer of material wealth, and the growing tension between the rural and urban life-styles and outlook. There is in Dennison Grant a "provocative and sustained social comment," 21 an interesting aspect of which is the articulation of the sense of alienation of the West from the East. The economic grounds for the West's animosity toward the East were already well established when Stead wrote Dennison Grant, and its grievances were being voiced by a wide variety of advocates and activists who believed that western Canada was being economically exploited by eastern interests. Stead's perception of the differences between East and West, however, was not in terms of the economic issues of the day. They were seen instead as differences in the moral values and outlook of the two societies.<sup>22</sup> It is also interesting to note - in a way it may even be regarded as apocalyptic - that Gander Stake, the hero of Grain, finds himself fascinated by machinery and technology and their application in agricultural production, as well as being powerfully drawn to the city where there is the opportunity to work with machines and to become expert in their use through study in a technical school. In such instances, Stead offers some evidence of what was happening to the "communal mind and outlook" of prairie society.

Frederick Philip Grove is perhaps the most celebrated of the prairie authors of that period. His works include scholarly articles, literary essays, short stories, a couple of semi-biographical volumes, and novels, four of which are set in the prairies. The first of his prairie novels, Settlers of the Marsh appeared in 1925. It was followed by Our Daily Bread in 1928, The Yoke of Life in 1930, and his last novel Fruits of the Earth in 1933. All of Grove's writings are deeply coloured by the traits of his literary personality: an acute sensitivity to the natural environment; an almost microscopic power of observation of the minutest details of his natural surroundings and the poetic power to bring them to life before the eyes of the reader; a profound spiritual involvement with the land, and an overwhelming sense of the inevitably tragic denouement of that involvement. Laurence Ricou, in comparing Grove with Stead, writes:

Stead's vertical figure dominating a horizontal world belongs to an era of unquestioned faith in progress; the exposure of vertical man in Grove's prairie dramatically presents the inevitability of decay..... Man standing upright on the prairie has no protection from the ravages of an extreme climate. While he is aware of the possible psychological extensions of this situation, Grove always gives the literal exposure of the prairie man primary consideration: man is at the mercy of natural forces. The eventual consequences of exposure, of course, is obliteration of man and his works.<sup>23</sup>

The abrupt vertical image obviously had great power for Grove: man in the prairie is a giant, strong and self-reliant, struggling determinedly in a barren land. But Grove saw, unlike Stead, that whatever the pioneer's measure of self-reliance and hardness, he would ultimately fail in his struggle with the land. He also recognized that the qualities which fit a man admirably to farming in this land could destroy his relationship with other men.<sup>24</sup>

The qualities to which Ricou refers in the above passage, which "fit a man admirably to farming in this land" are the capacity to endure loneliness and hardship, the readiness - eagerness might be a more accurate word - to forego involvement in

human affairs in favour of complete dedication to the affairs of the land. The demands of the prairie are so overwhelming as to leave no room for serving other demands. The character of the farmer is melded with the character of the land and the landscape. This is a common theme in prairie literature. The enforced loneliness and total commitment dams up the sluices of communication until when finally the loneliness is presented with companionship, the ability to communicate has been lost. Even if there is companionship present at the outset of life as a prairie farmer the harsh exigencies of survival drain away the impulses for human relationships. There is in this recurrent image in prairie literature something which one might recognize as an occupational hazard, an external danger inherent in the conditions of work. But there is also something in it which is internal, something inherent in the personality of the pioneer as depicted by the prairie novelist, something obsessive in his psyche which is the soil in which the seed of the prairie tragedy is nurtured, unfolds, and comes to its final calamitous end.

Grove's universe in his prairie novels is that of man in the prairie setting. His sense of the ultimate tragic failure of man is felt in terms of prairie man's struggle with the harsh, remorseless land and the fiercely hostile climate of the prairie environment. His tragic view of the human condition is framed in the context of man's identification with the prairie land, his bonding with it, and his inevitably doomed struggle with it. The close bonding between man and his environment makes his struggle with it in effect a struggle with himself, and his inevitable defeat an act of self-destruction.

It is also noteworthy that Grove's tragic view of humanity was manifested in his writing long before the cataclysm of the great depression and the drought plunged the whole of prairie society into a deep pessimism, from which, in some respects, it has never recovered. Grove then is not a Depression novelist. His pessimistic outlook expresses a personal emotional and philosophical disposition, although it is consistent with the general attitude and outlook which prevailed on the prairies during the 1930's and beyond. In spite of the deeply traumatic events of those years which devastated

prairie society - physically, economically, socially, psychically - prairie literature has surprisingly little to say about them. Only one author of note emerges from that dark period, indeed only one work. That author is Sinclair Ross, and the one work which was created out of the Depression on the prairies, and has not passed into oblivion, is his novel <u>As For Me And My House</u>,<sup>25</sup> published in 1941.

It is a novel about the life and thoughts of Philip Bentley - a preacher - and his wife during one year in a small prairie town during the Depression. Perhaps it might be more correct to say that it is about the life and thoughts of Mrs. Bentley rather than those of Philip Bentley, her husband, since the novel is written in the form of Mrs. Bentley's diary. Ross's prairie environment, like Grove's, is hostile and immanently threatening and man is an alien in it; but even as an intruder his identity is melded with his environment, and even in his struggle with it he is part of it. In Ross's novel the barrenness of the soil has its counterpart in the intellectual and emotional barrenness of the townspeople. Their lives are empty behind the false fronts which they present to each other. The false fronts which are the predominant architectural feature of the town's buildings are symbolic of the lives of their occupants, and the wind which turned the prairie atmosphere into a constant dust cloud during the drought years blows relentlessly throughout the novel, covering the town and the lives of its people with grit and grime. And the precariousness of the town itself, perched as it were on the edge of the surrounding abyss of the malevolent, wind-swept vastness of the prairie, is symbolic of man's perilous position on the brink of disaster, in constant jeopardy of being toppled over into the void. The Bentley's false front is their overt sanctimonious piety which is the norm of behaviour expected in the town, but which for the Bentleys is a hypocritical expedient, necessary for their economic survival. After a personal and marital crisis the Bentleys come to an honest acknowledgement of their relationship both to each other and to their life in the town, and strengthened in their feelings for each other decide to move to the city and open a book-store.

The novel's story-line and the details of incident and character are not of central concern to us here: we are not engaged in an exercise in literary criticism. What is of interest to us here is whether there is anything in the novel which supports the notion of "a communal mind and outlook"; anything which emerges from the interplay of characters and events which is peculiarly "prairie" in its flavour; anything in it which can be attributed to the influence of the prairie environment on the creative spirit of the author. The problem with such questions is that they are not amenable to objective, demonstrable answers. Any answer which is offered must necessarily be a matter of subjective perception. But subjective evidence can have its own validity. Ross's description of the physical appearance of the small prairie town, and of the droughtstricken prairie environment and the interminable dust-laden wind are authentic. They can be objectively corroborated. The dour, dry, cramped spirits; the empty, uncultivated, unresponsive, ignorant minds; the narrow religious rigidity; the fixed mask of social propriety and decorum which everyone holds up in front of his face to present to the world may be only adapted images, only the creatures of the author's creative imagination drawn from his subjective impressions and literary experiences. But anyone who has ever lived in a small prairie town, particularly during the dirty thirties, will instantly recognize the type. Ross did not invent the Bentleys and the town of Horizon out of thin air. However much their full development may owe to his literary imagination their genesis came out of real experience; they drew their first breath of life in the atmosphere and among the flesh-and-blood people of the prairies in the Depression. The people of Horizon are the flesh-and-blood people of that place and that time but clarified and transfigured into literary images by the alchemy of Ross's creative talent. Of course no flesh-and-blood person is as clearly defined and free of traits which are not essential for the definition of his character as are the types created by the novelist. Everybody is idiosyncratic inasmuch as everybody has his own peculiar personal identity; and no group of people has a fixed set of characteristics which every

member of the group possesses to the exclusion of all others and from which no member of the group ever varies. But every group of people nevertheless does have certain characteristics, certain attitudes, and patterns of behaviour and responses which they share in common. Every society has its own ethos and culture. Sinclair Ross's description of the personality and the ethos of the people of Horizon is as true-to-life as his description of the physical appearance of the town and its prairie setting even though it is not as amenable to objective proof by photographs or measurements. The qualities which Mrs. Bentley observes in the people around her may only be a kind of synopsis or selection, from all of their qualities, of only those which have made the strongest impression on her, but they represent the essential characteristics of the psychological and social atmosphere of the place. They are certainly true artistically to the imaginary world of the town and the people of Ross's literary creation.

Perhaps it is not straining credulity too far to believe that they are also the salient characteristics of the real-life "prairie personality" of that time; that they are a faithful representation of the dominant mood and thoughts and the most common behaviour of the flesh-and-blood people who lived on the prairies during that period of prairie history. And the Bentley's decision, at the end of the novel, to move to the city, is more than merely a convenient literary device for solving the author's problem of how to bring the story to a denouement. It is the revelation of a new perception, as yet inchoate, but definitely emerging and beginning to spread throughout prairie society, that the future lay not on the farm but in the city. Ross may not have deliberately intended the solution of his fictional problem as a metaphor for the emerging social reality, but the Bentley's decision foreshadows the rural-urban migration of the postwar era which was to drastically reduce the farm population and change not only the prairie region but the whole of Canada from a dominantly rural to a dominantly urban society.

The third period in the progression of prairie literature began with the end of World War II. The war years represent a hiatus in the literary life of the prairies as they do in almost every other aspect of the region's life. But when peace returned to the world, Canada was no longer the same place as it had been before the war, and the prairie region was also fundamentally changed. It was of course the same region in geophysical terms, but in terms of the human dimensions - politically, socially, economically, psychologically - it was dramatically altered. As it entered the post-war era the region was already undergoing mutations which were to increase and intensify and render virtually unrecognizable anything that it had been before. The creation of Manitoba in 1870 and of Saskatchewan and Alberta in 1905 had started the process of the political differentiation of the region into three separate political identities out of what had formerly been a single, somewhat amorphous regional entity. That process of differentiation was given shape and direction by the economic issues which emerged as the particular concerns of each of the provinces and by the patterns of urbanization which each experienced. It was in the decades following the war that oil displaced wheat as the dominant staple of the prairie economy and the urban metropolis displaced the farm not only as the setting in which the majority of prairie people lived and earned their livelihood, but also as the milieu from which they drew the dominant images of their self-consciousness. Because the prairie region, like the rest of Canada, was becoming industrialized, and the urban built environment was everywhere proliferating and rising to be the dominating element in both the physical and psychic landscape, the historic natural environment and the farmer's bonding with the soil was no longer the primordial compelling source of the imagery of prairie literature. The creative imagination is now less influenced by the natural environment and the farming ethos than by the contemporary urban landscape and the urban-industrial ethos not merely of Canada but of what has become the ethos of the whole of the western urban industrial world.

The artist absorbs and is moulded by the influences of his surroundings physical and social. The creative impulse surges up from some unknown source deep
within the artist's own psyche, but the stuff out of which he fashions his creations are
the impressions which his life experiences have imprinted upon him. Those experiences
come in to him from the outside world which surrounds him, and whatever final form he
gives to those creations their substance is ultimately the expression of those
experiences. The form may be aesthetic but the substance is sociological. But perhaps
it is merely critical preciosity or affectation to draw a sharp distinction between the
aesthetic and the sociological.

### 3. Changing Views

One may argue then that the works of the prairie novelists reflect something of the life on the prairies as they found it. If their writings in the period before World War I were romantic adventure stories or crime mysteries, they were also idealistic, filled with high moral precepts and an utopian naivete about the bounty and beneficence of the new land and the certainty of the ultimate triumph of virtue in it. The ideas of the evangelical missionaries are readily identified in them, although re-worked as the secular thoughts of the novel's characters in the frontier setting. One may well be justified in concluding that the attitudes and perceptions with which the authors invested their characters do reflect the ethos of prairie society of that time, and the salient beliefs and aspirations which its members held in common.

The same may be said about the prairie literature of the inter-war years. It reflects not only the physical and economic trauma of the period - the drought and the depression - but also the deep-seated changes in the socio-economic structure of prairie society, and the parallel changes in the psyche of the prairie people. And so with the post-World War II period. Literature in Canada, including the regional writings, became urbanized and internationalized. The environment and the landscape became anonymous: the settings of the novels became the city rather than the farmstead or the

village, but the urban setting, although understood to be the locale, made no significant contribution to the creative development of the story, or the characters. The themes became the highly personalized stories of the protagonists' relationships with other people in an anonymous or indifferent setting rather than with the land or a specific natural landscape with which not only the events of their daily lives, but also the details and textures of their psychic lives were closely identified, as had formerly been the characteristic of prairie literature.

The prairie personality then is not entirely a mythic character, a figment of the imagination. It is perhaps not a constant personality, but changes under the influence of changes in the environment to which it is exposed. The natural environment is less changeable than the socio-economic environment, but the latter probably exerts the more powerful pressure on the individual and the social psyche. All of these environmental influences, including those of the natural environment, can be identified in the changing manifestations of prairie literature. And like the environmental influences, the personality traits of prairie man, moulded by those influences, are also manifested in the literature. The emergence of new personality traits under the influence of changed environmental conditions however does not mean the obliteration and disappearance of all earlier characteristics. Strains of earlier outlooks and attitudes persist as part of the cultural heritage of a society. Often they persist only in the folk-mythology as nostalgic memories of a bygone time. But even as such they are part of the ethos of the society and have the power to colour present attitudes and values, and to influence present decisions.

The ethos of contemporary prairie society then is not entirely a reflection of contemporary socio-economic conditions but still mirrors memorable images from the past. The salient communal attitudes and outlooks however are no longer concordant and homogeneous throughout the region. There are major differences which reflect the differentiation of the region into three distinct sub-regions: the three prairie provinces.

The new conditions which emerged in each of the sub-regions created new local attitudes and outlooks. There are significant differences among the urban centres of the prairie provinces which arise out of the gradual differential evolution of the socio-cultural environment in each. Changing environmental conditions in the over-all region produced changes in the outlook of the prairie people as a whole, and these changes found expression in the prairie regional literature. Changes in the provincial sub-regional environments produced more highly localized changes in attitudes and outlooks which are not so overtly expressed in the literature, but may be found in other aspects of provincial life and its celebrations. The Calgary Stampede, for example, is perhaps modelled upon similar events in many places in the American mid-west. Nevertheless, its roots are firmly anchored in Calgary's own ranching heritage from which it draws its sustenance. The Stampede could not have developed and succeeded in Winnipeg because it could not have evoked the same sense of self-recognition in that city. Winnipeg's Folklorama may also be derived from similar festivals elsewhere, but it, like the Stampede in Calgary, evokes a response of self-consciousness in the people of Winnipeg which sees itself as a multi-cultural exemplar because of its varied ethnic composition. Regina's huge annual agricultural exposition, perhaps the biggest event in that city apart from a Roughriders home football game - celebrates the unique historical bonding between that city and its agricultural milieu. All of which attests to the influence of such factors in the general ethos of the community. Community attitudes and outlooks thus express themselves in a great variety of ways and in many instances these expressions are indigenous and peculiar to that community.

Someone has said - the saying is often attributed to Winston Churchill - that first we make our cities, then they make us. Whoever may have voiced that thought expressed a profound half-truth. The city and its inhabitants do affect each other, in many ways, some of which are not yet well understood or even wholly perceived, but the

influence is not serial - first that of the people on the city, followed then by that of the city on the people. Rather, the influence is mutual, concurrent and continuous.

A work of fiction can firmly convince one of the reality of a "communal mind and outlook." A work of literary criticism can discover it if it is obscure or only subtly present in a novel. But a city is not a work of literature, and the presence of a distinctive communal mind and outlook in its physical structure, administrative organization, or developmental programs may not be so readily demonstrable. This is particularly so in the contemporary world, made homogeneous by the universal spread of technology and commercialism. It is probably even more difficult to demonstrate distinctive indigenous characteristics in three cities such as Winnipeg, Regina and Calgary, all arising at the same time, in the same region, in the same country, out of the same pristine agricultural milieu.

And yet these cities are undeniably different from each other. On first acquaintance one may be more immediately aware of similarities than of differences office buildings, streets, automobiles, shops, residences, all of much the same style, and materials, and appearance; even the natural setting and topography and climate are virtually indistinguishable between Winnipeg and Regina, although markedly different in Calgary. On short acquaintance, however, significant differences become manifest and more impressive than the similarities. Size, and scale, and density of development, traffic congestion, landscaping, are among the differences which are noted quite quickly. Greater familiarity discloses differences in the number and variety of shops, the range of goods and services available, entertainment, recreation and cultural facilities, and so on, as increasing understanding of these cities reveals the essence of their individuality. Many of the characteristics of a city are rooted in its economy, and the differences in these characteristics among cities derive from the differences in their economies. It is the urban economy which determines the size and wealth of a city and the employment by

which its population earns its livelihood; and it is these basic traits which in turn affect many of the city's other, more salient qualities.

There are, however, certain characteristics of all cities which are not purely economic in their origin. Some of these are traceable to other statistically measureable sources. Demographic structure, for example, can have a determining influence on some of the marketing characteristics of a city, and even on certain aspects of its life-style. But there are other qualities whose major formative influence is not purely economic, or demographic, or anything else material or measureable. There is something in every city which is beyond measurement, but which can be clearly sensed as a real and living thing. Travellers know the difference in the "feel" of London and that of Paris, of New York compared with Los Angeles, of Montreal compared with Vancouver, yes, and even of Winnipeg compared with Regina compared with Calgary. It is a *genius loci*; a spirit of the place, an *animus*, an *elan*, a personality which has as much to do with the essence of the city as does its economy or its demography.

The distinctive aspects of the planning and development of each of the cities of Winnipeg, Regina, and Calgary are the central theme to be explored in this study. A salient issue in this exploration must of course be the question of whether the planning and development of each of these three cities is in fact distinctive, and if so, what makes it distinctive. We have seen in this section that the prairie literature reveals distinctive prairie attitudes and innate characteristics of a distinctive prairie personality. We have also seen, however, that those attitudes and characteristics change as the socio-economic environment changes. Moreover, there is evidence from the politico-economic sphere that there is a further differentiation within the region into the three distinctive sub-regions of the three prairie provinces. Is there then a "communal mind and outlook" in each city which distinguishes it from all other cities, and, if so, does it also change with changing circumstances, and what role, if any, does it play in the planning and development of each city? These are the centrally relevant questions of this exploration

and will be addressed as the discourse progresses. It is, however, also of some relevance to this work to be aware of how the idea of city planning emerged, and how the power to control land use and development came to be part of the city government's function. The next chapter looks at these origins.

#### NOTES.

<sup>1</sup>The Winnipeg Free Press of 15 July, 1990, under the story headline "Germans nasty, but still nice, Thatcher told" reported an event in Britain which illustrates this point precisely. In the summer of 1990, when the issue of European monetary union was being debated in the House of Commons, influential advisers to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher were fiercely opposed to the idea, as was Prime Minister Thatcher herself. Some of Thatcher's close confidantes felt freer of the constraints on international diplomatic decorum than was politic and made scathing denunciations of Germany which was spearheading the concept of European union. Trade Secretary Nicholas Ridley, a Viscount's son whose indifference to criticism was notorious among his colleagues, is reported to have told the Spectator (periodical) that the proposed union is "a German racket to take over Europe" and giving up British sovereignty to the European Community is like surrendering to the late German dictator Adolph Hitler. He described the French as "poodles" of the Germans. In order to placate Britain's key trading partners Ridley was forced to resign from the cabinet even though Thatcher told the members of Parliament they should accept his apology and retraction. Charles Powell, Thatcher's foreign-policy adviser prepared a confidential report for the Prime Minister on what to expect from a unified Germany. The document listed German characteristics as "angst, aggressiveness, bullying, egotism, inferiority complex, sentimentality." Germans, it said, are insensitive, self-obsessed, and inclined to self-pity, but they also want to be liked. The report acknowledged, however, that Germany, is not likely to make any more territorial claims for the foreseeable future.

<sup>2</sup>Marcia Pelley Effrat, ed., <u>The Community-Approaches and Applications</u>.

<sup>3</sup>Effrat, <u>The Community</u>. 13.

<sup>4</sup>M.L. Lautt, "Sociology and the Canadian Plains," in Richard Allen, ed., <u>A Region of the Mind</u>. 125.

<sup>5</sup>William Wordsworth, <u>Composed on Westminster Bridge</u>. <u>September 3, 1802</u>.

<sup>6</sup>Carl Sandburg, <u>Chicago</u>. (1914).

<sup>7</sup>Sandburg, Windy City. (1923).

<sup>8</sup>James Joyce, <u>Dubliners</u>. (1914); <u>Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man</u>. (1916); <u>Ulysses</u>. (1922); <u>Finnegan's Wake</u>. (1939).

<sup>9</sup>William Carlos Williams, cited in Laurence Ricou, <u>Vertical Man/Horizontal Land</u>. 43.

<sup>10</sup>Italo Calvino, <u>Invisible Cities</u>. 13.

<sup>11</sup>Henry Kreisel, "The Prairies: A State of Mind," in <u>Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada</u>. 171.

<sup>12</sup>McCourt, <u>The Canadian West in Fiction</u>. 125.

<sup>13</sup>Laurence Ricou, <u>Vertical Man/Horizontal World</u>. 4-5.

<sup>14</sup>Hugo McPherson, "Fiction 1940-1960," in G.F. Klinck, ed., <u>Literary History of Canada</u>. 722.

<sup>15</sup>Eli Mandel, "Images of Prairie Man,"in Richard Allen, ed., <u>A Region of the Mind</u>. 208. <sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>McCourt, "Prairie Literature and Its Critics," in Richard Allen, ed., <u>A Region of the Mind</u>. 161.

<sup>18</sup>See, for example, Gerald Friesen, <u>Prairie Literature and Cultural History</u>, a paper presented to the Western Canadian Studies Conference, 1978.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>Ricou, <u>Vertical Man</u>. 15.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>Henry Kreisel, "The Broken Globe," in Foley and Burnett, eds., <u>Best American Short Stories</u>. 1966, 165.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>Ricou, <u>Vertical Man</u>. 29.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup>Ricou, <u>Vertical Man</u>. 38.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup>Ricou, <u>Vertical Man</u>. 39.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>lbid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup>Sinclair Ross, <u>As For Me And My House</u>.

# PART III: THE CITY PLANNING FUNCTION

Chapter 4. THE HISTORICAL SETTING

Chapter 5. THE FUNCTIONAL SETTING

In the generic sense, planning is a method of decision-making which proposes or identifies goals or ends, determines the means or programs which achieve these ends, and does so by application of analytical techniques to discover the fit between ends and means. Planning can be used to shape an individual's decisions, but most often it is carried out by large social systems to determine long-range ends and means. City Planning applies this method to determine public investment and other policies regarding future growth and changes by municipalities and metropolitan areas.

- Herbert Gans<sup>1</sup>

If planning were judged by results, by whether life followed the dictates of the plan, then planning has failed everywhere it has been tried. Nowhere are plans fulfilled. No one, it turns out, has the knowledge to predict sequences of actions and reactions across the realm of public policy, and no one has the power to compel obedience.

- Aaron Wildavsky<sup>2</sup>

Planning is the journal of a sea-creature living on land wanting to fly in the air.

- Author Unknown

#### CHAPTER 4

#### THE HISTORICAL SETTING

## 1. Planning as Utopian Sociology

The roots of city planning ideology and practice go back a long way. Evidence of some degree of planning can be found in very ancient cities. Mention has already been made of such indications in the cities of the Harrapan culture in about 2000 B.C. Hippodamus of Miletus is generally considered to have been the first city planner<sup>3</sup> in the full sense of that designation, having prepared and carried out comprehensive plans of development for Miletus on the Ionian coast of Asia Minor, for Piraeus, the harbour town of Athens, (on commission from Pericles), and for Thurie in southern Italy, all between 479 B.C. and 445 B.C. Plato's Republic is in effect a dissertation on city planning even though the physical side of the city is virtually completely ignored and his thesis dwells most fully on the philosophical/spiritual/ moral/political aspects of city development. Thomas More's <u>Utopia</u> first published in 1516, like Plato's <u>Republic</u>, was also concerned with society, morality and spiritual values, but unlike the Republic did not limit itself to abstract argument but described in some detail the physical attributes of the kingdom of Utopia and the activities in the daily lives of its people. There were a substantial number of writers as well as city planners and builders in Renaissance Italy but the greater part of their works both in writings and in masonry were celebration of the architectural and spatial aesthetics of the city.4

It was not until the early 19th Century that a new perception of city planning emerged. For the first time it occurred to utopian thinkers that city planning could be the means of achieving their desired social ends. All of the theorists in this genre who had gone before made no distinction between the city as means and the city as end in their philosophical musings. The good life and the good city were one and the same thing.<sup>5</sup> Indeed, the method of their discourse did not permit any analysis of ends and means. For

them the ideal city and its society already existed as an intellectual construction. Their purpose then was to describe it and to prove its perfection through philosophical argument, logic, and moral precept. For them the question of how that society and its cities arrived at their blessed state did not arise. It was there, as an ideal, and such and so were its characteristics. It was a conceptual structure for contemplation and discussion, not a goal for political action or practical realization. Early in the 19th Century, however, a number of thinkers emerged in England and on the continent who saw the ideal state as something which could actually be achieved, starting from where society then stood. They propounded, each in his own terms, the notion that control of the urban environment could be the instrument through which to achieve the improvement of society - even its ultimate perfection - and, indeed, of the personal well-being of the individual.

These men differed from their predecessors in an even more important respect. They not only wrote and spoke about their ideas but they put them into practice; they built communities which sought to give living, concrete, practical expression to their theories. Among the most notable of these innovators were the Englishman, Robert Owen (1771-1858), and the Frenchmen Charles Fourier (1772-1837), Etienne Cabet (1788-1856), and Jean Baptiste Godin (1817-1889).<sup>6</sup> All of them believed that labour created all wealth and must be the unit of value; that the basis of a moral society is mutual assistance and co-operation, not rivalry and competition; that personal fulfillment can best be found in communal life and activity; that wealth must be equitably shared and there must be limits on the extent and type of private ownership; that society should be organized on the basis of small communes of not more than 2000 people. They were, then, rudimentary socialists. But they were also industrialists or important figures in the public service, or members of the petit bourgeoisie, not members of the working class.

The works of Claude-Henri de Rouvroy, Count of Saint-Simon (1760-1835), as well as other social philosophers, such as Auguste Comte and even the somewhat earlier Jean-Jacques Rousseau, should perhaps also be noted as important in the evolution and exposition of the elementary social planning ideas which were being expounded in the opening years of the 19th Century. These men, however, did not specifically address the issue of the urban environment as the physical counterpart of social ideals and are not directly relevant to our present discussion. They were, however, among the leading intellects of the time and an elemental force in the turbulent climate of opinion which thundered and flashed in Europe up to mid-century, and broke in the storm of 1848. We are here specifically interested in the background to the Planning Acts of Alberta, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan, and, accordingly, in the ideas and events which led up to the British Housing. Town Planning, etc. Act of 1909 on which the Canadian legislation was modelled. Both the ideas of the utopian socialist thinkers and the experiments of the utopian community builders are an essential part of that background.

They are significant because they represent one of the two basic themes in the historic city planning movement. They represent that motif which celebrates the perfectibility of society, the unity of the ideological and the practical, and the path to perfection as the rational application of humanitarian principles to the solution of the ills which beset mankind. It was a view which Marx and Engels were to reject with contempt as "utopian" because it did not recognize the class structure of society as the underlying cause of mankind's ills. It was displaced in the second half of the 19th Century by the second basic theme in the city planning movement. This second theme presents the motif of city planning as simply technology, without the millenarian counterpoint. Improvement of the urban environment will in itself bring social improvement, and the way to urban improvement is through the application of technical expertise. There are deep ideological differences between the two themes. For one thing, the utopian ideology of reform was all-embracing. It did not separate environmental

reform from its social context. Social reform subsumed environmental reform. For another thing, the egalitarian humanistic fervor of the early 19th Century was inspired by an empathy with the working class; its successor, the technical "scientific" theme, had the interests of the entrepreneurial class at heart. For, still another thing, the "utopian" motif was strongly and overtly political; it called for action to achieve political equality for all the disenfranchised and oppressed. Its technological substitute purported to be apolitical; it sought only technical remedies such as sewer and water systems, public health measures, building codes, etc. It was this thesis, that the ills of urban society were due to technological problems, without any reference to economic or political or class factors and could be set right by the application of "scientific" knowledge, which appealed to the legislators both in Europe and in Canada, reflecting, as it did, their basic socio-political ideology.

### 2. The 19th Century Upheaval in Europe and England

The year 1848 was one of violent upheaval in Europe. There were bloody popular uprisings in Paris, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Rome, Venice, Milan, Parma. The Communist Manifesto was issued by Marx and Engels and served to inspire and focus much of the revolutionary fury. Most countries of Europe were also at war, either to establish dominance over one another, or to overthrow domination. When the smoke and the violence subsided, the working class had not succeeded in establishing the revolution of the proletariat, although the position of the bourgeoisie was more secure, and internationally, new boundaries and new regimes had been established.

In England, 1848 marked the demise of the Chartist<sup>9</sup> movement, perhaps the most sweeping and dominant of the English working-class protest movements of the 19th Century. It began in 1836, when two radical newspaper men, Francis Place and William Lovett, founded the London Working Men's Association, a body of London radicals, for the purpose of discussing political reform. They drew up a Charter which contained six points: universal manhood suffrage; a secret ballot; annual parliamentary elections;

salaries for members of parliament; no property requirement for members of parliament; equal electoral districts. The movement attracted adherents from a very wide and motley assortment of reform groups. Drawn into its cohorts were industrial workers from the mines, collieries, spinning and weaving factories, artisans, workers' education enthusiasts, religious activists, currency reformers. At its peak, Chartist membership numbered in the millions. Notwithstanding the admixture of middle-class membership the Chartist movement was carried largely by the working class and was inspired by working-class aspirations and egalitarian ideals. They presented petitions to parliament, in 1829, 1842, and 1848. The 1829 petition contained over two million signatures, the 1842 over three million, and they required long lines of bearers to carry them into the House.

The petitions failed to move the members of parliament. Demonstrations, public meetings, pamphleteering, newspaper publication were all part of the Chartists' continuing activities, and these always met with organized harassment, arrests, imprisonment, confiscation; often blood was spilled. The last attempt to present a petition to parliament was made in 1848. The petition was claimed to contain not less than 5,706,000 signatures. It was carried across Blackfriars Bridge in three hansom cabs and delivered to the House. It became an object of derision when the Committee on Public Petitions found that instead of over five million signatures it contained less than two million, many of which were simply fraudulent and mocking, like

Victoria Rex, Duke of Wellington, No Cheese, and Flatnose, and, a last touch of the ludicrous, that instead of the boasted five tons, the Petition weighed only five and a half hundredweight. The demonstration which had spread such alarm in anticipation left a legend of ridicule. Chartism as a gospel preached by a few valiant though quarrelsome champions lingered on for many years, but as a serious method of expressing industrial discontent it was thoroughly discredited. 10

Much of the turmoil of 19th Century continental Europe had its origins in the French Revolution. 11 That revolution was a middle-class revolution. It was a revolt of the emerging middle-class of merchants and manufacturers against its imprisonment within the unyielding bonds of a mediaeval social structure of noble landowners and humble peasants, in which the state power was vested in the king and nobility, and in which there was no room for a middle class to find its place. The cry of Liberty! Fraternity! Equality! which rang from the street barricades in Paris in 1789 was a political battle cry in the struggle for the re-distribution of political power. It was this demand for political equality and the liberation of the middle class which suffused the reform movement throughout Europe and inspired its advocates and agitators. In England, the middle class had already achieved political liberation, at least for its upper echelons, in the Reform Act of 1832. The turmoil of the mid-19th Century in England had its origins in a different kind of Revolution - the Industrial Revolution. The French Revolution was an event; the Industrial Revolution was a process.

The Industrial Revolution<sup>12</sup> as a technological phenomenon is commonly considered to have begun in England with the invention of the spinning jenny by James Hargreaves in 1764-67, and its adoption by the cotton spinners in Lancashire and Cheshire. A long list of technical inventions and improvements fed the rapidly expanding industrial capitalism of 19th Century Britain - Richard Arkwright's water frame in 1769, Samuel Crompton's mule in 1778, Edmund Cartwright's power loom in 1785, James Watt's steam engine in 1769, Abraham Darby's process of smelting iron with coke, as early as 1709, Henry Cort's process of puddling iron in 1784, Henry Bessemer's process of producing steel, in 1858, to name only the most salient technical advances. In these terms, then, the Industrial Revolution may be viewed as having begun as a new technology introduced into the cottage industries of the cotton spinners and weavers of a number of urban centres in the Midlands - Leeds, Manchester, Bradford among the foremost - and then expanding into the large factories as the steady stream of

new inventions made vastly increased production possible; and then evolving into the concomitant struggle for economic and social justice for the working man, which in the end resulted in far-reaching changes in the structure of English society.

At about the same time as the new technology was beginning to change the character of the English city, a complementary phase of the industrial revolution was beginning to change the character of the English countryside. The Enclosure Movement<sup>13</sup> is generally considered to have begun about 1750. In fact there had been enclosures in the 16th and 17th centuries. In those earlier times, however, the enclosures were episodic in character and occurred entirely within the context of the semi-feudal agricultural society of rural England. It was not until the mid-18th Century that enclosure became systematic rather than episodic and an integral part of the broader phenomenon of industrialization which was sweeping through England at an accelerating pace. The term "enclosure" refers to the appropriation by the wealthy landowners - the Lords of the Manor in the rural context - of the common lands which from time immemorial had been part of the public domain of the English village and countryside and to which the poor had traditionally had free access for growing a few vegetables or pasturing the family cow or sheep, or cutting turf or wood, or simply for walking or playing recreational games. The enclosure movement destroyed the traditional village/agrarian culture, introduced agrarian capitalism, created an agricultural proletariat which supplied the labour force for the factories of the industrial revolution and the urban proletariat of its cities.

The loss of open space as a recreation amenity and a public health necessity was an issue which arose early in the bitter factional struggles occasioned by the general decay of the cities and the increasingly intolerable living conditions and relentless oppression of the urban poor. The degeneration of England's cities, particularly the quarters of their poor, which began to manifest itself towards the end of the 18th Century and reached its worst stage of squalor and dereliction in mid-19th Century are

well documented in the history and literature dealing with that dismal period. So are the conditions of abject misery and desolation in which the dispossessed of the industrial revolution spent their hopeless lives. Chartism was only one of the many revolts against the social system which flared up continuously in England in the first half of the 19th Century.

In the words of E.P. Thompson:

It is as if the English nation entered a crucible in the 1790's and emerged after the Wars in a different form. Between 1811 and 1813, the Luddite crisis; in 1817 the Pentridge rising; in 1819 Peterloo; throughout the next decade the proliferation of trade union activity, Owenite propaganda, Radical journalism, the Ten Hour Movement, the revolutionary crises of 1831-2; and, beyond that, the multitude of movements which made up Chartism. It is, perhaps, the scale and intensity of this multiform popular agitation which has more than anything else given rise (among contemporary observers and historians alike) to the sense of some catastrophic change. 14

As Thompson implies the change was not catastrophic in the sense of a sudden, unexpected cataclysm, the precipitate subversion of the existing system. The change in the English social structure, and the place in it of the working class was a long time in the making. Nevertheless, the years between the Luddite uprisings in 1811-12 and the effective demise of the Chartist movement in 1848 saw some profound changes in English attitudes to social problems and some equally profound changes in the approach to the urban environment and the ideology of city planning. As the Hammonds observed:

If English life had kept its bleak and unsympathetic character unchanged, the distractions that drew off the strength of the class conflict of the thirties would not have had more than a temporary effect. But after the forties there was a slow and gradual improvement in the conditions and temper of social life. This was due partly to economic causes....

These conditions undoubtedly made it easier for the great educating forces that were released and inspired by the Chartist movement to bring amenities into social life, and so to modify the sharp separation of classes that distinguished the England of the thirties. The

Chartists, wishing to strike all the monstrous inequalities of the age, had pressed for the suffrage, because they thought that the provision of political rights would do for the working classes what it had done for the middle classes. They failed, but the instinct for creating a society out of this chaos was prompting other movements which gained power and emphasis from their agitation. Some of these movements were primarily within the working class world; others were movements in which all classes co-operated. Between them they lifted the English town out of its first barbarism.<sup>15</sup>

# 3. England's Urban Slums and the Public Health Movement

In England, the event which may be regarded as marking the change from the broad-based ideology of concerns about the human condition to the more narrowly focused concerns over the urban condition was the Public Health Act of 1848. Up to that time the reform movement in England was populist, and driven by the passion of ideals -The Rights of Man, Universal Suffrage, The Grand National Moral Union of the Productive Classes for Establishing a New Moral World (formed in 1833), Trade Unionism, Cooperatives, Owenite Societies. On the other side, the representatives of the establishment in Parliament were embattled over such issues as protectionism versus free trade, the Corn Laws, the interests of the landowners versus those of the manufacturers, the expansion of the industrial economy and the exploitation of the colonial empire, the repression of the poor and the suppression of the workers' "Combinations". Meanwhile the cities were indeed in a state of "barbarism". Even in the more affluent quarters there was quite often no waste disposal system and no safe, reliable domestic piped-water supply. Many streets were unpaved and poorly lit. Garbage was collected on a contract basis and often went uncollected. What underground sewers there were had been laid for purposes of land drainage; time and again they were faultily laid, with little or no gradient and were badly trapped and connected, so that they did not function properly. The smell of sewer gas hung in the air and frequently

permeated the elegant dwellings of the gentry, greatly disturbing a genteel soiree or a discreet liaison.

In the poor quarters conditions were truly barbaric. To accommodate the large numbers of workers in the major industrial cities extensive tracts of workers' houses were built that were not much more than boxes, with little light and less air, densely packed together, many without cellars or foundations. Most were without running water - water for every purpose had to be fetched from an outdoor stand-pipe, often at some considerable distance. Garbage was dumped on a midden behind the house; sanitary waste was slopped into a cesspool. Then the widespread practice of building back-to-back houses made middens and cesspools unavailable. Street courts and alleys became the receptacles. Removal of the accumulated filth depended on individual contracts with cartmen. Sometimes as much as a year went by without the passages being cleared. Death stalked the streets. The average age of death in Bradford, a city with a large working class population, in the 1840's was 20, but even where there was no industrial working class, such as in Pateley Bridge, the average age of death was only 36.16

The horrors of this "Bleak Age" have been graphically documented by scholars and writers and need no further exposition here. There had been some intermittent expressions of concern about the conditions of the cities among both the reformers and the establishment, but other matters more constantly preoccupied them. It took a series of cholera epidemics, the first in 1832, to jolt them into the realization that the stench and smoke of the cities might imperil the life of everyone, and that what might be saved by the continued denial of the necessary expenditures on sanitation and other improvements might well be more than lost in the cost of productive inefficiency, illness and death. In 1838 the Poor Law Commission published a report which drew attention to the heavy burden on rates (taxes) imposed by illness and epidemics. The report included evidence from two of London's working-class areas, Bethnal Green and Whitechapel, submitted by three eminent physicians. It stirred considerable interest,

and the secretary of the Poor Law Commission, Edwin Chadwick, suggested privately to some members of the Commission that a similar study should be carried out for the entire nation. The proposal was put to Parliament and approved, and Chadwick set to work. In 1842 his Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population of Great Britain was published. From then on the annals of the movement for urban improvement are largely the account of the struggle between the forces with a vested interest in real property and its exploitation for its maximum return, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, those who perceived the existing conditions as a present and growing threat to the health and life, certainly of the urban poor, probably of all urban dwellers, but perhaps even of the nation as a whole.

In 1848 the <u>Public Health Act</u> was passed which introduced much-needed regulations for sanitation and housing, and the last half of the 19th Century saw further advances in public health legislation. Progress in improving the urban environment through action in the public sector advanced steadily but still at a sluggish pace. The deterioration was on such a vast scale that great sums of money and large tracts of land were required in order to achieve any significant improvement; municipal authorities had little of either. Nor did they yet have the power of expropriation for purposes of urban renewal. It would take nearly another century before the English respect for the sanctity of private property would acknowledge that in certain specific instances the public welfare might be accorded prior rights over those of private ownership of land.

## 4. The 19th Century Planned Industrial Towns

It is then, perhaps, not surprising to find, during this period, when public attitudes were becoming better informed and more concerned about the broader implications of urban poverty and the physical degradation of the city, but public instruments for action were still too few and too crude, that the most notable successes in the creation of a decent living environment for the working man were achieved in the private sector. A handful of enlightened and wealthy industrialists, who commanded the

necessary amounts of capital and of land were inspired by the fresh breath of air that was stirring through the opening windows of the nation's social conscience, to build model villages for the accommodation of their own plants and work forces. Chief among these were Saltaire, (Fig. 7.) built in 1853 by Sir Titus Salt, former Chief Constable, then Mayor of Bradford and owner of a large textile factory; Port Sunlight, (Fig. 8.) near Liverpool, founded in 1887 by W.H. Lever who made his fortune in soap at the time when the English had just come to recognize the evils which lurked in dirt and grime; and Bourneville, (Fig. 9.) near Birmingham, founded in 1895 by G. Cadbury, the chocolate manufacturer. Port Sunlight contained about six hundred small houses, arranged in village-like groupings and designed in the Gothic style. The community covered about 140-acres. Generous garden space, including kitchen gardens, were provided, and the dwellings were let out at moderate rentals to employees of the firm. 17 Bourneville contained some five hundred houses on about 460-acres, 18 a density considerably lower than that of the others, but all of them opened up new vistas of open spaces and natural verdure, and let in new floods of sunlight and fresh air, which the English lower classes had not known since they left the countryside, a century earlier, driven out by the enclosures into the "dark satanic mills" of the industrial cities. 19

These new purpose-built towns undoubtedly provided the workers with an environment infinitely superior to anything available to them in the older established places. For that their founders must be duly recognized as philanthropists and benefactors. Historically, too, these towns are important as signposts on the way to the Garden City movement which followed later. But their founders, if relatively enlightened, were also shrewd businessmen. They realized the economic advantages to be gained from a satisfied labour force. In this they differed from their utopian predecessors. Owen and Fourier and their disciples wanted to re-make the world; Salt, and Lever, and Cadbury only wanted to improve their businesses and the living conditions of their workers as part of those businesses. Their concerns lacked the broad

social and political dimensions of the earlier idealists; their towns however were more successful. As hard practical men of affairs they understood the realities of the world in which they lived, and the towns they built reflected those realities. In that era of parsimony and ferocious dedication to the accumulation of wealth, the new industrial towns were an uncommonly generous gesture. They were also commonly paternalistic a benefaction bestowed by the superior upon the humble, but one which served the donor's interests as well as those of his employees, although there was no identity or equality of interest in that gift. The salubrious towns founded by these men were business experiments, not social experiments. Whatever social good might be the outcome of their more healthy environment would of course be welcome, but would only be coincidental to their economic value, and could only be of benefit within the limits of the enterprise, and not to the wider society outside.

The earlier utopian communities were also founded by men in more fortunate social and economic circumstances than most of their followers, but their motives were ideological and altruistic, arising from a sense of outraged humanity and a genuine identification and empathy with the working man. Their hope was to create a new kind of society in which an ennobled humanity could emerge and flourish. Their communities soon dissolved and disappeared. Their demise was due in part to the fact that they were too small and too inadequately funded to survive. In part it was due to personality conflicts and internal dissensions. But mostly it was because the ideology on which they were based was irrelevant to the time; they were outside of the mainstream of the movement of history. Industrial capitalism was the way of the western world; its values were rugged individualism and unrestricted competition in a free market. Communality and co-operation as social ideals simply had no place in that milieu.

Saltaire, and Bourneville and Port Sunlight were demonstrations of the urban environmental quality which could be achieved in the context of an industrial capitalist society. They addressed the issues of sanitation, and space, and light, and air and traffic

as purely technical problems and provided technical solutions for them. The broader social aspects of urban life, indeed of society as a whole, did not exist in the same frame of reference. The founders of the new industrial towns were products of the socioeconomic system into which they had been born and in which they had made their way to maturity and success. The values of that world were their values. They saw society through the eyes of captains of industry, and among the things they saw were the advances which science and technology were bringing to society and the possible improvements which could be made in their own enterprises by the application of scientific, technical measures. The thought could never enter their minds that the economic system of which they were among the leaders, could relentlessly suppress the life-chances of vast numbers of their fellow human beings, or that the values they held dear could debase the human spirit. The social system and the political system were givens; they were outside of the realm of critical appraisal. Industry, however, could be seen as flourishing or faltering, and technology was seen as the means of improving the performance of the stumblers. The urban environment too, could be seen as deteriorated, and technological measures could be applied to improve it. Thus it was that the failings of the socio-economic system, and the flaws in its values and ethos, which the utopians had sought to transcend in their community experiments, came to be seen as merely technical defects in the physical environment which could be corrected by the application of the proper scientific measures. These were attitudes which were becoming prevalent throughout industrial and capitalist society in England and Europe and in Canada as well. Saltaire and Bourneville and Port Sunlight were simply among their early concrete manifestations.

The example of these advanced towns did not inspire a wave of new workers' communities. Most of the industrial labour force continued to live and work in the same woeful surroundings; most workers' housing continued to be built by contractors and developers whose only concern was the amount of rent they could squeeze out of their

properties. But there were, nevertheless, gradual improvements in the legislation regulating the construction of houses, setting higher public health standards, and vesting greater powers of initiative and capability of enforcement in the public authority. These legislative advances, although all dealing with much the same issues, were embodied in a variety of statutes which seemed to be *ad hoc* rather than systematic and organically related. For example, the Lodging Houses Acts dealt with building regulations and the public subsidy of housing; the many Improvements Acts sought by individual corporations and granted by Parliament empowered each respective corporation to carry out its own chosen improvements; the Public Health Acts were undoubtedly the major source of improvements affecting both housing standards and regulations in the private sector and health measures and powers in the public sector; the Housing of the Working Classes Act of 1890 combined the provisions for public subsidized housing and health.

Planning. etc. Act. of 1909.<sup>20</sup> The notable innovation which this Act introduced was that it turned its attention to the land as a factor in development. Previous legislation had focused on building standards and regulations and sanitary requirements, even on street widths, but had paid little attention to the land itself. The Housing. Town Planning. etc. Act of 1909 recognized that the use of the land was an important element in the creation of a satisfactory environment. The Act did not apply to land already developed. It applied only to "land which is in the process of development or appears likely to be used for building purposes",<sup>21</sup> and it enabled a responsible authority to prepare a scheme for the development of such land. But a *prima facie* case<sup>22</sup> had to be made that the land was suitable for development and would in fact be developed at some unspecified time in the future, and the central government's approval was required before a scheme could be prepared. It was not until the Town and Country Planning Act of 1947 that local authorities were given the full powers to undertake the comprehensive redevelopment of existing built-up areas. The Town Planning section of the Housing. Town Planning. etc.

Act of 1909, however, was the model for the Planning Acts of New Brunswick in 1912, and of Alberta, Manitoba and Saskatchewan in 1913, 1916, and 1917 respectively.

In order to understand how that piece of British legislation crossed the Atlantic and reached the remote hinterland of Canada's prairie region, one must step back for a brief look at what was happening in Canada during the last couple of decades of the 19th century and into the early years of the 20th century. From about 1880 to about 1920, Canada was agitated by a movement which is customarily referred to by urban historians as the Urban Reform Movement.<sup>23</sup> Like most reform movements, it attracted a variety of adherents, each group with its own view of the issues, its own grievances, and its own agenda for improvement. These attitudes and goals were not all held in common by the various elements caught up in the agitation and as a result the movement took several directions and had a number of different aspects. Among the ideas which kept emerging and reemerging in this fervent, somewhat amorphous, and often misdirected pursuit of social reform was the idea of city planning. Notable among its advocates were not, as in England and Europe, socialists and agitators operating on the fringe of polite society, but highly respectable members of society, often among its most blue-blooded.

There was, of course, some kind of city planning in Canada long before 1880.<sup>24</sup> Quebec, Louisburg, Halifax, Kingston, Guelph, and other centres all saw some measure of planning in their layout and development. Most of this planning, however, was planning by the colonial power - France or England - and had as its objective military defence. In places like Guelph and Toronto the planning was for the purpose of commercial development and sale of land by companies whose main financing was from England. But this is not the kind of planning which concerns us here. We are here not talking about the subdivision of a small part of the land of a city for special purposes such as the construction of walls or towers, or a one-shot speculative profit for absentee landowners, but rather city planning as a continuing responsibility of government for guiding and controlling the development of the whole city as it evolves into the future.

## 5. <u>Urban Improvement Movements in Canada</u>

The last half of the 19th century saw some profound changes in Canadian society. Among the most radical transformations were the great increase in the country's population, the emergence and consolidation of industrial capitalism, and the dramatic increase in the size of the cities. The growth of the urban population brought with it the usual ills of the city: slums, congestion, disease, infant mortality, fire, crime, prostitution, immorality, poverty. These conditions were endemic throughout the larger cities of Canada, and although they were most widespread and intense in the urban centres of central Canada they also plagued western cities such as Winnipeg and Edmonton. As might be expected, there was a reaction to these conditions. In the cities where it was highly visible, concerned, socially-minded, middle-class citizens became involved in a public demand that something be done about this urban blight. Their agitation has given the name of the Urban Reform Movement to the public call for reform.

But there was more to the reform movement than just its urban aspect. It had a strong rural side as well, which was not merely a simple reaction against the evils of the city. It is true that much of the rural-representative opinion of the period as expressed by farmers, journalists, novelists, poets, clergymen, educators, and even scholars, extolled the moral superiority - indeed the superiority in every way - of the rural life over the urban, and as the only refuge and salvation from the damnation of the city. But there was more to the rural attitude than merely a rejection of the city. Both the rural and the urban aspects of the reform movement were an expression of the deep-seated, perhaps even not clearly perceived, misgivings of Canadians about what they sensed was happening to their society. It was changing into an urban industrial society from an agricultural mercantile society, and they weren't very comfortable with that change. The city folk weren't comfortable with it not only because of the usual attendant city evils, but also because it was changing their lives, particularly their working lives,

into that of an industrial labour force with its intensifying confrontation not only between employer and employee but also between the workers themselves, between the skilled craftsmen and the unskilled. The farmers weren't very happy about what they sensed was going on, particularly the sense of increasing exploitation by the financial centres and capitalist entrepreneurs of the east, and their protest found expression in a number of organizations, all of them populist reform movements, some of them embracing the ideology of agrarian socialism.

The Urban Reform Movement was, in effect, only one aspect of a profound overall social adjustment to fundamental changes in the structure and functioning of Canadian society. The urban reform stream of that general movement was made up of several currents which all flowed together in a turbulent confusion, but in which, in spite of its appearance to the contrary, not all the currents were flowing in the same direction.

Several flows of interest can be identified: housing, sanitation, social welfare, Christian morality, the Garden City movement, the City Beautiful movement, and the Town Planning movement. The advocates of reform in the areas of housing, sanitation, and social welfare, in their professional and secular terms may be regarded as comprising one ideological group, although the preachers of the Social Gospel shared their views but came to them from the position of clergymen whose central motivation was the imperative of Christian morality. Those advocating the reform of the structure of civic government may be regarded as another group.

These latter reformers were businessmen who constituted the majority of the city councils in Canadian cities. They believed that the city was essentially a business, and that its government should therefore be organized along the lines of sound business management. Among the major reforms which they advocated was the separation of the legislative and executive functions of civic government through the creation of a small executive group - a Board of Control, or a Commission, or a City Manager - which would be entirely responsible for the civic administration with the council functioning like the

Board of Directors of a private company and responsible for broad civic policy. They were successful in this in a number of cities. The Board of Control structure was first adopted in Toronto in 1896. The idea spread to Montreal, Hamilton, Ottawa, Winnipeg, Edmonton, Lethbridge, and others. Edmonton adopted a Board of Control in 1904, and Winnipeg in 1907. Winnipeg's lasted until 1914.

An early cross-current in the evolution of the city planning idea in Canada was the City Beautiful movement.<sup>25</sup> This movement had its origins in the Chicago Exposition of 1893. The layout of the grounds and the design of the pavilions in this early World's Fair were under strict architectural and planning control, and the effect created was highly attractive, evoking images of classical urban splendour. Canadian architects were smitten by this demonstration of the potential for civic beauty which their profession commanded, and became the enthusiastic advocates of the application of the principles displayed in Chicago to the building of all Canadian cities. The professional associations of architects of both the Province of Ontario and the Province of Quebec were active participants in the promotion of the movement and prepared plans for Toronto and Montreal respectively. The O.A.A. prepared several plans, one in 1905, on behalf of the prestigious Toronto Guild of Civic Art, known colloquially as the Civic Guild. The Guild was an association of influential citizens who found that the appearance of their city left much to be desired and were enthralled by the visions of civic magnificence conjured up by the rhetoric and artistic renderings of the professional advocates of the City Beautiful ideal. Grandiose plans were drawn up by private architects for cities across the land, from Montreal to Vancouver. Some of these firms were Canadian, some American. Very few of their plans were ever implemented: few cities could afford them. Many civic engineers spoke out against them and against the whole City Beautiful movement, as merely fantasies which distracted attention from the real issues of city-building, which were to ensure the most efficient and economic construction of the city's infrastructure

and public works. In 1913 a severe depression struck Canada, and the shining image of the City Beautiful movement dimmed. By 1930 it was completely extinguished.

The Garden City Movement came to Canada from England, not from the United States. It had its genesis in a book titled <u>Tomorrow</u> written by Ebenezer Howard and published in 1892.<sup>26</sup> Howard was not a social revolutionary, nor a wealthy industrialist seeking to improve his productive infrastructure, nor even an architect or other professional involved in urban design. He was a shorthand writer-court reporter. He had been in Chicago at the time of the great fire, and the destruction of the city led him to speculate about the possibility of creating entirely new cities, built from scratch, and built according to a rational master plan. Whereas the City Beautiful idea was essentially superficial - its interest was limited to the surface appearance of the civic design - Howard's idea was profound; it penetrated into the deeper layers of the social and economic realities which established the limits beyond which his vision could not succeed, as well as into the financial, organizational and management structures which would have to be created for the successful establishment and operation of his new cities.

The easiest way to outline the principle involved is to quote the later definition of a Garden City. It is a 'town designed for healthy living and industry; of a size that makes possible a full measure of social life, but not larger; surrounded by a rural belt; the whole of the land being in public ownership or held in trust for the community'. No tiny isolated colony, then, but a complete working city whose estimated population was to be around thirty thousand. The diagrammatic scheme is circular, with a large central park containing also the principal public buildings and skirted by a main shopping street, with an outer circle of factories and the permanent green belt beyond. The city itself was to occupy one thousand acres and the agricultural belt five thousand. The railroad by-passes the town, meeting the circle at a tangent. By keeping the land in single ownership the possibility of speculation and overcrowding would be eliminated and the increment of value created by the community in industrial and shop sites would be preserved for itself. Essentially a

thorough-going experiment in middle-class consumers co-operation.<sup>27</sup>

The Garden City Association was formed in 1899. By 1901 it had 1300 members. The Association bought a site in Hertfordshire, about 40-miles from London, and in 1903 the First Garden City, Ltd., a limited dividend society, was organized for the purpose of building the first Garden City. The City of Letchworth, whose construction began in 1903, had that distinction. Just as the City Beautiful movement, which originated in America, attracted its Canadian admirers, so did the Garden City movement, which began in England, attract its Canadian devotees. A Canadian Garden City Association was organized, and the Garden City, the publication of the British Association found its regular subscribers in this country.

The Chicago Exposition of 1893 set off a strong current of interest in town planning as such, even though its ideology was only surface-deep and cosmetic, and its advocacy concerned only with beautification. As with so much of our Canadian enthusiasms, the City Beautiful movement was of American origin and inspiration, and represented the American approach to city planning - a private-sector formulary approach to city problems, to be marketed and used much like tooth-paste, something to brighten the smile and never mind the decay going on underneath. Also as with much in our Canadian outlook, there was a substantial measure of British derivation in the town planning ideas of the time. The British town planning movement had deep roots in the soil of housing and public health and the Garden City movement, and the Canadian town planning movement was also nurtured from those sources. The Toronto Housing Company represented that aspect of Canadian planning, which in fact was moving in quite the opposite direction from that of the City Beautiful movement since it involved government intervention at least to some degree, and tried to come to grips with underlying social and economic causes of urban pathology. The Toronto Housing Company was incorporated in 1912 to provide affordable housing for the working-class families of that city.29 It

was a direct result of the work of a committee headed by Mayor Geary of Toronto, and made up of representatives of the Toronto Board of Trade, the Canadian Manufacturers' Association, and the Toronto Civic Guild. Although there was some government funding in that Company, it was not a government agency. And although laymen constituted its Board of Directors, they were strong advocates of town planning. It is also of some significance that the Toronto District Labour Council, for whose members the Company's housing was presumably intended, was not represented on the mayor's committee, and that the Toronto Civic Guild, an architecturally-oriented group of affluent business and professional people who espoused the ideas of the City Beautiful movement, was so represented.

It seems clear that during this period, planning was amorphous. Everybody was talking about it but nobody really knew what he was talking about. Perhaps it might be more accurate to say that everybody was talking about it but everybody was talking about something different. The term was understood by each interest group to mean what represented its own interest. Architects and engineers saw it in terms of the physical appearance and infrastructure services of the city; housing and sanitation advocates saw planning in those terms; social reformers, ministers, Social Gospel preachers saw it in terms of religious or moral issues; government structure reformers saw it in terms of the balance sheet of the city as a business corporation. For the most part, and with some obvious exceptions, these groups were not professional associations. They were groups of ordinary citizens who in many instances were not even members of formal organizations but who had a citizens interest in the issues. And in many instances professionals such as architects and doctors and public health nurses and clergymen did belong to layman's organizations as members. And then there were also the professional organizations such as the architectural, engineering, medical, and other associations which became involved in the problems of the cities as professionals, and accordingly became involved in some aspects of the inchoate planning movement.

## 6. The Commission of Conservation

The definitive Canadian event which ultimately led to the emergence in Canada of the town planning movement, with a specific identity and ideology was the establishment of the Commission of Conservation.<sup>30</sup> It is perhaps ironical, although perhaps also not uncharacteristic of Canada, that the initiative which led to the establishment of the Commission of Conservation, which ultimately spawned the town planning movement proper in Canada, was an American initiative. President Theodore Roosevelt, soldier, traveller, outdoorsman, hunter, conservation enthusiast, had adopted a national policy of wilderness and resources conservation. Realizing that the pursuit of this objective might have international implications, and no doubt inspired by notions of continentalism, he convened a North American Conservation Conference, to be held in Washington, in which he invited Canada, Newfoundland and Mexico to participate. The year was 1909, the same year in which the British Parliament passed the Housing.

Town Planning, etc. Act.

[T]he Hon. Clifford Sifton, Hon. Sydney Fisher and Dr. Henri S. Beland were delegated to represent the Dominion. The conference adopted a declaration of principles, including a recommendation that a permanent Conservation Commission be established by each country represented. In pursuance of this recommendation, the Parliament of Canada unanimously enacted a law, assented to on May 19th, 1909, providing for the creation of such a body. By order-of-council, under date of September 3rd of the same year, the members of the commission, 20 in number, were duly appointed, and the Hon. Clifford Sifton was named Chairman.<sup>31</sup>

The Chairman of the Commission of Conservation, the Hon. Clifford Sifton, was the same Clifford Sifton who had been the Minister of the Interior in the federal cabinet of Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier. He was also the younger brother of Arthur Sifton, Premier of Alberta from 1910 to 1917. Arthur Sifton was Alberta's representative on the Commission during his years as Alberta's Premier, and there can

be little doubt that during his tenure on the Commission he became familiar with the idea of town planning and came to share the Commission's enthusiasm for it, and that it was his personal disposition toward it which moved the Alberta Planning Act through that province's legislature in 1913.

The purpose of the Commission of Conservation was to provide the government with the best available scientific and technical advice on all matters affecting resources conservation. Their primary focus of interest was the nation's natural resources - the forests, minerals, fish, wildlife, soil, water - but almost immediately their concern for the purity of the water and dismay over its polluted condition led them directly into the realm of public health. Ottawa, the seat of the Commission, had been visited by a series of disasters between 1900 and 1912, all drawing attention to the fact that the city lacked an adequate and safe water supply.32 A great fire had destroyed a large section of the central area in 1900;33 typhoid fever epidemics ravaged the city in 1911 and 1912.34 The city's water system was unequal to the task of fighting the fire, 35 and its unsanitary quality was responsible for the epidemics. Tuberculosis was endemic throughout the nation and its cause was blamed on crowded and unsanitary living conditions. Primitive methods of domestic sewage disposal were regarded as the principal problem in the management of water resources because they abetted the spread of water-borne diseases. It is not surprising, then, that public health became a leading concern of the Commission of Conservation virtually from its inception.

The first annual meeting of the Commission was held in 1910, when, in customary observation of protocol, the honour of delivering the opening address was accorded to the Governor General, Lord Grey. Both in his statement and that of the Chairman which followed, the prevailing ethos of Canadian society and the tenets which were to guide the work of the Commission were clearly enunciated. They were the same as those which prevailed in England, as well as on the European continent: an unawareness of any flaws in the ideology or structure of the existing socio-economic

system and a belief that any manifest shortcomings were technical in nature and could be corrected by the application of scientific knowledge; and a dedication to the principle that public health was the basis of the general well-being of the nation. Lord Grey commented:

The future prosperity of Canada depends on scientific research and upon the efficient application of the results of that research to the industrial and physical life of the people.<sup>36</sup>

### And Sir Clifford Sifton:

The physical strength of the people is the resource from which all others derive value. Extreme and scrupulous regard for the lives and health of the population may be taken as the best criterion of the degree of real civilization and refinement to which a country has attained.<sup>37</sup>

Dr. Charles A. Hodgetts was appointed medical advisor to the Commission and in him the cause of public health had as dedicated and vigorous a champion as could be found. Issues of public health in an urban context are inseparable from the problems of urban development generally, and Hodgetts, in his spirited and persuasive advocacy of public health measures found himself decrying the conditions of congestion and sub-standard housing which prevailed in Canada's cities and urging the adoption of town planning as the scientific means of ensuring proper and healthful development. His Reports of the Committee on Public Health, submitted to the annual meetings of the Commission of Conservation, customarily contained a section entitled Housing and Town Planning<sup>38</sup> in which he argued the common interests of public health and town planning, and in which he reviewed and admired the achievements of town planning in various countries abroad.

The concept of town planning, however, still remained ambiguous and entangled with a variety of other reform ideas such as those in the fields of housing and sanitation. When the concerns of the Commission of Conservation increasingly turned to the cities, and to the issue of city planning, they realized that they needed expert advice. The

Commission had been established to look at the natural resources of the country with a view to formulating recommendations for their preservation and development. They had no inherent professional or ideological connection with town planning, but became heavily involved in its mystique and spoke with great conviction about the need for it and about its potential blessings. When they realized their own inadequacies and how shaky was the platform on which they spoke, they sought the support of an expert. The logical choice was Thomas Adams<sup>39</sup> who probably enjoyed the highest reputation in this field in the English-speaking world. He was a disciple of Ebenezer Howard, the founder of the Garden City movement in England, and had served as the Secretary of the first Garden City at Letchworth. At the time that the Commission requested his services, Adams was serving as the Inspector of the Local Government Board in England, which was responsible for the administration of the Housing. Town Planning. etc. Act of 1909. He had given a most impressive performance in his address to the National Planning Conference in Philadelphia in 1911, and his merits were lauded wherever planning matters were of interest.

Thomas Adams was appointed as Town Planning Adviser to the Commission of Conservation in 1914. He was tireless in his activities while serving the Commission, and under his influence the concept of town planning was given a clear, specific articulation and a coherent ideology. He wrote extensively about town planning - pamphlets, tracts, reports - as well as a major book on rural planning in Canada, and he initiated and edited a new journal called Conservation of Life. He toured and lectured at universities and at various municipal and regional conferences. He advocated the adoption of planning legislation and prepared a model planning Act for Canada, which was then revised to meet the realities of Canada's federal system of government, and which was subsequently adopted by a number of provinces. He was influential in the creation of several departments of municipal affairs. He also carried on some private consulting but almost entirely for public rather than private clients. It was largely due to Adams'

influence that the Town Planning Institute of Canada was established in 1919 as a professional body.

In spite of Adams' enthusiasm and eloquence in the cause of town planning, the ideology of the planning movement was not something that city councils were comfortable with, or even fully understood, as a system for municipal government, and the city planning movement did not address its ideology to the city councils. It is noteworthy, in this connection, that the Commission of Conservation was a federal government creation and that its Town Planning Adviser began his Canadian role by mistaking the federal government as the legislative authority for planning, as the central government was in Britain, and addressing his efforts to Ottawa. He eventually got down to the provinces with his model planning act, but he never got down to the level of the city councils in terms of ideology and the adoption of his systematic concept of planning as the basis of municipal policy and decision-making. He did consult with a couple of municipalities on questions of design and layout, but that was a long way from the principle thrust of his town planning ideology.

As already indicated, interest in town planning had been manifested in Canada well before Thomas Adams appeared on the scene. Scattered across the country were a variety of organizations involved in activities relating to town planning in one way or another. In Winnipeg, what is generally considered to be the event which marked the beginning of the town planning movement there, was the occasion of a banquet reportedly held in the basement of St. Luke's church in Fort Rouge, sometime in late 1910, at which a paper entitled "Good Citizenship" was presented by a Mr. William Pearson. 40 Pearson was born in Manchester, England in 1865 and came to Manitoba in 1883. He very soon became a stock breeder and farmer. His enterprise flourished and he moved to Winnipeg in 1899, where he established a land and colonization society. He was a man of some means and social stature, being a member of the Winnipeg Industrial Bureau, the Real Estate Exchange, the Masonic Order, the Carlton Club, and the Royal Colonial Institute.

He was a Liberal and an Anglican, and lived at Ashley Lodge on Wellington Crescent. He had maintained close contact with affairs in England and often referred to the progress in town planning that was being made there, which he lauded as an example to be followed. Immediately upon the conclusion of his address to the gathering in the church basement, a committee was struck, consisting of six members, with Pearson as chairman, for the purpose of pursuing the matter of town planning as an issue of public interest and importance. This Town Planning Committee soon made contact with the recently established Town Planning Committee of the Winnipeg Industrial Bureau, and Pearson became the chairman of the amalgamated force. The group established a library which housed and circulated books and periodicals and other publications on the subject of town planning, and sponsored lectures on this and related subjects. They met regularly to discuss civic affairs, housing, streets, traffic, etc., and they pressed the city council to establish a commission with the formal responsibility for city planning. In this they were successful, and the Winnipeg City Planning Commission was established in 1911.

The First Canadian Conference on Town Planning was held in Winnipeg in 1912. In the same year the provinces of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick each adopted a Planning Act; and the Planning Commission of Calgary engaged the firm of Thomas H. Mawson and Sons, City Planners, of London, England, to prepare a plan for the City of Calgary. Mawson had an office in Vancouver and was already working on a plan for that city. In Regina the provincial government engaged Mawson to prepare a plan for the development of the site of the new legislative building, and the city council of Regina shortly after turned to him for a plan for their city. Lord Grey, the Governor General, had a continuing interest in garden suburbs as a solution to the problem of industrial housing congestion in England, and invited Mr. Henry Vivian, M.P. to come over and speak on the subject in a lecture tour of Canadian cities in 1910. The Garden City Association provided speakers to address public meetings on the garden city theme. In Montreal, interested citizens had organized the Greater Montreal Housing and Planning

Association. In Toronto, the Guild of Civic Art, counting many civic leaders and notables among its membership, pursued the grandiose visions of civic monumentality evoked by the Chicago World's Fair of 1893 and the City Beautiful movement which followed from it, but their inspiration soon expired in the cold reality of outrageous costs and egregious impracticality.

The variations in the nature of the town planning activities across the country reflected local interests and conditions. The Commission of Conservation however remained the unifying national presence. It was the articulator of the planning ideology, the disseminator of information, the enthusiastic inspirer of local efforts, the tireless advocate of the planning cause. The core of the Commission's planning interest was its concern for public health and its conviction that scientific techniques could achieve proper standards of sanitation. When the commitment to public health was melded with the commitment to town planning the confidence in sanitation science became integral with confidence in planning science. Town planning was seen as a scientific discipline apart from any social or political dimension. In all of this one may notice certain seeming parallels with the course of events in England but there are some very profound differences. The position of the Commission of Conservation on the basic issues, as the Commission saw them, was succinctly expressed by Sir Clifford Sifton in his welcoming address to the National Conference on City Planning, held in Toronto in May, 1914, which the Commission hosted:

It is but four or five years since the first practical word was spoken in regard to Town Planning in Canada. Previous to that time apparently no systematic attention had been given to the subject....

We invariably find large masses of people, who, although living in a perfectly respectable way, are located in congested districts where health and physique steadily deteriorate. Secondly, we find the growth of what are popularly described as slums, which follow the growth of the congested districts, where people are herded together under conditions which make clean and decent living practically impossible, conditions which breed disease and crime. It seems a terrible indictment

of modern civilization, but it is undoubtedly a true one, that the growth of insanitary, unhealthful conditions, the growth of slums and slum populations, are in direct ratio to what we call progress. The immense growth of the city is invariably accompanied by these undesirable conditions. Why is it? If you solve this question, you solve the most important social question of the modern world....

As to the question which I have propounded - what is it that causes these miseries and masses of unhappiness which we all deplore - there is in my mind no doubt that it is impossible to give any single answer to the question. No one theory explains the fact. But a part, and a most important part, of the answer is to be found in a rational system of Town Planning, a rational system of supervising the conditions in which the people in our great cities shall live.... What I desire to say to you in closing is that the problem you are engaged upon is, in my judgment, one of the two or three great problems in the world today. It is more important than flying machines or wireless telegraphy, or battleships or armies. It has to do with the health and happiness of the average citizen, with the abolition of wretchedness and unhappiness. The solution of it will bring health and happiness to increasing thousands of our fellow-men.42

In reporting back to the sixth annual meeting of the Commission of Conservation in 1915, concerning the National City Planning Conference which they had hosted the previous May, Sir Clifford reported that

The convention was in every respect a pronounced success, and undoubtedly helped create in the public mind a better understanding of the questions involved in what may be described as the science of town planning.<sup>43</sup>

Mr. G. Frank Beer, President of the Toronto Housing Corporation, delivered an address to the Fifth Annual meeting of the Committee of Conservation in Ottawa, in January 1914. The address was entitled "A Plea for City Planning Organization". It is of interest to us here because it expresses the same confused sentiments which Sir Clifford Sifton was to express four months later in Toronto, in his welcoming speech to the National Conference on City Planning. It is typical of the absurdly extravagant delusions which were widely prevalent in the planning movement at the time, about the

milleniumal promise of city planning, its capacity to cure all the ills of society, and its innate moral essence:

[I] have urged chiefly the economic value of city planning; it is a very great factor, but health, morals, beauty, and all that make life really worth living, lie at its very heart. This is work not for the few, but for all. Through it a standard of living may be established which will demonstrate our moral right to the ownership of Canada.<sup>44</sup>

In the same address Mr. Beer made it clear that although his speech addressed the matter of city planning, he did not restrict his notion of planning or the scope of its virtues, or his expectation of its benefits, to the city, but extended them to include the rural sector of Canada as well. "The subject really has a much wider application than is implied in its name. The interests of town and country alike are involved". And the rising feminist movement saw planning as serving the interests of the women of the country. Mrs. H.P. Plumptre, recording secretary of the National Council of Women of Canada also addressed the same meeting as Mr. Beer. During her speech she noted that

[I]f this Commission could inform people generally, as to what laws there are, if any, by which a village or small growing town might be prevented from thus selling its birthright for the good of one generation only, it would be doing a great service to the women of the country. If small and cheap leaflets, bearing on such questions as town planning, could be distributed broadcast throughout these rural and smaller urban centres, they would be exceedingly useful.<sup>45</sup>

From the Reports of the Commission of Conservation and other accounts of the time, and from subsequent historiography and criticism, it is easy to gain the impression that the town planning movement was a strong national movement with a broad base of support. Such an impression would be misleading. The town planning movement was in fact a highly specialized, exotic, even elitist movement which had only limited popular appeal. Like so much of Canada's culture at that time (and, indeed, subsequently) it did not arise indigenously, but was imported from abroad, mainly from

England, but increasingly from the United States. Its leaders were not populists like the leaders of the English social reform movement, one outcome of which was Britain's first Planning Act, but were, rather, middle-class professionals and businessmen who saw urban problems in a narrow technical context. The public health origins of the Canadian interest in town planning resemble the English experience, but the pressing urgency for the reform of the urban environment was much more desperate in England than in Canada. In a small, highly industrialized, densely populated country like England, with its congested industrial cities, the unsanitary conditions were calamitous. In western Canada, apart from Winnipeg, most urban places were small and still relatively unindustrialized. There were of course slums in Winnipeg as there were in the larger industrial centres of eastern Canada, but their virulence was soon dissipated in the vast open spaces of the seemingly limitless Canadian hinterlands. The struggle for reform in Canada was essentially a sectional struggle between east and west, fought on the issues of economic and political power and dominance, not a class struggle as it was in England, and did not recognize as a national concern, as it was in England, the spectre of universal contagion arising out of the miasma of urban degradation. It is true that the Commission of Conservation was loudly hortatory on the subject of public health/town planning but its exhortations were heard only in limited circles of the Canadian population. In 1914 nearly 65 per cent of the population of the prairie region was rural; urban industrial problems were not visible to them. The dereliction of the urban slums was a moving concern among the Christian missions in the cities, and were the seed-bed of the Social Gospel movement which eventually found political expression among the Progressives, but never emerged as a major national object of reform in its own right.

The Commission of Conservation was not unaware of the limited interest among its countrymen in the ideals which were close to its own heart. The pursuit of its objectives had led, quite naturally, to its setting up a committee to explore the matter of planning legislation. The chairman, Col. Jeffrey H. Burland, in his Preliminary Report

of the Committee on Town Planning Legislation, submitted to the fifth annual meeting of the Commission on January 20-21, 1914, stated:

Your Committee recognizes the keen interest taken in the subjects it has to consider by a large number of the intelligent and public-spirited citizens of Canada, and it has been impressed with the number and influence of the public and semi-public bodies which last year petitioned the Commission of Conservation to direct its efforts to the solution of Canadian town-planning and housing problems. Whilst recognizing this appreciation of the problem by many influential citizens, we regret to report that our observations compel us to conclude that the mass of the people are not fully aware of the baneful effects of allowing cities to expand without planning for the future, and permitting urban population to become congested in unsanitary dwelling areas. Nor have they a sufficient knowledge of what has been done in other and older countries to prevent and alleviate such conditions. With this view your Committee unanimously approves the following resolution:

This Committee, being convinced of the great economic value of modern town-planning, regret that after most careful consideration they have come to the unanimous conclusion that the public as a whole is quite ignorant of the great advance that has already been made in many cities in connection with town-planning. The Committee would, therefore, strongly urge that the first and essential step is to educate the people upon this point, and would ask the Conservation Commission to give immediate consideration to this most important matter.<sup>46</sup>

## 7. The Provincial Planning Acts

Bearing in mind the relative absence of popular interest in town planning, and Arthur Sifton's exposure to the Commission of Conservation's enthusiasm for it through his membership on the Commission as Alberta's representative by virtue of his office as Premier, the adoption in 1913 of the <sup>47</sup>Alberta <u>Planning Act</u> may be seen as something less than a response to public pressure or to a strongly felt need in that province, but

rather as a personal inclination on the part of the Premier. Professor P.J. Smith of the University of Alberta makes the following observation:

Sifton was facing his first election campaign as party leader, in the summer [of 1913] and he had a large schedule of legislation which he wished to see enacted. His dispatch stirred some complaints in the opposition press, but the Premier was not to be slowed. Even so, the Town Planning Bill was not expected to reach the House, and only some last minute lobbying by an Edmonton alderman changed its fate. In fact, it was introduced on the last day of the session and was rushed through all three readings in a matter of moments, slipping into law without serious discussion and virtually unheralded in the local press. If Sifton himself regarded it as a significant piece of progressive legislation, there is no evidence that the view was widely shared.<sup>48</sup>

In Manitoba, the adoption of the first planning Act also stirred few emotions. It was mainly through the work of William Pearson and a small group of planning devotees that the <u>Town Planning Act<sup>49</sup></u> was passed by the Manitoba legislature in 1916, quite unobtrusively, with little public interest and minimal debate in the House. In Saskatchewan too, city planning was not a burning public issue. Statutory planning controls over privately owned property was not a pressing concern of the city council, nor of the provincial cabinet. It was not until 1917 that the first Planning Act<sup>50</sup> was passed by the Saskatchewan legislature.

In enacting the planning statute, Saskatchewan may have been influenced by the example of Alberta in 1913, and of Manitoba in 1916. There may also have been additional encouragement through the activities of the Commission of Conservation and of Thomas Adams, their Town Planning Adviser. In 1916 Adams was a featured speaker at a Civic Improvement Conference in Winnipeg, and his appealing words undoubtedly set up sympathetic resonances in Regina.

Another significant influence which emerged at this time was the New York City Zoning Ordinance, adopted by that city in 1916. It sent reverberations throughout the

entire municipal world in the United States and Canada. Here was a straightforward administrative instrument for controlling the use of land which was perfectly suited to the structure and function of municipal government, and to the disposition of municipal councillors. Unlike the British Housing, Town Planning, etc. Act of 1909, and its recent Canadian copies, this New York City ordinance contained no reference to the preparation of planning schemes; no prospective involvement in the public acquisition of private property; no complex arrangements dependent upon provincial ministerial approval; no implication of long-term commitment to development policies. It was a simple regulatory instrument, entirely within the operational competence of the existing municipal administration, and involving a minimum of interference in the process of the private development of land. In a society committed to private enterprise, and which regarded the problems of cities as technical problems that could be solved by the application of "scientific" techniques of city management in the hands of the civic administration, and in which city councils saw their role as boosters rather than inhibitors of civic expansion and were loathe to interfere in the business of the land developer, the zoning ordinance seemed the ideal means of avoiding undesirable development and uses which could reduce property values or damage the amenity of an area, while at the same time avoiding unwarranted public intervention in the private land market.

The fact is that the cities were grossly unsuitable for carrying out city planning, at least the kind of planning that Thomas Adams and the faithful in the town planning movement of that time were talking about. Indeed, Adams drew a distinction between what he called "city planning" and what he called "town planning". 51 The former label he applied to the ideas and practices which reflected the American approach beautification, zoning, transportation, while the latter label he gave to his own British-rooted ideas which purported to look at the totality of the city, and to prepare a rational comprehensive plan for its development on the basis of that total analysis.

# 8. City Government, City Planning and Social Policy

The cities were in no position, financially, legislatively, or ideologically to do anything of the sort. They were created by the provincial governments for one basic purpose - to provide municipal services in the area of their municipal jurisdiction. Moreover, those services were mainly to property - sewer, water, roads, snow-councils were empowered to raise taxes against those properties to pay for those services. The notion of a comprehensive mandate for the council to deal with everything in their municipality including undertaking economic and social development programs was not part of the city's intended powers. Nor was the city provided with sources of revenue which could pay for such programs. Such concepts may have been appropriate in Britain where the central government was the planning authority and the initiative role of government was familiar, but in the Canadian context these were alien ideas. The councils of Canadian cities were made up mainly of businessmen who viewed the city as a business, and the responsibility of council as that of providing sound business management. In the context of the statutory role and limits of municipal government, the cities could not perform the planning function as prescribed by Adams. The trend in Canadian cities was in fact clearly and with considerable rapidity moving in the direction of the American model and away from the British, in spite of the still-present influence of Adams and his town planning ideology. Zoning and transportation were fast becoming the dominant elements in the planning compendium of city councils as the period of the so-called urban reform movement drew to a close.

Some writers in the field of urban affairs and planning regard the rise of this attitude among city councils as a turning away of city planning from a concern with social policy and therefore as a fall from grace. They see the adoption by cities of subdivision regulation and development control through an administrative bureaucracy as a shameful betrayal of the potential for social salvation which they believe town

planning possessed but abandoned in favour of the interests of the developer. Such a view is not merely naive, it is quite mistaken. City planning as a function of city government was never turned in the direction of social policy and never had the potential to deal with the city's economic and social problems. The impression that city planning actually had such an orientation and powers can only have arisen out of being misled by the confused rhetoric of the reform movement, and the failure to recognize what the city councils were doing and were *only* capable of doing and to distinguish that reality from the fanciful ideology of the popular town planning movement.

All doctrines take on whatever meaning their followers may ascribe to them at any given time. The Town Planning Institute of Canada was founded in 1919, largely through the advocacy of Thomas Adams, and the Institute sought to embody and perpetuate his doctrine of Town Planning. Indeed, a definition of Town Planning based on his principles was printed on the front page of the Journal of the Town Planning Institute of Canada, Volume VIII, No.4, its issue of August-October 1929. The definition appeared as a masthead feature on every subsequent issue of the Journal:

Town Planning may be defined as the scientific and orderly disposition of land and buildings in use and development with a view to obviating congestion and securing economic and social efficiency, health and well-being in urban and rural communities.<sup>52</sup>

Seen from a particular perspective this definition could well seem to be in accord with the legislative mandate of municipal government and the ideology of its businessmen-councils. It identifies the use and development of land and buildings as the essential instrument of the planning function for achieving certain economic and social objectives. At that time such a concept was obviously persuasive, else how could it have become the core doctrine of a professional body? And there is no reason to think that the businessmen-councillors did not share this persuasion. There is also no reason to believe that they did not find the notion of "economic efficiency" as the most persuasive

appeal of the Town Planning doctrine, and simply assumed either that in pursuing "economic efficiency" they were by that fact also pursuing the social benefits, or that the social benefits would automatically follow from the economic benefits. In fact this is not what Adams or the Town Planning Institute of Canada had in mind. They visualized vigorous public intervention in such areas as housing, decentralization of industry, public ownership of utilities and others. But that is not how "planning" was perceived by the businessmen-councils at that time. Today the attitudes of the councils are not greatly different although experience has shown that the "orderly disposition of land and buildings in use and development" serves the special interests of a small group in society, and cannot possibly be, in itself, the instrument to achieve "health and well-being in urban and rural communities".

Although the planning Act of each of the provinces conveyed to the municipal authorities power which went a considerable distance beyond the basic zoning powers, it also provided those zoning powers as part of the Act, and it was that provision which municipal councils drew upon virtually exclusively in their rudimentary planning function. For about forty years the planning schemes which municipalities in all three provinces prepared under their respective Acts were in fact simply zoning schemes. They controlled the use of land and buildings in broad general categories, as well as such matters as set-backs, density, site coverage, etc. It was not until late in the decade of the 1950's and into the 1960's that the broader powers of land acquisition and urban renewal came into common use as part of the city planning function. Nevertheless, by 1917 the primary planning statute had been established in all three prairie provinces. Each was to undergo substantial changes as the region became increasingly urbanized and as the cities expanded, and more sophisticated planning measures became increasingly necessary. The City of Regina and the City of Calgary continue to derive their planning powers from their respective provincial Planning Acts, although both have been notably amended over the years. The City of Winnipeg however derives its planning powers from

the <u>City of Winnipeg Act</u> - its own "charter" - rather than from the provincial <u>Planning Act</u>; and the Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg, the two-tier metropolitan form of municipal government which immediately preceded the present single, amalgamated city, derived its powers from the <u>Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg Act</u> rather than the provincial <u>Planning Act</u>.

The planning legislation in each province is the basic instrument of the city planning function, but the planning and development of the three cities - indeed, of all the cities in each province - did not proceed solely under the control and direction of these statutes. A variety of factors entered into the shaping of each city. The provincial governments rank high on the list of formative influences, not only as the source of the entire structure of municipal laws within which the city operates, but also because of the impact of provincial government attitudes on city policies and programs. Going back to their very beginnings, municipalities themselves are created by provincial Acts, and their responsibilities and powers are defined and controlled by the province through a variety of provincial statutes. Even under the planning legislation, any development plan or zoning by-law adopted by a city council requires the approval of the designated provincial minister. Frequently municipal policies are shaped by provincial initiatives or interventions, or by decisions of provincially appointed agencies or quasi-judicial bodies. Grants from the province constitute a significant part of annual municipal revenues. There is then a very close relationship between the municipal and provincial governments, in the realm of the law, in the fiscal realm, as well as in the realm of ideology, although this relationship is not always a joyful one. Obviously, any discussion of the planning and development of a city must necessarily touch upon this critical municipal-provincial relationship.

During the years before World War II the pressure on the prairie cities, and on their relationships with their respective provincial governments were not severe. It was an era during which the process of urbanization unfolded steadily but

undramatically, and the established means for dealing with it, both at the municipal and provincial levels, sufficed. Immediately upon the end of the war in 1945, however, Canada entered into a period of explosive urban growth. Many service men, returning from the war, came back to the cities rather than to the farms from which they had departed to enlist in the armed forces. Large numbers of immigrants from war-torn Europe, seeking relief from the ravages of the conflict, came to Canada in the hope of finding a new life here. The mechanization of the farm continued and the farm labour-force continued to shrink, sustaining the flow of population from the countryside into the cities. The "baby boom" became a critical demographic as well as economic factor. After six years of relative austerity and the channeling of large quantities of resources into the production of war material rather than production for civilian uses, the return of peace brought with it a great surge in the demand for consumer goods and services, most of which were to be found in the larger urban centres. Thus it was that for about three decades after the war the cities of Canada experienced a continuous vigorous expansion.

At the beginning of this period few, if any, cities in Canada were in a position to cope with the rate and magnitude of the coming urban growth. They had had no experience of urbanization on such a scale. The structure of their city administration was inappropriate to the task. They lacked the staff with the proper training and skills. They did not have suitable by-laws or powers. Municipal boundaries and jurisdictions were ineffectual because the flood of new urban development would spill out over the existing, traditional limits. An extensive change in the structure and powers of cities was necessary if they were to be enabled to absorb this tidal wave of new population smoothly and effectively. During the decades of the 1950's and 1960's there was then, not surprisingly, a great flurry of activity in the realm of municipal government. New forms of city government were created, such as the metropolitan governments of Toronto and Winnipeg, and the regional governments in Ontario; new ideas were experimented with such as district planning and extra-territorial jurisdiction; new powers were

conveyed to city councils under provincial planning acts and city zoning by-laws; new departments of the civic administration as well as the provincial government were created to deal with the new dimensions of urban life.

Winnipeg, Regina and Calgary participated in these changes. As with the rest of the country, the pressures upon existing municipal institutions in the prairie cities was felt immediately upon the end of the war. The rate and extent of change progressed from that time on into the decades of the 70's and 80's. If there is any validity in the notion that the local historical roots of a city, its distinctive ethos, its "communal mind and outlook" are expressed in its planning and development, then evidence to support this notion must be sought in each city's policies and programs as they manifest themselves in the process of each city's general historical development. Accordingly, in order to determine the degree to which that notion may or may not be valid, it is necessary to examine the policies and programs of Winnipeg, Regina, and Calgary as they found expression in the planning and development of each of those cities throughout the continuum of each city's distinctive historical evolution.

#### **NOTES**

<sup>1</sup>Gans, <u>People and Plans</u>, 57.

<sup>2</sup>Wildavsky, <u>Speaking Truth to Power</u>, 8.

<sup>3</sup>A.E.J. Morris, the noted urban historian, casts some doubt on the validity of this generally prevailing assumption. He suggests that the first town planner may have been "an anonymous Harrapan priest". See Morris, <u>History of Urban Form Before the Industrial Revolution</u>. 16.

<sup>4</sup>F.E. Manuel and F.P. Manuel, <u>Utopian Thought in the Western World</u>, 117.

<sup>5</sup>Plato's <u>Republic</u> is the classic example of this concept.

<sup>6</sup>See Leonardo Benevolo, <u>The Origins of Modern Town Planning</u> for a fuller treatment of these early utopian planners.

<sup>7</sup>See Leszek Kolakowski, <u>Main Currents in Marxism</u>, Vol.I., 231.

<sup>8</sup>19th century Europe has been exhaustively studied by historians. Of particular interest here is Eric J. Hobsbawm, <u>The Age of Revolution: Europe 1789-1848</u>.

<sup>9</sup>The Hammonds, J.L. and Barbara, are established authorities on the social and economic history of England from the middle of the 18th century to the middle of the 19th century. Their <u>Age of the Chartists</u> is a classic study of the Chartist movement. Their <u>The Bleak Age</u> is a graphic portrayal of social conditions in England in the 1830's and 1840's; the chapter entitled "The Revolt", 171-188, contains a succinct account of the Chartist movement.

 $^{10}$ J.L. and Barbara Hammond, <u>The Bleak Age</u> , 186.

<sup>11</sup>An exhaustive study of the French Revolution and its era is Will and Ariel Durant, "Rousseau and Revolution," Vol. X of their massive 11-volume work, <u>The Story of Civilization</u>.

<sup>12</sup>For an incisive analysis of the social and economic context of the industrial revolution in England see E.P. Thompson, <u>The Making of the English Working Class</u>, specifically chapter 6, "Exploitation," 207-232. See also Hobsbawm, <u>The Age of Revolution: Europe 1789-1848</u> and <u>The Age of Capital 1848-1875</u>. These two works of Hobsbawm provide an illuminating insight into the emergence of industrial capitalism in Europe and the parallel emergence of the protest and revolutionary movements among the masses of workers.

<sup>13</sup>For a graphic description of the affects of the Enclosure movement on the life of the agricultural smallholder and labourer see Raymond Williams <u>The Country and the City</u>, "Enclosures, Commons and Communities," chapter 10, 96-107.

14Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, 209.

<sup>15</sup>Hammond, <u>The Bleak Age</u>, 226.

<sup>16</sup>Hammond, <u>The Bleak Age</u>, 218.

<sup>17</sup>Leonardo Benevolo, <u>History of Modern Architecture</u>, Vol. 1, 351.

<sup>18</sup>lbid.

<sup>19</sup>The noted authority on the history of urban culture, Lewis Mumford, recognizes the important place of these early planned industrial towns in the history of the city in his <u>The Culture of Cities</u>, 218, 293, and <u>The City in History</u> 289, 475; photo plate 41.

<sup>20</sup>The Housing. Town Planning etc. Act, 9 King Edward VII, 1909, chapter 44.

- <sup>21</sup>Cited by P.J. Smith, "The Principle of Utility and the Origins of Planning Legislation in Alberta 1912-1975" in Artibise and Stelter, eds., <u>The Usable Urban Past</u>, 207. See also Abercrombie, <u>Town and Country Planning</u>, 170.
- <sup>22</sup>The Housing, Town Planning etc. Act, 54(2), cited by P. J. Smith "The Principle of Utility," 222, n.69.
- <sup>23</sup>See Stelter and Artibise, eds., <u>The Canadian City</u>, chapter VI, "Urban Reform." See also James D. Anderson, "The Municipal Government Reform Movement in Western Canada 1880-1920", in Artibise and Stelter eds., <u>The Usable Urban Past</u>, 73-111.
- <sup>24</sup>See Gilbert A. Stelter, "The Political Economy of the City-Building Process: Early Canadian Urban Development", in Derek Fraser and Anthony Sutcliffe, eds., <u>The Pursuit of Urban History</u>. See also J.M.S. Careless, <u>The Rise of Cities in Canada Before 1914</u>.
- <sup>25</sup>See Walter Van Nus, "The Fate of City Beautiful Thought in Canada 1893-1930" in Steller and Artibise, eds., <u>The Canadian City</u>, 162-185.
- <sup>26</sup>See Jacqueline Tyrwhitt, "Society and Environment: A Historical Review", in APRR eds., <u>Town and Country Planning Textbook</u>, 137ff. See also Lewis Mumford, <u>The Culture of Cities</u>, 394ff; photo plate 30.
- <sup>27</sup>Catherine Bauer, "Modern Housing", 110.
- <sup>28</sup>Jacqueline Tyrwhitt, "Society and Environment", 138.
- <sup>29</sup>Shirley Spragge, "A Confluence of Interests: Housing Reform in Toronto, 1900-1920", in Artibise and Stelter, eds., <u>The Usable Urban Past</u>, 247-267.
- <sup>30</sup>Commission of Conservation, <u>Eighth Annual Report</u>, "Introduction", 1.
- 32John H. Taylor, "Introduction", in <u>Urban History Review</u>, VIII.1.
- <sup>33</sup>John Fear, "Ottawa's Lumber Interests and the Great Fire of 1900", in <u>Urban History</u> Review, VIII.1.
- <sup>34</sup>Sheila Lloyd, "The Ottawa Typhoid Epidemics of 1911 and 1912", in <u>Urban History</u> Review , VIII.1.
- <sup>35</sup>Chris Warfe, "The Search For Pure Water in Ottawa, 1910-1915", in <u>Urban History</u> Review , VIII.1.
- <sup>36</sup>Lord Grey, opening remarks, <u>Report of the First Annual Meeting of the Commission of Conservation</u>.
- <sup>37</sup>Clifford Sifton, Chairman's opening address, Report of the First Annual Meeting of the Commission of Conservation.
- <sup>38</sup>See, for example, his report under that heading to the Fourth Annual Meeting of the Commission of Conservation, held January 21-22, 1913. At page 4 of that Report he says, in part, "The experience of every city is that most, if not all, of the evils consequent upon, and incident to, faulty planning and improper housing have arisen during the period of growth from a village to a city of fifty thousand. In other words, the city of this size is the heir to all the evils due to its chaotic growth during the years which have intervened. And what is more serious, these initial errors are then either insurmountable, or can be rectified only at enormous cost to the taxpayers".
- <sup>39</sup>For a description of the work of Thomas Adams with the Commission of Conservation see Alan H. Armstrong, "Thomas Adams and the Commission of Conservation", in Leonard Gertler, ed., <u>Planning the Canadian Environment</u>.
- <sup>40</sup>See Artibise, Winnipeg a Social History of Urban Growth 1874-1914, 267-280.
- <sup>41</sup>Canadian Press Association, Who's Who in Western Canada, Vol. 1.

- <sup>42</sup>Sir Clifford Sifton, Chairman's "Address of Welcome" to the National Conference on City Planning, Toronto, May 14, hosted by the Commission of Conservation. Chairman's "Address" published in Appendix I, Report of the Sixth Annual Meeting of the Commission of Conservation, January 19-20, 1915.
- <sup>43</sup>Sir Clifford Sifton, Chairman's "Address", Report of the Sixth Annual Meeting of the Commission of Conservation, January 19-20, 1915.
- <sup>44</sup>G. Frank Beer, "A Plea for City Planning Organization", in <u>Report of the Fifth Annual Meeting of the Commission of Conservation</u>, January 20-21, 1914, 112ff.
- <sup>45</sup>H.P. Plumptre, "The National Council of Women and Conservation", in <u>Report of the Fifth Annual Meeting of the Commission of Conservation</u>, 29.
- <sup>46</sup>Col. Jeffrey H. Burland, "Preliminary Report of the Committee on Town Planning Legislation", in Report of the Fifth Annual Meeting; 122.
- <sup>47</sup>Bill No. 85, "A Bill Respecting Town Planning". Third reading and Royal Assent, March 25, 1913. <u>Statutes of Alberta</u>, chapter 18.
- 48P.J. Smith, "The Principle of Utility", 206.
- <sup>49</sup>Bill No. 63, "A Bill relating to Planning and Regulating the Use and Development of Land for Building Purposes". Third reading February 15, 1916, Royal Assent, March 10, 1916, Statutes of Manitoba, chapter 114.
- <sup>50</sup>Bill No. 7, "A Bill with respect to Town Planning and Rural Development". Third reading December 7, 1917, Royal Assent, December 15, 1917. <u>Statutes of Saskatchewan</u>, chapter 70.
- <sup>51</sup>Thomas Adams, "A Town Planning Act for Canada", in Report of the Sixth Annual Meeting of the Commission of Conservation, Appendix I(a), "Discussion" section, 260.
   <sup>52</sup>Town Planning Institute of Canada, Journal, VIII.4, (August-October) 1929, 1.

### **CHAPTER 5**

## THE FUNCTIONAL SETTING

## 1. <u>City Planning - The Concept and the Instruments</u>

Before turning to the examination of the planning and development of the three cities which are the focus of this study, a short discussion of the phrase "planning and development," as it is used here, might be in order. There are, of course, many different kinds of planning. Essentially, however, they all share a common characteristic: they all deal in intentions. At its most basic level a plan is simply an expression of intent. In common usage the one is often taken for the other. For example, one can say "I plan to go on vacation some time next month," or "I intend to go on vacation some time next month", and the two statements will generally be taken to mean the same thing. The meanings of plan and intend in this usage are interchangeable. In a more precise usage, however, an intention is not a plan; it is only the starting point of a plan. A plan carries the germinal intention forward to the point where it has an organized content and a program for its realization. Simply stated, a plan articulates present measures to achieve future objectives. In these terms, planning includes every kind of thought or action which is directed towards the achievement of some stated goal in the future. In this vast generic realm of all possible kinds of planning, any specific kind of planning takes its identity from its context. The kind of planning it is, the name by which it is known (financial planning, social planning, parks planning, family planning, etc.) derives from the special circumstances of what is being planned, why it is being planned, how it is being planned, who is doing the planning and for whom.

The plans of individuals, in most instances, are in the form of intentions whose ultimate goal is felt by them to be highly desirable and even clearly perceived, but the means of realizing it are often only dimly apprehended and the actions taken are usually ad hoc responses to immediate demands. The plans of individuals are also usually simple

in the sense that there are relatively few variables affecting them, and their linkages and ramifications are not complex. These plans are also typically limited in scale and depend for their execution only on the individual or on a limited number of others. The individual is most frequently both the planner and the plannee; generally, he is himself the intended beneficiary of his plan. The time-span of the individual's plan is comparatively short, and the individual as planner is responsible only to himself for the success or failure of his plan.

Business corporations must necessarily be more systematic in their planning. Their goal is clearly articulated: it is to earn a profit; and their plans for production and sales are formally expressed in minutes, memos, and directives in terms of that goal. But their plans are subject to many variables with complex ramifications over which they have only limited control. The corporate management are the planners but their plans affect many more people than just themselves. They directly affect their work force, but most importantly they are responsible to the company's shareholders among whom there is never any dissent over the basic goal of earning a profit. The time-span of a corporate plan may be fairly long but in most companies it only extends over the next year's operations.

City planning is planning by the government of the city, which is of an entirely different order of planning from that of individuals or private corporations, or indeed, of any other planning authority or agency, whether public, quasi-public, or private. As with other governmental or public planning bodies, city planning is set within a legal and statutory framework which defines the limits of its jurisdiction and the nature of its operations, and which opens its activities to public scrutiny and public participation, criticism and dissent. As with all other governments, the city planning authority is politically answerable to its electorate. The distinction which sets city planning apart from all other kinds of planning, however, is its mandate: it is the only statutory authority responsible for the planning and development of the city.

The words "planning and development" frequently occur coupled together in this way as a phrase with the implication that they are two related but separate kinds of activities. In these instances, "planning" is regarded as the "thinking" or conceptual part of the relationship, and "development" is regarded as the "acting" or construction part. In many instances it is of course possible to conceive of the means of gaining an objective without actually ever taking any action to do so. Conversely it is possible to take action without having given much thought to the implications or consequences of that action. In city planning as a function of city government, however, the distinction between "planning" and "development" in this sense is obliterated. The conceptual aspect of the city planning function is embodied in the policies of the city council, and the policies of the city council are embodied in the development of the city. The process from policy conception to program implementation is continuous; the one flows into the other. It is true that the policies of the city council are not always carried out, but it is not a principle of city government that the city council should make policies which are not to be carried out. It is a fundamental premise, not only of city government, but of all government, that policies are made to be carried out. Indeed no government could function on any other basis. If policies are not carried out it is because of some breakdown or failure somewhere in the system, not because discontinuity between policies and implementing actions is an intended characteristic of the government process. In city planning as a function of city government, therefore, it is anomalous to draw a distinction between the cogitative or conceptual part of the function and the active or implementive part. The city planning function is a continuum in which both "planning" and "development" lose any separate identity. Because there must be a policy in existence before it can be carried out, there is necessarily a time gap between the making of policy in the council chamber and the carrying out of policy on the ground. This may possibly give rise to the notion that "planning" and "development" are two separate activities, but in the context of the total planning process they are simply

phases in a continuum, like the two sides of a coin. In the city planning function, as in a coin, you cannot have the one without the other. On this basis, then, the city planning function might be defined as the making and carrying out of future-oriented policies which regulate and guide the development of the city towards its adopted goals.

City councils exercise their authority through by-laws which are the legislative instrument of civic government. The power to pass by-laws comes from the relevant provincial statutes, depending upon the particular issue which the by-law addresses. For example, the city's jurisdiction over the control of traffic, parking, and similar motor-vehicle-related matters in the city usually is derived from a provincial Act covering the field of highway traffic; the city's powers of expropriation are usually contained in a provincial Act which sets out the broad range of powers and responsibilities of municipalities generally. Those powers and responsibilities which are not specifically set out in the Municipal Acts are covered in other provincial statutes. This sometimes leads to ambiguity about which statute is applicable in a given situation and makes for interesting litigation. As already indicated, in the three prairie provinces, the power to control and direct the development and use of land in the city comes either from the provincial Planning Act, or the provincial Act which incorporates the city.1

The two major instruments through which the city council guides and regulates the use and development of land are the long-range comprehensive development plan by-law - commonly referred to as the Master Plan, or General Plan, or Development Plan - and the Zoning By-law. The development plan embodies the long-range objectives for the development of the city and the policies for achieving those objectives. The zoning by-law is the administrative instrument of day-to-day development control, and embodies the regulations which must be complied with by all development and land-use in the city. Virtually every city also has a building by-law which specifies the standards which buildings must observe in their structure, fire safety, provision of

light and air, utilities and services, and all such items relating to the construction and functioning of the building. However, the uses to which the building and its site may be put, the location of the building on its site, its height and bulk, parking and loading arrangements, and all such matters relating to the development and use of the property (apart from the items covered by the building by-law), sometimes even the design of the building and the landscaping of the site, are controlled by the zoning by-law.

The development plan usually consists of a set of maps, charts, tables, texts, and other similar statistical, graphic, and written material which presents an idealized concept of what the city might look like in the future if all the premises on which it is based were to remain constant. It is a snap-shot of the city at some specified moment in the future: the time period of most development plans is twenty years. The plan commonly includes a discussion of the technical analysis upon which it is based, a statement of the policies and programs which will lead the city to the realization of its ideal, and perhaps some reference to costs. The picture of the future city which the development plan presents is drawn in terms of its physical nature - the area which the city will occupy, the street and transportation system, and sometimes the schools, police and fire stations which will be required to service it, the land-uses such as residential, commercial, industrial, recreational, etc., which will prevail in each of the various parts of the city. The analysis and projections, based on past and present trends, forecast the size of the future population, its age and sex distribution, the size of the labour force and type of employment, the number and types of dwellings, and similar statistical data. The policies adopted in the plan do not commit the council to direct initiatives for the improvement of the social or economic conditions in the city, or even to specific projects of physical development. Typically the policies of the development plan are expressed in the most general terms, without a time schedule or flow-chart for the achievement of any of the objectives. The implication is that the projected growth of

the city in accordance with the plan will bring with it an equivalent growth in its prosperity and the well-being of its populace.

The zoning by-law sets out a variety of land-use categories such as residential, commercial, industrial, etc., and a list of the uses which are permitted in each category, as well as the regulations which apply in each case. An integral part of the by-law is the zoning map which divides the city into a number of zoning districts and specifies which use-category is permitted in each district. All existing uses in the city should conform to the regulations of the zoning by-law, but provision is made for non-conforming uses. All applications for new development or uses or alterations to existing development or uses must comply with the requirements of the zoning by-law. And, in turn, the zoning by-law is intended to conform with and implement the objectives of the development plan.

The theory behind this dual mechanism is that the development plan sets the course for the city's development, and the zoning by-law ensures that all development and land-use stays on that course. The theory, as is not uncommon with theories in the realm of politics and government, does not always accord with the reality, and there is frequently a hiatus between the provisions of the zoning by-law and the long range objectives of the development plan. Nevertheless, conventional planning theory views the development plan as the embodiment of the council's policies for the long-range development of the city, and the zoning by-law as the means of implementing those policies.

## 2. Statutory Roles and Constraints

In order to understand the policy-making role of the city council, and, as a corollary, the council's relationship to the long-range development plan, it is important to understand the role of municipal government in the over-all order of government in Canada, and to understand, as well, the meaning of "policy" as that term applies to the legislation of municipal councils. A primary fact to be borne in mind is that all

municipal institutions, including the creation of municipal government itself, are the responsibility of the respective provincial governments. The structure of government in Canada was originally established under the <u>British North America Act</u> which in essence created only two levels of government - the federal and the provincial - and under Section 92 of the Act gave the provinces the responsibility for all municipal institutions.<sup>2</sup>

The British North America Act was passed by the British parliament in Westminster in 1867. It is the statute which served as Canada's constitution until 1982. In that year Canada "patriated" the constitution, that is, it replaced the BNA Act made in Westminster with the Constitution Act made in Ottawa, but the BNA Act was absorbed into the Canadian statute and continues to provide the basis of the new Canadian constitution. The BNA Act was devised in the light of the conditions which existed at that time. Canada was a colony of Britain; its economy was based mainly upon primary extractive industries; its society was mainly rural. The census of 1861 found that there were 3,299,633 people in Canada. Quebec had 1,111,566 people and Ontario 1,396,091. The biggest city was Montreal with 90,323, while Toronto had 44,821. Estimates for 1867, the year of confederation, indicate that Canada had grown in the six year interval to 3,463,000, Quebec to 1,123,000 and Ontario to 1,525,000. Montreal in that year is estimated to have had 102,254 inhabitants, and Toronto 52,710.3 Vancouver did not exist; it was a tiny hamlet called Granville. Winnipeg had not yet been incorporated; it was a settlement of not much more than 100 people known as the Red River Colony. The automobile had not yet been invented; neither had the electric elevator. How could there have been a concern for the city when there was no city to be concerned about? The pressing issues of the time were not urban issues and the political powers which Westminster was attempting to reconcile were not municipal. It would have been quite impossible for the British North America Act to have been cast in terms of urban issues or indeed to have recognized the city as a level of government with any

political status meriting its own place in the constitutional structure. British colonial policy was concerned with affairs at the level of the state, not with those of its components and particularly not with such rudimentary components as villages and hamlets. The provinces were given the responsibility for municipal institutions, and they created the municipalities to deal with purely local matters and with those residual affairs which were of no consequence or interest to the affairs of state.

From the beginning the provinces had only one overriding purpose in creating municipal governments, and that was to relieve the province of the responsibility for providing municipal services throughout the length and breadth of the provincial jurisdiction. Far better to place that responsibility in the hands of a local authority on the spot and leave the provincial government free to attend to more important issues of wider provincial import. But municipal services are sewer and water systems, and roads, and garbage pick-up, and snow-clearing and similar items. They are services directly to land, and through the land indirectly to people. Most of these services, particularly on the prairies, can be provided on an ad hoc basis, as the need arises, and require few if any initiatives of a policy nature. And in Canada, particularly on the prairies, municipalities did not experience the major impact of the urban explosion until after 1945, so that until the period of post-war urbanization municipal government was essentially an administrative rather than a policy-making activity. That cast of mind, imprinted on municipal councils from the beginning of municipal government, seems to have persisted until the present, and municipal planning has taken the form of the control of the use of land and of building construction through the administration of the zoning by-law and the building by-law, and the regulation of the subdivision of land, rather than the formulation and implementation of long-range development policies.

But the problems of the city are no longer merely the simple housekeeping problems of a century ago; they are no longer merely the problems of providing

municipal services to property. Certainly the problem of services has remained and has become more intense with the growth of demand by a rapidly increasing population. But a whole new generation of problems has emerged. Since the British North America Act was first established as Canada's constitution profound changes have occurred in Canadian society. Among the most significant has been the growth of the population and its place of dwelling. In 1871, five years after Confederation, there were 3,689,000 people in Canada. Of these, about 18 per cent, or some 675,000 lived in centres of 5000 or more people. There were only 38 such places; only one - Montreal - had more than 100,000, and it had barely more than that number. In 1986 the population of Canada was 25,309,330. Of these nearly 20 million - almost 80% - lived in centres of 5000 or more people; over 15 million, or nearly 60 per cent of all Canadians, lived in census metropolitan areas of over 100,000 people, and there were 28 such metropolises.4

With the enormous increase in the size and number of metropolitan centres there has been a corresponding decrease in the size of the rural population. The population of Canada has virtually moved from the countryside into the city. This great shift of the population has created severe pressures for the development of land and the provision of services. More than that it has shifted the focus of national economic and social dynamism into the major urban centres. The cities are now the place where most of us live and work, where most of our material wealth is produced; where most of our ideas and beliefs are created; where most of our aspirations are pursued.

With the cities' new roles as regional and national economic generators, the economic problems which beset us both regionally and nationally have an intimate interrelationship with the the economy of our major population centres. When the economy of the metropolis is in trouble, the effect is felt throughout its entire regional hinterland, and even throughout the nation. And reciprocally, when national economic vitality declines the effect is felt in the very marrow of urban life.<sup>5</sup>

Economic problems have their correlative social problems. So have physical and environmental problems. Poverty, unemployment, alienation, disorientation, loss of personal identity, apathy, hostility, tension, crime, drug abuse, harassment, are some of the personal and social illnesses from which the inhabitants of the city suffer. There are also great difficulties in transportation, housing, environmental pollution, urban blight, congestion; and we are profoundly disturbed by doubts about the validity of our values and aspirations both as a society and as individuals. Many of these problems have always beset mankind. But in the metropolis of our industrial-technological society they have assumed a character and dimension which did not exist before and which in effect makes them a new species of problem. The fact that they are now referred to as "urban" problems is an indication of their identification with the city in a way which did not occur in our agrarian past and which, indeed, could not have occurred.

The people of the city identify with these problems because the city is the milieu in which they experience the problems directly. They are poor in the city, they are unemployed in the city, they are alone in the city, they feel powerless in the city against the overwhelming forces of the anonymous and hostile "they" whom they sense to be the men who wield political and economic power in the city. And yet they cannot seek solutions to these problems in the city council because the city government has little authority in these matters. These issues have little to do with housekeeping and the provision of local services to property. For the most part they are issues which can only be dealt with at the level of social and economic policy, and the responsibility for such policy still rests with the federal and provincial governments.

This is perhaps the most intractable aspect of the urban municipal dilemma. The governments which have the power to deal with the problems of the cities are farthest removed from the cities and have the least political sensitivity to them. Each level of government has a genuine interest in city problems, but the constraints of the constitution not merely limit the nature and extent of their involvement but even

determine the way in which each one views the problems. As a result there is an ambiguity of jurisdiction and role over every urban issue, and no level of government has a clear mandate to attack the fundamental causes of urban malaise on its own authority and initiative.

The federal government understandably sees the problems of housing, for example, from the point of view of its own particular policy agenda, so it approaches the question of housing from that particular direction. It is responsible for the equalization of regional disparities in our federal system, so the cities are seen from the viewpoint of their potential for the achievement of those goals. But the federal government must conscientiously avoid becoming directly involved in the affairs of the cities because under the constitution that is the jurisdiction of the provincial governments. This statutory constraint however does not prevent the federal government, in seeking to carry out its own policies, from initiating a wide variety of city-oriented programs. Such programs must necessarily be indirect in their route to the cities, and cannot be designed to meet the specific local idiosyncratic needs of any particular city except through very special one-shot ad-hoc arrangements involving the province as well as the city. For these reasons, federal urban programs are often controversial, and always cumbersome, slow to develop, difficult to implement, and only marginally effective. But beyond these reasons, the federal government's remoteness from the cities - physically. statutorily, bureaucratically, empathetically, and because its major priorities lie within other aspects of national life - makes it impossible for the federal government to have any real insight into the nature of the city and its needs, or to develop any appropriate basis for its urban programs.

The province still sees its role as the policy-making authority for the areas under its jurisdiction, including the cities, and still sees the city's role as merely that of housekeeping, and believes that the city has the statutory power and the financial capacity to deal with those responsibilities which the province has delegated to it and

which are its proper concern. Unfortunately the role in which the province has cast the city is no longer adequate for the task of running the city. Increasingly the traditional revenue sources of the municipal government such as the property tax and license fees are proving woefully inadequate to pay for the city's costs and are having to be supplemented by grants and other forms of financial assistance from the senior governments, particularly the province. The cities have neither the statutory powers nor the financial resources to cope with the demands of city government, and it seems unlikely that the provinces will readily agree to convey to them a greater measure of either because that would crack the mold of the traditional constitutional structure, and perhaps more importantly, would diminish the province's own political power and financial capacity.

Most city councils also still see their role as merely housekeeping, providing the traditional municipal services. The changes which have occurred in our urban centres have been so rapid and profound that not only have our political and social institutions been unable to adjust to them but even our perception of the urban world has been bewildered and unable to keep pace. Not many members of city councils understand the nature of the contemporary city; not many realize that the government of the city requires policies and programs of a kind which traditionally have not been the city's responsibility, and which the city still cannot undertake; not many perceive that the exasperation and disaffection of their constituents and their cynicism toward the political process in the city is simply the result of that hiatus between what needs to be done in the city and city council's ability to do it. Indeed the constituents themselves do not perceive the nature of the dilemma. There is among Canadians a deeply-rooted identification with the wilderness and the frontier - perhaps more so in western Canada than in central or eastern Canada - and a corresponding lack of empathy with the city. It is not surprising therefore that there is little understanding among them or their political representatives of the nature of the city and how it affects their daily lives, or

that there is no sense of urgency to change conditions so that the city can be made a more satisfactory place in which to live.

The traditional roles of the three levels of government have not left any real policy-making functions to the municipal level, even though there is often reference made to the policies of municipal councils. As a result, policy functions and administrative functions, are hopelessly confused in most municipalities, and few councillors recognize the difference between them. Councillors become intimately involved in administrative matters and they think they are dealing with policy. And the administration often becomes involved in policy matters because the council does not regard these matters (particularly if they are in the area of long-range development concepts) as of great political consequence. The frame of reference within which municipal government has functioned from the beginning makes it unlikely that a member of council will regard seriously any issues outside of housekeeping services and administrative management or to have a longer time horizon than the next municipal election.

# Physical and Social Planning - The Essential Differences

The fundamental responsibility of municipal government was from the outset the provision of municipal services to the municipal population, and the dominant presence of land (property) as the determinant element in the statutory and psychological structure of the municipal realm was expressed in the fixed perception of municipal planning as "land-use" or "physical" planning. This was a basic tenet in the ideology of the planning function from the time that the control of land-use emerged as an important concern of municipal government. Until 1945 the process of urbanization in Canada was slow enough not to exert any great pressure on the land-use control practice or to raise any serious questions about the nature of the planning function. Following the end of the war, however, Canada entered into the period often referred to as the "urban explosion", a period of unprecedented expansion of existing urban centres and the emergence of new

ones. The servicing and supply of land for this tidal wave of new urban dwellers became the paramount activity of municipal government, and the professions involved in this activity - engineers and architects - became important members of the municipal administration and the dominant presence in the city planning profession. Much the same phenomena were experienced in the United States.

But although most of the professionals in the planning discipline were "physical" planners whose field of concern was strictly the physical environment, there were among them some who were dismayed by the narrow focus of city planning on the physical aspects of the city and argued that urban life has a much broader context than merely the physical, and that social issues are even more significant for the urban dweller than the physical. There were, in the 1950's, few such dissidents in the planning profession, but one of the most powerful and compelling exponents of this view was Herbert Gans. Gans was an American sociologist-turned-planner whose writings, teachings, and advocacy were instrumental in introducing the sociological perception into the city planning ideology in that country. What distinguishes Gans as sociologistplanner from the architect-planner or the engineer-planner is that Gans identifies a different set of problems from the others as the critical issues affecting the city. The difference is that the architect-planner and the engineer-planner see the city in physical/visual and mechanical/functional terms, while Gans sees the city in terms of people, social groups, their interrelationships and the effect of these on the way people live:

Consequently I found myself in constant disagreement with the planners' basic assumption that the physical environment, man-made or natural, played a major role in peoples lives and that reshaping the environment was the most urgent priority for social action to achieve the good life. I was sceptical about the importance of such burning planning issues as whether strip-shopping (a series of stores on a street) was inferior to the shopping centre with adequate off-street parking, what the optimal size of the city ought to be,

and whether zoning ordinances should classify row houses with apartments or single family dwellings.

These questions were sometimes relevant to people, but they were usually less pressing than questions of job security, work satisfaction, adequate income, family life, the avoidance of social isolation, peace of mind, and upward and downward mobility.... In other words, the planners were enamoured of two environmental or physical fallacies: first that the physical environment was a major determinant of society and culture; and, second, that only an environment based on professional planning principles could deliver the good life.<sup>6</sup>

Gans doesn't believe either of these propositions. To him, as a sociologist, the physical environment is not a major determinant of society and culture, and the pursuit of physical planning principles cannot deliver the good life. The physical planners and the sociologist here stand diametrically opposed to each other on some pretty fundamental issues of urbanism. Yet each is an expert in the field of urbanism. How is it that they have these profound differences about matters that are common to their disciplines?

The reason for these differences is not too difficult to find. It lies in the fundamentally different subject matter, perceptions, and training in each of the disciplines. The architectural discipline is concerned with aesthetics - architecture as an art form - although the successful functioning of the artifact is also an important objective; the municipal engineer is concerned with services systems (sewer, water, transportation, etc.) and the most important part of that concern is the public cost of those services and the efficiency of their performance. The basic materials with which each of these disciplines deals are physical artifacts, and the training in each of these disciplines conditions the mind of the trainee to see his world in terms of these artifacts.

The architect or engineer turned city planner brings to his new vocation a consciousness of the city conditioned by his basic discipline. In the forefront of that consciousness is the perception of the city as an artifact to be designed on the drawing

board and to be shaped on the ground in accordance with that design. Gans criticizes the physical planners for their mistaken belief that the physical environment plays a major role in people's lives and that reshaping this environment is the most urgent priority for achieving the good life. But it is quite obvious that Gans' notion of the good life is not the same as that of the physical planners.

It may be that many physical planners do understand the term "the good life" in the same sense that the social planner understands it. But many understand it in quite a different sense. Many physical planners are more directly concerned with the way the city looks and functions as a constructed thing than they are with "the good life" for its residents. Put another way, they believe that the city built in accordance with their design - visually beautiful and functionally efficient - is itself "good"; that the life of such a city, as artifact, is a "good life," and the life of its residents will partake of "the good life" of the city. To most physical planners, items such as job security, adequate income, family life, social and economic mobility, etc. are not relevant to their concept of a well-designed city. They may recognize that these are indeed among the realities of life, but they are concerned with a different set of realities. The city council, bound as it is within the limits of the city planning mandate, and imprinted as it is with the longestablished perception that the role of the council is to provide land-related services, must perforce see city planning as "physical" planning. When the physical planner became a city planner in the years immediately following World War II, his view of the urban reality was very comfortably subsumed under the corresponding view of the council who employed him. It was a different view of the urban reality which was held by the sociologist turned city planner at that time.

The widely differing views of the urban reality may well raise the question "which one is right?" The answer of course is both, and neither. It is a question which is raised frequently in the debate about planning and which receives the same answer on each occasion. Seen from the perspective of the physical planner, the city is indeed a

physical artifact which must be respected if the city is to "work". Seen from the perspective of the socially concerned planner the city is a congeries of individuals and groups with their own characteristics and their own difficulties in their pursuit of their own vision of the good life.

The fact is, however, that city planning is part of the ethos-system of city government in America and in Canada, and social problems are not a compelling item on the consciousness or the agenda of city councils, nor indeed in terms of their statutory mandate. Moreover, the city government shares the prevailing dominant view of society that land is an economic commodity, bought and sold on the open market. The city planning system then is one of the institutional mechanisms of society's market economy, and the ethos which suffuses it, and the guiding principles and operational practices which it has developed grew out of and reflect the fact that it is such a mechanism of the market economy and is centrally concerned with land as an economic commodity. The professionals who were drawn into the city planning system were inevitably and necessarily those who were skilled in the enhancement, development and control of land as a commodity - architects and engineers, and land-use planners. Social problems are not economic commodities; they are not bought and sold on the open market. They lie in a different ethos-system of the total society. They generate their own ethos and their own principles and their own type of professional specialists. Social problems have no place in the structure of a land-market-driven city planning system, or in the conceptual realm of its professionals. Nor do they have any place, certainly not a place of high priority, on the agendas of the city council, or of great urgency in the perception of their roles by most councillors.

### 4. Policy and Administration - The Ambiguities

The responsibilities of some cities have since been expanded to include the improvement of social and economic conditions, but few initiatives have been taken in these areas. The reasons are not altogether those of inertia. The fact is that

municipalities do not have sufficient revenue resources which policies in these areas would require, nor the supporting statutory authority for enforcing or carrying out such activities. In these areas then the policy-making role still remains with the senior governments; the municipal councils remain administrative authorities dealing primarily with land-related issues.

In this circumstance it is not clear as to which decisions of the council must be considered as administrative decisions and which might properly be regarded as policy decisions. Some light is thrown on this issue by the 1976 report of the committee established to review the <u>City of Winnipea Act</u>.

There is of course considerable ambiguity about the nature of policy-making at the municipal level. Traditionally, at the municipal level, there could be little or no distinction made between policy and administration. The decisions of council were almost entirely directed to the solution of short-term problems by immediate action - action in which councillors themselves were often directly involved. True, certain priorities had to be decided upon from time to time, but these were usually of a fairly simple nature, such as determining the sequence of works, for example. And, although such decisions might properly be regarded as policy decisions, they hardly constitute long-term policy formulation of a sort or calibre that the modern urban community, faced with the need to design for itself a viable future, must formulate. The essential characteristics of a policy are that it is an expression of the social and developmental goals of the community. It is intended to guide and determine the community's present and future decisions on issues of long-range importance and it is to provide the guidelines for administrative programs and actions. Administration, on the other hand, refers to the specific actions and programs carried out in the daily routine of municipal functions, whose objective is to ensure that the business of government proceeds as smoothly and efficiently as possible and that the policies of the government are carried into effect, thus achieving the stated social and developmental goals. It is sometimes difficult, of course, even in the modern urban government situation, to distinguish easily between matters of policy and matters of administration. The line between the two, is, on occasion blurred and it becomes a matter of

interpretation as to whether a particular issue is one or the other ....<sup>7</sup>

In practice few councillors draw a distinction between their role as policymakers and their involvement in matters which are purely administrative. It's all one
to them. In truth most councillors are eager to be embroiled in administrative issues
because such issues are of immediate import and give the councillors involved a high
visibility in the eyes of their constituents. It is however of increasing importance to
draw a distinction between policy and administration because of the increasing
complexity of urban life and the increasing need for policies which will guide the
development of the city as it moves into the future through these complexities.
Theoretically, the comprehensive long-range development plan is the instrument which
sets out these policies and is the reference frame for their implementation.

Theoretically, too, the policies of the council are taken to represent the concensual views of the city's population. This notion is part of the general perception that in the democratic system, all governments, including city councils, are elected to represent the interests of the people. Our system, however, is not only democratic, it is also pluralistic: our cities contain a wide variety of interest groups, each expecting that its interests will be protected by the elected representatives. The concept of "the people" then becomes confused. At the city level of government the confusion is confounded by the fact that city government is not based on political parties with policy platforms. The interests of the electors therefore are not expressed in terms of specific policies identified with partisan candidates. The city council represents, not a homogeneous, concensual "people", nor even a coherent body of electors united in a common cause or by common political loyalties, but rather a great variety of individual constituents with widely assorted interests which are frequently opposed to one another. Much of the council's business therefore involves debate over the local, parochial impact of development issues.

## 5. The Long-Range Comprehensive Development Plan

It has become part of the conventional wisdom surrounding municipal government that city planning is the means which enables the council to deal rationally with all such issues which come before it, and to dispose of them in ways which will most benefit the city as a whole. This precept is based on the notion that the development plan embodies the policies which reflect the wishes of the people, and that its implementation therefore serves the best interests of the city as a whole. Any developmental issue which comes before council can, it is presumed, be dealt with in the context of its policies as stated in the plan, and its regulations as stated in the zoning bylaw. There is here a formal legal and conceptual structure within which all such concerns can be assessed and dealt with rationally and to the general benefit of the entire city.

The theory, as might be expected, has a number of very serious flaws. One of the most questionable aspects of the development plan is that it is based on long-term projections - commonly as far ahead as twenty years. No one can see that far ahead with any measure of accuracy. That in itself is a serious anomaly in the practice of long-range planning. But in the context of city planning it is even more anomalous. Long-term projections are not only unreliable, but perhaps even irrelevant as the basis for short-term development decisions, and urban development decisions are made in the context of the relatively short-term constraints and opportunities of the market. It is the activity in the market-driven private sector which energizes the council and evokes its most salient responses. Much of the council's time is spent in dealing with applications for approval of land development proposals or property-servicing demands which require immediate attention. Whatever long-term plans have been evolved by the private developer for his own purposes, nothing is revealed to the council until the developer is ready to move, and he wants to move as quickly as possible because delay costs him money. Moreover, every developer works independently and in secret so that

council is not aware of what applications or demands may come from which quarter, or how many it may have to deal with at any given moment. In these terms the work of the council is mainly reactive: it responds to the pressure of circumstance rather than takes initiatives; it is motivated by private sector developmental activity; it is *ad hoc*; and it is short-term oriented. Add to these factors affecting the nature of the council's work the further circumstances that in most Canadian cities the office of council member is not a full-time job paying a full-time salary, and that council members are elected for the shortest term of office of any level of government, and it may be seen as perhaps inevitable that the mentality of the council is set within the time-frame of the current, if not indeed of the immediate developmental reality rather than the long-term and hypothetical ideal.

There are other aspects of the long-range development plan which raise doubts about its usefulness. It is inherent in the legal structure of the planning system that the development plan must be adopted by council by-law if it is to have legal status and be enforceable. But the very nature of the comprehensive long-range development plan makes it necessary to couch the principles and goals of the plan in language much more generalized and vague than is customary in a legal instrument. One reason for this is that the plan is essentially a statement of the ideal, and it is difficult to cast ideas which are in the realm of aspiration in language which is appropriate to the realm of the law. On the other hand, the zoning by-law in its form and language, and intent, is clearly a legal instrument and it is understandable why in the overwhelming majority of cases of litigation over planning issues it is the zoning by-law and not the development plan which is involved.

Another reason for the vague, generalized nature of the development plan's statements of goals and intentions is because they address the future and the future is itself uncertain. Clearly no council can make firm commitments with respect to the achievement of general benevolent desires for the city, and the specific time of their

achievement, because in large measure these matters are affected by forces outside of the council's control. For example, the principle that everyone in the city should have decent, affordable housing is found in many development plans, but although a laudable sentiment on the part of the council, it is clearly beyond its capacity to achieve within its own jurisdiction. Moreover, the picture of the future city presented in the development plan is also formed out of the analyses and projections of the technical and professional planners with reference to such matters as the growth of the city's population, economy, traffic, etc., and these have rarely, if ever, proven to be accurate and reliable.

Apart from the fallibility of the analytical and predictive techniques, there is always the question of whether the goals for the city's development which are initially adopted in the development plan will still be as valid and desirable in twenty years time. In an era of increasing and rapid change which affects every aspect of society, notions of what are desirable goals are notoriously unstable. So are city planning principles. What may be fashionable ideas among city planners at the moment may well become obsolete and discarded during the time-span of the development plan. In recognition of these hazards, planning enabling legislation usually provides for a review of the development plan at stated intervals; commonly every five years. This affords an opportunity to revise and up-date the plan in whatever ways may be deemed necessary at that time. It can therefore be argued that the development plan is not a fixed, rigid blue print but a constantly evolving concept readily adaptable to changing circumstances.

Again, in theory that may be a valid argument, but in reality the practice is quite different. Development plans are not reviewed by council regularly and systematically. For the most part they are ignored by council until some major issue arises, which clearly represents a contravention of the plan by-law, at which time the usual practice is to pass an *ad hoc* amendment of the plan without a general review. Not uncommonly, with the passage of time which may extend over a decade or more without a review, the

circumstances of the city diverge so far from the assumptions and provisions of the original plan that the original plan has to be completely scrapped and a new one adopted to replace it.<sup>8</sup>

The city planning function is the responsibility of the city planning department of the civic administration. The planning department came into being as a formal component of the city's administrative structure during the same period which brought forth the development plan; both were adopted as measures intended to help the city cope with the "urban explosion" of the post-war period. While the planning department carries out the analyses and projections and formulates the concepts relating to the development of the city, it is, of course, the city council itself which makes the city's development policies and legislates its by-laws. The planning department, as with all the civic departments, must submit its findings and recommendations for council's consideration and disposal. The planning department's work is essentially technical in nature. It deals with the statistical data of demography, economics, employment, traffic, housing, etc. and its findings and conclusions are drawn from the technical evidence. But council's decisions on planning issues arise out of the planning process, which comprises very much more than merely the work of the planning department. Involved in the planning process are the interests and opinions of all of those elements in the city which feel that they are affected by a proposed development or a proposed by-law of the council, and the decisions of council are influenced by these various interests. There are at least four major streams of influence which intermingle in the planning process: the political, the economic, the administrative, and the technical is perhaps the least significant in determining the outcome of a planning issue.

All of these factors are at work simultaneously in the planning process, and all are acting upon and modifying each other. And they are not the only factors exerting pressure. The context within which they vie for primacy exerts a pressure of its own, and that context itself varies from community to community. For example, the context

of ideology or value system, and of social structure within which an apartment building is built in Moscow is different from that in Regina, or in Stockholm, or in Dallas. These differences will exert differential pressure on the configuration of the political, economic, administrative, technical, and other forces in the planning process. Whether the issue is a low rental apartment block or a luxury rental apartment block, or a condominium will also make a difference in the configuration of the various components. So will the proponents of the scheme - whether it is a private sector or a public sector initiative. So will the level of government directly concerned - local, provincial or national. An issue may affect only very limited local interests, such as, for example, a proposal for a curb-cut on a residential street, or it may have much wider ramifications, such as a scheme for a major central area redevelopment. In all of these instances the planning process flows within the channels set by the ideological, socioeconomic, and historical constraints of the society, but within those broad general constraints, the forces which produce the final planning decision are largely political and economic rather than technical and administrative.

Ultimately the decision rests on whose interests are affected by the issue, what interests they are, and how severely they are affected. Each issue will provoke the coalescence of interest groups either in support or in opposition. In our society the economic interest generally has precedence over other interests, although from time to time other interests will prevail. Illustrations of this can be drawn from virtually every city in the land. Winnipeg can serve as well as any other. Winnipeg's city council approved the construction of a large apartment block immediately adjacent to and overshadowing the historic Fort Garry Hotel in spite of loud protests by opposition groups with a historic and architectural concern. That approval was a decision in favour of the economic interests over those of aesthetics and heritage recognition. The construction of the National Research Council building on the old St. Paul's College site was one of pure and unmitigated political interest. The construction of the underground

pedestrian concourse at Portage and Main was a victory of the administrative interests over those of the pedestrian public, particularly those members of the pedestrian public who have a mobility handicap. In that instance it was the city's Streets and Traffic Division which exerted the decisive influence.

The interest groups which coalesce around planning issues will vary with the particular issue, and the groups whose interest will prevail will be those with the greatest political power. This does not necessarily mean the groups with the greatest economic power since not all planning issues affect the interests of the wealthiest groups in the city. Indeed the economic aspects of a particular planning issue may not in any way at all touch the economic interests of the city's economic elite. A proposal by the city to acquire the land and to develop a public park in a residential neighbourhood is not likely to be seen as adversely affecting the economic interests of the groups with economic power. On the other hand, a proposal to require all shopping centres to landscape their parking lots is likely to be seen by them as an economic threat. It can be taken as a general rule - perhaps even a firm rule - that where a planning issue seriously affects the economic interests of individuals or groups with economic power, they will mobilize the necessary political power for them to prevail. Among the forces which they will bring to their side may indeed be those of the technical expert witness. but such evidence will serve only the secondary purpose of supporting the probably unspoken but decisive underlying economic imperative.

Among those whose work disposes them to view city planning in technical or aesthetic terms rather than in terms of the exercise of power, there is the persuasion that greater technical knowledge and keener sensitivity to the natural and man-made environments are the key to making the city a better place for human habitation. Planners, architects, environmentalists, and others whose lives are spent in the milieu of their technical discipline come to see the problems, and the failings, and indeed the promise of the city in terms of their own technology. Technology is largely a matter of

knowledge, and the rational application of that knowledge to problem solving. The technical specialist accordingly tends to approach the solution of any problem from the direction of this formulation. No one can have any serious quarrel with such an approach. And the knowledge which is applied to the solution of problems is constantly being enlarged and refined. Here the technical approach is on solid ground. When it comes to the premise of rationality, however, and its place in problem solving, then it steps into quicksands. What is rational for one set of interests is folly for another. The technical facts in any case are only one set of facts. There are other sets of facts, and there are other influences beyond the realm of facts - values, prejudices, fears, aspirations, illusions, avarice, political debts - which press more heavily on the decision than do the technical facts.

Viewed from a particular perspective, the long range development plan may be seen as essentially a technical document. Certainly its analyses and projections are technical exercises, carried out by technical personnel, and the policies which it embodies are concordant with the development scenario set out in the technical sections of the plan. But, as already indicated, the planning process is more than a technical exercise. It is in fact an aspect of the political process, and in our society the political process is based on public involvement. The planning enabling legislation of the province requires that before a development plan can be established by by-law, public meetings must be held at which the development plan will be discussed and the members of the public can express their views. However, public participation in the process of establishing the development plan has nowhere been marked by large numbers of participants or animated debate. Perhaps this is because of scepticism about the technical projections of the plan, its lack of social and economic programs which would be of interest to most people, its emphasis on the general physical aspects of the city's new growth which is not seen to have a significant impact on existing development, but perhaps most of all because of the remoteness of its time horizon which removes the plan from the realm of immediate reality to the realm of never-never land as far as the ordinary citizen is concerned. It is not unknown, when a public meeting has been called to discuss the plan, in accordance with the statutory requirements, that the meeting has had to be cancelled because no one has turned up to attend.

The comprehensive, long-range development plan, then, is a very imperfect instrument for guiding the development of our cities. A more effective instrument could be devised but it would necessitate abandoning some of the established features of the development plan while retaining others as a basis on which to build the new model. For example, it is generally recognized that the long-range plan is based on assumptions and conditions which are constantly evolving and changing. That is why a five-year review is usually required. That requirement in itself is recognition of the fact that five years represents pretty well the outside limit within which projections and policies can have any validity. It would seem eminently sensible, therefore, to abandon the twenty-year time horizon and substitute a five-year period. And instead of merely a review at the end of five years, (a traditional requirement more honoured in its neglect than in its observance) the by-law which gives legal status to the plan should expire at the end of the five years and a new one should be required. This would ensure that the relationship between the plan and the reality of the city's development is constantly being monitored and adjusted.

Nor is it necessary for the development plan to be comprehensive in its scope. If it addressed only those matters which could be achieved within its five year life-span, and if it included specific projects to be carried out during that life-span, three desirable improvements might be achieved. One would be the avoidance of the anomalies and derelictions which are inherent in the long-range approach to planning, thereby perhaps giving the plan a greater measure of soundness and respectability. The second would be to provide a more appropriate and readily-usable framework for carrying out projects with an immediate tangible effect, which might, accordingly, command the

attention of the public and enlist its participation. The traditional broad general statements of long-range goals and aspirations need not be entirely abandoned but they should not constitute the sum and substance of the development plan, and the exercise of divining the long-range future should not occupy so much of the time of the planners, or so much of the material of the plan. And thirdly it might begin to impress upon the consciousness of the council the realization that there are city-wide issues with which they can deal effectively in terms of planning policies, because the very much shortened time horizon and the more specific and limited goals of the development plan would tend to bring the planning function into a context which is more meaningful to them.

In spite of its low profile in the daily give-and-take of the council's affairs, the development plan does serve a useful purpose. Without it the city planning function would revert to its atavistic form of simply a zoning by-law management bureaucracy. The city planning function in its present role provides a useful technical advisory resource for the council which would be lost without the broader planning purview. But, more important than that, the city council itself would be diminished as a government, because the development plan provides one of the few occasions for the council to rise to the level of a policy-making body instead of being merely a routine municipal services administration. Moreover, inadequate as it may be, the development plan does provide a potential frame of reference which can give a measure of consistency to the decisions of the council, and which can help the council arrive at its decisions. The fact that councils frequently, even habitually, overlook or ignore the tenets of the development plan diminishes the effectiveness, and indeed the validity of the city planning function.

The development plan in its current form, is not very effective in guiding urban development. In spite of pride in advanced technologies, it is doubtful whether control over the development of cities today is any greater than was that exercised by the civic power in earlier times. It can be argued persuasively that the control over the

development of the bastide or fortified city of medieval France, or the Renaissance city of Italy, or even the Georgian city of England, was at least equal to - perhaps even greater than - control over the development of the contemporary city. And it is very likely that in each of these historical periods those cities satisfied the expectations and values of their respective societies as effectively as the urban environments which we build today for our own society. Often obscured by the populist rhetoric of the politician and the technical jargon of the planner is the underlying fact that the conscious control of the development of our cities, as was that of those historical cities, is, and was, exercised on behalf of the dominant class in the society.

### 6. Class, Power and the Planning Process

The notion of "class" is as controversial among sociologists as the notion of "community". This is perhaps truer of American sociologists (and, therefore, by the familiar process of intellectual osmosis, of Canadian) than it is of European sociologists. Those who subscribe to the "stratification" theory argue that "class" is the basis of social structure; those who subscribe to the "pluralist" theory argue against the notion of "class" as a social reality. But even among the stratification theorists there is disagreement over what constitutes a class, what are its characteristics, how it functions as a social form, and particularly, how it exercises power. If it is true that the development of our cities is controlled by the dominant class in the society, that fact is of fundamental relevance to this dissertation since it goes to the very heart of the question of whether there is a distinctive communal ethos among the people of a city which finds expression in its planning and development, thereby distinguishing it from all other cities. It also raises the questions of which is the dominant class, how does it control the development of the city, what goals does it pursue in exercising that control?

There is a very extensive literature on the subject of "class", going back at least as far as Plato.<sup>9</sup> A review of the full sweep of the writing - even a cursory review - is beyond the scope of this discussion, and would in any case not contribute significantly to

the central theme. Some reference to the salient ideas in sociological thought, however, may be useful in helping to distinguish more clearly the influences - those of a "communal mind and outlook," a dominant class, a power elite - which control the development of the city. Terry Clark, in his <u>Community Structure and Decision Making</u> identifies one of the basic conceptual difficulties in the debate over the issue of class:

Status and power probably have been the two values most often confused in community studies. Such is the case where two, three, or seven "classes" are reported in a community. While it is clear from the research procedures that it was primarily prestige or status that was investigated, such results have occasionally been interpreted as implying that power is differentially stratified among two, three, or X "classes" in the community.

Confusion on this particular point is due partly to the differing uses of the term "class". Marx and Weber generally used the term to refer to stratification in terms of power, primarily in an economic sense. In contrast, most contemporary American sociologists use class to refer to stratification in terms of prestige or honor.<sup>10</sup>

The notion that American society is free of a permanent rigid class structure, and that political and social power is independent of economic power, is quite common in American sociological and political writing. It is rooted in the American mythology that America is a free, open, egalitarian society in which everyone has equal opportunity for the good life, regardless of race, colour, creed, or class, in which indeed, the economic class that one happens to be in is irrelevant in terms of access to power and therefore to life-chances. This notion is pervasive in the American ethos. In the field of sociology it is represented by the "pluralist" school, one of whose most prominent advocates is Nelson Polsby. Writing in his Community Power and Political Theory, Polsby says

The first and perhaps most basic presupposition of the pluralist approach is that nothing categorical can be assumed about power in any community. It rejects the stratification thesis that *some* group necessarily dominates a community ....

Pluralism holds that power may be tied to issues, and issues can be fleeting or persistent, provoking coalitions among interested groups and citizens ranging in their duration from momentary to semi-permanent.<sup>1</sup>

On the other side of the argument is the "stratification" school of which Floyd Hunter's book <u>Community Power Structure</u> is regarded as the seminal work, and Hunter as the representative spokesman. But even in the stratification school, as Clark points out, the phenomenon of "class" is variously addressed in terms of status or prestige, rather than power, although among them there are, of course, those who argue that the economic power is the basis of class power.

Canadians are perhaps more forthright in expressing their views about the class structure of Canadian society and the realities of power. Peter McGahan, in his <u>Urban Sociology in Canada</u> argues that the spatial and social forms of the urban system are influenced by the way in which power is distributed and exercised - a fact which is generally neglected in classic American urban theory. Moreover, McGahan, in what is a fairly rare perception in Canadian planning literature extends this view to urban planning, which, he says "frequently reflects and sustains the distribution of urban power and influence systems". 12

Urban planning and the systems of power and influence in Canada are even more closely integrated than McGahan indicates. Their relationship in effect is the inevitable relationship of mutuality which exists between any society and its institutions. City government is an institution created by Canadian society. Urban planning is a function of city government. Canada is a democratic capitalist society, and accordingly, urban planning is a function which is performed within the constraints and imperatives of the Canadian democratic capitalist system. That is simply to say that the ethos which prevails in urban planning is a reflection - an institutionalized expression - of the interests of wealth and power in our society. It couldn't be otherwise. The urban

planning function as a function of city government can no more ignore or contradict the values, and perceptions, and demands of the capitalist system of which it is an institution, than the council of the City of Calgary could want to declare itself the government of an independent revolutionary socialist republic.

Among the basic tenets of the capitalist ideology are the commitment to private enterprise in the free market, and the private ownership of land. It requires no great insight to realize that there is a fundamental contradiction between the principles of planning and the principles of a free market economy. Planning assumes that the future, if not predictable, is at least determinable by present actions; that the determined future can be realized by the controlled allocation of resources and the programming of development; and that the best interests of society as a whole can most effectively be served by regulating private rights so as to achieve the greatest public good. These assumptions are in contradistinction to those of the capitalist system which holds that the free play of forces in open competition in the market is the best way to determine the course of events, and that the best interests of the public are served by the resolution in the market place of the private competing interests, with the minimum of intervention or regulation by the public authority.

In the matter of the private ownership of land, again, the two ideologies are in sharp conflict. At the municipal level of planning the differences are particularly significant since municipal planning is virtually entirely devoted to the use and development of land. If a society views land as an economic commodity, and, therefore, as a private property to be bought and sold on the open market, and that public intervention in the land market as an owner or developer is a violation of a fundamental tenet in the society's ethos and may only be undertaken in exceptional circumstances, then the limits to municipal planning are quite obvious. The municipal government must avoid direct ownership and intervention in land planning as much as possible, and must restrict its role to regulating the private use and development of land at the minimum

level necessary for the safety, health and amenity of the general public. In these circumstances it becomes clear why the zoning by-law, which does precisely this, is regarded as the real planning instrument in our cities, rather than the long-range comprehensive development plan, which requires a degree of resource control, public land ownership, and public initiative and intervention fundamentally in violation of the basic tenets of our liberal democratic capitalist ideology.

All of the institutions of capitalist society are imbued with this ideology. City councils believe in it, and city planning departments as institutions of the city government believe in it. There are a few planners and members of city councils, and members of the public at large, and various social reformers, who do not, and who advocate public ownership of land and a more interventionist role for the city government, and their advocacy has had some small success in influencing minor modifications in institutional attitudes and programs in this country. In general, however, our city councils function within the capitalist ethos and our institutions such as the city planning departments perform their functions in accordance with the prevailing ideology and their place in the hierarchical structure of our governing institutions.

Every society has a hierarchical structure of some description. Even in the Soviet Union, which was ideologically committed to the precept of a classless society, a rigid hierarchical structure still prevailed some seventy years after the revolution of the proletariat; the Czar and his court were replaced by the Politburo and the state bureaucracy. In every society the social structure is maintained by the exercise of some form of power. The nature of that power and the way it is exercised varies from society to society, depending on the myriad factors of history and culture which have gone into the making of that society. In some instances the cohesive force is the power of tradition and custom which maintains the social structure; in some it is the force of military and police oppression. In capitalist democracies it is economic power which drives the

wheels of the society and shapes its structure and its institutions. Political power is an adjunct of economic power although not every issue which arises in the daily life of a society requires the economic power to exercise its political muscle. But where the issue affects the interests of the economic power, the political power will invariably be invoked.

In the historic past the members of the ruling classes of the countries of Europe were known by name throughout the entire nation which they dominated. Indeed they were known throughout the whole of Europe and beyond. They were royalty, and the nobility, and princes of the church, and ministers of the government, and commanders of the armed forces, and great landowners, and merchants, and financiers, and industrialists. They were linked by family ties and by heritage, and by business enterprises, and by political ambitions and intrigues, and they shared an overweening sense of their special place in the universe. They were a small closely integrated hegemony and they exercised their power to safeguard and perpetuate their class interest. But the members of that class were real individuals, with their own names and their own personal identity, and they were seen and known as such. Nor was there any doubt in anyone's mind about the identity of the class to which these individuals belonged or the power which that class wielded.

In the contemporary world of democratic capitalism the multinational corporation has become the seat of economic power. But it is a faceless and impersonal presence wherever it operates. The corporate name, of course, is well known and instantly recognized. The buildings in which it employs the local population in greater or lesser numbers also are part of the familiar local urban landscape. But the business corporation is not a human being with a face and a personal identity. It is a creature made up of capital assets, and anonymous shareholders, and a remote board of directors, and a hired workforce all pursuing a single objective - the production of a product which will be sold at a profit in the far-flung markets of the world. The power which the

multinational corporation exercises is as unseen as the faces of those who exercise it, but its impact, not only on the economy of a nation, but on its politics, and even on its culture, is as dominant as was that of the "ruling class" in other times.

But do business corporations comprise a "ruling class" in the same sense? There seems to be something anomalous in the notion of a business organization as a member of the "ruling class" of a country. A business corporation has only a corporate identity. It operates in many countries with the same identity and presence. It has no particular national allegiance or sentiments. It is not a seated member of any national government. It is driven by a single, narrow economic motivation and responds (apart from the laws of the incorporating nation) only to the imperatives of the international market. Moreover, there are a bewildering number and variety of business corporations of varying sizes producing an enormous range of goods and services, although they do not all operate in the same market. Where markets are shared, or where corporations seek to move into new markets, all are pitted against each other in relentless competition, although collusion for mutually beneficial ends is not uncommon. In many instances, where a multinational corporation operates in a given market, its head-office and power base is located in a foreign country. How can a depersonalized, largely anonymous, narrowly focused, internationally oriented, foreign-based organization be a member of the "ruling class" in any particular country?

Part of the answer may be found in the way industrial capitalism has affected the economic and political structure of the world. Much of the world is now economically interdependent, and economic affluence has become the beatitude quested by the nations. The holy grail has been replaced by the cornucopia. The lure of investment has made the multinational corporation welcome in every corner of the globe. Moscow now has its Macdonalds and Beijing has its Coca-Cola vendors. The infusion of large amounts of development capital into the economy of a nation has the potential to create much needed employment, to produce eagerly desired consumer goods, to generate new capital, to

raise incomes and living standards. But the impact of the huge investments cannot be confined within the limits of the economy. For these much sought-after economic benefits the host country must offer something in return to the multinational corporation. It must ensure the conditions which will yield a profit to the corporation, otherwise the corporation will not invest. This has enormous political implications. It means in essence that the government of the host country must pledge its political power to support the economic interests of the corporation. It is true that the government's support also serves the interests of the nation, but it is also true that the economic power of the corporation is exercised over the political power of the country. In the capitalist democracies this symbiosis between economic and political power is a natural one because the ideology of the capitalist system is shared by business corporations whether multinational, national, or local - and governments alike. Thus it is that although the business corporations do not have a seat in the government, and may even have their headquarters in a foreign land, and may even be competing with each other individually, the exercise of political power by the government is consistent with the dominant economic interests in the society, that is, the interests of the business corporations as a "class."

Part of the answer may also be found in the way we think about "class". There is a conceptual issue involved in the argument over whether or not classes exist.

Sociologists on both sides of the debate, in both America and Europe, have tended to reify the idea, to think of socio-economic classes as real things with clearly visible surfaces separating the one class from the other, like a layer cake, and everyone in the society fitting into one layer or another on the basis of certain characteristics. Those who argue that there are no classes, and therefore no class structure or power, rest their case on studies of many communities in which they have found no rigid, permanent social stratification. They were looking for evidence of a firm set of layers in the communities, analogous to the strata of the earth's crust as revealed by geologists, and of

course they couldn't find any such evidence. They couldn't find any because "classes" in society do not exist in that form, and do not have that kind of material reality. The phenomena of classes are nevertheless real and do exist in every society, but in a different form from the reified concept of the sociological debate.

One of the most penetrating and illuminating perceptions of the nature of "class" is that held by E.P. Thompson, who discusses the matter in various writings. In <u>The Poverty of Theory</u> Thompson writes:

Sociologists who have stopped the time-machine and, with a good deal of conceptual huffing and puffing, have gone down to the engine room to look, tell us that nowhere at all have they been able to locate and classify a class. They can find a multitude of people with different occupations, incomes, status-hierarchies, and the rest. Of course they are right, since class is not this or that part of the machine, but the way it works once it is set in motion - not this interest or that interest, but the friction of interest - the movement itself, the heat, the thundering noise. Class is a social and cultural formation (often finding institutional expression) which cannot be defined abstractly, or in isolation, but only in terms of relationship with other classes; and ultimately the definition can only be made in the medium of time that is, action and reaction, change and conflict. When we speak of a class we are thinking of a very loosely defined body of people who share the same categories of interests, social disposition to behave as a class, to define themselves in their actions and in their consciousness in relation to other groups of people in class ways.

But class itself is not a thing, it is a happening. 13

For Thompson, then, "class-as-identity is metaphor, helpful at times in describing a flux of relationships" 14 rather than a thing which has its own identity with fixed and measurable dimensions. The phenomena of class only become manifest over a period of time, and can only be perceived on those occasions which provoke the open display of pervasive conflict among vested interests, and those occasions are rare and transient. Thompson here is speaking of those occasions when all the governing institutions of a nation act in concert to safeguard or establish the common interests of

the ruling class as a whole. Such occasions are indeed rare. The interests of the ruling class are not always common and unified but are frequently riven by regional and sectoral differences. This is particularly so in Canada where there is a historic resentment and hostility in the western region against Ontario and Quebec.

Nevertheless, even in Canada the occasion does arise from time to time when the governing institutions unite with the economic power of business on a national scale to achieve a common objective. Such an occasion was the federal election of November 21, 1988, when the federal government (and some provincial governments) and the national and international business interests acted together in a massive campaign to re-elect the Conservatives on the Free Trade issue. More frequent are the occasions when regional issues pit the government and business interests of one region against those of another. The National Energy Policy of the Trudeau government during the late 1970's was such an occasion, which pitted the federal government and the provincial governments and business of Central Canada against those of Alberta.

As one narrows one's field of observation to focus on areas of lesser physical extent and political jurisdiction, the frequency of collisions increases. The confrontations between environmentalists and resource-exploiting corporations, for example, has become endemic; the conflict between the native Indians and government institutions is unrelenting; the struggle of resource-based communities for survival in the face of an exhausted resource and the withdrawal of the extractive enterprise is a common occasion in Canada; the clash of labour unions and industry, and the strikes of the labour force against its employers is part of our way of life. All of these are instances and occasions when the power of the dominant economic class supported by the governing institutions is exercised against an inferior economic and political power. It is true that the antagonists in each of these instances represent a different set of interests. A logging company does not mine coal; environmentalists are not packing-plant employees; Indians are not postal workers.

On the face of it, each of these occasions and each set of antagonists might appear to have little in common with any of the others. But if one observes the behaviour of these and other sets of actors over time and on different occasions, one sees a recurring pattern which runs through them all and links them together. In each case there clearly emerges a group which wields the dominant economic and political power, and it wields that power for the purpose of safeguarding and perpetuating its vested interests. And even though the specifics of those interests are different in each case - McMillan and Bloedel's interest in a logging road to a stand of virgin timber in British Columbia, for example, is of no interest to IBM in Toronto - the general underlying interest is the same, namely the preservation of economic and political power and privilege. There also emerges another group with a different set of common interests even though the specific objectives of its constituents also differ from one another. Their common interests are to improve their living conditions and to better their life-chances. The differences in the values, objectives, patterns of behaviour between the two groups, as manifested over time and on the various occasions of overt conflict, is what identifies "class" - the dominant or ruling "class" and the "classes" which are dominated or ruled.

In the city the circumstances are different from those in the nation and in the region, and even in the lesser areas of conflicting interests. In the city, evidence of the dominant power is manifested not only occasionally, but continuously; it is not transient, but permanent; it is not inferential but direct; it is not circumstantial but material. It is manifested in the built environment of the city which is a permanent, material display of the dominant power of the business interests in the city. It is manifested in the skyscrapers which dominate the skyline and which house the business corporations; in the factories which house their industries; in the shops of the city's retailing businesses and in the goods which are sold in the shops; in the apartments and houses which are constructed and marketed like any other commodity by the development corporations. The city for the most part is built by business, and the governing

institutions of the city for the most part act in the interests of business. When a conflict arises between the interests of business and those of a group which counter or threaten those interests, it is very rarely that the decisions of the governing institutions are not on the side of business. In part this is due to the fact that in most instances the opposing group does not have the financial or political power to succeed against the business forces. In the greater part, however, it is because the prevailing ethos of our democratic capitalist society accords the highest esteem to economic values, and the governing institutions and the business corporations are as one in that view of the world. It is in fact the view of the world which became entrenched following the turbulent events of the year 1848, as touched on in the preceding chapter. It is the view of the world which eschews the philosophical doctrine of egalitarianism as contingent upon the re-structuring of society. It is the view which sees the capitalist system as the proper, indeed the inevitable form of the social order; which holds that social and economic inequities are functional rather than systemic; which regards city planning as a "scientific" technique for correcting the dysfunctions of the city; which closes its eyes to the realities of socio-economic classes but whose votaries are quick to perceive very clearly where their collective interests lie, and to react very quickly when they are threatened.

If one accepts Thompson's concept of "class", and if one moves along the path of its implications, paying heed to his directions, one can arrive at a clearer understanding of how the business corporations, not as individual entities, but as a general collectivity, not as the besashed and bemedalled prototypes of a hegemonic elite, but as a grey eminence, can exercise power; how the business corporations, although they have none of the attributes of the traditional indigenous ruling class, nevertheless can be the dominant group in a nation or a city and perform the role of a "ruling class".

Charles E. Lindblom, economist, author and educator, early in his career was an advocate of the "pluralist" view of the American socio-political and economic system. In

1977, however, he wrote <u>Politics and Markets</u> in which he departs from his earlier pluralist position and recognizes that in America, indeed in all democratic liberal capitalist (i.e. market-oriented) societies, not all groups are equal. He identifies specifically, and discusses at some length, the privileged position of business.

Not a myth but a misunderstanding is the common view of how liberal democratic government works. Except for some analysis of interest groups, democratic theory makes no place for the business enterprise. In American law the corporation is a "person"; and in all the democratic market-oriented systems, corporations and other business enterprises enter into politics. Their needs and preferences are communicated to lawmakers no less urgently than those of citizens. But these fictitious persons are taller and richer than the rest of us and have rights that we do not have. Their political impact differs from and dwarfs that of the ordinary citizen. Clearly democratic theory needs to be extended to take account of what we will call the privileged position of business. 15

Lindblom recognizes that in market-oriented systems the business sector is motivated by more than simply the sales of its goods and services. "What is required," he says, "is a set of governmentally provided inducements in the form of market and political benefits". 16 The inducements which businessmen need as a condition for performing the tasks which the market system assigns to them are income and wealth, deference, prestige, influence, power and authority. He might have added that they are also tax concessions, grants of money, and of land, bail-outs of failing investments, favourable legislation in such field as labour-relations, environmental pollution, the burden of social welfare responsibility. They also include ready and direct access to the seats of government authority. Indeed, in many instances, particularly in the United States, businessmen are appointed to leading positions in some of the most crucial institutions in the government, such as the President's cabinet. In this circumstance, the government is in effect a two-fold government: on the one hand the government elected by the political process, on the other hand the complementary government vested

in the business sector by the market-orientation of the economy and the economic ideology.

But the privileges accorded the business sector are of course not gratuitous.

Business in the market-oriented economy has a very heavy responsibility. It decides the nation's industrial technology, the pattern of work organization, location of industry, market structure, resource allocation, investment strategies, labour-force composition and magnitude, and even determines the direction of foreign policy. The elected government must therefore be extremely sensitive to the needs of business and do everything it can to ensure its success. There must accordingly be a very close linkage between these two components of government authority. Lindblom puts it this way:

Any government official who understands the requirements of his position and the responsibilities that market-oriented systems throw on businessmen will therefore grant them a privileged position. He does not have to be bribed, duped, or pressured to do so. Nor does he have to be an uncritical admirer of businessmen to do so. He simply understands, as is plain to see, that public affairs in market-oriented systems are in the hands of two groups of leaders, government and business, who must collaborate and that to make the system work government leadership must often defer to business leadership. Collaboration and deference between the two are at the heart of politics in such systems. Businessmen cannot be left knocking at the doors of the political system, they must be invited in...

Thus politics in market-oriented systems takes a peculiar turn, one largely ignored in conventional political science. To understand the peculiar character of politics in market-oriented systems requires, however, no conspiracy theory of politics, no theory of common social origins uniting government and business officials, no crude allegation of a power elite established by clandestine forces. Business simply needs inducements, hence a privileged position in government and politics if it is to do its job.<sup>17</sup>

Lindblom is discussing the politics of market-oriented systems in general. But the archetypical market-oriented liberal capitalist democracy is the United States, and, as with many American writers, Lindblom, although writing about market-oriented

systems in general, undoubtedly has the United States model before him. We Canadians, inundated and suffused as we are with American culture, often regard American ideas, and sounds and images as our own, even though they may have only a remote relevance for us. In this case, however, Lindblom's discussion is relevant to the Canadian situation, as indeed it is to the system of liberal capitalist democracy throughout the western world. Lindblom is right in his observation that it does not require any conspiracy theory nor allegations of a power elite established by clandestine forces to explain the politics of the market-oriented society, although conspiracies and clandestine machinations undoubtedly do go on,<sup>18</sup> and powerful linkages between the memberships of corporate boards of directors, government and the members of wealthy, elite families have been demonstrated in a variety of studies.<sup>19</sup>

On the other hand, contrary to Lindblom's contention, the relationship between government and business is not simply that of a pragmatic arrangement negotiated like a business deal. The successful functioning of the system is not simply a matter of the government accommodating itself to the needs of business on the basis of a calculated self-interest in which concessions to the latter are on the bargaining table in return for assurance that the state will continue to function. Business is just as committed to the continuation of the state as is government; and government is just as committed to the continuation of business as is business itself. The system is quite readily and persuasively understood in terms of a common ideology and common values held by both government and business. Their interests are essentially the same, and they depart from one another only on those occasions when that common interest is critically at variance with the interest of a significant group of electors whose dissatisfaction represents a potential threat to the government's retention of office.

#### 7. The Business Ethos, Community Values and the Built Environment

The liberal democratic capitalist ethos is not limited to the institutions of government and the businessman, but is pervasive throughout the entire society. True,

not everyone in the market-oriented society believes in the capitalist ideology. There are always dissidents and non-believers, even in the United States, just as there were dissidents from the communist ideology in the communist societies. But that doesn't mean that the ideology is not pervasive. As with any social phenomena, recognition of its presence does not require and may not even be amenable to precise statistical confirmation. In many instances extremely significant social phenomena exist simply as directional pressures or limiting tendencies rather than discreet reified entities which can be frozen in time and counted by a computer. That does not mean that they are not there. Nor does the occurrence of numerous anomalies and exceptions deny their suffusion throughout society nor diminish the force of their impact.

If the ethos of industrial capitalism is the credo of the nation, and the values of the business corporations are also those of the governing institutions, including those of the city, and if there is any validity in the notion that community values are expressed in the planning and development of the city, then one might reasonably except to find that the city reflects the self-image of the business world. And if the values of the business world are virtually the same throughout the society, then one might also reasonably expect to find that all the cities are very much like one another. And, at first sight this certainly seems to be the case.<sup>20</sup>

The structure of the city reflects fairly faithfully the structure of its land values. In each of Winnipeg, Regina, and Calgary the dominant presence in the central area is the skyscraper office towers of the business corporations. Also typically present are what are referred to in the current jargon of the advertising agencies as the "up scale" retail establishments; hotels to accommodate the business traveller; restaurants, bars, places of entertainment; and apartment buildings occupied by residents who prefer to live near the downtown "action," or who are only temporarily resident in the city. This central area, the heart of the city, is customarily identified by the appropriate name of "the central business district". Adjacent to the central business district is an

enclave of poorer quality residences and businesses, and even slums. And beyond these are the wealthier residential neighbourhoods. The automobile is ubiquitous, and the street system is designed to carry the optimum flow of automobile traffic, particularly in its linkage of the residential suburbs with the central business district.

What makes the resemblance among the cities seem even stronger is their architecture. It is probably inevitable that skyscrapers should look very much alike. How else can a very tall building look, other than very tall? The shape of these buildings is determined by their structural requirements, by the shape and dimensions of the site, and by the ratio of the revenue-producing to the non-revenue producing floor areas. Located on central area land which is very expensive, the site is relatively small, and in order to carry all the costs of the development the building must have a commensurately large revenue-producing floor area which extends the structure upward rather than sideways. Finishing materials vary, but only within a fairly limited range, and in any case it is the height and shape of the building which catches the eye and makes the impression on the mind.

Much the same is true not only of skyscrapers but of most large buildings, even of lesser height. In an age when factory-produced building products are vigorously marketed around the world, and building technology is constantly transferred across all boundaries, and the aesthetics of architectural design are derived from the internationally familiar building materials and construction techniques rather than from the traditions of the national culture, it is not surprising that the headquarters building of the Bank of Hong Kong, in Hong Kong, for example, and the John Hancock building in Chicago have no features by which their national origins can be identified or distinguished from one another. Moreover, fadism in architectural style is as strongly compulsive as fashion is in ladies' clothes.<sup>21</sup> If a building is produced which enjoys some celebrity in the architectural world, and that building has some distinctive element such as, for example, a cladding of reflective glass, then one can be quite confident that

there soon will follow a rash of mirrored-glass-faced buildings all over the country and beyond. If Seattle builds a tower with a revolving restaurant perched on it at the top, then Toronto must have one too, and so must Calgary; and Winnipeg, somewhat less demonstrative and adventuresome, puts a revolving restaurant modestly and securely on the top of an apartment building. Small wonder then if the three cities of the Canadian prairie region leave the observer with the impression that they are all very much the same.

The residential neighbourhoods of the prairie cities leave the observer with the same impression of likeness as do the central areas. Here the impression is created by the dominance of the detached single family dwelling, positioned on its site by zoning regulations which are very much the same in all the cities, fronting on a street of a standard width whose verges are treed and grassed in a standardized pattern of landscaping. The structure of the houses is invariably wood-frame, and the finishing material is predominantly wood or stucco with an admixture of brick or stone. Contributing to the sense of deja vue is the practice of tract development in which extensive residential neighbourhoods are built by a developer using only a limited number of house plans. In order to create the impression of variety the developer resorts to an assortment of devices such as "handing" the plan, or varying the finishes on the standard structure, but these gimmicks rarely conceal the underlying monotony of the development. This is a common practice in all prairie cities, and the same developers often operate in several cities. The major component of the housing stock is built for the middle-income market which comprises the largest sector of the population. This housing is accordingly the most visible, which probably contributes significantly to the strong impression it makes on the observer. Upper income houses are perhaps more varied but even in this sector there is little to distinguish those in the three prairie cities from one another.

Musing over these aspects of the city one is led unavoidably to the strong suspicion that it is the market which determines the structure and appearance of the urban environment despite the controls of the city planning process and despite the suppositions and the reasoning of a great many urban theorists. There is at the heart of a large part of planning theory the notion that the city planning process is a process of rational decision-making, and that the creation of the optimal environment is possible on the basis of the right decisions flowing from the appropriate and necessary knowledge and that man can consciously build urban environment optimally to suit his needs.

The fact is, however, that our society is a market-driven society and it is the market which ultimately determines where and what kind of development will take place. In terms of housing, it is a market which the developers themselves create, or at any rate manipulate and persuade. Their motive is not to create an optimal fit between what they build and the people who occupy it, but to get a maximum financial return from their investment. But in pursuing that objective they cannot entirely ignore the requirements of the home buyers. Within the limits set by the bottom line of their financial statements the developers satisfy the buyers' housing requirements on the basis of their empirical knowledge of those requirements, gained through personal contact and hands-on experience in the market, as well as through the creation and manipulation of some of those needs by high-powered salesmanship and advertising and attractive gimmickry. Within the limits of a system which is profit-driven, massmarket oriented, entrepreneurially controlled, highly competitive, technologically rather than environmentally sensitive, with a market that has limited purchasing power which is drastically affected by fluctuations in interest rates, and is more interested in personal, familial, domestic, income, employment, recreation and entertainment matters than in the niceties of the physical environment, the notion of the goal of an "optimal" physical environment seems merely academic and even naive; and the notion of

the social goals of the people realized through the planning process seems equally illusory.

In the central business district the same forces are at work. The business corporations dominate that sector of the city, and the conscious control of development has as its objective the establishment of the corporate presence not the creation of an optimal environment. On occasion a corporation may give thought to the physical relationship of its building to its surroundings, but in the majority of cases their concern stops at the boundaries of its site. There is then only the conscious control of development by a multiplicity of private corporate owners on their own individual sites. Most planning departments attempt to co-ordinate this discordant development through zoning regulations and design control. But city planning departments and the councils which employ them work within the same system of values as the corporations. To realize the kind of "optimal" development contemplated in urban sociology and urban planning theory would require a revolution in the ethos of our society and the establishment of an entirely new set of values as the basis of development-control measures which undoubtedly would move the corporate world and the government institutions to exercise their most extreme powers to resist. One need only look at the downtown of any city to see the extent to which the market forces dominate the controls which the planning function exercises, or, put another way, the extent to which the planning function is an institution of, and reflects the ethos of the democratic capitalist system.<sup>22</sup>

But, as has been so eloquently expressed by Calvino,<sup>23</sup> a city is more than its buildings and its morphology. A myriad factors go into its making, and the city at any time bears the imprint of those factors which have fashioned it throughout its history, although the factors themselves have changed in nature and impact as the city has evolved. The dominant factors which shape the contemporary city seem to be economic and technological. Land values, markets, economic infrastructure, corporate investment

decisions, the technologies of communications, transportation, structures and materials appear to be the major influences. All of these reflect the world of post-industrial capitalism in which, the economists tell us,<sup>24</sup> we now find ourselves - a world which is shrinking to the dimensions of a "global village," and in which former unique cultural identities are being smudged into a universal sameness. The prairie ethos of the prairie society in the years before the first World War underwent a change in the inter-war years, and evolved further in the post-World War II era. Some of the salient aspects of this process of evolution are revealed in the regional literature, some in the buildings and morphology of the contemporary city.

Today the dominant "class" in the city is the business class, and it is the interests of this class which are the major influences on the nature and direction of the city's development. What then becomes of the "communal mind and outlook" which was noted earlier in this dissertation as a likely influence in the planning and development of the city? There may not be any necessary contradiction between the *communal* mind and outlook and the *business* mind and outlook. In fact they have a lot in common. It should be borne in mind that the life of all business corporations depends upon the sale of the goods and services which they offer on the market. If they cannot sell their products they perish. And it is the insatiable appetite of our society for goods and services which sustains the business world. There is then a mutuality of interest between the business community and society at large. It is not the individual business corporations themselves which are engaged in this liaison with the purchasing public, but business as a "class". If an individual corporation fails and disappears it makes little difference to the purchasing public because there are many other companies who supply the same goods and services.

It is true that the business corporations have substantial power to influence the market, to create demand for their products, to influence governments so as to obtain a variety of legal and financial advantages, even to be adopted as adulated icons in the

popular culture and to have their names or logos or symbols emblazoned on the bosoms and the backsides of garments proudly worn by millions, and their virtues regularly sung in raucous, assertive hymns of praise from millions of television screens. But all of this has only one purpose, and that is to sell the corporation's products. For that, business must woo the consumers, and the consumers are more than willing to be wooed. Ours is a society of consumers. The business corporations and the society at large have a basic common interest - the continued production of goods and services by business, and the continued willing, even eager, consumption of those goods and services by society.

Although the business ethos is dominant and pervasive in our society, and infuses our governing institutions, including those of the city, that does not mean that everyone in the society, or every member of every city council feels the same empathy with the business world. There are, of course, dissidents. The council of the City of Winnipeg, for example, at least since the General Strike of 1919, has always had a significant number of labour representatives, even counting communists among its members for a number of years. But there have never been enough dissidents to outvote the business interests. Since so much of city government is concerned with land-related issues, it was probably inevitable that real estate and land development items would dominate the council's agenda and consume much of the council's time, and that the business interests involved in these issues would evoke the sympathy and support of a majority of the council members.

The city councils of Regina and Calgary have also had their dissident members, but they have also been too few to have much effect on the decisions of the majority.<sup>25</sup> In all three cities, then, planning and development has mostly reflected the business ethos. In general terms, this has meant that new investment in high rise towers and shopping malls, and the outward expansion of new residential neighbourhoods on vacant land in the outlying reaches of the city have been more highly valued by the council and have been accorded priority of support over alternative social programs such as the

improvement of the housing and living conditions of the poor and the disadvantaged, or the preservation of the integrity of existing residential neighbourhoods, or even the maintenance and renewal of the city's existing services infrastructure. And, as has been suggested above, there is much in the physical appearance and organization of each of the three cities which resembles that of the others, and which seems to confirm this observation.

Are there, then, any fundamental differences among the three cities, as implied in the basic premise of this thesis, and if so what are those differences, where do they originate, and how do they express themselves in the planning and development of each city? If not, then what accounts for the perceived differences among them, because they are assuredly quite different from one another, as anyone can attest who is familiar with them. If these differences are not the expression of each city's unique historical and cultural personality but merely a reflection of the differences of size and urban economy, are such temporal factors sufficient in themselves to create a unique "communal mind and outlook" which will be embodied in the policies of the city council and manifested in the planning and development of the city? These questions are addressed in the following chapters.

#### **NOTES**

<sup>1</sup>The City of Winnipeg derives its planning powers from the <u>City of Winnipeg Act</u>, chapter 105, Statutes of Manitoba 1971. The City of Regina's planning powers are derived from the <u>Planning Act</u>, chapter 73, Statutes of Saskatchewan 1973. The City of Calgary's planning powers are derived from the <u>Planning Act</u>, chapter P-9, Revised Statutes of Alberta, 1980.

<sup>2</sup>Section 92 of the British North America Act states:

Exclusive Powers of Provincial Legislatures

92. In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next herein - after enumerated, that is to say, -

The section then goes on to list 16 such Classes of Subjects of which only the following are of direct interest to us here:

8. Municipal Institutions in the Province.

Shop, Saloon, Tavern, Auctioneer and other Licences in order to the raising of a Revenue for Provincial, Local, or Municipal Purposes.

13. Property and Civil Rights in the Province.

15. The Imposition of Punishment by Fine, Penalty, or Imprisonment for enforcing any Law of the Province made in relation to any Matter coming within any of the Classes of subjects enumerated in this Section.

16. Generally all Matters of a merely local or private Nature in the Province.

Item 8, "Municipal Institutions in the Province" is the key item. It empowers the Province not only to create municipal governments but also to legislate their organization, jurisdiction, powers, procedures and all other matters pertaining to their structure and function.

<sup>3</sup> Statistics Canada.

<sup>4</sup>Statistics Canada.

<sup>5</sup>See N.H. Lithwick, <u>Urban Canada: problems and prospects</u>. See also James W. Simmons, "The Evolution of the Canadian Urban System," in Artibise and Stelter, eds., <u>The Usable Urban Past</u>.

<sup>6</sup>Herbert J. Gans, <u>People and Plans</u>, 1-2.

<sup>7</sup>Committee of Review, City of Winnipeg Act, <u>Report and Recommendations</u>, 3.

<sup>8</sup>For example, Winnpeg's <u>Metropolitan Development Plan</u>, first established in 1968 remained virtually in its original form until it was replaced by <u>Plan Winnipeg</u> in 1986. Regina's <u>Community Planning Scheme</u>, adopted in 1961, continued virtually unchanged until 1973 when it was replaced by an entirely new concept and document. Calgary's <u>General Municipal Plan</u>, first adopted in 1963, was superceded by a new plan in 1973.

<sup>9</sup>In his concept of the ideal city, as set out in his <u>Republic</u>, Plato bases the social structure of the city on the notion that all men are not born equal but have differing aptitudes. These personal capabilities consign every individual to an appropriate role in the society, where he is lodged for life. The class structure is therefore extremely rigid and comprises the philosophers, the warriors, the craftsmen and the husbandmen. The rulers of the city are, of course, drawn from the philosopher class.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>Terry Clark, ed., Community Structure and Decision Making, 26.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>Nelson Polsby, <u>Community Power and Political Theory</u>, 113.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>Peter McGahan, <u>Urban Sociology in Canada</u>, 341.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>E.P. Thompson, <u>The Poverty of Theory</u>, 295.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>lbid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>Charles E. Lindblom, <u>Politics and Markets</u>, 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>Lindblom, Politics and Markets, 173.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>Lindblom, Politics and Markets, 175.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>Perhaps the most notable American example in recent times is the Iran-Contra affair in which the most senior officials in the national security establishment and the government of President Reagan clandestinely and in breach of the law sold arms to the government of Iran and used the proceeds to fund the Contra rebels in Nicaragua. Private corporations in the armaments industry were party to the operation. The entire affair exemplifies the unity and power of the right-wing ideology and interests among the various elements of the dominant class in American society.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>See, for example, Peter C. Newman, <u>The Canadian Establishment</u>. See also Wallace Clement, <u>The Canadian Corporate Elite</u>; also John Porter, <u>The Vertical Mosaic</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>See Kevin Lynch, <u>The Image of the City</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>One need only recall the spread of the "Art Nouveau" style, the "International" style, and the more recent "Post Modern" style, as well as the international influence of trend-setters like Le Corbusier, Marcel Breuer, Mies Van der Rohe, to name only a handful of architectural fashions and fashion-setters in this century.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup>A forceful presentation of this view is made in Robert Goodman, <u>After the Planners</u>. See also Paul and Percival Goodman, <u>Communitas</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup>Italo Calvino, <u>Invisible Cities</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>See John Kenneth Galbraith, <u>The New Industrial State</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup>Regina is a brief exception. Labour controlled the Regina council from 1935 to 1939.

# PART IV: THE CITIES

Chapter 6.

WINNIPEG

Chapter 7.

**REGINA** 

Chapter 8.

**CALGARY** 

The essential and significant fact about the city is that the city... functions as the specialized organ of social transmission. It accumulates and embodies the heritage of a region, and combines in some measure and kind with the cultural heritage of larger units, national, racial, religious, human. On one side is the individuality of the city - the sign manual of its regional life and record. On the other are the marks of the civilization, in which each particular city is a constituent element.

- Victor Branford and Patrick Geddes<sup>1</sup>

But while the perception of space is more than ever a major preoccupation of architects and urbanists, the image of a town is not limited to geography alone. Plurivalent and many voiced it depends upon the collective memory, upon the depth of roots, the social context, the cultural conditions...

- François Bedarida<sup>2</sup>

A town is what society, economy and politics allow it to be.

- Fernand Braudel<sup>3</sup>

#### CHAPTER 6

#### **WINNIPEG**

#### PHASE 1: THE POLITICAL PATCHWORK ERA

### 1. The Genesis of Greater Winnipeg's Political Patchwork

From its earliest beginnings and for a decade and a half after the second World War was over, municipal government in Greater Winnipeg consisted of the City of Winnipeg and a number of surrounding municipalities, each one of which was a separate, independent municipal corporation, with its own council, and with full municipal jurisdiction within its own corporate boundaries. During the Metro regime - the period 1961-1972 - when the two-tier form of government was in effect - some municipal responsibilities such as planning, zoning, regional streets and traffic, parks, etc. were vested in the Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg rather than in the local municipal councils, but otherwise the local municipalities retained their corporate identity and powers. The fragmentation of the municipal jurisdiction within the Greater Winnipeg area has been perhaps the single most important factor in the history of the city and a critical influence on its planning and development. Indeed, it is of such central relevance to the planning and development of Winnipeg, and therefore to this study, that it is pertinent to review the salient events in the genesis of this political patchwork.

The junction of the Red and Assiniboine Rivers had been the site of major fur trade activity since about the 1760's. The first permanent settlers arrived in 1812, under the patronage of Thomas Douglas, the fifth Earl of Selkirk. They were crofters displaced from Lord Selkirk's estates in Scotland by the enclosure movement. The arrival of the Selkirk Settlers marked the beginning of the Red River Colony, conventionally thought of as located at the junction of the Red River and the Assiniboine River, referred to as the Forks. In fact the first of their party landed on the east side of the Red River, but Captain Miles Macdonnell, who was in charge, decided that the west side was more suitable and moved them across to occupy the area on the west side known

as Point Douglas, lying about a mile and a half north of the forks of the rivers, and extending from present-day Main Street to the Red River.

From its establishment in 1812 until 1836 the colony was ruled by the governors appointed by Lord Selkirk and his heirs (Lord Selkirk, the fifth Earl and patron of the Red River Colony died in 1820 in Pau, in the south of France). In 1836 the Hudson's Bay Company bought back from the Selkirks the land they had sold to the fifth Earl twenty-two years earlier, and thus became responsible for the governance of the Red River Colony. The governing body was the Governor and Council of Assiniboia. The Governor was the chief officer of the Hudson's Bay Company in the district, and the Council comprised members of the clergy and prominent members of the district who were appointed to office. The area over which the Council had jurisdiction was nominally all the land within a radius of fifty miles of the Red and Assiniboine Rivers. In fact however, the settlement over which the Council was actively engaged was not so dispersed. All settlement at that time was concentrated within narrow strips bordering the two rivers, so that the effective compass of the authority was a strip of homesteads along both banks of the Assiniboine River stretching westward for 50 miles, and a strip along both sides of the Red River running from the international border to Lake Winnipeg, a distance of some 100 miles. The Council had legal authority over all civic matters except education and religion; these came under the jurisdiction of the various parishes which emerged during the course of settlement.

From its earliest years the Red River Colony was a settlement of mixed ethnic and religious groups. The original core group comprised the Scottish crofters from Lord Selkirk's estates. But these were soon joined by the remnants of the disbanded Desmeurons Regiment,<sup>4</sup> which Lord Selkirk brought to the Colony for its protection, by Métis of both French and British descent who settled in and around the Colony, by French Canadians from Quebec, by retired Hudson's Bay Company employees, and by newcomers from Britain and Europe. Each of these groups formed its own community, with its own

church serving its religious and educational needs, and the land occupied by each such group came to be known as a parish, in accordance with British practice. The members of each of these parishes lived on both sides of the river. A parish was eight miles wide and straddled the rivers, while its length along the river depended on the number of its members who occupied the lots along the river. By the time of Confederation, twenty parishes were in existence along the banks of both rivers, extending a distance of some 20-odd miles westward along the Assiniboine River from its junction with the Red, to the parish of St. Francois Xavier, and about the same distance southward along the Red River to the parish of St. Agathe, and northward to the parish of St. Andrews.

The first parish to be established was St. Boniface, across both rivers from the Red River Colony.<sup>5</sup> Two priests arrived from Quebec in 1818 to build a church and educational institutions to serve the Catholic population, and so the parish of St. Boniface came into being. The second parish was the Anglican parish of St. John's, whose church was built in 1820 about two and a half miles north of the junction of the rivers. A second Anglican church was built about six miles north of the junction giving rise to the parish of St. Paul's; and a third was built even further down the river, establishing the parish of St. Andrews. English speaking settlers also took up land along the Assiniboine River and founded the parishes of St. James, St. Charles, and Headingley. Following the emergence of St. Boniface, French-speaking communities were consolidated southward along the Red River, out of which evolved the parishes of St. Vital, St. Norbert and St. Agathe. In 1851 the parish of Kildonan was formed by a group of Presbyterians living in the Anglican parish of St. John's, who secured their own Presbyterian minister and broke away from the Anglican parish. Many of the Selkirk settlers had taken land in the northerly reaches of the parish of St. John's, and when they broke away they took the name Kildonan from the parish in Sutherlandshire, Scotland, from which the original Selkirk Settlers had come. (See Fig. 4.)

When the Province of Manitoba was admitted into Confederation it became necessary to provide for a provincial legislature and for election of representatives to the House of Commons. Twenty-four electoral districts were created for the provincial house; 16 of these were simply the 16 smaller parishes as they were then constituted; the remaining eight were created by dividing the remaining four largest parishes into two districts each. Four federal districts were created: Selkirk, which included the parishes of St. John's, St. Boniface, Kildonan, St. Charles, and Headingley (virtually the present Metropolitan Winnipeg area); Provencher, which took in all the settlements south of the Selkirk district; Lisgar, which included all the settlements north of Selkirk; and Marquette - all the settlements west of Selkirk. Because of the sparseness of the population in most of the districts, the provincial government assumed responsibility for all public services.

The twenty-four provincial legislative ridings comprised twelve Englishspeaking and twelve French-speaking districts. Completing the government structure of
the province, there was also an appointed legislative council, or upper house, and an
appointed lieutenant-governor who acted as premier. The first lieutenant-governor was
Archibald (1870-1872), who had been born in Nova Scotia. A county system of local
self-government was in effect in Nova Scotia, which was modelled after the county
system prevailing in Britain. Archibald believed that some form of local selfgovernment should be introduced into Manitoba, now that it was a Province within
Confederation, and he turned to the British-Nova Scotia model. In 1871 he introduced
legislation which divided the province into five judicial counties. Three of these were
simply the federal electoral districts of Selkirk, Lisgar and Provencher as they stood.
The other two were derived by splitting the district of Marquette into two districts East Marquette and West Marquette. In each of these five counties a Grand Jury was the
body responsible for local public works. The Grand Jury was selected from among the
leading local citizens, and three officials were appointed as the administrative staff of

the Grand Jury - an Assessor to prepare the tax roll, a Clerk of the Peace to apportion the total tax levy among the property owners in accordance with their assessment, and a Chief Constable, to collect the taxes. The responsibilities of the Grand Jury were to meet in Quarter Sessions with the Justice of the Peace to determine the public works required by the county as a whole, and to arrange for the taxes to pay for them. Although the Grand Jury's jurisdiction was limited to the county as a whole, individual parishes which desired works which did not affect any other parish could obtain such very local services by holding a public meeting at which a resolution asking for the service was passed and then forwarded to the Clerk of the Peace. This was the first form of local self-government in Manitoba, and was the precursor of municipal government which was to be established in the province two years later.

In 1873 the provincial government headed by Henry Joseph Clarke introduced legislation which allowed any district with more that 35 free-holders to be incorporated as a municipality, if it so desired, on petition by two-thirds of the property owners. Upon incorporation, the municipality had the authority to carry out local improvements such as roads, bridges, etc., and to levy taxes to pay for such improvements. Prior to 1873, the settlement at Red River, and the surroundings had come to be referred to as the "town" of Winnipeg, although it had no such municipal status. With the new municipal legislation they were the first to apply for incorporation, and in that year, 1873, the City of Winnipeg came into existence.

The judicial counties which had been established in 1871 to provide county-wide services were still in existence, but in the context of the new municipal system the Grand Jury was an obsolete and obstructive instrument. However, the need for some sort of inter-municipal mechanism for co-ordinating multiple-jurisdiction undertakings was seen as a strong possibility in the future, if not a pressing present need, and in 1882 the provincial government legislated the device of a county council in each of the five judicial counties. In each county the heads of all the municipalities were

to comprise the county council, and the role of the county council was to arrange for carrying out any public works such as roads, bridges, drainage ditches, etc., which involved two or more municipalities, and for apportioning the taxes for these works among the municipalities involved. The legislation was permissive: municipalities were free to set up county councils or not to do so, as a matter of choice. This was the first legislative measure providing for the co-ordination of inter-municipal development in Manitoba, and its permissive voluntary nature remained the hall-mark of such legislation in the province until the establishment of Metro in 1961, some 80 years later.

Winnipeg had been incorporated as a City in 1873, the first municipality to be incorporated under the new legislation of that year. The lands abutting the city at that time were still organized as parishes, but Springfield and Kildonan-St. John's became municipalities shortly after, the former in 1874, the latter in 1876. In 1880 the entire province was divided into 31 municipalities and the area abutting Winnipeg was changed from five parishes and a municipality into three municipalities: Assiniboia on the west and south, Kildonan on the north, and St. Boniface on the east. Assiniboia was made up of the parishes of Headingley, St. Charles, St. James, and the portion of the parish of St. Boniface lying on the west side of the Red River. Kildonan was simply the former municipality of Kildonan-St. John's which had been incorporated four years earlier. St. Boniface was the portion of the parish of St. Boniface lying on the east side of the Red River. These three original municipalities abutting the original City of Winnipeg contained almost all of the area which comprises the present Greater Winnipeg.

Out of those three original municipalities adjacent to the City of Winnipeg, more than a dozen municipalities ultimately emerged. Out of Assiniboia were derived the municipalities of Assiniboia, Charleswood, Tuxedo, St. James, Brooklands, part of Fort Garry, and a part of Rosser. Brooklands became part of St. James in 1967; and

Assinibola and St. James amalgamated to form the City of St. James-Assinibola in 1969. Out of Kildonan came the municipalities of West, North, East and Old Kildonan. And out of the municipality of St. Boniface came the City of St. Boniface, and parts of St. Vital, Transcona, and Springfield.

The CPR was incorporated in 1881. One of the terms of its incorporation was the requirement to complete the transcontinental main line to the Pacific Ocean within ten years. Although the main line at this time was not designated to go through Winnipeg, the possibility that it might was sufficient to fire the council and the businessmen of the city with exuberant optimism and to set off an explosion of real estate speculation during the years 1881 and 1882; and the railway construction set off a surge of local business activity. Accompanying these events was a massive expansion of the city's population. Responding to these forces, the city, in 1882, under Mayor Alexander Logan, annexed an enormous amount of territory from the adjacent municipalities of Kildonan on the north and Assiniboia on the west and south. From Kildonan the City of Winnipeg acquired about 2000 acres; from Assiniboia it took 1750 acres on its western boundary and about 3200 acres south of the Assinibola River, for a total of over 3900 acres. This was the largest annexation ever effected by the City of Winnipeg. During the years that followed there were an abundance of boundary changes, name changes, absorptions, amalgamations, and annexations, the details of which are set out on Figures 10, 11, 12, 13.

## 2. The Business Ethos - The Railways and the Public Utilities

The Bill which incorporated Winnipeg as a city was given royal assent on November 8, 1873.<sup>6</sup> The city's first civic election was held on January 5, 1874, when a council consisting of a mayor and twelve aldermen was elected. The first meeting of the council was held at noon on January 19, 1874. The man who was elected as the city's first mayor was Francis Evans Cornish. The aldermen were James H. Ashdown, William G. Fonseca, John Higgins, Alexander Logan, James McLenaghan, John B. More, Robert

Mulvey, Thomas Scott, Andrew Strang, Herbert Swinford, W.B. Thibaudeau, and Archibald Wright. All of them were leading figures in the community. Most of them were from socially prominent families or had married into such families. Most of them were businessmen who had already made their fortunes or were well on their way towards them. Some discretion should probably be exercised in interpreting words like "business" and "fortune" in the context of Winnipeg in 1874. In 1873 the city was only just beginning to emerge from a state of virtual nonentity: two years earlier its population was only 241. It was, in fact, just a small town and the business community was still modest in size and made up largely of small businesses.<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless it was fired with ambition and enthusiasm and boundless confidence in the future; and a significant number of its businessmen did accumulate sizeable personal wealth. As the city matured over the next four decades, private fortunes grew, the wealthy class became more clearly visible, more firmly entrenched and exclusive. Success in business became virtually a required pre-condition for election to city council, and the mentality of the city council and its approach to civic government became increasingly merely reflective of the mentality and concern of the businessmen of the city.

Urban historian Alan F.J. Artibise, in his <u>Winnipeg: A Social History of Urban</u>

<u>Growth 1874-1914</u> explores in depth the first four decades of Winnipeg's history and finds that these salient characteristics of the council and its members dominated the city's public affairs throughout that entire period:

It can be said that Winnipeg was governed between 1874 and 1914 by a very select group of men, a group that was at one and the same time a social, cultural, and above all, commercial elite. The great majority of the elected members of the municipal government had in common a number of particular characteristics which distinguished them from all but a minority of their fellow Winnipegers. All except five of well over five hundred elected officials were of Anglo-Saxon origin, and most came to Winnipeg from Ontario or Britain. A large majority were of Protestant religion and members of the commercial classes. Most were active members of several business, social and cultural

organizations and had attained some degree of financial success in their own businesses. Few could boast of a very high degree of education and those that could were prominent in business as well. Many were men of humble origin who had proved themselves in the business world. And finally, as the following chapters will show, all agreed that the basic task of the municipal corporation was to encourage rapid and sustained economic and population growth at the expense of any and all other considerations.<sup>8</sup>

Artibise offers sound explanations for the dominant presence of this type of person on the council throughout the city's first forty years. He points out that it is quite normal for a new and rapidly growing centre to require the skills of the successful entrepreneur. These skills and successes are highly visible and highly regarded by the general population in such communities, and Winnipeg at that time was indeed such a community. The majority of the city's population was from Ontario and Britain, and even though there was a great influx of immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe in 1869, many of whom were labourers and artisans, internal divisions and hostilities among these groups prevented any possibility of mustering sufficiently large concensual blocks to elect either ethnic or labour representatives. Moreover, even though the labour movement was politically active, its interest was focused on the national and provincial sphere rather than the municipal. Finally, there was a property ownership qualification, not only to stand for election but even to vote. Of a population of over 100,000 in 1906, for example, there were only 7,784 registered voters in the city. These circumstances, taken together, are sufficient to explain the virtually exclusive membership on council of rich, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant businessmen who regarded their activities on the city council as simply an extension of their activities in their businesses and in their clubs and associations, at least up until 1919.

In an analysis of the occupational backgrounds of the men elected to the various offices of the civic government of Winnipeg over the forty years from 1874 to 1914, Artibise found that the overwhelming majority came from the business world: no

artisans or workingmen were elected to any office; only 14 per cent of the total cumulative membership of the city council came from the professions, and only 10 per cent and 9 per cent respectively of the mayors and the members of the Board of Control. Table 13 sets out this information. The successful businessman who enters municipal politics brings with him beliefs and attitudes which he formed in his business career and which served him well there, and which are even applicable to some parts of the issues with which the council must deal, but are not applicable to large sectors of civic government responsibility. Because of the traditionally administrative nature of municipal government, as indicated in the preceding chapter, and because the business mind is primarily concerned with the "bottom line" on the accounts book, the businessman in municipal government is prone to be more responsive to short-term expedients than to long-term plans, and more heedful of the effect of council's decision on his immediate electoral constituency than on the city as a whole. As a result, the long-term consequences of the councils decisions, as well as their more immediate impact on the lives of many communities in the city are often not addressed, and are simply left to the vagaries of chance.

In 1867 John A. Macdonald knew that his vision of Canada could not come true without a transcontinental railroad. Between 1874 and 1881 Winnipeg's successive city councils knew that their hopes for the growth and prosperity of their city would never be realized unless the transcontinental railroad came through Winnipeg.

Accordingly, they offered every possible inducement to bring the main line of the CPR to the city. Their inducements were successful and the main line of the CPR was diverted to Winnipeg from Selkirk where it was originally intended to cross the Red River. The city had given the CPR an extensive grant of land for its buildings and tracks, permanent exemption from municipal taxation, a \$200,000 bonus in cash, and a bridge worth \$300,000. The anticipated benefits of locating the main line together with its station, yards and shops in the city were felt immediately. The spectacular land boom of 1881-

82 was due virtually entirely to the advent of the railway; and the city's rocketing ascent to the position of primacy among all the cities west of Toronto was fuelled mainly by the large and expanding volume of commerce carried by the railway.

But that ascendancy was bought at a heavy cost, from which the city still suffers. The short-term "bottom-line" objective was realized in the wealth and advancement the railway brought to the business life of the city. But the broader, long-term consequences were entirely ignored in the council's eagerness for the short-term gain. The councils simply gave no thought to the matter of how the various railway lands and tracks right-of-way would fit into the overall development of the city; and this indifference prevailed among all of the city's councils throughout the entire period during which new railway companies and new railway lines continued to be established in the city, and during which Winnipeg's position as the railway transportation hub of western Canada was consolidated. It occurred to no one that the location of the railways, their points of entry into the city and exit out of the city, their impact on surrounding communities, properties, and land-uses, the city's traffic system and movement patterns, might profoundly affect the nature of the city and the course of its development, and might even adversely affect the interests of the railways themselves. The consequences of this indifference were indeed profoundly damaging and continue to affect the city even to the present day.

The legacy of the councils' laissez-faire attitude toward railroad development in the city produced a plethora of level crossings which interrupt the flow of street traffic and have required the construction of several costly bridges and underpasses which might have been avoided if thought had been given to this matter. Such grade-separations as have been constructed have contributed the barest minimum to the easing of the traffic movement, and the future holds the inescapable requirement of further separations. Recently, Keewatin Street, an arterial road which is becoming one of the city's major thoroughfares, has been depressed below the CPR mainline where it crossed

the tracks on the surface. The cost of effecting this grade separation is estimated at \$8 million.

Perhaps even more serious than the level crossings and their traffic tie-ups is the barrier effect which the tracks have had on the normal extension of communities in various parts of the city. They have interrupted the continuity of the physical fabric of the city and have thereby also interrupted its social continuity, creating isolated local enclaves which have difficulty in relating to each other across the dividing line of the tracks. They have also had a severely depressing effect on the value of properties in their vicinity, and therefore on the character and status of the neighbourhoods in those locations.

But the most damaging consequence of all was the virtually complete cutting-off of the entire north end from the rest of the city by the vast CPR Yards, which in effect turned that very extensive sector of Winnipeg into a ghetto and produced economic, social and political impacts that inflicted deep wounds on both the physical and psychic landscape of the city. The identification of the North End with the general strike of 1919 and its alleged communist revolutionary conspiracy is only one of the several traumas the city has suffered whose origins can be traced back to the CPR and the other railways, and to the successive councils' indifference to the consequences of railroad development other than those directly affecting the short-term returns to business.

Only slightly less damaging than the cutting off of the North End from the rest of the city was the isolation of the historic site at the forks of the Red and Assiniboine Rivers and the denial of public access to this important piece of the city's heritage and to the amenity of the riverbanks. The junction of the two rivers had been the site of furtrading posts since the mid-18th Century and had probably been an important gathering-place of the Indian peoples for centuries before that. A large tract of land some 80 to 90 acres in the north-west angle of the junction became the yards of the Canadian Northern Railway Company in the late 1890's, and in 1907 the Union Station

was constructed there, fronting on Main Street, to serve the passenger traffic of the National Transcontinental and the Grand Trunk Pacific Railways. These companies were later taken over by the federal government to form the CNR, and the site at the junction of the rivers came to be known as the East Yard of the CNR. The main line of the railroad was carried on an embankment rising some 14-feet above grade level, running parallel to Main Street for the entire length of the Yard, which effectively cut off the public not only from physical access but also from visual access to the rivers in this central part of the city. Subsequently most of the city's residents were not even aware of the presence of the rivers in this location, and it was not until some 80 years later that public action was taken, at a heavy cost and with great difficulty, to bring the forks of the rivers back into the public life of the city. The attempts to include the East Yard of the CNR in the planning of the city are described somewhat more fully later on in this dissertation.

All of this decrying of the council's irresponsible attitude toward the random, expedient location of the railway facilities and the damage which this wrought in the city is not simply a matter of the superior vision of hindsight. In fact the same criticisms were voiced at the time when better sites and locations could have been provided, and the damage avoided. For example, in 1900, the CPR found it necessary to extend its yards and applied to the city for permission to do so. It proposed an extension eastward, toward the river, and the city council immediately granted its permission. The Winnipeg Telegram agreed that this was a proper decision based on business considerations. The Winnipeg Tribune, however, was highly critical:

The subway agreement allows the CPR to extend its freight yard tracks eastward across [several streets]. It practically gives free a large amount of real estate to the CPR. That is a cheap way for the CPR to get additional yard room. The railway company could, of course, get any amount of land for extending its yards on the west side, but it might have to pay for it.

The present arrangement is not cheap, for the city... will be involved in a loss resulting up to hundreds of thousands of dollars to say nothing of the very serious injury to the value of all property north of the track.... A partial remedy will also have to be found for the condition that will be created on streets between the station and the river, where the increase of the CPR traffic will soon make the crossings as bad or worse than that on Main Street now. A new crossing or a new overhead bridge will be required, then we will have thru crossing to the North of the tracks, just as we now have thru crossings to the West of the river. But not even all this costly work will undo the injury to the north end caused by its separation from the rest of the city and the inconvenience of access to it.

If there is any valid objection, either from the point of view of the CPR or from the point of view of the city to having the railway come into the city from the northwest, clearing Main street and all streets east of any CPR traffic during the day, and making the city one continuous compact whole none has been offered.<sup>9</sup>

The Winnipeg City Planning Commission, in its report of 1913, expressed similar dismay over the lack of any planning on the location of the railway lines into the city:

The steam railways entering the city at present are the Canadian Pacific Railway, the Canadian Northern Railway, the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway and the Midland Railway. Each of these railways with their numerous branches, yards and shops, cuts off the city into many different sections. It does not seem that the entrance of these steam railways has been considered on any road scheme which would be convenient and beneficial to either the city or to the Railways themselves, but, that the entry has simply followed the line of least resistance.<sup>10</sup>

Given this prevailing disposition to conduct the affairs of the city along the lines of the narrowest business principles, a seeming anomaly appeared in the pre-World War I period. The city emerged as the owner of two important public utilities as well as of several supply industries. By 1912 the City of Winnipeg owned the waterworks system and the hydro-electric system, as well as some gravel pits, stone quarries, and an asphalting plant. On the surface this might indicate a disposition toward municipal socialism rather than private enterprise. Closer examination, however, reveals that the

council's ventures into public enterprise were forced by certain circumstances to which, in the end, they had to acquiesce.

In the case of the hydro-electric system the motivating force was the councils' consuming desire to attract industry to Winnipeg. 11 The problem they faced was that there was no power available in the city at a low enough rate to be attractive. The only power available was that generated by the coal-fired steam plant of the Winnipeg Electric Railway Company, and its rates were prohibitive. The city attempted to interest other entrepreneurs in constructing an alternative system whose rates would be cheaper, but no one came forward, and the WERC refused to budge from its position on its quoted rates. In the end the City of Winnipeg was forced to build its own hydro-electric generating plant on the Winnipeg River, which opened on October 16, 1911 - an instance of public ownership being the most expedient way to serve the purposes of private enterprise. The possibility of a cheaper source of power was first publicly aired in 1887 in a report to Council by H.N. Ruttan, the City Engineer. It had taken 24-years for that possibility to be realized.

The case of Winnipeg's water supply<sup>12</sup> is not greatly different in terms of the council's attitudes and actions. Initially the residents of the city were supplied by a few independent businessmen who sold the water from door to door. They pumped water from the Assiniboine River into barrels loaded on carts drawn by teams of horses or oxen and then made the rounds of their customers. During the summer this arrangement was fairly satisfactory but during the winter the thick ice on the river and the winter conditions generally made a constant and adequate water supply uncertain. In 1876 the city had installed a sewage system which emptied into the Assiniboine as well as the Red River and the public health authorities raised alarms about the dangers of continued use of river water for drinking and other domestic purposes. There were, in fact, not infrequent cases of typhoid fever. The health threat, however, did not seem to disturb the council as much as the fire threat since there was not an adequate supply of water to

fight fires, nor even a competent fire brigade. Fire insurance premiums were very high and prospects were that they would rise even higher as the city grew and the commercial establishments became more numerous. The city got its first fire engine in November 1874, but relied on a volunteer fire brigade to operate it. On Christmas Day 1875, a fire destroyed the fire hall and all the equipment in it, which sharpened the council's anxieties and pushed up the fire insurance premiums.

By 1880 the population had increased substantially - it was approaching 8000. Typhoid cases were more frequent, but they were almost entirely in the North End, and the fire danger was greater than ever, but there was still no adequate water supply either for domestic or fire-fighting purposes. Council decided that something had to be done, and in December 1880 they gave a franchise to a private company - the Winnipeg Water Works Company - to supply water in the City of Winnipeg and an area extending one mile beyond the city limits. The arrangement was confirmed by an Act of the legislature. The franchise was for ten years, expiring in 1890. In 1886 the City Engineer reported to the council that the company was not fulfilling the terms of its franchise, and this set off a long, bitter quarrel between the city and the company. In fact the company was abiding by its contract but the city maintained that there had been an error in the terms laid out in the provincial Act. The city maintained that the original terms agreed upon specified that the company would supply 60 gallons of water per capita per day, but an error somehow had crept into the Act, which required only 25 gallons per capita per day. The company was providing the stated 25 gallons. There was also a claim by the city that the company was in default in the number of fire hydrants they were obliged to provide, and in their functional design.

The city had three possible courses of action to resolve this dispute: it could buy out the Winnipeg Water Works Company; it could build its own system in competition with the company; or it could wait until the company's franchise expired in 1890. The council refused to pay the WWW Company the price it was asking for a buy-out. Under

the law the council could not sell water in competition with the company since the franchise and the Act gave the company a monopoly on the sale of water, although the city could go so far as to build its own system. In the circumstances the city decided to wait until 1890; in fact it had no other option. But it did raise money to proceed with the construction of an alternative system, based on an artesian well supply rather than on the Assiniboine River. When the WWW Company realized that they could probably not continue after 1890, they decided to reduce their asking price and sold their system to the city in 1889, a year before their franchise terminated.

The city thereupon proceeded with the construction of their artesian system which went into operation in 1890. Before a year had passed, however, there were complaints that the system was not delivering an adequate supply of water. In October 1904, a fierce fire broke out in the central area which threatened both businesses and residences, and which was so menacing that water from the Assiniboine River had to be pumped through the city's water system to augment the inadequate artesian well supply. The fire was brought under control, but the water supply system was contaminated and an epidemic of typhoid fever broke out. This time it was not confined to the North End but struck down residents indiscriminately, in all parts of the city, the rich as well as the poor.<sup>13</sup>

The council was now face to face with the stark reality that it could no longer continue to improvise *ad hoc* minimum-cost solutions to the water supply problem and could no longer demur over the extremely large capital expenditure which would be required to ensure a safe and adequate water supply. Even so, the next decade was spent in studies, and debates, and a generally reluctant, foot-dragging performance on the part of the council. Engineering studies found that the best water was that of Shoal Lake in the Lake of the Woods, and that an aqueduct costing some \$13.5 million would be required to bring the water to Winnipeg. The council finally agreed to adopt this solution, but because of its enormous cost sought to involve the municipalities around Winnipeg in

jointly sharing the costs and the benefits of the venture. As a result the Greater Winnipeg Water District was formed in 1913, comprising the City of Winnipeg, the City of St. Boniface, the Town of Transcona, and the Rural Municipalities of Fort Garry, St. Vital, Assiniboia, and Kildonan. Six years later, in 1919, the first water flowed through the aqueduct from the Indian Arm of Shoal Lake into the distribution system of the Greater Winnipeg Water District. It had taken thirty years from the time that the city assumed ownership of the water supply system in 1889, to the time that a safe and adequate supply of water was assured to the residents of Greater Winnipeg.

## 3. The 1919 General Strike and Its Aftermath

After World War I Winnipeg's city council was never again quite as homogeneously constituted as it had been in the era before the war. The bitter and violent general strike of 1919 was followed a decade later by the collapse of the world's financial market, the economic depression, and the prairie drought, but it also gave rise to the seating on city council of types of individuals who in the preceding 45 years since the city's incorporation, had had no entry into the council chamber. These were the representatives of labour and of those elements in the city who were even farther out on the left of the political spectrum.

The Winnipeg general strike began on May 15, 1919, and lasted six weeks to the day, ending on June 26, 1919. It brought the life of the city to a complete standstill - even the police were on strike - and it split the city into two camps, one on either side of the strike action. On the labour side were the strikers - some 12,000 unionized workers, together with their sympathizers who swelled the total number on strike to over thirty thousand - represented by the Strike Committee. On the anti-labour side were the forces of business and property, represented by the Committee of 1000. The strike was broken by the intervention of the three levels of government in support of the Committee of 1000. Ten of the strike leaders were arrested; a large force of army units, special police, and Royal Northwest Mounted Police was deployed against the

strikers; and a riot on June 21, in which one person was shot dead and 30 others were wounded brought the strike to an end.

The loss of the strike aborted the economic power of Winnipeg's labour movement. However, although the strike was broken and militant labour defeated, the legacy of that epochal event remains alive in Winnipeg. The city is still divided ideologically between the interests of labour and those of property, with the labour sympathy lying generally in the north and east sectors of the city and that of property in the south and west. And the membership on the city council reflects this division, with the heritage of the Committee of 1000 passed on under a variety of political designations, starting with the Citizens' League and continuing through the Citizens' Campaign Committee, the Winnipeg Civic Association, the Civic Progress Association, the Winnipeg Election Committee, and finally the Civic Election Committee. The legacy of the Strike Committee has been perpetuated politically in the presence of labour members on council under the banner of the Independent Labour Party, the CCF, and finally the NDP.

J.E. Rea has made an exhaustive analysis of "the fifty Citizens' League aldermen and the nineteen Labour aldermen who exercised political power in Winnipeg from 1919 to 1945 and the major effects of that control in the city's development." For ease of reference, Rea, in this study, uses the label of Citizen's League for the heirs of the Committee of 1000, and Labour for those of the Strike Committee. In making his analysis he employed two devices. One was to draw a collective portrait of the aldermen in each group using seven standard variables: ethnicity, religion, place of birth, occupation, quality of housing, education, and political affiliation. The other was to measure the level of intra-group cohesion in the voting patterns of each group.

Both the collective portraits and the voting patterns of the two groups of aldermen provide further statistical evidence of the division of the city council along class and ideological lines. The data relating to place of birth afford some interesting insights into the difference in attitudes between the two groups. Among the Citizens'

League aldermen, only 11 (22%) were born in Winnipeg; among the Labour aldermen, not one was born in Winnipeg, and only one in Manitoba. The majority of Citizens' League aldermen came from southern Ontario - 30% during the 1920's to 11% in the early 1940's while native born Manitobans rose from 23% to 56%. The overwhelming majority of Labour aldermen came from Great Britain - 85% during the 1920's and 70% during the 1930's. The ideological atmosphere which prevailed in southern Ontario during the pre-World War II era was conservative, small-town, rural-oriented, and embraced the values of the capitalist system. The Citizens' League aldermen who were born in southern Ontario breathed this atmosphere from birth and were nurtured in it. This was the ideology which they brought with them to the council chamber in Winnipeg. The Labour aldermen were nurtured in the atmosphere of the socialist ideology and militant working-class activism in the urban-industrial centres of turn-of-the-century Britain. They brought this view of the world with them to Winnipeg's council chamber.

Prof. Rea extended his analysis to the year 1976, and came to the conclusion that even up to that date Winnipeg's council was dominated by the business-oriented aldermen, and its decisions reflected the interests of the businessmen and property owners of the city.

### 4. Early Planning Measures - The Inter-War Years

By 1921 there were 13 municipalities which comprised the Metropolitan Winnipeg area. 16 These were the City of Winnipeg, the City of St. Boniface, the Towns of Transcona and Tuxedo, and the Rural Municipalities of Assiniboia, Charleswood, East Kildonan, Fort Garry, St. James, St. Vital, West Kildonan, East St. Paul and West St. Paul. The total population of these municipalities was 229,212. In 1901, only 11 municipalities comprised the metropolitan Winnipeg area (the Town of Tuxedo and Transcona had not yet been incorporated). Their total population was 48,488. During the two decades 1901-1921, then, the population of Greater Winnipeg had increased

nearly five-fold. In spite of this rapid expansion of population, and the various shifts and changes which occurred in the municipal boundaries, there was no crying need felt for a mandatory inter-municipal planning mechanism. Indeed, there was no demand for specific municipal planning powers of any kind. The Manitoba Planning Act was passed in 1916. It was permissive: it enabled any municipality in the province which chose to do so, to prepare a Town Planning Scheme in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It is an indication of the relative disinterest in this legislation among the 13 municipalities of the Greater Winnipeg area that eight of them took no action under the Act. These were the City of St. Boniface, the Town of Transcona, and the Rural Municipalities of Assiniboia, Charleswood, St. Vital, West Kildonan, East St. Paul and West St. Paul. Winnipeg already had its Greater Winnipeg Plan Committee. The remainder - the Town of Tuxedo, and the Rural Municipalities of East Kildonan, Fort Garry, and St. James - proceeded with the preparation and adoption of a Town Planning Scheme pursuant to the provincial legislation, but these were spread over 14 years, the last, that of St. James, being enacted in 1930.

Act were in effect simply zoning by-laws, and that the municipalities which did not proceed under the Act, at some time or another adopted zoning by-laws under the authority of their own councils, and there was virtually no difference in the substance or effectiveness between the two types of instruments. All of these by-laws sought to regulate such matters as land-use, lot size, depth of yards, building set-backs, building size, etc. and to apply these regulations over the entire municipality in some instances, or over only a portion of the municipality in other cases. Between 1916 and 1945 - the inter-war years - municipal planning in the Greater Winnipeg area was no more than the preparation and administration of these zoning by-laws, together with the provision of local engineering services.

Up until the post-World War II period there was in fact no great need for any more sophisticated planning measures. It is true that the metropolitan area was rapidly growing, but for the most part each municipal council was well able to cope with the problems which arose in its own area of jurisdiction. During the 25 years from 1921 to 1946 the population grew from 229,212 to 320,484 - an increase of 91,272. Of this total metropolitan increment, 49,958 accrued to the city of Winnipeg and 41,314 accrued to the suburbs; the suburbs, thus, were not very far behind the city in their share of the metropolitan population increase. In terms of the percentage increase, however, they left the city far behind. The City of Winnipeg during the two and one half decades grew from 179,087 to 229,045, an increase of 27.89 per cent; the suburbs grew from 50,125 to 91,439, an increase of 82.42 per cent. Clearly, the vigor of the growth was felt most powerfully in the suburbs. As the suburban population grew, the suburban identities became more sharply distinguished and more deeply entrenched. The suburban residents identified themselves ever more staunchly with their local community, and the municipal councils grew ever more jealous and protective of their local authority. The historical pattern of suburban growth, strong local community identity, and entrenched multiple municipal governments has probably been the most powerful single influence on the planning and development of metropolitan Winnipeg and continues to affect those aspects of the city's government today.

In spite of the more vigorous growth rate of the suburbs, the City of Winnipeg, in absolute numbers, was still the dominant centre, and the problems of servicing the urban population were more pressing there than in the suburbs. Nevertheless, the over-all growth of the metropolitan area created problems, even in the suburbs, which could not be dealt with by individual municipalities acting alone and which required the joint action of two or more of them because their solution necessitated the crossing of either the physical boundaries or the limits of the legal and jurisdictional authority of any single municipality. In order to cope with these cross-border issues it became the

practice to establish special purpose *ad-hoc* agencies, and to enter into inter-municipal agreements. It was not until the Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg was established in 1961, and was given the responsibility for the planning and development of the entire metropolitan area, that such special agencies and arrangements became no longer necessary. Among the first of these single-purpose agencies was the Greater Winnipeg Water District, established in 1913, to which reference has already been made. The Mosquito Abatement District followed in 1927. Then, in succession, there was the Greater Winnipeg Sanitary District (1935); the St. James-Winnipeg Airport Commission (1937); the Rivers and Streams Authority No. 1 (1940); the Metropolitan Planning Commission (1949); the Metropolitan Defence Board (1951); and the Greater Winnipeg Transit Commission (1953).

Apart from these specific instances of special inter-municipal authorities, development activities in the Greater Winnipeg area were managed by the individual municipal councils themselves. The suburban municipalities, although growing, were still relatively small, and, apart from the City of St. Boniface, were still largely ruraloriented. Their notions of the planning function, as already indicated, were of the most elementary kind. In the City of Winnipeg circumstances were somewhat different. To begin with, the city's population in 1911 was 136,035. That in itself set it widely apart from the suburbs. St. Boniface, the next largest place, was only 7,483, and all the suburbs taken together only counted 20,934. A city of over 136,000 people assuredly has to cope with a different order of problems from those of a widely dispersed and politically fragmented population whose largest fragment is barely 7,500. Secondly, Winnipeg's population during the decade 1901-1911 had grown from 42,340 to 136,035, an increase of over 221 per cent. That growth rate would severely tax the city government's capacity to absorb into the city the new urban development on the basis of the established practice of providing ad hoc services as the situation might demand. Finally, as the largest and most industrialized urban centre west of Toronto,

Winnipeg had attracted many people with urban backgrounds from Ontario and Britain. A large proportion of the city's leading residents were in continuing contact with events in England and Europe through family ties, newspapers, and a variety of journals. Visiting lecturers and entertainers were frequent, both from eastern Canada and abroad. There was, accordingly, familiarity in the city with urban issues in Canada and overseas as well as in the United States. A man like the English emigre William Pearson was well aware of the 1909 town planning legislation in Britain, and the latest urban movements such as the Garden City movement in England stemming from Ebenezer Howard's Tomorrow published in 1889, the German town planning movement inspired by Camillo Sitte's Stadtebau (1889), and the City Beautiful movement deriving from the Chicago Exposition of 1893. When the Commission of Conservation was established in Ottawa in 1909, and soon exhibited its deep interest in town planning, Pearson undoubtedly smiled with approval. His paper, delivered at a banquet in a church basement in 1910 marked the beginning of a series of organizational and legislative planning measures such as the Winnipeg City Planning Commission in 1911, the Greater Winnipeg Plan Committee in 1914, and the Manitoba Town Planning Act in 1916.17

The initiative for these measures appears to have come not from the city council but rather from men like Pearson and other like-minded individuals in the community who believed in the virtues of town planning and who constantly pressed for its application in the governance of the city. There is in fact evidence of the city council's indifference and even resistance to the planning idea and the procedures required for its implementation. Under pressure from William Pearson's Town Planning Committee and the Town Planning Committee of the Winnipeg Industrial Bureau, the city council passed a by-law establishing the Winnipeg City Planning Commission on June 5, 1911. The Commission was not authorized to prepare a plan; it was merely an advisory body. Its terms of reference were to look into and report to council on the conditions and requirements attending the preparation of a comprehensive plan. The Commission

comprised 18 members drawn from a broad sweep of organizations in the city. The chairman was Mayor Sanford Evans of Winnipeg; six other members of the city council were also commissioners. In addition, the membership of the Commission included the Municipal Commissioner of the Province of Manitoba, and one representative from each of the Architects' Association, Board of Trade, Builders' Association, Industrial Bureau, Provincial Board of Health, Real Estate Exchange, Trades and Labour Council, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg Electric Railway Company, and Winnipeg Parks Board.

Soon after the Commission was established a critical difference among its members manifested itself. While a number of the members, such as Mr. Pearson and those representing the Board of Health, the Trades and Labour Council and the University were genuinely committed to the planning idea, those representing the city council and the business interests in the city were more enthusiastic about the advertising and publicity opportunity provided by the Commission than they were about its value as an instrument of civic government. The phrase "City Planning Commission" had about it the ring of civic progress, the aura of a city in which everything was up-to-date, the assurance that in this city investments would be secure and tourists would find amenities designed specifically for their comfort and diversion. One of the first duties of the Commission was to prepare and submit to the city council its budget. It asked for \$15,000. The city council approved \$7,119, which included the salary of the full-time secretary of the Commission. None of the seven commissioners who were members of the city council raised his voice in support of the original request or against the council's drastic slashing of the amount by more than half. But in the following year, 1912, the city hosted the "First Canadian Conference on Town Planning" which they advertised widely and in self-laudatory terms, and which concluded with a lavish banquet under the auspices of the Industrial Bureau. Since the Bureau received its funding from the city council it seems fairly obvious that the council, and the business representatives on the Commission, were more favourably disposed towards the

exploitation of the external public image of the Commission than they were towards funding its internal, routine, but essential work.

In spite of the lack of support by the city council, the Commission produced, in 1913, an excellent report, summarizing the work of its six committees: social survey (general social and health conditions); housing; traffic and transport; river frontage and dockage; aesthetic development; and physical plan. The report was received with enthusiasm in some quarters, but with virtually complete indifference by the City Council. In the face of Council's indifference, William Pearson and a number of others formed the Winnipeg Housing and Town Planning Association in March, 1913. The objectives of this voluntary group were to pursue the implementation of the Commission's recommendations, to press for housing and planning legislation, to advocate progressive building by-laws and promote a model housing project, and to educate the public. It was largely due to the work of this Association, and on the recommendation of the City Planning Commission, that the City Council, in 1914, dissolved the Commission and appointed a Greater Winnipeg Plan Committee. And in 1916, again largely due to the pressures of the small, dedicated group of planning enthusiasts, the provincial government enacted the Manitoba Town Planning Act.

The Greater Winnipeg Plan Committee was made up of the Mayor, four citizens, and some trained technical staff. It concerned itself with the preparation of a street plan for the city and with the control of development on specific properties, on an *ad hoc* basis. After the establishment of the Manitoba Town Planning Act, the Greater Winnipeg Plan Committee continued to function and to deal mainly with zoning matters. It produced a comprehensive zoning report in 1936. It was, however, like the commission which preceded it, only an advisory body. During its entire life, which extended for 30 years, the role of the Greater Winnipeg Plan Committee had no administrative responsibility or legislative powers. Such zoning regulations as the council adopted from time to time on the committee's recommendation were administered by a committee

of the city council known as the Zoning Board. Following the production of its comprehensive zoning package, the work of the Greater Winnipeg Plan Committee became less and less useful while the need for a more effective planning body was more pressing. In May, 1944 the Council of the City of Winnipeg appointed the Winnipeg Town Planning Commission to replace the Greater Winnipeg Plan Committee. The Commission was made up of the Mayor, three Aldermen, seven citizens at large, and a civic engineer.

The world at that time was already well into the fifth year of World War II. From its beginning in September 1939, the war had gone badly for the Allies. In 1943, however, it began to turn in their favour. In that year the German armies were smashed before Stalingrad and Marshal Von Paulus surrendered his eastern front forces; the British and American armies linked up in North Africa and Marshal Rommel, the Desert Fox, was driven into retreat and the German Afrikacorps surrendered in Tunisia; the Allies landed in Sicily in July and Italy surrendered in September; the Americans destroyed a 22-ship Japanese convoy in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea and went on to take New Guinea, the Aleutians, and other islands in the Pacific; and the leaders of the super-powers, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin, met in a series of conferences - Casablanca, Quebec, Teheran - to plan the prosecution of the war, the achievement of the final unconditional surrender, and the terms of the post-war settlement.

In this atmosphere of greatly improved military fortunes, and growing optimism, the thoughts of the governments of Canada and the provinces were turning to the challenges which would face them in the aftermath of the war. In Manitoba, in 1943, the Progressive Party under Premier Stuart Garson formed the government. The Speech from the Throne which opened the 2nd Session of the Legislature, that year contained the following passage:

With the return of peace-time conditions, the men and women of the Armed Forces, many of whom because of their youth and as a result of conditions then existing had not been employed prior to the war, will require gainful employment in peace time industry. Many thousands of men and women now engaged in war industries will find it necessary to seek employment in other fields. Technological changes which have been accelerated by wartime rapid industrial expansion will cause further displacements....

Arising out of these considerations my Ministers have come to regard the preparation of plans relating to those branches of post-war reconstruction as fall within the jurisdiction of the province as being foremost amongst the many tasks demanding their attention.

Studies looking toward the preparation of plans with regard to specific projects have been under way for several months....

[S]tudies are being conducted as to the following matters:

- 1. Projects of social and human betterment.
- 2. Projects to promote the development, conservation, and most efficient utilization of Manitoba's natural resources.
- 3. Projects to prevent economic waste.
- 4. Projects to improve community living conditions.
- 5. Projects to promote the more efficient production, distribution, and marketing of Manitoba products.
- 6. Projects to develop recreational areas and promote the tourist industry. 18

At this stage the idea of a post-war program was still in its formative stage. Exploratory studies were being assigned to the various Ministers on the basis of their own departmental interests and initiatives. The studies were still underway, their findings still incomplete and uncoordinated, and the programs which were to be based upon them still to be conceived and formulated. By the following year, however, substantial progress had been made, and the policy and administrative aspects of the intended program were put in place. The Speech from the Throne in 1944 contained the following observations and report:

The effective carrying out of a post-war program for Canada will involve and require the active support of the Federal Government, the provincial governments, labour, employers, the primary producers and the

Canadian citizens generally. It will involve and require a large measure of co-operation between all of these governments, bodies, and groups, and an equally large measure of co-ordination of their several activities in support of one national plan. Since my Government's contribution will be made by and through its departments such co-ordination is being provided within the Government by an inter-departmental coordinating committee, appointed by my Government in April, 1943, and consisting of the deputy minister of each of the departments of my Government. This deputy ministers' committee is responsible to my Government itself through a post-war sub-committee of the Executive Council, consisting of Honourable Messrs. McDiarmid, Campbell, and Willis, under chairmanship of the Premier. Of the deputy ministers' committee there is an executive sub-committee, consisting of Messrs. Stephen, Fisher, and Pearson, with Prof. W.J. Waines of the University of Manitoba, as economist and adviser.19

The organizational umbrella under which these various committees and subcommittees were subsumed was the Post War Reconstruction Committee. The deputy
ministers' committee, and in particular its executive sub-committee was the dynamo
which activated the entire organization. It soon became apparent to the committee and its
executive that the City of Winnipeg was a critical factor in their assignment. They were
impressed with the need for co-ordinating planning and development control activities
across the whole of the metropolitan area, and realized the virtual impossibility of doing
so within the existing structure of municipal government in the Greater Winnipeg area.
With a view to discussing the possibility of creating a suitable body for this purpose, the
committee convened a meeting with the municipal officials of the metropolitan area in
October 1943.

Out of that meeting came a recommendation to establish a Metropolitan Planning Committee. Such a Committee was established in 1944, made up of two representatives from the Provincial government and two from each of the municipalities in Greater Winnipeg. Comprising the Metropolitan Planning Committee were members of the councils of the City of Winnipeg, the City of St. Boniface, the Town of Transcona, the

Town of Tuxedo, the Village of Brooklands, and the Rural Municipalities of Assiniboia, Charleswood, East Kildonan, Fort Garry, St. James, St. Vital, and West Kildonan. The two provincial appointees were Mr. Ralph McN. Pearson, who held the office of Treasurer of the Committee and Prof. W.J. Waines, who was the committee's Economic Consultant and who also served some time as the committee's chairman. Both of these latter provincial government appointees to the committee were members of the province's Post War Reconstruction Committee - Mr. Pearson in fact was a government deputy minister - and so it is not surprising that the Metropolitan Planning Committee was oriented toward provincial government concerns which were largely dominated by the issue of the expected post-war housing crisis. Their orientation in this direction may also have been influenced by the fact that generous amounts of federal government monies were available for programs in post-war housing. In spite of this orientation however, the committee accomplished little in terms of providing post-war housing.

Shortly after the creation of the Metropolitan Planning Committee at provincial initiative, the City of Winnipeg established its own City of Winnipeg Town Planning Commission, in May 1944, to replace its former Greater Winnipeg Plan Committee. It is interesting to note that the Greater Winnipeg Plan Committee had been in existence since 1914, and although it had produced some impressive studies culminating in its comprehensive zoning report in 1936, it accomplished nothing after that date. During the eight years between 1936 and 1944 the Greater Winnipeg Plan Committee was inert, but the city council took no notice of its quiescence, nor did it move to terminate or replace it until the municipalities in the metropolitan area were organized into the Metropolitan Planning Committee under the auspices of the provincial government. It is as if that action catalyzed the city council into a countering action. The provincial-sponsored committee and the city-appointed commission were established within short months of each other, but it may perhaps be an unwarranted suspicion to read into this something more than a coincidence. Nevertheless, inter-jurisdictional rivalry has often

motivated the decisions and actions of governments, and in the Greater Winnipeg area there have always been contentions and jealousies between the suburban municipalities and the central city.

In any case, almost immediately upon the establishment of the Winnipeg Town Planning Commission, it was recognized that the objectives of the two bodies were similar and that inevitably there would be an overlapping and duplication, and even conflicts. On June 19, 1944, barely one month after the creation of the city's commission, a meeting was held between the two bodies to discuss the matter and formulate a solution for the anticipated difficulties. As a result of this meeting there was formed in the following month, July, 1944, a Joint Executive Committee on Metropolitan Planning, made up of five members from each of the two parent bodies. Professor W.J. Waines moved over from his chairmanship of the Metropolitan Planning Committee to chair the new Joint Executive Committee.

The two bodies continued to co-exist in this form for about four years. The major undertaking of the joint body was the preparation of a comprehensive master plan for the Greater Winnipeg area, and in order to provide the technical resources for their undertaking the consulting firm of Earl O. Mills, of St. Louis, Missouri, was engaged on November 13, 1944, to act as professional adviser to the Joint Executive Committee on Metropolitan Planning. In addition, an in-house technical planning staff was established, headed by Eric W. Thrift. This technical staff was responsible to Earl O. Mills, who was responsible to the Joint Executive Committee, which in turn was responsible to the respective parent bodies - the Metropolitan Planning Committee and the Winnipeg Town Planning Commission. The cost of preparing the Master Plan was estimated at \$55,000, of which amount the province was to contribute \$11,750.

## 5. Prelude to Metropolitan Government

Towards the end of 1948 shortcomings and inadequacies were becoming seriously obstructive. The Metropolitan Planning Committee still reflected the position of the provincial government whose principal interest continued to be housing. The Winnipeg Town Planning Commission by its very nature represented only the interests of the City of Winnipeg. There was an increasing concern that metropolitan-wide problems still could not be, and in fact were not being addressed by the Joint Executive Committee arrangement. One of the serious impediments was that only a minority of the Greater Winnipeg municipalities was represented on the Joint Executive. The need for a permanent, metro-wide, fully representative planning program able to address the full range of metropolitan issues effectively was becoming urgently felt. The notion of a planning body which would function as a municipal unit and provide advisory planning services to every municipality in the area on demand, emerged as a possible solution to the problem. Accordingly, a joint meeting of the two bodies was held in March, 1949, to draft a bill for that purpose. After receiving the approval of each of the municipalities the bill was enacted into law on April 22, 1949.

The Act was the Metropolitan Planning Commission of Greater Winnipeg Act. It created the Metropolitan Planning Commission of Greater Winnipeg. The commission was purely advisory in function, with no policy-making or administrative responsibilities. It was to be simply a permanent organization for advising on, and to that extent, co-ordinating the physical development of the metropolitan area. The former Metropolitan Planning Committee and the Joint Executive Committee became redundant and ceased to function. On June 16, 1949, a joint meeting was held between the Metropolitan Planning Committee and the Winnipeg Town Planning Commission to discuss the turning-over of the affairs of the Metropolitan Planning Committee to the new body. This was done, but the Winnipeg Town Planning Commission continued in existence, and continued to be quite active. During the period 1946-1949 the Winnipeg

Town Planning Commission had produced a number of reports on such matters as population, transportation, neighbourhood planning, etc., which provided the basic material for the work of the new Metropolitan Planning Commission. In fact, the Metropolitan Plan. Greater Winnipeg, which the Commission produced in 1950, was simply a summary of the reports that had previously been produced by the Winnipeg Town Planning Commission.

As already indicated, the Metropolitan Planning Commission was purely an advisory body whose principal role was to provide planning and development advice to its member municipalities. During 1956 and 1957 the firm of Wilbur Smith and Associates of New Haven, Connecticut, prepared a number of demographic and transportation studies for the Commission, but there was little work done by or for the Commission which addressed metropolitan problems. The work of the Commission consisted almost entirely in preparing reports for its member municipalities on request. The authority for carrying out any plans for development remained vested in the individual municipal corporations. If any of the Commission's proposals extended across municipal boundaries, they required the separate approval of each council, if they were to be implemented.

Meanwhile the metropolitan population was expanding and the metropolitan services problems were growing commensurately. During the decade and one half 1941-1956, the population of the metropolitan area grew from 302,024 to 412,243, an increase of 36.5 per cent. The City of Winnipeg, however, only grew from 221,960 to 255,093, an increase of barely 15 per cent. The suburban population grew from 80,064 in 1941 to 157,155 in 1956, an increase of over 96 per cent. Clearly the bulk of the metropolitan population increase was in the suburban municipalities, and some of that suburban municipality growth was spectacular. East Kildonan, for example, grew from 8,350 to 18,718, an increase of over 124 per cent; West Kildonan grew from 6,110 to 15,256, an increase of nearly 150 per cent; North Kildonan grew

from 1,946 to 4,451, an increase of nearly 129 per cent; and Fort Garry went from 4,453 to 13,592, a whopping increase of over 205 per cent. The City of St. Boniface grew by only a comparatively modest 59 per cent, but St. James experienced a 91 per cent increase, and St. Vital's increase was over 97 per cent. This kind of growth, undoubtedly, inspired local councils and residents with feelings of pride and confidence in their future and in their ability to manage successfully their local affairs. And indeed they were able to do so. It is understandable, then, that they would guard their autonomy jealously and would resist any arrangements which would require them to surrender any part of their jurisdiction or their authority. That is part of the reason why all of the planning bodies which were created to deal with the metropolitan area during the halfcentury from 1911 to 1961 were purely advisory bodies on which municipal membership was voluntary, and which had no legislative or administrative functions. Another, and perhaps more critical reason was that there was no provincial statute in place which provided for the creation of an authority with legislative and administrative planning powers over the entire metropolitan area which would override those of the municipal councils. But while the local councils could manage their local problems satisfactorily, metropolitan scale services - those which had to cross municipal boundaries - were deteriorating, and metropolitan scale decisions such as required for an orderly rational pattern of metropolitan growth, were neglected.

In spite of the powerful factors which worked against any effective planning measures or programs on a metropolitan scale, and encouraged the individual municipalities to seek solutions to development problems within their own corporate areas of competence, it was becoming increasingly clear that the prevailing arrangements were inadequate to cope with the rate of urbanization in the metropolitan area. Obviously some way had to be found to provide regional services, and to manage and finance regional growth more effectively. The management and particularly the financing of municipal growth however was not exclusively a concern of Winnipeg and

the other municipalities in the metropolitan area. These were issues which exercised local governments generally throughout the province, and in 1951 at the request of the Union of Manitoba Municipalities and the Manitoba Urban Association, the government of Premier Douglas L. Campbell, head of the Liberal-Progressive coalition majority in the legislature, appointed a Manitoba Provincial and Municipal Committee to address these matters. The Committee was chaired by the Premier himself, and included five cabinet ministers among its members. It struck a number of sub-committees to consider various aspects of the main Committee's mandate, which was

to enquire into provincial-municipal relations, and to recommend appropriate revisions in the financial arrangements in effect between the two levels of government. The main Committee set up a subcommittee to consider the organization of local government services in the Greater Winnipeg area....<sup>20</sup>

In its report, published in 1953 as part of the main Committee's report, the Sub-Committee recommended the establishment of "... a single Metropolitan Board which would supercede all existing Metropolitan Boards or Commissions and be responsible for all the services now being administered by these bodies, together with any other services which might in future be organized on a metropolitan basis."<sup>21</sup> In the view of the Sub-Committee "... only the establishment of such a single metropolitan authority, equipped with sufficient powers, would ensure that all necessary metropolitan facilities were constructed, that all metropolitan services were properly co-ordinated, and that costs of such services were equitably shared."<sup>22</sup>

The Sub-Committee's report went on to recommend further studies into the possibility of amalgamating some of the municipalities as well as amalgamating certain school districts, where there were more than one in a single municipality. The municipalities in the metropolitan Winnipeg area reacted favourably to the Sub-Committee's report, and attempted to organize an inter-municipal agency to pursue them, but could not agree on a financing arrangement. Finally, in July, 1955, the provincial government decided to establish a commission, funded by the province itself,

to study the problems of metropolitan Winnipeg. Each of the municipalities concerned was invited to nominate an individual for membership on the commission, and from this list the government selected five persons to constitute the Greater Winnipeg Investigating Commission.<sup>23</sup> After an exhaustive study, involving extensive travel and painstaking examination of metropolitan problems and their solutions in Canada and abroad, the Commission published its Report and Recommendations in 1959.<sup>24</sup>

Following from its investigation and analysis of the metropolitan Winnipeg problems the Greater Winnipeg Investigating Commission made a large number of sweeping but carefully reasoned recommendations, the discussion of which need not detain us here. The salient recommendation was that there be created a "municipality of Metropolitan Winnipeg" with a council of 14 members and a chairman. It further recommended that the first chairman be appointed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council and that thereafter the chairman be elected by the council. It also recommended certain amalgamations among some of the municipalities within the metropolitan area so as to form eight cities.

During its investigations, the GWIC consulted extensively with the municipalities in the metropolitan area.<sup>25</sup> They found no consensus among them on the question of how to solve the metropolitan problems. There was general recognition that serious problems existed, but opinions on the best solution varied widely, some favouring total unification, some partial amalgamation, some a two-tier system, some a mixture of a two-tier system and partial amalgamations. The City of Winnipeg, in a brief to the Commission in October 1956 favoured a two-tier metropolitan system with councillors directly elected from specially designated areas. In December 1956, however, the writer of the brief reported to the city council that he had changed his mind after studying the metropolitan system of Toronto which had been established in 1954.<sup>26</sup> There may, however, have been a much more compelling reason than the Toronto example for this quick change in attitude. Municipal elections were held in October

1956, shortly after the GWIC public hearing, and Winnipeg elected a new mayor, Stephen Juba, who had very strong convictions about how Greater Winnipeg should be governed. A two-tiered metropolitan system was not what he had in mind, and on May 25, 1957, the Winnipeg City Council voted unanimously for total unification of the metropolitan area municipalities. This position of the Mayor and the City Council was to have a powerful effect on the entire realm of municipal government in the metropolitan area for the next twelve years.

The election of Stephen Juba as Mayor of the City of Winnipeg was the biggest upset in the city's electoral history. Juba was the son of Ukrainian immigrants, and it was the first time a non-Anglo-Saxon was elected to the city's top political office. He defeated the incumbent Mayor George E. Sharpe, a successful Anglo-Saxon businessman whose father had been mayor in 1904-1906. The election was fought openly along ethnic, class, and establishment lines, and Juba's victory (he won by a margin of 2000 votes) marked the emergence of what had been a slow growing unobtrusive, scarcely noticed movement into the mainstream of the city's life by the city's ethnic ghettos. Although the residents of British origin made up the largest single ethno-cultural group in the city, people of different origins continued to swell the population of the city until, by 1961, these non-British groups, taken together, constituted 55 per cent of the total. The city at the beginning of the decade of the 1960's contained a larger proportion of people in its various ethnic groups, except for the French and Italian, than did the country as a whole.<sup>27</sup> Juba had a populist appeal arising from his ethnic background which drew the support of the working class, but he also attracted the businessman and the middle-class voter by favouring development, championing the reduction of taxes, deprecating bureaucracy and the political establishment, and promoting the city. His most advantageous characteristics, however, were a shrewd, unerring political instinct, the sensibilities of a gutter-fighter, a mastery of political manipulation, and a flair for publicity. He was the leader of the forces against the proposals for a metropolitan form

of government, and relentless in his attacks against the metropolitan government which was finally put in place in 1961.

The Liberal-Progressive coalition government of Douglas Campbell, which had commissioned the Greater Winnipeg Investigating Commission, was defeated by the Conservatives under Dufferin Roblin in the provincial election of 1958. The Campbell government had been, in effect, a do-nothing government, paralyzed by its obsession with government economy and holding down taxes. Municipal reform had not been an issue in the election campaign; the Roblin government's priorities were to increase support for education, roads, health and welfare. When the GWIC's Report and Recommendations was handed down, Roblin realized that urban reform in the metropolitan area was an important issue and that a response to the GWIC document was necessary. He personally took charge of the matter and instructed William Johnston, the then deputy minister of municipal affairs to prepare a plan. Johnston worked closely with Eric Thrift, the director of the Greater Winnipeg Planning Commission and the other members of the Commission.

Rumours concerning their work were soon circulating, and in the Fall of 1959 city newspapers carried the story that the plan was to amalgamate all the metromunicipalities within a period of eight years.<sup>28</sup> In October and November of 1959 meetings were held with the heads of the municipal governments in the area. Steve Juba urged amalgamation, as did the representatives of Charleswood, Tuxedo, and Brooklands. Others argued that the GWIC proposals would give too much power to the metropolitan government. Fears were also expressed about the loss of control over the school system and the fire and police forces, as well as the costs which unifying these services would involve. In December 1959 the proposals for a gradual amalgamation were revealed. There was to be established in 1960 a Metropolitan Council of 14 members and a chairman. This Council would progressively take over the responsibilities of the metro area municipalities, until by 1964 the municipalities would be left with only the

responsibility for residential street maintenance, traffic control, garbage collection, and one or two other minor services. A referendum would then be held in that year to decide on the issue of total amalgamation.

Initially Roblin favoured the scheme of amalgamation. But although he was progressive in his outlook, he was also prudent when it came to expenditures and taxes, and on looking further into the plan it became apparent to him that amalgamation would involve heavy costs and tax increases if services such as fire and police and the school system were to be upgraded to adequate uniform standards throughout the metropolitan area. When all the factors were duly considered Roblin decided against the amalgamation idea and its gradual, progressive implementation and instead opted for a two-tier metropolitan system. In the Fall of 1960 the government introduced the Metropolitan Winnipeg Act (Bill 62) which was passed by the legislature and took effect on January 1, 1961,<sup>29</sup> thus creating the two-tier metropolitan government known as Metropolitan Winnipeg.

## PHASE 2: THE METRO YEARS

## 1. Metro's Planning Mandate, Political Structure and First Council

The metropolitan area encompassed 14 municipalities<sup>30</sup> - the City of Winnipeg and 13 municipalities surrounding it - and the boundaries of the metropolitan area were defined by the outer boundaries of the constituent municipalities. The government of this metropolitan area was made up of two components, a "metropolitan" component, designated as the "Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg", and an "area municipalities" component made up of the surrounding municipal corporations. The "metropolitan" government had a council of ten members. The chairman of the council was initially appointed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council, but after the first four-year term the council was to elect the chairman from among its own members. The metropolitan level was given responsibility for those services which were regarded as "inter-municipal" or "metropolitan" in scope and character. These included planning,

zoning, building controls, assessment of property for tax purposes, water supply and wholesale distribution of water within the metropolitan area, sewage and land drainage, major streets and bridges, public transportation, major parks and recreation areas, civil defence and emergency measures, and mosquito abatement.

The area municipalities were left with the responsibility for those services which were considered "local" in character. These in effect included those services provided for under existing legislation but not assigned to the metropolitan government. These comprised such largely local functions as the protection of persons and property, local roads, local sewer and water distribution systems, welfare, recreation, local parks. The City of Winnipeg retained jurisdiction over its public health, electric power distribution and traffic (other than on the "regional" streets). It is noteworthy that although the metropolitan level was given full authority over planning, zoning, and building permits, and was charged with the requirement to prepare a master plan, the area municipalities retained the responsibility for providing local services and connections, and, therefore, could in effect nullify any metropolitan level approval of a development by refusing to provide the services for that development. Moreover, the Metropolitan Council had no jurisdiction over the capital works program of the area municipalities, nor over their housing and urban renewal programs. These were major constraints on the planning function of the metropolitan government, particularly since housing and urban renewal were probably the dominant issues in the field of urban planning in Canada at this time.

Metro had four major sources of revenue: (1) tax levies on each municipality in the proportion of its assessment to the total metropolitan assessment, the rate of the tax to be determined at the time of each Metro budget; (2) direct fees; (3) a share of the taxes on industrial property collected by each of the area municipalities; (4) the sale of debentures subject to the approval of the Manitoba Municipal Board if the value of the debentures exceeded \$500,000.

There was also created under the Metro Winnipeg Act, an "additional zone" surrounding the metro area and extending about five miles beyond the metro boundary, which included all or parts of four rural municipalities. The Metropolitan Corporation was given jurisdiction in this extra-territorial zone over planning, zoning, building and property assessment for tax purposes.

There was thus established, for the first time, a legislative and administrative body for dealing with inter-municipal, metropolitan-scale matters in the Greater Winnipeg area. The notion of a functional linkage between city government and city planning had come a long way from the germinal paper on "Good Citizenship" delivered at a banquet in a church basement by William Pearson in 1910, to the creation of the metropolitan government in 1960. The very title of Pearson's paper, and indeed, even the venue in which it was delivered, bespeak the moralistic roots of the early popular conception of city planning. The seminal ideas were clearly utopian and embedded in the belief in civic improvement as the certain road to society's redemption. It had taken half a century for city planning to emerge from the apocryphal rhetoric and chiliastic illusions of the early urban reform movement to become a proper function of civic government.

An important aspect of this evolutionary process is the fact that the nature and role of the municipal planning function throughout the entire period was in lock-step with the nature and role of municipal government. The planning function was simply what the municipal government made of it, and it did only what was needed of it by the municipal governments at their prevailing levels of development activities and services programs. As long as the population in the municipality continued to grow, the councillors' pride in their community and faith in its future continued to swell in their bosoms, and as long as they could continue to accommodate this burgeoning growth their confidence in their own municipal practices was constantly reconfirmed. For the most part this involved nothing more than extending the municipal services as and when

required. There was no need for more sophisticated planning measures or long-range policies. When a situation arose in which services could only be provided if two or more municipalities co-operated, then they co-operated and established ad hoc boards and commissions, although not always without reluctance and misgivings. When development reached the point where some measure of control became necessary to prevent it from getting out of hand, or to ensure the maintenance of property values or the preservation of desirable neighbourhood characteristics, they adopted a zoning by-law and extended services in order to achieve these objectives. And when development in the metro area reached the point where the City of Winnipeg was clearly carrying a burden of municipal responsibilities beyond what was its equitable portion, much of it created by the growth in the surrounding suburban municipalities, and the municipal services in the entire metro area were becoming less and less able to keep up with the need, the provincial government created a two-tier metropolitan government structure which embodied the necessary broader planning concepts appropriate to the times and the prevailing circumstances. But even then the nature of the planning function still remained ambiguous, confused between the role of preparing plans on paper on the one hand and the power to implement those plans on the other.

For the first time the city planning function was recognized as an integral function of municipal government in Greater Winnipeg, and a division of the Metropolitan Government's administration was specifically set up to perform that role, and was designated the "Planning Division." The principle of managing the growth of the metropolitan area through the adoption of development policies and objectives in a statutory long-range plan, and the control of development to conform with that plan through the instruments of zoning and building by-laws was made the formal basis of the planning function. But the distribution of powers and responsibilities between the metropolitan government and the area municipalities made the successful implementation of that principle highly uncertain; and the hostility of the City of

Winnipeg toward Metro made the ultimate demise of the two-tier metropolitan structure virtually unavoidable.

A notable feature of the metropolitan government was its electorial divisions. These departed radically from the traditional area municipality boundaries, and from the system that was adopted for the metropolitan government of Toronto. In the latter case the members of the metropolitan council were selected from the local municipal councils of the metropolitan area to which they had been elected. In the case of metropolitan Winnipeg, ten new electoral divisions were created which bore no relation to the existing area municipalities. The new constituencies were roughly wedge-shaped and ran from the perimeter of the metro area to the centre, cutting across the established area municipality boundaries. (Fig. 16.) These new political divisions had the virtue of including within their limits a wide variety of constituents with a diversity of incomes and concerns, sweeping together into a single electorate the affluent suburbs and the disadvantaged core. The councillors, with such constituencies, accordingly had to be politically sensitive to a broad spectrum of interests and could not easily ignore the needs of the metropolitan area as a whole or cater exclusively to the parochial demands of a traditionally entrenched municipal constituency. On the other hand they had the very dangerous flaw of ignoring the historically entrenched area municipalities and leaving them entirely without any direct involvement in metropolitan decisions and activities. Undoubtedly this relegation of the area municipalities to a secondary role in the affairs of the metropolis, and even to some extent in what they saw as their own affairs, fed their resentment of Metro and contributed to its ultimate failure.

Moreover, because the metropolitan electoral boundaries included portions of a number of traditional municipalities, they gave rise to a certain amount of political confusion and indifference in the new constituencies. People in the old established political constituencies did not readily identify with the new divisions and their new co-constituents, and this contributed to their feelings of alienation from the metropolitan

government. The new divisions did not entirely successfully overlay the established local identities and dispositions. Although the boundaries of the new electoral division cut across the long-established municipal boundaries, and each division included portions of at least two municipalities, they could not obliterate the social and political imprinting which history had impressed upon the various parts of the metropolitan area, and these constantly manifested themselves in the election of the divisional councillors.

The election of the first Metropolitan Government Council took place in October 1960. The councillors and the respective divisions in which they were elected were:

Division 1: Albert Edward Bennett

Division 2: James Arthur Coulter

Division 3: Saul M. Cherniack
Division 4: John Blumberg

Division 5: Jack Willis

Division 6: Bernie R. Wolfe

Division 7: Lawrence Ellis Ostrander

Division 8: R. Darwin Chase Division 9: Albert H. Fisher

Division 10: Robert E. Moffat

Premier Dufferin Roblin appointed Mr. Richard Henry Gardyne Bonnycastle as the first Chairman of the Metropolitan Corporation, and the council held its first meeting on Tuesday, November 1, 1960, although the Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg did not officially come into being until January 1, 1961.

Notwithstanding the new more-or-less wedge-shaped electoral divisions, the voting patterns which emerged re-affirmed the labour and ethnic convictions of the north and east sectors of the metropolis and the business and property orientation of the south and west. The left-wing political persuasion of the north-end was manifested in the election to the first metro council of three socialists - Coulter, Cherniack and Blumberg. Over the entire 11-year regime of Metro, there was a total of 21 councillors. Of these, six, or over 28 per cent, were socialists and members of the NDP. Of these six, four came from the north-end - Cherniack and Green from Division 3, Blumberg from Division 4,

and Coulter from Division 2 which contained a part of the north-end proper. One of the six socialists - Robertson - came from Division 1, roughly the westerly reaches of the City of Winnipeg along Portage Avenue north of the Assiniboine River; and one - Hutton - was from Division 9, at the south end of the city. This may seem to be anomalous but in fact, because of the wedge-shape of the divisions, Division 9 extended northward a considerable distance and included part of the Fort Rouge area, traditionally an enclave of young transient residents such as university students who are not typical of the middleclass conservative permanent residents of Fort Garry. Three councillors of the total of 21 were representative of the ethnic loyalties of the north-end - John Sulymko who succeeded Sidney Green in Division 3, Peter Taraska who succeeded John Blumberg in Division 4, and Ken Galanchuk who succeeded Taraska. Bernie Wolfe who represented Division 6, a large part of which was Transcona, in the east end of the metropolitan area, was not a socialist, but his views were somewhat more socially sensitive than the councillors' from the south and west divisions of Metro. Perhaps his years as a YMCA Secretary and Vice-President of the Community Welfare Planning Council influenced his social attitudes.

Thus, in spite of the departure of the metropolitan electoral division boundaries from the established municipal boundaries and the political orientations they enclosed, the traditional social and economic patterns of the metropolitan area clearly manifested themselves in the selection of the councillors to represent the ten Metropolitan government electoral divisions. Political ideology, however, was not a major factor in the operations of the Metro council. The nature of their task minimized their political differences. The infrastructure systems which were their principle responsibility - the streets, bridges, parks, sewer and water, etc. - were metropolitan-wide and had become seriously neglected and inadequate because of the parochialism of the local authorities. The metropolitan government was brought into being because of the inability to address the metro-wide issues, and the Metro council could not fulfill its

mandate if it were to continue to be impeded by parochial obstructions whether jurisdictional or ideological. And whatever their shortcomings in terms of effacing basic ideological patterns, the new electoral divisions did turn the attention of the Metro councillor away from the traditional realms of political and community entrenchment and focused it on a different, unprecedented area of responsibility which commanded a new kind of loyalty. But the force which probably exerted the most powerful cohesive pressure on the councillors, compelling them to put aside their differences and stand together in unity, was the hostility of the area municipalities. There are few occasions when people share a greater sense of solidarity than when they are under siege, and Metro was under relentless attack, spearheaded by the City of Winnipeg under Mayor Steve Juba.

## 2. The Fight Against Metro

Juba threw himself vigorously and even with great relish into the battle against Metro. "I am offering to lead this fight. I am ready to stand or fall on it .... If I have learned anything about fighting, and I have, I will use it if necessary. This is probably going to get rough"<sup>31</sup> he declared. The opponents of metro readily accepted his leadership. Indeed there could hardly have been any question about his leadership; it came to him naturally and inevitably as Mayor of the City of Winnipeg, the major municipality in the metropolitan area and the one in which the changes and dislocations of the new government structure would have the greatest impact. Beyond that, however, his personal qualities would have brought him the leadership role. Politically shrewd, ruthless and unprincipled, and undoubtedly personally ambitious and resentful that he had not been appointed as the head of the new metropolitan-wide government, he was the right man at the right place and the right time to lead the anti-Metro forces. In May 1961 he convened a public meeting at the city hall to attack Metro. It drew an enormous crowd; an overflow of some 400 people had to be turned away.

Support for Juba, however, was not universal. On Monday June 5, 1961, under the heading "<u>Facts' Demanded</u> Juba Stands Alone In Anti-Metro War", the <u>Winnipeg</u>

<u>Tribune</u> reported:

Mayor Stephen Juba, it appears, will have a lonely fight on his hands, if he goes ahead with his announced war against Metro.

Suburban mayors and councillors Monday were generally agreed they weren't interested in solving their problems Mayor Juba's way.

The comments included some bitter attacks on the mayor with the charge that "he wants to see Metro destroyed." And Metro Councillor Robert Moffat has challenged the mayor to "stop talking meaningless generalities and get down to hard facts." 32

The <u>Tribune</u> story went on to report interviews with a number of suburban mayors and councillors: Mayor George Suttie of East Kildonan; Reeve A.E. Christianson of West St. Paul; Mayor Thomas Copeland of Transcona; Mayor Fred Brennan of St. Vital; Deputy Mayor Joseph St. Hilaire of St. Boniface; Deputy Mayor Saul Miller of West Kildonan; Alderman David Graham of St. James; Deputy Mayor J.R.C. Clouthier of Fort Garry. None of them supported Mayor Juba. Typical of their views was that of Deputy Mayor Clouthier of Fort Garry:

I think Mayor Juba will be all by himself. The argument is between the City of Winnipeg and Metro. We would go to Metro ourselves if we had problems here.

And Alderman David Graham of St. James:

Before we would say anything out our way we would like to study what Mayor Juba has said. They were very vague statements.

Perhaps the most perceptive of the comments was that of Deputy Mayor Saul Miller of West Kildonan:

As far as I'm concerned this is another display of Jubaism. It's a wonderful way to attract attention. West Kildonan has criticized Metro but our criticism is not meant to destroy, it is meant to assist. That I think is where we basically differ from Mayor Juba.<sup>33</sup>

On Tuesday, June 6, 1961, the <u>Winnipeg Free Press</u> ran an editorial under the heading "Back-handed Help":

In spite of himself, Mayor Juba appears to have done Metro a large service. His dog-in-a-manger anti-Metro ploys have finally reached a stage where they have persuaded even Metro's cooler friends that the best course for the future of metropolitan Winnipeg lies with Metro.

Just what Mayor Juba's objection to Metro is remains unclear. What has become quite unmistakable is that the Mayor intends to push every stick he can find along the way into the Metro wheel. It must be hoped for the sake of Winnipeg and all the metropolitan municipalities that he does not in fact "want to see Metro destroyed." Metro was created for the greater good of all the people of this community and one local politician, however popular he is, or may have been, cannot thwart it in what it is trying to do....

The irony is that, hitherto, many area municipalities have been reluctant to demonstrate their support. Now Mayor Juba, with his sweepingly broad allegations against Metro, has appealed to the municipalities' sense of fair play. In achieving this, he has served Metro's cause. He has done his own no good at all.<sup>34</sup>

Metro moved very quickly to assume its responsibilities. On January 1, 1961, immediately upon coming into being it took control of assessment, planning, sewage treatment and water supply, and transit. By April 1 it had added building permits and inspections, civil defence, mosquito abatement, parks and recreation including municipal golf courses and the zoo. And by May 1 it had assumed control over the metropolitan street system, arterial traffic and bridges.

The area municipalities were dismayed by the speed of the take-over. They were even more upset by the new levels of taxation. Metro's first budget (1961) ran at about \$5 million. This money was to be raised half from the business tax and half from the real property tax. The Metro property tax levy was applied to an equalized assessment base for the entire metropolitan area which immediately produced an increase in the

taxes of property owners in some of the municipalities where rates had previously been low. In addition, school taxes were ballooning, and when all of this was added up in the tax bill there were some very surprised and unhappy ratepayers. For example, the City of Winnipeg's tax rate rose by 7 mills; East Kildonan's by 8 mills; Assiniboia's by 15 mills. Local politicians immediately blamed the entire new burden on Metro, and the clear exposition of the facts in the situation by Metro and by the Winnipeg daily newspapers<sup>35</sup> - that most of the increases were due to normal municipal expenditures and the undertaking of formerly woefully neglected services improvements - did little to absolve Metro.

Resentment and hostility toward Metro, although not universal, was widespread and immediate. The antagonism of the area municipalities was not so much towards the principle of metropolitan government but generally towards the form it had been given. Certainly they did not favour total amalgamation, which was Steve Juba's unrelenting strident demand. Total amalgamation from the perspective of the area municipalities was seen as nothing less than wholesale annexation by the City of Winnipeg and there was little enthusiasm for this idea among most of them. The most bitter opposition to Metro, however, arose out of the specific projects which metro moved to undertake in carrying out its statutory responsibilities.

Perhaps the most acrimonious and prolonged of these were the disputes over Metro's bridge and road proposals. The struggle with St. James over the St. James bridge across the Assiniboine River connecting Madison Avenue on the north side with Academy Road on the south side was even taken to the Minister of Public Works in Ottawa, in an effort by the St. James council to prevent the project.<sup>36</sup> Since the Assiniboine River is classed as an inter-provincial navigable stream it comes under Ottawa's jurisdiction. Ottawa's approval was temporarily withdrawn pending the Minister's investigation. The Minister's decision was to approve the project<sup>37</sup> and the bridge was eventually constructed. Similar resistance was mounted against the Portage Avenue underpass;

against a bridge across the Red River in south St. Vital at the south end of Osborne Street; against Metro's 25-year street development program, its transit program, its sewage lagoon proposals. Metro could scarcely utter an idea without stirring up a hornets nest of swarming, stinging opposition.

In part the hostility arose out of the fact that not all of the area municipalities stood to derive direct benefits from some of Metro's projects, but would nevertheless have to help pay for them. In part the hostility arose out of the fact that some of Metro's development proposal undoubtedly threatened the comfort and vested interests of home owners, residential communities, and businesses affected by the proposals: roads and bridges almost invariably involve land expropriations, introduce heavier traffic flows, and change the appearance and character of an area; sewage lagoons stink and reduce the value of affected properties. But the hostility also was rooted in the resentment by the local councils of the loss of their prestige and power, and probably even in the very normal resistance of most people to anything which disturbs or changes their wellestablished and comfortable routines and way of life. Some area councillors may even have opposed Metro because they feared the possible loss of their jobs which they foresaw as threatened by further municipal government changes flowing from the initial Metro innovation. But some part of the negative reaction may also be attributed to the withdrawal of the provincial government from the metro Winnipeg scene and its indifference to, or at least its non-involvement in the metropolitan urban issues.

The Roblin government, having created Metro, presumably felt, as the government of the whole of Manitoba, and with its political strength lying in the rural constituencies, that it had done its duty by Metropolitan Winnipeg, and turned its attention elsewhere. It had provided Metro with a transitional grant which was little more than a token gesture: it amounted to \$100,000. And when Metro requested a grant of \$2 million in 1961 they were told that Metro would receive no grants other than those to which any municipality was entitled.<sup>38</sup> To compound the injury the Roblin

government increased its tax on fuel in 1961 which wiped out about \$65,000 of the \$100,000 transitional grant. The government also cut its contributions to road construction in the Greater Winnipeg area, so that by 1962 it was only spending \$660,000 as compared with \$994,000 before the creation of Metro.

The aloofness of the Roblin government to Metro's straits provoked a protest from Metro. As reported in the <u>Winnipeg Free Press</u> of Tuesday, February 15, 1962:

Metro Councillor Bernie Wolfe Tuesday charged Premier Duff Roblin with "political irresponsibility" in his relations with Metro during its first year.... "The province has been politically irresponsible, in my view, by throwing Metro to the wolves with no verbal or financial support...." Councillor Wolfe also said the premier "established a new form of government without encouraging it, or giving it sufficient financial support other than with a mere pittance."

One week later, on February 22, the same charge was made against the Roblin government in the provincial legislature. Under the heading "Roblin Failing Metro" the Winnipeg Tribune of Friday, February 23, reported:

A rise in property taxes this coming year will be blamed on the provincial government rather than on Metro, an angry NDP backbencher - David Orlikow - charged in the House Thursday.

Mr. Orlikow's speech - one of the hardest hitting of the session so far - was the second major assault on the provincial government's handling of Metro in as many days.

He accused the Roblin government of failing in its promises to keep property taxes down, to provide enough money for Metro government operations and of not anticipating the financial implications of Metro when it was planned.<sup>40</sup>

Early in 1961, the Metropolitan Corporation, reacting to the constant complaints and criticisms from the area municipalities on the issues of taxation and costs, had commissioned a study by Gordon Blake and H. Carl Goldenberg to examine and report on the whole question of metropolitan finance and taxation. Their report was submitted to

the Corporation in September 1961.<sup>41</sup> It recommended that the entire business tax revenues accrue to the Metropolitan Corporation. The area municipalities were already bringing heavy pressure to bear upon the provincial government for more financial assistance. Clearly, they argued, if they were to lose the business tax revenues they would be in an even sorrier state financially. The fact that Metro's levy upon the municipalities would be thereby reduced did not seem to affect their position. The province then asked K. Grant Crawford of Queen's University to examine the Blake-Goldenberg report as well as the issues of inter-governmental liaison and amalgamation. Professor Crawford never submitted a report, but the province decided not to accept the Blake-Goldenberg recommendations.

Meanwhile, Steve Juba persisted in his scathing derogations and blatant, outrageous but unsupported accusations against Metro. A <u>Winnipeg Tribune</u> editorial on Tuesday, June 6, 1961, under the caption "Be Specific" observed in part:

Mayor Juba has never made any secret about the form of municipal government he favors for Greater Winnipeg....

With the record of support for one big city, it was hardly to be expected that the Winnipeg City Council would be overjoyed by the form of Metro government approved by the Legislature. The Winnipeg Council not only failed to become governing body for the whole metropolitan area, but the creation of the Metro Council in effect demoted it from its traditional kingpin position....

Mayor Juba accuses Metro of failing to co-operate with the city. Vague charges of this kind serve only to confuse the public and to embitter relations. Juba should be specific. He should give chapter and verse on how Metro is failing to co-operate, if indeed it is....<sup>42</sup>

On Tuesday, May 29, 1962, Steve Juba and Richard Bonnycastle met in a televised debate. The tall, patrician, legally-trained head of Metro parried Juba's thrusts with dignified, logical, statesman-like rebuttals. But the mayor's predatory energy, flagrant fabrications and half-truths won the applause of the opinionated

viewers. Juba's parting shot was typical of his tactics. "In Metro," he sneered "they do business over whiskey glasses." It drew some protests from the public but delighted as many as it offended.<sup>43</sup> The general verdict, however, was that the contest was a draw. Some months later, while on a private visit to Fort William, Juba was interviewed, during which he said the "the Metropolitan Winnipeg government has a dictatorial attitude and is guilty of arrogance, inefficiency, duplication, and waste."<sup>44</sup>

Bonnycastle could not allow such slurs to go unanswered. In a speech to the Civics Bureau of the Winnipeg Chamber of Commerce he said:

I can no longer sit back and allow these deliberate misrepresentations to be foisted on the public. I am serving notice to the people who are spreading these lies that I'm going to answer them.<sup>45</sup>

Metropolitan Winnipeg could not be expected to dominate the Roblin government's agenda. Aside from the fact that the Conservatives owed their majority to the rural sector of the province, there were serious problems of finance and administration among the rural municipalities and their small urban centres which demanded attention. The government turned to these issues and appointed the Municipal Enquiry Commission with terms of reference to examine municipal organization and financing in the province at large. The Chairman of the Commission was Dr. Murray Fisher. He submitted his report in 1963, and although it did not address the problems of Metro directly, a number of his findings had relevance for metropolitan Winnipeg. Among these were his vigorous disapproval of conditional grants to municipalities and his stern admonition that municipalities should look after "things", that is, matters relating to property, and that the province should look after "people", that is, such matters as health, welfare, employment, etc.

But, Metro could not be ignored successfully for long. After all, more than half of the population of Manitoba lived in the metropolitan Winnipeg area. Moreover, the quarreling between the area municipalities, particularly the City of Winnipeg and Metro

was continuing unabated. At the annual conference of the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities, held in Toronto in May 1963, Steve Juba, in an interview, said that

He "couldn't think of a single good thing to say about Metro Winnipeg. It's so arrogant and dictatorial it can't be tolerated much longer".... He said popular feeling is so great against Metro Winnipeg than many taxpayers are refusing to pay the Metro levy on their tax bills.<sup>46</sup>

There is no evidence on the record that anyone had ever refused to pay the Metro levy, but evidence had little place in Juba's outrageous innuendos and defamations. The Metro controversy delighted the news media. It was a constant source of front-page stories. It was also a recurrent topic of debate in the Legislature. The Opposition found it a handy issue on which to attack the government. It is of course the duty of the Opposition to oppose, but much of their contention was more than mere political tactics but echoed some of the charges of the government's aloofness to the problem which were heard in other quarters. For example, in the debate in the House on the Department of Municipal Affairs estimates in April, 1963

Support for Metro came from an unexpected source, Larry Desjardins (L.-St. Boniface). A former opponent of the Metro system, Mr. Desjardins told the legislature that the time has come for the provincial government to stop the bickering between suburban municipalities and Metro.

"The government must give some leadership on the Metro question" said Mr. Desjardins. "It can't keep closing its eyes to inter-municipal squabbles, especially between Winnipeg and Metro. This kind of thing has got to stop because it's not conducive to good city management." Mr. Desjardins said the province should either give its endorsement to Metro or else "do something about it." He said much criticism of Metro Council has been justified, but now that body is being blamed for almost everything including "acts of God."<sup>47</sup>

In the face of the continuing cavilling of the area municipalities, particularly the City of Winnipeg, and the recurring charges of provincial government indifference to the Metropolitan Winnipeg issue, and being themselves without a clear position in the

matter, and lacking the support and direction of an authoritative study on which they could rest a position, the government brought in a highly reputed expert to make a thorough examination of Metro and provide them with the kind of solid analysis and recommendations they needed on which to base their metropolitan policies. The expert was Dr. Lorne Cumming, Deputy Minister of Municipal Affairs of Ontario. Dr. Cumming, in 1953, had been Chairman of the Ontario Municipal Board, and had prepared the report to the government of Ontario in which he recommended the establishment of Metropolitan Toronto, a recommendation which the government accepted and acted upon. Metro Toronto was created in 1953. Lorne Cumming clearly had outstanding credentials for examining Metro Winnipeg, and Premier Roblin invited him to be chairman of the three-man Metropolitan Winnipeg Review Commission which he had established on October 2, 1962. The other two commissioners were G. Sydney Halter, Q.C. lawyer, businessman, and Commissioner of the Canadian Football League, and Russell H. Robbins, business representative of the Carpenters' Union.

In summary, the briefs presented to the Cumming Commission by the area municipalities did not propose the termination of Metro, nor a return to the former system of completely autonomous municipalities, nor total amalgamation. Indeed, some organizations such as the Manitoba Association of Architects, the Winnipeg Housebuilders Association, the Community Planning Association and similar professional and quasi-professional planning bodies were strong and outspoken in their support of Metro in its existing form. Among the municipalities the two-tier system was endorsed in principle, but there was unanimous agreement among them on a number of proposed changes. The most frequently recurring demand was that the area municipalities should have direct representation on the Metro Council, indeed that appointees from the area municipality councils should comprise the Metro Council.

Steve Juba once again distinguished himself in his appearance before the Commission. Ellen Simmons, <u>Free Press</u> staff writer, vividly catches the

confrontational atmosphere that Juba brought with him into the hearing room, in her story of Tuesday, May 7, 1963, under the caption "Before the Cumming Commission The Mayor Loses a Battle":

Mayor Steve Juba of Winnipeg has had it in for Metro for a long time. He has attacked Metro's legislation, its operation, its councils; and he has made personal attacks on individual civil servants in Metro's employ.

He has, in short, tried to undermine Metro with every weapon in his political arsenal - and that amounts to a large variety of weapons.

It was inevitable, with this sort of background, that Mayor Juba's appearance before the Metro review commission should have been awaited with some interest. Nor was the gallery that had collected in Room 200 of the legislative building disappointed: they got an entertaining show. But they likely were somewhat surprised.

For once, Mayor Juba lost the entire battle, including his customary grandstand play for the benefit of the ill-informed voter. For, instead of creating an image of himself as the defender of the people against the bureaucratic tyrant, Metro, as he usually tries to do, Mayor Juba found the shoe on the other foot.

It is doubtful that, in the history of royal commission enquiries, any commission has ever been so disrespectfully addressed. Certainly, few witnesses before a royal commission have hitherto attempted to impugn the integrity of a duly appointed commission as Mayor Juba appeared to do on Monday.

When Mr. Juba took the stand on Winnipeg's behalf, he accused the corporation of lack of co-operation, or arrogance (in failing to let people know what it was doing), of "Alice in Wonderland" thinking (for publicizing its programs too well), for painting Metro's name on street construction signs ("to give the impression Metro is really cooking with gas") and for wasting money by printing information pamphlets.

Mayor Juba became more petulant and snappish with every attempt by Commissioner Lorne Cumming to elicit some factual information in support of the mayor's violent charges. (He even railed at the chief commissioner for presuming to interrupt him). Finally after 20 minutes of trying to establish some sort of evidence that would aid the commission in

setting its recommendations, Commissioner Cumming pushed back his chair and gave up.

"You go right ahead in your own way," he told the Mayor. "Just try to stick to what Metro has actually done."

Mr. Juba promptly and angrily accused the commissioner of pro-Metro bias, and waved aloft newspaper clippings which allegedly established that the commission was not impartial.

Commissioner Cumming refused to become involved in this ploy and the Mayor suddenly found himself thrashing the air.

He stopped talking, turned the microphone over to his subordinates, and contented himself for the rest of the hearing with stage-whispered contradictions of the evidence submitted by members of his delegation....<sup>48</sup>

Later, outside the hearing room, Mayor Juba said that despite its bias, the commission would likely recommend a larger Metro Council composed of elected municipal council members to be appointed locally to the Metro government. "I am certain this will be realized. The municipalities are going to form the next Metro council."

But the Mayor's certainty was ill-founded. The Cumming Commission report was presented to Premier Duff Roblin on February 21, 1964.<sup>50</sup> Not only did it belie Juba's certain prediction, but it also ignored most of the area municipalities' complaints. Its main recommendations were:

- No municipal representative should serve directly on the Metro council;
- Business tax and real property tax should be subject to the same mill rate;
- A four-year term of office for all Metro councillors instead of the twoyear system which was scheduled to go into effect in the Fall of 1964;
- Metro area should be reduced from 235.1 square miles to 170 square miles;
- Macdonald, Rosser, East St. Paul, West St. Paul and Springfield should not be part of the Metro area;
- Metro's master development plan should be regarded as a statement of policy rather than a legal document to freeze properties;

 The Board of Adjustment should have its power reduced so that it can only vary existing by-laws instead of making changes which contravene existing zoning.

On the issue of the value of the Metro Corporation and the two-tier system of government, the Cumming report said:

On the whole, the basic advantages of the local government system established by the Act, have been demonstrated beyond question even at this early date.... We have found no justifiable grounds for criticism and no real defects in the internal administrative organizations.... Although we have made a number of recommendations which in our opinion will improve inter-government relationships.... it should be apparent that we have found no need for any change in the basic principles of the statute.<sup>51</sup>

The complaints of the area municipalities had not been addressed in the report, and the province took no action on the political issue of area municipality representation on the Metro council. In exasperation, Mayor Juba called a referendum, to be held April 8, 1964, which asked two questions: (1) should Metro be abolished, and (2) should there be total amalgamation of the area municipalities. On the question of abolishing Metro 28,389 Winnipegers voted "yes" and only 12,058 voted "no." On the question of amalgamation 25,049 Winnipegers voted "yes", and 15,179 voted "no." The vote had no legal force but the opponents of Metro saw it as a clear victory. On the other hand, the total number of votes cast represented only about 25.5 per cent of the eligible voters, and the pro-Metro forces claimed that the very low turn-out was a clear indication that the people rejected the anti-Metro confrontation orchestrated by Mayor Juba. 52

## 3. Metro Planning as an Administrative Function

Reassured by the findings and recommendations of the Cumming report, Metro turned to its tasks with renewed confidence and vigor. The Streets and Transit Division was the strongest unit in the Metro administration, and the matters for which it was responsible were the subject of the most frequent and heated public contention. This was so not only because of the competence and boldness of the Division in formulating and

pressing on with its programs, but also because North Americans have been fascinated by the automobile since it first appeared on the streets, and municipal governments have from that time always accorded the matter of streets and automobile traffic the highest place on their agendas. In addition, the capital projects of the transportation system are among the costliest in the municipal budget and inevitably provoke intense debate.

Metro's Planning Division was established as a discreet unit in the administration comparable to the other Divisions. The planning of the metropolitan transportation, utilities, parks, etc. systems and the "planning" of the metropolitan area were thus the respective responsibilities of separate units of the Metro administration. This separation of the various functions was not peculiar to Metro; in fact it is the arrangement found in all municipal governments. But even if it is the common practice, there seems something odd, perhaps even self-contradictory, in the assignment of the responsibility for the preparation of a development plan for the entire metropolitan area to one department of the government, and the responsibility for planning all the infrastructure systems to various other departments. There must be, it is true, a division of labour in any bureaucracy, and the more complex the work of the bureaucracy the more complex the division of labour. The success of the over-all operation depends to a large extent on how well the work of its several components is co-But the separation of the development planning function and the ordinated. transportation and utilities planning functions has roots which go deeper than merely the efficient division of labour.

Civil engineering is synonymous with municipal public works; the civil engineer has been part of city-building since cities were first built. Sewer and water systems are the life-support systems of the urban population; without them life in the contemporary city would scarcely be possible and would constantly be ravaged by epidemic diseases. But sewer and water systems are underground and invisible; and what is out of sight is easily out of mind. The automobile on the other hand is highly

visible and enchanting, and when it made its appearance on the street it quickly became the darling of the North American public. The traffic engineer soon became the preeminent municipal engineer, and the transportation system soon displaced the vital but underground systems as the pet public work of the municipal council. The city planner was a very late arrival, an upstart, in this long-established and proven company of city-building experts. There have, of course, always been city planners, but throughout history they have appeared in various identities: absolute rulers, secular princes, military generals, princes of the church, engineers, architects, social reform activists, even artists, but the city planner in his contemporary incarnation as a member of the municipal government bureaucracy is of very recent date.

It was not until the urban explosion following World War II that municipalities were forced by the pressure of growth to adopt comprehensive city-planning by-laws. The new provincial legislation and the municipal by-laws contained features which were departures from the traditional types of municipal legislation and required personnel to administer them who where conversant with the meaning and intent of these new legislative provisions. There had been planning schemes and by-laws for some time before the second World War, but they were usually very limited in scope and application, typically prescribing certain limitations on the use of land in certain designated areas of the municipality. It was not until the post-World War Ii era that the notion of the long-range comprehensive municipal plan emerged, and along with it the role of the contemporary city planner. The Metro Winnipeg Act was the first piece of legislation to mandate a comprehensive plan for the metropolitan Winnipeg area and to provide for a bureaucracy to be responsible for its preparation. It would not have been possible for the traditional municipal engineers, trained in the techniques of water supply and sewage disposal or street and bridge construction and traffic flows and controls readily to have carried out the planning mandate of the Metro Act. It introduced ideas with which they were not familiar, and with which the typical engineering mind

was not in tune. Up until then there had been nothing in the provincial planning statutes with which they were not quite comfortable.

Manitoba's first planning statute - the <u>Town Planning Act</u> of 1916<sup>53</sup> - clearly was cast in terms of the entrenched concept of planning as an exercise in the control of land use. Its subtitle was

An Act relating to Planning and Regulating the Use of Land for Building Purposes.

The Act provided that

A town planning scheme may be prepared in accordance with the provisions of this Act with the general object of securing suitable provision for traffic, proper sanitary conditions, amenity and convenience in connection with the laying out of streets and use of land and of neighbouring lands for building and other purposes.<sup>54</sup>

The municipal engineers would have been very familiar with all of this; its meaning and intent would have been clear to them. Sanitation and traffic were their home grounds and they knew every inch of it intimately. Moreover, the Act was permissive. It said that a "town planning scheme *may* be prepared.." There was no compulsion on anyone to change from the customary practice of dealing with land-use matters *ad hoc*, as they arose in the day-to-day routine.

The Metro Winnipeg Act seemed to mark the beginning of a change in the perception of the planning function and in the language of its provincial enabling statute. However, this turned out to be only an ironic confirmation of the trite but nevertheless profound Gallic aphorism: "plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose" - the more it changes, the more it remains the same thing. It held out the promise of an entirely new approach to policy-making as a role of municipal government, but that promise was never fulfilled. Part IV of the Metropolitan Winnipeg Act, the Part devoted to Planning, set out, in Section 79, the basic responsibility of the Metro Council:

- 79.(1) After the coming into force of this Part, the metropolitan council shall, subject as herein provided, as soon as is practicable cause to be prepared, approve and by by-law establish, a plan with the object of promoting orderly growth and economic development of the metropolitan area and the additional zone in the manner most advantageous to, and that will best promote those amenities that are essential to, or desirable for, the well being of, the inhabitants thereof; and may alter and enlarge the plan as the council may deem to be desirable from time to time.
- (2) The plan shall provide for all matters necessary to achieve the objects stated in subsection (1) and, in particular, shall make provision respecting the use of land including the location of all highways and public utility services and facilities.
- (3) The plan established under subsection (1) shall be known as: "The Metropolitan Development Plan." <sup>55</sup>

Subsection (2) presented nothing new or different from the traditional view of planning as the control of land-use to achieve suitable provision for traffic and public utilities. The traditional municipal engineers understood all that. So did the municipal councillors. In spite of the fact that the planning horizon was being broadened everywhere, including Manitoba, it seems obvious that the drafters of the Act and the provincial legislators also could still not let go of the entrenched view of city planning as physical planning - simply a matter of traffic and utilities layout and land-use control, or zoning. But subsection (1) contained some new ideas. It declared that the object of the Metro plan was that of "promoting orderly growth and economic development of the metropolitan area and the additional zone...." It also stipulated that the promotion of the orderly growth and economic development is to be "in the manner most advantageous to, and that will best promote those amenities that are essential to, or desirable for, the well being of, the inhabitants thereof .... The notion of orderly growth was no longer thought of in terms of physical growth alone but now was enlarged to include economic development. And amenity was no longer restricted to easy traffic flow and convenient land development but was now extended to encompass the general well-being of the

population at large. The <u>Town Planning Act</u> of 1916 had also spoken of amenity and convenience, but it was "amenity and convenience *in connection with the layout of streets and use of land....*," not in connection with achieving the well-being of the general population. Subsection (1) also made it mandatory for the Metro council to prepare such a plan rather than leaving it to the council's discretion.

These were all quite radical departures from the customary context within which the "planning" function had been conducted hitherto. They were unfamiliar ideas to both the municipal bureaucracy and the municipal councillors. Nevertheless, they were a statutory obligation, and a Planning Division was established as part of the Metro administration to address that obligation, as well as to meet the requirement of the Act that a Director of Planning be included among the officers of the Metro Corporation. Neither the rest of the administration nor the members of the council welcomed the requirement of a development plan with whole-hearted enthusiasm. They felt that it might perhaps be a good idea but could not warm to it either as a familiar technical operation or a useful political instrument. Economic development problems and longrange policies, and comprehensive plans were things which did not fit easily into their experience and perception of municipal government. Such things had to call upon a range of expertise which had not previously had an established place in the municipal bureaucracy or in the council's approach to its duties as a government. They could, however, identify closely with the zoning and building inspections and licensing role of the Planning Division, and it was these matters about which they felt comfortable and could handle both politically and administratively with a sense of familiarity and ease. The prevailing attitudes in the municipal realm - among the politicians, the administration, the general public - seems to have confirmed the views of Dr. Fisher as expressed in his report of the Municipal Enquiry Commission of 1963, that municipalities should look after "things" and the province should look after "people."

The Metropolitan Development Plan as conceived in the Metro Act was intended to be a guiding master plan for the development of the metropolitan area, not only with respect to "things" as provided in subsection (2), but also, in a vague, unprecedented way, with respect to "people", as provided in subsection (1). As such it might be reasonable to expect that it would be the organizing and co-ordinating instrument not only for the development of the area municipalities but also for the plans of the other Divisions of the Metro government itself. But the Metro Act left with the area municipalities the authority for their own capital works programs and projects. It also left with them the authority for the approval and licensing of local services connections. It also left with them the authority for housing and urban renewal. Without these controls Metro was powerless to carry out or even to fully enforce its master development plan. Internally, the structure of the Metro administration as laid down in the Act created the Planning Division as a separate unit along with the other Divisions comprising the Metro administration and with no specific role in co-ordinating the planning of the other Divisions; and the habitual attitudes of the professionals in the other Divisions made it impossible for the Planning Division to assume such a central "planning" role. Instead, it was customary for the other Divisions, particularly the Streets and Transit Division, to prepare their plans independently, and for the Planning Division to take note of them in formulating its own plans, or at least to avoid any serious conflict with them.

Meanwhile the Metro council felt the immediate pressures to build and upgrade the metropolitan infrastructure systems far more heavily than they felt the need to formulate long-range comprehensive policies. The various committees of the council such as the Streets and Transit Committee or the Parks and Protection Committee concentrated on their own areas of concern, but co-ordination was achieved at the administrative level or at the political level, and it was effective; there was rarely if ever a major conflict in the proposals of the various Divisions which reached the

council. In large part this was due to the quality of the directors of the Divisions, who were all competent professionals among whom there was a high level of camaraderie and co-operation and none of whom had any tendency toward ego-tripping or empire-building. Thus it was that although the Metro Act hinted that the planning function was becoming something more than simply physical planning and might include such non-physical concerns as economic development and the well-being of the population, and although the Planning Division was given the responsibility for the preparation of the metropolitan development plan, the function of the Division was still seen in terms of land-use planning, an administrative function comparable to that of streets and traffic planning, or parks planning, or utilities planning - the responsibility of a specialized, discreet unit of the Metro administration, and the development plan was still regarded as a plan of physical development which fitted land-use into the context of all the other physical plans.

## 4. The Metropolitan Development Plan

The Planning Division, upon the advent of Metro, and pursuant to Section 79 of the Metro Act, immediately set about preparing the metropolitan development plan. On September 3, 1963, the Division's report was presented to the Planning Committee of the council, which marked the beginning of the complex public hearing procedures required before the plan could receive final approval. The plan had a 25-year time horizon; its projections and proposals extended to the year 1986. Much of the plan was devoted to prediction of the metropolitan area's population and other growth. By 1986, the plan foretold, the population of Greater Winnipeg would be 791,000. (The 1986 Census gives the population as 594,551). More than 100,000 new homes would be needed over the next 23-years; there would be twice as many motor vehicles on the streets by that time; the City of Winnipeg proper would grow very slowly but the suburbs would more than treble their population. (This prediction, too, has proven to be widely off the mark). Other forecasts, such as the growth of the labour force, the

demographic structure of the population, the number of teenagers in school and the need for new school space construction, all of which were functions of the over-all population growth forecasts, were set out in the plan (and have all proven to be grossly inaccurate).

The plan also contained a number of statements of policy and a number of development proposals. It declared that there would be extensive re-zoning of land for industry in the metropolitan area; that all development would be confined within the perimeter highway; that there would be a uniform building by-law and enforceable zoning by-law for the whole area; that there would be greater emphasis on aesthetics in the area's architecture as well as on pedestrian movement and comfort for the pedestrian, particularly in the downtown; that shopping plazas would be given preference over strip type shopping malls. The plan proposed to double the park acreage in the metropolitan area over the next five years. It also contained a 25-year plan for streets, bridges, and freeways estimated to cost \$150 million.

Apart from the estimated cost of the transportation proposals, which had already been formulated and made public by the Streets and Transit Division some time ago, the Metropolitan Development Plan contained no discussion of the costs which the plan would involve. Nor did it contain any indication of a specific schedule for implementing any of its component parts, nor any specific measures for realizing them. It spoke in the most general terms of Metro's powers to take direct action, such as its authority to construct streets or acquire parks. It also referred to Metro's jurisdiction to regulate development under its building, zoning, and occupancy and maintenance by-laws. It spoke vaguely about liaison and working with the area municipalities to achieve the plan's objectives. And it emphasized that the plan was not fixed and static but could be revised from time to time to meet changing conditions.

On Thursday, October 11, 1963, the first meeting of a special consultative committee to review the development plan was held following a regular meeting of the

Metro council. The committee was made up of about 60 representatives of 34 local governments - municipal councils, school boards, and school divisions. The reaction to the plan was mixed. The school system representatives generally praised the plan and pledged their support. Among the municipalities there was a mixed reaction. None of them condemned the plan, but a number of specific items provoked criticism. Mayor Juba asked that the meeting be adjourned to allow the City of Winnipeg time to study and respond to the plan. The meeting was then adjourned with the understanding that the City of Winnipeg would respond within a month's time.

A committee consisting of the city solicitor, the city surveyor, the city engineer and the financial commissioner was struck to review the plan and prepare a report. The report of the City's committee stated that

It is difficult to determine to what extent the population density requirements (set out in the plan as the basis for many of Metro's ideas) will affect particular lands and therefore difficult for an owner to know to what extent, if any, he will be damaged....

It seems that in fairness the Development Plan should either not have the binding effect given it by the Metro Act or should indicate the changes permitted in land use more clearly, and should omit the proposed changes which cannot be clearly defined....

The Draft Development Plan could at best serve as a guide to assist the Corporation in carrying out its own functions.<sup>56</sup>

The report also noted that the plan dealt in general terms with the downtown area, but gave no real indication or direction to its future. It commented that given the general vagueness of the plan and the absence of any cost estimates "it should therefore be understood that these proposals are necessarily speculation and may not be possible of implementation on a practical basis." 57

The first public meeting on the Metropolitan Development Plan was held on the evening of November 21, 1963. The plan was met with mixed opinions just as it was at its presentation to the consultative committee a month earlier. The City of Winnipeg's opposition was set out in the report of its special committee. The distribution of industrial land proposed in the plan was a point of serious concern to the Metro council. Moreover, the report of the Cumming commission was expected some time during the next couple of months, and it might well have something to say relevant to the plan. And Metro itself had applied for amendments to the Metro Act which would affect the plan. In the face of all of these considerations the Metro council put on hold any further public hearings. When the Cumming report was published in February, 1964, several of its recommendations, such as those relating to changes in the municipal membership of Metro, the Metro boundaries and the suggestion that the Development Plan not be a legally binding by-law gave the council further pause. The plan was withdrawn and reworked, and a second series of public hearings was held. But again there were problems serious enough to require reconsideration, and again the plan was re-worked. By early 1966 it was ready for Metro council's approval. But council, uneasy about the plan's rough passage up to that point, and wanting re-assurance on its soundness and acceptability, decided to appoint a panel of five consultants to provide a "second opinion." These experts spent two sessions of a week each discussing the plan with Metro council and the administration. Finally the council was satisfied that it could proceed and gave the plan by-law its first reading on October 13, 1966. Second reading was given more than a year later, on November 23, 1967. It was then referred to the Minister of Municipal Affairs who approved it about four months later on April 2, 1968. The Metro council gave it third reading on April 11, 1968, and the plan passed into law.

## 5. <u>Urban Renewal. Redevelopment and Riverbank Reclamation</u>

During the 1960's, urban renewal was perhaps the most highly visible and widespread activity in the urban planning field in Canada. This was undoubtedly due to a

1956 amendment of the National Housing Act<sup>58</sup> which allowed the redevelopment of land for its "highest and best use" whether that be low-rental housing, high-rental housing, commercial, industrial or public uses. The amendment specified that areas selected for redevelopment must be substantially residential either before or after redevelopment. This meant that the project must either subtract obsolete housing or add new housing. Families displaced by a redevelopment project must be re-housed in decent, safe and sanitary accommodation. And the federal government would pay up to half the gross cost of acquiring and clearing the land.

The amendment aroused some interest in urban renewal. A large number of studies and a small number of projects were initiated across the country. In Winnipeg a study of the area bounded by Princess and Sherbrook Streets, Notre Dame Avenue and the CPR Yards, was commissioned by the City of Winnipeg and CMHC in 1956. The terms of reference of the study were to "explore and recommend proposals for rehabilitation and redevelopment within the area." The consultant responsible for carrying out the study was The Planning Research Centre of the School of Architecture of the University of Manitoba, under the direction of Prof. Wolfgang Gerson. The study was completed and the report, known as the Gerson Report, was published in 1957. It was the first of a series of urban renewal studies in which the consultants, invariably architects, stepped enthusiastically but naively and without any understanding of the realities of urban poverty, into the realm of the city's urban blight, made jejune and trite inventories of the conventional criteria of blight conditions, proposed massive, sweeping clearance and redevelopment measures which were quietly shelved, and never heard from again.

In 1961 the City of Winnipeg applied to the Province of Manitoba and CMHC for financial assistance in carrying out a redevelopment scheme for the Lord Selkirk Park Development. The area of study for this scheme was bounded by Selkirk Avenue, the CPR tracks, Main Street, and Salter Street, and came to be known as the city's Urban Renewal Area #1. The city's Housing and Urban Renewal Department was the city's technical

liaison agency but the actual analysis and design of the project was carried out by the architectural personnel of CMHC. The first phase of this scheme comprised only a part of the total study area; it identified some 166 households which were to be displaced, and was approved in 1964.<sup>60</sup> This phase of the overall concept was actually carried out<sup>61</sup> but not without the inevitable confrontation with Metro. The City's scheme did not include the blocks fronting on Main Street. Metro's Planning Division, perhaps seeking a legitimate entry into this urban redevelopment project, prepared a plan which expanded the City's scheme by the inclusion of the five blocks fronting on Main Street between Sutherland Avenue and Selkirk Avenue. but other than voicing its usual ill-tempered condemnation of Metro, the City ignored the Metro Planning Division's proposal.

The design of the re-developed area was a row-house design, strongly reminiscent of English council-housing projects, something which had rarely been seen before in Winnipeg and was an unfamiliar element in the local cityscape. At that time most of CMHC's architectural and planning staff were expatriate Englishmen, and it was the idiom with which they were familiar which was transplanted, via Ottawa, into the heart of this city on the prairies of western Canada. The completed project received a lot of criticism, not only for its design but also because it disrupted the way-of-life of a large number of poor families, and destroyed an established community. The quality of the housing which it provided was undoubtedly superior to that which it displaced - it was new, not dilapidated and derelict, its roofs did not leak, it was warm in winter, it was free of vermin, it was punctuated with ample green areas where children could play free from the dangers of through traffic, and its rental was low. But it was not what the residents were used to, and it did not house the same community as before, and it was an alien concept to Winnipegers. The rest of the development, as visualized in the original scheme, was never carried out.

Two further urban renewal studies were commissioned by the City of Winnipeg and cost-shared by CMHC and the Province of Manitoba. One was known as Urban Renewal Area #2, which was the area bounded by Main Street, Notre Dame Avenue, Arlington Street and the CPR tracks, virtually the same area as the Gerson Study. It was prepared by a firm of Toronto-based architect/planners in collaboration with Winnipeg architects, was completed in 1967, and suffered the same fate as the Gerson report. The other, Urban Renewal Area #3 was the area bounded by Main Street, the Red River, the Assiniboine River and the CPR tracks. It too was prepared by a firm of Toronto-based architect/planners in collaboration with Winnipeg architects. It was completed and the report submitted in 1969. And that was the last that was heard of it.

All of these urban renewal activities were under the authority of the City of Winnipeg since the city had jurisdiction over its own housing and urban renewal programs even though Metro was the "planning" authority for the entire metropolitan region. The Planning Division of Metro found this a nagging irritation and an inhibition of the performance of its statutory function particularly since there was little if any liaison between the city's Housing and Urban Renewal Department and Metro's Planning Division. There was, of course, no prohibition against Metro undertaking urban renewal studies on its own account, although its ability, and even its authority, to carry out redevelopment projects in the area municipalities was highly questionable.

Nevertheless, not to be left out of the realm of urban renewal activity entirely, Metro's Planning Division carried out a comprehensive urban renewal study of the metropolitan area, the preliminary report of which was that a central housing authority, metro-wide in scope, be established to control and direct urban renewal in the metropolitan region.

The City of Winnipeg immediately accused Metro of manoeuvering to take over from the city the control of urban renewal and the clearance and prevention of slums.<sup>62</sup> They pointed out that the report had been released to coincide with the visit to Winnipeg of Barnet Lieberman, Commisioner of the Department of Licenses and Inspections of the

City of Philadelphia, and a renowned expert on slum clearance and urban renewal, who was in Winnipeg as a guest of the Community Welfare Planning Council, and was scheduled to present an address to a meeting of the Council that week. In an interview he said "What you need is a consolidated housing and urban renewal agency. Split authority among different city and area governments only brings confusion. We found that out in Philadelphia and it was changed." He went on to say that a transfer of power to the bigger group was needed and that the "bigger group" here would be Metro. This was sufficient to provoke Mayor Juba into his customary splenetic outburst. He accused Metro of dragging a red herring across the city's plans for the Jarvis Avenue (Lord Selkirk Park) project, then in preparation, in an attempt to delay the city from going ahead with it. He then turned on Mr. Lieberman who had said in his press interview that slum landlords are one of the basic causes of urban blight in big cities and few cities have politicians or judges who "have the guts to put the heat on them." Juba criticized Mr. Lieberman for

"unfair and unwarranted comments which are insults to the citizens of Winnipeg.

It is most regrettable that so-called experts make such comments after a brief study of our plans."

He claimed that in 10-years Winnipeg's urban renewal development will reach the same size as that of Philadelphia, saying: "Give us a decade and we'll make them ashamed of it."

"We've got more guts than he (Mr. Lieberman) gives us credit for. I have guts to stop Metro bringing red herrings to hold up our programs," Mayor Juba said, and added that Mr. Lieberman's comments were unfounded, unwarranted and most unfair.<sup>64</sup>

There was perhaps an element of manoeuvering and one-upmanship in the timing of the release of Metro's preliminary urban renewal report. The final Metropolitan Urban Renewal Study was published in 1967, but it, like those which had been prepared

under the authority of the City of Winnipeg (except for the Lord Selkirk Park scheme) led to no further urban renewal action.

The anomalies in the planning function were not confined to those between Metro and the City of Winnipeg. The provincial government made its own particular contribution to the confusion over planning roles, the intent of the Metropolitan Winnipeg Act, and the bitter inter-governmental confrontations that marked virtually every planning and development proposal in the metropolitan area. Its special contribution to the general discord was its creation of the Civic Development Corporation. This episode seems to have had its beginning as early as 1958, before the creation of Metro. At that time Premier Roblin was contemplating the redevelopment of the area in the City of Winnipeg often referred to as south Point Douglas - the area lying between Main Street and the Red River and extending from the CPR tracks in the north to the Assiniboine River in the south. It was a badly run-down area, about 1 1/2-square miles in size and containing a variety of mixed uses, many housed in dilapidated structures. In 1958 Roblin appointed Prof. A. Adamson, H.H.G. Moody, and E.W. Swift as a three-man commission to carry out a renewal study of the area under an agreement with CMHC and the City of Winnipeg. The commission reported that development of the area would be prohibitively costly, and that in any case it would be best to wait until a comprehensive plan for the main arterial roads system was established. One of the considerations here was the desire of St. Boniface council to have a bridge across the Red River connecting St. Joseph's Street with either Logan Avenue or Pacific Avenue, or Alexander Avenue and the Disraeli Freeway, so that St. Boniface residents would be able to cross the Red River in "six minutes" and walk to the area of the new city hall. Such an arterial would be a major element in the redevelopment area and should be given important consideration in any development plan.

The report was received by Mr. Roblin with little comment, and was quietly shelved. At that time, too, the City of Winnipeg was contemplating the construction of a

new city hall because the one they were in was already 73-years old and was becoming increasingly inadequate to accommodate the growing space requirements of the administration. Although no site for the new city hall had as yet been announced, it was mooted that the city had its eye on a location on Broadway near the legislative building. Perhaps Duff Roblin didn't want Steve Juba as a neighbour and was considering an attractive alternative for him; perhaps the premier was still genuinely interested in the possible redevelopment of south Point Douglas and thought that a new city hall would be not only a desirable element in such a renewal project but might also act as a catalyst to attract investment and improve the economics of the scheme. In any case, in spite of the discouraging report of the 1958 renewal study, he tried in 1959 to persuade Juba to abandon the notion of a site on Broadway, and instead build the new city hall in the south Point Douglas area. If Juba would agree to locate the city hall in the proposed renewal area the province would put \$4 million into the project. But Juba turned down the offer.

Events moved a step further along with the announcement by Mayor Juba on Wednesday May 31, 1961, that he had received a report from Metro (which had taken office on January 1, 1961) that the bearings on which the city hall's clock-tower rested were seriously deteriorated, and the massive tower which topped the city hall was in danger of collapsing and falling into the council chamber immediately below. In view of the prohibitive cost of repair work which would be required, and the fact that a new civic building was being planned anyway, it was decided to close down the council chamber and arrange for the city council to meet in other accommodation. The rest of the civic administration could continue to occupy the other parts of the city hall in which they were located with no danger. The council shopped around for a meeting place and ended up using a room in the legislative building. They tried briefly to persuade Metro to share their proposed new city hall: since Metro had come on the scene the city's need for space was considerably less than was being programmed in the new city hall design.

Metro however had just bought the Imperial Oil building at 100 Main Street and wasn't

interested in the city's proposition. In any case relations between the two governments were already so hostile that sharing space with the city was described by some Metro councillors as living with one's mother-in-law.<sup>65</sup> Metro turned down the city's invitation.

Events continued to unfold, helped along no doubt by discussions in private between the Premier and the Mayor. By April, 1963, both had made up their minds and had come to an agreement. On Thursday April 4, 1963, Premier Roblin introduced a bill in the legislature for the creation of the Civic Development Corporation, a private, non-profit corporation to redevelop the 1 1/2-square miles of south Point Douglas. And the city had decided to build its new city hall as part of the renewal project.

Redevelopment of the area, said Mr. Roblin, has been under consideration for some time. He said he was glad the city had decided after all to build the new city hall in the area of Main Street.

It is part of the redevelopment plan, said the Premier, to build in the vicinity of the city hall an arts centre which will be a monument to Canada's centenary in 1967.

Mr. Roblin said the original plan to redevelop the area had been held up while the city decided on the site for the new city hall.<sup>66</sup>

The new city hall would be built on the same site as the existing city hall, which would be demolished. This site was not properly within the renewal area whose westerly boundary was Main Street, but fronted on Main Street on the opposite side to the renewal area. Within the renewal area itself, it was visualized, secondary industries would be removed and relocated elsewhere, blighted buildings would be demolished, development of office buildings and apartment blocks would be promoted, and landscaped parkway drives along the river would be constructed. And an Arts Centre, comprising a concert hall, a museum, and an art gallery would be built fronting on the east side of Main Street directly across the street from the new city hall. Although the Arts Centre would be the responsibility of the Centennial Corporation, all of the south Point Douglas

redevelopment would be accomplished by an independent private corporation - the Civic Development Corporation - which would not be responsible to, nor have any connection with, the provincial legislature.

One of the greatest virtues of the Civic Development Corporation, as extolled by the Premier, was that it would be a private corporation made up entirely of private businessmen. He had enlisted the city's business leaders as members of the corporation, and for the first time a group of private businessmen would guide a large urban renewal project. The government's only function would be to act as expropriation agent. Possible profits from the urban renewal scheme would be used to help defray the operating costs of the Arts Centre. Twenty-six officers of the corporation were appointed. Their names read like the Who's Who of the city's business elite. Steve Juba was among them as a member *ex officio* but not a single member of Metro was included.<sup>67</sup>

Pursuing his objective of a major Arts Centre as Manitoba's centennial project for Canada's centennial in 1967, and as a centrepiece in the contemplated urban renewal scheme, Duff Roblin, in 1963, created the Manitoba Centennial Corporation, with Maitland Steinkopf, the Provincial Secretary, and MLA for River Heights, as its chairman. The cost of the Arts Centre was estimated at \$10 million. The federal government was committed to a grant of \$2.5 million, which would be matched by the same amount from the provincial government. Steinkopf proposed that the area municipalities contribute one dollar per capita of their populations for the next six years, which would raise an estimated further \$3 million, and he was optimistic that the balance could be raised by private subscription.

Indeed, Steinkopf was already busy acquiring and assembling the land for the Arts Centre through the agency of various businessmen acting on behalf of anonymous clients. This became Steinkopf's *modus operandi*. He was able to use the resources of the provincial government and the business community with great success, but in a manner in which they remained virtually anonymous, while he occupied the stage, front and

centre, and all of the Centennial Corporation's activities seemed to emanate from and revolve around him. Metro's planning role was virtually totally ignored by Steinkopf. Maitland Steinkopf was also a member of the Civic Development Corporation, and the formidable resources of the members of that corporation were undoubtedly called upon in putting together the site for the Arts Centre. In the early months of the Civic Development Corporation, its work was wholly in conjunction with that of the Centennial Corporation and focused on the Arts Centre. The Civic Development Corporation, like the Centennial Corporation, completely ignored the existence of Metro and seemed totally indifferent to, or unaware of its statutory planning responsibilities.

Metro, quite understandably, were disturbed by being entirely left out of this major planning and renewal project. They were particularly dismayed by the fact that in their Metropolitan Development Plan special consideration had been given to the possibility of an arterial road and bridge across the Red River, as desired by St. Boniface, and it seemed that the work of the two provincial corporations was proceeding without any reference to this, or indeed to any other aspect of the development plan. A story in the Winnipeg Tribune of Saturday August 31, 1963, under the caption "The corporation isn't talking to Metro" commented:

Plans are underway for the most ambitious redevelopment scheme ever undertaken in Winnipeg but the planning authority knows nothing about it. Metro, whose main function is planning, is completely in the dark about the Civic Development Corporation, the agency with bold plans to revitalize a large section of downtown....

Says George Rich, Metro Planning Director: "All we know about it is what we read in the newspapers. We think it is a wonderful idea but we would like to know what's going to happen."<sup>68</sup>

Early in 1964, Metro presented a report to the provincial government stating its concerns about the secrecy surrounding the work of the two provincial corporations and the lack of liaison with Metro and other interested parties. The report also referred to

the abandonment of previous principles which had guided both the province and Metro with respect to the south Point Douglas area - that it would be too costly to develop, and that in any case no action should be taken until the plans for the arterial roads system affecting the area were in place.

And in May of that year a story in the Tribune reported that:

The new arts centre on Main Street was chosen by the provincial government without a single reference to Metro planners or to the Metropolitan Corporation, which by law has authority over land use and buildings in the area.

Metro councillors say they have since got the message "loud and clear" from one cabinet member that if they object to the location, they will have difficulty obtaining provincial money for future Metro projects....

The ironic part is that although the provincial government has given zoning authority to Metro, the government's Civic Development Corporation has held meetings with the City of Winnipeg's centennial committee during the planning stage of choosing the arts centre location.

Metro officials say they have hit a "stonewall" in trying to discuss the arts centre with the provincial government because the premier has made up his mind it will go on Main Street in spite of the recommendations of Metro planners.<sup>69</sup>

In fact, Steinkopf did meet not only with the City of Winnipeg but also with the other area municipalities, including Metro. But not on the subject of the site selection or the planning of the Arts Centre, or the redevelopment of the south Point Douglas area. The agendas of those meetings were devoted exclusively to the matter of raising funds for the Arts Centre. Whenever Metro raised the question of planning south Point Douglas they were told that they would be called in "when the plans became firm."

Meanwhile Steinkopf continued to wear both hats - that of the Centennial Corporation and that of the Civic Development Corporation; and continued to make speeches on behalf of both. In an address to the Appraisal Institute of Canada, on

Thursday May 7, 1964, Mr. Steinkopf elaborated on the prospect for redevelopment of south Point Douglas. He suggested that land on the north west bank of the junction of the Red and Assiniboine Rivers might be turned into a park. This land was occupied by the offices of the Hudson's Bay Company and by the Union Station and the tracks of the CNR and was designated the East Yard of the CN's property in Winnipeg. It is one of the significant historic places in Western Canada having been the site of seven and possibly eight fur-trading posts, from Fort Maurepas and Fort Rouge in 1737 and 1738 to the Hudson's Bay Company's first Fort Garry which continued in active use until 1835. The land was owned by the Hudson's Bay Company and the CNR, and Steinkopf indicated that they might be interested in converting the 90-odd acres of the area into a park to commemorate the arrival of the first white man in the 1730's. He said that some of the \$150 million expected to be spent on the urban renewal scheme in south Point Douglas would be committed to parks.<sup>70</sup>

Steinkopf was successful in carrying out his mandate for the Arts Centre and it was completed pretty well on time for the Canada Centennial of 1967. But that was the only item in Premier Roblin's grand design that was carried out. The city hall was built across the street from the Arts Centre, but the ambitious urban renewal scheme for south Point Douglas which had been announced with such fanfare, and had evoked such high expectations came to naught. Not a single building was demolished or built as part of any urban renewal project in the area. And nothing was ever heard again of the Civic Development Corporation. This company of high-powered individuals had always been something shadowy as an organization, a background presence, felt rather than seen, and it was as though with the completion of the centennial complex its shadow grew paler and shorter until it simply disappeared. Perhaps it was because they discovered that the 1958 report was, after all, correct and the south Point Douglas area was too costly to redevelop. Perhaps it was because such a massive and complex undertaking as the redevelopment of 1 1/2-square miles of urban blight simply cannot be accomplished by

a group of part-time volunteers, no matter how wealthy and entrepreneurial they may be: after all they have their own enterprises to look after. 71 Perhaps it was because the CNR and the Hudson's Bay Company really were not as interested in selling the land at the junction of the rivers as Steinkopf had assumed. Perhaps it was because in 1967 Roblin resigned from the legislature in order to enter the race for the leadership of the federal Conservative Party and was succeeded by Walter Weir - an undertaker by profession and seemingly also by disposition - who did not have Roblin's vision or enthusiasm for the renewal project. Perhaps it was because two years later, in 1969, the Weir government was defeated and the socialist New Democratic Party under Ed. Schreyer was elected as the government of Manitoba, and the businessmen of the Civic Development Corporation were not interested in carrying on with the project in that political environment. Whatever the reasons, no redevelopment of any part of south Point Douglas occurred until 1989, when a tri-level government agency - The Forks Renewal Corporation - began the redevelopment of the CNR's East Yard. Contrary to many optimistic opinions which had been voiced at the time of the public announcement of Roblin's renewal proposals, that the Arts Centre and the city hall would act as catalysts for large-scale private investment in the area, these two high-profile public centres failed to stimulate a single private redevelopment project in south Point Douglas.

The notion of landscaped parkways and riverbank reclamation did not arise out of the south Point Douglas urban renewal concept. Winnipeg's rivers played a critical role in the early history of the city, but as the railway and then the automobile replaced the river boat as the means of travel, and as the metropolitan area grew and private ownership and development of the riverbanks proliferated and became entrenched, the rivers receded from the forefront of the consciousness of the general public, only to return with the threat of flood as the water levels rose during the annual Spring melt and run-off. A major flood of the magnitude of the one in 1950 brought awareness of the rivers to a dramatic high, and concern about flood protection became general. As a

corollary the reclamation, reinforcing and beautification of the riverbanks was a frequent subject of discussion.

Two major Canadian rivers flow through the Greater Winnipeg area - the Red River and the Assiniboine River. The headwaters of the Red River are in Minnesota and North Dakota, in the United States. The river forms the boundary between those two states, and flows northward a distance of some 530 miles to empty into Lake Winnipeg. The Assiniboine River arises in Saskatchewan and flows some 500 miles south and east, first as the Qu'Appelle River then as the Assiniboine River, to empty into the Red River at Winnipeg. Both rivers are of substantial width and volume and both have been an important part of the history of Winnipeg. Yet it would be difficult to find another city having such a magnificent endowment of natural and historical significance that has done so little to bring its rivers into the public domain and develop them as an amenity to be enjoyed by the entire population.

Metro, with its characteristic alacrity and directness, turned its attention to the riverbanks as soon as it came into existence. In August of 1961, barely eight months after coming to office, Metro's Parks and Protection Division and Planning Division jointly carried out a survey of riverbank property as a basis on which to formulate a policy of riverbank acquisition and development. Their report said that there were 11.58 miles of publicly owned riverbank to which the public had free or partial access. This was only 17.5 per cent of the total 66 miles of river front on both sides of both rivers. Of the 11.58 miles to which the public had access, 4.66 miles were on the Assiniboine River which ran for 22 miles through the metropolitan area, and 6.92 miles were on the Red River which wound its way through the area for a distance of 44 miles. The 11.58 miles of publicly owned land included undeveloped Metro and municipal land, developed Metro and municipal parks, municipal land leased to private golf courses and private clubs. The report recommended, among other things, that any publicly owned parkland should be "frozen for all time"; that Metro offer to take

ownership of parkland which municipalities cannot afford to maintain; that "flood plain zoning" be extended to cover all land outside the diking system liable to be flooded to the 1948 levels; that creeks and drainage canals be left alone to maintain their existing amenities.<sup>72</sup>

In the fall of 1962 Metro's Planning Division revealed its preliminary development plan for the area west of the Red River and south of the Assiniboine River. It proposed to hold a large amount of riverbank land in "open space" use - land which included park land, flood plain land, land outside the line of flood defences, and land difficult or excessively costly to service. This land would be held in the "open space" category of zoning until it could be brought into public use as part of the metropolitan parks system, and the same "open space" control would be applied to creeks and streams.

A year later, in the Fall of 1963, Metro's Parks and Protection Committee turned to the historically significant tract of land at the junction of the rivers - the East Yard of the CNR - as an area of great importance in any program of riverbank reclamation. It was the same tract of land which Maitland Steinkopf, a few months later, was to eye as part of Roblin's south Point Douglas urban renewal scheme. Metro wrote to the CNR asking what its plans were for the land, indicating that Metro wanted to buy the property as part of its riverbank beautification plans. In its letter of reply, read to a meeting of the Parks and Protection Committee on Tuesday September 17, 1963, the CNR stated bluntly that it intended to retain ownership of the East Yard. The Committee decided to pursue the matter at a subsequent meeting with CN officials, but the position remained unchanged. Even though only the main line through the Yard, and the Union Station remained active, and the use of the rest of the Yard had been reduced to a negligible role and most of the tracks were lying idle, the CN refused to part with any portion of the property.

Metro pressed on with its riverbanks reclamation concept, and on Tuesday, July 14, 1964, the Planning Division submitted a report to the council recommending that a

revolving fund of \$250,000 be established to buy privately owned riverfront property as it came onto the market. This would be in addition to any capital sum provided in the Parks and Protection's budget. The report identified a number of locations where riverside drives or parks could be built. It was a sweeping, inspiring concept. If successfully completed it would be a very long stride toward bringing the two rivers back into the public life and consciousness of the metropolitan community. It is somewhat surprising that the prospective locations did not include the strip of land on the north bank of the Assiniboine River between the river and Assiniboine Avenue extending from Main Street westward to the legislative building. This was a strategic piece of riverbank which could be a superb embellishment of the downtown cityscape. Although this potential riverside park was not identified in the Planning Division's report, it was in fact partially realized, but none of the other locations identified in the report was ever developed by Metro.

The \$250,000 fund for riverbank acquisition was never fully exploited. Metro's policy was not to expropriate but to buy land only as it was offered for sale on the open market, and even then, only at what was considered a reasonable price. Riverbank land is in a special category. The presence of the river makes the abutting land especially attractive and therefore gives it a special value. That special value in most instances was great enough to dissuade Metro from purchasing. Some riverbank land was acquired by Metro in the more remote reaches of the metropolitan area, such as on the banks of the Red River in the extreme south of the metropolitan region, but virtually none was acquired in the central area where it would have its strongest impact, and the riverbank acquisition fund eventually lapsed and disappeared.

The one significant attempt at central city riverbank development was

Bonnycastle Park. Richard Bonnycastle, Metro's first chairman, died in 1968, and the

Metro Council agreed to commemorate him by naming a park after him. The park was to

be the strip of riverfront between Assiniboine Avenue and the river extending from Main

Street to the Midtown Bridge some four short city blocks to the west. The Metro Corporation acquired all but one of the properties on this stretch of riverbank which were not already in their possession and turned them into parkland. The one property they did not acquire was the major private holding on the embankment - the Guertin Building - a four storey brick building used for the manufacture and sales of paints.

Metro began expropriation proceedings in 1969 to acquire the property but the process bogged down in negotiations and postponements. The matter came before the Manitoba Municipal Board where Steve Juba made a vehement attack against Metro and in opposition to the expropriation, and the completion of a riverbank park. The Board nevertheless approved Metro's application, and expropriation proceedings were initiated. Before the property could be acquired however proceedings were suspended because of the impending change from the Metropolitan government to the unified city. When the change was accomplished in 1972 and Juba became the Mayor of the unified city, he had the expropriation proceedings abandoned. It took another 17-years for the Guertin building to be acquired. In 1989 the city under Mayor Bill Norrie acquired it and demolished it and proceeded to complete Bonnycastle Park as it had originally been proposed by Metro 20-years earlier.

## 6. <u>Downtown Winnipea</u>

The planning process for the city's downtown was as fragmented, contentious and unproductive as it was for the riverbank reclamation and urban renewal. When the Metro government was established, Winnipeg's central area was so decentralized and diffuse as to be virtually non-existent. Mr. William Allen, Principal of the Architectural School of London, England, on a visit to Winnipeg as part of his speaking-tour itinerary of Canadian and American cities, in 1963, said in a newspaper interview:

Winnipeg is a "city without a heart".... "Winnipeg is a real city, but it doesn't look like one. Its centre is decayed so much I can't even find it. Winnipeg's City Hall is misplaced, its Legislative buildings are isolated,

its main street gives the appearance of 'a small town grown big'."

William Allen was born in Winnipeg. He was the University of Manitoba's gold medallist in Architecture in 1936. He continued in the interview:

"In ten years, Winnipeg will be another Los Angeles, which has been described as 26 suburbs looking for a city"....
Its Legislative buildings - "the finest of their kind in North America - have been left isolated on Broadway, while the City Hall is equally isolated on Main Street. The two should be together."
Portage Ave. "looks the same as when I left in 1936. It appears small townish. There is a complete failure to re-invest along it."

The downtown of a city is where one would expect to find the seat of government, the public institutional and cultural buildings, and the core of the city's commercial functions - a concentration of retail stores, office buildings, professional services. places of entertainment, and, in many cities, apartment residences. In most cities these downtown elements can be found fronting on the major arterial roads serving the central area simply because these arteries provide ready access to the places of business. In metropolitan Winnipeg, each of the constituent municipalities developed its own municipal government, community and cultural buildings, and its own business centre in competition with all the other municipalities. Each major traffic route in the metropolitan area ran through several municipalities, and businesses which were attracted to them were distributed lineally along the length of the arterial routes without any marked transition from one municipality to another. For example, the major arteries in the City of Winnipeg were Main Street and Portage Avenue, but Main Street was also the major artery in Old Kildonan and West Kildonan, and Portage Avenue also ran through St. James and Assiniboia. Similarly other arterials such as Pembina Highway and Henderson Highway, and St. Mary's Road all ran through several municipalities so that the businesses and institutional buildings of the metropolitan area were strung out through the metropolis without any sense of coherence of location or

function. And in the City of Winnipeg, a city of predominantly single-family dwellings, there were few residences in the central area in 1960. A handful of large houses still remained from an earlier era, but these had been converted to rooming houses, and there were only a limited number of apartment buildings, most of them no higher than four storeys. A large part of Winnipeg's downtown - nearly one third of the land area - was devoted to surface parking lots.

Portage Avenue was conventionally perceived as the hub of Winnipeg's retailing and commercial activities. In fact, it was only the two major department stores -Eaton's and the Hudson's Bay store - which did the greatest part of the retail business. Between them these two stores, at one time, enjoyed more that 50 per cent of all the retail business in the city. Each of these department stores occupied a full city block fronting on Portage Avenue, and they were only four city blocks apart from each other. The intervening blocks, as well as those flanking them on either side were occupied for the most part by nondescript two-storey structures, with generally tawdry retail establishments on the ground floor, although the occasional taller building arose, taller but equally undistinguished, out of the straggling commercial banality of the retail premises below. An office precinct with one or two impressive buildings was beginning to develop on Broadway but it was still only rudimentary. And an atmosphere of neglect and decay pervaded the entire central area. Many businesses had left downtown for cheaper, more spacious locations in the suburbs; what residents had formerly lived in the downtown had long since departed for suburbia leaving behind the poor and the disadvantaged; buildings were not being maintained or were being demolished and used as parking lots; there was little new construction or business investment.

The Metropolitan Development Plan was approved by the Minister of Municipal Affairs in 1967, and established by by-law of the Metro council in 1968. It said very little about the downtown. What it did say was so general and nebulous as to be merely rhetorical cant. It made some comments about downtown land-use and argued that

greater attention must be paid to accommodating and encouraging pedestrian movement in the downtown particularly in terms of weather-protection.

But a detailed plan for the downtown<sup>74</sup> was produced in 1969 which did have one or two practical results. Unlike the Metropolitan Development Plan, Downtown Winnipeg (as the downtown plan was called) made concrete proposals and provided detailed cost estimates as well as suggestions for an implementing mechanism. After analyzing population and labour-force trends, and the condition of the retail, wholesale, industrial, office commercial, residential, parking, open space and recreation sectors it found that Winnipeg's downtown was in a state of decline and decay, as were the downtowns of most metropolitan centres in North America. People and jobs were migrating to the suburbs. Some entertainment, some specialty shops, but particularly the service industries were the mainstay of the downtown economy. Downtown Winnipeg commented:

It is perhaps a truism to say that the life of the entire Downtown depends on people. It is not merely the service industries that grow with population, but all the other activities carried on in the Downtown. At the present time the life of the Downtown is sustained by the people comprising the Downtown shoppers, and the Downtown work force. The resident population is small and cannot be regarded as an element of the first order of importance in the Downtown economy....

Careful reflection on the problem can lead to only one conclusion, namely that if the Downtown is to be revitalized and brought to its appropriate place in the life of the Metropolitan community, it can only be accomplished through the introduction of large numbers of people into the central area; and this can only be accomplished, in Winnipeg's circumstances, through the introduction, not of a new labour force, or new shoppers, but of new residents.<sup>75</sup>

Residential development, particularly at the high density necessitated by downtown land values, requires open space, landscaping and other amenities to create a livable environment. And in Winnipeg the severe winters are a special problem for

everyone. Downtown Winnipeg recognized all of these factors. It set out the following elements as the basis for the plan:

- (1) The encouragement of high density apartment development as the major thrust of the plan;
- (2) The acquisition by the public of land in strategic locations for development with parking structures, combined with other uses;
- (3) The creation of a weather-protected pedestrian circulation system at a level above the ground, probably fifteen or sixteen feet, which will link together all of the major locations of the Downtown and ultimately provide sheltered access to every part of the Downtown;
- (4) The creation of a public open space system, including a series of "winter gardens" which will provide year-round green spaces;
- (5) The development of public recreation facilities such as a conservatory, aquarium, enclosed skating rink, swimming pool, etc. as part of the public investment in stimulating the development of the Downtown, but also as part of the public provision of amenities to serve the Metropolitan area.<sup>76</sup>

The basic premises of the downtown plan are particularly noteworthy. They depart from the conventional purport of long-range plans to be "comprehensive" but instead assume that the catalytic power of a few critical elements can give the rest of the field its desired character; and they specify that key projects, detailed in the scheme, must be carried out by the public sector if the plan is to succeed. These are somewhat unusual premises for a plan of the long-range comprehensive plan species, and markedly different from the provisions of the Metropolitan Development Plan.

Two key areas were identified in the plan which had the potential to satisfy the first premise. One of these was the triangular-shaped tract of the downtown (as defined for purposes of the plan) lying north of Portage Avenue. This key area was bounded by Ellice Avenue, Colony Street, Cumberland Avenue and Carlton Street.

It was, however, that part of the downtown lying south of Portage Avenue and extending to the Assiniboine River, between Main Street and Memorial Boulevard, which was perceived as the major component of the city's central area. In this sector of the

downtown the plan identified as the key site a 14-block tract lying between Broadway on the south and St. Mary Avenue on the north, and stretching from Main Street west to Edmonton Street. This key site was two blocks wide in the north-south direction between Broadway and St. Mary and ran for seven short blocks in the east-west direction.

The physical framework of the plan was based on the "movement corridors" comprising Main Street which formed the eastern boundary of the 14-block site, Edmonton Street which formed the western boundary, and the one-way pair of Smith and Donald Streets which passed through the centre of the site. Because of this arrangement the blocks abutting these movement corridors could be developed for such uses as parking structures and enclosed pedestrian ways with shopping, entertainment, recreation and similar non-residential facilities and services, while the blocks between the corridors could be appropriately developed for residential use. Six of te 14-blocks would accordingly be non residential and eight would be residential. The eight residential blocks would contain six apartment blocks each, all to be developed by the private sector. The non-residential blocks would be mainly developed by the public sector, particularly the parking structures and such public components as a convention centre, "winter gardens," an aquarium, the pedestrian corridors, etc.

The Metro council was enthusiastic about the plan and adopted it formally by by-law 1554 in 1969. Steve Juba, predictably, reacted against the plan. He had for some time been seeking a dazzling project for the downtown, not merely to discredit Metro's planning authority, but to establish his own ascendancy over the development of the downtown of his city. Parking in the downtown was a growing problem, and Juba was coming to realize that easy access to conveniently located parking was a necessity if commercial development was to be attracted into the central business district. Metro, at this time, was busily engaged in a variety of traffic and parking studies as part of the major transportation report - The Winnipeg Area Transportation Study - which it was

in the process of preparing. Perhaps as a reaction to Metro's activities, and because of his growing interest in the parking issue and its relation to downtown development, Mayor Juba, early in September 1968 appeared at a meeting of the Winnipeg Parking Authority - a low-profile, scarcely-visible agency, which had the authority to acquire and operate parking lots and garages on a user-pay basis. It was the first time Juba had ever attended a meeting of the Winnipeg Parking Authority although the Authority had been created by the City of Winnipeg council in 1958, and W.D. Hurst, the city engineer, was its chairman, and the mayor, ex officio, could attend its meetings. Juba told the meeting of the importance which he attached to parking and urged the Authority to look into the matter of parking needs and possible locations. The Authority agreed to undertake a study.

In September 1968 the Winnipeg Parking Authority published its report. It found that there was an existing deficiency of between 1000 and 1300 parking spaces in the downtown. One of the locations recommended for the construction of a parking structure was on a surface parking lot on Water Street already owned by the Authority. Juba was not satisfied with the report, and the Authority continued its investigations. When Metro's **Downtown Winnipeg** plan was published on April 1, 1969, Juba was exasperated and infuriated. He rejected it in its entirety and particularly condemned the proposal to use public money to build the parking structures which were to be the public support for the private investment. He had Bill Hurst, the city engineer, and Ross Nugent Q.C., the city solicitor (both members of the Winnipeg Parking Authority) appointed to investigate the financial implications of the Metro plan's proposals. They travelled to Montreal and other cities to gather information on how the parking problem was being met elsewhere. Their report to council concluded that the Downtown Winnipeg proposal would be prohibitively expensive in both the short and the long term. Moreover, it was their opinion that the development industry did not need that much relief from the cost of constructing apartment blocks downtown. The annual report of

the Winnipeg Parking Authority which carried a report of the Hurst-Nugent findings commented:

While undoubtedly the proposed parking system is in the public interest, it is a matter of real concern, we believe, to Winnipeg and/or other municipalities whether the citizens should be required to completely subsidize the private developer.<sup>77</sup>

The city engineer's department under Hurst continued to study the parking problem and finally recommended that a site be acquired and a parking structure be built with allowance for some modest commercial development if the demand for such space arose. The location they recommended was in mid-block between Portage Avenue and Graham Avenue, on the west side of Main Street just south of the Portage and Main intersection. This proposed location was in one of the most expensive blocks in the entire city. The cost of property one block to the south dropped dramatically, but the rationale for recommending the location between Portage and Graham was that people would not walk farther than 600-feet from their cars to their destinations, and it was assumed that the users of the parking structure would want to go to Portage and Main, or somewhere in that vicinity, where the newly constructed Lombard Place was expected to stimulate further development. The block between Portage and Graham was 810-feet long so that a mid-block location would put the proposed structure at the optimum distance.

Whether Juba had already found the dazzling downtown project which he had been seeking and was only waiting for the right parking site to set it in motion is a matter of speculation. Whether he had directed the city engineer's decision to recommend the location that it did for a parking structure is also a matter of speculation. On the basis of the cost of the recommended site, the existing demand in that location, and the assumption with respect to the walking distance and the location of imminent future development the wisdom of the recommendation was questionable. Nevertheless Juba

acted very quickly. He moved to acquire three parking sites - two on Carlton Street, and one in the recommended location in the mid-block between Portage Avenue and Graham Avenue, behind the Royal Bank tower at Portage and Fort. The two properties on Carlton Street were abandoned as parking sites, but the site between Portage and Graham was retained and soon became the essential bargaining chip in Juba's poker game to win a major project for the corner of Portage and Main. That major project turned out to be Scotia Square and the Trizec development.<sup>78</sup>

Trizec was one of the largest, most active and successful real estate development and management companies in Canada, with complex international corporate linkages. It worked closely with the Bank of Nova Scotia; much of Trizec's financing came from that bank, and E.J. Courtois, a prominent Montreal lawyer was a member of the board of both corporations. When the bank embarked on a program of upgrading its regional facilities, Trizec provided the design, development and management expertise. In 1968 the bank decided to expand its regional offices in Winnipeg and Trizec had a place in the scheme. The south-west corner of Portage and Main was the inevitable location upon which to display the presence of corporate power and prestige. It was perhaps the only intersection in Winnipeg which had some sort of national recognition. Moreover, the eminent brokerage firm of James Richardson and Sons was just completing Winnipeg's first skyscraper on the north-east corner of that intersection and the Winnipeg Inn hotel and the Bank of Canada were scheduled to construct buildings around an open plaza which together with the Richardson skyscraper would form Lombard Place. The southwest corner of Portage and Main intersection was the site targeted by the Bank of Nova Scotia for its new regional office building, to be called Scotia Square, and the adjacent property on the rest of that block, extending south to Graham Avenue was to be the site of a massive multi-use development by Trizec.

The city, pursuant to the recommendation in the city engineer's report, had, in 1969, expropriated 12 lots in the middle of the Portage/Graham block. Under the

agreement with the Trizec Corporation they undertook to expropriate the balance of the block south of the bank's site, to Graham Avenue, and to build a three-storey parking structure to accommodate 1000 cars. In return, the developer undertook to build two 34-storey office towers, the regional office building of the Bank of Nova Scotia, a 220-room hotel, and a large shopping mall. At the end of 99-years, the development was to revert to the city. The cost of the Trizec undertaking was estimated at \$80 million; the cost of the city's involvement - the expropriation of the land and the construction of the parking structure - was estimated at \$12 million.

As it eventually turned out only one office tower, the bank building, and an underground shopping concourse were built by Trizec. The second tower and the hotel were not constructed and in the light of subsequent office and hotel accommodation which had gone up in the downtown, they will not ever be built. What is of interest to us here however, is the demonstration of how ineffectual Metro's "planning" authority was over the City of Winnipeg. Metro had virtually no involvement whatever in the Trizec project, and the **Downtown Winnipeq** plan was irrelevant to it. It is true that the Downtown Winnipeg plan focused on a 14-block area in another part of the downtown and deliberately chose not to attempt to direct whatever development might occur outside of that planned precinct, but Metro did not expect that it would have no role at all to play in such other development even though the Metro Act gave them no real power to interfere in any capital projects of the area municipalities. The Trizec project was the subject of long and difficult negotiations between the City of Winnipeg and Trizec, and of intense public criticism and even condemnation which went on for years, but for Mayor Juba it was the satisfying visible proof of his ascendancy over Metro as the planning and development authority in the City of Winnipeg. It is of interest to note that although Juba had rejected out of hand as unthinkable Metro's **Downtown Winnipeg** proposal to use tax-payers' money to build parking structures at public expense as a cost-reducing incentive for private development, he was more than ready to commit the estimated \$12

million of tax-payers money for the land and the parking structure to attract and secure the Trizec project.

For several years there had been talk of building a convention centre in downtown Winnipeg as a means of encouraging tourism and attracting new business development, but no action had ever been taken and the idea had simply remained a subject of idle business-luncheon chatter. One of the basic tenets of the <u>Downtown Winnipeg</u> plan was the recognition of the need for "a strong commitment by the public to invest the sums of money in the public sector of the plan to ensure that the concept is realized." And one of the basic concepts in the plan was the creation of certain key projects which could stimulate the development of other components of the plan. Because a convention centre had been talked about for some time - albeit only as a conversation piece - and because a convention centre could act as a catalyst, the plan included such a centre as one of the elements in the non-residential block bounded by Carlton and Edmonton Streets, and St. Mary and York Avenues.

The Metro council was persuaded that a convention centre would be an asset to the economy of the metropolitan area, but was hesitant about shouldering the total cost of the project alone. It was clear that no area municipality, and least of all the City of Winnipeg, would support Metro in this enterprise, which left only the provincial government as a potential partner. Metro approached the province to secure its participation but the government of Ed Schreyer was non-committal. Negotiations dragged on for months until Metro, anxious to get on with the project, ran out of patience. Late in October 1978, Metro council decided that they would make the announcement of a convention centre at a breakfast meeting at the Fort Garry Hotel, to which representatives of the business and community life of the city would be invited. The province had not yet indicated that they would participate, either in the convention centre project or in the breakfast meeting to announce it, and Metro decided that if the province did not join with them, they would go it alone.

At the last moment the provincial government agreed to join with Metro but it was a reluctant partner in the convention centre project, and had decided to participate in it by only a very narrow margin of cabinet votes. Moreover it accepted only a minority position in the partnership committing itself to only one-third of the capital cost and half of the operating losses. Nevertheless, the Metro council was buoyed up by the province's participation, and embarked on a tour of publicizing the plan in Toronto and Montreal. A small group of Metro councillors and senior staff addressed a gathering of businessmen in Toronto on November 3, 1970, and in Montreal on November 5.

The convention centre was built, and, as had been anticipated by the plan, it did stimulate development in the private sector: a 400-room Holiday Inn hotel, and the office and apartment project known as Holiday Square - a sixteen storey office building, a six storey office building, and two apartment towers containing a total of 500 apartments, all enclosing a Japanese garden on three sides, and all on the block across the street from the convention centre and connected to it by overhead pedestrian walkways. This development was not in strict conformity with the concept set out in the Downtown Winnipeg plan, indeed was only vaguely reminiscent of it, but it was an achievement, and a break-through in the atmosphere of stagnation which had long hung over the downtown; and it may also have indirectly influenced the development of other projects such as the York House apartment building and the senior citizens apartment building on Smith Street, and perhaps even the numerous later downtown projects. It is a moot point whether these would have proceeded anyway simply because of improved market conditions, or whether the convention centre and the Holiday complex provided the example and created the confidence for the fairly substantial downtown development which followed.

But the enthusiasm for the downtown plan and the confidence in the public commitment to it which had been expressed in the Toronto and Montreal presentations was to prove to have been illusory. The deviation of the Holiday complex from the

proposals of the Downtown Winnipeg plan for that block was an augury of the fate which awaited the plan as a whole. When a developer came forward, some months after the start of construction of the convention centre, with a proposal to build an office building at the north-east corner of the Broadway-Edmonton intersection - an anchor corner of the 14-block plan precinct and in the block immediately across from the convention centre which the plan proposed for development with a conservatory and other public uses and to be linked across York Avenue to the convention centre - Metro council made no move to acquire the site or to discourage the office development; their position with regard to the plan became patently clear at that moment. With the satisfaction of seeing the start of construction on the convention centre and the Holiday complex, the Metro council seemed to lose interest in the principles of the plan. They seemed to regard the plan as a beguiling vision which did not necessarily have any connection with reality. and as long as private developers came forward to build their projects, the council was not prepared to reject or obstruct them if they did not conform with the Downtown Winnipeg concept. Nor were they disposed to invest the capital required to develop the public components of the plan, which was estimated at \$46.502.263.79 Although no construction time-schedule was specified in the plan, the expectation, explicit throughout the analysis of the costs, was that the plan could be realized in ten years. The public costs could therefore have been spread over a time period which would not have imposed a prohibitive burden on Metro's annual budget.

As it turned out, however, no part of the <u>Downtown Winnipeg</u> plan was ever realized, except perhaps the convention centre and the proposal for an overhead pedestrian walkway system, which was begun with the connection between the convention centre and the Holiday Inn hotel and has slowly been extended since then. But since no other part of the plan was implemented, the pedestrian walkway system must be regarded, not as conforming with the plan, but as something which vaguely resembles one of the ideas contained in the plan.

One aspect of the failed <u>Downtown Winnipeg</u> plan which is highly relevant to the interests of this dissertation is the fact that the <u>Downtown Winnipeg</u> report, containing the plan, was adopted by the Metro council by by-law, and was thereby made part of Metro's legal code and a committed policy of the Metro council. In spite of the demands upon it under the law, however, Metro council did nothing to fulfill its obligations nor to prevent any development which was in violation of the by-law. But such disregard and contravention of the by-law was never seen as a breach of the law and was never challenged. Nor, in all probability, would a challenge in the courts have been successful. Legal opinion indicates that the courts would most likely have regarded Metro's planning legislation not so much a legal matter as a political matter, particularly since no injury could have been shown to flow to anyone from its non-observance, and no penalties were provided in the by-law for its violation. The <u>Downtown Winnipeg</u> plan would have been considered simply as a statement of political policy, which lies beyond the realm of the law, and which the political authority was free to implement or to disregard at will.

This is one of the most obdurate and least understood problems in the realm of city planning. It has never been resolved because it has never been tested in the courts. And it has never been tested because of the assumption that the courts would find for the municipality. Until it is tested, however, that assumption must remain unproven. Meanwhile, in Winnipeg, the disregard by council of its own development policy commitments as stated in its planning by-laws is a habitual occurrence. Not only did the Metro council ignore its commitments under the Metropolitan Development Plan and Downtown Winnipeg by-laws, but so did the council of the unified City of Winnipeg (which succeeded the Metropolitan government) ignore the Greater Winnipeg which succeeded the Greater Winnipeg Development Plan, (as the Metropolitan plan was re-named), and Plan Winnipeg.

On the basis of legal opinion which has been given from time to time, it seems that the policies of the municipal council, as expressed in a long-range plan, even though

established by by-law, cannot be enforced against the council unless the by-law explicitly requires the council to carry out its stated intentions within a specific time and provides penalties for non-performance. Clearly, no council will put itself into a position of being liable to a penalty for not carrying out a policy at a stated time in a future as remote as twenty years, or even ten years, or indeed in any future which it cannot foresee. And yet if the council is under no compulsion to respect its own plan by-laws what is the point in passing them? And if there is no point in council's passing plan by-laws, what becomes of the planning function? It is an issue of basic relevance to the municipal planning function but one which has not been addressed by anyone in Winnipeg, not even the members of the Manitoba Association of the Canadian Institute of Planners.

Other aspects of the Downtown Winnipeg episode are of interest. The Downtown Winnipeg plan was a conception on the grand scale. It was carefully constructed and finely articulated and undoubtedly would have worked a profound change in the city's central area. It's analysis was competent and indicated that in the technical terms of the market demand, financial factors, land-use mix, etc. the plan was feasible. More than that, the Metro government formally adopted it as their downtown development policy. The planners, accordingly, were convinced not only that it could happen, but that it would happen. But there was another major dimension of the plan which they did not take into account in their planning. In their analysis they did not weigh in the balance the political structure within which the plan would have to be implemented, and the inadequate resources which were available to carry it out successfully.

To begin with, Metro's budget depended on monies raised from the area municipalities, and it is doubtful whether the area councils would have accepted the further burden of the capital cost of Metro's downtown plan. Any attempt by Metro to raise the money would have exacerbated even further the area municipalities' hostility

and resentment over the tax burden they had to carry for Metro. Metro councillors undoubtedly were sensitive to this circumstance.

Secondly, the problems of expropriating six blocks of downtown property were daunting. The prospect it held out was one of interminable litigation stretching into the distant future and involving formidable legal costs. It was enough to give even the most supportive councillor, and certainly Metro's cautious finance and legal officers, severe trepidations.

Thirdly, there was the possibility that the private sector would not come forward with the required investment capital, estimated at \$126,581,489. The downtown had been unable to attract new development for a prolonged period and the argument that the plan would effect a change of such magnitude was more an expression of hope than of certainty. Beyond that, however, even if private developers were prepared to move into the downtown, were they prepared to wait for the public sector components to be put in place (since there was to be a close interweaving of public and private sector components)? The agreements necessary between them, and the task of constraining the private sector projects to conform with the locations, shapes, and uses proposed in the plan would have been prohibitive. Metro could not have accomplished this through its own resources. In fact the <u>Downtown Winnipeg</u> report recommended that a special corporation, perhaps based upon Roblin's defunct Civic Development Corporation, be created to carry out the plan. Setting up such a corporation would in itself have required a herculean effort in terms not only of the time and money involved but perhaps even more in the attempt to persuade the provincial government to approve such a measure.

Fourthly, as already suggested, it is doubtful whether the Metro councillors saw the plan in the same light as the Metro planners. The planners saw the plan as a blueprint for a future reality, and paid little heed to these threatening spectres of destruction which loomed in the immediate but shadowy background; the councillors saw the plan as a fantasy of the future, and were more aware of the immediate reality. There

is no doubt that the Metro council admired and embraced the downtown plan, but the mind of the municipal politician is not future-oriented, and the notion that the shape of the future can be determined by actions in the present has little meaning for him. The mind of the planner is tuned to the future by the very nature of his vocation, and the future sometimes assumes a reality which demands greater recognition and devotion than the present. The planners believed that the by-law status of the plan would compel conformity with it; the councillors regarded the by-law simply as a gesture formally expressing their good intentions but having no claim on their commitment.

### 7. The Metropolitan Government - Success and Failure

All of this was soon to be made irrelevant because in 1971 the Schreyer government passed the <u>City of Winnipeg Act</u> which brought Metro to an end and replaced it with an amalgamation of all the area municipalities into a single city under the name of the City of Winnipeg. The new city government came into being on January 1, 1972, and the new unified city, rejecting virtually everything that was connected with Metro, turned its interest and attention away from downtown Winnipeg, so that even if the <u>Downtown Winnipeg</u> plan had had any prospect of implementation, however slim and however deviant from the original concept, it would have been aborted at the end of 1971. Fortunately the construction of the convention centre had already started in 1971, and, as already indicated, it went on to completion and occupied an important place among the subsequent developments of the downtown.

Metro's attempt to assume a role in urban renewal as part of its planning function was repulsed. Its riverbank reclamation program reclaimed a negligible amount of riverbank. Its Metropolitan Development Plan was ignored and had virtually no effect on the development of the metropolitan area. Its Downtown Winnipeg plan must be considered a failure despite the convention centre, and the Holiday complex and whatever other projects the centre may have influenced. However, although Metro may have failed in its "planning", it was highly successful in all of its other work. The

Metropolitan Corporation had been created to deal with the severe difficulties which had emerged in the provision of metropolitan-level services because of the division of authority among the metropolitan area municipalities, and Metro dealt with them very successfully. So much so that the Boundaries Commission in its report in 1970 was able to comment that "The crisis situation which existed in 1960 in connection with many of the area-wide or inter-municipal services no longer exists."

Part of the success of Metro in providing area-wide services must be attributed to the fact that the capacity and condition of all of those services systems had fallen so far behind the needs of the growing metropolitan population that simply bringing them up to a merely acceptable level would have represented a major achievement. But in fact they went beyond merely the minimum effective requirement. The Metro council was given area-wide authority over a broad range of services and they brought a high degree of competence, energy, imagination and commitment to the exercise of their mandate. But there were also a number of more specific reasons for their success.

The fact that the political constituency of each Metro council member extended from the perimeter to the centre of the city and included both suburban and inner-city residents minimized the possibility of a heavy bias toward the suburbs on the part of the individual councillor, and contributed to a metro-wide perspective on every issue which came before the council.

Another reason for the Metro council's ability to function relatively concensually was that it consisted of only ten members. It is generally easier to achieve concensus among a small number of members in any group than among a large number. Moreover this cohesion was enhanced by still another force at work in the political community, and that was the constant attack upon the Metropolitan government by the City of Winnipeg led by Mayor Juba. The attack was unrelenting and had the effect of consolidating the position of the ten metro councillors on almost every issue, not so much because of the

natural solidarity which arises from an internal coherence of views as from the need to defend the group against attack by external hostile forces.

Still another reason was the quality of the members of the council as well as of the senior personnel of the administration. Not all the members of council were of high quality, and during the ten years of its existence the membership of the council changed from time to time, but there was always a nucleus of councillors in office who provided, not only continuity but also sound and vigorous leadership. The heads of divisions of the administration were, for the most part, people of outstanding ability who were able to command the complete confidence of the council. This produced another factor which contributed to Metro's success - the close consultation between the council and the senior administration and the mutual respect which they had for each other. Evidence of this unusual working relationship can be found in the practice of what was called the "planning policy committee" which consisted of the entire council, together with the heads of the administrative divisions which met on a regular basis throughout the year to discuss both policy and administrative affairs. Once a year the group would retire to the lodge at Indian Bay, where the water intake from Shoal Lake is located which supplied the water to the metropolitan area and was under the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan government. The retreat was usually on a weekend, but the days were heavily committed to free-wheeling discussion of important issues and the hammering-out of policy positions.

Meyer Brownstone and Thomas Plunkett have made the following comment on Metro's achievements:

In its ten years the Metropolitan Corporation had spent over \$50 million on roads, bridges, and public works. The St. James, St. Vital, Nairn Avenue, Pembina, and Maryland bridges were built. Forty-three miles of new streets were constructed, 264 new buses were purchased and public transit was at last supported by area-wide taxes.

New pumping stations, feeder lines, and reservoirs increased water pumping capacity from 19 million gallons to 159 million, and storage from 15 million gallons to 180 millions. In 1960 Metropolitan Winnipeg had several hundred acres of parks, increased by 1976 to 3,400 acres. Uniform building codes, zoning procedures, and assessments were put into effect. Metro had dramatically increased the amount of money spent on research and planning. The development plan, downtown plan and numerous studies all attest to the high quality of the Metro planning division's work.81

Brownstone and Plunkett's praiseful recital of the accomplishments of Metro are well-founded, and their comments about the building codes and zoning procedures are correct, although Metro never managed to consolidate the many and diverse zoning bylaws of the area municipalities into a single metropolitan zoning code. They are also right in their observations about Metro's increased expenditures on research and planning, and even about the quality of the work of the planning division. But these are all administrative matters, and they are all oriented to the past, to the correction of deficiencies in the metropolitan-wide infrastructure services which had accumulated over the years. The authors do not address the more fundamental issue of the planning function of the Metro government: the making and carrying out of future-oriented policy. In this area of its responsibilities Metro was not successful.

Much of its failure in this can be attributed to the nature of the two-tier Metro government structure itself. When the Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg was created in 1960, Metro Toronto had already been in existence for some five years. There can be little doubt that the solution to the metropolitan Winnipeg problems of area-wide servicing, redistributing tax revenues and municipal cost burdens which was devised by the Roblin government was strongly influenced by the Toronto example. At that time the concept of regional government was enjoying a great vogue among political theorists, and the fresh achievement of metropolitanism in Toronto under the vigorous leadership of Fred Gardner, could be pointed to not only as the living proof of the theory,

but as a trail-blazing revolutionary solution to the problems of metropolitan area government.

Perhaps the two-tier system, with considerable power and autonomy still retained by the second tier of the local municipalities is an appropriate form of municipal government for a metropolitan area with a population as large as two million people. It cannot, however, serve as a model for a relatively small community of four or five hundred thousand, particularly not when that community's difficulties arise mainly out of the condition of multiple jurisdictions and split authority.

The Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg Act did little to resolve the problems of the policy-making function inherent in fragmented authority. The concept underlying the Act seems to have been that there are certain functions which are "metropolitan" or "inter-municipal" in character and others which are "local" in character. Obviously, such a distinction, if it can be made at all, is a function of size; it cannot be meaningful in a small village of several hundred people, for example. At what point it begins to take on meaning, if at all, is presumably a matter of judgment. Moreover, the validity of the distinction must also rest upon which functions are identified as "metropolitan" and which as "local."

It can be argued that the distinction was not appropriate in the Winnipeg situation because of its size and character. Historically there had grown up in the area a multiplicity of municipalities; and with the passage of time, each became strongly entrenched in its position, parochial in its outlook, jealous of its powers, and vain about its identity. But physically, economically, culturally and in every other way they were all really only one community suffering common problems, enjoying common fortune and sharing a common destiny. The powerful differences which separated them were of course political, and what the Metro Winnipeg Act attempted to do was to recognize and preserve those political differences while making a gesture in the direction of the issues of their common interest which was seen to be the infrastructure services. This it tried

to achieve by distinguishing between responsibilities which were "metropolitan" on the one hand and "local" on the other. Even if the distinction were valid in the context of the size of Greater Winnipeg, it failed in terms of the responsibilities it allocated to the respective tiers of government as they bore upon the planning function.

The distinction between major roads and minor roads can be made theoretically; in fact it often is made, and serves some very useful purposes. Operationally, however, major roads and minor roads form a single transportation system. To divide political and administrative responsibility on the basis of the possible theoretical distinction jeopardizes the system and creates operational difficulties. The same is true for underground services systems. Nevertheless these systems can be divided in this way and each part put under a separate authority and the systems can function somehow, although at an impaired level of efficiency. The "planning system" cannot be divided in this way and function at all. Planning is the making and carrying out of future-oriented policy. The formulation of a municipal plan of development is the formulation of a policy for guiding the future development of that municipality. The responsibility for such policy must remain undivided. If there are several levels of municipal authority, each with significant powers to make and carry out policy, then planning becomes virtually impossible.

The Metro Winnipeg Act regarded planning not as a policy-making function but as an administrative function, and it was consistent with its approach to the separation of what was seen as "metropolitan" concerns from what was seen as "local" concerns to assign the "planning" function to the Metro level of government. But as the policy-making function, planning cannot be divided in this way. In a unitary form of government, with only one council, that council by its very nature is responsible for the whole spectrum of municipal functions and can not only conceive a long-range plan of municipal development, but can exercise its considerable authority to ensure that it is carried out. In the Metro Winnipeg situation it was almost impossible even merely to

conceive a plan of development, let alone carry it out, because it was inevitable that the proposals of such a plan would not only encroach upon areas which the local councils felt were their areas of "local" jurisdiction, but would also depend upon the local councils' powers for their implementation.

A plan is not merely an idea, it is an idea and an action to carry out that idea. The authority for the one must have the jurisdiction over the other, or the whole planning process becomes simply a battle of attrition to wear down each other's power to resist. It is over-optimistic to expect one government to carry out the proposals of a development plan which has been prepared by another government of similar status; and it is naive to expect that the preparation of a "plan" on paper can constitute a pattern or guide for development without the power to ensure that the pattern will in fact be followed.

The zoning by-law is not capable of providing that power. Zoning control is limited in its capacity to ensure conformity with a development plan. It is essentially a negative instrument capable only of a regulatory or policing control over the private development of individual building sites. The zoning by-law says nothing about the nature or pattern of streets, the siting of specific projects, the timing of development, the size and composition of the future population, the city's social or economic objectives and other such matters which are the goals which define the city's future and which should constitute the substance of a development plan.

As important as the traditional powers over development of sites in the private sector are the powers to control activities in the public sphere, and to initiate and undertake development. Metro Winnipeg had no authority to co-ordinate the capital works programs of the area municipalities, and it could not undertake the most important of all the development activities of local government at that time - housing and urban renewal.

This view of planning as an administrative function and its division between what was regarded as the "metropolitan" component and the "local" component made it virtually impossible to plan. When Metro first aired its Metropolitan Development Plan it met with such opposition that it had to be withdrawn. The significant aspect of this episode was the fact that the opposition came from the councils of the area municipalities who saw in the proposals a threat not only to their jurisdiction but also to the economic and political interests of their own communities. What is relevant here is the fact that, although opposition to such plans is also common in municipalities with a unitary form of government, the plan in those instances represents the intended policies of the council, and if it is attacked, it is attacked by private interests who object to its proposals from the private owners' or developers' point of view, or from the point of view of citizens groups or action groups or other special interest groups. The plan however represents the point of view of the elected representatives of the citizens; the official point of view; the council's concensus as to what ought to happen in the community. Objections can be resolved because the proposals represent the intended policies of the governing body and provide a basis on which to negotiate; the alternatives are usually manifest and lie between the private citizen's rights on the one hand, and the long-term public interest on the other. It is possible in this circumstance, through the devices of negotiation, persuasion, exhortation, and finally the power to enact, to arrive at an operative plan of development. This was not possible in the Metro Winnipea situation, where a great measure of development policy and political power remained with the area municipalities. It was, in that circumstance, impossible for a plan to represent the policies of the governing body: there was no single governing body, and a concensus between Metro and the area municipalities, particularly Winnipeg, was difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. If, for whatever reason, the municipalities opposed a development plan, then unless the province was prepared to impose it through ministerial prerogative, the plan could not be established.

But perhaps the greatest failure of the Metro planning function was in the area of housing and social policy. These jurisdictions were simply not provided for in the Metro Winnipeg Act. As a result the initiative remained with the area municipalities, and in the years of the metropolitan form of government only about 350 units of low income family housing were constructed in Greater Winnipeg and there was no creative policy of any kind formulated in the field of social development or the urban economy.

The blame for the inadequacy of the Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg Act of 1960, in terms of its planning provisions, must of course rest with the provincial government of the time. The Act, and the decade of metropolitan government which followed it are a clear indication of the failure on the part of the provincial authorities to understand the nature and function of the contemporary metropolis in general and of metropolitan Winnipeg in particular. The Roblin government proceeded on the principle that the rural sector of the province needed their attention more than the urban and that the larger urban centres, particularly metropolitan Winnipeg, could look after their own affairs, although the metropolitan situation needed some structural adjustment. They took their cues for those adjustment from the Metro Toronto experiment (the introduction of a Municipal Board with "planning" jurisdiction - an idea formerly alien to Manitoba, and one which removed the final responsibility for planning decisions from the Minister to an appointed Board - is a case in point), and from the fashionable ideas of regional government prevalent at that time, and they created a structure of government which was bound to fail because it could only deal with the most superficial aspects of urban life - the major trunk systems. The provincial authorities failed to understand that the gut issues of the modern metropolis are not merely those of physical infrastructure systems and the method of delivering municipal housekeeping services; they also failed to understand that they themselves held the power to deal with the essential problems of the city, but did not see themselves in that role, preferring to leave those matters to the city itself to solve, but failing to

understand that they had not conveyed the necessary fiscal or statutory power to enable the municipality to do so. Their most abject failure however lay in the fact that they did not even enter into a creative or meaningful dialogue with the metropolitan authority on a strategy for dealing with these matters. In fact they held the metropolitan council at arms length, or else ignored them completely, and refused to become involved in these urban issues.

#### 8. Prelude to Amalgamation

On June 25, 1969, a provincial election was held in which the Conservative government of Walter Weir was defeated and the New Democratic Party under Edward Schreyer was elected as a minority government. The results of the election were NDP 28 seats, Conservatives 22, Liberals 5, Social Credit 1, Independent 1. Subsequently the Liberal member from St. Boniface crossed the floor to join the government side giving the NDP a majority - 29 seats in the 57 seat legislature. Tensions between Metro and the City of Winnipeg were not easing. If anything, they had been exacerbated by the publication of Metro's <u>Downtown Winnipeg</u> report in April. The issue of the form of government for metropolitan Winnipeg was much discussed during the run-up to the election in June, and the NDP regarded the matter as an important item on their political agenda. In fact, during the election campaign, the NDP seemed to lean towards a revised form of the two-tier structure. Ed Schreyer, on the eve of the election, was reported as having said that if elected his government would move towards a regional government with stronger powers than those of Metro.

But public opinion, towards the end of the 1960's, was beginning to favour amalgamation. The city's business community was increasingly advocating the creation of a single city as a measure which would help stimulate the dormant economy. In 1965, Sydney Green, as a member of the Metro council, introduced a motion favouring amalgamation; the motion was only narrowly defeated by a vote of 5-4. However, on June 28, 1968, Metro council reversed its position and voted in favour of unification by

a vote of 7-1. In January 1968 the provincial Liberal Party had declared its support for amalgamation. And, on April 2, 1968, Sydney Green, now an NDP member of the provincial legislature, introduced a personal resolution in the house advocating a single city. His resolution was supported by a majority of the NDP caucus members, and at the policy convention of the NDP later that year the principle of amalgamation of the metropolitan area municipalities was approved. The Metro government itself, in 1969, submitted a brief to the provincial government strongly supporting unification. It had reached the point where its major task had been accomplished and where the future prospect was only one of diminishing successes and increasing rancorous disputes with the City of Winnipeg.

Immediately upon its election the government of Ed Schreyer set itself the task of finding a solution to the problem of metropolitan Winnipeg. In September, 1969, the Premier announced that a special group would be created to assess the problems of Metro, and Professor Meyer Brownstone of the University of Toronto was appointed as consultant to the government. Brownstone set to work immediately, gathering information, sampling opinions among the caucus members, and drafting proposals and memoranda relating to the reorganization of the metropolitan government. On June 30, 1970, the cabinet decided that a policy review of Metropolitan Winnipeg would be carried out based on the premises of an amalgamation plan providing for political decentralization and citizen participation. A cabinet committee on urban affairs was struck with Saul Cherniack, a former Metro councillor and now Minister of Finance, as chairman and responsible for conducting the policy review.

A period of intensive activity followed during which various alternative policies were developed and debated and out of which emerged the concept of the new government. During this period a number of individual resource persons made important contributions as members of task forces and sub-committees, and the members of the cabinet committee themselves came to clearer understanding of their own positions with

respect to some of the fundamental premises underlying the general concept. Among the basic issues which were debated were such questions as whether there should be total or only partial amalgamation, whether it should be immediate or gradual, whether jurisdiction over services should be retained locally or be centralized, what should be the relationship between the citizens and the new government, how big should the new council be as a function of the ratio of citizens to elected representative, should the mayor be elected by the electors at large or by the council itself, and what should be his role and powers. Generally those members of the cabinet committee, and indeed of the caucus, who had previously been mayors or councillors of area municipalities did not support amalgamation and centralization. Those who were elected to the legislature from constituencies which included their former municipal power base undoubtedly feared that their support for such measures in the face of local opposition to them would jeopardize their chances of re-election to the legislature. Chief among these were the cabinet ministers Saul Miller and Al Mackling, and their views were shared by a number of other government members. Their concerns were of course seriously considered in the discussions of the amalgamation proposal and one of the solutions adopted was the principle of a gradual transition to full unification with the retention of as many characteristics of the former area municipality organization as possible. The differences which emerged during the period of policy formulation generally were resolved through compromise although on some of the issues there was no reconciliation and a majority view prevailed.

On December 23, 1970, the government released its White Paper, 82 in which were set out its policies for restructuring the government of Metropolitan Winnipeg. In general terms the government perceived three main causes of the urban area's difficulties: fragmented authority, segmented financial capacity, and lack of citizen involvement. It proposed to overcome these difficulties first through the unification of all of the municipalities which would provide a single centralized authority and a single

centralized financial capacity, and second, through the creation of a system of Community Committees which, it was hoped, would provide a vehicle for effective citizen participation. The two basic principles underlying the concept of the proposed new government were centralization of the administration and decentralization of the political process.

The main thrust of the White Paper was the unification of all of the metropolitan area municipalities into a single city and the centralization of municipal services and taxation, while at the same time decentralizing the political process in order to heighten citizen participation in the political life of the city. In keeping with the agreed policy of a gradual transition and the retention of as many characteristics of the former municipal regime as possible, the White Paper proposed that the former boundaries (although of course not the municipal powers) of the former municipalities be retained in the reorganization of the political structure of the new city. The White Paper stated:

It is proposed that all major urban services, and all fiscal resources, at the disposal of the community, be unified under one central council. In parallel, in order to effect the vital decentralization of government processes discussed earlier, it is proposed that this council be so elected, and its duties so arranged as to afford the maximum direct contact, communication and interaction between the citizen and his elected councillor.

We propose to accomplish this, as will be set out in detail, through the use of wards and groupings of wards into Community Committees. Although certain consolidations will be indicated, in the main, existing municipal boundaries will be maintained intact and used as a basis for establishing the grouping of wards into Community Committees. Hence (except for certain consolidations) each of the existing municipal areas would contain its own group of electoral wards and thus its own Community Committee and its traditional identity.<sup>83</sup>

Since there were 12 municipal areas<sup>84</sup> this principle meant that the White Paper proposed that there be 12 communities, each with its Community Committee. It was an article of faith on the part of the government that ready access by the citizen to

his elected representative was a critical requirement for effective citizen participation in the political process, and that the lower the ratio of citizens to councillors the greater the accessibility. The White Paper claimed that in the opinion of various experts in the field a ratio of 10-12000 citizens per elected councillor represents an optimum ratio. Accordingly, each community (or former municipal area) was divided into a number of wards so that each ward would contain that optimum number of residents. It was not possible to achieve that ideal distribution because even with certain consolidations the number of residents in the communities did not lend themselves readily to that arithmetic. However, on the basis of a 1969 metropolitan population of 516,644 this exercise produced 48 wards ranging in population from a low of 7,045 to a high of 11,690, averaging 10,768 persons per ward.

Since each ward was to elect a representative to the city council the council would then consist of 48 councillors, and, as proposed in the White Paper, the mayor would be elected by the councillors from among themselves. On the matter of the election of the mayor the White Paper stated:

It is essential in our view, that the Mayor, as chairman of such a council, must be both consistently responsible to the members of Council and have the sustained confidence of the Council. Area-wide election of the Mayor would, in our view, not merely dilute the supremacy of the popularly elected Council but leave ambiguous the question of who is really responsible, the Council or the Mayor.

Hence, the Mayor would be elected by the Council from among its membership.<sup>85</sup>

Each ward would be part of a community and the geographic area of each community would be the same as that of the former municipality. Each ward would elect a councillor, and the councillors from the wards which comprised a community would constitute a community committee. Thus each councillor would be simultaneously and automatically a member of both the city council and a community committee. The primary role of the community committees would be to provide ready access by their

constituents to the local government system, but they were also to have certain administrative functions. They were to be responsible for those services which were deemed to be essentially local in nature such as local parks, playgrounds, libraries, etc. and for whatever residual municipal services still remained untransferred until such time as the new central government was able to take them over. It was the proposal of the White Paper that the community committees propose programs for these services, submit budgets for these services to the central council, and supervise the delivery of these services.

The White Paper did not represent the government's final commitment to the Paper's proposals. It was intended, as is usual with such Papers, as the basis for public discussion with a view to making such revisions and adjustments to the proposals as might be appropriate in the light of public debate. A series of 11 public information meetings was arranged in which Saul Cherniack was to present the government's position on the proposals. The White Paper was met with general hostility at these meetings. It reached such a pitch on at least one occasion the police had to be called in to quell an incipient riot. Loud objections were voiced and placards protested against the loss of local identity, the loss of autonomy, the inevitable increase in taxes, and similar threats to the established and accustomed life-style. The intense opposition to the government's proposals which was demonstrated at these meetings may well have been orchestrated by select groups with special vested interests such as the members of the local municipal governments and by political partisans opposed to the New Democratic Party. The fierce objections and large crowds which marked the early meetings diminished dramatically as the series of meetings progressed until at the end there was virtually no opposition voiced and only a minimal attendance.

During the early months of 1971 various revisions of the proposals were made. In February the government established the Taraska Commission to recommend ward boundaries. The Commission, named after its chairman Judge Peter Taraska of the

Citizenship Court, submitted its report of electoral boundaries, in April. It recommended the creation of 13 communities and 50 wards instead of 12 communities and 48 wards which had originally been proposed in the White Paper. A Bill was prepared and was first presented in the House in May. Amendments followed the first reading, and in June 1971, Bill 36, the principal legislation, was introduced for second reading. Further procedures and amendments followed and the third reading was given on July 24. The Bill received Royal Assent on July 27, 1971, and the City of Winnipeg Act 86 was passed into law.

#### PHASE 3: THE UNIFIED CITY

# 1. The Unified City - Political Structure and Statutory Plans

The Act, and accordingly, the new unified City of Winnipeg did not come into effect until January 1, 1972. The election of the new city council was held on October 6, 1971. The Independent Citizens Election Committee (ICEC) won 37 seats, the NDP which chose not to contest the election as a full-scale party campaign won 7 seats, and the remaining six seats went to independents. Steve Juba was elected mayor of the unified city, thus culminating a decade and a half of bitter struggle for amalgamation and fulfilling his long-cherished ambition to be the mayor of the unified metropolitan area government.

The Act contained 680 sections filling some 326 pages and it would serve no useful purpose here to review, even cursorily, all of its provisions. There are, however, a number of aspects, not only of the Act, but also of the process of its formulation which are of central interest to this study and which merit discussion.

One of these relates to the matter of the provisions for the election of the mayor of the new government. The White Paper envisioned that the political process would culminate with the council; that it would begin at the grass-roots and flow from the citizens at large through their elected representatives to the council. The council then would represent the ultimate political authority. The mayor under this system would

have to be elected from within the council. To have the mayor elected at-large by the city-wide electorate would divide the political process and cleave the political authority in two. There was in this concept the implied notion of a parliamentary type of civic government system although this thought was never overtly expressed. There was precedent for the election of the head of the council by the members of the council themselves. The Metro Winnipeg Act had provided for the appointment of the first Metro chairman for the initial term of the council, but all subsequent chairmen were to be elected by the councillors from among their own members. The idea of a council-elected mayor for the city, however, raised objections not only within the government caucus but also in various quarters of the public. Among the objectors was the Institute of Urban Studies who, on the basis of a poll which they had conducted, claimed that the people of Winnipeg wanted to elect their mayor themselves.

One of the most virulent attacks on the proposal was made by Steve Juba, the Mayor of Winnipeg, who knew that his career in civic politics would end if he had to depend on the votes of his fellow-politicians for election to the office of mayor. He persistently lobbied Premier Schreyer on the matter, pointing out that both of them drew much of their political support from the same constituency - the ethnic and working class voters - who would be betrayed if they could not elect their chosen candidate to the mayor's office under the new Act. There was even talk that Juba threatened to form his own party to challenge the Schreyer government unless the proposed method of electing the mayor was changed. At the last moment the Bill to create the new city government was amended to provide for the election of the mayor at-large. However, the critical event which led to that decision was less a matter of the agitation and threats of the mayor of Winnipeg and of the editorials in the news media than it was of the adamant position taken by the Hon. Sydney Green, who was a minister in the

Schreyer cabinet at the time, and a powerful member of the committee dealing with the proposals for changing the government of metropolitan Winnipeg.

Mr. Green was firmly committed to the principle of a unified city and the centralization of municipal services. He viewed the proposed Bill as representing the condition of a transition phase from the multi-government structure of Metro to the fully unified state, and was prepared to accept the retention of some of the residual forms of the previous regime, as was advocated by many members of the government caucus. However, he was not prepared to tolerate any serious obstacles to the transfer of all municipal services from the communities which were the residuals of the former area municipalities to the new unified city government. At the time when this matter of responsibility for services was under discussion in the context of the Bill which was being prepared for presentation to the House, it was necessary for him to be out of town. When he returned he found that his colleagues had agreed to a revision of the Bill which provided that those services could only be transferred after a notice of intention of 90days and a 60 per cent vote of the council. He was incensed by this because he realized that the council, dominated as it would be by suburban members, would never vote for the transfer of services. Beyond the question of the transfer of services, however, he realized that the make-up of the council would ensure the perpetuation of the old suburban-based system. In order to counter this prospect he felt that a powerful political force was required at the centre. He saw this countervailing political force in the person of Steve Juba. He also knew that Juba would never be chosen mayor by the other members of council. Accordingly he took the position that he would support the conditions to transfer only if the Bill were changed to provide for the election of the mayor at-large instead of from within the council. He was able to make his position prevail at a caucus meeting on July 20 and the Bill was amended accordingly.87

As it ultimately turned out the election of the mayor at-large did not ensure that Winnipeg would have a "strong mayor" or that it would effectively counterbalance the

weight of the suburban orientation of the council. The powers of the mayor under the City of Winnipeg Act proved to be largely ceremonial. Apart from his responsibility for chairing the meetings of the council he had virtually no powers or authority. Whatever powers he could exercise derived almost entirely from his personal qualities of leadership and persuasion and initiative rather than from powers vested in the office by statute. The suburban interests dominated the decisions of the new council and history has proven Mr. Green's concerns to have been well-founded but his measure for meeting those concerns was erroneous and ineffectual.

Another item of importance in the structure of the new metropolitan government was the community committee and its correlative body of neighbourhood advisers, the residents' advisory group. As already indicated, the White Paper had proposed that there be 12 communities and 48 wards. The Taraska Commission recommended 13 communities and 50 wards. The government accepted the Taraska Commission's recommendations and they were incorporated in the legislation. (See Fig. 17 and Fig.

## 18.) The 13 communities and their respective number of wards were:

	<u>Community</u>	Number of Wards
1.	Assiniboine Park	3
*2.	Centennial	4
3.	East Kildonan	4
4.	Fort Garry	3
*5.	Fort Rouge	5
*6.	Lord Selkirk	4
*7.	Midland	4
8.	St. Boniface	· 4
9.	St. James-Assiniboia	6
*10.	St. John's	4
11.	St. Vital	3
12.	Transcona	3
13.	West Kildonan	3
* cent	tral city communities	•

The former City of Winnipeg - the central city - had 21 of the 50 wards, and the suburbs - the former area municipalities - taken together had 29. In 1974 amendments of the Act eliminated the community of St. John's and assigned two of its wards to the Lord Selkirk community and two to the East Kildonan community. This

revision of the electoral boundaries reduced the central city's wards to 19 and increased the number of suburban wards to 31; it also reduced the number of communities from 13 to 12.

Although the community committee provided the citizens with an entry to the council, it was felt that there was needed a vehicle to convey the citizens' views and wishes to the community committee and, through that entry, to the council. That vehicle was the residents' advisory group. The concept of the RAG, as it was to be known, was not one of the proposals contained in the White Paper but emerged during the discussion period following the publication of the Paper when a number of additions and revisions were made to the original concept. It was then included in the <u>City of Winnipeg Act</u>.

Members of the residents' advisory group were to be elected at a community conference which each community was required to convene once every year. The members of the residents' advisory group however were not to be members of the community committee and were not to share the functions or the powers of the community committee. The residents' advisory group was to formulate its own by-laws and procedures but its role was only advisory:

The role of a residents' advisory group is to advise and assist the members of the community committee for the community at whose conference they were elected, as to the performance of their functions under this Act.<sup>88</sup>

The relationship of the community committee to the residents of the community as set out in the original (1971) version of the <u>City of Winnipeg Act</u> was also generally that of communication with the residents of the community and of keeping them informed about the city's policies and programs. Section 23 of the Act states:

Each community committee shall,

 develop and implement techniques to maintain the closest possible communication between the city and the residents of the community, so that residents' views on policies, programs, budgets and delivery of services may be communicated

- to the council, the committees of the council, and the boards and commissions continued or created under this Act, and
- b) develop and implement techniques to provide the residents of the community with information concerning existing and potential city policies, programs, and budgets so as to facilitate residents in discussing and developing views concerning these matters.<sup>89</sup>

It is interesting to note that in this first version of the <u>City of Winnipeg Act.</u>

although provision is made for the establishment of both the community committee and the residents' advisory group, the responsibilities of the community committee are to the "residents of the community" and not specifically to the residents' advisory group, and the areas of responsibility are stated in broad general terms which to that extent are somewhat vague. It is as though the concept of the residents' advisory group and its relationship to the community committee was still only an emerging idea which had not yet acquired a precise form but was ideologically attractive enough to be incorporated into the legislation. Some years later, when the Act was amended in 1977, a third subsection (c) was added to section 23 which specifically set out the community committee's responsibility to the residents' advisory group and clarified to some further extent the relationship between them; the community committee was to

(c) develop and implement techniques to make the fullest and best use of the resident advisory group for the community committee in the committee's considerations of the Greater Winnipeg development plan, zoning changes or proposed plans of subdivision or any amendment, alteration, repeal or replacement of any one or more of them.<sup>90</sup>

The plans which were referred to in the 1977 amendment were already included in the original <u>City of Winnipeg Act</u> of 1971. They formed the basic structure of Part XX of the Act, entitled "The Environment" which dealt with the new city's planning function. The <u>City of Winnipeg Act</u> made a notable advance over the Metro Act in its overt acknowledgment of the policy-making role of the municipal government and in its

explicit recognition of the fact that the city's policy-making function is essentially its planning function. The Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg Act had broadened the scope of the traditional municipal plan from simply a matter of streets and utilities lay-out and land-use control or zoning to include, as an object of the plan, the promoting of "the orderly growth and economic development of the metropolitan area and the additional zone in the manner most advantageous to, and that will best promote those amenities that are essential to, or desirable for, the well being of, the inhabitants thereof." This statement of the plan perhaps contained the implication that the Metro government was expected to make systematic policies on these matters and to express those policies in the development plan. But if such indeed was the expectation it was not overt in the statement and could only be inferred. The City of Winnipeg Act went a step beyond this and made explicit the city council's responsibility for formulating development policies and expressing them in the form of a development plan. Section 569(f) of the Act states:

"Greater Winnipeg development plan" means a statement of the city's policy and general proposals in respect of the development or use of the land in the city and the additional zone, set out in texts, maps or illustrations, and measures for the improvement of the physical, social and economic environment and transportation.91

Section 570 of the Act went on to say that the Metropolitan development plan established by Metro by-law 1117 "shall be deemed to be the approved Greater Winnipeg development plan for the unified city and the additional zone..."92 Thus there was established a clear statutory mandate for guiding the development of the city on the basis of a broad spectrum of policies openly declared and approved and incorporated in law through the procedural mechanisms provided in the Act. In order to follow the logic of that mandate through from the general to the particular, from the adoption of the principle in the development plan to the execution of the development on the ground and

thus to maintain the integrity of the planning function, the Act provided two other types of plans - the district plan and the action area plan. These three types of plans were meant to be complementary to each other. The development plan was to be the most generalized and comprehensive plan for the entire city and the additional zone; the district plan was to be a more detailed plan for a district contained within the development plan; and the action area plan was to set out even more specific and detailed proposals for an area contained within the district plan. Each of these plans was expected to connect back to and elaborate and amplify the policies and proposals contained in a more generalized form in the next higher level of plan in the hierarchy so that the whole would constitute an integrated, closely linked system of plans.

This system of interlocking plans of progressively diminishing area and increasingly specific detail, together with the heightened public input provided initially by the community committee and subsequently by the addition of the residents' advisory group comprised a framework within which the city government could effectively make and carry out its development policies. The large number of councillors elected from the wards derived from the White Paper's assumption of an optimum ratio between population and elected representative. The Paper had indicated 48 wards and therefore a city council of 48 members, with the mayor elected from within the council. In its form as enacted in the City of Winnipeg Act of 1971 the council consisted of 50 members excluding the mayor, elected at-large. There is no hard evidence to indicate that there was anything behind the extraordinarily large size of the council other than the population/councillor ratio, but there was nevertheless the vague intuition, sensed rather than clearly manifested, of a shadow lying beneath the surface discussion, an adumbration of a party structure and parliamentary form of civic government. If this was indeed what was foreshadowed, that prospect was abruptly erased by the election of the mayor at-large; indeed the entire conceptual structure on which the large council had been overtly predicated, namely the flow of political authority from the grass roots

up through the elected representatives to the council itself, was nullified by the citywide election of the mayor.

Nor did the community committee system work in the way in which it had originally been visualized. The responsibility for supervising the administration and delivery of services which had been assigned to the community committee by the Act (Sec.22(1)) was very soon found to be unworkable and had to be rescinded in subsequent amendments leaving the committee virtually with only the role of communication and of serving as the starting point in the process of examining applications for zoning and plans amendments where these affected the community area, as well as the power to grant minimal zoning variances. The residents' advisory group also was less than successful in terms of the role which had been envisioned for it by its advocates. Indeed during the transition period of the first three or four years, Unicity - the popular cognomen for the unified city - failed to realize many of the high hopes of the NDP government and the officials and consultants who had been engaged in formulating the concepts and drafting the legislation for the amalgamated municipalities.

Shortfalls in performance were to be expected simply because of the enormous problems involved in embarking on an unfamiliar, indeed unprecedented, system of government. Some of the difficulties arose from the confusion among members of the council, members of the standing committees, the executive policy committee, the administrative staff including the board of commissioners, as to their roles, duties and relationships to each other. For most of them the new political structure was unfamiliar. Moreover, the Act itself in several of its sections was poorly drawn and ambiguous, and in certain cases assigned the same responsibilities to different bodies, producing overlapping and conflict. For example, Section 36 of the Act gave the standing committees the responsibility for the implementation of city policies and programs; but Section 49(b) gave the same responsibility to the board of commissioners. Section 36(c) made the standing committees responsible for the review of the annual capital and

operating budget of their departments including those of the community committees; but Section 50(1)(e) made the board of commissioners responsible for the same; and Section 39(1) gave the finance committee the same responsibility. Sections 40(1), 52(1) and 52(2) created the same overlapping and confusion between the committee on works and operations and "an appointed commission designated by council" with respect to responsibility for the city's works and operations. And reference has already been made to the unworkability and repeal of Section 22(1) which had made each community committee responsible for the supervision of employees in the delivery of all services.

Those members of the new Unicity council who had previously served on the councils of the area municipalities - and this included the majority of them - were accustomed to a markedly different system of local government. Although the Act established only three standing committees - finance, works and operations and environment - these committees almost immediately created sub-committees which soon mushroomed in number and which had no clear terms of reference or direction. Many senior administrators in the early period were uncertain of their futures and could not dedicate themselves wholly to the new regime. Many councillors not only came from former area municipality councils which had been opposed to amalgamation but also belonged to the Liberal or Conservative parties which were politically opposed to the NDP and had no intention of co-operating with the Schreyer government, or interest in making its experiment in the new unified city succeed. And the provincial government itself was still divided and uncertain about some aspects of the proposed unification such as the rate at which it should proceed and how far it should go in reducing the former local identities and roles. The government may also have been at fault in not working out more fully the legal and administrative minutae on which the success of the new regime would be so heavily dependent and in perhaps being less than vigilant in ensuring that the process of transition would lead to the realization of the vision of the unified city as conceived by the urban affairs committee and its consultants.

It may be that the government deliberately chose not to be seen as heavy-handed and paternalistic in directing the city, and preferred, in acknowledgment of the principle of local autonomy, that the city find its own way through the difficulties of the transition. Meyer Brownstone, the government's chief consultant, felt very strongly that the government was at fault in not taking a more aggressive role in ensuring that the transition was moving in the right direction. In a letter dated October 25, 1971, to the Hon. Sydney Green, then Minister of Urban Affairs, Brownstone wrote:

[T]he government should reiterate its policy regarding a strong co-operative partnership, and then it should make some concrete commitments about support, about systematic consultation, about readiness to consider specific measures to move towards more local autonomy - e.g. the Municipal Board, health and welfare responsibilities, perhaps housing. The stress should not be on avoidance of provincial responsibility in the name of local autonomy, but acceptance of provincial responsibility in the name of a healthier provincial community of which Winnipeg is unavoidably the vital centre.<sup>93</sup>

It seems that the Hon. Mr. Green was not persuaded by Brownstone's argument, and neither was the rest of the cabinet because no action was taken along the lines suggested by the consultant. Later, Brownstone was to write:

But the province persisted in its arms-length, if not hands-off posture. In contrast to its commitment to substantial local government change, the government's timidity on implementation seems surprising. It failed to recognize that "framework" legislation alone will not necessarily change the nature of political and administrative processes, especially if many of the principal participants are wedded to conventional notions. In such circumstances it is incumbent upon a provincial government - if it is to be an effective agent of change - to ensure that the processes and necessary supporting elements are developed to the point where their purpose cannot easily be misunderstood or thwarted....

For its part, the provincial government's reluctance to intervene, between the passage of the legislation and the election of the new city council, stemmed from rather naive assumptions regarding institutional

change under the prevailing conditions. These failures caused many problems in setting up and operating Winnipeg's new one-tier Unicity.<sup>94</sup>

How successful may have been a more active intervention by the province is open to question. Certainly the council of the new unified city would not have taken kindly to any interference by the socialist government. Of the 50 council members, 21 had been members of the councils of former area municipalities and nine had been members of the former City of Winnipeg council; 20 of them had not previously held political office. But the anti-socialist presence on the new council was overwhelming. The Independent Citizens Election Committee (ICEC) held 37 of the 50 seats and the ICEC was the heir of the Committee of 1000 which had moved against the strike of 1919 and was instrumental in the defeat of the "bolshevik red menace" which had threatened the established order of the city.

# 2. The Unified City - Diminished Planning. Unhonored Commitments

Despite all of these difficulties the new council assumed its responsibilities with some dispatch and moved quickly to take over and centralize most of the services which had formerly rested with the area municipalities. There were, however, some glaring weaknesses and failures which were causing exasperation among those who were involved in the city government process and disdain among the general public. The <u>City of Winnipeg Act</u> came into effect on January 1, 1972; Section 660 of the Act required that in or before 1977, that is within six years, the government was to carry out a review of the Act and the operations of the city under it. Concern over the frictions and faults which were afflicting the conduct of the city's affairs, however, led the province to undertake a review after only three years and eight months had passed. On September 11, 1975, by Order-In-Council 1174/75, the Committee of Review, the <u>City of Winnipeg Act</u>, was appointed, under the chairmanship of Judge Peter Taraska. The other members of the Committee were Professor Allan O'Brien of the Department of Political Science of the University of Western Ontario, and a former mayor of the City of Halifax,

and Earl Levin, Planning Consultant, formerly Director of the Planning Division of Metro, and a past-president of the Town Planning Institute of Canada. The secretary of the committee was Ellen Gallagher, who had been the secretary of the provincial government's cabinet committee on urban affairs which had produced the White Paper and carried the brunt of responsibility for the work leading to the <u>City of Winnipeg Act</u>. The Review Committee sat for about a year, and received submissions from more than 100 witnesses whose evidence took over 200 hours to present and filled over 3000 pages of typescript.

The material presented to the committee was "of a high order - perceptive, informed, carefully prepared, and well presented,"95 and covered every aspect of the city government's operations under the Act. The Review Committee submitted its report to the government on October 21, 1976. Much of its content is germane to one of the central concerns of this thesis - the policy-making or planning function of Winnipeg as one of the three subject cities of this study. It is, of course, not possible to review all of this material, but some of it speaks directly to our interest here and cannot be passed by in silence. It is ironical that the City of Winnipeg Act, which the government and its advisers had seen as the solution to the fragmentation of the metropolitan area government and its inability to make and carry out the area-wide policies should turn out to be the means of continuing that fragmentation although in a somewhat different form, and of subverting the council's planning function. Certain excerpts from the evidence quoted in the Committee of Review's report have been selected for the clarity with which they reveal these failings of the city government under the Act. Probably the most damaging of the Act's provisions, in this regard, was the creation of the system of electoral wards. The original intent of the wards was to increase the citizens' access to their elected representatives by keeping the ratio of citizens to representatives down to what was considered to be an optimum number. It can be argued that the Act achieved this objective. But in doing so it broke the metropolitan area into even smaller, tighter

and more insular pieces than had been the case with Metro and the area municipalities. From the brief presented to the Committee of Review by Councillor Jim Ernst, the report quotes the following passage:

The ward system for election of councillors also has its problems, the greatest being the pressure that ward residents can bring to bear on their councillor, at times sufficient to alter his or her stand on a given subject. In cases where something may be of benefit to the total community or the city as a whole, but is very unpopular in a ward or neighbourhood where the voters live, extreme pressure can be brought to bear on the councillor to vote in favour of his ward, helping his chances for re-election but not benefitting the city at large.<sup>96</sup>

Councillor William Norrie, who was later elected as mayor of the city, is quoted as saying:

That's been our great weakness.... that we haven't had an overview and as long as we cultivate the single member wards in that very parochial outlook, we will never get it. If you have had the experience of trying to get anything through council, something other than a local kind of issue, a lot of councillors just don't relate to it because it doesn't affect their area.

Conversely, if it is something that is important for the city as a whole but might have an adverse effect on a local area, there will be a dog fight on the part of the local councillor and simply because other local councillors who look at it from that point of view feel that some day they might be in that situation, they are very sensitive to that kind of objection. As a result, many of the things that have been needed in the interest of the over-all city haven't happened.<sup>97</sup>

And Councillor Robert Steen, who was also subsequently elected as the mayor of the city, had the following excerpt from his submission quoted in the committee's report:

You end up, as a councillor, becoming extremely parochial in your viewpoint. You never do get beyond that on matters that affect your particular ward.... you think only what's the interest of your ward and to hell with the rest of the city. You never get beyond that because the pressure is on you from the people you represent to do something about that particular

problem and hang the expense and the discomfort you're bringing to the rest of the city.98

Related to the small ward, and forming with it the package in which was wrapped the reformers' hopes of a more participatory type of democracy, of giving the citizen greater access to the political process and bringing him into closer contact with his elected representative, was the community committee and the residents' advisory group. The Committee of Review found that these latter devices, like the wards, also failed to achieve their intended objectives. The report made the following observation:

Of the many briefs which discussed the community committees and the residents' advisory groups, the majority felt that neither of these elements of the city government was working as the Act had intended....

As matters now stand, the residents' advisory groups, in most instances, feel that they are being ignored, or outrightly rejected by the community committees, and the community committees, in some instances, feel that the residents' advisory groups represent small special interest groups (rather than the general population of the community) who have manoeuvered themselves into positions of dominance on the residents' advisory groups and are imposing their own particular view on the community committees. Both the community committees and the residents' advisory groups, however, apparently feel that there is not enough responsibility and power at this very local level and want more authority given to them. Many briefs expressed the view that they were not functioning properly because they do not have anything of importance to do.99

The authors of Metropolitan Winnipeg attribute the failure of the community committees and the residents' advisory groups to two causes. 100 One was the fact that in too many cases the councillors who comprised the community committee were either completely indifferent or else overtly hostile to the residents' advisory group and even refused to comply with the requirements of the Act such as to maintain the closest possible communication with the residents so that the residents' views may be conveyed to council, or to develop techniques for providing the residents with information about the city's policies, programs, budgets, etc. The other cause of the failure was the fact

that the residents' advisory groups had inadequate resources such as secretarial services or research personnel to assist in gathering data, preparing position papers, providing information, etc. These were undoubtedly factors which were among the major causes for the failure of the community committees and the residents' advisory groups to realize the hopes of the idealists who had championed their inclusion in the local government structure.

The residents' advisory groups, then, failed in part because of the indifference or hostility of the community committees and lack of staff resources. But they also failed in part because they served no useful purpose in the political life of metropolitan Winnipeg. They failed, essentially, because they had nothing to do. The administrative responsibilities had been taken over entirely by the central administration and the policy making role of the council was virtually in limbo, so there was little to communicate by the community committee to the residents' advisory group and even less in the reverse direction. The one activity in which both the community committee and the advisory group might have been kept busy and productive was the preparation of community and action area plans in the context of a city development plan. But the members of the council were not interested in city-wide planning. Already their focus had narrowed onto their wards and their energies were concentrated on parochial politics. Mr. D.I. Macdonald, the Chief Commissioner of the City, appeared before the Committee and made the following indictment of the city of which he was the top administrative official:

The most serious failure of the new city is in the area of planning. The plans inherited from the former metropolitan government have either become obsolete by the passage of time or are politically unacceptable to the new city. They have not been replaced.

Consequently the city has no up-to-date development plan, no transportation plan whatever, or plans for the renewal and redevelopment of its decayed areas and no plan for the redevelopment of its downtown area.<sup>101</sup>

The Committee of Review opened the Summary section of its report with a succinct, two-paragraph synopsis of its findings:

The evidence indicated some impressive achievements: a single council for the whole of the Greater Winnipeg area; a unified administration; a single tax base; unified municipal services; a formal mechanism for citizen participation in the process of government; general acceptance of the unification of the city.

But evidence also indicated failings and deficiencies in important areas of the government: a lack of leadership; a lack of accountability; a confusion of roles and responsibilities among the political committees themselves as well as between the politicians and the administration; low staff morale; complicated and cumbersome approval processes; a narrow parochialism among the councillors and a neglect of large-scale city-wide policies by the council. 102

The Committee made 71 recommendations in its report, designed to overcome the failings and deficiencies in the operation of the city government under the Act which they had found during the investigation. The general thrust of their recommendations - if such a large number of recommendations addressing such a range of concerns can be seen as having a single direction - was toward a parliamentary form of city government. One of the requirements of a parliamentary system is that there is adequate political representation; another is that there be an opposition. To meet these criteria a large council was necessary, and the 50 members under the existing legislation provided sufficient numbers. But there had been serious criticism of the size of the council and demands that it be reduced. There had also been criticism of the number and nature of the community committees, and the Committee of Review felt that reorganizing the community committee areas on somewhat different boundaries from those of the former area municipalities might help to overcome the problem of the prevailing parochialism. The works and operations function of the city was organized on the basis of six districts, and the Committee of Review recommended that the 12 community committees be reduced

in number to six, with their geographical areas corresponding to those of the six engineering districts, and that the number of electoral wards, and therefore of the corresponding residents' advisory groups, be reduced from 50 to 39. The Committee argued that the 50 wards had been derived from a ratio of 10,00-12,000 persons per elected representative but this was anomalous since the 10,000-12,000 persons included minors and others who were not eligible to vote. Instead, they argued, the ratio should be based on the number of eligible voters per elected representative, and on this basis they arrived at a figure of 39 wards with their corresponding number of residents' advisory groups. The Committee also recommended that the community committees and resident advisory groups be given the responsibility for preparing the district and action area plans in their areas.

There were fairly extensive amendments of the <u>City of Winnipeg Act</u> in 1977. Included among these was the reduction in the number of committees from twelve to six, as had been recommended by the Committee of Review, but the number of wards was reduced even further than the Committee had proposed: the number of wards was reduced to 29. But they were given no planning responsibilities. The Committee had also recommended that the mayor be elected from among the members of the council, that the research capacity of the board of commissioners be increased and its advisory role be broadened, that the office of the mayor be separated form that of chairman of the council, that the mayor appoint the chairman of the council as well as the chairmen of the standing committees, and other changes conducive to a parliamentary system and to the enhancement and support of the policy-making role of the council, but none of these recommendations was incorporated in the 1977 amendments.

Thus, instead of moving forward towards the new kind of civic government envisioned by the NDP's urban reformers, the city was gradually losing those elements which the reformers believed represented advancement and innovation and the prospect of a true policy-making planning function, and was reverting to the traditional

housekeeping administrative model of civic government. The lack of firm conviction and single-mindedness among all the members of the Schreyer cabinet and caucus about the course to be taken in the restructuring of the metropolitan Winnipeg government contributed something to the failure of the city's operations, particularly during its early years. So did the ambiguities and inadequacies of the City of Winnipeg Act itself. So did the hiatus between the idealistic principles underlying the concept of the new government and the political realities of the metropolitan area. Retention of the former area municipalities' names and other desiderata from the suburban past was perhaps a necessary, even unavoidable, measure to ease the transition to Unicity, but it perpetuated the suburban identities and local commitments. And the creation of a large number of small electoral wards forced the attention of the councilors inward to focus on even narrower parochial issues, and made it virtually impossible for them to attend to matters of city-wide import. The ward councillors became prisoners of their wards. Their personal political survival was owed to the electors in their ward, and it was of no advantage to them to pursue or espouse major issues which lay outside their own ward, or which might even present a threat to their own ward in terms of taxes, or political intrusions, or the loss or deferral of some local amenity. Probably as effective as any of these, however, in diverting the course of the Unicity experiment from the vision of the White Paper, as well as subverting the city's planning function, were two other factors. One of them was the dominance of ICEC-supported members on the city council; the other was the persistent condition of no-growth in the population and the economy of the city.

In the first Unicity election, 37 of the 50 seats were won by ICEC-endorsed candidates. Later, when the size of the council was reduced to 29, they held 19, and then 18, and when their identification with the ICEC was dropped, they were dubbed "the gang of 19," and "the gang of 18." But whatever the label, and whatever the number, they were the ruling group on the council and they brought back to it, after the Metro interlude, the attitudes and values of the businessmen and property owners which had

dominated the Winnipeg city council since 1919. But now the majority of them came from what had formerly been the area municipalities and the political power was weighted on their side. Contrary to Sydney Green's expectation, Mayor Juba, elected atlarge, offered no counterbalancing weight at all on the side of the central city. The ICEC group consistently denied that they were a party, but they caucused together, selected the chairmen of the standing committees and the executive policy committee as well as the appointees to other prestigious positions, exercised certain caucus disciplines, voted for the most part en bloc, and behaved in every way like a political party except that they were not formally organized and registered. By contrast, the small NDP group on council was a formally established party but behaved as though it were not, its members frequently falling out among themselves, voting at cross-purposes, and rarely showing political solidarity. The views of the ICEC group invariably prevailed in the debates and the decisions of the council. Their preoccupation was with matters of administrative housekeeping rather than those of policy. They were committed to the pursuit of shortterm revenues and political expediencies rather than long-term concepts and guiding principles; protective of their collective suburban interests and hostile to those of the central city; intensely focused on their local ward issues and negligent of the city as a whole.

The ward structure, together with the city's stagnating economy had a major impact on the city's planning function. The Metropolitan Development Plan - Metro's master plan for the metropolitan area - was established in 1968. When Metro was replaced by Unicity in 1971, the City of Winnipeg Act re-named the Metropolitan Development Plan the "Greater Winnipeg Development Plan" and made it the approved development plan for the unified city and the additional zone. It carried forward the three-level hierarchical structure of the plans system unaltered. The 1977 amendments changed the "district plan" to the "community plan" in recognition of the city's community-based political structure, as had been recommended by the Committee

of Review, but the procedures for establishing or amending any of the plans, as had been set out in the Act in 1971, were left intact. These procedures formed a closely-linked, logical progression which was integral with the plans system itself.

The Act spelled out in detail the route through the successive committees from the Community Committee to the Environment Committee and/or the Executive Policy Committee to the Council, and finally to the Minister, which a plan by-law must follow, together with the details about the manner in which a proposed plan by-law must be advertised, and the specifications governing the public hearings on the proposal.

Implicit in this structure of plans and procedures is the belief that planning is a logical, monolithic system in which all of the events which affect the development of the city can be classified and pigeon-holed, each in its appropriate place and an appropriate place for each in the hierarchical structure, with the entire system controlled and directed by the central authority for the purpose of carrying out the policies and proposals embodied in the plans. It is essentially an ideological or abstract view of planning with a strongly academic or theoretical character, containing overtones of the belief in the perfectibility of the city which was a firmly held tenet in the utopian ideology of the early town planning movement. It is also a technical and bureaucratic view of planning which sees it as a "rational" or "scientific" process, highly structured, predictable, controllable, and responsive to management techniques, instead of seeing it for what it is - an essentially political process. One of the side effects which this view of planning has produced in recent years is the emergence of management consulting firms as leaders in the practice of planning consultancy, although undoubtedly this phenomenon is also due in large part to the important place which economics has assumed in the formulation of planning and development policies throughout the whole of the planning field. Another effect of this rigidly structured, hierarchical system of plans and procedures is that the council of the City of Winnipeg simply ignored it whenever it was politically, or for some other reason, expedient to do so.

There are numerous instances in which the prescriptions of Part XX of the City of Winnipeg Act which covers the city's planning function have been ignored by the council, and in which the council has made no attempt to implement the policies and objectives of the city as established in the Greater Winnipeg Development Plan. All of these discredit the status of the planning legislation and diminish the planning function. Perhaps the most glaring of these anomalies is the council's disregard of its statutory obligation to prepare community plans. The community plan is the middle tier in the three-tier hierarchy of city plans established under the Act. It is the intermediate link between the more generalized development plan for the city as a whole, and the more specific and detailed action area plan for a smaller area within the community. It is a necessary component of the system of plans and procedures as laid down in Part XX of the Act. Pull it out and the hierarchical structure collapses and the fundamental concept underlying the planning system set out in Part XX is subverted. Section 583(1) of the Act (a 1977 amendment) says:

The council shall cause to be prepared and approved under this part a community plan for each community and where practicable a community plan for all that part of each municipality that is within the additional zone. 103

The council has made no move to comply with this requirement of the Act, and has given no indication of any intention to do so. Their attitude in this regard is perhaps understandable. The preparation of a community plan for each community would be a formidable undertaking in terms of effort, time, frustrations and complexity of procedures involved. More daunting than that, it would require the reconciliation of the wide diversity of opinions which would inevitably arise among the wards comprising each community. Most, if not all, of the six communities in the city subsume wards which are heterogeneous in character and outlook, and the attempt to arrive at a concensus on which to base a community plan would undoubtedly expose the councillors

of the community committee to severe buffeting by political cross-winds blowing from their constituent wards. Moreover, a community plan could simply be another impediment or hurdle to cross in the process of securing approval for applications for which the development-oriented councillors might want a smooth and rapid passage.

From this point of view it is understandable why the council has ignored the directive of the Act which obliges it to prepare community plans. But what may be seen as persuasive objections from this point of view represent the very essence of the planning process which is implicit in the Act. Apart from the question of propriety, responsibility and accountability raised by the council's disregard of the statutory requirement imposed on the council to prepare such plans, the refusal to do so is an abandonment of the political ideal which inspired much of the White Paper and the Act to enhance the participation by the people in the political process. In effect it represents a repudiation by the council of the basic concept and structure of the planning function as set out in Part XX of the City of Winnipeg Act. The turmoil of conflicting opinions and their eventual resolution in terms of policy is an essential part of the democratic political process. It is also an essential part of the planning process. It is a means of ensuring that government does not embark on programs or make commitments without at least some public discussion of the issues and accordingly some public participation in the formulation of policy. It is what was implicit in the structure of plans and procedures set out in the Environment section of the Act. The indifference of the city council to the community plans requirement expressed the council's attitude towards both the political ideal and the planning principles embodied in the Act, and, by extension, in the Greater Winnipeg Development Plan.

In some instances, council's failure to carry out policies established in the <a href="Greater Winnipeg Development Plan">Greater Winnipeg Development Plan</a> were due to the fact that the stated policies were simply beyond the council's powers to implement. The fault in these instances lay more

with the development plan than with the council. For example, under PART C Sec. 10.32 Policies-Railway System, the plan established the following policies:

- .1 To minimize conflict between railway systems and other transportation systems, and between railways and adjoining areas of other activities.
- .2 To establish the future use of railway-owned lands where the present use is or will be obsolete or should be changed in the interests of community development. 104

The city as a matter of city policy has virtually no power to minimize conflict between railway systems and other transportation systems. The most prevalent and severest conflicts are created by the level crossings of the railroad over city streets. To minimize these conflicts requires grade separation of the crossings. The city's power to achieve grade separation is negligible. Nor does it lie within the city's competence to determine the future use of railway lands as a matter of city policy. The railways must be involved in the implementation of such policies, and the Canadian Transport Commission, and no doubt, even the provincial and federal governments. Certain aspects of these policies, however, do lie within the city's jurisdiction. Council could have taken some action to minimize the conflict between the CPR Yards and mainline and the lands adjoining them along the length of their north and south edges, but the city took no such action. The development plan contained other such policies - those, for example, relating to housing, 105 town centres, 106 transit, etc. - which were similarly either ignored by the council or lay beyond its competence, and which, apart from indulging the messianic illusions of the planners and gratifying the politicians' need to be heard singing with the angels, served no useful purpose, and with the unfulfilled passage of time survived in the plan not as firm policies but merely as rhetorical platitudes. In the light of council's continuing neglect of these commitments it is questionable whether council ever really intended to implement them. Such "policy" statements should either

have been deleted from the plan or re-cast in language which expressed more accurately both the council's intentions and their competence to carry them out.

There was however an even more deep-seated flaw in the Greater Winnipeg Development Plan as well as in its companion-piece, the Downtown Winnipeg plan: they were simply irrelevant to the developmental reality of Winnipeg. When Metro's Planning Division prepared the Metropolitan Development Plan, during the decade of the 1960's, the nation was in a period of economic prosperity and emotional euphoria, and Winnipeg shared those experiences. Growth was the order of the day. The nation's business was booming, its cities were expanding, optimism ran high, and there was a kind of game of one-upmanship being played among the cities in which they vied with each other in population growth, building construction, building permit values, sales volumes, high-rise towers, and general boasting about their vitality and position in the national urban hierarchy. Winnipeg played this game as enthusiastically as any, and the Metro development plan reflected that enthusiasm. It was based on the assumption of continuing growth and prosperity. In fact, however, the buoyancy of the decade and a half following the end of World War II was, for Winnipeg, uncharacteristic and shortlived. The city had been in decline since about 1929, although certain of its aspects had been diminishing since about 1914. That decline was arrested by the war and reversed by the period of national post-war recovery. But the period of Winnipeg's re-growth was brief, lasting only until about 1961. For the five years 1956-1961, census division 20, which subsumed much the same area as the present Unicity, grew at an average annual rate of about six per cent. For the five years 1961-1966 the average annual rate of increase dropped to two per cent, and for the next five years, to 1971 it dropped to one per cent. This dramatic change in the growth rate simply marked the return of Winnipeg to its historic condition of population equilibrium and economic lassitude resulting from the exhaustion of the potential for growth in the wheat-based economy. Since 1971 the city's growth rate has fallen well below one per cent per year

or else hovered on that one per cent mark. For the 20 years, 1966-1986 the average annual rate of the Unity census division was only 0.84 per cent.

Economists explain Winnipeg's condition of stasis on the basis of the staples theory of regional economic development. 107 They postulate that the successful establishment of a new region depends upon the export of a natural resource product to an international market. The prairie region grew as a staple-led economy, and the staple was wheat. As the demand for wheat grew, the prairie economy grew, and the non-staple sector (i.e. the manufacturing sector) grew as well, stimulated by and contingent upon the staple sector, but not as rapid in its growth as the staple sector. Winnipeg was early on the major beneficiary of this contingent non-staple sector growth. The productivity of the staple sector grew faster than its market with the result that a large part of the labour force engaged in its production became redundant and was forced off the land into the urban centres, swelling the ranks of the unemployed. The non-staple sector was retarded, its growth rate being slower than that of the staple sector, and because of the falling-off of the demand for its manufactures due to the decline in the wheat-growing labour force. The economists conclude that it is extremely difficult for the non-staple sector of the urban economy to diversify on a large enough scale and quickly enough to take over the role of growth-leader from the moribund staple sector. This is the position into which Winnipeg has gradually been sinking for the past fifty years and more.

The Metropolitan Winnipeg Plan did not recognize the reality of Winnipeg's economic condition. It was conceived in the atmosphere of the buoyancy and optimism of the immediate post-war era. So was the <u>Downtown Winnipeg</u> plan. High rates of population growth, flourishing business, high density development were their premises. Private sector development during the 1960's touched every sector of the metropolitan area - except the city's core area - and the perspective of the Metro councillors was turned outward and encompassed the city as a whole. When Unicity was established in

1972, the bloom was already off the rose. Growth had become stabilized, development activity had abated. And the ward structure of the new government swung the view of the councillors from the outward, city-wide compass of the former Metro council, to the inward-turned parochial focus of the Unicity council.

With the contraction of the political field of vision it was inevitable that the ambit of the city's planning function would be correspondingly contracted. The city's planning department turned away from city-wide issues and became pre-occupied with small-scale local issues such as variances, zoning appeals, neighbourhood improvement, street signs, parking, etc. The Greater Winnipeg Development Plan and the Downtown Winnipeg plan were, in effect, in abeyance. Apart from the Trizec project, there was no major private sector development during the decade of the 1970s which had city-wide implications, and no initiative by the city council to implement any of the development plan's policies. Section 572 of the City of Winnipeg Act requires that the development plan be reviewed at least once every five years. By 1980 - eight years after the election of the Unicity council - no such review had been carried out. But a review could not be put off indefinitely. Apart from the directive of the Act, the city's new political structure and the planning department's recognition of the anomaly between the established plans and the prevailing economic and social conditions in the city exerted increasing pressure for a review. Finally a review was carried out in 1980 and a new plan emerged. The Act had established the Greater Winnipeg Development Plan as the development plan for the city (and the additional zone); the new plan therefore had to continue under that rubric, but it was given the sub-title of Plan Winnipeg.

## 3. Plan Winnipeg - More of the Same

Plan Winnipeg was more appropriate to the city's prevailing circumstances than its predecessor had been. It acknowledged the city's condition of no growth and accepted that condition as the basis for its proposals. It assumed a continuing fall in the birth rate and continuing out-migration from the city, resulting in a population of 658,000

by 1999. This represents an average annual growth rate of 0.69 per cent over the twenty years of the plan. It also means an aging population since the bulk of the emigrants from the city would be young people. These demographic trends would have a significant impact on the labour force. Employment was projected to grow from 275,000 to 305,000 by the end of the century - an average annual increase of 0.54 per cent, and much of that growth would be in the low-paying service industries. The plan also projected a slow growth of the city's housing stock - about 1.0 per cent per year - most of which would be in single family units.

In some quarters these might be considered gloomy prospects indeed, but the proponents of <u>Plan Winniped</u> argued that they represented an opportunity rather than a liability:

What does this more modest rate of growth mean for Winnipeg? It can mean the opportunity for the city to refocus its twenty-year growth potential away from the suburbs and toward the downtown and adjacent areas. By redirecting its growth, Winnipeg will be able to resist the effects of suburban sprawl, to renew its older neighbourhoods, to revitalize its downtown area and to rebuild its essential services. With redirected, refocused growth, Winnipeg will retain its enviable compactness, preserve its traditional sense of community, and reap the benefits of lower costs of services, transportation, and precious energy. The Plan Winnipeg vision, then, will employ economic and social development to preserve the best of the past, to innovate for future needs, ensure that basic services can continue to operate efficiently and effectively... and do all this without unreasonable financial burdens. 108

The plan sets out 11 Policy Areas, but the major new proposals which emerge are those referring to the preservation, infill and revitalization of the city's older residential areas, and the constraining of suburban expansion and sprawl by the imposition of an urban limit line beyond which the city will not extend municipal services. Most of the other policies are re-statements of the policies of the Greater Winnipeg Development Plan although cast in different language and set out in more

specific detail, and all designed to conform to the basic discipline of the slow-growth premises. An attempt to avoid the ambiguities of the previous development plan with respect to the council's commitment to carry out its stated policies is made in the "Scope" section of <u>Plan Winnipeg</u>, in paragraph 2(b):

The policies, objectives, general proposals and measures set out in Plan Winnipeg, shall be carried out when and in the manner the Council from time to time determines to be appropriate and, where relevant, to be within the City's financial ability.<sup>109</sup>

This caveat clarifies the council's position with respect to its by-law obligations under the plan: it simply says that the council will decide if and when any of the policies established in the plan will be implemented, which is the same thing as saying that the council will decide, at its own discretion, whether to follow or to ignore the plan. This makes the plan merely a guide to development, and in that case the question again arises "why give it the appearance of a by-law with all the trappings of a formal statutory commitment within the mandatory provision of Part XX of the City of Winnipeg Act?"

This "Scope" section of Plan Winnipeg may relieve the council of any sense of obligation to the plan, but it merely deepens the confusion about the status of planning legislation in Winnipeg, and therefore the planning function itself. Subsequent events, indeed, have revealed how flimsy and insubstantial is the political commitment to the "Plan Winnipeg vision" as it was so proudly and confidently enunciated in the introductory document of 1981 and as it was embodied in Plan Winnipeg. We shall return to these events shortly.

The policy relating to the preservation, infill and revitalization of the city's older residential areas was, in a sense, not a new policy. Inasmuch as no such policy had been set out in the preceding <u>Greater Winnipeg Development Plan</u>, but was articulated in considerable detail in <u>Plan Winnipeg</u>, it was a new policy. In fact, however, most of the objectives of that policy were already being pursued some eight years before <u>Plan Winnipeg</u>, under what was known as the Neighbourhood Improvement Program, or NIP.

NIP was a joint federal/provincial program, established in 1973, to provide funds for the improvement and upgrading of older, declining residential neighbourhoods. Under NIP monies were available for the repair or construction of municipal services, and for social services, parks and recreation facilities, and similar items affecting the residential neighbourhood environment. In conjunction with NIP was a complementary program referred to as RRAP - Residential Rehabilitation Assistance Program - which provided monies for the repair and improvement of individual residences.

Funding for these programs came entirely from the federal and provincial governments but the city was the administrative authority and a special unit - the Neighbourhood Improvement Branch of the Environmental Planning Department - was created within the city administration to be responsible for their implementation. The City of Winnipeg Act under its Housing and Social Development component empowers the council to pass by-laws and take a variety of initiatives in the housing and social development field. These powers are conveyed in sections 638 and 639 under Part XX of the Act which places them in the ambit of the city's planning function. But because the funding for the NIP and RRAP programs came from the senior governments and not from the city's budget, the Neighbourhood Improvement Branch operated on the outer fringe and virtually entirely independently of both the city's administrative apparatus in terms of its operations and the Environmental Planning Department in terms of its planning role. The head of the Neighbourhood Improvement Branch was Tom Yauk, strongly individualistic, independent-minded, deeply committed to the social goals of the Improvement programs. Under Yauk's direction the programs flourished.

The federal government's NIP commitment expired in 1978, and a new program was established called the Community Services Contribution Program or CSCP. Under this program the province received funds from the federal government, and municipalities could avail themselves of those funds, to be spent on projects of their own choice on a cost-shared basis. A variety of undertakings could be funded under CSCP

such as the construction or repair of municipal services, public buildings, etc., or works under NIP which was still in place but in which the federal government was no longer a direct participant. There was, however, no specific vehicle available for conducting NIP on a cost-shared basis, so the province created CIP - the Community Improvement Program - for that purpose. Winnipeg chose to go with both CSCP and CIP. In 1983 the Neighbourhood Improvement Branch became a division - the Neighbourhood Improvement Division of the Environmental Planning Department. Altogether about 15 neighbourhood improvement areas were established in the city under these programs. In terms of "action" and actually improving living conditions in these areas, and of realizing the objectives of their mandate, these programs were a resounding success. Winnipeg in fact was recognized nationally as the place where these improvement programs enjoyed their greatest success, and where the intent of the programs was best fulfilled. Tom Yauk was later (1988) appointed the city's Commissioner of Planning and Community Services.

There is perhaps a certain irony in the fact that the Improvement programs, although coming under the Housing and Social Development component of Part XX of the Act, and accordingly being part of the city's planning function, were, nevertheless, successfully implemented outside of the procedures laid down in the Act, and outside of the scope of the Greater Winnipeg Development Plan - that plan made no mention of neighbourhood improvement. Section 639.1(1) of the Act provided for the establishment of neighbourhood improvement areas, to be established as neighbourhood action area plans at the action area plans level of the three-tier city plans hierarchy. But no action area plan was ever established for any of the neighbourhood improvement areas, as required under the Act. The procedures set out in sections 587 and 592 of the Act for establishing an action area were not followed. There was no public discussion of an action area plan proposal; no referral of such a proposal to the various committees specified. Upon approval by council that a neighbourhood improvement area be

established, and that funds be provided, the Neighbourhood Improvement Branch simply advertised the fact that the monies were available for residential improvement and dealt with individual applicants as they presented themselves.

The Neighbourhood Improvement Branch, however, did not act unilaterally. It consulted very closely with all other relevant branches of the city administration as well as with the Environmental Planning Department's own district planners for those parts of the city in which the neighbourhood improvement areas were located. An Interdepartmental Advisory Committee on Neighbourhood Improvement was established involving representatives from the Health Services, Social Services, Libraries, Parks, Works and Operations Departments of the city, as well as the Police. But there was never any "plan" prepared as prescribed in Part XX, and no linkage to the Greater Winnipeg Development Plan prior to the establishment of Plan Winnipeg. Plan Winnipeg was given first reading in August 1981. It received second reading and was referred to the Minister in October, 1983. The Minister approved it in April 1986, when it also received third reading by the council and became By-law No.2960/81 of the City of Winnipeg. 110 It brought the neighbourhood improvement activities of the Neighbourhood Improvement Division of the city's planning department into the context of the development plan. In 1987 the name of the Division was changed to the Community and Neighbourhood Improvement Division, and the main source of its funding is now through the Manitoba/Winnipeg Community Revitalization Program and the Core Area Initiative, of which there will be more discussion shortly. In the preceding year, on November 4, 1986, the name of the Committee on Environment had also been changed: it became the Planning and Community Services Committee, and in the same year the number of standing committees of council had been increased from three to four with the addition of the Protection, Parks and Culture Committee.

It will be noted that two and a half years elapsed between the time that <u>Plan</u>

<u>Winniped</u> was referred to the minister and the time when he approved it. This prolonged

period of inaction was not due to the minister's neglect nor to the press of other business on his time. It was due to his deliberate refusal to approve the plan because of his disagreement with one of its basic proposals. The main thrust of the plan, as already indicated, was to limit new suburban expansion and encourage the rehabilitation and improvement of the existing city. One of the measures proposed in the plan was the establishment of an urban limit beyond which the city would not extend municipal services. The minister was in accord with that principle but felt that the urban limit line in two locations - St. Vital and Charleswood - was drawn too far beyond the edge of existing development and represented a contradiction of the principle of the line itself. He wanted the line drawn back. The city refused and the issue was deadlocked. In the Charleswood case the city pointed out that there were already in place legally binding agreements with developers which embraced the disputed lands and which could not be rescinded. In the St. Vital case the city argued that development had already occurred up to the line favoured by the minister although, admittedly, there was still a large undeveloped acreage. The minister relented on the Charleswood issue but stood firm on his St. Vital position. Finally it was agreed that the proposed line could stand but no development would be approved beyond the minister's designated line until at least 75 per cent of the land had been developed in the area enclosed by his delineation. It had taken nearly three years to resolve the issue. But it was not the last time that the council was to disregard the policies established in Plan Winniped or that the minister would have to intervene to curb the council's eagerness for development which flaunted the plan.

One such occasion occurred in October 1988, when council approved an application to amend <u>Plan Winnipeg</u> to allow a development beyond the urban limit line. The subject site lay some two miles west of the urban limit line, but still within the city boundaries, in an area designated in <u>Plan Winnipeg</u> as a Rural Area, in which the land use is restricted to agriculture and its support services. The site is about 300-acres in

size and lies between Portage Avenue and the Assiniboine River. The developer - Leo Cholakis - proposed to develop the site as a residential subdivision which, according to the administration's analysis, could support an ultimate population of about 7500 people. The developer applied for an amendment of Plan Winnipeg, to change the designation of the site from Rural Area to Suburban Residential Neighbourhood which would permit his proposed development. This would be a major amendment of Plan Winnipeg. It would involve the relocation of the urban limit line some two miles to the west to include the subject property and would mean the destruction of the principle of containment which was the very foundation of the plan. Essentially it would mean the utter abandonment of Plan Winnipeg.

Council approved the amendment on October 26, 1988, and referred it to the minister for his approval. In accordance with the procedures set out under the provincial statute, the minister's approval is required before the council's by-law can become law. In this case the minister refused to give his approval on the grounds that the development would simply continue the process of urban sprawl which was responsible for an increasing burden of costs on the city for the extension of municipal services to the suburbs, and because <a href="Plan Winnipeg">Plan Winnipeg</a> had been established to prevent such sprawl and avoid such costs. Without the minister's signature the by-law was void and the development could not proceed.

The episode, however, illustrated the equivocal attitude of Winnipeg's council towards development and towards its policies as established in its planning by-laws. Council's position was that people should be given a choice as to where they want to live, and, moreover, council is in dire need of broadening its real property tax base. Whether the revenues to be generated by the proposed development would cover the cost of extending services to it is highly questionable, particularly in light of the length of time which would probably be required to fill the lots in the subdivision. But whatever the merits of these arguments may be, one must ask why council approved <u>Plan Winnipeg</u>

and its principle of containment in the first place. The same council gave third reading and approval to <u>Plan Winnipeg</u> in 1986 as gave second reading and approval in principle to its amendment and effective abandonment in 1988. Clearly Winnipeg's council still feels that it needs development more than it needs planning. "Growth" wherever it may be located still speaks more familiarly to them than talk of no growth and policies of containment.

Other policies, in addition to that of containment, were also either ignored or contravened by the council, policies, for example, relating to the improvement of older residential neighbourhoods and the acquisition of additional parkland and the development of park systems along the rivers and creeks. <u>Plan Winnipeg</u>, under section 5(1) Policy states:

The City shall undertake direct involvement in the rehabilitation and improvement of older neighbourhoods on a priority based on need; (1) In severely deteriorated neighbourhoods, the city shall continue to support the principle of comprehensive social, economic and physical neighbourhood programming....<sup>111</sup>

And under section 75(1) Policy, Plan Winnipeg states:

Within older neighbourhoods, the City shall upgrade neighbourhood parks and acquire and develop additional parkland in accordance with specific neighbourhood requirements, as determined by Council....<sup>112</sup>

and again, under section 80(1) Policy:

The City shall endeavour to establish linear park systems along or adjacent to Winnipeg's rivers and creeks. 113

Numerous instances can be cited in which the council has ignored or violated its commitments under these Policies. Among these can be counted the council's approval, in January, 1987, for the rezoning of a site in an older neighbourhood of St. Boniface, to permit the construction of two seven-storey towers containing a total of 78

condominiums on a vacant property zoned for two-family dwellings; the council's approval, on October 18, 1989, of the rezoning of a site on the Assiniboine River, from R.6 single-family zoning, to allow the construction of "The Pines," a project comprising a shopping mall and a senior citizens apartment tower containing 100 units; the Linden Woods episode in 1989 which comprised a joint-venture between the city and the developer; for the city's central works yard as the site for the relocation of the federal government's Laboratory Centre for Disease Control. The details of these various transgressions need not be enumerated here, but all of them departed from the council's commitments to improve older residential neighbourhoods and to acquire additional parkland and to develop park systems along the city's rivers and creeks even though the conditions in all of these cases met the criteria for the council's action under the Plan Winnipeg policies. Some of the council's decisions in these matters were reversed under public outcry or political pressure. But that is not the point. What is of consequence is the council's equivocal position with respect to market-led development on the one hand, and policy-led controls on the other hand.

## 4. The Planning Function in Winnipeg - The City Bows Out, The Senior Governments Bow In

Given the serious and frequent anomalies between the policies of the Unicity council as established in its planning by-laws, and the repudiation of those policies by the actions of council, one might be led to conclude that the planning function of the Unicity government is disoriented. One might even go a step further and say that by necessary implication the Unicity council is itself disoriented. Such a conclusion would not be far from the truth. The council is adrift, caught in a time-warp with no sense of where it is or of the direction it should take. Its policy-making function is disconnected from its socio-economic reality. It is suspended in the never-never land between its traditional self-image as the promoter of the development of the city, and the prevailing

condition of stasis, or no-growth, in which the historic phenomenon of urban expansion no longer obtains, and in which council's traditional role as promoter of development is therefore no longer relevant.

The condition of no-growth has other profound repercussions: the demand for extensive new tracts of land to be developed and new physical infrastructure to be constructed declines and the demand for social services rises. There is of course always a need for social services - health, welfare, recreation, day-care, police protection, employment, etc. - but during periods of vigorous urban growth the urgency of these needs is diminished because of the general level of prosperity, and they are submerged beneath the euphoria produced by exuberant developmental activity. When population and economic equilibrium sets in, the developmental activity abates, the social issues not only come to the surface as major urban issues, but they emerge in expanded volume and present intractable difficulties to the urban government. The city has neither the money nor the statutory power to deal with these problems. Indeed, even the need to maintain and replace the existing physical infrastructure in the face of costs that rise faster than revenues seems to be beyond the city's financial capacity. There is then a void in the government of the city which the senior governments are only too willing to fill. Both the province and the federal government are an unavoidable presence in the conduct of municipal affairs. In times of active urban growth their assistance is less critical, and their presence is less obtrusive because private sector investment buoys up the local economy and development issues fill the council agenda; in times of recession or stagnation the intervention of the senior governments becomes critical and their presence looms large in the city's affairs because private capital is no longer fueling the engine of urban growth and the resources of the senior governments are necessary to sustain the city's economic life. Neither the province nor the federal government is averse to such intervention because it affords them the opportunity of invaluable political publicity, provided, of course, that the occasion and the terms of the

intervention are acceptable, that adequate kudos will accrue to them, and that they can call in these political debts at the appropriate time.

These adjustments in political relationships and in the contingent planning roles among the three levels of government, arising out of the city's condition of no growth, are clearly represented in Winnipeg. Three major planning exercises have dominated the city's planning function during the decade of the 1980's - the Core Area Initiative, the Portage Place project, and the Forks development. Together, these three undertakings have provided a massive infusion of money and effort whose purpose is to revitalize the core area of the city. There has been virtually no other planning activity with a city-wide impact during this decade, certainly none to compare with these in status, significance, or concentration of planning effort and resources. But none of them arose out of the City of Winnipeg's own planning program; all of them were initiatives of the senior governments. Indeed it was the federal government itself which took the first step in establishing the Core Area Initiative, the first of the three programs out of which the other two subsequently emerged. Although all three were tri-level programs involving the federal, provincial and city governments in a partnership, there can be little doubt that the city was the junior partner, and the partnership would simply not have been formed without the federal initiative.

In the federal election of 1979 the Liberal party led by Pierre Trudeau was reelected to form the government of Canada. They had been the government from 1968 to
1979, and were again from 1979 to 1984. But throughout these years it was evident
that their popularity in the west was waning. Policies such as the Bilingualism and
Biculturalism policy, and particularly the National Energy Policy had alienated a large
portion of former Liberal support in western Canada. In 1979 they were able to elect
only two M.P.'s west of Ontario. One of these was Robert Boxtael, the other was Lloyd
Axworthy. Axworthy was a Liberal who had represented the Winnipeg constituency of
Fort Rouge in the Manitoba legislature immediately before the election to the federal

House of Commons. Prior to that he had been the director of the Institute of Urban Studies of the University of Winnipeg, and in his graduate program at Princeton University he had specialized in urban political and planning studies. He was appointed Minister of Employment and Immigration in the Trudeau cabinet. As the only Minister west of Ontario there was an important role for him to play in rebuilding the fortunes of the Liberal party in the west. The obvious place from which to undertake such a task would be his own power base in Winnipeg. From that vantage point not only could he exercise his influence over western regional events falling within the scope of his portfolio, but he could also strengthen and consolidate his own support in his constituency. Given his educational and vocational background it was perhaps inevitable that he should turn to some sort of urban-oriented program to carry out his work. Winnipeg was declining and its core area was seriously deteriorated. What could serve his party's as well as his own purposes more fittingly while at the same time giving desperately needed help to his ailing city than a program to revitalize Winnipeg's moribund core area?

On May 30, 1980, in his capacity as the Minister of Employment and Immigration, Axworthy addressed a meeting in Winnipeg of political representatives of the three levels of government. He invited the Province of Manitoba and the City of Winnipeg to join with the Government of Canada in a development initiative for the inner city of Winnipeg which would have the following purpose and objectives:

- 1. To provide a vehicle which focuses on Winnipeg's economic prospects, social disparities, and urban environmental options which provide for appropriate consideration of supportive environmental infrastructure.
- 2. To demonstrate the federal government's long-term commitment to relieve disparities in Manitoba, focusing on Winnipeg as the major secondary and service employment centre.
- 3. To identify potential Department of Regional Economic Expansion response to economic, social and urban/environmental projects in Winnipeg.
- 4. To promote federal, provincial, municipal (and private interest) action on the development of Winnipeg as a major manufacturing and service centre in Western Canada.

It is only on the rarest occasions, if ever, that a city council will turn down an offer by a senior government to cost-share a project in the city. Redevelopment of Winnipeg's inner city also had some appeal for the provincial government, offering as it did, the prospect of favourable publicity. There was no doubt that Axworthy's invitation would be accepted. During the following months the proposal was discussed by the interested parties, and the area within which the initiative would be effective was delineated. It included a much greater portion of the city than is normally understood by the term "core area." Nevertheless "core area" was deemed to be preferable to "inner city" as a title, and on September 22, 1980, the three governments signed a Memorandum of Understanding committing them to the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative.

In essence, the Initiative had three goals:

- 1. To create new jobs and stimulate private enterprise in manufacturing and other industries in the core area.
- 2. To provide training and social adjustment programs for core area residents so that they can take advantage of new job opportunities.
- 3. To improve the general core area environment, with emphasis on infrastructure, housing, community facilities and services.

In detail, the Initiative comprised 13 specific programs subsumed under three general sectors:<sup>114</sup>

Sector 1, with an allocation of \$3 million, was to provide relief of disparities through measures addressing employment, housing and neighbourhood revitalization. Five programs were contained in this sector. Sector 2, with an allocation of \$54 million, was to provide economic stimulus to the core area through the development of key sites. It contained five programs. Sector 3 had an allocation of \$5 million, to cover the costs of management, administration, consultants, etc. It contained three programs.

The Initiative organized and funded projects in all of these programs. The greater part of its efforts went into supporting local community organizations and ethnic groups, training, start-up assistance for new businesses, heritage preservation and similar commitments. Some of these were successful, others less so. The initial agreement

among the three governments expired in 1986, and was renewed for a further five years. The principal thrust of the Initiative was in the direction of employment creation and social development with the objective of revitalizing these sectors of the core area. It is not our purpose here to evaluate the success or the usefulness of the Initiative, but it must be acknowledged that the conditions of poverty and deprivation in the core area have not been eased since the start of the Initiative. If anything they have become worse. A report of the Social Planning Council of Winnipeg<sup>115</sup> shows that the number of poor and disadvantaged in the core area has been increasing steadily, employment has been declining, and the gap between poverty incomes and median incomes has been widening. It has been argued that without the Core Area Initiative conditions would have been even worse, and this may indeed be so. But the Initiative's early promise of core area revitalization has yet to be fulfilled in these sectors.

One important component of the core area which the Initiative did not address was the downtown business element, and in particular, the retail portion whose major concentration is on Portage Avenue. Eaton's department store and the Hudson's Bay Company department store are the largest and most prestigious retailers in the city. Both are located on the south side of Portage Avenue, four short blocks apart from each other. Between them they have attracted a large part of the retail market, and because of their presence, shops on the south side of Portage Avenue, particularly between the two large stores, have enjoyed a substantial volume of shopping traffic. On the other hand, and probably because of the flow on the south side, the establishments on the north side of Portage Avenue have done poorly. Indeed, the business on the north side declined steadily. Premises changed hands; some became hang-outs for street kids; pin-ball arcades, pool halls, cheap fast-food outlets and similar places symptomatic of declining fortunes were prevalent. If the core area were to be revitalized, something would have to be done to salvage and rehabilitate the north side of Portage Avenue, particularly that

stretch of it immediately across the street from the blocks contained between the two department stores.

The Core Area Initiative's structure and orientation were not well suited to the task of redeveloping the north side of Portage Avenue. It was felt that a special-purpose agency, specifically designed for that job, was needed. On December 16, 1983, the North Portage Development Corporation was established by the signing of a Unanimous Shareholders Agreement by the Hon. Lloyd Axworthy, who was then the Minister of Transport in the government of Canada, the Hon. Mary Beth Dolin, the Minister of Urban Affairs in the government of Manitoba, and Mayor Bill Norrie of the City of Winnipeg. 116 The Agreement designated the area within which the Corporation's planning and development mandate would apply - an area very much larger than merely the strip of land on the north side of Portage Avenue. It extended for five blocks in the east-west direction, crossed Portage Avenue to include the properties fronting on the south side of the Avenue, and stretched northward as far as Notre Dame Avenue, some five long blocks away. Altogether, over twenty city blocks were included in the designated area. A sum of \$71 million was committed to the Corporation under the Shareholders' Agreement, to be made up of \$22 million each from the three governments and \$5 million from the Core Area Initiative.

The first phase of the Corporation's program was to deal with the properties fronting on Portage Avenue's north side and extending northward back the full blocklength to Ellice Avenue. A Task Force was established to formulate the redevelopment concept. It proposed a mixed-use development including retail, commercial office, housing, and entertainment uses. By far the greatest emphasis, however, was placed on the retail component. It proposed the development of 200,000 sq. ft. of retail floor space. A number of submissions from developers were received and examined, and the proposal of the Cadillac-Fairview Corporation was accepted for the construction of a shopping mall of some 200,000 sq. ft. with provision for office space and other

elements above the base of the mall. Housing was to be provided by another developer - the Imperial Group - but market conditions at the time made the housing program somewhat tentative.

A two-storey shopping mall was completed, with two elevated pedestrian walkways crossing over Portage Avenue, one of them connecting the mall with Eaton's department store, the other connecting with the Bay. The development has had a mixed reception. Some Winnipegers object to the design as looking like a warehouse instead of an attractive shopping centre, and complain that the elevated walkways have destroyed the character of Portage Avenue. The operation of the mall has had some initial difficulties such as certain shops not being able to survive and at least one shop which had agreed to participate, not opening at all. Difficulties in the first years are of course to be expected, and the mall may eventually settle down to a profitable and generally accepted part of Winnipeg's downtown. What had not been fully anticipated however was the impact which the redeveloped north side would have on the south side of Portage Avenue, across the street from the Portage Place mall, as it was named.

With the completion of Portage Place the businesses across the street, on the south side, began to falter. Many of the establishments moved across into the new mall, leaving vacant premises behind. Some moved to other locations away from Portage Avenue; some went out of business. The result has been that the south side of Portage Avenue is now more seriously deteriorated than the north side was before the redevelopment program was undertaken, and heroic measures will be required to restore it to some sort of viable condition. Why this happened is understandable. Winnipeg's state of marginal growth means limited growth of economic activity and of discretionary income and of the retail market, and therefore limits the extent to which retail space can be expanded. A new 200,000 sq. ft. retail mall would inevitably have to find its market by capturing it from existing retailers. This is what it did; and the existing retailers were those on the south side of Portage Avenue.

At the time of this writing no solution has yet been found to the problems of the south side. Again, it is not the intention here to evaluate the merits or the success of the north side redevelopment project. It is cited simply to make the point that in a city which is in a state of equilibrium in terms of its population and economic growth, the planning and development role of the city council diminishes and is replaced by the initiatives of the senior governments.

The third major planning and development activity in Winnipeg during the decade of the 1980's is the redevelopment of the East Yard of the CNR. Attempts to reclaim this historic tract of land at the forks of the Red and Assiniboine Rivers had been made on several occasions during the past thirty years, but without success. Finally, in 1986, an understanding was reached between the CNR and the three governments that the 93acres of the East Yard should be redeveloped. In December, 1986, a tri-level task force submitted a report 117 in which they recommended that the redevelopment include historic and cultural projects, particularly an Historic Interpretive Centre: a riverbank park; festive/cultural/recreational facilities; and quality market housing. The report was unanimously endorsed by the three governments and in April 1987, the Forks Renewal Corporation, a special-purpose agency, was established with a 10member Board, to be responsible for the renewal of the East Yard. 118 The arrangements provide for the CN to retain 18-acres of the lands, which they will develop for commercial purposes; the federal government (Parks Canada) will retain 8.8-acres for the development of a Historic Site project; the city will retain title to the rights-of-way for the streets required in the site; and the Forks Renewal Corporation will be left with some 58-acres on which to carry out its redevelopment program. 119

Evidence of the Forks Renewal Corporation's activities is beginning to emerge. A charming riverside walk has been completed; two former barns have been joined together and reconstructed to create an interesting market building; roads have been

built to provide access into the site and its elements; and extensive sodding has been laid down.

There is no need to discuss the Forks renewal program any further. It, too, like the Core Area Initiative and the North Portage Development Corporation, has been cited to show how the council's role in the planning and development of the city has declined to that of a junior partner in the tri-level arrangements with the senior governments. It will be interesting to see what will happen to the planning and development of the city if, as seems likely, its condition of stasis becomes its permanent condition and the senior governments, particularly the federal government, decides it can no longer continue to fund development or redevelopment projects in Winnipeg.

## OVERVIEW - WINNIPEG'S DISTINCTIVE HISTORY, PLANNING FUNCTION, COMMUNAL MIND AND OUTLOOK

Let us now consider the theme questions underlying this dissertation as they may apply to Winnipeg. What aspects of Winnipeg's historical evolution are peculiar to that city as distinct from those of Regina and Calgary? To what extent has Winnipeg's planning function been determined by the city's own historical circumstances? Is there - has there ever been - anything which might be described as "a communal mind and outlook" among Winnipegers which has found expression in the city's planning and development?

Clearly the first question cannot be answered at this stage of the study. We cannot know which, if any, of Winnipeg's historical circumstances are peculiar to that city until we have looked at the other two subject cities of this thesis and can make comparisons. So far we have only dealt with Winnipeg. Regina and Calgary will be examined in the following chapters. Comparisons, evaluations and conclusions about distinctiveness or peculiarity must accordingly wait until the final chapter.

It is possible at this stage to see how certain historical conditions and events in Winnipeg influenced that city's planning function. Perhaps the most determinant

influence has been the constitutional and statutory position of municipal government in Canada generally. The municipal government sits at the bottom of the hierarchical structure of government in this country and has the least powers and responsibilities. the least revenues, the most restricted sources of revenue, the shortest terms of office. no party structure of government and therefore no structure for making and carrying out binding policy commitments, no structure for securing collective council responsibility and public accountability for policy commitments and therefore no tradition of such policy commitments, and therefore no real capacity to plan. All of these matters have been discussed in earlier sections of this study and need not be reintroduced here. It is relevant to note that these conditions are common to all municipal governments throughout Canada and are not unique to Winnipeg. We are here interested in Winnipeg specifically and in the extent to which its historical circumstances have affected its planning function. There are a number of historical factors which have clearly had a powerful influence on the city's planning function. Whether all of these factors are peculiar to Winnipeg we cannot as yet say with certainty. That matter is still to be determined. Nevertheless, our examination of Winnipeg up to this point reveals a number of relationships between the city's historical evolution and its planning function which seem to bear out the basic premise of this thesis.

Unquestionably, the local historical circumstance which has had the strongest affect on Winnipeg's planning function was the establishment from the very beginning of a local government and municipal structure made up of multiple autonomous authorities which made area-wide planning impossible. Competition for revenue-producing development and the absence of any effective co-ordinating authority was largely responsible for the spread-out, scattered pattern of development, particularly that of the commercial and industrial uses, which is a major contributor to the dispersed, disorganized and ugly appearance of the city. The fragmentation of municipal jurisdiction which produced inequities in area-wide services and taxation, and

prevented concerted metropolitan development policies led to the twenty-year search for and experimentation with new forms of urban government such as Metro and the unified city but the traditions of the historic autonomous municipalities continued to assert themselves in all of the new structures, and although gestures were made in the direction of strengthening their planning function, that is, their policy-making role and powers, the historically-set mould could not be entirely successfully broken.

The virtual bisection of the city by the CPR yards and mainline created the "North End" of the city as a working-class immigrant ghetto and severed it economically, socially and psychologically from equal participation in the life of the rest of the city. It also cut off the north end physically from the rest of the city so that access between the two parts was severely restricted. Traffic flow across the railway barrier was limited to two bridges and two underpasses. One of the most serious consequences of this segregation was that the north end had little political influence and therefor received little attention in the deliberations of the council and little recognition in its policy decisions.

The development of Winnipeg's warehouse district was the outcome of the city's domination of the wholesaling and warehousing functions of the entire prairie regional economy in the era before World War I. The district was extensive; its buildings were architecturally excellent, handsome and of imposing stature, and an appropriate symbol of the dominant status of the city. The role of the city's planning function at that time was simply the municipal engineering function - to supply the buildings with municipal services and ensure access to them by railway spurs and streets. When Winnipeg lost its role as the wholesaling and distribution centre for the region, around 1920, the warehouses lost the reason for their existence and the district went into decline. Many of the buildings deteriorated through neglect, much of the floor space became vacant. In the years between the wars neither the city council nor the private sector showed any interest in trying to save the district or recycling any of its buildings. Successive

councils had no policies for the district. They simply allowed the market to take its course which was in keeping with the traditional disposition and practice of the business-oriented municipal council. After World War II the district came to be regarded as a valuable historical heritage and desultory efforts were made to rehabilitate it through the city's planning department and some private special interest groups and individuals, but these accomplished little. Council, although paying the usual lipservice to the notion of heritage preservation was very diffident about intervention and very sparing in its expenditures. No policies were adopted for the revitalization of the area as a whole. It was not until the federal and provincial governments became the principal actors in the Winnipeg planning scene that noticeable improvements were effected. Through the tri-level Core Area Initiative a general plan of renewal was prepared, the district was given the name of The Exchange, and significant sums of money were invested in revitalizing the buildings and landscaping. Without this intervention by the senior governments, it is doubtful whether any improvements would have been effected by the city alone, given its customary conservative business ethos and wariness about expenditures that offered no assurance of foreseeable short-term revenue returns.

The pre-emption of the riverbank lands, first by the early settlers then by the railways, precluded the possibility of bringing the city's two historic rivers into the public life of the city as a visual, cultural and recreational amenity. Several attempts were made by the provincial and municipal governments, and by the private sector, to reclaim the land at the junction of the Red and Assiniboine Rivers as well as elsewhere along the riverbanks, but the pattern of private ownership was too firmly entrenched to allow significant progress in riverbank planning. It was not until the CNR decided to abandon its East Yard for railway purposes that a new opportunity arose for the planning and development of that historic part of the city. Again, without the intervention of the

senior governments this redevelopment in all probability would not be undertaken by the city alone.

The <u>Town Planning Act</u> of 1916 fixed the notion of planning as that of physical planning, that is, land-use regulation, and entrenched the disposition of the city council to regard the planning function as an administrative function concerned with the regulation of land-use in the present rather than a policy-making function concerned with the co-ordination and achievement of future-oriented objectives for the city. It is true that the very nature of municipal government in Canada and its place in the constitutional framework of the country ensures that municipal councils will be disposed to view the planning function as a zoning or land-use regulating function. This is a historical given. But the Manitoba <u>Town Planning Act</u> of 1916 entrenched that concept in both the provincial statutes and the perception of Winnipeg's city councillors. Subsequent Acts and amendments have moved the planning function towards the statutory responsibility for the formulation and implementation of broad-spectrum, future-oriented policies, but the indifference of city councils towards performing that role has left in abeyance the planning opportunities provided in the legislation.

The 1919 general strike split the city ideologically into two opposing camps - labour and business - and confirmed the domination of the council by business interests, particularly those of property and real estate. The business ethos prevailed in the decisions of the council: short-term expediency took precedence over long-term considerations; tax-producing development received preferential treatment; administrative matters commanded greater attention than policy concerns. In this respect Winnipeg is not unique. These characteristics prevail generally among municipal councils. But the general strike of 1919 was unique to Winnipeg and crystallized the ideological differences in the city which consolidated and made overt the business orientation of the council and submerged its wider planning interests.

The relative arms-length, non-interventionist stance of the provincial government (even under the NDP) toward Greater Winnipeg contributed to the demise of the Metropolitan government and to the failure of some of the key concepts and provisions for the planning function of both the Metropolitan government and the unified city. For example, the omission of services connections approval and housing and urban renewal authority from Metro's planning mandate were serious constraints on Metro's planning role, and the withdrawal of the provincial government from active intervention to secure the effectiveness of the resident advisory groups and the community committees virtually ensured the failure of that planning instrument.

The population expansion of the suburban municipalities and stagnation of the central City of Winnipeg was accompanied by the rise of flourishing suburban shopping malls and industrial parks, the depopulation of the core area of the central city and the severe contraction of its downtown retailing and other business establishments. This eventually led to attempts to revitalize the downtown through development plans which failed to accomplish that objective. A variety of reasons contributed to their failure but in the main they failed because they were historically anachronistic: they assumed that the downtown was a separate phenomenon from the rest of the metropolitan area and could be treated in isolation from the macro-phenomena of the metropolis, whereas the problems which beset Winnipeg's downtown were essentially an aspect of the historical evolution of the Greater Winnipeg area and could not be solved by limited micro-area measures. One plan was based on the assumption that the redevelopment of a limited enclave of the downtown with a mixed-use development would be able to stimulate the entire downtown back to a healthy condition. The assumption was probably naive but it was never put to the test: only a very small component of the plan was ever developed. But the plan was even more naive in its assumption that the council would be willing to commit the heavy expenditures of money and political effort necessary for its implementation. They weren't, and didn't. Nor did the plan take into account the changed economic and ethnic composition of the downtown which was one of the critical features of the new central area reality. Another plan was based on the premise that Winnipeg's downtown should still be the retail and commercial core of the metropolitan area as it had been traditionally, and sought to restore it to that historic position by developing a large shopping mall, but was unsuccessful because the additional retail floor space it created exceeded the capacity of the metropolitan market to sustain it and it simply drained the establishments on the other side of the street and left them derelict. The fault with these downtown plans was that they were anachronistic. They were geared to conditions of a previous era and were premised on the notion either that those happier circumstances still prevailed or that they could be recaptured. Those times, however, had passed and the plans were out of synchronization with the new reality of Winnipeg's social and economic conditions in general and its downtown in particular.

The decline of the city's economy and prestige as the primate metropolis in the west to a position of secondary status, together with virtually no population growth, engendered feelings of self-doubt and inferiority among Winnipegers, and attitudes of their own superiority and disparagement of Winnipeg among other cities, and turned the council and the planning function away from city-wide policies towards local neighbourhood concerns and the abandonment of the large-scale planning initiatives to the senior governments.

Whether there is in fact such a thing as a "communal mind and outlook" among Winnipegers is difficult to demonstrate. Part of the difficulty lies in understanding what is meant by the phrase. Is it simply a matter of a general agreement among the population on certain civic issues? Obviously in any city there are an enormous number and variety of things about which the residents will have differing feelings and opinions. Even so, there are, assuredly, some matters about which there will be a concensus. For example, the overwhelming majority of Winnipegers will agree that Winnipeg's winters are too cold and too long. On other matters, however, such as whether a commercial

pleasure dome should be built at the Forks, there will be a wide diversity of opinion.

But the notion of a "communal mind and outlook" is not a matter of a majority opinion on a specific issue, such as might be determined by a poll. It is, rather, a matter of such intangibles as ethos, group spirit, character, disposition, values, self-image, personality. The difficulty with such phenomena is that they are diffuse and ambiguous, and much of the data relating to them are coloured by subjective interpretations. But that does not prevent observers from making subjective judgements about them, nor indeed does it nullify the reality of the phenomena nor the validity of the judgements.

Winnipeg has the reputation of being conservative and dull, a city of limited imagination and enterprise, little vivacity or flair or excitement, whose future has already passed. One frequently hears such views expressed about the city. In fact, the impression that Winnipeg has nothing to offer and is going nowhere is so common that these negative qualities were seriously considered for use as the theme for a tourism promotion campaign for the city. That is to say, the word "NOWHERE" was to appear in bold capital letters on the print ads, followed, in much smaller print, immediately beneath NOWHERE, by the words "else in the world!" and then by the invitation "Come see our World." It was of course an advertising gimmick based on the theory that this seemingly self-deprecating approach, this "honest twist," would be sufficiently different from the usual cliche claims of paradise to pique the travellers' curiosity and lure them to Winnipeg. The ad campaign was designed early in May 1989, by McKim Advertising Ltd. for their client, Tourism Winnipeg, the city's then newly-established marketing agency.

There was, as might be expected, an unfavourable reaction in several quarters. Gordon Sinclair, a popular <u>Free Press</u> columnist, criticized the concept sharply in his columns of May 25, 26 and 27, 1989. Whether or not the gimmick was as clever as its creators thought it to be, and whether or not it was successful is of less interest to us here than the perceptions of Winnipeg which were revealed in the public discussion of

the idea. A press release, distributed at the news conference announcing the campaign and issued by Tourism Winnipeg, explained that the promotional campaign was being mounted because research had shown that Winnipeg "needs to overcome negative perceptions of the city held by potential tourists and even residents." Sinclair, in his column of May 25, 1989, wrote

We, the tri-level, overtaxed payers of Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada, unknowingly paid thousands of dollars to do research that told us what everyone already knew.

That Winnipeg has a negative image. 121

In January 1990, the firm of Price Waterhouse produced a report entitled <u>City</u> of <u>Winnipeg: Economic Development Strategy</u>. 122 The report was prepared for the Winnipeg Task Force on Economic Development, under the chairmanship of Mr. Eric Stefanson, formerly the deputy mayor of the city. In the summary report, which carries the title <u>Winnipeg 2000: An Economic Development Strategy for Winnipeg</u>, the following statement appears on page 8:

Being positive about our community does not come easily to Winnipegers. We must reverse our collective tendency to be all too quick critics, and actively support individual, corporate and community achievements. The Task Force strongly believes that changing this negative attitude is fundamental to our economic future.

The best ambassadors for our city are positive citizens who value our incomparable quality of life and who believe that without doubt, Winnipeg is Canada's best kept secret.<sup>123</sup>

The last paragraph smacks strongly of the advertising "hype" or the inspirational business "sales pitch" or "pep-talk", which is perhaps not surprising in a report prepared for an economic task force by a firm of management consultants. Nevertheless the statement does identify the attitudinal problem in Winnipeg, and in the main body of

the report the consultant proposes a Communications Plan designed to address that problem:

In parallel with the other components of this economic development strategy, a Communications Plan should be put into place to develop a more favourable image of Winnipeg as a place to do business. Indeed, Winnipeg, as a city, has a relatively poor and undeserved image among Canadians, largely due to negative media exposure. Winnipeg has no image to speak of among Americans. As a business centre, it has a negative image among Canadian business people due to a perceived anti-business stance from the provincial government, despite recent improvements. In addition, even Winnipegers express negative feelings and show an inferiority complex about their city; economic growth seems to bypass Winnipeg and 3000 Manitobans leave the province each year to seek opportunities in other provinces. Finally, even some business owners we have met declared they were considering leaving Winnipeg. Obviously every effort has to be made to emphasize community pride. A Communications Plan must be put in place to reassure people that Winnipeg has a future, and to mobilize the will of citizens and community leaders around the achievement of well-defined economic development objectives. This vision of the future should be communicated to Winnipeg citizens and Winnipeg business people, as well as to Canadian business people. 124

The report goes on to list five major recommendations containing seven action programs. These need not be detailed here. What is of interest to us is the recognition of a negative image about the city both by outsiders and by Winnipegers, an "inferiority complex" among Winnipegers about their city, a need to foster "community pride." The objective of the report was to produce an economic development strategy for Winnipeg and it quite properly approaches the problem of Winnipeg's image from the business point of view. It makes much of the out-migration of population, particularly of young people with education and training. This of course is a serious problem. But the report says nothing about the in-migration of population to replace those who leave. An editorial in the <a href="#">Free Press</a> of February 1, 1990, under the heading "A misleading

picture" severely criticizes the report for its failure to look at compensatory inmigration, and its misuse of demographic statistics:

> The Price Waterhouse study, unfortunately, is a less than competent piece of work. Its selective use of statistics gives a seriously misleading account of Winnipeg and Manitoba....

> Solutions to Winnipeg's problems can be sought once someone knows what the problem is. The Stefanson task force and the Price Waterhouse authors describe fictitious problems. Winnipeg deserves better. 125

Nevertheless, the city's condition of stagnation and decline relative to other Canadian cities cannot be made to disappear simply be pointing a finger at the biased use of statistics. On page 1 of Winnipeg 2000 the chairman of the Task Force quotes the following excerpt from the main Price Waterhouse report:

Although Winnipeg's economy has been growing regularly over the past decades, Winnipeg's relative importance in the Canadian economy has been declining steadily. While Winnipeg used to be the largest city on the Prairies, it is now third in size after Edmonton and Calgary. Winnipeg is now the seventh largest city in Canada, and forecasts indicate that the city will slip to eighth rank in 1993, after Quebec City. 126

Those words were written in 1990. The impression created is that the fall in Winnipeg's relative status in the urban hierarchy has been progressing undetected, or at least ignored, and is only now being brought to public attention by the Task Force, together with its call for concerted action to arrest the decline. It is, therefore, interesting and a commentary on the inertia of the social process in its reactions to social dysfunctions, to note that almost the very same words were spoken more than twenty years ago. In an address to the North Winnipeg Rotary Club on December 13, 1968, the then Director of Metro's Planning Division, commenting on the malaise of the Greater Winnipeg area observed:

The symptoms of deterioration, however, can be read throughout the entire organism. The rate of metropolitan population growth is very slow, in both

absolute and comparative terms. There was a time when we were the third largest centre in Canada. We are now the fourth. I expect that the next national census will find us in fifth plane, or perhaps even in sixth place. And the census after that will find us in seventh or eighth or even ninth place....<sup>127</sup>

And so it has come to pass. In the same 1968 address to the Rotary Club, other aspects of the 1990 Price Waterhouse report were also anticipated. It went on to say:

But size and rate of growth are not the only respect to which Winnipeg is lagging. We do not compare favourably by almost any criterion one chooses to apply. Our per capita incomes, our rate of new investment, the growth of our metropolitan economy by any of these standards our performance cannot be described as satisfactory except perhaps by the most unthinking kind of polyanna. One needn't labour the point that if we continue along this course, we will find it increasingly difficult to provide a good standard of services and amenities, we will be less able to attract new people, new ideas, and new investment, and life in this community will be increasingly difficult and unattractive....<sup>128</sup>

There is, assuredly, a connection between the state of health of a city's economy and the state of mind of its citizens. It is difficult to maintain high spirits and optimism in a steadily declining economic environment, or even in one which is maintaining itself at a rate of slow growth but is losing ground to its competitors. In an address to Winnipeg's Downtown Business Association's annual meeting on April 23, 1968, the Director of Metro's Planning Division put it this way:

One of our most serious problems is the problem of confidence. We seem to have lost much of the confidence of the investment community which we once enjoyed, or at any rate, other places seem to enjoy a greater measure of their confidence. Not that we are not getting development - we are; and we are getting it at a rate which in other circumstances might be regarded as quite satisfactory, but which in today's world of fierce competition and furious activity looks as though we are standing still. During the last ten years, over twenty major structures were built in our downtown; something better than two per year. That really shouldn't have to be regarded as a dismal performance. But Edmonton in the last <u>five</u> years built over forty structures, a rate of development 400%

higher than ours. In a highly competitive society, this seems to us very much like abject failure on our part; in a value system which is built on the values of the world of business and commerce, we accept this comparatively low "sales volume" as evidence of our inferiority; and pretty soon we believe that everything about us is inferior; and, moreover, we do a pretty good job of persuading everybody else that this is the case. 129

In the light of those words, uttered some twenty-three years ago, reading the Price Waterhouse report in 1990 one is overcome by a powerful sense of *deja vue*. There is, however, a difference in the underlying philosophy expressed in the 1968 address and that of the 1990 report. The 1968 paper goes on to say

I think we make a very serious error in applying the highly special values of the competitive business world to our urban community as a whole. We must be very careful to distinguish between the words "greatness" and "bigness," and between the words "expansion" and "explosion." Mere size cannot make a city great; and explosive growth can tear apart the very fabric and fibres which hold an urban community together. 130

The Price Waterhouse report, on the other hand, applies "the highly special values of the competitive business world" throughout its entire analysis and recommendations.

The negative attitudes which have been identified in the foregoing excerpts and discussions seem to have prevailed within and beyond Winnipeg for something like the last forty years. But such attitudes have not always overshadowed the city. On the contrary, Winnipeg has known periods of boundless optimism and exuberant growth and development. These episodes of supreme enthusiasm and expansiveness occurred intermittently during the period in which Winnipeg grew from a hamlet with the pretentious designation of "city" in 1873, to its dominant position as the primate metropolis in western Canada in the years leading up to World Wan I. During the approximately forty years of that steady expansion there were peak achievements recorded in population surges and business triumphs, but the general level of the city's self-image was consistently high and expectations for its future were confident, and it

was regarded with admiration by the outside world. The recurrent peak performances were induced by such things as the prospect of the CPR's arrival and establishment of a presence in the city, which set off the hysterical land-speculation and boom of 1881-1882, and the excellent to bumper wheat crops of 1885 and 1906, together with the constant stream of new immigrants which mounted to a high-tide during the early 1900's.

The surging expansion and bountiful prosperity brought confident anticipation of unlimited growth and development in the future. A representative of the New York Commercial who visited Winnipeg in 1910 calculated that the West contained one hundred and seventy-one million acres of which only a fraction has so far been occupied. In the light of the current rate of growth and the quantity of good land still available, he forecast that Western Canada would have a population of ten million by 1920, and Winnipeg a population of three quarters of a million.<sup>131</sup>

Neither of those optimistic figures was achieved by 1920. It is now 1990 and they have still not been achieved, nor does there appear to be any prospect at all that they ever will be achieved. They certainly won't on the basis of present-day conditions and trends, but of course, no one can say what may happen in the remote, inscrutable future. Whatever the future may hold, the past is more readily discerned. The high expectations and enthusiasms for Winnipeg continued on until the fall of 1920, dropped during the first half of the 1920's, recovered somewhat in the latter half, collapsed during the drought and depression of the 1930's and briefly recovered after World War II, then sagged and never again experienced the youthful buoyancy they had before World War I. In fact the conditions which gave rise to and sustained Winnipeg's self-confidence and the admiration of the outside world in its early emergent decades effectively came to an end in 1912.

Although Winnipeg continued to grow substantially after 1912, that year marked the apogee of its power and influence in the West. Its grain traders completely controlled the marketing of the great staple product of

Prairie agriculture, its wholesalers dominated merchandise trade from the Great Lakes to the Rockies. its financial community exercised authority throughout the region, its industry furnished a major proportion of building materials required by Western construction activity, and its railway shops and yards were crucial to the operation and maintenance of the Western railway network. With the expansion of the hinterland to massive proportions, this metropolitan domination conferred on Winnipeg economic power of major dimensions. Rising Western centres had begun to challenge Winnipeg's sweeping authority, but its supremacy was still virtually intact. The pride and confidence of its citizens brimmed over, sustained by reflection on the huge expansion of recent years, and the glowing prospect that this rate of growth would continue indefinitely. 132

Unfortunately, the glowing prospect did not continue indefinitely but soon began to fade away, and with it was dimmed the brightness of Winnipeg's self-image. Compared to its pride and confidence prior to World War I Winnipeg's feeling about itself after World War II has become one of inferiority and its reputation abroad has fallen so low that a tourism promotional campaign resorted to advertising Winnipeg as NOWHERE in the hope that the inverted logic of the appeal would attract tourists to the city. There is then a body of persuasive evidence indicating a certain attitude which is characteristic of Winnipeg - an attitude which might be regarded as a "communal mind and outlook." That attitude has been described in the evidence as "negative." It alleges that Winnipeg has an "inferiority complex." Implicit is the notion that Winnipeg is self-demeaning, pessimistic, introverted, conservative, critical and unsupportive, even derogatory of local abilities, enterprises and achievements, and that this attitude has prevailed virtually since the end of World War II.

One must, however, be cautious about reading too much into the evidence. What may be regarded as a communal mind and outlook does not mean that every member of the community shares that frame of mind or outlook; there are undoubtedly many who do not. But what emerges as a group characteristic is the melding of the characteristics of its constituent individuals which are many and varied and in themselves may be contrary to

what emerges as the common trait. An analogy can be drawn from the art of painting. The colour green is derived from the mixture of blue and yellow pigments. A green landscape can be painted by applying to the canvas the green paint directly, or it can be painted by applying dots of yellow and blue paint closely side by side so that the eye will blend the two different colours and see the total effect as green. This technique is known as "pointillisme." In looking at such a painting the mind will say "ah, that is a beautiful green meadow!" but in fact that green meadow is made up of constituent elements which are not green at all but are separate, individual dots of blue and yellow. And so it is with the communal mind and outlook. It is made up of different individual minds and outlooks, but it is the overt total effect which is the observed phenomenon and which is accepted as the reality.

Much of the evidence of Winnipeg's communal mind and outlook has been derived from its observed linkage with economic conditions in the city. When economic conditions were buoyant, Winnipegers were enthusiastic and confident; now that the economy is in a long decline Winnipegers are "negative" and have an "inferiority complex." There is clearly a relationship between the state of the economy and the communal mind and outlook.

But is the economy the only force which moulds the communal mind and outlook? It seems unlikely. Our examination of prairie literature in an earlier chapter provided evidence of a prairie personality and of the influence of the environment - apart from the economy - in shaping that personality. The land and the climate were critical factors in influencing the attitudes of the early prairie settlers. So was the cultural heritage which they brought with them from their places of origin. The struggle with the land in that herculean labour to subdue it and bring it into production made an indelible imprint on the prairie personality, but it can be regarded as merely one ingredient in the total input required to create the prairie wheat economy. Technology has had a decisive role in establishing the domination over the land, and the economy has moved from its early,

simple, wheat-staple-led era into a much more complex and sophisticated phase. And, as we have seen, changes in economic and social conditions produce changes in the group personality. The climate, however, has not changed; it remains as it was in the beginning. It is true that the climate may be regarded as an economic factor, but it can also be seen as a powerful psychological and emotional influence apart from its role in the economy, and its affect on the communal mind and outlook should not be dismissed out of hand.

It must be acknowledged that economic depression has its counterpart in psychological depression. But it must also be acknowledged that Winnipeg is renowned for its long and bitterly cold winters, that the corner of Portage and Main is famous as the coldest and windiest corner in the country and that this reputation has been a major factor in creating the image that is widely held about the city. Winnipegers themselves recognize these qualities of their environment but the adversities of nature become a stimulating challenge in good times and only an additional depressing burden to bear in bad times. Intuitively one perceives a linkage between the natural environment and human personality. The evidence is not scientifically rigorous, and it may be only a very tenuous connection. Little scientific research has been devoted to the investigation of the possible relationship between the climate and the psyche, the affect of the weather on the emotions. Some work has in fact been done but it is scant and the findings are inconclusive. And yet conventional wisdom acknowledges the stereotype of the tropical and semi-tropical personality, as well as that of the temperate northern zones. Perhaps climate plays little part in it, but the emotional, volatile, gregarious, extroverted Mediterranean personality is conventionally recognized and contrasted with the reserved, introverted, dour, undemonstrative northern personality of the English, Swedish, or Finnish type. Culture has a great deal to do with it, of course. But climate may also be an important factor. And, indeed, climate may even have a great deal to do with determining a culture.

In any case the empirical evidence is persuasive enough for us to acknowledge that Winnipeg's winter, which lasts from Hallowe'en Eve to April Fools' Day, has a marked effect on the life-style of its residents. It restricts the street life of the city and thereby limits the type and scope of the public life of the community. During the long winter months much more time is spent indoors within the confines of one's dwelling than outdoors. Inevitably this reduces the contact with the rest of the city and produces a kind of introversion, a turning away from the outside world. The greatly reduced hours of sunlight contribute to the feeling of confinement and lethargy. The term "cabin fever" has become a popular expression for this sense of winter restriction and depression. Those who can afford it escape to sunnier climes such as Florida, California, Hawaii, the Caribbean, for as much of the winter as their means will allow; there is in fact a constant tide of people flowing out and back throughout the winter months. In the summer there is an exodus from the city to the lakes and summer cottages, which is not restricted to the wealthier classes in the city and which again limits outside, on-thestreet activity in the city and face-to-face contact among its residents, reinforcing the introversion tendencies. The other elements of the environment, such as the natural landscape, must also have an effect upon the psyche. It is difficult to believe that none of these factors has an influence on the communal mind and outlook of Winnipegers.

Nor can one dismiss the effect of Winnipeg's relative isolation and remoteness from other major centres. The next largest centre in Manitoba after Winnipeg is Brandon, with a population of 35,000 (compared with Winnipeg's 608,600).<sup>133</sup> Brandon lies some 135-miles west of Winnipeg and there is little between the two but open fields. The nearest major urban centre larger than Winnipeg is the American twin-city metropolis of Minneapolis-St. Paul in the State of Minnesota, lying some 400-odd miles to the south-east of Winnipeg. Again, there is no hard evidence indicating how this relative isolation has affected the attitudes of Winnipegers, but one may speculate about the possibility that it has limited the stimulation and challenge to be

derived from another major metropolis in the province as a rival such as occurs between Edmonton and Calgary and Saskatoon and Regina and has contributed to Winnipeg's feelings of isolation and reinforced its tendency towards introversion and insularity.

In some respects this remoteness from other large centres may have had a positive and beneficial effect. In turning the city inward upon itself it has compelled it to develop its own resources in the arts, and this it has done extremely well. Winnipeg's Royal Winnipeg Ballet is a world-class ballet company; its Manitoba Theatre Centre is perhaps the outstanding regional theatre in Canada; its Winnipeg Symphony Orchestra is of national calibre; its Art Gallery, its Museum of Man and Nature, its Planetarium, its Zoo can hold their own with any in the country. Part of this success is undoubtedly due to the accident of leadership - the fortuitous arrival in the city from abroad of unusual dynamic and visionary personalities who almost single-handedly created these institutions. Outstanding among these are Gwenyth Lloyd who was the founder of ballet in the city and John Hirsch who was probably the most influential force in the development of the theatre. But the right person must appear at the right time and in the right place in order for momentous things to happen. It can be argued persuasively that Winnipeg, in its remoteness and isolation and its lack of stimulation from the outside, was a place that was waiting for the right persons to come along, and they did.

In spite of the negativism and pessimism which have been indicated as prevailing in the city, arising out of the city's economic condition and performance and the attitude of the business community, these do not seem to be the feelings of the arts community. Unfortunately, although the city's artists and arts companies are resilient and optimistic, their financial circumstances are straitened. All of them are dependent on grants of one kind or another, and most are in debt and operate at a deficit. Still, the attitudes among them are more positive than those of the business community. Perhaps this is simply a measure of the difference between the artist, whose sense of self-worth

is certain and constant because it is rooted in his own inner creative being, and that of the businessman who cannot be certain of his worth because it is determined by the vagaries of the external marketplace. But the arts groups are like the blue and yellow dots on the green pointillisme meadow. Their particular confidence and buoyancy, so bright in its own identity, disappears and is lost when it is blended into the dark colour of the city's sombre collective personality.

One must also acknowledge the extent to which political elements enter into the community psyche. That political ideology is an important component seems to be self-evident. What is perhaps less readily discernible is the impact of the form or system of organization of the political structure. Reference has already been made to the way in which the multiple-municipality structure of local government in Greater Winnipeg prevented area-wide planning. The same fragmentation of municipal government authority strongly affected the metropolitan communal mind and outlook. An excerpt from the speech of Metro Winnipeg's Director of Planning delivered to the Rotary Club on December 13, 1968, has already been quoted in connection with the affect on the planning function of this fragmentation of municipal authority. One further paragraph is worth quoting because of the light it throws upon the affect of the multiple-authority political structure on the communal mind and outlook of metropolitan Winnipeg at that time:

Because we are not a city but are an association of villages we do not think or act as a city; we think and act like villages, and we have only the tax base of villages to draw upon. Our socio-economic setting makes it difficult enough for us to regard the world with a positive and dynamic outlook.... But these essentially obstructive and reactionary forces are reinforced, one might even say enshrined, in the village form of our municipal government. It is impossible for us to think big, to be bold, to undertake heroic work, because our strength and our potential resources are split into fourteen fragments, none of which has the stature or the capacity of anything but a nonentity.<sup>134</sup>

The Price Waterhouse report and other commentaries from the business community tend to point a finger at the "anti-business" legislation of the provincial government - particularly that of the NDP - or at the negativism of the population at large, and even at the media as the reason for the poor image that Winnipeg has, and, therefore, directly or indirectly as the reason for the poor performance of Winnipeg's economy. The sympathies of these reports are overtly with business and the businessmen of the city who are viewed as the innocent, undeserving victims of these prejudicial attitudes. Invariably the reports contain the exhortation that the negative attitudes must be changed to positive and that everyone must work together to bring about that change because the improvement of business conditions which will result will ultimately benefit every aspect of life in the city. Rarely is the business community fingered as having played a part in the decline of the city's economy, and never in their reports is it accused of having been a major factor in that decline. Prof. W.L. Morton, the noted Manitoba historian, in his celebrated work Manitoba: A History provides some illuminating insights into the part played by the business community leaders in the decline of Winnipeg's fortunes in the post-World War II period:

> The Roblin government, as thoroughly as it tried to embody the will and aspiration of a new and dynamic society, was in fact a tour de force, attempted by one lonely and devoted man. He never succeeded in securing the support of, and indeed avoided as being of no use, two powerful elements in the province which should either have given the leadership he attempted, or at least have given support worthy of the leadership. One was the wealthy business community of Winnipeg. Partly because so much of it was branch office personnel, partly because so much of its wealth was controlled by widows and others who, not unnaturally were cautious, but mostly because it was canny, reactionary, untravelled, fearful of ideas and of imagination, not only failed to support the government but became a dead weight on its efforts, neither aiding nor opposing, but deadening. The other was the University.... The University failed because its administration was dominated by the same Winnipeg establishment that blighted the prospects of the city and the province. This was a failure, an inadequacy,

far more serious than any loss of strategic position, or any lack of oil fields. It was that failure of head and heart which damns any man and any society. It was even more serious because, clearly, Manitoba could live up to its past, and to its achievements in business and the public service outside the province and in the arts, letters and sciences within it, only if it were to make the best of what it had of head and heart. 135

What emerges from all this is a picture of Winnipeg as a city whose communal mind and outlook overwhelmingly reflects the mentality of its business community: when business is good the city is buoyant and optimistic; when business is bad the city is depressed and pessimistic. It is a picture which reflects a city whose business community is invariably self-righteous in its posture as the champion of the common good and blames economic misfortune on others or on forces beyond its control and is too myopic to see that its own failings have been an important factor in the decline of Winnipeg's status; a city whose harsh climate and isolated location can depress even the most high spirited among its people; a city whose interests are not entirely divorced from those of its rural hinterland and shares with it to some extent the normal conservatism of the farmer and the memory of drought and depression, as well as a tradition of religious rigidity, social puritanism and high seriousness. All of which is much more conducive to gloom and negativism than it is to high spirits and optimism.

To the sum of these general feelings must be added the special feelings of local identity and parochialism which informed the residents of the various autonomous municipalities in the metropolitan area. These feelings of insularity and local pride continued even after the area municipalities were amalgamated into a single city and continued to exert powerful pressures on the councillors who represented those communities in the Unicity government. Council decisions for many years reflected the historic tensions between the area municipalities and the central city of Winnipeg. While it is true that the unified city is now universally accepted and few in Winnipeg would want to revert to the former multiple-municipality or Metro form of

government, nevertheless it will probably take several generations before the memory and influence of that historic division of identities and loyalties will completely disappear and a new consciousness of a single city will emerge.

How then has this very complex and changeable communal mind and outlook found expression in the planning and development of Winnipeg? The mind and outlook of the city, insofar as it may be generalized, is to a large extent (as has been indicated in the foregoing discussion) a reflection of the state of the city's economic fortunes. It is, however, also conditioned by other influences such as those of climate, cultural heritage, political systems and structures and other factors, all of which are intuitively perceived as affecting the communal psyche but which elude precise measurement and demonstration. Indeed the communal mind and outlook is simply an aspect of the community's historical experience. The one has no existence without the other, just as fear has no existence without threat, or patriotism has no existence without a country. To speak of the communal mind and outlook is to speak of the community's historical circumstances - the social, economic, political, cultural, environmental, etc. milieu in which that community has its existence and out of which experience the community ethos is created. Within the limits of this dissertation such an account has already been given with reference to Winnipeg's planning and development. The communal mind and outlook of Winnipeg found a variety of expressions in its planning and development activities. In some instances it was in the buildings and land-uses of the built environment. In other instances it was in the social or developmental affects of the council's decisions, or lack of them, or in the council's utter disregard or contravention of its own planning by-law policies. In still other instances it was in the structure of the government of the metropolitan area, or in the creation and excellence of its artistic life, or in the inherent conservatism and tendency towards pessimism and gloom which lies as a basic sub-stratum in the psychological structure of Winnipegers 136 and which expressed itself in the failure of the city's business community to respond to the challenge of its

changing economic conditions. But all of this has already been discussed in the body of this chapter and needs no further comment.

### **NOTES - WINNIPEG PHASE 1.**

- <sup>1</sup>Branford and Geddes, "Our Social Inheritance, " cited in Lewis Mumford <u>The Culture of Cities</u>, 6.
- <sup>2</sup>Bedarida, "The French Approach to Urban History," in Fraser and Sutcliffe, eds., <u>The Pursuit of Urban History</u>, 406.
- <sup>3</sup>Braudel, quoted by R.E. Pahl in "Concepts in Context: Pursuing the Urban of 'Urban Sociology'," in Fraser and Sutcliffe, <u>The Pursuit</u>, 379.
- <sup>4</sup>The Desmeurons regiment was a Swiss mercenary unit which had fought for Britain against the United States in the war of 1812. The regiment had been disbanded in eastern Canada at the conclusion of the war and many of its members had remained in this country. Nearly 100 came to the Red River Colony with Lord Selkirk. Rue Des Meurons, in St. Boniface, bears their name.
- <sup>5</sup>For the early history of the political and administrative organization at Red River I have drawn upon the Greater Winnipeg Investigating Commission Report and Recommendations.
- <sup>6</sup>Statutes of Manitoba, 37 Victoria, 1873, chapter 7.
- <sup>7</sup>See Bellan, Winnipeg First Century, 9-10.
- <sup>8</sup>Artibise, Winnipeg: A Social History of Urban Growth 1874-1914, 36-37.
- <sup>9</sup>Winnipeg Telegram, 4 December, 1900, cited in Artibise, Winnipeg, 75-76.
- <sup>10</sup>Artibise, <u>Winnipea</u>, 75.
- <sup>11</sup>See Artibise, Winnipeg, 88 ff.
- <sup>12</sup>Artibise, Winnipeg, 207 ff.
- <sup>13</sup>It should be noted that by 1904 Point Douglas was no longer a fashionable residential address. The CPR mainline passed through the heart of that area, the Canadian Northern Railway occupied an extensive tract of land a little farther south along the Red River, large numbers of immigrants arrived in the 1890's and later settled in this general location and the rapid commercial development of the core area shifted the more desirable residential locations to the south and the west towards the vicinity of the Assiniboine River.
- <sup>14</sup>J.E. Rea, "The Politics of Conscience: Winnipeg After the Strike," Canadian Historical Association. <u>Historical Papers</u>, 1971, passim.
- <sup>15</sup>J.E. Rea, "Appendix IV: The Rea Report" 1976, 1. The Rea Report was prepared for the Committee of Review, City of Winnipeg Act and forms Appendix IV of that Committee's Report and Recommendations 1976 but was published as a separate report.
- <sup>16</sup>Dominion Bureau of Statistics, <u>Census of the Prairie Provinces</u>, 1921. It should be noted that the population figures for the City of Winnipeg and the suburbs cited on pages 295 to 298 as well as those on the later pages 308 and 309 have been taken from the Planning Division Metropolitan Winnipeg, <u>The Metropolitan Development Plan</u> 1968, Table B.2.4. 26, B.2.5. 26, and B.2.6. 27, which differ in several instances from the population statistics given by Statistics Canada cited elsewhere in this study.
- <sup>17</sup>See G.A.P. Carrothers, <u>Planning in Manitoba</u>. See also R.D. Fromson, "Planning in a Metropolitan Area" (MCP thesis); also Artibise, <u>Winnipeg: A Social History of Urban Growth</u> for an account of planning in Winnipeg between 1892 and 1914, specifically chapter 15, "The Rise and Demise of a City Planning Movement." 266-280.

- <sup>18</sup>Legislative Assembly of Manitoba, <u>Journals</u>, 21st Legislature, 2nd session, 1943, 14.
- <sup>19</sup>Legislative Assembly of Manitoba, <u>Journals</u>, 3rd session, 1944, 12.
- <sup>20</sup>The Exploratory Sub-Committee on the Organization of Local Government Services in the Greater Winnipeg area.
- <sup>21</sup>Report of the Exploratory Sub-Committee as cited in the Manitoba Provincial and Municipal Committee Report (1953).
- <sup>22</sup>Greater Winnipeg Investigating Commission, Report and Recommendations.
- <sup>23</sup>The members of the Commission were George E. Sharpe, Mayor of Winnipeg; J.G. Van Bellingham, Mayor of St. Boniface; Thomas Findlay, Mayor of St. James; Chaim N. Kushner, Councillor, R.M. of West Kildonan; J.L. Bodie, East Kildonan. The Commission held its first meeting in September, 1955, at which J.L. Bodie was elected Chairman and C.N. Kushner was elected Secretary. In October, Prof. R.C. Bellan of the Economics Department of the University of Manitoba was appointed Director of Research.
- <sup>24</sup>Greater Winnipeg Investigating Commission, Report.
- <sup>25</sup>The Commission also dealt with the problems of the tangled School Districts system, which are only marginal to our interest in city planning and development.
- <sup>26</sup>Meyer Brownstone and Thomas Plunkett, Metropolitan Winnipeg, 20.
- <sup>27</sup>Artibise, Winnipeg. An Illustrated History, 175 and Table XIV, appendix, 207.
- <sup>28</sup>See the Winnipeg Free Press, 18 September, 1959.
- <sup>29</sup>Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg Act, RSM 1960, 8 and 9 Elizabeth II, chapter 40.

#### **NOTES - PHASE 2**

- <sup>30</sup>Initially the area of the Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg comprised ten complete municipalities and parts of nine others as shown on Figure 14. Over time, however, there were a number of changes. Five rural municipalities which originally were among the nine which were only partially in the metro area were withdrawn from the Metropolitan Corporation, changing the configuration of the area to that shown on Figure 15, which contains a total of 14 municipalities. The number was subsequently reduced to 12 by 1969 with the amalgamation of St. James and Brooklands in 1967 and then with Assiniboia in 1969.
- 31 Winnipeg Tribune, 3 June, 1961.
- 32 Winnipeg Tribune 5 June, 1961.
- 33lbid.
- <sup>34</sup>Winnipeg <u>Free Press</u>, 6 June, 1961.
- <sup>35</sup>See, for example, editorial in Winniped Free Press, 23 May, 1961.
- <sup>36</sup>See Winnipeg Tribune, 5 December, 1961; Winnipeg Free Press, 5 December, 1961.
- <sup>37</sup>See <u>Winnipeg Tribune</u>, 13 December, 1961, under story headline "St. James Bridge Gets Green Light."
- 38 Winnipeg Tribune, 12 July, 1961.
- 39 Winnipeg Free Press, 15 February, 1962.
- <sup>40</sup>Winnipeg Tribune, 23 February, 1962.
- <sup>41</sup>Gordon Blake and J. Carl Goldenberg, <u>Report on Taxation</u>.
- 42 Winnipea Tribune, editorial, 6 June, 1961.
- <sup>43</sup>Winnipeg Free Press, 30 May, 1962.

- 44Winnipeg Free Press, 15 October, 1962.
- <sup>45</sup>Winnipeg Tribune, 1 December, 1962.
- 46 Winnipeg Free Press, 30 May, 1963; Winnipeg Tribune, 30 May, 1963.
- <sup>47</sup>Winnipeg Free Press, 19 April, 1963.
- <sup>48</sup>Winnipeg Free Press, 7 May, 1963.
- <sup>49</sup>Winnipeg Free Press, 7 May, 1963.
- <sup>50</sup>Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg Review Commission, <u>Report and Recommendations</u>. (Cumming Report).
- <sup>51</sup>Ibid. 72.
- 52 Winnipea Free Press, 9 April, 1964.
- 53 The Town Planning Act, SM.6 George V, 1916, chapter 114.
- <sup>54</sup>lbid. sec.1.
- <sup>55</sup>lbid. sec.79.
- <sup>56</sup>Winnipea Tribune, 30 November, 1963.
- <sup>57</sup>lbid.
- <sup>58</sup>See Humphrey Carver, <u>Houses for Canadians</u>, 6, 36n.
- <sup>59</sup>City of Winnipeg, <u>An Urban Renewal Study for the City of Winnipeg. The CPR Notre Dame Area</u>.
- <sup>60</sup>City of Winnipeg Department of Housing and Urban Renewal, <u>Urban Renewal Area #1</u>.
- <sup>61</sup>Known as the Lord Selkirk Park Project.
- 62 Winnipeg Tribune, 6 April, 1963.
- 63 Winnipeg Tribune, 4 April, 1963.
- 64 Winnipeg Free Press, 5 April, 1963.
- <sup>65</sup>Councillor Bernie Wolfe, reported in Winnipeg Tribune, 25 May, 1961.
- <sup>66</sup>Winnipea Free Press, 5 April, 1963.
- <sup>67</sup>The officers of the Civic Development Corporation were: Henry C. Ashdown, Peter D. Curry, R.G. Dickson, Louis Driscoll, Robert Courley, Reginald Hobday, Milton C. Holden, Stephen Juba, A. Searle Leach, John A. Macaulay, J. Hugh McDonald, Ralph Misener, Ernest Osler, T.O. Peterson, Kenneth A. Cowell, James A. Richardson, C.S. Riley, Stewart A. Searle, George Sellers, C. Gordon Smith, John Sifton, George Sharpe, Anna M. Speers, Maitland Steinkopf, Dr. P.H.T. Thorlakson and Alfred R. Tucker.
- <sup>68</sup>Val Werier, in Winnipeg Tribune, 31 August, 1963.
- 69Winnipeg Tribune, 9 May, 1964.
- <sup>70</sup>Winnipeg Free Press, 11 May, 1964.
- <sup>71</sup>It is interesting to note that the City of Winnipeg's Urban Renewal Area #3, the study report of which was submitted to the City in 1969, comprised exactly the same area as Duff Roblin's proposed renewal area. One can speculate that Roblin realized that his Civic Development Corporation needed professional advice and had a hand in commissioning the Urban Renewal Area #3 study.
- 72 Winnipeg Free Press, 16 May, 1962.
- <sup>73</sup>Winnipeg Tribune, 29 January, 1963.
- <sup>74</sup>Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg, <u>Downtown Winnipeg</u>.
- 75 Downtown Winnipeg, 64.
- 76 Downtown Winnipeg, 77.

- <sup>77</sup>City of Winnipeg Parking Authority, "Annual Report, 1969," 6, cited in David Walker, <u>The Great Winnipeg Dream</u>, 52.
- <sup>78</sup>For a fuller description of the Trizec project see David Walker, <u>The Great Winnipeg</u> <u>Dream</u>.
- <sup>79</sup>Downtown Winnipeg, 98, Table 8.4.
- <sup>80</sup>Local Government Boundaries Commission, <u>Provincial Plan for Local Units in the Greater Winnipeg Area</u>, 66.
- 81 Brownstone and Plunkett, Metropolitan Winnipeg, 32.
- <sup>82</sup>Government of Manitoba, <u>Proposals for Urban Reorganization in the Greater Winnipeg</u> <u>Area</u>.
- 83 Government of Manitoba, Proposals, 10.
- <sup>84</sup>St. James and Assinibola had by this time been amalgamated into a single municipality and Brooklands had already been absorbed by St. James reducing the number of municipalities in the Metropolitan structure from 14 to 12.
- 85Government of Manitoba, Proposals, 14.
- <sup>86</sup>Statutes of Manitoba, <u>The City of Winnipeg Act</u>, 1971, chapter 105.

#### **NOTES - PHASE 3**

- 87 Information provided by Mr. Green in conversation with the author.
- 88City of Winnipeg Act, sec.21.
- 89 City of Winnipeg Act, sec.23.
- 90City of Winniped Act, SM.1977, chapter 64, secs. 16, 17.
- <sup>91</sup>City of Winnipeg Act, 1971, sec. 569(f).
- 92City of Winnipeg Act, 1971, sec. 570.
- 93 Brownstone and Plunkett, Metropolitan Winnipeg, 132.
- 94lbid.
- <sup>95</sup>Committee of Review, City of Winnipeg Act, Report and Recommendations, ix.
- <sup>96</sup>Committee of Review, <u>Report</u>, 16.
- <sup>97</sup>Committee of Review, <u>Report</u>, 16-17.
- <sup>98</sup>Committee of Review, <u>Report</u>, 17.
- <sup>99</sup>Committee of Review, <u>Report</u>, 23.
- <sup>100</sup>Brownstone and Plunkett, <u>Metropolitan Winnipeg</u>, 132.
- <sup>101</sup>Ibid.
- 102Committee of Review. Report, 134.
- <sup>103</sup>City of Winnipeg Act, SM 1977 chapter 64, sec.583(1).
- <sup>104</sup>City of Winnipeg, <u>Greater Winnipeg Development Plan</u>, 83, Part C, para. 10.32.
- <sup>105</sup>City of Winnipeg, <u>Development Plan</u>, 41, 42, Part C, sec. 2.5 ff.
- <sup>106</sup>City of Winnipeg, <u>Development Plan</u>, 49, 50, Part C, sec. 2.33 ff.
- <sup>107</sup>See Hum and Phillips, "Growth," see also Bellan, Winnipeg.
- <sup>108</sup>City of Winnipeg, <u>Plan Winnipeg</u>: <u>An Introduction to the Greater Winnipeg</u> <u>Development Plan Review</u>, 6.
- <sup>109</sup>City of Winnipeg, <u>Plan Winnipeg: An Introduction</u>, 3, para. 2(b).
- 110City of Winnipeg, Plan Winnipeg, 1986.

- 111 City of Winnipeg, Plan Winnipeg, sec. 5(1) Policy.
- 112City of Winnipeg, Plan Winnipeg, sec. 75(1) Policy.
- <sup>113</sup>City of Winnipeg, <u>Plan Winnipeg</u>, sec. 80(1) Policy.
- <sup>114</sup>See Winnipeg Core Area Initiative Policy Committee, <u>Proposed Winnipeg Core Area Initiative</u>.
- <sup>115</sup>Social Planning Council of Winnipeg, <u>Winnipeg Census Data-Insights and Trends</u>, a report prepared for the Council's annual meeting 30 May, 1989.
- <sup>116</sup>The three levels of government are sole and equal shareholders of the North Portage Development Corporation. The Corporation is a Community Development Corporation established under Part XXI of the Corporations Act of Manitoba.
- <sup>117</sup>East Yard Task Force, Report and Recommendations.
- 118The Forks Renewal Corporation is effectively owned by the three levels of government. It is established as a wholly-owned subsidiary of The North Portage Development Corporation. The Board of Directors of the North Portage Development Corporation, however, can only exercise its powers and responsibilities with respect to the Forks Renewal Corporation upon the direction and with the approval of the three levels of government who are the sole and equal shareholders of the North Portage Development Corporation. The Forks Renewal Corporation was established under a Unanimous Shareholders Agreement on 29 July 1987. It is suggested that this complex, convoluted arrangement was decided upon in order to avoid the necessity of going back to the federal Treasury Board for approval to create and fund still another agency the Forks Renewal Corporation with the risk of running into difficulties, or even refusal.

  119See East Yard Task Force, Technical Background Report; see also Forks Renewal Corporation, Phase 1 Concept and Financial Plan, Report to the shareholders by Board of Directors, The Forks Renewal Corporation.

#### **NOTES - OVERVIEW**

- <sup>120</sup>Winnipeg Free Press, 25 May, 1989, Gordon Sinclair's column.
- <sup>121</sup>lbid.
- <sup>122</sup>Price Waterhouse, <u>City of Winnipeg: Economic Development Strategy</u>.
- <sup>123</sup>Winnipeg Task Force on Economic Development, <u>Winnipeg 2000: An Economic Development Strategy for Winnipeg</u>.
- 124Price Waterhouse, Economic Development Strategy, 90, 91.
- <sup>125</sup>Winnipeg Free Press, editorial, 1 February, 1990.
- 126Winnipeg Task Force, Winnipeg 2000, 1.
- <sup>127</sup>Earl Levin, <u>Address</u> to North Winnipeg Rotary Club, 13 December, 1968.
- <sup>128</sup>lbid.
- <sup>129</sup>Earl Levin, <u>Address</u> to Winnipeg Downtown Business Association, 23 April, 1968.
- 130 Ibid.
- 131Bellan, <u>Winnipeg</u>, 107, 108.
- 132Bellan, Winnipeg, 113.
- <sup>133</sup>Statistics Canada estimate for 1990.
- <sup>134</sup>Earl Levin, <u>Address</u> to North Winnipeg Rotary Club, 13 December, 1968.

135W.L. Morton, Manitoba: A History, 2nd edition, 501, 502.

136The relationship between literature and the communal mind and outlook is explored in chapter 3 of this study. Clearly, there is such a connection: literature is a mirror of the communal psyche and reveals what in the day-to-day living of the community may be hidden or simply not noticed. In that regard an interesting observation about Manitoba's psyche appeared in the Winnipeg Free Press of Saturday, 7 July, 1990. The "Books" section of that edition carried a review of a book entitled Made in Manitoba, compiled by Wayne Tefs and published by Touchstone Press, in Winnipeg. The review was written by Lee Shacter and was headed "Short stories portray dour, no-nonsense Manitobans". The stories are all by Manitobans such as Gabrielle Roy, Margaret Laurence, David Arnason, W.D. Valgardson, and others, a large proportion of them being Winnipegers. This is the opening paragraph of Lee Shacter's review:

After reading Made in Manitoba, a collection of short stories by 22 Manitoba authors compiled by Wayne Tefs, it is hard to escape the conclusion that we are a dolorous lot, if we accept that these stories are a mirror of life in this province. We mope, we suffer from guilt, and not many of us are having fun. We live in a world of limited resources - is there nothing out there?

## CITY HISTORY AND CITY PLANNING

The Local Historical Roots of

The City Planning Function in

Three Cities of the Canadian Prairies

by

#### EARL A. LEVIN

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of

**Doctor of Philosophy** 

Faculty of Graduate Studies University of Manitoba Winnipeg, Manitoba

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BY

## EARL A. LEVIN

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of the University of Manitoba in partial ulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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#### CHAPTER 7

#### REGINA

## PHASE 1: THE PLACE WITH NOT A SINGLE ADVANTAGE TO COMMEND IT

# 1. Regina's Genesis - Land Speculation on the Prairie Frontier

Regina was created by the CPR. Winnipeg rose to pre-eminence among prairie cities largely because it became the hub of a continental railway system, but there were people and activities at the site of the future city - first the fur traders, then the Red River Colony - long before anyone even thought of the railway. In the case of Regina, however, before the arrival of the CPR there was nothing, except perhaps a pile of buffalo bones. The buffalo was the basic life-staple of aboriginal prairie society. It was the source of the Indian's food, his clothing, his shelter, and an important element in his spiritual cosmology. A large part of his time and energy was devoted to the hunt, and sometime during the centuries of their nomadic hunting life the prairie Indians had evolved a method of harvesting the buffalo which reduced the risk to life and limb and greatly increased the efficiency of the kill. It was a primitive but effective technique and required only a steep embankment and a supply of prairie brush for its operation.

The brush was used to construct two converging fences to form a corridor or pound, sometimes as much as a mile long, wider toward the open prairie and narrowing toward the edge of the embankment. The members of the hunting party concealed themselves behind these fences, the gaps in which were often filled with snow banks in winter or earth mounds in other seasons. When all was in readiness, a single member of the party, called "Who-brings-them-in" would ride out towards the grazing herd and try to turn it towards the pound or corral. If he failed in this and the herd broke to either side before reaching the fence, the driver would be humiliated, the pound would be declared unlucky, and further efforts would be needed to secure the necessary supply of buffalo. On the other hand, if "Who-brings-them-in" succeeded, by his skilful riding

and noise-making, in coaxing the herd into the waiting, widespread arms of the fences, then the men concealed behind the fences would leap up and with wild gestures and shouting would spread panic among the stampeding herd which would rush with a thunder of hoofs over the edge of the embankment to be crippled or killed by the fall. Those that survived were quickly dispatched by the arrows of the hunting party.

One of the established sites for this hunting practice was a location on the creek known today as Wascana Creek, several miles north-west of the place where Regina was first established. North-west of the original townsite the creek was wooded and had high banks. It was well suited to the impoundment technique of buffalo hunting. As a result the creek became littered with countless numbers of buffalo bones, from whence it acquired its name. Variously referred to as Tas d'Os, Pile o' Bones, Many Bones and Bone Creek, it finally came to be called Wascana, which is a corruption of the Cree word Oskana, meaning bones. It was here that the site of Regina was eventually established.

The Canadian Pacific Railway Act created the CPR on February 17, 1881. This Act of the Canadian parliament incorporated the agreement between the recently established railway syndicate headed by Donald A. Smith and the government of Canada, which, among various other provisions, required the syndicate to complete the construction of the railway to the Pacific Ocean within ten years. The commitment to build the railway set off a storm of wild speculation in western land, of which Winnipeg was the storm centre, but which swept across the Wascana area and blew in the inevitable speculators, many of them financed from Winnipeg, who hoped to get rich from the appreciation of land values induced by the prospect of the railway. Investors bought land up and down the creek and in its vicinity, betting that the railway would cross their property, or even better, that a town would be established on their holdings. There were, of course, also a number of genuine homesteaders who simply wanted to establish a claim to a good, well-situated farm, but most were merely squatters gambling on a quick, profitable turnover of their short-term investment.

The preliminary survey of the railway line had swung on a northward arc to cross the creek some six miles downstream from the present site of Regina. But this alignment added unnecessary mileage to the track. The final survey straightened out the line and brought it south of the preliminary survey to cross Wascana Creek at the present-day site of the city. Many land speculators must have been foiled by this realignment because when the final survey was completed on May 13, 1882, there were only three settlers in its vicinity.

One of the more consequential effects of the railway re-alignment was to change the capital of the North West Territories. Battleford, located at the junction of the Battle and the North Saskatchewan Rivers had been the Territorial capital since 1876. But it was too far north of the final 1882 alignment of the railway to function properly as the capital in the changed circumstances of transportation and communication brought about by the new location of the right-of-way. The Territorial government felt that the capital should be located at some central point on the railway so as to have ready communication with the settled East as well as with the communities to the West which would inevitably spring up along the new transportation artery.

On June 30, 1882, Lieutenant-Governor Dewdney published a notice reserving from settlement all the land in township 17, range 20, west of the second principal meridian. On August 7 the Dominion Lands office enlarged the reservation by including the west half of the adjoining township 17, range 19. The total lands thus taken out of the normal process of homestead entry was 54 square miles. On it were already 39 squatters without legal title, who were ordered to relocate. The reasons for this action were explained in a letter from the Department of the Interior. The railway was now committed to cross Wascana Creek in Section 23 of township 17, range 20, west of the second meridian. The Government and the CPR were also now agreed on establishing their respective headquarters in Section 23. The surrounding lands would inevitably increase in value as a result of these events and the purpose of the reservation placed

upon those 54 square miles of lands which surrounded Section 23 was to ensure that their increase in value would accrue to the Government and the CPR.

The selection of the new Territorial capital fell to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Territories, Edgar Dewdney, and the General Manager of the CPR, William Cornelius Van Horne. As early as May 1882, Dewdney had leaned toward the site where the CPR crossed Wascana Creek, although he explored extensively along the railway right-of-way looking for the most suitable location. Early in August the choice was made and Dewdney travelled to Winnipeg to advise the president of the CPR, George Stephen, of the decision. On August 12, 1882, Stephen telegraphed the Prime Minister informing him that the site chosen for the new capital of the North West Territories was the site on Pile of Bones Creek. The government also decided to move the headquarters of the North West Mounted Police from Fort Walsh to the newly designated capital also on the recommendation of Dewdney.

The pressing question now arose as to a name for the new capital. "Pile of Bones" was obviously not acceptable, and its derivative "Wascana" was not regarded as suitable. "Assiniboia," the traditional designation of the Territory, and "Leopold," after Queen Victoria's youngest son were also rejected. An appeal was made to the Governor General for a suggestion, who in turn appealed to his wife, the Princess Louise, daughter of Queen Victoria. Louise proposed "Regina" in honour of her mother and the name was adopted. The formal christening ceremony was performed before a party of Eastern dignitaries who arrived in General Manager Van Horne's private car on the first passenger train to reach Pile of Bones Creek, on August 23, 1882.

The Government and the CPR had a common interest in developing the lands adjacent to the railway right-of-way, and in particular the lands earmarked for future townsites. In the spring of 1882 they had agreed to pool their holdings in four locations designated for townsite development - Regina, Moose Jaw, Fort Qu'Appelle and Virden, and to share equally the profits from the sale of these lands. For Regina, the lands

designated specifically as the townsite proper were Sections 19 and 30 in range 19, and Sections 24 and 25 in range 20 - a total of some 2560 acres.

Dewdney's choice of the site for the Territorial capital was severely criticized on a number of grounds by various critics. In fact the site had virtually nothing to commend it as a place for an urban settlement. It had no trees to provide fuel, shade, or timber for building; it was poorly drained; it had insufficient water to support even a modest-sized population. The Toronto Globe, and Forest and Stream ridiculed the site as "wretched," and "no more fitted for a town site than any other flat, dry, barren section" of the railway, while the Ottawa Free Press even scoffed at the grandiose pretentiousness of the name "Regina." The Manitoba Free Press, in a now much-quoted editorial, was particularly scathing:

One thing is certain, Regina will never amount to anything more than a country village or town, for the simple reason that in neither its position nor its surroundings is there anything to give it the slightest commercial importance. Situated in the midst of a vast plain of inferior soil, with hardly a tree to be seen as far as the eye can range, and with about enough water in the miserable creek - known as PILE OF BONES - to wash a sheep, it would scarcely make a respectable farm, to say nothing of being fixed upon as the site for the capital of a great province. The place had not a single advantage to commend it.<sup>2</sup>

But Dewdney was also criticized on other grounds. He was a member of a syndicate which included a number of notable persons such as two members of parliament, a former Manitoba cabinet minister, a high official of the Hudson's Bay Company, the comptroller of the North West Mounted Police and others, which had bought extensive tracts of Hudson's Bay Company lands adjacent to the route of the railway. Among the lands owned by this syndicate was the south half and the north-west quarter of section 26, township 17, range 20, west of the second meridian. The Dewdney syndicate stood to make a very handsome profit if the capital were to be developed on section 26. The CPR and the government, however, were not disposed to

share with anyone - not even the Lieutenant-Governor and his distinguished syndicate colleagues - any of the proceeds from the sale of the townsite lands. It was this as much as anything else which fixed the location of the site for the capital in sections 24 and 25, immediately east of section 26. But that did not end the real-estate tug-of-war.

Responsibility for the sale of all railway lands had been conveyed by the CPR to a land company called the Canada North West Land Company. Under an agreement made in June, 1882, the railway sold to this company a total of 47 town and village sites located along the railway right-of-way stretching from Brandon to the border of British Columbia.<sup>3</sup> Profits from the sale of land in these places were to be shared equally between the land company and the CPR. This arrangement did not alter the earlier agreement between the government and the railway with respect to the four townsites of Regina, Moose Jaw, Fort Qu'Appelle, and Virden.

At first the sale of lands in these 47 locations was placed in the hands of the Land Commissioner of the CPR. Shortly after the arrival of the first train in August 1882, the CPR's Land Commissioner, J.H. McTavish, chose the site on which the railway station was built; it was about two miles east of section 26. It was also a considerable distance from Wascana Creek, the only source of water, meagre though it was, not only for the railroad but also for the proposed town. Dewdney was sharply critical of this move on the part of the railway. Nevertheless, the railway station proved to be an attraction for new immigrants and most of them chose lots in its vicinity rather that at the creek crossing where earlier settlers had located. For a while there were two nodes of settlement but the earlier arrivals, most of whom still lived in tents, soon moved their portable dwellings to join those at the railway station, where the community's commercial hub was emerging just north of the railway track at Broad Street.

The continuing controversy and uncertainty over the location where development of the town would ultimately occur, together with the open public criticism of the site, had an inhibiting effect on immigration and investment. The government, the railway,

and the land company were seriously concerned about the early failure of the town to attract a satisfactory flow of new people and capital, and sent a committee of three - one representative form each of the partners - to examine the site and report on its suitability. The party arrived in Regina on October 5, 1882, and carried out this investigation. They found that the site was acceptable and would serve adequately for the Territorial capital. Moreover, they ordered a survey to be carried out. The survey covered sections 19 and 30 in range 19, and sections 24 and 25 in range 20. It did not touch section 26. Not to be outdone, the Dewdney syndicate carried out their own survey of section 26.

On October 29, 1883, the responsibilities relating to the railway's lands formerly carried out by the CPR's Land Commissioner were transferred to four townsite trustees: Richard B. Angus and Donald A. Smith appointed by the CPR, and Edmund B. Osler and William B. Scarth, appointed by the land company. The responsibilities of the four trustees included the "formation, encouragement, and establishment of the said several towns.... and.... the laying out, administration and sale.... of town lots...." At the same time the agreement between the government and the railway with respect to the pooling of their lands in the four townsites of Regina, Moose Jaw, Fort Qu'Appelle and Virden was confirmed, but the four trustees were made both owners and administrators of these lands. The agreement provided that the profits from the sale of these lands would be shared in the proportion of one-quarter to the railway, one-quarter to the land company, and one-half to the government of Canada.

Although there were four trustees empowered to deal with the sale and development of the townsite lands of the partners, the responsibility for the Regina townsite was left virtually exclusively to William Blain Scarth who had been performing this role in any case before the formal establishment of the trustees. It was he who took the initiative to market the surveyed lots in the designated capital. He proclaimed that Regina would be the terminal of a CPR Division, that thousands of men

would be employed in building and servicing that divisional point, that Regina would be the centre of a network of railway branch lines, that a large reservoir was about to be built capable of meeting the demand for water of a great city. But Dewdney was not easily discouraged. He still hoped to turn the townsite development to the advantage of section 26 and his land syndicate. He wrote regularly to Prime Minister Macdonald urging him to build all the government's public buildings west of the railway station, and the farther west the better. He based his argument on the nature of the soil, stressing the point that there was good drainage of the land near the creek but that the area around the station became a bog when the land was wet. George Stephen of the CPR and trustee Scarth also wrote to the Prime Minister pointing out that if the government's buildings such as the Post Office, Land-Titles Office, Indian Office, etc. were to be built outside of the designated townsite of Regina, both the railway and the government would sustain severe financial loss.

In the end the various government buildings were located, not with a view to their positive impact on the development of the town but merely to placate both of the contending parties. The North West Mounted Police barracks were located on a site west of the Wascana Creek, on land outside of the designated townsite, but on section 23, the section immediately to the south of section 26. The Lieutenant-Governor's residence was also erected west of the designated townsite boundary, also on section 23, but across the creek from the police barracks, on Dewdney Avenue which marked the boundary between section 23 and section 26. The Office of the North West Council, and the Indian Office were also built on Dewdney Avenue, about half-way between the barracks and the railway station. The Customs Office, the Dominion Lands Office, and eventually the Post Office were all located in the vicinity of the station. And the Registry Office was built on Albert Street about mid-way between the railway station and the North West Council Office. Thus all of the public buildings which had important roles to play in the early life of the capital, and which could have given a feeling of compactness and a catalytic

stimulus to the development of the community, were strung out across two and one half miles of open prairie, with virtually nothing between their isolated sites and no developmental linkage with the small residential nucleus which was beginning to emerge in the general vicinity of the railway station.

Moreover, some of the attractive prospects which had been glowingly portrayed by Scarth failed to materialize. The establishment of Regina as a divisional point on the railway would have contributed to the growth of the town and the expansion of its labour force. Scarth had proclaimed this as one of the townsite's attractions in his lot-sales promotion. The CPR had in fact laid down sidings in Regina in preparation for making Regina a divisional point, but it soon picked up these sidings and moved them to Moose Jaw, some 40 miles to the west. Dewdney decried this action and alleged that it was done because CPR officials had speculative interests in land in Moose Jaw. There was, however, no proof to support this allegation. The CPR said that the move was made because the distance to Moose Jaw was better from the point of view of railway operational efficiency than the distance to Regina. Similarly the prospect of branch railway lines radiating north and south out of Regina also faded very quickly. When the government raised the issue with the CPR, George Stephen, the president of the railway replied that the CPR had never given any undertaking to build such branch lines out of Regina.

Regina, then, was a forlorn, bedraggled, gap-toothed scattering of modest buildings in a vast, empty, arid, treeless, wind-swept plain, which had come into existence mainly as the product of competing land speculations. The site had been determined by a decision of the CPR and the Government of Canada but that decision in large measure was led by the primary concern for the profits to be gained from the sale of lots in this location. The spread of the town and the siting of its buildings which gave the town its initial shape and character was simply the physical manifestation of the

struggle between the contending real-estate interests and the evidence as to which of the contestants had prevailed.

The combination of the treeless, featureless plain in which the town was set, the random scatter of buildings, the prevalence of canvas tents as make-shift accommodation for both residence and business, the indiscriminate mixing, cheek-by-jowl, of tents and wooden structures, the quagmire of mud which the townsite became in wet weather, the absence of landscaped parks or any civic adornments soon gave Regina the reputation of being the ugliest place on the CPR line. The trustees, although real-estate profits were uppermost in their minds, nevertheless felt an obligation toward development of the town and the creation of the amenities which would not only raise the value of the townsite property but also would enhance the town as a place to live.

Scarth's land-sale promotion which had been launched on October 30, 1882, had stimulated a brisk sales activity initially but it gradually lost momentum, due, no doubt, to the uncertainty about the capital location, the lack of services and amenities, particularly water, the growing reputation of the town as badly sited and ugly. By February of 1883 interest had waned perceptibly and Scarth moved to renew it. He called a public meeting at which he announced that the capital would not be moved from Regina, that streets would be graded and improved, a bridge would be built across the creek, public buildings would be erected, a reservoir constructed, wells would be sunk and an adequate supply of water ensured. His effort was successful. The next morning over 75 lots were sold.<sup>5</sup>

Scarth kept his promises. Four miles of street were graded, and on April 24, 1883, a well was sunk on South Railway which yielded a good supply of water at 97-feet. A small bridge was constructed over the creek just west of Albert Street, and combined with it was a dam. The structure was built of three inch planks and banked with earth, and allowed only one lane of traffic, but it served not only to bridge the creek but to create the promised reservoir. It raised the water level eight feet and flooded

some 200 acres of land creating a lake from which adequate supplies of water could be drawn.<sup>6</sup>

By December, 1883, the Regina district's population had reached 1000. Most of these people had come to the district from Manitoba and Ontario, and were quite well-educated businessmen and professionals. There were also immigrants from the Maritimes and Britain, including even a few scions of the British peerage. Motives were varied for coming to this "uncouth and unfinished" town. Some came to make a quick profit from what they expected would be a boom town, but most came to take up permanent residence, confident about their long-term future in a burgeoning frontier community. The council of the North West Territories, headed by the Lieutenant-Governor, consisted of a majority of appointed members, but additional members could be elected to the council from electoral districts. Any area within the Territories not exceeding 1000 square miles in extent could become an electoral district on achieving a population of 1000 adults, exclusive of Indians and aliens. In 1883 Regina achieved that requisite population and became an electoral district. William White was elected its representative to the Territorial council.

#### 2. Early Times, Hard Times

But at the beginning of 1883 Regina still had no water supply, no sewers, no indoor plumbing, no paved roads or sidewalks, no fire brigade, no townsite police, and in fact no local government. To provide badly needed fire protection for the hazardously built community, as well as the other necessary municipal services, money and government were required. Public meetings were held in December 1882 which resulted in the formation of a volunteer fire brigade and the election of seven commissioners to perform the functions of a municipal council although there was no statutory basis for a municipal government. The body of seven commissioners was soon changed to an eleven member "citizens' committee" which tried to govern on the basis of voluntary donations of money and time, and the discussion of public issues at public

meetings. Clearly, such an arrangement could only serve as a temporary measure and a petition was submitted to the government asking that Regina be incorporated as a city. Finally, on October 4, 1883, the Territorial Council passed enabling legislation, and on December 8, 1883, Regina was incorporated as a town, the first incorporated town in the North West Territories. (Fig. 19.) Municipal elections were held one month later and David L. Scott, a prominent local lawyer, was declared mayor by acclamation, and four merchants were elected, by open vote of 213 residents, to constitute the town council. The four merchants were John Kerr, James Hambley, John D. Sibbald, and Jacob W. Smith.

The very small number of voters was only partly due to Regina's small population, at that time merely something over one thousand. A major limiting factor was the restrictive nature of the franchise. Only men, unmarried women, and widows who owned property with a minimum assessed value of two hundred dollars were eligible to vote. Official figures for 1901 provide formal confirmation of the influence of these limitations. The Census of Canada for 1901 found a population of 2,249 in Regina. The city's voters list for that year showed only 330 names as eligible voters.8 Another factor which contributed to the voter scarcity was lack of interest. There was during this early period of municipal identity a general apathy among the population towards local elections. Turnouts were low even when seats were contested. In the twenty years between 1885 and 1905 the office of mayor was filled twelve times by acclamation and on four occasions the entire council was elected without any contest. Fifteen different men served as mayor but none of them for more than three years.9 Voting regulations and voter interest would vary through the coming years but one aspect of Regina's council which made its initial appearance with that first election was to become its salient feature throughout most of the city's municipal life. That characteristic of the council was its domination by the businessmen of the city.

As was the case with Winnipeg, Regina's first mayor was a lawyer and all the members of the council were businessmen. It was perhaps inevitable, therefore, that much of the same attitudes and aspirations would motivate the two governments although differences in local circumstances would lead them to express their animus in different ways. Population growth and economic expansion were the imperatives which drove each council. In the case of Winnipeg the first overt, definitive expression of the council's business ethos occurred in 1878-1881 when it successfully wooed the CPR with extravagantly generous offers of subsidies and concessions. Its success in bringing the mainline of the railway to the city was the basis of Winnipeg's subsequent economic hegemony and an affirmation of the appropriateness of its council's business approach to city government. In Regina the council had no part in the location there of the CPR. On the contrary the CPR decided on the location of Regina, and there was at that time no municipal council. Nevertheless it was the business ethos of the council which took advantage of the railway's short-sightedness some twenty years later when Regina became a city which laid the foundation of Regina's subsequent evolution. In 1883, however, Regina was still a crude frontier community and it sought municipal incorporation as the first necessary step in dealing with the problem of an increasing population and no local revenue sources to provide that population with the services it increasingly needed.

Although the Territorial government made some minor grants to the town, property taxes were virtually its only source of income, and the proceeds from that source were meagre. With the establishment of municipal government in the town, the role of the townsite trustees came to an end, and with it the financing that they had provided for such town improvements as the well on South Railway, the bridge and dam across Wascana Creek, the grading of the streets in the townsite, the establishment of the Leader newspaper, etc. More than that, the trustees now refused to pay taxes on the unsold lots which they held in the town. Churches and other public buildings had been

provided with building lots tax-free by the trustees. The CPR's charter exempted them from paying land taxes, and the federal government lay beyond the tax jurisdiction of the municipality. The only property tax revenues readily available to the town were from resident landowners. In 1885, for example, a total of \$2,740 was raised from local residents, while an amount of \$6,523 was levied against absentee landlords, mostly the townsite trustees who refused to recognize the town's taxing authority over them. The town made representations to both the territorial government and the federal government, and entered into lengthy negotiations with the townsite trustees, but it was not until 1889 that a compromise was reached under which the trustees agreed to pay a lump sum of \$14,000 to wipe out its tax arrears and one quarter of the property tax due annually on all the unsold lots which they owned in the townsite.

on the prairies was shaken by events which reverberated throughout the nation. That was the year of the North West rebellion, and the trial and execution of its leader, Louis Riel, in Regina. The town was only moderately affected by the uprising itself. Regina was remote from the scene of the battle at Batoche, some 180 miles to the north, and information about the progress of the action was infrequent and disjointed. The main base of operations was at Qu'Appelle where the troops arriving from the east bivouaced and then proceeded along the Qu'Appelle-Battleford trail. Some troops passed through Regina on their way to other bases at Swift Current and Edmonton, but there was little involvement of Regina in the action, other than that some of the merchants in the town did a lively business in providing rations and supplies for the front.

The publicity generated by the rebellion and its quelling, and by the trial and execution of Riel, did much to focus renewed interest on Regina as a place in which people on the move from eastern Canada and England might settle. It was a compelling demonstration of the primacy of the Anglo-Saxon heritage of the west and of the loyalty of its people to the British crown and British institutions. In addition to the landmark

events which accelerated the local pulse-rate in 1885, the CPR completed its rail line to the Pacific coast on November 7 of that year, raising expectations for increased trade and enterprise. And a start had already been made in May on the grading of the road bed of the first branch railway link out of Regina - the Qu'Appelle, Long Lake and Saskatchewan Railroad and Steamboat Company, which had been incorporated in 1883 with Gilbert R. Pugsley, Lieutenant-Governor Dewdney and William B. Scarth among its directors and principal shareholders. Their prospectus stated that the line would be fully equipped and operational by October, 1885, between Regina and Long Lake, and that it would connect with a steamboat line which would navigate the full length of Long Lake by May 1, 1886. By 1886, however, only twenty miles of track had been laid. Nothing further happened and the line lay abandoned until 1889; lack of capital on the part of the company prevented them from proceeding with the construction. In 1889 the line was leased to the CPR and construction to Prince Albert was completed in 1890. The line, however, proved less remunerative to its investors than had originally been expected. Few settlers took up land between Regina and Saskatoon because the nature of the soil was deemed to be unsuitable for cereal crops.

Nevertheless, all of this activity, together with land that was made available on easy terms to veterans who had volunteered to serve in the Queen's forces during the recent uprising, encouraged a flow of new immigrants into the Regina area. Some of these were Scots who were brought in by the Canada North-West Land Company. But some were Germans who established a small colony near Boggy Creek, about eight miles north-east of Regina, while still other Germans settled in the town itself. Although modest in scale, this was the first significant influx of non-British stock into the population of Regina.

The year 1886 was a bad year for Regina. A severe drought wiped out most of the crop, creating onerous financial hardships in the town. Many farmers left the district, discouraged enough never to return. Many had to eke out a livelihood over the winter

wherever they could find it off the farm. Partly to counter the economic downturn, a Board of Trade was organized, which was formally incorporated two years later, to try to stimulate business activity in the town. The Board saw a significant role for Regina in the near future as a transportation and distribution centre for the surrounding hinterland. Their initial motivation was the urgency of getting a reduction in the railway freight rates to Regina, but they very soon also undertook the task of opening up roads into the interior which they regarded as trade routes bringing in businessmen and customers from places like Wood Mountain, Qu'Appelle, and even Saskatoon. They also were active in promoting and publicizing Regina as an attractive place not only in which to do business but also in which to settle. Their efforts in this regard were fruitful.

More immigrants arrived in Regina in 1889 than in the previous three years combined. There was a total of 480 new arrivals who brought with them some \$95,000 in possessions and cash. Of these 292 were Canadians from the east, 93 were British, 90 were Germans, and 5 were Swedes. 11

Economic conditions improved marginally in the years immediately following the recession of 1886. But 1889 saw another dismal crop; 1890 was much the same. The year 1891 however was a bumper crop year. Forty to forty-five bushels per acre were harvested and confidence and optimism flooded back into the district. The populace and the Board of Trade looked forward to further growth in population in the wake of the improved economy. But next year did not bring better times. The crop of 1892 was bad; that of 1893 was worse. And 1894 was a disaster. There was virtually no moisture; the land was parched and cracked and there was no crop. Even kitchen gardens barely produced a few scrawny vegetables, not enough for the winter food supply. The bumper crop of 1891 had inspired heavy purchases of new farm equipment and animals. The drought of the following years left farmers with an enormous burden of debt, and destitute. Again there was an exodus from the land.

The distress in the countryside had its counterpart in the town. In addition to the economic depression, Regina was hit by an epidemic of typhoid fever in the late summer of 1892. Sanitary arrangements in the town were extremely primitive. Some sewers had been installed in 1891 and 1892 which had drained the largest stagnant pools but there were still numerous small cesspools left standing. It was not uncommon for excreta, even that of typhoid victims, to be thrown on refuse piles in backyards. Conditions in the eastern sector of Regina, known as "Germantown" were even worse than in other parts of town, aggravated as they were by poverty, overcrowding, poorly constructed dwellings, and the keeping of animals such as pigs in the yards. The whole town "was served by a single scavenger whose filthy, stinking cart was dumped at the edge of the town without any attempt to destroy the putrid refuse." 12 There was no public hospital in the district. The nearest one was a long way off, in Medicine Hat, 280 miles to the west. In Regina there was only a small private hospital which served for only a brief period and then closed. The majority of the sick were cared for in their own homes. And there was the abiding problem of the mud. In the dry years the quagmire disappeared, but even so its memory and reputation clung. In seasons when it did rain the town was turned into a bog and the downtown area was the boggiest. Vehicles got mired and could not move; pedestrians had to lift, with painstaking, slow-motion movements, one high topped rubber-boot-clad foot after another out of the clutching, glutinous gumbo.

Although there were no crimes of violence, misdemeanours and minor crimes such as drunkenness, rowdyism, petty thievery, property damage, and prostitution were on the increase. There was no constable to deal with these infractions and the Mounted Police regarded them as lying outside of their responsibilities. Mayor Richard H. Williams, (1888-89), wanted to hire a constable but popular opinion was opposed to spending the money for this purpose, preferring to subscribe to the polite fiction that Regina was one of the most law-abiding, moral and religious towns in the land and there

was no need for a policeman. Three years later, however, conditions reached the point where even the blind eye of self-proclaimed virtue could no longer shut out the light of reality, and in July, 1892, James Williams, former corporal in the Mounted Police, was appointed Regina's first town constable.

A serious fire had swept through Regina on March 15, 1890, in which no lives were lost but which levelled an entire business block on South Railway. It took a force of most of the townspeople and some eighty Mounties three hours to quench the flames, using primitive equipment like hand-pumps, buckets of water, and wet blankets. The town council proposed a money by-law to buy proper fire-fighting equipment but the frugal voters turned it down. Again, in 1892 there was another major fire, which was only brought under control after causing extensive destruction of property. Again the council asked for approval to spend money on fire-fighting equipment and again the voters defeated the by-law. It was to be some years yet before the stinting, cautious taxpayers of Regina were to acknowledge the need for fire-fighting equipment as they had finally acknowledged the need for a town constable.

Public health problems were endemic and serious outbreaks of disease were recurrent. In 1896 the town was struck by an epidemic of scarlet fever. There were several deaths but there was no public health agency or officer with authority to impose the necessary control measures. The east end - "Germantown" - was particularly hard hit. The council could no longer sit idly by and simply allow the ravaging of the community's health to take its toll. They passed by-laws enabling the imposition and enforcement of a quarantine and appointing Dr. David Low as Medical Health Officer. Without a hospital, however, these measures were only marginally effective. The Victorian Order of Nurses was at that time in process of being organized nationally to commemorate Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee and at a public meeting in May, 1897, Regina's support of the Order was committed and a local branch of the Order was

subsequently established. In the fall of 1898 a cottage hospital was opened at the corner of Hamilton Street and 13th Avenue.

In 1890 Peter Lamont, book-store owner and agent for the Bell Telephone Company, together with thirteen others, among whom were included a number of Mounted Police officers, had incorporated the Electric Light and Power Company, to provide electric lights in the town. The town council had given the company the exclusive right to erect their plant, valued at some twenty thousand dollars, and the company initially supplied electricity to about a thousand bulbs. The first lights were turned on on November 20, but these were all indoors. It was some time before council decided that street lights might be desirable, and they installed ten street lights in the central area of the town which were turned on only on Saturday nights. In 1892 the Electric Light and Power Company was sold to Gerald Spring-Rice.

Gerald Spring-Rice had come from Cumberland, England, in the spring of 1887 and had settled on Cottonwood Creek just south of Pense. He was the grandson of Lord Mounteagle. For a while he was joined by his brothers Bernard and Cecil. Cecil later was the British ambassador to Washington, a post in which he served with distinction. Spring-Rice established a flourishing farm with all the accoutrements one might expect to find on a noble family estate in England - an impressive home, stables, smithy, excellent productive land, the best stock, servants. He and his wife lived there for some twenty-five years, were highly successful, worked unremittingly to improve the quality of farm life in the district, and lent a manorial air to Regina and its surroundings. In 1892 Gerald Spring-Rice became the owner of the Electric Light and Power Company.

In 1903, Spring-Rice as owner of the electric utility advised the town council that because of the growth of Regina his power plant required extensive improvement and enlargement. He was prepared to finance the work himself, but if he were to do so he would require a twenty-year monopoly of the franchise, otherwise he was prepared to sell the plant to the town at a negotiated price. The need for increased power supply was

urgent both for the enlarged residential population and for the growing number of business establishments. Mayor Jacob Smith was in favour of the town acquiring the plant and public opinion generally supported the idea.

The town's chronic water shortage was becoming an evermore pressing problem as its population grew. A solution which had been discussed over a number of years was to bring water in by pipeline from Boggy Creek, about eight miles north-east of the town. That source seemed to contain enough water to meet the town's needs well into the future. It was not only a matter of potable water for the town's residents but also one of an adequate volume of water for industrial and commercial uses and for fire fighting.

Driven by the need for services and utilities and drawing confidence from the steady growth of its population, the town was now at the point where it felt it must have the status of a city, not merely to raise its prestige to make it more appealing to immigrants and investors but to increase its borrowing and financing powers. James B. Hawkes, member of the Territorial Legislature for South Regina introduced the appropriate bill. It was passed unanimously and Regina became a city on June 19, 1903.

### 3. The First City Council and the Business Connection

The city council in 1903 consisted of the mayor and six aldermen. The mayor was Jacob W. Smith, a retail merchant whose business extended back to the early days of the town. The aldermen were J.F. "Frank" Bole, Frank N. Darke, James Grassick, Henry W. Laird, Edward McCarthy, and Robert Sinton.

These men were all - or nearly all - retail merchants, some with additional entrepreneurial interests, and one whose fortunes lay in real-estate and warehousing.

They were all businessmen in a small but burgeoning prairie community and all of them were enthralled by the prospect that Regina would become a great industrial city in the

foreseeable future. Nor was that prospect entirely groundless and merely the fantasy of a small-town mentality overblown by its own personal success. Certainly they were successful. Even as early as 1902 businesses were blossoming and there was the aroma of success in the air. Much of this excitement and optimism could be attributed to the efforts of the Board of Trade. Through the medium of the Board of Trade the businessmen of the town were an extremely effective advocacy group. More that that, they had been able to establish a dominant presence in the political life of the town and in the membership of its council.

In 1903 the CPR built the Arcola line - a branch line running south-east to Stoughton, Carlyle and Arcola; and in 1904 there were strong indications that the Canadian Northern Railway was about to build a line from one of its points in western Manitoba - probably Hartney - to Regina. The railway in that era was the generator of life and prosperity: where the railway stopped a community sprang up and flourished; where the railway only touched or passed by there could be no civic community. The growing importance of Regina as a railway centre raised high hopes and led the Regina Leader to enthuse that "Another line of railway will make Regina's position as the distribution and wholesale centre of the Territories secure and permanent." On the strength of the Canadian Northern Railway expectation

The Board of Trade lost no time in pressing the federal government to provide the necessary bond guarantees and urging the municipal authorities to deal fairly and generously with the company in the matter of a site for station, yards and terminal facilities.<sup>14</sup>

Regina, then, was experiencing a vigorous growth of its population and its economy and the soaring, expansionist enthusiasm of its business leaders was fed and sustained by that growth.

In 1901 Regina's population was 2,249. Economic conditions had been improving slowly since the end of the drought in 1896. By the turn of the century crop

yields were much greater, but the price of wheat was still depressed. Freight traffic was down; so was construction. Unemployment was still prevalent. Population growth was meagre. Nevertheless, conditions were gradually improving and by 1902 the improvement began to accelerate markedly. Several businesses expanded and new ones were established including a branch of the Imperial Bank. New homes were being constructed. Real-estate values moved upward: farm land on the outskirts of the town rose in value to thirty dollars per acre. In 1903 a government report revealed that for the preceding six years the Regina-Moose Jaw District had had the highest average crop yields in the Territories. Another report revealed that the Regina section had had more homestead entries than all the others. The value of new building construction rose to half a million dollars. In 1903 there were five banks in the town. Regina was made a chief customs port that year and its revenues in trade and customs grew to be second only to that of Winnipeg in the entire west. 15

In addition to the improvement in the crops as a factor contributing to Regina's rising fortunes was the granting of local distributing rates to the town by the CPR - "traders rates" as they were called - in 1902, and special rates on farm implements. This meant that it was cheaper for eastern manufacturers to ship their goods to Regina and from there to the ultimate consumer than it was to ship to Winnipeg and from there to the consumer. Prior to the changes shipment to Winnipeg and distribution from there had been more economic. The rates were changed again in 1907 to favour Winnipeg once more: the rates into Regina remained unchanged but rates for freight distributed out of Regina were raised thus giving Winnipeg a renewed advantage. The rates were equalized again in 1911 after the Saskatchewan Government became involved on behalf of the cities of Regina and Moose Jaw and the issue was taken to the Supreme Court. Freight rates continued thereafter to be the subject of continuing controversy and litigation and a continuing factor in western alienation.

The changes in the rates in 1902 had an immediate effect. New railway warehouses were constructed for storing and forwarding freight, and the multi-national farm implement corporations such as Massey-Harris, Case and International began to build their own warehouses. Wheat prices rose steadily, transportation costs declined, immigration increased dramatically and a feeling of optimism prevailed throughout the area. Between 1901 and 1916 some seventy-three million acres of prairie land were settled in the Territories.

Thanks to the immigration which was flooding into the prairies at this time, Regina had become second only to Winnipeg as the portal through which this vast flow of people streamed on their way to their ultimate destinations. A tide of Americans surged up from the mid-western states drawn by cheap land and favourable legislation and impelled by the fact that nearly all the land on the American side had by that time already been taken up. The Saskatchewan Valley Land Company was organized to bring Americans up to settle the lands along the Qu'Appelle, Long Lake and Saskatchewan line to Saskatoon - the land which had remained largely unpopulated because the soil was regarded by British and European settlers as unsuitable for growing wheat. American farmers were skilled and experienced dry land farmers and knew how to manage under those conditions. Generally these immigrants had to pass through Regina on their way to wherever they were going and many decided to stay in Regina instead of proceeding farther. Newcomers from eastern Canada, Britain and Europe continued to arrive as well and the population continued to grow. In 1901 Regina's population was 2,249. In 1906 it had expanded to 6,169, an increase of 174.3 percent; by 1911 it had mushroomed to 30,213, an increase of 1219 percent over the 1901 population figure.

The years from the turn of the century to the economic depression of 1913 were indeed boom years for Regina. Table 14 illustrates the magnitude of the boom in terms of annual value of building permits from 1904 to 1912. Behind these progressively ballooning figures (except for the temporary deflation in 1907 to 1909) lie the stories

of the rapid accumulation of a number of personal and family fortunes. A large part of this good fortune fell to those who were directly involved in the building and development process: builders, contractors, real-estate interests and providers of financial services. For example, in 1908 there were 37 real estate companies in Regina; in 1912, at the height of the boom there were 158. In 1908 there were 5 fire insurance companies in Regina; in 1912 there were 69; and over the same period the number of loan companies increased from 16 to 82.<sup>16</sup>

Before the 1900's the most prominent group in the business and political life of the town were the retail merchants. This was not surprising in view of the fact that there was little other business activity. Industry was underdeveloped. In 1891 there were 28 manufacturing firms in Regina, including the Regina Milling Company. Altogether these firms employed a total of 88 employees - an average of just over three employees per firm. In 1901, the Regina Creamery Company, founded in 1896, had been added to the manufacturing group, but no firm had more than five employees. 17 Wholesaling and retailing were rudimentary. Construction was small-scale. The railway was an important employer, but its clerical and labour personnel had a limited public interest and provided no public figures. The town's function as capital of the Territories employed a civil service staff of only thirty-four. 18 The Mounted Police were still a very visible group in the community and in its social life but took no part in its organized political life. Retail merchants on the other hand had a vested interest in promoting the expansion of the retail market. They were a coherent group in terms of both their economic concerns and the physical proximity to one another of their places of business. Undoubtedly there was visiting among them and they exchanged ideas and viewpoints. And as a group they probably had the greatest contact with the public of any group in town. In the period 1904 to 1913, businessmen held seventy-five of the total of ninety-eight seats on the council (including that of mayor) which were open for election during those ten years. 19 Professional men, mostly lawyers and doctors, held

most of the remaining seats. Trades and labour interests were not represented. The Regina Board of Trade was the organization which embraced all sectors of the business community, and it was inevitable that there should be close ties between that organization and the city council. It was not uncommon for Board of Trade members to attend meetings of the city council and undoubtedly private discussions were held between the members of the two bodies. The Board continuously made suggestions to the council on a variety of subjects such as road-paving, sidewalks, sewer and water services, building programs, public health, business incentives, transportation, etc. Board of Trade members from time to time were included in city delegations which were sent to represent the city's interests on matters of economic development. One such instance occurred in 1904 when a joint delegation went to Winnipeg to try to persuade the Canadian Northern Railway to build into Regina. Another occasion occurred in 1909 when the Ogilvie Flour Mills were lobbied to locate in the city. The city council for its part supported the Board with financial grants. In 1905 council approved a grant of \$5,000 towards a Board campaign to advertise the city. larger grants were made on succeeding occasions until they amounted to \$25,000 in each of 1912 and 1913.

The Board and the city council both pursued the goal of growth and development of the city. The Board even created a variety of committees within its organization which paralleled the departments and the objectives of the civic government.

Occupational similarities and a degree of overlapping membership ensured that there was a considerable degree of familiarity and agreement over civic policy while the similarity evident in committee structure facilitated continuity for those individuals who alternated between board of trade positions and aldermanic seats. Still, the two bodies were not identical, and, at least in theory were constituted for widely divergent purposes. Despite obvious similarities in viewpoint, city council members were charged with wider social responsibilities, and their receptiveness to board of trade influence, at least for public appearances, were tied to the board's submissions before council.<sup>20</sup>

The Board of Trade had been organized in 1886, a year of crop failure and economic depression, for the purpose of trying to stimulate the local economy, and it undertook as one of its major objectives the achievement of favourable railway freight rates for Regina. But it was soon realized that although the freight rates issue was critical, so was the opening of roads into the hinterland where lay a potential new market, and the promotion of new railway lines to serve the town, as necessary measures if Regina was to grow and assume a leading role in the economic life of the Territories. Mayor Dan Mowat, in convening a meeting of the town's businessmen in 1886, with a view to organizing a Board of Trade, explained

[T]hat recent correspondence published in the Leader respecting the CPR freight rates and the recent action of the Board of Trade, Winnipeg, had stirred up many of the merchants here to consider the advisability of forming a Board. Union was strength, and the merchants if united in an association could do more for the trade and commercial prosperity of Regina than by working singly for their own success.<sup>21</sup>

Quite properly, the concern of the Board was seen to be the "trade and commercial prosperity of Regina." But the trade and commercial prosperity of the town was not entirely within the competence of the business community to determine. To a much greater degree it was contingent upon the economic prosperity of the region which was almost completely dependent upon the wheat crop and the price of wheat; and it was also influenced by the decisions of the town council. Unfortunately because of the crop failure and the depressed economy in 1886 and the subsequent years, the Board was able to accomplish relatively little in practical terms, and because of the shortage of public funds the council was unable to undertake any significant public works. With the improvement of economic conditions in 1896, however, the Board became very active and after the turn of the century it was brimming with aggressive energy and confidence in its role as the driving force in the development of Regina.

The businessmen were well aware of the linkage between the trade and commercial prosperity of the town and the political decision-making power of the town council, and for the municipal election of 1901 they were poised to meld the two. In that year retail merchant Jacob W. Smith was the president of the Board of Trade, and, at a later date, in describing the role of the Board in that election he recalled:

We had come to the conclusion that the town was not moving ahead as it should be so we determined to draw up a slate, to elect men into the Council who would look after its interests in a business-like way. The Board selected a strong council and honoured me with their nomination for the mayoralty.<sup>22</sup>

Jacob Smith was elected mayor and most of the Board's candidates were elected to the council. The election of this council was widely regarded as a progressive step in the affairs of the town. The <u>Leader</u> viewed it as Regina's most important election and observed:

The advocates of a forward policy in Regina's municipal affairs have the satisfaction of knowing that a Mayor and Council were elected on Monday likely to adopt such a policy.<sup>23</sup>

Although the Board members were addressing the issues of freight rates and hinterland market expansion, they knew that the town could not attract new businesses until it had an adequate infrastructure of services and utilities. The council was also well aware of this, as well as the fact that the general population of the town was suffering seriously from their lack despite Regina's dramatic advances in population and economic growth, it was clearly perceived by the businessmen and by the city council that the city could make little real progress without an adequate and reliable supply of both electricity and water and the council moved to secure those resources. In 1903 the council submitted two by-laws for the approval of the burgesses: one was for the public acquisition and ownership of the electric power system, to be purchased from Gerald Spring-Rice, the other was for the construction of a water-supply system to bring

water to Regina from Boggy Creek. Both by-laws were approved with overwhelming majorities: only four votes were recorded against them. The City of Regina is still the owner of these utilities.

John Galt, a Toronto engineer, was engaged to examine the water-supply concept and to prepare a plan. He found that because of artesians and other well sources the Boggy Creek scheme could provide an adequate supply of water for a population of fifteen thousand. Tenders were called in December 1903 for the construction of the project. Work began in June 1904, and the system was completed to Regina early in 1905.

## 4. Regina the Capital of Saskatchewan

The council of the North West Territories had been brought into being by the North West Territories Act of 1875. The Act provided for an appointed council initially, but one elected member could be added to the council from each electoral district when the district met certain population and area criteria. The Act further provided that the appointed council would be replaced by an elected Legislative Assembly whenever the number of elected members on the council reached twenty-one. The Territorial council with its vestigial trappings of colonialism was becoming increasingly unpopular and although the number of elected representatives had not yet reached the required number of twenty-one, the Dominion Government nevertheless created an elected Legislative Assembly for the Territories in 1888. The Executive of the Assembly, however, was still appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor, and over the next nine years, the elected legislature was embroiled in a continuous struggle with the Lieutenant-Governor over the appointment and control of the Executive.

On October 1, 1897, Ottawa gave full responsible government to the North West Territories: authority over the appointment and control of the Executive was transferred from the Lieutenant-Governor to the elected representatives of the people, the majority group in the Assembly under Frederick Haultain. With that victory, territorial interest turned to the issue of provincial status. On that question, however, there was no

difference of opinion, no narrow partisanship. Pressure for provincial status came from all quarters. The population of the Territories grew fairly rapidly in the late 1890's, and with that population increase came an increase in the demand for public services. Financing of road construction, schools, prairie fire fighting, etc. came from the Territorial budget which, however, was supplemented by substantial subsidies from Ottawa. Expansion of territorial services would require changes in the per capita grant system which was the basis of the federal-provincial financial arrangements. The premiers of the existing provinces of the Dominion were vehement in their opposition to any changes which would reduce their benefits under those arrangements. The Territories had no leverage with Ottawa against the provinces. The Territories, furthermore, were under a further handicap. They had no power to borrow money. They also had no power to charter railways, and the development of branch lines into the interior was among the most promising means of increasing trade and expanding the territorial economy. Only provincial status would enable the territories to make their case for subsidy changes from a position of equality with the other provinces. Without such status the opposition of the provinces would persist forever, and successfully. And only with provincial status would other sources of financing for public works become available, and new avenues for economic growth be opened up. The facts were patently clear, and the argument reasonable. There were no dissenting voices to be heard anywhere in the Territories.

The issue entered the realm of federal politics. Robert Borden, head of the Conservative Party, promised, in 1902, to support provincial status for the Territories. Wilfrid Laurier, leader of the Liberal government in Ottawa, gave a similar promise in the lead-up to the federal election of 1904. Laurier won the 1904 election and early in 1905 created the provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta. Regina (Fig. 20.) and Edmonton were named the provisional capitals respectively, subject to subsequent confirmation by the provincial legislatures. Walter Scott, now the owner of

the Regina Leader (which was now a Liberal Party supporter) and an eminent member of the Liberal Party was invited to form the government in Saskatchewan, and Alexander Rutherford, also a Liberal, was invited to form the government of Alberta. Both were to call the first provincial elections, set up the civil service, and make the necessary suitable patronage appointments. Provincial elections were held in both provinces in 1905. Liberal governments were returned in both cases and thus the provincial structure together with the prevailing two-party political system was established across the Dominion.

In 1903 there occurred another event which was as critical for Regina's subsequent development as its achievement of city status, or the acquisition of an adequate power and water supply. Although the dispute over the taxes payable to the town by the CPR, the government, and the townsite trustees had been settled in 1889, the tax revenues which could be collected by the town continued to be grossly insufficient for its needs. For example, in February of 1902 the town's financial statement showed an overdraft of \$12,503, and in March the overdraft was \$11,366. The town had continued to press the federal government for payment on the unsold lands in the townsite until finally the government moved to resolve the issue. In 1903 Ottawa agreed to transfer to the municipality its share of the lands held by the three-way partnership. On the basis of the agreement between the partners this meant fifty percent of the holdings. Altogether 167 blocks containing over 4000 lots were transferred from the federal government to Regina. These blocks comprised three main groupings. The largest group was located north of the CPR tracks, bounded by Albert Street on the west, Winnipeg Street on the east and 4th Avenue on the north. It contained 72 blocks. The second group, containing 48 blocks, was in the south-east quarter of the city; and the third group, containing 47 blocks, was in the west-central section of the city and lay on both sides of the railway right-of-way. Also included in the transfer were some

scattered lots lying between South Railway and Victoria Avenue in the vicinity of Broad Street.

The achievement of city status and the acquisition of some 4000 city lots by virtue of the federal land-grant were two epochal events in the shaping of Regina's development. A third event was yet to occur which would also be a powerful influence on the nature and role of the evolving city. That event was the establishment of Regina as the capital of Saskatchewan. When Laurier created the Province of Saskatchewan in 1905 he designated Regina as the provincial capital, (Fig. 20.) but final confirmation of that position was the prerogative of the provincial legislature. There were a number of challenges to Regina for the coveted role of provincial capital - Moose Jaw, Battleford, Fort Qu'Appelle, Humboldt, Prince Albert all presented themselves as candidates. The strongest challenger, however, was Saskatoon. On May 23, 1906, the Saskatchewan legislature voted overwhelmingly in favour of Regina as the capital.

# PHASE 2: WAREHOUSING AND LANDSCAPING - PLANNING WITHOUT PLANNING

# 1. Railways. Spur Tracks and the Warehouse District Development

With its arrival at the status of a city and as the capital of the Province of Saskatchewan, Regina crossed into the realm of full-fledged cityhood; and with its acquisition of a vast amount of land within the city's boundaries as a grant from the federal government it had a formidable instrument with which to carry out the responsibilities of its new office. The railway still loomed in the minds of the city council and the Board of Trade as the generator of economic life whose presence was essential for metropolitan growth and economic development. And indeed the validity of that conviction was demonstrated by the very existence of the city. The CPR had created Regina and was the underlying reason for its progress. That being the case, further

growth and prosperity were inescapably contingent upon further railway service to the city, and the leaders of the community applied themselves to the pursuit of additional lines. The Canadian Northern and the Grand Trunk Pacific were their targets, as well as branch lines of the CPR to radiate north and south from the city.

The CPR, in 1903, had completed its Arcola line south to Portal at the American border, but the Canadian Northern's expected line to Regina from Hartney had not materialized. Despite the lobbying of the council and the Board of Trade there was no movement of the Canadian Northern until 1908. In that year the federal government implemented its long-anticipated assistance program to that company and the line to Regina was constructed. The CPR, in 1890, had taken a lease of the Qu'Appelle, Long Lake and Saskatchewan line from Regina to Prince Albert but the venture had not proved as profitable as had been expected and in 1906 the railway was sold to the Canadian Northern. With the completion of the Canadian Northern's main line to Regina in 1908 there was thus established a continuous connection from Winnipeg and the east through Regina to Prince Albert, and Regina's commercial hinterland was thereby greatly expanded. But this, satisfactory as it was in itself, was still not enough. The Grand Trunk Pacific Railway had proposed to construct a branch line from Yorkton to Regina. but by 1908 no work had as yet been started. The Regina Board of Trade protested to the Board of Railway Commissioners and demanded that unless construction proceeded without delay the company's charter not be renewed. The Board of Railway Commissioners however granted the railway an extension of two years. In fact construction began in 1909 and was completed to Regina in 1911 and the city began negotiations immediately for the erection of new terminal facilities for both the Canadian Northern and the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway. In 1912, then, at the height of Regina's boom, the city was being served by all three transcontinental railway lines.

The city in its pursuit of the railway lines was not unmindful of another component of the transportation system, without which the system was badly flawed and

could not function properly. That component was the spur tracks needed to carry the flow of commerce back and forth between the main lines and the warehouses or other places of business where goods were received and dispatched. It seemed a natural assumption on the part of the city that the spur tracks would be part of the railway's comprehensive transportation system and that the railway companies would build the spur tracks. The city council accordingly put such a proposal to the CPR but to their great surprise the CPR were not interested. The CPR's rejection of the spur track proposal dealt the city a double blow. Spur tracks were a critical necessity if new industries were to be attracted to Regina. The railway's refusal to build them struck at the very heart of the city's economic development aspirations. But it also delivered a stunning thump to another of the council's goals, a goal that was related to its over-all economic ambitions but which had overtones of a new emerging role for the city council. That emerging new role was the planning role, or at any rate the role of consciously and deliberately controlling the use of land as a future-oriented policy of city council. Up to this point the course of Regina's development had been determined in large measure by others, principally the CPR and the federal, territorial and provincial governments. Now, with the acquisition of over 4,000 lots in the city through the federal land-grant the Regina city council was suddenly in the position of being able to direct its own course of development through the control of the sale and use of these lands.

Perhaps this is putting too broad an interpretation on the council's approach to the newly-acquired lands. The council was certainly not interested in the comprehensive planning of the city. Their objective was much more modest and narrowly focused. Their goal was simply to attract new industry to Regina and they saw in the granted lands an opportunity to do so. This opportunity lay in the fact that the largest of the three groupings - 72 blocks - which made up the total of 167 blocks of lots transferred to the city was bounded on its southern edge by the CPR yard and mainline. In those days the railway was the only mode of transport which carried

freight and any business which required goods or materials or equipment for its operations, or which dispatched its products, depended entirely on the railway for these freight transport services.

The CPR had constructed few sidings for unloading and few buildings for the storage of merchandise. It had set up its buildings so that its station faced south onto South Railway while its freight handling facilities faced north onto Dewdney and onto the city's land grant. Moreover, the buildings had been sited in such a way that the CPR had virtually no more land onto which its freight operations could be expanded.<sup>24</sup> There was grumbling among local merchants about the poor condition of the CPR freight yard and about the railway's system of dispatching freight. The railway allowed merchandise to accumulate until the pile was large enough to be delivered most economically in a single delivery round. From the merchants' point of view this was unsatisfactory. They wanted their goods delivered regularly as they arrived at the freight yard.<sup>25</sup> When the merchants protested to J.W. Leonard, General Manager of the Western Division of the CPR, he told them it was up to the merchants themselves to provide the additional teams of dray horses to load and deliver the merchandise. He was at pains to point out that most of the available warehouse space was taken up by large farm implements held as bonded merchandise and waiting to be forwarded beyond Regina. The strained relationships between the community and the CPR were clearly revealed in Leonard's exasperated comment that "The CPR was almost inclined to regret that they had made Regina a distributing point."26

The city council nevertheless was determined to attract new industry and believed they were in a favourable position to do so given that the 72 blocks of grant lands in the north-east sector of the city fronted on the CPR freight yard and mainline, and that the CPR lacked any further property for expansion of its freight services and, moreover, seemed to have no inclination towards such expansion. Clearly, then, the city had a virtual monopoly on the lands which could be served by the railway for industrial

uses. Prospects for the location of new industries in Regina were bright and the city set out to make the most of its virtually exclusive ownership of the only land in Regina suitable for that purpose. They decided that these 72 blocks in the north-east sector of the city would be developed as a warehouse district.

In addition to providing the means of pursuing the city's economic development aspirations, the land-grant windfall could not have come at a more opportune time to serve the city's financial needs. Regina was desperately in need of revenues to finance its acquisition of the Electric Light and Power Company plant, the construction of the Boggy Creek water supply system, as well as the civic improvements such as underground sewers, sidewalks, street paving, etc., some of which had already been begun but for which much larger programs were badly needed. The land-grant of 167 blocks comprised not only the 72 blocks in the north-east sector of the city but also 48 blocks in the south-east sector and 47 blocks in the west-central sector. All of these lands represented a rich source of potential income. Their sale would bring in critically needed monies both in terms of the purchase price and the ongoing tax revenues, and the city council adopted a program of land sales. The land would be sold by two methods - by auction and by direct sale to the purchaser on the open market. In both cases, however, council would exercise control over the uses to which the lands were to be put, and the council established three categories of uses - industrial (which included wholesale and warehouse uses), residential, and public and quasi-public uses such as parks, schools, churches, playing fields, civic institutions, etc. Certain parcels of land had been designated as public reserves by the federal government which prohibited their sale and preserved them exclusively for public open space, and this caveat continued to apply to those parcels after the land was transferred to the city.

From the outset the council's primary interest was focused on the industrial lands, while the others, that is the residential and public, were only of secondary interest to them. There are a number of possible explanations for this bias. Since

industrial development was council's main goal it seems logical that the industrial lands would have their first attention. It may also have been because large tracts of land designated for residential development were already in the hands of private developers and the council did not want to become a major competitor against them. As for commercial uses, none of the blocks which Regina acquired from the federal government was located advantageously in relation to the emerging commercial core of the city.

Strict regulations were established for the sale of land for industrial purposes. Before selling a site the city required that the prospective purchaser describe in some detail the nature of the business and the type and cost of any buildings to be erected on the property. The applicant was further required to give an undertaking that he would carry on the business for a minimum of five years before re-selling the property. Only principals of the proposed business were dealt with by the council in the negotiating process. Applications from speculators or developers (as opposed to owner-occupiers) were not considered.<sup>27</sup>

Another measure of control was exercised by the city through its pricing policy. In this the city sought to maintain the price of the industrial lands low enough to attract buyers but high enough to bring an acceptable return. General economic conditions and the demand for land determined the asking price which council set. For example, in 1905 the price of a 25 foot lot was set at \$100. In the following year it was raised to \$200. The period 1905-1910 was one of steady if modest demand and the price remained unchanged, except that in 1910 the price for corner lots was increased. The years 1911-1912 however were boom years in Regina and the price of all industrial lands was increased dramatically. By mid-1911 the price of a 25 foot lot had escalated to \$1,000, and that of a corner lot of equivalent size had zoomed to \$1,500. Prices remained at these levels until the end of 1913, but 1913, brought severe economic recession and the price was sharply reduced very early in 1914.<sup>28</sup>

The council also held out certain bonuses as a means of luring new industries to Regina. Inducements such as tax exemption for ten years, sites to be bought at below market value, or even free of charge, and utilities at reduced rates were offered. This practice was pursued for a relatively brief period: it was discontinued after 1904. But while it was in effect it was successful in attracting such enterprises as the Regina Malting and Brewing Co. Ltd., the Regina Planing Mill Co; and the Western Manufacturing Co.<sup>29</sup>

Council's driving aspiration was to establish Regina as the premier metropolis west of Winnipeg and it was firmly convinced that this could only be accomplished by attracting industry to the city. If give-aways were necessary to achieve that goal, then they were prepared to take that course. In this they had the support of some sectors of the public and of the Board of Trade. These attitudes are clearly evident in various opinions expressed at that time. For example, the council had been approached by a brewing company in 1904 with a proposal to locate in Regina if the city would give the company a free site and tax exemption. The council was hesitant about such concessions because although there was some approval for them among the general public, that approval was not universal. The company persisted and amended its request to an unlimited supply of water free of charge. Mayor Laird, in addressing the council on the issue, pointed out that "They had before them a proposition that would advertise the place and benefit the country...." Furthermore,

His Worship drew attention to the policy the Council had declared when elected, namely to make Regina a manufacturing city. At present they had not even the nucleus of a manufacture to give the city an impetus.<sup>30</sup>

Certain enclaves of the population supported the principle of bonusing. At a ratepayers meeting called to discuss the proposed concessions, a Mr. Bert Friel contended that

There was only one thing to make a city and that was its manufactures. If a city depended on a farming community to develop it, it was bound to attain a certain size and stop there.<sup>31</sup>

In March 1905 the Board of Trade submitted to the council a recommendation that the council consider further bonuses to new industries. The council replied:

[T]hat the Board be advised that this Council are at all times ready to entertain all or any definite proposition(s) for the establishing of manufacturing or industrial enterprises and that this Council would be glad to be advised of any such proposition that the Board may have ....<sup>32</sup>

No bonuses were offered between 1905 and 1913, but in 1913, with the onset of the economic recession, the device was revived as a measure which might help the local economy and it did in fact succeed in attracting two new companies - Maurice B. Steine and the Western Tire and Rubber Co.<sup>33</sup> The provincial government, however, recognized the danger inherent in the practice, not only in terms of the potential misuse and market distortions within the bonusing municipality itself, but also in terms of the potential destructive competition among municipalities, and passed legislation in 1914 prohibiting the practice.

These measures were all pursued for the dual purpose of attracting industries to Regina and ensuring that those industries were all located on sites in the north-east sector of the city - north of the CPR and east of Albert Street - in order to create a warehouse industrial district there. But even with the use of such devices, the council's hopes could not be realized without a spur-track system to serve the industrial properties and the effort to create such a system occupied much of the council's attention at the same time as it was proceeding with these other measures. In 1903 the city had proposed to the CPR that the railway provide spur-tracks but the CPR had rejected the proposal and their Western Division manager, J.W. Leonard, had expressed his annoyance with the city. The city continued to press its interest, but the CPR was not moved to change its decision or its attitude. In 1905 Alderman Peter McAra, Jr.,

complained that "Trade was being banished from Regina owing to the refusal of the Canadian Pacific Railway to grant any facilities in the way of warehouse sites." Even as late as the Spring of 1907 the city clerk of Regina reported to a meeting of the Board of Trade that the city had still not been able to get any spur-tracks from the CPR.

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There may have been some dispute over the question of whether spur-track services were the responsibility of the national railway system or the municipal government as part of its warehouse district development program. In any case, in the face of the railway's adamant refusal, the city decided to take the matter into its own hands. In January 1907 the council instructed the city engineer to prepare a comprehensive plan for a spur-track system, and two months later submitted the plan to the CPR. The CPR rejected it. In October 1908 the plan was submitted to the Board of Railway Commissioners who, it was hoped, would approve it and direct the CPR to comply. At the same time the city decided to take action against the railway on a number of issues. One of these was the collection of arrears of taxes on CPR lands not being used for railway purposes. Another was the need for subway construction under the railway right-of-way for north-south street access.

Less than two months later, and before these issues even were considered, an agreement was reached in December, under which the city would provide a central spur located in the mid-block lanes. The industries which bought sites in these blocks paid an annual rental fee for the spur of 17 cents per frontage foot and made their own arrangements with the CPR for any additional equipment they might require such as switches, buffers, etc.<sup>35</sup> The city then withdrew its submission to the Railway Commissioners.

Perhaps the most notable feature of the city council's program for the development of the warehouse district was the control of the sale of lots in an orderly progression outward from the railway line. The first lots to be sold were those immediately adjacent to the railway line. When these were all gone another tier of lots

for sale was introduced adjacent to the first, and so on. There was no leap-frogging or scatteration. Control over this outward movement of development was exercised through the successive extension of services, street paving, and spur tracks. This system of staging ensured the maximum economy in the cost of providing these installations. It also ensured that the warehouse district gradually flowed northward from the tracks in a planned and orderly fashion.

In a sense this measure of development control may be regarded as an exercise in municipal planning. And it happened even though there was no provincial planning statute, and Regina had no development plan or zoning by-law, and the city council in all probability was even only dimly aware of the concept of town planning. It happened because the city owned the land, and the city council was anxious to do whatever it could to attract new industry and at the same time to be as economical as possible in the capital outlays for the services needed to create that industrial attraction. Their behaviour in fact was simply that of any ambitious and prudent entrepreneur pursuing a long-range program of business expansion. They were concerned only with the development of the city's business sector and applied their control measures only to it. The rest of the city's development they were content to allow to follow its own course, believing, no doubt, that if all were well with the warehouse district and the business community, all would inevitably be well with the city as a whole.

This inclination of the council was apparent in the looser regulation of the sale of lots for residential and public purposes. The lots sold for residential use were located in all three sectors of the federal land grant. The first of these sales was in a thirteen-block cluster in the north-east sector around Hamilton, Scarth and Albert Streets in the warehouse district. They were fitted in among the industrial properties, a practice which would come to be frowned upon by later standard planning and zoning practices. The second was in the west-central sector, on both sides of the railway, between Albert Street and Elphinstone. And the third was in the south-east sector between Scarth and

Winnipeg Streets and 12th and 16th Avenues. The council's actions in regard to these residential lot sales, however, were not entirely arbitrary and in contradiction of their policies for the industrial lots. They maintained the practice of staged extension of utilities and services, and they required permits for the construction of all buildings.<sup>36</sup>

There may have been some rationale for the sale of residential lots in the north-east warehouse district. These lots were sold in 1905 and 1906. At that time Hamilton Street was the only street crossing the CPR and was the only connection between the north side of the city and the south side. It was a main thoroughfare and homes on or near it had ready access to both the industrial area and the business section of the city. The industrial area and the downtown were important employment centres and workers living on the lots in this location were within easy walking distance of their work place. However, the increased demand for industrial lots after 1905 and the availability of other residential properties near the warehouse district led the council to discontinue their sale in the warehouse district. Moreover, the opening of the Albert Street subway in 1906 and the Broad Street subway in 1911 greatly improved north-south movement so that the vicinity of the Hamilton Street artery was no longer the exclusively advantageous location. In general, however, the control of the sale of residential lots was less strict than that of the industrial lots. As time went by residential lots were sold with increasing frequency by auction, and not infrequently even to speculators.

An even greater lack of concern over development control was felt by the council with regard to the lands which they had designated in the public lands category of the federal land-grant. There was little system in the council's disposal of these lots. Sites for the city's own purposes, such as a power plant, reservoir, fire hall and street car barns were located in the industrial district. Other public or quasi-public purposes, such as churches, a children's home, the YMCA, the Salvation Army, hospitals, playgrounds, etc. were granted land free of charge or at a small nominal price. Only school sites were sold at their market value.<sup>37</sup> But decisions on all of these various

occasions were made *ad hoc*, as the requests arose, without any consideration of their wider planning or developmental implications.

#### 2. Public Parks vs. Public Revenues

The council's relative indifference to the matter of public parks and other open space or similar public uses of the land grant lots as compared with their concern for the industrial lots is clearly revealed in their dealings with Victoria Park and Wascana Park. Victoria Square, as it was first called, was one of two large public reserves that had been laid out in the original townsite plan of 1882. In extent it covered two city blocks and the adjoining road allowance - an area of about six acres. It fronted on Victoria Avenue, a major thoroughfare, nearly mid-way between Albert Street and Broad Street, and thus was quite centrally located in the original town. Because of its central location and its size it soon became much sought after as a sports ground. In the Spring of 1888, for example, the Regina Baseball Club sought and was given permission to lay out a baseball diamond there. By 1897 permission had been given for the use of the square by cricket and lacrosse clubs. It was, however, a bare, empty expanse, and although quite heavily used for sports and other events such as fairs, its appearance remained barren and unattractive. The city council felt constrained to try to soften its harshness and in 1890 they had its perimeter planted with seedling trees, leaving the interior of the site untouched and still usable for sports. The attempt, however, was unsuccessful. None of the seedlings survived. No further serious attempt was made to landscape the park and it remained a bit of a bald prairie for another sixteen or seventeen years.

In 1906 the provincial government was contemplating the construction of an imposing legislative building and was looking for a suitable site. Regina's city council, ever mindful of the need to enhance the image of the city's business sector saw a superb opportunity in Victoria Park which could bring that prestigious provincial building to the very threshold of the city's downtown. They offered Victoria Park to the provincial

government, free of charge, as the site for the new legislative building. The province, however, rejected the offer. Shortly after that the council hired Frederick Todd - who was already preparing the landscape design for the new legislative grounds, on commission from the provincial government - to prepare a plan for the landscaping of the city's streets and boulevards, but particularly for Victoria Park. Todd's plans were completed in March 1907. The city, however, did nothing to implement his designs for the streets and boulevards and little to carry out his proposals for Victoria Square. What they did was nevertheless a beginning, even if a modest one, and efforts were increased in succeeding years. The present luxuriant landscaping of the park dates from that initial program and is one of the most attractive amenities in Regina's downtown. But the city council of 1906 would have been delighted had they been able to give it away for the provincial legislative building, not primarily as an expression of their deep regard for the institution of provincial government but rather because such a building in that location would not only be an ornament to the business district but would bring additional trade. Six years later, in April 1913, Victoria Park was again threatened. City council was again discussing the construction of a new city hall and Victoria Park was considered as a possible site. The idea however was not supported by a majority of council members. Less than two months later, in May 1913, the Board of Trade proposed that part of Victoria Park be converted to a parking lot to ease the parking problem in the downtown area.<sup>38</sup> Although neither of these proposals was accepted, they indicate the low position occupied by public parks in the order of priorities of the Regina council and the city's businessmen even at that late date.

The Wascana Park episode is even more indicative of the council's position on the relative merits of public parks and business development. It seems that the council, although its primary commitment was to the development of Regina's economy, was not entirely indifferent to the need for urban amenities such as parks and landscaping. No doubt these were seen as civic improvements which could contribute to the attraction to

the city of new enterprises and residents. As early as 1903 the council passed a resolution saying that

[I]t would be in the interest of the City to have a park facing on the reservoir and recommend that an effort be made to exchange a portion of the property east of Broad Street coming to the City with the Dominion Government for that portion of the gaol property west of Cornwall Street.<sup>39</sup>

The Dominion government's jail property west of Cornwall Street was on the north side of Wascana Creek facing the reservoir. But it was south of 16th Avenue and therefore outside the boundaries of the city, and accordingly could not come to the city as part of the Dominion grant. The land which the council hoped to exchange for this portion of the jail property was part of the 4,000 lots which the Dominion government was preparing to give to Regina. The city council was anxious to begin negotiations for the exchange of property before the transfer of land was formally concluded. In this they were successful, and the city became the owner of the site on the Wascana Creek reservoir. The deal was concluded in 1904<sup>40</sup> under which the city exchanged nine blocks of land-grant property for the forty-four acre site facing Wascana Creek, south of the city limits.

This land on the Wascana Creek reservoir had in fact been designated as a reserve for a public garden on the original townsite plan of 1882, and Scarth had early advocated that it be acquired and brought into the town. Now that the city owned it the council wanted to get on with the proper landscaping of "City Park" as it was called, and appointed a special committee to advise on the matter. The committee recommended that the best way to proceed would be to hold a competition for a design. Council agreed, and announced a competition offering a prize of two hundred dollars for the winning design and fifty dollars for the runner-up.<sup>41</sup> One of the conditions of the competition was that the design must include a recreation ground and a nursery, which suggests council's

interest in enabling the park to appeal to a broad spectrum of the city's needs, both recreational and aesthetic.

In spite of this display of interest in the park, the council's main concern remained the city's business interests. In 1906, the provincial government under Walter Scott, looking at seven possible sites for the new legislative building, chose the McCallum Hill property on the south side of Wascana Creek, opposite the city's park. The city council was dismayed by this choice because the site was too far away from the city centre, and as an alternative they offered City Park. The province however chose the McCallum Hill property, a site of 168 acres - nearly four times as large as City Park. They had a grand vision for the provincial legislature which required a site in keeping with the monumental scale of their concept. In turning down the city's offer of City Park, Premier Scott made a a gracious counter-offer that the city's park be included as part of the province's landscaping program for the legislative grounds. The Regina city council accepted Scott's offer. This added some forty acres to the landscaping program for the legislative grounds, bringing the area to over two hundred acres. Wascana Park (the name was used interchangeably with "City Park") as the site for the legislature would not have suited the business community as well as Victoria Park but it would have suited them better than the chosen site, and might have had the somewhat lesser merit of keeping the physical development of the city at that time more compact.

Although the opportunity to turn City Park to revenue account went into abeyance with Scott's decision, the opportunity was not lost forever to the city. When the Grand Trunk Pacific's line was under construction from Melville to Regina in 1909, it was agreed that the railway would build a first class hotel in the vicinity of the station as was then the common practice among railway companies. The hotel would have 225 rooms and would cost one million dollars. It would be tax-exempt for twenty years. The site would be Wascana Park, leased to the railway for ninety-nine years.

Construction of the Chateau Qu'Appelle, as the hotel was to be called, began in 1913. Not long after the outbreak of World War I work on the hotel was suspended. Nothing was done on it as the war dragged on to its end, and in 1919 the Grand Trunk Pacific went bankrupt. The partial skeleton of the structure had been gaunt against the sky for nine years and had become an embarassment to the city. The council pressed the Canadian National Railway, which had taken over the Grand Trunk Pacific, to complete the hotel. The CNR agreed to do so in 1924 but the federal government did not include any funds for the hotel construction in the railway's budget that year. This marked the demise of the hotel scheme for City Park. The steel framework was gradually dismantled and the site was returned to a park. Today it is the home of the Natural History Museum of which Reginans are justly proud. No doubt the council of that earlier time would have been more pleased with a hotel than a natural history museum.

# 3. <u>The New Legislative Building Site - The Genesis of Regina's Wascana Centre</u>

The choice by the provincial government of the 168 acre site on the south side of the Wascana Creek reservoir, beyond the then city limits, was a fateful one. It set in place the beginning of a central park for Regina which has since been developed into one of the outstanding examples in Canada of a landscape amenity in an urban area, and the most remarkable and admirable feature of the City of Regina. It should be noted that the achievement of this triumph over a barren natural setting was from the very beginning the work of the provincial government and not the City of Regina. As soon as they established the site the province engaged Frederick G. Todd, a Montreal landscape architect, to prepare a landscaping plan designed around the proposed legislative building. Todd advised the province to buy large quantities of seedlings and nurse them for a year or two in some "congenial" soil (Regina's soil he did not consider "congenial"). Accordingly, between October 1908 and March 1912, more than 110,400 trees and

shrubs were ordered from far-flung locations including North Dakota, Quebec, Ontario, France, and later the Netherlands, Sardinia, Philadelphia and other places. By May 1913 nearly 11,000 trees and shrubs had been planted. But by 1907 a very substantial planting had already been achieved on the periphery of the site. For the design of the legislative building the province decided to hold a limited architectural competition, to be judged by an appointed committee. As chairman of the committee, the province appointed Percy E. Nobbs, professor of architecture at McGill University. Bertram Goodhue of New York and Frank Miles Day of Philadelphia were the other committee members. Seven firms were invited to submit design proposals. They were Darling and Pearson, Winnipeg and Toronto; Cass Gilbert, New York; March and Haskell, Montreal; E. and W.S. Maxwell, Montreal; Mitchell and Raine, London; F.S. Rattenbury, Victoria; Storey and Van Egmond, Regina. The terms of the competition were quite loose, but one constraint was that "the Province is politically within the British Empire, and this fact should be expressed in its public building."

The winning design was that of Edward and W.S. Maxwell of Montreal. It was a worthy winner, and still stands today as a fine example of imperial architecture in the neo-classic style. An article which appeared in the Canadian Architect and Builder in 1908 commented:

In designing the exterior of the building a free adoption of English Renaissance work has been employed as being best suited to the requirements and offering a logical sensible and architecturally interesting solution of the problem that makes it unmistakably as representative of the British sovereignty under which the province is governed.... dignity, simplicity and purity of style have been combined with a monumental treatment of the best period of British architecture to produce a building that it is believed will serve its purpose in the best possible manner.<sup>44</sup>

The contract was awarded to the Maxwell firm and construction began 1908.

Todd and the Maxwells consulted together on the layout of the roads and walks in the

vicinity of the building, and by 1912 the final drawings for the grounds were ready. The legislative building itself was not completed until 1914.

In 1911 the dominion government decided to move its jail from its site at 16th Avenue and Broad Street to a new location north-east of the city. The old site comprised about 160 acres and extended east from City (Wascana) Park along 16th Avenue and south along Broad Street, skirting the reservoir on its easterly side. In 1908, the Scott government as part of the grand design of the setting for the splendid new legislative building, had re-built the crude earth dam across Wascana Creek at Albert Street, replacing it with a new concrete bridge and dam. During the work on the new structure the reservoir had to be drained which provided the opportunity to dredge and deepen the shallower portions of the Creek. With the enlargement of the legislative grounds, and the new bridge, a further landscaping plan was required, as well as some revision of the original Todd design. Instead of assigning this new work to Todd, the Province, in 1913, engaged the services of Thomas H. Mawson and Son.

George Watt, the gardener for the legislative grounds, had advocated that Todd be re-hired to do this new work, together with an English town-planner who was at that time working on a federal government building in Ottawa. This proposal was strongly opposed and Todd's work severely criticized by Malcolm Ross who had recently been hired to help co-ordinate the landscaping of the legislative grounds. Immediately before his appointment by the province Ross had been the superintendent of parks for the City of Regina. He left the city's employ because of dissatisfaction with the indifference shown by city council to an ambitious parks development concept he had prepared for the city in 1911. Rather than re-employ Todd, Ross urged that the firm of Thomas Mawson be approached. He was authorized to look into the matter, with the result that the Mawson firm was engaged to carry out the new work.

Thomas Mawson was a British town planner, with an office in London, England.

He had delivered, in Regina, a public address on town planning as part of a cross-Canada

lecture tour in 1912. He had opened an office in Vancouver where he was already pursuing his practice when he was hired by the government of Saskatchewan in 1913 to prepare a plan for the recently acquired former jail site, which was to be developed as a prestigious residential area, as well as a plan for the Lieutenant-Governor's residence on Broad Street and a normal school on 16th Avenue. Todd's work on the legislative grounds was to be reviewed and only revised if necessary. Mawson threw in, as a bonus, the preparation of a development plan for Regina. He completed the plans in 1914, but they were never fully implemented. Only the area adjacent to the legislative building. and the city-owned Wascana Park on the other side of the reservoir were landscaped by the end of 1914. The depression and the outbreak of World War I put an end to any further pursuit of the Mawson plan. Nevertheless, the landscaping which was actually carried out had a marked effect on the appearance and the amenity of the city. Some fifty years later, like a ghost out of the remote and forgotten past, the presence of the Mawson plan was felt as an influence in the creation of the Wascana Centre Authority.45 Mawson's proposals for the city of Regina were grandiose architectural designs in the Beaux Arts tradition and were impossibly impractical. But even though none of the plan was ever built it too exercised an influence and was a contributing factor in the emergence of the city planning movement in Regina.

#### 4. The Regina Municipal Railway and City Boundaries Extensions

The question of a street car service first emerged as a serious public issue in 1906. There had been some discussion of such a utility before the turn of the century, but it was so obviously beyond the town's financial resources at that time that no one considered it seriously. With the achievement of city status and the rapid growth of the population a street railway system gradually came to be regarded not merely as a realistic possibility but as a necessity. It came to symbolize an advanced, progressive city which was moving into the upper reaches of metropolitan prestige. Whoever pursued the vision of an ever bigger and busier and more progressive Regina saw in a

street railway system the proof that the city was realizing those ideals. An electricity system and a sewer and water system had served in much the same role in earlier decades. They were regarded by the business community and the city council not merely as basic requirements for urban life but as necessary measures for the continued growth of the city and the expansion of its economy. Now a street railway system was becoming the contemporary symbol and advertisement of progress. And as with those previous services, the Board of Trade was the foremost advocate of a street railway for Regina.

At a meeting of the Board of Trade on June 8, 1906, it was agreed among the members that a street railway was an urgent necessity. They had no preference as to whether the system was municipally owned or privately owned, the important thing was to make an immediate start on it. There was, however, the general feeling that although a publicly owned system might be desirable it might prove too costly for the city and therefore the alternative of the city granting a franchise to a private company might be the most expedient way to proceed, given the importance of establishing the system as quickly as possible.

Other voices advocated a cautious approach and the city council took no immediate action. In December of 1908, however, a group of street railway promoters applied to the province for the incorporation of the Regina Inter-Urban Tramway Company Limited. Such a name had serious implications for the city, and the city council petitioned the legislature not to create the precedent of favouring private companies over municipalities by allowing the company to incorporate. They argued that municipalities ought to have the power to build and operate suburban tramway systems themselves within certain defined limits and to have the right to grant franchises to private companies in those instances in which the municipality was unable to build and operate the system itself.

The legislature nevertheless granted incorporation to the company, but denied it the right ".... to run to the Barracks and encircling the City on the West and South sides

and coming within the boundaries of the City." Within a year the Regina Inter-Urban Railway Company Limited went out of business and ceased functioning in Saskatchewan. The Regina Board of Trade immediately asked the city council to advertise a street railway franchise. In August of 1909 the council instructed the city solicitor to open negotiations with the Board of Railway Commissioners for establishing a street railway plan, and to approach the legislature for approval to undertake construction. Early in 1910 a Winnipeg consortium and a group of promoters from Ottawa responded to the city's advertisement of a street railway franchise. The matter now became a public issue and the subject of a lively public debate. The central question in the debate was whether a street railway system in Regina should be publicly or privately owned. Related questions which were publicly discussed were whether a street railway could properly be classified as a public utility and whether it should have priority over other much needed public works. The general opinion was clearly in favour of public ownership of the street railway.

There had been, since 1907, a parallel public debate in Regina over the question of a gas utility. In the Spring of that year the city council had contemplated a private franchise for a gas plant but satisfactory terms could not be agreed. The question of a private gas franchise was then put to a referendum and the proposal was defeated. A few months later, on 2 July, 1907, the city council voted unanimously in support of a resolution proposing that they consider the erection of a municipal gas plant. Lack of financial capacity, however, prevented the city from proceeding with a plant but it seems clear that the people and the city council of Regina favoured public ownership of all municipal services and utilities.

Lack of financial capacity also prevented the city from undertaking the construction and operation of a street railway system. On 17 March, 1910, city council approved an Agreement granting a street railway franchise to the Winnipeg-based consortium. This move by the council provoked a howl of public protest. The opposition

grew to such proportions that the mayor called a public meeting to air the issue on 29 April. One of the principal arguments against the franchise was that it allowed the company to contract for power without restrictions. This would permit the company to build a second system to service outlying areas beyond the city's boundaries and to build its own plant to supply the electric power. It would thus avoid buying its power from the Regina municipal plant as well as avoid paying Regina municipal taxes on its own plant. There were also objections from the Regina Trades and Labour Council who were opposed to private ownership of the system, as well as objections from the Lord's Day Alliance who foresaw that the company would ultimately demand and be allowed to operate on Sunday and feared the moral degeneration which would result.

Those supporting the franchise argued that the city could not afford to build and operate the street railway and challenged the opponents to show how public ownership would be financially feasible. Alderman J.R. Peverett pointed out that in 1907 and 1908 he had "advocated that the proceeds of all property sales be placed in a sinking fund to be drawn on in cases of great emergency or to minimize our tax rate." It appeared that there was a balance of \$103,692 in the fund of which \$80,327 could be made available for the street railway. Moreover further property sales had been made since that last financial report, and the province indicated that the normal 20 per cent limit on municipal borrowing need not necessarily apply to the financing of revenue-producing utilities. The debate on the franchise raged on until a referendum was held on 7 May 1910, and the voters rejected the franchise by a margin of more than two to one.

The city council, in accordance with the wishes expressed by the voters moved quickly and on 30 May 1910 adopted a resolution to proceed with the construction of a street railway as a publicly-owned and operated system. Further investigation of the means of financing, however, revealed that instead of a surplus in the property account it was in fact overdrawn by some \$122,000. The situation was fortunately restored by a lively sale of property during the summer of 1910. But a lot more money was still

required and the council set about exploring the possible solutions to the problem. One possible measure was to enlarge the city's tax base and on 6 September 1910 the council directed the city commissioners to prepare a proposal for extending the city's boundaries. In early October the commissioners made their report, in which they said:

It is proposed that a street railway system be operated in the City at an early date and this area is not large enough for the successful operation of the system which will no doubt be needed in a few years, without going outside the limits and it is very desirable that the territories developed by the street railway should all be within the city limits.<sup>48</sup>

The first spike in the construction of the Regina Municipal Railway was driven on 7 May 1911. The annexation of surrounding land, as proposed by the commissioners in 1910 would not add much population to the city to provide significantly more street car riders but it could substantially expand the city's property tax base. Residences were being built in various locations on the outskirts of the city. There was, for example, a small group on the west side which had probably been drawn by the Royal North West Mounted Police headquarters. Similarly, there were some residences established to the north, no doubt due to the Grand Trunk Pacific shops which were located there. And in the south and south-west the vigorous promotional activity of the McCallum Hill Company, and the imminence of the legislative building, stimulated residential settlement. As with most peripheral residences, the homeowners in these instances, no doubt, located on the edge of the municipality, but outside its boundaries in order to enjoy the best of both possible worlds - relatively easy access to the services and amenities of the city but beyond reach of the city's tax jurisdiction. The number of people represented by these groups, however, was not great. Nevertheless a large amount of land had been subdivided by speculators and developers, fired by the anticipation of the wealth to be gained from the rapid growth of Regina in the years after the turn of the century. The city had grown from 2,249 in 1901 to 30,213 in 1911;

building permit values had soared from \$210,000 in 1904 to over \$8 million in 1912, and speculation in land, on the periphery, was rampant, driven by the expectation that the city's growth energy and escalating land values would spill out over the surrounding land. All of this land would yield property taxes if it were within the city's boundaries.

There were other compelling reasons for the city to seek annexation of these outlying areas. The residents on the subdivisions were demanding services and utilities. Regina was the only feasible authority to provide them but in order to do so the areas would have to be within the city's boundaries. Moreover further subdivision and development could only be controlled if the lands were within the city's jurisdiction. In addition, Regina was engaged in extensive land drainage and sewer construction projects within the city but satisfactory schemes required the inclusion of extensive areas of land outside the city's boundaries. There was also the matter of the railroads. Railway lines were still being built into Regina and their approach and entry from the surrounding areas could not be regulated unless those areas were under the city's control. The city council applied to annex large tracts on all sides of the existing city. The annexation was approved in 1911, and some 6,000 acres were added to Regina's area, extending the city's boundaries in all directions. (Fig. 21.) This was the first change in Regina's boundaries since it became a municipality in 1883. There would be further important annexations in subsequent years.

## 5. First Steps Towards A Planning Function

Reference to the control of development in the warehouse district as "planning" is probably justified. It was, of course, not comprehensive planning; it was planning in a very limited sphere of total civic development policy concerns, but it was nevertheless planning in that limited context. The measures employed by the council to carry out its policies for the warehouse district, such as the phased, progressive extension of utilities and services (which was also applied to residential development) and the control of lot prices, has already been touched on. Although these measures were the most direct and

specifically-targeted controls employed by the city, there were other measures of a more general, indirect type which were also adopted and which constituted a rudimentary land-use control system in the city at large. One of the earliest of these contemplated by the city council was a building permit system.

Municipal authorities early saw the desirability of directing the physical growth of Regina to avoid haphazard development. In arguing for the adoption of a system of building permits in 1904, Mayor H.W. Laird noted that it would "protect the residential portions of the city from the incursions of objectionable buildings, or enterprises calculated to disturb the peace or mar the appearance of the neighbourhood."<sup>49</sup>

Here was the rudimentary beginning of a land-use control instrument. Regina, however, would have to wait for another twenty-three years for a fully-fledged zoning by-law. And it must be said that there was no great interest in such a planning tool expressed by the council during that long interval of nearly two and one half decades. Meanwhile the city began its slow and indifferent progress on the road towards a statutory planning system by adopting, in 1904, a building by-law, whose primary purpose was protection against fire. By-law No. 302 defined fire limits which in turn set out certain regulations for the construction of buildings. Although the by-law controlled the type and standard of construction, it said nothing about where a particular type of building could be located. In part the by-law stated:

No person shall without leave of the said Council by resolution thereof, set up or carry on or continue within the said City any tannery, felt mongery or place for boiling soap, making candles and for the melting of tallow, or for any other factory which from its nature or the material used therein shall be dangerous in causing or promoting fires.<sup>51</sup>

It identified some obnoxious or hazardous activities in certain areas but it left the decision as to whether a proposed building would be approved or not entirely to the council's discretion.

Three types of business in particular came before council recurrently. They were lumber and wood establishments, livery and feed stables and hand laundries. The council was persistently petitioned to ban these uses from residential areas but maintained it could do nothing to prevent them because they were not specifically prohibited by the by-law. Finally, in 1907, the council dealt with these matters by adopting By-Law No. 386, which stated, in part:

- 1. No person shall without leave of the Council by resolution thereof, set up or carry on or continue within the said City any Feed, Sales, Exchange or Livery Stable.... until he shall have obtained from the Inspector of Buildings a certificate of compliance with any general regulations prescribed.... by by-law.
- No person shall without leave of the Council by resolution thereof, set up or continue to set up within the said City any lumber or wood yard unless and until he shall have obtained from the Inspector of Buildings a certificate to do so.<sup>52</sup>

This by-law represented a very small step forward on the road towards land-use control through the instrument of zoning. It shifted the focus of concern from dangerous uses to undesirable uses, but it did not limit them to certain designated locations; it simply made their establishment or continuation subject to the council's approval. In May, 1909, more stringent restrictions were placed upon the storage and manufacture of inflammable oils, gases or materials by confining them to certain specific lots in the warehouse district, designated solely for that purpose.<sup>53</sup> Complaints, however, continued to be lodged with council protesting against the ongoing practice of locating livery stables and hand laundries in residential areas. It was not until 1912, five years after By-Law No. 386 which first addressed livery stables and wood yards, that council finally took action. On July 2, 1912, they adopted By-Law No. 663, which specifically banned livery stables and hand laundries from residential areas.<sup>54</sup>

But By-Law No. 663 went a step beyond protecting residential areas from the undesirable intrusions of livery stables and hand laundries. In addition to continuing the regulations already in place relating to fire limits, the by-law established four land-use districts: First Class Business, Second Class Business, Warehouse and Wholesale, and Residential. Again, although it established four land-use districts, which was a further small step in the direction of zoning control, the by-law did not list the uses which would be permitted in each district, other than the indicated prohibition against livery stables and hand laundries in the residential district.

Livery stables and hand laundries are not the only uses which would be objectionable in the residential neighbourhood. Any number of other undesirable intrusions spring readily to mind. This flaw in the by-law must have come to the council's attention quite quickly because less than two months later By-Law No. 663 was amended to specify the particular uses which were prohibited in the residential district. The amended version provided that

No person, shall locate, build, construct, alter or use on any street, avenue or alley, within the district known as the residential district, any building intended to be used as a Brewery, Brick Works, Blacksmith Shop, Boiler Shop, Bowling Alley, Public Billiard, Pool or Bagatelle Room, Hide Warehouse, Laundry or Washhouse, Skating Rink, Dancing Hall or any other place of amusement, dairy-barn or cow barn or any commercial industry, employing power driven machinery, unless and until an application for a permit so to do has been made to the City Council, such application to be accompanied by a petition signed by the majority of the property owners.... in the block in which it is intended to construct or establish such a building.<sup>55</sup>

The by-law was still framed in terms of prohibited uses and these were excluded specifically only from the residential district. Uses in the other districts were still at the approval of the council. Current practice is to specify the uses which are permitted in each zoning district rather than those which are prohibited. It would still be quite a

long time before zoning as it is now practiced would find its place in Regina's system of planning and development control.

Another development control measure which emerged in rudimentary form at this time and which would later become part of Regina's standard planning and development control equipment was a subdivision by-law. There was in fact little need for such a by-law. The original townsite had been laid out by the CPR in 1883. This subdivision served adequately for the next three decades so that by 1913 there was little land within the original townsite boundaries left to be subdivided. The furious land speculation and subdivision which was generated by the city's growth during these years was occurring on the outskirts of the city, beyond its boundaries. When the city annexed these outlying areas in 1911 it brought within its jurisdiction land which was already subdivided, so that there was little that the city could do about subdivision control of these lands. (Fig. 22.) Nevertheless, within the city there was continuing subdivision activity in the form of re-subdivision of existing lots. The original CPR plan had created lots that were fifty feet wide, but during the land-boom years there was vigorous re-subdivision activity, dividing fifty-foot lots into twenty-five foot lots. Some concern was felt about the increased density and congestion which would result from this reduction of lot area and frontage. There were also frequent requests for amendments of existing subdivision lay-outs. In order to deal with these matters the city council adopted By-Law No. 721 on 17 March, 1913.

The main provisions of this by-law were that the civic administration was to review any subdivision proposal and the city engineer was to be satisfied that the land to be subdivided was suitable for its proposed purposes, and that every block and lot was accessible. An important innovation was the requirement that every subdivision of twenty acres or more must include a public reserve of five per cent of the total subdivided acreage. The city was obliged to purchase the public reserve within three years of registration of the subdivision. If the city failed to buy the public reserve

within the specified time, it reverted to the original subdivider. In spite of the authority vested in the council by its subdivision control by-law, the final approval of any subdivision was the responsibility of the provincial government, by virtue of provincial statute.<sup>56</sup>

Thus, Regina was moving unconsciously and imperceptibly towards a municipal planning function. Measures for land-use control were being put in place, although in rudimentary form and not systematically. But there was not as yet any overall notion of planning on the basis of which the city council could formulate comprehensive development policies. Not that Regina was unaware and entirely out of the mainstream of the planning movement in Canada at that time. The rhetoric of planning which was being heard in most cities in Canada was also heard in Regina. Henry Vivian, the English Member of Parliament who had been invited by Earl Grey, the Governor-General, to undertake a lecture tour of Canada, had spoken in Regina in 1910. Morell Nichols of Minneapolis had offered his planning services to the city council in 1912. Thomas Mawson delivered a lecture in Regina in 1912. Dr. Hegman, of Berlin, spoke in the city in 1913. There were frequent articles in the newspapers and magazines. Nor was the city council entirely without curiosity about the planning idea. It sent a delegation to the First Canadian Planning Conference, held in Winnipeg in 1912, and a representative to the International Planning Conference in Toronto in 1914.

### 6. City Planning As City Landscaping

Planning was a common topic of discussion at gatherings where questions of social improvement and public policy were talked about over tea or cocktails, but there was no common understanding of the meaning of the concept. Town Planning meant different things to different people; one's understanding of its meaning depended on one's background and disposition. When town planning first began to emerge out of the Commission of Conservation, created by the federal government in 1909, its initial

formative influence was a concern over the threat to public health presented by urban slums. Dr. Charles Hodgetts, the Commission's medical advisor, gave the nascent planning movement that identity. He equated town planning with public health. As the movement developed and spread public health continued to be one of its themes but there were numerous other themes which emerged and added their particular statements to the confusion. Which was the major theme recognized in any place or situation depended very much on local circumstances. In Regina public health was a relatively minor theme. The major theme there was city landscaping.

One can perhaps trace a logical progression starting from the slums and general lack of sanitation and polluted water which were not uncommon conditions in the urban centres, which led to epidemic diseases such as typhoid, which deeply disturbed a medical man like Dr. Charles Hodgetts, which led him to use his influential position on a prestigious federal Commission to advocate as the only effective solution to the problem the improvement of the urban environment, which led to the melding of this notion with the town planning theories of a man like Thomas Adams, who came to the Commission in 1914 as its town planning adviser: thus the presence of public health as a major theme in the town planning movement in its formative years in Ottawa. In Regina the progression was somewhat different and produced a town planning concept of a rather different character.

Not that Regina did not have its slums and polluted water and epidemic diseases. Conditions in "Germantown" were as bad and as threatening as those in any slum area in any eastern city. In the general atmosphere of civic huckstering and promotion which prevailed in Regina, as it did in every burgeoning western Canadian community at that time, the seamier side of the city's life was submerged from public view and rarely acknowledged. The fact of its existence, of course, could hardly be denied since it was there, on the ground, for anyone to see. But if eyes were kept averted, and one did not venture into that debased precinct, its existence need not be publicly acknowledged. On

the odd occasion however some reference to conditions in "Germantown" as the east side of the city was known, came to public notice. The <u>Daily Province</u>, in its issue of 15 November, 1911, reported:

Tracing up a truant child yesterday, truant officer Ayr came across a family, consisting of a father, mother and six children, all herded together in one room. In spite of the inclement weather, the little ones, whose ages ranged from ten to nothing, were insufficiently clad, and indeed, they were half-naked and totally devoid of foot wear. All that could be found in the wretched hovel, called by courtesy a home, were half a loaf of bread, half a sack of flour and a little coal.<sup>57</sup>

The kindly light of the Social Gospel shone on Regina as it did on other cities and revealed the desperate social conditions which lay at the root of poverty and of the cities' moral and spiritual ills. J.S. Woodsworth, director of the All Peoples' Mission in Winnipeg, published his Report of a Preliminary and General Social Survey of Regina in December, 1913. The survey had been commissioned by the Department of Temperance and Moral Reform of the Methodist Church and the Board of Social Services and Evangelism of the Presbyterian Church. Woodsworth himself surveyed 599 of the 607 houses in "Germantown." He found that although water mains had been laid through almost half of the area, over 60 per cent of the dwellings were so badly constructed that it was not possible to connect them to the mains. Only 48 of the 599 houses had indoor plumbing. Woodsworth's observations of the social conditions in the East End could be descriptions of the poorest working-class enclaves of any city. Referring to the area's dance halls he commented:

Beer is frequently sold or dispensed.... The young men who patronize these halls are chiefly labourers or mechanics; the girls, employees in restaurants, hotels, laundries and factories. Not infrequently there is drinking and fighting, so that it becomes necessary to station policemen to prevent disturbances.<sup>58</sup>

"Nevertheless," in the words of J.W. Brennan, "such establishments did fill a real social need. One young man told Woodsworth:"

I like this better than to lie on my dirty bed all the time. The room where I am staying drives me mad; I am not satisfied with these people with whom I live, and my job is hard in the day-time, so I am very willing to spend my 50-cents twice a week because I have here an hour of life.<sup>59</sup>

Before publication of his report, and presumably during its preparation,
Woodsworth delivered a lecture in Regina to the Metropolitan Brotherhood. The
Brotherhood was a Methodist group which met each Sunday in the basement of the
Metropolitan Methodist Church. In May, 1913, Woodsworth addressed a meeting of the
Brotherhood in which he spoke of social conditions as the cause of poverty and of the
great difficulties which working-class families faced in trying to sustain themselves
under conditions of high living costs and low wages. Regina's Mayor Robert Martin was
present at that lecture. His comments during the discussion which followed
Woodsworth's talk afford an insight into the mentality of Regina's civic leaders at that
time. He acknowledged that Woodsworth's description of the living conditions of the
working class might well be accurate but the workers had only themselves to blame. It
was his view that living costs were high simply because people desired things which they
could not afford and they should learn to live within their means.<sup>60</sup>

Reform of the social system was clearly not a high priority on the agenda of Regina's civic leaders. Neither was any town planning measures which called for anything other than the continued promotion of the city and the economic development strategy to which they were committed. In his report, Woodsworth pointed out that seven of the ten aldermen then sitting on Regina's City Council were involved in real estate, and he mused:

Whether or not the charges are true that civic administration is carried out in such a way as to financially benefit private enterprise it is undoubtedly true that it is not wise to entrust the government of the city so largely to a group of men representing one particular class.... Real estate interests have too often exercised a predominating influence with the result

that the public welfare has been sacrificed to private gain.<sup>61</sup>

Publication of Woodsworth's report stirred little excitement in Regina. The newspapers lauded it as the first statistical analysis of the city's social conditions ever carried out, and they quoted extensively from it. But after the initial reaction they had nothing more to say about it. None of them pursued any of the profound social issues raised in the report. And none of the members of city council had any comments to offer. The report was quietly shelved and soon forgotten.

In Regina the movement towards town planning had its origins not in the concern over urban slums but rather in the harsh unattractive natural landscape in which the community was set. From the very beginning the site at Pile of Bones was an object of ridicule and the town was sneered at as the ugliest place on the CPR line. Reginan's were not entirely unconscious of this natural disadvantage and there were desultory efforts to improve its appearance but these were largely unsuccessful until the province's legislative grounds initiative evoked a firm parallel response and commitment in the city. The province hired Frederick Todd as its first professional landscape architect in 1907 and the landscaping of the legislative grounds continued with Mawson's work and indeed has continued until today. The city's first concerted effort was not made until 1911. But as early as the late 1890's a Horticultural Society was organized in Regina whose object was to encourage the planting of flowers, shrubs and trees in the town. The society, however, had little support from the public. It limped along for a few years and then went out of existence shortly after the turn of the century.

It is understandable that the generality of its residents would be indifferent to the appearance of Regina during the first three decades of its existence. Initially they were a small community preoccupied with the formidable problems of establishing themselves in a hostile natural environment. As a town their financial resources were severely limited and the first call upon what little they had was the need for basic services such

as water, sewer and electricity. The top priority on the civic leaders' agenda was the development of the local economy and for this the greater part of their political commitment and expenditure of energy was devoted to attracting and establishing as large and diversified a railway network as possible to serve the city. Dedication to the goals of population and economy expansion left little time for the pursuit of civic beautification by the political and business leaders of the community. And the public at large was apathetic towards the matter. The average person in most instances is usually too busy with his own personal day-to-day affairs to pay much attention to the appearance of the urban environment and rarely is concerned about it to the point of demanding its enhancement. In Regina there were additional factors. Regina, as a small agricultural service centre, was intimately bound up with its surrounding farm society and the major concern of the townsfolk in growing things was in the growth of the wheat crop. Their interest lay in agriculture rather than horticulture. Raw frontier communities in any case are rarely concerned about the aesthetics of their built environment. It takes many years - even generations - before the services infrastructure and the economic and social structures of a community are sufficiently firmly established for its members to turn their attention to the appearance of their surroundings. It is particularly unlikely that the general public will show much interest if there is no interest shown by the civic leadership. And in Regina there was the further disincentive of the adverse natural conditions. The natural setting was arid, wind-swept, devoid of trees and indeed of any vegetation other than the prairie grass; the soil was hard and obdurate and required special knowledge and techniques for its successful horticultural cultivation. Few Reginans had the knowledge and patience to make the landscape bloom. Whatever efforts were made to plant trees, such as the early attempts in Victoria Park invariably failed, the saplings simply dying in the first season.

Davin, in championing the cause of city beautification, had consistently, in his Leader editorials, called for the creation of a parks board to be responsible for the development and maintenance of the city's parks rather than the parks committee of the council as was the then established arrangement. The council was not interested in such an idea and had never discussed it. In the Spring of 1911 however it had a change of heart and appointed a sub-committee to look into the question of possible provincial legislation allowing municipalities to establish parks boards or commissions. The members of the sub-committee were Alderman J.E. Doerr, a Regina lawyer, Alderman George Cushing, a retail merchant in the city; and Malcolm Ross, the city's Superintendent of Parks. The three spent the summer deliberating the concept of a parks commission but failed to agree on the basic principles of the structure of such a commission or the powers it should have. On 31 October, 1911, they submitted two reports - a majority report and a minority report. The majority report was signed by Alderman Doerr and Alderman Cushing. The minority report was signed by Parks Superintendent Ross.

The Doerr-Cushing report recommended the appointment of a commission with extraordinary powers. It argued that if the commission's responsibility were restricted exclusively to parks it would not be long before other commissions would be required to look after other aspects of the city's affairs. Instead the report advocated a City Planning Commission with very broad powers over property development, streets, the city's water supply, sewage and drainage systems, lighting, land development and building operations, and even property rights. In many respects the powers advocated for the commission anticipated by perhaps half a century the kind of authority vested in municipal governments under the planning provisions of present day statutes. It was the view of the authors that the City Planning Commission should consist of a number of experts in various fields such as a civil engineer, an architect, a landscape architect, a financial specialist, and such others as might be required in given circumstances. The report was mostly the work of Alderman Doerr, the lawyer. Among the drastically new proposals for the power of the commission was another idea which could not have met

with much sympathy from the city council. "The commission that we recommend" the report stated "would in time evolve into a body which would develop a commission form of government in the city. Then there would be no need of the council." 62

In the context of the Urban Reform Movement which was agitating the entire field of municipal government throughout the United States and Canada during the period approximately from 1880 to 1920, the statement is perhaps not surprising. One of many themes in the tangled ideology of the Urban Reform Movement was that city government was a business and must be managed along strict business lines; and one of the major revisions of the urban government system which it advocated was to take the business of government out of the hands of politicians and amateurs and put it into the hands of full-time professional experts. 63 Doerr, it seems, must have subscribed to that tenet of the Urban Reform Movement and agreed with the measures it advocated; the statement in his report referring to the replacement of the council by the commission is certainly in accord with the tenets of the movement. The fact that the councils of most cities in western Canada, including Regina, were already dominated by businessmen did not seem to meet the requirements of the urban reformers like Doerr. What they sought was the concentration of power in the hands of a small number of appointed experts whose positions would be secure and immune from political interference and public pressures and whose conduct of the civic government would be committed to the principles of the business ethos. The Regina city council did not care for Doerr's report at all.

Ross's minority report was at the other extreme from the majority report. He advocated caution and further study. Although he did not object to the notion of a city planning commission - indeed he would at a later date come to support it strongly - his recommendation was that a board of enquiry should first be appointed, with representation from both the city and the province, which would examine all aspects of the commission issue and report their findings. After that the appropriate legislation

could be drafted. The city council didn't care much for Ross's report either. The sub-committee was instructed to look at the matter again and come back with a new report. The revised report was submitted in November, this time signed by all three members of the sub-committee. The underlying ideas of the original majority report were retained, but the powers proposed for the commission were drastically reduced, particularly those relating to property rights.

By this time the annual civic election was approaching and the members of the council were preoccupied with their campaigns. The report of the sub-committee was merely received and set aside. The new council also ignored the report but showed a greater interest in the parks issue generally. They asked Ross for a report on possible sites for new parks in the city. They also increased the parks budget and made the position of Parks Superintendent a full-time rather than a part-time position. Ross did more than prepare a list of potential park sites. He produced an elaborate design for a comprehensive park system stretching beyond the boundaries of the city. He proposed that the city acquire two large park sites, one east and one west of the city, which would be connected by a series of landscaped drives following the course of Wascana Creek, with the centrepiece being Wascana Park, the lake and the legislative grounds.

It was characteristic of Ross that instead of providing a selection of individual park sites he created a comprehensive park system design. It was a tenet of his as a professional landscaper that no site should be considered in isolation, that no part of the city should be dealt with by itself but only as a component part of the whole, and that each park should be designed in the context of its local community as well as in relation to the city at large. In this he was embracing the principle of comprehensive planning but his concept of comprehensive planning was confined to the realm of landscaping. To him town planning meant the creation of a comprehensive landscaping plan for a town.

Ross submitted his comprehensive plan towards the end of 1912. The council received it without comment or discussion and Ross, offended by their indifference, resigned his

position to take up an appointment with the province. Early in 1913 the council did look at Ross's scheme and rejected it.

Another Reginan on whom the town planning idea was making a strong impression was R.O. Wynn-Roberts, an engineer. His concepts, like those of Ross, were also shaped by the programming of his own basic discipline. He believed that the cities of western Canada, which were still young and in a formative stage, could learn important lessons from the cities of Europe, and would be wise to adopt plans of development before their expansion went beyond remedy.

To avoid the fate of older, overcrowded and overexpanded cities, Wynn-Roberts advocated a comprehensive plan of development. Although streets and buildings were central to his concept of town planning, he nevertheless was well aware of the wider scope of the planning idea. He spoke of a town plan as one which would

Regulate the buildings, prevent the creation of slums and encourage everything that will lead to the artistic as well as utilitarian development of the city.<sup>64</sup>

Among the many lecturers and planning advocates who visited and spoke in Regina, Thomas Mawson made a strong impression. He obviously had an impact on Malcolm Ross who had never had any previous contact with Mawson but was sufficiently impressed by his lecture to urge his retention as the landscape architect for the enlarged legislative grounds. Another speaker who had a powerful effect on the evolution of the planning function in Regina was Ewart G. Culpin. Culpin was the secretary of the Garden Cities and Town Planning Association of Great Britain. He delivered a three-part lecture in Regina in March 1913. Consistent with the principles underlying the Garden City movement as expounded by its founder Ebenezer Howard, Culpin spoke of the linkage between the Garden City philosophy and the objectives of town planning. The <u>Daily Province</u> reported him as saying that

[T]he ultimate object of Town Planning was to provide the working classes with good, cheap and

convenient dwellings, so constructed and placed that the effect of the workman's surroundings would be to elevate and enable him [to develop], physically, mentally and morally.<sup>65</sup>

There is some discrepancy among the writers on the matter as to when the City Planning Association was formed in Regina. Drake cites the year as 1912.66 and the president as A.C. Garner. Moser also cites the year as 1912.67 Laporte, however, gives the year as 1913 and the president as James Balfour. 68 Brennan also says 1913 and gives the month as March. Careful reading of these sources and the attempt to reconcile the difference leads me to the conclusion that the formal establishment of the City Planning Association occurred in 1913, with James Balfour, a lawyer, as president. One bit of evidence which tends to support this conclusion is the fact that Ewart Culpin's three-part discourse on town planning was delivered in March 1913. It dealt in some detail with the various facets of town planning, and the stated objectives of the City Planning Association on its incorporation reflected very closely the principles described by Culpin. Not only did the Association's objectives embrace the tenets set out by Culpin, but the five committees which the Association established to carry out its work represented the full range of planning concerns as addressed in Culpin's lectures. These five committees were: housing and sanitation, playgrounds and parks, street planning and traffic, education, and legislation and finance.<sup>69</sup> The objectives of the City Planning Association also reflected the tenets of the Metropolitan Brotherhood. Many members of the City Planning Association were also members of the Metropolitan Brotherhood whose weekly discussion meetings dealt with very much the same issues as were of concern to the City Planning Association. The Brotherhood even went so far as to suggest the creation of a provincial planning organization whose objectives would be to ensure a happy balance between beauty and economy in development throughout the province. 70

Although the objectives of the Regina City Planning Association embraced the social reform ideals of the Garden City movement and the moral regeneration concerns of

the Metropolitan Brotherhood, it is of interest to note that the major projects in which the Association became involved almost immediately following its creation did not directly address the social and moral problems of the city but rather its problems of landscaping and city beautification. These projects were the city "clean-up" day, and the vacant lot gardens project. The rationale for both of these activities was that the creation of a healthy and beautiful city must start with cleaning up one's own backyard. and with the improvement of the appearance of vacant lots. This latter project was dependent upon the owners of the vacant lots giving the Association permission to enter upon their properties for that purpose, and it met with some success. In the first year 68 lots were beautified, and more in succeeding years. The connection between these activities on the ground and the idealistic social and moral goals of the Association are somewhat tenuous. It is true that one of the Association's five committees was a parks and playgrounds committee and there was a prevailing notion that civic beauty was the basis of civic health and morality but the simple truth is that there was no intellectual. social or political infrastructure on which a comprehensive planning movement could arise, such as the movements in England and Germany. There were, however, the conditions in Regina which favoured action in the realm of landscaping and civic beautification. The City Planning Association's declaration of its broader comprehensive planning goals was merely a pietistic echo of the rhetoric of the English town planning movement and of the Committee of Conservation which awoke a sympathetic response in the catechism of the Metropolitan Brotherhood, many of whose members were among the founding members of the Regina City Planning Association.

When, in the Spring of 1913, it was announced that the city council intended to engage a professional landscape architect to prepare a plan for the city, the news was greeted with enthusiasm by the Brotherhood who invited Mayor Martin to address them on the subject. The gist of the mayor's talk was that although Regina was enjoying a prosperous period, a large part of it being driven by the buoyancy of the real estate

market, that buoyancy could not be sustained indefinitely and was bound to be deflated sooner or later. It was therefore vital that a more lasting base be established for the economy which meant that new industries had to be attracted to the city. A landscaping program would beautify the city which was a good thing in itself, but perhaps even more important was the prospect that a beautified city would be better able to attract new industries and population. The Brotherhood was persuaded of the moral virtues of a landscaping plan; the council was persuaded of its economic virtues.<sup>71</sup>

Doubtless the Brotherhood and the city council both wished for the same end result - the improvement of the city. Each side saw the improvement in its own terms but neither of them recognized that the improvement wished for by each of them was totally different from the other's. It is a common human foible to interpret ideas and events in terms of one's own wishes and there was nothing unusual in the Brotherhood seeing moral and spiritual health as standing in the stead of a beautiful landscape or in the mayor and his council seeing economic health as the image reflected in the mirror of the landscape. Evidence of the prevalence of such transference of values can be found in a variety of sources. W.F. Kerr, editor of the Leader, provides one such instance. The Leader was for years the champion of city beautification, going back to the time of Nicholas Davin and continuing into the opening decades of the twentieth century under the editorship of W.F. Kerr. Kerr frequently scolded Reginans for their apathy towards the issue. For Kerr city beautification was more than just a matter of city adornment, far deeper and more fundamental values were involved. In a typical editorial he wrote:

Unless Regina awakens to the reality of the situation and grapples with the problems now the citizens of the Regina of the future will curse us. On the other hand, patriotic action now will give to the future generations a legacy of health, beauty, and happiness which will call forth blessings upon us rather than condemnation.<sup>72</sup>

The view from the city promotion and economic prosperity side was expressed by Lieutenant-Governor G.W. Brown when he addressed a meeting of the newly-revived Horticultural Society of Regina, in 1911. On that occasion he told his audience:

[A] well planned city with beautiful boulevards and parks, well kept lawns and gardens is one of the best advertisements that a city can have.<sup>73</sup>

For the Lieutenant-Governor the purpose which the advertisement would serve was self-evident.

These are merely a handful of examples indicative of the discussions pursued in Regina on the issues of parks, landscaping and planning in the years around the end of the first decade of the 1900's. It is true that most Reginans were indifferent to these issues - witness the lack of interest in the Horticultural Society even after its revival from extinction in 1911 - but they were the topics of earnest debate among the opinion-makers and leaders of the community and this was sufficient to ensure their continued and lively presence in the public arena. The landscaping issue was perhaps the liveliest in the Spring of 1913, animated by the expectation of the imminent engagement of a professional landscape architect and city planner to prepare a plan for the city.

# 7. The Mawson Affair and Saskatchewan's First Planning Act

Mawson was appointed in June. His assignment was to design a parks plan for the city which would comprise a system of parks, gardens and children's playgrounds with connecting landscaped drives. The plan was to be based on the existing lay-out of the city and there was to be a separate plan for each of the city's local areas. For this work Mawson was to receive a fee of \$8,000. An insight into the city council's concept of town planning - and indeed into the idea of town planning which was fairly common - is afforded by the fact that the council, when they commissioned Mawson to prepare his plan also made a grant of \$250 to the City Planning Association for the purpose of "assisting in the City Planning Scheme." There was no distinction in the collective

mind of the council, or of many Reginans, between a comprehensive parks plan and a comprehensive city plan.

Almost exactly a year after receiving the commission to prepare the scheme Mawson was ready to submit his report to the council. It was feared, however, that publication of his report would set off a flurry of land speculation and he was asked to withhold its presentation until appropriate legislation was passed by the provincial legislature; the next session of the legislature was not scheduled to be opened until the Fall. Meanwhile, seeing the prospect of various planning legislation issues on the horizon the city and the province sent representatives to the International Planning Congress in Toronto in late May, 1914, where one of the items on the agenda was the preparation of a model city planning by-law. The city sent Alderman Wynn-Roberts and Commissioner Thornton; the province sent the Hon. George Langley, Minister of Municipal Affairs, and N.B.W. Weeks, Director of Surveys.

It soon became clear that the city was reluctant to receive and process Mawson's plan, not because of the lack of suitable enabling legislation but rather because they had changed their mind about the plan. They had agreed to pay Mawson a fee of \$8,000 on completion and acceptance of his scheme. From their knowledge of his proposals there were certain aspects of the plan which would be very costly to implement. These involved property acquisition and the construction of new major roads and buildings. At some other time none of these might have deterred the council. After all they were under no obligation to carry out any of Mawson's proposals even if they accepted the plan. But the time was not propitious. A serious economic recession struck the country in 1913 which had a strong impact on Regina and which continued to afflict it for many years. The city did not begin to recover until after the end of World War I.

Some measure of the devastating effect of the economic recession on Regina can be gathered from the statistics for such indices as the value of building permits and the population. In 1912 the value of building permits in Regina was \$8,047,309. In 1913

it was \$4,018,350. For each of the succeeding years 1914 to 1917 respectively the values were \$1,765,875; \$464,065; \$222,075; \$416,460. It was not until 1918 that the value barely reached one million dollars; and it was not until 1929 that it regained the 1912 level, with a margin to spare. The population statistics tell a similar story. Regina's population in 1911 was 30,213; in 1916 it had fallen to 26,127, and it was not until 1921 that it reached and surpassed the number of a decade earlier: Regina's 1921 population was 34,432. Immigration into Saskatchewan followed a similar course. In 1913 new arrivals into the province numbered 40,999, in 1916 the number was only 6,001. Unemployment was high despite the diversion of many able-bodied men into the armed forces after 1914. There was wide spread destitution and the city was obliged to set up a welfare bureau, which provided some measure of relief to large numbers of people from 1913 to 1918.

In these circumstances one can understand that the city council was not much interested in pursuing the Mawson plan with its cost implications. Indeed the council's interest in landscaping and planning generally declined. The City Planning Association ceased to function during the war, except for its vacant lots program which turned to the promotion of the use of these lots for food production during the war years.<sup>78</sup>

Mawson continued to press the council to receive his plan and pay his fee but the council continued to refuse. Finally, after repeated letters to them the council relented somewhat and agreed in 1915 to send him \$2000 in part payment. This amount was later increased to \$3000 but the council was firm in refusing to accept his plan and to pay him in full. Meanwhile, in the same year, Thomas Adams, town planning adviser to the Committee of Conservation in Ottawa, drew up his draft town planning act which he hoped would serve as a model for planning legislation in Canada. He initiated discussions with Saskatchewan in 1915 with a view to persuading it to enact a planning statute. In 1916 he delivered a paper to the Civic Improvement Conference in Winnipeg in which he expounded his theory of town planning. No doubt Reginans attended the conference and

heard his message. He continued his discussions with the province and his efforts finally bore fruit. On 15 December, 1917, the Saskatchewan legislature passed the <u>Town</u>

<u>Planning and Rural Development Act</u>, 79 to take effect in July 1918. This Act was Saskatchewan's first planning statute.

The Saskatchewan Act departs from the format followed by Manitoba's <u>Town</u>

<u>Planning Act. 1916</u>. The Manitoba Act addresses the matter of the preparation of a town planning scheme immediately and directly; the very first section of the Act states:

1. A town planning scheme may be prepared in accordance with the provisions of this Act with the general object of securing suitable provision for traffic, proper sanitary conditions, amenity and convenience in connection with the laying out of streets and use of land and of any neighbouring lands for building or other purposes.<sup>80</sup>

The Act then goes on to set out the conditions and regulations under which a town planning scheme may be prepared, such as who may prepare a scheme, how the scheme may be funded, how the land may be acquired, the payment of compensation, the appointment of a commission, etc. There are no Parts in the Manitoba Act. It is only in the schedules to the Act (of which there are three, A, B and C) that the specific matters to be dealt with in a scheme are set out, such as prescribing the width of main thoroughfares and secondary streets; zones in which building use may be regulated; zones in which building density may be regulated; procedures for preparation and adoption; etc. It is a straightforward piece of legislation. Under the Manitoba Act the preparation of a town planning scheme is discretionary, not mandatory: "a town planning scheme *may* be prepared...."

Saskatchewan's <u>Town Planning and Rural Development Act. 1917</u>, unlike

Manitoba's, is divided into four Parts. Part I is entitled "Title, Interpretation and

Appointments." Part II is entitled "New Streets and Subdivisions - Powers and Duties of

Local Authority." Part III is entitled "Development By-laws and Scheme." Part IV is

entitled "Acquisition of Land." The Act concludes with two schedules, A and B. What is of interest here is that whereas the Manitoba Act introduces the town planning scheme and its preparation in the very first section, the Saskatchewan statute does not. Indeed, the Saskatchewan Act, despite its title, does not anywhere refer to a "town planning scheme." Instead it uses the term "development scheme," and it doesn't get around to dealing with the "development scheme" until section 9 in Part III of the Act. After dealing with the title, interpretations and appointments in section 1 through 4, which comprise Part 1, the Act's first concern under Part II is the control of new streets and subdivisions, and reads more like a Subdivision Act than a Planning Act. There is no definition of "town planning" in the Act, and, indeed, no satisfactory definition of any of the terms it uses. And it uses a number of terms indiscriminately and with no clear explanation or understanding of any of them or of the differences between them. Terms such as "development," "development scheme," "development by-laws," "town-planning bylaws," "town planning," become merely so much jargon in the Act and succeed only in creating a profound confusion over their import and a dilemma over their intent. Repeated and careful reading of the Act does little to clarify its obscurity and only confirms one's bewilderment over its intentions. A detailed analysis of the perplexing language and sections is perhaps unnecessary here, but a summary appreciation may be of interest.

The dilemma posed by the statute can be stated in these terms: A local authority need not adopt a development scheme (sec.10(1).). If it does not adopt a development scheme then it must adopt development by-laws "within three years of the passing of the Act" (sec.9(1).). "Development" by-laws or "town planning" by-laws (sec.2.8) must provide for the matters set out in schedule A (sec.9(1).) which are "development" or "town-planning" matters. How a local authority can adopt town-planning by-laws or development by-laws without a development scheme (or town planning scheme) the Act does not venture to explain. On the other hand if the local authority does adopt a

development scheme it need not adopt a set of town-planning by-laws (or development by-laws) (sec.9(4).) incorporating the matters set out in schedule A. How a local authority can adopt a development scheme without accompanying development by-laws or planning by-laws again is a mystery which the Act does not address. Presumably the development scheme itself would have to be adopted by by-law and presumably it would address the matters set out in schedule A. But the Act is silent on these points and it does not define what it means by a development scheme. An essential component of the statute is thus left in doubt and its intent becomes a matter of conjecture.

Saskatchewan's <u>Town Planning and Rural Development Act. 1917</u>, was a very badly drawn Act, ambiguous and virtually defying compliance. This in itself would not merit comment on the Act: there are many statutes which are badly drawn, whose intent is obscure, and whose requirements are ambiguous. It is not the anomalies in the Saskatchewan Act which are the reason for the above comments. Rather, the reason for the comments is that the very ambiguity of the Act throws some light on certain attitudes of both the provincial legislators and the city council at that time. The confusion in the <u>Town Planning and Rural Development Act</u> may be seen as an expression of the confusion in the minds of government officials over the concept of planning. It seems clear that the administrative regulation of land-use was regarded as a major role - or even the major role - of the planning function. The place of the other items set out in schedule A, such as land-use districts, density districts, building coverage, amenity, hygienic conditions, agricultural and horticultural land-use designation, etc. is not at all clear; but entirely absent is the notion that a context of policies is required to give direction and meaning to the various by-laws contemplated in the Act. It contained no reference to or even hint of future-oriented development goals which is the essence of the planning concept. It was then essentially nothing more than a blue-print for a subdivision and zoning by-law of a somewhat more elaborate nature than that which was already in place in Regina.

It is understandable that the control of subdivision and street design would be a major concern of the provincial authorities at that time. The opening decade of the twentieth century was a boom period in Saskatchewan in which land speculation was rife. Regina, the seat of the provincial government, experienced intense subdivision activity on its fringes with the inevitable accompanying problems of services and taxation. This could hardly have escaped the notice of the members of the legislature and it may be that the annexation episode of 1911 in which Regina absorbed some 6000 acres of land on its fringes which had been unsystematically subdivided, as well as the furious pace of subdivision elsewhere in the province, loomed large in the minds of the legislators as an issue demanding legislative attention. It seems reasonable that they should seek to control by provincial statute the subdivision and development of land not only in the urban centres but also in the rural areas around them. It also seems reasonable that as representatives, for the most part, of rural constituencies, and given the generally rural ethos of the province, they would view the safeguarding of the agricultural character of the rural areas as a necessary legislative measure and hence would make particular note of this need in the **Town Planning and Rural Development Act.** 

It is also understandable that Regina's city council would not respond with alacrity to the Act. In the first place, Regina already had a subdivision by-law in force. It also had a zoning by-law which set out certain land-use districts and prohibited certain noxious or undesirable uses in specific locations. It is true that none of the city's by-laws precisely corresponded to or satisfied the prescriptions of the Act and its schedules, but from the council's point of view its by-laws were working satisfactorily and were quite adequate. It is further understandable that the council might not embrace the Act simply because they did not think that Regina needed any planning other than what was already in hand, that is, a comprehensive landscaping program for the city, to say nothing of the Mawson plan with which they had been toying since 1913. Conditions in Regina, with a population of just over 26,000 in 1916, and with only rudimentary

industrialization, hardly warranted a statutory planning system based on the comprehensive planning philosophy of Thomas Adams. Finally it is possible that the ambiguous nature of the <u>Town Planning and Rural Development Act</u> dissuaded the council from turning enthusiastically to it and away from the measures which were already in place in Regina. In any case, perhaps for all of the foregoing reasons, Regina's council was very slow to respond to the Act.

How closely the members of Regina's city council were in touch with Adams and the Committee of Conservation is a matter of conjecture. But the main tenets of Adams' planning concept were known in a number of quarters of Regina before the passing of the Act in 1917. The members of the Metropolitan Brotherhood and the City Planning Association were acquainted with them as early as 1912 and 1913, although the general principles were expounded by speakers and writers others than Adams. But if the Regina community and its city council followed the progress and publications of the Commission of Conservation after 1914 they would have come across Adams' own exposition of the meaning of planning in a variety of sources including the eighth annual report of the Commission, in which he wrote:

A proper planning scheme is essentially a development scheme -- not a mere plan and report as to how things might be done, but a statutory plan and scheme showing how they have to be done.... we cannot conserve the city or the country without planning for its future development according to the best scientific principles and having in mind the ultimate aim of perhaps the most important aspect of conservation policy namely, to build up national prosperity on a foundation of character, stability, freedom, and efficiency of the human resources.<sup>81</sup>

The Regina council did nothing about complying with the requirements of the Act for two years after the legislation had been passed. In 1919, however, the city commissioners and a special committee of council began to discuss the advisability of a comprehensive plan for the city, although the Mawson plan was still not accepted.

Instead the council adopted a motion stating that "steps should be taken to adopt regulations under the authority of the Town Planning and Rural Development Act." The steps they contemplated however were not steps forward into a new era of planning but rather steps backward to the attitudes of a decade earlier. What the council had in mind was ".... the development of a permanent policy of beautification of the parks and boulevards.... " through a Parks Board. 83

The issue of a Parks Board had been raised and championed by the <u>Leader</u> as long ago as 1909.<sup>84</sup> It had subsided and disappeared when Mawson was engaged to prepare a comprehensive plan for the city and now was revived by the council's declaration of renewed interest. The <u>Leader</u> once again picked up the cause and launched a campaign advocating a Parks Board. The proposal had public support and a draft by-law was prepared and given two readings by the council. It was then set aside and not given third reading. Council did not proceed with the by-law because questions were raised about how the Board would be structured, who would sit on it, what powers it would have, what policies it should follow - questions to which there seemed to be no broad or firm consensus on the answers.

Early in 1920 the council appointed a committee to look into these questions and to come up with the answers. The committee reported in July and a by-law based on their report was drawn up and given two readings. Again however, the by-law was not read the third time and was not adopted. By this time the province was becoming restive over the city's failure to comply with the Act and W.A. Begg, the provincial Director of Town Planning, wrote to the council urging them to take action in accordance with the Act and adopt development by-laws. Again the council had a by-law drafted, which differed in some respects from that of the previous year, and again the by-law received only two readings and was not adopted. At the heart of the council's equivocation was its continuing reluctance to accept the Mawson plan. Begg again urged the council to take action under the provincial planning statute and there was mounting pressure from the

Leader and the public. Finally, in July 1921, the council agreed to ask Mawson for a preliminary report which they would study and then would decide whether to ask for the final report. They agreed to pay Mawson \$1000 for the preliminary report and a further \$2000 if they wanted the final report. Mawson's preliminary report arrived in mid-July, but the council ignored it until September. When they ultimately turned their attention to it they appointed a special committee to review it, and to review at the same time the general issue of parks and city planning.

The committee was slow to act: it had not yet produced even a draft report by the end of November. It began to look as though nothing would be accomplished that year and the matter would have to be deferred to next year's council. The Board of Trade, however, was not prepared to see the matter sink into abeyance yet again and convened a special meeting to discuss urban planning, to which it invited the city council. Also invited and in attendance were representatives from the Local Council of Women, the City Building Department, the West End Ratepayers Association, the Real Estate Board, the Architects' Association, the Engineering Institute, the Rotary and Kiwanis Clubs and the Central Ratepayers Executive. The consensus of the meeting was that council take action on a city planning program.<sup>86</sup>

The mood of the meeting was so positive that a second meeting was held the following week. This meeting was attended by an even broader representation than the first. Added to the earlier groups were members from the East End Ratepayers Association, Saskatchewan Land Surveyors, the Gyro Club, and the provincial Department of Municipal Affairs. One of the notable outcomes of this meeting was the revival of the moribund City Planning Association and its reconstitution under the name of the Regina Town Planning Association. A.C. Garner was elected president. Garner was not from the same mould as the members of the former City Planning Association, most of whom were in the real estate or land development business. Garner was by profession a land surveyor. He had served with distinction in the Boer War. On his return he

opened land survey offices in Qu'Appelle and Regina. In 1910 he went to work in the Land Titles Office and with the outbreak of war in 1914 he enlisted for overseas service again. At the end of that war he returned to Regina with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel and was made chief surveyor of the Land Titles Office of Saskatchewan. His conception of planning seems to have differed from the ideas of the Metropolitan Brotherhood and the City Planning Association. A background in land surveying and senior military responsibilities on active service might perhaps be expected to produce a somewhat different attitude from that affected by sermons from Methodist and Presbyterian pulpits and by weekly discussions of moral and ethical questions at church-basement meetings. In any case, Garner's views were different from those which prevailed among the former City Planning Association membership and they appear to have influenced the direction of the new organization. Whereas landscaping and city beautification were the practical pursuits of the City Planning Association and moral and intellectual improvement its ideological aspirations, the thrust of the new Town Planning Association was in the direction of land-use control through the zoning instrument.

The public display of support for action on planning which was demonstrated at the Board of Trade meetings, and the formation of a revitalized Town Planning

Association had its affect on the city council: they came to a decision on the Mawson plan. In January, 1923, they reviewed the plan and decided that they would accept the preliminary plan he had provided in 1921 but they did not want him to go any further.

The Leader expressed some doubts as to whether the plan prepared initially in 1914 was still relevant in 1923 and the Town Planning Association shared these doubts but felt that the plan might serve as the starting point for a new and more appropriate scheme. In order to assess the feelings of the general public about the plan it was put on public display. It consisted of a number of blue-prints and a forty-eight page typewritten, double-spaced report. The reaction to it was apathetic. During the first nine days of the exhibit only 203 people came to look at it. At the end of the exhibition period the blue-

prints and the report were packed up and quietly put away and forgotten. Nothing ever came of the Mawson plan for Regina; none of its proposals was ever implemented.

## 8. Planning as Zoning - The View after World War I

Support for the planning idea however continued among the more public-minded groups in the city. The Town Planning Association had been very active since its formation and had been able to recruit into its ranks in April 1923 a number of new organizations. These included the West End Electors, the Regina Medical Council, the Wascana Creek Ratepayers Association, the Eastern Ratepayers Association, the Northside Women's Christian Temperance Union, the Anglican Women's Club, the Daughters and Maids of England and the Regina Homemakers Club. These additions to the membership were the result of a membership drive which the Association launched early in 1923. The broad spectrum of interests represented by the various member organizations might be seen as comprising a large membership. In fact, however, at the end of the drive the membership stood at only 94. The Association probably never realized any of its target figures. As was the case throughout Canada at the time, the idea of planning was of interest to only a small enclave of Regina's population and stirred little enthusiasm among the general public. The Regina Leader probably gave an accurate assessment of the situation when it wrote:

A very credible city has grown up here from what forty years ago was a mud hole, without zoning and town planning. The man in the street cannot see why it should not continue to grow in the same way.<sup>88</sup>

The membership campaign was only one of the Association's activities; it pursued others as well, some with more encouraging results. In March 1923 it set up a committee to study the matter of zoning and the city council agreed to consult with the committee in the preparation of its report. A month later the committee's report was completed and submitted to the city council. The report recommended that the council adopt a zoning by-law. The presentation to the council was made by the Association

president, Colonel A.C. Garner. During his explanatory remarks President Garner noted that:

As a protection to property value and to the public health as well as a means of preserving and enhancing the beauty of the city, a town plan or system of zoning should be adopted at the earliest possible moment.<sup>89</sup>

The president of the Regina Town Planning Association was not saying that "a town plan or system of zoning" were alternatives and that the council could choose between them. He was saying that a town plan and a system of zoning were one and the same thing. The Town Planning Association now viewed the town plan as a means of protecting property values and public health and of preserving and enhancing civic beauty. In fairness, however, it must be acknowledged that in making the case for zoning, Colonel Garner did say that zoning was a first priority necessary at that time, and implied that further steps might be appropriate at some later time. 90 Thomas Adams' philosophy of comprehensive planning whose purpose was "to build up national prosperity on a foundation of character, sobriety, freedom and efficiency of human resources" was gradually mutating into a system of zoning whose purpose was to protect property values and public health and to preserve civic beauty. The spiritual and moralistic aspirations of the former City Planning Association and of the Metropolitan Brotherhood were now being superceded by a concern for property values, although the place of health and beauty was still acknowledged even if only in a secondary position, in President Garner's listing. The ideology of planning was beginning to move towards concepts which could be embraced in the ethos of the Regina city council and indeed in the ethos of municipal government throughout Canada.

In spite of the notion of planning as zoning which was emerging, and which was more compatible with the council's view of its role as the civic government as well as with its statutory powers, and in spite of public support for "planning" as manifested in the call for action by the Town Planning Association with its broad base of membership,

as well as of the Board of Trade, and in spite of the pressure from the provincial government urging the council to comply with the requirements of the <u>Town Planning</u> and <u>Rural Development Act</u>, the council made no immediate move. Nothing was done about the planning issue that year. In June, 1924, however, the council took action. It appointed a Planning Board whose terms of reference were to prepare a planning by-law which would conform with the requirements of the Act. The Board was made up of nine members, four of whom were city officials and five were Regina residents. The city officials were Mayor S.C. Burton, the city commissioner, the city solicitor and the city engineer. The appointees from the community were Colonel A.C. Garner who was appointed as the Chairman of the Board; Mr. J.N. de Stein, an engineer; Mr. A.J. Styles, a lawyer; and two appointees representing the real estate interests in the city, Mr. W.H.A. Hill and Mr. W.L. Wallace.

The Board took three years to produce its report. When the draft by-law was finally made public in 1927 it was clear that the focus of planning in Regina had shifted from high humanistic principles and the creation of a comprehensive system of landscaping of parks, boulevards and playgrounds to the simple administrative concept of land-use control. In effect, however, it did satisfy the broad requirements of the Town Planning and Rural Development Act, of 1917. There were three parts to the by-law. The first part divided the city into six Use-Districts: two Residential, two Business, and two Commercial and Industrial for the purpose of "regulating, classifying and restricting the location of trades and industries and the location of buildings designed, erected or altered for specific uses". Pl Residence District "A" included all the subdivisions annexed by the City in 1911 and was for the most part undeveloped land. Uses permitted here were single and two-family dwellings. Residence District "B" permitted multiple family dwellings and took in the existing built-up residential areas of the city. Business or industrial uses were not permitted in the Residence Districts although allowance was made for existing establishments as well as retail "convenience

corners" in the outlying areas. Business District "A" allowed "prime" retail uses and encompassed the existing downtown retail core. Business District "B" was cumulative in its permitted uses: it included all the uses of Residence Districts "A" and "B", all the uses of Business District "A", as well as some additional commercial uses such as those which required larger sites and outdoor storage. It was located to the east of the downtown.

Commercial and Industrial District "A" was meant for only light and/or clean industries and embraced the city's warehouse district, while Commercial and Industrial District "B" was designated for heavy and/or obnoxious industries and was located in the easterly extension of the warehouse district, mainly on the land acquired by the city through tax default as the result of the economic depression in 1913 and the following years.

Commercial and Industrial District "B" was referred to as the Unrestricted District and was essentially an "anything goes" zone, but Council's approval was required.92

The second part of the by-law divided the city into three zones in which the height of buildings was restricted, each zone having its own restrictions. The third part created four "Area Restrictions, for the purpose of regulating and determining the percentage of lot occupancy and area of yard, courts and other open spaces for buildings hereafter erected or altered." Also contained in the by-law were a number of regulations specifying the length and shape of blocks, the width and gradient of streets and the size of residential and commercial lots. It is of interest to note that the by-law made no mention of parks or playgrounds, although it did require that developers set aside as public reserve five percent of any tract of land for which they sought subdivision or development approval. The draft by-law produced by the Planning Board met with the approval of the city council and was passed by the council, virtually unchanged, in September 1927.94

Among those to whom the planning issue was of interest there was general approval that the by-law had been passed by the council, although there were those who were not so pleased. W.H.A. Hill, for example, who had been a member of the Board, had

serious reservations about some of the restrictions on development imposed by the bylaw, and his objections were shared throughout the real estate fraternity. Stewart
Young, who was then the provincial Director of Town Planning had indicated to the
council that merely a zoning by-law did not meet the requirements of the Act and that a
much broader planning approach was required and in this he was supported by some
public opinion. The pressure from the province and from the sympathetic elements
among the public finally persuaded the council in late October 1928 to appoint a Town
Planning Commission with a mandate to develop a Town Planning Scheme.<sup>95</sup>

The Commission consisted of five members. Colonel A.C. Garner was the chairman and there were two others who had sat with him on the former planning board - J.N. de Stein, the engineer, and L.A. Thornton, the former city commissioner, who was now employed by the Saskatchewan Power Commission. The other two members of the Town Planning Commission were F.H. Portnall, a Regina architect, and F.H. Darke, the prominent Reginan who had distinguished himself in the business, political and social life of the community. The Commission worked through the years 1930 and 1931. It seems that they were still at it in 1932 because the Leader Post reported in January that they were working out plans for the laying out of Regina on the basis of a city of at least 150,000 population but that they would only report when times were more propitious.<sup>96</sup> Whether they ever completed their work is not clear and there is no record of a planning scheme having been adopted by the council. The onset of the Great Depression and World War II turned the council's attention away from any concerns about planning and it was not until 1946 that planning again became a public issue.

One can appreciate the council's diffidence towards the Mawson plan and towards the whole ideology of planning if one considers some of the salient factors which influenced their approach to their role as the civic government. Probably the most influential was the fact that they were businessmen who saw civic government through the eyes of businessmen and whose objective for the city, as it was for their own

businesses, was uninhibited growth and economic prosperity. The principle of private enterprise and a market-driven economy were the foundation-stones of their ethos. Combined with these was the principle of financial responsibility and prudence. These tenets would not be readily amenable to proposals for regulations and controls, except insofar as such impositions would assist in the pursuit of the objective of the expansion of the city's economy. Moreover, Regina was a very small centre. When Mawson was hired the city's population was barely over 30,000; three years later it was barely over 26,000. Development control was the last thing the council would be interested in: quite the contrary, development stimulation was what they wanted. "Germantown" notwithstanding, the problems of a community of 30,000 people set in the middle of a vast, unurbanized, horizon-to-horizon immensity of farmland was not beset with the types of urban problems which cry out for city planning solution. Beyond that, however, the city owned an enormous amount of land thanks to the federal land-grant, and about 3000 more lots were added to its holdings because of tax default in the years following the 1913 economic debacle. The council was thus probably the biggest land owner in Regina and it controlled the development of this vast tract of the city quite satisfactorily through the exercise of prudent business policies. It is true that the council's most careful heed was paid to the development of the lands in the city's warehouse district but the lands for other uses were not entirely neglected and the land management controls exercised by the council worked as an effective planning system in the context of that city at that time.

The notion of urban planning was essentially an alien idea in Regina which tinted the edges of the conversations among certain enclaves of Regina society as it gradually diffused its way across the country from its Canadian source in Ottawa. There was little enthusiasm for it among Reginans generally and little understanding of it even among those who discussed the idea. In the visually impoverished and unappealing environment of the city it was perhaps inevitable that city landscaping would be regarded as city

planning. The various parks and landscaping proposals with which the council became involved they saw as means of enhancing the appearance of the city so that it would be more attractive to new investors and residents. But ambitious programs of landscaping cost money and in the years after 1913 the city's financial circumstances were precarious. Regina's economy was in effect a function of Saskatchewan's economy, which was the wheat economy. As the fortunes of the wheat crop went, so went Regina's fortunes. And in 1913 those fortunes suffered a severe and traumatic decline.

## 9. The 1913 Recession and the Decade of the 1920's

Hard on the heels of the general economic collapse in 1913 there was a severe drought across southern Saskatchewan in 1914 and a very poor harvest. The 1913 recession threw large numbers of men out of work; the crop failure of 1914 added more unemployed to those numbers. In 1915, however, the outlook brightened. A bumper crop was harvested and the demand for food from Britain and the allied nations at war in Europe sent prices upward. Regina's economic conditions improved notably. Its wholesaling and distribution activities increased dramatically; retailing also surged. The Robert Simpson Company and the T. Eaton Company opened large mail-order departments in the city. Regina became the motor-vehicle distribution centre for the entire province. By 1918 the number of automobile registrations in Saskatchewan reached 55,010, second only to those in Ontario. The Wheat prices remained high until the war ended and then collapsed in 1920. Many farmers, loaded with debts assumed during the prosperous war years in order to buy land and farm vehicles and equipment, were brought to near destitution. Some lost their farms and their livelihood altogether. But the worst was still to come about a decade later.

During the war the price of wheat had been stabilized because it was controlled by the Canadian Wheat Board. When wheat was sold on the open market its price fluctuated erratically but the bulk marketing by the wartime Canadian Wheat Board brought stability to the market. The Board was discontinued after the war. Farmers,

suffering under the depressed market conditions following the 1920 collapse, remembered the price stability under the Wheat Board's control and sought renewed control measures. In 1923 they began organizing a voluntary body to handle the marketing of western grain. Their efforts met with stiff resistance but in June 1924 they created the Saskatchewan Co-operative Wheat Producers Limited, known more familiarly as the Wheat Pool. About 45,000 farmers with a total of 6,240,000 acres of wheat land entered into a five-year contract to market their wheat through this co-operative organization. They set up their head office in the large Sherwood Store at Albert and Victoria in Regina and continued to operate on the basis of their original agreement until 1931, when due to the disaster of the world economic collapse the federal government had to step in and informally take over the financial affairs of the Pool. This arrangement continued until 1935 when the continuing depressed farm economy forced the federal government to take over that role formally.

The Saskatchewan economy remained depressed between 1920 and 1924. Poor crops and low prices took a heavy toll. The cost of living declined by nineteen percent but the price of wheat fell by fifty-seven percent. Conditions in the agricultural sector were reflected in Regina. The City had to retrench on its capital works program and was ultra-conservative and quite ruthless in its restrictions on the relief of the unemployed.

In 1924 the wheat crop was much better and conditions gradually began to improve. The crop in 1925 was better still and prices for both wheat and livestock rose dramatically. Immigrants began to come back into the province. Occupied acreage increased twenty-four percent and from 1926 to 1928 farm incomes remained high. The wheat crop in 1928 was the best ever, yielding 321.2 million bushels, which would not be exceeded until 1951. Railway branch-line construction resumed. Both the CPR and the newly constituted Canadian National Railways built new lines, particularly to serve communities in the central and northern parts of the province, and by 1928 this aspect of railway activity had returned almost to the level of the pre-war period.

A new wave of expansion began to surge through Regina. The city's population grew from 34,432 in 1921 to 37,329 in 1926.98 Business activity, particularly in the retailing and wholesaling sectors prospered. The city retained its position as the leading centre in Canada for the distribution of farm machinery and equipment. And in 1926 the Council launched a four-year program of capital construction in which \$24,000,000 was spent. But in spite of all this activity, business did not achieve the levels it had reached in the pre-war boom years. This was largely due to two factors. One was that the creation of the prairie wheat economy had been more-or-less completed. Most of the productive land had now been taken up although the introduction of new strains of faster-maturing wheat had encouraged farming to expand north of the Saskatchewan River, and the return of farmers to the land after the exodus brought on by the 1913-1915 depression and the war increased the occupied acreage. But it had beenthe waves of immigration and the frantic pace of building and investment driven by the almost unlimited infrastructure needs of the emerging wheat economy which had produced the pre-war boom, and now that was over. The pace of development was now slower and therefore the pace of business was slower and could not match that of the pre-war years. The second reason was that although farming was becoming more efficient - the average farm size, for example, was 350 acres in 1916 and 390 acres in 1926 and farms were becoming more highly mechanized - the price of wheat even though more stable than in the immediate post-war years could not keep pace with the rising costs of farm production. This meant that there was less money in the pockets of the farmers to spend on the goods and services offered by the businessmen of Regina.

Still, the years 1926-1928 were very good years. The value of building permits issued in Regina in 1926 was \$4,242,402; in 1928 building permit values had risen to \$6,619,200.<sup>99</sup> In 1927 the CPR opened its large, first-class Hotel Saskatchewan across from Victoria Park which made amends for the Grand Trunk Pacific's Chateau Qu'Appelle fiasco of an earlier decade. And in 1928 General Motors

opened a plant on Winnipeg Street for the assembly of Chevrolet and Pontiac automobiles. The plant employed a work force of 850 at peak production and attracted supporting industries such as the manufacturers and suppliers of paint and glass required for the vehicles. It may have been the bargain-basement price of the 38-acre site which the city sold to General Motors for \$1000 per acre, and the ten year fixed assessment on the land and buildings which attracted the giant corporation to Regina. But the establishment of the plant was seen as another one of the many promising signs that Regina was moving into a new era of industrialization and prosperity.

## 10. The Depression Years and the Politics of Protest

That beguiling prospect was suddenly blighted by the collapse of the world's financial structure in 1929. Saskatchewan's wheat economy, on which the fortunes of the entire province rested, was devastated. The price of wheat fell disastrously. During the late 1920's wheat was selling at more than two dollars per bushel; by 1932 it was selling at only thirty-eight cents a bushel. Added to the woes brought on by the worldwide economic depression were those inflicted upon the people of Saskatchewan by the double calamity of the searing drought and wind, and the plague of grasshoppers which ravaged the province in 1933 and 1934. Southern Saskatchewan was dessicated and pulverized by the scorching sun and relentless wind which turned the region into a desert of dust. Swirling clouds of granulated topsoil whipped through the air choking and stinging and abrading everything in their path and the wind-driven tumbleweed rolled and scudded and bumped across the blasted dust-dimmed landscape in a demented danse macabre. There were nine successive years of crop failure. The wheat crop in 1928 averaged 23.3 bushels per acre; in 1937 it was 2.6 bushels per acre. Net cash income per farm in 1928 was higher than in any other province; by 1933 Saskatchewan farmers were the poorest in Canada and by 1937 two-thirds of the farm population was destitute. Saskatchewan fell from the fourth wealthiest province in 1928 to the poorest in the nation by 1933. Farms were abandoned or lost through foreclosure. Thousands

became unemployed. Many left the land to seek employment or relief in Regina or elsewhere. The provincial population fell by almost 26,000 between 1931 and 1941.<sup>100</sup> The value of retail trade in the province dropped from \$189 million in 1930 to \$103 million in 1933. This represented a decline of 45.5 per cent in the value of retail business done in Saskatchewan in the short space of three years and was the worst plunge in retailing of any in the nation.<sup>101</sup> In most of the rest of Canada the depression reached the lowest point in 1933 but in Saskatchewan it deepened beyond that year: Saskatchewan's worst years were 1937 and 1938.

Regina suffered with the rest of the province. Unemployment and its relief were perhaps the most pressing problems for the city council. By August 1930, there were 3,756 unemployed in the city. On that date General Motors closed its Regina plant. (It was re-opened for a few months in 1931, then closed for six years, opened again in 1937 and then permanently closed in 1939.)<sup>102</sup> By June 1931 as much as twenty-three percent of all adult male wage earners were out of work. The number of unemployed continued to rise through the winter of 1931-1932 and then began a slow decline. But by June 1936 it still stood at 19.7 percent.<sup>103</sup> The value of building permits in Regina which had stood at \$10,022,631 in 1928 fell to \$227,069 in 1932.<sup>104</sup> The tax mill rate rose from 41 mills in 1929 to 48 mills in 1931.<sup>105</sup> Tax arrears also multiplied, reaching a million dollars in 1933 and growing to \$1,460,287 in 1937.<sup>106</sup>

That was the last year in which the federal and provincial governments participated in public works relief projects in Regina. After that the City had to make its own way unaided by the senior governments' capital contributions. It could have proceeded with more capital projects by financing them on the basis of long-term borrowing; but by 1931 the city was already holding over one million dollars in unsold debentures which discouraged the council from further borrowing. Unemployment, however, continued to mount and the number of people in need of relief continued to

grow. By October 1932 nearly twenty percent of the total population of Regina was on relief. 107 With public works relief projects no longer feasible the city council had to turn wholly to direct relief measures, known commonly as "the dole." The city had in fact been making direct relief payments as a parallel measure to its public works relief projects since 1929. For the three years 1929-1931 a total of \$543,505 had been spent on direct relief and by 1935 the accumulated cost of "the dole" totalled \$4,754,216. The federal and provincial governments each bore one-third of the actual relief payments and the city bore the remaining third. The city, however, also had to pay all the administrative expenses as well as the medical costs of all those on the dole who required medical care. As a result the city was carrying about half of the total cost of the direct relief measures.

Initially the city managed the direct relief program itself. In 1931, however, it assigned the work to the Civic Relief Board, a private agency. The relief allowance for groceries was eighteen dollars per month for a family of four. 108 This was soon reduced to sixteen dollars and \$2.40 was added or subtracted for each individual more or less than the basic four in the family. 109 There was also a small allowance for water, light and coal, and landlords could receive up to twenty dollars per month toward the rent of tenants on relief. Relief payments were regarded as a debt and recipients were required to promise to repay the city the full amount of the relief they had received. All relief was paid in the form of vouchers, not in cash. There was no allowance for clothing. The Leader-Post had set up a Community Clothing Depot in 1929 which collected and distributed used clothing. This role was taken over in 1931 by the Regina Welfare Bureau, a community organization comprising eighty church, fraternal and service organizations. The Bureau's staff consisted of a few salaried workers and a large number of volunteers. They made a thorough annual canvas of the city for cash and used clothing but their efforts frequently failed to meet the need for clothing among those on welfare.

At the onset of the Depression the city council moved to provide relief work for unemployed married men, but did nothing for the single unemployed other than to make a grant of five-hundred dollars to the Salvation Army to do work among the unmarried indigents. The grant enabled the Army to extend daily help to only about forty or fifty men which consisted of a bed, two bowls of soup and four slices of bread per day. At the end of 1932, however, a relief camp for the single unemployed was set up on the Exhibition Grounds. The camp was filled immediately with over four hundred men. here they were housed and fed until they could be sent out to work at pittance wages on farms, national parks or army work camps. The work camps program was under the jurisdiction of the senior governments rather than the city. It was inevitable that conditions of such severe and widespread distress should arouse anger against governments and the wealthy and impel people to impassioned political protest.

The Independent Labour Party (ILP) was among the first political organizations to champion the cause of labour in Regina. The local branch of the party was organized in 1929 and by 1933 three of its candidates had been elected to the ten-member city council. They were bitterly critical of the city's food allowance for those on relief, condemning it as inadequate and demanding that the food payment be made in cash rather than vouchers. In November 1930 the Canadian Unemployed Workers Association became active in Regina, and in 1932 the Regina Unemployed Workers Council staged a "relief strike" against the city's practice of paying only one-quarter of the wages of men engaged on city relief work in cash. Accusations were frequent that Communist agitators were responsible for stirring up all the unrest among the unemployed and for organizing the workers' associations. There was probably some truth in these allegations because the far left wing of the political spectrum was much more actively insurrectionist than the more centrist and philosophically-oriented Fabian socialists who were typical of such organizations as the ILP. The May Day rally of 1931 drew 8,000 people to Market Square. The occasion was marked by fiery speeches condemning the government and the

capitalists and the red flag was conspicuously displayed and waved. The meeting ended in violence when fighting broke out among the labour supporters and onlookers who regarded them as bolshevik revolutionaries.

The growing militancy of the political left stirred the business community in Regina to organize the Civic Government Association in November 1932. They were successful in having three of their candidates elected to the council in the civic election of that year. One of these was Helena Walker, the first woman to be elected to Regina's city council. The Civic Government Association claimed that it was not a political party and that its only interest was to encourage citizens to become more involved in civic politics although, clearly, their intent was to keep labour representatives out of city hall. In all of this they were analogous to the Winnipeg Election Committee in Winnipeg at about that time but whose genealogy went back in various forms and under various names all the way to the anti-strike Committee of One Thousand in 1919 and would go forward to the Independent Civic Election Committee and the Gang of Nineteen in the 1980s.

Perhaps the outstanding event of the depression decade, at any rate an event which has a lasting place in the history of Regina during the depression years, was the riot of July 1, 1935. It was the culmination of the On-to-Ottawa trek which began in the federal government's relief camps in British Columbia. Early in June, 1935, a thousand single unemployed men, languishing in these camps, were organized by the Relief Camp Workers Union and left Vancouver to take their grievances directly to Ottawa. They were joined by sympathizers along the way and their number soon swelled to 1400. As they moved eastward Mayor Rink, on June 4, warned them to keep away from Regina because the city would not feed and look after them. On June 14, Prime Minister R.B. Bennett ordered the trek to stop in Regina. On June 15 the Citizens' Emergency Committee, comprising a variety of organizations representing women's groups, ministerial associations, church organizations, as well as workers' political and

union organizations held a tag-day in support of the trekkers. The citizens of Regina responded with great sympathy. The tag-day raised \$1,146, the largest sum contributed by any community along the way. The trekkers were housed and fed on the Exhibition Grounds for two weeks while their leaders went on to Ottawa to confront the government. Bennett's government rejected their demands and they returned empty-handed to Regina. A mass meeting was called on July 1 to be held in the city's Market Square. As the leaders were addressing the rally a combined force of RCMP and the city police moved in to break up the meeting and arrest the leaders. A riot broke out in which a city police detective was killed and scores of trekkers, police and citizens were injured. 110

Although a signal occurrence in the history of Regina's Depression decade the event was not on the same scale as the Winnipeg general strike of 1919, nor did it have a traumatic impact or lasting effect on the political and social structure of Regina comparable to that which the 1919 strike and riot had on Winnipeg. Nevertheless the events of July 1935 did mark the start of a period in Regina's civic government which was significantly different from what had heretofore prevailed. Whether those events were the direct cause of the change or whether the change was inevitable in the socio-political ferment and stress of the Depression is a moot point. Whatever the relationship, in the civic election held late in 1935 Alban C. Ellison the labour candidate was elected mayor and labour aldermen won half the seats on the council.

Ellison was an unassuming, thoughtful man whose quiet confidence and sincerity contrasted sharply with the bombast of Cornelius Rink, the previous mayor. A new political organization representing labour - the Civic Labour League - emerged to fight the 1935 election on a platform of reform of the relief system, restoration of the cuts in the salaries of city personnel, the payment of wages for relief work, and a scheme for the repair and rehabilitation of housing fallen into disrepair. The restructuring of the city's electoral system into five wards in 1935 (Fig. 23.) may also have contributed to

the success of Ellison and the labour candidates. With the establishment of the ward system, the Civic Government Association, which had been organized to keep labour candidates out of the council, for some unexplained reason decided to disband.

Accordingly they did not campaign in the 1935 contest as an organized body and there was no concerted effective support for the anti-labour candidates. The new electoral wards corresponded fairly closely to the class and ethnic enclaves in the city and the Civic Labour League concentrated its campaign in the wards which lay on the east and north sides of the city in which the working-class neighbourhoods were located. The League took both seats in each of Wards One and Two and one of the two seats in Ward Four. The same voting pattern appeared in the mayoralty contest. Ellison won handily in Wards One, Three and Four; Rink won by a very small majority in Ward Two; and Charles Dixon, a businessmen, won in Ward Five. Labour maintained effective control of the Regina City Council until the end of the decade of the 1930s.

In the election of 1936, Ellison, uneasy about the influence which he felt the Communists were exercising over the Civic Labour League, broke his ties with the League and ran as an independent. He easily defeated the League's replacement candidate and Cornelius Rink who ran as the candidate of the Homeowners' Association. The council was evenly split between the Civic Labour League's representatives and the Homeowners' Association's representatives - five aldermen on each side - so that with the mayor's casting vote the council again had a labour majority.

The ward electoral system had been established by a city by-law in 1935, which was heavily supported by the voters in the east and north sectors of the city. Almost as soon as it was approved the council at that time, still dominated by the business interests, began to work towards its repeal, even in the dying weeks of its tenure for that session. The Homeowners' Association also launched a campaign against the ward system. Pressures mounted to the point where it became an election issue in 1936. Retention of the system received heavy support in Wards One and Three, which had

advocated the system originally; Wards Two and Four narrowly rejected it; and the affluent voters of Ward Five overwhelmingly rejected it. The ward system was abandoned for the election of 1937.

The change in the electoral system, however, had little effect on labour's political fortunes. The rift between Ellison and the Civic Labour League was repaired and Ellison ran again as the League's official mayoralty candidate. He defeated the Homeowners' Association candidate, the former Mayor Henry Black by more than 8000 votes. 111 An additional labour alderman was elected as well. In 1938, the Homeowners' Association, like its previous incarnation in the form of the Civic Government Association, and equally inexplicably, disappeared from the civic political scene and did not contest the election nor support any candidate. Ellison won by acclamation; labour won eight of the ten aldermanic seats on the council.

There was a dramatic change in 1939. Canada was at war in the defence of Britain, the Empire, and the whole of the free world. The anti-labour forces were better organized than before. A new mutant strain of the Civic Government Association/Homeowners' Association had emerged - the Civic Voters Association - which proclaimed itself to be "non-partisan," condemned "class government" in civic affairs and declaimed anti-communist and pro-patriotism rhetoric. The Leader Post intensified its customary anti-labour editorial comments and posture. In the election of 1939 Alban Ellison lost the mayoralty contest to the Civic Voters Association's candidate, James Grassick, and all the labour aldermen who were up for election were defeated. Thus ended labour's half-decade of ascendancy at City Hall in Regina.

### 11. Post-World War II Pressures for Planning

During the war Regina's population grew only modestly. In 1941 it was 58,425; in 1946 it was 60,246, an increase of only 2,000. After that, however, the city grew significantly. Over the next few years, from 1946 to 1951 the population increased by 11,070 to 71,519, an 18.4 percent growth; and by 1956 the population had expanded

to 89,755, an increase of 18,436, or 25.8 percent over the 1951 figure. Although economic conditions in the city began to improve with the end of the Depression and the outbreak of World War II in 1939, there were still 5,559 Reginans out of work at the beginning of 1941. The number of unemployed in the city fell to 2,494 in 1942, but in spite of this and other economic improvements the city still suffered from other legacies of the Depression. Housing conditions in the city, for example, were deplorable. During that dismal decade few new homes were built and many people had to find accommodation in grossly sub-standard housing. A study conducted in 1940 found that Regina's housing situation was one of the worst in Canada. 112 The average floor space per family was only 600 square feet compared to the national average of 850 square feet, and 7.5 percent of families lived in one room while the average for other cities was only 2.5 percent. A large proportion of the population lived in rented accommodation rather than in homes which they owned, which did not encourage dwelling repairs or maintenance. Unemployed Reginans and rural families driven off their farms to seek employment or relief in the city had no means, nor indeed any incentive to improve the blighted housing conditions.

The war did little to further the industrialization of Regina. the city's industrial capacity was too rudimentary and it was too far from the seat of power in central Canada and too remote from the seaports to receive any significant war production orders.

Nevertheless the federal government did take over the General Motors plant for the duration, renamed it Regina Industries Limited, and turned it into a munitions factory. At the peak of production it employed a work force of 1,596. When the war ended in 1945 the plant reverted to General Motors who closed it and never opened it again. A similar pattern was repeated in the meat-packing industry. During the war the Burns meat-packing plant was the second largest industrial employer in the city. When the war ended, restructuring and consolidation in the industry forced the closing of the Regina plant.

The end of the war did not ease the housing shortage. Military personnel no longer needed billeting, and war factory workers left the city, but returning exservicemen more than made up for that loss. These veterans, having offered their lives in the service of their country looked forward to a welcoming reception and to at least the reward of owning their own homes. The city council had in fact taken some steps to enable veterans to acquire their own homes by offering them city-owned lots at a reduced price if they undertook to build their homes on them. The council had also entered into an agreement with the federal government's Wartime Housing agency to build three hundred houses, mostly in the eastern and north-western sections of the city. These were the typical Wartime Housing units, built of green lumber, with no basements, with inferior plumbing, but containing four to six rooms, neat in exterior appearance, built on individual lots, and offered at very low rent to veterans and their dependants. Former army and air-force huts were also converted into family housing for ex-servicemen. Cottages at Regina Beach, some forty miles north of Regina on Long Lake, were winterized and a special commuters bus service was established between there and Regina. The council also approved the construction in the city of 120 unserviced two and three room emergency cabins which provided minimal shelter. 113

Even these measures were inadequate. Many families, in desperation, moved north of the city limits. (See Fig. 22. and Fig. 24.) Outside of the city limits they could escape the city's taxes and they could find cheap land on which to build minimal unserviced houses, or could rent such places at rents they could afford. Residential clusters had already been built in these areas some thirty years before when the Grand Trunk Railway shops and the Imperial Oil Refinery had been constructed there. During the Depression more families had moved into these areas to escape the city's taxes and rigid sanitation and building codes. With the end of the war there was a new wave of residential construction here. But there was also an influx of junk yards and wrecking companies whose premises, cheek by jowl with the jerry-built sub-standard housing

created a zone of dereliction on the northern outskirts of the city. In contrast to this depressing slum, however, was the veterans development called Churchill Downs which was also built on the city's northern outskirts. Here the dwellings were of a high standard of construction, fully serviced, with full basements, and located on sites of at least one acre in size. All of this sprawl would become the subject of a heated annexation controversy at the beginning of the 1950s.

In 1945, however, there was no talk of annexation. The council had its hands full with the city's housing problem. It also had some concerns about the amount of publicly-owned land in the city. Not all of the lots comprising the 1903 federal land grant had as yet been disposed of, and these together with the properties acquired by the city through tax default during the decade and a half of the Depression and World War II made the city the owner of fully one quarter of all the property in Regina. 114 Perhaps the council was uncomfortable with the ownership of and responsibility for such an inordinately large amount of land and was looking for some acceptable way to manage it; perhaps the housing crisis was pressing the council for a systematic housing program rather than an ad hoc series of expedients; perhaps the town planning commission, which had been appointed in October 1928 but had suspended its activities with the onset of the Depression, became active again with the end of the war and urged the council to renew its interest in town planning. Probably all of these factors contributed to the council's readiness to consider the merits of a planning solution to its problems, and when the commission recommended, in September 1945, that they engage Eugene Faludi to prepare a master plan for the city, the council agreed. The commission entered into negotiations with Faludi, a Toronto planning consultant, and he was engaged and started work on his plan for Regina in 1946. The plan was completed and presented to council in 1947.

# PHASE 3: GROWING CITY, DECLINING AMENITY - THE PLANNING FUNCTION AND PROVINCIAL LEADERSHIP

### 1. <u>The Emergent Planning Function - The Faludi Plan and the 1961</u> <u>Planning Scheme</u>

Faludi's was the first comprehensive development plan for Regina. It had a thirty-year time period (1946-1976) and it projected Regina's population to be between 82,000 and 90,000 at the end of the thirty-years. His population analysis was based on the city's historic rate of natural increase and did not take into account the factor of migration. His estimates, therefore, were grossly in error. In fact Regina's population in 1976, at the end of the plan's time period, was 149,593, some 60,000 more than the high figure of his projected range. One of the notable features of Faludi's plan was the important place accorded the suburban shopping centre. The suburban shopping mall was just beginning to emerge as a major element in post-war urban development - particularly in the large North-American metropolitan centres - and Faludi was impressed with the effect which these shopping malls would have on residential areas, both new and existing. He also recommended the abandonment of the rigid gridiron pattern of residential street lay-out in favour of curvilinear designs which were then becoming fashionable. The downtown received scant attention in the plan other than the recommendation that a civic centre be created between Victoria Park and Albert Street which would contain a new city hall and other public buildings. The plan also recommended the removal of the railway yard and lines from the central area to locations outside the city limits, the extension and beautification of city parkland adjacent to Wascana Lake and Creek, and the creation of a city planning department within the city administration.

The leading motif of Faludi's plan for Regina was the creation of low-density residential neighbourhoods. There was no danger of a shortage of land for such development, given the low expectation for population growth and the fact that the lands

which had been annexed in 1911 and the further lands acquired through tax-default gave the city a very large reserve which seemed more than adequate for the purposes of the plan. The council, accordingly, had no interest in adding to the city's land area. The communities of North Regina, Highland Park, and North Annex, on the northern fringe of the city, (Fig. 24.) wanted municipal services, but their small scattered populations made it uneconomic to provide such services on the available tax base. Accordingly, they saw becoming part of Regina as the solution to their problems, and they agitated for the city to annex them. The city at first strongly resisted their demands, contending that the cost of extending services into these areas would be much greater than the tax revenues they would yield. The provincial government however served notice that they intended to add these three fringe areas as well as several others to Regina. Recognizing the inevitable, the city council finally agreed not only to take in the proposed areas but insisted that all of the adjacent fringe developments should be incorporated into the city. The annexation was effected in 1951 and the end result was that 5.5 square miles was added to the area of Regina and some 5,000 people were added to its population.

Other annexations followed. In 1953 land was acquired to the south-west and south of the city for the extension of the airport and for the extension of the city's park along the Wascana Creek; and the city's boundaries were enlarged to include the Consumers Co-operative Refinery in the north. In 1955 and 1956 further lands were annexed from the Rural Municipality of Sherwood to provide for residential development. This pattern of annexation continued through the 1960s and 1970s. (Fig. 21.) By 1978 the incorporated area of Regina measured 40.4 square miles, more than four times its size at the end of World War II. The initial annexation in 1951 was at the behest of the fringe area residents and under the irresistible persuasion of the provincial government and was resisted by the Regina council until they finally and resentfully had to accede. The subsequent annexations, however, were at the initiative of the city. In the early 1950s the city had disposed of nearly all of its tax-delinquent lots

and was becoming short of land for residential purposes. The subsequent annexation initiatives were taken by Regina to meet this growing shortage. However, the city did not acquire ownership of any of the annexed lands. They merely brought the properties into the corporate limits of Regina but left the ownership and the development to the private sector. In this they were continuing the long-established policy of a much lesser measure of public intervention in the control of development in the residential sector than in the industrial/warehousing sector of the city. To Regina's benefit the process of successive annexations was successful in preventing the profusion of independent municipal authorities on the periphery of the city, thus avoiding the problems of fragmented planning jurisdiction which beset Winnipeg.

A number of the recommendations in Faludi's plan for Regina were actually carried out. The city's park along Wascana Creek was extended and several new parks were developed in various parts of the city; new residential subdivisions adopted less rigid street layouts than the rectangular grid which had formerly prevailed; suburban shopping malls appeared; a civic centre began to emerge between Victoria Park and Albert Street with the construction of a public health clinic in 1951, followed by a federal office building, a provincial courthouse, a new Regina Public Library building, and in 1978, a new city hall. In 1951 Regina's first city planner - King Teggart - was hired, and in the same year, 1951, a District Planning Commission was established made up of representatives from both the city and the rural municipality whose purpose was to exercise some measure of planning control over development in the areas abutting the city but outside the city boundaries. In 1957 Regina established a full-fledged City-Planning Department as part of its civic administration.

Faludi's master-plan was received by the council in 1947, and in 1949 the council adopted a new zoning by-law, No. 2356, which replaced the city's original zoning by-law of 1927 and was intended as the land-use control counterpart of the overall master development plan. In general, by-law No. 2356 simply acknowledged the

existing land-uses in the city and extended the zoning categories over extensive tracts of vacant land. Neither the master plan nor the zoning by-law set out any policies or specific time periods for achieving development targets, other than the very generalized notion of a city of some 80,000-90,000 people projected to emerge in thirty years time, and the regulations to guide the private developers who would provide the housing and other buildings to accommodate that population. This of course is commonly the nature of the long-range development plan and zoning by-law. Regina's population reached Faludi's maximum projected figure in 1956, some twenty years sooner than he had forecast, and the plan which had addressed only limited aspects of the city's total developmental issues became irrelevant.

The problem of a satisfactory supply of water had been a major concern of Reginans from the very first days of the settlement although it was not addressed in Faludi's master plan. Back in 1883, W.B. Scarth, the Townsite Trustee responsible for the promotion and development of the newly created CPR town, realized, as did everyone else, that the town had no future without water, and he promised in his lot-sales campaign that year, that a well would be sunk in the town in the expectation of finding an adequate supply, and if that proved unsuccessful, a piped system would be installed to bring water to the town from Boggy Creek some eight miles to the north-east. The well in Regina proved to be inadequate. Wascana Creek was dammed to create a reservoir but that too proved unsatisfactory as a source of potable water, and served mainly to replenish the boilers in the steam-engines of the CPR's trains. In 1903 the burgesses approved a money by-law to build a pipeline from Boggy Creek and the system was completed in 1904. The Boggy Creek supply was augmented from artesian wells in the creek valley. But this arrangement was never fully satisfactory, particularly with regard to the quality of the water which was highly mineralized and hard.

In 1919 Regina and Moose Jaw joined together to approach the province for assistance in constructing a pipeline from the South Saskatchewan River which had

always been regarded as the ultimate solution to both cities' water supply problem. The two cities recognized the huge scale of the project in terms of not only its costs but also of its political ramifications, and prior to laying their request before the provincial government they sought the support of the urban and rural municipalities through which the line would pass. The province responded by setting up a royal commission to investigate the feasibility of such a project. The commission found that it was feasible but expensive, involving an initial capital cost of \$5,700,000, and a further \$1,300,000 within five years to expand the system to meet the anticipated growth in the demand for water. They recommended that before the province became involved in the project a referendum should be held among all the municipalities which would be affected by it. A referendum was held. Regina, Moose Jaw and most of the other urban places voted heavily in favour of the project but the farm population voted against it and the province accordingly took no further action. 116 In 1948 Regina abandoned the notion of a pipeline directly from the South Saskatchewan River in favour of a less costly scheme using Buffalo Pound Lake, a shallow lake lying some thirty-odd miles north-west of the city.

Finally, in 1950, the federal government agreed to increase the volume of water in the lake by pumping water from the South Saskatchewan River into the Qu'Appelle River from which it would flow by gravity into Buffalo Pond Lake, making the lake in effect a storage reservoir for Regina's water supply. It could also be a reservoir for Moose Jaw's water supply if that city chose to participate. The province undertook to build a filtration plant at Buffalo Pound Lake and Regina undertook to build the thirty-six miles of pipeline from the lake to the city. The project was completed in 1955, and by that time Moose Jaw had agreed to participate and to share the costs. In the 1960s the Gardiner Dam was built on the South Saskatchewan River at Outlook which allowed the water to flow into Buffalo Pound Lake by gravity instead of pumping, and this system

since then has been able to supply more than half of Regina's water needs during the peak demand period of the summer months.

The expansion of Regina's water supply was well timed although probably more through happy coincidence than any special foresight. The period 1951-1965 during which the expanded supply system was put in place was also the period of the greatest expansion of Regina's population. The city grew from 71,319 in 1951 to 131,127 in 1966, a growth of 81.59 percent. 117 The post-war "baby boom" accounted for a substantial natural increase in the population. It was also during this period that oil and potash were discovered in Saskatchewan, which contributed greatly to the diversification of the provincial economy and was an important factor in attracting in-migration into the province and into Regina during this period. Oil and gas had been discovered in western Saskatchewan, near Lloydminster and Kamsack, in the 1930s but these were not of commercial significance. In 1947 the major Leduc field was discovered near Edmonton and virtually the entire oil industry in Canada shifted into Alberta. In 1950 the Interprovincial Pipe Line was constructed across Saskatchewan and Manitoba to bring Alberta's oil to southern Ontario. Regina was directly on the pipe-line and two large refineries were built in the city. In 1951 and 1952 commercially viable fields were discovered near Swift Current and Fosterton and production from these wells were added into the pipeline. From 1952 to 1956 highly productive light gravity crude oil deposits were found in the Williston Basin in the south-east of the province. Unfortunately, much of the oil from the western wells in Saskatchewan had a high sulphur content and it had to be shipped to Minnesota to be refined. The better quality oil found in the south east reaches of the province lay beyond Regina's location on the pipeline and hence it too could not be processed in Regina. Nevertheless Regina did benefit greatly from the oil boom, not only because of the refinery industry which it created but also through the establishment of the Interprovincial Steel and Pipe Corporation Limited (IPSCO) which was formed to supply pipe for the oil and gas pipe lines. IPSCO

subsequently expanded the scope of its operation and was the genesis of a steel industry (using scrap iron as its raw material) in Regina.

Potash was of lesser importance to Regina than oil. Most of the ten producing potash mines in the province were within a radius of seventy miles of Saskatoon and the headquarters of the potash industry were located in that city. One large potash operation, however, that of Kalium Chemicals was located at Belle Plains, some twenty-five miles west of Regina, and that company's headquarters was located in Regina.

All of these events, unforeseen by Faludi and no doubt everyone else, contributed to the dramatic growth of Regina's population during those years. Before the end of the 1950s Faludi's plan was no longer relevant to the realities of Regina's growth and a new Community Planning Scheme was prepared by the City Planning Department in 1961. The new plan went a considerable distance beyond the Faludi plan inasmuch as it contained detailed background analysis of the city's demographic structure, economic base, utilities, transportation, schools, parks and open space, and also called for further studies on such matters as low-income rental housing, low-cost home ownership housing, conservation of existing built-up areas, public transit, and senior citizens housing. But again, this new plan did not set any specific policy commitments of the council nor any time programs for the achievement of particular objectives. Instead it was again a statement of a general nature describing certain concepts and discussing what it considered to be certain desirable ends for the city to pursue. The report in fact clearly stated that it was merely an initial general scheme which would have to be articulated in much more specific detail by subsequent studies:

It is not intended that this Community Planning Scheme be of a comprehensive nature. This scheme is general in content and is intended to serve as the framework for a later comprehensive community planning scheme which will examine in greater detail such facets of community planning with particular reference to planning costs and resources.<sup>118</sup>

The Planning Scheme was adopted in 1961 and the development control instrument for the scheme, adopted in 1962, was zoning by-law No. 3618. It is not unusual that pressures for development as well as actual development on the ground breach the control bounds set by zoning by-laws and significant amendments of these by-laws become necessary. By-law No. 3618 remained in effect until 1968 when it was replaced by by-law No. 4306. And in 1973, by-law No. 4306 was amended by bylaw No. 5223. Normally there would be nothing noteworthy about this: zoning by-laws are customarily amended, superceded, repealed and replaced as part of the ongoing planning process. But in terms of the established, conventional planning theory, the master-plan is the policy statement and the zoning by-law is the control instrument whose role is to regulate development so that it conforms with the policies set out in the master plan. Amendments to the zoning by-law normally are made in order to reflect the tenets of the master development plan. If the nature of the development which is occurring or the direction in which it is tending to move is contrary to the expectation and provisions of the master plan then the normal practice would be to amend the master plan to adjust to the new development reality and then to amend the zoning by-law to conform with the revised plan.

In the case of the Community Planning Scheme of 1961 and Zoning By-law No. 4306 the Regina city council in 1973 took a notably different course. A controversy had arisen over a proposal to construct a high-rise building at the corner of Hillsdale Street and 23rd Avenue: there was a conflict between the provisions of the community planning scheme which seemed to rule out the proposal and the zoning by-law which seemed to permit it. The council resolved the issue by amending by-law No. 4306 by by-law No. 5223 which stated that

The proper document of planning control was heretofore, is now, and shall henceforth be the City of Regina Zoning By-Law No. 4306, amended to the present time. By-law No. 4306 is hereby adopted as amended to the present time as the sole mechanism of

specific planning control and where there is any conflict between the contents of the Regina Community Planning Scheme, 1961, and the Regina Zoning By-law No. 4306, as amended to the present time, the provisions of the said Regina Zoning By-law No. 4306, as amended to the present time, will be taken to be the proper intention of the Council and will prevail in all circumstances.<sup>119</sup>

It seems from this that the planning function in Regina, even as late as 1973, still did not embrace the generally-prevailing planning methodology and procedures nor the ideology of the planning discipline on which the methodology and procedures were based. It is probably true to say that the members of the council did not understand or else were indifferent to the separate and distinct roles of administration and policy-making in the city planning function but in this they did not differ from other civic governments in the prairie region.

### 2. The NDP. Regina Politics and the Wascana Centre

Another event occurred in 1973 which had a noteworthy effect on the civic government of Regina. In that year the NDP government of Saskatchewan under Premier Alan Blakeney re-established the ward system of civic electoral constituencies in Regina and Saskatoon. In Regina the new electoral structure comprised ten wards, (Fig. 25.) which again, as in 1934, closely corresponded to the areas of the established neighbourhoods and ethnic groups in the city. The earlier (1934) ward structure was made up of only five wards. The ten wards established in 1973 reflected the growth in the area and the population of Regina during the intervening forty years. In 1936 Regina's population was 53, 354; in 1976 it was 149,593, nearly three times as large. The composition of the population had also changed dramatically. In 1931, 37.69 percent of Regina's population was foreign-born and 67.32 percent were of British origin. Twenty years later, in 1951, 21.62 percent were foreign-born and 56.35 percent were of British origin. And in 1971, only 13.16 percent of Reginans were foreign-born and 46.36 were of British origin. The indication here is that after the

onset of the depression and the drought years of the 1930s in-migration of new population from abroad was a decreasing factor in Regina's population growth. The proportion of foreign-born declined consistently and dramatically from decade to decade. The proportion of the population of British ethnicity however did not decline nearly as rapidly as the proportion of the foreign-born. Natural increase was obviously a more important factor in Regina's demographic structure than was immigration. The movement of people off the farms into the cities was also a factor of great significance. In 1931, 40.27 percent of Regina's population was Saskatchewan-born; in 1971 that figure had swelled to 73.86 percent. Clearly not only were Europeans no longer migrating to Regina, neither were Canadians and Americans. 120

One group of Canadians, however, which was migrating to Regina was the aboriginal Indian. Their presence in the city became noticeable in the 1950s and 1960s. By the 1970s they had become a highly visible minority. The census of 1971 put their number at 2,860 "but unofficial estimates put the total closer to 30,000 by mid-decade.... By the late 1970s Native children comprised a majority in some innercity schools such as Albert School north of the CPR tracks, and a sizeable minority in others." 121 The 1981 census gives the Native population of Regina as 6,405 but here again the official figures are quite unreliable and the number is probably very much higher. Winnipeg's experience with the growth of the Native population was similar to that of Regina's. The movement into the city was caused by the intolerable conditions of poverty, degradation and hopelessness on the reserves. Chances of improving their lives in the city were little better than on the reserves but there was nowhere else to go. Tensions between the Native community and the rest of the city have at times come close to erupting in open violence. Efforts have been made to reduce the hostility, such as the creation of the Regina Native Race Relations Association, a co-operative association between the Natives and the Regina police; the establishment of an Indian and Métis Friendship Centre; the policy of the School Board to hire more Native aides and teachers; the establishment of a Task Force on Indian and Métis Opportunity, etc. All of these have had only a marginal effect on the lives of the native people in the city; the root causes of the Native people's problems continue and grow deeper and no real initiative has been taken by any level of government to address and uproot them.

The CCF (NDP after 1961) was the dominant political party in both the province of Saskatchewan and the city of Regina in the post-war years from 1944 to 1982. Except for the period from 1964 to 1971 when Ross Thatcher's Liberals were in power, the CCF/NDP reigned as the government of Saskatchewan. Even the city of Regina which from the beginning had been a Liberal stronghold returned CCF/NDP candidates in a majority of its provincial seats. In 1944 Regina had only two seats in the provincial legislature. It gained a third seat in 1952 and by 1975, because of the growth of the city's population, its representation had increased to nine seats, the majority of which were consistently held by CCF/NDP MLAs. This electoral behaviour may perhaps have been due at least in some measure to the fact that Regina is the provincial capital and a significant part of the city's labour-force and its electorate is made up of civil servants who do not customarily vote against the government which signs their pay cheques. Whatever the reason may be, a majority of Regina's electors supported the socialdemocratic government of Tommy Douglas, Woodrow Lloyd and Allan Blakeney during those years. This government had a profound impact on the province. The legislation which it implemented in the fields of social security, medicare, automobile insurance, economic planning, labour relations, farm support and others not only changed the life of the people of Saskatchewan but produced deep-seated reverberations throughout the nation. Regina, of course, in common with the rest of Saskatchewan, was affected by these province-wide measures but did not always accept them unanimously or with enthusiasm. The introduction of medicare, for example, was met with bitter resistance from many quarters, including some in Regina, a resistance organized and financed by local, national and American interests opposed to social medicine. But within the

somewhat narrower and more specialized purview of this dissertation, and specifically in terms of the impact of the province on Regina's planning and development, perhaps the single most noteworthy occurrence was the creation of the Wascana Centre Authority in 1962.

Since then a new campus of the University of Regina has been created in Wascana Centre, designed by internationally renowned architect Minoru Yamasaki and landscape architect Thomas Church, new government buildings have been constructed, the Saskatchewan Centre of the Arts has been built, further landscaping and site improvements have been carried out and the park has been extended north and south to provide long walking and bicycling paths. The Wascana Centre Authority has carried out its mandate with great sensitivity for the physical development of the Centre and regard for the public trust which has been vested in it. They have created a magnificent urban inner-city park of some 2300 acres which could well serve as a model and an inspiration for other cities, even those which are richer or larger or have been more generously endowed with a benign and verdant natural environment.

# 3. <u>Structural and Functional Changes in Regina and the 1973</u> <u>Provincial Planning Act</u>

The surge of population which Regina had experienced in the decade and a half between 1951 and 1966 abated quite dramatically after the mid-1960s. From 1966 to 1976, for example, the city grew by less than 1.5 percent per year. The population was 131,127 in 1966 and 149,593 in 1976 - an increase of 18,466 or 14 percent over the decade. From 1951 to 1966 it had grown nearly 82 percent or nearly 5.5 percent per year. Nevertheless Regina continued to grow during the 1970s albeit at a much slower rate than in that earlier decade and a half. Parallel to the growth in the city's population was the growth in its area. This was effected through successive annexations extending well into the 1970s. Regina's area was expanded from 19.5 square miles in 1951 122 to 35 square miles in 1975.123 Because of the airport and the city's sewage

treatment plant in the south-west sector of the city and the industrial park in the north-east, new growth was constrained to occur in the north-west and south-east directions. This was where the city's new residential subdivisions were developed. Virtually all of the housing in these new subdivisions was single family dwellings with the result that the overall gross density of Regina's population fell to about 7 persons per acre in 1975; in 1945 it had been about 11 persons per acre. 124

The implications of increased area together with decreased population density are, of course, serious for a municipal administration. They mean the necessary extension of all municipal utilities and services with fewer people to pay for them on a per unit basis, which in turn must result in higher property taxes. Suburban proliferation also meant the emergence of suburban shopping malls in Regina. Before 1955 the only shopping centre, properly so-called, situated outside of the central business district was Sherwood Co-operative Shopping Centre which comprised a grocery department, a hardware and appliances and a family clothing departments and an automobile service station. 125 Although its location was not within the conventionally defined central business district it was barely outside it, being located on the north-west corner of Albert Street and Victoria Avenue intersection. Between 1955 and 1965 fourteen suburban shopping malls were built, fairly evenly distributed throughout the city. This rash of suburban retailing centres corresponded with the spurt in Regina's population virtually all of which was occurring in the suburbs. And even though that population surge was beginning to ebb by 1965 and had drastically abated by 1970, more suburban shopping centres continued to be built for another decade, eleven more being constructed between 1966 and 1975. 126

This decentralization had a marked effect on the core area of the city. Between 1945 and 1975 there was a dramatic decline in both core area residences and retail establishments. In 1945 there were 27 single family dwellings and 530 apartment dwellings in the core area; in 1975 there were no single family dwellings and only 180

apartments. Similarly, in 1945 there were 142 retail establishments in the core area. That number rose to 162 in 1955, but then declined to 128 in 1975. Retailing in the city as a whole, however, grew. In 1955 there were 586 retail establishments in the city, of which the 162 in the core area represented 27.6 percent. By 1975 there were 842 retail establishments in Regina of which the 128 in the core represented only 15.2 percent. 127 Most of the residential demolition was undoubtedly in order to create sites for office buildings, the bulk of core area residents having relocated to the suburbs; and most of the decline in retail outlets in the core area was because they too had relocated to the suburbs, drawn there by the expanding suburban market.

These structural and functional changes which were occurring in Regina's central area were typical of what was happening in many cities in North America during the years 1945-1975. The downtown was no longer the hub of the city's retailing functionand was no longer a residential enclave of any consequence. It had lost its traditional character as the centre-piece of the city's activities and indeed had lost much of its former vitality. The streets were virtually deserted after office hours. And even during office hours when the labour force was busy at its desks and other office duties there was little activity in the downtown streets. This state of affairs was viewed with deep regret by various Reginans who felt that the city had lost a quality of great importance and that something should be done about recapturing it. Nor was it only the downtown which was perceived to be growing without any intelligent or coherent direction. The city generally seemed to be developing at random, simply in response to market pressures, and with no concept of where it was going.

There was probably no direct connection between the changes occurring in Regina and the provincial government's new planning act of 1973. If there was any connection it was only an indirect one: provincial governments do not adopt statutes with province-wide application on the basis of conditions in a single municipality even if the municipality is the provincial capital. Nevertheless, one may speculate about the

influence of Regina, through its senior representative in the legislature, in the formulation of Saskatchewan's <u>Planning and Development Act</u> of 1973. Allan Blakeney was a long-standing member for Regina in the provincial legislature and in 1971 he became the premier of the province. Blakeney was a lawyer, but apart from his legally trained and disciplined mind he was a highly intelligent and perceptive man who was aware of the broader implications of development trends in the province. He was also a New Democrat, leader of the NDP government in Saskatchewan and ideologically disposed towards government intervention and planning control of the development process. His home and his legal practice were in Regina and he felt strongly empathetic towards the city. The <u>Planning and Development Act</u> of 1973 certainly was not designed specifically for Regina, but conditions in that city, and Blakeney's awareness and understanding of them, it can be safely assumed, were among the factors which weighed in favour of the legislation.

Saskatchewan's <u>Planning and Development Act. 1973</u>, <sup>128</sup> was a highly sophisticated statute, enormously advanced in every way over the province's first primitive planning act of 1917. It contained 207 sections (compared with 28 in the 1917 statute) and embodied the most up-to-date planning concepts at that time. It set out clearly the purpose, nature and content of a municipal development plan, a signal advance over previous statutory statements. Section 36 is simple and straightforward in its requirement and in its concept of the purpose of a municipal plan:

36. A council of a municipality shall prepare a municipal development plan for the direction of the future physical, social and economic development and improvement of the municipality or any part thereof.<sup>129</sup>

And section 38 specifies:

38(1). A municipal development plan shall consist of: (a) the plans and supporting material defining the future physical, social and economic development of the municipality;

- (b) zoning controls which shall be consistent with the plan, which shall be the means of implementing the plan and which shall comply with the requirements of section 60:
- (c) a capital works program showing the estimated cost of each project and the proposed sequence of construction or the priority of each project for a period of not less than five years with provision for annual review and revision in order to maintain a fiveyear advance forecast;
- (d) provision for the revocation of any zoning by-laws or any other by-laws dealing with matters provided for in the plan with effect from the date of the coming into force of the municipal development plan.
- 38(2). A municipal development plan may make provision for any matter pertinent to the encouragement and control of development within the municipality.<sup>130</sup>

For the first time in Saskatchewan a provincial planning statute clearly enunciates the purpose of the municipal development plan as the direction of the future development of the municipality. For the first time, too, the statute draws a clear distinction between the development plan and the zoning by-law and stipulates that the zoning by-law is "the means of implementing the plan."

The Act, moreover, ensures that a municipal development plan will be put in place, if not by the municipality then by the minister. Section 35 gives the minister the authority to intervene in this way:

35. Where the council of a municipality fails to prepare or adopt a municipal development plan or to direct development in accordance with an approved municipal development plan or community planning scheme, the minister may exercise any of the powers of the council under this Act after giving thirty day's written notice to the municipality of his intention to do so. 131

This latter provision lends itself to an interesting comparison with a similar ministerial authority provided under the <u>City of Winnipeg Act. 1971</u>, the Act which amalgamated all of the municipalities in Greater Winnipeg into a single city. Part XX of

the City of Winnipeg Act is the Part which deals with the city's planning function. Section 572.1(1) under Part XX states:

572.1(1) After consultation with the council, the minister may, in writing, order the council to prepare and adopt an amendment, alteration, repeal or replacement or one or more of those things to the Greater Winnipeg development plan within such time as the minister may order and the minister may extend that time.<sup>132</sup>

And in the event of the municipality's failure to comply with the minister's order the next subsection provides:

572.1(2) Where the council

- (a) fails to comply with an order under subsection (1) or
- (b) where the minister approves a Greater Winnipeg development plan by-law and the council within the time prescribed by the minister does not finally pass that by-law; or
- (c) where the minister approves a Greater
  Winnipeg development plan by-law subject to
  conditions and the council does not comply with
  the conditions and does not finally pass the bylaw within the time prescribed by the minister;

the minister may cause all those things that are required to be done by the council under subsection (1) to comply with the order to be carried out by the city and the minister has all the power and duties of the council in causing one or more of those things to be carried out by the city.<sup>133</sup>

It should be noted that Winnipeg derives its planning powers from its own provincial charter, the <u>City of Winnipeg Act</u>, which applies only to the City of Winnipeg, whereas Regina derives its planning powers from the Saskatchewan <u>Planning and Development Act</u> which applies to all municipalities in the province. It should also be noted that at the time of the passing of the <u>City of Winnipeg Act</u> in 1971, Winnipeg already had a development plan in place, inherited from the Metropolitan Winnipeg government which preceded the amalgamated city, and to which the planning provisions of the Act applied, specifically and exclusively, whereas Saskatchewan's <u>Planning and</u>

Development Act applied to all municipalities in the province, both those with and those without development plans in place. In general, both statutes give the minister the power to impose a plan; in the case of Winnipeg, the power to change or completely replace the Greater Winnipeg Development Plan; in the case of Regina or any other municipality in Saskatchewan, the power to impose a plan where the municipality has failed to do so.

There is, however, a very important difference between the ministerial powers conveyed by the respective Acts. There is nothing in the City of Winnipeg Act which compels the council to comply with the policies contained in its own development plan. In the case of Saskatchewan's Planning and Development Act of 1973, however, section 35 explicitly requires a council "to direct development in accordance with an approved municipal development plan or community planning scheme," and empowers the minister to act in the stead of the council to secure compliance where the council has failed to direct development in accordance with its plan. This is not a trivial difference. It is of course true that compliance with municipal planning policies is largely a matter of political will. In the case of both Winnipeg and Saskatchewan, if both the municipal council and the minister are indifferent towards compliance then it doesn't much matter what the statute says: council will neglect its policy commitments and the minister will take no action. Nevertheless, it is a fact that Winnipeg's council has been able to ignore or contravene its own plans repeatedly and with impunity whereas there seems to have been no such overt transgressions on the part of the Regina council. How much of Regina's respect for its planning policies is due to the persuasion of section 35 is difficult to say. But it seems that enshrining in the Saskatchewan statute the requirement to comply with the municipal plan, while there is no such requirement in the City of Winnipeg Act, indicates a difference in the attitudes of the respective provincial governments toward the matter of a municipality's autonomy over its own planning and development policies. It suggests that the NDP government under Premier

Schreyer in Manitoba took a "hands-off" approach to municipal planning and development, preferring to leave these matters to the wisdom and under the jurisdiction of the city council. In Saskatchewan, on the other hand, the NDP government of Allan Blakeney seems to have taken a more interventionist view of its role in the realm of municipal planning and development. In both cases the provincial disposition had a notable effect on the planning function in Regina and Winnipeg respectively.

Saskatchewan's <u>Planning and Development Act</u> put Regina's council under a new constraint. They could not demur over the preparation and adoption of a development plan, and, moreover, one which met the specifications set out in section 38 of the Act. If they didn't do it the minister would do it for them. In the document entitled <u>Regina RSVP</u>: A planning strategy for Regina (A working document) the imperative of the Act is directly acknowledged. The document raises the question of the need for a plan and answers it:

Why a Municipal Development Plan? The answer to this question is clearly and legally rooted within the provisions of Saskatchewan's Planning and Development Act of 1973.<sup>134</sup>

Whatever may have been the council's feelings about this statutory demand Regina's City Planning Department welcomed it. They saw it as an opportunity to embark on a new direction with the city's planning function. This perception is expressed in the Regina RSVP strategy document:

The authors of this document believe that the time has come for the traditional role of the urban planner to be redefined, and the city planning function to be realigned within the municipal administration, so that the service rendered to the urban community by planners can become more relevant and effective. We believe the time has come for these changes, and that Regina is an ideal environment in which to apply them.<sup>135</sup>

#### 4. Regina RSVP, the Downtown, the Role of the Province

In essence, the view elaborated in the document was that the city planner must now become an activist, that the plan must address short-term and emerging issues rather than long-range concepts, and that the public - the people who will be directly affected by the plan - must become actively engaged in its formulation. The ideas and proposals contained in Regina RSVP: A planning strategy for Regina (A working document) were the subject of a series of public meetings in the Fall of 1977. Out of these public discussions evolved a final document - Regina RSVP; A Planning Strategy for Regina: Policy and Implementation. The Policy and Implementation document contained eleven chapters. The first three chapters were devoted to discussions on the history of Regina, a review of proposals in a variety of concept plans comprising the municipal development plan, and the notion of growth management through planning. These were followed by eight chapters which, respectively, set out policy proposals for major and emerging issues in the city: rail relocation, downtown, inner city, suburban growth, transportation, open space and recreation, special implementation issues, and the strategy of public planning. The city council adopted Regina RSVP as the City of Regina development plan by by-law 6600 on December 21, 1979. Regina RSVP was not the standard conventional type of long-range comprehensive development plan. It was not a snap-shot of the city at some future moment in time as imagined by the planners; it was, rather, a strategy - a series of policies for the management of the city's growth in the pursuit of certain development goals. Perhaps this is essentially what all comprehensive municipal plans are, but Regina RSVP departed from the customary in that it was less concerned about the final picture of the city at the time-horizon than it was about the policies which would guide the city's evolution and the role of the public in that guidance. Even its title, Regina RSVP, was extraordinary; it was not the usual style of a plan but rather the style of an invitation, which was what was intended - an

invitation to the people of Regina to respond to the proposals in the document and to participate in the process of confirming them as policies.

In 1973, the same year that the Saskatchewan government adopted its new Planning and Development Act the federal government, through its housing agency, the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, put in place its Neighbourhood Improvement Program, known in the abbreviated form of its acronym as NIP. The purpose of NIP was just as its name implied - neighbourhood improvement. Under its provisions funds were available for the repair or construction of municipal services and for parks, recreational facilities, social services and similar undertakings whose objective was the improvement of older, declining residential neighbourhoods. Along with NIP there was a complementary program called RRAP - Residential Rehabilitation Assistance Program - under which funds were available for the repair and improvement of individual residences, an element of the neighbourhood environment which was not included in the terms of NIP.

In 1976, Ronald S. Clark was appointed as the City of Regina's new Director of Planning. The coincidence of the new provincial planning act, the federal NIP regulations and the appointment of Clark generated a synergy which set Regina's planning off in a new direction. Clark was an activist who saw planning as an advocacy instrument and wanted to bring the planning function closer to the grass-roots of the community and to involve the people of the community more fully and directly in the planning process. Saskatchewan's <u>Planning and Development Act</u> and the federal government's NIP regulations provided the conditions in which he could pursue his ideas. He produced <u>Regina RSVP</u>, the new development plan for the City of Regina in 1979, which departed radically from the city's previous planning concepts, but the change in the city's planning direction began to manifest itself almost immediately upon his taking up his appointment as Director of Planning in 1976. That change was the first,

tentative emergence of community and neighbourhood associations as actors in the city planning process.

The federal-provincial Neighbourhood Improvement Program of 1973 was specifically aimed at the improvement of older, declining neighbourhoods; inevitably, almost by definition, this meant the inner-city neighbourhoods. (Fig. 26. and Fig. 27.) When the program went into effect in Regina city council reviewed the various neighbourhoods which might be eligible for assistance. Under the NIP regulations all funding for the improvement programs came from the senior governments; the municipality contributed no monies directly but was responsible for the selection of the neighbourhood to be improved and for the administration of the project. The council selected Highland Park as the general neighbourhood and designated North Highland Park as the specific part of the neighbourhood in which the first NIP project would be carried out. The designated project site was an area of twenty-four blocks bounded by Albert Street on the west, Winnipeg Street on the east, Third Avenue North on the north, and the CNR tracks on the south. That was in 1974.

There was no active community association in this area at that time. There was, however, an active local neighbourhood group in the area to the south of the designated NIP area, across the CNR tracks, in the North Central neighbourhood. The North Central group originated in the early 1970s as the North Central Community Resource Board, an advisory group established by the Social Services Department of the provincial government to provide feed back on a pilot project to test the possibility of establishing a district social services office in the neighbourhood. Initially the Board operated without any notable input from or consultation with the residents of the neighbourhood. Gradually, however, it began to bring in residents to discuss an every-widening range of issues. Then, in 1976, the city council, which had been contemplating additional NIP projects, decided to locate the next one in the North Central neighbourhood. This acted as a catalyst. It brought all of these issues discussed by the residents into an intense focus

of interest. The decision was taken to organize the group formally into the North Central Community Society and to establish proper by-laws and conditions of membership. The specific location of the NIP project was the Albert-Scott area, an area of some thirtysix blocks bounded by Albert Street on the east, Elphinstone Street on the west, Fifth Avenue on the north and Dewdney on the south. The NIP project became the dominant item on the Society's agenda and in the deliberations of its meetings. Fortuitously, it was also in that year that Ron Clark took over the Regina Planning Department and began to prepare the city's new development plan pursuant to the requirements of the Planning and Development Act of 1973. The city's commitment to the Albert-Scott NIP project and the establishment of the North Central Community Society was the happy combination of circumstances which opened the prospect of broadening public participation in the planning process and extending the debate on community planning and development issues. The Planning Department moved quickly to assist the Society in dealing with the NIP project and thereby brought the first community group into the process of formulating the new development plan for Regina. The Albert-Scott site was designated a NIP project site in 1976. The City Planning Department operated an active liaison and support program with the neighbourhood association from 1977 to 1983.

The North Central neighbourhood contained one of the largest concentrations of native people in the city as well as a very high percentage of elderly persons of various ethnic backgrounds. Neighbourhood issues therefore related not only to the usual "planning" problems of intrusive land uses, traffic and physical infrastructure but were also greatly involved with those matters which specifically affected the native population and the seniors. Although the NIP was the Planning Department's entry into the neighbourhood they were heavily involved in issues such as housing, day care, racism, education, social services, health, recreation, transportation, a neighbourhood newspaper, etc. A neighbourhood plan was completed in 1980 which ultimately was incorporated into the city's development plan.

Other neighbourhood organizations quickly followed. Notable among these was the Cathedral Area Community Association, established in 1976. The Cathedral Area was bounded by the CP tracks on the north, Wascana Creek on the south, Albert Street on the east and Elphinstone Street on the west. It contained some very dilapidated housing adjacent to the railway right-of-way and north of Victoria Avenue, but it also contained some of the most viable and interesting old neighbourhoods immediately west of the downtown. The Association was very aggressive in its approach to development applications in their neighbourhood. The executive of the association was made up of an interesting, articulate and effective mix of professionals such as architects and engineers and community activists who kept a close watch on development proposals with regard to such matters as intrusive land uses, densities, traffic, site planning, design and aesthetics, in order to safeguard the integrity of the neighbourhood. They received the assistance of the Planning Department in 1976 and completed a neighbourhood plan in 1979 which was adopted as an appendix to Regina RSVP. They were extremely effective in asserting their demands at City Hall.

Another notable community association which was established in 1976 was the Core Community Group. The area of the Core Community Group was immediately south of the downtown. It was bounded by Broad Street on the east, Albert Street on the west, College Avenue on the south and Victoria Avenue on the north. The concerns of this group arose out of the spillover effects of the downtown. It was suffering from the intrusions of parking lots, high-rise buildings, traffic volumes, and other effects normally experienced by a residential area located immediately next to the downtown and in a state of transition due to the development pressures of the adjacent central business district. The group was distinguished by the fact that it had the strongest heritage preservation lobby of any of the community groups. The Core Community Group was originally organized in 1976 not because of the NIP but because of much simpler but no doubt equally pressing concerns. They established their organization in order to make a

concerted attack on the nuisance of traffic and of litter near and generated by the Miller and Balfour High Schools. The area was not designated a NIP area until 1980.

Nevertheless the Planning Department started to support the group in 1976 and a neighbourhood plan was completed in 1979.

The fourth important neighbourhood association which emerged at this time was the General Hospital Community Association. Its area was bounded on the west by Broad Street, on the east by Winnipeg Street, on the south by College Avenue, and on the north by the CPR main line. This area was much like the Cathedral area in character - an older, high quality residential neighbourhood adjacent to the downtown. It was experiencing deterioration of the housing stock, speculative land acquisitions and development, particularly around the hospital, parking problems, traffic congestion, etc. The Planning Department also gave very early support to this association and a neighbourhood plan was completed in 1979 and adopted as an appendix to Regina RSVP, the city's development plan.

What is of interest about these neighbourhood associations is that they began quite spontaneously in order to deal with specifically local concerns such as, for example, the social problems of natives and seniors in the North Central neighbourhood or the traffic and litter problems in the Core Community area and had no systematic planning orientation until the city's Planning Department under Ron Clark entered the scene. That entry brought a significant change to the orientation and function of the community associations. It broadened their perspective; it brought together their previously fragmented uncorrelated concerns into a coherent, integrated focus; it set them on the clearly articulated path of preparing a development plan for the neighbourhood; and perhaps most important of all it provided them with funds, leadership, technical advice and support. Ron Clark recalls the relationship between the Planning Department and the associations in these words:

From a Planning Department point of view, we very much fostered the birth of these associations. encouraged them, assisted them wherever possible and subsequently got council approval to integrate them into the formal planning process of the city. Specifically, we did not do, as some cities had done at that time, which was to establish neighbourhood planning offices with planners from City Hall occupying offices in the neighbourhoods. I've always been sceptical of that model since it puts the city-paid planner in the position of trying to decide whether he or she wears the "hat" on the behalf of the neighbourhood or on behalf of the "Civic Administration." Alternatively the City entered into contractual relationships with all four Community Associations, provided them annual funding on a fee for service contracted basis and allowed them to hire their own community worker. These workers often were a community development activist, or an urban planner either by profession or by street experience, etc. These people clearly worked on behalf of the Community Association and articulated the views and agenda of the community. In retrospect, I still support this model and I can remember advising City Council in 1976 or 1977 that providing funds, at that time roughly \$50,000 or \$60,000 a year, to each of these groups amounted to Council having the courage to finance dissent (for that is clearly in many instances what they would be doing). But the Council went into this arrangement with their eyes open and I think it was a somewhat courageous move on Council's part to be prepared to actually finance, often confrontational, relations with community groups over important planning, land use and community development issues. 136

Today in the City of Regina there are twenty-eight neighbourhoods contained within five "zones" - the West Zone, East Zone, North Zone, South Zone and Central Zone. Each of the twenty-eight neighbourhoods has its formally organized neighbourhood association. But the relationship of the zones and associations to the civic administration which prevailed in the last half of the decade of the 1970s has changed. At that time the Planning Department was the dominant departmental presence in the affairs of the four original and most active neighbourhoods, provided leadership and advice and was responsible for their funding. Today the relationship has reverted to something which

resembles more closely that which obtained in the first half of the 1970s, before the advent of the Planning Department's new initiative.

It was the Social Services Department of the provincial government which at the beginning of the 1970s first set up experimental district offices in some inner city neighbourhoods to see whether such offices would be suitable for the delivery of neighbourhood social services. This provincial government experiment eventually led to the establishment of the North Central Community Society, the first of Regina's neighbourhood organizations. It was however the city's own Community Services, Parks and Recreation Department which, at about the same time in the early 1970s, divided the entire city into five geographic areas called "zones," which ultimately evolved into the present five zone, twenty-eight neighbourhood structure. The purpose of the Community Services, Parks and Recreation Department at that time was very limited; it was simply that of recreation. Its aim was to involve as many Regina residents as possible in the planning, development, administration and promotion of recreation programs and activities. Recreation remained the orientation of these zones until the advent of the Planning Department's community involvement initiative in the mid-1970s, when the planning function became the driving force in the neighbourhood's activities and the Planning Department became the mentor and the source of their funding.

Today the Planning Department is no longer the dominant departmental presence in the neighbourhoods. The Community Services, Parks and Recreation Department now provides an annual operating grant to each of the zones and the board of each zone is responsible for distributing funds among its component neighbourhoods and for the way in which the funds are spent and for their accounting. Not all the community associations have concerns which touch on the mandate of the Planning Department. Many of them have recreation as their major, if not indeed their only interest. In this sense the relationships have reverted to some extent to those which prevailed at the

beginning of the decade of the 1970s. Nevertheless there is still a strong liaison between the Planning Department and the neighbourhood associations as there is indeed between the associations and other departments and agencies of the civic government on specific department- or agency-oriented issues.

All the neighbourhood associations are incorporated bodies but there is no provincial statute or city by-law which integrates them into the structure of the civic government as, for example, the community committees and residents' advisory groups are integrated into the government of Winnipeg under the City of Winnipeg Act. On the other hand the community associations and zone boards are contacted for comments when there are specific items of interest or development proposals being considered for the area by council or committees of council. Some agencies of the civic government, such as the Planning Commission, provide, in their terms of reference, representation on their-boards from the neighbourhood associations or are required, in carrying out their mandate, to consult with the associations. The community associations and zone boards are part of the formal review process within the city administration although there is no statutory or legal requirement for their participation.<sup>137</sup>

The boundaries of the zones which had been established at the beginning of the 1970s were realigned in February 1987 in order to group like communities together, establish an "inner city" zone and accommodate population growth. The map formally setting out the boundaries of the revised zones and neighbourhoods was approved by council by-law and took effect on July 1, 1988. (Fig. 28.)

The deterioration of Regina's inner city neighbourhoods provoked government restorative programs such as the NIP. At the same time, however, the city's central business district was deteriorating. It had lost a substantial share of its retail market to the suburban shopping centres; it had lost the greater part of its resident population; many of its stores and other premises were vacant; the streets had an air of desertion; the entire central business district was in distress. The city council was deeply

concerned about this situation and cast about for some means to remedy it. At that time the pedestrian mall was in vogue as a downtown improvement measure and was being installed in a number of cities. The Sparks Street Mall in Ottawa was enjoying some celebrity and the Regina council decided to try the same approach. In 1976 Scarth Street was closed to vehicles for the block between 11th Avenue and 12th Avenue and the street was converted into a pedestrian mall with the customary new surfacing, planting and other suitable decorations.

The conversion had little if any effect on the viability of the downtown generally. The city council's concern was not relieved and in their continuing search for remedies they turned to the provincial government. All governments in Canada provide support to the private sector in a variety of ways, among which is the practice of public expenditures in the downtowns of their cities. This expenditure takes a variety of forms. In some instances it is the renting of space for government offices in privately owned buildings; in some instances it is the construction of government buildings to be owned by the government and used for its own purposes. These measures are taken on the principle that such investment will increase the value of the downtown as a whole and improve its viability in general. No doubt the Regina city council importuned the government of Saskatchewan to undertake some such commitment.

In fact the government of Saskatchewan had for some time been contemplating such a move itself. They were considering the construction of new head office buildings for two of their major crown corporations - the Saskatchewan Government Insurance Corporation and the Saskatchewan Government Telephones Corporation. They were already committed to the construction of these buildings but the question of where to build them had not yet been decided. This question was in fact the cause of a fierce internal struggle in the government administration. One faction wanted the buildings to go into the Wascana Centre where they would add to the group of government buildings that had already been built there and would thus enlarge and enhance the government

precinct in Wascana. The other faction wanted the two new buildings to be constructed in the downtown where, they argued, it would act as a catalyst to stimulate the revitalization of the central area of the city. In the end the decision was to build downtown but it took the intervention of the premier himself to resolve the dispute. Ron Clark makes this comment:

I think it's fair to say in brief (and there is a very long history to this whole issue) that Alan Blakeney, the Premier, was the driving force and was very much committed, both intellectually and financially, to the revitalization of downtown Regina. Because of his leadership (largely behind the scenes), the evolution of the Cornwall Centre emerged.<sup>139</sup>

The Cornwall Centre is a major redevelopment accomplishment in downtown Regina. Its initial impetus came from the provincial government whose two new corporate headquarters buildings were incentive enough to attract substantial private investment to the proposed redevelopment project. The completed project occupies more than three city blocks on the north side of the central business district. It is bounded on the north by Saskatchewan Drive, on the south by 11th Avenue, on the west by Lorne Street and on the east by Hamilton Street. Cornwall Centre is a mixed-use development comprising over a million square feet of combined retail space, offices and apartments. Eatons and Sears are the anchor stores of the retail mall which was built and managed by Chartwood Developments, a private developer; the two government office buildings anchor the government component. The retail component and the offices were constructed in 1980-81 and the apartments were constructed by the Saskatchewan Housing Corporation - another provincial agency - in 1982-83. The province played the dominant role throughout the entire project not only in the initial commitment of its two office structures to start the redevelopment process but also in assembling the land and in its unflagging support. Without the province's financial commitment and

determined leadership there is little doubt that the Cornwall Centre would not have been built.

The city was a minor player in this scene. It performed its regulatory role in accordance with the books. It ensured that the project was compatible with the zoning by-law and that the streets and lanes required for the consolidation of the site were legally closed. They also agreed not to permit the development or expansion of any more suburban shopping centres in order to prevent any further erosion of the downtown retail market. To their credit they observed that commitment and no shopping centre development occurred in the suburbs until the late 1980s. Towards the end of the decade they approved the development of a shopping centre, known as Victoria Square, on the east side of the city at the intersection of Victoria Avenue and University Park. The justification for this approval was that the Cornwall Centre was now securely viable and would not be threatened by this new development on the eastern periphery of the city and that the new suburban centre was consistent with the Planning Department's sector plan for that area.

The Cornwall Centre seems to have had the desired effect. It has stemmed the leakage of downtown retail trade to the suburbs and has stabilized the deterioration of the central area. There is no evidence as yet that the trend has been reversed and the former downward movement is now actively upward but at least the decline has been arrested and there is the possibility of building a new viability on the stabilized base. One noticeably positive effect which it has had is on the Scarth Street Mall. Prior to the Cornwall Centre the mall was lifeless despite the brave attempts to animate it with decorations and attractive street furniture. It was little used. With the opening of the Cornwall Centre, and with the Scarth Street Mall leading into one of the main entrances to the Centre's shopping concourse, the use of the Scarth Street mall has been greatly increased. Previously the Scarth Street mall led nowhere and offered little in itself to attract people. With the opening of the Cornwall Centre the Scarth Street mall became a

link or movement corridor between Victoria Park and the Centre and the pedestrian count on the Scarth Street mall is now second only to the volume on 11th Avenue between Lorne and Hamilton Streets which is the heaviest in the downtown. The city has also been pursuing the usual kind of municipal urban amenities program such as tree planting, sidewalk paving, etc. in the downtown generally as well as in the city at large.

The success of the Cornwall Centre and the Scarth Street mall seems to have been matched by modest successes in other aspects of downtown redevelopment. A new convention centre and hotel have been constructed for which the city contributed the land and favourable tax concessions. Two new parking structures have been built which have helped in some measure to ease the on-street parking problem. There has been a slight increase in the resident population downtown largely attributable to the construction of senior citizens' housing accommodation by the Saskatchewan Housing Corporation in a joint effort with the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation and the City of Regina. Inner city neighbourhoods have also benefitted from the Saskatchewan Housing Corporation's leadership in an infill housing program. Such a program had been proposed in the Planning Department's Regina RSVP development plan. The basic principle was to make housing available to low income residents through a land-banking scheme in which the public would acquire land in inner city neighbourhoods and write down the cost to zero thereby bringing the mortgage and monthly payments down to the point where the housing could be afforded by low income families. This would pre-empt the "gentrification" or "white painting" of these inner city neighbourhoods by middle and higher income people whose incursion into these desirable close-in locations would drive the lower income residents out into other parts of the city as has happened elsewhere.

In 1980 the Saskatchewan Housing Corporation and the City of Regina initiated infill housing projects in the Albert-Scott and Cathedral neighbourhoods. Under this scheme the province undertook to acquire the land and put up the housing through its

agency the Saskatchewan Housing Corporation, while the City of Regina's role was to select the sites on which the infill housing would be constructed and to administer the development control regulations as they affected the projects. The program enjoyed some small success until the Saskatchewan Housing Corporation's funding and mandate were changed after 1982 when the Conservatives under Grant Devine were elected as the provincial government.

Regina RSVP contains a large number of policies which, taken together, address the full range of development issues affecting the city. Some of them are merely statements of a broad administrative relevance such as, for example, "That information about City issues shall be made available to the widest possible audience." Others commit the council to specific capital projects such as "That a new east-west traffic route shall be constructed in the core area to accommodate east-west movements in and out of the downtown." Still others speak to issues over which the city has no jurisdiction and little control such as Rail Relocation or the Wascana Centre. On the whole Regina RSVP, the city's comprehensive development plan, can be considered as reasonably successful. Most of the policies over which the city has jurisdiction have been implemented in whole or in part; the policies over which the city does not have jurisdiction or which depend on financial or other participation by other government or private sector partners have not succeeded.

In 1984 the provincial government amended the <u>Planning and Development Act</u> to delete the capital works program from the required content of a city's development plan. This necessitated some adjustments and revisions to <u>Regina RSVP</u>. Although the amendment to the Act indicated a more restricted and archaic view of the planning function on the part of the new provincial government, the City Planning Department took the opportunity to review the performance of the development plan to-date, which had been approved in 1979, and to prepare a new and up-dated plan for the city. As part of that review the department published in May, 1985, a document with the title

Working-Paper Towards A New Development Plan. 144 In this document the department assesses the success or failure of some ninety policies contained in Regina RSVP. The assessment is objective and candid. What emerges from the evaluation, even taking into account the universal tendency of any bureaucracy to protect its interests, and show itself in the best light, is the persuasion that Regina RSVP has been as successful in providing a policy framework within which to guide the city's development as can be expected, given the limited capacity of any idealistic agenda to control events in the real world of political economy.

Three major successes of Regina RSVP must however be recognized. The first is that it succeeded in its intention to change the perspective of the planning function from a long-term, frozen-time-frame image to short-term and emerging issues. The development plan was approved in 1979; it was being formally revised and up-dated in-1984, only five years later. The second achievement was the broadening of the base of public involvement and participation in the planning process. And the third, and perhaps most notable success in the context of this study was the strict observance by the council of the constraints on its decisions imposed by its policy commitments in the development plan. Where the plan has presented an obstacle to decisions or actions which the council has felt desirable or necessary the council has amended the plan in compliance with the statutory or by-law requirements. Many of the policies contained in the plan have not been realized, mainly because their realization lay beyond the powers of the council, but in no instance have they been violated or deliberately ignored by the council in making its decisions on issues within their jurisdiction. The council has also refused approval of development applications because of the adverse impact such development would have on the quality of life of the residents in the area which would be affected and in doing so has foregone the tax revenues which the development would generate. 145 This approach to the planning function is in marked contrast to that of the council of the City of Winnipeg following amalgamation in 1972.

# OVERVIEW: REGINA'S DISTINCTIVE HISTORY, PLANNING FUNCTION, COMMUNAL MIND AND OUTLOOK

Over the one hundred and more years since Regina was created, its evolution has been shaped by historical circumstances which were peculiarly its own. Out of those indigenous historical conditions has emerged a city with its own identity and its own distinctive characteristics; and those innate characteristics have played their considerable part in the city's planning function.

A salient and distinctive characteristic of Regina has been its dependence on the provincial wheat economy. The economic fortunes of the city have virtually been a function of the fortunes of the wheat crop. Nor is the linkage limited to the economy. The strength of the economic bonding is matched by that of the psychological bonding. Insofar as one can speak of a "communal mind and outlook" Regina's is as one with that of its rural hinterland. Mutually scornful attitudes between the city and the country have been the taunting postures with which rural and urban cultures have confronted each other throughout history. Typically, the country dweller is regarded contemptuously as a crude, untutored simpleton by the sophisticated urbanite. Conversely the urban dweller is regarded as a scheming, posturing deceiver by the country person. "Country bumpkin," "hick," "hayseed," and "city slicker," "fop," and "lounge lizard" are the kinds of pejorative epithets with which each derogates the other. Disparagement of one another, however, is not a part of the mutuality which exists between Regina and its farming hinterland. To the extent that it is possible for an urban community and a rural community to have the same values, outlook, hopes and expectations, Regina and its surrounding countryside share those attitudes in fullest measure.

This unity of interests is compounded of a variety of components. The economy is an important factor. The sustenance of both the city and the country comes directly and overwhelmingly from the wheat economy. Wheat also accounts for a notable part of

Winnipeg's economy but the nature of Winnipeg's relationship to the wheat crop is qualitatively different from that of Regina's. Winnipeg's relationship to it is a remote institutional relationship, Regina's is a face-to-face personal relationship. Winnipeg dominates the financial and distribution components of the wheat staple economy from its distant corporate board rooms. Regina is at the very grass roots of the economic structure where the product is produced and every success and failure on the land evokes a corresponding reaction in the city. In Winnipeg the good or bad fortune of the farm is understood in terms of financial and institutional statistics; in Regina it is felt directly in human terms of joy or despair. The empathy between country and city has affected much of Regina's attitudes and behaviour. The struggle of Saskatchewan's farmers for a greater measure of control over their economic and political lives which found expression in their wheat pools, co-operatives, credit unions, etc. awoke sympathetic resonances in Regina. The political protest movement in Saskatchewan began in the countryside and culminated in the city. First the Progressives, then the CCF, then the NDP expressed the political aspirations of both the rural and the urban sectors of the society and in the post-World War II era the ideology of the left was present somewhere at the table in the council chamber of Regina's city hall. Because Regina did not become a highly industrialized centre the private industrial corporation was barely present. Because of its size, its isolation, its limited economic base, its sparsely populated, agricultural hinterland, Regina did not attract the head offices of large private corporations and the ethos of corporate capitalism did not pervade the atmosphere of the city. Indeed, the public corporation occupied a more visible place in the city and the social democratic ideology tended to mitigate any overt or excessive cronyism with the aggressive entrepreneurial element in the city on the part of the city council.

Regina's urban economy was predominantly based on the retailing, wholesaling, real-estate and service sectors (including government). Its private enterprise markets did not expand to any significant extent beyond the borders of the province. Its public

corporations' markets were also mostly contained within the province. Certainly the provincial economy enjoyed international markets for its wheat, potash and uranium and the Interprovincial Steel Corporation served a specialized market beyond Saskatchewan but the focus of all of these enterprises was Saskatchewan. The head offices were in the province and the revenues from them flowed to the province. This contributed to the tendency towards a kind of provincial introversion and strengthened the feelings of cohesion between the city and the country.

The economic dependence of the one upon the other is an important factor in this psychological bonding. Another factor is the size of the city and its setting in the countryside. Indeed, size and setting are simply facets of the total economic structure of the city and have as influential a role in shaping Regina's communal mind and outlook as does the city's dependence on the provincial wheat economy. Regina is a small city not only in population but also in physical spread. It has been a compact city for most of its existence. During the 1950s and 1960s it experienced substantial suburban growth but even so it has not sprawled extensively over the countryside. Accordingly, farmland comes right up to the limits of this small and fairly compact city and even in the heart of it the Reginan is in effect not very far from visual or physical contact with the farming countryside. And that farming countryside extends in all directions for hundreds of miles without interruption by another major centre. There are, of course, numerous small towns and villages scattered throughout the realm but these are strictly local agricultural service centres and their ethos, if anything, is even more closely melded with that of the farming community. The nearest large centre to Regina is Saskatoon, some one hundred and fifty miles north-west of Regina. Saskatoon's population in 1984 was 200,600; Regina's was 186,500. Regina is the smallest of the five major urban centres in the three prairie provinces.

There are three periods of relatively rapid growth in Regina's history. The first was between 1901 and 1911 when the city expanded from 2,249 to 30,213, an

increase of some 1243 percent or a remarkable average rate of 124 percent per year. The second period was the decade of the 1920s when it grew from 34,432 in 1921 to 53,209 in 1931, an increase of 54.5 percent or nearly 5.5 percent per year on average. And the third period was the two decades from 1946 to 1966 when the population increased from 60,246 to 131,127: 117.65 percent over the twenty years or an average annual increase of nearly 5.9 percent. Despite these periodic dramatic surges in growth Regina has remained a small centre. Its growth has been curtailed by the limited amount of urban growth dynamic available in a wheat-staple-driven economy, and moreover by the fact that the limited amount of growth-potential has had to be shared with Saskatoon, Saskatchewan's other major metropolitan centre.

Regina's relatively small size has made its problems of growth-management relatively simple. Regina's growth-management problems have further been simplified by the fact that at no time in its history was there another urban municipal government in the suburbs abutting Regina's borders. Certainly there were subdivisions and residential neighbourhoods and other types of development which sprang up just outside the city limits, but in every case these accretions on its borders were annexed by Regina and the metropolitan area was consistently under the single municipal jurisdiction of the City of Regina. This, together with Regina's modest size, has not only enabled the city government to extend its policies, by-laws and regulations over the entire urbanized area but it has also enabled Reginans to maintain a unified and coherent perception of their city.

Another distinguishing feature in the historic evolution of Regina was the federal government's land grant in 1903. Under this grant Ottawa transferred to the city title to all the land that the government owned in Regina at that time. The transferred land comprised 167 blocks containing 4000 lots. With ownership of this very large amount of property the council was in a position to exercise extensive control over the development in the city and to steer that development in the council's chosen direction.

City councils, of course, change with every civic election so it may seem anomalous to speak of Regina's council as though it were only one council which held office continuously and which led the development of the city constantly in the same fixed direction. But that, in effect, was the case. Certainly the individual members changed, some holding office for as little as one year, some being re-elected for extended terms. But notwithstanding the changes in the membership, the values and attitudes which informed the council remained constant throughout most of the city's history. This was so because throughout most of its history the majority of the members of the council were businessmen - retailers or real-estate brokers or developers - and it was the businessmen's view of the city and of its proper objectives which dominated the outlook of the council. Candidates representing civic election organizations on the labour side won majorities on the council in a number of civic elections between 1935 and 1970 but the social and economic concerns which are at the very heart of the labour ideology for the most part lie beyond the competence of the municipal authority. Accordingly, even during those periods when labour controlled the council the basic administrative municipal concerns of services, budget and land development continued to dominate the council's agenda, except during the period 1935 to 1939 when the problem of unemployment relief was the labour councils' primary concern. Nor did the labourdominated councils, during their intermittent brief periods of tenure, depart significantly from the general direction of the city's development which the businessoriented councils had established and pursued.

The ownership of the federal land-grant lots eventually led to land-use zoning and subdivision by-laws. In the circumstances of Regina's relatively small size, unity of jurisdiction and general consensus on development goals the city council, for more than half a century, had no need to resort to or even to contemplate planning and development control instruments any more sophisticated than the relatively simple measures of zoning and subdivision by-laws.

Of great importance in the evolution of Regina's planning function was the continuing role of the provincial government. The province played its role on two levels. One was the customary level of legislative and regulatory control which all provinces in Canada exercise over the cities under their jurisdiction. On the other level was its role as mentor for the landscaping of the city and as a leader in the city's development.

The province's role in the landscaping of the city began as a purely provincial project quite unrelated to any interest of the city. Saskatchewan became a province in 1905 and in 1906 Premier Scott conceived the inspired idea of building a monumental new legislative building for the newly-created province and setting it in a beautifully landscaped site. The site he chose was a tract of 168-acres on the south side of Wascana Creek, beyond the then southern boundary of Regina. What began as an ambitious site-landscaping project for the new legislature ultimately ended up as Wascana Centre, 2300-acres in extent and one of the most admirable central-city parks in all of Canada. The city's boundaries were extended in 1911 to take in the Wascana area and the city thus included a superb urban amenity, even at that early stage of its development. But some years before that boundary extension occurred the provincial government was already landscaping the city-owned park on the north bank of Wascana Creek, not so much for the sake of the city but rather to complement the beautification of the province's site on the south bank and to improve the vista across the Creek from the legislature.

It was, however, in 1963 that the NDP government of Woodrow Lloyd took the definitive step which set the Wascana development on its true course and ensured that whatever else might happen to Regina it could never again be disparaged as the ugliest place on the prairies. In that year Lloyd's government established the Wascana Centre Authority, an authority at arms-length from the government vested with the responsibility and the power to develop the Creek and the surrounding lands as a Centre for the Arts, Education, and Government. Since that time the Wascana Centre has

blossomed into the magnificent visual and recreational (and institutional) amenity which it is today. There can be little doubt that the City of Regina could not have created this remarkable urban park by its own efforts as a civic park and landscape project. It was only the resources, vision and commitment of the provincial government that could have done it. Wascana Centre stands as a testament to the positive role which the provincial government of Saskatchewan has played in the development of the City of Regina.

The Wascana Centre Authority Act was not the only piece of provincial legislation which had a direct and significant affect on the development of Regina. Also of consequence was the province's Planning and Development Act of 1973. This Act, for the first time in the history of the province, formally established the principle that the purpose of municipal planning was to guide the future development of the municipality. It made the preparation and adoption of a municipal development plan mandatory and it specified the nature and content of such a development plan. Regina's Community Planning Scheme of 1961, which was still extant, did not meet these new requirements and had to be replaced. In 1979 the Planning Department published its development plan for the city under the title of Regina RSVP. It was adopted by the city council under bylaw 6600 on December 21, 1979. On the whole Regina RSVP has been fairly successful. It has achieved its basic objectives in changing the city's approach to the planning function and about half of its policies have been implemented in whole or in part.

Two other items in the unfolding of Regina's planning function merit some closing comments. One of these is the system of neighbourhood associations which has arisen and flourished since 1973. The other is the Cornwall Centre, built in 1980-83. The neighbourhood associations were not created by provincial or city legislation. They began as proteges of the Planning Department and were closely involved in the Department's production of Regina RSVP, but they no longer have that relationship with the Planning Department. Nevertheless, they seem to be a significant participant in the

planning process and play an important role in the councils' planning and development policy decisions. Their number has grown from the original four to the present twenty-eight.

The Cornwall Centre was not, in fact, an accomplishment of the city and it owed little if anything to the Regina RSVP development plan. While it is true that the city council and its planning department were concerned about stopping the decline of the central business district it was the province which took the initiative and provided the leadership in this downtown revitalization project. The Cornwall Centre has succeeded in strengthening the central business district's retailing function and restoring a greater measure of viability to the downtown.

In summary, then, it can be said that there were three principal distinctive historical conditions which found expression in the City of Regina's planning function. The first of these was the factor of scale. The city's small size, compact form and unitary government precluded large-scale urban metropolitan problems and posed no great threat of such problems emerging in the foreseeable future. This allowed the city to develop for more than half a century with a minimum of day-to-day development controls; zoning and subdivision by-laws were adequate measures and the federal government's land grant provided the council with a further elementary means of growth management through the control of the sale of these lots.

The second factor was the provincial government. The provincial government had an important place in the city's life from the time of the establishment of the province and its capital city. Its influence came into play almost immediately with the beginning of the Wascana development. Not only did the province's Wascana project move the city to landscape its streets and parks but it also persuaded the city council that civic landscaping was in fact city planning. This perception of the planning function persisted until after World War II. During the 60s, 70s and into the 80s the province's creation of the Wascana Centre Authority, the passing of a progressive Planning and Development

Act (which resulted in the Regina RSVP development plan and the broadening of the base of public participation in the planning process), the province's initiative and leadership in the creation of the Cornwall Centre, and its continuous presence in the city as a high-profile employer and builder of buildings and facilities made the provincial government an important influence in the development of Regina and in the evolving character of its planning function.

The third factor was the general ethos of the society. The close harmony between the urban and the rural values together with a minimal presence of large multinational industrial and financial corporations precluded the infusion of the corporate capitalist ethos into the psychological climate of the city. The strong, agriculturally-based populist movement of political dissent in the province kept Regina's viewpoint turned in that direction rather than in the direction of the high-powered urban corporate ethos. This attitude was reinforced by the long years of social democratic provincial government in the province and its presence in Regina as the provincial capital. Evidence of such influence may be found in the election of labour aldermen to the city council from time to time and the moderation there of the common tendencies among municipal councils to pursue development as their primary civic responsibility and to support and collaborate with the developers. In terms of the planning function this ethos has influenced the council's attitude towards its policies under the 1973 development plan. These it has regarded as serious commitments and has conscientiously tried to honour them rather than abandon them in favour of revenue-producing development proposals which contravened the plan and were socially undesirable.

All of these factors, and their component elements, were not separate, discrete and independent of each other. Rather they were interdependent and closely interwoven into the life of the city. They affected each other in varying degrees as the city's circumstances varied. But together they comprised the complex of influences which moulded Regina's distinctive communal mind and outlook. The cast of the city's

communal mind and outlook was also not constant but changed as the city evolved and those changes produced corresponding changes in the city's planning function.

## **NOTES - REGINA PHASE 1**

- <sup>1</sup>Ottawa Free Press, cited in Earl G. Drake, Regina: The Queen City, 15, 16.
- <sup>2</sup>Manitoba Free Press, cited in George A. Nader, <u>Cities in Canada: Profiles of Fifteen Metropolitan Centres</u>, Vol.1, 296.
- <sup>3</sup>J. William Brennan, "Introduction," in Edmund H. Dale, ed., <u>Regina. Regional Isolation</u> and <u>Innovative Development</u>, 4.
- <sup>4</sup>Dominion of Canada Sessional Papers, 1887, No. 34C, cited by Brennan in Dale, Regina. Regional Isolation, 7.
- <sup>5</sup>Drake, Regina: The Queen City, 20.
- <sup>6</sup>Drake, Regina: The Queen City, 21.
- <sup>7</sup>J.F. Fraser, "Canada As It Is," cited in Brennan, "Introduction," in Dale, <u>Regina.</u> <u>Regional Isolation</u>, 10.
- <sup>8</sup>J. William Brennan, Regina: An Illustrated History, 41.
- <sup>9</sup>lbid.
- <sup>10</sup>Brennan, "Introduction," in Dale, Regina, 10.
- <sup>11</sup>Drake, Regina: The Queen City, 53, 54.
- <sup>12</sup>Drake, <u>Regina: The Queen City</u>, 73.
- <sup>13</sup>Regina Leader, 23 January, 1902, cited in Brennan, <u>Regina: An Illustrated History</u>, 33.
- <sup>14</sup>Regina Leader, 20 April 1904, cited in Brennan, Regina: An Illustrated History, 33.
- <sup>15</sup>Drake, Regina: The Queen City, 111.
- <sup>16</sup>Donald Stewart Richan, <u>Boosterism and Urban Rivalry in Regina and Moose Jaw.</u> <u>1902-1913</u>, 30.
- <sup>17</sup>Brennan, Regina: An Illustrated History, 20, Appendix, Table 1.
- <sup>18</sup>Brennan, <u>Regina</u>, 31.
- <sup>19</sup>Richan, <u>Boosterism</u>, 37.
- <sup>20</sup>Richan, <u>Boosterism</u>, 41.
- <sup>21</sup>Regina Leader, 23 March, 1886, cited in Richan, <u>Boosterism</u>, 17.
- <sup>22</sup>Regina Leader, 16 March, 1904, cited in Richan, <u>Boosterism</u>, n.29.
- <sup>23</sup>Regina Leader, 12 December, 1901, cited in Richan, <u>Boosterism</u>, 21.

#### **NOTES - PHASE 2**

- <sup>24</sup>John Lucas Moser, <u>The Impact of City Council's Decisions Between 1903 and 1930 In the Morphological Development of Regina</u>, 6.
- <sup>25</sup>Richan, <u>Boosterism</u>, 69, 70.
- <sup>26</sup>Regina Leader, 14 May, 1903, cited in Richan, Boosterism, 70.

- <sup>27</sup>Regina City Commissioners, "Minutes," 2 August, 1912, cited in Moser <u>The Impact</u>, 6.
- <sup>28</sup>Moser, <u>The Impact</u>, 7.
- <sup>29</sup>Moser, <u>The Impact</u>, 8.
- <sup>30</sup>Richan, <u>Boosterism</u>, 137.
- <sup>31</sup>Regina Leader, 23 June, 1904, cited in Richan, Boosterism, 139.
- <sup>32</sup>Regina City Council "Minutes" 20 May, 1905, cited in Richan, <u>Boosterism</u>, 72.
- 33Moser, The Impact, 9, 10.
- <sup>34</sup>Regina Leader, 4 October, 1905, cited in Richan, <u>Boosterism</u>, 72.
- 35 Moser, The Impact, 17.
- 36Regina City Council "Minutes" 15 August, 1904, cited in Moser, The Impact, 12.
- <sup>37</sup>Moser, <u>The Impact</u>, 17.
- <sup>38</sup>Regina Leader, 22 April 1913, cited in Rodney E. Laporte, <u>The Development of Parks in Regina</u>. 1882-1930: Private Initiative and Public Policy, 130.
- <sup>39</sup>Moser, <u>The Impact</u>, 16, 17.
- <sup>40</sup>Laporte, <u>The Development of Parks</u>, 35.
- <sup>41</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>42</sup>Laporte, <u>The Development of Parks</u>, 84.
- <sup>43</sup>lbid.
- <sup>44</sup>Canadian Architect and Builder, February, 1908, 14, cited in Laporte, <u>The Development of Parks</u>, 84.
- <sup>45</sup>See T.H. McLeod, <u>The Wascana Centre Authority in Regina: A Case Study in Planned Development.</u>
- <sup>46</sup>Richan, <u>Boosterism</u>, 99.
- <sup>47</sup>Richan, <u>Boosterism</u>, 111.
- <sup>48</sup>Regina City Council "Minutes," 6 September, 1910, 3 October, 1910, cited in Richan, <u>Boosterism</u>, 115.
- <sup>49</sup>Brennan, Regina: An Illustrated History, 73.
- <sup>50</sup>City of Regina By-Law No. 302, 18 April, 1904, cited in Moser, The Impact, 27.
- <sup>51</sup>City of Regina By-Law No. 302, sec. 46, cited in Moser, 28.
- <sup>52</sup>City of Regina <u>By-Law No. 386</u>, 6 May, 1907, cited in Moser, 28, 29.
- <sup>53</sup>City of Regina By-Law No. 476, 3 May, 1909, cited in Moser, 29.
- <sup>54</sup>City of Regina <u>By-Law No. 663</u>, 2 July, 1912, cited in Moser, 29.
- <sup>55</sup>City of Regina <u>By-Law No. 669</u>, 19 August, 1912, cited in Moser, 30.
- <sup>56</sup>Moser, 31, 32.
- <sup>57</sup>Regina Daily Province, 15 November, 1911, cited in Laporte <u>The Development of Parks</u>, 101.
- <sup>58</sup>J.S. Woodsworth, "Report of a Preliminary and General Social Survey of Regina," 26, cited in Brennan, <u>Regina</u>: <u>An Illustrated History</u>, 97.
- <sup>59</sup>Woodsworth, "Report," 47, cited in Brennan, 97.
- <sup>60</sup>Regina Daily Province, 5 May, 1913, cited in Laporte, <u>The Development of Parks</u>, 145.
- <sup>61</sup>Woodsworth, "Report," 3, cited in Laporte, <u>Parks</u>, 144. See also Regina <u>Leader</u>, 6 December, 1913.

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62Laporte, Parks, 113.
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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>63</sup>See James D. Anderson, "The Municipal Government Reform Movement in Western Canada, 1880-1920" in Artibise and Stelter, eds., <u>The Usable Urban Past</u>, 73.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup>Laporte, <u>Parks</u>, 117. Regina <u>Daily Province</u>, 3 February, 1913.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>65</sup>Regina <u>Daily Province</u>, 6 March, 1913, cited in Laporte, <u>Parks</u>, 122.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>66</sup>Drake, Regina: The Queen City, 138.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>67</sup>John Lucas Moser, "Regina: Development by Controls - Prelude to Town Planning 1903-1946," in Dale, ed., <u>Regina: Regional Isolation</u>, 205.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>68</sup>Laporte, <u>Parks</u>, 122.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup>Regina Leader, 15 March, 1913, 26 March, 1913, cited in Laporte, Parks, 123.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup>Regina <u>Daily Province</u>, 27 January, 1913, cited in Laporte, 123.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup>Regina <u>Leader</u>, 10 March, 1913, cited in Laporte, 123.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup>Regina <u>Leader</u>, 20 January, 1913, cited in Laporte, 120.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup>Laporte, <u>Parks</u>, 102.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup>Moser, <u>The Impact</u>, 47.

<sup>75</sup>Brennan, Regina: An Illustrated History, 195, Appendix, Table XI.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup>Brennan, 191, Appendix, Table IV.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>77</sup>Laporte, <u>Parks</u>, 153, 154.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup>Laporte, <u>Parks</u>, 154.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup>The Town Planning and Rural Development Act, ss.1917, chapter 70.

<sup>80</sup> The Town Planning Act. SM.1916, ch. 114, sec. 1.

<sup>81</sup> Commission of Conservation Report of the Eighth Annual Meeting, 1917, 95.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>82</sup>Regina City Council "Minutes," 16 December, 1919, cited in Laporte, <u>Parks</u>, 166. <sup>83</sup>Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>84</sup>Regina <u>Leader</u>, 21 April, 1909, cited in Laporte, 90.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>85</sup>Regina City Council "Minutes," 18 January, 1921, cited in Laporte, 168.

<sup>86</sup>Regina Daily Province, 24 November, 1922, cited in Laporte, 170.

<sup>87</sup> Regina Leader, 19 April, 1923, cited in Laporte, 179.

<sup>88</sup>Regina Leader, 20 April, 1923, cited in Laporte, 179.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>89</sup>lbid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>90</sup>Laporte, 184.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>91</sup>Regina <u>Leader</u>, 11 June 1927, cited in Laporte, 181.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>92</sup>See Moser, "Development by Controls" in Dale, ed., <u>Regina: Regional Isolation</u>, 210.
 <sup>93</sup>Laporte. 183.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>94</sup>City of Regina, By-Law No. 1378, 20 September, 1927.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>95</sup>Regina City Council "Minutes," 3 October, 1929, cited in Laporte, 183.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>96</sup>Regina <u>Leader-Post</u>, 13 January, 1932, cited in Laporte, 184.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>97</sup>Brennan, Regina: An Illustrated History, 101.

<sup>98</sup>Brennan, Regina: An Illustrated History, 101.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>99</sup>Brennan, 195, Appendix, Table XI.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>100</sup>Brennan, 191, Appendix, Table III.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>101</sup>Brennan, 102.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>102</sup>Brennan, 106.

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<sup>103</sup>Brennan, 135.
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<sup>105</sup>Brennan, 135.

<sup>106</sup>lbid.

<sup>107</sup>Brennan, 136.

108lbid.

<sup>109</sup>Drake, 187.

<sup>110</sup>Brennan, 140.

<sup>111</sup>lbid.

<sup>112</sup>Drake, 223.

<sup>113</sup>Drake, 223, 224.

<sup>114</sup>Brennan, 169.

#### **NOTES - REGINA PHASE 3**

- <sup>115</sup>Brennan, 175.
- <sup>116</sup>Brennan,135.
- <sup>117</sup>Brennan, 191, Appendix, Table V. See also Donald George Ross, <u>Population Growth</u>. <u>The Catalyst Of Spatial Changes In Regina</u>, 1945-1975, 24, Table 2.2.
- 118City of Regina Planning Department, "Community Planning Scheme for Regina," cited in Regina RSVP: A planning strategy for Regina (A working document), 17, 20.
- 119City of Regina Planning Department, Regina RSVP: (A working document), 21.
- <sup>120</sup>Brennan, 192, Appendix, Table VII, 193, Appendix, Table VIII.
- <sup>121</sup>Brennan, 165.
- 122See Donald George Ross, Population Growth, 42.
- <sup>123</sup>Ross. 50.
- <sup>124</sup>Ross, 43.
- <sup>125</sup>Ross, 92.
- 126lbid.
- <sup>127</sup>Ross, 95, 100,
- <sup>128</sup>The Planning and Development Act, ss. 1973, ch. 73.
- <sup>129</sup>The Planning and Development Act, sec. 36.
- 130 The Planning and Development Act, sec. 38.
- <sup>131</sup>The Planning and Development Act, sec. 35.
- <sup>132</sup>City of Winnipeg Act, SM.1971, ch. 105, sec. 572.1(1).
- 133 City of Winnipeg Act, sec. 572.1(2).
- 134City of Regina Planning Department, Regina RSVP: (A working document), 156.
- 135City of Regina Planning Department, Regina RSVP: (A working document), 2.
- <sup>136</sup>Letter from Ron Clark dated 6 September, 1990, to the author.
- <sup>137</sup>Letter from Lehman O. Walker, Director, Regina Urban Planning Department, dated 7 September, 1990, to the author.
- <sup>138</sup>Letter from Barbara L. Schick, Superintendent of Community Development, City of Regina, dated 10 August, 1990, to the author.
- <sup>139</sup>Ron Clark, letter of 6 September, 1990.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>104</sup>Brennan, 195, Appendix, Table XI.

142 Regina RSVP: Policy and Implementation, "Rail Relocation," chapter 4, 52 ff.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>140</sup>Item 1 under "Policy Recommendations," in Section I, "The Strategy of Public Planning," chapter 11, <u>Regina RSVP: A Planning Strategy for Regina. Policy and Implementation</u>, 128.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>141</sup>Regina RSVP: Policy and Implementation, "Policy Recommendations and Implementation," chapter 5, item 8, 61.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>143</sup>Regina RSVP: Policy and Implementation, "Special Implementation Issues," chapter 10, 125.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>144</sup>City of Regina Planning Department, <u>Working Paper Towards a New Development Plan</u>.

<sup>145</sup> Letter from Lehman O. Walker, dated 26 July, 1990, to the author.

#### **CHAPTER 8**

#### **CALGARY**

#### PHASE 1: FROM COWTOWN TO BOOMTOWN

## 1. The Genesis of Calgary - Lawlessness in Whoop-Up Country

Calgary, lying at the junction of the Bow and Elbow Rivers in southern Alberta, began its existence as a fort of the North West Mounted Police.

In 1870 the Hudson's Bay Company surrendered to the Government of Canada its authority over the whole of western Canada which it had enjoyed under its charter. Legal jurisdiction over the West thereby was passed to Ottawa. But there was no constabulary in place to enforce the observance of the law of the land and very soon reports began to reach the new authorities in Ottawa of illegal trading in whiskey, the establishment of American whiskey posts on Canadian soil, the theft of horses and the killing of cattle by the Blackfoot Indians, and even the frequent death of Indians from alcoholic poisoning whether from the consumption of lethal quantities or from the lethal quality of the rotgut drink. Moreover, there was in eastern Canada the continuing uneasiness over the possibility that the Americans might seek to annex the Canadian north-west.

By the end of the 18th century the Indians of the western plains, particularly the Blackfoot, were actively involved in the fur trade. Initially the trade was modest involving only the exchange of furs, horses and pemmican. As the presence of the white traders increased and the fur trade grew the exchange became more sophisticated involving blankets, guns and whiskey. Guns and ammunition were sought by the Blackfoot not only for the purposes of the buffalo hunt but also as weapons against their enemies to the north - the Cree. By the middle of the 19th century most of the Blackfoot trade was oriented to the south, specifically to the American Fur Company trading posts along the Missouri River, since they were more easily and safely accessible than traders to the north in the territory of their Cree enemies. In 1864 the American Fur Company

went out-of business and their former trading region was thus opened up to a host of small, independent and unscrupulous traders. A wave of these get-rich-quick American speculators swept northward into southern Alberta, spurred by the demand for buffalo hides in the eastern states and welcomed by the Blackfoot who wanted weapons, whiskey and other articles. An era of lawlessness had dawned in the region.<sup>1</sup>

Whiskey soon became the chief trading item. This trade was centred on Fort Whoop-Up, located just south of present day Lethbridge. Before long the entire Blackfoot territory came to be known as Whoop-Up country with its own particular economy and social characteristics. The underlying cause of the social and economic upheaval was whiskey. Its effect on the Indians was devastating. They quarreled among themselves, murdered each other as well as the traders, stole horses and other goods which had any value as trading items. Indians from the American side of the border also forayed into Canada and were involved in these incidents of theft and violence. The problem grew to such dimensions that the government in Ottawa could not ignore it. Coupled with this problem was Macdonald's concern about creating a new nation and preventing an American usurpation of the west.

It took the Macdonald government three years to come to a decision on how to establish and maintain law and order in the Territories and to help secure them against American intrusion. In 1873 they created the North-West Mounted Police, a quasi-military police force to perform that role. By 1875 there were two Mounted Police posts in this part of the Territories, one at Fort Macleod, the other at Fort Walsh. Fort Macleod was named after Colonel James Farquharson Macleod, Assistant Commissioner of the Mounted Police, stationed at that post and in charge of police activity in the whole of that southern region. The presence of Fort Macleod however did little to prevent the whiskey traders from slipping back and forth across the international border, and additional police forces were felt to be necessary. Accordingly, on April 10, 1875, an order-in-council was passed authorizing the establishment of a Mounted Police post on

the Bow River, about one hundred miles almost due north of Fort Macleod.<sup>2</sup> In the summer of that year a constable and a guide were dispatched to locate a site. They arrived at the river and chose a spot on the west side of the Elbow River, about a mile south of its junction with the Bow. Here they staked down a buffalo robe to mark the place. A contract was then entered into with I.G. Baker and Company of Fort Benton, Montana, to construct the fort. (Fig. 29.)

In August a troop of Mounties from "F" Division under the command of Inspector Ephrem A. Brisebois at Fort Macleod was ordered to proceed to the new site and establish a post there. Within a few days after the troop's arrival the ox-trains of the I.G. Baker Company<sup>3</sup> arrived with the building materials for the fort. The company had contracted to erect the buildings of the fort while the Mounties were to build the palisade. When the fort was finished Brisebois named it "Fort Brisebois" following the precedent of Fort Macleod and Fort Walsh which had been named after the commanding officers who had been in charge of their construction. He also ordered that the title "Fort Brisebois" was to appear at the head of all public documents issued from the fort. The name slowly came into limited use among the local traders but it only intensified and brought to a head the hostility towards Brisebois which had for some time been mounting among his superiors at Fort Macleod because of a long series of his incompetences and indiscretions, including even a mutiny of his men against him in 1875-76.4 On January 1, 1876, Colonel Macleod<sup>5</sup> retired as Assistant Commissioner of the NWMP to take up the position of stipendiary magistrate. He was replaced as Assistant Commissioner by Colonel A.G. Irvine. Irvine at once cancelled Brisebois' order concerning the "Fort Brisebois" title and wrote a strong letter of complaint to the Minister of Justice in Ottawa. He pointed out that Brisebois had not consulted either himself, or Colonel Macleod, on the question of either the name of the fort or the title on the fort's stationery, and that Brisebois had no grounds for giving his name to the fort because Brisebois' men had not built it but it had been built by I.G. Baker and Company. This was not entirely true since Brisebois'

troop had built the palisade, and in any case Brisebois was in charge of the entire project and was the commanding officer of the station. Irvine went on to tell the Minister in the strongest terms that he considered Brisebois unfit to command troops and to hold his position in the force.<sup>6</sup> Irvine advised the Minister that Colonel Macleod had suggested the name "Calgary" which he believed to be Scotch (i.e. Gaelic) for "clear running water." The name seemed appropriate for a fort which stood beside two running streams, barely out of the foothills in which they arose. Historian George F.G. Stanley however has shown that the word "Calgary" derives from a Gaelic form meaning "bay farm" or "bay pasture." In any event, Calgary was officially adopted as the name of the fort and Brisebois, thoroughly discredited, resigned from the NWMP in August 1876. The Baker Company completed the buildings of the fort by Christmas 1875; the palisade took a little longer. In addition to the buildings of the fort within the palisade the company built its own store a short distance from the fort which became a kind of gathering place for the tiny community. The Hudson's Bay Company moved its post from the Ghost River to a site on the east side of the Elbow River opposite the fort. By Christmas 1875, the settlement consisted of Fort Calgary, the two trading posts, Father Doucet's mission, the people engaged in those buildings, the Métis who had been brought in to construct the fort and who, upon its completion, built cabins for themselves on both sides of the Elbow and supported themselves by hauling freight in their Red River carts,8 and the homesteaders Livingstone and Glenn.

# 2. Ranching and the CPR - The Making of Calgary

Calgary lies at the western extremity of the mixed-grass prairie vegetative region. This zone of mixed-grass prairie approaches Calgary from the east, sweeps past it in a curving belt about 100-miles wide, southward and then southeastward into the United States. The dark brown soil of the mixed-grass prairie region is more fertile and the precipitation somewhat greater and more certain than the brown soil and the aridity of the short-grass prairie region - the heart of the "Palisser Triangle" - which lies

about 100 miles to the east of Calgary. Stretching away to the northeast is the flat plain of the Aspen Grove region whose black soil is highly fertile and agriculturally productive. The land to the south is also flat, but mixed-grass prairie. On the west side, however, are the rolling uplands of the foothills. Here the land is broken by troughs and hollows, rocky hillsides and treed slopes - formidable obstacles to crop farmers. "Even the open valleys were too small, too rolling and too prone to frost to attract the farmer." But the valleys and slopes of the foothills to the south-west, the Porcupine Hills west of Nanton and Claresholm, indeed the whole range of the southern hills, constituted the "finest cattle country in the world." (Fig. 30 and Fig. 31.)

Cattle were first introduced into the "cow country" of south-west Alberta in 1873. Dr. John McDougall, a Methodist minister, who had a mission at Morley, twenty-odd miles up-stream on the Bow River from its confluence with the Elbow, not only tended his pastoral flock but had a hand in introducing the first bovine herd into the area; he helped bring the first cattle to Morley from Edmonton - twelve cows and a bull. During the next eight years small herds appeared around Fort Macleod, Pincher Creek, High River and Calgary. Original homesteaders like John Glenn, Sam Livingstone and Joseph Macfarlane kept cattle as well as farmed the land and there were also a number of NWMP officers who either retired or left the service to become small ranchers. In addition, herds of cattle were driven north from Fort Benton by the I.G. Baker Company on contract with the Canadian government to supply food to the Indians after the signing of Treaty Number Seven in 1877.

1881 was a landmark year in the development of south-west Alberta. The federal government, pursuing its National Policy and seeking to attract population and investment into the west, passed an order-in-council making large tracts of land available for lease on very generous terms for cattle grazing. 11 Up to one hundred thousand acres could be leased for a term of twenty-one years at a rental of one cent per acre per annum. The response to this offer was dramatic. In 1881 there were some

nine thousand head of cattle in the entire North West Territories. In 1882, there were 154 applications for leases and 75 were actually issued covering an area of more than four million acres. Py the end of 1883 there were over 25,000 head of cattle between the Bow River and the U.S. border. And by 1887 almost ten million acres were under lease from the federal government and over 100,000 head of cattle were grazing on the grasslands of southern Alberta/Assiniboia. Early in 1881, before the order-in-council was passed, Senator M.H. Cochrane, who was aware of the impending regulation and saw the business opportunity it represented, was quick off the mark to establish his Cochrane Ranch Company and travel to south-west Alberta to select the land for his range. He chose a tract some twenty-five miles west of Fort Calgary; the site of his company headquarters would soon become the settlement of Cochrane. In September 1881, three thousand head of cattle - the first large herd in the Calgary area - were bought in Montreal and driven by the I.G. Baker Company across the border up to the Bow River and then west to the Cochrane ranch.

Cochrane's lead was soon followed by the Oxley Ranch, the North-West Cattle
Company (the Bar U Ranch), and the Walrond Ranch. Financing for these enterprises
came mainly from British or eastern Canadian sources. Still others followed so that by
the mid-1880s there were about a dozen large cattle operations in south-western
Alberta, again financed by British or eastern Canadian entrepreneurs and financiers.

1881 was a memorable year in other respects. In February the CPR was incorporated and later that year the decision was made to re-route the mainline across the west from its previously contemplated route along the North Saskatchewan River valley through Battleford and Fort Edmonton to a more southerly route. Fort Calgary buzzed with excited expectation that it would become a major station on the mainline. The expectation was heightened when advance parties of CPR engineers appeared and ran preliminary lines through the Bow valley. In 1882 Calgary was made the headquarters for the supply of survey parties looking for the most feasible route through the Rockies

to the Pacific. In spite of these indications, however, the exact route of the mainline was still not publicly revealed and as late as 1883 there were still rumours that it would pass to the north of Fort Calgary, across the Nose Creek. The anticipated arrival of the CPR stimulated both business investment and land speculation. Early in 1881, Frank White, a local resident, noted in his diary that looking down from the North Hill he counted sixteen log shacks, nine teepees, and the fort. The population numbered 75.16 In the spring of 1883 a British traveller, in a book called Life and Labour in the Far Far West, wrote that he had stayed at the Royal Hotel, a tent thirty feet by eighteen feet. He noted forty to sixty tents and frame houses. By August 1883 there were some forty merchants operating on both sides of the Elbow River; about twenty-four of these businesses, including the Hudson's Bay Company store, were on the east side of the Elbow, housed in tents, log cabins, and frame houses.

On August 9, 1883, the rails of the CPR mainline reached the east bank of the Bow River, and the first train, consisting of eight passenger cars and sixteen flat cars reached Calgary two days later, on August 11, 1883. Shortly after a railway bridge was constructed across the Elbow River, and in December 1883, railway engineers laid out a townsite about three-quarters of a mile west of the NWMP post, on section 15. In January 1884, the CPR built its railway station, a one-storey building measuring twelve feet by sixty feet. It was located on the north side of the tracks and had a large platform and freight sheds. In the same month the CPR offered for sale the first townsite lots. 185 out of 188 lots purchased were located within three blocks of the railway station.<sup>20</sup> The first regularly scheduled continental train, however, did not pull into the Calgary station until May, 1886.

The action of the CPR in locating its station and townsite on the west side of the Elbow River in section 15 upset a lot of people on the east side of the river in section 14 who had bought land there either for speculative or settlement purposes and had hoped to gain large profits from the escalation of land values as a result of the establishment of

the railway station and townsite on their side of the river. Protests were lodged in many quarters, but to no avail. It was clear that the new town would rise around the railway station in the townsite in section 15. The Hudson's Bay Company built a new store on the west side - a frame structure, one storey high, thirty-five feet wide, one hundred feet long and reputed to be the finest store west of Winnipeg.<sup>21</sup> The post office was towed across the frozen Elbow River; so were many shacks; most tents were re-located and the larger part of the population was soon settled in the CPR townsite on the west side. At the beginning of 1884 the entire settlement numbered 428 persons.<sup>22</sup> Although it would still be two years before the regular trans-continental train service would be in operation with Calgary as a major station, business boomed immediately and the community burgeoned. By the end of the year the population was over one thousand.<sup>23</sup>

Construction of the railway line westward from Calgary required massive supplies. Contractors required heavy machinery and equipment to cut through the mountains; the enormous numbers of men working on the construction crews required food and clothing and other necessities of life. Ranchers required outfitting. In 1883 precious minerals were found at Silver City west of Banff; prospectors came in hordes and required provisions and equipment. Hotel accommodation and restaurants were in great demand; bordellos, billiard parlours and saloons flourished. The customers of all of these spent freely and Calgary was the headquarters for their supply. On August 31, 1883, Calgary's first newspaper made its appearance. It was called the <u>Calgary Herald-Mining and Ranche Advocate and General Advertiser</u>. The name was symbolic and in a sense apocalyptic: it embodied the essence of Calgary's being - the source of its sustenance and the well-spring of its ethos, then and in the future.

As was the general case with emerging frontier communities in the west, the buildings which housed the population and its activities were, initially at any rate, flimsy, jerry-built structures. Even the more prestigious businesses, although established perhaps on solid market foundations, were conducted in premises that were

not very substantial. For example, James Reilly's Royal Hotel, where a British traveller had stayed in 1883 and later described as a tent thirty feet long and eighteen feet wide, had been re-established as a three-storey structure, but it was

[A] tinderbox fabricated from the portable houses Reilly used to sell to CPR contractors before he made Calgary his home. Located on the corner of Stephen Avenue and Mactavish (Centre) Street, this three-storey hotel was regarded as the finest west of Winnipeg despite the fact that the upper portion was partitioned into male and female quarters by cotton sheets.<sup>24</sup>

As going concerns these frontier businesses had little fear that the inferior quality of their accommodation would turn potential customers away: the competition in all likelihood had nothing better to offer. But they did have other grounds for serious concern. Fire was an ever-present threat which could consume and utterly destroy an enterprise in a sudden conflagration. Losses could of course be recovered through insurance. But in such frontier communities insurance premiums on business premises were burdensomely high. Part of the reason for the extremely high cost of insurance was the fact that there was no adequate water-supply system in the community and no fire-fighting equipment. To overcome these deficiencies in the public domain required public financial resources; and public finances in unincorporated communities came from the senior governments and invariably were inadequate. If the financial capacity was to be expanded the community would have to have powers of taxation, and this meant municipal incorporation.

But other problems also pressed upon the community which could not be properly addressed because there was no organization or group constituted to do so. In the very first week of January 1884, James Reilly, owner of the Royal Hotel on the east side of the Elbow River circulated 200 handbills announcing a "Public Meeting Tonight at 7.30 in the Methodist Church, To Consider Location of the Townsite, Bridges and Other Local Matters." 25 At the meeting Reilly explained that he had called the meeting because

he believed that the various problems facing the community needed a civic committee to take the responsibility for these matters until the place could be incorporated and a proper municipal council could be elected. The meeting was in agreement with this general proposal and when it was reconvened the following evening it was decided that there should be a committee of seven to take on this function and that the seven members would be elected by ballot the following Monday. And so they were.

By the late summer of 1884 the committee had prepared an application for presentation to the legislature of the North West Territories. Not everyone in the settlement, however, was in favour of incorporation. Because the nucleus of the settlement had moved across the Elbow River to the west side and the development potential of the settlement was emerging there the landowners and businessmen still on the east side opposed incorporation, believing that they would receive little benefit from it but would have to pay municipal taxes. When the committee nevertheless pressed on with their assignment the east-siders tried to have section 14 excluded from the incorporation but were unsuccessful. Even on the west side not everyone shared the enthusiasm of the businessmen who were championing the cause of municipal status. There were those who were familiar with the CPR's position with respect to the payment of municipal taxes and who could point to Regina's unhappy experience in that regard. Enthusiasm was by no means buoyant and the committee had great difficulty in raising the \$10026 incorporation fee which was required to accompany the application. At length, however, they succeeded in submitting the application, all in order, together with the fee, to the Territorial legislature. Calgary was incorporated as a town in November 1884. (Fig. 32 and Fig. 33.) The physical extent of the town comprised those portions of section 14, 15 and 16 south of the Bow River.

The first civic election was held in Calgary on December 3, 1884. The contest was for the office of mayor and five councillors, but the main public interest was centred on the mayoralty. George Murdoch was elected as mayor by a large majority.

The census conducted by the committee early in 1884 to determine the size of the population as a necessary part of the incorporation application had found a total of 428 people - men, women and children - in the community. Only property owners were eligible to vote, which substantially reduced the number of eligible voters. Murdoch won 202 votes which was almost as much as half the total population and must have represented an overwhelming majority of the votes cast. The five other members of Calgary's first municipal council elected along with George Murdoch were S.J. Clarke, I.S. Freeze, S.J. Hogg, N.J. Lindsay and J.H. Millward. Clarke was a hotel owner; Freeze was a merchant who sold general provisions; Hogg owned a lumber mill and building supply business; Lindsay (Doctor Lindsay) was a medical practitioner; Millward was a house sign and carriage painter and decorator.<sup>27</sup>

# 3. Rise and Decline of the "Big Spread" and Calgary's Emerging Regional Role

The south-west corner of Alberta is a unique sub-region of the province and the decade of 1882-1892 was a significant one in its history. That decade was of equal significance in the history of Calgary because the town and its sub-regional hinterland were intimately related and evolved together during that period. Perhaps the distinctive quality of this sector of the province is its climate; one of the distinguishing elements of its climate is the somewhat higher rainfall levels than are characteristic of the other parts of southern Alberta, but even more distinctive and particular is the chinook.

The *chinook* is a warm, gusty wind that descends the steep side of the Rocky Mountains and blows across the foothills and high plains of western Alberta and northwestern Montana. Calgary and Lethbridge are the major cities most directly affected by it. Chinooks are most pronounced between September and May.... An increase of as much as 50°F in the air temperature of the foothills region sometimes occurs in a period of less than 36-hours. Chinooks lasting several days are common.... The chinook is an important weather element. It makes winter pasturing of livestock in the foothills region possible and provides dramatic relief

from the icy weather that prevails during most of the winter....<sup>28</sup>

The frequent chinook which melts the snow exposes the "wool" or foothills' grass on which cattle can feed all winter and provides relief from winter conditions; and the hills and troughs of the foothills' rolling topography also provide cattle with shelter from the winter wind. This sub-region then has marked advantage for the range grazing of cattle and, as has already been indicated, the federal government's land lease regulations in 1881 initiated a boom period in cattle ranching in this south-western corner of the province.

In addition to the generous terms of lease the government's regulations permitted leaseholders to import herds free of duty. The border with Montana thus became virtually an open one. Quarantine regulations were established in 1884 but could not be enforced until 1886 because of the lack of sufficient border patrols.<sup>29</sup> It was only due to the North-West Rebellion of 1885 that greater border surveillance was established and patrols then became routinely available for the enforcement of the quarantine regulations. In spite of this absence of international barriers only one American Company operated in Canada in the years between 1881 and 1885. This was the I.G. Baker Company, or the "Circle Outfit," which had a number of large contracts to supply cattle and meat as well as other provisions in Canada. Changes, however, occurred in 1886 which exerted strong pressure to push American herds northward across the border. These were mainly changes in the conditions of the American cattle economy. Prices dropped; there was a severe drought; hundreds of thousands of cattle were turned off Indian lands where they had been grazing because President Cleveland's administration sought the reform of conditions on the Indian Reservations. And in Canada the prospect of a tariff on imported range stock was moving closer to realization. If American stockmen wanted to take advantage of the available grazing lands in Canada and avoid both the inevitable flood of long-horn herds moving from the south into the upper

central plains and the imminent Canadian tariff they had to move fast. Some of them did. In 1886 American companies took out nine leases on Canadian range lands comprising nineteen percent of the total lease acreage. It was estimated that 28,000 head of American cattle came into Alberta that year.<sup>30</sup>

British interests held about twenty-two percent of the total leased acreage in 1886. They represented three major companies, the Oxley, the Waldron and the Quorn. These were important companies which continued in operation in Alberta until well into the twentieth century. The balance of the industry however was in the hands of Canadian companies and financed by Canadian capital. Between 1882 and 1886 twenty-three cattle and ranching companies were incorporated in Canada. Not all of these were major companies in terms of capitalization, extent of range or size of herds, but they represented an important part of the cattle industry and their importance increased after the disastrous year of 1886.

No chinook winds blew in the winter of 1886-1887; more than that, the winter was unusually and extremely severe. The effect on the cattle herds was catastrophic, particularly to the east of the foothills country where most of the American herds had been brought. Thousands of head perished; the number of calves produced was alarmingly few. When spring came the surviving American herds retreated to their home ranges on the American side. Circumstances there that year also favoured this repatriation. Thousands of cattle had died in Montana too over the winter; ranchers faced with declining revenues had to slaughter their cattle and sell the meat in order to pay debts. And in 1888 the huge Indian Reservation, which stretched from the Missouri River to the Canadian border, was drastically reduced in size making some twenty million acres available to stockmen.<sup>31</sup> All of these occurrences conspired to provide vast tracts of grazing land to cattle on the American side and the imminent threat of the inundation of the Canadian cow country by American herds abated.

Other dramatic changes in the ranching economy followed after 1887. That year saw the beginning of a reduction in the amount of land under grazing leases. By 1892 the acreage under lease had declined virtually to the same point where it had stood in 1884; almost all of the leases issued after 1887 were for less than four sections (2560 acres). By 1892 only one quarter of the leaseholders held more than 15,000 acres and the percentage of the land held in units of more than 75,000 acres was halved. The handful of very large corporations still dominated the industry but there was a surge in the number of small leaseholders and stockholders and they were becoming an important element in the cattle economy. By 1892 the era of the cattle boom and the status of the great "spread" had come to an end.

Part of this change was economic in its origins but a good part of it was political. The range lease program had been based on the belief that all of southern Alberta was unsuitable for farming and consequently that ranching was the most effective way of establishing a Canadian presence in this remote reach of the Dominion. It was also influenced, no doubt, by the CPR's need to generate traffic, and if farming couldn't do it then ranching would be an acceptable alternative. Farm settlement had been the cornerstone of the Macdonald government's immigration policy; the ranching program was in a sense a variation dictated by the peculiarities of the natural environment. However, as more farmers came into the region, particularly after the CPR arrived there in 1883 and it was demonstrated that farming could be successful in the south-west region, the government came under increasing pressure to revise its policies. After 1885 all leases were awarded by open competition and were open to homestead entry. Rental rates were doubled and incoming settlers were encouraged to take up to four sections of land in conjunction with their homesteads. As a result of these changes in government policy a new class of farmer-rancher began to emerge.

Another epochal event which occurred in this period and which had a profound effect on Calgary, changing its character and the course of its history, was the arrival of

the CPR. Up to that time Fort Macleod had been the centre of activity in general and the cattle industry in particular, and Fort Calgary had been an outpost in Fort Macleod's hinterland. This was largely due to the fact that Fort Benton in Montana was the point of origin of nearly the whole of the traffic and business moving into southern Alberta. That freightage moved along the Old North Trail (variously referred to as the Macleod Trail or the Whoop-Up Trail) which stretched from Fort Benton to Fort Edmonton some 450 miles to the north. Fort Macleod was the first Canadian post north of the American border on that Trail. Traders in western Canada customarily went from Winnipeg overland to Fort Edmonton and then south to Rocky Mountain House and ended up at Bow River Fort which lay in the Rockies west of Fort Calgary. Southern Alberta then was oriented to the United States, specifically to Fort Benton, and Fort Calgary was a secondary post in the shadow of the major centre of Fort Macleod and of Fort Walsh, some 130 miles east of Fort Macleod. All that changed with the arrival of the CPR mainline at Fort Calgary. The main traffic route changed from north-south to east-west; Fort Calgary became a major distribution centre; Fort Macleod gradually diminished in the shadow of the burgeoning Fort Calgary; Fort Benton receded and disappeared from the Canadian scene and by 1890 had become only "a sleepy village."32

# 4. Ranchers and Townsfolk - a Community of Interests

It was during the years following the adoption of the federal government's grazing-land lease policy that the image was formed of Calgary as a "cow-town" - an image which has persisted to this day although it exists now more in the realm of folk mythology than in reality: oil has replaced cattle as the essential staple of Calgary's economy but the white cowboy Stetson rather than the roughneck's hard hat is still the city's symbol. The "cow-town" image grew out of the relationship which developed between the townspeople and the surrounding ranchers during that period.

There were in fact two types of rancher groups in the region. One comprised the managers, some of whom were also shareholders, of the great company-owned spreads;

the other comprised the small owner-operators, some of whom were rancher-farmers. The large companies with their enormous tracts of land, large herds and great financial resources dominated the industry and wielded strong political influence. In most instances their orientation was toward the seat of their power in Montreal or London and their senior management personnel moved in the exclusive sphere of the local social elite such as the Ranchmen's Club of Calgary. The smaller ranchers and rancher-farmers located in the foothills close to Calgary were more closely integrated into the fuller common day-to-day life of the townspeople.

The ranching population was varied in its origins. The largest part of it was of Anglo-Saxon background. Canadians from eastern Canada were the most numerous. Scots predominated in the Cochrane area. A small group of Irish settled in the Millarville district. There was a sprinkling of British aristocracy including a number of "remittance men" - the younger sons of landed British families who would not inherit the title or the estate and came out to the colonies to seek their fortune, most of them being supported in some fashion by remittances from home. There were also some Americans and even a few Frenchmen, mainly former army officers and personnel, who formed a colony at Trochu. Men with a military background were quite common among the ranchers but former members of the N.W.M.P. were especially numerous. The highly visible presence of the former Mounties, many of them from the Fort Calgary post, as well as the active force of the NWMP and the ex-soldiers, many of them former officers, combined with the traditional respect for authority which generally prevailed among the townspeople, all contributed to a regime of stability and law and order in the community. The townspeople were aware of this peaceable quality of their community and were proud of the extent to which it differed from the American frontier town. An editorial of the time commented that Calgary was

[A] western town, but it is not a western town in the ancient sense of the word. It is peopled by native Canadians and Englishmen.... citizens who own religion

and respect law. The rough and festive cowboy of Texas and Oregon has no counterpart here. Two or three beardless lads who wear jingling spurs and walk with a slouch.... [but[ the genuine Alberta cowboy is a gentleman.<sup>33</sup>

The ranchers and the townspeople were closely associated with each other in most aspects of the community's life - provisioning, Sunday worship, dances and balls, picnics and banquets, fairs (the first one was held in 1886) and especially sports. The sports which were most popular and which strengthened the bond between the town and the ranch were those sports which had their roots in Britain, which had been brought into the district by the British immigrants and in which the horse was the major player - hunting, racing and especially polo. The popularity of these sports attests to the strength of the middle - and upper - class British presence in the Calgary district. It would probably be more accurate to refer specifically to the English presence rather than generally to the British because it was the English customs and values which were prevalent not only in sports but in many of the social conventions and niceties of behaviour. A newspaper article of the time commented:

This is much more of an English district than Scotch or even Canadian, and the chances are it will presently become even more so.<sup>34</sup>

In the town proper the same ethno-cultural heritage predominated among the townspeople, and the merchants, who comprised the only salient, cohesive group in the community, took the lead in establishing the institutions necessary for a permanent civil settlement. Almost immediately after Calgary's incorporation as a municipality it became the distribution centre for the mail to the areas north and south of the CPR mainline; steps were taken to establish a school district; petitions were forwarded to the territorial and federal governments regarding the construction of roads and bridges; public subscriptions raised funds for the erection of a foot-bridge across the Elbow River; a literary society was formed; an agricultural society was organized; a masonic

lodge was established; church congregations were founded and plans laid for the construction of churches and the engaging of ministers.

The arrival of the first regularly scheduled train in 1886 ensured the survival of the town. It was the means by which Calgary soon became an important regional marketing and transportation centre. It did little, however, to bring population into the surrounding hinterland. The district had a poor reputation as farming country which discouraged the immigration of settlers wanting to establish farming homesteads. Calgarians, however, were euphoric about the prospects for their town and were lavish in their praise of its virtues and unbounded in their flights of fancy about its destiny. The Calgary Herald, ardent supporter of the Conservative Party, the CPR and the ranching hegemony and a ringing voice in the town's promotional chorus, commented in 1884:

We do not pretend to the role of prophet yet it requires little foresight to predict that the City of Calgary will be the largest in the North West Territories. We already anticipate another Chicago and can hear the sound of the busy mill or see in the mind's eye the street cars plying their traffic from east of 14 to the west of 16 and from river to river in the opposite direction.<sup>35</sup>

Notable is the comparison of Calgary with Chicago, the city with the largest stockyards in the world, whose fame and fortune rested to a great extent on its livestock and meat-packing industry and its importance as a railway and transportation centre. The linkage between the fortunes of Calgary and the cattle industry was firm. In 1886 the town persuaded the CPR to build stockyards in section 11, on town-owned land to the south and east of the town, just outside the town boundaries and downwind from it. The location was well chosen inasmuch as the inevitable stench from the stockyards would be carried away from the town on the prevailing wind. In 1887 Calgary began shipping cattle to Britain. In 1888 five thousand head of cattle from the Calgary stockyards were sold in Britain at prices ranging from \$40 to \$50 per head. Over the next decade

shipments to Canadian markets increased substantially with British Columbia counting as a particularly profitable destination. Over half a million pounds of dressed beef were shipped to markets in the interior of British Columbia in 1897.<sup>36</sup>

The ranchers' profits were not re-invested exclusively in the cattle industry. Many of the manufacturing industries which appeared in Calgary during this period were financed by ranching capital. The Calgary Brewing and Malting Company, for example, one of the first large employers in the city, was formed in 1892 by William Roper Hull, John Lineham and Alfred Ernest Cross, all of whom were involved in the cattle industry. Ranching money also built a soap factory, a tannery and a cold-storage plant in the 1890's. Calgary's first waterworks was built in 1889 by George Alexander who had ranching connections. The major shareholders in the elaborate sandstone Alberta Hotel, built in 1888, had ranching interests. Ranchers also invested in real estate and commercial establishments in the town as well as mining and railway enterprises outside of the town proper.

Other important industries were established during the closing years of the 19th century. James Walker's lumber business was already flourishing but that did not deter the Eau Claire Lumber Company from building a mill on the south bank of the Bow River, right in the town, in 1886. It was an American-owned company; its Canadian directors were Peter Prince and Isaac K. Kerr. By 1891 it was the largest producer of lumber in the North West Territories. William H. Cushing built a sash and door factory in 1884 which quickly won a reputation for the high quality of its products and sold into a regional market.

## 5. Calgary Council and the Business Connection

As was typical of the emerging municipalities on the prairies, businessmen, particularly merchants, dominated the Calgary council. For example, from the time of its incorporation as a town in 1884 until the end of the 19th century in 1899, Calgary had 14 councils. Altogether, a total of 103 councillors sat on these 14 councils. They

were not all separate and different individuals; some of these councillors had won seats in more than one election. An overview of their occupational backgrounds provides an insight into the overwhelming dominance of the council by Calgary's merchants.

Builders and contractors also comprised an important group on the council. The rest of the seats were held by a scattering of miscellaneous occupations. But they all represented the business community and in a general way the ratio of their representation on the council reflected approximately the relative public presence and influence of their respective occupational groups in Calgary as a whole. Of the total of 103 seats, 54 - more than half - were held by merchants; builders and contractors held 17; people in the service industries (insurance, transportation) held seven; real estate dealers held seven; manufacturers held seven; professionals (doctors, lawyers, legal secretaries) held five; hotel owners held three; and CPR employees held three.

For the same 14 councils the office of the mayor was held five times by a merchant; five times by a real estate dealer; twice by a hotel owner; once by a doctor-cum-banker; and once by a harness maker and saddler. Again, these offices were held several times by the same person. For example, Wesley Fletcher Orr was mayor three times during that period: in 1894, again in 1895 and again in 1897. James Reilly, the hotel owner, was mayor in 1891 and again in 1899.

As with Winnipeg and Regina the location of the CPR mainline was the primary determinant of the city's form. The railway, advancing westward from the east and pushing across the flat unresisting prairies in a straight line, could scarcely avoid becoming an east-west axis so that any settlement on the mainline would have to develop on both sides of that axis. The mainline thus would perforce divide the settlement into a north-of-the-tracks portion and a south-of-the-tracks portion. The location of the mainline set further constraints on the form and direction of Calgary's growth. The mainline virtually bisected the townsite as it was laid out in 1884. The distance from the mainline to the Bow River at the farthest point of the river's arc as it swept around

the north side of the townsite was only about three-quarters of a mile - enough land to accommodate a small frontier community but scarcely enough land to allow for substantial expansion. On the north side of the Bow, almost immediately upon its north bank, there rose a ridge some 500-feet high which at the top opened onto rolling prairie. The ridge itself was steep and difficult to build on, particularly to provide sewer and water services from below and the prairie beyond was not readily accessible because of the height and steepness of the feature. The Elbow River flowing northward to join the Bow, cut off about three-quarters of a mile of the easterly portion of the townsite from the main body of the townsite which lay to the west of the river. To the south and west of the townsite, at a distance of less than two miles, the flat land on which the townsite was located gave way to terrain that was broken by ravines and ridges which again were an obstacle to the extension of services.

The CPR built its station in section 15, something less than a mile west of the Fort on the north side of the tracks. Businesses clustered around the station in the fairly limited space between the tracks and the Bow River to the north, virtually precluding any other use of that area. Immediately across from the station, on the south side of the tracks, there gradually emerged the offices and facilities of the wholesale trade. The council abetted the pre-emption of this land for rail-related uses by making a grant, in 1898, of \$25,000 to the CPR for the erection of freight sheds. Businessmen, not wanting to live too far from their businesses, yet remote enough from the commercial environment of the business district and the industrial atmosphere of the railway, built their houses south of the wholesale and warehouse strip which lined the tracks on the south side.

The placing of the CPR station on the west side of the Elbow River drew most of the businesses and residences which had initially grown up on the east side across the river to the west side. Property owners on the east side were dismayed, fearing the loss of their substantial investments and did everything they could to prevent the

incorporation of the town in 1884, or, failing that, to prevent the inclusion of the easterly lands in the town in the hope that a separate rival town could be established there. When they failed to achieve these objectives the three principal land-owners and politically influential persons with interests on the east side adopted a different tactic. The three individuals were William Pearce, James Walker and Wesley Fletcher Orr and the new approach which they adopted was to attract industrial development to the lands on the east side of the Elbow River.

In February 1888, the council adopt a policy of offering incentives in order to encourage the industrial development of Calgary.<sup>37</sup> The policy committed council to offer prospective industries a free site and tax exemption for up to ten years. In 1893 the policy was expanded to include the offer of a cash bonus to industries which established immediately. By 1895 council's policies had attracted a flour mill, an oatmeal mill, a soap factory, a brewery, a creamery, a tannery, a slaughter-house, a cold storage plant, and a meat packing plant. Most of these were located on the municipally-owned north-east quarter of section 11, south-east of Calgary's corporate limits, which the town had bought at the urging of James Walker and on which the CPR had built its stockyards. The whole of the rest of section 11 was held by three major landowners - Pearce, Walker and Orr. Moreover, the establishment of a number of the industries had been advocated and their applications for approval and grants had been supported by one or another of these three influential citizens on whose property the particular industry was to be located. There seems to have been no irregularity or impropriety recognized by Calgarians or their council in the close collaboration between the council and the three landowners, or in the use of public money to establish and develop an industrial area outside of the municipal boundary which would attract further development to the adjacent privately-owned properties and greatly enhance their value, even though one of the private landowners - Wesley Fletcher Orr - was a member of the council.

On the contrary, the attraction of industry into the Calgary district was regarded as almost a sacred duty however it was accomplished, provided that the industry seemed to be economically viable and employed Calgarians. The industrial area on section 11 in east Calgary was an important industrial site but it was not the only one. Industries were also located on the west side of the Elbow River in close proximity to the business district. The Eau Claire Lumber Company occupied a strategic site on the south bank of the Bow River virtually on the northern edge of the business district. Its presence attracted other enterprises and before long the space between the commercial area and the Bow was largely occupied by manufacturing and related companies. The Bow River in this location had natural scenic beauty and a great potential for development as a public park but the temper of the times put little value on scenic and recreational amenity as compared to capital investment and economic growth.

Council's zeal for development was not limited to Calgary itself but reached out into the surrounding district. Support of agricultural interests was an important part of the council's involvements. They made an annual grant to the local Agricultural Society and when the Society fell into severe financial straits in 1900 the Calgary council paid off the mortgage on the Society's lands and leased them back to the Society. The council provided the funds for the exhibition of local agriculture products and supported lectures on the special characteristics of agriculture in southern Alberta. In 1894 they pledged a grant of \$25,000 if the Territorial Exhibition of 1895 were moved from Regina to Calgary. They were very active in lobbying for a Dominion Government Experimental Farm for the Calgary District and took a leading role in the agitation for district irrigation which resulted in the North West Irrigation Act of 1894. Two major projects which Calgary pursued with great vigour but with no success were a remount centre for cavalry horses for the British army and a federal government sanatorium for consumptives.

When the Imperial Government's interest in a remount centre was mooted, Calgary immediately mounted a promotional campaign. The council sent off a flood of petitions, pamphlets and data to people in influential political and military positions in Canada and Great Britain extolling the virtues of Calgary as the location for such a centre. Their efforts, however, came to nought. Local Calgary horseflesh was deemed by the authorities to be unsuitable for the Imperial Cavalry's purposes.

The prospect of a sanatorium arose early in 1895 out of a philanthropic gesture by W.G. Gage, the Toronto publisher: he offered to donate \$25,000 towards the establishment of such a hospital provided the federal government put up the rest of the capital and assumed the costs of administration. No location for the sanatorium had been indicated but it was understood that the official preference was for a site with climatic and topographic characteristics similar to those of Denver, Colorado. Promotion fever swept through the business community, convinced, as it was, that Calgary's setting met the site requirements fully and that with the proper approval they could secure the institution for Calgary and with it the contingent economic benefits. On April 1, 1895, the council eagerly passed a resolution which stated, in part:

We believe that the location at Calgary of such an institute would be the initial of the introduction of more capital and the cause of more rapid development than any other scheme within our reach and that, without bonds or expenditure.<sup>38</sup>

The opportunity and the prospect were enough to set any Calgary booster's heart a-thumping. The council launched a campaign which was massive in scale and feverish in intensity to persuade the principals involved to locate the sanatorium in Calgary. In spite of the lavish expenditure of money and effort; the production and distribution of a blizzard of reports, affidavits, testimonials, pamphlets, (including one with the title Calgary: The Denver of Canada); the support of the Board of Trade, the Medical

Association, numerous public meetings; the direct lobbying of important politicians in Toronto and Ottawa; the sanatorium did not come to Calgary.

As it was generally throughout the west during this frontier period, the railway was regarded in Calgary as the prime generator of economic prosperity. The arrival of the CPR rails in 1884 set off a speculative land boom and the inauguration of its regularly scheduled service in 1886 gave assurance to the sanguine Calgarians that their rosy expectations were not misplaced. Their optimism was re-confirmed with the completion of the rail line north to Edmonton in 1892 and south to Fort Macleod in 1894. Railway promotion reached a feverish pitch. Local interest obtained five railway charters before 1895,39 although none of them developed into an operating railway company. In 1897, however, the CPR built its Crows Nest branch, which gave Calgary businesses access to the East Kootenay markets - the mining and lumber camps - as well as the potential sources of coal as a fuel for Calgary's industries. Calgary now had lines that ran east and west as well as north and south and this network of rail services stimulated the emergence of secondary centres in Calgary's hinterland such as Lethbridge, Red Deer and Wetaskiwin. This growing hinterland constituted an expanding market for Calgary's goods and services and consolidated its position as the wholesaling and distributing centre for the surrounding region of south-central Alberta. That role was ensured in 1888 when the council persuaded the CPR to locate freight sheds and spur tracks on the south side of the main line across from the station. The persuasiveness of the council's argument for freight facilities was no doubt much strengthened by a grant of \$25,000 to the CPR for installing them in Calgary, even though Calgary's role as regional wholesaling and transportation centre was already established and the CPR, from a purely business point of view, had no more suitable alternative location.

The single-minded pursuit of economic expansion by the Calgary council was not a merely local phenomenon. It was the characteristic behaviour of all municipal

governments on the prairie frontier. Given the limits of their statutory mandate, the paucity of their financial resources, the nullity of their initial assets and the inexorably growing demands for services and the accoutrements of civil life, they had little choice but to seek the path of economic expansion. Indeed the possibility of choosing any other path could not have occurred to them. Compelling as were the factors of mandate and finances which set them on their quest for economic growth, perhaps even more compelling was the mind-set of the men who constituted the power group from the very beginning of the frontier community. These were the businessmen. Whether they came to the frontier already well-padded financially or came to it in poverty and soon succeeded in accumulating enough to rise to positions of affluence, it was the businessmen who dominated the public affairs of the community.

There were a number of circumstances which gave the businessmen preeminence in the public life of Calgary. Not the least of these was the fact that
collectively they were the wealthiest single group in the community. Wealth conveys
power and evokes admiration, deference and subordination among those less fortunately
endowed. Wealth also brings prestige and public prominence to those who possess it.
But those benefits also are felt to impose certain obligations of public leadership which
are generally accepted by those who enjoy private means and public prominence.
Businessmen respond to these pressures by entering public life and seeking political
office. Merchants comprised the largest group of businessmen in frontier Calgary.
Through the advertisement and patronization of their establishments they were among
the most visible and familiar figures in the community and it was therefore not merely
through happenstance that the largest proportion of council members came from the
merchant group of Calgary's businessmen.

Another decisive factor was the legislation of the government of the North-West Territories, specifically the <u>Municipal Ordinance</u>,<sup>40</sup> which was the statute governing the creation and operation of municipalities in the Territories. The Ordinance was

derived in large measure from Ontario municipal law. It set out the regulations relating to the structure of the council, the municipal franchise, voting qualifications, assessment, taxation and financial powers. In particular it was the regulations prescribing who could vote and who could run for office which ensured the principal presence of businessmen on the council. Qualifications both for voting and for office was based on the ownership of property. Only those ratepayers who owned property valued at \$600 or more could hold the office of mayor or alderman. This regulation disqualified about 65 percent of the population of 1889 from sitting on the town council. And the franchise was restricted to "male British subjects over 21 years of age who are assessed upon the last assessment role.... either in their own right or in the right of their wives for three hundred dollars."<sup>41</sup> These regulations restricted active participation in the political life of the town virtually exclusively to the businessmen.

A peculiar distinguishing feature of the <u>Municipal Ordinance</u> was that it did not require that the town council be chosen only by a formal election. The Ordinance provided that the councillors be chosen at a public meeting on a kind of "town hall" format at which the candidates would present themselves and opinions for and against would then be voiced. It was only in the event that there were more candidates than seats that a formal election was to be held.<sup>42</sup> An instance of the extraordinary consequences which could flow from this provision and an illustration of the businessmen's political hegemony occurred in 1889. In that year the town was confronted with its first serious financial predicament. The budget reached \$24,000; it had only been one-fifth of that in 1885, a mere four years earlier. Moreover, there were some threatening problems arising out of several of the town's contracts. The business community decided that the situation called for measures in which the usual process of electing the town council would not be observed. Instead, they convened a special, exclusionary meeting at which they chose a respected merchant, D.W. Marsh, as mayor and selected six councillors to constitute the town council. It is of some interest to note that of the six councillors (in

addition to the mayor), four were merchants, one was the CPR land agent and the sixth was the ubiquitous Wesley Fletcher Orr. This action was seemingly quite legal under the provisions of the <u>Municipal Ordinance</u> and provoked no objections or queries from the public. On the contrary it seemed to be accepted as a desirable move which was for the general benefit of the town. This sentiment of approval was expressed in an article commenting on the situation which appeared some months later in <u>The Western World</u>, a promotional magazine published in Calgary. The article observed:

Withall it forced itself on the minds of the businessmen that to do justice to themselves and to the Town of Calgary it was necessary to place at the head of affairs a man of thorough business training and sound judgement.... Following this consent the feeling became prevalent that a council chosen from the businessmen of the town should be considered.<sup>43</sup>

In 1891 Calgary's population was 3,876. It had been 428 only seven years earlier, in 1884, when Calgary was incorporated as a town. The intervening years saw a nine-fold increase in the population, business was flourishing, the economy was expanding and Calgarians felt that their community had grown far beyond the status of a town. A local committee was struck to prepare a submission to the Assembly of the North-West Territories requesting that Calgary be made a city. In 1893 the territorial council acted on that submission and Calgary was incorporated as a city and was given its own charter. The incorporating ordinance was given Royal Assent on September 16, 1893, but did not take effect until 1894 when the first city council was elected. Under the new city charter eligibility for civic office was made even more restrictive, further consolidating the businessmen's hold on the council. Candidates for council membership were now required to own property valued at \$1,000 or more. The franchise was restricted to male owners of property assessed at \$200 or more and to tenants with an income of \$400, none of which did anything to strengthen or encourage democratic values or to widen the scope for participation in the local political process.

Other provisions of the city charter clearly revealed its heavy bias in favour of the interests of property which in effect were the interests of the business community. The charter divided the city into wards and established the multiple-voting system which enabled the property owner to vote in every ward in which he owned property. Since businessmen generally had their business premises in one ward and their residence in another they were able to vote at least twice. Those who owned property in still other wards were entitled to that many more votes.

The limits on political participation imposed first by the Municipal Ordinance and then by the City of Calgary Charter probably were, in large part, the reason for the low level of popular interest in local elections. For example, in the mayoralty election of 1890 only 331 ballots were cast out of 1300 registered voters. Attendance at public meetings, even on critical money issues, was negligible. In 1888 a public meeting was called by Mayor A.E. Shelton to discuss the question of how to deal with the town's debt whether by an increase in the mill rate or by deficit financing. The hall was almost empty; the deficit financing alternative was approved by a vote of 12 to 11 and on the basis of this flimsy endorsement it was adopted as policy by the council. Public apathy toward the political process was so palpable that the Herald carried an editorial in 1895 proposing that the mayor be made an appointed office and that the electoral system be abolished.<sup>45</sup> The premise on which the piece was based was that the public was too immature politically to have electoral responsibility. Being the spokesman for the politically conservative business interests in the city, the Herald could not be expected to recognize that most of the problem lay in the exclusionary pseudo-democratic electoral system itself rather than the public.

The domination of the council by businessmen was not peculiar to Calgary.

Regina had precisely the same experience in the early years of its municipal existence, as indeed did virtually every centre which emerged on the prairie during the frontier era. And all of these businessmen-dominated councils were driven by the same

ambitions - the promotion and economic expansion of their communities. In pursuit of these goals the Board of Trade in each of Calgary and Regina was in close collaboration with its city council. This is hardly surprising given the dominant presence of businessmen on the council and the fact that the Board of Trade was the largest and most effective organization of the businessmen in both cities. In both cases the goals of the Board of Trade were virtually identical to those of the city council, and a large proportion of the businessmen in each city held membership in the Board of Trade.

Calgary's Board of Trade was first organized in 1886 but was initially unsuccessful; by 1889 it was defunct. In 1890 however it was revived. The 1890 application for incorporation of the Board contained 44 signatures; 21 of the signatories sat on the Calgary Council at one time or another, including five of the seven members of the council of 1890. In 1892, Alexander Lucas was both the president of the Board of Trade and the Mayor of Calgary.<sup>46</sup> The Board and the council worked closely together on many civic issues. In particular the Board was active in promoting Calgary in a variety of publications and at meetings and conferences whenever the opportunity arose. Many of the council's efforts to attract industries and investments to Calgary were made jointly with the Board and the Board frequently submitted briefs and recommendations to the council on such matters as taxation and amendments to the municipal ordinance and the city charter which the Council regarded with favour, a number of which they were able to implement. An insight into the Board's confident view of itself as the real power in the governance of Calgary is afforded by its canvas in 1903 of its members on the proposal that the Board enter into civic politics as a formal political organization. The letter circulated among the members asking for their opinions contained the comment "those members nominated should feel reasonably sure of election."47 The proposal did not have the support of a majority of the members and so no further action was taken by the Board. No doubt the members were cool to the proposal because of a prevailing preference among businessmen not to mix business and politics openly and directly but

knowing, on the other hand, that they were in effect covertly the alter ego of the council in the governance of Calgary and there was no need for a formal political identity for the Board.

### 6. The Council and the Public Utilities

Council's public works priorities favoured projects which benefitted the central business district. Roads were surfaced and sidewalks constructed primarily in the business district and access roads to the business district received maintenance priority. Utilities were provided initially in the business district and then extended to the residential areas in the order of priority of their distance from the business area. The town's water supply came from wells dug in various parts of the town, supplemented by sunken tanks and water wagons which delivered water to the consumer's door. Such an arrangement obviously could not properly serve the needs of a growing community either for domestic purposes or for fire fighting and soon was to prove to be totally inadequate. A fire in 1886 gutted the central business district and forced the council and the businessmen to turn their attention to the urgent need for an adequate supply of water for the town.

Council investigated the matter of the cost of a proper public water supply system and found that it would be at least \$75,000. This was a formidable sum for a small, newly-incorporated town with very limited financial resources. Indeed it was the severely restricted revenues which accounted in large part for the priorities accorded the central business district in its servicing programs. While it is true that the interests of the businessmen were the major influence in the council's decisions, it was nevertheless also true that the lack of public funds forced upon the council a regimen of strict priorities in their public works program and it seemed the most efficient use of its small budget to undertake services from the centre outward.

The estimate of a minimum of \$75,000 for a public waterworks system created a dilemma for the council. Some hope of a resolution, however, appeared when a group of

businessmen came forward with a proposal to build a private system. The council found very attractive the possibility that the heavy capital debt might be assumed by a private company rather than be forced upon the town. During the years 1887-1889 the council conducted negotiations with the proponents of the scheme, whose leader was George Alexander, a shrewd real-estate dealer and developer. In 1889 Alexander succeeded in raising the necessary capital in Britain and the council agreed to the creation of a privately owned waterworks system in the town. Alexander was able to persuade the council to agree to other terms favourable to his Calgary Gas and Waterworks Company. The council approved the expenditure of \$21,000 for the construction of a town-owned and operated sewage system to function in conjunction with the privately owned waterworks system and to grant the company exclusive rights to any natural gas found within the town boundaries before 1892.<sup>48</sup>

Relations between the town and the company, however, were hostile from the beginning. The waterworks system did not work properly. The company drew its water from the Bow River which was not as desirable a source as the Elbow River would have been. There were disputes and litigation over alleged breaches of contract and alleged inequities in the tax assessment of the company. Finally in 1895 the dispute came to its climactic moment when a fire destroyed a large part of William H. Cushing's sash and door factory. Settlement of the insurance claim was complicated and delayed by the fire-brigade's charge that they had had insufficient water with which to fight the fire. The city was unavoidably drawn into the dispute and the council decided that they would not renew the company's contract when it expired in 1898. Negotiations for the take-over of the waterworks system by the city were initiated in 1898 and two years later, in 1900, with W.H. Cushing himself as the mayor, the city acquired the system at a cost of \$90,000.

On the basis of the original estimates of the cost of a public waterworks system, Calgary might have had such a system at a lesser cost than they ended up paying to acquire

Alexander's privately owned one. Certainly they would have avoided the bitterness and the litigation and the legal costs which they suffered during the entire period of their relations with the company. This unhappy experience with a private company, however, did not discourage the city council from continuing to favour private rather than public ownership of the utilities which served the city. The supply of electricity, gas and street railway services all went through much the same acrimonious and costly confrontations between the city and the private companies involved as had the supply of water. This disposition towards private enterprise, already manifest at this early stage in Calgary's history, seems to have remained a salient characteristic of that community and, if anything, has become more entrenched with the passage of time. Along with this particular leaning Calgary has had a preference (along with the rest of Alberta) for the Conservative Party in federal politics, conservatism in its local socio-political attitudes, a tendency to entertain an extravagantly glittering self-image and a brash enthusiasm in the advertisement of itself. Self-promotion, however, was a common practice among all western communities at this time; Calgary was just louder and more flamboyant than the others.

#### 7. The Pursuit of Status

Although the capital of the North West Territories was in Regina and had been there since 1882, Calgary, in mid-decade was promoting itself as the rightful capital. It would of course have been an extreme and unacceptable position on the part of the council and the local enthusiasts to have openly advocated the removal of the capital from Regina to Calgary. But, unabashed by the cold fact of Regina's established status and role, the zealous Calgarians warmly pursued their quest and devised a compromise strategy. On January 18, 1888, they submitted a proposal to Ottawa "to have the sittings of the North West Council alternate between Calgary and Regina." The federal government saw no merit in the proposal and no change was made.

Calgary's ambitions were again dashed in 1905. The federal government was contemplating the creation of the Province of Alberta (as well as the Province of Saskatchewan) and the location of the provincial capital was an important issue. Demands for provincial status had agitated the Territories Council for nearly two decades and Calgarians were among the foremost agitators. The North West League, one of whose principal goals was provincial status, had been formed in Calgary in 1886. The Provincial Rights Association, with a large Calgary membership, was another influential organization pursuing that goal. Frederick Haultain, leader of the largest faction in the Territorial Assembly and the driving force behind the movement for provincial status for both Saskatchewan and Alberta, represented a southern Alberta constituency. Hugh Cayley, who was also a leader in the Assembly, came from Calgary. Calgary's expectations that it would become the capital of the new province were not therefore illfounded. But other centres entertained similar hopes. Red Deer, Banff, Lethbridge. Lacombe, even relatively obscure places like Blackfolds and Hobema claimed superior qualifications for the honour. The major contender, however, was Edmonton. But the decision hung not so much on the issue of local locational merits as on Ottawa's political interests.

That part of the Territories which encompassed what would become Alberta was a single federal electoral constituency up until 1903. This seat was held from 1887 to 1896 by D.W. Davis, a Conservative from Fort Macleod. Davis was the spokesman for the ranching industry but he almost never spoke and never in support of Calgary's interests. In the federal election of 1896 the Conservatives were defeated by the Liberals under Wilfrid Laurier and Davis lost his seat to Frank Oliver of Edmonton, editor of the Edmonton Bulletin. In the election of 1900 Calgary nominated Richard Bedford Bennett, Senator James A. Lougheed's law partner, as the Conservative candidate to stand against Oliver but Oliver won the election. In 1903 Calgary was given a seat in the Commons and immediately elected M.S. McCarthy, a Conservative. Thus it was when

Laurier was considering the creation of the Province of Alberta (and Saskatchewan) in 1905, Calgary had no representative on the government side of the House. Edmonton however did have one. Frank Oliver had been elected as a Liberal in 1896. Clifford Sifton had been Minister of the Interior in Laurier's cabinet until 1905 when he resigned and was replaced by Oliver.

Laurier had initially contemplated creating a single province of the territories beyond Manitoba but was uncertain whether a Liberal government would be elected there. His political instinct told him that it would be safer to create two provinces and thereby provide the possibility that at least one of them would bring in a Liberal government. He divided the territory into two equal parts with the fourth meridian as the dividing line and he named each of the parts a province - the easterly one Saskatchewan and the westerly one Alberta. In each province he appointed a Liberal as the interim premier and called upon him to form a government with both premier and government to be confirmed in a subsequent election. In Saskatchewan his choice was Walter Scott and in Alberta he appointed Alexander Cameron Rutherford who represented Strathcona in the Territorial Assembly. Strathcona was in the ambit of Edmonton whose voters had elected Liberal Frank Oliver. Regina was named the tentative capital of Saskatchewan and Edmonton the tentative capital of Alberta, both subject to subsequent ratification. There is no doubt that the presence of Frank Oliver as a senior minister in Laurier's cabinet, and with no one to argue Calgary's case, heavily tipped the selection of the capital in favour of Oliver's own home town. In the subsequent election Rutherford and his Liberal Party were confirmed by a substantial majority and Edmonton was confirmed as the capital of the Province of Alberta.

Calgarians were bitterly disappointed by the loss of the capital to Edmonton. That blow to Calgary's ego was quickly followed by another. In the first session of 1905, Premier Rutherford, who was also the Minister of Education, introduced a bill to create the University of Alberta. Calgarians, still smarting over the loss of the capital to

Edmonton, expected that the university would be located in Calgary, if only in compensation for their disappointment over the capital but even more justifiably on the grounds that Calgary was a bigger city and a more important regional centre. In 1907 the legislature approved the provision of funds for the purchase of a site and to Calgary's outrage the site designated was a tract of 258 acres in Strathcona, the premier's constituency on the south side of the Saskatchewan River. William H. Cushing, although a member of the government, was from Calgary and he objected vehemently to the choice but his protests were of no avail.

The loss of the manifest advantages inherent in the status and role of provincial capital and a university centre did not deprive Calgary of all of its prospects of becoming a first-rank city. In 1904 the CPR built a control system for the Western Irrigation District, which drew water from the Bow River and which made possible a great expansion of agriculture in the Calgary region, adding that dimension to Calgary's economic base. By 1911 the CPR had spent \$16 million on irrigation in southern Alberta, making it possible to bring over a million acres of land under cultivation which otherwise would have remained uncultivated. Calgary became the headquarters for the administration of this immense irrigation system and the centre for the distribution of irrigation supplies and equipment, as well as the agricultural product of the irrigated lands. And in 1911, the Calgary Power Company whose shareholders included Richard Bedford Bennett, Max Aitkin (later Lord Beaverbrook), Sir Herbert Holt and several local substantial investors built a hydro electric power generating plant at Horse Shoe Falls on the Bow River, some 45 miles west of Calgary. Its capacity dwarfed that of the city's twenty-year-old steam plant and it could produce power at a much more attractive cost.

Cheap power greatly enhanced Calgary's ability to attract industry and no doubt was an important factor in persuading the CPR to build its repair shops in Calgary. The city had been lobbying the CPR to build its shops in Calgary ever since the railway had

indicated the need for centralized repair facilities in western Canada. Medicine Hat, which had an ample supply of natural gas as a power source enjoyed an advantage over Calgary in this respect, but the completion of the Horse Shoe Falls power plant put Calgary in a more favourable position. Calgary intensified its lobbying. Local businessmen even threatened to boycott the CPR unless the railway complied with their urging, saying that they would turn to the services of the anticipated Grand Trunk Pacific and Canadian Northern Railway if the CPR shops were built elsewhere. As an incentive to the CPR to locate the shops in Calgary the city council offered to extend its street railway line to serve the site for the shops, to be selected by the CPR and to free the railway company from its obligation to build underpasses beneath the tracks for at least six streets in the downtown area. In addition the city agreed to build a road to the site as well as the necessary bridge to carry it across the Bow River and to extend sewer services to it. Power and water services were to be installed and supplied to the site at the lowest rate which prevailed in the city.

The CPR for its part wanted not only a large repair facility to service its western regional operations but also a first-class railway hotel. Calgary, of course, desperately wanted both the shops and the hotel. The CPR shrewdly used the one as a bargaining chip for the other. They would build the shops under the terms outlined but they also looked for concessions from the city for the Palliser Hotel. The city was hardly in a position to resist. They agreed to a fixed annual assessment of \$4000 on the hotel as well as a guarantee that they would not seek any further contributions or concessions from the company and a waiver of any claims to assess or tax any hotel property that the company might construct.

How much influence these various factors had on the CPR's decision is a matter of speculation. Probably the definitive incentive was the availability of power at an economic cost. In any case, the CPR built its repair shops - known as the Ogden<sup>50</sup> shops - during 1912-1913, in the Ogden area in the south-east of Calgary. The shops were

impressive in their size and extent. The locomotive sheds alone covered more than six acres. Some 1,500 men were employed in their construction and it was estimated that a force of 5,000 would be required to fully operate the facility. The completion of the Ogden shops entrenched Calgary's position as the primary transportation and service centre in southern Alberta.

#### 8. The Modest Presence of Labour

Although the prevailing mood in the city was that of its boosters and the dominant power was that of its businessmen and entrepreneurs, a countervailing presence was beginning to emerge in the form of an incipient labour movement. The first labour union in Alberta was a union of railway workers. It was the Cascade Lodge No. 342 of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and it was formed in Medicine Hat on January 6, 1887. Other lodges of the railway running trades followed soon after in Medicine Hat. The first labour group to organize in Calgary was the railway carmen's local, in 1900.<sup>51</sup> The Calgary Trades and Labour Council was formed in 1901 with three affiliated unions. By 1903 there were some 1,500 members in the various trade union organizations affiliated with the Trades and Labor Council. That year Calgary experienced its first major industrial strike: both the teamsters and the carpenters went out and both were unsuccessful. One of the leaders of the carpenters strike was Richard A. Brocklebank, the president of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners. Brocklebank was born in Bruce County, Ontario, where he learned the carpenters trade before moving to Calgary. In the Calgary civic election of December, 1902, he ran as a labour candidate in Ward Three, in south-east Calgary and was elected by acclamation (to sit during the 1903 session of the council). His platform was municipal ownership of utilities, abolition of the property qualification for civic elective office, and manhood suffrage. 52 Brocklebank was defeated in the election of December 1903, largely because of the forces massed against the carpenters strike during that year and Brocklebank's involvement in it, but he was re-elected in 1904.53

Another voice raised in support of labour in Calgary at this time was the Bond of Brotherhood, a weekly labour newspaper which lasted from May 1903 to June 1904. A notable feature of the Bond of Brotherhood's editorial and general journalistic policy was its rejection of extreme labour militancy and its advocacy of conciliation as the basis for settling industrial disputes. It championed the proposal for a permanent conciliation board comprising representatives of both labour and management under the authority of the federal government's Department of Labour. Notwithstanding the Bond's rejection of revolution and militant strikes it was clearly socialist in ideology. Calgary's labour movement, however, was not wholly committed to the socialist ideology, nor, indeed, to the notion of working-class solidarity. There were sharp differences, even hostilities, among the various unions, the craft unions in particular enjoying special status and advantages. A large number of the unions belonged to the conservative American Federation of Labour which embraced the principle of working within the capitalist system and rejected outright the Marxist theory and any sympathy or affiliation with the left-wing ideologies of various American and European socialist workers organizations.

The <u>Bond of Brotherhood</u>, during the year of its existence, had had the support of the leadership of the Calgary Trades and Labor Council but it had not been able to arouse enough support from the rank-and-file of workers to give it a broad enough base of subscribers to enable it to survive either financially or ideologically. The lack of unity and militant conviction among Calgary's workers was apparent in the failure of the electoral fund-raising campaign to support the candidacy of Richard Brocklebank in the 1903 civic election (although Brocklebank was re-elected to council in 1904) and would be seen on other occasions in the future.

#### 9. Boomtown Calgary

Calgary's population during the three decades 1875-1905 was quite modest. In 1875 it was a mere handful of Mounties, traders and Métis clustered around the NWMP fort; 26 years later, in 1901, it was 4,398 - a substantial increase over what was

initially perhaps not even 100, but in absolute terms still small. In the next decade, however, between 1901 and 1911, the growth was quite dramatic. Calgary's population in 1911 was 43,704 - about ten times as large as it had been in 1901 and a respectable size in its own right for a place that was still essentially a frontier town.

During those years immigrants were flooding into the west - Alberta's population soared from 72,000 in 1901 to 375,000 in 1911 - and Calgary enjoyed its share of the growth. There was also expansive prosperity. Agriculture flourished under favourable market conditions, more than compensating for the decline in the cattle industry. Calgary's manufacturing enterprises burgeoned. The 1911 census recorded 46 manufacturing establishments employing a total of 2,133 workers.<sup>54</sup> Food processing and building materials manufacturing became important in the industrial sector of the city's economy. Older companies established in the 1880's and 1890's grew into major corporations. Pat Burns' meat products were sold in 61 outlets in Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia. William H. Cushing employed a labour force of 200 in his ten-acre plant in east Calgary and manufactured over 400 doors daily. His operations included factories in Edmonton, Regina and Saskatoon and branch plants in Red Deer and Fort Saskatchewan. Cushing became very rich. (He also, incidentally, taught Sunday School, was a leader in Calgary's temperance movement, served as a councillor and as mayor of Calgary, and became the Minister of Public Works in Premier Rutherford's cabinet). The Calgary Brewing and Malting Company employed a work force of over 100; owner A.E. Cross ensured the continuing demand for his product by acquiring a string of hotels in Alberta and Saskatchewan in whose beer parlours much of his output was consumed. The Eau Clair Lumber Company employed over 150 men and the Crown Lumber Company, more recently established in Calgary, became the biggest lumber company in the west, operating 52 lumber yards.

Despite this expansion of Calgary's industrial base its market remained largely a regional market. Even more localized were the vigorous activities in the real estate and

construction businesses. The rapid expansion of the population drove Calgary's local economy in the first decade of the 20th century. In-flooding population produced a massive demand for housing which powered the construction industry. The demand for houses inevitably created a parallel demand for land on which to build the houses. This heated real estate speculation and sales to a fever pitch. So it was that construction and real estate joined hands in a frenetic dance that mounted in fury and recklessness until it collapsed in the sudden spasm of economic contraction in 1913.

Some measure of the importance of the construction industry in Calgary is provided by the fact that almost 25 percent of the city's total labour force was directly employed in that industry in 1911. That year there were more carpenters than any other workers in the city's work force. In 1912 there were over 200 contractors in Calgary. In the boom years 1910-1912 some \$40 million was spent on construction and the number of building permits issued in those three years was only reached again by the accumulated total for the 16 years from 1915-1930. Five hundred men worked on the construction of the Palisser Hotel in 1912 and some 1,500 on the construction of the CPR's Ogden repair shops. Major buildings were also going up in the city's business district. The volume of construction in Calgary in 1912 was the fourth largest on the North American continent. The achievement of the housing component of the construction industry was equally impressive. There were 1,689 houses in Calgary in 1901. By 1911 the number had increased to 11,350.56 But even that greatly increased number could not meet the needs of the burgeoning population.

The intense building activity generated by the dynamic expansion of the population was heightened by the anticipated arrival of the Grand Trunk Pacific and Canadian Northern Railways. The real estate industry danced a wild pas de deux, step for furious step, with the construction industry. Between 1909 and 1912 land speculation fever reached epidemic proportions spilling out over the boundaries of the city into the surrounding suburban countryside and land values soared to dizzying heights. In 1911

there were 2,000 people working in the real estate industry in Calgary and 440 business licenses were issued to real estate companies in that year alone. The site of the York Hotel which had been purchased in 1907 for \$12,500 was sold for \$100,000. Downtown property sold in 1912 for \$3000 per front foot. Profits taken in real estate transactions were probably re-invested in local businesses which were established in that period and in the construction of business blocks and warehouses; and the approach of the two new railways led the Calgary council in 1911 to annex to the city the suburban lands where the railway lines and terminals were expected to be located. In 1909 Calgary's boundaries enclosed 12 square miles. Annexations in 1910 and 1911 increased the city's area to over 40 square miles. (Fig. 34.) Most of this land was put to industrial or residential uses while the commercial land remained in greatest measure in the central area near the CPR railway station.

The new arrivals in Calgary during this period produced a notable change in the composition of the city's population. Immigrants came from Britain, Europe, the United States, eastern Canada and a sprinkling from Asia. Although the British heritage continued to dominate, the number of foreign-born continued to increase as a percentage of the population until, in 1911, the foreign-born exceeded the native-born residents of Calgary. In 1911, 56 percent of Calgarians were foreign-born and there were more foreign-born workers than native-born in every category of employment except the professions. Of the immigrants from Europe, those from Germany comprised the largest group. There were 2,500 of them living on the flats north of the Bow River in the area which came to be known as "Germantown" or "Riverside." There were also some 900 immigrants from Austro-Hungary living in the same area. Many immigrants settled in the working class district on the east side of the city where a large part of Calgary's industries were located. The term "Germantown" which was applied to the area north of the Bow River was the same term which was applied to the area of east Regina where German immigrants comprised the majority of the local population. It is also of interest

to note that in all three cities which are the subject of this study - Winnipeg, Regina and Calgary - the working-class immigrant population settled in the north and east sectors of the city while the affluent charter groups occupied the south and west.

The most numerous group of Calgary's immigrants were working-class emigres from the United Kingdom. They brought with them the customs and traditions of their homeland. They formed social clubs and sports teams, celebrated St. Patrick's Day and marched in the Orangemen's parade. Shrewd developers and real-estate companies played upon those sentiments by giving their housing estates such nostalgic names as Killarney, Belfast, Manchester, etc. Despite the pervasive Britishness, however, a new outlook was inexorably changing the communal mind of Calgarians - an outlook which would gradually replace the old-country viewpoint with a different perspective and the old allegiances with a different set of values. Some such change was inevitable. The social forms and cultural attitudes of the old world could not long survive in the turbulence of Calgary's free-wheeling economy, rapid urbanization, flooding immigration, social mobility and vaulting civic ambition. Vestiges of the old-world culture still remained, particularly among the *nouveau-riche*, but these were largely imitative and gauche, without the solid institutions of an ancient indigenous heritage to render them genuine rather than merely pretentious.

The preoccupation of Calgary's rising elite with its pursuit of wealth and the niceties of form and behaviour which marked the social order of Britain or even the older cities of eastern Canada were mercilessly lampooned by Bob Edwards, editor of the Calgary Eye Opener, gadfly and hilarious satirist. In ridiculing the as yet ill-fitting gentility of this class, Edwards often mimicked the mannerism of the society pages of the fashionable newspapers and journals. Typical of his shrewd observation and devastating raillery are the following:

Among those present were: a beautiful gown of blue satin with net trimmings and touches of gold.... and a

gorgeous creation from Paris, Saskatchewan, of sequin trimmings and sage and onion stuffing.<sup>59</sup>

and

Mr. and Mrs. Harry Brinkley have returned from their trip to England where they went on their honeymoon. Mr. Brinkley looks as if he had come through a threshing machine but reports a good time.... During his stay in London Mr. Brinkley attended a function at the court being driven home in a patrol wagon.<sup>60</sup>

# 10. The American Influence

Up until the eve of the 1914 war the heavy flow of immigrants from the British Isles onto the Canadian prairies gave the communities of western Canada certain characteristics which were of distinctly British derivation. But immigrants with different backgrounds were also pouring onto the western plains and were effecting significant changes in the attitudes of prairie society generally. Among the most dynamic of these modifying influences was that of the Americans who moved up into western Canada in great numbers between 1905 and 1912. The Americans brought with them a number of valuable assets such as their adventuresome entrepreneurial spirit, their lack of deference to the social establishment and their skills in the technique of dry-land farming. But most telling of all was their personal wealth. The great majority of the immigrants from Europe were peasant farmers and those from Britain were urban proletariat, none of whom had any personal possessions beyond the few sad household articles which they carried in their wicker baskets or cardboard suitcases and the clothes they wore on their backs. The Americans, on the other hand, were relatively affluent in terms of the cash monies which they brought with them. The promotional magazine Prosperous Calgary estimated that between the years 1906 and 1908 American immigrants infused something of the order of \$150 million in cash into the Canadian economy.61

By 1911 there were 3,500 Americans who were living in Calgary and who were successfully engaged in the social and business life of the city. Many were active in real

estate and land colonization companies in both the city and the outlying farmlands. Those who settled in the city were experienced urban dwellers and some of them became wealthy and socially prominent. Daniel Webster Marsh, an American who had emigrated to Calgary some years earlier, even served as mayor of Calgary in 1889 and as the first president of the Western Stockgrowers' Association in 1896. The wealthy and prominent Americans tended to associate with one another, not only socially but also as residential neighbours. A number of them made their homes in Mount Royal which thereby became one of the most prestigious residential suburbs in Calgary. Their presence in Mount Royal led Calgarians to refer to the locale as "American Hill." The popular substitution of "American Hill" for "Mount Royal" is, in a sense, symbolic of the way in which the American influence was modifying the old British imperial outlook of Calgarians.

Just as Calgary's residents of British background retained ties with the homeland, so did the city's American residents retain their American associations. Organizations such as Rotary were established by Americans in the city and there was constant communication with sister organizations in the border states and frequent visits back and forth. Calgary's annual exhibition always included an American Day which drew large numbers of Americans from across the border and was probably the most boisterous event in the exhibition program. Calgary's Americans always held a Fourth of July parade and celebrated the occasion with festivities in Victoria Park. And even during the Coronation Day parade in 1911, one of the vehicles in the parade was draped with an American flag.

The American connection was not new to Calgary. From the very beginning, even before the first shovelful of soil was turned to start the construction of the NWMP's Fort Calgary, the American I.G. Baker Company was engaged in bringing in materials for the construction. Even before that, American traders were moving freely back and forth across the border along the Whoop-Up Trail, between Fort Benton in Montana and Fort

Macleod in the south-western part of the Canadian territories and thence to Fort Edmonton in the northern part. And when Fort Calgary was completed and went on to become a town, the American I.G. Baker Company operated a store and supply depot there which played an important part in the commercial activities of the community and American traders continued to be active there until the arrival of the first regularly scheduled CPR train in 1886 began to turn the axis of Calgary's trade from north-south to east-west.

The greatest early American influence on Calgary, however, was probably the cattle industry. Many of the cattlemen in Calgary's hinterland were Americans. Many ranchers in the area travelled to and from the American cattle marketing centres on buying and selling trips and kept close watch on the behaviour of the American cattle market because what happened there had a decisive effect on the Canadian market. The opening of the Cypress Hills area to ranching in 1906 brought many ranchers from the United States up into south-eastern Alberta and their presence was felt in Calgary. By 1912, however, the cattle industry throughout the whole of southern Alberta was in serious difficulties.

The decline of the great cattle spreads from their zenith in the late 1880's and the establishment of the east-west trade route along the main line of the CPR did not completely efface the American influence; it only attenuated it and it came surging back with renewed vitality in the tide of immigration during the period 1905-1912. The downward slide of the cattle industry affected more than the ranchers. Much of Calgary's manufacturing sector had been built on the processing of food - meat packing, flour milling, brewing - and a large part of that was directly dependent on the cattle industry. Moreover, the most successful of Calgary's manufacturing and real estate entrepreneurs were also ranchers or had started their fortunes in the cattle industry and still had strong connections with it and even heavy investments in it. The decline was the result of many and complex economic factors, most of them beyond the power of the ranchers to

change or even to influence, but the solution which the "Big Four"62 entrepreneurs adopted was fairly typical of Calgary: it was a hyper-promotional event in the form of a wild-west show. It was the Calgary Stampede and it embodied everything that could be incorporated into such a show from the cowboy mythology of the wild and woolly American cowpunching frontier. The Calgary Stampede was largely the brain-child of American promoter Guy Weadick who had created similar extravaganzas elsewhere and the American imprint on the Calgary event was powerful and permanent. A cowboy band from Oregon led the first Stampede parade on September 2, 1912 (the Stampede ran from September 2 to September 5) and the meanest broncos in the show were imported from the United States. The Stampede did more than give Calgary an American image: it was a potent force in persuading Calgarians that the image in fact represented reality. The American impact during the period 1905-1912 was felt in varying degrees throughout the prairie region but nowhere was it felt so powerfully, nowhere was the American presence so much a part of the local history, nowhere has the American ethos been so fully assimilated into the communal mind and outlook as it has in Calgary. While it is true that the discovery of oil in the Turner Valley in 1914 and the subsequent discovery of an even richer field at Leduc in 1947 entrenched more firmly the attitudes and values of the American ethos in the minds of Calgarians, nevertheless the beginning of that communal outlook and of the American influence can be traced back to the very beginnings of Calgary itself.

#### 11. Incipient Development Controls

Clearly, the decade 1903-1913 was an eventful period in Calgary's development. Calgary was eager to attract industries, but was not as fortunate as Regina in receiving a free federal government gift of an extensive tract of land which constituted a virtual monopoly of sites suitable for industrial development. If the council was to play a leadership role in the industrial development of Calgary it would have to take the initiative in acquiring industrial land and attracting industries. This it did as early as

1886, when it acquired a quarter-section of land lying south-east of the municipal boundary of Calgary on which the CPR built its stockyards. This was the first major land acquisition by the Calgary council and was acquired pursuant to an understanding with the CPR that the railway would locate its stockyards there. It was also Calgary's first step into the unfamiliar realm of municipal land-use control. The council did not again acquire land for industrial development until 1911, some twenty-five years later. In the interim the council sought to attract industries and control their location through the device of bonuses. The bonusing policy was adopted in 1893. It began by offering free sites and exemption from all major taxes. But the policy was not systematic and consistent. The incentives varied from applicant to applicant and from council to council. Some of the agreements were so ambiguous as to be of questionable legality or as to expose the council to heavy financial loss. The contradictions and discrepancies in the policies as they were arbitrarily applied from one company to another, and indeed to the same company when the time came for the renewal of its bonus agreement, raised serious difficulties for the council. On various occasions the council made some gestures in the direction of establishing a uniform and stable policy of industrial incentives but none of these was satisfactory.

A further problem confronting the council's industrial development ambitions was presented by the industries which located outside of Calgary's corporate limits and therefore beyond its tax jurisdiction. In 1907 the council made a bold move to deal with this matter: it annexed the lands on which most of these factories were located. Among them were Pat Burns' extensive meat-packing plant, Cross's brewery, and the Portland Cement Company.

The companies were pleased by the prospect of unlimited supply of water and power and the provision of fire protection which were part of the city's industrial incentives policy but they objected to the certain increase in their taxes. A lengthy series of negotiations ensued, involving the companies, the city and the provincial

government. Finally the provincial government passed legislation governing the terms under which land annexed by Calgary could be taxed. The legislation imposed a flat rate of \$50 per acre on unsubdivided land and of \$3000 per acre on manufacturing land for ten years, increasing to \$5000 per acre for the next five years.63 All improvements were to be exempt from taxation for fifteen years. These constraints were satisfactory to the city in some respects but they gave the city little leverage in attracting industry to locate on privately-owned sites in locations which the city preferred. Despite the council's efforts, industries continued to locate outside of the city limits. And the council continued to deal with these by annexing the lands on which they stood. Between 1907 and 1912 four such annexations were carried out which enlarged the area of the city well beyond the current demand for land. Indeed, Calgary's boundaries were not extended again until 1951 and were actually contracted in 1923. By 1911 council had come to the conclusion that the city's industrial development aspirations required municipallyowned land if they were to be realized. Accordingly they acquired the N.W. 1/4 of Section 34, Township 23, a low-lying tract of 160-acres south of the CPR stockyards location, south-east of the city, through which ran the Fort Macleod branch of the CPR, and which was called Manchester.

The decision to acquire the Manchester industrial site in 1911 was no doubt seen as a prudent one by the council in the light of the city's surging growth since 1909. They could not, of course, foresee that the buoyant prosperity would not continue forever, nor even that it would only last a short year after the purchase. By 1912 the economy was already faltering and by 1913 it had fallen. By 1915 less than half a dozen industries had located in Manchester. Part of the failure to attract more development was due to the flattening of the western economy in general, but a good part of it was due to the strength of the competition from private landowners in and around Calgary, which the city could not successfully match. A contributing reason to the city's inability to match the success of the private landowners was the inefficiency of the city's industrial administration.

The city clerk was given the responsibility for carrying out the city's industrial development program but he could not act entirely independently of the council. He had a heavy load of other responsibilities as well and council's instructions and procedural regulations were indecisive and ambiguous which led to frequent breakdowns of communication not only between the city clerk and the council but also between the city and prospective industries interested in establishing in Calgary.<sup>64</sup>

Although the peak years of Calgary's pre-World War I economic boom were 1909-1912 the general rise in the level of the city's prosperity had started in 1905. Calgary's population in 1901 was 4,398; in 1906 it was 11,967; and by 1911 it had ballooned to 43,704. The influx of people set off a real estate and construction outburst as well as a burgeoning of the city's commercial and industrial base. The rapidly expanding numbers of new arrivals created a great need for new buildings, particularly dwellings. The house-builders could not keep up with the demand although commercial construction was also stretched to the limits of its capacity. Overcrowding became prevalent and proper building practices were not always observed. The emergence of these conditions led the council to adopt its first building by-law. As was the case with Regina, Calgary's initial venture into building-control legislation was motivated perhaps more by the fear of fire than it was by the desire to ensure structural safety or health or amenity standards. In 1907 the city adopted By-Law No. 763:

A By-Law of the City of Calgary respecting the erection and removal of buildings, fire limits and prevention of fires. 65

The by-law was only indifferently successful as a building control instrument. Council in fact was less than enthusiastic about the notion of public control of private development. For the most part the councillors believed that the question of what was built was largely a matter between the seller and the buyer of the property. The council's principal concern was to ease the housing shortage and to increase the city's tax

revenues. The by-law regulations were loose and indifferently enforced. As a result the lay-out of many subdivisions was very bad, 25-foot frontage were common despite the consequent crowding, and dwellings not merely in the same subdivision but even in the same block were often extremely incongruous in design and quality rendering the neighbourhood unattractive. Frequently the agreement by the purchaser of a lot to build a house of a certain standard was simply ignored once the purchase was made, and a house of a lesser value and inferior quality and character was erected instead and it was seldom if ever possible to do anything about such violations. Lots were being sold in sites which could not possibly be serviced by sewer and watermains and subdivisions and buildings were being constructed in locations whose topography or scenic attractions would have better served the needs of the city as parks or other types of public amenity.

The absence of any reasonable standards for subdivision design had produced some very bad lay-outs. The kind of plan which sometimes resulted from this lack of public regulation was summed up by a comment from William H. Cushing in 1907 who was the provincial Minister of Public Works at that time. He said:

Some very peculiar work is being done in connection with subdividing property.... I have here before me one subdivision plan.... and it is one of the worst subdivisions I have ever seen.<sup>66</sup>

This situation was improved in 1912 when the provincial government tightened the regulations governing the registration of subdivisions.<sup>67</sup>

Calgary's building by-law No. 763 was replaced by by-law No. 1090 on 12

September, 1910, and this in turn was replaced by by-law No. 1485 on 5 May, 1913, which was more comprehensive and more tightly drawn than those which had preceded it. It would be another two decades, however, before Calgary adopted its first zoning by-law. During the pre-war boom decade Calgary's governance was characterized by council's indulgence, if not indeed its active abetment of the free play of the market conditions condusive to uninhibited land development in the city. Among these were the

absence of any concept of a rational or coherent pattern for the city's growth and no serious consideration of measures to guide that growth; indiscriminate support and encouragement of all types of investment and development; free-wheeling real estate speculation; minimal building standards; random proliferation of buildings and the encroachment of conflicting land-uses upon one another; cronyism between the business community, in particular the board of trade, and the council; and extravagant self-advertisement.

The intrusion of business uses into what had formerly been distinctly residential locales began to come to public notice as early as 1906. The <u>Herald</u> in an article in its issue of 3 April 1906, saw the movement as evidence of Calgary's growth but did not seem altogether happy about its effect on the central area residences:

The 1st Street E. and W. residential portion of the city is rapidly giving way to the spread of stone buildings. On 1st Street W., the retail stores have passed south of 12th Avenue and threaten to invade the block adjacent to St. Mary's church. This tendency of the business section to encroach upon that portion of the city hitherto regarded as essentially residential suggests the growth of the municipality as no other development can.<sup>68</sup>

Again, in its issue of 17 August 1910, the <u>Herald</u> carried an article which lamented the lack of any city policy to ensure a clear and definitive separation between commercial and residential uses downtown. By 1910 the condition had become aggravated to the point where the Building Inspector, in his report for the year 1910, which he submitted on 12 January 1911, asked for additional help to cope with the city's growth demands and to map out a clear delineation of the business district in order to deal with the problems of overlapping and conflicting land-uses.

Council's response was typically equivocal and ineffectual. It designated certain streets as business thoroughfares and left the use of the adjacent streets to be decided by the then existing device of petition. At that time in Calgary it was possible for the

residents on streets in the areas marginal to the downtown to petition the council concerning the use of land fronting those streets. Petitions could specify that the entire block abutting the street should remain residential or that certain businesses should be allowed. As for the area of the established business district, the council was firm in its insistence that its regulations be observed, particularly those directed towards fire safety. Building heights could not exceed six storeys because the city's water pressure could not pump water any higher; building materials and other fire-safety measures were strictly controlled.

#### PHASE 2: FROM BOOMTOWN TO OILTOWN

#### 1. First Steps Towards a Planning Function

The problems created by exuberant and random development were not restricted to the central business district. Owners of residential properties and developers were also confronted by the appearance of incompatible neighbours and the intrusion of undesirable uses. Although the real-estate business was flourishing there were those who felt that the laissez-faire conditions which prevailed were actually detrimental to their interests and that their affairs would be even more satisfactory if there were some measure of development control exercised by the civic authority.

This inchoate feeling of uneasiness about the way in which the city was developing found expression in a motion submitted to the council on 2 November, 1911, by Alderman James Garden, seconded by Alderman Adorinam Samis, that council adopt the principles of planning to guide the city's growth. Garden was a lumber manufacturer and building contractor; Samis was in the real-estate business and involved in the financing of building projects. Their motion roused no controversy. It was debated routinely in council and on 11 November 1911, the council authorized the mayor to appoint a committee to "prepare a comprehensive and extensive scheme for City Planning which will meet the requirements of this City for its future development." Two days later, on

13 November 1911, the mayor appointed a Town Planning Commission "to prepare and recommend a comprehensive and exhaustive system of town planning." 69

Calgary's planning commission consisted of 50 of the city's most prominent businessmen, mainly in the real-estate and construction fields. As might be expected in the circumstances of 1911, they had no idea of what to do. The commission met monthly but the meetings were poorly attended. There was no direction from the council and no leadership or ideas from within the commission. They did not even adopt a constitution or a set of by-laws during the year following their appointment. But their dilemma was about to be resolved. Thomas Hayton Mawson, the British town planner, appeared on the scene.

Mawson was on his way to Banff, Alberta. Early in 1912 he had been commissioned by the Canadian government to prepare a plan for Banff and he was making his initial site visit. <sup>70</sup> Mawson was travelling in the entourage of Prince Arthur, Duke of Connaught, the new Governor General of Canada who was on a tour of the western provinces. Winnipeg, Regina and Calgary were on the CPR mainline and the company passed through all of them. But Calgary was only some 60-odd miles away from Banff. And Mawson was not one to miss an opportunity to sell his services. On 9 April 1912, he delivered a speech to the Canadian Club of Calgary. Its title was "The City on the Plain and How to Make It Beautiful." He awoke in his listeners the exciting notion that Calgary could be made a city of great beauty and importance. His message did not fade and disappear with the end of his address. On the contrary it persisted and gained adherents. On 4 October 1912, he was back again, <sup>72</sup> this time speaking under the joint sponsorship of the Women's Canadian Club, the I.O.D.E. and the Calgary Planning Commission. The public meeting drew a large crowd. It was held in the High School and it was chaired by R.B. Bennett, the Member of Parliament and future Prime Minister of Canada.

Mawson's speech on this occasion had an even greater impact than his previous one. He urged Calgarians to start planning their city immediately in order to ensure its

great future as a centre of commerce, industry, arts, letters, music and science. He was an extremely persuasive speaker even though his audience needed no persuading. This was the kind of stuff Calgarians loved to hear and to delight themselves with, and still do. The reaction to the vision which Mawson conjured up was widespread enthusiasm. The newspapers carried laudatory reports and supportive editorials. One real-estate businessman is said to have enthused "we'll build a New Jerusalem right here on the banks of the Bow."

The planning commission had found the solution to its predicament. Ten days after Mawson's lecture they submitted a report to the city council in which they recommended:

the engaging of Thomas Mawson of Liverpool, England, or some other expert regarded as possessing equal qualifications, to investigate conditions in Calgary and make report covering the traffic and housing problems, boulevard drives, a proposed civic centre and such other matters as generally come under the head of "City Planning."<sup>74</sup>

The council adopted the report and voted a grant to the commission to enable it to pursue the matter. Applications for the task of preparing a plan for Calgary were invited through newspaper advertisements. Early in January 1913 the commission reported to the council:

We now recommend that Mr. Thomas Mawson be appointed to this position at a salary of \$6000 for complete preliminary plans.<sup>75</sup>

On 8 January 1913, the City of Calgary commissioned Mawson to prepare a preliminary scheme for directing the growth of the city and authorized him to start work at once.

In April 1914, Mawson submitted his report. It bore the title "Calgary. Past, Present and Future" and it was the typically extravagant conception characteristic of Mawson, characteristic indeed of the aesthetic approach of the *Ecole des Beaux Arts* in Europe and its American expression in the *City Beautiful* concept. His proposals for the

civic centre were particularly utopian. But by 1914 the recession had firmly set in and Calgary was experiencing severe economic difficulties. The council paid Mawson for his work but was no longer interested in carrying out the plan. It is doubtful whether they would have seriously considered doing so even if the economy were not in recession. It was simply too costly for a small prairie city to undertake, and too remote and grandiose for a prairie mentality - even Calgary's - to contemplate. The plans were put away and forgotten as had been his plans for Banff and would soon be for Regina. Many years later Mawson's plans for Calgary were found serving as wallpaper in the garage of a residence in the city. They were recovered and restored and are now preserved as an interesting bit of Calgary's history. In October 1914, the planning commission went out of existence. The members resigned *en masse*, stating as their reason that they had accomplished the task for which they had been appointed.

1913 saw another event in the planning saga of Calgary: the Alberta legislature passed the <u>Town Planning Act</u> which was given royal assent on 25 March 1913. The Act was permissive; it allowed any local authority to prepare a town planning scheme within the provisions of the Act, if it chose to do so. Section 1 of the Act states:

1. A town planning scheme may be prepared in accordance with the provisions of this Act with respect to any land which is in course of development or appears likely to be used for building purposes, with the general object of securing suitable provision for traffic, proper sanitary conditions, amenity and convenience in connection with the laying out of streets and use of the land and of any neighbouring lands for building or other purposes.<sup>76</sup>

The Act left the initiative for the preparation of a town planning scheme entirely to the local authority. The Calgary council had no interest in any such undertaking and simply carried on as it had before the Act was passed. The same attitude would prevail in the Regina council after the passing of Saskatchewan's <u>Town Planning and Rural</u>

<u>Development Act</u> in 1917. Although there was some interest in the town planning idea on

the prairies it was mainly among particular groups who were actively involved or concerned in public affairs but not among the population at large. The general public had little interest in the idea. In Calgary the council preferred to leave development to the private sector and even to support the private sector with public monies. This subvention was not restricted to bonuses for industrial enterprises but extended to real-estate development as well. For example, in 1907, a group of developers who owned land in the Crescent Heights and Mount Pleasant areas of the city, north of the business district, on the other side of the Bow River, built the first Centre Street bridge in order to open up their properties for development. But the city maintained the bridge until it finally took over the ownership in 1912. Three years later the flimsily built structure was washed away by the waters of the Bow River which were in flood.

The enthusiastic but only minimally effective efforts of the Calgary councils to be the direct agents of the city's economic expansion also extended into the commercial sector, although here it did not take the same form as it did in the ownership and development control of industrial land. With respect to commercial development the council's intervention was restricted to the central business district and it took the form of financial assistance. The city made loans to landowners in the business district for the purpose of erecting commercial buildings. The loans were financed from the city's sinking fund and were in the form of five and ten year mortgages against the business properties. This policy was initiated in 1909. By 1913 the city held 36 such mortgages with a total value of \$629,359.<sup>77</sup> But by that time the arrears in the payments on these mortgages had reached such an alarming level that the city discontinued this practice.

The abandonment of the commercial building mortgage program was only one relatively minor indication that important changes were emerging in the realm of local government which would affect the way in which Calgary was governed. As early as 1903 alternative forms of government were being discussed by the council such as a

board of control, government by a commission, and the addition of commissioners to the existing council system. No action was taken by the Calgary council at the time of its early discussions but in 1906 the council designated the mayor, the city engineer and the city clerk as commissioners. A year later the council entertained a motion that two incumbent aldermen be appointed as salaried commissioners but the motion was defeated. A subsequent motion was approved calling for a plebicite on the question of whether appointed or elected commissioners should be made part of the city administration, and the question was put to the voters. The public expressed a preference for elected commissioners and in 1909 two commissioners were elected: they, together with the mayor constituted Calgary's first Board of City Commissioners.

At about the same time other regulatory boards and commissions were established. In 1907 the provincial government passed the <u>Public Health Act</u>, pursuant to which Calgary established a Board of Health. A Library Board was established pursuant to a grant from the Carnegie Foundation in 1908. A Joint Power Commission was established in 1909 to carry out the difficult negotiations with the Calgary Power Transmission Company. In 1910 a Parks Board was established by a Statute of Alberta. The creation of a Town Planning Commission in 1911 has already been noted. A Civic Labour Bureau was established in 1912 to deal with unemployment.

It is of interest to note that most of these regulatory bodies were created by the provincial government or in response to the initiatives of outside agencies, not by the council's own initiatives or policies. They indicate the extent to which the senior government was beginning to intervene in the conduct of municipal affairs and to which the independent, improvisatory and unregulated decisions and actions of the Calgary council were being constrained and channelled into new directions by circumstances imposed upon them rather than through the pursuit of their own civic goals. In 1916 the Province of Alberta created an even more powerful provincial authority - the Board of Public Utilities. Initially the Board's powers were focused on the regulation of

utilities companies in the province but as the <u>Public Utility Act</u> was amended over subsequent years its powers were extended to the supervision of all monies raised by local authorities, making all civic borrowing subject to the Board's approval. The Board was also given important controls over land development inasmuch as it was made the approving authority for all new subdivisions and was empowered to fix assessments on subdivided as well as unsubdivided land.

It must be borne in mind that it was only in 1905 that Alberta became a province. There was then little provincial legislative structure in place and it was imperative for the provincial government to establish, as soon as possible, the framework within which it would perform its role and to define its relationship to the various sectors under its jurisdiction. The rapid production of regulatory legislation is therefore understandable. So is the changing character of Calgary's governance. The province's regulatory statutes were a powerful restraining influence on what had been Calgary council's free-wheeling, business-promoting approach to civic government. The end of the economic boom in 1913 imposed further disciplines and changes.

### 2. "Enemy Aliens" and Racial Bigotry

World War I began in August, 1914. It brought with it the inevitable hostility towards local "enemy aliens" - in this case city residents of German or Austrian origin. The military were a highly visible presence in the city. Between 1914 and 1918 over 37,000 Calgary men enlisted for overseas service and the number of troops stationed either in the city's Exhibition Grounds or the nearby Sarcee Military Camp varied between 5,000 and 15,000. The war and the tangible presence of large numbers of soldiers had their unavoidable effect on the day-to-day life of the city. Social constraints were looser; behavioural codes were relaxed; feelings of patriotism and commitment coupled with the sense of possible tragic sacrifice in the imminent future pervaded the general public consciousness. The soldiers themselves, freed from the norms of civilian life and caught up in the primitive, atavistic feelings of solidarity and

swaggering manliness common among warriors who have yet to experience combat, were prone to outbursts of chauvinism and bravado. On two occasions in 1916 they were responsible for riots. The first eruption occurred in February when a rampaging mob badly damaged the White Lunch Restaurant and the Riverside Hotel, incited by allegations of pro-German sympathies on the part of the owners. The second occurred in October when a horde of soldiers attacked the N.W.M.P. barracks to free some fellow soldiers who had been arrested for breaking the Prohibition Law.

The hostility towards enemy aliens was not confined to the military. On the contrary, it was a common sentiment among the general population. The <u>Herald</u> openly called for the internment of all aliens<sup>78</sup> and the Calgary city council adopted a policy of discrimination against them in its employment practices. Almost immediately upon Canada's entry into the war the council ordered an inventory of the national origins of all its employees. Then in May 1915 all employees who had not been naturalized before August 1, 1914, were ordered to be suspended from employment. Nine months later, in February, 1916, all employees of German or Austrian extraction were suspended regardless of naturalization.

These discriminatory measures had a lesser impact on the city's work force than might be expected. The aliens inventory revealed relatively few employees of German or Austrian origin. For example, the listing in the Street Railway Department showed only half a dozen out of a total of over 200 employees. Twelve other city departments had none at all.<sup>79</sup> The very low numbers may have been due to concealment or falsification on the part of the employees, and this may even have been done with the compliance of department heads who were loathe to lose good employees who had proven themselves over the years to be loyal and reliable workers. Even in such cases, however, German or Austrian ethnic backgrounds could not easily be concealed and there were numerous public complaints that the council's policy was being breached. Because of the difficulty of enforcing the policy the council decided, in 1917, to allow the city commissioners to

use their own discretion in employing workers of alien extraction who were naturalized citizens.

All of Calgary's residents of German or Austrian descent were not city employees; there were many others throughout the city who were engaged in other occupations and pursuits. They too suffered the general opprobrium of the "enemy alien." Those who were deprived of their means of livelihood became, in effect, unemployed and as such were treated by the relief agencies as part of their normal responsibilities. The Local Council of Women and the Associated Charities regarded them no differently from any other unemployed or needy and dispensed welfare to them without ethnic discrimination.

There were other instances of racial hostility outside of the context of the "enemy alien." In 1919 the Calgary Federated Ratepayers Association lobbied the council to remove the Chinese community from their established location near the downtown and disperse them to other parts of the city. This was not the first instance of anti-Chinese bigotry in Calgary. In August, 1892, a drunken mob had attacked Chinatown after two Caucasians had died of smallpox and the outbreak of the disease had been blamed on unsanitary conditions in a Chinese laundry. The council did not act on the Ratepayers Association's urging in 1919 mainly because they knew that there was nowhere the Chinese community could be relocated to: they would find no place in the city where they would be accepted.

Another instance of racial bigotry occurred in 1920 when a petition dated March 31, 1920, and bearing over 500 signatures was submitted to the council by the residents of the Victoria community, asking the council to prohibit Negroes from buying property in their area and that those already living there be moved elsewhere. Again the council did not act on the request but did not criticize the petition. It maintained a neutral position, having no strong belief in the rights of the Negroes and a very strong belief in the merits of political expediency. It offered to meet with both the Negroes and

the petitioners to discuss specific problems. Nothing came of the offer and eventually the agitation subsided.

#### 3. The 1913 Recession and Changing Local Politics

The severe economic contraction which occurred in 1913 had a disastrous effect, particularly on the real-estate and construction activities in Calgary. These two industries were major employers in the city and the generators of a large part of its income. When the recession hit a great number of people were thrown out of work and the demand for building sites and new buildings shrank drastically. The customary self-appointed role of the council as the direct agent and stimulator of the city's economic growth was no longer tenable; and the war years which followed hard upon the recession ensured that Calgary's council could no longer be wholly preoccupied with promotion and development incentives and that the council could no longer be the exclusive domain of the city's merchants and entrepreneurs.

In 1913 the provincial government enacted legislation prohibiting municipalities from offering attractions and incentives to industries in the form of bonuses and tax exemptions. The legislation also prohibited municipalities from selling land or providing utilities and services at less than their actual cost. Minimum lease and rental rates were stipulated and council members were to be held personally responsible for violations and liable to fines of up to \$100 and disqualification from office.

In 1912 the right to vote in civic election was still restricted to owners of property with an assessed value of at least \$200 and to tenants with personal assets of at least \$400. Qualification for candidacy for the positions of mayor, commissioner and alderman required ownership of real property with a minimum assessment of \$1000 and personal property of \$2000. Election was for a one-year term only. Women were excluded from holding civic office although they could vote if they were property owners or the wives of property owners. Wives of tenants, however, could not vote even if their husbands were entitled to vote by virtue of meeting the personal assets requirement.

All of that began to change in 1913. In that year the ward system was abolished and was replaced by the system of election-at-large on a single ballot. The annual election of the entire council was replaced by the election of alternating halves of the council on successive years. Women were given the vote and could hold office although the property qualification was retained. In 1915, however, property qualifications were removed from the franchise and the length of residence in the municipality was made the only condition of eligibility to vote. In 1916 the property qualification for elected office was reduced by half to \$500 for real property and \$1000 for personal property; and in 1918 the property requirement was removed entirely. In 1916 a system of proportional representation on a single transferable ballot was introduced into Calgary's election procedures.

The liberalization of the electoral regulations opened membership on council to a wider constituency of candidates. In the election for the council of 1917, for example, the seven aldermen who were elected included a machinist, a civil engineer, a secretary, a clergyman, a gentleman of leisure, a broker and a merchant. The more liberal electoral regulations also increased the number of eligible voters but it did not increase the number who exercised their franchise. Indeed, the number actually declined. The number of registered voters in 1916 was less than the number in 1915. This may have been due to widespread public apathy towards the political process in general. It may also have been due to the fact that a significant number of men were in military service and were preoccupied with matters other than civic elections. Preoccupation with the war may have diminished interest in local civic affairs among the population generally. Whatever may have been the causes, the fact is that less than 20 percent of eligible voters cast ballots in the election of 1917. After the war there was some increase in voting but hardly enough to be regarded as a surge of public interest in local government affairs. In the 1920 election the number who voted reached a five year high but it was only 25.5 percent of the number on the eligible voters list.

The depressed condition of Calgary's economy may also have been reflected in the depression of local political interest. In the one month of September 1914, 1200 men were thrown out of work. By 1915 over 3,000 unemployed were registered with the Labour Bureau. The July-August 1915 issue of the Labour Gazette estimated that 60 percent of the bricklayers and masons in Calgary were not employed in the construction industry but were on military service. The volume of building permits declined steadily until by 1920 it was down to only about 10 percent of what it had been in the peak year of 1912. There was a brief flurry of optimism and speculation occasioned by the discovery of oil in the Turner Valley in 1914 and by a bumper crop in 1915 but this was short-lived in the pervasive gloom of the general economic recession and the concern about the war.

The changing occupational background of the council members was in large part due to the new laws governing the elections and the franchise. But it was also due in part to the declining interest in civic politics among those groups in the business community from which candidates for civic office had traditionally been drawn such as the merchants, real-estate brokers and builders. In 1917 the Board of Trade abandoned its traditional direct involvement in civic elections through its endorsement of selected candidates. Organized labour exhibited little class consciousness or solidarity. Unions tended to be exclusionary in their outlook, the older and more powerful craft unions being unconcerned about the labour movement as a whole and interested mainly in preserving and extending their own advantage. Labour candidates in provincial and federal elections received little organized labour support. It has been suggested that R.B. Bennett, the Conservative candidate in the 1911 federal election received strong support from organized labour.<sup>82</sup>

On the local political scene labour was equally lacking in class-consciousness.

The electoral ward system had had some potential for consolidating the labour vote in at least a couple of wards but the potential was never fully realized. When the ward

system was abolished in 1913 and replaced by election-at-large the change was met mainly with indifference and little comment by both the general public and the Trades and Labour Council. In Calgary's local civic election organized labour did not nominate slates of candidates. Instead, individual unions named individual candidates with little consideration for class solidarity or the formal presentation of a united labour front.

The labour movement in Calgary was clearly not militant. It lacked a strong sense of class consciousness and solidarity and a compelling ideological faith. It was divided by internal dissensions and the pursuit of self-interest among its several factions. And it lacked unifying leadership. In all of this it was in sharp contrast to the labour movement in Winnipeg at this time. In that city the labour movement, although not invariably revolutionary throughout its ranks was self-conscious and militant and led by dedicated, experienced, intelligent, charismatic leaders. The summer of 1919 in Winnipeg was torn apart by the violent general strike which split the sympathies of Winnipegers into pro-labour and anti-labour alignments, the legacy of which persists in the city to this day. Calgary has no such continuing tradition of left-wing, political activism.

Nevertheless, there were a few brief moments in the political life of Calgary when labour was able to command attention. One of these occurred in 1919. The Socialist Party of Canada, headquartered in Vancouver, counted a large part of its membership in western Canada. Its extreme left-wing faction organized an unprecedented Western Labour Conference to be held in March 1919 in Calgary. The Conference indulged itself in boisterous revolutionary rhetoric, although its main business was as much practical as ideological. It was asked to decide whether to hold a region-wide referendum on the question of whether western workers should secede from the international American Federation of Labor craft unions and organize themselves under their own industrial union to be known as the One Big Union (O.B.U.). The delegates to the conference were industrial workers and came mostly from the larger,

more industrialized centres of the prairie region. They were wildly enthusiastic in their support of the proposal to hold a referendum. Another proposed referendum would ask whether to call a general strike in aid of a demand for a thirty-hour work week and certain other benefits. This, too, was overwhelmingly approved by the delegates. Within a few months after the conference the revolutionary fervor had subsided. The O.B.U. was never established and did not replace the A.F.L. There was, however, a general strike - largely confined to Winnipeg (there were a few small sympathy strikes of brief duration in other centres). But for a few days in March 1919, Calgary was the focus of an intense display of labour militancy rarely seen in the western region up to that time. It is worth noting as a comment on Calgary's character that the event was originated and organized not by the labour movement in Calgary but by a militant labour faction based in Vancouver; and the consequences of the event found their most dramatic expression not in Calgary but in Winnipeg, in the general strike which erupted there just three months after the conference.

#### 4. The Immediate Post-War Years

Throughout the half-decade immediately following the end of World War I the economy of the prairie region was depressed. The economic stagnation and melancholy outlook of 1913, which had been temporarily overlain by the turmoil and stress of the war during its four-year interlude, simply re-emerged with the return of peace. Along with the rest of Alberta, Calgary's local economy was in deep distress and many of its residents were suffering privation. Between 1921 and 1922 the city lost more than 6,000 people. The construction industry was virtually at a standstill: in 1924 only 480 building permits were issued compared to 3,800 in 1912. There was no movement in the real-estate market and nothing available in the job market. The annual reports of the Board of Trade between 1921 and 1925 were considerably more sombre in tone than their usual effusive praise of current achievements and optimism about the future. The

subdued performance of the retailing and manufacturing activities hardly lent themselves to prideful congratulations.

Notwithstanding the economic and psychological gloom which pervaded the city in 1921 and 1922 and the marked deflation in the customary huckstering hyperbole of the Board of Trade and the city council, the irrepressible Calgary Herald, bastion of conservative ideology, champion of the business interests and trumpet of the Calgary millenium, in continuing to sound its polyanna booster rhetoric, seemed oblivious to the harsh realities suffered by Calgarians in the depths of the post-war depression.

Perhaps it felt that there was a need to boost public morale during this difficult period when not only the economy was depressed but also when the established values of society were being threatened by the bolshevik hordes. Whatever its motive, an editorial comment in 1922 extolling the virtues of the city seems more in keeping with the customary fulsome afflatus of business promotion than with the unhappy temper of the times:

Today Calgary is known for the cheery optimism of its people, the healthfulness of its climate, the richness of its resources, the industriousness of its inhabitants, the advancement of its schools, the sanctity of its churches, and the beauty and number of its homes. It has its tradition and its history, and no one can look back upon the rapidity of its development without feeling a thrill of civic pride in the industry of indefatigable men, its founders, and turns with expectation to himself and others that they, too, must carry on with the work of citizenship which lies in the path before them.<sup>83</sup>

Traditionally the public image and statements of the city council were of the flag-waving, drum-beating, bright-toothy-smile variety. In the first half of the 1920's, however, and particularly after 1922, there was an atmospheric change: there was far less exuberance and hyperbole, greater sobriety and concern. Perhaps the more visible presence of Labour on the council was a moderating influence. A promotional pamphlet out of the mayor's office in 1925 contained none of the rhetoric of economic boom and

population explosion and industrial greatness but spoke instead of tourism, oil discoveries and the shipment of grain to the Pacific coast as the determinants of Calgary's future.<sup>84</sup>

# 5. Labour and Business - Contending Political Factions

In the circumstances of the economic collapse of 1913, the war which did little to brighten the lives of ordinary Calgarians, the continued depression and massive unemployment in the immediate post-war years and the inability of the council to cope with the city's problems (and perhaps some of the fervent left-wing enthusiasm which attended the Western Labour Conference still lingered in some quarters of the city) it is not surprising that Labour's share of the popular vote increased from 20 to 30 percent between 1918 and 1920. Labour candidates were nominated by the unions and sympathetic left-wing organizations and supported by the Dominion Labour Party, and Calgarians for the first time elected Labour representatives to the city council. In successive years more Labour candidates were elected until by 1922 they held half the aldermanic seats.

Labour's success upset the traditional political structure of the council and introduced an alien point of view into its deliberations. The Labour aldermen were capable advocates, well able to champion working-class interests. In this they were seen to be a threat to the interests of the business community who were nonplussed by the Labour group's effectiveness. The dismay of the businessmen can be palpably felt in the following extract from the Minutes of a meeting of the Calgary Board of Trade on April 19, 1922:

#### **Civic and Community Matters:**

There was some discussion regarding the possibility of getting before the public through the newspapers the views of the business men on civic matters and Alderman Webster explained that everything possible was being done by the Aldermen who were not associated with the Labour or Socialist

Parties to present the views of the business men at Council meetings. It was explained that the work being done by Alderman Webster.... was appreciated.<sup>85</sup>

Incidentally, Alderman George Webster was elected Mayor in 1922 and served as Mayor from 1922 to 1926.

Three years later Labour was still a presence to be reckoned with on the council although the fact that the labour movement in Calgary had never embraced the principle of revolution and had always advocated negotiation and reconciliation as the means of improving the working man's lot may have eased the qualms of the business community. In his Presidential Address to the Calgary Board of Trade in 1925, President F.E. Osborne observed:

I believe the time is opportune for a better understanding and greater co-operation between business and labour. Extremists on both sides are a menace to our civic and national welfare.... Thinking men on both sides have long realized that business and labour are both necessary to the successful operation of our national life and yet we each go our own way, imputing improper motives to the other's most trivial acts and acting as though each thought they were self-contained.<sup>86</sup>

Fred Osborne, a bookseller, became Calgary's Mayor in 1927 and again in 1928.

Perhaps his business occupation as a bookseller induced in him a more scholarly and philosophically tolerant attitude than that of his businessmen predecessors in the office of Mayor. In any case, although not a Labour partisan, he was more accommodating towards the Labour point of view.

After its success in 1922 Labour was not able to increase its numbers or to take control of the council although the three or four aldermen it was able to elect out of the total of 12 made their presence felt on various issues of working-class interest. There was also the odd mayor, such as Andrew Davison, who supported Labour's position on council. Davison was a linotype operator with the Calgary Herald when he was first elected as an alderman in 1921. He was re-elected every year until 1929 with the

exception of the two years 1927 and 1928. In 1929 he was elected Mayor by acclamation and served as Calgary's Mayor until 1945, being returned by acclamation on four more occasions. Davison was also elected to the Alberta Legislature as a Labour MLA, a position he held concurrently with the mayoralty of the city. Notwithstanding this modest success of Labour, the C.G.A.-supported representatives among the mayors and commissioners as well as the aldermen dominated the Calgary council. The C.G.A. endorsed candidates put forward by organizations such as Rotary and Kiwanis; the Dominion Labour Party endorsed candidates nominated by the trade unions or by organization such as the Labour Church. But neither the C.G.A. nor Labour campaigned in the civic elections as a formally organized political party. There was no party discipline on either side, and no platform of systematic, coherent policies. Elections were fought on specific issues current at the moment. And there were always enough independent candidates to dissipate any tendency in an election campaign to polarize into a two-party contest. The flatness of partisan fervor in Calgary's civic elections reflected this low level of political energy among the contending groups. It also reflected the limitations on the type and range of issues the municipal government could address in terms of policies which could command political loyalties. Perhaps most of all it reflected the widespread apathy towards the political process in general among the city's population. Voter turn-out was consistently low. In the election of 1921 only 7,000 votes were cast although the total population of the city was over 63,000. In 1928 less than one third of the eligible voters voted. Neither the quality of the candidates nor the earnestness of their campaigns seemed to make any difference in the voter turn-out or in the pattern of their voting.

# 6. <u>Inner Area/Outer Area Development Control and Its Consequences</u>

The city's population after 1913 was stagnant, even shrinking, and business was at a stand-still; tax revenues accordingly were being generated at a declining rate while bonded debts were fixed and operating costs were increasing. Moreover, taxes were

falling into arrears and not being paid. Revenues from liquor licenses, dray and automobile licenses, police and court fines which formerly accrued to the city were redirected to the provincial treasury since the onset of the recession in 1913. The Mothers' Allowance Act of 1919 required the city to pay half of the costs of that program, and the Supplementary Revenue Act of 1920 required the city to impose a tax levy sufficient to raise annually the sum of \$90,000 to pay for the provincial administration of urban-related programs. In 1916 the province had passed the Volunteer and Reservists Relief Act, commonly referred to as the "moratorium" whose purpose was to protect servicemen from the loss of their property through foreclosures resulting from default of tax or mortgage payments. All of this pressed down heavily on the city's income.

The boom years of 1909-1912 had spread a rash of residential development over an extensive area of the city. Many of these dwellings were built in remote locations beyond the end of the services and the street-car lines in the expectation that the continuation of the boom would soon bring massive in-fill development together with the concomitant services and utilities. The economic collapse of 1913 put an end to those expectations. It also terminated a significant amount of mortgage payments to developers and tax payments to the city.

The straitened financial circumstances which followed the collapse of the boom compelled the city to adopt policies of retrenchment. It cut back on capital expenditures and one of the programs affected was the extension of municipal services into as yet unserviced areas. The most effective way to carry out such a cost-cutting policy would be through measures to control the physical growth of the city. Thus it was that in 1920 the council designated an inner area and an outer area of the city. Services to the outer area were to be drastically restricted and high assessments were to be levied on all land in the outer area which was not used for agricultural purposes. Owners of property in the outer area were encouraged to exchange it for equivalent property in the inner area.

A special house-moving fund was established in 1929 to assist in relocating buildings from the outer to the inner area. In 1930 a by-law was passed which prohibited the sale of any property in the outer area for the purpose of erecting a building on it unless that property was adjacent to an already existing building. Apart from their implications for capital expenditures, one can see the merit of such measures in the light of a report by a special committee of the city council, produced in 1922, which found that of the 36 sections of land within the city's boundaries, 28 sections were unimproved, with a substantial portion of the unimproved land lying in the inner area. Eight years later, in 1930, as much as 80 percent of the city's total area was still unoccupied.<sup>87</sup>

The measures had their desired effect. They sharply reduced development in the outer area. They also had other effects, not all of which were intended or desirable. Although they reduced development in Calgary's outer area they could not prevent development in outlying communities such as Bowness on Calgary's north-west edge and Forest Lawn on the east. These communities lacked municipal services but they were within easy reach of Calgary. Forest Lawn was very close to Calgary's industrial employment sites on the east side of the city and Bowness was directly connected to Calgary by the street railway. These communities attracted residential development which, but for the restrictions, might have located in Calgary's outer area. Because of the lack of municipal services the housing which they attracted was of a low standard and poor quality. When these communities were incorporated into Calgary in the 1960's they brought with them and dumped on the council all the problems attendant upon inferior housing and low-income occupants.

Another consequence of the outer area growth restrictions was to steer development, such as it was during the depressed economy of the time, into the inner city. Because of the economic recession land values had fallen throughout the city which meant that even in the downtown rentals were low enough to enable commercial

establishments to remain in their downtown locations despite the reduction in business activity. The restricted growth policies ensured that retail and other businesses would not move into the outer area. Those businesses which were already located along the outer reaches of the railway lines were unable to attract other establishments and to expand into flourishing suburban commercial centres. The downtown remained Calgary's prime shopping precinct until well after the second World War. From the point of view of the downtown businessmen and indeed from the point of view of maintaining a viable central business district this was a highly satisfactory result. But there were contingent effects which were far less salubrious.

One such unhealthy consequence was that population growth was virtually confined to the inner area. Between 1913 and 1915 the growth was modest but increased significantly towards the end of the decade. This confinement tended to consolidate the residential pattern which had already been established in the city, but it also tended to concentrate accommodation in the centre of the city, particularly in locations contiguous to the central business district. The capacities of the sewer and water systems in the central area were insufficient to allow the construction of high density apartment buildings and the building by-law was of little use in controlling development. Because high-density apartment development was precluded there was extensive conversion of large single-family dwellings into multiple family and rooming-house accommodation. The building by-law provided for only two usedistricts, residential and business, and was of questionable relevance or application in other parts of the city. It specifically prescribed only the total area of a lot without any reference to lot width or frontage requirements. As a result, much of the house construction was on 25-foot lots which produced excessively crowded residential areas. An investigation of housing conditions in Calgary, carried out in 1929, found that the area between the CPR mainline and 17th Avenue South was the most congested in the city. As many as one-third of the families surveyed lived in one or two rooms in converted

houses which contained large numbers of such units and had grossly inadequate cooking, washing and sanitary facilities.

In sum, then, the measures to restrict development in the outer area of the city produced a mixture of uses in Calgary's central area - single-family dwellings, multiple-family dwellings and rooming houses converted out of former large single-family houses, commercial establishments, all lumped together in crowded, cheek-by-jowl contiguity. They also were responsible, even if only indirectly, for the growth of outlying communities as extensive enclaves of sub-standard housing.

## 7. <u>Temporary Economic Recovery</u>

After 1926 the prairie economy began to improve. Grain yields and grain prices increased. So did beef exports. There was some increased activity in oil exploration in the foothills south-west of Calgary. All of this helped to stimulate Calgary's internal economy. The construction industry in the city came back to vigorous life. In 1929 the value of building permits issued topped \$11 million, the highest since the 1912 peak of \$20.4 million. The 1912 figure, and the 1929 figure, would not be surpassed or even equalled until 1950. A significant portion of the heightened building activity in 1929 was due to the location in the city that year of four major enterprises. The T. Eaton Company built a million dollar store at the corner of Eighth Avenue and Third Street West; the Hudson's Bay Company tore down the vintage Alexander Block to make room for a new major department store; the Manitoba Rolling Mills built a mill; and the Dominion Bridge Company, which had bought a site in 1912, finally came to Calgary and built a plant.

The railway was still seen as a critical factor in the economic development of the city and the council lobbied the Government of Canada and the railway companies to switch a substantial volume of grain shipment from its eastward movement westward to the Pacific coast. The established movement pattern, however, was not changed, largely

because, it was argued, there were inadequate terminal facilities in Vancouver. Council. together with the Board of Trade also approached the CPR and the CNR in 1923 with the proposal that the two railways combine their passenger depots in a jointly operated union station. The railways did not act on the proposal, but in 1929 the CNR offered to buy all of the city-owned land in three blocks adjacent to its station located on the site of the original Fort Calgary. It wanted to build spur lines on the land and it offered to pay the city the very low price of \$55,000 for the property. The land was close-in to the central area, serviced, and eminently suitable for residential development. The benefits which the railway company claimed would flow from its proposal were acknowledged to lie in the future. The council however still beguiled by the notion of railway-led industrial development and having regained some confidence in its self-appointed role of development mentor as a result of certain changes in the provincial legislation and the economic recovery of 1928-1929, was pleased to accept the railway's offer. In spite of the experience of the recent recession, the problems of unemployment, the changing responsibilities of municipal government, the emergence of the Labour presence, brief though its moment of strength may have been, the council easily resumed its traditional attitude towards business development as its primary concern, with little thought to the long-term consequences for the general development of the city.

Throughout the war years and up until 1921 the council had been reluctant to enforce forfeiture proceedings against property in default of tax payments. In 1921, however, in the face of falling revenues and continuing financial distress, the council allowed forfeiture proceedings to take their course. In 1923 caveats were registered against properties worth \$3.8 million and in the following two years the city took title to properties worth \$1.5 million. Defaults and delinquencies in property tax payments continued throughout the 1920's and into the depression years of the 1930's. The city, however, realized little from the sale of these forfeited properties and in the light of the meagre revenues produced and the legally complicated and emotionally trying procedures

entailed, the council's former reluctance to move against such properties seems to have been well justified. In June, 1924, for example, the city offered for sale 4,731 lots with a total value of over \$244,000 which had been taken through tax default. Although the sale had been advertised in accordance with customary practice only 44 lots were sold which brought the city the sum of \$3,808. With the marked improvement in economic conditions in 1928-1929, however, the demand for land returned. A sale of tax-forfeited properties in 1929 produced \$640,000 for the city's treasury.

The continued forfeiture of properties in default of taxes put a large amount of land into the title of the city. Much of this land lay in the outer area which had been designated by the council as an area of severely restricted services and high taxable assessment on non-agricultural holdings. Perhaps the discouragement of development in this area was a contributing factor in the relinquishing of properties by their owners. By 1939 the city held lands whose value was estimated at \$5 million.88 The world-wide economic depression which struck in the Fall of 1929 perpetuated and intensified the economic and social distress which had begun in 1913, but there was a brief respite in 1928 and 1929 when there was a short-lived resurgence of comparative prosperity. Farmers were enjoying the rare coincidence of high grain prices and high crop yields. The farm protest movement which had swept across the prairies at the close of the 19th Century had not been able to satisfy all of the farmers' long-standing grievances against the eastern establishment but in the thirty-odd years since it first swirled up like a wind storm on the prairies it had achieved a number of successes such as the creation of the co-operative, farmer-owned elevator system and the United Grain Growers grain marketing organization. Parallel to this business response the farmers' protest movement also generated a political response. In Alberta the political manifestation of the protest movement was the United Farmers of Alberta party, founded in 1916.

#### 8. Early Planning Measures

The United Farmers of Alberta were first elected as the Government of Alberta in 1921 with Herbert Greenfield as Premier. Greenfield's UFA party finally ended the 16 year reign of the Liberal party which had formed the government since Alberta was first created a province in 1905. The Liberals under Arthur Lewis Sifton (1910-1917) had passed the first Planning Act in the province in 1913. The next Liberal regime under Charles Stewart (1917-1921) had left the 1913 statute intact. The first UFA government under Greenfield did nothing with it either. But in 1928 Greenfield's successor as Premier, Edward Brownlee, felt that the time had come when, with the brightening of the province's economic landscape, a corresponding change in the province's planning statute might be appropriate. The United Farm Women of Alberta and the Edmonton Local Council of Women expressed public concern about the proliferation of unsightly advertising billboards along the roads and highways and the inadequacy of existing legislation to deal with the problem. Edmonton felt that the 1913 statute was obsolete. And the UFA, the party in power in the legislature in Edmonton, was politically committed to the policy of maximizing the quality of rural life. In 1928 the 1913 Planning Act was replaced by An Act to Facilitate Town Planning and the Preservation of the Natural Beauties of the Province. And then, in March 1929, that Act was repealed and replaced with the Town Planning Act of 1929, which was an advance over the 1913 Act and incorporated a number of provisions of the 1928 Statute in an amended form.

The new <u>Town Planning Act</u> empowered municipalities to appoint town planning commissions to advise the municipal council on planning matters. The commissions were also made responsible for the preparation and administration of planning schemes as well as zoning by-laws. Under the zoning provisions municipalities were empowered to prescribe permissible land uses in various areas of the municipality and to fix the densities, lot sizes, building heights and floor areas. Municipalities and municipal

districts and improvement districts in a region were authorized to establish a regional planning commission. No unit of government could appoint more than three members to a regional planning commission, but the costs of such a commission were to be borne "by the councils in the proportion which the total value of the assessable property in their respective municipalities as shown on the assessment rolls bear to one another."

Obviously the United Farmers of Alberta government had a keen appreciation of the relative values not only of the rural and urban municipal assessment rolls but also of the relative values of the rural and urban political support.

Although the authority to establish town planning commissions was vested in the local municipalities the ultimate jurisdiction over their policies was retained by the provincial government. The Act provided for the establishment of a Town and Rural Planning Board and a Provincial Director of Planning whose roles were to establish the guidelines for the planning function in the province and to oversee its operations. Horace L. Seymour was appointed the Provincial Director of Planning. Any proposals of a town planning commission which were formally adopted by the local council had the force of law but the provincial Town and Rural Planning Board had the power to repeal or amend them on appeal to the Board. The Board included among its members Premier J.E. Brownlee and the Hon. R.C. Reid, Minister of Municipal Affairs. The Minister of Municipal Affairs was the minister responsible for the Act and among the powers vested in him was the power to compel a municipality to adopt a town planning scheme or to impose one in those instances where the municipal council was unwilling to do so. Although the requirements of the Act were not rigidly enforced to the letter of the law, the Alberta government was nevertheless serious about the town planning function and mounted an extensive publicity campaign to promote it.

The <u>Town Planning Act</u> was one of several positive steps taken by the provincial government in the atmosphere of rising optimism brought on by the marked improvement in economic conditions after 1926 and particularly in 1928 and 1929.

And Calgary followed in the province's positive, optimistic footsteps. In 1929 the province and the city agreed to proceed with a long overdue major water storage reservoir for Calgary, called the Glenmore Reservoir, to be constructed on a bend of the Elbow River south-west of the city. And Calgary was quick to respond to the province's new Town Planning Act. On June 10, 1929, the council referred the matter of planning to its legislative committee for consideration and report. Three days later the committee brought in its report to the council, the major recommendation of which was that the council appoint a town planning commission. Council accepted the report and recommendation and on September 30, 1929, gave third reading to by-law No. 2585 which established the City of Calgary Town Planning Commission. Pursuant to the bylaw the council appointed a commission of nine members. On November 5, 1929, the Commission advised the council that it was hiring "an experienced draughtsman whose duty will be .... to undertake a study of the local situation and be prepared to carry into effect a scheme for the next year."89 On November 15, 1929, J.A. Doughty-Davies, a draughtsman from Victoria began working for the commission at a salary of \$225 per month.90

The Commission then instructed Doughty-Davies to undertake a number of studies to provide the background information for the preparation of a comprehensive planning scheme for Calgary. The studies contemplated ranged over an extensive list of topics such as zoning, transportation, recreational land use, civic art, etc. and even included consideration of a plan for regional development. The projected work program also contemplated a large-scale publicity campaign. Doughty-Davies, aware that this voluminous body of studies would take a long time to complete and that the city would have no effective planning instrument in hand during that prolonged interval, recommended that an interim zoning by-law be put in place to serve until the definitive one was prepared and adopted.

At the end of October, 1929, barely two weeks before Doughty-Davies took up his Calgary appointment, the stock market had crashed and the Great Depression had begun. The good humour of the city council was soured. Budget cuts were inevitable and the council's concerns turned to matters other than planning. Doughty-Davies knew that it was unlikely that he would be able to complete all the planning studies which had been contemplated - there were about thirty studies which had originally been proposed. The Town Planning Commission, however, conscientiously pursued its mandate. Almost immediately upon its appointment it had started to advise the city council on matters which were brought before it by residents, mainly concerning questions of lot subdivision and building regulations. To offer reasonable advice the Town Planning Commission needed background information, which meant that certain studies had to be pursued. Chief among these were the studies on which a zoning by-law could be based, primarily studies of existing land-use and population densities.

The conclusion drawn from the studies was that Calgary faced a future very much like that of the preceding decade in terms of the demand for land. The studies found that there was sufficient land in the residential commercial and industrial sectors of the city to accommodate a population twice the size of the then current population which was between 75,000 and 80,000. The city's population was not expected to reach 100,000 for at least another 20 years. Studies on transportation and recreational land-use were also carried out.

Based on these findings the Town Planning Commission prepared a draft interim zoning by-law. One of the main features of the draft by-law was that it applied almost exclusively to the inner area of the city, leaving the outer area - about 60 percent of the city's total land area - without zoning regulations. This was perhaps a less serious omission than it might seem to be at first glance since the regulations restricting development in the outer area were still in force although they had been loosened somewhat in 1928 and the city now was prepared to extend services to properties in the

outer area provided the property owners paid all the costs. The overall effect of the bylaw was to confirm and perpetuate the existing land-use pattern of the city. This, too, is not surprising since this is the nature of virtually all zoning by-laws.

The role of the central business district as the dominant commercial location in the city was affirmed and strengthened. A "Local Commercial" district was designated in areas outside of the central business district but the regulations governing lot and yard sizes, advertising, and architectural design were sufficiently severe to discourage commercial establishments from locating there. Within the central business area the by-law designation of "Commercial" drew no distinction between retailing functions and wholesaling functions even though the space and servicing requirements are different for each. Housing in the areas contiguous to the business precinct was given two use-categories, a "Two Family" district and a "Multi-Dwelling" district. Apartment buildings, however, were limited in height to three storeys because of the limited capacity of the services infrastructure.

The draft by-law met with general public disapproval. The business community was against it. In particular the construction industry raised strong objections to it on the grounds that it threatened to suppress building activity in the city at a time when this vital part of the city's economy needed support and stimulation rather than further restriction. The case of the Bank of Montreal was cited as evidence of the barriers against progress which the by-law would erect. The Bank of Montreal was proposing to put up an attractive new 10 storey building whose projected height was 130 feet. The zoning by-law prescribed a maximum height of 120 feet with a set-back of one foot in every three feet above the height of 75 feet to the stipulated maximum of 120 feet. The issue became one of general public discussion. The Board of Trade, the Lions Club and the Gyro Club voiced their objections. The premier of the province himself intervened to ask the city council not to proceed with the by-law at that time because the province was considering amendments to the Town Planning Act, which among other changes would

allow the council to appoint its own zoning appeal board instead of having such appeals dealt with by the provincial planning board as required by the existing legislation. The council was sharply divided on the issue, those members dedicated to the traditional concepts of business expansion and promotion opposing the by-law and those with a broader view of civic government supporting it. The Town Planning Commission defended the by-law on the grounds that it was based on the evidence found in its studies but couldn't prevail upon the council to adopt it. The by-law was shelved pending further investigation. It was not until 1934 that Calgary's first zoning by-law was adopted by the city council.

The Town Planning Commission's transportation study, entitled "Major Street and Arterial Highway Plan" was completed in August, 1932. It examined such matters as the major access routes into the downtown, one-way streets and by-pass routes. No significant changes in the existing traffic system were proposed and the policies which derived from the transportation study were limited to simply varying the width of the street to accommodate the different volumes and directions of traffic flow in accordance with the place of the street in the functional hierarchy of streets.

The Commission's "Report On Public Recreation" - its study of recreational land-use in the city - was rather more innovative than its transportation study. It set out standards for various categories of recreation areas which were related to the areas they were intended to serve. For Calgary this was a new departure. The city had not previously had a formula for the allocation of recreation space although the province's <a href="Town Planning Act">Town Planning Act</a> of 1913 had made provision for the dedication, without compensation, for open space or public lands purposes, of up to five percent of the land in any new subdivision. In fact, however, Calgary had no shortage of land for recreational purposes, land which had accrued to the city through tax default and could have been available for recreational land use had the city chosen to use it that way. The Town Planning

Commission recommended the following standards for the various types of public recreation areas:

- a) Playgrounds within 1/2 mile of any residence.
- b) Playfields ten acres in size and within 3/4-mile of any residence.
- c) Neighbourhood Parks twenty acres and spaced about one mile apart.
- d) Large Area Parks should follow topographic lines around river banks and creeks, both within and outside city boundaries. 91

What was innovative about the commission's report on recreational land use was its proposal of functional standards. In other respects it contained nothing that was particularly new. The Calgary Parks Department under Superintendent William Reader had been pursuing progressive policies which included not only the public development of parks and open spaces but also support for the efforts of private organizations to provide and to beautify recreational areas. In 1929 approximately 14 percent of the city's developed area was in parks and recreational use. Fifty years later, however, in 1978 the proportion had fallen to eight percent. In spite of the town planning commission's codification of standards the city was less than diligent in preserving, protecting and acquiring recreational land over the years, or even, indeed, in respecting the commission's standards.

The deepening depression from 1930 onward diverted the council's attention away from the planning issue and stifled the commission's enthusiasm for pursuing its mandate. Although the zoning by-law was adopted in 1934, the commission's transportation study was not acted upon and no further serious transportation planning would be done until 1952. As for the preparation of a comprehensive general plan for the city, that notion receded into the shadows and it would not be until 1963, some thirty years later, that Calgary council would formally adopt its first official city plan by-law.

# 9. Depression and the Rise of Social Credit

The economic recession which had set in in 1913 and which had continued with only short periodic remissions until 1929 had imposed heavy burdens on Calgary as it had on the rest of Alberta and indeed on the entire prairie region. For Calgary's city council it had created problems which the council could not solve. The council could not reduce the city's budgetary deficits or overcome its intractable financial woes in general. It could not cope with the city's unemployment problem. Its expansionist concept and style of civic government was progressively changed and constrained by provincial statute and the harsh realities of the economic slump and the decline in the rate of population growth. It couldn't remedy the housing shortage or the over-crowding in the central area. But these were lesser adversities when compared with those of the Great Depression which began with the collapse of the stock market on October 29, 1929.

By November 1930, Calgary had a list of 1,600 single men who had applied for relief. In addition there were 1,200 applications for employment. By September 1931, there were 2,900 single individuals and 1,300 families on relief. In February 1932, there were 3,200 families on relief and the city was feeding and sheltering 2,600 single men. The Board of Trade in its annual report for 1934 estimated that 10,000 people, or about twelve percent of Calgary's population, was living on the relief provided by the City of Calgary.<sup>92</sup> Some measure of the difference in the severity between the depression of the 1920's and that of the 1930's can be seen in the difference between their respective costs of relief. In 1923 the City of Calgary spent \$48,314 on relief.<sup>93</sup> In 1933 the city spent \$585,325 on relief. Other expenditures on social welfare were \$267,830 in 1929 and \$818,715 in 1933.<sup>94</sup> The city's tax revenues fell by \$276,376 during that four-year period due to the drop in assessment values. Between 1930 and 1935 the cost of relief to the city totalled \$2.4 million. The railways which had always been a major employer in Calgary and a symbol of the city's

solid economic success were struck a blow by the depression. In 1929 the railway companies were the direct employers of about 15 percent of Calgary's labour force. The wages paid to those employees brought something like \$6.5 million into the city's internal economy. In 1931 the economic stagnation forced the CPR to close down its Ogden shops and lay off 800 men.<sup>95</sup>

With the increase in unemployment as the depression deepened, the housing problem became more acute and more visible. Large numbers of jobless were coming into Calgary from outside points looking for work and for accommodation. It got to the point where the city was issuing \$2.00 permits for the erection and occupancy of tents as housing accommodation. The widespread misery and degradation led to demonstrations and several outbursts of violence. Racial discrimination, particularly against the Chinese, was prevalent. Andrew Davison, Labour alderman since 1921, was elected mayor in 1929 and led the fight for the city's right to initiate its own public works relief projects as well as for the province and the federal government to assume the cost of relief. Davison's strong leadership as champion of the city's interests may have served as something of an inspiration to Calgarians. The deteriorating living conditions for increasing numbers of them may also have stimulated them to political action. In any case, in the election of 1933 Labour for the first time actually out-polled the CGA and was the dominant presence on the council.

Although Labour had gained the majority on Calgary's council, a powerful new force was being generated which did not differentiate between labour and capital. The gospel as it was preached by William Aberhart from his radio pulpit in his Prophetic Bible Institute in Calgary was evoking a massive response throughout Alberta. His message, initially, was apolitical and asocial. It was a Christian evangelical message which did not recognize the class structure of society as a source of evil or the class struggle as a striving after social justice. Such concepts lay outside the realm of Aberhart's fundamentalist tenets and had no place in the political ideology of the Social

Credit Party which he founded. Good and evil had no meaning other than that given to them in the Bible and the only path to salvation for everyone, both rich and poor - station in life was irrelevant - was in the footsteps of Christ.

Aberhart's rhetoric found its warmest response in rural Alberta where there was a widespread following of religious fundamentalism. But Aberhart lived and preached in Calgary and initially his fundamentalist gospel also found acceptance among Calgary's labourers as a purely religious credo. When the provincial government of the United Farmers of Alberta failed to fulfill the expectations of improvement in the depression-mired living conditions of Albertans the Social Credit Party was founded. It quickly swept the rural population into its political fold. In the urban centres its success was less dramatically rapid. But if somewhat slower it was nevertheless ultimately equally complete. The labour movement in Calgary was not as sophisticatedly self-conscious or committed to the socialist ideology as was, for example, the labour movement in Winnipeg. Calgary was not as industrialized as Winnipeg; its labour force was much smaller; its leaders were not as dynamic and persuasive and had not grown up and been educated in the socialist labour movement in England as had Winnipeg's.

Gradually labour in Calgary was won over to the Social Credit political party which became the government of Alberta in 1935.

Oddly enough it was the businessmen who, in the beginning, were most resistant to the Social Credit political platform. Actually it was the economic theory of Social Credit which initially aroused their hostility. The quirky concept of "social credit" and the condemnation of the banking system represented, in the eyes of the businessmen, a threat to investment capital on which the life of the business community rested. They regarded the Social Credit Party phenomenon with anxiety and hoped for its early demise. Typical of their attitude was the comment of Thomas Underwood, English emigre but long-time resident of Calgary, former mayor (1902-1903), supporter of the

Chinese community, entrepreneur and capitalist and staunch, inveterate Conservative, who observed in 1938:

We have an extraordinary government and we will have to put up with it for another two years anyway, and what will be the end of it is hard to say.<sup>96</sup>

After a few futile attempts to legislate some of its more extreme ideological principles, which were found to be ultra-vires and were thrown out by the courts, the Social Credit government settled in to a more orthodox regime with a fundamentally conservative approach to both policy and administration and a fundamentalist evangelical tone to its political oratory. They remained in power for 36-years, from 1935 to 1971. In 1971 the Social Credit government was defeated by the Conservatives. The change however was more a change of face of the government rather than a change in the direction it faced. There was little difference in the outlook of the two parties. Both were firmly planted on the conservative wing of the political spectrum and both faced unwaveringly to the right.

Calgary was the centre of the south-west region of the province. When the first economic experiments of the Social Credit government were abandoned and a more conventional course was adopted, the businessmen of the city and indeed of the province saw that rather than representing a threat to business interests the Social Credit government was an ally. Calgary soon became the hub of the Social Credit movement.

During the decade of the 1930's Calgary was a small city. In 1931 its population was only 83,761.97 Its labour force, as indicated in Table 15 was only 35,405. Ten years later in 1941 the city's population was 88,90498 although there were an additional 5,906 residents in adjoining settlements in Calgary's metropolitan ambience. It can be seen from Table 15 that the largest numbers of Calgary's workers were employed in the Trade and Services categories - 6,784 and 8,594 respectively - for a combined total of 15,378 or 43.4 percent of the city's labour force. These were not the

industrial workers. The industrial workers were to be found in the Manufacturing, Construction and Transportation categories, with 5,768, 3,194 and 3,219 workers respectively. Their combined total was 12,181 or 34.4 percent of the total labour force. If one accepts the common rule-of-thumb that only about 20 percent of the total labour force is unionized, and if that ratio obtained in Calgary in 1931, then the number of union members in the city's labour force of 35,405 would have been about 7,000. It is interesting to compare these figures with Winnipeg's. In 1931 Winnipeg's labour force numbered 96,845. If 20 percent of this number were unionized, Winnipeg's labour force would have contained close to 20,000 union members. The contrast with Calgary is instructive. The figures throw some light on the relatively subdued role of labour in Calgary at this time.

With a small industrial labour force and with only a small proportion of that unionized; with a dominant rural ethos whose values were compounded of fundamentalist religion and the fancied attractions of life on the open cattle range; with the charismatic personality and organizational gifts of "Bible Bill" Aberhart; with a business community which happily melded the pervasive rural ethos with their own specialized interest in fostering the growth of the city and the expansion of the urban economy; with city councils dominated by the business community but compelled to pursue policies of severe frugality and retrenchment ever since the economic recession of 1913; with a civic administration led by men with long-term service, respected reputations and a conservative, bureaucratic view of civic government which accorded closely with that of the political leadership; with no strong artistic community or cultural forces to counterbalance or mitigate these powerful influences; by the time World War II broke out Calgary's communal mind and outlook was already firmly set in the conservative, right-wing mold.

#### 10. Four Decades of Not-Quite-Planning Events

During the 40 years from the time that Calgary was incorporated as a city to the end of World War II the city planning function in Calgary was rudimentary. Perhaps the term "city planning" cannot even properly be applied to it. There was no systematic process of codifying and carrying out policies for the future development of the city. There was only a number of *ad hoc* expediential measures, quite unrelated to one another, which addressed various issues as they arose sporadically throughout the period. What may be regarded as the salient "planning" events of that time will vary with the personal perceptions of whoever is making the selection. Accordingly the following list is not presented as definitive, but rather is offered as an illustration of the random nature of the events which had some "planning" connotation but which occurred outside of the context of a formally organized and established planning function, before that function was officially recognized as an integral part of the process of civic government. Those salient events, set out in chronological order are:

- · Calgary's first building by-law, 1907
- Calgary's purchase of the Manchester industrial site, 1911
- The Ogden agreement with the CPR, 1911
- · Calgary's first Town Planning Commission, 1911
- The Alberta Town Planning Act, 1913
- Calgary's hiring of Thomas Mawson, 1913
- Calgary's designation of an "inner area" and an "outer area" of the city, 1920
- The Alberta Town Planning Act, 1929
- · Calgary's second Town Planning Commission, 1929
- Appointment of the Town Planning Commission's first technical staff person, 1929
- Calgary's first zoning by-law, 1934
- The Alberta Town Planning Act, 1942

Of these several events the most noteworthy are the purchase of the Manchester industrial site, the Ogden agreement, and the council's division of the city into an "inner area and an "outer area." These are the most noteworthy from the perspective of this study because they come closest to being "planning" measures, that is, systematic measures for the long-range development of the city. In broad general terms, the

planning function comprises the setting of goals and the systematic formulation and implementation of policies and programs to achieve those goals. Policies and programs directed towards those ends and sustained over time - preferably a designated time - are in effect performing the planning function. The fact that policies and programs are directed towards only a single, limited goal makes the planning less than comprehensive but does not deny the "planning" nature of the function. The overriding goal of the Calgary council was the expansion of the city's economy. It was, to be sure, only a single, limited goal, but it was a clearly conceived and articulated goal, and the three measures indicated were directed towards its achievement. To that extent they comprised a planning function. The fact that the city's goal of business expansion had no specific size target and no designated time horizon was not so much an indication that Calgary's planning function was still at a rudimentary level - which it was - but rather a confirmation of the fact that a municipality is powerless to carry out a precisely designed and controlled economic or industrial development plan. It can only set general goals and provide favourable local conditions. Beyond that the progress and ultimate fate of the plan is determined by external forces outside of the control of the municipal authority. Calgary's pursuit of new industries and new business investments was frequently interrupted and frustrated by recessions of the economy but whenever conditions permitted the pursuit and promotional campaign was resumed and the city's measures governing industrial land development were applied.

The Manchester site was purchased specifically for the purpose of implementing the council's industrial development policy. The same is true of the city's Ogden agreement with the CPR. The division of the city into an "inner area" and an "outer area" was perhaps not as directly in pursuit of the industrial development goal as were the other two measures. It was occasioned by the city's desperate financial circumstances and the need to curtail its expenditures on capital works. It was, nevertheless, a far-reaching and effective development control measure and was sustained for a number of

years. And although adopted for reasons of capital programs retrenchment it contributed towards the city's long-term economic goal insofar as it discouraged industries from sprawling hap-hazardly outside of the designated inner area and it strengthened the central business district as the commercial hub of the city. The city's general goal of economic expansion and the three measures for its implementation constituted the closest approach to a planning function which Calgary achieved during the four decades from 1905 to 1945. But it was not recognized as a planning function, nor was the "planning" designation applied to it nor did the "planning" notion play any part in it. It was simply a business-expansion objective adopted by a businessmen council which employed business measures to pursue that objective.

As for the other salient points in the foregoing list, the most relevant to the city's planning function were the establishment of the second Town Planning Commission and the appointment of the Commission's technical staff person, J.A. Doughty-Davies, in 1929. The significance of these events was that they were the first steps in the evolution of a formal statutory planning structure in Calgary. It would be another 21-years - not until 1950 - before a City Planning Department was established as an integral part of the city's administration. But the Town Planning Commission of 1929 together with its technical staff person marked the first occasion when a formal measure was adopted by the Calgary council which recognized that city planning might have something to contribute to the process of city government. It was a tenuous first step which was virtually obliterated by the crush of the depression but it was the herald of an emerging new dimension of civic governance. The establishment of the Town Planning Commission and its staff person were consequent upon the Town Planning Act of 1929 and accordingly that statute must be considered as also relevant to the evolution of Calgary's city planning function.

It may be argued that all provincial planning statutes are relevant to the local government planning function. But the fact is that although the Alberta <u>Town Planning</u>

Act of 1929 brought statutory planning a step closer in Calgary, the <u>Town Planning Act</u> of 1913, the province's first planning Act, had no such effect. It did virtually nothing to induce the planning function in Calgary. The most that can be said for it is that it introduced the term "Town Planning" into the legislative vocabulary of the province and sketched the statutory rudiments of the planning concept.

There was not even any direct connection between the <u>Town Planning Act</u> of 1913 and the appointment of Thomas Mawson in 1913 to prepare a development plan for Calgary. Mawson was appointed on January 8, 1913; the Planning Act was passed on March 25, 1913, more than two months after Mawson's appointment. Other than indicating that the notion of "planning" was not an unfamiliar one in government circles there is nothing in these two events to suggest any linkage between them. And Mawson's plan was equally marginal in the historical evolution of Calgary's planning function.

Some claims have been made that there are echoes of a few of his ideas in the 1963 Calgary General Plan. Be that as it may, Mawson's plan was not adopted by the council and neither he nor his plan had any direct connection with the establishment of the city planning function in Calgary.

Much the same can be said about Calgary's first Town Planning Commission, appointed in 1911. It had nothing to do with any provincial planning statute and no role in the ultimate emergence of Calgary's city planning function. The frantic real estate and construction boom was giving some members of the council second thoughts about the wisdom of unregulated development. The council appointed a Town Planning Commission to find some answers. They found Thomas Hayton Mawson. He produced his plan and the Town Planning Commission resigned *en masse* in 1914 having fulfilled its mandate. There was no other planning body in Calgary until the second Town Planning Commission was appointed in 1929. The only connection between the two Town Planning Commission to the

basis of the council's general powers. The 1929 commission was appointed pursuant to the provisions of the <u>Planning Act</u>.

The city's first building by-law, adopted in 1907, can hardly be considered as a planning instrument. Its main concern was with fire regulations rather than with structural safety or building amenity and it had only limited application. The city's first zoning by-law adopted in 1934 was equally questionable as a planning instrument. It was extremely rudimentary in its regulations and was also limited in its application. Moreover, the city had no development plan setting out the council's policies for the city's growth, and a zoning by-law without the context of a development plan is a very primitive planning instrument indeed. Both of these by-laws, however, merit recognition because they introduced the concept of by-law regulation into the development process in the city, a concept which ultimately was refined into the operative principle of the city's planning function.

The 1942 Planning Act is included in the list because it replaced the 1929 Act and all the amendments to it which had been made during the 1930s. As such, in terms of the province's statutory presence, it marks the end of the 40-year era we have been discussing and stands at the threshold of the new era which is about to burst upon the Province of Alberta and the City of Calgary with the discovery of oil at Leduc.

What may be concluded from the foregoing discussion is that during the period 1905-1945 the notion of planning was extant but had not yet crystallized into a clear set of methodological principles. Some principles had been embodied in provincial legislation but the idea of planning as an integral part of the process of city government had still not occurred to the Calgary council. The various "planning" episode which punctuated the period and are discussed above testify to the fact that the planning idea was floating around freely in the political atmosphere, had alighted momentarily, now here, now there, and then had floated off again and had not yet settled into a permanent place in the conduct of city government. Planning was seen as an esoteric expertise

brought in to deal with a particular problem on a one-time basis, much as a royal commission of investigation might be called upon by a government. The town planning commission of 1911 and Thomas Mawson were appointments of this type. There was, in truth, no proper city planning function during this period in Calgary. The city had no general development plan, development control was arbitrary and rudimentary, council's policies were fragmentary, unco-ordinated, *ad hoc* and expediential. The <u>Town Planning Act</u> of 1929 and the consequent Calgary Town Planning Commission marked the tentative beginning of the formally structured city planning function in Calgary but it would not be until 1950, twenty-one years later, that the next significant step in the evolution of the city's planning function would be taken with the establishment of Calgary's first City Planning Department, Technical Planning Board and Planning Advisory Commission.

# PHASE 3: OIL, THE PLANNING FUNCTION AND OILTOWN'S DOWNTOWN

# Calgary - Capital of Canadas Oil Industry

With the end of the war in 1945 Calgary began to return to normal peace-time conditions. Demobilization of the armed forces brought ex-service men and women back home. The city's population in 1941 - two years into the war - was 88,904; in 1946, one year after the end of the war, it was 100,044 - an increase of 11,140 or 12.5 percent over the half-decade. In 1951 the population had grown to 129,060 - an increase of 29,016 or 29 percent. Part of this substantial increase between 1946 and 1951 was of course due to the re-absorption of returning services personnel and the normal settling-in of the population in the war's immediate aftermath. But the city's economy had not yet had time to adapt to peace-time conditions in the first couple of years after the war and employment was not easy to find. People were not coming to Calgary during 1945-1947 because work was readily available. The increase in the city's population over the half-decade to 1951 was accordingly only partly due to the

re-establishment of the normal pattern of life which had been interrupted by the war, and that was only a lesser part of it. The larger part of the increase was due to the influx of new population after 1947, drawn to Calgary by the discovery of oil and the lure of employment. And that was only the beginning.

On February 14, 1947, Imperial Oil's Leduc No. 1 "blew in." It was the most momentous event in the history of Alberta in terms of its far-reaching and enduring consequences. It had a profound impact on the provincial economy, the nature and direction of its future history, the communal mind and outlook of its people. And its effect on Calgary was epochal. It moved the city into a new era. Over the next two decades Calgary underwent monumental changes. Its internal economy was restructured, its appearance transfigured, its ethos re-made, its identity altered. In the words of historian Max Foran:

The new Calgary bore little resemblance physically to the city of the 1940s. Towering skyscrapers, sprawling subdivisions and regional shopping centres indicated both growth and affluence. Yet the most significant change between 1945 and 1965 was not in the city's appearance or in the nature of its labour force. The critical difference was that the new Calgary no longer reflected the productivity and mentality of its hinterland. It now stood separate, and in this sense had achieved a new urban status.<sup>99</sup>

The discovery of oil was not a new experience for Alberta and certainly not for Calgary. Oil had been found at Turner Valley in the Sheep Creek area less than 30-miles south-south-west of the city. The strike was made by the Calgary Petroleum Products Company's Discovery Well on May 14, 1914. It set off a wild frenzy of speculation. By October 1914 over 500 oil companies had been incorporated with a total capitalization of \$83 million. The directors of Calgary Petroleum Products were Calgary residents, and local real estate men and investors were its backers. But the man in the street was not to be left out of this bonanza. Within days of the May 14 strike almost half a million dollars had been withdrawn from local deposit accounts to be invested in speculative oil

ventures. The fever, however, did not last. The productivity of the field was meagre. New wells which blew in soon petered out. Many wells which were sunk were dry. A lot of money was lost. By 1920 exploration was virtually at a standstill. In 1924 the discovery of a deposit of oil and gas set off another flurry of speculative excitement reminiscent of that of 1914. But although this field produced some oil its main product was gas and salt water and new investment capital gradually lost interest. Again there was little expectation and limited activity. What there was was sustained by the local owners and investors who had survived. Then in 1934, Robert A. Brown, Sr., the Superintendent of Calgary's street railway system and an inveterate follower of the oil play decided to yield to his inner urging. He was convinced that there was abundant oil in the western reaches of Turner Valley. He was not a geologist and no geologist would agree with what Brown felt intuitively, and consequently no company would accept his theories or act on his proposals. In frustration he formed his own company, Turner Valley Royalties, with financial backing from Jack Moyer, a lawyer, and George Bell, a publisher. In June 1936, Turner Valley Royalties No. 1 well "blew in" with the first real gusher of significant volume. In 1937 the total volume of production from Turner Valley reached two million barrels. And yet, by 1945, Turner Valley was again a declining field.

Then came the Leduc-Woodbend find in 1947. Leduc was not near Calgary; it was near Edmonton. So were the later discoveries of Redwater and Pembina. The Swan Hills field was not near either Edmonton or Calgary: it was some 125-miles north-west of Edmonton and about 250-miles north-west of Calgary. But the Turner Valley experience had left a legacy which was invaluable to Calgary. By the time Leduc was discovered Calgary was already established as the oil centre of Alberta. Beginning in 1914 the city was associated with oil. Local companies had led the explorations and discoveries and local entrepreneurs and investors had financed them, but the linkage between Calgary and oil had also come to the attention of interests abroad and the city's

reputation in this respect was known. Expertise had been acquired locally not only in the financial aspects of the oil industry but also in its field techniques and its production know-how. And the rise and fall of the oil field fortunes was as one with the other boom-and-bust progressions in Calgary's history. The frenetic build-up of get-rich-quick expectations and speculative investments ending in the collapse of the house of cards was a familiar experience to Calgarians. They were inured to the vagaries of the market place, both its euphoric promises and its traumatic failures. They were, then, well prepared for the prospect of entrepreneurship on an unprecedented scale presented by the vast oil resources of the Leduc-Woodbend field. No place could match or even challenge Calgary's position and the city quickly became the centre of Alberta's oil industry. Edmonton, because it was closer to the field, could more economically provide the equipment and servicing of the rigs and the supplies for the crews, but Calgary was the headquarters for the company head-offices, the operational strategies, the financing, the international communications, the multi-national corporations - the money, the brains and the corporate power of Alberta's - indeed Canada's - oil industry.

## 2. <u>Emergence of a Statutory City Planning Function</u>

There seems to have been some connection between the discovery of a major oil field at Leduc in 1947 and a major revision of Alberta's <u>Town Planning Act</u> in 1950, but that connection was not through Calgary; it was through Edmonton. Like Calgary, Edmonton too had started to grow rapidly after the war ended. In fact Edmonton's growth between 1946 and 1951 was much greater than Calgary's in terms of both actual numbers and as a percentage of its 1941 size. Edmonton gained nearly 60,000 people in that five year period, increasing from 113,116 in 1946 to 173,075 in 1951, an increase of 53 percent. O Calgary in the same period gained only 39,000 people, an increase of 39 percent. As with Calgary, a significant part of Edmonton's growth was generated by the employment opportunities created by the oil find at Leduc. The Leduc oil field was virtually on Edmonton's doorstep, barely ten miles to the south of the city.

Some Edmontonians were concerned that the proximity of the field and the activities which it would stimulate, together with the expansion of the city's population would create problems for the orderly development of Edmonton and feared that the existing Town Planning Act was obsolete and totally inadequate to deal with these problems.

In particular, the Edmonton Local Council of Women raised the issue and petitioned the city council to do something to make planning in Edmonton more effective and specifically to create a town planning department. The council appointed two consultants to look into the city's problems. On receipt of their report the council found that their recommendations were cogent and submitted them to the provincial government in support of their request for amendments to the <u>Town Planning Act</u> which would permit Edmonton to improve its planning.<sup>101</sup> The government went beyond the Edmonton council's recommendations and reviewed the entire Act. The end result was an entirely new Act - the <u>Town and Rural Planning Act</u> of 1950.

The resurgence of normal civilian life after the war presented the provincial government with a wide range of municipal government problems which required attention. New provincial statutes were enacted, such as for example, the County Act, intended to bring greater efficiency into rural government, and the City Act, aimed at establishing uniformity in city charters. The idea of planning, amorphous in the pre-war period, was beginning to take more definite shape. If the Edmonton Local Council of Women and the Edmonton City Council were concerned about the impact of the post-war turmoil on their city, the provincial government was also aware of the potential for disorder in the burgeoning new growth and not only for Edmonton but for the entire province. The most innovative aspect of the new Town and Rural Planning Act of 1950 was its recognition of the need for a formal administrative structure for conducting the planning process. Three salient features of the Act addressed this need. It provided for the appointment of a Technical Planning Board, the establishment of a District Planning Commission and the adoption of Interim Development Control. 103

Calgary had had a town planning commission since 1929, but its role was purely advisory. Its original mandate included the preparation of a general development plan for the city but in the exigencies of the depression and the war that goal faded and disappeared from the commission's agenda. It also had a planning staff which had been expanded to three members from the original single member in the person of J.A. Doughty-Davies. In 1950, however, the long-dormant idea of a general development plan was revived. The Town Planning Commission's budget was expanded and a City Planning Department was created in June, with a staff of eight headed by A.G. Martin as Director. The new Department's primary responsibility under the Commission was the preparation of a general plan of development for Calgary. Eric W. Thrift, the chief planner of the Metropolitan Planning Commission of Greater Winnipeg was engaged as a consultant.<sup>104</sup> During that year the Planning Department prepared and submitted to the council a report on the implications for planning contained in the 1950 Act. The council received the report favourably and in 1951 extensive changes were made in the administrative structure of the city's planning function.

A Technical Planning Board was established in August, 1951, which took over from the Town Planning Commission the responsibility for the preparation of the city's general development plan. 105 As part of that function it dealt with zoning applications. The preparation of the general development plan for Calgary would be a lengthy process. The existing zoning by-law was obsolete, many of its provisions even being contradictory to some of the principles contemplated for embodiment in the plan. During this period in which the plan was being prepared a more appropriate means of development control than the existing zoning by-law was necessary in order to ensure that the emerging plan would not be jeopardized by unsuitable development. To meet this need the instrument of Interim Development Control was available under the 1950 Act and in 1951 the City Planning Department began to prepare a draft by-law to establish such a measure. The Minister issued an Interim Development Order which would enable

the city to abandon its existing zoning by-law and to impose interim development control immediately upon council's adoption of the interim development control by-law later that year. 106

The Technical Planning Board was made up of the mayor and the senior officials of the city administration. This new planning body, it was felt, would ensure greater coordination of all of the technical and administrative factors involved in the planning of the city. The Town Planning Commission was not disbanded. It remained, but its name was changed to the Advisory Planning Commission. It retained its role of advising the council on general planning matters and was given the additional role of a zoning appeals body to hear appeals from the zoning decisions of the Technical Planning Board. In carrying out its planning advisory function the Advisory Planning Commission could consult with the public on the planning matters which came before it and could appoint ad hoc committees to assist it in its deliberations. In 1951 two such Citizen Advisory Committees were appointed - the Advisory Committee on Zoning and the Advisory Committee on Major Thorofares. 107 Procedures called for the review by the Advisory Planning Commission of all proposals arising from these citizen committees before their submission to the Technical Planning Board. The Technical Planning Board was thus cognizant of public opinion and could take note of it in preparing the city's general development plan. With this structure in place the framework for a true city planning function was formally established in Calgary.

Just as there had been a Calgary Town Planning Commission before the <u>Town and Rural Planning Act</u> of 1950, so had there been a Calgary District and Regional Commission before 1950 which had involved the municipalities around Calgary. And just as the Calgary Town Planning Commission had turned out to be merely advisory and minimally effective, so had the District and Regional Commission been largely merely a token authority with no power to plan or to enforce planning measures. Late in 1950 a joint meeting was held between the Calgary District and Regional Commission and the

Calgary Town Planning Commission to discuss the establishment of a Calgary District Planning Commission with a new mandate pursuant to the 1950 Act. The proposal was endorsed by all of the municipal representatives present at the meeting and each of the councils sent a resolution to the provincial government asking that such a commission be established. The order-in-council establishing the Calgary District Planning Commission was issued on July 31, 1951.<sup>108</sup>

The members of the Calgary District Planning Commission were:

The Province of Alberta
The City of Calgary
The Municipal District of Conrich #44
The Municipal District of Springbank #45
Local Improvement District #46
The Village of Bowness
The Village of Forest Lawn

The problems which brought these local authorities together and led them to ask for a planning commission were the problems which arise inevitably out of rapid urbanization: fringe area proliferation, sprawl, ribbon development along the highways radiating out of the central city and a host of others. Calgary was expanding rapidly and was the source of the problems in its immediate hinterland. To deal with these problems the commission launched into the preparation of a general development plan for the entire district under its jurisdiction, with immediate emphasis on the areas closest to Calgary. Since whatever happened in Calgary had an impact on the surrounding area and developments in the district affected Calgary, it made sense for the work of the two planning bodies to be correlated. Accordingly, the city planning staff and the district planning staff were located in Calgary's city hall and placed under the direction of Calgary's Director of Planning. Eric Thrift was appointed as a consultant in the preparation of the district plan. Although the planning staffs were under a single director, they were nevertheless distinctly separate bodies, and the District Planning Commission's staff was available to individual member municipalities for assistance in

dealing with their local individual problems. In 1961 the name of the Calgary District Planning Commission was changed to the Calgary Regional Planning Commission.

By 1954 the process of urbanization in both Calgary and Edmonton had advanced so far and so rapidly and the attendant impacts on their outlying suburban municipalities had so complicated central city/fringe area relationships that the provincial government appointed a royal commission, known as the McNally Commission, to study and report on the metropolitan problems of the two cities. Calgary's Planning Director prepared the brief to this commission, which advocated that Calgary annex the surrounding areas. 109 The brief argued that artificial municipal boundaries should not remain a hinderance to the orderly development of metropolitan areas and the welfare of the people living in such areas. It recommended that all surrounding areas be amalgamated with Calgary. The principal proposals of the brief were:

- 1. The projection of population as a basis for amalgamation, residential densities, and land requirements and integration;
- 2. The distribution of the main areas of expansion based on functional requirements rather than political boundaries, to achieve balanced growth in accordance with the General Plan outline:
- 3. The progressive expansion of sewer and water systems.

In 1957 the McNally Report on Metropolitan Development in Alberta was published. It recommended that Calgary's annexation and amalgamation proposals be endorsed for all Alberta's metropolitan areas. Calgary's brief to the McNally Commission has, in effect, served as the basis for residential planning since that time.

Meanwhile the City Planning Department had been proceeding with its background studies for the city's general development plan and in September, 1956, it published its first progress report. In 1961 (Fig. 35.) the work of putting together the various components of the plan was begun, studies on downtown renewal were

undertaken pursuant to the urban renewal provisions under Part V of the federal government's National Housing Act, and a planning progress report was submitted to the Planning Advisory Commission in October. The draft general plan was completed in June 1963, and in August 1963, the city council adopted by by-law the first General Plan for the City of Calgary.

# 3. <u>Demographic and Work-Force Changes and a Strengthened American Presence</u>

As already indicated, Calgary's population ballooned during the 20 years following World War II and the greater part of that expansion was due to the discovery of oil at Leduc. In 1946 Calgarians numbered 100,044; in 1966 there were 330,575 of them - an increase of 230,531, or more than 230 percent, over the two decades. But there were other aspects of the city's population besides its astonishingly rapid increase which are of interest. One of these was its demographics. As might be expected, the largest part of the city's population increase was due to immigration. In the eleven years between 1948 and 1959, almost 70 percent of the increase was due to newcomers; during the decade 1951-1961 an average of 8,000 people per year came to live in Calgary and only a negligible number of these came into the city as residents of the adjacent areas which were annexed by Calgary in 1951 and 1965.

Most of these new arrivals came from other Canadian provinces, with

Saskatchewan and Manitoba contributing the largest numbers. Close to 80 percent of

Calgarians were Canadian by birth and almost half of those were Alberta-born. A

substantial number of the Alberta-born came to Calgary in the rural-urban shift of

population in southern Alberta. Some new arrivals continued to come from Britain and
the United States, but immigration from Europe had dwindled significantly by the

1960s. Anglo-Saxons were the predominant ethnic group in the city, comprising nearly

59 percent of the population in 1961. The next largest group were the Germans,

followed by much smaller number of Scandinavians, Dutch, Ukrainians, Poles and Italians. 110

The second interesting feature of Calgary's population was the structure of its work force. The Trade and Services categories continued to employ the largest number of workers and accordingly the managerial and professional classes tended to form a higher proportion of the working population in Calgary than they did in other centres where unskilled and industrial workers were more numerous. Women were becoming a larger component of the labour force. In 1961 Calgary's labour force totalled 99,349, of which 30,021 or 43.3 percent were women. In particular women were employed in largest numbers in the Trade, Services and Finance sectors of the labour force. The total number of females in these three categories in 1961 was 22,075 out of the total female work force of 30,021.111 By 1965 Calgary's labour force was predominantly whitecollar, enjoyed the highest average annual income of any centre in Alberta and one of the highest in Canada; and had a fairly high ratio of female to male employees. These qualities of Calgary's labour force were not conducive to labour militancy or to a socialdemocratic political ideology. They help in some measure to understand the sociopolitical conservatism, capitalist-system-orientation, business-ethos-disposition of Calgary generally.

The third notable feature of Calgary's population during the period 1945-1965 was the consolidation of the American presence. Calgary had had a close relationship with Americans from its very beginnings. First the movement of supplies and trade up from Fort Benton in Montana and then the movement of cattle herds across the international boundary and the contact between the cattle men had forged strong ties between Calgarians and the Americans. Then the discovery of oil and gas in large quantities at Leduc brought a flood-tide of Americans into the city. American oil companies poured personnel and equipment and money into Alberta and Calgary was the principal recipient of this inundation. By 1965 over 30,000 Americans lived in

Calgary. Most of them were in the higher-income brackets and were prominent in the city's economic and social life. They exerted a potent but subtle influence on the mores and values of Calgarians and their communal mind and outlook. Calgary has more in common with Houston or Dallas than it has with Regina or Winnipeg. It probably is the most "Americanized" of all the cities in Canada. This too helps to explain the strong socio-political conservatism of the city and its commitment to the ethos of the private enterprise, free market ideology. According to historian Foran:

Calgarians of the 1950-65 era seemed more apathetic than ever towards politics and civic issues in particular. Labour became a token force in city council in the 1950s. Elected commissioners disappeared in 1952 with little public reaction, even though ratepayers in the past had consistently voted against the concept of government by appointment. There was no public pressure and little rationale behind council's decision to return to the ward system in 1960. Election statistics for all levels of government indicated that for an increasing number of Calgarians the option of the franchise was irrelevant. Voting patterns at both the provincial and civic levels appeared habitual and reflected the enduring appeal of individuals identified with social conservatism. Calgary's general voting patterns remained complementary to those of rural Alberta, and no typically urban differential had emerged by 1965. 112

At the provincial level, Social Credit was consistently returned to power as Alberta's government. When Aberhart died in 1943, he was succeeded by Ernest Manning. Manning reigned as the leader of the Social Credit Party and Premier of Alberta until 1968 when he resigned and was succeeded by Harry Strom. By this time Alberta's socio-economic dynamics were changing rapidly under the powerful forces of oil-generated wealth, explosive population growth and urbanization and in the provincial election of 1971 the Social Credit Party, which had formed the government of Alberta for 36 years, since 1935, was defeated by the Conservatives under Peter Lougheed.

On the local scene, the years between 1949 and 1965 also saw the election of mayors and councils who were euphoric over Calgary's growth and who epitomized Calgary's business-oriented, apolitical, socially conservative communal mind and outlook. In particular, the mayors of this period reflected Calgary's preference for personal charisma in its leaders rather than depth of understanding of social and political issues. During this period, too, the imagery of Calgary's western frontier cowboy mythology became more deeply branded into the city's personality. Calgary had three mayors between 1949 and 1965. Donald H. MacKay was the mayor from 1949 to 1959; Harry W. Hays held the office from 1959 to 1963; and J.W. Grant MacEwan was mayor from 1963 to 1965. MacKay was in the customary tradition of Calgary's flamboyant boosterism. It was he who established the white Stetson hat as Calgary's symbol, wearing it himself and raising it to the status of an official emblem by presenting it as a gift or a token of honour on every possible public occasion. Harry Hays, a cattleman, was equally effusive and florid. He personally presided over the annual "Hay's Breakfast" held on his sprawling ranch just outside of High River during the Stampede, when, in addition to the traditional flapjacks, he dispensed a popular drink of his own secret concocting. MacEwan was more reflective and restrained than his predecessors but he distinguished himself and contributed to Calgary's western frontier image by writing voluminously about frontier life and in particular about Calgary's frontier and general historical heritage. 113

#### 4. The City Expands, the Private Developer Appears

The growth of Calgary's metropolitan population was not confined within the corporate limits of the City of Calgary. Some of it occurred in the outlying suburbs although that was only a small amount. In 1951 the population living on the fringes of the city but outside its boundaries was 12, 158; by 1961 it had grown to 29,421. Consistent with its own principles and with the recommendations of the McNally Commission, Calgary annexed these fringe communities. The city had carried out

annexations before the population explosion and before the McNally Commission, going back as far as 1883 and 1884 and again in 1907, 1910 and 1911. But in the post-World War II period it annexed territories on a massive scale. In 1951 it annexed the small community of Windsor Park, but between that time and 1964 it carried out a series of annexations which brought the small outlying population into the city but increased the city's corporate area from about 40 square miles to almost 156 square miles. (Fig. 34.) This enormous expansion of the city's area was consistent with the city's growth in population, the demand for housing to accommodate the new population and the need for land on which to build that housing. But it had still another dimension. It was an aspect of a new era in the development of the city. By the beginning of the 1960s the City of Calgary's supply of publicly-owned land available for development had been virtually exhausted. The new lands brought into the city by annexation were mostly privately owned and the continuing demand for housing ensured that the land would be developed - but in the new circumstances of the city it also ensured that the development of that land would now be in the hands of the private developers.

The emergence of the private developer as the major presence in the land development process was part of a set of complex relationships among a number of phenomena which marked the city's entry into a new era. The overwhelming preference of Calgarians for single family dwellings made it necessary to use more and more land farther and farther away from the centre of the city to satisfy that demand and the annexed territory was able to meet that requirement. The dramatic increase in the use of the private automobile provided easy access to those remote locations without the limitations inherent in the street railway which was formerly the only means of mass intra-urban transportation. The city's new practice of extending the street system and the sewer, water and power services into the new areas on demand from the developers signalled the closer ties of interest between city hall and the development industry. The demand for suburban residences provoked intense competition among developers to

attract home-buyers to their particular developments, which produced the particularly delineated, fancifully designated residential neighbourhoods replete with whatever attractions (such as landscaping, vermiform street lay-outs, community centres, house design, household gimmickry etc.) it was felt would lure the prospective purchaser. Inevitably, as part of these self-contained neighbourhoods, there appeared the neighbourhood shopping centre, and not long afterwards, the larger shopping malls, which had a dampening effect on the central business district, particularly its retail component. The business district itself would soon become a forest of high-rise towers housing the offices of multi-national business corporations while the surrounding area of mixed uses and congested dwellings deteriorated into slums.

The city planning department was swept along on these streams of new urban phenomena and Calgary's first General Plan, in 1963, reflected the bureaucracy's changing perceptions of urban issues. Two matters now absorbed most of the planning department's attention - suburban residential development and central area redevelopment. The virtually self-contained neighbourhood unit became the conceptual model for the department's suburban residential development guidelines and the urban renewal provisions of the National Housing Act became the basis for the proposals for central area development.

The department had become aware of the irrelevance of theoretical concepts of the rational allocation of public resources in an affluent, acquisitive, private-sector-driven society. It recognized the costs of low-density, single-family development but it also recognized the failure of the zoning by-law to bring about higher residential densities and in the end it accepted the unavoidable imperatives of the market place.114

### 5. <u>Urban Renewal Attempts</u>

The City Planning Department was also much concerned about the affect which the vigorous growth of the city was having on the downtown. From the beginning the central business district was destined to be chronically short of breathing-space. When the CPR

fixed the location of its Calgary station it did so on the basis of its strategy to control the surrounding lands and to receive the maximum revenues from the sale of lots. As usual, the long-term consequences for the physical growth of the community received little or no thought in this choice of site. But the railway cannot be blamed for that omission. The long-term consequences of any action are virtually imponderable and at that time the massive urbanization of the mid-twentieth century was still in the hidden future and could not be anticipated. The merchants who clustered around the railway station and thereby started the central business district were also unable to see into the future. And even if they could have they surely would not have acted any differently. They, like the CPR, were bound to act according to the dictates of the present reality, not of a future possibility. The railway located its station with a view to maximizing the returns from the sale of railway lands; the businessmen located their businesses near the station with a view to maximizing the returns from their investments, given that the station was their source of goods, their main communications link with the outside world, and the generator of a significant part of their market.

The consequences of these decisions were that the central business district was confined between the railroad to the south and the river to the north and east. Contiguous growth was possible only to the west and even that was limited by the adjacent belt of mixed uses. As the city grew the business district could only evolve in its fairly constricted space and the density of the core increased dramatically with the construction of increasingly taller buildings, the commercial uses spread into the adjacent mixed-use area and the residential population abandoned the centre of the city. The central commercial core was becoming increasingly derelict and slummy. It was estimated in 1964 that about 40 percent of Calgary's labour force worked downtown but only three or four percent of the city's population lived there.

These were the issues which drew the attention of the city planners. One measure which it was hoped would improve the downtown situation was pursued by the council in

along the Bow River. This would have removed the railway barrier on the south side of the downtown and permitted its extension in that direction. It would also have erased the boundary between the downtown and the rest of the city and opened much freer access between them. But the CPR could not be persuaded and the city had to seek other remedies. The most promising possibilities lay in the urban renewal programs available under the National Housing Act and in December 1965, the planning department completed the draft of its Downtown Master Plan, the major feature of which was Urban Renewal Area No. 1 - a proposal for the renewal of that part of the downtown known as "Churchill Park" bounded on the north by the Bow River, on the east by 6th Street S.E., on the south by 9th Avenue S. and on the west by 1st Street S.E.

The scheme proposed that an extensive tract of the cleared area be redeveloped for housing, mainly low-rental housing, that there be an abundance of public uses including open space as well as institutional buildings and a junior college. Within the Churchill Park area, designated as Urban Renewal Area No. 1, two sub-areas were subsequently delineated and designed in greater detail. One of these areas was Urban Renewal Scheme 1A, the other was Urban Renewal Scheme 1B.

These urban renewal schemes were part of a strategy for the large-scale redevelopment of the city's downtown, the broad outlines of which had been sketched in the Downtown Master Plan prepared by the city's planning department. Among its ambitious proposals was the conversion of 8th Avenue into a pedestrian mall and the creation of a pedestrian walkway system at the +15 level. The urban renewal schemes #1, #1A and #1B all flowed from the general concept of the Downtown Master Plan and were the next more specific proposals for implementing the plan. Agreements were concluded with the federal and provincial governments to carry out the proposals for four blocks of urban renewal scheme #1B - the blocks between Centre Street, 2nd Street East, 7th Avenue and 9th Avenue.

Not long after, the federal government discontinued its urban renewal programs under the National Housing Act and Calgary's bold strategy for a sustained, long-term downtown renewal activity under the auspices of the senior governments was terminated. Nevertheless, a start had been made and although the senior governments withdrew their participation the private sector poured in its money and energy and know-how to transform the downtown. Driven by the deluge of population, head-office locations, office-tower developments, oil-generated money, the private sector took over the redevelopment of the city's central area. In general, the guidelines of the city's downtown plan were followed, and the city, for its part, readily adjusted its guidelines and policies to accommodate the requirements of the private sector. Thus, working together, the city and the private developer transformed the downtown, but the transformation was in the image of the private developer. The transformation did not occur overnight. It was not until the mid-1980's that its final lineaments took shape. It was not without bitter public controversy that the city and the developers were able to achieve their desired ends. That confrontation is discussed more specifically farther on in this chapter.

#### 6. Calgary's 1973 General Plan

Calgary's General Plan of 1963 had been formulated in the context of the preceding decade. That is to say that all long-range development plans draw upon past experience to predict the future and Calgary's plan of 1963 was based on what had happened in earlier years. During the 1960's the momentum of growth which had been building during the 1950's and had barreled on into the 1960's was such that the unforeseen problems of suburban proliferation, transportation, housing and the downtown rendered the 1963 plan obsolete almost from the day that it was adopted. A new General Plan was adopted in 1970, and was revised in 1973.

As was customary in the preparation of long-range development plans, the professional city planners on the staff of the city planning departments took the initiative in visualizing the city of the future and in formulating the policies proposed for incorporation in the plan . The members of the city councils were led by these professionals and for the most part accepted their recommendations because the professionals had the advantage of supporting technical arguments and data which the politicians didn't take the time to understand and were rarely inclined to challenge. More than that, however, the long time-horizon of these plans were too far in the distant future to be of any real interest to the politician. His time-horizon was very much shorter and his concern was for the immediate impact of any staff proposals on his constituents and his political prospects for the next election. Where the recommended policies were perceived as presenting a short-term threat to political fortunes or to the interests of a supporting constituency, the politicians rejected them. But since many long-range policy proposals were cast simply in terms of desirable goals which did not demand any immediate action, politicians were inclined to accept them as virtuous intentions without imputing to them any serious import. It was presumably this circumstance which led a former Director of Planning of the City of Calgary to assert that the city council didn't understand planning, had no firm policies or directions and didn't know where it was going.116

In the light of the foregoing comments it is of interest to note some of the concerns and recommendations contained in the Calgary General Plan of 1973. The interaction between the city and the surrounding region was seen as an important issue. The City of Calgary planning department saw the continued encroachment of urban growth into the rural areas and its undesirable consequences for both the city and the rural areas as a problem which needed serious attention. The 1973 Calgary General Plan proposed a number of principles for dealing with these matters, such as an

appropriate administrative structure, adequate financing and more effective legislation; all of these, however, were stated as generalizations rather than specific measures.<sup>117</sup>

The Residential section of the 1973 General Plan lists a number of Causes for Concern which indicate conditions in the housing field in Calgary which impede the fulfillment of the stated principles. The proposals for dealing with these housing problems are more specific and direct than those for some of the other issues identified in the 1973 Plan. The Guidelines proposed include such measures as encouraging maintenance of the housing stock, refusing development applications which do not conform with the General Plan or approved Design Briefs, enforcing residential standards, direct city involvement in land development and housing, and other similar proposals requiring heavy public interventions in terms of both programs and monies. 119

Although Calgary was experiencing a housing boom at the time the 1973 General Plan was being prepared (17.8 percent of all dwellings in the city had been built in the three years 1970-1973) the Plan nevertheless indicates that despite this furious rate of house construction, those at the lower levels of income would still be left in substandard or derelict homes and it is incumbent upon the public sector to ensure that decent housing is provided for these people too. 120

Clearly many of the Guidelines set out in this section of the Plan are aimed directly at this problem of providing adequate housing for the poor. The major emphasis in the Guidelines of the residential section of the Plan was laid upon the measures to involve the public sector in housing programs for low-income Calgarians because the private sector had no interest in such involvement. Several other Guidelines throw an interesting light on the prevailing conditions in the housing realm at this time. One of these is proposal 1(b):

refusing development applications when they do not conform with the General Plan or approved Design

Briefs and are not in the interests of the surrounding communities. 121

Implicit in this Guideline is the tacit acknowledgement that development applications were being accepted which contravened the formally established development control regulations or which offended against the interests of the surrounding neighbourhood. Calgary's Director of Planning from 1965 to 1971 has confirmed that there was frequent "spot zoning" which changed the land-use designation of a particular site without requiring an amendment of the general land-use category. 122

Still another Guideline with important implications is 2(a):

the City in association with senior governments exploring methods of reducing excessive speculation in land and property. 123

The tacit acknowledgement here is that there was excessive speculation in land and property in Calgary. Again, what is "excessive" is a matter of perception. In view of the steeply rising cost of housing and of building lots during the 1970's and in view of the hold which a small number of land development firms were fastening on the developable land in the city, the 1973 Plan's implied accusation of excessive speculation was probably justified.

The section of the 1973 Plan devoted to the Inner City is essentially an updating and expansion of the Downtown Master Plan approved by the city council in 1967. The Inner City identified in the Plan covers an area of 5334 acres. It comprises the office/retail core of the downtown (about 220 acres) together with the surrounding older residential neighbourhoods which grew up around the core during the period before the suburban explosion detonated by the discovery of the Leduc oil field. Although the city's outward expansion was dramatic a significant part of the furious building activity occurred in the inner city, particularly in the core area. Between 1966 and 1972 the value of building permits issued for the inner city, excluding the permits for single

family dwellings, exceeded \$256 million. This was more than one-third of the total value of permits in the city during that period.

As for the inner city residential neighbourhoods, the Plan's main concerns were to ensure the clear separation of these from the core area, to maintain in them an appropriate population density (which it specified) and to control the intrusion into them of apartment buildings, particularly in areas of predominantly single family dwellings. The Plan also proposed that measures be adopted whereby commercial uses encroaching upon these areas would be encouraged to serve as neighbourhood shopping facilities. The transportation system and the local parks and recreation requirements of these inner city residential neighbourhoods also received their due attention.

There are other sections of the 1973 General Plan, such as those devoted to the Commercial, Industrial, Public Service, etc. etc. aspects of the city's development, all of which are dealt with by the Plan in the same thoughtful and comprehensive manner as the sections in the foregoing discussion. It is, however, unnecessary to examine these: the sections reviewed above are typical of the disposition and approach of the rest of the content of the Plan and provide a sufficient insight into the general conditions which prevailed in Calgary, the concerns which the planners felt for the city and the way in which they proposed to deal with those conditions and concerns.

In summary, a number of aspects of the 1973 General Plan are worth highlighting. One is that it provided a revealing insight into the full range of the city's problems which were contingent upon the rapidity and scale of its population and economic growth. Another noteworthy aspect of the Plan was the degree of control of minutae implicit in the discussion and Guidelines for each category, such as, for example, the controlled limits on the densities of the residential neighbourhoods, or the rigid fixing of the core area boundary, or the co-ordination of the design of the streetscape's open space, planting and street furniture. Still another significant aspect of the Plan was its heavy emphasis on the interventionist role of the public sector which

must be viewed as an unrecognized anomaly in a plan for a city so imbued with the ethos of the private-enterprise free-market ideology and which anomaly would later be openly demonstrated.

#### 7. The Community Associations

The problems arising out of the vigorous growth of the population and the economy which were besetting Calgary were quite general throughout Alberta. The benefits bestowed upon the province by the gift of oil were not without costs. The management and control of this dynamic expansion posed serious difficulties for all municipal councils and the provincial government had sought to help them cope with these problems by providing appropriate powers and procedures in the 1970 Planning Act. Under the relentless pressure of the unabated growth the 1970 legislation required constant review and in 1974 the Department of Municipal Affairs of Alberta issued a publication entitled Towards a New Planning Act for Alberta, in which were set out the Department's proposals for a new statute and on which all agencies and institutions were invited to comment. One of the proposals in the publication was that area planning advisory committees be established throughout the province to advise and assist municipal councils in the planning and regulation of development within their areas; another was that community organizations be appointed to receive notices, participate in hearings, file appeals and bring legal proceedings insofar as these were permitted under the Act.

The Planning Department of the City of Calgary reviewed the document 124 and criticized these proposals on the grounds that they were elaborate and bureaucratic, would involve people too late in the planning process and would create, in effect, another level of bureaucracy. Instead the critique urged that the existing planning process be strengthened. What was needed, the review argued, was that the existing community association structure be recognized formally as a citizens group able to participate in the planning process. In order to be effective this organization would need full, reliable,

timely information concerning planning proposals and the opportunity to present their views at the stages in the planning process where they would be given full and fair hearings.<sup>125</sup>

In 1976 the Planning Department embarked on a review of its 1973 General Plan, and consistent with its stated views on public participation it organized an extensive program of community consultation. Calgary has an elaborate and wellorganized system of community associations. There are some 125 communities comprising the network of neighbourhoods or communities which covers the entire city. The history of community associations in Alberta goes back to the turn of the century American "social centre" movement, the first of which was established in Rochester, New York, in 1907. This concept was introduced into Alberta in 1917 by George M. Hall, Industrial Commissioner for the City of Edmonton, where the first community organization, the 142 Street District Community League was formed in March, 1917. In Calgary, the Scarboro Community was the first to form an organization and call itself a Community Association; that was in 1920. Their objective was to provide recreational facilities for the neighbourhood. From this beginning other Calgary neighbourhoods began to organize for the provision of recreational programs and beautification projects and even to become involved in some of the social problems of their areas. By 1940 about 40 communities were banded together in a loose federation to co-ordinate sports programs and to promote the community association concept. These communities began to register under the Alberta Societies Act, with by-laws and constitutions fashioned to meet the requirements of each respective neighbourhood. These associations were staffed and operated entirely by volunteers. The City of Calgary then entered into land lease arrangements with individual associations for which the volunteer members were fully responsible.

On August 10, 1961, the Federation of Calgary Communities was organized and registered as an incorporated non-profit society under the Societies Act. Each

association elects its own executive and the presidents of all the member associations of the Federation comprise the Central Council of Presidents which is the Federation's decision-making body. The Central Council of Presidents elects the Board of Directors of the Federation which carries out the business of the Federation through consultation with the Central Council of Presidents. Candidates for the Board are selected by a nominating committee as well as by nominations from the floor at an annual general meeting and are subject to acceptance by the Central Council of Presidents. There are about 90 community associations of Calgary's total of 125 association which are members of the Federation of Calgary Communities.

Many of the community associations are primarily concerned with recreation programs. Some, however, have become involved in planning issues, usually in response to some threat to the community's interests. For example, the Hillhurst-Sunnyside Community Association became heavily involved in the struggle to prevent Calgary's LRT system from passing through and destroying the integrity of their neighbourhood. The Victoria Park Community Association has been active in opposing the proposed expansion of the Calgary Stampede grounds which are adjacent to their neighbourhood. Other communities have become politically active in opposition to proposed developments which would reduce the amount of open space in their areas. There is no historical evidence to indicate a consistent geographical pattern to these activities except perhaps the general experience that inner-city communities have resisted the encroachment of commercial development "while suburban communities have rallied around environmental issues, including proximity to sour gas wells on the periphery and development which threatens green space." 126

#### 8. The Planning Department's Review of the 1973 General Plan

The planning department opened its campaign of public involvement in the planning process with the publication in March, 1976, of a report entitled <u>Calgary Plan</u>

Review Public Participation Program. This report sets out the objective of the review

as the identification of strategic growth alternatives for the city. It discusses the role of each of the three components of the review process - the administration, the politicians and the citizens but points out that in the end it is the responsibility of the city council to decide which alternative will be chosen. The report discusses the various survey techniques which are available and proposes that the review process be completed by the end of 1976. Following this initial statement of the public participation program there were three Progress Reports, each describing the progress of the program to-date. The last of these reports - <u>Public Participation Program Progress Report No. 3</u>, dated February 1977 - provides an overview of participation in the program up to January 1977.

In parallel with the Public Participation Program Reports, the planning department published a series of eight Background Papers, seven Working Papers and four Policy Discussion Papers. Out of this intensive review process emerged six alternative strategies for the future development of Calgary. In March, 1977, the city council made its choice from among the six alternatives. It was not a clean choice of a single preferred strategy. It was, rather, a hybrid, containing selected aspects of Strategies D and F(1), and was given the name of "The Balanced Growth Strategy." Essentially, this adopted strategy represented no major re-direction of existing trends and no re-orientation of council's attitudes. With a few minor gestures in the direction of new initiatives it was, on the whole, a business-as-usual strategy. Strategy D bore the rubric "Maximum Efficiency of Investment and Resources." How could such a concept fail to evoke the immediate fervent embrace of the council? It is a principle which has the compelling authority of a Biblical commandment which cannot be ignored or dismissed by any man, least of all by any politician, certainly not by a business-oriented city council.

Strategy F(1) bore the rubric "Price of Housing." Its main objective was to minimize the rate of increase in the price of housing. This, too, had an irresistible

appeal to the Calgary city councils of the 1970's. One of the contingent effects of the booming economy and burgeoning population was a skyrocketing increase in the cost of housing and a critical shortage of accommodation, particularly among middle- and lower-income earners. During this period Calgary was consistently among the top three or four cities with the highest cost of housing in Canada. Such an undesirable situation is not exclusively an economic issue; it also has a large political dimension. Even though there is little that a city council can do about it, councillors must be seen to be concerned and they must make gestures in the direction of easing the crisis. It is politically unprofitable to be seen as callous or indifferent to the problem. Accordingly it was virtually inevitable that "Strategy F(1), Price of Housing" would be part of the council's selection from among the six alternative strategies.

The chosen "Balanced Growth Strategy" carried with it a policy package of 74 policies. The policy package was divided into eight separate subjects and the 74 policies were distributed among these eight subjects and the number of policies in each were:

1.	Efficiency	-	11 policies
2.	Housing	-	19 policies
3.	Decentralization	-	4 policies
4.	Transportation	. •	12 policies
5.	Environment	•	10 policies
6.	Conservation/ Rehabilitation	-	10 policies
7.	Economy	-	5 policies
8.	Others	-	3 policies
			74 policies 128

Some of these policies were cogent and lay entirely within the powers of the council to implement without reference to other jurisdictions or constraints. A few of them lay entirely outside of the powers of the council and could only be implemented

with the approval of the senior levels of government. Most of them, however, were policies which could not be implemented unless market conditions favoured such policies and the developers chose to act in accordance with them. They were, in effect, policies which would be under the control and dictate of the economy, the market and the developer rather than of the council. It may also be noted that of the policies which lay within the council's jurisdiction, the majority only proposed to "examine," or "investigate," or "encourage;" virtually none of them committed the council to a direct, active, interventionist role in any of the fields traditionally occupied by the private sector.

# 9. The Council, the People, the Entrenched Development Industry - A Community of Interests

As background to the planning department's review of the General Plan and the council's selection of the "Balanced Growth Strategy" and its 74 policies, a brief look at certain events that were happening in Calgary might be informative. From 1949 until 1965 Calgary had three mayors. They were colourful, down-to-earth, home-grown, folksy men. Don Mackay established the Stetson hat as a Calgary symbol. Harry Hays left Calgary in mid-term to go to Ottawa as Minister of Agriculture in Lester Pearson's cabinet and was subsequently appointed to the Senate; Grant MacEwen left local politics in 1965 and became the Lieutenant-Governor of Alberta. In 1965 John C. Leslie was elected Mayor of Calgary. He too was a native Calgarian. He had served in the RCAF during World War II, and upon his discharge in 1946 had joined his father's real estate firm. His entry into the field of local government was as a school trustee and he was active in the affairs of Knox United Church. He was not as charismatic a personality as his predecessors and although his business was real estate he did little during his term as mayor to provide any stirring leadership in the city's development.

During the civic election campaign of 1969 Leslie was opposed by a newcomer - Rod Sykes. The contest was won by Sykes who brought a new image into City Hall in

Calgary. Sykes was not a home-grown Calgarian. He was not even an Albertan and received no schooling in Alberta. He attended Victoria College in Victoria and then completed his training at Sir George Williams University in Montreal. He became a registered chartered accountant specializing in the field of taxation and was employed by the firm of Price, Waterhouse and Company. In 1961 he joined the Canadian Pacific Railway's Department of Research in charge of economic and financial studies. In 1962 he moved to Calgary to carry out a redevelopment scheme for the CPR and in 1965 he became Vice-President of Marathon Realty, the CPR's real estate and development arm, one of the largest real estate and development companies in Canada. Sykes' election as Mayor of Calgary in 1969 ended the succession of local personalities as the city's mayor. More than that, it put a large-corporation executive in the mayor's chair, a man who came to the office from a background of real estate and development on the national corporate scale.

The expansive growth of Calgary's economy and population in the 1960's continued on into the next decade. Early in the 1970's it was becoming apparent that there was an increasing concentration of the development industry in the hands of a very few large companies and that one of the reasons for the housing crisis was this monopoly control of the housing market. In 1973 the Chief Commissioner of the City of Calgary engaged consultants to prepare a report on Genstar Limited, one of the leading development companies in the city. In part, the consultants reported:

Genstar activity levels in the land development, construction and housing industries could, if they have not already, attain a position where its activities could be deemed capable of unduly preventing or lessening competition or adversely affecting prices in one or more of the said industries to the detriment of the residents of the City of Calgary.... The writers have concluded that, in their opinion a *prima facie case*can be established in this matter which would justify the City of Calgary presenting same to the Director appointed under the federal Combines Investigation Act. 129

When the report was received, it seems that Mayor Sykes was so annoyed, not merely with its findings but that it had been done at all, that he withheld it for several months. 130 It was, however, leaked and then made public during the civic election campaign in the Fall of 1974. Sykes was re-elected mayor and Genstar threatened a law-suit on the grounds that the city, having commissioned and made public the report, was responsible for damaging the company's reputation. The city had no desire to pursue the matter in the courts and wrote to Genstar acknowledging that the report was misleading and inaccurate but not specifying in what ways it was so. Genstar was satisfied and considered the matter closed. Nevertheless the report was sent to the Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs for examination under the Combines Investigation Act. In the summer of 1976 the federal department announced that no violation of the Act had been found.

In the same year the City of Calgary administration submitted a report on land ownership and development to the Royal Commission on Corporate Concentration (the Bryce Commission). The submission indicated that there was in fact a concentration of land ownership and development activity among a small number of companies in Calgary. It pointed out that 81 percent of the lots in outlying areas and 85 percent of the building permits were in the hands of only five companies although there were 24 development companies in the city. Two of these 24 companies were BACM and Kelwood who owned 26 percent of the lots for which building permits had been issued; both of these companies were subsidiaries of Genstar Limited. The administration's submission pointed out that the major developers had divided the city into a number of areas in each of which one or two companies operated virtually without competition. There seemed to be an understanding among them not to encroach on each other's territory. The report expressed concern that this type of control of the development industry could adversely affect the public interest. 131 It has been stated that land developers in Calgary, in 1976, made about \$20,000 profit on every house lot they sold; this was simply on the

sale of the lot and did not include the profits from the servicing of the land and the construction of the house. 132

Despite these reports and the various expressions of concern and the evidence provided not only in the studies but also in the constantly rising cost of housing and the continuing housing shortage and the rapidly accumulating wealth of the developers<sup>133</sup> there was no change in the city's development regime. There was no public inquiry into the city's development industry and no further studies or reports. And there was no change in the pattern of Calgary's exuberant growth. Each year throughout the decade of the '70's and into the early '80's saw a gratifying increase in the number and value of building permits and each census saw a prideful increase in the city's population. Table 16 sets out the relevant data on these aspects of Calgary's progress.

Between 1971 and 1981, then, Calgary's metropolitan population grew by 222,647 or some 55 percent. This rate is remarkable. In Calgary it produced the conditions which were conducive to the generation of wealth and a number of fortunes were made, particularly in the development industry. It also had its "down" side. Rising costs and rising expectations made it necessary for a large proportion of families to have two wage-earners. Even so, many families at the lower end of the income scale could not afford decent housing. But apart from the few incidents noted above there was no attempt made by any public authority to redress the imbalance or correct the inequities.

It was perhaps to be expected that the prevailing conditions would have the broad general approval of Calgarians. The majority of them enjoyed a comfortable standard of living even though reaching it and maintaining it demanded great effort and imposed a heavy burden of stress and anxiety. People were quite prepared to accept these as the necessary costs of what was considered success, or at any rate of "belonging" and observing the social norms. The size and wealth of the city was palpable. Homes of millionaires were becoming an increasingly common sight; their limousines were frequent in the city's traffic. The cathedrals of commerce which were visibly rising

day-by-day in the downtown shed their radiance over the entire city. And the high priests of business together with their supporting choirs of the media which sang the hymns of praise to growth and wealth proclaimed Calgary's state of beatitude which Calgarians knew in their hearts to be the truth and in which all believed they personally shared. The financially and politically powerful created the ethos of the city and the communal mind and outlook of its people embraced that ethos.

One could not expect a vice-president of one of Canada's major real-estate and development corporations to make any move against the real-estate and development industry - certainly not at a time when that industry was flourishing and the city generally was prospering. Rod Sykes was mayor of Calgary from 1969 to 1977 and it may be assumed that the "Balanced Growth Strategy" which, in 1976, the Calgary council chose from among six alternatives was also the one approved by Mayor Sykes. It was a business-as-usual strategy which could well appeal to a business-minded council and a development-oriented mayor. Sykes withdrew from civic politics in 1977, but the city planning department, having received council's approval of the growth strategy and its package of 74 policies, proceeded with its revision of the 1973 General Plan to incorporate these changes.

### 10. Oiltown's Downtown Debacle

The re-writing of the plan had not proceeded very far when the provincial government passed a new Planning Act. 135 This new Act was the culmination of the review process which the province had initiated in 1974 with the publication and circulation of its exploratory communication Towards a New Planning Act for Alberta. The new Act introduced a number of changes in the planning regime of the province but they affected Calgary only minimally. One of its changes was to bring planning in Alberta more closely under the political surveillance of the provincial government. It created the Alberta Planning Board as the agency embodying the overriding authority of the provincial government in the field of planning. All regional plans were required to

be approved by the Alberta Planning Board. The importance of this requirement lay in the fact that the Act also required all ten Regional Planning Commissions to prepare regional plans, but beyond that, it required all plans, by-laws and planning measures of all member municipalities of the region to comply with the regional plan:

Every statutory plan, replotting scheme and land-use by-law, every action taken or thing done by a local authority, regional planning commission or a council and every decision of a municipal planning commission, development appeal board or development officer shall conform with the regional plan. 136

This posed no serious problems for Calgary. The Calgary General Plan of 1973 was generally compatible with the existing Regional Plan. The City had been maintaining close liaison with the Region at both the technical and political levels. The planning staffs of both authorities were in regular communication with each other and the city had aldermanic representatives on both the Regional Planning Commission itself and the Commission's Regional Plan Committee. Calgary also had technical representation on the Technical Steering Committee of the Calgary Region Growth Study which was conducted by the Commission and completed in 1977.

Other provisions of the 1977 <u>Planning Act</u> made the Alberta Planning Board the appeal authority for subdivision appeals; required all municipalities with a population of 1000 or more to adopt a general municipal plan; and it combined the instruments of zoning and interim development control into a single "land-use by-law." In the matter of public participation the new Act required that:

a council shall, during the preparation of a general municipal plan, provide an opportunity to those persons affected by it of making suggestions and representations....<sup>137</sup>

The Act also required that a public hearing be held before the council gave second reading to a general plan or to any planning by-law. It did not, however, provide for public participation in the process of formulating planning policy such as marked the planning

department's review of the 1973 General Plan. None of these measures required any significant change or adjustment in Calgary's planning process. The new Calgary General Municipal Plan was adopted by the council on March 12, 1979.

At the same time that the planning department was reviewing the 1973 General Plan it was also reviewing the 1966 Downtown Plan. The 1973 General Plan had addressed a number of important Inner City issues. The Downtown Plan, however, focused specifically on the downtown itself, not the adjacent inner-city neighbourhoods, and set out specific proposals and guidelines for its redevelopment. During the decade 1966-1976 the scale and density of development in the office/retail core and changes in the federal government's policies vis-a-vis urban renewal rendered the 1966 Downtown Plan obsolete. The general ideas which impelled the review of the Downtown Plan were much the same as those of the downtown plans of most urban centres at that time: to restore the downtown as a place for people; to bring life back into the downtown in the evenings, not just during the working-hours; to make the downtown environment comfortable, stimulating and safe; to make the downtown not only an attractive place to work but also an attractive place to live and find recreation and entertainment.

In 1976 the city planning department organized a Special Projects Division of the department to carry out the review. The team's mandate was to formulate policy proposals for land-use, transportation, housing, social and recreational facilities and environmental quality. It produced a preliminary report, The Downtown Plan, which was approved by the council in February 1979. The planning department then was directed to prepare a detailed plan for the implementation of these policies. The department's approach was to divide the city into six areas: the Office/Commercial Core, the East End, Chinatown, Eau Claire, South Downtown, the Riverbank. From the point of view of their potential impact on downtown development and in terms of the public controversy that they provoked, the two substantive components of the policy proposals

which were under consideration during 1979 and 1980 were the Transportation section and the Housing section.

In brief, the Transportation section recommended that Light Rail Transit (LRT) and buses should comprise the dominant mode of public transportation not only to and from the downtown but also within the downtown itself. This would require that traffic flow in the downtown be dramatically restricted. One of the contingent requirements of such a policy would be the restriction of downtown parking. The report recommended that parking in the central core be limited to 20 percent of the by-law requirement for office development with the remaining 80 percent located on the periphery. It also proposed that instead of developers providing parking they should give the city cash with which the city would build parkades.

The Housing section recommended that housing be encouraged throughout the downtown and that the downtown housing stock be increased through integration with commercial development as well as by building exclusively residential neighbourhoods. The report was also concerned about downtown housing densities and proposed that they be reduced.

The section dealing with environmental quality also contained some radical proposals. One of its concerns was the level of pollution in the downtown which it argued was affected by the design of the buildings in the area. It proposed that a study of building design be undertaken for the purpose of determining how changes in the design could contribute to the reduction of pollution levels. In fact, the planning department in 1980 asked the council for a grant of \$55,000 to carry out such a study, but the request was rejected. One of the reasons for council's refusal to fund the study was the vigorous opposition of the business community represented by Brian Lee, who argued that the design of buildings was not council's business.<sup>138</sup>

During the planning department's review process, the policies which were emerging seemed to be receiving substantial community support. By March, 1980,

many groups endorsed the plan. These included such organizations as the Calgary Inner City Coalition, the Eastern Core Community Organization, the Federation of Calgary Communities and even the Calgary Chamber of Commerce. The development industry, however, was fiercely opposed to the department's proposals. The president of Lincoln Development Ltd., Charles Smith, argued that lower density housing in the downtown core "defies the realities of the market place. Whichever way you cut it, it has to be high density, high rise." 139 The president of the Calgary Business Owners and Managers Association, George Brookman, called the proposals an attack on the property rights of developers. He said "I think everyone of us should resent the insidious subversion of land owner's property rights.... developers would lose some freedom and city planners would gain too much authority."140 Developers also vehemently opposed the department's parking proposals. They argued that such regulations would drive development out of the downtown. When the parking proposal came before the council in June, 1980, the public gallery was crowded with businessmen. Marathon Realty claimed that the parking restrictions would bring retail investment to an end in the core, and branded the proposals as "monopolistic." 141 Alderman Brian Lee argued that there had not been sufficient public participation in the formulation of the parking proposals and persuaded the council to adjourn debate on the issue. Council voted unanimously for adjournment.

Following the departure of Rod Sykes from the civic scene in 1977, Calgary elected Ross Alger as mayor. He held office for three years and was then defeated by Ralph Klein who won an unexpected landslide victory in the election of 1980. Klein was a journalist who had earned something of a reputation as an advocate of reform and a champion of the "little man" and of grass-roots community causes. In an article entitled "The City Blockbusting.... Or What Smacks Of it" published in the Calgary Magazine early in 1980<sup>142</sup> Klein accused the city council of acting like "sleazy developers" and attacked their use of expropriation which resulted in the demolition of heritage buildings

and the destruction of the viability of residential communities. It has been reported that during the boom years of the 1970's, more than 600 older houses and buildings were being destroyed each year. 143

Klein was not alone in protesting against the uninhibited and wholesale bulldozing of older neighbourhoods and structures which stood in the way of new development and investment. Various publications, including even the <u>Calgary Herald</u>, carried articles by journalists and academics and comments by community activists and concerned laymen condemning the council's indifference to local community interests and criticizing the council's passionate ideological commitment to the icon of growth and the virtually free hand accorded to the development industry. For example, Phil Elder, a faculty member in the Faculty of Environmental Design of the University of Calgary, and founder of the Urban Reform Party, in an article in the <u>Calgary Herald</u> of October 26, 1980, commented:

Anybody who wants to build anything downtown is instantly given permission to build anywhere he wants to.144

Elder ran as a mayoralty candidate in the 1980 civic election but was unsuccessful. His Urban Reform Party was equally unsuccessful and soon disappeared from the scene. Ron Wood, in an article in the <u>Calgary Magazine</u> in November 1980 wrote:

Growth! It has been the chant of several decades of politicians and bureaucrats. Growth! It's a wonder Calgary city council's opening prayer doesn't beg the blessing of Growth instead of God when its members gather every other week.<sup>145</sup>

When the new council under Mayor Ralph Klein took office on January 1, 1981, there was some expectation that Calgary was entering a new era in terms of the council's attitude towards the development industry. That expectation soon faded. In February the planning department submitted its <u>Downtown Area Redevelopment Plan</u>, the plan which they had been working on since 1976 as the revision of the earlier 1966 downtown plan.

It was an ambitious conception. The cost to the city could be as much as \$25 million. But perhaps the dollar cost was not as questionable for the councillors as were the active role proposed for the city and the limitations on the freedom of action of the developers. The policies which had been contemplated and discussed during the review period and which had been objected to by the business community appeared again, not much diminished in number or changed in substance, in this document. Mayor Klein's reaction was equivocal. He seemed to support the plan in principle but pointed out that it was still only a concept and until formally adopted by by-law it had no legal status and was not binding on the developers. The erosion of the plan then began.

During the years 1979 to 1981 the construction of office space in downtown Calgary reached staggering proportions. Office towers were developed on a scale and at a density and rate which was unprecedented in Canada. In 1979 there was more square footage of office space built in Calgary than in New York and Chicago combined. Virtually all residential enclaves in the downtown were obliterated. The momentum of this furious development activity undoubtedly continued to sweep the 1981 council along on a euphoric emotional high. Mayor Klein's presence on that council seemed to exercise little dampening effect on the council's enthusiastic approval of every proposed new development. Typical of their behaviour was an incident in March, 1981, when the council approved an application for an office tower with a floor area ratio more than twice as great as that provided in the **Downtown Area Development Plan**. This action of the council so upset the Director of Planning, George Steber Jr. that he intervened with the mayor, pointing out the folly of such a move. The action of the council not only set a dangerous precedent for other developers to follow but made a mockery of the entire plan and the planning process. Moreover it conveyed to the developer in question an enormous gratuitous increase in the value of his site. The approval was eventually modified. 146

Not all approvals for increased office densities were reconsidered. An application by the Bank of Montreal for erection of a building with a Floor Area Ratio of 22 was

approved even though the land-use control regulations set the maximum FAR at 15.<sup>147</sup> There were numerous instances in which council knowingly "bent or ignored or contradicted its own regulations in order to give certain developers higher densities or other advantages." In pursuing this practice the council did not amend the classifications in the land-use by-law. Instead each case was treated as a special project and the site in question was "spot-zoned." This was the most expedient way of processing approval of the applications since it avoided the prescribed by-law amending procedures involving public hearings.

By the end of April it was becoming obvious that the council had little intention of adopting the <u>Downtown Area Redevelopment Plan</u>. The Director of Planning was dismayed by the council's attitude and actions. In an article in the <u>Calgary Sun</u> of April 29, journalist Michael Shapcott wrote that "city planning director, George Steber Jr., said council is afraid of upsetting developers and realtors who are opposed to the plan." The reported statement by the director angered the council. Mayor Klein indignantly rejected the suggestion that his council was influenced by the lobbying of developers. Moreover, he warned all civic staff, but particularly the planning staff, against becoming actively involved in politics or face the possibility of dismissal:

The [planning] department has taken a far greater political role than it should.... What can we do about it? Well there's the old saying that heads may have to roll. The future of some divisions of the planning department are in doubt.<sup>150</sup>

The attack on the plan and on the planning director was intensified. In a <u>Calgary</u> Herald story on May 2, the mayor was quoted as saying that he didn't care how high buildings go in the city.<sup>151</sup> And in an earlier statement Alderman Pat Donnelly had said of the planning director "If he can't work with this council, his only choice is to resign."<sup>152</sup> The development industry continued to attack the plan. It was described as unrealistic and naive and there were implied threats that developers had other

alternatives elsewhere if development in downtown Calgary was made uneconomic. The council tabled the plan until the fall of 1981 but during the summer several projects were approved which contravened the guidelines in the plan. These approvals did not go unnoticed or uncriticized. Gillian Steward, in an article in Calgary Magazine, wrote:

Looking at downtown these days, it would seem making money has become our first priority in life. Those who want to make a lot of it - real estate developers - have been given a free hand in the core, at the expense of people who want fresh air, sunshine and green space.... City council was not elected to protect the economic interests of developers. It was elected to protect and promote the interests of all Calgarians. Those two sets of interests do not always coincide. 153

A month earlier, in September, in an address to the Calgary Rotary Club, Mayor Klein had cautioned:

In our efforts to make the commercial core a more human place, we must be careful to avoid the trap of putting sunlight ahead of commerce: sunlight does not turn the wheels in our factory.<sup>154</sup>

One of the bitterest controversies which flared up during the summer was sparked by council's decision to build a coliseum in Stampede Park which would entail encroachment into the adjacent inner-city residential neighbourhood of Victoria Park. The decision to build a coliseum was a necessary part of Calgary's pursuit of the 1988 Winter Olympic Games. An enclosed stadium of this type was required if Calgary's application for the games was to be taken seriously by the World Olympic Committee. The Calgary Olympic Development Association, the board of the Calgary Exhibition and the Stampede all favoured a site at Stampede Park. Mayor Klein agreed with them in spite of the fact that in 1977 the council had approved the "Balanced Growth Strategy" which committed the council to the preservation and enhancement of inner-city residential neighbourhoods and had formally adopted the Calgary Municipal General Plan in 1979 which enshrined those policies.

The issue of the coliseum site had arisen earlier. Various citizens groups had voted opposition to its location in the inner city. They urged that the coliseum be sited in a less central area where traffic and parking problems would not be exacerbated and where overshadowing and other environmental difficulties would be minimized. In 1980 a group called the Coliseum Impact Committee actually advocated a non-central location for the building and openly proclaimed that the decision-making process in the city was entirely in the control of special interest groups and not of the citizens at large. 155

When the council came out in favour of the Stampede Park location in the summer of 1981 it raised a storm of protest. Residents of Victoria Park were incensed by the prospect of the encroachment into their neighbourhood with its attendant destruction of established community patterns and property values. An injunction was obtained from the Court of Queen's Bench requiring the city's Development Appeal Board to hear appeals against the proposed location of the coliseum. But the Stampede, the Olympic Development Association and the City of Calgary made a counter-move. The council applied to the provincial cabinet for an order-in-council. Mayor Klein justified this unprecedented action on the grounds that it was necessary to demonstrate to the World Olympic Committee that Calgary was united behind its Olympic Games application and was capable of carrying them off successfully. Had the site for the coliseum been chosen in a less sensitive location the problem of community opposition would likely never have arisen. But the power group in the city was determined that the facility be located in Stampede Park and their power prevailed. Mayor Klein had undergone his final mutation from populist to elitist and the prospect for the adoption of the downtown plan dwindled. Calgary was awarded the 1988 Winter Olympic Games in October 1981 and the coliseum, which emerged as the Saddledome, was built (at a cost overrun of more than \$16 million) in Stampede Park, which was extended into the community of Victoria Park for that purpose.

In the fall of 1981, when the Downtown Area Redevelopment Plan again came before the council it was again tabled to allow for further public comment. An opinion poll conducted by the Calgary Herald in December 1981 indicated strong general support for more green space and trees downtown but the development industry felt that the building densities allowed in the plan were not high enough. On February 23, 1982, a public hearing was held by the council, the purpose of which was to discuss and decide the question of the downtown plan. Representatives of the development industry as well as of community associations were present, but the council refused to open the meeting to public discussion. Alderman Brian Lee spoke forcefully against the plan. He argued that it had already been discussed for three years and it would probably take another three years or more to resolve the problems it posed and to reconcile the conflicting opinions about it. Meanwhile an estimated 35 percent of existing buildings were already in violation of the proposed code. He did not dwell on the fact that the violations were due in large measure to the council's practice of "exceptions" or spot-zoning. The meeting came to an end when the council voted to abandon the idea of having a statutory downtown plan.

Having been largely instrumental in orchestering the demise of the idea of a statutory plan for the downtown, Alderman Lee organized a Citizen's Options Committee to review policy issues and alternatives for the downtown. No doubt he felt that the defeat of the planning department's plan left the matter of the downtown in a state of limbo and that it should be brought to some kind of suitable close. The Citizen's Options Committee held its first meeting on March 29, 1982. As might be expected, it was dominated by representatives of the development industry. Only a small handful of its members represented the citizens groups. Lee asked two aldermen - Jack Long and Elaine Husband to sit on the committee. Both refused on the grounds of the obvious weighting and bias of the committee. Lee also asked Alderman Bob Hawkesworth if he would co-chair the committee with him. Hawkesworth had been a supporter of the

department's <u>Downtown Area Redevelopment Plan</u>. He turned down Lee's invitation on the grounds that the committee would become a closed forum for negotiating deals on what should and shouldn't go into a downtown plan. Those questions, Hawkesworth believed, should be discussed and decided at a public hearing in accordance with established procedure, but no such public hearing had yet been held. Hawkesworth refused to be party to a plan which was formulated by horse-trading behind closed doors.

One of the committee members was Dr. Sheldon Goldenberg, a sociologist and development consultant, who had previously presented a brief to the city council entitled Assessment of the Downtown Area Redevelopment Plan, in which he vigorously attacked the planning department's plan. The gist of his criticism was that there was no scientific evidence to support the department's supposition that a substantial resident population could be established in the downtown; that there were cities in North America comparable to Calgary in size and other respects which had no planning departments and no plans but which seemed to work very well without them; that there was no evidence to prove that a downtown without a plan would suffer in any way and that there probably was no need for a downtown plan at all. Goldenberg's ideas, because of his academic qualifications, were regarded as objective and scientific and he brought these ideas with him into the Citizen's Options Committee.

On May 16, 1982, George Steber gave notice to the city commissioners and the city council that he was resigning as the Director of Planning and leaving the service of the city. Aldermen Jack Long and Elaine Husband attempted to have the council conduct an investigation into the circumstances of his resignation because there was reason to believe that the city's chief commissioner, George Cornish, had for some time been trying to get rid of Steber without advising the council. The council however refused to pursue the matter. In June, 1982, the Citizen's Options Committee issued their Final Report. What the Committee recommended for the development of Calgary's downtown

was a set of flexible policy options which would not be legally binding but would simply be a set of suggested general guidelines. The report stated in its opening paragraphs:

To begin with the Committee felt that it could not be bound by past documents and decisions of Council (General Plan, Inner City Plan) nor by pending ARP's (Area Redevelopment Plans) for particular areas or other pending legislation. Thus we began with no legislation "fixes" and felt free to consider Downtown on its own terms. 156

There was, of course, no statutory requirement for Calgary to adopt a downtown plan. There was, however, a requirement under the Alberta <u>Planning Act</u> for Calgary to adopt a municipal general plan, which it had done in 1979. In spite of the fact that the 1979 <u>General Plan</u> embodied a number of policies relating to the inner city and the office/commercial core it was clear that they would play little part in the further development of downtown Calgary. The free play of the market and the developers' decisions would determine the course of the city's downtown.

In the spring of 1983 it was announced that there were 125 "redundant" positions in the planning department. Questions were raised and public pressure was brought to bear on the council and the number was reduced to 76. In July, 1983, 76 members of the planning department lost their jobs. The Special Projects Division, which had been responsible for the downtown plan with its stringent controls on core area development, was cut from 17 people to eight. A new Director of Planning was appointed in the fall of 1983. He was Art Froese, a builder and developer who had been closely involved in the Saddledome episode. With his background and qualifications he was considered by the commissioners, the council and mayor to have the proper credentials and disposition for the job.

# OVERVIEW: CALGARY'S DISTINCTIVE HISTORY. PLANNING FUNCTION. COMMUNAL MIND AND OUTLOOK

The history of the planning function in Calgary is one aspect of the general historical development of that city. There were two major epochs in Calgary's history: the pre-Leduc epoch and the post-Leduc epoch; that is to say, Calgary before oil and Calgary after oil. A third period can also be recognized - the years between 1913 which marked the end of Calgary's early boom, and 1947 which was the year when the Leduc oil field was discovered. Although it was during this period that Calgary settled into its new role as an established sub-regional centre, it was, in a sense, only a middling phase in the pre-Leduc epoch of Calgary's historical evolution. In the pre-Leduc era Calgary grew from a NWMP post, to a frontier town, to an emerging sub-regional railway and distribution centre whose economy was still mainly based on the cattle and meat industry and agriculture, together with a small component of manufacturing and wholesaling for the southern Alberta hinterland market. During this era the initial phase was the cattle-ranching phase. That was succeeded by a more generally diffused agricultural phase made possible by the extensive irrigation installation of 1911 and after. The period 1905-1912 was one of extremely rapid population growth and industrial expansion. Then came the severe recession of 1913, then the first World War, then the Great Depression of the 1930's. During this period of some three decades not much of significance occurred although there was, of course, growth and the maturation of the system of civic government. By the end of World War I Calgary was still a small provincial centre, fairly heavily in debt and beset with seemingly intractable problems of post-war adjustment.

In the beginning, Calgary's council comprised mainly merchants but as the town grew other types of businessmen such as real-estate brokers and contractors and even some professionals were elected to civic office. But there was always a consistency among all the successive councils in their approach to civic government and their

conduct of the office. All of them pursued the ideal of growth - growth of the city, growth of the city's economy, growth of business, growth of industry, growth of the population, growth of status and importance. In their quest of these goals Calgarians never seemed to doubt that they would achieve them. Modesty was never one of the city's notable attributes. Nor was the lack of ambition or energy. Whatever prospect presented itself which seemed to lead in the desired direction the city pursued with vigour and trumpeting. Whether that prospect took the form of the promise of industrialization inherent in the railway and the Manchester industrial lands, or of the British Cavalry's need for a remount centre, or of W.G. Gage's offer to finance a sanatorium, or of the hope of being named the capital of the North West Territories or of the Province of Alberta, or the seat of a provincial university, or of the tourism potential of the Calgary Stampede, or of the advertising value of the high-jinks in connection with the 1948 Grey Cup game in Toronto, Calgary went for it with enthusiasm and bravado.

It was during this epoch that Calgary acquired the "cowtown" reputation as well as overtones of the American attitudes of rejection of the role of government as a positive force for the general welfare of society, the substitution of business for government in that role and the laudation of the icon of the self-directed individual as the symbol of virtue and the agent of social progress. It was also in this epoch, although in its closing decade, that the Social Credit movement swept across Alberta, which had its genesis in Calgary, in William Aberhart's Prophetic Bible Institute. On the surface these various occurrences may appear to be separate and unrelated phenomena which emerged at random in the flow of Calgary's historic progression. Beneath the surface, however, certain aspects of each of them may be discerned which seem to have very similar and related characteristics.

The Calgary Stampede was organized and mounted by Guy Weadick, an American showman and promoter who had staged similar evocations of the American Wild West in

several locations in the United States. It is perhaps not entirely fortuitous that the event was successful and became a permanent institution in the life of the city. Calgary had its own period of the cattle spread and the cowboy which was still fresh in the memory of Calgarians. They had also had frequent contact with Americans up and down the Whoop-Up trail from Fort Benton in Montana to Fort Calgary and beyond to Fort Edmonton from the time when Calgary was first established as a police outpost. Cowboys and Americans, then, were no strangers to Calgarians from the earliest beginnings of the community and made their early imprinting on its communal mind and outlook. Americans, too, were early immigrants in substantial numbers to the growing city during the expansive years of the first decade of the 20th Century. It was probably inevitable that they brought with them some of the romantic mythology of the American frontier which became comingled with Calgarians' fancies about their own cattle ranching period. Indeed, ranches could still be seen as picturesque landmarks in the rolling countryside around Calgary. But the imagery of the open range-land in the beautiful foothills country appealed to more than merely the eye; it called to something deep-seated in the communal mind and outlook of Calgarians - an identification with the natural landscape and the sense of freedom the spirit experiences in the midst of that landscape and the remoteness of organized society with its burdens and stresses and constraints. A similar vista was opened up by "Bible Bill" Aberhart only his was a vista of the heavenly paradise rather than the earthly one. But even in his prophetic sermons the central figure was the individual, not society, and the central message was the salvation of the individual soul, not the redemption of society.

Calgary's communal mind and outlook, then, from the beginning seemed to hold the individual, particularly the colourful, rough-and-ready, outdoors-living individual like the fantastical cowboy, in high regard. It embraced fundamentalist religion and found in William Aberhart the evangelical charismatic individual who stood as the counterpart to the secular image of the cowboy. It was not particularly drawn to

organized political partisanship and repudiated organized labour's ideology of class struggle. The dominant group in the city - its businessmen and entrepreneurs - single-mindedly pursued the goals of economic expansion and civic aggrandizement as the ultimate good. The city councils, drawn largely from the business community, shared these aspirations and values and held them as the guiding principle of their civic governance. And the general populace absorbed them as the fundamental tenets of their communal mind and outlook. Calgarians were ideoligically conservative, apolitical, business-oriented, ambitious for wealth and status, aggressive in their pursuit of those ambitions, immodest in their self-esteem and flamboyant in their self-advertisement.

During the pre-Leduc era the planning function in Calgary was virtually nonexistent. What there was, was the exercise by the council of a few rudimentary, ad hoc measures of land-use control. Principally they involved control over the extension of municipal services and some primitive zoning and building regulations; but the closest approach to a planning measure was the council's ownership and control over the sale and development of the Manchester industrial lands. Inasmuch as this was a council policy and program to realize a long-term, future-oriented objective it may be considered as coming within the terms of the "planning" concept, although it was an isolated measure and not part of a comprehensive development plan. Certain "planning" incidents occurred, such as the appointment of a planning commission and the preparation of the Mawson Plan but these, too, were isolated events outside of the context of any planning function as a coherent, properly integrated, statutory component of the city government. This rudimentary approach to the planning function was appropriate to the stage of development Calgary had reached at that time; it was consistent with the Calgary council's conception of the nature of civic government and of the council's role in it; and it was reflective of the communal mind and outlook of Calgarians generally.

With the discovery of the vast oil fields in Alberta, Calgary began its transition from a cattle-and-agriculture-based, sub-regional distribution and small

manufacturing economy to an oil-based economy. It also triggered Calgary's ascent into the upper strata of the regional urban hierarchy. This, however, did not alter the personality traits of the city or change the basic tenets of its communal mind and outlook. It only affirmed and intensified them. Post-Leduc Calgary, driven by the relentlessly burgeoning population and economy, battened on its own success. World-class status was what it now hungered for and whatever trappings it could assume or whatever prizes it could pursue which would provide the assurance that it was surely and swiftly on the path to that destiny were promoted with that city's customary swagger and fanfare. Items like the Saddledome, the Winter Olympics, the German-designed Light Rail Transit system, all fed this ambition. As was often the case with Calgary, the euphoric self-image of the city's promotional campaigns was not always justified by the reality of the situation and was not the way in which others viewed the city. In that connection, a comment by sociologist Chuck Reasons is pertinent:

[I]n March 1984 the provincial tourist bureau, Travel Alberta, released results of a survey of visitors to Alberta which presented a rather critical view of Alberta's two major cities, particularly Calgary. Condensing the perceptions of summer 1982 visitors from Los Angeles, Houston, Minneapolis, Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal, it revealed that many tourists identified Calgary as trying to be what it is not sophisticated, urbane and cosmopolitan. They viewed Calgary as a poor and superficial imitation of the "true' cities of the world. Some visitors even suggested that Calgary combines the worst of two worlds - Toronto and Dallas. 157

The oil industry brought a flood of American oilmen, American companies,

American money and American values into Calgary and although the ascendancy of the oil
industry in the lives of Calgarians did not change the basic tenets and orientation of the
city's communal mind and outlook it strengthened a number of attitudes which were
already embedded there. It deepened the conservative American colouration of that city's
attitude towards political, governmental and social issues at all three levels of

government. And it added a companion image to the cowboy image in the city's ethos.

Although the oil industry is sharply different from the cattle industry the images of both are entwined in Calgary's communal mind and outlook. The derrick and the monotonously nodding pump have taken their place with the white Stetson in the symbolism of the city.

Perhaps what weaves these images together are some of the salient characteristics which are common to the men employed in these industries and who have come to be regarded as their industries' archetypical representatives, their iconic images. These two archtypes are the roughneck in the oil industry and the cowboy in the cattle industry. The characteristics which they have in common are that they both work outdoors in the wide open spaces at physically demanding jobs; both are strong and macho-masculine; both are individualistic and seemingly independent; both are remote from polite, urbane society and the daily demands and frustrations of the city; both have the appeal of what seems to be a self-sufficient life free of the regulations and complications of the conventional work-a-day world. There is much in these qualities that Calgarians would find admirable. But there is probably more that Calgarians find admirable in the fact that these two industries, each in its time, have produced the economic energy and wealth which has been the engine of Calgary's prosperity, affluence and status, and Calgarians are aware of that fact. Perhaps the interwoven images are so deeply embedded in Calgary's communal mind and outlook not because of any romantic symbolism or advertising gimmickry, but simply because these two industries have been at the core of Calgary's economic life and prosperity. It is of interest in passing that it was these same two industries - cattle and oil - which produced the wealth of Texas and which moulded the character and personality of that state.

Whatever weighting one may give to the evidence of mass psychology it cannot be denied that the oil industry had a major impact on Calgary's psyche. James Laxer, of the University of Toronto's Department of Economics has written:

Calgary died socially and politically as a community with the rise of oil. The sterility, brutality and crass materialism of Texas and Oklahoma were stamped on the city and the local culture did not have sufficient strength to resist the city's new masters. It went under and since that time the city has existed for no other reason than for the greater good of the oil industry and the bounties that it distributes locally. 158

In the same exerpt Laxer is quoted as saying that "in the period before the rise of oil Calgary had been a centre for lively and powerful political and social movements." He cites various instances such as the tradition of tough journalism, the intellectual stirring of the United Farmers movement and the CCF and of Social Credit. One may agree with his view that some of the various instances to which he refers were lively and powerful, but for the most part the lively and powerful among them were also conservative and on the right wing of the political spectrum and one need not agree that the essential aspirations and motivations at the core of the community were destroyed with the rise of oil. The evidence clearly indicates that the arrival of the oil industry strengthened and made explicit certain basic characteristics which were always present in Calgary's communal mind and outlook. This is the case which has been argued in the foregoing pages of this dissertation. One can, however, agree with Laxer's observations about the reflection of certain traits of Texas and Oklahoma in Calgary and the influence of the oil industry on the city's raison d'etre.

R.W. Wright, of the Economics Department of the University of Calgary, holds a view of the oil industry's impact on the communal mind and outlook of Albertans which differs from Laxer's; it is a view which seems more reflective of the historical reality. Wright does not believe that the oil industry imposed its ethos on Alberta but rather that the historically-held attitudes and values of Albertans were not only congenial to those of the oil industry, but indeed were identical to them. In a paper entitled "Free Enterprise in Alberta," 159 Wright persuasively argues that the free enterprise ideology was inherent in the Alberta [read Calgary] psyche from the beginning and that it persisted

throughout the process of their economic evolution and despite the changes wrought by that evolution. Wright opens his essay by citing a three-part proposition of Harold Innis', the Guru of Canadian economic history:

- 1. Mainstream economists normally explain growth in terms of particular relationships between savings and investment. However, in the case of frontier development, it is more meaningful to visualize it as a process in which new technology or information is introduced into a region where expansion is not inhibited by an unresponsive institutional structure.
- The values of those who achieve power during the initial stages of frontier development can easily become entrenched. This can have a pervasive and possibly dampening effect on subsequent development patterns.
- 3. Popular values are shaped by the dominant means of communication. 160

## Wright then goes on to say:

The particular phenomenon which I wish to explain is the persistence of the free enterprise ideology in the face of changing economic circumstances. In the earlier days of development when the industrial system was based on agriculture and the discovery of energy resources such an orientation was understandable: the mode of production favoured atomistic capitalism; vested interests espoused libertarian views because it legitimized their prosperity; the mass information systems were under local control and seeking to mold a distinctive regional identity without alienating the elite, they found support of the free enterprise spirit to be a logical (and profitable) vehicle. 161

With the advent of the oil industry with its overwhelming corporate organizations and bureaucracies and multinational connections one might have expected that the individualistic orientation of Albertans [and Calgarians] might have been dissipated and replaced by an admiration of the impersonal corporate image. But this did not happen. Instead "the value system is probably even more committed to free enterprise than it was during the earlier settlement period." 162 Wright suggests that

the reasons for the strengthening rather than weakening of the individualistic disposition was that the sudden prosperity conferred by the oil industry dulled any interest Albertans [or Calgarians] might have in confronting the economic truths of that prosperity and that the economic elite and the mass media, which dominated the communal mind and outlook found it in their interests to encourage the retention of the old views. "The result is a one-dimensional society in which the language (but not the essence) of free enterprise has become impenetrable dogma." 163

Wright maintains that from its beginnings the oil industry "has nurtured the image of aggressive free-wheeling entrepreneurship." He speculates that the industry may have consciously and deliberately promoted such an image in order to keep governments from seeking to participate in the industry and sharing its revenues. Whether or not such is truly the case, the fact is that Albertans, including Calgarians, embraced that image as representing the revealed truth.

Wright pursues his analysis with some observations about the role of the mass media, both print and electronic. He contends that the attitudes of conservative regionalism were promoted and lauded by the media not only because they were the personal convictions held by the owners, editors and program directors of the media but also because the media arose and flourished in a parochial setting where profit-seeking organizations could not afford to offend the sensibilities of the locals, least of all those of the advertisers on whom the media's revenues depended.

Thus it is easy to understand why the Alberta [and Calgary] public became enamoured with the virtues of private enterprise capitalism. The settlement pattern, the economic system, the dynamics of elite formation and the orientation of the mass media represented a set of mutually supportive individualistic forces and prosperity validated their authenticity. 164

It was during the post-Leduc period that Calgary's planning function came to maturity. Just as in the pre-Leduc epoch the city's rudimentary land-use controls were

appropriate to Calgary's stage of development at that time, so was the later, mature planning function appropriate to the city's historical circumstances in the post-Leduc era. And in both periods the planning function was consonant with the governance of the city and with the communal mind and outlook of its people. The first steps in the direction of a planning function, properly so called, were taken in Calgary in 1950, about three years after the discovery of the oil field at Leduc. In that year the city established its first Planning Department and Planning Advisory Commission as formal components of the city's administration. In the following year the city established a Technical Planning Board and Calgary, together with the local governments surrounding it, established the Calgary District Planning Commission. The formal apparatus for conducting the planning function was thus being put in place early in the post-Leduc era.

Calgary adopted its first General Plan in 1963 and produced its first downtown plan in 1966, in a publication entitled The Future of Downtown Calgary. A new general plan was adopted in 1970 and revised in 1973. A major review of the 1973 plan was undertaken by the planning department in 1976 out of which emerged the "Balanced Growth Strategy" in 1977, which in turn was incorporated into the Calgary General Plan of 1979. There followed further amendments and revisions, and a major revision in 1988, when Parts I and II of the General Plan were replaced by new Parts. In all of these versions of the plan, the central focus was the growth of the city, and the plans in general addressed the methodology of extension of the built-up area to accommodate that growth. They set out the framework of the sequence of expansion and the administrative procedures for the approval of that development. But the unrelenting pressure of population growth, the insatiable demand for housing, the council's commitment to growth and the virtual control of the housing market by a handful of major developers made the development industry rather than the general plan the arbiter of the city's development.

An even more dramatic exemplar of the common spirit which prevailed among the city government's dispositions, the city planning function and the communal mind and outlook of Calgarians is provided by the conception, progression and ultimate demise of the downtown plan. The plan for Calgary's downtown was conceived by the city planners as a means of bringing some measure of order into the furious, indiscriminate development of the downtown core. The frenetic pace and scale of building was triggered by the discovery of oil and the establishment of related and contingent business corporations in Calgary's downtown. This promiscuous building activity was destroying old established inner-city neighbourhoods, heritage buildings, landmarks and lifestyles. It was replacing these with a high-rise, high-density built environment which, although alien to the former living patterns and accustomed emotional responses, was nevertheless well suited to the new corporate life-style which was being created. The situation was admirably summed-up in a succinct comment by Calgary lawyer and novelist John Ballem:

There is a score of permanent residents but transients come and go, bankers, oil people, and that all affects the nature of the community. But it's still very much a small town and one of the contributing factors, for professional and business people, is the fact that the downtown core is so concentrated. Professors up at the University say it's terrible and environmentally horrible but if they had to work here they'd find it very convenient. You can go to the courthouse, to business meetings, everything is accessible within a few blocks and that's a tremendous advantage in the business community and this is a very business oriented town. 165

The planning department's <u>Future of Downtown Calgary</u> was published in the fall of 1966 and endorsed by the city council early in 1967. Over the next decade, however, much of its content was rendered obsolete by the rapid changes that were affecting the area. The planning department undertook an exhaustive review of the plan in 1976 and in February, 1981, it submitted the revised version of the plan which bore the title

Downtown Area Redevelopment Plan. From the outset the city council was cool towards it and the development industry was intensely heated against it. At a meeting on February 23, 1982, the council formally abandoned the notion of having any kind of statutory plan for the downtown.

It recommended that there be no firm, legally enforceable policies for the downtown. The dominant ideology of the development industry and the business-oriented council had prevailed. The enormous energy of development let loose by oil wealth made planning in Calgary's downtown virtually redundant. The objective of the dominant group in the society and of the city council was to create a core area which mirrored the world-class centres like New York and Chicago, at a density that dwarfed the human scale and reduced human values to the numbers on the bottom line of the corporate balance sheets. There was no need for a master plan to accomplish that objective. The explosive proportions of the business and population expansion was achieving that end by itself. The planning function became a matter of accommodating that growth as quickly and expediently as possible and the most expedient way to do that was for the private sector to assume the effective role. In this, the city council was pleased to co-operate. The city plan was abandoned and the city planning department was made a merely marginal body, and the communal mind and outlook, as expressed by the leading media, contemplated with satisfaction the evidence that their city was indeed emerging with the tangible trappings of wealth and enormously enhanced status.

A revealing look into the communal mind and outlook of Calgarians is provided in a man-on-the-street survey conducted by journalist Bettina Liverant and published in the Calgary Herald Sunday Magazine of 9 August, 1987. In her story, entitled "Here comes 2001: Visions of Calgary" and carrying the sub-title "Calgarians' hopes and fears for the city in the 21st century" Ms. Liverant presents the views of 23 people she interviewed in Calgary concerning their attitudes towards their city and their expectations for its future. Of the 23, only one, with the wisdom of age, (he was 71)

was sagacious enough to say that he couldn't foresee the future. Of the remaining 22, all but one saw the future in terms of greater economic growth and continued physical development. Not a single one of these 21 interviewees touched on the problems of urban poverty, or the issues of civic government, or the matter of social or ethical values. The majority of them - 17 of the 21 - saw the Calgary of the future as simply a more grandiose version of the present city - a bigger and better physical environment.

Moreover, each saw the expansion and improvement in terms of his or her own personal vested interest. The architects spoke of better urban design; the retailers spoke of greater retail sales; the real estate dealer spoke of more building cranes on the skyline; the Trizec chairman spoke of growth and his hopes for a demand for more saddledomes; even the housewife spoke of her wish for a bubble over the central area so she could go shopping among flowers, like they do in Hawaii.

Among the five who did not see the future of Calgary as simply more of the same - an expanded version of today's Calgary with certain physical improvements and from their own highly personal perspective, was the Head of the Alberta College of Art: he was pessimistic about the levelling effect of technology, but even he was talking about the loss of visual distinctiveness in the city's built environment because of the sameness produced by technology; the auctioneer regretted the loss of historic buildings; so did a secretary; another secretary thought that the Calgary of 2001 would look much the same as the present one, but worse. Only Grant MacEwan, former Lieutenant-Governor of Alberta, hoped for a change in the values of Calgarians - less emphasis on growth and fortunes.

It is, of course, quite unscientific to extrapolate from such a sample to the city as a whole. No doubt the responses were what they were because of the composition of the sample. A different set of interviewees would probably have produced different responses. Nevertheless, the results of this survey are in accord with the evidence from other sources. They reveal a communal mind and outlook which sets a high value on

economic success as manifested in the high-rise buildings of the city's commercial sector and the physical environment in general; and they indicate that Calgarians are well pleased with their city's achievements and look forward to more of the same. These findings were corroborated by a survey carried out by the Angus Reid Group of Winnipeg between 28 August and 4 October, 1991. The Reid pollsters' telephone survey involved 4000 urban Canadians living in Winnipeg, Calgary, Edmonton, Vancouver, Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal and Halifax. As reported in the Winnipeg Free Press of Saturday, 2 November, 1991, the survey found that Calgarians think their city is best overall for its quality of life. Calgary residents gave high marks for the city's economy, physical environment and lack of stress. 166

#### **NOTES - CALGARY PHASE 1**

- <sup>1</sup>Richard P. Baine, <u>Calgary: An Urban Study</u>, 16.
- <sup>2</sup>Max Foran, <u>Calgary: An Illustrated History</u>, 11.
- <sup>3</sup>I.G. Baker and Company was the leading transportation and supply company in the west at that time. It was headquartered at Fort Benton, Montana, but its operations extended northward into Canada even as far as Fort Edmonton. Fort Macleod, built in 1874, was located at the place where the Old North Trail known in the area as the Whoop-Up Trail crossed the Oldman River. Fort Macleod was some 150 miles north of Fort Benton and it was along this trail that the Baker company's bull-trains hauled their cargoes. Bull-trains, or ox-trains, were drawn by oxen which could live and work on an all-grass diet and could haul heavy loads an average distance of 12 miles a day. Over the 100-mile distance between Fort Macleod and Fort Calgary the bull-train was the standard form of transportation. North of Fort Calgary, over the 200-mile stretch to Fort Edmonton, the terrain was too soft for the heavy bull-trains and the Red River Cart was the preferred vehicle. See Baine, Calgary: An Urban Study, 16.
- <sup>4</sup>See Hugh A. Dempsey, "Brisebois: Calgary's Forgotten Founder," in Rasporich and Klassen, eds. <u>Frontier Calgary</u>, 1875-1914, 32.
- <sup>5</sup>For a brief biographical sketch of James Farquharson Macleod see the Very Reverend David J. Carter, "Calgary's Early Anglicans," in Rasporich and Klassen, eds., <u>Frontier Calgary</u>, 199.
- <sup>6</sup>Dempsey, "Brisebois," in Rasporich and Klassen, eds., <u>Frontier Calgary</u>, 35.
- <sup>7</sup>See Lewis G. Thomas, "The Rancher and the City: Calgary and the Cattlemen, 1883-1914," in <u>Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada</u>, VI, IV, June 1968, Section II, 203, for opinion that "Calgary" was the name of the Macleod home in Scotland. Thomas' essay is a vivid description of the close relationship between the city and the ranchers during that period.
- <sup>8</sup>J.P. Dickin McGinnis, "Birth to Boom to Bust: Building in Calgary 1875-1914," in Rasporich and Klassen, <u>Frontier Calgary</u>, 8.
- <sup>9</sup>Sheilagh S. Jameson, "The Social Elite of The Ranch Community And Calgary," in Rasporich and Klassen, eds., <u>Frontier Calgary</u>, 59.
- <sup>10</sup>Grant MacEwan, "The Town-Country Background At Calgary," in Rasporich and Klassen, eds., <u>Frontier Calgary</u>, 3.
- <sup>11</sup>Department of Interior, 3, 611-613, 20 May, 1881, cited by Simon Evans, "Spatial Aspects of the Cattle Kingdom: The First Decade, 1882-1892," in Rasporich and Klassen eds., <u>Frontier Calgary</u>, 42.
- 12 Evans, "Spatial Aspects," in Rasporich and Klassen, eds., Frontier Calgary, 42.
- <sup>13</sup>Foran, <u>Calgary: An Illustrated History</u>, 16.
- <sup>14</sup>Evans, "Spatial Aspects," in Rasporich and Klassen, eds., Frontier Calgary, 9.
- <sup>15</sup>McGinnis, "Birth to Boom to Bust," in Rasporich and Klassen, eds., <u>Frontier Calgary</u>, 9.
- <sup>16</sup>Baine, <u>Calgary: An Urban Study</u>, 18.
- <sup>17</sup>McGinnis, "Birth to Boom to Bust," in Rasporich and Klassen, eds., <u>Frontier Calgary</u>, 9.
- <sup>18</sup>Foran, <u>Calgary: An Illustrated History</u>, 16.
- <sup>19</sup>McGinnis, "Birth to Boom to Bust," in Rasporich and Klassen, eds., <u>Frontier Calgary</u>, 9.

- <sup>20</sup>Foran, <u>Calgary: An Illustrated History</u>, 22.
- <sup>21</sup>McGinnis, "Birth to Boom to Bust," in Rasporich and Klassen, eds., <u>Frontier Calgary</u>, 10.
- <sup>22</sup>Baine, Calgary: An Urban Study, 18.
- <sup>23</sup>McGinnis, "Birth to Boom to Bust," in Rasporich and Klassen, eds., <u>Frontier Calgary</u>, 10.
- <sup>24</sup>Foran, <u>Calgary: An Illustrated History</u>, 22.
- <sup>25</sup>Grant MacEwan, <u>Calgary Cavalcade: From Fort to Fortune</u>, 51.
- <sup>26</sup>MacEwan states the fee as \$100, <u>Calgary Cavalcade</u>, 53, but Foran states it as \$500, <u>Calgary: An Illustrated History</u>, 22.
- <sup>27</sup>Max Foran, <u>The Civic Corporation and Urban Growth: Calgary 1884-1930</u>, Appendix G, 399.
- <sup>28</sup>Baine, <u>Calgary: An Urban Study</u>, 15.
- <sup>29</sup>Evans, "Spatial Aspects," in Rasporich and Klassen, eds., Frontier Calgary, 41.
- <sup>30</sup>Evans, "Spatial Aspects," in Rasporich and Klassen, eds., <u>Frontier Calgary</u>, 50. <sup>31</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>32</sup>Evans, "Spatial Aspects," in Rasporich and Klassen, eds., Frontier Calgary, 41.
- 33 Calgary Herald, 12 November, 1884, cited in Lewis Thomas, "The Rancher and the City," in <u>Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada</u>, VI, IV, II, 206.
- <sup>34</sup>Calgary Herald, 14 February, 1886, cited in Lewis Thomas, "The Rancher and the City," in <u>Transactions</u>.
- 35Calgary Herald, 21 March, 1884, cited in Foran, Calgary: An Illustrated History, 25.
- <sup>36</sup>Foran, Calgary: An Illustrated History, 28.
- <sup>37</sup>See Foran, <u>The Civic Corporation</u>, 52.
- <sup>38</sup>Foran, <u>The Civic Corporation</u>, 49.
- <sup>39</sup>Foran, Calgary: An Illustrated History, 34.
- <sup>40</sup>Ordinances of the North West Territories, No. 2, 1883.
- <sup>41</sup>Foran, <u>The Civic Corporation</u>, 34, n. 3.
- <sup>42</sup>Foran, <u>The Civic Corporation</u>, 35.
- 43"The Western World," August, 1890, 143, cited in Foran, The Civic Corporation, 33.
- 44 Ordinances of the North-West Territories, No. 33, 1893.
- <sup>45</sup>Calgary Herald, 23 January, 1895, cited in Foran, <u>The Civic Corporation</u>, 38.
- <sup>46</sup>Foran, <u>The Civic Corporation</u>, 30, n.1.
- <sup>47</sup>Foran, <u>The Civic Corporation</u>, 31.
- <sup>48</sup>Foran, <u>The Civic Corporation</u>, 58.
- <sup>49</sup>MacEwan, <u>Calgary Cavalcade</u>, 128.
- <sup>50</sup>Named after Isaac G. Ogden, the CPR's first auditor.
- <sup>51</sup>James G. MacGregor, <u>A History of Alberta</u>, 185.
- <sup>52</sup>Henry C. Klassen, "The Bond of Brotherhood and Calgary Workingmen," in Rasporich and Klassen, eds., <u>Frontier Calgary</u>, 269.
- <sup>53</sup>Brocklebank not long after became the manager of Thomas Underwood's extensive construction business.
- <sup>54</sup>See Foran, <u>Calgary: An Illustrated History</u>, 174, Appendix, Table I.

- <sup>55</sup>Foran, <u>Calcary: An Illustrated History</u>, 74.
- 56lbid.
- <sup>57</sup>Foran, <u>Calgary: An Illustrated History</u>, 76.
- <sup>58</sup>Brian Peter Melnyk, <u>Calgary Builds: The Emergence of an Urban Landscape, 1905-1914.</u> 22.
- <sup>59</sup>Bob Edwards, quoted by Grant MacEwan in "Eye Opener Bob," 142, cited by Paul Voisey, "In Search of Wealth and Status: An Economic and Social Study of Entrepreneurs in Early Calgary," in Rasporich and Klassen, eds., <u>Frontier Calgary</u>, 239.
- <sup>60</sup>Calgary Eye Opener, 10 April 1920, cited in Foran, <u>Calgary: An Illustrated History</u>, 113.
- <sup>61</sup>Foran, <u>Calgary: An Illustrated History</u>, 86.
- <sup>62</sup>The "Big Four" were Pat Burns, Alfred Ernest Cross, George Lane and Archie McLean.
- <sup>63</sup>Statutes of Alberta, 1907, chapter 32, cited in Foran, <u>The Civic Corporation</u>, 100.
- <sup>64</sup>Foran, <u>The Civic Corporation</u>, 103.
- <sup>65</sup>City of Calgary By-Law No. 763, 3 June, 1907. A subdivision by-law was added to the city's building ordinances in 1909. It was minimal in its requirements, merely limiting the number and spacing of streets and lanes in any one subdivision.
- <sup>66</sup>Foran, Calgary: An Illustrated History, 98.
- <sup>67</sup>Land Titles Act, Statutes of Alberta, 1912, ch. 24, sec.124(4).
- <sup>68</sup>Calgary Herald, 3 April, 1906, cited in Foran, <u>The Civic Corporation</u>, 143.

#### **NOTES - CALGARY PHASE 2**

- <sup>69</sup>City of Calgary Council Minutes, 13 November, 1911, cited in Foran, <u>The Civic Corporation</u>, 144.
- <sup>70</sup>Mawson's plan for Banff was completed but was never implemented.
- <sup>71</sup>See Joyce E. Morrow, <u>Calgary Many Years Hence: The Mawson Plan in Perspective</u>.
- <sup>72</sup>Grant MacEwan, <u>Calgary Cavalcade</u>, 137.
- 73MacEwan, Calgary Cavalcade, 137.
- <sup>74</sup>MacEwan, <u>Calgary Cavalcade</u>, 138.
- 75lbid.
- <sup>76</sup>The Planning Act, Statutes of Alberta, 1913, ch. 18, sec.1.
- <sup>77</sup>Foran, <u>The Civic Corporation</u>, 128.
- <sup>78</sup>Calgary Herald, 14 May 1915, cited in Foran, <u>The Civic Corporation</u>, 232.
- <sup>79</sup>Foran, <u>The Civic Corporation</u>, 292.
- <sup>80</sup>The Labour Gazette, September, 1914, 362-364, cited in Foran, <u>The Civic Corporation</u>, 172.
- 81 Ibid.
- 82 Foran, Calgary: An Illustrated History, 182.
- 83 Calgary Herald, 8 September, 1922.
- 84 Foran, The Civic Corporation, 258.
- 85Calgary Board of Trade Minutes, 19 April, 1922.

- <sup>86</sup>Calgary Board of Trade Minutes, Presidential Address, 1925.
- 87 Foran, Calgary: An Illustrated History, 134.
- 88 Foran, The Civic Corporation, 300.
- <sup>89</sup>Foran, <u>The Civic Corporation</u>, 306.
- <sup>90</sup>lbid.
- <sup>91</sup>Foran, <u>The Civic Corporation</u>, 311.
- <sup>92</sup>Foran, <u>The Civic Corporation</u>, 362.
- <sup>93</sup>Foran, <u>The Civic Corporation</u>, 337, Table IV.1.
- 94 Foran, The Civic Corporation, 363.
- 95 Foran, Calgary: An Illustrated History, 120.
- <sup>96</sup>Foran, Calgary: An Illustrated History, 184, n.39.
- 97 Foran, Calgary: An Illustrated History, 176, Appendix, Table IV.
- 98lbid.

#### **NOTES - CALGARY PHASE 3**

- <sup>99</sup>Foran, Calgary: An Illustrated History, 157.
- <sup>100</sup>Paul Phillips, <u>Structural Change and Population Distribution in the Prairie Region</u> 1911 to 1961, 264, Appendix Z<sub>1</sub>
- <sup>101</sup>Jack Masson, Alberta's Local Governments and Their Politics, 261, 262.
- <sup>102</sup>Masson, Alberta's Local Governments, 278, n.25.
- <sup>103</sup>Calgary City Planning Department, Annual Report, 1951, 2.
- 104lbid.
- 105lbid.
- <sup>106</sup>Calgary City Planning Department, Annual Report, 1951, 14.
- <sup>107</sup>Calgary City Planning Department, Annual Report, 1951, 4.
- <sup>108</sup>Calgary City Planning Department, Annual Report, 1951, 16, 17.
- <sup>109</sup>Calgary District Planning Commission, "Brief Submitted to The Royal Commission on Metropolitan Development of Calgary and Edmonton," 6 December, 1954. A.G. Martin, who prepared the Brief, was both Director of the City of Calgary Planning Department and Director of the Calgary District Planning Commission. The Brief was submitted by the Calgary District Planning Commission under Martin's name as Director.
- <sup>110</sup>Foran, Calgary: An Illustrated History, 178, Appendix, Table VII.
- 111 N.H. Lithwick, <u>Urban Canada: Problems and Prospects</u>, 119, Table A-12.
- 112 Foran, Calgary: An Illustrated History, 166, 168.
- <sup>113</sup>Harry Hays was appointed Minister of Agriculture in Lester Pearson's cabinet in 1963 and later was made a Senator. Grant MacEwan became Alberta's Lieutenant-Governor.
- <sup>114</sup>Calgary City Planning Department, <u>Report on the City of Calgary General Plan</u>, 1963.
- <sup>115</sup>Calgary Planning Department, <u>Urban Renewal Scheme No. 1. Supporting</u> Information, 70.
- <sup>116</sup>George Steber Jr., Calgary Director of Planning, 1972-1983. Statement on audio tape cassette recorded for the author.

- <sup>117</sup>Calgary Planning Department, <u>Calgary General Plan</u>, 1973, "The Calgary Region. Causes for Concern," 1.3.
- 118 Calgary General Plan, 1973, "Residential. Causes for Concern," 4.2.
- <sup>119</sup>Calgary General Plan, 1973, "Residential. Guidelines," 4.5.
- <sup>120</sup>Calgary General Plan, 1973, "Residential. Housing Development," 4.1.
- 121 Calgary General Plan, 1973, "Residential. Guidelines," 4.5.
- <sup>122</sup>Michael H. Rogers, Calgary Director of Planning, 1965-1971, in conversation with the author.
- 123 Ibid.
- <sup>124</sup>Calgary Planning Department, "Towards A New Planning Act For Alberta: A Review," adopted by Calgary City Council 7 October, 1974, cited in Calgary Planning Department, Calgary Plan Review: Public Participation Program, March, 1976, 23.
- <sup>125</sup>Calgary Planning Department, <u>Calgary Plan Review</u> March, 1976, 3.
- <sup>126</sup>Letter from Wendy Charlton, Executive Director, Federation of Calgary Communities, dated 2 July, 1991, to the author.
- <sup>127</sup>Calgary Planning Department, <u>Calgary's Future.... Decide Now: A Summary of the Evaluation of the Alternative Strategies for Calgary</u>. January, 1977, 7-10.
- <sup>128</sup>Calgary Planning Department, <u>The Adopted Strategy: Policy Discussion Paper No. 4</u>, 5-11.
- <sup>129</sup>Burnet, Duckworth, Palmer, Tomblin and O'Donogue, and Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath and Horwath, "Report of the Preliminary Investigation On Activities of Genstar Limited" December, 1973, II-1, II-2, as cited in Chuck Reasons, "Real Estate: The Land Grab," in Chuck Reasons, ed., <u>Stampede City: Power and Politics in the West</u>, 62, 63.

  <sup>130</sup>Reasons, <u>Stampede City</u>, 63.
- <sup>131</sup>Reasons, Stampede City, 64.
- <sup>132</sup>James Lorimer, "The Developers," 99-128, cited in Reasons, <u>Stampede City</u>, 64.
- <sup>133</sup>The Financial Post Ratings in 1983 showed the assets of the Nu-West Group Ltd. as \$1.87 billion. Nu-West, a Calgary-based company, was the biggest homebuilder in Canada and third largest in North America during the 1970's. In 1969 its assets were a mere \$18.7 million; they grew a hundredfold in the following decade. Among the other top developers in the city were the Calgary-based Trizec, Carma, and Daon companies, all of them ranked among those with the largest sales in Canada. Cited in Reasons, Stampede City, 64.
- 134Rod Sykes was not entirely an unregenerate robber baron although he was certainly no Robin Hood. He was hugely successful in his first election campaign in 1969, winning the mayoralty by a margin of 24,300 votes over his nearest rival. His candidacy may also have been a major factor in the unusually large turn-out at the polls: 44.6 percent of eligible voters compared to 36.9 percent in the 1963 civic election. Part of Sykes' success may be attributed to his appeal to the vast army of construction workers in the city at that time and to Sykes' ability as a real estate and development entrepreneur to appeal to that group as someone who understood their dependence on a continuing high level of growth and construction. His campaign emphasized his commitment to "action" and continued growth and development of Calgary. He also spoke sympathetically about the housing crisis and the pressing need for something to be done about it and that he was prepared to do something about it. He later (when he was no longer in office or politics) strongly criticized the promoters of the Olympic Coliseum (the Saddledome) for their ruthless aggression against the residents of the Victoria Park

- neighbourhood. See Colin Campbell, "The Stampede: Cowtown's Sacred Cow," in Reasons, Stampede City, 103-122.
- <sup>135</sup>The Planning Act, Statutes of Alberta, 1977, ch. 89.
- 136The Planning Act, 1977, ch. 89, sec.53(2).
- <sup>137</sup>The Planning Act, 1977, ch. 89, sec.62.
- 138Reasons, Stampede City, 68.
- <sup>139</sup>Sheila Pratt, "To Be or Not To Be? Downtown Is In Question," in the <u>Calgary Herald</u> 8 March, 1980, 14, cited in Reasons, <u>Stampede City</u>, 69.
- <sup>140</sup>Vicki Barnett, "Developer Image Changes Urged," in the <u>Calgary Herald</u> 18 April, 1980, 16, cited in Reasons, <u>Stampede City</u>, 69.
- <sup>141</sup>Chuck Reasons, Stampede City, 69.
- <sup>142</sup>Ralph Klein, "The City Blockbusting.... Or What Smacks Of It," in Calgary Magazine, 2.1., March 1980, 76, cited in Reasons, <u>Stampede City</u>, 70.
- <sup>143</sup>Linda Hurst, "Boom and Gloom Combine in Calgary," in the <u>Toronto Star</u> 19 April, 1980, 85, cited in Reasons, <u>Stampede City</u>, 70.
- <sup>144</sup>Phil Elder, "It's Our Choice," Calgary Herald, 26 October 1980, 24, cited in Reasons, <u>Stampede City</u>, 70.
- <sup>145</sup>Ron Wood, "Representation: Today's Politicians Beget Community Associations," in <u>Calgary Magazine</u>, 3.3., November 1980, 129.
- <sup>146</sup>George Steber Jr., in conversation with the author.
- 147 Ibid.
- 148 lbid.
- <sup>149</sup>Michael Shapcott, "Aldermen Gutless," in <u>Calgary Sun</u>, 29 April, 1981, cited in Reasons, <u>Stampede City</u>, 71.
- <sup>150</sup>Peter Backgeorge, "Keep Out of the Political Arena or Heads Roll Klein Tells Staff," <u>Calgary Herald</u>, 1 May, 1981, 5, cited in Reasons, <u>Stampede City</u>, 71.
- <sup>151</sup>"Klein Attacks Guidelines For Core Development," <u>Calgary Herald</u>, 2 May, 1981, 7, cited in Reasons, <u>Stampede City</u>, 71.
- <sup>152</sup>Peter Backgeorge, "City Staff Warned of Arena Dangers," <u>Calgary Herald</u>, 18 April 1981, 8, cited in Reasons, <u>Stampede City</u>, 71.
- <sup>153</sup>Gillian Steward, "Eclipse of the Sun: Just Whose Interests Is City Council Saving?" Calgary Magazine, October, 1981, 2, cited in Reasons, Stampede City, 72, 73.
- <sup>154</sup>Chuck Reasons, <u>Stampede City</u>, 73.
- <sup>155</sup>Colin Campbell, "The Stampede: Cowtown's Sacred Cow," in Chuck Reasons, <u>Stampede City</u>, 117.
- <sup>156</sup>Chuck Reasons, <u>Stampede City</u>, 75.
- <sup>157</sup>Chuck Reasons, <u>Stampede City</u>, 9.
- <sup>158</sup>James Laxer, "The Energy Poker Game," cited in Richard Baine, <u>Calgary: An Urban Study</u>, 115.
- <sup>159</sup>R.W. Wright, <u>Free Enterprise in Alberta</u>. Wright's paper deals only with the Province of Alberta as a whole and does not refer to Calgary or any other particular city or location. Calgary, however, is sufficiently representative of Alberta to make Wright's views and comments equally applicable to Calgary.
- <sup>160</sup>Wright, <u>Free Enterprise in Alberta</u>, 1.
- <sup>161</sup> Ibid.

<sup>162</sup>Wright, <u>Free Enterprise in Alberta</u>, 2.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid.

<sup>164</sup>Wright, Free Enterprise in Alberta, 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>165</sup>John Bellam, quoted by Barry Calaghan in "After the Fall," in <u>Saturday Night</u>, November, 1983, 68, cited by Chuck Reasons, <u>Stampede City</u>, 66.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>166</sup>Of the eight cities surveyed, Winnipeg took sixth place in the survey ratings on the basis of the responses of Winnipeg's residents. Toronto was rated seventh and Montreal was last. Winnipegers were dissatisfied with and gave low ratings to their city council and the civic government in general, their police force, their downtown - its appearance and entertainment facilities, their cold winters and the city's lack of natural beauty and scenery.

# PART V: CONCLUSION CHAPTER 9 COMMON BEGINNINGS, UNCOMMON ENDINGS

Scholars approach the question of the relevance of the past in understanding the present and planning the future in various ways: in some work it is explicit and part of the argument; in others it is less direct, only implied. But in virtually all recent scholarly work there is agreement on certain fundamental points. It is obvious, for example, that a city's site, its buildings, the early surveys and divisions of land, and the original location of residential, institutional, and commercial districts impose a measure of permanence on the form of a community. So, too, do the political structures and values rooted in the initial period of rapid urbanization.

#### - Alan F.J. Artibise<sup>1</sup>

Probably the approach which offers the greatest scope for the urban historian, in addition to theme studies and general analyses of the process of urbanization, is the study of the individual community. Based on the assumption that a community's life has meaning not discernible by a study of fragmentary portions only, this involves seeing a community as a whole and relating the parts to the larger context. This further necessitates combining local and universal interests. The urban historian, with his feet on the twin camps of history and urban studies, is grounded in local history, seeing a community in its particularity and uniqueness and at the same time aware of the general and comparative aspects of his subject matter. Finally this involves an appreciation of the way in which human factors of personality and decision-making combine with large-scale, faceless social forces in the development of a community.

#### - Gilbert A. Stelter<sup>2</sup>

The role of an urban image has not yet been fully explored. It is a subjective concept which requires much more careful analysis.... Thus this intangible factor of image which adds substantially to the differentiation between cities is a potentially useful concept with which to improve the quality of the urban system.

- N. Harvey Lithwick<sup>3</sup>

#### **CHAPTER 9**

#### COMMON BEGINNINGS, UNCOMMON ENDINGS

#### 1. The Underlying Premises of the Thesis

The preceding chapters of this dissertation have touched on the salient features of the physiography and history of the prairie region, commented on certain aspects of the philosophy of planning and the evolution of the planning function, mused over the concept of a prairie regional personality and of a "communal mind and outlook," and reviewed the historical development of the three subject cities of this study - Winnipeg, Regina and Calgary. In this, the final chapter, it is not intended to present a summary or overview of all that is contained in the foregoing pages. The intention here, rather, is simply to see whether the basic premises of the thesis are valid and borne out by the findings of the study.

It will be recalled that the premises on which this thesis is based are: that each city is different in significant ways from every other city and these differences are more revealing of the inner nature of cities than are the commonalities among them; that the differences among cities are the result of the peculiarities in each city's own particular history; that these distinctive characteristics are a facet of each city's "communal mind and outlook" as it is moulded by changing historical circumstances; that this communal ethos is expressed in each city's planning function; that the planning function is the making and carrying out of future-oriented policy by the city government and that therefore the nature of the city planning function in a city provides a revealing insight into the nature of that city's government.

In order to establish the validity of these premises it will be necessary to marshall the supporting evidence from the material contained in the foregoing pages.

Although it is not the intention in this closing chapter to present a detailed review of the study material, some measure of repetition will be unavoidable, but that should be no more than what is required to provide an explanatory background or to make a point in

support of evidence or argument. The difference among the three subject cities is the central theme of the thesis. The distinctive characteristics of each city is the leitmotif which recurs in various forms throughout the several aspects of the work - the historical movement, the community ethos, the city planning function - and links them together. Before proceeding to the summing-up of their differences, however, it must be acknowledged that there are also important similarities among them, and that perhaps their differences can be more sharply drawn and better understood against the background of their similarities. A brief sketch of their commonalities is, accordingly, in order.

#### 2. <u>Historical Commonalities and Differences</u>

It should not surprise anyone to find that there were strong parallels in the early history of all three cities and that they all had some very similar experiences during their formative years. After all, the three of them were established in a common milieu, in similar circumstances, within a few years of each other, and all developed in their emergent period under the stimulus of much the same forces. All three are located in the same geographic region - the prairie region of western Canada - although Winnipeg and Regina are on the flat part of the great plains in an exposed and relatively featureless natural environment while Calgary lies in a more sheltered and visually more varied setting at the foothills of the rocky mountains. They share the same continental climate although the harsh prairie winter is somewhat mitigated in Calgary by the intermittent Chinook wind which brings warm air in from the Pacific and blows it down the eastern slope of the mountains. They each emerged on the leading edge of Canada's first major westward-surging tide of settlement. Each of them in its time was a frontier community on the outer edge of Canada's expanding western domain and each of them in turn had a similar frontier mentality and outlook shaped by the common natural environment, the same ethno-cultural heritage, the same life expectations and values rooted in the freemarket, private enterprise capitalist ethos of the society of which they were an integral part even though they arose on the remote undeveloped fringe of that society.

The CPR gave life to all three of them and made possible not only their survival but also their ultimate burgeoning into important metropolitan centres. The CPR also was a major determinant of the physical form of all three cities. In each case the east-west alignment of the main line right-of-way constrained development to locate on the north and south sides of this axis thereby resulting eventually in a city which was cut into two parts with the north part severed from the south part; and in all three cities the severance was more than only physical - it was economic and social as well and resulted in one of the startling parallels among them. In all three cases the socio-economic and ethno-cultural aspects of the settlement pattern was notably similar. In each of them the working-class immigrants, mainly of other than Anglo-Saxon background, settled in the northern and eastern sectors of the city and the wealthier middle- and upper-class Anglo-Saxons settled in the southern and western sectors.

All three communities were incorporated as municipalities within a few years of each other - Winnipeg in 1873, Regina in 1883 and Calgary in 1884. The municipal councils, in each case, were dominated, at least in the early years, by merchants, although subsequently other types of businessmen were elected; but in all three places the business ethos coloured the deliberations and decisions of the civic government. Expansion of the local economy, growth of the population, and aggrandizement of the civic image were the council's objectives in all three cases and they all used similar devices to achieve these ends - industrial bonusing, money and land grants, tax exemptions and exuberant civic promotion and boosterism. The pursuit of these business-like objectives was inevitable, given the larger socio-economic context of Canada in which all of these communities are embedded. And the domination of their councils by businessmen was also inevitable, given the statutory status and role and the fiscal limits of municipal government. These contextual constraints inevitably produced similar broad over-all

patterns of behaviour among the councils of the three cities, patterns, however, which varied in their details due to differences in their local circumstances and experiences.

There were, of course, differences even at the outset. The differences in the natural environment across the prairie region evoked correspondingly different responses among the settlers in the respective sub-regions. Cattle ranching initially emerged in south-west Alberta because the local topography and climate were much more favourable to that pursuit of livelihood than they were to grain farming. On the other hand the natural environment of the central plain was most conducive to grain farming, as it was in the easterly reaches of the plain. These natural influences and their initially evoked responses and trends left their mark on the psyche of the respective communities. In support of this notion one can point to the early imprinting of the "cowboy" image on the communal mind and outlook of Calgary with its mystique of dominion over the open range, unfenced freedom of movement and unfettered pursuit of one's own personal horizons, beholden to no man - an image which is perpetuated to this day by the Calgary Stampede and the symbolic white Stetson hat. Contrasted with this is the early image of the Saskatchewan farmer, tied to the land and locked in a desperate struggle to wring a livelihood from the tauntingly fruitful but reluctant soil and harsh environment - an image with which the people of Regina still have a closely binding empathy. And these again contrast with the buoyant, expansionist business euphoria of Winnipeg's early ascendancy, an image which to this day lingers as a wistful, nostalgic memory in the subconscious layers of the pessimistic and negative cast of contemporary Winnipeg's communal mind and outlook.

Against this brief and generalized background, what can be said about the distinctive characteristics of the three subject cities of the study, the communal mind and outlook of each and how these are expressed in each city's planning function? And what do these facets of each city's personality reveal about the nature of its civic government? Perhaps the first thing that can be said about the three subject cities is

that each of their origins was distinctive. Winnipeg began as a fur-trading post and later became a farming settlement established by Lord Selkirk as a re-settlement project for crofters displaced from the farms of his ancestral estate in Scotland by the enclosure movement. Regina began as a townsite created by the CPR for the purpose of producing revenues for the railway company from the sale of townsite lots and the transportation of local and hinterland freight. Calgary began as an outpost and fort of the North West Mounted Police established by the federal government of John A. Macdonald to bring law and order into the Whoop-Up country of south-west Alberta.

In the beginning Calgary's economy was based on cattle ranching in the surrounding hinterland. Agriculture then became established and with the help of irrigation expanded to rival and even surpass ranching and then was itself displaced by the oil industry. Regina's economy from the outset was almost wholly dependent upon the provincial wheat crop and continued so in spite of some diversification of the province's economic base by the discovery of potash, uranium and oil. The growth potential of a wheat-based economy like Saskatchewan's was limited. Its greatest expansion occurred during the period when the farm land was being taken up and the infrastructure of the wheat economy was being put in place. In Saskatchewan these were the decades between 1883 and 1913. When all the productive land had been taken up and the financial, production and marketing infrastructure had been put in place there was, in effect, nowhere else for the economy to grow. Winnipeg's economy initially was based on the fur trade and then, with the arrival of the Selkirk Settlers in 1812, agriculture was introduced. But Winnipeg was the gateway to the west and all traffic between eastern Canada and the west passed through it. When the mainline of the CPR was routed through Winnipeg in 1882 this transportation portal assumed proportions of national significance and Winnipeg's importance zoomed.

By 1891 Winnipeg's population was 25,639; Calgary's was 3,867; Regina's was 1,681. By 1911 Winnipeg's population had grown to 136,035; Calgary's had reached

43,704; and Regina's stood at 30,213. Winnipeg had become the financial and market centre for the entire prairie wheat crop. The westward flood of immigrants was continuing; traffic on the railway in both directions was escalating and Winnipeg was soon transformed into the transportation, warehousing, wholesaling, manufacturing and financial centre of the entire prairie region. With the depression of 1913, the completion of the Panama Canal in 1914, the maturing of the western wheat economy, the emergence, growth and development of other important western cities to which many of Winnipeg's former economic functions were transferred, the failure, for a variety of reasons, of Winnipeg to move in new economic directions, Winnipeg's population and economic growth abated. And with the discovery of oil at Leduc, Calgary gradually took over from Winnipeg the role of primate metropolis of the prairie region.

#### 3. Early "Planning" Gestures

In the period between 1905 and World War I there was still no planning function in any of the three cities. There were certain pursuits in both Calgary and Regina which, in the loosest possible application of the term might be deemed to be of a "planning" nature. In Calgary, the purchase of an extensive tract of land to the east of the municipality for industrial sites might be regarded as a "planning" gesture inasmuch as it was a move by the council to carry out its industrial development policy.

Similarly, the Regina council's control of the extensive lands in the north-east of the city, granted to Regina by the federal government, was also the implementation of an industrial development policy. In Winnipeg, carried headlong by the economic development forces inherent in the elaborate spread of its railway network, the burgeoning of its warehousing function, the expansion of its manufacturing base as the supplier of the goods and of its financial institutions as the supplier of the financial services required in the expanding west, there was, in effect, no need for a consciously formulated economic development policy: the economy was developing according to its own policies and dictates.

Nevertheless, the idea of planning was beginning to gain some currency. The federal government had created the Commission of Conservation in 1909, with Clifford Sifton as president. The Commission soon became an energetic champion of town planning to which it attributed an extravagant potential for salvaging what the Commission saw as the seriously deteriorating condition of a number of aspects of Canadian cities. Town planning became a topic of conversation among various interest groups across the country and in 1913 the legislature of the Province of Alberta, with Arthur Sifton as premier, passed the Alberta Town Planning Act. Arthur Sifton was the brother of the Commission of Conservation president, Clifford Sifton. This was followed by Manitoba's Town Planning Act in 1916 and Saskatchewan's Town and Rural Planning Act in 1917. The idea of planning attracted adherents but there was no consensus on what was meant by the term and no understanding of the limits on the "planning" powers available to municipal government. The Planning Acts of all three prairie provinces were permissive in character and rudimentary in their planning concepts and none of the three subject cities acted on any of their provisions for many years.

The thirty-odd years between the economic recession of 1913 and the end of the second world war in 1945 were marked by the outbreak of World War I, economic stagnation, the Great Depression, the outbreak of World War II, and very little growth in the population of any of the three cities. There was also very little change in the attitudes of the three cities towards the planning function. Calgary and Regina continued to manage their development, such as it was, through the normal provision of municipal engineering services and the zoning and building by-laws which were only indifferently effective. The councils, however, saw no need for more sophisticated planning measures. Winnipeg continued in much the same vein but because of the fragmented municipal jurisdiction in the metropolitan area special *ad hoc*, single-purpose agencies had to be established among the affected municipalities for the provision of certain metro-wide

services, such as the Greater Winnipeg Water District, the Greater Winnipeg Sanitary District, and others.

### 4. <u>Post-World War II Urbanization and the Emergent Planning Function</u>

The end of World War II marked the end of an era on the prairies as it did for most of Canada. Before that the prairie region was characteristically a rural region whose communal mind and outlook were conditioned by the rural way of life and rural concerns and the greater part of whose population lived in the rural areas. All of that changed with the end of the war in 1945. A great wave of urbanization swept across Canada in the decades which followed, profoundly changing the character of the country as it did of the prairie region and as it did of the three subject cities of this study. Calgary was the most dramatically affected in terms of population increase, Regina to a lesser extent and Winnipeg to a much lesser extent, proportionately, than the other two.

As Calgary's status and role in the prairie region steadily and inexorably rose, Winnipeg's and Regina's correspondingly declined. Regina had always been very much smaller than both Calgary and Winnipeg and its decline relative to Calgary's growth was not very significant. Winnipeg, on the other hand, had always been very much larger and more important than Calgary and its decline relative to Calgary marked a colossal shift in the structure of the urban system of the prairie region. Calgary gradually moved ahead of Winnipeg in the fields of commerce, finance, communications, transportation (particularly air transportation), and made heavy inroads into Winnipeg's leadership position in wholesaling and manufacturing. Calgary overtook and passed Winnipeg in size of population in the late 1970's, and replaced it in status among the cities of the prairie region.

As the nature of urban society changed in the post-World War II decades and under the pressure of urban growth and the increasing complexity of managing it,

attitudes towards the city planning function also changed. Alberta passed a new <u>Planning Act</u> in 1950. It recognized the need for a more effective, formally established administrative structure to perform the planning function and provided for the creation of Technical Planning Boards, District Planning Commissions and Interim Development Control. Calgary established its first Planning Department, Technical Planning Board and Planning Advisory Commission in 1950. In the following year the Calgary District Planning Commission was formed for the purpose of co-ordinating the development of the city and its surrounding municipalities. Although the City of Calgary's Planning Department was established in 1950, the first Calgary General Plan was not adopted until 1963. Nevertheless the agencies created in 1950 were the first measures taken by the City of Calgary to put in place a proper city planning function.

Regina's experience in the decades following the war resembled Calgary's in some respects but was significantly different in others. At the end of the war the City of Regina was the owner of fully one quarter of the property of Regina. The Civic Voters Association - the business-oriented civic election organization - dominated the Regina city council from 1939 to 1953, and they were probably unhappy about such a large amount of property being in public ownership and producing no tax revenues. Furthermore, Regina was suffering from a housing crisis immediately after the war (as also was Calgary) and some systematic way had to be found to deal with it. A master development plan seemed to offer the solution to these problems. Faludi was accordingly engaged in 1946 to provide that plan, which he presented to the city council in the following year. Calgary welcomed its explosive growth in the immediate post-war years but by 1950 it was apparent that some measure of control was necessary and it created a Planning Department, while Regina looked to its consultant's advice. Nevertheless Regina did appoint its first in-house city planner in 1951 and its first full Planning Department in 1957. The first Regina District Planning Commission was also established in 1951. Although Regina implemented some of Faludi's recommendations,

the population forecasts which were the basis of this plan were rendered erroneous and obsolete by the unforeseen growth of the city and by the end of the 1950s a new plan was required. The city planning department was in fact already at work on a general development plan, and in 1961 the Regina city council adopted its first development plan prepared by its own administration.

Winnipeg's situation at the end of the war and during the decade of the 1950s was quite different from that of the other two cities. During those years Winnipeg's growth - even the growth of the metropolitan Winnipeg area - was very much slower than that of the other two cities. The problem of accommodating rapidly increasing populations was not as pressing in Winnipeg as it was in Calgary and Regina. But the fragmentation of municipal government into some 14 autonomous jurisdictions created problems which were even more difficult than those of accommodating a mushrooming population. These problems included such troubles as the serious deterioration of the metropolitan area's infrastructure and bringing it up to an acceptable standard across the metropolitan area, the inequitable distribution of the municipal tax burden and many other problems inherent in a system of multiple municipal authorities governing what was essentially a single urban population. Each municipal corporation had its own engineering department which performed whatever "planning" function each council deemed necessary but there was no city planning function as the term is now understood. Each municipality was jealously protective of its own identity and authority and in fierce competition with every other municipality for business, growth and status. There was only grudging co-operation among any of them for the provision of services where such co-operation was the only way of providing those services.

The provincial government recognized the problems and inequities of the local government system in metropolitan Winnipeg and in 1960 passed the Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg Act, to take effect on January 1, 1961. The Act created the two-tier system of municipal government in Greater Winnipeg. One tier was the

Metropolitan tier, the other tier comprised the Area Municipalities, in which the central City of Winnipeg was included. The Act, among other things, set out the administrative structures for the Metropolitan tier, in which was included a Planning Division. The Act also gave the Metropolitan tier a broad range of planning powers which were deemed to be appropriate for planning at the metropolitan, area-wide scale. The area municipalities retained certain powers over development at the local level.

The Metropolitan Development Plan, prepared by the Metropolitan Government's Planning Division, was the first comprehensive development plan prepared for the whole of the metropolitan area by the civic government administration. The draft plan was completed and presented in September 1963. It was greeted by a virulent attack from the area municipalities led by the central City of Winnipeg. After four years of inter-municipal recrimination and bitterness and revisions to the plan, the Minister approved the final version in 1967 and the Metro Council gave it third reading and passed it into law in April 1968. It had taken nearly five years for a plan finally to be accepted by all the parties involved and established as the development plan for the Metropolitan Winnipeg area.

In all three cases, however, the general development plan was still only a fairly rudimentary and tentative instrument. The central theme in each of them was the pattern of land-use and physical development of the city. Each of them analyzed past trends in the city's growth rate, demographic structure, economy, transportation system, etc. and projected these to the stated time-horizon of the plan. Each plan then drew a picture of what it thought the land-use pattern of the city and the physical appearance of some of its places should be at that time. None of them set out specific details of goals to be achieved within given time limits or proposed any strategies for achieving the pictured overall land-use pattern. Guidelines and policies, where they were stated, were cast in terms of very broad principles and general concepts which were little more than vague aspirations with no indication of how they were to be

implemented or realized. It was, in fact, the zoning by-law rather than the development plan which was regarded by the city councils of all three cities as the effective development control instrument.

By the end of the 1960's, then, the city planning function had emerged in all three cities as a formal part of the government process, even if still something of a novelty. Each of them had its planning department and related administrative units, its planning staff and its comprehensive long-range plan. But these parallels were for the most part only surface manifestations. Beneath the surface were significant differences which would become more pronounced and manifest as the cities evolved further and their planning functions matured and became more distinctive.

#### 5. <u>Differences in the Roots of the Planning Function</u>

Calgary's planning function was driven by the energy of growth. The booming, oil-fuelled economic and population growth created an enormous insatiable demand for land. The planning function under this unrelenting pressure became primarily that of processing applications for development. This involved the whole spectrum of land-planning procedures and techniques - site inspections and analyses, identification of city requirements including community reserve dedications, infrastructure services, sub-division designs and approvals, code regulations, zoning applications and variances, reports to the city's technical and political bodies, etc. But, the compelling need was to accommodate the growth as quickly and effectively as possible, which meant that delays and obstructions in the approval process had to be reduced to a minimum. Where the developer's requirements conflicted with the city's general plan or zoning by-law accommodation had to be negotiated or amendments prepared and processed without delay under the pressure of the demand. It was, in effect, the private developer who was setting the nature of Calgary's planning function and was laying the foundations of the massive development in the core of the emerging metropolis.

Regina's growth was smaller and slower than Calgary's and its pressure on the city's planning function was much lighter. Applications for development had to be processed but these did not impose extreme demands on the planners and the system. The relatively easy routine of managing the development activity in the city is indicated by the nature of Regina's 1961 development plan. The plan is cast in the most general terms and proposes no specific policies for growth management. More than that it openly states that it is only a tentative plan and is intended only as a framework for further studies on which a more permanent and comprehensive plan can be based. This is hardly the kind of plan which would arise out of the pressure-cooker of intensive development activity.

There was an even more notable difference between Calgary and Regina in their development and planning: in Regina the provincial government was a major presence and played an important role in the direct, hands-on development of the city; in Calgary the provincial government was a minor presence and had little or no direct involvement in the city's development. Wascana Centre is an exceptional inner-city park and is one of Regina's outstanding features. It was created by the Province of Saskatchewan in the 1960's and there were further provincial interventions in Regina in subsequent years. Calgary has no comparable provincial government presence. It is true that Regina is the capital of Saskatchewan while Calgary is not the capital of Alberta. This circumstance alone will ensure a far greater provincial government involvement in the one than in the other. But there is more to Saskatchewan's intervention in Regina's economy and physical environment than the government's requirement for offices and facilities to carry out its responsibilities. It has as much to do with the fact that public intervention is more traditional and acceptable in Regina than it is in Calgary, and this, in turn, probably has something to do with the fact that since the discovery of oil at Leduc the private sector in Calgary has been able to drive the city's economy and to influence the communal mind and outlook in Calgary more readily than the private sector in Regina.

Winnipeg was different again from both Calgary and Regina even though the appurtenances of the planning function seemed to be the same in all three cities. The major issues which exercised metropolitan Winnipeg during the 1960's were not those of extremely rapid growth or how to control it or towards what future to guide it. Metropolitan Winnipeg was more concerned with straightening out the past than with ordering the future. The problems of multiple municipal authorities, truncated and obsolete infrastructure systems, inter-municipal hostility and the adjustments and accommodation required to function within a new, unfamiliar and uncongenial structure of municipal government were enough to ensure that there was no unified or coherent communal mind and outlook, that attitudes among the metropolitan population were divided and factious and that the planning administration was less directed towards planning the future development of the metro area than it was towards finding ways to function effectively in a present milieu of political conflicts and obstructions.

# 6. <u>Differences in the Legislative Framework and Public Participation</u> in the Planning Function

It was after the 1960's that the differences among the three cities became marked and entrenched. In 1972 the several municipalities in the metropolitan Winnipeg region were amalgamated into a single city under the name of the City of Winnipeg. Among the provisions of the City of Winnipeg Act, 1971, (effective January 1, 1972) the creation of the Additional Zone and the Residents' Advisory Group are of interest inasmuch as they are notably different from the corresponding items in the other two cities. The Additional Zone created by the City of Winnipeg Act was an area extending from the city's boundary outward into the adjacent areas all around the city to a depth of approximately five miles in which the City of Winnipeg had extra-territorial planning jurisdiction. The City had the authority to exercise full land-use, zoning and development control over this area. The council of a municipality in the Additional Zone

could initiate planning measures such as zoning by-laws or development plans but these required the approval of the City of Winnipeg before they had any legal status or force.

In Regina the control over development in the surrounding rural area was vested in the Regina District Planning Commission in which the City of Regina was only one of several members and had no primacy of place or power. The City of Regina had no overriding authority over the decisions of the District Planning Commission.

In Calgary it was the Calgary District Planning Commission which had the authority over development in the area surrounding the city but here the position of the Commission was different from Regina's Commission and Winnipeg's Council. Under the Alberta Planning Act 1977, all district planning commissions in the Province of Alberta were required to prepare district plans which the Act established as the cardinal plan in the hierarchy of planning instruments in the district. Every municipal plan and every municipal planning measure from general development plan to area structure or concept plan to zoning by-law amendment, including those of the City of Calgary, were subordinate to the district plan and had to conform to it.

These differences arising out of the relevant provincial legislation are perhaps more indicative of the differences in the attitudes of the respective provincial governments than of the cities themselves, but as is inevitable with provincial statutes they affected the cities in correspondingly different ways. Calgary's planning department had to work closely with the District planning staff and harmonize their planning measures with the District's. Winnipeg's planning department had virtually no liaison with the administrations in the Additional Zone and there were frequent acrimonious confrontations over planning or development proposals in the surrounding municipalities to which Winnipeg's administration and council were opposed. In Regina the scale and rate of development in the surrounding rural area was so slight as to present little difficulty in arriving at agreement among all the parties.

The Residents' Advisory Groups which were created by the City of Winnipea Act were unique to the City of Winnipeg among the three cities. They were intended as a vital component of the system of citizen participation in the political process which the NDP government of Premier Edward Schrever sought to establish in the new, amalgamated city. The Act divided the city into six Communities. Each Community was composed of a number of Wards and each Ward elected one member to the City Council. The councillors for each Ward of a given Community together constituted the Community Committee for that Community. The Residents' Advisory Group was elected from among the residents of the Community and was intended to be the citizens' counterpart of the political Community Committee. The views and wishes of the residents were expected to be voiced by the Residents' Advisory Group and transmitted to the City Council through the medium of the Community Committee. In theory and on paper the arrangement appeared attractive as a mechanism for the exercise of grass-roots democracy. Unfortunately it did not work out as had been intended. There are a number of reasons for this which need not be detailed here but important among them is the lack of harmony between the councillors on the Community Committees and the members of the Residents' Advisory Groups who were often social activists and dissidents opposed to the views of the Community Committee politicians. The RAG's, as is their popular acronym, seldom become involved in the conception or formulation of long-range planning policy. But then, neither do the Community Committees. However, where local zoning or traffic issues or similar matters affecting local neighbourhoods arise, the RAG's do perform a useful function in vigorously representing the local point of view before the Community Committees, even if they are not always successful in their advocacy. What is noteworthy is the fact that they are a part of the formal statutory political structure of the city and have a statutorily designated role in the city's political process.

In Regina, community associations were not common prior to the 1970's and had no formal status or role in the decision-making process of the city government. The

introduction by CMHC of the Neighbourhood Improvement Program (NIP) in 1973 stimulated the formation of neighbourhood associations in those areas where NIP programs were implemented. In that year, too, a new Director was appointed to head Regina's City Planning Department, who brought a new approach to the planning process in the city. He actively involved in the broader planning issues those neighbourhoods in which NIP programs were proceeding and from there went farther afield to draw other communities into the general planning activity. Stimulated by the example of the NIP neighbourhood associations, other associations were being formed and a number of neighbourhood plans were prepared by the members of these associations working in close collaboration with the staff of the city planning department. The planning department set up and operated a number of store-front offices which were quite successful as long as funding was available to them. Eventually, however, the field offices funding was discontinued and the presence of the community associations in the planning process faded. Most of the neighbourhoods and community groups focused their attention on programs of local sports and recreation, although some maintained an interest in political issues. The difference between the situation in Regina and Winnipeg is that in the case of Winnipeg the attempt was made to embed the principle and practice of citizen participation in the provincial City of Winnipeg statute and it was partially a failure because of the failure of the political will that it should succeed; in Regina the community groups' participation in the political process was partially successful because of the planning administration's will to make it succeed.

In Calgary the first community association was formed in 1916. Subsequently such associations sprang up in all parts of the city until in 1961 it was possible to organize them under an effective umbrella organization called the Federation of Calgary Communities. Today there are something like 125 community associations in Calgary with 90 of them belonging to the FCC. For the most part they are interested in local sports and recreation programs and have little involvement in the planning or political

process. Occasionally, however, an issue arises which threatens the interests or welfare of a neighbourhood and the residents are stirred to action in their own defence. Some of these actions have been extremely vigorous and loud; some of them have even been successful. But these have been ad hoc responses to perceived imminent threats. The FCC and the individual associations are not formally integrated into the City of Calgary's political system or planning process. That however does not seem to prevent them from active involvement in the process on those occasions when such involvement becomes necessary. Perhaps the fact that Winnipeg's RAG's are required by statute to be represented to council through their community committees is a disadvantage. In both Regina and Calgary the community associations are free to voice their opinions directly to their councils. In Winnipeg the interposition of the community committees seems to place an obstacle in the way of direct and effective communications between Winnipegers and their city council.

These differences, as already suggested, derive from the differences in the approach by the three provincial governments to issues of local government and planning; they therefore reflect the differences in their respective provincial statutes. There are, however, more profound differences among the three cities whose sources lie beyond the ambit of provincial legislation. These are the differences which are determined by the cities' economies and which therefore reflect the differences in their respective socio-economic circumstances. It is these circumstances which mold the communal mind and outlook and the character of the planning function.

## 7. <u>Differences in the Social and Economic Circumstances Affecting the Planning Function</u>

Perhaps the salient characteristics of Winnipeg's socio-economic circumstances is the decline in its status, not only in the prairie region but in the nation. Calgary, Edmonton and Vancouver have eclipsed Winnipeg in the west and have taken over most of the functions of national significance which at one time had made Winnipeg the third

metropolis of Canada, behind only Montreal and Toronto. In the decade and one-half 1951-1966, metropolitan Winnipeg gained 151,771 people, increasing from 357,229 in 1956 to 509,000 in 1966 (Table 19), an increase of 42.48 percent over the fifteen years or an average annual increase of 2.83 percent. This was a fairly respectable performance. On the strength of it, and on the contingent assumption that Winnipeg would retain its status in the front rank of prairie cities and on the premise that the revitalization of the downtown core was the top priority among the measures necessary to establish and maintain the city's prestigious image, the planning department of the metropolitan government in 1969 produced Downtown Winnipeg, a plan for the redevelopment of the city's downtown. The department had already produced the Metropolitan Development Plan, the general plan for the entire metropolis. Downtown Winnipeg zeroed in on the decaying core area which had been abandoned by both resident population and business and was left in a derelict condition. The metro council adopted the downtown plan by by-law and that was the last of it. The only component of the ambitious, elaborate scheme which was implemented was the convention centre. The rest of the plan was simply ignored and lapsed into obscurity where it joined other faded dreams like the Metropolitan Development Plan, the Mawson plans for Calgary and Regina, Calgary's **Downtown Area Redevelopment Plan** and others.

The amalgamation of all the municipalities in the metropolitan area into a single city in 1972 ushered in a new era in the governance of Winnipeg. By that time the city's familiar pattern of virtually no growth had re-asserted itself. Between 1966 and 1976 the average annual increase in the metropolitan population sat at 1.01 percent for each of the ten years. The city planning department accepted the reality of the city's condition of near stasis. In 1980 they produced a new development plan for the city entitled Plan Winnipeg which was based on premises and assumptions which reflected the city's prevailing socio-economic circumstances. Essentially, the plan sought to focus the city's policies on the improvement of the older residential neighbourhoods, river bank

reclamation, local zoning and traffic issues and similar concerns relating to the improvement of the quality of life within the context of the city's existing conditions. The new structure of the civic government turned the attention of the councillors to the parochial issues in their local wards. There was little consideration of large-scale, city-wide, long-range, development concepts or programs, and little observance by the councillors of the policies embodied in <a href="Plan Winnipeg">Plan Winnipeg</a>. The historic rivalry between the central city of Winnipeg and the surrounding area municipalities was not entirely abated by their amalgamation into Unicity. Suburban councillors were even less sympathetic with the problems of the central city.

Regina is markedly different from Winnipeg. Perhaps the most immediately noticeable difference is in the size of the two cities. Regina is very much smaller than Winnipeg and has always been so. (Table 4 and Table 5.) Because of its small size Regina was able to absorb the increment without any major mutations in its prevailing civic institutions or communal mind and outlook. The introduction of Medicare early in the 1960's was, of course, a major institutional change. But this was a provincial government policy and did not arise out of internal stresses in the city's own socioeconomic circumstances or civic government regime. Moreover, Regina's communal mind and outlook was always receptive to provincial interventions, particularly in the fields of social services and economic supports. Just as Calgary's communal mind and outlook was inherently disposed towards the ideology of individualism so Regina's was disposed towards the ideology of collectivism.

It was not only its small size which was a contributing factor in Regina's relative stability. Another important contributor was the city's successive boundary extensions to incorporate the communities which grew up on its periphery, thereby ensuring a single municipal authority over the entire built-up area. Another critical aspect of Regina's size, which was not so much a consequence of its size as a reflection of it and which differentiated it sharply from Winnipeg, and from Calgary, was its continuing

position as the least of the five prairie metropolitan centres. Regina was never a centre of national stature. It never developed a strong diversified economy. Its manufacturing sector is fairly rudimentary; its wholesaling and distribution functions are localized. Essentially Regina is the service centre for the southern half of Saskatchewan. Its economy is based on retailing, wholesaling, warehousing, distribution, real estate, some manufacturing, government and services and its market for these rarely extends beyond the provincial boundaries.

Regina's economy is heavily dependent upon the Saskatchewan wheat crop. An abundant harvest and good international sales mean good times in Regina; a poor harvest and poor sales mean long faces in the city. This close economic linkage has also melded Regina's ethos with that of the surrounding farming community. They share a common communal mind and outlook. The psychological unity is strengthened by the fact that Regina's economy has not attracted the large multi-national corporations so that the corporate image and ethos have not been imprinted on the city's communal mind and outlook. It is interesting to note that although Regina has its "Old Families" the city has not really spawned any wealthy, powerful, dynastic families like the Richardsons of Winnipeg or the Lougheeds of Calgary.

The small size, manageable growth rate, rural-oriented ethos, wheat-dependent economy, hinterland service-centre character, have enabled Regina's planning function to cope with the development of the city in a controlled and systematic way. Although the real-estate developers played a significant role in the development of the city they did not assume the magnitude or the domineering presence of the development industry in Calgary. The forces of growth were not so enormous as to overwhelm all other considerations for the rational allocation of the city's resources. The new residential neighbourhoods were developed at a reasonable rate and to a decent standard of lay-out and design and with adequate community amenities and services. The downtown however suffered much the same unhappy experience as that of many other North American cities.

This was not the overloading of the core area with high-density high-rise development as in Calgary but rather the desertion of the area by its viable constituents much the same as in Winnipeg. As the suburbs developed, residents and businesses abandoned the downtown for suburban locations leaving the city's core in a desolate state.

Calgary's expectations were always high, its confidence in its roseate future never flagged and its self-esteem was never abashed. However, it might have gone on indefinitely looking for its destiny to be fulfilled if Leduc #1 had not blown in in 1947. That was the magic elixir which transformed Calgary's aspirations into reality. The city's communal mind and outlook had always embraced the ideology of individualism, private enterprise and a minimal presence of government not only in the operation of the market but also in the conduct of the affairs of the community. The advent of the oil industry simply affirmed and made overt and explicit that ideology. Calgary was inundated with oilmen, oil companies, oil money and a flood of businessmen, workers, and residents who were the contingent or secondary wave flowing in behind the primary tide of oil. The city was transformed from a small provincial service centre into the hub of Canada's oil industry. Investment money poured in, the population ballooned, the real-estate and development industries burgeoned. From the perspective of this study the aspects of Calgary's oil-generated boom which are of direct and particular interest are its affects on Calgary's communal mind and outlook and on the conduct of the city's planning function.

Prior to 1950 Calgary had no planning function in its civic administration. The city's land-use controls were rudimentary and *ad hoc* and its disposition towards the future was buoyantly optimistic, but directionless. There was little concern about where the city was going or how it was getting there, as long as it was on the path to wealth and celebrity. Whatever measures the council adopted, such as the purchase of the Manchester industrial site, or the mounting of the Calgary Stampede, or the subsidies to industries, or the numerous promotional campaigns, or the pursuit of

whatever developments and investments, they were all directed towards the ultimate goals of wealth and status. And they were all *ad hoc* expedients and improvisations. There was no coherent, systematic plan and there was no clear conception or delineation of the ultimate nature or form of the city towards which they were yearning, other than the hazy and euphoric sentiment that it would be wealthy and renowned.

After the Leduc field was brought in in 1947 and the impact of oil was being felt in Calgary, it became clear that the city was on the way to its ordained destiny. It was during the decade of the 1960's and on into the 1970's that Calgary experienced its most massive population growth. This volume and rate of new arrivals produced an enormous demand for land and housing and the development industry responded effectively to the demand. In the residential sphere a small number of large, efficient, well-financed development companies emerged as a virtual monopoly in the creation of new suburban residential neighbourhoods. Each had its own sector of the city in which to operate and each respected the other's territorial boundaries. They were extremely successful, not only in terms of their profitability but also in catering to the wants of their middleclass clientele. The neighbourhoods they developed were the last word in trendy lay-out and design, ostentation, gimmickry and one-upmanship - the very thing that would appeal to the egos of a widening middle-class bent on accumulating possessions and preoccupied with their display as a token of success. And because of the urgency of the demand, it was, in effect, the development industry which determined the city's planning function. For the poor, the disadvantaged, those who could not afford the high costs of land and house which continued to escalate under the pressure of demand, there was no accommodation other than what could be found in the degraded enclaves of the city.

## 8. <u>Differences in Downtown Typify Differences in the Planning Function, Communal Mind and Outlook</u>

That was the situation in the suburban residential sector. The core area had a somewhat different experience. The downtown of many North American cities suffered a

common traumatic experience in the decades after the second World War - they were simply abandoned. There was an exodus of residential population to the suburbs, followed by businesses whose habitat had traditionally been the central business district. The out-migration left the central areas of these cities in a state of dereliction, with extensive vacancies and spreading deterioration and dilapidation and populated largely by the society's under-classes. In the United States, the blacks and the new immigrants - Hispanics and Asiatics - occupied these core areas. In Regina and Winnipeg the native Indians were their highly visible habitues. Calgary's experience was the opposite. Instead of being deserted its core area became very densely occupied. The multitude of corporations drawn to Calgary by the oil wealth all sought central area locations for their offices. The core became a forest of glass and concrete towers. But in the process of creating this high-rise city-within-a-city much damage was done to existing inner city neighbourhoods, to existing buildings and familiar landmarks, to small businesses, to established life-styles and patterns of behaviour.

In the cities like Winnipeg and Regina where the core area was dying, its revitalization became something of a sacred credo among city planners. It is understandable that the businessmen who remained in the central business district would desperately desire its renewal: their revenues were dramatically reduced and the continued existence of their businesses was under constant threat by the depopulation of the area and the falling-off of market traffic. But among the planners the issue was something more than just a matter of restoring business levels. Downtown renewal was a crusade to restore the ailing heart of the city to a condition of health and joyfulness. The objective was not merely to bring business back but to bring people back, to bring humanity back into the centre for pleasure, for entertainment, for the enjoyment of the full range of amenities which only a well-conceived urban environment can provide. Downtown redevelopment became a watchword among the urbanists. Books were written on the subject, pamphlets were published, lectures delivered, seminars and conferences

held, courses offered. Indeed the Downtown became the microcosm of the city and its planning and renewal became the exemplar of the planning function. Its appeal lay in the fact that it represented the essential, the truly urban aspect of the city; its area was limited - in a sense it was a self-contained enclave; it could be completely comprehended as a single unified concept; its functions were clearly definable; its design an urban designer's blissful opportunity.<sup>4</sup>

The plethora of downtown studies which were produced all contain expressions of the very special view of the downtown which was held by the planners. <u>Downtown</u> Winnipeg, for example, the plan for the downtown of metropolitan Winnipeg produced by the Metropolitan Winnipeg Planning Division makes this comment:

.... Perhaps the most telling argument in favour of a special effort to revitalize Downtown is the fact that the future of the whole of Metropolitan Winnipeg hinges to a very great degree on what is going to become of the central business district.

This critical relationship is so because the character and personality of the city are expressed by its Downtown; the image of a city which is presented to the world is that which is projected by its central business district. The truth of this proposition becomes immediately apparent when one calls to mind the great cities of the world. The image which the names Paris, New York, London, Moscow, Montreal, Stockholm, Vienna, Copenhagen, conjure up is the image of their central area; and it is not merely for the greatest cities but generally for all cities.<sup>5</sup>

The <u>Metropolitan Development Plan</u> of Metro Winnipeg expresses much the same sentiments:

Downtown's important for several reasons. It is the location of the many activities that serve the whole of the Metropolitan and the surrounding region. It creates the image of Metropolitan Winnipeg that is held in common by all residents. It is the place where the community's national and international reputation is made. It is seen by all of our visitors and their reaction to its interest, vitality and efficiency will influence their decision to return as tourists or investors.<sup>6</sup>

The planners in Regina held a similar view of Regina's downtown. The publication Towards a Downtown Plan produced by the City of Regina Planning Department, contains the following comment:

The overall goals for the downtown should recognize the role this area plays within the city. By virtue of its high accessibility and centrality the downtown has traditionally developed as the dominant office, commercial, retail, entertainment, administrative and service centre. These roles should be continued and encouraged....

Although more localized needs can be met through the provision of secondary centres, the downtown should be recognized and developed as a city wide facility and provide the widest and most intensive range of activity.

Above all, the goals for the downtown must recognize and direct their attention to the human use of the area; to <u>enhance</u> shopping, working, living, visiting, leisure, and the various other activities engaged in by <u>people</u> in the downtown.<sup>7</sup>

And in Calgary the planners held much the same view of the downtown and the same expectations for its development. In the Foreword to the document <u>The Future of Downtown Calgary</u>, produced by the City of Calgary Planning Department in 1966, Mayor J.C. Leslie wrote:

The shape of the future is already beginning to unfold in the Downtown, the area most sensitive to the influence of growth. The heart of every great city is both a reflection of the past and a conception of the future. Our Downtown should be more than just streets and structures, parks and public buildings, it should be our common meeting place and cauldron of business, social, and cultural activity.

Downtown is the link between Calgarians and their city and the link between Calgary and the world at large. It should be a place that we can all enjoy for the sake of the feelings of pride, pleasure, and excitement it may stir within us. Both beauty and efficiency must be keynotes of its development.<sup>8</sup>

In all three cities, then, the official documents produced by the city planning departments echoed each other's appreciation of the downtown's role in the city and hopes

for its future. This would seem to indicate a commonality among the three cities in their communal mind and outlook and in their planning function. in a sense there was a commonality, but only in a very special and limited sense. That commonality existed among urbanists in their disposition towards the downtown, particularly among the urbanists on the staffs of the city planning departments. This is hardly surprising since they were all trained in the various planning schools of the nation where very much the same concepts of planning were taught; they all read the same planning literature; they all attended the same planning conferences; they all exchanged ideas and experiences; they all subscribed to the same theories and reiterated the same tenets. They all saw the role of city planning as that of restoring harmony and beauty to the physical environment of the city and of achieving a more equitable distribution of the city's resources and amenities and they believed that as a contingent affect of these achievements the human spirit would be uplifted and urban society would be more equable and just. These were the ideals of the planning fraternity. This was the commonality among them but it did not diffuse very far beyond their inner circle. In effect, the ideal did not accord with reality and did not reflect the consensus, the communal mind and outlook of their respective cities. Nor did the precepts of the ideal govern the conduct of the planning function in the political realm which is the only possible realm, the only true context within which the planning function has any real existence or meaning. The socio-economic circumstances were different in each of the subject cities of this study. These differences were reflected in the communal mind and outlook of each and were embodied in the planning function of each. In spite of what seems a commonality among them as expressed in the downtown plan documents of each, the actual planning experience in each of their downtowns is perhaps the most vivid revelation of the distinctiveness of each of the cities, of the differences in their communal mind and outlook and in their planning function. The downtowns and their

planning experience can stand as the epitome of the evidence which validates the premises underlying this thesis. Here then is the evidence from the downtowns.

There is not much more to be said about Calgary's downtown experience than has already been said. The impact of the oil industry on Calgary's core area has already been referred to. The planning department of the city, alarmed by the voracity with which the new corporate world was devouring the landmarks and the social structure of Calgary's older pre-oil-epoch downtown, produced a plan for redevelopment of the area. It sought to reduce the density of new construction and to control its design and placement in order to introduce sunlight, greenery, human scale, amenity and delight into the downtown environment. But the new corporate world was not interested in these attributes of the downtown. It was interested in convenience, accessibility, ease of communication, an ambience of power, modernity and success, and the bottom line on the balance sheet. The development industry was interested in maximizing the financial return from every square inch of downtown property. The city council was interested in an ever bigger and wealthier Calgary and saw the skyward-thrusting downtown towers as not merely the symbols but the hard evidence of the affluent expansion which they cherished. They stood ready to accommodate the development industry in clearing the pathway through the city's by-laws and procedures in whatever way possible. The mayor cautioned that sunshine doesn't turn the wheels of the factories. And the general public was of the same mind and outlook as the corporations, the development industries and city council. In any case, those whose views were different could not prevail against the dominant group.

The Director of the Calgary planning department resigned because of the disregard of the council for its own policies as embodied in the downtown plan. The development industry argued that there was no need for a downtown plan at all: its regulations and restrictions were only an impediment and an obstruction in the path of progress. The council agreed with them and dropped the downtown plan and abandoned

any notion or commitment to the idea that Calgary should have a statutory plan for the downtown. The forces of the market were considered sufficient to guide downtown development. And they continue to be so regarded.

Although Regina was able to manage its residential growth quite systematically and with no serious distortions of its customary social patterns or the exercise of its planning function, the central area followed the downward path taken by the downtown of innumerable cities in North America. There was an exodus of the traditional residents and businesses of the city's downtown to new suburban locations and the central area was left impoverished and declining.

The city council was anxious to salvage the downtown but was quite powerless to do so. It tried to improve its attractiveness by turning one of the downtown business streets - Scarth Street - into a pedestrian mall but this had no effect. In its frustration the council sought the intervention of the provincial government. The province had already intervened on a large scale in the physical planning and development of Regina when it created the Wascana Centre, a provincial park in the heart of the city. It was an intervention warmly welcomed by the people of Regina and by their city council. The park is the city's outstanding feature and raises the quality of Regina's urban environment well above the level of mediocrity which might otherwise have prevailed.

Since the private sector was not prepared, and probably quite unable, to revitalize the central business district and the city was certainly not able to do so, the council asked the province to intervene again on the city's behalf. In fact, the province had already been considering the construction of two office towers, one for the Saskatchewan Government Insurance Corporation, the other for SaskTel, the government's telephones corporation, but was debating whether to build them in the Wascana Centre or in the downtown. The city council's importuning may have influenced the province's decision to build downtown. But they went beyond merely the towers for their two crown corporations. They led the way in the development of the Cornwall

Centre, a mixed-use commercial complex made up of a shopping mall, the government's two office towers, and an apartment building. The province was the principal agent in assembling the land for the project; it built the two office towers for the use of its own crown corporations; and the apartment block was built by the province's housing agency, the Saskatchewan Government Housing Corporation. The shopping mall, however, was built entirely with private sector financing. The Cornwall Centre has been effective in bringing back into the central business district a measure of new vitality, particularly in its retailing sector and the contingent spin-offs from the noticeably augmented shopping traffic.

As discussed elsewhere in this study, growth is the sustenance of municipal government as it is of the capitalist system and its institutions generally. The essential role of a municipality is to provide municipal services. Where there is municipal growth, the municipal government functions as it is intended to do in servicing that growth. More than that, however, new growth is a source of new revenues without which municipal government simply cannot carry out its responsibilities. Where there is no growth, or only marginal growth, the civic government must turn to other issues and find other sources of revenue. In such circumstances, where physical growth is minimal and does not fully engage the civic government's agenda, the issues which emerge as the critical ones in the life of the city are social and economic issues over which the municipal level of government has little if any jurisdiction. The statutory authority in these fields traditionally lies with the federal and provincial governments. Conditions in Winnipeg - social, economic, political - presented an open door for the direct entry of the senior governments into the city's socio-economic affairs and thereby into the city's planning function.

Fortuitously, Pierre Elliott Trudeau's Liberals were re-elected as the government of Canada in 1980 and Lloyd Axworthy was appointed to the cabinet as Minister of Employment and Immigration. Axworthy's federal constituency was

Winnipeg South-Centre in the inner city of Winnipeg. His educational and employment background was in urban affairs. He held a graduate degree in that field from Princeton University and had been the Director of the University of Winnipeg's Institute of Urban Studies. In western Canada the fortunes of the Liberal Party were at a low ebb; Axworthy was the only cabinet minister from west of Ontario. All of these circumstances - Winnipeg's declining status and its economic and population equilibrium and derelict core area and its parochially divided city council; Axworthy's background and ministerial office and Winnipeg inner city constituency; the Liberals' desperate need to improve their image in the west - all of these circumstances came together in an historic moment in which the federal and provincial governments took over the planning function from the city council. Axworthy spearheaded the tri-level Core Area Initiative and the related North Portage Development Corporation and the Forks Renewal Corporation, in which the City of Winnipeg, although formally an equal partner, was, in effect, a minor presence. Responsibility for major, future-oriented planning of city-wide significance had been ceded by the city to the senior governments.

The lack of growth, static economy, inadequate financial resources, lack of jurisdiction and competence to deal with social and economic problems, all contributed to the displacement of the city from the role of creative initiative in Winnipeg's planning function. But perhaps most telling of all was the inability of the city councillors to change their mind-set from the conventional business-oriented, growth-committed view of the role of city government to a view more consonant with the reality of Winnipeg's socio-economic circumstances, and, indeed, the view underlying the city's own Plan Winnipeg.

Calgary's downtown planning experience is obviously different from both Winnipeg's and Regina's. It may be argued, however, that the downtown planning experiences of Winnipeg and Regina are very similar. In Winnipeg, the two senior governments were the effective agents; in Regina it was also a senior government - the

province - which played the leading role. And in both cities the senior governments became involved because of the inability of the city's governments to deal with their downtown problems. In Winnipeg, the tri-level Forks Renewal Corporation is redeveloping an extensive site for a variety of recreational and heritage purposes; in Regina the provincial government created the Wascana Centre. In Winnipeg the tri-level North Portage Development Corporation has been the effective agency in the development of Portage Place; in Regina the provincial government was the effective agency in the development of the Cornwall Centre. These parallels seem to indicate strong common characteristics between the two cities' downtown planning experience; they are, however, misleading. The two sets of experiences are, in fact, profoundly different from one another.

The most obvious difference is the fact that in the case of Winnipeg all three levels of government are involved whereas in Regina it is only the provincial level. This may seem only a superficial distinction, a mere debating-point difference, but in fact it is a substantive difference. In Regina the provincial government acted without reference to the federal government and very little involvement of the city government in the case of both the Wascana Centre and the Cornwall Centre. It did not create an elaborate bureaucracy to carry out the projects as was done in Winnipeg. The political motivation in Regina was, if not entirely absent, then at most only minimally present; the political motivation in Winnipeg was, if not the overriding one, then at least a major one. But the outstanding difference between the tri-level downtown Winnipeg projects and the unilevel downtown Regina projects is that the Regina projects are successful and the Winnipeg projects are not and beyond that, the distinction between them lies in the reasons for the success of the one and the failure of the other.

The success of the Regina projects can be attributed in large measure to the modesty of their scope, the preciseness of their programs and the simplicity of their implementation. The Wascana Centre, although extensive in area, was limited in its

scope. It was conceived by some senior officials of the provincial government administration as a public amenity which would enhance the quality of life of Reginans. Only the provincial government would own the land and would be responsible for the direction of its development. It was to be, in effect, an island, albeit a rather large island, of provincial ownership and jurisdiction in the surrounding main of the city. No other authority could exercise jurisdiction within its boundaries. Its program was clearly defined: it was to accommodate only public recreation amenities and facilities, buildings and structures of the provincial government and buildings and structures of the University of Regina. No other development and certainly no commercial uses would be allowed. The province created a Board for the administration of the Centre whose members were government appointees or subject to government approval.

In the case of the Cornwall Centre the scope of the province's interest was equally modest. It merely wanted to build a couple of office towers for two of its own crown corporations which were badly in need of office space. And it decided to build them where they could help to bring some new life into the city's business district. To augment that assist it also built an apartment block through the agency of another of its crown corporations. But the province acted alone in this intervention. It financed its components of the mixed-use complex by itself and it retained provincial authority over those components. The private sector shopping centre component was left entirely to the private sector. There was, in the province's intervention, no immoderate presumption of the wholesale renewal of the city's central area, or the revitalization of the entire business district or the eradication of core area poverty. There were no political constituencies to cater to and no conflicting political or economic interests to reconcile or beguile. The province's scope in the Cornwall Centre was indeed modest and its program was limited: build the three public sector components and nothing more. This would meet the province's own administration's needs and fulfill its mandate, which in

itself was well and good. If it helped to bring some new vitality into the area, so much the better.

In Winnipeg, the Portage Place project has destroyed a couple of blocks of what was once the city's prime shopping precinct, instead of revitalizing it, as was initially promised. The Forks project is the subject of bitter controversy which seems to be growing more acrimonious instead of abating. The Core Area Initiative has not succeeded in diminishing the poverty of the core as had been its initial expectation, although some argue that it has limited its spread. These failures in contrast to Regina's successes, can be traced to the unmanageable scope of the tri-level concept and its constituent projects; its unrealistic goals and expectations; the immoderate publicity accompanying its establishment; the range, ambiguity and impreciseness of its programs; its inevitable underlying political nature; its disposition towards commercial profitability in its projects.

But perhaps most of all the failures can be attributed to the nature of the trilevel organization at both the policy and management level. Because the federal,
provincial and city governments comprise the shareholders and policy committee of the
tri-level structure it purports to be a politically responsible organization and publicly
accountable. And there are no tenable grounds on which that claim can be challenged.
But because of the complexity of organization and ambiguity of roles, no part of the
structure can be held publicly accountable. The Portage Place project is a failure
because the retail market on Portage Avenue simply wasn't big enough to support it as
well as the retail outlets which were already there. But the decision to proceed was
more a decision by the private developer - Cadillac-Fairview - than it was of the
political authority. In any case the political authority supported the private developers
interests, although an enormous amount of public money was involved. The Forks
project is a failure because the plans for it are vague and constantly changing and
because its commercially-oriented ideology is bitterly rejected by a significant part of

the Winnipeg public, but the public opposition cannot bring the Forks Corporation to public account and the project is in an anomalous position. The Core Area Initiative has not succeeded because its mandate was too general and too ambitious to permit the possibility of success.

Clearly, whatever parallels there may seem to be between Winnipeg's downtown planning experience and Regina's, they are illusory. They are profoundly different and the difference is simply a reflection of the difference between the two cities. Each city is distinctive and its distinctiveness derives from the peculiarities of its historical evolution and the differences in its socio-economic circumstances. These mold the city's communal mind and outlook and are expressed in its characteristic mode of civic government and in the conduct of its planning function.

In summary, then, what conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing study? The substantive conclusion which can be drawn is that the premises of the thesis are validated. There is such a thing as a communal mind and outlook, a distinctive ethos in each of the three cities which is the result of each city's own particular historical development. Moreover, that community ethos has changed in each city as it has evolved through changing social and economic conditions and that changing ethos has been expressed in the distinctive characteristics of the governance and planning function in each city. The findings of the study also imply that all cities have such characteristics. It must be recognized, however, that the three cities - indeed, all cities in Canada - have some critically important common characteristics. Among their outstanding common features is the fact that all of them exist in the context of Canada's socio-economic system. From the perspective of this study the salient aspect of that system is its dedication to the pursuit of growth. Growth is the energy which drives our cities as it does all of the institutions of our society. Not only is it the impetus which impels us forward, it is also the beckoning vision which draws us onward, the ideal towards which

our society strives. City councils pursue growth as a normal function of city governance. They do so automatically and unquestioningly simply because it is an imperative of the culture in which they exist. The pursuit of growth establishes certain common characteristics among the three cities of the study - their boosterism, their industrial bonusing and subsidies policies, their various efforts and devices to attract population, business and investment. These characteristics are common not only to the three subject cities of the study but, indeed, are shared by all Canadian cities.

A further common feature of the three subject cities is that they must operate within the constraints of the statutes legislated by the senior governments. Essentially these prescribe the limits of municipal jurisdiction and fiscal authority. Within those limits the ambit of civic initiative and action is severely restricted. Two such constraints are noteworthy. One is the prescription of the city's primary responsibility as that of providing municipal services, most of which are oriented to servicing the land within its municipal area. The other is the prescription of the city's fiscal resources which makes the city dependent upon the property tax as the major source of its revenues. These, together with the systemic commitment to growth inevitably disposes the city government towards the development of the lands within its jurisdiction as its top priority.

This inescapable bias leads to another common characteristic - the indifference of the city councils to policies embodied in their official plans where these interfere with growth and development. What enables the councils to ignore or to violate their own policies as contained in their development plans is the legal condition that unless prescribed by statute or unless they are clearly legally binding, the councils' planning policies are considered political rather than legal in character and have no status in the legal system. They can be ignored or violated with impunity. Such actions can only be called to account in the ballot-box. But the structure of civic government makes the council as a whole rather than individual councillors, or even identifiable groups within

the council, responsible for the decisions of the council. It is most improbable that an entire council would be defeated on the issue of violation of committed planning policies. There is, accordingly, no mechanism for bringing to account those responsible for such acts of neglect or contravention of the policies in the city's development plan.

In spite of these commonalities among cities which derive from the context of our cultural imperatives and our constitutional system, cities do have their individualities which derive from their distinctive historical evolution and communal mind and outlook. It is therefore a matter of some importance that these two sets of characteristics be differentiated from one another whenever the occasion demands such a discriminatory approach. Among such occasions are those when the senior governments intervene in the affairs of the city, particularly in the city's planning function. The differences in the downtown planning experiences of the three subject cities are illustrative of the significance of such judgments. The import of these experiences is that it would be advisable for the senior governments to accommodate their programs to the distinctive, individual characteristics of the cities in which they choose to intervene rather than to the general tenets of growth and development which prevail throughout society at large. It is these distinctive qualities rather than the commonalities which provide the most penetrating insight into the essential nature of the city. They are therefore the best guide for the conduct of the city planning function, and indeed for the governance of the city. The city planning function, like city government itself, can only exist within the parameters of the culture and the statutory system within which it is embedded. But within those inescapable limits it is the distinctive individuality of each city which fashions its governance and on which its city planning function must rest.

# **NOTES**

- <sup>1</sup>Alan Artibise, "General Introduction," <u>The Usable Urban Past</u>, 2.
- <sup>2</sup>Gilbert Stelter, "A Sense of Time and Place," in Stelter and Artibise, eds., <u>The Canadian City</u>, 435.
- <sup>3</sup>N. Harvey Lithwick, <u>Urban Canada</u>, 52, 53.
- <sup>4</sup>See, for example, Victor Gruen, <u>The Heart of Our Cities</u>.
- <sup>5</sup>Metropolitan Winnipeg Planning Division, <u>Downtown Winnipeg</u>, 2-3.
- <sup>6</sup>Metropolitan Winnipeg Planning Division, <u>The Metropolitan Development Plan</u>, 59, C.5.4.
- <sup>7</sup>City of Regina Planning Department, <u>Towards a Downtown Plan</u>, 3.
- <sup>8</sup>City of Calgary Planning Department, "Introduction," <u>The Future of Downtown Calgary</u>, 1.

# PART VI: ENVOIE CHAPTER 10 REFLECTIONS ON GLASS GLOBES

In the centre of Fedora, that grey stone metropolis, stands a metal building with a crystal globe in every room. Looking into each globe, you see a blue city, the model of a different Fedora. These are the forms the city could have taken if, for one reason or another, it had not become what we see today. In every age someone, looking at Fedora as it was, imagined a way of making it the ideal city, but while he constructed his miniature model, Fedora was already no longer the same as before, and whatever had until yesterday a possible future became only a toy in a glass globe.

The building with the globes is now Fedora's museum: every inhabitant visits it, chooses the city that corresponds to his desires, contemplates it, imagining his reflection in the medusa pond that would have collected the waters of the canal (if it had not been dried up), the view from the high canopied box along the avenue reserved for elephants (now banished from the city), the fun of sliding down the spiral twisting minaret (which never found a pedestal from which to rise).

On the map of your empire, O Great Khan, there must be room for both the big, stone Fedora and the little Fedoras in glass globes. Not because they are all equally real, but because all are only assumptions. The one contains what is accepted as necessary when it is not yet so; the other, what is imagined as possible and, a moment later, is possible no longer.

- Italo Calvino1

## CHAPTER 10

#### **ENVOIE**

### REFLECTIONS ON GLASS GLOBES

The profound poetic truth of Calvino's image of glass globes is affirmed by the historical experience of the three cities as described in the foregoing pages. Winnipeg, Regina and Calgary, like Fedora, were, at varying states in their evolution, each poised on the threshold of an anticipated future which did not come to pass, and each moved into a realized present which was different from what was thought possible. This experience all three cities had in common. Indeed, as Calvino's insight reveals, it is the common experience of all cities. More than that, the debate and the tension between the constantly receding ideal future and the constantly emerging real present is a basic characteristic of the human psyche. As a kind of epilogue, outside of the main body of the work, it seems appropriate to send this dissertation on its way with some parting reflections on the aptness of Calvino's metaphor to the historical experience of the three subject cities of this study.

Consider, then, the case of Winnipeg. In the heady days before World War I the prospect before Winnipeg, stretching out beyond the knowable horizon, was one of anticipated continuous growth, affluence, prosperity, success and power. This widely held conviction moved a commentator to write:

Upon Winnipeg must fall the greater responsibility of providing the principal manufacturing and commercial needs of the Canadian West. In almost like ratio Winnipeg's responsibility is identical to Chicago two decades ago. The demands upon Winnipeg's commercial resources will create a population of a million in less than ten years. It is one of the cosmic facts of our time.<sup>2</sup>

No one in that euphoric moment believed that this would not happen, that
Winnipeg was not imminently to emerge as the "Chicago of the North." No one foresaw
the economic failure of 1913 or the devastating war which followed or the collapse of the

global financial structure only a decade later, or the end of the growth of the wheat economy. And the world which emerged from each of these events was very different from what had been expected. Looking back on that moment with the clearer vision of hindsight it could be seen that:

On the eve of World War I, Winnipeg was on the threshold of attaining metropolitan stature. Capital flowed in, mainly from Montreal and Toronto, entrepreneurs had gone west, and branch establishments had grown rapidly. For example, in 1914, banks of Winnipeg origin had more branches in Saskatchewan than those of Montreal origin and only nine less than those of Toronto origin (Winnipeg 256, Montreal 223, Toronto 265). In addition, investment houses, insurance companies and other institutions had grown up amidst the western boom. By 1917, bank clearings through Winnipeg had reached almost 20 percent of the Canadian total.

The decline of Winnipeg as a primate city on the Prairies set in after World War I; and although the 1966 census recorded a population of just over half a million there is no question that its growth in the last fifty years has been at a much slower rate than its western rivals. The explanation lies mainly in the lack of diversity of the prairie hinterland, which, with its agrarian economy and overwhelming focus on wheat, could not support a national centre but rather a number of well spaced regional centres. The inability of Winnipeg to compete with Toronto in the Shield was crucial, although there is little in the historical record to suggest that it tried. Undue emphasis on western farmland and, in particular, the enormous success of the wheat economy, made it unattractive before World War I for Winnipeg entrepreneurs to compete in other sectors of the economy with their counterparts from Montreal and Toronto. Further, a combination of economies of scale, and to a large extent the very sparsely populated territory between the Manitoba Lowland and southern Ontario and Quebec, made the establishment of national manufacturing organizations in Winnipeg extremely difficult.3

Today, in the 1990's, Winnipeg is a city of over 600,000 people. But it has never again been elated, as it was in that earlier time, by the certainty that success and world renown lay within the grasp of its outstretched fingers. Still, the memory of that

momentary expectation haunts the psyche of the city and the thought of what almost was continues to bemuse it and beguiles it into the delusion that such a future is still possible. Hence the city council and the business community embark upon an "economic development strategy" in pursuit of the past, accepting that the timeworn ethos of economic boosterism is necessary when it is no longer so, and believing that it can be recaptured when the possibility has long since passed.

During the course of Winnipeg's evolution there have been various events which could stand as monuments to the city's remembered futures. Among these relicta of unfulfilled expectations have been the successive attempts to perfect the system of local government in Winnipeg's metropolitan area. These have represented, in one way or another, what, at the time, was someone's idea of how to make the ideal city, but these model cities never emerged as they had been conceived and the ideal became only a memory of a future that never was. If in one's reverie one enters Calvino's world of city museums, one may perceive that each of these failed models is indeed a blue city contained in a glass globe and that there are three such glass globes in Winnipeg's museum of ideal cities.

The first glass globe holds the model of the original urban organization and its underlying conception: a congeries of autonomous municipalities in competition with one another but mainly in competition with the central city of Winnipeg. The disordered physical form of the urban agglomerate reflected the discordant ambitions of its constituent governments, each in conflict with the others. Each municipality pursued its own independent ideal of greater economic and political power which ultimately could only be achieved by diminishing the status of the central city; the central city, on the other hand was committed to the preservation and enhancement of its own dominant position in the face of its shrinking proportion of the metropolitan population and its declining role in the region. The planning function in each case was highly localized, expediential and short-term in its outlook, with each municipality constantly pursuing

measures to re-affirm its autonomy, and the central city, at every opportunity, advocating amalgamation of all the municipalities into a single city under its *aegis*, in the hope of bolstering its diminishing stature. However firmly these possibilities may have been held by their believers, they were only illusory assumptions and in fact impossible. None was realized.

The second glass globe contains the model of Metro Winnipeg, embodying the ideal of a political organization which would overcome the inequities, disparities, and internecine rivalries among the contending constituent municipalities. The political structure comprised two tiers of government with one level being the area municipalities which were assigned the responsibility for local matters within their own jurisdictions and the other level being the metropolitan government which was responsible for metropolitan-wide matters. The major thrust of the metropolitan government's policies and programs was directed towards the improvement of the metro area's deficient services and utilities infrastructure and parks and transportation systems. Although the metro government produced the first master plan for Winnipeg prepared in-house by the administration it was stridently opposed by the area municipalities and ignored by the metro council. At the time of its conception the metropolitan model seemed to hold the promise of a future free from the problems which had historically beset the metropolitan area. When the conceptual model was put in place by the legislature what seemed ideally possible became practically impossible. After a decade, during which the opposition of the area municipalities, mainly that of the City of Winnipeg, was so obstructive that it impaired the effective functioning of the metropolitan government, the experiment was abandoned.

The third globe encloses the model of the unified city. It succeeded the metro model and was expected to finally overcome the shortcomings and failures of the past. It held out a new civic ideal of people-oriented goals, equitable taxation and grass-roots participation in the political process and decision-making. But this vision, too, soon

faded. Parochial hostilities continued, now in the form of suburban interests against the central city interests, and the brave new people-oriented ideals were displaced by the imperatives of the development industry. Policies and programs which embraced new values and objectives were enshrined in the city's master plans but these were ignored or contravened by the council in favour of the biases of the business community whose ethos the councillors shared but which was bemired in the anachronistic perceptions of a bygone era.

Thus the various models of the ideal Winnipeg are now encased in the glass globes of Winnipeg's historical collection of ideal Winnipegs. All of these at the time of their conception were what some visionary imagined to be the ideal city but each in turn was negated by the quixotic turns of history, the imponderability of the future and the prevailing communal mind and outlook which assumed the unknowable future in the light of the irrecoverable past.

Regina's historical experience differs significantly from Winnipeg's. It is less complex, more straightforward with fewer turning points and fewer structural upheavals. Three basic factors have been the principal influences on the course of Regina's historical evolution and have moulded the city's communal mind and outlook so that they are distinctive and different from both Winnipeg's and Calgary's. One of these factors is the city's natural environment - harsh, unattractive, and without any commercial advantages; another is Regina's overwhelming economic dependence on the Saskatchewan wheat economy; the third is the historical unity of Regina's municipal jurisdiction. These have combined to give Regina its distinctive characteristics: the significant presence of the provincial government in the city's built environment and public affairs; its small size; its rural-oriented ethos; its localized economic hinterland; its relatively uncomplicated city planning function.

As with Winnipeg, Regina's future, as it unfolded, raised expectations at various moments of its unfolding which in the next moment were not realizable, and what had

seemed to be the inevitable future was no longer possible. What emerged in the course of time was not always a disappointment for Regina even if it was not what had been anticipated. This was particularly so at the very beginning of Regina's existence. Instead of the laudatory and optimistic predictions which normally attend the beginning of a new community, those for Regina were derogatory and pessimistic. When the capital of the North West Territories was transferred from Battleford to Regina in 1882 the Saskatchewan Herald of Battleford snorted contemptuously:

The choice of this capital has but one thing to recommend it - it lies on the line of the railway; but that advantage is also enjoyed by hundreds of other places which have in addition both wood and water. Pile of Bones has little of the latter and none of the former, standing as it does in the midst of a bleak and treeless plain. However rich the soil may be the lack of wood and water in the vicinity must militate against its becoming a place of very great importance.<sup>5</sup>

The <u>Herald</u>'s disapproval cannot be attributed to the fact that it was a Battleford newspaper and was simply venting the chagrin and ire of Battleford over its loss of the status and advantages which went with the capital. Much the same pejorative views were expressed by commentators in Ottawa, Toronto and Winnipeg. The opinion was widespread that Regina was too ugly and barren to attract residents and had no future.

Through the cumulative efforts of the townsite trustees, the council, the board of trade, the interventions of government and the persistence of the population, what was thought impossible became possible and Regina gradually emerged as the urban centre which it is today. During the early decades of the 20th Century when the prairie wheat economy was put in place and was moving to its zenith, expectations for Regina's future were in sharp contrast to those earliest predictions. Riding high on the mounting wave of immigration and investment in the creation of the agricultural economy's infrastructure, optimism about Regina's prospects was buoyant. In 1909 the Greater Regina Club, a booster organization, was founded with the objective of promoting the

vigorous industrialization of the city.<sup>6</sup> In this it was as one with the board of trade and the city council. In 1910 it issued a publication entitled Regina: The Capital of Saskatchewan. Canada. Its Commercial and Industrial Opportunities.<sup>7</sup> And those opportunities were described in the most glowing and attractive terms. And in 1911 appeared a publication with the title Regina. The Queen City of the Middle West. The Undisputed Business Centre of the Wheat Fields of Canada.<sup>8</sup> But even in those heady moments Regina's aspirations did not reach out much beyond the wheat fields of the middle west. Its ambitions were not as vaulting and its claims were not as pretentious as were those for Winnipeg in the same years around 1910. Regina did not see itself as "the Chicago of the North" with a population numbering in the millions. Its expectations were more modest. Perhaps that accounts in some measure for its more modest disappointment when the promise of an expansive future faded away with the exhaustion of the economic growth potential of the wheat economy in the 1920's and the onset of the Great Depression.

Unlike Winnipeg, Regina had no epochal changes in its local government structure. And unlike Calgary, Regina had no epochal changes in the structure of its basic economy. The most significant change which affected Regina was in the political realm when the CCF was elected as the provincial government, first in 1944 and then again in 1971. Regina's museum of ideal Reginas accordingly contains two glass globes. The first holds the model of the city from its inception until the election of the first CCF provincial government in 1944. During this period the federal government's immigration policy, generous land grant, and naming Regina the provincial capital ensured the city's survival and its increasing importance as an administrative and service centre. The provincial government's creation of the legislative grounds and the Wascana Centre refuted the derogations and apocryphal predictions of the early critics. The promotional activities of the business-oriented council and booster organizations consolidated Regina's position as a sub-regional transportation, warehousing and

distribution centre although its market was limited and it never developed a significant manufacturing sector and never fulfilled the promotional promise of large-scale industrialization. The dominant wheat farming milieu in which the city was embedded imbued the communal mind and outlook with the agrarian ethos rather than the urban/industrial and this remained constant throughout that period.

It was these circumstances coupled with the city's small size and manageable growth which lay at the heart of Regina's long ignoring of the provincial Planning Act, rejection of the Mawson Plan and indifference to the Faludi Plan. The model in the first glass globe records all of these kaleidoscopic turns in the sequence of Regina's expectations and realizations - the derisive views about the early Regina and the predictions of its stunted future, none of which was borne out; the visionary Mawson Plan which turned out to be simply one man's grand illusion; the Faludi Plan which the very next turn revealed to be a mistaken assumption. It also records the fact that during this period the outstanding image of the ideal Regina was conceived, not by the city council and its planners, but by the visionaries in the provincial government, and that the city's naive view of the city planning function changed very little throughout the entire period.

The second glass globe in the museum of Regina's ideal cities contains the model of the city after 1971 when the NDP (CCF) were elected as the provincial government for the second time. The salient features of this model are those which exhibit the influence on the city of the provincial government's <u>Planning Act</u> of 1973. Among these are the city's recognition and articulation of the proper purpose of a city plan and the establishment of a proper city planning function under the <u>Regina RSVP</u> plan.

Underlying this contemporary urban model and its acknowledgement of contemporary urban challenges is the empathy between the city and the country which has come down in unbroken continuity from Regina's beginnings as a modest village to its present status as a modest city. As with the models in Calvino's metaphorical glass globes, the second

globe in Regina's museum of ideal Reginas contains the record of many of the ideals embodied in the city's RSVP plan which could not be realized, but it also expresses in the values of its city planning function the empathy between the rural ethos and Regina's communal mind and outlook.

Calgary's metaphorical museum of ideal cities also contains two glass globes. They tell the story of Calgary's successes and failures in economic terms rather than those of local government or provincial politics. From its earliest years Calgary was obsessed by visions of wealth and status and it pursued those visions with single-minded commitment. For its first four decades Calgary was exuberantly confident and aggressive and shamelessly boastful in its self-advertisement, but the folly of its financial over-reaching and the cyclical recessions of the regional and national economies constantly denied the city the success it longed for. During this period the cattle industry was the economic base of the south-west region of Alberta and accordingly of Calgary itself and the imagery of that industry became imprinted on the city's communal mind and outlook. But conditions changed and the cattle industry was unable to continue on its previous scale or to serve as the underpinning of Calgary's local economy. Agriculture moved into the region and with extensive irrigation helped to bolster the economy. But even that was insufficient to raise Calgary to the status of the great metropolis which the city's businessmen and local boosters had persuaded themselves was its destiny.

The depression of 1913 and the maturing legislation and institutions of municipal government in the province subdued the free-wheeling style of Calgary's governance. But the underlying booster spirit and ambitions remained and experienced a brief flurry of excited revival with the discovery of oil in the Turner Valley in 1914. That soon subsided however as the promise of the well fizzled out and Calgary continued to be a small, insolvent frontier centre and would have remained so but for the discovery of the vast oil field at Leduc in 1947.

That event changed the course of Calgary's history. It brought Calgary into the front rank of Canadian cities; it enabled Calgary to displace Winnipeg as the primate centre between Toronto and Vancouver. It also reinforced the ethos of corporate America in the city's communal mind and outlook and it filled every open space and the air above it in the city's downtown with concrete and glass towers at a density which smiled condescendingly and shrugged its shoulders at the more environmentally and humanly sensitive land use control standards of the city's own municipal plan and development control by-laws.

All of the unforeseen twists and turns in the historical evolution of Calgary are displayed in the two glass globes in the city's metaphorical museum of ideal cities. The first globe records the city's expectations and disappointments from its founding until 1947, the year of the Leduc discovery. The salient features of this exhibit include the embedding of the romantic "cowboy" mythology together with its symbols, the Stampede and the Stetson Hat, as a permanent facet of Calgary's personality, none of which had any verity in the city's historical experience except for a brief period at the turn of the century and as a business promotional device ever since, but which persists as an anachronistic self-image in the city's communal mind and outlook; the unrealized vision of large-scale industrialization; the rivalry with Edmonton for status and the unsuccessful pursuit of the provincial capital and the university; the euphoria of the breathtakingly rapid expansion of the city between 1905 and 1912 and the trauma of the collapse in 1913; the elation over the discovery of oil in the Turner Valley field in 1914 followed shortly after by the disappointment over its meagre content; the entrepreneurial style of the city's governance and the budgetary woes and fiscal insolvency which plagued it; the inspirational vision of the Mawson Plan which faded into oblivion as soon as it was published; the various references to "planning" by the city council and the establishment of certain "planning" measures and agencies, all of which revealed only the most rudimentary notion of the planning function; and through it all the sequential brightening and dimming of the flame of the boosters' vision of a greater Calgary, each successive ideal differing from the preceding as the unfolding of the future revealed new conditions and prospects, but each promoted and pursued with the same zeal.

Continuing the theme of Calvino's museum of crystal globes which hold the images of the ideal city and in which the visitor to the museum chooses the city that corresponds to his desires, Calgary's second globe offers the visitor the choice of either the affluent city which has been created by the new oil-staple-led economy or the ideal city of the visionaries which never came into being; but whether he chooses the one or the other he must also acknowledge, in the one case, the failure of the chosen model to realize the promise of the ideal city inherent in the emerging reality, and, in the other case, the failure to bring forth the real city inherent in the visionaries' ideal conception.

Down through the decades the businessmen, the entrepreneurs, the boosters of Calgary have chosen as the city which corresponds to their desires the ideal of a metropolis of imposing structures and impressive economic and political stature.

Undoubtedly these visitors to Calgary's museum of ideal cities see the realization of their desires in the city which is now arising on the foundation of oil-gotten wealth. This Calgary of the second sphere is energetic, expanding, wealthy, influential, more aggressive and self-confident and more inspired by and committed to the values of the business world than ever. Implicit in the desires of these visitors to the museum is the notion that their realization will bring great benefits to the entire city, even to its most neglected residents in its remotest corners. But this emerging city is less than the ideal city. For these visitors, whose desires are as highly selective as those of all visitors, it is perhaps sufficiently ideal. But even they must be conscious of and acknowledge some of its shortfalls. Among its omissions and failures can be counted the sacrifice of environmental amenity, visual relief and comfortable scale and density in the downtown; the congestion and deterioration in the downtown frame; the continuing presence of the

impoverished and disadvantaged; the outward spread of the residential neighbourhoods requiring the extensive and extremely costly proliferation of the road network to serve the centrifugal suburbs and their preference for their private automobiles; the construction of an LRT system which is grossly uneconomic due to insufficient ridership volumes; the high cost of land and housing and the inadequate accommodation of those with low incomes; the collapse of their oil-based ideal in the early 1980's and the accompanying massive building vacancies, unemployment and exodus from the city, while the subsequent recovery can give no assurance that such a disaster will not recur.

Other visitors to Calgary's museum of ideal cities have chosen, in this same second glass globe, a different version as corresponding to their desires. But few aspects of this version have been realized. These visitors comprise a small group and are outside of the mainstream of the city's communal mind and outlook. They are the political idealists, the economic and social reformers, the academics, the planners and other ideologues and visionaries whose image of the ideal city is different from that of the first group and in many of its aspects it is not merely different from that other image but opposes or contradicts it. The city which they have chosen as corresponding to their desires is one which is not the creature of the international corporations; whose council is not dominated by the land developers and the real estate lobby; whose policies seek social and economic equity, not just for some, but throughout the city down to its lowliest members; whose land and housing costs are maintained at moderate levels by public land ownership and public housing projects; whose public investments are not channelled into projects whose main purpose is to enhance the profits of the private sector; whose traffic and transportation systems encourage the use of public transit rather than the private automobile; whose ethos and values are more sensitive to the human needs of its people than to the corporate needs of its international business conglomerates.

A number of these ideals have in fact been included as objectives or policies in the municipal plans which have been produced for Calgary over the years. Their inclusion in these formal policy documents have raised expectations of their implementation. Their proponents have at those times felt that the futures they promised were indeed possible but through the subsequent years those possibilities have been ignored or deliberately rejected and what seemed ideally possible at the time of their formal declaration the fruitless passage of the years has shown to have been in reality impossible.

Underlying Calvino's poetic musings about ideal cities is the fundamental truth that the ideal city is beyond human capacity to achieve. There is, of course, in the precept a certain ambiguity of meanings: by definition the ideal can only exist in the mind; if it exists in the realm of physical reality then it no longer exists in the realm of the ideal. But setting aside this semantic issue as only marginal to our central concern, one can find a number of reasons why the ideal city lies beyond man's ability to realize on the ground. Clearly, there cannot be a universally ideal city because the biological and social imperatives for variation make universal concensus impossible: what may be the ideal city for one group of its citizens is inevitably not so for another. What may be ideal this week is no longer so next week because of changes in popular desires or perceptions or technologies. What may seem possible at one moment is no longer so at the next moment because of altered circumstances or missed opportunities. The ideal city is indeed a chimera, a will-o'-the-wisp, an illusion which only the bemused or beguiled pursue with serious intent. Among these, perhaps the most beguiled and seriously intentioned have been the planners. The annals of the planning function are replete with the abandoned relics of the New Jerusalem which was never built. What were the shining visions of the imminent future faded into dim shadows with the passage of time. But their failure was not due to fickle fashions or lost opportunities. They were never realized because of the simple yet profoundly complex fact that the ideal city


which corresponds to the desires of those who decide the reality of the city is not the city which corresponds to the desires of those who contemplate a different ideal but are powerless to realize it.

Nor is it only a matter of incompatible perceptions. The dialectic which moves between thesis and antithesis is not merely an intellectual exercise. It is rooted in the sub-stratum of the society's culture; it is nourished in the history, the social and economic milieu of the society in which the city is embedded. These are inescapable conditions which mould the communal mind and outlook. That is why the planning function which began as an inspired hope for an ideal future became an administrative process for the preservation of the established forms of the society and why those planners who offer a different vision of the city must see their images ignored or rejected and faded from the public view. But the conception and advocacy of the ideal is nevertheless as significant as the administration of the mundane. It is necessary constantly to reach for the more desirable future: the alternative is to be forever mired in the undesirable present. In any case, to strive for the ideal is as strong an imperative in the human psyche as is the drive to preserve the status quo. Neither compulsive urge can be avoided. And while Calvino's observation is true that the ideal city can never be realized it is also true that its existence in the minds of men is nevertheless real and will not be denied.

# **NOTES**

- <sup>1</sup>Calvino, <u>Invisible Cities</u>, 28.
- <sup>2</sup>Canadian Annual Review, 1910, 568, cited in Bellan, Winnipeg First Century, 108.
- <sup>3</sup>Donald P. Kerr, "Metropolitan Dominance in Canada," in John Warkentin, ed., <u>Canada: A Geographical Interpretation</u>, 545-550. *Emphasis added*.
- <sup>4</sup>Winnipeg Task Force on Economic Development, <u>Winnipeg 2000: An Economic Development Strategy for Winnipeg</u>.
- <sup>5</sup>Saskatchewan Herald, 30 September, 1882, cited in J. William Brennan, Regina: An Illustrated History, 12.
- <sup>6</sup>Brennan, Regina: An Illustrated History, 58.
- <sup>7</sup>Brennan, Regina: An Illustrated History, 201, n.9.
- 8lbid.
- <sup>9</sup>See, for example, the <u>Calgary General Municipal Plan</u>, 1973.

**APPENDIX A: FIGURES** 



Source: Adapted from Gerald Friesen, <u>The Canadian Prairies: A History</u>. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984. n.p.




Figure 2: The Physical Setting of the Western Interior

Source: Taken from Brenton M. Barr and John M. Lehr, "The Western Interior: The Transformation of a Hinterland." In L.D. McCann, ed., <u>Heartland and Hinterland: A Geography of Canada</u>. Toronto: Prentice Hall, 1987. 292.




Figure 3: Vegetation Regions of the Prairie Provinces

Source: Taken from B. Kaye and D.W. Moodie, "Geographical Perspectives on the Canadian Plains." In Richard Allen, ed., <u>A Region of the Mind</u>. Regina: Canadian Plains Research Centre, University of Regina, 1973. 19.




Figure 4: The Red River Settlement

Source: Taken from Gerald Friesen, <u>The Canadian Prairies: A History</u>. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984. n.p.





Figure 5: Political Boundaries Of The Prairie West 1870-1912

Source: Taken from Gerald Friesen, <u>The Canadian Prairies: A History.</u>

Toronto: University of Toronto, 1984. n.p.


Figure 6: The System of Land Survey in the West

Township 43 Range 4	Base Line					
Township 42 Range 4	31	32	33	34	35	36
	30	29	28	27	26	25
	19	20	21	22	23	24
	18	17	16	15	14	13
	7	8	9	10	-1:1-	12-
	6	5	4	3	2 -	_ ! _
Township 41 Range 4	Township 41 Range 3					



Source: Adapted from Lewis H. Thomas, ed., "Introduction," <u>The Prairie West to 1905: A Source Book</u>. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975. 4.

Figure 7: Plan of Saltaire



Plan of Saltaire, founded by T. Salt in 1851 (from C. Stewart, A Prospect of Cities).

Source: Taken from Leonardo Benevolo, <u>The Origins of Modern Town Planning</u>. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977. Illust. 38. 120.





Figure 8: Plan of Port Sunlight

Plan of Port Sunlight, founded by W. H. Lever in 1887 (from A. Whittick, Modern Architecture).

Source: Adapted from Leonardo Benevolo, <u>The Origins of Modern Town Planning</u>. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977. Illust. 40. 122.

Figure 9: Plan of Bourneville



Plan of Bournville, founded by G. Cadbury in 1895 (from P. L. Giordani, L'Idea della citta-giardino).

Source: Taken from Leonardo Benevolo, <u>The Origins of Modern Town Planning</u>. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977. Illust. 41. 123.





Figure 10: Greater Winnipeg 1880



Source: Adapted from Greater Winnipeg Investigating Commission, Report and Recommendations. Winnipeg, 1959. Map 3. n.p.



① 1880 - R.M. ST. BONIFACE ANNEXED PARISH OF ST. VITAL
② 1880 - CITY OF WINNIPEC ANNEXED PORTIONS OF ASSINIBOIA & KILDONAN
② 1883 - TOWN OF ST. BONIFACE ESTABLISHED OUT OF R.M. ST. BONIFACE
④ 1890 - PRESENT EASTERN BOUNDARY OF RM ST BONIFACE EST'D.
⑤ - PARISHES OF CARTIER AND ST. NORBERT BECAME R.M. RITCHOT
⑤ 1893 - R.M. ROSSER ESTABLISHED OUT OF ASSINIBOIA AND ST. PAUL
⑦ 1895 - RM KILDONAN ANNEXED SOUTH HALF OF ELMWOOD
② 1903 - R.M. ST. BONIFACE CHANGED NAME TO R.M. ST. VITAL
③ 1906 - CITY OF WINNIPEG ANNEXED ELMWOOD OUT OF KILDONAN
④ 1899 - R.M. ASSINIBOIA GAVE OVER SMALL SOUTHERN STRIP-MACDONALD

Source: Adapted from Greater Winnipeg Investigating Commission, Report and Recommendations. Winnipeg, 1959. Part of Map 3. n.p.




Figure 12: Greater Winnipeg 1910-1915

- 1911 TOWN OF TUXEDO ESTABLISHED OUT OF ASSINIBOIA
- 1912 TOWN OF TRANSCONA EST. OUT OF KILDONAN, ST. VITAL, SPRGFD
- R.M. ST. VITAL SPLIT INTO FORT GARRY AND ST. VITAL
- G FORT GARRY ANNEXED TERRITORY TO THE SOUTH
- 🕲 1913 THE NEW R.M. ST. VITAL ANNEXED TERRITORY FROM RITCHOT
- O CHARLESWOOD ESTABLISHED OUT OF ASSINIBOIA
- 1914 CITY OF ST. BONIFACE ANNEXED TERRITORY FROM ST. VITAL
- 1915 ST. PAUL SPLIT INTO WEST ST. PAUL AND EAST ST. PAUL

Source: Adapted from Greater Winnipeg Investigating Commission, Report and Recommendations. Winnipeg, 1959. Part of Map 3. n.p.




Figure 13: Greater Winnipeg 1915-1924

@ 1920 - R.M. ST. JAMES SEPARATED OUT OF RM. ASSINIBOIA

@ 1921 - R.M. BROOKLANDS SEPARATED OUT OF R.M. ROSSER

3 1921 . OLD KILDONAN SEPARATED OUT OF WEST KILDONAN

© 1924 - NORTH KILDONAN SEPARATED OUT OF EAST KILDONAN Source: Adapted from Greater Winnipeg Investigating Commission, Report and Recommendations. Winnipeg, 1959. Part of Map 3. n.p.




Figure 14: Metropolitan Winnipeg-Municipalities and Population 1960

Source: Taken from S.G. Rich, "Metropolitan Winnipeg: The First Ten Years." In. R.C. Bryfogle and R. Kreuger, eds., <u>Urban Problems</u>. Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1975.





Figure 15: Metropolitan Winnipeg-Municipalities and Population 1964

Source: Taken from S.G. Rich, "Metropolitan Winnipeg: The First Ten Years." In. R.C. Bryfogle and R. Kreuger, eds., <u>Urban Problems</u>. Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1975. 365.

Figure 16: Metro Winnipeg Electoral Divisions



Source: Adapted from Alan F.J. Artibise, <u>Winnipeg: An Illustrated History.</u>
Winnipeg: 1977. Map 12. 173; and Metro Winnipeg Planning Division, <u>The Metropolitan Development Plan</u>. Winnipeg, 1970. Plate 2. B22.





Figure 17: Unicity Community Committee Areas 1972-1977

Source: Adapted from Brownstone and Plunkett, <u>Metropolitan Winnipeg: Politics and Reform of Local Government</u>. Berkley: University of California, 1983. Map 3. 66.



Source: Brownstone and Plunkett, <u>Metropolitan Winnipeg: Politics and Reform of Local Government</u>. Berkley: University of California, 1983. Map 4. 67.

Figure 19: Regina in 1883





Figure 20: Regina in 1905






Figure 21: City of Regina Annexations and Boundary Changes 1945-1975

Source: Taken from Donald George Ross, "Population Growth: The Catalyst of Spatial Changes in Regina 1945-1975." M.A. thesis, University of Regina, 1979. Fig. 3.1.

Source: City of Regina (1977a).

area incorporated as Regina, 1883

Figure 22: Regina in 1913




Figure 23: Regina Wards 1935-1936





Figure 24: Regina in 1939



Source: Adapted from J. William Brennan, Regina: An Illustrated History.

Toronto: James Lorimer/Canadian Museum of Civilization/Secretary of State, 1989. Map 6. 122.




Figure 25: Regina Wards 1979

Source: Adapted from J. William Brennan, Regina: An Illustrated History.
Toronto: James Lorimer/Canadian Museum of Civilization/Secretary of State, 1989.

Map 10. 186.




Figure 26: Regina's Inner City

Inner City Area

Source: Adapted from Regina Planning Department, Regina RSVP A planning strategy for Regina (A working document. Regina, 1977. Map 1. 101.




Figure 27: Regina Inner City Neighbourhoods

Source: Adapted from Regina Planning Department, Regina RSVP A planning strategy for Regina (A working document. Regina, 1977. Map 2. 102.




Figure 28: City of Regina Zones and Neighbourhoods July 1, 1988

Source: Adapted from map provided by Barbara Schick, Superintendent of Community Development, City of Regina, in a letter to the author, August 10, 1990.

6 Fort Lac la Biche THICKWOOD Fort Assiniboine CREE Victoria Mission † St. Paul de Métis Fort George Fort Vermilion O Fort Pitt Fort)Edmonton Q Beaver Hills Blackfoot Hills PLAINS CREE Fort Battleford ARCEE Neutral Hills Eagle Hills Fort and Battle River Fort Eegle Hills BLACKFOOT Hand Hills Bad Hills ort Calgary BLOOD Great Sand Hills Fort Walsh Oldmen R. Fort Whoop-up CANADA U.S.A. Sweetgrass Hills PIEGAN Bearspaw Mins. Little Rocky Mtns. Fort Benton North West **Mounted Police forts Rocky Mountains** O Fur company forts Approximate Scale Other highlands --- Old North Trail · International border BLOOD General location of Indian tribes

Figure 29: The Situation of Fort Calgary

after W.B. Fraser

Source: Adapted from Richard P. Baine, <u>Calgary: An Urban Study</u>. Toronto: Clarke Irwin, Urban Studies Series, 1973. Map 2-4. 17.




Figure 30: Contour Map of the Calgary Site

Source: Taken from Richard P. Baine, <u>Calgary: An Urban Study</u>. Toronto: Clarke Irwin, Urban Studies Series, 1973. Map 1-12. 8.





Figure 31: Topographic Sketch of the Calgary Site

Source: Taken from Richard P. Baine, <u>Calgary: An Urban Study</u>. Toronto: Clarke Irwin, Urban Studies Series, 1973. Map 1-13. 8.

Figure 32: Calgary in 1884



Source: Taken from Max Foran, <u>Calgary: An Illustrated History</u>. The History of Canadian Cities Series. Toronto: James Lorimer/National Museum of Man/Nationam Museums of Canada, 1978. Map 1. 17.

tilip S. Van Cartlandi 151 a 24.5-69 m 159.5m 103~ 156a Pacific Railway FLEWAY NEW Baptiste Anouse emosfilzgorald AND ASSESSED TO THE OWNER. George Hamilton

Figure 33: Plan of Part of Township No.24 (Now Central Calgary), 1884

Source: Taken from Richard P. Baine, <u>Calgary: An Urban Study</u>. Toronto: Clarke Irwin, Urban Studies Series, 1973. Map 2-12. 19.




Figure 34: City of Calgary Annexations and Boundary Changes 1893-1976

Source: Taken from E. Joyce Morrow, <u>Calgary Many Years Hence: The Mawson Report in Perspective</u>. Calgary: City of Calgary/University of Calgary, 1979. 58.




Figure 35: General Land Use, Calgary, 1961

Source: Taken from Richard P. Baine, <u>Calgary: An Urban Study</u>. Toronto: Clarke Irwin, Urban Studies Series, 1973. Map 2-64. 34.

APPENDIX B: TABLES

Table 1. Population Growth Prairie Region 1871-1911 (000's)

	1871	1881	1891	1901	1906	1911
N.W. Territories Rural *Urban	48 -	56 . -	95 4	131 33	<u>-</u>	-
Total	48	56	99	164	<u>-</u>	-
% Rural	100	100	96	80	-	-
Manitoba Rural *Urban	25 -	52 10	111 41	185 70	228 138	261 200
Total	25	62	152	255	366	461
%Rural	100	84	73	72	62	57
<u>Saskatchewan</u> Rural *Urban	- -	- -	- -	- -	204 48	361 131
Total	-	-	-	-	252	492
%Rural	-	-	<u>-</u>	-	81	73
<u>Alberta</u> Rural *Urban		-	- -	- -	127 58	237 138
Total	-		*	-	185	375
%Rural	-	-	<b>.</b>		69	63
Total Prairie Region Rural *Urban	73 -	108 10	206 45	316 103	564 244	858 470
Total	73	118	251	419	808	1.328
%Rural	100	92	82	75	70	65

<sup>\*</sup>Urban includes all incorporated villages, towns, and cities. Source: Census of the Prairie Provinces, 1916: Census of Canada 1931, Volume 1.

Table 2. Provincial and Regional Populations 1911-1926

	1911	1916	1921	1926
Manitoba				
Rural	261,029	312,846	348,502	360,198
Urban	200,365	241,014	261,616	278,858
Total	461,394	553,860	610,118	639,056
% Change		20.04	10.15	4.74
Saskatchewan				
Rural	361,037	471,538	538,552	578,206
Urban	131,395	176,297	218,958	242,532
Total	492,432	647,835	757,510	820,738
% Change		31.55	16.92	8.34
Alberta				•
Rural	236,633	307,693	365,550	373,751
Urban	137,662	188,749	222,904	233,848
Total	374,295	496,442	588,454	607,599
% Change	**************************************	32.63	18.53	3.25
Prairie Region				
Rural	858,699	1,092,077	1,252,604	1,312,155
Urban	469,422	606,060	703,478	755,238
Total	1,328,121	1,698,137	1,956,082	2,067,393
% Change	44444444444444444444444444444444444444	27.86	15.18	5.69

Source: Adapted from Paul A. Phillips, M.A. thesis "Structural Change and Population Distribution In The Prairie Region 1911-1961." U. of Saskatchewan, 1963, Appendix W2. 260.

Table 3. Provincial and Regional Populations 1931-1951

	1931	1936	1941	1946	1951
Manitoba	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,				
Rural	384,170	400,289	407,871	389,592	392,112
Urban	315,969	310,927	321,873	337,331	384,429
Total	700,139	711,216	729,744	726,923	776,541
% Change	10.24	1.58	2.60	-0.38	14.70
Saskatchewan					
Rural	630,880	651,274	600,846	515,928	461,047
Urban	290,905	280,273	295,146	316,760	370,681
Total	921,785	931,547	895,992	832,688	831,728
% Change	12.31	1.05	-3.81	-7.06	-0.11
Alberta					•
Rural	453,097	486,335	489,583	448,934	451,313
Urban	278,508	286,447	306,586	354,386	488,188
Total	731,605	772,782	796,169	803,330	932,501
% Change	20.41	5.62	3.02	0.89	16.95
Prairie Region					
Rural	1,468,147	1,537,898	1,498,300	1,354,454	1,304,472
Urban	885,382	877,647	923,605	1,008,487	1,243,298
Total	2,353,529	2,415,545	2,421,905	2,362,941	2,547,770
% Change	13.84	2.35	0.26	-2.42	7.82

Source: Adapted from Paul A. Phillips, M.A. thesis "Structural Change and Population Distribution In The Prairie Region 1911-1961." U. of Saskatchewan, 1963, Appendix W2. 260.

Table 4. Provincial Populations and Five Major Cities' Populations as Percentages of Provincial 1911-1946

	1911	1926	1936	1946
_				
Manitoba Population	461,394	639,056	711,216	726,923
Winnipeg	136,035	189,709	215,814	302,024
Wpg. as % Manitoba	29.48	29.68	30.34	41.50
Saskatchewan Population	492,432	820,733	931,547	832,688
Regina	30,213	37,329	53,354	60,246
Regina as % Saskatchewan	6.13	4.54	5.72	7.23
Saskatoon	12,004	31,234	41,734	46,028
Sktoon. as % Saskatchewan Regina + Sktoon as	2.43	3.80	4.48	5.52
% Saskatchewan	8.56	8.34	10.20	12.75
Alberta Population	374,295	607,599	772,782	803,330
Calgary	43,704	65,291	83,407	100,044
Calgary as % Alberta	11.67	10.74	10.79	12.45
Edmonton	24,900	65,163	85,774	113,116
Edmonton as % Alberta Calgary + Edmonton	6.65	10.72	11.09	14.08
as % Alberta	. 18.32	21.46	26.53	26.53

Note: Figures for Winnipeg 1946-1966 are for the Winnipeg Census Metropolitan Area, not for the City of Winnipeg. CMA data have been used to make the Winnipeg figures more comparable to the other cities (particularly Regina and Calgary, the subject cities of this dissertation) because Winnipeg did not annex suburban communities on its boundaries during this period while the other cities did. (See Fig. 7 and Fig. 8.) In 1972 all the municipalities comprising Metropolitan Winnipeg were amalgamated into the single City of Winnipeg and thereafter the census data for the City of Winnipeg and the other cities are comparable.

Source: Census of Canada, 1911-1986

Table 5. Provincial Populations and Five Major Cities' Populations as Percentages of Provincial 1956-1986

	1956	1966	1976	1986
Manitoba Population Winnipeg Wpg. as % Manitoba	850,040 409,121 48.12	963,066 508,759 52.82	1,021,506 560,874 54.90	1,063,016 594,551 55.93
Saskatchewan Population	880,665	955,344	921,323	1,010,198
Regina Regina as % Saskatchewan	89,755 10.19	131,260 13.73	158,566 17.21	186,521 18.46
Saskatoon Sktoon. as % Saskatchewan Regina + Sktoon as	72,858 8.27	115,892 12.13	149,388 16.21	200,665 19.86
% Saskatchewan	18.46	25.86	33.42	38.32
Alberta Population Calgary Calgary as % Alberta	1,123,116 200,449 17.84	1,463,000 330,600 22.59	1,838,037 491,000 26.71	2,375,278 671,326 28.26
Edmonton Edmonton as % Alberta Calgary + Edmonton	251,004 22.34	401,300 27.42	614,336 33.42	785,465 33.06
as % Alberta	40.18	50.01	60.13	61.32

Note: Figures for Winnipeg 1956-1986 are for the Winnipeg Census Metropolitan Area, not for the City of Winnipeg. CMA data have been used to make the Winnipeg figures more comparable to the other cities (particularly Regina and Calgary, the subject cities of this dissertation) because Winnipeg did not annex suburban communities on its boundaries during this period while the other cities did. (See Fig. 7 and Fig. 8.) In 1972 all the municipalities comprising Metropolitan Winnipeg were amalgamated into the single City of Winnipeg and thereafter the census data for the City of Winnipeg and the other cities are comparable.

Source: Census of Canada, 1911-1986

Table 6. Distribution of the Labour Force by Occupation Prairie Region and Manitoba - Selected Years

Place	Prairie Region				Manitoba			
Year	19111	1931	1946	1951	1911	1931	1946	1951
Total Labour Force All								
	548,238	895,234	892,869	954,511	178,106	300,466	279,929	298,501
Occupation				Percentage	e Distribution	on		
Agriculture	51.70	49.50	41.04	35.25	39.21	31.03	28.82	24.73
Fishing and Trapping	0.05	0.82	0.592	0.41	0.25	1.36	0.862	0.52
Logging	0.253	0.14	0.41	0.36	0.15 <sup>3</sup>	0.18	0.42	0.46
Mining and Quarrying	1.224	1.26	1.06	1.20	0.504	0.50	0.71	0.74
Manufacturing and Mechanica	ıl 5.18	5.66	8.47	9.12	8.20	7.63	12.45	13.11
Construction	5.50	3.25	3.82	4.76	6.24	4.23	4.92	5.52
Transportation and								
Communication	5.48	5.90	7.05	8.92	7.31	6.72	8.27	9.86
Trade and Finance	7.44	7.67	8.10	9.97	9.90	8.23	8.76	3 10.48
Service	10.23	13.85	18.48	16.56	12.90	14.46	20.44	17.14
Clerical	3.57	4.96	6.83	8.38	5.43	6.81	9.4	7 10.95
Labourers5	8.81	6.80	3.38	4.41	9.8	8.80	4.0	7 5.65
Not Stated	-	0.04	0.71	0.62	-	0.04	4 -	0.77

Source: Adapted from Paul A. Phillips, M.A. thesis "Structural Change and Population Distribution In The Prairie Region: 1911-1961" U. of Saskatchewan. 1963. Appendix C1, C2, C3, C4, D1, D2, D3, D4. 203-210.

- Labour force in 1911 includes employees 10-years of age and over.
   All other years Labour force includes employees 14-years of age and over.
- 2. Excludes Indians living on reserves.
- 3. Includes pulp mill employees.
- 4. Includes almost all mine and smelter employees except clerical workers.
- 5. Labourers in all industries except agriculture, fishing, logging and mining.

Table 7. Distribution of the Labour Force by Occupation Saskatchewan and Alberta - Selected Years

Place		Saskatche	wan				Alberta		
Year	19111	1931	1946	1951	1911	1931	1946	1951	
Total Labour,									
Occupations	208,522	338,720	310,486	302,112	161,610	286,048	302,454	353,898	
Occupation			1	Percentage	Distribution	on			
Agriculture	63.78	60.32	52.80	48.84	49.82	50.90	40.26	32.52	
Fishing and Trapping	0.86	0.60	0.402	0.45	0.57	0.78	0.522	0.27	
Logging	0.023	0.07	0.32	0.20	0.413	0.16	0.51	0.41	
Mining and Quarrying	1.314	0.22	0.18	0.30	3.184	3.18	2.28	2.34	
Manufacturing and Mechanical	3.02	3.64	5.20	5.53	4.63	5.37	8.16	8.81	
Construction	4.52	2.30	2.59	2.86	5.96	3.02	4.06	5.73	
Transportation and		, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,				e un no e e e e e e e e e e e e			
Communication	3.88	4.82	6.05	8.06	5.51	5.71	6.95	3.86	
Trade and Finance	5.78	6.76	7.48	9.20	6.86	7.36	8.12	10.20	
Service	8.07	12.51	16.98	15.01	10.08	13.35	18.21	17.39	
Clerical	2.28	3.33	4.79	6.03	3.19	4.42	6.47	8.21	
Labourers5	7.72	5.37	2.56	2.92	9.76	5.70	3.58	4.63	
Not Stated	-	0.01	0.59	0.77	-	0.02	0.8	2 0.58	

Source: Adapted from Paul A. Phillips, M.A. thesis "Structural Change and Population Distribution In The Prairie Region: 1911-1961" U. of Saskatchewan. 1963. Appendix C1, C2, C3, C4, D1, D2, D3, D4. 203-210.

- Labour force in 1911 includes employees 10-years of age and over.
   All other years Labour force includes employees 14-years of age and over.
- 2. Excludes Indians living on reserves.
- 3. Includes pulp mill employees.
- 4. Includes almost all mine and smelter employees except clerical workers.
- 5. Labourers in all industries except agriculture, fishing, logging and mining.

Table 8. Gross Value of Agricultural\* Production (\$000) Prairie Region and Provinces - Selected Years

Year	Prairie Region	Manitoba	Saskatchewan	Alberta
1910	223,236	68,599	106,100	48,537
1915	594,890	126,798	326,283	141,809
1920	622,253	136,211	3 0 0,437	185,605
1925	736,941	120,976	414,359	201,606
1930	332,375	69,746	147,265	115,364
1935	316,511	52,297	144,794	119,420
1940	470,349	90,094	199,219	181,036
1945	743,967	157,424	325,626	260,917
1950	879,745	182,764	369,001	327,980

<sup>\*</sup>Agricultural production includes land crops, animals, and animal products.

Source: Paul A. Phillips, M.A. thesis: "Structural Change and Population Distribution

in the Prairie Region 1911 to 1961." University of Saskatchewan:

Appendix P. 247.

Table 9. Gross Value of Manufacturing\* Production (\$000) Prairie Region and Provinces - Selected Years

Year	Prairie Region	Manitoba	Saskatchewan	Alberta
1910	67,734	46.506	4,562	16,666
1922	175,505	91,020	36,076	48,409
1926	250,988	127,359	44,022	79,607
1931	215,264	111,762	39,810	63,692
1936	247,708	122,051	51,605	74,502
1941	460,207	221,535	96,021	142,651
1946	777,276	351,887	168,357	257,032
1955	1,260,440	551,346	250,813	458,281
1956	1,648,779	647,389	298,203	703,187

\*Manufacturing comprises three categories: Export Manufacturing, which includes Flour Mills, Slaughtering and Meat Packing; Mixed Export-Residentiary Manufacturing, which includes those manufactures partly consumed within the prairie region and partly exported: mainly butter and cheese production and petroleum products; Residentiary Manufacturing which includes those manufactures primarily consumed within the region and comprises all other manufactures not contained in other categories.

Source: Paul A. Phillips, M.A. thesis, University of Saskatchewan, 1963. Adapted from thesis Appendixes Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, Q5. 250, 252, 253, 254.

Table 10. Population of Prairie Cities, 1871-1916a

City	1871	1881	1891	1901	1906	1911	1916
Winnipeg Calgary	241	7,985	25,639 3,867	42,340 4,392	90,153 13,573	136,035 43,704	163,000 56,514
Edmonton			300b	4,176	14,088	31,064	53,846
Regina Saskatoon		800c	1,681 <sup>d</sup>	2,249 113	6,169 3,011	30,213 12,004	26,127 21,048
Moose Jaw				1,558	6,249	13,823	16,934
Brandon St. Boniface	817	1,283	1,553	5,620 2,019	10,408 5,119	13,839 7,483	15,215 11,021
Lethbridge		•	,	2,072	2,936	9,035	9,436
Medicine Hat Prince Albert				1,570 1,785	3,020 3,005	5,608 6,254	9,272 6,436
Portage La Pr	rairie		3,363	3,901	5,106	5,892	5,879

Notes:

- a) Population is listed according to areas as of 1916
- b) This is an approximation taken from City of Edmonton records
- c) The population of Regina in 1882-1883 was between "800 and 900 souls". See E.G. Drake, Regina: The Queen City. 22.
- d) E.G. Drake, Regina: The Queen City. 71.

Source:

Taken from Artibise, Alan F.J., "Boosterism and the Development of Prairie Cities, 1871-1913," in Artibise, Alan F.J., ed., <u>Town and City: Aspects of Western Canadian Development</u>. Regina: Canadian Plains Research Centre, University of Regina, 1981. Table 1, 210.

Table 11. Urban Population Growth Prairie Region and Provinces 1911-1931

	1911	1916	1921	1926	1931
Regional Total urban	1,328,121 469,422	1,698,137 606,060	1,956,082 703,478	2,067,393 755,238	2,353,529 885,382
% urban	35.34	35.68	35.96	36.53	37.61
% urban Change		0.34	0.62	0.57	1.08
Manitoba Total	461,394	553,860	610,118	639,056	700,139
urban	200,365	•	261,616	278,858	315,969
% urban	43.42	43.51	42.87	43.63	45.12
% urban Change		0.09	-0.64	0.76	1.49
Saskatch. Total	492,432	647,835	757,510	820,733	921,785
urban	131,395	176,297	218,958	242,532	290,905
% urban	26.68	27.21	28.90	29.55	31.55
% urban Change		0.53	1.69	0.65	2.00
Alberta Total	374,295	496,442	588,454	607,599	731,605
urban	137,662	188,749	222,904	233,848	278,508
% urban	36.77	38.02	37.87	38.48	38.06
% urban Change	<b></b> .	1.25	-0.15	0.61	-0.42

Note: Urban includes all incorporated villages, towns and cities.

Adapted from Paul A. Phillips, M.A. thesis "Structural Change and Population Distribution in the Prairie Region 1911-1961." U. of Saskatchewan 1963. Source:

Appendix W2. 260.

Table 12. Urban Population Growth Prairie Region and Provinces 1936-1951

	1936	1941	1946	1951
Regional Total	2,415,545	2,421,905	2,362,941	2,547,770
urban	877,647	923,605	1,088,487	1,243,298
% urban	36.33	38.08	42.67	48.79
% urban Change	-1.28	1.75	4.59	6.12
Manitoba Total	711,216	729,744	726,923	776,541
urban	310,927	321,873	337,331	384,429
% urban	43.71	44.10	46.40	49.50
% urban Change	-1.41	0.39	2.30	3.10
Saskatchewan Total	931,547	895,992	832,688	831,728
urban	280,273	295,146	316,760	370,681
% urban	30.08	32.94	38.04	44.56
% urban Change	-1.47	2.86	5.10	6.52
Alberta Total	772,782	796,169	803,330	939,501
urban	286,447	306,586	354,396	488,188
% urban	37.06	38.50	44.11	51.96
% urban Change	-1.00	1.44	5.61	7.85

Note: Urban includes all incorporated villages, towns and cities.

Source: Adapted from Paul A. Phillips, M.A. thesis "Structural Change and Population Distribution in the Prairie Region 1911-1961." U. of Saskatchewan 1963. Appendix W2. 260.

Table 13. Occupational Groups Represented On Winnipeg City Government 1874-1914

Occupation	Ма	yor	City Council		Board of	Board of Control	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	
Merchants and Businessmen	1 6	39	179	34	7	22	
Real Estate Agents and Financiers	15	37	191	37	22	66	
Manufacturers and Contractors	6	1 4	49	10	1	3	
Professionals	4	10	71	1 4	3	9	
Artisans and Workingmen	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Others (not specified)	-	-	-	-		-	
Totals	41	100	515	100	32	100	

Source: Compiled from Alan F.J. Artibise, Winnipeg: A Social History of Urban Growth 1874-1914. Montreal: McGill-Queens, 1975. Table 1.24., Table 3.26.

Table 14. Value of Building Permits in Regina 1904-1912

<u>Year</u>	<u>Value(\$)</u>
1904	210,000
1905	750,000
1906	2,000,000
1907	1,177,040
1908	516,656
1909	749,749
1910	2,361,288
1911	5,099,340
1912	8,047,309

Source:

Taken from Donald Stewart Richan, M.A. Thesis "Boosterism and Urban Rivalry in Regina and Moose Jaw, 1902-1913." University of Regina, 1981. 31.

Table 15. Calgary Labour Force, 1931

Industry	Male	Female	Total
Primary Industries	1,789	26	1,815
Manufacturing	5,237	531	5,768
Construction	3,172	22	3,194
Utilities	173	20	193
Transportation	2,938	281	3,219
Trade	5,259	1,525	6,784
Finance et al.	1,306	543	1,849
Services	4,308	4,286	8,594
Government	1.949	162	2,111
N.E.S.	1,802	76	1,878
Totals	27,933	7,472	35,405

Note: Lithiwick's Table shows 1931 Male total as 28,933. The numbers for Male employees have been added up incorrectly in his Table. The correct total is 27,933, as shown above.

Source:

N.H. Lithiwick <u>Urban Canada: problems and prospects.</u> Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1970. Table A-12. 119.

Table 16. Building Permits and Population Increase, Calgary 1970-1980

Year	No. of Building Permits	Value of Building Permits	Population
1970	7,751	\$ 173,400,000	
1971	9,245	193,900,000	403,319
1972	10,224	223,600,000	
1973	11,545	242,000,000	
1974	11,523	275,900,000	
1975	14,070	393,100,000	
1976	13,755	448,400,000	491,000
1977	14,806	820,400,000	
1978	16,693	1,059,400,000	
1979	18,288	1,105,000,000	
1980	19,584	1,405,500,000	
1981	21,396	2,536,800,000	592,743 (625,966)

Source: Building Permits - Calgary Economic Development Authority <u>Calgary In Fact. A Profile 1989-90</u>. Calgary: City of Calgary, n.d. Building Permits. 14.

Population - Statistics Canada

A word of explanation is required with respect to the figure (625,966) in Table 17. Statistics Canada, in its census report for 1986 gives Calgary's 1981 adjusted population as 625,966. The adjustment was occasioned by the fact that shortly after the 1981 census Calgary annexed territory on its borders in which there were 33,223 residents. The metropolitan Calgary population in 1981 was accordingly adjusted in the 1986 census to include that additional population.

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