

TOPOS AND THE RHETORIC OF PRAIRIE POETRY

BY

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Submitted to the
University of Manitoba in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for a

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degree in the
Department of English

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Abstract

A rhetorical analysis of twentieth-century prairie poetry in Canada rests on several assumptions: (1) rhetoric and poetics have a non-empty, significant intersection; (2) the rhetorical and poetical tradition bears on poetry written in this century and in this country; and (3) there is a prairie poetry which is amenable to rhetorical analysis. These assumptions are also the major findings of this study.

But the study itself is motivated by re-thinking the critical cliché that prairie poetry is dominated by a sense of place. Rhetoric's traditional treatment of literal "place" as a topos is the basis of a method of rhetorical analysis developed in Part 1 and applied in Part 2.

Part 1 surveys the relevant tradition and concludes that (1) the figures function as topoi for the invention of style, and (2) the topoi and the figures share an iterative binary structure which is the basis of argumentation. Consequently, a topos is well-defined as a partial ordering: it is a binary relation $\langle x, y \rangle$ between two terms such that whenever $\langle x, y \rangle$ and $\langle y, z \rangle$ then also $\langle x, z \rangle$.

Part 2 traces a chronology of topoi, especially but not only of the form $\langle \text{prairie}, x \rangle$ or $\langle x, \text{prairie} \rangle$, in the work of five major and three minor Canadian prairie poets. It identifies the characteristic topoi and arguments of each poet and demonstrates that rhetoric functions as an heuristics of the composition and the reading of their work.

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Introduction

A rhetorical analysis of twentieth-century prairie poetry, such as this is, rests on several assumptions about which it is best to be clear. First, it assumes that rhetoric (the art of persuasion) and poetics (the art of mimetic production) have a non-empty and significant intersection. Secondly, it assumes that the whole rhetorical and poetical tradition has some bearing on poetry written in this century and in this country. Thirdly, it assumes that there is a coherent sense and a substantial body of prairie poetry which is amenable to rhetorical analysis.

These assumptions, though they necessarily function as presuppositions, are also the major findings of this study. But the study is motivated by a re-thinking of perhaps the single most obvious and certainly the most often remarked fact about prairie poetry: it is a writing dominated by a sense of place. What, then, is the rhetorical function of "place"? Rhetoric's two-thousand-year-old answer, that literal "place" is an instance of a topos, seems at first either hopelessly muddled or superficially coy. In fact, this answer is the basis of a method of rhetorical analysis developed in Part 1 and applied in Part 2: a topos is a binary, transitive relation that is central to both the composition and the reading of poetry; and prairie poetry is deeply informed by a topos of place.

Part 1 surveys the relevant tradition, beginning with Aristotle. According to The Rhetoric, a (rhetorical) topos, for example, the greater and the lesser, is a structure embracing a large number of enthymemes or rhetorical syllogisms. This observation reflects a conception of rhetoric as the counterpart of dialectic with its emphasis on logos, one of the three modes of persuasion (ethos and pathos being the other two). Under this conception, the topoi are used to invent the matter and manner of arguments for persuasion by the spoken and written word. Despite the artless clarity of Aristotle's observation, the nature of the topos is obscured as much by its ubiquity in his work as by the absence of any careful definition. Besides the four topoi common to all oratory, Aristotle provides a list of twenty-eight valid topoi and a distinction between special and general topoi. As if this were not enough, two concepts (predicables and predicaments, later called logical topics) related to yet distinct from the notion of topos are introduced in Topics and Categories. Finally, the centre-piece of rhetorical style, the metaphor, seems to function as a place where the good (that is, persuasive) style can be invented, a suggestion that is supported by the treatment of style in The Poetics.

Roman contributions to the notion of topos do not clarify its nature. Cicero's list of sixteen basic topoi (De Oratore) freely combines logical and rhetorical topoi, and

the location of topos in stasis rather than in logos represents a diminution of Aristotle's more general concept. Regarding style, however, the Romans go much further than the Greeks by providing an extended classification of the tropes and the figures. These lists are places where the several styles may be invented. Indeed, the high, middle, and low styles are defined by the frequency and kinds of tropes and figures used; and Aristotle's three modes of persuasion are restated as the aims of the orator and linked to the three styles. This development, an instance of the Roman notion that all oratory is one despite the five divisions of rhetoric, presages the emergence of the figure as a topos of style.

The classical notion of topos is therefore as useful as it is imprecise. If function (for example, invention) is an important part of definition, then the figures deserve to be considered as topoi of style. In the Middle Ages, two rhetorical poetics do indeed treat the figures in just such a way. Geoffrey de Vinsauf (Poetria Nova) applies rhetoric to the composition of poetry, devoting most of his treatise to the role of the figures in inventing style; Dante (De Vulgari Eloquentia) applies rhetoric to the vernacular, effectively enlarging the list of places where style may be invented. Both works suggest that the significance of topos for literature is shifting from argument (logos) to style (lexis).

Style literally constitutes the rhetoric of English poetry in the Renaissance. Erasmus (De Copia) teaches that style includes manner (the figures) and matter (the topoi). Thomas Wilson (The Arte of Rhetorique) gives a separate yet functionally similar treatment of the classical doctrines of invention (the topoi) and style (the figures). Peter Ramus reduces the topoi to ten, removes them from rhetoric to logic, and leaves rhetoric (apparently) only style. But Ramistic rhetoricians (Fraunce, for example) base the tropes on Ramus's ten (logical) topoi, and the famous "method" is more rhetorical than logical. Manuals of figures (such as Peacham's The Garden of Eloquence) which include nearly all of the classical topoi show that style has become (by synecdoche) the whole of rhetoric. And a new element, the imagination, is treated in rhetorical terms: Sidney's Apologia emphasizes the poet's imaginative invention, Bacon's De Augmentio Scientiarum links reason to the imagination by way of rhetoric.

If stylistic rhetoric is the first "new" rhetoric, it is hardly the last. Locke's empirical philosophy (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding) initially had little effect on the rhetoric of poetry, but it did provide the stimulus for a second "new" rhetoric in the eighteenth century. George Campbell's A Philosophy of Rhetoric recovers much of Aristotelian rhetoric by founding it on empiricism. Campbell does not treat the topoi as such, but he does discuss fully

the rhetorical triad, ethos / pathos / logos. He emphasizes pathos--for example, to explain the power of the tropes to affect the imagination of the reader or hearer, Campbell introduces a notion of vivacity of language derived from Locke's philosophy of ideas. Imagination is a favourite eighteenth-century notion, and Romantic poetics fashions out of it a new figural topos. For both Wordsworth and Coleridge, the imagination is the creating faculty (genius) of the poet, manifested in language, and appealing to a similar appreciating faculty (taste) in the audience. But they differ in their understanding of how this faculty is manifested in language: Wordsworth locates the imagination in metaphor ("Preface" to Lyrical Ballads); Coleridge introduces a new figural topos, the symbol, defining it, the poet, and the poem in similar rhetorical terms (Statesman's Manual, Biographia Literaria). The ensuing so-called collapse of the rhetoric of poetry rests in part on the inability of rhetoric to account for the symbol.

Twentieth-century rhetoric consists of three related strands: the rhetoric of the figure, the rhetoric of language, and rhetoric proper. The work of Richards (The Philosophy of Rhetoric) and Ricoeur (The Rule of Metaphor) shows that the rhetoric of the figure prioritizes metaphor. Though it fails to account for the dominant role of the symbol in twentieth-century poetry (despite some advances made by the New Critics), the rhetoric of the figure does

establish that all the classical figures are signs in the Saussurean sense (Group Mu A General Rhetoric; an immediate consequence of Group Mu's work is that the Saussurean sign is also a figure).

The rhetoric of language, that is, the somewhat fuller reformulation of classical rhetoric in semiotic terms, derives in part from Saussurean linguistics. The work of Barthes (The Pleasure of the Text) and Derrida (Of Grammatology) demonstrates that the instability of the sign (= signified + signifier) means that the presence of author (ethos) and reader (pathos) can never be eradicated from the text (logos). The semiotics of C. S. Peirce, a second source of the rhetoric of language, offers a broader if more difficult notion of the sign which incorporates rather than eliminates the rhetorical triad (Collected Papers Vol. 2). Peirce's concept of the sign, for example, accounts for the semiotic nature and the persuasive power of the literary symbol by iteration.

Rhetoric proper in the twentieth century is either classical rhetoric applied or classical rhetoric rethought. Corbett may be cited as an example of the former; Perelman is the major example of the latter. In his The New Rhetoric (co-authored with Olbrecht-Tytteca) and The New Rhetoric and the Humanities, Perelman returns us to the role of the topoi. According to Perelman, the Aristotelian topoi are very general premises shared by a speaker and his audience

(for example, the greater and the lesser). Each topos is a preference, a simple binary ranking according to some value ("greater than" means "preferred with respect to some criterion") which allows argumentation to proceed. These topoi may themselves be further grouped into pairs (for example, topoi of quantity versus topoi of quality) which again function as more generalized topoi in that they too are binary rankings based on preferred values.

This survey of topos suggests first of all that the figures function as topoi for the invention of style; and secondly, that all topoi as well as the figures share an underlying binary structure which is successively applicable. Such binary relations are called partial orderings and are familiar to students of (mathematical) logic. Recent researches in category theory have used a generalized partial ordering, called a topos, to provide a foundation for logic (Goldblatt Topoi: A Categorical Investigation of Logic). These considerations motivate a definition of rhetorical topos:

A topos is a binary relation $\langle x, y \rangle$ that is transitive, that is, such that whenever $\langle x, y \rangle$ and $\langle y, z \rangle$ then $\langle x, z \rangle$.

That all the classical topoi as well as the figures (including the symbol) are topoi in the sense of the

definition can be demonstrated. Besides capturing the essence of traditional notions of topos and figure, this definition provides a simple and flexible tool for rhetorical analysis.

Part 2 of this study comprises an analysis which traces the chronology of topoi, especially but not exclusively of the form <prairie,x> or <x,prairie>, in prairie poetry. These topoi are relations between a place (the prairie) and the things (persons, deeds, objects) associated with or belonging to that place; values and attributes of place transfer to the things associated with it. In the work of Dorothy Livesay, the topos <woman,land> emerges from the early poetry of the thirties as a consequence of topoi such as <woman,x> and <x,prairie> (x is variously wind, rain, bird, flower, earth, and so on). This topos ultimately finds clear expression in the metaphor "I am mainland." One of the major attributes of the prairie that transfers readily to woman is its Dionysian quality, a quality that leads eventually to a rejection of the male. The male is usually figured by the (Apollonian) sun or by a consequence of its absence, ice. When the topos <woman,ice-melter> appears, it represents the female's usurpation of the male's role as well as her ability to prevent the coming ice-age occasioned by the failure of man. The rejection of the male is completed by the topos <woman,woman> in the later poems. Thus, the sequence of major topoi, <woman,land>, <woman,ice-

melter>, and <woman,woman> may be said to describe Livesay's female rhetoric.

Miriam Waddington, whose writing career begins in the forties, employs chiefly a "topos of transformation," that is, she uses figures of transformation to deliver themes of transformation. The sequence (1) <prairie,colour>, (2) <colour,pictura>, (3) <pictura,poesis>, for example, describes the topoi (1) used in an early poem as well as the rhetorical pointing (2 and 3) of a set of ekphrastic poems. This rhetorical consciousness culminates in a later poem which explicitly uses the topoi <experience,x> and <x,colour> to express transformation (birth, life, death) in an array of the colours (red, blue, yellow) of rhetoric. The theme of transformation is rendered also by such symbols as <water,->, <trumpet,->, and the literal signs of language, <x,->. A particularly powerful transformation is effected by the topos <male,female>, representing the interpenetration of the anima and the animus within any individual psyche.

Eli Mandel might be called a poet of the imagined place. In the fifties, Mandel writes a straightforward landscape poetry infused with references to mythology and based on topoi such as <prairie,grammar>. As Mandel increasingly adopts the resources of rhetoric, this topos is replaced by <prairie,rhetoric>. The question, how to turn place into poetry, receives its fullest answer in a "tree of place" constructed out of the "double" topoi, <place,A/B>

and <"out of",A/B>, in which A/B is a doubling of or pun on the meaning of the first term. In particular, the most important "place" for Mandel is the double itself, a kind of tension between the literal and the imagined, neither of which can exist without the other. Not surprisingly, Mandel is the first writer here studied to consciously employ a double persona, <writer,rhetorical/serious>.

The most "prairie" of all prairie poets considered in this study is undoubtedly John Newlove. From his earliest work (the sixties) to his most recent, Newlove's major topos, <prairie,x>, collects hundreds of references to the objects, persons, and deeds associated with this place. <Prairie,x> functions also as a symbol whose values include the imagination (of home, escape, and return) and the poet himself. The topoi <prairie,singer>, <prairie,nomad>, and <prairie,tree> are significant stages in the development of Newlove's "prairie" persona. The last of these, <prairie,tree>, is part of an extended topical argument that establishes <prairie,garden>.

Robert Kroetsch's poetry (beginning in the seventies) is a continuing argument against the law of the excluded middle. This argument uses a topos based on paradox, <x,not-x>, and a persona based on the derived topos, <homo, rhetoricus/seriosus>, to engage in a search for meaning. It concludes, in effect, that meaning is subject to the law of undecidability. Kroetsch moves steadily toward an extreme

reflexivity, expressed by <x,x>; in the latest poetry, <x,x> takes the form <woman,woman>. Though the topos <prairie,x> is present in the poetry, it is overwhelmed by paradox and persona.

Each of the five past decades (the thirties to the seventies) therefore introduces a major prairie poet, all of whom are still writing today (the eighties). These five poets constitute the core of an an extended first generation of prairie poetry; a second generation begins writing in the seventies and achieves its maturity in the present decade. Three of these newer poets represent both a continuing tradition and a new departure.

Andrew Suknaski makes his debut in the seventies with a very specialized application of the topos <prairie,x>: "prairie" is Wood Mountain, and "x" is the people, the times, the stories, or the language of that place. Two of these second terms (language and time) point, respectively, to Suknaski's earlier and later concerns. Time, for example, is figured in the later poetry by direct reference, by a topos of repetition (<time,x>), and by the fusion of two images (a wheel and an arrow). Suknaski therefore writes chiefly in the tradition of Mandel and Newlove.

Douglas Barbour, on the other hand, locates himself in the tradition of Waddington and Kroetsch. His affinity with Waddington is seen in his deliberate, pointed use of ekphrasis based on the topos <sight,speech>, or, more

precisely, on the topos <painting image, verbal image>. This topos leads him to explore others, namely, <verbal -, sound image>, <sensation, word>, and <sound, word>. Such reflexivity is reminiscent of Kroetsch, but Barbour's concerns are narrower and technical rather than philosophical.

Patrick Friesen, like Suknaski, begins his career as an ethnic poet, but his earlier topos, <prairie, x>, is replaced in the most recent poems by symbolism and a severe irony. The symbol <light, x> traditionally signifies knowledge; <room, x> symbolizes the female; Friesen uses these two symbols to denote illusion and entrapment, thereby mocking his narrator's self-portrayal as a holy fool of love. The author's rhetoric of conviction and mockery contrasts sharply with the narrator's misplaced reliance on conviction alone.

The presuppositions of this study are, I hope, borne out by its conclusions. The intersection of rhetoric and poetics includes the topoi of invention of both argument and style, leading to a simple yet useful definition of topos. This definition, applied systematically to a body of contemporary poetry, shows that rhetoric does indeed continue to function as an heuristics of composition and reading. Furthermore, the actual topoi discovered in the poetry, ranging as they do over a long and living tradition, demonstrate that this poetry is both substantial and rhetorical.

Part 1: Topos

1.1 Greek Topos

The word topos means place (F. E. Peters, Greek Philosophical Terms 1967 197). Aristotle's "innermost motionless boundary of what contains [a thing]" (Physics IV, 212a) is obviously physical topos, but he had also a notion of natural topos (for example, the natural place of fire, which is derived from absolute lightness, is above us, On the Heavens IV, 310a-311b), and, more significantly for a literary study, a notion of logical topos (unless otherwise indicated, all quotations are from the The Complete Works of Aristotle, Revised Oxford Translation, 2 vols., 1984, edited by Jonathan Barnes). In its most general conception, a logical topos is an aspect of the formal cause of a thing: "the form or the archetype, i.e. the definition of the essence, and its genera, are called causes (...), and the parts in the definition" (Physics II, 194b25-30). More precisely, the logical topoi are the predicables and predicaments treated in the Categories and Topics. Thus, the four predicables (definition, property, genus, accident) are distinguished linguistic elements or signifiers from which all propositions are formed (Topics 101b15-25); the ten predicaments (what a thing is, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity) are

categories of signification in which the predicables fall (Topics 103b20-30, Categories 1b25 ff.).

It will be helpful, in view of the long-standing difficulties in distinguishing between predicables and predicaments, to quote Aristotle's explications of each.

First, the predicables:

For every predicate of a subject must of necessity be either convertible with its subject or not; and if it is convertible, it would be its definition or property, for if it signifies the essence, it is definition; if not, it is a property..... If, on the other hand, it is not predicated convertibly of the thing, it either is or is not one of the terms contained in the definition of the subject; and if it is one of those terms, then it will be the genus or the differentia; whereas, if it is not one of those terms, clearly it would be an accident... (Topics 103b5-20).

Second, the predicaments (categories):

Of things said without any combination, each signifies either substance [e.g., man, horse] or quantity [four-foot] or qualification [white, grammatical] or relative [double, half, larger] or where or when or being-in-a-position or having or doing or being-affected (Categories 1b25 ff.).

Third, the relations between predicables and predicaments:

Next, then, we must distinguish between the categories of predication in which the four above-mentioned [predicables] are found. These are ten in number: What a thing is, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Place, Time, Position, State, Activity, Passivity. For the accident and genus and property and definition of any thing will always be in one of these predications; for all the propositions found through these [predicables] signify either what something is or its quality or quantity or some one of the other types of predicate. It is clear, too, on the face of it that the man who signifies what something is signifies sometimes a substance, sometimes a quality, sometimes some one of the other types of predicate (Topics 103b20-30).

A simple statement of the nature of the predicables and the predicaments seems therefore to be this: the predicables are the four basic types of predicates useful for generating propositions about things; the predicaments are categories or types of predicates useful for signifying the nature of things. Both are in fact classifications of predicates, but from different perspectives: for the former, the perspective of the signifier; for the latter, the perspective of the signified. For this reason, and because later rhetoricians (e.g., Thomas Wilson) referred to them as such, the predicables and the predicaments may be called logical topoi. They are, literally, places where predicates may be found (see also Ochs 197).

The most important notion of topos, however, for literary analysis, is rhetorical place. This notion is introduced somewhat casually (implying therefore its treatment elsewhere in the canon) in The Rhetoric:

...the proper subjects of dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms are the things with which we say the commonplaces are concerned, that is to say those that apply equally to questions of right conduct, natural science, politics, and many other things that have nothing to do with one another (1358a10-15).

Immediately following this statement is an example of such a commonplace or topos, namely, that concerned with "the more or less" (1358a15). A few lines further, Aristotle identifies "the special commonplaces which are based on such

propositions as apply only to particular groups or classes of things" such as the examples (right conduct, natural science, et cetera) listed above (1358a17 ff.). On the other hand, "The general commonplaces have no special subject-matter and therefore will not increase our understanding of any particular class of things" (1358a20). Finally, "we must distinguish, in dealing with enthymemes, the kinds and the commonplaces on which they are founded. By kinds I mean the propositions peculiar to each several class of things, by commonplaces those common to all classes alike" (1358a30).

This passage (as it appears in the earlier, not the revised) translation is the source of the much-debated distinctions between particular and general topics, or between material and formal topics, or between particular and common places (see Ryan Chapter 2 and Grimaldi for a full discussion of the debate). Without engaging in that debate, one can nevertheless observe that, whatever they are, the topoi exist in degrees of generality (or, equivalently, specialization) and that they are the stuff out of which enthymemes are made. Aristotle's further discussion of topos emphasizes the latter: (1) the topoi are "embodied" in enthymemes (1395b20); (2) the topoi are the "elements" of enthymemes (1396b20); (3) "an element is a commonplace [topos] embracing a large number of enthymemes" (1403a18).

Again, it will be helpful to describe the topoi listed

in The Rhetoric. First, under the rubric of "arguments common to all oratory," four topoi are given (1392a5-1393a20):

- (1) "Greatness and Smallness";
- (2) "Possible and the Impossible";
- (3) "Past Fact";
- (4) "Future Fact".

Second, the enumeration of twenty-eight valid topoi (1397a5-1400b35) may be summarized as follows (Lanham Handlist 107-109):

- (1) Restate your contention in an opposite way.
- (2) Redefine a key term.
- (3) Use a correlative idea.
- (4) Argue a fortiori.
- (5) Argue from the past.
- (6) Turn an accusation against an accuser.
- (7) Define your terms favourably.
- (8) Play upon various senses of a word.
- (9) Divide your argument into its logical parts.
- (10) Argue from induction.
- (11) Argue from authority.
- (12) Argue your contention part by part.
- (13) Argue from consequences.
- (14) Invert your opponent's arguments.
- (15) Argue from appearance or its opposite.
- (16) Argue from logical consequences.
- (17) Argue that the same results imply the same causes.
- (18) Argue from the earlier to the later.
- (19) Substitute possible for actual motives.
- (20) Use general motives to argue individual motives.
- (21) Argue that the truth of a greater improbability implies the truth of a lesser.
- (22) Use an opponent's inaccuracies and self-contradiction.
- (23) Refute slander by reviewing the facts.
- (24) Prove effect by showing cause.
- (25) Argue that failure to use one's best argument shows trustful innocence.
- (26) Disprove an action by showing it inconsistent with earlier actions.
- (27) Earlier mistakes excuse or explain present ones.
- (28) Play on the meanings of names.

Some commentators feel that these twenty-eight topoi

are the detailed working out of the first four given above (Corbett). Others feel that they fall into three inferential patterns: antecedent-consequent or cause-effect, more-less, some form of relation (Grimaldi). More recently, Ryan has argued convincingly that the topoi are the underlying structures of the enthymemes (48-49). There seems to be a consensus that both the first four and the latter twenty-eight are general topoi and have a formal rather than material nature. Thus, Grimaldi in his concluding summary says that the general topics are "forms of inference into which syllogistic, or enthymematic, reasoning naturally falls. As modes of reasoning, they may be used for the [particular topics] of various subjects which specifically differ..., and when they are applied to the [particular topics] they effect syllogistic or enthymematic argumentation" (Grimaldi 186). Others hold that "the rhetorical topics do not constitute a logical system of invention" (Ochs 195).

The special (particular, material) topoi are not listed in The Rhetoric for obvious reasons. Aristotle holds that these topoi belong not to rhetoric but to the other sciences (1358a), yet he refers to and uses them constantly. For example, in his discussion of epideictic oratory (Book I Chapter 9), he analyzes the objects of praise and blame (excellence and vice, the noble and the base) by defining his terms, establishing the relations between them (e.g.,

excellence is a noble thing), determining the parts and the effects of excellence, listing the kinds of noble acts, and so on (1366a25 ff.). Aristotle is using several topics (definition, relation, division, effect, and so on) to determine the "aspects of the subject," to set out the content of the discussion. These topics are drawn from both the logical and the rhetorical *topoi* (as I have used these terms); yet, the topics are not used to argue a point but to generate the material for possible argument. As Grimaldi says, "particular topics are concerned with the specific content and meaning of the subject under discussion. They enable one to acquire the factual information pertinent to the matter which in turn permits one to make intelligent statement upon the subject" (186).

The *topoi* occupy a central position in Aristotle's concept of rhetoric as "the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion" (Rhetoric 1355b25). Persuasion for Aristotle means argumentation, and "the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word" are of three kinds: "The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself" (Rhetoric 1356a1-5). These three kinds (of modes or means of persuasion) are commonly known as ethos, pathos, and logos; and the terms mean both the bases of persuasion (character

of the speaker, frame of mind of the audience, proof provided in words) and the techniques of using these bases to persuade (Lanham Handlist 1969 46, 74, 107). The topoi are used to invent both the matter and the form of logos, as Grimaldi's analysis (above) corroborates: insofar as persuasion is logos, it is enthymematic argumentation; insofar as it is enthymematic argumentation, it is generated by the topoi (Rhetoric, Book II, Chapters 19-26). But the relation between topos and the other two modes of persuasion is equally close. Ethos and pathos are treated in the first seventeen chapters of the second book of the Rhetoric; the topoi are enumerated only in the remaining chapters (19 to 26) which deal with logos. Yet, the discussion of pathos uses the topoi to set out the facts about the emotions and advocates the topoi as ways of appealing to the emotions: "It is now plain that when you wish to calm others you must draw upon these commonplaces" (1380b30). Similarly, the discussion of ethos sets forth the nature and types of "character" by using the topoi and is immediately followed by a discussion of the four topoi common to all oratory (1392b29). Evidently, the cornerstone of Aristotle's conception of rhetoric is logos, and the topoi are themselves situated in this cornerstone. At the same time, logos and, a fortiori, topos are also considered not only in themselves but in relation to ethos and pathos.

Although the organizing principle of The Rhetoric is

the threefold division of persuasion into ethos, pathos, and logos, the later fivefold division of rhetoric is immanent. Book III begins as follows: "In making a speech one must study three points: first, the means of producing persuasion; second, the style, or language, to be used; third, the proper arrangement of the various parts of the speech" (1403b5 ff.). Aristotle goes on to note that the "means" are three and have already been discussed, that the "sources" of enthymemes (the *topoi*) have also been treated, that he will turn next to style, and that delivery properly belongs also to the art of rhetoric. Thus, four of the five traditional divisions of rhetoric--invention, arrangement, style, delivery--are present; only memory would be added later. The relation between *topos* and invention has traditionally been understood exactly as summarized above, but the relation between *topos* and style, though equally important, has not often been remarked.

The centre-piece of Aristotle's concept of style is metaphor. Referring the reader to The Poetics for a definition, Aristotle notes that "metaphor is of great value both in poetry and prose" because "[it] gives style clearness, charm, and distinction as nothing else can: and it is not a thing whose use can be taught by one man to another" (1405a5-10). A little later, "it is from metaphor that we can best get hold of something fresh"; "both speech and reasoning are lively in proportion as they make us seize

a new idea promptly"; and "the metaphors must not be far-fetched, or they will be difficult to grasp, nor obvious, or they will have no effect" (1410a13-35). The "most taking" or liveliest metaphor is the kind based on "proportion" (1411a1 and 1411b22). "Liveliness is especially conveyed by metaphor, and by the further power of surprising the hearer" (1412a18). The most significant aspect of Aristotle's entire discussion of metaphor in relation to style is that metaphor is a technique of invention in style: speaking of "how to devise lively and taking sayings," Aristotle says, "Their actual invention can only come through talent or long practice; but this treatise may indicate the way it is done. We may deal with them by enumerating the different kinds of them" (1410b5-15). In other words, although the invention of metaphor cannot be taught, the invention of style can, and the best technique is metaphor (others are similes (actually a kind of metaphor), epigrams, riddles, and proverbs--Book III, cc. 10-11). Since metaphor is based on proportion, it follows that metaphor itself derives from the topos of analogy. For these reasons, it makes sense to speak of metaphor as a topos of style, a place in which style is invented. (See Paul Ricoeur (1977) 32-35 and Ryan (1984) 157-72 for a full discussion of the role of metaphor in the context of a rhetorical notion of style.)

Though Aristotle's centrepiece of style is metaphor, he also pays due attention to the so-called "classical virtues"

of the good style: clarity, decorum, purity, ornament (1403b5-1414a29 passim). He makes no mention of the three general kinds of style (grand, middle, plain); but, as the work of the Roman rhetoricians shows, both the "virtues" and the "kinds" of style represent additional *topoi* for its invention.

In summary, then, this discussion of the Aristotelian *topos* shows that: (1) there are four distinct but related notions of *topos*--physical, natural, logical, and rhetorical; (2) with respect to the rhetorical triad--ethos/logos/pathos--*topos* is situated in logos because it is the method of generating arguments; (3) with respect to the later five parts of rhetoric--invention, arrangement, style, delivery, and memory--*topos* is the basis of invention, chiefly of arguments; (4) nevertheless, invention applies to style as well as to argument, and one *topos* of style is metaphor which, in turn, is understood as an application of the *topos* of analogy. Evidently, the role of *topos* in the Aristotelian canon is both pervasive and, especially in The Rhetoric, creative. As Grimaldi has noted (see above), the *topoi* have an underlying binary structure which is used transitively in argument. By Aristotle's own definition, the most important *topos* of style, metaphor, has the same structure: "Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else" (Poetics 1457b5 ff.).

1.2 Roman Topos

To Cicero falls the distinction of articulating the five parts of classical rhetoric: "all the activity and ability of the orator falls into five divisions,....he must first hit upon what to say [invention]; then manage and marshall his discoveries, not merely in orderly fashion, but with a discriminating eye for the exact weight as it were of each argument [arrangement]; next go on to array them in the adornments of style; after that keep them guarded in his memory; and in the end deliver them with effect and charm" (De Oratore, I, xxxi, 142-3). Cicero's contributions to the notion of topos, however, indicate the beginnings of a long history of interpretation, amendment, and, generally speaking, playful use of that concept.

In the first instance, Cicero's list of sixteen basic topoi is clearly located in invention: "three things are necessary to the discovery of arguments, first, acuteness, secondly theory, or art, ..., thirdly painstaking" (De Oratore, II, xxxv, 147; see also Topica, ii, 6). More significantly, Cicero's list freely combines topics drawn from Aristotle's logical topoi with topics drawn from his rhetorical topoi:

- (1) definition
- (2) partition
- (3) etymology
- (4) conjugates
- (5) genus
- (6) species

- (7) similarity or analogy
- (8) difference
- (9) contraries
- (10) adjuncts
- (11) antecedents
- (12) consequents
- (13) contradictions
- (14) efficient cause
- (15) effects
- (16) comparison

(De Oratore II, xxxix,162-xl,174; Topica ii,9-iv,33).

The list contains arguments from definition (a predicable), from similarity (which, since it is based on quality, is a predicament), and from antecedent to consequent (a "proper" rhetorical topic). This characteristic of the topoi, namely, their flexibility in the hands of successive rhetors, will appear again and again. Although such flexibility may be viewed negatively, it may equally well be argued that the flexibility of the concept of topoi constitutes its second most important characteristic, the first being of course its function as a method of invention.

Secondly, Cicero in fact toys with the intension as well as the extension of the concept of topoi. Defining a topic as "the region of an argument," Cicero emphasizes a theory of stasis within which the topics find their application (see Topica xxi,79-86 and De Oratore II, xxv,105-113). Of course, the concept of stasis is much older than Cicero: "In Pre-Aristotelian Greek thought, in Aristotle's physical philosophy and in the metaphysical rhetoric of Post-Aristotelian Peripatetics of the Third Century before Christ, [stasis] was the rest, pause, halt,

or standing still, which inevitably occurs between opposite as well as between contrary 'moves', or motions" (Dieter 369). The fullest discussion of this theory is found in Quintilian and will be dealt with below, but its relation to topos may profitably be described here. Stasis represents a specialization of the topoi to the subject of jurisprudence. All the topics become applied rather than general, and, though the Roman rhetors constantly assert that they are dealing with rhetoric not just forensic rhetoric, the net result is a significant shift in rhetoric toward specialization. In a word, stasis represents a diminishment of the range of Greek topoi at the hands of the Romans.

The question in legal issues, says Quintilian, is either definite (special, hypothetical) or indefinite (general, theoretical), and the former (should George marry the rich widow?) presupposes the latter (should man marry?). Every question has an "essential basis on which it rests" (Institutio Oratoria III, vi,1); this essential basis is what the Greeks call stasis (III, vi,3: other terms are constitution, issue, and even question). Stasis "reside[s] in that which I would say, if I were confined to a single argument" (III, vi,10); it is the "most important point on which the whole matter [argument, question] turns" (21). After a lengthy review of others' views, sub-divisions, and opinions of stasis, Quintilian follows Cicero by concluding that stasis in itself is either conjectural (whether a thing

is), definitive (what a thing is), or qualitative (what kind of thing it is) (80). In that review, Quintilian makes an interesting observation about the relation between stasis and topos. We might note that all three types of stases look suspiciously like Aristotle's categories (predicaments) and that one of them, definition, is also a predicable--but not Quintilian: stases are not "sufficiently determined" by the categories; only the first four categories "concern" stases; the remaining are "topics for argument"; and there are topics not covered by the categories (24-28). If we recall that the predicaments (categories) and the predicables are classes of predicates considered as signifieds and signifiers, if we recall Dieter's notion of stasis as a rest between oppositions, then Quintilian's stance is clear: a stasis is a point of disagreement about a signified (if the question is hypothetical) or a signifier (if the question is theoretical); in either case, stasis questions the applicability of a signifier to another signifier or to another signified. It is itself a point of binary opposition (i.e., an issue to which a topos might apply) and sets in motion a series of applications of topoi. Does the signifier "marry" apply to the signifier "man" (or to the signifieds "George" and "widow")? Yes, or no, and why? In the course of answering "why," the topoi are used to construct the arguments (see Institutio V, x, and Cicero's Topica xxi, 79). Thus, in Book III, vii, Quintilian takes up the question of

"praise and blame" (panegyrics) by using the topics to construct arguments of either praise or blame of gods, men, cities, and so on, noting that the type of stasis involved is chiefly quality (III, vii,28).

For the sake of completeness, Quintilian's summary of the topoi or "places of arguments" follows:

[A]rguments are drawn from persons, causes, place and time (which latter we have divided into preceding, contemporary, and subsequent), from resources (under which we include instruments), from manner (that is, how a thing has been done), from definition, genus, species, difference, property, elimination, division, beginnings, increase, consummation, likes, unlikes, contradictions, consequents, efficientes, effects, results, and comparison, which is subdivided into several species (Institutio Oratoria, V, x,94).

The change that results from locating topoi within stasis rather than within logos is not of great consequence for either Cicero or Quintilian. The structure of their treatises leaves no doubt that the correct order of thinking about composition (oral and written) is stasis / invention / topoi (De Oratore II, xxiv,99 - xxvi,113 and xxxix,162-xli,177; Topica, xxi,79 - xxv,96; Institutio Oratoria, III-VI). But the relocation of topoi in stasis suggests, for instance, that the consideration of style is now separated from the topoi. Aristotle's order is logos / invention / topoi, and the reverse direction easily offers him the opportunity to put forward metaphor as a major topoi of style (logos considered as word). For the Roman rhetors, the reverse movement leads from topoi to "rest, pause, halt, or

standing still" (stasis) rather than to word (logos). Both Cicero and Quintilian echo Aristotle on the rhetorical function and priority of metaphor in style (De Oratore III, xxxviii,155 - xlii,168; Institutio Oratoria VIII, vi and IX), but Cicero pointedly notes that "there is no need for me to give you a lecture on the method of inventing these [metaphors] or their classification" (III, xxxviii,156). Nevertheless, a method of inventing metaphors is assumed, whereas for Aristotle metaphor is a method of invention of style (and metaphor's invention cannot itself be taught). The method of inventing metaphors that Cicero assumes is evidently a classification of metaphors, for he has already split metaphor proper from "metaphors" such as metonymy and synecdoche (calling the latter figures) and he will later classify figures of two kinds, thought and speech (III, lii,200 - liv,208). The figures of thought include some of the most important *topoi* (comparison, opposites) and even syllogism and example. Quintilian, similarly, offers an extensive classification, using a distinction between tropes (including metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche) and figures (of speech and of thought) as a basis. In both Roman authors, *topos*'s role in the invention of style moves away from the creative (the method of metaphor whose invention cannot be taught) to the static (the method of inventing tropes and figures via classificatory lists).

Classification (or codification) is of course the great

Roman virtue (or vice), and the extensive lists of tropes and figures are the places where style may be invented. Even the three kinds of style, introduced by Cicero and linked to the means of persuasion by Quintilian, may be considered as topoi of style. According to Cicero, "the full and yet rounded style of oratory, the plain style that is not devoid of vigor and force, and the style that combines elements of each class and whose merit is to steer the middle course" all have "a certain charm of colouring, not as surface varnish but as permeating their arterial systems" (De Oratore III, lii,199). Quintilian restates Aristotle's logos, pathos, and ethos as the three aims of the orator--to instruct, move, and charm (Institutio Oratoria III, xiv,2)--and links them to the three styles--plain for instructing, grand for moving, middle for charming (XII, x,58-59). But the three styles are defined on the basis of the kind and frequency of the tropes and figures used, and the full Roman concept of stylistic invention emerges: from aims, to styles, to tropes and figures.

In summary, then, the contribution of the Roman rhetors to the notion of topos is three-fold:

- (1) by locating topos in invention, first, and in stasis, second, the Romans emphasize the special rather than the general nature of the topoi;
- (2) the same relocation suggests (by a play on the word stasis) a change in the role of topos in the invention of

style from the dynamic to the static effected by the Roman
penchant for classification;

(3) the figures include most of the basic topoi.

1.3 Medieval Topos

The classical notion of topos is therefore neither precisely defined, nor clearly separated from notions of proof and debate, nor extensionally determined. Rather, almost any formal or thematic viewpoint, logical or psychological tactic of disputation, objective fact or fictional image, concrete example or conventional code "may, under certain socio-cultural conditions, attain the rank of a topos" (Bornscheuer, "Zehn Thesen zur Ambivalenz der Rhetorik," 1977, 208; my translation). Nevertheless, Bornscheuer goes on to note four functional characteristics of the topos: it is grounded in endoxa [general opinion]; it is potential [widely interpretable and applicable]; it is intentional [directed at argumentation]; it is symbolic [fundamental to a culturally determined communication system] (208-210).

Given such a flexible and ambivalent notion, it is no wonder that the medieval world (which did not have access to all relevant classical documents) seems to neglect topos except in the most obvious sense. It is neither possible nor necessary to trace here the causes and course of rhetoric in the middle ages; but Murphy's generalized conclusions to his study may be quoted by way of summary: (1) "medieval theorists did indeed make pragmatic adaptations of ancient materials to shape special genres [ars dictaminis, ars praedicandi, ars grammatica--which includes, for example,

the subgenre ars poetriae] for their own purposes"; (2) "[u]nderlying every medieval rhetorical treatise, whatever its genre, is the assumption that the communication process can be analyzed, its principles extracted, and methods of procedure written down to be used by others. This [preceptive nature] is the essence of rhetoric" (1974 362-3).

Three examples will illustrate the role of topos in the middle ages: Augustine's subordination of rhetoric to truth, Geoffrey of Vinsauf's concept of style, and Dante's search for the ideal vernacular. Whereas all demonstrate that topos as such has a restricted role in medieval rhetoric, none is as unequivocal on this point as Saint Augustine's On Christian Doctrine (c. 400, translation by D. W. Robertson, Jr., 1958). Since "the art of rhetoric" can be used to urge both truths and falsehoods, it might as well be used in the service of truth (Book Four, II,3). But truth is synonymous with the teachings of the Scriptures (IV,6) and Cicero's "eloquence without wisdom ... profits no one" is best understood as referring to the Scriptures (V,7). The Scriptures, however, have an eloquence all their own, namely, "a kind of eloquence fitting for men most worthy of the highest authority and clearly inspired by God" (VI,9). The model for our eloquence, therefore, is the eloquence found in the Scriptures, not the eloquence which happens to be held in common with "pagan orators and poets" (VI,10).

Examples from the Scriptures are adduced (VII,11-21); all of them show that eloquence is not amiss if subjugated to Christian teaching. At the same time, the prime consideration is not eloquence but clarity of teaching (IX,23). For example, even Cicero gave first place to the function of eloquence to teach, second to its function to please, and third to its function to move (XII,27). However, because knowledge of the truth (obtained by teaching) does not always result in proper (Christian) actions (beliefs and deeds), the other functions of eloquence may be used to persuade the listener (XIII,29). The three styles, therefore, are understood and applied in the same manner: the subdued style is used for teaching to persuade the learner directly of the truth; the moderate style is used to please the hearer, to hold his interest if necessary; the grand style to move him to proper action if he is not already so moved by knowledge (XXV,55). All three styles are appropriate for persuasion to the truth of Christian doctrine.

Nothing, it seems, could be clearer than this: as Murphy notes, Book Four of On Christian Doctrine is "the first manual of Christian rhetoric" (1974 58), and the phrase itself specifies exactly what has happened to the classical tradition. Augustine's open adoption of rhetoric as a tool in the service of a doctrine is of course part of the massive conflict between paganism and Christianity in

which rhetoric was seen as one of the pagan "captive women" (St. Jerome) or as "Egyptian gold" (Robertson). From the perspective of this study, the possibility of invention (ergo, the creative role of *topos*) is therefore severely restricted. God, we might say, has invented the truth; man's role is simply to teach it. And Augustine's treatise is itself the best example of the literary quality of the writing that results from such a prescription.

An entirely different applied and prescriptive rhetoric is found in Geoffrey of Vinsauf's Poetria Nova (c. 1208-1214, translation by Jane Baltzell Kopp, in Murphy 1971). The difference is that rhetoric is applied to literary composition rather than Christian doctrine; the similarity is that the *topoi* are absent in the rules of composition that are treated. But this similarity is only apparent: Geoffrey's own style shows that the figures of classical rhetoric are the *topoi* of invention of his style. It is commonly agreed that a major difference between Geoffrey and his sources (chiefly Cicero and Quintilian) is that he is speaking entirely of written composition and they speak almost entirely of oratory. An equally important difference is that Geoffrey is concerned with and demonstrates the invention of style, whereas the Roman rhetors were concerned with the invention of arguments for debate. Geoffrey thus exemplifies and amplifies that contention of Aristotle and to a lesser extent of the Romans, that style too could be

invented.

A brief description of Geoffrey's work will indicate three of its outstanding features. The Poetria Nova begins with a dedication to Pope Innocent III (vv. 1-42), followed by an introduction (43-86) in which all but one of the five divisions (i.e., invention, arrangement, style, and delivery) of rhetoric are briefly considered in the context of poetic composition. Then, in order, Geoffrey takes up arrangement (87-202), style (203-1973), memory (1974-2035), and delivery (2036-65), closing finally with an epilogue (2065-2116). Invention and the topoi, except for a brief, allusive treatment in the introduction, are not discussed at all; and the great majority of the treatise is devoted to style (see Ernest Gallo 1971 Appendix II for a fuller outline, and Murphy 1974 170-3 for a summary).

Invention, furthermore, is the tenor of a metaphor whose vehicle is housebuilding: to build a house, one needs a plan, measurements, steps to follow, all developed by "the mind's inner compass," and assembled in its "stronghold." Only then can "Poetry come to clothe your material with words." That is, the matter and the form of the poem are built in the mind like a house, then the house becomes a person whom poetry clothes in language. The house-building metaphor is traditional (Quintilian, for example, uses it to introduce his discussion of arrangement), as is the clothing metaphor (Cicero uses it in his description of the parts of

rhetoric). As will become apparent in the sequel, Geoffrey's concern is almost entirely with the invention of this dress.

First, the treatment of style consists of over seventeen hundred lines divided up as follows: amplification and abbreviation (540 lines), the ornaments or figures (800 lines), conversions (250 lines), and a miscellaneous section (120 lines). In fact, the whole section is dominated by a study of the figures: amplification proceeds by way of the figures of repetition, periphrasis, apostrophe, prosopopoeia, and digression, as well as by the use of topoi such as comparison, and opposition. The figures treated are the tropes (ornatus gravis) and the figures of diction and of thought (ornatus levis). Conversion treats of ways of changing chiefly verbs into nouns.

Secondly, Geoffrey tends to use the figure treated in his discussion of that figure. "In order, then, that your theme may assume a rich costume, if the expression be old, be a physician and make the old veteran a new man," he says, and launches into a discussion of transferatio (metaphor) (Murphy 1971 60). Or, "Give hyperbole its head, but do not allow the speech to gallop away out of hand: let reason rein it in" (70). Or, again, "With that same figure of speech [i.e., synecdoche], you, Gion, will be assessed for your various attributes: muddy and clear, narrow and broad, bitter and savoury" (70-71). Examples may be multiplied almost endlessly: using amplification he discusses the

techniques used in amplifying; a passage on *prospopoeia* begins with "Come, *Prosopopoeia*, fifth helpmeet in extending the journey." Today we would call this technique self-referential or self-reflexive.

Thirdly, two recognizable *topoi* appear openly in the section on amplification: comparison and opposition. Comparison may be either "covert" or "open": the former is indicated by the signs "more than," "less than," and "just as"; the latter comes "disguised," "there is difference yet similarity," and, not surprisingly, it is illustrated by metaphors (42-43). Opposition allows "any statement you please [to be] dressed in a two-fold form": "One sets out the thing proposed and the other denies the reverse of it" (57). His example is youth/not-age.

There are, then, places where style can be invented. These places are discussed, illustrated, and most importantly used by Geoffrey of Vinsauf writing a poem about how to write a poem. His sources have been demonstrated to be Roman (Cicero, Quintilian, Horace), but his method is uniquely his own. That method consists in inventing a style suited to his subject by using the *topoi* of style, namely the figures. Such a reflexive work strikes one as entirely contemporary and utterly astonishing for the early thirteenth century. A hundred years later, Dante's search for the vernacular has the same feel of the present.

De Vulgari Eloquentia, written in 1304-1306,

introduces a new topos of style--the language of the people. A similar interest in the native tongue will occur in England in the late sixteenth century, but Dante's study is "the first piece of scientific literary criticism in the modern world, and the first serious treatment of the literary use of a vernacular" (Purcell, Introduction, Dante: Literature in the Vernacular (De Vulgari Eloquentia) 1981 7). Eloquentia (eloquence) is the traditional term for rhetoric (Cicero--"The pen is the best and most eminent author and teacher of eloquence," De Oratore I, xxxiii,150), and Dante's text is perhaps best understood in the traditional rhetorical context as it applies to writing poetry. His subject is "the theory of the correct usage in the vernacular" (I,i). Once he has discovered this vernacular, he will go on "to formulate our teaching on eloquence in the vernacular" in terms of "those whom we think worthy to use it, and for what subjects, and in what fashion, and where, and when, and for what audience" (I,xix). Altogether, Dante's text represents a considerable reduction of traditional rhetoric, however, and except in one respect introduces nothing new.

Dante's search begins with a review of a humanistic theory of language (I,i-ix). Language is a gift of God to man for the intercommunication of thoughts. The first word spoken by man was obviously an equivalent of "God," spoken in paradise, and the first language was obviously Hebrew.

Different languages originated in the third "fall," the fall into a profusion of tongues remarked in the story of the Tower of Babel. The languages of Europe still bear signs of a common origin, as do the dialects of Italy. Grammar, invented to move us slowly back to that original unity of language, seeks to overcome the natural variety and change in languages as they are actually spoken. A brief survey of Italian dialects (x) introduces a "hunt for the most excellent and agreeable of them" (xi), but none of the dialects is the "illustrious vernacular" he is seeking (xiv). Indeed, "the panther [he is] tracking, ... whose scent is in every city, and its den is in none" is an ideal: "... it is an illustrious, cardinal, courtly, and curial vernacular in Italy, which belongs to every city in Italy and is not seen to be the property of any one, by and against which the vernaculars of all Italian towns are measured and weighed and compared" (xvi). The four virtues of this vernacular are described (xvii-xix), and the search is over.

Dante's vernacular is therefore a standard of excellence in the language of the people of Italy. It is not a grammar; nor is it a particular dialect; it is "the language used by the famous masters who have written poetry in the vulgar tongue in Italy." What this standard comprises is made clear in Book II: only the "most excellent" poets should use this vernacular (II,i); only the

"most important" subjects (security, love, virtue) should be treated in it (ii--here Dante gives several examples, including himself but referred to as a "friend"); the proper form for the vernacular is the canzoni because only in it "is the whole art [of poetry] comprehended" (iii). The canzoni is analyzed with respect to style (the vernacular has three styles, of which the tragic is the highest, iv), line (the hendecasyllabic is best, his own poetry is again given as an example, v), "construction" (apparently, syntax, and his own poetry is an example, vi), diction (the best words are the "combed" and the "hairy", vii), and definition ("an assembly of equal stanzas without refrain in the tragic style, on one subject, or on the same theme, or displaying unity of thought," viii). The remaining sections (ix-xiv) treat some of the earlier subjects in further technicality; the treatise breaks off a few lines into the fourteenth section.

Incomplete though it is, De Vulgari Eloquentia is an application of traditional rhetoric to poetic composition: invention yields three general places where subjects may be found; arrangement provides the form of the canzoni; style is treated in three levels and in specifically poetic terms. The new thing is the language, the vernacular, to which the traditional rules of grammar and rhetoric are applied. And Dante nearly misses specifying the contribution of the vernacular: "there is no greater adornment than the

illustrious vernacular," he says (II,i); a few lines later, he speaks of the poet's "mix[ing his work] with his own roughness"; and when he speaks of diction, he claims that "the combed and the hairy [words] are the noblest and belong to the illustrious vernacular" (II,vii). As might be expected, then, the vernacular contributes a controlled roughness of diction. It is a generalized place where the poet can find words both smooth and rough with which to adorn his language.

As the end of the middle ages approaches, the significance of the notion of topos for literature might be characterized by three words: logos, stasis, lexis (style). Of these three, lexis has emerged as the most important. Poetry and rhetoric have intersected from the beginning in lexis: Aristotle's treatment of rhetorical style refers the reader to his Poetics; his discussion of style in the Poetics notes that "the element of thought" (one of his six parts of poetry) belongs properly to rhetoric (Poetics, 1450b6 and 1456a35). Cicero's Antonius remarks that the orator needs, among other things, "a diction almost poetic" (De Oratore, I, xxviii,128); Quintilian holds that, although rhetoric is chiefly a practical art, it draws on the theoretical and the productive (poetic) arts as well (Institutio Oratoria, II,xviii). Horace's well-known adoption of the aims of rhetoric for the aims of poetry, "The aim of the poet is either to benefit, or to amuse, or

to make his words at once please and give lessons of life" ("Art of Poetry" 73), is followed by de Vinsauf's and Dante's applications of rhetoric to poetic composition. Yet, important as this traditional intersection is, the difference between rhetoric and poetry remains sharp: rhetoric is to pistis (persuasion) as poetry is to mimesis (imitation), and lexis pulled in two directions.

It is in the direction of rhetoric that the literary function of topos as a place to invent style appears. For Aristotle the major topos of style is metaphor; for Cicero, Quintilian, and de Vinsauf, the topoi of style are the figures, for Dante, add the vernacular. In addition to this literary function, topos retains its wider rhetorical purpose, and the invention of style therefore always presupposes considerations of ethos, pathos, and logos, or of the other divisions of rhetoric (invention of argument, arrangement), or of the kinds of rhetoric (deliberative, forensic, epideictic). The topoi of style, in short, are becoming (by synecdoche) a rhetoric of poetry.

The pervasive function of topos in medieval literature is amply documented by Curtius (1953). A list of topoi he considers includes: (1) topoi suitable for exordia: affected modesty (83), novelty (85), dedication (86), knowledge dictates teaching (87), shun idleness (88); (2) topoi suitable for conclusions: abruptness (89), day is done (90); (3) other general topoi: invocation of nature (92), the

world upside down (94), age in youth (94, 98); (4) topoi of style: Chapter 7, "Metaphorics" (128-44; but Curtius does not consider the figures as topoi of style); (5) topoi of panegyric: sapientia et fortitudo (174), beauty, nobility, and manliness (180), inexpressibility (159), outdoing (162); (6) topoi of person and thing: specifically, place and time, derived from the topics of Quintilian and applied to the description of landscape (193-4).

But more important than this documentation is Curtius's insight into the deeper significance of the topoi. Using the topos "age in youth" as his example, Curtius notes that it appeared first in late antiquity: "the genesis of new topoi" is therefore a measure of literary change (82). A particular variant of this topos, "the old-young woman," appears, falls into mannerism, reappears in a rejuvenated form, and so on, from late antiquity onward: "This is only comprehensible by the fact that it is rooted in the deeper strata of the soul. It belongs to the stock of archaic proto-images in the collective unconscious" (105; this topos is the subject of Chapter 6, "The Goddess Natura"). Finally, Curtius's own willingness to find new topoi or to consider old topoi in new ways simply asserts once more the ubiquity of the concept.

1.4 Renaissance Topos

That the topoi of style are a rhetoric of English poetry becomes fully apparent in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Usually such a statement would be understood to refer to the negative influence of Ramus (who removed invention and disposition from rhetoric and left it chiefly style); but it may equally well be understood positively. That is, the stylistic manuals of the Renaissance in England constitute a remarkably full-fledged rhetoric in the classical sense precisely because they provide a list of places where style is invented. "Language," says Jonson, "most shows a man," and, though he is speaking here of oratory and not poetry, the statement is amplified in his remarks on both writing and poetry (Timber 126). The point is that in his style the writer reveals also his thought, and so style includes in itself the whole of rhetoric. This synecdochic view of the stylistic rhetorics is over-looked by today's readers; it is unlikely that it was over-looked by the Renaissance reader, and certainly not by the authors of these manuals. In the words of Brian Vickers: "Mind, knowledge, truth; action, power, conviction: elocutio [style] provided the passage from potentiality to realization, via the control of language and the force of feeling" (1981; 129).

The first rhetoric to be printed in the English

language is Leonard Cox's The Arte or Crafte of Rhethoryke (c. 1530). Invention, says Cox, "is comprehended in certain placys," that is, in kinds of orations: logical, demonstrative, deliberative, and judicial (44). These kinds of orations are also called causes, and the more limited notion of place appears in his discussion of each type. Thus, the logical places are definition, causes, parts, and effects (45); the demonstrative places are of three general kinds (of persons, of deeds, of concepts), each of which has the usual parts (of orations), each part of which has its particular places (49-66); and so on, for the remaining two kinds of orations. Cox concludes his incomplete rhetoric with a graceful apology for treating only invention, for the elementary nature of his book, and for his "rude" style (87-88).

The manual that points the way was written in Latin by the friend of Sir Thomas More. Erasmus's De Copia (1534) asserts that copia (the abundant style) has two parts, abundance of expression and abundance of subject (300-301). The former treats the figures and tropes as methods of introducing variety (307-48) and presents a famous example, two hundred variations on "Always, as long as I shall live, I shall remember you [Sir Thomas More]" (354-65). The latter treats eleven methods of generating matter, including "proofs and arguments" which, in turn, includes the invention of arguments from places such as description,

definition, and deduction (each again subdivided further) (605-606). Two points about De Copia deserve special mention: first, the clear assertion that style includes matter as well as manner; second, the book's several variants and its long history as a standard school-text in the early sixteenth century in England (Vickers 1981 118-119). In other words, the Renaissance view of style is verborum et rerum, from the beginning.

If Cox's rhetoric is the first in English, Wilson's The Arte of Rhetorique (1553) is the first complete rhetoric in English. In his preface, Wilson expresses what was later to become the typical English humanist attitude to Jerome's "captive woman": "Eloquence, first geuen by God, after loste by man, and laste repayred by God agayne" (9). Rhetoric becomes the means by which God's redemption of fallen man is effected (10); and a man's ability to be eloquent places him potentially above other men and nearer to God (11). Of course, Wilson was "a lawyer as well as a militant Protestant" (Introduction ix) and not a poet; but the twenty-year popularity of his book as a school text makes it easily the best measure of the Renaissance attitude to the *topoi*.

First, Wilson's concept of *topos* is inherent in his concept of rhetoric, "an art to set furthe by utterance of wordes, matter at large" (13). Second, the *topoi* themselves are situated in their traditional place, invention, one of

the five parts of rhetoric, all of which Wilson treats: "The finding out of apte matter, called otherwise Invention, is a searching out of thynges true, or thynges likely, the which maie reasonably sette furth a matter, and make it appear probable" (18). Third, the concept of topos is complex and multivalent: the "places of Logique" are basic to everything (18). (Interestingly enough, though Wilson uses the phrase, his notion of the concept is extremely confused. His Rhetorique at one point lists six places of logic (see below), but in his treatment of invention in The Rule of Reason (1553) he lists twenty-four places which include these six and most of the predicables and predicaments listed earlier under his treatment of judgement.) There are also "three kyndes of causes or orations which serve for every matter" (23); and each such kind has its places. For example, the demonstrative oration (24-43), whose "cause" is praise or dispraise, may be of person, thing, or deed: the places of person are before his life (realm, shire, town, parents, ancestors) (24), during his life (birth, childhood, youth, maturity, old age, death) (25), and after his life (no places are given). The places of deed are either places of confirmation (honesty, possibility, ease, difficulty, impossibility) or places of circumstance (who, what, where, with what help, why, how, when) (31); and the places of thing are either places of confirmation (honesty, profitability, ease, difficulty) or places of logic (definition, causes,

parts, effects, things adjoining, contraries) (37). Fourth, " whereas Invencion, helpeth to finde matter, and Disposicion serveth to place argumentes: Elocucion getteth wordes to set furthe invencion, & with suche beautie commendeth the matter, that reason semeth to be clad in purple, walkyng afore, bothe bare and naked" (182).

Thus is style ranked next to invention, not subjugated as a topos but admitted as the necessary and royal dress of the naked truth. Wilson's further treatment of style is full and traditional: its four virtues are Englished as plainness, aptness, composition, and exornation (183-191); he discusses the three kinds of style in relation to exornation (191); and he offers a complete catalogue of tropes, schemes, and colours, all under the head of figures of exornation (191-234). Wilson's view of these figures is signalled in his introductory remarks: speaking of the colours of rhetoric, he says they are generated "by diversity of invention" (192). The ensuing catalogue functions rather obviously as a set of places where all the figures may be found, just as it did for Wilson's most important source, Cicero, and contains many of the classical topoi (notably "propositio," "distributio," "exemplum," and "contentio" 200 ff.). Some figures, for example amplification (treated earlier, 139-77), are directly based on topoi such as the greater and the lesser (144). Finally, Wilson adds an index to the whole book, "A Table to fynde

out such matter as is contained in this Booke" (251): but matter, in rhetorical terms, is found in the places, and the alphabetical listing provides the reader with a quick reference to figures, that is, to the topoi of style. Wilson's underlying trope, in other words, reveals clearly the Renaissance's whole-hearted adoption of the Ciceronian concept that "eloquence is one." At the core of eloquence lies style, and style (through its topoi, its figures) contains the whole of classical rhetoric.

In the context of the Renaissance concept of style as the core of rhetoric, Peter Ramus plays a contradictory role. By locating invention and disposition (arrangement) in logic and leaving rhetoric only style, Ramus impoverishes the sense that style is the synecdochic core of the whole of classical rhetoric at the same time as he strengthens the identification between rhetoric and style. In particular, since Ramus's invention (a list of ten distinctly logical topoi) and disposition (a theory of the proposition, the syllogism, and the "method") belong only to logic, it would seem that the logical topoi and argumentation are forever lost to rhetoric. In fact, this does not happen, for several reasons. First, the "method" is a rhetorical, not logical, technique; secondly, Ramistic rhetoricians use the logical topoi as a basis for their classification of the figures; thirdly, the near-circularity and obvious self-referentiality of Ramistic logic fuels the Renaissance

delight in paradox, so manifest in the poetry of the period. Far from being lost to rhetoric, the logical topics continue to be basic to rhetoric; far from being divorced from rhetoric, logic continues to be an indispensable adjunct to rhetoric (and, therefore, to poetics).

It is generally agreed that Ramism in England centered at Cambridge where it was known by the early 1570's (Catherine M. Dunn, ed., The Logike of Peter Ramus (trans. Roland MacIlmaine 1574) 1969, Introduction) and expounded from the mid-1570's onward (Harold Wilson and Clarence Forbes, eds., Gabriel Harvey's Ciceronianus 1945, Introduction; Wilbur Howell 1956, Chapter 4). On the method, both the first translator of Ramistic logic and the first teacher of Ramistic rhetoric wax equally eloquent. MacIlmaine calls it "the only methode which Aristotle did obserue" (Logike 55); Harvey calls it "the resplendent glory of Method" (Ciceronianus 91). In essence, the method is a principle of organizing propositions in an argument:

The methode is a disposition by the which amonge many propositions of one sorte, and by their disposition knowen, that thing which is absolutely most cleare is first placed, and secondly that which is next: and therefore it contynually procedethe from the most generall to the speciall and singuler (Logike 54).

This is followed by examples from the arts (the organization of grammar), poetry (Virgil), oratory (Cicero), and history (Livy). MacIlmaine admits that "the poetes, orators & all sort of writers how soeuer they purpose to teach there

auditor, doo alwayes follow this order of methode, although they do not euery where insist therein" (56). He concludes the Logike with a brief and negative discussion of "the craftie and secrete methode," clearly meaning by it rhetorical persuasion (this method is used to deceive, is full of digressions, inverts the order of antecedents and consequents, and so on) (58).

What is suppressed in MacIlmaine's Ramus is that the method consists actually of a dichotomy: the natural method and the prudential method--"as if the natural method were the arrangement for science, and the prudential method were the arrangement for opinion" (Ramus Dialectique 1555, quoted in Howell 1956 164). Opinion, of course, is the domain of rhetoric, and the method for rhetoric is to "arrange them [ideas] according to their degree of conspicuousness in the consciousness of the inexpert listener or reader" (160):

things are given precedence, not altogether and absolutely in terms of their being most conspicuous, but in terms of their being still the most convenient for him whom we must instruct, and of their being most amenable for inducing and leading him whither we purpose (163).

Finally, Ramus notes that the whole of rhetoric (that is, style) "serve[s] no other purpose than to lead this vexatious and mulish auditor, who is postulated to us by this [i.e., the prudential] method" (164). From here, it is but a step to the observation that even the more severe natural method postulates a particular auditor, namely, one who will be persuaded by an arrangement of propositions

proceeding from the most general to the most particular. In short, as Ong has pointed out, the method is rhetorical not logical (1958 230).

Secondly, regarding the *topoi* (a word neither Ramus nor MacIlmaine uses, preferring "argument"), the Logike in effect provides ten places of invention: cause, effect, subject, adjoint, opposites, comparison, etymology, distribution, definition, and material evidence (passim). It will be immediately apparent that these places are very closely related to the logical *topoi* of Aristotle and all those who followed him (see Howell 1956 156-7). More interesting, from the point of view of the Renaissance emphasis on style, is the fact that these *topoi* provide the basis for a Ramistic classification of the figures. This is clearly seen in Dudley Fenner's The Artes of Logike and Rhetorike (1584). Fenner's is the first translation into English of Ramistic rhetoric and he classifies the four basic tropes according to whether they involve comparison (metaphor) or not (synecdoche, metonymy, irony); next, whether they involve division (synecdoche) or not (metonymy and irony) (169-170). (See also Sister Miriam Joseph [1947] 1962 35-36 315-328.) An application of Ramistic rhetoric to poetry, Abraham Fraunce's The Arcadian Rhetorike (1588), uses exactly the same classification. Fraunce introduces the terms "congruity" and "bravery" for grammar and the theory of figures, respectively, and consistently cites Sidney as

one of his major examples. Both Fenner and Fraunce include in their rhetorics a treatment of prosody (under the head of figures), the first time this aspect of poetics is found in English manuals of rhetoric.

Thirdly, though the Renaissance fascination with paradox is well-known (Rosemary Colie, Paradoxia Epidemia 1966), its relation to Ramism is not. Colie does not mention Ramism, and Rosemund Tuve's Elizabethan and Metaphysical Imagery (1947), though it treats Ramism, mentions only in passing that Ramism emphasizes a kind of disjunction (347). Ramism enters English poetry through Gabriel Harvey, a life-long friend of Spenser and a personal acquaintance of Sidney (Howell 1956 247; Ethel Seaton, Introduction, The Arcadian Rhetorique 1950 xii). Spenser's "E. K." addresses Harvey and Ramism in both the preface and the notes appended to The Shepheardes Calendar (1579) (see, especially, "September," where Hobbinoll, one of the speakers in the eclogues, is identified as Harvey); and Sidney's Ramistic tendencies are evident in Astrophel and Stella as well as in his Apology for Poetry (see below). In both poets' works, paradox plays a central role (John Shawcross, "The Poet as Orator: One Phase of His Judicial Pose," and Thomas Sloan, "The Crossing of Rhetoric and Poetry in the English Renaissance," in Sloan and Waddington 1974 5-36 and 212-42, resp.). But paradox is a central feature of Ramistic logic which, according to Harvey, was part of the "double analysis" (the

other part being rhetoric) advocated by Ramus and himself (Ciceronianus 1577 85-87). Briefly, the heart of Ramistic logic is the famous "method"; this method depends on a principle of dichotomization; dichotomization is a kind of "distribution" (a topos); distribution depends on the topoi of "opposites" and "contraries"; and the most accurate kind of distribution is the dichotomy itself (Ramus passim). Paradox (an only apparent self-contradiction) therefore characterizes the "method" and, a fortiori, Ramistic logic. Such intense near-circularity, of course, is also a characteristic of the best poetry of the Renaissance.

Two famous books on Renaissance poetics, one appearing just before and the other after the entrance of Ramism into English thought, illustrate further the sense in which stylistics had become the whole of classical rhetoric but with a peculiarly English flavour. Henry Peacham's The Garden of Eloquence (1577) is essentially a dictionary of figures, classified as tropes and schemes (with further subdivisions) and furnished with examples from poetry. There are two kinds of tropes, "of words" and "of sentences," and two kinds of schemes (grammatical and rhetorical). One of the rhetorical schemes is "of sentences" and includes the figures of aporia and paradox. Another is "of amplification" which includes the following kinds of figures: topographia, syllogismus, climax, antithesis, distributio, partitio, divisio, dilemma, and so on. Some of these figures are, of

course, the traditional topoi of rhetoric and logic, and Peacham himself refers to "the places from whence we may fetch these [figures]" (N.iii). Amplification has a long and interesting history: Aristotle held that it was not a topic; Cicero called it a figure of thought; Quintillian said it was achieved through augmenting, comparing, reasoning and accumulation and devoted a whole chapter to it; de Vinsauf elevated it to a major head including figures like periphrasis, comparison, apostrophe, prosopopeia, digression, description, and opposition; Erasmus studied it under copia of matter; Wilson called it a figure and noted that the topic greater/lesser was used in it. And so it goes: the Renaissance notion of figure is incomprehensible without the fuller context of rhetoric, including, naturally, the concept of topos.

George Puttenham's The Art of English Poesie (1589) is a courtly rhetoric, emphasizing several particularly English concerns. Book II, for example, studies the prosody of English verse, a subject that had been discussed carefully in the correspondence of Spenser and Harvey (1579-80). This interest expresses the sense in which the vernacular is a topos of style, as in the case of Dante. Book III, on style, Englishes many of the traditional figures (synecdoche is "the quick conceit," metonymy is "the misnamer," metaphor is "the "sensible") and finishes the whole with a treatment of sprezzeratura for the courtier.

To consider Puttenham's book a rhetoric of poetry, however, begins to stretch the point: but Sidney's Apology (1583; pub. 1595; rpt. Adams 1971) returns firmly to the larger rhetorical context. This work, structured like a classical oration, represents Sidney as a logician turned poet (155), invokes an Aristotelian and Horatian definition of poetry as "an art of imitation" and "a speaking picture" of the ideal whose function is "to teach and delight" (158-9), and introduces a new ingredient into the rhetoric of poetry. Compared to the other arts (including rhetoric) and their rules, poetry is unique:

Only the poet, disdain[ing] to be tied to any such subjection, lifted up by the vigor of his own invention, doth grow in effect another nature, in making things either better than nature bringeth forth, or quite anew, forms such as never were in nature, ...freely ranging within the zodiac of his own wit.... [Nature's] world is brazen, the poets only deliver a golden (157).

This new ingredient is located in the individual's capacity for invention, yet is not subject to the rules of invention "but range[s], only reined with learned discretion, into the divine consideration of what may be and should be" (158). The new element is the imagination.

The genesis and the complexity of the Renaissance concept of the imagination--its relations to Neoplatonism, for example--cannot be treated here, but its relation to rhetoric is of paramount importance well into the twentieth century. In the words of Sir Francis Bacon,

Rhetoric is subservient to the imagination, as

Logic is to the understanding; and the duty and office of Rhetoric, if it be deeply looked into, is no other than to apply and recommend the dictates of reason to imagination, in order to excite the appetite and the will (De Augmentis Scientiarum 1623 535).

For Bacon, the imagination is one of the three faculties of the rational human soul (reason and will are the other two), and rhetoric clearly applies reason to imagination to affect the will. This is a moralized version of what Sidney had in mind, and, to see that it is otherwise essentially the same, one need only look at Bacon's cosmography of human learning (Book V):

(1) three branches of human learning (and their corresponding faculties of the soul): history (memory), poesy (imagination), philosophy (reason).

(2) logic (a division of philosophy) consists of four "arts": invention, judgement, memory, and elocution.

(3) elocution, "an art of transmitting," has three doctrines: the organ, the method, and the adornment of discourse.

(4) the adornment of discourse is rhetoric.

The apparent influence of Ramus (whose method of dichotomization Bacon derided as at best worthless, at worst temporary 530) is seen in the removal of invention and judgement from rhetoric. Yet, invention is of two kinds, of the arts and sciences (inductive, approximately) and of speeches and arguments (recovery, actually); the latter consists of the topics and in fact applies also to rhetoric

by Bacon's own view of its function (above). Method, traditionally part of logic, is placed by Bacon in rhetoric: among methods described are the magistral, the imitative, the enigmatic, the exoteric, the aphoristic, the methodical, assertion and proof, question and answer, and methods specially suited to their subjects (530-2). Finally, Bacon's subordination of rhetoric's function to the imagination, the faculty of poetry, directly makes much of the full classical concept of rhetoric available to poetry without diminishing the priority of the imagination.

A contemporary of Bacon's, Thomas Hobbes, put the sentiments of the late Renaissance thinkers regarding topos in a fine perspective in his translation of Aristotle's Rhetoric: there is "one general place," he said--"that which is proper" (The Whole Art of Rhetoric @ 1650 477). The one "true and natural colour," to put the same sentiment in figural terms, is knowledge based on experience (Hobbes "Answer" Witherspoon and Warnke 214). Yet, the best single closure for the Renaissance notion of rhetoric as it pertains to poetry belongs to Ben Jonson. In his great appreciation of Shakespeare, Jonson wrote:

For though the poet's matter nature be,
 His art doth give the fashion; and that he
 Who casts to write a living line must sweat
 (Such as thine are) and strike the second heat
 Upon the Muse's anvil, turn the same,
 And himself with it, that he thinks to frame,
 Or for the laurel he may gain a scorn;
 For a good poet's made as well as born.
 ("To the Memory of My Beloved the Author, Mr.
 William Shakespeare, and What He Hath Left Us")

This, much more than anything in his Timber, rich as that work is, expresses exactly the sensibility that made Renaissance poetry what it was.

The argument in this discussion of Renaissance rhetoric has been that: (1) the notion of topos enlarges to include the three kinds of orations as well as the growing lists of figures; (2) the lists of figures include most of the traditional topoi and actually function as such; (3) in short, style becomes (by synecdoche) a rather full classical rhetoric; (4) a new source of topos, imagination, is emerging.

1.5 Romantic Topos

From the point of view of the *topoi*, the great revolution in rhetoric just before the Romantic era is chiefly a revolution in terminology. Certain words (*topos*, invention) fall out of usage, but the concepts continue to function; other words (imagination, taste, and genius), denoting new instances of these old concepts, take their place. Nevertheless, a revolution in rhetoric did take place in the eighteenth century, and understanding its nature is essential to understanding how and why *topos* continued to be important. Students and historians of rhetoric agree that a new rhetoric influenced by the empirical philosophy of John Locke dominated the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries (Howell 1971; Horner 1983). At the same time, the "old" rhetoric continued to attract its adherents, a new elocutionary movement (generally considered a debased form of classical oratory) flourished, and the emerging belles lettres split from rhetoric proper.

The origins of these developments are of course in the seventeenth century. A new interest in science had ushered in an accompanying disparagement of classical rhetoric, especially its stylistic excesses. Thomas Sprat urged men "to reject all the amplifications, digressions, and swellings of style: to return back to primitive purity, and shortness, when man delivered so many things, almost in an

equal number of words," to use "a close, naked, natural way of speaking" akin to "Mathematical plainness," "preferring the language of Artisans, Countrymen, and Merchants, before that of Wits or Scholars" (History of the Royal Society 1667 112-113). This attitude was of course extreme, and many continued to advocate the real uses of style in literature: "to imitate well is a poet's work; but to affect the soul, and excite the passions, and above all to move admiration, which is the delight of serious plays, a bare imitation will not serve...[but]...must be heightened with all the arts and ornaments of poesy..." (Dryden, "A Defense of an Essay of Dramatic Poesy" (1668) 606). The fact was, however, that the plain style was increasingly becoming the favoured style, even in literature (Peterson 1967). And the abuses of stylistics and rhetoric now received their severest denunciation from the man at the centre of eighteenth century thought. Rhetoric, said John Locke, is "that powerful instrument of error and deceit" (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding [1690] 1700 508).

Locke's theory of human understanding in the Essay amounts to four theses:

- (1) there are no innate ideas (Book I);
- (2) the mind forms ideas through the experience of two kinds of perceptions (sensations and reflections) and combines these (simple ideas) into ever more complex ideas (Book II);
- (3) the basic principle of language is that words are signs

of ideas not things (Book III);

(4) knowledge consists first in the correspondences among ideas and second in the correspondence between ideas and things (Book IV).

These four theses condemn rhetoric because it uses words that do not signify clear ideas (490); it uses words inconsistently (492) or obscurely (492); it assumes that words (which are the signs of ideas only) are things (497); it substitutes words for the wrong things (499); and it assumes that the connections between words and ideas are necessary and immediate (503). This critique is based on a distinction among words, ideas, and things that is as old as Aristotle, but, whereas he used it to found rhetoric, Locke uses it to condemn rhetoric: "if we would speak of Things, as they are, we must allow, that all the Art of Rhetorick, besides Order and Clearness, all the artificial and figurative application of Words Eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong Ideas, move the Passions, and thereby mislead the Judgement; and so indeed are perfect cheat" (508).

Locke seldom uses the word "topic" in its traditional technical sense in the Essay (91 and 678), yet he uses the traditional topoi themselves from beginning to end as he criticizes them. Examples are found most readily in Book II-- the hierarchy of ideas (Chapters 2-22), the discussion of substance (Chapters 23 and 24), of relation (Chapter 25), of

cause and effect (Chapter 26), of the association of ideas (Chapter 33). Indeed, Locke adopts the topical approach rather completely, but with one important exception: he excludes the topos "figure." The analysis of language in Book III provides an excellent treatment of "general terms" (Chapter 3), noting, for example, that "essence" is a general term; in Chapter 6, Locke argues that "the idea of substance in general" is empty but that the more particular idea of "sorts" of substances is clearer. The argument of the whole book, therefore, is an example of rhetorical persuasion: it uses the plain style which, or so the rhetors taught, is appropriate for instruction; it invents arguments from the traditional places applied to the knowledge of the day; and it arranges the whole according to both Cicero's parts of the oration and Ramus's method. But the use of figures is treated in Chapter 10, "Of the Abuse of Words."

More generally, Locke has been hailed as the leading stimulus for a "new logic" and a "new rhetoric" (Howell 1971 Chapters 5 and 6). The "new logic" turns out to be a critique of the syllogism and a preference for induction as a method of inquiry. The "new rhetoric" hinges on six issues (first identified by Howell and later discussed by Corbett 1982 73-84):

- (1) expository/didactic discourse is preferable to persuasive discourse;
- (2) evidence is preferable to art;

- (3) induction is preferable to deduction;
- (4) knowledge is probable rather than certain;
- (5) the traditional form of discourse is worthless;
- (6) the plain style is better than the ornate.

This new rhetoric evidently had little or no effect on literary theory and practise at least until near the end of the eighteenth century. Pope's "Essay on Criticism" (1711) and Dr. Johnson's Rasselas (1754) may be cited as examples that "the aims of [traditional] rhetoric and poetry are for the most part identical" (Stone 1967 20). In these authors' works, the concepts of taste and genius became critical touchstones. Edmund Burke explicitly defined taste as a faculty of mind capable of responding to works of the imagination (A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origins of Our Ideas Concerning the Sublime and the Beautiful 1757), an idea that was expressed also by his contemporaries of a more scientific bent. David Hume's literary essays advocated a standard of "taste" based on experience, imagination, practise, comparison, freedom from prejudice, and common sense ("Of the Standard of Taste"); he held that fine writing was the expression of "sentiments that were natural without being obvious" ("Of Simplicity and Refinement in Writing"); in his opinion, the orators of his day lacked both genius and judgement as well as order and method (Essays: Moral Political and Literary 1741-2 and 1757).

Adam Smith's Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres

(1763[?]) treat language and composition in a traditional way but are infused with a contemporary attitude. This may be seen most clearly in his notion of sympathy :

When the sentiment of the speaker is expressed in a neat, clear, plain and clever manner, and the passion or affection he is possessed of and intends, by sympathy, to communicate to his hearer, is plainly and cleverly hit off, then and then only the expression has all the force and beauty that language can give it (25).

Though the figures have "no intrinsic worth of their own" (26), the requisites of the good writer remain knowledge of the subject, proper arrangement of its parts, and effective expression of his ideas (42). Discourse is narrative or probative; the former is historical writing (with poetry a sub-species); the latter is either didactic or rhetorical, the difference being that the rhetorical aims at persuasion and so emphasizes only one side of an issue whereas the (preferred) didactic emphasizes both (63). Smith does use and advocate the *topoi*: he treats "Eloquence" traditionally according to its kinds (demonstrative, deliberative, judicial), each of which has its particular places (he uses the word "topic" only in his discussion of judicial discourse, referring to Quintilian for a fuller treatment 170-77). Demonstrative discourse (128-34), whose end is to praise a man, has two means available to it--description of actions and praise of character; the latter requires a consideration of virtue/vice and should be arranged in chronological order and embellished appropriately. Still,

his treatment of the larger parts of rhetoric (invention and disposition) is sketchy at best: his "arrangement" is vaguely Ramistic (24); his invention of arguments is Newtonian--"we may lay down certain principles known or proved in the beginning, from whence we account for the severall Phenomena, connecting all together by the same Chain" (146)--and admittedly not suitable for rhetorical discourse for which he favoured the Socratic or Aristotelian methods (146-47). His major contribution is the peculiar importance he attached to the communication of feelings in a characteristic style.

Locke's influence is most prominent in the work of the man who effectively saved rhetoric from empiricism by founding it on empiricism. In Book I of The Philosophy of Rhetoric (first published in 1776), George Campbell establishes a theory of human nature based on Lockean principles in order to justify the ways of classical rhetoric to the eighteenth century. Rhetoric is "that art or talent by which discourse is adapted to its [four] ends"--"to enlighten the understanding, to please the imagination, to move the passions, or to influence the will" (1850 1). Understanding involves rhetoric in instruction, information (and therefore perspicuity), and conviction (therefore, argument) (2-3); imagination involves the sublime (and the "creative faculty" of the fancy) (3); the passions involve both the pathetic and the sublime (3-4); and the will

involves persuasion (requiring an artful mixture of all the other involvements together with vehemence) (4). The relation of rhetoric (which, generally speaking, aims "to convince an auditory") to logic (which aims "to evince the truth") and grammar (the art of conveying thoughts in words) is that rhetoric participates in both: "Now, if it be by the sense or soul of the discourse that rhetoric holds of logic, or the art of thinking and reasoning, it is by the expression or body of the discourse that she holds of grammar, or the art of conveying our thought in the words of a particular language" (34). Logical truth is based on an inclusive notion of "evidence"--intuitive (mathematical, consciousness, common sense) and deductive (scientific, moral) (35-46). Deductive (or rational) evidence having to do with the relations among general ideas is called scientific; that having to do with the relations among ideas about things is moral. All ideas are based on experience, of course, but scientific and moral evidence are differentiated with respect to subject (ideas about ideas versus ideas about things), certainty (absolute versus probable), contrariety (never versus sometimes), and proof (demonstrative argument versus mixed argument). Moral evidence is immediately founded in experience and is the proper province of rhetoric: Campbell discusses this type of evidence fully under the heads "experience" (50-53), "analogy" (53-54), "testimony" (54-56), and probability (56-

58). The experiential basis of all deductive evidence naturally implies that the inquiry into truth should be based on a logic of induction (called, somewhat confusingly, "analysis") rather than a logic of the syllogism (called "synthesis") (61-70).

The science on which rhetoric is founded is therefore none other than Locke's theory of human understanding: experience is the basis of moral evidence (Locke's ideas about things), and rhetoric's aims include enlightening the understanding (arguing inductively). But the traditional concerns of rhetoric with ethos/logos/pathos are not neglected. Campbell emphasizes pathos: his remarks on the speaker's considerations of the hearer, for example, treat the faculties of understanding, imagination, memory, and passion (72-81); passion is taken up again (81-94) with respect to (what can only be called the topoi of) probability, plausibility, importance, proximity, local place, relation, and consequence. Invention and disposition are omitted, as such, except insofar as the several kinds of orations are discussed in terms of considerations regarding the speaker, the audience, the subject, the occasion, and the purpose (Chapter X).

Books II and III of The Philosophy of Rhetoric, devoted to elocution, are in fact a study of style. The essential qualities of style (purity, perspicuity, vivacity, elegance, animation, and music--216) are related to the ends of

rhetoric: purity really belongs to grammar, but perspicuity relates especially to the understanding, vivacity and elegance to the imagination, and all of them to the passions and the will. The new and interesting term is vivacity: it is an undefined force or energy of language which commands the attention, rouses the emotions, and is responsible for assent or belief (73, 75, 81). It is linked directly to the imagination for a distinctly empiricist reason: ideas of the imagination are less vivid than ideas based on memory and sensation (81, 119, 137) and hence in need of enlivening. Such ideas are however the rhetor's stock in trade by virtue of the medium (language) of discourse. Vivacity thus becomes a central quality of language for rhetorical purposes. It is achieved, according to Campbell, by a diction of particularity, a principle of economy, and appropriate use of the tropes (285-99). The tropes especially conducive to vivacity are (in order of treatment) synecdoche, metonymy, and metaphor (299 ff.). This, it will be recognized, is an old idea (see Aristotle) albeit in a contemporary dress.

By the time Campbell's work was entering its fourth edition (1816), William Wordsworth had already published all of his several prefaces to The Lyrical Ballads (1798-1815). These prefaces are not, strictly speaking, rhetorical works; but they are essentially rhetorical treatments of poetry. In the first place, Wordsworth's very great awareness of the rhetorical triad is everywhere apparent, nowhere more so

than in his definition of "poetry":

For all good poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings: and though this be true, Poems to which any value can be attached were never produced on any variety of subjects but by a man who, being possessed of more than usual organic sensibility, had also thought long and deeply. For our continued influxes of feeling are modified and directed by our thought, which are indeed representatives of all our past feelings; and, as by contemplating the relation of these general representatives to each other, we discover what is really important to men, so, by the repetition and continuance of this act, our feelings will be connected with important subjects, till at length, if we be originally possessed of much sensibility, such habits of mind will be produced, that, by obeying blindly and mechanically the impulses of those habits, we shall describe objects, and utter sentiments, of such a nature, and in such connection with each other, that the understanding of the Reader must necessarily be in some degree enlightened, and his affections strengthened and purified (Preface 448).

This passage emphasizes ethos first and pathos second, leaving logos to third place. But such bias is more than corrected by Wordsworth's treatment of the imagination--as a faculty of the poet, it belongs to ethos; as manifested in metaphor, it belongs to logos; and, as that faculty to which the poem and the poet appeal in the reader, it belongs to pathos. Imagination is the key element in "the theory upon which the Poems were written" (445), not because Wordsworth said so but because it is a primary source (topos) of matter, argument, style, ethos, logos, and pathos.

The word "imagination" is necessitated by the poverty of language (478; also, Prelude VI 592-6): it is itself therefore an instance of Curtius's "inexpressibility topos."

This "power" of the poet is the subject of The Prelude (XIV 206). Its visible sign in language is the metaphor, and Wordsworth's treatment of this trope evokes the topoi traditionally associated with metaphor as well as the mental operations of empirical philosophy. The imagination operates according to a hierarchy of powers: it confers properties upon and abstracts properties from [the image of] an object; it makes juxtaposed images modify one another; and it shapes and creates images by consolidating many into one or dissolving one into many (485-6: all of Wordsworth's examples are metaphors). The imagination shares some of its characteristics with the fancy, but the former is essential not accidental, fluid rather than fixed, eternal not temporal (488-9). The metaphorical vehicle whose tenor is the imagination itself is liquidity--poetry is an overflow, and the imagination which is its source is figured in The Prelude as a vapour and a flood or stream.

Coleridge's poetics, like Wordsworth's, is similarly infused with rhetorical considerations, but where Wordsworth emphasized ethos Coleridge gave the priority to logos. The centre of Coleridge's theory of poetry is the symbol:

a symbol...is characterized by a translucence of the special in the individual, or of the general in the special, or of the universal in the general; above all by the translucence of the eternal through and in the temporal. It always partakes of the reality which it renders intelligible; and while it enunciates the whole, abides itself as a living part in that unity of which it is the representative (Statesman's Manual 1816 30-31).

The full significance of this definition includes its tropical basis in synecdoche and its relation to the faculty of the imagination. The secondary imagination is, in effect, the symbol-making power:

The secondary [imagination]...dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-create; or where this process is rendered impossible, yet still, at all events, it struggles to idealize and to unify. It is essentially vital, even as all objects (as objects) are essentially fixed and dead (Biographia Literaria 1817 Chapter XIII 167).

The poem and the poet become symbolic artifact and symbol-maker, respectively:

A poem is that species of composition which is opposed to works of science by proposing for its immediate object pleasure, not truth; and from all other species (having this object in common with it) it is discriminated by proposing to itself such delight from the whole as is compatible with a distinct gratification from each component part.

.....
[The poet] diffuses a tone and spirit that blends and (as it were) fuses, each [faculty] into each, by that synthetic and magical power...of the imagination. This power...reveals itself in the balance or reconciliation of opposite or discordant qualities: of sameness, with difference; of the general, with the concrete; the idea, with the image; the individual, with the representative; the sense of novelty and freshness, with old and familiar objects; a more than usual state of emotion, with more than usual order; judgement ever awake and steady self-possession, with enthusiasm and feeling profound or vehement; and while it blends and harmonizes the natural and the artificial, still subordinates art to nature; the manner to the matter; and our admiration of the poet to our sympathy with the poetry (Biographia Literaria Chapter XIV 172, 174).

Biographia Literaria of course contains much more rhetoric than these several quotations exhibit, but Coleridge's

symbol quite clearly represents the core of his contribution to the traditional doctrine of style. Symbolism contributes to the "best parts" of human language (197); metre, which gives "vivacity and spirit" to poetry (208), is one aspect of the synecdoche that is the poem (211). The symbol is a new topos of style which fuses invention and arrangement as well as the rhetorical triad into one. Yet, Coleridge himself never indicated any awareness of his indebtedness to the rhetorical tradition.

By the early nineteenth century, the classical tradition of rhetoric has been recovered in several respects: Campbell's philosophy of rhetoric rescues style from Locke's exclusion and recovers the rhetorical triad (emphasizing pathos); the Romantics recover ethos and logos, and by focussing on the relatively new concept of the imagination, Coleridge introduces a new trope which functions as an all-inclusive topos. In Richard Whately's Elements of Rhetoric (1828), the term invention and the concept topos are re-introduced to rhetoric. Whately considers rhetoric to be " `Argumentative Composition', generally and exclusively" (4). Whereas reasoning has two parts, the ascertainment of truth by investigation and the establishment of truth to the satisfaction of another, only "the latter belongs exclusively to the province of Rhetoric" (5). His book will therefore treat of the discovery of arguments (which he calls "invention"), their arrangement,

the passions, style, and elocution (6). All of this of course has a familiar shape and constitutes nothing essentially new.

Whately classifies arguments according to several different and traditional methods, clearly preferring a classification according to the relation between the premises and the conclusion (see his Table 45):

- (1) a priori arguments (the premise necessarily implies the conclusion): these are all arguments from cause to effect;
- (2) other arguments (the premise does not necessarily imply the conclusion): these are of two kinds, the "sign" (arguments from effect to cause or condition) and the example (or induction).

It is apparent that the traditional topoi are being used: in addition to cause and effect, Whately invokes such topics as evidence, testimony, probability, analogy, and contraries. A contemporary flavour is also present: a discussion of Aristotle's "signs," for example, demonstrates a clear and Humean distinction between causality and temporal contiguity, between cause-of-knowing and cause-of-being (53-6).

Thomas De Quincey's review of Whately's Elements, later expanded into an essay entitled "Rhetoric" (81-133), offers a concept of rhetoric which he evidently pretends is distinct from the views of Campbell and Whately: "We, for our parts, have a third view which excludes both. Where

conviction [Whately's view] begins, the field of Rhetoric ends; and as to the passions [Campbell's view], we contend that they are not within the province of Rhetoric, but of Eloquence" (82). Somewhat more precisely, De Quincey feels that rhetoric consists in "finding arguments for any given thesis" which neither prove nor disprove it but lend it "colourable support" and provide a "ground of assent" (86). "The province of Rhetoric...lies amongst that vast field of cases where there is a pro and a con, with the chance of right and wrong, true and false, distributed in varying portions between them" (91). De Quincey is of course something of an ironist, and he is evidently tilting at the utter seriousness of the two rhetoricians named. Thus, regarding the style of Edmund Burke, De Quincey notes that "in some cases [he] did indulge himself in a pure rhetorician's use of fancy; consciously and profusely lavishing his ornaments for mere purposes of effect" (115). De Quincey is a brilliant essayist, introducing such issues as the influence of the book and the newspaper on style, the positive role of women in maintaining the "mother tongue," and the contributions of the Romantics to language ("On Style" 134-245). He agrees with Wordsworth that style is the "incarnation" and not the "dress" of thought (229) because matter and manner cannot be separated (137-41). His view of rhetoric, in other words, indicates a full understanding of the classical tradition as it is known after Whately.

The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it has been argued, do not introduce a "new" rhetoric. Rather, rhetoric accommodates to itself the philosophy of empiricism (as its psychological and epistemological grounds), recovers a great deal of the classical tradition, and introduces a new topos. These developments are achieved in several steps:

(1) Locke's philosophy rejects the figural topoi and therefore (by synecdoche) all of Renaissance rhetoric;

(2) Campbell grounds rhetoric in empiricism and recovers the triad and the figures;

(3) Romantic poetics emphasizes the imagination (which has its roots in Sidney) and introduces a new figural topos, the symbol;

(4) Whately revitalizes the traditional concept of invention of arguments.

The net result is that significance of the topoi is enhanced.

1.6 Twentieth Century Topos

The twentieth century course of rhetoric comprises three related developments--rhetoric of the figure, rhetoric of language, and rhetoric proper. All three are presaged in Nietzsche's late-nineteenth-century lectures on rhetoric (Blair). In his view, language is essentially rhetorical: "the rhetorical is a further development, guided by the clear light of the understanding, of the artistic means which are already found in language" (106). The argument for this view is based chiefly on the contention that language is tropical: "All words are tropes in themselves, and from the beginning"; synecdoche, for example, is present "when drakon is called snake, actually 'that which looks shiny'"; metaphor appears in every designation of genus; metonymy is present in expressions as simple as "the leaves are green"; that is, "language is actually all figuration" (108). Such an equation of language with figure has obvious consequences for the rhetorical triad (and therefore the whole of rhetoric): "whenever the 'naturalness' is imitated nakedly, the artistic sense of the listeners will be offended; in contrast, wherever a purely artistic expression is sought, the moral confidence of the listener will be shaken" (115). These emphases on first, figure, second, linguistics, and third, rhetoric proper, echo through the first half-century, culminating in the structuralism and the second so-called

"new" rhetoric of the second half-century.

Of course all three developments have been manifest in the history of rhetoric since the beginnings, and whatever can be said about this history in the twentieth century has its obvious roots in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For example, it is a commonplace that the dominant rhetoric in this century, at least until recently, is a figural rhetoric of the metaphor (Ricouer 1977; Genette "Rhetoric Restrained" 1982). Yet, the traditional primacy of metaphor was enhanced by the advent of the "new" rhetoric of the eighteenth century and was even more firmly established by the Romantic affinity for the imagination in the nineteenth.

The Romantics also contributed the notion of the symbol, which, as far as twentieth century poetry is concerned, is arguably at least as important as metaphor. It may be that the rise of symbolism is in part responsible for the decline of rhetoric (Todorov 147-221). Or, it may be that rhetoric has been so slow in accommodating this new trope that its presence has seemed to destroy rhetoric's long and close relationship with poetics. In any case, the poetics of the early twentieth century emphasizes symbol (John Porter Houston, French Symbolism and the Modern Movement 1980), whereas the figural rhetoric of the same period emphasizes metaphor, and a figural rhetoric capable of dealing with the symbol is perhaps only now emerging.

This is not very surprising, given that the nature of the symbol itself poses considerable difficulties.

That the symbol is not readily separated from metaphor is part of the difficulty. Synecdoche is viewed by some (as it was, for example, by Aristotle) as a special case of metaphor. But Coleridge was emphatic that the two were different. He associated metaphor with the fancy (and symbol with the imagination), and the fancy played with "fixities and definites" according to the laws of association (Biographia Literaria 167). What the imagination was capable of, in his view, we have already seen. Indeed, Coleridge's reason for introducing the notion of symbol was to have a term for a function of language "between the literal and the metaphorical," a function that was the linguistic manifestation of the faculty of the imagination (Statesman's Manual 30). Coleridge's symbol, like his notion of the imagination, is definitionally characterized by an inherent un-fixity. How does the symbol "partake of that reality which it renders intelligible"? What is the "reality" or "whole" which it "enunciates"? In what sense does the symbol remain "a living part in that unity of which it is the representative"? Coleridge did his best to fix the values of his symbols--sun, stream, plant come with their values of the spiritual, the eternal, the reason; and the general context is decidedly Christian--but even he had to admit defeat in theory though not in poetry. "[A]ll symbols of

necessity involve an apparent contradiction" (Biographia Literaria 85); "it is very possible that the general truth represented may be working unconsciously in the Poet's mind during the construction of the symbol" (Notebooks Vol. 3 4503f134). The fact is that, though grounded in synecdoche (pars pro toto), the peculiar nature of the symbol is that the "part" is specifically given (as word in a text) but the "whole" is not. The word symbol denotes both the specified "part" and the unspecified "whole"; hence, the symbol is, at best, a multivalent relation.

The nature of much modern poetry is, moreover, unabashedly symbolic. John Houston enumerates the following characteristic features: disorientation, incoherence, fragmentation, disorder, perturbation, suddenness, dislocation, alienation, nonsequentiality, unpoeticity, imagism, enumeratory style, astigmatic vision, reversability, contentless ideality, transcendence (x). Houston notes that these features are represented most obviously in the French symbolistes and from them pass on to the great triumverate of the English tradition--Yeats, Eliot, and Pound. At the same time, these characteristics are technically grounded in the "literary symbol," which partakes of several levels or patterns of meaning (the typological, the archetypal, the psychological) but from which fixed meaning is absent (267-8). As noted above, such un-fixity is the essence of the (Coleridgean) symbol.

Symbolism is also a dominant aspect of the poetics of the three founders of modernism. Yeats's poetics of the symbol is most fully (though not altogether satisfactorily) developed in A Vision (1937). Eliot's objective correlative, "a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion" (Selected Essays 145) is a symbolic matrix. Pound's definition of an image as "that which presents an intellectual and emotional complex in an instant of time" (Literary Essays 4) explains why "the proper and perfect symbol is the natural object" (9). Both Eliot and Pound could not have been unaware of the rhetorical bent of their poetics. Eliot's attitude is negative--"the pathology of rhetoric" divorces language from experience (Bush 17-31), but Pound's poetics seems to be a nascent rhetoric of the symbol. In The ABC of Reading (1934), he offers "the ideogrammic method or the method of science" (26) as the proper method of studying literature in order to write it. "Great literature is simply language charged with meaning to the utmost possible degree" and poetry is its "most concentrated form" (36). This charging is done in three ways--"phanopoeia, melopoeia, logopoeia," or, by use of image, sound, and (approximately) sense (37). Arguing that "language is a means of communication," Pound repeats the three ways of charging language with meaning (63), and in the composition exercises at the end of the same section he quotes Agricola on the purpose of writing--

"to teach, to move or to delight" (66).

Nevertheless, the major development in figural rhetoric in the early twentieth century concentrates on metaphor. I. A. Richards (The Philosophy of Rhetoric 1936) argued that a "new" rhetoric was needed to study "misunderstandings and its remedies" (3) and offered his own "theorem about meanings which may be useful in constructing the most general problems of a new Rhetoric" (26). The "context theorem of meaning" states:

[W]hat a word means is the missing parts of the contexts from which it draws its delegated efficacy (35).

[M]eaning [is] the delegated efficacy of signs by which they bring together into new unities the abstracts , or aspects, which are the missing parts of their various contexts (93).

What this "theorem" means is itself a major problem of meaning (the concepts "context" and "delegated efficacy" are particularly problematic), but Richards's purported application of the theorem is a brilliant contribution to the theory of the metaphor. Claiming that "metaphor is the omnipresent principle of [all] language" (92), he notes that his context theory of meaning is "a summary account of metaphor" (93). "Thought is metaphoric, and proceeds by comparison, and the metaphors of language derive therefrom" (94). In particular, one must distinguish between the tenor and the vehicle of a metaphor: "the tenor...[is]...the underlying idea or principal subject which the vehicle or figure means" (97); and "the co-presence of the vehicle and

tenor results in a meaning (to be clearly distinguished from the tenor) which is not attainable without their interaction" (100). Rather surprisingly, Richards goes on to identify his concept of metaphor with Coleridge's concept of symbol, without noticing there is a difference (109-111). Ricouer's analysis of Richards's theory (1977 76-83), equally surprisingly, given his insights into the relations between metaphor and symbol (1976 45-69), does not remark on this lapse.

The New Critics, with whom Richards shares an interest in language and metaphor, nevertheless shift the emphasis slightly in the direction of the symbol. Allen Tate, for example, in an essay entitled "The Symbolic Imagination," contrasts two kinds of imagination. The symbolic imagination "bring[s] together various meanings at a single moment of action" (427); it is not equivalent to analogy, for it includes a temporal sequence of action, is occupied with "the body of this world," and is intuitive (428). By contrast, the angelic imagination "tries to disintegrate or circumvent the image in the illusory pursuit of essence" (429). As the essay is a study of Dante, the chief example of the symbolic imagination at work is Dante's use of the moving light and the mirror, both obviously Coleridgean symbols. This preference for the symbolic emerges also in Tate's view of the knowledge to be found in poetry. In "Literature as Knowledge" (1941), Tate asserts that poetry

alone offers a "complete knowledge" which is "of the mythical order" (64). The several approaches to the knowledge in literature that Tate takes up and dismisses are Arnold's "culture added to science," Morris's semiotics of reducing literature to sign-systems, Coleridge's legacy of the intellect-or-feeling dilemma, and Richards's earlier (1926) pseudo-scientific positivism. The only view that he approves is Richards's in his study Coleridge on Imagination (1935) in which Richards argues that only the imagination can resolve the antithesis between language and subject, truth and life. As noted above, this is why Coleridge introduced the notion of the symbol. Tate does not discuss the symbol, however: but he comes as close to it as he can in his approval of Richards's views on Coleridge and in his own sense of mythic knowledge, offering, in effect, a suppressed rhetoric of the symbol. In "Is Literary Criticism Possible?" (1950), Tate in fact argues for a recovery of the full tradition of rhetoric which is "the study and use of figurative language of experience as the discipline by which men govern their relations to one another in the light of truth" (33). Eliot's symbols, for example, cannot be extracted from their "full rhetorical context," Tate says, and "The rhetorical disciplines ... alone seem to yield something like the full import of the work of the imagination" (38).

A similar interest in the relation between reality and

the imagination is expressed by Wallace Stevens. "The Noble Rider and the Sound of Words" (1942) is his most famous essay, but his clearest expression of this complex relationship is found in "Effects of Analogy" (1951 105-30). Stevens discusses the image as an analogy which serves a rhetorical function, concluding that there is "an analogy between nature and the imagination, and possibly poetry is merely the strange rhetoric of that parallel: a rhetoric in which the feeling of one man is communicated to another in words of the exquisite appositeness that takes away all their verballity" (118).

Philip Wheelwright made a considerable advance in the rhetoric of the figure in The Burning Fountain (1954; rev. ed. 1968), first by introducing some clarity into the confusion surrounding the symbol, second by relating the symbolic to the archetypal. A symbol stands for something other than or more than itself (7); its attitude is contemplative (9); it is not a "natural" sign (10); and although the common symbol has a certain stability by convention, the importance of the symbol for literature is that the organic, expressive, or depth symbol has its own life (11-13). Referring to Coleridge's secondary imagination, he argued that there are several different ways of imagining: the confrontative, the distancing, the compositive, the archetypal (Chapter 3). All of these are involved in the kind of language Wheelwright called

"expressive": its traits include referential congruity, contextual variation, plurisignation, soft focus, paralogical dimensionality, assertorial lightness, and paradox (Chapter 5). Wheelwright seems to separate symbol and metaphor: metaphor, the most important element of expressive language, engages tension by holding simile and plurisignation in one (Chapter 6); the emblem and the archetype are the pictorial and the deep aspects, respectively, of the symbol (Chapter 7). The difference between symbol and metaphor, though not explicitly stated, emerges by implication: archetypes (and therefore symbols) lead to thresholds of experience, metaphors lead to unity of experience (142-7). Archetypes, when embodied in story, constitute the mythic which itself constitutes a way of apprehending the world and posits a kind of belief different from belief in propositions (Chapter 8). Truth may therefore be created even out of the paradoxical and the apparently self-contradictory (Chapter 9). The book concludes with studies of the imagery in The Oresteia and the use of expressive language in Eliot (Chapters 10 and 11).

Such a bald summary does not do justice to the significance of Wheelwright's ideas for this study. But it must conclude temporarily one aspect of the rhetoric of the figure in this century. With some difficulty, the symbol approaches recognition in its own right as a topos of style, whose inherent persuasion is grounded in the unconscious and

in un-fixity. The former leads some to regard the symbol as rooted (Ricoeur 1976 69); but rootedness is not the same as canonization, and the symbol remains in some sense "free" (Waardenburg 1980 47). The nature of the symbol as a trope, however, continues to be easily confused with the metaphor.

Two individuals made fundamental contributions to the rhetoric of language at the turn of the century, a semiotician and a linguist. This is not the place to discuss their works as such even if that were possible: only those aspects of their contributions that bear on topos can be considered in any detail. Still, some larger sense of context is needed, and, in the case of C. S. Peirce if not F. de Saussure, the context is somewhat incomplete or incoherent or even self-contradictory in the manuscripts which are available.

Peirce defines semiotics as "the quasi-necessary, or formal, doctrine of signs" (The Collected Papers Vol. II par. 227, i.e., 2.227). His key term is sign:

A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its object. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the ground of the representamen (2.228 1897).

Because each sign (i.e., representamen) is associated with three things, semiotics has three branches: (1) "pure

grammar," the study of relations between representamen and ground (i.e., of meaning); (2) "logic proper," the study of relations between representamen and object (i.e., of truth); (3) "pure rhetoric," the study of relations between representamen and interpretant (2.229). Since the third branch concerns this study directly, Peirce's definition of the function of rhetoric is worth stating in full:

[Pure rhetoric's] task is to ascertain the laws by which in every scientific intelligence one sign gives birth to another, and especially one thought brings forth another (2.229).

The first of several observations which must be made is that this definition of sign incorporates the rhetorical triad, for the representamen (and possibly the interpretant) belong to logos, and the interpretant and ground presuppose either ethos or pathos indiscriminately (in the "scientific intelligence"). The second observation is that, according to Peirce, rhetoric is, in effect, the study of the power inherent in signs. The third observation is that this power of the sign is a power of recursion or iteration, as may be seen directly in Peirce's comments several years later:

If a Sign is other than its Object [Peirce has just observed that the Sign and its Object need not be distinct], there must exist, either in thought or in expression, some explanation or argument or other context, showing how--upon what system or for what reason the Sign represents the Object or set of Objects that it does. Now the Sign and the Explanation together make up another Sign, and since the explanation will be a Sign, it will probably require an additional explanation, which taken together with the already enlarged Sign will make up a still larger Sign; and

proceeding in the same way, we shall, or should, ultimately reach a Sign of itself, containing its own explanation and those of its significant parts; and according to this explanation each such part has some other part as its Object (2.230 1910).

In this statement, the term "explanation" is evidently what Peirce formerly called "ground"; the "enlarged Sign" made up of "the Sign and the Explanation" is evidently what he formerly called the "interpretant." Hence, the iterative process may be represented as follows:

Let $\langle -, - \rangle$ denote "ground," S denote "representamen," x denote "object," and S_i denote "the i -th interpretant." Then,

$$S_1 = \langle S, x \rangle$$

$$S_2 = \langle S_1, x \rangle = \langle \langle S, x \rangle, x \rangle$$

.....

$$S_{i+1} = \langle S_i, x \rangle = \langle \langle \dots \langle S, x \rangle, \dots \rangle, x \rangle, x \rangle$$

(length $i+1$)

The S_i represent successive "enlargements" (i.e., interpretants) of the initial sign. The relation $\langle -, - \rangle$ represents the ground relating the i -th interpretant to the object: it remains a binary relation, though iteration clearly encodes increasing complexities. The object seems to remain the same: but Peirce thought of the "object" as part of the sign's "meaning," both of them capable of growth in an endless series (2.274, 2.293), and this is represented in the diagram if we consider the i -ary chain of x 's (which encodes a series of objects or meanings) as the immediate "object" (or "meaning") of S_i . This seems to capture Peirce's idea of "a sign of itself" as well as his idea of "how one sign gives birth to another," the process that is

the subject of rhetoric. It also represents what Peirce meant by "symbol":

For every symbol is a living thing, in a very strict sense that is no mere figure of speech. The body of the symbol changes slowly, but its meaning inevitably grows, incorporates new elements and throws off old ones (2.222 1903).

Peirce's definition of the symbol, however, is introduced in an entirely different manner. He divides the sign "by three trichotomies":

[F]irst, according as the sign in itself is mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law; secondly, according as the relation of the sign to its object consists in the sign's having some character in itself, or in some existential relation to that object, or in its relation to an interpretant; thirdly, according as its Interpretant represents it as a sign of possibility or as a sign of fact or a sign of reason (2.243 1903).

This division (like Aristotle's division of *topos* into special and general) has led to endless disagreements about what Peirce meant. Peirce himself thought at first that there were only three trichotomies and ten resulting classes of signs; he later discovered ten trichotomies and sixty-six classes. Leaving that difficulty aside, even the above division poses problems:

(1) The notion of trichotomy derives from Peirce's phenomenology. According to that theory, there are three modes of being (possibility, actuality, law--1.23) and three categories of phenomena (quality, fact, law--1.284); when these modes (or categories? or both?) are applied to triadic relations (of which signs are the most important kind),

three types of triadic relations can be isolated: relations of comparison, of performance, and of thought (2.233-34). In general terms, these types are seen in each of Peirce's three divisions above--e.g., his "first" division is into the trichotomy of quality (a comparison), actuality (a performance), and general law (a thought).

(2) But the choice of three trichotomies derives from his definition of the sign. According to that definition, the sign has three aspects (ground, object, interpretant); yet, the three aspects Peirce seems to use in the division are the relation of the sign to itself, the relation of the sign to its object, and the relation of the sign to its interpretant. Of course, the "ground" has not really disappeared--Peirce's "second" division is essentially the "ground," but what is one to make of his "first" and his "third"? They too are "grounds" in the sense that any relation presupposes a ground or idea of relation.

(3) The second of the three trichotomies (the trichotomy of relations between sign and object) yields three classes of signs called the icon, the index, and the symbol whose relations to their objects are characterized by resemblance, connection, and association of idea (2.247 1903).

Now come the several definitions of the symbol, of which one is given here:

A Symbol is a sign naturally fit to declare that the set of objects which is denoted by whatever set of indices may be in certain ways attached to it is represented by an icon associated with it

(2.295 1902).

Peirce's example is the word "loveth": associated with this word is a mental image of one person loving another (the icon); any usage of this word in a sentence contains names of particular individuals (indices); and the word itself is the symbol (295). Another example is "it rains": the mental image of rainy days is the icon; those things which specify a particular day are the indices; "rains" is the symbol which the mind associates with that day (2.438). Indeed, Peirce makes it clear that for him a symbol is a verbal sign (see 2.292, 296, 298, etc.), especially a verb or a noun (261, 262, 295, 296). He is equally emphatic that the symbol is a growing (293), living (302) thing. Of course, the symbol itself comes in several kinds--the genuine, the singular, and the abstract, depending on the nature of its object (293).

Since any word is a symbol for Peirce, his concept is not the same as Coleridge's or Wheelwright's (see above). But his careful explication of how the symbol (or the sign) grows is a semiotic contribution to the theory of the literary symbol and to the rhetoric of language. Peirce's notion is rife with difficulties (see D. Greenlee 1973 134-41 for a summary of these), but he shows how the symbol (or the sign) is itself a topos of persuasion. Other aspects of the intersection of Peirce's work with rhetoric include his remarks on assertion (2.332-343), and his unsystematic

treatment of "speculative rhetoric" (e.g., 2.105-110). The core of Peirce's influence on rhetoric, however, remains his work on the sign (and therefore the symbol). His ill-fated ten classes of signs, in fact, include everything that can have any relation to the rhetoric of language: syllogisms, propositions, terms, parts of speech, symbols, icons, indices, voluntary and involuntary cries, and feelings (2.254-264).

A work that has been (generally speaking) far more influential than Peirce's is de Saussure's Course in General Linguistics (1906-11, trans. 1959). Compared to Peirce's work, which, because of its triadic emphasis and incomprehensible breadth, seems to impinge everywhere on rhetoric, de Saussure's use of one particular binary seems both simple and separate from rhetoric. The necessary context includes:

- (1) a notion of semiology: "a science that studies the life of signs within society" (16);
- (2) a concept of (oral) language: "a system of signs in which the only essential thing is the union of meanings [concepts] and sound-images [auditory images]" (16[14]);
- (3) a concept of writing as the graphic representation of oral language (23).

Within this context the key term is the sign: "the linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept [signified] and a sound-image [signifier]" (66[67]).

The fuller nature of this sign is elucidated in de Saussure's five principles (73-74):

- (1) the bond between signifier and signified is arbitrary;
- (2) the system has a "multiplicity" of signs;
- (3) the system is characterized by "over-complexity";
- (4) the sign is inertial with respect to innovation;
- (5) the sign's relative stability makes change possible.

De Saussure's obvious preferment of spoken language over written language is well-known (see Derrida below), but a few comments on the relation between his sign and Peirce's are necessary. A first approximation might be that de Saussure's sign concerns only the arbitrary classes of Peirce's sign (thus, it excludes, for example, icons). But Peirce's sign is triadic, it invokes the full rhetorical situation, and it is essentially symbolic, whereas de Saussure's sign pointedly excludes the symbol altogether. Although the word "symbol" has sometimes been used to denote the signifier, says de Saussure, this is not permitted by the principle of arbitrariness: "One characteristic of the symbol is that it is never wholly arbitrary; it is not empty, for there is a remnant of a natural bond between the signifier [i.e., considered as a 'symbol'] and the signified" (68). In other words, "the symbol has a rational relationship with the thing signified" (73) whereas the sign does not. It is not the case, of course, that symbolic and rhetorical considerations are of no consequence for de

Saussure (see his definition of semiology above); it is rather that de Saussure has by choice limited his considerations to a very small portion of the semiotics (or semiology) that both he and Peirce study. De Saussure reduces the triad to a binary, making it apparently possible to introduce a limited principle of arbitrariness (though some, notably Derrida, disagree). The advantages of this move are clear--for one thing, the work becomes simpler and more accessible. The chief disadvantage is that its rhetorical significance becomes known only through the work of others.

These others include many names now familiar to literary criticism. Roman Jakobson's definition of the poetic function of language, for example, builds directly on the binary of selection/combination (or, paradigm/syntagm, diachrony/synchrony, metaphor/metonymy): "The poetic function projects the principle of equivalence [i.e., of selection] into the axis of combination [i.e., of contiguity]" ("Linguistics and Poetics" (1960) 1972 95). The rhetorical significance of this formulation is that a poetic function is defined by two traditional figures emphatically separated from each other by a linguistic binary.

This is a rethinking of rhetoric in structuralist terms before Roland Barthes was advocating that very project ("The Rhetoric of the Image" (1964) (1977 32-51). In essays such as "The Death of the Author" (1964) (1977 142-48) and "To

Write: An Intransitive Verb?" (1970), Barthes draws out some decidedly rhetorical consequences of de Saussure's signifier/signified distinction: the arbitrary nature of the pairing frees the reader to participate actively in the production of meaning (i.e., the rhetorical triad is dynamic with respect to pathos); the author is dead insofar as control of meaning is concerned, but a narrator (a verbal representation of ethos) lives on in the text (logos). The arbitrariness (in the small) of the sign implies the arbitrariness (in the large) of meaning. Freed from fixity of meaning, the text becomes a source of pleasure for the reader who continues to desire meaning (including the meaning tantalizingly predicated by the presence of a flickering narrator) and engages in its creation. For Barthes there are "readerly" and "writerly" texts, approximately, texts of "pleasure" and texts of "bliss" (1975 14 51-2). The distinction hinges on the signifier/signified relation: in the "readerly" text, the text of "pleasure," the arbitrary relation fixes meaning; in the "writerly" text, the text of "bliss," the arbitrary relation un-fixes meaning. Both writing and reading are revealed as the use or abuse of various codes (hermeneutic, semic, symbolic, proairetic, cultural) to create meaning; each code is a complex of signs, each of which entails the arbitrary and hence ultimately unstable signifier/signified relation. Again, the rhetorical significance of "semio-

criticism," as Barthes called it, is that meaning (ergo communication) insofar as it involves the rhetorical triad (and the nature of the sign does presuppose this triad) becomes utterly fragile.

In one sense, early structuralism became possible only because rhetoric was forgotten: the binary Saussurean sign seems to "forget" ethos and pathos, remembering only logos. But just as the relative stability of the sign (i.e., its arbitrary nature) makes change in the sign inevitable, so loss of memory makes recovery inevitable. Jacques Derrida (Of Grammatology 1976) deconstructs the neat Saussurean dichotomy of (spoken) sign into signifier/signified in such a way as to make remembering necessary.

First, Derrida argues that, rather than being secondary to spoken language, "writing comprehends language" (7). De Saussure had claimed that writing was secondary because it was a signifier of a signifier (speech), whereas speech was a signifier of a signified (meaning). Derrida simply observes that the signified of spoken language is also a signifier: tree (written) signifies tree (spoken) signifies tree (concept) signifies, for example, the tree of life (another concept), et cetera. De Saussure's ostensible reason simply doesn't hold because the chain of signification does not end with the signified.

Secondly, the history of the view that speech is prior to writing suggests two real reasons for this belief: the

presence of the speaker helps to determine meaning (11-12); the immediate speaker and the immediate meaning are grounded ultimately in a "transcendental signified," the eternal presence and word of God (15-17, 23). This is the famous charge of logocentrism or logophonocentrism. De Saussure's sign (because the signifier is a sound-image, a spoken word) encodes the presence of a speaker and (because the signified presents the illusion of completed meaning) encodes the transcendental presence of both a final speaker and a final meaning.

The Saussurean sign can neither forget rhetoric nor suppress the endless play of signification. But Derrida is not yet done with it: he will destroy it directly with a classical reductio ad absurdum argument (44-45). Two of de Saussure's tenets are: (a) the sign-system of writing represents the sign-system of speaking; (b) the signifier/signified relation of any sign is arbitrary. If (b) holds, then it must hold also for the relation between writing (a signifier) and speaking (a signified of writing); but this implies that (a) cannot hold, for a representation is never arbitrary.

Derrida's work has other consequences for a rhetoric of language than the demonstration of presence (ethos) in the Saussurean sign. Perhaps as important as the near-eviction of ethos from writing is the near-introduction of pathos into writing. The endless play of signification provides the

opportunity for both. Invoking Peirce as an ally--"Peirce goes very far in the direction that I have called the deconstruction of the transcendental signified" (49)--Derrida focusses on the process of signification by introducing new terms dealing with its failure to achieve closure. Thus, trace (a possibility common to all systems of signification 46); differance (difference makes the signifier/signified relation both possible and arbitrary 52; deferral of the final signified, or meaning, or presence 46-7, 52, 61, 62-63); and deconstruction itself (the necessary discovery of aporia within a text). Just as Peirce's interpretant presupposes ethos/pathos, so Derrida's process of signification deconstructs the absence of especially pathos (the reader).

The significance of the structuralist and post-structuralist movements for a rhetoric of language is to clarify the nature of the unit of signification and to explicate the process of signification (both of which turn out to presuppose the rhetorical triad). But a third significance emerges almost as a by-product--the binary, a notion as old as Aristotle, is given a prominence that elevates its role in the topoi of invention. It appears everywhere as the smallest and most natural unit of classification, analysis, thought, and, most important, language. The general significance of the binary is well-known (Ong 1981 13-48), but it appears now also as the basis

of the topoi of style.

By the time that Group Mu was using the Saussurean sign to analyze the figures (A General Rhetoric 1970 trans. 1981), Gerard Genette had already pointed out that the signifier/signified relation was figural:

[B]etween what the poet has written and what he has thought, there is a gap, a space, and like all space, it possesses a form. This form is called figure and there will be as many figures as one can find forms in the space that is created on each occasion between the line of the signifier...and that of the signified..., which is obviously merely another signifier... ("Figures" (1964) 1982 47).

Figure as the gap between the signifier and the signified: that gap that de Saussure had said was arbitrary now turns out to be motivated, intentional, and rhetorical. Writing (even the zero degree of writing is "a sign defined by the absence of sign") is always figural, always style (47). Genette's definition of rhetoric remarries what de Saussure had divorced: "rhetoric is a system of figures" (48). And so, once again, the whole of rhetoric enters the rhetoric of language, but now through notion of sign as figure:

The figure, then, is simply a sense of figure, and its existence depends completely on the awareness that the reader has, or does not have, of the ambiguity of the discourse that is being offered him.... This hermeneutic circle exists also in rhetoric: the value of the figure is not given in the words that make it up, since it depends on the gap between these words and those that the reader perceives, mentally beyond them (54).

Group Mu (Mu) is rather critical of Genette's use of a figure to define figure (Rhetoric 129 ff.): in its place

they offer trees of the linguistic units of signification (based on the the decomposition of these units according to two principles, the binary sign and length of the signifying unit 25-28) and assert that "every rhetorical figure will be an alteration of coordinates or displacements on these trees. Rhetoric will thus be the set of rules of movement on the trees" (26). A "tree" may be a more organic figure than a "space," but it still remains a figure. Nevertheless, using a number of other linguistic terms, Mu defines a rhetoric (of the figure) more fully as follows:

[R]hetoric is a collection of deviations capable of autocorrection: that is to say, they modify the normal level of redundancy of language by breaking rules or creating new ones. The deviation created by an author is perceived by the reader thanks to a mark and subsequently reduced thanks to the presence of an invariant. The totality of these operations, ... [created by author and perceived by reader]..., produces a specific aesthetic effect called ethos, which is the real object of artistic communication (40-41).

Figure as deviation: this is the classical definition, grounded now in linguistic terminology. As to the actual production of these deviations (which approaches, in terms of this study, *topos*), Mu suggests two "operations" (addition and suppression) and one "relational operation" (permutation) (41-2). An extended table classifying the figures of rhetoric follows (45).

Mu's rhetoric of the figure therefore evokes the rhetorical triad (especially *ethos*) through figure, avoids *topos* altogether, and bases itself on binaries and

iteration. It is a tour de force of analysis which establishes that the traditional figures may be considered operations performed on signification in the linguistic sense. It does not admit that this argues that the figure is a sign: but, if the figure is an operation on a sign, say an addition, a suppression, or a permutation (which are all the operations possible), then applying the permitted inverse operation (which is also either an addition, a suppression, or a permutation) yields another figure which is in fact the original sign. Quod erat demonstrandum.

Not everyone is as certain that every figure is a sign, but even those who elevate the status of particular figures agree that the rhetoric of the figure (like the rhetoric of language) extends readily to all of rhetoric. Ricoeur, for example, says that "metaphor is the rhetorical process by which discourse unleashes the power that certain fictions have to describe reality" (1977 7). On the other hand, Paul De Man, whose Allegories of Reading (1979) prioritizes metaphor, holds that semiology reduces rhetoric by emphasizing the how of meaning at the expense of the what of meaning (semantics) and by treating the tropes and figures syntactically as elements of grammar (5-6). Yet, says de Man, Peirce's semiological notion of sign (especially its iterative nature based in the interpretant) is the very essence of rhetoric (9). De Man's two positions would seem to argue that the intersection of rhetoric and semiology is

being mistaken for the whole of rhetoric toward which it tends.

The relation between the figure and the sign is both complex and vexing. Though the metaphor, for example, seems readily amenable to semiotic analysis (vehicle/tenor = signifier/signified), Todorov's Theories of the Symbol (1982) argues that the (literary) symbol is only a particular kind of (semiotic) sign. It happens to be typological, plurifunctional, and heterological (291), which is to say difficult, and he castigates semiotics for pointedly avoiding it (255 ff.). Eco's Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language (1984) argues that the symbol is not a kind of sign but a mode somewhat paradoxically characterized by openness/privacy, certainty/uncertainty, and textual implicature (156-62). Eco sees the symbol as something between a trope and a sign: it is not really a trope because it may also have a literal truth value (signified) whereas the true trope does not (139-41); it is not a sign because the signifier/signified relation is too unstable (136-7, 143). In the troublesome area of overlapping disciplines, in this case rhetoric and language, the symbol (sign or figure?) focusses the problem quite precisely. If a consensus is emerging that it is both, that is to say only that the rhetoric of figure and of language are one rhetoric which is ultimately inseparable. Perhaps discourse is a more appropriate word than language (Eagleton

1983 194-217; Easthope 1983 3-47), but if it is, then a rhetoric of language is full and traditional, "every utterance assuming a speaker and a hearer, and in the speaker, the intention of influencing the other in some way" (Benveniste, quoted in Easthope 41).

Rhetoric qua rhetoric in the twentieth century consists of two general kinds--rhetoric applied and rhetoric rethought. The distinction cannot be maintained with any rigor, of course, but the extremes may be exemplified by two texts, Corbett's Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student (1968, rev. 1971) and Chaim Perelman's and L. Olbrecht-Tytteca's The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation (1969). Rhetoric applied itself may be further subdivided into rhetorical analyses of literature, rhetorical heuristics of the creative act, and so on (see James Kinneavy's survey, "Contemporary Rhetoric" in Horner 1983 167-213, and the essays collected in Murphy 1982). Rhetoric rethought differs from rhetoric applied in that its accommodation of both classical rhetoric and contemporary thought is rather like Campbell's in the eighteenth century: it is full with respect to the former and deep with respect to the latter. Evidently, a great deal of applied rhetoric constitutes rethinking of part of the classical tradition. An interesting example is Kenneth Burke's A Grammar of Motives (1969), which uses a dramatic pentad (act / scene / agent / agency / purpose) to explore how we think and speak

about "motives." Burke's is a deep rethinking of classical rhetoric, in part because he replaces classical rhetoric's central exemplum (the oration or its written text) of the persuasive act with an example (drama or its text) of the motivated act. Thus, the larger topos in which Burke invents and arranges his argument is that particular literary genre (just as it was in classical rhetoric) which suits his subject. The application of the tradition is also full: in the first part of his argument, Burke draws on the classical topoi to define his subject through its "grammar" (which, incidentally, is itself a topos for Burke); he amplifies the scope of his argument by relating the elements of the pentad to philosophical schools of thought; he applies his method of "dramatism" to an analysis of modern dialectics; and, in an appendix, he offers an interesting discussion of the four "master tropes" as modes of thinking. On the whole, however, no one but a Burke could reinvent classical rhetoric in this idiosyncratic way.

Perelman's New Rhetoric perhaps best represents the sense in which rhetoric may be rethought for our time. In it and in his The New Rhetoric and the Humanities (1979), Perelman reclaims and rethinks the idea of persuasion, the rhetorical situation or triad, the major divisions of rhetoric (invention, arrangement, style), and, especially, the role of the topoi. Perelman's is no mere application or contemporary reformulation of rhetoric but an integrated and

provocative demonstration, based on a notion of argumentation, of how the old may become new (for a convenient summary, see Secor 1984).

The domain of argumentation, says Perelman, echoing rhetoricians from Aristotle to De Quincey, is the credible, the plausible, and the probable, but never the strictly demonstrable (1969 Introduction). This is also the domain of rhetoric, the art of non-logical reasoning (i.e., argumentation) aimed at "gaining adherence" (14). Argumentation is above all audience- and speaker-conscious: since an audience consists of "those the speaker wants to influence," it is "a construction of the speaker" (19); more generally, any particular audience is a specific instance of an idea of a "universal audience" (31-32) which the speaker has--"The deliberating subject is often regarded as an incarnation of the universal audience" (40). Argumentation therefore assumes a unity-in-principle of speaker and hearer, an agreement of some kind, a consensus, which is clarified by what Perelman calls the presuppositions of argumentation (1979 11-15): a will to persuade and be persuaded, a common language, an issue considered both significant and value-dependent, and commonly held bases for agreement or disagreement.

Perelman's rhetoric therefore is grounded in a generous notion of persuasion as argumentation which draws a fine line between manipulation and deceit: argumentation

presupposes some agreement. It also recognizes a dynamic relationship between speaker and audience that is particularly suited to writing: in the isolation of the writing act, the "audience" (reader) is necessarily some "universal" (idea) incarnate in the "deliberating subject," (writer), and an obvious extension could be made to the reading act.

Two of the three elements of the rhetorical triad are thus treated in an essential and new way in the concept of argumentation. The third, *logos*, is discussed from the point of view of the *topoi*. Argumentation is impossible unless there are some bases of agreement; these bases include "on the one hand, ...facts, truths, and presuppositions; on the other, values, hierarchies, and the loci of the preferable" (1979 15; see also 1969 83 ff.). The *topoi* (which need not necessarily be articulated), then, belong to the bases of agreement upon which argumentation depends. They are loosely defined as "headings" or "storehouses" for arguments, in short, as premises of a very general nature shared by speaker and audience, and are based on Book III of Aristotle's Topica. Perelman's contribution is to observe that the *topoi* seem to occur in antithetical pairs and to make this structure into a larger *topos* which he calls "the locus of the preferable" (1969 85; 1979 159). This observation and the use made of it emphasize the role of the binary in the *topoi* (see above). Three major binaries are

given (quality/quantity, order/actuality, and essence/person), each of which is a simple ranking of values on the basis of preferability. Perelman's use of the binary topos of preference is especially interesting. He uses quantity/quality to distinguish between literary eras (Classicism prefers quantity, Romanticism prefers quality 1979 161); he introduces another binary, reality/appearance--reversing the order of his terms--and uses it to characterize an era itself (particular instances of this topos indicate Romanticism's preferences--imagination/reason, for example 164); the topos truth/opinion expresses the Classical position that demonstration is preferable to argumentation (165).

Perelman does not apply the general topos of preference to style, but he makes it clear that the rhetorical figures function as topoi of style (1969 167), treats metaphor in the context of argument by analogy (1969 399), and considers the role of the figures in the creation of ethos (1979 17). "In fact, if their argumentative role is disregarded, the study of the figures is a useless pastime, a search for strange names for rather far-fetched and affected turns of speech" (1979 18).

He also studies the larger arrangements of arguments (1979 18-24). These arrangements are of two kinds, associative and dissociative, both of which involve binaries. Associative arguments include quasi-logical

arguments (e.g., the topoi); reality arguments (either appeals to "reality" through causality, authority, et cetera, or establishing "reality" by example, illustration, model, and analogy). Dissociative arguments play a major role in resolving incompatibilities by moving from the plane of disagreement to another plane on which agreement is possible (hence, the term dissociation). Perelman's example is the appearance/reality pair noted above, which represents a movement from incompatibility in "the apparently real" to compatibility on an ideational plane of "a higher reality." One might add that the binary itself functions as a dissociation: the pair "appearance/reality" formally resolves the incompatibility of two, "appearance" and "reality," by uniting them into one "binary."

In sum, Perelman re-establishes the centrality of the topoi in rhetoric by using a concept of argumentation based on tacit agreement and appealing to preferences (values). The topos he establishes is the topos of the preferable, a binary ranking of values. This is the core of his contribution to rhetoric: argument, topos of the preferable, binary. Its significance may be understood by considering the enormous amount of argumentation that rests on an agreement that a binary opposition is a useful place to begin. The rhetorical triad may itself be considered as logos from two points of view (ethos and pathos). But logos must be invented with respect to both matter and manner,

both of which involve binaries--matter insofar as its invention resorts to the topoi, manner insofar as the figures of style are themselves based on binary relations. Synecdoche is pars pro toto, metaphor is vehicle and tenor, metonymy is an iteration of "is next to," and so on. It is perhaps not an exaggeration to say that Perelman has (like his countryman, Ramus) identified the topos of rhetoric for over two thousand years.

1.7 Definition

"In my beginning is my end....

In my end is my beginning."

T. S. Eliot, "East Coker"

Several developments in this survey of topos lead to its definition. They are listed in approximately chronological order and have been discussed above in some detail:

1. The Aristotelian notion of topos almost always involves a relation between two things; this relation can usually be applied successively, yielding a rhetorical but not strict demonstration.
2. The Roman concept of stasis is an opposition on some issue which can be resolved by successive applications of the topoi.
3. The idea of figure (especially the four "master tropes") is always considered as a relation between two linguistic elements; since the time of the Romans, figure includes most of the traditional topoi and functions as a place in which style is invented.
4. The Romantic poets introduce a new figure, the symbol, which (because of its relation to ethos and pathos) emphasizes the rhetorical triad and functions as a topos.
5. The linguistic sign is analyzed as a binary (de Saussure) or as a triad which resolves into an iterated binary

(Peirce). The latter version has close affinities with the symbol which has become important in modern poetry and poetics.

6. Twentieth century rhetorics of the figure and of language claim they are rhetoric; the relation between figure and sign becomes clearer and closer.

7. Twentieth century rhetoric re-establishes the topoi (which seem to occur in pairs) as relations of preference which rank values and make value-based argumentation possible.

The suggestion that the topoi of invention (of argument and style) have an underlying structure is very strong. This structure rather consistently exhibits two characteristics:

(a) it is a binary relation of some kind;

(b) this relation is successively applicable (or iterative).

Such relations, as a glance at any contemporary textbook confirms, are fundamental to the set-theoretical foundations of mathematics. They are called partial orderings, and their two characteristics are that they are binary and transitive. Of course, set theory is not rhetoric: set theory is one of the foundations of mathematics; but logic studies the foundations of mathematics, and logic is closely related to rhetoric. From Aristotle (rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic) to Perelman (rhetoric is the complement to logic), the relationship between rhetoric and logic has been the relationship between the open palm and the closed fist.

There would seem to be some historical precedent, then, for an investigation of contemporary rhetoric to also appeal to contemporary logic. This appeal yields an insight about topos. Briefly, the study of the foundations of mathematics has recently developed an alternative to set theory known as category theory. In very general terms, a category is a formalization of the idea of "minimal structure," involving "relations" among "objects." Among the kinds of categories is a particularly important kind called an elementary topos which serves as a model for different "logics." One of the most significant examples of an elementary topos is a partial ordering. (See R. Goldblatt, Topoi: A Categorical Investigation of Logic 1984 1-5, 24-30, 84-85.) The definition of topos as a transitive binary relation thus emerges from the term's history in rhetoric and from recent developments in rhetoric's counterpart, logic. It remains for me to show this definition is adequate to its task.

Definition: A topos is a transitive binary relation: that is, a relation $\langle -, - \rangle$ such that if $\langle x, y \rangle$ and $\langle y, z \rangle$ then $\langle x, z \rangle$.

Aristotle said that rhetoric was the counterpart of dialectic because the enthymeme, or rhetorical syllogism, represented a loosening of the true syllogism (probabilities instead of certainties, approximate rather than strict implication, and steps missing). This can be made quite precise using a partial ordering:

Let $\langle x, y \rangle$ denote a partial ordering. Therefore, if

$\langle x, y \rangle$ and $\langle y, z \rangle$, then $\langle x, z \rangle$ (by transitivity). But the form of the syllogism is: if x is y , and if y is z , then x is z . That is, every syllogism expresses the transitivity of the binary relation of implication: $\langle x, y \rangle$ may be interpreted to stand for the implication " x is y ," or "if x , then y ."

Thus, implication (the binary relation successively applied in the syllogism) is a partial ordering. The converse--that a partial ordering is a (strict) implication--is false (consider the partial ordering "is preferable to"). The characteristic of transitivity is precisely what makes a topos useful in rhetorical argumentation or demonstration.

The definition of topos may be recast using the relation "implication," or $[-,-]$:

A topos is a binary relation $\langle -, - \rangle$ such that
 $[\langle (x, y), (y, z) \rangle , \langle x, z \rangle]$.

By convention, $\langle (x, y), (y, z) \rangle$ means " $\langle x, y \rangle$ and $\langle y, z \rangle$ " (this convention is adopted for technical reasons which will become apparent below). Put in this way, the definition of topos shows precisely the relation between topos and enthymeme.

All the Aristotelian topics are topoi in the sense of the definition given above. Since there are fourteen logical topics and at least twenty-eight general topics, my demonstration will consist of some general remarks and several examples. Regarding the logical topics (considered as predicates), Aristotle himself observed that "Whenever a thing is predicated of another as subject, all things said of what is predicated will be said of the subject also"

(Categories 1b10). His example is that if "man" is predicated of "John," and if "animal" is predicated of "man," then "animal" is also predicated of "John." Predication, under the appropriate circumstances, is therefore transitive. It may also be considered as a binary relation: let \langle , \rangle denote "predication"--that is, $\langle \text{John}, \text{man} \rangle$ denotes "the predicate man applies to John), or, briefly, "John is a man."

The four common topics (Rhetoric 1392a8 ff.) are also topoi in the sense of the definition. "The greater or the lesser" has been treated in the introduction. Aristotle's discussion of the topic of "the possible" shows that he always combines "is possible" with some other relation between two things: contrary pairing, similarity, priority, whole/part, and so on. In other words, this topic may be expressed as "possibility is transitive with respect to some binary relations." Since each of these binary relations is, under appropriate circumstances, a partial ordering, so is its combination with the unary relation "is possible." This seems intuitively clear, and its direct expression using a single binary relation is relatively straightforward:

Let $\langle x,y \rangle$ denote "if x is possible, and if x stands in some permissible relation to y , then y is possible."

Using some further notational conventions, we may recast this expression to make its structure clearer:

(1) Let "1" denote "truth" and "0" denote falsity." Then $[1,x]$ asserts " x ," and $[x,0]$ asserts "not- x "

(Goldblatt 128).

(2) Let $[x,y]_p$ denote "x possibly implies y." Then, $[1,x]_p$ asserts "x is possible." Note that

$[[(1,x),(x,y)]_p , [1,y]_p]$
says that "if x is possible and if x possibly implies y, then y is possible."

(3) Finally, letting $\langle -, - \rangle$ denote any binary relation,

$[[(1,1),(x,\langle x,y \rangle)]_p , [1,y]_p]$
says "if x is possible and if $\langle x,y \rangle$ is possible, then y is possible."

Thus, (3) represents what Aristotle meant by the topos "is possible." It is a weak form of implication--which is the point of defining a topos as a partial ordering.

The remaining two common topics, "the past" and "the future," are again considered by Aristotle in combination with some other binary relation (more likely, causality, priority, et cetera); the demonstration that they are partial orderings is similar to the above.

Aristotle's list of twenty-eight general topics has been intensively analyzed by Ryan (96-109), who, like Grimaldi, concludes that they are all statements of binary relation (cause-effect, antecedent-consequent, et cetera). These relations are clearly transitive, and therefore every such topic is a partial ordering. Nevertheless, since an example is also a form of demonstration (being the rhetorical counterpart of induction), two topics will be represented directly as partial orderings. Aristotle's first topic is described as follows:

One probative commonplace is based upon consideration of the opposite of the thing in question. Observe whether the opposite has the opposite quality. If it has not, you refute the original proposition; if it has, you establish it.

E.g., "Temperance is beneficial; for licentiousness is hurtful" (Rhetoric 1397a10).

This topic is not simply an "opposite" (which is in general a binary but not a transitive relation): it is an implication involving an "opposite." Aristotle's "opposites" constitute a complex theory of negation using the notions of "relatives," "contraries," "privations," and "negation" (Categories 11b5-14a20), and only the first of these is itself a topos; Aristotle's example, however, is a "contrary," and "in most cases what is contrary to a bad thing is good" (Categories 14a5). Letting $[x,y]$ denote "x is y" (x implies y, or the predicate y applies to x) and $\langle x,y \rangle$ denote "x is an opposite of y," the topos is

$$[\langle (x,y,[x,y]), (X,Y,0) \rangle , \langle [X,Y],0 \rangle] .$$

In words, "if x is y, and if both x,X and y,Y are opposites, then (under the appropriate conditions) X is Y." Or, more familiarly, "opposition is (sometimes) transitive with respect to implication."

The second example is the topic, "if two results are the same, their antecedents are also the same" (Rhetoric 1399b5 ff.). This topic involves two other topics, similarity and antecedent/consequent (a kind of generalized implication which seems to include causality), both of which are partial orderings. The nature of the topic may be clarified by observing that "similarity" pushes backward from consequents to antecedents; or, alternatively, "implication" pulls "similarity" back from consequents to

antecedents. The presence of two relations in the same topic, together with the fact that one of them travels backwards, so to speak, suggests that the representation will be complex, despite the intuitive validity of the claim that it is, in principle, possible.

Let \langle , \rangle denote the relation similarity, $[,]$ denote the relation between antecedent and consequent, and $(,)$ denote any ordered pair. Then,
 $[[(x,w), \langle y,z \rangle], \langle x,w \rangle]$
 represents the topic "if two results are the same, their antecedents are also the same."

The representation of this topic shows quite graphically how "similarity" travels backward from consequents (y and z) to antecedents (x and w). That the relation is transitive is also intuitively obvious--"similarity" pushes backward from consequents to (the immediate) antecedents to (any prior) antecedents, and "implication" pulls "similarity" back from (the last) consequents to (any prior) antecedents. The (rhetorical) demonstration that the twenty-eight general topoi are, in fact, partial orderings is therefore complete. Since the several parts of the assertion that all the Aristotelian topoi are partial orderings have been demonstrated, by another familiar topic so has the whole.

The Roman topics are in essence the same as Aristotle's, and only the notion of stasis needs to be considered from the perspective of partial orderings. A stasis is a point of rest between oppositions (Dieter), "the point on which the whole matter turns" (Quintilian), which

is either conjectural or definitional or qualitative. These three are all topoi in the sense of being partial orderings. The nature of the opposition, in other words, is a topos, and the opposition itself is settled by the application of topoi. In an obvious way, stasis is not a topos but a question (issue, point) to which a topos applies. On the other hand, a stasis is a point of (rest between) opposition(s), as is any binary relation. The best solution seems to me to say that stasis is a binary relation (but not a partial ordering).

The history of topos shows that the figure functions rather clearly as a place in which to invent style. Four figures are dominant--the so-called master-tropes, metaphor, synecdoche, metonymy, and irony. Their definitions have remained fairly constant and each definition is a topos in the sense defined above. A metaphor is a binary pair, $\langle \text{vehicle}, \text{tenor} \rangle$; synecdoche is some variation of $\langle \text{part}, \text{whole} \rangle$; metonymy is based on the relation of contiguity; and irony is an extended (iterated ?) duplicity. It is also easy to see that these binary relations are transitive, which, for the figures, means that the relation persists through repeated application (iteration). For example, the transitivity of the metaphor may be represented by

$$\langle \langle v, t \rangle, T \rangle$$

where the inner metaphor, $\langle v, t \rangle$, itself becomes the vehicle of a second tenor, T. "Let me not to the marriage [v] of

true minds [t] admit impediments; love [T]" And the symbol, according to Peirce, is $S_{i+1} = \langle S_i, x \rangle$, where S_{i+1} is the (i+1)th interpretant, x is the object named by the representamen S , and $\langle -, - \rangle$ is the ground relating the i th interpretant to its object.

The transitivity of the topos "figure" is best seen in the linguistic analysis of the sign. De Saussure, of course, would have it that the process of signification is not iterative; but, as Derrida and others have shown, it very clearly is. It is Peirce's analysis of the sign, however, that reveals both that the sign is an iteration and that it is very like the literary symbol (see above). Group Mu, similarly, basing its definition of the figure (a deviation) on linguistic notions including the (binary) sign of de Saussure, supports the argument that the figure is surely some kind of sign. Since the sign is an uncompleted process of iteration of a binary relation, so is the figure. That is, the figure is a partial ordering.

Finally, Perelman. His sense of topos is perhaps both closest to Aristotle's and the nearest source of the definition offered in this chapter. By associating two simpler topics on the basis of preference, he repeats exactly Aristotle's procedure in his discussion and use of the topics. As we have seen, a binary relation between two simple topics is a more complex topic which retains the essential features of the simpler topics. That essential

feature is consistently employed but never named by Perelman: his "preferability" is a partial ordering of two values (simple topics), tacitly agreed to by hearer and speaker, which makes argumentation possible. More generally, partial orderings make argumentation (rhetorical persuasion) possible. That is the conclusion of this chapter and the motivation for its definition of topos.

Part 2. The Rhetoric of Prairie Poetry

2.1 Place and Topos

That prairie writing is preoccupied with place has been a critical cliché since the nineteen-fifties. Edward McCourt, in a seminal definition, stated that "True regional literature is above all distinctive in that it illustrates the effect of particular, rather than general, physical, economic, and racial features upon the lives of ordinary men and women" (The Canadian West in Fiction 1949 revised 1970 56). McCourt was speaking of course of prose fiction, not poetry, but he might as well have been speaking of both. Carlyle King, trying to avoid the fallacy of regional environmentalism, fell nevertheless into a variant, which might be called the fallacy of regional subjectism: "there are [for example] no Saskatchewan writers; there are only writers," said Professor King, and very sensibly--in view of this assumption--collected an anthology of "writing about Saskatchewan" (Saskatchewan Harvest: A Golden Jubilee of Saskatchewan Song and Story 1955) which included writers from the prairies (Sinclair Ross), as well as from Newfoundland (E. J. Pratt), all writing about the same place. Both of these examples, in different ways, attest to the effect of place on writers of that place. When that place is the prairie, the effect is most often due to the

landscape. As Wallace Stegner puts it, "The drama of this landscape is in the sky, pouring with light and always moving. The earth is passive.... These prairies are quiescent, close to static; looked at for any length of time, they begin to impose their awful perfection on the observer's mind. Eternity is a peneplain" (Wolf Willow 1962 7).

In the seventies, Laurence Ricou did for poetry what McCourt had done for prose in the fifties: exercising his prerogative as an editor, he assembled a collection of the work of prairie poets that showed that "the prairie is a prominent, and often persistent, focus of the poet's work" (Twelve Prairie Poets 1976 Introduction 7). It may be that this demonstration was effected as much by Ricou's editorial stance as by the works of the poets, but no one has suggested that Ricou was not at least partly right. Ten years later, Dennis Cooley introduced a new (for prairie literature) reading of the effect of place on poetry. Instead of arguing from the extended reference to place, and relying heavily on the practise and theories of Robert Kroetsch, Cooley argued from the voice of place: "These [prairie] poets . . . wrote out of an increasingly vernacular voice found in the people and events around them" (ECW 18/19 (Summer/Fall 1980): 15). But the voice of place is still linked to the environment, including the physical: prairie poems are written in "open forms and rhythms," the

models are "idiomatic, open-ended" (17). Significantly, for the argument here being advanced, the reprint of Cooley's special edition of ECW was entitled RePlacing. Recently, he has argued that the vernacular is postmodern (The Vernacular Muse 171), an argument that has the curious consequence (given that recourse to the vernacular is a traditional rhetorical technique) that rhetoric is postmodern.

There is no question that these readings of prairie poetry and fiction, extending over thirty years, have identified a central preoccupation of that literature. Even Eli Mandel, whose perception of place in prairie poetry is somewhat different from those cited above, does not omit reference and literality. Noting that "[t]he theoretical basis of literary regionalism is weaker than the historical or geographical," Mandel offers his "image for the prairie writer": he [she] is "one who returns," that is, "a man [woman] not so much in place, as one out of place and so one endlessly trying to get back, to find his [her] way home, to return, to write himself [herself] into existence, writing west" (Another Time 69). The place that interests Mandel is a state of mind, "a tension between place and culture, a doubleness or duplicity" (69), a state that is grounded not in "[n]ostalgia, sadness, memory, even affection" of place, but in language and form (76).

Mandel's image of the prairie poet is an image of a "resident" in the legal and metaphorical sense; his notion

of this poet's doubleness manifested in language and form verges on contemporary notions of figure as a "gap" between the signifier and the signified, between "what the poet has written and what he thought" (Genette "Figures" 1982 47). In Mandel's conception, the poet himself (herself) is a figure of gap-ness in the text: because the figure of the "poet" (ethos) represented in the text (logos) is an instrument of appeal to the reader (pathos), this comes close (as Godard has pointed out, though inadvertently, in "Epi(pro)logue" Open Letter 6th ser. 2-3 (Summer-Fall 1985): 301-35) to grounding poetics in rhetoric. But there is still a great resistance to naming the context of all that passes as reading and writing by its traditional name (rhetoric), and Mandel, sensitive as he is to the tradition of which poetry is necessarily a part, cannot bring himself to "eff the ineffable" (the phrase is Robert Kroetsch's, echoing Eliot's delightful "Effanineffable" from "The Naming of Cats" 1969 209).

A topos of particular relevance to prairie poetry is based on literal "place." This topos, which derives from Cicero's De Inventione, appears most clearly in Quintilian under both "arguments drawn from persons" and "things" (Institutio Oratoria V.x.23-31 and 37). Curtius notes its wide use in epideictic poetry (narrative and lyric) in the Middle Ages (European and Latin Literature in the Middle Ages 153-159); Wilson discusses its role in the praise or

dispraise of men and their deeds in the Renaissance (The Arte of Rhetorique 1553 24 ff.); and the topographical element in Romantic poetry attests to its continuing influence. In brief, this topos is a relation between a place and the things (persons, deeds, objects) belonging to or associated with that place: if the place is praiseworthy, valued, or preferred, then so is the thing; more generally, the attributes of place transfer to the thing in place. Whether considered as an instance of $\langle x, \text{place} \rangle$, $\langle \text{place}, y \rangle$, their consequence $\langle x, y \rangle$, or $\langle \text{if}, \text{then} \rangle$, whether technically a trope or a figure, this topos is a partial ordering in the sense of the definition above. Mandel's image is an instance of $\langle \text{person}, \text{place} \rangle$, where $\langle -, - \rangle$ is defined by the double "out of" ("is from," yet "is alien to"). Stegner's $\langle \text{active}, \text{light} \rangle$, $\langle \text{light}, \text{sky} \rangle$, $\langle \text{sky}, \text{earth} \rangle$, $\langle \text{earth}, \text{passive} \rangle$ in some sense prepares the reader to accept the concluding metaphor ("Eternity is a peneplain") which conflates time (measured by the constant "motion" of light) and space ("static," flat as the prairie). Thus, the "argument" may be subtle, the nature of the relation $\langle -, - \rangle$ may be flexible, the conclusion oblique--but this is precisely the domain which rhetoric has traditionally claimed as its very own. It is also a domain in which topoi abound.

In the two major models of rhetoric, topos (in the sense of both the definition of Part 1, above, and the tradition) occupies a central position. Aristotle favours a

triad, ethos / logos / pathos, in which the topoi (his sense) and the figures are located in logos (The Rhetoric 1355b, 1356a, 1358a, 1392a-1393a, 1397a-1400b;); rhetors following Cicero employ the first three elements of a five-part division, invention / arrangement / style (omitting memory/delivery), with the topoi (his sense) embedded centrally in the first and the figures in the last (De Oratore I.142-3). A combination of the two with the above definition of topos forms the model of reading for this study (arrangement is omitted because the genre studied is predominantly the lyric):

		ethos
	figure (style)	
topos (invention)		logos
	argument (matter)	
		pathos

Such a scheme, incorporating more than two-thousand years of the practice and theory of reading and writing, suggests that the topoi play similar roles for readers and for writers. If one thinks of composition as a movement from invention to arrangement to style (the Ciceronian model), then the topoi provide the arguments, the forms, and even the figures, approximately in that order (Sloan "Reading Milton Rhetorically" 1983 394-410). Reading reverses this movement: beginning with the "finished text," the reader likely perceives the figures first, notices the larger form

next (as in, say, genre), and gets the argument last, moving therefore from style to arrangement to invention. Writing and reading do not of course proceed this simply, but if a general heuristics of the writing/reading act is wanted, then rhetoric provides a model. As Thomas Sloan notes, "invention in rhetorical reading...mean[s] exactly what it meant in rhetorical composition, finding the thought already present in the materials" (397). Alternatively (in the Aristotelian model), the text (logos, poem) establishes an ethos by representing within itself a narrator who has been much studied in the poetics of fiction (on narratology, see Chatman Story and Discourse 1978). This narrator may be overt ("I") or covert (the "consciousness" behind the poem or its overt narrator), and his use of particular topoi determines his ethos. Similarly, the topoi presuppose and appeal to a reader (pathos), either overtly (a named addressee or "you") or covertly (anything in the text is "readable"). The topoi of prairie poetry (usually involving place), centred in the rhetorical triad (especially logos but also ethos and pathos), therefore constitute what is meant in this study by the rhetoric of prairie poetry.

2.2 Dorothy Livesay's Rhetoric of Woman

The several stages of Dorothy Livesay's career from the thirties through the seventies have been outlined rather fully by her readers of the same period: (1) the early years (Green Pitcher (1928) and Signpost (1932)); (2) the social-realist period (Day and Night (1944) and including some poems from Signpost as well as documentary poems for voices); (3) and the feminist love-poems of maturity (especially The Unquiet Bed (1967), Plainsongs (1971), and Ice Age (1975)). Together with works like Selected Poems (1956), Collected Poems (1972), and The Woman I Am (1977), all of which are republications of earlier poems, these constitute the bulk of Livesay's work till the eighties. The new poems of this decade, when added to the canon, constitute a fourth phase: (4) reconsideration (The Phases of Love (1983) and Feeling the Worlds (1984)).

In this "readerly" outline, thematic considerations are dominant--sexual love in its several modes, social concerns, wifhood and motherhood, aging (see Room of One's Own 5.1-2 1979, a special issue on Livesay). Technical studies of the poetry, despite the implications of some of the articles' titles, are almost completely absent; and the nod to technique in throw-away remarks like "Livesay's line is lyrical" is followed usually by a reversion to thematicism. Such criticism of course justifies Frank Davey's complaint

in "Beyond Paraphrase" (1976) (1983 1-12) that other approaches in Canadian criticism were desperately needed.

An occasional critic will mention, for example, the "rhetoric" of Livesay's poetry:

At other times the poet mars a poem by making the reader too conscious of an image, so that it becomes for him a conceit, a rhetorical device that militates against the tone of honesty and directness in most of the poems (Stevens [1971] 1974 51-52).

This quotation reveals more about an attitude toward rhetoric than about the rhetoric of Livesay's poetry: it tells us, for instance, that the reader has chosen to disregard the rhetoric of authenticity which is found already in Aristotle. Perhaps, given such an impoverished sense of rhetorica, it is just as well that references to rhetoric are few and widely scattered. Yet, it is surprising that little properly technical study of Livesay's poetry exists, particularly since Livesay herself demonstrated a desire that poetry be given "a very close analysis" ("The Documentary Poem: A Canadian Genre" 1971 269). Two studies do use Livesay's imagery to buttress thematic analyses (Mitchell 1974 and Zimmerman 1974), but Woodcock's fine survey (1979) is entirely representative of readings of Livesay through the seventies (see also Davey 1974 168-72 and his article in Toye 1983).

Livesay criticism in the present decade, by contrast, is rather thoroughly technical. Pamela Banting's feminist reading uses the theories of Kristeva to argue that

Livesay's figuration of woman reveals "her struggle with the symbolic [as opposed to semiotic] mode of language itself" (1984 17). Rhetorical aspects of Livesay's poetry are treated in a number of essays in Dorney et al (1986). Pierce, for example, argues that Livesay refuses to apply a "private rhetoric to a public situation" (1986 20), choosing instead to use "Song and Dance" (Canadian Literature 1969) as an appropriate symbol of both personal (song) and public (dance) freedom (25). Cooley finds that Livesay's women are enclosed in the early poems, out among the elements in the middle poems, and earth mothers in the later poetry (1986 107). His argument is based on formal as much as on thematic developments within the poetry--for example, an early emphasis on closure, punctuation, and imagism (107-115) yields to variability and flexibility in rhymes in the middle period (115-119), and downright "irregularities" and "open-ness" in form in the last period (119-123). Finally, Jewinski openly uses Paul De Man's insight into the difference between the codes of grammar and rhetoric to read Livesay: briefly, the poet undercuts the grammatical assertions of an identifiable speaker by using rhetorical devices, creating a sense that "'being' is that which always exists one step beyond language" and that "woman" is an "unthought thought" (1986 138).

Paul Denham's Dorothy Livesay and Her Works (1987), an expansion of his essay in Dorney, is perhaps the fullest

study of Livesay to date. Denham favours a "dialectical treatment" which he develops from the critics he surveys (7-12). Thus, Livesay's earlier work is treated as a series of oppositions: lyric mode (short poem, private) versus documentary mode (long poem, public) (13 and 18-19); and garden symbols versus crow symbols (15). These antitheses, including male versus female, are resolved in the middle period (after 1967) by "a loosening of form" and a fusing of "the lyric voice and the political voice" (29), by a unifying tree-symbol (30), and by a more balanced treatment of love (32). The poems of the eighties continue to reflect the "feminist sensibility" (33) and the concerns with women as artists, both of which emerged in the middle period, but with a new sense of distance (34). In summary, Denham finds that "[t]he relationship between freedom and responsibility is a consistent pattern in Dorothy Livesay's poetry and prose": this relationship is an opposition in the early work, an interdependence in the later; it provides "thematic continuity" and is "a central structural principle"; it shows that Livesay's two poetic forms, "the inner-directed lyric and the socially-directed documentary[,]" are aspects of a single sensibility" (38).

Although this study appears to turn to standard critical canons and away from the rhetorical emphases of some of the essays in Dorney, it nevertheless identifies the binary nature of Livesay's work. Dennis Cooley's analysis of

two poems, "Green Rain" and "Day and Night," on the other hand, argues a sharp division between Livesay's lyric and her documentary (The Vernacular Muse 1987 223-75). He identifies the narrator in "Green Rain" as "sincere" (232), but the narrator in "Day and Night" is openly "rhetorical" (248). The distinction is based in a close, rhetorical reading of the text and a nascent awareness that both narrators are, in different senses, equally rhetorical (229 and 237).

A recent shift in Livesay criticism, then, is toward the rhetorical. Systematic attention to the triad ethos / logos / pathos (Cooley), to specific rhetorical techniques (Jewinski), and to binary structures (Denham) prepare for the study of selected topoi in Livesay's poetry. Generally speaking, Livesay is an urban not rural poet, which is to say that prairie-as-place is less important in her rhetoric than, say, farmer-as-labourer or woman-as-victim: "For Livesay... one's 'own' place (in [her] poetry, at least) tends to be The World" (Atwood Surfacing 1972 242). Nevertheless, prairie is a part of the topos of persuasion in both the social-realist and the love poetry, early as well as late. Green Pitcher (1928), filled as it is with a young woman's romantic longings for sexual fulfillment, figures this longing as the wind:

Encased in the hard, bright shell of my dream,
How sudden now to wake
And find the night still passing overhead,
The wind still crying in the naked trees,

Myself alone, within a narrow bed.
 ("Reality" CP 1972 9)

Of course wind is not prairie-specific, but the great prevalence of the figure in the poems and the well-known facts about prairie life suggest that a prairie topos is here operating (see CP 2-4, 6, 8, 10). This use of the figure, however, is much less interesting than its role in "Widow-Woman" (CP 10-11), in which poem it is a part of a very significant topos for Livesay--the oppressed female is associated with the land itself. The association, it is true, is implicit, but it could hardly be clearer: the woman "should know" and "should feel" the seasonal cycles of the land; she also "should know" that a sown field may produce a harvest; and she "should know" that when "The starkness of earth cries for some covering" it will come as "The wind...hurtling down / His burden load / His numbing gift / Of snow." The woman-as-land is implicitly oppressed, for her status is widowhood, and her stance is passive (she is the slow student of patient experience). The wind, itself part of the "land," is both the figure of oppression and (curiously) the figure of sexual fulfillment (the "load" of "snow" may be seen as semen).

Woman-as-land is developed further in the second book, Signpost (1932). In "Sun" (CP 26), for example, the speaker asserts "I am as earth upturned, alive with seed." From implicit association to explicit simile is not a large movement, but it is significant because the movement will

culminate in outright (metaphoric) identification. The landscape (and therefore the woman) here includes the wind-- "I am bound as earth, yet wholly free / As the slow early wind"; in "The Difference" (31), the speaker reverts to implicit association--her lover is too "slow" for her, more suited to loving a "tree" than "A falling flame, a flower's brevity" such as herself.

The same book contains another, somewhat different use of the prairie topos. In "Sonnet for Ontario," a poem which George Woodcock rightly describes as "permeated with the nostalgia of the passing hour so characteristic of Canadian poetry in its late colonial phase" (1979 53), the prairie is the vehicle of nostalgia, whereas the present Ontario landscape seems to evoke a positive response (CP 35). Crocuses, meadow-larks, and prairie winds recall only a remembered glory; but "This land grows like a garden in my heart." Prairie is romantic and past, garden is real and present, or so it seems. Behind this ranking which demotes prairie, however, is another which promotes it: the prairie is associated with pain, with the stopping of pulse and breath, with wildness, and with wonder and delight; the East is associated with order and sobriety, a (mere) garden, tamed and subdued. In mythological terms, Livesay's prairie is Dionysian, whereas her eastern garden is Apollonian; and her well-documented preference in her poetry (if not her life) for Dionysus suggests that the prairie topos is

presents two series of associations, <day,x> and <x,grandmother>, which together establish the conclusion <day,grandmother> of the last lines. The relation of the land to that day (rain, valley, wind, and even road are land-based), that is, <land,day>, again suggests the topos <land, woman>. (But see Cooley's very different reading Muse 226-35.)

The figure denoted by "woman-as-land" therefore offers an early instance of a specifically prairie topos in Livesay's poetry. Its rhetorical function, the argument establishing such a denotation, may be diagrammed as follows:

<woman,x> and <x,prairie> and <prairie,land>
implies <woman,land>, where the relation <-,> is
an implied ("Widow-Woman") or overt ("The Sun")
association which may be "membership" (as in
<x,prairie>).

As indicated above, a significant aspect of the pair <x,prairie>, which is rather easily overlooked, is that Dionysian attributes of the prairie transfer readily to the persons and things associated with it. The topos <woman,land> will become very important in Livesay's love-poetry, incorporating much if not all of her female rhetoric (if I may put it that way). But first, Livesay will turn to the more "partisan rhetoric" of social-realism, or, as she has it, the documentary poem.

The reasons for Livesay's temporary abandonment of love-poetry are well-known (see Woodcock 1979 for a readable

and full account of the life and the poetry). Her social-realist poems of course do not neglect the subject of love (and woman) entirely, but their dominant concern is the larger one of life (and womankind). Historical developments such as the Regina Riot and the Winnipeg Strike, as well as the facts of her biography, make the prairie a persistent if muted ground for individual poems (CP 71-106). For this reason and because Livesay relates her documentary poems of this period to Ann Marriott's The Wind Our Enemy (The Documentaries 1968 17; Livesay 1971 281), the role of the prairie topos in that poem may be considered as an introduction to Livesay's employment of it.

The prairie topos is muted also in Marriott's ten-part poem (1939). The title and frame (parts I and X) personify the wind as the arch-enemy (compare Livesay's use of the wind in "Widow-Woman"): it (and the wind is actually male by implication) is a "gaunt furious self" (I) who plays "a lonely laughterless shrill game" (X) with the wheat, the land, and the people. But the wind is almost completely absent from the rest of the poem, appearing only incidentally or obliquely in parts II, VII, and VIII. Instead, the poem presents a number of victims of the sky: (1) "The wheat [which] in spring was like a giant's bolt of silk / Unrolled over the earth" (II), and "was embroidering / All the spring morning" (III), is eventually consumed by the sky (III); (2) "But sky like a new tin pan / Hot from

the oven / Seemed soldered to the earth" (III), and this metal sky finally turns the nourishing earth to dust (VIII); (3) in the process, the people suffer through a life of "No rain, no crop, no feed, no faith, only / wind" (X). A mythological marriage, in other words, between earth and sky destroys wheat, earth, and the people: the male (sky, sun, wind) victimizes the female (wheat, earth, and wheat) and destroys her children (the people). Hesiod's Theogony provides the full story. Despite the obvious primacy of a prairie subject, Marriott's basic topos is mythological first and prairie-as-place second. The poem exhibits a central weakness, an uncertainty, in that the announced subject struggles vainly against the topos employed; similarly, the announced hero (wind) yields to the operating force (sun). Marriott's poem seems uncertain about its rhetoric.

Livesay has called Wind a documentary poem, that is, a poem that "record[s] immediate or past history in terms of the human story, in a poetic language that is vigorous and direct, and rendered emotionally powerful by the intensity of its imagery," a poem whose "impact is topical-historical, theoretical, and moral" (Livesay 1971 281). Rhetorical aspects of this definition, interestingly enough, deal with logos and pathos (but not ethos) in terms that recur in the handbooks from Aristotle to Lanham. Whether Wind qualifies as a documentary poem in Livesay's sense is an open

question. It seems an interpretation not a "record" of history; it has virtually no "human" narrative line; its language is "poetic" in a sense somewhat opposed to Livesay's; and, because of its lack of topological decorum, its impact is "rhetorical." Historical events are referred to (drought, war, relief), but a reference made for didactic purposes is not a record; a local idiom is not so much used as pointed (by quotation marks); and the human story is overpowered by a mythological saga of a failed cosmic marriage reflected in a pastiche of vignettes of depression-era life on the prairie. Marriott's language (and this actually is appropriate for the mythological topos) is heavily symbolical and allegorical--in addition to the examples already cited, consider the ironic Christian loading in "The third day he left the fields" (III).

These two related issues--of genre and of topos--are raised also by the six poems collected in Livesay's The Documentaries. First, are they documentaries in Livesay's sense? Denham (1987 19-22) and Cooley (Muse 246-68), though agreeing that "Day and Night" (1936) is a most distinguished work, suggest by their treatments of it that it is better considered a dramatic or rhetorical long poem. Livesay, herself, claims that the later "Roots" (1966) is a subjective autobiography, not a documentary (Documentaries v and 50). On the other hand, it seems to satisfy the four criteria of the documentary (history, narrative, language,

impact) at least as well as the other works in the collection. Secondly, a prairie topos is employed only incidentally in some of the poems (see the "Epilogue" to "The Outrider" CP 119, and the voice of the wife in "Call My People Home" CP 191), is replaced entirely in "Day and Night" by a mythological topos (<day,night>), and is dominant only in "Roots." What Marriott does in Wind, Livesay does in her documentaries, and the prairie topos yields to other concerns.

But it is not entirely missing. The crow (also an eastern bird) flies up several times in "The Outrider" (1944; CP 112), a symbol as before of the positive powers of disorder (112, 115, 119); and the poem's "Epilogue" moves its generalized pioneer-protagonists to "the prairie dry" where the "serene untouchable vault of sky" (119) marks the depression of the thirties. "Call My People Home" (1949; CP 180) similarly locates the Canadian Japanese displaced during the second war in the prairies at the end of "The eastward journey into emptiness / A prairie place called home" (191). The voice of a Japanese-Canadian wife renders several images--the fields are a "Bleak tableland"; "the sweet / Heart-snaring song of meadowlarks" is heard; "In summer the sun's beak / Tore at our backs bending"; and so on. One image joins two for a somewhat stronger effect: "in the pasture fireflies danced / Like lanterns of Japan on prairie air."

"Roots" (CP 267-74), written after Livesay's social-realist period, offers a perspective on matters of genre and topos. It is arguably a documentary and makes good use of a prairie topos. The poem is a typical Canadian poem of journey from the west coast to the interior prairie. A female protagonist ("Livesay") admits her longings for place to her son--"I was born on the baked prairie / O son I miss the sun" (269) and "my high land, my dry land" (270). But when the car reaches the very centre of the prairies, a different note is sounded (271):

In Saskatchewan
 they seem to hate trees
 they hate the finger upraised
 to disturb the flatness
 not The Wind Our Enemy--
 but trees.

We drove and drove
 dust devils swirled
 black puffs of oil wells
 choked
 we drove in madness
 yet eased in the towns
 to see one solid building
 brick (a city hall?) pivotal
 among false fronts

And after the shaken blackened houses
 twisted on a ditchside
 gaping doorways aching silos
 we were surprised, in Saskatoon
 by a green welcome.

Whose wind?
What enemy?

Spring lilacs hung down, dusky
 scenting the river.

The journey ends in Livesay's Manitoba childhood home, rendered simply and quite beautifully in images of a

Winnipeg garden "where [she] grew amongst the flowers" planted and tended by her parents, "heart planted then / and never transplanted" (274).

Livesay's poem is rather close to her definition of the documentary, chiefly because of a narrative whose protagonists are human and whose plot is historical. Her language, too, is appropriate for the subject and the topos employed. "Roots" replaces almost the entire baggage of depression images and arguments with a more contemporary set--trees not winds are the enemies, dust devils co-exist with puffs of oil wells, and in the centre of the prairie desert is a green welcome. Traces of the old images remain (false-fronted towns, abandoned farms), but the new note is the sound of a positive response to the prairie, even though that response is couched in negatives. The point is that Livesay repudiates The Wind Our Enemy once and for all, and an overt mythological topos is abandoned along with it. Instead, the poem employs <prairie,x>, with x assuming values from several different sets: positive values for the narrator (heat, high and dry land, trees, green-ness, gardens); positive values for prairie-dwellers (flatness, wind, green-ness); negative values for the narrator (distance, dust, abandoned farms); negative values for prairie-dwellers (trees); and so on. Together, these values argue that beauty lies in the eyes of the beholder: whose wind? what enemy?

After the publication of Day and Night (1944), Livesay returns to her earlier strength, the love-poem. New Poems (1955) contains the fullest development of the woman-as-land topos to be found in her work. The statement is apparently simple and stark and very strong: "Men prefer an island....But I am mainland" ("Other" CP 220). "I am mainland" moves well beyond association and simile (see the discussion, above, of Livesay's early love poetry) to metaphoric identification: the argument by figure is becoming more direct. Not only is woman = mainland, but man's idea(l) of woman is woman = island. This is the core of a poem (with its unstated but completely obvious conflict) which augments the tenor (man's ideal of woman versus woman's ideal of woman) of the metaphor by offering further explicatory or alternative vehicles. Thus, man prefers woman-as-road or -as-shell circling in on itself. Woman, however, ranges across the continent, sleeps everywhere, inhabits all times and places, travels all roads without end, and, indeed, is "A place where none shall trespass / None possess: / A mainland mastered / From its inaccess." Prairie, of course, is not neglected in this vision of woman-as-place: the mainland includes the sage, the cactus hill, and the furrowed prairie field. But the significance of the figure lies less in its details than in what it argues: for <woman,mainland> and <mainland,place> suggest <woman,place>, and if we recall that <place,topos>

and <topos,rhetoric>, then we may conclude <woman,rhetoric>.

This is hardly a new observation. Chaucer's Wife of Bath, for example, plays the game of rhetoric much better than she plays the game of love; and Renaissance iconography consistently portrays Eloquence as a fully armed or ornately clothed female (Truth, by contrast, is either naked or simply dressed in white), or as a Hercules leading his hearers by fine chains passing from his lips to their ears (John Steadman The Hill and the Labyrinth 1984 136 ff.). The implication would seem to be that woman is rhetorica, man is rhetor; or, in terminology as ancient as rhetoric itself, there is ars docens (theory) and there is ars utens (practice). This makes theory female and practice male, a healthy, traditional counter to those contemporary attitudes which take the opposite position. It may be argued that the traditional representation of rhetoric as female is itself a male view; but, while this is undoubtedly true, it is also indisputable that Livesay, a woman and a feminist, adopts the topos <woman,land> as her trademark and generalizes this topos to <woman,place>. The tradition of rhetoric (which, insofar as it relates to poetry, also informs Livesay's poetics) provides the topoi <place,topos> and <topos,rhetoric>, and these two suggest the conclusion <woman,rhetoric>. This latter topos is part of what is meant by "Livesay's female rhetoric" (above).

Selected Poems (1956) provides several minor instances

of the prairie topos, but it is marked most strongly by an emerging and increasingly overt feminism (see, for example, the heavily ironic "Hymn to Man" CP 227) which reaches its fuller flowering in The Unquiet Bed (1967). "Ballad of Me" (CP 265) is both autobiographical and severely critical of the (male) world's reception of the (female) poet ("No one remembers Dorothy / was ever here"). "Sunfast" (286) opposes a male sun to a female, green world: "I am one / with rolling animal life / legs scissoring / the sun." The title poem (292) asserts flatly that "The woman I am / is not what you see / move over love / make room for me," inviting comparison with the hint of narcissistic love in "Other" ("The country I caress" is the woman herself, for she has asserted she is "mainland"). Finally, overt sexuality, heightened in poems such as "The Touching" (297), measures an intensified dissatisfaction with the male lover seen in "Notations of Love" (302).

Dissatisfaction is replaced by frustration in Plainsongs (1971). A note informs us that plainsong is "vocal music composed in medieval modes and in free rhythm ... and sung in unison," though there is little of medieval modality (as in the Gregorian chant) and much of free rhythm in this book. The deeper significance of the title, as established by the poems, is in the association of plain with plaint and place (prairie). This book, usually considered one of Livesay's best (Davey in Toye 1983), is,

in the first instance, a (female) lover's complaint in which, secondly, a series of figures struggle to become fully realized topoi of the form <woman,place>. The male lover is figured primarily as day or sun; the female is associated with flora, fauna, and earth ("At Dawn" CP 316, "Dream" 318, "Auguries" 319, "Con Sequences" 321, "The Eaters" 323). A significant absence is the topos of the form <prairie, Dionysus>, figured in the earlier poetry by the crow. There are birds aplenty, of course, but the absence is pointedly made in at least one poem: in "Sorcery" (318), the speaker asks the "engineer of spring" to "magic" her "from scarecrow into girl again." The dominance of the male lover who says "no" in "Auguries" and who "releases" the woman in "Another Journey" (326) is finally broken in "The Operation" (328), undoubtedly the most significant poem in the collection. Love--at least of the kind represented by "but you / were ever again there / over me lord / over me cutting me open again"-- is figured as a disease which is cured only when the narrator herself finishes the "operation" which her lover/surgeon has begun by quartering herself:

I decide to complete the operation
 tear myself into four quarters
 scatter the pieces
 north
 a crystal city of ice
 arching up stretching out daily
 dazedly
 into uncoiling
 animal sun--
 another kingdom.

Evidently, full health is a long way off: the poem ends with the cry "O let me grow / and push / upright! / ever aware of height / and the cry / to reach a dazzled strangeness / sun-pierced sky," in which the woman is still a plant trying to reach the sun. A somewhat fuller recovery is found in the revised and extended version of Plainsongs (1971): "Heritage" (CP 348) presents a speaker who identifies herself with her father, a kind of androgynous wholeness found also in "De-Evolution" (346).

The Collected Poems concludes with "Disasters of the Sun" (355), a long poem on sexuality and aging. Seven "disasters" are presented, not all catastrophic, all but one figuring the sun as a dominant male principle: (1) the sun defines the female speaker; (2) "The world is round / it is an arm" but "bright between our bones / shines the invisible sun"; (3) the "look" of a "calm" man at an airport reduces the speaker to wordlessness and fumbling, is "a soft bomb / behind [her] eyes"; (4) the hands of the aging speaker "are knotted bones / whitening in the sun"; (5) a sunflower that dares to stand up to the sun dies; (6) the northern sun, both grower and destroyer, is "most killing" and "no goodfather / but tyrannical king." The speaker responds to this sixth disaster ("all I want now / is to grope for those blunt / moon scissors") by emasculating the sun: (7) "When the black sun's gone down," the speaker asks to be connected

underground (roots, water), and asserts that the loveliest man is "he with moon-wand / who witches water." (Again, this reading differs radically from Denham 1987 31-2).

The figures in these poems therefore regress from the assertiveness of the <woman,land> topos of "Other" and return to the partial expression of the earlier love-poems: in other words, woman is again associated only with parts of the land, and the dominance of the (male) sun is established. Of course, by synecdoche, the part may represent the whole, but once an extremely powerful metaphoric identification (woman-as-mainland) has been made, anything less is in fact less. At the same time, rhetorical hints of a new wholeness appear. Though Livesay's "feminism" continues unabated after its emergence in the mid-fifties, her female rhetoric is changing, measured by a retreat from the central figure of that rhetoric. Livesay recovers power in Ice Age (1975), rhetorically speaking, by changing topoi completely: land is replaced by ice and woman becomes a smelter.

Much of the power of a topos derives from its ability to condense a whole range of meanings and associations into one particularly striking figure: thus, <woman,land> includes lesser figures such as <woman, flower>, <woman,prairie>, and <woman,not-island>. At the same time, the function par excellence of a topos is to carry an argument: thus, <woman,land> is a natural consequent of the

antecedent figures it includes, as well as a natural antecedent for <land,place> and the figures suggested by rhetorical tradition--<place,topos>, <topos,rhetoric>--with their own consequent, <woman,rhetoric>. An isolated instance of a topos, in other words, has almost no rhetorical significance; a topos demands and presupposes an appropriate context. "I am mainland," as has been shown, is such a figure for Livesay's poetry of the fifties and sixties; so is "ice age" for the poetry of the seventies.

"Ice age" is the vehicle of a metaphor one of whose tenors is our collective and immediate future (title poem Ice Age 70). This poem, written well before the advent of the current theory of "nuclear winter," clearly foreshadows it and echoes a consequent of the earlier "cold war." Within the range of its signification, therefore, falls the threat of nuclear annihilation. The cause of this threat is male:

man tortures his prey
 given sun's energy
 and fire's blaze
 he has ripped away
 leaf
 bird
 flower
 is moving to destroy
 the still centre
 heart's power.

Man here is not the gender-free, collective noun signifying "all of us": man has the power of the sun, which, we have seen, is male both traditionally and in Livesay's poetry. The poem only sharpens this critique of maleness by its ending in metonymic (and ironic) generalization:

Now who among us
 will lift a finger
 to declare I am of God, good?
 Who among us
 dares to be righteous?

God, it hardly needs to be said, is the sun, is male. The overwhelming critique of maleness is nicely pointed by the poem on the facing page which specifies the male's failure to "recognize," "yield to," and unleash the female's creative power ("The Old Bawd" 71).

To discover the woman's role in (preventing) the coming ice-age, one must begin at the beginning--for the title poem, with its serious indictment of the male, is strategically and appropriately placed very near the end of the book. Woman's role is implicit in the very first poem, "Why We Are Here" (13). Some lesser reasons are given first--because we have "a third ear [not eye]," because we are "women / open." A deeper reason (signalled by the poet's syntax) follows:

But some of us are here
 to say lie down
children of men
 lie down on the stiff brown stubble
 lie down at noon the ice
 melting to puddles
 lie down at noon
 on hard soil
 singing with underground
 water
 lie down
 and let our hands bear you as rivers
 to the sea's room.

This highly figured version of the sexual act ("lie down" is obvious, "stiff brown stubble" is pubic hair, "ice melting

to puddles" is erection followed by ejaculation and tumescence, "underground water" and "the sea's room" are female excretions and the vagina, and so on) yields the equations man = ice, woman = earth + water (river and sea). The final stanza, moreover, implies that in the sexual act (repeated, often at noon) man is reborn of woman: "...in the small womb / lies all the lightning" tells us that lightning, traditionally associated with the visitation of the male god upon the earthly female and therefore the sign of divinity as well as inspiration, is perhaps female in origin.

Not only is man the potential cause of the coming ice-age, he is "rowing with all his might / towards the ICE" ("Unexpected Guests" 16). The woman, on the other hand, has one thing to offer to these "indifferent gods" who would destroy even "the Arctic's icy shape"--"this small / cradled baby / ... / [who] invites the universe / to be plain human" ("Five Months Young" 31). A positive version of ice seems to be snow (see "Winter Ascendant" 52 and "Whitepiece" 61), associated in both poems with children. The final poem, "The Survivor" (74), confronts the narrator with the image of her own death, appropriately an ice-woman whom the narrator finally melts and eats, only to discover herself freezing and being eaten in turn--"the body of the woman I ate / moves over me / her mouth / devours my mouth."

For Livesay, as for many others, the child is a multi-

valent symbol. Denham (1987 26-8) points out that the child symbolizes such possibilities as imagination, renewal, and bondage (both to and of the adult). Even a cursory count reveals that Livesay has written literally dozens of poems in which the child figures significantly, from the rather celebratory "Serenade for Strings" (CP 132), through the deeply troubled "Godmother" (205), to the wise old "Grandmother" (Ice Age 33). On the whole, the child is the measure of the life of woman--once a child herself ("Ballad of Me" CP 265); then a wife (Plainsongs); always a mother to the race (Ice Age); and finally a child, again, in old age (Part 3 The Phases of Love 1983). As Livesay says, "I am the sybil's voice / crying for knowledge: / O do not put me down" ("The Sybil" Part 3 Phases).

This collection and the earlier The Woman I Am (1977) represent rather clearly a reconsideration of ongoing concerns. Woman collects published poems, Phases unpublished, and both provide a psychic chronology of the poet. Part 3 of Phases (unpaginated), "Voices of Women," moves toward tautology in its introduction of an apparently new topos <woman,woman>. Yet, this topos has been implicit in the poet's rhetoric from the beginning (see above for hints of self-love), as Banting's discussion of Livesay's life-long search for a female language suggests (1984). A relatively early poem, "On Looking into Henry Moore" (1956 CP 236), makes self-sufficiency a distinct possibility (see

Denham 1987 28-29):

when I have found
 Passivity in fire
 And fire in stone
 Female and male
 I'll rise alone
 Self-extending and alone.

Given the topos <woman,earth>, a line such as "The earth is my lover" ("Confession" Part 1 "Adolescence" Phases) carries its own implications. "Self-Portrait: The Androgyne" (Part 4) presents not an hermaphroditic figure but a female with a fully developed animus; "The Secret Doctrine of Women" is to "share and divide"; and "Dawnings" has a narrator waiting "for the tender fingers / of the woman sun." In Feeling the Worlds (1984), lesbian love is implicit in at least two poems. "Towards a Love Poem" (34) is addressed to "my sister / surrogate daughter" who "elected to know me / after reading my poems":

O early morning listener
 lover explorer
 who places the affirming kiss
 on my vulva
 catch as catch can
 love in flight weightless.

"Arms and the Woman" (35), a fine inversion of Virgil in its title, is self-explanatory:

My hand within you
 yours in me
 by these crossed swords
 we make a peace
 not of this world
 song without words.

The chronological development of Livesay's rhetoric, then, is seen in a sequence of topoi:

- (1) <woman,x>, where x belongs to land;
- (2) <woman,land>;
- (3) <woman,rhetoric>;
- (4) <woman,ice-melter>;
- (5) <woman,woman>.

That this development follows its own strict logic is readily apparent: the second terms of these topoi constitute a sequence of metaphoric vehicles in the form of a curve (part of land, land, [place], [topos], rhetoric, ice-melter, woman) which reaches from woman to herself. Ultimately, such a circle argues that poetry and language are essentially self-referential, that the triad (ethos/logos/pathos) on which rhetoric is based collapses at least insofar as speaker (ethos) and audience (pathos) are supposedly separated from each other by logos. The female rhetoric of the poems, in other words, reaches far beyond its immediate subject (love) to an argument about language and poetry. The "other" is the "self," and logos (poetry) is the trace of a journey toward that insight which is also death ("The Survivor" Ice Age 75).

2.3 Miriam Waddington's Transformational Rhetoric

If Waddington were interviewed by Albert Moritz today, she would probably not say "I don't have the place in Canadian literature that I think I deserve" (Books in Canada (May 1982): 8); or, if she did, she would politely but emphatically be shown Peter Stevens's more recent study (1984). For Waddington has, until very recently, been better served by the literary establishment than Livesay, who could say only two years ago that she was "a popular poet but not completely accepted by the Establishment" (Banting and Gunnars Prairie Fire 7.3 (Autumn 1986):12). But Waddington was surely wrong about her reasons--"I'm a Jew, a woman, and I don't write out of the Christian tradition" (Moritz 8). Until Stevens's work appeared, however, she might have legitimately claimed that she was not accepted because she was too overtly rhetorical at a time when rhetoric was simply a bad word in Canadian criticism.

This is not to say that Stevens studies her rhetoric, however, though he does come close to doing that. Stevens isolates two critical aspects of Waddington's works--its "lining" [sic] and its ambivalent "directness"--and goes to considerable lengths to reconcile these two with a notion of "a swaying form" which can express "moments of clarity and hope in the encroaching darkness" (14). His commentary on the line (14-20) is, as he admits, "straining to see the

effect" (19), but the basic point--that Waddington's line has a rhetorical function--is well-taken even if it is never stated openly. According to Stevens, the swaying form is perfectly suited to a thematic tension (which he prefers to call "paradox") in Waddington's works, a tension that manifests itself in binary oppositions like subjective/objective, innocence/experience, loss/recovery, bright/dark, hope/despair, unity/chaos, and so on (20-25). Once he is done with this demonstration (whose chief defect is that the notion of "swaying form" is never clearly defined), Stevens turns to the role of the prairie (especially the prairie city) in her poetry (26-30), a treatment of the less-than-excellent "social poetry" (30-35), a discussion of the portraits (35-38), and ends with a full study of the love poetry (39-49). It is an altogether decent and commendable study of a major prairie poet.

Stevens attempts to remedy a defect of Waddington criticism prior to 1983, namely, that it deals almost exclusively with the form rather than the content of her work (11). His own treatment nevertheless separates form from content once again: his discussions of the line, of the binary structure of her themes, of the role of prairie, and of the "metaphysical" nature of the love poetry overwhelm his sensitivity to Waddington's major theme, transformation. At the very least, such a response to the poetry and its criticism suggests that the version of the form/content

dichotomy that Stevens is using may not be appropriate to Waddington's poetry, or that the notions of "voice" and "swaying form" may belong to the category of "eclectic" criticism castigated by Waddington herself and quoted approvingly by Stevens (10). Perhaps form and content themselves are not at fault at all--perhaps it is the neglect of a long and venerable tradition that is the problem, a tradition that offers a full and flexible notion of manner and matter, verborum et rerum, and within which the dichotomy is articulated, explored, and developed in a dynamic way. The crux of that tradition is the notion of *topos*, and Waddington (if not her critics) seems to be fully aware of its role in the invention of form as well as content.

Of course Waddington was not fully aware of the tradition when she began writing and publishing (Green World 1945), but her practice may be discussed using that tradition--as rhetors have stressed since at least Cicero, art follows actual practice. With an instinct as unswaying as Livesay's (or Page's), Waddington begins with the colour green, which is to say that she begins with (a colour of) rhetoric. In "Green World One," the narrator is cupped by a "green world" which shapes her in "green rhythms," expanding "under the intensely golden point of the sun" to uncup her "into a large and windy space" (Driving Home 1972 57). The terrain is familiar: the cup is the symbol par excellence of

woman, green represents burgeoning female sexuality, the sun is pointedly male, and we are in the presence of a standard rhetorical device (symbolism verging on emblemism). In Waddington's work, however, colour is a figure of rhetoric itself, which persists throughout her work and points to the larger "sister arts" topos traditionally part of rhetoric. All poets of course use words naming the colours, just as all poets use images (words referring to the visual sense): but there is a difference between the phrase "a red wheelbarrow" and the phrase "a wheelbarrow coloured red," a difference called rhetorical pointing. Ut pictura poeisis, we might say, is an important part of Waddington's rhetoric, and in that part the topos prairie has a place.

The topos colour, and, more generally, the ut pictura poeisis tradition, which may be traced through Waddington's career, culminates in a remarkable poem, "Primary Colours" (The Visitants 1981 19). This poem directly employs the equations red = birth, blue = living, yellow = death, in a three-part arrangement of elaboration. Colour symbolism approaching emblemism is traditional (see Cirlot 50-57, which is the basis for what follows), and Waddington's use of it is interesting chiefly because it is so overtly a rhetorical ploy. The ascending alchemical order of the colours is {yellow, blue, green, black, white, red, gold}: Waddington's order, {red, blue, yellow}, suggests that life is a cycle descending to a new beginning rather than

ascending to an ending in light and illumination. Similarly, the role assigned to blue differs slightly from the tradition: it is usually a colour of equilibrium--between white and black--or a colour of thought, distance, and coldness (blue/sky/the gods), rather than a colour of life. In the "blue" section of the poem, striking use is made of the colour orange (usually a figure of violent emotion): speaking of writing, the poet says "compose an orange song / and circle it / with canticles of blue." Here, in a figure, is a most concise statement of Waddington's personal poetics rendered elsewhere in prose:

From my own experience as a poet I believe that an artist's biography is supplementary to his work. He arranges his life in the best way possible but since factual reality is the medium in which he works, he is constantly transforming it and refreshing it through language. It is the transformed, newly created reality which counts, and not the one that just happens to happen (A. M. Klein 1970 2).

The "orange song" represents what William Carlos Williams called the "anarchical phase" of writing, when the immediacy and emotion of archetypal experience spills onto the page; but the transformation of experience into poetry is not completed ("circle[d]") until experience ("orange") is subjected to thought ("blue") which yields up the linguistic structure called a poem ("canticle")-- or, as Williams put it, when the writing passes through "the field of intelligence" ("How to Write" 1936 rpt. New Directions 50 1986 36-39). Furthermore, orange is a secondary colour

composed of red (being born) and yellow (dying).

The "yellow" section of the poem brings to the surface a submerged bird motif that becomes very important in Waddington's most recent poems (see below):

Yellow,
 who are you
 yellow?
 Tuwhit tuwhoo
 I am I and
 you are you.

The owl has been present all along--in the flight imagery of the "red" section and in the "hundred owlsh / eyes" of the "blue" section--but now it answers the speaker's question with the owlsh wisdom of tautology.

There is little profound or original argument in this poem; but there is an accomplished recreation of the ageless riddle of life posed to Oedipus by the Sphinx (what crawls at morn, walks on two legs at noon, and totters on three at night?). Oedipus's answer (man) argues "That's life--crawl, walk, totter." Waddington reworks the riddle through three colours (red, blue, yellow) to the same answer: "That's life--be born, live, die." Nevertheless, the poem is central to Waddington's work because it is the clearest instance of her rhetorical technique. To "colour" in rhetorical terms is to "figure"; when that figure is colour itself (and it might have been any other figure), then one of the terms in the topos employed becomes "rhetoric"; and the poem's argument becomes an argument about the nature of poetry. In this case, that argument may be summarized readily enough:

- (1) <life,(birth,living,death)>;
- (2) <(birth,living,death),colour>;
- (3) <colour,rhetoric>;
- (4) <life,rhetoric>.

The poem, we might note, could equally well have been called "primary rhetoric," for the cycle of life figured by the colours is also the cycle of rhetorical invention in the poem. As Waddington herself notes, such invention is transformational (1970 2).

In "Primary Colours," as in many intervening poems, the rhetorical pointing occurs very strongly in the title. Earlier examples include "Prairie Thoughts in a Museum," "Falling Figure," "Pictures in a Window," "Looking at Paintings" (The Glass Trumpet 1966); "A Drawing by Ronald Bloor," "Icons" (Say Yes 1969); "A Landscape of John Sutherland," "In Small Towns" (new in Driving Home 1972). Later examples are "Little Prairie Pictures," "Grand Manan Sketches," and the various portraits and profiles (The Price of Gold 1976). In other poems, the pointing is absent from the title but the topos is present in the poem, for example, as in "In Small Towns" (Driving Home) and "Prairie" (The Visitants). As a group, all these poems are a straightforward application of ut pictura poesis. Since Gotthold Lessing's nineteenth-century analysis ("Laocoon"), poetics has held this equation in disregard on the grounds that visual art is spatial whereas verbal art is temporal; but the same poetics has continued to employ mimetic techniques spatial as well as temporal nevertheless. It has

been said that Waddington's "imagery is intense and visual" (Toye 1983 817): the redundancy (is "imagery" not necessarily "visual"?) is probably unintentional, critical terminology being what it is, but it is significant on rhetorical grounds (a "visual" image corresponding to rhetorical pointing, as when the word "colour" occurs in a poem using the names of colours).

Of some particular interest for this study are those poems in this group in which "prairie" occurs as part of the poet's pictorial response to a picture. "Prairie Thoughts in a Museum" (The Glass Trumpet 1966 38) situates a speaker in a big-city gallery viewing both a painting and the people in the gallery. The speaker notes that the picture, apparently an abstract painting of a landscape, does not suggest prairie:

never the last sun in September
falling through the dusty film
of window over desk never the
cries of children at recess across
the cleft valley this would be
too ordinary this would be like
a line straight as the crow flies.

In the gallery of the "rational / mechanical" city, the prairie seems pointless and unreal--"what if the wild sun- / flowers still bloom in the scraggly field / at the bus stop?" Similarly, in "A Drawing by Ronald Bloor" (Say Yes 1969 62) the artist's image, rendered repeatedly by the phrase "your cage of cells," evokes the poet's more or less prairie images of herons and seagulls, large spaces of air

and sun, a world devastated by lightning and full of dead roads.

If there is something mechanical about these two poems, it is perhaps their transparent application of the tradition of ekphrasis (the verbal rendition of the state induced by the contemplation of a work of visual art) in rigidly mimetic terms (of course, ekphrasis is not limited to the prairie poems). More interesting are those poems in which an experience or thought or mood, not itself pictorial, is rendered in pictorial terms. "In Small Towns" (DH 38) recalls a momentous meeting ("your crossing / my threshold") in several painterly images. The meeting was "Unreal as the / shifting fields of winter":

you came very
 imaginative light
 and delicate, fitful;
 not at all like
 those prairie towns
 we lived in or maybe
 yes, delicate like them
 in a landscape of ink
 and flat paper
 all those fastidious
 township plans and
 lot surveys penned
 through with paths
 leading to the very edge
 of maps dwindling
 into distant archives.

(Maps figure also in "The Glass Trumpet," "Canadians," "Provincial," and "The Transplanted: Second Generation" DH 152, 175, 42, 63.) Even more pointedly, the prairie experience in "Little Prairie Pictures" (The Price of Gold 1976 ll) is presented in seven images moving the viewer

steadily from the synesthetic (1) through the abstract (2, 3) and into the increasingly anthropomorphic ("we" occurs in 4, "I" in 7). And "Prairie" (The Visitants 1981 27) renders the prairie in two images based on the absence of an expected effect ("shadows") in the presence of strong light. Once again, it is hardly noteworthy that a poet renders place through images: what makes these poems interesting is that the particular place (prairie) is rendered by images which emphasize their painterly aspects. Thus, the prairie towns are located in a landscape of ink, pens, paper, and maps. Thus, the koan-like synesthesia includes "the colour / of quiet." Thus, chiaroscuro is impossible on the prairie and shadows must be invented. And in "Icons" (DH 166), an experience or thought or mood, not itself pictorial, is figured by using photographs of past experiences, thoughts, or moods.

To sum up this aspect of Waddington's rhetoric, we may note that the simple sequence of topoi,

<prairie,colour>,
 <colour,pictura>,
 <pictura,poesis>,
 <prairie,poesis>,

represents not so much an argument as a statement of method (and the remark applies also to Waddington's use of colours). That method, as Waddington noted in 1970, is transformational: experience is transformed into poetry in such a way as to emphasize a method which is based on topoi of transformation. The "content" (transformation) is the

"form" (transformational), and the topoi employed describe both Waddington's matter and her manner.

To see this, consider a specific example. "Transformations" (DH 9) explicitly transforms personal history into a prairie myth of coming home to place. The narrator asserts (rhetorically, as we shall see) that "the blood of [her] ancestors" has died in her, and she cites the evidence: she has "forsaken the steppes / of Russia for the prairies / of Winnipeg"; now she "love[s] only St. Boniface" and wants to "spend [her] life / in Gimli." She will "come home" only when Henry Hudson does, and then "the blood of [her] ancestors / will flower on Mennonite bushes." The figures of transformation are synesthesia (which we have met before) and metaphor: listening to "the roar of emptiness," and looking for the music of rainbow-skinned fishes" are synesthetic as well as metaphoric, and the "blood...[that] flower[s]" is a metaphor distinctly recalling the myths and the method of Metamorphoses.

Given, then, grounds that suggest that transformation informs matter and manner, one might reconsider the function of myth in Waddington's work: "Everyone has one or two myths that run through [her] life, but I think they should remain secret" (Moritz 7). This is a fond wish which overlooks the tendency of myth (in the sense of archetype, and Waddington is certainly not referring to mythological allusions) to assert itself in the literary work willy-nilly (Hinz and

Teunissen). Once the nature of the beast is understood, he leaps up from almost every page: transformation is after all the ur-myth behind every myth retold by Ovid, and it is the topos on which Waddington's poetry is built. The colours of rhetoric as well as specific myths of transformation are instances of a transformation topos which "run[s] through [Waddington's literary] life" and will not "remain secret."

For an early example, we need to recall only "Green World One": the cup of the green world is transformed by the sun into the un-cup of a large, windy space. Perhaps the most outstanding example is "The Cave" (The Price of Gold 109), a poem that has been called "murky" with respect to its central idea (Stevens 25). This poem presents "the cave / of green light / and water" which contains the opposites self/other, father/mother, and sister/brother (Part 1). Here, too, are the "traces," the "watery faces," of evolution (dragonfly, fish) illuminated by history, by the "fire / of father and mother / by the ashes of self / by the birth of the other"--but all these are "shadows" (Part 2). The cave, where the apparent oppositions of Part 1 are dissolved, is "the heart of the earth," the source as well as the end of the ceaseless flow of all things (Part 3). The widening light, originating from "a crack in the darkness," and the quickening pulse of the water reveal the writing hand that has summoned from the cave of light and water the "shadowy figures / of those who come after" (Part 4).

Both light and water function as figures of transformation. Light transforms fundamental processes (for example, the flowing waters of the cave) into shadows (ironic and written versions of illumination), whereas water transforms the shadows (for example, the oppositions) into a cycle of fundamental processes. Water, furthermore, is the very possibility of transformation: "The waters, in short, symbolize the universal congress of possibilities, the fons et origo, which precedes all form and all creation" (Cirlot 345); water is female, the unconscious, and the most transitional of all the elements (345-7). The cave, a symbol of the mother (Erich Neumann The Great Mother 44a Schema 2), is "of water and light," and even the light is the colour of water (green). If <water,x> denotes water-as-symbol, then among its values is "transformation," an element in a growing complexity of symbols including <water,cave>, <cave,mother>, and ending in the tautology <water,water> (for the mother is the "bringer of water"). As Peirce noted, a symbol ultimately becomes a symbol of itself (2.230).

A quick check of Waddington's poems indicates the extent of her use of water as a symbol of transformation:

- (1) the "long ocean flowings" of "Green World One";
- (2) the "bitter waters" (tears) of "Miriam" which "will melt / the world of desert stone" ("Desert Stone" DH 138);
- (3) "snow" as water in stasis ("Understanding Snow" Say Yes 1);

(4) "Rivers" of change (The Price of Gold 15);

(5) the liquid imagery of "The Milk of the Mothers," including "syrops of the dead," "green and pulsing" ashes, "the white blood / of electricity," as well as the "thin' and "shrieking" milk of the mothers (The Visitants 14).

None of these poems achieves quite the fullness of transformation as theme and method that is found in "The Cave"; they are cited to support the argument that the role of transformation in Waddington's work is central and pervasive. But the mode of transformation need not always be water symbolism, and if modes such as "music" and "writing" are considered, further support is readily marshalled.

The title poem of Waddington's 1966 collection, The Glass Trumpet (DH 152), is an important example of the first. The narrator represents herself as "an empty carton" ready to be run over by a car, or as a flimsy "frame for / / the map of manitoba or any / birthplace" ready to be stuffed with death. Both these reductions are "one way of return- / ing to earth" a host of creatures emblematic of the self: "lost" Icelandic eagles, "tired" Hebrew squirrels, and above all the people of Gimli ("my / love-place")--cottage dwellers, sinners, wanderers (Part 1). These creatures are presently "all outside the map," that is, alienated from the speaker, but they will some day provide both the "sand" out of which a glass trumpet will be fashioned and the "breath" with which to "blow" it in a song of resurrection of eagles

nesting, squirrels sleeping, purified wells, and a prairie alive with buffalo (Part 2). In fact, the glass trumpet is already at hand: presently, it "blows no miracles" but "sings the last / of death and loss / and the farthest / rim revealed" of the narrator's night of despair: "it tells / of maps and sand / and people number- / less"; it "tells" (prophesies?) "of our blind sick- / ness healed," holding us "open-eyed / in pure transparency" (Part 3). The glass trumpet, in other words, is both an effect and an instrument of a continuing transformation and figures, therefore, both the theme (death continuously transformed into life) and the method of transformation (by song, that is, poetry). Like the water of "The Cave," the glass trumpet is the locus of a complex symbolical argument, <trumpet,x>. The role of the poet, by contrast, is reduced to being a kind of music-stand, a "frame" for the "map" about which the trumpet "tells"; the trumpet seems to "blow" poetry all by itself, though a generalized "breath" comes to the still-living from the already-dead (see also "Trumpets" The Price of Gold 71).

The figure is not entirely successful, partly because the player is separated from her instrument (in the first part of the poem), partly because musicality as such is not exploited (only instrumentality is) in this poem or in Waddington's poetry generally. The very jumpy and lively syntax of "The Mile Runner" and "Falling Figures" (The Glass Trumpet 57, 76), repetitions of various sorts in poems like

"On My Birthday" (50), and the general trope of poetry-as-song ("Goodbye Song" 36)--all these draw on surface analogies between poetry and music (Vickers 1984). Rhetoricians call these figures "easy" rather than "difficult," but deeper analogies between the two art forms are indeed possible: every figure may also be an argument (see the survey, "Music and Poetry" Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry).

Consider, for example, two musical forms--the fugue and the sonata (The New Grove's Dictionary 7:9-21 and 17:479-96). The fugue, and the word is derived from fuga per canon (literally, "flight of canons"), is a development by repetition, counterpoint, variation, et cetera, which returns to itself. The sonata is a musical version of the Hegelian dialectic: thesis, antithesis, and resolution. The forms immediately suggest relations to two modes of poetry, the Classical (fugue) and the Romantic (sonata), and, since the masters of these musical forms are, respectively, Bach and Beethoven, the suggestion is supported by historical developments. More particularly, the fugue and the sonata are rhetorical arguments or topoi, places writ large, which may be adapted to a variety of particular themes or subjects. The fugue, since it is a flight of canons, and since a canon is a reflection of (or on) itself, courts self-referentiality and paradox. The sonata, on the other hand, is a great attempt to blunt the paradox implicit in

opposition by positing some resolution. The fugue is always also "about" itself, whereas the sonata is usually chiefly "about" the Other.

What does the figure of the glass trumpet argue? The obvious answer is transformation, for the trumpet figures both this theme and a method of delivering it. But transformation may be either sonotal or fugal, and the poem's development of the "glass trumpet" figure itself is decidedly fugal. The trumpet emerges from the poem (Part 2) by a series of repetitions (of sand, breath, blows, glass), variations, and counterpoints (transparency is a variant of and counterpoint to glass, death and life are contrapuntal, and so on). On the other hand, the theme embodied in the motif of resurrection, which is also a transformation, is sonotal, as both the reference to Gabriel and the poem's three-part structure reveal. A fugal argument for the fitness of the trumpet as a mode of delivering a theme of transformation clashes with a sonotal transformation-as-resurrection motif. This discrepancy could have been avoided: the fugal development of the instrument of delivery for a sonotal theme represents a failure to exploit fully the rhetoric of music in poetry. Even a poem such as "Bulgarian Suite" (The Visitants 75), which has the appropriate formal appearance, fails to use or exploit fully the inherent argument of the suite (there is no discernible variation in either rhythm or mood in the sequence).

When Waddington uses figures of writing to deliver themes of transformation, she is more successful, partly because (like most writers) she probably knows writing better than she knows music, partly because any figurative use of writing is both an example of and an argument for the natural reflexivity of language with which the writer is intimate. The figure of a musical instrument does not readily serve both of these functions simultaneously, as the example of "The Glass Trumpet" demonstrates. "Canadians" (DH 175), by contrast, offers geese, fish, Eskimo faces, girl-guide cookies, and so on, as "our signatures". That is, though we "look / like a geography," we are clearly alive, even though we may wonder sometimes whether we are "real" or "invented," and, if the latter, by whom (the possibilities include "those / amateur map-makers / our Fathers / of Confederation"). The poem argues for the priority of a primitive, almost pictographic language over the abstract language of maps. "Looking for Strawberries in June" (Say Yes 28) figures the writer's continuing search for the right words as a search for strawberries, a search in which one finds oneself always in an alien landscape where no strawberries are to be found. As a version of the inexpressibility topos this poem is interesting chiefly because it draws that topos through the familiar topos of landscape as language.

"The Wakened Wood" (36) evidently goes much farther.

An unidentified "you" is figured in wood: his chest is a sea of sailboats whose "wakened wood" turns into "flowers"; his shoulders are the "wooden pillars" of a Winnipeg verandah in winter; his back is as strong as the "wooden boats" of the Levitan. But he himself seems to be "Chekhov's baffled / mild glance" as he sat writing at his "cherrywood / desk"; he shines like "the wood / of the grand piano," makes designs like "the mosaic / of cut logs" which float downriver to become (mostly) matches; some logs, however, are turned into paper on which poems may eventually appear. Traditional rhetoric is strongly present. Waddington's blazon of the "you" in figures of wood is skilfully modulated from physical description through description of the mind to a figure of poetry which is also a figure of the body and mind of a country's emerging literature:

a few float
away later flower with
garlands and ring their
white bells in the
trilliumed valleys of
my country's spring.

Two of the new poems in Driving Home draw on aboriginal cultures for figures of writing. In "Signs" (10), the speaker sees the message in her beloved's face as "an Indian word / ...carved on / a 2000-year-old / glacial stone / in Manitoba." In "Totems" (48), she wants to carve "a new totem pole" out of the Manitoba maple and plant it on the prairie as a talisman. "Before I Go" (The Price of Gold 22) returns to landscape-as-language: the speaker "want[s] to... /

...invent / ... / a completely new language / giddy / as butterflies / burning / as prairie sunsets," but her words turn out to be only the same old flowers. A more specifically female language is posited in "Husbands" (57): in the context of the narrator's split personality (wife/woman), her tongue has turned from "termagent" into "queen of nothing." This (absent) language is not, however, developed with any great vigor: "Women" (80), after a history-in-brief of the emergence of women from "namelessness" and objectism, has them writing in a borrowed language--"we are carving our names / in time's forest of stone"--despite its assertion that women are now "the hand making the picture" and "the source of the waters / flowing back to the waters." Indeed, Waddington returns to a safer play on Edmund Waller's "Go lovely rose": "Celebrating Mavericks" (The Visitants 60) is an extended apostrophe addressed to "little words," enjoining them to collect and curb the mavericks ("those stranger-words") with rhetoric, to "invent" yet another garden-of-Eden of language, and to rise finally in a military apotheosis as "golden cipher[s] / in God's motorcade."

Generally speaking, then, the topos Waddington employs has the form <-, -> where the relation varies as it remains overtly transformational (painting metaphors, water symbolism, musical figures, figures based on writing). Since a number of these relations involve aspects of the prairie

as one term or another, the so-called prairie topos (as I have defined it) is subsumed into a larger place. This place might well have been called mythos, though I have preferred to use the rhetorical term transformation. Nevertheless, mythos itself delivers the theme of transformation in a substantial number of poems. One of these basic myths involves the pair <male,female> in a continuing transformation based on specific differences. In "Popular Geography" (PG 75), a light-hearted poem about the changes in North American cities, the province of Manitoba seems to emerge as a bastion of constancy:

everything
has changed, but Manitoba
oh Manitoba, you are still
a beautiful green grain
elevator storing the sunlight
and growing out of the black
earth.

In fact, two kinds of changes are contrasted--that of the city (negative) and that of the country (positive). The figure of Manitoba expresses the natural cycle of change in male/female terms: the green (female) elevator (male) grows out of the black earth (female, female); sunlight (male) is stored (female) within it. A similar use of the male/female pair occurs in "Legends" (18), where the male is figured by light, the female by dark; and the presence of the female within the male is figured in "Tallness and Darkness" (39) by making the male both tall and dark (in this poem the female is figured as ice and snow which are finally melted

by the male's darkness).

In many poems, the female principle seems at first glance to be passive and the male active. "Where the North Winds Live" (PG 107) presents the speaker's vision of the (female) city, "the transplanted / European village / ... /that became my / prairie city." In this city lived the (male) "north winds" which "whistled" her clean, "stripped" her bare, "bussed" her, and finally told her to move from "the transplanted / village of snow" to a "golden" never-never land of eternal summer. Waddington's female is "still / as a bird" in winter ("Certain Winter" Visitants 38); she was "born / in winter" but her "lovers were / all from autumn" and she now awaits "the true lover / ... / with his bow / and his arrow / dressed in the / green livery / of spring" ("Horoscopes" 40). "Past the Ice Age" (53) figures the female ("empty spaces" of snow, "ropes of night," and "laps of strawberries") as one who wants to live "just to hear / the new music / in everything."

This peculiarity of relation however is modified in one important way: though the male principle activates the female principle, the female is also present within the male. This has already been seen in "The Cave," "Tallness and Darkness," and "Popular Geography"; its converse is strongly figured in two recent poems about owls (The Structurist 23/24 (1983/1984): 19-20). The bird in Waddington's work is usually the female principle, the

colour gold is prominently male, and the "golden owl" situates maleness within femaleness in "a wonderful consoling image of stillness and permanence" (Structurist 18; see also my remarks on "Primary Colours," above). In "Aspects of Owls I" we glimpse the golden owls "asleep at the bottom / of very deep wells," waiting for "a pebble to fall" into the waters above them. The narrator, however, sees both the owl and what the owl sees: in particular, she sees the motion in the water induced by the falling pebble, a motion that "both announces / and delivers / its own birth / from the golden point / in an owl's golden / eye." The second owl poem, didactic where the first is symbolic, outlines the several functions of these owls: they are associated with the future, with the emotions, with writing (about both past and future), and with an uneasy sleep. The poem ends by both heightening and questioning the possibility that the owls will waken:

Somewhere perhaps
muffled rumours
and faint traces
of the golden eye
flicker
in the bottom of
an old well.

The topos operating in the first of these two poems is evidently transformational: the owl, in its wisdom and passivity, is female; within this female is the male golden eye of insight whose vision includes the penetration (male) of the pebble into the water (female) which results in a

movement that is both an announcement (male) and a delivery (female) of its birth.

In Waddington's hands, the ur-myth of "transformation" is an instrument of considerable subtlety and range. The binary, as a recognition of difference and a possibility of transformation, has enormous consequences for human thought and behaviour (Ong 1981 Chapter 1), to say nothing of its role in explicating the development of the psyche (The Great Mother). As "Driving Home" asserts, "Classical ESSO" and "bloodlit SHELL" are versions of the two principles, male and female, which inform all change, all personal, national, and cultural histories on the individual's journey to a "home" that is past, present, and future "forever" (DH 65). This myth is the message of "Those earth-stained voices / those murmurings in wood / those soundings and turnings / on the pathless prairie" (The Visitants title poem 65).

The course through Waddington's works by way of the topos of transformation comes to rest with the question that has divided the critics: what about her line? Its development has been outlined by these same critics as a movement from the traditional line in the early poetry, to the very short line with a nod to the prosody of William Carlos Williams in the poetry of the sixties and seventies, ending in a slight lengthening in the eighties (Stevens). Here is the "skinny" line (Jacobs 32) at its most extreme (reproduced in two columns):

Speak me
my images
your words
are earlier
they shout
in the morning
when I am
still asleep

slow to wake
at noon I hear
your voice
speaking my
images I wake
but I am not
me I am you
speaking my
images and

my words are
earlier they
shout in the
morning they
wake everyone
who is slow
to wake and
now I am you

speaking my
images and the
slow to wake
are all awake
they go out
in the world
they are not
afraid of
being awake
not afraid
of speaking
their images
in words that
are earlier
newer than
now louder
than morning

("How Each Becomes Another in the Early
World" Say Yes 32)

First, several observations about this line:

- (1) its immediate effect on the reader of the poem is visual;
- (2) the uniformity of lineation, as much as its shortness, is responsible for this effect;
- (3) the line is overwhelmingly phrasal (two-thirds of the lines in the above poem, for example, are syntactic phrases);
- (4) departures from phrasality invariably enhance the visual effect (that is, they seem to have been made to keep the line uniformly short);

(5) these departures from phrasality also undermine (but only temporarily) the expected (syntactical) effect.

Second, these rather obvious remarks (which apply to more poems than the one quoted--see Stevens (16-19)) lead to several less obvious and more contentious suggestions. Waddington's short line is evidently deliberate, which is to say rhetorical: it emphasizes visibility and destabilizes sense. But her line is also extremely rigid: in the books of the sixties, especially, there is almost no release from the vertical poem standing firmly erect on page after page after page of white space. The visual suggestion is that the short-line poem is a phallic symbol in a vaginal space, and the rhetoric of Waddington's line may be revealed in these two implications. The phallic poem (which is a function of the short line) is a technical manifestation (that is, a manifestation in versification) of the male principle operating within the female; the skinny poem may be seen as an icon of the animus in the female psyche.

Waddington's form is appropriate for her content. Her themes deal pervasively with transformation; the figures she uses are very often transformational. One of these themes is, and is delivered by, a male/female dichotomy in which the two terms interpenetrate one another, and the most graphic figure of this theme and its delivery is the distinctive poem in the Waddington canon.

2.4 The Rhetoric of Eli Mandel's Imagination

The poetics of Elias Wolf Mandel is succinctly summed up in a startling little poem in Stony Plain (1973):

Saskatchewan Surveyor
 at a correction line
 he reads the wind's grammar
 rhetoric falls from trees
 in a simple sentence of land
 a disappointed syntax

(Dreaming Backwards 1981 66)

This poem's figure is at once utterly traditional and fully contemporary; it is both a personal statement and a rebuke to prairie poets; its language is (like Dante's) a paradigm of the vernacular rather than a quotation from the vernacular; and the much-admired trap of authentic voice (into which Mandel's criticism sometimes but his poetry never falls) is neatly sprung to reveal its jaws of truth and lie.

The Saskatchewan surveyor is, of course, both literal surveyor and poet. The former figures the typical prairie landscape-poet who stops at the correction line (which itself literally denies the platitude of flatness) to notice the ever-present wind. But, and this is the import of the isolated singleton, "rhetoric falls from trees," and the poet's attention shifts now to a certain kind of prairie poetry. His judgement is severe: simple landscape-as-poetry

is disappointing. The poet's survey, in other words, yields a reading of typical prairie poetry, finds it wanting, and provides an alternative view of poetry. This alternative is the larger figure of the isolated stanza: a traditional figure for the poem, the leaf, is identified as rhetoric, and the poet is figured as a tree (presaging Newlove, see below). Of course the surveyor-poet reads and speaks a truth: the prairie is windy, it is flat. Of course this truth is a lie: the surveyor ignores the evidence of the correction line (which our poet notes), though he does stop at it; the surveyor doesn't see the trees (though our poet does) and therefore misses also the falling leaves. And there can be no question here of authenticity of voice: the poet's language is both simple (the diction of the people) and ornate (his tropes are metaphors whose vehicles are drawn from grammar). The poem's figure of thought is an opposition (not grammar, but rhetoric) represented in stanzaic arrangement, whose grammar is suppressed ("but" does not appear in the poem). Thus, the poem's argument--poetry is more than a grammar of landscape rendered by metaphors--is carefully delivered by a rhetorical device which includes both grammar and trope yet goes well beyond them.

Mandel's poem, in short, contains both the so-called "serious" and the so-called "rhetorical" stances: its style is both plain and grand, its language both simple and

ornate, its ethos both sincere and deceiving, its pathos emotional as well as intellectual. In Richard Lanham's fruitful terms, Mandel's persona is a bifurcated self that is both homo seriosus and homo rhetoricus, both truth-teller and liar (1976 Chapter 1 passim, and Mandel's "The Poet as Liar" Another Time 1977 15-24). His poetry will therefore continue to be misread by that reader who believes that the plain style, the sincere speaker, and the authentic prairie voice do not constitute a rhetorical stance. Rhetoric itself has always been perfectly clear on this point: Aristotle notes that "the writer must disguise his art and give the impression of speaking naturally and not artificially" (Rhetoric 1404b18); Nietzsche observes that rhetoric is a balance between the naked imitation of "naturalness" and the expression of the "purely artistic" (Blair "Lecture Notes on Rhetoric" 1874 115); and countless rhetors between and after these two support their contention. Yet, critics since Locke have persisted in equating the grand (defined most often by ornateness of figuration) with the rhetorical, and the remonstrances of a Genette that the plain is also a rhetorical style ("Nothing is more marked than this simplicity: it is the very figure, indeed the perfectly obligatory figure, of the sublime" "Figures" 48) have gone largely unheeded. This false equation reveals more than an unfamiliarity with the rhetorical tradition: it shows also that the Christian and especially Protestant ideology of the

plain style has so far not received the examination it deserves.

The response to Mandel's poetry provides a clear example of a criticism slowly finding its way to a more adequate understanding of the rhetorical tradition embodied in that poetry. In his introduction to Mandel's first publication (Trio 1954), Louis Dudek remarks that Mandel's "vigorous, rhetorical myth-making imagination" will cause readers some difficulty, words that turn out to be only too true. Ower (1969) complains that the poetry up to and including An Idiot Joy (1967) "seldom rises beyond a rhetorical utterance to the lyricism which is the mark of the fully integrated poetic sensibility" (150). By contrast, Mandel himself asserts that "Poetry is energy, poetry is delight, poetry is power" (Fee 1974 4), echoing the traditional adaptation of the functions of rhetoric to the definition of poetry in the works of rhetors from Quintilian and Horace through Sidney and Pope to moderns such as Pound. Cooley's early disappointment that Mandel's influences include several conflicting rhetorics culminates in the lament that "[h]e never really finds a vernacular voice" (1978 80). A Manitoba triumverate (Arnason, Cooley, and Enright) tries to get Mandel to admit that he is an "inventor" rather than a "process" poet as he claims (ECW 1980 70-73); Mandel counters their charges that his poems exhibit a "total absence of a vernacular voice" (73-74) and

that "the voice [in Out of Place] is a pose" (79) with the astonishing claim that a line like "the Hebrew puzzles me" is "so authentic" because it is an instance of the principle of "syntactical ambiguity" which he uses in composition (80). The same seminal "Prairie Poetry Issue" of ECW contains Stevens's application of Mandel's criticism to his poetry. Using Mandel's critical dichotomies (savage/civilized) and awareness of duplicity, Stevens finds that the poetry of Out of Place is unable to transcend the division which it tries to transform into a vision of wholeness (65-67). "Mandel the Prairie poet cannot escape Mandel the mythic poet" (67); "the Prairie eludes his grasp, for the poetry was already there" (69). This judgement claims that the poetry "falls short" (64) because it contains both the rhetorical and the serious stances without apology. Robert Kroetsch, introducing Dreaming Backwards (1981), is much closer to the mark: he identifies three characteristics of Mandel's poetry and poetic--it is a "radical" landscape poetry because it resists "the attraction of the landscape itself," its dominant ethos is "the double," and it therefore confronts "place" in a "profound, insistent" manner ("Preface" 9-12). Ann Munton (1983) follows this lead by studying the poetic "means" Mandel uses to write about "place" (especially Estevan) (73-79). But she continues to accept the unexamined notion (promulgated by Ricou 1976, among others) that Mandel's

poetry after 1970 is somehow a "new, open, and looser Prairie poetry" (73)--despite her own demonstration that Mandel's arsenal of technique includes practically the whole of classical rhetoric (see especially 76). Finally, Kamboureli (1984) argues convincingly that "language and place can [and do] become identical" in Out of Place (267). Though Kamboureli uses the word topos in an essentially rhetorical sense, she does not acknowledge her debt to her countryman and to the tradition he founded.

Evidently, most of Mandel's readers have read his criticism; too many of them, perhaps, have read and applied it rather uncritically. Even Mandel's oft-quoted remark--"it's important to connect my criticism with my poetry" (Arnason 1980 70)--uses the word connect rather pointedly, suggesting that the two be read together, not that one (criticism) be used to read the other (poetry). Indeed it is dangerous to apply the poet's criticism to the critic's poetry--as a closer look at both may readily demonstrate. In the first place, Mandel has some obvious critical obsessions. On the whole, the essays collected in Another Time (1977) reveal a preoccupation with Steiner's concept of language and its movement toward its implied opposite, silence; the essays in Family Romance (1986) reveal a preoccupation with Bloom's reading of Freud's reading of the Oedipus myth; and both sets of essays demonstrate a continuing obsession with the binary as a fundamental

structure. Not all these major fixations are found in Mandel's poetry (the Oedipal paradigm is largely absent), and those that do occur are modified in the process. In particular, the binaries that interest Mandel as a critic are not the same binaries that appear in the poetry: the critical binaries tend to function as dichotomies (for example, savage/civilized), whereas the poetic binaries tend to function as related pairs (for example, the double). Of course, the over-riding concern with the binary remains; but it is just such a shift in emphasis that Ower, for example, might have observed but does not.

In the second instance, Mandel's criticism has its blind spots. In reading Wittgenstein, for example, Mandel stops at the Tractatus notion of language (of what we cannot speak we must remain silent, AT 15) instead of going on to the Philosophical Investigations (language is a motivated game, not a strict calculus). Mandel's reading of Norman Brown suffers similarly: using Brown's notion of symbolism to argue that Steiner's silence is another kind of speech, Mandel insists that "the body of love" is the physicality of language (AT 39), yet Brown himself pointed out that it is a symbolical construct. Finally, Mandel argues that the Oedipal paradigm (son / father / mother = poet / tradition / land) does not fit regional writing (Family Romance 1986 11-27); yet his own examples (of mis-fit) and his own use of the paradigm to read several different regions show that it

does fit rather well. These blind spots reveal a critical tendency that is emphatically not found in his poetry: the tendency to fix a difference. The criticism also reveals a barely repressed desire to unfix that difference (as in his "Death of the Long Poem" 1985 11-23), and this desire becomes an endless play of fixity and unfixity in the poetry, a play in difference that is ultimately represented by the very idea of binary structure (see also Godard 1985 307-18).

The formal structure of topos is $\langle x,y \rangle$, and it is no accident that Mandel is a poet of place, of double, and of binaries. To return for a moment to "Saskatchewan Surveyor," the topoi there employed are $\langle \text{grammar}, \text{wind} \rangle$, $\langle \text{rhetoric}, \text{leaf} \rangle$, and $\langle \text{sentence}, \text{land} \rangle$. If the traditional figure $\langle \text{leaf}, \text{poem} \rangle$ is applied, the argument $\langle \text{rhetoric}, \text{poem} \rangle$ emerges. The poem therefore suggests a contrasting but related pair of figures for poetry: the figure $\langle \text{grammar}, \text{poem} \rangle$ may be taken to represent the typical prairie landscape-poem; the figure $\langle \text{rhetoric}, \text{poem} \rangle$ points to the resources to which the poet has access. There is then literal evidence within the poem of the poet's consciousness of two extremes of style, the plain (grammar) and the grand (rhetoric), and two kinds of prairie poetry, the serious and the rhetorical. The same figures constitute a bifurcated ethos (the double, the serious / rhetorical) which in turn appeals to a similar pathos in the reader. This little poem

therefore exemplifies perfectly the rhetorical imagination of Eli Mandel, poet: it is based on and argues for the primacy of topos (which is to say, rhetoric) in poetry.

Mandel's Baconian rhetoric (which continually recommends the rigour of reason to the flight of imagination) however emerges only gradually in his poetry. The often-reprinted "Minotaur Poems I-VI" (1954; DB 15-18) translate the heroes and legends of classical Greek mythology into contemporary terms and are therefore less interesting than his place-poems. Of places, Estevan has received the most critical attention, but Trio contains also a sequence of poems on Val Marie that merits study (n. p.). "Val Marie I," for example, personifies the land as a female lover; II and III treat the male protagonist's growth to maturity; and IV figures the place itself. "The land goes out like sea at Frenchman's creek," says the poem; "Towns are five-masted here and work the sea." But this sea is not teeming with life: the glacier that created the valley is a "sick Leviathan" that retreated to the north; the streams left behind are "dammed and rotting"; and the valley itself is "sea wrack," the town a boat "pinned at the dust-wake's head." Small wonder that the townspeople "Look northward to the ice-beast, where it ran." The poem stinks like a slough of modern alienation, yet its figuration is pure and classical, rich and fully allusive. The landscape, rather precisely rendered in figure, is overwhelmed by a "waste

land" ethos which views Val Marie as the evidence of a geological illness.

"Estevan, Saskatchewan" (1954, DB 19) is similarly figured as a place of sickness: it "bears the mark of Cain," it "produc[es] / Love's queer offspring only," the young feign madness and the old forecast more illness, while Shakespeare's "goodly frame, the earth" becomes a place betrayed on whose fields "the stupid harvest lies." The Estevan that flickers in and out of the poet's imagination as he participates vicariously in the Holocaust twenty years later ("Auschwitz" 1973, DB 74-76) is still sick, "a nasty memory" of movies in which cowboys killed Indians and little jewboys cheered wildly; but the poem itself is distinguished by an utterly sincere and wonderfully contrived rhetorical stutter which delivers the message that the illness was located in person not place. Mandel returns to Estevan in 1977 (Out of Place), and the contrast to 1955 is astonishing. First of all, the earlier poem is re-read: "in the estevan poem, for example, / how everyone can be seen eating / or is it reading / but not everyone / there is myself in the souris valley" ("the return:" DB 89). In fact, "everyone" is neither eating nor reading in that poem; everyone is ill, the earth included, and the "ghostly jews" (including the earlier poet whose presence is now recognized) were unwittingly praying for a return to health. That health, the poet now remembers as he returns, was

actually present then: "the family we / called breeds," though they were dirty and poor, nevertheless "touched one another," just as "they touched stone / they touched / earth" ("estevan 1934:" 99). This recognition does not obliterate entirely the earlier insight; the two positions resolve themselves in the notion of the double: "I stand / inside the film and stare / at places that I never knew" ("doubles: estevan" 107). What has happened is in a sense described in "Saskatchewan Surveyor": the simple grammar of landscape has yielded to the fuller rhetoric of a poetry which creates its own bifurcated ethos. Health, in other words, is defined neither in the merely serious nor in the merely rhetorical but in the recognition of both.

Fuseli Poems (1960) takes its rhetoric rather seriously, lacking the more enduring local interest of the earlier place-poems (though "Prologue" and "Epilogue" are clear exceptions DB 27 and 28). With Black and Secret Man (1964), Mandel moves from Greek to Jewish myth--and the colour turns very black. "A black and secret man of blood walks / In the garden" of the poet's personal and racial memory (BSM 1). He is the father "with his soiled Tallis, his Tefillin, / the strict black leather of his dark faith" ("Charles Isaac Mandel" 3); he is the "Secret flower of [the poet's] own design," yet is "Deeper and more secret / darker and older" than the design ("Secret Flower" 4); he is the intellectual professor, "A black gownful of lectures /

billowing from a man as black as a blackboard" ("Only One Other Reality Among Other Orders?" 6); he is the play of darkness and light ("On the Death of Dr. Tom Dooley" 8), the "David" among Philistines who contemplates murder to end murder (10), "the wet, mouthing idiot, Night" ("In the Beginning" 13), and even "Orpheus in the Underworld" (17-18). This figure is both the archetypal double of Apollo, the shining one, and the archetypal wandering Jew, forever waiting for a Messiah who never comes ("There is No One Here But Us Comedians" 30).

This "black and secret man," himself speechless, appears in another guise in "Crusoe" (An Idiot Joy 1967 22): he is the tongueless, black man Friday to the tradition of articulation of which the poet is heir. A silent figure of inexpressibility, he nevertheless begins to articulate precisely how and why silence is a language. Indeed, the most articulate of all languages is literally the most silent. Writing, which consists visually of silent black marks on a silent white page, is inaudible, and the traditional battery of figures which invariably renders writing as speech simply emphasizes this pseudo-silence ("The Silences" DB 46). Similarly, metaphors of reading, typically used to render a human response to place, figure the speechless landscape as a written (silent) text. The speaker in "From the North Saskatchewan" is unable to "read the tree markings" (53). The earth speaks in (silent) images

only: grandfathers and lovers alike fall into "our lady earth" which "flowers / into the sea-green of language" to which we are enjoined to "listen" ("The Speaking Earth" 52). The sequence of topoi by which silence becomes language may readily be diagrammed:

<seeing,reading>
 <reading,writing>
 <writing,speaking>.

The visual (the silent) is read; reading is always of the written; writing is figured as speech; and the centrality of written language emerges. The topoi therefore argue for the priority of writing over speaking, and the place of the vernacular in Mandel's poetry is thereby described. The grapholect translates silence into speech via writing, and every grapholect therefore sounds the same ("I see rhythms, I don't hear rhythms," Mandel, in Arnason 1980 85).

Stony Plain (1973) is distinguished by two major poems in the canon--"Wabamun" and "On the 25th Anniversary of the Liberation of Auschwitz" (DB 57 and 74). The most pointed and didactic of the poems in Stony Plain, "Saskatchewan Surveyor," has been discussed above, but the two major poems are equally if less overtly persuasive. "Wabamun" is an extended meditation in extremely plain language on an image that might have been taken directly from Pound. In the central moment of Canto 81 ("there came a new subtlety of eyes into my tent"), Pound sees an image: "sky's clear / night's sea / green of the mountain pool." This image is

repeated in Canto 83: enjoining the reader to "look from [his] eyes," the poet sees a double image, "sea, sky, and pool / alternate / pool, sky, sea." Mandel, who admits only to the influence of Webb and Nichol on "Wabumun" (Fee 1974 10), begins his poem as follows:

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lake
  holds
    sun moon stars

      trees
        hold
stars moon sun
      (Part 1)

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But the reader should not be lulled by the simplicity of the diction (on which Mandel remarks, Fee 9) into thinking that the figuration is therefore not ornate, for the exact opposite is the case. The first section is a figure of recursion delivered by control of line, verb, and permutation. Letting <-, -> denote "holds," this section has the following structure:

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<lake, (sun, moon, stars, <trees, [stars, moon, sun]>>>.
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In Mandel's own terminology, the figure is a "strange loop" (Family Romance 11-27) in which "holds" refers to itself. But the self-reference is not fruitlessly vicious, for the world seen through the poet's eyes contains also the poet as double:

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whether
  that one
floating
  is myself
or the light
  one
standing

```

on the red
 pier
 (Part 5)

There is no better account of the other major poem of Stony Plain, "Auschwitz," than Mandel's own "Auschwitz and Poetry" (Family Romance 3-10). For present purposes, the central fact about the poem is that it is an instance of the full conjunction of homo seriosus/rhetoricus in Mandel's work:

There was a way to write the poem to be thought of as "Auschwitz." It would be a series of displacements: structurally, grammatically, imagistically, psychologically. It would be a camp poem by not being a camp poem. Stuttering. All theatricality. All frantic posturing. All pointing to a resolution that would not be a resolution, a total ambiguity in which two different moments (Toronto 1970 and Estevan 1930) dissolved into one another seamlessly, becoming at that instant another time, the unimaginable place of the killing ground itself (9).

Mandel here suppresses direct mention of rhetoric. The stutter, whose tenor is authenticity and seriousness itself in the poem, is a contrived and deliberate vehicle of rhetoricity for the poet; and the poem's ethos is whole because neither half of its split nature is suppressed. This commentary itself closes on a rather interesting figure (synesthesia): two "moments" are given as points in space-time, and their fusion into "another time" turns out to be also an "unimaginable place."

What had been only emergent before Stony Plain and present only as method in its two major poems is fully present as subject and method in Out of Place (1977). By far

the best reading so far, Kamboureli's "Locality as Writing" (1985) nevertheless continues to suppress all reference to rhetoric while at the same time using rhetoric's current manifestation, deconstructionism, to read the poem. Whatever the reasons for this, some consequences may be noted. Kamboureli bases most of her argument that language and place become one on the role of Ann Mandel's preface (267-74). This preface, claims Kamboureli, is the reader's first entry to the poem (268); if she were right, one would have to grant her argument the objectivity it claims for itself. Preceding the preface, however, are a title and three epigraphs. Secondly, Kamboureli twice uses the word topos (268, 275) in a quasi-rhetorical sense: her usages are rhetorical yet suppress the rhetorical tradition. These factors contribute to the one major way in which Kamboureli misreads OP: citing the poet's own words as authority (words to the effect that Out of Place exists in its gaps, its absences), Kamboureli claims that the gaps or absences between the poems "signify the erasure of the binary complexity that threatens to lock the poet between the landscape he visits and the mindscape of his language" (267). My argument will be that the binary complexity (of reference and reflex, fact and figure, Other and Self, the serious and the rhetorical), far from being erased, is both the method and the subject of Out of Place.

Mandel first used the title in another context entirely

in 1976. Speaking to a meeting of the Saskatchewan Writers Guild in Moose Jaw, he addressed the predicament, as he saw it, of the prairie writer:

My image of the prairie writer...is...the one who returns, who moves in this direction. ...it is not place but attitude, state of mind, that defines the western writer--and that state of mind...has a good deal to do with a tension between place and culture, a doubleness or duplicity that makes the writer a man not so much in place but out of place and so one endlessly trying to get back, to find his way home, to return, to write himself into existence, writing west (Another Time 69).

Of course, to follow the implicit suggestion for reading contained in these words would be to repeat an error; but the words do point to rhetoric. "Not place but attitude" suggests a stance, a rhetorical position that the phrase "out of place" catches rather precisely. "Place" is both geographical and cultural: "place" is therefore a double which contains two different yet related concepts in fruitful tension. "Out of place" is a doubled duplicity: each of the two senses of "place" is split in two by the phrase "out of," which may mean either "come from" (as in origination) or "no longer belonging to" (as in alienation). In a diagram, "out of place" is the following tree:

	out of (come from)	(1)
geographical		
	out of (alien to)	(2)
place		
	out of (come from)	(3)
cultural		
	out of (alien to)	(4)

And there is no reason the "tree" of a particular place cannot continue to "grow." For example, a place (Estevan)

may be identified as a geographical locus by splits such as city/rural, as a cultural locus by splits like ethnic/native, or as both by dichotomies such as the two sides of the railroad tracks--all applied before the double "out of." Splitting may occur even after the double "out of" has been applied: thus, along the path marked (1) ("I come from Estevan"), a split such as ethnic/native may appear, signalling to the reader that he is really on the path marked (3) or (4). As we shall see, OP is structurally akin to both such kinds of trees, truncated and extended.

Long before the reader encounters Ann Mandel's preface, then, s/he has confronted this title, this figure of manner and matter. Moreover, the title is reproduced several times before the reader encounters even the epigraphs: first, as cover (with its left half a photograph, its right the title and the subtitle "Poems by Eli Mandel / Preface and Photographs by Ann Mandel"); second, as title only on the half-title page; third, as title and subtitle on the title page (with a reduction of the cover photograph in the lower right-hand corner). There can be no doubt that "out of place" must be read in the context of repetition and photograph--but read how? The phrase itself raises the question of who is out of what place, and the photograph answers "Mandel is out of a house on the prairie." This photograph of course signifies much more: the grass visible in the foreground is tall and wild; the house is clapboard,

weathered and unpainted; a window's panes are missing; inside, a door, off its hinges, juts into view; behind the house, seen through a second paneless window, stands the poet looking into the house or at the camera; behind him is a bit of flat horizon. That is, "Mandel is out of an abandoned house/home on the prairie." But this raises more questions: whose house was this? Why and when was it abandoned? What is the relation of Mandel to this house?

The text never answers these questions; neither this photograph nor any of the others is identified in any way. Whatever the suppression of literal reference (the photographs are evidently "real" photographs) says, the effect of the cover photograph is to foreground the poet (by seeming to place him in the background--itself a nice double) with reference to the book's title: the reader looks directly at Mandel looking into or through a house into a camera held by Ann Mandel. This is "the rhetoric of the image," a set of "connotations" carried by the more explicit "denotations" of the image itself (Barthes 1977 49). This rhetoric appeals to chiefly "ideological assumptions," which, in this instance, since a particular Self (the poet) is located in a particular place (the prairie) but outside another place (the house) located also within the first, we might call the assumption of authority. Whatever doubt there is about the identity of the house in the photograph, there is no doubt about the identity of the author (and, by

extension, the persona) of the poems that follow nor about the right of that author to speak about the prairie in which he is placed.

The reader now turns the title-page and encounters the epigraphs. The first, a quotation from Land of Hope by Hoffer and Kahan, and the second, from King's Estevan the Power Centre, are identified (5) and acknowledged (75); the third, "the nature of fiction / supposes our presence," is not. In fact, however, it is given a rather specific context amounting to near-identification: contemporary (the seventies) literary criticism locates this saying as a variant of Robert Kroetsch's "the fiction makes us real," which Mandel himself has quoted on several occasions (Munton 75). By contrast, then, to the erasure of reference to literal place for the cover photograph, the epigraphs are referred to their literal places (the larger sets of words in which they are to be found). Once again, a forceful statement about place is being mounted on two fronts, the geographical and the cultural, emphasizing the conjunction of the two rather than prioritizing either one.

Finally, the reader confronts Ann Mandel's preface. Kamboureli has pointed out the preface's major functions:

- (1) it establishes the history of the poem's origin (268);
- (2) it excludes the poet (268);
- (3) it is double to the poem and its pre-history (269 and 273);

(4) it reveals the central idea of the poem, writing (270). Kamboureli's analysis of the role of the preface is brilliant, as is her further analysis of the central image of the preface, the vault. The vault is a duplicitous reality, like Plato's cave (271), which contains the records which lead toward writing the poem (273); it is a place to exit from before returning to the true place of writing (the poet's own writings) (275).

But do "Language and space become identical in the greyness of the vault" or afterward (271)? And does this identification occur "through the poet's displacement" (267)? Taking the latter question first, we must answer that though the poet is displaced in the preface he is emphatically central in what precedes the preface (the repeated title and photograph, the epigraphs): in other words, the reader's experience entering the poem argues that the poet is as much "in" as "out of place" (which, we recall, is a doubled double). At best, then, the poet is displaced from Ann Mandel's writing about the vault but not from the vault (place) itself nor from his own writing about the vault. But this only emphasizes that the writer (Ann) occupies a central place in her writing, just as the writer (Eli) occupies a central place in his. The role of literal place (the vault) stubbornly persists alongside both literary places (the writings). Indeed, everything Kamboureli asserts about the vault (and I agree with her

assertions) argues for this persistence: the vault is duplicitous--if it is the place of Ann's language, it is also its double, literal place; the vault is a place of reading but not writing--it cannot therefore be identical with language for language consists of reading and its double, writing; the vault is left before writing begins (for both Mandels)--it is therefore not identical with even the place of Ann Mandel's writing, let alone her place of language.

Kamboureli's analysis, in short, establishes that place, far from being identical with language, is a rhetorical topos in language. The vault is an element of any one of several pairs: <vault,cave>, <vault,records>, <vault,reading>, and so on. Adducing to the topos <vault,reading> the topos <reading,writing> which is used by Mandel elsewhere, we obtain <vault,writing>: this sequence captures what is surely the case in Out of Place, namely, that the experience of reading the records in the vault leads to writing poems.

The topos <vault,writing> may be derived also from a general topos which is familiar to the rhetorical tradition. From Cicero to Perelman, one of the "topics" from which arguments may be drawn is "place" itself. Arguments drawn from "place" are particularly suitable for the praise (and dispraise) of individuals associated with that "place." In the terminology of this analysis, the topos is

<place, person>, with <-, -> denoting "associated with." By specialization, we obtain the topos <vault, Mandel>, which is one of the topoi employed in Ann Mandel's preface. At the same time, the title, subtitle, the cover photograph, and the book as a whole establish the topos <Mandel, writing>. Transitivity yields, again, <vault, writing>. The fact that there are many different arrangements of topoi leading to the same conclusion simply means that the denial of that conclusion (that is, the conclusion <vault, writing>) requires the denial of all these different arrangements. But these arrangements are grounded on the actual entry to the poem through title/photograph/epigraph/preface, Kamboureli's analysis, and the rhetorical tradition.

Mandel names this tradition several times in the book, most significantly in "petroglyphs at st victor" (33):

I've always been wrong
 about metaphors
 about the five figures
 of discourse
 the seventy
 names of rhetoric and tree
 alphabets.

What these errors may be we can only speculate, but the speaker's claims are resonant with the history of rhetoric. Until very recently, rhetoric has always given priority to metaphor, though never to the exclusion of other tropes. There are no five figures of discourse; but there are five parts of discourse (rhetoric), each of which is a large figure (topos) in the terms of this study. The various names

of rhetoric surely include "eloquence," "lies," and "poetry" itself. And trees (of binaries) began to play a prominent role in rhetoric in the sixteenth century (Ramus): they continue to be instruments of great subtlety and flexibility which both depend on and transcend the rigor of the law of the excluded middle (a double). "[P]etroglyphs" has a second reference to rhetoric: long after visiting the petroglyphs, the poet "remember[s] the cut / god's mouths at Wood Mountain / rhetoric of stone its bluntness" (35). Here "rhetoric" is the vehicle of a metaphor whose tenor is the double, for "that [the double] is what what was written in the rocks" ("the double world" 53).

So it is with doubles that the reader of Out of Place must deal, with topos, especially the topos of place itself. This has been so often remarked that it is a cliché--yet, a full analysis of the role of that topos in the poem will probably never be given, perhaps because the task is after all too tedious once the conclusion is glimpsed. The first poem, "the return" (13), is a return to "the estevan poem" as well as to Estevan, as the ambiguity of reflex and reference in the lines "but not everyone [in the poem is reading or eating] / there is myself in the souris valley / forty years later" suggests (13). But there is more: the return to the poem is a new reading of that poem, indicating that the poet is alien to as well as from that cultural place; and the return to Estevan mixes a sense of

origination with a sense of alienation (the poet's family and friends, "the ghostly jews / of estevan," appear to him). The first poem, in other words, is based on the topos described above as a tree (see Figure 1 215).

This truncated tree may therefore be considered as a preliminary way of understanding how topos functions in Out of Place. Indeed, when that tree, which is derived from the title, is superimposed on the poems, some insights do emerge. In Part I, "The Return," the poet's sense of doubleness is overwhelmingly cultural rather than geographical (Figure 1 215). Geographical place, it seems, plays only a positive (originary) role, or a negative (alienatory) role, but seldom both. Of course, it always provides a tag for cultural place. Only two poems (excluding the "found" poems) express no sense of cultural duplicity whatsoever, and both are closely associated with the poet's geographical but not cultural origins: "strike" (24) is about a cultural aspect of Estevan that is divorced from the poet; "estevan, 1934" (29) reconsiders a Metis family known but culturally alien to the poet in his youth.

Several different kinds of cultural place are explored in Out of Place: native culture, ethnic culture, and the world of writing. These kinds are not mutually exclusive, of course, and in most the sense of alienation is balanced against a sense of origination, illustrating that the double "out of" continues to function as the poet progresses along

the branches of the extended tree of a particular (cultural) place. Nevertheless, some branches grow farther than others: native culture, for example, which is clearly alien to the poet, terminates rather quickly; ethnic culture and writing, which evoke continuing double responses of origination and alienation, simply continue to grow and grow. One might say that doubleness is a necessary formal condition for the exploration of a cultural place to continue in an extended tree (see Figure 2 216).

It is not necessary to discuss here all the extended trees of place for Part I, but because much has been made of one particular place--Estevan--some comment on its tree seems to be required (Figure 2). Estevan is a prominent cultural place, ethnic, native, and literary, for Mandel. It is situated in the Souris River Valley in Southeastern Saskatchewan. This region, denoted here as "Greater Estevan," centres on Estevan itself, includes Hoffer, and abuts St. Victor. The poems located in this larger geographical place continue to treat ethnicity (the Jewish tradition) as both originary and alienatory in the manner of "the return." In "birthmark" (16), an old wives' tale (an alien superstition) becomes a personalized mark of Cain and of souris (mouse) on the speaker's brow (signifying, besides ethnic, literary and geographical origins). The "souris river" of the poet's youth is remembered as the "Jewish river where my boyhood drowned" (17), a figure which catches

up the double origination / alienation rather nicely (it clashes unpleasantly, however, with the literal meaning of souris, leading to the extreme catachresis of a "boyhood" drowning in a "mouse"). Memory operates without alienation in "birthmark," however, and in "slaughterhouse" (22) it yields a vivid accommodation of origins.

The place of native culture, though its branch terminates rather quickly, informs several poems (Figure 2 216). In "estevan, 1934" (29), the poet remembers an alien (to him) culture he has conveniently overlooked, the metis; "bienfait" (27) offers a stanza on either native culture or coal-mining; but the central poem for this place is "petroglyphs at st victor" (33-35). In its first section, the poet confronts the sun-god whose minions, "great slow metaphors," remove him from the presence of the god, take his eyes and tongue, and return to the god carrying his name. Bereft of speech and sight, the nameless poet somewhat incongruously sees that "my drawings of god / look no better than my child's / drawing of me." Remembering the sun of his prairie boyhood, the poet attempts but fails to improve the drawing, and a confession of poetic inadequacy follows (see above 205). The second section now takes up the question of the meaning of "the crooked gods." The poet kneels before them, he anthropomorphizes them (hands, feet, faces), Ann photographs everything, but the gods remain silent. Section three locates the petroglyphs (native culture) within two

other alien cultures--St. Victor ("separate as Quebec") and Gravelbourg ("another god / hangs on his cross"). Recovery from alienation is by way of literary ("we drive through names") and familial (domestic) place. But the memory of alienation remains sharp, and even the application of the western literary tradition cannot naturalize what is fundamentally foreign ("rhetoric of stone" is after all a considerable reduction of "rhetoric" to the mere vehicle of one of its figures).

As literary place, Estevan (and the surrounding area) is only remotely associated with the shaping influences of Wiebe, Huxley, Blake, Smart, and Thompson ("doors of perception" 15). The Hebrew "book of years" has been replaced by the land-as-text ("lost place" 23), and the books--English texts, Tarzan comics--of "bienfait" (27) by the poet's own writing ("the return" 13). Most importantly, "Greater Estevan" includes Hoffer--and the vault which is the place associated with the writing of this book. The vault, as Kamboureli has noted, is all but missing from the poems in Out of Place; yet its one occurrence has all the fullness of topos that we might by now expect. "[T]he hoffer colony" (38) appears to the reader first as a cliched parody of the supple prose of Edward McCourt's Saskatchewan, "just as in... / though unlike his prose." This simile is strongly originary with respect to literary place; the sense of alienation comes from the ways in which the poet's

familial means) the overwhelming fact of literal place (the vault and its records) emphasizes the significance of literal place. The vault will not be displaced, cannot be displaced, nor the poet within it, for without it the attempted naturalization would be "mere" rhetoric. As it is, the poem provides a full example of topos--place and double place.

Much of the above discussion has naturally dealt with writing as place, or more precisely, with topoi in which "writing" is one of the elements of a double. But "writing" is itself a double ("various kinds of doubles" 57), a topos of the form <x,y>. One particular instance of this topos is examined in some detail in Part II, "The Double." The figure of the writer is a doubled double, writer = <doppelganger 1, doppelganger 2>, in a pair of poems bearing these titles (47, 48). The first doppelganger is homo rhetoricus: he refuses, he praises, he abuses himself, jogs, makes love to the poet's wife, and is an utterly western incarnation of the trickster figure with his comic vision. The second doppelganger is homo seriusus: he thinks, his diction is measured and deliberate, his vision is tragic and high. Together, the two comprise the writer with his tragi(serious)-comic(rhetorical) vision.

A place of particular significance for this bifurcated Self, Estevan, is the subject of the next poem, which again uses a topos of place applied to "pictures" (49):

		in
	film(moving)	of
picture		in
	icon(still)	of

"[T]he cause of doubles" (51) plays on two aspects of the "cause" (causality and purpose) of duplicity in the Self; this Self raises questions both rhetorical and serious in "questions a double asks" (52). "[T]he double world" (53) is an utterly serious poem in a philosophical vein, but the more serious mixture of rhetoricity and seriousness reasserts itself in "instructions" (55). Part II concludes with a list of doubles which is doubled by its mirror image on the facing page, a technique that implies the infinite regress which doubling naturally invites.

Part III, "A Suite for Ann," seems at first out of place in this text. Individual poems do use various topoi of a distinctly double sort--"Fear of Flying" is based on "p or not-p," "Strange Places" on "destination or journey"--but a more satisfying way of reading this section is to consider the double <woman,man>. Like Part IV, "Epilogue," Part III has the feel of closure about it: how to exit from the infinitely doubled place that is this book but by getting out of the vault of mirrors by reprinting a poem that begins "Notice: all mirrors will be covered" (72)?

But Mandel cannot abandon the double so easily. Life Sentence (1981) plays, in its title, with puns on both "life" and "sentence" (7). "Prologue to Bloodlines"

considers the ambiguities of "line" (13), "false openings" (14), and language itself (16). "Poem as Person as Place as Words" (33) reconsiders the central topos of Out of Place:

If we could turn the world into words
If people would only become poems
If the stories I told were only stories
If the old magic about words worked
If forgiveness were as simple as language.

Complex and ambiguous as language is (stories are more than stories), its doubles (world, people, forgiveness) are not any simpler. The doubled persona, too, continues to fascinate: "I know / myself an imitation. I hear / his voice reading my poems written by him"; "the question of love" is both "more complex" and "a trick with my tongue . . . and with your ear" ("Ventriloquists" 32). Repetition begins to overpower place, however, as one topos yields to another:

This is the year my mother lay dying
.....
This is the year the cancer inside my father's
groin began its growth...
.....
This is the year I grew, ignorant of politics,
specious with law, careless of poetry.
There were no graves. The prairie rolled on
as if it were the sea.
.....
What shall I say?
.....
Telling the time fiction consumes me.
("In My 57th Year" 51)

Figure 1

Truncated Trees of Place
Out of Place Part 1

(Note: originatory = +; alienatory = -)

Poem (page)	Place	Geographical		Cultural	
return (13)	Estevan	+	-	+	-
doors (15)	prairie	+		+	-
birthmark (16)	Souris	+		+	-
souris (17)	Souris	+		+	-
badlands (19)	Hirsch to Hoffer	+		+	-
near Hirsch (20)	cemetery		-	+	-
rabbi berner's (21)	farm		-	+	-
slaughterhouse (22)	farm	+		+	-
lost place (23)	?			+	-
strike (24)	Estevan	+	-		-
bienfait (27)	Bienfait		-	+	-
estevan (29)	Estevan	+	-		-
lines (30)	Estevan?	+		+	-
returning (31)	Estevan	+		+	-
petroglyphs (33)	St. Victor	+	-	+	-
sonnenfeld (37)	Hoffer		-	+	-
hoffer (38)	Hoffer		-	+	-

Figure 2

Extended Tree of Cultural Place: Greater Estevan
Out of Place Part I

(Note: originatory = +; alienatory = -)

1. Native: "estevan 1934" (-)
 - "bienfait" (-)
 - "petroglyphs at st. victor" (-)
2. Other: almost all the poems in Part I (+-)
 - 2.1. Ethnic.
 - 2.1.a. Religion: "the return" (+)
 - 2.1.b. Other
 - 2.1.b.i. Literary: "the return" (+-)
"the hoffer colony" (+-)
 - 2.1.b.ii. Other: "the return" (+-)
"birthmark" (+-)
"souris river" (+-)
"slaughter house" (+-)
 - 2.2. Other
 - 2.2.a. Religion: "petroglyphs" (-)
 - 2.2.b. Other
 - 2.2.b.i. Literary: "the return" (+-)
"the hoffer colony" (+-)
 - 2.2.b.ii Other: "badlands" (+-)

STRANGE LOOPS

(for Eli Mandel)

There you stood in moose jaw that worried look or loop on your face and we sat stunned in front of you would you choke to death in the anguish that looped itself about you here on the prairie your home where you had always been strange?

But you managed a deep gasp a breath of air filled your lungs and your voice was suddenly stronger not less worried just louder your brow was still worried but we too took deep breaths he's going to make it we said to each other softly.

No one understood what you were trying to say the pain was too much we couldn't hear anything except this hurts this thought and the snake's tail in its mouth seemed to us an excruciating circle but years later some would feel what you meant.

But then your voice sank and the look on your face got strange again and our brows too creased and something looped itself around your brain and all our breaths were suddenly short again all our brains were tightly squeezed as by a snake and you smiled.

The applause rounded on you as you sat down still smiling looking pained and some stranger rose to thank you and your smile disappeared you looked down at the coiling floor between your feet what was there that made you look suddenly up and smile again?

2.5 John Newlove's Prairie

Direct references to the prairie abound in John Newlove's poetry. From his earliest published book (Grave Sirs 1962) to his latest (The Night the Dog Smiled 1986), Newlove grounds his work in a referential space and time: a boyhood in Verigin, Saskatchewan, home of Doukhobors; growing up in Regina; leaving, endlessly crossing, and finally returning to the plains of Saskatchewan. Hundreds of literal references to person, place, and thing combine with occurrences of the words prairie or plain to establish a symbol of the poet's imagination, a symbol whose values include despair and hope, the multiple extremes of the human condition, and the desire for and loathing toward home. Newlove and prairie are as inseparable as Newlove and the personae he adopts--the sad-funny-thin-grey man and his double, the fat man.

It is impossible to list here the poems in which "prairie" occurs as a place of reference, either as literal word, or as "plain," or as generic term for specific words, or for that matter as symbol with a great range of values. All the poems usually considered to be Newlove's "major poems" contain the word "prairie"--with one exception: "The Fat Man" (1968) is set in a city beside the ocean which, because prairie has by this time been equated to the sea and because the fat man's double is the thin man, is a trope of

prairie. Significantly, the three arguably most important works in the Newlove canon--"Ride Off Any Horizon," "The Pride," and The Green Plain--are set in the prairie, contain the word "prairie," and are about the prairie. The critical cliché that Newlove is a prairie poet is therefore well-founded even if it is not sufficiently grounded (see Barbour 1980 256-80). If such a grounding were undertaken, it would demonstrate that "prairie" serves a rhetorical function in the poetry: it is a fundamental topos which generates the invention of Newlove's argument, constitutes an essential figure in that argument, and establishes an ethos and a pathos. My argument, in other words, is that Newlove is a prairie poet in a rhetorical sense: his major topos is a binary pair $\langle x, y \rangle$ of which one term is or is associated with "prairie."

A book such as Elephants, Mothers & Others (1963) is heavily and obviously indebted to the prairie as place and experience, but as early as Moving In Alone (1965) Newlove uses prairie as a topos. "East from the Mountains" (The Fat Man 1977 28), for example, situates its narrator away from the prairie on the west coast looking east and back in time. A stanza by stanza summary:

(1) a "single, faltering, tenuous line of melody" is "displayed by a thin man's lungs" in winter (introducing a sound/sight synesthesia into the poem);

(2) an abstract question--"what to say?"--is answered by

"Oh, say nothing. / But listen to the ...wind" (replacing the thin singer by the wind);

(3-4) the wind's song, however, is silence, snow, the white land, the cold, shining sun (synesthesia);

(5-6) the injunction "To listen to the ... wind" is repeated, and this act yields several visual effects: it removes "the idea" of hills and reveals "the real geometry of the land"; this geometry has "no single distinction to ruin / the total wholeness of sweep / of the earth" but follows "the tentative line of a gully" to become "lost at last" in Qu'Appelle where it disappears in perspective like "the tentative line" of the railway;

(7-8) the wind indicates the spaces between cities and covers the sounds of rural and town speech;

(9) this speech ("so hard / to hear what someone is saying," stanza 8) is compared to the singer's weak melody;

(10) and the poem ends with "o tired and halting song!"

The larger figure in this poem is synesthesia--wind-sound turns into prairie-sight--and this figure is based on two synecdoches: <wind,sound> is a synecdoche in which "sound" is part of the whole, "wind"; and <sight, prairie> represents those visual images in the poem that are parts of the seen prairie. Because they share middle terms drawn from the senses, these synecdoches combine transitively to yield <wind, prairie>. This transition more or less expresses the poem's argument, part of which is the evident

intervention of the narrator and an appeal to the reader (marked by the "senses"). But the argument is enhanced by the references to the singer's breath (first and last stanzas), which suggest that the pair <singer, breath> may combine with the pair <wind, prairie>, since both breath and wind are air-in-motion, to yield <singer, prairie>. Putting the two together, we obtain the following analysis of the poem's fuller argument:

<singer, breath> and <breath, wind> and <wind, sound>
and <sound, sight> and <sight, prairie> together
imply <singer, prairie>.

The argument proceeds entirely by figure: in order, these figures are synecdoche, metonymy, synecdoche, metonymy, and synecdoche, yielding the concluding metaphor. That the association of this singer with the prairie proceeds paradoxically by way of the wind which overpowers both speech and song, yet is made the vehicle of both, is countered by the naturalness of each element of the series. The reader who (intuitively) follows each step in this association, that is, who accepts this series of conventional, figurative relationships, will conclude with the poem that the "thin man" sings "prairie." In so doing, the thin man (Newlove) draws upon a traditional topos of the lyric: poem-as-song or <poem, song>.

It has been said that "Ride Off Any Horizon" (Black Night Window 1968; Fat Man 41) is one of the two quintessential prairie poems in Newlove's work (Wah 1986

216). A rhetorical analysis of this poem not only justifies this judgement but reveals why the judgement is correct. The title is itself a powerful combination of two symbols, a particularizing synecdoche followed by a generalizing synecdoche, repeated six times within the poem. "Ride off" is pars pro toto for "leaving"; "horizon" is toto pro pars for "prairie." Both individually and together, these two synecdoches are very rich: ride suggests several modes of travel including train and horse; horse suggests Sidney's imagination and Wallace Stevens's noble rider; horizon evokes the mythic union of earth and sky; it also suggests "any direction will do," circularity, and the end of the world (falling off the horizon is specifically noted in the poem's third part).

A triplet is repeated (more or less) at the beginning of each of the six parts of the poem:

Ride off any horizon
and let the measure fall
where it may.

The second line of this triplet places one highly charged word in six contexts redolent with inevitability. "Measure" is judgement (and the larger trope of the whole triplet suggests a reading like "leave the prairie any way you can and let your judgement of it be what is is"), a musical term (recalling the musical analogy in "East From The Mountains"), and a poetical term (in prosody, measure is a rhythmical period, that is, a repeated structure of stress

patterns). Measure presupposes repetition; "measure" is part of a refrain; measure therefore serves a reflexive as well as a referential function in the poem. This "measure" is inevitable, for the context established by the phrase "let [it] fall where it may" is que sera sera (note the ethical shrug, as in "I'm not responsible").

Yet, the measure hardly falls randomly. One of the delights in reading Newlove is his employment of the larger trope of irony (including, as it does, a continuing doubleness and duplicity): it was seen in "East" (one is enjoined to "listen" and ends up "seeing"), it occurs here again in the contrast between apparent chance and actual selection, and it will form the basis of his third major collection, Lies (1972). The places where the measure falls in this poem are "on" childhood memories, "among" the detritus of prairie history, "off" the edge of the known, childhood world, "on" (a night in) a prairie town, against the British in the Riel rebellion, and finally on the prairie's "other," namely, the cities elsewhere. The structure of this list of places is a movement from the general to the specific in two kinds of history--personal (moving from general memory to specific fear and specific sexuality) and public (moving from prairie history to native history)--concluded by a movement away from the prairie altogether. Each "fall" is a harsh measure indeed: the memory is hot, bad, dirty, cheap, and narrow; prairie

history includes death, loss, depression, dryness, emptiness, dust, wreckage, defeat, and sadness; a childhood fear is black and annihilating; the night in town is hot and poised on the edge of wariness; the British are damned for their murder of the native peoples in the Riel uprising; and the cities are cold and empty, their inhabitants staring fixedly at the blockage of their visions. These negative judgements of prairie would have to be called mere escapism were it not for the concluding judgement of the cities. By comparison, the prairie is judged much less harshly than the city: on the prairie, it is at least possible to have a vision of an infinity of choices suggested by riding off imaginatively in any direction whatsoever; in the city, this premise simply does not obtain, for "the concrete horizon, definite, / ... / stop[s] vision visibly."

The figures in "Ride Off Any Horizon" are four: first, the combined synecdoche in the opening triplet; second, the multiple-valued synecdoche "measure"; third, the repetition of this triplet; fourth, the amplification through repeated application of this triplet to the two kinds of prairie history (personal and public) described above. But this poem's argument is very different from the argument in "East," which moved forward by a series of carefully controlled conventional figures: here the reader is moved forward by repetition and amplification, lulled into believing the poem's appeal to chance and its apparent

condemnation of prairie life, only to be awakened by the last stanza's surprising shift to an even more severe condemnation of the city. Perhaps, we say, the prairie wasn't so bad after all; perhaps, we say, here in the last stanza is the rhetorical reason for the poet's use of repetition (it makes shock possible); certainly, we agree, the vision, measured by its extension, is very bleak and becoming even bleaker. Finally, the poem contains, within these four major figures, a number of lesser figures, one of the most important of which occurs in part three:

off the edge
of the black prairie

as you thought you could fall,
a boy at sunset

not watching the sun
set but watching the black earth,

never-ending they said in school,
round: but you saw it ending,

finished, definite, precise--
visible only miles away.

This is a topos of apocalypse, figured by a boyhood fear of falling off the edge of the prairie where it meets the sky at the horizon. Its larger connotation includes the sailor's fear of sailing off the edge of the sea, an apt fear certainly for a migrant poet who judges the place which he escaped from less harshly than the place he escaped to. That this is a crucial, imagined-yet-real event for Newlove will become clear below.

It is fairly evident, then, that the landscape of the

prairie is the locus of the early Newlove's imagination. In fact, it is landscape generally, not specifically prairie, that comprises this locus, and it is the imaginative not the "real" landscape that is rhetorically important. "The Double-Headed Snake" (48) is Newlove's clearest, early statement about "the natural sublime," that is, about the relation of the landscape to the imagination (Barbour 277). This poem is an exercise in enthymematic reasoning based on the topos "greater and lesser." Its opening lines suggest that the "feel" of the mountains and the "feel" of the prairies are somehow opposed; they move to a statement of a major premise--"What's lovely / is whatever makes the adrenalin run"; and, omitting the minor premise, they conclude "therefore I count terror and fear among / the greatest beauty." But "the greatest beauty" (applying the topos) is "to be alive," and this beauty is related to "remembrance," though it "hurts" and is "foolish."

Stanza two repeats the major premise ("Beauty's whatever / makes the adrenalin run") and substantiates the unstated minor premise by an example--"Fear / in the mountains," engendered not by cold and place but by remembrance of the Indians' stories of "the double-headed snake," makes the adrenalin run. Part of the conclusion of stanza one (that fear is a beauty) follows. Stanza three, again repeating the premise, provides another example of "fear at night on the level plains," again engendered not by

cold and place but by "no horizon / and the stars too bright" and by the remembrance of winter's blowing snow brought on by the "wind bitter / even in June." By this time the opposition in similarity between mountain and plain is rather strong, and it is explicitly stated in the fourth stanza: "And one beauty cancels another." This stanza gives three examples of such cancellations: in the mountains, the plains "seem" safe; in Saskatchewan, the mountains "are comforting to think of"; and in the foothills, both "seem easy to endure." One fear (that is, beauty) may cancel another when its place is absent. Remembrance without place inspires no fear or terror.

The last stanza therefore concludes the argument for remembrance in place as the greatest beauty (which was suggested in stanza one, is implicitly argued by each example of beauty so far given, and is clarified by the stanza on cancellation):

As one beauty
cancels another....,

[like, or because, fear (experienced in mountains or plains)
cancels fear (remembered away from plains or mountains)]

.... remembrance
is a foolish act, a double-headed snake
striking in both directions

[so, or therefore, remembrance alone is foolish in both
places].

Thus, remembrance in place, which inspires fear and terror (which are beauty), is the greatest beauty. And what is this remembrance? The poem does not tell us, of course, but it is

evidently an active, deep, imaginative response to the landscape, involving place as experience, place as memory, but clearly going beyond both. What the poem does say, does argue, is that remembrance in place is the greatest beauty.

Beauties, in other words, may be ranked: mountains and plains are less beautiful than the fear and terror they inspire; fear and terror are less beautiful than remembrance evoked in place; remembrance in place (being alive, forgetting nothing) is the greatest beauty. The topos "greater or lesser" therefore argues strongly for the priority of the imagination in place over place itself, over feelings inspired by place, and over mere memory.

"The Double-Headed Snake" explicitly argues what is implicit in "Ride Off Any Horizon"--that the escape from an entrapment in mere place is imaginative. Contra Atwood (1973), Newlove knows very well how to escape, and it is not surprising that she discusses neither "Ride" nor "Snake" in her early and important article. A closer reading of Newlove is Jan Bartley's amendment of Atwood (1974). She reads Newlove as a mixer of "positives and negatives," a poet who sees what is, despairs, and offers some hope nevertheless. Bartley claims that Newlove's hope is seen in his "courage," his "craftsmanship," and his "versatility" (47); she gives pride of place, at least thematically, to "The Pride," Newlove's second most important prairie poem, because it offers a positive vision.

"The Pride" (1977 67), despite its technical achievement, is flawed by naivete (at best) or racism (at worst). It is Newlove's personal ride on a troika of "image," "ghost," and "story" to a dubious affirmation of "this land is my land." Part 1 employs the by-now familiar technique of repeating a generic term (image) amplified by specific images of the native peoples in their empty land (pawnees, teton sioux, arikaras, cree, athabaskans). Part 2 fills the spaces with the ghosts (legends) of Indians from the coast to the plains: ethlinga, raven, thunderbird, and d'sonoqua the wild woman. The distinction between memory and remembrance in place (see "Snake") is evoked, for the "ghosts and memories" are waiting "to be remembered." Part 3 raises a distinctly Eliotian question: "But what image, bewildered / son of all men / under the sun" is yours to worship and to make you whole? The fourth part, very short, presents an image of the western country moving quickly through time from the past to the present. Part 5 gives us an image of early eighteenth-century warrior life as remembered by an old cree and told to David Thompson, followed by the narrator's meditation on the nomadic ways of the plains peoples, moving restlessly with the wind, following the buffalo, and "wheeling in their pride / on the sweating horses, their pride." The word pride turns the poem sharply from its ostensible subject (the Indian on the plains) to its real subject (the narrator's attitude to the

Indian and the plains, namely, the narrator's pride of place). This subject is developed in Part 6 as poem, not story:

Those are all stories;
 the pride, the grand poem
 of our land, of the earth itself,
 will come, welcome, and
 sought for, and found,
 in a line of running verse,
 sweating, our pride.

More specifically, "a single line" with its "sunlit brilliant image" will shock us beyond desire into the recognition that, alone but not lonely, we "have roots," and by dwelling on these "rooted words," by formulating and contemplating "the unyielding phrase / in tune with the epoch'," we will achieve "the [desired] knowledge of / our origins, and where / we are in truth, / and whose land this is / and is to be." The knowledge is now unequivocally spelled out in the seventh and last part. We are the new Indians: they "still ride the soil in us"; "we become them"; "they / become our true forbears"; and "we / are their people, come / back to life again."

The technical achievement is stunning: twentieth-century poetics (image, phrase, line) becomes the basis of a claim to the land; the implicit argument of the first six parts is revealed with consummate clarity in the last part (the images have all been "of" the Indian and "by" the poet, the "unyielding phrase" is also coloured white, and the "line of running verse" is Newlove's very own). Indeed, the

proof of the truth of the claim in the seventh part is parts one to six. At the centre of that argument is a sequence of synecdoches:

images (of plains Indians)-->image (as an element of
poetics)
-->poem (of the land).

These synecdoches carry the argument forward to its conclusion, though they do not appear in the poem in exactly this order. In the poem, the generic term "image" comes first; it is followed by specific images of "Indian"; next, a specializing synecdoche, "ghosts," reduces native legend and mythology and prepares us for the generalized "image" and Christian overtones of the narrator's question; specific images are now replaced by the general image of "the country" from which its native peoples are absent; when a specific image of "Indian" is introduced, the poem turns, on the general term "pride," away from the Indian's false pride in the horse (a legacy of the white man) toward the true pride in the white man's poem of the land; most importantly, "image," which previously functioned as a generalizing synecdoche (as a general term for many specific images), now becomes particularizing (it is a specific part of that whole called poetry). The poet's claim to the land, in other words, is precisely that he is able to write the poem of the land by incorporating many specific instances of "image" within an abstract, general term and by changing that abstraction into a particularity within the larger context

of poetry. Shelley's "unacknowledged legislator" here manipulates a take-over of the land with a sequence of binary topoi which constitute the poem's argument:

<[poet], specific images> and <specific images, image> and <image, poem> and <poem, land> imply <poet, land>.

This rhetorical analysis ("finding the thought already present in the materials" Sloan) hardly needs to be made by the reader: it is sufficient, rhetorically speaking, that s/he feels the force of the poem's argument; indeed, it is better that the force be felt and not examined, for analysis reveals the usurpation that has taken place. Bartley's judgement, that the argument is naive, is perhaps too generous: the argument is a "poetic" version of a popular response to Indian land-claims ("at least we did something with the land"). The Indian never turned the land into a poem, whereas "The Pride" does exactly that. The great technical achievement, then, seems blighted by the latent racism that Monkman sees lurking in almost every literary appropriation of Indian history by Euro-Canadian writers (1981 Conclusion). Assimilation, my native students continually remind me, is but the other face of appropriation. As Lenore Keeshig-Tobias writes in a recent review of W. P. Kinsella's "Indian" writings, "Maybe now it is time for him [the narrator Silas Ermineskin, but by simple extension also his creator] to melt back into the prairie bush" (1987 25).

Black Night Window, then, reveals Newlove as an already skilled rhetorician, employing figure (chiefly synecdoche) as a topos of place in argument. Newlove himself has indicated his preference for symbol and synecdoche (though he did not put it quite that way, echoing Pound instead with "I try to produce the thing itself," Bartley "An Interview with John Newlove" 1982 149). The care and intensity with which Newlove persuades also undercuts the second half of the suggestion that Newlove was "the first to produce a large collection of impressive Prairie poems, written in open forms and rhythms--structures that evidently suit a large part of Prairie experience" (Cooley 1980 17). Exactly the opposite is the case: the forms are traditional, rhetorical, and can hardly be called "open," whatever that means. Nor does "Newlove's style exhibit a strong distrust of rhetoric and conventional form" (Denham 1973 248); it exhibits rather a profound use of both rhetoric and form. Similarly, the rhythms are classical and tightly controlled, as the second major collection (The Cave 1970) demonstrates. Newlove does not think that some structures "suit the Prairie experience": his starting point is rhythm--"The first thing that brought me to poetry was rhythm" (Bartley 1982 141); and "It [the poem] mostly starts with sound. Rhythms for me" (143). One rhythmical device that Newlove uses is of course simple repetition (and it may be noted that repetition is the basis of all prosody), but there are

others, equally potent. Off-rhyme is a favourite device: the line of melody becomes "lost at last" in Qu'Appelle ("East From the Mountains"); the sought-for poem "will come, welcome" ("The Pride"). And one poem, "The Prairie" (Fat Man 80), bases part of its appeal on "figures of words" (metaplasms), or sound-play.

"The Prairie" is a poem about prairie poetry. It develops its argument by figuring words as excrementa (stanza 1), the prairie as food-source that animals transform into words (stanza 2) which turn out to be insufficient for both history and scene for the alienated narrator (stanza 3) who therefore becomes a perpetual migrant, a seeker of "god or food or earth or word" (stanza 4). The poem admits tacitly that the vision of "The Pride" has failed--but the ability of the prairie to generate poems continues unabated. The words that the poet "compiles, piles, piles" (1970; "compiles, piles, plies" 1977) are so many "dried chips / of buffalo dung" excreted by the "beasts / / the prairie fed." The buffalo roam, men roam as beasts, and the poet too roams endlessly: this is an argument for authentic belonging, but the poet knows he does not belong, that "bred / on the same earth [he] wishes himself / something different, the other's / twin, impossible thing." The migrant poet, in other words, figures both authenticity (the native animals and peoples are nomads) and alienation (he is "never to be at ease," that is, he is not native).

As noted above, however, one topos in "The Prairie" is sound-play. Besides the "compiles, piles, plies" of the first stanza, the poem features masses/massifs/mastiffs; "words, verbs"; "fed, foddered, / food...fostered" in stanza two; a string of -ing sounds (barking, meaning, roaming, something, thing, twining, meaning, migrating, seeking); and the concluding sounds of god/food/earth/word. The overt figuring of the poem as music ("East from the Mountains") has become actualized as sound distributed throughout the poem; and the sounds of the key words of the poem are repeated in the concluding line ("god or food or earth or word"). The poem's sound points to its thought: for the poem is in effect a distributio of "word" (piles of excrement, derived from the prairie, insufficient to establish authentic belonging or being-in place, and a cause of endless searching) followed by a recapitulatio (or summary). Sound, the basis of this poem's rhythm, is closely modulated to thought, and it seems that Newlove's rhythms are not open, either.

"The Prairie" is prototypical of The Cave because it introduces a concept basic to topos, the binary or "double." Not only is doubleness the measure of the narrator's impossible desire ("Desire is what I write about, mostly" (Bartley 1982 146)) to be a double ("twin") of a double ("the other"), but it is a major characteristic of the language used to express that desire. Thus, "the words do

not suffice" uses an inexpressibility topos (Curtius 159-162), expressing what is ostensibly inexpressible (<expressible, inexpressible>). The "lie" emerges strongly as a motif in The Cave and becomes a theme as well as a technique in Newlove's next book (Lies 1972). Lie and truth (<lie, not-lie> or <truth, not-truth>) are contrasted, compared, and explored in a great many poems in The Cave: some use the word "lie" in its double sense ("You" 14, "You Told Me" 16, "Any Place I Look At" 22, "Take These Three Months" 23, "Strand by Strand" 24, "Remembering Christopher Smart" 57); others play on the differences and similarities between "lie" and "truth"--here are poems of despair in love, of beauty within despair, of the un-reality of reality. Indeed, the title poem deals with the dichotomy of appearance and reality which is one of many variations on the doubleness of truth and falsehood.

"The Last Event," a poem about death and war (not reprinted in Fat Man), may show how doubleness is incorporated into the topos of place. Much of the underlying imagery is prairie: "Great heaps of captivating skulls, stretched tents of our human / skin, filling the dark plain with mementos" sets the scene. Men have searched everywhere and have departed, learning nothing. War and sickness and death are all that is left in the desolate plain. But situated in this place is a series of duplicities or paradoxes: knowledge, which kills, of course, or is born of

misery and surpasses understanding to become "the consummate poise of / a falsified death"; "hands carefully searching for the slack lax vaccine / of warring love"; "fever...and a desire for fever"; and, everywhere too, the play on sound, manipulated to make order out of the "Black chaos...below."

The Cave marks a lessening in Newlove's overt use of prairie as topos. The topos has gone underground, so to speak, and is now recognized as the same topos as the sea: "The flat sea and the prairie that was a sea contain them [the men waiting in the cities]" ("The Engine and the Sea" Fat Man 76). At the same time, the topos continues to function, ever more subtly, in both figure and argument. "The flower / is not in its colour, / but in the seed" ("The Flower" 97), for example, uses an organic figure particularly applicable to wheat (whose flower is the colour of the rest of the plant) to make a statement about rhetoric and poetry. It argues that the colour (of rhetoric) is not as appropriate a synecdoche for its flower (poetry) as is the seed (invention or thought) which generates it. The flower is in the seed, and not vice versa, just as invention precedes style, just as style is more than the mere dress of thought.

Lies (1972), a fuller exploration of the binary structure of topos via the double doubleness of "lie" and "truth," locates the exploration in the prairie in only a few poems, one of which however is (nearly) the title poem.

The speaker in "White Lies" (Fat Man 101) is away from "home" (prairie) in a rainy place where the atmosphere is "Glum glue." It is "summer," and he "seem[s] to remember those winters":

The hard-surfaced snow
would have stretched tightly
over the low hills, vast pearls
glowing in the night of five o'clock,
white lies.

The question, evidently, is what white lies? The snow? The pearled hills (its sounds--pearls, lies--evoking Shakespeare's "Those are the pearls that were his eyes" in The Tempest)? The too-early night? Or, the winter, or even the whole lot of memories? The recapitulatory position of "white lies" at the end of the stanza suggests they refer ultimately to all these memories and therefore to memory itself. The white lie of mere memory is therefore not the imaginative "remembrance" in place of "The Double-Headed Snake" which, we recall, was "the greatest beauty." There is no run of adrenalin in a narrator who says "The winter shines, I think."

Two other poems in Lies, "If You Would Walk" and "Like A River," modulate several of Newlove's concerns. "Walk" (1972 50) recovers the horizon of "Ride Off Any Horizon"-- "One long look down the undulating line of prairie / leads to the horizon"; a hypothetical walk through the fields is repeated to evoke blackbirds flying up, dust-devils swirling behind you, and an endless search for the once-seen horizon;

and the walk is recapitulated in the "return through the swaying fields and rattling birds / to your own known house, of which you are the core, / more easy as you close the rasping door," recalling and changing the dis-ease of the speaker in "The Prairie." This poem has some lovely rhymes and employs a very long line, two features found also in "River" (1972 51) which contains, in my opinion, Newlove's finest off-rhyme: "we will go on, until we are gone." This rhyme occurs appropriately in a poem in which a plane leaves one city for another as "the sunset flows like a river into the blackening sky." A plane/plain rhyme is implied, for the scene is a "prairie sunset" in a land once peopled by "raiders" and "nomads" who have now been replaced by jet-setting wanderers. An earlier identification between the plains Indian and the wandering poet is here repeated; an earlier identification between prairie and sea is here narrowed in the simile linking river and sky.

Sea and land provide the binary structure of "Why Do You Hate Me?" (Fat Man 117). Briefly, the opposition between sea and land is developed as an opposition between "you" (swimming fish, curving trajectories of blood) and "I" (dull grain, planted in rows), and concluded by "you's" hearing ("hate") the opposite of "I's" saying ("love"). A fine little poem, "Party" (1972 69), uses the implicit opposition in a very different manner. At a party, "you" is berated by a speaker (an implicit "I") in such a way as to

make clear that you/I are the warring halves of Richard Lanham's bifurcated Western self, that uneasy pair called homo seriosus/rhetoricus (1976 Chapter 1). The speaker takes the opportunity for full rhetorical flight in a rhetorical question of great seriousness:

How, trapped in rhetoric's parabola, now constrained
to faster and faster invention, what lie
can you explain?

It is hard to free myth (seriousness) from reality (rhetoric).

1977 saw the publication of selected poems from 1962 to 1972 (The Fat Man), and Newlove's deliberate choice of the thin man's double for the title only emphasizes the binary topos discussed above. He published no books of new poems between 1972 and 1981 when The Green Plain appeared. That book (with Preface 1981; reprinted without preface The Night the Dog Smiled 1986 19-23) is John Newlove's master prairie-poem. The Preface, "An Accidental Life," is helpful in understanding his thematics (but not his poetics); the poem itself is a coming-home to the prairie; and the prairie is both an altogether imaginative and a completely literal place. Technically, The Green Plain is more accomplished than "The Pride"; philosophically, it is unmarred by questionable social assumptions; formally, it is a long lyric which places itself in direct opposition to that locus of modern poetry The Waste Land whose title it parodies. Whereas Eliot celebrated (in a mournful way) loss, Newlove

celebrates (in a mournful way) recovery; where The Waste Land marked an apogee of poetic despair, The Green Plain marks a perigee of muted hope.

In his Preface to the poem, Newlove articulates the centrality for him of a childhood vision of loss obliquely noted in "Ride Off Any Horizon": "a crystal image" of "a tangible vision of paradise" which "was broken, ruined abruptly after an eternity" by himself as a very young child. As he points out, "Most of what I write seems to me to go back eventually to that day: to the real knowledge of the existence of a veritable paradise and the real knowledge of the tiny monster, the ogre, lurking in like a shadow in that greenness" (Preface). This Blakean vision of experience within innocence, realized in the marriage of heaven and hell that is represented by his work before 1981, is now re-examined in the garden called the green plain.

Because The Green Plain comes at the top of a poetic cycle, one expects (and finds) that it re-interprets much of what has come before, both in Newlove's and others' works. Stanzas 1-3 restate the "crowded world" motif of "In the Crammed World" (Fat Man 126): filled with humans and monsters, the world surrounds the narrator with dreams and rain; he wonders whether "civilization / [is not] only an ant-heap at last." Stanza 4 reiterates one of Newlove's central claims to authenticity in place--"Even the nomads roaming the green plain, for them / at last no land was ever

enough." Escape--riding off any horizon, in other words-- seems impossible and doesn't really solve anything: we prefer "small farms" to "stars," and "all the places we go / space is distorted [by us]" making "the symmetry of the universe" which is our own symmetry seem unsalvageable (stanzas 5-6). Stanza 7 asks again the question in "The Pride," but now in even more general, cosmic terms: "Which myths /should capture us,... / or are they the same, all of them?" In stanzas 8-10, the narrator re-dreams a figure evoking Blake's "Nobodaddy," Stevens's "major man," Pratt's "Panjandrum," and tentatively identified with "Gulliver": this "giant sprawled among stars" is a "huge, image of us"--stupid, slow to learn, capable of delight, ending in hatred. But he is "an image only," an image of a disaster which never happens though "we [do] lose joy and die." The rhetorical questions of meaning in stanza 11 include the image of "the ruined crystal" of the Preface; stanza 12 counters with an image of forests, beautiful in their own being; and 13 corrects Heraklitos: "It is not time that flows but the world." This ceaseless flow of the world moves poets (stanza 14) to speak of spring (stanza 15), and here occurs the poem's first overt reference to prairie--the flowers' perfumes and colours are "rural as the hairy crocus or urban as a waxy tulip." Stanza 16--by its fragmented sentences, its staccatto questions--suggests that the prolonged meditation is leading to the despair implied by

the poem's opening lines on the meaning of civilization and echoed in stanza 17 ("Fly-speck, fly-speck"). Then comes the poem's turn and centre (stanza 18):

And the land around us green and happy,
 waiting as you wait for a killer to spring,
 a full-sized blur,
 waiting like a tree in southern Saskatchewan,
 remarked on, lonely and famous as a saint.

Stanzas 19-22 (the last) state the poem's answer to the question of civilization and meaning: "we live / inside the stars," but "the mechanisms by which the stars generate invention / live all over and around us" and constitute "this only world." The world--variated and spreading, happy and flowing--flows also "through the climate of intelligence" which is a "beautiful confusion," seeing and marvelling. The last words are a lament: "O Memory...."

The key stanza (Stanza 18) of this central prairie poem situates all of "us" as well as "you" (the narrator and the reader) on a "green and happy" plain, "waiting for a killer to spring" (the killer will not spring, however), "waiting like a tree" in Saskatchewan. The topoi <poet,tree> and <tree,prairie> again yield <poet,prairie>; but the middle term tree measures the last of several developments in the narrative ethos: the poet was first a singer whose voice was the wind which overcame it, then a wanderer like the plains Indian, and now a rooted, remarkable tree. Such a development is insignificant unless the prairie changes from brown to green as it becomes a garden: <prairie, brown> and

<brown,green> and <green,garden>, however, do imply <prairie,garden>.

Newlove's prairie garden is a peculiar and astonishing place. It is raining, but the rain is "arguments and dreams." It is crowded with "small human figures and fanciful monsters," with "forests [of people?] between us." Time's arrow circles back on itself in this garden: prehistoric animals ("dinosaurs") jostle for place with the plains Indian ("nomads"), the citizens of India, and all of us ("Fly-speck, flyspeck"). The garden is "spreading" and "flowing" and "burning." Overhead shine the cold stars.

There are many possible readings of this garden. It is first of all a centre-piece of Christian mythology, post-Edenic, and redolent with revision (the tree is the most obvious instance; the motif of immanent fall is another). It is also a contemporary version of Spenser's "Garden of Adonis" (Fairie Queen III Canto vi) with its theme of cycles of generation and regeneration presaging his later and more secular vision of mutability (VII, vi, vii, and especially vii.58). It is Blake's "Argument" in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell--"Roses are planted where thorns grew, / And on the barren heath / Sing the honey bees. // Then the perilous path was planted..."--and Pound's "paradiso terrestre" ("Notes for Canto CXVII et seq."), that "green world" that pulls down man's vanity (Canto LXXXI). But most of all, the garden that is a green plain is Eliot's waste land,

radically challenged and updated.

Fortunately for us, Newlove has not attempted to mirror the five parts of The Waste Land, though there are many structural parallels between the two poems. Eliot's bored belladonna is matched by Newlove's doltish "Gulliver." The flow of time marked by the seasonal movement in the parts of Eliot's poem is replaced by the flow of the world in Newlove's. Both poems employ sharp shifts in rhetorical situation--compare Eliot's "Winter surprised us" and Newlove's "Rain surrounds us" to the subsequent individualizations of "I think we are in rats' alley" (Eliot) and "Now a dream involves me" (Newlove). Eliot's use of Dante's fire is as different from his predecessor's as Newlove's. Each poem offers a synecdoche of itself in its title and central image--the waste land and the green plain are literal-imaginative places drawn from a traditional topos, namely, the topos of place. The fisherman-poet with the arid plain behind him (<fisherman-poet,waste-land>) tries to escape the waste land; the tree-poet with the green plain around him (<tree-poet,green-plain>) assumes the garden as his natural habitation.

Eliot ends The Waste Land on a note of practicality: the thunder has spoken three rules for living (give, sympathize, control); the narrator somewhat confusedly intends to put his fractured world into some semblance of order ("These fragments have I shored against my ruins");

and the last line is a Hindu benediction, "shantih," repeated a trinity of times. Newlove's meditation--which has teetered on the brink of despair--resolves itself in the image of a tree in a fruitful plain. The old centre (Yeats) has not held: Newlove's centre is not an attempted recovery (like Eliot's) of the old images now lying about in ruins; Newlove's centre is the imagination. Where The Waste Land lamented lost beliefs and attempted to put Humpty together again, The Green Plain offers a relation among the ideal ("stars"), the actual ("green plain"), and the imagination of the poet (the "tree") which accommodates both by being rooted in the earth and pointing to the heavens.

It may help to have Newlove's argument before us:

The mechanisms by which the stars generate invention
live all over and around us
and yet we refine machines, defer
to tricks as discovery. Everything is always here,
and burning.

There are no surprises, there is only
what is left. We live
inside the stars,

burning, burning,

the mechanisms.

(Stanzas 19-21)

The "mechanisms" are not machines but living, burning entities teeming "all over and around us" in the green plain. One of the "mechanisms" is man, that means "by which the stars generate invention." Man "live[s] / inside the stars" as well as in the green plain: this (apparent) paradox is "what is left," the kernel of Newlove's vision.

The poet's imagination mediates between heaven and earth: <plain,tree> and <tree,stars> yield <plain,stars>.

Paradox has a complex rhetorical history. It is implicit in Aristotle's Rhetoric--the very first commonplace "is based upon consideration of the opposite of the thing in question" (1397a5). In Topics, Aristotle seems to equate paradox with impossibility and absurdity (159a18, 160b17-22); in Sophistical Refutations, he discusses how to elicit paradoxes from an opponent by using several "commonplace rules" such as generalization, proliferation of questions, and especially fallacious opposition (for example, meeting an argument based on convention or opinion with an argument based on its opposite, nature or truth) 172b10- 173a30). Cicero and Quintilian list both "contraries" and "opposites" as topics (De Oratore II.xxxix.162-xl.174; Institutiones Oratoria V.x.32-100); Quintilian considers "arguments drawn from opposites" as figures of thought (IX.i.34) and "antithesis" (contraposition or contentio) as a figure of speech (IX.iii.81); like "correction," these figures of speech differ little from figures of thought (IX.iii.89). The Renaissance rhetors follow suit: Wilson classifies "contraritie or contentio" as both a logical "place" and a "colour of rhetorique" (The Arte of Rhetorique 37, 224); Ramus's Logike bases its method of dichotomy on a theory of "opposites" which has four levels of negation (relatives, denials or contradictions, repugnings, and deprivings) (37-

42). His followers, Fenner and Fraunce, classify synecdoche as a trope based on division, thus grounding it on dichotomy and therefore on the theory of opposites. Paradox, "when we affirm something to be true, by saying we would not have believed it," appears in Peacham's The Garden of Eloquence under rhetorical schemes of the sentence (25); and Puttenham renders it as "the Wondrer," a figure similar to aporia or "the Doubtfull" (n.p.). Colie's observation that a rhetorical paradox is a defense of the indefensible whereas a logical paradox is a contradiction (Paraoxica Epidemica 1966 3 and 7) summarizes the theory and practise of paradox in the Renaissance. Interest in paradox is replaced in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by a concern with the empiricism of Locke (see Campbell and Blair); it revives somewhat in Whately's Elements of Rhetoric (1846) which emphasizes "the burden of proof" or "the presumption" in argument (112 ff.) The position of twentieth-century rhetoric with respect to paradox is to grant it a limited role: insofar as logic is strict reasoning based on a formal system, paradox is illegitimate; insofar as rhetoric is non-logical reasoning aimed at persuasion, paradox is legitimate (see Perelman 1969 1-13 and 187 ff.).

Paradox, as has been recognized since antiquity, is moreover at the core of the "human condition." Aristotle introduced a "Prime Mover" (motivated significantly like Lucretius' atoms by love) to avert the paradox of infinite

regress of "first" causes; Sir Thomas Browne heartily asserted that paradox moved him to ecstasy rather than despair because it led to God; others have been less enthusiastic--the melancholia of Romantic irony, the fear of loss of belief in Matthew Arnold's "Dover Beach," Yeats's assertion of that loss, and Eliot's attempt to recover--all these attest to the centrality of paradox in the disease called humanity. Marvin Minsky's The Society of Mind 1986 demonstrates an "artificial intelligence" expert's attempts to escape paradox in our time.

Newlove's contribution to the continuing debate about the problem is startlingly resolute: to state the paradox in a singular manner for his time and his place--and that is all. The contrast to Eliot is sharp: Newlove is very conscious of the consequences of paradox for belief (Eliot is not); Newlove confronts paradox, directly stating one (Eliot does not); Newlove does not beg the question by escaping paradox (Eliot does). Thus Newlove can end the poem by praising "this only world...flowing through the climate of intelligence," which is to say engaging the imagination actively ("looking," "seeing," "marvelling"). This imaginative activity goes by various names: here, "invention"; in "The Double-Headed Snake," it was called "remembrance." Recalling that "remembrance" is not memory, we see why the poem closes with the invocation "O Memory": the muse, Mnemosthene, is necessary but not sufficient for

the imaginative act, and the invocation is both a lament and a recognition.

In a curious footnote to The Green Plain, Newlove underscores the negative aspects of his muted hope with heavy irony. "The Light of History: This Rhetoric against That Jargon" (1986 57) alerts us by its title to distinguish "this rhetoric" from "that jargon." Rhetoric is traditionally associated with poetry; jargon is group-specific argot; and Newlove's "rhetoric" is quite clearly his own poetry. Specifically, "Light" takes up the vision of The Green Plain, removing death and leaving only an Eden of vigorous life lived in peace and love forever. That the poet considers the Edenic vision "jargon" is emphasized by his use of a syllogistic form (if-then). "When [if] the day comes that these cries [this rhetoric, this poetry]" will be thought "ridiculous," "amusing," and "ununderstandable," "then God bless you happy people." Happiness here depends on ignorance: being unable to "comprehend / sadness or cruelty"; saying "To Hell with it" to "understanding." Again, the ironic conditional:

So long as the green Earth grows
and the great stars shine, live on and love each other.
Being is admirable and the graceful trees in the wind
sway in concert with you in this ever deathless world.

There is more in The Night the Dog Smiled, of course, but nothing to match the culminatory nature of The Green Plain. "The Wandering Tourist Comes Home" (14) evokes the

earlier wandering poet motif and a sense of (spiritual) homecoming to family rather than place. The very fine "White Philharmonic Novels" (58-68) is, like The Green Plain, a summing up, but a summing up of the rhetoric of poetry generally rather than of the topos of place (the technique of that poem is stated within the poem--"arrangement is all"). Hence, the findings in this study with respect to Newlove's use of the topos <prairie,x> would have to rest with the evidence of The Green Plain.

The argument has been that Newlove's major topos is <prairie,x>. As defined above, the topoi are sources of both figure and argument, and the figures themselves may function as topoi. Thus, the notion of topos explicates the sense in which Newlove's poetry is rhetorical: its argument is drawn from a topos, <prairie,x>, which itself constitutes an argument from place. Particular examples of this topos include synecdoches such as <singer, prairie> ("East from the Mountains"), <measure,prairie> ("Ride Off Any Horizon"), <poet,land> ("The Pride"), and <tree-poet, plain> ("The Green Plain"). Other topoi (amplification, repetition, greater-lesser, metaplasms, paradox) are used in poems about both prairie and prairie poetry ("The Double-Headed Snake" and "The Prairie" are notable examples). Newlove's poetry, in other words, demands a rhetorical reading because it is rhetorically based.

2.6 Robert Kroetsch and Paradox

A major topos in the critical and poetical writings of Robert Kroetsch is paradox. This assertion, which incorporates the received criticism, is intended to suggest both Kroetsch's actual practise and an underlying, unarticulated philosophical position. He challenges perhaps the oldest and most fundamental of all philosophical principles (the law of the excluded middle) by transforming the traditional vehicle of such challenge (paradox) into a central and dominant topos of thought and style. Kroetsch's long-standing flirtation with paradox, though it is an important element in his readers' responses (see below), is usually not itself subjected to scrutiny. There is a recognition of a debt Kroetsch owes to the Renaissance; and there is a wide-spread and growing understanding of the logic of paradox in that poetic (Rosalie Colie's Paradoxica Epidemica is the best-known, early example). Yet, critics have been content to observe, to describe, and to follow Kroetsch's poetical and critical interests: they have, in short and in contemporary terms, deconstructed Kroetsch according to Kroetsch.

The rhetorical tradition of paradox has already been described (247-9, above). But contemporary logic offers a further insight into the significance of paradox for both thought and language. All known cases of paradox apparently

involve self-reference of some kind (for example, the set of all sets) and thereby violate some form of the vicious circle principle. Under the rubric of classical logic, a paradox is a statement which implies a contradiction: that is, a paradox is a statement which implies another statement of the form "p and not-p." At the same time, "p and not-p" is classically equivalent to "not-(p or not-p)." The statement "p or not-p" is known as the law of the excluded middle (it asserts that "either p, or not-p, is the case, and there is no other possibility"). In other words, in classical logic, the denial of the law of the excluded middle is equivalent to a contradiction; and every paradox denies the law of the excluded middle (Mendelson 1964, or any standard text).

It has been suspected since antiquity, however, that neither the assertion of a paradox nor the denial of the law of the excluded middle is necessarily the assertion of a contradiction. Indeed, it may be noted that rhetoric qua rhetoric grounds itself on this very insight (Part 1). Similarly, many paradoxes (for example, "The Liar," Martin 1970) are not self-evident contradictions: the inference of contradiction depends on the formal system in which the paradox is formulated; this inference may be prevented by altering the system in some way. At the beginning of this century, these insights led to the development of non-classical logics which do not accept that axiom which allows

a contradiction to be derived from the denial of the law of the excluded middle (Heyting 1966 99-100). Under these non-classical logics, however, every paradox still denies the law of the excluded middle: but the way is open to considering a paradox as something which denies the law of the excluded middle but does not necessarily imply a contradiction.

Several arguments having nothing to do with non-classical logics have been advanced against the validity of the law of the excluded middle, including arguments from psychoanalysis, physics, and hermeneutics (Harold Brown 1982). The most interesting of these arguments, however, comes from developments within classical logic itself: in 1931 Goedel proved that any language powerful enough to formulate the theory of elementary arithmetic within classical logic can formulate also a statement (S) such that both S and its negation not-S are formally unprovable in that theory, yet S is intuitively true of that theory (Mendelson 143-44). Such statements are called undecidable; the formal systems to which they belong are called incomplete. The existence of undecidable statements in classical logic supports the suspicion that the law of the excluded middle may not be universally valid: if "p" is given the standard interpretation "p is provable," then the unqualified law of the excluded middle asserts that "for any statement p, either p is provable or not-p is provable."

Yet, for the undecidable statement S , this assertion is evidently false. Moreover, Goedel's proof depends fundamentally on a form of self-reference which courts but does not imply outright contradiction. The point, then, for this study, is that there is a defensible logical position which suggests that paradoxes derived from self-reference are undecidable statements which may, in some sense, be true.

Binary relations may be used to summarize the above discussion:

- (1) if $[-,-]$ denotes "and," then $[x,\text{not-}x]$ asserts a contradiction for x ;
- (2) if $\{-,-\}$ denotes "or," then $\{x,\text{not-}x\}$ asserts the law of the excluded middle for x ;
- (3) if $\langle-,-\rangle$ is any binary relation, then $\langle z,[x,\text{not-}x]\rangle$ asserts, with respect to the relation $\langle-,-\rangle$, a paradox for x but not necessarily a contradiction;
- (4) if $\langle-,-\rangle$ is any binary relation, then $\langle z,\text{not-}\{x,\text{not-}x\}\rangle$ denies, with respect to the relation $\langle-,-\rangle$, the law of the excluded middle for x .
- (5) if $\langle-,-\rangle$ is any binary relation, then $\langle x,x\rangle$ asserts that the relation $\langle-,-\rangle$ is reflexive for x .

Evidently, if (3) holds, then so does (4). Furthermore, (4) asserts the law of undecidability with respect to the relation $\langle-,-\rangle$ for x . For Kroetsch, (3) to (5) are fundamentally significant: (the rhetorical) paradox (3), (the law of) undecidability (4), and (the principle of) reflexivity (5).

Some critics are rather close to understanding Kroetsch's rhetoric. Robert Lecker argues that "recent criticism of Kroetsch's poetry tends to be inspired by Kroetsch's current critical pronouncements" and therefore

denies "the traditional levels of meaning that Kroetsch has never denied" (1986 123). It is certainly true that postmodern, deconstructivist terminology has reduced the ovibos moschatus of meaning to a mirage glimpsed only occasionally in a white-out of noise; but Kroetsch's "traditional levels of meaning" are not all that traditional, as we shall see. On the other hand, more traditional approaches to Kroetsch's poetry are also flawed. "The search for an adequate language," says Thomas, "is essentially the same as the quest for an authentic self" (Robert Kroetsch 1980 17). Thomas's notion of adequacy is narrow: it is an adequacy for authenticity--which is only one half of Lanham's bifurcated Western self. This self, however, is adopted as a persona by Kroetsch and becomes the subject and object of his ridicule and praise. The search for an adequate language is Robert Kroetsch's search--but this language must be and is a language adequate to both homo seriusus and homo rhetoricus, to both authenticity and rhetoricity. To insist that the language be adequate for one to the exclusion of the other is to insist that the law of the excluded middle apply--and that is precisely not Kroetsch's philosophical position. Russell Brown is on firmer ground when he asserts, for example, that "Seed Catalogue is not after all a poem constructed through binary opposition...but rather one made up of [the rhetorical devices of] reversals and corrections" (1984 162-63). And E.

D. Blodgett concludes that for Kroetsch the object of all discourse is "the problem of how significance is produced" (1984 203).

What Kroetsch's position is may be found, inarticulated but clearly present, in his critical writings (an earlier version of the following analysis appeared in Prairie Fire 6.3 (Summer 1985): 57-61). Consider the following (admittedly reductive) readings of Essays (1983):

- (1) the dichotomy, American writer or not-American writer, admits a third, namely, the Canadian writer who is not simply not-American ("The Canadian Writer and the American Literary Tradition" (11) and "Contemporary Standards in the Canadian Novel" (37));
- (2) the binary opposition, hiding/revealing, yields to an "unhiding" which is neither yet both of the former ("Unhiding the Hidden: Recent Canadian Fiction" (17));
- (3) langue and parole do not exhaust the possibilities--there is also "voice" ("Effing the Ineffable" (23));
- (4) the traditional male/female opposition in fiction has a non-traditional resolution in prairie writing: for example, the "horse-house" opposition becomes "whore's-house" rather than "marriage and family" ("The Fear of Women in Prairie Fiction: An Erotics of Space" (47));
- (5) between form and formlessness lies "violated form" ("The Exploding Porcupine: Violence of Form in English-Canadian Fiction" (57));
- (6) beginnings and endings are both strategies of "delay" ("Taking the Risk" (65) and "For Play and Entrance: The Contemporary Canadian Long Poem" (91));
- (7) Canadian writing is a "literature of dangerous middles" ("Beyond Nationalism: A Prologue" (83));
- (8) order or chaos? No--"carnival" ("Carnival and Violence: A Meditation" (111)).

Of course, such readings completely overlook the content of Kroetsch's criticism, but they do begin to locate its form. Again and again, Kroetsch announces variations on a single theme--the law of the excluded middle does not hold--by offering "third" possibilities which, taken

together, promulgate a law of undecidability. Whether critical issues are decidable or undecidable is probably itself undecidable; hence, Kroetsch's position is a belief (in the law of undecidability rather than in the law of the excluded middle). The form of this criticism is, moreover, its theoretical content. A restless motion of mind--forward, backward, oscillating, doubling--suggests directly that reading and writing are a never-ending play of making out with meaning. For this play, the law of undecidability is much less inhibiting and repressive than the law of the excluded middle. The idea that "doubling" ultimately exhausts all possibilities is exactly what the law of the excluded middle implies. Doubling is also dichotomization, and as such is an indispensable tool in the establishment of meaning. At the same time, without "doubling," the law of undecidability loses its significance because the "third" option assumes a value only on the basis of its purported exclusion. The double is therefore central to Kroetsch's attack on that law (excluded middle) which announces the double's central position in the search for meaning.

Labyrinths (1982) demonstrates that the object of Kroetsch's search is meaning itself. First, the book is a quest for the meaning of the term "postmodern." When this term is directly confronted (195-209), it resists definition (which is, after all, "as restrictive as cosmology" 7). Second, the book's index shows that the "double" is a

longstanding, central preoccupation for Kroetsch: though there are entries with more citations, few have a larger range or a greater intension (see, besides doubling, index entries for game, undecidability, myth, dichotomy, indeterminacy, et cetera). Third, Kroetsch's favourite response to "meaning" of any kind is to "resist" or "refuse" it (see index), yet, the "fragment" discovered typically in an archaeological site (167) is an open invitation to create meaning. Thus it is not meaning as such that is denied, but received meaning: in place of this, Kroetsch would substitute his own invented meaning. Kroetsch desires making meaning so much that he courts meaninglessness precisely because it provides the opportunity to create meaning. He is utterly decided on this point: "I do believe in writing so profoundly...I suppose I write against systems even if I, ironically, end up incorporating a system" (160). The system Kroetsch incorporates, in my view, is the law of undecidability: it slays the minotaur of received meaning and allows him to replace that hated beast with his own invention, a new muskox of meaning.

Thus, as Lecker says, "there is an aesthetic centre in Kroetsch's work"; but that centre is not "the space between polarities" such as tradition/innovation, model/anarchy, form/invention, father-/sonship, history/presence, myth/tale, genealogy/isolation, convention/experimentation, archetype/fragment, stability/instability, east/west,

start/stop, closed/open, death/birth, and so on (148). Each such polarity is an instance of the law of the excluded middle, and to locate Kroetsch in the emptiness between such polarities is to miss precisely his challenge to the validity of that law. The aesthetic centre of Kroetsch's work is the meaning of meaning: the meaning of meaning is that meaning necessarily demands the demolition of the polarities on which it depends; that is, the meaning of meaning is a paradox called the law of undecidability. One of the immediate consequences of undecidability is a personal commitment to process--"I do believe in writing so profoundly."

But the Essays, in which Kroetsch unwittingly yet consistently argues from this philosophical position, date mostly from the late seventies and early eighties. By that time he was already a recognized novelist and poet, and it comes as no surprise that the same philosophical concern is a ground for his imaginative writings as well. The Stone Hammer Poems (1975), for example, contains several early instances of quests for meaning that fail to satisfy the questor. Kroetsch's dissatisfaction with received meaning at this point in his career is underlined by the variety of forms he uses in his poetry: retelling Indian legends, arguing syllogistically, portraying the artist-figure, and playing with descent motifs. The title poem is itself a text-book exploration of the meanings of meaning.

The sequence of "Old Man Stories" (3-12) is a self-confessed attempt to locate meaning in stolen "tales" (1, footnote). Thomas's very positive response to this sequence is based on his admiration of the poet's use of stolen narrators, the trickster and the shaman: "'The Old Man Poems' express the trickster principle..."; "The shamanistic sensibility of 'The Old Man Poems' is evident in Old Man's discontinuous acts and in his incidental existence which is characterized by chance meetings and events that are resolved only 'ironically'" (ECW 39-40). These two figures seem to stand in some (unspecified) relation to Narcissus and Orpheus and their associated descent motifs (41). Thomas articulates an important insight in his recognition that Orpheus and Narcissus are doubles (53) whose "interchange" (49) and "interpenetration" (45) constitute an axis of significance in Kroetsch's poetry. As we have seen, however, Thomas (like most modern readers) prefers Orpheus to Narcissus (48), and this bias undermines his reading of Kroetsch's poetry and of the original myths, classical and native.

Orpheus and Narcissus may be considered representations of homo seriusus and homo rhetoricus, respectively, and as a representation of the full yet bifurcated Western self, jointly (Lanham 1976). The shaman and the trickster seem to represent a similar bifurcation in the Amerindian self (Radin 1956, Eliade 1964). That both native American and

classical Greek myths should agree structurally on a representation of the self suggests that the dynamics of the self in these two traditions might exhibit further similarities--and, indeed, similarities are found in a shared ascent/descent motif. In the classical version, Orpheus is a changed singer when he returns from his failure to rescue Eurydice from the underworld: "now I need a lighter refrain to tell of boys whom the gods have loved and of girls...seized with unlawful passion..." (Ovid, Metamorphoses X.150). The love of male for male is symbolically equivalent to self-love, and hence this change tends toward narcissism (III.410 ff.): a "serious" Orpheus has been transformed into a "rhetorical" Narcissus-figure. The new Orpheus has not lost all power, but he has lost the power to move his "serious" audience which now kills him.

In the native version, the shaman's Orphic descent into the underworld (to retrieve a lost soul) is both a demonstration and a source of his powers; when he returns, he can use these powers effectively only if the society retains its "serious" beliefs. Eliade notes that, as the belief systems of native societies erode, the effective powers of the shaman diminish, making him a "black sorcerer" (299). This sorcerer is similar to the trickster-figure who acts negatively rather than positively but has considerable power. Jung, commenting on Radin's study of the trickster cycle, says that "the trickster obviously represents a

vanishing level of consciousness which increasingly lacks the power to take shape and assert itself" (Radin 204), a "shadow" (202) behind which is the "anima" (210). The structure of the relation between a "serious" shaman and a "rhetorical" trickster-figure, in other words, is that the latter is a transformation of the former.

The meaning of "Old Man Stories" therefore resides in the narrator as much as in the narrative, in the representation of ethos as much as in the representation of logos. Thomas's observation that this narrator is "resolutely unconnecting" is entirely fair: "He [Old Man] demonstrates very completely the unstable self which has creative energy and is capable of knowledge but perennially falls back into the error of self-love" (ECW 41). On the other hand, this narrator has very little of the serious shaman: if "shamanism = technique of ecstasy" (Eliade 4), and if the shaman is "the great specialist in the human soul" (8), "a sick man who has been cured, who has succeeded in curing himself" (27) and who "knows the mechanism, or rather the theory of illness" (31), then Old Man is no shaman. Homo seriusus is present in Kroetsch's poems, and in a distinctly shamanistic form, but not in "Old Man Stories" where homo rhetoricus roams freely:

He, touching, found them warm, and turned them over.
 He lifted off their clothes and "Ah, he said,
 "they have been stabbed. Here are the wounds."
 He put a finger in the wounds, then added, louder,
 "No. They have been shot. I smell the gunpowder" (11).

<Self,[rhetorical,serious]> is a paradox, and Old Man's rhetorical self does turn serious in the last of these stories (20). He shapes a woman and her son out of clay and buries them, resurrecting them four days later. In response to the woman's question, "Will we always have life?," Old Man claims he "didn't think of that" and suggests a buffalo chip will decide:

If it floats, people when they die
will be dead for four days.
If it sinks they die forever.

Of course his suggestion reveals that he knows there is no issue: people will die, the only question is whether forever or not. The woman, pleased with life, suggests they use a stone:

If it sinks we must die forever, so that
we will always be sorry for each other.
If it floats, we live forever.

Her alternative to Old Man's suggestion introduces a serious note: death is acknowledged as inevitable (for the stone necessarily sinks), and those who love life should therefore pity each other. The woman's words unmask Old Man's mocking use of logic (his application of the law of the excluded middle is rhetorical). "Throw the stone," he replies, now utterly serious.

"Syllogisms of Desire" (22-3) uses the topos <if,then> (which is after all the paradigm of all topoi). Each of these "syllogisms" is an enthymeme (a rhetorical syllogism), one of two basic tools of rhetorical

demonstration. The wit in these arguments is often in the suppression of a premise: in "A," for example, the conclusion, "Therefore my dog has fleas, but keeps / me scratching," is seen to follow from the major premise, "All dogs have fleas," only when the minor premise, "my desire is a dog," is recognized in the middle stanza:

My bed and blankets, all are rank
with itching; back, belly, bum and
balls all burn.

Of course, the wit is compounded because this middle stanza itself is enthymematic--desire causes my body to itch like a dog, therefore desire is a dog--and because the conclusion returns us to a consequence of one of this enthymeme's premises--my desire may be the dog, but I keep scratching. Sometimes the suppressed premise is cued by a pun: "Man is what he eats" is followed by a menu in honor of Aphrodite (ending with "one / small rhinoceros horn") and a conclusion ("come, sweet, I must / in thee abide") which asserts that the speaker is 'horny' ("C"). Syllogism "E" states its major premise last, assumes its minor premise (Socrates is a man), and uses these two to imply an answer to a rhetorical question. What did Socrates do when he met Xantippe? "All men are mortal" and history answer that he married the terror. The paradox that is the meaning of desire (and paradox with respect to the relation "desires" is denoted by $\langle z, [x, \text{not-}x] \rangle$) is caught with an elegant mingling of the rhetorical and the serious in the middle section of

"Sketches Towards a Couplet on Love" (26):

My ark of longing has its beast
 and crying beast; but never quite
 a pair. My cataclysm of desire
 rides you to comfort in the night

and me to fire and despair,
 and more desire.

On a more serious note, Kroetsch next rings several meanings on the term artiste. Critics have studied four poems on the artist-figure (Thomas ECW 44-45, Lecker 1986 129-30): to these must be added a fifth poem on St. Jerome. All these artists are silent men who "speak" in the media of graphic and silent languages. Wong Toy is elegized in his "son's" poem (44); Grove finds a new identity in his invention of the world in words (46); Albert Johnson survives in words because he was literally silent and silenced (48); and Tom Thompson speaks in a language that can never be voiced (50). That leaves St. Jerome, "the first man ever, reading not to read / aloud not moving / / his lips" ("20/20 Vision" 53). This observation is actually St. Augustine's about his teacher Ambrose (Confessions Book 6 Chapter 3 133-34), but, historical inaccuracy aside, we may recall that St. Jerome is remembered in literature for his mastery of rhetoric and his misogynistic writings, the latter ridiculed by Chaucer's Wife of Bath. The Word that Jerome read silently in study and desert is surely the Scripture; "The Word (she) saying" that we read in the poem is the good Wife's, a skilled rhetorician and anything but

silent. Yet, the speaker in the poem identifies with Jerome, "when he read / moving the world into his own / (my) head into his vision." The writer, in other words, is a man of silence, just as his artistic medium is silent. The writer transcends "the victimization of voice" (Lecker 1986 131); his silence is emphatically not evidence of inexpressibility, or, as Thomas would have it, a sign of "the inability to express private grief in public song" (ECW 34). Kroetsch's stance is traditional, ironic, and rhetorical--an inexpressibility topos writ large--though the point is serious. The reader who finds a tragic interpretation of "silence" disconcerting in the context of the exuberance of Kroetsch's work is right to be uneasy: the critics have been misled by a rhetorical use of silence to make a serious point about writing.

Kroetsch's fourth attempt in this collection to locate meaning--the first three (in received narration, argumentation, and artist-figures) have all resulted ultimately in dislocation--again involves the inexpressibility topos. A returned Orpheus who anticipates future failure of expression as he evokes the hope implied by past successes, who, in other words, employs both prolepsis (anticipation) and analepsis (evocation), is using the inexpressibility topos. The version of this topos that he employs is <poet,[prolepsis,analepsis]>, which involves an instance of [x,not-x] (pro = before and ana = after).

This topos may be analyzed by applying Aristotle's "common places" to the concept of expressibility: both failure and success in expression are possible ("what can or cannot happen"); future failure is anticipated ("what will or will not happen"); and past successes are evoked ("what has or has not happened"). More specifically, expressibility ("what") is possible ("can happen"), as the past demonstrates ("has happened"), yet unlikely ("will not happen") in the future. The "Orphic topos" consists then of a particular iteration of rather basic topoi applied to expressibility. The choice of alternatives (the preferred ranking of alternatives) for the future is, however, dictated by Orpheus's experience in the immediate past--the drastic outcome of his descent to the underworld.

It need not be so: the healing function of the shaman hinges on the possibility that he can in fact bring the soul lost in the underworld back to its owner, thus curing a soul-sickness (Eliade). If expressibility is the "soul" of the poem, if the failure or success of expression in the poem is a measure of its "sickness" or "health," then the poet is a "shaman" precisely insofar as he evokes (past) failure of expression and anticipates (future) success (that is, insofar as he undergoes a successful descent / ascent experience). A shaman-poet, in other words, employs the topos <poet, [prolepsis, analepsis]> somewhat differently than does Orpheus. When the subject of the poem is a descent /

ascent experience, then the poem is about the writing of the poem, that is, about expressibility. Such a poem is based on the reflexivity of the relation "expresses," $\langle x, x \rangle$.

Four poems in SHP begin the process that will end many years later in an extreme self-referentiality (reflexivity) expressing the solipsism of the human predicament. All four contain shamanistic elements, either private "technique[s] of [achieving] ecstasy" or public "healing" functions, and all four play on the descent/ascent motif. "Pumpkin: A Love Poem" (24) situates its speaker "[i]nside the pumpkin" which the end of the poem implies is the centre of the world. The speaker is at the nadir of his descent experience, repeatedly insisting "I feel much better." The repetition undercuts the assertion which is further denied by many allusions to effort and difficulty: the speaker is "trying to smile," "squirming uneasily," and "just barely able to unzip." Readers have agreed that the poem involves a masturbatory movement (Thomas ECW 42-3 and Lecker 1986 132); they feel that the poem is unsuccessful because it is too narcissistic (Thomas) or ultimately self-defeating despite its postulation of an idealized female Other (Lecker). But the shaman is first a wielder of techniques of ecstasy and then a healer; "Pumpkin" evidently presents the speaker as the former.

The remaining three poems similarly feature the descent motif. In "Winter Birds" (31), the world into which the

shaman-poet attempts to descend is up in a tree. He discovers that the inhabitants of this world reject him: the best he can do is become the tree; the birds, in effect, descend to their underworld (the tree-man rooted in the earth), but the poet cannot descend (ascend) successfully into his. "Idea for a Poem" (52) likens the descent/ascent of the poet to the experience of the fish-hawk. The poem ("pike") sought by the poet ("hawk") may be articulated (brought "ashore"); or it may be so powerful ("heavy," "strong") that the effort to express it (bring it "ashore") kills him (the hawk drowns). What happens to the poem in the latter case is not clear, but the danger to the poet is clearly expressed. "Mile Zero" (61) is literally "some account of a journey through western Canada in the dead of six nights," a descent to an end which is also an ascent to a new beginning. Four poems, then, treat the arrested descent/ascent experience. In retrospect, these poems anticipate the more successful experience in "How I Joined the Seal Herd" (prolepsis) while they recall the failure of Orpheus (analepsis); they show a trickster-figure struggling to exercise the techniques that induce the ecstasy needed to make a successful journey to cure his own and his poetry's "soul sickness."

The quest for meaning in SHP (represented by explorations of a narrating ethos, enthymematic argument, the artist-figure, and descent motifs) is focussed on what

it means to be a "poet." The title poem, however, deals overtly with the meaning of "stone" (54). In an obvious way, the stone is paradoxically both lost and found, which is to say that its meaning is the paradox <stone,[lost,found]>. Nine of the poem's eleven parts (parts 1-6 and 8-10) alternate between a "lost" stone (1-3-5-9) and a "found" stone (2-4-6-8-10); part 7 equates poem and stone--hence, <poem,[lost,found]>; and part 11 replaces the opposition with "kept" stone. All parts move from the present tense and situation to the past: more precisely, then, the poem and the stone mean this process of finding and losing, moving to that which is "kept." Thus, the meaning of both poem and stone is the paradox <z,[losing,finding]>, moving finally to <z,keeping>.

Russell Brown, however, reads the poem as a study of loss (1984 173), remarking that the poem proceeds by correctio (163) and is "an enactment of the poet's invariable response [writing]" to that loss which is ultimately death (173). But more than death is lost (and found) in this poem. According to Lecker, the stone that is repeatedly lost and found means origins, Indian history, family history, an actual paperweight, and poetry (1986 127-8). Poetry, for example, this poem, therefore is the process of searching for meaning (128-9). Lecker points out that Part 6 contains "the paradox of [Kroetsch's] most emphatic statement" (129), a statement that Brown interprets as an

expression of "Kroetsch's divided desires (to know; to not know)" (169):

I have to/I want
to know (not know)
?WHAT HAPPENED
(SHP 56)

The narrator's statement, "to know (not know)," is worth examining carefully, for it bears centrally on Kroetsch's argument. It has several possible interpretations:

1. to know or not to know;
2. to know or to not know;
- 3. to know or not know;
4. to know and not to know;
5. to know and to not know;
- 6. to know and not know.

Readings 1-3 are all applications of the law of the excluded middle (which Kroetsch overwhelmingly rejects); readings 4-6 are all paradoxes (and Kroetsch welcomes paradox); readings 2 and 5 are evidently the two possibilities Brown favours (Lecker does not specify which of readings 4-6 he chooses). But the statement itself suggests that only readings 3 and 6 are possible on syntactic grounds: both share a distinctive feature--one instance of the ^{infinitive} preposition "to" distributes over two infinitive forms ("know," "not know"). That is, the interpretations closest to the poem's statement are 3 and 6; and 3 may be excluded because it is an instance of the law of the excluded middle. That leaves interpretation 6: to know and not know.

"I want to know and not know" is an extremely

interesting paradox of the following form:

$\langle z, [\text{know}, \text{not-know}] \rangle$, where the relation $\langle -, - \rangle$, in this poem, is "desires to."

It implies therefore (see above 255),

$\langle z, \text{not-}\{\text{know}, \text{not-know}\} \rangle$.

But this latter statement translates into

z desires to not- $\{\text{know}, \text{not-know}\}$,

which, in turn, translates into

z desires to deny the law of the excluded middle
for knowledge.

That is,

z desires to assert the law of undecidability
for knowledge.

"To know and not know" therefore is not a binary opposition, but a unitary if unstable state. The narrator's (z's) desire "to know and not know" is a desire to assert that knowledge is undecidable. But knowledge is meaning: therefore the narrator desires to assert that meaning is undecidable in general, just as the meaning of the stone and the poem are undecidable in particular (for the meaning of stone and poem are continuously lost and found). The meaning of meaning, in other words, is its (paradoxical) undecidability. "Stone Hammer Poem," then, argues that poetry is a search for meaning (for example, the meaning of "stone"); it argues also that this search is not meaningless (for the meaning of meaning is undecidability, the object of desire). The paradox "to know and not know" justifies the importance that Kroetsch and his readers evidently attach to it.

"The Ledger" (1975; Field Notes 1981 23-43) argues from and for the same position. Its double-entry, double-column form is appropriate for "the paradox that is implicit in any attempt to find a 'balanced' account of oneself" (Thomas RK 17); it ends with "the paradox of peace through terror" (Thomas ECW 48); and it features the poet as Coyote bringing chaos (McKay 1984 150), or as dialogician exploring "the meaning of writing" (Lecker 1986 135). Paradox in "The Ledger" is distributed over six definitions of "ledger," all of which are recapitulated in the last: besides $\langle z, [x, \text{not-}x] \rangle$, the poem employs $\langle z, \text{not-}\{x, \text{not-}x\} \rangle$, distributio / recapitulatio, and definitio (the lexical kind). In summary:

- (a) the ledger (=z) is a book of [credit,debit] which is in a state of [balance,imbalance], its pages [present,absent], and writing is a search, ["is debit, is credit"]--all instances of $\langle z, [x, \text{not-}x] \rangle$;
- (b) the ledger as a piece of wood leads to $\langle z, [\text{raise}, \text{cut}] \rangle$, as well as [raise,burn], [raise,kill], [raise,fall]; a moment of balance is tenuous--"yes:no / no:yes";
- (c) the ledger as "resident" violates the neat dichotomy of {arrival,departure}--that is, $\langle \text{ledger}, \text{not-}\{\text{arrival}, \text{departure}\} \rangle$;
- (d) "the nether millstone" is, paradoxically, "the grinding stone / that does not turn";
- (e) ledger as tombstone suggests that [married,buried] balances; thus, "You MUST marry the terror";
- (f) the ledger, "a book that lies permanently in some place," is both [lie,truth] and "the poem"; the definitions are reviewed; and the poem ends on a note of [peace,terror]. (Note: where no confusion can result, I have written [x,not-x] instead of the full statement of paradox, $\langle z, [x, \text{not-}x] \rangle$.)

The trope correctio used in this poem (Brown 1984 163) is therefore actually based on successive applications of paradox. A larger paradox in both "The Ledger" and "Seed Catalogue" is $\langle z, [\text{documentary}, \text{poem}] \rangle$. As Brown argues, one

of the major oppositions "corrected" in "Seed Catalogue" is the usual one involving the seasons (155): spring is absent on the prairies, and winter is followed immediately by summer. The poem makes this correction as an inference:

Into the dark of January
the seed catalogue bloomed

a winter proposition, if
spring should come, then

(Seed Catalogue 1977 13).

The seed catalogue is metonymically and synecdochically the literally absent spring of the prairies; a metaphor "blooms" this season into the "winter" proposition that "if / spring should come, then" summer can't be far behind. That is,

if <winter, seed catalogue> and <seed catalogue, spring>
and <spring, summer> then <winter, summer>.

The seed catalogue is a "place" where the missing season (spring), rhetorically necessary for the connection between winter and summer, may be found (this is precisely Ong's understanding of the Ramistic notion of topos 1958 182-3). The inference is enthymematic: the major premise (if spring, then summer) is only partially stated; the minor premises (it is winter, and spring has come) are delivered by the reference to winter and the advent of the seed catalogue; the conclusion (winter is followed by summer) eliminates the literally absent season by modus ponens.

Formally, "Seed Catalogue, like many of Kroetsch's poems, is an extended anaphora or isocolon of question and answer: "How do you grow X?" is the poem's question (X =

garden, lover, town, past, and, most importantly, poet) and governs the methodical development of its answer. The question is predictably (given the poet's work so far) undecidable, which is to say, that the answers are paradoxical. To grow a poet one plants a seed in a suitable environment: but the title suggests that the seed of the poet is found in the catalogue which is the poem; the given environment is so hostile that a suitable one needs to be grown before the seed can be planted; hence, the poem is also a catalogue of seeds for the environment of the poet. The whole analysis, moreover, proceeds by way of paradox, for each of the possible answers to the several related questions is an apparent opposition whose conjunction is a seed of the poet. Thus, $\langle z, [x, \text{not-}x] \rangle$, where $[x, \text{not-}x]$ is $[\text{male, female}]$, $[\text{mother, father}]$, $[\text{garden, field}]$, $[\text{poem, story}]$, $[\text{writing, speaking}]$, $[\text{absence, presence}]$, $[\text{love, lust}]$, $[\text{do, die}]$, $[\text{past, future}]$, $[\text{forget, remember}]$, $[\text{war, peace}]$. The poem closes with a question, "Adam and Eve got drowned - / who was left?", which recalls similarly italicized remarks strategically placed in the poem. First is the repeated question "How do you grow X?"; second, a series of statements on the paradoxical nature of love in Parts 2 and 3, and "Adam and Eve got caught / playing dirty" in Part 3; Part 7 has "Flourishes under absolute neglect"; Part 9 begins with "The danger of merely living"; and the last part begins with a poem:

Poet, teach us
to love our dying.

West is a winter place.
The palimpsest of prairie

under the quick erasure
of snow, invites a flight.

These italicized words are apostrophes by the poet to the self-as-poet, he who was left ("Pinch-Me" 21) when Adam and Eve fell from innocence, he who is "left" when the seed ripens.

Brown's reading, that "Seed Catalogue" is made up of reversals and corrections rather than binary oppositions (1984 162-3), is therefore closer to the spirit and method of the poem than Lecker's interpretation that the poem is a dead draw between the oral and the written (1986 137-9). Indeed, one of the paradoxes in the poem is <poem,[writing, speaking]>, which bears on "growing" the poet: the poem itself contains "lyric" and "story"; the mother is associated with the lyric impulse, the garden, and the breath; the father "tells" stories, yet the "story" about his advice to the son who would "write" a poem is a poem; and the whole is an instance of silencing words by writing them down. The relation <poem,[literacy, orality]> is the general "place" from which these paradoxical assertions are drawn. As Blodgett points out, Kroetsch uses the techniques of both poetry and narrative to explore "how significance is produced" (1984 203).

"Seed Catalogue" returns to the project of discovering

the meaning of "poet" explored in The Stone Hammer Poems--except in one respect: it says nothing about the descent / ascent motif. The collection, however, ends with an ultimate descent / ascent poem, anticipated by the attempt in "My Tree Poem" (62). "How I Joined the Seal Herd" (SC 67) is, somewhat surprisingly, dismissed by Kroetsch's readers: Thomas regards it as a light-weight "shamanistic dream-song" (RK 31 and ECW 50-53); Lecker calls it an "ultimate regression" that posits "a [temporary] death of writing" (1986 139-41). It is, of course, neither, but the recreation (after the fact and in writing) of a shamanistic journey (real or imagined is not the point) that heals the narrator's soul. By situating the narrator in the present, recalling an event in the immediate past, Kroetsch can employ to great effect the paradoxical ethos <homo, [rhetoricus,seriosus]>--the experience was serious, the telling is rhetorical and serious, and the interplay of these two is the locus of the poem's persuasive power. An "Orphic topos" (see above) with its propensity to tragedy (inexpressibility) is rejected in favour of a "shamanistic topos" with its propensity to comedy (expressibility). Like "Stone Hammer Poem," with which it shares a prominent, last position in a collection, "How I Joined the Seal Herd" is a paradox: how to be rhetorical and serious, simultaneously.

The descent / ascent experience in the poem may be simply described: (1) the narrator is in a room with a woman

who wants "no other going/than to be gone"; (2) he--or both he and the woman, the ambiguity is deliberate--joins the seal herd outside; (3) undressing, he sees a young cow (who may be the woman), enters the water at her invitation, and fights off a bull; (4) they mate; (5) he returns (perhaps with the woman/cow) to the shore. That this is a successful shamanistic descent / ascent experience is clear: the narrator prepares for descent by a ritual of deprivation (symbolized by removing the appurtenances of civilization); he recovers his own lost soul (symbolized by the cow with whom he mates), thereby healing himself; he returns, a new man, to the society from which he departed. Possession of techniques for achieving ecstasy is the mark of the shaman, and the ability to heal oneself is a prerequisite to healing others (Eliade).

But the telling of this experience is another matter entirely. First, it establishes that the descent was successful: the narrator returned a new man, he sang, and he sings again in this new poem. The experience, in other words, was serious (not to be confused with tragic) as well as comic (as successful descent experiences are by definition). Several examples of serious speech during the descent/ascent are recorded, the major one being the song of insight during or immediately after sexual union:

America was a good lay she nearly
fucked me to death, wow but this
I'm a new man (mammal, I corrected
myself) here.

Of course the seal/man never loses his human-ness, measured always by the capacity and articulation of expression, and his return to the shore is accompanied by an increase in verbosity.

Secondly, the telling establishes that the narrator retains his capacity to be rhetorical. He is both sure ("I swear") and unsure ("maybe / I have this wrong") about what happened; he represents himself as playing both hero ("I, the lone bull seal bravely / guarding the rookery") and human ("Frankly, I wanted to get laid") in those past events; he provides evidence that he experienced both bravado ("men in their forties . . . are awfully good / in bed") and anguish ("my nights are all bloody . . . / god, I am lonely") in his pursuit of the cow/woman down under. This telling reveals also that during the descent experience the rhetorical capacity was diminished. As the narrator recalls and tells his experience, his present rhetorical control mirrors his descent from the world of rhetoric to the world of seriousness and his return therefrom. The reported speeches during the descent, even in retelling, ring of utterance. A contrast may be drawn with "Pumpkin: A Love Poem" (SHP 24). It is spoken from within the descent experience; "Seal Herd" is spoken after such an experience. The change in tense makes all the difference: the narrator in the pumpkin remains primarily homo rhetoricus; the narrator who joined the seal herd became homo seriusus and

upon his return is <homo, [seriosus, rhetoricus]>; the former descent, though it induced ecstasy, did not heal; the latter "un-hid" the serious part of the soul, healing the self into accepting its full and bifurcated nature. The rhetorical self claims (after the fact) that he wanted to say "I am/writing this poem with my life," and no doubt he was. But the serious self extends his concern further:

dear, I whispered I hope my children
 (ours, I corrected myself) their ears perfect
 will look exactly like both of us.

"Seal Herd" marks the fuller emergence, then, of <homo, [seriosus, rhetoricus]>, that complex persona (ethos) who figures more or less in all of Kroetsch's subsequent poetry. Because the persona is not split into two opposing parts but rather consists of two parts held in paradoxical conjunction, it constitutes a continual challenge to the law of the excluded middle (which would say that the self can be serious, or rhetorical, and there is no third possibility). But [seriosus, rhetoricus] is a third possibility; it specifically violates the law of the excluded middle; it is a paradox answering an undecidable question. Question: Is this persona serious, or rhetorical? Answer: It is both (that is, the question is undecidable). The only certainty is that the "Orphic topos" has been abandoned for another version of descent.

This ethos dominates two more poems in Field Notes (1981). Both "The Sad Phoenician" (75) and "The Silent Poet

Sequence" (103) share another major characteristic: they rely heavily on the use of and/but and on the pun. "And/but" is the paradox <but,[and,and-not]> (Fowler calls this usage of but "illogical"). The pun, like the grammatical "but," is both an example of the low made high and an instance of <z,[x,not-x]>: disparate meanings of two words rendered by one word which is similar to another -- "Earache the Red" is <The Red,[Earache,Eric]>. It depends for its effect on both phoneme and grapheme, marrying the worlds of orality and literacy. And the alphabet, perhaps these two poems' most obvious topos, is emphatically the essence of orality made visible. Nearly every section is informed in some way by its letter: for example, (x) is "a cargo to Upsilon [y]," (y) asks "why? who? him," and (z) is "izzard." The alphabet is a gloss on the extended argument that is "The Sad Phoenician," allowing the reader to track the argument in the large (just as and/but does in the small), giving the reader the illusion that s/he is "following," but at the same time offering a negative comment on argument itself. The alphabet is, of course, the legacy of the Phoenicians, and provides therefore the "place" from which the poem's title and narrator's name are drawn. Alphabets are based on iterated doubling (<a,b> and <b,c> allow passage to <a,c>, and so on), and Kroetsch furthermore divides his alphabet in half:

and even if it's true, that my women all have new
lovers,
 then laugh, go ahead (a)

but even if it's true, that my women all have new
 offer no pity, remember, the worm turns ^{lovers,} (b).

This inversion suggests that the second half of the poem (n-z) will be in some sense the mirror image of the first half (a-m), a generalized "but" to a generalized "and." Since each poem, (a) to (z), ends with the conjunction with which it begins, every pair of poems shares this alternating structure: (a) is framed by "and," (b) is framed by "but," just as (a-m) is framed by "and," and (n-z) by "but." The paradox <but,[and,and-not]> therefore is superimposed on the alphabet, yielding the structure of any two successive stanzas in every section, any two successive sections in the sequence, and the two halves of the sequence.

It is perhaps clear, then, that relations of the form <z,[x,not-x]> generate matter, manner, and ethos in "The Sad Phoenician." Indeed, the role of paradox is so pervasive that it seems to frustrate every attempt to make any traditional meaning out of the poem (Lecker 1986 141). The poem is about the paradoxes of language and love, of course, as they are viewed by the ethos <homo, [seriosus,rhetoricus]>. Since the speaker is a paradox, an answer to an undecidable question, the poem's meaning includes the undecidability of the speaker's statements. A particular instance where this meaning emerges with stunning clarity is at the end of the highly rhetorical section (n)-- which is, not incidentally, the first section in the second

half of the sequence: "but I love you," says the Sad Phoenician, with utter seriousness.

The Sad Phoenician's ethos poses an enormous problem for his women: how to love <homo, [seriousus, rhetoricus]>? The woman from Swift Current now pursues adverbs; the woman in New York runs after dooknobs; "Miss Reading" of Montreal follows the fire to the fireman; and the woman from Nanaimo lives in a submarine. He, in turn, claims he loves them all (n), accuses them of leaving him, and suggests the possibility that he "might" be their new lovers (l). But these particular women in fact give way to "the huntress" (n), who reappears as "the lady" who is "the guardian of the tree" (y), also called "the old gal" (z). This figure is the archetypal female herself, embodying as she does characteristics of Artemis, Aphrodite, and Athena, as well as of the four identified women. "Woman," rather than any individual woman, is the object of the Sad Phoenician's paradoxical desire, and he paradoxically forsakes the individual for the archetype rather as the neoplatonist forsakes the individual for the ideal.

The Silent Poet (FN 103-13) shares the dual ethos of the Sad Phoenician, but tends more readily to the serious: a completely serious rival, Earache the Red, is lampooned mercilessly, yet his seriousness and success reveal the anxiety beneath the Silent Poet's humour (Lecker 1986 143). Once again, individual women figure in each of the six poems

in the sequence: each of them is the poet's lover in some sense--Earache's wife, "Whatzernayme" and the "patient in the asylum," "she who loves gold" and is taken in by Earache, and the woman ("Jezebel") in the poet's bathroom. Each of them is a face of Woman.

Woman is a point of entry also to "The Winnipeg Zoo" (FN 117-119). A narrator recounts the activities of an unnamed woman who takes her lovers (a boy, a tall young man, a farmer, a lawyer), one by one, to the Winnipeg zoo and returns alone. It is important to understand the narrator's situation: he is "here," but where is that? First, he is "exhausted from moving" and "the moving is a story." Secondly, he seems at times to be at home (for example, when the woman returns alone); at other times, he seems to be at the zoo, watching the woman with her lovers, or (at the end of the poem) being with the woman, wanting to go home. This suggests that the narrator in fact follows the woman and her lovers to the zoo, rushes home to be there when she returns, and is finally discovered by the woman herself at the zoo. He is literally exhausted from all this moving, the story of which he recounts in the poem. Furthermore, the narrator, in the guise of his alter-ego, Audubon, fixes for the reader the succession of dead, non-moving images of woman and lover in zoo (hence the gun imagery). As poet, however, his resources are not limited to fixed images: there is also movement, that is, narrative. Thus, signification is once

again produced by uniting story and image in the poem (Blodgett); and the reader, who is continuously addressed, becomes a kind of doubled voyeur. He sees what the narrator sees (the fixed images of the woman and her lovers), and he sees the narrator following and spying on the woman (story). (See Lecker 1986 for a rather different reading of this poem.) The exit from "The Winnipeg Zoo" is therefore the marriage of techniques of story and poetry in a poem, a marriage that is contradictory only if the law of the excluded middle is taken seriously. But Kroetsch does not take this law seriously, as we have seen again and again.

"Sketches of a Lemon" (FN 123-127), in some ways very similar to "Stone Hammer Poem," explores the meanings of "lemon." Lemon, it turns out, has no fixed meaning, is a thing which stubbornly violates the law of the excluded middle on which fixed meaning depends, yet nevertheless is very much a lemon. That is to say, a lemon, like A is A, is a tautology. Amending Lecker, "The ultimate subject of the poem becomes [not] the impossibility of articulating its ultimate subject," but a particular instance (what is lemon?) of an undecideable question (what is meaning?).

"The Criminal Intensities of Love as Paradise" (FN 131-144) has been read as a series of left-hand, poetic meditations on a right-hand, narration of events (Dyck 1982 22, Neuman 1984 183, and Lecker 1986 145). Topically speaking, it sets the stage for Kroetsch's next book by

featuring a particular instance of <x,x> as its dominant figure: old as old as / time as time; hand of hand; ripe as rite; the is of light / is all or all; the lip on lip; as always as; lovers have hold / of hold; the knocking knuckle / knocks; the bell / ringing the bell; all alone alone; and horse beware / the horse; to begin begin; the darting of / & and is tongue tongue; and death as proud / as death. This figure is the x of x. (See Dyck 1987 for an earlier version of the following analysis.)

Advice to My Friends (1985) employs this figure with the same wit and obsession. A list of some obvious applications:

the cabbage, folding itself, unfolds (17)
 Let the surprise surprise you (18)
 the years' aging (27)
 the was or is of / story is a story of (35)
 (after / which there can be no after) (37)
 the bait bait, and / the hung hook hang (38)
think you think (39)
 the roar of the sea was the sea's roar (40)
 the story of the poem / become / the poem of the
 story / become (41)
 A dark as dark as a dark (55)
 to desire an end to desire / is to desire (65)
 We must live our living (71)
 By meaning we mean something that means (72)
 the holes in the cheese contain the cheese (100)
 as as / a concept / poses problems
 as in the / example of / as ever (121)
 nothing / but / nothing (135).

It is easy to establish that these are all extreme examples of the figure of figurality in the Western poetic tradition. Metaphor has always been and continues to be a kind of abuse of words: "Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else," says Aristotle. One figure of

metaphor is $\langle x, y \rangle$, where x is a word not applicable, properly speaking, to the thing y . By a slight swerve, this becomes $\langle x, x \rangle$, an abuse of metaphor, a metaphor of metaphor, a catachresis. (The figure chiasmus may also be a source for $\langle x, x \rangle$: for chiasmus has the form $\langle x, y \rangle$ and $\langle y, x \rangle$, which together yield $\langle x, x \rangle$.)

Taking most of Kroetsch's readers' responses at full value, this catachresis figures in itself the subject of Advice and of much of Kroetsch's work: the writing of writing. $\langle X, x \rangle$ is therefore a figure of the subject and the style of Advice to My Friends. As Ricoeur has argued, metaphor is the figure of style and content in the Western tradition (The Rule of Metaphor 1977). But style--to repeat the argument of Part 1--has always been a central figure of rhetoric itself. That is, the path from a particular figure ($\langle x, x \rangle$), to a figure of style and content (metaphor), to a figure of rhetoric (style), never escapes from figure. When that figure ($\langle x, x \rangle$) represents both the manner and the matter of a book of poems, we may suppose that the book is somewhat rhetorical in nature. That is, $\langle x, x \rangle$ is literally a topos of style and subject (a place where both are invented).

Three sections of Advice to My Friends consist of "sonnets." The first, "Advice to My Friends" begins with an eighteen-line poem about the sonnet (9); this eighteen-line form is used and named in the penultimate section, "Sounding

the Name" ("Sonnet #1" 131, and "sonnet for my daughters" 136); a fourteen-line poem in the same section is called "Sonnet #5"; and the last section, "The Poet's Mother," contains four "sonnets" of fourteen lines, one of sixteen lines, and an "envoi."

The sonnet is a major figure of form in the English tradition. Its origins are foreign (Dante held that it and the ballad were much inferior to the canzoni). Its history is a history of play and struggle with fixity, from Petrarchan, Shakespearean, Spenserian, Miltonian variations to the jumping rhythms of Hopkins and the wonderful distortions of e. e. cummings. Its subject has varied from eros through philia to agape. It has always tended to the personal and is often addressed to the author's friends or enemies in moments of crisis. Even the number of lines has not remained constant (for example, the "tailed" sonnet). This is the tradition that provides a topos for matter and manner in three of the eight sections of Advice to My Friends, sections that constitute, literally, a frame for the remaining five sections. Here is an example of the rhetorical pointing that introduces the sonnet:

but you take now your piecemeal sonnet
 wow, certain of these here poets,
 these chokerman can't count to fourteen
 and as for Petrarch, well, I mean

I've been to bed with some dandy and also skilled
 ladies, sure, but would I a ballyhoo start
 for the keen and gossipy public?

("for a poet who has stopped writing" 9)

Among the people addressed in Advice to My Friends are three figures of woman: beloved, daughter, mother. "Letters to Salonika" are addressed by the poet at home to the beloved (wife) away. Just as wife is a figure of domesticity, so the letter is a figure of intimacy. Consequently, the poet struggles with the absence in his bed, the eggplant in his fridge. But the tongue as always is busy making words, making love. Similarly, daughters are addressed in "Postcards from China." Again, the postcard is an appropriate vehicle of fatherly address to his daughters. The tone is utterly familiar to anyone who has ever written home: "Today we went to many places, and one of them was the New Summer Palace" (79-80); "And the voice, Laura, you should have heard him" (82). Daughters figure also in "Delphi: Commentary." Here, again, the situation is domestic--the aging poet is seen in the company of two lively, slightly irreverent daughters who are going to Delphi for very different reasons than he.

A footnote in the revisited "Mile Zero" introduces the most important of these three figures: "And yet is not the mother figure at once most present in and most absent from this poet's work?" (36). This absence is remedied in the last two sections, in a typically Kroetschian manner, by presenting snapshots, dreams, and memories of the mother gone ("Sounding the Name" 132-134), and by locating precisely the matrix of the poet's life-long quest for the

female in the most serious and moving poems of the whole book ("The Poet's Mother" section, especially "I have sought my mother" 140).

And so Female enters the poems. It is not hard to see why the sections "The Poet's Mother" and "Delphi: Commentary" are the most successful of the book. The appeal to pathos via mother and daughter is deft and sure, whereas the recourse to orality in the "Letters" section is calculated to embarrass or even offend, and the deliberate flatness of "Postcards" is likely to discourage. For this very reason, these two sections are among the most daring (though not the most successful) portions of the book. The reader is not in the formal world of the sonnet any longer: s/he is rather in the unpoetic worlds of the husbandly letter and the fatherly postcard, preludes to the world of the private journal addressed to Ishtar (see Excerpts from the Real World 1986, below).

Shirley Neuman has offered a close reading of three of the longer poems in Advice to My Friends using the notion of intertextuality (1984 176-194). "Mile Zero," according to Neuman, foregrounds the ways in which this poem is its own intertext: earlier versions affect and are affected by later versions, deletions become insertions, reading becomes indistinguishable from writing, forwards becomes backwards, a six-part poem becomes a six-pair poem, and so on (Neuman 184-185). The poetics of "Mile Zero," in other words, is the

poetics of revision. As the poem makes clear, revision (read "writing") is a never-ending process with temporary stops. Even the earlier 1969 version contained reference to the failure of closure (30); the later version consists of six poems within poems, six instances of $\langle x, x \rangle$. This figure is literally a figure of recursion because the sequence $\langle x, x \rangle$, $\langle x, \langle x, x \rangle \rangle$, $\langle x, \langle x, \langle x, x \rangle \rangle \rangle$, ... models a potentially infinite iterative process. The process may be stopped at any point, but it never actually ends. The poem called "Mile Zero" may not yet be finished.

The formal structure of the poem parallels the poem's other theme: the journey west stops at mile zero, a beginning. This theme, a particular version of the quest-motif, is explicitly stated in the earlier version ("(Mile Zero is everywhere)" 40). The journey is repeated in the six inserted poems; and the theme is restated in the last, which is a collected set of aphorisms chiefly on cyclicity (for example, "Every year is the same: / it's different" 41). The never-ending quest, the quest which stops at yet another beginning, is again an instance of $\langle x, x \rangle$. As the poem suggests, the quest of west becomes the quest of quest itself ("quest / or quest or)" 35). The message of "Mile Zero," we might say, is the same as its medium.

"Delphi: Commentary," says Neuman, is "Kroetsch's most complex use to date of intertextuality" (186). One aspect of intertextuality of course is the citation of authority, the

rhetorical function of which is to establish the ethos of the speaker (he is knowledgeable and therefore believable) and thereby to establish a suitable frame of mind in the hearer (pathos). Authority, furthermore, is firmly located, in the rhetorical tradition, as a topos: it is a place where especially the matter but also the manner of the work may be invented. Like many others before him, Kroetsch uses authority as a topos against itself to reveal a hidden truth about authority, namely, that it is its opposite, uncertainty. Thus, the poem begins with a fragment of "The Eggplant Poems," followed by a double column, Frazer's Pausanias on the left, Kroetsch's "What can we say for certain?" on the right. Indeed, the poem is based on the undermining of authority by the citation of the citation of the citation of authority which turns out to be commentary on commentary on commentary....

An ultimate figure of authority in the Western tradition is the oracle of Apollo at Delphi, rendered in the myth of Oedipus. The richness of this story is rather fully exploited in this poem and this book: the father is displaced (his words, which are the oracle, are an echo of the poet's words in Seed Catalogue); the poet's quest for love is identified with the quest for mother (in "The Poet's Mother" section). Most importantly, the oracle is itself lost in the maze of uncertainties of the moment and the situation, foreshadowed by an earlier gloss on meaning: both

answer and question are "always" mislaid, stolen, revised, erased, forgotten, denied, remembered, and so on (105). The only certainty, in fact, is an "Eggplant" fragment: "the gnomon is all / that remains" (103).

We may now enter the text of "The Frankfort Hauptbahnhof." The gnomon is a geometrical figure (derived from the parallelogram by deletion) that looks very much like a "V" on its side. This is the formation of "crows numerous / on a flighty sky" (120) and is (almost) literally rendered in the text on the next page: "notation > divination > augury." "Hauptbahnhof" is full of (attempted) definitions of notation: notation is prediction (117), a system of writing (119), "a set / of instructions for / reading (in) the / future" (123), "the reader in the text" (124), "the double of the poem" (125), "a flying" (125), "what keeps it moving" (127). Neuman has already noted the extent to which these definitions recover contemporary notions; but notation specifically differentiates the rhetoric of literality from the rhetoric of orality. The quintessential rhetorical situation is, in both cases, a triad: speaker/the spoken/hearer in oratory; the writer/the written/the reader in written communication. A major difference--and it is a crucial difference--between the two is that the writing (the gnomon) remains whereas the spoken word vanishes (except in recordings). No matter how it is rendered, writing is impossible without notation. Notation

is the writing of writing. A poem about the self-as-other, the writer-as-reader, writing-as-reading, all of which are indissolubly linked by notation grounded in graphic symbols, is and is about $\langle x,x \rangle$. The poem is the hermeneutic circle.

The speaker in Advice to My Friends is hardly limited to the role of friendly counsellor, which functions as a generalized topos for "self" in these poems. Among the figures of the self which appear explicitly or implicitly in the collection are sonneteer, husband, lover, father, traveller, quester, son, editor, critic, reader, double, and so on. The poems fulfill their own prophecy of "self, portraying / self" (39). It is of course true that this utterly reflexive image of the self is yet another instance of the figure $\langle x,x \rangle$; it is also an instance of $\langle \text{homo}, [\text{rhetoricus}, \text{seriousus}] \rangle$, in the sense that one half of the self may be portraying the other half. To follow the speaker of Advice to My Friends is to see this speaker adopt a number of rhetorical selves, sometimes within a poem or even within a line:

envoi (to begin with)

There is no real
world, my friends.
Why not, then,
let the stars
shine in our bones?

The argument has been that Advice to My Friends is a self-proclaimed rhetorical document grounded in a particular figure which provides a topos of both matter and manner for

the poems. But, to note the ways in which Advice is specifically rhetorical is not to suggest that it is merely rhetorical. Rhetoric begins with the view that language is both referential and reflexive (it refers to the Other as it reflects on itself) and that any instance of language usage involves a community (ethos, logos, pathos). Advice, therefore, is, in an essential way, about the tragicomedy of the human condition: about the desire to communicate, about the wonderful failure to realize desire, about the deep fear of and aspiration toward desire--all of which are figured in <x,x>.

Kroetsch's latest collection of poetry, Excerpts from the Real World (1986) is in many ways a continuation of earlier concerns. There are however several relatively new features in this book: the journal format, the epigrammatic prosepoem entries, the motif of the country and western song, and the central role of Ishtar. None of these has been used specifically before in Kroetsch's poetry; though all of them are intensifications of earlier techniques.

"Style is a way of thinking," says the narrator, and immediately provides an example: "Contemplate the rodeo rider, pitched wildly about by his fancy boots" (56). The figure is contemporary and Western, but the idea is classical and fully rhetorical--for the figure is a figure of thought. The essence of the rodeo rider is to ride the bucking animal (to be "pitched wildy about"); this essence

is literally obvious to anyone who sees him walking (the high heels of "his fancy boots" will throw him about); the boots, usually considered "mere dress", deliver the essence of the man. In the same way, style, usually considered the "mere dress" of thought, delivers the essence of thinking. The narrator's observation suggests that we think about the poems' style to determine how the narrator thinks.

First, the style is only apparently prosaic. That is, the only formal element of poetry missing is the line (it has been replaced by the sentence): the paragraph or journal entry is the stanza; surprising juxtapositions of an enthymematic sort are fully employed; and a full array of traditional figures is used (see Kroetsch's comment in Gunnars's interview 1987 57). Secondly, the lyric is a subject rather than a mode in these poems: blue is associated with desire (15); several country and western laments are included in the poems (20 and 21); and singer and song are evoked in the titles of two sections (25 and 47). Thirdly, the traditional singer is not the narrator but the unnamed woman addressed by the narrator. She is not actually a singer but a guitar player: she composes country and western songs in her sleep (20), was a Spanish guitarist in a previous incarnation (44), and is now a performer (65-66, 70, 75). Fourthly, the rhetorical triad is overtly present in the text: the narrator and the woman are each other's audience and speaker, each having his or her

preferred mode of address.

The figuration within the text of ethos/logos/pathos begins in the book's dedication, ". . . and for you, Ishtar." But Ishtar is and is not the woman addressed as "you" in almost every entry. The relation between "you" and Ishtar is revealed only at the end of the book, when "you" is suddenly replaced by "she" in a single entry (30/11/85):

"We live," she said, "a whole life with the same person. It makes us very old." I sipped my coffee. From far in the distance, I heard artillery. "Then you are not," I said, "Ishtar." She wore a dozen bracelets on each of her golden arms. "You have known her for a long time," she told me (77).

"You" returns in the following entry, and a little later the narrator makes the relation between the two explicit:

The gate is off its hinges. But I love you just the slam. And the proof of the pudding, Ishtar is. I am mad today, with missing you. You are everywhere (78).

As we have seen in earlier poems, the figure of address is not a particular woman but Everywoman. Ishtar, as is well-known, is the name of the Babylonian mother-goddess of love, war, fertility, cyclical generation, propogation--in short, a manifestation of the Great Mother (Neumann 1963).

If style is a way of thinking in these poems, then there are four aspects to that way: the narrator's prose poems, the singer's lyrics, her identity as Ishtar, and the narrator's efforts to communicate with her (see also the leading epigraph, "Perhaps if I call you forever / you'll hear me toward the end"). That is, the narrator prosaically

addresses the singing goddess of his desire. Prose, song, goddess, and desire--in a triangle. Robert Kroetsch has been thinking this way for a long time.

<logos,[prose,song]>

<I,[speaker,listener]>

<Ishtar,[listener,singer]>

2.7 The Second Generation

The distinction between major and minor writers is no doubt tenuous except in extreme cases, usually situated in the distant past. The size of a body of work, its reception by readers and critics, its influence on writers who come later, and, most importantly, its use of and contribution to the evolving traditions of poetry, poetics, and rhetoric--these are the criteria by which a work may tentatively receive the label "major" or "minor." All the writers considered so far continue to write into the present and overlap therefore with those poets here called the "second generation." Some of the works which are discussed below may predate some of the works belonging to the major prairie poets; some of these later poets may have a larger body of work than some of the major poets; and some of these second generation poets may already have had more influence on both readers and younger writers than their predecessors ever will. But all of them have read and been influenced by the five poets discussed above. Since the converse is not the case, and since only a representative sample of three poets will be presented, the term "second generation" describes this group without suggesting that other contemporary poets are less important. All of these three poets have made their most significant contributions in the present decade.

2.7.1 Andrew Suknaski

Of all the poets here designated second generation, Suknaski has the largest body of work, the greatest influence, and has made a significant contribution to prairie poetry (making him a strong candidate for majority status). Suknaski's influence and contribution derive from his first major collection, Wood Mountain Poems (1976). As Al Purdy says in his introduction, "More than anything, the poems are a clear look at people and places of Wood Mountain, seeing both past and present simultaneously with a kind of double vision" (11). People, place, and time, in other words, are three of five characteristic concerns of this most "prairie" of prairie poets since Newlove. Lorne Daniel adds narrative (Canadian Forum 56 December 1977 61); and after a second collection, The Ghosts Call You Poor (1978), Laurie Ricou describes the "characteristic" Suknaski poem as "an informal narrative monologue" by a locally situated character (Canadian Literature 86 Autumn 1980 129). These critical touchstones are summarized by Stephen Scobie, editor of The Land They Gave Away: New and Selected Poems (1982): Suknaski's subject is Wood Mountain, his form anecdotal, his mode realistic as well as mythic, elegaic, and celebratory (12-13).

The second stage of Suknaski criticism begins to challenge these assumptions, and begins, in fact, before the

first stage ends. It also locates the fifth and most important of the poet's concerns as language. Patrick Lane, responding to the darker side of Suknaski's vision, sees language as the cause of the poet's disease of alienation (ECW 18/19 Summer/Fall 1980 95). Others see language as a source and sign of the poet's authenticity (Munton Dalhousie Review Spring 1983 82); a cry of despair and need for community (Gunnars Dinosaur Review 1985 45), a failed but noble attempt to recover religious and mythical wholeness (Cooper 49), or a celebration of "the vernacular muse" (Cooley VM 186-7).

Suknaski's most immediate topoi are evidently instances of <prairie,x>, where prairie = Wood Mountain and x = people, time, story, and language--all associated with that particular place. It will not be necessary to analyze all these topoi in detail (see, for example, Munton 1983, the fullest study to date of the poetry up to Montage for an Interstellar Cry 1982), but one of the second terms (language) informs two others (people, story) to such an extent that <prairie,language> easily becomes Suknaski's major topos. The people's story, in brief, is told in the people's language--or so it would seem--and the poet is their chronicler. In "Indian Site on the Edge of Tonita Pasture" (Land 39), the people are the natives and the settlers of Wood Mountain. The story is a blend of the actual discovery of three "indian rings" by "lee soparlo,"

the poet's re-discovery of this discovery, and the history of the native peoples and the settlers as it bears on this discovery. The language is colloquial, and the poet identifies himself as a chronicler. His recounting of the native story, however, is an imaginative reconstruction, for "only the wind knows for certain" what that story is. In this poem, as in "Poem to Sitting Bull and His Son Crowfoot" (37), the wind is an authority or a speaker, but it may also be a figure for the language itself, as a later, ekphrastic poem specifically states: "suknatskyj listens / to what the dry grass speaks / in the vernacular of wind / across prairie" ("After `A Prairie Boy's Summer'" 71). The same lines are repeated in Montage (33) in the context of the poet's remembering his last meeting with his father, making the wind emblematic of Suknaski's concerns with language throughout his career.

John Newlove, of course, had by this time (the early seventies) established an ethos by reference to place in a very similar way, but Suknaski's use of the prairie wind differs in one important respect from Newlove's. Where Newlove's wind sings, Suknaski's wind speaks the vernacular; where, in other words, Newlove's poet is a lyricist, Suknaski's is a vernacularist, and in that difference is the measure of Suknaski's contribution to prairie poetry. Suknaski's language, especially during the Wood Mountain period, is prosaic, deliberately anti-poetic, and anti-

literary. What George Ryga said about the language of Canadian drama applies with uncanny accuracy to Suknaski's poetry: "The common speech of the people, carefully studied and reproduced, is now being elevated into theatrical poetry" (Canadian Theatre Review 14 (Spring 1977) 8). This language, moreover, is chosen on the same principles as the founders of the Romantic movement in English poetry chose theirs: it is "a selection of language really used by men" (Wordsworth's Preface to Lyrical Ballads 1802). For this reason, Suknaski's early poetry, especially but not exclusively in its vernacular aspects, may be called Romantic. (An earlier version of this analysis appeared in The Dinosaur Review 6 (Winter 1985): 40-44).

The first poem in the Wood Mountain Poems section of Land is Part 1 of "Homestead" (25). That the language in this poem is "a selection of language really used by men" may be readily demonstrated. The poem contains several italicized quotations of speeches by the poet and his father. Every one of the father's speeches in Land (1982) differs from the corresponding speech in WMP (1976) in exactly the same way: the correct English of WMP has been broken. One example will suffice:

(1976) my life moves now to an end with the speed
of electricity

(1982) myne life now moveh to end vit speed of
letrica

What happened between the "Homestead" of 1976 and the

"Homestead" of 1982 is anyone's guess; mine is that in 1976 the father is represented as speaking Ukrainian (which the poet correctly rendered in grammatical English), whereas in 1982 the father is represented as speaking the broken English rendered by the poet. In both cases, a principle of selection is operating but with very different effects. The 1976 version is actually more realistic because the non-native speaker of English is likely to revert to his native language in moments of passion or stress; the 1982 version is, however, more powerful--and more Romantic. Further examples of Suknaski's selection of "the language really used by men" are readily found by comparing other poems in Land with their earlier versions: "Andrew Czornucha" (Land 53, The Ghosts Call You Poor 36) and "Hurakan" (Land 89, In the Name of Narid 1981), for example, show that Coleridge's critique of Wordsworth's conception of language (but not of his practise) applies readily to Andrew Suknaski (Biographia Literaria Chapter 17).

Suknaski's poetry is Romantic also in its search for that elusive symbol of the "one Life" theme. Gunnars calls this the "search for ultimacy" (Dinosaur Review 1985 45), and Lane finds such a symbol in a prairie mandala, the teepee ring in Vasile Tonita's pasture (ECW 1980 97). But, as the poem (Land 39) makes perfectly clear, the teepee ring is not such a symbol for the poet. The teepee ring symbolizes the wholeness of a past and alien culture; the

poet may "claim these things / and this ancestral space" as his own, but claiming is not possessing, and "making them live" is not living them. Indeed, the strain is evident in the poet's efforts ("try," repeated, stanza 2) to "imagine" (a telling word, also repeated) what that lost paradise must have been like. The teepee ring (by extension, the prairie encircled by the horizon) symbolizes loss for the poet; the prairie he knows is hopelessly split, cut up, and fenced in--it is, in other words, the pasture.

If the land symbolizes lost wholeness, it symbolizes also a lost sense of community (man's relation to the land). This loss, moreover, is dramatized in the poetry by a fragmentation of ethos into an array of characters and speakers appearing in the poems. These ethoi range through the Chinese cafe-owner ("Jimmy Hoy"), the Indian driven from his ancestral homeland ("Sitting Bull"), and the East-European immigrant (an important example is Suknaski's father). Whether alienated from the environment or not, these characters are alienated from the poet who is searching also for that kind of "ultimacy" found in an adequate reflection of himself as poet. Chief Sitting Bull, for instance, is a "dreamer / or a poet" (Land 36) who functions as an ennobling human, "an index of delight, / Of grace and honour, power and worthiness" (Wordsworth Prelude 8.280-1). But Sitting Bull is hopelessly separated from the poet: the Indian's connection to the land was authentic and

mythic, he was a great leader of his people, and he was ultimately killed by the society to which the poet (by virtue of being white) belongs. Less exalted characters, chiefly immigrants such as Lee Soparlo, are closer to the poet's ego and are therefore more likely candidates for symbols of wholeness. Even as remembered, Soparlo is a writer of sorts--he made crosses, "texts," out of plywood; he records the births, deaths, arrivals, and departures of Wood Mountain; he remembers and retells stories (44). This is perhaps a remarkably apt characterization of the poet's practise in WMP; but the poet clearly wants and realizes more than Soparlo, who after all is a "[p]oet sown by nature" and lacks "the accomplishment of verse" (Wordsworth "The Wanderer").

If in its language, its search for a symbol of the "one Life," and its reliance on memory, Suknaski's poetry is distinctly Romantic, it shares also in the Romantic irony of any attempt to reclaim nature through the imagination. Suknaski's attempts to reclaim the prairie (by which is meant the land and its people) for himself end in failure. "Western Prayer," the last poem in WPM (122) and not reprinted in Land, celebrates that failure by turning it into a prolepsis of success: "time poet / to put aside what you came to / leaving all else / behind." In fact, Suknaski did not leave the dream and search behind, but he did move temporarily to a fuller recovery of his interest in

language. In the "New Poems" section of Land, he returns to his earlier concerns with the Chinese immigrant and his language. To his immense credit, Suknaski makes an attempt to understand the Chinese he writes about, and his attempt is linguistic rather than empathetic. He had already translated, iconically speaking, the ideogram into a visual poem (Land 19-21); the figure of the Chinese immigrant had already appeared in poems like "Jimmy Hoy's Place" and "The Gold Mountain" (27 and 65); and now the two are merged in "Hwui Shan Crossing 55 N Parallel West of Turtle Island (Now North America) in 499 AD" (96-101).

Hwui Shan, a Buddhist monk, sailed across the Bering Sea from China to North America a thousand years before George Vancouver arrived on our western coast. This Chinese "ancient mariner" was guided by the stars and his knowledge of the heavens; he named the place he landed on "Many Voice Wind"; he kept his records; he made his inter-lingual connections; and he moved on, leaving an enigmatic memory of himself behind. Hwui Shan is not only essentially homeless, he is at home with his homelessness: there is not the slightest trace of homesickness in him. His business is the language which connects heaven and earth: his job is to spread a "zen gospel" (heaven) and name the places he travels (earth). He is fundamentally a poet, not because he writes something called "poetry," but because he deals in language. Here is an adequate alter-ego and symbol of

wholeness for the contemporary poet, a model that shows also why Sitting Bull could never be the model Suknaski wanted him to be. The Sioux chief's tradition is oral rather than literate; Suknaski's tradition, like Hwui Shan's, is a literate rendition of orality.

Several characteristics of the Chinese language inform this very ambitious poem. There is the visual stanza (see also "Barkerville" 102); the line is short and characteristic; Chinese words and ideograms appear. Despite the problems with the Chinese characters in the poem (see Dyck 1985 44 for a full discussion), "Hwui Shan Crossing" is a key poem in Land: it signals a movement away from the Romanticism of the Wood Mountain period; it presents an adequate symbol (or emblem) of the poet; and it abandons the anti-literary stance altogether. The movement away from anti-literarity is, in fact, seen also in a marked use of traditional repetitions in several other poems in this section--"In the Beginning Was The" (95), "Tracing" (115), "Second Thoughts" (139), "Betrayal Beginning in Dreams" (146), and "The Faceless Goodbyes" (155). Repetition has recently been re-invented as a basis of poetry (Easthope 1983 16); but from a rhetorical point of view, this discovery is better understood as a return to the fundamental properties of a topos.

Simple repetition is, in the terminology of this study, the repeated application of a topos <x,y> :

$\langle x, y_1 \rangle$, $\langle x, y_2 \rangle$, $\langle x, y_3 \rangle$, $\langle x, y_4 \rangle$, and so on.

The term x may itself be suppressed after its initial occurrence, only the topological formula being repeated (epic similes, simple lists, and extended rhymes on one sound are examples). More complex repetition reveals the transitivity that simple repetition masks:

$\langle x, y_1 \rangle$;
 $\langle x, y_1 \rangle$ and $\{y_1, y_2\}$ imply $\langle x, y_2 \rangle$;
 $\langle x, y_2 \rangle$ and $\{y_2, y_3\}$ imply $\langle x, y_3 \rangle$;
 $\langle x, y_3 \rangle$ and $\{y_3, y_4\}$ imply $\langle x, y_4 \rangle$;
 and so on.

The term x may again be suppressed; the sequence $\{y_1, y_2, y_3, y_4, \dots\}$ may be regarded as a set of variations on x itself, or as a set of variations on y_1 (which is related to x by $\langle -, - \rangle$); and two (or more) related topoi ($\langle x, y \rangle$ and $\{x, y\}$) may be involved. Of course, the relation between $\langle x, y \rangle$ and $\{x, y\}$ must be close enough to allow transitivity to be applied across the two topoi. Indeed, repetition may become an incredibly complex sequence of nested arguments involving sub-sequences of related topoi--as its dominant role in traditional rhetoric might suggest. Repetition therefore is often the mark of an extended argument based on the inter-transitivity of several topoi as well as on the topoi themselves. Far from being only an oral formula, repetition represents a mode of thought involving transitivity which appeals directly to the reader through an easily perceived aural effect (also called repetition).

The first of the "New Poems" in Land provides an

of a new kind of language] was / the ascent," and "that / was the beginning [of historical time]." Both terms of the topos <time,the y> have been changed--the first now applies to historical time; the second now applies the to abstractions (ascent, word) rather than to objects (world, mountain, sea). Successive sexual images accompanying the repeated application of the topos <time,the y> argue that the change within the topos is a debasement: "a single cock" (the whole world) "filled her mouth"; but "his tongue" only "plough[ed] / through damp / earth"; and now "the word is / doled out / like fucking / sunday / mints." Language as system, in other words, is male; the first speaker is female, the first mode hieroglyphic and oral; the next speaker is male, the mode hieratic but still oral; this is followed by a movement to abstraction, the written, and the merely emblematic, marking the fall of language from immanence to transcendence (Frye 1982 6-15).

Yet, as noted above, the conclusion of the poem is "in the beginning was the": this phrase inserts perhaps the most abstract of all words (the) into the originary mythic moment of stanza one; the continues to be applied in the historical time of stanza two; and the familiar conclusion to the Biblical phrase is supplied at the end of the poem. The poem, in other words, demonstrates that the debasement (the fall) in language never happened, it was always there: in the beginning was the. The poet's choice of topos (<time,the

y>) itself is the figure of such an assertion: the topos marks a relation of immanence between time and language, for language (in the poem's argument) always has contained the, but has revealed this containment in historical time. Similarly, the changes from female to male speaker, from orality to literacy, whatever they say about a fall, unequivocally suggest that language systems are male. The world that swells inside the female speaker's mouth is a "single cock," namely, the word itself; the poem features an active male speaker addressing a passive muse ("lady coyote").

Repetition is the figure of an argument also in Suknaski's Montage For an Interstellar Cry (1982), a poem which is in many ways a drunken rant. The poem is not an epic, though it has epic dimensions; it is not a lyric, but it has lyric moments; it is not an elegy, yet laments a great loss. Montage draws on sources as diverse as anthropological prehistory ("lucy" and "taber child"), the Norse eddas and mythologies of several kinds including the Christian, the visual arts from the cave paintings to Munch, twentieth century holocausts like the bombings of Dresden and Hiroshima, and Ginsberg's Howl. But most of all, Montage is a journey through time in Winnipeg circa 1980 which ends on a drunken night in the bar of the Tourist Hotel, St. Boniface. This journey is measured by the repetition of a topos <time, x>, where "time" orders the events "x" as they

march inevitably forward "to arrive at this" interstellar cry. (For a personal account of Suknaski's obsession with time, see his rambling review-essay in Brick 1982.)

Time is overwhelmingly marked by "after" (over forty repetitions) and, to a somewhat lesser extent, by "before" (some fifteen occurrences). The sense of the first of these markers is that the moment of arrival at this cry is "after" the events the poem records; each instance of "after," in other words, emphasizes the difference between the present event (a poem, "this" cry) and past events; it asks the reader to consider the present as a natural response to the past, to understand the cry as rooted in the experiences, personal and collective, of human history; it foregrounds the present moment (now) and mode (cry) of enunciation as it provides the necessary background. "Before," on the other hand, situates the speaker and reader imaginatively at some point in the past, looking ahead to events yet to be narrated but already experienced by the speaker. The sense of "before" is therefore "before this moment, before this cry." There is something distinctly Orphic about Suknaski's use of "before" (prolepsis) and "after" (analepsis), but the different times (of the narrative situations) associated with these markers means that this is not an "Orphic topos" as that term was used earlier.

The "montage" of the poem's title comprises the events narrated in the poem. It is a serious clue to the poem:

diverse events are not simply juxtaposed--they are selected and ordered by a poetic consciousness into a vision of apocalypse which manifests itself in the lives of three characters. "Suknatskyj" is the familiar persona of the poet; "mahzahkahzah" is a Metis poet and suknatskyj's bloodbrother; "mikeodin" is a Norse artist of destruction. All three share in a specific rage and despair; all three "arrive at this" moment and cry, but in their own characteristic ways. Mikeodin's art attempts to escape the "black spot" of his melancholy heritage (33-40); mahzahkahzah's drunken song of his people's story concludes with the assertion that "we've all got the right of the cry" (71-75); and suknatskyj himself recalls his personal history of Wood Mountain (31-33). Behind these three is the immense pressure of world history that has preceded this arrival.

"To arrive at this" is applied seven times, with seven references for "this": (1) "rites of a lonely passage / on the edge" (17); (2) revelations of apocalypse like those of St. John the Divine (18-19); (3) "in narayan [man path]" (21); (4) "these gleanings of millenarium promise" (23); (5) "the cry" (30); (6) "totality" (33); and (7) another apocalyptic revelation (43). Thus, "this" is the poem, the oracular stance of the poet, the vision of the poem, and of course the particular selection of apocalyptic, historical events shaping that vision. As in the language of the Wood Mountain period, "selection" is everything; as the word

"montage" suggests, the vision of the poem is a single image made up of many elements carefully selected and arranged.

This image is the image of time:

sweat your brow
 eat bread
 till earth
 you from dust
 you to
 dust return

(13)

time is absolute
and universal
flowing steadily from past to future

(15)

"...by the way
 welcome to the 20th
 century..."

(75)

The ancient wisdom of the cycle (from dust to dust) fuses with dreams of progressive history (time as an arrow) to yield a figure of a wheel rolling in a straight line. The figure of a wheel (the cycle) endlessly repeating itself through time (the arrow) renders the argument of the topos <time,x>.

2.7.2 Douglas Barbour

In her biographical article on Douglas Barbour's fellow-poet, Stephen Scobie, Margery Fee quotes his claim that "when they try to write an account of prairie poetry that does include Robert Kroetsch, they're going to have to bring in Doug and me as well" (Fee 1987 90). A claim to odd-man-out status may be valid for Scobie, but Douglas Barbour writes out of a prairie tradition that he makes peculiarly his own. White (1972), for example, uses a figure of all colours (white-ness) to explore the prairie to which he returns from eastern Canada (Visible Visions 1984 33-48); Songbook (1973) begins a distinctly aural word-play (see "Song 5," for example, VV 52) which will culminate in the "breath ghazals" of ten years later (VV 153-7). Between are sandwiched experiments in notation (Shore Lines 1979) and "homolinguistic translations" of other poems in English (Pirates of Pen's Chance 1981, co-authored with Stephen Scobie). From beginning to end, then, Barbour is intensely interested in language--its figurative possibilities, its aural persuasiveness, its notative functions, its structure as system. These interests are focussed in Visions of My Grandfather (1979; VV 97-123), a poem which locates Barbour firmly in the tradition of prairie landscape poetry (Tefs 1980).

An ekphrasis is "a self-contained description, often on

a commonplace subject, which can be inserted at a fitting place in a discourse" (Lanham 1968 39). When the subject is a work of visual art, however, the description is neither "commonplace" nor "self-contained":

The ekphrastic tradition in antiquity grounded itself in a belief that the verbal description of a work of art unfolds into multiplicity and sequential time what the visual work itself captures frozen. The words make the still work of art move. . . . It has been argued, in fact, that ekphrasis signifies "speaking out," that is, the bestowing of a voice upon a mute picture (Barkan 1986 9; Barkan's note cites Jean H. Hagstrum's The Sister Arts Chicago 1958 49-53).

If the locus classicus of the ekphrastic tradition in the West is Homer's description of Achilles' shield (Iliad Book XVIII), the fuller development of that tradition includes Ovid's Metamorphoses, topographical and Romantic nature poetry, and contemporary Canadian landscape poetry. Ekphrasis mediates between the sister arts of painting and poetry as it recognizes their differences (visual versus verbal, silence versus speech, and the frozen moment versus metamorphosis through time). Indeed, the rhetorical basis of Barkan's study is that ekphrasis is itself a metamorphosis of the visual image (whose content is very often a frozen moment of metamorphosis) into verbal description (of the temporal metamorphosis). Ekphrasis therefore falls between Horace's ut pictura poesis and Lessing's contention that the plastic arts are spatial and the verbal arts are temporal (Laakoon 1766).

Prairie poets have made use of this tradition

occasionally (see Livesay, Waddington, and Mandel, above), but no one has exploited it as a rhetorical strategy in landscape poetry--no one, that is, except Barbour. His landscape is either conceived in painterly terms (the colour studies in White) or based on visual representations of the literal landscape (the studies of paintings in Visions of My Grandfather). In the latter case, the ekphrastic tradition is explicitly identified (Part 2 Visible Visions 98):

My grandfathers voice, the eye
speaking, its yea-saying (now, to me
across the years) colours, designs, yes
this he has seen, his perspectives

the world he knew in these pictures
stories i never heard
by firelight, word of mouth

of eye, for aye

an uneven speech, a calling
forth.

Ekphrasis depends on a topos of transformation: <sight,word> and <word,speech>, hence <sight,speech>. The topos <sight,speech> is here directly named ("the eye / speaking"), but no mention is made of writing (though, of course, it is used). The medium upon which the transformation from sight into speech depends is, however, named in Part 3 where the poet refers to the acts of writing ("now as i write this") and "checking [his] sketches, notes for a poem / begun in [his] mind last summer" (99). Nor are these isolated instances of self-consciousness with respect to the rhetorical basis of the poem, for the topoi are named

again and again: (1) "what was seen, heard inwardly by the heart which said / yes" (101); (2) "Everything. Exists / to be seen & recorded by the hand by the mind / colours or words, but we have to get it down" (107); (3) "& how i speak to you grandfather, of you for you, is different, a / nother way, these new lines long lines, lean like the prairie towards / some meaning" (111); (4) "i would sing what you did not paint" (115).

Identifying (naming) the topoi on which ekphrasis is based is however not ekphrasis, properly speaking. The first instance of that is "the etching" (108) which the poet loves best of all his grandfather's works. The poet knows the place, long since commercialized by tourism, whose more pristine, original image seems to be hanging above his desk. Sandwiched between these two observations is the following description:

the water is smooth, the sheer lip of
mountain runs out then in, image and reality,
& the log, the log canoe, rests on the shore, on the
water
& it is all a kind of momentary perfection
coming clear & still.

Notably, this ekphrasis partakes fully of the tradition: the image is presented (water, mountain, log canoe, shore, and-- in the closing lines of the poem--sky and tree); the presentation unfolds into multiplicity ("image and reality" refer most likely to an etched reflection but evoke also the differences between the etching--image--and the place the poet knows--reality); and the description suggests

temporality ("the momentary perfection" is frozen, yet to the viewer it is "coming clear and still"). The verbal image is framed above and below (so to speak) by change and time (the place then and now, the etching of that place [then] hanging where the working poet can view it [now]); beyond that frame lies another, the poet's apostrophe to the grandfather, indicating authorship of painting and poem and asserting a shared love of the land. Of course, the ekphrasis itself demonstrates the poet's love, just as the painter's etching demonstrated his; but the ekphrasis clearly extends the original image, just as it enlarges the scope of the poet's love to include the grandfather.

A second major example of ekphrasis is found in the next poem (untitled, Part 8 109-110). This poem begins by locating the grandfather on the prairie with its need for and love of water in the presence of the manifest beauties of sky, land, and wind. It then describes "8 colourful versions of what [the grandfather] saw," seven of which contain water. Each description voices multiplicity and temporality--sometimes by pointing to the interpretative function of the viewer, be he painter or writer or both ("the far bank is a long humped animal stretching / its fur"), sometimes by articulating an implied movement ("white huge / pennants of cloud / crash against blue"), sometimes by locating the painter at work before or after the moment actually represented ("how soon did you run / paper inside

your shirt, the first huge drops / exploding off your skin?"). The poem concludes with the poet's speculations on the changes between time primordial and the moment caught in the paintings (very little, "only the cultivation" is new) and on the (only apparent) absence of "life moving" on the canvas.

Evidently, one of the rhetorical functions of ekphrasis (and the topos <sight,speech>) is to identify the grandson with the grandfather. The very real gap between generations is bridged by recourse to a technique: focussing on the grandfather's literal vision, the poet himself relies heavily on literal vision in order to articulate the grandfather's metaphoric vision, his vision of life. The limitation (to one sense) is not entirely satisfactory to the poet (after all, he does write ekphrastic poems), and leads him eventually to question the grandfather's larger vision. Though the poet repeatedly insists on his grandfather's great love for the land (a love which the poet shares), the truth is that there are no sounds, smells, tastes, or touches of the land in the paintings. Above all, there are no people. The poet's ever so gentle critique of the grandfather's limited vision begins with questions--did he notice that the grass was being replaced by grain (98)?; why is the white winter missing from the paintings (100, 102)?; did his "mind's eye" see as well as his eye (106)?-- and extends to noting that the grandfather's vision omits

Yet, the colour is again the colour of a landscape, and the ekphrasis again unfolds the colour into multiplicity and temporality. The time is winter, but more important than the season are the symbolic values of its colour. These values include of course the expected ones: the winter moon, clouds, hoarfrost, fog, storm, drifts, and owl. White also symbolizes the empty page, its invitation to put down in black "what i want to say" (37); it is a new negative, "white darkness" (41) as well as "facts" such as death and life (45); and it represents possibility itself (36 and 47). This last value is extremely powerful: "white" contains all the colours of the spectrum (as is specifically noted 36); it is twice associated with "possibilities" (36 and 47); therefore, "white" in itself symbolizes "symbol" (for the symbol is defined by its having a spectrum of possible values).

The topos <sight,speech> at the centre of ekphrastic poetry is more precisely expressed by the transformation <visual image,verbal image>, which is to say that the ekphrastic topos involves a metaphor (the verbal image, the word, is a vehicle whose tenor is speech). What is needed to transform sight into speech is another "topos" like <verbal image,sound image> (for speech is not grapholect but phonolect). But this latter "topos" (if, indeed, it is a topos) describes the act of reading aloud. Perhaps recognizing the metaphoric nature of the <sight,speech>

topos, Barbour turns to notation in an attempt to make visible some oral aspects of speech (shore lines VV 127-8). The visual representation (in notation) of oral aspects of speech (sounds), however, seems to employ a topos like <sound,visual image>--which returns us to "sight." Barbour's newer poems take a different approach to his central concern: they use topoi of the type <sensation,word>, in which the sensation is speech-related and the word applies to that sensation. The "Touch" poems (VV 148), for example, begin with verbal descriptions of touching and end with the reflexivity of "Touch 5" (152):

```

labial
  lab
ratory movement of
the tongue tone
          tent
ative
  live
          ladling the
words letters
lost in the glottal
stop.

stop.
```

The correspondences between word and speech are very close: "labial" and "tongue" name the organs of speech used to articulate the words; "glottal" (almost) uses the glottal stop. Such correspondences are, strictly speaking, autological (the words apply to themselves): "labial" is labial; "tongue" is tongued; "glottal" is glottal; and the two instances of "stop," each followed by a full-stop and together bracketing a stanzaic break, are literally stops.

The experience of autology in "labial," "tongue," and "glottal" is primarily physical (the organ is used, touched); but the experience of autology in "stop." is primarily visual and mental. The topos <sensation, word> takes an aspect of speech (for example, the sensation of using the organs of speech), and transforms it into a word referring to that aspect. Barbour's interest in one sense involved in speech (sound) has been replaced by an interest in another (touch).

Touch and sound are both integral to speech. So is breath:

among the many leaves
surround me listen

phtt phtt phtt
tlip tlip tlip so

softly & apart look
only grey clouds slightly

cross the sun phtt
tlip you listen

rain drums soft
on leaves spaced apart
("breath ghazal number 2" VV 154).

Here, then, is the topos <sound,word> ("phtt," "tlip"), and the larger argument of Barbour's exploration of <sight,speech> emerges:

<sight,word>, or <visual image,verbal image>;
<sound,visual image>;
<sensation,word>
<sound,word>.

The metaphoric problem in the original topos has not been resolved (it may be incapable of resolution), but a deeper

insight into the ways language turns experience into speech has been won. Experience begins always in the senses; it wants also to end in the senses; but the relation between language and the senses remains as mysterious as it has ever been. Somehow, breath enters the language and the poem, and with it comes the soul of the speaking poet. Barbour's interest in language therefore is rather broad and deep. It includes the specifically rhetorical (ekphrasis); its topoi become ever more precise as he searches for the topos that will transform experience directly into speech; and the language system that his poetry embodies and articulates is remarkably complete.

3.3 Patrick Fiesen

Near the end of Patrick Fiesen's Flicker and Hawk (1987), the narrator cries,

I want something other than rhetoric or ritual maybe
a gesture (67).

At first glance, this cry would seem to be more serious than rhetorical. The line is void of figure; the style is plain; and "maybe" echoes the vagueness of "something" without questioning the speaker's desire. But the position of "maybe" is ambiguous ("I want . . . maybe"? Or "I want . . . maybe / a gesture"?); and the line cannot seriously posit "gesture" as an alternative to "rhetoric or ritual," for gesture is a part of rhetoric and ritual. The context of this cry is a poem entitled "an audience with the dalai lama or, the old-fashioned pas de deux," hardly grounds for arguing that this cry is of the heart. The poem is full of similar cries: "What can I say about what I know?"; "I feel a lot more stupid than I did is this wisdom?"; "I want to redeem love before it does me in." Perhaps the narrator's full-throated rhetoric is crying here, fully conscious that any escape from rhetoric is an illusion, that rhetoric is, so to speak, all there is (in poetry). Perhaps the narrator is very cleverly mocking himself. Unless the narrator is a fool.

In the seventh part of the serial poem "nothing in the mirror" (32), the narrator comments bleakly on the heroic

quest, offering his own pursuit of the illusory woman "in my mirror" as an example:

I follow

a stony river bed
an overgrown road

always riding past the tournament
into the desolate countryside

narr.

Narr is the poet's German for fool; narrator is the poet's translinguistic pun; and the evidence is in the poet's (not the narrator's) "translations" (73). The narrator really is a fool, then; and the poet is mocking him. Consider, now, the narrator's statement "I want something other than rhetoric. . . ."

But the narrator in these poems himself insists, over and over, that he is a fool, above all, a fool for love (46, 47, 52, 58, 65). So the narrator is not a fool, or, if he is one, he is a wise fool; when he calls himself a fool, then, he is being rhetorical, pretending to mock himself. And the poet, when he calls the narrator narr, is being rhetorical, too, meaning rather that the narrator is wise. Consider the narrator's statement "I want something other than rhetoric. . . ."

The narrator sings "the song of the sly one" (11):

I am the sly one
who slides through the net
that every jesus cast
show me an icon
show me the text
I will show you where I passed.

If the narrator is being rhetorical when he calls himself a fool (that is, if he really is wise), then what is he being when he calls himself "the sly one"? Isn't "the sly one" rather "wise"? So the narrator is being serious when he calls himself "the sly one": after all, the poet was being rhetorical when he called the narrator a fool (narr), meaning of course that the narrator was really a wise fool.

Consider, again, the narrator's "I want something other than rhetoric. . . ." Is he speaking as "fool" or as "wise fool"? That is, is he serious, or is he rhetorical? And if one or the other, what of the poet? Or are both being both? Or are narrator and poet one and the same person(a)?

Patrick Friesen's achievement in FH is to move far beyond earlier, ethnic obsessions into the fuller humanity of rhetorical and serious play. The obsession has been well-documented for his first two books, the lands i am (1976) and bluebottle (1978) (Lenoski 1980); it continues through The Shunning (1980) and Unearthly Horses (1984); but in his most recent work it is confined to the first part ("water burial" 1-23). Even here, a lessening is apparent in increasing compassion ("john isaacs is long gone" 4), hints of humour ("bible" 9), and the use of rhymes ("john isaacs" and "song of the sly one" 11). In the remaining three sections of FH, a complex narrative ethos reminiscent of Kroetsch's narrator in The Sad Phoenician emerges. As Group Mu asserts, this ethos is a function of rhetoric: "The

totality of these operations. . . [of rhetoric]. . . produces a specific aesthetic effect called ethos" (41). But if the narrative ethos is more serious than rhetorical, it is because Friesen directs two rhetorics--the "rhetoric of conviction" and the "rhetoric of mockery" (Eco The Name of the Rose)--with great seriousness against the narrator.

Conviction is a rhetoric of high seriousness, often symbolic and evoking a range of archetypal significances, both religious (fixed) and mythic (free) (Waardenburg 1980 47-49). Two related symbols, "light" and "room," dominate FH. The traditional symbolic value of light is illumination, and Friesen uses just such an equation in "fool's week" (12). The narrator endures a downward cycle from Monday through Saturday, but on the next morning he wakes to clarity: "I was becoming light / on a sunday / with all the other days before me." In a similar way, "first light" (15) contrasts "the sun's going down" with events inside a room, where "the children are dreaming toward first light." The serial poem, "nothing in the mirror" (25-41), associates light with the narrator's often illusory insights (28, 30, 31) and with the archetypal woman he seeks (26, 30, 32). The title of this poem links both the absence of the woman and her ephemeral nature to the absence of light--"somewhere it is midnight / and nothing in the mirror" (37). The nether side of light (that is, darkness) represents the narrator's Orphic descent in the "black river" section ("dream of the

black river" 44-45); his highly qualified ascent is figured as "breaking for light" and out of the cold toward warmth (52-53). This section contains the title poem (48-49) which again associates light with a woman in the room of the narrator's heart; "flicker" is the flicker of love and warmth as well as a bird. Two poems in the last section pointedly continue these associations. A "quiet light goes down" in a kitchen as the narrator and his wife descend to words and anger and love ("after words" 56-57). In "the blue wind" (60), the speaker sees a woman through a window as she stops to admire herself; but "the sun dips behind a cloud / and she sees [him] instead." This fleeting encounter awakens his great need, "[his] heart rasp[s] open, and the blue wind blows through at last" as he stammers and wails his pain and joy: "this woman I know by the grace of mirrors I've seen her / an appearance in my life and my life bending like light as it / passes earth."

The poet's topos is <light,x>, where x = illumination, love, warmth, illusion, and even light's absence. An explicit association of light with room and woman, moreover, leads directly to the poems' second major symbol. A room is a vessel, a container, and the vessel is the archetypal symbol of the essential feminine (Neumann The Great Mother 39). Specifically, the room, one aspect of the vessel-symbol, is related to the womb and the belly, that is, to the generative and procreative aspects of the great mother

(Neumann 43-46). Room symbolism in FH is, if anything, more intensely developed than light symbolism. A major sequence ("nothing in the mirror") takes place in the mind of the narrator as he sits with his cat in a room eating oysters. He recalls a woman lying on a bed where she threw herself, turning toward the sun, rising and opening her blouse (26); now, however, the grave is empty (27). At a New Year's party, seeking "the woman who knew every dance," he hides in another room where she finds him (29). Sometimes she invites him out of the shivering cold and into her room (30-31, 34-35); other times he is surrounded by walls but she is absent (39), or he is walking toward a room where she may be and he may die (40). Symbolically, the woman is the room: "she opens her lilac umbrella / and makes room for me" (37).

The room the narrator wishes to enter is also a room from which he wants to escape. In "dream of a black river," he is drowning in a cold, dark flow (another symbol of the female) from which he wants to be rescued (44); even at the point of symbolic death he desires to enter death more fully ("my darling lord take me all the way" 44, "take me beneath your umbrella of water" 45); he becomes someone other than himself, someone "banging at the window" trying to break into his own dream, wanting "another / another" (45). In "flicker and hawk," the room full of "love and anger we should have torn apart / years ago" contains "what / we know of love" (48-49). Escape is the subject of "breaking for

light" (52-53); yet this escape from water and room to a place "somewhere outside the room where it's warm" leads to earth, to love, and back to a room ("I want you all the way / sometimes at close quarters"; "when the streetlight's in the window and the children asleep / can you know my absence?")

In the last section, "after words" continues the theme of breaking out of and back into the room (56-57): "I want the walls down but I know / I'll need them"; "I want to go home to my room a boy on mother's lap"; "if we stay with it long enough" perhaps we can "break the glass and step out. . . come clear / and . . . hold hands." "Leaving home" (61-64) questions the possibility of hierogamos ("it can't be put together can it?") yet presents another mythical history of an eternal return to the elusive room. "Private ceremonies" celebrates also the room in which they occur (68-69); and "one more round" (70-71) has the narrator standing at a window in an empty room, looking out into the rain, hoping once more to "get lucky." The narrator, it seems, has come full circle (11).

The topos <room,x> is a powerful symbol of woman, fully exploited in the last three sections of FH. X is woman, but several intervening topoi are important: <room>window>, for example, and <window,mirror> "grow," as Peirce said, into the possibility that woman is an illusion or a projection of the narrator's mind, or, in Jungian terms, his anima. On the

other hand, the woman (several identifiable women may be treated as aspects of woman) has some distinguishing features. She usually has black hair, grey eyes, long fingers and legs, delicate shoulders, and a slender back. She wears skirts, a yellow scarf, a silk top hat, and carries a lilac umbrella. She travels a lot or is often absent. She is lover, wife, mother, juggernaut, seer, a black river, life, and death. Above all, she is room--which is to say that she is a particular aspect of archetypal woman, treated with full, rhetorical conviction in its positive and negative aspects by the poet.

By contrast, the narrator is continuously mocked, a holy fool. Of course, he mocks himself (or so it seems), but he is mocked also by the author's rhetoric--and "drie mock" is a traditional appellation for irony. Symbols have been associated with unconscious processes since at least the time of Coleridge; Jungian archetypal criticism (Hinz and Teunissen 1978) and readings of Freud through the linguistics of de Saussure (Lacan 1972) emphasize that symbolism is a rhetoric of the unconscious. Briefly, the symbol (a signifier) points to repressed desires (the symbol's values, the signified's). And for all his ranting, wailing, caterwauling, and crying, the narrator is unaware of the nature of this desire. He claims he desires love, yet the symbols (the room and light) imply that he desires womb and knowledge, the bliss of darkness and light, the

conjunction of the lower and the higher, the chthonic and the Platonic. The irony of which the narrator is the butt is precisely this, that he hopelessly, irreconcilably desires to be split in two. For the narrator identifies himself with the male principle, but the female principle is (in his view) unequivocally Other:

we are two people man and woman we are two cultures and two
 birds in different flights we are two elements
 we have learned the odds and embrace them
 we come together fire and water flicker and hawk this is
 what
 we know of love (49).

As Denham has pointed out, these lines expresse a Donne-ish belief that "love contains all contraries" (1987 24); but it is love that contains these contraries, not the narrator. At the apparent apex of his search, the narrator achieves wholeness by classification (people, cultures, birds, elements); his mood is insisntently indicative (are, are, are); his insights are cerebral (learned the odds, know of love); and he embraces a probability. Cutting through this semblance of unity is a fundamental difference, "two," Self and Other, symbolized by "fire and water flicker and hawk"--and the implication of putting these two together seems to be lost on the narrator.

The narrator is mocked also by his views on language. His attitude toward words is complex: his own are sometimes "clouds" and "foolishness" (29); an other's "words teased me into her arms" (31); he is "bereft of words but not the need to find them" (46); he yearns for the beloved's words but

female is in the male (as anima), and unable to recognize his words as himself (as rhetoric), the narrator rides the horse of his knighthood through these poems, "past the tournament / into the desolate countryside," searching for the woman (anima) he glimpsed in his mirror (32). The tournament, of course, is precisely what he is but does not want (rhetoric); the countryside, of course, contains himself and therefore the other (anima). And the irony is that that's all there is.

The narrator, in other words, cannot embrace fully the rhetoric of his desire. In contrast to the poet, who directs a rhetoric of conviction as well as mockery at the narrator, the narrator directs only a rhetoric of conviction at himself. He is unable to mock himself, despite his running assertion that he is a fool, for he takes that role seriously. In "evisceration," welcoming the love that will destroy him, he cries, "I will be your fool in the talons of an iron bird I will be free in the / horrible sky" (47). In "breaking for light," there is no hint of mockery in his discovery that he's "fooled again" by an old trick" (52). Indeed, his attitude, measured again by the statement "I feel more stupid than I did is this wisdom?," maintains its sincere conviction to the end. In "one time round" (70), the narrator seems to be ready to play:

tonight I'm ready where is everyone? my fever's gone down
 I want to dance all night maybe I'll get lucky.

But the holy fool overtakes him in a shift of pronouns:

"cello") is precisely to "surround" those things. That is, the closing metaphors do represent precisely what the cello is (for him). Again, the narrator recognizes that "epperson's cello breaks through the formalities tonight"; but does he? He describes the bacchanal in eucharistic terms, catches himself ("it sounds like a set-up"), then asserts the presence of a trinity (dvorak, epperson, cello). If the consciousness of formality is a first step toward breaking the formality, then the narrator is on his way. But he reverts to the figure of the lover/fool kneeling before the beloved, his heart is in her hand, and he dies again. Unself-consciously.

The poet's account of the narrator, however, includes the account of the narrator's flashes and lapses of self-consciousness, offering an ironic commentary on the ethos created in these poems. The poet employs the topoi <light,x> and <room,x> and the varying self-consciousness of the narrator to reveal him to us. The ethos (of the narrator) that emerges as a function of (the poet's) rhetoric is ultimately serious and, therefore, blind to itself. He sees, dimly; he plays, seriously; and he earns the irony he heaps unwittingly on himself: ritter and narr.

Conclusion

Now preye I to hem alle that herkne this litel tretys or rede, that if ther be any thyng in it that liketh hem, that therof they thanken oure Lord Jhesu Crist, of whom procedth al wit and goodnesse. And if ther be any thyng that displese hem, I preye hem also that they arrette it to the defaute of myn unkonnyng, and nat to my wyl, that wolde ful fayn have seyð bettre if I hadde had konnyng. For oure book seith, "al that is writen is writen for oure doctrine," and that is myne entente. Wherefore, I beseke yow mekely, for the mercy of God, that ye preye for me that Crist have mercy on me and foryeve me my giltes; and namely of my translacions and enditynges of worldly vanitees, the which I revoke in my retracions: . . . the tales of Caunterbury, thilke that sownen into synne;

Geoffrey Chaucer

When Chaucer's reader finishes The Canterbury Tales, he encounters the words quoted above. This reader may notice some traditional topoi: divisions such as <treatise, good/bad>, <book, manner/matter>, <man, knowledge/will>; generic places like <good, God>, <bad, man>; and, of course, the oppositions underlying all of them. The reader will not be surprised at Chaucer's awareness that "this litel tretys," which refers primarily to "The Parson's Tale," may please some and displease others (for, isn't it the most serious and moral of all the tales?). But how could any of the tales "sownen into synne," and which tales are these? To "sownen into" is to "tend toward, make for, be consonant with," and Chaucer first uses the phrase in describing the speech of the Clerk:

Noght o word spak he moore than was neede,
 And that was seyde in forme and reverence,
 And short and quyke and ful of sentence;
 Sownyng in moral vertu was his speche
 And gladly wolde he lerne and gladly teche.
 ("General Prologue" 304-308)

Ah, yes, the clerk, and isn't his speech rather like the speech of the Parson, "sownyng in moral vertu"? But "The Parson's Tale" turns rather sharply on the Parson, revealing him to be tending toward sin as much as toward virtue. Perhaps the Chaucer of the retractions is after all not so far removed from the Chaucer of the "General Prologue" and of the tales: <homo, seriosus/rheticus>).

This study must conclude on a similar note. There are things in it that will please some and displease others. If the reader is pleased, I hope s/he thanks my teachers and my guides. If the reader is displeased, I hope s/he attributes the fault to my "unkonnyng," for I would have said better if I had been able to. My "doctrine" is that a fully traditional notion of topos deeply informs prairie poetry; and I acknowledge that this treatise has "sownynges" which need to be "retracted."

The study itself is based on a topos which might be described by <theory,practise>. Part 1 is a theory of topos; Part 2 is practical criticism. At the same time, Part 1 extracts its theory of topos from the practise of rhetoric; Part 2 tests that theory against the prior practise of poetry. Within each part of the study, then, I have been guided by an ancient rhetorical principle: ars utens

(practise) comes before ars docens (theory). Thus, the actual practise of rhetoricians with respect to "topos" had to be surveyed before a theory of topos could be offered up, and the actual practise of prairie poets with respect to "place" had to be known before a theory of topos could analyze that practise. This rhetorical principle is therefore based on the very topos used in this study, for <theory,practise> describes a complex relation between two processes that are each others' antecedents and consequents.

The theory of topos advanced in Part 1 is one of the study's major findings. The definition of topos, "a relation <x,y> such that if <x,y> and <y,z> then <x,z>," accommodates traditional and contemporary concepts of both "topos" and "figure." It is simple, flexible, and useful. But it may seem to do its work without addressing a continuing problem in the rhetoric of poetry: so, poetry persuades, but to what? And the proper technical answer (it persuades the reader to accept the relation <x,z>) may strike some as just that, technical. This objection may be met, I believe, in several ways. First, the analysis of a poem (or an author's entire work) traditionally proceeds by considering both "what" and "how" the poem (or work) "means." That is, "what" the poem "means" is inseparable from "how" it achieves that "meaning." The topoi are, so I have argued, an essential part of "how" and, therefore, of "what." Secondly, "what" the poem "means" raises the question of "meaning."

Contemporary views that "meaning" is both sense and reference (Frege), a relation between signifier and signified (Saussure), a hermeneutic circle (Heidegger), an aporia (Derrida), the reader's response to the author's text (Barthes), and an endless play of signification (all of the above)--all these views are anticipated, even present, in the traditional triad, ethos / logos / pathos, which is Aristotle's contribution to rhetoric. In that triad, topos plays a central role. Thirdly, a technical answer to the question (persuades to what?) does not limit the reader in any way: it simply provides a basis for any larger answer that may be invented, for the reader, like the poet, is a rhetorician. In Wordsworth's terms, an imaginative poetry (of genius) demands an imaginative reader (with taste).

Despite my conviction that the technical nature of this study is an asset, I may not have succeeded in using it to its full advantage. The search for the topoi present in the work (Part 2) may strike the reader as the study's major characteristic, and a tiresome one at that. Again, my justification for the search is that the topoi must be discovered before one can talk about them; and if I did not talk profoundly enough about a poet's use of topoi in a poem, then I am to be blamed (not the poet, not the poem, not even the topos). The binary structure of the topos sometimes obscures the transitivity of the relation involved, but this is in part caused by the very nature of

enthymematic persuasion. And even where I pay full attention to transitivity, the reader may notice a kind of "wrenching" rather like the Renaissance prosodist's attempts to fit English rhythms into classical hexameters. But the end result of Renaissance poetry, its flower so to speak, is not "wrenched" at all, and is its own demonstration of rhetorical fitness:

Let me not to the marriage of true minds
 Admit impediments; love is not love
 Which alters when it alteration finds
 Or bends with the remover to remove.
 (Shakespeare Sonnet 116)

My point is that my skill in topical analysis is evidently beginning not ending.

For example, I have asserted that the topoi constitute much more than the enthymematic argument of the poem, that they present an ethos and determine a pathos as well. Yet, only in the studies of two poets (Mandel and Kroetsch) has this assertion received any kind of demonstration. In other words, the relation of topos (obviously integral to logos) to ethos and pathos needs to be studied more carefully. When this is done, a better understanding of the question of persuasion (to what?) and of the role of transitivity should result.

These "retractions" aside, the study's second major finding, Part 2, is the identification of the topoi used by five important prairie poets. This identification is the basis for a characterization of the most significant aspect

of each poet's work:

- (1) Livesay's female rhetoric;
- (2) Waddington's poetry of transformation;
- (3) Mandel's tree of imagined place;
- (4) Newlove's symbolic prairie;
- (5) Kroetsch's paradox of undecidability.

The mature work of three representative, second-generation poets shows both influence and innovation in their use of a prairie topos (Suknaski), an ekphrastic topos (Barbour), and symbolism (Friesen).

My last "retraction" is the simple admission that more poets might have been studied, and those poets who were studied might have received fuller treatment. A full study of prairie poetry is still not at hand. But a beginning has been made, and only time and the limits of this exercise have prevented me--so far--from completing it.

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