

THE UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA

MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ANALYSIS FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF
PUBLIC POLICY: AN APPLICATION IN THE EVALUATION
OF THE INTERLAKE F.R.E.D. PLAN

by

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
A THESIS

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ABSTRACT

Management System Analysis for the Assessment of Public Policy:

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This study has two related objectives. The first is to construct a model or technique which can be used in evaluating policy decision-making related to issues of intelligence, where "intelligence" is operationally defined to encompass the generation of new solutions to problems in defined situations (innovation) as well as the definition of problems and solutions in novel or changing situations. The second objective is to apply the developed model or technique in assessing the management function in the implementation of the Interlake Regional Development Plan.

The study's first objective is achieved by a synthesis of principles, concepts and theories of general systems, organization and management. The result of this synthesis is the conceptualization of an hierarchical information control model that is held to be the ideal or standard by which empirical management systems can be assessed. Performance criteria are thence derived from this model, and the resultant evaluative technique is termed Management System Analysis.

Phase 2 of the thesis entails the application of the developed

technique to the implementation of the Interlake Plan. This involves firstly, a description, substantiated in part by personal interviews, of Interlake Management System components and activities for three time stages (Pre-Plan; Plan; and Implementation). In each stage the operational dimensions of two policy organizations (Maker and Addressee) and an inter-organizational network are presented and discussed. Through the use of an aggregating technique called "diagramatic overlay", the inter-organizational network becomes the Management System for each stage. Thus an assessment of changes occurring in the Interlake Management System, over time, can eventually be made. The results of this assessment are summarized in a "Management System Performance Checklist", which reveals that although there are weaknesses evident in the Interlake Management System, that system's performance far exceeds the operation of "normal" public policy delivery mechanisms in dealing with issues of intelligence.

In summary, the objectives of the study are achieved through:

1. The development of a model and technique where none currently exist, to be used in the assessment of intelligence issues in public-policy decision-making; and
2. The evaluation of the management function in the implementation of the Interlake Development Plan, including specific recommendations to rationalize that system in terms of the hierarchical control model.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM STATEMENT

This study attempts to meet the challenges of two problematic situations, one of which arose during the search for a resolution for the other. Initially, the study was designed to undertake an analysis of a specific activity within a particular program. That is, its objective was to evaluate the "management function"¹ in the implementation of a regional development plan for Manitoba's Interlake area. However, it soon became apparent that any broad, working definition of the term "management function" must encompass or take account of a dynamic system involving various organizational structures, roles, activities and actors. In the face of vast empirical complexity, it was of course necessary to seek concepts and techniques which would serve to impose order upon confusion.

The search for such concepts and techniques led to the consideration of broader issues: what kinds of techniques exist for evaluating government policies and aiding decision-makers; how are these techniques related to each other; how can they be classified; and are there any apparent gaps

¹As a working definition, "management function" was understood to involve the identification of problems, the generation of (program) solutions for them and the implementation of those solutions.

in the available set of various types of evaluation techniques?

Since possible omissions from the set of techniques were an eventual concern, it seemed sensible to begin the study by identifying and describing the various management issues for which the existence of related evaluative techniques would be desirable, as aids to decision-makers, rather than starting the analysis by enumerating components of the existing set of such aids.

The process of identifying management issues confronting policy decision-makers eventually led to the recognition of an apparent absence of techniques to evaluate decisions for two important types of such issues. Moreover, both of these issues were deemed to be central elements in the management function. Therefore, it became necessary to solve the study's broader problem before attempting to challenge its narrower one, i.e. the absence of techniques to evaluate decisions related to two critical aspects of the management function took precedence over the evaluation of the "management function" in the implementation of the Interlake Plan. Once a technique was developed, it would then be possible to employ it, in a necessarily crude manner, to help assess the Interlake Plan's management function. Because the two problem situations described above are so closely related, it is impossible to deal with one independent of the other. Therefore, throughout this study the discussions are intended to refer simultaneously to both problems, emphasizing one or the other at any particular time.

With this brief and general background to the study, it is now possible to provide a more explicit "statement of the problem."

PROBLEM STATEMENT: TWO PROBLEMATIC SITUATIONS

This study attempts to deal with two related problem situations:

1. the need for, and development of, evaluation techniques to aid public policy decision-makers in dealing with two important types of (management) issues confronting them; and
2. the application of those techniques in assessing the management function in the implementation of the Interlake Development Plan.

Socio-economic disparities have long been recognized as a way of life for many Canadians in certain geographic areas or communities where natural forces have tended to reduce the entire quality of residential life relative to that which is available in other parts of the country. Thus, inequities of living standards have been recognized to exist not only within particular areas, but also between the various areas of the country.² Such conditions exist as contradictions of one fundamental goal enunciated in our society -- equitable distribution of real income.³ In light of these circumstances, most governments have adopted one form or another of regional development policy, herein defined as a "conscious intervention or definitive course of action, selected from among available alternatives,

²The existence and extent of regional income disparities in Canada are discussed in Economic Council of Canada, Second Annual Review: Towards Sustained and Balanced Economic Growth (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1965), pages 97-143; see also S. E. Chernick, Interregional Disparities in Income: Staff Study #14 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966).

³Equitable distribution of income is enunciated as one of five national goals in the terms of reference of the Economic Council of Canada and by the Council itself. Economic Council of Canada, First Annual Review: Goals for Canada to 1970 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1964), page 1. Equitable income distribution among individuals and regions (balanced growth) is presented as a goal in Economic Council of Canada, Sixth Annual Review: Perspective 1975 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969), page 6; see also K. L. Carter (chairman), Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, Volume 2: The Use of the Tax System to Achieve Economic and Social Objectives (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966), pages 10-13, 42-45.

which is designed to move the entire social system of disparate regions in a more desirable direction."⁴

Regardless of the good intentions of regional development policies, however, desirable conditions will not be achieved in disparate regions unless policies are well managed. This involves accurate problem identification and the generation of solutions which are acceptable to, and practical for, all concerned. Thus, regional development policy encompasses more than just a single decision to improve conditions for certain areas; it is in fact an on-going, iterative process of actions, effects, and reactions. A development policy process involves "planning" a detailed set of operational programs for a region, "implementing" that set of programs, and "evaluating" its impact upon specified development objective(s).⁵ It is unlikely that the time horizon for planning, implementing, and evaluating activities is uni-dimensional, so that one or more of these policy process activities may be occurring at any point in time.

Even if most policies designed to remove regional disparities did not emphasize economic variables, such as employment and income, these policies would still have to operate within the constraints imposed by economic parameters. Scarce resources, having alternate uses, must be allocated toward the attainment of seemingly unlimited desirable ends. To achieve an optimal end-position with a given set of resources, decision-makers must

⁴The text definition of "regional development policy" is an expansion of the definition of "policy", defined as a deliberate interference in the functioning and evolution of an on-going eco-system, in K. Boulding, Principles of Economic Policy (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1958), Chapter 1.

⁵"Policy process" is defined as ".....the formulation, promulgation, and application of identifications, demands and expectations" in H. Laswell and A. Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), page 71.

act in an economically "rational" manner by allocating their available resources to achieve a preferred position vis-à-vis the satisfaction of those desirable ends. Furthermore, rational decision-making necessitates the establishment of priorities among desirable ends, as well as adequate knowledge about available resources, their alternate uses, the consequences of those uses and the (future) environment which the consequences will affect.⁶

Unfortunately, there are limits on the capacity of human knowledge, and these limitations become most important when decisions are taken in a future-oriented dynamic environment. In such situations, there is little certainty about potentially available resources, or the alternative uses of those resources. However, there is even less certainty about the intended or unintended consequences of the alternative uses for resources and/or the nature of the environment wherein such consequences will actualize. It seems apparent, therefore, that the likelihood of decision-makers acting rationally or "optimizing" under the conditions described above is minimal,⁷ and that any tendency towards optimization or increased (economic) rationality in decision-making will largely depend upon the availability of extant empirical information regarding the present value of the decision-related variables (utility functions, resources, alternative uses, and others).

⁶The presentation is a standard explanation of the meaning of rationality in economic decisions. See G. David Quirin, The Capital Expenditure Decision (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1967), page 8. It can be noted that the discussion implicitly assumes that regardless of the method or variables used in the setting of priorities among competing ends, once priorities have been established, "optimization" is a most desirable course of action.

⁷Under these conditions, some economists claim that a decision-maker "satisfices", but does not "optimize" where "satisfice" means the attain-

Of primary concern to this study are those techniques which aid decision-makers in both evaluating previous decisions and identifying or organizing available information that is required to make current decisions.

Regional development policy decision-makers are confronted by four categories of management issues which have been identified, in a broader sense, by H. L. Wilensky for (managerial) decision-makers in organizational settings:

1. goal-setting;
2. control;
3. innovation; and
4. intelligence.⁸

For the purposes of this study, "goal-setting" is intended to mean the defining of a set of desirable end-products, to be attained in the future, by employing one or more available means, given a resource constraint. "Control" is the regulating of both the use of resource input and the operation of selected means. "Innovation" is the solving of novel problems in defined situations. Finally, "intelligence" is the defining of problems and their solutions in novel situations. The relationships among these issues can be summarily described in terms of a very simple, mechanical model where input is converted to output by some intervening process.⁹ In such an input-output model, the definition of intended output involves goal-setting; the allocation of resource input and regulation

ment of some minimally acceptable point for all decision variables. J. G. March and H. A. Simon, Organizations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958), Chapter 6.

⁸The four categories of issues confronting policy-makers are goal-setting, control, intelligence and innovation, as defined in H. L. Wilensky, Organizational Intelligence (New York: Basic Books, 1967), Chapter 1.

⁹The simplest form of mechanical system, without a feed-back loop, is

of "through-put" involves control; the creation of non-routinized responses to familiar problems in the intervening process involves innovation; and both the definition of initial and/or on-going problems and the generation of solutions for them involves intelligence.

In order to assess the performance of decision-makers in reacting to any one or all of these issues, an evaluative study would have to begin by focussing on those variables related to the particular issue under consideration. For goal-setting issues, the study would focus on the establishment and degree of success in achieving objectives; for control issues, it would consider how well limited resources are allocated and how efficiently they are used; for innovation issues, it would focus on the quantity and quality of novel solutions generated in familiar problem situations; and for intelligence issues, it would emphasize the degree of success both in identifying new problems, whether current or in the future, and in generating solutions for those problems.

In the field of public policy evaluation, several techniques exist which can be classified or related, on the basis of the variables upon which they focus, to any one of the four issues confronting decision-makers.

Socio-economic models that provide "effectiveness indicators" of output maximization, based on movements in the empirical valuations of functionally related variables, can be considered as evaluative techniques for goal-setting issues. Similarly, budget studies, administrative reviews, and models of performance optimization (systems analysis) can be classified as evaluative techniques for issues of control, since they attempt to minimize resource utilization through operational and input regu-

depicted as follows:

INPUT → → CONVERSION PROCESS OR THROUGH-PUT → → OUTPUT

lation, given a desired level of output. Other techniques, such as benefit-cost analysis and planning, programming, budgeting systems (P.P.B.S) would seem to straddle the boundary of goal-setting and control issues, although the primary emphasis of both of these techniques relates to goal-setting and goal achievement.

The evaluative techniques mentioned above can also be related to three major functions that have often been attributed to budgeting: financial control, managerial control and strategic planning. In a budgeting framework, strategic planning is used to aid decision-makers when they are confronted with goal-setting issues such as specifying program objectives or designs. Similarly, managerial and financial control are employed to deal with control issues, such as ensuring that funds are spent properly (as per appropriation) or that spent funds are used properly (maximum administrative efficiency).¹⁰

It must be remembered, however, that budgeting impinges on complicated political processes, wherein decisions regarding priorities are made by mutual adjustment (a workable concensus) on the basis of differing sets of objectives, as enunciated by a number of "partisan advocates."¹¹ It is precisely this process of mutual adjustment that is encompassed by issues of both intelligence and innovation, since such issues relate to the identification, classification and generation of solutions for problems. Yet there seems to be no technique(s) that can be applied to indicate the success of decision-makers in identifying problems and their sol-

¹⁰"Financial control" focusses on the "object of expenditure". "Managerial control" focusses on "program classifications" and efficiency in program execution (administration). "Strategic planning" focusses on the achievement of objectives. Charles L. Schultze, The Politics and Economics of Public Spending (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institute, 1968), pages 9-14.

¹¹Ibid, page 16.

utions within a relevant (decision) environment.

Two critical points emerging from this discussion can be summarized by:

1. the observation that techniques exist to aid policy decision-makers in setting goals and controlling the utilization of resources. The reliability of applying these techniques is dependent upon the availability of sufficient amounts of necessary information, as well as assumptions about the constancy of political and other institutional parameters; and
2. the hypothesis that the quality (rationality) of policy decisions can be improved by refining available evaluative techniques (related to goal-setting and control issues) and/or by easing the constraints imposed upon decision-makers by an absence of techniques to aid them in dealing with issues of intelligence and innovation.

Figure 1.1 categorizes the four types of organizational issues confronting decision-makers and the evaluation techniques and foci as they have been presented thus far.

To bring the central elements of Figure 1.1 to a more specific level of approximation, both the decision issues and the evaluation foci and techniques can be discussed in terms of their application to a comprehensive plan for Regional Development in the Interlake Area of Manitoba.¹² One decision issue confronting any legislating body is goal-setting. With respect to the Interlake area, the goals established for the development plan are to bring about an increase in income levels and living standards

¹²Department of Forestry and Rural Development, Interlake Area of Manitoba Federal-Provincial Rural Development Agreement (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1967). The Plan allocates \$85 million to Education (\$27 million, Manpower (\$28 million), Development and Structural Adjustment (\$28 million) and General (\$2 million).

CATEGORIES OF ISSUES CONFRONTING DECISION-MAKERS	EVALUATION	
	FOCUS	TECHNIQUES
Goal-Setting	OUTPUT: The fulfilment of policy goals and objectives	Socio-economic models of effectiveness, benefit-cost studies, P.P.B.S.
Control	INPUT: Allocation and expenditure of resources among alternative uses. PROCESS OR THROUGHPUT: Regulation of selected means to minimize waste and operational inefficiency.	Budget studies, administrative reviews, and optimization models of performance (systems analysis)
Innovation	PROCESS: Finding new solutions for defined problem situations	- ? -
Intelligence	ADAPTATION: Identifying new problem situations and generating solutions for them	- ? -

FIGURE 1.1

DECISION ISSUES AND POLICY EVALUATION

for the region's residents.¹³ In order to assess the degree of success in achieving these goals, \$250,000 has been allocated for a long-term (ten-year) research and analysis program to determine the economic impact of the Plan on the region.¹⁴ This research and analysis program is being carried out by the Department of Agricultural Economics at the University of Manitoba. The (empirical) modelling of the region's economic relationships and the determination of the effect of the Plan's program expenditures on those relationships has been the subject of several reports.¹⁵ The research results derived from the regional economic model and special studies have facilitated decisions relating to goal-setting;

1. by indicating the feasibility of achieving improvements in residents' incomes, employment opportunities and living standards;
2. by precisely indicating the clients of various programs (manpower, drainage, land clearing, and others), the impacts of the programs on those clients, possible areas for improving clientele (target) definitions, and potential resource requirements for such programs; and
3. by indicating new areas for Plan efforts, e.g. the importance of livestock production to the farm economy and its multiplier effects; the high mobility associated with training programs and associated ways of improving adjustment without utilizing apparently unacceptable mobility programs.

While this research has contributed directly only to decisions on goal-setting issues, it has indirectly contributed to control and innovation decisions (points 2 and 3, respectively).

¹³Ibid, pages 3, 4 and 7.

¹⁴Ibid, pages 19 and 49.

¹⁵Some examples of such research reports are: John R. Tulloch and James

The Plan also recommends the implementation of a research program to study its social effects on the region.¹⁶ While the design of this social research is not specified, it is conceivable that it might be carried out using "social indicators" as the basis for analysis.¹⁷ In any event, the Plan's intention is clear that its social research program, like its economic research program, is to be used to assess the impact of development programs on the achievement of objectives, i.e. a goal-setting related evaluation.

A second decision issue confronting any legislating body is control. Generally speaking, this issue requires that a rational strategy, which is assumed to follow from the statement of a set of objectives and relevant constraints, be monitored during its implementation. The focus of evaluations related to this type of decision issue, then, is to regulate operational processes in an on-going and ex post fashion to ensure that

MacMillan, "A Micro-Analytic Model of Migration", Regional Science Perspectives, 1973 (forthcoming); Paul Molgat and James A. MacMillan, Education in Area Economic Development: Research Report Number 10 (Winnipeg: Center for Settlement Studies, University of Manitoba, 1972); Raymond D. Bollman and James A. MacMillan, Income - Expenditure Relationships and Level of Living in the Interlake Area of Manitoba: Research Bulletin Number 72-2 (Winnipeg: Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Manitoba, 1972); James A. MacMillan, Leo A. Bernat, and John J. Flagler, Benefits and Costs of Manpower Services in the Interlake Rural Development Area: Research Bulletin Number 72-1 (Winnipeg: Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Manitoba, 1972); and Geoffrey A. Norton and James A. MacMillan, A Framework for Economic Planning of Watershed Development: Research Report Number 6 (Winnipeg: Agassiz Center for Water Studies, University of Manitoba, 1972).

¹⁶ Department of Forestry, op. cit., page 49.

¹⁷ For a discussion of social-indicators as they relate to the goal-setting function, see A. D. Bederan, "Social Indicators and Goals" in R. A. Bauer (ed.), Social Indicators (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1966), pages 68-154. A presentation of a social system model which results in the presentation of empirical indicators is given in B. Gross, "The State of the Nation: Social System Accounting", in R. Bauer (ed.), op. cit., pages 154-272.

allocated funds are expended with a minimum of waste.¹⁸ There are two techniques which are most commonly employed for such evaluations: budget studies and administrative reviews.

Since the budget indicates a legislating body's opinion of the least-cost method, in real terms, by which to achieve maximum benefits relating to a particular set of goals, accounting reviews that compare allocated and expended funds can provide an indication of the efficiency of policy application. In the Interlake, eighty-five million dollars of development funds are allocated among the three broad categories of training and orientation, infra-structure and resource rationalization.¹⁹ Even though the utilization of budget studies is complicated by the shared-cost nature of the Plan, they are nevertheless performed annually, as a matter of normal procedure, by each of the various governments and departments involved in funding the Plan's programs.

Supplementing budget studies in the evaluation of control issues are reviews of administrative operations, where an "administrative unit" (the target of such reviews) is understood to be a neutral policy instrument employed for the execution and supervision of a given purpose.²⁰ Evaluations with this type of focus are often done by consultants external to

¹⁸E. J. Benson, Financial Management in Departments and Agencies of the Government of Canada (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968), page 9.

¹⁹Department of Forestry, op. cit., pages 50-51 (24-51).

²⁰"Administration" is defined as the concern with the implementation of policy received from outside and above the administrative limit. Rules governing the procedures of implementation are also established outside and above the administrative unit. W. Harrison, "Administration", in J. Gould and W. L. Kolb (eds.), A Dictionary of the Social Sciences (Great Britain: Tavistock Publications, 1964). pages 10-12; also see O. Sheldon, "Management", in E. A. Seligman (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: MacMillan and Company, Volume X, 1933), pages 76-80.

the implementation unit, as is illustrated in the region under analysis by the "Interlake Management Study".²¹ The object of such reviews is to identify, with an intent to remove, any tensions or operational inefficiencies in the internal functioning of the bureaucracy.

To this point, then, techniques to aid decision-makers involved in the Plan have been identified for both goal-setting and control issues. However, there is no mention in the Plan of evaluating (and subsequently improving) decisions which are taken in response to confrontation of decision-makers by issues of innovation or intelligence. Yet the dynamical nature of this or any social system wherein a development policy is being implemented, obviates the existence of such issues. Regardless of how well structured a policy is, it must be implemented in an ever-changing environment; hence, its executants are required to solve problems in both unexpected and novel situations. Questions as to whether or not clients per se and their needs have been effectively utilized, resources have been allocated in a socially desirable manner and others all demand answers. Such answers would be extremely useful aids to decision-makers when confronted with similar issues at subsequent points in time, so that rationalizing alterations in the design and structure of both policy and its delivery system's organization could be made.

It has been asserted above, however, that there exists a dearth of techniques, both actually and potentially available, for use in the evaluation of decisions related to issues of innovation and intelligence.²²

²¹Hickling-Johnston Management Consultants, Interlake Management Study (Toronto: October, 1969), unpublished consultant's report.

²²"Innovation" stresses defining new programs (responses) to old problem situations. March and Simon, op. cit., pages 174-175. "Innovation" is concerned with system design and can also be operationally defined such that novelty of response to a particular problem is its essen-

In view of these circumstances, it is apparent that there are two problematic situations facing this study:

1. to develop a technique which can be used to evaluate decisions taken on issues of intelligence; and
2. to apply that technique and assess such decisions as they relate to the Interlake Plan.

In order to perform the analysis required to resolve the first problematic situation, principles derived from general systems, organizational and management theories will be employed in the structuring of a model design as a technique for evaluating intelligence. Using a subjectively-derived (personal interviews, documentary material, media coverage) data base, soft data, the study will then apply the evaluating technique to assess, in qualitative terms, intelligence (issues) in the implementation of the Interlake Plan. This evaluation technique will be termed "Management System Analysis." The term "management" is used to refer to both the formulation and execution of policy, although in specific cases where policy has been established already, the formulation component will involve re-planning.²³ The term "system" is used to denote the fact that management refers to more than just a specific group of people or a particular type of activity.²⁴ Instead, management denotes an organized and integrated

tial feature, as in T. Axworthy, The Politics of Innovation (Winnipeg: The Institute of Urban Studies, University of Winnipeg, 1972), page 4. "Intelligence" stresses defining new problems and responses for them. Since there is some overlap in the meaning of the terms "innovation" and "intelligence", for subsequent purposes in this study, "intelligence" will be used to encompass both the introduction of novel techniques (innovation), as well as problem solving in a changing or novel environment (intelligence).

²³ A broad definition of management includes both the formulation and execution of policy through the functional activities of planning, organization, direction, and co-operation as in W. H. Wesson, "Management", in J. Gould and W. L. Kolb (eds.), op. cit., pages 403-404. A narrower definition includes only policy execution as in O. Sheldon, op. cit., pages 76-80.

²⁴ "Management" is more than the sum of its members and can adopt a

structure of groups and individuals, performing differentiated functions involving some degree of co-ordination in order to best achieve a specific set of objectives. In these terms, a primary purpose of a management system analysis would be the identification and specification of the structure, components and functions which compose such a system. By comparing this system to a set of performance criteria, which in this study are derived from an "ideal" model of a management system, an evaluation occurs.

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

This study has both general and specific objectives. The general objective is to develop an evaluation technique which can be applied in analyzing intelligence issues as they arise in various public policy settings. The study is more specifically aimed at applying the developed technique in the particular case of the implementation of a comprehensive plan for the development of Manitoba's Interlake region. Both the general and specific concerns of this study are reflected in the following set of objectives.

1. to synthesize relevant concepts, methods and methodology for the evaluation of intelligence issues, as reflected in management systems for the implementation of public sector policies, plans and programs;
2. to describe in detail the experiential model of the management system for the implementation of a comprehensive plan for rural development in the Interlake; and

number of forms and approaches according to C. Kerr et al, Industrialism and Industrial Man (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960), pages 146-147.

3. to assess the performance of the Interlake management system (when it is confronted by intelligence issues during its delivery of policy) and to recommend changes which would tend to rationalize the operation of that management system.

OUTLINE OF THE STUDY

To achieve the objectives specified above, the study begins by reviewing relevant theories of organization, management, and systems. From that basis, a conceptualization of the ideal functioning of a management system is developed. This model is intended to act as a basis for the establishment of standards and/or criteria by which empirical management systems of organizations can be assessed. The model which is developed specifies the existence of five hierarchical levels of management functions within each of two policy organizations. In addition, the model identifies numerous "internal" linkages (among hierarchical levels) as well as various linkages between the organizations and their relevant external environments. The latter "external" linkages are intended to facilitate mutual adaptation to conditions of change. Since the model is initially developed in very general organizational terms, definitional adjustments are made in its specification of organizations and environments to permit its application in a public policy setting.

The next phase of the study involves the collection of data. Since much of the information required to specify the operation of the Interlake Management System is known only to a small number of people who were intimately involved in the Plan's implementation, the study's data base is a subjective one. This data base is large composed, in addition to docu-

ments and media coverage, of personal interviews with central figures of the Plan, such as administrators and Area Development Board chairmen. All of these interviews are presented in Appendices B and C, which in part form Volume 2 of the study. Also found in Volume 2, Appendix A, is a discussion of the Area Development Board (chairman) interview format and a presentation of the format per se.

Once the data are collected and presented, the next phase of the study is to use them in specifying the Interlake Management System. That system is specified for three time-periods: the pre-Plan, Plan and implementation stages. The purpose of "staging" the empirical specification of the Interlake Management System is to permit analysis of changes occurring in the system over time. Within each time-stage, three components of the Management System are specified: the Policy-Maker Organization, the Policy-Addressee Organization, and the Inter-Organizational Network. To ensure that these three components are not misinterpreted as being mutually independent, the components are "overlaid" as each is specified.

Once the Interlake Management System is specified, it is compared qualitatively to the ideal Management System model. Discrepancies between the actual and conceptual models are identified, and their implications for policy are discussed. Finally, an attempt is made to evaluate in a more absolute fashion the "performance" of the Interlake Management System.

CHAPTER II

DEFINITIONS, CONCEPTS AND MODEL APPROACHES

One purpose of this chapter is to review some of the relevant literature pertaining to organization and systems theories. That review provides some critical definitions and concepts to be used in understanding, analyzing and evaluating the policy issue of intelligence as it applies to the implementation of the Interlake Plan. However, there is no attempt in this chapter to enumerate properties which are necessary, regardless of their degree of existence, for a phenomenon to be termed a (human) organization. Analytically, this is an important point which is analogous to an often-cited definitional differentiation between intention and extension¹ that provides two alternative frames of reference for the identification of an organization.

To "intentionally" define a set of empirical entities as an organization, one must assume that there exists a structure or pattern among the relationships of those entities. The various relationships can then be studied, not to "prove" that the (relational) patterns are of an organized form, but instead to "learn" more about each of the relationships (among entities) in the pattern and their operation.

¹Wesley C. Salmon, Logic (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), pages 89-97.

When "extensionally" defining a set of empirical entities as an organization, the procedure is to perceive unity among entities and then to search and test for a pattern of relationship similar to that found in other "known" forms of organization. In this instance, a priori knowledge of the properties of organizations must be assumed.

For this study, it is the intentional definition of organization that is relevant, since the objective of the study is not to test whether a set of people and institutions involved in the implementation of the Interlake Plan do or do not form an organization, but rather to understand how and how well they inter-relate in attempting to fulfill their Plan implementation goal.

Since this study adopts an intentional approach in the definition of two policy-related organizations in the Interlake area, it is important to emphasize that its theory chapter is designed to transmit nothing more than a basic understanding of the integration of organization and systems theory. Thus, the initial purpose is to develop a common perspective about organizations, rather than to establish criteria for the specification of empirical phenomena as organizations. Once this common perspective regarding organizations has been established, an "extensional" definition, in the form of a hierarchical control model, will be developed for "management systems." This model is then to be modified or redefined in a public policy setting, whence operational criteria for testing the relations in, and operations of the Interlake Management System will be established.

ORGANIZATION THEORY IN A SYSTEMS FRAMEWORK

Several authors have indicated that an intrinsic relationship exists

between organization and system.² In fact, Gross even contends that all "human organizations are open systems."³ However, in order to appreciate, analyze and test the relationship which does exist between organization and system, an identification of the basic characteristics and a definition of each of the terms involved is necessary.

Firstly, then, "system" will be defined as a set of inter-connections among a group of entities whose association is such that an internally inter-dependent, complex whole or unity is identifiable. This definition has been chosen for this study in preference to others⁴ because of its explicit focus upon the relational connections among components of the system. There are also, however, a number of implicit characteristics which can be ascribed to a system: boundary, stress, state, feedback, and input and output. Each of these will be briefly considered.

Since the definition of system emphasizes the existence of a clearly identifiable whole, it follows that there will be something which separates one system from another or a system from its environment. This separator will be called the "boundary". Operationally, the boundary of a system can be defined as the line forming a "closed circle" around selected variables, where there exists less flow of energy across the line than within the line.⁵ Alternatively, the empirical specification of a boundary may be related to a difference in relationships among components across, as

²David I. Cleland, and W. R. King, Management: A Systems Approach (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1972), page 69; also see A. G. Donald, Management Information and Systems (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1967).

³Bertram M. Gross, Organizations and Their Managing (New York: The Free Press, 1964), page 113.

⁴"A system is a set of components interacting with each other, and a boundary which selects both the kind and rate of flow of input and output to and from the system" in F. K. Berrien, General and Social Systems (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1968), page 32.

⁵Robert Chin, "The Utility of Systems Models and Developmental Models

compared to within the boundary.⁶ Regardless of the specification criteria, the primary function of the boundary will be to filter or select the various inputs and outputs of the system. It would seem, then, that the initial assignment of a boundary to a given system under study would be highly tentative and subject to revision once the variables or roles which are focussed upon have been more closely analyzed.

The other characteristics of systems are more familiar perhaps than that of boundary, and therefore require a less detailed description. Input and output can be understood in terms of the "energy" used for various on-going operations, where input is energy absorbed from the environment and output is energy expelled from the system. It is axiomatic that output will be in some way distinct from input if the system is active.

Another rather familiar concept is that of "state" which merely indicates a particular pattern of relationship which does, or can, exist among the entities of the system at a particular point in time. A state can be related to the dynamical concept of "stage", which identifies the relational patterns that a system has adopted over time.⁷

Closely tied to the concepts of state and stage is that of "stress". Stress indicates the pressures or forces which are the result of, and in turn, result in dynamic relationships among the various entities of a system. Since a system's components may compete for limited resource input, produce competing product output, and be productively dependent, or since

for Practitioners" in W. G. Bennis, K. D. Benne and R. Chin (eds.), The Planning of Change (2nd ed.) (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), pages 297-312.

⁶Berrien, op. cit., chapter 2 and page 32.

⁷A mathematical formulation of stage and state in dynamic linear program modelling can be found in H. M. Wagner, Principles of Management Science: With Applications to Executive Decisions (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), pages 206-212.

they may not be perfectly integrated or may have to react to externally induced change, forces will arise which create various degrees of attraction and repulsion among the components. Such forces can be termed stress, tension or conflict and each one can have both positive and negative valuations.

The final characteristic of a system to be considered here is that of "feedback". This term can be defined as "...the control of input as a function of output."⁸ Since feedback means that some output is re-used as system input, it emphasizes the fact that a system affects and is affected by its environment. Generally, feedback will be used to control the on-going processes of a system:

1. either in maintaining an existing normal state when it deviates; or
2. in introducing a change of state by altering the existing situation or creating a new one.⁹

Given these characteristics and concepts of a system, there are various hypotheses and propositions which can be combined to form a theory of systems.¹⁰ For the purposes of this study, it is sufficient to summarize those which have been developed or re-formulated by Berrien.¹¹ Thus, this study assumes that all open systems, that is, those which exchange energy with their environment, exist within other systems. If one of these systems is inconvenient or impossible to describe, it may be treated as a

⁸Berrien, op. cit., Chapter 3 and page 47. ⁹Donald, op. cit., page 1.

¹⁰The basis of the theory in a biological setting is found in L. Von Bertalanffy, General System Theory: Foundations, Development Application (New York: George Braziller and Co., 1968). For a comprehensive review and expansion of the fundamental concepts of the theory, see Walter Buckley (ed.), Modern Systems Research for the Behavioural Scientist: A Sourcebook (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1968). For a summary of the basic principles and definitions, see Daniel Katz and Robt. L. Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966), pages 14-30.

¹¹Berrien, op. cit.

"Black Box", where inputs and outputs only (but not transformation processes) are identified, without invalidating the analysis of its supra-systems. With respect to the outputs of a system, it will be assumed that they are of two types, useful and useless, and that both the criteria of selection and the selection per se of useful outputs rests in the supra-system. Hence, the system receiving outputs from its sub-system will accept useful outputs and reject those which are useless. In order for a system to survive, its useful outputs must exceed its useless outputs. Furthermore, the production of a system's output involves time and is therefore constrained by temporal considerations. Moreover, the limit or variability of output is controlled by the number of states a system has the capacity to assume. This, in turn, is controlled by the structure of the entities of the system and their boundary. Similarly, the functions of a system are dependent upon its structure.

It would not be useful to summarize or enumerate any further propositions of systems theory, because, as Cleland and King indicate, systems theory is a way of thinking rather than a detailed action plan emanating from a set of principles.¹² For example, when dealing with the analysis of an open system, it is the assessment of the critical supportive and maintenance relationships between the structure of the system and its environment which the theory stresses,¹³ rather than the prescription of operational tactics. Hence, if an attempt is made to analyze organized human activity within a systems framework, a focus for such analysis is readily available.

Defining "organization" poses a somewhat similar problem to one which

¹²Cleland and King, op. cit., pages 1-23.

¹³Katz and Kahn, op. cit., page 9.

is involved defining "system". Although much research has been done in and about organizations, little work has been done on the principle of organization per se.¹⁴ "Organization", as a concept, refers to the pattern of behaviour among various entities and the unity in anticipation of which each entity exists. Just as a system, therefore, refers to the various relations and inter-connections of entities and not the entities per se, organization refers to systems of relational patterns. When these systems of relational patterns involve human activities and groupings, they become human organizations and can be defined as ".....social units deliberately constructed and reconstructed to seek specific goals."¹⁵ Such a definition of an organization is useful only if it is qualified by the recognition that "organization" per se transcends common classification schemes and stereotypes of organizations. As Katz and Kahn indicate, an organization consists of patterned activities of a number of individuals operating as part of a system transforming energetic input into output; while deliberate relations and specific goals are involved, it is incorrect to locate and identify organizations by popular names and/or to regard them as simply the epitome of the purposes of their designers, leaders or key members.¹⁶

As was the case with systems, there are some basic characteristics of organizations which can be identified. These characteristics include structure, functions and processes. Firstly, what is referred to as "structure" is the pattern of relation of a number of inter-dependent parts of an entity, to each other. Although the term connotes stability,

¹⁴ R. Jean Hills, Toward a Science of Organization (Eugene, Oregon: University of Oregon Press, 1968), page 1.

¹⁵ Amitai Etzioni, Modern Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), pages 3-4.

¹⁶ Katz and Kahn, op. cit., pages 14-17.

the structure is susceptible to change over time and structural transformation often forms the essence of organizational change. While structures of human organizations are often represented by a static and formal organization "chart", it is important to note that human organizations lack structure in the physical sense. In fact, their structure is related to functions and events and is composed of behavioural role patterns which change only slowly over time, even in spite of more rapid changes in individual behaviour.¹⁷

Secondly, "functions" refer to the actions or activities for which individual entities are specifically fitted or used in an organization. Since human organizations can be perceived in terms of the specific purposes for which they are designed, as well as the unintended consequences associated with the means to these purposes,¹⁸ their functions are defined by the structures which their purposes necessitate. Generally, there are five basic sub-systems which are used to describe the various aspects of organizational functioning.¹⁹

The "productive" sub-system is concerned with transforming input into output. The "supportive" sub-system ensures that there are adequate resources available for on-going production and that wastes are disposed of.

¹⁷ Katz and Kahn, op. cit., pages 454-455. The slow and periodic changes of role relationships lend the study of organizations to period analysis (comparative statics).

¹⁸ A summary of the models of Selznick, Merton and Gouldner on the feedback of unanticipated consequences from a sub-system to a system in response to an original demand for equilibrating control in the sub-system is presented in J. G. March and H. A. Simon, Organizations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958), pages 37-47.

¹⁹ Katz and Kahn, op. cit., pages 39-47. It can be noted that Talcott Parsons has but four sub-systems in his conceptualization of a societal system. These are the adaptive, goal-attainment, integrative and the pattern-maintenance as described in Walter Isard, General Theory: Social Political, Economic and Regional (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1969), pages 495-497.

The "maintenance" sub-system ensures that there is an adequate supply of individuals in both the organization and its field to provide human energy for various functional roles. This involves attracting individuals to and keeping them satisfied in, their organizational roles. The "adaptive" sub-system is concerned with promoting sufficient organizational change to permit survival in a changing environment. Finally, the "managerial" sub-system is used to control, co-ordinate, direct and integrate the activities of the various sub-systems.

Thirdly, "process" is understood to mean an activity or set of actions which leads toward a particular end. In an organization, this involves the transformation and utilization of energy, either directly (as in production) or indirectly (as in information exchange between inter-acting individuals). Katz and Kahn establish three levels of generality related to the indirect transformation of energy, the most general of which is communication, then influence, and finally leadership.²⁰

Within this type of organizational framework there will exist a group of decision-makers who will attempt to direct changes in the organization's structure which are consistent with evolving purposes, a changing environment and available alternatives. The measure of the effectiveness of these decision-makers will be a comparison of the organization's on-going state vis-à-vis that of the environment, as reflected by improvements in the ratio of energetic input to output.²¹ In order, however, to measure the

²⁰Katz and Kahn, op. cit., pages 457-459.

²¹This means of measuring effectiveness differs somewhat from that presented in Katz and Kahn, op. cit., pages 458-460, in that this writer perceives the organization's efficiency to be related to the effectiveness of decision-makers, given a particular structure. The effectiveness of the organization is nevertheless related to its capacity and ability to adapt to a changing environment.

effectiveness of the organization, it is necessary to assess its on-going structural relationship with its environment, in terms of the organization's adaptive ability. Since adaptation involves dissipating, blocking or neutralizing harmful input,²² the primary means by which the adaptive ability of an organization can be assessed is through the analysis of existing and potential information exchange. This can be supplemented by an evaluation of the on-going importance of the organization's exports to its environment: its products or services, image and ideology.

While the relationship between systems and organizations becomes apparent by the very definition of the basic concepts involved, it is desirable to state explicitly some of the prominent features of organizations when they are perceived as open systems.²³ Of course, there will be an existence of input, "through-put" and output flowing between the system and its environment. Since the organization is open, its output will have a prominent effect on its future input through a feedback mechanism. More importantly, perhaps, the survival of the organization will depend upon its ability to draw resources from its environment to reverse the natural entropic process, which leads all organizations toward disorganization over time. Finally, any initial inconsistency of either operational or non-operational purposes among the various entities of the organization will result in conflict. Such stress will augment over time if the organization follows a trend of differentiation and evolving complexity, and will necessitate the co-ordination of functions as well as the integration of the system's components.

²² "Adaptation" is defined as "...those behavioural and structural modifications within the life span of a system or across generations which are survival extending" in Berrien, op. cit., Chapter 4 and page 74.

²³ For a good review, see Katz and Kahn, op. cit., pages 19-29.

A CLASSIFICATION SCHEME FOR THE COMPONENTS OF AN ORGANIZATION

As stated in the introduction to this chapter, the point of departure for any study of a particular organization goes beyond the mere identification of the existence of inter-dependence of entities forming a whole; since inter-dependence is a fundamental perspective in the intentional definition of organization. The real problem, therefore, is to identify the components or entities of the organized system, their patterns of structural relation and the dynamic processes of those relations. Moreover, the analysis can be aided by employing the concept of functional system, wherein "...units (entities) are differentiated with respect to the contribution each makes to the functioning of the (referrent) system."²⁴

The unifying concept of functional system is the assumption that the parts of the system work together with a sufficient degree of internal consistency to permit the emergence of a distinct unity. When this perspective is applied to a system of human activity, it means that the function of any single entity is that amount which it provides to the "life" of the total system through its various forms of behaviour, activity and inter-action, as constrained by its structural relations. Given that such a system has some purpose (for which the entities were brought together), it can be analyzed as an organization. The means by which the organization is studied will, in fact, be closely related to those means that are used to assess any other system.

²⁴ R.J. Hills, op. cit., page 17.

While there is a demonstrated conceptual relationship between systems and organizations, Berrien extends that connection in a postulation about the empirical origin of organizations:

"Organizations evolve among components or between natural systems initially by accident when:

- a. two or more systems fall into a coupled symbiotic relationship; or
- b. feedback relationships develop between complex systems consisting of more than two components."²⁵

By adopting such a perspective, it is possible to study organizations within the framework of a system employing the classification schemes involved therein. One such scheme is alluded to by R. Jean Hills, in an attempt to develop a science of organization.²⁶

A simple, but important, premise to the classification scheme must be mentioned in this chapter: conceptually it is the varying properties of entities, or variables, among which inter-dependencies can be identified, that are the referent of system. Thus, it is their relational patterns and activities which require classification. Firstly, these variables can be classified according to an activity standard, i.e. whether they are static or dynamic. The static variables form elements of structure, since any transformation within or between these elements occurs only slowly over time. Alternatively, the dynamic variables form elements of the ongoing processes of the system. Secondly, the variables can be classified by a purpose standard, i.e. whether they are character properties of many individual entities or relational properties of the single unity. The character properties of variables differentiate among both the entities and operations of the organization.

²⁵Berrien, op. cit., chapter 4 and page 74.

²⁶R. J. Hills, op. cit., pages 2-19.

Alternatively, the relational properties are involved in the ordering of these entities and operations. From this classification scheme emerges a way of summarizing the procedural components for an analysis of organizations.

For example, an organization has both properties of structure and process, wherein structural properties refer to the behavioural role patterns of entities (nodes, channels), while process properties identify the activities of the entities which lead to particular end products (functions). Also, an organization has both character and relational properties, wherein character properties differentiate entities from one another (identification) and relational properties order the patterns of exchange among entities (positioning).

Although it has been indicated that organizations lack a physical structure, schematizations often represent "positions" or "nodes" in organizations by blocks, and "linkages" or "channels" of responsibility, authority or communication by lines.²⁷ This form of diagrammatic modeling can be most useful if it satisfies two conditions. Firstly, the diagram itself must be related to a conceptualization of the phenomenon under study: in this case, the systematic organization. Secondly, if the diagram represents human activity, it must not exclude the behaviour of entities.

Figure 2.1 presents the classification scheme for organizational components discussed above, and uses the activity and purpose standards of that scheme as the conceptual basis for summarizing procedures used in the empirical analysis of organizational variables. It therefore satisfies, for this study, the first condition accompanying the use of diagrammatic

²⁷ Cleland and King, op. cit., page 41.

		ACTIVITY STANDARD	
		STRUCTURAL PROPERTIES (STATIC)	PROCESS PROPERTIES (DYNAMIC)
PURPOSE STANDARD	Character Properties	- differentiation among entities of the organization, i.e. identification of nodes and channels	- differentiation among operation of the organization, i.e. identification of functions
	Relational Properties	- order or pattern among entities of the organization, i.e. vertical and horizontal positioning of nodes and channels	- order or pattern among operations, i.e. temporal positioning of functions (stages and states)

FIGURE 2.1

A CLASSIFICATION SCHEME FOR PROCEDURES USED IN ANALYZING
A (SYSTEMATIC) ORGANIZATION

(organizational) models. From the "cells" in Figure 2.1, it can be seen that the method of analysis to be used later in the study will involve identifying the roles of (Interlake Plan related) entities as nodes or channels, positioning them relative to one another in an organizational structure, identifying how they function in time, and positioning (changes in) their functions over time.

The second condition of the use of a diagram model is met if explicit recognition is given to the actual operation of the organization, as well as its desired or hypothesized activities and relationships. Moreover, it is important to note that behaviourism encompasses many levels of analytic generality, and as March and Simon inadvertently demonstrate, human behaviour is a variable in even the most instrumentalist approaches to organizational study.²⁸ Since both conditions have been met, the use of diagrams in this study to represent the reality of an organization does not warrant the many negative connotations often attributed to "organization charts."

ORGANIZATIONAL MODELS IN A POLICY CONTEXT

Two points which have been established form the basis for this section:

1. Organizations can be analyzed within a systems framework by means of systems models; and
2. Under the adoption of an intentional approach to the definition of organizations, a particular phenomenon can be deemed an organization on the basis of its consistency with a "common per-

²⁸ Organization theory analyzes the inter-actions between the characteristics of individuals and the task and social environment as defined by the organization, in J. G. March and H. A. Simon, op. cit., pages 9-12; also "...the distinction between formal and informal organization.....is

spective" of organizations.

The useful application of (systematic) organization models and concepts in a public policy setting thus depends on whether or not a system of relationships can be identified and related to purposeful activity. Since the definition of "public policy" explicitly encompasses a purpose, and the very existence of government bureaucracies to implement policy clearly implies a pattern of relationship, it would seem appropriate to use an organizational model in such a policy context.²⁹ The problem is to construct an appropriate organization model, and the issue is to define its relevant system characteristics by synthesizing the available concepts that have been discussed above.

At a general level of approximation, a policy can be perceived conveniently to involve two sets of people, as defined by their primary relationship to that particular policy.³⁰ One set encompasses those people who have the responsibility and authority, regardless of its form of legitimization, to "make" and implement policy decisions. In the public sector, these persons are generally organized into a goal-oriented control system referred to as the "executive and administrative" branches of government. This group, and particularly those to whom power has been delegated by an electorate, are eventually judged on the basis of the policy decisions they have made, how effective these decisions have been and how consistent their policies are with the more general needs or non-operational goals of society. These persons can be termed the "makers".

largely an arbitrary one stemming from the academic and professional division of the total organization", in E. D. Chapple and L. R. Sayles, The Measure of Management: Designing Organizations for Human Effectiveness (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1961), page 9.

²⁹For the definition of "policy", see chapter 1, footnotes 4 and 5.

³⁰Peter H. Markl, Political Continuity and Change (New York: Harper

A second set of persons involved in policy decisions can be termed the "addressees".³¹ This group includes those persons at whom a policy is directed, those who are unintentionally affected and those who provide the resources by which the policy operates.

While it is apparent that there may be some overlap between these two policy sets, especially in a society where the government or a particular private corporation is a major employer, the sets are still sufficiently independent to provide a focus for policy analysis. Furthermore, it is not surprising, given the power-dependence relationship between the "makers" and "addressees" of policy, that much attention has been paid to the nature of inter-action between these groups.³²

It is, in fact, this inter-action within a given policy context and over a specific period of time, with which this study is concerned.

It would seem, then, that in most policy situations, there will be two definable sets of human activity in operation. Moreover, as long as the "makers" of policy must legitimize themselves to the "addressees", there will be some on-going inter-action between them. If this relationship is to continue over a period of time, there is a high likelihood that a particular pattern of behaviour will emerge. Furthermore, if there is anything more than random and unstructured activity occurring within each set, relevant system characteristics can be defined.

For the analysis of the situation described above, an inter-system

and Row, 1967), pages 223-226.

³¹Loc. cit.

³²See H. D. Laswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950); see also R. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965).

model would seem most appropriate.³³ The systems framework of the model forces the analysis to treat a phenomenon as if there exists organization, inter-dependence, inter-action and integration among its components. However, the advantage of this model type is that it concentrates on the analysis of relational patterns and inter-dependence dynamics both within and between the activity sets. Moreover, it "...exaggerates the virtues of autonomy and the limited nature of inter-dependence",³⁴ permitting a developmental approach to the study of the structure of connectives between the systems over time. Furthermore, unlike most systems models, which contain supra- and sub-system components, the inter-system model affords equal status to both policy sets (the "makers" and "addressees").

There are a few operational aspects, with respect to the application of this model type to a policy context, that can be mentioned. Firstly, both the maker and addressee policy sets described above are open systems, since each one has an on-going relationship with its environment. Secondly, the lines of relationship or connectives between these two systems can adopt an affective, positive pattern (conjunctive connective), or they can adopt a conflictive, negative pattern (disjunctive connective). These patterns, of course, also hold for the connectives within each system. Thirdly, the study of connectives between the systems provides a time pattern for analysis with respect to the initial condition, shifts or changes and cut-offs.

Each system, then, within the policy context can be treated as an organization. It is of particular importance when considering the system of addressees, however, to recognize that the study of organization does not involve the enumeration, description and classification of various groups

³³ See Chinn, op. cit., pages 297-312.

³⁴ Ibid, page 304.

or agencies (i.e. organized entities) within the given environment. Instead, it entails the analysis of a network or unity (i.e. an organizational system) within a broader environment, as defined by the objectives and means of a specific policy. Moreover, the analysis necessitates the study of the on-going inter-actions between the two organizations.

HIERARCHICAL MODEL OF POLICY ORGANIZATIONS

A point which has often been overlooked in analyses of the relationship between "maker" and "addressee" systems is that the duality apparent in the policy context does not, in itself, provide a sufficiently specific or useful focus for study. In fact, a review of thee of the research on the role of citizen participation in areas of action planning,³⁵ resource management,³⁶ and community development³⁷ reveals only a disjointed body

³⁵See the following "action planning" studies: Richard S. Bolan, "Community Decision Behaviour: The Culture of Planning" in The Journal of the American Institute of Planners, Vol. XXXV, No. 5, September, 1969, pages 301-311; Edmund M. Burke, "Citizen Participation Strategies" in The Journal of the American Institute of Planners, Vol. XXXIV, No. 5, September, 1968, pages 287-295; Pierre Cavel, "Planners and Citizen Boards: Some Applications of Social Theory to the Problem of Plan Implementation" in The Journal of the American Institute of Planners, Vol. XXXIV, No. 3, May, 1968, pages 130-140,

³⁶See the following "resource management" studies: Richard Males, Wm. Grates and Junius Walker, A Dynamic Model of Water Quality Management Decision-Making: Systematic Analysis of Management Effectiveness of the Water Quality Control Board System of California, a report submitted to the Office of Water Resources Research, Department of the Interior, Contract #14-01-0001-1489, Washington, D. C., 1970; W. R. D. Sewell and Ian Burton (eds.), Perceptions and Attitudes in Resources Management (Ottawa: Policy Research and Co-ordination Branch, Department of Mines and Resources, 1971), pages 37-91.

³⁷See the following "community development planning" studies: J. Friedman, "Notes on Societal Action" in The Journal of the American Institute of Planners, Vol. XXXV, No. 5, September 1969, pages 311-319; Joel M. Halpern, The Changing Village Community (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967); G. D. Ness, "Planning and Implementation: Paradoxes in Rural Development" in G. D. Ness (ed.), The Sociology of Economic Development (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pages 577-594; O. P. Tangri, "India's

of literature and strategies relevant to only highly qualified empirical contexts. It would seem desirable, therefore, to adopt an analytic framework which is more broadly applicable than those currently used in this field of public policy research. A model based on such a framework, which seems particularly relevant for this study, is that presented by Stafford Beer in "a cybernetic account of the interface between planning and action."³⁸

The model is based upon three implicit assumptions. Firstly, it is assumed that organizational survival is the main objective of planning, which implies that the achievement of operational goals is a means to a higher end. The premise of this assumption is that an organization is an open system, operating within an ever-changing environment, to which it must adapt. Secondly, it is assumed that the structure of an organization must be adaptive, or the organization itself cannot be. Thirdly, as a principle derived from cybernetics, hierarchy is assumed as a given characteristic of the structure of surviving organizations.³⁹

Although this model was initially designed for use in the private sector, its major focus is the development of an information (control) system to promote a flexible and adaptable organizational structure. Therefore, only a few adjustments in terminology should be necessary for its ap-

Community Development Program: Critique and Suggestions", in Gove Hambridge (ed.), *Dynamics of Development* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), pages 306-311.

³⁸ Stafford Beer, "The Aborting Corporate Plan: A Cybernetic Account of the Interface Between Planning and Action" in Eric Jantsch (ed.), *Perspectives of Planning* (Paris: O.E.C.D., 1969), pages 397-424. Subsequent references to, and description of, the hierarchical control model refer to this source.

³⁹ The organization can be perceived as an open system and is analogous to living organisms being perceived as open systems. It is for such living organisms that the structural feature of hierarchy holds. See Beer, *ibid.*, page 399.

plication to an organization in the public sector. For example, private sector concepts of "division" and "firm" are very similar to public sector concepts of "agency" and "department", with respect to their roles in the organizational structure. Permitting this applicational modification, then, the model can be explained in some detail.

Since it is a hierarchical model involving five sub-systems or levels of information control, it is perhaps easiest to organize its description around the inputs and functions at each level. The lowest level, sub-system one, can be termed "Agency Control" and it involves the reaction of the organization to the demands from its relevant external environment. At this level, the basic "doing activities" or service delivery occur, and the major control function is to sequence these activities to permit productive flexibility. Input (demands) from the environment is interpreted and filtered before being passed on to higher organizational levels, while instructions flow down from senior levels which direct organizational response (output) to previous environmental demands.

When more than one agency or division is involved in the delivery of organizational output, a sub-system two control will be necessary. This sub-system is termed "Integral Control" and is designed to integrate any divergence in the means or goals of the various agencies. The input to this level is the demands filtered up through system one, the departmental policies descending from higher authority levels, and the stress created by inconsistencies in the operational objectives of agencies. The function of the Integral Control unit will be to bring the various agencies together to optimize, not on an individual unit basis, but with respect to a more central unit. Such centralized optimization may necessitate the establishment of satisficing achievement standards at the agency

level.⁴⁰

Sub-system three of the model is termed "Internal Homeostasis", and its primary purpose is to ensure that a balanced relationship exists among the various departments or components of the organization. The information input to sub-system three is vertical, with general policy flowing down from senior management levels and the filtered information regarding both the operations of agencies and the specific demands of the environment flowing up from the departments. To promote the balance necessary for the effective internal operation of the organization, the control unit at this level must interpret the policies and non-operational goals emanating from the superior "world view" of upper management. Moreover, it must re-assemble the relevant data regarding the organization's operations for analysis with respect to its objectives. Analyses of cost-effectiveness are most often used at this level.

Sub-system four of the hierarchy is termed "External Homeostasis", and it is employed to maintain a balanced relationship between the organization and its environment. The central functions of this system are twofold:

1. marketing; and
2. finance.

The first aspect involves the marketing of the entire organization to its relevant external environment, and not the marketing of specific products or services (which is the function of system one). Similarly, finance entails raising funds and disbursing them on a general objective or departmental basis, rather than on an agency or program basis.

⁴⁰ For an expansion of the principle of satisficing in decision-making, See March and Simon, op. cit., chapter 6; also see K. E. Boulding, "The Economics of Knowledge and the Knowledge of Economics" in American Economic Review, Vol. LVI, No. 2, May 1966, pages 1-14.

The informational inputs into sub-system four are both vertical and horizontal, since it collects and distills information from the outside world as well as receives the filtered communications from sub-system three and general policies from the senior level. Beer points out that, although sub-system four would seem to fulfill the staff function of management theory, it sits squarely on the command axis and is involved in at least implicit decision-making in its "advisory" role.

Sub-system five is termed "Foresight" and its function is to develop viable strategies on the basis of the information it receives from lower levels regarding the organization's operations in, and relationships to, its external environment. It is important to stress that the principle of satisficing is again employed, in the strategies of sub-system five, because it is impossible to know all the available action alternatives, their consequences or the future environment to which they will pertain.

A diagrammatic summary of this structural model is shown in Figure 2.2.⁴¹

Having described this hierarchical control model, some qualifications regarding its application can be stated. Firstly, each of the sub-systems of the model employs human actors in its empirical setting, and these actors will have behavioural characteristics and rational limitations which will alter the operation of the organization from the straight-line, consecutive level inter-action depicted in Figure 2.2. This is a problem which did not exist in the model's development because it is a computer-based interface system (between the organization and its environment). Since the problem is one which has not as yet been overcome by socio-psychological organizational theorists, little more than mention can be made of it here.⁴²

⁴¹ Figure 2.2 is a revised version of a diagram by S. Beer, in Beer, op. cit., page 414.

⁴² Instrumental, motivational, and rational are the three types of prop-




FIGURE 2:2 A SUMMARY OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE HIERARCHIAL CONTROL MODEL AFTER BEER




FIGURE 2:3 THE STRUCTURE OF A MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ENCOMPASSING TWO PUBLIC POLICY ORGANIZATIONS AS MUTUAL PRIMARY ENVIRONMENTS

Secondly, the application of this hierarchical model in the study involves a particular policy setting which emphasizes two organizations, as defined by that policy. Hence, the model must be applied to each of those policy sets, the "makers" and the "addressees". This type of application can be facilitated by the inter-system model which has already been discussed.

Thirdly, the establishment of sub-system five as the highest level of the authority hierarchy is somewhat arbitrary, since the assumed principle of hierarchy could be extended to infinitely higher sub-systems. This point is even more relevant to a democratic, public policy setting, where the authority of the senior level is in fact derived through the delegation of power by groups in the organization's external environment. Since the nature of this delegation is an unresolved problem of political theory, similar to that of behaviour in organizations, it will not be discussed any further.⁴³

Given these qualifications to the application of the control model in a public policy setting, the model is presented in its usable form, as a Management System, in Figure 2.3. It should be noted that while the "maker" and "addressee" organizations are shown as "primary relevant external environments" for each other, additional environments could be specified either within the current ones or by using the current primary environments as subsets of larger environments. Since the Management System shown in Figure 2.3 is to be used as the basis for criteria to evaluate the Inter-

ositions which can be made regarding organizational behaviour. See March and Simon, *op. cit.*, pages 6-7. Three theoretical bases for organization theory are identified as information theory, network theory and game theory which are classified as subdivisions of cybernetics, topology and decision theory, respectively, by A. Rapoport and W. J. Howath, "Thoughts on Organization Theory" in Walter Buckley, *op. cit.*, pages 71-75.

⁴³ Alternate theoretical positions on the role of the legislator as a

lake (Plan's) Management System, it is important to summarize the characteristics of each "node" (control level or sub-system) and of each vertical and/or horizontal "linkage" between the nodes. These characteristics (coded to Figure 2.3) are:

1. AGENCY CONTROL

- to permit productive flexibility, organizational "doing activities" (program production and control) must be sequenced.
- to expand "production capacity" and to utilize available resources efficiently, research, related to agency programs, must be carried out.
- demands from the environment (clients) must be interpreted and filtered.
- organizational responses to previous environmental demands must be produced.

a) HORIZONTAL LINKAGE (IN)

- demands (interests, needs and others) must be carried from the appropriate parts of the environment.

b) HORIZONTAL LINKAGE (OUT)

- responses to previous environmental demands in the form of goods, services and information.

2. INTEGRAL CONTROL

- if there exists more than one agency, then divergences among the goals or means of those agencies must be removed and their related activities co-ordinated and/or integrated, i.e. optimization above the agency level and removal of inter-agency

citizen's representative are presented in H. D. Hamilton (ed.), Political Institutions: Readings in Political Science (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962), pages 181-190.

stress.

a) VERTICAL LINKAGE (IN)

- filtered demands from the environment.
- operational objectives of each agency.
- program performance parameters.

b) VERTICAL LINKAGE (OUT)

- optimization standards to guide agency (lower order) programs.
- program resources and re-developed parameters.

3. INTERNAL HOMEOSTASIS

- relationships among organizational components or departments must be balanced.
- policies and non-operational goals of senior management must be interpreted.
- relevant data regarding organizational operations must be assembled and used in the analysis of goal (achievement) effectiveness.

a) VERTICAL LINKAGE (IN)

- filtered environment demands.
- filtered information regarding operations of agencies and program impacts.

b) VERTICAL LINKAGES (OUT)

- directions for removing inconsistencies between non-operational and operational goals.
- directions for changes or adjustments in reviewed programs.
- resources on a program or departmental basis.

4. EXTERNAL HOMEOSTASIS

- a balanced relationship must be maintained between the organi-

zation and its environment, which involves two functions:

- (i) "marketing" the entire organization (not specific products) to the environment; and
- (ii) "financing" organizational activities by raising funds (resources) and disbursing them on a departmental or objective (not an agency or program) basis.

a) HORIZONTAL LINKAGE (IN)

- general information on the organized environment and its anticipated, intended and/or potential future.
- resources or funds.

b) HORIZONTAL LINKAGE (OUT)

- general information regarding non-operational goals (public image, social responsibility, et al).
- resources to meet the requirements of marketing non-operational goals.

c) VERTICAL LINKAGE (IN)

- filtered information regarding the coincidence or divergence of non-operational and operational goals, as well as the degree of success or effectiveness in achieving operational goals (non-operational goal proxies).

d) VERTICAL LINKAGE (OUT)

- description of non-operational goals and their general relationship to current and future environment states.
- directions for the translation of non-operational goals into operational ones.

5. FORESIGHT

- specification of non-operational goals.
- development of viable, long-run strategies.

- a) VERTICAL LINKAGE (IN)
 - information regarding the general (actual and potential) states of the environment.
 - highly filtered information regarding operational needs, programs and program effectiveness in achieving them.
 - currently and potentially available resources.
- b) VERTICAL LINKAGE (OUT)
 - non-operational goals.
 - viable, long-run strategies for achieving broad goals.

A SUMMARY OF THE MODEL AND THE MEASURES IMPLIED

The model for the study of organizational adaptation which has been developed in this chapter assumes that organizations are open systems, and hence, that they display the attributes of such systems. One characteristic of an open system is negative entropy which suggests that a strong dependence relationship exists between an organization and its environment.⁴⁴ This means that organizations will attempt to adapt to their environments over time in order to survive. Successful adaptation, moreover, requires that organizations ensure that sufficient energetic input of information comes from the environment to judgement or decision nodes. Survival requires the existence and use of adequate communication channels both within the organization and across its boundary. In order to establish the adequacy of channels and their usage, a hierarchical control model has been described which demonstrates the structure and functions of a theoretically ideal system. Of course, the application of such a model to organized human ac-

⁴⁴"Entropy" is defined on page 9 and 10 as the natural tendency, of an organized system, towards disorganization. "Negative entropy" is thus a reversal of that tendency and may lead to increasing organization as reflected in higher-order differentiation, co-ordination, integration and others.

tivity must recognize that behavioural analysis will be useful in the study of both the emergence and operation of a communications structure.

Applying this information (control) model to a context defined by a particular public policy requires a modification in the model; since a policy involves two sets of actors (the "makers" and "addressees"), each of which can be treated as an organization. By employing an inter-system framework to analyze the inter-action between these organizations, each organization becomes a principle external environment for the other. The procedure to be adopted for analytic purposes will be to study each organization independently, by means of the information control model, and then to integrate them within the inter-system network.

The inter-system network is observed and specified in each of three time stages (pre-Plan, Plan and implementation) and alternative states both within and between the three stages, as well as a final optimum state, are discussed in Chapter IV. Finally, on the basis of the structure presented in Figure 2.3 for the "ideal" Management System and the subsequent discussion of various essential functions of its nodes and linkages, a "Management System Performance Checklist" is developed in Chapter V. This checklist provides a format for the eventual "scoring of the Interlake Management System in each of its three stages. These scores illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of the Interlake Management System and therefore obviate priority areas for change.

It is important to indicate that recommendations to rationalize the Interlake Management System, through changes in some of its static and dynamic components, are presented in both Chapters IV and V. Since these recommendations are premised on the hierarchical model developed in this chapter, it must be noted that accepting this model encompasses a value judgement which acts as the basis for subsequent normative analysis and prescriptions for change.

CHAPTER III

A DISCUSSION OF THE TEMPORAL AND DATA COMPONENTS OF THE ANALYSIS

This chapter contains substantial synthesis and application of concepts developed in the previous chapter. Its discussion centers on procedures for collecting data to measure the purposes and activities of organizational variables (Figure 2.1) that fit the ideal Management System model (Figures 2.2 and 2.3). Data in this context involves a description or empirical specification of the character, relational, structural and process properties of such variables. The chapter begins with a brief note regarding some background information and temporal aspects of the study. This is followed by an explanation and justification of the basic data set. Finally, consideration is given to one of the primary means of data collection, the personal or subjective interview. Transcribed reports of data collected in this manner are found in Appendices B and C, while Appendix A explains the "loosely-structured" format for one set of interviews.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND THE TREATMENT OF TIME

The specific piece of government policy to which this study refers is a ten-year, comprehensive rural development plan for the Interlake.¹

¹Department of Forestry and Rural Development, Interlake Area of Manitoba: Federal Provincial Rural Development Agreement (Ottawa: Queen's

Since the Plan encompasses more than one jurisdictional level of government, a joint agreement is involved. This agreement is co-signed by representatives of the Province of Manitoba and the Government of Canada and is dated May 16, 1967. At the time of this analysis, therefore, the Plan has been operant for approximately four years and has another six years remaining. The temporal bounds of the Plan extend beyond the 1967-77 decade in both directions.

The signing of the agreement marks only the start of the implementation phase of the Plan. Prior to this date, provincial government workers had been collecting background information for the area² and had been appraising the attitudes and desires of local citizens for at least a year. Moreover, since the late 1950's, local citizens themselves had been involved in government sponsored "participation organizations" as a result of the implementation of some of the recommendations of the report of the Committee on Manitoba's Economic Future (C.O.M.E.F.).³ The point being established here is that Manitobans in general, and Interlakers in particular, are familiar with the concepts of development and citizen participation, as well as the on-going policies of the two senior levels of government with respect to these concepts, from a point in time well before the 1967 agreement.⁴

Printer, 1968).

²The preliminary information is compiled into what the administration refers to as "The Green Book".

³Manitoba, Committee on Manitoba's Economic Future, Manitoba 1962-1975: Report of the Committee (Winnipeg, Manitoba: Department of Industry and Commerce, 1963).

⁴Helen Buckley and Eva Tihanyi, Canadian Policies for Rural Adjustment: A Study of the Economic Impact of A.R.D.A., P.F.R.A. and M.M.R.A. (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1967), page 232. This source also provides a concise history of F.R.E.D. as it evolved from the policy roots of A.R.D.A., P.F.R.A. and M.M.R.A. on pages 10, 92-113.

The desirable changes envisaged by this particular development plan are pre-dominantly long-run, structural ones. This is, in fact, inherent in its use of such terms as "growth" and "development".⁵ Since many of the intended consequences of the Plan may not be completely or even largely felt until after 1977, it is impossible to determine the totality of the Plan's effects before that expiration date. Moreover, some of the unanticipated outcomes of the Plan may never be recognized.

It is important, therefore, to realize that under these conditions, the assignment of a time period for analysis involves a rather arbitrary decision. However, such a decision requires careful thought in order to capture a sufficient amount of detail for study while rejecting irrelevancies. The specification of a time horizon for an analysis ultimately depends upon the nature of the problematic situation and the characteristics of the model being applied to it. Similar dependencies also apply to decisions regarding the disaggregation of time within that horizon.

Before defining the temporal components of this study, there are some theoretical perspectives to be developed which will serve to simplify matters. One consideration is that there are two types of time-related aspects relevant to the study of organizations, both of which relate to organizational motion. The first type of motion refers to the "external" movement of an organized system vis-à-vis its environment. Since organizations display a tendency towards balance with their environment, the study of external motion can focus on the various relational positions

⁵"Growth" is defined as structural change over a long period of time; "expansion" is temporary and reversible increases in output; and "development" is change over a broad front (political, economic, social, administrative) which changes the whole structure of society; but all three are then used inter-changeably in T. N. Brewis, Regional Economic Policies in Canada (Toronto: The MacMillan Company of Canada, 1969), page 54.

adopted over time in the manner of comparative statics.⁶ Such positions have previously been termed "stages".

A second type of motion is that which is "internal" to an organized system at any point in time. In this context, statics refer to the analysis of organizational structure, while dynamics refer to the functions and processes of the organization (Figure 2.1). Since it is necessary to have an understanding of organizational structure before analyzing any active components,⁷ the model developed in the previous chapter necessitates the use of both static and dynamic approaches. These approaches are integrated in the definition of an organization's state.

This study, then, employs comparative statics to the extent that a series of stages will be defined with respect to the existence of a balance between the organization and its environment. Moreover, the specification of potential and/or actual states within each stage involves the use of both statics and dynamics.

Since this study is concerned with the implementation of a development plan, assuming planning activities as given, the initial stage for the analysis would appear to be defined by the inter-organizational (organization-environment) relationships (Figure 2.3) specified by the Interlake Plan. Similarly, the terminal stage would appear to be defined by these operational relationships at the completion of the Plan's implementation.

⁶The method of comparative statics analyzes change in a system due to a disturbance after the system has adjusted to a new equilibrium or steady state position. This method compares two static positions rather than tracing the path of adjustment as is done by a dynamic method. An application of comparative statics to economic theory is provided in W. J. Baumol, Economic Theory and Operations Analysis, 2nd edition (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pages 348-349.

⁷J. Feibleman and J. W. Friend, "The Structure and Function of Organization" in F. E. Emery (ed.), Systems Thinking (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1969), pages 30-58.

It is also to be expected that intervening stages exist between the initial and terminal ones. Any significant change in the components or relationships of the organizations and their environments, between the Plan's design and experiential implementation, would demarcate an additional stage. For example, if any major alterations in Management System relations occurred as a result of the "five-year review" in 1972, an intervening stage could be specified.

However, this study is intended to be a part of the on-going, formal evaluation, referred to in Chapter I, that has been structured into the Interlake Plan. The analysis of the Interlake Management System would potentially be of much less value if it were done entirely ex post of the Plan's implementation. Therefore, this study defines as its terminal stage the operational relationships and realities existing at the time of the study. In order to provide a broader understanding of the impact of the Interlake Plan on organizational aspects in that region, the study's initial stage is defined by the pre-Plan setting or "normal" relationships between public policy defined Maker and Addressee organizations, in Canadian regions. The intervening stage for the study is defined by the relationships specified in the Plan.

In each of these stages of time, the two policy organizations can be described in terms of both the structural relationships and functional processes existing within and/or across their boundaries. Moreover, relevant alternative states can be identified which will act as the basis for evaluative comparison. Such analysis can focus either on the condition of the then current state or positive changes for future states, and it (analysis) relies explicitly upon the ideal control model developed in Chapter II.

THE DATA SET: JUSTIFICATION AND EXPLANATION

An important consideration in any analysis relates to the basic resources available, including techniques, theories and data.⁸ There is a strong inter-relationship among these resources which has previously been alluded to. "Data" is not an isolated term, a set of facts which exists independently in an empirical setting. Instead, it is a set of observations which takes on meaning only when it is related to a theory or set of hypotheses in which the observer is interested.⁹ A fundamental feature of all data, therefore, is a subjective component inherent in the conceptual constructs of the observer. A second feature of data is that both its collection and interpretation are further constrained by the instruments and/or theories which are available at any particular time.

It follows, then, that while some data are more subjective than other data, the former are not of necessity any less reliable for analytic purposes. Similarly, the existence of observations which cannot be explained by current theory does not render either the phenomena under study nor the observations themselves meaningless. Such abstract, definitional asides as these are necessary in this study because neither is the theory as well developed, nor the data base as explicitly defined, for this problematic situation as it is for other socio-behavioural analyses.

Although the distinction between formal and informal organizational variables has been criticized in an earlier section as being impractical, it does provide a focus for relevant data sources. The extensive writings which emphasize the need for the inclusion of one or the other of these two variables, clearly indicate the need for data on both the design and

⁸ Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioural Science (San Francisco, California: Chandler Publishing Co., 1964), page 87.

⁹ Ibid., pages 133-134, 268.

operation of an organization. Design information is readily available from the Plan itself, as well as from the body of literature on government organization which has amassed in Canada.

Operational information, however, is much more difficult to obtain. One of the reasons for this is that the justification for, and the existence of, activities themselves are known only to those directly involved. Under these conditions, the basic materials from which data are derived are documents, reports and newspaper items referring to the development area or plan, as well as personal interviews with, and observations of, those involved in the implementation of the Plan. This latter source is not by any means "fixed", and in fact the study relies on the assumption that:

1. Some operational information may be known to only one or two individuals; and
2. Involved individuals will be able to refer the researcher to other original sources of information.

Thus, the study is based in part on an evolving, subjective data base of original sources. Selection of a sample from among these sources, then, becomes a matter of personal judgement, because the survey is of a small scale and the population size is indeterminate.¹⁰

Normally, there are two basic formats by which to gather original data.¹¹ The first of these is the "objective" or "mail" questionnaire, which has the advantage of being economical when a large geographic area is to be covered. This method also provides the respondent with more time

¹⁰For a discussion of the relative merits of judgement as compared to probability sampling under various conditions, see W. A. Spurr and C. P. Bonini, Statistical Analysis for Business Decisions (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1967), pages 343-344.

¹¹Ibid., pages 26-37.

to provide information, which is especially valuable when large amounts of data must be compiled. A major problem, however, with the mail questionnaire method is that the results are often unreliable, because the respondent is unable to receive help with respect to the clarification or interpretation of questions.

The second format for original data collection is the "subjective" or personally administered interview. Personal interviews have several advantages, including provision of opportunities to obtain complete information, explain questions, persuade individuals to respond, add additional questions and assess the validity of responses. Thus, they would seem to provide a means of more reliable and comprehensive data collection than mail questionnaires. Moreover, the personal interview is particularly suited to the current study, in that the personal contact established by each interview provides an informal method by which the data base can be expanded.

The most serious disadvantage of the personal interview, besides the expense involved, is the bias introduced by the interviewer. This is especially true where the interviewer must employ his judgement in assessing what parts of the information provided are experiential fact, and what parts are emotional attitude. Moreover, bias of response can be greatly increased if the interviewer does not take conscious note of the procedure used during an interview, the way in which questions are posed, the contents of the questions themselves, and his own biases.¹²

Since most of the information which defines the structure and operations of the Interlake Management System have been derived from personal interviews with various involved individuals, it is necessary to explain the procedures and techniques surrounding these interviews. This is the

¹² A discussion of the occurrence of bias and error in personal interviews is provided in W. Van Dyke Bingham and B. U. Moore, How to Interview

topic of the next section. Before proceeding to that section, however, consideration must be given to the type of data which has been collected, as well as the use to which it is put.

It is interesting to note that some researchers in the field of management decision-making have stressed a dichotomization of data which is desirable when behavioural and system sciences are both employed in a single analysis.¹³ That is, "soft" or qualitative data are best suited to the identification and definition of organizational components and their systematic inter-connections; while "hard" or quantitative data are useful in the specification of the behaviour of components for conceptual and/or computerized models.

It is, however, important to realize that quantity and quality are misconceived when treated as alternatives, since "qualities are of qualities, and a measured quality has just the magnitude expressed in its measure."¹⁴ Thus, data not specified in terms of a scale are qualitative, but the introduction of an appropriate and meaningful scale will transform them into quantities. Similarly, the introduction of a set of labels to a quantitative data set can transform it into a qualitative one.

Since much of the data for this study is in fact qualitative, a decision was necessary as to whether or not it would be feasible and worthwhile to attempt soft-hard data transformations. One must appreciate that there are only a limited number of resources which can be devoted to achiev-

(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1941), pages 3-20.

¹³R. M. Males, W. E. Gates and J. F. Walker, A Dynamic Model of Water Quality Management Decision-Making: Systematic Analysis of Management Effectiveness of the Water Quality Control Board System of California (Washington: Office of Water Resources Research, Department of the Interior, 1970), pages 2-3.

¹⁴Kaplan, op. cit., pages 206-207.

ing the objectives of a particular piece of research. This requires that the objectives of the research be weighted in terms of their relative importance. In the current study, there are in fact two objectives of high priority: one is the development of a means by which to study public policy implementation in terms of organizational adaptation, and the second is to apply the developed technique in the assessment of the operation of a particular management system.

Since the conceptual approach herein adopted is relatively novel for this area of study, much effort has been spent to secure both definitional and methodological correctness and consistency. Indeed, it is the integration of theory from several disciplines (economics, political science, management, organization and systems theories) that has received a high priority in both the development and application of the model.¹⁵ The model, however, is but a preliminary one and will likely require alterations before it is more rigorously defined in mathematical terms. This is an enormous task in itself, and is seen to be unwarranted given the purpose and constraints of the current context.

Notwithstanding the apparent infeasibility of quantification, there also remains some doubt as to the usefulness of numerical measures for this study. Firstly, the assessment of the empirical management system can be predicated in qualitative terms, and it is unlikely that available quantity transformation techniques could "produce" data that would significantly add to the understanding derived from this study. Secondly, in an altruistic, if perhaps logically invalid, vein,¹⁶ it would be incorrect to ex-

¹⁵ It should be noted that in this study it is the empirical which is being tested against the theoretical. The approach might therefore be termed deductionist.

¹⁶ The argument is invalid in that it argues a point of justification in the context of discovery (or usage). See W. Salmon, Logic (Englewood

aggerate the significance of the study's findings by alluding to a mystique of quantification.¹⁷ It is for these reasons, therefore, that only soft data is employed in the analysis.

THE PERSONAL INTERVIEWS

As indicated, much of the soft data set used in the analysis is obtained by the method of personal interview. A number of problems arise with respect to interviews:

1. What kind of information is required?
2. Who can provide this information?
3. How can reliable data be obtained?

The model developed in the previous chapter indicates that descriptive information about the components of the system, their inter-connections and their functioning is necessary. Such an operational focus implies that those individuals most directly involved in the Plan's implementation can act as primary resources. Since the development plan is a comprehensive one which involves both senior levels of government and several of the departments within each, it is desirable to develop a means to group or stratify those persons directly involved. Fortunately, a review of general background material¹⁸ provides an initial identification of groups of people

Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), pages 10-14. Nevertheless, its conclusion may be true and in this writer's opinion seems appropriate.

¹⁷For an analysis of the mystique of quantity, see Kaplan, op. cit., pages 172-173.

¹⁸Hickling-Johnson Management Consultants, Interlake Management Study (Toronto: unpublished consultant's report), 1969; F.R.E.D., Interlake F.R.E.D. Plan 1970 Revisions: Draft C (Winnipeg: unpublished draft, for discussion only); Department of Forestry and Rural Development, Kah-Miss-Ahk (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969).

having a sufficiently common nature to permit classification by numerical dimension alone, i.e. nodes. Each of these differentiated units can then be related to a particular level of generality of the Plan's means-end hierarchy.¹⁹ A specification of the nodular groups and a summary of their formal relationships, as defined by the Plan, is provided in Figure 3.1. It is the actors within each of these groups that become the interviewees for the study.

In order to weight the various nodes in terms of their informational importance to the study, it is necessary to first set priorities among the various levels of the means-end hierarchy. Since the focus of this study is on the implementation of the development plan, highest priority can be assigned to the operational levels, which include strategies, programs and projects. From among this group, the program section is given the highest valuation because it consists of a set of five sub-programs around which the Plan is structured.²⁰ Therefore, it is towards the groups whose primary implementation involvement is in terms of programs, that this study's inquiries are addressed.

¹⁹ Means-end analysis is explained and then applied to the goal-structure of an organization in J. G. March and H. A. Simon, Organizations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958), pages 32-34, 194-196. For the Interlake Development Plan, the items of the hierarchy moving towards operational goals at the lower levels are defined as:

- a) Objectives - the non-operational aims of the plan, consistent with the general goals of society.
- b) Strategy - "The means.....by which the objectives of the Agreement will be promoted."
- c) Program - "a definite course of intended proceedings for a major operation within the plan."
- d) Project - "an undertaking, with specific objectives, that forms a self-contained unit within a program."

in Department of Forestry and Rural Development, op. cit., pages 8-9.

²⁰ The five program categories are listed as:

- a) education
- b) manpower
- c) development and structural adjustment
- d) research




FIGURE 3.1

THE RELATIONSHIP OF IMPLEMENTATION GROUPS TO THE MEANS-END
HIERARCHY OF THE PLAN

However, since the categorization of individual actors by nodular relationships is more ideal than behaviourally realistic, and since these relationships indicate that nodular activity can be directed at least secondarily towards more than one level of the hierarchy, interviewees are not restricted to those who are members of the Development Board and/or the Administrative-Coordination unit. Furthermore, it has already been stated that the data base is perceived to be evolutionary, expanding by virtue of referral from the initial set of experiential authorities. Thus, informants have been chosen because they occupy positions where they are likely to have observed and reflected upon significant events.²¹

The final point for consideration in this chapter related to the interview technique employed. All interviews have certain fundamental components. For example, they must be directed towards the achievement of an objective, they must involve more than one person, and structurally, they must contain a beginning, middle and ending. Of course, the list of such components is probably endless, but there is little to be gained by expanding it any further. The important points to establish are that interviews can be distinguished from a casual conversation because they have a definitive purpose, and that interviews are a form of human interaction and hence involve behavioural strategies and tactics.

A discussion of the interviews employed in this study can perhaps best be organized on the basis of a description and justification of both the interview format and the interviewing style. Basically, there are two groups of informants for the study, members of the government administra-

e) administration
in *ibid.*, pages 13-22.

²¹W. F. White, "Interviewing in Field Research", in R. N. Adams and J. J. Preiss (eds.), Human Organization Research (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorey Press, 1960), page 358.

tive and co-ordinative unit and chairmen of the citizen's Area Development Boards. While the style of interview is the same for both groups, the format is not. One of the reasons for the differences in format is that the government informants are diversified with respect to their role relationships to the Plan, while the citizen informants are homogeneous to the extent that all have been or are chairmen of Area Development Boards. Moreover, the initial interviews, which provide a preliminary understanding of the relationships involved in the implementation of the Plan, are done with the government group. These interviews also provide the informational basis for the subsequent selection of citizen informants.

The main distinction between the two interview formats is that the government ones are much less structured than those with the citizen group, and it is for this reason that only an Area Development Board "basic questionnaire" is provided and explained in Appendix A. However, this distinction in format need not be over-emphasized, since all of the interviews are based upon a free-narrative approach.²² Such an approach is adopted because it is the most reliable means of finding facts in circumstances where unexpected information is the most important data source.²³

The free-narrative format implies that interviews are unstructured to the extent that they are perceived as sessions of joint inter-action between the informant and interviewer, rather than question and answer periods.²⁴ Moreover, when questions are asked, they are "open-ended" so that a simple "yes" or "no" response is not likely to occur. Finally, while each ques-

²²The procedural details of the free-narrative approach are given in *ibid.*, pages 352-374.

²³H. S. Becker and B. Geer, "Participant Observation: The Analysis of Qualitative Field Data" in Adams and Preiss, *op. cit.*, page 268.

²⁴"It (interviewing) does not progress in a series of definitive steps to a standardized, finished product. It is a general manner of work-

tion is intended to produce information on a certain topic, the format is sufficiently flexible to permit the phrasing and/or timing of the questions to be adjusted according to the personality and behaviour of each respondent.

Since all interviews involve inter-personal inter-action, the interviewing style which is used is important in determining both the amount and reliability of the information to be derived. It is therefore necessary to describe in some detail the specific procedures used in gathering the interview data for this study. Prior to all interviews, background information is obtained on each informant, which proves to be useful in establishing an initial rapport, as well as in interpreting an individual's responses in terms of his role or position in a group.²⁵ The first questions of the interview are posed with respect to this background information, which provides a simple means of introduction. The beginning of an interview also includes an explanation of the purpose of the study, how the particular informant fits into the study and why the study is important to that person. To avoid distraction, interviews are conducted at pre-arranged times and places, in an atmosphere of seclusion and confidentiality.

During the course of the interview, a pre-determined method is used to extract and record information.²⁶ Since people react not only to what is said, but also to how something is said, the interviewer consciously avoids making judgemental remarks or leading statements. This is aided by the use of a carefully selected vocabulary in both posing questions and reacting to

ing toward the accomplishment of an end." A. F. Fenalson, Essentials in Interviewing (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952), pages 99-100.

²⁵Becker and Geer, op. cit., pages 273-274.

²⁶This approach is called the "Ben Franklin Method" by Fenalson, op. cit., pages 107-108.

replies.²⁷ Moreover, in order to ensure that responses have been correctly understood by the interviewer, important points are re-phrased and related to the informant. This procedure is also used to summarize a general opinion or attitude, especially at the end of the interview.

The responses by informants to direct questions are not the only source of information in the interviews. Others include attitudinal asides which occur during a response, observations of the interviewee, and topics which are introduced by the informants themselves. In order to encourage the expression of an opinion or the broaching of a topic not introduced by the interviewer, each informant is explicitly asked to provide any additional information which he thinks the interview may have overlooked. Often, such information is provided while bidding farewell, after the "formal" interview has ended.

Recording information in a free-narrative interview poses a special problem, since the success of such an interview relies on the interviewer gaining the confidence of the informant. The interview can best be done in an informal atmosphere, which is shattered if the interviewer recites questions from a questionnaire, interrupts the conversation and flow of ideas to take verbatim dictation, or requests that the respondent speak into a tape recorder. To avoid such problems, this study's interviews are recorded by a carte blanche method, i.e. only brief notes are taken at the interview on an otherwise blank pad of paper. The expected advantages of this approach²⁸ are repeatedly borne out by the uninhibited, free conversational flows between the interviewer and informants. Moreover, this method permits the interviewer to devote full attention to understanding responses,

²⁷ A list of word alternatives, based on a suggestiveness scale, is given in W. Van Dyke Bingham and B. U. Moore, op. cit., page 13.

²⁸ Ibid., pages 37-41.

and therefore it allows him to have contentious or confusing points clarified and expanded in the course of the original conversation.

The method, however, is not without its disadvantages. Perhaps the most serious drawback relates to psychological interference with the interviewer's memory, which can be of both pro-active and retro-active forms.²⁹ To counteract pro-active interference, attempts are made to arrange interviews in the morning as the first activity of the day for the interviewer. If this is not possible, they are arranged for other times during the day where an appropriate amount of time has elapsed between serious mental activity and the start of the interview.³⁰ Efforts to avoid retro-active interference result in the transcribing of the brief interview notes into long-hand narratives as soon after the interview as is physically possible.³¹ In this matter, the topical organization of the Area Development Board interviews, and in fact of all the interviews, greatly facilitated accurate post-interview recording.

In order to verify the accuracy of the accounts given by respondents, a number of procedures for the removal and/or identification of distortion are employed.³² For example, it has already been mentioned that pre-interview material is collected on the respondents themselves, in order to help identify their mental set and/or reliability as reporters. Structurally,

²⁹"Retro-active interference" is the subsequent learning of responses that interferes with those already learned. "Pro-active interference" is the interference of previously learned material with the recall of subsequently learned material. C. W. Telford and J. M. Sawrey, Psychology: A Concise Introduction to the Fundamentals of Behaviour (Belmont, California: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1968), pages 220-222.

³⁰This time was found to be in the range of 2 to 2½ hours.

³¹In no case did more than one hour elapse between the time an interview ended and the time its transcription began.

³²Whyte, op. cit., pages 359-365.

some of the topic areas of questions overlap so that a check is available on the consistency of information relating to the same issue. Similarly, the accounts of various individuals on the same questions or issues can be compared. Finally, some descriptive accounts of informant activity are checked by the interviewer personally observing these activities, and then comparing the real world experience with the informant's account.³³

While procedures have been developed for conducting fact-finding interviews,³⁴ they are by no means infallible and must be adjusted to the differing personal inter-actions of each interview. Moreover, an over-emphasis on a strict procedure, which is presumed to be able to hold for all cases, tends to inhibit meaningful responses by creating an atmosphere of artificiality and insensitivity. Finally, not even the most strict of interview methods can completely eliminate or discount the personal prejudices of the interviewer himself.

This section has described the style of interview which is employed in this study's data collection. The main points that it has tried to establish are:

1. That personal interviews are sometimes the only reliable means of gathering information;
2. That interviews must be perceived as inter-actions of human actors wherein each actor has a particular value, attitude, and behavioural pattern;
3. That care must be taken to ensure that reliable data are elicited and recorded; and

³³One such check was of the Bifrost Area Development Board, and in the interviewer's opinion, the informant's account was surprisingly consistent with the reality observed. See A. D. B. interview number 6, September 31, 1971.

³⁴A set of eighteen steps for use in fact-finding interviews is given

4. That interview information can at best provide only a close approximation of reality.

CHAPTER IV

A SPECIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE INTERLAKE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

The analysis presented in this chapter involves an inter-system model which studies the feedback relationship between two policy organizations. These organizations have been termed "Maker" and "Addressee", names which correspond to their roles in formal public policy decision-processes. The two premises underlying the use of the inter-system model in this study are that each organization can be differentiated from the other, and that each organization acts as the primary human environment for the other.

There are both political and geographic considerations which interfere with the identification of simply two policy organizations. The Interlake Plan, the policy in terms of which these organizations are defined, involves a cost-sharing agreement between two levels of government. Therefore, this analysis dichotomizes the Maker organization by political jurisdiction, resulting in the description of both Federal and Provincial Government components. Similarly, the division of the Addressee organization into two parts, Interlake Clientele and Non-Interlake Clientele, indicates the specific geographic focus of the policy under consideration.

The primary concern of this study is with organizational adaptability: structural transformation related to expected or actual changes in an organization's environment. Theoretically, such transformations imply re-

active alterations in both organizational processes and the functions performed by an organization's components. Since useful structural transformation is dependent upon the feedback of adequate amounts of reliable information from the environment to an organization, a model of communication processes and information control is employed.

The analysis begins with an empirical specification of the Interlake Management System, the name given to the inter-system network of relations within and between the two policy organizations. This involves identifying nodes and their functions as well as linkages and the (informational) communication flows along them.¹ Two comparative static positions and one disequilibrium position of this system are considered, rather than a continuous dynamic sequencing.

In the first stage, the Management System is described prior to the formulation of the Development Plan. An assumption that no Federal-Provincial cost-share programs or plans exist is made in order to exaggerate and clarify the changes brought about by the implementation of the Interlake Plan. The second stage involves a description of the structure and operation of the Management System as it is conceived in the Development Plan. The third stage considers the behavioural system as it appears in August, 1971, approximately four years after implementation began.

It is important to note that the first two stages represent equilibrium positions for the Management System: a matter of deliberate selection. The third stage, however, is not an equilibrium point in the System's de-

¹"Communications represent a co-operative attempt on the part of a sender and a receiver to expand the realm of ideas, impressions, and experiences they hold in common." For communications to occur, there must be a sender, message, channel, receiver, receiver attention, common language, time and one or more purposes. R. L. Meier, A Communications Theory of Urban Growth (The Joint Centre for Urban Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1962), pages 9-12. The patterns of interactions among a number of senders

velopment, i.e. it represents neither a major turning point nor a plateau in the relationship between the two policy organizations. Instead, stage three is chosen because of its convenience as an interruption point in the implementation process. Since only four years have passed, many of the individuals originally involved with the Plan are still a part of its implementation system, and memories of important variables have not faded. Alternatively, sufficient time has elapsed for changes to be occurring in both the individuals and variables concerned. With six years remaining before the completion of the Plan's implementation, it is possible to consider evolutionary trends with the idea of promoting positive changes in the system. In this context, December, 1972, the year of the five-year review, would very likely be another equilibrium point. Due to the disequilibrium state of stage three, observations about its specification will be of necessity more speculative and less definitive than those related to the other two stages.

After specifying these three stages of the Management System, an assessment will be made of the effectiveness of both the operating inter-system network and its organizational components. This will consist primarily of an analysis of the functions of each component, the channels of communication between them and the flows of information along these channels with respect to their deviation from the ideal control model as outlined in Chapter II.²

Before proceeding to the specification of the first stage, it is necessary to explain a procedural device which will be employed to simplify the description of networks. This device is termed "overlay diagramming", and receivers, over time, is conceived of as a communications network.

²See Chapter II, Sections D and E.

and it consists of a series of diagrams, wherein each successive one adds and explains a new set of elements in the overall network. This particular procedure of aggregation is used to gradually introduce the reader to, and familiarize him with, a reasonably complex final network. In order to achieve the overlay effect, each diagram contains both light and bold-type figures: the light figures are "carried over" from a previous diagram, and the bold-type figures are awaiting explanations in the then current diagram.

The standard pattern of aggregation will be as follows:

1. A description of the Maker Organization by:
 - (i) the identification of nodes and their respective functions; and
 - (ii) the specification of internal communication channels and informational flows along them.
2. A description of the Addressee Organization in the same terms as number 1.
3. An identification and explanation of the inter-organizational connectives and flows along them.

It can be noted that as either organization becomes more complicated, its internal network can be aggregated in some arbitrary pattern similar to the one above.

STAGE I: THE PRE-PLAN NETWORK OF MANAGEMENT SYSTEM RELATIONS

According to the overlay procedure described in the section above, the pre-Plan policy network, as it is perceived in the Interlake, can be outlined in three diagrams. The first is concerned primarily with the Maker Organization, the second with the Addressee Organization, and the third, with the integration of these two organizations (Figures 4.1 to 4.3, respectively).

The Maker Organization. Figure 4.1 summarizes the conceptuali-




FIGURE 4.1 STAGE I: THE MAKER ORGANIZATION

zation of the Maker Organization as an information network in a pre-Plan stage. Since the Canadian form of democratic government is a federation,³ the Maker Organization is divided into two sections:

1. federal government, and
2. provincial government.

It is not surprising to find a strong similarity in the structural organization of these two bodies. The highest node in Figure 4.1 depicts both the executive and legislative branches in the Canadian system of government. Members of the provincial legislature and federal parliament are representatives of the Canadian electorate and perform the dual role of law enactment and general, critical supervision of government policy. Alternatively, members of the Cabinet⁴ perform the executive roles of policy initiation and law enforcement. The dotted line separating the executive and legislative branches are used to illustrate that the Cabinet, whose members also hold seats in the legislating body, is dependent in its functioning upon the confidence of the legislature, i.e. a responsible system of government.⁵

Since the Cabinet is the only formal policy body where all departments of government are represented, it is responsible for high level policy coordination. Unfortunately, Cabinet Ministers have many other duties,

³"In a federation, the broad powers of government are distributed between a central or federal government on the one hand and a number of state or provincial governments on the other, and each exercises its own powers without being subordinate or inferior to the other." R. MacGregor Dawson and W. F. Dawson, Democratic Government in Canada, revised by Norman Ward (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), pages 9-11.

⁴Ibid., pages 46-47. The "Cabinet" is not recognized anywhere in the B.N.A. Act, and its formal activities are conducted under the name of the legally constituted Privy Council. Since the term "Cabinet" communicates all but the legal distinction, it (Cabinet) will be used throughout this chapter as if it were the legally constituted decision-unit.

⁵The concept of "responsible government" is discussed and contrasted

pressures and demands to which they must attend, with the result that policy co-ordination is often poorly done except ".....in the most urgent and inescapable problems."⁶ To remedy this problem, other bodies or committees either usurp or are delegated the responsibility for the co-ordination of policy in various problem areas.

In Manitoba, the Manitoba Development Authority (M.D.A.), created by Premier Roblin's government, is intended to be a multi-program body designed to co-ordinate the development strategies of several provincial departments.⁷ The M.D.A. consists of five senior government departments and is chaired by the Premier. Federally, the Treasury Board, a formal sub-committee of the Privy Council which tends to behave independently from the Cabinet, integrates government policy through a complicated process of financial control and budget review.⁸ The distinction between the two bodies is that the M.D.A. is explicitly a policy co-ordination body having financial control as one of its available tools, while the Treasury Board may co-ordinate policy as an "unanticipated consequence" of its financial control activities. A role similar to that of the Treasury Board, but on a much smaller scale, is portrayed provincially by the Minister of Finance.

Beneath each co-ordinative unit are a number of government departments which can be identified primarily on the basis of the program areas for which they are responsible, e.g. labour, Indian Affairs, health, and others. Since there are a large and ever-changing number of these departments, whose distinctions beyond functional responsibility are not important for this study, they are identified symbolically in Figure 4.1. Provincial depart-

with that of "representative government" in *ibid.*, pages 6-9.

⁶ *Ibid.*, page 52.

⁷ Interview No. 5, 1.a)ii.

⁸ The M.D.A. was superseded by the Planning and Priorities Committee

ments are listed as P.D.j where $j = 1, 2 \dots R$ and "R" is the total number of functional problems formally recognized by that government. Similarly, Federal departments are listed as F.D.j where $j = 1, 2 \dots S$ and "S" is the total number of that government's departments. The purpose of specifying two nodes of P.D.j is to indicate that some provincial departments fall within the co-ordinative responsibility of the M.D.A., while others do not.

The authority within a department is shared by both the Minister and Deputy Minister. As indicated, the Minister is an elected representative who has decision-making and supervisory responsibilities in a particular program area. His power emanates from the traditional practices that only Cabinet Ministers can introduce legislation which increases taxes to pay for programs and/or legislation which alters program expenditures. This power is legitimized by the Minister's responsible position vis-à-vis both the legislative body and the electorate.

The Deputy Minister is the senior public servant in a department and his authority is based upon that administrative rank. His power is derived through the public service's role of providing both the information upon which, and the technical framework within which, policy decisions are made.⁹ Regardless of this informational dependency, the Minister is always ultimately responsible for any departmental decisions.

Given these roles of the Minister and Deputy Minister, it is apparent that departmental functions will include both program determination and program execution. That is, the functions of the P.D.j and F.D.j nodes

of Cabinet in Manitoba. Dawson and Dawson, op. cit., pages 44-45.

⁹A detailed description of the relationship between the public servants and policy decision-makers is provided in R. MacGregor Dawson, The Government of Canada, revised by Norman Ward (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), pages 255-303.

involve the translation of broad objectives and strategies into a program set containing projects and activities, and the subsequent implementation of that set.

The final node in Figure 4.1 represents departmental field agencies. Since each agency is attached to one or another of the government departments, their first two symbols are used to indicate that relationship, i.e. F.D.j or P.D.j. Similar to the differentiation among departments, field agencies are classified by the specific projects and activities for which they are responsible, e.g. Manpower: occupational training centre, unemployment insurance office, upgrading school, and others. Hence, field agencies are symbolized by F.A._k, where $k = 1, 2 \dots t$ and "t" is the total number of field agencies attached to any department, P.D.j or F.D.j.

The term "field agency" is not intended to imply that all such offices are located in the local community, away from the central administration of the department, although this is often the case. Instead, the separation of the field agencies from the departments is an organizational one, based upon the differing functional responsibility of each node. That is, field agencies are operational entities whose responsibility is the delivery of departmental activities (goods and services, programs and projects) to their intended recipients in the external environment. As such, field agencies act as a transition unit between the Maker Organization and its clientele: delivering operational output and bringing in informational inputs in the form of clientele demands, needs and interests.

Having identified the nodes and specified their functions, it is now possible to consider the linkages in the Maker Organization. Since the primary concern of this study is with information exchange, the linkages in Figure 4.1 are intended to represent a communications network; even though some of them may be coincident with "formal" lines of authority and re-

sponsibility. For the moment, what might be termed "informal" connectives, where information is exchanged through casual conversation or by the dual role of a person at two different organizational levels, will be overlooked.¹⁰

Linkage 1 illustrates both Federal-Provincial Cabinet and administrative interfaces, which occur through regular ministerial and plenary conferences on technical and professional matters or those of concurrent jurisdiction.¹¹ Generally, the information moving along these channels is used to direct the co-ordination of priorities, policy objectives, and programs which affect areas of concern to both senior governments.

Linkage 2 is another horizontal connective, but at a much more specific or operational level of policy. Assuming that contact is established between field agencies and policy clientele, the information transmitted to the department interprets clientele:

1. reaction to current projects and activities, i.e. program delivery,
2. current and future needs and implicit priorities,
3. demands for goods and services, and
4. acceptable operational adjustments.

Coming from the department to the field agency are directions regarding project and activity responsibilities as well as operating resources, such as staff, materials and funds, to carry out those responsibilities.

Linkage 3 connects both federal and provincial departments to their

¹⁰The formal pattern of communication can be "short-circuited" by informal interactions. For example, relationships between a Minister and his former civil servants may result in their policy preferences being more rapidly communicated to the Cabinet, than might otherwise occur.

¹¹The various forms of such meetings, and their relationships to one of the bureaucracies involved are discussed in Taylor Cole, "The Federal Bureaucracy and Federal-Provincial Relationships", in A. M. Wilms and

respective program co-ordinating bodies. Moving up the channel are messages regarding apparent clientele needs and demands, as interpreted by the field agencies. Also moving upwards are the results of program evaluations as performed by each department. Moving downward is information regarding specific programs or an available range of programs, which if delivered at a satisfactory level, will optimize the achievement of a broader strategy.

Linkage 4 connects the program co-ordinative node with the policy co-ordinative one. Flowing up to the Cabinet are suggestions regarding strategies and programs which are most likely to achieve broad government objectives, given evaluations of the impact of current strategies under a set of political, social, temporal and financial constraints. Also moving upwards are filtered perceptions of the needs and demands of clientele. Flowing down to the program co-ordinative nodes are policies identifying the broad objectives of government and information regarding the parameters for strategies and programs to be designed to attain these objectives.

In this system, evaluation is logically the responsibility of each successive hierarchical level. For example, departments evaluate the success of field agencies in delivering projects and activities; the M.D.A. and Treasury Board evaluate the program design and implementation success of their respective departments; and the Cabinet evaluates the consistency of program sets and strategies in terms of its broad policy objectives. To assist in gathering information for, and/or actually doing such evaluations, consultant groups and commissions are often contracted in addition to normal staff.¹²

W. D. K. Kernaghan (eds.), Public Administration in Canada: Selected Readings. (Toronto: Mathuen Publications, 1968), pages 154-159.

¹²Dawson and Dawson, op. cit., pages 51-52.

The Addressee Organization. Figure 4.2 illustrates the addition of the second component of the pre-Plan Management System, the Addressee Organization. Since this study is concerned with the Interlake Region, the Addressee Organization is divided into components of Non-Interlake Clientele¹³ and Interlake Clientele, the latter being a sub-set of the former. Non-Interlake Clientele are identified on an individual basis as X_i where $i = 1, 2 \dots V$ and " V " is that region's population.¹⁴

In specifying the Addressee Organization, a problem arises with respect to the grouping of individual citizens. Since this study is concerned with functional behaviour and information exchange, it is not meaningful to classify individuals on the basis of demographic characteristics. An alternative approach is to consider citizens in terms of the group or groups within which they are active participants. Such groups would include political parties, labour unions, ethnic and religious organizations, local government councils, work groups, professional associations, service organizations and others.

There are a number of problems of complexity associated with the use of this means of classification. Firstly, not all citizens will belong to the groups cited above, and in any event, the list of such groups would seem endless. Secondly, and perhaps more probable, is the realization that some individuals will belong to many of these groups. Thirdly, it is difficult to aggregate the multiplicity of groups under some common class-

¹³It might also be noted that Non-Interlake Clientele includes the aggregation of both Canadian, Non-Manitoban and Manitoban, Non-Interlake Clientele groups, as per the Maker Organization's Federal-Provincial dichotomy.

¹⁴Interlake Clientele: Y_i = Population by Sex, 1968.

	<u>Rural Total</u>	<u>Rural Non-Farm</u>	<u>Rural Farm</u>	<u>Urban</u>	<u>Grand Total</u>
Male	16,566	5,303	11,263	9,802	26,368
Female	13,734	4,082	9,652	9,588	23,322
Total	30,300	9,385	20,915	19,390	49,690

C. F. Framingham, J. A. MacMillan and D. J. Sandell, The Interlake Fact




FIGURE 4.2 STAGE I: THE ADDRESSEE ORGANIZATION

ification scheme in order to develop a network of hierarchical levels and functional nodes.¹⁵ This is not just a modeling problem, but instead is a predicament encountered by anyone potentially or actually participating in organized social inter-action.

To circumvent these problems, social groups are "black-boxed" in Figure 4.2, and symbolized as Z_i , where $i = 1, 2, \dots, W$ and "W" is the total number of groups in the region. Since membership and participation procedures in these groups are so diverse, no formal linkages are shown between them and the Interlake Clientele. However, the groups are diagramed as a sub-set of the clientele in order to emphasize single, multi- or non-group membership by individual citizens. Similarly, internal linkages are not shown for the Addressee Organization because there is no apparent pattern or consistency among the various forms of inter-personal contact.

The Pre-Plan Network. The final diagram in the specification of the Pre-Plan Network, Figure 4.3, illustrates the connectives between the two organizations. Linkage 1 indicates the operational exchange between the service deliverers (field agencies) and the service consumers (individual clientele). It is important to note that service consumers are specified as individuals rather than groups. This follows from the nodular grouping scheme explained in Figure 4.2, as well as the fact that, while government programs may be directed at classes of people, they are not explicitly intended (only) for organized groups.¹⁶

(Winnipeg: Province of Manitoba, 1970), page 1.

¹⁵ One classification scheme would be to separate groups into (legally) "governing" and "non-governing" bodies. For example, municipal and town councils would be legally governing bodies, because they can levy taxes to raise money for their activities. However, other groups can exercise the withdrawal of membership on constituents who fail to financially support their activities. Moreover, only the Provincial and Federal governments are recognized, as the governing "partners" by the B.N.A. Act.

¹⁶ Five examples of inputs of demand and support, from the environment




FIGURE 4.3 STAGE I: THE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM NETWORK

The channel into the Addressee Organization is depicted by a dotted line. This technique is used to indicate there are no formalized interaction patterns emanating from the Maker Organization at this level. In most government projects clients are responsible for "initiating" their participatory role. The field agencies are responsible only for the general dissemination of explanatory information and the delivery of goods and services, after they are sought. The channel back to the field agency is a normal one, along which flow demands for goods and services available under current programs, information on current and future client needs, and pressures for project adjustment and/or program development to satisfy these needs.

Linkage 2 is a political overlay which is both vertical and horizontal, i.e. an inter-system connective by-passing several hierarchical levels. The end-points of this linkage are somewhat ambiguous. In the Maker Organization, the connection is made with members of Parliament, although it is important to note that the influence of such a connection is likely to increase if the particular member is also a member of the majority party and/or Cabinet. In the Addressee Organization, the channel cuts across the boundaries of all three clientele nodes, illustrating that communications can emanate from individuals, regardless of residence, or groups. The single most important of these groups, of course, is the political party, followed by various interest groups who have the resources for ef-

to the political system, are:

- 1) votes
- 2) policy preferences aggregated by parties
- 3) policy preferences aggregated by interest groups
- 4) issue-specific citizen group activities
- 5) influence buying

Brett W. Hawkins, Politics and Urban Policies (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1971), pages 11-13.

fective lobbying.¹⁷

Flowing to the Maker Organization is information regarding the consistency of projects and activities with both the operational strategies and non-operational goals of the government. These non-operational goals are mutually agreed upon, if not explicitly defined, through the election of legislative representatives and the tacit approval contained therein. Also moving in the same direction are specific problems, general evaluations and acknowledgements of activity. In these instances, political parties can become as much a means of communication as direct letters or mass media editorials.

Flowing back to the Addressee Organization are the responses to specific problems or questions, the "marketing" of a government "image" through either the mass media or staff agencies such as Information Canada, and the financing of government activities through taxation.

By the overlay method, a summary of the entire set of relationships in the Pre-Plan Network is presented in Figure 4.3.

Observations on Stage I. Before proceeding to the specification of the next Management System Stage, a number of observations can be made regarding the Pre-Plan Network. Firstly, it is apparent that the major focus of the first stage is on bureaucratic detail and information channels in the Maker Organization. This focus occurs because highly routinized and technically well established patterns of service delivery have developed there over time. Alternatively, citizen groups or clientele "action" committees tend to have short life spans consistent with, and in response to, current topical issues. These groups, being issue-oriented, seem to have few areas

¹⁷The role of political parties and interest group lobbying in policy formulation in Canada is discussed in Dawson and Dawson, op. cit., pages 17-28.

of mutual concern which lend themselves to hierarchical, problem-solving organization. It is in fact somewhat illusory to term the Addressee Organization in Stage I as anything but a relevant external environment for the Maker Organization.

Secondly, there appear to be only highly filtered and/or random link-ages between policy decision-makers and the recipients of their policy. That is, client needs, interests and program reactions reach high level decision-nodes in one of three ways:

1. filtered up through the Maker Organization,
2. interpreted through the political process, or
3. expressed directly by the mass media.

Each of these means encompasses difficulties. The filtering process has an exceedingly long channel, wherein client interests must be perceived, interpreted and prioritized at least four times before reaching the senior decision level. Not only must they compete with other forms of upward moving information for limited "message space", but their evaluative nature creates well documented interferences on free upward flows.¹⁸

The political process also poses problems for the communication of client messages. The most major of these is that macro election or political party issues are often so complex or so numerous, that it is impossible to align an election vote with a specific issue. Similarly, written communications, media editorials and pressure group presentations can be discounted by decision-makers as being unreliable and unrepresentative, especially if the messages they carry are "unpleasant". The most direct means of communication in the political process would seem to be through the "party faith-

¹⁸D. Katz and R. L. Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), pages 245-247.

ful", although such communication is likely to be highly biased and favourable.

Thirdly, the network in Stage I shows a discussive channel, but no institutional bargaining framework to ensure the consistency of Federal and Provincial policies and programs in areas of mutual concern. The settlement of jurisdictional disputes or the exposition of technical mechanisms does not ensure that approaches to a problem or services in a community will be consistent when they are the responsibility of departments from both levels of government. Without such a framework, policy co-ordination and activity integration between Federal and Provincial departments is a matter of chance, and not design, except in those cases where the Federal and Provincial Finance Departments have explicitly sought inter-governmental policy consistency.

Fourthly, it is apparent that the Cabinet performs most control functions, and all of the highest level ones, for the Maker Organization. Having the responsibility for planning and foresight, organizational marketing and finance (external homeostasis), policy co-ordination and program evaluation (internal homeostasis), and short-run program co-ordination¹⁹ can overload the functioning of this node. The response to such overload will at best be the delegation of functions to other nodes, and at worst will result in performance errors, delays or task omissions.²⁰

It is in the context of the Stage I Management System Network that both the Federal and Provincial governments perceived a need for a Comprehensive

¹⁹ Since Cabinet Ministers must sponsor all legislation which involves spending or collecting tax revenues, and since there is an historical principle of Cabinet solidarity, the assurance of consistency among programs is an individual and/or collective responsibility of the Cabinet Ministers.

²⁰ Katz and Kahn, op. cit., pages 231-235.

Development Plan²¹ in the Interlake. Having cognizance of the limitations of the system depicted above, and desiring active citizen participation in the implementation of policy, several structural changes were designed for the implementation network. The next section deals with the network specified by the Plan, and the section following it illustrates the operational network which actually developed in the course of the Plan's implementation.

STAGE II: THE PLAN NETWORK OF MANAGEMENT SYSTEM RELATIONS

The creation of the Stage II network consists only of an imposition of the Plan's designed relations on the specifications of Stage I. Therefore, some of the elements will perform the same roles as before. In such cases, there is no need to provide anything more than a reference to their previous explanation.

The Maker Organization. This organization is still dichotomized by the jurisdictional specifications of the Canadian Constitution, so that both federal and provincial government components exist. However, the Development Plan ties these two components together at several levels of responsibility, creating the appearance of more general integration and cohesion. For this reason, the two components are not divided by their external environments in Figure 4.4, as they were in Stage I.

As an organizing principle for explaining the Maker Organization in Stage II, the analysis can proceed from nodes at the lowest levels of responsibility (operational) to those at the highest level (non-operational). The first new node is termed "General Counsellors" and consists of a group

²¹Department of Forestry and Rural Development, Interlake Area of Manitoba: Federal-Provincial Rural Development Agreement (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968). Since this Agreement (or Plan) provides much of the basis for the Stage II analysis, subsequent references to it have been integrated into the text of the study, identifying page and/or section numbers of the source.




FIGURE 4.4 STAGE II: THE MAKER ORGANIZATION

of generalists operating under the Administration's budget as one of the development strategies (page 30). These counsellors have three functions to perform in the Plan's implementation:

1. actively seek out residents to inform, orient and counsel them with respect to appropriate and available programs under the Plan;
2. refer local citizens to the proper available field specialists employed by the Departments of Agriculture (provincial) and/or Manpower (federal); and
3. follow the progress of those who have participated in a project under the Plan, to help ease their transition into a new environment and to prevent their withdrawal into a former environment.

Simply, then, the counsellors are to act as activating and initiating "middlemen" between specific clients and programs offered under the Plan.

While the Field Agency nodes have not changed symbolically, they become more specific and tangible under the Plan. The most prominent federal agencies in the Interlake, in terms of the Plan's implementation, are the local Manpower offices. Similarly, the Provincial Agricultural Extension Offices are the most prominent agency of that government. While other departments also have field agencies in the region, most projects and activities under the Plan, regardless of their department of origin, are designed to be delivered through the two agencies cited above.

Several departments are involved in the Plan either because their normal functions fall within one of the F.R.E.D. programs or because they have been delegated the implementation responsibility for a project. The federal departments involved are Forestry and Rural Development, Manpower and Immigration, Northern Affairs and Indian Affairs. Provincially, the Mani-

toba Development Authority encompasses the Departments of Agriculture, Highways, Industry and Commerce, Tourism and Recreation and Youth and Education. Also involved in the Plan are the Departments of Mines and Resources and Health and Social Services, although they are not members of the M.D.A. Most of the funds to support the Plan's programs come from these departments' revenues, either through a special F.R.E.D. "vote" or as a component of a normal departmental "vote."²²

The node referred to as "administration" in an earlier section, is composed of two roles. Since these roles differ somewhat in both functional responsibility and authority, they can be discussed separately. The Provincial Program Administrator (sections 66 and 71, pages 46-48) is a civil service appointee of the Minister of Agriculture. His role is a central one in the implementation of the Plan, involving managerial, financial, informational and personnel functions. Specifically, the program administrator is responsible for the:

1. management of day-to-day implementation of programs, projects and activities, which includes working directly with those Federal agencies involved in the Plan;
2. co-ordination and integration of the activities of Provincial departments and agencies involved in the Plan;
3. maintenance of a central financial authority over Provincial aspects of the Plan and the provision of a central control for budgetary estimates and expenditures;
4. co-ordination and implementation of an information dissemination

²²The responsibility and implementation linkages of the various Federal and Provincial Government Departments also indicate the financial relationships of those departments, in the Joint Federal-Provincial Advisory Board, to the Interlake F.R.E.D. programs, through their budget "votes", Interlake F.R.E.D. Plan 1970 Revisions (Draft "C", an unpublished discussion paper hereinafter referred to as "Revisions - Draft C"), Appendix D.

program, which under sections 5 and 72 makes Federal participation contingent upon citizens being informed about the Plan, its objectives and its opportunities for them;

5. reporting of progress directly to the Minister of Agriculture; and
6. hiring and managing of a Plan management staff, information service staff and supplies.

The second role in the Administration node is that of the Federal Program Co-Ordinator (section 67B), a civil service appointee of the Minister of Forestry and Rural Development. The co-ordinator performs three major functions:

1. the promotion of joint planning and operational co-operation between the Federal and Provincial Governments;
2. the assurance of Federal department and agency co-operation in the implementation of the Plan, as well as the co-ordination of their activities; and
3. the review, preparation and recommendations of all programs and projects (done jointly with the Administrator).

The next node in Figure 4.4 is the Federal-Provincial Joint Advisory Board (section 67a). This Board consists of at least six senior public servants from each government, with equal representation on both sides.

The Advisory Board meets twice yearly to:

1. evaluate the management of the Plan with respect to its objectives, performance and priorities;
2. re-examine objectives and evaluate implementation progress; and
3. review budgets and recommend modifications of program and project cost for each subsequent year.

The Advisory Board then reports its findings to the Federal Minister of Forestry and Rural Development and the Provincial Minister of Agriculture.

The Interlake Manpower Co-Ordinating Committee is a sub-committee of the Advisory Board, composed of Canada Manpower Representatives, the Provincial Administrator and representatives from the Manpower and Training Centre in the Interlake (page 31). This is a program-specific committee whose only function is to advise the Advisory Board as to whether or not Manpower programs meet the problems, needs and aspirations of local citizens.

The parallel structure of the Federal and Provincial components of the Maker Organization is demonstrated in the Minister node (page 47). The Provincial Minister responsible for the Plan is from the Department of Agriculture. His functions include assuring that the overall Plan is implemented and that all program elements are integrated and co-ordinated at some unspecified, but desirable level. Similarly, the Minister of Forestry and Rural Development is responsible for administration and implementation at the Federal level. While the term "administration" is used with respect to the responsibilities of each Minister, section 71 of the Plan makes clear the initiator's role portrayed by the Province, and its related responsibility for overall administration. Even though administrative costs are shared jointly, the Federal government's role is essentially non-operational.

The roles of the highest level nodes are unchanged from those specified in Stage I. Therefore, once annual F.R.E.D. program and expenditure recommendations have been approved at the Ministerial level, they are still subject to scrutiny and potential revision by senior policy and financial co-ordination units such as the M.D.A., Treasury Board or Cabinet.

Linkages for Stage II have been numbered in a manner similar to those of Stage I. The only difference is that under the Plan the Maker Organiza-

tion becomes more complicated. Linkage 1 still indicates the Federal-Provincial Cabinet and administrative interfaces referred to in the Pre-Plan Network.

Linkages 2 and 3 are both operational ones, i.e. they are related directly to government delivery of goods and services. Flowing to field agencies along channel 2 are directions regarding project and activity responsibilities, as well as the finances related to them. As in Stage I, the information flowing back to departments involves the perception of new client demands, the interpretation of their needs and suggestions regarding necessary tactical revisions in project implementation. Linkage 3 carries general information regarding projects and activities being implemented under the Plan, as well as requirements for client participation programs, to the General Counsellors. Flowing back to the Field Agencies are candidate referrals for specific programs, although the broken line indicates that the counsellors have no "formal" power to make such recommendations. Since Field Agencies also have direct contact with individual clients, the flow of information regarding client needs and demands is limited along channel 3.

Linkage 4 is on the vertical command axis. Flowing up to the Administration are requests for funds in the form of expenditure estimates on a departmental basis. Accompanying the requests for finances are evaluations of the adequacy of activities and projects as well as recommendations for necessary changes in the implementation programs. Finally, client needs, demands and interests are re-interpreted and related to the Plan's programs as part of the upward moving communication.

A number of types of messages move down to the departments from the Administration. Firstly, responsibility for the implementation of programs

related to normal departmental functions is delegated downwards, accompanied by the necessary funds. Secondly, messages establishing priorities both among programs and their sequences of implementation are transmitted downwards. Thirdly, the role of a particular department in the optimization of strategies which transcend (departmental) program goal achievement is specified.

Linkage 5 merely indicates a flow of funds from the Administration to the General Counsellors. It is represented by a broken line because the General Counsellors are actually staff sub-ordinates of the Administration.

Messages moving upwards along linkage 6 are primarily related to programs and their priorities. That is, information regarding the degree of success in the implementation of operational programs, the adequacy of these programs with respect to clientele needs, and requests for changes in program priorities through the re-allocation of funds between them, all flow upwards to the Joint Advisory Board. Accompanying these messages are others which relate to finance, such as budget estimates and audits.

Messages flowing downwards through channel 6 indicate alterations in either the general objectives or strategies of the Plan. Information regarding changes in program fund allocations is also transmitted along this connective. Finally, directions regarding changes necessary in the performance of the implementation process in achieving the Plan's objectives are given to the Administration.

Linkage 7 connects the Joint Advisory Board with the two Ministers responsible for the Plan. Moving upwards along this channel is information regarding modifications in strategies and/or programs which are necessary to more efficiently and effectively achieve the broad objectives of development. Other messages include budget estimates, recommendations for the re-

allocation of funds and evaluations of the Plan's management. Most messages moving downwards are responsive. That is, unless there are major changes in policy guidelines or objectives, this channel carries directions regarding the delegation of administrative and financial responsibilities for the implementation of the Plan's strategies. Implicit in such directions will be an assurance of high level policy co-ordination, that emanates from the Cabinet.

Channels 8' and 8'' are located outside of the vertical command axis, although their flows are vertical. In each case, the broken line indicates that the responsibility for the appointment of the Provincial Administrator and Federal Co-Ordinator rests with the respective government Ministers. More important, perhaps, is the channel 3', which also moves upward, carrying reports to the Minister of Agriculture regarding:

1. the progress of the implementation of programs, projects, and activities (including the information dissemination program);
2. the co-ordination and integration of department and agency activities; and
3. financial needs.

It can be noted that no such reciprocal relation is specified between the Federal Program Co-Ordinator and the Minister of Forestry and Rural Development.

Linkage 9 indicates a relation similar to that between any Minister and a financial co-ordinating unit. Flowing upwards along this channel are requests and justifications for funds in the form of expenditure estimates, and flowing downwards are funds and the parameters within which they are to be expended. Finally, linkage 10 is unaltered from that which was specified for Stage I.

The Addressee Organization. As a matter of simplification, the Non-Interlake Clientele (X_i) component of the Addressee Organization is not shown in Figure 4.5. Although the Plan makes no specific reference to this group, it should be remembered that the same relationships, both within this component and between it and the Maker Organization, that were described in Stage I still hold. Similarly, neither the Interlake Clientele (Y_i) nor the local "action" groups (Z_i) have shown any marked change in either their composition or relational inter-actions.

There are, however, some new nodes which emerge as a result of the Plan's stipulated threat that the Federal Government can withdraw its support unless the Province establishes local advisory boards to provide for the active participation of local citizens in the Plan's implementation (section 5). Towards this end, the Interlake is divided into twelve geographically defined "areas" and each area is intended to have a development board whose aim it is to provide "...a measure of popular participation in implementation."²³ Since there are twelve areas in the region, this node is symbolized as Area Development Board_e (A.D.B._e) where $e = 1, 2 \dots 12$.

The Plan does not specify the composition of these boards, beyond an area citizenship requirement. It is perhaps misleading to suggest that the Area Development Boards were a creation of the Plan, since similar informal bodies in fact existed to advise the Provincial Administrator during the drafting of the Plan.²⁴ The Plan merely formalizes the existence of the Boards and designates to them the following functions:

1. determine local needs and define interests around which community activity can be organized; and

²³ Ibid, page 3.

²⁴ Interview No. 5, Section 9, b. Department of Agriculture, Guidelines for Development: The Interlake Region of Manitoba (Draft Copy, 1966),




FIGURE 4.5 STAGE II: THE ADDRESSEE ORGANIZATION

2. help administer community affairs programs (page 33).

A second node in the Addressee Organization, which is established by the Plan, is the Program Advisory Board (section 73). This Board is composed of both Interlake residents and Area Development Board representatives, although its specific membership is not detailed. The Province is required to consult with the Program Advisory Board on matters related to program and project design and implementation. Within a context of implicit Provincial government membership on the Advisory Board, the Board's functions are:

1. to ensure that programs are consistent with community needs and values (page 48);
2. to assess the effects of programs and projects on the region's development (section 73); and
3. to make recommendations on all aspects of the Plan (page 48).

The linkages which accompany the nodes created by the Plan, in the Addressee Organization, are far less specific than those in Stage I or the Stage II Maker Organization. Linkage 1 indicates that local citizens, whether grouped by activities or not, are intended to be members of the Area Development Board. However, the means by which representatives are selected is not specified, and so a broken line is used to indicate the upward directed portion of the channel. It can only be presumed that local citizen representatives, whoever they are, will take with them to the Board information regarding individual and/or group client needs, interests, and demands.

The downward flows from the Area Development Board are almost as uncertain as the upward ones, except that programs involving joint citizen-

government administration can be delivered through linkage 1.

Linkage 2 is a uni-directional connective having two sources and one end-point. The channel between the Area Boards and the Program Advisory Board is solid because there is a formalized representative connection between these two bodies, such that the Area Boards' chairmen are members of the Advisory Board. Although local citizens are also intended to be members of the Advisory Board, no specific representation formula exists for them. Hence, that portion of the channel is symbolized by a broken line.

Flowing upwards along this channel is information regarding the values and needs of the various areas and clients. In relation to these needs and values are reactions to and evaluations of the Plan's programs and projects. Finally, on the basis of perceived needs and values, messages are also to contain the development priorities of local citizens and the interests around which program activities can be potentially organized.²⁵

The Plan Network. Figure 4.6 illustrates the entire Plan network and adds only inter-organizational connectives to the previous Stage II diagrams. Linkage 1, being solid in the direction of the Addressee Organization, illustrates the "reaching out" of the General Counsellors to inform citizens of both government programs, which are available to solve particular client needs, and the way in which clients can participate in them. This linkage also carries general adjustment assistance to program participants who are adapting to new life-styles and environments. Finally, this channel carries messages disseminating information of a general nature regarding the Plan's programs and their availability, with respect to all Interlake Clients.

Flowing back to the general counsellors along linkage 1 is information

²⁵ Interview No. 5, Section 9, b - c.




FIGURE 4.6 STAGE II: THE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM NETWORK

about the problems, needs and aspirations of Interlakers and their families.

Linkage 2 is uni-directional, carrying messages from the Administration to the Interlake Clientele. The information flowing through this channel is directly related to the Plan's dissemination program. Basically, the program involves informing Interlake citizens about the Plan, its objectives, and the opportunities provided for its clientele.

Linkage 3 is a higher level inter-organizational connective, carrying messages for the Program Advisory Board which attempt not only to identify available government programs and projects, but also attempt to illustrate their consistency within a general policy framework. The Advisory Board responds to the Minister with information about the congruency of both implemented programs and their objectives with the perceived needs and values of Interlake citizens. This information is implicitly contained in general assessments of the Plan (from a citizen perspective), recommendations for changes in the Plan or its programs and statements of interests around which citizens can be organized.

Linkage 4 is the same as the political overlay mentioned in Stage I. It is important to remember, however, that while some messages flowing in this channel will involve direct communication between an Interlake citizen or group and a legislator, many will be mixed with Non-Interlake messages emanating from the client node which has been omitted. This channel, when active, provides legislators with a direct and independent source of information on operational and non-operational client goals.

Observations on Stage II. This section can best be organized on the basis of two considerations:

1. What changes does the Plan design produce in the network as it was specified in Stage I?

2. How significant are the changes the Plan creates?

This Plan Network is different in many ways from that of the Pre-Plan Stage. Firstly, the Maker Organization has been lengthened, and its extended structure includes institutional bargaining devices to ensure that the strategies and objectives of Federal and Provincial Governments, as represented by the actions of departments involved in the Plan, are consistent. These devices are the Federal-Provincial Joint Advisory Board and the Dual Administration, respectively.

Two apparent weaknesses still exist in this matter. One is that the consistency of the Federal and Provincial Governments' broad objectives is still not guaranteed institutionally, i.e. the Cabinet interface still represents only a discussive channel. This problem is offset somewhat by the long-term commitment of these governments, in the Agreement itself, to a single set of broad objectives.

The second weakness is that the new bargaining and decision nodes assure strategy and program consistency only for those departments involved directly in the Plan. It has already been mentioned that Figure 4.4, the Stage II Maker Organization, is a simplification to the extent that departments, whose activities fall beyond the Plan's strategies, are not shown. Figure 4.7 illustrates the extent of this simplification only in terms of the number of federal departments which, having either a development or non-development orientation, might have programs affecting the Interlake. Perhaps a better indicator of the extent of the simplification of Figure 4.4 is a statement of the direct employment and expenditure impacts of F.R.E.D. and non-F.R.E.D.-related departments in the Interlake Area. In 1968-69, F.R.E.D. expenditures were approximately \$5 million, creating direct full-time employment for 40 people. Local government expenditures were \$4.7 million,

creating 191 full-time jobs; provincial expenditures totalled \$15.5 million, creating 2,191 jobs; and federal expenditures equalled \$21.4 million, creating 1,575 jobs. Thus, F.R.E.D. expenditures accounted for approximately \$5 million of \$46 million or 9% of all government expenditures in the Interlake Area, and 40 of 4,000, or 1% of all full-time government employment created by expenditures in the Interlake Area.²⁶

In order to co-ordinate and integrate the activities of all of these departments, the Maker Organization still must rely on the Cabinet and Treasury Board. The ineffectiveness of such a reliance was referred to in the observations on Stage I. In addition to those comments, it must also be remembered that, while F.R.E.D.-Interlake related departments will be optimizing on the basis of an integrated Plan, other departments operate on an individual basis. Contradictory program decisions might be anticipated under such a network design, e.g. the Department of National Defence's decision to close the Gimli Air Base. Even Figure 4.7 understates the situation since it does not include the parallel structure of the provincial government.

A second alteration that the Plan introduces into the Management Network is the design of functional responsibilities for nodes in the Addressee Organization. This design is in response to the lack of cohesion exhibited by this organization in Stage I. Unfortunately, the relations, representativeness and even responsibilities mentioned for Addressee nodes in the Plan lack any apparent specificity and certainty. This ambiguity of de-

²⁶ F.R.E.D. expenditures include items such as wages paid to personnel in Winnipeg. Provincial expenditures include Education which includes F.R.E.D. operating grant 100% provincial of \$1.5 million. Federal expenditures are mainly wage payments. See "Government Expenditures and Employment Interlake Rural Development Area", Framingham, MacMillan and Sandell, op. cit., pages 75-76.




FIGURE 4.7

CO-ORDINATED AND UNCO-ORDINATED FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS WHOSE
POLICIES AFFECT THE INTERLAKE REGION

sign exists in spite of the existence of informal contact and pre-Plan behaviour, after which the Plan's proposals are drafted. Moreover, the complexity gap between bureaucratic and citizen organization has widened, rather than diminished, between Stages I and II, i.e. the Addressee Organization has become weaker vis-à-vis the Maker Organization in terms of the number of counterveiling institutional bargaining structures.

The Plan Network also reveals a change in the attitude of the Maker Organization members with respect to inter-organization relations. At the operational level, the new attitude entails altering the government's role to that of an "initiating-deliverer", rather than a "clearing-house administrator" of programs. This is accomplished primarily through the functions of the General Counsellors. The government also attempts to increase the informational input of local clients into the Maker Organization through this node. At a non-operational level, the Program Advisory Board provides a mechanism for increasing the amount of feedback from the Addressee Organization, regarding the congruence of citizen needs and government policy.

A fourth alteration which can be observed in the Management Network relates to the functions and capacity of nodes, especially in the Maker Organization. For example, it can be suggested that the Interlake Manpower Management Committee is either an insufficient or dysfunctional unit. It is insufficient to the extent that only one of the Plan's programs had been selected for specific evaluation, in terms of its criteria of satisfying both citizen needs and departmental feasibility. Alternatively, it is dysfunctional because such decisions must be made in a node having responsibility for external balance, so that both types of informational input are flowing directly into the decision process, i.e. at the "Minister" level.

Finally, it is interesting to note the very central and influential

position of the Administration, and especially the Program Administrator, in the Management Network. The individual portraying this role has integral control in the programming of the Maker Organization, as well as a position in the node responsible for internal homeostasis. Moreover, he has direct linkages which criss-cross both the horizontal and vertical control axes of the entire network, extending as high as system 4 (external homeostasis) of the Maker Organization.

STAGE III: THE IMPLEMENTATION NETWORK OF MANAGEMENT SYSTEM RELATIONS

The system to be analyzed in Stage III is not in an equilibrium state, i.e. in year 4 of the Plan some characteristics of roles and relations are unstable. In order to denote any evolutionary trends, the description of the two organizations and their dynamic inter-actions will include expressions of "tendency". Since the Stage III system consists of the imposition of behavioural patterns on the Stage II network, any elements which have undergone no changes in characteristics from their previous descriptions will be identified by a reference to those descriptions.

The Maker Organization. Since government activity tends to be highly routinized, the Maker Organization, as depicted in Figure 4.8, is the more stable organization in the Stage III system. Stability, however, refers only to the behavioural roles which are portrayed in Stage III, and not to the relationship between the current organizational state and that which exists under the Plan's design in Stage II.

At the operational or program delivery level, there are still General Counsellor, Field Agency and Departmental nodes. The only real change in these nodes is that the General Counsellors can be specifically identified by two distinct working groups:




FIGURE 4.8 STAGE III: THE MAKER ORGANIZATION

1. A line staff of five persons under the Department of Health and Social Development, whose functions are to counsel, guide and assist Indians and Metis in achieving alternative vocational activities and in adapting to new social environments; and
2. A line staff of fourteen persons under the Department of Agriculture whose function it is to counsel and assist primary industry workers (farmers, fishermen) on technical matters, alternative educational and/or occupational opportunities, and social adjustment necessitated by resource rationalization programs.²⁷

From this description of General Counsellors, it is apparent that this node is not highly differentiated from departmental field agencies, either in terms of composition or operational functions.

Two new bodies emerge in System III between the operational level and that which is responsible for integral control, the Administration. "HURDAC" is a committee of field operating personnel which evolved from informal meetings among field agents from the Provincial Departments of Education, Mines and Natural Resources, Agriculture and Health and Social Development, and the Federal Departments of Manpower and Indian Affairs.²⁸ The members of HURDAC are committed to attempt to better serve their mutual Interlake clients by avoiding agency competition through operational co-operation and the informal co-ordination of activities. It is important to emphasize that HURDAC's functions deal exclusively with operational implementation. That is, it has no members from, and/or influence at, the planning levels of programs, strategies or objectives.

The second low-level integration node is called the Manpower Corps Directorate.²⁹ This group is composed of senior administrators and offi-

²⁷ Interview No. 6, Section 1, a - b.

²⁸ Interview No. 6, Section 3.

²⁹ Interview No. 6, Section 7.

cials from the departments identified under HURDAC above, as well as representatives from the Administration. Similar to HURDAC, the Directorate evolved from informal inter-actions among officials either centrally or peripherally responsible for aspects of the Manpower Program under the Plan. The Directorate addresses itself only to problems associated with the Manpower Corps Program, which is a program to provide a mixture of experience and training for high risk, but employable, individuals in the region.

The Manpower Corps Directorate has two specific functions. The first of these is to integrate the objectives and program activities of all departments with respect to the Manpower Corps Program. The list of departments includes those which might potentially become involved with the program, as well as those actually involved in it. The second function of the Directorate is to make decisions regarding all proposals and agreements under the Corps Program.

The next node in the hierarchy is the Administration, which shows no apparent difference from its Plan design. However, two important changes in the composition of the provincial component have occurred. Firstly, the Provincial Administrator's staff has been specified and its seven members, in addition to the Program Administrator, include five permanent employees and two term employees.³⁰

Secondly, the Program Administrator has been selected from the staff of the Planning and Priorities Committee of Cabinet Secretariat. While holding such a dual position has the advantage of increasing the level of

³⁰The permanent positions include an economist, resources programmer, manpower programmer, administrative officer and information officer. The term positions include an analyst and computer analyst-programmer. Hickling-Johnston Management Consultants, Interlake Management Study (an unpublished

the command hierarchy which can potentially be influenced by the Administrator, it also has a disadvantage. The disadvantage is that as a member of a Cabinet Secretariat the Administrator has an increased number of personal functions and responsibilities. This results in a necessary delegation of Interlake responsibilities to a sub-ordinate whose formal position limits his discretionary power, so that the Administration's activities tend to become less innovative and more routinized.³¹

There are two changes in the Joint Provincial-Federal Advisory Board; one is structural and the other attitudinal. Structurally, the Interlake Manpower Co-Ordinating Committee was dissolved after a few meetings because it was not perceived to be performing a purposeful function.³² Attitudinally, provincial members of the Board have altered their problem perception from a unified approach to one which emphasizes the opinions of individual departments. Also, a clear distinction is evident between the perspectives of Federal and Provincial Board members on the entire issue of approaches to regional development.³³

In performing its programming function of developing and selecting a structure of programs and a set of activities to achieve the Plan's goals, the Joint Advisory Board must overcome serious conflict situations. The most prominent among these are attempts to match both the available funds and diverse objectives of each of the departments, Federal and Provincial, which are involved in the Plan; and then have a central planning unit (the Administration) create a package of programs which satisfies some minimum acceptance level for each department. The problem is magnified by the facts that:

consultant's report, October, 1969), page 80.

³¹ Interview No. 6, Section 8.

³² Interview No. 6, Section 2.

³³ Interview No. 5, Section 1, a - b.

1. the central planning agency has few resources for independent sponsorship of programs and so must rely on departmental co-operation and support;
2. the central planning agency is provincially dominated, and so has limited influence over federal departments;
3. the provincial component of the planning agency has less financial power and departmental control under its current Cabinet committee affiliation than when it was a part of a central development agency; and
4. the minimum thresholds for program acceptance often change and are inter-related among departments.

The next senior node involves the Ministers responsible for the Plan. Provincially, there has been no change in this role from its Plan design. Federally, however, a new department was created in 1969 to ensure the wide, national dispersal of Canadian economic growth, especially in those regions where the level of employment opportunities or natural resources were low.³⁴ This department is called Regional Economic Expansion (D.R.E.E.), and its Minister assumes the responsibility for the F.R.E.D. Plan from the Minister of Forestry and Rural Development.

While one might expect an increased focus on the Interlake from a Minister whose department's exclusive function is regional development, this is not the case. The major reason that no noticeable change occurs in terms of the Interlake, when the Plan is moved into a new Federal Department, is that F.R.E.D. is a component of A.R.D.A. which is only one of three development programs under D.R.E.E. Moreover, A.R.D.A. is a pro-

³⁴ Dawson and Dawson, op. cit., page 84. Also, the department's operations were described to the Standing Committee on Regional Development (Spring Session, 1971) by the departments Minister, The Honourable Jean Marchand, as follows:

gram with a specific "Provincial initiative-Federal reactive" role design.³⁵

A number of structural changes occur at the senior policy level between the Stage II and Stage III Maker Organizations, some of which have already been attended to. One such provincial change is the removal of the Manitoba Development Authority and its replacement by two committees of Cabinet:

1. planning and priorities (P.P.C.C.), and
2. management.

The Management Committee of Cabinet is primarily a financial control group, a responsibility previously imputed to the Minister of Finance, and still somewhat implicit in that office.³⁶

The Planning and Priorities Committee of Cabinet has an expanded policy, but diminished financial role as compared to its predecessor, the Manitoba Development Authority. The P.P.C.C.'s basic function, planning, involves providing guidance on the priority of programs, and establishing general government policy objectives.³⁷ In addition, this committee attempts to co-ordinate and integrate the programs of various departments in order to ensure a consistency in provincial objectives and activities. To balance and co-ordinate program planning, the Cabinet committee is supported by a civil service staff. The P.P.C.C.'s support staff is composed of two secretariats, Planning and Continuing Programs, the latter of which is responsible for the implementation of the Interlake Plan.

"I think the danger, Mr. Chairman, is to mistake D.R.E.E. for an economic planning department which it is not. The purpose of the department is to try to work on regional disparities and not to take care of the general economy of the Nation."

³⁵ Helen Buckley and Eva Tihanyi, Canadian Policies for Rural Adjustment: A Study of the Economic Impact of A.R.D.A., F.R.E.D. P.F.R.A., M.M.R.A. (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1967), page 10.

³⁶ Dawson and Dawson, op. cit., page 122.

³⁷ Revisions - Draft "C", op. cit., page 53.

Federally, a structural change similar to that in the Province has occurred, although the Treasury Board still maintain its responsibility for financial co-ordination and control. The nodular addition is the Prime Minister's Office, which is "new" only in the sense of increases in its staff, role and policy influence.³⁸ The office is composed of three "regional desks", one of which serves Western Canada. These desks are operated by a staff which is directly responsible to the Prime Minister, and they are used to provide him with information on Canadian regional needs. Generally, the Office functions as a troubleshooting, public relations, and information resource unit on all important matters of government policy. The basis of influence for this single-minded group of persons derives directly from the trust placed in its decisions by the current Prime Minister, and indirectly from his tremendous personal and positional power in Cabinet and its policy determination function.³⁹

The most senior control nodes in Figure 4.8 have not altered in function or jurisdictional responsibility from that depicted in Stage II. Although it is not shown here, one structural change does occur in the Federal Cabinet node. This change involves the formation of an informal "inner cabinet", whose opinion on policy matters is believed to bear more import with the current Prime Minister than the opinions of other Cabinet Ministers.⁴⁰ It is mentioned here only because the current Minister of D.R.E.E. is also a member of this inner cabinet, which establishes a potentially important and

³⁸For an historical analysis of the Prime Minister's Office and its more recent changes in both composition and role, see Walter Stewart, "The Thirty Men Trudeau Trusts", Maclean's: Canada's National Magazine, Vol. 82, No. 10, October 1969, pages 36-48.

³⁹"...better to have the ears of half a dozen of the Prime Minister's aids, than the mouths of half of his cabinet", *ibid.*, page 43.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, pages 46-48.

influential link for all policy matters related to Interlake development. It is extremely difficult, however, to assess or even speculate on the significance of this relationship, especially given the minor importance already attached to the Interlake Plan in the D.R.E.E. Minister's functions.

Having considered the nodes in the Stage III Maker Organization, it is now possible to analyze the connectives between them. There are two connectives which remain unchanged, both in terms of their end-points and the messages flowing between them, from their description in Stage II. These are: linkage 1, the Federal-Provincial Cabinet and departmental interfaces; and linkage 7, the vertical exchange of program recommendations and directions between the Joint Advisory Board and the two F.R.E.D. Ministers.

Most other channels involve some limited changes. For example, linkage 2 still illustrates the horizontal exchange of operational information and procedural direction between field agencies and departments. However, the existence of HURDAC implies that information emanating from any single field agency is more likely to contain recommendations consistent with the current or future activities of other field agencies, than in Stage II. Similarly, directions related to Manpower Programs coming from departments are more likely to be co-ordinated among departments, due to the integrative control of the Manpower Corps Directorate.

Linkage 3 indicates no change in the relationship between General Counsellors and Provincial Field Agencies from that depicted in the Plan, although the difficulty in differentiating between the two end-point nodes has already been mentioned. The parallel linkage, 3, involving the Counsellors and Federal Agencies, however, has changed. This linkage is now uni-directional with the broken line indicating that the Counsellors have no positional authority, and little behavioural power, to influence the

activities of the Federal Agencies.⁴¹ In fact, the only real communication between these nodes is through the integrating node, HURDAC.

Linkage 4 carries information, regarding operationally feasible means of expediting programs, up to the Administration. Again, some of this information will be less diverse than would be anticipated in the Plan, due to the idea integration activities of HURDAC and the Manpower Corps Directorate. In addition to programming directions, a new type of message flows downward. These messages are in the form of brochures and general newsletters which are sent from the Administration to all provincial departments, whether these departments are involved in the Plan's implementation or not. The purpose of such communication is to keep Provincial departments informed about the various activities occurring in the region, as well as to create and maintain a general awareness of the Interlake among them.

Linkage 5 is a new channel on the vertical command axis. Moving downwards along this channel, through the formal participation of the Administration, is information regarding the available and feasible range of activities for Manpower Corps programs under the Plan. Moving back upwards are both agreements and directions regarding these programs.

Linkage 6 connecting the Administration and Advisory Board, carries essentially the same messages as it is designed to under the Plan. The only significant change is the upward flow of "seed" money, which is used by the Administration to encourage increased or new participation in the Plan, by departments.⁴² Basically, the Administration's approach is to offer a fixed amount of funds, either as an initial payment or on a cost-share basis, to a department, in order to convince it to sponsor a program or project in the Interlake. Since not all of the departments approached are

⁴¹ Interview No. 1, Section 1, C.

⁴² Interview No. 2, Section 6.

involved in the Plan, seed money also flows downwards through linkage 4.

For example, the addition of a Parks Construction Project, from the Recreation Program, to the Manpower program, resulted in the creation of a Manpower Corps project.⁴³ This illustrates the use of the "seed" money device, since the Department of Tourism increased its total expenditures in the Interlake. More significantly, however, is that this example also demonstrates the ability of the Provincial Administrators to use seed money to continue to add projects to their initial program recommendations, until these recommendations gain political acceptability. Thus, the Administration's roles in program decisions extends beyond that of a simple advisory body.

The only change in either linkages 8' or 8", from their Plan specification, relates to the appointment of the Federal Co-Ordinator. While this appointment is the responsibility of the Minister of Regional Expansion, it is apparent that the Minister merely ratified a selection made by the Provincial Administrator.⁴⁴ The result is that the current Federal Co-Ordinator is sympathetic to both the needs of the Interlake and the operational and program approaches of the Provincial Administrator. It can also be mentioned, in relation to linkage 8", that no apparent pattern of upward exchange is evident between the Co-Ordinators and Federal Minister; a situation implicit in the Plan's design.

Linkage 9 contains only one significant change in its communication process, and this change occurs at the provincial level. Since the Planning and Priorities Committee of Cabinet is concerned with more general issues of policy than was the Manitoba Development Authority, the messages between it and the Minister relate to a broader co-ordination framework than develop-

⁴³ Loc., cit.

⁴⁴ Interview No. 5, Section 6, a.

ment, i.e. provincial government priorities. This expanded perspective in the Provincial component now more closely parallels the linkage 9 exchanges in the Federal component.

Linkage 10 indicates the membership of the Provincial Administrator and his staff in the Continuing Programs Secretariat. The connective is shown in Figure 4.8 not because of the occurrence of joint membership, but because the Administration initially formed the entire staff of both Secretariats. The potential policy influence of the Interlake Administration group through its direct informational inputs to Cabinet is obvious.

Over time, the composition of the Planning and Priorities Secretariat changed in two significant ways. Firstly, the Secretariat was divided into the two components identified above, and an entirely new staff was hired for the Planning unit. While internal conflicts between the two Secretariats prevent speculation regarding their relative influence in policy matters, it is apparent that the Administration's power is decreased by the creation of a second Secretariat. Secondly, an increase in the areas of program responsibility for the Continuing Programs Secretariat also reduces the importance of Interlake Plan messages both to and from the Administration.⁴⁵

Linkage 11 is a staff connection between the Planning and Priorities Committee of Cabinet and its Secretariat. Messages to the Secretariat contain directions for problem-specific research, with the objective of identifying action and policy alternatives available to the government in the resolution of these problems. Flowing back to the Cabinet Committee are the results of research investigations, including their implications. Although linkage 11 appears to be horizontal, the informational control regarding available policy alternatives, which resides with the Secretariats, might

⁴⁵ Interview No. 6, Section 8.

warrant their placement on the vertical command axis.

Linkage 12, the final one to be considered in this description of the Maker Organization, shows little significant change between Stage II and III. One alteration which has occurred is that upward flowing messages have more importance attributed to them by their Cabinet receivers. This situation occurs as a result of an increase in the delegation of the responsibility for problem analysis and policy formulation from the Cabinet to its Committees and staff. Such delegation is believed to result in more reliable policy information being received by those responsible for making policy decisions.⁴⁶

The Addressee Organization. Figure 4.9, which overlays the Stage III Addressee Organization on that Stage's Maker Organization, illustrates few changes between the former and its Stage II depiction of Figure 4.5. The most significant difference between the organization in these two stages is that the composition of both nodes and relations can be more clearly and specifically described in the later stage. This is especially true in the case of the nodes which are created under the Plan, since the Interlake Clientele (Y_1) and the active groups in the region (Z_1) are essentially the same. Therefore, the focus of nodular description is on the Area and Regional Development Boards.

The Area Development Boards informally existed three or four years prior to the specification of the Development Plan. Initially, their function was to establish implementation and development priorities, review the Plan, and recommend revisions in it to civil servants from the Department of Agriculture.⁴⁷ These civil servants eventually formed the staff of the Provincial Administration for the Plan's implementation. From the twelve

⁴⁶Walter Stewart, op. cit., page 36.

⁴⁷Interview No. 3, Section 3, a.




FIGURE 4.9 STAGE III: THE ADDRESSEE ORGANIZATION

Boards formalized under the Plan, two were amalgamated and one was disbanded, leaving ten in Stage III, i.e. A.D.B._e where e = 1, 2 ... 10.

It is apparent from the Stage II description of these Boards that their composition and functions are not clearly or formally specified. In fact, the Boards are designed to be highly adaptive to local conditions, being unified by only a very general and flexible common constitution imposed on them by the Administration. Thus, both the composition and activities of each Board are determined by Area residents.

In spite of a potential for diversity in the structures and functions of the Development Boards, several clearly identifiable patterns emerge. Firstly, the range of active members on each Board is ten to twenty-four, with a central tendency of fourteen to sixteen. The use of ranges of course is necessitated by both the lack of precision in interviewee responses and the fluctuations which occur in individual participation on the Boards. However, these figures do provide some indication of the size of group under consideration.

Secondly, there are three distinct processes by which Area Development Board membership is attained:

1. the current Board appoints new members (2);
2. the Area's residents attend an annual general meeting at which each resident is allowed to nominate and elect new members (5);
and
3. the local elected governments, such as town and municipal councils, appoint new members (2).

The figures in brackets represent the number of Boards employing a particular selection process.⁴⁸ It is apparent that a form of "popular democracy",

⁴⁸The total for the bracketed figures (9) does not equal the number of ADB's in the Interlake (10) because some of the ADB's use a mixture of the

process 2, is the most frequent and acceptable in the region.

Secondly, the interviewees unanimously agreed that it is either a "civic-minded", "community interest" type of individual or a person who has a major vested interest in a particular F.R.E.D. project, that most often becomes an active member. That is, Board members tend to come from a broad cross-section of the community, apparently transcending occupational, ethnic or other social groupings. However, repeated references are also made in the interviews to the following points:

1. "civic-minded" persons often belong to at least one other local organization which makes demands on their time and influences their attitudes;
2. accomplished, middle and upper class persons form the majority of board members, with a few low income and lower class representatives (who are often difficult to find); and
3. farmers and businessmen tend to be most prominent on the Boards because of the agricultural history of the Boards and the rural-urban dichotomy of both the region and Plan.

Thirdly, the term of office for Board members is generally two or three years, with one-half or one-third of the members selected annually. Repeated terms are not only possible, but highly probable, since the turnover rate of members is low and new members are often difficult to find. In addition, to the problems associated with new membership, the primary constraining factors on Area Development Board activities are its limited human and financial resources: the available "time" of individual members and the size of operating grants from the Administration, respectively.

three systems and have been counted more than once, while two of the Boards were not involved in the interviews.

The Area Development Boards perform a variety of functions, which might be classified as follows:

1. if local citizens groups are weak or do not exist, the Board acts as a community organizer and project activist;
2. if local groups exist, but are not well inter-related and organized, the Board acts as an inter-group project co-ordinator and activity integrator; and
3. if local groups exist and are well organized, the Board acts as a F.R.E.D. Plan advisory body, reviewing projects and suggesting (minor) changes in either the method or timing of implementation.

Of course, the functions of each Board cannot be as neatly or definitively classified as the above enumeration might suggest. That is, these roles tend to overlap and all Boards become involved in the advisory function.

The Area Development Boards are also involved in other functions related generally to the Interlake and specifically to the Development Plan. Firstly, the Boards provide a means for confrontation among local citizens, to help resolve distributive conflicts.⁴⁹ That is, by bringing together citizens from beyond the normal bounds of geographic inter-action, such as towns or municipalities, the Boards help to develop a general awareness among Interlakers of the needs and interests of other Area residents, and expand the development perspective of individuals.

Secondly, the Development Boards prepare local citizens for the Plan's programs, so that projects and activities can be more rapidly implemented with a higher likelihood of acceptance and success than would ordinarily

⁴⁹"Distributive conflict" is defined as a situation wherein the interests of one party can be achieved only at the expense of the other, while "integrative conflict" is defined as a situation wherein total potential benefits are not fixed and solutions benefiting both parties are possible, in Hickling-Johnson, op. cit., pages 45, 86-89.

occur. That is, the Boards help legitimize programs to Area residents.⁵⁰

Thirdly, the legitimization of programs is achieved through a process of regional development education at the local level. The process is chronologically designed to:

1. break down old patterns of behaviour, as well as attitudes and expectations among citizens, by establishing the Board as an open forum for discussion and conflict;
2. promote the accumulation of knowledge among residents regarding feasible development alternatives for the area and region, by disseminating necessary information to them; and
3. teach and encourage citizens to establish priorities and goals, and to subsequently shape their behaviour around these new objectives.⁵¹

The final node in the Stage III Addressee Organization is the Regional Development Board. The Regional Board is quite distinct from the Minister's Citizen Advisory Board, which occupies the same position under the Plan's design (Figure 4.5), especially since the Regional Development Board is a creation of Interlake citizens rather than the government. The voting membership of the Regional Board is comprised of the chairman of each Area Development Board plus one additional representative from each Area Board. Other members of the Area Boards are allowed to attend the Regional Board meetings, held between three and eight times per year, and participate in all activities but voting. In this way, the Regional Board might seem to represent merely a series of horizontal linkages among the Area Boards. The fact, however, that the Regional Board has its own organizational hierarchy and its decisions are to some extent binding on Area Boards, warrants its

⁵⁰ Ibid., pages 86-89.

⁵¹ Interview No. 3, Section 2, e.

placement at a higher integrative level in the Addressee Organization.

The primary function of the Regional Development Board is to create a regional perspective among the Area Boards. For example, the Regional Board helps to decrease the amount of area parochialism by providing a means for the exchange of ideas and information concerning the activities, interests and problems of all the areas.

In addition to creating a sensitivity for the multiplicity of both area unique and inter-area problems confronting the region, the Regional Board acts to resolve and reduce inter-area conflicts related to the distribution of external funds for either industrial or infra-structure investment. For example, by accepting the attitude that the entire region gains if one area attracts a new industry, the Board oversees and promotes Interlake development by a criterion of regional optimization.

Finally, the Regional Board is involved in non-industrial research related to human development programs, regional organization techniques and area leadership. All of these functions, however, are constrained by the time limitation of Regional Board members, who already have a similar constraint at the Area Board level.

There are two linkages symbolized in the Stage III Addressee Organization. Linkage 1 connects a geographically defined population, area citizens, to the Area Development Board. The most prominent change in this channel from its specification in Stage II (Figure 4.5) is the inclusion of both Interlake clientele and local groups as the lower end-points. Local groups are prominent in this implementation scheme as a result of their previously described functional and representative relationships to the Area Boards.

Implicit in the representatives to these Boards is information regard-

ing the attitudes, needs, interests and demands of local citizens, a basic understanding of the environment in which they reside, and often a technical expertise in a chosen occupational field. This information is exchanged at Board meetings through the various inter-actions of the members.

In addition to Area representatives, a majority of which have been described as the "community interest" type of individual, interested citizens can carry messages about local circumstances directly to the Board.⁵² This direct contact can occur in one or more of the following ways:

1. membership on a Board project sub-committee;
2. participation in a F.R.E.D. program or project which is jointly administered by the Board and the Administration;
3. voting or standing in the election of Board members, at the annual meeting (where applicable); and
4. expression of personal grievances, needs and demands at regular Board meetings.

These direct channels of citizen contact with the Area Boards, especially number 4, are interrupted by several blockages. For example, there is no fundamental sense of responsibility between the Board and local citizens, since Board membership is not necessarily related to traditional political processes or institutions at the local level: such as the popular (representative) election of municipal and/or town councils. Even in those cases where a form of popular democracy is employed to attain Board membership, local citizens are often perceived in an "apathetic, non-doer" type-cast by elected Board members, and little or no feeling of practical re-

⁵²Two types of local participation on ADB's have been observed:

- a) community leaders
- b) service recipients

The interests of the first group are described as "development on their own terms", while the second group's concerns are with their own economic situations, i.e. highly personalized concerns, in Hickling-Johnson, op. cit.,

sponsibility is encountered.⁵³

Moreover, the linkage between local citizens and Area Boards involves largely unrepresentative communication. This point would normally follow from the self-interest/community interest dichotomy of citizen messages outlined above. However, the lack of representativeness extends as far as the exclusion of an entire group of persons who consider themselves as functional or problem related residents of the Interlake, in addition to their confirmed geographic citizenship. The group referred to is the (reserve) Indian population, none of whom are formally represented on any Area Board, in spite of their common Interlake-based problems of low income, poor housing, unemployment and others.⁵⁴

The situation of limited upward flows along linkage 1 of the Addressee Organization is clearly recognized by the Administration staff, some of whom consider Area Boards to be weak and unrepresentative bodies.⁵⁵ Such an attitude, of course, has important implications for both the flow and types of messages which might move along an as yet unspecified inter-system channel, between the Area Boards and the Administration.

Linkage 1 also carries messages in a downward direction. There are in fact two lower end-points of this channel:

1. local groups; and
2. individual citizens (or clientele).

The number of local groups with which each Board has face-to-face contact is in the range of five to ten, while their range for such contact with individuals is approximately thirty to fifty. These ranges, of course,

pages 86-89.

⁵³Area Development Board interview No. 1, Section 1.

⁵⁴Interview No. 7, sections 2 - 3. ⁵⁵Interview No. 2, Section 3, b.

vary for each Area. However, the interviews do indicate that the contact with local groups is more comprehensive than that with unorganized individual citizens. Moreover, this point is magnified by a concensus that most information disseminated from the Board reaches only other Board members or individuals already knowledgeable about the Board's activity through their previous inter-actions with it, rather than reaching the "uninformed" citizen.

Flowing to individual citizens along linkage 1 are the project services provided under the joint government/citizen administration programs. Some Boards also administer their own projects, such as driver training programs or community recreation centres. However, this latter project set is highly constrained by the limited revenues of each Board. This results in project specific relations emerging between the Boards and local groups, who then indirectly relate to the clientele.

In these linkage 1 relations with local groups, the Area Boards usually provide organizational and technical expertise. This leaves the procurement of financial resources and program implementation as the primary responsibilities of the local group(s) involved. In addition to their advisory role, Area Boards often co-ordinate the activities of local groups: by formally disseminating project information among various groups and/or by informally directing local groups' interests through individuals who hold both Board and group memberships. Finally, Area Boards also "delegate" entire projects to those local groups which have necessary and sufficient resources for both planning and implementation.⁵⁶

Linkage 2, connecting the Area Boards and the Regional Board, is the

⁵⁶ Although ADB No. 5 provides some financial assistance to local groups, most ADB's act only in the capacities specified.

only other connective in the Addressee Organization. Flowing upwards to the Regional Board are the needs, interests, problems, desires and expectations of the citizens in each area, as interpreted and prioritized by each of the Area Boards. Also moving upwards along this channel are the reactions of Area citizens and Board representatives to F.R.E.D. projects which are being implemented in the respective Areas. The purpose of such messages is to identify and bring together the specific interests of each area in order to create a general awareness of the multiplicity of needs and priorities upon which a regional perspective can be developed.

Flowing downwards along linkage 2, which is represented by a "secretarial pool" communication service, are messages directed toward the creation of a regional attitude, awareness and perspective. These messages transfer information about the problems, projects and interests of each Area Board among all the other Area Boards. In addition to helping Inter-lakers understand the diverse interests of those in other geographic areas of the region, the Regional Board's downward communication also serves to co-ordinate similar interests and activities of Area Boards, which otherwise would exist in isolation. An often cited example of the success of the Regional Board in developing a broader perspective among Area Boards was the formal support received from all Area Boards, by the town of Selkirk in its bid to locate the Freshwater Fish Marketing Corporation in that sub-regional centre.⁵⁷ This example illustrates the willingness of other competitive urban centres, to work together and perhaps forego individual, community or area gains, in the hope of increasing the likelihood of a regional gain. The Regional Board, therefore, has the effect of transforming, or at least provides a mechanism for the transformation of inter-

⁵⁷ ADB interview No. 2, Section VI, B; Interview No. 2, Section 2b; Interview No. 4, Section 3 (iii).

Area "distributive" conflicts into "integrative" ones.⁵⁸

The Implementation Network. Figure 4.10 illustrates the nodes and connectives in the field between the two organizations. Since there is only one new node, the Minister's Citizen Advisory Board, most of the discussion will focus upon the inter-system connectives. The Citizen Board is composed of twenty members: the chairman and one representative from each Area Board. These members are invited by the Minister to a meeting which is called at his convenience. Since the formal members of this board are the same persons who comprise the Regional Development Board, the Citizen Board does not represent in reality a node, but rather it is a setting for formal inter-actions among the Minister of Agriculture, other Ministers and government legislators related to the region or its Plan, and the (citizens') Regional Development Board. For this reason, the Citizen's Advisory Board is symbolized by a diamond shaped figure, where the symbol represents a communication re-direction and/or screening mechanism.

Linkage 1, between the Interlake Clientele and government field agencies, is unchanged from its specification in previous stages. That is, messages regarding individual client needs and interests, as well as reactions to programs and their implementation are carried to the Field Agents, while general program and project information is impersonally disseminated to the clientele. Similarly, the lack of search by Field Agents to initiate operational citizen participation in service consumption results in the broken line symbolization of the channel to the clientele.

Linkage 2 connects the Clientele to the General Counsellors who are employed under the Plan. This linkage carries the types of messages it was designed to in Stage II:

⁵⁸The definitions of these terms is provided in footnote 47, previously.




FIGURE 4.10 STAGE III: THE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM NETWORK

1. personal problems and needs, as well as criticisms of these and other available government programs, from individual participating citizens; and
2. active search, available program information and "follow-up" adaptation assistance from the General Counsellors.

In spite of the similarity between this channel and its counter-part in the Plan, a tendency by the Counsellors to be increasingly less active in their search function has been identified.⁵⁹ If this develops into a long-run behavioural pattern, the connective to the clientele would be symbolized by a broken line as it is in linkage 1. Considering the previously mentioned similarity between General Counsellors and the Field Agents in the Implementation Network, the diminishing search tendency of the Counsellors would eventually result in a complete lack of differentiation between them and Field Agents. Such an operational instability illustrates the similarity, at the lowest level of organizational hierarchy, between the Stage I and Stage III inter-system networks.

Linkage 3 is a uni-directional channel, with messages flowing from the Administration to the Interlake Clientele.⁶⁰ These messages carry a general interpretation of the Plan, its scope and methods to citizens at large. This information also indicates the role that citizens can and/or are expected to play in the Plan's implementation, and the effect that the Plan, and their participation in it, will have on both the regional environment and individual life-styles. Linkage 3 is also used to fill the gaps in local communications media, such as regional newspapers and radio, by providing "re-feedback" of citizen based information to the general resident

⁵⁹ Interview No. 6, Section 1, C.

⁶⁰ For commentary on the purposes, tactics, strategies and relative success of this program, see Interview No. 4, Sections 1 - 2.

population. Finally, this channel carries messages which help local citizens learn to organize, and in this capacity it provides a referral system for the Area Development Boards.

Two interesting observations can be made regarding linkage 3. One is that the information carried by this channel flows largely to the same 800 Interlake residents, rather than the regional population in general, and this group of receivers encompasses those who are participating either as service recipients in operational activities or those who are participating as citizen representatives to Area Boards.⁶¹ The second observation is that linkage 3 consciously by-passes the Non-Interlake Clientele Addressee node in order to reduce the political pressures for similar government Plans in other provincial regions.⁶²

Linkage 4 connects the Area Development Boards to both the Administration and HURDAC, although the HURDAC end-point is understood to be an aggregation of Field Agents and General Counsellors. Messages from the Area Boards often request technical advice from HURDAC and political or administrative feasibility advice from the Administration, on Board proposals for projects or alterations in the Plan.

In addition, the Boards provide programming advice regarding alterations in the extent or timing of the implementation of operational activities. While the Boards were designed to act in part as "sounding-boards" for Maker-initiated program proposals, an attitude exists among the Boards that they have little influence in altering the fundamental parts of current or planned programs. This attitude is reflected in the following

⁶¹Interview No. 4, Section 1, b.

⁶²Interview No. 4, Section 1, b(i). This point is impossible to illustrate in Figure 4.10, because of the omission of non-Interlake Clientele from the Addressee Organization in that figure.

quotation: "If we like a program, we get it; if we don't like it, we still get it."⁶³

Linkage 4 also carries the community needs, interests and priorities, as they are interpreted by the Area Boards, to the Administration and HURDAC. Messages to HURDAC generally relate to specific departmental programs and citizen concerns, while those to the Administration have both broader policy and operational implementation orientations. Broader policy messages are communicated to the Administration because this unit is considered by the Boards to be a trusted liaison between themselves and the political decision-makers of both FRED and non-FRED departments. Implementation messages to the Administration provide both a measure of the likelihood of local participation in a particular program, and instructions regarding the most "acceptable" way of presenting it.

Flowing to the Area Boards, from the Administration, along linkage 4 are:

1. financial resources in the form of a \$1,500 annual operating grant;
2. organizational expertise to aid in the establishment and identification of needs, priorities, regional perspective and citizen participation; and
3. information regarding the likelihood of action being taken on particular citizen demands, how these demands fit into an overview of the Plan, and what types of demands are likely to attract the interests of political decision-makers.

The last form of message mentioned above, regarding the "political acceptability" of Board demands is perceived by Board members as "inside infor-

⁶³ ADB Interview No. 6, Section III, A; see also Interview No. 7, Section 5.

mation" and implies to them that they have been taken into confidence by the Administration.⁶⁴

Other messages to the Area Boards, along linkage 4, come from the individual members, Field Agents and General Counsellors, of HURDAC. These messages primarily provide solicited advice on technical and administrative aspects of Board projects and proposals. Since the members of HURDAC are perceived by the Board to have an equal or greater interest in the community, vis-à-vis their line department, their advice is well heeded and it acts as the major technical resource for Board decisions.

There has been a noticeable decrease in quantity and quality of the exchange along linkage 4 between the Administration and Area Boards. This has resulted from the weakening of personal contact which occurred when the Administrator's role was broadened with respect to responsibilities in the Maker Organization. The consequences of the shift away from innovation and towards routinization by the Administration has been an increased reliance upon Area Boards to initiate and organize local citizen activity. While the Boards have managed to maintain their strong technical resource relationship with HURDAC members, the limited funds provided through the annual operating grant are not commensurate with the Board's new responsibilities, and are tending to become the most serious constraint on Area Board activity.

Although linkage 5 has two end-points in the Addressee Organization, an earlier discussion regarding the Minister's Citizen Advisory Board implicitly indicated that the only relevant Addressee end-point is the Regional Development Board (R.D.B.). Also, that same discussion illustrated that the linkage 5, end-point in the Maker Organization is not only the

⁶⁴ ADB Interview No. 1, Section III, A - C.

Minister of Agriculture but instead consists of all policy decision-makers with Interlake responsibility.⁶⁵ Linkage 5 therefore provides a connection between the Regional Board and the senior levels of most government line departments.

Most of the messages from the Regional Board are expressed as complaints or criticisms of government policy. In this manner the government decision-makers receive information about local conditions and needs, as well as feedback concerning both the (administrative) delivery of programs and their effectiveness in satisfying local citizen demands. A most frequent message carried along this channel implores the government to make its departmental policies and/or their operational implementation internally consistent, in order to facilitate rational regional planning. Some often cited examples of such policy inconsistencies are:

1. the Defence Department's decision to close the Gimli Air Base, which significantly altered the economic base and aggregate income of a town, an area, and the region;
2. the Federal Government's decision to place the Freshwater Fish-marketing Corporation, which appeared to be a "natural" industry for the Interlake, in a Winnipeg suburb; and
3. the Department of Regional Economic Expansion's decision to designate all of Southern Manitoba as eligible for industrial development grants, which removed any comparative industrial advantage established by the F.R.E.D. agreement, for Interlake urban centers.

The portion of linkage 5 directed towards the Addressee Organization is depicted by a broken line. This is intended to illustrate that in spite of his power and responsibility to select the members and convene the meetings

⁶⁵ The decision-makers referred to here are largely from the Provincial Government.

of the Citizen's Advisory Board, the Minister of Agriculture initiates little formal inter-action with local residents or their organizational representatives. Also, the reporting done by the Minister to the Board is very limited and vague. so that most "political feedback" received by the Board is obtained indirectly, through the Administration. In fact, some citizen members of the Advisory Board feel that the meetings with the Minister were sometimes so uncomfortable for him that he decreased the number of meetings held and attempted to "purge" those citizens who were most verbose.⁶⁶

The final inter-system connective to be considered is linkage 6. This channel specifies the representative and responsible characteristics which, as described for the Stage I Network, are fundamental to the democratic system of government in Canada. The Area Development Board interviews provide an operational perspective of this channel. Perhaps not unexpectedly, the interviews indicate that little instrumental valuation is attached to linkage 6 by local citizens, i.e. local citizens do not question the need for democratic, representative and responsible government (independent valuation) but do emphasize the insignificant role, in the Plan, which is played by their government representatives (instrumental valuation). A number of reasons are provided by interviewees which they feel "explained" this limited importance of the Region's elected representatives. These are summarized in the following three statements:

1. Local representatives never hold a balance of power in a party or government, and so they have little apparent influence in policy decisions, i.e. they are weak receivers for messages regarding the Plan and its implementation;

⁶⁶ ADB Interview No. 2, Section III, C; see also Interview No. 5, Section 2.

2. Regional development never becomes a partisan election issue -- all of the political parties pay "lip service" to it so that citizens cannot align themselves with one or another of the competing political groups and act as protagonists on the issues of regional development; and
3. The shared-cost nature of the Plan makes it very difficult to determine political accountability for individual programs.

In spite of the apparent weaknesses in linkage 6, between the Inter-lake Clientele and policy decision-makers, some communicative inter-action does occur. Flowing to the politicians are both positive and negative criticisms of policy decisions in general, and demands for action on issues of local concern. Such messages are transmitted by means of written letters, mass media editorialization and inter-personal communication through local political groups. However, it must be recognized that these messages relate to both F.R.E.D. and non-F.R.E.D. issues, although no account can be given of the relative frequency or importance of each.

Flowing back to the Clientele are messages of creditation for programs and projects. These messages are transmitted through the mass media, by means of a program of general information dissemination and by the use of posters or billboards. At an individual level, clients may receive responses to their inquiries, solutions or explanations of their project-related problems and acknowledgements of their demands or statements of interest. Again, the amounts of this communication which are related directly to the F.R.E.D. Plan have not been determined, but the earlier descriptions of the Maker Organization would imply that there are many non-Plan forms.

Observations on Stage III. Consistent with the approach adopted for the observations on Stage II, this section will consider the most pro-

minent changes in the Management Network between its second and third stages. Some of these observations, as well as supplementary ones, have been alluded to in the text of the analytic description presented above. However, the following set of three observations will be considered in a more detailed manner in this section:

1. Many of the problems identified in Stage I, with respect to intra- and inter-organizational structures and activities, still persist;
2. The Provincial Administration adopts a central role in the implementation process and becomes the critical component in the function of matching the Plan's rigid goals to the changing needs and environment of its clients; and
3. The creation of the Interlake Development Corporation and the subsequent dissolution of the Regional Development Board, causes confusion and irrationality in the structure and functioning of the Addressee Organization.

The first observation, regarding organizational problems in the Stage III Management Network, has three components which relate to the Maker Organization, the Addressee Organization and the Inter-System Network, respectively. In the Maker Organization, the Stage I problems of limited policy and program co-ordination and/or integration, both between the two governments and among their departments, still persist. The often cited criticism of Joint Federal-Provincial Planning bodies, that they do little planning and analysis but much formalized bargaining, seems to be supported by the Interlake experience.⁶⁷

⁶⁷T. N. Brewis, "Regional Economic Planning: The Canadian Scene" in The Challenge (Winnipeg: The Department of Industry and Commerce, 1971), page 63. Brewis also criticizes the lack of communication between the Province (failure to provide information on program success) and the D.R.E.E. (failure to provide program guidelines), which results in no attempts being made to integrate regional or sectoral approaches with national goals,

Another problem in the Maker Organization is indirectly related to the operational dominance of the Provincial civil servants, as compared to their Federal counterparts, in the Administration node. This situation is problematic to the extent that it blocks communication between the Administrators and those Federal departments actually or potentially involved in the Plan's programs. The result is that integral control at the program level is provided by the Manpower Corps Directorate, and at the project level by HURDAC. Unfortunately, while the integration function of the Directorate is legitimate, it is not comprehensive, i.e. rather than integrating all programs and departmental approaches to them, the Directorate merely co-ordinates the approaches of several departments to a single program. Conversely, HURDAC's functions are comprehensive in terms of departments and programs, but its operational powers are not legitimized in the government bureaucracy.

In the Addressee Organization, the major weaknesses involve the structure of citizen participation linkages, the messages they transmit, and the definition of their end-points. For example, in most Areas the upward channel between the clientele and Area Development Boards is poorly established and transmits little new information to the Board. Moreover, even the informal channel inherent in the citizen members of the Board is perceived to be unrepresentative and a weak informational link. There is no apparent tendency for these linkages to be getting stronger and in fact, there is a suggestion that their weaknesses are being reinforced over time.

The problems persisting in the Inter-System Network are similar to those in the Addressee Organization. That is, they are largely related to weaknesses in both linkages and message transmissions. Unlike the situation

in the Addressee Organization, however, the flows along inter-organizational channels, created by the Plan, are strongest as they move from the constituents (clients) to representatives (government), and weakest in the reverse direction. The long-run disparity in strength of communication, as classified on the basis of transmissional direction, appears to be widening. That is, for all cases except messages from the Area Boards to the Administration and those from the Administration to the Clientele (channels 4 and 3, respectively, in Figure 4.10), there is a tendency for communication channels and informational flows from the Addressee Organization to get stronger and those from the Maker Organization to get weaker.⁶⁸ This situation is perhaps best illustrated by the gradual deterioration of the initiation function of the General Counsellors, which reduces them to the role of Field Agents as described in Stage I. Conversely, the non-Plan designed linkages, those which are in both Stages I and III, seem to be largely unchanged from their depiction in the pre-Plan Network.

It is interesting to note that the description of the Implementation Network provides an operational insight into a fundamental question in the theory of representative democracy. The question, alluded to in an earlier section, involves the governmental role of the responsible legislator, and more specifically whether he is an independent delegate or popular representative of his constituents.⁶⁹ While a position was not adopted by this study on the theoretical aspects of this issue, the Interlake experience

⁶⁸In a hierarchy of citizen participation, this type of flow would reach a level (ascending degrees of citizen control) of 3 or 4 out of 8. These levels are classified as lower order "degrees of tokenism" (3 - informing, 4 - consultation), and are somewhat distant from the "degrees of citizen power" (partnerships; delegated power; citizen control). See Sherry R. Arnstein, "A Ladder of Citizen Participation", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, XXXV, July 1969, page 217.

⁶⁹For a discussion of the two concepts involved, see Chapter II, Section A.

provides operational support for the independent delegate approach. That is, the weakness of the connective and inter-actions between citizens and their political representatives (linkage 6, Figure 4.10) implies that legislators criticize and scrutinize Cabinet policy proposals and legislation largely in ignorance of the degree of awareness of local citizens concerning either the "relevant issues" and/or the legislator's positions on those issues.

The second observation on Stage III involves the prominence of the role played by the Provincial Administrator and his staff in the implementation of the Plan. This observation is made in light of a comment by that Administrator that the Interlake Plan is a "Development and (citizen) Participation Model";⁷⁰ in fact, a highly centralized and concentrated control model would seem to be a closer approximation of operational reality.⁷¹ This point warrants elaboration.

From previous descriptions of the types of messages flowing among the Management System Network's nodes, as well as their frequency, and importance to their receptors, a diagrammatic summary of the "strongest" implementation stage relations has been compiled and is presented in Figure 4.11. A descriptive analysis of this diagram is best premised by a statement of the pre-conceived (with respect to the Plan) objectives of the Provincial Administrator and his conceptions of necessary conditions for successful "action planning."⁷²

⁷⁰Interview No. 5, Section 4.

⁷¹"Centralization" is a tendency towards a high density grouping of decision-making authority. "Concentration" is used to refer to similar high density levels of information and communications. The use of these terms here is not intended to bear value-judgement or connotations.

⁷²This section is a summary of Interview No. 5, Section 8, a - d.




FIGURE 4.11

THE MOST PROMINENT (BEHAVIOURAL) IMPLEMENTATION LINKAGES

The operational or mechanical objectives in action orientated development planning, according to the Provincial Administrator, are threefold:

1. to achieve consistency between policy goals and program expenditures;
2. to promote and obtain co-operation and mutual agreement among line (program delivery) departments, in both the political and administrative systems; and
3. to discover the priorities of local citizens (general clientele) and then organize them around their interests.

In order to achieve these objectives in an on-going manner, a central planning and/or implementation unit must attain and maintain a "favourable" or control position in four critical sub-systems.

1. political;
2. administrative;
3. financial; and
4. communicative.

The linkages in Figure 4.11 are numbered arbitrarily in a clock-wise manner. Channel 1 carries policy demands, as well as messages regarding the feasibility of implementing programs in terms of citizen acceptance, from "civic-minded" citizens to the Administration. Channel 2 carries the highly personalized service needs and demands of individual program clients to Field Agents. These "self-interest" messages are then filtered and communicated by the General Counsellors, through channel 3, to the Provincial Administrator.

Channel 4 carries both informational and financial messages to the Administrator. The information coming from departments identifies a flexibility range with respect to participation in new, or continued, support

of old programs under the Plan. That is, by communicating with line departments, the Administrator is able to determine what types of programs and projects are unacceptable, minimally acceptable or highly desirable to the various departments. Closely related to this information is the upward flow of resources in real or financial terms, to support a department's actual or potential participation in the delivery of a program in the Plan.

Channel 5 transmits information regarding the political feasibility of programs as they relate to Federal Government goals and guidelines on Regional Development. These messages are consistent with the sub-ordinate role and co-operative evaluation function attributed to the Federal Co-Ordinator in the section above.

Along channel 6, from the Joint Federal-Provincial Advisory Board to the Administrator, flows information which helps to identify the feasibility of program proposals in the administrative sub-system, as well as the dichotomized political sub-system. Also, transmitted along this channel are revenues to help initiate new programs or alter the priorities among old ones.

Channel 7 is purely in the realm of intra-provincial relations, with the responsible Plan Minister and senior policy decision bodies grouped as an upper end-point. Flowing downward along this channel are statements regarding the political feasibility of program proposals for the Plan; where "political feasibility" includes considerations of the goal-relations among departments, the relations between the government and its constituents and the consistency of Plan proposals with the broad policy objectives of the incumbent government. Also transmitted downwards to the Administrator are decisions regarding funds for F.R.E.D. programs, both conditional and unconditional with respect to the joint participation of Federal and/or

Provincial departments.

All of the connectives in Figure 4.11 also carry messages in the reverse direction, i.e. from the Provincial Administrator to the other nodes. What is termed "inside information" regarding politically feasible proposals from citizens is transmitted along channel 1. That is, the Provincial Administrator not only acts as a "sounding board" for citizen criticisms and program adjustment suggestions related to the Plan, but also provides information, in confidence, to some members of the Area Boards, upon which they base their proposals. This information identifies what types of criticisms and/or recommendations will be most successful in gaining consideration and action from political decision-makers.

Information transmitted from the Administrator to individual clients or groups, along channel 2, is delivered in a less personalized manner than the messages of channel 1. In conjunction with the General Counsellors through channel 3, a general information dissemination program is delivered to the Interlake Clientele. This program identifies both the importance of citizen participation to the Plan, as well as the importance of the Plan to Interlake citizens.

There is a close parallel among the messages transmitted to departments, the Joint Advisory Board and senior provincial decision-makers along channels 4, 6 and 7, respectively. Therefore, these connectives will be considered together in a comparative analysis. In addition to the delegation of program implementation responsibility, "seed money" flows down to line departments along channel 4. Such funds are intended to attract the participation of a department into the Interlake and its Plan, to implement a program which it would provide somewhere in Manitoba anyway. The "carrot" employed by the Administrators is a reduction in the total funds

which must be committed by a department, since the seed money is substituted for some of the department's expenditure.

Seed money also flows up channel 6, to support program "requests" made by the Administrator at the Joint Advisory Board. In addition to the use of seed money, the Administrator's position in bargaining for programs at the Board is strengthened by his recognized affiliation with local citizens. That is, the Administrator establishes himself as, or is perceived to be established as, an administrative representative (of Interlake clientele) who is both aware of, and sympathetically sensitive to, the needs and demands of all types of Interlake clientele. This "representative" tactic is also used to supplement the Administrator's program proposals to senior Provincial decision-makers, along channel 7.

Consistent with a previous description of the dominant sub-ordinate relationship between the Provincial Administrator and Federal Co-Ordinator, channel 5 primarily carries information which makes the Co-Ordinator aware of new program "thrusts" being considered by the Administrator. Such information is provided early in the program development stage, in order that the Administrator can receive feedback regarding the feasibility of a program within the Federal operational and objective goal structures. Of course, similar opinions are also sought from the Federal departments themselves, along channel 4.

Figure 4.11 demonstrates the central position of the Provincial Administrator politically, administratively and financially; all of which are achieved by means of control over the communication network. While negotiating with the decision-makers, the Administrator "represents" citizen views and operational administrators; while negotiating with senior administrators of line departments, he "represents" operational administrators,

citizens and the broad objectives of government decision-makers; and while negotiating with citizens, he "represents" an administrator who has knowledge of the program preferences of the incumbent government. Therefore, in addition to responsible authority designated to the Administrator by the Plan, his power in the implementation phase is greatly increased by a conscious effort to become the central node in a system of behavioural inter-action.⁷³ The other nodes in this system include community and individual interest Interlake clients, as well as Federal and Provincial decision-makers and line department administrators.

Moreover, the operational methodology of the Administrator is to seek and avoid potential blockages or breaks in the Management System Network, in order to ensure the development and implementation of the more desirable programs for the Interlake. The criteria of desirability are most often determined by the Provincial Administrator, according to his thoughts, information sources and actions. This conclusion is drawn from a number of observations:

1. Individual local citizens have difficulty in abstracting beyond anything but highly personalized needs;
2. Area Development Board members ("community interest" citizens) represent only an affluent interest group and not the average, low-income Interlakers;
3. Federal and Provincial decision-makers are not, or cannot be, uniquely sensitive to the needs and demands of only one politically insignificant, geographic region; and
4. line department administrators are too committed to routinization, which is inherent in a government bureaucracy, to be able to pro-

⁷³The designated powers of the Administrator are outlined in the analysis of the Stage II, Maker Organization, in Section II, Part A, previously.

vide the innovative and highly specialized programs and/or leadership necessary to equalize the socio-economic status of a disparate region.

Thus, by weighing and integrating the decision-factors for each of the groups discussed above, the Administrator deliberately devises programs which can gain policy approval from legislators, delivery approval from line department administrators, and implementation approval from citizens. Needless to say, it is not the entire membership of these groups from which a minimum program acceptance threshold is sought, instead it is those few members who are critical elements in the "dynamics" of their group's actions, to whom reference is made.⁷⁴

The third observation on Stage III, regarding the Interlake Development Corporation, might have been included as an overlay in the descriptive analysis of the Implementation Management System Network as depicted in Figure 4.10 above. However, this was not done because the Corporation can be perceived to be an institutional imposition from a source external to the particular development policy with which this study is concerned. As was the case with other externally based changes, however, this institution has serious implications for both the Plan in general, and its organizational-citizen participation components in particular. A second problem involved in a descriptive analysis of the Regional Development Corporation emanates from its relative newness as a development mechanism, both in the province and the Interlake.⁷⁵

⁷⁴In Interview No. 3, Section 5, one of the Administrators indicates that the tactics and strategies employed in the Plan closely resemble, and were to some extent patterned after, those described in Bertram Gross, The Administration of Economic Development Planning: Principles and Fallacies (New York: United Nations, 1966).

⁷⁵The recommendation to create Regional Development Corporations in Manitoba is found in the report of the Committee on Manitoba's Economic

Figure 4.12 attempts to illustrate in a general way the relationships which occur as a result of the creation of the Interlake Development Corporation. Only those nodes and channels which are directly related to the Corporation, or the changes it causes, are depicted in this diagram.

There are two such nodes in the Maker Organization, both of which are a part of the Provincial Department of Industry and Commerce:

1. Minister, and
2. Regional Development Branch Administration.

The Minister of this Department is positioned adjacent to the Minister of Agriculture, since both of these roles have largely the same responsibility with respect to the operational aspects of sub-regional development. Alternatively, the role of the Regional Development Branch is not approximated by a node in the Implementation Management Network of Figure 4.10, although it is in fact a component of one of the non-Plan departments as mentioned in Figure 4.7. The role of this Branch of Industry and Commerce is not Interlake specific, since its major responsibility is to assist in the creation and operation of Development Corporations in all seven regions of the Province.⁷⁶

In the Addressee Organization, the major difference between the Stage III Network and Figure 4.12 is the removal of the Regional Development

Future (C.O.M.E.F.) 1962. That report, however, placed little emphasis on regional growth (within the Province) and/or the mechanisms to promote that growth. In 1964, an amendment to the Companies Act was passed, which permitted the creation of incorporated Regional Development Corporations. By 1969, five of the six regions in Manitoba (excluding Winnipeg and the North) had such corporations, with the Interlake being the only region without one. More detailed recommendations, for the use of Regional Development Corporations in promoting provincial growth, are provided in the T.E.D. report. The Commission on Targets for Economic Development (T.E.D.), Manitoba to 1980 (The Province of Manitoba: Winnipeg, 1969), pages 422-424, 455.

⁷⁶ Manitoba Department of Industry and Commerce, Regional Development Corporations (Winnipeg, Manitoba: Departmental publication), page 2.




FIGURE 4.12 A SIMPLIFICATION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM NETWORK APPENDED TO INCLUDE THE INTERLAKE DEVELOPMENT CORP.

Board, which was disbanded by its citizen membership when it was perceived to be redundant in anticipation of a similarly functioning Development Corporation.⁷⁷ While the Development Board's hierarchical position is now occupied by the Minister's Citizen Advisory Board, the role of the latter node or "transparency" is unchanged from that ascribed to it in Stage III (Figure 4.10).

Finally, the Interlake Development Corporation is depicted as an inter-system node. Although it is not unreasonable to anticipate that the Corporation eventually will become a part of the Addressee Organization, current information can neither assure its placement there nor specify its relative hierarchical position. Regional Development Corporations are organizationally standardized in the Province of Manitoba:

1. The Board of Directors is composed of officials elected from the proxy representatives of each member municipality in the Region;
2. The Corporation is financed by a Provincial Government grant and a per capita levy on each member municipality;
3. The Corporation has a full-time manager and secretarial staff; and
4. The major functions of the Corporation are behaviourally promotional, although it can legally assess the economic potential of a region, identify factors inhibiting economic development and recommend their removal, and/or promote and assist regional development per se or programs for development.^{78/79}

⁷⁷ ADB Interviews No. 1, 4 and 5, Section IV, A.

⁷⁸ Department of Industry and Commerce, op. cit., pages 1-3.

⁷⁹ The legal functions of the Development Corporation are defined by The Companies Act, Part III, Section 140 (1)(d); also see T.E.D. Commission op. cit., page 455; B. W. Macy and D. L. Vogelsang, Community Development as a Factor in Industrial Growth in Manitoba, Midwest Research Institute, a report to the Committee on Manitoba's Economic Future, 1962), pages 28-32.

Functionally, the Interlake Development Corporation can be differentiated from other such regional bodies, to the extent that its operational definition of development encompasses social and analytic considerations, as well as economic or industrial growth.⁸⁰ This characteristic has been attributed to the fact that some of the Corporation's directors are also members of Area Development Boards, although cases of dual membership are formally coincidental. In fact, the Area Development Board interviews indicate that no current operational or representative relationship exists between the Corporation and the Boards; although the potential for meaningful interactions in the future is perceived.

There are several connectives illustrated in Figure 4.12, each of which will be considered briefly. Channel 1 indicates the representative relationship between the Development Corporation and the Municipal Councils, which are the primary institution of local government in the Province. Flowing to the Corporation, in addition to appointees to the Board of Directors, are finances in the form of per capita levies. While no specific relations are required from the Corporation to the Councils, it can be assumed that some information or justifications of expenditures are provided in order to assure the continued support and participation of member municipalities.

Channel 2 is depicted by a broken line between the Area Boards and the Corporation. This linkage depicts the informal or "associate" membership status that some Boards have in the Development Corporation. Such status costs each participating Board fifty dollars per annum, and permits that Board's representative to attend the Corporation's meetings and influence its policy decisions in a non-voting manner. Flowing back to the par-

⁸⁰ Interview No. 6, Section 6.

ticipating Boards is analytic information, promotional material and/or attitudes regarding various aspects of the economic development of the Interlake, as perceived by the Corporation.

Channel 3 is an Administrative linkage between the Corporation and the Regional Development Branch of the Provincial Department of Industry and Commerce. Flowing directly to the Corporation are operating grants which amount to one-half of the revenues in the Corporation's budget, while the Corporation receives technical information indirectly, through the expenditure of "economic analysis grants" provided by the government.⁸¹ Messages from the Corporation relate primarily to its findings and recommendations regarding the economic development of the Interlake. Since the Regional Development Branch of Industry and Commerce has similar operational relations with the other six Regional Development Corporations in Manitoba, channel 3 provides a means of indirect communication and inter-action among these Corporations.⁸²

Channel 4 is a Maker Organization linkage which parallels the "policy direction-reactive information" exchange between higher and lower levels of all government departments. Such exchanges are considered in the descriptive analyses of Stage I to III above, and so there is no need to develop them further here.

Finally, channel 5 is an inter-system connective between the Area Development Boards and the Minister of Agriculture. While the nature and pattern of these exchanges is similar to those described for channel 5 in Stage III above (Figure 4.10), one prominent change has occurred. This change involves the dissolution of the Regional Development Board, which

⁸¹M. Decter, "Quasi-Public or Collective Enterprise", an unpublished working paper of the Planning and Priorities Committee of Cabinet Secretariat, May 1972, page 4.

⁸²Department of Industry and Commerce, op. cit., page 2.

was responsible for the integration of Area demands and attitudes toward the creation of a regional perspective of economic development. In the absence of any mechanism to mould a regional perspective by integrating local, parochial attitudes, a management consultant team observed that participation in myopic, distributive conflicts over the location of infra-structure is then a "natural" role for Area Development Boards.⁸³

The most prominent effects of the formation of the Interlake Development Corporation and the disbandment of the Regional Development Board seem to be:

1. a reduction of informational quality in Addressee Organization messages at the Citizen's Advisory Board, i.e. a reduction in the regional perspective of Board members;
2. a weakening of the entire communications network within the Addressee Organization; and
3. a creation of confusion regarding the allocation of responsibilities for development activities among the Area Boards and the Regional Corporation.

Having now made observations on each of the stages of the Management Network, the next section can provide observations relating the empirical network to the theoretical control model, as developed in Chapter II.

RATIONALIZING THE STRUCTURE OF THE INTERLAKE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

In Chapter II, an "ideal" Management System, containing five (information) control sub-systems, is described.⁸⁴ It is suggested there that a qualitative, descriptive analysis of a management network might be evaluated

⁸³Hickling-Johnson, op. cit., pages 86-89.

⁸⁴Chapter II, Section IV.

by two criteria:

1. Are the organizations in the network structurally rational, as measured by their divergence from the ideal control model; and
2. Are the inter-organizational connectives properly structured and functioning, such that they provide sufficient information for on-going organizational adaptation to a changing environment.

An assessment of the structural rationality of the organization in the Interlake Management System will of necessity be impressionistic and qualitative, since this study does not lend itself to precision of measurement. There are two phases involved in analyzing this organizational rationality. Firstly, consideration must be given to the extent to which the control functions of the ideal model exist in the empirical setting. Secondly, attention must be given to the way in which the functions are performed. That is, the activity of an entire organization must be analyzed to define the nodes or nodes performing the control functions. Moreover, the existence of a hierarchical pattern, for the control functions in the model, precludes the rational existence of multi-functional nodes, unless such nodes' internal structures parallel the hierarchy of the functions they perform, and there are no other nodes performing those functions.

In the Maker Organization of the Implementation Network, Agency Control (sub-system 1) is performed by General Counsellors and Field Agents, although the Administration has some involvement in this function through the provision of the information dissemination program. Integral Control (sub-system 2) is carried out by HURDAC, with some involvement by the Administration. The function of Internal Homeostasis (sub-system 3) involves the activity of two nodes:

1. The Manpower Corps Directorate, for Manpower Programs; and

2. The Administration, for all other programs.

External Homeostasis (sub-system 4) is the responsibility of a number of nodes including the Administration, the Federal-Provincial Joint Advisory Board and the Ministers. Finally, Planning and Foresight (sub-system 5) is provided by the Planning, Budgeting and Management Committees and staffs of both Federal and Provincial Cabinets, as well as by the Cabinets and Legislatures per se.

In order to provide a complete picture of the Management Network, a similar matching of control functions and nodes can be done for the Addressee Organization. This also will provide a basis for inter-organizational comparison. Agency Control is performed by individual and/or groups of clients in the Addressee Organization, where the goods and services of the organization are defined as expressions of its human interests and needs. While one might expect Integral Control to be the function of local groups, it is also performed by the Area Development Boards in their organization of local concerns and priorities. Similarly, the Regional Development Board is used to integrate the concerns of a geographically broader set of persons. While the latter activity of the Regional Development Board might be considered as Internal Homeostasis, it cannot be classified by that term because policy in this organization flows largely in a horizontal and/or upward (vertical) direction. Given that much of the existent organization-environment balance, External Homeostasis, is imposed upon the Addressee Organization, and given that there is a lack of sub-system 5 control in this organization, it can be seen that all of the Executive System functions (sub-systems 3 to 5) are weakly defined or non-existent in the Implementation state of the Addressee Organization.⁸⁵

⁸⁵ These comments and all other comments in this section refer to the Stage III network as depicted in Figure 4.10. The problems identified in

In terms of the criteria of rationality, a conclusive impression is that the Maker Organization is structurally more sound than the Addressee Organization. However, this does not mean that the Maker Organization is highly rational. Its primary weaknesses occur at the lower functional levels and can be identified with respect to both gaps and overlaps in the performance of those functions. An example of a gap in function is evidenced by the jurisdictional limitations on the Manpower Corps Directorate and/or the lack of operational authority delegated to HURDAC. Overlays can best be identified by considering the multi-functional role of the Administration, in light of the existence of intervening nodes in the organizational hierarchy. A secondary weakness in the structure of the Maker Organization involves the senior-functional levels. Due to excess demands on its time, as a result of an increased need for its involvement in Planning and Foresight, the Administration must abdicate its responsibility for Internal Homeostasis. As an unintended consequence of this abdication, however, sub-system 3 representation is for the most part excluded from the Maker Organization's executive sub-system.

The most obvious weaknesses in the Addressee Organization are at its senior levels of hierarchical functioning. However, even its lower order functions are not performed very well. For example, the extremely low degree of perceived representation of "local citizens" on the Area Development Board limits the amount of integrating activity that can occur in the reverse direction, i.e. from the Area Boards to individuals and groups of the Interlake clientele. Similarly, the weakness of the channel bearing inputs at the agency level, from Field Agents and/or General Counsellors to individual clients, results in relatively uncontrolled and undirected

the Addressee Organization would become even more exaggerated, had the reference included the Regional Development Corporations (as in Figure 4.12).

outputs being released by clients and consequently, reduces the potential strength of needs-interest delivery to the Maker Organization.

The second evaluative criterion of the Management Network relates to the structure and functioning of inter-organizational connectives. Under ideal circumstances there will be only two connectives between the two organizations. One of these will be at the level of Agency Control (sub-system 1), while the other will be at the level of External Homeostasis (sub-system 4). The flows of information along these channels would be highly valuable to the adaptive processes of both organizations, because the end-point nodes of these channels perform equivalent functions in their respective organizations. The only factor of impedence which might arise concerns the mode of message transmission, i.e. a communicative code that is comprehensible to both end-points must be employed.

The large number of inter-organizational connectives in the Implementation Management Network (Figure 4.10), and their criss-cross pattern with respect to the control functions of their end-points, suggest that the Interlake System does not closely approximate ideal conditions. An obvious flaw relates to the comparative pattern of concentration of strengths and weaknesses in the two organizations. That is, the Maker Organization is strongest at the executive level (sub-systems 3 to 5), while the Addressee Organization performs best at the operational levels (sub-systems 1 and 2). Thus, the blockage of communication transmitted from the lower levels of the Addressee Organization results in its re-routing along inter-organizational connectives at higher levels. Conversely, the apparent or perceived absence of higher order receptors in the Addressee Organization results in a minimum transmission from the Ministerial node of the Maker Organization.

A second divergence from the ideal setting involves the inter-connect-

ives between organizational nodes, where at least one of these nodes has no authority for external relations. For example, there is no rational justification for the existence of an inter-connective between the Area Development Boards and either HURDAC or the Administration, although the former relation is at least between two functionally equivalent nodes. The explanation of such irrational linkages can be found in the existence of consciously designed, multi-functional nodes in the Maker Organization.

Criticisms, such as those presented above, necessitate the presentation of revisions in the organizational design of the Management Network. To help simplify the presentation of recommendations, suggested alterations will be discussed firstly for the Maker Organization, secondly for the Addressee Organization and thirdly for the interface area of these organizations. Of necessity, these organizational alternatives will be classified according to the hierarchical functions specified in the ideal control model, and moreover, will involve considerations of changes in general approach, as compared to the details of their operational implementation.

In the Maker Organization, sub-system 1 of the control network is operating adequately and requires no changes as identified by this analysis. However, it must be remembered that horizontally, the ideal model illustrates only input channels for Agency Control. Thus, the weaknesses of outward directed connectives will be considered under the analysis of sub-system 1 in the Addressee Organization.

Sub-system 2 in the Maker Organization also appears to be functioning well, although two obvious recommendations can be made for improving Integral Control. Firstly, HURDAC, its representative membership and behavioural functions, must be formally authorized within the (inter- and intra-jurisdictional) governmental bureaucracies. Secondly, that power of

integrative control currently held by other nodes, specifically the Administration, should be removed and/or delegated to HURDAC.

In addition to removing integrating functions from the Administration, direct program delivery (information dissemination), planning and foresight functions and marketing functions might more rationally be the responsibilities of Field Agents and General Counsellors, Committees of Cabinet and their staffs, and the relevant Ministers, respectively. In the absence of the activities cited above, the Administration can focus its attention entirely on the functions of sub-system 3. That is, the Administration, as a mixed group of Federal and Provincial civil servants, can direct itself toward the achievement of balance among the programs actually or potentially offered in the region by Federal and/or Provincial line departments, i.e. Internal Homeostasis. This can be achieved by assuring both that such programs are delivered effectively with respect to the attainment of their objectives, and that the program decisions of all Federal and Provincial departments involved in the Interlake are consistent in terms of their strategic goals and operational interpretation as projects and activities. Thus, the Administration would perform a function paralleling that of the Manpower Corps Directorate, but with legitimate, inter-departmental and inter-jurisdictional, powers in all program areas.

One alteration to the functioning of sub-system 4 has already been mentioned above. That is, the responsibility for the Marketing of the Maker Organization, as it relates to the Interlake, must be actively performed, rather than passively abdicated by the relevant Ministers. Operationally, this means that the Minister, and his senior support staff must be aware of the broad nature and implications of the particular development policy herein under consideration. Moreover, they must be willing and able

to communicate this information to the representatives of the Addressee Organization with whom they relate, i.e. the inter-organizational connectives at the Ministerial level must carry meaningful messages in both inward and outward directions. Such a recommendation implicitly requires that the Federal Minister of the D.R.E.E. become more actively involved in the implementation of the Development Plan.

The second aspect of External Homeostasis, financing, is not feasible for this policy situation. One reason for its lack of usefulness is that the current system of government, of which the Maker Organization is empirically composed, collects revenues and disburses them by means of a general revenue, distributive mechanism. That is, revenues collected are not designated for specific or necessarily related expenditures, and in any event, government expenditures are not made or justified solely on the basis of user benefits received. Therefore, financing⁸⁶ will realistically be the responsibility of a higher order node, with funds "trickling down" to sub-system 4, and the inter-organizational, "support" connective, as perceived from the Maker Organization, will continue to cross several levels (channel 6, Figure 4.10).

Finally, a change is required in sub-system 5. Given the re-structuring of the role of the Administration, it is not necessary to maintain a direct linkage between it and those nodes performing the functions of Planning and Foresight. That is, there would seem to be no rational justification for the positional influence of the Administration, which is currently legitimized by its incumbents' occupation of roles in the Plan-

⁸⁶ It would of course be illogical to attempt to finance regional development programs entirely from within a disparate region, unless of course one expects to create massive economies of scale in aggregation of administration at the regional level. Such an expectation is contradicted by an analysis of the effectiveness of the Regional Incentives Program of the D.R.E.E., in Policy Research and Planning Branch, Department of Indus-

ning and Priorities Committee of Cabinet Secretariat. Once this change is made, Interlake related expenditures can be considered within the broader public service allocational framework of the entire province. In this way, a clearer understanding can be gained of the "real" commitment of the Provincial Government to the development of this disparate sub-region where "real" is a measure of allocated resources which are net of normal program expenditures in that or other sub-regions of the province.

If the development of a particular sub-region, such as the Interlake is a high priority program for both the Federal and Provincial governments, it would be more rational, organizationally, to create special purpose, problem-oriented bodies, such as Ministries, for a pre-determined time period, to be responsible for Interlake Development in each of the government bureaucracies.⁸⁷ The Ministers of Interlake Development would be responsible for sub-system 4 functions, and would be complimented by an Administration, with a "vested interest" only to develop a particular sub-region. The Administration would then perform all, but only those functions related to Internal Homeostasis.⁸⁸

While the deficiencies apparent in the Maker Organization are largely operational, relating to the performance of certain lower order functions, those problems observed in the Addressee Organization involve both the absence of nodes responsible for higher order functions and the operational weaknesses of existent lower order nodes. Sub-system 1 functioning in the

try and Commerce, The D.R.E.E. Regional Incentives Program and Its Impact Upon Manitoba, September, 1971, a confidential report used as part of an evaluation of the Department of Industry and Commerce, pages 6-15.

⁸⁷The distinction between "departments" (long-term, functional organization) and "Ministries" (short-term, client or problem oriented) is drawn by Walter Stewart, op. cit., page 48.

⁸⁸This recommendation to provide considerable political power and influence behind programs, but to insulate administrators from external financing pressures, parallels the first of five determinants of successful

Interlake Addressee Organization has not been explicitly analyzed in this study. Such an analysis would require an investigation of the relative ability of Interlake clientele, as compared to some control group, to identify and express individual or group needs, desires and interests. It is apparent, however, as implicated by the General Counsellor Program under the Development Plan, that there is concern on the part of some government officials as to the abilities of Interlakers in these matters. Similarly, the study of on-going relationships between individuals in the region (or specific areas) and interest or service groups is beyond the scope of this study, although it is important as a tactical consideration in the re-structuring of the Addressee Organization. This study has treated sub-system 1 nodes as a black-box, identifying only that the basic function of these nodes is the expenditure of human energy in productive forms of activity, where "productive activity" is broadly defined as encompassing all attempts to satisfy needs, interests or desires (or to respond to a stimulus cue).

The primary purpose of sub-system 2 is to prioritize the multitude of human activity which is sequenced by energy, time and space constraints in sub-system 1. To achieve integral control, and to protect the right of individual and group activities, some form of representative, local government must emerge. The reference of representativeness in such government systems, in Canada, is the individual citizen, regardless of his group affiliations, if any. Such a system assumes that the principle "one man - one vote" will guarantee a single and equal (direct) influence, by every citizen, on an electoral decision. Presumably, group attitudes will be

development plan implementation identified in Gayl D. Ness, "Planning and Implementation: Paradoxes in Rural Development" in G. D. Ness (ed.), The Sociology of Economic Development (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pages 579, 584, 590.

expressed (indirectly) through the ballots of individuals. Alternatively, the direct involvement of groups, as occurs in some Interlake Areas, can help to increase the sensitivity of the local government to "active" elements in the community, and can also provide a means by which the pattern of individual "productive activity" can be influenced by the decisions of a higher order, integrating entity.

In any event, the basis of representativeness in a local government system is clearly only a question of means and not ends. That is, the broader goal which must be considered is the creation of a node performing the sub-system 2 control function. In the Interlake there are at least two entities involved in such activities, the Municipal Governments and the Area Development Boards, although neither seems to have a particularly broad research base nor a very strong reciprocal relationship with its constituents. What is apparently necessary is a form of Area Development Council⁸⁹ which is designed to be active in the identification and prioritization of all local needs and interests, as well as in the co-ordination and integration of activities related to those needs and interests. In the event that no activity is organized around a potentially or actually important local interest, the Area Development Council must be able to act either as a catalyst, to encourage the production of such desirable activity, or as an actual initiator of that activity.

While there are a number of Areas in the Interlake, each with a potentially different mix of desires and constraints, the roles portrayed by the various Area Councils will be functionally equivalent. To ensure a regional balance among these area-based councils, internal homeostasis

⁸⁹The term "Council" is used because it denotes an entity of democratic responsibility and representativeness, as contrasted to the term "Board" which bears a sub-ordinacy connotation vis-à-vis an elected (senior) government.

within a geographically defined organization, another mechanism is required. This node might be referred to as the Regional Development Council, and could be patterned after the defunct Regional Development Board. The primary function of the new node would be to co-ordinate and integrate Area Council activities subsequent to an evaluation of those activities on the basis of criteria related to both regional and provincial resources, needs and desirability criteria.

In addition to its responsibility for sub-system 3 control functions, the Regional Development Council might also be called upon to perform those activities encompassed by External Homeostasis and Foresight and Planning. That is, the Regional Council would be a multi-functional executive sub-system for the Addressee Organization. A special Finance Committee might be delegated responsibility for the sub-system 4 control functions of (high-level) marketing and finance. It would therefore be through this committee that inter-organizational exchanges would occur. Similarly, a special Policy Committee would be formed (elected, designated, appointed) to carry out those activities encompassed by Foresight and Planning functions. Such activities would include the identification of alternatives, and the selection of the most desirable courses of action for regional development, within the constraints of actually and potentially available resources and the desires and expectations of lower order components. Moreover, the development strategies referred to above would provide the framework for establishing the evaluative criteria necessary for the performance of sub-system 3 functions.

Having considered some structural changes which would serve to rationalize the independent, internal functioning of both the Maker and Addressee Organizations, this study can now direct its attention to the area of or-

ganizational inter-face, i.e. the analysis of inter-organizational connectives. There will be two inter-connectives between these organizations -- one having sub-system 1 nodes as its end-points, the other having sub-system 4 nodes. Specifically, the lower-order linkage will inter-relate Interlake Clientele and Field Agents, while the higher order one will join the Finance Committee (of the Regional Development Council) to the Ministers responsible for Interlake Development. While the "products" to be exchanged through these nodes have been discussed in the section above, structural changes to permit, enhance or ensure the flow of these items have not been considered.⁹⁰

With respect to the lower order inter-connective, it is apparent that Field Agents must not only take responsibility for the delivery of Maker Organization outputs to clients, but must also portray an activist or "search initiator" role in terms of the receipt of outputs from the Addressee Organization. That is, in order to receive the information on client needs desires and interests which are generated by individuals and groups within the Addressee Organization, the Field Agents must not only ensure the existence of an inter-organizational connective at the sub-system 1 level, but must also take responsibility for initiating and monitoring feedback flows. Operationally, this might necessitate the creation of roles, in the government bureaucracy, paralleling those of the client-oriented General Counsellors, or it may involve implementing special research programs designed to identify and interpret local citizen wants.⁹¹

⁹⁰ It must be remembered that the outputs flowing from each organization are the products of the behavioural inter-actions of the entire system, and not any single and/or isolated node or level within the organization.

⁹¹ Such research is currently being carried out by the Manitoba Department of Industry and Commerce's Regional Analysis Program, for all of Southern Manitoba (excluding Winnipeg). Citizens' needs and interests

Of course, both of these alternatives are intended as complements of, and not supplements for, the day-to-day information search activities of Field Agents.

The only structural change required at the higher level, inter-organizational linkage is the removal of the Citizen Advisory Board transparency. That is, given the structural adjustments recommended for each organization, effective exchange of information occurs between sub-system 4 nodular end-points that are perceived to be equivalent. Operationally, this might mean that funds for the Addressee Organization would be derived through the budget of the Minister for Interlake Development, which would ensure at least a minimum information flow to the Minister. Again, paralleling the initiation role of lower-level government bureaucrats, Ministers would have to take the responsibility for search activities related to sub-system 4 outputs of the Addressee Organization.

Figure 4.13 presents a diagrammatic sketch of the structure of a rationalized Interlake Management System. The objective of developing this adjusted, inter-organizational network was to ensure that each organization could adapt to its primary environment, or changes in that environment. However, adaptive processing must be premised upon reliable information concerning the past, present and (probable) future states of both the organization per se and its environment. The rationalization process ensures the existence of nodes to perform the five control functions in each organization, as well as ensuring that inter-connections exist to both necessary and relevant sources of inputs and sinks for outputs -- whether these sources and sinks are internally or externally related to

have been reported and summarized in Regional Development Branch, Department of Industry and Commerce, Community Committee Reports (Summaries): Regional Analysis Program (Department of Industry and Commerce: Winnipeg, 1972).




FIGURE 4.13 A RATIONALIZED ORGANIZATION OF THE INTERLAKE MANAGEMENT NETWORK

the organization. Of course, while the operational monitoring of the performance of the Network is not beyond the analytic bounds of the model, it is beyond the scope of this study.

CHAPTER V

FURTHER OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

In the previous chapter, the Management System related to the Interlake Plan was empirically specified for three time-stages. For each specification, an analysis was done which implicitly fitted the Interlake Management System to an ideal standard, by super-imposing the abstract Management System model (developed in Chapter II) onto the empirical system. A qualitative assessment (observation) was then made of the Interlake Management System's operational performance, for each stage, and on the basis of those assessments conclusions were drawn respecting both the rationality of structural changes which actually occurred among stages and the potential changes which could occur to rationalize the empirical system, i.e. reduce the gap between the "real" and "ideal" Management Systems. The purpose of this section is to explain the application of criteria used to assess the Interlake Management System, and to indicate a ranking of the performance of that particular system for each criterion. The result of this exercise will be the provision of a "checklist" for use in the evaluation of other empirical Management Systems. Also, the ranking of the Interlake System's performance, by each criterion, will serve to illustrate how a numerical scale can be applied in Management System Analysis.¹

¹It should be noted that the passage does not claim to have "quanti-

THE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST

Table 5.1 illustrates a score-sheet for use in evaluating Management Systems. The particular set of relational patterns among entities to be evaluated occupy the columns. Thus, the checklist indicates that the performance of two organizations (Maker, Addressee) is to be evaluated in three time-stages (Pre-Plan, Plan, Implementation). Occupying the rows of the checklist are the performance assessment criteria. These criteria are derived directly from the ideal or "standard" model of a Management System as conceptually developed in Chapter II.² The "Standard Management System" contains five hierarchically related (control) sub-systems, in two related policy organizations, which will be used as the basic set of criteria for assessing empirical management systems. Associated with each of the five sub-systems are one or more relational linkages, which also will be employed as (supplementary) evaluation criteria.³

The method of applying these criteria encompasses three steps, the first of which is "identification". This step involves identifying whether or not a proxy of a particular criterion exists in the empirical Management System. If no empirical proxy exists for a standard model variable, a zero (0) will be found beside that variable in the checklist; otherwise it will be marked with a plus (+).

fied" Management System Analysis. In fact, the passage has been phrased in a particular way, such that it avoids arguments regarding the relative merits of quantification and qualification. This writer shares the opinion that "...both quality and quantity are misconceived when they are taken to be antithetical or even alternative. Quantities are of qualities, and a measured quality has just the magnitude expressed in its measure.... Predicates not assigned in terms of an (extensive) scale....specify qualities; when an appropriate scale has been introduced, we identify their referents as quantities." Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioural Science (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1964), page 207.

²See Chapter II, pages 37-50.

³Sub-systems and linkages are associated by a simple, mechanical input-

TABLE 5.1

THE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST

CRITERIA/ORGANIZATION	S T A G E					
	I		II		III	
	MAKER	ADDRESSEE	MAKER	ADDRESSEE	MAKER	ADDRESSEE
1) AGENCY CONTROL -horizontal linkage (in) -horizontal linkage (out)						
2) INTERNAL CONTROL -vertical linkage (in) -vertical linkage (out)						
3) INTERNAL HOMEOSTASIS -vertical linkage (in) -vertical linkage (out)						
4) EXTERNAL HOMEOSTASIS -horizontal linkage (in) -horizontal linkage (out) -vertical linkage (in) -vertical linkage (out)						
5) FORESIGHT -vertical linkage (in) -vertical linkage (out)						

The second step in applying the criteria might be termed "qualification", since this step involves assessing the quality of the empirical proxy vis-à-vis the role prescribed for that variable in the Standard Management System. That is, if the proxy variable from the empirical model, such as a particular linkage, has both the "correct" character (performs the right roles) and relational (has appropriate end-points or hierarchical placement) properties, it will be termed "structurally accurate" and a plus (+) will be placed beside that standard model variable in the checklist. Similarly, if the proxy is structurally inaccurate, a minus (-) will be placed in the checklist.

The third step in applying the criteria involves "rating" the operational performance of each variable. For this study, the performance ratings indicate judgemental valuations of the relative gap between the standard and empirical models (for each criterion). The ratings are indicated by the placement of numerical symbols beside the standard model variables in the checklist.⁴ The greater (lesser) the number for any par-

output relationship: linkages carry energetic resources into a sub-system's processes, where those resources are used and/or converted into a different form and subsequently, wastes and/or products are carried out by other linkages. Since the processes provide purpose for such sub-systems, they can be used as an organizing focus. Linkages are thus analyzed only as a sub-set of the sub-system processes. To simplify the analysis format, only those vertical linkages using a particular sub-system as an upper end-point will be studied as a sub-element of that sub-system.

⁴This scale of rating is an ordinal scale, since the assignment of one symbol set (a number symbol and a plus or minus symbol) indicates not only the performance of a particular variable with respect to its related standard variable, but also indicates the performance of that particular variable relative to the performance of other variables. Thus, a rating of (+ + 3) on criterion 1, and a rating of (+ + 1) on criterion 2 means that both are structurally accurate, that both demonstrate functional precision, but that the variable tested under criterion 1 more closely approximates prescribed functioning (as per its related standard variable) than does the variable tested by criterion 2.

This scale thus permits specification of "degrees", but not "amounts" of performance, i.e. it answers questions of more or less, but not now much. Kaplan, op.cit., pages 191-195.




FIGURE 5.1

A SUMMARY OF THE THREE-STEP PROCEDURE FOR ASSESSING MANAGEMENT SYSTEM VARIABLES

ticular variable, the more (less) "functionally precise" it is said to be, i.e. the greater (lesser) the numerical value of the symbol, the more (less) closely the empirical Management System is approximating the performance prescribed for it, under that criterion, by the Standard Management System.

The three steps described above, leading eventually to the "scoring" of a Management System, are intended to be chronologically dependent. That is, it must be possible to "identify" a variable before it can be "qualified", and preceding the "rating" of a variable's "functional precision" must be the "qualification" of its "structural accuracy". This three-step procedure is summarized in Figure 5.1.

As a final point, it can be noted that when applying the three-step procedure in the assessment of a Management System, the five sub-system (function) criteria must be tested first, both because the existence of linkages depends upon the presence of these functions and because the results of applying sub-system criteria are employed in step two (qualification) in the application of linkage criteria to the elements of the empirical system.

SCORING THE INTERLAKE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Table 5.2a indicates the scores for the Interlake Management System in each of its three stages, as determined through the application of the (five-sub-system function and twelve-linkage) Standard System criteria, by the three-step procedure described above. As mentioned before, this score-sheet provides a summary of, and useful complement to, the scripted description and observations presented in Chapter IV. In order to simplify an understanding of the relationship between Table 5.2a and the text of Chapter IV, the empirical elements, which are identified as uniquely or primarily

TABLE 5.2a

INTERLAKE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM SCORESHEET

CRITERIA/ORGANIZATION	S T A G E					
	I		II		III	
	MAKER	ADDRESSEE	MAKER	ADDRESSEE	MAKER	ADDRESSEE
1) AGENCY CONTROL	++ 4 (FA)	++ 2 (CY1)(CZ1)	++ 5 (FA)(GC)	++ 2 (CY1)(CZ1)	++ 5 (FA)(GC)	++ 2 (CY1)(CZ1)
-horizontal linkage (in)	++ 3	++ 1	++ 4	++ 5	++ 4	++ 3
-horizontal linkage (out)	++ 1	++ 3	++ 5	++ 4	++ 3	++ 4
2) INTERNAL CONTROL	++ 2 (D)	0	++ 2 (D)	++ 2 (ADB)	++ 4 (D)(HURDAC)	++ 3 (ADB)
-vertical linkage (in)	++ 2	0	++ 2	++ 1	++ 3	++ 3
-vertical linkage (out)	++ 2	0	++ 2	++ 2	++ 3	++ 1
3) INTERNAL HOMEOSTASIS	++ 3 (MDA)(CAB.)	0	++ 4 (FPJAB)(ADM.)	0	++ 5 (FPJAB)(ADM.)	++ 2 (RDB)
-vertical linkage (in)	++ 3	0	++ 4	0	++ 5 (MCD)	++ 3
-vertical linkage (out)	++ 3	0	++ 4	0	++ 4	++ 1
4) EXTERNAL HOMEOSTASIS	++ 1 (CAB.)	0	++ 1 (MDA)(MIN)	++ 2 (MCAB)	++ 2 (ADM.)(MIN)	++ 1 (RDB)(MCAB)
-horizontal linkage (in)	0	0	++ 2	0	++ 1	++ 1
-horizontal linkage (out)	0	0	0	++ 2	++ 1	++ 1
-vertical linkage (in)	++ 2	0	++ 4	0	++ 5	0
-vertical linkage (out)	++ 1	0	++ 4	0	++ 3	0
5) FORESIGHT	++ 3 (CAB.)	0	++ 4 (CAB.)	0	++ 4 (CA)(CAB.)	0
-vertical linkage (in)	0	0	++ 3	0	++ 4	0
-vertical linkage (out)	0	0	++ 4	0	++ 4	0

TABLE 5.2b

ABBREVIATIONS OF INTERLAKE SYSTEM ELEMENTS

MAKER ORGANIZATION ELEMENT ABBREVIATIONS

FA	- Federal and Provincial Government Departmental Field Agencies
D	- Federal and Provincial Government Departments
GC	- General Counsellors
MDA	- Manitoba Development Authority
CAB.	- Federal/Provincial Joint Advisory Board
ADM.	- Provincial Program Administrator and Federal Program Co-ordinator and Staffs
MIN	- Federal and Provincial Ministers Responsible for the Interlake Plan
HURDAC	- Human Resources Development Action Committee
MCD	- Manpower Corps Directorate
CA	- Central Agencies such as Treasury Board, Management Committee, P.P.C.C., and their staffs

ADDRESSEE ORGANIZATION ELEMENT ABBREVIATIONS

CYi	- Interlake Clientele: individual citizens
Czi	- Interlake Clientele: organized groups
ADB	- Area Development Board
RDB	- Regional Development Board
MCAB	- Ministers Citizen Advisory Board

portraying a particular (functional) role, have been bracketed and inserted into the table. For example, beside criterion 1 (Agency Control) and under Stage I: Maker Organization, is the scoring "(FA) ++ 4". This score is interpreted as follows:

1. (FA) refers to Federal and Provincial Government Departmental 'Field Agencies' (see Table 5.2b);
2. The first plus (+) means that an element or elements in the Stage I Maker Organization can be "identified" as performers of Agency Control, those elements being the Field Agencies;
3. The second plus (+) means that the Field Agencies occupy the correct hierarchical position in the Maker Organization to provide Agency Control, and that their roles are not, for the most part, inconsistent with the characteristics of that criterion; and
4. The numerical symbol four (4) means in absolute terms that the roles actually played by Field Agencies and those prescribed under the Agency Control Criterion do not show a large amount of divergence. In relative terms, the score of four is a high one (since the highest score in the checklist is five), which means that alterations in the roles performed by Field Agencies need not be of a high priority.

By analyzing all of the scores in Table 5.2, some general conclusions can be drawn about the performance of the Interlake Management System. For example, the scores indicate the superiority, in both structure and performance, of the Maker Organization in all three stages. Moreover, the Maker Organization achieves improvement in its operational performance,

according to assessment by all five process criteria, over time. The Addressee Organization, on the other hand, demonstrates a very different type of performance improvement over time. Its improvements are largely structural, achieved through the creation of elements to perform four of the five (sub-system) criteria in Stage III, as compared to the one sub-system that exists in Stage I.

The Stage III scores in Table 5.2 also help to illustrate those elements or roles requiring most immediate attention. Thus, it is apparent that the Maker Organization is weakest in its performance of External Homeostasis (criterion 4). A quick perusal of the Stage III column reveals that the problem is not primarily internal to the Organization, but rather is related to a weakness in the operation of the horizontal or inter-system linkages at this level. This problem is in turn derived from the weakness of the performance of Executive Functions (criteria 3 to 5), and is accentuated by the absence of Foresight (criterion 5) in the Stage III Addressee Organization. The solution, of course, involves the establishment of an element or elements to perform the functions of Foresight in the Addressee Organization. Since the establishment of such an element would logically lead to improvement in the operations of all higher order Addressee elements, the second priority area for change in the Addressee Organization would involve improvements in the operations of those elements performing Agency Control (criterion 1) functions. Moreover, at this point, it is not difficult to contend that the higher order weaknesses in the Stage III Addressee Organization are positively related to the "central control information system", rotating about the Provincial Administrator, that is observed in Chapter IV.⁵ Similarly, the changes recommended here in the

⁵See Chapter IV, pages 143-150 , and Figure 4.11.

Stage III Interlake Management System are merely a summary of the more detailed proposal presented in the final section of the previous chapter.⁶

SUMMARY, LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS

One of the primary objectives of this study is to develop an empirical model or technique which can be used to systematize the analysis of intelligence (and innovation) issues in policy decision processes. Once this objective was satisfied, theoretically, by the structuring of an "ideal" Management System model, that model was used as a standard or criterion for assessing the performance of the Interlake Management System in dealing with intelligence issues. The evaluation of the Interlake Management System involved four phases:

1. a description, substantiated by personal interviews, of the structure and inter-actions within and between the two policy organizations (Maker and Addressee) in the Interlake Management System, for three time-stages (Pre-Plan, Plan, Implementation);
2. an identification and analysis of the changes, over time, occurring in Management System relations;
3. an assessment of the Interlake System by criteria derived from the ideal or standard Management System; and
4. a specification of several alterations which would serve to rationalize the Stage III Interlake Management System.

In addition to indicating the need for specific alterations in the Interlake Management System, as described in Chapter IV, this study also emphasizes the necessity of a rational organizational design for the implementation of a Regional Development Plan. In the absence of a rational

⁶See Chapter IV, pages 161 - 171, and Figure 4.13.

design, it is apparent that insufficient, incomplete or redundant information is transported to decision nodes in each of the Interlake System's Policy Organizations. Instead of providing decision-makers, at the various levels of a functional hierarchy, with the ability either to select an alternative from a bounded set and/or to open a set of available alternatives,⁷ an irrational organizational design results in illegitimate centralization at nodes where informational resources are concentrated. For example, the large number of channels and flows of information directed at the Provincial Administration node result in the potential for, and exercise of, unwarranted influence by that node over the decisions of other nodes which have different functional responsibilities. This has a serious negative influence on the higher-order, structural development of the Addressee Organization.

The rationalizing of organizational design, which in part involves the removal of "random", and the creation of required nodes and linkages takes on increased significance when it is realized that proper information is a limited organizational resource. When the source of that resource is external to an organization, and when the organization has limited direct influence over that source, it is essential that the organization ensure the long-run availability of information by not under-estimating, and subsequently frustrating the short-run contribution of the source to the organization's functioning. This is precisely the relationship that exists between the Maker Organization and its citizen clients -- if current client

⁷"'Information' provides the 'reciever' with the ability to select from a bounded repertory or ensemble. Complete 'information' involves just enough coded instruction to select an item uniquely and unambiguously. Redundant 'information' implies instructions that are surplus, or unnecessary for unique determination." R. L. Meier, A Communications Theory of Urban Growth (The M.I.T. Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1967), page 125.

efforts to make a meaningful (and warranted) input to the Maker Organization's decision processes are frustrated, the result will be a reduction in the likelihood of such information being available, when it is required at a future time. That is, while it may be expedient (and facilitate short-run decision-making) for a government to avoid citizen opinion or select only that which does not conflict with current policy, programs or projects, such actions will tend to be counter-productive or destructive to the policy system, in the long-run. Since the essence of adequate performance by an organization, on issues of intelligence, is related to the organization's ability to (structurally) adapt to environmental changes, the importance of accurate information emanating from external sources cannot be minimized.

In addition to those organizational implications specified in Chapter IV, this study has relevance in other policy matters. For example, the analytic technique, premised on an (information) control model and two policy organizations (the Maker and Addressee), can be generalized for use in the evaluation and rationalization of Management Systems involved in the implementation of other Regional Development Plans. This can be done by simply repeating the process of operational dimension description, analysis and assessment discussed above.

More important, however, is the abstracted basis of this analysis, which permits the technique (or model) to be applied in any policy setting where the handling of intelligence issues requires assessment. For example, there are currently strong demands being expressed for increasing the influence of "citizens" in decision-making about urban problems⁸ and resource

⁸This is one of the principles that underlay the re-organization of local government for the City of Winnipeg; also see B. E. Hawkins, Politics and Urban Policies (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1971); D. M. Connor, "From Partisans to Partners", Community Planning Review,

planning,⁹ as well as demands for an unravelling of the "administrative maze"¹⁰ which inhibits such citizen participation. These concerns about the "role of citizens" in decision processes must be understood within a framework which permits classification and analysis of all of the variables, their characteristics and inter-relations, that are involved in an active policy system. Otherwise, the role of policy clients in decision processes is not understood, and the weaknesses ascribed to development programs whose raison d'etre is "social animation" may apply.¹¹ This study provides the necessary framework for classification and analysis.

While some of the problems identified at the outset of this study have not been resolved, the study has achieved its primary objectives. Firstly, it has synthesized relevant concepts, methods and methodologies from several behavioural and social science disciplines in order to create an evaluative technique for intelligence (and innovation) issues in public policy decision processes. Secondly, the study provides a detailed description, over three time stages, of the Interlake Management System, i.e. the experiential model for the implementation of the Interlake Plan. Thirdly, there is an empirical assessment made of the performance of the Interlake Management System, which includes recommendations for structural alterations which would serve to rationalize that System.

It is therefore possible to conclude that a framework has been de-

Volume 22, No. 1, pages 15-18.

⁹ Five case studies of public involvement in the planning process are discussed in Section 3 of W. R. D. Sewell and I. Burton (eds.), Perceptions and Attitudes in Resource Management (Ottawa: Policy and Research Co-ordination Branch, Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, 1971), pages 91-132.

¹⁰ Claude Langlois, "Today? Tomorrow?", Community Planning Review, Volume 22, No. 2, page 2; see also D. M. Connor, "Constructive Citizen Participation", Community Planning Review, Volume 22, No. 1, pages 19-22.

¹¹ Ian Adams, The Poverty Wall (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1970), pages 149-150.

veloped which:

1. specifically serves to replace conjectures, regarding the appropriate role of particular participants (e.g. citizens, politicians, bureaucrats) in the implementation of policy, with systematic analysis; and
2. generally aids in the understanding, analysis and assessment of (two) important policy decision issues.

When applied to the Management System for the implementation of the Interlake Plan, that framework demonstrates that:

1. both the Maker and Addressee Organizations function better in the Interlake System (Stage III network) than in "normal" policy management systems (Stage I network); and
2. both the Maker and Addressee Organizations in the Interlake System can achieve a more rational state than their present one (Stage III), with priority emphasis in change required at the higher order levels of the Addressee Organization.

As one attempt in a problem area that is not well-defined, the evaluative technique developed in this study and its application to the Interlake Development Plan are not without problems. That is, some of the major conclusions of this study relate directly to its limitations and their implications for further research.

A first limitation of the study is that its assessments of the Interlake Management System are based largely upon qualitative, structural analyses. Observations and conclusions cannot be precisely drawn in qualitative terms, and in any event, this study's observations and conclusions relate largely to relational patterns, and not behavioural inter-actions, among management system entities. Therefore, it would be desirable to ex-

tend both analytic and evaluative quantification in the techniques application. Analytically, subsequent to the specification of the empirical elements of an existent Management System, it would be valuable to measure (with more precision) both the role performance at nodes and the flows along linkages. With respect to evaluative quantification, the findings of a study such as this could be stated more reliably if a paradigm could be developed which permitted less subjective criteria application and, hence, more objective performance ratings.

A second limitation of this study emerges from the combining, in Chapter I, of intelligence and innovation issues, under a broad operational definition of intelligence. Actually, these two decision issues are quite unique, where "innovation" refers to the introduction of new problem-solving techniques (in an organization) and "intelligence" relates to organizational problem-solving in a changing or novel environment. It would therefore be desirable if each decision function could be analyzed by a separate technique. Moreover, there not only exists a need to develop a new technique which is better suited to one type of decision issue being analyzed (innovation), but there is also a need to empirically test and refine the technique applied in this study to the other type of decision issue (intelligence).

A third limitation of the study emerges from its focus on the "implementation" phase of a policy process. Although the study does not consider both the "pre-Plan" elements of the Management System and the re-planning activities during the implementation phase, time limitations prevent an adequate assessment of "intelligence" in the formative stages (problem identification) of the Plan.

A final limitation is that the data for the study are "soft", drawn

from a subjective base. The data may therefore be subject not only to normal errors of commission, such as biased reporting, but might also be incomplete due to errors of omission in such areas as source identification, questioning and others. It is difficult to control for this latter type of error in any meaningful way.

While the above list of limitations encompasses the major problems of the study, it is probably not complete. Such a list is never really complete. Its purpose is served, however, if it performs two functions. The first is to ensure that the reader has some indication of the writer's biases and the study's most prominent weaknesses. The list's second function is to facilitate the identification of matters for further research.

Most of the limitations cited above result from the fact that this study is a preliminary foray into a subject area where little research has occurred. Moreover, the research effort of this study is constrained by the time factor and capacities of the writer. Given the apparent limitations of the study, it is not difficult to begin an identification of related topics which warrant further research.

Firstly, techniques which independently consider innovation and intelligence must be developed. To that end, this study's technique is best suited to the analysis of intelligence, provided that it is augmented by some form of rigorous behavioural analysis. A conceptualization of the central elements of innovation must also be developed, followed by an empirical application paralleling the procedure of this study. Secondly, evaluations of intelligence and innovation issues must be expanded to focus on policy processes in their entirety, rather than merely concentrating on one or another of the policy process phases (such as planning or implementation). Thirdly, in order to facilitate the understanding of evaluation

outcomes and to permit comparison among various management systems, attempts must be made to mathematically model and quantify management system relations.

While it is appropriate to enumerate limitations of a study and their research implications, some major benefits of the study should also be identified. For example, although the evaluation of the Interlake Management System is, of necessity, limited in scope (and little confidence can be placed in its specific outcome valuations), this study does provide both a means to assess management systems and a basis upon which to recommend and/or judge changes in them. Moreover, the development of the evaluation technique and its empirical application have substantial value as "learning" vehicles in dealing with, and organizing, a complex phenomenon such as the Interlake Management System. Finally, this study is a necessary first step in adding a new dimension to available evaluation tools -- tools designed to assist decision-makers in making sound judgements on policy issues.

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APPENDIX A

AN EXPLANATION OF THE AREA DEVELOPMENT BOARD INTERVIEWS

The purpose of this appendix is to provide a detailed description and explanation of the Area Development Board interviews. This involves providing the reader not only with a copy of the questions that each interview was intended to answer, but also with an elucidation of the purposes underlying these questions. Since the questions or topics encompassed by the interview format¹ emanated from a particular classification scheme for the activity of an Area Development Board, an explanation of the conceptual basis for the questions will precede the presentation of the interview format per se. It will be noted, however, that the interview format can be cross-referenced to the classification scheme, so that the information desired from each question can be considered in a broader perspective.

THE TOPICAL BASIS OF THE INTERVIEW FORMAT

An Area Development Board can be described in a "familiar" manner as one of a number of Interlake organizations.² The stated purpose of this

¹The term "format" is used, rather than "form", to strengthen the implication that the interviews were highly unstructured and did not involve the administration of a questionnaire.

²In Chapter III, it is argued that a "familiarity criteria" not be used to identify an entity as an organization. Since this argument is used only to avoid errors of omission when there is some doubt as to whether or not an entity is an organization, it is inappropriate in this instance.

particular organization is to provide a means by which local citizens can become involved in the planning and implementation of the F.R.E.D. Plan. Therefore, the activities of these Boards become important in terms of how the Boards relate to:

1. individual citizens;
2. single or multi-purpose interest groups (including government agencies and other Area Development Boards); and
3. development resources.

The study of these relationships is complicated by the fact that it involves inter-actions among more than one type of social group.³ Furthermore, these inter-actions occur in more than one geographic setting, i.e. ten areas in a region.

To simplify the analysis, field theory is used to dichotomize the elements of Area Development Board behaviour.⁴ The first behavioural element obtained in this manner concerns the Board as an organization and encompasses its background and resource input, given and emergent structure of role relationships, and potential output. Since the inclusion of an "experience" component is implied, the aggregation of these factors at any point in time will determine what March and Simon refer to as an internal

Moreover, Area Development Boards are called organizations by definition, and they might easily have been termed "organized small groups", "departments of the addressee system", and others.

³Human activity can be perceived at several levels of grouping, including the individual, small group and organization.

⁴Field theory analysis is organized on the basis of two entities:

- a) clusters, and
- b) field.

In this study, clusters of human activity are proxied by the "internal state", while the field in which the activity occurs is referred to as the "operational environment". An explanation of field theory and its application to human activity is provided in R. L. Meier, A Communications Theory of Urban Growth (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1962), pages 24-28.

state.⁵

The second element of Area Development Board activity concerns the context to which the organization relates, and within which its behaviour occurs. Although this element is termed "operational environment", it will be understood to include both unnoticed and noticed environmental stimuli. The relevant factors of an operational environment might be conceived as being both tangible and intangible. In the Interlake, the tangible factor includes both the given and potential resources of the region as well as its infra-structure, while the intangible one is composed of the role defined inter-actions among the various groups, individuals and organizations in that geographic setting.

In order to understand how or why an Area Development Board behaves, it is necessary to obtain information which permits the specification of its internal state and operational environment. While Area Development Board interviews are not the only source of information on these matters,⁶ they do provide the primary means by which local citizens' attitudes and experiences are imparted to this study. Moreover, the fact that the information sought in these interviews is largely subjective and perceptual means that a priori anticipation of relevant topics around which to organize data collection is extremely difficult. Thus, the specification of some topics occurs in the "field", as the interviews are in progress.

Given this evolutionary nature of the topical basis for Area Development Board interviews, it would seem impossible to construct a single

⁵The behaviour of an organism at any point in time is a function of its "internal state", which is composed of both the evoked and unevoked sets of past experience, interacting with its "environment", which is composed of unnoticed and noticed elements (stimuli). J. G. March and H. A. Simon, Organizations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958), pages 9-11.

⁶The background documents referred to are listed in Chapter III, footnotes 2 and 18.

questionnaire which would be applicable to all interviews. It is, however, reasonable to provide a summary which encompasses all of the topics for which information is gathered. This is done in Figure A.1. Since the basic topics from which a "perceived internal state" and a "perceived operational environment" can be induced are established early in the interviewing process, a loosely structured interview format is developed. Before presenting this format, a more detailed explanation of the information sought under the two elements of Area Development Board behaviour is necessitated.

Firstly, the internal state of an Area Development Board is conceived as having two types of input as defined by the geographic origin of the source of experience:

1. area input, and
2. regional input.

With respect to area input, attention is directed towards the background factors of individual Board members at both an individual and composite level. The focus at the individual level is on the type of person who becomes a member of the Board, how membership to the Board is achieved, and how representative Board members are of an Area's citizens. This type of information is necessary to gain an insight into probable types of emergent behaviour both within the Board and between the Board and the community. At the Board level, the concern is more prominently with the likelihood of, and/or the potential for, an Area Development Board to take action on any given issue. Hence the information sought at this level relates to the technical basis upon which, the constraints within which, and the motivational factors by which, the Board functions. A diagrammatic summary of Area input to the perceived internal state is provided in Figure A.2.




FIGURE A.1

A SUMMARY OF THE TOPICAL BASIS FOR THE COLLECTION OF DATA ON AREA DEVELOPMENT BOARD BEHAVIOUR




FIGURE A.2

A SUMMARY OF AREA INPUT TO THE PERCEIVED INTERNAL STATE

A second group of input, coming from beyond experiences in any single area, can be identified as a contributing factor to the internal state of a Board. The experiential information of such "regional input" is directed at the Board as a unit, rather than its individual members. The focus of attention here concentrates on two patterns of relationship. The first of these is the inter-action between the Area Development Board and those responsible for both the planning and implementation of policy. In order to "fit" the Board into a scheme of development policy decision-making, it is necessary to know what type of inter-action exists between it and both senior politicians and F.R.E.D. administrators. Moreover, where these relations are formalized, it is necessary to assess the effectiveness of communication channel usage, identify changes in these channels and relate them to the Board's attitude regarding its political and administrative influence. A similar type of analysis is also required with respect to the policy defined relationship between the Board and both organized groups and the general public in an Area community. Therefore, information on direct policy relations is intended to provide an understanding of the interface between those responsible for making and implementing regional policy and those who are the recipients of it, assuming the Area Development Board as an intervening organization.

Another dimension of regional input to a Board's experience is derived from the relations among the Boards themselves. Since geographic aggregation transforms the ten areas into a region, it is desirable to know whether or not a similar transformation occurs with respect to citizens' attitudes and perceptions regarding development. Therefore, attention is centered on information about inter-area organizational inter-action; the distinction of roles and the evolving relationships between Area Development Boards and

regional organizations; and the development of a regional perspective among citizens. A summary of all of the afore-mentioned components of regional input is presented in Figure A.3.

The second determinant or element of Area Board behaviour was previously termed "operational environment", and it is understood to contain both tangible and intangible factors. The major concern of this study, with respect to tangible factors in the operational environment, relates to existing resources and their potential role in regional development. It is important to note that the term "resource" is herein understood to include both human and natural forms. Since the stock of available resources in the Interlake is reasonably well documented,⁷ the additional information which is required relates to the usefulness of those resources as perceived by Area Development Boards. This perception includes assessing the affect of development strategies on the resource base, both in terms of its (resource base) current usage and its potential as a means to achieve socio-economic development goals. It is important, however, to qualify consideration of the achievement of such goals by reference to any changes in the basis upon which achievements are valued.

Figure A.4 provides a summary of the various factors contributing to an Area Development Board's perception of its material environment. Since the areas geographically aggregate to form a region, and since there exists a strong inter-dependency among the socio-economic activities in sub-regions, the information associated with Figure A.4 is concerned with regional resources. Moreover, it is intended to provide an understanding of development potential in terms of past, present and future expectations of resource availability and usage.

⁷ See C. F. Framingham, J. A. MacMillan and D. J. Sandell, The Interlake Fact (Winnipeg: Planning and Priorities Committee of Cabinet Secre-




FIGURE A.3

A SUMMARY OF REGIONAL INPUT TO THE PERCEIVED INTERNAL STATE




FIGURE A.4

A SUMMARY OF THE TANGIBLE FACTORS IN THE PERCEIVED OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The second factor in the specification of a perceived operational environment is an intangible one, which might best be termed "role relations." Role relations are understood to encompass the institutional network of a region, through which human needs are expressed and satisfied and around which human interests are organized. Role relations include more than the delineation of an institutional network. The term is a dynamic concept which also considers evolutionary trends in the inter-action patterns of social groups. Moreover, it has an evaluative component which seeks to determine the self-sufficiency of organizational functions with respect to the goal of regional development.

In addition to a description of community organizations as they are related by formalized patterns of behaviour, an institutional network can also be considered in terms of both sub-regional needs and conflicts. With respect to sub-regional needs, interest focusses on available mechanisms for both recognizing and coping with them. Alternatively, sub-regional conflict can be viewed from the process perspective of emerging competitive relations. Also, since the Interlake is the object of a comprehensive rural development plan, it is important to identify the role adopted by those responsible for that plan's administration in the regional institutional network.

The dynamic aspect of role relations is perceived through the prediction of roles and actors required to perform the functions necessary for Interlake development. Moreover, changes over time in the behavioural relationships within the region can be considered specifically in terms of the participants of the F.R.E.D. Plan, or generally in terms of factors stabilizing or disrupting existing role relations.




FIGURE A.5

A SUMMARY OF ROLE RELATIONS IN THE PERCEIVED OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

It is important to know firstly whether these changes in role relations are useful in sustaining regional development, and secondly, whether they are related to and/or reliant upon F.R.E.D. supported agencies. Such information is valuable in the assessment of current and potential organizational self-sufficiency in the region. "Self-sufficiency" is used here to refer to the ability of the institutional network of a region to identify and prioritize a multiplicity of citizens' needs, and then organize purposeful action around them. Figure A.5 provides a diagrammatic summary of the informational components of role relations in the perceived operational environment.

THE AREA DEVELOPMENT BOARD INTERVIEW FORMAT

Having summarized the topics involved in the Area Development Board interviews in Figures A.2 to A.4, and having related them to the determination of Area Development Board behaviour in Figure A.1, it is now possible to present the interview format itself. It should be noted that the numbers of the questions in the format can be cross-referenced directly to the numbers of the topics and their components as summarized in Figures A.1 to A.5.

I. AREA INPUT: BACKGROUND FACTORS AT AN INDIVIDUAL LEVEL

- A. Describe the process by which a person becomes a member of the Area Development Board.
- B. Do board members generally belong to any particular social class or group, as defined by income, occupation, interest, ethnic origin and others?
- C. Are the abilities and/or qualifications of those who become

Board members known throughout the area or only in particular segments of it?

- D. (1) To what extent does the general, non-affiliated local citizen become involved in Board activity, and would a different level of activity be more or less desirable?
- (2) How do Board members view the representative aspects of their position, with respect to:
- (a) the service or interest groups to which they may belong or by which they have been nominated to the Board?
 - (b) the public interest of the Area?

II. AREA INPUT: BACKGROUND FACTORS AT THE BOARD LEVEL

- A. Who provided the technical information necessary for decisions taken by the Area Development Board? How much influence can this person bring to bear on the Board's decisions?
- B. What are the major sources of limitation imposed on the number, type and effectiveness of Area Development Board activities?
- C. How does the Board organize "to get things done", and what means (incentive, sanctions) are used to ensure that members participate?

III. REGIONAL INPUT: DIRECT POLICY RELATIONS

- A. (1) What type of relationship exists during the implementation of the F.R.E.D. Plan between the Area Development Board and:
- (a) the F.R.E.D. administrators,
 - (b) federal and provincial legislators.
- (2) Has this relationship changed:
- (a) between 1967 - 1971?
 - (b) between April, 1970 - August, 1971?
 - (c) Is it expected to change in the future?

- B. What and who do you feel influences the decisions of the F.R.E.D. administrators in the review and re-planning of activities, projects and programs?
- C. (1) Identify what and who you feel is most influential, at the political level, in making decisions with respect to establishing priorities among the goals of regional development and the means by which they are achieved.
- (2) What, if any, channels of communication exist between the community and federal and/or provincial legislators?
- D. (1) With which organizations or groups in the Interlake does the Area Development Board have contact?
- (2) What is the nature of the relationship or inter-action between the Board and these organizations?
- (3) Have either the mix of organizations or the nature of relationship between the Board and these organizations changed since the beginning of the Interlake Plan's implementation? Are any changes expected in the future?
- E. (1) How is the "general public" made aware of the F.R.E.D. Plan, its programs, and their role in them (Plan or programs)?
- (2) Who should be responsible for informing local citizens about these programs?
- (3) How aware is a local citizen of the:
- (a) F.R.E.D. Plan's organization for implementation?
- (b) F.R.E.D. Plan's programs, projects and activities?
- (c) financial arrangements surrounding the F.R.E.D. Plan?

IV. REGIONAL INPUT: INTER-AREA BOARD RELATIONS

- A. Describe the relationship among Area Development Boards as it

has existed or developed since the beginning of the Plan's implementation in 1967.

- B. (1) What distinctions or overlaps occur between the functions of the Area Development Boards and the Regional Development Corporation with respect to Interlake development and citizen participation?
- (2) What kind of future relationship between these two organizations would be desirable, and what type of relationship can be expected?
- C. Have there been any changes in attitudes or perspective among the communities in the Interlake since the Development Plan's implementation first began? If so, identify the type of changes which have occurred and the places in which they have occurred.

V. TANGIBLE FACTORS: REGIONAL RESOURCE ASSESSMENT

- A. What kinds of changes have occurred or are occurring in the:
- (1) development of the economic potential of the region (e.g. resource rationalization, industrial growth)?
- (2) development of the infra-structure of the region (e.g. highways, schools)?
- (3) development of an awareness among the population of opportunities, and their ability to take advantage of such opportunities?
- B. (1) How does the progress to date compare with pre-Development Plan (1966) expectations?
- (2) Does it seem that significant increases can or will occur in the Interlake's per capita level of income and standard of living?

- C. Has there been any change in the geographic base to which development in the region is compared? What is the basis of comparison?

VI. ROLE RELATIONS: INSTITUTIONAL NETWORK

- A. (1) Is there a common denominator by which local citizens' needs and interests have been grouped in the implementation of the F.R.E.D. Plan?
- (2) What device, if any, is used to arbitrate conflicts among groups with different needs and interests, or to organize those of similar needs and interests?
- B. (1) Has the F.R.E.D. Plan's emphasis on "areas" altered in any way former competitive relationships among towns and municipalities in the region?
- (2) Have any new units of competitive relation emerged, or are any new ones emerging?
- C. (1) Have there been any significant changes in the composition of the network of community organizations and institutions since the start of the F.R.E.D. Plan's implementation in 1967?
- (2) What role does the F.R.E.D. administration play in this network?

VII. ROLE RELATIONS: EVOLUTIONARY TRENDS

- A. What persons, groups and organizations would seem to be destined to play prominent roles in guiding future Interlake development, and what functions will they perform?
- B. Is there a recognizable trend or need for significant change in either the participants implementing the F.R.E.D. Plan or the roles they play?

- C. What factors would seem to be stabilizing conditions in the Interlake, and which ones would seem to be initiating change?

VIII. ROLE RELATIONS: ORGANIZATIONAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

- A. What community organizations would seem to be the focal point for organizing and expressing community needs and interests with respect to Interlake development?
- B. What would be the effect upon this focus if F.R.E.D. was to withdraw after only four years of implementation of the Development Plan, i.e. in 1971?
- C. What do you expect will happen when the Plan naturally terminates in 1977?

APPENDIX B

AREA DEVELOPMENT BOARD INTERVIEWS

This appendix presents eight Area Development Board interviews, which have been referenced in the text as "ADB Interviews No. 1 - 8". Each interview appears as an independent unit and can be cross-referenced, by the numerical topic codes, to both the general interview format and its topical basis as discussed in Appendix A. In the interests of preserving confidentiality and the anonymity of interviewees, identifying names, dates and places related to the interviews have been deleted. Where names and places are part of the subject matter of the interview, they remain in that context.

ADB INTERVIEW NUMBER 1¹

I.

- A) - the ADB has 11 members.
- future members are appointed by present Board members, e.g. with 11 incumbent Board members, there exists a potential range of outside contact of approximately 30 people, from which the community "doers" can be selected and appointed as incoming members of the ADB.
 - the turnover rate is approximately $\frac{1}{2}$, i.e. 5 members change at each changeover period.
 - the Board is organized around specific projects for purposes of:
 1. incentive to complete work, i.e. a vested personal interest implies that a person will work harder to be sure that a project is completed properly and quickly; and
 2. feedback: a material interest and physical product are good feedback devices, to show a person that something is being accomplished, in order to sustain his interest.
 - when projects are completed, new members are appointed to the Board (generally old members weed themselves out as their interest subsides) and the whole process begins again.
- B) - the Board's members are representative of a broad cross-section

¹Since this was the first interview with an Area Development Board (ADB) Chairman, adjustments were made to the original format (to be used for subsequent interviews) after the interview ended. Therefore, the format of this interview only approximates that used for the other Area Development Board interviews.

of the "people" of the Area in terms of:

1. geographic location (focus is on having representatives from each of the towns, as opposed to Rural Municipality representatives);
2. employment type: labourers, union men, business community (small self-employed) as well as farmers and corporate business organizations (which are the most difficult to get interested); and
3. income type: low income groups are not well represented (Indian-Metis in Selkirk) because their formal representative organization (Friendship Center) does not respond to the ADB's invitations for its participation. The middle income group seems to be the most prominent, since it generally possesses a civic minded attitude, a material or financial vested interest (i.e. it can receive material gains or benefits indirectly through projects, from participation and active involvement), and is viewed as containing the "doers" in the community.

C) - individual members tend to be of the "industry specialist" type, i.e. they have a single field where they have exhibited a high degree of competence, and are known well only to members of that field.

D) (1) - all local citizens cannot be involved, since many of them are not "doers" by nature; also, there are few incentives to attract most of the general public to the Board.

- what is important is:

- (i) that a general education process, regarding what F.R.E.D. is doing through its development programs, is occurring, and an informed public can then participate in those programs of interest to them, or those designed for them as individuals; and
- (ii) that the general public's opinion (when it can be discerned) can influence (guide) both the direction and degree of various programs.

- this process occurs by citizens making presentations directly to the Board or through one of the Board's members.

- (2) - most members of the Board that come from local interest groups tend to act as "civic-minded generalists" on the Board, rather than "vested interest specialists".

II.

- A) - the ADB technical advisors are "ag. reps", extension officers, industry and commerce people, etc., one or two of whom sit formally on the ADB.
 - these technical advisors, in some instances, actually "float" from one Board to another.
 - they are seen as "liaisons" between the ADB and F.R.E.D.
- (NOTE: They are identified with, and seem to behaviourally play the part of F.R.E.D. people, rather than their various departmental allegiances.)
- they are "trusted" by the ADB's who feel they are sufficiently

concerned and aware of the Area's particular needs and desires to properly express those needs and desires to higher F.R.E.D. levels, i.e. ADB's feel confident that these people have a stronger interest in the Areas, than in F.R.E.D. or their own departments.

- B) - the Board currently has an operating income of only \$1,500 per year, which is not sufficient to initiate and/or support its own projects, i.e. every time a project is initiated by the ADB, the Board must go out and find another group to implement the project, because the ADB does not have enough funds to see anything through to its completion, e.g. a house-to-house survey that was initiated by the ADB had to be taken over by a women's association.
- the "seed" money provided to the ADB is destructive, because of its small size, i.e. it forces the ADB to be too heavily reliant on external groups, limits the Board's potential activities and involvements, and destroys any concentrated interest of its members.

III.

- A) to C) - the ADB's are generally a "tool" of the administrators in the broadest sense of the term, i.e. the Board tends to initiate the actions of the F.R.E.D. administrators, by following the directions suggested to it by the administrators on particular issues, especially with respect to what the Board should say to the Cabinet Ministers at Program Advisory Board meetings.

- the Boards often express the ideas that the administrators would like to say to senior politicians, but cannot because of their formal roles vis-a-vis those politicians in the policy process (administrators are seen in some political quarters as being non-political establishers or initiators of policy).
- with respect to administrators, there is also a very prominent feedback of information as to directional changes (via local input) in the programs that were initiated by the administration and supported by the ADB's.
- ADB's input to the F.R.E.D. administration is both emotional (desires of local people) and technical (an idea of what is possible), but they are vague, however, on the possibilities.
- information regarding alternatives is adequate: F.R.E.D. administrators are trusted and formal F.R.E.D. members of the ADB fill any gaps which could occur.
- administrators do not impose action on the ADB; they only suggest that certain actions occur.
- the direction of initial action is specified but it is subject to revision upon feedback to administrators by the ADB (and subsequent secondary feedback from administrators to ADB, etc.).
- programs and projects are initiated by the F.R.E.D. administrators.
- the ADB helps to implement the programs by organizing around projects and activities (i.e. general direction of path is given by F.R.E.D. administrators, minor alterations are added by the ADB).

- review is a continuing process and the ADB sees itself as one (but a primary one) of much input into re-planning (others are government departments, other formal local groups--not large, since most have a representative on the ADB, although some input exists since their representative is a "generalist" on the ADB--and individual citizens--to a small degree and only those who are directly affected in some way by a project.)
- there is very little participation of ADB's (or for that matter local citizens) at the political level of program change or program initiation for the Plan.
- this is a major barrier to the successful implementation of the Plan.
- originally, there was a Joint Program Advisory Board wherein the Chairman and one member of each ADB in the Region were to meet three times yearly (it usually happened only twice a year) to discuss alterations of the Plan, in terms of various programs, with the Provincial Minister of Agriculture and various other officials.
- this Board turned into a "bitch" session of local (largely administrative) complaints, and while it did not appear to be valuable to a sharing of ideas and possible solution generation, its removal at the time of the Plan's review (1970) effectively severed the only real link that local people had with higher level politicians and policy makers.
- now, the problem is that, despite the "good" working relationship between the local citizens and F.R.E.D. administrators, highly unexpected changes of policy by senior politicians

destroy the efforts of lower level activity and "put it back to square one in a new ballpark", e.g. all the work done locally (in Selkirk) to attract industry to that town's "failing" industrial park is obliterated by, firstly, the Federal government changing its industrial grants policy (AIDA) to include all southern Manitoba (rather than just the Interlake as designated areas), and hence pulling any industry to Winnipeg that Selkirk had a chance for; and secondly, pulling the Air Base out of Gimli and creating an industrial park there to "compete" with Selkirk in matters of intra-regional distribution of industry.

- the primary role of the ADB seems to be to change local circumstances to meet the new directives issued by higher level politicians, rather than to adapt general policy formulations to existing local conditions.
- if a role is to be discerned, it is primarily that of post-policy adjustment, rather than post-policy initiation.
- this is seen by the ADB as being highly frustrating, although it has not as yet been strong enough to stop the dynamics of the Boards. (NOTE: These types of occurrences are really just apparent in the past one and a half years and are caused in part by:
 1. the broadening of senior Provincial Administrators' jobs, which necessarily decreased their local contact and the trust placed in them by the local citizens;
 2. the Federal D.R.E.E.'s movement away from sub-regional development policies; and

3. the Fish Processing and Gimli Air Base decisions.
- information given to the F.R.E.D. administration is primarily used for alteration (incremental) of existing program directions.
 - it might also act as a basis for their (F.R.E.D.'s) next program design (along with other input).

III.

- D) - informal contact with individual members of other ADB's is not significant.
- there is a liaison connection through the "ag. reps" (as previously mentioned) to other ADB's in nearby areas.
 - this has increased understanding of problems and conditions of other towns and municipalities, which are represented both on the ADB and on other such Boards in neighbouring Areas.
 - the major formal and informal links are to F.R.E.D. administrators.
 - there is an indirect link to other government departments through F.R.E.D. and field agents that attend ADB meetings.
 - there are some informal links to other departments through local associations and groups.
- E) - information flows well between F.R.E.D. administrators and the ADB.
- breakdown occurs between the ADB and the general public ("How do you pass on information to an apathetic public?").
 - the "Interlake Flyer" is a major source of general information from F.R.E.D. to the general public and it is good, but it

reaches most of the people in the community who are already interested, i.e. it informs those already involved; it does not initiate new contacts.

- ADB feels that it is not necessary to involve the public at large; it openly disagrees with the F.R.E.D. information officer's formula of total community involvement.
- most people would know of the projects (e.g. roads) themselves, rather than the fact that F.R.E.D. co-ordinates these projects or even what F.R.E.D. is (local newspaper and media coverage is not that good in terms of emphasizing F.R.E.D.).
- by filtering out those who are not involved with an ADB, we would still find a project-oriented view of F.R.E.D., e.g. farmers are more likely to know the details of the bush clearing program, than know that F.R.E.D. is involved in the Winnipeg Beach Recreation Program.
- general knowledge of what F.R.E.D. is and does is to be found at higher involvement levels.

IV.

- A) - ADB's have been moving towards intensive East-West conflicts.
- participation in the R.D.C. is seen as an out, so that growth centers, industrial centers and recreational centers can be explicitly defined for the whole region, and hence decrease the intensity of intra-regional conflicts.
- the relation of ADB's to government departments has not changed much, since:

(i) "co-ordination and programming" of these departments is

done by F.R.E.D.; and

- (ii) the ADB's were originally organized under A.R.D.A. and were never really involved with singular departments (except Agriculture).
- the R.D.C. was not necessarily what was evolving from increased co-operation among ADB's.
- the R.D.C. is formed on more of a municipal basis ("You almost have to be a high municipal official to be on the R.D.C."), whereas the ADB's are more locally (town) centered and cut across municipal boundaries.
- the ADB's were moving towards some form of regional organization, since inter-board understanding was increasing with increases in intra-regional communication.
- in the future:
 - (i) R.D.C. will be primarily responsible for material-industrial growth and the physical development of the region;
 - (ii) ADB will be primarily concerned with the intangibles of people (human) programs and community organization and leadership, e.g. education seminars, etc.
- overlaps:
 - (i) R.D.C. programs include humans as a resource; and
 - (ii) ADB's organize around material projects (incentive) to promote action and visual accomplishment indicators.
- there is an increased sense of "region" in the Interlake which has developed through contact among people from other towns and municipalities, to gain a greater understanding of

the types and reasons for the various problems of other centers. (NOTE: This does not imply a removal of conflict; it just alters the conflict atmosphere and increases the likelihood of resolving conflicts, e.g. Selkirk was able to overcome its unfounded image as the "Fat Cat" of the Interlake.)

- the "agent for co-operation" would be the emphasis placed on the "regional aspects of the Plan".
- before the Plan, Selkirk was largely considered as an extension of Winnipeg, but now its outlook is very significantly as a part of the Interlake.

V.

- A) - the region is not significantly better off in terms of income levels, relative to the rest of the province.
- most re-trained and re-educated people are leaving the region.
- some improvement in roads (which might have occurred anyway) has occurred.
- regional awareness and "community" organization have improved.
- much of the improvement seemed possible and desirable.
- there is still a lot of room for more improvement, especially in the attraction of industry to the Interlake to hold better trained people there.
- on external development matters, the region now stands as a unit, (i.e. a unified front) which it did not prior to 1967.
- there still exists strong intra-regional conflicts, which have been accentuated by the failure to designate growth centers

and specialized centers (so that all units feel they have a "right" to any development of any type, which comes to the region).

VI.

- A) - F.R.E.D. administrators have tried to stay "at an arm's length" from areas, so as not to become overly involved in local problems, e.g. even though the ADB made a formal request that the administrators attend a community "understanding" session at Windego (promoted so that all walks of life in the Area might better get to know how one another "ticked" and what the Area "felt") the administrators would not go.
- the F.R.E.D. administration has become recognized as a part of the local institutional environment, at least to the ADB, although it has remained uninstitutionalized with the general populace (as has the ADB to some extent).
 - major breaks or problems of communication:
 - (i) critical: between policy makers and the ADB;
 - (ii) not critical: between the ADB - F.R.E.D. administrators and the general populace; and
 - (iii) good connection: between the F.R.E.D. administration, the civil service generally and the ADB.

VII.

- A) - Roles in Implementation:
- (i) individual citizens have a minor role: participation in specific projects, tacit consent;

- (ii) formal local institutions have a more positive role, in that they provided people to sit on the ADB;
- (iii) political representatives play a minor role in that they do not hold a balance of power or even a major power position in the two senior government legislatures. (NOTE: The senior governments play a major role in policy initiation and change since they define the "ball park" at any given time.)

Interlake development never became a partisan political (or even relevant) issue in the Provincial or Federal elections (all party candidates paid lip service to it);

- (iv) ADB plays a large role in aiding the dynamic processes (once policy and program direction has been established by other bodies) of implementation, incremental direction alteration and guidance for the future.

- no regional or sub-regional perspective.

- little participation; and

- (v) local service groups - their representatives to the ADB adopt a civic-minded generalist role.

- the only involvement of service groups is with specific activities that fit their orientation, e.g. Kinsmen Kiddies.

NOTE: - these roles are not changing significantly.

VIII.

- A) - the network of local organizations is now sufficiently strong to carry on if the F.R.E.D. administration were removed, as

long as F.R.E.D. funds were not removed.

- the organizational network would not revert to Pre-Plan (pre-A.R.D.A.) form, unless all incentives and indicators of accomplishment were removed.
- in 1976, when the Plan ends, the community organizations should be as strong (but are not likely to have increased their contacts to the general populace much more).
- the ADB feels very strongly that there will be another Plan subsequent to this one, implying that, although the region will be organizationally strong, it will still be economically weak.

ADB INTERVIEW NUMBER 2

I.

- A) - Board members serve overlapping 1-, 2-, and 3-year terms.
- current ADB members nominate people to fill positions, where terms have terminated, at the general meeting held each year (once a year).
 - nominations from the floor are also accepted.
 - voting is done by all those present at the general meeting.
- NOTE: - only once has there been no nominations from the floor.
- there are 24 Board members.
- B) - all groups can be represented on the Board.
- the Board has many farmers (as does the Area) and also has representation from the Indian bands who inhabit the northern portion of Fisher.
- C) - because this area is so large, most Board members are known (with respect to qualifications) only in their own "community".
- however, ADB meetings during the year are moved from town to town so that the whole Area can become acquainted with the Board, its members and its activities.
- D) (1) - most Board members are those who are usually involved in other "community interest" activities or have a particular vested interest in F.R.E.D. (e.g. farmers: drainage programs; land reclamation, etc.).
- the "general" citizen is defined as "apathetic", although there is an increasing number of new involvees who were formerly "apathetics".

- (implied): it takes both incentive and some degree of success to get and keep these people involved, even if the success incentive isn't directly a F.R.E.D. goal, e.g. people took winter courses as much for the direct increase in income as for education.
 - increasing citizen involvement is seen as a fact (trend) and is implied to be good.
 - ADB meetings are open to observers and have been attracting more response. Observers can express opinions, issue complaints, etc., but can't vote (i.e. popular, but representative democracy).
- (2) - community interest is as strong in many cases as Area interest.
- both of the above are stronger than personal and interest group concern, although such interests do exist.

II.

- A) - on specific issues, government officers such as agricultural extension agents, engineers, etc. are asked to give the details of a project's feasibility.
- such input is respected for its technical merit.
 - technicians do not and are not generally encouraged to express opinions beyond feasibility.
 - "Ag-reps", etc. are seen as "liaisons" between the ADB and various government departments; hence, they aren't perceived to be the representative of either side (government or citizens).

- on certain issues, ADB members themselves can provide the technical input.

- B) - funds (\$1,200 - \$1,500 per year) are sufficient only to cover administration and travel costs; hence, funds impose a limit on the scope of ADB activity.

NOTE: - by increased efficiency, this Board sometimes saves some money, and so it can fund external (with respect to F.R.E.D.) projects in part or in whole, e.g. for a student summer recreation project, the Board covered \$200 of the \$600 needed.

- time is a constraint on effectiveness - ADB members and the chairman are not salaried, and so divide their time between a job, home, other community service positions, and the ADB.

- C) - the Board organizes around specific complaints (brought to it usually by citizens) and/or suggestions and interests as raised by individual Board members. (Projects are of specific interest to particular localities or persons in the Area and sometimes affect the whole Area.)

III.

- A) (1) - F.R.E.D. administrators are viewed as "liaison" persons between the ADB and the politicians (i.e. they are not seen to represent either party's interests; they are seen to represent the joint interests of both).

- there exists more certainty and trust for the administrators than for the politicians.

- (2) - no major changes have occurred or are seen as likely to

occur.

B) - effective input in replanning:

ADB - local citizen reaction (emotion, needs, desires, priorities) and the operational feasibility of suggested projects.

"Ag-reps" - technical advice regarding the feasibility of various project combinations.

- project costs and the "good of the region" are also perceived to be planning input considered by the administration.
- the political feasibility of projects in terms of (1) inter-government disputes, and (2) provincial political acceptance are not seen as being as important as other input, since the "province's program domain" over F.R.E.D. programs takes care of the first one, and effective citizen participation on ADB takes care of the second.

C) (1) - political considerations such as the doctrine of a governing party and pragmatism (re-election) is the effective input into political decision-making.

- although administrators have some influence, it is not enough to make this process wholly rational.
- therefore, there is less rationality and certainty regarding political programs and goals as compared to economic goals and programs.

(2) - the main communication channel to politicians is the Program Advisory Board, which is perceived as a "general council of ADB for the Interlake".

- the problem is that certain Boards (such as this one) have

many complaints, and this makes things uncomfortable for politicians (Ministers), which prompted a "re-organization" (said facetiously to imply that it was more of a purge) that removed those Boards who were creating "waves" for the politicians.

- now, the main channel is the R.D.C., which is better organized (formally), so that there is less disturbing and disruptive feedback to the politicians.
- all municipalities but one are represented on the R.D.C. (the R.D.C. was instigated by the government).

- D) (1) - the ADB has friendly informal relations with any (and all) community groups, organizations and councils.
- the relationship becomes formalized around projects (i.e. project - specific inter-actions of ADB and local bodies).
- (2) - the relationship is one of joint co-operation (the ADB usually provides administrative expertise, etc. but not funds).
- (3) - the relations (contacts) are ever-changing due to their project specific orientation, but the "pattern" has not changed.
- the ADB is perceived to be filling a gap for local citizen feedback to all government projects.
- E) (1) - there is a heavy reliance on the information dissemination program of F.R.E.D., implemented by the information officer.
- (2) - F.R.E.D. should inform local citizens.
- the ADB is a feedback unit, not an information disseminator.
- (3) - the local citizen is most aware of the activities

themselves, than F.R.E.D. (what it is), than F.R.E.D.'s degree of involvement in projects and activities.

- people are becoming more and more aware of F.R.E.D. in a broader Interlake perspective, i.e. with respect to the programs and goals of the Plan.

IV.

- A) - the original ADB in this Area was non-functional because a single town (Arborg) had more vote strength than all the other committees combined, and while the Board did pay attention to issues (besides those which Arborg thought to be relevant), this dominance "hung-over" the ADB.
- the result was a redefinition of boundaries along more natural and serviceable (practical) lines to form two ADB's.
 - the ADB's in the region are coming closer together (in some cases because of geographic propinquity, in others because of activity inter-action), which is resulting in the evolution of a more regional perspective.
- B) (1) - the ADB handles local (community and Area) problems and complaints (used as a feedback to both administrators and politicians on programs' human impact and Area needs).
- the R.D.C. is employed more as a mechanism to direct the total growth of the region (integrates various Areas and so it has a stronger government input).
- (2) - R.D.C. relation will continue as described in IV.B.1,

except that the R.D.C. will become more and more relevant as the Interlake gains a more equal footing with other provincial regions.

- C) - there has been a gradual clarification of the natural boundary between Areas (promoted by ADB).
- there is better understanding of intra-Area: inter-Area: regional problems, as a result of the communications of problems and desires among citizens and towns at the ADB meetings, and among towns and areas at the R.D.C. meetings.
 - (inferred): the F.R.E.D. administration originally carried the burden of constantly reminding the ADB to have a regional perspective: now the R.D.C. will handle this role.
 - the ADB seemed to be evolving toward the regional perspective of a R.D.C.. but the government kept one step ahead by inaugurating one.

V.

- A) (1) - the economic potential of the region is increasing now that the government has stopped ignoring the Interlake, but "it can't develop overnight".
- (2) - regional infra-structure is developing, but more development is required at the local and individual level (i.e. towns and individual farms, similar to the drainage program).
- (inferred): he indicated that F.R.E.D should be responsible for secondary and tertiary road improvement, but the analogy to the drainage program breaks down here, since

secondary drains are a municipal responsibility and tertiary drains are the responsibility of the individual farmers.

- (3) - there is increased confidence of the general population in the government's interest (effective interest, since it is backed up with funds) and in the region itself, i.e. increased awareness brings about increased confidence.
 - a support and interest base is forming in the population, but it may not always be strongly visible.
- B) (1) - progress is better than expected, since there have been accomplishments (physical improvements) which act as material proof that the government has serious intentions to help the region, rather than just paying "lip service" (as was expected).
 - (2) - (i) changes can occur in the standards of living and income, as has been shown by some improvement already.
 - (ii) the most significant improvement is seen as most likely to come in the distant future (after 1977).
- C) - gradually the basis of development is expanding (not shifting) from community, to area, to region, to province, to nation, with overlaps in trends and changes in emphasis occurring.

VI.

- A) (1) - local needs have been grouped by the geographic dimension of Areas.
 - the geographic dimension has been changed where it conflicts with "natural" boundaries.

- (inferred): "income is a common denominator, to the extent that there is a common group: "Interlake income".
- (2) - higher level politicians take each "interest" affected by a decision into consideration as input, and emphasize that there is other input as well, upon which a decision depends, e.g. A versus B (interest dispute), but the decision also involves effective input from C and D, etc.
- B) - although a general spirit of community is evolving, many towns still feel that "One man dead is another man's bread".
- (inferred): distributional conflicts sometimes are secondary to locational ones, but not always.
- the trend evolving is for locational concerns (regional) to come ahead of distributional ones (areas), as the communities become more aware that development must occur in more than just one town or center--if the whole region is to benefit, i.e. quarrels over varying degrees of development concentration thus come after the region gets the industry, e.g. fish processing plant. NOTE: This trend is just starting to develop.
- C) (1) - the ADB have filled a gap (vacuum) for community complaints and feedback to both the Federal and Provincial governments regarding specific projects and activities.
- the F.R.E.D. administration has become a critical and integral "liaison" between the government and the representative community organization (ADB).
- (2) - no.

VII.

- A) - the government in general will play the most prominent role by setting guidelines and goals towards which a community can strive, i.e. a faith to fill the religion gap.
- the ADB will remain crucial in the encouragement and organization of people for activity participation, and as a community feedback mechanism for the government.
- B) - (trend): R.D.C. is becoming more important but its worth will not really arrive until the next Plan.
- no significant participant or role changes are seen.

VIII.

- A) - various organized bodies have various roles about which development clusters, e.g. towns (sewer and water, etc.-- local), ADB (programs: highways, recreation--area), R.D.C. (programs: industry, attraction--regional).
- some overlaps occur, causing a "friendly" competition, until the overlap conflict is resolved. (These organized bodies also work together on projects).
- (inferred): the ADB is filling a gap, as is the R.D.C., rather than taking over from a poorly functioning (existing) unit.
- B) - if F.R.E.D. left today, everything would revert to its original state, with perhaps even more disputes among towns.
- strong towns would hold a strengthened position and would force weaker towns to come to them for help.
- skeptics would be happy.

- C) - 1977 will bring a new Plan to replace the present one, perhaps with more emphasis on a provincial perspective to tie the Interlake in with other development regions, e.g. East Manitoba, West Manitoba.

IX. Additional Comments

- (1) - he said, "Be sure to make the Interlake look good".
- (2) - there is a very strong emphasis, almost paranoia, of the force the big unit can exert over the little one.
- (3) - he emphasizes that people require guidelines and that the specific accomplishments of F.R.E.D. so far have provided Interlakers with an incentive to help themselves and planted a belief that the government is not only able, but is also willing to remove regional disputes.

ADB INTERVIEW NUMBER 3

I.

- A) - 15 members are appointed by municipal and civic councils as follows:
- | | |
|-----------------------|-----|
| L.G.D. Armstrong | = 5 |
| Rochwood Municipality | = 5 |
| Town of Teulon | = 5 |
- the town council appoints members for Teulon.
 - the term of office is 3 years, and 1/3 of the members change each year.
 - usually a person volunteers for a position if he is interested in it, and lets the council know he is available if a position is open.
 - it is becoming more difficult to find interested people; members usually look for a "protege" to replace them when their term is up: such "inbreeding" is perceived as a good idea.
- B) - members do not belong to any single class, beyond the fact that they are "community-conscious".
- the representatives from Teulon are a teacher, a high school principal, a garage operator, a butcher, and a retired (well-to-do) farmer (one is also a town councillor).
- C) - the capabilities of ADB members are known to "influential" and/or other qualified townspeople and civic-minded (interested) citizens.
- also, most members seem to have a broad contact citizen range.

- D) (1) - the general citizen is usually involved to the extent that he has a vested interest in a particular program, project or activity of F.R.E.D.
- ADB meetings during the year are moved around and sometimes community projects attract general citizens to take in a meeting, e.g. a skating rink for Inwood.
- (2) - the primary concern is for development of the Area.
- specific local interests, such as town roads, etc. cannot be handled by an ADB and this is recognized by the Board members.
 - a strong Area orientation creates a strong competitive attitude regarding other Areas in the Interlake.

II.

- A) - the technical basis of decisions is twofold:
1. abilities and expertise of Board members, e.g. schools, farm projects, etc.; and
 2. government field agency people, e.g. the manpower representative and agricultural extension officer attend most ADB meetings; they are perceived as liaisons (links) with government departments, and technical advisors (to the extent that they can demonstrate their qualifications in their given field) and are also identified more closely with the Area than with the government.
- these people are reasonably influential, as noted above (it depends on their proven ability, rather than their formal positions).

- B) - finances are a major limit on ADB activities.
- until 1970, the Board received \$1,500 from F.R.E.D. to co-ordinate, administer and direct activities such as manpower training, farm business courses, sewing and driver training, etc.
 - now the Board receives an additional \$1,500 to help defray personal expenses (travel, etc.) plus a per-meeting payment (approximately \$5.00) as an "incentive to show up, and not much more".
 - the rigidity of the F.R.E.D. plan is a limit, in that whenever new projects are proposed, the ADB is told there is no money for them, e.g. \$15,000 for Norris Lake recreation area to serve "local" needs was rejected (Norris Lake is 6 miles north-west of Teulon).
- C) - the ADB organizes around courses, as described in II.B, e.g. farm business, etc., which it administers during the winter.
- the ADB tries to organize around its own projects but it has received no results in past efforts and hence there is no incentive for novelty, e.g. Norris Lake, sewer and water for Teulon.
 - the meeting payment of \$5.00 does not act as an incentive to get things done, only to turn out.

III.

- A) (1) - during re-planning, the ADB does not believe it is an effective input to either the administration or politicians.

- "everything seems cut and dried when it comes down from the Federal and Provincial Governments, so that even though they (F.R.E.D., in the Plan) claim they need citizen participation, they don't seem to listen to what we say."
- (2) - no change has been noticed in the degree of citizen participation, in decisions, over time, nor is any expected.
- B) - F.R.E.D. administrators seem only to listen to certain ADB's, e.g. those along Lake Winnipeg who get "most of the money" in recreation grants.
 - also, a lot of decisions are made on the basis of behind curtain "politicking", e.g. the incumbent R.D.C. manager and Gimli got an industrial park (grant), which competes with Selkirk).
 - (inferred): a large degree of mistrust of administrators, politicians and the general "bargaining" procedures (used by the east side ADB's) exists.
- C) (1) - the priority seems to be to increase the revenue from the tourist trade in the Interlake, i.e. provide commercial, government recreation spots, instead of recreation for Interlakers.
 - (2) - the Program Advisory Board (P.A.B.) was a good link, but now it is gone.
 - the P.A.B. served its purpose, but now the only links to politicians are political:
 1. Through the R.D.C.'s manager, and

2. through "normal" political influence channels
(both Federally and Provincially).

NOTE: - because of the joint nature of the Plan, it is difficult to pin down who is at fault when something does not come off, e.g. when a requested program is not initiated.

- (inferred): there is a weak link to politicians.

D) (1) - this ADB has contact with other ADB's concerning projects which mutually affect them, e.g. the joint proposal of all ADB's to increase the bush-clearing grant from \$2/acre to \$4/acre.

- similarly, the ADB will relate to government bodies or service groups, etc. on a project specific basis, e.g. stocking Norris Lake with fish.

(2) - the Board will provide its administrative know-how, etc. as input, since it has no funds that are undesignated.

NOTE: - the Board is just into this type of thing in a very superficial and preliminary way.

(3) - the relationship has not changed and is not expected to change.

E) (1) - the general public sees signs on all F.R.E.D. projects in progress.

- the ADB advertises in local papers (Stonewall and Arborg) to inform the public regarding up-coming projects.

- F.R.E.D. newsletter (Interlake Flyer) informs the public regarding projects already completed.

- also, the ADB representatives are well spread, geographically

through the Area so that much information is transmitted by word of mouth.

- (2) - citizens can come to meetings, etc. which are all open to the general public; hence, it is largely the citizen's responsibility to be informed.
 - (inferred): much of the F.R.E.D. releases are merely "sell campaigns" which "overstate" what is being done.
- (3) - (i) local citizens generally know what F.R.E.D. is.
 - (ii) those people who travel the Area a lot know what F.R.E.D.'s activities are.
 - (iii) (inferred): most people do not realize the details of the joint F.R.E.D. arrangements, etc. or relative contribution of each government's (Federal and Provincial) participation.

IV.

- A) - relations among ADB's are fairly stable: they are organized around specific programs.
 - representatives from all ADB's get together at annual seminars (Program Advisory Board meetings which no longer occur) to discuss their various, Area-based interests.
- B) (1) - the ADB has both a local and broader program outlook.
 - the prime function of the R.D.C. is to attract industry to the region and to help smaller communities get a "fair share" of the industry.
- (2) - future relationships will and should continue as they now do, since relationships are reasonably satisfactory now

(some of the R.D.C.'s "politicking" is not liked, e.g. industrial park in Gimli).

C) - few attitude changes are occurring in the Areas.

NOTE: - Selkirk is not considered part of Interlake except by the Plan definition, and it seems that Selkirk got more money than the rest of them (i.e. deserving Interlake communities), e.g. "the purpose of the R.D.C. is to help towns like Teulon find out that an industry is available for location before it goes somewhere else (out of the region) like Portage la Prairie or Selkirk".

V.

- A) (1) - the economic position of the region is declining vis-à-vis the rest of the regions in the province.
- (2) - infra-structure would have been just as developed without F.R.E.D., e.g. with F.R.E.D. here, the provincial grants for yearly road construction in towns such as Teulon and throughout the region have been suspended; similarly, the school district in the central Interlake was consolidated years ago, but the Technical School that was promised still has not been built (the grants for schools are no better than the rest of the province got under the school consolidation bill in 1968).
- (3) - many people (percentage unspecified) seem to be abusing opportunities for improvement, e.g. farmers who take farm management courses during the winter do it as much for the income as for the education and/or those who use

carpentry and electrical courses not to earn extra money in off-season as was intended, but instead use skills for "home improvement".

- B) (1) - progress is far below Pre-Plan expectations.
- (2) - (i) the standard of living and level of income could be increased absolutely and relatively; but
- (ii) will not be, if the present program orientation persists, i.e. firstly, the "whole" Area is not really depressed, and secondly, the people who are taking advantage of the programs have no personal stake in them, e.g. farm management courses.
- C) - there has been little change in the geographic development base.
- the Interlake is now more recognized by its inhabitants as a region.

VI.

- A) (1) - areas are organized on a geographic base, which has remained relatively stable.
- (2) - F.R.E.D. administrators are either "locked in" to supporting one group over another by the original Plan's specification of the competing projects, or decide "politically" how to do it.
- B) (1) - towns and municipalities are still similar to their original competitive bases (inferred: although F.R.E.D. seems to have shifted some of the balance of power away from the central region to the eastern one).

- (2) - no; there are still town-against-town conflicts, except within an Area.
- (inferred): the R.D.C. is tending to help attract industry to the "region", after which distributional disputes can occur; unlike the present attention wherein distributional disputes force industry away from the region as a whole.
- C) (1) - (implied): not really: the F.R.E.D. unit is seen as an autonomous body, super-imposed on the region.
- (2) - no: they are much more a "director" of activity than a two-way communications unit, which can be altered by local feedback.

VII.

- A) - R.D.C. - attracting industry to the region and mediating disputes for it among areas.
- municipal councils - improving their own resources, etc.
- B) - ADB - if they get funds and are listened to, they could be an invaluable asset in developing recreation facilities for intra-regional use, industrial incentives, etc.
- C) - stability derives from the rigidity of allocated F.R.E.D. funds, which means that little change occurs in most Areas.

VIII.

- A) - the focal point of development relates to the type of development, i.e. responsibilities are widely disbursed, e.g. the Chamber of Commerce and service groups for particular facilities

such as swimming pools.

- town council for town needs such as roads, sewer and water.
- B) - if F.R.E.D. were withdrawn today, things would not change much (assuming "normal" Federal and Provincial programs were re-activated), except that the ADB's would likely dissolve, which is the present trend anyway, e.g. in Hecla Island, the ADB dissolved as soon as pre-determined program was occurring.
- C) - it is hard to say what will happen in 1977, but dispersal of government responsibility is likely to still exist.

IX. Additional Comments

- (1) - he does not see the Plan or the ADB's as a success.
- (2) - he resents the extensive "politicking" and "bargaining" (trade-offs) that goes on.
 - he definitely feels his Area has been getting "shafted".
 - (He seems to extend this to the failure of the Plan in general.)
- (3) - he implied that a lot is being spent on "administration", as in any "typical" government job, where "they create a whole bunch of white collar jobs for themselves."
- (4) - he is retiring from the ADB because he does not feel it is getting anywhere.

ADB INTERVIEW NUMBER 4

I.

A) - there is a general meeting each year which alternates between Lundar and Eriksdale at which the 18-member ADB is elected by all those who turn up for the meeting. (Constraint: regardless of how many people turn up for the meeting, there is equal representation on the ADB for the two municipalities involved, i.e. 9 members from Coldwell and 9 members from Eriksdale.)

B) - Board members are from a broad cross-section of the Area, e.g. some farmers, townspeople, businessmen, labourers, etc.

NOTE: - there are, and have been, no Indians on the ADB; they have their own tribal bands, etc. to represent them to the government.

C) - ADB members' contacts with the community (i.e. recognition) are more on a personal contact (friendship, etc.) basis; hence, those who are businessmen are recognized as such, but particular skills, etc. are rarely widely known.

D) (1) - the general citizen may know about the ADB, but in most cases citizens just criticize the ADB's existence (since they do not seem to think it fills a valuable role).

- it would be desirable to have general citizens bring complaints, suggestions, ideas, etc. to ADB meetings.

- meetings are shifted between the towns of Eriksdale and Lundar each month, as much to maintain municipal balance as to encourage general citizen participation.

(2) - the ADB members view their task in terms of the good they

can do primarily for the Area (if there are side benefits to the rest of the region, they do not begrudge them these benefits).

- little weight is put on representative aspects of service group, town, etc., since each member is elected as an individual.
- generally it is "community service" types that sit on the ADB.

II.

- A) - during the initial years of the Board, the major technical input came from field agency people, e.g. manpower agents, "ag-reps." and also to a lesser extent from ADB members themselves.
 - these field agents were looked upon as advisors (and not really community representatives) and their opinions were weighed as such.
 - since the ADB's began to inter-act on a regional basis (two or three years into the Plan), these field agency people came to fewer and fewer meetings and now are rarely seen.
 - the major technical advice now comes from the F.R.E.D. administration, e.g. the ADB drafts a number of proposals into a brief or report, and then sends it to the department involved and/or to F.R.E.D.; there its "feasibility" is considered (and it is usually rejected--"We're lucky to even get a letter back, acknowledging that they received the brief.").
- B) - lack of funds is a major limit on ADB activities (the \$1,500 grant is not available to finance projects).

- it goes deeper than just funds for the Board, though, since there are technical constraints implied by the fact that everything the ADB recommends is branded unfeasible (in terms of cost, location, etc.).
- C) - the ADB organizes around specific projects, e.g. in the early years, it organized around the "brainstorming" sessions sponsored by F.R.E.D.
- now it organizes around its own "pet projects" (those of individual members) which it hopes can materialize in the undefined future, e.g. sewer and water for all Interlake towns (Lundar); recreational expenditures to fix up Lundar Beach; education programs (helping technically trained young people, electricians, etc. get a start in business in the Interlake towns).
- even though little seems to come of ADB suggestions, members continue in the hope that eventually they will be listened to; and they are satisfied that they do get some "inside information" from the Plan's administrators, on Interlake programs.

III.

- A) (1) - the ADB feels that there is little flow of effective input from them to the administration or politicians for replanning.
- (2) - originally, the "brainstorming sessions" (during the first couple of years) were useful, since the ADB could tell the administrators what its priorities were (such as education and bush clearing), which the administrators

listened to.

- the government is listening to recreation facility and sewer and water demands, but they have not moved on it very much.

NOTE: - notice that the ADB priorities that were "acted upon" coincide with the priorities of the administrators as per the original Plan, while the second set of priorities (not acted upon) do not coincide with the administrators' priorities.

- the changes in relationship correspond to when the various ADB's got together for their first regional meetings (as in II.A).

- B) - the administrators' own ideas and those of the politicians (especially provincial ones, who are trying to avoid providing the Interlake with as much funds as they should) are the effective input into replanning.
- the ADB in this area certainly is not listened to very well.
- C) (1) - the administrators are an effective input into the political decision-making unit as are the "usual" political input, e.g. much of the East shore recreational development was the result of political pressures during the Roblin regime; since several Cabinet ministers were from that Area, such as the M.L.A. for Gimli who was also the Minister of Education.

NOTE: - he does not feel the Federal MP's in the Interlake (e.g. the M.P. for Selkirk) had any influence on the original draft.

- (2) - weak channels exist to the higher political levels (especially since the regional meetings turned into the R.D.C.; because ADB members rarely see responsible ministers, whereas they used to see them twice a year under the Program Advisory Board set-up).
- D) (1) - mainly government agencies such as manpower.
- (2) - the type of relationship involved is one in which the ADB provides administration and labour on a free time basis (e.g. for a recreation complex), etc. and the agency (or service group) must provide the basic materials and/or funds.
- (3) - the ADB is beginning to become a little more involved with other agencies since it no longer devotes most of its time to the "brainstorming".
- E) (1) - F.R.E.D. puts up signs on all its projects.
- people are also informed through newspaper articles, etc. (although this is weak in this Area, since there is no local paper).

NOTE: - he believes that the general public (especially those outside the Interlake) is being misinformed about the size of the development: "\$85 million seems like a lot, but we don't see most of it anyway."

- (2) - F.R.E.D. informs the ADB and most citizens should know (since the information is available), ". . . unless they want it put right in their laps."
- (3) - (i) a lot of citizens know about F.R.E.D.

- (ii) those who use F.R.E.D. sponsored projects are made well aware that F.R.E.D. is behind the project.

IV.

- A) - the ADB's had little contact for the initial two or three years.
- after two or three years, the various ADB's initiated the regional meetings which worked well.
 - they supported one another whenever they could, e.g. they got together to increase bush clearing grants from \$2 to \$4/acre; Coldwell-Eriksdale sent a letter to support Gimli keeping the air base ("It seemed a disaster for the region at the time.").
 - the ADB's then encouraged the formation of the R.D.C., which made the regional meetings unnecessary.
- B) (1) - ADB's handle more local oriented problems, although the R.D.C. is really the growth or extension of the ADB's.
- (2) - the R.D.C. will likely (and should) expand its activities so that the ADB's become unnecessary: the ADB's served their major feedback function in the first few years and now information flows only one way.
- C) - there has been an increased understanding among the intra-area communities, e.g. there is much less competition among towns on small things, although there is still strong competition on major issues like schools.

V.

- A) (1) - the region's resources have been developed to some extent (absolute) but change was bound to occur anyway.
- (2) - the government had to develop the highways and schools regardless of F.R.E.D., e.g. all other school divisions got huge grants when school divisions were consolidated, so the Interlake is not any further ahead on this matter.
- the #6 highway north had to be developed (paved) for easier access to resources.
- the Provincial government seems to be using F.R.E.D. as an excuse to get out of putting as much money as they should into the Interlake region.
- (3) - this is where the best progress has occurred because the re-training programs provided people with an incentive to go back to school, e.g. a lot of people in this Area did not go any further than Grade VIII originally.
- B) (1) - the feelings on progress to date compared to Pre-Plan expectations are mixed in light of the success in some programs, the failure to re-allocate funds to other programs (not in the original agreement) and the fact that the original \$85 million was made to sound like more than it really was.
- (2) - (i) an increase in the standard of living and level of income is bound to occur, since even natural change occurs (because the government will interfere when better conditions are not developing).

(ii) more improvement (in absolute terms) should occur in the region as a whole, although some areas still are declining in terms of industry, job opportunities, e.g. Lundar.

- C) - development is perceived in absolute terms, e.g. "We don't begrudge Selkirk people any of the funds or industry they get, but we don't compare ourselves with them."
- "If we could develop bigger than Winnipeg, we would, but it wouldn't matter", i.e. we don't care about the absolute size of other towns.

VI.

- A) (1) - interests are generally grouped by geography, i.e. low income areas are specified: (implied: income conditions are pretty one-dimensional, although some programs are directed specifically towards certain people.)
- (2) - conflicts are settled according to the comparative "feasibility" of the conflicting desires.
- B) (1) - some of the towns have been brought closer together, e.g. Lundar and Eriksdale, on minor issues, but it has not changed former relations, e.g. Eriksdale and Ashern (inter-area and inter-municipal).
- (2) - no new units of competition are emerging.
- C) (1) - the only change related to institutions is that the ADB has become a "local institution": part of the local organizational network.
- (2) - F.R.E.D. administrators remain pretty much distinct from

the "community", i.e. they are still perceived as "government representatives".

VII.

- A) - municipal governments and towns will continue to promote the municipality, while the R.D.C. should help promote regional industrial growth.
- perhaps the ADB's will start to be listened to again, although it seemed they fulfilled their feedback purpose in the early years.
- B) - the R.D.C. should become more important ("... although I'm not perfectly clear on what it's doing or why it's doing it.").
- C) - stability results from the fact that change-agents such as the ADB's are not listened to.

VIII.

- A) - general dispersal of development activity; also a general lack of co-ordination.
- B) - ADB might dissolve but some towns might get together under similar mutual arrangements, e.g. Lundar and Eriksdale.
- otherwise, there would be little effect on those structures which F.R.E.D. substituted its own for or which F.R.E.D. is not involved with.
- C) - this Plan is sort of a "pilot project" for Canada and so it is assumed that there will be some kind of expansion or tying it in with other development policies.

IX. Additional Comments

- (1) - he has mixed feelings about F.R.E.D. and especially about the role ADB's are or will be playing--he thinks the ADB's did most of their work in the first few years of the Plan, by providing feedback to the administration about community priorities.

ADB INTERVIEW NUMBER 5

I.

- A) - there is a general meeting held each year at which time members of the ADB are elected at large (nominated and voted on by anyone and all present from the Area), for a 2-year term.
- half of the ADB members are elected each year.
 - generally representation is on the basis of towns, e.g. 3 members from around Gypsumville, 2 members from Fairford (1 Metis, 1 white), 3 members from Moosehorn, etc.
 - if any locality (town and surrounding area) has no representative, a spot is left vacant and someone can be nominated to the Board from that locality at a later date; acceptance then requires ADB approval.
 - the membership number is not fixed, there is a sliding scale, depending on community interest, e.g. original (17 members) . . . interest growing (29 - 32 members) . . . recent decline in interest (24 - 25 members) in the last couple of years.
 - approximately 10 to 15 people attend the monthly meetings (usually an overlap, i.e. some come one month, others the next); meetings alternate among four major towns.
- B) - many members are farmers, because of the very nature of the Area.
- there are some businessmen, some "half-breeds", but no Indians on the Board--Indians were originally on the ADB but decided

they would have their own Board because they had "special" problems; but they never got their own Board so they have no formal representation anywhere.

- C) - the abilities of the ADB members are usually known throughout the community, because they are chosen for their "civic-mindedness" rather than their particular skill at a given task. (Inferred: although many Board members are "reasonably" successful in their given occupations, the primary criterion is a noted willingness to spend time on community projects.)
- D) (1) - the "general" citizen is largely "apathetic".
- it would be good if the citizens were at least more aware of what F.R.E.D. and the Boards are doing.
 - citizens get involved only to the point of self-interest, and even when personal interests exist, they will not always become active.
- (2) - Board members try to consider the needs of the community as a whole (Area): there is little emphasis on the region, less emphasis on service or interest groups and least emphasis on personal interest.

II.

- A) - the feasibility of plans and program suggestions is given preliminary, cursory, review at the ADB.
- advice is given by Field Agents, e.g. Manpower officer from Ashern and the Area "Ag-reps."; less participation from Soils and Crop Specialist: this is the universe of government Field Agents in this Area.

- the A.R.D.A. co-ordinator and the F.R.E.D. administrator also sit in on some meetings, in an advisory capacity like the Field Agents, but they only give information or opinions when they are asked to.
 - these "outside" technical opinions do carry weight in the ADB's decisions.
- B) - the major limit on ADB activities is not funds (they receive (\$1,500 for basic operating expenses and have been able to get an extra \$1,500 when they needed it for extra programs, etc.).
- the major limit is the number, variety and quality of new ideas which originate from the ADB at large; the chairman does most of the suggesting.
- C) - the ADB organizes around specific projects, e.g. organizing farm business classes, recreation developments for Lake St. Martin, veterinary clinics for Lundar, Arborg and Ashern.
- "community spirit" and material results are used to encourage member activity.

III.

- A) (1) - (i) there is a good information flow, both ways, between the administrators and the Board.
- the administrators use ADB input to the extent that flexibility of re-allocation of funds exists in the Plan, and to the extent that the ADB has considered the total regional effect of its proposals.
 - the administrators sat in on both ADB meetings and R.D.B. meetings.

(ii) politicians get good feedback from the ADB, indirectly (through the administrators) and directly (at Program Advisory Board meetings); although the politicians do not always make their actions clear directly, they are related, through the administrators back to the ADB's.

(2) - there has not been much change in the above relationship except that the administration tie has weakened in the last couple of years (since the Provincial Administrator's job was expanded).

- however, an increase in the importance of the information officer has taken up some of the slack.

B) - (inferred): effective input to the administration is cost, constraints, limits imposed by the original Plan's rigidity in parts (e.g. Selkirk's large share of grants), community reaction through ADB's and a regional perspective of problems.

- the Plan is largely organized around towns, and hopefully this perspective will eventually broaden to a more regional outlook.

C) (1) - originally, the Federal minister for the Plan and his political channels were most important.

NOTE: - heavy emphasis is made on the fact that the original surveys done before the Plan was drafted are the real key input to both the politicians and administrators.

- (2) - normal political channels exist through the political party system.
 - indirect communication occurs through local government district (LGD) administrators.
 - the Program Advisory Board (which used to meet once a year with both Ministers and MLA's) is now (since 1971) scheduled to meet twice a year, but it has not occurred yet this year.
- D) (1) - the ADB has contact with all local organizations, e.g. church and service groups' LGD administrators (since some ADB members also sit on the Citizens Advisory Board to the LGD administrator, they act as liaisons); local organizations such as women's groups, farmers' unions, and also ad hoc citizens groups organized around specific issues.
- (2) - the ADB provides technical and organizational support, but more importantly, also issues grants to finance the projects of these various groups in part or in whole.
 - (3) - (inferred): originally the ADB was more self-contained, but it tried to interact with these various groups as rapidly as it could.
- E) (1) - the general public does not become aware of F.R.E.D., etc. except when it comes into direct contact with a F.R.E.D. activity, in which F.R.E.D.'s participation is plainly spelled out and emphasized.
- there are many ways citizens could become informed, e.g. the ADB chairman posts minutes of meetings in prominent

places (he suspects they are not read anyway), F.R.E.D. sends out newsletters, articles in the "Stonewall Argus", and through personal contact.

(2) - the education system is largely at fault, since people lack a civic-responsibility attitude.

- F.R.E.D. and the ADB's are trying as hard as they can.

(3) - (i) most people are probably still referring to F.R.E.D. as A.R.D.A., i.e. they have not sorted out the name distinction, never mind the formal role distinction.

(ii) and (iii) people who use F.R.E.D. activities and projects will know about the activity per se much more than its connection to F.R.E.D.

IV.

A) - after only a few years, the various ADB's wanted contact with one another, since they could see that many of their problems were the same (in most respects); therefore, they began the Regional Development Board (quite distinct from the R.D.C.) to which each ADB contributed a certain amount of money that was primarily used for information dissemination (secretarial services regarding activities of the various ADB's and inter-ADB communication).

- although interest began to decline in the R.D.B., that Board was still maintained.

- then, the government initiated the R.D.C.

- after a year or so, it was seen that the R.D.C. was doing (or could do) much the same things as was the R.D.B., so the

R.D.B. was disbanded in early 1971.

- B) (1) - the ADB's are strictly advisory bodies within the F.R.E.D. administrative structure; they can suggest, but have no authority (or funds) to legislate their decisions.
- the R.D.C. can pay a full-time manager, is incorporated and, hence, has more "legislative-type" authority.
 - while the ADB perspective has expanded (to regional issues under R.D.C.), there is a role for both the R.D.C. and the ADB, since the ADB can operate even under the cumbersome-ness of large numbers of citizens (note its fluctuating size in this Area), while the R.D.C. can remain operative under a limited number of directors on regional (finance and program) issues.
 - associate memberships are allowed to ADB's for a \$25/year fee, so ADB's have formal as well as informal links with R.D.C.
- (2) - eventually the ADB and R.D.C. will merge, after the ADB's get voting membership on the R.D.C.'s Board of Directors (ADB is moving toward a more regional perspective anyway).
- the R.D.C. should eventually become a government administrative unit, to handle regional programs, i.e. the need for a local, regional government.
- C) - there has been no significant change in attitudes of towns and communities (they are still very much committed to the capitalist credo of survival of the fittest).
- there has been some strengthening of the natural internal boundaries of the region. (Inferred: areas or counties have

much more logical boundaries than municipalities, which are inefficient government units).

- (inferred): as communications increase, there is some increase in the awareness of the problems of other areas and towns.
- "community" has always been defined naturally (geographically) as the area between Lake Winnipeg and Lake Manitoba, as well as the common bond of a hard life to eke out a subsistence standard of living (which is still economically better than concentration and its consequence of farmers on welfare in Winnipeg):

V.

- A) (1) - centralization is not a good thing, but this is precisely what is happening to farmers.
 - industrial growth is only good if it betters conditions for the people.
- (2) - highway and school development had not occurred, and likely would not have occurred, without F.R.E.D., e.g. #6 highway paving.
- (3) - manpower programs have been the most significant accomplishment of F.R.E.D., having helped many people to upgrade themselves and attain higher (relative, not absolute) formal educational status.
 - community organization and communication have also improved very significantly.
- B) (1) - progress is not as good as Pre-Plan expectations, but in retrospect that could be anticipated since "we generally

set our hopes (and goals) higher than we can reach."

(NOTE: some people who had very high expectations have now dropped out of participation on the ADB).

- (2) - there is a limit to the standard of living and income level that the Interlake resources can provide the region's residents, but this has not been reached yet.
 - also, the declining population and increasing resources (such as recreation) have also expanded the potential levels of income and standards of living limits.
- C) - the region was always identified as it is now (under the Plan).
- the region resented Selkirk's inclusion in the Plan, and still does resent Selkirk (perhaps even more bitterly now than before) being called a part of the Interlake.

VI.

- A) (1) - interests have been grouped around towns.
- (2) - (inferred): since most problems are similar, there should not be too many disputes except on major questions, e.g. who gets sewer and water (i.e. a distributional question about the location of particular industrial developments, since the failure of Eriksdale to get sewer and water would eliminate it from competing with more "prosperous" towns like Teulon, if Teulon got sewer and water). In these cases, the administration tries to determine the "good of the region", although the real issue revolves around how "good" is defined.
- B) (1) - there has been no change in competitive relations except

that F.R.E.D. has not stopped the increasing concentration of wealth in some towns at the expense of the decline of others, e.g. Ashern grows at the expense of Eriksdale and Moosehorn; St. Martin is dying because "capitalism" encourages profit-maximizing and this means that this town is by-passed.

(2) - no; there is only increased disparity among old units, i.e. new units are growing from old as sizes become changed significantly in both directions (larger and smaller).

C) (1) - there has been a great decline in the number of church and school oriented type organizations in the community network.

- (inferred): the ADB and, to a lesser extent, the R.D.C. have become part of the region's organizational network.

(2) - the F.R.E.D. administration has stayed out of the organizational network, although it ties in indirectly through the ADB's.

VII.

A) - the R.D.C. and county councils will play the most significant part (after the re-organization of regional government) in the development of regional resource potential.

B) - ADB's will have to continue to have a regional perspective and gain full membership to the R.D.C. so that all of the various sub-regional interests can be merged.

C) - "apathy" on the part of the general public, which inhibits both change and development.

VIII.

- A) - the R.D.C. is presently, as well as the ADB.
 - there is some dispersal, since LGD's have full-time administrators to look after district issues.
- B) - if F.R.E.D. left today, the economic situation would likely revert to the same struggle it was prior to the Plan.
 - the community organizations, however, would likely remain (financed by the province), since the need for intra-region communication has been obviated and bonds have been established.
- C) - by 1977, the region should be able to stand on its own two feet, the community organizations for information exchange will remain, and no Plan will be needed as a follow-up.

NOTE: he admits he believes this mostly with his heart and that he is generally an eternal optimist.

IX. Additional Comments

- (1) - he feels that the designation of the Interlake as "depressed and uneducated" overemphasizes the point, e.g.
1. He feels the average level of educational achievement is biased, since it indicates only formal schooling. (Interviewer's Note: He is a prime example of an intelligent, self-educated person of Grade IV formal education).
 2. The Indians pull down the average because they try to be segregated and originally had a lower level of formal education and training than the whites in the Interlake.

ADB INTERVIEW NUMBER 6

I.

- A) - there are 25 members on the ADB, of which 12 to 15 normally attend (12 is the quorum--this meeting was cancelled because only 4 members turned up).
- membership is generally gained by a personal request of one of the ADB members that a particular person be added to the board either to replace himself or someone else, or just as an extra member.
- B) - the ADB members are generally "reasonably" successful people, but they are a cross-section (broadly representative) of the two towns (Riverton and Arborg) and the rural municipality contained in the Area, i.e. businessmen, farmers (mostly, since region and towns are highly dependent on agriculture).
- C) - most ADB members are also people who sit on other community organizations (e.g. farmers' unions, church groups, town council, etc.) and so they are recognized as being "accomplished" in their particular field, as well as for their community interest. (NOTE: the "accomplished" statement came from a non-Board member, while the "community interest" one came from the ADB members.)
- generally, abilities are best known to those who have business contacts with these people, e.g. farmer-to-farmer and/or implement dealer.
- D) (1) - the general local citizen does not become involved in ADB activity (they rarely even attend the public meetings to

air grievances).

- more general public interest would give the ADB more incentive and would lessen the heavy burden of civic service that a very limited number of people must bear.
- (2) - members view in some respects the good of the whole Area before personal interests, but there is a very strong town rivalry (Arborg - Riverton) which is apparent on the Board, is recognized by Board members, and is seen to be undesirable (now, however, both sides are waiting for the other to make the first move toward better relations.)

II.

- A) - the ADB relies very heavily on field agents from manpower and agriculturists to provide technical input on specific projects, e.g. types of courses to offer in adult education program.
 - they respect the opinions of these resource personnel highly.
- B) - the major source of limitation for ADB activities is not funds (they often under-spend and extra grants are available if they over-spend).
 - the major limitation is a Board member time constraint, i.e. the time that members can devote to organizing projects, "following-up on leads", etc.; since most ADB members spend a lot of time earning a living (e.g. farmers) and also devote time to other community organizations, e.g. town council.
- C) - the Board organizes around specific projects, e.g. manpower re-training, farm business courses, adult education courses, which it sponsors.

- incentive to participation is to make sure this Area gets as much of the funds and recognition it deserves relative to other Interlake Areas.

III.

- A) (1) - (i) the F.R.E.D. administrators seem to have fairly "fixed" (firmly established) ideas about desirable programs and projects before they come to the ADB's for reaction (consultation): "If we like it (a project), we get it; if we don't like it, we still get it!"
- (inferred): there is some secondary communication (effective input) of ADB, through the field agents for the administration.
 - (ii) in the first two years, there was the Program Advisory Board which was a good thing because all the Areas would send representatives to it who would really "lay it on the line" to the politicians.
 - (inferred): sometimes the citizen representatives "over-criticized" because they could not back down in front of the other ADB representatives there.
- (2) - the R.D.B. worked to some extent because certain points were acted upon and some changes were made . . . but then it was dissolved (for some unknown reason, probably because the politicians did not care for the "heat").
- the relationship between the ADB and the administrators has not changed much.

- B) - the F.R.E.D. administrators seem to "think for themselves":
the ADB members cannot identify the key input, but suspect that the administrators rely on a few people from the Interlake and their own judgement.
- C) (1) - at the political level, the relations between the Federal and Provincial governments on many problems "external" to the Interlake, e.g. agricultural market prices, have a lot to do with the type and degree of short-term programs that are implemented.
- the original Plan itself seems fairly "fixed" over the long run.
- (2) - few channels exist now to politicians from the ADB, except the (occasional) meetings called and sponsored by F.R.E.D. (administrative seminars) and through the R.D.C.
- D) (1) - the ADB has contact with nearly every formal group in the two towns and municipality.
- (2) - the contact is in two ways:
- (i) Most ADB members sit on at least one other local group or board and so they provide an informal link for communication and co-operation; and
- (ii) In many cases, local groups come to the ADB for financial help, e.g. the school board regarding adult education courses; youth groups for funds for tennis courts, etc. (these groups do receive assistance).
- there is little co-ordination or organization of other activities or groups by the ADB.

- (3) - the contact mix and types of relation have not and are not expected to change.
- E) (1) - the general public learns of F.R.E.D. by contact with projects, etc., inter-action with people who work on F.R.E.D. projects or sit on ADB and to some extent through the newspapers in the Interlake. (NOTE: Although the Lake Center News has an "office" in Arborg, little news from the Area seems to appear in the paper after it has been submitted.)
- (2) - the individual citizen himself should try a little harder to be informed regarding F.R.E.D., although there is little incentive for this, since most people seem to think F.R.E.D. does more surveys and studies, than actual projects.
- (3) - the local citizen is reasonably aware of F.R.E.D. as an organization, but is not nearly as aware of its projects unless directly involved with them.

IV.

- A) - there has been some increase in communication among ADB's resulting in an increased understanding of the problems they all face (although the communication has not increased nearly to the extent that intra-Area communication has).
- the basic mode of communication is the information services of F.R.E.D., e.g. newsletters, etc., and this ADB uses some of the ideas it gets from the experience of other ADB's.
- the various Boards have always supported each other's motions

and reports to outside groups or bodies.

- B) (1) - the R.D.C. has representatives from each municipality and so there seems to be some overlap in terms of information input.
- (2) - there is room for both the R.D.C. and ADB in the region, since the R.D.C. can go after big programs like industry, manpower, recreation, etc. (because it can afford to hire a full-time manager), while on the other hand, the ADB's are good to help solve the problems "peculiar" to the various Areas (more local and personal).
- the relationship should be one of mutual co-operation, since the R.D.C. has offered its services to the ADB.
 - "The R.D.C. seems to get at problems. We get copies of their minutes and they seem to 'do things'."
- C) - various communities know a little more about one another's problems now.
- in terms of towns, there is a strong competition and animosity, e.g. Fisher Branch left this Board to form a new one even though Arborg - Riverton - Fisher Branch are a "natural" community.
 - Interlakers have, and will continue to have, a resentment to the inclusion of Selkirk as part of the Interlake in the Plan; "Selkirk is just a suburb of Winnipeg".

V.

- A) (1) to (3) - it is hard to say how much improvement has occurred in terms of manpower training, highways etc.

- the Plan has been successful in that the F.R.E.D. administration was only expecting a very small proportion of the population to take part in upgrading, etc., and so while the absolute numbers of participants may seem small, it is large relatively speaking.
 - these programs are also useful because, even if they do not help train the people, they provide extra income for the individuals to spend in the Area during the off-season (winter).
 - if people want to better themselves, they will work at these courses rather than just going to collect the money.
- B) (1) - progress is fairly good from the ADB's viewpoint, although many local citizens think a lot less surveys and more actual product could come out of \$85 million.
- (2) - (i) the Area has a lot of trouble just keeping pace.
- even when the number of farmers declined, so did grain prices and so the people left are not really that much better off.
 - improvement can occur, but it will always be hard to earn your living in the Interlake.
- C) - there is no significant change; it is still how well the various towns of the region are prospering.

VI.

- A) (1) - "needs" under the Plan are broadly grouped by the Areas,

but it basically comes down to a focus on the towns.

- (2) - the problem itself brings two similar interest groups or Areas together once it has been communicated between them.
 - F.R.E.D. solves disputes by usually having decided what the answer will be ("fixed" the program) before the arguments have even been "aired".
- B) (1) - towns are still strongly competitive, but in sub-areas they are beginning to realize that this competition has caused losses to all sides, and so in the future, Arborg and Riverton hope to get working together better (neither side wants to take the initiative).
 - no new competition (although they would rather see Gimli develop than Selkirk).
 - "F.R.E.D has definitely resulted in an east-west division in the Interlake".
- C) (1) - (inferred): ADB's have helped to increase the communication among local (Area) organizations and groups because so many people sit on the ADB and other boards; the ADB has become a key link in the community's organizational network.
 - (2) - the F.R.E.D. administration per se has not tried to become a part of this network, i.e. field agencies are advisory to ADB; F.R.E.D. administration is directive.

VII.

- A) - the government, by stabilizing or meeting "external" problems will play the most critical part.

- B) - no, except that the R.D.C. will likely become more prominent.
- C) - "external" factors, e.g. agricultural product prices, as established by international (uncontrollable) markets, initiate change.

VIII.

- A) - the R.D.C. is the agency through which the promotion of community development must be focussed.
 - various other bodies promote local development, on the basis of their own specific interests, e.g. farmers' unions, town or municipal councils, etc.
- B) - (inferred): the R.D.C. would probably still function with an increase in area representation, since the ADB's would dissolve.
- C) - the government will develop policy for the Interlake on the basis of external conditions as outlined in VII.C. above.

IX. Additional Comments

- (1) - By-laws were given to the ADB's by the administration in the form of "terms of reference", and, although they can be amended by the ADB, they are not amended very often; yet, these rules are followed religiously.
- (2) - Meetings are held on the first Wednesday of every month, and the place of meeting alternates between Riverton and Arborg.
- (3) - NOTE: Attached is a set of minutes of the Bifrost Area Development Board Meeting held on June 2nd, 1971 in the Bifrost Municipal Offices at Arborg.

MINUTES of the BIFROST AREA DEVELOPMENT BOARD MEETING held on June 2nd, 1971 in the Bifrost Municipal Offices at Arborg.

Attended by: D. M. Barr, M.D.A. Arborg
 Fed Slavinsky, M.D.C. Winnipeg
 Tom Magnusson, Manpower, Arborg

Paul S. Holyk, Chairman	Peter Loewen
Jim Craig	Ken Reid
H. I. Finnson	Joe Klym
T. E. Finnson	Cliff Holm
Philip Orzach	Steve Gislason
Ken Foster	John Klassen, Secretary

The Chairman, Paul Holyk, had the minutes of the May 4th board meeting read.

MOTION: THAT the minutes be accepted. Moved, H. I. Finnson
 Sec., Cliff Holm CARRIED

1. Adult Education Dougie Barr reported on the Bifrost Education Board's cash flow:

<u>Income</u>	
4 creative Arts classes 47 members 42 @ \$10, 1 at \$5	425.00
A.D.B. Grant	500.00
2 Typing courses 11 & 10 members @ \$10.	210.00
4 Stretch and Sew Courses 44 & 49 members @ \$20.	1,860.00
1 Basic Sewing 13 members @ \$5.	65.00
Creative Arts--Receivable 4 @ \$10	40.00
1 Sewing with Knits 33 members @ \$2.	66.00
1 Speed reading 8 members @ \$10.	80.00
Small motors two sessions - no income	
108 Sessions for 215 Students paid in fees	<u>\$3,246.00</u>
<u>Expenses</u>	
2 Typing courses (Instructors)	280.00
4 Stretch and Sew 1860 and (93x3)	2,139.00
1 Basic Sewing	65.00
4 Creative Arts Classes 480 x 120	600.00
Subsidy 42 at \$3	126.00
Payable 5 x \$3	15.00
1 Sewing with Knits	60.00
1 Small motors (Instructor)	22.40
Speed Reading	???
	<u>\$3,307.40</u>
	-61.40
If refund \$80. from 8 members	<u>80.00</u>
	141.40

Discussion: The Education Board is disappointed that the sources of income referred to last fall have not yielded any money. They applied several

-2-

times to the Department of Education via the Evergreed Division Office in Gimli but these applications were not even acknowledged.

- Steve Gislason noted that Bifrost Education Board members had spent considerable time and mileage in serving the case of adult education. He felt better co-ordination was needed between those who donated their time and those who were paid. Reference was made to time lost in waiting for government personnel to appear and to the unsatisfactory speed reading course instruction in which it was felt that Mr. Peter Thiessen had not provided instruction as he had promised.

- Education Board Membership: The Education Board members indicated they would like to see a new Board. In the discussion the meeting agreed that Paul Holk would assist in the Riverton area and Joe Klym in the Arborg area. Mr. Alfred Thompson was suggested to also enter the Education Board.

- Appreciation was expressed to the Board for its efforts in the first and difficult season. It was hoped that the experience gained would be an aid in adult education in the future.

- The Area Board agreed to pay mileage claimed on expense forms by members of the Education Board.

- Mr. Fred Slavinsky requested a written report on the adult education courses held so far. He also suggested regarding requests for grant for adult education:

- a) That a request be submitted on the provided forms for courses already given, and
- b) That the Board send in request forms for courses promptly and as often as any are being planned even if the enrollment, etc., can only be estimated.

- Mr. Barr repeated his contention that the local extension office could not be accused of lack of co-operation (April 7 minutes). This was not disputed in the meeting.

- MOTION: THAT the Bifrost Area Development Board pay \$225.00 to the Education Board at this time. Moved by H. T. Finnson

Seconded by Joe Klym CARRIED

- Methods of assisting or subsidizing adult education other than by straight \$3.00 refunds was discussed. Perhaps that now board will suggest guidelines.

2. Reports by Tom Magnusson

- a) He had calculated that roadway clearing on Grindstone came to about \$533.00 per acre.
 - This job could not have been done by big machines because of muskeg.
 - Most of the crew were fishermen who were required to work there in order to qualify for fishermen compensation.
 - Some would have been on welfare without this job.
 - This employment project had been of real economic benefit to Riverton.
- b) Tom has a farm employment listing service going at Fisher Branch and at Arborg.

3. Request by the Hecla Board to support their resolution regarding policing of the island was read.

MOTION: THAT our Board support the Hecla Board resolution with letters to

-3-

Mr. Sam Uskiw and Mr. Bill Uruski. Moved by P. Loewen
Seconded by Ken Foster CARRIED

4. P. Loewen reported that at its meeting on May 10th the Regional Board had dissolved itself and had refunded its assets to the Area Boards. (Our board received \$6.65).
5. Ken Reid reported for the I.D.C. They are presently concerned about the spiralling costs of health and welfare. They will be considering this matter with other Regional Corporations. Probably will ask the government for a Royal Commission on the question.

MOTION: THAT the next ADB meeting be held on September 1 at Riverton
Moved by P. Loewen
Seconded by Joe Klym CARRIED

MOTION: THAT the meeting adjourn. Moved by T. E. Finnson
Seconded by Ken Reid CARRIED

ADB INTERVIEW NUMBER 7

I.

- A) - there are between 15 and 20 members on the ADB.
- people are chosen in every district in the Area, by the district council or a popular election, to represent that district on the Board.
 - it really turns out to be almost on a volunteer basis, with the only real election being that of the Chairman, Vice-president, and Secretary-treasurer at the annual meeting (by the ADB members).
 - there are 3 or 4 members who are appointed to the Board by the town councils of Gimli, on the request of the Board.
- B) - ADB members (from districts outside of the three major towns) are generally, though not always, farmers.
- the "volunteer" nature of ADB membership means that those who do sit on the Board are usually the type of people who normally get involved in community and civic activity.
- C) - while the occupational qualities of ADB members may be known throughout the community, it is their willingness to do "civic-minded" type jobs that is better known.
- D) (1) - the general citizen sometimes brings a grievance to the ADB, but not that often.
- also, some citizens do turn up at the general meeting.
 - most "citizen" involvement comes indirectly, by means of contact with other local organizations, which become involved with F.R.E.D. (just as with even more specific

local projects, the "general public" only gets involved if there is some kind of personal gain to be derived, and sometimes not even then).

- (2) - the members of the ADB are very strongly role-cast as representatives of their geographic districts, and so they tend to be parochial in that respect.
- however, if a project can be logically shown to them to be beneficial to the whole Area or region, they will support it even though one district may benefit more than another.

II.

- A) - the Board will invite the government "experts", from field agents to the Federal Co-ordinator and Provincial Administrator, to provide technical information.
- these technical opinions bear import on local opinions, but certainly do not outweigh the local opinion, e.g. "They (technicians) may know what's more efficient or feasible from a mechanical point of view, but the ADB members provide the input of knowing the basics, the human environment, at the local level. So we (experts and locals) get together and 'hammer out' a solution that's acceptable to both sides."
- B) - this ADB does not sponsor "activities", although a prime constraint on most individual members is the heavy demand from their occupations, other organizations, etc. for time.
- C) - the Board organizes around providing "feedback" to F.R.E.D. on the Plan.

- members are kept involved by the incentive of a learning experience, the reward of being kept informed of what is going on ("inside information") by the F.R.E.D. administration and by the physical presence of F.R.E.D. achievements, e.g. highways, schools, Hecla Island development, etc.

III.

- A) (1) - (i) The ADB sees its primary raison d'être as an advisory body at the local level, to the F.R.E.D. administrators.
- to the extent that the points raised and suggested changes in the Plan recommended by the Board are not too parocíal to a district or the Area, the Board feels their words are listened to, which is only right since a project as big as F.R.E.D. (comprehensive) has to deal with the needs of the whole region, not just parocíal local-interest projects. For example, "Our (R.D.B. and ADB) priority as established by the very first meetings in 1966 were that education, in its broadest sense, was to be the first goal - and the administration saw to it that it was." (education defined to include everything from Grade I to manpower re-training to adult education)
 - in the other direction, the administration constantly keeps the Board informed regarding changes, developments, future directions, etc. so that the Board considers itself to be well-informed.
- (ii) the ADB's have "ready access" to all politicians at

the provincial level, e.g. the Ministers related to F.R.E.D. (Agriculture, Industry and Commerce, etc.), MLA's and at the Federal level, they have contact with the MP's for the region but not the Cabinet Ministers; whenever the "locals" feel an issue is important enough to require such direct political contact (NOTE: locally initiated communication which is issue-oriented).

(2) - (inferred): the essence of the relationship has not changed significantly since 1966, except that certain individuals have less time to come to all the ADB meetings now (e.g. the Provincial Administrator) but they do send substitutes either from F.R.E.D. staff or the Dept. of Agriculture.

B) - the ADB's opinions, technical feasibility, cost constraints and a regional perspective (i.e. what will be best for the region as a whole) seem to be the major inputs to the administration.

C) (1) - (inferred): the F.R.E.D. administration is the major input to the politicians, while local opinions via ADB's and political processes (parties, etc.) are also considered, but to a lesser degree.

(2) - the direct channel of requesting a meeting is available to ADB's (and so it is indirectly available to any "concentred" citizen).

- political channels (parties) are also available.

D) (1) - this ADB has contact with almost every local organization, community club or service group in either the towns or

rural districts.

(2) - the relationship is one of communication and information exchange, done informally by ADB members, who also sit on these other organizations (liaisons) and formally, by virtue of the fact that these organizations are all put on the F.R.E.D. mailing list, so that they have first hand knowledge of F.R.E.D. programs.

- the ADB sees that these groups handle most community projects and so does not itself run projects, lest it might be redundant.

NOTE: - he does indicate that in some of the other Areas, where the Areas do not have the large number of local organizations and service groups that Gimli has, the ADB must expand its role of advisor to that of administrator and also become an activist for community projects, e.g. Camper-Gypsumville ADB; in still other Areas, where local clubs and organizations exist, but are not co-ordinated, the ADB then acts as an integrator/co-ordinator and also provides its own activities (besides its advisory role), e.g. Bifrost.

(3) - not much change has occurred in this relationship, nor is any expected (unless drastic changes occur in the number and/or type of service groups).

E) (1) - the general public becomes aware of the activities and projects of F.R.E.D. through:

- (i) their direct use of and contact with projects;
- (ii) their communication with citizens involved with

- F.R.E.D. projects (e.g. ADB members);
 - (iii) information passed along by the service clubs, organizations, etc.;
 - (iv) the information services of F.R.E.D. (e.g. newsletter); and
 - (v) the many press releases in local newspapers.
- (2) - F.R.E.D. seems to have taken on the task although it is the job of everyone (including the local citizen himself).
- (3) - (i) at the outset of the Plan, most people probably knew about F.R.E.D. (what it was), because of all the publicity the administration made sure the Plan got.
- some of the people may now have forgotten.
 - (ii) right now more people would probably know about the F.R.E.D. projects (what F.R.E.D. does) because the Plan is in the project development and implementation stage, so that this gets the most publicity now.

IV.

- A) - the ADB's were all brought together by the administration right at the outset of the Plan (almost before the Plan), to help set program priorities.
- after that, the ADB's did their own separate "things" for a year or two, then the ADB's decided they should get together and meet every so often to discuss issues of mutual concern.
 - it worked for a while because the exchange of problems and ideas created a better understanding of the region as a whole.

- however, there seemed to be some "empire building" going on, and the R.D.B. was having too many meetings for no reason at all (as much as one per month last year) - "So we decided that it would be best if we disbanded the formal meetings, but we left ourselves the opportunity to call an R.D.B. meeting at any time, even now, if a problem of regional concern arises."

NOTE: - Some of the regional understanding has filtered down to the local community through the liaisons but it is hard to say just how much has.

- B) (1) - the ADB's and R.D.C. are two completely different things, even though some people think that their activities overlap.
- the ADB's were created under the Plan as advisory boards to the F.R.E.D. administration at the local level.
 - the purposes of the R.D.C. are:
 - (i) to try to attract industry to the Interlake by publicizing the good features of the region;
 - (ii) to act as a technical unit to provide town and rural municipal councils with information on the technical aspects of development projects (the type of information beyond the reach of any single council); and
 - (iii) to help distribute industry within the region.
- (2) - in the future the ADB's will continue to act as an advisory body of local opinion, and there is nothing in the Plan which says that they need only advise the administration,

i.e. the ADB's will also provide local informational input to the R.D.C.

- C) - there has been an increased understanding of the whole region, although Interlakers still feel that Selkirk is not a part of the Interlake, but is a "suburb" of Winnipeg.
- geographically, even Stonewall is not really part of the Interlake, but at least many of its problems are rural and common to those of the rest of the Interlake.
 - if the Plan were drawn up today (instead of 1967), Selkirk probably would not be included because all of southern Manitoba can get D.R.E.E. aid, i.e. Selkirk's inclusion was political, to get it an industrial attraction advantage over Winnipeg.

V.

- (1) to (3) - many improvements have come through the F.R.E.D. Plan, which would never have occurred otherwise or may not have come for a long time, e.g. #6 highway paving, schools.
- the problem is that once people have had a "material" benefit for a year or so, they think they have had it all their lives and so are not as appreciative of F.R.E.D. as they should be.
 - "There are other non-physical things, like community spirit, education and side-benefits not measurable, which are probably more important over time, that result from those material-oriented programs--that's the real achievement of F.R.E.D."

- B) (1) - the progress to date in some respects is even better than Pre-Plan expectations: "not so much in the material gains (although they are definitely there) but more in terms of the 'unmeasurables' that we didn't anticipate".
- (2) - significant changes in income levels and standards of living can come, and they will probably come faster, because it is always hardest to start the ball rolling in the "backward" parts of the region, e.g. in some of the places where there is no sewer and water, the towns are starting to ask for it: then one or two farms will put it in, a few neighbours visit that farm and see what they are missing and so they get it put in, and so on.
- "Not all of the changes in income levels or living standards can be credited to F.R.E.D., because many were and are bound to occur; but there is no doubt that F.R.E.D. had a lot to do with speeding up such favourable changes."
- C) - not much change has occurred in the internal competitive structure, except now there is less animosity in the struggles of where an industry is to be placed, because the towns figure that even when they do not get an industry, if another near-by town does, there is still benefit to them and the region.
- although competition is still strong, there exists a primary desire to at least get an industry to locate somewhere in the region, rather than outside of it.
- some Interlakers are also quite proud of the fact that the F.R.E.D. Plan seems to have worked better here than in other

parts of the country (such as Quebec and the Maritimes), as far as they can tell from the comments of out-of-province Ministers and visitors who have toured the region.

VI.

- A) (1) - needs have been recognized as common to the whole Area, and particular circumstances are organized on the basis of individual Areas, which includes interests (such as low income) of towns and municipalities.
- (2) - in the final analysis, decisions on interest conflicts are not dealt with by the administrators, since they give their most concentrated attention to problems of import to the whole region, rather than parochial local issues.
- B) (1) - there has been no mellowing of inter-town competitive relationships, but the towns are more aware that at the most basic level, they must ensure that industry comes to the Interlake; towns now appreciate this fact and so there is not as much animosity behind the competition.
- (2) - Gimli seems to be expanding as a real growth node for the region. "We get people who live here even though they work in Arborg and at the same time, our nearness to Winnipeg (one hour) allows people to live here and work there."
- C) (1) - in some of the Areas, e.g. Camper-Gypsumville, you find that the ADB's are filling the "gap" which exists because there are few or no service groups, community clubs, etc. (besides their normal advisory role), whereas in Gimli

that added role is not necessary for the ADB: in Gimli, the ADB's role is tied solely to its function as a communication unit in the F.R.E.D. Plan, i.e. the ADB co-ordinates similar F.R.E.D. Plan and service projects, but does not directly administer them.

- (2) - no, except to the extent of the information distribution directly to local groups by F.R.E.D., which is really more related to better local awareness of F.R.E.D. to improve the quality and quantity of feedback.

VII.

- A) - the R.D.C. will become more prominent by providing local councils and Boards with technical information, which the councils do not have the time to gather themselves, by promoting the region to outside interests and developers, and by acting as an information-placement service to help developers distribute industry to the "most desirable" locations in the region, i.e. they can tell developers which towns have the services best suited to a particular industry.
- B) - no; the unit as it now exists works well with the ADB's acting in an advisory capacity, from the local level to the administration.

NOTE: - "At first I wondered about why they (administrators) were going out of their way so much to push local involvement - but it's starting to become clearer and make more sense now. I think Interlakers know and say more about

F.R.E.D. than any other government project that's ever been done out here."

- C) - ADB advice seems to initiate change, in addition to the normal or natural process of change.
- (inferred): the close contact the administration has with the ADB's and the ADB's informal ties with local groups and organizations seems to stabilize things.

VIII.

- A) - there is no single focal point for development, since different bodies are responsible for the promotion of particular interests and (be they geographically centered, as with town councils, or centered on an activity interest promotion, like the farmers' union) in some areas, the ADB's have really been training people for community groups, since no service clubs or community groups presently exist.
- B) - if F.R.E.D. were removed today, the rate of development of the region would slow down, but the direction and certain intangible benefits of the material programs, such as improved education and an increased number of local organizations could not, and would not, be removed with it.
- C) - in some Areas, the dissolution of the ADB's (since they are a creature of the Plan) would result in these same people forming community clubs, etc. to take care of the problems that they have come to realize exist at the local level, because of their involvement on the ADB.
- people have gained an education in civic activity and it

will not evaporate when the Plan ends; instead, they will use their training in a "re-directed" way.

ADB INTERVIEW NUMBER 8

I.

- A) - membership is gained by election from the floor at the annual general meeting, open to the public (about 50 people usually turn out), held in St. Laurent.
- there is one person appointed to the Board: the "administrator" of the rural municipality of St. Laurent.
 - there are 14 Board members and each serves a 2-year term, i.e. 7 are elected each year.
- B) - ADB members are from all walks of life, e.g. farmers, business, labour, Metis, i.e. like the community, the ADB is a large mixture of various types of people, although "many of the members are from the middle and upper income class" and "there are 3 or 4 Metis on the ADB, although more than 50% (he said 90%) of the people in the district are Metis."
- C) - most of the ADB members are fairly prominent in the community or segments of it, and so are generally "known" (with respect to ability and accomplishments).
- D) (1) - the "general" citizen becomes involved in three ways:
- (i) at the general meeting to elect ADB members;
 - (ii) by participating in F.R.E.D. program activities, e.g. bush clearing; and
 - (iii) by sitting on the ADB sub-committees.
- (2) - ADB members do not represent service groups (since they are not appointed by them, but are elected at large; even if they do coincidentally belong to a particular service

group.

- although self-interest sometimes plays a part in motivating people to come on the ADB, their decisions show a general concern for the "community" at large. ("Community" was originally defined as the Area, but now is expanded to include the whole Interlake region.)

II.

- A) - there are three means of obtaining technical information for the Board's decisions:

- (i) individual members themselves generally have some technical knowledge of the Area they are working in, e.g. agricultural proposals, so that they can at least identify solutions to problems which might be feasible and would resolve the problem;
- (ii) sub-committees of the ADB sometimes hire outside professional services, e.g. industry committee hired a lawyer for \$700 to help draft proposals. The ADB will call on the professionals available to them through various government departments, e.g. if a proposal is being drafted regarding F.R.E.D., then the ADB will request a F.R.E.D. official to attend the meeting; if the Board needs an engineer for a water resources proposal, then they will ask for one to attend from Natural Resources; and
- (iii) the Board will submit its proposals to the government, where the "experts", who know what is possible and

what might be acceptable to local citizens and the whole region, assess the "feasibility" of the project proposal.

- B) - money is to some extent a limit on ADB activity in general (and more so in recent times), since the Board would like to help finance outside projects with other groups, but can only do so presently to the extent that it can save funds from its operating expenses grant (\$1,500), e.g. last year the ADB helped finance only one project with its own money: the Metis dental clinic renovation (although a few other requests were received).
- C) - the ADB is organized around 4 sub-committees:
- (i) industry;
 - (ii) agriculture;
 - (iii) water control; and
 - (iv) tourism.
- numbers (i) and (ii) are the most active and prominent sub-committees.
- these sub-committees look at projects that the Board could undertake in the Area, do studies, submit them to the Board and then submit them to the government.
- there are members of the ADB as well as "interested citizens" who sit on these sub-committees.
- the initiating incentive is often personal self-interest, but additional incentive, in terms of feedback from government regarding feasibility as well as productivity, keeps these groups going.

III.

- A) (1) - (i) the F.R.E.D. administration, for the most part, has pre-established its programs for the region, then the administrators come to the Board and "test the ideas out on us" to get a feel of community reaction; they go to all the Boards in the region and then somehow fit it together and gauge the overall response.
- they do make some adjustments in the particulars of programs, but do not make any major changes, either from the Boards' reactions or from the Boards' own (novel) suggestions, i.e. "We're sort of used just for feedback, you might say."
- (ii) the ADB's relation to the politicians is not as strong, because "we only see them once a year at a general meeting, where representatives from all the ADB's meet with some of the Provincial Cabinet Ministers (we've rarely seen a Federal Minister)."
- the meetings were originally supposed to be held twice a year, but it is usually just once a year.
 - there is also some indirect contact through both the administration and political parties, although it is less significant, and the political parties seem to do more harm than good.
- (2) - in recent years, the relationship between the administrators and the ADB's has been dropping off: "They don't seem to come out to our meetings as often as they used to, especially during the early years. Mind you, maybe it's

because we aren't inviting them--I guess it's a little the fault of both sides. Also, we've required their attendance less and less as we've gained more experience in handling our own affairs."

- "We haven't seen as much of the politicians since this government (NDP) came to office. They don't come around as much as the others did; that's not very good."

B) - the F.R.E.D. administrators seem to be concerned with what's best for the whole region, what's feasible (possible) in a particular Area, and which Area can handle particular programs best.

- "They use us for 'feedback' more so than as an original idea input."

C) (1) - most of the decisions are made by the province on the specific programs (although they must get approval from the Federal government).

- while political considerations are important (whether an Area elected a member of your party), this only helps speed up or increase their "push and speed" to get a proposal through the legislature; like most government representatives, the politicians seem to rely heavily on the administrators for their decisions on programs. "Often the Deputy Minister knows more about what's going on than the Minister."

(2) - there are the annual meetings with the Cabinet which are effective to the extent that they get feedback from us.

- "If we want to propose something specifically to the

politicians, we go directly to them; sometimes you have to go two, three or four times to get action, but eventually we seem to get results", e.g. "The building of an elementary school in St. Laurent, (which the government had decided not to do) occurred after the ADB had got the Minister of Education to come out and inspect (and get lost in) the 'firetraps' we used to have as an elementary school."

- political parties are also a channel, although they tend to do more harm than good because they can apply pressure to do something even when it will not help the whole community and is not the best solution for a problem.

- D) (1) - there is no real formal contact with other local groups: informal link because some ADB members also sit on other community boards.
- (2) - usually the ADB provides organizational know-how to other groups, acts as a channel to government for proposals and funds, and sometimes provides its own funds to help co-provide a service, e.g. Metis dental clinic renovation.
- (3) - the ADB is more and more becoming recognized as the "key link" of the local citizens to the government, and more and more groups (of non-government nature) are starting to turn to the ADB to help co-ordinate their activities, co-administer projects and integrate the similar functions of various unrelated groups in the community.
- it is expected that the ADB will grow in prominence in the Area vis-à-vis the other groups and organizations

relying on it.

- E) (1) - the general public mainly becomes aware through personal contact with people (friends, neighbours) involved in specific activities; secondly, information also comes through the newspapers (Flyer, Free Press, Farm Weekly).
- (2) - it is sort of a mutual responsibility among F.R.E.D., ADB's and the local citizen himself.
- (3) - (i) originally the local citizen knew more about what F.R.E.D. was than what it was doing, because he had great expectations about what the Plan could (or would) do. "\$85 million sounds like a lot originally, until you figure it out over the whole region and over 10 years. A lot of people figured we were going to get something for nothing."
- now that the program has been operating for a while, people are more familiar with what F.R.E.D. does, than with what F.R.E.D. is.

IV.

- A) - "About a year after the Plan began, one of the ADB's in the region suggested in a letter that we all get together, so we began to send representatives to a meeting with the other ADB's."
- "The Regional Meetings Board (R.D.B.) was disbanded last April, because it looked like the R.D.C. would handle the same kind of things."

- the real purpose of the R.D.B. was to increase the understanding among the ADB's (in terms of a regional perspective) "so that we could better understand one another's situations and work together on projects of a regional nature."
- there is also some communication between Boards, e.g. "we support other Boards, if we think they have a good (project) proposal, and sometimes we can use the ideas we get from them."

- B) (1) - the ADB and R.D.C. handle the same kind of problems in general, e.g. agriculture, industry, etc., except that the R.D.C.'s concern is more with the whole region, while the ADB's concentration is more local.

NOTE: He did not seem too certain about exactly what the R.D.C. is involved in.

- (2) - presently the ADB's can sit on the R.D.C. and listen, but do not have a vote (each municipality has a voting member on the R.D.C., "in our case it's the municipal administrator who also is on the ADB.")
- some municipalities have a municipal council and a couple of towns, so that an Area like the Central Interlake would have 6 R.D.C. representatives: 2 from the Rural Municipality of Rockwood, 2 from Woodlands, 1 from Teulon and 1 from Stonewall.
 - the present arrangement, of ADB representatives not being able to vote at the R.D.C., will have to change or else the ADB's will have to go.
 - there is a definite role for both the R.D.C. and ADB's

in the future, as defined by regional and local interest, respectively.

- C) - there has gradually been an increasing awareness of the "region", as opposed to just local concerns, although where two towns of almost equal size and strength exist near one another, there is still quite a battle between them.
- much of this change in attitude was initiated by F.R.E.D. through the ADB's and the regional emphasis in the Plan's programs.

V.

- A) (1) to (3) - there has been an acceptable improvement in all of these things.
- there has been more and faster improvement than what would have occurred without F.R.E.D.
- B) (1) - "A lot of people thought we would get more than we got, i.e. 'something for nothing', because \$85 million seemed to be an awful lot of money." (Inferred: however, now that we think more carefully about what we did get, it is still satisfying, even if it isn't physically as much as we thought, e.g. community organization through ADB's, which isn't something you can just buy.)
- (2) - more increases can occur, but whether they do or not has a lot to do with the opportunities available for, and the desires of the "kids", since the current generation will not be around that long, to encourage further changes.
- C) (1) - there was a definite split between the east and west sides

of the Interlake at the beginning, because most of the money seemed to be spent on the west side (e.g. Hecla Island, Winnipeg Beach), but that feeling has been changing and it looks like there will be more spent on the east side in the future (especially since the north, along #6 highway has been opening up).

- (2) - "We used to compare our standard of living just locally (if you stay on the land long enough, all you can see after a while is the bush in front of you), but now we tend to compare ourselves to Winnipeg."

VI.

- A) (1) - local interest seems to have been classified very generally, at least in this Area "because we were a special case (the Metis' proportion)".
- (2) - just by the "feasibility" of the various proposals (by Area within the region).
- B) (1) - this Area has not changed much, but then, remember that this Area is equivalent to the municipality (St. Laurent), i.e. it is all of one and only one municipality, and the only other town of any size is Oakpoint, which does not have the population to compete with St. Laurent.
- there is a more prominent concern now to support other towns in getting things which this town could not get anyway, but which still help the Interlake.
- (2) - no.

- C) (1) - the ADB has become the central unit of all government organizations in this Area, and is also becoming the same for non-government (services and social) groups and organizations.
- (2) - the F.R.E.D. administrators are seen, not as an organizational unit, but rather as individuals who originally offered and now can be called upon for advice and aid, i.e. they have not tried to, and have not become, a "local" institution.

VII.

- A) - (inferred): the ADB will help organize and co-ordinate other agencies and organizations in the Area, as well as initiating proposals for programs as they now do (similarly, the R.D.C. at the regional level), e.g. suggesting changes in agricultural programs, promoting industrial development, etc.
- B) - the ADB's are coming to rely less and less on the administration to initiate activities or ideas (in most areas) and to do the work of organizing in the community.

VIII.

- A) - the ADB's at the local level (Area).
 - the R.D.C. at the regional level.
 - towns themselves, where they are large enough.
 - in some municipalities, through the administrator.
- B) - the Provincial government would probably make up most of the difference in terms of funds spent in the region, so there

would be little change in the situation.

- C) - in 1977, there will probably be another Plan, but this time it will cover a larger region and may even take in the whole Province.

IX. Additional Comments

- (1) - "The ADB elections parallel government elections, where the best man may not always win because two "good" men may split the vote and a "slacker" may get in--but what can you do."
 - the structure of the ADB is established such that the President and executive are elected by the ADB members at the annual meeting after the election of new people to the Board.
- (2) - "I think we have good participation by the general public (and good awareness), especially when you compare the turn-out we get at a general meeting to the turn-out at some of the other Area meetings, e.g. Central Interlake."
- (3) - the Interlake is geographically defined as the Area between Lakes Winnipeg and Manitoba, and so has its natural boundary at Woodlands ridge, which runs through Balmoral and actually excludes Stonewall from the region.
 - "We don't mind Stonewall being included, because many of their problems are similar to ours and programs like the drainage one have helped much of their good land, but Selkirk is definitely not a part of the Interlake--it's just a suburb of Winnipeg."
 - "Gradually, the people are beginning to accept such government defined, unnatural boundaries of the region, because

there's not much we can do about it." (Inferred: Operationally, these boundaries will never become "real" ones and will never be wholly accepted.)

APPENDIX C

INTERVIEWS

This appendix contains six interviews with "key" individuals in the Plan's implementation, as well as one interview with a representative of a group that is largely ignored by the Plan, the Indians. The interviews are referenced in the text of the thesis as "Interviews No. 1 - 7". The same conditions, regarding the independent nature and confidentiality of each interview, apply to this set of interviews as were applied to the ADB interviews in Appendix B. Since these interviews (Appendix C) are not "coded" to a general topical basis format, a list of "topics" is presented at the start of each interview.

INTERVIEW NUMBER 1

TOPICS

1. Boards: Operation and D.R.E.E. Involvement
 - a) Joint Federal-Provincial Advisory
 - b) Area Development
2. Federal Government's Role in Implementation
3. Problems Encountered During Implementation
 - a) Time constraints
 - b) Political-administrative conflicts (federal)
 - c) Political-political conflicts (federal vs. provincial governments)
 - d) Intra-administrative conflicts (federal)
4. Successes of Plan
 - a) Learning process of administrative co-ordination
 - b) Model for citizen participation
 - c) Education of general public
 - d) Innovative ability
 - e) Tangible successes
5. References

1. Boards: Operation and D.R.E.E. Involvement

a) Joint Federal-Provincial Advisory Board

- this board meets twice yearly and its purpose is to review progress, and hear suggestions, from the two Plan co-managers, regarding new thrusts for the Plan. i.e. "general overview", not detailed implementation function: e.g. the Hecla Island causeway was not spelled out in the original Plan, but was put forth as a provincial idea (prospective proposal) at one of these meetings.
- any changes in program "thrusts" have to be justified at this board since it is responsible for the re-allocation of funds between major categories in the Plan.
- the initiation of or recommendation for new thrusts is always the responsibility of the provincial group of administrators.

b) Area Development Boards

- there is a very limited amount of D.R.E.E. employee participation on these citizen boards.
- when D.R.E.E. representatives attend an ADB meeting they do not initiate topics or suggestions, instead they listen and observe the proceedings, acting as a secondary check to insure that the Plan is in fact acceptable at the local level (citizens).
- D.R.E.E. representatives also act in a limited way as a liaison to other Federal departments or agencies and/or as resource people (information, not financial) for the boards.
- N.B.: the emphasis is on limited involvement and a reactive role.

- D.R.E.E. relates to citizens through the Field Representative in Selkirk (personal contact).

2. The Federal Government's Role in Implementation

- the primary role is to act as a "general monitoring agency", i.e. the federal people attempt to ensure that programs and projects, whether "new" proposals or the real outputs of "old" ones, are consistent with the guidelines, general objectives and strategies (in a broad framework) of the "original Plan" as well as being consistent with other Federal government agency programs in the Area. i.e. limit overlaps and program inconsistency of Federal Departments.
- there is little Federal initiative for new thrusts in program development and implementation, i.e. initiative is a responsibility of the provincial administration.
- also most thrusts deal with agricultural production (not, for example, general prices or marketing) and so are beyond Federal jurisdiction.
- consistency assessment and program reaction (as contrasted to initiation) is the role desired for D.R.E.E. by that Department's incumbent Minister.

NOTE: the Plan identifies a similarly limited initiative role for the Federal government even though it (the Plan) was drafted, in part, by the Rural Development Branch of the Department of Forestry. (The Plan was largely drafted, at the Provincial level, by the incumbent senior administrators).

3. Problems During Implementation (Associated With the Nature and/or Structure of the Plan)

a) Time Constraints

- 10 years is too long for a Plan in such a rapidly changing environment:

- (i) Few structures remain constant in this type of long-run situation so that a great number of variables become "uncertain", (which would otherwise be "fixed" in a shorter run); and
- (ii) Evaluation and impact studies are difficult because external circumstances have changed so much that there is no "relative" position by which to compare change. e.g. the economy "caught up" with the Plan and so the Plan outputs were occurring when changed circumstances in the environment had resulted in a minor depression (which would not be favourable for the comparative advantage of a region just beginning to find its way). Thus, economic "impact analyses" are of very questionable worth.

b) Political-Administrative Conflicts (Federal)

- one of the major problems with any Plan is that it is rationally and efficiently based (designed), but its implementation and the environment within which it is implemented are subject to political de-rationalization. e.g. the planners never dreamed that the Department of National Defence would close down the Gimli Air Base, which was purely a "political"

decision, trading-off Gimli for Rivers, Manitoba; this decision changed the whole "ball park", since the Plan relied on the Air Base's annual expenditures, etc. to help support Gimli as a growth centre.

- "We expect politically inspired inconsistency when there is a change in Federal governments, but not when its the same government and executive making the decisions."

c) Political-Political Conflicts (Federal vs. Provincial Governments)

- the classic example here involves the classification of Winnipeg in the "zone" wherein new industries could obtain A.I.D.A. grants.
- while this helped Winnipeg compete against other major industrial centres out of the province (e.g. Toronto) for new industry, it also removed any comparative advantage which smaller Manitoba urban centres (e.g. Selkirk) had gained through their inclusion in the original Plan.
- NOTE: This advantage, if it existed at all, was a small one anyway, i.e. the grants only narrowed Winnipeg's advantage over Selkirk by a small amount.
- the Federal government favoured this decision, while the Province opposed it.

d) Inter-Administrative Conflicts (Federal)

- a major problem is to get other federal departments to "buy" the idea of the Plan to the extent that they will get involved directly in it, or at least insure that their activities are not inconsistent with those of the Plan. e.g. Indian Affairs wanted a new hospital to be built in Hodson in spite of the

facts that:


- (i) it would be difficult to staff (because of the labour pull of a nearby hospital, in the preferable living location of Fisher Branch);
 - (ii) the recommended location was dysfunctional with respect to the reserve it served, because of the hospital's southern location; and
 - (iii) it would promote an extension of life for a community which was, and still is, bound to die, when an (implicit) objective of the Plan is to rationalize population concentrations.
- various government departments change their objectives and concerns over time (in response to changing perspectives of emerging needs) and so new priorities and perspectives must be established, which often results in program inconsistencies vis-a-vis an ongoing Plan. e.g. the A.R.D.A. (policy), administered by the Rural Development Branch of the Department of Forestry, had a definite rural focus, whereas the (new) D.R.E.E. under which F.R.E.D. is now administered, has an urban focus. Therefore, "F.R.E.D. becomes an anomaly in the D.R.E.E. framework", and is somewhat inconsistent with D.R.E.E. objectives, as a result of divergent policy perspectives.

4. Successes of Plan (Listed in Order of Importance)

a) The Learning Process of Administrative Co-ordination

- successfully co-ordinating the program thrusts of many

departments, both federal and provincial



* dotted lines show cross-linkages among departments.

- ordinarily there are no cross-linkages to co-ordinate, induce, and administer the activities of (agencies of) various Federal and Provincial Departments, as they affect a particular region.

- the Interlake Scheme provides a frame, a strategy by which these various departments can all be inter-related.

b) Model for Citizen Participation (More Successful Than in the Rest of Manitoba).

- the ADB etc. model for citizen participation helps to increase Interlake consciousness of the Plan.

- it creates a "localized self-interest" which results in local groups playing politics to let the government know what they want.

- REALISM plays an important role in the success of this model, since people's expectations regarding potential results are not raised beyond what is feasible to deliver. e.g. compare

the Gaspé where for years, even before a Development Plan was drafted there were unreasonably high expectations transmitted to the local citizens which resulted in an "implementation let down".

- i.e. CONTROL - people must be aware of the services and opportunities government can provide, so that they can take advantage of what is available; but they must also realize there are limits (constraints) on government finances, and so citizens must "learn to make priorities" realistically, within financial constraints, and to limit expectations.

c) Education Level of General Interlake Population

- the general education has not only risen absolutely in the region, but also relative to the rest of the province, so that the Interlake has risen from the lowest education rank up past the middle.
- however, unemployment is still high (11-14%), even compared to the rest of the province.
- NOTE: The ironic situation seems to be the Plan's effect of creating "better educated bums" (although "bums" is inappropriate since most of these people are actively seeking work and are willing to work, if employment opportunities exist).
- the "Manpower Corps" Program initially sought to give people a "(functional) education" through related experience, but it now must seek to find employment, for its clients, as a primary objective so that learned skills and attitudes are not lost.

d) Ability to Innovate

- there is a certain degree of freedom to operate within the administrative constraints of the Plan so that novel "programs" can be "developed" in the Interlake and "evolve" to meet arising "NEEDS", applying the "experience" gained through evaluative feedback, in the development of programs.
- "learning to do by doing"
 - e.g. the whole idea behind the Manpower Corps Program is new to Canada; the program evolved over time to meet the rising needs of:
 - (i) adults (under-educated; low income); then
 - (ii) education; then
 - (iii) jobs.
- the problems were tackled at the regional level in an "ongoing, innovative" manner by the Plan administrators, rather than by following any specific set of procedures as established by the Plan.
- there are three requirements for innovation in management:
 - (i) a highly flexible administrative structure;
 - (ii) administrators who will innovate if the opportunity for innovation arises; and
 - (iii) incentives and re-enforcements for successful innovation.

e) Tangible Successes

- NOTE: these are given a low rating both in terms of their degree of importance and their level of achievement.
- specific projects - highways (No. 6 was built)
 - recreation (Hecla; East side development)

- education level increased
- increases in income levels and levels of living are questionable because of the economic and impact problems outlined in 3 a) above

5. References

- a) For Management and Innovation see the Hickling-Johnson study
- b) Regional-Federal People
 - incumbent D.R.E.E. co-ordinator in Selkirk
 - other D.R.E.E. staff in Selkirk
 - F.R.E.D. involved staff from the Federal Department of Manpower and Immigration
 - the Western Regional Director for D.R.E.E., now and during the Plan's drafting
- c) National People
 - Federal Cabinet Minister of Forestry and Rural Development for the Plan's draft
 - the current Assistant Deputy Minister of Policy Research, Department of Environment, Fontaine Building, Hull, Quebec
 - the incumbent Minister of D.R.E.E.

INTERVIEW NUMBER 2

TOPICS

1. Re-Allocation of Designated Funds
2. Interlake Program Advisory Board
3. Area Development Boards
 - a) Chronology
 - b) Power, representatives and tension (external to ADB's)
4. Bureaucracy Preparedness
 - a) Original program vagueness
 - b) Implementation strategies
5. Priorities of the Plan
 - a) People
 - b) Relevance of infrastructure development
6. Use of Financial Incentives
7. Goals of the Plan

1. Re-Allocation of Designated Funds

- shifting funds from program to program within the Plan, requires the sanction of the Joint Advisory Board. (i.e. major re-evaluation requires both Federal and Provincial Governments' sanction).
- objective achievement however, is not necessarily a result of program success (as an aggregation of project success), since the definition of program success (measure) is necessarily altered by incremental, intra-program fund shifts.
- intra-program fund shifting which is conceived as a major implementation strategy, requires only the sanction of the Plan's co-managers.
- this type of "incrementalism" is largely made possible by the high degree of flexibility in the original Plan, with respect to:
 - (i) generality of program design; and
 - (ii) intra-program fund shifts.

2. Interlake Program Advisory Board

- this Board was scrapped at some point during implementation.
- (reference: see interview number 6)

3. Area Development Boards (ADB)

a) Chronology

- the ADB's grew to become a citizen body which acted as a

"cohesive" unit to speak on behalf of the Interlake, but it eventually encompassed little social interaction.

- the people became an "Area entity", even though they occupied a very disjointed, physically dispersed and independent geographic area.
- originally, Interlakers lacked cohesion, and did not identify with the region (Interlake) "per se" as a community, but this situation changed over time, as a result of the activities of the ADB.
- unfortunately, ADB's evolved as an "affluent representative" pressure group.
- the role of ADB's is either 1) integrative: a body which "allocates" resource among municipal communities, or 2) distributive: no allocation, just a body to demand more and more to meet every need of every member unit.
- "the evolutionary pattern": ADB's were originally little more than a number of competitive bodies, but they seem to be evolving into a more integrated unit of regional interaction, e.g. in 1970, Gimli "supported" Selkirk's bid for the Freshwater Fish Marketing Board, rather than making a competitive bid of its own. Before the Plan, Gimli would have acted quite differently.

b) Power, Representatives and Tension (Conflicts)--External to ADB's

(i) Roles

- ADB's are viewed as pressure groups of affluent citizens
- the bureaucracy (Provincial Administrators) conceive

themselves to be protectors of the low income "natives"

(Interlakers in general).

2) Conflicts

- ADB's press for expensive sewer and water projects for towns, while the administration lobbies for an increase in Manpower Corps programs.

3) Rationalization of Conflict

- ADB's feel sewer and water services will attract more and better industry to develop the Area and provide a higher standard of living for residents.
- the Administration feels industrial employment has a low Interlake multiplier and also feels that Manpower Corps programs aid people who cannot fend for themselves and do not have an effective way to express their needs.

4) Resolution of Conflict

- final decision is made by the Minister responsible for the Plan.
- there is a trade-off between voters (ADB's) and non-voters (low income natives) but the incumbent government is committed to the cause of low income people, but political pressure is high, but it is not likely that "ADB types" vote for the N.D.P.: all of this implies that there exists a high degree of uncertainty about the outcome of the Minister's decision, so the Administrators attempt to "resolve" problems by exercising their power of knowledge with bureaucratic processes, in order to impose their program decisions and/or to block ADB program decisions.

- by this manner of procedure, the Plan has become a gradual process of addition and subtraction of projects (NOTE: not programs) e.g. the Administration fought for housing in Selkirk so that a family, as well as the household head (man), could live in the city, while the household head received Manpower Corps training. This later required an education input in the form of a family councillor to help the family adapt to a new (urban) life style (shopping, health care, etc.).

4. Bureaucracy Preparedness

a) Original Program Vagueness

- the original question facing the administration was "what can we do to create jobs in the Region?"
- the recreation program, which was designed, was very general and its specifics did not become evident until the projects were underway, e.g. "recreation was a good 'idea' although we did not know the specifics of its potential", i.e. the approach: "general" idea to meet "specific" objectives by evolution of "particular" projects.

b) Implementation Strategies

- "reasonably intelligent people (administrators) would observe the Region's "needs", as they arose, and would find "unique" solutions. This incrementalism required a sufficiently flexible "design" in the original Plan to permit execution (fund shifting as problems became evident, adjustment and adaptation.

5. Priorities of the Plan

a) People

- the primary criterion of the Plan was specified as the improvement of the lot of Interlake residents.
- environmental change was seen as a secondary goal, and it would come only as it related to improvements in "human conditions".

b) Relevance of Infrastructure Development

- rationale: it is used as a means to employ people of the region in order to create a predictable direction of job supply pull and to subsequently increase the income of Interlakers.
- methodology: 1) choose a potentially dynamic area; 2) increase Manpower Corps programs usefulness, (i.e. justify skills through training) by speeding up normal infrastructure investment (roads or schools) or actually inducing new infrastructure investment.
- the key concept is "CONTROL" over factors of trained labour demand, and since "job creation" is not a saleable political commodity, job creation programs have to first be justified as infrastructure development programs.

6. Use of Incentives (financial)

- to aid in the co-ordination of various government departments, who carry on projects or full-scale programs in the Interlake, financial incentives are used, e.g. the current Director of Parks for the Province has developed an INTEGRATIVE TRUST with the F.R.E.D. Administrators, since they provided inducement

funds and he added program funds which resulted in the construction of a new park: 1) the Parks Branch is happy since it has a new recreational development at less than normal costs, and 2) F.R.E.D. is happy since they have a "planned" development project with job pull.

- the "requisite" for incentives as an implementation strategy is the potential in the original Plan design for re-distributing finances among programs.

7. Goals of the Plan

a) Explicit in Plan

- increase levels of residents' (Interlakers) income
- increase the participation of Interlakers in economic activity.

b) Modular: high risk, unemployed, or non-participants in the labour force.

- "training cycle" creates a supply of trained workers from non-participants in the labour force (in the first stage).
- "job pull cycle" is required to remove the newly trained workers from the production of social maintenance programs (in the second stage) i.e. there is a gradual dissemination of (expanded) labour force members, with infrastructure development programs providing the means of employment.

INTERVIEW NUMBER 3

TOPICS

1. "Rules" and Their Role in Implementation
2. Potential System Breakdowns
 - a) Categories of involved actors
 - b) Avoiding breakdown
 - c) Budgetary breaks
 - d) Specific programs
 - e) Programs of direct people involvement
 - f) Budget constraints in fund re-allocation
3. Community Involvement and Relations
 - a) Area Development Boards
 - b) Direct community contact
 - c) Reverse relations: community to government departments
4. Relations of Administration Unit to Political Level
5. Operational Logistics
 - a) Manpower Corps program
 - b) Assessing Manpower Corps Programs
6. Reference Book

1. "Rules" and Their Role in Implementation

- the purpose is to attain an objective, and so the administrative unit cannot be bound by rules which are applicable to "routine" jobs (this implementation unit seems to perceive itself as being "experimental" and "innovative").
- the only required rules are:
 - (i) legislative authorization of budget gives the comptroller and auditor general some power of approval over programs; and
 - (ii) specific departments will have handling rules of technique for certain tasks.
- there are two distinct roles:
 - (i) management - administrators
 - (ii) program implementation (through projects and activities)
 - line offices.

2. Potential System Breakdowns

a) Categories of Involved Actors and Types of Involvement

- involvement of Interlake citizens.
- seven or eight departments actually carrying out programs under the Plan - this requires that the administrators participate in extensive discussion so the departments understand the programs and their inter-relations so that the departments are easier to co-ordinate.
- internal provincial administration - central system (finance)
 - i.e. comptroller.
- Federal-Provincial joint units:

- (i) administrators - a program in general may be agreeable to policy makers, but it is still subject to default due to differences in its operational interpretation by various line departments; and
- (ii) planning - involves a different set of people.

b) An example of breakdown process avoidance

e.g. Manpower Corps Program

Principle: Identify and Avoid Potential Breakdown

- local people - do they want job re-training in the long-run? i.e. is it consistent with their long range goals, which is not likely if their experience can provide no material basis for such an expectation.
- unions - will they accept the re-trained workers (i.e. institutional barrier) into organized jobs?
- Canada Manpower - rather than import people to fill a job vacancy will they opt for re-training people? I.e. a Federal Government barrier which distorts the national mobility functions.
- companies - what are their expansion plans, etc.? - so that the required potential numbers and types of jobs are known.

c) Budgetary breaks

- primary element: speed in projects:
 - (i) provincial funds are voted for in block and payments are made and co-ordinated by F.R.E.D.; and
 - (ii) flexibility, e.g. money was transferred from a highway to a drainage project when "weather" conditions slowed down the former.

- the budget was designed in August, 1966, for the Plan.
 - changes were made in allocations by the following April, even before any money was spent.
 - revisions occurred several times in the early years.
 - balance: balance was prioritized between the major programs expenditures (total and annual) to keep fund flows even over the Plan's duration (10 years).
 - balance was kept in mind when fund re-allocations occur.
 - there is no problem with inter-project, intra-program re-allocation.
 - by 1970, most major capital (infra-structure) programs were almost completed, which resulted in a decrease in the central co-ordination job of the F.R.E.D. Administrators.
- d) Specific programs - (high "material" input: imposition)
- education - there were 165 one-room school houses in Inter-lake region in 1967.
 - road construction was an inter-dependent program of education (its necessity arose as a result of facilitating access to new education facilities).
 - drainage - critical in areas where agricultural production potential was good, but crop losses were heavy due to lack of cohesive drainage system.

(NOTE: Estimated B/C ratios: low income = 2/1;
high income = 4/1 for the drainage program.)

e) Toughies: programs of direct "people" involvement

- Manpower Corps: average annual expenditure is \$300,000 (approximately).

- only 1/3 of the allocated funds were spent in the first year; now, however, there are not enough funds for this program.

- the first year's expenditure of \$100,000 was used for "gearing up" local people to create a better "understanding" of the purposes of and involvement required by the program.

- leadership: Manpower Corps involves and requires a lot of local support and individual initiative.

- a local person or administrator to co-ordinate and "move" this type of activity is difficult to find.

i.e. (i) experimental mode of administrative technique is required; and

(ii) community learning and subsequent (induced) initiative is required: future expectations are based on previous experience (a constraint); internal "knowledge accumulation: will precede external behavioural pattern change".

- expression of the Plan's purpose helped to initiate the active involvement of local citizens.

- counselling: - there is little administrative understanding of what such a program involves; thus, the program is neither understood nor used by local citizens.

- the "Treasury" has to approve funds annually, and they fear that staff increases (which is

part of the original Plan) will occur in the Departments involved in the co-ordinated programs of the Plan. Since other departments often have frozen staffs, those involved in F.R.E.D. programs ask for "new" staff to meet the increasing demands of ongoing, or newly initiated projects or activities.

f) Budget constraints in fund re-allocation

- an extra limitation, on flexibility, is inherent in the nature of cost-share agreements since:

- (i) the absolute share of provincial funds in one program cannot be exceeded by re-allocation; and
- (ii) the total Federal share or overall funds for all programs cannot be exceeded by re-allocation.

e.g. (i) if program "A" = \$10 million and the cost share formula is 10% Provincial: 90% Federal, if a re-allocation is desired to program "B", where the cost share is 50:50, then total funds available for program "B" = \$2 million, because of a \$1 million ceiling on provincial funds.

- (ii) after all re-allocations have occurred, the total Federal expenditure cannot be more than the original amount, this results in under-spending due to:

- problems related directly to implementation difficulties (administrative, local

involvement, work conditions, weather,
etc.); and

- cost sharing constraints on fund shifting.

3. Community Involvement and Relations

a) Area Development Boards

- they are organized by "groups" of towns and/or municipalities rather than by individual towns and/or municipalities.

(i) broad concerns of central feedback, e.g. where does a local concern (ADB) fit into the total Plan and the Interlake?;

(ii) specific concerns - each department meets "on request", with the ADB's; and

(iii) informal - each department maintains its normal contacts, which may be represented on or lie outside of the ADB's.

- Ministers Advisory Board - local people meet ministers twice yearly.

- ADB's select one person from the Board or community, in addition to the chairman of the ADB.

- individual project or activity pressure groups also relate through old channels of information to line departments. i.e. ADB is an addition to existing "communications linkages".

- local inter-action: - ADB's give local people a means to talk to one another.

- because the boards are jurisdictionally broader than one municipality, and

include more than one town, regional understanding is increasing, as a result of the increased "awareness" of the problems etc. of citizens from beyond the usual inter-action areas.

NOTE: this does not imply that there is no longer any disagreement or inter-municipality "conflict", but that there is more "sensitivity" (in decision-making) to the needs of other Interlakers.

- 12 local ADB's created a regional board (RDB) of 24 members (2 from each ADB).
- creation of the RDB was the idea of the various ADB's, so that the perspective of members could be broadened to a regional level. NOTE: time elapsed from the beginning of the Plan to RDB formation = 1 year.
- the Regional Development Corporation took the RDB's place.
- the RDB was initiated by the Department of Industry and Commerce but the people appointed to the RDB were generally members of the RDB who could just transfer over because of their similar roles in the RDB.
- chronology:
 - ADB's were groups that had existed three or four years prior to the Plan.
 - once the agreement was signed, they thought their role was over but they were now used for:
 - 1) establishing implementation priorities; and
 - 2) Plan review and revision

- re-adjusting the role of ADB's was an awkward process, requiring much time; but it was considered to be necessary, since implementation is more than just administering a (given) set Plan.
- the original needs of ADB's were related to specific problems and projects so that many distributive conflicts occurred: during their discussions with the ADB's, the Administrators tried to relate ADB involvement to an "overview" of the Plan.
- organization: - to preserve the "overview" (general goods) the Administration pressured the ADB's to accept certain given Areas (broader than municipal boundaries) as their operational regions.
- concerns such as organizational methods etc. were left up to the different communities to solve themselves.
- representation on ADB's: - the discretionary organizational format resulted in very simple to very complex (sophisticated) representation formulas for membership election to the various ADB's i.e. organizational flexibility was suited to local needs and desires.
e.g. 1) Selkirk - key local organizations and groups elect two members to the

Board - the ADB then elects its officers.

2) Fisher - almost a "ward" system. The problem of one public meeting (participatory democracy) is the fear of potential dominance of the ADB, by any single town, therefore sub-wards were created.

3) West Side - one public meeting to elect and/or appoint ADB officers.

- unfortunately ADB's are not likely to represent every possible opinion in an Area, since the efficiency and effectiveness of the committee system is constrained by the numbers of people on a committee.

- notable omissions from the ADB's would be low income people, but human development programs (Manpower Corps, counsellors, etc.) helped build up the "confidence" of low income residents and as their confidence and general understanding increase they become members of the ADB and are able to make valuable organizational, administrative and decision-making contributions (a very prominent case was cited).

NOTE: the existence of a participation channel does not ensure its usage by those for whom it was created.

b) Direct community contact

- e.g. unproductive agricultural land purchasing.
- F.R.E.D. had funds to purchase unproductive land from residents.
- the purchase method adopted served to strengthen local "autonomy", since both Municipal-F.R.E.D. relations and ADB-F.R.E.D. relations came into play.
- the ADB's decided which land should be purchased so that F.R.E.D. was not expropriating any land or "kicking people out".
- then the Municipal Government had to approve the land purchase, since they would lose a tax holding through the purchase.
i.e. the ADB had a human responsibility; the municipal government had a financial interest.
- the land purchase process was not expropriation, since the individual resident had the final say on the offer to purchase (price includes: value of land, dislocation cost, investment recovery, i.e. the value of the land was more than zero for its incumbent owner, even on low productivity land).

c) Reverse relations: community to government departments

- ADB's shake-up the departments (especially at Area meetings, i.e. the ADB's are not afraid to speak and force departments to get off their backsides), e.g. Mantago Lake Wildlife Development Project (the Camper-Gypsumville ADB): extra elk were available at Riding Mountain Park so they were given to the Area and everyone said it was crazy to put an elk herd in the Area because they would all be shot; the ADB became "responsible" for elk and of the 117 they were given, only one was ever shot. The ADB polices the herd by "social pressure"

rather than by an "authoritarian approach", since the herd is viewed in terms of community ownership and proprietorship.

4. Relations of Administration Unit to the Government

a) Federal Government example

- e.g. recreation programs
- the Federal Government found two faults with the initial recreation program proposed:
 1. it would not create jobs, and
 2. it would not create a facility for Interlake residents.
 - i.e. it was intended more for Winnipeg residents.
- the Administrators justified the program as a Manpower Corps Project, which would provide a physical, tangible job for the training and orientation of unemployed employables. i.e. "continuing complementarity" among programs during implementation is used to make the whole Plan work (rather than hoping for positive externalities to appear obvious).
- the Administration consciously attempts to limit local expectations regarding the performance of particular projects or programs, so that there will be no let down for Interlakers if an activity shows only moderate success.
- e.g. after the first year had seen a 23% increase in recreational tourism (Winnipeg Beach), the administrators tried to qualify future predictions so as not to build over-expectations in local citizens. Therefore, they said that the weather for the first year, which was unusually good, may have accounted for a large portion of the project's success; however, increases of similar size were actually felt in subsequent years.

5. Operational Logistics

- objective: create mechanisms so people can be "directed to jobs"
 - e.g. 1. primary or "basic" job direction
 - the Manpower Corps Program worked to train and direct people to get jobs in park construction.
 - 2. secondary and/or "service" jobs
 - there is now a need for a new directive mechanism.
 - original spending has gone indirectly to income support to reduce underemployment.
- a) Manpower Corps - program operations
 - the program has not become institutionalized and so it is still productive because tasks and decisions involve a minimum of routine, i.e. they are innovative "strategies":
 - (i) adapt jobs to available manpower resources; and
 - (ii) adapt people (manpower resources) to available jobs.
 - the match between projects and people is necessary (induce simultaneous adaption) e.g. the restaurant (service) industry's failure, as compared to the recreational (basic) industry's success, is partially the result of putting the wrong people into jobs.
 - in all areas either manpower or jobs (or both) must be adjustable.
 - also restaurant projects may not have Manpower Corps potential.
 - if one strategy works once, it can be tried again, in a different Area, (in modified form) but success should not be expected as a certainty, i.e. do not allow a strategy to be routinized in the hope that it will be suited to, and successful in every situation.

b) Assessing Manpower Corps Programs

- (i) in the first year there were 147 participants
 - the initial projection of 150-200/year as an objective was based on poor data (the only available source was the 1961 Census).
- (ii) the program broadened its scope during implementation:
 - it relates to families of trainees;
 - it extends to unemployables (hard core);
 - it acts as a "filler" for those on seasonal courses during interim breaks; and
 - it acts as a stepping stone to new training.
- (iii) there grew a recognition of a need to expand the program, during implementation:
 - training programs were the initial Manpower Corps Projects; and
 - pure physical programs such as job corps programs (which are purely "production"-oriented) are now seen as a necessary link to provide people with "preparation" in a transitional society, (partial isolation and protection) prior to their entrance into a broader urban, industrial space-economy.
- there are several benefits of providing Job Corps program (sheltered environment) as an entity separate and distinguishable from a Manpower Corps Program:
 - it avoids problems inherent in macro-demand, e.g. unemployment trends - lack of predictable demand pulls;

- it obviates pay offs by increasing the effectiveness of general counsellors.
- general counsellors relate to "motivational" counselling for jobs: the hardest thing is to get the counsellors to go out and talk to the people, instead of waiting for people to come in and talk to them.
- information is useless if it is not in the hands of people, and if it is not being used in such a manner as to increase their understanding about something.
- a major problem in implementing a Plan is to get information about the Plan into the hands of people who can use the Plan's programs.

6. Reference Book

- Bertram Gross, The Administration of Economic Development Planning: Principles and Fallacies (New York: U.N., 1966), is an especially useful book because the patterns outlined by Gross so closely follow the implementation procedures used by the Administrators.

INTERVIEW NUMBER 4

TOPICS

1. Information Dissemination
 - a) Sequence
 - b) Means of information dissemination
 - c) Strategies for information dissemination
2. Subjective Value of Information Dissemination
3. Community Identity
4. Future Approaches to Information Dissemination
5. Present Weaknesses of Information Dissemination Methods
6. Why F.R.E.D. Worked
7. F.R.E.D. System Failure

1. Information Dissemination

a) Sequence

- early years: the purpose of information services was to "interpret" the Interlake agreement to Inter-lakers, so they could "understand" its scope, where they fit, what kind of contribution the F.R.E.D. Plan would make to their daily lives and what contribution they could make in the Plan.
- later years: subsequent to informing Interlakers, the role was to "inform" the broader population (Winnipeg, etc.) as to the general nature of the development agreement.

b) Means of Information Dissemination

- television and radio
 - newspapers
 - other printed matter
- (i) television (radio) as a mechanism of information dissemination
- early idea was not to use television and radio media since the stations serving the Interlake are largely Winnipeg based (outside region), and their listening audience goes well beyond the Interlake (half of Manitoba):
 - 1) cost would be too high - charges for advertising are per capita costs, based on the whole listening audience, (most of which is outside the Region) and

few people in the Interlake could be reached; and
 2) external exposure was not desired - excessive exposure of the Plan (and details of its \$85 million expenditure) outside of the Region would have added increased external pressures (on government) from other poor regions that were not part of the Plan.

(ii) newspapers

- local newspapers
 - were primarily used to pass along information re: "people participation projects", e.g. bush clearing, Manpower Corps, etc. (programs where people had to come to F.R.E.D.).
 - many communications gaps existed, i.e. the newspapers did not cover the whole "Region".
 - Winnipeg papers were not used since their level of Interlake circulation was low.
- Interlake Flyer
 - direct contact mechanism
 - the paper was being published (like the ADB's formation prior to the F.R.E.D. agreement signing under a different name, by the ADB's and was printed once every two months.
 - under this new name it is printed once every 3 weeks.
 - the circulation is approximately 800, mainly to Interlakers who were participators in the pre-Plan ADB's who turned up at the public meetings, etc. i.e.

participators in regional activities, such as:

- those registering at public meetings or conferences,
- ADB past members, and
- those recommended by friends, etc. (informal)

NOTE: Names are never deleted from circulation lists, except by request, so that circulation is always expanding.

- the paper reaches the "upper middle class" of the Interlake: any formally or semi-formally organized body.

NOTE: ADB is a semi-formal body since it has no

- taxing power, but plays an administrative role.
- not many individuals come and ask for the paper.
- the paper's orientation is towards news features

NOTE: The Flyer is a major tool of communication.

- Interlake Intercom
 - printed every 10 days with a 2 day delivery lag.
 - it is sent to the same people as the Flyer.
 - initiated by F.R.E.D.
 - more rapid, sharper news orientation.
 - articles and information are passed to the Intercom by: a) personal contact; b) letter; c) collect phone calls by Interlakers, (all of which are encouraged).

(iii) other printed matter

- general publications

- subscription of 1,200 (800 are Interlakes on the Interlake Flyer list).

NOTE: most materials reach the same 800 people.

- orientation: magazine-type journalism which tries to popularize issues, rather than just passing on basic information.
 - people do not seem to read these publications as much as they do the Flyer (or as thoroughly), but they do get:
 - a general impression of the scope of the F.R.E.D. Plan's involvement in the region; and
 - information on specific projects in which they may have an interest
 - scope of publications
 - e.g. annual reports (year III, "KAH-MISS-AWK").
 - specific programs ("The Land Around Us").
- NOTE: this publication drew informal comment, betting, discussion, etc. as to which town was pictured on its back cover (it was actually Altona which is not in the Interlake Region).
- urban adjustment (Hello Winnipeg).
 - tourist kits, i.e. promotional (. . . Big Country).
 - community organization.
 - other department publications.
- NOTE: these publications seem to promote increased awareness of the Region as a community.
- direct mail brochures

- potential contact with every municipal taxpayer in the Interlake (11,000).
- a comprehensive mailing list has been available to F.R.E.D. only since 1969.
- it is used for direct participation programs, e.g. bush clearing, manpower training.
- gap supplements - posters
 - poster campaigns are used to support newspaper ad campaigns and to fill the "communication gaps". e.g. bush clearing ads were put in newspapers to straighten an administrative "goof", because farmers were making themselves ineligible for land clearing grants by clearing some land before applying for the grants (the ads were used to inform farmers of the correct procedure) but gaps still occurred:
 - North of Arborg, Ashern and Lundar where farmers continued to make the same errors even after the ads were printed in newspapers, which necessitated a supplementary poster campaign.

c) Strategies for Information Dissemination

- the original press releases hurt the pride of Interlakers, since they emphasized the Plan's goal to re-develop a "depressed" area, i.e. "help a backward area get back on its feet".
- F.R.E.D. now attempts to push the "positive" aspects of development, i.e. present a "challenge" to Interlakers to aid resource expansion.

- publications help support regional pride, in addition to disseminating information, e.g. the "Big Country" encouraged Interlake Development Corporation to start a map campaign at Winnipeg's perimeter, on highways leading into the Region, on restaurant place mats, etc. to promote the recreational facilities of the Interlake.

NOTE: the Administrators produced the structure (map), but left it up to the Area people themselves to use it.

- the "information officer" does not pretend to be a public relations or promotions man for the region, i.e. he does not pass on canned information to the media; instead he takes a "risk" and invites the mass media to interpret what the significance and success of various programs and projects is.
- there are special department "designers" to make publications more attractive, interesting, etc.
- publications distribution is spread out over time so as not to overload the information system.

NOTE: publications are generally sent in the same mailing as the "Flyer".

2. Subjective Value of Information Dissemination

- keeps directly active people more informed than in other areas of government programs.
- serves as an "internal communication" piece, e.g. local stories in papers, etc. serves to promote a "sense of region" in the Interlake.
- fills local paper gap - geographic boundaries of the region mean a limited clientele exists: an insufficient subscription level

occurs, which results in too much advertising and not enough local news and so local papers fail to promote a sense of community e.g. Selkirk Enterprise and Lake Center News; Stonewall Argus (for Stonewall and Teulon) covers No. 6 to Eriksdale, but leaves a communication gap outside this limited area.

- inter-government and inter-departmental information:
 - the objective is to keep other agencies, etc. informed re: the Interlake.
 - the Flyer is distributed to Federal colleagues as well as to the various departments involved in the Interlake (both Federal and Provincial) e.g. D.R.E.E. (in Ottawa) knows more about the Interlake than other D.R.E.E. projects, such as P.E.I.
- organize public opinion
 - this is done by criticizing their own departments, projects, programs, approaches, etc.

3. Community Identity

- e.g. the Regional Development Corporation
- the Department of Industry and Commerce tried to organize the Interlake with similar "structures" to what had been imposed in East-Man and West-Man by means of talking to a few key people to "produce" quick organization (and productive) results.
- this method of organizing works well where there does not exist a "community awareness" in the region.
- in the Interlake, the citizens forced the Department of Industry and Commerce to change the normal structure:
 - (i) to allow three sub-units to the major board; and

(ii) to have a twelve man, rather than seven man board.

- these changes occurred because the Interlakers were used to, and prepared to organize to fight policy imposition of government.

NOTE: ADB's were evolving into a regional board at this time anyway.

- the region was badly split before F.R.E.D.:

(i) geographic units required ties (roads and infrastructure);

(ii) communications system had evident gaps (media, papers, etc.); and

(iii) organizationally - lacked a concept of region, e.g. after F.R.E.D., Gimli supported Selkirk for Fish Processing Plant when previously the two towns battled to almost suicidal degrees.

4. Future Information Dissemination Approaches

- continuing means

- the Flyer, Intercom and distribution of publications will continue.

b) - new modes

- new attempts will be made to increase the communication among individuals and groups of Interlakers.

e.g.-in the summer of 1972 there will be an attempt to organize the communications system around VTR.

-community newsletter: presently there is one in St. Laurent, while Ashern is a loosely knit community where few people have any idea of what is going on. Therefore, F.R.E.D. will support communications projects (newsletter) similar to

its pattern in other projects: "show people how to organize to do the task."

- "tentative long-run possibilities":

- (i) short range radio network; and
- (ii) local information offices, locally staffed to provide "comprehensive" information, i.e. information on all government departments and agencies in the region.

c) Rationale for changing style

- F.R.E.D. has been "feeding" information to the Interlakers since the start of the Plan, its time now for Interlakers to become more self-sufficient (independent).
- when F.R.E.D. pulls out in 1977 the infra-structure, etc. will be there but there must be "community organizations" to carry on, which implies the necessity of a good organization of "inter-personal" communications to back up general programs (premise: people do not read details in news-releases).
- government specialists, agriculture representatives, conservation officers, etc. now go "voluntarily" to ADB meetings and express candid opinions re: paths to development, program participation, etc.

NOTE: "if F.R.E.D. pulled out in 1971, the Interlakers would not be equipped to pick up the slack."

5. Present Weaknesses of Information Dissemination Methods

- the Public at large (Winnipeg, other regions, etc.) may not know why or how \$85 million is being spent in the Interlake (no understanding of the Plan's benefits).

- Interlakers themselves must be able to take up the organizational (especially communication and information channels dynamics).

6. Why F.R.E.D. Worked

- a) - for the first two years the "basic implementation unit" was a small organization which did nothing but work in the Interlake (direct link was between Poyser-Collinson and local citizens).
 - now Poyser and the other Administrators have been spread too thinly to work directly with local people so the only direct link for citizens to policy is through the information section (the "weaning" process has perhaps been ended too soon, too abruptly).
- b) - information staff
 - consists of two people in terms of the Interlake Plan
 - Federal staff in Ottawa has 65 people, yet the productivity of the small Provincial staff is much greater, largely because the Federal bureaucracy over-emphasizes hierarchy and an industrial incentive slant, which restricts their output in quantitative terms.
- c) - survival techniques
 - the information administration staff intuitively knows local attitudes and so avoids initiating distributive conflicts or publicizing local opinion on various issues.
 - e.g. Intercom and Flyer get articles and reports directly from local citizens, rather than reporting on issues of various local importance themselves.

7. Failure of F.R.E.D. System

- people (general) in the region either do not want to or do not know how to read. Thus, many individuals (general) do not seem to know what F.R.E.D. does.
i.e. most people will vaguely know what F.R.E.D. is, but would not know what F.R.E.D. does.
- the ADB's do not communicate well in the region, they have a weak internal communication system and an unrepresentative structure.

INTERVIEW NUMBER 5

TOPICS

1. Joint Federal-Provincial Advisory Board
 - a) Membership (M.D.A.)
 - b) Operation
2. Relationships Between the Community and its Politicians
3. Regional Development Board
4. The Nature of the F.R.E.D. Plan
5. Area Development Boards
 - a) Assessment of role and operation
 - b) Purpose
6. Relationship of Federal and Provincial Governments
 - a) Co-ordinator and administrator
 - b) Government to government
7. Interlake Citizen's Advisory Board
8. Successful Planning and Implementation of a Development Policy:
Key Elements

- a) Political placing
- b) Administrative placing
- c) Control over money
- d) Information and communication control

9. Basic Design of a Development Policy

- a) General elements
- b) Focus on organization

1. Joint Federal Provincial Advisory Board

a) Membership

- senior administrative people from both the Federal and Provincial Governments.

(i) Federal: a) Department of Regional Economic
Expansion

b) Department of Manpower and Immigration

c) Treasury Board

d) Indian Affairs

- the various departments represented on this Board were chosen on the basis of whether or not the development Plan involved them or required programs which could be handled by their department, i.e. post-Plan representation determination.

(ii) Provincial:

- initially the province was represented by a body called the Manitoba Development Authority, which was in fact a multi-program department. The M.D.A. encompassed several departments including Education, Agriculture, Mines and Resources, Industry and Commerce, and Highways. The Authority's chairman was the Premier, and the Authority had some funds of its own to work with. The M.D.A. later became the Planning and Priorities Committee of Cabinet under the then Progressive Conservative Government (circa 1968). It was stripped of many of its direct powers. Membership on the Advisory Board did not involve a large personnel change, since

the senior administrators of the Department now chosen for Board participation had also been members of the M.D.A. However, they now each represented a single department, rather than an integrated program (such as provincial development).

b) Operation

- there is a divergence of attitude between the perspectives of development adopted by the Federal and Provincial people on the Program Advisory Board. The federal people must constantly weight funds allocated to Manitoba on the basis of a broader, national goal of reasonably balanced development, while the provincial people want to see a particular region (the Interlake), and Manitoba itself, develop relative to other provinces. This is a normal problem in cost-share programs and is generally resolved by bargaining.
- the most important feature of the Board's operation, and its central issue, is "who holds the money", because whoever (in terms of departments, both Federal and Provincial) has the funds can control how, where and when it will be spent. At this level, the conflict is not so much between two levels of government as it is (i) among several departments (all of whom have somewhat different goals and priorities), and (ii) between the departments as a whole and a central programming unit such as Planning and Priorities. This creates problems because the funds for the development of the region are not obtained from one source or consolidated fund. Instead they are the aggregation of available or related funds in each

of the departments, e.g., there is the Federal-Provincial cost-share funds, funds from C.M.H.C. and M.H.R.C., funds from the Department of Education, and funds from Canada Manpower. Of these, the only money which the F.R.E.D. Plan Administrators (Provincial) have direct control over, is the cost-share fund. This is really only a small portion compared to the total monies being spent in the region or necessary for the success of a development plan. The key to the operation of the Board is to influence those who have funds, to spend it on the Plan's programs.

- under the M.D.A. system, the central program group felt that a more effective implementation process was achieved because they could use the influence of the Premier (to persuade the department's directly) to concur with the development Plan's programs and spend their funds in a manner consistent with them. Under the current system, however, the Provincial Administrator has very limited persuasion powers (and no ultimate or legitimizing agent) and must rely on personal contacts and/or other formally related departments to provide pressure for "desirable" fund allocation. This results in cost-share funds being used to "induce" the participation of departments in what the departments would otherwise consider "unacceptable" projects. These means of gaining favourable response and participation are used for both Federal and Provincial departments, e.g., influencing Canada Manpower through the Department of Education.

- since the primary formal responsibility for implementing the Plan rests with the Provincial Administrators, Planning and Priorities becomes the "nerve centre" for the programs considered by the Advisory Board. Planning and Priorities position of power on the Board is increased by the fact that it has close ties and lines of communication to the Interlake's needs, through the Area Development Boards. Even though the Provincial Administrators were the primary implementors of the Plan, technical and resource constraints necessitated "farming out" some of their jobs to departmental agencies. A guidance and support role was then adopted by Planning and Priorities with respect to these agencies.

- summary:

- the problem of matching objectives to specific programs is analogous to a football; narrow at both ends but wide in the middle. To get from one end to the other involves a constant process of influence and bargaining aimed at bringing together a number of sources of funds under the roof of a single Plan of programs.

2. Relationships Between the Community and Politicians

- the Provincial Administrative staff and some of the relevant Provincial Ministers (and Legislators) hold open meetings with Interlake citizens two or three times per year. These meetings are generally good for the Government because they helped to make senior policy decision-makers more aware of citizen's needs and desires. The citizens, however, seem to

adopt the attitude that they come and air their grievances, have a sympathetic hearing, and then are ignored as soon as the politicians leave ("Out of sight, out of mind"). In many cases this attitude of the citizen's is accurate, e.g. the Conservative Minister of Agriculture in 1968-69 would rely almost exclusively on the Provincial Administrator to provide information to respond to citizen's questions. This was largely because that individual was not an Interlaker and therefore, he did not understand the area he was working with. The situation was almost reversed with the incumbent (NDP) or 1968 Agriculture Ministers, both of whom are Interlakers.

3. Regional Development Board

- it was largely from these meetings (in 2 above) that the Regional Development Board (a group of representatives from all the Area Development Boards) was formed. The R.D.B. idea was initiated by the citizens themselves, and even in setting it up and operating it there was little or no assistance or guidance from the government. "In view of its eventual failure, perhaps we should have gotten more actively involved in helping the citizens set it up".

"Eventually it was pre-empted by the Regional Development Corporation, which was set up by the Department of Industry and Commerce."

4. The Nature of the F.R.E.D. Plan

- this Plan is a development and participation model, not a

distribution one. Income re-distribution is merely a hoped for consequence of the Plan's implementation.

5. Area Development Boards: An Assessment of Their Role and Value

a) Assessment

- from a citizen's point of view the concept of an ADB did not work. The basic reason for this opinion is that local citizens, in general, are too pragmatically oriented to be able to abstract to the program, strategy or goal level. All that they are concerned with is the activity or sub-activity level: so they come to a meeting, demand a road or drainage ditch or a school or some other specific item, and if they do not get it they think the Board is of no value.

- from the point of view of those who have worked on an ADB for some time, there would be mixed opinion as to the value of the role it plays.

e.g. St. Laurent: it was useful in bring together very diverse and normally non-interactive viewpoints regarding community needs and desires;

Gimli: there would be mixed reaction because they really did not get much from the Plan;

Stonewall and Teulon: the ADB idea would not be popular because their main desire was for sewer and water, which is outside the policy domain of the F.R.E.D. Plan;

Fisher: the response would be "not bad"; and

Hecla: the current re-location problems might

discolour their attitude, although they got everything they asked for (the Hecla Island Park).

- from the Administrators, the ADB's provide an opportunity to review and re-check community priorities and trouble spots, and to react to the thousands of little problems that would arise at the community level. In cases where problems are brought to the attention of one of the Administrators, he will go back to Winnipeg and attempt to use his personal influence with a Minister or Deputy Minister to have the policy creating that problem explained and/or changed. However, there is not enough manpower in the Administrative unit to solve, follow-up, and report back on all of these problems (in this ad hocish manner). The point is, minor issues can not and should not be solved at a "central level" of Government, since they are only of a local interest: there is not a regional or local government with enough power or money to handle this type of issue. (The interviewee is pessimistic about the effect of the present non-policy concerning regional government). The division of funds in the F.R.E.D. Plan clearly indicates the relative program powers of governments: sub-regional, self-determination does not work because of a lack of funds at that level.

b) Purposes of ADB's

- to organize the multi and diversified interests of the community; and
- to create pressure and get more government attention.

6. Relationship of Federal Government to Provincial Government

a) Co-ordinator and Administrator

- the basis of power and co-ordination resides with the province under Federal cost-share agreements: "If the Province does not do it, it does not get done." Therefore, the initiative for, and administrative control of the Plan is Provincial.
- the Provincial Administrator is also the Comptroller of the accounts payable for the Plan. The role of the Federal co-ordinator is just to indicate the Federal "presence" (a philosophy originally put forward by both the then Federal Minister of Forestry and Rural Development and the Prime Minister.)
- the Federal co-ordinator for the Plan was as much as hand picked by the Provincial Administrators. He was selected because it was felt that he would be more sensitive to Interlake needs and "sympathetic" to the necessary expenditures than any of the other available candidates.

b) Government to Government (Political)

- the Federal Government had originally not pushed for open recognition of their participation in programs, but after two minority governments were elected in the early 1960's the Deputy Minister of D.R.E.E. persuaded them to show more openly their part in cost-sharing arrangements. Now, however, the Federal Government has become almost paranoid, demanding that equal exposure be given to the Federal role on signs describing all cost-share projects, e.g. on Hecla Island the information sign was removed after the Federal Government noticed that the Province had put the Manitoba emblem as well as name on it.

7. The Interlake Citizen's Advisory Board

- as occurred with the Area Development Boards, the I.C.A.B. was originally an informal body which was established by the Administrative group to help identify Interlake needs. Under the Plan it was formalized. Its composition:

- (i) the chairman of the nine ADB's or their designated alternative;
- (ii) the Minister of Agriculture (Manitoba);
- (iii) two or three unofficial members from each ADB; and
- (iv) other Ministers, senior administrators, or legislators involved in some way with the Interlake.

- this Board meets a couple of times each year (in the Interlake).

8. The Key to the Successful Planning and Implementation of a Development Policy

- the Provincial Administrator is a central figure in the Interlake Plan, but his key or critical role is a function of the fact that he is "reasonably well placed in a number of areas which are critical in establishing the 'dynamics' for a development policy". There are four such areas:

- (i) political or legislative;
- (ii) administrative;
- (iii) control over money; and
- (iv) information-communication control.

a) Political (legislative) placing

- at the outset of the planning phase for the Interlake Development, there were Conservative Governments in power both

Provincially, and Federally. This reduced the "flak" or tension which often interferes with Federal-Provincial relations.

- the attitudes of the key political leaders at both levels were favourable to regional planning, sympathetic towards agriculture and aware of the problems of the Interlake, e.g. there was a newly elected Conservative Premier in Manitoba, his government was still keen and aggressive in terms of development, he was aware of the problems of agricultural areas and he was consciously committed to developing the agriculturally based economy. Further, one of the key people involved in the planning of the Interlake was an Interlaker who was a very influential man in the Provincial Conservative Cabinet. This individual understood the problems facing the Interlake because he came from that region. Federally, the Prime Minister was committed to helping the West, which meant providing funds for agricultural areas; and a key Minister in his Cabinet (Department of Agriculture) pressured and influenced the federal government into providing adequate funds to help support the development of the agricultural regions. From this political climate came the ARDA agreements, and the Provincial Administrator, with the support of the incumbent Premier, began the preparation of development proposals for the Interlake.

b) Administrative Placing

- in 1959, the then Manitoba Premier formed the Manitoba Development Authority, which was to act as a very powerful body to promote provincial growth. From the M.D.A. came the C.O.M.E.F.

report which specified a series of development objectives for the province. This report was valuable in that it provided the Cabinet with a point of reference from which to consider its priorities and planning.

- by being a central administrator with the M.D.A., the now Provincial Administrator gained access to, and influence in a number of key development related departments. This stemmed from the fact that the Premier was Chairman of the Authority and lent his support to development planning, as well as the fact that the M.D.A. per se was a powerful body which could exert direct influence on the programs operated by the various departments. Thus, the Provincial Administrator had a means of establishing what programs were politically and administratively feasible and/or acceptable to line departments as well as being able to influence their acceptance.
- an example of the type of influence that could be gained is cited by the cavalcade of cars carrying Ministers, Deputy Ministers and Assistant Deputy Ministers, which on more than one occasion toured the Interlake. These tours were organized by the Provincial Administrator, through the Premier, and illustrate the lines of influence he had. The key was to be able to get the Ministers to agree to a particular set of objectives, as well as the types of programs which will achieve these objectives. Once this happens, pressure can be administered from above on line administrators to achieve a consistent and desirable set of programs under a Plan.

c) Control over money

- again, the political climate aided the Provincial Administrator in his tasks. Because the Federal government was willing to enter into cost-share agreements, and because they claimed to have enough funds to support development programs, the Administrator was able to construct a 10 year development Plan and present it to the Provincial Government; which achieved much more than their current expenditures, and yet cost the Province no more money. Because the Province was not going to be forced to increase its total expenditures in the Interlake, and because Roblin desired regional economic planning, it was not difficult to gain approval for the opening of negotiations with the Federal government.

- The Provincial Administrator was in charge of negotiating the agreement, and he used this position to formalize his subsequent control over funds to be spent under the Plan. The concern here was not with the Federal government, since they did not desire to initiate Plans, or to control expenditures as previously mentioned, but instead the concern was to keep the funds in a centrally controlled pool away from line departments. This way, with the support of senior administrators in these line departments, additional funds could be induced through currently operative provincial programs. Moreover, central control over funds helped to maintain a set of programs consistent with the objectives of the Plan. "The most difficult thing in government is to relate policy to financing; that is, to keep the program expenditures consistent with the objectives of

the overall policy."

d) Information and communication control

- control over an information network is vital. There are two sides or attitudes which were originally expressed regarding Interlake Development. Firstly, the government Ministers had definite ideas as to the needs of the Interlake, as well as the types of programs which would meet such needs, while maintaining consistency with programs in other regions of the province. Secondly, local citizens met in informal Area Development Committees to clarify their needs and priorities. The role of the Provincial Administrators was to bring together the ideas, desires and constraints of both the Ministers and people, and create some grounds of mutual agreement from which a development policy could emanate.
- in the Development Plan this communications network was formalized on the basis of its planning operation. This resulted in the formation of ten Area Development Boards and the Interlake Citizens Advisory Board. The key to keeping the Ministers in touch with events in the community and vice versa, was to insure that information was continually flowing between the two. Thus, the administrative group sometimes "generated or induced" the flow of information in one direction or the other if they felt it necessary. This is a central mechanism in the establishment and re-planning of policy, and is necessary for programs to be mutually acceptable to both citizens and government. The communication network was controlled by the Administration to ensure its continued and effective operation.


Their position in the network was as an intermediary between the two groups, i.e. the administration is on the "pulse" of the information network.

9. Basic Design of a Development Policy

a) General elements

- this section gives the details of the design upon which the Interlake development plan (and any development plan) is based.
- essentially there are four basic elements which affect an individual in his daily activity. These elements are:
 - (i) education - formal and informal training of the individual (a background factor);
 - (ii) organizations - groupings of human interaction to which the individual relates (a social factor);
 - (iii) financial inputs - the adaption of an individual to a society based on a monetary exchange system (an economic factor); and
 - (iv) environment - the physical and demographic setting in which behaviour occurs (a material factor).
- for each individual there will be a different empirical set of the elements of these factors, but many individuals can be classified cross-sectionally to reduce the number of sets to be identified, e.g. fishermen, farmers, teachers, etc.: classification by occupation.

- diagrammatically the scheme looks like this:




- by analyzing the set for each of the types of individuals in a geographic area, by determining what set is desired by them and by defining what set is possible or feasible to assist in providing, a set of government programs can be placed between each of the four factors and the individual.

b) Focus on organization

- the Citizen Participation Programs focus on the organizational factor in the Interlake. The first priority is to find a means of organizing the multiplicity of organizations which reflect an individuals needs, so that priorities can be filtered at an early stage. In the Interlake the Area Development Boards (local needs perspective) and the Interlake Citizens Advisory Boards (regional needs perspective) were designed to help

determine and specify the needs of and/or interests of local citizens. Once a set of selected needs was extracted from local interests, citizens could be organized on the basis of these selected needs. Diagrammatically, the process can be shown as follows:



INTERVIEW NUMBER 6

TOPICS

1. General Counsellors
 - a) Health and Social Development
 - b) Agriculture
 - c) General Comments
2. Interlake Manpower Co-ordinating Committee
3. HURDAC Committee
4. Minister's Advisory Board
5. Regional Development Board
6. Interlake Development Corporation
7. Manpower Corps Directorate
8. Observations

1. General Counsellors

- there are two projects under the general counsellor program, one is run by Health and Social Development, the other by the Department of Agriculture.

a) Health and Social Development

- this project is designed to help council the native people in the Interlake, i.e. Indians and Metis.
- the basic line staff is composed of 5 persons:
 - (i) one community development officer;
 - (ii) two follow-up officers; and
 - (iii) two manpower or education officers.
- there are also a few support staff.
- most of the work done under this project occurs in the North Interlake where the reservations are.
- the role of the General Counsellor is to council, guide and assist Indians and Metis in discovering and achieving alternative vocational activities which are available to them under the development Plan. Also, help is offered in any one of a number of areas where an individual native person is likely to encounter difficulty, e.g. in locating housing, in adapting to urban living; in learning to budget household income; in job training.
- much of the work of these counsellors consists of attempting to have persons placed in upgrading Manpower Corps or job-retraining courses. While some of the persons aided in these matters are successful, it appears that sometimes Counsellors are just "filling courses for the sake of filling courses".

b) Agriculture counsellors

- this project is directed at all Interlakers.
- besides support staff, there are 14 counsellors employed under this project as follows:
 - (i) four agricultural extension agents;
 - (ii) four home economists;
 - (iii) one resource analyst;
 - (iv) one home visitation leader;
 - (v) one youth leader;
 - (vi) one fisheries advisory; and
 - (vii) two adjustment officers.
- most of the activities are performed from Agricultural Extension offices in several Interlake towns. E.g. Selkirk, Arborg, Fisher Branch. The two adjustment officers are located in Winnipeg and also help to tie the field offices into the normal departmental activities carried on in the city.
- the home visitor leader is located in Selkirk, and with the help of 7 or 8 local citizen volunteers, he works generally to help Indian and Metis families to adjust to a white, urban society.
- the fisheries advisor is located in Hnausa and his services are in fact purchased from the Department of Mines and Natural Resources.
- while these counsellors were "created" under the Plan, some were in fact operative a year before the start of the implementation phase of the Plan, an event similar to the pre-Plan existence of informal Area Development Boards.

c) General comments

- this project achieves only varying degrees of success because the system that the counsellors work through is very complex.

- the counsellors are hampered by the fact that they have no legitimate power, e.g. at the start of the project, the counsellors did not even have the authority necessary to recommend individuals for the Manpower Training Programs.

All that the counsellors could do was to use indirect methods of personal contact and persuasion to convince Canada Manpower to accept their references. Combined with this was a very great reluctance on the part of Canada Manpower officials to recognize the general counsellors role as a valid or useful one.

- at the start of this project the counsellors were definitely taking the initiative as prescribed by the Plan, and "reaching out" to get involved with local citizens in discussing their needs and in guiding their actions. This form of direct contact seemed to give way over time to a more reactive role, where the individual citizen is expected to take the initiative and come and visit the counsellor. This in-office exchange between the two is still at an individual to individual level, and the project has not digressed to the degree of inwardness that Canada Manpower Agents have always been in, i.e. "Canada Manpower has always been of the opinion that field agents should sit in their offices and wait for clients to come to them."

- complimenting direct contact between citizen and counsellor

has been an activity of indirect contact. This involves disbursing information regarding the general services available under the Plan, throughout the region by means of one-way communication devices, e.g. newspapers. Citizens are then encouraged to come in and get the rest of the particulars from the counsellors.

- it should be remembered that two important things happened in 1967, which caused a good deal of difficulty between Canada Manpower and the General Counsellors. Firstly, the F.R.E.D. Plan came into being with one-third of its expenditures for Canada Manpower Programs. However, these programs were very loosely defined because the province knew there were major changes to be introduced in the Federal Department of Manpower. Until this time all of Manpower training was the responsibility of the province, and since the Federal government would not reveal the changes imminent in the Manpower department, the Plan was drafted with the assumption that these responsibilities might remain the same. Secondly, in 1967, Canada Manpower came in with a program whereby they would assume 100 percent responsibility for training and selection of Manpower program recipients. The Province would then "purchase" spaces from Manpower and could only hope that sufficient space to meet demand would be available. This, of course, altered the Manpower training referral role anticipated for general counsellors, because referral became the sole responsibility of a Federal Department. Canada Manpower, therefore, suggested that General Counsellors be removed entirely as a program

under the Plan.

- Counsellor functions are gradually shifting from assisting in work training to counselling, guiding and work creation, i.e. counsellors are tending to accept that some of their clients will always have limited training and abilities, and are attempting to find or create jobs where these abilities can be used, i.e. "Doing the best with what they have got".

2. Interlake Manpower Co-ordinating Committee

- functionally it never existed although it is formally specified in the Plan.
- it lasted for a couple of meetings but served little purpose, since it was composed largely of Manpower officials anyway; so that no new directions in Manpower activities were likely to be suggested.

3. HURDAC Committee

- the name stands for the Human Resources Development Action Committee.
- this body in fact developed from an amalgamation of the North and South Interlake Manpower Co-ordinating Committees. These two groups are not to be confused with the sub-committee of the Federal-Provincial Advisory Board that bears the same name.
- the committee is composed of Field Operating Personnel, (extension agents, manpower agents, etc.) who initially got together on an informal (personal) basis to discuss how they might work together to better serve the interests of their

mutual clients.

- after one year of informal meetings of the two committees, HURDAC came into being to serve the entire region.
- the meetings served as a means of operational information exchange, confidence building periods, suggestion periods and gripe sessions.
- rather than attempting to view operations in terms of a single agency, e.g. Canada Manpower, the focus of discussion became "How can we co-operate, at an individual, personal level, in order to go beyond the competition occurring at the agency level?".
- the central theme or tactic employed is to "influence operations, because we have no control over policy". The group did attempt to make statements and presentations designed to alter policy, but these attempts rarely worked and only served to frustrate the individuals involved.
- the field people involved are from the Provincial Department of Education, Mines and Resources, Agriculture, Health and Social Development, as well as the Federal Departments of Manpower and Indian Affairs.

4. Minister's Advisory Board

- members of this Board, which is formally created by the Plan, are appointed by the Provincial Minister of Agriculture, as follows: the chairman and one other member from each Area Development Board is invited to a meeting arranged upon the Minister's initiative.

- meetings were originally held twice a year, but now occur only once a year.
- the Board provides the Minister with a means to talk to local people, regarding the Plan and all other Interlake issues.
- the Board is only as useful and effective as the Minister allows it to be. Some Ministers feel more comfortable in this setting than others, e.g. the Board functions better under the present Minister (1972) than it did under the 1968 Minister.
- citizens are willing to attend such meetings and talk constructively, only if they can notice some changes occurring over time, i.e. that the Minister at least partially heeds their suggestions and acts upon them, creating effective two way communications.

5. Regional Development Board

- after meeting at the Advisory Board a couple of times, a more regionally oriented perspective began to develop in the attitudes of Area Development Board representatives. In order to better establish this attitude and discuss the problems of the Interlake in an holistic manner, the Area Development Boards got together to create a Regional Development Board.
- this Board was quite distinct from the Minister's Advisory Board, even though many of the individuals involved were members of both.
- the Board met an average of three to six times per year.

- its activities were financed through contributions from each of the Area Development Boards, who all sent representatives to the Regional Board.
- no administration or government officials were formally involved with the Board although the incumbent Community Affairs Director for the Department of Agriculture was keenly interested in both the Area and Regional Development Boards, and often acted as an advisor to them.

6. Interlake Development Corporation

- by 1969, the Interlake and the North were the only regions in Manitoba without a Development Corporation (a project sponsored by the Department of Industry and Commerce).
- the Interlake Development Corporation was set up very rapidly in terms of the elapsed time from the introductory citizen meetings to the incorporation of a Board of Directors (this took only six months).
- two or three meetings were held by Industry and Commerce, through municipal councils, to discuss the Corporation idea with citizens, "Six months later, there it was".
- although not formally involved in these meetings, Area Development Board members did appear to discuss the issues.
- nine months after the Corporation was formed in 1970, Area Development Boards had taken up associate membership for their representatives on the Board of Directors, and the Regional Development Board was disbanded.
- it should be noted that the Interlake Development Corporation

differs somewhat from other Regional Development Corporations in that the promotion of industrial development is considered to be only a minor part of the I.D.C.'s activities. This Corporation has a broader perspective and also looks into problems of Health Services, river and soil erosion, housing quantity and quality, etc.

- the Interlake Development Corporation, influenced somewhat by the Area and Regional Development Board experiences, gets involved in areas where citizen interests lie, and where it (I.D.C.) can be successful in influencing government action, e.g. the Water Resources Program (the provision of water and sewer for small towns) and the Farm Water Program were both problem areas in which government action corresponded to the desire of the Corporation.
- the Area Development Boards per se have not become strongly involved in the corporation although some of their (ADB's) individual members have. The Corporation seems to be mainly a body of reeves and mayors.
- meetings of the Corporation's Board of Directors are moved throughout the region, on an individual meeting basis, in order to help solidify the notion that the I.D.C. is a regional entity.

7. Manpower Corps Directorate

- this is a Board which evolved in response to meeting the need for co-ordination among the departments involved in the Manpower Corps Program (a program of mixed training and

- experience for potentially employable, but high risk individuals).
- the Directorate began initially from meetings between the Departments of Agriculture and Tourism and Recreation. The purpose of these meetings was to convince Tourism and Recreation to find a way in which to use high risk manpower trainees (usually native people) in their Park Construction Program, in order to provide such people with on the job training and experience.
 - the Directorate is now composed of senior administrative officials from the provincial departments of Health and Social Development, Agriculture, Education and Mines and Natural Resources; the Federal departments of Manpower and Regional Economic Expansion; and the F.R.E.D. Administration. The first three provincial departments mentioned are considered to be "key members".
 - this Directorate is now the decision-making board for all proposals and agreements for the Manpower Corps Program.
 - other departments can become involved with the directorate in response to purely operational needs, e.g. the Winnipeg Beach Restaurant, constructed under the Department of Tourism and Recreation development program, was experiencing difficulty with staff service and management. The Departments of Manpower, Community Colleges, and Tourism came to an agreement, through the Directorate, to use the Restaurant as a "field classroom" for Red River Community College, to help train and employ business and hotel course students. At the same time the

Restaurant is used as a job training centre for Manpower
Corps participants.

8. Observations

- functionally, the role of Provincial Programmer is now the same as that of the Provincial Program Administrator under the Plan. i.e. co-ordinating and integrating program participant activities; day to day administration. This has resulted from the expansion of the personal role of the Provincial Administrator in other provincial government policy matters.
- reflections on inter-government and/or department meetings:
"Consensus follows a pot of gold."

INTERVIEW NUMBER 7

TOPICS

Questions Relating to the Role of Indians in F.R.E.D. and the Interlake.

1. General Information Regarding Reserves.
2. How do the Indians Relate to the Interlake?
3. Describe the Split Which Occurred Between the Reserves and the ADB's.
4. Describe the F.R.E.D. Programs that Help the Indians.
5. What is the Relationship of the Indians to the F.R.E.D. Administration?
6. What Does the Future Hold for Citizen (and Indian) Participation in the Plan?
7. Assessment of F.R.E.D.'s Work and Success.
8. How do the Indian People Express Their Concerns with Respect to Government Programs, in General, and F.R.E.D. Programs, in Particular, in the Interlake?

1. General Information Regarding Reserves

- there are seven Indian Reserves in the Interlake.
- six are in the Province's political jurisdiction of The Pas. (Only the Lake Manitoba Reserve which is west of Camper is not in this constituency.)
- three reserves are in the Camper-Gypsumville area: Fairford, Lake St. Martin, and The Little Saskatchewan.
- three reserves are in the Fisher area: Jackhead, Fisher River and Peguis.

2. How do the Indians Relate to the Interlake?

- the Indians consider themselves a part of the Areas in which they live, they believe that some of their problems are distinct from those of other Interlakers. e.g. Indians have earned the dubious classification of being unreliable, lazy, incompetent, etc., and while this may be true of some, it is not fair to judge each individual in this manner; yet many prospective employers (in the Interlake) and prospective landlords (in Winnipeg) would not consider the personal worth of individual Indians. Hence, Indians have more accented problems of employment and housing.
- Indians from the reserves do a lot of business in towns like Moosehorn, Fairford, Asher, etc. They own land and farm (e.g. one individual has approximately twenty head of cattle and worked some land before going to work for "community development"); Indians earning income or owning land off of the reserve also pay both land and income taxes: therefore, despite common misconceptions, (of whites from outside the area) Indians do contribute to the economic and social

"life" of the community. NOTE: He is particularly disturbed with the current M.L.A. for Thompson's comment that "We (the government) pay more to you Indians in welfare than anywhere near the amount of taxes we collect from you".

- the reserves do create a "geographic barrier" or differentiation of Indians from whites in the Area, and while this was originally the design of the whites, some Indians are pleased with the set-up because it provides them with a "retreat" (and an alternative to Winnipeg slums).
- while the Indians used to belong to the ADB, they initially and generally preferred to listen and participate in that way, because the environment was strange to them.
- the Indian Reserves definitely consider themselves a part of the Interlake, much more so than they consider Salkirk (or even Gimli) a part of it, since the problems facing Indians are similar in many respects to those facing poor Interlakers (farmers, fishermen) and communities.
- even though Indians transact much of their business in local communities, little or no mention is ever made of them in communities' briefs and reports.

3. Describe the Split Which Occurred Between the Reserves and the ADB's.

- originally the Indians were members of the ADB.
- the Boards, at that time, did not function as well as they do now, and many of the Indians felt they were not being listened to (since the government was not listening to the ADB).
- also, because of the old tribal system (old chiefs--traditional

ways) and the old paternalistic empire-building system of the Department of Indian Affairs, many of the Indians wanted to band together to form an "ADB for Indians", i.e. organize according to interest group rather than by geography.

- hence, their participation on ADB's declined.
- the seven tribes held a meeting and decided to have a twenty-one member Board of their own (three representatives from each tribe: two regulars and one alternate).
- they decided that the \$1,000 the ADB's were getting from the government, at that time, for operating expenses was not enough, so they asked for \$1,500.
- they never got the \$1,500 or formal recognition as an ADB, but they did not return to their old positions on the Camper-Gypsumville ADB either.
- now Indians have no formal representation in F.R.E.D. NOTE: They do have informal representation, because some Indians act as liaisons by inter-acting with government departments (that may be employing them) that are directly or indirectly involved with F.R.E.D. in the Interlake.

4. Describe the F.R.E.D. Programs That Help the Indians.

- most of the F.R.E.D programs, projects and activities are not helping the Indians much, because there are no funds designated for Indians specifically, e.g. the Indians can see a benefit to both themselves and Area residents if the consolidated school for Ashern is finally built, or if the highway between the reserves is hardtopped so that increased inter-action between whites and

Indians can occur. i.e. some F.R.E.D. programs "help" Indians, but only in an indirect way.

- the Manpower programs have been of more value, since Indians are beginning to see the advantage of steady employment and the need for skills to get that employment.
- however, of the twelve families placed in Selkirk last year, half have returned to the reserve.
- inference: in "absolute" terms there are still many problems with this program, and it does not appear to be a success; in "relative" terms it has been quite useful to Indians who wish to work.
- the Indians do not want programs which are specifically designed for them, but instead want to see F.R.E.D. re-design all of its programs, with Interlakers (of which Indians are a portion) suggestions bearing some import. i.e. he presently feels that Indians, not as Indians but as Interlakers in general, are not being listened to. e.g. the Indians would like to see more industrial development for smaller Interlake towns (those smaller than Gimli and Selkirk), and would like to see better quality upgrading and Manpower Corps Programs.

5. What is the Relationship of the Indians to the F.R.E.D. Administration?

- the Indians feel F.R.E.D. has provided community Boards merely as "tokenism" to replace "real citizen participation".
- they feel this is true of both the ADB's and the tribes representation thereon.
- the Provincial Administrator has definitely stated that both the funds

for, and structure of citizen participation are "fixed" in the original Plan, and therefore, he leaves the impression that any suggestions for change must be rejected after due consideration because of the rigidities of the Plan. i.e. the Administrator has given the impression over time, that while he listens to local citizens (and passes on their "information" to the legislators) little can be done by either the Administrators or the legislators to make changes in the original agreement--the whole process of communication seems to be in only one direction.

6. What Does the Future Hold for Citizen (and Indian) Participation in the Plan?

- many people have been extremely discouraged by the tokenism and one-way (F.R.E.D. directed implementation) relationship that exists with respect to citizen participation in the management of the Plan (including re-planning, which citizens do not feel has significantly occurred).
- the Plan built up the hopes of many Interlokars (in terms of their potentially influential role) but it now seems as if the only reason Indians and citizens were included was because it was a good way for the Province to get more money from the Federal Government (since the original recommendations came from the Province to the Federal Government).
- it was easy to get the people interested in the Plan, at first, but it will become more difficult as time goes on (or if there is another plan), if the government does not change its attitude and become more serious about having effective citizen partici-

pation.

- NOTE: the interviewee appears to agree with the economic and social improvements intended in, or brought forward by the Plan, but greatly dislikes the "lip-service" paid to citizen participation.
- one way to get more results might be to reduce the size of Areas to more natural and manageable geographic units. i.e. more Boards and smaller Areas would bring more people into the "active" segment of the ADB's.
- one of the problems with the ADB's is that politics at the local level tends to reduce the citizen participation rate, e.g. some people vow they would not work for their community, through the Camper-Gypsumville ADB because its current chairman is a strong and highly opinionated New Democrat.

7. Assessment of F.R.E.D.'s Work and Success.

- much of the improvement for Indians has come from departments not directly involved with F.R.E.D., e.g. Health and Social Services; changes in Indian Affairs towards giving Indians more responsibility and others.

8. How do the Indian People Express Their Concerns with Respect to Government Programs, in General, and F.R.E.D. Programs, in Particular, in the Interlake?

- originally there was room for one representative on the ADB for each reserve in the Area. Since the reserve's representative was usually the chief or one of the Band Officer's many of the Indians'

problems or concerns could be expressed through him. The usual procedure is for an Indian to bring his complaints to the Reserve Council, who will in turn express that concern to the government, through available channels.

- even when the Indians were represented on the ADB, it seemed that the most effective means of reaching decision-makers or having particular problems solved, was to work through the various government departments Field Agents in the Area. This was especially true, in view of the fact that most of the substantive program changes in the Plan, as recommended by an ADB, would be rejected by the Administrators on the grounds that the Plan was sufficiently flexible to allow for such changes. Also, because some of the members of local governments, such as a plumber and store owner on the Gypsumville municipal council, have their own self interests to protect, they block "progressive" ideas proposed by the ADB or other citizens, e.g. the thought of potential business losses encouraged the two councillors mentioned above to block all attempts (by the ADB) to have a school built in Ashern.
- many of the government's decisions involving the Plan seem so highly political, that it is difficult to assess the chances of a "good" proposal being able to survive being processed through the F.R.E.D. system, e.g. even today, the inclusion of Selkirk as part of the Interlake is treated with a high degree of suspicion by "Interlakers". That decision has caused much tension and animosity, because Interlakers view Selkirk not as a growth centre in the region, but rather as a suburb of Winnipeg.

"Why then was it included in the Plan"--for irrational (but politically sound) reasons.