Nodal Governance and Security Provision:
The University of Manitoba Security Service

by

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A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of
The University of Manitoba
in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

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Abstract. Security has consistently been identified as a State prerogative whereby the State holds a monopoly on the governance of all such activities within itself. This understanding has been challenged over the past two decades by the proliferation of security providers in both state and non-state forms. The frameworks of anchored pluralism and private governance have expanded criminologists’ understanding of security governance, moving it beyond a state-centric model. The nodal governance paradigm encompasses these concepts and develops them by emphasizing an increasing ‘pluralisation’ of security governance. This study focuses on the University of Manitoba Security Service as an institution, mapping the ways in which it forms relationships with other security nodes to form a complex system of governance. This thesis illuminates that the University of Manitoba Security Service is a node of security governance, and thus it uses both formal and informal mechanisms to network with other security bodies.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

There is a tension between security and freedom. Security must, by definition, limit an individual’s freedom to act as they choose, yet without security, the freedom of some can impinge on the freedom of others. Isaiah Berlin’s (1969) typology of positive and negative liberty is useful in describing the relationship between a state of security and pure freedom. Positive liberty “means freedom to [act], or self-determination--freedom to act or to be as one wills” (Heyman, 1992:81). This encompasses the need for an individual to be one’s own master and have his or her own thoughts, and is usually the outcome of State involvement so that citizen’s true potential is realized. Negative liberty, on the other hand, is “freedom from interference, coercion or restrain” (Heyman, 1992:81). This form of liberty exists when no other individual or State can obstruct or interfere with an individual’s activity.

Positive liberty (security) and negative liberty (pure freedom) appear to be conflicting ideas: how can an individual be their own master, when doing so infringes on another’s ability to determine their own actions? Central to this dichotomy is the role of the State in citizens’ security and in ensuring everyone meets their true potential as opposed to allowing ‘pure freedom’ to prevail un-obstructed by governments. An example of positive liberty is that of the welfare state, whereas negative liberty could be considered the free market. John Stuart Mill touches on this in On Liberty by stating “The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it” (John Stuart Mill, 1859:19). Jean Jacque Rousseau elaborates on this through the ‘social contract’, where citizenship affords certain protections so long as individuals through citizenship give up certain freedoms. Usually these ‘social contracts’ are codified in one manner or another. Canadian citizenship, for example, affords every member
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms consisting of fundamentals rights. These civil liberties span the right of conscience and religion, freedom of thought, opinion and expression, and the right to vote. It also affords the right to life, liberty, privacy and security. Therefore, the positive liberties that Berlin describes can be found guaranteed in the Charter.

Furthermore, to be a Canadian citizen means that all are subject to the Criminal Code of Canada, enforced by various judicial and policing bodies, which can be considered another form of positive liberty. This is where individuals are told what they ‘cannot do’. This proscriptive system tells individuals they may do everything except for those actions codified in the Criminal Code. As such it creates security for all members of society. It is from the need to protect the freedom of others by limiting the freedom of certain individuals that the State exercises the right to place citizen under surveillance and the right to interfere with action. Thus, as part of the social contract, the State is responsible for balancing autonomy with limitation, privacy with surveillance, and freedom with detention. However, there has been an increase in recent years in the performance of security roles by non-state actors.

Security has consistently been identified as a State prerogative whereby the state holds a monopoly on the governance of all activities within itself. This understanding has been challenged over the past two decades by the proliferation of security providers in both state and non-state forms.

There have been several interpretations of how state and non-state organizations control the provision of security. The private governance of security and anchored pluralism are sensitizing theoretical frameworks that explain certain aspects of web based policing systems but cannot accurately account for the reality of private military corporations (PMCs) and private policing corporations (PPCs). The private governance of security framework emphasizes the
growing industry of private security, tied to their employer or contractor, private industry. Anchored pluralism advances this idea by describing an increase in non-state security, but where ultimately the state still “steers”, while other actors (ie. non-state security agents) “row”. The nodal governance paradigm will be utilized in this study due to its ability to help us to understand and to measure the way in which organizations govern security along networks with the entire system contributing to the provision of services in their geographical areas. These concepts will be discussed in further detail below in the literature review.

Past research supports the need to study the provision of security as function of many different organizations working with and/or against each other. Dupont’s (2006) research on policing agencies in Montreal and on Australian police chiefs shows the need to shift from a state-centric understanding of governance to a network approach. In a study conducted in Edmonton and Halifax, Murphy and Clarke (2006) found variation in the provision of policing within these two cities, and also found that a large number of organizations were active in providing security.

Although past research highlights the need to shift from a purely state-centric theoretical framework to a nodal paradigm, limited research has been conducted to determine whether organizations network with others to form a web based system of governance. It is for this reason that this study is exploratory in nature. The organization chosen for the study was the University of Manitoba Security Service (UMSS). This study focused what type of ‘node’ the UMSS is (described in-depth below), and how the UMSS networked with other organizations. The University of Manitoba was chosen for convenience as well as for the size of the community policed. The enrolment at the University of Manitoba is 26,938 full-time and part-time students (University of Manitoba, 2011). This makes the University of Manitoba the third largest urban
centre in Manitoba, following Brandon and Winnipeg. In addition, the University of Manitoba has international students and visitors, making it an area open to policing at the federal level with such organizations as the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA), Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). Thus, it has a diverse range of policing organizations involved in policing jurisdictions of different levels (that is, local, provincial, and federal) at the same location.

It is hypothesized that the University of Manitoba Security Service was a node of security governance, and that it used both formal and informal mechanisms to network with other security bodies.

During data collection for this research, nineteen different organizations were active in the provision of security on the Bannatyne and Fort Garry campuses. At the conclusion of data analysis, it became evident that the UMSS is the central security agency at the University, dealing with the majority of security issues. Any security functions beyond its capability were automatically referred to the Winnipeg Police Service (WPS). This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.

In conclusion, the UMSS can be understood as a security node and it uses its resources to network with other agencies on campus to meet its objectives. More importantly, it responds to the majority of security concerns within the University, making it an influential organization within the province.

**Literature Review**

This section has three aims. First, it will provide a definition of ‘security’ followed by a discussion of the central paradigms/frameworks being used within the field of criminology in relation to the governance of security and how they expand on this thesis. This includes the
private governance, anchored pluralist, and nodal governance paradigms. Finally, an analysis of current studies will be applied to these paradigms/frameworks. This will determine what type of methodology will prove most useful in an exploratory analysis of the UMSS as a node that uses its resources to achieve desired objectives in networks.

**Understanding ‘Security’**

Security is a term that describes an array of different social control functions, but the term generally is not well defined or specific as to what functions are included. For this reason it will be important to specify what is meant by ‘security’.

David Baldwin (1997) addresses the ‘concept’ of security and how it should be studied and defined. He states that “one could specify security with respect to the actors whose values are to be secured, the values concerned [and] the degree of security. . .” However, he discusses an important element that is omnipresent in most security studies, which is what he describes as the basic notion of security. That is “the absence of threats to acquired values” (Baldwin, 1997:13). However, the matter of security is not as simple as understanding it as the ‘absence of threat.’ Theorists have expanded on the meaning of security by differentiating real and perceived ‘security’. Johnston and Shearing (2003) emphasize that the term ‘security’ is usually thought of as an ‘objective’ entity, which can be researched and measured as a tangible condition or state of affairs. However, they also propose that security should be thought of as a term measured by an individual’s subjective understanding. An example will prove useful in distinguishing the two (Johnston & Shearing, 2003:3). Every person’s perception of whether they are or are not safe in any circumstance affects their feeling of security, and in some instances may cause them to ‘buy’ extra security. Thus, the term ‘security’ incorporates both an objective and subjective understanding and measurement. Both levels have an effect on how security providers and
governments approach its provision (Johnston & Shearing, 2003:3). While it is important to understand these two differing perspectives in relation to studying security, this analysis will focus on the objective level rather than measuring individuals’ own understandings of it.

There are several different types of security. Deborah Avant (2005) provides a model illustrating the two most prominent forms of non-state security. According to her model, private security can be divided into two distinct types: companies that conduct private military functions and those that are involved in private policing. More specifically, each category is broken into different levels stratified by the function’s proximity to the ‘front line of battle’. As shown in Annex A, Avant considers armed operational support to be closest to “front line” military operations followed by unarmed operational support on the battlefield. Farther from the front line is unarmed military advice and training and, lastly, logistical support (Avant, 2005:16). Policing closest to the front line can be described as armed site security (Avant, 2005:17). Generally, these individuals are involved in a visible manner and armed, such as cash in transit followed by unarmed site security. The next is crime prevention (through private firms) and, finally, intelligence agencies (Avant, 2005:17).

Thus, Avant describes a model based on services that can be purchased from the market in both military and policing forms, but are also potentially relevant when looking at both state and non-state security providers. It also proves useful in defining the parameters that situate (delineate) the different forms of security. In addition, it is important to note that purchasing a security service from the market does not necessarily mean that the purchaser controls all aspects of that service’s actions. Thus, security can be defined as the objective level of protection by reducing threat to acquired values (both physical and intangible items). In this study, security provision means organizations whose primary function is to attain this end.
Moving Away From a State-Centric Understanding of Security Governance

Traditionally, the provision of security services has been viewed as the sole responsibility of the state. This trend has existed for almost two centuries tied to the theories of Thomas Hobbes and Jean Bodin (Loader, 2000: 325). The central thesis of their work is “that the defining feature of the modern sovereign state was its monopoly on the use of legitimate force within given spatial boundaries, a monopoly which is principally vested. . .in [the] uniformed body we have come to know as the police” (Loader, 2000: 325). They also acknowledge that the state has control of its national military, which provides the state with a different form of security. However this view does not explain or situate the growing forms of non-state security tied to sites of private ownership.

These concepts articulated by Hobbes and Bodin have been omnipresent within the fields of criminology and security since their creation. As a result, non-state security has not been studied according to the increasing role it has assumed in the absence of state activity or in areas in which the state does not want to become involved. It is for this reason that this thesis will adopt one of the few paradigms that understands security provision as a set of organizations providing security through intricate webs of governance.

The nodal governance paradigm will be discussed in this section, using the private governance of security and anchored pluralism frameworks to help understand patterns observed in networks. All three theoretical paradigms/frameworks move away from a state-centric understanding of security governance and aid this study in understanding how organizations govern through complex webs.
Burris, Drahos, and Shearing (2005) have proposed that a multitude of different actors are involved in the governance of society. They define governance as “the management of the course of events in a social system” (Burris, Drahos & Shearing, 2005:2). According to these authors, governance at all levels is a complex entity, involving several different actors such as “state, corporations, the WTO, institutions of ‘civil society,’ [and] criminal and terrorist gangs” (Burris et al, 2005:3). These actors usually form complex networks of governance and exert such mechanisms as “force, persuasion, economic pressure, norm creation and manipulation” (Burris et al, 2005:3). The combination of these mechanisms employed by different actors creates networks of governance that produce specific outcomes.

Nodal governance is a specific theoretical framework of network governance that narrows and defines how these actors involved in governance can be described; in other words, nodal governance sets the parameters and attributes of the type of node an organization occupies. It also provides a framework to study connections between different ‘nodes’. A node “is a site within an outcome generating system (OGS) where knowledge, capacity and resources are mobilized to manage a course of events” (Burris, Drahos & Shearing, 2005:11).

Shearing and Wood (2003) understand that most governance takes place in a networked manner and have established a theoretical model for describing this condition, termed ‘nodal governance’. These theorists propose moving away from a state-centered approach to studying security, and they emphasize that criminologists have been concerned with the three “big C’s”--Cops, Courts and Corrections--for far too long (Shearing & Wood, 2003:402). As they point out, security has historically been performed by a multitude of different agencies, which include

Network Theory and Nodal Governance
those bought from the market in the form of policing and mercenary work. Private security personnel outnumber public personnel 2 or 3 to 1 in North America, and 5 to 7 to 1 in South Africa, which illustrates the increasing growth of private security in contemporary society (Shearing & Wood, 2003: 402). This has created a greater ‘pluralization’ of governance in security. As a response, western governments have implemented licensing that involves examination for security guards and private security guards. As Shearing and Wood state, “[t]he growth of non-state governance, both with and without state action, has made it more and more difficult to maintain this state-centered view of governance” (Shearing & Wood, 2003:403). Thus, they propose “a ‘nodal’, rather than a state centered conception of governance” (Shearing & Wood), where nodes represent sites of power. Such nodes include state, corporate/business, and non-governmental sectors. They also highlight a possible fourth informal or formal sector that exists outside the other three, such as international law (Shearing & Wood, 2003: 405). These theorists point out that these nodes can interact or work in benign neglect of each other (Shearing & Wood, 2003:405).

Burris, Drahos, and Shearing (2005) expand on this idea by further defining the meaning of nodal governance. They propose that a node has four distinct characteristics. The first is a way of thinking about matters that the node has emerged to govern (mentalities), the second is a set of methods for exerting influence (technologies), the third is resources to promote and exert its influence, and the fourth is a structure that mobilizes all of these assets over time (an institution) (Burris, Drahos & Shearing, 2005:29-30). An important element to emphasize is that the structure must exist over time, meaning it must exist long enough to exert influence over the individuals that it governs. These nodes govern a collectivity of individuals. More specifically, a ‘collectivity’ is defined as “any group of people living in the same place or on
some other basis identifying themselves as a group for at least some important purpose” (Burris et al, 2005:34). Usually, such a ‘collectivity’ has the potential to produce problems such as poverty, but also goods such as wealth in both monetary and material forms. Burris, Drahos, and Shearing propose that these outcomes are objective and can be measured. It is for this reason that they delimit the idea of ‘collectivity’ by defining it as an outcome-generating system (OGS), which produces different outcomes.

The theory of ‘nodal governance’ appears to be useful in understanding security governance, because it allows theorists to contextualize and to identify how different nodes, such as private security companies, states, and private businesses, are interrelated. Two examples illustrate the need to shift from state-centric and private governance paradigms to the nodal governance paradigm. These examples describe new policing developments in Britain and the Private Military Companies involvement in Sierra Leone. In Britain, police officers are being hired by businesses for numerous functions, while these officers are still under the complete control of the Chief Constable. Alongside this development has been the creation of Community Support Officers (CSO) who are part of the police force, but are not sworn in and have limited functions, such as issuing tickets for violations. The police force has thus remained a competitive option in relation to other private companies, which has increased its economic capital (Crawford, 2006:132). These recent developments in British policing can be seen as a node attempting to increase its economic base by providing security services to private corporations while retaining complete authority over the officers ‘contracted out’. Although these contracted police officers are providing security to private corporations to advance corporate interest, it does not mean that the purchaser governs such an entity completely. From this example, it becomes evident that the different nodes involved such as private business
owners and state police forces, operate with their own sphere of autonomy and their own governance structures.

The second example that allows theorists to understand the complexity of how states and private businesses interact in terms of security is the case of Sierra Leone, where the government was overthrown by Valentine Strasser in 1992. Once in power, he contracted such private security companies as the Gurkha Security Guards (GSG) to train the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF). However, as conflict continued, the Strasser government wanted GSG to provide operational support and protect forces while they were training. Concerned for their international image, GSG continued under their original contract and refused to take an operational role. This ultimately led the company to voluntarily leave in 1995 (Avant, 2005:86).

Needing a private military company willing to actively participate in operations with armed support, Sierra Leone hired Executive Outcomes (EO) in March of 1995. Executive Outcomes was paid by the Sierra Leone government and an oil company named Branch Energy that had an interest in ensuring stability within their area of business. Within a month of being in country, EO led the RSLMF on a counter-offensive. However, EO recognized the need for greater military support, specifically in the country’s southeast, and looked to local tribes and militia to guard mines in that area. A large ethnic group called the ‘Kajamors’ proved useful, and EO provided training and weapons to repel Republic United Front (RUF) attacks (Avant, 2005:89). Although this was effective for a short period of time, the RSLMF had several military altercations with the Kajamors, and rumors led the RSLMF to believe that Strasser had greater loyalties towards the Kajamors, which provoked a new coup to remove Strasser. In 1995, EO moved out of the country.

Several Private Military Corporations were involved in providing private security in
Sierra Leone. However, as the example of GSG illustrates, although states (nodes) contract for security services, this does not mean that the providing node (GSG) is governed by the purchaser. More importantly, private security companies may guard their own symbolic capital necessary to maintain the ability to increase their economic base. EO, on the other hand, illustrates that even if a private security company is effective in creating security, the means by which this is done may not be entirely in the interest of the employer due to the security organization’s own autonomy and governance. Sometimes, these actions among security nodes give other nodes (Kajamors) more political capital, while achieving their goals (providing security).

It is evident that security governance can be very complicated and that no single node has complete control over all the others as the state-centric model implies. Also, while security services are bought from the market, it does not necessarily translate into a relationship where the purchaser is the governing body of the security company.

Having established that a theoretical shift away from a state-centric understanding of security governance is necessary, the nodal approach allows this study to further understand the complexity of networked governance. This nodal approach will be expanded by exploring the capital used by nodes and their capacities to influence other nodes through networks in the following section.

Two of the first criminologists to move away from understanding security as purely a state function were Shearing and Stenning (1983). They proposed that trends in the increase of private policing could be seen as a shift to a new disciplinary society. This disciplinary society was heavily influenced by property relations that were changing policing from reactive to preventative (that is, preventing crime from ever happening rather than apprehending those
individuals that committed crime) (Shearing & Stenning, 1983:194). Shearing and Stenning introduced the notion of the unique role that ‘mass private property’ (such as shopping malls and amusement parks) played in creating a new disciplinary society. According to Shearing and Stenning, the increase of private property that was now open to the general public led to an increase in private policing that tried to reduce crime in order to enhance profit. They argue that there are fundamental differences between public and private forms of security where “private forms of personnel will often be far more influenced by their perceptions of the interest of their immediate employers” (Shearing & Stenning, 1983:210). If this is true, then these organizations hold the interests of their employer above that of others. This can be seen most notably in the private military capacity, such as the ‘Blackwater’ incident of September 2007. While protecting a state convoy, a fire fight broke out that resulted in the death of several Iraqi civilians. No matter who started the firefight, it became evident that Blackwater’s primary allegiance was to those who were paying for the protection of the convoy. This raises accountability issues and highlights the security node’s ability to meet its own objectives. This is helpful in framing the subject of security agencies as autonomous organizations attempting to meet their own goals. Thus, in theory, organizations such as the UMSS will act in a manner to meet their own objectives and not necessarily those outside of the organization.

Another contemporary example of this securitization for profit can be found in Phil Hadfield’s (2008) study of nightclub security in central London, England. Hadfield conducted several interviews that showed that night clubs in Central London use multiple techniques to not only police their territory, but to maximize profit by only letting individuals who have large amounts of money into the club (Hadfield, 2008:443). These night clubs use door teams to restrict access to individuals with perceived low buying power to entice those with extra buying
power to attend their establishment (Hadfield, 2008:430). More importantly, within these establishments there are usually areas guarded by bouncers for those affluent enough to use them, called Very Important Person (VIP) areas. The going rate according to Hadfield for access to these exclusive areas is at least £200 to £1000 per head, or per group (Hadfield, 2008:439).

Hadfield’s article illustrates that in the night-time economy, it is not necessarily good enough to spend money, but rather you must be able to spend more money than others to be granted access to these establishments. This is coupled with the VIP areas that indicate the importance of the individuals inside as a form of stratification even within clubs. The enforcement of this condition is achieved in several ways; however, it primarily uses door teams, bouncers, and other subtle building designs. The overall aim is to create a situation that maximizes profit built on exclusion of those not wealthy enough to afford these establishments, rather than on preventing deviance.

Clifford Shearing (2006) argues that criminologists have used the idea of mass private property as an explanation for the increase of private security services without acknowledging the rise of private governance. By private governance, Shearing means the rise of private ownership and the ability of the owner to control their property. According to Shearing:

One of our central intentions was to show how the growth of private security provided evidence for the emergence of private auspices of governance who governed in ways that enhanced their profit. While the articles in which this argument was advanced have become relatively well known, the arguments about the emergence of corporate governance that were central to them have not received much sustained attention. (Shearing, 2006:12)

The term ‘government’ has traditionally been tied to the idea of a public state. Shearing proposes that this should be reconsidered, and he argues that the increase in private policing is one indicator that there has been an increase in sites of governance outside the state apparatus.
Shearing’s discussion illustrates that the state is not always ‘steering’, but rather is caught in a broader relationship between sites of private and public governance. Such an argument moves past a state-centric understanding and highlights the growing position that private security services hold in security networks. Thus “... non-state entities... operate not simply as providers of governance on behalf of the state, but as auspices of governance in their own right” (Shearing, 2006:11). This framework illuminates that these private governments (ie. private industry) have significant control over their security services. However, the purchase of private security services by private organizations and/or states does not necessarily mean they can or do govern them.

Shearing addresses two significant issues. The first is that the state is not the only site of security governance but one organization among many that are involved in actively controlling the behaviour of individuals. This can be seen in the expanding growth of the private security companies, which include private military companies (PMC) and private policing companies (PPC). The second is that there appear to be several different sites of governance, and the state is but one site in a multitude of private spaces. These other ‘private’ sites of governance appear to have the power to police individuals within their territory. In certain circumstances, this includes search and detention, if the individual is to be processed through the criminal justice system. However, an alternative is restricting access, since most stores are private property and the owner has the power to decide whom they allow on their premises.

Shearing emphasizes the need to move away from a state-centric understanding of governance to one in which public and private “governments” compete to achieve their own needs, but he does not adequately explain who governs the security services that public and private sites of governance employ. For this reason a model of nodal governance working from
a networked model is more appropriate, because it interprets governance through a multitude of different actors and institutions that each has its own autonomy. It is important to understand that the private governance framework is not contradictory to the nodal governance paradigm, but rather emphasizes the growing development of and the place private security agencies have within web based systems of governance.

*Anchored Pluralism*

The anchored pluralism framework acknowledges that the state is but one site of security governance among many. This framework emphasizes the important role that state security nodes play within security networks and sees the state moving from the rowing seats to occupy the steering column in regards to policy and administration. Such an approach accepts the idea of networked governance and emphasizes the pivotal place that the state maintains within security networks. Several different theorists subscribe to the idea of anchored pluralism.

The first is Adam Crawford (2006), who describes the present condition of security networks as anchored by state regulation and traditional policing agencies, such as municipal and national police forces. He argues that the increase in regulation of security providers in Britain and the police remaining as a “resource of last resort, when all else fails” (Crawford, 2006) makes the state an anchor in guiding security provision. This highlights the shift in position that the state holds within security networks from provision to supervision and strengthens the need to use a nodal paradigm to describe security governance.

Second, Ransley and Mazerolle (2009) describe the notion of “third party policing” (Ransley & Mazerolle, 2009:373) where “public police can steer... crime control networks, by mobilizing other parties and making use of their resources” (Ransley & Mazerolle, 2009: 373).
This implies that the state is at the center of these networks (Ransley & Mazerolle, 2009: 373), but at this point has not harnessed this position to its full potential to gain maximum compliance from other ‘nodes’. Ransley & Mazerolle have a prescriptive element that advocate for the police to use a “model based on the idea of third party policing” (2009: 379) as the way forward in the provision of security. These theorists describe an important attribute of current security networks where the state is a pivotal node, but still influenced by other non-state nodes. It is through these connections among security organizations that security governance is conducted through a complex interaction of state and non-state nodes.

Anchored pluralism is helpful in understanding security governance in specific geographical areas. Although Britain has increased the amount of legislation regulating the security field (Crawford, 2006), such legislation (anchoring) may not be possible in third world countries. This may explain why South Africa has the largest proportion of non-state security personnel in the world (Shearing & Wood, 2003: 402), as this area has historically had difficulty retaining a strong government body. Secondly, if the state is attempting to secure its place as the central organization, it would simply be one node among others using its resources along networks to achieve the end most favorable to itself. Hence the anchored pluralism framework strengthens the need to use the nodal paradigm to study current security networks.

The private governance and anchored pluralism frameworks highlight important attributes of the nodal governance paradigm by articulating the increasingly larger role non-state security organizations perform. Furthermore, anchored pluralism highlights that, although the state is one node among many, the resources at its disposal make it an important organization in influencing (steering) security governance. The theory of nodal governance is most useful in understanding security governance, because it allows theorists to contextualize and identify how
different nodes, such as private security companies, states, and private businesses, are interrelated. Notwithstanding, there still appears to be a gap in the theoretical literature and research conducted in this area. Thus, I have conducted a study on the University of Manitoba Campus to explore the current state of networked governance in a specific geographical area.

*Nodal Governance: Nodes Using Capital (Resources) in Networks*

Nodes governing an outcome-generating system are not theoretical entities that exist at the abstract level, but rather real entities that mobilize resources through an institution. This section illustrates that there are five types of capital used within security governance at the nodal level. These different forms of capital can be understood as resources used by different security nodes. Benoit Dupont’s research will be utilized to expand on the application of nodal governance to nodes active in providing security. More specifically, Dupont’s work on capital studying Australian police chiefs, and a study conducted in Montreal will be examined to illustrate the complexity of security governance. Finally, a study of two Canadian cities, Edmonton and Halifax, (Murphy & Clarke, 2006) will illustrate that the environment that security occurs in has an effect on how nodes interact with each other.

Dupont (2004) proposes that “five different forms of capital can be highlighted as being relevant in the context of security networks” (Dupont, 2004:85). These resources can be mobilized to promote the interest of those actors that use them. These consist of economic, political, cultural, social, and symbolic capital. Economic capital, according to Dupont, refers to “the traditional meaning of financial resources allocated through the fiscal process or the ‘invisible hand’ of the market” (Dupont, 2004:85). Unlike private providers, which are free to
find profitable opportunities, government organizations, limited by fiscal restrictions, attempt to use their economic capital to increase other types that can then be used to enhance their ability to influence. Dupont argues that “economic capital will . . . dictate the patterns found in security networks” (Dupont, 2004:85).

**Political capital** can be thought of as “the proximity of actors to the machinery of government and their capacity to influence or direct this machinery toward their own objectives” (Dupont, 2004:85). By government, Dupont means the sovereign state, but this does not imply that it is the government in control of all aspects of governance. Rather, it is a site where other actors such as large corporations or other non-state bodies can mobilize capital to achieve their interests. However, public entities such as the public police force may be in a better position to mobilize political capital from the government than non-state counterparts.

The third form discussed by Dupont is **cultural capital**. Cultural capital can be understood as the creation of “unique expertise in the field of crime prevention and detection, which is accumulated and transmitted through higher levels of selection and training” (Dupont, 2004:86). This also includes research and development, which Dupont believes can be found in a superior form in public police agencies, but, as the private security industry has grown, it has expanded its own cultural capital (Dupont, 2004:86).

The fourth form of capital is social in nature and thus called **social capital**. It can be defined as “the whole set of social relations that allow the constitution, maintenance and expansion of social networks” (Dupont, 2004:86). This can come in the form of professionalization and bureaucratization of public police forces. This involves creating systems to legitimize police authority such as police colleges that train forces, thus creating a social expectation that they are qualified to accomplish their goals. The private security industry,
however, can draw and maneuver inside much different networks than can the public police force, since they do not have a formal government institution overseeing their activities as closely as the public police force does.

Lastly, Dupont describes *symbolic capital*, which is the combination of the other four, and is the most “general form of capital” (Dupont, 2004:86). For example, the public police force can use its ‘symbolic’ capital of being a representative of the state to try and maintain a monopoly on security over other non-state actors, due to their symbolic place within society as the sole body for policing.

Dupont’s (2006) qualitative study of police chiefs in Australia is useful in observing the pragmatic results of such capital. This study was conducted by interviewing ten police commissioners about their perception of their place within the greater field of actors or nodes, such as the community, police unions, and the media. Unlike private security companies, public police forces depend solely on governments for funding, which influence their ability to implement policy. Thus, the commissioner is required to obtain funding from the government by proposing strategies. According to one retired commissioner: “The government totally supported me in my aims and that is reflected in the fact . . . [the budget] has increased 100 percent of what it was when I arrived” (Dupont, 2006:97). More importantly, several commissioners stated that they could influence the level of funding received by arguing for reviews so as to allow ‘progress’ to be made, meaning that if the reviews were progressive then their aims were being reached, and as such would receive increased funding. Dupont concludes that commissioners believe that political capital, the ability to influence other actors to support their objectives, is a necessity. One respondent states, “A commissioner has no chance of being effective unless he has credibility with the government and the key stakeholders with whom he or she works”
Along with this political capital, cultural capital can be seen in the education of police officers, which has created the professionalization of the criminal justice field. For example, Dupont cited the example of one commissioner who created a graduate school at Charles Sturt University in an attempt to change policing from an occupation to a profession (Dupont, 2006:100).

The Commissioners believed that social capital was important and attempted to improve the relationship between the public police force and other groups that had an interest in community safety such as community watch groups and private security firms. This was done by informing other stakeholders of police policy and trying to motivate these stakeholders (members concerned with community safety) to find a solution (Dupont, 2006:101). Symbolic capital is the last and most general of the five, but as several commissioners stated in this study, corruption, which usually erodes the police’s symbolic capital, could be decreased by implementing more accountability boards.

Dupont’s study shows that specific actors involved in security governance believe that economic, political, cultural, social, and symbolic capital are important, and can influence the power or ability to network with other stakeholders (nodes) in security. His research study also shows that these individuals are independent autonomous actors who use their subjective understanding to influence the governance of security by increasing all types of capital. While the study is exploratory, it demonstrates that several different nodes are active in governing security.

It is evident that different types of capital are used by different security nodes. This section will advance this discussion by demonstrating that other factors such as the centrality of a node and the number of connections it has to other organizations may influence its ability to
serve its interest.

In a study conducted in Montreal, Dupont (2006) illustrates the inter-connectedness of security networks. A security network can be defined as a “set of institutional, organizational, communal, or indoor individual agents or nodes that are directly or indirectly connected in order to authorize and/or provide security for the benefit of internal or external stakeholders” (Dupont, 2006:167). Data were collected by interview using nine variables (see Annex B), which were meant to measure inter-connectedness between nodes. Forty seven security organizations were interviewed, but only those who provided Dupont “with their complete list of partners and for which we had reciprocal data” (Annex C) were included in the core network of analysis. The results showed “that actors can reach all the other nodes of the network through only one intermediary” (Dupont, 2006:175). More importantly, the public police force was the most central agency, with 96% of respondents claiming they had some link to the municipal police (Dupont, 2006:176). However, when the public police force is removed from the model, nodes still have to go through only one intermediary to reach another node. This may imply that such a network can function without having ties to the public police force. Finally, one important attribute of this research showed that public police officers reported a significantly smaller number of ties to other organizations. Thus they work with agents from different organizations without understanding that any relationship exists. This is due to their central position in the security network. Other nodes can take advantage of these public police nodes, where they can tap public police resources by pulling these assets (trained police officers) into areas to improve a private security company’s ability to increase security within a specified area.

Dupont’s study illustrates that security networks are usually dense and complex. This analysis also illustrates the large number of nodes involved in providing security, which further
emphasizes the need to look at security governance through a nodal framework. However, this is not the only study conducted on a Canadian city.

Christopher Murphy and Curtis Clarke conducted case studies in Edmonton and Halifax. They found significant variation in the policy of public police forces for working with private security firms and non-state entities such as community watch.

In Halifax, there are many different groups involved in policing including: military police, Halifax Regional Police, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Canadian Corps of Commissionaires, special constables, ‘extra duty’ public police, security guard companies, corporate ‘in house’ security, and private investigators. The authors describe these different bodies as being governed “loosely and selectively by a mixture of government regulation, legal rules and market forces” (Clarke & Murphy, 2005:228). These market forces (spending cuts for policing services by the government) partially explain the Halifax Regional Police decision to claw back services that were originally provided by state forces. There appeared to have been little cooperation between these different segments, and thus Halifax seems to have a low level of nodal governance because the connections between different policing bodies are relatively weak.

Edmonton, on the other hand, exemplifies a different approach to policing. The authors state, “Edmonton provides a good example of how multi-agency cooperation does in fact support greater access to community surveillance, organization and intelligence” (Clarke & Murphy, 2005:231). This policing shift took place in a time of increased fiscal restraint and demand on the public police force, which resulted in the public police creating the ‘Edmonton Police Plan’ (Clarke & Murphy, 2005:230), which set out clear goals, accountability for different agents of policing and boundaries for those agents. The result of such a plan allowed the public police
force to offload some of their work to other agencies that could perform it instead. For example, through coordination, the West Edmonton Mall Safety and Security service does all the ‘foot work’ necessary so that the officer ‘on scene’ can appear and take an individual into custody immediately.

Also, due to the unique and different legal jurisdictional powers for non-state, state, and private policing agents, the Cooperative Police Program was implemented so that each actor understood their role and legal authority when dealing with certain situations. This program also provides an opportunity for actors such as Caritas Health Group (special constables) to attend meetings and share intelligence on current policing and control problems (Clarke & Murphy, 2005:231).

Edmonton’s security network differs from that of Halifax in the connections that are made by the different bodies involved in security. The public police force in Edmonton has created programs to enhance cooperation between different groups, making the city’s security network more cohesive and creating stronger ties between these different bodies. This example illustrates that different security bodies can have a significant impact in the connections between nodes within security networks.

Evidently, security is provided by a plurality of different nodes that interact with each other in networks. Nodal governance appears to be the most applicable theory when studying the security of an area. As Dupont’s study on capital emphasized, nodes utilize different resources to gain their desired outcomes. He expands on this study by illustrating that the position a node holds within a network will affect its ability to network with others. Murphy and Clarke’s case study illustrates the sizeable number of security nodes involved in different cities, and how the environment and actions of the public police force can have an effect on the security network as
a whole. This will be useful for understanding how the UMSS interacts with state and non-state agencies along networks to meet its objectives.
CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY

Although several researchers have studied policing networks, and nodal governance appears to be the best theoretical framework for understandings plural policing, some fundamental issues arise. First, the parameters that describe what type of a node an organization is have not been pragmatically defined. Second, although previous studies have discussed some programs and mechanisms that organizations use to network, there has been limited research on how a node mobilizes to accomplish this. An exploratory study was conducted on a security node and the surrounding network to address these issues. The security node that was chosen was the University of Manitoba Security Service (UMSS). It was hypothesized that the University of Manitoba’s Security Services was a node of security governance, and that it used both formal and informal mechanisms to network with other security bodies. This study gathered information from other security nodes that surrounded the University of Manitoba Security Service to look at the nature of nodal ties. There are several questions underpinning this research including:

1. What kind of node is the UMSS and where it is located within the larger network?

   A node has four characteristics that describe what type of node it is including: a distinct set of mentalities; resources; technologies; and an institution to utilize all of these characteristics (Burris, Drahos and Shearing 2005).

   Mentalities are what Burris, Drahos, and Shearing describe as “a way of thinking. . .about the matters that the node has emerged to govern” (Burris, Drahos & Shearing, 2005:12). In this study, this would be the mentalities towards infractions of either a criminal code or rules laid out by a non-state entity. The two most prominent mentalities within the security sector are based on
punitive or preventative attitudes. The reason for choosing these two types of mentalities or, as some theorists state ‘attitudes’, is because they will have a direct impact on how law enforcement personnel approach policing a collectivity. Generos Ortet-Fabregat and Jorge Perez (1992) conducted two studies on attitudes held by professionals in the criminal justice system. They measured attitudes towards the causes of crime, prevention of crime and the rehabilitation of criminals. Of importance to this study are the attitudes toward crime prevention. The authors deconstructed attitudes to crime prevention into coercive prevention and social intervention prevention. The first of these two measures individual’s beliefs that harsher punishments create deterrence and the latter measures whether the individual believes that positive social interaction will reduce crime. One of the findings of this study was that:

Police have a fundamental role to play not only in society’s protection, but also in the implementation of crime prevention measures. Police attitudes revealed in this study lead to the expectation of good levels of acceptance of and participation in community based and social intervention programs of crime prevention, beyond deterrence aspect of their profession. (Ortet-Fabregat & Perez, 1992:204)

In other words, although the public police force appears to embrace preventative attitudes, they still must maintain coercive mentalities.

It is important to analyze what type of mentalities the UMSS has to describe what type of node it is. Thus, it will be important to analyze whether nodes of security have either punitive or preventative mentalities when dealing with social infractions.

Resources can be defined as objects that are used “to support the operation of the node and the exertion of its influence” (Burris, Drahos & Shearing, 2005:12). These usually come in the form of different types of capital such as economic (finances), cultural, political, social, and symbolic capital. Dupont’s study found that all of these types are usually employed by different nodes to achieve their interest. This data was collected during interviews with management.
The next characteristic used to classify a node is the distinct types of technology it employs. These different types of technology can be defined as “a set of methods for exerting influence over the course of events at issue” (Burris, Drahos & Shearing, 2005:12). In the case of security nodes, this includes active and passive methods and mechanisms of social motivation and control used to increase security, ranging from information campaigns and surveillance to patrol techniques and searches. Data on technologies were collected through interviews with management and rank and file members. The questions used during interviews with management and members of the UMSS focused on drawing out what type of technology they use to maintain peace and order (as per Annex D, Appendix 1& 2). This research study was focused on measuring technologies such as Closed Circuit Television (CCTV), Warning Posts, and everyday equipment that special constables use in their job, such as radios and vehicles.

The fourth and most important criterion of a node is its ability to construct an institutional form. An institution can be defined as “[a] structure that enables the directed mobilization of resources, mentalities and technologies over time” (Burris, Drahos & Shearing, 2005:12). Thus, it was important to analyze the institutional form of the security body being studied. Interviews and secondary analysis were used to map the institutional form, complemented with surveys to analyze such items as demographics, training levels, institutional tasks, education and general characteristics of the individuals that make up the institution (Annex D, Appendix 3).

2. How do nodes network with each other to form a networked system of policing?

This research project involved a comprehensive analysis of the way the UMSS networks with other policing bodies and sites of governance, such as the President of the University of
Manitoba and other security bodies. This consisted of all possible entities, including armoured car companies, Commissionaires, alarm companies, and any other security organization that was involved in maintaining security. It was useful to distinguish between formal and informal networking mechanisms. To do this, interviews were used to gain in-depth knowledge of how these connections were made, and security nodes that the organization might have connections with were canvassed, including both the Bannatyne and Fort Garry campuses. The UMSS was the focus of this study, but the areas surrounding the Fort Garry and Bannatyne campuses were also considered.

Surrounding the Fort Garry campus is the Victoria Hospital, the University’s Smart Park, several residences, and labs that require added security. Also, it was predicted that the UMSS would have ties to the Winnipeg Police Services (WPS), Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and other security agencies. Also, the University has bank machines located throughout the University of Manitoba, and for this reason it was assumed contract security agencies were active on campus. Other organizations known to be active on the Fort Garry campus included the Corps of Commissionaires, which is responsible for parking enforcement. This study needed to include other organizations, because, as mentioned above, security nodes can act in complete isolation from one another. Of important note on the Bannatyne campus is the Health Sciences Centre (HSC), which is located adjacent to it and G4S cash-in-transit services.

**Variables to be analyzed include:**

a. General demographics of personnel in the node (ie. age, sex);
b. General attributes of personnel in the node in question (training levels and education);
c. Different forms of capital (social, cultural, economic, political and symbolic);
d. Mentalities and technologies;
e. Mechanisms for networking;
f. Degree of connectivity between nodes (strength of relationship)

Instruments

Two types of data collection were used including self-administered surveys and interviews.

Measurement and Coding

Mentalities

Punitive and preventative attitudes are distinct types of mentalities. There were ten to fifteen questions for each type on a survey. These questions were closed-ended and measured on a five-point Likert scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree, with a category of “I don’t know” (See Annex D, Appendix 3).

Technologies

All equipment used to maintain social control within the specified area such as radio, warning posts, and vehicles were categorized as material technologies. Crime prevention routines and strategies were also considered technologies and separated into a different category. These data were collected through interviews with management and rank and file members.
Resources

This information was collected through interviews with management using open-ended questions aimed at collecting the importance that management places on political, social, symbolic, economic and cultural capital. Management included the director, assistant director, and the two patrol supervisors. As described above, this involved asking management a series of questions to see how important they believe their resources are in providing security; in other words, what significance they place on resources. Also, they were asked to discuss what other agents are involved in security and how important their relationship with these other bodies is in ensuring a safe campus (See Annex D, Appendix 1). Symbolic capital was measured by asking how important the organization’s image in the eyes of other stakeholders is in allowing them to provide security (See Annex D, Appendix 1). Economic and Political capital are usually closely linked, because the organizations ability to justify their expenses and the returns they provide will most likely have an effect on the amount of funding they receive. Three questions were asked for each type of capital, with follow-up questions asked if additional detail was required.

Institution

Three categories describe the type of institution the UMSS maintains. The first is general demographics (age, sex and education levels). The second is the amount of training required for the job, and on-the-job training (as an indicator of a comprehensive training system), which will encompass all forms of training received while working for the institution. The third includes the size, policing powers and history of the University of Manitoba Security Service.
Networking Mechanisms

Networking mechanisms were broken into two categories, formal and informal. Formal networking mechanisms are official programs that both organizations have acknowledged through written confirmation. Informal mechanisms are ways in which members of the security service network by word of mouth, personal networks, and unofficial contacts (for example, the “old boys” club). It will be important to learn whether these informal and formal connections are reciprocal and to develop a way to measure the strength of these connections.

Degree of Connectivity between Nodes (Strength of Relationship)

The strength of the relationships between the different nodes on the Fort Garry Campus was broken into four ordinal categories: strong, moderate, weak, and none. Strong relationships are those that have formal, pre-implemented protocols in which both parties acknowledge that they work together and articulate the parameters in which they do so. Moderate relationships will be those where both organizations acknowledge that they work in cooperation/contestation without any formal written declaration of cooperation. A weak relationship is one in which one organization recognizes a connection with the other, while there is no reciprocal recognition from the other organization. Finally, there is no connection when these organizations have no contact and may even be unaware of the other’s presence.

Conduct of Research Study

Data collection occurred between December, 2009 and November, 2011. The UMSS was contacted for interviews and distribution of surveys. The survey was composed of 17
questions designed to measure individual’s mentalities, known connections with other security organizations and the general demographics of the UMSS (for example, the age, sex of individuals in the organization). More specifically, the first ten questions were composed of mentality questions. Six measured coercive mentalities among members with four measuring social intervention prevention mentalities. Three questions measured known connections with other security organizations active on the U of M campus, while the last four measured age, sex and education levels of the members comprising the UMSS. The survey was mailed to each individual within the UMSS. After initial distribution the response rate was 11 out of 31 members, however after a reminder letter, 17 out of 31 members (54.8%) responded. Reminder letters were sent out once for interviews and twice for the return of survey. The letters were sent out to solicit telephone interviews with surrounding security providers in order to obtain the corresponding information that is needed to see whether they acknowledge/work with the University Security Service. Four interviews with management were conducted, one with the director and three with supervisors. Only two interviews were obtained with rank and file members (special constables). These individuals were initially selected by Simple Random Sampling (SRS). However, since only one constable agreed to be interviewed, an invitation was sent out to all constables, which secured one additional interview. I then canvassed other known security organizations and asked the prepared questions (Annex D, Appendix 4).
CHAPTER 3: DATA ANALYSIS

The aim of this chapter is to analyze the results of this research project. The first step is to provide a brief description of the nodes active on both campuses. This will be followed by an analysis of what type of node the UMSS is by describing four characteristics, which include: a specific type of mentalities, technologies, resources, and an institution. The final section investigates the connections with all the security bodies on campuses to identify the ways in which they make connections with each other.

ORGANIZATIONS ACTIVE ON BANNATYNE/FORT GARRY CAMPUS

There were several different agencies active on the Fort Garry campus, varying from contract security nodes to public security nodes at the municipal, provincial, and federal level. More specifically, these include: the Canadian Corps of Commissionaires, G4S Cash Services, OBO (Outdoor Box Office [security company]), Winnipeg Police Service, St. John’s Resident Dons, St. Andrew Resident Assistants, Cangene Security, Fresh Water Institute, Canadian Agriculture, Provincial Security, physics lab (Department), chemistry lab (Department), University Centre Security, Wise Guys, Parking and Shuttle Services, Housing and Student Life, SMARTPARK, and the Canadian Forces Military Police (as per diagram in Annex D). This amounts to a total of 18 (19 including the UMSS) different security organizations active on the Fort Garry campus alone. The Bannatyne campus had a significantly smaller number of security nodes to include the Health Sciences Centre (HSC) Security and G4S Cash Services. Thus, for
the entire University there were 20 different organizations active in the provision of security and as a result it will be important to give a brief description of each.

Formed 85 years ago, the Canadian Corps of Commissionaires (CoC) is one of Canada’s largest security firms, with approximately 20,000 employees offering an array of different functions (Corps of Commissionaires, 2011). They provide security solution planning, design, and management, identification services and finger printing, enforcement and detention services, and training programs (Corps of Commissionaires, 2011). The majority of employees are retired policing and military members with comprehensive security backgrounds. On the Fort Garry campus, they are active in five different locations, the Federal Agricultural Complex, the Provincial Agricultural Complex, the Fresh Water Institute, Cangene Security, and they also work for Parking and Shuttle Services, making the CoC an important security node within the University of Manitoba Fort Garry campus.

One of the unique aspects of the Fort Garry campus is SMARTPARK, which houses an array of different corporations with varying specialities. Originally started in October of 1999 and finished in 2008 it consists of Apptius Computer Solutions Inc., BASF Canada, BioMark Technologies, Cangene Corporation (to be discussed later), Global Wind Inc., and Industrial Technology Centre, to name only a few. There are several alarm companies active within SMARTPARK and they have a security manager responsible for internal security of the buildings while the UMSS is responsible for the exterior (R1, 2010). Due to the inability to canvass this organization, information on security management was limited.

As articulated above the CoC are active within Cangene. However, this organization is isolated and is a separate security node from SMARTPARK. The reason for this is that Cangene has a security manager who is in charge of all security operations. Cangene is a developer and
manufacturer of therapeutics “primarily targeting exigent infectious disease and biodefense applications” (Cangene, 2011). The pillars of business for this company include: contract manufacturing, bio-defense, and commercial therapeutic products (Cangene, 2011). The United States government is one of their largest clients, filling their U.S. Strategic National Stockpile. The security manager for the Winnipeg, location actually holds special constable status and is able to enforce certain provincial acts (R2, 2010). Thus, this company will be considered a security node that operates not only at the local level but nationally as well.

St. Andrew’s college is similar to Cangene Corporation in the sense that other security agents are involved in policing their building and parking lot (UMSS and CoC), but they provide their own security in the form of Resident Assistants (RAs). These RAs can be considered a form of security as they are responsible for dealing with “minor” incidents, such as broken windows or small thefts (R3, 2010); however, it must be noted that anything outside of these circumstances is reported to the UMSS to be dealt with. St. Andrew’s College is a private college that is affiliated with the University of Manitoba. It is sponsored by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Canada (R3, 2010).

St. John’s College also has agents similar in terms of function and duties to RAs, called Resident Dons. St. John’s College, like St. Andrew’s, is a private college and has strong ties to the Anglican Church. It was one of the founding colleges of the University of Manitoba (St. Johns, 2011) and has a small residence attached to the College, creating the necessity for site security.

St. John’s and St. Andrew’s are not the only residences on the Fort Garry campus. University College, Tache, and Speechly are governed by Housing and Student Life. These
residences have their own security manager, but an inability to interview this security organization limited information on security aspects.

Another node within the Fort Garry campus is Parking and Shuttle Services (PSS). PSS is responsible for managing approximately six thousand parking spaces on the Fort Garry campus and 475 parking spaces on the Bannatyne Campus (PSS, 2010). This department also manages shuttle bus services on both campuses and “oversees the staff and administration of the Fort Garry Visitor Centre, Parking Ticket Services, and Parkade Services” (PSS, 2010). Thus, parking enforcement on the Fort Garry campus is coordinated and managed through PSS. It is important to note that the CoC are contracted for parking enforcement through PSS and also that it is the UMSS that provides these services on the Bannatyne Campus.

Internal as well to the University of Manitoba is University Centre Security (UCS). They are responsible for providing security for University Centre, and the department responsible for managing this asset is Conference and Catering Services. This department is responsible for all functions that take place within the University Centre and at times will contract other security services depending on the size of the function. Such contracted companies include G4S and OBO (R5, 2010). The University Centre security personnel typically operate after hours, as the UMSS takes care of day operations, but still work on a daily basis. It is for this reason that the UCS will also be considered a security node.

Security itself takes different shapes, including emergency response guidelines that are set in place in case of fires. There are several locations within the University of Manitoba Fort Garry campus that require special consideration due to the materials held therein, such as the Physics and Chemistry labs. Both labs are the responsibility of the University of Manitoba governance structure and as such must follow their guidelines. The Physics lab is equipped with
an alarm system and specific guidelines in case of emergencies, which rely specifically on the UMSS as the first responders (R6, 2010). Although the labs themselves would not be considered “security nodes,” the dangers inherent in these labs required added research. However, note that the Chemistry lab is not included in Figure 1 below as information was unobtainable due to being unable to gain an interview.

Wise Guys on campus also highlights a unique type of security within the Fort Garry campus. It is one of the most prominent types of private security encountered during afterhours in the form of “bouncers” or “door men”. Wise Guys is considered a “private” club and entrance into it requires membership at a cost to those who want to join. This private members club serves alcohol and has special nights where a portion of university students partake in what can be considered a traditional night life. Thus, there exists a potential for violent and other types of incidents due to the increase in alcohol consumption, requiring special functions to deal with these issues. It is for this reason that Wise Guys on campus provides “door men” as a security asset (R7, 2010). The UMSS is not responsible for providing security within the club, leaving the management responsible for internal security and thus making Wise Guys its own security node.

On the Fort Garry campus, there are several provincial and federal buildings that provide their own security. First, there is Agriculture Canada, which is located on the East side of campus. They are considered their own node, because they have a security manager in place to deal with any issues. More importantly, this organization also contracts CoC services and designates different individuals within the organization to specific security functions, such as a fire representative in case of emergencies. This building falls outside of the UMSS jurisdiction, and they are not the primary organization responsible for security within this building. Keep in
mind that Agriculture Canada is a federal organization and abides by health and safety protocols deemed necessary by Health and Safety Canada (R8, 2010). This is also the reason for the use of CoC, as the federal government has a standing agreement with that organization.

The Freshwater Institute (FWI) is another Federal organization located on the Fort Garry campus, housing several programs for the Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO). This building houses the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) and Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC) (FWI, 2011). Programs offered in this location include: Freshwater Science, Arctic Research, Fisheries Management, Fish Habitat Management, Oceans Management, and Small Craft Harbours. The FWI, like Agriculture Canada, has a security manager to address security issues and also contracts CoC services (R9, 2010). However, since the FWI has a security manager it will be considered a security node.

At the provincial level, there is the Manitoba Agriculture and Animal Industry building. The Livestock, Food Safety, Crop Industry, Innovation Services, Land Use Planning, and Agri-Environment branches offer an array of services that aid the Manitoba agricultural industry, and security for the Manitoba Agriculture and Animal Industry building is provided by Manitoba provincial security elements, not the UMSS (R1, 2010). Thus, this organization provides its own security and can be considered a separate security node. There is minimal information available on these Manitoba provincial security elements, as they would not agree to be interviewed.

It is notable that there is a strong CoC presence on the Fort Garry campus, since they are a prominent contract security service. Joining the ranks of contract security agencies is G4S Cash and Event Services. They are responsible for the safe transportation and delivery of monies to and from the University of Manitoba Fort Garry and Bannatyne campuses, as well as providing additional security elements for special events. G4S is an international security
agency operating all over the world and providing a variety of different services, including: risk management and consultancy, cash solutions, event security solutions, national and international logistics, security system and technology, manned security solutions, investigative services, facilities management, and training. The two of relevance to this study are cash solutions and event security solutions. G4S provides both of these functions on the Fort Garry campus, but only cash services on the Bannatyne campus.

Also involved in contract services at the Fort Garry Campus is Outdoor Box Office Ltd. (OBO). During large social functions within the University Centre, OBO is used through the special functions branch, the same body responsible for the University Centre security elements (R5, 2010). OBO, like G4S, offers several services, such as event security and a uniformed guard element, but operates strictly in Canada, more specifically in Saskatchewan and Manitoba.

The University of Manitoba Fort Garry and Bannatyne campuses, like most universities, fall under the jurisdiction of a municipal policing agency. In this case, it is the Winnipeg Police Service (WPS). This organization consists of approximately 1,328 uniformed police officers (Annual Report, 2008) and 367 non-sworn (staff) members and has a budget of approximately $170,000,000. Their area of responsibility (AOR) includes Winnipeg and surrounding area and consists of five police districts. These five districts are District 1 (City Centre), District 2 (St. James/Assiniboia), District 3 (Lord Selkirk/West Kildonan), East District (St. Boniface, St. Vital, Elmwood, East Kildonan, North Kildonan/Transcona), and District 6 (Assiniboine Park, Fort Rouge, Fort Garry). The Fort Garry and Bannatyne campuses lie within Districts 6 and 1 respectively; however due to the size of the Fort Garry campus, the UMSS’s primary link with the WPS is through the Inspector in that location (WPS, 2010).
The WPS offers services similar to other municipal police forces, including a Canine Unit, Central Traffic Unit, Child Abuse Unit, Diversity Relations Section, Ground Search and Rescue Unit, Missing Persons Unit, Mounted Patrol Unit, and Stolen Auto Unit, to name a few. They have several other units that specialize in specific types of crime, but the list is too extensive to cover in this section. The important aspect to highlight is that the WPS offers many services that the UMSS does not have.

The WPS can be considered the most active public security organization on the Fort Garry campus. However, other public security agencies with a connection to the UMSS include the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA), and the Canadian Forces Military Police (CFMP). With the exception of the Military Police, these other federal agencies were not canvassed in this study due to time and resource constraints. Also, although the University of Manitoba campuses are within their jurisdiction for specific issues, they usually mobilize through the WPS, which then approaches the UMSS (R10, 2009). The only exception in regards to this was the Military Police.

The CFMP is a large organization consisting of over 1250 personnel and offers an array of services both domestically and abroad. Domestically, they provide municipal policing functions similar to those of the WPS, but focused on the Canadian Forces community (CFPM, 2009), which numbers approximately 200,000 individuals (CFPM, 2009). Added to these basic functions, they have other services such as the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service (CFNIS) and Canadian Forces Service Prison and Detention Barrack (CFSPDB). Internationally, they participate in North Atlantic Treaty Organization activities such as those in Afghanistan and aid in training the Afghan National Police (ANP). The most important aspect of
this organization in relation to the UMSS is that they police military personnel and property both on and off Canadian Forces Bases, which includes CF members attending the University of Manitoba.

The majority of security nodes discussed above are active on the Fort Garry campus, but the Bannatyne campus has one specific security body that is exclusive, the Health Sciences Centre (HSC) security node. The HSC is the largest hospital within Winnipeg and is located adjacent to the Bannatyne campus, specializing in many different facets including mental health (HSC, 2011). Thus, this organization has a need for security services, which they provide internally. This security department has a head of security responsible for the safety of staff and patients. With that being said, the size of and qualifications for this service are unknown as these questions were not asked during data collection, but they report a relationship with the UMSS at the Bannatyne campus (R11, 2010).

It becomes evident that even within a geographical area as small as the Fort Garry and Bannatyne campuses there are a variety of different security agencies involved in the provision of policing. More importantly, there is a variety of different types, such as intradepartmental (departments within the university providing their own security), contract, and even nightclub security. They provide the context within which the primary security service at the University, the UMSS, operates.

THE UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA SECURITY SERVICE

The University of Manitoba Security Service is responsible for providing security services on both the Fort Garry and Bannatyne campuses 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. It offers an array of services such as safe walk, bike units, community-based policing, crime
prevention through environmental design, non-violent crisis intervention, and Rape Aggression Defence (RAD) (UMSS, 2011). The size of the UMSS is 31 members (at the time of data collection for this study), and the authority for this organization comes from the University of Manitoba Act and special constable status through the province of Manitoba. This power comes through the Police Services Act, which articulates in Part Eight that “The director (of policing) may appoint an individual or class of individuals as special constables, subject to any terms or conditions that the director considers appropriate” (The Legislative Assembly of Manitoba, 2011). Moreover, these special constables are granted the protections of peace officers when acting within the parameters set out in their position or appointment. In addition, the employer is liable when the individual or class are carrying out their appointment. Thus, it is the Province of Manitoba that gives these powers (The Legislative Assembly of Manitoba, 2011).

The aim of this section will be to describe the type of security node the UMSS is by illuminating on a distinct set of mentalities, technologies, resources and the institution it mobilizes them through. The distinct characteristics of the UMSS will come to light during the analysis of the data collected, so there is no need to provide background information on the UMSS in this introduction.

Mentalities

As discussed in the methodology chapter, the type of mentalities measured consisted of social intervention prevention attitudes and, coercive attitudes. These attitudes were measured through surveys. There were ten questions measuring these mentalities (see Annex E). Five measured coercive mentalities, while four measured social intervention prevention mentalities.
(see Annex E); one question was eliminated as it could indicate a belief in increased surveillance rather than a coercive attitude.

As per table 1 below, the UMSS displayed a strong coercive mentality with four out of five of these questions receiving 70% or higher of special constables agreeing with coercive statements. The only question that had a percentage less than 70% was “the death penalty should be re-instated”, with only 58% of respondents agreeing with the question. Thus, since four out of five questions received a strong response rate, the survey illustrates that members of the UMSS have coercive mentalities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mentalities</th>
<th>1-3 (Disagree)</th>
<th>4 (Neutral)</th>
<th>5-7 (Agree)</th>
<th>Non-Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tougher punishment measures are necessary to make potential offenders think before committing a crime. (Coercive)</td>
<td>2 (12%)</td>
<td>1 (6%)</td>
<td>14 (82%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime would decrease with greater police presence. (Coercive or Surveillance)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>2 (12%)</td>
<td>15 (88%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The criminal justice system usually obstructs the work of law enforcement bodies. (Coercive)</td>
<td>2 (12%)</td>
<td>3 (18%)</td>
<td>12 (70%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The death penalty should be re-instated. (Coercive)</td>
<td>3 (18%)</td>
<td>4 (24%)</td>
<td>10 (58%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minors committing serious crime should be punished as if they were adults. (Coercive)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>4 (24%)</td>
<td>13 (76%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judges should give harsher sentences to individuals who commit crimes. (Coercive)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>2 (12%)</td>
<td>14 (82%)</td>
<td>1 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is necessary to create and to improve youth institutions where children at high risk of becoming delinquents can attend. (Social)</td>
<td>1 (6%)</td>
<td>3 (18%)</td>
<td>13 (76%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In order to prevent crime it is necessary to put more money into deprived areas. (Social)</td>
<td>2 (12%)</td>
<td>5 (30%)</td>
<td>10 (58%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There have been other studies of law enforcement officer’s attitudes. One such study was conducted by Fielding & Fielding (1991), which found officers had strong conservative mentalities focusing on coercive attitudes. However, a result of a study conducted by Jorge Perez and Generos Ortet-Fabregat (1992) suggests that UMSS officers have slightly more coercive attitudes. 162 agents of different police forces (34 Catalan, 114 local and fourteen state) with an average age of 33 years of age where included in this study conducted in Catalonia, Spain. The police officers had a mean of 2.48 on a five point Likert scale for coercive prevention with a standard deviation of 0.7, whereas the mean on the UMSS study was 5.28 (re-calculate) on a seven point Likert scale. Thus, the UMSS differs from other policing agencies within that study by having a stronger coercive prevention mentality.

In regards to social intervention prevention mentalities there appears to be a less cohesive response from special constables within the UMSS. These four questions had a mixed response, with only two questions receiving 70% or more of respondents agreeing with the statements. The other two questions had 58% or less of respondents agreeing with the statements. Thus, there is not strong enough evidence to illustrate a cohesive set of social intervention prevention mentalities within the UMSS. In addition within the Perez and Oretet study there was strong social intervention prevention attitudes from the 162 officers surveyed with a mean of 4.01 on a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>UMSS</th>
<th>Perez and Oretet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An effective way of preventing crime would be by detecting and assisting adolescents who are at high risk of becoming delinquents. (Social)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5 (30%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If society had more knowledge about factors related to crime, it would be easier to prevent crime. (Social)</td>
<td>4 (24%)</td>
<td>8 (46%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
five point Likert scale, whereas the UMSS had a 4.97 mean on a seven point Likert scale which is significantly lower illustrating a low social intervention prevention mentality.

In conclusion, there appears to be a high level of coercive mentalities within the UMSS, as the majority agreed with four out of five questions. The results for social intervention prevention mentalities did not share such a high level of agreement. Therefore it is evident that the UMSS have a distinct set of coercive mentalities.

Technologies

As discussed in the methodology chapter, a node will have a distinct set of technologies. In the case of the UMSS, this includes two distinct categories. The first is all of the equipment necessary to carry out their duties, which will be further broken down into personnel equipment and infrastructure. The second category is crime prevention strategies and techniques, including seminars and information packages.

Starting with the first category, the UMSS has a significant amount of equipment to provide security for the University of Manitoba Bannatyne and Fort Garry campuses. For personal equipment each special constable has an ASP baton, handcuffs, one flashlight, personal radio, Kevlar stab resistant vest, a mask to perform CPR, and latex gloves to administer first aid. In addition, each special constable wears a UMSS uniform and shoulder epaulets with “special constable” written on them (R1, 2010). Besides these personal types of equipment, there is an infrastructure that aids the UMSS in performing their duties. The first and most evident is the use of vehicles on the Fort Garry campus. The UMSS has three vehicles for mobile patrols, all equipped with lighting packages, and their newest vehicle is as well-equipped as most municipal policing vehicles (R10, 2010). Other infrastructure that the UMSS uses can be found within
their facilities to include two state of the art holding cells as well as a “soft interview” room (R10, 2009). One of the most important rooms in the facility is the CCTV room, which is equipped with an extensive number of LCD monitors tied into the camera systems located on the Fort Garry campus. The system is capable of viewing the feed of any “digital camera” on the Fort Garry campus (R10, 2010) and can monitor eight cameras simultaneously. The Bannatyne campus differs in regards to how their CCTV system is designed. This campus has only two computer monitors located in the security office that are tied into approximately sixty cameras (R12, 2009). In addition CCTV, the UMSS also has an assortment of different communication devices such as “blue” poles (ten on Fort Garry and three on Bannatyne) and “red” phones (approximately one thousand between the two campuses). The “blue” poles act as a distress beacon when students or staff on the University encounters an emergency and are equipped with two-way communication tied directly to the UMSS monitoring room. The “red” phones act in this way as well, except they do not have a light. In terms of personal equipment and infrastructure the UMSS is relatively well equipped, having similar equipment to a domestic police force, with the exception of firearms and tasers. The UMSS has Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) written in a manual so that each special constable has access to them. Although this is not a conventional piece of equipment, it is still a material technology that the officers use to carry out their duties. Besides physical equipment and infrastructure, there is also an array of different crime prevention strategies aimed at the faculty staff and student body (R1, 2009) that composes the second category and will be discussed below.

Another technology available to UMSS is the Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC), which is a reporting agency that policing agencies use at the municipal, provincial, and federal level (R13, 2010). CPIC gives the UMSS a capability that other policing agencies have
to inquire about criminal acts and criminals themselves. CPIC is operated “by the R.C.M.P. on behalf of the Canadian law enforcement community” (CPIC, 2011). This is an invaluable tool for any police agency to have and adds to the array of technologies available to the UMSS.

Although personal equipment and infrastructure are the most visible forms of technology the UMSS uses, there are also a variety of crime prevention programs to reduce crime and disorder on the Fort Garry and Bannatyne campuses. These include cooperation with Autopac programs, the use of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED), Rape Aggression Defence (RAD) training, community based policing, non-violent crisis intervention, and “Safewalk” (UMSS, 2011). These programs have a distinct preventative element within them and as such can be considered technologies.

Manitoba Public Insurance (MPI) and the Manitoba Criminal Justice Association provide several programs and the UMSS has partnered with them on some. An example of this can be seen in the use of a speed radar (loaned from MPI) and sign to tell individuals at what speed they are driving down Bison Drive to alert them to speeding (R10, 2009). Although the sign is not permanent, it is used at different times during the year. Coupled with this is signage posted to inform individuals about putting valuable items outside of plain view in parking lots. As one of the managers for UMSS states, “You have seen the signs in all of the parking lots about not leaving valuables in vehicles there are crime tips out in the parking lots on signage, and that was all provided by MPI” (R10, 2009). These items and programs are seen throughout the year and are aimed at reducing speeding and auto theft from vehicles on the Fort Garry campus. The majority of these programs are provided on the Fort Garry as opposed to the Bannatyne campus.

Partnerships with MPI are not the only crime prevention programs that the UMSS provides on the Fort Garry campus. CPTED stands for crime prevention through environmental
design. It is defined as “the proper design and effective use of the built environment that can lead to a reduction in the fear and incidence of crime and an improvement in the quality of life” (UMSS, 2011). CPTED works by “manipulating the physical environment, which in turn affects people’s behaviour and can lead to a reduction in criminal and unwanted behaviour” (UMSS, 2011). Key concepts include natural surveillance, natural access, territorial behaviour, and maintenance. “Natural surveillance is the placement of physical features and/or activities, and people that maximizes natural visibility or observation” (CPTED Ontario, 2011) (including introducing better lighting around important areas and access points). Natural access on the other hand deters access to a target and creates a perception of risk to the offender. Territorial behaviour usually defines a clear border of controlled space (for example, creates zones of public, semi-private, and private areas). Furthermore, CPTED Ontario states that “maintenance allows for the continued use of space for its intended purpose” (2011). The UMSS has five members who are qualified in this crime prevention strategy. The UMSS uses the qualification by “auditing” departments and buildings to implement change. As one of the managers stated, “I got a gentleman, one of the officers, coming in tomorrow on duty. We’ll see in the morning he’s been tasked with doing an audit for Robson Hall” (R10, 2009). This technology is included in the design of new buildings on the Fort Garry campus, as one respondent explained, “We are included also in all new design plans through physical plant, so any construction of building and layouts, we are included in that process” (R10, 2009). Thus, it becomes evident that the UMSS is extensively involved in preventing crime through environmental design on the Fort Garry campus and illustrates one of many crime prevention technologies.

In addition to CPTED, the UMSS offers Rape Aggression Defense training. These courses are offered throughout the year and aimed at staff, students, and are even open to people
not affiliated with the University of Manitoba. The program focuses on “the development of easily mastered personal safety skills” (UMSS, 2011) and takes place over a twelve hour period combining physical safety awareness and physical skills to reduce the chance of victimization (UMSS, 2011). This program is specifically aimed at females. Special constables provide this training, and within the UMSS there are two qualified instructors (UMSS, 2011). This program is available at both the Bannatyne and Fort Garry campuses.

Although the UMSS offers an array of different programs, an important aspect of its crime prevention strategy is the use of a “community constable” (R10, 2009). One respondent states, “We do crime prevention, we have a community constable who is on day shift, that person gives regular presentations to the community on crime prevention” (R10, 2009). The UMSS has one individual active on the Fort Garry campus. According to management, these presentations cover the topics of personal and office safety/security and target the University One students. This information is also provided to all new employees through human resources (R10, 2009).

This position exists specifically on the Fort Garry campus, but is one of the duties of Bannatyne employees as well. One Bannatyne employee, when asked who the Bannatyne community constable was, stated, “Well you are looking at him. My position is actually an interesting one. It’s a combined--it’s called patrol supervisor/community constable” (R12, 2009). The community constable appears to be an important aspect of the UMSS crime prevention strategy and is located on both campuses.

Another program offered through the UMSS is non-violent crisis intervention “designed to teach individuals how to deal with disruptive behaviour in a non-violent, non-intrusive manner” (UMSS, 2010). The program focuses on teaching individuals when to physically intervene and how to develop team intervention strategies. It also teaches how to safely and
effectively control and transport individuals. The UMSS has taught this to over five hundred individuals, primarily students and staff from departments at risk of encountering violent or disruptive behaviour (UMSS, 2010).

The last crime prevention strategy that the UMSS uses is “Safewalk”. The program is supported by the UMSS Student Security Patrol, which is composed of volunteers and paid members equipped with two-way radios (UMSS, 2011). The aim of this program is to provide “safety in numbers” (UMSS, 2011) for students and staff who are walking from one building to another building, car, or bus stop and represents UMSS’s remaining crime prevention technology to be discussed. “Safewalk” is offered 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. However, it appears that this is utilized most often during the evenings, as one manager stated: if someone is working overnight, or doing research over night, they can request someone to walk them to their car (R14, 2009).

In addition to a distinct type of mentalities, the UMSS has a set of technologies to accomplish the governance of security within the boundaries of the Fort Garry and Bannatyne campuses. This organization has an array of different personal equipment and infrastructure, including holding cells, vehicles, and ASP batons, which are items that would be found in a municipal policing agency. Complementing these material technologies is a variety of different crime prevention technologies, including partnerships with MPI, CPTED, RAD, community based policing, non-violent crisis intervention, and “Safewalk”. One of the most obvious personifications of the UMSS crime prevention technologies is the community constable who operates year round to ensure that the needs of the community are met and that best practices are implemented to reduce crime. Overall, the UMSS has the necessary equipment and programs to govern security within its area of operations and in many ways mirrors the characteristics of a
municipal police force. This leads the analysis to whether the UMSS has the required resources to be considered a node.

**Resources**

Dupont (2004) identified five different forms of resources: economic, political, cultural, social, and symbolic capital. The data collected through interviews with UMSS is valuable because it will help us to understand which forms of capital that UMSS sees as being important to help it achieve its goals and help describe what type of security organization it is.

Economic capital is an important aspect of a node because it has an impact on characteristics such as technologies (batons, cars etc.) and staffing levels. Throughout the interviews there was an overarching theme of importance placed on funding and its effects on achieving goals set out by University administration. When asked “how important is the level of funding in enabling you to properly discharge your duties as campus security and maintaining a positive image with other stakeholders in the University community” one manager responded with “It is absolutely vital” (R10, 2009), and another responded that:

There is probably a direct correlation. I would think as to how professional we appear to our administrators and Winnipeg Police, or R.C.M.P. or whoever else attends here and coming out of that [old building] we used to work in, everybody has been quite impressed with our building and the way that it is set up and our holding facilities if necessary and our exhibit lockers which have motion sensor cameras in them . . . . (R14, 2009)

These responses illustrate that management within the UMSS understand the importance of economic capital and its effect on other stakeholders, especially the University administration as who provide them with operating funds.
Although UMSS management understand the importance of economic capital in being able to govern security in the UMSS’s area of responsibility, the level of funding they have achieved by meeting objectives set out by the University administration is another issue. According to all the managers that were interviewed, the level of funding given to the UMSS is sufficient. When asked “Are there specific kinds of funding that you want, but have not been able to secure that would enhance your ability to discharge your responsibilities?”, managers were content with the funding received. One manager stated, “I would have to say . . . no. There are specific things I want that would enhance the ease of my work load . . . , but in terms of making better security, I would have to say no” (R12, 2009). It is apparent that UMSS’s management believes they are receiving enough funding and understands how that impacts the organization’s ability to govern security within the Fort Garry and Bannatyne campuses. However, as mentioned in the literature review, economic capital is gained by mobilizing political capital.

Political capital can be used to gain funding and autonomy within a security node. To explore this, UMSS managers were asked “Have you been able to effectively meet the objectives set out for you by the governing bodies? And if yes, has your performance resulted in an increase in autonomy for your organization?” All four people interviewed agreed that autonomy had increased in relation to the provision of security due to meeting objectives set by the University administration. As one manager stated, “I would say yes . . . the [manager] before me. . .really [brought] this department forward and leading in the service . . . we have met with the objectives” (R10, 2009). Although this question received similar responses from all managers, one suggested that UMSS autonomy was restricted by the organization’s capabilities (R14, 2009). Special constable status only allows the constables to enforce certain acts, such as
the Liquor Control Act. Also, an important element that one manager stated was that although they do not have control over all security on the Fort Garry campus, they do work closely with administration to ensure that UMSS concerns are expressed (R10, 2009). The manager stated:

We . . . don’t have authority over other security groups on campus, for example, our department does not provide direction to Housing and Student Life or University Centre Security, but we certainly have voice in how that, those departments are operated and work closely with the people that are in charge of those areas too. So it is all about the working relationship part. (R10, 2009)

A good example of this ‘input’ or ‘voice’ is the contribution to designing new buildings on campus. As one manager states:

We are included also in all new design plans through physical plant so any construction of buildings and layouts, we are included in that process which is good and the officers they have just gotten a new reporting system a new software system again with support from administration because we required funding for that, so just another example of the support that we do get and the training that goes along with that new reporting system (R10, 2009).

There are two important considerations to be taken from these statements. The first is that the UMSS is not the only security agency on the Fort Garry campus. The second is that the manager realizes that the proximity to the political machinery of the University, “getting a say”, is an important aspect to achieving the UMSS’s goals. In addition, a common tactic used by managers in several fields is to use an organizations success to gain more economic capital. During the course of data collection it became evident that managers at the UMSS understand this strategy and employ it as well, linking political and economic capital. One manager states, “when looking at the budget and doing strategic planning, when we are addressing certain things on campus, statistics, anything to back up our request for funding, we would provide to administration” (R10, 2009). Thus, there is a strong connection between funding and the strength of relationship with the machinery of governance that provides funding.
UMSS management understands that achieving the goals set out by University administration results in greater political autonomy and that by actively communicating with certain parts of University administration the UMSS can achieve its goals. Besides political and economic capital the UMSS also uses Cultural capital.

Cultural capital, according to Benoit Dupont, encompasses “unique expertise in the field of crime prevention and detection, which is accumulated and transmitted through higher levels of selection and training” (Dupont, 2004:86). The key element within this definition is “unique” expertise, of which the UMSS appears to have little, according to its members. UMSS management was asked “Do you think that your organization has developed unique expertise in the field of crime prevention and detection, which is transmitted through ‘in house’ training? If so, please describe.” Respondents did not believe that UMSS members had “unique” expertise. As one manager stated, “I can’t say as it is unique, but once again we seem to be doing what we need to be doing that suits us, whether it is unique or not I wouldn’t say” (R12, 2009). This is further developed by another who stated, “No, no, nothing unique, some of that stuff I mentioned earlier, it’s always, it’s mostly done, those skills we have learned from outside agencies” (R14, 2009). Although crime prevention strategies and “in-house” training offered through the UMSS is not “unique”, that does not necessarily mean that the organization does not have its own cultural resources to transmit corporate knowledge.

UMSS managers were also asked, “Are there any formal educational programs and/or classes that the University of Manitoba Security Service has created or used to train individuals that are new at the job?” Again, the majority of management responded that there was little unique training, with the exception of “non-violent crisis intervention” (R14, 2009), which is offered to staff and students at the University on both the Fort Garry and Bannatyne campuses.
Along with this program, management described several others that were offered internally through the UMSS, including pressure point control training, one hundred sixty hours of “in-house” training, and CPTED, but none of the training was given to other security agencies (R10, 2009).

Lastly, managers were questioned whether “prospective recruits to your organization see the U of M Security Service as a career destination or as a stepping stone to other employment in the security field?” This question received an array of different answers, but most agreed on the difficulty of speaking for all members of the organization. With that being said, the majority of management believed that there was a mix of individuals who were using the UMSS as a retirement job (in fact, one of the managers came from a municipal police force), others who were using it as a stepping stone, and some who saw it as a career. As one of the managers said, “. . . so I got into this because I wasn’t interested in pursuing further into the law enforcement, loved the university, loved the community here and seventeen years later. . .still here” (R10, 2009).

All four managers who were interviewed agreed the University does not offer “unique” types of crime prevention, but offers an array of different services to the University community. These include RAD, community constable presentations, Safewalk, and non-violent crisis intervention. Coupled with these programs given to the community, they have several types of training programs for their members that are given by other agencies such as CPTED, Canadian Police Knowledge Network, and 160 hours with the WPS. However, these are not programs transmitted from the UMSS to other agencies, but the opposite. Employment aspirations received mixed results, but it is evident that cultural capital is important to the institution, as all of the elements needed to transmit it exist.
Economic, political, and cultural capitals are resources that managers of the UMSS understand and attempt to use to ensure that their objectives are met. However, when discussing nodal governance, networking is a key element and this importance emphasizes the importance of social and symbolic capital. UMSS managers where asked “Are there any training or qualifications that have professionalized the University of Manitoba Security Service such as peace officer status or national/provincial or regional exams?” This question enables us to begin to probe the dimension of social capital. The responses received included training through the Canadian Police Knowledge network, the special constable course offered through the WPS, and their memorandum of understanding with the WPS (R10, 2009). Three out of four managers interviewed provided these as examples. The second question asked “What university regulations establish the authority of the University of Manitoba Security Service?” The common response to this question from UMSS management was the University of Manitoba Act and Special Constable Status (R14, 2009). It is interesting to note that among the managers interviewed there was a strong emphasis on special constable status and the Canadian Police Network, as these are training and statuses that are accepted by other security agencies, one at the provincial and other at the national level.

Symbolic capital is the last type of “capital” to be discussed. Managers were asked, “Do you think that the University of Manitoba Security Service has a good reputation within the University community and the surrounding areas?” The responses received from UMSS management emphasized that the UMSS has a high level of symbolic capital. In fact, one manager who was employed within another law enforcement agency preceding employment with the UMSS stated, “I would say for the most part I have been here over two years . . . . From 2001-2005, I was a member of the police service. . . so from looking at it from those two
perspectives. . . I would say we have a favourable [image]” (R14, 2009). Another manager believed that their community image was high as well, and that it was driven by communication. However, when asked what the difficulties were in maintaining a positive community image, managers stated that the number of stakeholders in the University created difficulty (R10, 2009). The time necessary to communicate with all stakeholders, groups, and organizations within the University of Manitoba was considered a stumbling block. As such, sometimes contact is made when an incident occurs. However, as a result these incidents will ensure a constant flow of communication among the UMSS and other stakeholders in the community (R10, 2009).

Another manager stated that “meeting expectations” was difficult at times, because the UMSS had to balance between community service and enforcement (R14, 2009). Thus, it becomes evident that event driven contact can sometimes leave negative impressions, whereas proactive communication appears to be tied to community service. It is important to note that there was a slight difference at the Bannatyne campus, where management did not see any difficulties in maintaining a positive image among stakeholders in the community (R12, 2009).

Resources are necessary for any node within a network to achieve its desired aims. The difficulty of measuring this is the reason for capturing management’s view of economic, political, cultural, social, and symbolic capital. The UMSS management is well aware of these resources and attempts to mobilize them to achieve their objectives. As demonstrated through interviews, the UMSS understands the importance of economic capital and its relationship to political capital through the use of statistics. One manager stated that, when asking for funding, statistics or “anything to back it up” were useful in gaining funding (R10, 2009). The UMSS also understand the importance of a close relationship with the University of Manitoba governance structure. UMSS’s ability to create cultural capital is evident in both the services it
offers to the University community and special constable status, even though it is not “unique” according to those interviewed. Social and symbolic capital is believed to be high within the UMSS and this is supported by the views of constables who have come from policing organizations outside the UMSS. The key factor on the Fort Garry campus is communication due to the large number of organizations active within that campus. The UMSS, like other nodes, understands the need to use political capital to achieve their aims, such as attaining a ‘voice’ in projects. The UMMS also uses statistics and other accomplishments, which is expressed in the political sphere aids in increasing economic capital for this organization. The UMSS promotes cultural, symbolic, and social capital as well, making it a node that attempts to utilize all its resources.

Institution

An institutional form is important for any organization to sustain itself. Three categories were analyzed. The first was general demographics (age, sex, and education level). The second was the amount of training required for the job, including on-the-job training (as an indicator for a comprehensive training system) and the third is the size, powers and history of the organization. However, before these are discussed, a brief description of the UMSS’s organization is necessary.

The organization chart is shown in Annex F and consists of a director at the top, followed by patrol supervisors down to their platoons, which are made up of special constables. There is an executive assistant to the director as well as an investigator. The UMSS is tied to the University administration through the UMSS director.

Out of those surveyed, 71% were male and 29% were female, which is close to the actual
numbers found in the UMSS with 80% and 20% respectively. The average age was 42 years of age. Almost half (46%) had attained bachelor degrees; 12% had received a college diploma, 24% had some university or college education and 20% had received their high school diploma.

The second characteristic of an institution is the amount of training required. Special constables require 160 hours of training. This is broken down into special constable training and on-the-job training. Special constables receive 40 hours of training from the WPS to get their certification (R10, 2009). On the job training on the other hand made up considerably more hours than special constable training with the WPS. In addition to WPS training, each new constable receives 120 hours of on-the-job training within the UMSS. This on-the-job training consists of several different aspects of a constable’s daily duties (R10, 2009), such as monitoring the CCTV, familiarity with University guidelines, and dealing with the public. Although this comprises the total 160 hours of training constables receive, as mentioned previously, some also use the Canadian Police Knowledge Network, with some officers receiving extra training in non-violent crisis intervention and CPTED. Due to extensive on-the-job training received by all members of the UMSS, there is a robust third category present within the UMSS to maintain the institution.

The third characteristic of an institution is its size, powers and history. The University of Manitoba Security Service currently employs 30 members and at the time of data collection this was 31. As specified in Annex F the UMSS organization is structured into different four different platoons with the director, assistant director and investigator above them (R10, 2011).

The UMSS is able to deal with a variety of issues due to their status as “special constables”, which gives them a variety of powers to enforce portions of the Petty Trespass Act, Liquor Control Act, Highway Traffic Act and theft under $5000.00 (R14, 2009). These powers
enable them to deal with the majority of issues at the University of Manitoba, which may explain their over-arching position as the lead security organization within their Area of Responsibility (AOR). It is through this special constable status that the UMSS have the authority to carry such use of force options such as the ASP baton and hand cuffs. 

The UMSS was formed in the mid 1950s with only four individuals on staff. This staff had a dual function as both security guards and fire fighters for the University of Manitoba. In regards to equipment, they had one pumper truck at their disposal with at least one individual living on campus for 24/7 service in cases of emergency (UMSS, 2011). As the University grew, the UMSS became larger, with their numbers reaching thirty individuals today, along with three patrol cars and an assortment of equipment. Listed in Annex G is an assortment of the different cap badges that the UMSS has had over its institutional history, illustrating the long history the department has had.

**Conclusion: What Kind of Security Node is the UMSS**

A node can vary along four characteristics including mentalities, technologies, resources, and institutional form to mobilize these characteristics. The way in which an organization uses these elements describes the type of node that it is. In regard to mentalities, there was a definite trend articulating a strong punitive attitude, while displaying a low level of social intervention prevention attitudes.

The UMSS has a wealth of technologies to carry out their objectives, including patrol cars, radios and stab resistant vests, and a diversity of crime prevention technologies that are similar to those technologies used by current policing agencies outside of the University campus. More importantly, management within the UMSS attempts to use their economic, political,
cultural, symbolic, and social capital to meet their objectives, illustrating a comprehensive set of resources at their disposal. This data was collected by interview and demonstrates that management uses their existing resources and technologies to meet their objectives.

Lastly, the UMSS has an institutional form that is over fifty years old. The UMSS has an extensive training program consisting of a 160 hour recruit block and further on-the-job training after they are done the original training program. In addition, it had an institutional history, in combination with special constable status given to from the UMSS by the Province of Manitoba. Furthermore, the UMSS currently has 30 individuals; its increase in size illustrates how deeply rooted the organization is in the University. In conjunction with an increase in size, it is evident that, in the eyes of state security holders such as the Province (granting special constable status) and WPS, there is confidence in the organization as a reputable institution.

In conclusion, the UMSS is a node with a set of coercive mentalities, with technologies mirroring those of civilian police forces, minus some Use of Force options such as firearms and pepper spray. However, this node is cognizant of important resources necessary to network with other security organizations on campus and appears to do this effectively. Lastly, it has an institution to mobilize these through and, as a result, has had over fifty years of history, in which it has grown quite considerably.

**Networking with Other Security Nodes**

Since the UMSS is considered a node within a network, it is important to analyze the ways in which it networks with others. The data from the UMSS and the other nodes surrounding it show that there are a multitude of different nodes active within the University campus (see Figure 1, where each line denotes a different type of connection between nodes).
Those lines with arrows on each end represent a formal written agreement that both organizations acknowledge. Lines with no arrows connecting organizations represent informal connections through word of mouth or mutual understanding. Lastly, those lines that have an only one arrow represent connections where one organization acknowledges a connection with another, which is not reciprocated.

The strongest connections will be discussed first, followed by the weaker. As seen in Figure 2 below the most prominent connection that the UMSS has is with the WPS in the form of a memorandum of understanding (MOU).
This is a formal agreement that both organizations acknowledge, establishing the roles and responsibilities of each organization. Unfortunately, a copy of the MOU was not made available during data collection, but representatives of both nodes were interviewed. According to UMSS management and the WPS, the MOU outlines specific policing functions that fall within the UMSS jurisdiction, such as parts of the Highway Traffic Act, Liquor Control Act, and Petty Trespass Act (R13, 2010). The WPS spokesperson stated that the UMSS jurisdiction is purely within the confines of the University of Manitoba Fort Garry and Bannatyne campuses (R13, 2010). However, the representative states, “[t]here is an expectation that anything outside of what was mentioned in the MOU, that they would contact us” (R13, 2010). In addition, there appears to be a certain level of discretion when dealing with more serious breaches, such as an assault.
One of the UMSS managers was asked, “you also mention other types of infractions, like bar brawls, petty break-ins, those would probably be within your realm to handle as a first responder” (R14, 2009). The manager responded, “yes, we would be the initial, the initial officer’s attending the scene, and judge the nature of how serious it was, if it is serious we will ask the WPS to attend” (R14, 2009). Thus, anything that the constables feel uncomfortable with is automatically referred to the WPS, and anything involving weapons is automatically handed over to the WPS (R14, 2009). Another manager stated, “The officers know that their safety is [paramount]” (R10, 2009). It appears that there is a level of discretion involved in the connection between the WPS and UMSS, but the majority of guidelines are found in a formal written agreement.

Another important element that was discovered during the interview process is the connection that the UMSS has with public security agencies at the federal level. As discussed above, management noted occasional contact with the RCMP, CBSA and CSIS, but it was usually event-driven. Rather than directly approaching these agencies, the UMSS uses the WPS as an outlet to gain information. This was evident in the interview extract below:

*Manager: . . . we would refer them back through Winnipeg Police. Then Winnipeg Police on their behalf would approach and make request for information (for the UMSS)*

*Interviewer: So. . .
Manager: Not in all cases but in many cases*

*Interviewer: So for example the RCMP wouldn’t come directly to you to ask questions, they would go through the WPS?*

*Manager: Depending on the questions, yes.*

The UMSS uses the WPS as a conduit to higher-level organizations according to this manager. However, for special events involving dignitaries, they have contacted the UMSS directly in the past (R10, 2009). It is through the MOU with the WPS that the UMSS gains access to CPIC, which is a significant crime fighting tool, reinforcing the degree to which they are connected.
As illustrated in Figure 2, there are several connections that the UMSS has with other security agencies active on the Fort Garry and Bannatyne campuses. These will be discussed starting with informal connections that both organizations recognize. These connections include connections with Cangene, St. John’s College, Agriculture Canada, University Centre Security, Wise Guys, and Parking and Shuttle Services.

Cangene and the UMSS have an informal connection that both organizations recognize. First and foremost, both organizations acknowledged that they had contact with one another. Cangene reported contact with the UMSS on a weekly basis and for any minor infractions Cangene would contact the UMSS. However, for serious issues, management contacts the WPS. The manager interviewed emphasized that even if the WPS are contacted, the UMSS are notified as well. There was however a discrepancy between how the two organizations understood their connection as the Cangene manager stated, “...we have a memorandum of understanding with the University Security. In fact, they usually swing by here and drop off internal mail for us” (R2, 2010). The UMSS stated that they did not have an MOU with this organization, but a close working relationship with the manager at that location (R10, 2011) and for that reason the connection was stated as informal as neither organization acknowledged a formal written agreement. There are two important elements contained within this connection. The first is that the connection is informal, and the second is that, for minor offences, Cangene contacts UMSS and, for major offences, they inform the UMSS immediately after the WPS. There appears to be an understanding that the UMSS are first responders. Lastly, even the manager stated that they have an informal connection through mail exchange, which is an example of a word of mouth connection outside of what would normally be considered an official agreement.
This is not the only informal connection that the UMSS has with other security providers on the Fort Garry campus. The UMSS has an informal connection with Parking and Shuttle Services (PSS) who are responsible for parking enforcement. Management of PSS reported contact with the UMSS on a daily basis due to proximity; both organizations are housed in the same building (R15, 2010). Management within PSS stated that they “work closely with Security Service and their patrol officers, because they assist us in issues such as theft services” (R15, 2010). This was confirmed by members of the UMSS acknowledging a connection with the CoC for parking services (R1, 2010).

PSS stated that although the CoC provided daily parking enforcement, the UMSS work with PSS for theft of services, call management, weekend/night enforcement, vehicle tow, and convocation parking (R15, 2010). Theft of services includes forged parking passes or tampering with parking meters, while call management means that all calls concerning malfunctioning meters are directed through the UMSS before being directed to PSS. In addition to these services, the UMSS also provides weekend and after hours parking enforcement on the Fort Garry campus, while offering service on the Bannatyne campus 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Finally, the UMSS aids in planning and enforcing parking during convocation due to the increase in parking volume (R15, 2010).

The connection between these two organizations appears to be informal as both organizations acknowledge daily interaction with each other and cooperate on the issues mentioned above. It appears the PSS deals with a significant portion of security in the form of parking enforcement. The UMSS on the other hand merely supports this operation. Both organizations fall under the University governance structure.

Internal to the University of Manitoba is the University Centre Security (UCS), which
patrols the University Centre at night. The UMSS and UCS have an informal connection as both organizations acknowledge a connection with each other, but have not formalized this in writing. The UCS was asked whether official protocols were established with the UMSS, and UCS management responded “. . . if there are any security incidents within University Centre, the first rule of our security is to contact University Security immediately” (R11, 2010). In addition, the UCS reported daily contact with the UMSS. The UMSS stated that there were specific radio channels established for their organization, but they also have the UCS on a separate channel in case of emergency (R11, 2010). According to the UCS, security personnel must contact the UMSS at the beginning of their shift. The UMSS is the primary outlet for the UCS as both organizations have daily contact and any security infraction identified by the UCS must be communicated to the UMSS.

The UMSS has several other connections as illustrated in Figure 2. Among them is an informal connection with Wise Guys. As with any other campus, establishments that serve alcohol have the possibility of creating deviant behavior and require special attention. In this case it was found that the UMSS and Wise Guys have an informal connection. Both organizations acknowledged contact with each other. Wise Guys stated that it had contact information for the UMSS in cases of emergency (R7, 2010) and “. . . in general terms [we] work with them on an incident by incident basis” (R7, 2010). The example given was in circumstances when individuals are going to be expelled and “. . . instead of just sending the person out of here we would call campus security and advise them that we are sending someone out of the club. . .these people would be entering into their space. . .”(R7, 2010). Thus, Wise Guys acknowledges the UMSS jurisdiction and ensures that communication is maintained with the UMSS. Wise Guys reported contact with the UMSS at a rate of two to three times a week.
The UMSS acknowledged a connection with Wise Guys and reinforced that contact was usually event driven in the form of fights that move into their jurisdiction (R14, 2009).

Overall, the UMSS and Wise Guys have a mutual understanding in regards to events that transfer from inside Wise Guys to outside of the establishment, which creates an informal connection. Other providers forming informal connections with the UMSS include Agriculture Canada. Agriculture Canada is a federal department and holds a significant amount of property on the Fort Garry campus, including one building and several greenhouses.

The security manager for Agriculture Canada reported that there was only one protocol that had been established with the UMSS in case of emergency, and his organization had contact information in case of emergency as well. Agriculture Canada reported that it had contact with the UMSS on a monthly basis, and it is usually event-driven (R8, 2010). Lastly, although Agriculture Canada stated that it only had one protocol established with the UMSS, in cases of minor offences they would contact UMSS and for more serious offences the WPS would be contacted (R8, 2010). The UMSS acknowledged contact with Agriculture Canada, but noted that the connection was not well defined. Overall, it appears that there is an informal connection between these organizations; however, it is not as strong as others, such as with Cangene.

Beyond PSS, there is an array of connections internal to the University. These include the Physics Lab, St. John’s College, St. Andrew’s College, and those residences under the governance of Housing and Student Life. It was discovered that there was an informal connection between St. John’s, and St. Andrew’s, and Housing and Student Life.

During an interview with a representative from the Physics department, questions were asked in reference to the security precautions in place for their lab. The spokesperson for the department reported that the department used CHUBB security systems and the department
follows the regulation guidelines of the University (for example, by-laws). Also, any emergencies, such as fires, would automatically be directed to the UMSS for any security requirements, such as evacuation (R6, 2010). The, UMSS confirmed this by stating that they had a connection with them and had specific Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to deal with any emergencies the physics lab had. In addition, the U of M has designated “an Emergency Response Manager (ERM) dedicated to address all campus emergencies 24/7. The ERM is a shared responsibility between the management of Physical Plant, Risk Management, and Security Services. . . .” (R14, 2011). The guidelines for this are written out in a template for all ERM managers. Thus, this relationship is rated as a formal two way relationship because there are formal written procedures in place to deal with security/emergency matters.

St. Andrew’s, on the other hand, reported that it had contact with the UMSS in case of emergency and guidelines were written in the residence assistance hand-book on how to deal with major security issues. This node also stated that it fell under UMSS jurisdiction for any security–related infractions. When asked if there were any official written agreements between the two, the St. Andrew’s manager responded, “No. Whatever agreement the campus security has with the university to take care of the campus facilities, we fall under” (R3, 2010). In this case, that would include any University by-laws that do not articulate the way in which residences must operate with the UMSS. However, this does not prevent St. Andrew’s from contacting the WPS for more serious breaches. When asked whether it had contact with the WPS, the St. Andrew’s manager stated “we will deal with the Winnipeg Police if it is warranted, campus security will deal with most of the issues, . . . but we usually go through campus security first” (R3,2010). An important element to note is that, even for more serious events, St. Andrew’s goes through the UMSS first and is directed. This connection is informal as the
UMSS identified St. Andrews as a security stakeholder, but no written formal agreement exists (R10, 2009).

St. John’s holds a similar connection to the UMSS. The UMSS confirmed that it had contact with St. John’s residence (R10, 2009); however this connection was not well defined during the interview. St. John’s management reported that there were protocols established to deal with emergencies such as fires or injury of students (R4, 2010). St. John’s explained that there were written guidelines. As management stated “…there are some written ones, they come from the University policies, for instance if there is a shooter, we have a written, we have something from security services to follow” (R4, 2010). St. John’s also stated that it received a report from the UMSS on a monthly basis and had contact other than this with the UMSS on a weekly basis (R4, 2010). Lastly, management noted that if any infraction occurred that could affect the college, he would be notified by the UMSS. Thus, this connection is informal.

St. John’s and St. Andrew residences have an informal connection with the UMSS. This connection is driven by a “good neighbour” policy and as a result both maintain contact with the UMSS. Also, both residences contact the UMSS before going to outside agencies for major criminal infractions, illustrating that although the residences have security agents to deal with minor infractions, all serious infractions are routed to the UMSS.

As mentioned previously, the UMSS acknowledged that it had contact with Housing and Student Life services but acknowledged that there were no University by-laws dealing with this connection. However, it was noted that these two organizations had an “excellent relationship with [one another] and provide necessary security related information” (R14, 2011). It is for this reason that this connection will be rated as an informal two-way connection between the organizations.
The other connections that the UMSS had were a one-way connection with the Military Police and a two-way connection with SmartPark. As mentioned above, the Military Police are a large organization; however, when the local detachment was contacted (CFB Winnipeg) it denied any connection with the UMSS. In contrast, the UMSS stated that it had contact with the Military Police (R10, 2009). Incorporated into its SOPs is how Canadian Forces members are dealt with on campus. For this reason, the connection is rated as one-way low strength relationship, where one organization recognizes contact with the other (UMSS), while the MPs do not recognize contact with the UMSS.

The relationship between SmartPark and the UMSS is a two-way connection. The reason for this was the strong relationship articulated by the UMSS stating that their “SOPs include a section specifically for SmartPark. . .and monitoring [is] made through [Smart Park personnel] and he is kept informed of all issues” (R10, 2011). However, there are no formal written agreements, and as such this is an informal two-way connection.

The most significant connection on the Bannatyne campus is between the UMSS and the HSC, which is illustrated in Figure 1. It is considered an informal connection, as both organizations acknowledged a connection with each other, but neither organization has a formal written agreement with the other. A HSC spokesperson reported “We don’t have any official protocols, but we do have them on radio channel. . .our radios are set up with. . .an individual assigned number to theirs [UMSS]” (R16, 2010). This node not only has UMSS on the radio channel, the spokesperson emphasized that there is a mutual understanding between the two organizations. The HSC spokesperson cited an example, “We had one instance when they had a trailer on one of their parkades, on one of their parking lots and there was two individuals breaking in. They contacted us via radio and we sent four or five officers to assist and in the
assistance we managed to catch and apprehend the culprits” (R16, 2010). This situation exemplifies the type of mechanisms used to cooperate with other nodes where there is an informal understanding. The HSC spokesperson went further by stating that HSC personnel had little official contact, but on unofficial business reported contact with the UMSS two to three times a week. Lastly, in relation to security issues, the HSC reported that the UMSS is the only organization it contacts for issues concerning the University (R16, 2010).

The Bannatyne branch of the UMSS stated that there were no formal connections with the HSC, but “information exchange” occurred between the two organizations (R12, 2009). The frequency reported by the Bannatyne spokesperson varied from monthly to two times a week. Despite the minor variation in how each organization reported contact with one another, both acknowledged an informal connection with each other through word of mouth and a general understanding in regards to joint security concerns. Thus, it reconfirmed an informal connection between the two.

The UMSS had an array of different connections varying from formal, informal to one-way with organizations surrounding it. However, there are several other organizations active on the Fort Garry campus that perform a significant role. The CoC is one of these organizations, providing security to Agriculture Canada, Cangene, PSS, St. Andrew’s and FWI as seen in Figure 3 below.
Agriculture Canada is a federal organization and contracts the CoC for security guard services. This connection was rated as formal because the CoC are a contracted security service, meaning that their connection is written, and both organizations acknowledged one another. During an interview with a manager for the CoC, he was asked whether his organization had a connection with the Agriculture Canada building and responded that the CoC have contact with the FWI institute as well (R9, 2010). Another important aspect of the connection between Agriculture Canada and the CoC is that when contracted out, the commissionaires report directly to the security manager of the organization they are contracted to (R9, 2010).

Agriculture Canada confirmed this connection stating, “we have a guard force here of Commissionaires that basically provide security during silent hours, both security and also an alarm watch, like fire watch” (R8, 2010). This organization went further, reporting that, during the day, security was managed internally with one CoC personnel at the reception desk, but
during the evening it was exclusively CoC. Overall, there is little doubt that the connection is formal as these services are contracted and both organizations acknowledge a connection with each other.

The CoC also have a formal connection with Cangene; both organizations reported a connection with one another. Cangene was asked whether it had any Commissionaires working in its organization, and stated “. . .we do, they report to me as the security manager” (R2, 2010). As discussed above the CoC personnel usually receive direction from the organization they are contracted to. The CoC acknowledged this connection stating “Cangene is one of my clients on Campus itself, they’re on, they’re on the property of the University, but we provide security services to the Cangene Corporation” (R8, 2010). More importantly, this node was questioned about the degree to which personnel are directed by the organization to which they are contracted. As illustrated in the case of Sierre Leone, contracted services are considered to have their own objectives, thus governance for contracted services belongs to the organization buying these services under certain conditions. If these conditions are breached or change (i.e. contract), services may be revoked when the contract is up for renewal. This was evident during the interview with this organization, as the manager interviewed stated:

And that would be I guess, if there were a lot of incidents of threats being made to our officers we would have to consider, okay next time they want a contract, we would have to consider the fact that we have had threats, so with that place becoming a little more dangerous to our officers from a safety stand point, but like I say so far, I am dealing with two of the sites out there and the parking and shuttle services and Cangene and there hasn’t been any incidents serious enough to warrant such a process (R2, 2010).

Thus, any issues arising in organizations contracting services can affect the decision of the CoC to contract these services again, meaning they are ultimately governed through the CoC.

In addition to Agriculture Canada and Cangene, the CoC provide parking enforcement to
PSS. While the UMSS aids the PSS with security–related issues, the Commissionaires enforce parking regulations throughout the University. Both organizations acknowledged a connection with one another, and this relationship is considered formal, as it is a contracted service with a written agreement. During the interview with PSS, management stated, “We contract out parking enforcement to the Corps of Commissionaires” (R15, 2010). The CoC reinforced this connection “Our services are contracted parking and shuttle services, so parking and shuttle services” (R9, 2010). There is little difference between this relationship and that found between the CoC and Agriculture Canada as both are formal contracts.

There were several other CoC connections that include the FWI and St. Andrew’s. In regards to the FWI, the connection is two-way as the CoC spokesperson acknowledged a contract with this organization and that commissionaires were active in that location (R9, 2010). Since this is a contracted service this is considered a formal connection. The St. Andrews spokesperson stated, “. . .the Commissionaires are here on a daily basis. . .they come in and check [the parking ledger] for parking, so we see the Commissionaires on a daily basis” (R3, 2010). However, the CoC did not report St. Andrew’s as an agency it provided parking enforcement to. Therefore the connection is one-way.

It is evident that the CoC hold a significant role within this web-based system, providing Commissionaires to several locations on the Fort Garry campus. More specifically, these services work under those governance structures they are contracted under, unless serious repetitive issues arise. The result as illustrated above could be a change in the contract terms or non-renewal of services. The majority of services consist of parking enforcement and site security with the majority of security issues transferred to the UMSS with the exception of serious offences. These serious offences appear to be directed out to the WPS, which is the next
organization holding a prominent position within this web-based system of governance.

There was a trend in the data collected where organizations external to the University governance structure would contact the WPS in cases that were serious in nature, such as those involving weapons and assault. As seen in Figure 4 there are several one-way connections, with the exception of the UMSS. The connection between the UMSS and WPS was discussed above; however, Wise Guys, Cangene, HSC, and Agriculture Canada all reported a connection with the WPS. This connection was usually event driven. During the interview with the WPS, none of these organizations were acknowledged as security providers on campus. The WPS spokesperson agreed that the UMSS was the portal through which contact was made with organizations on campus (R13, 2010). Thus, this re-enforces a conduit for coordinating policing responsibilities.
The four diagrams discussed compose the majority of connections within the Fort Garry and Bannatyne campus. There are only a few miscellaneous connections that have not been discussed. These connections include Wise Guys and three residences (St. John’s, St. Andrew’s, Housing and Student Life) and two private security providers (G4S, OBO).

As illustrated in Figure 1, there is a one-way connection from Wise Guys to St. John’s, St. Andrew’s and Housing and Student Life where Wise Guys reported contact with the residences (R7, 2010). However, this was not reciprocated by the three residences. The other miscellaneous connections existed between PSS and G4S, where PSS reported daily contact with the other organization for money transfer (R15, 2010). However, G4S could not be contacted for interview, making this connection one-way. Another private security organization active on campus, OBO, was reported to have contact with the University Centre Security for special events (R5, 2010), but an interview with OBO was unattainable. Lastly, the Provincial Agricultural Complex declined to interview stating that “provincial security” was responsible for any issues, and this was the only information provided.

This concludes the way in which nodes make connections with one another on the Fort Garry and Bannatyne campuses with one exception, which are associations. UMSS reported participation in two associations: International Association and Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA) and Manitoba Protective Officers’ Association (MPOA). According to IACLEA, it “advances public safety for educational institutions by providing educational resources, advocacy, and professional development services” (IACLEA, 2011). At the present time, it represents 1,200 universities and colleges in twenty different countries. These associations give members the opportunity to communicate by word of mouth and network with other organizations and are often overlooked by researchers, but represent another networking
mechanism for nodes.

Another association the UMSS is active in is MPOA (R10, 2009). It has over eighty members and its fundamental goal is to “bring together members of investigation, security and plant protection departments in all branches of business and industry. . .[and give] an opportunity to network with colleagues” (MPOA, 2011).

In conclusion, the analysis of how nodes on the University of Manitoba network with one another and the amount of formal, informal and one-way connections that exist is complete. It is evident that the majority of connections occur on the Fort Garry campus because of its size, leaving only one major informal connection on the Bannatyne campus, with HSC. After analyzing the security network, there are three prominent organizations active on the University of Manitoba: the UMSS, WPS, and CoC hold the most connections with other security nodes. More importantly, there appears to be a distinct difference in how each of these security nodes network with others. The most prominent is that the connection between the UMSS and WPS is formal, while the other organizations only have one-way connections with the WPS. Thus, the UMSS is the outlet for all providers even though not all organizations fall under the internal governance of the University of Manitoba.

Furthermore, internal organizations such as the UCS, residences, PSS, and physics lab report most security concerns to the UMSS, then depending on its seriousness the event may be reported to the WPS. It is important to note that although the MOU sets out what the UMSS can enforce, there is still a level of discretion used by the organization. Thus, it governs the majority of security issues for internal organizations. Also, for nodes outside the internal governance system of the University, such as Cangene, Wise Guys, and Agriculture Canada, minor issues are still reported to the UMSS rather than the WPS. This indicates that the UMSS governs all minor
security issues/events on the University campus, regardless of which security node encounters the infraction/violation. Furthermore, the WPS understands that the UMSS is the primary security provider within the University and endorses its position, making it the primary security node within the geographical confines of the University.

The CoC are another prominent node on campus and in essence are connected to most nodes under the governance of the organization its personnel are contracted under. However, it ultimately still controls its personnel and may choose to change the way in which contracts are constructed, but at the everyday level has little impact over the governance of security on the University campus, leaving the UMSS as the overall governing body within the University of Manitoba in regards to security.

**Weakness of Study**

The primary weakness of this study was an underrepresentation of private security companies, because all those active on campus declined an interview. Thus, the type of connections that private organizations establish with other state and non-state organizations is unknown.

**Future Research**

There is little doubt that there are a multitude of connections on the Fort Garry campus illustrating the complexity of security governance. Therefore, studies of these connections in other geographical areas would increase researchers’ understanding of how smaller networks connect to other web-based systems of governance. The WPS and private nodes at the municipal level, and the geographical area of Winnipeg as a whole could be considered as a future study.
The WPS is the primary policing agency and outlet to the RCMP and other federal security agencies for Winnipeg and has organizations at the municipal level making their own web-based system of governance. As such it would be valuable to study a web-based system at this level to illustrate how smaller webs feed into this level.

Furthermore, considering recent legislation, the theoretical framework of nodal governance developed in this study would prove useful in analyzing the growing rise of private governance through provision of internal and contract security. This trend is illustrated by the legislation proposed in Bill C-26. There are two significant portions of this legislation that would aid private security organizations in carrying out their duties. These include clause two and three, which repeal certain portions of the Criminal Code of Canada (Library of Parliament, 2011).

Clause two increases the powers of ‘defence of property’, where if private security guards “are acting under the authority of, or lawfully assisting, a person whom they believe on reasonable grounds is in peaceable possession of property” (Library of Parliament, 2011:16) they can use a reasonable amount of force to prevent theft or damage to the property. It includes preventing individuals from unlawfully entering premises, taking property, and damaging property (Library of Parliament, 2011:12). Lastly, these must be achieved under ‘reasonable circumstances’ (Library of Parliament, 2011:12).

Clause three, in conjunction with clause two, gives significant powers to private security agents by expanding Citizen’s Arrest under section 494 of the Criminal Code of Canada. This clause will move arrest from merely ‘found committing’ to arrest within a ‘reasonable time after the offence is committed” (Library of Parliament, 2011:13). This in essence will allow property owners and representatives to conduct entry level investigation while retaining the right to
‘arrest’ individuals (Library of Parliament, 2011:13). Clause two and three will allow private security agents to repel people from private space, arrest them for entering, and investigate damage to personal property. These are characteristics similar to state agencies such as municipal police forces.

Thus, nodal governance and the study of security agencies that use resources along networks to achieve desired objectives include more than just state agencies. Future research should focus on “all” security agencies, especially the rise of non-state security organizations and how they achieve their desired objectives.
CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION

The UMSS is the outlet for all internal security organizations on the Fort Garry campus and the sole provider within the Bannatyne campus. The UMSS has a distinct set of technologies, resources and an institution through which to mobilize its governance. In addition, the UMSS has a large portion of personnel (33%) with similar mentalities that appears to be adequate to move its organization in a common direction. Thus, it can be considered a “node”, one which networks with other organizations to achieve its desired objectives.

A total of 19 security nodes were identified within the University of Manitoba. At the centre of this web-based system of nodal governance is the UMSS, followed by other prominent organizations such as the WPS and CoC. As discussed during the literature review, there were three prominent theoretical frameworks: private governance, anchored pluralism, and nodal governance, and the nodal governance paradigm was selected to study the UMSS.

In regards to the private governance framework, it is evident that there are several organizations active in the provision of security which include both state and non-state entities, making it difficult to argue that there are growing areas of private governance with security providers acting in their stead. More realistically, there appears to be an array of security nodes using resources along a web to attain their objectives, especially in the case of contracted security providers. As highlighted above in reference to the CoC, although these providers act in the interest of those who hire them, there are limits in where depending on certain conditions contracts need to be changed. Thus, the framework helps us to understand some of the nuances of security governance, such as the increasing role of non-state security agencies.
Anchored pluralism has also been of some assistance in this study as well. The principle understanding of this framework is that the state guides all other security providers. In respect to this study there were elements that support such a perspective. The first is that special constable status is attained through the province with the WPS being the sole trainer for those holding this position. Also, an MOU was established between the UMSS and WPS articulating certain enforcement capabilities that appear to be general directions rather than specific limits of exploitation.

This is evident in that the WPS uses the UMSS as an outlet to all nodes on University grounds, giving it control of the area in entirety in many respects. This allows the UMSS a degree of discretion when dealing with security issues that arise, such as ‘bar fights’ and ‘traffic violations’.

The nodal governance paradigm best helps us to understand the complexity of these governing systems and the way in which nodes compete, cooperate, or ignore each other to achieve objectives. The data demonstrates that the UMSS has a coercive set of mentalities with technologies similar to those of municipal police force, minus certain Use of Force equipment. Furthermore, it uses resources to attain its own objectives such as the use of statistics to increase the amount of economic capital it receives from its employer. The UMSS institution has survived over fifty years and uses a collection of training from the WPS and corporate knowledge to sustain itself.

Networking with other nodes on campus was achieved by an array of formal and informal connections. However, as illustrated in Figure 1, the majority of connections were informal with both organizations acknowledging a connection with the other, or at the least an understanding the other organizations existed. Therefore, by merely studying policy or formal
agreements, many connections would be overlooked, revealing the need to research security governance with nodal governance. In many instances, informal agreements are adequate to meet the security needs of the campus.

Another interesting aspect discovered during data analysis was that there were three major organizations active on the Fort Garry campus composing the majority of connections. It is interesting to note out of the three prominent organizations, there was a hybrid policing agency (UMSS), a contract security firm (CoC), and a traditional state entity (WPS). This further underlines the complexity of security governance and that it is no longer monopolized by state entities.

It is evident the UMSS has a cohesive coercive set of mentalities, advanced technologies, is resource rich, and has been institutionalized for fifty years. It is responsible for security concerns for over 25,000 students at the University and has strikingly similar qualities to those that a police force would have. Thus, it exemplifies the need to shift theorists’ understanding of security governance and how it should be researched in the future.

Therefore the UMSS is one node among many, which uses its resources along complex webs of governance to produce outcomes within a specific geographical area. Furthermore, the theoretical perspectives in this study explain the importance of studying security governance as a set of nodes (organizations), networking with others to achieve their own objectives. The nodal governance paradigm highlights the importance of the state in security governance. The framework used in this thesis will also be helpful in analyzing and explaining the growing trend toward non-state security governance.
Bibliography


Health Sciences Centre. 2011. “About the HSC.” August 5 http://www.hsc.mb.ca/corporate/


Annex A

Figure 1.1. Contracts in battlespace.

**Military**
- Armed Operational Support
  - EO in Angola
  - Sandline in Sierra Leone
- Unarmed Operational Support on the Battlefield
  - SAIC in Gulf War I
- Unarmed Military Advice and Training
  - MPRI in Croatia
  - Vinnell in Saudi Arabia
- Logistical Support
  - Brown & Root in Afghanistan

**Police**
- Armed Site Security
  - SDS in Mexico
  - Saracen in Angola
  - Blackwater in Iraq
- Unarmed Site Security
  - DSL in DRC
- Police Advice and Training
  - DynCorp in Iraq
- Crime Prevention
  - DSL in DRC
- Intelligence
  - Open Source Solutions & Kroll in Iraq
  - CACI in Iraq
Annex B

Dupont’s Nine Variables

• The number of individual contacts within the partner organization
• The existence of more privileged relationships with one of these contacts
• Extra-professional socialization with those contacts
• The context in which meetings with professional contacts occur outside the workplace (friendship, kinship, love affair, . . .)
• The frequency of contacts with the privileged partner or the group of contacts
• The general distribution of responsibilities for activation of ties
• The preferred technological tools used to interact with the contact
• The contact’s perceived level of responsibility (as compared to the respondent)
• The formal or informal nature of the partnership
Appendix 1 to Annex D:  Interview Questions (Management)

Institution

1. How is the governance of your organization structured?

2. What qualifications are required to gain a position in your organization and how much on the job training do your employees receive?

3. What type of security tasks does the U of M Security Service perform?

4. Does your institution promote crime prevention or does it see its role as responding to breaches when they occur?

Networking with other Nodes

Security Stakeholder Definition – Any organization or individual that is involved in or affected by the provision of security within a specific area.

1. Do you maintain contact with other security bodies in or around the University of Manitoba? If so, which organizations and do you have any official protocols that both organizations recognize, or do you have a contact that you know working in those organizations.

2. (If answered yes to question 1) How often do you have contact with these organizations?

3. Are there any informal connections?

Symbolic

1. Do you think that the University of Manitoba Security Service has a good reputation within the University community and the surrounding areas? (Probe: Why or why not)

2. What do you think some of the challenges are in maintaining/attaining a positive standing among other stakeholders in the university community?

Economic

1. What other security stakeholders are active on the Fort Garry and Bannatyne campus.

2. What kind of an image do your superiors have of campus security and how does this affect the level of funding that you receive from the University?
3. How important is the level of funding in enabling you to properly discharge your duties as Campus Security and in maintaining a positive image with your stakeholders. Are their specific kinds of funding that you want but have not been able to secure that would enhance your ability to discharge your responsibilities? PROBE: what kinds of equipment, resources, training, etc. they think they need but are unable to afford at this time.

Political

1. Have you been able to effectively meet the objectives set out for you by the governing bodies of the University? If yes, has your performance resulted in any increase in autonomy for your organization in providing its own initiative in defining its overall range of activities? Has your success given you more autonomy in how you accomplish your tasks?

Cultural

1. Do you think that your organization has developed unique expertise in the field of crime prevention and detection, which is transmitted through “in house” training? If so, please describe?

2. Are there any formal educational programs and/or classes that the University of Manitoba Security Service has created or used to train individuals that are new at the job? If so, do these programs have a reputation in the community that brings non-force members to workshops/presentations?

3. Do prospective recruits to your organization see U of M Security Service as a career destination or as a stepping stone to other employment in the security field?

Social

1. Are there any training or qualifications that have professionalized the University of Manitoba Security Service such as peace officer status or national/provincial or regional exams?

2. What university regulations establish the authority of the University of Manitoba Security Service?

Symbolic

1. Do you think that the University of Manitoba Security Service has a good reputation within the University community and the surrounding areas? (Probe: Why or why not)

2. What do you think some of the challenges are in maintaining/attaining a positive standing among other stakeholders in the university community?
Technologies

1. Can you describe some of the tools and resources that your organization uses to provide security? Ie. Cars, warning posts

2. Can you describe some of the strategies your organization uses to prevent crime?

Direction of Relationships with other Policing Bodies

1. What do you think are the most serious forms of breaches of security that might occur on a University campus?

2. Do you have specific protocols developed for each of them? Are they written? How were they developed?

3. What are the most frequent kinds of such breaches?

4. Are you legally mandated to work with public authorities for specific kinds of problems (probe them on which ones and at what stage of escalation)? Are you legally required to give control to some other police or security organizations for specific kinds of breaches(probe the circumstances)?
Appendix 2 to Annex D: Interview Questions – Rank and File Members

Technologies

1. Can you describe some of the tools and resources that your organization uses to provide security? i.e. Cars, warning posts

2. Can you describe what type of strategies your organization uses to prevent crime?

Institution

1. What types of qualifications are required for a special constable position? Are there other skills or attributes that are considered an asset for it?

2. What type of training is needed to hold this position?

3. What type of on the job training did you acquire while in this position, and how many hours of this did you receive?

Networking Mechanisms/Degree of Connectivity

1. Do you have any formal connections with any other security organizations that surround the University of Manitoba? Are there any informal connections?

2. Do you have any friends or associates in other security services across the country?

3. How often do you have contact with other security organizations and the individuals in them? What kind of contacts are they?

Direction of Relationships with other Policing Bodies

1. What do you think are the most serious forms of breaches of security that might occur on a University campus? Do you have specific protocols developed for each of them? Are they written? How were they developed (PROBE: as a joint initiative with specific organizations, in house policies developed by the University, adoption of protocols developed by other organizations, etc.)

2. What are the most frequent kinds of such breaches?

3. Are you legally mandated to work with public authorities for specific kinds (probe them on which ones and at what stage of escalation) of problems? Are you legally required to give control to some other police or security organizations for specific kinds of breaches (probe the circumstances)?
Security Service Questionnaire

I would like to thank you for taking the time to participate in this survey. As a sociology graduate student I have always been interested in studying the security field. I would like to explain to you what this study is about as well as the importance it holds for you and your fellow members of the University of Manitoba Security Service.

The non-state security industry (i.e. citizen initiatives, private companies) has seen a significant increase in both its size and the different tasks that it conducts. On any given day different parts of the security industry interact with each other to police different territories. For example, Commissionaires and armoured car security guards work within the University of Manitoba, along with the University of Manitoba Security Service.

This survey will help to describe the characteristics of the University of Manitoba Security Service by understanding the individuals that belong to it. As well it is designed to learn about the different security organizations that you interact with.

Thank you again for your participation in this study.
**Instructions:** Remember that all answers are kept confidential and that you will not be identified in any way. Please try to answer all questions to the best of your ability.

Please Circle the Most Appropriate Answer

1. Tougher punishment measures are necessary to make potential offenders think before committing a crime.

   1  
   2  
   3  
   4  
   5  
   6  
   7

   Strongly Disagree
   Strongly Agree

2. Crime would decrease with greater police presence.

   1  
   2  
   3  
   4  
   5  
   6  
   7

   Strongly Disagree
   Strongly Agree

3. The criminal justice system usually obstructs the work of law enforcement bodies.

   1  
   2  
   3  
   4  
   5  
   6  
   7

   Strongly Disagree
   Strongly Agree

4. It is necessary to create and to improve youth institutions where children at high risk of becoming delinquents can attend.

   1  
   2  
   3  
   4  
   5  
   6  
   7

   Strongly Disagree
   Strongly Agree

5. In order to prevent crime it is necessary to put more money into deprived areas.

   1  
   2  
   3  
   4  
   5  
   6  
   7

   Strongly Disagree
   Strongly Agree

6. An effective way of preventing crime would be by detecting and assisting adolescents who are at high risk of becoming delinquents.

   1  
   2  
   3  
   4  
   5  
   6  
   7

   Strongly Disagree
   Strongly Agree
7. If society had more knowledge about factors related to crime, it would be easier to prevent crime.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

8. The death penalty should be reinstated in Canada.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

9. Minors committing serious crime should be punished as if they were adults.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

10. Judges should give harsher sentences to individuals who commit crimes.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

11. How many times a day do you interact with other security agents while on duty with the University of Manitoba Security Service? (ie. Commissionaire, resident dons, police services etc...).

a. 1 times  
   b. 2 times  
   c. 3 times  
   d. 4 or more times

12. How many hours a week do you work for the University of Manitoba Security Service?

a. less than 16 hours  
   b. 16 to 32 hours  
   c. 33 to 40 hours  
   d. more than 40 hours

13. What is your sex:

a. Male  
   b. Female
14. Which of the following security bodies/organizations have you had contact with while working with the University of Manitoba Security Service (please check all that apply):

- □ Winnipeg Police Service
- □ The Royal Canadian Mounted Police
- □ Canadian Security Intelligence Service
- □ Armed Guards Transiting Money: Specify Company
- □ Canada Border Services Agency
- □ Commissionaires
- □ Winnipeg Parking Authority
- □ Resident Security (ie. Dons): Specify Building
- □ Monitoring Companies for Security Systems: Specify Company
- □ Community Watch Organizations: Name Organization
- □ Canadian Forces Military Police
- □ Private Investigators
- □ Smart Park Security Personnel: Specify
- □ Health Science Center Security Personnel
- □ OTHER: Please specify any agencies you feel are security organizations that are not mentioned above:
  - □
  - □
  - □
  - □
  - □
  - □
  - □
  - □
  - □
  - □

15 (A). Do you work at another job outside of the University of Manitoba Security Service?
  a. Yes
  b. No, go to question 16

15 (B). How many hours a week do you work this other job?
  a. less than 16 hours
  b. 16 to 32 hours
  c. 33 to 40 hours
  d. more than 40 hours
15 (C). Is this other job in the security field?

a. Yes, Specify: ____________

b. No

16. What is your age, specify: ____________ years

17. What is the highest level of education you have attained? (Please Check One Box)

   a. Some High School
   b. High School Diploma / GED
   c. Some University or College
   d. College Diploma
   e. Bachelors degree
   f. Some Graduate school
   g. Masters Degree
   h. Some Post Graduate School
   i. Doctorate

Conclusion

I would like to thank you again for your time and consideration. If you have any questions do not hesitate to ask. Once this research project is completed a finished copy of the research thesis will be made available to everyone in the University of Manitoba Security Service.
Appendix 4 to Annex D: Interview Questions (Other Organizations)

1. Do you have any official or un-official protocols established with the University of Manitoba Security Service? If so what types?

2. Do you have any contact information in case of an emergency for the University of Manitoba Security Service?

3. How many times a week do you have contact with the UMSS?

4. Do you have contact with any other security providers on the University of Manitoba Campus? (Ie, G4S, University of Manitoba Security Service, Winnipeg Police etc. . .)
## Annex E

### Mentalities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>1-3 (Disagree)</th>
<th>4 (Neutral)</th>
<th>5-7 (Agree)</th>
<th>Non-Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tougher punishment measures are necessary to make potential offenders think before committing a crime. (Coercive)</td>
<td>2 (12%)</td>
<td>1 (6%)</td>
<td>14 (82%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime would decrease with greater police presence. (Coercive)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>2 (12%)</td>
<td>15 (88%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The criminal justice system usually obstructs the work of law enforcement bodies. (Coercive)</td>
<td>2 (12%)</td>
<td>3 (18%)</td>
<td>12 (70%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The death penalty should be re-instated. (Coercive)</td>
<td>3 (18%)</td>
<td>4 (24%)</td>
<td>10 (58%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minors committing serious crime should be punished as if they were adults. (Coercive)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>4 (24%)</td>
<td>13 (76%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judges should give harsher sentences to individual who commit crimes. (Coercive)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>2 (12%)</td>
<td>14 (82%)</td>
<td>1 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is necessary to create and to improve youth institutions where children at high risk of becoming delinquents can attend. (Social)</td>
<td>1 (6%)</td>
<td>3 (18%)</td>
<td>13 (76%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In order to prevent crime it is necessary to put more money into deprived areas. (Social)</td>
<td>2 (12%)</td>
<td>5 (30%)</td>
<td>10 (58%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An effective way of preventing crime would be by detecting and assisting adolescents who are at high risk of becoming delinquents. (Social)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5 (30%)</td>
<td>12 (70%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If society had more knowledge about factors related to crime, it would be easier to prevent crime. (Social)</td>
<td>4 (24%)</td>
<td>8 (46%)</td>
<td>5 (30%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The head of the Security Services Department is the **Director**, followed by the **Assistant Director** and the **Administrative Assistant**. These three positions are responsible for all operational and administrative aspects of the department. Reporting to the Assistant Director are 5 shift **Supervisors**; 4 Supervisors at the Fort Garry Campus and 1 Supervisor at the Bannatyne Campus. Each responsible for their own platoon of Patrol Officers. Each platoon varies in size from 5-8 Patrol Officers. The **Patrol Officers** on each platoon are responsible for ensuring the safety and security of all members of the University community.

The Fort Garry Campus **Community Constable** is responsible for the student patrol Safewalk Program, as well as being the liaison for many of the departments on campus. Duties include giving presentations to students and staff on campus safety and coordinating with the Director on many of the promotional aspects of the department. The **Community Constable** reports directly to the **Assistant Director**.

Our **Investigator** is responsible for all investigative aspects of the department and liaises with many outside agencies such as the Winnipeg Police Service, R.C.M.P., and the Federal, Provincial and Municipal court systems. The **Investigator** reports directly to the **Director** of Security Services.

Last Modified: July 14, 2009
Annex G

1969 - 1973
Constable

1973-1975
Constable

1975 - 1993
Constable

1993-1998
Constable

1993-1998
Supervisor

1998-2002
Constable
2002-Present
Constable

Hat Badge