

The Problems and Ideals
Underlying the
Achievement of Confederation

by

George Buxton, M.A.

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Aide-toi et le Ciel t'aidera.

In the lives of communities, as in the lives of men arise moments of almost overpowering difficulty and stress, the overcoming of which builds and strengthens the fibres of manhood and nationhood. From the crucible wherein the heated passions of sectionalism and the pressing need of communications reacted upon one another, where personal interest and unselfish idealism each played a part, emerged Canadian nationality. Dr. Tupper said of the union of British America, - "I believe that to be a question which far transcends in its difficulties the power of human advocacy to accomplish - I am not insensible to the feeling that the time may not be far distant when events which are far more powerful than any human advocacy may place British America in a position to render a union into one compact whole, not only practicable but absolutely necessary....." (1) We are thrilled at the mention of the thirty-three high minded patriots who guided the forces which made our Canada. Canadians of today have risen to the occasion in doing these men the honor they justly deserve. Yet the thirty-fourth Father of Confederation, though recognized by history, has not been sufficiently appreciated by the public mind. It is indeed a matter of conjecture, whether or not we would have celebrated the Diamond Jubilee of the Dominion of

Canada had it not been for that peculiar set of circumstances - the problems underlying the achievement of Confederation.

One historian has pointedly remarked, "When great questions end little parties begin..." (2) The union of Upper and Lower Canada in 1840 saw Lafontaine's French bloc and Baldwin's English-speaking reformers fused together in a common cause, acting as one party in the achievement of Responsible Government. Opposed to them was the Tory party which solidly upheld the policy of looking to the Mother Country for protection in trade and politics. The coming of Responsible Government saw these two opposing forces dissolved, the one by victory the other by defeat. The average French Canadian who fought for self-government desired this reform in order to preserve the language, the laws and institutions of his kinsmen. This Conservative in his tendencies, he was not the natural ally of the English-speaking reformer in Canada West and the Coalition which had won the day in 1848 now practically disappeared. Not only was east separated from west, but there was a division of east against east, and west against west. Sparks of radicalism generated by nationalism, in Italy and Germany, and by republicanism in France, had lodged in a corner of French Canada where they were fanned by a side current of the whirlwind of United States, democracy. In this way, originated the Rouges urging that ultra-democratic principles be applied to their institutions, daring upon occasion to attack even the church. In Canada West took place the rift in the other section of what was once the Responsible Government 'party'. The Reform Party

here broke into the elements of which it had been composed. Those who had entered the struggle with a preference for American forms of democracy became the Clear Grits. At this time they advocated an elective Governor and second Chamber, a fixed term of office for the Lower House, and other reforms which constituted in the main a plan of democracy, American rather than British in genius. Then there were those who went into the struggle with their hopes centered on applying to institutions already in Canada, the British system of Cabinet responsibility, The government was to be carried on by an executive appointed by the Crown in accordance with the wishes of the majority in the Lower House, to whom it was responsible. These men, satisfied that in 1848 their great end had been accomplished, no longer moved fast enough to suit their more radical companions and drafted toward new friends. The Tory, whom Responsible Government and Britain's new Free Trade Policy deprived of the two main footholds on which he based his allegiance, whose hands were for a moment blackened by the ashes of the Montreal riots and the ink of the Annexation Manifesto, could not now cry "Loyalty!" Similarly, the raising of the issue of Responsible Government from a party to a national policy, the secularization of the Clergy Reserves which defeated his policy of union between church and state, swept away from him other tents to which he had clung. Thus dislodged from his peak of Toryism he was forced to descend toward the valley where he met the moderate reformer and both became Liberal-Conservatives. Thus had disintegrated the Tory and Reform parties of 1848.

But did not clear Grits and Rouges agree in advocating, say, a further extension of the elective principle to Canadian institutions? Similarly, was there not certain ground common to the Conservatives of Canada East and Canada West? Should not the liberal and conservative elements in each section have united with their counterparts to the other to form two parties which would ensure the smooth working of the constitution? On the face of things, there were two parties. The administrations of Brown-Dorion Aug. 1st - Aug. 3rd, 1858; J. S. MacDonald - Sicotte in 1862, and MacDonald-Dorion in 1863, were Liberal administrations. Conservative Governments were those of J. A. MacDonald - Cartier in 1858, and Tache - MacDonald in March 30th - June 14th, 1864. But we do not see one ministry lasting only three days and another scarcely more than two months? Do we not see ministries holding office by majorities of two and three, going down to defeat on the slightest issues? The MacDonald-Sicotte government resigned because it lacked a sufficient majority with which to carry on. The Tache-MacDonald ministry was defeated because its Finance Minister was condemned for a transaction which had taken place under a former government. In brief, when we see that there were six administrations from 1858 to 1864, we realize the hopeless state of parties in Canada at this time.

A study of parties and their policies during this period makes to us further revelations. In the first place, we see that each administration was under a dual leadership, each leader representing a section of the provinces. Hincks retired in 1854 because he felt that he had not the confidence of his own

section; a government was defeated in 1846 because it was charged, the Upper Canadian section did not represent Upper Canada. Then again, we see in these administrations, two Attorney-Generals, one for Canada East and one for Canada West. In fact, whether these cabinets were Liberal or Conservative, we see in their make-up an attempt to satisfy two distinct elements within the same party.

George Brown in the debate on Confederation in 1865, said, "...it was from our views as to the applying of public money to local purposes - the allotment of public lands to local purposes - the building of local roads, bridges and landing piers with public funds - the chartering of ecclesiastical institutions - the granting of public money for sectarian purposes - the interference with our school system - and similar matters, that the hot feuds between Upper and Lower Canada have arisen...." (3) As early as 1850, we hear the English section of the province express great dissatisfaction because a school measure, affecting themselves has been passed by a French majority. So too, blame for the delay in the much sought secularization of the Clergy Reserves in Upper Canada, was laid at the feet of the French cabinet ministers who were known to be opposed to the measure. Situations of this sort inspired J. S. MacDonald's attempt in 1862 to govern by the principle that legislation affecting one section alone should have the assent of a majority from that section. This very attempt, however, served to emphasize the fact that parties were divided on sectional lines.

Indeed, the Act of Union itself did but recognize two distinct elements in Canada. For it sought to protect English-speaking Upper Canada by giving to its smaller population equal representation with the more thickly populated French-speaking Lower Canada. Here lay one of the main roots of the trouble. The English element upon finding itself no longer a minority felt that its share in the control of the country's affairs was too small in proportion to both its population and its contribution to the provincial revenue. 'Representation by population', the war cry of Brown's Liberals, was echoed from most sections of Upper Canada. Even in 1855, John Ross, Conservative speaker of the Legislative Council, had voiced the injustice of the system of representation then in force. "There is nothing that will so surely break down the union as the leeching process going on towards Upper Canada. If they will insist on throwing away from year to year sums of money which bring us no return, and are productive of no real good to the country, the union cannot be preserved." (4) But if equality of representation was unfair to the English majority, representation by population would be unfair to the French minority. According to George Cartier, one of the most influential men of French Canada "The consequence of representation by population would have been that one territory would have government another, and this fact would have presented itself session after session in the House, and day after day in the public prints....It would have given rise to one of the bitterest struggles between the two provinces that ever took place between two nations." (5) Thus in the administration of 1862, Sandfield MacDonalld could command a

majority in Canada West in favor of this change in representation. But his colleague, Dorion, in Canada East saw the French Canadians collect under the standard of George Cartier. So too, in the succeeding Conservative administration, which Cartier's followers strongly supported, John A. MacDonal, found that he could not enjoy the favor of Upper Canada unless he pronounced himself sufficiently in favor of "rep. by pop." to leave it at least an open question. Thus neither party was able to command a majority in the whole province sufficient to carry on the government.

"I found two races warring in the bosom of a single state," (6) said Lord Durham, with reference to Lower Canada in 1838. Representation in parliament as fixed by the Act of Union, the double cabinet formation and double majority system, the nature of the issues before the public, alike proclaimed the division which still existed between English and French speaking Canada.

The principles of Responsible Government required that the administration of the country should be in accordance with the wishes of the people as expressed and carried out by the party which they should see fit to place in power. Party Government was in a state of disruption, due to the presence of sectional difficulties inspired by a dualism of races, Legislative union as established in 1840 could not continue. Legislative union with representation by a population would not prevent a majority from one section passing measures, local in

importance, in contradiction to the wishes of the section which they concerned. Federative union of the two Canadas only, giving to local assemblies control over local legislation, was not likely to overcome dualism in the general assembly. Complete separation of Canada East and Canada West would leave them weak in the face of complex problems of trade, dashed from the hope of playing an important role internationally, a temptation to the absorbing democracy of the south. Canadian self-government was indeed in perilous straits.

"The strawberry grows underneath the nettle,
And wholesome berries thrive and ripen best
Neighbored by fruit of baser quality;" (Henry V. Act 1,
Sc. I, Line 60)

Certain vexing aspects of Canada's relations with her neighbors in the middle of the last century, helped to nourish to maturity the plan of Confederation.

If one were to read editorials from issues of the London Times, the New York Herald and the Toronto Globe during this period, one would be struck by their unfriendly tone. The Atlantic Monthly in November 1861 charged the Times with presenting American affairs in a "false, ill-tempered, malignant and irritating manner." (7) The Toronto Globe of August 7th, 1861, said, "The insolent bravado of the Northern Press towards Great Britain and the insulting tone assumed toward

these Provinces have unquestionably produced a marked change in the feelings of our people." (8) What said the New York Herald? "Now that we are endeavouring to defeat the projects of Great Britain which seeks to divide us into two nations for her own selfish purposes, to re-establish on the ruins of our great republic the commercial supremacy England has lost, we have fallen into disfavor with our Canadian neighbors." (9)

Did these effusions really represent the state of public opinion? The Daily News, the Star and the Spectator in Great Britain, and the World, the New York Commercial and the Philadelphia Inquirer in American were moderate and conciliatory in their views. (10) Evidence of goodwill was the enthusiasm with which the Prince of Wales was received in the United State in 1860; further testimony was the half-masting of flags in New York at the death of the Prince Consort. Nevertheless, there were factors in 1860 which made the Anglo-American situation very delicate. Since the Revolution, Bombastic Fourth of July orators had continued to paint George III in the darkest of hues, whilst English travellers in the United States delighted to point the finger of ridicule at American life and institutions. (11) Boundary disputes and the war of 1812 fed the irritation thus produced. In Civil War times, the English aristocracy conscious of kinship with the gentility of the South, the cotton manufacturer sympathetic with the Southern policy of Free Trade, monarchical Englishmen in general, willing to see American democracy discredited, alike were hostile to the Unionist Northern States. Similarly, in Canada, Conservatives opposed to the wide suffrage and supremacy of the elective prin-

principle in American politics, showed an unsympathetic attitude to the North. Nor were the Unionist States unconscious of this attitude, as is witnessed by the sensitiveness with which they misunderstood Britain's declaration of neutrality. This act necessarily and justifiably recognized the South as a belligerency; the Northerner interpreted it in the light of an insulting first step to recognition of the South as an independency. In 1861 an American sloop seized two Southern envoys travelling on the British ship Trent. As a result, Canada received English reinforcements, whilst Washington received a British ultimatum. To avert war, it required all the moderating influence which the Crown could bring to bear on the British cabinet, all the tact of the British ambassador at Washington, and all the technicalities behind which the American executive could cover its retreat.

Though the storm had not broken, yet had it not threatened? Canadians, as familiar with Washington as A. T. Galt believed that the conciliatory policy of Lincoln and his executive did not necessarily reflect popular American feeling. Writing from Washington, Dec. 5th, 1861, he said, "I cannot, however, divest my mind of the impression that the policy of the American Government is so subject to popular impulses that no assurance can be, or ought to be, relied on under the present circumstances."

(12) Then too, was there not an element in the United States that looked to the eventual absorption of Canada? George Cartier produces for us the very Constitution of the United States and shows us there a provision for the admission of Canada into the Union. (13) The war of 1812 was in a sense a manifestation of

the persistence of American opinion. In 1861, Secretary of State

Seward in his "Thoughts for the Presidents Consideration" suggested a foreign war as a means of reuniting the States. Though Lincoln scouted such a notion, a fear somewhat akin to this idea gained ground in England. Lord Ellenborough, commenting on the probable effects of the Civil War, believed, "If the people of the North fail, they will attack Canada as a compensation for their losses. If they succeed they will attack Canada in the drunkenness of victory." (14) Fear of the United States certainly existed in Canada at this time. Whelan spoke of a "...military despotism, not far distant, where in every vestige of liberty is daily offered as a sacrifice to the Moloch of ambition, and wherein the ties that were supposed to bind two people of common origin and common language, are now as brittle as glass, and an opportunity is desired to cry, "havoc and let slip the dogs of war upon unoffending colonists." (15) Though the rhetoric in this passage may have been pronounced under the influence of champagne, the idea contained here did not go unsupported. Dr. Tupper, speaking more conservatively, remarked of the Canadian Provinces, "They were weak and defenceless, living at the threshold and perhaps at the mercy of a great military nation." (16) In the speeches of those who hoped and those who believed that no trouble would arise, there was a note of reservation. General Napier said, ".....should war arise - which I sincerely hope may not be the case - but should war arise, owing to the number of miles we have to defend, it would be impossible for the regular troops for a moment to make a successful resistance against a large force unless we were supported, and well supported, by an organized and effective militia" (17)

George Brown professed sufficient "faith in the good sense of our neighbours to believe that the idea of an unprovoked aggression on the soil of Canada never seriously entered the minds of any large number of the inhabitants of the Northern States." And, yet even he, in his next sentence expressed the sentiment, "But come war when it may, I am sure I speak the sentiments of every man in Upper Canada when I say that the first hostile foot placed upon our shores would be the signal and the summons for every man capable of bearing arms to meet the enemy and that the people would show in the hour of trial, that that spirit which was manifested in 1812 has not died in 1864." (18) In the above passages, both Napier and Brown were talking in terms of the possibility of war and preparedness against such a contingency.

What, indeed, was the preparedness of the British North American Provinces? They had a long unprotected boundary with no common military organization for its defense. To be sure each province had its own volunteer bodies. But even with the spirit of 1812, what could these units do against the trained machine which the United States would be able to put against them?

The St. Lawrence was an excellent highway - in summer. But at the time of the Trent incident, a detachment of British troops en route to Canada, was forced by winter conditions to land at Portland, Maine, and proceed to their destination via United States territory. In the event of war, how could a campaign be carried on with communications of this nature?

An article in the London Times, June 6th, 1862, read, "We no longer monopolize the trade of the colonies; we no longer job their patronage.....If they are to be defended at all, they must make up their minds to bear the greater part of the burden of their own defense." (19) In 1846 - 1848 Canadians had obtained control of their internal politics; in 1859 Galt's vindication of his tariff had extended local control to the general trade policy of the country. (2) In accordance with these changes in colonial status, Great Britain argued that the privilege of self-determination carried with it the responsibility of self-defense. Opinion differed as to the extent to which this principle should be applied to Canada.

In the six or seven years preceding 1854, one-third of the English troops had been withdrawn from the North American Provinces. Hon. C. B. Adderley was of the opinion that British protection should be completely retired from this section of the Empire. (21) He did not take into account the fact that it was neither to the liking nor to the interest of Canada to seek a quarrel with her strong neighbours. War, if it came, would probably be the result of Anglo-American relations. Moreover, Great Britain ready to spend men and money in the defence of allied states, could not conceivably desert her own flesh and blood in the colonies in their hour of need. The fairness of these arguments, the British Government realized. At the time of the Trent affair, England sent eight thousand regulars to Canada. British official policy was not prepared to go the whole length of Cobdenite theory. Canadians were justified in believing

with George Cartier, "...when England saw we were self-reliant to a great extent;...she would cheerfully come to our assistance with all her vast power in any difficulty that might arise."(22)

At the same time, disappointment expressed at the rejection of the Militia Bill in Canada 1862, showed England to be dissatisfied with Canadian efforts. Galt, a member of the Conservative Government which went down with the Militia Bill, expressed the opinion, "The proportion in men and means which Canada ought to contribute in the event of a war with the United States, could be readily settled by negotiations with the Imperial Government, provided difficulties were not made through unjust and acrimonious attacks upon Canada...."(23) George Brown, the Liberal, exclaimed, "But I desire to enter a firm protest against the manner in which of late our duty has been laid down for us chapter and verse by gentlemen three thousand miles off, who know very little of our circumstances and yet venture to tell us the exact number of men we are to drill, and the time we are to drill them....It is not to be concealed that we in Canada are deeply interested in having this whole question discussed and settled."(24)

Perhaps the likelihood of an American war was exaggerated. Perhaps English criticism of Canadian methods was over-done. One fact stands clear, however, fear of America and pressure from Britain brought forcibly to the attention of public men in Canada, the problem of defence.

The advent of Free Trade and Responsible Government had rung the knell of Imperial supervision of colonies in the interests of Imperial Trade. The general commercial element in Canada, no longer under the protecting wing of the Mother Country

had talked of throwing itself into the arms of its neighbors. Then came Britain's opposition to Annexation, a change in the Navigation Laws favoring Canadian trade, together with the discovery that every advantage of a commercial union with the United States could be obtained without necessitating severance of the connection with the Mother Country. Annexation agitation died down and Reciprocity became a fact.

Reciprocity on the whole did work benefit to Canada. From 1852 to 1862, Canadian export trade in home products had increased by ten and a half million dollars; from 1856 to 1862 the movement of United States breaststuffs via the St. Lawrence had quadrupled. (25) Though the United States too gained by the arrangement, it became apparent that clouds were gathering. The raising of the Canadian protective tariff on manufactured articles, Canadian discrimination in favor of the St. Lawrence, rather than the United States shipping routes, created a discontent south of the border. Furthermore, the protectionist Northern States were unsympathetic towards Free Trade and towards Canada. Reciprocity was doomed.

The colonies must look elsewhere to maintain the prosperity in trade which they had begun to enjoy. A. T. Galt expressed the opinion, "If we have reason to fear that one door is about to be closed to our trade, it is the duty of the House to endeavour to open another; to provide against a coming evil of the kind feared by timely expansion in another direction; to seek free trade with our own fellow colonists for a continued and uninterrupted commerce which will not be liable to be disturbed at the capricious will of any foreign country." (26) If Canadians would enjoy commercial prosperity they must look to themselves.

But when they looked to themselves, what did they see? They saw customs officials collecting duties of ten percent on manufactured articles going from New Brunswick to Nova Scotia, and fifteen percent on goods going from Nova Scotia to New Brunswick. (27) They saw in each province a difference in the postal service, the currency, the system of weights and measures, and the method of becoming a British subject. (28) "How did Newfoundland stand toward Canada at the present moment? Her people had to go to the United States to do business, for they had to pass by way of Halifax and Boston to reach Montreal. (29) Statistics compiled at the time Reciprocity was in force, show the same natural products in both the imports and exports of both countries. What is the explanation of this? Certainly, to some extent, the United States was the medium for the interchange of natural products between Canada and the Maritime Provinces. With the St. Lawrence closed during the winter, with no adequate communication between Canada and the Lower Provinces, the commerce of this country tended to flow North and South, rather than East and West. Restrictions both artificial and geographical presented an obstacle which must be overcome, if inter-Canadian trade were to be realized.

"Not less than seven lines of American railroads lead through the United States to the borders of Canada, and give the means of rapid hostile approach; not a single line of British railroad connects the provinces together or affords communications

from the Atlantic shore through national territory."(30)

"Montreal is at this moment competing with New York for the trade of the great West. Build the road and Halifax will soon become one of the great emporiums of the world. All the great resources of the West will come over the immense railways of Canada to the bosom of your harbor." (31).

"We have been more like foreigners than fellow subjects; you do not know us and we do not know you. There are men in this room who hold the destinies of this half of the Continent in their hands; and yet we never meet unless by some chance or other, like the visit of the Prince of Wales, we are obliged to meet." (32)

The Holloway survey of 1844 resulting in the Temiscouata military road and postal route, the Metapedia road completed in 1866, both testified to the efforts of Great Britain to obtain an all British line of communication. The perilous journey of Mr. E. W. Watkin along the Temiscouata in Sept. 1861 demonstrated the impossibility of this road for summer travel;(33) in the following winter, the long unpleasant journey of the British troops added further testimony to the inconvenience and undesirability of such a route. In spite of the \$15,000.00 spent in 1863 to make the Metapedia passable in summer, in spite of the expense incurred in the upkeep of both roads in winter, it is a fact that as late as 1876, a large portion of the mail went by way of the United States. (34) It is a fact too that if the

Maritime Provinces reluctantly changed their political relationship with Canada, it was in the interests of a better mode of communication (35).

A \$20,000,000 canal system illustrated the attempt to draw Western Canadian and American trade via Montreal and the St. Lawrence. Canadian legislation in 1860 gave preference to this route; winter frosts and American railroads discriminated against it.

Lack of adequate communication drove British North Americans to intercourse with the United States rather than with themselves. Military, economic and political factors alike pointed clearly that Canada too must have railroads.

Opinion in the Provinces was for the most part alive to this situation. The proposed St. Andrews-Quebec railroad in 1836, aided by an Imperial grant of £10,000, and incorporated by the legislature of New Brunswick, came to grief because of boundary changes which disqualified St. Andrews as a terminal. In the case of the proposed Halifax-Quebec railroad, the surveys authorised by the legislatures of the three provinces produced no immediate results, due to two reasons - the inability to agree on a route, and the unwillingness of Great Britain to lend financial aid. In 1850 the Quebec-Halifax scheme in conjunction with a proposed European and North American railroad between Halifax and Portland, was alike doomed. The Provinces, too sensible to allow a foreign power to finance their railway, were still too weak to finance it themselves; Great Britain refused to help a railway which, running through the St. John valley, would be connected with, or at least, exposed to a for-

eign power; New Brunswick on the other hand, would do nothing for a railroad which did not tap this frontier portion of her territory.

In 1861, in spite of indirect government aid in the form of additional guarantees and loans, postponements of obligations and virtually unauthorised advances, (36), the Grand Trunk Railway in Canada found itself crushed by general financial mismanagement and excessive running expenses amounting to eighty-five per cent of the receipts. Railway difficulties brought out E. W. Watkin, idealist, promoter, financier, Member of Parliament; this man gave his weight to a transcontinental railway, an Imperial trade route, a scheme which would incidentally boost the Grand Trunk by giving it an increase of business, and a renewal of outside stimulus; this highway was to see its eastern lap in the linking of the Grand Trunk with the Maritime local lines.

In the years 1857 and 1858 again had deputations from Canada and the Maritimes appealed to England for aid in building this stretch of inter-colonial road; again had the British Exchequer failed to respond. To the Howe-Tilley-Vankougnet delegation of 1861, the British Government, refusing to raise at their request, half of £120,000 interest on the necessary £3,000,000 loan, made the counter proposal of merely an Imperial guarantee of interest. An inter-provincial conference at Quebec, 1862, decided in favor of the North American Provinces accepting the Imperial guarantee of interest which Canada, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia were to raise in the proportion of 10:7:7. The result was the Howe-Tilley-Sicotte-Howland delegation, so promising in outlook, so disappointing in results.

Possibly Howland and Sicotte were right in arguing that Gladstone's demand for a sinking fund as a security for interest would prevent expenditures upon internal improvements which were themselves a security for the loan. Possibly, in maintaining that the failure of the above negotiations cancelled the Quebec agreement of 1862, Canada took this stand because a portion of her population was unwilling to see her assume the larger portion of the burden of financing the railroad. But whether the objection to the sinking fund were more than a pretext for the disaffection of the Canadian delegates, whether Howland and Sicotte were influenced by the anti-railway element in Canada, the series of incidents above related, culminating in the breakdown of the negotiations of 1862, point to us a definite conclusion. The North American Provinces were anxious enough to bind themselves by ties of steel, which in their state of disunion they were unable to secure. The problem of railways was a problem of co-operation.

Hand in hand, with the problem of communications eastward, went the problem of communications westward. The Grand Trunk and Intercolonial Railways were only a part of the trans-continental system of which Watkin had dreamed. He was but the successor to the first seekers for a "North-West Passage;" he but followed Alexander MacKenzie who had proposed not long after 1793, "to open and establish a commercial communication through the continent of North America between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans." (37) True, he had precursors. But these men were

idealists of a different type. The 'North-West Passage' explorers and Alexander MacKenzie were pathfinders; Watkin was one of those whose lot it was to work at the solution of the actual problems obstructing the realization of his ideal.

Great, indeed, were the obstacles to be overcome in Watkin's time. Major Carmichael Smythe, R. E., in 1848 aroused the interest but not the support of England in his plan for a transcontinental railway. Allan Macdonell, in 1851, conceiving a Lake Superior and Pacific Railway Company, applied for a charter which was refused on the pretext that Indian claims must first be settled. In 1858 the same man actually obtained a charter for a North-West Transportation, Navigation and Railway Company for the purpose of building links of railway connecting navigable lakes and rivers from Lake Superior to the Fraser River. This scheme failed because it lacked material backing. In 1858 too the Canadian Government placed itself on record as being in favor of a coast to coast railroad which would facilitate the opening up, development, defence and consolidation of the West. (38) We see then, that though there were disappointments, men in diverse quarters of England and Canada were looking to the possibility of a pathway across the Western prairies to the gateway of the Orient.

But these visions were not restricted to British eyes. Senator Seward of the United States said, "I see in British North America, stretching as it does across the continent from the shores of Newfoundland and Labrador to the Pacific.... a region grand enough for the seat of a great empire." Nor did the United States confine themselves to mere admiration of the territory.

Railway activities in the United States, spurred on by the opening of the California and Oregon, brought to light the unfitness of Western American desert regions and the superiority of the British territories for a transcontinental railroad. Moreover, the United States controlled the best route from the East to the Red River Settlement. Already in 1853, the settlers at Fort Garry had made postal connections with Fort Ripley in the United States; by 1857, the gap between these two points had been narrowed down to the distance between Fort Garry and Pembina; by 1859 even the Hudson's Bay Company, bringing supplies in through St. Paul, rather than York Factory, had testified to the superiority of the line of communication through Minnesota. The United States were indeed going ahead in the race for the West.

Canada was undoubtedly placed at a disadvantage by such a situation. For this channel, unavailable for British military travel, tended to deflect to Minnesota. Certain interest in Canada recognized this evil to the extent of trying to remedy it. The Rescue Company, since 1858 operating a bi-monthly mail service by steamer and canoe in summer, attempting to establish a monthly service by snow-shoe and dog sled in winter, failed finally in 1861. The North-West Transit Company proposed to institute a transcontinental water and wagon route for conveyance of passenger and mails; due to inability to obtain the contract for Pacific mails, this scheme too faded away. A further project came nearer to realization. Watkin, despairing of the immediate construction of a railway to the Pacific, took up the scheme of a wagon road and telegraph line to British Columbia. Accordingly, there was proposed an "Atlantic and Pacific Transit and Telegraph Company."

The Imperial Government, the Colonies of Canada and British Columbia, and the Hudson's Bay Company were to grant land; Canada and British Columbia were to guarantee profits of four to five per cent on a capital limited at £500,000. Such a cheering prospect was rendered more hopeful by the fact that the group interested in the Pacific Transit had bought out the Hudson's Bay Company. Yet in 1863, Watkin's efforts, prompted by this promising outlook, were doomed to disappointment. The Company refused to endorse his tentative arrangements with the Montreal Telegraph Company for the building of the lines; the Canadian Government on its side, urging that a telegraph line without a wagon road was practically useless, virtually withdrew its support.

Another scheme had failed. The Americans were energetically pushing West, whilst Canadian efforts in this direction seemed unavailing. If the West were to remain British, there was need of broad policy and united action on the part of British North America.

Thus, whilst one province was well nigh torn asunder by sectional strike, all the British provinces in North America were faced by the common need of defending themselves, of trading and otherwise communicating with each other, and of developing and retaining their western hinterlands. Here was a set of problems worthy of the temper of the men who grappled with them, worthy of the nation whose birth they fostered. What was the solution?

Significant was the attitude of the British Government to the scheme for the union of the North American Provinces. In June 1865 a despatch from Colonial Secretary Cardwell to the Governors of the Maritime Provinces instructed them that Her Majesty's Government considered it an object much to be desired that all the British North American Colonies should agree to united in one Government. (39) Governor Gordon of New Brunswick became from this time forward, an ardent advocate of the scheme he had once opposed; (40) he remained in office. Governor-Macdonell of Nova Scotia continued in opposition to the union scheme; he was sent to Hong Kong. Significant too was the change of sentiment in New Brunswick. In 1866 the people of this province declared themselves solidly in favor of the plan for colonial union which they had turned down in the elections of the previous years. Why? Fenian Raids had appeared on their border. The idea in the minds of Englishmen and Canadians at this time had been adequately expressed by Cartier. "We know very well that, united, the militia of the provinces could turn out to the number of at least 200,000; and then, with the 60,000 sailors that the Canadas and the Maritime Provinces could provide to help the army and navy of England, what power would be crazy enough to attack us?" (41) The uniting of forces, making the provinces stronger of themselves, inclining Great Britain to their aid, constituted the solution of the problem of defence.

We have before us the necessity at this time of stimulating inter-colonial trade. But how was this to be done? Lieut. Col. the Hon. J. H. Gray, of New Brunswick, pointed out clearly that a mere commercial union would be insufficient to remove

tariff restrictions which the different provinces deemed wise to levy in their own interests. (42) In the field of trade, as in the field of defense, the need of a common policy called for political union.

Speaking of the future of the Intercolonial negotiation of 1862, Dorion said, "Such was the origin of this Confederation scheme. The Grand Trunk people are at the bottom of it; and I find that at the last meeting of the Grand Trunk Railway Company, Mr. Watkin did in advance congratulate the shareholders and bondholders of the bright prospects opening before them, by the enhanced value which will be given to their shares and bonds by the adoption of the Confederation scheme and the construction of the Inter-colonial as part of this scheme." (43) Again, to Cartier's remark, "There is an Interoceanic railway to be built," Dorion replied, "Yes, I suppose that is another necessity of Confederation to which we may soon look forward. Some western extension of this Grand Trunk Scheme for the benefit of Messrs. Watkin & Co., of the New Hudson's Bay Company." (44) Indeed, the Cartier-Ross-Galt delegation to England in 1858 and the many succeeding delegations which discussed both the subject of railways and that of intercolonial union, all testify to the close connection between railways and politics in those days. Certainly, the union of the provinces was favorable to railway interests. Article 58 of the Quebec Resolutions of 1864 provided that, "The General Government shall secure, without delay, the completion of the Inter-colonial Railway from Riviere-du-Loup through New Brunswick to Truro in Nova Scotia." (45) Certainly the railway interests were friendly to the union of the Provinces. In

recognition of the numerous courtesies extended by the Grand Trunk officials to the delegates during the discussions of the proposed union, (46) Dr. Tupper said, "I see I have but to mention the name of Mr. Brydges to secure a cordial response. The great company of which he is the representative in this country, has accomplished to a great extent that which it has been the object of the Maritime provinces to bring about - that is, union;"

(47) Indeed when we harken to the remark of Tilley of New Brunswick, we realize how necessary to political union was the railway. "Now alluding to the intercolonial railway project, he said their feeling on this subject was: "We wont have this union unless you give us the railway." (48) If the Intercolonial Railway was an inducement to the Maritimes to enter the union, so too was the promise of the development of the West. Again referring to the Quebec Resolutions we see in Article 69, the provision that, "The communications with Northwestern Territory, and the improvements required for the development of the Trade of the Great West with the seaboard are regarded by this conference as subjects of the highest importance to the Federated Provinces and shall be prosecuted at the earliest possible period that the state of the finances will permit." (49) It is evident that the question of political union of the Colonies, and the question of communications and development east and west were so related that they must stand or fall together.

George Cartier said rather humonously, "In a struggle between two - one a weak and the other a strong party - the weaker could not but be overcome; but if three parties were concerned the stronger would not have the same advantage; as when it was

seen by the third that there was too much strength on one side, the third would club with the weaker combatant to resist the big fighter." (50) The remedy for the deadlock in Canada was to alter the existing balance by entering into a larger union with the Maritimes. But since Canada East, Canada West, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island, each had local interests to safeguard, any union of these sections must be federative in principle. Accordingly, the scheme was devised of "constituting a general administration and general legislature, to which should be committed matters common to all the provinces, and local governments and legislatures for the several sections to which should be committed matters peculiar to their several localities." (51) Though representation in the lower branch of the general legislature was to be according to population, this was not an injustice to the French Canadians. There was an English minority in Quebec which to some extent was a guarantee that the French would receive fair treatment at the hands of the English in the general government. Moreover, the addition of new elements made it unlikely that the general assembly would be divided on the old racial lines. More important than any guarantees was the spirit in which George Cartier, champion of the French, and George Brown, champion of the Upper Canada English, co-operated in this settlement of their difficulties. In spite of Dorion's criticism, (52), in spite of imperfections which may now exist, the workable solution of sectionalism in British North America, has been the federal union of the several provinces.

A threatening note in the attitude of the United States, an appeal from Canadian industry and trade, a call from the West, joining in the request for communications, blended as one voice bidding Canadians, "Unite!" The demand for union spoken in the presence of diversity of interests in the Provinces of Canada, as in the whole of British North America, framed for Canadians, the word, "Confederation."

What were the ideals which burned in the hearts of the men who faced these difficulties? Rapt in contemplation before the resources of the East and the possibilities of the West, Alexander Morris marshalled visions of a new Britannic Empire. (Morris - Nova Britannica) Hon. George Brown rejoiced that the population of the United British North American provinces was exceeded by only eleven sovereign states in Europe (53). In the opinion of Sir A. T. Galt, the shipping, fishing and mining of the Maritimes, combined with the agriculture and industry of the Canadas, constituted the foundation of a country, great and powerful because of its diversified interests. (54) This idea was vividly expressed by George Brown. "New Brunswick, for instance, instead of being confined to its own small market of 250,000 consumers, would have four millions of customers. Far away on the western slopes of the Rocky Mountains were the rich gold fields of British Columbia, awaiting the enterprise and capital of our people....." (55) Looking toward the Eastern seaboard, Cartier asked, "What nation on earth has obtained any amount of greatness unless it has been united with a maritime element?" (56) Carrying this thought still further, Gray of New Brunswick said, "The Maritime Provinces proposed to add their marine to that of Canada. This done and the British North American would become the fourth maritime power in the world...." (57) These idealists saw in the union of their provinces, the personal, territorial and commercial elements of nationality. John A. McDonald said, in 1864, "If we can only obtain that object - a vigorous general government - we shall not be New Brunswickers, nor Nova Scotians, nor Canadians, but British

Americans under the sway of the British sovereign." (58) George Cartier on this same occasion, stated on behalf of his French Canadian followers, "I am living in a province in which the inhabitants are monarchical by religion, by habit and by the remembrance of past history." (59) What is the connection between MacDonald's wish for a strong central government and Cartier's desire to perpetuate monarchical institutions? A comparison of the American and Canadian federations answers this question. When the Thirteen Colonies broke away from the Mother Country, each vested in itself the rights of sovereignty which it was unwilling to delegate to any extent to the central government. When the British North American Provinces decided to unite, sovereignty was still in the possession of the Crown. Theoretically, the provinces had no right of sovereignty to safeguard. Though in accordance with the principle of Responsible Government they still retained control of local policy, the power of the Crown was now to be transmitted to them through the Governor-General of the Dominion. (60) Thus was realized the ideal of a strong executive unity in the federation of the provinces.

But there was need of even more than this consolidation of physical resources and political power. Gray, of New Brunswick, uttered this noble sentiment: "From the plains of Abraham, the ascending spirits of Montcalm and Wolfe - united in their death - left us the heritage of a common country and a glorious name." (61) The French Canadian, Sir E. P. Tache, hoped, "that at no distant period a fraternal era might be opened unto us by which the cool headed and per-

severing Englishman might be drawn closer to the warm-hearted and generous Irishman, to.....the persevering and economical son of Caledonia, and the gay and chevalric offspring of old Gaul, each of these contributing their quota of the good qualities they had inherited from their ancestors, blended together in one grand people...." (62) Thus did the men of those times picture the diverse elements of Canada co-operating in the building of a nation.

These are the problems and these are the ideals which entered into the making of the Dominion of Canada. They are to us a heritage. Whatever may be our problems of the present or the future, a voice from the past calls, "Go forth Canadian and fulfill thy destiny."

FOOTNOTES.

1. John Boyd: Sir George Etienne Cartier Bart.
MacMillan Co. of Canada: MCMXIV, p. 190.
2. Id., pg. 171, n 1.
3. Confederation Debates, Hunter, Rose & Co. Quebec, p. 96.
4. Reginald George Trotter; Canadian Federation, published
by Dent & Sons Ltd., Toronto, MCMXXIV, p. 27.
5. Confederation Debates, p. 54.
6. Lord Durham's Report.
7. Oscar Douglas Skelton: The Life and Times of Sir, A. T. Galt.
Oxford University Press, Toronto 1920, p. 304, n. 13.
8. Id., p. 308.
9. Id., p. 310.
10. Id., p. 304, 305, 309, 311.
11. Id., p. 302.
12. Id., p. 316.
13. Confederation Debates, p. 56.
14. O. D. Skelton: op. cit., p. 345.
15. Hon. Edward Whelan: M.P.P. The Union of the British Provinces
edited by D. C. Harvey, pub. by Garden City Press, 1927,
p. 119.
16. Id., p. 58.
17. Id., pp. 173, 174.
18. Id., p. 214.
19. O. D. Skelton, op. cit., p. 346.
20. Id., pp. 328 - 331.
21. Id., p. 343.
22. Hon. E. Whelan, op. cit., p. 55.

23. O. D. Skelton, op. cit., p. 347.
24. Hon. E. Whelan, op. cit., pp. 214, 215.
25. O. D. Skelton, op. cit., p. 259, n. 10. p. 294, n. 8.
26. Confederation Debates, p. 67.
27. Hon. E. Whelan, op. cit., p. 40. Hon. S.L. Tilley's speech at Halifax, 1864.
28. Id., p. 128. Hon. Geo. E. Cartier's speech at Montreal, 1864.
29. Id., p. 114. The speech of the Hon. John Ambrose Shea, at Montreal, 1864.
30. Trotter, op. cit., p. 173. J. W. Johnstone and A. G. Archibald to Labouchere, Aug. 20th, 1857.
31. Whelan, op. cit., p. 48. J. A. MacDonald's speech at Halifax, 1864.
32. Trotter, op. cit., p. 187. Howe, Montreal, 1858.
33. Id., p. 148.
34. Whelan, op. cit., p. 78.
35. Trotter, op. cit., p. 169.
36. Id., p. 257.
37. Id., p. 259.
38. Id., p. 130.
39. Id., pp. 130-131.
40. Whelan, op. cit., p. 27.
41. Id., pp. 108, 109.
42. Confederation Debates, p. 257.
43. Id., p. 263.
44. Whelan, op. cit., p. 248.
45. Id., pp. 90 and 157.
46. Id., p. 158.
47. Id., p. 78.
48. Id., p. 248.
49. Confederation Debates, p. 54.

50. Whelan, op. cit., pp. 205, 206. Brown's speech at Toronto, 1864.
51. Confederation Debates, pp. 263 and 264.
52. Whelan, p. 33.
54. Confederation Debates, pp. 63 and 64.
55. Whelan, p. 56.
56. Id., p. 25.
57. Id., p. 108.
58. Id., p. 47.
59. Id., p. 28.
60. Id., p. 108.
61. Id., pp. 242, 244.
62. Id., pp. 83, 84.

