

URANIUM MINING, PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION AND RESISTANCE IN BAKER
LAKE, NUNAVUT: RECENT CHANGES IN COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVES

By

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ABSTRACT

Historically, the Inuit of Qamani'tuaq (Baker Lake) have expressed strong opposition to uranium mining in their territory, in part due to concerns that it would be detrimental to their harvesting practices. During these struggles, the Inuit of Qamani'tuaq had the support of various Inuit Organizations. The first decade of the 2000s saw the relevant Inuit Organizations change their policies from ones which opposed uranium mining to ones which support it. This thesis is an attempt to understand if Inuit at the community level have changed their opinions about uranium mining and, if so, why. During my time in Qamani'tuaq, it became apparent that the shift in policy has been followed by a gradual change in perspective among some members of the community. While opposition to uranium mining is by no means dead, the seemingly united stance the community previously held has become fragmented. This change is due to a number of factors, including an increased astuteness on the part of the mining industry, certain aspects of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement and ongoing economic dependency upon the market economy.

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ma'na/qujannamiik/thank you

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Qamani'tuaq (Baker Lake) is a settlement situated in the Kivalliq region of Nunavut, close to the geographic centre of Canada. Located in an Arctic Tundra eco-region, Qamani'tuaq is the only inland community in Nunavut. The region, despite being described as “barren” by some visitors, is very much full of life. The Beverly and Qamanirjuaq caribou herds make annual migrations through the region and musk ox, wolverines, foxes, wolves and many species of birds all inhabit the area, at least seasonally. Local lakes and river systems (including the Kazan and Thelon, both Canadian Heritage Rivers) contain a variety of fish. In the short summer months, the tundra is home to wildflowers, berries and other types of vegetation. Most people in Qamani'tuaq are Inuit. Their ancestors lived throughout the northern Kivalliq and most of them relied primarily on the region's caribou herds to satisfy their material needs – a fact which prompted some anthropologists to attach the title “Caribou Eskimo/Inuit” to the people of the area.

Following a somewhat rapid movement of Inuit from the land into the settlement of Qamani'tuaq in the post war period of the twentieth century, the community has been faced with successive waves of activity related to non-renewable resource extraction (primarily mining) in their territory. Due to the negative impact these activities were having (including dispossessing Inuit of their ability to provide for themselves via hunting) and concerns related to the social, economic and health impacts of proposed projects, the Inuit of Qamani'tuaq have historically expressed a great deal of opposition to industrial development on their land, and have undertaken legal and political battles to either cease existing activities or block proposed projects. Some of these struggles have received a great deal of media and scholarly attention, especially a 1979 court case in which Inuit attempted to halt uranium exploration in the region and a plebiscite in

1990 where the vast majority of the community indicated that they opposed a proposal to construct a uranium mine 80 kilometres west of Qamani'tuaq at Kiggavik.

In recent years, it appears as if local attitudes have shifted a great deal. A goldmine (Meadowbank) was constructed north of Qamani'tuaq with minimal resistance, and a new proposal to mine uranium at Kiggavik is being met with little organized opposition. In fact, many of the Inuit Organizations that opposed the Kiggavik proposal twenty years ago now appear to support it. Furthermore, some community members are now actively supporting the proposal while others are now becoming more open to the idea of uranium mining but have yet to formulate a specific stance on the issue. It should be noted that, despite these changes, some community members still vehemently oppose uranium mining in their territory.

This thesis is an attempt to explain why this seemingly drastic change in perspective has taken place. It is based on 25 interviews (as well as numerous informal conversations) I engaged in with Inuit in Qamani'tuaq during January, February and March of 2010. I attempted to include perspectives of youth (over 18), hunters, adult wage workers and Elders in my interviews. Particular attention was also given to people involved in historic opposition movements, people closely involved with consultations regarding the new Kiggavik proposal and local politicians.

The formal interviews were formal in so far as I recorded them with either a voice recorder or pen and paper. With regards to setting and structure they were largely informal. Often conducted in people's homes, at times over a meal of raw caribou, they took a form that I hesitate to label as even semi-structured. I posed general questions about the history of the community, the historical movements which opposed mining in the region, the experience people have had with the Meadowbank gold mine, people's opinions of the contemporary proposal to

mine uranium at Kiggavik, whether or not they feel that community members in general have changed their minds about uranium mining and if so, why. However, to my delight, conversations more often than not went “off topic” and followed tangents that were, at least initially, not a part of my research. These “off topic” discussions provided a means for me to discover what the concerns and interests of the interviewees were, rather than simply gauging their perspectives on issues that were of concern and interest to myself.

In addition to interviews and conversations, I sat in on a number of local meetings regarding the mine. I had the opportunity to observe two community consultation meetings held by the Kivalliq Inuit Association on the topic of the Kiggavik proposal. Also, I attended one consultation meeting between representatives of Areva Resources Inc. (the project proponent for the Kiggavik proposal) and a community group created to help facilitate local involvement in the development of the Kiggavik mine.

I was lucky enough to participate in a number of local social events (including a talent show at the community hall) and “traditional”¹ Inuit activities. People in the community were kind enough to let me tag along on hunting trips, teach me how to sew fur clothing, and tolerate my attempts to “help” them clean and process wolf skins. I developed friendships with many of the Inuit and Qallunaat² who were kind enough to open their homes to me and inconvenience their own lives so I would have a place to sleep and people to keep me company while visiting Nunavut. Many gave me gifts of caribou meat and fish so I could have a healthy diet in a community where it is extremely difficult to rely upon store bought foods alone if one wishes to

¹ I am hesitant to employ the term “traditional” to describe these activities because I feel that it implies that these activities are being carried out for “tradition’s sake” with no relevance to the present.

² Qallunaat is the Inuktitut word for Euro-Canadians

remain healthy. I was, and still am, awestruck by the generous and welcoming attitude I encountered throughout my stay.

My interviews, conversations and observations are supplemented with reports from Nunavut's regulatory boards (many of which contain unedited copies of input from community members) and the analysis of policy documents and court cases. Secondary sources are utilized throughout. A wide variety of academic theory from fields including Native Studies, History, Geography, Anthropology, Sociology and Political Economy is drawn upon throughout this analysis. Beyond helping to explain social phenomena at the community level, the theory which informs my writing helps situate these issues in the context of broader historical and social processes, including those involving domination and exploitation, something which I feel is necessary if many local issues (in Nunavut or elsewhere) are to be addressed in a manner which has any hope of long-term success.

These issues of domination and exploitation are the source of my interest in this topic of study. All of Canada's Aboriginal Peoples, including Inuit, have and continue to be placed in a position of political, economic, cultural and ideological submission relative to the non-Aboriginal re/settler population. At its most fundamental level, this study acknowledges both the colonial history from which the state of Canada was forged and the need for justice and self-determination for Aboriginal Peoples. The conquest was unjust from its beginnings in 1492, and remains unjust in its present forms. From my subject position – I am non-Aboriginal, “white,” middle-class, and I benefit from colonial relationships economically – I have an ethical obligation to ally myself and my work with movements that strive for the decolonization of Aboriginal Peoples.

This ethical responsibility is reinforced by my role as an academic who studies

Aboriginal issues as well as the role of knowledge collection (both scholarly and otherwise) in the colonization of Aboriginal Peoples. In *Orientalism* (1978) Edward Said examines the role of western understandings of the Arab world and their relationships to European imperialism. Acknowledging the political dimensions and implications of academic knowledge that generally understands itself as apolitical, Said argues that the cultural texts of European literary depictions of the Orient – influenced by and influencing western stereotypes – acted alongside military, economic and political rationales to create the imperial relationship between Orient and Occident. Said's highly influential and groundbreaking analysis has subsequently informed various studies of colonialism and imperialism globally. In *Decolonizing Methodologies* (1999) Smith draws from Said to highlight the role of academic research in the process of knowing and dominating the Other in the context of Indigenous communities worldwide. Smith argues that "both the formal scholarly pursuits of knowledge and the informal, imaginative, anecdotal constructions of the Other are intertwined with each other and with the activity of research," and that research is "a significant site of struggle between the interests and ways of knowing of the West and the interests and ways of resisting the Other." (2) In this context, Smith argues for the need for decolonizing methodologies which "address social issues within the wider framework of self-determination, decolonization and social justice." (4)

The fact that the Inuit of Nunavut have achieved, with the passing of the *Nunavut Land Claims Agreement* and *Nunavut Act*, a certain degree of political self determination may prompt people to question whether or not there is any political value in critically examining mining in Nunavut in the present context. Uncertainty regarding the value of a study of this sort – grounded in support for decolonization and focused on mining – may be increased by the fact that many of the provisions of the land claim are allegedly designed to give Inuit greater control

over resource extraction in Nunavut. To some observers, self-determination and justice may appear to have become a reality. However, the limited scope of land claims agreements (as well as other recent developments in the same direction) causes them to fall short of real decolonization. Taiaiake Alfred argues this point.

Newcomer governments claim to be forging historic new relationships with indigenous nations, relationships based on mutual respect, sharing, sovereignty, and our inherent rights. Economic development, modern treaties, self-government, compacts, revenue-sharing, and co-management have become the watchwords of the 'post-colonial' age. But beyond words, is the promise holding?

There have been some improvements. But our reserves are still poor, our governments are still divided and powerless, and our people still suffer. The post-colonial promises cannot ease this pain. The state has shown great skill in shedding the most onerous responsibilities of its rule while holding fast to the lands and authorities that are the foundations of its power. Redefining without reforming, it is letting go of the costly and cumbersome minor features of the colonial relationship and further entrenching in law and practice the real bases of its control. It is ensuring continued access to indigenous lands and resources by insidiously promoting a form of neo-colonial self-government in our communities and forcing our integration into the legal mainstream. Real control remains in the hands of white society because it is still that society's rules that define our life - not through obviously racist laws, but through endless references to the 'market', 'fiscal reality', 'Aboriginal rights', 'and 'public will'. And it is still the white society's needs that are met. (Alfred, 1999:xiii)

COLONIALISM AND CAPITALISM

In a context in which a land claim has been settled and mostly implemented, the role of economics (or for Alfred “the market” and “fiscal realities”) in the continued subjugation of Aboriginal Peoples is particularly noteworthy, due in part to the intricate connections between colonialism and capitalism. The capitalist mode of production has always relied upon colonial domination to satisfy its structural requirements. Indeed, the history of interaction between these two social processes stretches back to the genesis of capitalism in Western Europe. Capitalism – a social process defined by social relations between workers engaging in wage labour (rather

than subsistence production or simple commodity production) for capitalists who own the means of production (resources, technology and the money to pay wages) and accumulate and reinvest profits or surplus value, extracted from the labour power of workers – required an original phase of accumulation to set it into motion. The social conditions in which a large group of people, unable to produce for themselves, were in contact with a smaller group of people who owned the means of production had to be created. This involved both the destruction of previous modes of production to render the masses unable to provide for themselves and the accumulation of a great deal of wealth in the hands of a few. Marx provides an analysis of this process (which he somewhat subversively referred to as “primitive accumulation”) as it took place in Western Europe (particularly England) in the first volume of *Capital*. Marx’s narrative – a response to the peaceful and benign description of primitive accumulation offered by the political economists of his day – focuses on the role of the expropriation of agricultural peasants from the land in Europe, colonialism, the public debt, new forms of taxation and commercial wars in the centralization of wealth in the hands of a few, the creation of a group of workers divorced from the means of production and the construction of markets for capitalist manufactured goods.

While Marx gives attention to the role of colonialism in this process (and identifies colonial processes as often moments of primitive accumulation in and of themselves) he, treats it as but one of numerous factors in the story of the ascendancy of the capitalist mode of production to a position to dominance in Europe. Ultimately, Marx seems to give far more weight to processes internal to Europe in his account of the transition to capitalism. However, while it may have been one of many agents of primitive accumulation, it was no less vital to the entire process. Through colonial tribute, slave labour plantations, coercive monopolies and the theft of land and resources from non-Europe, the European capitalist class was able to amass a

great deal of wealth (Bagchi, 2005:229-242). Jim Blaut (1993) argues that the immense quantity of wealth that was stolen from the Indigenous Peoples of the Americas since the onset of the conquest was "the one basic force that explains the fact that Europe became transformed into a capitalist society." (152) The investment capital and markets required for the industrial revolution, as well as the economic power necessary for the capitalist class to transform European political and legal structures into ones which facilitated capitalist accumulation (a process often termed "bourgeois revolution") would not have been available without European overseas expansion (199-206). In effect, the conquest of the Americas provided the European bourgeoisie with the economic and political power necessary to exert its dominance both in Europe and overseas.

This relationship between the two systems has continued through history, in part due to structural the characteristics of the capitalist economic system. Drawing from Marx's analysis of the capitalist system, David Harvey (2001) argues that, in general, capitalism requires constant economic growth to perpetuate its own existence, with minimal or negative growth generally classified as a recession or depression. Whether or not this growth is achieved is largely contingent upon the ability of the system to access ever larger populations of surplus labour, expand the sphere of the circulation of capital, perpetually increase consumption and incorporate of all forms of production into market exchange. Harvey argues that the capitalist system has historically coped with this systemic issue through constant geographic expansion and intensification.

Capitalism can escape its own contradiction only through expanding. Expansion is simultaneously *intensification* (of social wants and needs, of population totals, and the like) and *geographical extension*. Fresh room for accumulation must exist or be created if capitalism is to survive. (Harvey, 2001:251)

Harvey then argues that this need for growth can manifest itself in a wide variety of ways.

...the development of overseas markets...the attainment of cheaper raw materials...the searching out of a more easily exploited and a more docile labour force...primitive accumulation at the expense of non-capitalist societies...cheating through exchange...the manifestation of monopoly power, expressed through the political organization of a system of nation states...the international division of labour... (Harvey, 2001:262)

Many of these manifestations can, are and were achieved through colonial/imperial means, or in some cases can be understood as neo-colonial processes in and of themselves. Of particular relevance to this study are accessing cheaper raw materials and the primitive accumulation of non-capitalist societies.

The economic history of Canada suggests a general correlation between economic “development,” Canada’s internal colonial treatment of its Aboriginal populations and primitive accumulation in Aboriginal communities. Drawing on the work of Harold Innis, Mel Watkins (1977) states that the economic history of Canada is “a succession of staple exports from successive geographic frontiers to serve the needs of more advanced industrial areas.” (85) The major frontier “staples” which have dominated Canada’s economic realm include fish, fur, timber, lumber, wheat, pulp and paper, minerals and oil and gas. Watkins goes on to argue that the production and export of each of these staples has served the interests of the metropolis, as opposed to the “frontier” regions which include all Inuit territory (85-86).

Each of these “staples” was either extracted from Aboriginal territory or, in the case of agriculture, created through the use of Aboriginal territory. With the exception of instances in which Aboriginal Peoples were a necessary component of the fur trade, all forms of staple production required that Aboriginal Peoples were dispossessed of either their lands or the resources those lands contain (minerals, lumber, fish, timber et cetera). In the cases of agriculture and industrial resource extraction, indigenous economies were often destroyed

through loss of a land base, environmental destruction and other social processes (86). In effect, the economic history of Canada is essentially a history of primitive accumulation from the perspective of Canada's Aboriginal Peoples.

Returning to the specific location of study, the relationship between the geographic extension and intensification of capitalist processes and Canadian Arctic colonialism is equally apparent. Initial interactions between Inuit and people of European descent were for the most part motivated by staple production in the form of commercial whaling and the fur trade. The 1950s-1970s was an era which marked the bluntest, most apparent and most intensive phase of colonial rule in the Arctic. Numerous aspects of Inuit life – including but by no means limited to birthing, child rearing, education, group movement, hunting practices, sexual morality and marriage – were all subject to non-Inuit interference. The motivation for this intensive colonialism and domination had roots, to a certain degree, in capitalist processes, as it largely stemmed from a desire to engage in industrial non-renewable resource extraction in Canada's North.

A capitalist logic underlying the colonial policies which Inuit were subjected to during this time can be determined. This can be difficult, as Inuit policy during this period was largely reactive, and was criticized for lacking a clear vision regarding the role of Inuit in Canada's future and the new wave of industrial "development" that was planned for Inuit lands (Maurie, 2007:30). Competing motivations, ideologies and personalities (discussed briefly in chapter 3) ensured a fragmentary and often contradictory colonial project. However, despite its seemingly incoherent nature, Canadian Inuit policy in this era possessed a logic which can be determined retrospectively – the outcome of state involvement in Nunavut has been the gradual destruction of the harvesting mode of production and its replacement with capitalist social relations (a

process which is by no means complete and described in chapter two).

In addition to providing economic power to capitalists (and through this, the political power imbued in the state apparatus) colonialism has served the interests of capital in other ways. Through his concept of hegemony, Antonio Gramsci (1971) argues that Marxist understandings of society and historical change which narrowly focus on economic explanations – which grow out of a limited interpretation of Marx’s writings and generally see any changes in a society’s political, cultural or ideological “superstructure” as nothing more than a reflection of a change in society’s economic “base” – or on notions of political and military power are ultimately unable to explain historical change nor do they lead to effective revolutionary strategies. Accordingly, Gramsci differentiates between “civil society” and “political society” and explores the role of ideological hegemony in the construction, maintenance and future destruction of the totality of bourgeois dominance.

What we can do...is to fix two major superstructural “levels”: the one that can be called “civil society”, that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called “private”, and that of “political society” or “the State”. These two levels correspond on the one hand to the function of “hegemony” which the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of “direct domination” or command exercised through the State and “juridical” government. (12)

This cultural ideological hegemony over the European and Euro-North American working class enjoyed by the capitalist class has been augmented by colonial processes in a number of ways.

John and Jean Comaroff (1992) argue that colonialism in South Africa served to aid capitalists in their endeavour to exert control over the British working and peasant classes, especially with regards to domesticity, the character of the home and the role of women in the family unit.

...the campaign of the African mission to instill a particular idea of home was only one side of a dialectic of domesticity. The other was the effort by bourgeois reformers to mobilize Africa in the cause of remaking the British underclasses – to hold up the “dark continent” as a negative image with which to devalue its own peasants and proletarians. (285)

In effect, lower class British peoples were encouraged to adopt bourgeoisie cultural norms by drawing comparisons between the “savage” Africans and the “uncivilized” working and labouring classes in a process where colonial myths and images were used to secure hegemony both abroad and at home in England.

While colonialism may have served to reinforce capitalist hegemony in the metropolis, colonized peoples pose a threat to this hegemony in a number of ways. The position of Aboriginal societies relative to the capitalist mode of production and the character of their social relations and world views challenge and threaten the perpetuation of capitalist ideologies. Michael Taussig has argued that humans in western society interpret our cultural form as "natural - 'thing like' and physical" (Taussig, 1980:3); we fail to see the socially constructed reality of our social relations, conceptions of time, et cetera. Taussig goes on to argue that the study of people(s) living at the periphery of the capitalist system (a designation that clearly includes Inuit Elders and hunters) can provide critical insights into the way the dominant society is structured. These insights may challenge and disrupt the reified understanding of capitalist social relations that permeates capitalist society.

In addition to possessing a critical vantage point due to the fact that they are not yet fully incorporated into the capitalist mode of production, many Aboriginal Peoples practice cultures and possess worldviews which make them particularly threatening to capitalist hegemony. Peter Kulchyski (1992) argues that:

While the Native way of life would be associated with the gatherer/hunter mode of production, I would stress that inasmuch as the latter is a form of what Marx and Engels called primitive communism it also contains and embodies "anticipatory tendencies": it points to social relations and practices that are not just different, not just outdated, but possibly emancipatory. Hence the special animosity directed at primitive peoples in thought and action. Hence also the deeply coded strategies of resistance offered up in

response. There is more at stake here than the survival of an "exotic" way of life. At risk is an embodied emancipatory possibility. (174)

While a loss of Aboriginal cultures and worldviews poses the risk of losing emancipatory strategies for those interested in social justice, the perpetuation of those same cultures and worldviews poses a risk to the capitalist class and system at large – exposure to properly functioning egalitarian communities could, and would likely, prompt many people in the metropolis to reconsider the exploitative social organization of their own communities. Notions that capitalism's social relations are somehow an expression of human nature could be negated by the existence of humans living in relatively egalitarian and communal societies. Thus, it is clearly in capital's best interests that colonialism continues, that Indigenous Peoples continue to be dispossessed of their lands, resources and "traditional" livelihoods and that Indigenous cultures and world views continue to be viewed through the lens of discrediting, dehumanizing and racist mythology, due to economic, political and ideological imperatives. This may take political forms that differ from those that are traditionally understood as colonial, but the logic of domination and "progress" must remain.

For these reasons, the context of Nunavut requires an analysis that does not simply study colonial domination or capitalist exploitation as distinct and parallel processes. The intersections between these two processes of domination must be afforded a great deal of attention. Therefore, a study of mining in Nunavut – the latest phase of capitalist expansion into Inuit lands and lives – is necessary for a proper understanding of the manner in which the domination of Inuit continues in a post-land claim era.

MINING AND PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION IN NUNAVUT

Given the largely negative connotations of the word “primitive”, I feel as if I should discuss my use of the term “primitive accumulation” in a Native Studies thesis, not least because the term appears in my title. I find Marx’s concept useful to describe what is going on in Nunavut at this time. It should not be interpreted as an expression of my understanding of Inuit society as “less evolved” or “savage”. Neither should it be understood that I am implying that this is a necessary stage all societies must go through in some grand narrative of human “progress”. This process will, at best, result in Inuit having their resources dispossessed and labour-power exploited by mostly Qallunaat capitalists. It should also be pointed out that my use of this term is intended to be subversive, as it associates the word “primitive” with the activities of colonialists and capitalists. I take some delight in this fact, because I feel that it helps highlight my assertion that Inuit harvesting ways of being and social forms are in many ways more progressive and forward thinking than those lived by capitalist Qallunaat.

The role of mining in primitive accumulation in Nunavut is complex and warrants further theoretical discussion. It is important to note that the rise of the capitalist mode of production in Inuit lives is an ongoing process that involves both the state and capital. Industrial resource extraction represents one of many agents of primitive accumulation operating in the context of Nunavut.

Primitive accumulation is a dual process of both dispossession – of Inuit land, resources and the ability to produce for themselves – and absorption into the labour market. The primary means by which mining dispossesses Inuit is through both the taking of the minerals themselves and the destruction of the gathering and hunting mode of production. While the dispossession of minerals is a straightforward topic and requires little elaboration, the destruction of the

harvesting sector is more complex, and warrants a discussion of both the role that harvesting plays in present-day Qamani'tuaq and the manner in which mining can be antagonistic to these activities.

In 2006, 68% of Inuit adults in Qamani'tuaq reported hunting, 77% reported fishing, 87% reported gathering wild plants and 44% reported trapping in the 12 months prior to the administration of the survey (Statistics Canada, 2006). The most commonly harvested species are caribou and lake trout, with wolf, fox, ptarmigan, geese, arctic char, whitefish and greyling also contributing substantially to harvesting activities (Priest and Usher, 2004:650). These statistics make clear that harvesting continues to provide economic benefits to the Inuit of Qamani'tuaq

The economic value of country food is far greater when the cost of imported foods in Nunavut and the nutritional value of country food are taken into consideration. Due to increased storage and transport costs, prices for market foods are far higher in Nunavut than they are in the south. In some communities in Nunavut, the price of milk is twice that of milk in Southern Canadian cities, while the prices of beef and flour are four times that of beef and flour in Southern Canadian cities (Statistics Canada, 2001:9). Many country foods contain greater concentrations of nutrients than imported foods. For example, caribou meat is a good source of protein, iron, vitamin A and B vitamins, and is lower in fat than farmed meats. Arctic char constitutes an excellent source of protein, iron, calcium, vitamin C, B vitamins, and omega fatty acids (ITK, 2001). Some studies have voiced concerns that a shift from nutrient rich country foods to imported foods that are generally less nutritious will have significant impacts on Inuit health, including an increase in the prevalence of cardio-vascular disease, diabetes and some types of cancer (Sharma et al., 2010:749). Other studies have found a correlation between food

security – “a condition in which all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” (Egeland et al., 2010:243) – and access to country foods in Nunavut (Ford and Bereang-Ford, 2009). Given the high nutritional content of country foods in comparison to their store bought counterparts, as well as the relationship between harvesting activities and food security in the Arctic, a shift from a “mixed” economy to one that is reliant solely upon wage-labour can be seen as a threat to community health and wellbeing.

The economic benefits of harvesting encompass more than a source of nutritious food. Inuit in Qamani'tuaq continue to wear homemade winter clothing, often made at least partially out of fur. Many insist that, given the cold winters of the area, imported clothing is insufficient for the climate of Qamani'tuaq. Furthermore, given the high costs of warm winter clothing, purchasing new clothing for growing children, year after year, is not economically viable for families on a limited income. Harvesting activities also provide some monetary income to hunting families in Qamani'tuaq. Some harvesters hunt and trap wolves, wolverines and foxes and sell their pelts for cash. Others sew caribou skin clothing or create art and carve artworks from the bones and antlers of hunted animals, and then subsequently sell these articles to Qallunaat tourists and transient labourers.

The most obvious and perhaps most important of the impacts mining can have on harvesting economies involves the destruction of the renewable resource base (Arctic wildlife) on which Inuit hunting depends. Some mining projects – as well as the cumulative impacts of numerous projects in one region – may be so destructive that they irreparably destroy wildlife populations. It hardly needs to be stated that if the resources hunting depends upon cease to exist, hunting itself will cease to provide for Inuit.

In addition to the potential destruction of the resource base upon which Inuit hunting depends, there are a variety of other aspects of the industrial wage labour system that give it the potential to undermine the Inuit gathering and hunting mode of production. One way in which capitalist wage-labour systems can be antagonistic to gathering and hunting production systems involves differences in the manner in which goods are distributed throughout society. Prior to movement to settlements, the products of hunting were distributed throughout the Inuit community through a variety of mechanisms. Elders indicate that the role each Inuk had in a hunting party and kinship system dictated how game was distributed following a hunt. In addition to food being distributed according to kinship, Elders indicate that food was shared in general with all other Inuit who were in need. In times of starvation, this willingness to share ensured the survival of not only the immediate camp, but other camps as well. (Bennett and Rowley, 2004:86-91) Despite some changes in systems of distribution, country food is still distributed along kinship lines (Ford and Berrang-Ford, 2009; Wenzel, 1995) and to people in need (Wenzel, 2000). These systems of food distribution serve to reinforce the social relations involved in wildlife harvesting – social relations which are, in turn, critical to the harvesting economy's viability (RCAP, 1996:472).

Capitalist systems of distribution differ greatly from those of gathering and hunting economies. Writing in the context of Dene First Nations Peoples faced with the development of a natural gas pipeline, Michael Asch (1977) has commented on the fact that the manner in which payment is distributed to wage earners and welfare recipients – to individuals rather than to the community in general – is contradictory to Aboriginal methods of distributing resources. Thomas Berger (1988) has commented on the fact that in Dene communities food purchased from the store is not shared through the same kinship systems that harvested food is. These

tendencies to move towards notions of individual private property when faced with capitalist income create obvious problems for hunting systems that rely upon food sharing to remain viable.

Other ways in which wage labour can be antagonistic to the gathering and hunting mode of production have to do with the manner in which capitalist societies conceptualise and operate in space and time, and the ways in which this conflicts with the spatio-temporality of the gathering and hunting mode of production. In *Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference* geographer David Harvey discusses the role of the imposition of capitalist space-time in the colonization of the Americas. Harvey describes the process by which a shift from mobile (what others might refer to as “nomadic”) communities to permanent/centralized settlements, as well as a move from communal/usufructuary to private/commodified notions of property took place (Harvey, 1996:222-223). While Harvey provides an excellent theoretical discussion of this process, his presentation implies that it is a completed dimension of the colonial project. Within the context of Nunavut, this is not the case. Twentieth century colonialism has had a profound impact on the manner in which Inuit society experiences and lives in space and time (a process which I describe in chapter two). However, it has not completely eroded the ways of being associated with the harvesting mode of production.

Mining is a continuation – and in some ways the logical conclusion – of this process of imposing capitalist spatio-temporality on Inuit society at the expense of the proper functioning of the harvesting mode of production. This takes place in a variety of ways. For example, the way capitalist enterprises like mining and exploration companies subdivide and categorize time has many implications for gathering and hunting peoples involved in industrial development. Prior to centralization, the success of Inuit harvesting economies largely relied upon proper adherence

to seasonal cycles, which differed between cultural groups. For example, the Harvaqtuurmiut seasonal cycle involved changes in the spatial distribution and density of hunting camps, changes in species of interest, and a variety of clothing and food preservation processes that were aligned with seasonal cycles and the lifecycle of the caribou. Thriving and surviving were contingent upon completing the necessary tasks at the required times; sufficient amounts of food had to be cached in the fall in preparation for the winter and proper winter clothing had to be sewn at a time when caribou skins were the correct thickness (Webster, 2001).

The cycle of seasonal wage labour for mining exploration camps – involving constant work in the summer and unemployment in the winter – became superimposed over harvesting seasonal cycles for some Inuit, resulting in the inability of Inuit to provide for their families on the land while engaging in wage labour for exploration companies. Qamani'tuaq Elder John Nukik, who worked for exploration companies, explained the contradictions between wage labour jobs and Inuit seasonal cycles, as well as the role of this contradiction in his choice to move to the settlement of Qamani'tuaq.

I would work only during the summer and go back to traditional hunting in the winter. There was once or twice I tried asking 'hey, I want to go back home because I want to catch some caribou and do some caching before the winter sets in', but I was told no. I continued until we got done. I couldn't do any hunting what-so-ever. My grandmother had said, 'hey, because you don't hunt that often and because you're working all summer during the good hunting season you'll have no cache and there will be times when there are no caribou around. Your children, your wife, are all going to become hungry during those times. You'd might as well move to the community.' So I did.

In today's context – one in which the vast majority of Inuit reside permanently in centralized settlements – the temporal constraints of wage labour continue to prove antagonistic to temporal systems related to harvesting pursuits. Wage labour jobs operate on schedules dictated by socially constructed timeframes. Employees show up for work, not when it suits

them or when conditions for work are optimum, but when their watches tell them to. When an employee is working, it is expected that the employee will devote all of his time and energy to his work, despite any opportunities to engage in other personally productive behaviour unrelated to their job that may arise. Gathering and hunting temporality works in a manner which is contradictory to this system. Harvesting pursuits are opportunistic and take place when social and environmental conditions allow. Time is dictated by factors such as weather conditions, ice conditions, and the availability of harvesting companions and wildlife. Furthermore, gathering and hunting notions of time are fluid – if a woman is working with skins outside of a tent on the land and a caribou wanders near, it is unlikely that she will hesitate to grab the spare rifle nearby to shoot the caribou.

It is easy to see how these two systems may create conflict when they interact, with one prominent expression of this antagonism being decreased time available for hunting, and a resultant decrease in overall harvesting activities. When one is working, one is not hunting, regardless of how favourable conditions may be for hunting at that time. Additionally, the contradictory conceptions of time may result in an increase in exposure to hunting related hazards; some Inuit are forced to hunt at times which are appropriate to a wage labour conception of time (weekends and holidays), but which may be inappropriate for harvesting activities due to poor weather conditions (Ford et al, 2006). This fact was expressed by Elder Gamiali Kilukishuk of Pond Inlet at a 2001 Elders conference on climate change:

In the old days, Inuit never used to worry about the weather until the white man came into the North. Then the government herded us into the communities and weather became an enemy to those Inuit who lived in these communities as it collided with their clocks and workdays. (NTI, 2004:24)

Essentially, Inuit now often have to choose between harvesting during dangerous conditions and

simply not harvesting at all.

In addition to imposing conceptions of time which are contradictory to gathering and hunting understandings, capitalist industrial expansion also alters space in a manner which may conflict with the ways in which Inuit utilize space during harvesting pursuits. The infrastructure that is constructed to support extractive activities may be built over pre-existing, gathering and hunting infrastructure including all terrain vehicle trails, boating routes and preferred camping locations. This new infrastructure may impede the use of the area for gathering and hunting purposes, either through physical barriers (for example, fences) or regulating access to the infrastructure itself (as in the case with the road to the Meadowbank gold mine, an issue I discuss in chapter five).

It must be stressed that these contradictions between the spatio-temporal logic of state/capital and that of Inuit harvesting have not, nor will they, completely annihilate Inuit ways of being. These factors antagonize the harvesting mode of production and make harvesting much more difficult. On the other hand, in the present context of Inuit dependence on capitalist commodities for harvesting (including boats, motors, snowmobiles, gas, rifles and bullets) the income earned from wage labour can often enhance a family's ability to engage in harvesting activities. In fact, some of the most active harvesters and their families in Qamani'tuaq are employed full time. Ultimately, Inuit harvesters are creative and look upon adaptability with high regard. Some Elders in Qamani'tuaq stressed the fact that, while harvesting practices may change with wage labour, they will by no means stop altogether, as long as Arctic wildlife is not destroyed. Furthermore, Inuit can and (as I demonstrate in chapter four) are resisting these changes.

It should also be made clear that what is at issue here is not the act of mining itself – the

extraction of minerals from the earth – but rather the way in which this activity is carried out in an industrial capitalist framework. Prior to contact with Europeans, Inuit extracted soapstone for tool production throughout Nunavut (Birket-Smith, 1929), while Inuit in the Kitikmeot region gathered copper for similar purposes, leading to the anthropological label "Copper Eskimos" being applied to them (Jenness, 1970). Tools made from copper, iron and soapstone were also incorporated into an extensive trade economy (Morrison, 1991; Issenman, 1997). Furthermore, soapstone mining continues to be an important part of the contemporary carving economy in Qamani'tuaq. However, the scale of these activities, their impact on wildlife species, the manner in which production is organized and the way returns are distributed varies greatly from industrial capitalist mining.

While mining clearly holds the potential to dispossess Inuit of their harvesting lifestyle, its potential for incorporating Inuit into the wage labour system is less certain. With the exception of the Rankin Inlet Nickel Mine, extractive projects in Nunavut have historically relied primarily on southern, imported labour, as opposed to Inuit labour. Beyond the initial construction of mines (a phase which often relies on local labour) the jobs mining creates are for the most part technical and require a great deal of training. The vast majority of unemployed Inuit historically did not possess the educational qualifications necessary for these positions, an issue that continues to pose problems in the present day. This pattern of dispossession without absorption stands to leave Inuit in an extremely marginalized position – unable to provide for themselves either through traditional economies or through the exploitative wage labour system.

Inuit have consistently resisted the dispossession – both of minerals and of the harvesting economy – that accompanies extractive capitalist endeavours in their territory. The way this resistance is expressed varies greatly between communities, between individuals, and across

time. While Inuit have, up to this point, avoided the forms of strong and militant opposition that have been involved in various First Nations' struggles against capitalist expansion in Canada, they have resisted dispossession by opposing mining in legal and discursive contexts. Examples of the latter type of resistance include the activities of the Baker Lake Concerned Citizens Committee during the Urangschenschaft proposal during the 1980s, while examples of the former include the petitions and court cases initiated by the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada and the Hamlet of Qamani'tuaq in the 1970s. Both examples are discussed in more detail in chapter 2.

In addition to outright opposition, the dispossessive tendencies of capital and extractive activity can be resisted in more subtle ways, which might imply tolerating some mining activity in Nunavut. This form of resistance involves Inuit demanding monetary compensation for minerals taken from their land and a great deal of control over capitalist extractive activities in their region. The latter demand is often an attempt to ensure that these activities operate in a manner which has minimal negative impacts on – and preferably some benefits for – the harvesting economy. This form of resistance is facilitated by many of the mechanisms created by the *Nunavut Land Claims Agreement* (NLCA) and appears to be becoming more popular in the community of Qamani'tuaq as a strategy to combat the negative implications of mining, including the contemporary proposal for the Kiggavik uranium mine.

While Inuit have exhibited a great deal of resistance to the dispossessive processes of primitive accumulation, they have exhibited far less resistance to their incorporation into the wage labour system. Those who choose to live their lives free of capitalist wage work (to whatever extent possible) and support themselves through harvesting endeavours are clearly passively resisting this process, but no form of organized and confrontational resistance has taken place. In fact, Inuit political organizations often express a need for more wage

employment for Inuit, and certain sections of the NLCA attempt to ensure that mines will rely on local labour in the future. This has to be understood in relation to the impacts colonialism has had on local Inuit economies. Rapid population growth has created a situation in which harvesting alone cannot support Nunavut's population. Furthermore, a dependency on imported equipment has rendered Inuit harvesting activities structurally dependent upon the wage labour system; despite the contradictions between the two forms of economic activity, wage labour, or some other form of involvement in the cash economy, is the only way most Inuit can afford the equipment necessary for harvesting pursuits. Given the fact that Inuit currently have few alternatives to earn/access money, they are now reliant upon wage labour for their material well-being, with employment opportunities in short supply.

I have made no effort towards quantifying what amount of people support or oppose the Kiggavik proposal, beyond acknowledging the observation – made by the majority of people with whom I spoke – that a significant number of community members have recently changed their minds and are now more open to uranium mining in the region. Furthermore, I have avoided indicating what percentage of interview subjects agreed upon factors which have influenced this shift in opinion. I have written in this manner for a variety of reasons. The focus of this study, a Master's thesis, was quite limited; the time and resources required to interview every member of the community were unavailable. Even if this was possible, the results would still be of limited academic value, as they would represent nothing more than a snapshot in time. In this context, statistics can tell us very little. While a comprehensive description of the contemporary opinions of the Kiggavik project at the community level are beyond the scope of this research, it remains valuable in as much as it provides insights into the relationships between social, political, economic, legal and historical factors and the contemporary debate surrounding

the Kiggavik proposal.

Due to the fact that academia is a site of struggle between different ways of knowing, and my attempt to ally myself with the colonized, I have sought to incorporate, to the best of my extremely limited abilities, Inuit ways of knowing into the methodological underpinnings of this study. Thus, my choice to avoid quantifying opinions is also related to the manner in which Inuit construct notions of truth and validity with regards to knowledge. Kublu, Laugrand and Oosten (1999) describe the role of Elders' knowledge in Inuit society and the personal and individual nature of this knowledge.

Elders have always been held in high respect in Inuit society. Their knowledge and experience was supposed to guide the younger generations. This knowledge was highly personal and rooted in practice. It would be a mistake to assume that we are dealing with a body of objectified knowledge about which all Elders agreed. Each Elder had his own knowledge and experience and was prepared to acknowledge the value of different opinions and experiences related by others. (9-10)

Given the value many Elders place on considering different perspectives, rather than quantifying perspectives and focusing on what the majority of community members feel, I have attempted to include a discussion of diverse opinions and explanations. In a context where Inuit seem to be gradually coming to accept the idea of a uranium mine near their community, it may appear as if I have given undue weight to dissenting and opposing ideals. While this is largely rooted in my own ideological leanings, it is also influenced by assertions from many Inuit (including many who support the Kiggavik proposal) that perspectives which challenge the mining companies' promises of community and environmental health are being left out of the discussion surrounding uranium mining in Qamani'tuaq as well as other communities in the Kivalliq. My hope is that my work will, in some small way, help fill this void.

Throughout this thesis I have made attempts to identify the people who have been kind

enough to share with me their knowledge, thoughts, insights and stories regarding my academic interests, and attach their names to quotes they have provided me with in interview settings.

Primarily, this stems from the fact that they deserve at least as much (and perhaps more) recognition for their contribution to this study as the scholarly sources the conventions of academia require me to cite. However, attributing specific information and opinions to the people who shared them with me is also desirable due to the individual and variable nature of Inuit Knowledge. Regarding this issue, Kublu, Laugrand and Oosten (1999) state:

Variation is an essential characteristic of the knowledge of the Elders. As each one has his or her own knowledge, it is absolutely essential that this knowledge is seen as related only to that particular Elder. Once the source, more specifically the name of the Elder, is lost, the knowledge loses its roots and becomes devoid of much value to most Inuit. It is essential, therefore, that in the presentation of these interviews we indicate exactly which Elder made which statement. (10)

While I began with the goal of attributing information to the Inuit who shared it with me, this was often not possible. The discussion surrounding the Kiggavik mine in Qamani'tuaq remains highly controversial, prompting many to request that their names not appear in my writing.

Some felt that the opinions and perspectives they shared with me may have negative implications for their professional careers or social standing in the community. Others (especially young adults and middle aged adults) felt that it was more important to cite names of Elders and that due to their more general understanding of Inuit culture and contemporary political issues, identifying themselves in my writing would hold little value. As a result, many quotations and opinions are either categorized as anonymous, or have no reference. In all cases where information is presented without reference to the community member who provided it to me, this has been done at the request of the community member in question.

The remainder of this thesis is separated into five chapters. Chapter two describes the

history of the community, the first half of which focuses on the manner in which Canadian colonialism and capitalist mining has contributed towards the ongoing process of primitive accumulation. The second half of chapter two focuses on Inuit resistance to the dispossessive aspects of mining, prior to the signing of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement. Chapter three is largely an analysis of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, particularly the aspects of it which provide Inuit with mechanisms to resist the dispossessive tendencies of mining activity in Nunavut. Chapter four discusses the recent proposal to mine the Kiggavik ore body and the perspectives that various governing bodies, public figures and the Inuit of Qamani'tuaq have of the proposal. Chapter five is an attempt to account for the shifts of opinion in the Inuit leadership and at the community level in Qamani'tuaq, and focuses on the public relations campaigns undertaken by mining companies, the capitalist nature of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement and the context of economic dependence caused by state colonialism (and perpetuated by later neglect) that exists in Qamani'tuaq. Chapter six explores the implications of my discoveries in previous chapters, especially the ongoing process of capital relying upon colonialism to find new sources of profit, the likelihood of the Kiggavik mine contributing towards a perpetuation of the colonial relationship between Southern Canada and Nunavut and the fact that (when socio-economic and environmental impacts are considered) the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement contains an internal antagonism – it both provides mechanisms for Inuit to resist dispossession and seek justice, while at the same time ties them into an economic order that will continue to result in further dispossession.

CHAPTER 2: HISTORY

The ancestors of the Inuit of Qamani'tuaq were – prior to the movement to a centralized settlement – spread throughout the Kivalliq region and relying upon a variety of subsistence strategies. Anthropologists and Inuit Elders often classify Inuit of this era as belonging to one or another group or band, associated with particular locations, dialects and economic activities. For example, the Qairnirmiut occupied the territory ranging from Rankin Inlet to Qamani'tuaq, and employed a seasonal cycle which shifted between inland caribou hunting and marine-based sealing. Other groups, such as the Harvaqtuurmiut, remained inland year-round and depended almost solely on caribou for food and clothing. The Elders with whom I spoke identified varying numbers of groups from which the present population of Qamani'tuaq has descended. Some studies have identified as many as nine primary groups – Qairnirmiut, Hauniqturmiut, Harvaqtuurmiut, Padlirmiut, Akilinirmiut, Ukkuhiksalingmiut, Iluiliqmiut, Kihlirmiut, and Haningayuqmiut (Webster, 2001:14).

Some of these groups, most notably the Qairnirmiut, became involved in the European and American whaling industry in the 19th century. Some Inuit were employed directly as labourers in whaling crews, while others acted as middlemen in the trade of furs and carvings for manufactured goods between whalers and Inuit groups with more strictly inland orientated economic systems (Fossett, 2001:184-189). Although Inuit throughout the Kivalliq had sporadic interactions with Qallunaat explorers and traders and began to use European trade goods as early as the 18th century, it was not until 1913 that a permanent non-Inuit presence was established at Qamani'tuaq when the Hudson's Bay Company, eager to profit from the Arctic fox pelts available in the region, established a post. The Hudson's Bay Company was quickly followed by Anglican and Catholic Missionaries, with missionaries first arriving in the early 1920s and

permanent missions being established by 1929 and 1931 respectively. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), having been active in the region since the early 1920s, established a permanent station at the current location of the settlement of Qamani'tuaq in 1931. (Vallee, 1967:24-25).

These Qallunaat colonial agents had a substantial impact on Inuit lifestyles. During the 1920s the Inuit economy shifted its focus from primarily hunting to intensive trapping, resulting in Inuit becoming dependent upon the trade goods made available by fur traders. Vallee reports that, by the late 1950s, rifles had replaced spears, lances and bows and arrows, while caribou skin clothing had been, to a degree, replaced by clothing made of imported fabric. The use of some "traditional" implements such as wooden dog-sleds, hand fish lines and fish spears continued at this time. Furthermore, from the early 1930s onwards, missionaries were converting Inuit to Christianity in increasingly numbers, with pre-colonial shamanic activities, drumming, dancing and songs declining rapidly (Vallee, 1967:25-32). For Vallee this was indicative of an overall decline in Inuit culture; although he does concede that Inuit world views and the Inuktitut language remained intact, and that Inuit understandings of Christianity likely differed substantially from Qallunaat understandings of the church, his writings focus far more strongly on discontinuity than continuity.

This lack of attention to continuity is challenged by many subsequent writings on Canadian colonialism and Aboriginal Peoples. For example, despite a growing dependence upon foreign goods, the manner in which Inuit economic activities took place during the fur trade did not prompt a radical departure from either pre-colonial Inuit social relationships, relationships with land and resources or worldviews. Mel Watkins (1977) describes the minimal alterations in the relationship Aboriginal Peoples had with their lands and resources as a result of the fur trade.

The persecution of the fur trade depended, at least initially in each region into which the trade extended, on the Indian as fur-gatherer. As such the Indian was a commodity producer, not a wage-earner, and the fur trade was literally a trade, or a commercial activity, not an industrial activity...neither his labour-time nor his land had to become themselves marketable commodities. (87)

Some of the Elders I interviewed discussed the transition to Qallunaat technology during the fur trade era. Rather than indicating some form of departure from Inuit economic and social activities, they described the adoption of western technology at this point as a development which simply made Inuit economic and social activities easier.

Some of the implements that we used to use...when we were growing up, there were no such things as rifles and canoes. So therefore bows and arrows and spears were used because those were all we had to harvest. Dog teams were used because that's all we had, and kayaks were used during the summer because that's all we had. Then once rifles came in it was easier to use the rifles, and then boats came in and they replaced the kayak. (Jacob Ikinilik)

Oosten, Laugrand and Remie (2006) argue that, despite the fact that many Western observers assumed that adopting aspects of Qallunaat culture and technology meant that a parallel decline in Inuit culture and worldviews was taking place, Inuit were merely incorporating aspects of Qallunaat culture into their own cultural traditions.

For Western observers the acceptance of Western culture implied the loss of Inuit culture, and the adoption of foreign technology, clothing, and housing was considered proof of the Inuit's decline. They did not consider the possibility that the Inuit were incorporating and integrating this technology, and even Western religion, into their own cultural traditions. (447)

Oosten, Laugrand and Remie also argue that the decline of specific cultural practices – like shamanic rituals and persons identifying themselves as shamans – was also not indicative of a decline in Inuit culture or worldviews.

Shamanic traditions were embedded in a wider cosmological framework that still operates. This cosmological framework concerns a wide range of features such as respect for animals, the beliefs in *tarniit* (shades, souls), *tuurngait*, nonhuman beings (such as *ijirait* [caribou-people] and *tuniit* [people who inhabited the land before the Inuit]), the Inuit

naming system, the sharing of country food, the need to communicate or confess transgressions or exceptional experiences, tirigususiit (the following of old rules and taboos), ritual injunctions, and many other features, all of which play a part in modern Inuit society. (471)

While the Inuit transition to Christianity was not a topic that came up during the interviews I conducted, several of my experiences indicate that for Inuit a strong dedication to Christianity did not and does not represent a refutation of Inuit culture and world views. Early on in my time in Qamani'tuaq I met a female Inuit Elder outside of her house. She called me over to introduce herself and to ask who I was and what I was doing in town. Over a cigarette she explained to me how strong her personal dedication to a local church and Christianity in general were. A number of days later, she invited me into her home for a cup of tea. Once inside, I met one of her grandchildren who was eating in a fashion which I will describe as quite eagerly (although, this is, a vast understatement). The Elder then indicated to me that the reason her granddaughter was eating so much was that she had been named after an Elder that died in a famine out on the land. Through the name of the deceased famine victim, her granddaughter had inherited some aspects of the former's personality, including, in this case, a constant hunger brought about by hard times. During another visit, while teaching me how to clean and prepare wolf skins and allowing me to "help" her with her work, she described the role of dreams in her understanding of reality. On other occasions, she discussed the strong imperative she felt to respect and protect animals, which she indicated were rooted in Inuit worldviews. It is also important to note that her family still relied very strongly on country food and spent a great deal of time hunting and trapping and used winter clothing that her and her daughter-in-law sewed at home. Clearly, despite her extreme dedication to Christianity, Jesus and the Church, this woman still possessed a cosmological understanding that was distinctly Inuit.

The presence of Qallunaat also brought about some changes to Inuit population patterns, as some Inuit gravitated towards the settlement of Qamani'tuaq and found employment with the Qallunaat inhabitants of the settlement (Vallee, 1967:136). Other groups were drawn to points of non-Inuit activity at other locations – for example, the Inuit of Gary Lake altered their seasonal migratory cycles in order to remain close to a Roman Catholic mission located on an island in Gary Lake, while, further to the south, Inuit near Ennadai Lake settled near a fur trading post and then a military radio station. The presence of non-Inuit provided material incentives for Inuit to centralize in the form of readily available “relief” or welfare. This shift from a nomadic to somewhat settled existence served to limit the ability of some groups to provide for themselves via wildlife harvesting alone – relief became an integral economic input for land-based Inuit (Tester and Kulchyski, 1994:239).

Another wave of colonial actors entered the region in the 1950s. Welfare officers, social workers, teachers and Northern Service Officers (NSOs) joined the traders, police officers and missionaries. This new phase of colonialism was motivated by a perceived need to help Inuit overcome economic hardships, interest in exploiting the north's mineral resources and, more than anything else, notions of progress, development and civilization (or, more correctly, assimilation) (Tester and Kulchyski, 1994:327).

This wave of colonialism was also far more intensive than previous expansions into the Arctic. Qallunaat came to play an increasingly large role in all aspects of Inuit life as colonial agents sought to alter Inuit values and behaviour into forms which were consistent with western ideals. Vallee describes this process, referring to the colonial and paternalistic process of altering Inuit culture as “socialization.”

...we can say that nearly all Kabloona in the Baker Lake region assume the role of

socializer vis-a-vis the Eskimos there. With the exception of a few individuals who are not directly involved in Eskimo affairs, every Kabloona encountered feels impelled to change at least some of the features of Eskimo behaviour and bring them into line with his or her conception of the desirable person. (Vallee, :129)

While Many of the Qallunaat in the community were explicitly attempting to alter Inuit behaviour and values due to the nature of their jobs (for example, teachers, missionaries and RCMP officers) Vallee notes that this paternalistic attitude towards Inuit was also present in other Qallunaat – for example, HBC personnel and the spouses of Qallunaat who filled more explicitly assimilatory positions. Vallee identifies the justification of this paternalistic relationship as the widely held – but, Vallee notes, incorrect – assumptions that Inuit were child-like and that Inuit culture was at an early stage of development in comparison to Western society (129).

The motivations, strategies and methods of the wide range of colonial bodies present by this point were often at odds with one another. One of the most obvious examples of this lies in conflicting attitudes towards relief and Inuit land use patterns, and is illustrated in the example of the Gary Lake Mission. Missionaries utilized relief and Inuit centralization around the mission to encourage conversion to Christianity (Tester and Kulchyski, 1994:242). This conflicted with the goals and strategies of the RCMP, who discouraged the issuance of relief and encouraged Inuit to remain dispersed throughout the land, due to a perceived need to avoid Inuit dependence on government aid. The HBC was in an interesting position – while centralization would impede the ability of Inuit to trap effectively (and therefore diminish profits), the issuance of food relief could free Inuit from commitments to hunt caribou and provide food, allowing them to spend more time tending their trap lines and contributing to the company's bottom line (247-248).

The late 1950s brought on a period of economic hardship for the Inuit of this region.

Trade goods, now an integral aspect of the Inuit hunting economy, were increasingly difficult to acquire due to the collapse of the price of Arctic fox following the Second World War (Tester and Kulchyski, 1994:98). Furthermore, the basis of Inuit hunting in the region – migratory caribou herds whose ranges extend from the tundra of the northern Kivalliq in the summer to the forests of northern Manitoba and Saskatchewan in the winter – failed to come to the region in sufficiently large numbers³. These economic changes, coupled with delayed and contradictory responses on the part of colonial institutions, resulted in a number of starvations throughout the region, some of which received a great deal of public attention in southern Canada (see Mowatt, 1959). The state's response to these starvations involved relocating some groups to the settlement of Qamani'tuaq, including the Inuit of the Gary Lake region (Tester and Kulchyski, 1994:238-239).

By the late 1960s, the majority of the Inuit in the region had relocated to the settlement of Qamani'tuaq and began to reside in southern-style housing. In *Arctic Migrants/Arctic Villagers*, David Damas describes this process, painting a picture of a relatively benign and voluntary migration of Inuit from the land to the settlement. Relying primarily on archival research, Damas argues that this movement was motivated by declines in caribou harvests and the fact that the state had shifted from a policy of dispersal – wherein Inuit were encouraged to remain in dispersed hunting camps on the land – to a policy of centralization where movement to the community was facilitated through the construction of new houses for Inuit (Damas, 2002:169). While processes of relocation described by Kulchyski and Tester clearly played a role in this movement, Damas argues its role was minor when compared to that of voluntary migration (192-

³ The cause of the failure of the Caribou herds to provide for Inuit during this time period is a topic of some debate. While Qallunaat scientists assumed that the herds were declining due to overhunting on the part of Inuit, Inuit Elders believe, to this day, that the Caribou had simply changed their migration routes.

194).

The Inuit memory of the movement to the settlement seems to be far less benign than Damas characterizes it, with some Elders drawing attention to state actions which they felt coerced them to move to the settlement. While the Elders whom I interviewed had varying reasons for moving to the settlement – ranging from marriage to an Inuk who was already living in town, to simply moving to town because everyone else was leaving their traditional lands – most associated the movement to town with the opening of a Federal Day School in Qamani'tuaq in 1957. Although attendance at the school was technically voluntary, Elders described a power dynamic in which they were unable to refuse to send their children to school. Many Inuit described a general inability to "talk back" to the Qallunaat "bosses" during this era due to feelings of intimidation. Hugh Brody (1975) discusses this issue at length, attributing it to a variety of factors. Principle among these factors is a type of fear that corresponds to the Inuktitut term *ilira* – "...the feeling of nervous awe that comes from being at an irreversible disadvantage, a situation in which one cannot modify or control the actions of another; it can also describe unpredictability – one is *ilira* of a person whose actions cannot be predicted, nor understood." (178) Thus, for Brody, *ilira* towards Qallunaat was based in the imbalance of power that existed between Inuit and Qallunaat – Inuit realized they were dependent upon colonizers in many ways, especially with regards to trade goods and social assistance. As a result, many Inuit worried that Qallunaat would withdraw from the Arctic if Inuit did not cooperate with them. This issue was compounded by other factors; from the perspective of Inuit, Qallunaat were (and are) easily angered and bad at taking criticism. Furthermore, Inuit felt self conscious over a variety of Inuit cultural traits which Qallunaat often associate with savagery and poor hygiene. Dietary practices serve as Brody's primary example of this. The consumption of raw meat – "an important trait of

Inuit self identification” (182) – as well as tendencies to eat at times which Qallunaat deem irregular and in ways which Qallunaat view as odd (for example, sitting on the floor around an animal carcass rather than seated at a dinner table) were all sources of anxiety for Inuit when in the presence of Qallunaat. As a result, Inuit generally avoided confrontation with colonial officials and opted to cooperate with their wishes. (175-185).

Notions of intimidation were magnified by the fact that some Qallunaat officials utilized the fear Inuit had towards them to help them achieve the goals assigned to them by the colonial system. Silas Aittuaq described the Qallunaat reliance upon fear and intimidation to ensure that their wishes were satisfied with a description of an interaction between himself and a local RCMP officer.

During the famine when there were no caribou, we had been in town for a bit. Even though there were people being moved in because of the famine, an RCMP officer told me to leave town and go to Gary Lakes. I asked if I have no food, no shells to shoot wildlife...and at the same time the RCMP had told me that if I didn't reach Gary Lakes, he was going to shoot me! That's why I said intimidation. The RCMP provided me with some travelling food and some shells. We stayed at Gary Lakes for about four months, looking for fish. We couldn't even catch fish to try and live on. It was April, May, June, July that we stayed up there. In August, we came back. As we came back to town, the RCMP officer who said he was going to shoot me was being sent south. Even though I didn't say a word about it, he was being sent south. (Silas Aittuaq)

While the majority of Qallunaat in Qamani'tuaq at this time likely did not conduct themselves in as unfavourable a manner, the actions of some overzealous and authoritarian Euro-Canadians likely served to perpetuate the intimidating image of Qallunaat.

The role of unequal power dynamics and intimidation in the movement of children to the school in Qamani'tuaq was furthered by colonial officials threatening to withhold family allowance payments – income that was, by this time, necessary for survival – if parents failed to enrol their children in school programs. Qamani'tuaq Elder Jacob Ikinilik stated,

We were intimidated at the time too, back then, by whites. And so we always felt intimidated. Another thing too, we were told that if our children didn't go to school, we wouldn't receive a penny if they don't go to school. If our children don't go to school, we won't receive welfare. And there we were, hungry. And we were told, your children don't go to school, you won't get your welfare. So it was either one thing or another. It was intimidation back then. (Jacob Ikinilik)

Many of today's Elders came to the community when they themselves were sent to school.

Additionally, in response to compulsory schooling, many Inuit began to move permanently to the settlement of Qamani'tuaq in order to be with their children year round, something they viewed as necessary for the proper development of their children.

What had happened was the first time our oldest daughter went to school, she moved here but we didn't. But the second time she had to come into town, we decided it would be better to have family there, so we moved into town. My wife stuck around for the kids, and the rest of the time I was out hunting year round, in and out, so that we'd have traditional food. (Silas Aiuttauq)

Matthew Kunangnat, who had no children of his own when he migrated to the settlement and reported moving into town because everyone else was leaving the area, still identified the root cause of his migration as the compulsory education of Inuit children, stating, "It was when children were being gathered together for formal education that people started moving in. We were some of the last in that area to move into town."

This characterization of events poses serious challenges for Damas' argument. It is difficult to describe this movement as entirely voluntary, given the obvious coercive actions of colonial officials, and the impoverished conditions under which Inuit lived during this period – the “option” to stay on the land and starve due to a lack of ammunition and other supplies to hunt with can hardly be described as an option at all. His characterization of the role of relocations in the process as minimal is equally problematic; the coerced movement of children to the settlement in the name of schooling clearly classifies as a form of population relocation and

should be understood as such. While many Inuit may have moved to town voluntarily, the role of coercive state actions in migration must be taken into consideration.

The school system has had a substantial impact upon Inuit, and warrants some discussion. While Inuit attended elementary school at a day school in Qamani'tuaq, they were sent elsewhere, first to Churchill and later to Yellowknife, to attend high school until sometime in the 1980s. In general, this system was built upon a logic of assimilation. First and foremost, the curriculum was focused on skills necessary to enter the wage labour market, as opposed to the skills necessary for hunting pursuits. The teaching style was also distinctly Qallunaat – rather than learning through observation and imitation, students in a classroom listen, record notes and regurgitate. Some Inuit commented that this style of teaching continues to pose difficulties for Inuit in the school system. Additionally, children were spatially removed from their families and cultures during high school, preventing them from regularly practicing Inuktitut or learning land based skills from their parents. The schedule of Qallunaat schooling also raised issues of temporality for Inuit attempting to teach land based skills to their descendants. Some Elders complained that their children and grandchildren have a fragmented understanding of Inuit culture due to the school's schedule – many children have gained skills necessary to harvest during times that coincide with school holidays (for example, during the summer months) but lack land based skills that are necessary during other times of year (such as early spring or late fall). The current dialogue surrounding the residential schooling of Aboriginal Peoples in Canada focuses a great deal on the physical, sexual and emotional abuse Aboriginal children suffered at the hands of school staff. This is a topic which I did not approach during my interviews, primarily because my time with each interview subject was relatively short and the focus of my research was mining, not schooling. I learnt few details about any abuse that took

place in the school system. However, some Elders I spoke with did make broad and general comments regarding abuse and the profound psychological impact it had on them – at times leading to suicidal and self destructive thoughts. This is an issue with a great deal of relevance to the Inuit of Qamani'tuaq and clearly requires further research.

While schooling had dramatic cultural, social and psychological implications for Inuit, the impacts of a shift from dispersed camps to a centralized settlement (motivated by compulsory schooling) on Inuit life were likewise immense. Maintaining a gathering and hunting economy from a centralized location in the Kivalliq is incredibly difficult. William Noah drew my attention to the fact that caribou is a very difficult resource to rely upon from a centralized location – caribou often change their migrations routes, and at times fail to come close to the settlement. The mobility associated with life on the land compensated for this issue, as Inuit could modify their seasonal movements to ensure they had consistent access to wildlife. However, ties to the community, including work, school and social commitments, make it difficult to travel great distances to hunt. As a result, caribou is a resource that cannot be relied upon consistently for the sustenance of the community. This is an issue which is likely heavily influenced by the geographic setting of Qamani'tuaq; the community is the only settlement in Nunavut to be located inland, and the only one which has such a limited diversity of species upon which to base a harvesting economy. Coastal communities have the opportunity to make use of a wide variety of sea mammals in addition to caribou and fish, providing them with alternatives if one species fails to migrate near the community or experiences a population decline.

A dependence upon capitalist commodities, which began with interaction with capitalist whaling and fur trading enterprises, was accelerated greatly by the movement to the settlement.

Dog teams, still a primary means of transportation prior to settlement life, became relatively obsolete. Elders in Qamani'tuaq highlighted the difficulties associated with the maintenance of a useful dog team from a centralized location.

Once you're in a community it is really hard to keep dogs as dog teams. It is almost impossible. Both their exercise and their food [are difficult to provide]. When you're using them all the time they learn a whole lot. When you haven't used your dogs in a while, they get to the point where they've forgotten what they'd learned. You've got to keep on using them. Just keep on using them and they'll keep the knowledge. (John Nukik)

Back in the 50s, 60s and 70s, caribou were never close to the community so therefore it became harder to find feed for dogs. And then, if they wanted to keep their dogteams they'd have to travel miles and miles just to find food for the dogs. (Jacob Ikinilik)

Some Elders explicitly associated these difficulties with the shift from sled dogs to snowmobiles.

Back then dog teams were the only source of travel during the winter. In the summer, we'd walk. It was easier to feed them [the dogs] because you were out there where the source of food was. When you move to the community it became a little harder to find feed for the dogs, and then the snowmobiles came in. It became easier. Because you're in town and not out there hunting all the time as you used to...the feed for dogs became a lot harder [to acquire] when you moved into town. Because of it, we started losing our dogs and teams and snowmobiles eventually took over. (Jacob Ikinilik)

Inuit were also placed in a new political context when they moved permanently to Qamani'tuaq; the shift to settlement life was accompanied by an increase in non-Inuit control over Inuit affairs. The power imbalance that existed between Inuit and Qallunaat was magnified as a result of the increased Inuit dependency on manufactured goods, as well as the divergent roles Inuit and non-Inuit played in community affairs.

The role system in the Baker Lake region accentuates the difference between the Kabloona and the Eskimos in terms of the distribution of power. No Eskimo is in a position to give orders to a Kabloona. No Kabloona needs to get the sanction of an Eskimo in order to receive purchasing power in the form of wages, relief, or credit. Hiring, firing, giving, teaching, commanding – all of the functions which put a person or a group 'one-up' over another person or group in the power market are Kabloona prerogatives. (Vallee, 1967:197)

This "role system," combined with the more generalized power Qallunaat held over Inuit

described by Brody, resulted in a situation where Inuit had little control over their lives once the movement to the settlement was complete.

The state made several attempts to address the increasing levels of economic dependence that had become widespread in the Canadian Arctic. Initial attempts included increases in social assistance payments and attempts to develop small industries (like hog and fox farming), most of which failed (Mitchell, 1995:149). Attempts to increase simple commodity production were far more successful, and Inuit art and handicrafts, especially soapstone carving, became profitable economic ventures for many Inuit (166). One of the Elders I interviewed indicated that he was able to purchase a snowmobile in the early 1970s from income earned solely from carving. Many Inuit in Qamani'tuaq continue to derive part of their income from carving and other handicraft production.

While the above-mentioned methods of address Inuit economic dependence had a variety of implications for Inuit, more relevant to this study was a push to develop Canada's North via industrial resource extraction. This understanding of the role of Canada's North as an undeveloped and uncivilized resource frontier was embodied in the Diefenbaker government's "Road to Resources" program. This program was based upon the assumption that providing infrastructure to facilitate the commencement of resource exploration and extraction projects in the North would result in positive changes in the living conditions experienced in the Arctic (as well as economic growth for Canada in general).

While the area which now makes up Nunavut was not home to any of the Diefenbaker government's infrastructural projects, the region and the Inuit who inhabit it was still subjected to a great deal of activity related to the mining industry. The first experience Inuit from Qamani'tuaq recalled related to mining came from the North Rankin Nickel Mine, located in

Rankin Inlet. The mine was constructed in 1956, and produced Nickel from 1957 until its closure in 1962. For pragmatic reasons, the mine relied a great deal upon Inuit labour, with the government aiding in recruiting Inuit workers and transporting them to the mine site by boat or aircraft. The majority of Inuit who were employed at the mine were from Chesterfield Inlet, Arviat and Repulse Bay, although a small percentage of the workers originated in the Qamani'tuaq area (McPherson, 2003:7-9). Unfortunately, I was unable to interview anyone who had worked at the mine.

While the mine introduced Inuit to a money economy, it failed to substantially improve the economic stability and quality of life for many of its workers. Furthermore, it had a variety of social implications for Inuit. The relocation of Inuit from differing regions resulted in some level of tension between the various groups who found themselves in Rankin Inlet. Inuit employees also tended to abandon pre-colonial harvesting implements and other items, especially the dogsled and fur clothing, resulting in greater dependence on a wage economy. This further reliance on imported food and clothing diminished the role of Inuit women in economic life, as they were no longer required to produce clothing or prepare food (11-15). Following the mine's closure, many Inuit remained in Rankin Inlet, while others were relocated to mining projects in Ungava, Quebec and Lynn Lake, Manitoba or moved to other settlements in Nunavut.

Perhaps more relevant to the current inhabitants of Qamani'tuaq was a dramatic increase in exploration activity in the area surrounding Qamani'tuaq in the late 1960s. Although some small amounts of geological surveying had taken place prior to World War Two, it was short lived and had a minimal impact on Inuit lives – most of the Inuit Elders I spoke with indicated that they did not become aware of mineral exploration in their territory until much later. In 1968

an increase in the market value of uranium sparked an exploration boom in the Thelon basin, (McPherson, 2003:145). At this point, despite having a limited understanding of what exploration crews were looking for and the English language, Inuit became increasingly aware of the presence of prospectors, with some Inuit becoming employed by exploration crews.

Once we got to the camp we started helping out. I remember, back then they were understood as 'people who are looking for something.' I remember back then you didn't make much money off them. I was later told that since I was in contact with them, I was to work with the prospectors from July until then end of September, and that's what I did. I did work for them; I did work with them, even though I didn't understand them. There were no interpreters at the time. It was only through hand communication, hand gestures and stuff like that. Their system of hand gestures, compared to the Inuit, are completely different. So again, that was a new learning experience for me. (John Nukik)

During the time when the houses were being built, a number of the older kids and adults were employed building these houses...When housing slowed down...a few of the younger people had at least summer jobs helping the prospectors, using Geiger counters. One of the companies that I had worked for was West End Mine...It was enjoyable work, but you get tiered of wandering around aimlessly...I didn't even know what they were looking for...At the time I was working I wasn't really too concerned...never really thought of asking what it was we were looking for (Anonymous Elder: Male)

I remember them, especially when I was living around the Kazan River area, when the choppers were being used, the old helicopters, flying back and forth over us. It was around there, around the Kazan that my memory really starts. At the time I didn't even know who or what they were doing. All we knew was that they were around and we didn't even know they were mining prospectors and prospecting for what they really want. Back then, nobody really knew. (Matthew Kunnangnat)

Initially, this increased exploration activity drew limited concern from Inuit. However, as the presence of prospectors increased over time, the environmental impact of their activities became progressively more extensive. The Inuit memory of exploration during this era is marked by pollution and disturbance to wildlife. William Noah explained to me that in the 1970s, exploration activities were carried out in a far different manner than they currently are. He cited the fact that a great deal of garbage (especially fuel barrels) was left on the land, and that low flying aircraft and noise from drilling were scaring away caribou herds, which made

hunting quite difficult. These complaints were echoed by other Elders.

The other concern was that Caribou migrated in full herds until the mining companies were all over the place, that's what started breaking up the big full herds into smaller herds and that became a part of the concern. What we considered a big herd is not what it is today. When people today say that there's a big herd, it's just a small portion of what a big herd used to be...some of the caribou migration routes have also changed because of the mining companies. Mining companies back then left all kinds of garbage out there...some old freezers, old barrels and stuff like that. (Irene Kallurak)

As a result of an increasingly centralized population, inescapable interactions with a colonial bureaucracy and the negative impact of mineral exploration crews, Inuit found themselves in a situation where previous forms of leadership and decision making became, in some regards, insufficient. Qallunaat officials and mining companies paid little heed to the values, aspirations, opinions and advice of the Inuit whose lives were being affected by their actions. Inuit were rarely consulted when decisions were being made and many Qallunaat in the community during this period generally assumed that discussing issues with Inuit would have constituted a waste of time. If Inuit were involved in discussions, according to Qallunaat logic of the time, they would always elect to do whatever the Qallunaat suggested anyways.

The response to these issues included the formation of numerous Inuit organizations at the local, territorial, national and international levels. In the context of Qamani'tuaq, the first Inuit experience with this form of political organization came with the formation of the Baker Lake Eskimo Council in 1957. Organized by Doug Wilkinson, the community Northern Service Officer (NSO), the council acted as an advisory body to the NSO, providing space for Inuit views to be expressed and allowing Inuit to take some control over their own affairs (Kulchyski and Tester, 2007:205). The Baker Lake council also served to demonstrate that the assumption that Inuit had little to contribute to community decision making was quite clearly false – state agents merely routinely neglected or refused to engage in dialogues with Inuit in any meaningful

fashion.

In the context of the times, this council was an extraordinary development. It illustrated that Inuit were prepared to speak up about problems, to offer solutions, to participate in planning, to question officials, to take part in forms of democratic decision making different from those embedded in their own culture. With careful preparation, they were eager for the opportunity to do so. That so little consultation took place, that Inuit voices were paid such little attention, often begrudged, was not due to a lack of interest or ability among Inuit. In the right circumstances, where they would be heard, they were happy to speak. They had important, insightful things to say. For the most part, though, no one really wanted to hear them, so there was little reason to speak. (Kulchyski and Tester, 2007:238)

This experience with western-style decision making was followed by the genesis of a dizzying array of Inuit political organizations. At the local level, the provision of Hamlet status resulted in the election of hamlet councils and mayors to handle municipal issues, while other community-based organizations representing specific Inuit interests – such as Hunters and Trappers Organizations – were created. At the national level, the Inuit Tarpirisat of Canada (now Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami) was created in 1971 to represent Inuit interests. The Inuit Circumpolar Conference was created in 1977, representing Inuit from Greenland, Canada and Alaska, as well as Yupik from Alaska and Russia.

The creation of these organizations provided Inuit with the means to engage both exploration companies and the Canadian state in political and legal contexts; new avenues for resistance to the dispossessive impacts of both the state and industry were taking shape. For the most part, resistance to the impacts of mining in the Qamani'tuaq region at this time was characterized by legal opposition; a series of petitions and court cases took place in an attempt to halt exploration activities. In 1974 the Inuit of Qamani'tuaq submitted a petition to the federal government, requesting a freeze on new mining activities in the area, due to a concern for the wellbeing of the caribou herds they depend upon for various economic and social activities. This

petition was rejected, as was a similar formal proposal by the Inuit Tarpirisat Canada (ITC) the following year. In 1977 a one year cessation of the issuance of land use permits in the area was passed, but existing permit holders were allowed to continue operations (McPherson, 2003:81).

The Inuit of Qamani'tuaq submitted a second petition to the federal government in 1978, requesting that the land freeze continue (82). When their petition was once again rejected, the Hamlet of Baker Lake, the Baker Lake Hunters and Trappers Organization (HTO) and the ITC sought litigation to have the cessation of issuance of land use permits reinstated. In April of 1978, Justice Mahoney issued a temporary injunction, prohibiting the issuance of land use permits until the trial concluded (*Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development* [1979]). Mahoney stated that, due in part to the Inuit of Qamani'tuaq's inability to access sea mammals, "there is evidence of exceptionally strong psychological physiological dependence of the Baker Lake Inuit on the caribou hunt and harvest...the existence of a special relationship between Inuit and caribou is undisputed" (345). After discussing the particularly delicate state of caribou herds when they inhabit the region near Qamani'tuaq and the potential impacts mining could have, Mahoney found that an injunction was called for, stating "I have no hesitation in finding that the balance of convenience falls plainly on the side of granting an interim injunction. The minerals, if there, will remain; the caribou, presently there, may not." (348)

In 1979 the case went to trial. The Inuit case was based upon a claim to unextinguished Aboriginal title in the area, arguing that land use permits were illegitimate because the government could not unilaterally abrogate Inuit land rights. Mahoney's final ruling found that although Inuit continued to possess some form of Aboriginal title to the region, the area surrounding Qamani'tuaq was still classified as "public lands" and therefore subject to the

Canadian Mining Regulations (*Hamlet of Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development* [1980]:3). He also came to the conclusion that there was not enough evidence that exploration activities were harming caribou herds, and therefore ended the injunction blocking land use permits (62).

Despite the large amount of energy and media attention devoted to opposition during this time period, it is important to note that there were apparently some Inuit in the community of Qamani'tuaq who were supportive of mining exploration in this era.

Back then it was the local hunters or local people or people out there who were living out there at the time who were becoming concerned about wildlife with mining companies all over the place and disturbing their land areas, their harvesting areas and what have you. There were those who were in support of the harvesters and those who were in support of the mining companies and there was this clash. Those who were working for the companies, of course they were making good money. Some people were also saying that wildlife always moves around and will always be there and there is nothing to be concerned about...you'd get that on both sides [both harvesters and mining company employees]. But still, people were still concerned and that's where the conflict started, to my knowledge. (Irene Kallurak)

While Inuit Organizations were involved in legal resistance to mining exploration in the region, they were also busy negotiating increased Inuit control over their lands and lives through prospective land claims and self government arrangements. In 1976 the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada forwarded a land claim proposal for Nunavut. Originally including the northern Yukon and Mackenzie Delta regions of the Western Arctic Inuvialuit, this group soon broke away from the larger Nunavut proposal and negotiated a separate land claim, due to perceived immediate pressures posed by oil development in the Beaufort Sea (Hicks and White, 2000:94). In 1980 Inuit negotiators indicated that they would not sign a land claim unless the creation of a separate territory of Nunavut – an attempt to satisfy their desires for self governance and self determination via the creation of a public government with majority Inuit constituencies – was a

part of the agreement (54). In 1982 the Tunngavik Federation of Nunavut (TFN) was created to take over negotiations for the Nunavut Land Claim from the ITC. The TFN's board of directors included representatives from a variety of Inuit organizations, including the ITC, the Co-op Federation of the NWT, the Baffin Regional Inuit Association, the Keewatin Inuit Association (KIA) and the Kitikmeot Inuit Association. The process was initially slow going, as both parties found it difficult to come to common terms on a variety of topics, including many which were relevant to the mining industry such as a new regulatory and resource royalty sharing regime (McPherson, 2001:131-133).

While the TFN negotiated the terms of the NLCA with the Federal Government through the early 1980s, exploration activity in the Qamani'tuaq area continued. In 1986 Urangesellschaft Canada Ltd. (UG) released a pre-feasibility study regarding the Kiggavik uranium mine, to be located on the post-calving grounds of the Beverly caribou herd. This was the beginning of a long struggle between local Inuit and UG, which received a great deal of media attention. The controversy is afforded an in-depth description by Robert McPherson (2003). The following summary of events is taken primarily from his work.

At a 1989 presentation by the North West Territories Chamber of Mines a major debate took place regarding this proposed project. The president of the Keewatin Inuit Association voiced opposition to uranium mining in the area, citing health concerns and ethical issues associated with nuclear weapons. Jack Hicks of the Keewatin Regional Council criticized the fact that Inuit had little control over the design of the assessment to be conducted by the Federal Environmental Assessment Office (FEARO). Concerns were also voiced by Inuit politicians, including Peter Irniq (territorial MLA), Tagak Curley and Donat Milortuk (president of Tunngavik Federation of Nunavut) (169-172).

Following this meeting, a uranium intervention coordinating committee of Keewatin regional groups was formed, comprised of the Keewatin Regional Council, the Keewatin Inuit Association, the Keewatin Health Board, the Keewatin Wildlife Federation, the Tunngavik Federation of Nunavut and Peter Irniq (representing the riding of Avillik in the NWT legislative assembly). Tagak Curley served as spokesperson for the group (174).

The intervention coordinating committee – renamed the Northern Anti-Uranium Coalition (NAUC) and headed by Tagak Curley – sponsored workshops in Qamani'tuaq and Rankin Inlet, which were organized by Jack Hicks and included presentations by individuals and organizations experienced with the politics of nuclear power and uranium mining. The list of presenters included Gordon Edwards of the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility, Rosalie Bertell of the International Institute of Concern for Public Health, Journalist Mike Simmons and Saskatchewan anti-uranium activist Nette Wiebe. Topics discussed included the potential for the radioactive contamination of wildlife, health risks to uranium miners, the impacts of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and the potential for uranium mined near Qamani'tuaq to be used in the production of nuclear weaponry (174-6). These presentations clearly had an impact on the manner in which Inuit perceived the Kiggavik proposal. “Their [local Inuit] own concerns for the loss of the game on which they depended and on its contamination from the radionuclide trail were genuine enough, but they were also captivated by the larger moral issue and sought to make a responsible decision for mankind as a whole.” (200)

A six-man Federal Environmental Assessment Review Panel was formed in 1989, with the tasks of examining the potential environmental, social and economic impacts of the Kiggavik mine on the Qamani'tuaq area, setting guidelines for UG's Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) – a report, from UG, examining the environmental impacts that were likely to accompany

the Kiggavik project – and ultimately approving or rejecting the EIS after a public review. Over two hundred thousand dollars in intergovernmental funding was made available for intervenor groups. This money was necessary for northern groups to fund research and facilitate public involvement in the debate. Some groups criticized the small amounts of funding available, as well as the limitations placed upon how funding could be spent. For example, Nuclear Free North (NFN), an organization based out of Yellowknife received funding on the condition that it be used to hold workshops in Yellowknife, rather than Qamani'tuaq. NFN was upset by the fact that they could not use the funding to hold workshops in Qamani'tuaq, where UG had begun to mount a public relations/propaganda campaign (184).

In late April, 1989, the FEARO Panel began scoping sessions, consultations to help determine the terms of reference of UG's EIS, in Qamani'tuaq and Rankin Inlet. Many regional organizations were concerned with how quickly the process was unfolding, and felt that they did not have enough time to properly respond to the challenges it posed. Out of concern that Inuit leaders were too busy with land claims negotiations to properly communicate issues with the Kiggavik proposal to Inuit at the community level, Joan Scottie and Samson Jorah formed the Baker Lake Concerned Citizens Committee (BLCCC). The committee joined NAUC and received some funding from them (176-177). The BLCCC's primary purpose was to provide information regarding uranium mining to the Inuit of Qamani'tuaq. A phone-in show was held on Qamani'tuaq's community radio station, where Inuit were given the opportunity to ask questions about uranium mining. The BLCCC, with the help of academics and activists, then formulated answers to the questions and translated them into Inuktitut (Joan Scottie, 1992:3). Additionally, the organization opened an information office in Qamani'tuaq to further facilitate answering questions of local residents. A similar Concerned Citizens Committee was created in

Rankin Inlet (McPherson, 2003:176).

In response to the rapidly growing local and regional opposition, UG opened an information office in Qamani'tuaq and distributed information sheets which promoted their proposal. Additionally, they hired Ed Schiller to engage in ongoing public relations work in the community (178-9). In the fall of 1989 the company held a series of public information and relations meetings in Qamani'tuaq, Rankin Inlet and Chesterfield Inlet, where they argued that the project would have minimal environmental impacts, and that nuclear energy was inherently more environmentally friendly than that produced by fossil fuels (with global warming used as evidence for the latter claim) (183). Despite these efforts, UG's public relations campaign can be understood as a largely reactive rather than proactive phenomenon. It lacked an overall vision or clear strategy, and was described by McPherson as "inept" (185).

UG released their EIS in early 1990. The lack of Inuit involvement in research for the EIS was criticized by some community members, while the lack of an adequate discussion of the potential health impacts of radiation exposure was criticized by some regional organizations (including the NAUC). Due to deficiencies in the EIS – especially with regards to examinations of potential social impacts of the project – the FEARO panel delayed further public hearings to allow UG to revise their statement.

Although various MLA's were critical of the project, the Government of the North West Territories (GNWT) did not officially enter the debate and claimed that they would wait until the FEARO panel had finished its assessment before forwarding a stance on the project. However, in the eyes of many Inuit it clearly supported the Kiggavik proposal (180). This perception of government support for Kiggavik "behind closed doors" was validated when a departmental report for Indian Affairs and Northern Development was leaked to the media. Based on

conversations with territorial deputy-ministers, the report indicated that the cabinet of the GNWT supported UG's proposal. The conflicting messages being sent by the GNWT was criticized by the Keewatin Inuit Association, Territorial MLA Peter Irniq and numerous local Inuit (187). Some local Inuit identify this as a key turning point in the opposition movement at the local level – the notion that decisions were being made without local input angered many and prompted them to lose faith in the regulatory process.

UG's attempt to engage Inuit persisted, but remained disorganized and largely ineffective. Representatives from the company addressed the Keewatin Inuit Association's general meeting in 1990, but many Inuit in attendance (including Tagak Curley) found their attitude towards Inuit opposition condescending. Representatives from a variety of organizations also voiced opposition to the proposal at this meeting.

Up until the release of UG's EIS, the Hamlet Council of Baker Lake had officially remained neutral in the debate (although many community members were of the opinion that, like the GNWT, the hamlet council supported the project "behind closed doors"). However, hamlet elections resulted in a new mayor and council who decided to enter the debate by holding a plebiscite to determine whether or not it should oppose the mine. Leading up to the vote, a petition opposing the mine which was circulating secured the signatures of 1700 residents of the Keewatin. By this time the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, the Inuit Tarpirisat of Canada, the Tungaviik Federation of Nunavut, the Keewatin Inuit Association, the Keewatin Regional Council, the Keewatin Wildlife Federation, the Beverly and Qamanirjuaq Caribou Management Board, the Baker Lake Concerned Citizens Committee, the Rankin Inlet Concerned Citizens Committee, the North West Territories Federation of Labour, Ecology North and Nuclear Free North had all voiced opposition to the Kiggavik proposal (191). At the March 26 vote, more

than 90% of voters opposed the mine, with 72% of eligible voters present (*Nunatsiaq News*, Sept 5, 2003). The hamlet council proceeded to write to UG, requesting that it abandon the Kiggavik proposal, as they had publically stated they would do if the community of Qamani'tuaq did not support it (McPherson, 2003:192). UG responded by suspending the project indefinitely because of the level of opposition and the large number of concerns brought forward by the federal assessment panel (*Nunatsiaq News*, Sept 5, 2003).

A number of ways in which UG could have swayed the public perception of their proposal are discussed by McPherson. Most prominent among McPherson's arguments are the fact that UG could have utilized Inuit knowledge in their EIS and supported Inuit political aspirations by negotiating some form of impact and benefit agreement with Inuit Organizations (despite the fact that they were not legally required to do so). While McPherson makes a valid point – this may have in fact diffused a great deal of local opposition – one also has to consider whether or not these actions would have been positive for the community of Qamani'tuaq. What McPherson was suggesting essentially amounts to the appropriation of Inuit knowledge and political aspirations. Had UG engaged with Inuit in the manner McPherson suggests, they would have done so for the sole purpose of leveraging their profit margins by having their project move forward, rather than out of concern for the well-being of Inuit or social justice in general. Furthermore, the manner in which most traditional knowledge studies are structured tend to remove Indigenous knowledges from their cultural context, rendering the studies essentially meaningless for many Indigenous People. A great deal has been written about the appropriation of Indigenous Traditional Ecological Knowledge by policy makers and resource extraction companies, a topic I dedicate some discussion to in chapter 6.

The fact that UG did little to engage with the Inuit Organizations throughout this

controversy demonstrates a degree of ignorance regarding the political climate in the North West Territories at the time. It also displays ignorance, on the part of UG, to a political trend taking place in all of Canada during the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s. In 1977, a federal inquiry recommended that a pipeline in the western North West Territories not be built until outstanding land claims with Dene First Nations had been settled (Berger, 1988) – in other words, it was becoming increasingly apparent that Aboriginal communities were entitled to some degree of control over mineral extraction in their territory. In 1982, Aboriginal Rights became protected in Canada’s new constitution (*The Constitution Act* [1982]). Additionally, a series of court decisions⁴ demonstrated that the judicial branch of the Canadian state was gradually becoming more sensitive to Aboriginal Rights. All of this should have alerted UG that some substantial effort to gain the support of at least the Inuit leadership was required. However, as McPherson’s narrative demonstrates, UG did little to court the favour of either Inuit leaders or members of the community of Qamani’tuaq.

McPherson concludes his discussion of the Kiggavik controversy with an analysis of the intervener groups’ presentations following UG’s final EIS, stating that these groups exhibited an “obsessive biases towards developers, and towards uranium miners in particular.” (196) This comment requires an in-depth analysis, due to the fact that it essentially writes off the opposition movement as irrational – an obsession is, by definition, not rooted in logic and rational consideration. Regarding the movement’s “bias” towards uranium mining, McPherson provides no evidence that the group’s fears of radioactive contamination in the north or moral qualms with

⁴ For example, in addition to the 1978 and 1979 cases discussed in this chapter, in *Calder v. British Columbia* (1973) and *Guerin v. The Queen* (1984) the Supreme Court of Canada recognized the existence of, and defined the implications of, un-extinguished Aboriginal title. Also, during the review of the Kiggavik proposal, the SCC adopted a broader definition of Aboriginal rights in *R. v. Sparrow* (1990)

the nuclear industry in general were unfounded. Furthermore, rather than some form of irrational paranoia towards “developers,” what McPherson witnessed may have in fact been an expression of Inuit resistance to western notions of “progress,” “development” and modernity – inherent aspects of industrial expansion into the Arctic – undertaken as a result of the views and wishes of the community’s “informal” or “traditional” leadership.

Vallee (1967) describes the notions of leadership and decision making processes Inuit utilized in camps during his fieldwork in the 1950s. Leaders, generally older and more experienced individuals, emerged from processes of decision making within the social group, rather than through some formal process like an election. “Most decisions affecting the camp as a whole appear to emerge from quiet discussion and the exchange of views. The leader is the one whose views are given more weight than those of other people in the camp.” (202) Although Vallee argues that this system of decision making and leadership was falling out of use as Inuit moved to the settlement, there is evidence that it persists in the settlement of Qamani’tuaq. Many of the people with whom I spoke claimed that particular Elders still exercise a great deal of influence over community decisions, including those related to mining. Many families still rely upon the guidance of specific Elders when important issues are being considered. Some of the Inuit youth I met while teaching at the Arctic College mentioned that they seek the advice of their grandparents when they are confronted by important life decisions. Several of the Inuit (both Elders and the middle-aged) that I interviewed drew my attention to the role that a variety of Inuit Elders – most of whom have since passed away – played in their decision to oppose UG’s proposal.

Growing up I had always taken the side of our Elders who have now passed away and they were always opposed to the mining because they wanted to keep the Inuit culture alive and they've understood from the past that mining usually moves very quickly and language

disappears and culture disappears quickly. (Anonymous Adult: Male)

All those who were really really concerned are no longer alive. Thomas Tapatai, Louis Tapatai, a lot of other Elders who have long passed on. It was those who were Elders at the time who were concerned and have passed on since. (Winnie Ikinilik)

While I was unable to construct a narrative of these Elders' roles in the debate from the statements provided to me, it is clear that their commitment to the preservation of Inuit culture (as well as the role that Inuit Elders continue to play in community decision making in general) influenced Inuit perceptions of UG's proposal throughout the debate. It is likely that these Elders' wishes, combined with their diffuse authority over community life, influenced the actions of the politicians and activists that McPherson discusses. This commitment to cultural preservation is in no way irrational or obsessive, it simply represents values and ideals which differ greatly from those of western, capitalist society. To suggest that these values are irrational is essentially ethnocentric, and in doing so McPherson may be revealing his own biases. It is also possible that this conclusion was based upon the sources – primarily archival – which McPherson utilized in his study. The logical result of relying on archival sources is a narrative that focuses on formal leadership and community groups, as opposed to the informal decision making structures which are much more difficult for an outsider to observe or become familiar with. A focus on the actions and logic of the informal decision making structure with regards to UG's proposal may have prompted McPherson to come to different conclusions.

It is also important to note that, while the majority of the community voted in opposition to the Kiggavik proposal, many claim they did not fully understand the issues associated with uranium mining. The BLCCC clearly made attempts to explain the potential environmental, health and moral implications of the nuclear industry; however, the success of these attempts is debatable.

Back then, in the 70s and early 80s, those who had come together to...it became a committee, a committee started, and it was that committee...but the rest of the community members who weren't a part of the committee had no idea what it was all about. They'd only hear bits and pieces and [were] not really getting the gist of what the conflict was. Because they were community members they supported the committee and most of the community supported the committee. That's the way it was. (Irene Kallurak)

Joan Scottie, founding member of the BLCCC described the difficulties she experienced when attempting to explain nuclear issues to Inuit Elders. Apparently, it is incredibly difficult to translate “technical” aspects of uranium mining into Inuktitut, as the language currently lacks the vocabulary to explain concepts like radiation. Furthermore, as few Inuit Elders have completed even the most basic levels of western education, most lack the conceptual understanding of science required to fully grasp how radiation can be harmful to humans and their environment. This does not suggest that Inuit Elders are unintelligent – in reality, the knowledge possessed by Elders is nuanced and complex. However, nuclear physics is a topic which, until very recently, has had little relevance to Inuit communities and is based in a conceptual framework which differs greatly from Inuit knowledge. As a result, the incorporation of an understanding of radiation into Inuit knowledge would require a great deal of time, energy and resources, beyond what was made available during the UG controversy. The fact that many Inuit still did not fully grasp all of the reasons why uranium mining posed serious dangers to their community has a great deal of relevance for contemporary proposals to mine uranium in the region.

CHAPTER 3: THE NUNAVUT LAND CLAIMS AGREEMENT AND RESISTANCE TO DISPOSSESSION

On July 9, 1993 the *Nunavut Land Claims Agreement* (NLCA) and the *Nunavut Act* were passed. The former provided – in exchange for all Inuit Aboriginal title – a capital transfer of \$1.14 billion to Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated (NTI) (the successor to the Tunngavik Federation of Nunavut, which was dissolved following the completion of negotiations), which was to be administered by the Nunavut Trust. This capital transfer was then invested by the Nunavut Trust, with the profits earned off the investments used in part to fund the activities of NTI. Additionally, the NLCA enshrined particular rights for the Inuit of Nunavut, guaranteed Inuit ownership and mineral rights over some tracts of land and created the royalty sharing and regulatory regimes described below. The *Nunavut Act* served to partition the North West Territories, creating the new territory of Nunavut. While the new territory is administered by a public government, it affords Inuit a certain degree of self-government by virtue of the fact that the population of Nunavut is composed of a majority of Inuit.

Several sections of the NLCA have created mechanisms, which, to a certain degree, facilitate Inuit resistance to dispossession. While not directly related to mining, the increased control of the harvesting economy the NLCA affords to Inuit should be understood as reinforcing the harvesting mode of production. For example, Inuit Organizations now appoint members to the newly formed co-management institution, the Nunavut Wildlife Management Board (5.2.1). This affords Inuit a greater voice in discussions related to wildlife conservation and can help Inuit ensure that conservation laws are not detrimental to their way of life.

More directly related to the topic of mining are the new royalty sharing and regulatory regimes created by the NLCA and the implications they have for the dispossession – of both

minerals and the harvesting economy – associated with mining. With regards to the theft of minerals from Inuit lands, the royalty sharing regime ensures that Inuit will receive some form of financial compensation for the minerals mining companies take from their lands. Royalties, previously collected solely by the federal government in the territorial north, are now partially collected by Inuit Organizations. The manner in which royalties are channelled to the Inuit Organizations – and which Inuit Organization collects this money – depends upon whether a project is located upon Crown land or Inuit Owned Lands (lands in which, by virtue of the NLCA, Inuit hold either surface or subsurface rights).

Resource royalty taxes are collected by the Federal Government when projects are located on Crown land. Pursuant to Article 25 of the NLCA, a share of these royalties are then paid to Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. Article 25 of the NLCA states:

25.1.1 Inuit have the right, in each and every calendar year, to be paid an amount equal to:
(a) fifty percent (50%) of the first two million dollars (\$2,000,000) of resource royalty received by Government in that year; and
(b) five percent (5%) of any additional resource royalty received by Government in that year. (NLCA, 1993, pp. 214)

These resource royalties are then transferred to the Nunavut Trust, which then distributes the money to Inuit Organizations, including Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated and the Kivalliq Inuit Association. The amount of money Inuit have access to through this framework is relatively small, with their share of royalties decreasing dramatically if a large number of mines are located on crown lands. If a mining project utilizes Inuit Owned Lands where Inuit hold surface title to the land, land use fees are paid to the appropriate Regional Inuit Association, which in the case of the Kiggavik proposal is the Kivalliq Inuit Association (KIA). Where projects involve Inuit Owned Lands where Inuit hold subsurface rights, proponents enter into agreements with NTI, which can be very financially beneficial for the land claim corporation because such agreements

would normally guarantee NTI a share of profits.

The new regulatory regime provides mechanisms which can facilitate Inuit resistance to the destruction of the harvesting economy, by allowing Inuit control over certain characteristics of mining projects and some ability to reject projects that may be detrimental to the harvesting sector. The regulatory regime created by the NLCA involves a variety of Institutions of Public Governance, including the Nunavut Planning Commission (NPC) and the Nunavut Impact Review Board (NIRB). Sections 11.4.1 and 11.5.10 of the NLCA describe the duties of the NPC, including the development of land use plans and the review of project proposals to determine whether or not they conform to the land use plans. Following the determination of land use plan conformity of a project, the NPC then forwards the proposal and their determination regarding land use plan conformity to the Minister of INAC. If the NPC determines that the proposal violates the land use plan, the Minister of INAC is able to exempt the particular project from this stage of the regulatory process, but must make their reasons for doing so public (see sections 11.5.11 and 11.5.12).

The *Keewatin Regional Land Use Plan* (the applicable Regional Land Use Plan for the Qamani'tuaq region) has two sections that are particularly relevant to the contemporary situation in Qamani'tuaq, as they deal specifically with uranium mining. Sections 3.5 of the plan states:

Uranium development shall not take place until the NPC, NIRB, the NWB and the NWMB have reviewed all of the issues relevant to uranium exploration and mining. Any review of uranium exploration and mining shall pay particular attention to questions concerning health and environmental protection.

Section 3.6 of the plan assures that "any future proposal to mine uranium must be approved by the people of the region".

If a proposal is approved by the NPC (or if an exemption has been granted by INAC), the

application is then forwarded to the NIRB. Pursuant to section 12.4.1 of the NLCA, the NIRB screens the applications they receive and determine whether or not an environmental review is required. The NIRB can recommend a project proceed without a review, recommend a full-scale environmental review or recommend that the project be rejected entirely, depending on anticipated social and environmental impacts.

If the NIRB determines that a review is required, the Minister of INAC may commission a review by a Federal assessment panel, or indicate to the NIRB that it should conduct the review. The review process involves the project proponent compiling an Environmental Impact Statement, a document outlining the anticipated environmental and social impacts of the proposal. Following the review, the NIRB must submit a report to the minister, indicating their assessment of the project's impacts, terms and conditions that should be placed upon the project and ultimately whether or not the project should proceed. The minister then may accept or reject the NIRB's recommendation.

Some of these mechanisms attempt to promote the use of *Inuit Qaujimagajatuqangit* (IQ) in decisions related to mining and the day to day operations of mining projects. IQ is an Inuktitut concept – often likened to Inuit Traditional Knowledge or Inuit Traditional Ecological Knowledge – which was formulated by Inuit in an attempt to facilitate the incorporation of Inuit culture and values into governance when the territory of Nunavut was created in 1999. Specific definitions of the term vary, but in general they all suggest that IQ encompasses the entirety of Inuit knowledge and culture, including (but not limited to) worldviews, values, language, social relations, decision making processes, hunting skills, sewing skills, survival skills and intimate knowledge of wildlife and the environment (Oosten, Laugrand and Aupilaarjuk, 2002; Arnakak, 2002; Tester and Irniq, 2009).

A developing scholarly interest in traditional knowledge in general has resulted in numerous academic IQ studies in recent years, the majority of which concern climate change (Government of Nunavut, Department of the Environment, 2005; Leduc, 2006; Thorpe et al., 2002) and wildlife management (Dowsley and Wenzel, 2008). This trend has also resulted in a requirement, created by the NIRB, which states that mining companies utilize IQ in their environmental impact statements (NIRB, 2009). This stipulation is generally met through formal IQ studies, which involves interviewing a sample of local Inuit, usually Elders and harvesters. Topics often include information about local wildlife populations and migrations and Inuit use of the area where the mine will be located. These studies provide the opportunity for Inuit to express their perspective on the manner in which the mine will operate, giving the mining proponent the information necessary to help mitigate the impact of their proposed project on Inuit harvesting activities.

In addition to formal IQ studies, input Inuit provide during the regulatory process can often be construed as IQ. Therefore, Inuit participation in the regulatory process in general provides opportunities for IQ to be incorporated into both decision making and mining projects. Inuit are able to participate in decisions at a variety of stages in this process. The NLCA stipulates that development of land use plans by the NPC must involve the "active and informed participation and support of Inuit and other residents affected by the land use plans" (11.2.1(d)) and public hearings throughout the planning process (11.4.4(g)).

During both the screening and review phase of major projects, the NIRB is required to promote public awareness and participation in the regulatory process (12.2.27). However, the actions they undertake to engage the community can vary, as "NIRB may conduct its review by means of correspondence, public hearings or such other procedures as it deems appropriate to the

nature of the project and range of impacts." (12.5.3) The NIRB seeks input from interested parties at a variety of stages in the review process, including scoping and guideline development (essentially determining which issues the proponent must address in the final Environmental Impact Statement) and the review of the final Environmental Impact Statement to determine whether or not the project should be approved (NIRB, 2006a:5). Also during the review process, the NIRB holds two rounds of public hearings (preceded by community information sessions) where the NIRB is committed to giving "due regard and weight to the tradition of Inuit oral communication and decision making, through the participation of Elders and community members." (5)

In addition to consultation undertaken by the NIRB itself, the NIRB requires the project proponent to engage in consultation with effected Inuit communities. Depending on the "size, scope and location of the Project Proposal," the NIRB "recommends that consultation occur throughout the life of the project." (NIRB, 2006b:3) The NIRB also requires proposals submitted for screening to contain descriptions of previous and planned consultations (3). During the review process, the NIRB requires, at minimum, consultations prior to the commencement of activities which "meet or exceed usual consultation practices in Canada." (4) These aspects of the NIRB provide a great deal of opportunity for Inuit to participate in decision making regarding mining and control the characteristics of mining projects in Nunavut through the incorporation of IQ into mining.

This new regulatory regime also affords an increase in the ability of Inuit to reject projects that will have negative implications for harvesting livelihoods. With regards to uranium mining, section 3.6 of the *Keewatin Regional Land Use Plan* clearly states that Inuit must support uranium mining before it takes place in the Kivalliq. While the final decision as to

whether or not a mining project in Nunavut proceeds remains in the hands of the Minister of INAC, the Inuit Organizations clearly possess the political power to, at the very least, lock proposals into a state of bureaucratic purgatory.

Resistance to the destruction of the harvesting economy may also be facilitated through Inuit Impact and Benefit Agreements (IIBAs) and the royalty sharing regime discussed previously. Both of these mechanisms ensure that mining activity, to a certain degree, supports the harvesting mode of production in the context of its structural dependence upon capitalism, providing harvesters with income required to purchase harvesting equipment. The most prominent legal mechanism for Inuit to attain economic benefits from mining projects is Article 26 of the NLCA which makes the negotiation of Inuit Impact and Benefit Agreements (IIBAs) compulsory. IIBAs are agreements between Regional Inuit Associations (in the case of Qamani'tuaq, the Kivalliq Inuit Association) and the project proponent, and often contain provisions for preferential hiring for Land Claims Beneficiaries and training programs for local Inuit. As I have noted previously, although wage labour is in many ways antagonistic to harvesting activities, the income it generates is now necessary to purchase fuel, equipment and other commodities; in present day Qamani'tuaq many full time wage workers are among the most active hunters in the community.

The money provided to the Inuit Organizations through resource royalty sharing may also be used to reinforce the gathering and hunting mode of production. Most importantly, it may be used to fund legal and political battles pertaining to Inuit harvesting. This can take the form of legal battles over Inuit harvesting rights, such as the struggle over polar bear and bowhead whale quotas. It may also be utilized in political struggles to ensure access to markets for commodities produced in the harvesting sector (for example, it may be used to fight bans on imports of seal

skins and polar bear hides). Campaigns to oppose development proposals that are deemed too destructive may also be funded in part through resource royalties.

The money provided to these organizations is also utilized for a variety of services and programs for land claims beneficiaries, some of which directly benefit the harvesting sector. NTI provides a variety of Nunavut Harvester Support Programs, which provide capital and equipment to harvesters who would be otherwise unable to finance harvesting ventures on their own. The Capital Equipment Program provides assistance in the form of snowmobiles, all terrain vehicles and boats/motors to families that cannot adequately finance these items. Meanwhile, the Small Equipment Program provides reduced cost equipment to local Hunting and Trapping Organizations to be sold to harvesters. The Community Harvest Program provides money to local HTOs to help organize community hunts while the Atugaksait Program provides money to aid in the teaching of survival skills, harvesting knowledge and traditional sewing techniques. Additionally, the Kakiniit Grants Program provides funding to Inuit who are acquiring knowledge or skills that are components of Inuit culture, including hunting, sewing and language skills (NTI, n.d.). The Kivalliq Inuit Association also funds two cultural camps which teach harvesting and other traditional skills to Inuit youth. The Pijunnaqsiniq Summer Cultural Camp teaches traditional skills including land and sea hunting, skin preparation and sewing, food preparation and preservation and tool making to youth ages 15 to 25, while the Ukiurmi Pijunnaqsiniq Cultural Camp teaches males ages 16 to 25 how to hunt and travel in winter conditions (KIA, n.d.). The programs discussed above have the potential to provide a great deal of support to many aspects of harvesting, helping to promote the long-term viability of the gathering and hunting mode of production in the face of globalization.

The NLCA has clearly made some space for Inuit resistance. However, it should be

made clear that while it provides mechanisms which facilitate Inuit resistance to the dispossession mining entails, it is not resistant in and of itself (especially with regards to the destruction of the harvesting economy). Whether or not these legal mechanisms will be used to promote the perpetuation of the harvesting sector depends on whether or not Inuit choose to do so. Despite the structures created by the NLCA, resistance remains an act of agency on the part of today's Inuit. In other words, the NLCA empowers Inuit to resist if they so choose. The contents of IIBAs, topics discussed during IQ studies and the issues brought forth during community consultation meetings as well as the Inuit Organizations' choices of which projects to support and how to use resource royalties largely determine whether or not the NLCA will be utilized in a resistant fashion. It must also be emphasized that utilizing resource royalties for the purpose of supporting the harvesting economy forces Inuit and their political representatives to contend with the possible destruction of wildlife resources and the spatio-temporal implications of the capitalist economy. Furthermore, the manner in which both the federal government and the mining industry interpret the duty to consult will have implications for the effectiveness of these legal mechanisms.

CHAPTER 4: THE CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENT OF THE KIGGAVIK PROPOSAL

Following Urangschellshaft's shelving of the Kiggavik Project in 1990, commercial interest in the ore body has continued. In 1993 UG sold the rights to the project to Cogima, a French company. Cogima proceeded to undertake a feasibility study for the Kiggavik project in 1997, only to subsequently shelve the project as well. In the spring of 2006, Areva Resources Canada Inc., the successor to Cogima, launched what was to become an intense public relations campaign. An information office, staffed by a local community liaison officer, was opened in Qamani'tuaq. The office is open weekday afternoons, and provides information, in both English and Inuktitut, related to the Kiggavik proposal, Areva's uranium mines located in Saskatchewan and uranium mining in general. Additionally, a public relations officer, Barry McAllumn, has made regular visits to the community since the opening of the office (Areva Resources Canada Inc., 2009:61).

Later the same year, Areva formed a local Community Liaison Committee (CLC), consisting of representatives from a variety of local community groups, including the local District Education Authority, Hunters and Trappers Organization, Hamlet Council, Elders group, youth group, Health Committee, Justice Committee, business community, and the Inuit group whose homeland, the Aberdeen Lake area, will be impacted by the Kiggavik project. The CLC holds roughly ten meetings each year, which are open to the public and have an Inuktitut-English interpreter present (61). A survey of the minutes of the CLC meetings since its inception reveal that meetings generally involve representatives from Areva providing updates on the actions undertaken by the mining company regarding the planned Kiggavik project, as well as seeking input from the committee members regarding the development of some aspects of the project.

Community input is most actively sought in relation to which route a proposed road connecting Qamani'tuaq and the Kiggavik mine would take, but topics including baseline IQ studies, local employment opportunities and fuel storage are also given space for discussion. In addition to these regular meetings, members of the CLC are also occasionally sent on trips to mining symposiums in Iqaluit, Yellowknife, Vancouver and Toronto, are given tours of Areva's uranium mines located in Saskatchewan and make visits to the site of the proposed Kiggavik mine.

Complementing the Baker Lake CLC, Areva has also organized a Regional Liaison Committee (RLC) for the proposed Kiggavik mine. The RLC was formed in 2007, and is composed of representatives appointed from each community in the Kivalliq region. The RLC meets annually, with topics of discussion mostly focused on the business and employment opportunities which are anticipated to accompany the opening of the Kiggavik mine (Areva Resources Canada Inc., 2009:61).

In addition to the consultations that are undertaken through the CLC and RLC, Areva has sought community input through a variety of other avenues. Areva has held meetings with NTI, the KIA, all hamlet councils in the Kivalliq, the Baker Lake, Chesterfield Inlet and Arviat HTOs, Qamani'tuaq's Community Land and Resources Committee, the Kivalliq Wildlife Management Board, the Beverly and Qamanirjuaq Caribou Management Board, various high schools in the Kivalliq region, the Baker Lake Arctic College and the Baker Lake Concerned Citizens Committee. Additionally, Areva has taken part in KIA, NTI and NPC information sessions and workshops dealing with uranium mining (63).

Community hall-style consultation meetings with communities throughout the Kivalliq have also taken place. Areva held a series of information sessions in all Kivalliq communities in 2009. According to Areva, these sessions, which consisted of open houses and public meetings,

provided an opportunity for the community to discuss aspects of the project with Areva's experts in management, engineering and the regulatory system, as well as a mine site employees and Dene Elders from Saskatchewan. (62)

In an attempt to further inform community members about uranium mining, Areva has launched a variety of other initiatives. In 2005 Areva began giving tours of both the proposed site of the Kiggavik mine, and Areva's uranium mining operations in Northern Saskatchewan. Thus far, 96 people, including Qamani'tuaq Elders, the Areva CLC and RLC, the Premiere of Nunavut, the Mayor of Qamani'tuaq and representatives from the District Education Authority have visited the proposed Kiggavik mine site. The Saskatchewan mine tours have involved 126 people from Nunavut on nine separate tours. In addition to Elders, students, and business owners from Qamani'tuaq, Areva's RLC and CLC, participants have included representatives from NTI, the Kivalliq Inuit Association, the Qikiqtani Inuit Association, the Kitikmeot Inuit Association, the Baker Lake Hamlet Council, various co-management boards, the NPC, the Arctic College, the Kivalliq Wildlife Management Board, the Government of Nunavut and Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (68-69).

These initiatives were supplemented with Dene hunters and Elders from a Saskatchewan First Nations community located near an Areva mine visiting Qamani'tuaq in May, 2007. The group, which met with the Baker Lake HTO and Baker Lake Concerned Citizens Committee, included three hunters, an Elder that advises Aboriginal workers at one of Areva's mines and the Athabaskan Coordinator. The Dene visitors also took part in a community feast and traditional dancing (Areva CLC Meeting Minutes, June, 2007).

Areva has undertaken a variety of other programs which enhance their public image in the Kivalliq. Areva has made a variety of sponsorships and donations in Qamani'tuaq and other

Kivalliq communities. The list of groups and activities that Areva has provided funding or other assistance to is extensive, and includes community events (feasts, Christmas celebrations, Hamlet days festivals), hunting activities (a bowhead whale hunt in Repulse Bay, a fishing derby and search and rescue support with Areva's helicopter), education (school scholarships, science fairs, science and geology camps and computers) and sports and recreational activities (Areva Resources Canada Inc., 2009:57).

Apparently developed as an offshoot of the Kiggavik mine site tours (56), since 2006 Areva has used their exploration helicopter to transport Elders residing in Qamani'tuaq to the regions which they inhabited prior to the movement to centralized settlement in the 1950s and 1960s. At this point, 63 people have participated in 14 separate visits, with each trip involving one or more Elders who were born on the land, members of their families and the Areva Community Liaison Officer (67).

The first decade of the twenty first century also brought other mining activity to the Qamani'tuaq area. In 2003, Cumberland Resources Limited submitted a proposal to open a gold mine, 80 kilometres north of Qamani'tuaq. After working its way through the regulatory process and gaining approval, the project was acquired by Agnico-Eagle Mines Limited and construction began in 2007. An open pit mining operation, Meadowbank, is connected to the community of Qamani'tuaq by an all-weather access road (NIRB, 2009:1-3). The mine began the transition from construction to production in February 2010, and is anticipated to continue producing gold until 2019 (*Numatsiaq News*, March 1, 2010).

Areva resumed exploration activities in the Kiggavik Area in 2007, and submitted a project proposal to the NIRB for screening in 2008, initiating the regulatory process. The proposed project is located 80 kilometers west of Qamani'tuaq, and is split between two separate

sites: Kiggavik and Sissons. This is essentially the same ore deposit that Urangesellschaft was attempting to develop in the late 1980s. Five individual mines will be located on these sites, four of which will be open pit and one which will be an underground operation. The mine will produce uranium concentrate or "yellowcake." The mines will be situated on a mixture of Crown and Inuit Owned Lands, with 700 hectares of Crown Land and 1200 hectares of Inuit Owned Land (which itself is a mixture of land in which Inuit own surface and subsurface rights) used. The life cycle of the mine is anticipated to involve 3-5 years of construction, 15-20 years of production and 5 years of decommissioning. It is estimated that hundreds of jobs will be created during the construction phase, with 400-600 personnel employed during production. Due to the mine's distance from Qamani'tuaq, it will operate on a fly in/fly out employment program, with schedules running 7 to 14 days long (Areva Resources Canada Inc., 2008).

The proposal was first forwarded to the Nunavut Planning Commission to verify the land use conformity of the Kiggavik project. By January of 2008, the NPC had reached a decision, ruling that the conditions outlined in sections 3.5 and 3.6 of the Keewatin Regional Land Use Plan – necessitating a review of issues relevant to uranium mining by regulatory boards and the support of the residents of the Kivalliq for uranium mining – had been satisfied. Following the positive land use conformity decision by the NPC, the proposal was forwarded to the Nunavut Impact Review Board for screening. After receiving submissions from a variety of interested parties, the NIRB recommended that the Kiggavik project proposal be subjected to a full environmental review, either carried out by the NIRB itself or a federal assessment panel (NIRB, 2009a). In March of 2010, Federal Indian and Northern Affairs Minister Chuck Strahl indicated that the proposal will be subjected to a territorial review carried out by the NIRB (*CBC News North*, March 4, 2010). At the time of writing, the NIRB was beginning the review process.

PERSPECTIVES ON THE PROPOSAL

A variety of groups – including Inuit organizations, governmental institutions and non-governmental organizations – have expressed opinions of the Kiggavik project in particular and uranium mining and mineral extraction in general. Prior to 2006, NTI forbade the exploration and mining of uranium and thorium on Inuit Owned Lands in their exploration agreements (NTI, 2006:1). However, NTI has since changed their position on this issue with the release of their *Policy Concerning Uranium Mining in Nunavut* in 2007. The 2007 policy supports the mining of uranium on Inuit Owned Lands, provided that it is “carried out in an environmentally and socially responsible way and the uranium that results from the mining shall be used only for peaceful and environmentally friendly purposes.” (NTI, 2007:5) The reasons given for this shift in opinion include the possibility of benefits for Inuit stemming from uranium mining (in the form of employment opportunities and resource royalties) and the potential of nuclear energy to act as a source of alternative energy to fossil fuels in a world faced with anthropogenic climate change (7).

The Kivalliq Inuit Association (KIA) has also shown support for uranium mining in the region, approving of NTI's *Policy Concerning Uranium Mining in Nunavut* in 2007. The two organizations sent a joint submission to the NIRB during the screening process for the Kiggavik project proposal, recommending that the project be subjected to an environmental review due to the potential environmental and socio-economic impacts of the project (NIRB 2009a:Appendix B-1). While this submission alone does not amount to support for the project, other actions of the KIA demonstrate their support for this particular project. For example, in 2007 the president of the KIA presented Areva with a commemorative plaque in recognition of the efforts they have undertaken regarding community involvement (*Nunatsiaq News*, November 7, 2008).

Between 2006 and 2008, all Hamlet Councils in the Kivalliq region passed motions which supported uranium mining. These motions, combined with the KIA's adoption of NIT's uranium mining policy, were used by the NPC to satisfy section 3.6 of the *Keewatin Regional Land Use Plan*. At the time of writing, no Hamlet Councils have (to my knowledge) passed any resolutions supporting the Kiggavik project in particular. While some members of the Baker Lake Hamlet Council are prominent supporters of the Kiggavik project at the community level, the Hamlet has lent some support to community members who oppose uranium mining in the form of funding to support the Baker Lake HTO in assisting local residents wishing to comment during the NIRB screening of the Kiggavik proposal (*Nunatsiaq News*, February 20, 2009).

The Government of Nunavut has similarly shown support for uranium mining in Nunavut. In 2007, the GN approved a policy supporting uranium mining, entitled *Uranium Management Plan Principles*. This policy indicates that the GN's support for uranium mining stems from the potential benefits uranium mining would bring – wage labour employment, resource royalties and an alternative fuel source. This support, however, is conditional. Prior to supporting a particular project, the GN requires that the project has the support of all Nunavummiut, has strict health, safety and environmental standards, and brings benefits to Nunavummiut (NIRB, 2009a:Appendix B-18).

During the NIRB's screening of the mine proposal, a number of organizations commented that the project has the potential to have significant adverse impacts on the environment and the socioeconomic wellbeing of Inuit and other Aboriginal Peoples. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada highlighted the potential for environmental and socioeconomic impacts, the Department Fisheries and Oceans Canada commented on the impact the project was likely to have on fish and fish habitat and the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission indicated that the

project “involves technological innovations for which the effects are unknown.” (NIRB, 2009a:7) The latter comment was largely directed at the fact that this will be the first time uranium mining and tailings management will be carried out in a permafrost environment.

Mining Watch Canada – a non-profit organization dedicated to ensuring that mineral extraction is carried out in a socially sustainable and ecologically healthy manner – has released a *Policy Statement on Uranium Mining*. This policy asserts that a total moratorium on uranium exploration and the commencement of new uranium mining activities should be put in place until:

- There is a full, well informed, and serious public debate and national consensus regarding energy policy, and the role of nuclear energy as part of this overall energy policy;
- The destructive environmental legacy of past and existing uranium mining has been cleaned up and permanently neutralized, and the people who have suffered injury to their health from involvement in or exposure to uranium mining and processing have been adequately compensated individually and collectively; and
- There is a sound, long term, economically feasible, scientifically demonstrated, and publicly acceptable means of isolating radioactive wastes (from the mining, processing, and use of uranium) from the environment and from human communities. (NIRB, 2009a: Appendix B-13)

As Mining Watch Canada is of the opinion that none of the above-mentioned conditions have been met - nor has any progress been made towards their resolution - they submitted commentary to the NIRB that voiced firm opposition to Areva's Kiggavik proposal.

In 2006 the Pembina Institute, a not-for-profit think tank, dedicated to research, education, consulting and advocacy related to sustainable energy, released a report entitled *Nuclear Power in Canada: An Examination of Risks, Impacts and Sustainability*. This report, which analyzes the environmental impacts of all phases of the nuclear cycles, came to damning conclusions which questioned the ability of the nuclear industry to operate in a benign and healthy manner. The environmental impacts of uranium mining and milling were found to be

particularly severe. Many of these impacts were associated with waste-rock and tailings, which are often acidic and radioactive, and contain heavy metals and other contaminants. Tailings management facilities and waste-rock storage areas have severely contaminated surrounding groundwater with radionuclides, heavy metals and other contaminants. Likewise, windblown dusts from tailings and waste-rock have contaminated the environment and wildlife. The study highlighted “significant potential increases in cancer risks to humans from the consumption of caribou in the vicinity of uranium mines” (Winfield et al, 2006:23) and increased rates of lung cancer and death from silica exposure among uranium mine workers (24).

The concerns with the health and environmental impacts of uranium mining are shared by many residents in the south, which has prompted legislative action in two Canadian provinces. In 2008 Nova Scotia renewed a ban on uranium mining and exploration that had been in place since 1982 (*CBC News*, April 15, 2008), while British Columbia has legislation in place which prevents uranium deposits in the province from being developed (Minister of Mines, Energy and Petroleum Resources, 2010).

The Beverly and Qamanirjuaq Caribou Management Board (BQCMB) – a multi-jurisdictional board, established to assist in the conservation of the Beverly and Qamanirjuaq caribou herds – has provided commentary on draft versions of NTI's new uranium policy, as well as Areva's exploration and proposed mining activities at Kiggavik. In a series of letters to NTI Vice-President James Eetoolook the BQCMB argued that the draft uranium policy was formulated without adequate consultation from citizens of Qamani'tuaq, Aboriginal communities outside of Nunavut which rely on the Beverly and Qamanirjuaq caribou herds or the BQCMB (BQCMB, 2006a). They further suggest that the draft policy is biased in favour of uranium mining, draws conclusions about the safety of uranium mining which are not supported by

analysis of evidence and fails to adequately address both the potential impacts of uranium exploration and development on wildlife and the potential for radioactive materials to be released into the environment. With regards to caribou conservation in particular, the BQCMB lists a variety of issues that they claim the draft policy fails to take into account, including direct disturbances to caribou as a result of increased human activity, habitat loss, the contamination of waterways, the cumulative impact of numerous projects on the Beverly and Qamanirjuaq caribou herds and the potential loss of hunting lifestyles reliant on caribou in communities located in Nunavut, the North West Territories, Saskatchewan and Manitoba (BQCMB, 2006b).

During the NIRB screening for Areva's proposal to resume exploration activities at Kiggavik in 2007, the BQCMB submitted comments which opposed exploration at Kiggavik. Their submission drew attention to the importance of the Kiggavik area to the Beverly caribou herd: the Kiggavik ore body lies under land which is used during spring migrations, late-summer post-calving and fall migrations. The BQCMB finds this aspect of exploration particularly concerning, as these points in the life-cycle of the Beverly caribou herd are when the herd is at its most sensitive. Disturbance – stemming from both low-flying aircraft and drilling – to cows travelling to calving grounds in spring may result in decreased calf survival, while frequent interruption of grazing during the spring, summer and fall months may result in an increase in calf mortality and reduced pregnancy rates the following year. As a result, the BQCMB suggested that the NIRB prohibit any exploration or other mining-related activities in the Kiggavik area (BQCMB, 2007).

In a submission to the NIRB during the screening of Areva's Kiggavik mine proposal in 2009, the BQCMB recommended a full review of the proposal and drew attention to the fact that the project may have impacts for Aboriginal communities outside of Nunavut which rely upon

the Beverly caribou herd. Their submission outlined a variety of concerns the BQCMB has with the Kiggavik proposal, including the concerns with exploration discussed above. Concern was expressed over the habitat destruction and obstruction of migration routes associated with roads, mining facilities and open pits as well as the increased potential for the contamination of water, soil and vegetation from ore, explosives, chemicals, wastewater and dust from the Kiggavik mine. Additionally, disturbance to caribou as a result of land and air transportation and the noise from the construction and operation of the mine was highlighted as a concern (NIRB, 2009a:Appendix B-8).

Nunavummiut Makitagunarningit (NM) – a non-governmental organization with the goal of fostering an informed public debate regarding uranium mining – was created in November of 2009, and consists of members from Qamani'tuaq and Iqaluit. Translated into English the group's name means, "the people of Nunavut can rise up." NM has an extensive list of objectives, which include promoting the public awareness of the impacts of uranium exploration and mining in Nunavut, conducting research and promoting consultation regarding uranium issues in Nunavut, promoting the use of Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit in the process of making decisions related to uranium exploration and extraction and protecting the environmental, health, social and harvesting rights of Nunavummiut. Preliminary action towards these goals has included the release of a series of factsheets, which provide basic information on uranium and radiation, a description of the uranium cycle and associated health hazards, a narrative of the history of the development of uranium mining policy in Nunavut and an overview of Nunavut's regulatory regime. While these factsheets are currently only available in English, apparently Inuktitut versions are in the works.

In June of 2010, NM submitted a petition calling for a territory wide public inquiry into

uranium mining in Nunavut, to be carried out by the Government of Nunavut. Their motivation behind calling for an inquiry included the potential social and environmental impacts of uranium mining, the fact that the NIRB is intended to approve specific projects only (and that, in their opinion, the approval of Kiggavik will signal the approval of uranium mining in general for all of Nunavut), the lack of community consultation involved in NTI and the KIA's newfound support for uranium mining and the inability of Nunavut's regulatory regime to properly monitor uranium projects (*Nunatsiaq News*, June 29, 2010).

Other prominent public figures in Nunavut have expressed opinions regarding both the Kiggavik project and the manner in which decisions surrounding uranium mining in Nunavut are being made. Darrell Greer, the Qallunaat editor of *Kivalliq News*, responded to the concerns of the BLCCC in a 2009 editorial. Greer suggested that fears of uranium mining were unfounded, and that "Areva's proposal will help Baker evolve and prosper, if it ever reaches fruition." He went on in his editorial to imply that Inuit culture and harvesting activities are now outdated, and are of little use in Nunavut today, stating, "Elders can pine for things to stay the same, and hunters and fishers can want their agendas followed, but that won't help young families own their own homes and become financially stable." While Greer admitted that, in the past, exploration and mining companies have made numerous unfulfilled promises and done a great deal of damage to communities, he contended that, due to stricter regulations, mining companies have now become trustworthy (*Kivalliq News*, March 25, 2009).

In a letter to the editor of *Nunatsiaq News*, former commissioner of Nunavut Peter Irniq responded to Greer's editorial, showing support for the BLCCC's perspective in the debate. Irniq described the author's assertion that the support of middle class growth and capitalist economic development are more relevant to the present context than hunting and Elders' values as

"colonialistic and outdated." Irniq went on to engage Greer's assertion that stricter regulations have rendered mining companies trustworthy, highlighting the environmental destruction other mining projects are currently causing in other areas of Canada (most prominently the oil industry in Alberta and uranium mining in Northern Saskatchewan). Irniq concluded that "The more debate we have about uranium mining in Nunavut, the better." (*Nunatsiaq News*, March 18, 2009)

Irniq has also levelled criticism at the manner in which NTI and the KIA have adopted pro-uranium mining stances. Irniq co-authored another letter to the editor of *Nunatsiaq News* (December 19, 2008) with filmmaker Zacharias Kunuk and former KIA Social Development Coordinator Bernadette Dean. The three suggest that the land claims organizations' approach to the uranium mining issue in Nunavut fails to live up to *Aajiiqatigiingniq*, one of the core values of IQ. In the letter they stated that

Aajiiqatigiingniq is the Inuit way of consensus decision-making: the ability to think and act collaboratively, to consult and respect various perspectives leading to a strong belief in shared goals...NTI leaders, boards and negotiating teams seem to believe aajiiqatigiingniq means democratic decision-making, the southern belief that getting elected or appointed every few years gives leaders the right to decide what's best for everyone else.

This concern with "top-down" decision making overtaking Inuit consensus style decision making in a post-land claim context resonates with the BQCMB's concerns about the consultation process involved in the adoption of NTI's new stance on uranium mining, NM's objective of encouraging the incorporation of IQ into decision making processes related to uranium mining and the feelings of many residents of Qamani'tuaq.

Two Aboriginal communities located outside of Nunavut have also expressed opinions on the Kiggavik project during NIRB's screening process, both voicing opposition to the proposal. The Athabasca Desuline Negotiating Team, representing First Nations communities in

Northern Saskatchewan, explained that their opposition was rooted in the role the Beverly and Qamanirjuaq caribou herds play in Athabasca Denesuline economic, social and cultural identity, the fact that the Kiggavik project will be located in sensitive caribou habitat and the belief that the mitigation measures currently proposed by Areva will be insufficient to protect the caribou herds (NIRB, 2009a:Appendix B-4). The Lutsel K'e/Kache Dene First Nation (LKDFN) – whose hunters also utilize the Beverly caribou herd when it is in the eastern North West Territories – submitted comments to the NIRB screening of the Kiggavik proposal in which they argued that "the potential adverse impacts of the Kiggavik and Sissons projects are so unacceptable that it should be abandoned." (NIRB, 2009a:Appenix B-19).

COMMUNITY VOICES

The people with whom I spoke exhibited a wide range of perspectives on this issue. It must be emphasized that one group of opinions is not true while others are not true. Inuit perspectives on the issue vary for a number of reasons and the Kiggavik mine will impact different individuals and different families in different ways. Many agreed that opinions are constantly shifting and most felt that, during my time in Qamani'tuaq, the general population had at the very least become more open to the idea of uranium mining at Kiggavik. Most had observed a sharp increase in support for the proposal in recent years, in conjunction with many people becoming more ambivalent about the prospect of uranium mining in the region.

Although opinions of uranium mining may be shifting towards a stance that is supportive of the nuclear industry, opposition to the Kiggavik project still exists within Qamani'tuaq. The most vocal source of opposition has been Joan Scottie, who has re-formed the Baker Lake Concerned Citizens Committee (BLCCC) in response to Areva's interests in developing the

Kiggavik ore body. The BLCCC submitted commentary to the NIRB during the screening of Areva's mine proposal, in which they expressed their continued opposition to uranium mining in the Kivalliq region, and recommended that a federal assessment panel review the project proposal. The reasons behind their opposition include the perception that the approval of the Kiggavik proposal will render the community of Qamani'tuaq politically impotent to successfully oppose future uranium mine proposals, making it necessary to consider the cumulative impacts of multiple uranium mines when assessing the Kiggavik project. The BLCCC is of the opinion that the numerous anticipated uranium mining projects will have substantial negative impacts on the Beverly and Qamanirjuaq caribou herds, as well as hunting lifestyles, human health and the general socioeconomic condition of people residing both within the Kivalliq region and in communities in the North West Territories, Manitoba and Saskatchewan which rely on caribou herds which utilize the Kiggavik area as habitat (NIRB, 2009a:Appendix B-7).

The concerns of the BLCCC are shared by many residents of Qamani'tuaq, many of whom remain disconnected from the activities of opposition groups like the BLCCC and NM. People were concerned about the environmental impacts associated with mining, including disturbances to wildlife, the management of tailings and the risk of toxins being released into the environment in the event of an accident. These fears were often connected to potential impacts on community health, in terms of a decreased access to country foods and potential exposure to toxins. For some, the fear of accidents was increased by the fact that the physical environment of the region – Arctic tundra – was a context in which uranium mining has never been attempted and few southern transient workers have experience with.

During an interview Vera Avaala, whose family routinely hunts and fishes downstream

from the Kiggavik area, voiced concern that the fish and animals her family depends upon for food would be killed or contaminated if an accident were to occur. She also questioned where the community would get their water from in the event of contamination of the hydrosphere. Her belief that spills and accidents may take place was, to a degree, related to the fact that the transient workers that come to Qamani'tuaq to work in mines are not familiar with Arctic winters and will have trouble avoiding accidents during storms and blizzards.

These types of concerns were echoed by many other Inuit in Qamani'tuaq. Concerns of possible contamination of the land, water and wildlife were common.

They say that accidents don't happen, but they do. The water system that Kiggavik is located on flows directly into Baker Lake. It's scary to think of what might happen if there is a huge accident. We might not be able to occupy this area anymore, or might not even survive. (Anonymous Youth: Female)

There is going to be some kind of pollution happening with the water. They say everything's all safe and everything but I don't believe that. It's mining; it's digging into the ground and removing stuff that shouldn't be moved because it was there to begin with. Yeah, it's probably going to create jobs and stuff but what about the pollution that it's going to cause? I'm not thinking about next year, I'm thinking about ten years, twenty years, what's going to happen then when our water's polluted and the fish doesn't taste as fresh and have to go further just for fresh water. I went hunting and there was one area where I saw puddles and it was nothing but oil spills. I know that's from Hondas and stuff like that, but that's going to end up happening as you go to the mining camp, there's going to be pollution. We try to use everything we have, but with the mining there it's driving the animals further and further away and that means we have to travel further and further away and sometimes that's too hard. They can have meetings over and over for ten, twenty years or fifty years saying how safe it is, and meanwhile it's just slowly, all the chemicals and all the blasting that they do, that's stuff that's going into the air that will eventually seep back down. (Anonymous Youth: Female)

From a mining perspective, the more I learn about, I got more concerned. The way they mine it, it [yellowcake] will be just like flour, that's how fine it will be. The other thing is with the tailings. Basically, what's been explained to me is that they will just be taking one isotope, but they will also be leaving two other isotopes, you know, as tailings. Those two are very highly radioactive. They said 'ok, this is how we're going to manage the tailings.' I think 'fine,' but, I mean, it has a really long half-life eh? As far as we're concerned, hundreds of thousands of years. I already didn't think that could be managed all along. They pretend if something ever does happen they can clean it up. Think of throwing a bag

of flour on the land and trying to clean it up. It's the same in the water. There's just no way, like, you can't just pick it up and clean it, you know. So, that is my concern. So many mining companies, you know a lot of times they leave their tailings and by the time something happens, like decades later, you know if there is an environmental [issue]...sometimes they try and go back to the companies and tell them to clean up their mess, and the company's no longer there. Especially when we talk about hundreds of years, with radioactive material. You know, things change over time. All they have to do is change their company name in some cases, and it's legally not their problem.

A lot of people heard about that and say 'ok, so uranium mining and having the tailings, it can be managed quite well down south but people believe that, you know, it cannot be managed up here. Like, we have some people coming up from Northern Saskatchewan coming up to Baker Lake and saying 'you know, look at these mines in northern Saskatchewan, they're working great.' I've been to northern Saskatchewan too, but it's so different from up here. You can say it's working great in northern Saskatchewan, but this is not Northern Saskatchewan...Some people are not comfortable with...what works down south works up here. What works down there might not necessarily work up here as far as the tailings go. (Hugh Ikoe)

Some felt that the regulatory boards in Nunavut were unable to enforce the restrictions they place on mining projects. In their submission to the NIRB's screening for the Kiggavik mine, the BLCCC stated that

The proponent likes to the point to uranium development in northern Saskatchewan as a 'success story.' To whatever degree it can be considered a 'success', this is due to the very high level of scrutiny that the industry has received from the regulatory authorities. The regulatory authorities in Nunavut simply do not have the capacity to subject uranium development here to the same level of constant and rigorous scrutiny. **If uranium mining is to take place in Nunavut, who will regulate the regulators?** [Bold in original] (NIRB, 2009a: Appendix B-7)

Some of the people I spoke with who opposed the Kiggavik project were upset with how quickly mining projects were moving forward in the area, and wanted more time for the community to gain experience with the Meadowbank gold mine before moving forward with other non-renewable resource projects.

It is upsetting how quickly things are moving...Meadowbank gives us the opportunity to see the benefits and the drawbacks of mining so we don't go into other projects blind. Why should we rush into things? Let's see how Meadowbank works first. (Anonymous Adult: Female)

Doubts regarding the likelihood that community members would gain long-term benefits from the mine were voiced during a number of interviews. At a consultation meeting held by the KIA, one community member addressed the meeting and expressed doubts that many residents of Qamani'tuaq would be hired at the mine beyond the initial construction phase of the mine's lifecycle. Some people cited the fact that the Meadowbank gold mine was already employing the majority of the residents of Qamani'tuaq who were willing and able to attain jobs in the mining sector, as many Inuit were in familial contexts which prevented them from adhering to the mine's work schedule.

Even right now, this mine, we can hire everyone that's unemployed right now. It's just that, number one, socially it's just hard for them to be up there. Number two they don't have their education. If it wasn't for those two everyone would be working...One mine is enough for us, but the problem we have right now is that our population is not educated enough to take so many jobs and the other problem is that we're not...I duno...we're just not culturally, you know, prepared to be working out, leaving a family for two weeks, because that's the hardest thing that the company's dealing with right now. A lot of people are quitting. One of our relatives just last week, she was working up there with her husband and she says that she quit. She doesn't want to quit but they got four kids and their parents are looking after them so the kids are being looked after by the grandparents. It was too much for the grandparents so I went to Agnico's monthly meeting and last summer they said that something like fifty people quit in one month last summer because of family. Not so much family problems but they're having a hard time finding a babysitter. They're not prepared to work in a mine. (Hugh Ikoe)

The Kivalliq is not ready for more jobs. It is unlikely that Kiggavik will hire many Inuit, especially from Baker Lake. Also, we don't want to prepare the whole region to work in a mine. We want Inuit doctors, lawyers, police officers and things like this, not just miners. It will benefit some of the business-owners in town, but it will hurt everyone else for generations to come (Anonymous Adult: Female)

Opposition to the Kiggavik project was, for some, related to more than the direct environmental and social impacts of the Kiggavik mine itself. The likelihood that the approval of Areva's proposal will set precedents for future uranium mines in the region was a factor in their decision to oppose the mine.

When we talk about uranium mining, we're not just talking about one mine. We're surrounded by uranium exploration. There's Areva, there's Cameco, there's Uravan. We have at least 6 or 7 companies exploring for uranium. Our concern has always been that the approval of one uranium mine will lead to....I mean if we approve one uranium mine it will be politically impossible to stop others in the future. That's one issue that has been a concern of ours because we have a lot of uranium in our hunting grounds, and also in caribou migration routes and caribou calving grounds. (Joan Scottie)

There's not going to be just a uranium mine, not one. If one mine opens up there will be others after that, no doubt about it. This is not the only mother load. We are completely surrounded. (Hugh Ikoe)

Some of the people who opposed the mine also expressed distaste to the manner in which decisions regarding the proposal have been made. A degree of concern regarding the manner in which Inuit Organizations have come to support uranium mining was apparent in some of the people with whom I spoke. People felt that Inuit Organizations were biased in favour of mining companies, and were making decisions “behind closed doors” with little input from Inuit at the community level. In a submission to the NIRB’s screening of Areva’s proposal, the BLCCC claimed that the pro-uranium stance of NTI and the KIA was adopted without adequate community consultations.

We are well aware that Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. and the Kivalliq Inuit Association have already given their approval in principle to uranium mining in our region. They paid no attention to our concerns, and we feel that their decisions were made on the basis of one-sided information. We want you to know that we do not feel that we have been adequately consulted during the development of these positions, and that these organizations do not speak for us in this regard. The fact that several political organizations have already made their minds up does not mean that the people of the region have.

Some of the people with whom I spoke connected the Inuit Organizations’ openness to uranium mining to the resource royalty framework created by the NLCA, a topic I explore in chapter 5.

Community members have also expressed frustration with the manner in which the NPC concluded that section 3.6 of the *Keewatin Regional Land Use Plan* had been satisfied. The NPC’s decision was based upon the fact that the Kivalliq Inuit Association and Hamlet of

Qamani'tuaq have indicated support for uranium mining. However, Joan Scottie has suggested that – due to the fact that the KIA came to support uranium mining without adequate consultation – gauging the opinion of the residents of Qamani'tuaq, preferably through a plebiscite, would be more appropriate. In an interview with the media, Joan Scottie mentioned that the NPC held a workshop in Qamani'tuaq regarding uranium mining in 2007, but contends that participants were not told that the meeting would constitute support for uranium mining in the future and that a public plebiscite is the only way to properly satisfy section 3.6 (*CBC News North*, Feb 18, 2009). The claim that participants did not realize that they were giving consent to uranium mining appears to be consistent with media reports from the time of the meeting, which indicate that no agreement was expected to be reached at the workshop (*CBC News North*, June 7, 2007).

Although opposition does exist, it appears as if it is currently in decline. Many claimed that they were now more open to the idea of the Kiggavik mine becoming a reality, or at least to mining in general. The prospects for jobs for Inuit youth in Qamani'tuaq and the fact that mining companies engage in consultations with the community were given as primary reasons for support.

In the past I wasn't too happy about all these mines and stuff that were coming up here but later on my thinking started changing...you have all of these people who would have been on welfare, who now have jobs, are now getting an income, are working. I can't really oppose them. Kiggavik is on the south side of Aberdeen/Shultz Lake area. Where I grew up is really close to where the proposed mine is. We used to have our tents set up along the south side of the lake near where the mine will be. The mine they want to open up is very close to where I grew up. I have no problems with that now. (Irene Tiktaalaaq)

I am in support of Kiggavik at this point because I am trying to think of their [my grand children's] future and they have to think of their future...far into the future...what life might be like and how to set things for the future. (John Nukik)

My main support for the mine opening was for the youth to have employment opportunities. Over the years I have been told that it's the youth that will have employment opportunities and that they'll have options open. If they want to work they'll have a job.

Because of that, I supported the mine at Meadowbank. (Jacob Ikinilik)

As with Areva, knowing that there won't be anybody living out there for any length of time anymore and also knowing that the mining companies are really informing the community and the people and that it's become obvious that they're going to be watching what they're doing. I'm now at a point where I'm in support of Areva. I am in support of them mainly because of employment for youth. (Matthew Kunangnat)

Today, mining companies both for Meadowbank and Kiggavik, today those mining companies are keeping the community, everybody, informed as to what they're doing. They're keeping the community up to date about what they're doing. Before then, the Elders who were only on pension, were almost like the administrators, providing food for their children and grandchildren. But the mining companies are now providing employment. Today, the only way to get anything or do anything is through money. As for me, because young people I had been providing money for are now able to find work, whether it's for Agnico or Kiggavik, they are now able to find work a lot easier. For myself, I am in support of both [mines] for now. The need for my children and grandchildren to depend on me is gone, so it's much easier for me. (Silas Aittauq)

I am neither against nor am I going to oppose mining for a number of reasons. There are a lot of young people who were unemployed in town who are now gainfully employed in town. The only thing I sort of opposed was the building of the road. But I stopped opposing it when I heard that Caribou will cross the road, will go wherever they want, cross the road whenever they want. Once they want to move, not even the road will stop them. That's when I stopped opposing the building of the road. I have nothing against them [the mining companies] as far as I know. (Paul Atutuva)

Mining provides a variety of benefits to Baker Lake. Mining would be a good career because of the money they're making. This is good because of how expensive things are up here. It is also important because of high unemployment in Qamani'tuaq. (Anonymous Youth: Male)

However, despite indicating some degree of support for the Kiggavik proposal, many continued to have concerns with the project. It is perhaps useful to categorize their feelings for the project as mixed. Some people were still concerned with the potential environmental impacts the mine may have, the implications these impacts would have for community health and harvesting and the possibility that mining companies may not live up to the promises they are making.

Once a mining company starts, there's no stopping the disruption. From what I'm hearing

there are a number of original homeland [people] who are starting to say that 'hey, the land is being disrupted' and as much as they don't like that idea, they still see the one positive, that their family members are now gainfully employed. For themselves, they are sorry that their traditional homeland is being completely disrupted. As long as they don't disrupt other homeland areas where they don't need to, I'm okay with it. It's someone's traditional homeland, but as much as I don't like that, I alone can't stop the mining companies from [doing] what they've started. Once they've started they're not going to stop. What else can I say? As much as I have nothing against them at this point, you never know.

It's good that they're trying to keep the Inuit concerned, but sometimes, maybe, as a big corporation, they find it easy to take over management when they're not managers or landowners for that matter. It's easy for them to start acting as landowners...whereas the Inuit, who are landowners, should be the ones giving the say, instead of the mining companies giving the say to the Inuit. In other words, they like to take the helm instead of giving the helm to the Inuit (Paul Atutuva)

Growing up I had always taken the side of our Elders who have now passed away and they were always opposed to the mining because they wanted to keep the Inuit culture alive and they've understood from the past that mining usually moves very quickly and language disappears and culture disappears quickly. But over the years I now have mixed feelings. I still support Inuit language and culture, but we do need employment here and mining companies offer a good deal of employment, often with pretty good pay even for lay people. So, in that sense I think economically speaking, I totally support it. I would support it socially if the mining companies were a little more open to the community and got involved in community affairs and learn where the community is coming from and where it stands, support local activities, get involved in cultural affairs and take language classes - Inuktitut as a second language - and things like that. Become aware that Inuit feel very attached to the land. Many of these people who are now working are hunting part time, just on a part time basis...weekends, on their time off...so, I don't know. Mining can be a good thing, but we've also heard a lot about alcohol and drugs coming in and young girls having children at an early age from mining people passing through and stuff like that so those are concerns that we have about the mining industry. Sometimes things just move so fast. (Anonymous Adult: Male)

Some expressed a desire to wait until the project moves ahead further before forming an opinion, while others emphasized that, while they currently support the Kiggavik project, that their minds could potentially be swayed if Areva fails to live up to the promises they have made.

From what I understand, as much as I am still concerned, but because the powers that be are a little more open to supporting a uranium mine, as much as I am concerned, as long as they are going to make sure that our concerns are looked after, I am a lot more open to it. At this point, seeing as how they haven't opened yet, I'm not too concerned. But once the mine opens, and of course they are going to be removing snow when they're mining, and

because the snow will melt and trickle everywhere and through the creeks and rivers, that's where my main concern is, contamination in the snow. I'm not too concerned because they're not opening yet and I want to watch and see if the powers that be are really monitoring the situation. And as they're opening see if the powers that be are really monitoring all of my concerns. That's when I'll start opening my own thoughts. (Jacob Ikinilik)

It seems right now, seeing as how they are still only looking at the possibility of opening a mine, at this point it seems that they are doing good so far, but they really haven't opened yet, and haven't been given permission to open...so far it looks like they're doing a good job, but then again, things may change (Anonymous Elder: Male)

At this point I have nothing against the mines. They are now employing a number of Inuit, both the young and the middle aged. But, if any Inuit start having some kind of concerns, as an Inuk myself, I will always side with the Inuit. Right now I have nothing against the mining companies, but if a concern ever comes, the first support I'm going to give to is to the Inuit, not the mining companies (Paul Atutuvaa)

While many still had mixed feelings about the mine, others were far more confident in the ability of the Kiggavik to play a positive role in the future of Qamani'tuaq. Some sought to actively support the development of the project proposal; during a Community Liason Committee meeting with a representative from Areva, one resident asked what he could do to help accelerate the regulatory process and get the Kiggavik project started sooner. During interviews, some Elders also expressed a desire to commence mining at Kiggavik as soon as possible.

I don't know, even if the mine were to be opened I don't know if I'm going to be here if it does finally open. I am hopeful, I am striving for it too, but I don't know if I'll still be alive if they do start. (Irene Tiktaalaaq)

While support for mining may have increased, a need to resist dispossession by the mining company is by no means non-existent in those who support Kiggavik. An analysis of the dialogue surrounding mining in the community reveals that many Inuit who support the Kiggavik project are still very much devoted to the maintenance of a harvesting economy. Inuit still rely upon harvesting a great deal in Qamani'tuaq, especially Elders. I had the opportunity to

visit the homes of some of the people who support the Kiggavik proposal, and many contained chunks of raw caribou, set upon cardboard on the floor, available for people to eat casually throughout the day. Others were nice enough to provide me with gifts of fish after the interview. Many claimed that many imported foods made them feel sick. One woman informed me that the only imported foods she eats regularly are tea and flour.

...but the Inuit also want to protect their way of life and their traditional staples and want them protected...they want to be able to eat what they grew up on...store bought food looks good and tastes good...but for the traditional Inuit who grew up on traditional staples, it's really hard on our bodies, it gives us heartburn. As you're eating them they taste good, but after an hour or so, after you've eaten, it starts giving you heartburn. You get to the point where, in order to fix that heartburn, you need traditional food to fix it. (Anonymous Elder: Male)

Also, the food that is store-bought, it's hard on your chest, you get heartburn and stuff, and also they don't keep your energy up as well as traditional food. You can go pretty well all day with one big meal and go and do whatever you have to do without thinking about hunger. (John Nukik)

Many youth with whom I spoke, who are often accused of having little interest in harvesting or in the perpetuation of harvesting activities, support the Kiggavik project but continue to see a great deal of value in the harvesting economy and Inuit culture, and view it as integral to their quality of life. They described knowledge of their culture and language as important for their self esteem and mental health in general, and highlighted the enduring utility of a source of furs for clothing and organic meat. Some discussed the fact that country food tastes better than imported food, and that it is healthier – due to both the high concentration of nutrients in wild game and concerns related to the use of hormones and other drugs in factory farmed meat.

It is important for me to hunt animals for the iron they contain, and they are healthier than store bought food. Plus, I am not sure what they put into the food they sell at the stores. It is also important for others to use animal skins for shelter such as tents, mitts, boots, and even blankets. Even fish skins are used to make tool bags and skins are also used to make ladles. (Anonymous Youth: Male)

Today we hunt for food because it's a lot healthier for the blood, and it gives us protein. When we hunt for food, it lasts longer. You can leave it outside to keep frozen or in the freezer without spoiling the meat. Whenever you buy food from the store it will only last a few weeks. The country food tastes better than store-bought food. (Anonymous Youth: Female)

Some supporters of the project expressed confidence that the hunting economy of Qamani'tuaq will continue to provide for Inuit into the future, regardless of whether or not the Kiggavik mine opens.

Hunting will not change, whether you're working or not. Come the weekend, those who are working on Saturday will be going out hunting. Hunting will not change whether you're working or not or young or not. It's a source of food, aside from what you get from the stores. Back then when there were no stores, the hunters went out every day, went out hunting for food, clothing, whatever. Although times have changed, today there are people who are working and come weekend they're going to go out hunting. So the way of hunting and the time of hunting have changed, but people will still hunt because it's a source of food. It's also a main staple for the Inuit, for those who enjoy caribou. (Jacob Ikinilik)

In addition to attributing importance to the maintenance of the harvesting economy, many demands made by Inuit who support the Kiggavik project are attempts to ensure that the harvesting economy remains viable despite the existence of a uranium mine. A common condition upon which Inuit offer their support to the Kiggavik project is that it will not significantly harm or poison caribou and fish populations. Many insisted that proper monitoring procedures be implemented. William Noah expressed the need to properly monitor and control uranium mining projects, and felt that the NLCA ensured that this would happen. Others also discussed the need for proper monitoring.

The concern I have is that any of the wildlife...I wonder if any contamination...if they might eventually consume any contaminants and become contaminated themselves and unsafe for human consumption or fatal for human consumption or any consumption. I'd rather like to see proper monitoring mechanisms put in place to watch each and every mining company. (Paul Atutuva)

In addition to demanding that the Kiggavik project operates in a manner which will not

destroy the wildlife upon which Inuit hunting depends upon, some described a need to alter the temporal constraints wage labour jobs at mines place upon employees. One Elder and numerous youth who were or had previously been employed in the mining industry were concerned with the fact that Inuit cannot hunt or fish while living at most exploration or mining camps. They believed that this stipulation is unjust, and contended that it made it difficult to regularly engage in harvesting pursuits. Some went as far to suggest that if the opportunity to hunt arises – for example, if caribou approach jobsites – Inuit should be permitted to leave work briefly to harvest the wildlife.

Inuit resistance to the imposition of capitalist conceptions of space parallels resistance to Western/capitalist conceptions of time. This is most apparent in the controversy related to Inuit access to the road connecting Qamani'tuaq with the Meadowbank gold mine. During the construction of the Meadowbank mine, a 110 kilometre all-weather access road was built atop of an existing all terrain vehicle trail Inuit utilized to access hunting grounds and cultural sites (NIRB, 2009b:10). Due to concerns with the consequences of increased human access to caribou, the NIRB placed restrictions upon the use of the road, insisting that it operate as a private access road (2). However, Inuit in the community were under the impression that the road would be available for Inuit to use without restrictions (many of the Inuit I interviewed informed me that they were told that they would have access to the road during consultation meetings). During construction, a manned gatehouse was built at the southern end of the road. Although Agnico-Eagle initially turned a blind eye to Inuit travelling on the road via ATV, they eventually began to block access to the road (3).

In 2008, the Hamlet of Baker Lake applied to have the restrictions on the road amended, allowing unregulated public access to the first 90 kilometres of the road. Following

consultations, Agnico-Eagle and the Hamlet Council put forth a joint position on the road at a NIRB meeting. They requested that the road remain a private access road, but that Inuit could gain access to the road for traditional uses if they are issued passes by the local HTO (4). The NIRB later accepted this compromise position, and the road is now open for Inuit to use it, provided they are travelling by all-terrain vehicle (iii).

Access to roads built by mining companies was a common theme in the interviews I conducted.

One thing about this road that bothers a lot of people is that when the road first got constructed the whole community was told 'as soon as this road is done, as soon as it is complete you will have access to it to go hunting on it and you'll have no problems with it'. That was told to the community at first and later on as soon as things started moving along and the road was constructed, they put up a gatehouse and started telling people that they're not allowed to use the road anymore. (Irene Tiktaalaaq)

I went through this conflict...before the road was built everyone went by trail to wherever they wanted to go, there were trails everywhere...if they wanted to go far they had to bring extra gas...we were told, that once the road was built, local harvesters could use the road, but once the road was built...all of a sudden things changed. And the company, Agnico, who had taken over, said harvesters couldn't use it. But I said 'no, this is my land, and I see other Hondas on the road anyways. Only if you tell every other person on an ATV to get off the road, I'll get off, but not before then. But I'm going home, and once I get home I won't be back here anyways. There were a few arguments back and forth. I started talking back, I wasn't too happy with it, and a lot of other hunters weren't happy with it. (Anonymous Elder: Male)

Many felt that existing restrictions are too confining, and felt that Inuit should be able to use the road without passes and in trucks rather than just all-terrain vehicles. However, people often felt that the compromise solution they have arrived at is, at the very least, acceptable.

There's too many restrictions on the road. Although HTO is giving passes to all hunters if they want to use it, that's the only way they can use it if they have a pass and just on their ATVs, not on their trucks or anything. (Joan Scottie)

They've built the road, harvesters can use it, but there are times when you can't really pick and choose. That's where, maybe, one of the sticky points is for a lot of hunters. Sometimes you are able to travel on the road freely, but at times there are restrictions. Not

much one can do when you are an individual. I understand that obviously there are restrictions at times. It's easy to be able to get on and off the road if you're on an ATV, unless of course it's steep. (Paul Attutuvaa)

Another thing that bothers people quite often is that now we have to have a pass to use the road. When the process first got started they told the community that this is a road we'd have access to, and we could use it no problem. But now-a-days we have to get a pass from HTO in order to use the road and go hunting. When a small community, quite often hunters will hear from other people, okay, the caribou are in this area or that area. As soon as you hear you want to get up and go. It's a little hard to do that because you have to wait for the HTO office to open, get that little pass, and then go. The thing that really bothers us is that we were told we'd have access to the road whenever we wanted, we'd have freedom. When we were first told we had to start using passes we weren't happy with it, but we had no choice, we had to adapt. At first it was very inconvenient and very awkward, but we understand that we have no choice in the end and we adapt, even though we are not happy with the simple fact that we do have to get a pass to get up there. (Irene Tiktaalaaq)

In effect, the requirement that harvesters acquire a pass prior to utilizing the Meadowbank road has transformed an issue of space into one of temporality. The ability to act quickly when environmental conditions (especially those related to weather and the availability of wildlife) allow is an important component of the harvesting economy, and one which is already constrained by settlement life and a reliance on wage earning pursuits. Capitalist notions of time are being imposed by the nine-to-five schedule of the HTO office where permits must be sought. While Inuit seem to have conceded on this issue and accepted the compromise, it is clearly not an ideal situation for Inuit harvesters.

By engaging in legal action to restore access to the road to Inuit hunters, the Hamlet Council and the community in general are resisting the transformation of the landscape from one which facilitates harvesting to one which facilitates capital accumulation. Although they are seeking a compromise between the logic of the two economic systems, they are ensuring that the harvesting mode of production is not erased from the landscape. Some feel that, with the compromise solution, the road is now reinforcing the hunting economy, rather than damaging it.

Before the road was in, all we had were trails when we were out hunting by ATV. So, we had to [stay] overnight if we were going a distance to harvest any caribou. But today now that the road is in, sometimes your former camping grounds when you were hunting by trail, you can pass it. And you get there so fast and pass it, do your hunting, and you can return the same day. Today, you can do that. (Silas Aittuaq)

When people go out hunting sometimes the machines will break down. There have been a few occasions where, thanks to the road getting them back into town...finding them has been a lot faster. That's one benefit now that the road is open. The area where the road is in is where people go hunting quite often...so that is one useful aspect of it. Having that road closed may be bad, but at the same time people have used the gate post. People have been calling there if their machines break down or they run out of gas, and they'll call the people at the gate and ask to be picked up. That saves a lot of walking and a lot of heartache. You have two aspects to it, the good and the bad. (Irene Tiktaalaaq)

Inuit in Qamani'tuaq are also expressing concern with the dispossession of mineral resources by mining companies throughout the dialogue surrounding both the Kiggavik and Meadowbank gold mines. Inuit are well aware that the minerals taken from their lands will be used in industrial processes in the metropolis, for the benefit of residents of the metropolis. During the Areva CLC meeting I attended, one member of the audience asked if the uranium Areva was going to mine could remain in Nunavut rather than being shipped south. Similarly, several youth indicated to me that they think that the gold mined at Meadowbank should stay in Nunavut so it can benefit Inuit.

These wishes are obviously impossible in a capitalist framework. Nunavut has no secondary industries that could purchase or make use of these mineral commodities and mining companies are corporations seeking profit, not charitable organizations with the primary goal of bettering the economic condition of Inuit. The gold and uranium cannot and will not remain in Nunavut if it is mined by a capitalist corporation. However, despite the impossibility of the desire for the extracted minerals to remain in Nunavut, these comments and perspectives demonstrate that Inuit are well aware that they are being dispossessed by the mining industry and

that they want this to change.

It is beyond the scope of this study to determine whether or not the Kiggavik mine would provide net benefits to the Inuit of Qamani'tuaq or what type and magnitude of environmental impacts it would have. I do not possess the qualifications or familiarity with the community to draw definitive conclusions. However, it should be clear that, at the very least, this is a complicated and difficult issue that calls for an in-depth and critical analysis before any decisions should be made. Many Inuit and Qallunaat have expressed the view that this form of critical analysis is not taking place; this is made clear by statements from the BLCCC, Peter Irniq, the BQCMB and numerous community members.

From my perspective, it seems as if these assertions that an adequate critical appraisal of the proposal is not taking place are well founded. For example, NTI's *Background Paper on Uranium Policy* (2006) and *Policy Concerning Uranium Mining* (2007) appear to engage with social and environmental concerns in a very limited fashion. They insist that uranium mining will only be carried out in a socially and environmentally friendly manner, but provide no details regarding how this will be ensured. Their analysis of contemporary uranium mining projects relies almost completely on the "success story" of Northern Saskatchewan. It seems as if a more thorough engagement with recent research on the subject which highlights the contemporary dangers of uranium mining (for example, Winfield et al, 2006) would be necessary for a fair and balanced assessment of the issue.

In general, it seems as if there is insufficient information to substantiate claims that the Kiggavik mine will be both good for the community of Qamani'tuaq and benign in terms of environmental impacts. I will return to this topic in my conclusion. For now, I would like to attempt to explore how the idea that the Kiggavik mine will be both safe for the community of

Qamani'tuaq and provide benefits to the general population is becoming common sense at the community level, despite the fact that it appears as if there is currently insufficient evidence to support such a claim.

CHAPTER 5: ACCOUNTING FOR CHANGE

The reasons Inuit gave for their own changes in opinion regarding uranium mining, or their perception of why other people have recently changed their minds, varied a great deal. Different factors are clearly contributing to each person's perspective on the issue, rendering any comprehensive explanation of this shift in opinion impossible. However, a number of common themes came up throughout the interviews I conducted, which point to phenomena that are particularly influential. The most prominent of these factors can be broadly categorized as relating to Areva's public relations campaign, the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, Inuit economic dependence, a loss of land-based skills in the younger generation and the current status of the Meadowbank Gold Project.

AREVA'S PUBLIC RELATIONS CAMPAIGN

Many attribute the openness to uranium mining to the public relations campaign undertaken by Areva Resources, discussed in the preceding chapter. However, the manner in which people characterize this campaign varies greatly between individuals. Some described it in a positive light, highlighting the fact that Areva had gone to great lengths to educate the community about the way uranium is mined, and has gone to great lengths to involve Inuit in the decision making process. Some contrasted this with the way in which Urangschelschaft approached the community in the late 1980s.

It wasn't until I became a member of the Areva CLC that I really started finding out what the issues were locally. Up until then, I had never been told and so I wasn't too concerned. One thing Areva's been good for is having tours with the community, including the CLC. What I saw for myself and from what I have been told it seems that they're upright. They told us how it might look over time and what's going to happen if it opens and how they're going to look after...giving some definite details. UG never really informed the community in any way as to what they were doing. It wasn't until the end of the court sessions that the

community was really informed as to what happened. In my mind, if they're still going to keep informing the community and keeping us up to date, I feel that there's not going to be that much more of a conflict. It seems, from what I hear, that the community is a lot more informed today than we were in the 70s and 80s. It's obvious that there are people who are very nosey and want to know everything in every culture. And then there are those who just follow along...Those who aren't really nosey and asking questions seem to be a lot better informed than they were back then.

We have all our elected officials, our councillors and all that. They've gone for meetings, they've gone on these trips, they've gone to different mines that the company is running now-a-days, they're shown what will happen if the mine is opened, what sort of procedures they will be following, for example, what will be done with the tailings when it is completed, what sort of measures will be taken to ensure that it is safe. Yes, we have heard that uranium is dangerous but from what Areva has been saying, if they follow what their procedures dictate them to follow, as long as all of the safety guidelines are followed there should be no problems because we've been shown other places where they have all these mines and processing plants and stuff. Hamlet councillors and mayors and stuff have been flown out and shown other places and judging by what they say, they are really happy with it as long as they follow their procedures and treat Inuit with respect. (Irene Tiktaalaaq)

The prospect of thinking of opening a uranium mine started to change for a couple of reasons. A number of people had been taken for tours to northern Saskatchewan to see how uranium is mined, how it was being developed. People both from the community and the Inuit organizations were given tours. That's when people slowly started changing their minds once they had a better understanding of how uranium is worked with. (Anonymous Elder: Male)

The change started happening when the mining companies started informing and keeping the hamlet council informed as to what they're doing and what they were going to be doing. It was also becoming obvious that there would be people monitoring them on their sites. Whether the companies or on the Inuit side. (Matthew Kunangnat)

This positive characterization of Areva's work in the community is drawn upon primarily by people who support the Kiggavik proposal.

Those who opposed the project or had mixed feelings often had a different opinion of the way in which Areva is engaging with the Inuit of Qamani'tuaq. Many felt that Areva's campaign was more akin to a propaganda war than a public-relations campaign. Many distrusted the information provided by the company and the perspective of the nuclear experts Areva sends to the community, claiming they were inherently biased.

It's the mining company that brings out what they'd like...all the real dangerous aspects are not really exposed or explained...they want to open the mine. (Anonymous Elder: Male)

When mining industry is determined to get what they want, they are not going to provide you with answers that are dangerous [honest answers] (Anonymous Youth: Female)

...these guys are just getting paid to help open the uranium mine, they're not getting paid otherwise, and they're going to say it's good stuff. It's their job to say so. (Hugh Ikoe)

Many community members also expressed distrust towards Areva's public relations campaign outside of the setting of formal interviews. During one of the KIA consultation meetings I attended, I was standing at the back of the room speaking to a friend when a man walked up to us, leaned towards forward, asked, "Have those mining guys gotten any better at telling lies? They're full of shit!" before leaving the room. Similar sentiments were expressed regarding the the Dene Elders that visited Qamani'tuaq in 2007.

Areva has been bringing in Saskatchewan hunters. Actually, it was my idea and it backfired. I had been on the HTO for so many years. Areva always comes to us and talks to us and they say that uranium mining in Saskatchewan is okay and it doesn't hurt the environment or the wildlife. I told the other HTO members that we should hear from their own hunters. Areva of course brought their bunch of hunters, and they're hand picked. They come and talk to us. They don't look like hunters to us. I have been on various committees for over twenty years. They're the same faces I see when I go to meetings. They're not hunters like Paul or Silas or hunters we have in this community. They don't go to meetings. They don't go to other places, their interests are hunting and providing meat for their families. (Joan Scottie)

Some people felt that the discussions with representatives from Areva focused on the positive role uranium can play in human society and present information in a way that makes it difficult for Inuit to engage in a meaningful dialogue.

They keep telling you these good stories of products in your own home...as an example, TV gives off radiation or is made from some sort of radioactive material...so is your microwave...so is the clock...they give out radiation all over the place. They say, if that's safe...why shouldn't our products be safe...is the analogy they're using...obviously it is hard to answer back when you are told that your TV produces radioactivity...whether it is your watch, your clock, your fridge, your fast cooker, whatever is electrical it seems. They give you that answer...it is hard to really talk back. As a real Inuk, you don't really know what

else to say. But still, there are questions. It gets to the point where there may be issues that might come up, but given that type of answer it is difficult to try and talk back. You may have concerns, but how do you explain what your concerns might be given the type of answers you are given? (Anonymous Elder: Male)

Some Inuit interpreted a variety of Areva's actions as attempts to buy off the community. The primary means by which this is taking place is through honoraria and gifts provided to members of the community, as well as the donations Areva provides to communities in the Kivalliq region. Some interview subjects drew attention to the hefty honoraria paid for participation in Areva's CLC, while others pointed to the gifts Areva gives out at consultation meetings.

They manipulate like that. They have a bunch of prizes. When we get really concerned, 'okay, it's time to draw for two airline tickets to Winnipeg!' So everyone is trapped, this is how it works. They are professional PR, whatever you call them. They really know how to get your mind off the track. This causes real disturbances. They sway people from real issues. They buy votes by little gifts. They meet with Elders with little gifts. Some are really nice, like nice backpacks or hats that are useful to you. Little things like that. (Joan Scottie)

The thing about all these honoraria, hats, clocks, t-shirts and backpacks from Areva is that, to me, it's kind of like glass beads for land. (Daniel Piruarq)

During my time in Qamani'tuaq, I visited many peoples' homes to carry out interviews. I encountered few homes that did not contain gifts from Areva, in forms including clocks, t-shirts, backpacks and hats. It is interesting to note that these "gifts" all bear Areva's corporate logo. Each "gift" serves as an advertisement for Areva, reminding not only the recipient, but also all who visit their homes or see them wearing their shirts, of the alleged generosity of the company. It is important to remember that the amount of money Areva spends on these programs is quite small in comparison to the profits they stand to make by extracting minerals from Inuit lands.

Areva's public relations campaign is clearly more organized and thought out than UG's campaign in the late 1980s and can be characterized as proactive rather than reactive – while UG's campaign was launched in response to rising opposition to their proposal, Areva became

active in Qamani'tuaq prior to commencing exploration activities. What I found particularly striking was the nuanced understanding of Inuit culture and local issues Areva is demonstrating through their public relations campaign. When compared to the blundering campaign UG undertook in the late 1980s, Areva's actions can appear extremely culturally and politically sensitive, a fact some Inuit pointed out during interviews. However, others implied that they believe that, rather than being sensitive to Inuit culture, values and political issues, Areva is appropriating these facets of Inuit life and using them to achieve their own corporate goals. This detailed understanding of Inuit social realities is most apparent in the manner in which some programs appear to support the maintenance of traditional Inuit culture, the way Areva engages with Inuit notions of validity of knowledge and truth, the homeland visit program and Areva's use of rhetoric that resonates with contemporary community issues such as climate change and cancer.

Several of Areva's community donations programs give the appearance that the company supports and promotes the perpetuation of traditional Inuit culture. The use of the company's helicopter for search and rescue when hunters go missing on the land, the donation of money for community feasts and hunts and the provision of scholarships for students with proficiency in Inuktitut all serve to reinforce this image. However, there is no guarantee that, once approval for the mine is secured and production begins, Areva will continue to act in this way and apply a logic of supporting Inuit culture to their mining operations. Many Inuit are aware of this, and claimed that they had no reason to trust the promises the mining company was making. In fact, this logic is contradictory to the profit motive that is the basis for Areva's interests in the region. It is clearly in the company's best interests to have an English speaking workforce and to have Inuit sever their cultural and economic ties with the land. The latter development would make it

less complicated and costly to expand production and mine other uranium ore deposits in addition to Kiggavik (of which there are many in the Qamani'tuaq region) while the former would substantially simplify workplace communication.

Areva's decision to send local Elders and politicians to visit their uranium mines in Saskatchewan portray an appreciation of Inuit notions of the validity of information. In general, information that someone has gained from a second or third party is suspect among Inuit (especially Elders) and information that one has gained through first-hand experience is deemed far more reliable. Kublu, Laugrand and Oosten (1999) discuss this fact, and quote Saullu, an Inuit Elder who told them that "Even if it's something I know about, if I haven't experienced it, I'm not going to tell about it...One is not to talk about something just from hearsay, because it is too easy to speak a falsehood. It is not desirable to tell untruths." (5) Many of the Elders I interviewed also began discussions with a sort of "preamble" that they were only willing to give me information that they had first-hand experience with. When abstract topics came up in conversation, Elders often relied upon concrete examples they had experienced to make arguments and explain their perspectives. For example, during a discussion of the issues which arise when attempting to combine Inuit and European cultures and worldviews between myself and John Nukik, John answered all of my theoretical questions by referring to his work in search and rescue operations that necessitated the cooperation between Inuit and Qallunaat RCMP officers.

The preference for first-hand information in present-day Qamani'tuaq is also demonstrated by the reactions some Inuit who support the Kiggavik proposal have towards community members who oppose or are concerned with the proposal. During my stay in the community it was rather obvious that I was critical of Areva's proposal, as many community

members were aware that I was boarding with someone who opposed the Kiggavik mine. Prior to an interview, one Elder asked me if I had ever visited uranium mines in Saskatchewan. When I replied that I had not, he asked me how I could even begin to form an opinion about the issue without visiting other uranium mines to see things with my own eyes. Another Elder indicated that he would not believe the concerns some people discuss until he is shown, firsthand, how dangerous uranium mining can be.

There are those who oppose and I figure for myself that they are only thinking of themselves...they try and set in stumbling blocks, such as health problems and other stumbling blocks to let others know that they are not in support of Kiggavik...I am wondering, have they really seen it for themselves, is that why they are opposed? At this point, unless I have really seen anything derogatory I don't believe what they are saying. (John Nukik)

By providing Inuit the opportunity to visit mine sites in Saskatchewan and “see what uranium mining is like with their own eyes,” Areva is demonstrating a degree of understanding for the aspects of Inuit culture discussed above. While this is arguably a positive development – allowing Inuit to know what uranium mining will be like may help them decide whether or not it will be good for the community – concerns still exist. Some of the people I spoke with felt that these tours were tightly controlled and provided no opportunity to interact with people that were not on Areva’s payroll. One commented that “they only let you see what they want you to see.” Taken from this perspective, rather than being sensitive to Inuit understandings of validity, these visits to Saskatchewan are part of a process of appropriating Inuit values and utilizing them to deceive Inuit.

Areva’s initiation of a homelands visit program is perhaps the most interesting example of how astute they have become regarding Inuit culture and values. Some interview participants explained these visits as a very underhanded way of securing support from Elders. This

sentiment is related to the attachment many Elders feel towards their homelands, the traumatic manner in which many were removed from these areas, the fact that many Elders have never had the opportunity to return to their homelands and their incredibly strong desire to do so. These are issues of which I myself have a limited understanding, rendering a comprehensive discussion of the topic impossible. However, a story that was recounted to me by one Elder, in addition to discussions I had with another Elder, may help shed some light on the significance of mining companies taking Elders for visits to their homelands.

Over a cup of tea, a local Elder recounted a homeland visit her aunt participated in, as a part of another mining company's public relations campaign. By this stage in her aunt's life, she had fallen ill and became largely bedridden. She described her aunt as often depressed and too sickly to accomplish daily tasks. During her visit to her homeland, however, her behaviour and disposition changed considerably. She became so full of energy and excitement that the youth the mining company had hired to monitor the safety of the Elders had trouble keeping track of her, eventually necessitating two young people to adequately follow her around.

Another local Elder whom I spent a great deal of time with would often speak of her longing to return to her homeland for a visit. She described previous visits she had made to her homeland, and the emotional breakdown that accompanied each of these visits. She suggested that if I had accompanied an Elder on a homeland visit that I "would think that something was wrong, that visiting the homeland was a bad idea. It's because Inuit get so emotional when we visit our homes." She went on to describe the flood of emotions that she experiences when visiting the landscape of her youth, "both good and bad." These emotions were related to the stirring of memories – happy memories of her parents and grandparents when she was a child, as well as traumatic memories of her relatives succumbing to famine and of her being forced to

leave her family to attend school. On one occasion we discussed Areva's practice of taking Elders on trips to visit their homelands. Regarding this topic, she commented, "Imagine there was something you wanted, something you wanted more than anything else in the world. If someone gave it to you, could you say no to them?" Given these stories and explanations, it is possible to at least understand the significance that the homeland visit program has for many Elders, and the manner in which it may be swaying public opinion of the Kiggavik proposal.

Areva has also managed to draw upon contemporary community problems to make the Kiggavik project appear to be a good idea. Presentations by Areva's representatives often refer to the nuclear industry's role in combating climate change and in cancer treatment.

I was meeting with another small uranium company that's looking for uranium. About a year ago. Like so many other companies that come up here to explain what they going to do. One man raised his hand and asked a question, and his questions was 'why are you looking for uranium anyways in this area?' and he said "money." And I thought that was honest, you know, they came for money. But uh, you will not hear that from bigger companies like Cameco and Areva and these guys. For them it's "because, you know, global warming and clean energy, it doesn't give off any greenhouse gasses or any of that stuff." But the truth of the matter is that in a public meeting they were misleading the public by saying it is a clean way to produce energy. There is no such thing as a clean way to produce electricity. You can work off of fossil fuels, but we all know exhaust is a problem. Or you can go up to hydro-electric and you know, you can dam only so many rivers...You know, at the moment, uranium pellets they're just stock piling them because they really don't know what to do with them. You know, where are we going to put this stuff? If you tell me there is a clean way to produce electricity, then I will tell you, you know, Einstein would flip over in his grave! When we think about global warming, if you live up north you can really see the difference that's going on, it's easy to see what's going on up here, and most people know that. (Hugh Ikoe)

Another example they give is that if a person gets cancer they use radiation therapy to correct the cancer. Hearing stuff like that, it is slowly getting harder and harder to talk back. (Anonymous Elder: Male)

They always bring up that uranium is used for cancer treatments now. It makes it so we can't oppose uranium mining now. It's like, if you're against uranium mining, then you're supporting cancer! (Anonymous Adult: Female)

The focuses on climate change mitigation and cancer treatment warrant particular

attention. Both of these issues are having increasingly dramatic impacts on Inuit society. Recent studies of the Inuit Knowledge of climate change has brought scholarly attention to an extensive list of Inuit observations of climate change in the Qamani'tuaq region, as well as the impacts these changes are having on the Inuit hunting mode of production. Elders now find it more difficult to predict the weather, making travel on the land more dangerous. It is more common to find diseased caribou, with white pustules in their meat. The quality of caribou skins has declined, often rendering them useless for clothing. The water level of the lakes and rivers of the region has dropped, resulting in decreased accessibility to some hunting areas. Igloos are now often impossible to build due to changes in the layering of snow, while a decrease in overall snowfall – leaving areas of tundra and ice exposed – is making travel more difficult during the winter. Summers are now longer, making it difficult to cache meat in the early fall (Fox, 2002).

The issue of cancer is equally relevant to Inuit society. A number of Inuit leaders have had recent battles with cancer, an issue which has been well-publicized in the media. Furthermore, many of the friends I made while in the community indicated that they had lost friends and loved ones to cancer in the recent past. It is unlikely that there is anyone who has not lost someone they know to cancer at this point in time. The tactics of employing rhetoric of climate change and cancer is being interpreted by many as an attempt to draw on the emotions of Inuit to create a situation in which the primacy of the positive implications of uranium mining becomes common sense.

The role of the nuclear industry in combating these social ills is controversial, and presentations by Areva's representatives often conflate the ability of uranium to provide solutions beyond the realm of fact – a fact which is not lost on many of the Inuit I interviewed. The Pembina Institute's report regarding the environmental impacts of the nuclear industry

included an analysis of the greenhouse gas emissions involved in the nuclear fuel cycle.

The study finds that GHG emissions arise at each stage of the nuclear energy cycle, with power plant construction being the most significant source of releases. Further releases of GHGs occur as a result of the operation of equipment in the uranium mining process, the milling of uranium ore, mill tailings management activities, and refining and conversion operations. (Winfield, 2006:4)

While the nuclear fuel cycle may emit smaller amounts of green house gases than other sources of power (for example, coal or petroleum), it can by no means be understood as greenhouse gas free and having no role in the perpetuation of anthropogenic climate change. There are serious doubts as to whether or not nuclear energy can provide the necessary reductions in greenhouse gas emissions required to prevent traumatic changes in the earth's climate in the near future (Pembina Institute, 2007:1).

The necessity of more uranium mines to treat cancer patients is likewise a subject of debate. While radiation is used in a variety of medical procedures, including cancer treatment, the amount of uranium required to supply these procedures is relatively small. Current shortages of radioisotopes, which have received a great deal of media attention in recent years, are primarily the result of the Federal Government's mismanagement of the reactor which creates these isotopes, rather than a shortage of uranium. Given the ongoing debate as to whether or not the opening of more uranium mines will contribute positively to these social issues, it is not at all surprising that some Inuit see Areva's campaign as blatant propaganda.

Some people with whom I spoke also drew attention to the individuals that Areva has approached for consultations, claiming that the traditional leadership structure of the community (described in chapter 2) is slowly being "bought off." Some local residents stated that the mining companies have realized that there are particular Elders who hold a great deal of sway in community discussions, and focus their efforts on these individuals. They believe that, through

large honoraria for consultations, homeland visits, gifts, symbolic but nuanced displays of respect, and promises of environmental stewardship and jobs for their unemployed grandchildren, Areva has convinced strategic people that they are a good company, uranium mining is safe and that Kiggavik will solve many of the community's social problems. In turn, these people's influence has resulted in a perspective which is open to uranium mining becoming common sense with much of the community.

The mining companies have a new strategy now, a new way to do business with Native People. They please some of the more respected people in town, and others follow. It is important for Areva to get heads of households on their side. Many families are traditional and listen to certain Elders. If they work with these people, act respectfully, pay them a good honorarium and pretend that their opinion matters, it will pull a lot of people onto their side.

...out on the land, this [traditional style of decision making] was good because Elders were experts and it was the only way to survive. If someone was a good hunter, he or she naturally became the leader. This has carried on for many Inuit. Therefore, if the mining companies get a few prominent men and women on their side, their children and grandchildren will quickly follow. In this situation, kids don't really look into things for themselves (Anonymous Youth: Female)

Some described these actions as resulting in a situation where they felt uncomfortable speaking publically about their apprehensions to Kiggavik, out of fear of offending powerful families.

That Areva has undertaken a campaign of this sort is in no way surprising. Since the 1980s the mining industry has become increasingly aware of the need to secure the support of Aboriginal communities (or at least the community leadership structure) if projects are to proceed. The transition period that UG was operating in has now passed, and Aboriginal political movements have secured a great deal of Aboriginal control over industrial development.

Furthermore, Areva clearly possesses the resources necessary to undertake a campaign of this sort. The regular presence of a Public Relations Officer in Qamani'tuaq allows Areva to not only maintain a public presence in town – it also enables Areva to collect information about the

community. This data collection is a source of concern and suspicion for some Inuit. During one interview, an Inuk attributed Areva's ability to subvert the community's traditional leadership structure to the regular presence of a public relations officer, who is in a position to slowly learn about the community and formulate a strategy to buy support. They claimed that this was "why having him in town is so dangerous. He can learn these things about us, and then use them against us."

While the Public Relations Officer himself may have nothing but the best of intentions towards the community, Inuit have good reason to be suspicious and concerned about corporations becoming familiar with local realities. While learning about different cultures can play an important role in peaceful and respectful coexistence, whether or not the knowledge gained is used for these purposes is a different story. The history of colonialism demonstrates that the process of collecting information about indigenous peoples has always played a prominent role in their subjugation (Smith, 1999). The fact that this form of "research" is not subject to the same ethical scrutiny as other research projects (academics are required to have their research approved by the Nunavut Research Institute) makes it all the more suspect.

In addition to the information gathered by Areva's Public Relations Officer, Areva also has access to decades of academic study of Inuit culture, politics and social issues. The latter section of McPherson's discussion of the controversy surrounding UG's proposal reads like a beginner's guide to utilizing Inuit knowledge, values and aspirations to gain support for capitalist endeavours. Regarding the use of academic knowledge in the dispossession of Aboriginal Peoples in Canada, anthropologist Hugh Brody commented, "to be neglected by science might well be a blessing." (Brody, 1981: Xxiii)

THE NUNAVUT LAND CLAIMS AGREEMENT

Through the NLCA, legal and political frameworks have been created which provide avenues for Inuit to exert control over the extractive projects which may take place in Nunavut. Many feel that the land claim agreement ensures that the mine will be monitored properly and will operate in a manner which will not be destructive to wildlife. Furthermore, the stipulation that IIBAs must be negotiated prior to the commencement of production has led some to believe that the mine will provide benefits to the Inuit of Qamani'tuaq, primarily in the form of employment.

Other community members (mostly Inuit who oppose the Kiggavik proposal) felt that the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement has created a “conflict of interest” in the Inuit Organizations, which is prompting them to be supportive of both the Kiggavik proposal and uranium mining in general. Joan Scottie drew attention to the context created by the current resource royalty framework – in which she feels the interests of the Inuit Organizations are now in some ways at odds with the interests of the Inuit they represent and decisions are made in a “top-down” fashion – in a number of interviews with the media.

I'm frustrated with our aboriginal organizations. They are the ones who are supposed to represent us. Instead, they are getting revenue in millions of dollars from the mining companies for our hunting grounds. We are the ones who are going to get the negative consequences if something happens. (*Nunatsiaq News*, Feb 20, 2009).

Scottie further commented on this situation during an interview I carried out during my research.

There have been changes to our Aboriginal organizations. We have the land claims agreement. Our Aboriginal organizations, KIA and NTI, are holders of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement. They are the ones getting all the money from the federal government. All of the money from the land claim is going to our Aboriginal organizations and they have made a bunch of departments and they wanted to do their own water survey and all that stuff. It has become a big political thing. We have elections and they get elected after so many years. Through the elections they become very strong and they are very strong politically, making decisions. From there it has become like a little government. They're

supposed to represent us but it's not working like that anymore. Things have changed so much. They have bonded with mineral exploration, they can benefit from it. This is where a big change has occurred as soon as we had NTI and KIA. Just that handful of people, they're making lots of money. They know they can get more money from our Inuit surface lands and from the mining and land use, they know they can get more money like that. This is where I guess money is a big factor in how just a regular person...like Inuit, they're not being represented the way they should be. (Joan Scottie)

The idea that Inuit politicians may personally benefit through resources royalties and that they have been “bought off” by the mining industry was expressed by other local Inuit. While there may be truth to these sentiments, I am in no position to accept or reject them. Furthermore, as I was unable to officially interview any politicians from either NTI or the KIA, I cannot provide a proper response from their perspective. However, rather than focusing on issues of corruption, I would like to draw attention to the structural context within which NTI and the KIA now operate in the hopes that it may shed some light onto this puzzle.

Most importantly, with the passing of the NLCA both NTI and the KIA are in a position where they are expected to solve the territory’s problems. They are operating in a context in which decades of colonial intrusion have made Inuit dependent upon the Qallunaat (capitalist) economy, and have been offered few options for developing this economy in Nunavut other than through large-scale mining projects (an issue I discuss later in this chapter). It seems reasonable that the motivation to support the Kiggavik mine stems, to some degree at least, from an attempt to improve the lives of the Inuit they represent.

The fact that NTI and the KIA are now organized as capitalist corporations and receive income from the use of Inuit Owned Lands and resource royalties may also be having an impact on the dialogue related to uranium mining in Qamani’tuaq. On the one hand, through resource royalty sharing and payment for resources located on Inuit Owned Lands, Inuit receive compensation for the minerals taken from their lands. However, these monetary transactions,

together with the way in which NTI and the KIA are now structured, likely also encourage the form of "top-down" decision making criticized by Peter Irniq, the BQCMB and some citizens of Qamani'tuaq. In many ways, NTI and the KIA are dependent upon the monetary input non-renewable resource extraction can provide, if they are to remain stable and viable political bodies.

Although the Nunavut Trust provides the majority of funding to NTI (and through NTI, the KIA), the reliability of this source of income is questionable. In addition to funding both NTI and the regional Inuit organizations, the interest earned on the capital transfer to the Nunavut Trust must also fund the Nunavut Economic and Social Development Trust, which in turn funds the Atuqtuarvik Corporation. Constraints on this source of income also stem from the necessity of the fund to grow in a manner which is consistent with inflation – if the values of investments stagnate, the real buying power of the capital transfer will decline and eventually be of little value to beneficiaries of the NLCA. Furthermore, in addition to a need for perpetual growth of the amount of capital the Nunavut Trust has tied up in investments, the monetary needs of the Inuit Organizations will grow over time (Nunavut Trust, 2007:1). In other words, the Nunavut Trust is locked into the same capitalist logic of growth and expansion that provided the impetus to colonize the Arctic in the first place. For the Inuit Organizations to retain a significant level of political and economic power (and therefore continue to effectively represent Inuit interests) both their investments and sources of income must perpetually grow.

It is also important to note that the Nunavut Trust has not invested this income into a market system that can be described as anything close to "stable." The capitalist system of exchange is ridden with contradictions and is structurally prone to crises, a fact which David Harvey (2001), relying heavily on Marx, demonstrates. Crises of over accumulation – situations,

in which a lack of opportunity for profitable investments exists, characterized by large amounts of unutilized labour and unused capital – are chronic problems which plague the global economic system. Capitalists have a tendency to perpetually increase the amount of commodities being sold on the market while simultaneously attempting to lower the wages of the working class in their drive to realize ever-expanding rates of profit. The result is crises of over accumulation – situations in which there is an excess of products on the market and a populace whose wages are too low to purchase them (239-241). Harvey draws a connection between this tendency to over accumulate and the variety of crises which perpetually affect the capitalist system.

The various manifestations of crisis in the capitalist system – chronic unemployment and underemployment, capital surpluses and a lack of investment opportunities, falling rates of profit, lack of effective demand in the market, and so on – can therefore be traced back to the basic tendency to overaccumulate. (240)

The crisis-prone nature of our economic system is especially evident in the present day, with impacts of the 2008 global recession still being felt worldwide. The Nunavut Trust was in no way immune to the 2008 financial meltdown, and experienced a \$9.3 million net loss on their investments in 2008. While this did not amount to a major impediment to funding for the Inuit Organizations (\$35.8 million was paid out to beneficiaries in 2008 due to technicalities in the calculation of taxable income) (Nunavut Trust, 2008:14) it serves to demonstrate the delicate and potentially unstable status of the Nunavut Trust as a source of income for both NTI and the Regional Inuit Associations.

Given the unstable nature of income from Nunavut Trust in the face of requirements for growth, it makes logical sense for the Inuit Organizations to diversify their sources of income. Resource royalties, joint mining ventures and memoranda of understanding present an obvious opportunity to do this. Projects which involve ore bodies to which NTI owns subsurface rights –

as is the case with the Kiggavik mine – are particularly attractive from this point of view. The fact that NTI and the Regional Inuit Associations do not possess the financial means to initiate a mining project on their own means that their options for securing money from mining are limited to the ore bodies which mining companies show interests in. Due to the small number of current projects and proposals which utilize Inuit Owned Lands and have progressed to the proposal stage (beyond indications of interest or exploration) Kiggavik is one of very few options for the Inuit Organizations.

The impetus to support Kiggavik stems not only from the resource royalties Kiggavik will provide, but also from the resource royalties of future mines in Nunavut. If other ore bodies are to be developed, investment from large corporations must be courted. To attract corporate investment, Nunavut must display a business climate which appears both favourable and safe. It is unlikely that capitalists will be drawn to invest in mining in a region where Aboriginal Organizations have a reputation for opposing and obstructing project proposals. Future investment in Inuit Owned Lands is, in many ways, contingent upon the manner in which the Inuit Organizations conduct themselves during the Kiggavik regulatory process.

If approved, the Kiggavik mine will also be able to provide a great deal of infrastructure to other uranium mining projects in the area (for example, milling facilities). This would allow smaller projects that would have otherwise been unprofitable – due to the ore body being too small or of too low a concentration to justify constructing milling infrastructure – to succeed financially. Through the opportunities provided by economies of scale and the regulatory certainty that will exist if Areva's proposal is approved, Kiggavik may well be the first step towards creating a uranium agglomeration economy in the Kivalliq region, which would no doubt be extremely financially beneficial for the Inuit Organizations.

It must be made clear that what is at issue here is not that the Inuit Organizations collect resource royalties – if anything, they deserve a larger share of the profits that result from the extraction of resources from Inuit territories. The problem is the capitalist structure of the NLCA and the lack of other opportunities to generate capital. Thrown into the sea of capitalist social relations (relations which create a need for perpetual exponential growth) the Inuit Organizations must choose whether they will sink or swim. Given Nunavut's role in the overall Canadian economy as a part of the northern resource frontier, the mining industry serves as the only life raft available to NTI and the Regional Inuit Organizations.

These structures are not necessarily forcing NTI and the KIA to support the Kiggavik proposal. It remains within their power to react to Areva's proposal in any fashion they choose. Due to the fact that I was not able to interview anyone from these organizations, I cannot comment regarding to what degree their decisions are being influenced by their need for funding. However, the funding and resource royalty structures created by the NLCA, combined with the logic of market investment, do seem to align the interests of the Inuit Organizations with those of Areva's shareholders. They have a choice to oppose this project, but to do so may come at the cost of their future political and economic clout. As a result, the interests of the Inuit Organizations have in some ways been rendered contradictory and oppositional to those of Inuit who may suffer health and economic impacts as a result of the Kiggavik mine. However, despite the structural issues caused by a need to solve economic problems caused by colonialism and the capitalist structure of the land claims agreement, it must be stressed that the Inuit Organizations could still oppose the Kiggavik project. This may, it should be noted, have to involve more *radical* political demands. Rather than settling for solutions which obey the logic and exigencies of the market, the Inuit Organizations may have to demand that the Canadian state solve the

problems it has created.

A LACK OF SPACE FOR DISCUSSING CONCERNS

The context and structure of the NLCA helps explain the seemingly unquestioned support the KIA and NTI have expressed regarding uranium mining. Its relationship to public opinion is, however, more complex and related to the manner in which these organizations engage with people who oppose uranium mining. A situation has been constructed in which there is a lack of space for the discussion of the negative consequences the Kiggavik project may have, reinforced by hesitancy on the part of the Inuit Organizations to help the residents of Qamani'tuaq access information regarding the dangers of uranium mining and the drawbacks to an economy based upon mining.

When Urangschellschaft was proposing to mine the Kiggavik ore body in the late 1980s, the Inuit Organizations of the time (the Tunngavik Federation of Nunavut and the Keewatin Inuit Association) readily engaged and supported Inuit who were concerned with the prospect of a uranium mine opening near Qamani'tuaq. However, in the present context, no funding has been supplied to the BLCCC or NM, and no independent scientists have been hired to engage with the community. Furthermore, to my knowledge, no prominent Inuit leaders have engaged with the Inuit opposition or supported them publically, other than Peter Irniq's series of letters to *Nunatsiaq News*. Some Inuit commented on this situation, at times contrasting it with the context of the Urangschellschaft proposal.

In the late 1970s, before NTI, it was something else. The whole Kivalliq was really concerned about a uranium mine. I am a founder of the Baker Lake Concerned Citizens Committee and we also formed NAUC for the whole Keewatin. We formed that to have other Kivalliq communities to have a voice. We were strong, we had big people like Tagak Curley and Peter Irniq. All those big people. That was twenty years ago. We had a

big group with one mind and one goal. We had small funding just for the duration of the environmental review. People here asked questions and we forwarded them to experts and they weren't called NTI or KIA. They provided experts to come in and talk to us, to go on the radio and answer our questions. This was a way to do it twenty years ago, which is not today. They don't provide that anymore, they don't even provide funding. They say that, with NTI, they have Nunavut Water Board they have Nunavut Impact Review Board, they have Nunavut Implementation commission, all those IPGs, that they're going to be the ones that will make sure our land and water is protected. They also said each community has a voice through their KIA liaison office. And the CLARC committee, the Community Land and Resource Committee, with members from HTO, Hamlet, Elders, youth and a KIA rep, but they haven't met in two years. (Joan Scottie)

People who might be against uranium mining, we have nobody, we have no budget, we have nobody, as you might know. (Hugh Ikoe)

For some reason they are not allowing other independent scientists to really explain their side. If there was an open dialogue with other scientists, where they are given the real side, the negative side, the bad side, and have an open dialogue with the Inuit and maybe the company might open up a bit more...maybe if that dialogue was open between all concerned including the Inuit, the mining company. It might be better if we get other, non-involved scientists to come up and explain things...just as a regular Inuk you have no idea of where else to turn or who to believe. (Anonymous Elder: Male)

There's not enough discussion in the community. No one talks to the public about the concerns, only about the good parts. (Vera Avaala)

According to the Elders...that's what I'm hearing...that the mining companies are not completely up to par with their information. The Elders don't feel that the mining companies are giving them all of the information, so that they could be included and be there within the discussions while they [the company] are looking for answers. All they're doing is making the decisions themselves without the consultation of all of the Elders. (Paul Atutuva)

It should be noted that the need for independent scientists to engage the community is by no means only expressed by people who oppose uranium mining. The majority of the people with whom I spoke, including some members of Areva's CLC, agreed that a more informed debate regarding uranium mining would benefit the community. One ardent supporter of the Kiggavik proposal commented

We know we are only getting one side of the story. We hear about all the benefits from Areva, but no one tells us about the negatives. We need someone to come to town to talk

about the negatives. Not to shut down the proposal, but just so there is a real discussion, so we can make an informed decision. We've been saying this at the NIRB meetings and other public meetings. We've asked INAC, Health Canada, the GN and NTI, but they haven't been listening. Some of these organizations seem very concerned about the mine. If they're so concerned, why won't they let us know why? They should let the community know the downsides. (Anonymous Adult: Male)

Some Inuit requested that I specifically mention in my report that there is a dire need for impartial scientists to visit the community on a regular basis to work with Elders and provide them with information about uranium mining.

These complaints regarding a lack of independent scientists educating the community about the potential drawbacks to uranium mining may seem pedantic and absurd to residents of the south. From our vantage point, the internet appears to have made information readily available to the entire populace, negating any need for face to face explanation of issues. However, Qamani'tuaq is not in the south, and continues to rely a great deal upon oral information. Inuit Elders, primarily unilingual Inuktitut speakers, play a disproportionately important role in public decision-making⁵. Issues associated with the difficulty of translating concepts related to uranium mining and the nuclear industry to Elders were discussed in previous chapters. Difficulties with translation are compounded by a lack of material available in Inuktitut and barriers to accessing information related to projects and proposals in any language.

There are serious difficulties for Nunavummiut who want information about uranium projects. Public Registries for the Boards and Commissions are not very accessible, and staff do not have enough resources to assist the public in finding information. There are no public notices for many decisions made by these Boards. NTI and Regional Inuit Organizations do not post agreements with mining companies on their websites so that Inuit know what benefits they are getting from the projects. (NM, 2009e)

Due to these constraints on Inuit Elders' ability to access information regarding uranium mining,

⁵ Their influence is disproportionate from the western perspective of electoral decision making. This does not imply that they wield an inappropriate amount of influence.

the primary source Elders have for information on these topics is oral information from employees of Areva who visit the community. Many believed that this places them in a disadvantaged position, relative to mining companies, during consultations and negotiations.

One of the reasons why we really need to hear from both sides is because we really don't know much about uranium, period. We know a lot of them are making their decisions and saying 'ok Areva, everything looks good, let's go ahead with it.' They cannot even begin to be objective because they haven't even heard the other side. Like, the unilingual people, all the Inuit who don't speak English, they're very gullible to the civilized world. And Areva knows that very well. And that's why, I can see from the people they have sitting in there and the people they know that they are gullible. That's one thing, but, as for people who are not crazy about uranium mining, at least let's hear it from people who know about nuclear energy and about uranium, to tell us what this stuff is, what the dangers of this stuff are. We need to hear it. It's not like we need someone to brainwash these people and bring them back [to the opposing side]. It's just because they haven't heard it from both sides.

I think it [the presence of independent scientists] would make it fair. It would be very fair for anyone who wants to hear it from the other side as well. If they do that, it's not so much saying that Areva is wrong about uranium and we need to prove it. It's not so much that. What we're trying to say is that 'ok, you've got your scientists, you've got your public relations guys, you've got your psychologists telling us how friendly and good uranium really is. But we're not hearing it from the other side. You know, let's hear it from the other guys as well so that, you know, we can make a sound decision from there. But for now it's really one sided... (Hugh Ikoe)

Assessed in isolation, the lack of independent experts in the dialogue surrounding uranium mining in the community appears concerning. However, when considered in light of the onslaught of propaganda to which Areva is subjecting Qamani'tuaq, the Inuit Organizations' refusal to hire critical experts becomes a reason for alarm. It is in no way surprising that this project is beginning to appear to be a good idea, given the lack of available information at the community level which highlights concerns and the massive amounts of information which focus solely on the potential benefits of uranium mining. In the realm of decisions related to economic "development" knowledge can rightly be equated with power – the power to make decisions which will have positive consequences for the community. In this regard, Areva and the Inuit

Organizations are disempowering the Inuit of the Kivalliq region by informally placing restrictions upon the type of information available to the public in a form which they can utilize. When a variety of other contemporary social issues are taken into consideration in conjunction with the lack of available information regarding the dangers of uranium mining, it makes sense that the Kiggavik project is gaining support at the community level.

ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE

An increased astuteness on the part of the mining industry, combined with the capitalist nature of the NLCA are the chief causal factors which explain why a proposal which was met with such strong opposition by the Inuit of Qamani'tuaq in the past is now becoming increasingly accepted at the community level. However, it is unlikely that these phenomena would have been sufficient to sway public opinion if it were not for a variety of other issues the Inuit of Qamani'tuaq are faced with, including economic dependence and a related decline in Traditional Knowledge in the younger generations. Although Qamani'tuaq was plagued with similar problems in the 1980s and early 1990s, it is difficult to believe that Inuit would even consider giving their consent to a uranium mega-project, located upstream from the community's supply of drinking water and in the post-calving grounds of important caribou herds if they were not in a difficult economic circumstance. If a relatively affluent urban centre in Southern Canada (Winnipeg, for example) were faced with a similar proposal to mine uranium directly upstream from the city's water supply, it is unlikely that any corporate public relations campaign, no matter how well thought out or well financed it may be, could have even a glimmer of hope of gaining the support of the general population. Furthermore, for many Inuit who are now more open to the idea of the Kiggavik mine becoming a reality, issues of dependency and a loss of

land-based skills in the younger generations were central to their explanation for their support for uranium mining.

Areva's public relations campaign and attempts by the Inuit Organizations' bureaucracy to "sell" the idea of mining to Inuit is taking place in a context of Inuit economic dependency, with little government action to address these issues other than those related to resource extraction. Inuit economic dependence is an issue which has roots the activities of the capitalist fur trade and the colonial state. The movement to the settlement and the fact that children began to (and continue to) be required to attend schools seem to have had a profound influence on the ability of Inuit to provide for themselves through harvesting activities alone. The role of centralization in rendering harvesting activities dependent upon imported technology and supplies was discussed in chapter 2, especially with regards to the introduction of the snowmobile. This, combined with a need for other supplies, makes harvesting a rather costly endeavour in the present day.

Everything costs money and there was no way to make money [for bullets, rifles, boats, snowmobiles]. You have to buy your shells, you have to buy your gas, you have to buy something in-between before you catch and also, you need a source of travel. (Jacob Ikinilik)

Inuit economic dependency is in no way limited to harvesting pursuits. While less than a century ago Inuit still produced the vast majority goods and services they required, the movement to the settlement has placed them into a context where the vast majority of goods and services are imported, and cost money.

As much as I am concerned about my main staple, today, everything you got, we're now in houses which the Inuit didn't build, they came from the whites but still we're living in them. Everything costs money. Whatever you want to buy whether it's food or a source of travel or whatever. If you want them, you have to buy them, you need money. Because we need money, we have to work. As much as I am still concerned I am in support because the only source of income right now is mine income. (Winnie Ikinilik)

Today the only way to survive is by money, whereas forty years ago money was not the surviving point, so you were out there, trying to harvest to survive...but it's all money today. (John Nukik)

Inuit have been rendered further dependent upon the capitalist economy by changes in values and a loss of land-based skills among the younger generation. Many Elders suggested that settlement life has resulted in a decreased interest in harvesting, a loss of land based skills and feelings of boredom and loneliness out on the land for many young Inuit. They described youth as having little interest in Inuit culture in general, and often pointed to the decline of Inuktitut in the community⁶ as evidence for, as well as a causal factor of, the decline of Inuit Qaujimagatuqangit in the younger generation – if youth cannot communicate with unilingual Elders, they lack access to the knowledge Elders possess. While Elders associated this decline in interest in Inuit culture in younger generations with a variety of factors – including schooling, television and the internet – many identified the movement to a centralized settlement as the chief causal factor of this issue.

Today it's a lot different with the young people. The young people, a lot of them, have not learned the traditional Inuit traditions, a lot of the traditions. They're in school and learning English and a lot of them don't even speak Inuktitut anymore or understand it and all they speak is English. They've learnt the western way and it's obvious that they're not going to be able to learn all of the traditional Inuit style. They're going to follow the direction they're led into. There's no turning back once the trend has started.

A lot of the young people, even my grandchildren no longer want to go out on the land. We've got a couple of cabins, one where we spend the summer and catch caribou and cache them, and another one which is closer that we go to in the winter for a day or two and none of them [grandchildren] really want to go out and a lot of them aren't interested in harvesting or hunting.

The fact that they [the younger generation] didn't grow up on the land, so they don't know

⁶ In 2006, 13.1% fewer Aboriginal People in Qamani'tuaq had an Aboriginal language as a mother tongue than Nunavut as a whole. Furthermore, 35% fewer Aboriginal People in Qamani'tuaq speak an Aboriginal language most often at home (Nunavut Planning Commission, 2008:6).

what's out there and they're not concerned about it. They grew up in and around town, of course with TVs and computers...there's sports some of them enjoy. And also the population. Out there, there's nobody. You're out there alone and they feel lonely. Because of it, some of them don't even want to go out, because their best friends are not out there with them.

I grew up out there on the land with my parents where there's no houses, no nothing. That's what I'm comfortable with, that's where I'm happiest. At times around the community being around houses all the time gets tiring, I want to be out there where there's nothing to see but it's peaceful. It's what I know, what I grew up with. The young people today, they didn't grow up in that environment, they grew up in this environment, so they want to stay where they're comfortable. Just like I get tired of being in the community so I want to go out there where I feel comfortable, but young people think there's nothing to see. For me, seeing nothing, seeing the land is comfortable and peaceful. ... Every once in a while some young people, or even some of my grand children might go out on the land, but whenever they go there there's nothing to see, nothing to read and no TV to watch and you go outside and there's nothing to see. So, this is the environment they know, where they think they can see things. For me, I am happy just enjoying the lay of the land, looking at it, even if there's nothing to see. (Winnie Ikinilik)

I'm also learning that, now that all the kids and everyone else don't have the same mind as the Elders do anymore, because they've seen something completely different from the traditional. Therefore, it is always hard to have the same mind with the young people today. And so, half of them are thinking half the time that I am just blabbing and don't know what I am talking about. That type of attitude. The attitude has changed over time because of our different understandings.

You try and tell stories or explain to them how you used to deal with things and you try and explain them to young people they think it doesn't relate to them, it's not in their life, that type of attitude. They don't understand the traditional.

Now that the schools are educating the children, it seems our lifestyle has changed. It is good that kids get a formal education because it helps, but for myself, and I understand that it is helpful and they need it and it'll help me, but as a traditional Inuk who grew up in the traditional ways following Elders' advice and knowing what you've learnt from childhood about life out there. When you grew up with it and have lived with it for so many years, it's hard to leave behind. We can understand younger people thinking that the Elders' advice is irrelevant today, but still, as a traditional Inuk, it is hard to leave that thought.

The Elders understand that we're here to help and we are. The western style of living has a use of its own and it helps our young people today. But, as a traditional Inuk who learnt the traditional lifestyle, because we understand it and we know exactly what it is, as much as we understand that the western culture also has a way of helping, because we didn't grow up with it, it's hard to mingle the two, put the two together for an Elder. In our minds, we can't understand why the youth find the western lifestyle [so attractive], when

our lifestyle can help in terms of how to be a good husband and stuff like that, how to be a good human and stuff like that, traditional knowledge. A lot of young people don't understand where that traditional knowledge comes in. The youth have moved on to the western knowledge, instead of taking in the Inuit traditional knowledge. Yes, of course they still have a lot to learn. The Inuit tradition is also real. If our forefathers had not been able to teach us the knowledge as to how to live, we wouldn't be here today.

I have three sons, the oldest of whom...as much as he's able to, he'd rather do work instead of being a hunter...he'd rather do wage earning work. All sons and grandsons are all different and all differ from each other...there are those who enjoy the land and those who don't (John Nukik)

It should be noted that, while some of the youth I met appeared have little interest in harvesting, had limited abilities in Inuktitut and limited interest in Inuit culture in general, I met many others who were very enthusiastic about harvesting (some of whom had ambitions to start guiding companies for tourist sport hunters to help fund their own harvesting activities) and were quite dedicated to maintaining continuity in Inuit culture in the face of globalization. The continued importance of hunting to youth was also discussed in the preceding chapter. While it is clear that some youth have no interest in harvesting, it is beyond the scope of this study to comment on what proportion of the population they represent. However, what is clear is that some youth are either not interested in or incapable of harvesting and therefore must support themselves via wage earning pursuits alone.

Clearly, the impacts of state and capital have left their mark on Inuit society in Qamani'tuaq, reducing the viability of the harvesting mode of production and marginalizing the population. The situation is compounded by the fact that the Federal Government has done very little to address the social and economic issues experienced by Nunavummiut, other than promoting extractive industrial expansion and militarization in the region. Mary Simon, President of the Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, has recently commented that the Federal Government's recent interest in Canada's North continues this policy of neglecting Aboriginal political

aspirations, cultures and social issues (or, more generally, Aboriginal people) while promoting industrialization and militarization. In an editorial to *Nunatsiaq News* stated:

But while the federal government's attention to the Arctic may be genuine, it is eerily backwards-looking in its focus. Speeches and interviews by ministers have a Diefenbaker era "roads to resources" tone to them. There appears to be a central assumption that a massive expansion in large-scale mineral and oil and gas extraction projects should drive everything else; that helping Canada become a mineral and energy "superpower" should be the North's new vocation; that the state should get out of the way by reducing regulatory controls; that the trickle-down effects of new wealth creation can be relied upon to help the poor...In this backwards-looking focus, the aboriginal realities of the Arctic – our demographic majority, our aboriginal and treaty rights, our distinct languages and cultures – are effectively pushed out of sight...There is a core fallacy that threatens to take hold at the heart of the federal government's emerging northern and Arctic policies: that the top third of Canada can be managed and developed as if its aboriginal history, demography, and its aboriginal values and character, are peripheral and transitional. Policies built around such a misleading notion will be unsound in concept and unsustainable in practice. (*Nunatsiaq News*, April 11, 2008)

This inaction on the part of the federal government has resulted in a situation where many Inuit feel they currently have no choice other than supporting mining in their territory. This is further demonstrated by the fact that many of the people who were most outspoken in their criticism of Areva's mine proposal still accept or support other mining projects in the Qamani'tuaq region.

I'm mainly concerned about uranium mines. We're not opposed to mining of as long as they follow regulations and that they abide by traditional laws...whatever the hunters and the Elders are concerned about. As long as our concerns are covered. (Joan Scottie)

Everybody knows we need a mine up here very very badly, for jobs and employment. There's no doubt about it that we need the money and are desperate for employment and there's no doubt about it. I think that's a reason why, like you said, there's been a change. A lot of people have said in public meetings like 'I am going for uranium mining because my son needs a job.' There's so much other things to mine other than uranium. With the population that we got up here, I don't think we really need a uranium mine to survive. (Hugh Ikoe)

THE MEADOWBANK GOLD PROJECT

Areva's campaign has been levered by its temporal juxtaposition to the Meadowbank

gold mine. Most people I interviewed felt that, in general, the community's experience with the Meadowbank mine has been positive and has contributed towards an openness to mining in general in the community. Some of the people whom I interviewed suggested that Cumberland laid the groundwork for consultations between the community of Qamani'tuaq and mining companies.

Over time another prospect of a mine opening with Meadowbank and that was agreed upon. It was during this process that there was this interaction between the people and the mining companies and they were starting to realize that uranium is not the only prospect for a mine, so therefore the agreement with Meadowbank. Over time, people got the information that uranium may not be as dangerous or it could be. The mining company said 'ok, we're going to be bringing experts that will give you the low down as to what happens' and so the interaction between the mining companies and the Inuit started. (Matthew Kunangnat)

Others connected the number of Inuit who had been employed at Meadowbank (as well as their new ability to purchase harvesting equipment) with the rise in support for the Kiggavik proposal.

What really helped was Meadowbank. When it was getting closer and closer to there really being a mine at Meadowbank and the prospect of jobs at both were becoming more and more prominent that's when people really started slowly changing their minds. Cumberland was employing more and more Inuit over time, the numbers started growing, and the prospect of opening the mine became a reality...and therefore the prospect of employment was becoming a reality. Those who worked at the mine were able to buy vehicles, snowmobiles, Hondas. They were able to buy expensive boats and motors. People started thinking 'hey, if there are good jobs there, what if Kiggavik opens?' That's when people really started changing their minds. (Anonymous)

Thus far, Agnico-Eagle has managed to employ a substantial number of local employees. In 2009, roughly 21% of the workforce employed by Agnico-Eagle Mines and construction contracting companies to work on the Meadowbank gold project were local hires, with "local" being defined as any Inuit resident of the Kivalliq region. Of these 258 Inuit workers, 189 were employed directly by Agnico-Eagle Mines, 141 of whom were residents of Qamani'tuaq. Information regarding what percentage of Inuit employed by construction contracting companies

are from Qamani'tuaq is unavailable. (Larry Connel, Agnico-Eagle Mines, Personal Communication)

While this represents a substantial number of new jobs for the community of Qamani'tuaq and the Kivalliq region, this situation is in no way likely to be permanent. As mines move through their lifecycle, the number of employees changes drastically. The construction phase of a project requires many more employees than the production phase. Additionally, there are more opportunities for untrained labour jobs – which most Inuit are qualified to do – during the construction phase of a project, with the production phase requiring primarily skilled workers. As relatively few Inuit in Qamani'tuaq have completed post-secondary education, it is unlikely that many Inuit will be qualified to fill most of the positions available during the production phase of the Meadowbank gold mine.

Despite the fact that the number of jobs available at Meadowbank will decrease as the project makes the transition to production, the fact remains that Areva's campaign has benefitted from the Meadowbank mine. By engaging the community during the construction phase of development – a phase which makes the possibility of the community benefitting from mining through meaningful employment seem attainable – the community was no doubt more open to the idea of mining in general. However, the role of the Meadowbank gold mine in public opinion of mining in Qamani'tuaq may change as more and more Inuit lose their jobs as production begins. Furthermore, other drawbacks to the Meadowbank mine are becoming apparent, which may eventually contribute to a shift in public opinion regarding the Kiggavik proposal.

Some of the people with whom I spoke referred to a variety of social impacts the Meadowbank mine was having on Qamani'tuaq. Issues of overcrowding, increased drug and

alcohol consumption and a lack of people available to hunt and perform other tasks in the community were among the issues which some highlighted.

With Meadowbank, there are already a lot of problems. Some of them are social problems. A lot of problems that should be looked into. Different businesspeople are getting workers from other communities without providing them with housing. There's a family, a relative of mine in a small three bedroom house. I think sometimes there's up to 20 people in a house. That's been going on almost 6 months now maybe 8 months, and there's no way to look into that kind of problem. Overcrowding causes a lot of problems in the homes. Health reasons and other personal problems. That's another issue in the social problems. There's also...I don't think we're prepared for alcohol and drugs and all that stuff. We're going to see a lot of problems that weren't there before, so we're not prepared for that. That's another issue. Social and moral problems and concerns. Some we don't even think about because we've never done this before.

This year we have really noticed that there is a shortage of meat which has never happened before. The caribou are here, and especially in the wintertime it is easier to hunt because you can go almost anywhere. But a lot of people are short of meat, and a lot of families they don't go out hunting anymore, everybody is working or, I don't know what the problem is. Even this morning we were talking about it during our coffee break. Everyone has turned into working people and they're not hunting anymore. We don't have enough hunters to provide for HTO and the Elders centre or even to the different families. That's something else that we didn't really think of before maybe. There are other issues, like at the Elders' home. They hire people to be caregivers. Not only at the home, but also for the people who can't look after themselves at their house. They can't get workers because there's not enough money in it and they'd rather work for Meadowbank where you get more money, so we can't get any workers for Elders. There are also things like that which are affecting the whole community, not having enough workers for our own. Little things like that can create a lot of community problems. (Joan Scottie)

A number of youth who are or were employed at the Meadowbank mine expressed distaste with the conditions under which they work. The most common complaint centered on the fact that most Inuit occupy labour or cook's assistant positions, while the foreman and managerial roles are performed by Qallunaat. Additionally, despite the existence of anti-harassment policies, some former employees complained of racist treatment on the job site. They insist that, while foreman and managers are culturally sensitive, Qallunaat employees occasionally make racist remarks and treat Inuit as inferior. The existence of a racially

stratified work force and racist treatment on the job site is incredibly insulting to many Inuit, especially because they feel it is their land that is being destroyed to create jobs for the Qallunaat Inuit are cleaning up after. One female youth (and former Meadowbank employee) commented, “If they want to come up here and fuck up the land, they should at least respect the people who own the land.”

Another prominent complaint involved the use of Inuktitut in the workplace. Agnico-Eagle Mines has policies in place which require the use of English during discussions related to the job that all employees must understand, especially issues related to workplace safety. Furthermore, employees must use English when communicating over radios. Despite these requirements, Inuit are still nominally free to speak to one another casually in whichever language they prefer (Bergeron, 2009). Despite this freedom, many Inuit report feeling pressured to speak English at all times while on the job site. Although it is not a mandated policy and most foreman and managers are also reportedly sensitive to this issue, at times Qallunaat employees apparently chide Inuit for speaking Inuktitut rather than English.

Some former female employees voiced complaints regarding sexual harassment at the worksite. Although sexual harassment is forbidden according to Agnico-Eagle’s anti-harassment policies, how well this policy is enforced is unknown. Furthermore, even if behaviour does not meet the legal definitions of sexual harassment, this does not mean that the workplace constitutes a space in which women feel safe and comfortable. One woman who had visited the mine site prior to speaking to me commented, “I went to the mine for a day, and you can really feel being watched by the men there. They're obviously not looking to settle down in Baker and marry an Inuk girl. They're just looking for a good time.”

How these concerns will be managed and mitigated in the future remains to be

determined. The implications the Meadowbank mine will have on the future development of the Kiggavik proposal is also something that can only be discussed in terms of mere speculation. However, it is clear that the experience the community is having with the Meadowbank gold mine is influencing the perception local Inuit have of Areva's proposal, and that future opinions of the Kiggavik proposal will continue to be swayed by the successes and failures of the Meadowbank mine.

THE CHANGING ROLE OF QALLUNAAT IN DISCUSSIONS

Some of the Inuit I interviewed partially attributed the community's newfound openness to uranium mining to the fact that local Qallunaat are no longer speaking out against the nuclear industry in the community.

We really need, I mean I have heard from, the people like you know...what we have here is we have a large Native population that is quite ignorant as far as uranium and the civilized world for that matter. They have very little knowledge about, say like, mining, uranium mining. They're not educated enough. What you do have now though, is a lot of southerners come up from down south, to be teachers to teach the Natives, the nurses, professionals. These professionals, many of them do have concerns about uranium mining, but they're not going to say a word. And the reason they're not going to say a word is because of fear. It's because they have a job to protect. They're not going to say anything because they know that their jobs, their supervisor and the government are run by the Inuit. Once they know they become anti-mining or anti-uranium, they know they will be out of a job. I have discussed this with some people and there has to be a way for them to speak up because a lot of these people that do come from down south and have some knowledge about uranium mining and why they don't want it. They have their reasons, they have their knowledge, but the thing is we have to find a way for them to be able to speak up without fear. I understand their fear. I'd probably do the same things if I was in their situation. I was born in an igloo. If I was down south I don't think I'd speak up as much either. A lot of these people that are very well educated when they say if they open the uranium mine, they will move out of here. These are well educated people and they have really genuine fears. (Hugh Ikoe)

A number of the Qallunaat teachers I spoke with (generally in non-interview settings, over glasses of wine) were critical of uranium mining and the manner in which Areva is buying off

the community, but all said that it would be inappropriate for them to say anything. Senior educators, both the high school and elementary schools said that they did not "weigh in on the uranium issue" because it "was none of their business". No one mentioned any fear of losing a job, but I did get the sense that this discussion is for Inuit only and Qallunaat should stay out of it.

I think that it is important to consider that a lot of Qallunaat are already publically involved in this discussion – but they only include those who support the Kiggavik mine. Qallunaat who have publically taken a supportive stance on the proposal (explicitly or implicitly) include Areva's scientists who regularly visit the community to reassure Inuit that the project will be safe, their public relations officer who is constantly in the community to promote the project, Qamani'tuaq's economic development officer who seemed very supportive of Kiggavik, the KIA's Qallunaat bureaucrats who essentially ran the KIA consulting meetings I observed (with the Inuit politicians merely making formal speeches at the beginning and end of the meetings) and the editor of Kivalliq News who has published editorials that both support Kiggavik and criticize the opposition movement.

As Hugh Ikoe noted, this is having an impact on the manner in which Inuit perceive the proposal. Since no one is speaking out, it gives the appearance that all Qallunaat share the opinion that this mine is a good idea (a fact which several interview participants of varying ages discussed with me). This may well influence Inuit opinion on the matter. This influence is at least partially rooted in the fact that local Qallunaat (and the other Qallunaat that are involved in the debate) are generally university educated, whereas Inuit in Qamani'tuaq are, for the most part, not. If no one with a formal education speaks out against Areva's proposal, the opposition movement may be seen to have less legitimacy than it otherwise would.

It would also seem reasonable that the general colonial relationship between Inuit and Qallunaat has not ended, and that Qallunaat still hold some form of power or authority over Inuit. The “role system” Vallee theorized is now clearly a thing of the past. In fact, it appears to have been reversed with the NLCA – Inuit no longer require Qallunaat permission to undertake day-to-day activities and Qallunaat now have to regularly answer to Inuit authority in many circumstances. For example, the Inuit District Education Authority now exerts some degree of control over the Qallunaat teachers in the community, and the Nunavut Research Institute ensures that the activities of Qallunaat researchers are acceptable to Inuit. However, the more generalized authority Qallunaat wielded which Brody described is quite likely present today, as the conditions which created this power-dynamic have not been eliminated. While Inuit have greater control over local politics, they continue to be economically dependent upon Qallunaat society.

Furthermore, other factors which Brody outlined, such as a self conscious attitude around Qallunaat due to an acknowledgement that Qallunaat find Inuit dietary habits bizarre and disgusting find expression in the present day. While Inuit often offered me different types of country food like *quak* (frozen-raw meat) and *nipko* (dried caribou meat) they often reacted with surprise when I both agreed to try some and happily ate with them until my fill. (It is worth mentioning that I had previously spent a summer in Pangnirtung on Baffin Island, an experience which provided me the opportunity to develop a taste for Inuit cuisine.) On one occasion, after seeing me eat a piece of *quak*, an Elder asked me, in a tone of voice that conveyed bitter sarcasm, “Now, are you going to go and vomit like all the other Qallunaat?” Later, while smoking outside, his wife commented to me that I learn very quickly. When I inquired what she meant by that, she said that most Qallunaat would never try Inuit food, and “act like it’s dirty meat.” Later

during my visit I had the opportunity to observe some Qallunaat sampling Inuit food. The event was marked with a great deal of fanfare (for example, giddily dancing around and giggling at the thought that they had just tried raw whale meat). Furthermore, rather than treating Inuit food as food that could be eaten as a meal, they limited themselves to just a small taste. It is not difficult to understand how this sort of reaction to something as natural to Inuit as eating would come across as hurtful and judgemental. It is also worth noting that during some visits I made with other families, local Qallunaat were visiting at the same time and, naturally and very enthusiastically, enjoying a delicious meal of raw Mattaq (whale skin) with their Inuit hosts. Despite this, there still seems to be a perception that Qallunaat in general view country food, as consumed by Inuit, as a bizarre and perhaps savage activity. These factors are likely compounding the fact that Qallunaat professionals in the community possess educational qualifications which are far more advanced (from a western perspective) than those possessed by the vast majority of Inuit makes them authorities on certain topics, including western science.

The contemporary appearance of “unified support” from the Qallunaat community is a departure from the manner in which Qallunaat involved themselves in the dialogue surrounding UG’s proposal twenty years ago. McPherson’s (2003) narrative reveals that numerous Qallunaat from the Kivalliq region played an important part in the debate. The most obvious example is Jack Hicks and his role as head of the Northern Anti-Uranium Coalition. It is also important to note that concerns were voiced by Qallunaat teachers during a scoping session in Rankin Inlet (177) and Qallunaat teachers and GNWT employees were a part of the opposition movement prior to the plebiscite in Qamani’tuaq (190). Qallunaat from outside of the Kivalliq also played an important role in the debate, especially those who presented at NAUC’s public workshops.

During this period, the Qallunaat who spoke out against UG’s proposal were not immune

from criticism. Prior to the release of UG's EIS, Jack Hicks resigned his position as executive director of the Keewatin Regional Council, amidst criticism (from a southern business journalist and GNWT politicians) of the apparent bias of the consultants Hicks brought to workshops in Qamani'tuaq and Rankin Inlet and his apparent "patronizing" attitude towards Inuit. McPherson commented that these criticisms "sounded reminiscent of industry criticism over transplanted southerners or radicals stirring up the otherwise amiable natives on environmental issues" and went on to point out that "Industry never hesitated to garner the best legal and technical advisors for its own purposes, however." (McPherson, 2001:178-9) Regardless of the hypocrisy in these criticisms, it is clear that pressure did exist for Qallunaat to keep their mouths shut if they did not support UG's proposal. However, the fact remains that many Qallunaat did speak publically against uranium mining, and that this played a substantial role in Inuit decisions to vote against the Kiggavik mine during the hamlet plebiscite. Robert McPherson observed that, "The Inuit were influenced mightily during the Kiggavik event by the advocacy and eloquence of others who were of the anti-uranium stripe." (McPherson, 2001:200)

The reasons behind this shift in Qallunaat involvement are difficult to ascertain. While it is possible that the implementation of the NLCA has created an attitude among some Inuit that they should no longer have to engage with local Qallunaat in these sorts of discussions, this seems unlikely. Inuit always have, and continue to view Qallunaat permanent residents of Nunavut (as opposed to transient workers who only stay in Nunavut for short periods of time) as important components of the contemporary society of Nunavut. Evidence of this can be found in the recent public outcry surrounding a long-time resident of Iqaluit being billed by the Government of Nunavut for medical boarding in Ottawa, on the basis that he is not Inuit. Some local Inuit labelled these government actions as racist, and undertook a fundraising campaign to

help him pay for his medical bills (*CBC News North*, Oct 8, 2009). This change in Qallunaat participation is clearly complex, and requires additional research before it can be properly explained. However, whatever the reason behind the hesitancy on the part of dissenting local Qallunaat to partake in the uranium debate, the fact that they are staying out of the debate is having an influence on local perceptions of the Kiggavik proposal.

“I DON’T WANT TO MAKES RIPPLES”

One final factor which seems to have contributed towards an apparent change in perspective on uranium mining is related to the nuances of Inuit consensus decision making and the manner in which this may be effecting whether or not opposition to the project is being expressed publically. Two Elders with whom I spoke, one strongly supporting the mine, the other with mixed feelings and a variety of concerns, respectively indicated to me that they “don’t want to make ripples and change the course the community is on” and that they are supporting the project because “the powers that be are more open to mining and pursuing it.” At first glance, from a Qallunaat perspective, this can appear as if these Elders are merely sheep, following the flock and neglecting to think about the issues for themselves. If understood as a nuance of Inuit-style consensus decision making, it would be easy for a Qallunaat to conclude that Inuit consensus decision making is outdated with regards to the issues that present themselves in the present context, especially when considering the number of health concerns associated with uranium mining. With great embarrassment, I have to admit that I reacted in a similar fashion, and as a result did not ask further questions. However, after a great deal of pondering and careful consideration, it became apparent that these Elders likely had concerns

that varied from the ones in my mind. Perhaps a more important issue in the eyes of these particular Elders was the maintenance of community cohesion. These types of negotiations often tear communities and families apart, and Qamani'tuaq is no exception. Tempers flare during discussions related to the Kiggavik proposal, some people resort to petty name calling and casual insults. One Inuk indicated to me that she no longer speaks to some of her relatives due to their perspectives on the proposal. These two Elders' decision to follow the general trend rather than "making ripples" may well be an attempt to maintain social bonds within and between families in the face of challenges "development" is bringing to the North. Read in this light, their words and actions are not relics of a by-gone era, irrelevant in the present context. They become visionary attempts to resist the social fragmentation that accompany colonial and capitalist processes – attempts to create a future for Inuit without the anonymous hostility of the inner city and the polite but detached interactions of the suburbs. Perhaps they are more concerned with maintaining and reinforcing harmony in Qamani'tuaq than they are with maintaining a harvesting economy (although, it should be stressed, both are active hunters).

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION – MINING, COLONIALISM AND THE INTERNAL DIALECTIC OF THE NUNAVUT LAND CLAIMS AGREEMENT

This study began as an attempt to understand whether or not Inuit in Qamani'tuaq have changed their minds about the Kiggavik proposal, and if so, why. As the previous two chapters indicate, during my time in the community there seemed to be a marked shift in opinion towards support or openness to uranium mining among many residents (although a substantial group of dissenting Inuit still exists). This was largely related to an astute and well planned public relations campaign on the part of Areva and the mining industry in general, as well as certain structures created by the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement which make projects like Kiggavik an economic necessity for the Inuit Organizations. However, if it were not for perpetual poverty, the effectiveness of these developments in swaying public opinion is questionable.

At this point, I would like to explore the colonial implications of the contemporary dialogue and decisions surrounding the Kiggavik proposal. To a substantial degree, colonial processes, both historic and contemporary, have influenced the shift in opinion at the community level. The economic dependence created by the actions of capitalist enterprises and capitalist/colonial institutions have left Inuit in a position where they feel they have few options but to allow some industrial resource extraction in Nunavut. Furthermore, the dialogue surrounding uranium mining appears to be influenced by a contemporary manifestation of the diffuse authority Qallunaat held over Inuit, described by Brody. The recent shift to openness to uranium mining in the community of Qamani'tuaq is a clear example of how capital accumulation continues to rely upon colonialism in Canada's North.

I would also suggest that the act of mining in Nunavut in and of itself – especially when

large mega-projects with the potential for severe environmental destruction like the Kiggavik proposal are concerned – often represents a continuation of the colonial process in which transnational corporations often based outside of Canada, enabled by a mostly Qallunaat business elite, enrich themselves at the expense of Aboriginal Peoples (Usher, 1976). For this fact to be clear, we must first delve into a discussion of the potential social and economic impacts of mining in Nunavut on Inuit, as well as discuss some of the limitations of the consultation process. This will then reveal some of the contradictions inherent in the NLCA; that the spaces for resistance created are accompanied by contradictory influences of colonization/dispossession.

A brief analysis of mining in Northern Aboriginal communities reveals that this project may be characterized by a perpetuation of the colonial relationship from which the transnational bourgeoisie and mostly Qallunaat Canadian elites benefit a great deal at the expense of Inuit environmental, economic, social and cultural health. At this point it is perhaps useful to address the question of whether or not the Kiggavik mine will bear the fruit of societal benefits for Qamani'tuaq from the broader perspective of the historical penetration of capitalism into non-capitalist societies. In *Perilous Passage*, Amiya Kumar Bagchi characterizes the assumption that the rise of global capitalism has resulted in benefits for all societies and individuals integrated into the capitalist system as false. Bagchi describes many attempts to gauge the benefits of the rise of capitalism as insufficient, as they rely on indicators of economic growth, as opposed to the condition of the peoples affected by such growth. Regarding this issue, he states

Insofar as economic growth increases the availability of goods and services, it generates the potential for advancing human development and widening human freedom. However, whether that potential is realized depends on the composition of the basket of goods and services, on the state of knowledge regarding the impact of consumption of different kinds of goods, and on the distribution of what have been termed *entitlements* among different

groups of people. (Bagchi, 2005:7)

Utilizing alternate measures of human wellbeing, and paying careful attention to social divisions like class, gender and geographic location, Bagchi finds that “neither in history nor in terms of our current understanding of causal links is there a simple relation between aggregate economic development or industrialization and achievements in the advance of human development.” (16) Bagchi contends that the capitalist mode of production possesses, for the first time in human history, the technology necessary to drastically improve the human condition. However, the constant warfare that accompanied capitalist accumulation, and the unequal distribution of wealth, nutrition, access to healthcare and access to safe and sanitary environments at work and at home have prevented any real system-wide revolution of human development. The lack of a causal relationship between industrialization and human development forces us to assess the benefits mining will bring to Qamani’tuaq with a great deal of caution – while an increase in economic activity and economic growth for Nunavut in general is obvious, impacts on community wellbeing require further consideration.

Questions exist regarding the capability of the Kiggavik project to take place in a manner which allows a thriving harvesting economy in Qamani’tuaq to persist. The concerns raised by various organizations – especially the BQCMB and BLCCC – highlight the potential this project holds to irreparably damage caribou populations. Additionally, the potential of the mine to contaminate waterways which many Inuit depend upon for fishing casts doubt on the ability of a uranium mine located in this area to coexist with a thriving and healthy hunting lifestyle. Furthermore, as information regarding how the KIA and NTI intend to spend the Resource Royalties they collect is unavailable, it is impossible to determine whether or not they will be used in a manner that will support Inuit harvesting (for example, whether or not they will use the

monies to fight for harvesting rights or expand the harvester support programs discussed in chapter 3). Given the strong reliance many Inuit continue to have on wildlife harvesting, it is likely that, should caribou herds in fact be harmed, the implications for Inuit of Qamani'tuaq will be both negative and severe. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that, if the caribou herds should be damaged, the Kiggavik mine will ultimately result in Inuit becoming further dependent upon Qallunaat society. Rather than diminishing the colonial relationship of dependency, the mine may actually augment it.

We must also consider the possibility of damage to the wildlife resources Inuit harvest in the context of the finite nature of mineral extraction in Nunavut, as well as the unstable nature of the commodity market for these minerals. Eventually, the economically viable mineral bodies in Nunavut will run out. It is also entirely possible (and perhaps likely) that the unstable and crisis prone nature of the capitalist economic system will result in declines in the value of resources, rendering some ore-bodies not economically viable in the future, even if, at present, they are. This is especially problematic in Nunavut, where high transport costs and other infrastructural difficulties necessitate a higher commodity value to make mining profitable than would be required in the south. If wildlife resources are destroyed or contaminated and the Kiggavik mine closes due to changes in the price of uranium, what will Inuit be left with? Assessed from a larger temporal scope (in conjunction with some rosy-eyed optimism with regards to the stability of the commodity market) what will happen in one hundred or two hundred years when the economically viable ore bodies run out?

Whether or not the benefits from further extractive activities in the Qamani'tuaq region will benefit the Inuit in an equitable manner also requires analysis. Local business owners – especially those who own businesses which may provide contractual services to Areva during the

construction and operation of Kiggavik – stand to acquire a great deal of wealth if Areva’s proposal is approved. However, the majority of Inuit do not have the resources to position themselves to benefit in this manner. While many Inuit will likely attain some degree of employment during the construction phase of the mine, it is debatable whether or not substantial numbers of Inuit from Bake Lake will be able to work at Kiggavik during the production phase of the mine’s life-cycle. Construction requires a great deal of employees, especially untrained labourers and cook’s assistants. In contrast, production generally requires fewer employees, and requires primarily skilled labourers (NAHO, 2008a). Given the small number of Qamani’tuaq Inuit who have anything close to the educational qualifications necessary to be employed as a skilled labourer⁷, it is questionable whether or not many Qamani’tuaq Inuit will be employed at the mine beyond the initial construction phase. Areva will offer training programs to local Inuit, but how effective they will be is questionable, especially given the low rates of scholastic success in Qamani’tuaq and the questionable nature of the ability and willingness of many residents of Qamani’tuaq to leave the community for extended periods in order to undergo work training. The positive prospects for employment at the community level are further challenged by the fact that the mine will operate on a rotational, two weeks on two weeks off schedule. The necessity of regular separation from family members may render mining employment unviable for many Inuit. The fact that – with Meadowbank and other projects which may be created in the near future – multiple mines may be in operation simultaneously in the Qamani’tuaq area also forces us to ponder whether or not the Kiggavik mine will provide many necessary benefits to

⁷ In 2006, 72.6% of Aboriginal People in Qamani’tuaq aged 15 and over did not have any form of certificate, diploma or degree from a formal education institution, including High School diplomas. Additionally, 82.2% of Aboriginal People in Qamani’tuaq did not have any form of certificate, diploma or degree from a post-secondary institution (Nunavut Planning Commission, 2008:9-10).

the community in the long term. It is possible that the Inuit who are able to work at a mine, over the long term and during the production phase of activity, could be employed at other mines in the region.

The likelihood of the Kiggavik mine playing a positive role in the economic life of the majority of Inuit is clearly questionable. In fact, it is possible that the mine will, should it be approved, have negative implications for the majority of Inuit society. In addition to the project's potential impacts on community health through environmental contamination and the further destruction of the harvesting economy, a wide array of other social issues that often accompany mining projects near Aboriginal communities must also be considered in this context. The influx of workers to communities located near resource extraction activities (both Qallunaat and Inuit from other communities in Nunavut) could potentially pose a variety of problems in Qamani'tuaq. Existing housing shortages may be exacerbated, while housing prices and rent may escalate. Rotational work schedules (often two weeks on and one week off) have the ability to disrupt family life and contribute to the breakdown of marriages. These projects are also associated with increases in substance abuse, gambling, domestic violence and crime in Aboriginal communities (NAHO, 2008b)

These social impacts of industrial development in Aboriginal communities often effect Aboriginal women in a more dramatic manner than Aboriginal men, (in the form of increased rates of alcoholism and spousal abuse) (Brown, 1996; Shkilnyk, 1985). Opportunities for women to participate in the decision making process regarding mining projects and the mitigation of their impacts is significantly decreased by the frequent lack of gender-based analyses in impact assessments (Archibald and Crnkovich, 1999). Furthermore, women often receive fewer benefits from extractive projects, as they are often only employed in low-paying

jobs like housekeeping, cleaning and culinary services (NAHO, 2008c). The question of how the Kiggavik project will impact Inuit women in particular is one which clearly requires a great deal more attention than it has thus far been afforded.

To be fair, Areva is proposing a variety of mitigation measures to deal with the environmental and social impacts of this project. However, how effective these measures will be remains to be seen. In fact, a number of issues associated with the mechanisms created by the Nunavut Land Claims Agreements – Inuit Impact and Benefit Agreements (IIBAs), Inuit Qaujimagatuqangit (IQ) studies and community consultations – cast some doubt on Areva’s ability to effectively mitigate the negative impacts of the Kiggavik proposal and ensure that the Kiggavik mine will be beneficial for the Inuit of Qamani’tuaq. IIBAs – agreements which may include local hiring and training initiatives and preferential contracting for Inuit businesses – are associated with a variety of problems. IIBAs often focus solely on capitalist economic development, while paying little attention to social and health issues (Knotsch and Warda, 2009). The contents of IIBAs are also often confidential, making it impossible for most Inuit to participate in their negotiation in any meaningful way. The case of Qamani’tuaq seems to fall in line with the trend of confidentiality, as the contents of the IIBA concluded with Agnico-Eagle Mines for the Meadowbank mine are confidential, as are the negotiations of an IIBA with Areva Resources. IIBAs also tend to ignore gender-based issues related to industrial encroachment on Inuit lands – despite the potential to include gender equity provisions in IIBAs, this is rarely done. Furthermore, IIBAs generally do not contain incentives that encourage Inuit women to participate in business opportunities that arise due to development projects (Archibald and Crnkovich, 1999).

IQ studies are also associated with a variety of problems and limitations. A great deal of

controversy exists surrounding the manner in which IQ is utilized by both academia and industry. These studies often treat IQ as a source of empirical data about wildlife rather than a living body of knowledge that embodies non-western worldviews and ways of being. This can lead to the fragmentation of IQ, removing it from the values and cosmological understandings that give it meaning (Tester and Irniq, 2009). Furthermore, this treatment of IQ may render it more vulnerable to corporate appropriation. Regarding this issue, Inuit politician and intellectual Jaypeetee Arnakak stated:

One of my criticisms of the treatment of indigenous knowledge and IQ is that it's a thinly veiled corporatist agenda regarding the environment. It's way too specific to corporate style resource development and management to really be considered indigenous knowledge. (quoted in Leduc, 2006:27)

The limited number of participants in IQ studies is also a source of concern for some Inuit in Qamani'tuaq. This is largely related to the nature of IQ itself – a variable and individual, rather than universal and objective, body of knowledge. Each Elder possesses their own knowledge and experience, and most place a great deal of value on the different and sometimes contradictory information and opinions provided by others (Kublu, Laugrand and Oosten, 1999:9-10). For some Inuit, the complex nature of IQ and the fact that IQ studies often only include a small number of Inuit rendered them quite problematic.

I've heard of people collecting traditional knowledge, but often times they hand picked people who they think have traditional knowledge. And if they pick five people from anywhere, they think that's traditional knowledge. I think it should be approved by the whole community. We have so many different tribes and what traditional knowledge are they talking about? How many are they going to interview? Is ten enough or is twenty better? How is our traditional knowledge used? How does it cover all of the areas of traditional knowledge? We may have different knowledge. I don't know a whole lot, I know some, but you'd have to go to someone else to learn about different kinds of traditional knowledge. There's so many things like meat preparing and hunting and land use and wildlife habitats and fishing areas and different seasons. If I say that I hunt in one area, it's not all year long. This might be my seasonal hunting area and then I go somewhere else. And if I get caribou in the month of January it's not the same thing as if I

hunt in the month of August. How I prepare and how I hunt. How do they cover all of that stuff? (Joan Scottie)

Paul Atutuvaa felt that the only way IQ could be utilized by mining companies in a meaningful fashion was through consultation with *all* local Elders regarding every aspect of a mine's design and operation.

Areva's IQ study also exhibits limitations which may be specific to its particular context. The fact that the study focused on Elders who were born in the region is in some ways problematic. The land use patterns of Inuit in the Qamani'tuaq region have shifted a great deal since the movement from scattered camps throughout the Kivalliq region to a centralized settlement in the 1950s and 1960s. Most of the Elders interviewed, as well as their families, now frequent different hunting territories, while a number of families who trace their origins to different areas use the area immediately downstream from Kiggavik for fishing and caribou, wolf, fox and wolverine hunting. It is likely that Areva's study will do little to help protect the subsistence activities these families rely upon, due to their lack of participation in the research.

Given the numerous issues associated with IIBAs and IQ studies, consultations appear to provide a much more viable avenue for Inuit to control development projects in the interests of protecting the harvesting economy. While these types of meetings are inherently more useful to Inuit seeking to protect the future of Inuit hunting, a variety of barriers to meaningful Inuit participation still exist. Many of these barriers are most problematic for unilingual Elders, whose meaningful input is by far the most valuable.

Most prominently in the case of consultations dealing with Areva's Kiggavik proposal, many Inuit are finding it difficult to engage mining company representatives in a meaningful discussion because they lack an understanding of the scientific concepts used to explain issues

related to the nuclear industry and are experiencing difficulty accessing information about the proposal and the nuclear industry in general. This is often made more problematic by the fact that many consultation meetings take place without adequate information being sent to the community prior to meetings. Some feel that if more information was made available prior to meetings, allowing Inuit time to discuss and familiarize themselves with issues within the community, that the meetings would be far more productive. I have already discussed these issues related to a lack of available information at length in the preceding chapter. These problems are exasperated by a variety of other issues with the consultation process. Some Inuit feel that there is insufficient time available to absorb issues and discuss concerns in the context of short consultation meetings. Furthermore, some complain that these meetings are often dominated by people who are members of the Hamlet Council or other community organizations, groups who already have a dialogue with mining companies through private meetings. The result is that community members who are not involved in these organizations, councils and committees have limited opportunities to participate in decision making.

The consultation process is also affected by issues of translation in a variety of ways, most prominently during discussions of the “technical” aspects of uranium mining. A recent exchange between NM and the NIRB highlights just how problematic issues of translation may prove to be as this controversial proposal continues work its way through the regulatory system. On November 15, 2010 the NIRB made public the draft guidelines for Areva’s Environmental Impact Statement in English only. When NM accused NIRB of violating the NLCA by failing to translate the document into Inuktitut, a representative from the NIRB replied that “We don’t have the confidence just yet that we can create an Inuktitut document that holds the same intent as it does in English,” and that interpreters are especially “at a loss” when it comes to translating

issues related to radioactivity. NM subsequently requested that the review be suspended until the NIRB can provide an Inuktitut version of the draft EIS guidelines and an English-Inuktitut terminology list (*Nunatsiaq News*, November 23, 2010). The NIRB responded with a letter to NM, indicating that they are unable to comply with their request, but that they will work towards eventually translating key sections of the draft EIS. The NIRB's reply also made clear that the Qikiqtani Inuit Association has voiced similar complaints regarding the consultation process for the Mary River Iron proposal, which would involve an iron mine on Baffin Island. One is left wondering how meaningful oral discussions about the potential impacts of mining (uranium or otherwise) are if there is no way to translate the issues in writing.

Some Inuit also pointed out that many of the more land-oriented Inuit (who are arguably the most important community members to involve in consultations if the safety of wildlife and the harvesting sector are to be maintained) are not comfortable attending large public meetings, a phenomenon I also observed myself. They seem to prefer to, in the words of one Inuk, "leave the politicking to the politicians" and instead focus on securing food for their families. This issue may point to issues with the structure of consultation meetings themselves – perhaps this is not the most appropriate form of soliciting input from land-oriented Inuit.

Issues related to the amount of intervener funding available for the NIRB's Environmental Review of the Kiggavik Proposal highlight issues specific to the Kiggavik consultations. Some individuals and community groups (including the Baker Lake HTO, the BQCMB and NM) have applied to the NIRB for intervener funding, to help them take part in the Environmental Review of the Kiggavik proposal, conduct research related to the proposal and represent Inuit interests during the review. At the time of writing, the amount of intervener funding allotted for the Kiggavik review by Indian and Northern Affairs Canada

was \$250,000, and is to be split between ten interested parties. This is a relatively small amount of funding (and roughly the same amount provided for intervener funding during the UG proposal twenty years ago), especially when compared to the combined \$1,976,035 these groups requested. The small amount of funding made available has been criticized by Moses Aupaluktuq (MLA for Qamani'tuaq), NM, the Beverly and Qamanirjuaq Caribou Management Board and MiningWatch Canada. As a result, the NIRB has written INAC Minister Chuck Strahl, requesting that the minister reconsider the amount of funding allotted for interveners (Arragutainaq, 2009). With so little funding available for interveners, conducting the research necessary to ensure that the Kiggavik project will have positive implications for Nunavummiut (something which I personally believe is impossible, regardless of the amount of research conducted) seems incredibly unlikely. The travel expenses, consultant fees and other costs associated with properly analyzing and critiquing Areva's Environmental Impact Statement will likely not be covered by this amount of funding.

One final issue related to the consultation process I wish to discuss involves the degree to which oral promises made to Inuit are binding. To help explore this issue, I wish first to return to the example of the road to the Meadowbank mine. When I discussed the controversy surrounding access to the road with representatives from the mining companies, their account of the conflict generally began with "somehow, during the consultation process, Inuit were given the impression that they would have unrestricted access to the road." However, the Inuit who discussed the issues with me all claimed that the mining company told them that Inuit would have unrestricted access early on in the consultation process. These accounts of the issue differ greatly, and some attempt to reconcile them is necessary. On the outset, I

must once again stress that one version of events is not true while another is false; I do not believe that one side is merely lying. To Inuit, it likely appeared that a promise was being made, while the mining company representatives likely do not feel the same way.

It seems to me as if this is a symptom of a variety of issues, related to the manner in which public relations campaigns operate and problems with rapid translation required during consultation meetings. An example of a conversation I had with a representative from Areva may help highlight this point. When I spoke with a representative from Areva, we discussed the sensitive caribou habitat that Kiggavik would be built upon, should the proposal be approved. S/he informed me that Areva might consider shutting down the operation completely during the time periods in which caribou utilize the Kiggavik area, if it is necessary to protect the herds. While s/he fell short of articulating this as a promise, I was definitely given the "impression" that Areva would do whatever it takes to ensure that no caribou will be harmed as a result of their operation. If we consider this type of rhetoric in relation to issues of translation, it becomes clear that this type of statement could easily be interpreted as a promise in the context of a consultation meeting. During the two consultation meetings that I attended, people spoke quite quickly, leaving little time for exact translations. As a result, the simultaneous translation provided was often choppy, with certain aspects of the conversation necessarily left out. This became apparent to me when I had Inuit sitting near me translate while a unilingual Elder was speaking – the interpretation they gave me differed completely from what was being said over the translation headsets provided. In this sort of situation, the difference between "we will shut down the mine during time periods when caribou occupy the Kiggavik area" and "we might consider shutting down the mine during time periods when caribou occupy the Kiggavik area" can potentially (from my

perspective) become blurred. It is entirely possible that this sort of issue is related (to some degree at least) to the differing interpretations of the causes of the Meadowbank road controversy.

The "impression" that Inuit would have unrestricted access to the Meadowbank road no doubt played some role in their decision to support the Meadowbank proposal, or at the very least not to oppose it directly. When road access was later revoked by the NIRB, Agnico-Eagle supported the Baker Lake Hamlet Council in their political struggle to regain road access for local Inuit. Through this action, Agnico-Eagle may appear to be champions of Inuit rights. However, this surface appearance hides a deeper issue – to what extent is Agnico-Eagle responsible for the manner in which Inuit understand the often confusing statements made during the consultation process that led to the approval of the Meadowbank mine? How meaningful are consultations if mining companies make what seem to be promises they cannot keep, even if it is the regulatory system that causes mining companies to break them? If promises like road access – a type of promise which allows us to easily determine whether or not it has been kept – can be broken, what about promises of environmental sustainability? It is extremely difficult to scientifically determine the causes of declines in wildlife populations. Mining companies (and their allies in the bureaucracy) can blame species declines on a host of other factors, like climate change or Inuit harvesting practices, minimizing the role that mining and exploration activities play in the destruction of wildlife resources. Furthermore, while Areva is making numerous “suggestions” which sound like promises, will the numerous sub-contracting firms which will be involved in the Kiggavik project abide by oral agreements made by Areva’s representatives? How will this be enforced?

Finally, through the actions of Barry McAllumn (Areva's public relations officer) many Inuit are now "under the impression" that Areva is committed to developing a meaningful relationship with the community of Qamani'tuaq. Barry's interests in doing so seem entirely genuine. He has clearly worked hard to establish relationships with many community members, and has many Inuit friends. Through our conversations, it became clear that he was fascinated with Inuit history and culture and that he was honestly committed to playing a positive role in the community. However, regardless of Barry's personal disposition, does Areva as a whole share his compassion for Northern residents, or do they simply look at Barry's efforts in terms of their utility in gaining public support for a project which will generate a great deal of profit for them? Will they continue to consider community relations important once the mine is approved and goes into production? If Barry retires, transfers or is otherwise replaced, will his successor approach the community with the same mindset? With such a vast array of unanswered questions, it appears impossible to say with any degree of confidence that this project will have lasting positive implications for Qamani'tuaq. In fact, it seems quite reasonable that the reverse may be true.

The fact that some Inuit will no doubt benefit greatly from the development of the Kiggavik ore body and that many other Inuit now support the Kiggavik proposal bears limited relevance to the question of whether or not the mine will have colonial implications. Ultimately, the Kiggavik mine will serve the interests of the colonizer rather than the majority of the colonized, regardless of the fact that many Inuit now appear to be willing to give their consent to the Kiggavik proposal.

The perpetuation of the colonial relationship by projects like Kiggavik – considered in conjunction with the fact that certain aspects of the NLCA seem to have influenced the Inuit

Organizations to support the proposal – reveals a great deal about the nature of the NLCA.

When these two issues are considered together, the internal dialectic of the NLCA becomes apparent; it is a mechanism of decolonization and colonization, of resistance to dispossession and of dispossession itself. While some political decolonization has occurred and new spaces for resistance have been created, the political and economic structures the agreement gave birth to ensure that Inuit serve the interests of capital and therefore Southern Canadian capitalist society. Inuit Organizations are now integrated into a system that necessitates perpetual exponential economic growth, placing exchange values ahead of use values and therefore numbers on a balance sheet ahead of the real needs, wellbeing and aspirations of the Inuit these organizations represent.

This fact should come as little surprise. Thomas Burger's (1985) analysis of the Alaska Native Settlement Act (a piece of legislation upon which Canada's land claims agreements with Inuit, including the NLCA, are based) revealed the implications it has for the dispossession of Alaskan Native lands and resources. Specifically, he argues that because Native Alaskan lands have been placed in the care of development corporations, Native communities are now in danger of losing those same lands in the event of corporate failure or bankruptcy (which, I feel I should emphasize again, may have more to do with market dynamics and cyclical crises than the level of competency of Inuit Organizations). While the Inuit Organizations in Nunavut are not legally able to sell Inuit Owned Lands, they are in a position to effectively destroy them via large and potentially destructive mining projects, especially in the face of the ever-present threat of bankruptcy or corporate failure.

As a final note, it is important to remember that this thesis represents a snapshot in time. My time in Qamani'tuaq was brief, and thus far, I have only visited once. Opinions of uranium

mining in the community seem to be shifting towards a position of support, but a variety of factors may serve to sway public opinion in the opposite direction. A large-scale accident at a uranium mine elsewhere may cause Inuit to become more adverse to the idea of uranium mining in their territory. Additionally, a drop in the value of uranium on the global market (or a rise in the costs associated with the proposed project) could cause Areva to withdraw their proposal to mine in the region. Acts of grassroots resistance may also prove successful. The campaigns of groups like NM may serve to inform Inuit at the community level about the issues associated with the project, which may in turn result in stronger local opposition.

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