

Comparing Canada's role on the United Nations Security Council and the Arctic Council:

Finding several roles

by

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Abstract

The main objective of this thesis is to compare Canada's role on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and on the Arctic Council in order to critically examine the "middle power" theory – the idea that Canada, as a western ally, has influence in the world to play the role of the "helpful fixer". The UNSC and Arctic Council are chosen as they include all of the great powers in both organizations, but Canada serves different roles on both. On the UNSC, Canada is a non-permanent (some prefer elected) member for a two-year term with a vote, but not a deciding one like the veto given to the five Permanent Members (P5) whereas Canada is a lead decision-maker as an Arctic state with a veto on the Arctic Council. Ultimately, this thesis seeks to answer the question **does Canada's role change when it is a member of an international organization in which it has the same decision-making powers as at least some of the P5 members?** By comparing these two organizations, this thesis seeks to determine if Canada plays a placeholder, bridge-builder, or lead role thus providing evidence to the ongoing and contentious middle power debate. This thesis found that Canada does not always play the role of a middle power because it has different roles on the UNSC and the Arctic Council. Canada is best described as a middle power on the UNSC but a leader on the Arctic Council. Canada's behaviour and role changes based on the organization's mandate and the voting parity Canada has with great powers.

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Dedication

I would like to dedicate the thesis to my family and friends. This thesis would also not have been possible without your encouragement and support.

Table of Contents

Abstract	1
Acknowledgements	2
Dedication	3
Chapter 1: Introduction	6
Chapter 2: Canada as a “middle power” and the role it is assumed to play on international organizations.	18
What is a Middle Power?	20
Canada as a “leader” or “decision maker”	22
Canada as the “helpful fixer” and the quintessential Middle Power	24
Canada as a peripheral player or “placeholder”	26
1. Power and its Projection	29
2. Middle Powers with Western Values	32
3. Multilateralism	33
Chapter 3 – Canada on the United Nations Security Council	35
Canada’s first term on the UNSC 1948-1949	39
India/Pakistan Question	40
Israel/Palestine	43
Indonesia and the Netherlands	44
Analysis	45
Canada’s second term on the UNSC 1958-1959	46
The Palestinian Question	47
The Complaint by Lebanon	47
Arctic Overflights	48
Laos	49
Analysis	50
Canada’s third term on the UNSC	50
The Six Day War	51
The Pueblo Affair	53
Cyprus	54
Southern Rhodesia	55
Analysis	57
Canada’s fourth term on the UNSC	57
South Africa	58
Benin	61

Analysis	62
Canada’s fifth term on the UNSC	63
Libya	64
Terrorism	65
The Middle East	66
Invasion of Kuwait	67
Analysis	68
Canada’s sixth term on the UNSC	68
Angola	70
Responsibility to Protect (R2P)	71
Women, Peace and Security (S/RES/1325)	72
Kosovo	73
Analysis	75
Canada’s Failed Bid for a non-permanent seat on the UNSC in 2010 and 2021	75
2011-2012 Failed Bid	75
2021-2022 Failed Bid	76
Analysis	76
Conclusion	77
Chapter 4 – Canada on the Arctic Council	78
Canada’s first chairmanship on the Arctic Council (1996-1998)	81
Analysis	82
Canada’s second chairmanship of the Arctic Council (2013 – 2015)	83
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014	84
China joins the Arctic Council	85
Russia’s second chairmanship and the invasion of Ukraine in 2022	86
Conclusion	89
Chapter 5 - Conclusion	90
Policy implications	94
Policy recommendations	95
Significance of the research	97
Contributions and suggestions for future research	97
Bibliography	99

Chapter 1: Introduction

Canada bills itself as an internationalist and ardent supporter of international organizations.¹ As a result, its foreign policy, especially during the Cold War, tended to support multilateralism and functionalism.² Multilateralism is the willingness to join international organizations and work with other states.³ Functionalism, as an approach to making foreign policy, is defined by Adam Chapnick, as keeping in mind a state's capabilities and national interests.⁴ Internationalism encourages active involvement of states in the world via international organizations, such as the United Nations.⁵ As a smaller (some argue middle) power, this means that Canada has to find a niche area to occupy when it joins a state-based international organization rather than leading the organization as would a great power. According to Global Affairs Canada (GAC), Canada belongs to and contributes to over forty-four international organizations, summits, and forums.⁶ In the literature, there are passionate debates about the role Canada does and should play in international organizations.⁷ Should it be the leader and decision maker, or the trusted helpful fixer (the "middle power") or simply show up and take notes (the placeholder)? Certainly, successive Canadian prime ministers, upon assuming their positions, have announced that

¹ Keating, *Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy*, 1.

² Jennifer M. Welsh, "Canada in the 21st Century: Beyond Dominion and Middle Power," *Round Table* 93, no. 376 (2004): 583, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0035853042000289164>.

³ Adam Chapnick, "The Canadian Middle Power Myth," *International Journal* 55, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 200, doi:10.2307/40203476. See also Tom Keating, *Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy*, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 4.

⁴ Chapnick, 2000, "The Canadian Middle Power Myth", 200.

⁵ Keating, *Canada and World Order*, 1.

⁶ "Partnerships and Organizations", Government of Canada, updated October 19, 2021, https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/partnerships_organizations-partenariats_organisations.aspx?lang=eng#a1.

⁷ Eugene Lang, "Searching for a Middle-Power Role in a New World Order," Canada Global Affairs Institute, accessed on May 19, 2020, https://d3n8a8pro7vhm.cloudfront.net/cdfai/pages/4207/attachments/original/1560376414/Searching_for_a_Middle-Power_Role_in_a_New_World_Order.pdf?1560376414, 2.

Canada “is back” or “will be a leader” via participation in multilateral institutions.⁸ But, given that there are so many organizations, and that Canada has never been considered either a “great” or “super” power, what role has Canada played? And how can one compare roles given the very different mandates, makeup, and goals of the various international organizations? The key is to find organizations with members which are the same great powers of the day but with different decision-making powers from Canada from which to compare. The only two organizations that have both all of the great powers and Canada but in different roles are the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the Arctic Council.

Canada is a founding member of the United Nations and has served six, two-year terms as a non-permanent member (some prefer the term “elected” or E10 for the ten elected members) on the UNSC.⁹ The UNSC has five permanent members (P5 = United States, United Kingdom, Russia, France, and China)¹⁰ and ten elected non-permanent members with two-year terms.¹¹ The mandate of the UNSC is to maintain international peace and security.¹² Canada has had to learn how to navigate the political preferences of the P5 and find its “niche” role as an elected, non-permanent member of the UNSC.

Canada is also a founding member of the regional intergovernmental forum called the Arctic Council.¹³ The Arctic Council’s mandate is to promote environmental protection and sustainable development in the Arctic.¹⁴ It too has all of the P5 states represented, but they have

⁸ Rob Gillies, “‘We’re Back’: Justin Trudeau’s Liberals head to Ottawa with a majority,” *The Associated Press*, October 20, 2015, <https://globalnews.ca/news/2288872/canada-returns-its-liberal-roots-under-trudeau-after-a-decade-of-conservative-rule/>.

⁹ Adam Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council: A Small Power on a Large Stage* (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2019), 3-4.

¹⁰ Chapter V, UN Charter (San Francisco, 1945).

¹¹ Chapter V, UN Charter (San Francisco, 1945).

¹² Chapter V, UN Charter (San Francisco, 1945).

¹³ “Arctic States,” Arctic Council, accessed on May 19, 2020, <https://arctic-council.org/en/about/states/>.

¹⁴ “Ottawa Declaration (1996),” Arctic Council, accessed on May 19, 2020, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/85/EDOCS-1752-v2-ACMMCA00_Ottawa_1996_Founding_Declaration.PDF?

different roles on the Arctic Council – not all are decision makers. The United States and Russia are Arctic states, as is Canada- all with an equivalent “veto” power on the Arctic Council among the eight Arctic states.¹⁵ The Arctic Council makes decision by consensus¹⁶ and must have the agreement of all the “Arctic states.”¹⁷ The United Kingdom, France, and China are Observer states on the Arctic Council as well as ten other states as of January 2022.¹⁸ Canada has also had to navigate its role among these “great” powers given their Observer status in the Arctic Council versus Canada’s decision-making power as an Arctic state.

Ultimately, this thesis seeks to answer the question **does Canada’s role change when it is a member of an international organization in which it has the same decision-making powers as at least some of the P5 members?**

State Membership

Canada’s Role	UNSC Decision making	Arctic Council Decision Making
Membership	P5 + 10 elected members	8 Arctic states + 6 Permanent participants + 13 non-Arctic States (Including P5) (25 NGOs and IO observer members are not germane to this study).
Voting	Nine affirmative votes needed and no veto by one of the P5. Canada and the E10 can (technically) outvote the P5. especially on non-substantive issues or thematic issues.	Can cast one of eight votes and, as decision-making is by consensus, Canada possess a de facto veto as an Arctic state.

sequence=5&isAllowed=y.

¹⁵ “Arctic States,” Arctic Council, accessed on May 19, 2020, <https://arctic-council.org/en/about/states/>.

¹⁶ Danita Catherine Burke, *Diplomacy and the Arctic Council*, (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2020), 7.

¹⁷ Burke, *Diplomacy and the Arctic Council*, 7.

¹⁸ “Observers,” Arctic Council, accessed on May 19, 2020, <https://arctic-council.org/en/about/observers/>.

Canada's Role	UNSC Decision making	Arctic Council Decision Making
Voting power on par with P5 members	None	US, Russia, and Canada can veto a decision. France and the UK cannot
Greater voting power than P5 members	None. All P5 members have a veto	France, UK, and China have no voting rights.

Great powers are global players—states with the ability, or at least the potential, for global force projection, international action, and economic clout.¹⁹ They are assumed to have key decision-making roles that can shape and determine the actions of international organizations and, by extension, their members.²⁰ Great powers also determine and shape the global agenda as they have a veto on the UNSC.²¹ **Canada has never been a great power nor becomes one with a veto on the Arctic Council and/or taking a leading role (meaning Canada conceives of the key idea or is able to rally other states to see a decision through to fruition).**

According to Moeini et al, “Middle powers, in contrast, are confined—both in intent and their activities—to their designated regional security environments due, for the most part, to their relative resource constraints”.²² In other words, middle powers can have considerable economic and military capacity relative to smaller neighbours, have been traditionally western-aligned, and are limited in their ambitions — they do not seek domination, but rather assumed positive influence in the world.²³ Rarely does anyone talk about the third category; the place holders.

¹⁹ Arta Moeini, Chrisopher Mott, Zachary Paikin and David Polansky, *Middle Power in the Multipolar World*, Ottawa: The Institute for Peace and Diplomacy (March 2022): 2, <https://peacediplomacy.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Middle-Powers-in-the-Multipolar-World.pdf>.

²⁰ Moeini et al., 2.

²¹ Chapter VII, UN Charter (San Francisco, 1945).

²² Moeini et al., *Middle Power in the Multipolar World*, 7.

²³ Moeini, et al., 13.

Place holders abide by and participate in decision making but will have no influence on the outcome and are simply “occupying” a seat.

The assumption in the literature has been that since Canada is a middle power (i.e., a trusted western ally on whom its greater allies can depend), it will never have the voting rights on par with the great powers (in line with the limited capacity and influence of middle powers). Canada’s only option, therefore, is to remain the “helpful fixer” or “place holder”, but never a key decision-maker – a leader.

However, when one looks at Canada’s role on the UNSC and the Arctic Council, Canada does have voting power and Canada interacts with all members of the P5 on both the UNSC and the Arctic Council. By comparing and contrasting the voting record and influence of Canada on these two organizations in which Canada votes with the great powers, the “middle power” theory can be tested. Since Canada has key decision-making power on the Arctic Council it can be compared to its role on the UNSC - the proverbial control-like comparison. **What, therefore, is Canada’s role on the United Nations Security Council and the Arctic Council? Does it lead ideas, is it the “helpful fixer” middle power or does it simply serve as a place holder? Furthermore, how are Canada’s roles on the UNSC and the Arctic Council similar or different given that all P5 members are present in both albeit in different voting roles?** If Canada is in a leading position in an organization, one would expect it to spear head key decisions and hold sway over other voting members. For example, on the UNSC it might be demonstrated by drafting a resolution, changing procedures (such as monitoring by sanctions committees) or recommending changes to voting procedures. Canada has drafted and co-drafted resolutions on the UNSC that were consequential. For example, Canada drafted UNSC S/RES/41 (1948) which supported and praised efforts by the Netherlands and Indonesia to sign a truce

agreement.²⁴ Canada has no veto power and therefore, is expected only to play a middle power or place holder role on the UNSC as reflected in its voting pattern. Canada may vote yes, no, abstain or simply not vote at all and may be President of the UNSC for a month in a two-year rotation, although that is never guaranteed depending on other member states.²⁵ In contrast, in addition to creating the Arctic Council, Canada may demonstrate leadership by the creation of subsidiary bodies or preventing certain organizations/states from joining as Observers and setting the Council's agenda when it chairs the Council for two years on a rotating basis. For example, Canada vetoed the European Union's observer candidacy application during its second chairmanship²⁶ and established the Arctic Economic Council in the Arctic Council.²⁷ Given its veto-like voting status, Canada has the potential to be a leader, middle power, or place holder on the Arctic Council.

If Canada behaves like a “helpful fixer” or “bridge builder” (i.e., a middle power), Canada's actions help to keep the great powers from being in direct conflict, usually by assisting its key allies. This is often referenced as the middle power theory – key smaller, western allies (such as Norway and Canada) help fulfill a vital role that aids the United States or another key great power ally, such as the United Kingdom or France. Canada's most famous example is suggesting “peacekeepers” be sent to help provide the great powers time to negotiate a settlement to the Suez Canal crisis in 1956.²⁸ In an Arctic Council scenario, Canada may suggest a solution

²⁴ S/RES/41 (1948).

²⁵ The President of the UNSC is chosen based on the English spelling of the state name of members of the UNSC. Each year, five new elected members are added which means Canada is not guaranteed to be President in a two-year term. E.g., hypothetically, if Belarus is President in December, Canada could be President in January except if Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina etc. become members and begin their rotation 1 January.

²⁶ Leigh Phillips, “Arctic Council rejects EU's observer application,” *EUobserver*, April 30, 2009, 09:39, <https://euobserver.com/green-economy/28043>.

²⁷ “Canada,” Arctic Council, accessed on May 19, 2020, <https://arctic-council.org/en/about/states/canada/>.

²⁸ Keating, *Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy*, 39-40. Of course some suggest the United States came up with the idea and presented to Canada, but this is not the prevalent narrative.

to solve tension between Russia and the United States or ensure rules of procedure limit the influence of Observer states, including geopolitically powerful ones such as India and China.

If Canada is simply a placeholder, it will operate on the margins of an issue or will have little to no significance for the great powers. For example, on the UNSC, Canada's vote may be negated by a veto or Canada may not be invited to closed door meetings where decisions are made.

This research helps to test and potentially even put to rest the "middle power" theory by examining Canada's role on two international organizations with great power participation. The middle power narrative and consternation are decidedly Canadian. Few other states (western or non-western) devote articles and attention to the theory of middle powers and the role their state should play in accordance with the theory. Moreover, the debate is limited to Canada's assistance to the United States, the UK and France only: never to China or Russia. Likewise, there is no literature on which states are potential "middle powers" to China or Russia. This is a decidedly western and specifically Canadian debate. As a result, much of the literature reviewed in this thesis was written by Canadians and in Canadian journals. The literature on which to draw, therefore, is parochial by nature.

The key ideas examined in this research explore decision-making, power, and allyship. The methodology used in this research compares Canada's roles in the UNSC and the Arctic Council decision-making processes. The UNSC and the Arctic Council were chosen for this research because they are the only two organizations that include all members of the P5 and Canada and in different decision-making roles. Other organizations, like the World Health Organization, for example, include Canada and the P5 as members, but there is no guarantee that any are in key decision-making roles as the Executive Body is chosen by the Assembly and not

because of historical, geopolitical or geographic location of states as is the case for the UNSC and Arctic Council. By directly comparing Canada's role on the UNSC and Arctic Council, a richer basis of comparison for the middle power theory is available. Simultaneous analysis across two organizations rather than the usual examination of Canada's role in one particular organization can provide better comparison of Canada's role between organizations with the same great powers. The UNSC and the Arctic Council have different mandates. The UNSC has the power of mandatory enforcement as authorized in the UN Charter under Chapter VII.²⁹ The UN Charter indicates that military issues can be brought up and discussed in the UNSC.³⁰ On the other hand, the Ottawa Declaration affirms that the Arctic Council will not discuss issues relating to military security.³¹ The Arctic Council, created by a declaration and therefore, having no mandatory powers at all, is associated with soft power because it works by consensus on issues connected to environmental protection and sustainable development.³² In addition, the Arctic Council is a regional forum focused on the Arctic whereas the UNSC is an international forum.

In Canadian foreign policy literature, it is assumed that Canada's goal, indeed its de facto role, is to be a middle power in international organizations.³³ An example is Canada as the "helpful fixer" which serves as a go-between the hegemon (the United States) and the other states. Canada, therefore, is the able public servant that can "get the ball rolling" in international organizations. Perhaps the default middle power role is outdated because the literature (not

²⁹ Chapter V, UN Charter (San Francisco, 1945).

³⁰ Indeed, the *raison d'être* of the Security Council is to have primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. See Article 24 (1).

³¹ "Ottawa Declaration (1996)," Arctic Council, accessed on May 19, 2020, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/85/EDOCS-1752-v2-ACMMCA00_Ottawa_1996_Founding_Declaration.PDF?sequence=5&isAllowed=y.

³² "Ottawa Declaration (1996)," Arctic Council, accessed on May 19, 2020, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/85/EDOCS-1752-v2-ACMMCA00_Ottawa_1996_Founding_Declaration.PDF?sequence=5&isAllowed=y.

³³ Paul Gecelevsky, "Constructing a Middle Power: Ideas and Canadian Foreign Policy," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 15, no. 1 (2009): 77–93, <https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2009.9673483>.

withstanding its Canadian, parochial nature) has not considered an organization like the Arctic Council where Canada has parity or greater decision-making power than some members of the P5. Much of the literature, for example, refers to Canada as a middle power in a NATO context or in a UN General Assembly context but not when dealing directly with the great powers. Now that China is an Observer state of the Arctic Council (as of June 2013),³⁴ we can compare Canada's role vis-à-vis the P5 on both the UNSC and the Arctic Council. In the case of the UNSC, Canada does not have a right of veto, but in the case of the Arctic Council, it does. Therefore, we can probe whether or not Canada is given an equal decision-making role as at least some of the great powers, or does its role change? Is it more than a "middle power" or does it remain the "helpful fixer" or is it simply the placeholder?

No analyst has compared Canada's role on the UNSC with its role on the Arctic Council to see if the middle power theory holds given the voting parity between Canada and the "great" powers. This research seeks to fill in the gap in the literature by looking at whether Canada's role on the UNSC and Arctic Council dealing directly with all of the P5 members has an effect on its role in the organization.

The hypothesis for this thesis is the following: **Given voting parity on an organization with at least some of the P5 members, Canada can be more than the "helpful fixer" and can lead ideas and decision-making.** This serves as a test to the middle power theory because it considers voting parity with the "great" powers. According to Gecelovsky, middle powers, like Canada, can use functionalism (ensuring Canada achieves national interests and has the capabilities and capacity to achieve its goals) to lead ideas in niche areas.³⁵ The null hypothesis would be that given voting parity with the P5, Canada has no influence on decision-making and

³⁴ "Observers," Arctic Council, accessed on May 19, 2020, <https://arctic-council.org/en/about/observers/>.

³⁵ Gecelovsky, "Constructing a Middle Power: Ideas and Canadian Foreign Policy", 78.

therefore puts to bed the idea that perhaps Canada does have a default middle power role. It is also posited that Canada is rarely simply a placeholder given that it actively chooses which organizations to join and is unlikely to join an organization only to pay bills and serve no national interests or fail to protect them. According to Chapnick, the functionalism approach to making foreign policy and middle powerness are different concepts.³⁶ For Chapnick, middle powerness is mythical and a term invented to make Canada feel more important about their actual influence in the world.³⁷ For Chapnick, states are either great powers or they are not. Functionalism continues to be a good framework to help foreign policy making but is unlikely to thrust Canada into a lead decision-making role or one that could influence the direction of decision-making. This null hypothesis tends to be the more popular assumption of the literature, but rarely is Canada's role on the Arctic Council (for example, neither Chapnick nor Gecelevosky have done so) and/or the detailed voting record of Canada on the UNSC considered. Rather, the literature tends to assume that given the geopolitical and rule-making domination of the United States (and increasingly China and Russia often as spoilers), Canada has very little decision-making influence. To answer this question, I will draw on the primary voting records of both organization as well as the secondary sources that outline and critique the middle power and functional theories of Canada's role in the world. I will draw on UNSC resolutions and meeting records during Canada's six terms as a non-permanent member on the UNSC. In the case of the Arctic Council, I will draw on the official Arctic Council website, declarations, and Ministerial meeting documents during Canada's two chairmanships of the Arctic Council.

³⁶ Chapnick, 2000, "The Canadian Middle Power Myth", 189.

³⁷ Chapnick, 2000, 189.

This chapter outlined the research question, methodological approach, and outline the order of the thesis. Chapter 2 explores the literature and the idea of Canada as a “middle power” and the role it is assumed to play on international organizations. The chapter situates the literature’s assessment of Canada as a “leader” (i.e. idea champion), a “helpful fixer”, or “place holder” in international politics. Of course, much of the literature assumes Canada is always subordinate to great powers (e.g., Canada can only be the fixer for the United States and key allies on the UNSC or a place holder) or NATO’s US whisperer. With two chairships on the Arctic Council and six terms served on the UNSC as a non-permanent member means that Canada has decades of experience making decisions with the P5. In the case of the Arctic Council, Canada has arguably had a lead role while in the case of the UNSC it is more likely to play the fixer or place holder role. **This is a test to see if Canada’s niche in international organizations is because of the lack of voting rights or because Canada truly does default to being “the helpful fixer”.** Chapter 3 will investigate the role of Canada on its six terms of the UNSC. The chapter will examine Canada’s voting record vis-à-vis the agenda on its six terms of the UNSC. Chapter 4 will examine Canada’s role on the Arctic Council as one of the eight decision-making Arctic states. Canada has served two terms as the chair of the Arctic Council and was the creator of the Arctic Council.³⁸ Finally, Chapter 5 will bring together the policy implications and perhaps a correction to the Canadian foreign policy literature which has overlooked the voting parity Canada has on an international organization as a major function of its “niche” on the organization. The final chapter will also summarize the conclusion of the thesis and suggest ideas for future research.

³⁸ “Canada,” Arctic Council, accessed on May 19, 2020, <https://arctic-council.org/en/about/states/canada/>.

Although it is expected that the research will establish that Canada can find a niche lead area when voting parity with the P5 is considered, there are caveats and limits to the findings. First, perhaps the middle power “helpful fixer” moniker needs to be retired – as it can no longer match the new geopolitical realities of the 2020s in which the hegemony of the United States is politically, militarily, and economically challenged by Russia and China. Second, perhaps Canada has more latitude than the literature allows in championing ideas or influencing outcomes. Finally, this thesis provides new research areas for the understudied role of non-permanent members and Arctic states in foreign policy decision-making. Perhaps, for example, a study of the allies of China and Russia and the roles they play may provide new geopolitical insights?

Chapter 2: Canada as a “middle power” and the role it is assumed to play on international organizations.

Canada is often referred to as a middle power and a “helpful fixer” within multilateral organizations in the literature.³⁹ Most of the literature draws these conclusions based on Canada’s role at the UN and NATO. The classic example of Canada as the “middle power” is Canada’s experience mediating between the great powers and offering the concept of peacekeepers positioned between the great powers during the Suez Crisis in 1956.⁴⁰ Indeed, Canada is credited with creating the idea of peacekeeping for the UN during the Suez Canal crisis under Prime Minister Lester Pearson and was the model for these so-called “Chapter 6 ½ missions”.⁴¹ According to Dorn, peacekeeping is part of Canada’s identity and tradition.⁴² Canada has been involved and contributed troops to peacekeeping missions in both the UN and NATO auspices.⁴³

In the NATO literature, Canada assumes the role of US whisperer and go between with the European allied members given that Canada is an ally of the United States and the United Kingdom.⁴⁴ According to Gecelovsky, middle powers use internationalism, defined as the willingness to engage in “international affairs” and functionalism, an approach to policy making keeping in mind interests and capabilities to contribute to peace in the international system.⁴⁵ Canada is a founding member of NATO and joined the organization for the promised Article 5

³⁹ Gecelovsky, “Constructing a Middle Power: Ideas and Canadian Foreign Policy,” 78. See also Tom Keating, *Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2012).

⁴⁰ Welsh, “Canada in the 21st Century: Beyond Dominion and Middle Power,” 584.

⁴¹ Walter Dorn, “Canadian Peacekeeping: Proud Tradition, Strong Future?”, *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 12, no. 2 (Fall 2005), 7-32, doi: 10.1080/11926422.2005.9673396.

⁴² Dorn, 7.

⁴³ Dorn, 24.

⁴⁴ See Joseph Jockel and Joel Sokolsky, *Canada and NATO: 1949 – 2019* (Montreal: McGill/Queen’s University Press, 2021): 316 and Keating, *Canada and World Order*, 287.

⁴⁵ Gecelovsky, “Constructing a Middle Power: Ideas and Canadian Foreign Policy,” 78.

insurance.⁴⁶ The Canadian Armed Forces were involved in NATO missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan.⁴⁷ According to Jockel and Sokolsky, Canada has an interest in joining NATO and being involved in Europe to ensure its “security.”⁴⁸ Canada joined NATO for collective defence as opposed to its reason for joining the UN for collective security. Canada acts a bridge between the United States and Europe in NATO, especially with its ties to the United Kingdom.⁴⁹ Canada has managed to prevent definitive statements on a NATO role in the Arctic⁵⁰, and insisted Article 2 – the Economic clause – be added to the Washington Treaty⁵¹, but these are all decisions on the margins of the core missions of NATO.

According to Chapnick, Canada wanted to be considered a middle power to have status and influence above the small powers at the UN.⁵² At the creation of the UN, Canada and Australia pushed for the recognition of middle power status in the UN.⁵³ Canada was not successful in getting permanent middle power status recognized in the UN Charter.⁵⁴ Chapnick argues that because the UN Charter does not recognize middle powers and only recognizes the small and great powers, Canada is only a small power and does not have a claim to a middle power status.⁵⁵

⁴⁶ Keating, *Canada and World Order*, 67.

⁴⁷ Jockel and Sokolsky, *Canada and NATO*, 329.

⁴⁸ Jockel and Sokolsky, 315.

⁴⁹ Jockel and Sokolsky, 317.

⁵⁰ Andrea Charron, “Arctic Security: Keeping NATO Out, Russia and China Down, and the United States in” in *Beyond Afghanistan: An International Security Agenda for Canada*, Edited by James Fergusson and Francis Furtado (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2017): 97-109.

⁵¹ Joseph Jockel and Joel Sokolsky, *Canada in NATO: 1949 – 2019*. (Kingston: McGill/Queen’s University Press, 2022): 11-35.

⁵² Chapnick, 2000, “The Canadian Middle Power Myth”, 189-198.

⁵³ Adam Chapnick, *The Middle Power Project: Canada and the Founding of the United Nations* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), 1.

⁵⁴ Chapnick, 2000, “The Canadian Middle Power Myth”, 192.

⁵⁵ Chapnick, 2000, 192.

What is a Middle Power?

Middle powers are often located between two great powers which allows them to have the opportunity to act as a “bridge” or “mediator” between two great powers.⁵⁶ An example is Canada as a middle power located between the Soviet Union and the United States.⁵⁷ As Canada is physically located between the Soviet Union and the United States, its Arctic was the fastest avenue of approach for an attack by the Soviets on North American targets. Canada had to ensure it remained a competent ally to the United States, band wagoning to it for protection against the Soviet Union.

According to Lyon and Tomlin, Canada is an internationalist because of its memberships in international organizations which are vital tools of foreign policy.⁵⁸ Canada is a member of “the UN, the Commonwealth, La Francophonie, NATO” and thirty-nine other fora.⁵⁹ Being a Western internationalist goes hand-in-hand with the potential to be a middle power. A characteristic or behaviour of middle powers is that they support multilateralism.⁶⁰ According to Keating, Canada multilateralism is Canada’s most important tool of foreign policy.⁶¹ Canada’s support and membership in the UN and NATO are examples of multilateralism which is defined as the willingness to work with other states.⁶²

⁵⁶ Kim Richard Nossal, Stéphane Roussel and Stéphane Paquin, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 4th ed. (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015), 63.

⁵⁷ Kim Richard Nossal, Stéphane Roussel and Stéphane Paquin, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 4th ed. (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015), 63.

⁵⁸ Peyton V. Lyon and Brian W. Tomlin, *Canada as an International Actor*, (Toronto, Ontario: The Macmillan Company of Canada, 1979), 1.

⁵⁹ Lyon and Tomlin, *Canada as an International Actor*, 1 and “Partnerships and organizations,” Government of Canada, last modified October 19, 2019, https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/partnerships_organizations-partenariats_organisations.aspx?lang=eng.

⁶⁰ Keating, *Canada and World Order*, 1.

⁶¹ Keating, 1.

⁶² Keating, 1.

On the one hand, the literature on “middle power” theory shows that there is a debate about whether Canada is a “placeholder” or a “middle power” in decline.⁶³ According to Lang, Canada’s military, economic, and diplomatic powers are declining.⁶⁴ Similar to Lang, Keating also notes that Canada’s support for multilateralism is waning because of the decline in “support” for “diplomacy and development assistance.”⁶⁵

On the other hand, the literature also discusses Canada’s role as a “leader.” Canada was an important player in the creation of the Ottawa Land Mine Treaty, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas, and the International Criminal Court.⁶⁶ Canada was able to help create the organizations and treaties even when the United States is not a signatory or party to the treaties or organization.⁶⁷ According to Nossal et al., the great powers like the United States, Russia, and China did not sign the Ottawa Treaty.⁶⁸ The absence or unwillingness of the great powers on organizations and treaties allow middle powers like Canada to take the lead and initiative. During its sixth term on the UNSC, Canada was the lead in the human security agenda under Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy.⁶⁹ And Canada proposed the creation of the Arctic Council; the founding declaration of the Arctic Council is called the Ottawa Declaration.⁷⁰

⁶³ Lang, “Searching for a Middle-Power Role in a New World Order”, 2.

⁶⁴ Lang, 2.

⁶⁵ Keating, *Canada and World Order*, 283.

⁶⁶ Keating, *Canada and World Order*, 176-177. See also “Canada and the International Criminal Court,” Government of Canada, last modified February 26, 2019, https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/icc-cpi/index.aspx?lang=eng.

⁶⁷ Keating, 176.

⁶⁸ Kim Richard Nossal, Stéphane Roussel and Stéphane Paquin, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 4th ed. (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015), 81.

⁶⁹ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 157.

⁷⁰ “Ottawa Declaration (1996),” Arctic Council, accessed on May 19, 2020, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/85/EDOCS-1752-v2-ACMMCA00_Ottawa_1996_Founding_Declaration.PDF?sequence=5&isAllowed=y.

This thesis seeks to determine which, if any, of these memes of Canada's role in the world applies when comparing Canada's interactions with P5 members of two different organizations – the UNSC and the Arctic Council.

Canada as a “leader” or “decision maker”

Gecelovsky emphasizes that “ideas” are important in studying foreign policy and that the middle power theory is “important” in Canadian foreign policy because it has guided policymakers in “crafting Canada’s foreign policy.”⁷¹ According to Gecelovsky, middle powers can provide leadership in its “functional” or niche “area.”⁷² A “leader” proposes new ideas or create new norms on international organizations.⁷³ Leading ideas, however, is not the same as being a great power, which was determined post WWII and is codified in the UN Charter.

According to Gecelovsky, “policy entrepreneurs” create new ideas in foreign policy.⁷⁴ The new ideas can help provide solutions to problems or crises in foreign policy.⁷⁵ “Norm entrepreneurs” can be societal actors, such as community groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but foreign policy decision making power rests with the prime minister and his/her Cabinet.⁷⁶ For example, public outcry and media reports convinced Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau to take a policy leadership role and adopt the *Arctic Waters Pollutions Prevention Act* to require certain rules of ships transiting the Northwest Passage (NWP) to limit pollution in the Arctic after the USS *Manhattan* transited the NWP in 1969 and 1970.⁷⁷ This exceptional Canadian regulation was adopted by the world and is now enshrined in Article 234 in the UN

⁷¹ Gecelovsky, “Constructing a Middle Power: Ideas and Canadian Foreign Policy”, 77.

⁷² Gecelovsky, 78.

⁷³ Gecelovsky, 78.

⁷⁴ Gecelovsky, 81.

⁷⁵ Gecelovsky, 81.

⁷⁶ Gecelovsky, 81.

⁷⁷ Keating, *Canada and World Order*, 104.

Convention on the Law of the Sea allowing coastal states in ice covered waters to make national rules for vessel traffic.⁷⁸

Other examples are the numerous NGOs which found an advocate in Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy to push for the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine and the Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction to be adopted by the UN.⁷⁹ Former Prime Minister Stephen Harper led the charge to have sanctions applied against Russia in 2014 when it annexed Crimea and Canadian Inuk and Circumpolar Ambassador Mary Simons played a crucial role in the creation of the Arctic Council.⁸⁰ Canada's Philip Kirsch was also the first President of the International Criminal Court.⁸¹ And Canada helped to ensure that Article 44 was included in the UN Charter which requires the UNSC to invite troop contributing states to participate in UNSC meetings about the employment of their troops.⁸²

It seems that when the great powers do not feel strongly about the adoption of conventions or creation of organizations, Canada is able to find its lead role and create new institutions, treaties, and exceptions in international law.

⁷⁸ Article 234 states: Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. Such laws and regulations shall have due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine environment based on the best available scientific evidence. See pp. 115-116 UN General Assembly, *Convention on the Law of the Sea*, 10 December 1982. https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf

⁷⁹ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 160.

⁸⁰ John English, *Ice and Water: Politics, Peoples and the Arctic*, (Toronto: Penguin Random House, 2013), She was appointed in 1994 by Jean Chrétien and held the position until 2004

⁸¹ Keating, *Canada and World Order*, 176-177.

⁸² "United Nations Charter (full text)." United Nations, <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text>.

Canada as the “helpful fixer” and the quintessential Middle Power

A “helpful fixer” is a middle power that has interest in a keeping a peaceful international system and maintaining the harmony between the great powers.⁸³ The veto on the UNSC was an initiative by the United States and the United Kingdom to allow the Great Powers to protect vital national interests.⁸⁴ The League of Nations, by contrast, was unsuccessful as an international organization in preventing WWII because the great powers did not have a veto.⁸⁵ At the UN’s creation, so-called middle powers, like Australia and Canada, wanted to limit the powers of the P5 in the UN Charter; indeed, Australia campaigned for a seat on the UNSC vowing to eliminate the veto.⁸⁶ Canada was more pragmatic and instead advocated for middle powers to have a seat at the UNSC table for discussions of concern to them if not elected members at the time.⁸⁷ While Australia won a seat on the UNSC, the veto remains because the great powers would not stay if there is no veto.⁸⁸ Canada, instead, ran on a platform to keep the veto which was appreciated by the United States and the United Kingdom as its key allies.⁸⁹ Instead, Canada advocated for Article 31 in the Charter which states:

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected.⁹⁰

Middle powers, like Canada, are assumed to play the role of the “helpful fixer” in the international system.⁹¹ Peacekeeping is an example of how middle powers play the role of

⁸³ Adam Chapnick, “The Middle Power,” *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 7, no. 2 (1999), doi: 10.1080/11926422.1999.9673212, 75.

⁸⁴ Chapnick, 2005, *The Middle Power Project*, 135.

⁸⁵ Chapnick, 2005, 138.

⁸⁶ Chapnick, 2005, 85-138.

⁸⁷ Chapnick, 2005, 135.

⁸⁸ Chapnick, 2005, 138.

⁸⁹ Chapnick, 2005, 138.

⁹⁰ Chapter V, UN Charter (San Francisco, 1945).

⁹¹ Dorn, “Canadian Peacekeeping: Proud Tradition, Strong Future?”, 20.

“helpful fixer.”⁹² Often solving an intractable issue for the Great Powers (especially Canada’s ally, the United States) and preventing them from being directly involved. Canada’s most famous example was inventing a peacekeeping mission in the Suez Canal crisis to prevent the United Kingdom, France, as well as the Soviet Union and the United States from engaging in war in 1956.⁹³ “Helpful fixers” can provide assistance via governance ideas and leveraging the mandates of international organizations.⁹⁴

The Suez Canal crisis began in July 1956 when Egypt’s former President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal.⁹⁵ The United Kingdom and France were against the nationalization of the Suez Canal because it was important for their “foreign trade” and it was in their national interest to keep the Suez Canal open.⁹⁶ Israel, Britain, and France were in favour of an attack on Egypt and attacked Egypt.⁹⁷ On the other hand, the United States was not in favour of an attack on Egypt.⁹⁸ There was also the potential for the Soviet Union to be involved in the Suez Canal crisis which could encourage the involvement of the United States.⁹⁹ Canada was an ally of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States and wanted to ensure that the Soviet

⁹² Dorn, “Canadian Peacekeeping: Proud Tradition, Strong Future?”, 20.

⁹³ Lang, “Searching for a Middle-Power Role in a New World Order”, 2.

⁹⁴ Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, “The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings”, October 2018, [https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 15.

⁹⁵ Kim Richard Nossal, Stéphane Roussel and Stéphane Paquin, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 4th ed. (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015), 144.

⁹⁶ Keating, *Canada and World Order*, 39.

⁹⁷ Kim Richard Nossal, Stéphane Roussel and Stéphane Paquin, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 4th ed. (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015), 144.

⁹⁸ Kim Richard Nossal, Stéphane Roussel and Stéphane Paquin, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 4th ed. (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015), 144.

⁹⁹ Kim Richard Nossal, Stéphane Roussel and Stéphane Paquin, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 4th ed. (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015), 144.

Union and the United States did not become directly involved in the crisis.¹⁰⁰ The involvement of great powers in the Suez Canal crisis with vetoes meant that the UNSC was deadlocked.¹⁰¹ Former External Affairs Minister Lester Pearson had supported a United States' proposal called the "Uniting for Peace" resolution which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1950 to deal with the war between the Koreans.¹⁰² The resolution states that if the UNSC cannot fulfill its mandate of ensuring international peace and security because it is deadlocked, the UN General Assembly can hold emergency special sessions.¹⁰³ Using the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, Lester Pearson proposed that the UN General Assembly support an UN Emergency Force (UNEF) for peacekeeping in the Suez Canal.¹⁰⁴ Canada's relationship with the United States, France, and the United Kingdom allowed it to function as a bridge between the great powers.¹⁰⁵ Canada's competent military and ability to mediate effectively meant Canada's Lieutenant General Burns became the mission Commander of UNEF (shifting from his role as mission Commander for the UN Truce Supervision Organization headquartered in Jerusalem) and Lester Pearson won the Nobel Peace Prize for helping to settle the Suez Canal crisis.¹⁰⁶

Canada as a peripheral player or "placeholder"

There is an alternate camp in the middle power literature that argues that Canada is no longer an important player because it is either a middle power in decline or the idea of a middle power was meaningless.¹⁰⁷ In both cases, if Canada is not a leader or middle power then it is on

¹⁰⁰ Kim Richard Nossal, Stéphane Roussel and Stéphane Paquin, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 4th ed. (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2015), 144.

¹⁰¹ Keating, *Canada and World Order*, 39.

¹⁰² Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 47.

¹⁰³ Chapnick, 2019, 46.

¹⁰⁴ Keating, *Canada and World Order*, 39.

¹⁰⁵ Keating, 39.

¹⁰⁶ Keating, 40.

¹⁰⁷ Lang, "Searching for a Middle-Power Role in a New World Order", 2 and Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 11.

the periphery of issues and can only operate on the margins of events that are of less or little significance to the Great Powers. Indeed, Canada is, at best, a placeholder in organizations (i.e. it occupies a seat) serving its time but not affecting the strategic direction or issues that the organization tackles.

Lang argues that Canada's power is in decline and that Canada needs to get rid of the middle power persona to increase its role through hard power.¹⁰⁸ According to Lang, there are "three instruments of power" to measure Canada's power: "military, aid, and foreign service."¹⁰⁹ An eye watering deficit in the 1990s are cited as the catalyst for Canada's decline in military power due to budget cuts in military spending.¹¹⁰ In terms of military power, Lang cites that Canada has still not met its target to contribute 2% of GDP to NATO.¹¹¹ Successive prime ministers from Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau to Stephen Harper have limited aid and foreign service intervention in world issues.¹¹² More recently, despite multiple promises Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has yet to meet any of the government's climate change goals.¹¹³ Lang concludes that Canada has been focusing on soft power which can be construed as finger wagging.¹¹⁴ If it wished and wanted to contribute to the international system, Canada needs to increase its instruments of power.¹¹⁵ Similarly, Cohen also argues that Canada is a middle power in decline in his popular book entitled "While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World".¹¹⁶

¹⁰⁸ Lang, "Searching for a Middle-Power Role in a New World Order", 2.

¹⁰⁹ Lang, 2.

¹¹⁰ Lang, "Searching for a Middle-Power Role in a New World Order", 9 and Bartley Kives, "By spending more on defence, the true north concedes it must be stronger if it wants to stay free," *CBC News*, April 10, 2022, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/canda-winnipeg-defence-budget-analysis-1.6413824>.

¹¹¹ Lang, 5.

¹¹² Lang, 7-8.

¹¹³ Mia Rabson, "It's 'not nothing': Trudeau defends climate change action," *The Canadian Press*, September 11, 2021, <https://globalnews.ca/news/8183335/trudeau-climate-change-push-back>.

¹¹⁴ Lang, "Searching for a Middle-Power Role in a New World Order", 9-10.

¹¹⁵ Lang, 9-10.

¹¹⁶ Andrew Cohen, *While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World* (Toronto, ON: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 2005), 25.

Lang and Cohen used the same instruments to measure Canada's power to argue that Canada is in decline.¹¹⁷

According to Nossal, some of the literature describes Canada as a satellite or dependent of the United States and necessarily in a place holding role.¹¹⁸ Canada's contributions to issues are limited if it is dependent on the great powers; an example is Canada's over reliance on the United States' economy and bandwagoning with the United States for military protection.¹¹⁹ Canada has not been contributing the 2% of its GDP to NATO which has been an issue with its great powers allies, particularly the United States who have been pushing for NATO members to contribute 2% of its GDP to NATO.¹²⁰

Being on the periphery of an issue, however, means often working on processes, budgeting and machinery of government issues – those that are often neglected, tedious and not central to solving world crises.¹²¹ Canada's insistence, for example, that the UNSC verify and monitor sanctions busting activity,¹²² or that UNSC elections begin earlier in the year by six months before the newly elected non-permanent members assume their responsibilities to allow more handover time,¹²³ or that there be open interviews of candidates for the Secretary General

¹¹⁷ Cohen, *While Canada Slept*, 3 and Lang, "Searching for a Middle-Power Role in a New World Order," 2.

¹¹⁸ Kim Richard Nossal, Stéphane Roussel and Stéphane Paquin, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 4th ed. (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2015), 67.

¹¹⁹ Kim Richard Nossal, Stéphane Roussel and Stéphane Paquin, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 4th ed. (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2015), 67.

¹²⁰ Lang, "Searching for a Middle-Power Role in a New World Order," 4-5.

¹²¹ Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, "The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings", October 2018, [https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 15.

¹²² Andrea Charron, "Three Canadians and their Contributions to UN Sanctions: A Tribute to Margaret Doxey, David Malone and Robert Fowler," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 16 no. 3 (Fall 2010): 1-15, doi: 10.1080/11926422.2010.9687317.

¹²³ "Security Council Elections 2014." *Security Council Report*, October 15, 2014, <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2014/10/security-council-elections-2014.php>.

of the UN¹²⁴ are important process and transparency contributions. How organizations, work, however, are rarely considered important decisions and are considered to be at the margins of important decision making within international organizations. Rather than judging a priori what role Canada should have, this thesis focuses on the actions of Canada in the organizations to determine what is Canada's main role in the UNSC and Arctic Council on balance. Certainly, Canada has been instrumental in creating organizations such as the International Criminal Court¹²⁵ and the Arctic Council suggesting its role, regardless of "title" as a middle power or not, has been significant. Three variables are often referenced when determining the status of a middle power: power, Western values, and multilateralism.

1. Power and its Projection

The literature on middle power looks at power as an indicator of a state's position in the international system. The two types of power are hard power and soft power.¹²⁶ Hard power is usually associated with the UNSC, NATO, and the great powers. Hard power is also associated with the amount of coercive force a state can wield via armed force, sanctions, or threats of withholding vital economic aid or resources. By having a veto, the great powers ultimately decide when force can be used in the international system to ensure international peace and security.¹²⁷ In contrast, middle powers do not have the military capabilities of the great powers.¹²⁸ Canada has a decent sized and capable armed forces but cannot deploy internationally

¹²⁴ "The UN Secretary-General Selection and Appointment Process: Emerging from the Shadows." *Security Council Report*, April 4, 2017, <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/research-reports/the-un-secretary-general-selection-and-appointment-process-emerging-from-the-shadows.php>.

¹²⁵ "Canada and the International Criminal Court," Government of Canada, last modified February 26, 2019, https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/icc-cpi/index.aspx?lang=eng.

¹²⁶ Kim Richard Nossal, Stéphane Roussel and Stéphane Paquin, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 4th ed. (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2015), 80-81.

¹²⁷ Chapter VII, UN Charter (San Francisco, 1945).

¹²⁸ Burke, *Diplomacy and the Arctic Council*, 24.

without the assistance of allies as it is missing some key capabilities, especially the ability to sustain a persistent presence abroad.

Great powers were also meant to be the only states with nuclear weapons or at least initially prior to rapid proliferation of the technology.¹²⁹ Nuclear weapons are the ultimate measure of great power status in the international system, but it is not the only measure because the possession of nuclear weapons does not automatically make a state a great power.¹³⁰ Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, and India have such weapons but they are not considered great powers, nor are they considered middle powers. Canada, South Africa and Iran are examples of states that could possess such weapons. Canada decided not to in the Cold War, South Africa was actively prevented from acquiring them during the Cold War by a UN arms' embargo and sanctions against Iran since 1996 are trying to frustrate its active proliferation attempts. None of these states, however, have ever been considered great powers.

Soft power, according to Joseph Nye, refers to the ability of a state to influence others with ideas rather than coercion.¹³¹ Soft power includes being able to project an ideology and influence other states to adopt ideologies, values, and beliefs.¹³² Great powers, middle and small powers can wield soft power which includes negotiations, exchanges, aid, and diplomatic support to name a few tools. For example, Canada, used diplomacy to get states to support the Anti-Personnel Land Mine Treaty during its sixth term on the UNSC under former Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy.¹³³ Canada also had to use diplomacy when running for a seat

¹²⁹ Wood, "Middle Powers in the International System", 16.

¹³⁰ Wood, 16.

¹³¹ Kim Richard Nossal, Stéphane Roussel and Stéphane Paquin, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 4th ed. (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2015), 80-81.

¹³² Kim Richard Nossal, Stéphane Roussel and Stéphane Paquin, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 4th ed. (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2015), 80-81.

¹³³ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 160.

as a non-permanent member on the UNSC or to get other non-permanent members to support a resolution in the UNSC.¹³⁴

There is also the idea of power as a rule maker. While it is difficult to categorize as hard or soft, rulemaking ability is generally the domain of great powers. For example, the rules for voting on the UN were determined by the United States in consultation with the UK and the Soviet Union.¹³⁵ As a result, the P5 on the UNSC were granted veto power to protect national interests and only the P5 can use the veto power to fulfill its mandate of ensuring international peace and security.¹³⁶ The P5 usually sets the agenda on the UNSC because a veto by one of the P5 means that the issue or conflict would not be included on the UNSC agenda.¹³⁷ There is also rulemaking in the form of institutional creation. In the case of the Arctic Council and its predecessor, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), it was small powers like Finland and Canada which were the drivers behind their creation.¹³⁸ According to Burke, Canada created the initial proposal for the Arctic Council, but the United States amended it.¹³⁹ The initial Canadian proposal for the Arctic Council allowed for the discussion of military issues on the Arctic Council, but it was the United States that was opposed and insisted to include the footnote on the Ottawa Declaration that the Arctic Council will “not deal with matters related to military security.”¹⁴⁰

Economic power is an example of hard or soft power depending on how it is wielded. If used as a threat of tariff or embargo, economic power can be coercive indeed. Gross National

¹³⁴ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 43.

¹³⁵ Chapnick, 2005, *The Middle Power Project*, 79-130.

¹³⁶ Chapter V, UN Charter (San Francisco, 1945).

¹³⁷ Chapter V, UN Charter (San Francisco, 1945).

¹³⁸ English, *Ice and Water*, 12.

¹³⁹ Burke, *Diplomacy and the Arctic Council*, 101.

¹⁴⁰ English, *Ice and Water*, 191.

Product is a measure of a state's economic power.¹⁴¹ Canada is a member of the G7 and the G20 because of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP)¹⁴² and is often called upon to help finance missions and initiatives in international organizations, such as for the UN and the Arctic Council.¹⁴³ An example of a softer use of economic might is Canada's lead in financial support to the Indigenous Permanent Participants on the Arctic Council.¹⁴⁴ But economic status is also not sufficient to be called a middle power as Italy and Japan are rarely referenced as middle powers but are also part of the G7 and G20 like Canada.¹⁴⁵

2. Middle Powers with Western Values

The term middle power is often associated with Western states like Canada, Australia, and Norway.¹⁴⁶ Middle powerness is often a reference to the Western states that helped the United States lead the allies in the defeat of the Axis powers and were victorious in World War II.¹⁴⁷ Middle powers continue to be allied with the United States during the Cold War, through its unipolar moment and even in today's more contested, geopolitical context.¹⁴⁸ Middle powers were expected to support the international order that was created after World War II and established during the creation of the United Nations.¹⁴⁹ Thus, middle powers are often associated exclusively with Western liberal democracies and so membership in certain alliances was a key factor to classify middle powers.¹⁵⁰ Non-NATO members or partners, for example are rarely referenced as middle powers even if they have bridging capabilities, sizeable militaries

¹⁴¹ Wood, "Middle Powers in the International System", 17.

¹⁴² Keating, *Canada and World Order*, 1.

¹⁴³ Burke, *Diplomacy an the Arctic Council*, 25.

¹⁴⁴ Burke, 25.

¹⁴⁵ Kim Richard Nossal, Stéphane Roussel and Stéphane Paquin, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 4th ed. (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2015), 41.

¹⁴⁶ Wood, "Middle Powers in the International System", 17.

¹⁴⁷ Moeini et al., "Middle Power in the Multipolar World," 3.

¹⁴⁸ Moeini et al., 3.

¹⁴⁹ Moeini et al, 3.

¹⁵⁰ Wood, "Middle Powers in the International System," 10.

and regional influence. This limitation to western democracies only, however, is criticized more and more in the literature as outdated. It was Canada who pushed to include the criteria that NATO members support the principles of democracy in Article 2 of the Washington Treaty.¹⁵¹ Thus, Article 2 of the Washington Treaty outline that members of the alliance adhere to “the principles of democracy, individual, liberty, and the rule of law.”¹⁵²

If regional power reach is one of the criteria for states to be considered a “middle power”, then certainly Iran, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, and others could be considered middle powers. Brazil, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and South Africa are regional powers and also organization joiners (multilateralists) and have also served as non-permanent members on the UNSC like Canada.¹⁵³ Brazil, for example has been an E10 member on the UNSC no fewer than ten times. Wood argues that middle powers now include states in the East and the West.¹⁵⁴ Indonesia, Egypt, and Nigeria are examples of middle powers in the East.¹⁵⁵ Nevertheless, in terms of the UNSC and Arctic Council, which are western constructs, the assumption for this thesis is that Canada, as a Western ally and a liberal democracy, are key variables of its “middle powerness.”

3. Multilateralism

According to Keating and Wood, middle powers prefer to engage in “multilateral diplomacy.”¹⁵⁶ Middle powers join international organizations or form alliances to pursue common goals as a tool of foreign policy.¹⁵⁷ Multilateralism, however, is tied to variables such as

¹⁵¹ “The North Atlantic Treaty,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, last modified April 10, 2019, 14:16, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm.

¹⁵² “The North Atlantic Treaty,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, last modified April 10, 2019, 14:16, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm.

¹⁵³ Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, “The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings”, October 2018, [https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 15.

¹⁵⁴ Wood, “Middle Powers in the International System,” ix.

¹⁵⁵ Wood, 10.

¹⁵⁶ Keating, *Canada and World Order*, 1.

¹⁵⁷ Keating, 1.

power, values and common goals. Canada is a multilateralist because it is a member of international organizations including NATO, Commonwealth, La Francophonie, UN, WTO, G7, and the G20.¹⁵⁸ It is a member of these organizations, however, because they are often supported by the United States and given limited power projection, Canada needs an international organization to extend its reach and influence especially with other like-minded states. Of all the concepts, this is the weakest. Even North Korea has joined many international organizations but often to keep tabs on decisions made and to defend its interests, not to work actively toward commons goals.

These ideas of what constitutes a middle power and especially the variables of a middle power will be instrumental in defining the role of Canada on the UNSC and Arctic Council. The next chapter reviews the role of Canada and its six terms on the UNSC. As Canada does not have a veto, it is not expected that Canada will serve as a decision-making leader. Rather, it is the control to confirm the role of Canada as a middle power (i.e., helpful fixer) when a member of an organization with great powers in lead roles.

¹⁵⁸ Keating, *Canada and World Order*, 1.

Chapter 3 – Canada on the United Nations Security Council

The United Nations was created in 1945, after the end of the Second World War.¹⁵⁹ It is the successor to the League of Nations. The UNSC is one of the main bodies of the United Nations along with the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the UN Secretariat.¹⁶⁰ The mandate of the UNSC, as outlined in the UN Charter, is to have primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.¹⁶¹ In the beginning of the creation and planning of the UN, Canada was isolationist and hesitant to join international organizations under Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King lest Canada be pulled between its allegiance to the UK and growing alliance with the United States.¹⁶² It was the policy entrepreneurs and bureaucrats in the Department of External Affairs, like Hume Wrong, who convinced Canadian Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King to join the UN.¹⁶³ According to Chapnick, Canada was behind the post-war planning of an international organization that would later become the United Nations.¹⁶⁴ For example, Canada signed onto the Atlantic Charter in 1942 and hosted the Quebec Conference in 1943 at which the United States and UK agreed to draft the framework that would become the UN.¹⁶⁵ Canada, for example, was never considered one of the “big four” which includes the US, UK, USSR, and China and which were key to the organization’s future to agree to the terms of the UN Charter.¹⁶⁶ It was ultimately, however, the United States, United

¹⁵⁹ “About Us,” United Nations, accessed July 16, 2022, <https://www.un.org/en/about-us>.

¹⁶⁰ “Main Bodies,” United Nations, accessed on July 1, 2022, <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/main-bodies>.

¹⁶¹ Chapter V, UN Charter (San Francisco, 1945).

¹⁶² Chapnick, 2005, *The Middle Power Project: Canada and the Founding of the United Nations*, 1.

¹⁶³ Chapnick, 2005, 3.

¹⁶⁴ Chapnick, 2005, 3-79.

¹⁶⁵ “The Formation of the United Nations, 1945”, accessed on November 13, 2022, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/un>.

¹⁶⁶ Chapnick, 2005, *The Middle Power Project: Canada and the Founding of the United Nations*, 3-79.

Kingdom, and the Soviet Union which were the key architects and had the deciding votes in the creation of the UN.¹⁶⁷

Canada has served six, two-year terms as a non-permanent member on the United Nations Security Council.¹⁶⁸ Canada first ran for a seat on the UNSC as a non-permanent member in 1946, but it was unsuccessful losing to Australia.¹⁶⁹ Canada was first elected as a non-permanent member on the UNSC in 1948-1949.¹⁷⁰ Canada has served as a non-permanent member on the UNSC every decade until its bids to serve as a non-permanent member in 2010 and 2021 failed.¹⁷¹

Until 1965, there were only six non-permanent members but given the growth of the UN membership, four more non-permanent members were added.¹⁷² The non-permanent members represent different regions of the world. Canada is part of the Western European and Other Group (WEOG includes Australia and New Zealand as well as western European states like Germany, Portugal, Norway and Ireland).¹⁷³ WEOG has two of the now ten elected non-permanent seats on the UNSC. Every month, the President of the UNSC changes and they manage the agenda. While most of the UNSC's agenda is set with "bring forward" decisions that require periodic renewal, the President can include issues of concern to the state in question. The Presidency rotates among the UNSC members by the first letter of the English spelling of the

¹⁶⁷ Chapnick, 2005, *The Middle Power Project*, 3-79.

¹⁶⁸ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 3.

¹⁶⁹ Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, "The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings", October 2018, [https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 12.

¹⁷⁰ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 23.

¹⁷¹ Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, "The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings", October 2018, [https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 16.

¹⁷² Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 71.

¹⁷³ Chapnick, 2019, 69.

state name. If fortunate, a state may have the opportunity for a presidency once every one or two years, especially when there were only eleven Council members during the Cold War.

Non-permanent members, in theory, can have vote deciding powers on the UNSC.¹⁷⁴ Only nine affirmative votes of fifteen are needed for a resolution to pass if none of the great powers vetoes the resolution. Therefore, when the great powers are indifferent to a particular issue, the P5 provide the space for non-permanent members, like Canada, to lead ideas. In practice, the United States, United Kingdom and France are the primary “pens” of resolutions, and it is increasingly rare that the P5 members do not assert their voting preferences.¹⁷⁵ When the P5 are unwilling or unable to create resolutions for a particular issue, non-elected members can present draft resolutions.

Canada is an ally of the United Kingdom, the United States, and France and therefore its votes on the UNSC are expected to align with its western P5 allies.¹⁷⁶ The United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Canada are all NATO allies.¹⁷⁷ Canada, France, UK, and US are also part of the G7 and G20.¹⁷⁸

Canada’s voting record, as a non-permanent member on the UNSC, shows that it aligns with the United States almost exclusively given that it is the primary drafter of the majority of

¹⁷⁴ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 71.

¹⁷⁵ Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, “The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings”, October 2018, [https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 7-8.

¹⁷⁶ See Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, “The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings”, October 2018, [https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 5 and Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 27.

¹⁷⁷ “NATO – member countries.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization updated August 31, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/nato_countries.htm.

¹⁷⁸ “Canada and the G7,” Government of Canada, updated October 25, 2022, https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-reactions_internationales/g7/index.aspx?lang=eng and “Canada and the G20,” Government of Canada, updated October 28, 2022, https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-reactions_internationales/g20/index.aspx?lang=eng#a1.

UNSC resolutions.¹⁷⁹ Similarly, Chapnick concurs that Canada aligns with the United States and the United Kingdom on the UNSC.¹⁸⁰ During the Cold War, Canada (and frankly all states) had an incentive to ensure that the United States and the Soviet Union did not clash given the doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD).

The Soviet Union (now Russia) was the most likely to be at odds with US-led resolutions during the Cold War. With notorious resort to the veto, the Soviet Union often stopped any discussions on issues of national interest to it at the UNSC requiring a work around process enshrined in the Uniting for Peace Resolution adopted by the General Assembly – led by the United States and supported by Canada.¹⁸¹ While China’s seat was occupied by Taiwan (officially, the Republic of China in 1945) until 1971, Canada and Taiwan voted similarly given Taiwan’s dependence on the United States. When the People’s Republic of China (PRC) took over the seat in 1971, it was initially cautious in its voting, preferring to abstain rather than veto resolutions. Of late, China has become more strident seeking to protect its national interests often voting with Russia against the Western P5 members. Canada, as a result, is increasingly at odds with China in terms of its voting record given that Canada is an ally of the United States.

¹⁷⁹ Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, “The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings”, October 2018, [https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 5.

¹⁸⁰ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 27. Canada was a former dominion of the United Kingdom until Canada gained independence with the signing of the Statute of Westminster in 1931 which means Canada could create its own foreign policy after the Statute of Westminster was signed. Also, Canada and the United Kingdom are members of the Commonwealth. Canada and the United States created the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) in 1940 when they both signed the Ogdensburg Agreement (really a press release) and the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) Agreement in 1958 pledging both states to the joint air defence of North America.

¹⁸¹ United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution 377 A (3 November 1950).

Canada's first term on the UNSC 1948-1949

Canada served its first term as a non-permanent member on the UNSC in 1948-1949 having lost to Australia in the first elections held in 1945.¹⁸² The prime ministers of Canada were William Lyon Mackenzie King followed by Louis St. Laurent during Canada's first term on the UNSC.¹⁸³ General Andrew McNaughton was Canada's Permanent Representative to the UN during its first term on the UNSC.¹⁸⁴ According to Chapnick, Canada was on the Committee of Experts and the Commission for Conventional Armaments during its first term as a non-permanent member on the UNSC.¹⁸⁵ Canada's first term on the UNSC also coincided with the negotiations to create the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance.¹⁸⁶ The non-permanent members on the UNSC in 1948 were Canada, Argentina, Belgium, Columbia, Syrian Arab Republic (Syria), and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (Ukraine).¹⁸⁷ Cuba, Egypt, and Norway replaced Belgium, Syria and Colombia as non-permanent members on the UNSC in 1949.¹⁸⁸

The key issues on the UNSC agenda during Canada's first term as a non-permanent member in 1948 were India/Pakistan, Palestine/Israel, and questions about the status of Indonesia.¹⁸⁹ The election of judges to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), rules of engagement for the UN International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the admission of Burma to the UN were also on the UNSC agenda in 1948 but they are issues for which consensus

¹⁸² Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 25

¹⁸³ Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, "The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings", October 2018, [https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 12.

¹⁸⁴ Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, "The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings", October 2018, [https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 12.

¹⁸⁵ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 42.

¹⁸⁶ Chapnick, 2019, 27.

¹⁸⁷ S/PV.229 (1948).

¹⁸⁸ Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, "The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings", October 2018, [https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 12.

¹⁸⁹ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 42.

was needed and the P5 set the tone; if the Soviet Union and the United States were in agreement, the other members of the UNSC fell into line.¹⁹⁰ Canada, therefore, is observed to play the role of a “place holder” in these cases as there was really little option but to agree for had Canada voted “no”, it would have damaged relations with the United States.¹⁹¹ The other three “questions” however, were ones in which the United States and Soviet Union were at odds and so Canada had the opportunity to play a potential “middle power” role. They also provide an opportunity to assess Canada’s role because the issues involved the great powers.

India/Pakistan Question

India, a former British raj, was partitioned into India and Pakistan becoming sovereign independent states in August 1947.¹⁹² The control of some of the territory was disputed.¹⁹³ India brought the issue of its relations with Pakistan to the attention of the UNSC in 1948.¹⁹⁴ India accused Pakistani nationals of operations against Jammu and Kashmir, which are provinces that India claims to belong to them.¹⁹⁵ Pakistan also laid claim to both.¹⁹⁶ The conflict was largely between Hindus, which was the predominant religious group of India, and Muslims, which was the predominant religious group of Pakistan.¹⁹⁷ India and Pakistan were both members of the

¹⁹⁰ “Resolutions adopted by the Security Council in 1948.” United Nations Security Council, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1948>.

¹⁹¹ “Resolutions adopted by the Security Council in 1948.” United Nations Security Council, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1948>.

¹⁹² United Nations, Repertoire of the UN Security Council, “The India-Pakistan Question”, 344, https://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/46-51/Chapter%208/46-51_08-16-The%20India-Pakistan%20question.pdf.

¹⁹³ United Nations, Repertoire of the UN Security Council, “The India-Pakistan Question”, 344, https://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/46-51/Chapter%208/46-51_08-16-The%20India-Pakistan%20question.pdf.

¹⁹⁴ United Nations, Repertoire of the UN Security Council, “The India-Pakistan Question”, 344, https://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/46-51/Chapter%208/46-51_08-16-The%20India-Pakistan%20question.pdf.

¹⁹⁵ United Nations, Repertoire of the UN Security Council, “The India-Pakistan Question”, 344, https://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/46-51/Chapter%208/46-51_08-16-The%20India-Pakistan%20question.pdf.

¹⁹⁶ Chapnick, 2009, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 30-31.

¹⁹⁷ Chapnick, 2009, 30.

Commonwealth of Nations headed by the Queen of the United Kingdom putting the United Kingdom in a very difficult position.¹⁹⁸

The UNSC voted to put the India/Pakistan issue on the UNSC agenda in 1948.¹⁹⁹ The possible roles for Canada in the India/Pakistan issue were as a “leader” to provide a definitive solution to the conflict. The second role is that of a “helpful fixer” and provide assistance with the creation or amendments to UNSC resolutions especially ones that help the United Kingdom by mediating between the various Commonwealth members.²⁰⁰ Lastly, Canada could play the role of a place holder by simply doing the minimum at UNSC meetings making few comments and voting as required by the United Kingdom but not in a way that could change the outcome of a vote.

According to Chapnick, Canada was reluctant to be involved in the India/Pakistan issue on the UNSC.²⁰¹ Canada declined the United States’ request to be on a “three-member committee” on the India/Pakistan conflict because it did not want to get involved and implicate its relationship with the great powers, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom.²⁰² Instead, Canada used its one month presidency in January 1947 on the UNSC to become a “facilitator” to bring the facts to light to the UNSC and between the parties to the conflict.²⁰³ Canada held meetings with India and Pakistan as the UNSC president.²⁰⁴ The United Kingdom did not want to take the lead in the India/Pakistan conflict either because of its colonial status and obvious implication in the conflict as the head of the Commonwealth.²⁰⁵ The United States

¹⁹⁸ Kim Richard Nossal, Stéphane Roussel and Stéphane Paquin, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 4th ed. (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015), 214

¹⁹⁹ S/PV.229 (1948).

²⁰⁰ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 31.

²⁰¹ Chapnick, 2019, 31.

²⁰² Chapnick, 2019, 31.

²⁰³ Chapnick, 2019, 31-32.

²⁰⁴ Chapnick, 2019, 32-34.

²⁰⁵ Chapnick, 2019, 31.

was not expected to be involved in the India/Pakistan conflict because it would bring in the Soviet Union.²⁰⁶ Canada was able to secure a commitment from the Soviet Union that it would not be involved in the India/Pakistan conflict which allowed negotiations to take place on the UNSC.²⁰⁷

Between January 1948 and December 1971, the UNSC adopted seventeen resolutions endorsing the 1949 Karachi Agreement which established a cease-fire line agreed to by India and Pakistan and monitored by the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) which remains in place in 2022.²⁰⁸ Belgium was the primary sponsor of resolution S/RES/39 (1948).²⁰⁹ Later, Canada cosponsored one of the resolution S/RES/47 (1948) which enlarged the membership of a commission established earlier in the year (S/RES/39) to investigate and mediate.²¹⁰ Canada cosponsored resolution S/RES/47 with Belgium, ROC, US and UK which recommended various measures including the use of observers to monitor the ceasefire (which eventually became the UNMOGIP).²¹¹ According to Chapnick, the United States and the United Kingdom were not willing to take the lead on the India/Pakistan conflict which gave Canada an opportunity to lead.²¹² Both the United States and the United Kingdom wanted Canada to be involved in the issue.²¹³ Canada voted in favour of all resolutions on India/Pakistan along with the United States and the United Kingdom.²¹⁴

²⁰⁶ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*,31.

²⁰⁷ Chapnick, 2019, 32.

²⁰⁸ “UNMOGIP Fact Sheet,” United Nations Peacekeeping, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unmogip>.

²⁰⁹ S/PV.230 (1948).

²¹⁰ S/RES/47 (1948).

²¹¹ S/RES/47 (1948).

²¹² Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 30-31.

²¹³ Chapnick, 2019, 30-31.

²¹⁴ S/PV.229 (1948).

Israel/Palestine

Israel/Palestine was another of the issues on the UNSC agenda during Canada's first term.²¹⁵ In 1917, the United Kingdom proclaimed the Balfour Declaration which supported a home for the Jewish people in Israel.²¹⁶ The United Kingdom had the mandate for Palestine post WWII, which the General Assembly recommended should be partitioned to provide a home for the Jewish people.²¹⁷ When Israel proclaimed its independence, war broke out between Israel and neighbouring Arab states in 1948.²¹⁸ The UK brought the problem to the UNSC.²¹⁹ Jordan and Egypt controlled part of the formerly mandated area designated as Arab under General Assembly resolution 181 (1947) and Israel would control the rest of the territory.²²⁰ The United Kingdom and the United States had different plans for Palestine because the United Kingdom wanted the issue dealt with by the United Nations General Assembly and the United States wanted the issue to be dealt with among the P5 in the UNSC.²²¹ The United Kingdom supported the Arabs and the United States supported the establishment of an independent Jewish state in Palestine.²²² The United States and the United Kingdom drafted different resolutions for the UNSC on the Israel/Palestine conflict and Canada had to choose between its great power allies.²²³ Similar to the India/Pakistan conflict, Canada had to navigate its relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom.²²⁴ According to Chapnick, Canada favoured a two state solution to the

²¹⁵ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 34.

²¹⁶ Chapnick, 2019, 34.

²¹⁷ "General Assembly – Question of Palestine, United Nations, accessed on November 13, 2022, <https://www.un.org/unispal/data-collection/general-assembly/>.

²¹⁸ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 36-37.

²¹⁹ Chapnick, 2019, 35.

²²⁰ "General Assembly – Question of Palestine, accessed on November 13, 2022, United Nations, <https://www.un.org/unispal/data-collection/general-assembly/>.

²²¹ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 35.

²²² Chapnick, 2019, 37.

²²³ Chapnick, 2019, 37.

²²⁴ Chapnick, 2019, 37.

Palestine/Israel conflict as recommended by the UN General Assembly.²²⁵ Canada was in favour of actions that would ensure peace.²²⁶ The Israel/Palestine conflict led to a decline in the relationship between United States and the United Kingdom.²²⁷ What is more, the United States and the Soviet Union were in favour of admitting Israel to the UN and the United Kingdom was opposed.²²⁸ Canada had originally abstained from voting on the resolution to admit Israel to the United Nations because the United Kingdom wanted Canada to delay the vote until there was a peace settlement.²²⁹ Canada gave Israel “de-facto” recognition on the UN to satisfy both of its great power allies.²³⁰ De facto means that in practice Canada recognizes Israel as a state while waiting for UN membership.²³¹ Israel later reapplied for admission to the United Nations in 1949, and Canada co-sponsored a General Assembly resolution to admit Israel to the United Nations.²³²

Indonesia and the Netherlands

Indonesia was a former colony of the Netherlands.²³³ Indonesia wanted to become an independent state and separate from the Netherlands to become an independent republic.²³⁴ The Netherlands refused to grant Indonesia independence and sent its military to regain control of Indonesia.²³⁵ The UN Committee of Good Offices, created to advise on the issue consisted of the United States, Australia and the Netherlands.²³⁶ This was hardly an impartial committee as the

²²⁵ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 35.

²²⁶ Chapnick, 2019, 38-39.

²²⁷ Chapnick, 2019, 37.

²²⁸ Chapnick, 2019, 38.

²²⁹ Chapnick, 2019, 38.

²³⁰ Chapnick, 2019, 38.

²³¹ Chapnick, 2019, 38-39.

²³² Chapnick, 2019, 39.

²³³ Chapnick, 2019, 39.

²³⁴ Chapnick, 2019, 39.

²³⁵ Chapnick, 2019, 39.

²³⁶ Chapnick, 2019, 39.

Netherlands was set to become a NATO ally and Australia was closely aligned with both allies. Nevertheless, the United States was firm on its push for decolonization and was annoyed with the Netherlands for having sent its military. Canada had to navigate its relationship with the United States without jeopardizing its relationship with the Netherlands and ensure the continuation of the North Atlantic Treaty negotiations.²³⁷ Canada used its Presidency on the UNSC in February 1948 to recommend actions on the Indonesia issue.²³⁸ Canada supported a UNSC resolution proposing a ceasefire, but it “abstained on the issue of “withdrawal.”²³⁹ Canada was successful in getting the United States to modify its draft resolution on Indonesia.²⁴⁰ The United States had planned to propose a resolution to turn the Committee of Good Offices into a powerful UN Commission for Indonesia that would oversee Indonesian independence but softened the demands.²⁴¹ In the end, Indonesia became a UN member, and the North Atlantic Treaty was signed on April 4, 1949.²⁴²

Analysis

On balance, a review of Canada’s position and roles taken on the three substantive questions on the Council’s agenda suggests Canada played the role of the “helpful fixer” during its first term on the UNSC because it was able to navigate its relationship with its great power allies and in certain cases, save them from untenable positions. Canada was a middle power which helped to establish peacekeeping missions in India/Pakistan and Israel/Palestine. On the India/Pakistan issue, Canada had limited ability to affect real change. Canada sponsored and co-

²³⁷ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 41.

²³⁸ Chapnick, 2019, 41.

²³⁹ Chapnick, 2019, 40.

²⁴⁰ Chapnick, 2019, 41.

²⁴¹ Chapnick, 2019, 41.

²⁴² See Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 41-42 and “Founding treaty,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, updated September 2, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67656.htm.

sponsored resolutions with the P5 and the E6 on the UNSC in the India/Pakistan conflict that were particularly helpful for the UK. The UK was implicated in the conflict and therefore, Canada's skillful use of its Presidency to bring facts to light and ensure the parties could be heard, was of tremendous assistance to the UK and to the establishment of a peacekeeping mission. This is the role of a helpful fixer, but whether this one-month stint is sufficient to declare Canada as a middle power is up for debate. In the Israel/Palestine conflict, Canada is most definitely the "helpful fixer" navigating its relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom in the Israel/Palestine conflict and ultimately helping to encourage the UN General Assembly to accept Israel as a UN member.²⁴³ Canada's role vis-à-vis the Indonesian question is less clear although Canada deserves recognition for its ability to navigate its relationship between the United States and the Netherlands on the Indonesia question given that all were founding members of NATO.²⁴⁴ Again, it was its term as President of the UNSC which helped Canada to support a ceasefire which was instrumental in allowing further negotiations leading to an (eventual) sovereign Indonesia.

Canada's second term on the UNSC 1958-1959

Canada served its second term on the UNSC as a non-permanent member in 1958-1959²⁴⁵ at a time when the Cold War dominated geopolitics. The prime minister of Canada was John Diefenbaker and Charles S.A. Ritchie was the Permanent Representative of Canada to the UN.²⁴⁶ The non-permanent members on the UNSC in 1958 were Canada, Colombia, Iraq, Japan,

²⁴³ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 38-39.

²⁴⁴ Chapnick, 2019, 42.

²⁴⁵ Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, "The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings", October 2018, [https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 12.

²⁴⁶ Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, "The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings", October 2018, [https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 12.

Panama, and Sweden.²⁴⁷ Argentina, Italy, and Tunisia joined the UNSC as non-permanent members in 1959 replacing Iraq, Columbia, and Sweden.²⁴⁸ The issues on the UNSC agenda during Canada's second term as a non-permanent member were few; indeed, in 1958 only five resolutions were adopted.²⁴⁹ Two were consensus votes on the admission of Guinea as a member of the UN and a new ICJ judge.²⁵⁰ The others were complaints to the UNSC by Lebanon, the Palestinian Question and Arctic Overflights.²⁵¹ In 1959, only one resolution was adopted on the issue regarding Laos.²⁵²

The Palestinian Question

The Palestinian Question was “resolved” with S/RES/127 (1958) adopted unanimously.²⁵³ It directed the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine to conduct surveys of land and for parties to adhere to the Armistice Agreement.²⁵⁴

The Complaint by Lebanon

The complaint by Lebanon concerned an accusation of interference by the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon and the reply of the representative of the United Arab

²⁴⁷ Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, “The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings”, October 2018, [https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 12.

²⁴⁸ Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, “The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings”, October 2018, [https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 12.

²⁴⁹ “Resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council in 1958,” United Nations Security Council, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1958>.

²⁵⁰ “Resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council in 1958,” United Nations Security Council, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1958>.

²⁵¹ “Resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council in 1958,” United Nations Security Council, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1958>.

²⁵² “Resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council in 1959,” United Nations Security Council, accessed on November 13, 2022, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolution-adopted-security-council-1959>.

²⁵³ S/RES/127 (1958).

²⁵⁴ S/RES/127 (1958).

Republic (Egypt and Syria), and the Arab Federation (Iraq and Jordan).²⁵⁵ The Soviet Union supported the United Arab Republic²⁵⁶ while the United States and the Western members of the P5 supported Lebanon.²⁵⁷ Canada had to navigate its relationship between its Western allies and the Soviet Union in the Middle East during the Cold War so as not to aggravate already tense relations.²⁵⁸ Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States held negotiations.²⁵⁹ The S/RES/128 (1958) called for an Observation group to be sent immediately.²⁶⁰ It was adopted with 10 yes votes and an abstention by the Soviet Union.²⁶¹ Given the lack of unanimity, another resolution was adopted calling for an emergency meeting which was adopted unanimously.²⁶²

Arctic Overflights

Canada was intimately connected to the concerns of Arctic Overflights given its allyship with the United States and the newly signed North American Air Defence Command agreement in 1958²⁶³ Prime Minister Diefenbaker was open to hosting a meeting between the United States and the Soviet Union in Canada.²⁶⁴ The meeting did not happen, and the Cold War continued.²⁶⁵ This shows that on issues regarding national defence, Canada does not have influence if the great powers are involved.

²⁵⁵ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 56-57.

²⁵⁶ Chapnick, 2019, 57.

²⁵⁷ Chapnick, 2019, 57.

²⁵⁸ Chapnick, 2019, 56-57.

²⁵⁹ Chapnick, 2019, 57.

²⁶⁰ S/RES/128 (1958).

²⁶¹ S/RES/128 (1958).

²⁶² S/RES/128 (1958).

²⁶³ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 56.

²⁶⁴ Chapnick, 2019, 56.

²⁶⁵ Chapnick, 2019, 56.

Laos

In the second year of Canada's term, Laos was the sole resolution that was adopted on the UNSC agenda.²⁶⁶ The Vietnam War was raging and allegations of North Vietnamese aggression against Laos was brought forward to the UNSC.²⁶⁷ According to Chapnick, Laos wanted the issue to be on the UNSC, but the Soviet Union, which supported North Vietnam, promised to veto any actions by the UNSC.²⁶⁸ Canada assisted with negotiations conducted by the UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld.²⁶⁹ The United States and the United Kingdom sponsored S/RES/132 (1959) which was adopted on September 7, 1959.²⁷⁰ The UNSC resolution S/RES/132 (1959) approved the creation of a sub-committee consisting of Argentina, Italy, Japan and Tunisia which would gather statements and documents regarding on Laos and report to the UNSC.²⁷¹ It was the only resolution adopted by the Security Council in 1959.²⁷² The great powers, especially the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom were in conflict as to whether or not the draft resolution S/RES/132 (1959) should be considered a procedural vote.²⁷³ The President of the UNSC at the time was Italy.²⁷⁴ The result of the vote was 10 in favour and 1 against.²⁷⁵ The resolution, according to the President and shared by the overwhelming majority of the members, was that the draft resolution falls clearly under Article 29 of the Charter which reads: "The Security Council may establish such subsidiary

²⁶⁶ Chapnick 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 61.

²⁶⁷ Chapnick, 2019, 61.

²⁶⁸ Chapnick, 2019, 61.

²⁶⁹ Chapnick, 2019, 61.

²⁷⁰ S/PV.848 (1959).

²⁷¹ S/RES/132 (1959).

²⁷² "Resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council in 1959," United Nations Security Council, accessed on November 13, 2022, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolution-adopted-security-council-1959>.

²⁷³ S/PV.848 (1959) ¶ 78.

²⁷⁴ S/PV.848 (1959).

²⁷⁵ S/RES/132 (1959).

organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.”²⁷⁶ Canada voted in favour of the resolutions as did the United Kingdom and United States citing that the resolution was procedural and therefore not subject to vetoes.²⁷⁷ Of course, further decisions regarding the Vietnam War within the UNSC were stymied by future vetoes.

Analysis

Canada’s role during its second term on the UNSC was one of placeholder especially during the Lebanon and Laos conflict. Indeed, so few resolutions were adopted between 1958-59 that most of the states were simply going through the motions of voting according to Cold War allegiances. Aside from voting in support of the United States and the United Kingdom, Canada was not a bridge-builder and could not overcome the geopolitical Cold War dynamics on the issues of Lebanon and Laos during its second term on the UNSC.

Canada’s third term on the UNSC

Canada served its third term as a non-permanent member of the UNSC in 1967-1968.²⁷⁸ During Canada’s third term on the UNSC, the number of non-permanent members of the UNSC increased from six non-permanent members to ten non-permanent members.²⁷⁹ The prime ministers of Canada during its third term on the UNSC were Lester Pearson and Pierre

²⁷⁶ S/PV.848 (1959): ¶ 79.

²⁷⁷ S/PV.848 (1959) ¶ 78.

²⁷⁸ Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, “The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings”, October 2018, [https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 12.

²⁷⁹ Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, “The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings”, October 2018, [https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 11-13.

Trudeau.²⁸⁰ George Ignatieff was the Permanent Representative of Canada to the UN.²⁸¹ Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, Ethiopia, India, Japan, Mali, and Nigeria were the non-permanent members of the UNSC in 1967.²⁸² Algeria, Hungary, Pakistan, Senegal, and Paraguay replaced Argentina, Bulgaria, Japan, Mali, and Nigeria as non-permanent members of the UNSC in 1968.²⁸³ The key issues on the agenda for the UNSC was the Six Day War in the Middle East, the Pueblo Affair, Cyprus, Rhodesia, and Czechoslovakia.²⁸⁴ In 1967, twelve resolutions were adopted and in 1968, eighteen were adopted.²⁸⁵

The Six Day War

The Six Day War was a conflict between neighbouring countries in the Middle East which included Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Israel.²⁸⁶ Canada was involved in the conflict because it had peacekeepers stationed in Egypt as part of UNEF which first responded to the Suez Canal crisis.²⁸⁷ From 1956 to 1967, UNEF had managed to keep relative calm on the Israel/Egypt border but by 1967, the tensions in the region were too high and on 16 May 1967,

²⁸⁰ Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, “The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings”, October 2018,

[https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 12.

²⁸¹ Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, “The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings”, October 2018,

[https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 12.

²⁸² Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, “The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings”, October 2018,

[https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 12.

²⁸³ Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, “The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings”, October 2018,

[https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 12.

²⁸⁴ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 80-95.

²⁸⁵ “Resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council in 1967,” United Nations Security Council, accessed on November 13, 2022, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1967> and “Resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council in 1968,” United Nations Security Council, accessed on November 13, 2022, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1968>.

²⁸⁶ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 80.

²⁸⁷ Chapnick, 2019, 80.

the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser ordered UNEF to leave his country.²⁸⁸ The Six-Day war began three weeks later, on 5 June, and fifteen UNEF personnel (fourteen Indian and one Brazilian) still in the Gaza Strip awaiting repatriation were killed as fighting occurred around them.²⁸⁹ The United States and the Soviet Union were fighting for influence in the Middle East.²⁹⁰ The UN Secretary General at the time was U Thant from Burma (Myanmar) who succeeded the popular Dag Hammarskjöld who was killed in a plane crash.²⁹¹ U Thant was a skilled negotiator and promised Egypt that he would discuss the withdrawal of UNEF with troop-contributing countries, but really the decision was Egypt's to make; UNEF needed the permission of Egypt to stay as it was not a Chapter VII mission.²⁹² Canada was part of the UNEF's advisory committee and was keen to hold a meeting regarding the issue to keep the UNEF peacekeeping force in Egypt longer.²⁹³ Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to Israel and kicked out UNEF troops.²⁹⁴ The United States and the United Kingdom had decided that Canada should take the lead on the issue of the Six-Day War given that US' and UK's direct involvement could escalate tensions with the Soviet Union.²⁹⁵ The P5 and the non-permanent members held separate meetings betraying the split within the UNSC, but Canada acted as the go between.²⁹⁶ Canada supported the United States and the United Kingdom allies to

²⁸⁸ "UNEF I," Government of Canada, updated December 11, 2018, <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/past-operations/middle-east/united-nations-emergency-force-i.html>.

²⁸⁹ "UNEF I," Government of Canada, updated December 11, 2018, <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/past-operations/middle-east/united-nations-emergency-force-i.html>.

²⁹⁰ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 81.

²⁹¹ "Dag Hjalmar Agne Carl Hammarskjöld," United Nations, accessed on July 1, 2022, <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/dag-hjalmar-agne-carl-hammarskj%C3%B6ld>.

²⁹² Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 82.

²⁹³ Chapnick, 2019, 82.

²⁹⁴ Chapnick, 2019, 83.

²⁹⁵ Chapnick, 2019, 83.

²⁹⁶ Chapnick, 2019, 84.

encourage continued UN involvement.²⁹⁷ Ultimately a second UNEF mission was established but not until 1973 after fighting in the Middle East resumed on 6 October 1973, when Egypt, in the Suez Canal sector and Syria, in the Golan Heights, attacked Israeli positions.²⁹⁸

The Pueblo Affair

The Pueblo Affair involved North Korea and the United States.²⁹⁹ An American spy ship (the *USS Pueblo*) carrying 83 US crew members (killing one) was seized by North Korea on January 23, 1968.³⁰⁰ North Korea maintained that the United States had passed into its territorial waters, while the United States maintained it was in international waters when the *USS Pueblo* was attacked.³⁰¹ The ship was taken to a North Korean port and the crew were held hostage.³⁰²

The backdrop to the crisis, which made the situation even more tense, was the war in Vietnam. The United States wanted to hold an emergency meeting in the UNSC, but North Korea was not yet a member of the UN.³⁰³ According to Chapnick, given the United States' involvement in the Vietnam War, asked Canada for help to communicate with North Korea privately.³⁰⁴ Canada and Hungary acted as the intermediaries on behalf of the United States and North Korea (backed by the Soviet Union).³⁰⁵ The United States did not recognize North Korea as a legitimate government and had to hold secret meetings to avoid being seen holding talks with a government that it did not recognize.³⁰⁶ Eventually, negotiations between the United States and North Korea, including US admission they were spying, resulted in the release of the

²⁹⁷ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 85.

²⁹⁸ "Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II) – Background (Full text)," United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed on November 18, 2023, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unef2backgr2.html>.

²⁹⁹ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 88.

³⁰⁰ Chapnick, 2019, 88.

³⁰¹ Chapnick, 2019, 88.

³⁰² Chapnick, 2019, 88.

³⁰³ Chapnick, 2019, 88.

³⁰⁴ Chapnick, 2019, 88.

³⁰⁵ Chapnick, 2019, 88.

³⁰⁶ Chapnick, 2019, 88.

crew (who had been tortured) but not until 23 December 1968.³⁰⁷ North Korean leader Kim II Sung celebrated the victory, but many around the world criticized the guerilla tactics and brinkmanship in a time of great political tension.³⁰⁸

Cyprus

Canada was involved in the Cyprus issue (involving a conflict between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders over the management of the newly independent Cyprus) because it contributed troops to the peacekeeping mission.³⁰⁹ The constitution of Cyprus confirmed a Greek majority rule while the Turkish minority was given only “legal rights.”³¹⁰ The Greek majority government in Cyprus was going to remove and limits the rights of the Turkish minority which led to an uprising.³¹¹ “Bolivia, Brazil, Ivory Coast, Morocco and Norway” were the sponsors of S/RES/186.³¹² The resolution was adopted on March 4, 1964 and the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was created.³¹³ Fast forward to 1967 and the UNSC adopted resolution 244 (1967), which recognized the enlargement of UNFICYP’s mandate to include supervision of disarmament and arrangements to safeguard internal security.³¹⁴ As Canada was one of the important troop contributing members, its concurrence with this plan was vital. The resolution was adopted unanimously.³¹⁵ Speaking after the vote, Mr. Ignatieff, Canada’s Ambassador, stated “In recent days, Mr. President [who was the representative for

³⁰⁷ Benjamin Young, “A Reckless Act: The 1968 Pueblo Crisis and North Korea’s Relations with the Third World,” *Wilson Center* (blog), April 14, 2021, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/reckless-act-1968-pueblo-crisis-and-north-koreas-relations-third-world>.

³⁰⁸ Benjamin Young, “A Reckless Act: The 1968 Pueblo Crisis and North Korea’s Relations with the Third World,” *Wilson Center* (blog), April 14, 2021, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/reckless-act-1968-pueblo-crisis-and-north-koreas-relations-third-world>.

³⁰⁹ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 90.

³¹⁰ Chapnick, 2019, 89.

³¹¹ Chapnick, 2019, 89.

³¹² S/PV.1102 (1964) ¶ 26.

³¹³ S/PV.1102 (1964) ¶ 26 and S/RES/186 (1964).

³¹⁴ S/RES/244 (1967).

³¹⁵ S/RES/244 (1967).

Nigeria], [...] the representatives of the parties as well as to members of the Council, have finally produced a substantive result. And under your genial and effective guidance the Council has just adopted a resolution which, the Canadian delegation hopes, will be a constructive step forward”.³¹⁶ It was stressed by the Secretary General that, were it not for the troop contributing countries willing to take on the extended mandate, hope for a settlement would be lost. “I take this opportunity to express my deep appreciation to the Governments of Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom for their whole-hearted and unfailing contribution to this important United Nations peacekeeping operation, which has discharged the Mandate defined for it by the Security Council with impartiality, restraint, and a high sense of duty.”³¹⁷ Canada continues to send a few troops to support what is now one of the longest, continuous UN peacekeeping missions in its history.³¹⁸

Southern Rhodesia

Southern Rhodesia was a former colony of the United Kingdom.³¹⁹ Rhodesia was late in declaring independence from the United Kingdom because there had to be majority rule before independence could be achieved.³²⁰ The population of Rhodesia was majority black Africans and minority white.³²¹ Racism was a part of the issue because the dominant white minority group led by Ian Smith did not want to give equal “constitutional equality” to the black African majority.³²² Instead, Ian Smith declared independence before there was majority rule.³²³ Zambia,

³¹⁶ S/PV.1386 (1967) ¶ 38.

³¹⁷ S/PV.1386 (1967) ¶ 35.

³¹⁸ “UNFICYP Fact Sheet,” United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed on November 13, 2022, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unficy>.

³¹⁹ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 90.

³²⁰ Chapnick, 2019, 90.

³²¹ Chapnick, 2019, 90.

³²² Chapnick, 2019, 90.

³²³ Chapnick, 2019, 90.

Mozambique, and Malawi were Commonwealth members and they had demanded the United Kingdom denounce Ian Smith's regime or they would withdraw from the Commonwealth.³²⁴ The United Kingdom, resistant to taking any action was put on the spot when the UNSC adopted S/RES/217 on November 20, 1965 and "*Determine[d]* that the situation resulting from the proclamation of independence by the illegal authorities in Southern Rhodesia is extremely grave, that the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland should put an end to it and that its continuance in time constitutes a threat to international peace and security [...]."³²⁵ Canada had to choose sides between supporting a very resistant United Kingdom, and very exercised Mozambique, Zambia, and Malawi - all members of the Commonwealth.³²⁶ In 1968, the UNSC decided to invoke Chapter VII (one of the first times) when S/RES/253 (1968) outlined that it "Call[ed] upon the United Kingdom as the administering Power in the discharge of its responsibility to take urgently all effective measures to bring to an end the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia, and enable the people to secure the enjoyment of their rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in conformity with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);"³²⁷ S/RES/253 (1968) put in place mandatory sanctions, and comprehensive ones at that to quell the rebellion and end white minority rule.³²⁸ The resolution was adopted unanimously.³²⁹ Awkwardly, the UK was the President for the month of May 1968.³³⁰ The UK invoked a provisional rule and made the United States the President for the purposes of the meeting.³³¹ Clearly, the UK was under pressure by many, especially Canada and

³²⁴ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 90

³²⁵ S/RES/271 (1965).

³²⁶ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 91.

³²⁷ S/RES/253 (1968) ¶ 2.

³²⁸ S/RES/253 (1968).

³²⁹ S/RES/253 (1968).

³³⁰ S/PV.1428 (1968).

³³¹ S/PV.1428 (1968).

other African members of the Commonwealth, to face the fact that Southern Rhodesia needed to accept majority rule.³³² In a statement by Mr. Ignatieff after the vote, he stated “The Canadian authorities have repeatedly stated that Rhodesia must not be granted independence before majority rule and we have supported Security Council action directed towards change in the regime and return to legality in Rhodesia.”³³³

Analysis

By 1967-1968, the world was far more complex. Decolonization was in full swing and as a result, the United States and Soviet Union were vying to ensure that newly independent states fell under their sphere of influence. On more than one occasion, Canada’s role on its third term as a non-permanent member on the UNSC was as a bridge-builder helping the US and the UK to gracefully exist untenable positions. Certainly, Canada’s involvement in peacekeeping missions in Cyprus and the Middle East were appreciated greatly and often part of the exit strategy for its key, more powerful allies. In the end, Canada’s vote and actions were not “leading” ones, but the support and ability to serve as the important, dependable middle power was key to conflicts not escalating and encouraging, especially the UK, to change outdated policies.

Canada’s fourth term on the UNSC

Canada was elected as a non-permanent member on the UNSC for the fourth time in 1977-1978.³³⁴ The prime minister of Canada was Pierre Trudeau.³³⁵ William Barton was the

³³² S/PV.1428 (1968) ¶ 114.

³³³ S/PV.1428 (1968) ¶ 114.

³³⁴ Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, “The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings”, October 2018, [https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 12.

³³⁵ Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, “The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings”, October 2018, [https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 12.

Permanent Representative of Canada to the UN.³³⁶ Benin, Canada, Germany, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Libya), Mauritius, Pakistan, Panama, and Venezuela were the non-permanent members of the UNSC in 1977.³³⁷ Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Gabon, Kuwait and Nigeria replaced Benin, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Libya), Pakistan, Panama, and Romania as the new non-permanent members of the UNSC in 1978.³³⁸ Many new UN members continued to be added to the General Assembly. The non-administrative type of issues that were on the UNSC included: South Africa, continued sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, continuation of the mission in Cyprus, and Benin but South Africa and Benin were the most consequential in terms of new decisions that needed to be made.³³⁹ Twenty-one resolutions were adopted in 1977 and 1978 – the majority were pro forma, extension of mandates and/or administrative in nature.³⁴⁰

South Africa

Like the third term on the UNSC, Canada was needed to help the UK adopt new, less harmful policies on the issue of apartheid. Apartheid in South Africa was a pressing and divisive issue on the UNSC agenda.³⁴¹ There was an international call for sanctions against the racist

³³⁶ Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, “The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings”, October 2018,

[https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 12.

³³⁷ Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, “The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings”, October 2018,

[https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 12.

³³⁸ Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, “The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings”, October 2018,

[https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 12.

³³⁹ “Resolutions adopted by the UNSC in 1977,” United Nations Security Council, accessed on November 13, 2022, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1977> and “Resolutions adopted by the UNSC in 1978, United Nations Security Council, accessed on November 13, 2022,

<https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1978>.

³⁴⁰ “Resolutions adopted by the UNSC in 1977,” United Nations Security Council, accessed on November 13, 2022, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1977> and “Resolutions adopted by the UNSC in 1978, United Nations Security Council, accessed on November 13, 2022,

<https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1978>.

<https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1978>.

³⁴¹ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 107.

regime in South Africa.³⁴² South Africa is a Commonwealth member but had white minority rule which was antithetical to the spirit of decolonization of the times.³⁴³ The government in South Africa was committing violence against the African majority population.³⁴⁴ The United Kingdom did not want to impose sanctions on South Africa because it had investments in South Africa.³⁴⁵ On the other hand, many other Commonwealth states, especially African states, wanted sanctions placed against South Africa.³⁴⁶ South Africa was also particularly aggressive with its neighbours, especially Lesotho, and began a very controversial nuclear proliferation program. The UNSC resolution S/RES/418 (1977) placed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.³⁴⁷ S/RES/421 (1977) then created the first ever sanctions committee to monitor the arms embargo.³⁴⁸ While both were adopted unanimously, it was clear that the UK was resistant to more comprehensive measures.³⁴⁹ Canada, outside of the UNSC in the 1980s under PM Brian Mulroney, rallied Commonwealth and other states to place voluntary measures against South Africa including banning the sale of South African wine and banning its teams from international competition.³⁵⁰ Canada, therefore, was more active and helpful on the outside than inside the UNSC. South Africa was also on the agenda for its mandate over South West Africa (now Namibia).³⁵¹ The UN had removed South Africa's mandate over Namibia due to apartheid.³⁵² The issue involved South Africa, Angola, Cuba and Namibia.³⁵³ South Africa refused to leave

³⁴² Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 107.

³⁴³ Chapnick, 2019, 108.

³⁴⁴ S/RES/418 (1977).

³⁴⁵ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 108.

³⁴⁶ Chapnick, 2019, 108.

³⁴⁷ S/RES/418 (1977).

³⁴⁸ S/RES/421 (1977).

³⁴⁹ S/RES/418 (1977) and S/RES/421 (1977).

³⁵⁰ John Harkness, "Marshall, Lerner and Botha: Canada's Economic Sanctions on South Africa", *Canadian Public Policy* 16, No. 2 (June 1990): 155-160, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3550962>.

³⁵¹ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 111.

³⁵² Chapnick, 2019, 111.

³⁵³ Chapnick, 2019, 111.

Namibia and launched attacks against its neighbour Angola.³⁵⁴ Angola aligned with Cuba and “the Southwest African People’s Organization (SWAPO).”³⁵⁵ The UN General Assembly, which was dominated by the non aligned movement (i.e. countries that block voted in the General Assembly to be nonaligned with US or Soviet policies) (NAM) had supported the SWAPO liberation movement in Namibia.³⁵⁶ The Western states had hoped that Namibia would remain aligned with the West instead of the NAM.³⁵⁷ S/RES/385 was adopted by the UNSC in 1976.³⁵⁸ Canada worked with France, Germany, the UK and the United States to implement S/RES/385.³⁵⁹ Fast forward two years and S/RES/435 (1978) was hotly debated on the UNSC and it was adopted on September 29, 1978 creating the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG).³⁶⁰ The UNTAG “ensure[d] the early independence of Namibia through free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations.”³⁶¹ Canada, France, Gabon, the Federal Republic of Germany, Czechoslovakia, Mauritius, Nigeria, the United Kingdom and the United States of America were the sponsors of S/RES/435 (1978).³⁶² The Soviet Union and now People’s Republic of China abstained.³⁶³ It would take until November 22, 1989 for South Africa's remaining troops to leave Namibia.³⁶⁴ Canada contributed troops to UNTAG, but not mission command – instead, Austria and India assumed Command and Ireland commanded the

³⁵⁴ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 111.

³⁵⁵ Chapnick, 2019, 111.

³⁵⁶ Chapnick, 2019, 111 and “Namibia – UNTAG,” United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed on November 13, 2022, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/untagS.htm>.

³⁵⁷ Chapnick, 2019, 111 and “Namibia – UNTAG,” United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed on November 13, 2022, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/untagS.htm>.

³⁵⁸ S/RES/385 (1976).

³⁵⁹ “UNTAG,” United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed on November 13, 2022, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/untagFT.htm>.

³⁶⁰ S/RES/435 (1978) ¶ 3.

³⁶¹ S/RES/435 (1978) ¶ 3.

³⁶² S/RES/435 (1978) ¶ 8.

³⁶³ S/RES/435 (1978).

³⁶⁴ “Namibia – UNTAG,” United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed on November 13, 2022, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/untagS.htm>.

police force.³⁶⁵ UNTAG is viewed as one of the most successful of the UNSC's missions.

Namibia eventually became independent in 1980 and became a member of the UN.³⁶⁶

Benin

Benin just happened to be on the UNSC in 1977 when it was attacked by mercenaries.³⁶⁷

Paris granted Benin independence on August 1, 1960, but the country was plagued by ethnic strife and political turbulence immediately.³⁶⁸ Following several coups, approximately 100 mercenaries (white and French speaking) arrived in an unmarked DC-7 in the capital Cotonou and tried to take control of the Marxist-Leninist country on 16 January 1977 in a three-hour invasion.³⁶⁹ According to eye witnesses, heavily armed white men fired in the direction of the presidential palace indiscriminately.³⁷⁰ Confronted by a few Benin soldiers, the mercenaries returned to their plane, took off, and were never heard from again.³⁷¹ Benin reported the violence to the UNSC that its "territorial integrity and political independence" was threatened.³⁷² The issue was brought up before the UNSC because of the potential to involve the great powers like France, the Soviet Union, and China.³⁷³ Benin, Libya, and Mauritius were the sponsors of S/RES/404 (1977).³⁷⁴ The UNSC adopted S/RES/404 (1977) on February 8, 1977 and the Special Mission to the People's Republic of Benin was established.³⁷⁵ The members of the

³⁶⁵ "UNTAG," United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed on November 13, 2022, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/untagFT.htm>.

³⁶⁶ "Namibia – UNTAG," United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed on November 13, 2022, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/untagS.htm> and Chapnick, 2019, Canada on the United Nations Security Council, 111.

³⁶⁷ Chaim Herzog, "The UN at Work: The Benin Affair," *Foreign Policy* 29 (Winter 1977-78): 144, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1148536>.

³⁶⁸ Herzog, "The UN at Work," 144.

³⁶⁹ Herzog, "The UN at Work," 144.

³⁷⁰ Herzog, 144.

³⁷¹ Herzog, 144.

³⁷² S/RES/404 (1977) and Herzog, 155.

³⁷³ Herzog, "The UN at Work," 155-157.

³⁷⁴ S/PV.1987 (1977) ¶ 3.

³⁷⁵ S/RES/404 (1977).

special mission were chosen from the UNSC and it included Panama, Libya (who was the President of the UNSC on January 1977) and India.³⁷⁶ Problems arose immediately. The Chair (from Panama) spoke only Spanish, but was investigating a French country and the Special Mission only conducted its work in English.³⁷⁷ Interpreters and staff meant that the small team of investigators increasingly became a gang.³⁷⁸ While their search was thorough, it did not confirm the source country (ies) of the mercenaries.³⁷⁹ Benin, however, accused neighbouring Africa states.³⁸⁰ The debate in the UNSC was far from disciplined and mostly consisted of an internal argument among African states including those not on the Council at the time but invited to participate.³⁸¹ The special mission determined Benin had suffered financial losses. Evidence pointed to Morocco as bearing some responsibility.³⁸² While the African states continued to accuse each other, the United States, Canada, and the UK tried to keep a very low profile.³⁸³ S/RES/405 (1977) was passed “by consensus” allowing Benin to take the lead as it was directly implicated.³⁸⁴ Many of the non-African states were hoping the whole matter would disappear.³⁸⁵

Analysis

Africa was increasingly on the agenda of the UNSC and with more civil and internal wars than interstate. While Canada’s role outside of the UNSC is to deal with Africa’s apartheid policy, Canada can be said to be a “helpful fixer” in dealing with Namibia because it was

³⁷⁶ S/RES/404 (1977) and Herzog, “The UN at Work,” 144.

³⁷⁷ Herzog, 145.

³⁷⁸ Herzog, 145.

³⁷⁹ Herzog, 159.

³⁸⁰ S/PV.1987 (1977)

³⁸¹ Herzog, “The UN at Work,” 148-149.

³⁸² Herzog, 156.

³⁸³ Herzog, 158.

³⁸⁴ S/RES/404 (1977).

³⁸⁵ Herzog, “The UN at Work, 159.

involved in the United Nations Mission in Namibia (UNTAG).³⁸⁶ Again, its support of a draft resolution and suggestion for a mission (UNTAG – to which it contributed) was especially helpful to the UK.³⁸⁷ In terms of the case of the attack on Benin, Canada (and the other Western states for that matter) were simply placeholders hoping the whole matter would conclude quickly. Canada did not make any comment at any of the meetings.

Canada's fifth term on the UNSC

Canada served its fifth term as a non-permanent member on the UNSC in 1989-1990.³⁸⁸ The prime minister of Canada was Brian Mulroney.³⁸⁹ Yves Fortier and Philip Kirsch were Canada's Permanent Representatives to the UN.³⁹⁰ Algeria, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, Finland, Malaysia, Nepal, Senegal, and Yugoslavia were the non-permanent members on the UNSC in 1989.³⁹¹ Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Romania, Yemen, and Zaire replaced Algeria, Brazil, Nepal, Senegal, and Yugoslavia were the new non-permanent members on the UNSC in 1990.³⁹² The issues that were on the UNSC include Libya, a general resolution on terrorism, the Middle

³⁸⁶ "UNTAG," United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed on November 13, 2022, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/untagFT.htm>.

³⁸⁷ "UNTAG," United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed on November 13, 2022, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/untagFT.htm>.

³⁸⁸ Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, "The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings", October 2018, [https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 12.

³⁸⁹ Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, "The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings", October 2018, [https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 12.

³⁹⁰ Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, "The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings", October 2018, [https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 12.

³⁹¹ Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, "The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings", October 2018, [https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 12.

³⁹² Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, "The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings", October 2018, [https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 12.

East, Namibia, Cyprus, and Iraq.³⁹³ Libya, the hostage taking resolution, the Middle East and Iraq were new issues or demanded new decisions. The Cold War ended during Canada's fifth term on the UNSC, and a new peace dividend was about to commence along with a very engaged UNSC in the growing number of African civil wars. But first, there were old animosities with which to contend. A total of 20 resolutions were adopted in 1989 and 37 were adopted in 1990.³⁹⁴

Libya

The United States and Libya were at odds over aircrafts at sea in the Mediterranean Sea.³⁹⁵ The United States had been conducting training exercises at sea using the "US navy aircraft carrier John F. Kennedy on January 4, 1989.³⁹⁶ The United States detected two Libyan MiGs and intercepted the Libyan aircrafts using its US Navy F-14.³⁹⁷ The F14s destroyed the MiGs, and Libya immediately demanded the UNSC take action. The US claimed self-defence but Libya, backed by every enemy of the United States, proceeded to try to hold the United States to account. The NAM proposed an anti-United States resolution. Three UNSC meetings were held on the matter but the US ensured that there were no decisions made.³⁹⁸ Libya and its

³⁹³ "Resolutions adopted by the Security Council in 1989," *United Nations Security Council*, accessed on June 22, 2022, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1989> and Resolutions adopted by the Security Council in 1990," *United Nations Security Council*, accessed on June 22, 2022, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1990>.

³⁹⁴ "Resolutions adopted by the Security Council in 1989," *United Nations Security Council*, accessed on June 22, 2022, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1989> and Resolutions adopted by the Security Council in 1990," *United Nations Security Council*, accessed on June 22, 2022, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1990>.

³⁹⁵ Benjamin Brimelow, "How an air-to-air victory by Navy F-14 fighter jets became a headache for the Pentagon", *Insider*, January 31, 2022, <https://www.businessinsider.com/navy-f14-shutdown-of-libyan-jets-became-headache-for-pentagon-2022-1>.

³⁹⁶ Benjamin Brimelow, "How an air-to-air victory by Navy F-14 fighter jets became a headache for the Pentagon", *Insider*, January 31, 2022, <https://www.businessinsider.com/navy-f14-shutdown-of-libyan-jets-became-headache-for-pentagon-2022-1>.

³⁹⁷ Benjamin Brimelow, "How an air-to-air victory by Navy F-14 fighter jets became a headache for the Pentagon", *Insider*, January 31, 2022, <https://www.businessinsider.com/navy-f14-shutdown-of-libyan-jets-became-headache-for-pentagon-2022-1> and S/PV.2835 (1989).

³⁹⁸ S/PV.2835 (1989), S/PV.2836 (1989), and S/PV.2837 (1989).

allies (Iran, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe, etc.) accused the United States of aggression against Libya since 1969 and proceeded to outline those activities. The US response was short stating: “The facts in the case are clear. The incident took place on 4 January. The aircraft carrier Kennedy was on an easterly transit through the Mediterranean Sea: 170 miles north of the border between Libya and Egypt. The United States Navy aircraft were operating on a training mission in international airspace. over international waters, some 70 miles off the coast of Libya, north of Tobruk.”³⁹⁹ The remainder of the meetings consisted of Soviet aligned states decrying the aggressive actions of the United States. Canada did not make any statements. Indeed, the Western allies left the floor open for the very capable US Ambassador Mr. Walters who stated: “In the last two days we have heard some intemperate statements which demand consent. The United States is not really disposed to receive lessons on terrorism from a nation like Sandinista Nicaragua. Nor is it ready to be taught the norms of international behaviour by nations governed by various forms of military or civilian one-party dictatorships”⁴⁰⁰.

Terrorism

Canada and Finland were the sponsors of S/RES/638 (1989).⁴⁰¹ The UNSC S/RES/638 was adopted unanimously on July 31, 1989.⁴⁰² It decried hostage taking and abduction generally as offences of grave concern to all States.⁴⁰³ The UNSC president at the time was Yugoslavia.⁴⁰⁴ The increase in hostage taking, abduction and the murder of US Lieutenant-Colonel Higgins was the catalyst for S/RES/638 (1989). Lieutenant-Colonel Higgins was deployed with the UNTSO

³⁹⁹ S/PV.2835 (1989).

⁴⁰⁰ S/PV.2836 (1989).

⁴⁰¹ S/PV.2872 (1989).

⁴⁰² S/PV.2872 (1989).

⁴⁰³ S/PV.2872 (1989).

⁴⁰⁴ S/PV.2872 (1989).

as a military observer and abducted.⁴⁰⁵ The UNSC S/RES/618 (1988) adopted on July 29, 1988 demanded the release of Lieutenant-Colonel Higgins, and condemned the abduction in the strongest possible terms.⁴⁰⁶ He was hanged on the day S/RES/638 (1989) was adopted.⁴⁰⁷ His hanging was videoed by Hezbollah and released to the world to watch. Little was said in the verbatim minutes but clearly the hanging of a US service personnel deployed with UNTSO was a concern for other troop contributing states in Lebanon like Canada.⁴⁰⁸

The Middle East

The issue in the Middle East during Canada's fifth term on the UNSC involved the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel.⁴⁰⁹ The PLO was not able to voice its concerns in the UNSC because it was not a sovereign state.⁴¹⁰ The PLO wanted to be recognized as such.⁴¹¹ The PLO wanted Canada and the United States to condemn Israel's actions in the Occupied Territories.⁴¹² Instead, the United States issued three vetoes that condemned Israeli activity in 1989.⁴¹³ Canada also supported Israel, but worked with the NAM and the United States to find compromising language.⁴¹⁴ As a result, S/RES/636 (1989) was finally passed on July 6, 1989 with the United States abstaining.⁴¹⁵ The resolution noted with grave concern activities in the occupied territories and reminded Israel of its obligations under the Geneva Convention.⁴¹⁶

⁴⁰⁵ S/PV.2872 (1989).

⁴⁰⁶ S/RES/618 (1988).

⁴⁰⁷ S/PV.2872 (1989).

⁴⁰⁸ S/PV.2872 (1989).

⁴⁰⁹ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 139.

⁴¹⁰ Chapnick, 2019, 139.

⁴¹¹ Chapnick, 2019, 139.

⁴¹² Chapnick, 2019, 140.

⁴¹³ S/20463 (1989), S/20677 (1989), and S/20945/Rev.1 (1989).

⁴¹⁴ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 140.

⁴¹⁵ S/RES/636 (1989).

⁴¹⁶ S/RES/636 (1989).

Invasion of Kuwait

The Iraq invasion of Kuwait was a shock to the international system.⁴¹⁷ On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded and annexed Kuwait.⁴¹⁸ Iraq wanted Kuwait to increase the price of oil to help its economy.⁴¹⁹ Kuwait refused to increase the price of oil, and Iraq sent troops to intervene in Kuwait.⁴²⁰ The UNSC condemned the invasion, demanded that Iraq withdraw immediately and called for both parties to immediately begin negotiations when it adopted S/RES/660 (1990).⁴²¹ The resolution passed with 14 yeases.⁴²² Yemen did not participate in the vote.⁴²³ Canada used its position in the Commonwealth and diplomacy to get the support of NAM members for subsequent UNSC resolutions to sanction and condemn Iraq.⁴²⁴ According to Chapnick, the United Kingdom requested Canada's assistance to convince Malaysia (a Commonwealth member and member of the NAM) to support UNSC resolutions.⁴²⁵ It was imperative that the resolution be passed unanimously given the gravity of the situation. Canada also used its connections to La Francophonie to help the United States and France communicate with Côte d'Ivoire.⁴²⁶ Canada co-sponsored twelve resolutions on the UNSC on the issue of the Iraq invasion.⁴²⁷ While the United States wanted to deal with the Iraq invasion unilaterally, Canada convinced the United States to seek a multilateral solution to the issue given the new geopolitical world order.⁴²⁸ This is important because Canada convinced a great power to change its preference. The rest of 1990 saw a number of resolutions applied against Iraq resulting in

⁴¹⁷ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 149.

⁴¹⁸ Chapnick, 2019, 149.

⁴¹⁹ Chapnick, 2019, 149.

⁴²⁰ Chapnick, 2019, 149.

⁴²¹ S/RES/660 (1990).

⁴²² S/RES/660 (1990).

⁴²³ S/RES/660 (1990).

⁴²⁴ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 150.

⁴²⁵ Chapnick, 2019, 150.

⁴²⁶ Chapnick, 2019, 150.

⁴²⁷ Chapnick, 2019, 150.

⁴²⁸ Chapnick, 2019, 150-151.

comprehensive sanctions against Iraq and Kuwait culminating in S/RES/678 (1990) adopted in November 28, 1990 which authorized “all necessary means” unless Iraq left Kuwait by January 15, 1991.⁴²⁹ This time, Cuba and Yemen voted no and China abstained.⁴³⁰

Analysis

Sometimes not adding to the conversation at the UNSC is the most helpful of actions and Canada certainly helped by not making any statements during the Libyan affair; the United States was perfectly capable of defending itself and the downing of the Libyan MiGs. “Placeholding” was the most helpful of positions for Canada at the time.

In the case of the terrorism resolution, Canada and Finland drafted a resolution that could not be drafted by the United States. Indeed, both Canada and Finland were helpful fixers. In the other two cases concerning ongoing aggression by Israel in the occupied territory and invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, Canada was able to use its connections in other international organizations to ensure wording could be found to remind Israel of its international obligations and to try to keep NAM onboard with increasingly comprehensive measures against Iraq. Canada was a successful bridge builder during its fifth term on the UNSC.

Canada’s sixth term on the UNSC

Canada was elected as a non-permanent member on the UNSC for the sixth time in 1999-2000. Canada’s sixth term on the UNSC was nine years into the post-Cold War era after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The prime minister of Canada was Jean Chrétien.⁴³¹

⁴²⁹ S/RES/678 (1990).

⁴³⁰ S/RES/678 (1990).

⁴³¹ Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, “The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings”, October 2018, [https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 12.

Robert Fowler and Paul Heinbecker were Canada's Permanent Representatives to the UN.⁴³² Argentina, Bahrain, Canada, Brazil, Gabon, Gambia, Malaysia, Namibia, Netherlands, and Slovenia were the non-permanent members on the UNSC in 1999.⁴³³ Bangladesh, Jamaica, Mali, Tunisia, and Ukraine replaced Bahrain, Brazil, Gabon, Gambia, and Slovenia as non-permanent members of the UNSC in 2000.⁴³⁴ The issues that were on the UNSC's agenda included Sierra Leone, Angola, Croatia, the Middle East, Western Sahara, Eritrea/Ethiopia, Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Congo, Cyprus, Georgia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Timor/East Timor, and Haiti.⁴³⁵ Many of the resolutions were extensions of missions, ensuring UNSC-created criminal courts had the resources they needed (including a running list of ad litem judges) and admission of new UN members including the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Tuvalu, Tonga, Kiribati and Nauru.⁴³⁶ The age of ethnic conflicts had been in full swing for most of the 1990s and the UNSC increasingly resorted to thematic resolutions to deal with global situations of concern including a particularly Canadian one – Women Peace and Security S/RES/1325 (2000), the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), as well as the protection of children in conflict, and the role of the UNSC generally to deal with international peace and

⁴³² Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, "The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings", October 2018, [https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 12.

⁴³³ Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, "The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings", October 2018, [https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 12.

⁴³⁴ Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, "The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings", October 2018, [https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 12.

⁴³⁵ "Resolutions adopted by the Security Council in 1989," United Nations Security Council, accessed on November 18, 2022, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1989> and "Resolutions adopted by the Security Council in 1990," United Nations Security Council, accessed on November 18, 2022, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1990>.

⁴³⁶ "Resolutions adopted by the Security Council in 1989," United Nations Security Council, accessed on November 18, 2022, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1989> and "Resolutions adopted by the Security Council in 1990," United Nations Security Council, accessed on November 18, 2022, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1990>.

stability. A total of 65 resolutions were adopted in 1999 and 50 resolutions were adopted in 2000.⁴³⁷ The most important resolutions from a Canadian perspective included those dealing with Angola, R2P, Women Peace and Security, and Kosovo.

Angola

The issue in Angola involved the government of Angola and the rebel group National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).⁴³⁸ The UN had placed sanctions to prevent UNITA from re-arming.⁴³⁹ The leader of UNITA was able to finance its arms using the sale of illegal blood diamonds.⁴⁴⁰ According to Chapnick, Canada assumed the chair of the Angola sanctions committee and Ambassador Robert Fowler completely changed the way sanctions committees were run.⁴⁴¹ Instead of a passive, almost disinterested role, Fowler demanded that the UNSC members actively investigate sanctions busting activity. As a result of his proactive stance, a new international process called the Kimberley Process was adopted to stop the sale of “blood” diamonds and several states were called out for their sanctions busting activity much to the horror of China and others.⁴⁴² Pushed by Canada, the Council went so far as to adopt S/RES/1295 (2000) “to consider appropriate action in accordance with the Charter of the UN in relation to States it determines to have violated the measures contained in [its] resolutions.”⁴⁴³ The rebel group UNITA against whom diamond and other sanctions were targeted had their funding curtailed considerably resulting in negotiations between UNITA and

⁴³⁷ “Resolutions adopted by the Security Council in 1999,” United Nations Security Council, accessed on November 24, 2022, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1999> and “Resolutions adopted by the Security Council in 2000,” United Nations Security Council, accessed on November 24, 2022, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-2000>.

⁴³⁸ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 167.

⁴³⁹ Chapnick, 2019, 167.

⁴⁴⁰ Chapnick, 2019, 167.

⁴⁴¹ Chapnick, 2019, 167.

⁴⁴² David Angell, “The Angola Sanctions Committee” in *The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century*, David Malone (ed) (Boulder CO: Lynn Rienner Publishers, 2004): 195-204.

⁴⁴³ S/RES/1295 (2000).

Angola. In April 2002, UNITA officials and the Angolan government signed an agreement to end hostilities, ending 27 years of civil war. Some UNITA troops were absorbed into the Angolan army, but the majority returned to civilian life. UNITA is now a legitimate member of successive Angolan governments.

Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

Canada was the primary architect of Responsibility to Protect in 1999 under Former Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy along with Australia.⁴⁴⁴ The UN Secretary General at the time was Kofi Annan and he submitted a report to the UNSC on September 8, 1999.⁴⁴⁵ Kofi Annan was a supporter of the Responsibility to Protect and he played an important role in getting other states to support the R2P doctrine.⁴⁴⁶ The UNSC resolution S/RES/1265 (1999) was adopted on September 17, 1999.⁴⁴⁷ According to the Security Council Report, it was Canada who took the initiative to “bring the issue of the protection of civilians in armed conflict” to the UNSC.⁴⁴⁸ The R2P was innovative because it shifted the focus in armed conflict to the protection of civilians.⁴⁴⁹ The focus was no longer on states but now states have the responsibility to protect its civilian during armed conflict.⁴⁵⁰ S/RES/1265 (1999) calls for states to stop and “prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and serious violations of international law.”⁴⁵¹ The resolution was adopted unanimously.⁴⁵² Sovereignty is an

⁴⁴⁴ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 167.

⁴⁴⁵ S/RES/1265 (1999).

⁴⁴⁶ “Kofi Annan | United Nations – Secretary General,” United Nations, accessed on November 18, 2022, <https://www.un.org/sg/en/formersg/koffi.shtml>.

⁴⁴⁷ S/RES/1265 (1999).

⁴⁴⁸ “Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, December 2005 Monthly Forecast,” Security Council Report, accessed on November 18, 2022, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2005-12/lookup_c_glkwlemtisg_b_1203269.php.

⁴⁴⁹ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 167.

⁴⁵⁰ Chapnick, 2019, 167.

⁴⁵¹ S/RES/1244 (1999).

⁴⁵² S/PV.4046 (Resumption 2) (1999).

ongoing debate that comes up regarding R2P and whether other states have a right to intervene when a state is unable or unwilling to protect its citizens.⁴⁵³ The great powers supported the resolution of R2P.⁴⁵⁴ This is significant because it shows a Canadian initiative on the UNSC that was supported by the P5.

Women, Peace and Security (S/RES/1325)

Canada played an important role and currently has an active role in promoting the issue of Women, Peace and Security (WPS) at the UNSC.⁴⁵⁵ According to the Security Council Report, it was Canada which took the initiative to create a group of “UN Member States” called “Friends of 1325” to gather support for S/RES/1325.⁴⁵⁶ The UNSC S/RES/1325 was adopted by the UNSC on October 31, 2000.⁴⁵⁷ Canada continues to promote the issues on S/RES/1325.⁴⁵⁸ In November 2017, Canada announced the Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations.⁴⁵⁹ Women have been underrepresented in UN peacekeeping operations.⁴⁶⁰ The Elsie Initiative plans to address the “gender inequality” and increase the participation of women in UN peacekeeping

⁴⁵³ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 172.

⁴⁵⁴ “Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, December 2005 Monthly Forecast,” Security Council Report, accessed on November 18, 2022, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2005-12/lookup_c_glkwlemtisg_b_1203269.php.

⁴⁵⁵ “Women, Peace and Security, November 2005 Monthly Forecast,” Security Council Report, accessed on November 18, 2022, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2005-11/lookup_c_glkwlemtisg_b_1141141.php.

⁴⁵⁶ “Women, Peace and Security, November 2005 Monthly Forecast,” Security Council Report, accessed on November 18, 2022, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2005-11/lookup_c_glkwlemtisg_b_1141141.php.

⁴⁵⁷ S/RES/1325 (2000).

⁴⁵⁸ “Women, Peace and Security, November 2005 Monthly Forecast,” Security Council Report, accessed on November 18, 2022, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2005-11/lookup_c_glkwlemtisg_b_1141141.php.

⁴⁵⁹ “Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations,” Government of Canada, accessed on November 18, 2022, https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/gender_equality-egalite_des_genres/elsie_initiative-initiative_elsie.aspx?lang=eng&.

⁴⁶⁰ “Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations,” Government of Canada, accessed on November 18, 2022, https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/gender_equality-egalite_des_genres/elsie_initiative-initiative_elsie.aspx?lang=eng&.

operations.⁴⁶¹ All resolutions since S/RES/1325 (2000) are supposed to use the lens of WPS when they are drafted, even resolutions drafted by the P5.

Kosovo

The Kosovo War was fought between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) (which is now present-day Serbia and Montenegro).⁴⁶² The FRY government of Slobodan Milosevic launched attacks on “ethnic Albanians” in Kosovo.⁴⁶³ The United States had warned the FRY government that it would resort to the use of force if it did not stop the attacks against ethnic Albanians.⁴⁶⁴ The conflict also had the potential to bring in Russia as an ally of the FRY and the involvement of NATO in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia beginning in 1992.⁴⁶⁵ NATO was also concerned that the conflict would spread to other regions and create a humanitarian crisis.⁴⁶⁶

NATO had Chapter VII authority to assist with UN efforts to end the violence in the former Yugoslavia, but not in the FRY in particular. Tense negotiations in Paris with Milosevic, UN and OSCE representatives were at an impasse.⁴⁶⁷ The ethnic cleansing by Serbian forces in the FRY and especially against Albanians in Kosovo could no longer be tolerated and NATO decided to intervene in Kosovo in 1999 using a previously passed UNSC resolution as its

⁴⁶¹ “Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations,” Government of Canada, accessed on November 18, 2022, https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/gender_equality-egalite_des_genres/elsie_initiative-initiative_elsie.aspx?lang=eng&.

⁴⁶² Keating, *Canada and World Order*, 212.

⁴⁶³ Keating, 212-213.

⁴⁶⁴ Keating, 212-213.

⁴⁶⁵ Keating, 213 and “Kosovo Air Campaign (March-June 1999),” North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, accessed on November 19, 2022,

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49602.htm#:~:text=NATO%20launched%20an%20air%20campaign,the%20conflict%20by%20diplomatic%20means.%20%20Accessed%2019%20November%202022.

⁴⁶⁶ “Kosovo Air Campaign (March-June 1999),” North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, accessed on November 19, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49602.htm#:~:text=NATO%20launched%20an%20air%20campaign,the%20conflict%20by%20diplomatic%20means.%20%20Accessed%2019%20November%202022.

⁴⁶⁷ “Kosovo Air Campaign (March-June 1999),” North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, accessed on November 19, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49602.htm#:~:text=NATO%20launched%20an%20air%20campaign,the%20conflict%20by%20diplomatic%20means.%20%20Accessed%2019%20November%202022.

authority.⁴⁶⁸ Operation Allied Force started on 24 March 1999 and was suspended on 10 June, lasting a total of 78 days.⁴⁶⁹ This air bombing campaign conducted by NATO against FRY targets ultimately resulted in NATO and the Yugoslav Army signing of the Kumanovo Agreement in June 1999 but not before NATO had accidentally hit a Chinese consulate and killed a cleaner and 38,000 sorties.⁴⁷⁰

The UNSC did not provide approval to use force in this particular context.⁴⁷¹ Canada was the president of the UNSC in February 1999 and Canadian NATO troops were in the FRY.⁴⁷² Canada tried to get the support of the UNSC to approve the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia.⁴⁷³ S/RES/1244 was adopted by the UNSC on June 10, 1999 but after the bombing campaign had ended.⁴⁷⁴ The sponsors of the S/RES/1244 included Canada, France, Gabon, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, Slovenia, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America and Bahrain.⁴⁷⁵ Many of the NATO states understood that their participation in the bombing campaign put them in a legally difficult position. How could they use force to uphold international law by violating clear rules of jus ad bellum? The FRY elected to take all NATO members who participated in the bombing campaign to the International Court of Justice.⁴⁷⁶ As the United States is not a member and did not recognize the jurisdiction of the court, it was exempt, but others, including Canada were

⁴⁶⁸ Keating, *Canada and World Order*, 213.

⁴⁶⁹ “Kosovo Air Campaign (March-June 1999),” North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, accessed on November 19, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49602.htm#:~:text=NATO%20launched%20an%20air%20campaign,the%20conflict%20by%20diplomatic%20means.%20%20Accessed%2019%20November%202022.

⁴⁷⁰ “Kosovo Air Campaign (March-June 1999),” North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, accessed on November 19, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49602.htm#:~:text=NATO%20launched%20an%20air%20campaign,the%20conflict%20by%20diplomatic%20means.%20%20Accessed%2019%20November%202022.

⁴⁷¹ Keating, *Canada and World Order*, 213.

⁴⁷² Keating, 213.

⁴⁷³ Keating, 213.

⁴⁷⁴ S/RES/1244 (1999).

⁴⁷⁵ S/RES/1244 (1999).

⁴⁷⁶ “Legality of the Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Canada),” International Court of Justice, accessed on November 19, 2022, <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/106%20Accessed%2019%20November%202022>.

not.⁴⁷⁷ In the end, the ICJ determined it had no jurisdiction to hear the case as the FRY was not yet a recognized sovereign state of the UN.⁴⁷⁸ However, in the closing arguments, the judges warned that had the case been allowed to proceed, the NATO states would have been found in violation of international law.⁴⁷⁹

Analysis

Canada's sixth term on the UNSC shows that it is particularly skilled at promoting thematic issues like R2P and WPS. As these are rarely considered issues that affect the key national interests of the P5, they are examples of Canada taking advantage of their lack of particular interest to lead ideas. For example, that every resolution since S/RES/1325 (2000) is meant to consider the WPS context is important.

Canada's Failed Bid for a non-permanent seat on the UNSC in 2010 and 2021

2011-2012 Failed Bid

In 2010, Canada under the Conservative government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper ran for a seat as a non-permanent on the UNSC.⁴⁸⁰ Canada, Portugal, and Germany were the candidates for non-permanent seats on the UNSC.⁴⁸¹ Canada lost to Portugal and Germany after

⁴⁷⁷ "Legality of the Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Canada)," International Court of Justice, accessed on November 19, 2022, <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/106%20Accessed%2019%20November%202022>.

⁴⁷⁸ "Legality of the Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Canada)," International Court of Justice, accessed on November 19, 2022, <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/106%20Accessed%2019%20November%202022>.

⁴⁷⁹ "Legality of the Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Canada)," International Court of Justice, accessed on November 19, 2022, <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/106%20Accessed%2019%20November%202022>.

⁴⁸⁰ Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, "The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings", October 2018, [https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 13.

⁴⁸¹ Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, "The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings", October 2018, [https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 13.

it withdrew on the second round of voting.⁴⁸² Canada did not get elected as a non-permanent member on the UNSC in 2010 and Germany and Portugal was elected as a non-permanent member on the UNSC for 2011-2012.⁴⁸³

2021-2022 Failed Bid

The Liberal government of Justin Trudeau ran for a seat as a non-permanent member on the UNSC in 2016.⁴⁸⁴ Canada, Ireland, and Norway were the candidates for the non-permanent seats for 2021-2022 on the UNSC from the WEOG block. (San Marino had been another candidate but withdrew in 2016.⁴⁸⁵ Canada lost to Norway and Ireland.⁴⁸⁶ Norway and Ireland were elected as non-permanent members on the UNSC in 2021-2022.⁴⁸⁷

Analysis

Canada had served six two-year terms as a non-permanent member on the UNSC every decade until it lost its bid for a seat for 2011-2012 and 2021-2022.⁴⁸⁸ On the one hand, an argument can be made that Canada's failure to be elected as a non-permanent member means that its power is in decline. Perhaps, Canada no longer has the diplomatic power to get elected to

⁴⁸² Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, "The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings", October 2018,

[https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 13.

⁴⁸³ Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, "The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings", October 2018,

[https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 13.

⁴⁸⁴ Katheen Harris, "Canada loses its bid for seat on UN Security Council, *CBC News*, June 17, 2022, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/united-nations-security-council-canada-1.5615488>.

⁴⁸⁵ Katheen Harris, "Canada loses its bid for seat on UN Security Council, *CBC News*, June 17, 2022, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/united-nations-security-council-canada-1.5615488>.

⁴⁸⁶ Katheen Harris, "Canada loses its bid for seat on UN Security Council, *CBC News*, June 17, 2022, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/united-nations-security-council-canada-1.5615488>.

⁴⁸⁷ Katheen Harris, "Canada loses its bid for seat on UN Security Council, *CBC News*, June 17, 2022, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/united-nations-security-council-canada-1.5615488>.

⁴⁸⁸ Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, "The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop Summary of Findings", October 2018,

[https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018\(1\).pdf](https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/UNSC_workshop_final_summary_1_Oct_2018(1).pdf), 13.

the UNSC. On the other hand, there were other reasons (including the lateness of Canada's declared candidacy) and the very strong campaigns of Canada's competitors. There is not enough information, however, to conclude whether or not Canada's "middle-powerness" or lack-there-of was part of the voting calculus.

Conclusion

In summary, Canada's role on the UNSC is mixed. On brief occasions, it has been a leader bringing forward thematic issues. During key times during the Cold War, Canada was an essential bridge builder helping its great power allies to step back from untenable positions. And often Canada was simply a placeholder vote that did not affect the outcome of the policies decided by the P5.

Chapter 4 – Canada on the Arctic Council

According to Canadian historian John English, there were three catalysts that led to the creation of the Arctic Council.⁴⁸⁹ First, was the activism of the Indigenous peoples on the protection of the environment, especially by Canadian Inuk Mary Simon who was also the president of the Inuit Circumpolar Council from 1986-1992.⁴⁹⁰ Second, was the concern for state the environment by the Canadian government; years of military testing during the Cold War (especially by the USSR) meant that the Arctic was contaminated with radioactive waste.⁴⁹¹ Third, and perhaps most important, Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev delivered a speech in Murmansk on 1 October 1987 calling for cooperation in the Arctic and even opening the door to a nuclear free zone in the Arctic.⁴⁹² Finland and then Canada turned these opportunities into two fora respectively to foster Arctic cooperation; the Arctic Protection Strategy (AEPS) and the Arctic Council.⁴⁹³ Finland seized on Gorbachev's speech to create a forum on environmental protection and sustainable development given the Soviet Union's willingness to seek assistance from Arctic states and aid with the Arctic contaminant cleanup.⁴⁹⁴ Finland initiated discussions to create such a forum in 1989 at Rovaniemi and the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) was born in 1991.⁴⁹⁵ Its members included the eight Arctic states (Canada, Denmark (by virtue of Greenland), Finland, Iceland Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States), a few observer states (UK, Poland and Germany), the UN agencies (the Economic Commission for Europe and Environment Program), the International

⁴⁸⁹ English, *Ice and Water*, 11.

⁴⁹⁰ English, 11.

⁴⁹¹ English, 11.

⁴⁹² English, 11.

⁴⁹³ English, 11.

⁴⁹⁴ Burke, *Diplomacy and the Arctic Council*, 9.

⁴⁹⁵ "Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy," Arctic Council, accessed on November 18, 2022, https://www.pame.is/images/02_Document_Library/_1991_Arctic_Environmental_Protection_Strategy.pdf.

Arctic Science Committee and a few indigenous groups (the Saami Council, the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) and what was then called the USSR Association of Small Peoples of the North (now RAIPON)).⁴⁹⁶ The AEPS was focused on environmental pollution mitigation.⁴⁹⁷

In the introduction to the AEPS Declaration, the member states outlined the urgent need:

There is a growing national and international appreciation of the importance of Arctic ecosystems and an increasing knowledge of global pollution and resulting environmental threats. The Arctic is highly sensitive to pollution and much of its human population and culture is directly dependent on the health of the region's ecosystems. Limited sunlight, ice cover that inhibits energy penetration, low mean and extreme temperatures, low species diversity and biological productivity and long-lived organisms with high lipid levels all contribute to the sensitivity of the Arctic ecosystem and cause it to be easily damaged. This vulnerability of the Arctic to pollution requires that action be taken now, or degradation may become irreversible.⁴⁹⁸

While important pollution mitigating research was conducted, informed by Indigenous knowledge, Inuk Mary Simon (then Canada's Arctic Ambassador) advocated for more attention to the sustainable development of the Arctic, especially to benefit Indigenous peoples.⁴⁹⁹ Canada initiated negotiations with the AEPS members and Observers and proposed adding sustainable development to the environmental protection mandate of the AEPS. The result was the creation of the Arctic Council.⁵⁰⁰ The Arctic Council was created on September 19, 1996, in Ottawa.⁵⁰¹ The proposal for the Arctic Council began in 1989 with the AEPS, but the Arctic Council was not created until 1996.⁵⁰² The Ottawa Declaration is the founding document of the Arctic Council.⁵⁰³ The Ottawa Declaration established that the mandate of the Arctic Council includes

⁴⁹⁶ English, *Ice and Water*, 136.

⁴⁹⁷ "Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy," Arctic Council, accessed on November 18, 2022, https://www.pame.is/images/02_Document_Library/_1991_Arctic_Environmental_Protection_Strategy.pdf.

⁴⁹⁸ "Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy," Arctic Council, accessed on November 18, 2022, https://www.pame.is/images/02_Document_Library/_1991_Arctic_Environmental_Protection_Strategy.pdf.

⁴⁹⁹ English, *Ice and Water*, 95.

⁵⁰⁰ English, 206.

⁵⁰¹ Burke, *Diplomacy and the Arctic Council*, 3.

⁵⁰² "Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy," Arctic Council, accessed on November 18, 2022, https://www.pame.is/images/02_Document_Library/_1991_Arctic_Environmental_Protection_Strategy.pdf.

⁵⁰³ "Ottawa Declaration (1996)," Arctic Council, accessed on May 19, 2020, <https://oarchive.arctic-council.org/>.

environmental protection and sustainable development.⁵⁰⁴ There are eight Arctic states which are the founding members that signed the Ottawa Declaration.⁵⁰⁵

Canada was instrumental in the drafting of the Ottawa Declaration and ensuring that Russia and the United States continued to be involved.⁵⁰⁶ The United States was initially against the creation of the Arctic Council.⁵⁰⁷ Although relations between the two states were thawing, there was too much distrust for them to initiate negotiations. This left Canada as the most likely instigator. It would seem Canada's desire to be a leader in an organization of national interest to it was coming to fruition. The Arctic Council also includes six Permanent Participants representing Indigenous peoples including three with presence in Canada (the Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Gwich'in Council and the Athabaskan Council) and state, nongovernment organizations and international organizations with Observer status. Permanent Participants must be consulted by the Arctic states before decisions are made by consensus.⁵⁰⁸ Observers are simply that – they may observe but have no decision-making role.

According to Whitney Lackenbauer, the structure of the Arctic Council was particularly innovative because it involved Indigenous peoples' organizations who participate in all aspects

bitstream/handle/11374/85/EDOCS-1752-v2-ACMMCA00_Ottawa_1996_Founding_Declaration.PDF?sequence=5&isAllowed=y.

⁵⁰⁴ "Ottawa Declaration (1996)," Arctic Council, accessed on May 19, 2020, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/85/EDOCS-1752-v2-ACMMCA00_Ottawa_1996_Founding_Declaration.PDF?sequence=5&isAllowed=y.

⁵⁰⁵ "Ottawa Declaration (1996)," Arctic Council, accessed on May 19, 2020, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/85/EDOCS-1752-v2-ACMMCA00_Ottawa_1996_Founding_Declaration.PDF?sequence=5&isAllowed=y.

⁵⁰⁶ English, *Ice and Water*, 214.

⁵⁰⁷ English, 214.

⁵⁰⁸ "Ottawa Declaration (1996)," Arctic Council, accessed on May 19, 2020, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/85/EDOCS-1752-v2-ACMMCA00_Ottawa_1996_Founding_Declaration.PDF?sequence=5&isAllowed=y.

of the Council's work (albeit without a vote) and thus affirm the central role of Arctic Indigenous peoples in regional affairs.⁵⁰⁹

Canada's first chairmanship on the Arctic Council (1996-1998)

Canada served as the first chair of the Arctic Council in 1996.⁵¹⁰ Mary Simon, as Canada's Arctic Ambassador became the first chair of the Arctic Council in 1996.⁵¹¹ Jean Chrétien was the Prime Minister and Lloyd Axworthy was the Minister of Foreign Affairs during Canada's first chairmanship of the Arctic Council.⁵¹² "The Chairmanship of the Arctic Council rotates among the Arctic States every two years."⁵¹³ The United States always follows Canada as Chair while Sweden hands off to Canada.

The Iqaluit Declaration was adopted during Canada's first chairmanship of the Arctic Council and the first ministerial document was adopted after Canada's first chairmanship ended in 1998.⁵¹⁴ This is an example of Canada being a leader creating an agenda and research areas of focus for the six scientific working groups of the Arctic Council. The Arctic Council also adopted Rules of Procedure, the terms of reference for a sustainable development program, approved a new Permanent Participant (the Aleut International Association) and welcomed eleven new observers including Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, the UK, the Nordic Council, The Northern Forum, UN Economic Commission for Europe, UN Environment Program,

⁵⁰⁹ Whitney Lackenbauer and Ryan Dean, "Canada and the Origins of the Arctic Council: Key Documents, 1988-1998," accessed on November 13, 2022, <https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/18-DCASS-Canada-Origins-Arctic-Council-PWL-RD-upload.pdf>, 2.

⁵¹⁰ English, *Ice and Water*, 10.

⁵¹¹ English, 10.

⁵¹² English, 95.

⁵¹³ "About the Arctic Council," Arctic Council, accessed on January 19, 2022, <https://www.arctic-council.org/about/#:~:text=The%20Chairmanship%20of%20the%20Arctic,Kingdom%20of%20Denmark%2C%20and%20Sweden>.

⁵¹⁴ "Ottawa Declaration (1996)," Arctic Council, accessed on May 19, 2020, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/85/EDOCS-1752-v2-ACMMCA00_Ottawa_1996_Founding_Declaration.PDF?sequence=5&isAllowed=y.

International Arctic Science Committee, The Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, the World Wide Fund for Nature and the International Union for Circumpolar Health.⁵¹⁵ Furthermore, Canada was asked to help with a review on the impact of environmental contaminants.⁵¹⁶ In addition, Denmark, Greenland, and Canada provided financial support to the Indigenous Peoples' Secretariat.⁵¹⁷ Canada worked to ensure that the interests of the Indigenous peoples in the Arctic were heard on the Arctic Council.⁵¹⁸ Canada's priority during its first chairship was strengthening the "cooperation between the Indigenous Peoples and the Arctic States."⁵¹⁹ The meeting in Iqaluit also served to officially handover the Chairmanship to the United States from 1998 until 2000.⁵²⁰

Analysis

Canada was certainly a leader during its first Chairmanship of the Arctic Council. Canada created the Arctic Council in 1996 and became the first chair of the Arctic Council.⁵²¹ Canada showed that it can create and lead an organization. Given the equivalent of a veto vote and have the same voting rights as the United States and Russia, Canada's leadership is evident.

⁵¹⁵ Iqaluit Declaration (1998)," Arctic Council, accessed on June 22, 2022, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/86/01_iqaluit_declaration_1998_signed%20%282%29.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

⁵¹⁶ Iqaluit Declaration (1998)," Arctic Council, accessed on June 22, 2022 : para 8. , https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/86/01_iqaluit_declaration_1998_signed%20%282%29.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

⁵¹⁷ "Iqaluit Declaration (1998)," Arctic Council, accessed on June 22, 2022, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/86/01_iqaluit_declaration_1998_signed%20%282%29.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

⁵¹⁸ Burke, *Diplomacy and the Arctic Council*, 25.

⁵¹⁹ "Canada," Arctic Council, accessed on May 19, 2020, <https://arctic-council.org/en/about/states/canada/>.

⁵²⁰ "Iqaluit Declaration (1998)," Arctic Council, accessed on June 22, 2022, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/86/01_iqaluit_declaration_1998_signed%20%282%29.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

⁵²¹ "Canada," Arctic Council, accessed on May 19, 2020, <https://arctic-council.org/en/about/states/canada/>.

Canada's second chairmanship of the Arctic Council (2013 – 2015)

Canada served its second Chairship of the Arctic Council from 2013 to 2015 under Former Prime Minister Stephen Harper.⁵²² Rob Nicholson was the Minister of Foreign Affairs.⁵²³ Leona Aggluqaq, another Inuk, was the Arctic Ambassador during Canada's second chairmanship.⁵²⁴ Canada prioritized development in the Arctic and it created the Arctic Economic Council during its second chairmanship of the Arctic Council.⁵²⁵ Canada's motto for its second chairship was "Development for the North" which was criticized for using paternalistic and colonizing language.⁵²⁶ Nevertheless, Canada pushed to recognize and incorporate Indigenous knowledge on the Arctic Council during its second chairmanship.⁵²⁷ One of Canada's priorities during its second chairmanship on the Arctic Council was to improve the "mental wellness" for the "Arctic communities."⁵²⁸ Canada also prioritized environmental protection during its second chairmanship of the Arctic Council.⁵²⁹

⁵²² "Canada," Arctic Council, accessed on May 19, 2020, <https://arctic-council.org/en/about/states/canada/>.

⁵²³ "Iqaluit Declaration (2015)," Arctic Council, accessed on November 18, 2022, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/662/EDOCS-3431-v1-ACMMCA09_Iqaluit_2015_Iqaluit_Declaration_original_scanned_signed_version.PDF?sequence=7&isAllowed=y.

⁵²⁴ "Iqaluit Declaration (2015)," Arctic Council, accessed on November 18, 2022, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/662/EDOCS-3431-v1-ACMMCA09_Iqaluit_2015_Iqaluit_Declaration_original_scanned_signed_version.PDF?sequence=7&isAllowed=y.

⁵²⁵ "Iqaluit Declaration (2015)," Arctic Council, accessed on November 18, 2022, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/662/EDOCS-3431-v1-ACMMCA09_Iqaluit_2015_Iqaluit_Declaration_original_scanned_signed_version.PDF?sequence=7&isAllowed=y.

⁵²⁶ "Iqaluit Declaration (2015)," Arctic Council, accessed on November 18, 2022, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/662/EDOCS-3431-v1-ACMMCA09_Iqaluit_2015_Iqaluit_Declaration_original_scanned_signed_version.PDF?sequence=7&isAllowed=y.

⁵²⁷ "Iqaluit Declaration (2015)," Arctic Council, accessed on November 18, 2022, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/662/EDOCS-3431-v1-ACMMCA09_Iqaluit_2015_Iqaluit_Declaration_original_scanned_signed_version.PDF?sequence=7&isAllowed=y.

⁵²⁸ "Canada," Arctic Council, accessed on May 19, 2020, <https://arctic-council.org/en/about/states/canada/>.

⁵²⁹ "Canada," Arctic Council, accessed on May 19, 2020, <https://arctic-council.org/en/about/states/canada/>.

Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014

Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 during Canada's second year of its chairship of the Arctic Council. Russia is an Arctic state on the Arctic Council.⁵³⁰ The Arctic Council includes Arctic states which are also members of NATO including Denmark, Iceland, Norway, the United States. In 2022, Finland and Sweden declared their desire to join NATO as member states as a result of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.⁵³¹ Russia and NATO were adversaries during the Cold War, but Russia and the other Arctic States had developed good working relationships in an Arctic context. Indeed, the Arctic region was declared to be an "exceptional zone" of cooperation and the Arctic was described as the "high north, low tension".⁵³²

Canada condemned and criticized Russia for its annexation of Crimea within the Arctic Council during its second chairmanship.⁵³³ Indeed, Harper wished to expel Russia from the Arctic Council, but was persuaded not to by the other Arctic states and Observers.⁵³⁴ Canada, under Harper, behaved as if it had the power to dictate to another great power on its behaviour even outside of an Arctic context.⁵³⁵ Instead, the rest of the Arctic Council took a different approach from Canada and decided to overlook Russia's annexation of Crimea to ensure that there was still regional cooperation in the Arctic Council given its exceptional nature in a clearly more contested world.⁵³⁶

⁵³⁰ "The Russian Federation," Arctic Council, accessed on November 18, 2022, <https://www.arctic-council.org/about/states/russian-federation/>.

⁵³¹ "Secretary General: Sweden and Finland's membership will make NATO stronger," North Atlantic Treaty Organization, last modified October 20, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_208464.htm.

⁵³² Marc Lanteigne, "The changing shape of Arctic security," *NATO Review*, accessed on November 24, 2022, <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2019/06/28/the-changing-shape-of-arctic-security/index.html>.

⁵³³ Burke, *Diplomacy and the Arctic Council*, 34.

⁵³⁴ Burke, 34-35.

⁵³⁵ "Canada," Arctic Council, accessed on May 19, 2020, <https://arctic-council.org/en/about/states/canada/>.

⁵³⁶ Burke, 34-35.

China joins the Arctic Council

China was admitted to the Arctic Council as an Observer in 2013 during the Kiruna Ministerial meeting as Canada handed over chairship to Sweden.⁵³⁷ The addition of China as an Observer in the Arctic Council in 2013 means that all of the great powers are on the Arctic Council as Arctic states or Observers along with the United Kingdom and France which joined in 1998 and 2000 respectively.⁵³⁸ The addition of China to the Arctic Council means that Canada has to navigate its relationship with all of the great powers on the Arctic Council. China joined the Arctic Council at a time when there was a strain in the China-US relation. China has been involved in the Arctic with the potential to clash with the US on the Arctic Council. China has identified itself as a “Near-Arctic state”, but it is only an Observer on the Arctic Council.⁵³⁹ The Arctic Council only includes Arctic states, Observers, and Permanent Participants. Prime Minister Harper was not encouraged to vote for China’s membership but was convinced by other states to acquiesce.

Analysis

Canada’s role on the Arctic Council during its second chairship was mixed. On the one hand, it created the Arctic Economic Council.⁵⁴⁰ But on the other hand, Canada backed down to keep Russia as a member of the Arctic Council when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 and vote to include China as an Observer.⁵⁴¹

⁵³⁷ Observers,” Arctic Council, accessed on May 19, 2020, <https://arctic-council.org/en/about/observers/>.

⁵³⁸ Observers,” Arctic Council, accessed on May 19, 2020, <https://arctic-council.org/en/about/observers/>.

⁵³⁹ Burke, *Diplomacy and the Arctic Council*, 7.

⁵⁴⁰ “Canada,” Arctic Council, accessed on May 19, 2020, <https://arctic-council.org/en/about/states/canada/>.

⁵⁴¹ Burke, *Diplomacy and the Arctic Council*, 35.

Russia's second chairmanship and the invasion of Ukraine in 2022

Russia assumed its second chairmanship of the Arctic Council starting in 2021 on the 25th anniversary of the Arctic Council.⁵⁴² The 2021 Reykjavik Declaration passed the chairmanship from Iceland to Russia for 2021 to 2023.⁵⁴³

On February 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine.⁵⁴⁴ The Russian invasion of Ukraine is a military issue, and the Arctic Council does not discuss military issues so it will not be discussed on the Arctic Council notwithstanding the creation of an Arctic Coast Guard Forum in 2015 to deal with search and rescue issues.⁵⁴⁵ Global Affairs Canada (GAC) released a statement on March 3, 2022:

Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and the United States condemn Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and note the grave impediments to international cooperation, including in the Arctic, that Russia's actions have caused.⁵⁴⁶

The Arctic states also announced that they would pause their participation on projects in the Arctic Council because of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.⁵⁴⁷ Canada was the lead behind the decision to pause the remaining Arctic states' participation on the Arctic Council.⁵⁴⁸ However,

⁵⁴² "The Russian Federation," Arctic Council, accessed on November 18, 2022, <https://www.arctic-council.org/about/states/russian-federation/>.

⁵⁴³ "Reykjavik Declaration (2021)," Arctic Council, accessed on November 18, 2022, <https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/2600/declaration%202021%20web%20EN.pdf?sequence=9&isAllowed=y>.

⁵⁴⁴ "Canada's response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine," Government of Canada, accessed on November 19, 2022, https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/response_conflict-reponse_conflits/crisis-crisis/ukraine.aspx?lang=eng.

⁵⁴⁵ "Ottawa Declaration (1996)," Arctic Council, accessed on May 19, 2020, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/85/EDOCS-1752-v2-ACMMCA00_Ottawa_1996_Founding_Declaration.PDF?sequence=5&isAllowed=y.

⁵⁴⁶ "Joint statement on Arctic Council cooperation following Russia's invasion of Ukraine," Global Affairs Canada, updated on March 3, 2022, <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2022/03/joint-statement-on-arctic-council-cooperation-following-russias-invasion-of-ukraine.html>.

⁵⁴⁷ "Joint statement on Arctic Council cooperation following Russia's invasion of Ukraine," Global Affairs Canada, updated on March 3, 2022, <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2022/03/joint-statement-on-arctic-council-cooperation-following-russias-invasion-of-ukraine.html>.

⁵⁴⁸ "Joint statement on Arctic Council cooperation following Russia's invasion of Ukraine," Global Affairs Canada, updated on March 3, 2022, <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2022/03/joint-statement-on-arctic-council-cooperation-following-russias-invasion-of-ukraine.html>.

the Arctic states did not consult the six Indigenous Peoples' organizations on the decision to pause their participation on the Arctic Council. The Permanent Participants are required to be consulted for all decisions of the Arctic states.⁵⁴⁹ Indeed Canada's leadership to halt all meetings of the Arctic Council was against the Rules of Procedures of the Arctic Council in which Canada was instrumental in creating.⁵⁵⁰ The statement from Global Affairs Canada did not mention why the Indigenous Permanent Participants were not consulted on the decision to pause the work of the Arctic Council during Russia's invasion of Ukraine.⁵⁵¹ Canada was the most fervent advocate for the inclusion and participation of Indigenous peoples in the Arctic Council.⁵⁵² But it did not consult with the Indigenous groups (not even the groups with Canadian participation) on its decisions on the Arctic Council as a result of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.⁵⁵³ Most of the Permanent participants issued statements agreeing with the decision – especially the three with Canadian participants. RAIPON (Russia's Indigenous organization) and the Saami Council (with Russia participation) backed Russia's decision to attack Ukraine although the Saami announcement was a mixed message. On June 8, 2022, Global Affairs Canada released another statement:

We intend to implement a limited resumption of our work in the Arctic Council on projects that do not involve the participation of the Russian Federation. These projects, contained in the work plan approved by all 8 Arctic states at the Reykjavik ministerial,

⁵⁴⁹ “Joint statement on Arctic Council cooperation following Russia's invasion of Ukraine,” Global Affairs Canada, updated on March 3, 2022, <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2022/03/joint-statement-on-arctic-council-cooperation-following-russias-invasion-of-ukraine.html>.

⁵⁵⁰ “Arctic Council Rules of Procedure,” Arctic Council, accessed November 13, 2022, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/940/2015-09-01_Rules_of_Procedure_website_version.pdf?sequence=7&isAllowed=y.

⁵⁵¹ “Joint statement on Arctic Council cooperation following Russia's invasion of Ukraine,” Global Affairs Canada, updated on March 3, 2022, <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2022/03/joint-statement-on-arctic-council-cooperation-following-russias-invasion-of-ukraine.html>.

⁵⁵² “Canada,” Arctic Council, accessed on May 19, 2020, <https://arctic-council.org/en/about/states/canada/>.

⁵⁵³ “Joint statement on Arctic Council cooperation following Russia's invasion of Ukraine,” Global Affairs Canada, updated on March 3, 2022, <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2022/03/joint-statement-on-arctic-council-cooperation-following-russias-invasion-of-ukraine.html>.

are a vital component of our responsibility to the peoples of the Arctic, including Indigenous peoples.⁵⁵⁴

The Arctic Council remains paused as of January 2023 although the A7 have resumed work and meetings on projects that do not involve Russia.⁵⁵⁵ The effect of the pause on the work of the Arctic Council remains to be seen as Russia is the current chair of the Arctic Council until May 2023.⁵⁵⁶ The June 2022 statement from Global Affairs Canada also did not mention that the Indigenous Participants were consulted on the “limited resumption” of the work of the Arctic Council.⁵⁵⁷ The statement only recognizes the responsibilities of the Arctic states to the Indigenous peoples in the Arctic.⁵⁵⁸ The works of the Arctic Council is also important to the Indigenous Permanent Participants and Indigenous peoples.

It is important to recognize that Russia is an important player in the Arctic.⁵⁵⁹ Russia is the “largest Arctic state” by land mass and it has a large population living in the Arctic.⁵⁶⁰ Russia has been involved and contributed to projects on environmental protection, sustainable development, and the Indigenous Peoples on the Arctic Council since it was a founding member.⁵⁶¹ According to Burke, Russia is important for “regional cooperation” and “regional

⁵⁵⁴ “Joint statement on limited resumption of Arctic Council cooperation,” Global Affairs Canada, accessed on November 18, 2022, <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2022/06/joint-statement-on-limited-resumption-of-arctic-council-cooperation.html>.

⁵⁵⁵ “Joint statement on limited resumption of Arctic Council cooperation,” Global Affairs Canada, accessed on November 18, 2022, <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2022/06/joint-statement-on-limited-resumption-of-arctic-council-cooperation.html>.

⁵⁵⁶ “The Russian Federation,” Arctic Council, accessed on November 18, 2022, <https://www.arctic-council.org/about/states/russian-federation/>.

⁵⁵⁷ “Joint statement on limited resumption of Arctic Council cooperation,” Global Affairs Canada, accessed on November 18, 2022, <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2022/06/joint-statement-on-limited-resumption-of-arctic-council-cooperation.html>.

⁵⁵⁸ “Joint statement on limited resumption of Arctic Council cooperation,” Global Affairs Canada, accessed on November 18, 2022, <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2022/06/joint-statement-on-limited-resumption-of-arctic-council-cooperation.html>.

⁵⁵⁹ Burke, *Diplomacy and the Arctic Council*, 35.

⁵⁶⁰ Burke, 35.

⁵⁶¹ “The Russian Federation,” Arctic Council, accessed on November 18, 2022, <https://www.arctic-council.org/about/states/russian-federation/>.

unity.”⁵⁶² After all, Mikhael Gorbachev’s speech in Murmansk on 1 October 1987 was instrumental to the creation of the AEPS which led to the Arctic Council.⁵⁶³ Without Russia’s willingness to cooperate on environmental protection and a nuclear free zone in the Arctic, Canada and Finland would not have taken the initiative to create the AEPS and then the Arctic Council.⁵⁶⁴ If a lesson is to be learned from attempting to remove Russia on the Arctic Council after its invasion of Crimea in 2014, it is that Russia is an important player in the Arctic.⁵⁶⁵ According to Burke, the Arctic Council is the only forum that allows other states to work with Russia as an “partner” rather than an “adversary.”⁵⁶⁶ China is also a partner on the Arctic Council as an Observer.⁵⁶⁷ This is in contrast to the UN and the UNSC, where Russia and China are often seen as antagonists and competitors to US hegemony.

Conclusion

There are two scenarios for the future of the Arctic Council as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. First, since Russia and the Arctic states chose not to cooperate, the Arctic Council could dissolve. Norway was due to resume the Chairship of the Council in May 2023 and may do so without Russia involving only the other seven Arctic states. It would be up to the Arctic states if they are willing and able to cooperate with Russia in the future. Second, the Arctic Council could look the other way to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 just like it did in 2014 during Russia’s annexation of Crimea to ensure regional cooperation in the Arctic.⁵⁶⁸

⁵⁶² Burke, *Diplomacy and the Arctic Council*, 35.

⁵⁶³ English, *Ice and Water*, 11.

⁵⁶⁴ English, 11.

⁵⁶⁵ Burke, *Diplomacy and the Arctic Council*, 35.

⁵⁶⁶ Burke, 35.

⁵⁶⁷ Observers,” Arctic Council, accessed on May 19, 2020, <https://arctic-council.org/en/about/observers/>.

⁵⁶⁸ Burke, *Diplomacy and the Arctic Council*, 35.

Chapter 5 - Conclusion

In comparing Canada as a non-permanent member on the UNSC and as an Arctic state on the Arctic Council, this thesis sought to examine and contribute to the debate on the middle power theory. The theories of multilateralism, internationalism, functionalism, and the “middle power” theory were used in the thesis to examine Canada’s role on international organizations. The thesis looked at UNSC resolutions, meeting records, and voting records to determine Canada’s role on the UNSC. On the Arctic Council, the thesis also looked at declarations and Ministerial meeting documents to determine Canada’s role on the Arctic Council. The UNSC and the Arctic Council were chosen for the thesis because all P5 members are present on both organizations with different roles, mandates, and voting parity. This final chapter summarizes the findings of the research, discusses the policy implications, provides policy recommendations, and suggests directions for future research.

This thesis found that Canada’s role on the UNSC and the Arctic Council are different. Canada’s role as a non-permanent member on the UNSC, especially during the Cold War, was often as a bridge builder. On numerous occasions, actions taken by Canada helped a big power ally to extricate itself from an untenable position. Similarly, Canada’s membership in alliances and international organizations such as NATO, the Commonwealth, La Francophonie, G7, and G20 allowed it to function as a bridgebuilder like its role the UNSC.⁵⁶⁹ Canada has also been a placeholder on some of its six terms as a non-permanent member on the UNSC. An example is during its second term on the UNSC when only two resolutions were passed on the UNSC in 1958-1959.⁵⁷⁰ When an issue on the UNSC is of great interest to one of the P5 members, Canada

⁵⁶⁹ “Partnerships and Organizations,” Government of Canada, updated October 19, 2021, https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/partnerships_organizations-partenariats_organisations.aspx?lang=eng#a1.

⁵⁷⁰ Resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council in 1958,” United Nations Security Council, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1958> and “Resolutions adopted by

can often do very little but to cast a vote that will have no outcome on the final decisions taken. In its last term on the UNSC in 1999-2000, Canada led and was able to enshrine thematic resolutions, especially the women, peace and security theme, into the drafting of all future resolutions.

Canada's role on the Arctic Council was often as a leader. On the one hand, it was instrumental to the creation of the Arctic Council and its Rules of Procedure. On the other hand, Canada was walked back from decisions to eject Russia and to accept China as an Observer suggesting that it does prefer to respect the Council's consensus decision-making. At least in the context of the Arctic Council, Canada does not play the role of a middle power that would be presumed by the middle power theory.

Canada's behaviour is different on the UNSC and on the Arctic Council. On the UNSC, Canada does not have a veto and therefore it cannot behave as a great power via a veto. Instead, Canada plays a variety of roles. Sometimes it mediates when the great powers are not getting along on the UNSC. An example is during the Israel/Palestine conflict when Canada was the mediator between the UK and the US on the issue.⁵⁷¹ The issues on the UNSC often involve intractable conflicts created by the great power competition of the Cold War. After all, the Great Powers, and especially the United States, codified the privileges of the Great Powers in the UN Charter, including the veto. According to Chapnick, the veto of the P5 prevented Canada from bringing "significant change" to the UNSC during its term in 1967-1968.⁵⁷² Canada was adept at finding niche areas to occupy including introducing R2P and WPS in 1999-2000 to the UNSC.

the United Nations Security Council in 1959," United Nations Security Council, accessed on November 13, 2022, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolution-adopted-security-council-1959>.

⁵⁷¹ Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 38-39.

⁵⁷² Chapnick, 2019, 94.

Rarely, however, does the literature acknowledge such a lead role because R2P and WPS are considered thematic, soft power issues and not as consequential as limiting or starting wars.

Canada's dismal election results of late for a seat on the UNSC on its last two attempts suggest that Canada's ability to affect the UNSC agenda will be a long time coming. Unless Canada chooses to represent the WEOG in an uncontested election, Canada's chances of election look particularly weak in comparison to other western European allies.

On the Arctic Council, Canada has a veto and therefore it can lead because it has similar voting rights as some of the P5. An example is during Canada's second chairmanship when Canada condemned Russia's annexation of Crimea on the Arctic Council in 2014.⁵⁷³ It is an example of Canada thinking like it can have the influence of a great power on a regional organization. As an Arctic state, Canada was also able to oppose the application of the European Union to be an Observer on the Arctic Council in 2009 due to the EU seal product trade ban.⁵⁷⁴ Canada has also flouted the same procedural rules it was instrumental in creating for the Arctic Council and failed to consult the Permanent Participants in the decision by seven of the Arctic States to suspend Arctic Council activities post 24 February 2022.

The assumption that Canada will never have the same influence as the great powers on an international organization is outdated. Canada's experience on the Arctic Council shows that it can play the role of a leader on international organization. It is assumed in the literature that the United States and Russia will always dominate the agenda of the Arctic Council and have more power than the other members.⁵⁷⁵ But the Chairmanship of the Arctic Council rotates among the

⁵⁷³ Burke, *Diplomacy and the Arctic Council*, 34.

⁵⁷⁴ "Canada against EU entry to Arctic Council because of seal trade ban," CBC News, April 29, 2009, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/canada-against-eu-entry-to-arctic-council-because-of-seal-trade-ban-1.806188>.

⁵⁷⁵ Burke, *Diplomacy and the Arctic Council*, 24-25.

Arctic States.⁵⁷⁶ Russia and the United States must wait for their terms as chair to set the agenda of the Arctic Council. The rest of the P5, like the UK, China, and France, cannot be chairs of the Arctic Council and cannot set the agenda as Observers.⁵⁷⁷ They can only observe and contribute to the scientific work and funding of the Arctic Council.⁵⁷⁸ Russia and the United States must still forge a consensus among the other Arctic states for a decision to be made on the Arctic Council which includes Canada.⁵⁷⁹

Since the Arctic Council involves decisions of a soft power nature only, it seems Canada can play the role of a leader more easily. With mandates on environmental protection and sustainable development, the Arctic Council's agenda and voting structure allows for leaders by any of the Arctic states – great ones or not.⁵⁸⁰ On the UNSC, often decisions involve the use of hard power and decisions are often dominated by the P5. On occasions, however, Canada and other non-permanent members have inserted the requirement to consider the fate of civilians, especially women and girls.

⁵⁷⁶ Arctic Council Rules of Procedure,” Arctic Council, accessed November 13, 2022, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/940/2015-09-01_Rules_of_Procedure_website_version.pdf?sequence=7&isAllowed=y and and About the Arctic Council,” Arctic Council, accessed on January 19, 2022, <https://www.arctic-council.org/about/#:~:text=The%20Chairmanship%20of%20the%20Arctic,Kingdom%20of%20Denmark%2C%20and%20Sweden.>

⁵⁷⁷ “Observers,” Arctic Council, accessed on May 19, 2020, <https://arctic-council.org/en/about/observers/>.

⁵⁷⁸ “Arctic Council Rules of Procedure,” Arctic Council, accessed November 13, 2022, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/940/2015-09-01_Rules_of_Procedure_website_version.pdf?sequence=7&isAllowed=y.

⁵⁷⁹ “Arctic Council Rules of Procedure,” Arctic Council, accessed November 13, 2022, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/940/2015-09-01_Rules_of_Procedure_website_version.pdf?sequence=7&isAllowed=y.

⁵⁸⁰ “Ottawa Declaration (1996),” Arctic Council, accessed on May 19, 2020, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/85/EDOCS-1752-v2-ACMMCA00_Ottawa_1996_Founding_Declaration.PDF?sequence=5&isAllowed=y.

Policy implications

The thesis found that Canada *can* play the role of a middle power on international organizations but also found it can play other roles including a lead role. Perhaps, this means that Canada's roles on international organizations needs to be re-examined. Canada's experience on the UNSC and Arctic Council shows that it can play a significant role especially if it picks niche issue areas of interest to it on which to focus – for example, WPS or Arctic issues.

Canada is a loyal western ally on the UNSC. Therefore, Canada will need to gather as much information on the preferences of its Western allies before it makes decisions as a non-permanent member on the UNSC in the future. Canada is expected to continue to support and align with its Western allies but should also look for opportunities to insert normative requirements, such as the protection of civilians.

Canada's experiences on the UNSC and the Arctic Council shows that soft power remains important today. Issues like climate change, terrorism, and pandemics cannot be solved using hard power and the military.⁵⁸¹ Canada's niche focus on dealing with issues connected to human security, therefore, are likely to be supported (at least not rejected) by other states. According to Burke, the Arctic Council is an example of an organization that still has influence even if its mandate relies on soft power like environmental protection and sustainable development.⁵⁸² Canada can have influence in the world via these foci. For example, Canada was able to promote soft power on the UNSC with initiatives such as human security and the Ottawa Treaty and S/RES/1325.⁵⁸³ On the Arctic Council, Canada was able to convince the great powers, like Russia and the United States, to allow Indigenous Permanent Participants

⁵⁸¹ Keating, *Canada and World Order*, 215.

⁵⁸² Burke, *Diplomacy and the Arctic Council*, 30.

⁵⁸³ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 160-164.

consultation status on the Arctic Council (albeit with Russia constraining and controlling its RAIPON organization).⁵⁸⁴ One wonders if Former Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy, who was a proponent of soft power in Canadian foreign policy and was the Minister of Foreign Affairs when Canada was on the UNSC and the Arctic Council, was not in his position at the time, if Canada would have had as much policy success in the late 1990s and early 2000s?⁵⁸⁵

Policy recommendations

The thesis has determined that Canada's role on the UNSC can be as a middle power, laggard or leader and Canada's role on the Arctic Council can be as a leader. It is time for the Canadian literature to catch up.

The world order is changing to a more contested world order and the return of great power competition with Russia and China challenging the US hegemony. Finding a niche role for Canada will be more difficult. Indeed, the attention of non-great powers like Canada is returning to preventing Russia, the United States and China from clashing.

Canada's six terms on the UNSC shows that it had experience dealing with the great powers, but it has been more than twenty years since its last term on the Council. Canada can pursue niche topics as a non-permanent member on the UNSC when the great powers are either getting along or are not particularly interested in the topic at hand. The UNSC will not function at its best and resolutions will not get passed on the UNSC if the great powers are not cooperating or very interested in topics which makes it important for Canada and other non-permanent members on the UNSC to act as a mediator or bridge builder on the UNSC.

⁵⁸⁴ "Canada," Arctic Council, accessed on May 19, 2020, <https://arctic-council.org/en/about/states/canada/>.

⁵⁸⁵ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 164-165.

Canada's niche includes drafting treaties and creating international organizations. For example, Canada created the Arctic Council based on the Finland's AEPS.⁵⁸⁶ In addition, Canada also created the Ottawa Treaty (on anti personnel land mines) and contributed Article 2 to the North Atlantic Treaty.⁵⁸⁷ A policy recommendation for the government is to continue to draft treaties and encourage the cooperation of other states via multilateral organizations when there are opportunities. Canada's initiative to create the Arctic Council in 1996 on the urging of Mary Simon is a wonderful example. While the AEPS dealt with pollution (especially radiological), the people of the Arctic were overlooked. The Arctic Council added an issue of interest to Canada and Inuit – sustainable development.⁵⁸⁸ This gives Canada the opportunity to play the role of a leader on organizations. By determining Canada's niche, it provides Canada with insights on issues where it can potentially play a lead role.

Canada is a skilled mediator and negotiator on international organizations. Canada had to ensure the continuity of the Commonwealth during Apartheid in South Africa when some members threatened to leave the Commonwealth if the UK did not deal with Apartheid in South Africa.⁵⁸⁹ This was also the case with Southern Rhodesia. The Ottawa Treaty was the result of Canada's persistent negotiation on the UN under Former Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy.⁵⁹⁰ Canada is often needed to mediate and negotiate on international organizations.

⁵⁸⁶ English, *Ice and Water*, 11.

⁵⁸⁷ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 160.

⁵⁸⁸ English, *Ice and Water*, 11.

⁵⁸⁹ See Chapnick, 2019, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 41-42 and "Founding treaty," North Atlantic Treaty Organization, updated September 2, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67656.htm.

⁵⁹⁰ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 160.

Significance of the research

Gecelovsky has mentioned that the “middle power” theory is the theory that has guided policymakers in Canada.⁵⁹¹ The thesis has shown that the “middle power” theory is particularly Canadian and that perhaps the term “middle power” needs to be retired as it is such a lightning rod for misconceptions. Policymakers must consider that Canada can play the role of a leader on international organizations, bridge builder, or placeholder; these are better terms than the very contested “middle power” term.

According to Chapnick, Canada has used the “middle power” theory to increase its influence in the world.⁵⁹² But Canada already has influence in the world, and it does not need the “middle power” moniker as its calling card. Rather, Canada needs innovative ideas that speak to its national interests.

Contributions and suggestions for future research

By examining Canada’s roles on two international organizations with the P5, the thesis provided new avenues for research.

The thesis briefly mentioned the debate on the “middle power” theory and whether it only applies to Western liberal democracies. There is a potential for research in the understudied “middle powers” of non-western allies and the implications. The UNSC, NATO, and the Arctic Council are western-dominated states. The international organizations are western constructs. But what of the role and influence of non-western states and their allies? An example are the cases of Brazil and Iran which can have significant regional impact, but are often viewed as uncooperative to western ideals on the UNSC. This notion of regional dominance could be

⁵⁹¹ Gecelovsky, “Constructing a Middle Power: Ideas and Canadian Foreign Policy”, 77.

⁵⁹² Chapnick, 2000, “The Canadian Middle Power Myth”, 188.

explored further in the future and especially actors in regions like the Middle East, Africa, and Asia which are often overlooked in Canadian literature.

The thesis also briefly discussed the Indigenous groups who make up the Permanent Participants on the Arctic Council. According to Burke, there is still research to be done on the Permanent Participants on the Arctic Council.⁵⁹³ It is particularly important to study the Permanent Participants on the Arctic Council, given that the Indigenous Permanent Participants were not consulted on the decisions of the Arctic Council during Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The dynamics between the Arctic states and the Permanent Participants is an important issue on the Arctic Council. Canada has done work to strengthen cooperation between the Arctic Council and the Indigenous Peoples.⁵⁹⁴

⁵⁹³ Burke, *Diplomacy and the Arctic Council*, 177.

⁵⁹⁴ "Canada," Arctic Council, accessed on May 19, 2020, <https://arctic-council.org/en/about/states/canada/>.

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