

**Ethnicity and the Canadianization
of Red River Politics**

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The University of Manitoba
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The University of Winnipeg
Joint Master's Program**

**In Partial Fulfilment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts**

**By
Ruth Ellen Swan
March 1991**



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*ETHNICITY AND THE CANADIANIZATION
OF RED RIVER POLITICS*

BY

RUTH ELLEN SWAN

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of
the University of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements
of the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

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CANADIANIZATION

A MÉTIS VIEW:

We are not free because we are governed by Canada.
 (Louis Riel, PAM, Riel Papers #253, May 27, 1874)

AN ONTARIO BRITISH VIEW:

It has travelled far and wide and it is known as a fact everywhere that a handful of people numbering less than 3000 - a people un-Canadian and un-English in their language, habits and customs - are dictating to a people superior to them in ability and numbers, but who are unfortunately the victims of duplicity and treachery.
 (W.L. Luxton, Free Press, Sept. 12 1874)

AN ANGLO-QUEBECKER VIEW:

I was elected for Winnipeg, the biggest place in the province; I represent in the cabinet the interests of the English and Protestant majority; I will defend them with all the energy of my will; but I declare to Mr. Cornish that I will always remember that I have colleagues in the Ministry of which I am Chief that are of the Catholic and French minority of the Province: I will muster as much zeal as necessary to safeguard the rights of the weak and the minority while insisting on the rights of the majority.
 (Premier R.A. Davis, Le Metis, 3 avril, 1875)

A MÉTISSE VIEW:

They tell me Red River is so changed I would not know it; that strangers are coming in great numbers; may God protect poor Red River.
 (Sara Riel to her mother, PAM, Riel Papers #319, Jan 10 1876)

CHAPTER ONE: ETHNICITY, CANADIANIZATION AND ENCAPSULATION

The first decade of Manitoba's existence after Confederation saw the political interaction of a number of different ethnic groups who were vying for power under the new regime. Each group had its own ideology and agenda, but each, because of its position in the social hierarchy, used different strategies to achieve its goals. Because of the division of population, no one group controlled the Legislature, but engaged in alliances to form a majority government.

The difficulty in overcoming ethnic hostilities after Confederation was compounded by the fact that the federal government delayed the implementation of responsible government in Manitoba. Furthermore, it retained control of public lands and economic development through the Manitoba Act. As a result, the provincial cabinet operated at a disadvantage not experienced by the older provinces in Canada.

This work originally began as a biography of the Hon. R.A. Davis (1984-78), second Premier of Manitoba. The lack of documentary collections of political papers made it difficult to write a well-rounded biography. As a result, I decided to produce a social history which would compare the experience of the different ethno-cultural groups and analyze the issues that concerned them. The present work involves a comparison of articles and editorials in Le Métis and the Free Press, the major sources used. The views of these two papers provided such a different perspective on events in Red River during the first decade of Manitoba's provincial history that it was possible to separate the competing ideologies of the different groups. Politics became the vehicle, rather than the focus, for analyzing the process

of "Canadianization".

In addition, this study examines the reasons that the Métis lost their land in Manitoba. There is debate in the literature as to whether the departure of the Métis was voluntary or whether they were forced to leave because of the policies of the Dominion Government. A study of the interrelationships of the ethnic groups in the Manitoba Legislature from 1873-78 helps to understand how the Métis and French Canadians suffered from minority disadvantage. By analyzing the social hierarchy and power structure, it is obvious that the Métis had few options, but resisted the loss of their land mainly outside the Legislature.

The effect of "Canadianization" on various groups during the three provincial administrations headed by Attorney-General Henry Clarke, Premier M-A. Girard and Premier R.A. Davis was considered to understand why the leaders acted as they did. Because there was no responsible government until 1874, the first cabinets represented the political elite of Red River under Canadian control. They were appointed by the Lieutenant Governor who was responsible to the Privy Council in Ottawa, not to the people of Manitoba. When the first Premier was forced out of office after only six months because his Ontario colleagues refused to run in the election with a French-speaking leader, it was a reflection of the ethnic conflict which perennially plagued Canadian politics in central Canada. Consequently, ethnicity was a major issue in the 1874 election and continued to be significant in controversies that erupted during the Davis administration.

By analyzing the members of the Legislature by group identity and by tracing their voting patterns, one gains insight into the position within the political structure of Manitoba

after Confederation.¹ Such analysis then brings into focus Manitoba's position within the Canadian political structure and gives an opportunity to examine the effects of Canadianization.

The historiographical use of "ethnicity" is controversial. Until recently, Canadian historians applied the term to the period of mass Eastern European migration in the period from 1890 to World War I.² A second approach was to distinguish between "charter groups" and those who came later, using the term "charter" to apply to the first European groups to come into an area of colonial expansion. Such an approach ignored the fact that aboriginal groups were in North America before the Europeans, but rarely influenced the direction of the subsequent dominant culture.³

In reacting against these conventional approaches, Gerald Friesen argued that the study of ethnicity in Manitoba must begin with native history and that European immigration to the West began with the fur trade. The second wave of European immigration included mainly British Canadians who arrived in the post-Confederation period and established an "Ontario-like agricultural community".⁴

¹ Ethnicity is defined as a group identity derived from racial origin, national origin, language, religion and historical or contemporary consciousness in Gerald Friesen, The Canadian Prairies: A History, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984, p.244.

² R.D. Francis and Howard Palmer, The Prairie West: Historical Readings, Edmonton, Pica Pica Press, 1985, Chapter 7: "Immigration and Ethnic Relations".

³ T.H. Breen, "Creative Adaptations: People and Cultures" in Colonial British American, ed. by Jack P. Greene and J.R. Pole, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985, p. 205. This issue still poses problems for aboriginal people who opposed and defeated the Meech Lake Accord because it was based on the assumption that the French and the English were the two "founding" nations of Canada and ignored the aboriginal claims to be "First Nations".

⁴ Friesen, p. 245.

In analyzing the period of contact, a new approach has been pioneered by ethnohistorians who use a combination of anthropological and historical methods to understand the interaction of cultures. James Axtell argues that it is necessary to fully understand the motives and actions of both groups in the interaction and not just the dominant group. It is also necessary to recognize their diverse value systems.⁵ Thus, the interaction of the various ethnic groups in the Manitoba Legislature can be used as a case study of a "contact" situation to determine the interaction of colonial and indigenous groups and to determine both the adaptations and resistances that occurred.⁶

The social and economic transformation which occurred in Manitoba in the 1870's and 1880's can be called "Canadianization".⁷ Although historians acknowledge that French Canadians played a role in the early politics of the first western province, the transformation of the British North West to a Canadian "hinterland" is usually associated with Ontario British expansionism.⁸ In other words, "Canadianization" is equated with "Ontarioization". However, if one compares the first three provincial elections of 1870, 1874 and 1878, two parallel

⁵ James Axtell, The European and the Indian, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981, p. 14-15.

⁶ "Contact" is not used here in the conventional sense of a first contact, but to indicate the clash of cultural values which occurred in the political, economic and social transformation of "Canadianization".

⁷ This term was used to describe a similar situation in B.C. R.C. Macleod, "Canadianizing the West: The North-West Mounted Police as Agents of the National Policy" in Francis and Palmer, Prairie West, p. 187.

⁸ Gerald Friesen, "From Homeland to Hinterland", C.H.A. Historical Papers, Saskatoon, p.33-47; and Doug Owram, Promise of Eden, Toronto: University of Toronto press, 1980.

Canadian elites emerged in Manitoba: one from Ontario and one from Quebec.⁹ Although most of the members of the Conventions of 1869-70 were either Métis or Hudson's Bay Scottish, Canadian immigrants from Quebec and Ontario displaced the local groups in the political elite and occupied most of the cabinet positions after 1870. Only a few representatives of Red River were included.

Given the fact that the first two Lieutenant-Governors were Canadian, acted as Premier in selecting the cabinets and were answerable to the Dominion cabinet rather than the provincial legislature, the dominance of Canada over Red River was immediate. Louis Riel's demand for local control was not met in 1870. Responsible government was delayed for the first four years on the pretext that local politicians were too inexperienced to handle it. This rationalization is difficult to explain given the fact that most of the cabinet ministers were Canadian with a variety of professional and business experience. One must question why the Dominion government felt it necessary to interfere to such a drastic degree in Manitoba's internal affairs. As a result, "Canadianization" resulted in both ethnic domination of Red River elites by outsiders as well as political control from Ottawa.

Canadian domination of Red River elites suggests that the other groups suffered from minority disadvantage. "Minority" in the sociological sense does not imply numerical value, but a lack of power, that is, being outside the dominant group, in the same way that women are a minority group in a patriarchal society. Using power as a measure of dominance or marginality suggests that Canadianization affected different groups in different ways and this study will examine each group separately to determine its goals and success or failure in

⁹ Ruth Swan, "Ethnicity and the Formation of Manitoba Political Elites", unpublished paper, University of Manitoba, 1985.

achieving them.

Generally-speaking, the three parties in the Manitoba legislature were alliances of five ethnic groups, although observers disagree on their number and identities. In 1876, Lieutenant-Governor Morris described the parties as follows:

ENGLISH PARTY: English Halfbreeds and Selkirk Settlers

FRENCH PARTY: French Halfbreeds

CANADIAN PARTY: The new settlers from Ontario¹⁰

Because of Morris' differentiation between English and French "halfbreeds", it is necessary to assume that these groups were politically distinct.¹¹ The parties' composition, however, was more complex than Morris suggested. French Canadians and Anglo-Quebeckers who arrived after 1870 were not even mentioned although they played a prominent role in the early cabinets.

Furthermore, the ethnic groups contained their own divisions. Mailhot and Sprague observed that class divisions split the Métis and "Native English" as some of the more affluent expected to benefit from the new Canadian regime and welcomed the newcomers. Similarly, these authors differentiated between the Ontario British who were "land-hungry speculators" who led the persecution of the Métis, and the more moderate farmers who only sought land

¹⁰ National Archives of Canada (NAC), RG6, A1, Vol 158, Morris to Mackenzie, 12 February, 1876.

¹¹ This study follows the model of Mailhot and Sprague that differentiates between the "two distinct ethnic groups with separate origins in the history of the fur trade." P.R. Mailhot and D.N. Sprague, "Persistent Settlers: the Dispersal and Resettlement of the Red River Metis, 1870-1885", *Canadian Ethnic Studies* XVII, Vol.2, 1985: pp.1-30. The term "Métis" refers only to the Catholic francophone group. The term "Native English" is rejected because descendants find it pejorative and the Protestant anglophone group is called "Hudson's Bay Scottish".

for small-scale agricultural purposes. Scholars have debated whether the two groups of part-Indian ancestry should both be called "métis" or should be labelled differently.¹² Because they were seen as politically distinct by contemporary observers such as Morris, they will be treated as separate ethnic groups in the following discussion.

The structure of the thesis is based on the ethnic makeup of the parties. The first three chapters after the introduction deal with the groups in the French Party: the Métis, French Canadians and the Anglo-Quebeckers. The next chapter deals with the Hudson's Bay Scottish and Red River British who were in the English Party and the final chapter before the conclusion deals with the Ontario British of the Canadian Party.

The Red River Census of 1870 was used as much as possible as the information can be interpreted as "self-identification" rather than as biological or bureaucratic identification. Forms were filled out in English or in French and the categories were: French Halfbreed, English Halfbreed, White or Indian (Métis francais, Métis anglais, Blanc ou Indien). This information was most useful in determining who were of part-aboriginal background. The category of "white" was not used in this thesis as it did not take into account ethnic differences between French-Canadians, Anglo-Quebeckers, Ontario British and Red River British. These identities could be determined by combining language, religious and racial designations.

Aboriginal groups who were resident in Manitoba in 1870 were excluded from the political process once Confederation took place. Although Henry Prince, a Saulteaux Chief

¹² Both Friesen, in Canadian Prairies, and Gerhard Ens, "Metis Lands in Manitoba", Manitoba History, Vol. 5, 1983, pp. 2-11, use "métis" to refer to both groups on the basis of their fur trade antecedents.

from St. Peter's, had been elected and participated in the Convention of 1869, his people received no right to vote or be represented in the legislature. The political recognition they received through treaty negotiation replaced participation in the mainstream political arena.¹³ Although Indian communities did not elect members to the Legislature or to Parliament, they were affected by Canadianization.

Similarly, women did not enjoy political rights and were not represented in the Legislature. The history of both native people and women provides an insight into the use of power and patterns of dominance experienced by minority groups. As fur trade historian Sylvia Van Kirk noted, feminist and native perspectives have much in common:

History has become an important tool, not only in seeking explanations for the roots of domination, but also in the effort to retain a part which has been ignored and considered irrelevant to the development of the Canadian nation.¹⁴

Dominance and resistance must be studied in tandem to determine what realistic choices were available to both the dominant and disadvantaged groups.¹⁵

The theoretical assumption which becomes quickly obvious to the observer is that Confederation brought Manitoba into a state of "internal colonialism" despite the fact that the local people thought they had achieved a degree of local control over their political

¹³ For a discussion of the early interaction between native people, Métis, "Scottish halfbreeds" and Ontario British, see Steve Prystupa, "Images of our Past" Catalogue, Winnipeg: Manitoba Multicultural Resources Centre.

¹⁴ S. Van Kirk, "towards a Feminist Perspective in Native History", Papers of the Eighteenth Algonquian Conference, ed. William Cowan, Ottawa: Carlton, 1987, p. 377.

¹⁵ Jane Lewis, "Women. Lost and Found: The Impact of Feminism on History", in Men's Studies Modified: The Impact of Feminism on the Academic Disciplines, ed. Dale Spender, Pergamon Press, 1981, p. 62.

situation.¹⁶ As a result of joining Canada, the people of Red River became minority groups within their own province and were dominated by Canadian immigrants. The Dominion Government undermined local democracy by withholding possession of public lands and by the denial of responsible government. As a result, the provincial government did not control the economic development of the province, and could not generate any revenue or solve local problems such as the distribution of the Halfbreed Land Grant.

One useful theoretical framework for explaining the process of social change called "Canadianization" and the resultant internal colonialism is "encapsulation". F.G. Bailey, a social anthropologist, suggested that when a small self-contained political arena is progressively encapsulated within a larger political structure, there is likely to be instability and disharmony because the value system of the encapsulating and encapsulated structures are different.¹⁷ Bailey's theories developed out of anthropological field work he did in India, but his ideas have some relevance to the situation in Manitoba in the post-Confederation era.

Bailey predicted three possible reactions to encapsulation: (1) Structure B, the larger structure, leaves structure A, the small unit alone. (2) Structure B is predatory; it leaves A alone as long as it gets its revenue; this situation was the equivalent of British indirect rule and was the situation in Red River under the Hudson's Bay Company in which the Company allowed the residents to follow their own beliefs and keep their institutions. (3) Structure A would be integrated into B so that radical change in A would be necessary.

¹⁶ For a discussion of internal colonialism in a Canadian context, see J. Rick Ponting, ed., Arduous Journey: Canadian Indians and Decolonization, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986, p. 82.

¹⁷ F.G. Bailey, Strategems and Spoils: A Social Anthropology of Politics, New York: Schocken Books, 1969.

Differences in culture bring about those conditions of uncertainty which inhibit political competition and cause political fighting. Very often this is to some extent a revolutionary situation - the State is trying to bring about a revolution in the villages by changing fundamentally the rules which regulate political competition between the villagers.¹⁸

He observed that the success of integration depends on the degree of resistance that the people of A wish to offer and the resources that they can call on to assist them. If Structure B is too strong, not only does structure A lose its rules, but the people who followed those rules may be exterminated.¹⁹ In 1869-70, the Métis resisted Canadianization and, in the decade that followed, the residents of Red River had to come to terms with the new political regime. Decisions to adapt or resist depended to a large extent on one's ethnic identity and position in the social hierarchy.

The following discussion cannot review all the significant issues that emerged during the period of 1873-78 from the viewpoint of all the groups. Issues of greatest significance to each group are selected to illustrate their priorities. As a result, a topic such as the Half Breed Land Grant is discussed under the French Canadians because it was this group that sponsored the Half Breed Land Grant Protection Act through the Legislature. Similarly, the drive for responsible government is discussed under "Anglo-Quebeckers" although this issue affected all the groups.

The major sources are the newspaper reports of the legislative sessions as there was no Hansard at the time. The Free Press and Le Metis represented the Ontario British and

¹⁸ Bailey, p. 149

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 155

French Canadian points of view.²⁰ Because archival collections of the political papers of cabinet members are sparse, extensive biographical research was conducted on most of the significant cabinet ministers during this period. Papers of other politicians such as Lieutenant-Governor Alexander Morris and Louis Riel were also consulted. Minutes of the Executive Council and Assembly and Department of Interior Records in Ottawa were used. The biggest problem was that written records giving the perspectives of the politicians and documenting their cultural and ideological outlooks are very scarce. This is as true for Premier Davis as for the Hon. John Norquay or the Hon. James McKay.

The following discussion attempts to show Manitoban politics from the Manitoba perspective. Viewing "Canadianization" as an external force is a way of analyzing social and political change. It goes without saying that the Métis lost their land in the Red River Settlement, but how and why this occurred is still a matter of dispute. The power relationships that established Manitoba's inferior status in Confederation will be explained and will help show why western Canadians still feel that "Canadianization" was a process more to the advantage of Central Canada than to the West.

²⁰ W.L. Luxton was the editor of the Free Press. There were no bylines on the stories, so it is assumed that he wrote the articles and editorials. Joseph Royal, French Canadian and politician, was a founder and editor of Le Métis. It is assumed that either he wrote the articles or that they represented his viewpoint. It was not uncommon for politicians to use newspapers to promote their views. R.A. Davis bought the Nor'Wester in 1874 before the provincial election, presumably for that purpose. If other groups were represented in these papers, it is difficult to determine without authors' names. However, the content of the articles reflects a definite ethnic bias.

CHAPTER TWO: METIS MARGINALIZATION AND RESISTANCE

Although the largest ethnic group in Manitoba in 1870, the Métis feared that the population balance would be upset by increasing immigration from Ontario. They were not initially threatened by the newcomers from Quebec whom they regarded as allies in the attempt to maintain their land and culture because they shared in part the same language, religion and cultural heritage. Their political agenda as outlined by their leader, Louis Riel, was to implement the promises made in the Manitoba Act regarding the Half Breed Land Grant and to secure the amnesty for those involved in the Provisional Government. Although these were federal issues, they overrode in significance other items in the provincial arena and the Legislature could provide a forum to lobby for these most basic requirements.

The persecution by the Ontario British and the lack of an amnesty handicapped Métis politicians, however, because it was not safe for them to run openly in a democratic election. They came to rely on the professional expertise of French Canadian lawyers who arrived after the Resistance of 1869-70 and who were in less danger because they were not involved in that confrontation.

In the House, the Métis and French Canadians joined forces to offset the attacks of the men from Ontario. With the support of Anglo-Quebecker, Henry Clarke, they formed a French Party which put forward a common agenda of support for the Métis land base and French Canadian concern for linguistic, religious and education rights. Within this political framework, the Métis became marginalized and suffered two different effects of Canadianization. They lost their land through Ontario British persecution and government ineptitude and they were overshadowed politically by French Canadians who enjoyed educational, professional and racial advantages.

Section 1: Marginalization

The election results in 1870 and 1874 show that the Métis lost seats and were severely weakened in terms of their political representation in the Legislature. Table 1 compares the elections on a riding basis and shows that the Métis lost seats both through redistribution and through contested nominations with French Canadians.

TABLE 1: METIS POLITICAL PERSISTENCE IN MANITOBA: 1870-74
ELECTIONS IN FRENCH PARISHES FOR THE LOWER HOUSE

<u>Riding</u>	Ethnic <u>ID-1870</u>	Ethnic <u>ID-1874</u>
St Laurent	Angus McKay Métis	Angus McKay Métis
Baie St Paul	J Dubuc Fr Cdn	F Chenier Fr Cdn
St F-X West	J Royal Fr Cdn	J Royal Fr Cdn
St F-X East	P Breland Métis	Max Lepine Métis
St Charles	H Clarke Anglo-Quebecker	A Murray HBS
St Bon West	L Schmidt Métis	lost through redistribution
St Bon East	M-A Girard Fr Cdn	M-A Girard Fr Cdn
St Vital	A Beauchemin Métis	J Lemay Fr Cdn
St Norbert N	J Lemay Fr Cdn	J Dubuc Fr Cdn

St Norbert S	P Delorme Métis	lost through redistribution
Ste Agathe	G Klyne Métis	A F Martin Fr Cdn
Ste Anne	J McTavish RRB	Chas Nolin Metis
Totals:	6 Métis 4 Fr Cdn 1 Anglo-Quebecker 1 RRB	3 Métis 6 Fr Cdn 1 HBS 2 seats lost
HBS - Hudson's Bay Scottish RRB - Red River British		

TABLE 2: METIS REPRESENTATION IN THE UPPER HOUSE
1870-76

James McKay
Francois Dauphinais
Solomon Hamlin

Table 1 shows that redistribution and contested nominations in the French ridings hurt the Métis rather than the newcomers from Quebec in 1874 as they lost half their seats and were reduced to three. Furthermore, their most vocal spokesman in the first Parliament, Louis Schmidt, was defeated. The French Canadians doubled their seats. Nevertheless, they had reason to worry because anglophone immigration was infiltrating some of their parishes such as St. Charles, Ste. Agathe and Baie St. Paul so they were in danger of losing these seats as well. In fact, their fears were reasonable because in 1877 they had to give up two seats.

The Métis were split into two groups called the "Provisoires", those who had supported the Provisional Government, and "Loyaux", the Loyal French (loyal to Canada).¹

¹ N.E.A. Ronaghan, "The Archibald Administration in Manitoba, 1870-72", PH.D. Thesis, University of Manitoba, 1986, pp. 367-368.

In the face of persecution by the Ontario Volunteers in 1870, these two groups united as all Métis became potential victims of violent reprisals. The Loyal French tended to be less outspoken and more compromising than those who had fought with Riel and it was the Loyal French who persisted in the 1874 election.

TABLE 3: METIS POLITICAL ORIENTATION AND PERSISTANCE

1870: Provisoires:	Schmidt, Beauchemin and Delorme
Loyaux:	McKay, Bréland and Klyne
1874: Provisoires:	Lepine
Loyaux:	McKay and Nolin

Thus, after the 1874 election, the character of Métis representation changed to become more moderate and accommodating. With Schmidt gone, the three Metis MPPs who were left tended to give way to the French Canadian leadership, especially once Nolin quit the cabinet in 1875. Gerald Friesen observed:

In a democratic parliamentary system with fully representative government, the metis land crisis would inevitably have found its way into public debate. And yet few metis complaints about the stunning dispossession were aired in the legislature. Why was so little heard from the metis?²

The fact that the Métis were marginalized politically and muzzled in their resistance is not surprising in the context of ethnicity. It is not uncommon for governments representing the dominant majority to undermine ethnic leadership and reward those leaders who are most accommodating to the government's agenda. The ethnic leaders face a dilemma: if they

² Gerald Friesen, Canadian Prairies: A History, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984, p. 200.

concur, they are silenced and probably will be taken for granted. If the government does not make good on its promises, they are powerless. If they resist and are critical in public, they will be isolated and undermined by losing future government patronage. Neither option will obtain what they want if the majority is not inclined to be cooperative and recognize their demands as legitimate.

Bailey predicted the difficulty for minority leadership in his theory of encapsulation. He observed that leaders had to act as middlemen between the encapsulating and encapsulated structures and their success depended on their ability "to deceive and misrepresent the strength and intentions of both sides to each other". Leaders who were prepared to compromise were likely to be regarded with suspicion and contempt by those who had made an ideological commitment to the cause or by the local leader [such as Riel] who fought single-mindedly for local autonomy. Suspicion of deviousness, he wrote, was inherent in the middleman's role.³ The Métis leadership faced impossible choices in the 1870's and the result was a division in their ranks and frustration with the Canadian and Manitoban governments. Without the amnesty to protect them, the Provisoires found public resistance difficult.

Because of the failure of the Dominion Government to proclaim the amnesty, the Provisoires and particularly their most well-known leaders, Louis Riel and Ambroise Lepine, were in great danger. Besides these two, at least ten other members of the Provisional Government did not run in the provincial election of 1870 because they would have been either assaulted or arrested if they had appeared in Winnipeg.⁴ Louis Riel

³ F.G. Bailey, Strategems and Spoils, p. 167.

⁴ Ronaghan, pp. 523-526. These were Louis Laserte, William O'Donaghue, Pierre Parenteau, Pierre Poitras, Baptiste Tourond, Baptiste Beauchemin, Charles Nolin, Xavier Patee, John Bruce, Jean-Baptiste Perrault.

considered running for a provincial seat in 1872 when André Beauchemin offered to resign and force a byelection. The Lieutenant-Governor, however, agreed with Prime Minister Macdonald that Riel should not run for the Legislature. Morris suggested that he could frustrate Riel's intentions by refusing to sign a writ of election and speculated that Riel could be beaten in St. Vital by bribery. He also warned Joseph Royal that a warrant would be issued for Riel's arrest if he persisted.⁵

Although forced into hiding by threats on his life, Riel continued his leadership activities and was the most persistent critic of the government in the early 1870's. He attended political functions in the French parishes such as the establishment of the St. Jean Baptiste Society in December 1871 where he was elected Vice-President and continued to write instructions and develop strategy with his supporters. He sent a "Memorial and Petition" from himself and O'Donoghue to President Grant in September 1871 and a similar address to Lieutenant-Governor Morris after he was officially inducted in January 1873. Both of these documents outlined Metis grievances.⁶

Because Riel was so outspoken and uncompromising, he was seen by his supporters as a hero and became the acknowledged head of the French Party in exile. The French Canadian leaders including Taché, Dubuc and Royal worked on Riel's behalf to get him elected federally in Provencher riding so that he could lobby for the redress of Métis grievances in Parliament. Unfortunately, the delay of the amnesty distracted the leadership

⁵ D.N. Sprague, Macdonald and the Métis, Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1988, p. 82.

⁶ George F.G. Stanley, Louis Riel, Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1985, pp. 161-162. For his political involvements before his collapse and final exile, see Stanley, p. 192; Sprague, 1988, Chapter 5, "Eliminating the Riel Factor from Manitoba Politics"; Robert Painchaud, "Rapports entre les Metis et les Canadiens Francais au Manitoba, 1870-1884", The Other Natives: Les/The Metis, Vol. 2, ed. by A.S. Lussier and D. Bruce Sealey, Winnipeg: Manitoba Metis Federation, 1978.

from issues such as the land grant because they spent much time lobbying and protesting; without the amnesty, the Métis political leaders were immobilized to a great degree.⁷

Their attempts to get Riel into the House of Commons was a risky strategy because they were blamed for causing animosity in the English Parishes. Their actions reminded the vengeful Orangemen that the leaders of the Provisional Government were still free. Nevertheless, the French Canadian leaders persisted because Riel was the most popular leader in the French parishes.⁸

The French Canadian leadership realized that their support for Riel was risky, but defended it nevertheless. During one of Riel's election campaigns, the Premier, R.A. Davis, tried to persuade Dubuc not to work on Riel's campaign because it would hurt the government in the English Parishes if it were known that the Attorney General was openly supporting the Metis chief. Dubuc retorted that, if he did not help Riel, the government would never elect another member in the French Parishes.⁹ Davis conceded that Dubuc was correct in his assessment and agreed that he would have done the same thing in his place.

Even Riel's Anglophone opponents admitted that he wielded power and influence despite the fact that he fought the elections "underground" and out of sight. As Gilbert McMicken of the Dominion Land Office confided to the Prime Minister:

⁷ After a large public meeting protested the arrest of Lepine and the warrant against Riel, Girard, Cunningham, Dubuc and Ritchot lobbied Morris on their behalf in a marathon two-hour session. Stanley, p. 192.

⁸ During the preliminary hearing for Lepine's trial, Dubuc wrote to Riel: "Je les [Joseph and Duncan Nolin] ai assurés que Riel s'il était élu irait à Ottawa pour faire décider la liberation de M. Lepine la sienne et celle de tout le peuple". PAM, Riel Papers #218, 9 octobre, 1873. Riel was thus portrayed as a popular liberator and man of the people.

⁹ PAM, Dubuc Memoirs, typescript, pp. 27-28.

It is an undeniable fact that Riel is an object of the strongest regard with them and for him they would do almost anything, especially if incited to it on grounds affecting their common interest or touching their feelings.¹⁰

Because Riel was acknowledged to be the most powerful francophone leader, he was the most dangerous to the Ontario British who opposed Métis settlement in Manitoba and therefore he became the target of their greatest harassment.

While Riel was in hiding, however, his colleagues in the provincial house required a leader and the most vocal representative of the "Provisoires" in the Legislature during the first Parliament was Louis Schmidt, former Secretary of the Provisional Government. In Riel's absence, he articulated their resistance to the Dominion government's delay in implementing its promises. Schmidt had been educated in Quebec and might have been a suitable choice as cabinet minister. His involvement in the Provisional Government branded him as a "radical", however, and he was forced to defer to his French Canadian colleagues.

Schmidt acted as Métis advocate by lobbying the provincial cabinet as well as organizing meetings and delegations outside the House. In February 1873, Schmidt asked for a report on the action taken by the provincial government on the question of the "halfbreed land grant". Royal replied in French (and Norquay in English) that they were aware of the serious situation caused by the delay of the Dominion Government in settling the land question. Norquay noted that the public was very angry about the delays and some country people had threatened to demolish the land office.¹¹ He reported that members of the government had gone to the Land Office the previous July to persuade the officials of the urgent necessity of immediately settling the question. He indicated the local government

¹⁰ Sprague, 1988, p. 100.

¹¹ "Country people" was the term Norquay used and it is not clear if he means "rural" or "country born".

considered the delay "criminal" and that they had performed their duty by this lobbying effort. Then he admitted that the key to the problem was that "If the effort was not so successful as was desirable, the reason was that the power was lacking".¹²

By February 1873, Schmidt and his colleagues were more than a little concerned about the delays and harassment, and promised that there would be trouble if nothing were done to alleviate the situation. A crisis occurred when Gilbert McMicken in the Land Office fired M. LaRivière, the only French-speaking member of the staff. Without a francophone in the office, most Métis would have had a difficult time obtaining information about their rights, let alone trying to register claims.

The French Party reacted with consternation. Le Métis noted that not one of the wood inspectors or under-agents of immigration was French Métis and blamed Ottawa for discriminating against them. It also complained that McMicken's Land Office did not offer any welcome for those who were not friends of the Dominion Land Agent:

C'est le parti pris du Bureau des Terres de ne pas se conformer a l'égard des droits des métis aux termes et à l'esprit de l'Acte de Manitoba. Ce que nous savons, c'est que tout individu qui n'est pas courtesan de M. McMicken n'a aucune espèce d'être traité, meme avec politesse, dans ses bureaux.¹³

Louis Schmidt complained about McMicken's action in the House and advised that:

"La conduite de M. McMicken est injustifiable et insulte odieusement la population d'origine française du pays.....le pays tout entier doit protester contre des actes semblables, afin d'empêcher qu'ils se renouvellent." ¹⁴

¹² Le Métis, 15 février, 1873.

¹³ Le Métis, 15 février, 1873.

¹⁴ Ibid.

He persuaded the provincial Legislature to send a petition to Ottawa to protest the delays in land assignments and the hay question and congratulated the Provincial Government for its concern.¹⁵

Frustrated by the obvious discrimination in the Land Office against francophones, three MPP's, Schmidt, Lemay and Delorme led a delegation of about 150-200 Métis to the Land Office on March 29, 1873, to make inquiries about staked claims outside the two-mile limit. The reception they received illustrated the hostile environment Winnipeg presented to anyone who was linked to the Métis community and the Provisional Government. They obtained little satisfaction from Col. Dennis who claimed he had to wait for further instructions from Ottawa.

A hostile crowd of Ontario British surrounded the Métis delegation when they heard a rumour that Riel was there and they hoped to arrest him.¹⁶ Some of the Ontario British held their hands near their revolvers in a threatening position. They searched the office for Riel, but he was not amongst his friends. After hurling taunts and insults, the Ontario crowd dispersed.

Because they were such a large group, the Métis were not intimidated. One Métis challenged the newcomers: "Ceux qui veulent voir Riel viennent avec moi, je les conduirai auprès de celui qu'ils cherchent." But Le Métis noted that the Ontario man did not accept the challenge to look for Riel in Métis-controlled territory where he himself might be threatened or in the minority.¹⁷

¹⁵ Free Press, February 22, 1873.

¹⁶ Free Press, April 5, 1873.

¹⁷ Le Métis, 5 avril, 1873.

This incident suggests that the Métis would not have been safe if they had come to Winnipeg in a small group and that it was not safe for them to transact business at the Land Office. Such intimidation was another tactic used to discourage them from pursuing their land claims. Since Canadianization resulted in the appointment of hostile bureaucrats such as McMicken and Dennis¹⁸, it is not surprising that the Métis had difficulty in obtaining their land claims and blamed "la Puissance du Canada" for their problems.

Louis Schmidt then wrote a letter to the editor of Le Métis disputing the version of the meeting as described in the Free Press. He argued that Col. Dennis recognized Métis claims under the fourth section of clause 32 of the Manitoba Act and suggested that they could apply for these lands in the same way that was done for the first three sections of clause 32. Dennis also agreed to enter the names of those present on lots whenever they had been omitted by surveyors. Schmidt complained, however, that the lots were marked in such a way that no one would see the markers and that the Métis would have to prove they owned the land at the time of the transfer.¹⁹ The difficulty such a requirement imposed on his friends and relatives was not lost on Schmidt and he was angry at the treatment they received at the hands of the Canadian bureaucrats. Such treatment justified their original suspicions that the Canadian government was not dealing in good faith and that the creation of the Provisional Government to negotiate their rights had been justified:

Depuis trois ans, nous ne vivons que de protestations. Et mon Dieu! Que serions-nous donc devenues si le Gouvernement avait pris possession du pays de la

¹⁸ Note as well that regulations were discriminatory as described by Sprague, 1988, p. 115.

¹⁹ According to D.N. Sprague, the Canadian government did not respect the practice in Red River of staking claims. "The normal practice of intending occupants was simply to plant stakes at the corners of a chosen area; if no one objected, no survey was needed. In the event of a dispute one of the two surveyors was called in. If he found that the property was no more than twelve chains wide and did not encroach on the land of any prior, neighbouring occupants, no objection could be sustained." In Canada and the Métis, p.117.

maniere qu'il le voulait d'abord?. Aujourd'hui avec toutes nos libertés politiques sanctionnées par Actes du Parlement, il nous faut lutter et lutter continuellement pour obtenir quelque chose.²⁰

Schmidt showed in this letter his understanding of the issues and the frustrations they faced. Through publicity and political lobbying, the Métis could embarrass the Land Office officials by registering their objections to the lack of progress on settling Metis land claims.

The marginalization of the Métis not only resulted from fewer seats, but also from weakness in cabinet representation. It is significant that the Métis representatives in the provincial cabinet were never chosen from Riel's supporters. Instead, they were men with strong "loyalist" connections who had refused to support the Métis Chief in 1869-70. They were the Hon. James McKay and the Hon. Charles Nolin.²¹

Although James McKay's father was a Presbyterian Scot, he had extensive family ties with the French Catholic Métis community as his mother, Marguerite, was a Métisse whose family name was Gladu. Amongst their children, two brothers, James and Angus, became Catholics while two became Protestant. James married Margaret Rowand, the Catholic daughter of the Chief factor of Fort Edmonton. Because her father was one of the wealthiest men in Rupert's Land, Margaret inherited a sizeable fortune which enabled her husband to quit his position with the Hudson's Bay Company and become a successful trader and entrepreneur. McKay was a loyal confidante of Archbishop Taché and a respected member of the Red River elite, but he was reputedly popular amongst all levels of Red River society.

²⁰ Le Métis, le 8 avril, 1873.

²¹ Robert Painchaud contended that there were no Métis representatives in cabinet except Nolin until 1880 and did not consider McKay a Métis representative. However, George Bryce noted that in the Legislative Council, there was an ethnic balance of power: 4 Catholics to 3 Protestants and 4 English to 3 French. The three French members were Dauphinais, Hamlin and McKay. A History of Manitoba. Toronto and Montreal: Canada History Company, 1906, p. 167.

As an example, Ambroise Lepine named one of his sons James and invited the Hon. James and Margaret McKay to be his godparents.²²

Most historians were not aware that James McKay represented the French Métis in cabinet because of his Scottish name. There is evidence, however, that he was considered by contemporaries as the Métis spokesman. For one thing, McKay had been born the son of an HBC labourer and had grown up as a plainsman while his father worked on the boat brigades. According to Sir George Simpson, McKay was one of the best tripmen in the Company and he offered him a Chief Tradership before McKay resigned to go into business for himself.²³ As a result, McKay was a popular choice to represent the labouring classes as well as the elite because he had proved himself by excelling at plains' skills such as tracking and buffalo hunting.

McKay obtained his cabinet position as President of the Executive Council through his seat on the appointed Legislative Council. In the first four years of Manitoba's history, there was no responsible government and the Lieutenant-Governors chose the cabinets. Members tended to be appointed on the basis of ethnicity and class and Red River inhabitants who were not part of the affluent elite were excluded. McKay was one of the few who could bridge the gap between buffalo hunter and affluent trader. The Dominion Government, however, would have not approved of a "French Halfbreed" in the cabinet. In order to rationalize McKay's appointment in 1871, Lieutenant-Governor Archibald downplayed McKay's Métis connections and Catholic loyalties, suggesting that he "would in

²² Société Historique de St. Boniface (SHSB), dossier sur Ambroise Lepine.

²³ Ruth Swan, "The Cultural Identity and Fur Trade Career of the Hon. James McKay", unpublished paper, University of Manitoba, 1985 and "The Native English Elite in Post-Confederation Manitoba Politics", Churchill: Rupert's Land Research Conference, 1988.

no way disturb the delicate balance since his father was Scotch, his mother was French Half-Breed and though he himself is a Catholic, he has two brothers Presbyterian".²⁴

Archibald needed to justify the selection of a fourth Catholic to the seven-member Council because his superior in Ottawa, Sir John A. Macdonald, would not have been pleased with a Catholic majority. Macdonald had already indicated that he wanted to encourage Ontario immigration to avoid the impression that Manitoba was a "Popish preserve".²⁵ The choice of McKay allowed a third Métis representative in the Upper House to satisfy the francophones while his ties to his maternal community were masked by his Scottish name and Presbyterian relatives, thus making him more acceptable to the Ontario Canadians. Such manipulation was a reflection of the "internal colonialism" that the Métis faced with Canadianization.

The other reason for the selection of James McKay to cabinet was his "Loyal" reputation. During the Resistance of 1869-70, some Métis did not support Riel and his military strategy.²⁶ McKay hoped to keep a neutral stance as he wanted to be loyal to the Queen, but refused to take up arms against the relatives of himself and his wife.²⁷ Yet in a highly polarized atmosphere, he had difficulty maintaining his neutrality and was seen by both sides as loyal to the Canadians, not to the Provisional Government.

²⁴ Allan R. Turner, "James McKay", DCB Vol. X, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972, p. 474.

²⁵ D.N. Sprague, Canada and the Metis, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1988, p. 147.

²⁶ Some Metis even avoided the colony during the Resistance and did not get involved. See Guillaume Charette, Vanishing Spaces: Memoirs of Louis Goulet, Winnipeg: Editions Bois-Brules, 1976; Mary Weekes, The Last Buffalo Hunter, Toronto: The MacMillan Company, 1945; and Jock Carpenter, Fifty Dollar Bride, Sydney, B.C.: Gray's Publishing, 1977.

²⁷ M.M. Ferguson, The Hon. James McKay of Deer Lodge, published by the author, 1972.

After Confederation, when the Lieutenant-Governor made the government appointments, the Métis who were seen as loyal received certain advantages, while those who were identified with the Rielites experienced less recognition. Of the three Métis appointments to the Legislative Council, two of them, McKay and Hamlin, were "loyal" while Dauphinais represented the Provisoires. Because the Canadian Government had control over patronage through the Lieutenant-Governor and because there was no responsible government, the appointments could be used to foster pro-government allegiances.

The Canadian government made blatant use of its patronage power to show the people of Red River where power lay. The Loyal Métis and Native English who helped the Canadians oppose the Provisional Government were rewarded with damages by the Canadian Government for "rebellion losses".²⁸ In 1875, the Mackenzie government established a "Loyal French Fund" to reward those men who assisted Donald A. Smith in 1870. They included: John F. Grant, Angus McKay (brother of the Hon. James), Pierre Leveiller, Augustin Nolin, Joseph Genthon, Norbert Nolin, Charles Nolin, Baptiste Moris, Eli Genthon, Narcisse Marion, Francois Gosselin and Joseph Hamlin.²⁹ Such patronage manipulation served to divide the community by undermining the leadership of the men the Métis had chosen for themselves. In fact, the Rielites outnumbered the Provisoires. As a result, those sympathetic to Riel had to mask their true feelings and repress their anti-Canadian sentiments.

The violent atmosphere of Red River prevented several of the Métis who supported Riel from running in the first provincial election: Louis Laserte, William O'Donaghue, Pierre Parenteau, Pierre Poitras, Baptiste Touround, Baptiste Beauchemin, Charles Nolin, Ambroise

²⁸ Maillhot and Sprague, "Persistent Settlers...", p. 10.

²⁹ PAM, Morris Papers, LG's Collection #993, Dec. 17, 1875.

Lepine, Xavier Pagée, John Bruce, Jean-Baptiste Perrault.³⁰ As well, Riel himself was discouraged from running provincially in a byelection in St. Vital in 1872 under threat of arrest:

We may as well have it now.....if there are any warrants out they should be executed against Riel. He should be arrested for the murder of Scott and put upon his trial.³¹

On the one hand, Riel and his supporters were not part of the electoral process to win a place in the Legislature and, on the other, "Loyal" men received preferential treatment in appointments and patronage. As a result, Métis complaints of the land dispossession were not heard loudly and consistently in the provincial house. As a minority, they were under pressure to repress their complaints.

The Provincial Government used patronage to obtain a vote to abolish the Upper House in 1874 and 1875. When James McKay voted to maintain the appointed chamber, the government subsequently dropped him from the cabinet.³² In the spring of 1875, they replaced McKay with Charles Nolin, another Loyal Métis.

Nolin tried to use his position in cabinet to lobby for Métis grievances and to obtain more Métis appointments, but without much success. During Nolin's tenure, a split occurred between the French Canadian and Métis groups which had been strongly united as the French Party in the Legislature. Nolin became upset when he was protesting the slowness of land distribution in the House because Alphonse Martin ridiculed his manner of speaking French. Martin was a renegade francophone who supported the Canadian Party and he offended his French colleagues with his attack on Nolin. Unfortunately, the damage was

³⁰ Ronaghan, 1986, pp. 523-526.

³¹ Sprague, *Canada and the Métis*, p. 82, quoting Macdonald to Morris, 11 October, 1872.

³² John Finlay, "The Abolition of the Legislative Council", unpublished article.

done as such comments suggested to the Métis that the French Canadian considered himself superior and they resented it very much:

I am not here to please Mr. Martin with my beautiful language and my eloquence. No. I was elected by my fellow citizens to serve their cause which is that of all the members of the French family in Manitoba.³³

In November, Nolin demanded that certain French Canadians should be dismissed from office and replaced by Métis since they comprised a larger proportion of the population.³⁴ The cabinet refused to comply and accepted Nolin's resignation. Royal, the French Canadian leader, explained that Nolin had not made such demands when he joined the government in March.³⁵ It would appear that Nolin was jealous of Royal's powerful position in cabinet as he subsequently challenged him for the leadership of the French Party in 1879 and lost.³⁶ Thus, although Nolin was more vocal than his predecessor, he alienated his cabinet colleagues and he lost his influence once he was out of the cabinet. Nolin's forced resignation showed that any Métis who resisted too vocally the hegemony of the French Canadians in cabinet would not be tolerated.

McKay rejoined the cabinet as Métis representative, being accepted for having voted in favour of the abolition of Council.³⁷ He now had the support of the French Canadian leadership through Joseph Royal. Nolin, angry at losing his cabinet position, attacked McKay

³³ Le Métis, 17 avril, 1875; translation by the author.

³⁴ PAM, Executive Council Minutes (E.C.M.) #216, 14 December, 1875.

³⁵ Manitoba Daily Free Press, January 21, 1876.

³⁶ G. Friesen, "From Homeland to Hinterland", C.H.A. Historical Papers, Saskatoon: 1979, pp.33-47.

³⁷ Finlay, "Abolition of Council".

and accused him of not having the confidence of the French-speaking people in his position as Minister of Agriculture. Royal defended McKay in the editorial pages of Le Métis:

L'Hon. M. McKay donnera comme par le passé tout son dévouement et tout son appui à la cause qu'il personille dans le gouvernement avec l'Hon. M. Royal. Nous felicitons le cabinet de M. Davis d'avoir mené ces negotiations à si bonne forme.³⁸

The "cause" referred to above was the French Catholic defence of rights in Manitoba for both Métis and French Canadians which McKay was expected to support. When he resigned his cabinet post in 1878, the Free Press described him as the man who had so ably led "the French-speaking natives of the province".³⁹ While McKay might not have been seen as a legitimate representative by some of the Métis, the Free Press quote shows that he was seen as a representative of that group by outsiders. Another sign of minority disadvantage was that the Métis did not control their politicians in cabinet.

Thus, while there appears to be little doubt that McKay represented the Métis in the provincial cabinet, it is more difficult to document how he represented them. He was rarely quoted in newspaper articles, there was no record of the parliamentary debate and the minutes of the Executive Council only report resolutions, not the debate or individual speakers.

McKay's style was such that he handled political problems quietly in the back rooms rather than by making public demands in Parliament. In 1874, for example, he sought Taché's help in procuring a contract to build the Lake of the Woods road, the purpose of which was to keep "our own people in employment". He said that he would not make any money out of the deal, but it would keep the work "out of Strangers' hands."⁴⁰ In this way, with a

³⁸ Le Métis, 27 janvier, 1876.

³⁹ October 16, 1878.

⁴⁰ Ruth Swan, "Native English Elite", p. 18.

behind-the-scenes approach, he helped his maternal community while at the same time keeping patronage contracts for the benefit of the Métis since he gave them priority in hiring.

An analysis of attendance at cabinet meetings suggests that McKay only attended 13 out of 51 meetings during his tenure from 1876-78.⁴¹ However, it should be kept in mind that McKay was out of the province, negotiating Indian treaties with Lieutenant-Governor Morris during the summer of 1876.⁴² He was later reported ill with rheumatism and missed some of the sessions due to illness.⁴³ His wife died early that winter and he himself passed away within a year on December 2, 1879.⁴⁴

The fact that James McKay was not an outspoken militant in the Provincial Legislature and cabinet is not surprising, given his actions during the Resistance of 1869-70 and given the atmosphere of persecution in Red River against any Métis who was visible and vulnerable. Riel had exerted a strong influence until his exile in 1875, but was hampered by not being able to sit in Parliament or speak in public. In his absence, Métis grievances were verbalized by Schmidt and Nolin in the House as well as by the French Canadian leadership both inside and outside the house.

Section 2: Resistance:

Despite their weak representation, the Métis tried to resist the loss of their lands and the persecution. They used the newspaper, Le Métis, as one way to express their frustration and opposition. Letters to the editor reflected their concern with the political situation in

⁴¹ PAM, E.C.M.

⁴² Le Métis, 12 octobre, 1876.

⁴³ Le Métis, 17 mai, 1877; 10, 17 and 31 janvier, 1878.

⁴⁴ Free Press, December 3, 1879.

Manitoba and their future. John Bruce, for example, advised his compatriots to leave Manitoba for either the USA or the North West because of the hopeless situation in their homeland:

I have decided on the first occasion to go to Pembina and to stay neath the "stars and stripes". If we had killed Schultz and his clique, we would have saved the country. You understand that as long as the orange flower is here, the country will be in disorder.⁴⁵

In June 1873, an anonymous writer from St. Norbert complained about the tyranny they faced and blamed McMicken and the men in Ottawa for betraying their promises:

D'abord il faut dire qu'il n'y a pas dans le bureau d'affaire un seul personne capable de parler la langue francaise et nous MÉtis, pour la plupart pas habitués aux affaires, nous sommes incompris, bousculés et souvent remouyéés sans pouvoir obtenir satisfaction.⁴⁶

He also complained that men from the Land Office prevented them from cutting wood between sowing and harvest as they had done traditionally.⁴⁷

The Metis recognized and resented the bureaucratic barriers that they faced and the language barrier was one of the greatest. All instructions, brochures and circulars were

⁴⁵ Le Métis, 25 avril, 1874. Gerhard Ens argues that out-migration from Red River in the 1870's was a continuation of the trend to follow the bison herds that had occurred since the 1840's and rejected Sprague's thesis that the Metis were pushed out by hostile government measures. John Bruce's letter appears to contradict Ens because the Orangemen were not only the rowdy immigrants, but Government appointees such as Thomas Scott who worked on the government road-building gang. See "Dispossession or Adaptation? Migration and Persistence of the Red River Metis, 1835-1890", Canadian Historical Association Papers, 1988, p. 27; and "Kinship, Ethnicity, Class and the Red River metis: The Parishes or St. Francois Xavier and St. Andrew's", Ph.D. Thesis, Edmonton: University of Alberta, 1989.

⁴⁶ Le Métis, 21 juin, 1873.

⁴⁷ This probably occurred because the Land Office did not recognize the traditional practice in Red River of using lots on both sides of the river. In some cases, the Red River settlers would cultivate on one side of the river and cut wood that grew on the river bank on the other side. The Land Office only recognized the side that was cultivated and assumed that the other side was uninhabited. Canadian regulations did not recognize Métis claims to land that was not cultivated. See Sprague, Canada and the Metis, p. 117.

printed in English. It has been claimed that 60% of the Metis could not read either "official language".⁴⁸ Of the remaining 40% who could read French, probably a large proportion would need a translator for the English instructions. If they went to the Land Office in person for information, not only was there no employee who could communicate with them, but they were in danger of being assaulted. In order to overcome such problems, Le Métis published articles on how to cope with the regulations. For example, one edition explained how to register patents; it also gave information about the commission that had been established to hear disputed claims.⁴⁹

Unfortunately, this advice did not help people like André Jerome who claimed land at Ste. Agathe. Although his parish priest had informed him that his name was on the lists and that he and his family were entitled to patents, when Jerome went to the Land Office, he found that someone else had impersonated him and stolen his claim.⁵⁰ As a result, he moved south of the border and became a pioneer farmer in Minnesota.

The Métis leadership soon discovered that their French Canadian colleagues were prone to adopt Archbishop Taché's attitude of conciliation. Riel expressed their frustration and complained that "Monseigneur" struggled constantly as a moderate between the Orangemen and the Provisional Government.⁵¹ Issues of dominance, power and minority disadvantage were commonly discussed by Riel and his French Canadian supporters. The view from Quebec was that the French in Manitoba were being tyrannized:

⁴⁸ D.N. Sprague, personal communication with the author.

⁴⁹ Le Métis, 29 mars, 1873.

⁵⁰ I would like to thank Ed Jerome of Hallock, Minnesota, for this information. André was his great-grandfather.

⁵¹ PAM, Riel Papers #291, September 1874, Riel to Dubuc.

Your struggle against a fanatical majority is understood; each time we see concessions, we protest to prevent the loss of your rights in order to give you strength to resist your English colleagues.⁵²

Riel was acutely aware of the realities of the power struggle they faced and challenged his French Canadian colleagues in Manitoba to resist.

We are not free because we are governed by Canada. As to responsible government, I said that the Lieutenant- Governor trespassed against the Constitution in forming a ministry and did not allow the people to exercise their right of approval or disapproval through an election.⁵³

Riel had hoped that obtaining provincial status would result in a "government of our own choosing".⁵⁴ The federal government undermined his efforts, however, by delaying responsible government for four years so that the power of provincial status was denied.

Nevertheless, self-determination was a priority for Riel and so the Métis elected to the House counted on the political support of the French Canadians in one common French Catholic cause. Quebec supporters urged their Manitoba brothers to support each other and to recognize Riel as the leader:

Prepare and organize to elect in the local elections men devoted to the Métis cause for it is in the local house that the struggle for the rights guaranteed by the Act will be fought.⁵⁵

External support from Quebec thus helped overcome minority disadvantage.⁵⁶

⁵² PAM, Riel Papers #273, August 25, 1874, E.P. Lachapelle to Dubuc.

⁵³ PAM, Riel Papers #253, May 27, 1874, Riel to Dubuc.

⁵⁴ "Riel's Petition to the President of the US, 1870", CHR, Vol. XX, March 1939, pp. 421-8.

⁵⁵ PAM, Riel Papers #272, E.P. Lachapelle, Montreal, to Dubuc. See also: #258, June 9, 1874.

⁵⁶ "Minority" is used here in the sociological sense meaning "subordinate group". "Majority" is equivalent to "dominant group" and does not imply numerical superiority. See Richard T. Schaefer, Racial and Ethnic Groups, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1979, p. 8.

Politically, inside and outside the Provincial Legislature, the Métis and French Canadians were united. When Joseph Royal, the newcomer from Quebec, established the first francophone newspaper, he called it Le Métis for inspirational purposes. His editorials advocated unity. The two groups jointly organized the St. Jean Baptiste Society, the national association of French Canadians in December 1871 with Royal as President and Riel as Vice-President.⁵⁷ In 1873, Dubuc who had become President made a speech advocating that the Métis and French Canadians should form one population to press for their rights in the Manitoba Act, a message that was heartily endorsed by Métis leaders, Riel and Schmidt.⁵⁸

The organizing and resistance activities of the French Party sometimes led to reprisals, harassment and divisions in their leadership. In October, 1873, for example, during the Provencher election, 65 armed constables were sent to St. Norbert ostensibly to maintain law and order, but covertly they were to intimidate Riel's supporters. Some of the francophone leaders suspected that House leader, Henry Clarke, had orchestrated the search, a sign of divisions in the party and minority disadvantage.⁵⁹ On another occasion, at a meeting of the new Colonization Society in the basement of St. Boniface Cathedral in March 1874, the Sheriff (who did not speak French) and fifty armed constables from Winnipeg surrounded the church in order to search for Louis Riel who they suspected was present. Not finding him there, they went to the homes of LaRivière and Dubuc, scaring their wives who were alone at the time. Such tactics inhibited resistance activities.

⁵⁷ Stanley, 1985, p. 176.

⁵⁸ Le Métis, 5 juillet, 1873.

⁵⁹ PAM, Dubuc Papers, p. 28. It was a sign of minority disadvantage that Clarke, an Irish Catholic, would be leader of the French Party and that he could be coerced into supporting the dominant majority. See Chapter 4: The Assertion of Anglo-Quebecker Leadership.

While the Métis did not have their own public voice in print, the French Canadian editor supported their demands and verbalized their frustration.⁶⁰ Editorials suggested that Ontario held a dominant position in Confederation while other provinces such as Quebec and Manitoba were subordinate. They concluded that the French Party was at a disadvantage because Ontario dominated the House of Commons:

La Chambre, va-t-elle décider qu'il n'y a qu'Ontario dans la Puissance, que les vues les plus arbitraires d'Ontario vont prédominer absolument et sans restriction sur les autres Provinces, même dans ses ingérences les plus injuste?

Riel elucidated the Métis view in his own correspondence. After he was expelled from the Parliament and in exile, he was well aware of the ethnic tensions between the provinces. He saw the persecution of the Métis in terms of the battle between Quebec and Ontario over who should put its stamp on the North West and realized that the politicians in Ottawa did not want a new Quebec in Manitoba:

We are in a struggle with those who disposed against [the Manitoba Act] because we are French and Catholic, who would diminish our influence.⁶¹

While he was in exile in New York, he continued to correspond with his supporters in Manitoba. He realized the importance of exploiting the rivalry between Quebec and Ontario and sought to raise public opinion in the older province to use as a lever against Ottawa:

I argued the question of responsible government with our friends in French Canada and Le Nouveau Monde published an article; now that sympathy for our cause is so great, if we demand the amnesty, responsible government and protest against the cutting up of our parishes, we will carry the day.⁶²

⁶⁰ Le Métis, 31 mai, 1873, for an explanation of the paper's role as Métis advocate. Since there were no bylines in the paper, it is difficult to determine exactly who wrote the articles, but it seems likely that they were written by Royal or a French Canadian colleague as they give the government's view.

⁶¹ PAM, Riel Papers #278, September 10, 1874, Riel to Dubuc.

⁶² PAM, Riel Papers #253, May 27, 1874, Riel to Dubuc.

His ultimate goal was to win a seat in Parliament or the Legislature so that he could argue for the promised land grant.

At the time of his third election to Parliament, Riel was becoming disenchanted with some of the French Canadians in Red River, especially when he was told that Royal and the Archbishop were in favour of finding another candidate since the prospects for the amnesty were not good.⁶³ Furthermore, Métis in Red River were displeased with the actions of their French Canadian leaders and had threatened not to support them in the provincial election of December 1874. Although responsible government had been instituted in July 1874 and the French Party had obtained a French Premier, M.-A. Girard, and a French Attorney-General, Joseph Dubuc, some of Riel's supporters did not feel that they could count on these men to uphold the Métis cause and stop the persecution:

The Métis have decided not to elect Canadians; they reproach Dubuc for not allowing bail to Nault and they reproach Royal and Girard for a number of similar things; have seen Charles Nolin who says the Métis will not accept these insults; I am trying to re-establish unity, but without success.⁶⁴

The arrest of Ambroise Lepine and Andre Nault in 1873 caused a crisis in the Métis community for they realized that they could no longer accept assurances that the amnesty would be forthcoming. Divisions between the two francophone groups became more pronounced as they decided what strategy should be employed. During the Lepine trial, the Métis were dependent on the legal expertise of the French Canadians which led to resentment and criticism.⁶⁵ Royal acted as one of the defence lawyers and felt that Lepine

⁶³ PAM, Riel Papers #279, n.d., Riel to Dubuc.

⁶⁴ PAM, Riel Papers #274, August 25, 1874, L.O. Bourget to Riel.

⁶⁵ Painchaud (1978) argues that the break occurred when Nolin quit the cabinet in November 1875; however, it is curious that he did not quote from the Riel Papers for his article. He relied on Le Métis and the Dubuc Papers.

had a strong case. He argued that the Canadian Government did not have jurisdiction over Rupert's Land at the time of the Scott murder and could not hear the case. Chief Justice Wood threw out this argument.

When Royal lost the case and Lepine was sentenced to death, Riel became bitter and felt betrayed by his colleagues, particularly the Archbishop who was considering another candidate in Provencher. He felt that Taché was too willing to compromise on the Manitoba Act and the land grant and he began speaking out in American newspapers as well as in Quebec, asking his friends to prove their loyalty and to choose "between Monseigneur and me". He thought Taché was naive and criticized him for supporting Archibald's plan to form a moderate Executive Council in 1874 with representatives from the various ethnic groups:

If Monseigneur had listened to his clergy and his people, he would have understood it was impossible to make a complete compact with heterogeneous elements; he acted always outside the party of the Provisional Government and now we see the result in the representation and loss of influence; French Canadians arriving generally adopt Monseigneur's ways.⁶⁶

Riel's continuing resistance to Canadianization contributed to tension in the Settlement. Since Riel's life was in danger, Taché decided Riel would be safer if he left Manitoba. In July 1874, the Archbishop arranged for Abbé Dugast to get Riel out of the province, but he suffered a collapse in Grand Forks from the strain of his political battles and threats on his life.⁶⁷

Taché found another candidate who could represent the francophones in St. Boniface with fewer repercussions: A.G.B. Bannatyne. Once again, the French Canadians were forced

⁶⁶ Ibid., #278, September 10, 1874, Riel to Dubuc.

⁶⁷ Archives de l'Archevêché de St. Boniface (AASB), Taché Papers, T14545, 9 juillet, 1874, Dugast to Taché.

to compromise by electing an anglophone in their riding, another sign of minority disadvantage and the weakening of their constituency.⁶⁸

By the time responsible government had been achieved in 1874, Riel complained that the French Party had been undermined by forced compromises and internal dissension. Riel and his supporters did not trust Premier Girard, calling him "an egotist, a man of money".⁶⁹ A Quebecker, LaChapelle, observed: "We are not infatuated by your First Minister -Girard - we think the cause of the Metis requires a man of another temper".⁷⁰ Riel noted: "He is obstinate; I feared compromises".⁷¹ The new Premier was a figure-head who would take direction from Tache rather than from Riel. The fact that the first Premier was French Canadian was probably also galling to Riel who had hoped to be Premier himself one day. In this way, class divisions emerged between the two groups and served to divide them.⁷²

Riel's increasing frustration resulted in outspoken criticism of his French Canadian allies and he alienated some of them when they read his remarks in American newspapers or heard about them from friends. Rumour and gossip increased each side's suspicion of the

⁶⁸ Painchaud, "Rapports entre les Metis....", 1978, argued that this was another sign that the French Party was weakening. In the French ridings, Archbishop Tache and his political supporters would select a candidate they thought was suitable and try to arrange that no other candidate would be nominated so that their candidate would win by acclamation.

⁶⁹ PAM, Riel Papers, August 25, 1874, Bourget to Riel.

⁷⁰ Ibid., #276, September 1, 1874, Lachapelle to Dubuc.

⁷¹ Ibid., #291, n.d., Riel to Dubuc.

⁷² During the fur trade, French Canadians who came to Red River tended to marry into the Metis community and work in the fur trade so that class distinctions were less obvious, for example, Joseph Lemay who arrived in 1858 and later became an MPP. After 1870, however, when professionals such as lawyers arrived, the Metis did not have access to the same educational advantages and lost status.

other's motives while both sides fought to maintain an external facade of unity in the face of the Lepine trial and upcoming provincial election.⁷³

Attorney-General Dubuc was under pressure to act impartially in the Lepine Trial by the Canadian Party while the French expected him to ensure that Lepine received a fair hearing. When Dubuc appointed Frank Cornish, one of the Orange leaders, to act as prosecutor, Riel accused him of another betrayal. Dubuc explained his reasons and cautioned Riel against making such public accusations:

The difficulties we have had to meet, you will see, I have not changed my ideas or principles in regard to the Métis; am persuaded you will regret, as I, the words which have been said of me and those of certain papers in the United States.....in the interest of the cause, you ought to rectify these things; nevertheless, be assured I will continue to fight, these prosecutions are Clarke's doing.⁷⁴

Dubuc was becoming equally frustrated with Riel after his loyal support, having organized his election campaigns, the numerous protests, the assault after the election riots and the stress of the Lepine trial. Riel won the election of 1874 with French Canadian support, but his increasing distrust of "Monseigneur" and his attacks on his French Canadian colleagues undermined the alliance. His enemies became not only the partisans in Ottawa, but the moderates in Red River upon whom he could no longer count to avoid compromise.

On December 9, 1874, shortly before the provincial election, Riel learned that Girard's ministry had fallen, destroyed by ethnic tensions. Two Ontario-Canadian cabinet ministers refused to go to the polls in support of a French Premier and Attorney General. Robert Davis of Quebec formed a cabinet with French Canadian Joseph Royal and Colin Inkster, a Hudson's Bay Scot of Red River origin. Riel's French Canadian friend in Keesville,

⁷³ Ibid., #289, A. Desjardins to Louis Riel, n.d.

⁷⁴ Ibid., #280, n.d. Dubuc to Riel.

New York, dismissed this combination as "the worst of the worst".⁷⁵ They were distrustful of Davis as they suspected he was an ally of Schultz, disappointed that Dubuc had resigned with Girard and felt Royal was ambitious and less trustworthy. Colin Inkster had opposed the Provisional Government and was thus a "loyalist". As a result, the Rielites looked on the new administration with disfavour.

Only three Métis were elected in 1874: Charles Nolin (loyal), Angus McKay (loyal) and Maxime Lepine (provisional). The Métis had lost three seats, including their spokesman, Louis Schmidt. During this critical period in their history, the Métis representation in the Legislature was at its weakest while their leader, Riel, was forced to leave the country. On February 12, 1875, Prime Minister Mackenzie declared a partial amnesty for Riel and Lepine, including five years banishment and deprivation of political rights.⁷⁶ It was impossible for Riel to continue his resistance activities from exile in the United States and Quebec.

As already noted, it was at this point that Charles Nolin was brought into cabinet as Métis representative and he used his position in the House to agitate for the settlement of the land issue. Although the provincial government was powerless to act on the land question, it did support Nolin's initiative to lobby the Dominion Government:

The Hon. M. Nolin, who represents in cabinet that element of our race, has taken the initiative to ensure that we regain our rights. He demanded and obtained from the House that it should send an address to his Excellency the Governor General, to request the execution of the Manitoba Act and especially the part concerning the concession of land. In making known the grievance of the population, the Minister of Agriculture was very forceful.⁷⁷

⁷⁵ Ibid., #286, December 9, 1874, Rev. Barnabe to Riel.

⁷⁶ Stanley, 1963, pp. 212-213.

⁷⁷ Le Métis, 17 avril, 1875. In this context, "race" refers to the French Catholic group, including both French Canadians and French Métis.

Joseph Royal congratulated Nolin on his initiative and William Luxton, from Ontario, agreed that the promises were only just and that delay in granting the reserves delayed the progress of the country. None of the members opposed his motion and the petition went forward, but with little result as the federal cabinet ignored it. Once McKay replaced Nolin as Métis representative in the House, such public agitation diminished.

Resistance continued, however, in the pages of Le Métis. When the distribution of scrip was announced in the fall of 1876 and the spring of 1877, Le Métis assumed the role of advocate of Métis rights. It published announcements about when the scrip would be drawn on the children's lands.⁷⁸ The editor urged the Métis not to sell:

Les scrips se vendent de \$40 à \$50 et vont baisser encore. Les speculateurs tentent maintenant davantage sur les droits des enfants. Nous n'avons qu'à répéter l'avis que nous donnons depuis cinq ans - "ne vendez pas".⁷⁹

It also gave advice on how to prepare titles for registration at the land office. French Canadian leaders hoped to persuade the Métis not to move. However, there was a shortage of capital in the Red River Settlement and many Métis preferred to sell their scrip and move rather than face the continued harassment in Manitoba; as well, they needed the capital to buy trade goods.⁸⁰

The scrip-for-money system resulted in fraudulent practices. The Free Press reported that some people were selling their scrip several times over. Other speculators

⁷⁸ 28 septembre, 26 octobre, 7 décembre, 1876; 17 mai, 1877.

⁷⁹ Le Métis, 2 novembre, 1876.

⁸⁰ Allen Bobiwash, personal communication with the author.

complained that, when they arrived at the Land Office, they were cheated by the lawyer transacting the deal as he had arrived first and made the claim himself.⁸¹

Since the complaints of their political leaders were having no effect, the Métis finally tried public agitation to gain attention for their cause. On January 10, 1878, a public meeting was organized to protest the land question. Delegates from the Métis parishes of St. Norbert, St. Vital and Ste. Agathe met to pass resolutions demanding the recognition of the legitimacy of their land claims which for the most part had been ignored.⁸² Taché's complaint was that "a case-by-case analysis would show that Col. Dennis did not understand the custom of the country in staking claims". The delegates argued that their land claims should be recognized according to the "anciennes coutumes du pays".⁸³ Improvements demanded by the Land Office were imposed by Canada unilaterally and were not in keeping with the Manitoba Act of 1870. In order to register a lot, the surveyor expected to find 1) continuous occupation, 2) registration with the Hudson's Bay Company survey and 3) really valuable improvements. Father Ritchot had pointed out that some lots were "not inhabited, but marked only by posts, lines, ploughing, little houses or otherwise and that this manner of taking up lands in the

⁸¹ Alexander Begg, History of the North West, Vol. II, 1894, Toronto: Hunter, Rose and Co., p. 200. See also Sprague, Canada and the Métis, p. 121: "That benefit [scrip] had passed almost immediately to persons with powers of attorney alleging ownership of the right". Duplicate fraudulent claims occurred when attorneys took names of families known to be absent from the province and used them on documents, signed them with an "x" and bribed justices of the peace to affirm them. Sprague, p. 124.

⁸² Le Métis, 10 janvier, 1878.

⁸³ Amendments to an Order in Council, 19 April, 1876, stipulated three types of claims for river-frontage. "Unimproved land alleged to have been taken up" before the transfer was disqualified by the Canadian government as a legitimate claim. The government asserted that the customary practice included a survey, but this was not the case. See Sprague, Canada and the Métis, p.117 for a discussion of these amendments and the definition of staked claims. See also footnote 19 in this chapter.

country had been respected, in fact, for ten, twelve or fifteen years".⁸⁴ Archbishop Tache also asserted that "staking was the customary way of proclaiming intent to settle".⁸⁵

These settlers resisted Canadianization by demanding that all acts and rights customary to the Red River Settlement prior to the transfer should be respected by the Canadian authorities; that, having occupied the river lots and built homes, their peaceable possession should be recognized. They expressed surprise that the government was going to ignore their rights to these lands and warned that, if the federal government persisted in this intention to dispossess the legitimate owners, it would cause a great injustice. Since they had acted as the owners of the land, they were angry that their former customs were not recognized.⁸⁶

It is obvious that the representatives of the Métis who attended this meeting deeply resented the treatment they received at the Land Office. They saw Canadianization as the imposition of foreign control over their lives which caused their greatest fear to become a reality - the loss of their homeland. They realized that their situation under Canadian control was worse than under the Hudson's Bay Company, for the Company and its political arm, the Council of Assiniboia, at least respected the customs the country, including recognition of their staked claims.⁸⁷ As feared in 1869-70, Ontario politicians and bureaucrats ignored the

⁸⁴ PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 141514-141526, Ritchot to Macdonald, 15 January 1881, quoted in Sprague, Macdonald and the Métis, pp. 135-136.

⁸⁵ Sprague, Canada....., p. 119, quoted Taché in a letter from Dennis to Codd, 20 November, 1876, PAM, Morris Papers, LG Collection, #1327.

⁸⁶ Le Métis, 10 janvier, 1878.

⁸⁷ See Minutes of the Council of Assiniboia, 27 February 1860, quoted in Department of the Interior Memorandum, 19 April, 1876, quoted in Sprague, Canada....., p. 117, footnote 26.

traditions of Red River and did not care to accommodate the different culture of the Métis. Clearly, by 1878, little had been accomplished since the Métis had complained to McMicken in 1872.⁸⁸

The Mackenzie Liberals did not remedy the situation either. They did not allow the Métis any local control as Riel hoped and instead the Métis became subject to a structure of internal colonialism whereby they were dominated by an external group who were their most unsympathetic adversaries, the politicians in Ottawa and their appointees in Manitoba.⁸⁹

This structure of internal colonialism resulted from "encapsulation". It did not matter which party they belonged to as the record of both Conservatives and Liberals was the same; under the new structure of Confederation, Manitoba's land policy and economic development would be controlled by Ottawa. Because the Dominion politicians (excluding Cartier) did not want a new Quebec in the West or to have Manitoba as a "half breed province", the customs of Red River were ignored in preference to the claims of the newcomers. The provincial legislature, while supportive of the Métis protests, was powerless to change federal government regulations.

In the post-Confederation period, the Métis who had supported the Provisional Government were marginalized in their political representation by the French Canadians from Quebec and Loyal Métis who agreed that a policy of conciliation was the only way to offset the violence that persisted after the resistance. The Métis who were elected or appointed tended to avoid agitation because those who were too outspoken were not successful.

⁸⁸ Sprague, 1988, p. 100.

⁸⁹ The definition of "internal colonialism" is the domination of a minority group by the dominant group within a country. Richard Schaefer, 1979, p. 32. For a discussion of internal colonialism in a Canadian context, see J. Rick Ponting, ed., Arduous Journey: Canadian Indians and Decolonization, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986.

Since Ontarioization threatened not only Métis rights, but those of French Catholics in general, the two groups allied themselves in votes in the Legislature. Since the local government did not have jurisdiction over the issues they were most concerned about, most of the resistance, expressed in Riel's letters, newspaper articles and letters and meetings of protest, occurred outside the House.

Gerald Friesen noted that the Métis blamed their religious and political leaders for their ineffectiveness.⁹⁰ Yet, it was unfair to blame the French Canadians when they were also in a position of minority disadvantage. The problem for the French Party was that no strategy would have solved the problem of the loss of Métis land and so it was irrelevant whether they were vociferous or conciliatory. As Norquay had observed in 1873, "If the effort was not so successful as was desirable, the reason was that the power was lacking."⁹¹

⁹⁰ The Canadian Prairies, p. 201.

⁹¹ Le Métis, 15 fevrier, 1873.

CHAPTER THREE: FRENCH CANADIAN ACCOMMODATION

The French Party faced a number of agonizing dilemmas in the early post-Confederation era. They initially held twelve seats, but knew that they were in danger of losing some as Ontario immigration increased. They had to form a solid block of votes in the House to maintain the balance of power while at the same time allying themselves with the more moderate anglophones to form a majority.¹ This strategy was so successful that the French Party played a key role in cabinet during the first two administrations. The drawback was that the Métis were frustrated with their French Canadian colleagues because of the lack of progress in obtaining the amnesty and settling the land claims while the Ontario British resented the francophone influence in the cabinet.

The French Canadians assumed the role of middlemen between these two hostile camps by lobbying for Métis rights and, at the same time, compromising and making concessions when they felt cornered. This strategy of appeasement alienated the Métis and undermined their alliance. When Norquay defeated Royal and assumed the Premiership in 1878, the French Party lost its power.² This loss occurred because the French residents in Red River were overwhelmed by the anglo-Protestant newcomers and could not count on the anglophones of mixed heritage to support them.

Symptoms of dissension between the two francophone groups first appeared in the nomination battles in the French Parishes in 1874. The loss of two seats through redistribution put pressure on all the other ridings. Although the French Party tried to avoid

¹ Gerald Friesen, "From Homeland to Hinterland: Political Transition in Manitoba, 1870-79", CHA Historical Papers, Saskatoon, 1979, pp. 33-47.

² *Ibid.*, p. 47.

contested nomination battles which would divide the community, there were six contests in the ten ridings. Three of these involved inter-ethnic rivalry between French Canadians and Métis, and three were French Canadians against anglophones. Only one contest involved two French Canadians competing against each other. The results are shown in Table 4:

Table 4: ELECTION RESULTS IN FRENCH RIDINGS, 1874

Nominated by Acclamation:

Lac Manitoba - McKay (Métis)
 St. Francois-Xavier Est - Lepine (Métis)
 St. Francois-Xavier Ouest - Royal (French Canadian)
 St. Boniface - Girard (French Canadian)

Contested Seats: Inter-Ethnic Rivalry

St. Agathe - Martin (French Canadian) defeated Almon* & Dease (Métis)
 Baie St. Paul - Chenier (French Canadian) defeated Spence*
 St. Charles - Murray (Hudson's Bay Scottish) defeated Schmidt (Métis) and Mulligan (Irish Catholic)
 St. Norbert - Dubuc (French Canadian) defeated Delorme (Métis)
 Ste. Anne - Nolin (Métis) defeated LaRivière (French Canadian)
 St. Vital - Lemay (French Canadian) defeated Foucher*

* Ethnic identity not documented in Red River Census 1870 or elsewhere.

As a result of these contests, the French Party was weakened by two forms of inter-ethnic rivalry and was threatened by increasing anglophone presence in francophone areas.

Because the French Party feared erosion of French support in their own ridings, they tried to arrange for nominations by acclamation instead of undergoing a divisive election battle between their own people as had happened when Dubuc moved seats and challenged Delorme in St. Norbert. In this case, a Métis lost the seat to a French Canadian. If they had to run against a Protestant candidate, they did not want to divide the vote. In St. Charles,

for instance, Louis Schmidt lost to Alexander Murray as the Catholic vote was divided between himself and R.P. Mulligan, an Irish Catholic. Acclamations ensured that the leaders kept control of who the candidates would be. Because the leadership was taken over by the French Canadian lawyers from Quebec, the Métis candidates were at a disadvantage.³

The party's ability to avoid inter-ethnic rivalry declined between 1870 and 1874 as acclamations declined from 58% to 40%. The problem for the French Party was not just divisions in their Catholic ranks between French Canadians and Métis, but was a result of encroachment by incoming Protestants.⁴ They feared that the unity of the party was threatened. Although the leaders were generally successful in keeping a strong voting block of their supporters in the Legislature from 1874-78, they did have problems with one French Canadian. A.F. Martin won the riding of Ste. Agathe which included not only the Métis settlements along the southern part of the Red River, but also the new Ontario British community of Emerson. As a result, Martin often voted with the Ontario British in the Legislature and was considered a renegade by his own people.

Of the total number of candidates in the 1874 election in French ridings, 44% (8/18) were French Canadian, while 33% (6/18) were Métis. This shows that a significant number of Métis ran, but only three were elected. What is noteworthy, however, is that 22% (4/18)

³ The French Canadian lawyers who emigrated in the early 1870's were Joseph Royal and Joseph Dubuc. Marc-Amable Girard was a notary. Henry Clarke, a Catholic Anglo-Quebecker and lawyer, became acting head of the French Party since there was no Premier.

⁴ Painchaud argued in 1978 that competition between French Canadian and Métis candidates in 1874 was a sign of disunity in the French Catholic community. He did not discuss the threat of anglophone Protestant candidates contesting French ridings. See Robert Painchaud, "Rapports entre les Metis and les Canadiens Francais au Manitoba, 1870-1884", The Other Natives: Les/The Metis, Vol. 2, ed. A.S. Lussier and D.B. Sealey, Winnipeg: Manitoba Metis Federation, 1978.

were anglophone by the time of the second election in the province.⁵ It is not surprising that the leaders of the French Party felt threatened.

St. Charles Parish was a case in point. Louis Schmidt, Métis, had represented St. Boniface West on the west side of the Red River in 1870. He lost this seat through redistribution and it became part of St. Charles which Schmidt subsequently contested. He lost to Alexander Murray, a Protestant "half-breed" whose father was a Selkirk Settler. Although an anglophone Protestant, Murray declared that he supported the maintenance of French in the Legislature and courts.⁶ Through this promise, he attracted French Catholic support.

Murray, however, did not run as a candidate for the French Party. Although he was of part-Indian background, he did not publicly associate himself with the Métis as did Schmidt. The Free Press called Murray along with the other Protestants of similar background "independents". This lack of identification with the Métis or the French Party suggests that it was not politically expedient for an anglophone to be associated with that group, even though he might profess some sympathy for their agenda. He would have lost votes amongst the anglophones if he had done so. This was an indication of hostility between the groups, another reason for the French leadership to worry about their future.

It is therefore obvious that the divisions in the French Parishes were not only between the French Canadian immigrants and the Métis, but also between the Catholics in general and encroaching Protestant settlement. Because they felt threatened by the population pressures and resulting redistribution of seats, the French Canadian professionals who took over the

⁵ These were William Spence, Alexander Murray, R.P. Mulligan and C.W. Almon.

⁶ See biography of Alexander Murray in Canadian Parliamentary Companion, ed. H.J. Morgan, Ottawa: W. Mitchell, 1876, p. 587-588.

leadership in consultation with Archbishop Taché sought to consolidate their position.

The French Canadians in the Legislature were most powerful during the six month regime of Premier Marc-Amable Girard, starting in July 1874, but their power was short-lived. The existence of three parties in the House resulted in a minority government situation. Although the French Party was probably the strongest, it could not sustain a French Premier. Girard was forced to resign because E.H.G.G. Hay (an Ontario British cabinet minister) would not support him in the election. Hay feared that he himself would not be re-elected with a francophone leading the province.

This defeat was not only a personal one for Girard, but a blow against the French Canadian leadership in general. The French Canadian politicians realized their minority position. They would have to compromise with the more moderate English to maintain power or allow the disparate English groups to coalesce so that the French would be excluded from power altogether as happened in 1878. Le Métis advised:

"Entre deux parties, l'un modère and l'autre fanatiquement radical, il a fallu choisir et ne risquer que le moins possible; c'est ce qu'il avait été fait."⁷

Like any minority group, the French Canadians faced a choice of problematic strategies and neither choice gave them control of the power structure. In December of 1874, in anticipation of the next election, they had to decide who they would support as the Premier to succeed Girard. They agreed to support R.A. Davis, an anglophone Premier, whom they preferred over John Norquay. Being from Quebec, Davis could speak French and

⁷ le 5 decembre, 1874. Sister McAlduff re-inforced this view in her biography of Dubuc that the French held onto power in the 1870's through their ability to compromise, a political reality that eluded Schultz and the Ontario British. See "Joseph Dubuc: Role and Views of a French Canadian in Manitoba, 1870-1914", MA Thesis, Ottawa: University of Ottawa, 1967, p. 179.

understood the minority point of view.⁸ Davis appointed Joseph Royal Provincial Secretary and gave him responsibility for the French constituencies in the same kind of partnership that Macdonald and Cartier had in Ottawa. Their tenure was often referred to as the "Davis-Royal administration". Through this cabinet position, Royal assumed the position as most powerful politician in the French Parishes.

In order to maintain this strong position in cabinet, the French Party had to compromise on some important issues such as redistribution of land and the abolition of the Legislative Council while it continued to protect the inherent ethnic duality in language and education. It also fought for and obtained the agreement of the House on the quick settlement of the halfbreed lands, the issue of greatest concern, not only to the Métis, but to the French Canadian leadership, who wanted to maintain the Métis presence in Manitoba as a bulwark against Ontario immigration. Dubuc noted: "On voyait avec regret diminuer le nombre des Métis français".⁹ They did not want to displace them, but to re-inforce the French Catholic community.

French Canadian appeasement developed in reaction to the Ontario British "reign of terror" which occurred in the aftermath of 1869-70.¹⁰ After the election riots of 1872, a grand jury was called to investigate the violence and interview eye-witnesses. Dubuc recalled:

Un grand nombre de témoins oculaires furent appelés et examinés. Personne n'avait rien vu. C'est à dire que le règne de terreur existant à Winnipeg effraie les témoins.

⁸ McAlduff suggests that Dubuc considered Davis a friend, although he was not a Catholic as she suggests. "Dubuc", p. 182.

⁹ PAM, Dubuc Papers, Memoirs, p. 50.

¹⁰ Ibid., Dubuc, p. 15.

Ils craignaient des représailles.¹¹

When Dubuc testified against the Orangemen who had attacked Métis voters in St. Boniface and against John Ingraham who had threatened to shoot Dubuc with his revolver in the polling station, the French Canadian leader personally suffered a reprisal. In broad daylight on Main Street, in front of witnesses, Ingraham assaulted Dubuc with a severe blow on the back of the head so that he lost consciousness. The Orangeman escaped to St. Paul, Minnesota, but a cover-up occurred. Dubuc claimed that he was pressured by the anglophone community to drop the charges against Ingraham if he should return to Winnipeg. Dubuc's English associates threatened that anti-Catholic feelings would be enflamed if Ingraham were brought to trial.¹² Dubuc agreed that, if his attacker would plead guilty, he would not ask for a severe sentence. As a result, Ingraham was fined \$10 for the assault. A few days later, Attorney General Clarke named him Chief of the Provincial Police. Dubuc felt bitter that his assailant had been so rewarded and felt betrayed by Clarke who was afraid to pursue the Orangeman's conviction. With such a man in charge of the police, it is not surprising that francophones were afraid to come to Winnipeg.

During the election campaign of 1874, Joseph Royal reiterated the French fear of violence and he noted in a campaign address that francophones did not feel safe outside the French parishes. He claimed to be the "first French-speaking British subject to address an English-speaking audience in Winnipeg" because people on the east side of the river were

¹¹ Ibid. This situation amounted to a potential cover-up as anglophones attempted to persuade Dubuc to drop the charges. Intimidation of witnesses resulted in the lack of people coming forward to testify as Dubuc noted above. Dubuc showed courage in demanding public documentation of the crime against him as he would have been in danger of further reprisals.

¹² Ibid., p. 16.

afraid to come to the capital. They feared "those Winnipeg fellows would cut their throats".¹³

Such incidents had two effects on the francophones of Manitoba: 1) they were threatened by intimidation and violence outside of their own communities and could not hope to redress such wrongs through the courts and 2) no matter what role they played in 1869-70, they had to stick together for mutual support. They perceived that justice was applied unequally when the murderers of Elzéar Goulet were never apprehended, but warrants were issued against Riel and Lepine for the murder of Scott.

The French Canadians who arrived in Red River after the resistance tried to counter the hostility against the supporters of the Provisional Government by being cooperative and conciliatory. This strategy was successful to the extent that it attracted the support of moderate anglophones like the Inksters who had become alienated by the violence and prejudice of Schultz and his Orange supporters.¹⁴ Since most of the French Canadians arrived after 1869-70 and were not active participants in the resistance, they preferred to distance themselves from those events.

While the French Canadians did not want to be the victims of the reprisals aimed at the supporters of the Provisional Government, they observed that they supported a common cause with the Métis to protect the French Catholic community and they helped protect the Métis leaders to save them from arrest. They noted that the persecution was ongoing and difficult to avoid.

During Louis Riel's election campaign in 1874, Dubuc acted as his campaign manager

¹³ Free Press, December 9, 1874; also Marcel Giraud, The Metis in the Canadian West, Vol. II, trans. by George Woodcock, Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1986, p. 376.

¹⁴ Colin Inkster ran against Schultz and his Orange supporters in Lisgar in 1871, A. Begg, Ten Years in Winnipeg, Times Printing and Publishing, Winnipeg, 1879, p. 24.

and organized political meetings to garner support. Riel could not attend as his life was in danger, so other supporters were invited to speak. On nomination day, Dubuc heard a rumour that Attorney-General Clarke was sending a large posse of armed constables to arrest the Métis leader. Métis supporters from Ste. Anne to St. Francois-Xavier arrived at the polling station in St. Norbert and hid their guns in the bottom of the carts out of sight. A police officer accompanied by 63-64 constables arrived and searched the house, stable and grounds, but found no Riel. Dubuc admired the restraint of the Métis sharpshooters who resisted the provocative action of the police.

"Pendant ces recherches, les Métis, éparpillés autour de la maison, fumaient tranquillement leurs pipes, chacun tenant l'oeil fixé sur la charrette où était son fusil."¹⁵

The threats to the Métis were thus also threatening to the French community as a whole since the French Canadian leaders such as Dubuc and Royal were intimately involved in Riel's election campaign, an attempt to show the Métis leader's political strength and credibility within the French community. Anyone connected with Riel would have felt harrassed by the searches for the Métis leader.

The same night as the above incident, Dubuc, Bannatyne and some friends were dining with Father Ritchot in St. Norbert when the police arrived to search the presbytery, church and convent for Riel. Ritchot allowed one person to accompany him on the search, but they did not find the Métis leader there either. He was hiding in a haystack at Rivière aux Rats. Dubuc blamed Clarke for these confrontations with the police and did not believe his testimonies of loyalty to the Métis cause.¹⁶ The leaders had difficulty restraining the Métis from reacting violently. Archbishop Taché despaired: "How often have they come,

¹⁵ Op. cit., Dubuc Memoirs, p. 19.

¹⁶ Ibid.

tears in their eyes, to ask if it is not time to respond to violence by force?"¹⁷

Having avoided an armed struggle and persuaded the Métis to be patient, the French Party pursued its goals, particularly the settlement of the Métis land question.¹⁸ In the spring of 1873, Girard introduced a controversial bill to deal with the land question. Since the Lieutenant-Governor soon planned to begin the selection of lots, the leaders of the French Party were alarmed at the prospect of speculation and "whole-sale buying up of half-breed claims." They organized a delegation to lobby the cabinet to intervene and protect the 1.4 million acres for the children and future generations.¹⁹ The lobbyists argued that the speculation in Métis land was "antagonistic to the spirit of the grant", suggesting that they considered the land a community resource and should not be sold.²⁰ The influence of Taché on the drafting of this bill is obvious as he had supported the goal of Métis land held

¹⁷ Marcel Giraud, The Metis in the Canadian West, Vol. II, translated by George Woodcock, Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1986, p. 638.

¹⁸ Gerhard Ens claims that "the record here is one of generally protective legislation until 1878 and an almost total disregard for Metis land rights thereafter". See Manitoba History, Vo. 5: 1983, p. 3. Swan asserts that this policy of protective legislation was a high priority with the Davis-Royal administration.

¹⁹ Swan disputes the interpretation of G. Ens regarding the ethnicity of this delegation. He claims it was a combined group of English and French Metis. She claims it was the French Party with a few English-speaking supporters. These included 5 Metis MPPs: BRELAND, SCHMIDT, DELORME, BEAUCHEMIN AND KLYNE; 2 Metis from the Legislative Council: HAMLIN AND DAUPHINAIS; 2 French Canadians: GIRARD AND DUBUC. They were accompanied by AGB BANNATYNE and THOMAS SPENCE, French Party supporters. JAMES MCKAY and JOSEPH ROYAL were part of the cabinet that met the delegation. While "English Metis" MPPs David Spence and Fred Bird also attended, it is difficult to argue that they supported the bill as they later voted against it. Therefore, they attended either as observers or spies. For the result of the vote, see Free Press, March 1, 1873.

²⁰ Manitoban, February 15, 1873.

communally for the benefit of future generations.²¹ Attorney General Clarke who was House Leader (there was no Premier at the time) agreed that the land had been intended for the children, so protective legislation was required to prevent parents from selling the claims.

When Girard introduced his bill, it raised a storm of protest. The legislation stated that, if the land sold for less than half its value, the original owner could re-claim it within six months. The editor of the Manitoban (reflecting the views of the cabinet) felt that parents should not be allowed to sell their children's birthright at low prices and criticized the federal order-in-council which included "Heads of Families" as eligible for the grant.²² He feared that heads of families would be tempted to sell for quick profit and not keep it for the benefit of future generations. He argued that the fathers would qualify for the homestead grant and so would not need a portion of the 1.4 million acres set aside for the "halfbreeds". The government feared that unscrupulous agents would take advantage of people. Clarke claimed that one of the speculators boasted \$40,000 in claims "for which he probably paid a few yards of cotton or a few gallons of rum with a good deal of Red River water in it."²³

The old settlers did not agree with the French position and the views of Senator Sutherland²⁴ expressed the opposing view:

²¹ Robert Painchaud, "Les Origines des Peuplements de la langue française", TRSC, 1975, pp. 110-111.

²² Manitoban, February 15, 1873.

²³ Free Press, March 1, 1873.

²⁴ Senator Sutherland was both a member of the Canadian Senate and an MPP. He was a descendant of Selkirk Settlers and therefore was a Red River settler of European descent. For the sake of this discussion, he will be designated "Red River British". Most of his constituents were of mixed descent and are called "Hudson's Bay Scottish". He represented Kildonan riding and it is assumed that his opposition to the Halfbreed Land Grant Protection Act reflected the views of some of the HBS residents in his riding.

This bill appears to me as if the people of this province did not know anything. If a man is of sound mind, he should be allowed to sell his property as he sees best.²⁵

Such a view reflected the ideological split in the House between those who believed in government intervention to protect Metis rights and those who did not.

The bill was lost when it was amended to delay the legislation for six months and the amendment passed as follows:

TABLE 5: VOTING PATTERN ON THE FIRST HALFBREED LAND GRANT PROTECTION ACT, 1873

<u>Yeas:</u>	<u>Nays:</u>	<u>Absent:</u>
F. Bird (HBS)	Beauchemin (M)	C.J. Bird (RRB)
Boyd (B)	Delorme (M)	Bunn (HBS)
Bourke (HBS)	Dubuc (FC)	Clarke (OC)
Hay (OB)	Girard (FC)	Smith (AQ)
Howard (AQ)	Lemay (FC)	Cunningham (HBS)
Klyne (M)	McKay (M)	Schmidt (M)
McTavish (OB)	Royal (FC)	Bréland (M)
Norquay (HBS)		
D. Spence (HBS)		
Sutherland (RRB)		

Abbreviations:

AQ - Anglo-Quebecker	M - Metis
B - British	OB - Ontario British
FC - French Canadian	OC - Ontario Catholic
HBS - Hudson's Bay Scottish	RRB - Red River British

The above list shows clearly that the "English Metis" did not support the French on this bill as other authors have argued.²⁶ In fact, most of them voted against Girard and his

²⁵ Manitoban, March 1, 1873.

²⁶ See Gerhard Ens, "Metis Lands.....". Gerald Friesen used this article to support his contention that the "English Metis" supported the French Party during the Davis administration. It would appear that, while most of them did so, their reasons were different than those of the French Party.

French Party. If several of the French supporters (such as Clarke, Smith, Schmidt and Bréland) had not been absent, they could have defeated the amendment. In any case, the anglophones of part-Indian ancestry did not agree with them. The English Protestant "old settlers" (including Hudson's Bay Scottish and Red River British) appeared to feel differently about the land issue from the French Catholic community. They saw the land grant as an opportunity for individual profit. For them, Canadianization in Red River implied new economic opportunities and they did not see it as a threat. Their objections to Girard's bill centred on the delays in settling the question. They did not object to selling scrip to speculators. They considered the bill as unnecessary and an insult to their intelligence and their ability to operate in the capitalist economy.

John Norquay was a prominent member of the Hudson's Bay Scottish who did not support the bill. The vote shows that Norquay did not agree with the platform of the French Party. Although he had been raised in Red River, he did not feel it was necessary to protect the Red River settlers from the speculators or for the government to protect victims of the fraud that even the Attorney-General realized was a danger and already occurring.²⁷ Norquay agreed with the views of Hay and Sutherland who moved and seconded the amendment.²⁸

²⁷ Gerhard Ens argued that Norquay supported the bill in principle and was a respected spokesman for the moderate English interests in cabinet, op. cit., "Metis Lands", p. 3. There is no evidence that Norquay sympathized with the French position. Le Metis argued in its edition of March 6, 1875 that he had opposed the official use of French in the Legislature, but dropped this demand when he entered the cabinet. This was hardly a "moderate" position.

²⁸ Manitoban, March 1, 1873. Swan would argue that it is misleading to call this group "English Métis" at this period of history as they were not in agreement with the political goals of the French Métis. It would appear that they identified with the British Protestant culture and hoped to assimilate and repress their native background which was a source of shame to many Protestants in Red River.

Georges Klyne, a Métis representative from Ste. Agathe, was the only French Métis to vote against the French Party to defeat the bill. Klyne was one of the affluent class of traders who did not support Riel during the Resistance.²⁹ His position suggests that the more affluent Red River settlers felt that they did not need this kind of government protection or interference in their property transactions whereas the representatives of the poorer class felt it was necessary to protect the future of their community.

The French Party did not give up after the delay of the bill and, on March 8, Donald A. Smith introduced a similar bill by the same name. Smith was simultaneously an MP and MPP. He had been in Ottawa during the debate and had missed the vote on Girard's resolution. Smith's act cancelled sales made before the patents were issued, giving the buyer the right to be reimbursed. Being a close ally of Taché, Smith argued that "fair prices were not generally paid and the allowing of these people to sell these lands would in all probability cause the Province to have to support a large number of paupers".³⁰ Norquay disagreed and reiterated the old settler position. He criticized the attempt to cancel previously made bargains and suggested it was an "insult to the Halfbreeds".³¹ On the second vote, the legislation passed (14-8) because the French Party ensured that all their members were present. The results are seen in Table 6. Hay proposed that Smith's bill be tabled for six months, another attempt to defeat it, but the amendment was defeated as follows:

²⁹ Nicole St. Onge argued that Klyne was one of the affluent class of Metis who did not support the resistance. See "Dissolution of a Métis Community: Point à Grouette, 1860-1885", Studies in Political Economy 18 (1985): 149-172.

³⁰ Free Press, March 8 1873.

³¹ Ibid.

TABLE 6: SECOND VOTE ON HALFBREED LAND GRANT
PROTECTION ACT

<u>Yeas:</u>	<u>Nays:</u>	<u>Absent:</u>
F. Bird (HBS)	Clarke (OC)	C.J. Bird (RRB)
Bourke (HBS)	Howard (AQ)	Bunn (HBS)
Kline [sic] (M)	Royal (FC)	
Norquay (HBS)	Schmidt (M)	
Spence (HBS)	Lemay (FC)	
Hay (OB)	Dubuc (FC)	
Sutherland (RRB)	Beauchemin (M)	
Cunningham (HBS)	Boyd (B)	
	McKay (M)	
	Delorme (M)	
	Girard (FC)	
	McTavish (OB)	
	Bréland (M)	
	Smith (AQ) ³²	

It is perhaps surprising that a successful capitalist such as Donald A. Smith would be sympathetic to the victims of capitalist enterprise. However, it was politically advantageous for him as his federal riding of Selkirk included St. Boniface. Another surprising fact was that, despite the temporary reservation by the Lieutenant Governor, the Minister of Justice in Ottawa "recognized the need for protection of Métis interests" and it became law in 1874. This is also surprising given the record of the federal government in dealing with Métis grievances.³³ Perhaps the only explanation is that there had been a change of government in 1873 and the Liberals were now in power.

The debate over this legislation demonstrated a conflict in cultural values among the various ethnic groups in Red River. French Canadians wanted to preserve their land in

³² Free Press, March 8, 1873.

³³ See D.N. Sprague, Canada and the Metis, Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1988.

francophone communities because they felt that was the only way to preserve their cultural institutions and way of life as distinct from the Ontario British.³⁴ They counted on the maintenance of Métis lands. At the same time, they were also capitalist and believed in individual ownership of lots. Keeping the community together was not anti-capitalist.

The old settlers opposed the legislation because people like Norquay felt they did not need to be protected. They resented the paternalism implied by the legislation. The editor of the Free Press argued that assimilation should occur. He objected to the reservation of townships so the minority could maintain their community identity and resented its attempts at resistance.

It is desirable that people settling in this country should mix as much as possible to the end that we might become homogeneous.³⁵

Confident in his position as a member of the dominant group, editor W.F. Luxton was an uncompromising critic of the minority's attempts to preserve its community. He claimed that the minority had no reason to fear anglophone domination:

So long as the French-speaking people continue as distinct a class as they are now, no matter how far in the minority they may be, all their just rights will be respected....[The English-speaking members] recognize that magnanimity is a grace of the mighty.³⁶

This attitude implied a sense of superiority of the English over the French. The Free Press editor objected to the Halfbreed Land Grant on the grounds that "so much of the land was the property of minors.....which would have lain undeveloped for many years".³⁷ The Ontario British such as W.L. Luxton wanted the land to be made available to settlers, not tied

³⁴ Free Press, March 11, 1875.

³⁵ Free Press, March 27, 1875.

³⁶ Free Press, March 11, 1875.

³⁷ March 23, 1875.

up in claims. He saw the French politicians as unprogressive and anti-development and felt the Métis had little use for the land. He argued that issuing transferable scrip was a good method for dealing with the reserves which were hindering Ontario settlement. "Those to whom the money is of more use than the land will speedily dispose of same".³⁸ He concluded that, for a short time, the halfbreeds should have exclusive right to claim halfbreed reserves to avoid complaint and criticism. The Dominion government followed the opposite course.³⁹

During the Davis Administration (1874-78), the French Party was under annual pressure to abolish the Halfbreed Land Grant Protection Act as the Ontario British agitated in the Legislature to free up the "halfbreed" reserves for settlement. In 1875, an attempt was made to amend the act.

Unless the Métis, having sold his land, returned the money at 12% interest to the purchaser within three months of the date of the passing of the act, the sale would be valid.⁴⁰

The proponents of the change were the Ontario British: Cornish, Brown and Luxton, supported by old settler, Senator Sutherland. A son of the Selkirk Settlers, Sutherland reported many of his Hudson's Bay Scottish constituents who were supposed to gain from the legislation were complaining of government interference in their land transactions. He asked mockingly: "Would they not be able to buy an ox next?"⁴¹

Editor Luxton of the Free Press (who was also an MPP) reported that the "native population" were in favour of the speedy settlement of the province and were insulted by the

³⁸ Free Press, March 23, 1875.

³⁹ Sprague, Canada and the Metis, Chapter 6.

⁴⁰ Gerhard Ens, "Metis Lands", p. 4.

⁴¹ Free Press, April 27 1875.

law's paternalistic interference.⁴² Premier Davis, who had not been a member of the Legislature in 1873 when the bill was first introduced, agreed with the Opposition Ontario British on this issue. He did not like the old bill which annulled contracts and contended that property was a "sacred trust". Norquay expressed sympathy for the settlers who had "sold their claims from necessity" and had not received fair value for their land. Nevertheless, he noted that he had opposed the original bill because he felt it induced people to be dishonest.⁴³ He believed, like Davis, in capitalist enterprise without government intervention.

The French Party was under increasing pressure to compromise. The original amendment in the Legislative Assembly had stipulated a six-month period to buy back claims, but the Legislative Council which was supposed to protect minority rights, changed it to three months.⁴⁴ There was no recorded vote in Council, so it is difficult to know who was responsible for the amendment. The French Canadian leadership, however, must have been annoyed at this action. Joseph Royal later defended the need for Métis land protection, but the views of his Métis colleagues were not reported in the newspapers. The provincial government did not further oppose the amendment and it passed the House.⁴⁵

It is not clear why the French Party did not more vociferously oppose this amendment in the House. However, they did succeed in undermining the intent of it. Royal, on behalf of the cabinet, advised the federal Minister of Justice to reserve the amended bill because the

⁴² Ibid. Luxton used the term "native population" to refer to the Metis and Hudson's Bay Scottish.

⁴³ Free Press, February 21, 1875.

⁴⁴ April 30, 1875. PAM, Journals of the Legislative Council, 38 Vict. Cap. 48.

⁴⁵ Free Press, May 5, 1875.

old act offered the required protection to the purchaser of "halfbreed" land rights while the amended bill threatened that protection.⁴⁶ The provincial cabinet probably agreed to allow the amendment to pass in the hope that they would be able to persuade the Dominion Government to reserve it, thus avoiding a divisive debate in the House.

Immigration from Ontario increased the pressure on the provincial legislature to repeal the act of 1873. On February 17, 1877, the Free Press reported that a large influx of English-speaking immigrants was expected in the spring. The editor feared that, if the reserve lands were not opened up, many would settle in the USA. The threat of losing potential British-Canadian settlers to the U.S.A. was a powerful motivator to the Ontario British.

Provincial politicians wanted the land question settled as soon as possible. They were frustrated by the delays at the federal level. In the provincial Speech from the Throne, the government announced that a delegation made up of Davis, Royal, Norquay and McKay were lobbying Ottawa to give parents and guardians of the children's reserves immediate possession. Le Métis noted with satisfaction that the Legislature was united that such action should be taken: "C'est aussi l'opinion de la Chambre and nous sommes heureux de voir l'union qui règne sur ces questions générales".⁴⁷ In this case, the provincial cabinet overcame any ethnic differences and presented a united voice to Ottawa.

Premier Davis and Minister of Public Works Norquay pursued the matter further on February 17, 1877, when they proposed drafting an address to the Governor General (in effect, lobbying the Privy Council) demanding that public announcement be made as soon as possible of the allotments so that "children of full age may have an opportunity to settle on

⁴⁶ W.E. Hodgins, Dominion and Provincial Legislation, 1867-1895, Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1896, p. 804, Minister of Justice to Governor General.

⁴⁷ 8 fevrier, 1877.

them and that the parents and guardians of minors may have the opportunity of protective any timber that exists". Members of all the major ethnic groups were represented on the committee drafting the address: Norquay, Royal, Gunn, Taylor, Lepine, Luxton and Cowan.⁴⁸ The editors of the Free Press and Le Métis congratulated the provincial government for its quick action and castigated the federal members for their disunity and ineffectiveness in solving the delays caused by the Dominion government.

Disagreement still emerged over the continued relevance of the 1873 legislation and Cornish continued to press for its repeal. Although the Ontario British constituted a small contingent in the Legislature, they represented an increasingly powerful constituency outside the House. In his role as Premier, Davis had been required to forge numerous compromises between the vociferous Ontario British and the French Party. The government subsequently defeated Cornish's amendment, but Davis and Norquay introduced a motion that would validate sales six months after the act came into effect.

In his discussion of Métis lands, Gerhard Ens noted that Norquay asserted that all the "métis" had voted against Cornish's bill, suggesting that Norquay as an "English Métis" was supportive of protecting "métis" lands.⁴⁹

In light of this assertion, it is difficult to understand the métis decision to vote for yet another amendment to the 1873 act which in effect abolished much of the protection that existed.⁵⁰

Ens confuses the issue by using the term "métis" for both English and French groups. It is important not to lump them into the same category and assume that their aboriginal background united them in a common political agenda. If one examines their statements and

⁴⁸ Free Press, February 17, 1877.

⁴⁹ Free Press, February 21, 1877.

⁵⁰ Ens, p. 4.

voting patterns, it is obvious that their goals were different and this is the reason that Norquay supported another revision to the act.

Ens questions why the "métis" voted for the amendment. In the case of the French Métis, it should be noted that only one of their members, Maxime Lepine, was present for the vote. The other two, James McKay and Charles Nolin, were absent. Of the Hudson's Bay Scottish, Norquay assumed a compromise position. While both Norquay and Davis had been philisophically opposed to the original bill, they felt some recognition had to be made for the bungling that had been caused by delays in Ottawa. Furthermore, they undoubtedly hoped that Ottawa would assign allotments of the 1.4 milion acres before the six months was up. Davis noted that, when the 1873 act came into effect, each claimant expected 140 acres. This amount later increased to 190 acres and then 240 acres. It would not be fair, he said, to give the new owners the benefit of the increased lot sizes. The fault lay with the federal government for delaying so long, changing the regulations and utterly confusing the issue. In this way, the provincial cabinet still saw their role as one of intervention for the protection of the victims of land fraud.

After considering reservation, the federal government allowed Davis' amendment on the grounds that "circumstances.....under which the original act was passed have changed considerably since that time".⁵¹ The Minister of Justice advised that, after four years, the "halfbreeds" had had ample opportunity to realize the value of their land. The Hudson's Bay Scottish did not object to selling off the "halfbreed" reserve in principle, so they supported Davis and Norquay's compromise position which ended protection within six months of the act coming into effct. This was a more moderate approach than that of Cornish who wanted to end any protection immediately.

⁵¹ Hodgins, op. cit., "Report.....", 3 May, 1878, p. 822.

The French members were probably unhappy with the resolution, but had to compromise because of increasing pressure from the Ontario British. They did not stand to gain anything by opposing Davis and Norquay because, if they had resisted on this issue, they would have weakened the government and lost their influence on all other debates. The French Canadians must have felt bitter, however, as they watched the 1.4 million acres reserved for the Métis being sold off to Ontario newcomers. They were also becoming frustrated with the Métis who were leaving for the Northwest in increasing numbers.⁵²

Although the 1877 amendment had passed the Legislature, the Dominion Government did not decide to allow it until May 3, 1878.⁵³ Cornish argued that Métis minors over 18 were anxious to sell, but Norquay criticized the Dominion government for changing the regulations to allow 18 years olds to sell their patents without parental consent. He cited instances of men being made drunk and selling their claims while inebriated and wondered what would happen to young men more easily influenced. He did not, however, object to the lands being conveyed with parental consent.

By this time, even French Canadians were giving up the fight to protect the 1.4 million acres. Girard admitted:

If the adults wanted to sell their land which was theirs as a birthright, it was their business, but the House must not intervene and assist them to dispose of it.

Lemay argued that protection was still needed because "the natives attached no value to real estate" and Dick, an Ontario British member, agreed that "some parents would allow children to squander it away."⁵⁴

⁵² PAM, Dubuc Memoirs. See also Morris Papers, Ketcheson Collection, #112, April 20, 1874.

⁵³ Hodgins, op. cit., "Report.....", p. 822.

⁵⁴ Free Press, February 4, 1878.

These speakers did not question the principle of whether the land should be available for sale - they only questioned the lack of parental authority. Royal, however, reminded the House that the purpose of the "halfbreed reserve" was "to provide a homestead for those who were in the country at the time of the transfer".⁵⁵ He was a lone voice. The House accepted the amended version which stipulated that only children of 18 could sell their scrip if they had consent of both their parents and upon examination before a judge.⁵⁶ Ens noted that Cornish's motion had aroused the total opposition of the "m tis" and the French Canadians and yet once again they allowed the bill to pass. It would appear, however, that the French Party realized that there was little support for resistance from their community by 1878.

In The Canadian Prairies: A History, Gerald Friesen wondered why so few complaints about the dispossession of the "m tis" were heard in the Legislature. One reason is that, after 1874 when Louis Schmidt lost his seat, the M tis had no effective spokesman in the House. Neither Charles Nolin nor Maxime Lepine nor Angus McKay was reported in the debates on the land issue. The leading spokesmen were French Canadians and the most passionate defender of M tis rights was Joseph Lemay. He was born in Quebec, but had settled in Red River in 1858 and was knowledgeable about the M tis traditions. He moved a bill that would secure peaceable possession of river lots for owners who had bought their land verbally and were not included in the HBC Land Register.⁵⁷

It is difficult to know whether the average M tis valued the communal land concept

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ens, 1983, p. 4.

⁵⁷ Le M tis, 22 mars, 1873, and Free Press, April 27, 1875. For an explanation of how the Metis traditionally marked their lots through staked claims, see D.N. Sprague, Canada and the Metis, Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press, p. 117.

sufficiently to preserve the 1.4 million acres for future generations. Probably they were divided between those who wanted to preserve it and those who wanted the capital. After their experiences with the surveyors and the Land Office, they probably lost confidence in the legal and justice system of Manitoba.⁵⁸ Many of the French Métis were traders who, in the cash-poor economy brought on by the depression of 1874, needed capital to buy trade goods or to pay their debts.⁵⁹ It is also difficult to know to what extent the Métis in Manitoba shared an aboriginal view of land which reflected a sense that Mother Earth was to be shared by all and that parcels of her could not be bought and sold by individual owners.⁶⁰

Gerhard Ens argues that a substantial number of Métis left the Red River Settlement in pursuit of the buffalo hide trade and had been doing so since the 1840's. He did not believe that they left because of the treatment they had received from the federal government. He also described them as "proto-capitalists" who as traders were quite able to adapt to the capitalist system. What Ens does not explain is why these people "chose" to leave permanently. While they might have left voluntarily for a few years to follow the herds, one might assume that they would return to Red River to their relatives and friends. The fact that they "chose" to make their permanent settlements elsewhere suggests that they had given up hope of obtaining their land rights in Manitoba.⁶¹ A second problem with Ens' research

⁵⁸ D.N. Sprague, "Government Lawlessness in the Administration of Manitoba Land Claims, 1870-87", Manitoba Law Journal, 10, 1980: 415-42.

⁵⁹ For example, Norbert Welch bought ten Red River carts from James McKay for \$400 which he had to pay in cash. See Mary Weekes, The Last Buffalo Hunter, 1945: 111.

⁶⁰ Phil Fontaine, Grand Chief, Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs, asserted at a public meeting that the aboriginal view of land is different from that of non-aboriginals for the above reasons. Winnipeg, Westworth United Church, January 15, 1991.

⁶¹ Gerhard Ens, "Kinship, Ethnicity, Class and the Red River métis: The Parishes of St. Francois Xavier and St. Andrews", Ph.D. Thesis, University of Alberta, 1989.

is that he only consulted the North West Halfbreed Claims which were submitted by people who had already left the province and decided to live elsewhere. If he had consulted the Manitoba claims, he would have found Métis who wanted to return home to claim land in the Red River Settlement.⁶²

The French Canadians were discouraged as well by the bigotted atmosphere in Winnipeg. Their community leaders including the most influential, Archbishop Taché, were under attack in Free Press editorials:

We have no hesitation in averring that Bishop Taché sought this land for the Halfbreeds expecting that in so doing he would be enabled to control a large section of the country.⁶³

The paper concluded that the land grant was a scheme intended "to lay the greater portion of the grant in the lap of the church." This kind of rhetoric was guaranteed to appeal to the anti-Catholic paranoia of the Orangemen whose greatest fear was control by the Catholic Church. The Winnipeg paper also insinuated that anyone who defended the Métis and their demands was a "pliant tool of a powerful and meddlesome hierarchy.....and a patronizing, vacillating Government".⁶⁴

Le Métis was outraged by such accusations and responded that the 1.4 million acres was negotiated by the North West delegates and that Taché had nothing to do with it. It asserted that Taché had no wish to dispossess the Métis of their rights.⁶⁵ The Free Press, in contrast, liked to remind its readers that "so long as the French-speaking people held

⁶² D.N. Sprague, personal communication.

⁶³ March 29, 1873.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ 5 avril, 1873.

control, they used that control unjustly in the extreme.....".⁶⁶ The English-language paper also used inflammatory vocabulary to describe Louis Riel, the most prominent secular leader. It called him a "murderer" and suggested that anyone connected to his Provisional Government was disloyal.⁶⁷ These attacks put the French Party constantly on the defensive. As a result, it tried to be conciliatory and used peaceful methods to resolve the political problems with Ottawa.

The difference between the newcomers from Quebec and Ontario lay in their attitudes to the nature of the Red River settlers of part-aboriginal descent. The Ontario British sought to distance themselves from people of mixed background while French Canadians thought that the Red River people could be assimilated into their culture through religion and education. In reaction to the insulting treatment of the Métis by the government surveyors, Taché wrote an extensive letter to Col. Dennis entitled "Condition of Halfbreeds in the Northwest Territories".⁶⁸ He argued that the question of "halfbreed lands" should be settled at once as the disappearance of the buffalo and the incursion of settlers in Indian country would cause difficulties in the future:

A liberal policy on the part of the Government would attract to its side a moral and physical power which in the present critical relations of the various tribes of Indians towards each other and towards the Government would prove of the greatest value to the Dominion. On the other hand, the Halfbreed elements if dissatisfied, would turn a standing menace to the peace and prosperity of the Territories.⁶⁹

In a special section entitled "What ought to be avoided when alluding to the

⁶⁶ March 11, 1875.

⁶⁷ February 22, 1873.

⁶⁸ Archives de l'Archeveche de St. Boniface (AASB), Tache Collection, TA 4117-4132, 3 fevrier, 1874.

⁶⁹ AASB, Tache Papers, TA 4118.

Halfbreeds", he explained that they should not be considered to have the "tastes, habits and instincts of Indians". He described them as "hunters, traders or settlers.....Christian people" and complained that racial prejudice undermined their abilities:

Common lumbermen, fishermen, sailors etc. as a class are much more rough in their manners and have no more idea of thrift than most of the Halfbreeds of the plains; they are, however, never represented as being in a semi-barbarous state, nor as semi-savage. Farming, although so desirable, is not the sole condition in the states of civilization.⁷⁰

They were frequently insulted by newcomers to the West:

In fact, they are daily humiliated with regard to their origin, by the way they are spoken of, not only in newspapers, but also in official and semi-official documents.⁷¹

Taché advised Dennis that public documents or instructions to civil servants should treat the "halfbreeds" with respect and appreciation for their services. Such a letter reflects the difficulties faced by the Métis when dealing with the Canadian bureaucracy and the intermediary role played by the French Canadians. Taché's attitude, while paternalist, suggested that he felt they should be treated as legitimate settlers. His ideas about the nature of "halfbreeds" contrasted with those of Gilbert McMicken, Dominion Land Agent, who introduced the system of transferable scrip to make way for "actual settlers".⁷² The Ontario British treated the Red River settlers as nomads who did not deserve the land grant and so did not feel guilty for taking it away from them. The French Canadians had difficulty in persuading the Canadian civil servants to treat the Métis with respect because their attitudes

⁷⁰ AASB, Taché Papers, TA 4121.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Sprague, Canada and the Métis, p. 100. Sprague asserts that Macdonald sent McMicken to Manitoba as a spy. "Macdonald's man was a former magistrate and policeman who knew nothing about land surveys or adjudicating land claims but a great deal about espionage, particularly spying on conspirators against the state, such as Fenians." See pp. 95-96.

were inherently prejudiced.

The French Canadian leadership, including Archbishop Taché, participated actively in lobbying for the amnesty and the arrest of Lepine in 1873 and his subsequent trial occupied so much of their attention that they were distracted from issues in the provincial assembly.⁷³ Because of their active involvement in the cause of the Métis leaders, the Ontario British accused them of being biased. When Girard became Premier in 1874, he appointed Joseph Dubuc as Attorney General. This appointment had its negative connotations, however, because the anglophones pressured Dubuc to appoint a more "objective" prosecutor for the Lepine trial. Dubuc had acted as one of the defence attorneys at the preliminary hearing and so he could not prosecute the case. Because the trained French Canadian lawyers were also in the government, Dubuc appointed the Orange leader, Frank Cornish. He rationalized that it was necessary to "acquiesce" to this condition so that the French community would be able to maintain an important portfolio.

Dubuc's French Canadian colleagues assured him that he had done the right thing, but they paid a high price for their attempt at impartiality.⁷⁴ The Métis felt that they had been betrayed. Louis Riel was outraged when he heard the French Canadians had given in on this issue and wrote to Dubuc:

I was content to see you become more powerful; I feared compromises; what confirmed me was seeing Le Métis say you would not handle the case of Lepine, Nault, and Elzéar; who is the impartial substitute? Cornish!⁷⁵

This kind of problem served to divide the French Party as the Rielite Métis became

⁷³ See George F.G. Stanley, Louis Riel, Toronto: McGraw Hill-Ryerson Ltd., 1985, Chapter 10: "Member of Parliament".

⁷⁴ PAM, Dubuc Papers, p. 29.

⁷⁵ PAM, Riel Papers, #291, n.d., Riel to [Dubuc].

disillusioned with their French Canadians' strategy of appeasement.⁷⁶

The French Canadian leaders were again accused of capitulation when the Girard administration was forced to resign after only six months in office. Two Ontario cabinet representatives, Hay and Ogletree, resigned because they feared fighting an election campaign with a Premier and Attorney General who were French. The Lepine trial created an emotional political climate that forced the French Canadians out of two powerful portfolios, a move which Dubuc described as no less than "le fanatisme de race".⁷⁷ Le Métis explained that the only way for the French to maintain power was to accept a moderate anglophone as Premier and denied that they were giving in to the English:

Il n'y a pas eu de capitulation.....Entre deux parties, l'un modère and l'autre fanatiquement radical, il a fallu choisir et ne risquer que le moins possible.⁷⁸

The French Party lost two significant portfolios. The defensive attitude of Le Métis suggests that people in the French community were critical of their leaders for this move. On the other hand, they did not have much choice. If they did not compromise, they would be out of the cabinet altogether. Furthermore, they must have had some confidence in the new Premier, R.A. Davis, because he was adept at political compromise and opposed the hard line of the Orangemen. His platform included cutting the number of ministers to three in the interests of economy and so the post of Attorney General was eliminated. Instead, he appointed two Crown Counsels - one English and one French.⁷⁹ While this action defused the Ontario British hostility towards Dubuc, the French Party was left with only one cabinet

⁷⁶ Gerald Friesen, op. cit., "Canadian Prairies...", 1985, p. 201.

⁷⁷ PAM, Dubuc Papers, p. 35.

⁷⁸ Le Metis, 5 decembre, 1874.

⁷⁹ They were Walker and Dubuc. PAM, Dubuc Papers, p. 36.

minister: Royal.

Because of his cooperative attitude, Dubuc was rewarded with the Speakership, a position that alternated between French and English.⁸⁰ Le Métis criticized several of the English-speaking representatives who had "repudiated the convention of honour between the majority and minority of the country".⁸¹ Nevertheless, such defensive comments showed that the French could not take such positions for granted and were always forced to defend their claims to equality.

A similar situation occurred when Lieutenant Governor Morris resigned in 1877. Le Métis criticized the Free Press for suggesting that it would be impolitic to nominate a francophone to the position.⁸² The Mackenzie Government in Ottawa respected the principle of duality and appointed a Quebec Liberal, Joseph Cauchon, to the post. Archbishop Taché was so amazed that he described this move as "aussi extraordinaire que l'arrivée du chemin du fer".⁸³ Yet again, the French could not take duality for granted and were forced to defend what they had assumed was a right.

The French Party continued its fight against inequalities and its newspaper was on guard to point them out to the public. It criticized the Dominion government whenever it published official notices in English only such as 1) a notice from Lieutenant Governor

⁸⁰ Le Métis, 1 février, 1873. The French Party advocated that all major appointments should be alternated.

⁸¹ 3 avril, 1875. Most actually approved the choice because Dubuc was a lawyer and experienced in parliamentary procedure.

⁸² 18 octobre, 1877. George Bryce felt that it was antagonism arising from the Riel Resistance that gave rise to the anti-French criticisms of Cauchon's appointment. The Ontario British rationalized the bigotry they brought with them from Ontario by blaming the Métis for their treatment of the prisoners during the Resistance. See, Bryce, A History of Manitoba, Toronto: Canadian History Company, 1906, p. 262.

⁸³ Dom Benoit, Vie de Mgr. Taché, p. 235.

Morris announcing the rules for regulating land disputes;⁸⁴ and 2) the Department of Interior and Indian Affairs tenders for transportation contracts. The newspaper complained that most of the freighters were French-speaking, but, as a result of this policy, anglophones were the successful bidders. The French only received subcontracts at a lower rate.⁸⁵ Dubuc complained to Archbishop Taché about the editorial bias of the Free Press which made frequent attacks on the French language.⁸⁶

Despite their commitment to the duality principle, the French Canadian leaders sometimes compromised. When Kenneth McKenzie, the MPP for Portage La Prairie, suggested that government printing in French be eliminated in the ridings of Marquette West and Lisgar, Royal concurred. When Martin criticized Royal for giving up French rights, he replied:

If the French refused to yield in such trifling matters.....how could they expect generous treatment from the English in matters of vital consequence to the French population?⁸⁷

The French Canadians leaders were thus on the defensive, having to weigh each decision as to whether it was worth the cost of resistance. They were under the illusion that compromise would help maintain their rights.

Issues of greatest concern, besides the Métis land grant, were the preservation of equality in institutions, representation, language and education. All of these were under attack during the Davis-Royal administration. Besides the undermining of the duality by publishing English-only government notices and employing unilingual employees in the

⁸⁴ Le Metis, 8 mars, 1877.

⁸⁵ Le Metis, 19 avril, 1877.

⁸⁶ AASB, Tache Papers, TA 14886.

⁸⁷ Free Press, April 9, 1875.

government offices, the Dominion government undermined the duality principle by insisting on the abolition of the Legislative Council - the appointed Upper House or "Manitoba Senate". It was intended to protect minority rights.⁸⁸ This action caused another major crisis for the French Party.

When the Council was first appointed in 1871, its composition was based on the duality principle, "imitating the model of Quebec rather than Ontario....formed on the same principle of compromise as was seen in other parts of the government machinery."⁸⁹ What made the Council relevant to the French community - its balanced ethnic composition - was the very thing that made it anathema to the Ontario British. The Council consisted of representatives of all the major groups in Red River society except the French Canadians and Indians (and women):

TABLE 7: COMPOSITION OF LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, BY ETHNICITY

<u>Name:</u> <u>Parish:</u>	<u>Bryce's</u> <u>Description:</u>	<u>Religion:</u>
McKay St. James	Scoto-French Halfbreed	RC
Gunn St. Andrews	Pure Scottish Celt	P
Hamlin White Horse Plains	French Halfbreed	RC
Inkster Kildonan	Scottish Halfbreed	P

⁸⁸ Free Press, February 7, 1876; July 16, 1874; Dubuc Memoirs, p. 52.

⁸⁹ George Bryce, op. cit., "History....", 1906, p. 167.

Dauphinais St. Norbert	French Halfbreed	RC
Ogletree Portage	Canadian Lowland/Scot	P
O'Donnell Winnipeg	Irish Celt	RC

SOURCE:⁹⁰

One aspect of the composition of Council that George Bryce did not notice was that five of the seven members were long-term residents of the Northwest and were fluent in Cree. A newspaper article published in 1890 noted that the two Ontario members had difficulty because they could not understand all the proceedings - they could not speak the "lingua franca" of the fur trade:

In those days, there were three official languages: English, French and Indian in use. It is related that Dr. O'Donnell exasperated at the use of more Indian than he considered necessary, said, "I don't see anything in our acts permitting the use of Indian". Still, it was not discontinued.⁹¹

This "Indian" language was probably Cree.⁹² Five out of the seven members who were from Red River undoubtedly were fluent in Cree: McKay, Gunn, Hamlin, Inkster and Dauphinais. Only the two members from Ontario would not have understood. The reaction of Dr. O'Donnell, who was Ontario British, suggested another effect of Canadianization: the

⁹⁰ George Bryce, A History of Manitoba, op. cit., p. 167.

⁹¹ Winnipeg Daily Tribune, March 1, 1890 - "Manitoba Senate". I would like to thank Eleanor Blain for this reference from her MA thesis: "Bungee: The Dialect of the Red River Settlement", University of Manitoba, 1989.

⁹² Professor David Pentland, Department of Linguistics, University of Manitoba, personal communication.

discouragement of the use of aboriginal languages and dialects.⁹³

The threat by the federal government that the Legislative Council should be abolished caused another crisis of conscience for the French Party. The provincial government was dependent on the Dominion for its revenue and, by 1874, was badly in debt. Premier Davis and Joseph Royal visited Ottawa in 1875 to petition for "better terms": i.e. an increase in the subsidy. Mackenzie responded that the Dominion could not afford the \$3-4 million annual cost and reiterated that no subsidy would be forthcoming unless the Council was abolished.⁹⁴

This caused great consternation for the French Party and Le Métis discussed at length the implications of the proposal for the minority group.⁹⁵ In the end, they decided to support abolition as they would rely on the guarantees of the BNA Act.⁹⁶ Some historians have argued that the French Canadians gave in too easily, but Le Métis stressed that the French politicians had to remember their minority position:

Le moment est grave et rien ne doit être fait à la légère. D'un autre côté, la majorité n'est pas de notre côté; nos représentants afin de ne laisser échapper rien qui pourrait ruiner leur influence générale.⁹⁷

Dubuc agonized over the dilemma of the French Party. If the government abolished the Council, the French would lose the guarantees they counted on as a minority. If they refused,

⁹³ See Blain for a discussion of the Bungee dialect and Guy A. Lavallée, "The Michif French Language: A Symbol of Métis Group Identity at St. Laurent, Manitoba", Canadian Anthropology Society, University of Calgary, 1990 for a discussion of the evolution of Michif, the language of the Métis.

⁹⁴ W.L. Morton, Manitoba: A History, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957, p. 149 and Bryce, op. cit., 1908, p. 261.

⁹⁵ 4 juillet, 1874, 25 juillet, 1874, 27 janvier, 1876 and 10 février, 1876.

⁹⁶ Morton, op. cit., p. 149.

⁹⁷ Le Metis, 27 janvier, 1876.

they would not get the federal subsidy which would lead to provincial bankruptcy. Dubuc resented the Ontario influence of Mackenzie who, he felt, was insensitive to the dual nature of Manitoba society with its foundation on the Quebec model of a bicameral system. The Quebec model was essential to the French Party.

The second dilemma was that the French were afraid to further antagonize the English in Manitoba. If they were too obstinate about their constitutional rights, they would be excluded from future cabinets. Dubuc noted that, when the issue was debated in the Legislature, several of the anglophone MPPs understood "notre apprehension and nos anxiétés". He recorded that his English friends assured him that the rights of the French Catholic minority would always be respected by the majority.⁹⁸

Yet there was an important reason that the French Canadians found it difficult to support the maintenance of the Upper House which they were reluctant to express in Le Métis - the Council lacked credibility. It had defied public opinion and the government over a number of issues.⁹⁹ Furthermore, the French Canadian leaders felt that their representatives in Council were betraying the minority position:

Tel qu'il était composé le Conseil Législatif ne pouvait et n'a presque jamais pu rendre les services qu'on devait en attendre. Maintes fois, il a constitué un véritable danger pour la minorité qu'il avait une mission de protéger.....Qu'on sache bien que cette opinion n'attaque que quelques conseillers et que surtout l'éducation politique et non la plus stricte probité qui a manqué à certains de nos Membres français de la Haute Chambre.¹⁰⁰

In the same editorial, probably written by Joseph Royal, the writer suggested that the French had enough enemies in the Lower House without fighting more in the Legislative Council.

⁹⁸ PAM, Dubuc Papers, p. 52.

⁹⁹ Bryce, p. 261.

¹⁰⁰ Le Metis, 10 février, 1876.

It is not stipulated on what issues the party criticized the stand of the Council, but the leader of the Lower House seemed embarrassed by his colleagues in the Senate, making it more difficult to defend their preservation in office. While admittedly not an unbiased source, the Free Press observed that "there was [sic] not those [francophones] who believed that the maintenance of the Upper House was necessary to shield their interests from ruthless attack".¹⁰¹ This observation suggests that the French Party did not raise loud objections to abolition in public because they had difficulty in defending the actions of their members who were already unpopular.

Premier Davis had criticized the Upper House before he was even elected over amendments it made to the City of Winnipeg Act which had been passed by the Lower House. Davis suspected that they were "under the influence of an outside party" - presumably the mistrusted Hudson's Bay Company.¹⁰² On another, Joseph Royal said the Council had rejected the bill on unpatented lands too late in the session to change it so the Provincial Government might be forced to go to court.

One problem with the Metis representatives on Council was that they were not united in their political outlook. Dauphinais was a Rielite and Hamlin and McKay were "Loyal French". As well, Le Métis suggested that there was petty jealousy on the part of those representatives.¹⁰³ Both McKay and Hamlin had opposed Riel in 1869-70 and Hamlin's son Joseph had challenged Riel in Provencher. Joseph Hamlin was also listed as a recipient of D.A. Smith's "Loyal French Fund".¹⁰⁴ The Loyal French Senators who were Métis probably

¹⁰¹ February 7, 1877.

¹⁰² Free Press, May 13, 1875.

¹⁰³ 27 janvier, 1876.

¹⁰⁴ PAM, Morris Papers, Lieutenant Governor's Collection, #993, 1538 and 1550.

resented the assumption of leadership in the House by the French Canadians such as Royal who were telling them what to do. The French Canadians had assumed leadership positions because of their educational and professional advantages, i.e., class position. This friction between the community leaders in the French Party was another example of class divisions that created cleavages.

The Davis-Royal administration ensured the successful abolition of Council through the judicious use of patronage. Those who voted for it were given other offices.¹⁰⁵ Colin Inkster, for example, was appointed Sheriff; the former holder of that post, Mr. Armstrong, had been accused of alcoholism and abuse of the French prisoners.¹⁰⁶ Angus McKay, a Catholic who represented the Métis community of St. Laurent at Lac Manitoba was persuaded to give up his seat for his brother James while Angus was rewarded with the appointment of Indian Agent for the Qu'Appelle District. The Hon. James McKay won the seat in a byelection and was thus able to stay in cabinet once his Council seat was abolished.¹⁰⁷ McKay had replaced the Métis representative, Charles Nolin, in November 1875. Le Métis overlooked any criticism of the Hon. James during the campaign and urged the voters in that riding to remember the importance of "the cause" that the Hon. Monsieur McKay represented in cabinet i.e. the French Catholic cause.¹⁰⁸

The French Canadians in the provincial cabinet did not strenuously oppose the abolition of Council because that body had become a political liability. Although the Métis had three out of seven representatives, they were not successful either in agitating for Métis

¹⁰⁵ Bryce., op. cit., p. 261.

¹⁰⁶ PAM, Minutes of the Executive Council, #226, February 4, 1876.

¹⁰⁷ PAM, Minutes of the Executive Council, #227, February 7, 1876.

¹⁰⁸ 11 janvier, 1877.

rights or in supporting legislation initiated by their allies in cabinet. Although abolition threatened the duality principle, it was not working in practice and became expendable.

Another problem that the French Party faced as a minority group was the defection of so-called allies to the side of their enemies. Such a defection occurred when Dr. J.H. O'Donnell, a Catholic representative on Council, opposed abolition. Dubuc wrote bitterly about O'Donnell whom he blamed for signing the arrest warrants against Riel and Lepine. The French Party felt betrayed because its leaders claimed he owed his appointment to Archbishop Taché.¹⁰⁹ The Ontario British assumed that anyone who was pro-Riel was disloyal and anti-Canadian. Anglo-Catholics such as O'Donnell, Henry Clarke, and Joseph Ryan (MP for Marquette) were tempted to conform to the Ontario-British ideology, even if it meant embarrassing their French colleagues.

O'Donnell waged a public war against the Davis-Royal administration for its pro-abolition stand, including writing libelous letters to the Ottawa Free Press while the two ministers were in Ottawa to negotiate with the federal government. Although his charges were later disproven, he caused so much embarrassment to the Manitoba delegation that even the Free Press felt that getting rid of O'Donnell was an accomplishment:

If the gentlemen [Davis and Royal] whom he spoke so spitefully and so untruthfully against have accomplished nothing more than to rid the halls of legislation of the presence of the doctor, in the capacity as legislator, they have earned the gratitude of the people of the province.¹¹⁰

The issue which stimulated the most passionate response from Le Métis during the Davis administration was the separate schools question which the Ontario British raised on an annual basis. The French editorialists interpreted this pressure as an attack on the

¹⁰⁹ PAM, Dubuc Papers, p. 18.

¹¹⁰ Free Press, February 1, 1876.

integrity of their community and the politicians were forced to find compromises on a highly charged emotional issue on which it would be difficult to satisfy either faction. By 1875, increasing anglophone immigration had resulted in a great imbalance in population so that Winnipeg had a much greater proportion of Protestants. The education funds from the province were divided between Protestant and Catholic Boards and the Protestants felt they were not getting revenues relative to their population ratio.

The Ontario British demanded reform of the education system. Although the population of Winnipeg was between four and five thousand people, the schools were in deplorable condition. The provincial government appointed a number of Ontario British members to the Winnipeg Board of Education because they perceived the problems were caused by the inexperience of some of the trustees, the opposition of some of the leading citizens (unnamed) and by the difficulty of collecting taxes. The Ontario British resented their tax dollars going to Catholic schools. The new board members tried to overturn the duality principle by advocating the abolition of sectarian religious teaching and insisted on the compulsory use of English in all schools.¹¹¹ Trustees who were committed to the 1871 Act which enshrined duality either resigned or refused to appear, the public became upset and the board devolved into chaos.

The issue was temporarily resolved when the government decided that Catholics would only contribute to Catholic schools and vice versa.¹¹² It issued the School Act of 1876 which followed the Ontario plan of creating a special educational act for Winnipeg which allowed board members to be elected on a ward basis with powers of taxation, inspection,

¹¹¹ Bryce, p. 274.

¹¹² Le Metis, 15 mai, 1875.

hiring of teachers and erecting buildings.¹¹³

The French community, however, felt threatened by these attacks. Le Métis wrote resentfully that the Globe in Toronto inspired the agitation¹¹⁴ while also quoting that the News of Saint John, N.B. advocated the abolition of separate schools in Manitoba. The public agitation led the French to fear that the Ontario British would pressure the provincial government to do away with Catholic schools and Le Métis editorials reflected an increasing desperation and sense of helplessness in the face of which they considered a fanatical attitude. Its editor noted that certain Ontario hotheads were counting on the "majority" to crush the Catholic minority, but counted on the fact that certain "liberal" members would not vote against their conscience to oppress the "minority". Le Metis urged its political representatives to maintain a united front against the "tyranny" which threatened them.¹¹⁵ The vocabulary of majority/minority, resistance/tyranny shows that the French, despite their relatively strong position in the Legislature and cabinet, felt increasingly threatened. The strategy they advocated was to appeal to the MPPs who were "métis anglais et français ou anciens colons" to resist the attacks of Cornish and his Ontario British agitators. In fact, the government did not give in on this issue.

In the undermining of French rights in Manitoba, one of the manifestations of prejudice was the frequent attacks on clerical influence in the French Party as well as on the native background of the Métis. When A.G.B. Bannatyne ran as an MP in Provencher, the Free Press accused Father Ritchot of trying to garner support for his opponent, Elie Tassé. The paper said that the French would not vote for the Scot because he was not French.

¹¹³ Bryce, p. 275.

¹¹⁴ 18 novembre, 1876.

¹¹⁵ 18 janvier, 1877.

When Bannatyne did indeed win the election, the Free Press was amazed that he garnered French support and observed that the French "halfbreeds" were "gaining ground as a people who followed a short time ago the priest's instructions to the letter".¹¹⁶ The paper felt that the problem of conflicting cultural values should be solved by assimilation and it resented the attempts of the French Party to maintain a separate cultural identity:

The enemy of Canadian advancement in this country has always been the Quebec conservative. It is he that has always sought to hold the balance of power by making every public question either sectional or religious. His public sheets have been printed and circulated with the view of preserving his identity. He has opposed amalgamation and the merging of the races with him has always been considered heresy.¹¹⁷

W.L. Luxton's editorial gratuitously advised French Canadian politicians not to allow themselves to be controlled by priest or church which Luxton considered undemocratic. In 1876, he also criticized Sir John A. Macdonald for giving in to the Roman Catholic Church's pressure to reserve the 1.4 million acres for the "halfbreeds" despite the fact that almost half of the land would be reserved for Protestants. He also denounced Archbishop Taché for reserving two townships in Provencher for French Canadian settlers from the USA.

The French Party resented such attacks which Le Métis described as "les allegations d'écrivains hallucinés".¹¹⁸ Taché was also blamed for supporting separate schools. His response, like that of other French leaders in the face of bigotted attacks, was to be conciliatory and moderate:

If the majority had continued to be Catholic, the old and new Protestant settlers would find the provision [of separate schools] very wise and very convenient and no one would think of showering abuse on me or those who, like myself, think that what

¹¹⁶ March 25 and April 1, 1875.

¹¹⁷ Free Press, July 15, 1875.

¹¹⁸ 17 aout, 1876.

was agreed ought to be faithfully adhered to.¹¹⁹

Royal and Dubuc stressed their loyalty to the Crown to distance themselves from any implied disloyalty that had been created by the Rielite Métis and the Provisional Government. They admired "les fair play britannique" and celebrated British holidays such as the twenty-fourth of May.¹²⁰ When the Governor General and Lady Dufferin arrived in 1877, there was a great outpouring of loyalty speeches from the French Party. Archbishop Taché was particularly anxious to defend the role of the clergy in educating the Métis of Red River to respect British institutions:

We are loyal. The clergy has done its part in civilizing the aborigines and is encouraging the settlers to respect the British throne.....The job of the clergy is to instruct the people in honouring and respecting legitimate authority. This mission we are accomplishing; Your Excellency must not doubt it. ¹²¹

Taché defended the position of the clergy as middlemen between the encroaching "civilization" of Canada and the Red River Settlement, a role he had played since the Canadian Government had recalled him from Rome in 1869 to intercede in the Red River Resistance. Taché argued that Red River now had to adapt to the new regime and he saw the role of the Catholic Church was to mediate in that process.

The "encapsulation theory" of F.G. Bailey predicted the appeasement behaviour on the part of the French Canadian leadership. When the Canadian government took over Red River, it fundamentally changed the rules of land distribution and introduced the cash economy. The rules which regulated the economic, social and political systems were

¹¹⁹ Free Press, January 15, 1890.

¹²⁰ Le Métis, 24 mai, 1876. Dubuc received his law degree from McGill, Canadian Parliamentary Companion, 1876, p. 582.

¹²¹ Le Metis, 16 aout, 1877.

drastically altered so that the Métis found their chosen leaders, Riel and the members of his provisional government, were not allowed to participate under the new regime.¹²² The traditional customs regarding ownership of property through staked claims was disregarded. Those people who were interested in operating as traders, ranchers and farmers or who could accumulate capital ostensibly had an advantage over those who shared their wealth with their community. However, because of racism and internal colonialism, the new system actually discriminated more against certain groups than others. One must conclude that ethnicity overruled class.

The persecution by the Ontario British was not only directed against Riel's supporters, but also against anyone French, Catholic, of native background or against those thought to be sympathetic to the Provisional Government. As a result, Métis such as Charles Nolin and Angus and James McKay who had opposed Riel in 1869-70 also found themselves to be part of the "losing side" and in danger of not obtaining their land.

Métis traders complained that Winnipeg in the 1870's was a bad place to do business and they could obtain higher prices for their buffalo robes elsewhere.¹²³

Last year, some traders complained of maltreatment by certain lenders here. Is this the reason that deters from our province the commerce that should naturally come here?¹²⁴

Such complaints suggest that the problem was not the introduction of the capitalist economy

¹²² W.L. Morton, Manitoba: A History, op. cit., p. 146.

¹²³ Le Metis, 12 juillet, 1877. They received better prices in Fort Benton, Montana, than in Winnipeg. In 1875, they received \$6.00-8.00 per skin. In 1877, the price dropped to \$3.50 or \$3.00.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

as there were already in Red River affluent Métis traders who were accumulating capital.¹²⁵ The problem was that the Métis in particular had a great deal of difficulty claiming the land that had been promised them by the government. The problem was political, rather than economic, because the officials in the Land Office in Winnipeg and the Winnipeg business and professional elite did not want the Métis to benefit from the land grant that was intended for them.

Bailey predicted that the success of integration depends on the degree of resistance that the people wish to offer and the resources that they can call on to assist them. The Métis were able to resist the changes imposed on their community for nearly a decade after Confederation as they were able to recruit the support of other ethnic groups to resist the actions of the Dominion Government. Through the intervention of the French Canadian leadership in particular, and the provincial cabinet in general, the Métis protests received support. The resistance of the Manitoba Government to the changes in the "Halfbreed Land Grant Protection Act" showed that the loss of Métis lands was a political problem that was acknowledged by the non-Métis politicians, lending credibility to the complaints. The cry for provincial rights and "Better Terms for Manitoba" grew out of the perception by Manitoba politicians that the Dominion Government was not sympathetic to its problems and that Confederation did not bring all the benefits they expected.

Bailey's hypothesis helps to explain the problems faced by the French Canadian leaders. His model suggests that local politicians like Taché, Royal and Dubuc created a role for themselves as middlemen who brought the wishes of their electorate to the notice of the central authorities. Their interest was to bargain and persuade both sides that compromise was possible, for example: when the "Better Terms" delegations went to Ottawa to obtain the subsidy. Bailey noted that the success of such people's role depended on their ability to

¹²⁵ Gerhard Ens, "Kinship, Ethnicity and Class...", Ph. D. thesis, op. cit.

deceive and misrepresent the strength and intentions of both sides to each other. They were likely to be regarded with suspicion and contempt by those who had made an ideological commitment to the cause or by the local leader (such as Riel) who fought single-mindedly for local autonomy. It is not surprising that the Protestants were suspicious of the French Canadians' pro-Catholic bias or that the Métis accused them of receiving more than their fair share of patronage appointments. The French Canadians were in a no-win situation.

The political structure contains rules about prizes, personnel, leadership, competition and control.¹²⁶ It is important for a leader to control the distribution of prizes in order to maintain his following, but he must also appear fair. This is the reason that Premier Davis and Joseph Royal brought Charles Nolin into the cabinet to represent Métis interests, but Nolin quit within the year because he perceived they were not being fair. The role of the middleman breaks down when either his subjects learn to make their own connections or when the controlling power decides the whole country must be modernized and integration takes place. Then the middlemen become irrelevant because decisions are made externally.¹²⁷

Bailey noted that encapsulation only persists when the contestants are not grossly mismatched. If the larger structure overwhelms the smaller one or controls all the levers of power, the leaders of the encapsulated community have no room to maneuver.¹²⁸ In Red

¹²⁶ Bailey, p. 20.

¹²⁷ This was probably the reason that Joseph Royal lost the leadership of the governing party to John Norquay in 1879 after defeating Nolin. Royal was no longer seen as a trustworthy middleman for the Métis and they withdrew politically. The anglophones united to defeat Royal. Norquay himself was driven into bankruptcy when he actively opposed the policies of the Dominion Government. See G. Friesen, "From Homeland to Hinterland", CHA Historical Papers, Saskatoon, 1979: pp. 33-47.

¹²⁸ Bailey, p. 167.

River, the leaders of the French Party were middlemen faced with a Canadian government intent on integration of the economy. As Canadianization progressed, the dream of Archbishop Taché for a French Catholic homeland outside of Quebec became a more remote possibility. French Canadians in New England hesitated to move west and Métis no longer felt welcome in Manitoba. They had hoped to form communities where they could protect their religion, language and culture, but the dominant Protestant majority did not want such ethnic diversity to persist:

It is only because the French halfbreeds and their leaders treat the question, not as one of business, but rather as one of race and creed and language and because they are unwilling that their people should form part of a mixed community that they prefer having the lands to which they are entitled off in one block.¹²⁹

The exodus of the Métis and the insufficient immigration from Quebec and the USA predicted the ultimate political defeat for the French Canadians. Canadianization based on the Quebec model (the preservation of dual institutions) would have meant the assimilation and integration of the Métis into the French Canadian community. Such a result only occurred on a small scale and so the French Canadians were doomed to failure. Canadianization on the Ontario or "encapsulation" model predicted a social stratification pattern in which French Canadians would be forced to assimilate with the British. Despite the resistance of provincial politicians who preferred the Quebec model, they were constantly forced to compromise and undermine French rights.

¹²⁹ Lieutenant Governor Archibald quoted in Robert Painchaud, "Les Origines des peuplements de langue française", TRSC, 1975, pp. 110-111.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE ASSERTION OF ANGLO-QUEBECKER LEADERSHIP

As a result of the discrimination against the French Canadians and Métis, the newcomers to Manitoba who were anglophone had a decided advantage. When Manitoba entered Confederation, the Dominion Government promised provincial status and responsible government. Yet, Prime Minister Macdonald undermined provincial control by advising his Lieutenant Governor in November 1870:

Although you are a constitutional Sovereign, it is evidently necessary that, in the present state of affairs, you should be, in fact, a paternal despot.¹

Macdonald's advice resulted in the denial of responsible government in Manitoba for the first four years of the province's history and, despite the fact that there were francophones trained in law and government, they were forced to step aside in favour of people whose Canadian culture and English language made them part of the dominant majority of Canada. The people who were in the right place at the right time were Anglo-Quebeckers Henry Clarke and Robert Davis who were both bilingual and could act as middlemen between the French Party who were mainly Métis and Quebecois and the more moderate wings of the English and Canadian parties who were not so anti-French as the Orangemen.

Subsequent historians have excused Macdonald on the grounds that the Red River politicians were too inexperienced to run the government, believing the Governor's complaints that they had much of the work to do in drafting legislation.² In fact, such interference by the Canadian government in the democratic process resulted in an unstable

¹ F.A. Milligan, "The Lieutenant Governorship of Manitoba, 1870-1882", MA Thesis, Winnipeg: University of Manitoba, 1946, p. 104.

² Milligan, p. 104; W.L. Morton, Manitoba: A History, University of Toronto Press, 1979, p. 146; and M.S. Donnelly, The Government of Manitoba, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963, p. 20.

administration (as Bailey's model predicted) and a state of internal colonialism. When provincial politicians found the situation unworkable, resisted the control of the Dominion, and fought for responsible government, encapsulation resulted. The Dominion Government could manipulate the province because of its dependence on the federal subsidy.

The first Lieutenant-Governor Adams Archibald chose the first cabinet, and acted as Premier and Chairman of the Executive Council. He excluded the antagonists of 1869-70 from the cabinet so that the new administration would be both "Loyal" and moderate, thus predisposing the cabinet against representatives by Rielite Metis. It included: Clarke, Girard, Howard, McKay, and Boyd. The first three were from Quebec and were not involved in the resistance; McKay was a "Loyal Métis" and Boyd a moderate English-born merchant. As a result, Quebeckers received the elite positions instead of the francophones of Red River who were in the majority. Political scientist M.S. Donnelly suggested that local politicians were too inexperienced to be given a cabinet position and implied that the newcomers from Canada were better able to fulfil the highest jobs.³ He argued that the Prime Minister was justified in delaying the choice of a Premier for four years on this ground. However, it appears that this argument is groundless when it is learned that the first Premier, from Quebec, was only in office for six months and the second, also from Quebec, was in office for four years with no political background whatsoever.

Because of this undemocratic form of government, provincial politicians excluded from cabinet agitated for reform. In December 1871, delegates from the English parishes demanded responsible government and more English representation.⁴ As a result, Boyd was

³ M.S. Donnelly, The Government of Manitoba, Toronto: University of Manitoba Press, 1963.

⁴ Donnelly, p. 22

replaced by Norquay, also a "Loyalist" but representative of the Hudson's Bay Scottish which made up the majority of the English Party.⁵

Anglo-Quebecker Henry Clarke became the head of the government through his support for the "Loyal" faction of the French Party. Royal, leader of the Rielites, aspired to that position himself and so, in March 1872, when Girard became a senator, Royal negotiated a place for himself in cabinet as leader of the Rielite faction.⁶

Bréland is chief of a National party of loyalists and they have adopted Clarke as their mouthpiece.... The split in the French is now so decided and Clarke is leader in the House of the National Party and Royal of the other party.⁷

Louis Schmidt was educated in Quebec and might have been an acceptable cabinet minister, but was rejected because of his role in 1869-70 as Riel's secretary in the Provisional Government.

It is not surprising that the Lieutenant-Governors preferred representatives of the French Party who would be willing to compromise with the English. As an Anglo-Quebecker, Clarke was their ideal choice because they hoped he could represent the French while not antagonizing the Ontario British with a French name. James McKay as a Loyal Métis was in the same position. The Orangemen, however, distrusted Clarke and McKay as Catholics and so conciliation was almost impossible. Clarke did not have the talent for political compromise and caused more disunity than cooperation.

Initially, Clarke was a target of Orange reprisals. On one occasion, when he arrived in Winnipeg on the steamboat from the East, he was met by a mob of Ontario volunteers who hooted and yelled as he stepped off the gangplank. He pulled his revolver to protect himself

⁵ PAM, Inkster Papers, Sibyl Inkster's memoirs.

⁶ Begg, History of the North West, Vol. II, P. 51

⁷ PAM, Morris Papers, Ketcheson Coll., Morris to MacDonald, 20 January, 1873.

and was finally escorted to safety by a group of friends.⁸ When Clarke arraigned the Métis supporters of the Fenians (L'Entendre, Jerome and Villeneuve), the Loyal Canadian party attended the preliminary hearing in magistrate's court and their actions were reminiscent of the Ku Klux Klan in the American south:

A mob of loyalists were in attendance, one of whom carried a rope with which to hang the Attorney General if he failed in his duty in obtaining the commitment for trial of the prisoners.⁹

Clarke reacted to the intimidation of the Orangemen by giving in to their demands and by trying to replace Riel as leader of the French Party. He aspired to be the "middleman" or spokesperson for the French Party, but could not attain such a position while Riel was still in Red River. His personal ambitions persuaded him that Riel was a liability and that he could achieve power and appease the Ontario British by eliminating the Métis leader. This strategy brought Clarke into conflict with the other French Canadians who were loyal to the Métis chief and his commitment to the Manitoba Act.

Despite his attempts to win the support of the newcomers, Clarke alienated the Ontario British. He was blamed for not controlling the provincial debt, and was accused of using his position as Attorney General to line his own pockets. He received a fee for every case he prosecuted; after his defeat, Treasurer Davis initiated an audit which showed that Clarke had earned \$17,041.36 over and above his salary.¹⁰ Appeasing the Orangemen through his prosecution of the Métis did not win him support among the English who were disaffected by the extremism of Schultz and Cornish. He was not effective in achieving "Better Terms", partly because he was seen as contributing to the deficit, and he was not successful

⁸ Begg, Ten Years in Winnipeg, p. 39.

⁹ Begg, History of the North West, Vol. II, p. 96.

¹⁰ Free Press, July 21, 1874.

in finding political solutions for controversial issues such as the incorporation of Winnipeg, redistribution and the abolition of Council.¹¹

The Lord Gordon case in July 1873 was a typical example in which the Attorney General was seen to play both ends against the middle. He was blamed by the Americans for arresting and jailing the kidnapers and at the same time was accused by Gordon of blackmail. Gordon's subsequent suicide shocked the Red River Settlement and the only unanimity of opinion which resulted was that Clarke was a thoroughly despicable character unworthy of a cabinet post.¹² Le Métis felt that the persecution of Riel and Lepine was linked to the Gordon Affair - that Clarke was trying to save face by securing their conviction to make up for the Gordon fiasco.¹³

Although Clarke alienated both the anglophone and francophone communities, his enemies had difficulty defeating him in the House. The dilemma for his rival Royal was to get rid of Clarke without defeating the government. Clarke's domineering personality and verbal abuse in the House intimidated his opponents and they were afraid to precipitate a confrontation. A political stalemate resulted while demands for responsible government escalated.

The argument that the province was not ready for responsible government is easily challenged by the fact that most of the provincial cabinet in 1871 were well-educated professionals or successful businessmen.¹⁴ Clarke, Girard, Royal and Howard were lawyers;

¹¹ Milligan, p. 168.

¹² Begg, History North West, II, p. 108.

¹³ Le Metis, 25 octobre, 1873.

¹⁴ M.S. Donnelly argued that the provincial politicians were too inexperienced to implement responsible government in 1870. See The Government of Manitoba, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963.

Norquay had been a teacher and Boyd and McKay were merchants, no different from men who go into provincial politics in modern times. Nowadays, experienced civil servants advise ministers on preparing legislation and help them avoid political embarrassment in the House, but these were not available in Manitoba during Archibald's administration.¹⁵ Donnelly cites several examples of the cabinet's incompetence, one of them being the provincial debt, and suggested that the Dominion's advice to the province was to live within its means. He implied that the Dominion Government had to exercise paternalistic control over immature and inexperienced provincial politicians. However, this was unrealistic as the debt problem was partly structural and partly a reflection of Clarke's corruption and his tendency to use his cabinet position to his own advantage. The province had no ability to raise revenue and depended on the federal subsidy. The boundaries were very small, excluding potential taxpayers (the subsidy was based on population estimates). The debt problem was a legitimate grievance with Ottawa and sparked a perennial demand for "Better Terms" which became an important election issue in 1874.¹⁶

The situation changed in April 1874 when a byelection was held in Winnipeg to replace Donald A. Smith. Winnipeg was an Ontario British constituency, but it elected an Anglo-Quebecker, Robert A. Davis, to represent them because Davis had vowed "to defeat Clarke or die in the attempt".¹⁷ Undoubtedly, many of his constituents also hoped that the defeat of Clarke would mean the defeat of the French Party. A political observer noted: "The

¹⁵ Begg, History North West, II, p. 92.

¹⁶ Begg, History North West, II, p. 102.

¹⁷ Sun, June 2, 1883.

advent of the new member seemed to raise the courage of the House."¹⁸ Davis set about to arrange a non-confidence motion with an anglophone (Hay) as mover and a francophone (Dubuc) as seconder. By such a method, Davis avoided political embarrassment for either side as both groups wanted to end the regime of the unpopular Attorney General. For this reason, most historians have not realized the important role Davis played in Clarke's defeat and the instituting of responsible government in Manitoba (only Morton did so in his biography of Davis).¹⁹ To find a political compromise and allow other politicians to play the front role and take credit was typical of Davis' back-room style of politics and it is also why little has been credited to him.

A group of Winnipeg businessmen who opposed the transportation monopoly of the HBC organized a secret political society called the Grangers in February 24, 1874 during the Smith-Bannatyne election. They failed to defeat Smith who was the head of the HBC, but when he resigned his seat in the legislature, they chose R.A. Davis to represent them. Through the organization of the Grangers (which had originated in the USA as a farmers' movement opposed to the railway monopolies), Davis won the Winnipeg seat and became a spokesman for the Ontario British in the Legislature.²⁰

Clarke was taken by surprise on July 2, 1874, when the non-confidence motion was made. He might have expected a challenge from Royal, but not from the other members, especially Hay, with whom he had cooperated on the ill-fated redistribution bill. Clarke must have recognized that Davis was the instigator because he shouted that it was the outcome of

¹⁸ Legislative Library Scrapbooks, M1, "Voice of the People", p. 85. The author of these detailed articles was anonymous, but he may have been George Bryce as he used similar phrases which can be found in Bryce's history of the province.

¹⁹ Encyclopedia Canadiana, 1977, p. 208.

²⁰ Begg, Ten Years in Winnipeg, p. 96.

a plot from the backroom of a city tavern (referring to the Davis House on Main Street). He insulted his colleagues, threatened to throw Dubuc out the window and challenged Davis to a duel, but Begg noted that Davis proved more than a match for Clarke.²¹ Davis was not intimidated and used information he had gained in Quebec to remind Clarke of his reputation for corruption:

[Clarke] found the House perfectly impervious to threats or abuse and perhaps the Hon. R.A. Davis' offer "that if the gentleman wished to deal with personalities, he would discuss with pleasure the history of the ex-Attorney General's life during his last years in Montreal" had some effect in calming him to a certain degree during the rest of the session.²²

Davis was immediately brought into cabinet as provincial Treasurer in Girard's administration in July 1874 and, when that cabinet fell due to ethnic tensions, Davis, on the recommendation of Girard, was asked to be second Premier and formed a cabinet.²³ Lieutenant Governor Morris claimed to have instituted responsible government himself, but Davis disagreed, noting that Morris did not want to give up control:

For the space of three days this country was run without a government. Governor Morris wanted a government of which he would be the leading spirit. I was known to possess independence and strong views of my own. These did not accord with the governor's and it is generally understood that we experienced here at that time what Mr. Gladstone is reputed to have experienced in 1880. He sent for Dr. Bird the Speaker, and several others, who belonged to the defeated party. Of course they could not form a government. Nor could they break our ranks....Mr. Morris was

²¹ Ibid., p. 99.

²² Legislative Library Scrapbooks, M1, p. 85.

²³ In the fall of 1874, the two Ontario cabinet minister, Hay and Ogletree resigned because they would not go to the polls in the upcoming election supporting a French Premier and Attorney General - Girard and Dubuc. The Ontario men clearly hoped to rally all the anglophone members to support an anglo Premier. The compromise candidate was Robert Davis from Quebec who had the support of the anglos because he was English-speaking and Protestant and he had the support of the French because he was from Quebec and he spoke French. The francophones trusted him more than Norquay. The refusal of the Ontario cabinet ministers to support Girard suggests discrimination against the Premier's ethnic background. They rejected him because he was a francophone.

forced to act constitutionally. He had a party at Government House and during the evening found that the members of the Opposition were not such desperate men as he had been led to believe they were. I finally consented, though reluctantly, to enter a Government led by Mr. Girard.²⁴

The above quotation suggests that Davis considered himself part of the Ontario British Opposition and that Morris was opposed to choosing one of them to be Premier. When Girard's administration fell in December, the Lieutenant Governor asked Davis to form the ministry.

Despite the instability that had existed under Clarke and Girard, Davis succeeded in forming a coalition cabinet that maintained power for the next three years until he retired in 1878. Although he is generally credited with abolishing the Legislative Council and establishing the financial credibility of the province during a time of restraint, no other author has detailed how Davis succeeded in orchestrating the moderation of ethnic tension during a time when violence, intimidation and hatred had been characteristic of the conflict between the groups in the Red River Settlement in the post-Confederation era.

First of all one must wonder why Royal cooperated so fully with Davis, first in eliminating Clarke and, secondly, in establishing the new administration. After Royal had worked so hard for two years to undermine Clarke to become the recognized spokesman of the French Party, he would have expected to succeed Clarke. Royal probably hoped that Girard's administration would be short-lived as it would be difficult to maintain unity with Rielites and Ontario British in the same cabinet.

He had undisputed leadership of the largest, most close-knit and best disciplined of these groups. For Premier, he might have anyone he chose; he held the balance of power.²⁵

²⁴ Sun, June 2, 1883.

²⁵ Milligan, p. 181.

Obviously, an ambitious man like Royal would expect to become Premier himself and some historians have asked why the French leader stepped aside to allow the Anglo-Quebecker to fill the post of First Minister. After noting that Girard recommended Davis, F.A. Milligan wondered:

If such was the case - and Davis' selection is incomprehensible otherwise - it was a strange recommendation, for Davis had actually no personal following in the Assembly, having been only one of the Hay group. The only reasonable explanation is that Davis had decided to throw in his lot with Royal and break with his Winnipeg confrères.²⁶

The only explanation is that, while undoubtedly Royal wanted to be Premier, he realized a francophone would not be acceptable to a majority of the English. Since Hay and Ogletree resigned from the cabinet because they would not face an election with a French Premier and Attorney General, especially with so much antagonism engendered by Clarke's corruption and by the Lepine Trial, it became impossible for the French Party to hold the Premiership. So Royal had to set aside his personal ambitions again and wait until Davis resigned in 1878 when he could challenge Norquay. Davis must have made Royal an attractive offer - the kind of political partnership exemplified by Macdonald and Cartier. Royal would have control of patronage and political decisions in the French ridings. Royal suffered from minority disadvantage as he could not successfully compete for the post of Premier because of his ethnic background.

No author has explained why Davis, an anglophone who was an associate of Winnipeg businessmen and more particularly those Ontario men who had been responsible for much of the violence, should suddenly "break with his Winnipeg confrères"²⁷ and join the French Party. The French Party would have considered the choice of one of the Ontario British as

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

the greatest threat to the goals of the French community: the amnesty and the settlement of the halfbreed land grant. In fact, Riel's friend, Father Barnabé, said as much.

The reason for Davis' acceptability to Royal and Dubuc was that he came from Quebec and he could speak French.²⁸ He saw the demands of the French Party as reasonable, he did not assume it was "un-Canadian" to be French and he had the ability to make political compromises which would bring some peace and accommodation to the Red River Settlement. Like Clarke, Davis had the advantage of an English surname and, like Clarke, he came from Quebec. Unlike Clarke, he was not Catholic, but he won the respect of people in both Winnipeg and St. Boniface. At a public meeting in Winnipeg, Cornish insinuated that Taché dumped Clarke and took Davis into his confidence.²⁹ This was probably anti-clerical paranoia as there is no evidence to link Davis and Taché. It is more likely that Joseph Royal acted as a middleman between the Archbishop and the Premier and that Taché approved the partnership as a compromise arrangement.³⁰

It should be noted that Davis was a Protestant.³¹ Some authors contend that he

²⁸ Davis family oral history suggests that, when Davis and his wife arrived in Red River in 1870, he was met by Riel's Métis scouts who patrolled the roads. They took him to see the President in Fort Garry. Riel, suspicious of anglophone newcomers, asked his business. Davis could speak French and replied that he wanted to take up land. Reassured, Riel replied, "As long as your intent is peaceable, I have no problem with that" and released him. Davis and his wife disappeared until September after the troops from Canada arrived, bought a hotel on Main Street and began a profitable business. This story was used to illustrate the point that it was valuable for anglo-Canadians to learn French. Andrew Swan, personal communication.

²⁹ Free Press, December 9, 1874.

³⁰ A survey of Taché's correspondence reveals few letters from provincial politicians. One can assume that they talked on a regular basis and that Girard, Royal and Dubuc were his closest confidants.

³¹ Red River Census, 1870 and Davis family oral history. The family was Anglican; see Quebec census, 1861, courtesy of Anna Grant, Eastern Townships Collection, Bishop's University, Lennoxville, Quebec. A transcript can be found in the PAM, Robert Davis

was a Catholic to explain his leadership of the French Party, but this assertion has never been documented.³² As Premier, Davis acted as a middleman between the French Party and the Ontario British, not because he was Catholic, but because he was an Anglo-Quebecker.

Although Davis had no firm ethnic following as Milligan suggested, he used common economic goals, patronage and his Quebec experience to forge a loyal following in the Legislative Assembly with MPPs who provided him with a majority on government measures. He co-opted the leaders of the various ethnic groups into his cabinet and, by making himself the spokesperson of the anglophones, he excluded the intolerant faction of the Ontario British. Although it was in the area of ethnic relations that Davis achieved the most, it was also the area where he has received the least recognition.

F.A. Milligan argued that Joseph Royal was the key figure in the government and did not discuss the role of Davis:

[Royal] seemed to have taken over from the Lieutenant Governor the role of 'cabinet maker'. His power rested on his control of the close-knit French-speaking population, and 'Soyons-Unis' became the watchword of his newspaper. On the day when the tide of English-speaking immigration should destroy the dominance of that racial group, Royal's power would end.³³

Yet Milligan ignored the fact that, by 1874, there were sufficient anglophone MPPs to form a majority in the Legislature. The Redistribution Act of 1874 which was prepared under Davis' direction forced the French Party to give up two seats so that it had ten and the English and Canadian Parties combined had fourteen. This majority suggested that the next Premier would be an anglophone. The English and Canadian Parties could not unite,

Collection. There is no evidence in any documents that Davis was a Catholic, but he may have been labelled as such to undermine his support from his Protestant constituents.

³² Holmes, p. 17.

³³ Milligan, pp. 183-184.

however, as they were divided on racial grounds.³⁴ During the election of 1874, they ran as "independents" and "opposition" to the Davis-Royal ticket. The French Party was stronger because they maintained a united voting block, while the English and Canadians could not find common ground.³⁵ Therefore, Royal was not strong because his party was dominant, but because the opponents were in disarray.³⁶

Milligan made a major oversight in ignoring the man who successfully defeated his rivals (Royal and Norquay) for the Premiership. Davis showed political acumen in assembling his cabinet. He played off the leaders of the major ethnic groups against each other. Davis probably could not challenge Norquay as leader of the Anglophone MPPs without the support of the French as Davis represented the more moderate faction. He isolated Norquay by forming a coalition of French and more moderate English. He must have promised important concessions to Royal to get his support: these would have included a promise to lobby Ottawa for the halfbreed land grant and to resist the demands of the Ontario British to abolish separate schools and French as an official language. Both items were part of the Davis-Royal platform in 1874 and they defended them throughout their administration.³⁷

What is more difficult to understand is how Davis made the transition from being an associate of Schultz and Cornish to an ally of the French Party. An examination of the coverage of the election campaign of December 1874 in the Free Press and Le Métis offer

³⁴ From 1874-78, the MPP's of part-Indian ancestry did not support the Ontario British. John Taylor of Headingley was an exception. Even one of their own men, John Norquay, could not unite the two groups until 1878 when Davis retired and left the province.

³⁵ McAlduff, biography of Dubuc.

³⁶ Swan, "Ethnicity and the Canadianization of Red River Politics", Manitoba History Conf. 1988, University of Manitoba.

³⁷ Free Press, December 10, 1874 and February 1, 1878.

an insight into the competing and conflicting ideologies on either side of the Red River and Davis' successful negotiation of the pitfalls of Red River politics.

Davis was closely allied with the Ontario Canadian Party until 1874. When he and his wife arrived in Red River in 1870, he bought the Emmerling Hotel on Main Street and became wealthy in a short time.³⁸ In 1873, after his wife's death, he lost interest in the business and concentrated on politics. He was appointed chairman of the committee investigating the election riots of September 1872.³⁹ Later the same year, he challenged Donald A. Smith for the presidency of the Provincial Agricultural Association and lost.⁴⁰ The Winnipeg Businessmen hated the HBC for its freight monopoly of the steamboats and considered Smith their arch enemy. Attacks on the company were a common theme of Winnipeg town hall meetings; for example, a meeting was held at the Davis House in May 1872 to protest the site of the new Dominion government buildings for being too close to Upper Fort Garry instead of the village of Winnipeg. Davis played a leadership role in the agitation. Attempts to organize a Winnipeg business lobby culminated in the creation of the Board of Trade in 1873⁴¹ of which Davis was a charter member and he was also elected a Protestant School Trustee with Orangemen Frank Cornish and Stewart Mulvey.⁴²

³⁸ Begg, Ten Years in Winnipeg, p. 14; he had made his capital as a freighter in the gold fields of the American Rockies after the American Civil War; Swan, biography of Davis, DCB, Vol XII in press.

³⁹ Manitoba Liberal, Vol. 2, #7, September 1872.

⁴⁰ Begg, Ten Years in Winnipeg, p. 66.

⁴¹ Ibid., pp.77-78.

⁴² Free Press, February 8, 1873. It is doubtful that Davis was an Orangeman. The Free Press of May 10, 1873 reported on a meeting at the Orange Hall, Winnipeg, at which a "Brother Davis" was present. This could have been George Davis, a blacksmith and brother of Matilda Davis, an "old settler" family. Robert Davis appeared to avoid such fraternal organizations. He did not join the Manitoba Club like Royal and only joined the Masons in

Davis was one of the leaders of the Winnipeg "Incorporation Movement" in 1873, an attempt to create municipal government in Winnipeg to exert local control over the HBC. Schultz, McMicken, Davis, Bannatyne, Wilson, Bird, Cornish, McTavish, Villiers and Lyons were appointed a committee to lobby for the incorporation of Winnipeg at a town hall meeting.⁴³ Davis and Cornish became leading critics of Clarke's handling of the issue and they felt he was being manipulated by the Company because it was resisting the taxing powers of the new city.⁴⁴ When the new Council was formed, Davis was mentioned as a candidate, but did not run; Cornish was elected the first Mayor, showing that the Orangemen had dominant influence in Winnipeg.⁴⁵

During the Dominion election of February 1874, Davis was a prominent member of a newly formed secret society called the "Grangers", "its ostensible object being to oppose monopolies of all kinds".⁴⁶ During the Smith-Bannatyne election, Davis was a political organizer and he subsequently ran to replace Smith in the Provincial House in April 1874. He defeated Alexander McMicken, a banker and son of the Dominion Land Agent, by a substantial majority.⁴⁷

It is surprising that McMicken was an opponent of the Grangers and at this point we see the beginning of a split in the ranks of the Ontario British. Davis won because he was

1876 when he was already Premier. If R.A. Davis had intended to benefit from the political association with the Masons, he should have joined much earlier like his colleagues, Inkster and Norquay. Masonic archives, Winnipeg, personal communication with the author.

⁴³ Free Press January 4, 1873.

⁴⁴ Legislative Library Scrapbooks. M1, p. 79.

⁴⁵ Begg, Ten Years in Winnipeg, p. 92.

⁴⁶ Begg, History North West, II, p.112.

⁴⁷ Begg, Ten Years, p. 96 and Le Metis, 11 Avril, 1874.

well-organized and his pledge to defeat Clarke was popular. He was unlike the Canadian Orangemen who reportedly opposed Catholicism in the context of resisting French Canadian values. Membership in the Masons, for example, would have been awkward for Davis if known publicly because of his close association with the French Party;⁴⁸ as a result, he resisted joining them until 1876.

Davis garnered Canadian support because he was an English-speaking Protestant and a Winnipeg businessman who could articulate the grievances of the Ontario British. They had come to Manitoba, expecting to get land and get rich, but they felt excluded from the political process. Many were left off the election lists because they did not satisfy the residency requirement⁴⁹ while others felt that they could not compete in business when they were forced to pay higher freight rates than the HBC.⁵⁰ Most of all, they resented the influence of the French in the Legislature and their Orange leaders hoped to eliminate all aspects of duality as soon as possible. They felt superior to the "halfbreeds" and thought the land grant should be sold quickly to serious farmers from Ontario.⁵¹

Davis' most pro-Canadian stand was to sign an "Address of Welcome to Alexander Ogilvie of Montreal by the residents of this country during the winter of '69-'70 and who were fellow prisoners of the murdered Thomas Scott".⁵² This was indeed the elite group of the

⁴⁸ Fraternal Organizations, Greenwood Encyclopedia of American Institutions, Greenwood Press, Westport Connecticut: 1980, p. 208. Fraternal organizations were commonly based on ethno-cultural exclusivity. American Masons are exclusively white and do not recognize the legitimacy of black lodges known as Prince Hall Masonry, p. 124. Canadian Masons were known to be anti-Catholic.

⁴⁹ Bryce, p. 257.

⁵⁰ Bryce, pp.199-203.

⁵¹ Free Press September 12, 1874 and March 23, 1875.

⁵² PAM, MG3 B22, oversize, 1875.

Ontario British, and his signing suggests that Davis was a trusted Loyalist. However, it is also surprising as Davis did not arrive in Red River until May 10, 1870, after Scott's murder, and there is no evidence that he was a prisoner of the Métis; furthermore, Davis' family history suggests that he was on friendly terms with Louis Riel because he came from Quebec, he could speak French and Riel did not oppose his entry into Red River as he did with Ontario residents.⁵³ There is no evidence as to his whereabouts in the Settlement from May to September, 1870, when he bought the Emmerling hotel.

Davis had a few contacts on the St. Boniface side of the river which would have been troubling to his Canadian associates. He advertised his saloon in French in Le Métis, 21st September, 1871. During the Dominion election of 1872, Louis Schmidt reported to Louis Riel that Davis was organizing opposition to Donald A. Smith and was looking for French support:

M. Davis, de l'Hôtel Davis, m'a dit que 25-30 peut-être des Canadiens de Winnipeg voteraient plutôt pour un français que pour M. Smith. Ils détestent la Compagnie.⁵⁴

Another sign of disloyalty to the Ontario British was that, during Lepine's trial, Davis attended and sat with Premier Girard. This accusation was made by Cornish, the prosecutor.⁵⁵ To compound the matter, after Lepine's conviction, Davis signed the petition to commute the death sentence which Dubuc and Taché circulated among prominent members of Red River society.⁵⁶ Once Girard formed his new ministry in July 1874, he formed a coalition with three representatives of the Canadian Party into his cabinet: Hay,

⁵³ This information comes from A.W.D. Swan, Westmount, P.Q., personal communication with the author.

⁵⁴ PAM, Riel Papers, Schmidt to Riel, #163, 27 mai, 1872.

⁵⁵ Free Press, December 9, 1874.

⁵⁶ PAM, Dubuc memoirs, p. 32.

Ogletree and Davis; the three French members were himself, Dubuc (Rielites) and McKay (Loyal). By participating in such a bi-partisan group acting as middlemen between the French Party and the moderate Anglophones, Davis earned the distrust of the Ontario editor of the Free Press, W.L. Luxton:

It is unfortunate for this province that among the French Canadians who set themselves up as rulers and leaders of the poor misguided halfbreeds there is not a Dorion or a Joly. It is significant that the whole crowd of them are French Tories...they have...set to work upon the corruptability and sublime pliancy of Mr. Robert Atkinson Davis, formerly of McGill.... Is it possible for the McGill Premier to act honestly in the interests of the English-speaking people when he is dependent upon the French contingent for support and political existence?⁵⁷

Luxton questioned Davis' loyalty for cooperating with the French Party while, at the same time, Le Métis took the opposite view. It praised the new government as "moderate" and suggested that, by making mutual concessions, they would "render justice to all".⁵⁸

Davis continued to describe himself as a "Canadian" and representative of the English-speaking people. He explained in the House after the fall of the Clarke ministry that he was not anti-French, but trying to get rid of the Attorney General and his corrupt practices:

Davis explained why he had defeated the government; it was not to aid the Canadians; it was for the good of all. That the French could not be blamed for hatred of a man who betrayed their church. "He would not be guided by men who came to this country and who were a curse to the country they came from; who were dead politically there and stunk in the nostrils of honest men....The French had behaved very patriotic, they had conceded everything that is going to make this country great in the future....He was satisfied some of the later Ministry were honest [Royal and Norquay].⁵⁹

Davis had to convince his Winnipeg constituents to vote for him on a basis other than anti-

⁵⁷ Free Press, July 15, 1874.

⁵⁸ Le Metis, 11 juillet, 1874.

⁵⁹ Free Press, July 8, 1874.

French bias, so he appealed to them on an economic basis. He developed the following platform which could be used to appeal to the voters on both sides of the river:

- 1) Obtain a better federal subsidy.
- 2) Introduce a new municipal system to pay for public works such as roads and bridges.
- 3) Abolish the Upper House.
- 4) Reduce member's salaries.
- 5) Reduce expenditure of the Justice Department.
- 6) Bring the CPR through Winnipeg.
- 7) Improve navigation on the Red and Assiniboine Rivers.⁶⁰

Coupled with the two additional promises to the French, to amend the school laws and settle the land question, Davis' program served to deflect ethnic confrontation and concentrate on the economic development of Winnipeg and the province.

This program was accepted by Royal because he realized that Clarke's mismanagement had brought the province to the edge of bankruptcy and Davis would be more likely to compromise on issues of French rights than other Canadian leaders. The defection of Hay and Olgetree which undermined the Girard ministry made the French Party realize how vulnerable they were. Le Métis noted that the Ontario man did not have the courage to confront "stupid prejudice" and blamed "la fanatisme de race" for the ministerial crisis.⁶¹ Dubuc later remembered that Davis thought the conduct of Hay was unworthy, but that he could not stay in the cabinet if Hay left. "He would raise the cry of race against me.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Le Metis, 17 avril, 1875.

They would say I was the puppet of the French Party and make ceaseless war against me."⁶²

So he resigned as well, but maintained the trust of the French Canadian leaders.

Hon. M. Davis has shown himself full of the frankness during the ministerial crisis and negotiations following it. His conduct was always of a gentleman. And the cabinet of which he is head has our confidence and support.⁶³

Davis was correct because "raising the cry of race" against him was exactly what his opponents tried to do. Such feelings were reflected in the pro-Canadian editorials of the Free Press, written by Luxton, a candidate for the Ontario Party. Luxton continually reminded voters that it was important to elect an English majority in the election and vote against the Davis-Royal ticket. As a result, he suspected that English supporters of Davis-Royal might not be honest about their affiliations.

The English-speaking people have pronounced against the Government and no supporter can be elected in any English contest under his true colours....We believe most of the independents are Government supporters.⁶⁴

The English representatives were to a large degree split on ethnic lines with the Ontario British adamantly opposed to the Davis-Royal team while the Protestant Hudson's Bay Scottish were covertly in favor, but afraid to declare themselves. The Free Press pinpointed Davis' biggest liability and cause of distrust - he came from Quebec:

Born, raised and educated in the Province of Quebec, accustomed to Quebec institutions, Quebec unprogressive ways, the dual language, and all the 1000 and one things which it is necessary should be avoided in a British Province, Mr. Davis finds it impossible to shake himself clear of the effects of his early teaching and tenaciously clings here to what he was taught to cling to there. Let Winnipeg, inhabited by

⁶² PAM, Dubuc Memoirs, p.35. In this case, "race" refers to the categories of French and English. The French Canadians felt they were being discriminated against on the basis of their "race".

⁶³ Le Metis, 12 decembre, 1874.

⁶⁴ Free Press, November 26, 1874

Ontario people, send an Ontario man to represent them in Parliament.⁶⁵

Luxton further suggested that Davis was guilty of the worst kind of disloyalty to Canada because he was "a fair friend to the men who shot the martyr Thomas Scott".⁶⁶ While Davis tried to deflect such criticism by promoting his platform of economy, efficiency and "Better Terms", Luxton continually returned to his anti-French diatribes and sought every way possible to defeat what he called "the Quebec Party".⁶⁷ The election battle became another contest between the competing ideologies of Quebec and Ontario.

The Canadian Party recruited Captain Thomas Scott from the Ontario militia to defeat Davis, but they were horrified to discover that French Canadian officers in his regiment were supporting the man from Quebec:

Every French voter in the constituency avers that he will vote for Mr. Davis. And the more candid give their reasons for this change in their determination. Briefly it is that they are advised by Mr. Royal that Mr. Davis and he are in exact accord; that Mr. Davis is the friend of the French-speaking people and therefore every French-speaking man should cast his vote for Mr. Davis....We do not ask that French haters should be elected to Parliament, but the history of this Province since it had an existence shows that only political parties are English and French; moreover, our very Legislature proves the same thing, or else why is so much made of the Redistribution Measure, which practically prescribes so many English and so many French members? It is said that there are 14 English and 10 French seats. Winnipeg is rated with the former and the question is should this Division elect a friend of the English or a friend of the French?⁶⁸

Luxton obviously felt that Davis had forfeited his right to call himself "Canadian" by forming an Administration with a French cabinet minister. He called him and his supporters "traitors"

⁶⁵ Free Press, December 7, 1874.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Free Press, December 14, 1874.

⁶⁸ Free Press, December 23, 1874.

and "Benedict Arnolds" and accused them of being opportunists to get into power.⁶⁹ Luxton also attacked Royal when he spoke in support of the Premier at a town hall meeting in Winnipeg:

[Royal's] Quebec experience is not wanted here. It is the very thing we don't want. It is the oppression against which the people have kicked and if we mistake not, they will kick with such effect as to remove the experience entirely.⁷⁰

Luxton used a few other reasons for discrediting Davis in English eyes. A letter to the editor reported that, at a town meeting in the Canadian riding of Rockwood, to an Ontario British audience, Davis had claimed to have engineered redistribution to "swamp the halfbreed vote".⁷¹ There is no indication that this charge lost the Premier the support of the Hudson's Bay Scottish, but it does indicate some racial tension between the Ontario men and the "old settlers". If the charge was true, it would indicate that Davis, like many successful politicians, was prepared to tell the voters whatever would appeal to them to get their votes.

Luxton also criticized Davis on the grounds of his business background. The FP editor was a temperance advocate and he and other opponents of Davis disapproved of having a saloon keeper as "Hotel Premier".⁷² The temperance forces felt the issue was one of class and being a hotel-keeper did not suit a member of the elite. Rev. Bryce noted:

The position of hotel-keeper is not usually taken as one fitting a man to become a public representative. Davis was, however, a fair-minded, honourable man.⁷³

⁶⁹ Free Press, December 28, 1874 and January 4, 1875.

⁷⁰ Free Press, December 19, 1874.

⁷¹ Free Press, December 19, 1874.

⁷² This term was coined by Dr. J.H. O'Donnell in Manitoba As I Saw It, 1909, Winnipeg:Clark Brothers, p. 88; the doctor hated Davis because he removed him as President of Council and coroner for signing the warrants against Riel and Lepine.

⁷³ Bryce, 1906, p. 259.

While Dr. O'Donnell made fun of Davis' dress and manner of speech, Luxton indignantly wrote:

"We will not have our country laughed at abroad by having for Premier a man who has a sign at his door: "Meals at all hours; oysters in every style."⁷⁴

The editor accused the hotel man of not providing enough polling stations in certain districts and suggested this "blunder" reflected his lack of professional training and his inappropriate occupation:

The people of this province, especially those who have been practically disenfranchised through the ignorance of the combination with R.A. Davis at its head, cannot feel too deeply incensed...through the utter incapacity and ignorance of the upstart in this city who, because he has aquired a few thousand dollars by peddling whiskey out by the glass and taking in strangers thinks thereby that this qualification must redeem innumerable defects of training - constitutional and otherwise - that because he has succeeded in the one traffic, he is preeminently ordained to achieve wonderful success in the other.⁷⁵

The Free Press only represented one faction of public opinion in Winnipeg; it gave a very biased view of the election because it did not report anything positive that Davis said. The Nor'Wester was the opposite probably because Davis was the owner.⁷⁶ The Standard was also more positive and reported that Davis had publicly defended French rights in Manitoba and promised "he would not wish to be at the head of a government which would oppress the French".⁷⁷ It described Cornish and Luxton as being "Francophobic", always speaking against French as an official language and the principle of duality. The town hall meeting it described broke up when a chair was hit over the heads of some of the audience, an example of the hot tempers that flared up at Red River political meetings. In such a

⁷⁴ Free Press, December 28, 1874.

⁷⁵ Free Press, December 29, 1874.

⁷⁶ Begg, Ten Years in Winnipeg, p.10.

⁷⁷ Standard, December 19, 1874.

bigotted atmosphere, it was difficult for any politician to maintain a moderate stand, but it was this public defence of minority rights which helped Davis achieve power over other rivals such as Norquay.

On the other side of the Red River, Davis' colleague Royal published the French paper which was more sympathetic to the new regime. Le Métis noted that the English population was divided in the election and that Davis represented the more moderate group, suggesting that he had distanced himself from the Cornish (Orange) faction.⁷⁸ At a town hall meeting at the "Pride of the West" Saloon, Davis defended himself against the accusations of Cornish and Luxton:

L'Hon. M. Davis eut beau jeu à démolir notre militaire et son remarquable discours lui rallié les sympathies de la grande majorité.⁷⁹

Le Métis predicted a Davis victory.

When Davis did win the election, the anti-French faction in Winnipeg was angry because he had succeeded in splitting the English vote.⁸⁰ Luxton did not give up his anti-French tirades:

It was the French vote in this city that elected R.A. Davis and furnished him with a small majority of 15. And yet, Davis and a few admirers have the impudence to call themselves the Canadian Party. The title remains an affix and we respectfully supply it - the French Canadian Party....Let the[English-speaking people of this province] remember that this party is made up of traitors and men who justify the murder of Thomas Scott and who have declared murderers and outlaws in our courts.⁸¹

Despite their success at the polls, Davis and Royal had to continually resist Ontario British

⁷⁸ Le Metis, 28 novembre, 1874.

⁷⁹ Le Metis, 12 decembre, 1874. This quote suggests that Davis blamed the army volunteers for many of the violent incidents and harassment of the Red River inhabitants.

⁸⁰ John Gunn, elected MPP, noted to Schultz that their party was divided; both supported Davis; PAM, Schultz Papers, #7366 and #7368, November 22, 1874.

⁸¹ Free Press, January 4, 1875.

attacks. In the first session of the Legislature, Davis made the following response to the "fanatacisms" [sic] of Frank Cornish. It shows that he understood the minority mentality of the French who were forced to defend themselves against the dominant power of Ontario:

I was elected for Winnipeg, the biggest place in the province; I represent in the cabinet the interests of the English and Protestant majority; and I will defend them with all the energy of my will; but I declare to Mr. Cornish that I will always remember that I have colleagues in the Ministry of which I am chief that are of the Catholic and French minority of the Province. I will muster as much zeal as necessary to safeguard the rights of the weak and of the minority while respecting the needs of the majority.⁸²

Despite this stand, historians writing in the Ontario British tradition labelled his regime as "unprogressive".⁸³

The fact that Davis came from Quebec was an obvious issue in the election of 1874. Despite his economic and social ties with the the Winnipeg business community, most of whom were from Ontario, Davis exhibited a talent for political compromise and respect for minority rights not shared by most of the Ontario British. The tradition of duality which had existed in Red River in the Council of Assiniboia and in the working relationships of the fur trade found an affinity in the approach of Quebec politicians. The Quebec ideology approached government in Manitoba from the perspective of the minority. The French Canadians were united with the Métis as a voting block despite personal and class divisions until the Métis became disillusioned with the political system which worked against them.

Once he became Premier, Davis maintained a stable government until 1878, an achievement considering the Dominion government felt that Manitoba politicians were not ready for responsible government. Aside from deflecting ethnic tensions, Davis succeeded in

⁸² Le Metis, 3 avril, 1875.

⁸³ Begg, History North West, p. 206. Anglo historians in this tradition felt that the money spent on French printing and other costs of the duality would have been better spent on "progressive" items such as schools and roads.

winning the loyalty of a majority in the House by patronage and political maneuvering. When the "pragmatic" rules conflicted with the "normative" rules, however Davis got into trouble as Bailey's model predicted.⁸⁴

The Davis-Royal ministry tried to ensure that there would be only one government candidate in each riding. On one occasion, however, they were accused of interfering in the election. After the election in Kildonan which ended in a tie, Senator Sutherland, the incumbent, brought a charge of "corrupt practices" against the Ministry.⁸⁵ Sutherland accused the Davis-Royal administration of bribing one of the candidates in Kildonan to withdraw from the race. A public enquiry was held and the leading politicians in the province were called to testify. The Premier and his supporters were accused of wanting to ensure there would only be one pro-Government candidate in each riding.

Witnesses testified that, the night before the election, a meeting was held at Colin Inkster's house with the two opponents to Sutherland: Thibaudeau and Henderson. At quarter to five in the morning, Thibaudeau agreed to withdraw in return for his election expenses. The next day, he met Mr. Matheson on the river bank and was handed a cheque for \$350 signed by R.A. Davis. The Premier under oath, declared that this was not "an inducement for the resignation of the retiring candidate", but only to defray his legitimate election expenses.⁸⁶ As a result of the inquiry, however, the legislature decided that Sutherland should have the seat. Without strong party organizations, the political leaders

⁸⁴ Bailey, 1969, p. 5. Normative rules are those which are governed by principle while pragmatic rules are those which are determined by practical considerations. Bailey contends that politicians usually use normative rules to justify practical considerations. When these conflict, they have difficulty rationalizing their actions.

⁸⁵ PAM, Kenneth MacKenzie's Diary, April 29, 1875.

⁸⁶ Sessional Papers, 1875, Appendix, p. 83.

resorted to bribery and other means to strengthen their political machines.

Davis was also criticized for patronage appointments, such as those made in response to Nolin's demand that Metis replace French Canadians in key positions. Presumably, Dr. O'Donnell was not offered another position when the Council was abolished because of his unrelenting and public criticism of the cabinet. This may explain his unfavorable comments about the "Hotel Premier" in his book, Manitoba As I Saw It.

Most of the newspapers in Red River at that time were very biased and each took a firmly partisan stand. They could be swayed, however, by government favouritism. After the Free Press received the English printing contract from the government in 1875, Luxton ceased his vituperative editorials. He denied that his forthcoming praise of the administration had anything to do with his new-found support. During the next election campaign in 1878, most of the criticism of the government came from the Manitoba Gazette edited by Frank Abjon who suggested that Luxton received the contract because Davis held the mortgage on the Free Press Building.⁸⁷ The Gazette did its best to discredit Luxton:

Can the Free Press tell the public who the present great advocate of morality and temperance is, who a few years ago in a nude state, while drunk, literally chased "a poor girl" through the halls of the Davis Hotel till he was dragged back by his roommate and choked into submission?...we feel the scoundrel should be unmasked and his true character laid before the people.⁸⁸

A week later, after daily headlines in a similar vein, the paper obliged its curious public and revealed that Luxton was the man caught in the compromising position at the Davis Hotel; it was also implied by the story that the Premier had led the former temperance advocate into such a nefarious situation. The competition between the papers for government contracts resulted in such scandal-mongering.

⁸⁷ Gazette, November 30, 1878.

⁸⁸ Gazette, December 14, 1878.

The way that the newspapers reported election results is a good example of their contrasting political views. Because Le Métis was run by Joseph Royal, that paper was favourable to the new government in 1874 while the Free Press was vitriolic in its castigation of the Davis-Royal team. The campaign of 1874 effectively resulted in a minority government, but the newspapers could not agree on the significance of the results. After an analysis of voting patterns in the House during the following sessions, J.L. Holmes came up with the following list to show who supported the government and who opposed. It would appear that the list in Le Métis predicted the party alignment in the House better than that of the Free Press.

TABLE 8: PREDICTIONS OF PARTY ALIGNMENTS AFTER 1874 ELECTION

	Prediction	Prediction	Actual Voting Pattern
	<u>Free Press</u>	<u>Le Métis</u>	<u>Holmes</u>
Gov't Supporters	Davis Royal Lepine Chenier McKay Girard Nolin Lemay Dubuc <u>Martin</u> 10	Royal Davis Girard Dubuc Lemay Chenier Lepine Martin Nolin McKay Gunn Dr. Bird Bourke Murray <u>Taylor</u> 15	Davis Royal Lepine Chenier McKay Girard Nolin Lemay <u>Dubuc</u> 9
Independents	Taylor Murray Bourke Dr. Bird <u>Gunn</u> 5	Dick Howard Cowan <u>McKenzie</u> 4	Norquay Dick Luxton Bourke Gunn McKenzie <u>Murray</u> 7
Opposition	Brown Cowan Norquay Dick McKenzie Cornish Howard Luxton <u>Sutherland</u> 9	Cornish Luxton Norquay Brown <u>Sutherland</u> 5	Cornish Cowan Sutherland Taylor Brown Howard Bird <u>Martin</u> 8
Total:	24	24	24

Sources: Free Press, January 2, 1875; Le Métis, 2 janvier, 1875; Holmes, p. 20.

Holmes wrote a MA thesis in 1936 which extensively analyzed the election results in Manitoba from 1870-1899 and which is often referred to by other authors. He noted that the so-called 'Independents' voted with the government (after the cabinet reconstruction of March, 1875) so that the Le Métis was right about most of them (the only exceptions were Martin, Taylor, Howard and Cowan). Most of the Independents were Hudson's Bay Scottish who were perhaps sympathetic to the program of Davis-Royal, but who feared they would lose votes in the English parishes if they said so publicly. However, it also included some of the more moderate of the Ontario British.

Royal was well aware of his supporters when he published his post-election list in the Le Métis. Luxton had suspected during the campaign that the Independents were really Government supporters⁸⁹, but Luxton's position was contradictory, as he did not want to concede that Davis-Royal had a voting majority. He must have hoped that the two English groups (Independents and Opposition) would combine in an anti-French, anti-Davis-Royal coalition. Two days later, Luxton admitted that Davis had a small majority of 15, showing that the list in Le Métis was close, but, on January 7, 1875, he demanded that the House be called into session immediately as he suspected [hoped] they did not have the majority they claimed. The House was not called into session until after the cabinet reconstruction in March.

In February, the Opposition elected John Norquay as their head. This was surprising as Norquay was the only Hudson's Bay Scottish to stay with the Opposition - the others were already leaning towards the government. It is possible that the Canadians were trying to win them back as Luxton noted:

A greater tribute of respect could not be paid to the English half-breeds in this province than has been by the election of Mr. Norquay as leader by an Opposition

⁸⁹ Free Press, November 26, 1874.

composed chiefly of newcomers.⁹⁰

It is obvious that Norquay was politically closer to the Canadian Party than his ethnic colleagues⁹¹. The Ontario British must have hoped that Norquay could unite the anglophones and overpower the French minority. Norquay's election as Leader of the Opposition is major proof that he was not the great moderate leader of Red River as he has been portrayed.⁹²

Davis claimed he had won a clear majority of 15-9.

To prevent holding the balance of power, the opposition proposed a coalition. They agreed to accept my program, and I then took Norquay into the Government as their representative. From that date, the lions and the lambs sat in the House together.⁹³

Le Métis noted that the opposition agreed to drop its demand for the abolition of French and separate schools⁹⁴ and Royal insisted that Charles Nolin be admitted to replace James McKay as the French Métis representative in cabinet. McKay had resigned with the Girard Administration and had not been replaced as Davis had pledged to reduce the size of cabinet as one of his economy measures. When one of the Opposition members accused Davis of changing his program, the Premier explained that, while his group had been victorious at the polls, they did not get the support of the majority of English and they wanted all classes to be represented.⁹⁵

⁹⁰ Free Press, February 4, 1875.

⁹¹ Swan, "Ethnicity and the Canadianization of Red River Politics", Manitoba Historical Society Conference, 1988, p. 8.

⁹² See Gerald Friesen, "From Homeland to Hinterland: Political Transition in Manitoba, 1870-79", CHA Historical Papers, Saskatoon: 1979: pp. 33-47.

⁹³ Sun, June 2, 1883.

⁹⁴ Le Métis 6 mars, 1875.

⁹⁵ Le Métis, 10 avril, 1875.

Norquay was probably willing to give up his anti-French platform as a temporary measure because it was merely a matter of time before the French would be reduced to a small minority. He could not say that publicly, of course (a pragmatic norm) and so he justified the switch by claiming he wanted to unite all the groups, heal the divisions and say that he had the support of his [Ontario British] colleagues. Yet Norquay could not bring all the Opposition with him. Only three made the move, so that the Ontario British were still split between government and opposition.⁹⁶

In his biography of Norquay, Friesen did not deal with questions of ethnicity and did not mention that Norquay was head of the Ontario British faction. Yet he argued:

The group of English-speaking members of the Legislature to which Norquay belonged could not be ignored and, in March 1875, he returned to the cabinet on the strength of Davis' promise of an electoral redistribution to allow more adequate representation of the growing English-speaking community.⁹⁷

Friesen ignored the claim of Le Métis that Norquay had to give up his demand for the abolition of the official use of French in order to get into the cabinet.

It would appear that Davis felt his English support was weak and needed bolstering and that is why he delayed the opening of parliament until after the two next ministers were brought in. This was another example of the way Davis and Royal used patronage to strengthen their administration. They traded off redistribution against the acknowledgement of French rights.

One has to question the myth of Norquay as the great "moderate" politician of the Red River.⁹⁸ This position is difficult to maintain, given Norquay's position as elected

⁹⁶ Free Press, 2 April, 1875.

⁹⁷ DCB, Vol. XI, p. 644.

⁹⁸ Friesen described him as "one of the moderate elements", DCB, Vol. XI, p. 643; Morton wrote that Davis and Norquay "refused to countenance racial politics". p. 174)

Leader of the Opposition (i.e., the Ontario British in the Legislature). If Norquay had wanted to deflect racial tension, he might have made speeches such as Davis did, defending minority rights in the election, or he might have supported the government after the election as did Bourke, Gunn and Murray.⁹⁹ But instead, he chose to throw his lot in with the anti-French faction in the hopes of defeating the Davis-Royal ministry. Because the other English "halfbreeds" (except Taylor) supported Davis-Royal, Norquay was forced to compromise. He thus lost the respect of some of his Canadian supporters. Donald Gunn, member of the Legislature Council reported to Schultz:

There is some talk in town that greasy John has made another somersault - given his friends of the intended opposition the slip and is to have a seat in Mr. Davis' new ministry and Charles Nolin is mentioned as likely to have similar honor conferred on him.¹⁰⁰

Once Norquay had joined the government, Cornish became the new Leader of the Opposition and Le Métis contrasted his views with those of Davis. The Premier risked his seat during the election by defending French rights, and thereby won the biggest prize, the Premiership:

[Winnipeggers} chose between Mr. Davis who has always shown himself to be just and liberal and the famous Cornish who wants to abolish French, close our Catholic schools and chase all the Métis out of the country.¹⁰¹

Davis was much more of a moderate than Norquay and that is why he won. While Davis did not have a strong ethnic following, he won the support of a majority in the House and he resolved certain controversial issues by the judicious use of patronage.

Begg noted that Davis used patronage appointments to induce the members of the

⁹⁹ Le Métis, 2 janvier, 1875.

¹⁰⁰ PAM, Schultz Papers, #7461, March 5, 1875.

¹⁰¹ Le Métis, 3 avril, 1875.

Legislative Council out of office:¹⁰²

The out-going councillors who voted in favor of abolition were provided for by appointing them to other offices and in this way the vote to do away with the Upper Chamber was secured.

Lovell Clark has suggested that the other provinces had much greater difficulty in abolishing the Upper Houses and Davis deserved credit for accomplishing this feat within a year of taking office.¹⁰³

Over the issue of abolishing the Upper House, Premier Davis had his own reasons for opposing the Senate. He felt that it had interfered with the Incorporation Bill passed by the Lower House.¹⁰⁴ Davis later suggested:

They were an irresponsible body who in many instances vetoed the proceedings of the House, blocked the wheels of progress and exasperated the Government. So we decided they "must go"....[they were] mostly old fogies.¹⁰⁵

As already noted in the last chapter, the French Canadians felt that their representatives had betrayed the cause. The Lieutenant Governor Morris, however, went over the heads of the provincial cabinet and appealed to the cabinet in Ottawa, opposing the measure and asking for instructions.

The matter was referred to the Minister of Justice, Edward Blake, for his opinion. He advised that the Province of Manitoba had the right to amend the constitution:

It will be for the Legislature of Manitoba, if doubts should be raised as to its validity, to move the proper authorities for such legislation as shall remove these doubts and he recommends that the Act should be left to its operation.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰² History North West, II, pp. 107-198.

¹⁰³ Clark to Swan, personal communication.

¹⁰⁴ Sun, June 2, 1883.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ NAC, Secretary of State, RG6, A-1, Vol, 158.

In other words, Blake felt that any constitutional problem could be solved by the province because the Dominion cabinet insisted on it. This was another example, like the amnesty and the land grant, whereby the provincial government suffered for lack of local control and had to effect political solutions on the basis of Dominion coercion. The provincial government, despite its doubts about the Upper Chamber's usefulness, would not have abolished it without the interference of Ottawa which insisted on abolition as a condition of the subsidy. Therefore, Ottawa told Manitoba that it had to abolish the Council and then told Morris that they had the right to do it if they wanted to.

In fact, they did not have any choice under the system of internal colonialism. When Davis later claimed that he had decided it "must go", he was using normative rules to justify a position which would have seemed like a betrayal to his French supporters.

Premier Davis preferred an independent course from the Dominion Government and advocated more local control. When he went to Ottawa to negotiate better terms, Prime Minister Mackenzie complained to Morris:

We had pleasant enough interviews with your Ministers here. Mr. Davis, however, appeared to have come as far as Toronto with some curious ideas. He said to parties there that he meant to tell us plainly that, unless something effective were done, they would have to look to the States. His friends warned him not to attempt anything of that kind here; and he did not.¹⁰⁷

It was obvious that Davis was expressing considerable frustration in his dealings with the Dominion Government. It is not clear what he meant by the comment "they would have to look to the States". Did he mean that Manitoba might withdraw from Confederation? Certainly, fraternizing with American annexationists caused Riel much trouble; it would be surprising if Davis were thinking along those lines - the ultimate disloyalty.

Yet, in terms of his connections with the USA, Davis was very different from his

¹⁰⁷ PAM, Morris Papers, Ketch. Coll. #166, December 3, 1875.

Ontario counterparts. He was raised in the Eastern Townships of Quebec, close to the American border in an area that had been settled by non-Loyalist New Englanders in the early part of the century. He and his brother worked in the American mining fields in Montana and Colorado in the 1860's and both his twin brother and one of his sisters immigrated to Dakota Territory. His maternal grandparents and mother were American as were his two wives. Davis moved to Illinois when he retired from Manitoba politics. He preferred the USA to Canada because of the milder winter climate as well as the opportunity for business.

Davis showed a much greater affinity to his maternal American culture than to the British culture from which his paternal line had sprung.¹⁰⁸ It would appear that he did not aspire to a British peerage like Donald A. Smith who later became Lord Strathcona of Mount Royal or Sir Joseph Dubuc, a Knight of the Realm. Davis felt that economic opportunities should cross the border and he hated monopolies like the HBC. He would later be the front man for an American Syndicate which proposed to build the CPR more cheaply than the Canadian-British group headed by Stephen and Smith.¹⁰⁹

In his pro-American sympathies Davis would have been considered in Ottawa a renegade at best, and at worst, a traitor, not unlike Louis Riel and Ambroise Lepine, who wrote to President Grant in 1871, petitioning for intervention on behalf of the Métis. It would not be surprising if such frustration with the economic limitations of Canadianization as elucidated by the National Policy contributed to Davis' decision to leave Canada in 1878 when his term as Premier expired.

In Canada and the Métis, Sprague argued that the denial of an amnesty to Riel, the

¹⁰⁸ PAM, Davis Papers. See Swan, "R.A. Davis", DCB, Vol. XIII, in press.

¹⁰⁹ Sun, June 2, 1883.

denial of responsible government and the opening of the Métis land base to newcomers between 1870 to 1874 were policies which Macdonald used to disrupt the democratic process in Manitoba. The work of Milligan and Donnelly suggest that responsible government was denied for the first four years under the pretext of local inexperience. Yet, once responsible government was allowed to take effect, the local politicians succeeded in balancing the budget. Their biggest problem was the inequitable power sharing with the Dominion Government and the lack of control over public lands and the economic development of the province.

Encapsulation and economic integration meant lack of local control over development. Quebeckers Davis and Royal were both in Manitoba in 1870 as were other competent men with intelligence and experience. They proved that Manitoba could have run its own government without the paternal control of the Dominion, but the local politicians from Lower Canada were too sympathetic to the concerns of those "impulsive halfbreeds" to be trusted with governing a province that was destined to inherit the British Protestant tradition of Ontario. Encapsulation resulted in assimilation.

CHAPTER FIVE:

ASSIMILATION OF THE "OLD SETTLERS": HUDSON'S BAY SCOTTISH
AND RED RIVER BRITISH

In the provincial legislature in the post-Confederation era, it was generally accepted that there were three parties: the French, the English and the "Canadians" [Ontario British], but as Frank Cornish pointed out, no one element could rule the other two.¹ In order to form a majority, the government had to organize a coalition.

Holmes (1936) suggested that "English Halfbreeds" (as he called them) provided the balance of power by siding with the unified French Party (French Canadians and Métis) against the Ontario British, thus forming a moderate coalition in both the first and second Parliaments in the 1870's. Yet as already noted, Norquay tended to side with the Ontario British, thus indicating that he was not so moderate as other authors have suggested. Furthermore, as noted by Holmes' analysis of voting patterns in the House, several other "old settlers" voted against the government as well. It is therefore necessary to examine the voting patterns to determine why the Red River anglophones split as they did.

One of the problems in dealing with this group is in the definition of terms. The "old settlers", or English Party, included the Red River Settlers of English-speaking, Protestant ancestry, the majority of whom had settled in the Anglican parishes north of the Assiniboine and east and west of the Red River. The 1870 Census showed that the great majority were of part-Indian ancestry (the Hudson's Bay Scottish) while only a small number were non-aboriginal, usually of Scottish descent (the Red River British).² However, they did not

¹ Free Press, January 26, 1876.

² In Mailhot and Sprague, 1985, footnote 1, they claim that 783 families were of part-Indian descent while 61 were descendents of Selkirk Settlers.

distinguish between themselves on racial grounds, except in discussions of the halfbreed land grant.³ Racial designations tended to be used by the Ontario British immigrants including the Lieutenant Governor, Ottawa politicians, Orangemen and settlers who did not want to be identified with the Red River Settlers.⁴ Although there was evidence of racism in Red River society in the pre-Confederation era⁵, there had evolved a tradition of cooperation under the HBC rule, evidenced by the participation of francophone representatives in the Council of Assiniboia, recognition by the Company of Roman Catholic holidays (reported in HBC post journals) and the recognition of religious differences in the organization of Anglican and Catholic parishes and missions.

The arrival of the Ontario British in the 1860's caused much greater division in the settlement.⁶ Under normal circumstances, one might have expected the Protestant groups to become Canadianized as advocated by the old settlers such as Captain William Kennedy and James Ross.⁷ The violent intolerant actions of John C. Schultz and his Orange supporters, however, drove a great wedge among the Protestant settlers of Red River and caused divided loyalties. As a result, while some Red River natives strongly identified with the Ontario

³ Swan, "Native English Elite", 1988.

⁴ Bryce noted that "the Canadians were ambitious, were desirous of connecting the country with Canada, and were decidedly brusque and arrogant in many cases to the "old settlers", p.297.

⁵ Jennifer S.H. Brown, Strangers in Blood, Vancouver: UBC, 1980 and Sylvia Van Kirk, Many Tender Ties, Winnipeg: Watson & Dwyer, 1980.

⁶ F. Pannekoek, "The Rev. Griffiths Owen Corbett and the Red River Civil War of 1869-70", CHR 57, "2 (June 1976), pp. 133-49.

⁷ Van Kirk, "What if Mama were an Indian?"

British⁸, others such as Colin Inkster's sister Jane Tait, wrote that she would rather have Louis Riel as President than Dr. Schultz.⁹ She was angry at the burning of her husband's [Robert Tait] haystack and the attack on her brother, David. The violent incidents, the delay in the allotment of the halfbreed lands and the hay question drove most of the old settlers of part-Indian descent to take sides with the French Party in the Legislature.¹⁰

For the purpose of this study, a distinction must be made between the old settlers of part-Indian ancestry and those of non-Indian ancestry because this research in part is concerned with racial attitudes of the various groups. The difficulty is that, as Foster pointed out, no single term has evolved to satisfactorily identify the group of part-Indian ancestry.¹¹ This fact alone suggests that these Red River people did not want to be identified as a separate group. They wanted to assimilate; for this reason, they used the term, "old settler" rather than a racial designation.

Oral history research shows that descendants of some of these families who aspired to the higher positions in society either denied or downplayed their aboriginal background because they felt their ancestors considered themselves "white" and distanced themselves from their Indian connections.¹² They rejected designations such as "halfbreed", "English Métis" or "Native English" as they did not want to be associated with any term that linked them with a native background. The oral history sample undertaken was biased to the extent that the

⁸ Leslie Taylor on his grandfather John Taylor, The Native Link, Victoria: Pencrest Publications, 1984.

⁹ Swan, "Native English Elite", p.16.

¹⁰ For a description of violent incidents against the English, see Ronaghan, pp. 501-509; for discussion of delay in the land grant, see *ibid.*, p. 884.

¹¹ J.E. Foster, "The Metis: the People and the Term", Prairie Forum, 3:1, 1978, p. 7.

¹² Swan, "Native English Elite, p. 9.

people interviewed were descendants of Red River settlers who were the most motivated to assimilate as they aspired to elite positions and were in the closest contact with the Ontario British. Their ethnic confrères who continued tripping and trading were most likely to resist "Canadianization" and its racial antagonisms. These people were more likely to assimilate with native groups either on reserves or on the fringes of reserves.

Compare the attitude of Colin Inkster's brother, George who worked for the HBC in Minnesota and North Dakota, with his brother who was appointed to the Upper House:

"I have dearly longed to be a Big Indian. They are a proud lot of fellows and I get along [with them]."¹³

George also used Indian words in his letters: "Kie-Kit-te-mak-im-mim to see anything in the Nor-Wester."¹⁴ In the same letter, George contrasted his position with that of his brother:

I am unfit to live in the society that our family moves in, in Manitoba and elsewhere....I am really a Black spot in the Family and I don't want to be a white-washed Christian as I told the Preacher the other day....I see that you are riding a pretty high horse at present, but look out, You are apt like other Great Men to have a fall! but Mr. President and Speaker, You only seemed to care about the Honor of your Position. The first question I'd ask would be - what pay do you get?"¹⁵

The term "Hudson's Bay Scottish" has been used to denote those Protestant settlers of part-Indian, part-European ancestry who were mainly of Orcadian descent. "Red River British" would apply to those of European (usually Scottish or English) ancestry who were either married into or closely allied (politically and economically or as neighbours) with the Hudson's Bay Scottish (such as Dr. Curtis J. Bird, John Sutherland, A.G.B. Bannatyne and Robert Cunningham). The term "old settlers" will be used whenever no racial designation is required as this is the term they used for themselves. The designation "halfbreed" became

¹³ PAM, Inkster Papers, July 23, 1874.

¹⁴ This is probably a form of written Bungee; *ibid.*, January 26, 1875.

¹⁵ PAM, Inkster Papers, January 26, 1875.

insulting and derogatory and is only put in quotation marks to note when it was used in the context of the time such as the "Halfbreed Land Grant Protection Act".

A second problem in studying the political orientation of the "old settlers" is similar to that of the Métis - there are no extensive primary sources giving their own articulation of their views. The newspapers of Red River used for this thesis, the Free Press and Le Métis, were written by Canadians; the only newspaper which might express the views of the Red River British was the Manitoban, edited by Robert Cunningham. He defeated Norquay in 1872 to become MP for Marquette and was a strong supporter of the French Party and the dual nature of Red River.

In order to pinpoint their views, it is necessary to find quotations of old settlers, usually found in discussions in the House or in reports of political meetings. Biographical and genealogical research on cabinet ministers and MLA's also provide material.

Linguistical analysis is useful in examining the status of the Red River dialect, Bungee, as a "stigmatized" language.¹⁶ Bungee is a dialect of English with Cree vowels and Scots consonants.¹⁷ It probably contained many more Cree words a century ago, but these have been mainly eliminated as Bungee speakers discovered that their native connections labelled them inferior: for example: "The canoe went apeechequanee and they went chimmuck". Translation:

¹⁶ Eleanor Blain, "Bungee: The Dialect of the Red River Settlement", MA Thesis, Winnipeg: University of Manitoba, 1989.

¹⁷ Brian Orvis, a Bungee-speaker who grew up in Selkirk, Manitoba, disputes Blain's description of it as a "dialect". He claims that there are still Bungee speakers and that it is a language like Michif, not a dialect. Orvis suggests that Bungee-speakers do not like to be taped speaking the language as they share the native value system that one should not call attention to oneself. Therefore, it is difficult to document as Bungee-speakers will often deny knowledge of it. Personal communication with the author, Winnipeg, March 4, 1991.

the canoe capsized and they went splashing into the water.¹⁸

Contemporary evidence shows that descendants of the Hudson's Bay Scottish suffered racial slurs because of their native background which made them ashamed. One young oral history informant from St. Andrews told the author that her father made her practice her speech to ensure she would lose her Bungee accent.¹⁹ Linguistical analyst Eleanor Blain noted that she had to tell her informants that she was studying something other than Bungee because they would not have consented to be interviewed. They had learned over the years to eliminate elements of Bungee from their speech because they had been victims of mockery and only lapsed into it in casual conversation. The sister of Blain's major informant who had grown up in Lockport did not want to be associated with any native ancestry.

Blain's study provides an interesting contrast to the one by Swan because she was dealing with people from a lower class background. Yet, informants in both studies, while a small sample, admitted that speaking with a Bungee accent was a social liability and they felt that it should be avoided as well as any identification with a native background. These attitudes reflect a reaction against the racism which these people have had to face.²⁰

While some descendents of the Hudson's Bay Scottish will talk Bungee for fun or performance, it is not a dialect most speakers feel proud of. The mockery they experienced and subsequent avoidance of the Bungee dialect is a reflection of the racial prejudice suffered by the descendents of the Hudson's Bay Scottish and was probably much greater in the 1870's.

¹⁸ A radio address by Osborne Scott, Winnipeg, Inkster File, Manitoba Museum of Man and Nature. In this case, nouns are in English and the verbs are in Cree.

¹⁹ Informant AL, 1988.

²⁰ Brian Orvis noted people of part-Indian ancestry have been called "Sunburnt Scotchmen" or "Red River Royalty" in a mocking way. Personal communication.

The Bungee accent is avoided in the 1990's as it sounds like the accent of a native person speaking English. Even though most Cree or Ojibwa words have been dropped, it is still associated in descendants' minds with a native dialect.

It would appear that Bungee did not evolve as a language to the same extent as Michif, the Red River language which is a mixture of French nouns and Cree verbs.²¹ Linguistical analysis suggests that Michif has persisted to a greater degree than Bungee because there was more intermarriage for a longer time and more tolerance between the groups for each other's cultures while it evolved.²² Since 1870, however, Michif speakers have faced the same type of mockery of their language by French Canadians as Bungee speakers did by the Ontario British. As a result, some refuse to speak French.²³

Writers of earlier Red River history noted that language was an issue in ethnic relations. As noted in the last chapter, Dr. John O'Donnell criticized his colleagues in the Legislative Council for speaking "Indian".²⁴ The language was Cree which five of the seven members could understand.

Another contemporary writer who commented on the discrimination against the Red River natives by the Ontario British was the Rev. John McDougall. Although a missionary from Ontario, his first wife was part Ojibwa, Cree, and Scottish and their children were "half-breeds". He despaired of the attitudes of the newcomers who were "nasty and vulgar and

²¹ John Crawford, "What is Michif?" in The New Peoples, ed J.H.S. Brown and J. Peterson, Winnipeg: U of M Press, 1985, pp.231-247. Brian Orvis also disputes this assertion. He suggests that Bungee is on a par with Michif.

²² Prof. D. Pentland, "Michif and Bungee", Voices of Rupert's Land Conference, 1986.

²³ Prof. Paul Chartrand, Louis Riel Conference, Societe Historique de St. Boniface, 1985 or as noted, Charles Nolin by A.F. Martin.

²⁴ As noted in Winnipeg Daily Tribune, March 1, 1890.

sometimes most shameful in their modes of expression" in their references to Red River settlers. He advised them to be more accommodating as they might need their help in the future:

I must say that I have felt hurt as I mingled with you and listened to the tone of your conversation concerning these people. You are going into their country and will have more or less intercourse with them and I advise you to be more careful or at least more courteous....for I also am a halfbreed.²⁵

McDougall's message was that such labels can be misleading and hurtful and that the newcomers should respect the Red River settlers and not alienate them. They might have to depend on them for support in the future. He also pointed out that one could not depend on racial stereotypes. Some of the steamboat passengers had noted a blond-haired resident and commented that at least he was no "damned breed". McDougall enlightened them that the settler was in fact Métis.

Archbishop Taché echoed McDougall's sentiments in his document, "What ought to be avoided when alluding to the Half Breeds":

The Half Breeds are a Highly sensitive race; they keenly resent injury or insult and daily complain on that point. In fact, they are daily humiliated with regard to their origin, by the way they are spoken of, not only in newspapers, but also in official and semi-official documents....As a rule, the newcomers to this country do not spare the feelings of the Half Breeds and many sad consequences result from that habit.²⁶

In this case, Taché was referring to the Metis, but the problem he identified with the Canadian surveyors affected the Hudson's Bay Scottish as well and contributed a) to their desire to distance themselves from their native ancestry and b) to their identity conflict over

²⁵ His mother was English and his father Scots-Canadian. In the Days of the Red River Rebellion, West Canada reprint series, Edmonton, U of A, Press, 1983, pp. 260-261. McDougall was using the term "halfbreed" facetiously.

²⁶ AASB, Ta 4120, Tache to Dennis, February 3, 1879.

"Canadianization".²⁷

The problem for this group in the post-Confederation era was to what extent they wanted to and were permitted to assimilate with the Ontario British group. The delay in the allotment of the land question and the delay in the amnesty unnecessarily caused much racial antagonism in Red River for years after the resistance. The fact that four out of five of their group in the provincial House did not join their Ontario British colleagues until 1878 shows that, for some Red River settlers, Ontario Canadianization had some negative connotation.²⁸

Like the other groups, the old settlers were split between the allegiance to the Ontario British and those sympathetic to the "Quebec" government.²⁹

As noted in the previous chapter, Norquay was elected Leader of the Opposition in the reconstruction after the 1874 election, indicating that he had strong support of the Ontario British. In fact, Norquay acted as a middleman between the Hudson's Bay Scottish and the Ontario British. Bryce wrote that by 1878:

"Old settlers" and "Canadians" were ceasing to be political battle cries, Hon. John Norquay had the blood of the country in his veins so was a useful link in binding the two opposing sections together.³⁰

That Norquay should be pro-Canadian is not surprising, given his background. He was raised by his maternal grandparents and, although of a poor background, he was able to

²⁷ For a discussion of cultural ambivalence, see Sylvia Van Kirk, "What If Mama is an Indian?" in The Developing West: Essays on Canadian History in Honor of Lewis H. Thomas, ed. by John E. Foster, Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1983.

²⁸ See Chapter Four, Table 7. The four who voted with the Government after the cabinet reconstruction according to Holmes were: Norquay, Bourke, Gunn and Murray. Only Taylor supported the Ontario Opposition.

²⁹ Bird and Sutherland were of Red River ancestry, but were not of part-Indian ancestry; they tended to vote with the Opposition; *ibid.*

³⁰ Bryce, p.263.

attend St. John's parochial school because his grandfather was a tailor who made the school uniforms. He was not of the elite, but was educated with them. He won a scholarship to the Red River Academy, but a good education did not translate into a high status occupation. In a speech written by Colin Inkster's daughter, Sibyl, she noted that there were not many opportunities in Red River for a young man of Norquay's background: he had the choice of working for the HBC, as a missionary or school teacher. Officer positions in the Company were closed to him as he was not of the "purple". He tried teaching and trading, but it was only when he ran for politics that he found his niche. For a young man of such frustrated ambition, Confederation with Canada would promise new opportunities.³¹

Norquay's success in provincial politics appeared in part due to his good education and high class accent. He was known for "the pure diction and correct English of his speech", suggesting he had dropped his Bungee accent.³² This was important because it showed that Red River "Halfbreeds" could assimilate when educated.³³ His success was also due to his identification as a "loyalist" in 1869-70 as it undoubtedly won him support from the newcomers in his first riding of High Bluff. When he was brought into Archibald's cabinet in 1871, he was the acceptable alternative to Schultz as an Ontario British representative, reflecting his pro-Ontario leanings.³⁴ Norquay did not defeat Robert Cunningham in

³¹ PAM, Inkster Papers: a pencil-written memoir of John Norquay by Sibyl Inkster appears to be similar to the biography of Norquay by Schofield in The Story of Manitoba, p. 462.

³² Schofield, p.465.

³³ Bryce called him one of the best public speakers of the province, p. 263.

³⁴ Gerald Friesen, biography of John Norquay, DCB, Vol. XI, Toronto: U of T Press. pp. 608-614.

Marquette in 1872 as most of the Métis settlements supported the editor of the Manitoban³⁵, suggesting that Norquay's pro-Ontario stance made him suspect in French-speaking areas³⁶. In 1874, Norquay moved to the riding of St. Andrews and defeated the incumbent, E.H.G. Hay, the vociferous leader of the newcomers in the House whose defection had caused the fall of the Girard ministry. By then, Norquay had established himself as the spokesman of the pro-Canadian point of view.

It would appear that Norquay, like Davis, did not like the ethnic designations and promoted assimilation. He rejected the idea of politicians representing what he called "national interests" and felt they should work for their local constituents.³⁷ He was probably torn between his "English Halfbreed" identity and his Ontario sentiments, wanting to find a niche in the new regime; but the question remains: was he a member of the English Party or the Canadian? He was not listed in the Red River Census of 1870 so his "self-identification" is not available.

On various issues, Norquay adopted an Ontario view. On redistribution, he argued with Clarke that electoral divisions should be divided by population, not by ethnic voting.³⁸

On the land grant, he felt it should not be restricted to "halfbreeds", but extended to all old settlers resident at the time of the census³⁹. He did not support the "Halfbreed Land Grant Protection Act", felt that it was an "insult to the Halfbreeds" and that the Government should

³⁵ Begg, Ten Years in Winnipeg, p.71.

³⁶ In his obituary, Le Metis wrote that Cunningham defended the cause of the Metis in his paper and in Parliament, 11 juillet, 1874.

³⁷ Free Press, July 18, 1874.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Manitoban, February 15, 1873.

not interfere in their real estate transactions⁴⁰. Regarding the Legislative Council, Norquay rejected the Quebec model of duality which protected the principle of minority rights. He also denied the existence of a duality tradition of the Red River Settlement.⁴¹

When we consider the institutions under which we lived previous to Confederation, that we were all one people living under common institutions and whose common interests centered in a common issue, I cannot see the propriety of continuing such a House.⁴²

The Opposition which Norquay led in 1875 was committed to the idea of British superiority. They expected that the redistribution of 1874 would give them a majority and were disappointed that it did not. Luxton, who was elected as part of the Opposition caucus, expressed this sentiment:

Those elected to the second Parliament of Manitoba as the Opposition were regarded and we believe justly as the peculiar and uncompromising advocates of that supremacy in the affairs of the country for the English-speaking people to which their numbers entitled them.⁴³

By choosing a leader of part-Indian ancestry, the Opposition may have hoped to attract the votes of the other members of the English Party (Murray, Gunn, Bourke, Taylor, Bird and Sutherland). They then proposed to the Premier, Mr. Davis, that Norquay be taken into the cabinet "to give the English the balance of power."⁴⁴ The Government agreed to another redistribution giving the English more seats and the Opposition agreed to drop its

⁴⁰ Free Press, March 8, 1873.

⁴¹ George Bryce noted that the appointments to the Legislative Council were based on the Quebec recognition of duality - that is, equal representation of English and French, Protestant and Catholic. Such recognition of duality reflects a respect for minority rights and is an important basis for the Canadian nation.

⁴² Free Press, July 17 1874.

⁴³ Free Press, March 6, 1875.

⁴⁴ There would be three English ministers to two French: Free Press, March 6, 1875.

demand for the abolition of the French rights (Official language and separate schools). The deal broke down, however, when Norquay was unable to deliver all his supporters. Several defected and continued to oppose the government under Cornish' leadership, thus splitting the ranks of the anglophone representatives even more. Norquay took Dick, Luxton and McKenzie with him, while Cornish, Cowan, Sutherland, Taylor, Brown, Howard and Martin remained opposed⁴⁵.

Norquay must have been hurt by this betrayal and he publicly criticized Cornish, the Orange agitator, for withdrawing his support. He argued that he had won a concession on redistribution which "the English" wanted and that opposition should be made on political principles, not national differences.⁴⁶ Norquay stated that the English wanted fair English representation which they would get through fair redistribution.⁴⁷

In an editorial Luxton accused Cornish of bad faith to his party for betraying their agreed-on course of action.⁴⁸ He implied that Cornish abandoned Norquay because he agreed to Métis Charles Nolin's appointment to cabinet.⁴⁹

It is obvious that the strategy of the Opposition to get representation in cabinet was undermined by the actions of Frank Cornish. One must wonder at his motivation. Did the Ontario British object because of Norquay's pro-French concessions⁵⁰ or did they reject the leadership of a man with part-Indian ancestry? As Sylvia Van Kirk noted: "The cultural biases

⁴⁵ Holmes, p.20.

⁴⁶ Free Press, April 2, 1875.

⁴⁷ Free Press, May 12, 1875.

⁴⁸ Free Press, May 4, 1875.

⁴⁹ Free Press, May 12, 1875.

⁵⁰ Holmes suggested that they criticized Norquay for giving in to French demands, p.21.

of the newcomers, often racist in nature, denied to this group the successful integration into white society that they desired".⁵¹ The indignation meetings and political tirades the Ontario British organized against "halfbreed" claims make it surprising that Norquay was elected Leader of the Opposition in the first place. Despite his loyalty to the Ontario Canadian cause and his belief in assimilation, Norquay was betrayed by the newcomers he tried to please. Thus, his role as middleman between Hudson's Bay Scottish and Ontario British was blocked by the racist attitudes of the newcomers.

Despite the fact that Norquay was elected Leader of the Opposition, not all of the English of part-Indian ancestry were of similar disposition. While Norquay appeared generally popular with his constituents and was re-elected by acclamation after his appointment to cabinet, he was criticized at a public meeting by a Mr. Muckle who thought "Mr. Norquay had allied himself with the Canadians who were hostile to the native population".⁵² Such criticism suggests that not all residents of the English parishes were pro-Ontario (as the voting patterns of the MPP's in Holmes showed). The Nor' Wester, the paper owned by Premier Davis, wrote that the Opposition was not so popular among the Canadian representatives as was expected, suggesting that they preferred the more moderate Davis-Royal combination.⁵³ This sentiment was undoubtedly true of most of the Scottish halfbreeds who sided with the Government rather than Norquay. The only exception was John Taylor from Headingley who, in an election meeting, declared he favored the abolition of the dual languages.⁵⁴ Alexander Murray, for instance, from the French Parish of St. Charles, advocated the retention of

⁵¹ Sylvia Van Kirk, "What if Mama was an Indian?", p. 134.

⁵² Free Press, March 9, 1885.

⁵³ Free Press, February 10, 1875.

⁵⁴ Free Press, December 19, 1875.

French in the Legislature and the Courts.⁵⁵ John Gunn, running in St. Andrews, supported the abolition of the Legislative Council "although, in so doing, he would be cutting off the head of his own father" [who was a councillor]. Gunn was pro-Canadian, an ally of Schultz and had opposed the HBC in the free trade movement⁵⁶, but he probably supported Davis-Royal because of Davis' attacks on the company and his economic development program. William Tait was the Government candidate in Headingley and a relative of the Inksters. He supported the Davis-Royal program, including the use of French, abolition of the Council and "the opening up of the country by the immediate settlement of the Halfbreed grant".⁵⁷ Although Tait lost to Taylor, his platform shows that he considered the settlement of the land question an important priority.

The other important member of the cabinet who was of part-Indian ancestry was Colin Inkster. He never held a seat in the Assembly, but he was brought into cabinet by Davis by virtue of his seat in the Legislative Council. Inkster, although only a young man of 27 at the time of his appointment in 1870, represented the elite of the Red River Settlement. His father became wealthy through trading with St. Paul and was later appointed to the Council of Assiniboia from 1857-1868.⁵⁸ Colin, like John Norquay, was educated at St. John's College School, worked on his father's farm and did some freighting to St. Paul with his father's ox carts.

As in the case of Norquay, the coming of Confederation opened up job opportunities for educated men like Inkster. His appointment at a young age to the Upper House proved

⁵⁵ Canadian Parliamentary Companion, 1876, as quoted in Holmes, p. 30.

⁵⁶ Gunn's obituary, Legislative Library Scrapbooks, P1, p. 139.

⁵⁷ Free Press, December 19, 1874.

⁵⁸ MMMN, Inkster Collection Finding Aid.

that the Canadian government appointed men who were not only moderate, but loyal. James Ross, another Red River native who was educated as a lawyer in Toronto, had expected the appointment to the Council in March 1871. He had returned to Red River and had advocated joining Confederation for several years as an editor of Schultz's newspaper, the Nor' Wester. Yet, because he played a conciliatory role in the Provisional Government of the Métis as a mediator between the hostile groups, he was disqualified from a government appointment in Archibald's administration. Ross was so distraught at this rejection that he drank himself to death shortly after.⁵⁹ Van Kirk observed that the degree of psychological dislocation of "British Indians" as she called them was proportional to the degree to which they attempted to assimilate. As a result, the ones that aspired to high-status positions were likely to suffer the greatest rejection.

While this theory may explain Norquay's political problems with Cornish (and later McDonald) and his early death at the age of 48, it does not explain the success of Colin Inkster. Like Norquay, he had declined to participate in the Provisional Government and was known to be hostile to Riel. Such a stand earned him the reputation of a "loyalist" and helped him earn the seat in the Upper House. Although he was criticized by Cornish as the "representative of a family interest and not of the natives or old settlers"⁶⁰, yet he was a popular figure, both as a politician and in his subsequent appointment as Sheriff. The previous Sheriff Armstrong was known to be hostile to the Métis and was fired for his alcoholism, but Inkster carried on for 37 years as a popular civic administrator.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Jas. Ross to Archibald, Ross Family Papers, 11 March, 1871, quoted in Van Kirk, "What if Mama is an Indian?", p.133.

⁶⁰ Free Press, December 16, 1874.

⁶¹ Schofield, The Story of Manitoba, p. 14-15.

Inkster and Norquay were both Masons. Inkster joined the Davis-Royal ministry before the election of 1874. Such support won him the position of Sheriff when the Council was abolished.⁶² Alvin J. Schmidt noted that the Orange Lodge had a close association with the Masonry based on the fact that, in England in the 1800's, all fraternal organizations were banned except Freemasons. As a result, British Orangemen joined Masonic Lodges and sometimes operated under Masonic covers.⁶³ Through the Masons, Red River settlers like Inkster and Norquay were exposed to Ontario cultural values, such as those espoused by the Orangemen.

Inkster did not share James Ross' cultural ambivalence because he did not identify with his native heritage. While Ross' mother was an Okanagan Indian, Inkster's maternal line included several generations of mixed-blood women who were the wives of HBC officers. He identified with the maternal side and was proud that his maternal grandfather had been Governor at York Factory (William Sinclair). Jennifer Brown wrote that identifying with the mother was important in the formulation of Metis identity. In Inkster's case, he did the opposite and rejected the "Halfbreed" identity⁶⁴.

As an amateur historian and collector, Inkster loved to write and tell stories about the history of the Red River Settlement.⁶⁵ He might have considered himself Scottish or

⁶² Minutes of Executive Council, February 4, 1876, #226.

⁶³ Fraternal Organizations, Greenwood Encyclopedia of American Institutions, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut: 1980, p.208.

⁶⁴ J.S.H. Brown, "Women as Centre and Symbol in the Emergence of Metis Communities" in Canadian Journal of Native Studies, Vol 3, #1, pp. 39-46.

⁶⁵ Obituary, Winnipeg Tribune, September 28, 1934.

Canadian in identity.⁶⁶ He probably only identified himself as an "English Halfbreed" in the Red River Census of 1870 in order to qualify for the land grant. He did not have much sympathy for the French Métis who were losing their land. In his file are copies of transfers of halfbreed claims which he bought from people such as Marie Falcon, François Jeannette, Joseph Bercier, and Elizabeth Bruce.⁶⁷ Like many contemporaries, he speculated in halfbreed scrip, but probably did not feel guilty that he was participating in the displacement of the Métis. He would have justified the diaspora of the Métis as inevitable as the assimilation of the Hudson's Bay Scottish was into the soon-to-be dominant Ontario British culture.

Van Kirk questioned the failure of "British Indians" to produce talented leaders after Confederation.⁶⁸ This author suggests that Colin Inkster whose home is now a museum and John Taylor (who had a high school named after him) never stood out as successful leaders of the Hudson's Bay Scottish because they rejected that identity and embraced the Canadian identity. They assimilated so successfully that subsequent generations were unaware of their native heritage. Like Norquay, they benefited from their resistance to the Provisional Government and pursued a loyal course. Inkster's participation in the Davis ministry before the election of 1874 suggest that he was not opposed to French rights. At the same time, he had no trouble adjusting to the new régime. His opposition to the Provisional Government was to their actions, not their goals. Unlike his brother George who found the native lifestyle attractive, Colin avoided cultural ambivalence by identifying with the glorious deeds of his

⁶⁶ Oral history interviews with descendents, see Swan, "Native English Elite". His granddaughter supplied these ethnic designations and was adamant that Colin Inkster would not have considered himself "Metis" or "Native English".

⁶⁷ PAM, Inkster Papers, file #2.

⁶⁸ Van Kirk, "What If Mama....".

male ancestors. Although he admitted to his descendents that they were not "Selkirkers", it is not surprising that he was one of the leaders of the Lord Selkirk Association.⁶⁹ His hobby of collecting native artifacts, his fluency in Cree and Ojibwe and his love of goose hunting were his main links to his native heritage.

Van Kirk also contended that "unlike the Métis, the Anglophone mixed bloods lacked a distinct cultural identity based on the duality of heritage and this made it difficult for them to build on their uniqueness as a people of mixed racial ancestry".⁷⁰ The division of voting patterns of the old settlers suggests that they did not have a strong group identity like the Métis. Most of them supported the Davis-Royal administration for pragmatic rather than normative reasons. They appreciated the economic platform put forward by the men from Quebec which they could support and avoid the racial antagonism that had existed in Red River since 1870. Furthermore, their constituencies would benefit from government patronage.

The model of Canadianization provided by Quebec was more attuned to the duality of Red River than that of Ontario, but, because of unbalanced immigration patterns, Quebec influence was short-lived. If the old settlers wanted to succeed under the new regime, they had to adopt the British Protestant identity and reject their native heritage. Without a strong group identity that would have tied them to their native heritage and common goals with the Métis, it was easy for them to transfer their allegiance to the Canadian ethnic identity and to sell their halfbreed scrip. Unlike the Métis, they had no desire to preserve their cultural identity in the face of racial persecution and mockery.

⁶⁹ MMMN, Inkster File, newspaper clippings of Inkster's historical articles.

⁷⁰ Van Kirk, "What If Mama....", op. cit.

CHAPTER SIX:

THE IDEOLOGY OF THE ONTARIO BRITISH IN THE LEGISLATURE

The preceding chapters have outlined how the provincial governments of Manitoba after 1870 were based on an alignment of politicians who were seen to be both moderate and loyal to Canada. The ethnic groups were divided into factions who were vying for power and the Canadian Party, representing the English-speaking newcomers or "Ontario British", were divided on the issue of recognition of French rights. Under the Davis-Royal administration, some of the Canadian representatives agreed to support the government in return for another redistribution giving the English more seats while dropping their demand for the abolition of French as an official language and separate schools. Part of the Canadian contingent led by Orangeman Frank Cornish refused to accept such terms and thus organized a sustained opposition to the policies of the Davis-Royal administration. An examination of the issues and ideology of these Ontario British members is necessary to understand their unwillingness to compromise and their effect on policy, despite their exclusion from cabinet.

It has already been pointed out by authors such as Holmes and Morton that the main area of controversy in the Legislature in the post-Confederation era concerned relations between French and English. Since French rights were enshrined in the constitution, such debates evolved as attacks by the Ontario British on various aspects of duality (French printing, redistribution, the abolition of the Legislative Council, the land grant, separate schools and patronage appointments). The French Party was usually in a defensive position, trying to prevent further erosion of their rights while the Ontario British demanded further concessions.

The Government tried to blunt the attacks of Cornish and his supporters by

developing an economic development policy based on "local control" which should have appealed to the newcomers. While the French were prepared to compromise on some important issues to maintain their power in cabinet, the Ontario Opposition were not.

In Promise of Eden, Owram analyzed the intellectual history of the Canadian expansionist movement and concluded that the pro-British bias of the Ontario British led them to assume that the Métis were inferior and their future in the new province would be limited.¹ They did not appreciate that the Métis had any legitimate grievances and believed that they were being manipulated by outside powers: American expansionists, French Catholic priests and HBC officers.² Since in the Ontario view, Manitoba was seen as "Britain of the West" or "Nova Britannia" as Morris called it, they rejected the American model of a democratic society and assumed British dominance and a class structure in which the Ontario British would assume leadership positions.

Owram did not discuss the fact that there was no room for French Canadian rights, institutions and leadership in such a province, but one cannot help but conclude that the pro-British Protestant ideology rejected any role for the French Canadians as well as the Métis. There could be a place for English-speaking Protestants of part-Indian ancestry if they assimilated into the Ontario British culture and denied their native heritage, but any sympathy for Métis or French Canadian rights were equated with disloyalty to Canada. An example of extreme disloyalty was the handshaking incident between Archibald and Riel at the time of the Fenian raid.

The handshaking incident only brought Orangemen to new heights of vituperation in Ontario. Macdonald told Archibald later in the month that Scott's murder by Riel and

¹ The Promise of Eden: The Canadian Expansionist Movement and the Idea of the West, 1856-1900, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980, p. 162.

² *Ibid.*, Chapter Four.

the handshaking incident are the topics that we have to fear on the stump and at the Hustings before the next general election.³

During the Lepine Trial, editor Luxton reiterated the Ontario British view that French Catholics were "unCanadian":

It has travelled far and wide and it is known as a fact everywhere that a handful of people numbering less than 3000 - a people un-Canadian and un-English in their language, habits and customs - are dictating to a people superior to them in ability and numbers, but who are unfortunately the victims of duplicity and treachery.⁴

Such an attitude suggests that the HBC Scottish would have had an easier time assimilating than the French Canadians or Metis because they were partly British and spoke English. Prejudice was directed selectively at the minority groups and some suffered more than others.

The ideal of a new Quebec in the West was rejected. Even more moderate elements assumed that French rights were only temporary until immigration would provide numerical superiority and democracy could overturn any constitutional impediments. As Sir John A. Macdonald wrote to Archibald in November 1870, it was government policy to encourage Ontario British immigration and avoid the impression that Manitoba was to be a "Popish Preserve".⁵ This view was based on the assumption of British cultural superiority and reflected an intolerance which was anti-French, anti-Catholic and anti-native.

The Ontario British exhibited different kinds of prejudice against their opponents. Against the Hudson's Bay Scottish, it was racial; against the French Canadians, it was on the basis of religion and language; against the Métis, it was a combination of all three. Therefore, of the three groups opposed to the newcomers from Ontario, the Métis were liable to suffer the most. The HBC Scottish could avoid discrimination when and if they could distance them-

³ Sprague, Canada and the Metis, pp. 77-78.

⁴ Free Press, September 12, 1874.

⁵ Sprague, 1988, p.93.

selves from their native history.

TABLE 9: DEGREES OF PREJUDICE IN INTER-ETHNIC RIVALRY

	<u>Ethnic Groups</u>	<u>Types of Prejudice</u>	<u>Degree</u>
Dominant Group:	Ontario British		
Minorities:	HBC Scottish	Racial	1
	Fr. Cdn.	Religion & Language	2
	Métis	Racial, Religion & Language	3

Although the Ontario British were a small group in the Legislature, they still represented the dominant group because they reflected the attitudes of the Dominion Government which had the greatest power. Macdonald's policy of withholding responsible government and delaying settlement of the Métis land grant suggested a pro-Ontario orientation. The attitude of the Prime Minister was little different from that of the prejudiced anti-Métis newcomers. The prejudice they articulated was not unlike that directed against East Europeans and Asian immigrants in the period from 1890-1920 called "nativism", the discrimination of a majority against minority groups.⁶ The striking difference in the case of Red River is that the Ontario British were still a numerical minority in the House.

Why did Cornish and his supporters maintain such a hard line against French rights? They did not need to compromise because they thought it was just a matter of time until they would have control of the political institutions. They felt threatened by the French Party's influence in cabinet. In the meantime, they used violence and intimidation to coerce Red River settlers to accommodate their views. While not all the Ontario British indulged in rioting and assaults, the most violent confrontations were precipitated by Schultz and Cornish.

⁶ Howard Palmer, Patterns of Prejudice, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982.

The fact that Colin Inkster ran against Schultz in 1871 in Lisgar reflected their unpopularity with the "old settlers".⁷ Since the leaders were involved in the Orange Lodge and since Le Métis frequently attacked the actions of "les orangistes"⁸, it is obvious that there were very close ties between the Orangemen and the Ontario British. An examination of the Orange roots of the Ontario newcomers and the attitude they brought to Manitoba will show how the cultural values of the Orangemen represented Ontario cultural in general.

In his quantitative study of the Irish in Ontario, Donald Akenson traced the cultural history of the Ontario British and suggested that military confrontations with the Americans along the border played an important role in shaping the Ontario Canadian identity.⁹ In the post-loyalist period up to 1870, the largest groups of immigrants were the Protestant Irish and they confirmed their bond to their new country by affirming their British loyalty during the War of 1812 and in skirmishes in 1837.

In the tradition of the Loyalists of the Revolution, they fought the Americans. They conformed to the patriotic mythology of "loyalism" which had justified the privileged position of the Loyalist predecessors and successfully integrated into the local elites.¹⁰ Their mythology suggested that the best way to prove one's loyalty to Canada and the British Empire was by fighting Americans to keep Canada different and separate from American culture.

Akenson concluded that the invasions of 1812 and 1837 "naturalized" immigrant

⁷ Begg, Ten Years in Winnipeg, p.24.

⁸ Le Metis, 30 janvier, 1875.

⁹ Donald A. Akenson, The Irish in Ontario: A Study in Rural History, Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1984.

¹⁰ Akenson, p. 118.

Protestant Irishmen and gave them a chance to prove their loyalty by participating in the bonding myth.¹¹ In my own family, the most significant episodes of family oral history for Ontario ancestors were tales of male relatives who fought for the British militia or army at Lundy's Lane and the Battle of Waterloo.

As Owram pointed out, the Métis Resistance of 1869-70 was seen by the Ontario expansionists as the result of outside agitation by Americans who wanted to annex the North West. They did not see that the Métis had any legitimate grievances or independent agenda from the French Canadians. The Métis opposition to Canada was seen in the context of previous American invasions and therefore the Métis were pro-American, disloyal to Canada and the British Empire. They did not question whether the British Government might have a different view of the situation from the Canadian Government over, for example, whether to send a military expedition to Red River.

The impact of the American threat was much greater, however, than Owram indicated as it went much farther than the mere intellectual perception of American manipulation of Métis leaders. The American threat in Manitoba (embodied in O'Donoghue's participation in the Provisional Government, the presence of American annexationists in Red River and the Fenian Raid of 1871) required loyal Canadians to prove their loyalty through military intervention. If the country were threatened, the Ontario Canadians had to fight to save it. As a result, they had to fight Riel (for example, the confrontation at Schultz's store, the attack on Fort Garry to free the prisoners and the vicious assault on Parisien at Kildonan which resulted in his death).

This military attitude helps explain the hysterical rhetoric and mythology which followed the shooting of Thomas Scott whom the Ontario British characterized as a "Martyr"

¹¹ p. 195.

to the Loyalist cause and the labelling of Métis leaders as "murderers". It also helps explain the hysterical Orange reaction in Ontario to Archibald's handshaking with Riel in October 1871. Since the Métis were seen as the enemy and in league with the American invaders, it was necessary to deny any evidence which would suggest they were loyal. The denunciation of Archibald in Ontario forced his resignation despite his popularity amongst the majority of Manitobans.

The Métis threat to the superiority of the Ontario British identity was so great that it unleashed a flood of angry emotions that demanded revenge. They were not assuaged until the conviction and incarceration of Lepine in 1875. Before the Governor General commuted his death sentence, Lieutenant Governor Morris had to post a guard of fifty men around the jail in Winnipeg to protect Lepine from an Ontario British lynch mob.

Anyone who defended the legitimate grievances of the Métis was also seen as disloyal and branded as a traitor. When editor of the Manitoban Robert Cunningham spoke in the House of Commons as a defender of the Métis and French Party, he was castigated by the Free Press:

He is the tool of the rebels and murderers and he has even attempted to extenuate and condone treason and murder while he makes ever so much ado about a drunken row attended with no serious consequence in which the hated Ontario Volunteers happen to be implicated.¹²

The lines that were drawn were very clear: "All were dubbed either Rebels or Loyalists."¹³

In the first election in 1870, the issue of "loyalism" was the most important in the campaign and the attitude of the Ontario British as the oppressed minority of the French was reflected in this editorial in the Toronto Daily Telegraph:

¹² Free Press, May 17, 1873.

¹³ PAM, Inkster Papers, Sybil Inkster's Memoir of Norquay.

The result was a union of the priest party, the Hudson's Bay Company party and the Government Party, against the handful of loyal Canadians under Schultz and Lynch. Of course, the Canadians were powerless against such a coalition. They were defeated at every point and Governor Archibald will now have the pleasure of calling around him, as his advisors, the colleagues or supporters of the rebels who opposed our authority a year ago and whose hands are stained with the blood of Scott. We have gained a great deal by sending out that military expedition - have we not?¹⁴

Schultz labelled everyone who did not agree with his ideology of British superiority as "disloyal" and they became the targets of violent reprisals. Their tactics included assaults (as on Dubuc), murders (Goulet and Tanner), and vandalism which were aimed at giving the newcomers control of Winnipeg. Not all Ontario British agreed with this approach; for instance, Alexander Begg argued that the Métis were loyal during the Fenian raid:

There was too much of a disposition at the time to throw discredit on the feelings and intentions of our French neighbours and whatever may have been the portion of truth or falsehood in the rumours afloat at the time, it behooves us as historians to give them the full credit of their outward acts which undoubtedly evidenced a disposition of loyalty.¹⁵

Generally, however, the Red River settlers who were sympathetic to the French Party found it easier to keep quiet than to defend them publicly in light of the reprisals they might suffer (such as the horsewhipping of Thomas Spence). As well, subsequent narratives by Métis usually distanced the writers from any connection with Riel.¹⁶

After Schultz was elected to the Dominion Parliament in 1871, he was in Ottawa many months of the year and his place was taken by Frank Cornish, former Mayor of

¹⁴ Larry Fiske, "Controversy on the Prairies: Issues in the General Provincial Elections of Manitoba, 1870-1969". Ph.D. Thesis, Edmonton: U of A., 1975, p. 47. Fiske surveyed the election coverage in the newspapers and ranked the issues. He concluded that "loyalism" was the most important issue in the 1870 election in Manitoba.

¹⁵ Begg, Ten Years in Winnipeg, pp. 43-44.

¹⁶ See narratives by Peter Erasmus, Louis Goulet, Norbert Welsh and Fifty Dollar Bride by Jock Carperter about her grandmother, Marie Rose Smith.

London, Ontario, who had a reputation for illegal tactics such as stuffing ballot boxes.¹⁷ Cornish was a Liberal and blamed the Macdonald government and its appointees for recognizing the duality principles in Manitoba politics.

The Orangemen's targets ranged from the Rielite Métis to all those opposed to the "loyalists". Their identity with the military, anti-American tradition of Ontario loyalism and their intolerance of Catholicism stemming from their Irish Protestant roots was transformed in Red River to a fanatical hatred of the Métis, French Canadians and natives. They were prepared to prove their loyalty to Canada by mob rule if they could not count on the Government to suppress the French.

In 1872, a group of Ontario thugs crossed the Red River to prevent the Métis from voting for Donald A. Smith in the Dominion election. They beat up the Métis with wheel spokes and then stole the poll book where the votes were registered; the Métis had only mud and stones to defend themselves. Then the Orangemen went back across the river and rioted, destroying the newspaper offices of the Manitoban and Le Métis which were considered pro-Government organs.¹⁸ Such intimidation on election day was reminiscent of the violence used by some of the Irish Protestants in Ontario in 1834 led by Ogle Gowan:

The poll, which took place in Beverley, opened with the usual speeches by each candidate and with opposing groups massing around the hustings like teenage gangs in a school yard. There were minor scuffles. Most voters hung back. On the second day of the poll, several supporters of the reform ticket of Buell and Howard were hit, kicked and had their clothes ripped and some took small knife wounds as they tried to vote: Gowan's Irish supporters intimidating the reformers who wished to vote....Buell and Howard became convinced that they could not break through the line of Irish shillelaghs and after the fourth day, retired.¹⁹

¹⁷ Swan, "Frank Cornish: First Mayor of Winnipeg", Manitoba History, 9 (Spring 1985), pp.29-30.

¹⁸ Swan, "Frank Cornish".

¹⁹ Akenson, The Irish in Ontario, p.183.

Once Gowan became a member of the legislature, and a member of the political elite, such tactics were no longer necessary, but, in Manitoba, the 1870's saw protracted confrontations between the Ontario British and Red River Settlers.

The fact that Schultz, Cornish and their allies were members of the Orange Lodge in no small way explains their cultural tradition of anti-Catholic prejudice. Yet, as Akenson pointed out, the social ramifications of Orangism spread far beyond the ethnic boundaries of the Irish Protestants to include Ontario Protestants generally. Along with the Anglican Church and the public school system, the Orange Order provided the key for the assimilation of immigrants. It not only allowed for the economic integration of immigrants from the British Isles, it acted as a source of jobs and business contacts in the New World, as a social club and a mutual benefit society.²⁰

It is not unusual for immigrant groups to form such ethnic associations to fulfil social and economic goals.²¹ The important difference is that Orangemen aspired to be the dominant group and sought to exclude anyone who was not Protestant, British, non-aboriginal and male. Because its members exercised significant control of Ontario political elites, the Ontario British who immigrated to Manitoba assumed they would fill elite positions here.

They were angry when Lieutenant Governor Archibald included French Canadians and people of part-Indian ancestry in his cabinet and acknowledged the duality of French rights. They did not perceive that their own intolerance and bigotry prevented them from achieving power much sooner than they did. Their persistent demand to eliminate French rights alienated not only the French, but some of the anglophones, allowing the Canadians

²⁰ Akenson, p. 281; this explains how a man by the name of "Schultz" of German background became an Orangeman.

²¹ Steve Prystupa, "Images of Our Past" Exhibit Catalogue, MMRC, Winnipeg: 1988, p. 33.

from Quebec, Davis and Royal, to keep them out of positions of power.

The first test of the newcomers' strength and influence was in the provincial election of 1870 in which the Ontario hardliners were essentially defeated. The second test was the incorporation movement and the elections to the first Winnipeg city council in 1873.

The election of Cornish as the first Mayor signified Orange dominance at City Hall. As Akenson noted, such election battles were indicators of power and prestige and the results showed who was dominant in terms of class. The battle to achieve the position of Mayor of Winnipeg concerned issues of class and economic development.

Many of the young men who emigrated from Ontario were the sons of farmers whose ambitions were frustrated by the lack of good land at home and who hoped to make their fortune in the North West, either through farming, speculation, providing services or a combination of the above.²² They resented the monopolistic control which the HBC exercised in both freight rates on steam boats as well as in land development in Winnipeg. The Ontario British felt that the HBC and prosperous Red River settlers exerted too much political control.²³ They had hoped that the incorporation of Winnipeg would give them a new political lever to use against the Company and the elite of Red River.²⁴ They felt the HBC had intervened with the provincial legislators to diminish the effects of taxation on the land it owned in Winnipeg.²⁵

²² An example was Major Charles Boulton who was one of the leaders of the Ontario resistance against the Provisional Government in 1869-70 and later in General Middleton's army in 1885. See K.S. Coates and Ruth Swan, "Charles Arkoll Boulton", Dictionary of Canadian Biography, Volume XII, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 119-120.

²³ Manitoban, June 22, 1872.

²⁴ Free Press, January 4, 1873.

²⁵ Begg, 10 Yrs. in Wpg., pp. 80-81.

This issue of HBC influence in the legislature became an election issue and set the newcomers against the old settlers. When the Speaker of the Lower House, Dr. Curtis J. Bird, who was Red River British, threw out an amendment passed by the Upper House allowing license money to go to the corporation on grounds that it lessened the revenue of the Province, he was accosted and tarred by supporters of the incorporation movement who felt that the government was controlled by the HBC and Donald A. Smith.²⁶ The newspaper charged that changes in taxation were made to pacify the interests of the HBC and large landowners such as McDermott and Bannatyne: "The whole thing amounted to the HBC saying to the people, 'We'll run the machine and make you pay for it.'"²⁷

Incorporation was a class issue because the newcomers felt that the elite composed of Red River gentry and French Canadians were not responsive to the wishes of the Ontario men, many of whom were disenfranchised through the lengthy residency requirements. Indignation meetings were held to oppose the way the Legislature mishandled the issue. They were organized by incorporation leaders such as Davis, Cornish, G. McMicken, Villiers, Wilson and Luxton.²⁸ Davis and Cornish demanded that the bill be amended to allow the taxation of government buildings, but Morris reserved the bill on the grounds that such a move was unconstitutional.

Morris used this incident as an example of the legal ignorance of local politicians, but Begg (who was active in the movement himself) argued that the issue further alienated the people of Winnipeg from the provincial government.²⁹ He noted that, while the majority

²⁶ Free Press, March 8, 1873.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Begg, 10 Yrs. in Wpg., p. 81.

²⁹ Ibid.

disapproved of such tactics such as tarring the Speaker, the Orangemen were frustrated with the Clarke administration which they felt was corrupt and did not represent their interests.

The unpopularity of Clarke developed into criticism of the French Party in general. They hoped that the creation of the City of Winnipeg would give them access to power. When the election for Mayor was held, W.L. Luxton challenged Frank Cornish for the position. Cornish supporters must have included a substantial number of repeat voters as 582 votes were cast when only 388 names were on the voters' list.³⁰ Begg accused Cornish of winning with the support of the HBC and its friends, but it is more likely that Cornish won by fraud in voting procedures. It is difficult to see how Donald A. Smith and his friends would have found any kind of sympathetic colleague in Cornish who was dead set against the HBC monopoly. The HBC became a scapegoat with which no self-respecting Ontario politician would be associated. In November 1874, Cornish himself accused the cabinet of being a French government supported by the HBC.³¹

Cornish had a reputation for illegal practices which caused him to lose the Mayoralty after a year (he was defeated by Alderman Kennedy, one of Davis' supporters).³² Le Métis reminded French voters in Winnipeg that Cornish' role as mayor of London was so shameful and dishonourable that he was chased out of town. It is quite amazing that the French paper would support Luxton with his ideas about the place of French in Manitoba politics, but compared to Cornish, he was the lesser of two evils.

Although many of Luxton's ideas are far from ours, we respect his honesty and he is

³⁰ Begg, 10 Yrs. in Wpg., p. 94.

³¹ Free Press, November 26, 1874.

³² Begg, 10 Yrs. in Wpg. p.108

a friend of "fair play."³³

As noted in previous chapters, it was the issue of incorporation which brought R.A. Davis to the fore as a spokesman for the Winnipeg businessmen and it was this group which was attracted to the new social movement called the Grange.³⁴ The newcomers from Ontario were attracted to the ideology of the Grange, despite its American origins, because of its opposition to monopolistic control. In the USA, it had been essentially a farmers' movement attracting men who wanted some influence with the railway cartels over freight rates and land development. Politicians like Davis used the same approach to organize opposition to the HBC.³⁵

There is little information on the membership of the Grange as it was a secret society and so it is difficult to know whether the Orangemen were involved in it or not, but there is a significant difference between the two. While the Orange Lodge was based on cultural and religious distinctiveness, the Grange appealed to economic goals. Thus, Davis was different from Cornish in his attempts to organize the Ontario British. Through the Grange, Davis helped direct Red River politics to economic development rather than to ethnic confrontation.

Although Cornish became Mayor of Winnipeg for a year, he also ran for the

³³ Le Métis, 27 decembre, 1873.

³⁴ For a brief history of the Grange Movement in the USA, also known as the "Patrons of Husbandry", see Free Press, September 13, 1873; also Nordin, D. Sven, Rich Harvest: A History of the Grange, 1867-1900, Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1974.

³⁵ It is possible that Davis introduced the concept of the Grange into Manitoba as he was in the Eastern Townships of Quebec in the spring of 1872 when it first entered Canada through Vermont. Davis was one of the leaders when it is first mentioned in Manitoba during the Smith-Bannatyne election of February 1874. L.A. Wood, A History of Farmers' Movements in Canada, Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1924, p. 30. Wood, however, does not mention Davis' role.

Provincial Legislature in 1874 and it was in that forum that he competed with Davis for the leadership of the Ontario British. Cornish' biggest mistake in his attempt to lead the Canadian Party was his inability to win over like-minded individuals such as J.C. Schultz. At an election meeting, held in Winnipeg, Schultz attacked Cornish whom he accused of organizing a group of men with axe-handles to go to Lisgar to defeat Schultz at the last general election. It is not known on what pretext Cornish would have undertaken such a confrontation or why he opposed Schultz, but, as a result, Schultz supported Davis.³⁶

During meetings held in various English constituencies, Ontario candidates announced their platforms geared to attract the support of Ontario constituents, some of which implicitly held an anti-French bias. These included a fair election law (redistribution giving the English more seats), a school act based on the Ontario system (abolition of separate schools), a municipal act based on the Ontario system (abolition of river lot parishes) and abolition of French as an official language.³⁷ If the candidates were in favour of the Davis-Royal administration, their comments were not generally reported in the Free Press or they were afraid to declare themselves and said they were "Independents".

It is difficult to judge the pro-government feeling in the English ridings based on the Free Press because of the climate of anti-French feeling, but, as the Nor' Wester (owned by Davis) pointed out, the Canadians were not so decidedly opposed as the Free Press pretended, given the fact that Davis was able to not only win his seat in Winnipeg, but gain the support of some of the Hudson's Bay Scottish and a few Ontario British in the Legislature. Therefore, despite the determination of leaders like Cornish and Luxton to run on an anti-French ticket, they could not win a majority of seats to form a government. Some

³⁶ Free Press, December 9, 1874.

³⁷ Free Press, November 26, December 2, December 9, December 10, 1874.

members like Luxton chose to support Norquay's decision to compromise while Cornish did not, thus leaving the most prejudiced Ontario British out of the cabinet in favour of Red River men like Norquay.

Another problem that the Ontario British faced was that they became disaffected with the policies of the Dominion Government when they realized that Manitoba's interests were overruled by those of Ottawa. Both Conservatives and Liberals were alienated particularly by the failure of the Dominion railway policy. Likewise, the Dominion politicians often became frustrated with the actions of their intended allies in Manitoba. In January 1873, Sir John A. Macdonald advised Dominion Land Agent Gilbert McMicken to distance himself from "This so-called Ontario Party. They seem to think that the whole of the North West was made for that province alone."³⁸ McMicken himself was suspected of being "subservient to French interests" when he was appointed, but the Free Press was pleased to note that this had not occurred.³⁹

When Lieutenant Governor Morris first came to the province in 1872, he distanced himself from the policies of his predecessor by refusing the Métis demands for amnesty and immediate settlement of the land question. The Free Press congratulated him for his stand.⁴⁰ Within a year, however, Morris perceived that Cornish' actions as a Liberal partisan supporter were aimed at embarrassing the Conservative Government in Ottawa. Such tactics overrode any allegiance that might have allied the two Ontario men. He blamed Cornish and the "Ontario Opposition" for engineering the arrest of Lepine and noted that he had ordered

³⁸ L.H. Thomas, The Struggle for Responsible Government in the North West Territories, 1870-97, 2nd ed., Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978, p. 55.

³⁹ Free Press, April 5, 1873. In fact, he was just the opposite. Macdonald chose McMicken, a former policeman and Fenian fighter, as a spy against the Métis. See Sprague, Macdonald and the Métis, p. 96, footnote 23.

⁴⁰ Free press, December 14, 1872.

twenty men from the artillery posted in front of the fort to protect the prisoner.

Morris was forced to change his mind about the grievances of the Métis:

My sympathies have been with the native mixed population as I have shown by my course in the Hay question. They are even tempered people with many good qualities, but, for the moment, the Dominion Government and the Local and the Governor are all blamed for the arrest. Even Girard was under the impression yesterday that your government had prompted the arrest....As to the Scott murder, it is very late for punishment and revenge ought not to be encouraged.⁴¹

He ended this letter by suggesting it was time to reconsider the amnesty. Morris was not able to pursue this change in policy because Macdonald's government fell in the Pacific Scandal, but it would appear that he, like Red River settlers such as the Inksters, were tired of the violence and would have preferred Riel and Lepine to be left unmolested (not because they agreed with their political agenda, but because they felt the ethnic hostility was counter-productive).

Once the Liberals were in power in Ottawa, the Liberals in Manitoba must have hoped that they would benefit from political patronage. However, Morris warned the Dominion cabinet on several occasions about the difficulty he had in keeping the peace, both in protecting Lepine as a political prisoner and on election day avoiding a repeat of the Election Day Riot of 1872.⁴² Secretary of State Edward Blake hired Cornish, but, by December 1875, had received such bad reports about him that he no longer wished to maintain him as his agent.⁴³ MacKenzie noted that Cornish had not given up his "vice".⁴⁴ Whatever it was (probably alcoholism), it destroyed Cornish' credibility with the Liberals in Ottawa who

⁴¹ PAM, Morris Papers, Lt. Gov. Coll. #57, September 20, 1873.

⁴² PAM, Morris Papers, Ketch. Coll., #141, December 25, 1874.

⁴³ PAM, Morris Papers #167, December 6, 1875, Blake to Morris.

⁴⁴ Ibid, #162, September 22, 1875, MacKenzie to Morris.

appeared to have more trust in former Conservative Alexander Morris' advice than in that of their own colleague. Thus the party ties between Manitoba and Ottawa were not so strong given the nature of the Opposition in the West.

The Ontario British became frustrated with the Dominion for imposing decisions on Manitoba that was not in Western interests. Their anger centred on the delay in connecting Winnipeg with the railway and led them to anti-Canadian talk. In 1875, Winnipeg businessmen formed a "Railway Committee" to lobby the Mackenzie Government to speed up its plans. J. Franke Lynne, Secretary of the Committee and editor of the Standard, wrote a scathing editorial castigating the Dominion Government. While Luxton of the Free Press denounced Lynne's anti-Canadian sentiments, the debate showed that the Ontario British were developing a consciousness of separate identity from that of Ontario:

In last week's issue, we find an article concluding, because the Dominion Government's Pacific railway route does not suit the province, that Confederation has been a grievous injury to it and that the Canadian nationality is its chief enemy. Another article hints at a crown colony. Perhaps there are many people in this province who feel that Canada might do something better for us than she is doing, but that it is possible for our condition to be improved by separating ourselves from the Confederation (were it possible) is a suggestion distasteful in the extreme to those [genuine and patriotic Canadians], one which will not tolerate and though made by an "imperial" sage is arrant nonsense in their eyes.⁴⁵

Talk of separation from Canada was bordering on the "disloyal" as was Davis' threat to go to the States for help in economic development. Such strong feelings suggest that Canadian expansionists became disillusioned with Canadianization earlier than the 1880's.⁴⁶

As George Bryce noted:

This tide of immigration had changed the conditions of Winnipeg by the middle of the seventies....Public opinion began to change and old combinations began to break up.

⁴⁵ Free Press February 25, 1875.

⁴⁶ As Owrarn suggested in his Chapter 8: "Disillusionment: Regional Discontent in the 1880's".

New issues arose. A new western type of Canadian man began to develop.⁴⁷

Businessmen like Davis advocated an unrestricted capitalist approach which would allow American railways to come into Canada.⁴⁸ In 1881, Davis acted as a front man for a group of American financiers who bid on the CPR contract. Sir John A. Macdonald ignored their offer, probably because the company would have its headquarters in New York and the Prime Minister did not want an American concern running the CPR.⁴⁹

Davis had no difficulty in embracing the American capitalist model, but it was more difficult for the Ontario expansionists with pro-British leanings. They expected that transportation and trade links would run east-west, not north-south, but the slowness of development made them question the feasibility of Confederation. It also made the Liberals in Ottawa very unpopular and helped to bring the Conservatives back into power.

Although many of the Winnipeg businessmen hated Donald A. Smith and his HBC monopoly of the transportation network, they had to swallow their pride when Smith emerged as one of the leading organizers of the CPR Syndicate. Although the Ontario British in Winnipeg opposed monopolies, Canadianization of Red River meant that people like Smith were still in control because he made his base in Montreal and had access to international capital and influence in Ottawa. Ontario fear of Americanization would not allow any other economic alternative. The Ontario British had to confront the fact that, although they might be successful in displacing the French in Manitoba, they still did not exercise local control because decisions about Western economic development were being made in Central Canada.

⁴⁷ Bryce, 1906, p.182.

⁴⁸ Sun, July 2, 1883.

⁴⁹ NAC, MacDonald Papers, Vol. 128, #53048 January 15, 1881 and #53049-51, January 17, 1881, Davis to MacDonald.

CHAPTER SEVEN: CANADIANIZATION AS ENCAPSULATION

A state of internal colonialism existed in Manitoba during its first decade because the provincial government did not have control over economic development and settlement. Initially, there was no premier and the cabinet was responsible to an executive head appointed by Ottawa. Even when a provincial premier was in place, local control was denied through the province's dependence on the federal subsidy.

In Canada and the Metis, D.N. Sprague argued that, while the denial of an amnesty to Louis Riel amounted to denial of responsible government, the opening of the Métis land base to newcomers between 1870 and 1874 was even more important in defeating the Métis as a people in Manitoba. Sir John A. Macdonald had confided to his Governor General in February, 1870:

These impulsive halfbreeds have got spoilt by their émeute and must be kept down by strong hand until they are swamped by the influx of settlers.¹

In fact, a combination of factors conspired against the Métis. There can be little doubt that Ontario Canadians interfered with the political process in the new province by intimidating the supporters of the Provisional Government to discourage them from running. Similarly, there is no argument that the Prime Minister discouraged the selection of a Premier until 1874. Authors such as Milligan² and Morton³ accepted Macdonald's paternalistic assertion that the local politicians were not experienced enough to handle representative insti-

¹ Sprague, Canada and the Metis, p. 89.

² The Lieutenant-Governship in Manitoba 1870-1882, p.104.

³ Manitoba: A History, p. 146.

tutions and that Archibald was justified in acting as a "paternal despot".⁴ This does not make sense since Archibald's cabinet advisors were mainly Canadians such as Clarke, Howard, Girard, and Royal who were all trained in the legal profession. One cannot help but conclude that the federal politicians undermined responsible government in Manitoba so that they could keep control of the legislative agenda. As George Bryce observed: "The wonder is that a government based on such a principle should be workable at all."⁵

Superficially, it seemed that the French Party was dominant as it produced the first Premier. It formed a coalition with the Métis, French Canadians, Anglo-Quebeckers and Hudson's Bay Scottish which provided a voting majority until 1878. However, the French Party saw itself as a minority group that was being increasingly threatened by the Ontario British. Although the latter were excluded from the cabinet, they were vociferous in their demands to abolish the institutions of duality. They saw themselves as inheritors of British supremacy and felt that they were deprived of their rightful position by the French. Through their constant attacks on the Manitoba Act, they forced the French to be constantly on the defensive. Because of the dominant power of the Dominion Government, the French were forced to make compromises which undermined their position as one of the charter groups of Confederation.

Canadianization had two effects on Red River politics. Canadians from Quebec and Ontario formed competing elites which dominated Red River settlers until eventually the Ontario British succeeded in dominating the French Canadian elite. Also, the Quebec and Ontario newcomers treated their ethnic allies in Manitoba differently. The French Canadians and Anglo Quebeckers formed an alliance with the Métis which functioned successfully in the

⁴ Milligan, p.104.

⁵ Bryce, A History of Manitoba: Its Resources and People, p.107.

House despite increasing distrust and frustration on the part of the Métis. The delay of the Dominion Government in settling the land grant and amnesty were blamed on the French Canadian leaders who were seen as increasingly ineffective middlemen (between the Métis and Ottawa). The success of the French Canadians in withstanding the attacks of the Orangemen was offset by the compromises they were forced to make to keep their position in cabinet. The proof that the French Party suffered from minority disadvantage is that it was in a no-win situation - it was bound to lose power sooner or later because the dominant group, the Ontario British, were hostile to their assumptions of equality.⁶

By contrast, in the short term, the Ontario British did not succeed in organizing the support of the Anglo-Quebeckers and the Hudson's Bay Scottish who found more common ground with the French Party than with the Canadian Party. The prejudice of the Ontario British against people of native and French heritage "obstructed open, creative adaptation, especially by the people of dependent status"⁷, so that, even when they elected Norquay leader of the Opposition, the Ontario British did not give him whole-hearted support, despite his obvious leadership qualities. Norquay's position suggested that the Red River natives had to conform to the Anglo-British model in order to find a place in the dominant culture. They also learned that assimilation did not guarantee acceptance.

A useful theoretical model for understanding this process of Canadianization is "encapsulation" by which the Dominion of Canada took over the Red River settlement and integrated it into the national economy. Delaying responsible government was a way for Dominion politicians to exert control over Red River politics through the intervention of the Lieutenant Governor. Local politicians resisted such control, but found that, even when

⁶ See quote of W.L. Luxton in the preface, p. v.

⁷ Breen, p. 201.

responsible government was instituted, they still lacked local control because they did not have jurisdiction over land and economic development. The demand for "better terms" reflected a growing perception of unequal power sharing so that the Canadian newcomers (Anglo-Quebeckers and Ontario British) soon discovered that dominance in Manitoba would not give them the power they sought. Thus, agitation for provincial rights began in the 1870's, sooner than other authors have identified.

The theory of encapsulation helps explain the dispossession of the Métis. The dominant power of the Ontario British was assured, not just by unbalanced immigration, but by the policies of the federal government which was not committed to the implementation of the Manitoba Act. The undermining of the Métis land base affected not just that group. It resulted in the undermining of the Manitoba provincial government which supported the demands of the most disadvantaged. Lacking power to solve the problems of the Métis eventually meant that it lacked power to develop the railways and a strong provincial economy.

Competition for leadership during this critical period occurred in all the groups, but the men who were successful were those who could play a middleman role to negotiate between them. While Riel and Schmidt were leaders of the Rielite-Métis, they had to depend on their French Canadian colleagues and Loyal Métis, such as James McKay, to represent their view in cabinet. Yet, because of this association, Royal, Dubuc and Girard were seen as less-than-loyal to Canada. The fact that Girard could not maintain the Premiership in 1874 showed that the French Canadians did not enjoy the dominant position to which they aspired and they had to rely on an anglophone who would be sympathetic to their agenda.

The man who successfully forged an alliance between the moderate Ontario British

and the French Party was not John Norquay who aspired to lead the Ontario British. Norquay was not seen as sympathetic to the goals of the French Party even though he grew up in Red River. The position of Premier was taken by an Anglo-Quebecker, R.A. Davis, who better understood the minority fears of the French Canadians and the Métis.

The Orangemen did not succeed in attaining power during this period because their behaviour and attitudes alienated potential allies in Red River and Ottawa. Nevertheless, through the dispossession of the Métis and increasing immigration, their future dominance in Manitoba was assured.⁸

Attitudes of prejudice were different between the Canadians of Quebec and Ontario. Initially, the French Canadians were willing to cooperate with the Red River Métis because they needed them to form a strong francophone presence. Although they undoubtedly hoped the Métis would assimilate into the French Canadian community, they respected the Métis leadership and cooperated with them, not only in cabinet, but in cultural organizations such as the St. Jean Baptiste Society.

By contrast, the Ontario British sought the support of the Red River anglophones without understanding the Red River perspective. The Hudson's Bay Scottish were expected to assimilate and reject their native heritage, language and traditions. Leaders such as Norquay and Inkster were accepted when they rejected their maternal culture and conformed to the Ontario British model.

⁸ For example, the Manitoba Schools Question during which the Ontario British were finally successful in abolishing separate schools and French as an official language in Manitoba. Another example occurred when the NDP Government under Premier Howard Pawley tried to introduce French Language Services during the 1980's. Most of the ethnic groups in the province opposed special services for francophones, suggesting that they believed English should be the only official language. They did not perceive that their own claim to minority rights would be enhanced through the historical claim of the French minority in Canada.

Ontario prejudice was not selective in its application. Intolerant of the French language, Catholic religion and native heritage, the Ontario British would be most opposed to securing the Métis land base and to the leader who demanded it. Despite the obvious leadership abilities and intellectual capacity of Louis Riel, he could never become Premier of Manitoba as he proposed in 1872. Riel articulated the language of resistance so well that he could not act as a middleman. His grievances challenged the power of Canada and, under the encapsulating structure of Canadianization, the Métis agenda was in direct conflict with Ontario British domination. Riel would simply never have been accepted by a majority of anglophones as leader of the province.

It is not surprising that Davis and Royal acted as the middlemen between the French Party and the Canadians, and between Red River and Ottawa. It was only through compromise that they could achieve their political goals and deflect ethnic tensions, but the price they paid was that future generations who identified with the dominant English-speaking majority would call their regime "unprogressive".

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