The Resettlement of Japanese Canadians in Manitoba, 1942-1948

by

Louis Dion

A Thesis
presented to the University of Manitoba in fulfilment of the thesis requirement for the degree of Masters of Arts in History

Winnipeg, Manitoba
Copyright Louis Dion, 1991
The author has granted an irrevocable non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of his/her thesis by any means and in any form or format, making this thesis available to interested persons.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in his/her thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her permission.
THE RESETTLEMENT

OF

JAPANESE CANADIANS IN MANITOBA, 1942-1948

BY

LOUIS DION

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of
the University of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements
of the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

© 1991

Permission has been granted to the LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA to lend or sell copies of this thesis, to
the NATIONAL LIBRARY OF CANADA to microfilm this
thesis and to lend or sell copies of the film, and UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS to publish an abstract of this thesis.

The author reserves other publication rights, and neither the
thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or other-
wise reproduced without the author's written permission.
I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis.

I authorize the University of Manitoba to lend this thesis to other institutions or individuals for the purpose of scholarly research.

Louis Dion

I further authorize the University of Manitoba to reproduce this thesis by photocopying or by other means, in total or in part, at the request of other institutions or individuals for the purpose of scholarly research.

Louis Dion
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ........................................................................ iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ......................................................... vi

Chapter page

INTRODUCTION ................................................................. 1

1. THE BRITISH COLUMBIA SECURITY COMMISSION AND THE CREATION OF THE MANITOBA SUGAR BEET PROJECT .... 25

2. RURAL RELOCATION AND THE JAPANESE DIVISION ............... 66

3. URBAN MIGRATION .......................................................... 112

4. DEPORTATION, COMPENSATION AND THE JAPANESE COMMUNITY .... 135

CONCLUSION ................................................................. 182

Appendix

A. Map of the Manitoba Sugar Beet Project

B. Example of a Segregation Form

SOURCES ........................................................................ 190
ABSTRACT

Much of the literature on the removal of Japanese Canadians during the Second World War is preoccupied with British Columbia and Ottawa; and little detailed research has been done on the fate of Japanese communities resettled in other provinces. Between 1942 and 1948 some 1,180 Japanese evacuees were relocated in Manitoba. The task of this thesis is to examine why the Japanese families were relocated in Manitoba, and how they were treated by federal authorities, the Manitoba government and the province's residents. The establishment and evolution of the Japanese community in Manitoba during the period will also be discussed. The thesis will accomplish this by examining the complex inter-relationship among the British Columbia Security Commission (BCSC), a federal agency associated with the Department of Labour, the Manitoba Sugar Beet industry, the Manitoba government, the Japanese evacuees and concerned citizens amongst the province's rural and urban population.

The people of Japanese origin resettled in Manitoba represented a cross section of British Columbia's Japanese community. First (Issei) and second (Nisei) generation Japanese
Canadians, born or naturalized, as well as Japanese Nationals (citizens of Japan), arrived in Manitoba together. From the correspondence between the BCSC and provincial governments as well as among Security Commission officials, it is clear that the evacuees were viewed as one community. Japanese Canadians and Nationals were accorded the same treatment whether under the jurisdiction of the BCSC, or later, the Japanese Division within the Department of Labour. Of the 1,180 relocated in Manitoba, 220 were Japanese Nationals. While Japanese Nationals elected a representative who dealt with the Spanish Consulate monitoring the treatment of enemy aliens, in actual practice any changes in regulations by the authorities were applied to all evacuees. Thus, for the purpose of this discussion, references such as evacuees, Japanese families, Japanese community and Japanese Canadians will include all persons evacuated to Manitoba, unless otherwise specifically stated.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis could not have been completed without the assistance of many people. I am indebted to the staff of the National Archives of Canada, the Provincial Archives of Manitoba, and the Legislative Library of Manitoba for their generous help. I would like to thank Harold Hirose for his time and effort. I am grateful to friends and colleagues for their encouragement, especially J.L. Guillias for his useful comments. Special thanks to Professor Ed Rea for his criticism, perseverance and guidance. Last but not least, I would like to thank and dedicate this thesis to my parents for their patience and support. While acknowledging the assistance of others, I alone am responsible for any errors or omissions.

I am also grateful to the J.S. Ewart Memorial Fund and the Canadian Japanese Mennonite Scholarship for their financial assistance.
The literature discussing Canadian Japanese can be placed into three categories; contemporary monographs, academic studies and Japanese Canadian personal histories. Monographs portraying the contemporary ideological climate are an important and useful addition to the literature. The monographs which support anti-Asian exclusionist's ideologies played a vital role in developing the Caucasian cultural bias, which manifested itself in the Japanese Canadian evacuation in 1942. When analyzing the writings some general questions may be asked. Was racism in British Columbia motivated by political, economic, or cultural factors? What caused the federal government to evacuate the Japanese Canadians from the coast in 1942? What were the effects of the evacuation on the minority group? How successfully did the Japanese evacuees resettle outside BC.? Before these questions can be answered a sample of the period's mindset is required.

By the end of the 1890s, racist propaganda denigrating Chinese and Japanese immigrants was readily accessible in pamphlets and newspaper articles in BC. The first to dramatize this xenophobic attitude was Hilda Glynn-Ward's *The Writing on the Wall* (1921). The novel contained the traditional elements of good versus evil, corrupt politicians, unsavoury businessmen, and family intrigue; all
of which was linked to the "Asian Menace" threatening the very heart of BC's Occidental society. The novel's decisively anti-Asian theme was designed not simply to shock the reader, but to "educate" as well as entertain. The book has a number of interrelated themes. Glynn-Ward, like her exclusionist counterparts, argued the only way to avoid the impending Asian invasion was to stop or restrict Oriental immigration, maintain disenfranchisement, and tightly control their economic penetration in the province.

Glynn-Ward's work represented the contemporary view of Orientals in BC during the twenties and thirties. The first significant academic study on the Asian community in British Columbia was *The Japanese Canadians*, (1938) by C.H. Young, H. R. Y. Reid and W.A. Carrothers. Prior to the Japanese Canadians, opinions expressed by exclusionist were not seriously refuted. Young, Reid and Carrothers' study was the first attempt to dispel many of the myths that embellished this emotional issue. The book was divided into two parts: part 1 discussed the Japanese Canadians, while the latter looked at the Chinese and the Oriental standard of living. Part 1 examined the Japanese Canadians' settlement process, immigration and fertility rates, employment, and their economic impact on the provincial economy. The authors also studied the assimilation rate of the Japanese Canadians with respect to occupation and their standard of living.
The relationship between economics and prejudices was one of the book's centrepieces. Young, and Reid and Carrothers maintained that as Japanese Canadians advanced on the economic ladder, white groups became agitated and lobbied for restrictions on immigration and economic occupations, illustrated by a sharp reduction in fishing licences in the mid-1920. The authors also stated that because wealth was distributed unequally, the common antagonism of class conflict was compounded by cultural and colour factors. Strong economic competition magnified the ingrained prejudices of white British Columbians.

Equally important in the authors' analysis was the social and cultural conflict between Caucasians and Japanese immigrants as well as the simultaneous rift between the Issei (first generation) and Canadianized Nisei (second generation). Young, Reid and Carrothers suggested that the Nisei were raised with mainly Canadian values, and during their youth were largely accepted by the Occidental community. As the white children aged and learned prejudices, they became less tolerant of non-whites. Despite not being accepted by the dominant Occidental culture, the Nisei tried to assimilate into Canadian society.

Young, Reid and Carrothers declared that in order to eliminate racial prejudice, the Asian community must be granted citizenship rights and dispersed over a large area.
The authors examined the topic in a thorough manner and their contribution was an important first step in correcting the inaccurate allegations levelled at the Asian community.

Ten years after Young, Reid and Carrothers conducted their study, Forrest E. LaViolette published *The Canadian Japanese and World War II* (1948), a sociological and psychological account. LaViolette was the first to examine the effects of internment on the Japanese Canadians and discuss the actions of the federal government in the evacuation. The book offers a description of the internment, workcamp conditions, the evacuation, and resettlement across the prairies and Eastern Canada. As well, it illustrates the problems and shortcomings of employment opportunities on sugar beet farms and federal facilities in the interior resettlement centres.

LaViolette's account was rich in historical data, but the book's primary task was to analyze the sociological and psychological effects of the evacuation on the Japanese community. He attempted to look at the leadership and religious divisions within the Japanese community and how they affected Japanese-White relations. LaViolette noted that within the Japanese community, leadership was moving from Issei to Nisei control, a process hastened by relocation. Prior to the evacuation, Issei leadership, embodied in the Canadian Japanese Association (CJA) was unquestioned. As the Nisei generation matured, however, they
became better educated and more comfortable with Canadian society, demanding a larger say in the decision making process of their community.  

Religious divisions were an equally divisive force within the Japanese community. Most of the Issei were Buddhist, while the Nisei were Christian. As a result of ties with the Christian church, the Nisei were more acculturated and had supporters within church organizations like the United Church League and the Y.W.C.A. which enhanced their leadership role, but strained the relationship among religious groups.  

Despite the Nisei's Christian affiliation, the displacement of the Japanese evacuees led to disorientation, a loss of ambition, and feelings of insecurity for all members of the Japanese community.  

LaViolette's work was a valuable contribution to the literature. If the book had any deficiencies, it was the discussion of the sugar beet project. LaViolette's analysis centred on Alberta with a peripheral look at the Manitoba program. While acknowledging that the Manitoba sugar beet industry had different problems, LaViolette did not recognize the resistance to the BCSC's proposal within Manitoba, nor did he take into account the administrative differences of the project, which made the evacuees' resettlement in Manitoba an unique experience.
After the war, Japanese Canadians reorganized and rebuilt their lives. Written testimonies and public statements were abandoned in an attempt to blend into Canadian society. Not until the late 1960s and early 1970s, with the encouragement of the federal government's multiculturalism policy, was there a significant increase in the quantity and quality of articles and books relating to Japanese Canadian history.

The first modern Japanese Canadian study to benefit from the federal government's program was Ken Adachi's *The Enemy That Never Was*, (1976). As part of a series to promote the ethnic diversity in Canadian society, the book was jointly funded by the National Japanese Canadian Citizens Associations (NJCCA) in conjunction with the Secretary of State, Canadian Citizenship Branch, and Canadian Ethnic Studies. Adachi's work was important as it represented the first official attempt by the Nisei to record the community's history. He produced a well-written, thoroughly researched book (including a map showing where the workcamps and resettlement locations were in the BC interior). Adachi clearly and convincingly conveyed two themes in the book. First, he wished to reveal racial prejudice and its ramifications. Secondly, Adachi presented the nearly century-old history of the Japanese in Canada; and by placing their evacuation process in the larger historical context, he gave the episode meaning.
The first portion of Adachi's book dealt with the period 1870-1940, and identified the different forms of discrimination expressed in BC which included, anti-Asian groups, provincial laws, and economic restrictions imposed on the Japanese community. In chapter eight, Adachi discussed how BC politicians used political and economic propaganda to keep Japanese Canadians second class citizens, and if possible to remove them. Also, within the first eight chapters, Adachi noted the development and acculturation of the Nisei. Building on earlier works by LaViolette and Young, Reid, and Carrothers, Adachi analyzed the inter-generational conflict within the Japanese community, and the development of Japanese-White relations. In chapter thirteen the conditions and hardships of resettlement were presented. Chapter fourteen examined the Canadian government's plan to extend the War Measures Act, giving parliament the right to deport/repatriate Japanese evacuees to Japan. Only with the help of groups like the CCF, NJJCA, church groups, and Civil Liberties Unions did Canadian popular opinion shift, forcing the federal government to abandon its repatriation policy. Adachi ended his analysis by outlining the achievements and successes of Japanese Canadians since 1950. He believed that the recovery of the Japanese since the war was not due to the advantages bestowed by Canadian society, but was a product of their internal strength and ability.
While comprehensive, Adachi fails to analyze the treatment of the 1075 evacuees "shipped off" to Manitoba's sugar beet fields in 1942. His treatment, like that of LaViolette, centred on events in Alberta. Adachi discussed the climatic, work and living hardships as well as the initial unfriendly reception afforded to the evacuees by the Alberta government and the province's residents. Adachi inaccurately contrasted the Alberta and Manitoba experience stating that "evacuees who moved to Manitoba encountered few problems ...."17 By not recognizing that organized resistance by Manitobans occurred, and administrative restrictions and deficiencies existed, Adachi presented an erroneous analysis of the Manitoba sugar beet project. Despite this unevenness, the book was a competent effort.

While Adachi wrote a survey history of Japanese Canadians, W. Peter Ward's, White Canada Forever (1978),18 studied anti-Orientalism in Canada, specifically in British Columbia. Ward suggested that British Columbians were opposed to Orientals because of race prejudice grounded in that province's psychology. He acknowledged that prejudice was not universal, but prejudicial consensus was very general with little dissension. Other factors such as economic competition were secondary to white xenophobia.19

The social psychology that dominated Caucasian British Columbia might be attributed to the increased racial awareness that accompanied the rise of the British Empire.
As Britain conquered more territories the broad range of racial, ethnic and national differences presented themselves; and intellectuals formulated theories for these relationships. Although Ward denied that any post-Darwin racial theory directly influenced British Columbians' anti-Orientalism, the nativists truncated similar concepts and used them as vehicles to voice their fears and hostilities.  

Once expressed, these beliefs were nurtured and became visible with varying degrees of intensity, as illustrated by propaganda, the riots of 1907, legislative restrictions and the evacuation. Ward noted that racism was not confined to one segment of society. Trade unions, veterans, journalists and politicians, as well as businessmen, home-makers and missionaries were active in the anti-Asian movement, all of which was made possible because racism became a cultural norm. Ward found that this cultural norm was sustained by newspapers and politicians making anti-Oriental speeches. The constant agitation of nativist groups was combined with the free flow of prejudicial actions in everyday living, evident by de facto segregated cafes and movie theatres.

Consequently anti-Asian expression erupted when stimulated by continued migration, increased birthrates, and recurring economic rivalry. Yet, economic factors for discrimination were secondary, flowing out of the psychological prejudice that constantly exists in latent and
active forms. Economic diversification combined with the common element of psychological prejudice exercised the white population. Caucasian British Columbians deemed the Asian to be unassimilable by virtue of culture and skin colour. By wanting to protect their British cultural purity the Occidentals excluded the threatening element. As a result, racism was grounded in fear and desire for ethnic purity. While cleverly argued, Ward's central thesis never expands beyond the premise that Caucasian British Columbians were racist because of inherent racism. He fails to explain adequately the origin of their racism.

Another active observer of Asian-White relations in BC is Patricia Roy. Unlike Peter Ward, Roy prefers to accent the economic and political factors in her analysis. In a series of articles, Roy argued that White-Asian relations were a mixture of political and racial elements, based on the economic survival of Caucasian British Columbians. "The Oriental Menace in British Columbia," (1972) maintained that the province's white population wanted to segregate the Oriental element from society to keep BC "white", in culture, economics and landownership. Incremental increases in Asiatic population or economic standing raised Occidental fears. "Educating the East:BC and the Oriental Question in the Interwar Years," (1972) highlighted the tactics of exclusionists in their bid to persuade Ottawa to restrict and remove Asians from BC and Canada. Through a non-abrasive
and extensive education campaign comprising speeches, pamphlets, journal articles, and lobbying in Ottawa, BC politicians sought and received new laws reducing employment opportunities in fishing and immigration quotas.

"The Illusion of Tolerance: White Opinion of Asians in British Columbia, 1929-1937", (1980) suggests that support for exclusionist groups decreased when British Columbians faced more pressing economic problems like the depression. While prejudice remained ingrained in the province's psyche, a degree of tolerance existed between 1927 and 1937, as trade with Asia was seen as one possible solution to the depression. Events such as the trial and conviction of a Japanese immigration interpreter, and the 1930 election campaign did not create the usual outcry of anti-Asian protest. Not until the late thirties, with renewed Japanese aggression in Manchuria, did protests resume. The dislike for non-white economic competition, the question of assimilation, and security were the issues discussed in "The Evacuation of the Japanese, 1942" (1969). These factors and Japan's military efficiency convinced Ottawa to evacuate the Japanese population from BC. In Roy's latest effort, A White Man's Province (1989), she applies the economic determinist theory to the period 1858-1914. White-Asian relations during this period were always political, but largely driven by economic considerations with racial overtones dividing Caucasian British Columbians. Roy's economic determinism...
offers an interesting perspective to the continuing debate on White-Asian relations in BC.

Prior to 1978 researchers faced restrictions on documents detailing the federal government's decision to evacuate Japanese Canadians in 1942. A. G. Sunahara's *The Politics of Racism* (1981), was the first study to use government documents to explain federal policy towards Japanese Canadians from 1941 to 1950.28 Sunahara argues that the federal government's racist actions were politically motivated rooted, in traditional prejudice and carried out by politicians within the federal Cabinet in an attempt to protect another more important minority in BC, the Liberal party.29

Government policy was formulated by the Cabinet Committee on Japanese Questions and the Departments of Labour and Justice. It was endorsed by the silence or neutrality of the majority within the federal Cabinet and legalized by Orders-in-Council 1486 and 365, 1942. Under the War Measures Act, the federal government uprooted, confined, and dispossessed people of their property, dispersed them East of the Rockies, and after the war, tried to repatriate them to a defeated Japan. Sunahara asserted that the opinions of External Affairs, the RCMP, and the military were cast aside. The Asian issue presented King with the opportunity to avoid a conscription crisis in Quebec. By overplaying the threat of a Japanese attack, the PM
strengthened west coast security and evacuated Japanese Canadians to satisfy Quebec and BC.\textsuperscript{30}

Although Sunahara has produced a generally well-documented analysis of the evacuation years, the book carries some insidious flaws. The \textit{Politics of Racism} was written with an agenda, to prove the federal government was evil. This bias detracted from the factual presentation. The evidence in itself is compelling, making the anti-government slant unnecessary. As in earlier works, little attention was given to the problem of the federal administration governing the evacuees in Manitoba, or the reaction of the Manitoba government and the province's citizens to the evacuees. Sunahara seems to argue that the evacuees in Manitoba were accepted, at least in North Winnipeg, because it was CCF territory.\textsuperscript{31} In actuality, labour demands and the wishes of city council had more influence in the evacuees' situation. Finally, Sunahara concludes that "by the fall of 1943 life for Japanese Manitobans began to seem relatively normal. Within the bounds of the government's restriction, they had begun to rebuild their lives."\textsuperscript{32} As will be discussed, by the fall of 1943 two thirds of the evacuees continued to search for a better way to survive and had not yet established themselves. Despite being well researched, the presentation, at times, was misleading.

One of the latest academic contributions on Japanese Canadians was a collaborative effort by P.E. Roy, J.L.
Granatstein, M. Iino, and H. Takamura, entitled Mutual Hostages: Canadians and Japanese during the Second World War (1990). Although not a survey, one of the book's objectives was to look at Ottawa's actions and policies and their effects on the Japanese in Canada. As a result, Mutual Hostages briefly discussed the placement of Japanese evacuees in the sugar beet project in Manitoba. The information presented concerning their resettlement was often incorrect. While noting that Alberta and Manitoba received evacuees with conditions, the authors fail to acknowledge that Manitoba as well as Alberta, indicated that they expected the evacuees to be removed at the conclusion of the conflict. Similarly, the authors stated that Winnipeg was "very cooperative in accepting families." In actuality Winnipeg reacted to the evacuees' presence in a cautious and restrictive manner, prohibiting employment to male Japanese labour and tightly regulating any migration into the city—hardly a "cooperative" attitude. Finally, Mutual Hostages states that once the Alberta and Manitoba sugar beet industry began to rely on the evacuees, "the growers persuaded the Department of Labour to "freeze" the Japanese in their jobs as essential agricultural workers... ." The suggestion to "freeze" the labourers to sugar beet farms was proposed, but in Manitoba, the evacuees were not forced to remain in the sugar beet industry. Indeed, the opposite was true. The Japanese evacuees in Manitoba were allowed to
leave the beet farms in search of better employment. Despite these specific inaccuracies, the idea of comparing the experience of prisoners of war within Japan and Canada made the book a valuable addition to the literature.

In the latter part of the 1970s, Japanese Canadians began publishing books and articles describing their experience in workcamps, concentration camps and the early resettlement years. One of the first books to express the views of Japanese Canadians was Barry Broadfoot's *Years of Sorrow, Years of Shame*, (1977). The book was a collection of stories "told by the people themselves, how they lived and acted and reacted, how they survived." Like his other works, it was an oral history accumulated by tape recorder and field notes. Broadfoot wanted to show Canadians the injustices done to the Japanese during the war years. Although written as popular history, the book lacked analysis and references to source material which detracted from the book's credibility. Yet the project was useful as a vehicle which showed that many Japanese Canadians still did not understand what had happened to them during the war years.

*A Man of Our Times*, (1976) was the biography of a Japanese Canadian fishermen, Ryuichi Yoshida. Interpreted by M. Koizumi and edited by R. Knight, the book charted the life of an Issei who was influenced by, and active in, the Japanese labour movement. As a contributor to a Japanese
labour newspaper, The Labour Weekly, Yoshida added new information to Japanese history in BC. Yoshida's story exposed the pre-World War II Japanese labour movement's relationship with the Japanese Consulate and the Canadian Japanese Association; a relationship that was often marred by disputes over conflicts of interest. Yoshida presented an interesting angle to the relationship among the Japanese Union movement, BC labour unions, and the Japanese community.

T. Nakano's Within the Barbed Wire Fence, (1980) provided an account of his experience in the interior workcamps of BC, and his treatment at Angler concentration camp in Northern Ontario. Nakano illustrated the tension that existed within the concentration camp among the zealous minority of prisoners loyal to Japan, and those whose loyalty lay with Canada. Through Nakano's account valuable insight was gained about the internal dynamics of the interned segment of the Japanese population.

A fictional approach concerning the internment period was presented by Joy Kogawa's Obasan, (1981). Obasan was an account of herself and her family's life from the end of the thirties to the present. Through the description of the plight of her family, the reader condemned the political expediency of the government's racist policies. Kogawa illustrated the guilt and feelings of betrayal within the
Issei generation, and the haunting loss of dignity and security felt by of the Nisei generation.

Most of the literature written by Japanese Canadians depicted the realities of living as a foreign element within their native land. Roy Ito's *We Went To War*, (1984), was the story of the few exceptions who served in WWI and WWII. Ito's book acknowledged one of the many ways in which they fought prejudice, discrimination and charges of disloyalty that faced them in BC. *We Went to War* not only explored the invaluable service the Japanese men rendered overseas as interpreters, interrogators and intelligence agents, but illustrated the Nisei struggle for full citizenship. Moreover, in the appendix there was a list of all the war veterans—a useful reference guide and a valuable addition for further research.

Muriel Kitagawa's, *This is My Own*, (1985) discussed Kitagawa's life as a prolific writer and contributor to the Japanese Canadian newspaper the *New Canadian*. The introduction looks at how the internment years affected Kitagawa personally. The main sources for the book were Muriel's letters to her brother Wes who lived in Toronto and was attending medical school. Wes's desire for detailed reports of events on the West coast provided unique insights viewed through the eyes of a participant.

The preceding discussion highlighted three distinct types of writings; contemporary monographs, academic
studies, and personal histories. Anti-Asian writings which flourished prior to 1946, helped create the ideological mindset for the removal of Japanese Canadians from BC. Through the publication of books, Japanese Canadians tried to comfort those surviving Issei and Nisei by confronting the past, as well as proving to Caucasian Canadians that they were not enemies, saboteurs or disloyal, but victims of racial intolerance in their own country.

Within the academic literature, discussions varied on the main causes leading to the uprooting and dispersal of the Japanese population. Ward proposed that it was due predominantly to racism, Roy emphasized economic factors, and Sunahara stated that political concerns guided by a strong undercurrent of racism in government led to the dark stain on Canada's past. Nevertheless, all agree that these factors are closely interrelated and must be included in any study of the topic. Many of the points that have been highlighted in this analysis, as well as in the books, can be attributed directly or indirectly to the works of Young, Reid and Carrothers, and LaViolette, who together have laid the building blocks for further research.

The literature surveyed raised some important questions that need further research. Through the work of LaViolette, Adachi, and Sunahara, much of the Japanese evacuation experience was presented. Their research, however, tended to emphasize national events. As has been
demonstrated, more attention needs to be given to specific provincial histories. Only by separating and analyzing the relationship among the specific parts to the larger body will an understanding of the total experience be gained. It is also clear that the existing literature has not paid enough attention to the resettlement of approximately 1,180 evacuees in Manitoba. By studying the resettlement of the Japanese community in the province, an important aspect of the national experience of Japanese Canadian communities in Canada will be presented. It will help contribute to a better understanding of a tragic episode in Canada's past.
NOTES TO INTRODUCTION


2H. Glynn-Ward, The Writing on the Wall, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1921, p. 125. In the United States similar works appeared. Wallace Irvin's, Seed of the Sun, and Peter B. Kyne's, The Pride of Palomar, were published in 1921. In Kyne's novel, as in Glynn-Ward's, the Chinese were viewed as less threatening because they knew their position in society, while the Japanese were depicted as ambitious, deceitful and disloyal. Copies of Kyne's racist tract found their way into the hands of important Americans, courtesy of Cornelius Vanderbilt Jr. Vanderbilt's friends printed a pamphlet called "The Verdict of Public Opinion on the Japanese-American Question." In Canada Glynn-Ward's novel was promoted by A.W. Neill, independent M.P. For Comox-Alberni, who believed the book would facilitate the education of Eastern Canada on the Oriental menace in BC. Although not specific to BC, J.S. Woodsworth, Strangers Within Our Gates, Toronto: Frederick Clarke Stephenson, 1909, called for a halt to non-Anglo-Saxon migration as it undermined Canadian political structures and lowered the standard of living. He feared that Eastern Europeans, Blacks and Orientals were unassimilable, and that Canada's Anglo-Celtic cultural identity would be lost. As an example, Woodsworth pointed to the United States which he felt was losing its "Anglo-Saxon" heritage because of its immigrants. Carl Berger's "True North Strong and Free" outlined a similar view of the nativist position that confirmed Canada's uniqueness and superiority. Due to Canada's latitude her people had to be mentally and physically fit in order to meet the challenges of the northern climate. As a by-product, nativists believed that French and English Canadians had developed into a resourceful and resilient people profiting from both the climate and the Anglo-Saxon-North European heritage. Consequently, nations that did not enjoy similar benefits of harsh climates like Canada's inevitably developed into weaker, less progressive societies. As a result, immigrants from these countries were thought to contaminate Canadian society.

3Glynn-Ward, p. xxiv, 59, 60, 90. A.W. Neill had the Parliamentary library purchase several copies of The Writing on the Wall. Similar attempts were made by C.E. Hope and W.K. Earle, activists and supporters of the White Canada Association. Through their articles in Maclean's magazine (1933), Hope and Earle tried to win support for the exclusionist position stating that the Japanese and Chinese could not assimilate, and unless immigration was stopped, BC and Canada would be taken over by Japan. By writing in national magazines exclusionists tried to "educate" Eastern Canada and influence federal policy. C.E.
Young, Reid and Carrothers, The Japanese Canadians, Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1938. The book is based on a field survey in the summer of 1934 and was supplemented by a M.A. thesis by Rigenda Sumida. In a similar study to Young, Reid and Carrothers, Carey McWilliams's Brothers Under the Skin, (1942) and Prejudice: Japanese Americans, Symbols of Racial Intolerance (1944) argued that racial and economic interest groups determine the level of racial prejudice expressed by the population. McWilliams emphasised the racial prejudice aspect and the influences of pressure groups and business interests in manufacturing propaganda, agitating public opinion and colouring political decisions. Moreover, McWilliams argued that Japanese do assimilate as evident by the differences between the first and second generations.

Young, Reid and Carrothers, p.xxix.

Young, Reid and Carrothers, p.122-126.

Young, Reid and Carrothers, p.xxiii-xxiv.

Young, Reid and Carrothers, p.xxiv

Young, Reid and Carrothers, p.192-193. Also, T. Boggs, in an article "The Orientals on the Pacific Coast" states that the main factor for racial prejudice stems from the ethnocentricity of Westerners and the economic effects on the standard of living of the new group. Boggs notes that similar arguments were put forward to try and exclude Irish immigration in the 19th century, and ultimately concludes that for a healthy democracy to exist, legal rights to its citizens by birth cannot be withheld based on racial segregation. After the evacuation, considerable debate ensued concerning the permanent solution to the evacuee question. As early as February 1942, A. W. Neill, MP from Vancouver, declared people of Japanese origin had to be repatriated regardless of generation, as they were a security risk and a threat to BC cultural homogeneity. Howard Green, an exclusionist and M.P. from Vancouver, endorsed that position, in an article entitled "Should We Send Japs Back? Yes!", (1943) Maclean's. In the same issue A. MacInnis, another M.P. from Vancouver wrote "Should We Send Japs Back? No!", which challenged and refuted the exclusionists' arguments. The debate between Green and MacInnis is found in Maclean's, No.50 December 1, 1943, p.12 & 34 &37.

LaViolette, The Canadian Japanese and World War II, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1948. The book was funded by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and the Canadian Social Science Research Council. Also useful is H.F. Angus, "Asiatics in Canada", Pacific Affairs, vol. 19 December 1946. For a more detailed
discussion of the legal status of Asians in this time period see
H.F.Angus's article, "The Legal Status in British Columbia of Residents
of Oriental Races and Their Descendants", in The Legal Status of Aliens
in Pacific Countries, ed. by Norman Mackenzie. Toronto: Oxford University
Press, 1937.

11LaViolette, p.77-78.

12LaViolette, p.78-79.

13LaViolette, p.164-167.

14Ken Adachi, The Enemy That Never Was, Toronto: McClelland and
Stewart Publishers, 1976. In the US, as in Canada, the internment years
received more attention. Roger Daniel's, Concentration Camps
USA: Japanese Americans and World War II, New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, Inc., 1971, was the first study on minority groups coming out
of the Berkshire Studies in Minority History. The mandate of the
Berkshire program was to illuminate different minority group experiences
within the US. Daniel's book dealt with the Japanese American topic in
a broad fashion discussing the pre-Pearl Harbour Japanese experience
beginning in the 1890s, the relevant material concerning the decision to
evacuate, the evacuation, treatment within the concentration camps, and
Japanese American achievements since the war. By presenting past errors
Daniel hoped that future discriminatory acts in times of crisis against
minority groups would not be repeated. Adachi's book followed a similar
format to that of Daniels'.

15Adachi, preface, iv.

16As a model minority, the Japanese were achieving greater
assimilation according to Adachi. One measure of acculturation was
inter-marriage; in 1941 the Japanese had the highest rate of endogamy,
99%. By the 1970s the 3rd generation (Sansei) had a higher rate of
inter-marriage within society, 59%.


18W. Peter Ward, White Canada Forever, Montreal: McGill-Queen's

19Ward, p.169.

20Ward, p.168.

21Ward, p.169.

22Ward, p. 169.


29Sunahara, p. 162.


31Sunahara, p. 82.

32Sunahara, p. 83.


34Mutual Hostages, p. 141.

35Ibid., p. 142.

36Barry Broadfoot, Years of Sorrow Years of Shame, Toronto: Doubleday Canada Limited, 1977.
37 Broadfoot, p.vi.

38 His other books include: *Ten Lost Years, Six War Years, The Pioneer Years*.


40 R. Knight's book on Yoshida raises several important questions concerning the Japanese community. What was the nature of the relationship between the Japanese Consulate and the CJA? How influential was the Consul in the affairs of the Japanese community, especially in the thirties? Did the Japanese organizations represent his views, and/or interest? Or were the organizations dominated by the middle class and not representative of the "Whole Japanese community"?


42 The trend in Canada followed a similar move in the United States. D. Kitagawa, *Issei and Nisei*, New York: The Seabury Press, 1967, discussed the US internment. When Japan attacked Pearl Harbour, Kitagawa was a minister at St. Paul's Church in Washington State. Kitagawa was interned for more than a year. His work provided a description of the confinements of camp life as well as the psychological conflicts that the displaced internees suffered. Internment led to the breakdown of traditional family life, exacerbated the conflict between Issei and Nisei, and undermined the Japanese will to work. Moreover, the loyalty registration crisis and the segregation policy demoralized the Japanese Americans.


45 Muriel Kitagawa, *This is my Own*, Vancouver: Talonbooks, 1985.
CHAPTER 1

THE BRITISH COLUMBIA SECURITY COMMISSION AND THE
CREATION OF THE MANITOBA SUGAR BEET PROJECT

The British Columbia Security Commission (BCSC) with
the co-operation of the Manitoba Sugar Beet Company, moved
the Japanese evacuees to Manitoba for security reasons and
to fill the labour shortage in the Manitoba sugar beet
industry. This chapter will examine the role of the BCSC,
Manitoba sugar beet industry, and the Manitoba government in
arranging the evacuees' arrival in the province. The
resettlement process, and the reaction of interest groups
and municipal officials in the province will be analyzed as
well.

On December 7, 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor,
crippling the US Navy's Pacific fleet. Five hours later
Japan bombed the British Protectorate of Hong Kong. Within
hours of the assault, Britain and Canada declared war on
Japan. Hostilities in the Pacific presented influential
elements within BC's population the opportunity to galvanize
public opinion into believing that the Japanese community
needed to be removed from the coast for security reasons.¹
Intensifying an already explosive racial situation, federal
and provincial politicians from BC pressured Ottawa for
action.²

Despite assurances from top-ranking officials in the
R.C.M.P., the Military, and External Affairs, Prime Minister
Mackenzie King's Cabinet yielded to the political demands of BC's representatives.³ On January 16, 1942, PC 365 was issued. The order prohibited Japanese Canadians and Japanese Nationals from fishing for the duration of the war, and their boats were confiscated and sold to non-Japanese. Moreover, as of January 16, 1942, male Japanese Nationals were to be removed from the coastal defence zone before April 1, 1942.⁴

Once PC 365 was issued, the federal government had the task of locating a destination for the Japanese Nationals. Federal officials approached Manitoba. As a result M.A. Lyons, Deputy Minister of Public Works in Manitoba, contacted V.H. Campbell, District Engineer for The Pas-Cranberry. In early February Campbell presented a proposal to build a road between The Pas and Cranberry Portage employing approximately 500 Japanese Nationals.⁵ On February 9, 1942 T.A. Crerar, Federal Minister of Mines and Natural Resources, sent a letter of support to Premier Bracken with respect to the above proposal. Crerar was initially involved because the proposed plan would stimulate Northern development. After consulting with his cabinet, Premier Bracken was ready to cooperate with Ottawa. The Manitoba government was not enthusiastic about the plan, but, as a necessity of war, felt it was the province's duty to assist the federal government.⁶ The Premier stated, however, that any Japanese located in the Province as part
of a war measure "would be removed when the need for keeping them from their present domicile no longer existed." It was clear from Bracken's correspondence that Manitoba's conditional acceptance of the Japanese Nationals was predicated on supporting the general war effort, and their removal at the conclusion of the conflict was expected. With this understanding Bracken and Crerar agreed to turn the matter over to their respective departments to work out the details.

After receiving approval from Bracken and E.F. Willis, Manitoba's Minister of Public Works, Campbell went to Ottawa to finalize the plans. On 28 February, however, Campbell requested approval for alternative project sites. He proposed roads to Point Du Bois, White Shell Forest Reserve and Duck and Turtle Mountain Reserves. These sites were opposed by the power companies in Manitoba that had stations in the areas. The Manitoba power companies were extremely protective of the power plants which supplied hydro to the war industries in Manitoba. The original plan was scuttled when Mr. Greene from the Hudson Bay Mining and Smelting Company successfully lobbied Crerar to rescind federal approval for the The Pas-Cranberry project. Greene opposed the project because the Flin Flon railway line had a number of wooden trestles which presented the Japanese with the opportunity to commit acts of sabotage. The discussions concerning Japanese Nationals working on the The
Pas-Cranberry project were terminated and Campbell returned to the province.

The security measures passed by the King government on January 16, were viewed favourably by BC Members of Parliament (MP's) in Ottawa. As the Pacific war continued to go in favour of Japan a resurgence of fears and rumours among West Coast residents developed on both sides of the Canada-US border. Alleged sightings of Japanese attack craft by US sources (subsequently disproved) and the British loss of Singapore on 15 February renewed the BC government's demand for a buttressing of coastal defence and the removal of all Japanese.⁹

Despite pressure from federal and provincial BC politicians after the fall of Singapore, federal authorities did not take steps to remove all members of the Japanese community.¹⁰ On February 24, 1942, PC 1486 was passed empowering the Minister of Justice, Louis St. Laurent, to remove all people of Japanese origin from the protected area, and impose restrictions with respect to employment, business and movement or place of residence. Prime Minister King justified the evacuation as necessary for national security.¹¹

Once the Minister of Justice was authorized to remove people of Japanese origin from the coast, an effective expulsion method was needed. To facilitate a swift evacuation, the British Columbia Security Commission (BCSC)
was established on 4 March 1942. The BCSC consisted of Chairman Austin C. Taylor, a prominent BC businessman, and two Assistant Commissioners: F.J. Mead of the R.C.M.P and J. Shirras of the British Columbia Provincial Police. As a federal agency associated with the Department of Labour, the primary duty of the BCSC was to transfer all designated persons out of the strategic area in BC. The BCSC's mandate, however, did not include a provision for recognizing Canadian citizenship, native born or naturalized, thus negating the rights of Japanese Canadian citizens.

Charged with the task of removing the Japanese community from the coast, the Security Commission now took up the search for potential destinations. The shortage of labour in the sugar beet industry presented the BCSC a possible option. As war continued, the federal government asked Canada's sugar industry for maximum sugar production. Despite the federal government's appeal for increased production, Manitoban farmers were reluctant. Sugar prices were lower than other crops on the preferred list and there was a shortage of labour to harvest the crops. To alleviate the labour shortage, both Alberta and Manitoba's sugar industry expressed interest in the Japanese internment scheme. On behalf of the Manitoba Sugar Beet industry, the President of the Manitoba Sugar Company, G.H. Aikins, contacted the Commission's Chairman for information on the
evacuation of Japanese from the coast. Aikins and the Manitoba Sugar Beet Growers Association believed Japanese families with agricultural experience could be useful in meeting the labour shortage in Manitoba.¹⁴

The BCSC welcomed the overture of the sugar beet industry. The sugar beet proposal met two important Security Commission criteria: a destination for the evacuees outside BC and the productive use of their labour in the war effort. Acting on Commissioner Mead's advice and experience with the Japanese community in BC, attempts were made to keep the Japanese families together. By moving the Japanese in family units they were more likely to cooperate and expenses would be reduced.¹⁵

As Aikins waited for a response, the BCSC issued a letter to the Alberta Beet Growers Association and the Beet Growers Association of Manitoba. The letter noted that as a "war emergency" it was necessary that all Japanese be removed from the coast for defence reasons. The statement loosely defined the obligations of the BCSC and future employers with regard to Japanese workers.¹⁶

On March 15, Aikins received a similar letter listing the Commission's duties and responsibilities if evacuees were sent to Manitoba. Unlike the statement issued to the Manitoba Beet Growers Association, the obligations cited in the memo to the Manitoba Sugar Company did not include the Commission's guarantee that "any Japanese so moved, (to
Sugar Beet farms) would remain domiciled on the farms to which they (were) allocated... ."17 This omission led to misunderstanding and disagreement between the sugar industry and the Japanese families in the following year.

With the sugar industry in Manitoba willing to accept the BCSC's terms, Aikins and the Security Commission began making arrangements for resettling evacuees in Manitoba. The BCSC also wanted the approval of the Manitoba government. The federal Minister of Labour, H. Mitchell, wired Premier Bracken endorsing the proposed project and stated that "the matter was of national importance. The people in question must be moved from the coastal areas and used in productive occupations in the interest of Canada."18 Premier Bracken responded by noting that the federal government had made a similar request in February and Manitoba's position had not changed. The province agreed to cooperate in any war plan, provided that the federal government assumed full financial and other responsibility, including protection against sabotage. Bracken assured Mitchell and the BCSC that the province would not object to any arrangements between the BCSC and groups in Manitoba. The Premier demanded, however, that all evacuees brought to the province under this agreement be removed when the emergency was over.19 The rationale for Bracken's position remains unclear. Perhaps his approval of the plan was partially a response to the request for assistance as a war measure and the need to
acquire labour for the province's sugar beet industry. The labour shortage was very likely the main reason. The BCSC accepted Manitoba's position and offered a letter of obligation, similar to that addressed to the sugar beet industry.20

After Shirras' trip to Winnipeg in late March, the Security Commission acknowledged the preliminary agreement with Manitoba.21 Two months later, Manitoba received a formal agreement indicating the terms under which the BCSC was to operate within the province.22 Manitoba refused to sign the agreement. Bracken and his advisors believed that the Dominion government and its agent (the BCSC) had asked for the province's consent out of courtesy and to elicit Manitoba's cooperation. From the province's standpoint, little would be gained by signing a formal document. First, the proposal did not suggest that the Province take any responsibilities. Second, the Manitoba government had no legal authority to pass an Order in Council approving the agreement. Third, if in the future, the BCSC did not keep its promises, the Manitoba government would need the consent of the Attorney General of Canada to sue the Commission, or its successor. Since the Commission had no assets in Manitoba and was a federal crown agent, the province would be illegally suing the federal government. Bracken preferred to reserve the right to seek redress through public pressure or withhold provincial cooperation. The courts would be a
last resort. As a result the Premier requested an exchange of letters setting out the obligations of the Commission.23

The Commission Chairman, in a letter of understanding, stated the duties and obligations of the BCSC. The Security Commission promised to send to Manitoba on a temporary basis evacuees suitable for agricultural work. The BCSC would take full responsibility for the movement of Japanese people to, and within Manitoba, and would ensure they were properly housed and supported. The BCSC, in conjunction with the R.C.M.P, would provide security for Manitobans and the evacuees. The Japanese families would not be an expense to the province, any city or municipality for relief, medical services, or hospitalization. The Commission would reimburse any of the above authorities if the evacuees failed to pay. The Commission would maintain supervision preventing movement from the districts in which they were placed.

Education costs were the responsibility of the evacuees. If local school boards objected to Japanese children in school, the BCSC would provide education. The BCSC expected the evacuees to be paid the regular contract rate and receive suitable housing and accommodations for year-round residence. The Commission agreed to remove the Japanese people from any district that protested their resettlement. Finally, the BCSC promised to remove the evacuees once the emergency was over.24 This arrangement met the Premier's wishes and on June 30, 1942 agreement was achieved.

33
After the BCSC received Manitoba's preliminary consent in late March, Aikins began laying the groundwork for the transfer of evacuees from BC. Some Manitoban farmers were eager to test the labour opportunity presented by the evacuation process. To obtain positive results from the transferred labour supply, an optimum size family unit was considered essential. Aikins suggested that the Commission select good agricultural families with two to four workers. He believed that in a family of four to five persons, two to three people needed to work the fields. Based on figures from Alberta, Aikins speculated that each individual could handle ten to twelve acres. A family of four would be responsible for forty acres, earning between $900-$1000 per season.

To get the program started, Aikins recommended the Commission send twenty to twenty-five families and "arrangements would be made to place these in good housing with a type of farm employer who would be dependable and sympathetic to the undertaking." The BCSC agreed with Aikins' suggestion of matching twenty Japanese families with host farmers. To facilitate the matching process, the Sugar Company was to supply the Commission with information concerning the type of farm operation available. The Security Commission would then assign the Japanese families to a Manitoba farmer. When the people arrived in Manitoba,
The local appointed Commission representative was to assist the host farmer with the necessary clerical details.  

The BCSC also notified the R.C.M.P. in Manitoba of the Commission's plan. The Security Commission stated that the resettled people would be escorted by R.C.M.P. and transported in family units. On arrival in Manitoba the BCSC's representative would be responsible for directing the resettlement operation. Each family would fill out forms, and a copy would be sent to the local R.C.M.P. detachment for their records.

The placement of Japanese families on selected farms increased the program's chances of success. "Success" had two important implications. If local farmers were impressed with the Japanese labourer a demand and a destination for the evacuees would be created. Also, the evacuees would likely send back favourable reports, encouraging friends and relatives to move from the internment camps in the BC interior. In addition, the Commission hoped that the evacuated families' work would benefit the war effort and provide sufficient income to maintain themselves without being a charge to the federal Government.

Using selected host farmers to begin the program created false expectations for the farmers and evacuees. As 1940 was the first crop year for the Sugar Company, the industry did not have a large number of experienced sugar beet farmers dedicated to beet farming. Nor were all farmers sympathetic to the
Japanese resettlement program. Consequently, the successful extension of the sugar beet program beyond a select number of sympathetic farmers was less certain.

The Manitoba sugar industry had evolved over years of experimental testing. By the early thirties, sample crops proved that sugar beets were a viable cash crop. Approximately twenty-five farmers in the Emerson, Gretna and Altona area grew 3,500 tons of beets under contract for the American Sugar Beet Company in East Grand Forks. With this precedent, local farmers and businessmen tried to finance the construction of a sugar refinery in Manitoba. Due to the depression, the capital could not be acquired locally.

In 1935 the construction of a refinery was brought one step closer to reality. Provincial legislation authorized the government to guarantee bonds to a limit of $600,000. It was not until 1939, however, that investors such as Baron C. Neuman de Vegvar and Baron P.G. Kronacker from New York and Brussels purchased the shares of preferred stock which raised the necessary finances. The factory was built in Fort Garry, a suburb of Winnipeg. On November 8, 1939 the Manitoba Sugar Company was incorporated.

In 1940 the Manitoba Sugar Company completed its first crop year. With 1,100 farmers in the Red River Valley area under contract, on 15,700 acres, 95,120 tons of sugar beets were harvested. The Sugar Company employed 70 to 90 full time staff and as many as 400 men during the refining
season. Until sugar beet farming became mechanized, it was labour intensive. In some districts it required 70-80 hours of labour to cultivate one acre of beets. Approximately 40% of the labour was devoted to thinning, hoeing and weeding; 60% was expended on the harvest operation. Labour was supplied by the farmer's family and hired individuals on an informal basis. Thus labour shortages at harvest time were one of the industry's most serious problems. Despite the industry's youth in Manitoba, it quickly became a significant producer of sugar beets. In 1940, Manitoba produced 11.5% of Canada's sugar. Between 1941 and 1943, the years in which Japanese families played an instrumental role in the sugar industry, production rose to 23% of Canada's total before declining to 14.3% in 1944.

Considering that sugar beet farming was not a major commercial crop until 1940, with no solid historical success, why would farmers in Manitoba switch from wheat and other grains to sugar beets? Farmers began to grow sugar beets for a number of inter-related reasons. Some regions such as Emerson, Portage, Morden, and Altona had soils of fine, sandy loam and silty clay loam which were more conducive to beet than to cereal crops. Weather factors were an additional consideration. Beet crops were less susceptible to hail and wind damage, a constant threat to Manitoba farmers. While environmental factors were important, economic inducements were also significant. The
establishment of a new refinery provided the producer with a local processor, guaranteeing the grower a purchaser. Moreover, the Sugar Company contracted the acres before they were planted. Thus the farmer had the security that the acreage planted would have a purchaser, and at a fairly stable price. With the added protection from climatic dangers and the economic inducements, many farmers chose to experiment with sugar beets. The industry's most serious drawback was labour shortages. This problem appeared to have been solved with the arrival of Japanese families from BC.

Before Japanese families could be resettled on the sugar beet farms a local Commission representative was required. The candidate had to possess good administrative skills and a working knowledge of the agricultural industry. Assistant Commissioner J. Shirras was responsible for coordinating the resettlement of Japanese families onto sugar beet farms in Alberta and Manitoba. Shirras believed the success or failure of the project depended on the Commission representative. The BCSC asked Aikins to find a suitable person.

Aikins believed a person from BC who had had previous experience with the evacuees would be best qualified to administer the project. Nevertheless, the Commission insisted on a Manitoban. Guided by Aikin's recommendations, the BCSC hired Charles E. Graham, Manager of Melady Sellers & Co. in early April 1942. Graham, born and educated in
Ontario, had moved to Winnipeg in 1905 and worked at a family owned and operated canning business. In 1913 he entered the grain business with Blackburn and Mills, then transferred to Melady Sellers in 1924 and held the post of managing director from 1930 until his retirement in 1945. Graham's qualifications were sound. In addition to his position at Melady Sellers, he was Vice-President of the Winnipeg Grain Exchange from 1941-43, Chairman of the Rural Victory Loan campaign, and farmed land in the Elm Creek District. Thus Graham possessed the skills and agricultural knowledge the Commission was looking for in a representative.

Once Graham assumed the responsibility of Commission representative in Manitoba, Aikins' direct involvement with resettling evacuees diminished. Aikins remained an active participant in the sugar beet industry and continued to play an advisory role to the Security Commission, but did not figure prominently in future policy decisions. During Aikins early association with the BCSC's sugar beet project, links were forged between the Manitoba sugar beet industry and the Security Commission. Aikins' initial strategy of selecting the optimal family size and matching them to a compatible host farmer was accepted by the BCSC, but poorly implemented. Aikins had pragmatic motives for wanting the project to succeed. As president of the new Manitoba Sugar Beet Company, he had a vested interest in solving the
industry's labour shortages; if the resettlement program succeeded, the labour shortage might be alleviated.

As the search for a Commission representative persisted throughout the latter part of March, policy discussions between the BCSC and Aikins continued. Shirras pointed out to Aikins the importance of treating the Japanese people in a humane manner. In order to prevent negative publicity, Shirras wanted the farmers and evacuees to meet under the best circumstances. Shirras also wanted the farmer to provide the evacuees with the type of "accommodation supplied to one of our own farm labourers and his family." Aikins realized that due to office procedures, there would be a day or two wait in Winnipeg before the farmers could pick up their workers. In an effort to provide acceptable accommodations Aikins arranged to use Immigration Hall No.2, next to the C.N. station in Winnipeg.

With the Security Commission keen to initiate the project they endorsed Aikins' earlier proposal to send twenty Japanese families. The timetable was determined by the Security Commission in BC. The evacuation of Japanese families from BC was a pressing matter. This coincided with the need to have available labour for the sugar beet season. The sooner they were in Manitoba the better for the beet industry and the BCSC; the concerns of the Japanese families were inconsequential.
The BCSC was eager to launch the program but the Commission office in Manitoba was not ready. With less than 11 days before the arrival of the first group of evacuees the Manitoba Sugar Beet Company had not provided the Commission with the necessary information to match the evacuees and host farmers. Some farmers had not been canvassed, and living quarters were not prepared. As well, Graham needed to arrange support staff to feed and assist the new arrivals. Even at this late date, Graham was still in the process of learning the Commission's objectives.

Despite the inadequate preparations, on April 13, twenty families, totalling 118 individuals arrived in Winnipeg from BC after a two day train trip. The train's accommodations had been minimal, with primitive water and heating facilities. The majority of the evacuees were from Haney-Hammond, Mt. Leman and Steveston. They came as families or extended families, although some single workers resettled as well. The Japanese people who chose Manitoba did so because it was an opportunity to keep their families together. The alternative to sugar beet farming in Manitoba or Alberta was logging camps in the BC interior. Leadership was an additional factor encouraging group relocation. The destination of a respected community leader often determined the community's new location.

On arrival the Japanese families were taken to the Immigration Hall. The five storey building provided spartan
living conditions. The building's heating and washroom facilities were inadequate as there was only one bathroom per floor, and only one sheet and blanket were supplied for each army style bunk bed. Meals were served mess style and rarely warm. Men were separated from their families and there was a curfew at dusk for anyone who left the building. Substandard conditions such as these highlighted the deficiencies in the BCSC program.

It was soon discovered that the distribution system in Winnipeg required more time to process the people. Once the evacuees unloaded their luggage from the train, they were fed and assigned beds. The next morning, the families were interviewed and allocated to farms best suited according to acreage and accommodation. The recipient farmer was advised and transportation arranged. Evacuees were assigned a serial number which identified their residence in Manitoba. Forms were processed and copies were made and sent to the participating organizations: two were kept for the BCSC file, one went to the Manitoba Sugar Company for their records, and one went to the R.C.M.P. in Manitoba. When the people left the Immigration Hall, the local R.C.M.P. were informed of their destination. The Security Commission asked the police to watch the evacuees in the province in order to alleviate public concerns, and prevent hostile actions against the evacuees. The BCSC also gave the host farmer an information package stating the evacuees' serial numbers,
family description, and the Commission's expectations of the farmer.  

Within the first week 44 families (263 people) were sent to Manitoba. Only 19 families were settled on farms, leaving 25 families (151 people) in the Immigration Hall. Before the backlog could be dealt with, additional families arrived, increasing the total number of families in the Hall to 64 (378 people). Aikins' strategy of testing twenty families dissolved. It seemed that once the project was started the Security Commission did not want to wait for test results as there were no definite criteria or conclusion date to determine if the experiment was a success. It remains unclear from the documents why Graham did not request a stop or slow down in the number of evacuees until the Immigration Hall could be cleared. Perhaps Graham believed Shirras' timetable to be inflexible in the face of political pressures in BC and labour demands for the approaching sugar beet season in Manitoba. In an attempt to speed up the resettlement process, Graham sought and received the Commission's approval to expand the resettlement scheme beyond the sugar beet farms of the Red River Valley. To solicit support from the farming community, and in particular other sugar beet farmers, the BCSC advertised in the Winnipeg Free Press and Winnipeg Tribune. The advertisement sent a mixed message to its audience. It did not distinguish between Japanese Canadian
and National evacuees labelling the whole group as Japanese Canadians. Yet, while praising the virtues of the hard working and loyal Japanese Canadian labourers, it also noted that they were a national security risk. By employing these people, farmers would be solving a national security problem as well as supporting the war effort through increased beet production. Guidelines governing living conditions were included as part of the advertisement, which stipulated that the host farmer needed to provide a house in good condition for year round occupancy and an outhouse, with sanitation complying to Manitoba laws. Access to a good supply of drinking water, and a garden plot were required.  

The notice stated that "every house in which a Japanese family was to be placed would be inspected by a fieldsman or qualified inspector detailed by the BCSC," and "the Commission will in all cases supply provisions for two weeks." The former statement suggests that an inspection was a pre-condition for the placement of a Japanese family. This was not the case, since the pace at which the evacuees arrived taxed the Security Commission's ability to find host farms, let alone enforce the terms listed earlier. Thus inspections rarely preceded the arrival of families. The latter statement committed the BCSC to a policy of temporary assistance. Yet the Security Commission shifted its responsibility to the farmer who was reimbursed by the evacuee after wages were earned. On May 2, another 21
families (121 people) arrived in Winnipeg. Only 16 families (101 people) were provided with a local destination. Despite the campaign 47 families (286 people) had yet to be settled.59

While Graham perceived the scheme to be operating with "very little difficulty and very few kicks,"60 the Japanese families saw the process differently. Organization and orderly processing were absent. Many evacuees asserted that the selection process was crude "it was the same as an old slave market, the farmers came in to look over which families best suited the farmer and then took them."61 It soon became apparent that young families with children had a harder time finding a host farmer. Farmers wanted labourers not families.62

Regardless of Graham's efforts, the distribution system continued to suffer from poor coordination. The farmer/evacuee matching process was disorganized, and overcrowding in the Immigration Hall was common. Despite the published regulations, living conditions on the farms were substandard. The BCSC placed evacuated families on a farm without first inspecting the premises. Inclement weather conditions also interfered with housing preparations on host farms. Moreover, the project experienced a shortage of building supplies, hindering the farmers' and Sugar Company's efforts to upgrade the homes of the Japanese
families before they arrived. Graham's reports overlooked many of these problems.

Once resettled on farms, the Commission gave each family $12.00 for fuel and food. Some of the more needy families were provided additional provisions to last two weeks. Both supplements were distributed through Graham from a trust fund established by the BCSC. It was not long before problems arose. Through contact with the Sugar Company fieldsmen, Graham discovered that the groceries allocated to the families did not last two weeks. In some cases Japanese families were seeking food supplies after two days. The lack of work and low personal savings left some Japanese families nearly destitute. Either the local stores would have to extend credit, which many were reluctant to do, or the farmer or the BCSC would be obliged to provide credit. Graham believed the best policy was to let the farmer cover the cost and receive payment from the Japanese families for food after wages were earned. This action was in line with Security Commission management practices and was subsequently approved by the BCSC.

With these deficiencies present, Assistant Commissioner Shirras, after an inspection tour in May, expressed reservations concerning the viability of the project. "This project does not appeal to me and I question whether it will develop to any great advantage to this Commission." The pockets of local opposition to Japanese family resettlement
from relatives of Canadian soldiers captured in Hong Kong, the inexperience of local farmers in dealing with Japanese labour, and poor weather conditions concerned Shirras. He further stated that the living conditions at the Immigration Hall were unacceptable and unsanitary, and doubted the Hall's usefulness. Shirras instructed Graham that in the future, no more than twenty families were to be detained in the Hall at one time. Graham believed the Immigration Hall was indispensable as a clearing house. The Red River Valley was too large an area in which to process and move the Japanese families when they arrived. For example, Portage, Morris and Emerson were 56, 41, and 69 miles away from Winnipeg.

Despite Graham's professional background, Shirras lacked confidence in Graham's administrative abilities. Expenditures were deemed to be high in relation to the project's success. "Mr. Graham seems very capable in many ways but he is of the salesman type, does a lot of talking and I am just wondering whether his type, taking into consideration conditions and circumstances, is to our advantage." Shirras' opinions seemed to weaken the BCSC's enthusiasm towards the project.

After Shirras' inspection, it was 18 days before additional families came to Winnipeg, but in reduced numbers. The last group of Japanese families reached Winnipeg June 4, and were resettled on host farms after a
couple of days. Between April 13 and June 4, 1075 individuals arrived in Manitoba and were deployed onto farms in time for the sugar beet season. The resettlement process was quick, but not dignified. Shirras' desire to treat these people in a humane manner fell short of his stated intentions. Responsibility for this shortcoming lies in the lack of communication between Shirras and Graham. Many of the problems Shirras cited were a direct result of the restricted timetable and the numbers sent from BC.  

While the BCSC reduced the number of families sent to Manitoba, farmer participation in the program also regulated how many Japanese families entered the province. Public opinion toward the evacuated families in the Red River Valley was mixed, affecting the degree to which the farming community was involved in the program. Public reaction was partially conditioned by reports in the national and provincial media and by questions raised in the Manitoba Legislature concerning the resettlement program. On March 27, 1942 Premier Bracken was questioned by MLA's (Member of the Legislative Assembly) about the project. D.A. Best, representing Assiniboia, asked if arrangements were made to prevent sabotage and espionage in regard to the Greater Winnipeg Water District and the nearby war industries. S.E. Rogers, representing Roblin, wanted the Premier to explain what occupations the evacuees were to be employed in. Bracken replied by stating that security and other details
were the responsibility of the BCSC. As such Bracken did little to reduce fears that the Japanese families were a provincial and national security threat.

Similar attitudes were exhibited in rural newspapers. The *Morris Herald* reiterated the general perception that the evacuees were potentially dangerous. The paper stated that "one cannot help but feel sorry for these people... because they have darker skin and slant eyes we look upon them as our enemies." The article noted that some nations at war with Canada have the advantage of centuries of development, illustrated by leading scientists, musicians and philosophers, but the Japanese did not have these advantages; "they worship strange gods, and their ways are not our ways... with proper precautions against them, it is possible to give them a square deal and show them the light." To the uninformed Manitoban, if Japanese families had to be settled in Manitoba for national security reasons, the accusations might have merit. Thus the evacuees were to be viewed with suspicion.

Winnipeg City Council was equally cautious in its dealings with the evacuees. At the beginning of March the city received a pamphlet from the "Immediate Action Committee." The Action Committee, located in Victoria, urged the city to support a nation-wide policy to intern and deport people of Japanese origin after the war. The pamphlet stated that the Action Committee was in the best position to
judge the evacuees' true intentions. The Committee declared that the Japanese were a treacherous race. If they were a danger in BC, they were a danger in Manitoba. It seemed likely that this pamphlet helped contribute to the initial suspicion which the city councillors directed towards the evacuees.75

After the BCSC announced that Manitoba would take part in the evacuation program, city council established a sub-committee (comprised of Mayor Queen, Aldermen Coulter, Knowles and Blumberg) to deal with Japanese applications from Vancouver. Mayor Queen stated that the city had received several requests from Japanese businessmen in Vancouver wanting to relocate in Winnipeg. The committee asserted that only applications which passed an R.C.M.P. security check, and were made by the Security Commission on behalf of the evacuees, would be considered. The Committee had several concerns: Blumberg was worried that an influx of Japanese labour would depress the wages of local workers. The concern was misdirected in that Japanese businessmen were applying for relocation, not labourers. It appeared that city council did not want any class of Japanese relocated in Winnipeg. Finally, city council wanted to prevent the evacuees from becoming a charge on the city's social services.76 Despite the clear intentions of the BCSC to resettle the evacuees in rural Manitoba, the city was worried by the applications of the evacuated businessmen.
The city felt that they might experience a large influx of settlers. The response of the city's sub-committee to the Japanese question began to reveal the members' personal opinions. The concern for security and Japanese labour adversely distorting wage levels reflected statements made by nativists and racist organizations such as the White Canada Association and the Immediate Action Committee in BC. While city council had yet to enact discriminatory policies, their initial opinions were ambiguous.

In an attempt to facilitate a better understanding of the project, Graham organized an information luncheon. Graham wanted to counteract any rural movement that would be detrimental to the program. To that end, he invited the Reeves, clerks, and city officials in the Red River Valley. Despite Graham's efforts, protest occurred. As resettlement proceeded throughout April and May, Selkirk and the surrounding municipalities (Lockport, Sanford, St. Andrews, St. Clement, and Mapleton) were active in registering their disapproval. A delegation of local businessmen from Selkirk voiced their concern for the type of restrictions on the evacuated families and the protection of the area's war industries. Lockport residents protested with equal vigour. They objected on the grounds that Japanese labour would be employed on German farms at Little Britain, the evacuees would be living and working close to war industries such as Fairfield Woollen Mills, and local
children would pass near their dwellings. Finally there were fears that the presence of Japanese families would hurt the summer tourist industry.  

St. Andrews Council petitioned both Graham and James McLenaghen, the Attorney General of Manitoba (their elected representative), stating that the evacuees were located in the municipality against the wishes of local residents. Chamberlain Berg, a St. Andrews Council member, pointed out that many residents had relatives and friends captured by the Japanese in Hong Kong. Emotions were running high following the comments in the British House of Commons describing the inhuman treatment by the Japanese of prisoners of war in Hong Kong. It was believed that under the circumstances residents would not welcome any type of evacuee.  As a result, the BCSC removed the Japanese families from the Lockport and St. Andrews area.

Open disagreement with the resettlement project was not confined to elected municipal governments. Concerned citizen groups and labour organizations voiced their disapproval. The motives behind the open dissension ranged from latent racism to racial-economic fears. The Imperial Order of the Daughters of the Empire and Children of the Empire was an example of latent racism. With little or no direct contact with the evacuees, the organization passed resolutions asking the provincial government to prohibit evacuated families from starting businesses or working as labourers in
an attempt to ensure employment for returning servicemen. The Imperial Order further requested that a 9:00 p.m. curfew be imposed on the evacuees. They also endorsed the Immediate Action Committee's proposal that all people of Japanese origin be repatriated to Japan after the war.81

The Winnipeg and District Trades and Labor Council expressed its reservations about the BCSC scheme. The Labor Council displayed its socio-economic fears by implying that the evacuees would decrease wage levels and increase Occidental unemployment. The Labor Council asked Bracken to act in their best interest. In response, Bracken directed their concerns to the Security Commission.82 In a similar move at City Hall, the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen registered their opposition to resettling evacuated families in Manitoba.83 The concerns expressed by labour groups and the Imperial Order reflected some of the attitudes manifested by interest groups in BC. Through the news media and printed material distributed by groups such as the Action Committee, racist and socio-economic fears were transmitted to Manitobans. However, the geographic confines of the project, the limited number of family transplants, and the docility of the evacuees were factors which mitigated public resentment.

With only a limited number of interest groups voicing objections, the resettlement project continued. As the evacuees were settled, the Security Commission established a
communication network using the Manitoba Sugar Company's fieldsmen. As Company representatives, the fieldsmen were instrumental in determining crop acreage and finalizing contracts between the Company, farmer and evacuee. Until June 1942 an accurate account of the beet acreage was unknown and beet contracts had not been issued. Once the acreage was surveyed, contracts were assigned. Prior to contracts, the BCSC attempted to avoid situations where the evacuees were taken advantage of. It seemed that the evacuees were likely paid the accepted local rate. The fieldsmen travelled the farms daily and the Commission relied on them to report irregularities. Graham wanted the fieldsmen to fill out monthly reports outlining the well-being of each evacuated family. If an issue was serious, the fieldsman would notify Graham immediately. The fieldsmen reports were to highlight how the farmer and resettled families co-existed. Also they were to note the evacuees' progress in growing winter food reserves, as well as their access to winter fuel supplies. The financial condition of the Japanese families and the availability of credit at local stores were additional items for the fieldsmen to check.

Graham noted that credit was a problem. Local farmers, unlike their counterparts in Alberta, were reluctant to accept responsibility for store credit. To regulate the amount of goods charged to a storekeeper or farmer, the
Commission advised the Japanese families and the fieldsmen that a limit on relief levels equal to $45 a month for a family of 5 would be enforced. Graham was confident that the number of families needing credit would not become an issue. The main exceptions were the families from Steveston. Steveston was a fishing town, and the Japanese community was barred from fishing in January, 1942. They had had to exist on personal savings since that time.

The Sugar Company employees informally agreed to many of the duties mentioned but they refused to submit monthly reports or investigate the evacuated families' finances to ascertain whether or not relief needs were genuine. The fieldsmen accepted the responsibility of communicating problems such as store credit to the Commission. Though policy implementation and enforcement were the BCSC's obligations, Graham had little alternative but to enlist the support of the Sugar Beet Company's field operatives. The BCSC's fixation on financial restraint, and its mandate for a quick removal of Japanese from the coast did not allow Graham enough time to acquire adequate support staff to handle all of the Commission's duties. Consequently, issues such as family finances, store credit, and living conditions were not properly handled.

Through May and June, administrative policies continued to be devised. Medical and hospitalization costs were two such examples. The agreement between the province and the
BCSC stated that no evacuee would be a charge on any jurisdiction within Manitoba. The Commission, however, instructed Graham that the Japanese families were to pay for their own hospital bills. Only if an evacuee was unable to pay would the Commission reimburse the doctor or hospital. When doctor's bills could not be paid, the BCSC would pay the charges at a reduced rate, guided by the Workmen's Compensation Board scale. In an effort to simplify accounting procedures, special agreements were entered into with four Winnipeg hospitals to care for the evacuees' medical needs.

By July 1942, the evacuees started adjusting to life in Manitoba. Branded as a security threat in BC, the Japanese families were resettled in Manitoba to augment the sugar beet industry's labour supply. The provincial government did not object to the BCSC temporarily resettling the evacuees in the province so long as the Security Commission took full responsibility for their welfare, and would remove them once the war ended. With the assistance of G.H. Aikins, President of the Manitoba Sugar Company and the sugar beet farmers, the BCSC placed the evacuees on farms throughout rural Manitoba.

From April 13 to June 4, 1942, 1075 evacuees were relocated in the province. Resettlement was cumbersome and plagued with difficulties. Poor communication between Graham and Shirras created numerous problems. Overcrowding in the
Immigration Hall, and the placement of families on farms not meeting stated regulations were two prominent examples. Moreover, as the Japanese families arrived, interest groups such as the Imperial Order and municipalities like Winnipeg and Lockport exhibited racial and socio-economic fears which complicated the Commission's mandate.

The urgency with which the Japanese families were sent to Manitoba and the limited preparation time afforded to Graham affected the abilities of the Commission's local operation. Graham had to rely on the Sugar Company's fieldsmen for information that should have been secured by the Commission. As a result the Commission was underdeveloped and "crisis management" orientated. It was under this struggling administrative structure that the Japanese families were dispersed among the sugar beet fields of Manitoba.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 1


2Ibid. Roy's "The Evacuation of the Japanese", noted that the American Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox described the attack on Honolulu in this manner: "the fifth column work of the Japanese was the most successful since the Quislings of Norway." This has been subsequently disproved. For additional discussion on this point see Ward's White Canada Forever, or Ann Sunahara, The Politics of Racism, Toronto: James Lorimer & Company Publishers, 1981. Roger Daniels, Concentration Camps USA: Japanese Americans and World War II, 1971. Carey McWilliams, Brothers Under the Skin, Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1942, and Prejudice: Japanese Americans, Symbols of Racial Intolerance, 1944.


5PAM. Campbell to M.A. Lyons February 7, 1942. RG18 A4 Box 36. Public Archives of Manitoba.

6PAM. Bracken to Crerar February 13, 1942. RG18 A4. Box 36.

7Ibid.

8PAM. Telegram, March 2, 1942. Ibid. The cancellation of the project elicited negative reactions from the town of Flin Flon. The Mayor of Flin Flon, who had worked on the railroad between the Pas and Cranberry Portage in 1928, stated that "it is a well known fact that there is not one trestle between Wanless and Cranberry Portage." He went on to state "the obvious advantage of having both a rail and highway route as a connection from Flin Flon to the outside have obviously been overlooked." No doubt Mr. Greene of the Hudson Bay Mining and Smelting Co. felt that a road link would work to the detriment of his company.

58


10LaViolette, p.59-61. In an effort to co-ordinate internment with the US, federal authorities did not pass PC 1486 until the US passed Executive Order 9066, on February 19, 1942.


13Report of the BCSC, Department of Labour, March 4, 1942 to October 31, 1942, p.4. The BCSC had an advisory board of 20 supportive of the scheme including: R.L. Maitland, BC Attorney General, G. Pearson, BC Minister of Labour and H.E. Winch, Leader of the Conservative opposition. The strategic area was defined by Order in Council 365, January 16, 1942. The protected area was the belt of land situated between the Cascade Mountains and the Ocean, including all islands off the BC coast.

14NAC. Aikins to Taylor, March 11, 1942 RG 36/27. Vol.31 File 1721 The preferred crop list, issued by the Dominion government, paid higher prices for grains deemed to be important for the war effort and encouraged farmers to produce more of those grains.

15Forrest E. LaViolette, The Canadian Japanese and World War II, Toronto:University of Toronto Press, 1948, p.71-74. Increased German submarine activity in the Atlantic created shipping shortages, and the flow of sugar into Canada was restricted; thus internal sugar production acquired new importance.

16NAC. Taylor to the Alberta Beet Growers Association and to Beet Growers Association of Manitoba, March 11, 1942, RG 36/27 Vol, 31 file 1721. The Commission's duties were: control, supervision and responsibility over the movement of resettled Japanese Canadians and Nationals and if necessary, additional police protection for the district in which the people were affected. Once the emergency ceased the evacuees were to be removed from the province. The Security Commission was to place the families on host farms only after security checks were conducted by the R.C.M.P. Educational, medical, and other costs were to be paid by the evacuees or the BCSC. It was the obligation of the farm employer to pay wages in line with industry standards,
provide a house and garden plot for year round residence, and allow the Japanese to upgrade the dwelling for winter use. The host farmer was not expected to be responsible for the Japanese family or labourer after the end of the contract period. It was the farmers' obligation to see that the wages earned by the Japanese family during the summer season were sufficient to maintain the family during the winter period. It is important to note that the specifications on what constituted a house for year round residence were not cited in detail. Moreover, in the agreement with Manitoba, the BCSC stated they would be responsible for ensuring suitable housing, a condition subsequently delegated to the farmer. Later in the program specifications were published but the resettlement program was already in full swing and enforcing the guidelines was almost impossible.

17Ibid.

18PAM. Telegram, Mitchell to Bracken, March 24, 1942. G113 file 112.

19PAM. Telegram Bracken to Mitchell, March 25, 1942. Ibid.

20PAM. Taylor to Bracken, March 25, 1942. G113 File 112. Due to the loss of Bracken's personal files, evidence of his personal opinions on the Japanese issue remains sketchy. Hints of Bracken's position on the Japanese question were revealed in a speech given in August 1944. Following Bracken's election as national Tory leader in December 1942, he supported the policy of the permanent removal of Japanese from BC, and argued that they should be deported from Canada if other provinces were not willing to accept them as residents. It is useful to remember that Manitoba, under Bracken's leadership, only agreed to temporary resettlement, and like Alberta, looked forward to their removal once hostilities ceased. Vancouver Province August 15, 1944, found in Adachi chapter twelve footnotes.

21PAM. Shirras to Bracken, March 29, 1942. G113 file 112

22This was the same agreement offered to and signed by Alberta.

23PAM. Bracken to Taylor, June 23, 1942. G113 file 112.

24PAM. Taylor to Bracken, June 30, 1942. G113 file 112. Under P.C. 2483, March 27, 1942, RG 2. Any Japanese Canadians or Japanese Nationals living in Manitoba prior to February 5, 1942, were the responsibility of the R.C.M.P. The R.C.M.P. were not concerned with these people of Japanese origin in the province. NAC. September 23, 1942. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1703.

25NAC. Aikins to Taylor, March 27, 1942. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1721. Aikins received 43 requests for Japanese families with suitable housing and facilities. Aikins believed additional interest was likely
and the Manitoba Farm Labour committee in the Department of Agriculture could diversify the program into other types of farming. This was not pursued.

26Ibid.

27NAC. Aikins to Taylor March 27, 1942. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1721. Since Alberta farmers had more experience growing sugar beets using mainly Hungarian families to work the fields, Aikins used their productivity as a model.

28Ibid.

29NAC. Shirras to Aikins March 29, 1942. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1721.

30NAC. Taylor to R.C.M.P., Manitoba Commander's office, April 7, 1942. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1721.

31NAC. Shirras to Aikins March 27, 1942. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1721.

32J. Friesen, "The Manitoba Sugar Beet Industry: A Geographical Study," Unpublished MA thesis. University of Manitoba, 1962. Chapter 1. It is interesting to note that American authorities, when analyzing similar soil conditions, generally consider a good crop of sugar beets to produce 12 tonnes per acre with a sugar purity of 80% or higher, with sugar content ranging from 15-20% or higher.


34Friesen; and Restrictive Trade Practice Commission, Report: "Concerning the Sugar Industry in Western Canada and a Proposed Merger of Sugar Companies", Department of Justice Ottawa, 1957. p.48-49.

35Ibid.

36Restrictive Trade Practice Commission, p.48

37Canada Year Book 1945. J.C. Gilson, "Economic Aspects of Sugar Beet Production in Manitoba," Research Report No.1, Department of Agricultural Economics and Farm Management, University of Manitoba, p.8. The majority of sugar beet farmers were in a 60 mile radius of the factory.

38Friesen, p.137. The number of employees included the fourteen fieldsmen who assisted the BCSC resettle the Japanese families.

39Gilson, p.7. Most hand labour was local so that after the work day they could return home. Casual, out of town labour stayed in old
shacks or converted chicken houses on the farms. The same shacks would house Japanese families from BC.

4G. Gilson, p.8

42Census Canada: 1951 Vol.VI. In subsequent years, 1945-49 the average output was 13.1%. Following the 1943 harvest, two-thirds of the evacuees moved off the sugar beet farms. This was likely an important factor in the decrease in sugar output in 1944.

42NAC. Shirras to Aikins March 29, 1942. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1721.

43Ibid. The Commission was prepared to pay a salary of $200.00 a month plus transportation and office expenses.

44NAC. Aikins to Taylor March 31, 1942. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1721. Ibid. The Security Commission felt that hiring a Manitoban would be less expensive. Also, prairie agricultural knowledge was more practical than an understanding of Japanese Canadian culture.

Winnipeg Tribune, October 16, 1948. During Graham's short involvement with the BCSC, April to September 1942, it was unclear from the records whether he continued to work full-time, part-time, or took a temporary leave of absence from his other duties.

46NAC. Shirras to Aikins March 27, 1942. RG 36/27 Vol.31 1721.

47NAC. Aikins to Shirras March 30, 1942. Ibid. Shirras to Aikins March 29, 1942. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1721.

Winnipeg Tribune, April 14, 1942.

PAM. Oral History Collection, "Japanese in Manitoba," Tape C-840. Interviews with K.C. Matsuo and Almer Oike by L. Mukai, September 3, 1987, 50 min. Tape C-852. September 10, 1987, 75 min. When using oral history tapes only points that had two or more corroborative recollections were used. For example S. Sato was a respected community leader from Steveston. His decision to resettle in Manitoba led others to follow.


NAC. Taylor to R.C.M.P., Manitoba Commander's office, April 7, 1942. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1721.
Graham's attempt to expand the resettlement plan beyond the sugar beet farms was not very successful.

Winnipeg Free Press, April 23, 1942. As well, beds, mattresses, chairs, a stove, table, lamps, coal oil, and a small supply of wood/coal were conditions to be met by the farmer. Ibid.


64NAc. Graham to Shirras, May 8, 1942. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1703. Graham had employed 3 people, 2 stenographers and an assistant, Mr Lockerby. It would appear from Shirras' comments that the BCSC's Treasury department and Shirras felt the Commission office in Manitoba
constituted a large expense in relation to the level of development attained. Judging by Shirras's statements it seemed that Shirras and Graham may not have been compatible. This would help explain why Shirras did not have confidence in Graham or the project.

71NAC. Graham to Simmons May 25, 1942. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1713. From May 20 to May 22, 37 families arrived in Winnipeg and within a few days 25 were located on farms. However, 14 families still needed placements.

72NAC. Graham to Shirras, June 12, 1942. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1713.

73Winnipeg Tribune, March 27, 1942.

74Morris Herald, April 16, 1942. Similar comments were found in the Portage Daily Graphic. Comments like the ones in the papers provide insight into how little the population of Manitoba knew about Japanese culture or people of Japanese origin in Canada.

75Winnipeg Archives and Records. Immediate Action Committee to City Clerk office, March 2 1942. File No. 17854.

76Winnipeg Tribune, April 3 and 10, 1942. St. Boniface also passed resolutions protesting the arrival of Japanese families and barred them from the city. Winnipeg Free Press, May 27, 1942.

77NAC. Graham to Shirras, April 21, 1942. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1703.

78Selkirk Journal, May 7, 1942.

79Winnipeg Tribune, April 28, 1942. and Winnipeg Free Press, April 24, 1942.

80Selkirk Journal, May 14, 1942.

81PAM. Imperial Order to E. Willis, May 18, 1942. RG 18 A4 Box 36. Also the Order asked that Japanese be barred from driving taxi cabs. Winnipeg Free Press, October 17, 1942.

82PAM. Anderson to Bracken May 15, 1942. Bracken's response May 26, 1942. G113 file 112. The Labor Council's reaction to the resettlement program was likely caused by the city actions directed towards restricting access to evacuees. Based on the city's public statements, the Labor Council might have inferred that labourers would be living and working in Winnipeg.

Graham noted that the norm for precontract wages in the provincial agricultural industry was $1.50-$1.75 per day with board for men and at least .15 cents per hour for women. Some evacuees claimed they were unfairly paid, but the accusations could not be verified.

NAC. Shirras to Graham, June 1, 1942. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1703.

NAC. Graham to Shirras, June 1, 1942. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1703.


NAC. Graham to Shirras, June 1, 1942. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1703.

NAC. Shirras to Graham, June 5, 1942. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1708.

NAC. Graham to Shirras June 9, 1942. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1708. The hospitals were: Winnipeg General, Victoria General, St. Boniface, and Grace Hospital. Dr. Creighton was hired by the Commission for $50 a day.

PAM. Graham to Bracken, June 30, 1942. G113 file 112.
CHAPTER 2

RURAL RELOCATION AND THE JAPANESE DIVISION

Once the evacuees were placed on the sugar beet farms, the Commission transformed its policy to meet their needs. The original aim of having the evacuees be self-sufficient by working on beet fields in the summer, and live off their savings during the winter months proved unattainable. Poor weather conditions, and problems inherent in the Manitoba sugar beet industry increased relief costs for the Security Commission and its successor the Japanese Division. This chapter discusses the changing economic and residential needs of the Japanese community, the problems within the sugar beet industry, and the Division's ability to modify plans in order to manage the sugar beet project in Manitoba.

The majority of Japanese families who came to Manitoba resettled in an area which ranged from the Portage La Prairie district in the west to the Selkirk district in the north-east, and from the Altona district in the south-west to the Steinbach district in the eastern section of the province.¹ The rural communities participating in the resettlement project differed in size and included such towns as Portage, Oakville, Carman, Brunkild, Headingly, Curtis Siding, Dufrost, Whitemouth, Sanford, and Lorette.² The numbers of evacuees resettled in each area varied. The
most common arrangement was one farmer hiring one or two families to work the fields. Larger farms required more workers. For example in Oakville, Dufrost, and Portage as many as ten families were employed on one farming operation.

The majority of Japanese families were experienced agriculturalists from BC farming communities such as Haney, Strawberry Hill, and Mt. Lehman. Berry farming, however, did not compare to sugar beet work. Prior to mechanization, sugar beet work was labour intensive. Seeding, hoeing, weed thinning, and fall harvest required a labour input of seventy to eighty hours per acre.³

The physically demanding work was exacerbated by substandard living conditions. Two or three families per dwelling was not uncommon, and water would often be of poor quality, or a substantial distance from the house; in Lockport it was one mile away. In Headingly, an old converted barn originally built for cattle housed four families. The barn-house was dirty and insulated with manure piled to the windowsills.⁴

The Commission's inability to ensure proper living conditions did not deter Graham from dispatching optimistic reports to both the Security Commission and Premier Bracken. In June 1942, Graham advised the Commission that the "Japanese were giving real satisfaction to the people for whom they were working, and everyone appeared to be quite content and happy."⁵ Graham expressed similar sentiments in
a letter to Bracken, noting that by the end of June 1942, 1075 "Japanese" were resettled in Manitoba. Graham's optimistic assessment was based on the low number of complaints and likely his own self-interest. In the coming months, however, the evacuees demonstrated that they were not "content and happy" on the farms. Many showed their displeasure by moving into the urban centres without permission.

Over the summer the evacuees hoed and thinned the beet fields. In August they helped harvest grain to earn extra money. As winter drew near the expected cold temperatures and inadequate housing facilities worried the evacuees. In an effort to ease their concerns, the Commission pledged to winterize the houses.

Before mid-August the Security Commission was forced to find a replacement for Graham and relied on G.H. Aikins to suggest a suitable candidate. Aikins recommended Mr. R.C. Brown, a former farmer representative to the Farmers' Creditor Board. Brown's principal occupation was farming which meant he was only available on a part-time basis. With no other candidate for the position, the BCSC appointed Brown as their new representative in early August 1942.

Prior to Brown's appointment, the BCSC received a request from the Spanish Consulate General asking for a Japanese National representative from each project throughout Canada. The representative would submit a list of
names of those Japanese persons who wanted the Spanish Consulate General to act in their interest. Before vacating his position, Graham was instructed to find a delegate. K. Onagi was elected as spokesman for the 220 Japanese Nationals in Manitoba. Soon after the Japanese National representative was elected, the Japanese Canadians began pressing for similar representation. They wanted to establish a committee with appointees from the various districts. Each appointee would be a liaison person informing the Security Commission of any problems, thereby eliminating the necessity of individuals dealing with the Commission. Graham supported the initiative, but the BCSC was less enthusiastic. The Commission did not want Japanese Canadians meeting or travelling into Winnipeg on a regular basis, as entry into the city was prohibited. More importantly, the Security Commission did not want "the Japanese to meet in any way in large groups where they can discuss their problems and perhaps stir up trouble for us." Where Japanese families were already in large groups, the BCSC did not object to district representatives. The Commission was not against representation, but prohibited the evacuees from meeting or creating a formal organization. Despite the sanctions imposed by the Commission, Japanese Canadians began organizing and meeting secretly. Shinji Sato, Harold Hirose, Tom Mitani, and Ichiro Hirayama illegally formed the Manitoba Japanese Joint Council (MJJC)
in September 1942. From their experience in marketing cooperatives in the Fraser Valley and the Japanese Fisherman's Association in Steveston, they recognized the power of collective action. In the coming months the MJJC proved to be an important element in the interaction among the BCSC, the Sugar Company and all resettled people of Japanese origin.

At the beginning of the 1942 harvest season sugar beet farmers expected a good crop, but unsettled weather conditions threatened this prospect. With an estimated 100,000 of the 130,000 tons of sugar beets still in the ground in October, both the growers and the Company pressed for a quicker harvest. Despite the efforts of the evacuees, extra labourers were brought in from schools and Winnipeg to pick the crop. For every acre worked by the uncontracted labourer, the evacuees lost revenue. A successful sugar beet harvest benefitted the industry, but to the financial detriment of the Japanese families.

With the prospect of insufficient earnings, additional winter employment was required if the evacuees were to avoid government relief. The BCSC's original intention was to prevent the evacuees from leaving their assigned districts. To help alleviate unemployment, however, Brown made exceptions to the June agreement and successfully lobbied the City of Winnipeg to allow Japanese domestics into the city. In regard to Japanese men, however, the city wanted
all applications submitted to the city's subcommittee before permission was granted.\textsuperscript{15}

To assist in the domestic employment program, the federal Deputy Minister of Labour, Arthur MacNamara, asked the National Council of the Young Women's Christian Association (Y.W.C.A.) and their provincial branches to help the BCSC; the Manitoba branch agreed. Under the direction of the Y.W.C.A.'s Mrs. Lang, in consultation with Brown, the domestic servant program was initiated. Mrs. Lang's committee and their church connections were a vital part of the maid program.\textsuperscript{16}

Despite Brown's efforts, a part-time Commissioner could not adequately address all of the project's problems. Winterizing the Japanese homes, finding winter work, and establishing a relief program for those unable to work or find work were some of the persistent difficulties. To solve these administrative deficiencies, the BCSC's Travelling Supervisor J.N. Lister, recommended that Brown be upgraded from a part-time to a full-time appointment, and additional staff be hired.\textsuperscript{17} Lister also noted that inter-governmental cooperation was absent. After discussions with Inspector Tucker and Sergeant Appleby of the Manitoba R.C.M.P. detachment Lister discovered that they regarded the sugar beet project as a "non-restricted" area. The R.C.M.P. were not interested in preventing the movement of evacuees, or prohibiting the use of shortwave radios or cameras. Despite
the BCSC's original agreement stating that the R.C.M.P. would monitor the evacuees' movements, no such order was issued from the R.C.M.P. headquarters in Ottawa to the Manitoba detachment. Before the detachment would change its policy, special instructions had to be issued from Ottawa. Consequently, without the R.C.M.P. enforcing the Security Commission's travel restrictions, many evacuated families freely visited between districts. To remedy this situation, Lister suggested that instructions be sent from Ottawa to enlist the support of the local R.C.M.P.. It remains unclear if the orders were ever sent. At no time during this period was there any indication that the R.C.M.P. enforced the travel restrictions between rural areas. The R.C.M.P. seemed to observe rural to urban migration more closely than between the rural districts, but there was no evidence to suggest the R.C.M.P. were actively preventing evacuees from moving.\textsuperscript{18}

Lister also recommended increasing the number of hospitals admitting evacuees. Several of the evacuated families complained that transportation to Winnipeg and hospital costs made medical assistance expensive. Given the large area of resettlement, Lister proposed that contracts be made with the General Hospitals in Portage, Morris, Carman, Selkirk, and Teulon.\textsuperscript{19} Nine months later the hospitalization policy was decentralized to include these rural areas.
In July, many Japanese families expressed concern over winter accommodations. Under the agreement among the BCSC, the province, the farmers, and the Sugar Company, responsibility for proper living conditions lay with the host farmers. Nevertheless, the Security Commission, as manager of the project, was ultimately responsible for the evacuees' well-being. Despite the Commission's earlier assurances, little was done to prepare the dwellings for winter. Finally, in November the Commission acknowledged housing was a problem that needed immediate attention. The BCSC allocated $7,500 for building supplies for families that were financially burdened. Yet it was not until the end of December that the winterization program was completed.\(^\text{20}\) In response to these conditions some Japanese families, without city council's or BCSC permission, began filtering into Winnipeg and small towns to find better living and working conditions.\(^\text{21}\)

The first problem the evacuees encountered in Winnipeg was locating living accommodations. The majority of landlords in Winnipeg were not ready to open their premises to the evacuees. The landlords refused on the basis of personal prejudice or protest from other tenants. In some cases the landlord agreed to rent, but at a higher rate.\(^\text{22}\) Many men overcame this problem by staying with friends already in the city. This was possible for the single male or female; families were less fortunate. They tended to find
housing in the North Kildonan area, a predominantly Mennonite community on the outer fringes of the city which had few utilities.  

City council's restriction on Japanese males working in Winnipeg was designed to prevent a decline in the hourly wage level. The city prohibited employment to male evacuees that paid less than 45 cents per hour. The city's wage rule only applied to people of Japanese origin. The city's actions mirrored racial discrimination found in BC. After consulting with the Unemployment Insurance Commission (UIC), Brown determined city council could not prevent Japanese persons from being employed in the city provided that they registered with the UIC and had his approval. In any case, the BCSC was not interested in challenging the city's discriminatory by-law. Therefore those evacuees employed in Winnipeg were approved by the city's subcommittee, or were quietly placed in labourer positions by Brown and the UIC office. Most men who worked in Winnipeg did so as dishwashers, orderlies, tanners, meat packers, furriers, and as labourers in grain and seed elevators. Women found employment in the garment industry or as maids in households.

Unable to provide sufficient winter employment for the evacuees in Winnipeg, Brown established contacts with National Mills in Northern Manitoba and Schreiber Mills in Fort William, Ontario, seeking positions for bush workers.
and mill wrights.\textsuperscript{27} The Commission believed the lumber industry was ideal for the evacuees since its labour needs were seasonal, allowing the evacuees to return to the sugar beet farms in the spring. Furthermore, it provided a source of employment, thereby limiting the number of relief cases. As well, it was politically safe; the Japanese were out of the urban centres which reduced the chances of aggravating the Caucasian population.

While winter work decreased maintenance costs, it did not eliminate them. The BCSC's relief policy was straightforward: if employment could not be found, the Commission wanted the Japanese family to remain on the farm. The BCSC believed that "if they (Japanese family) were to stay on the sugar beet farm the white farmer will undoubtedly feed them and they will be available to him next Spring."\textsuperscript{28} The Commission did not want the evacuees living on maintenance in the city and failing to return to the farms for spring employment.

The Commission's strategy of shifting the maintenance burden onto the host farmer was not successful. Many Japanese families applied for assistance regardless of where they resided, but the Security Commission was not equipped to administer a relief program. Consequently, Brown asked the province to distribute the claims through the existing provincial system.\textsuperscript{29} In November 1942, the Manitoba Department of Public Works agreed, but it was not until May
1943 that the system was actually working. In the meantime, the BCSC allocated $2,500 for Brown and his staff to handle immediate relief cases.\textsuperscript{30}

By the end of October 1942, the BCSC had removed all people of Japanese origin from the "protected area" on the coast. The Commission had fulfilled its initial mandate and the original executive of Taylor, Shirras, and Mead resigned. A general supervisor was required to manage the national evacuee program. The federal Minister of Labour, H. Mitchell, after consulting his advisors, appointed George Collins, Assistant Deputy Minister of Public Works for Manitoba as the Japanese Division's general supervisor. Collins' long-standing relationship with Arthur MacNamara, federal Deputy Minister of Labour, undoubtedly played a major role in his selection as Division Supervisor. George Collins had been born and educated in Manitoba. After his graduation from the University of Manitoba, he was hired by Manitoba's Deputy Minister of Labour, Arthur MacNamara. Collins succeeded MacNamara as Manitoba's Director of Unemployment Relief after MacNamara went to Ottawa in 1940 to work for the federal Department of Labour. Soon after, Collins was appointed the province's Assistant Deputy Minister of Public Works.\textsuperscript{31} Collins was hired by the federal Department of Labour on December 1, 1942 as supervisor for the newly created Japanese Division within the federal Department of Labour.\textsuperscript{32} On February 5, 1943, the Japanese
Division was activated and assumed all the rights, duties and obligations of the BCSC as entered into with any province or individual.\textsuperscript{33}

The transition to a new agency in February 1943 also marked a change in the mandate of the project. The BCSC had been created to remove the Japanese from the coast. The BCSC's successor, the Japanese Division, was formed to manage the resettlement program and encourage permanent relocation throughout Canada. Senior officials in the Japanese Division and the Department of Labour recognized that "it will take some time (possibly years) to settle families permanently elsewhere,"... and that the ultimate goal "should be devoted to dispersing the Japanese across Canada in productive employment, in small groups or family units where they will be assimilated into local community life... ."\textsuperscript{34} It would appear that the Japanese Division's original intention was dispersal; political considerations, however, altered the plan.

As part of its mandate to encourage relocation outside BC, the Japanese Division continued to endorse the Manitoba sugar beet project and canvassed the interior camps looking for families to move to Manitoba and eastern Canada. Collins was confident, in December 1942, that once the housing issue was solved, more Japanese families would be moved to Manitoba "now that officials of the Commission and the Sugar Company have had one year's experience."\textsuperscript{35}
However, by May 1943, the project's viability was under question. The expense of fuel, food, medical needs and rent for those evacuees who had moved into towns had drained their savings. Throughout the spring the numbers on relief climbed from 41 families in March, to 57 families in April. By June 1943, 62 families, or 23% of the families resettled in Manitoba, required financial assistance.36

Expenditures beyond food, shelter, heating and clothing bankrupted many families. The evacuees also had to contend with the financial burdens of high school costs and medical expenses. Grade school education costs were paid by the BCSC, but high school education was a particular problem. It was an expense as well as a drain on labour, thus reducing family earnings. Medical bills were equally costly. The Division decided whether the family paid for its medical needs; the charges for medical services were weighted against the families' ability to pay, ascertained by previous earnings, savings rate and current employment status. If the family was on relief, the cost was covered by the Division. The chief medical examiner, Dr. Creighton, had final control over medical needs.37

For many evacuated families, maintenance and sugar beet work did not provide an adequate standard of living.38 Many families arrived in Manitoba with two or three people but had added to their numbers since their arrival. The documents did not state how many families enlarged their
totals, but new family members forced one of the parents, (usually the mother) out of the labour force, thus decreasing production and wages. Presented with lower incomes, sugar beet employment was no longer sufficient.

Income was just one reason for the evacuees' desire to find permanent work in other occupations; health and age of the family members were other factors limiting work ability. Moreover, some farmers and evacuees were incompatible. Unfair wages, and unfavourable working and living conditions were additional factors. The distances between friends and relatives was a problem as well. Finally, a lack of water forced many families to take their drinking and cooking water from sloughs, ponds and dugouts. At Dufrost, for example, water was supplied from St. Pierre, using a Sugar Company truck. In the Morris district, water was sold for 2 cents a gallon. These deficiencies turned many Japanese families against sugar beet farming.

In an effort to address the problems and improve morale, the Division recognized the MJJC in May 1943. By sanctioning the organization, minor issues could be solved through the MJJC's area representative. For the MJJC, recognition allowed them to lobby the authorities on matters affecting all evacuees: primarily sugar beet contracts, living conditions, and employment opportunities.

The MJJC's struggle for reforms were assisted by weather conditions preventing sugar beet planting. In the
spring of 1943, the planting season was late, and the evacuees remained unemployed and uneasy about spending another season on the beet fields. With little or no farm employment, more evacuated families opted for Winnipeg to find year-round employment and better living conditions. Others, sensing that a return to BC following the war would be impossible, wanted to move to Southern Ontario and locate permanent employment. The Japanese Division recognized that Southern Ontario offered better employment and living standards and wanted to avoid an exodus from Manitoba. Movement out of Manitoba was tightly regulated.43

The challenge for the Division was to keep the Japanese families in the sugar beet industry. In an effort to make the Manitoba project more appealing to the evacuees, the Division agreed to allow free movement between the project districts, but due to city restrictions on employment, access to Winnipeg was controlled. Thus the evacuees still needed the permission of the Division if they were moving into Winnipeg. If the evacuees violated the rules the Division could seek the assistance of the R.C.M.P. to enforce the guidelines.44

By contrast, the Japanese Canadians believed that once out of the protected area and after fulfilling their contracts, they should be free to determine future employment. Evidence supporting their position remains uncertain. The evacuees may have inferred this because sugar
beet contracts were only for one year, and as Canadian citizens outside the protected area, they believed future employment should be their choice. While a few families found employment in Winnipeg through the Selective Service and with the permission of the Division, most remained in the sugar beet industry for another season. Their decision to stay within the sugar beet industry was not entirely determined by employment opportunities. The Division exerted "considerable pressure to keep quite a number of the Japanese on beet work this season and it (was) the general opinion of the Japanese that they (were) being compelled against their wishes to remain on beet farms."  

The Division's restrictive labour policy was complicated by poor weather conditions; excessive moisture resulted in a loss of acreage which reduced the evacuees' income. The areas most seriously affected were the districts of St. Arnaud, Morris, and Condon. Poor climatic conditions also resulted in a high weed infestation which prompted five sit down strikes by the evacuees. They refused to work until contracts were adjusted to reflect work requirements. In each case the MJJC, the Division, the farmer, and the Sugar Company came to an acceptable agreement.  

Confronted with reduced earnings, the Japanese community and the MJJC pressed the new Division representative, Frank Ernst, for alternative employment.
Ernst responded by locating summer employment in grain harvesting and industries such as peat moss and lime works.\textsuperscript{50} Despite Ernst's efforts, the evacuees began to move off the beet farms, becoming independent labour, capable of choosing the most promising occupation. While grain harvesting paid well, it was seasonal and did not offer stability. Consequently rural centres such as Emerson, Portage, and Morris which might offer permanent employment were preferred.\textsuperscript{51}

After two summers of work on the sugar beet fields, many evacuees within the project could not earn a satisfactory income. In early fall of 1943, the Division reformulated its policies. Both the Sugar Beet Company and the Manitoba Growers Association took the position that the Japanese labour was "frozen" to the industry for the duration of the war. Movement was only possible among sugar beet farms.\textsuperscript{52} Their position was supported by the BCSC letter of intent to the Beet Growers Association of Manitoba in March 1942. In the original agreement, however, the BCSC stated that it was the farmers' duty to see that wages earned during the summer period were sufficient to maintain the Japanese family over the winter; this rarely happened.\textsuperscript{53}

In contrast, the evacuees believed that once out of the protected area, they would be free labour after the original sugar beet contracts had expired. In their attempt to be financially secure, they wanted to be independent of
the Sugar industry, with minimum Division supervision. The original policy of the BCSC and the Japanese Division was to keep the evacuated families on the farms. To supplement income, the Commission and the Division supplied them with in-between seasonal work and additional winter employment. Pressure from the Japanese community to move into more secure employment, and the prospects of a larger number of families on relief because of the expected decrease in the sugar beet harvest, forced the Division and the Sugar Beet Company to re-evaluate the sugar beet project.

By late August 1943, the Division implemented its updated policy. The new regulations tried to meet the needs of the evacuees, the Sugar Company and the farmers, while also seeking to reduce Division expenses. Trying to meet these divergent interests created policy inconsistencies. On the one hand, the Division wanted the evacuees to remain in the agricultural industry, satisfying the Sugar Company and the farmers' needs. Financially, however, the evacuees could not support themselves in sugar beet work despite free accommodations. The Division, in order to avoid paying higher relief costs, permitted the Japanese families to locate employment outside of the agricultural sector, in contradiction to their own policy. Moreover, the Division did not agree with the sugar industry's contention that the evacuees' were "frozen" to the sugar beet industry for the duration of the war.
In fairness to the sugar beet industry and to the farmer, the Division stated that those families who promised to return to the farms after winter employment should do so. Those families who did not renew their contracts with the farmers and were employed should not be forced to move back to the farm.\textsuperscript{57} Despite allowing greater freedom to the evacuees, the Division tailored its policy to coerce the Japanese families to remain in the agricultural or lumber industry. By confining the Division's job search program to seasonal industries, a seasonal employment cycle was established, keeping some evacuees on sugar beet farms. If agricultural employment did not financially sustain the families, however, the Division preferred that people find other occupations rather than resort to welfare. In order to direct movement, the evacuees were assisted in their search for employment by the Division and the Selective Service, discouraging rural to urban transfers.\textsuperscript{58} By devising this type of policy the Japanese Division hoped to alleviate many of their own monetary problems and those associated with the sugar industry.

In step with policy initiatives, the Division permitted greater freedom of movement within the project. Evacuees no longer needed a permit to travel within the rural areas of Manitoba, but permission was still needed to enter Winnipeg.\textsuperscript{59} Also, due to persistent Division requests, city council rescinded its earlier position which prevented
Japanese males taking jobs which paid less than 45 cents per hour. Therefore, Ernst was able to arrange employment in the city provided that the evacuees went through the Selective Service.60

As another winter approached, residences and employment remained important issues for the Japanese families and the MJJC. The new Division policy had not addressed the particularly delicate situation of young families. With only one worker, many young families were not able to save enough money to live over the winter. If the family was forced to stay on the farm and the husband left for a winter job in the lumber industry, two residences would have to be maintained. His earnings would not support the family, and the family would be ineligible for relief because he was working.61 In addition, poor sources of water and fuel in some districts, combined with limited transportation for supplies in isolated areas, increased the Japanese families' demands for alternative residences.62

With these issues in mind, the evacuees continued to leave the fields for Winnipeg and rural towns. By the beginning of September 1943, two-thirds of the Japanese families had left the farms and found at least temporary employment outside the sugar beet industry.63 Once Winnipeg rescinded its employment restrictions against male evacuees, Japanese families relocated in the city through the Selective Service, but without informing the Division. The
Selective Service and the R.C.M.P. were not in the habit of checking with the Division for approval, nor were they concerned with where the evacuees resided, provided that the law was upheld within their jurisdictions. Faced with a steady increase in the number of Japanese in Winnipeg, the Division, with the assistance of the Selective Service, excluded the city as an option for further relocation unless approved by Ernst. Possible public resentment over the concentration of people of Japanese origin prompted the Division's move. Moreover, the Division wanted those evacuees in the agricultural industry to remain. Preventing the people from settling in Winnipeg helped achieve this objective.

Unable to stop the evacuees' exodus from the farms completely, Ernst devised a two-pronged policy. For the young families with one worker, Ernst arranged permanent employment in industries such as lime quarries at Stonewall and peat moss at Whitemouth. Coal yards, meat packing plants, and the Hide and Wool Company in St. Boniface and Winnipeg were additional options.

Single men, or families with more than one worker, were encouraged to take seasonal winter jobs in the logging industry at Nipigon Lake Timber, Lahti's Sawmill in Northwestern Ontario, as well as National Mills in Manitoba. Unlike the previous winter, the lumber industry was not the only job option. Residences and employment for carpenters
were to be found in Neepawa and Morden with the North American Lumber Company. Temporary manufacturing positions were available with East Kildonan canneries, Gregg Manufacturing, Canada Packers, P. Burns, Dominion Tanners, and Winnipeg Supply and Fuel in Winnipeg and St. Boniface. Other factories and manufacturers were opened to Japanese Canadians later.65

In an attempt to bolster the image of Japanese Canadians, the Department of Labour tried to publicize their loyalty and good working habits and urged Ernst to collect letters of support from employers. In reply, Ernst stated that according to the MJJC, 75% of Japanese Canadians bought Victory Bonds and had contributed to the Canadian Red Cross. Many rural employers would not admit publicly to hiring people of Japanese origin because they would be accused of using cheap labour. While the accusation was false, the public was ready to believe this charge.66

Employment prospects for Japanese families continued to open over the winter months, assisted by a full time Division representative. In keeping with Division policy, rural towns were canvassed for suitable jobs. Ernst began his search in the fall thereby increasing the range of work opportunities. The results of the 1943 sugar beet season added urgency to his job searches. With a crop average of 7 tonnes to the acre (with areas as low as 4 tonnes) 14,078 acres were harvested or 105,000 tons of sugar beets, down
from the 130,000 in 1942.\textsuperscript{67} Root rot, excessive weeds, and an insufficient number of vehicles to transport the crop to the factory caused spoilage; all of which contributed to reducing the final crop yield. The unsatisfactory sugar beet conditions and lucrative grain prices induced many farmers to return to growing grains.\textsuperscript{68}

During the 1942-43 winter period, the lumber industry was the principal alternative to agricultural labour, and it remained a viable option. Jack Devlin at Rennie, Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company, Kenora, Ontario and National Timber and Fence Company, and National Mills Manitoba continued to employ evacuees. Through the efforts of Ernst, the Selective Service, and the Japanese families themselves, additional jobs were secured.\textsuperscript{69} For example the municipality of Portage La Prairie, private businesses in Dominion City, A.H. Flett, Hambley Machine Shop, and Bobrowski's Machine Shop in Morris, as well as manufacturers of agricultural implements at Belleview Manitoba hired evacuees.\textsuperscript{70}

As the availability of winter employment increased, the MJJC attempted to improve sugar beet contracts for the Japanese families remaining on farms. Negotiations between the Sugar Company, the Growers Associations, and the MJJC began in January 1944.\textsuperscript{71} The contracts in the Manitoba sugar beet industry mirrored those used in the Alberta industry. As mentioned earlier, Aikins' estimates on the number of
workers per acre and approximate return per family were based on Alberta figures. These figures adversely affected the Japanese family in two ways. First, the soil conditions in Manitoba were inferior to Alberta's, creating lower yields. Secondly, lower yields meant less income for the worker. Contract revisions were necessary if Japanese families were to stay on sugar beet operations and survive.

By April 1944, the MJJC, representing the remaining farm labourers, and the sugar beet industry agreed to a new contract. The contract was similar to the earlier one, but with a few important changes. The 1944 agreement granted the family a guaranteed minimum of $8.00 per acre, an additional fifteen cents per ton on harvests of nine tons per acre or over, regardless of who completed the harvest. A further clause gave the family a minimum of thirty-five cents per ton extra, if loading was required. By successfully acquiring income protection in the harvesting clause, the MJJC removed a major deterrent facing evacuees in the sugar beet industry.

While winter employment and sugar beet contracts for the 1944 season were settled, the need for financial assistance continued. The peak months were from February to May, when approximately 10% of the Japanese families accepted maintenance. The reasons for the families receiving assistance varied. Some recipients were young married couples with several infants and sugar beet work did
not produce enough income. Others were on relief due to illness, or age.\textsuperscript{75}

The attention to alternative employment for the evacuees reduced Division expenses. Between February and June 1943, the Division spent $6,224.80 on relief. For the same period in 1944, maintenance expenditures were $2,901.66.\textsuperscript{76} Thus, the Division's efforts at locating winter jobs as well as the Japanese desire to find work contributed to the decline in maintenance costs.

The modest level of unemployment apparently had a settling effect on the Japanese community. Economic security, for the majority of evacuated families, helped create an atmosphere of stability. This hint of permanence was the catalyst for establishing community organizations. In conjunction with the Y.W.C.A., two clubs were formed, the Niseiettes for Japanese Canadian girls and the Maniseis for Japanese Canadian boys.\textsuperscript{77} The clubs were social organizations allowing the younger members of the community to interact. Both clubs were designed to promote positive relations between the evacuees and the Caucasian population.

The improved economic security and sense of permanence led the evacuees to consider the possibility of remaining in Manitoba. The change in outlook was reflected in two ways. In a report to the International Red Cross, the MJJC, on behalf of the community, stated that "ninety-five percent of the (Japanese) people in Manitoba (were) well and happily
situated". Moreover, in an unprecedented move, the MJJC and the Japanese community decided to promote the province and sugar beet work as a destination for resettlement among friends and relatives in the BC interior housing project. The MJJC, in conjunction with the Japanese Division and the Sugar Company, determined the best district for future Japanese families in Manitoba.

Through the combined efforts of the MJJC and the Division by December 1944, 29 Japanese families entered the Manitoba project for resettlement. An impediment to further settlement was the statements made by the Sugar Beet Growers' Associations in Manitoba and Alberta. Despite the Division's refusal to "freeze" the labour to beet fields, the Growers Association continued to suggest otherwise. This incorrect information caused many Japanese families in the interior to consider other options.

While the MJJC and the Division continued to promote sugar beet work in Manitoba, weather conditions played havoc with the industry. Excessive moisture in May 1944, once again threatened the project's viability. Crops in the Letellier and Lorette districts were drowned out. With the expected losses in acreage as high as 30%, the Division was forced to locate other employment opportunities. In keeping with the trend, Ernst found summer jobs in rural Manitoban industries at Rennie, Millwater, Moss Spur, and Shelley. The task of finding suitable employment was
complicated by a series of articles in the Winnipeg Free Press and Winnipeg Tribune which claimed that the BC government would not allow the evacuees to return after the war. In addition, reports highlighting the brutal treatment of prisoners of war by the Japanese decreased public tolerance towards the evacuated families in Manitoba, Canadian born or otherwise. Municipalities such as Winnipeg and St. Boniface remained cautious in accepting Japanese families. While they refused to endorse resettlement, they did not officially disapprove either, deferring responsibility to the Japanese Division.84

The press reports dampened public support, but did not substantially affect Ernst's efforts in locating summer and winter employment for the evacuees. The demand for labour took precedence over the employers' racial intolerance. As in previous years, fall haying and the wheat harvest supplemented many Japanese family incomes.85 As expected, wet conditions during the growing season reduced sugar beet production. In 1944, only 9,520 acres were harvested producing 80,884 tons of sugar beets, a decrease of 29,000 tons from the preceding year.86 The reduction in acreage forced the remaining marginal evacuee labourers into other occupations.87 As in prior years, work existed in logging, agriculture, and other related industries throughout rural Manitoba. The forestry program was extended to include the
Fort Frances and Dryden Pulp and Paper Companies in Northwestern Ontario, providing 112 jobs.88

Locating winter employment helped reduce maintenance cost and was an important aspect of Division policy. In the fall of 1943, more freedom was granted to the evacuees in an attempt to better their living conditions. For the first time the Division actively sought permanent employment primarily for young families and older workers unable to earn adequate incomes from sugar beet farming. One year later, in cooperation with municipal governments, Ernst expanded the policy initiative by locating permanent rural destinations across Manitoba and Northwestern Ontario for any Japanese family needing alternative residence due to financial reasons. By securing a pledge of cooperation from municipal governments, Ernst hoped that these families would not be forced to move after the war.89 The municipalities were willing to accept a limited number of evacuees as a "solution to the general problem of rehabilitating the Japanese." The number placed, however, was negotiated between Ernst and local officials.90

To accelerate the program, Ernst consulted the National Selective Service (NSS) authorities and received a current list of job vacancies in the various districts. Armed with the monthly lists and NSS support, Ernst was better able to disperse the evacuees evenly within the project. With the participation of rural municipalities,
placements began in the fall of 1944. Strachan's Seed Company and Aubin's Nursery in Carman, the hospital in Neepawa and a chicken farmer in Morris were examples. Despite the cooperation of municipal officials and the NSS, Ernst's policy was hindered by the lack of housing in the rural areas.

An important factor determining whether Ernst's rural resettlement policy succeeded was the cooperation of the Japanese community and the MJJC. Ernst noted that "the work of the Japanese Committee has greatly facilitated the work of this Commission and has had a very settling effect upon the Japanese people in Manitoba." The MJJC's assistance proved valuable when explaining Division policy initiatives to the evacuees. In return, the MJJC provided the Japanese community with an opportunity to express their concerns.

Economic security was another vital element contributing to the evacuees' growing sense of community. By December 1944, Japanese workers became union members in meat packing plants and garment factories where they were employed, bolstering their sense of stability. Furthermore, the evacuees continued to migrate away from unproductive sugar beet areas. In 1943, 595 evacuees worked the beet fields; the number steadily decreased to 431 in 1944, 428 in 1945, ultimately falling to 347 in 1946. In the areas where sugar beet farming was profitable, a number of the Japanese families made favourable incomes, and since
they were satisfied with their present locations, alternative arrangements were not necessary.95

The readjustment in demographics was determined by the search for better jobs. The decline in relief expenses and the steady number of registered births might suggest an improvement in the economic position amongst the Japanese community. Family expansion in itself did not prove that Japanese families were better off or had accepted Manitoba as a permanent home, but it may suggest an increasing degree of contentment. In 1944, 56 births were recorded, affecting approximately 28% of the families in Manitoba. Moreover, relief costs for the last half of 1944 continued to decline, totalling $625.32, as opposed to $1120.33 for the same period in 1943.96 Medical expenses decreased as well. Between April 1, 1943, and March 31, 1944, medical costs were $4537.71. Between April 1, 1944, and March 31, 1945, medical charges fell to $2811.45, a decrease of $1726.26.97 Education expenses were assisted by the Division. For the 1944-45 school year, 216 children in 39 districts attended school in Manitoba, at a cost to the Division of $2,165.00. In addition, 18 students attended the University of Manitoba.98 Thus, among the original evacuees resettled in 1942, a growing sense of stability seemed to evolve.

As in prior years, rural employment was cyclical. The bedrock of the evacuees' job market, (1945-46), remained in the agricultural and lumber industries. This seasonal labour
included sugar beet farming, grain harvesting, and peat moss work from May to October, and forest related jobs as well as employment in rural industries during the winter months. In keeping with Division policy, Ernst concentrated on dispersing the evacuees across rural Manitoba, and whenever possible, placing additional families in towns in Northwestern Ontario.99

Despite a slight rebound in the sugar beet harvest in 1945 and 1946 reaching 82,154 tons and 97,886 tons, respectively, compared to 80,884 tons in 1944,100 employment opportunities in the peat moss, and forest related industries located in Shelley, Martin, Anola and Long Lac remained a necessity.101 An impediment to Ernst's plans to resettle evacuees in rural areas was the shortage of housing. Returning veterans had priority in job opportunities as well as for homes and building material.102

Ironically, one occupation which was able to provide jobs and living accommodations was the sugar beet industry. The exodus of evacuees from the beet farms in the fall of 1943, created a labour demand and a surplus of living facilities. The labour shortage was accentuated by the federal government's request, at the Dominion-Provincial Agricultural Conference in December 1945, to increase Manitoba sugar beet production to 15,000 acres in order to off-set the sugar scarcity. To encourage extra output, the federal government improved crop payments to growers,
amounting to $12.50 per acre.\textsuperscript{103} Additional monetary incentives were not sufficient; the farmers and the sugar company reminded the government that the labour shortage was a critical factor in meeting the government's quota.\textsuperscript{104} Only 347 evacuees would work the fields in 1946, a decrease of 81 from the previous year.\textsuperscript{105} Transfers to better jobs within the project and families repatriating to Japan contributed to the reduction in farm labour. Many farmers were concerned that additional evacuees would repatriate. Growers and Sugar Company officials claimed that the "Japanese were the most satisfactory labour that the beet farmers had employed."\textsuperscript{106} In an effort to attract replacements, growers and Company officials informed the Japanese Division that 55 houses were available for evacuated families wishing to relocate from the BC interior.\textsuperscript{107} Moreover, the sugar beet growers and Sugar Company improved labour contracts as an added incentive. Contracts were increased by $1.50 per acre for thinning and hoeing, and 25 cents per ton for harvesting, as well as 15 cents per ton for loading and a guarantee of $8.00 per acre regardless of the condition of the crop. The improved contract benefited the Japanese families in the beet industry, but had minimal effect in recruiting Japanese families from the BC interior.\textsuperscript{108} While a large influx of evacuees from BC did not materialize, the Japanese families on the beet farms continued to be a significant part of the industry's labour force, accounting for 25% of the labour in
the 1946 harvest. Thus the remaining evacuees working in the sugar beet industry continued to play a valuable role in the industry's survival.

Since June 1942, the sugar beet project had experienced important administrative changes. The original regulations designed to keep the evacuees on the sugar beet farms, were adapted to reflect the needs of the various participants involved in the project. Arrangements amongst the government agencies active in the program were strengthened and clarified. Consequently, the NSS and the Japanese Division were better able to meet the needs of the evacuees.

The changes in administrative practices occurred due to a combination of factors. Weather conditions made sugar beet employment a marginal occupation providing most Japanese families with inadequate incomes. The Division's determination to avoid large operating costs necessitated greater flexibility in order for the evacuees to be financially self-sufficient. Thus the original sugar beet proposal proved untenable, and most evacuees eventually trickled into other industries. The Division's policy adjustments attempted to satisfy the concerns of the sugar beet industry, the evacuees and its own needs. By not "forcing" the evacuees to stay on sugar beet farms, the Division jeopardized, in the short term, the sugar
industry's labour supply; however seasonal employment in other industries cut Division costs. In an effort to balance out the economic restrictions, the Division sanctioned the MJJC and granted greater latitude to evacuees moving within the project for employment outside the sugar industry. In a bid to control internal movement, the Division and the NSS assisted the Japanese families to locate other jobs. Through their involvement, the Division continued to direct the evacuees' choice of employment, favouring either agriculture, forestry, or essential war industries in rural areas throughout the province and Northwestern Ontario. The Division's seasonal employment scheme eventually broke down as evacuees located permanent positions.

Under a more established administrative arrangement the Japanese community began to stabilize. Following the Division's recognition of the MJJC in May 1943, the organization lobbied for, and received, better sugar beet contracts, improved housing conditions, and greater access to alternative occupations which would advance the financial standing of individual evacuees. As economic opportunities diversified, changes occurred; Japanese workers were accepted by local unions, relief cases decreased, and social organizations were established. The MJJC's encouraging assessment of the project to the International Red Cross, and active role in recruiting families from the BC interior in 1945, was further evidence of the positive change in
attitude. Thus the improved financial situation of the Japanese families reduced grievances and discontent.

Contributing to the overall sense of stability felt by the evacuees was the equilibrium achieved in employment. Over the years, the Japanese families vacated the least productive sugar beet areas and the families who remained in the sugar beet industry achieved a satisfactory standard of living. Over time, however, as restrictions governing movement and property ownership were eased and later revoked,¹¹⁰ most of the 347 labourers filtered into other occupations in Winnipeg or left the province.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 2


Graham to Shirras, June 22, 1942. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1713. PAM. Immigration file #A66589 C-10586.


4PAM. Tapes C-842, Ibid. C-852 interview with A. Sato by L. Mukai, September 28, 1987, 97 min.

5NAC. Graham to Shirras, June 22, 1942. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1713.

6PAM. Graham to Bracken, June 30, 1942. G113 File 112. Of the total 220 were Japanese Nationals. September 8, 1942. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1713.

7NAC. Graham to Shirras, July 22, 1942. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1713.

8Once Graham resigned, he returned to Melody Sellars. The records do not indicate why he left early. Perhaps he was only able to take a short leave of absence from his job.

8NAC. Minutes of the meeting of Japanese Nationals in Manitoba. September 8, 1942. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1713 and October 13, 1942. Ibid. The Japanese Nationals' representative did not appear to express any concerns that differed from those of the Japanese Canadians. There was no indication of how many Japanese Nationals in Manitoba applied to the Spanish Consulate to act in their interest. Enquiries were made by the Canadian Red Cross at the request of the International Red Cross and the Japanese Red Cross on behalf of relatives in Japan concerning Japanese Nationals living in Canada. Approximately 30 requests arrived between 1943-45 asking about relatives in Manitoba. The Japanese Division responded in 25 words or less stating the evacuees health, well-being, general location in Canada and working status. Personal letters from
Japanese Nationals to Japan were prohibited. PAM. Canadian Red Cross: "Enquires: Re Japanese Canadians during WWII, 1943-45. P4481 file 7.

10NAC. Graham to Eastwood, August 24, 1942. RG 36/27 Vol.16 file 610.

11NAC. Eastwood to Brown, August 28, 1942. RG 36/27 Vol.16 file 610.

12PAM. Tapes, C-852, Ibid. C-859-862 interview with H. Hirose by L. Mukai, October 20, 1987, 3 hr 20 min. Also interview with H. Hirose, June 9, 1989, Winnipeg MB. The MJJC and its members will be discussed in Chapter four.

13NAC. Brown to BCSC, October 13, 1942. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1713. And Beet Growers Agreement for Hand Labour on Sugar Beets, form No.0-58-600-4-44. The contract entered into among the three parties did not prevent the grower from hiring extra labour at harvest time, at the expense of the evacuees' earnings. These contracts were designed to ensure that the grower and sugar beet company received beets at all cost. Following Aikins' calculations on family size, extra labour was not always sent from BC. It should be noted that a limited number of Japanese families did earn a good living as Sugar Beet labourers. They were the exception. Prior to the war local labour had been used. See J. Friesen, as cited.

14NAC. Lister to Eastwood, November 11, 1942. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1713. The desire of affluent Winnipeggers to employ cheap domestics created the opportunity for a maid program. The main reason young adults and high school people worked as maids was for free room and board while attending school or university. The first winter (1942) the University of Manitoba accepted 8 students. It was the only university in Canada to do so.


16NAC. Brown to Eastwood October 14, 1942. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1703. PAM. Y.W.C.A., Board of Directors minutes, January 1942 to December 1943. Minutes of Annual Meetings, October 1941-October 1947. P 3856 and P 3833. Mrs. Lang's committee consisted of Miss Davidson, Mrs. Scrambler, Miss Megafin, and Miss Saddler. The Y.W.C.A. program will be discussed in chapter 3.

17NAC. Lister to Eastwood November 11, 1942. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1713. Brown admitted that as a part-time representative policy and services were left unfinished.

18Ibid. The R.C.M.P. received forms detailing the evacuees' location in the province as a precautionary measure, in the event they would have to assist the Division.
19Ibid. The specific number of complaints was not recorded, nor was there any indication that medical services were refused.

20NAC. Lister to Eastwood, November 11, 1942. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1713. Also Lister to Eastwood, December 7, 1942. Ibid.

21Ibid.

22PAM. Tapes, C 842-843-859-862-864, Ibid. Interview March 14, 1989 with H. Hirose. His was a favourite temporary residence for men looking for work and living accommodations in the city.

23Ibid. The "official" BCSC policy was rural resettlement. Brown was acting on his own in an attempt to find work for those without sufficient savings.

24NAC. Brown to Lister, December 16, 1942. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1703. Lister to Brown December 22, 1942. Ibid. NAC. Brown to Collins March 17, 1943. Ibid. City Council's actions seemed to indicate that organized labour had considerable influence at City Hall. In addition, perhaps, the Immediate Action Committee's propaganda raised unnecessary fears at City Hall.

25Ibid. The "official" BCSC policy was rural resettlement. Brown was acting on his own in an attempt to find work for those without sufficient savings.

26PAM. Tapes C-864-861, Ibid.

27NAC. Lister to Eastwood, December 7, 1942. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1713.

28NAC. Eastwood to Brown, October 21, 1942. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1703.

29NAC. Eastwood to Brown, Ibid. Lister to Eastwood, November 11, 1942, and December 7, 1942. Ibid. NAC. Lister to Collins July 6, 1943. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1713. The first Manitoba Government Public Works employee to assist the Commission was J. McTavish. Wm. Morrison succeeded McTavish in late spring 1943. While Morrison assisted the Security Commission office, records and payment came from the Manitoba Legislative Building where the provincial welfare office was located. By spring 1943, 23% of the families were on relief.


The Japanese Division succeeded the BCSC. After completing its mandate the BCSC dissolved and the Japanese Division assumed the role of caretaker of the evacuees in Canada.

The switch in official title did not alter the administration procedures in Manitoba. After the change in status, letterhead was not altered. Also the Division representative was still referred to as the Commission representative. NAC. H.T. Pammet to A. MacNamara, Memorandum Re: Proposal for reorganization of the BCSC (Japanese Division) December 3, 1942. RG27 Vol.642 file 23-2-2-11

Collins to C.L. Taylor, Manitoba Sugar Company. December 30, 1942. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1721. Despite Shirras' negative assessment the Division held out hope for the project's success.

Ernst to Eastwood, June 30, 1943. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1713. Ernst to Eastwood May 15, 1943. Ibid.

Generally, facilities for grade school education were available. The only area that presented a problem for the BCSC was Lorrette due to overcrowding. Brown believed transportation to another school could be arranged.

Brown to Eastwood, May 1 and 15, 1943. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1713.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Brown to Eastwood, May 15, 1943, Ibid. The MJJC was illegally formed in the fall 1942. MJJC members were used as interpreters and helped the Commission solve minor problems.


Brown to Eastwood, May 1, 1943. Ibid. Desbrusay to Ernst, August 23, 1943. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1703. Evacuees could leave the project only with special permission.

Lister to Collins, July 6, 1943. RG36/27 Vol.31 file 1713.

Ibid. Sunahara makes this point as well, but she does not footnote her source. LaViolette noted that ill-informed BCSC officials stressed the "freedom" aspect to Japanese when trying to convince them to work on sugar beet farms. Perhaps alternative employment opportunities were confused with freedom of movement after the first beet season.
The National Selective Service was not required to check with the Division before locating a Japanese person or family. They helped the Division representative locate jobs when the Division requested assistance. Hence there was little coordination between the two government agencies.

In June 1943 Frank Ernst replaced R.C. Brown as the Department of Labour's Japanese Division representative in Manitoba. Ernst was formerly with the Universal Life Assurance Company. There was no indication that G.H. Aikins was involved in the search for Brown's replacement. The Division probably conducted their own search. It will be recalled that in the fall of 1942 Brown was up-graded to full-time status for the winter months. In the spring Brown left the job to return to his farming operation.

Ernst noted that the pay was good for labourers, $4.00 a day for harvesting and $5.00 a day for threshing.

The Japanese Division was not prepared to treat the evacuees as "indentured" labourers to any farmer, or industry for the duration of the war. The Division felt that the evacuees were partially justified in
arguing that once out of the protected area they should be granted a limited amount of freedom. The Division also recognized that the farmers were unable to provide adequate summer earnings for the evacuees to live off during the winter, as the 1942 agreement stipulated. Consequently, the farmers defaulted on a basic tenet of the agreement allowing the Division to support the evacuee's demand for greater freedoms; which incidentally reduced Division maintenance expenses. Collins to MacNamara, August 21, 1943. RG36/27 Vol.31 file 1703.


58NAC. Lister to Collins August 18, 1943. RG 36/27 Vol.2 file #40.

59NAC. Lister to Collins July 6, 1943. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1713. At the same time, Collins allowed greater freedom to all evacuees in Canada living outside BC by granting travel options for 30 days without a travel permit. PC 946 section 3 viii. 1943.

60Ibid. The city rescinded its by-law because businessmen informed City Council that they needed labourers and the evacuees were eager and available. Furthermore, some businessmen had had positive experiences using Japanese labour over the previous winter. NAC. Ernst to Lister December 1943. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1713. Also liquor restrictions were lifted in August 1943 by the Division. Lister to Collins August 10, 1943. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1713.

61NAC. Ernst to Lister September 30, 1943. RG 36/27 Vol.31 1713.

62NAC. Lister to Collins July 6, 1943. Ibid. Ernst to Lister, September 30, 1943. Ibid.

63NAC. Ernst to Lister August 31, 1942. Ibid. The farmers rarely objected.

64NAC. Lister to Eastwood, October 23, 1943. Ibid. Collins to MacNamara, August 21, 1943. RG 36/26 Vol.31 file 1703. Lister did not state numbers, but was alarmed at the situation, and described it as "dynamite".


106
As noted earlier, wheat and barley as well as other grains were on the Dominion preferred crop list yielding higher incomes per acre.

As noted earlier Frank Ernst was hired full time in June 1943. Through correspondences with Division headquarters it was clear that as early as August 1943 Ernst was locating winter employment for the evacuees.

This was a 13% decrease from the previous year.

Note that the peak periods in 1943 for welfare cases were March 41, April 57, May 60+ and June 63, compared to March 27, April 28, May 25 and June 6 in 1944.

The Maniseis was formed in January 1944. The Maniseis policy of encouraging additional movement from BC. The MJJC's
program to attract more families to the sugar beet farms may be linked to contract negotiations. If additional labour could be obtained from BC, better wages and labour arrangements might be forthcoming from the Company.

80The number of families was determined by adding the monthly totals entering the project from February to December 1944.

81NAC. Ernst to Division, Monthly Report March 1944. Ibid. An accurate number of families who reconsidered their decision to move to Manitoba was not supplied by the MJJC.

82NAC. Ernst to Division Monthly Reports May and June 1944. Ibid.

83Ibid. Lister continued to praise and support Ernst for a job well done. These towns were only a few of the total numbers.

84NAC. Ernst to Division Monthly Report February and June 1944. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1713.

85NAC. Ernst to Division Monthly Report, July 1944. RG 36/27 Vol.31 File 1713. Until the veterans returned from war, the Japanese were in demand. After the veterans returned the Japanese were employed in the least desirable positions.

86Canada Yearbook, 1940-55. According to Division statistics, sugar content was 16.56 and the purity was 82.17. Ernst to Division Monthly Report December 1944. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1713. Ernst to Division Monthly Report November 1944. RG 27 Vol.640 file 23-2-2-8-1.vol.1.

87Of the 80,884 tons harvested the majority came from 3 of 7 districts. Despite the drop in production many farmers and Japanese labourers who resided in the productive areas had a good harvest and incomes were satisfactory. NAC. RG 27 Vol.645 file 23-2-3-8-1 pt.1. The following chart shows average earnings per worker per season by districts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1944</th>
<th>1945</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South east of Winnipeg</td>
<td>124.43</td>
<td>108.22</td>
<td>105.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South west area</td>
<td>124.99</td>
<td>198.99</td>
<td>178.87*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West side Red River</td>
<td>126.90</td>
<td>134.41</td>
<td>174.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North side Assiniboine River</td>
<td>131.73</td>
<td>189.10</td>
<td>241.21*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North of Winnipeg</td>
<td>136.28</td>
<td>125.01</td>
<td>112.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East side Red River</td>
<td>140.05</td>
<td>146.57</td>
<td>158.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South side Assiniboine River</td>
<td>187.13</td>
<td>244.91</td>
<td>268.86*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* denotes the areas which provided the workers with the highest earnings. NAC. J.F. Kristjansson to MacNamara, "Sugar Beet
Moreover, Tokatsu previous exploiting Tokatsu vrere, Vol.31 full, difficult at pt.z.Ernst to number vol.645 Winnipeg representations. Ernst preferred permanent rural placements whenever possible. The evacuee urban relocation will be discussed in chapter 3.

89NAC. Ernst to Division Monthly Report August 1944. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1713. Ernst did not attempt to secure a similar pledge from the provincial government because it was beyond his authority.


91NAC. Ernst to Division Monthly Report July and August 1944. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1713.

92NAC. Ernst to Division Monthly Reports October 1944. RG 27 Vol.645 file 23-2-3-8-1 pt1. Ernst to MacNamara October 13, 1944, RG 27 Vol.645 file 23-2-3-8-1 pt1. While Ernst focused his policy on rural placements, Winnipeg experienced a shortage of housing and the Division closed the city to Japanese families. The Division was sensitive to the number of Japanese families in the City and anxious to avoid public resentment. Ernst preferred permanent rural placements whenever possible. The evacuee urban relocation will be discussed in chapter 3.

93NAC. Ernst to Division Monthly Reports August 1944. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1713.

94NAC. Ernst to Division Monthly Report December 1944. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1713.

95NAC. Ibid. and J.F. Kristjansson to MacNamara, April 3, 1946, "Sugar Beet Problems Manitoba 1946," RG 27 Vol.645 file 23-2-3-8-1 pt2. Ernst to Division, Monthly Report May 1946. RG 27 Vol.645 file 23-2-3-8-1 pt2. The majority of Japanese families were content. There were, however, instances where dissatisfaction and uneasiness occurred. In October 1944, H. Furukawa was investigated after it was reported that he threatened another employee (a Mennonite) on Mr. Atchison's farm at Oak Bluff. No formal charges were laid. In a censored letter between S. Tokatsu of La Rochelle Manitoba and Mr T. Mitani of Dominion City, Tokatsu complained about the conditions in Manitoba, particularly the previous season's working conditions. Tokatsu stated that thinning was difficult and when he was not able to meet contract commitments threats that other labour would be hired and deducted from his wages were used. Moreover, Tokatsu felt that the farmer was not paying the workers in full, and that the farmer, and Sugar Company were making money by exploiting the evacuees. NAC. Department of National War Services,

These figures were arrived at by adding Division Monthly Reports for a 6 month period, July-December compared to the same period the previous year. The number of births recorded in 1942-43 were two in each year. Undoubtedly more occurred, but it is unlikely that there were more than 56 given the unsettled nature of the evacuees.


Some of the towns targeted in Northwestern Ontario were Kenora, Dryden, and Fort Frances.


NAC. Ernst to Division Monthly Reports May 1945, RG 27 Vol.645 file 23-2-3-8-1 pt1, and Monthly Reports October 1945, February 1946, March 1946, RG 27 Vol.645 file 23-2-3-8-1 pt2. Of the rural industries, excluding sugar beet farming, bush work was favoured by the Division. Forestry provided employment that was not popular with veterans. Ernst noted also that forestry positions "should be given close attention and every effort should be made to send families to these types of locales. Several hundred people could be located in this area without anybody knowing it."


Ibid. Manitoba Sugar Company to MacNamara February 18, 1946. RG 27 Vol.645 file 23-2-3-8-1 pt2. The sugar industry did not foresee an increase in Japanese labour, as a result they lobbied the
federal government for approximately 700 German prisoners of war for additional labour; a plan subsequently approved.


106NAC. Ernst to Division, Monthly Reports November 1945 and January 1946, RG 27 Vol.645 file 23-2-3-8-1 pt.2.

107NAC. Manitoba Sugar Company to MacNamara February 27, 1946. RG 27 Vol.645 file 23-2-3-8-1 pt.2. Ernst to Division Monthly Reports April and March 1946, Ibid. Mr. Lister's review of the Manitoba project noted that the farmers and Sugar Company were opposed to repatriating the Japanese families during the beet season. They preferred that any deportation take place after the harvest.

108NAC. Ernst to Division Monthly Report March 1946. RG 27 Vol.645 file 23-2-3-8-1 pt2. Evidence supporting this claim was found in Ernst's "Semi-annual Breakdown of Japanese in Manitoba July 1, 1946", July 4, 1946. RG 27 Vol.645 file 23-2-3-8-1 pt.2. Kristjansson calculated that there were approximately 370 evacuees in the sugar beet industry. However, Ernst reported 347 were employed in the industry.

109The remaining percentage of labour was supplied by local workers and German prisoners of war. H. Sulker to MacNamara, April 2, 1946. RG27 Vol.645 file 23-2-3-8-1 pt2.

110NAC. RG2 Order in Council, P.C. 270 January 23, 1947. Due to Order in Council P.C. 1457 and 946 February 1943 property ownership was prohibited and consent for a licence was needed from the Japanese Division to acquire property. This was amended by Order in Council 5973 September 14, 1945 and revoked on January 23, 1947.
CHAPTER 3

URBAN MIGRATION

Despite the Division's policy of rural resettlement, Japanese families began to migrate to Winnipeg as early as the autumn of 1942. The movement was a constant concern for Division officials. The evacuees had been sent to Manitoba to resolve the labour shortage in the sugar beet industry, but working on sugar beet farms did not provide sufficient income to last the winter months. After the first winter the Division realized that not all beet farming areas were prosperous, and a change in policy was needed. The urban movement was propelled by a combination of inadequate working and living conditions on sugar beet farms, a labour shortage in Winnipeg industries, and the BCSC/Japanese Division's reluctance to provide relief. It should be noted that the evidence outlining the migration of evacuees into Winnipeg was limited, even though the urban movement concerned Ernst and his predecessors.

Urban reintegration had numerous difficulties. Organized resistance from unions and citizen groups, as well as housing and job shortages, complicated the process. Economic reasons were the driving force behind the movement into Winnipeg, yet a job opening in the city did not automatically mean the Japanese family would move to Winnipeg. It should be realized that the types of jobs
available could be as important as government regulations in determining the future residence of the evacuees. The job market evolved over time. While employment opportunities existed as a blend of seasonal and permanent positions, the ratio of permanent, as opposed to seasonal employment opportunities, only increased once Division policy adjusted to project realities in 1943.

As Japanese families arrived in Manitoba, city councillors took steps to minimize their involvement with the evacuees. Council created a sub-committee, comprising Mayor Queen, Aldermen Coulter, Knowles and Blumberg, to review applications for resettlement made by Japanese families wishing to relocate in Winnipeg. Before the subcommittee ruled on an application, it had to pass a R.C.M.P. security check and be sponsored by the BCSC. The city devised further restrictive measures in October 1942, by prohibiting employment of Japanese male evacuees at jobs paying less than 45 cents per hour. City council's concerns for security and the earning power of labour, echo similar opinions expressed by racist organizations like the Immediate Action Committee in BC. The city justified its by-law by stating it was designed to prevent a decrease in the hourly wage and protect Occidental jobs. Yet, city councillors permitted Japanese maids to be hired in the homes of some of the more influential members of Winnipeg society. The city argued, however, that domestic servants
were unrelated to industry. The wage rule might protect
Caucasian jobs, but could also be interpreted as an attempt
to prevent the evacuees from assimilating and permanently
resettling. St. Boniface also passed a resolution
prohibiting Japanese families from settling in their
jurisdiction. City politicians were not alone in their
negative reaction to the resettlement project. As noted
earlier, The Imperial Order of the Daughters of the Empire
and Children of the Empire, as well as the Winnipeg and
District Trades and Labor Council, and the Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen, had protested against the proposal. 2

Latent racial and socio-economic fears stimulated the
dissent of these groups. With minimal previous direct
contact, their racist opinions were founded on prejudice
moulded by what Peter Ward described as the social
psychology of race relations. Basing their prejudiced views
on the broad consensus of society, racial groups deemed the
Japanese families to be inferior. This belief was nurtured
and made visible in varying degrees of intensity, as
illustrated by city by-laws, newspaper reports, and the
resolutions of organizations who objected to the presence of
the evacuees. The disgruntled organizations in Manitoba
feared for their economic safety and cultural homogeneity.
The only way to preserve their cultural purity and economic
status was to exclude the threatening element. As a result,
racism was grounded in economic fear and the desire for ethnic purity.³

Supported by calls for caution and intolerance, city officials felt justified in their actions. In October 1942, the city's employment by-laws did not impede BCSC actions; the Security Commission's intention was to isolate the evacuated families on designated sugar beet farms. After the harvest in 1942, the financial resources of many evacuated families made additional winter employment a necessity. Following persistent lobbying by Commission representative R.C. Brown, city officials agreed to let 100 Japanese domestics work in the City. The Commission had to guarantee they would be responsible for the evacuees, and supply the city with the number of Japanese moved, as well as addresses and names of employers.⁴

The domestic maid program was a joint effort by the Security Commission and the Y.W.C.A. The Y.W.C.A. became involved after the federal Deputy Minister of Labour, Arthur MacNamara asked the National Council of the Y.W.C.A. and its provincial branches, to assist the BCSC's employment program.⁵ The Commission and the Y.W.C.A. recorded the homes registering for maid services; the Commission supplied the city with the names and addresses of Winnipeg residents employing maids. The remainder of the program was administered by the YWCA. To help pay for expenses, the federal Department of Labour contributed approximately $950
from 1942 to 1944. The Y.W.C.A. set up a subcommittee with Mrs. Lang as project coordinator. Subcommittee members interviewed prospective maids and employers before awarding a domestic to a home. The subcommittee's assessment was based on the age of the potential maid, the racial attitudes of the employer, living accommodations, type of work, wages, time off, and discharge from employment. In addition, the occupation of the homeowner was important as applicants in essential war occupations were given special consideration. The Y.W.C.A. also provided the evacuees with recreational facilities for social gatherings, and helped establish clubs such as the Niseiettes. In May 1944, the placement committee recommended that the maid program be discontinued because the demand for the maids had declined, the girls were more familiar with the city, and potential employers had accepted them. The committee also felt that to encourage their assimilation, the girls should not be given special status.

The Y.W.C.A. was more than an employment coordinator and provider of recreation and social development to the young evacuee women living in Winnipeg. The Y.W.C.A.'s cooperation and support helped set an example for younger members of the Y.W.C.A. and the community at large. While their intentions were positive, members of the Y.W.C.A. actively sought to convert the evacuees to Christianity. "As members of a Christian Organization we should exemplify such a spirit of tolerance as would win the respect of the
Japanese Canadian for our way of life..." The Y.W.C.A attempted to provide assistance in all facets of the resettlement process.

After winning city approval for domestic servants, the Commission continued to lobby for the admission of Japanese male labour. The Security Commission wanted the evacuated families to stay on the farms, but under dire financial circumstances the Commission preferred the male to secure seasonal employment in Winnipeg than receive maintenance from the BCSC. The BCSC did not challenge the city's discriminatory wage rule which applied only to people of Japanese origin since they did not want to make the evacuees a public issue. After consulting with the UIC, however, Brown determined the city could not legally enforce the by-law. Consequently, the Commission, in conjunction with the UIC, quietly provided jobs to Japanese males in violation of the city by-law. As noted, most jobs were seasonal and included dishwashers, orderlies, tanners, meat packers, furriers, and labourer positions at grain and seed elevators.

The BCSC's successor, the Japanese Division of the federal Department of Labour, in conjunction with the UIC, continued the job location program over the winter months. By late spring 1943, both the UIC and the Japanese Division were reluctant to perpetuate the practice of finding jobs in Winnipeg for Japanese males without city council's approval.
Following the Winnipeg Chamber of Commerce announcement that the city was in the midst of a labour shortage, and in the face of persistent lobbying by the new Division representative, Frank Ernst, city councillors removed the by-law restricting evacuee male labour in July 1943. The by-law was repealed with the proviso that they be informed of the occupation and residence of all male labourers. Ernst was free to place labourers in Winnipeg providing that they register with NSS and the Division assume responsibility for their welfare.11

As the 1943 sugar beet season progressed, weather conditions caused a decline in output for a second consecutive year. Division policy had to change if high maintenance costs were to be avoided. The Japanese Division embarked on an ambiguous plan.12 Despite opposition by the sugar beet industry, the Division granted the Japanese families more freedom to change occupations within the project, including movement to Winnipeg if suitable employment could be arranged. This decision allowed the Japanese families a chance to improve their financial situation.

The Division continued to endorse the sugar beet industry as a worthy source of employment, but its overall view was pragmatic. The financial circumstances of the Japanese family were a significant qualifier when assessing a job position. The age, family size, and injury history of
the workers, as well as the productivity of the sugar beet area in which the family resided, were important factors when determining the future location of the Japanese family. While the Division preferred locating the families in Manitoba's small rural towns, single males, and females, as well as families, received temporary and permanent positions in Winnipeg.¹³

As the evacuees moved into the greater Winnipeg area, re-establishing their former living patterns became a priority. For many evacuees an important element was to perpetuate the practice of their Christian faith. After the evacuees arrived in Manitoba, Reverend Akagawa was directed by the United Church of Canada, in June 1942, to leave his congregation in Westminster BC and continue his ministry in Manitoba. As part of the Home Mission branch of the United Church of Canada, Akagawa was to provide spiritual leadership and church services for the sizeable number of Christian Japanese Canadians resettled in Manitoba.¹⁴

From 1942-44, Rev. Akagawa travelled extensively through rural Manitoba offering guidance to his congregation. As a minister, Akagawa was allowed a vehicle and not subjected to the travel restriction applied to other evacuees in the province. Since most of the congregation was located rurally, Akagawa established a church in Letellier in November 1942.¹⁵
As more evacuees moved into Winnipeg they sought out churches where evacuees already attended. One of the first churches to accept Japanese members was Knox United Church. S. Sato began attending Knox Church soon after his arrival in Winnipeg in late 1942, and by October 1943, became a member. Two months later Tom Mitani also became a member of Knox United Church. Following the large influx of evacuees into Winnipeg in the autumn of 1943, church facilities had to be secured. Before a location for church services was found, private homes were often used. To alleviate the problem, Rev. Akagawa approached Knox Church for assistance. In May 1944, the Manitoba Japanese United Church congregation held their first formal meeting and service within Knox Church.

From the beginning, the evacuee community within Knox was a distinct congregation with their own Church Elders and Executive. Except for social organizations such as the Joshi Dendo Kwai (Japanese Mission Circle), which was sponsored by the Women's Missionary Society of Knox Church, little formal interaction occurred between the two congregations.

Led by Rev. Akagawa, the Manitoba Japanese United Church worked to unify their community. From 1944-46 the United Church membership was approximately 111 persons; 20-25 attended Knox Church. Under the direction of the church executive, the congregation raised donations for the
maintenance and upkeep of Knox Church. They initiated programs that benefitted their congregation such as a pension fund for Japanese United Church members,\textsuperscript{22} and began a fund-raising drive to build their own chapel within Knox United Church; a task completed by 1948.\textsuperscript{23} The amicable relationship between the Japanese United Church and the larger Knox congregation reinforced the evacuees' acceptance in Winnipeg. Their participation within the Christian community in Manitoba undoubtedly eased the relocation process.

As the Division lifted restrictions on movement, more evacuees departed for Winnipeg. Driven by insufficient incomes from sugar beet work as well as the need for suitable housing and employment, Japanese families registered and received employment through the NSS office in the city.\textsuperscript{24} The new Division policy allowed the evacuees more responsibility over their domicile and occupation. Final authority over residence, however, still rested in the hands of the Japanese Division. The Division wanted to guard against an over concentration of evacuees in Winnipeg. The Selective Service and the R.C.M.P. were not required to, and often did not, report to the Division job placements made through the NSS. In order to control the movement of evacuees, Ernst had to establish a closer working relationship with NSS. When relocating to the city, the evacuees tended to congregate in small groupings spread

121
throughout Winnipeg (unlike the Powell district in Vancouver). North Kildonan, the North End, and the Kennedy Street area in Winnipeg were a few of the preferred districts. These areas were attractive due to proximity to work, and rental vacancies. In the case of North Kildonan, the area was on the outer fringes of the city with few utilities and had a high vacancy rate.25

The unmonitored flow of evacuees into Winnipeg worried Division officials. Only two months after modifying travel restrictions, concern over the number of Japanese relocated in Winnipeg forced the Division once again to restrict access to the city in October 1943. Exact numbers were not cited, but after consulting with the NSS, Ernst and Lister were alarmed by the infiltration of Japanese into the city without Division approval. "This is just dynamite as far as the whole situation is concerned... There is a lot of work available here (Winnipeg) and... city placements are merely a temporary move which may lead to a lot of trouble."26

The Division was anxious to regulate urban migration because rural placements were a priority, and an over-concentration of evacuees in Winnipeg might cause public resentment. Furthermore, the Division may have anticipated complaints from veterans if too many Japanese were employed in Winnipeg's industries. The Division believed that it was easier to regulate the number of evacuees entering Winnipeg than to remove them later if
veterans and the public objected. Thus jobs were secured for evacuees, but in cooperation with the Division and the NSS. Low paid and unskilled job placements were made at Western Auto & Body Works, Canada Packers, P. Burns, Winnipeg Supply and Fuel, Dominion Tanners, and coal yards.27

Select job placements continued throughout the winter and spring of 1944. Despite articles in the Winnipeg Free Press and Winnipeg Tribune describing Japan's brutal treatment of prisoners of war, and the BC government's intentions to prevent evacuees from returning to the province following the war, Manitobans remained tolerant in their dealings with the evacuated families. Municipalities such as Winnipeg and St. Boniface favoured a "do nothing approach", stating the issue was the responsibility of the Japanese Division. Employers continued to hire Japanese workers because labour was in short supply.28

The demand for labour in industries in the city prevailed over concerns that the evacuees posed a security threat. Many Japanese workers were given jobs in businesses with military contracts. Monarch Machinery Co. and Welton Malgren Mfg. held naval equipment contracts and employed five evacuees. Western Auto & Body Works, Donald Hart Ltd., Western Garment Co., United Garment Co., and Direct Furniture Co. supplied military equipment and employed another twenty evacuees.29 Japanese were working in other essential industries such as food processing and farm
machine manufacturing. The evacuees' co-workers seemed to accept their presence. By December 1944, the Japanese workers were granted union membership in the industries in which they were employed, meat packing plants, agricultural related industries, metal works, and garment factories. In one case a Japanese was elected as Secretary of the shop union at Manitoba Co-operative Implements. Union membership and job performance did not prevent some negative reactions. The Department of Labour tried to publicize the evacuees' good working habits and loyalty, but companies that were satisfied with the evacuees' work ethic were hesitant to admit that they employed them. On various occasions members of the public accused the companies of using cheap labour, precluding the employment of local Occidental workers. Despite this falsehood, companies felt threatened by the accusation and declined to participate in the publicity campaign.\textsuperscript{30}

With the 1944 sugar beet crop reduced from the previous year, more Japanese families looked for alternative employment. The number of evacuees living in Winnipeg climbed to 230 by October 1944. A shortage of housing facilities, as well as Ernst's desire to avoid public resentment, prompted the Division to close the greater Winnipeg area. Moreover, the number of veterans entering the labour force was a complicating factor. As veterans returned, the NSS advised the Division that they would
receive priority for housing and jobs. Thus for the immediate future, the number of Japanese in Winnipeg stabilized.³¹

For the next two years, (1945-46) job prospects and housing continued to be affected by the returning war veterans. As the labour supply increased, work opportunities for evacuees declined or were reduced to the lowest paying positions such as waiters, orderlies, and dish washers. Many unions in the city asked their employers not to hire additional Japanese labour, since ex-servicemen were available. The dearth of adequate housing also persisted and by the spring of 1946 the demand for living facilities remained acute, curtailing the influx of evacuees into Winnipeg.³² Thus the debilitating combination of scarce housing, low paying jobs, and the large number of recently discharged servicemen limited the evacuees' employment options. Presented with these circumstances, some evacuees left Winnipeg to find employment in rural areas.³³

As employment opportunities tightened in Winnipeg, the evacuees adapted in order to remain in the city. Nevertheless, veterans' groups, active in helping the returning servicemen reintegrate into civilian life, targeted the evacuees for working in industrial jobs that veterans might want. The most vocal group in Winnipeg was the Winnipeg Civilian Committee for Rehabilitation of Veterans. The Civilian Committee was composed of
representatives of various branches of the Legion, prominent local businessmen, and a provincial representative from the Rural Rehabilitation Commission. The Winnipeg Civilian Committee was part of a national organization with offices in large and small centres throughout Canada. In Winnipeg, their office was near the Department of Veterans' Affairs, (D.V.A.) Associated with veterans' placements, the Civilian Committee worked in close cooperation with the Department of Veterans' Affairs and informed W. Rumball, District Supervisor of Rehabilitation, Department of Veterans' Affairs, that evacuees were employed in local industries. Rumball contacted the NSS and the Japanese Division and demanded that any Japanese working in positions suitable for veterans must be released immediately, regardless of the wishes of unions and employers. If the NSS and the Division failed to act on this directive, the Civilian Committee, in cooperation with the Legion and D.V.A., would make the issue public. The Civilian Committee's threat had serious consequences. The publication of newspaper articles detailing the harsh treatment of prisoners of war coinciding with the returning members of the Winnipeg Grenadiers imprisoned by the Japanese in Hong Kong made for an explosive mixture. Confronted with the Civilian Committee's demands, Ernst contacted the Commissioner of the Japanese Division, T.B. Pickersgill, for policy clarification. Given the
national reach of the Civilian Committee, trouble in
Winnipeg could spread across Canada to centres where other
evacuees resided. Ernst noted that the unions and employers
he contacted, such as the International Fur Workers Union,
Metal Workers Union, and the Needlecraft Workers Union,
stoated that the Japanese were working in positions no one
wanted. The employers and union officials declared that they
would support the Japanese worker if any attempts were made
to remove them from their jobs on the basis of racial
origin.36

Meanwhile, T.B. Pickersgill conferred with his
superiors in Ottawa. The Winnipeg area protest was not
viewed favourably by the Department of Labour. In an
intra-governmental memorandum, A.H. Brown advised the Deputy
Minister of Labour, A. MacNamara, that the D.V.A. in Ottawa
should unofficially instruct "their local people in Winnipeg
to lay-off this matter for the present....We will, no doubt
get pressure of this nature from some sources but I don't
think it should be inspired or supported by the officers or
another branch of the Government."37

Officially the Department of Labour stated that the
employer had the right to hire and retain any employee
regardless of race, unless the position was sought by a
veteran who had previously worked for the employer. The
government did not want to engage in ordering employers to
fire specific workers, especially Canadian citizens; this
would set a dangerous precedent. Moreover, the Division stated to the Civilian Committee that of the 110 Japanese men employed in Winnipeg industries, 59 were Canadian born, 18 were naturalized, and 33 were Nationals. Of the 51 Japanese women 36 were Canadian born, 6 naturalized, and 9 were Japanese Nationals. Releasing Canadian born or naturalized Canadian citizens would be a discriminatory act. The Division was willing, however, to look into any cases where veterans wanted positions that Japanese Nationals held. In those circumstances efforts would be made to re-employ the Japanese Nationals elsewhere. 38 The combination of unofficial pressure on the D.V.A. and official policy initiatives by the NSS and the Division contained the Civilian Committee's outburst.

Apart from the concerns raised by veterans' organizations and the reservations expressed by city council, Winnipeggers displayed little hostility towards the evacuees. As war drew to an end, the evacuees continued to be employed in lower paying jobs, or positions veterans did not want. In some cases businessmen tried to change job classifications designed to retain Japanese labour and subsequently reduce wages. The NSS monitored and prevented the abuse. 39

Despite the shortages of housing and lucrative employment opportunities, Japanese families continued to trickle into Winnipeg from rural Manitoba. 40 Over the
preceding years (1942-46) government policy, originally designed to contain the evacuees on sugar beet farms, was altered to conform with the problems inherent in the project. Poor living conditions and inadequate financial opportunities left the federal government little alternative but to allow movement from the farms into rural towns and Winnipeg in order to avoid higher maintenance costs. Relocation was permitted but the Division exerted a tacit measure of control over the migration into Winnipeg in cooperation with other government agencies such as the NSS. Despite Division attempts, some early active resistance against Japanese families existed. City Council, civilian organizations, and at first, some unions displayed a reluctance to accept Japanese families as part of the Winnipeg community.

As the evacuees moved into urban settings, they continued to rent accommodations. Stripped of their rights to own property in February 1943, the evacuees remained a landless segment of the population. Their status did not begin to change until September 1945 when the federal authorities enabled the evacuees outside BC to buy property with the permission of the Minister of Labour.41 In January 1947, the federal government removed all existing restrictions pertaining to land purchases outside of BC.42 The low vacancy rate, their meagre finances, and the
deportation/repatriation issue hindered the evacuees from purchasing real estate.

It was not until spring 1946 that the evacuees began to apply for property ownership in Manitoba.43 This move elicited no serious protest by other Manitobans as the evacuees often purchased property in the area in which they had been living. With the passage of time, the constant cooperative efforts of the Japanese community and the favourable attitude demonstrated by most veterans towards the evacuees, opposition to their presence subsided. The evacuees developed a largely unfettered community lifestyle.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

1Winnipeg Tribune, April 3, and 10, 1942. Winnipeg Free Press, May 27, 1942. Brown to Collins March 17, 1943. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1703. As noted in Chapter II, other municipalities such as Lockport, Selkirk and St. Andrews initially rejected the resettlement proposal.

2As cited in Chapter 1. p.28-29.

3Peter Ward, White Canada Forever.


5PAM. Y.W.C.A., Board of Directors Minutes January 1942 to December 1943, P3856, P3833, and Minutes of Annual Meetings October 1941 to October 1947, P3853.

6PAM. Y.W.C.A., Minutes Board of Directors, May 31, 1944, P3833.

7PAM. Ibid.


9PAM. Ibid. Clearly the Y.W.C.A did not understand that a portion of the evacuees were already Christians. Their church affiliation will be discussed later in this chapter.


11NAC. Lister to Collins July 6, 1943. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1713. Collins to Brown, March 25, 1943. Ibid. The Japanese Division and UIC were not eager to offend the city because the Division did not want the resettlement program to become a public issue. In addition, point 9, in the 1942 agreement stated that if any district or municipality wanted the evacuees removed, the BCSC was obliged to relocate the Japanese families. Undoubtedly, the Division realized the usefulness of Winnipeg as a temporary alternative employment centre, and did not want the city to decree itself closed to evacuees. PAM. Winnipeg Chamber of Commerce; Executive and General Council minutes, 1941-46. May 27, 1943. When reading the Chamber's minutes, one gets the impression that the organization was not particularly concerned with the evacuee issue. No mention was made about wage reductions due to cheaper labour.

12See Chapter II. for further discussion on this point.
NAC. Ernst to Lister August 31, 1943. RG36/27 Vol.31 file 1713. Ernst to Lister September 30, 1943. Ibid., Lister to Collins November 3, 1943 Ibid., Ernst to Eastwood, Monthly Report December 1943, Ibid. Winnipeg City was a label used to describe the greater Winnipeg area which included: the City of Winnipeg, St. Boniface, East Kildonan, North Kildonan, Old Kildonan, St. Vital, St. James and Port Garry.

Japanese Canadian United Church Committee, ed. A History of the Japanese Congregation of the United Church in Canada, 1892-1959, Toronto:Japanese United Church, 1961. p.150-152. It should be noted that prior to the evacuees' arrival in Manitoba the Japanese community in BC had been exposed to Christianity for sixty years. Organizations like the Y.W.C.A. and press reports, as cited in earlier chapters, failed to recognize this fact. Consequently, efforts to convert some evacuees were not needed. I would like to thank Takao Abe for his translation services. Without his assistance the information contained in the Sessional Minutes of the Manitoba Japanese United Church Elders records as well as in A history of the Japanese Congregation of the United Church in Canada, 1892-1959, would have been unavailable. I would also like to thank Rev. Yoshi Masaki, Robert Publow and Phyllis Fabbri at Knox United Church for their generous assistance.

Ibid. The initial Letellier congregation contained twenty persons.

Knox Sessional Minutes of Church Elders, 1942-48. p.350. Other smaller congregations may have existed in the city, but this was the largest and only documented attendance discovered.

Ibid. p.360. It is interesting to note that both of these men were active in the MJJC.

Ibid. p.378.


Knox Church Annual Report, 1945-46. The Japanese Mission Circle was established in 1945, and was sponsored by the Women's Mission Society in 1946.

Sessional Minutes of the Manitoba Japanese United Church Elders, April 28, 1946, p.122. Rev. Akagawa was concerned with the attendance of the younger evacuees because services were conducted in Japanese. Unable to understand the service, many either stopped attending, or went to Occidental services. The future membership of the Japanese congregation was uncertain due to the lack of younger followers. Nonetheless, Akagawa supported their attendance in the Occidental congregation.
The Japanese United Church members also participated in fund raising events involving the Winnipeg community. They raised funds to contribute to the construction of United College which was to be affiliated with the University of Manitoba. The New Canadian March 22, 1947.

NAC. Lister to Eastwood, October 23, 1943. RG36/27 Vol.31 file 1713.

PAM. Tapes, C842-43-59-62-64, Ibid.

NAC. Lister to Eastwood October 23, 1943. RG36/27 Vol.31 file 1713.


NAC. Ernst to MacNamara, November 13, 1943. RG27 Vol.645 file 23-2-3-8-1.

NAC. Ernst to Division Monthly Report December 1944. RG36/27 Vol.31 file 1713. Ernst to MacNamara November 13, 1943. RG 27 Vol.645 file 23-2-3-8-1 pt1

NAC. Ernst to MacNamara October 13, 1944. RG27 Vol.645 file 23-2-3-8-1 pt1. Ernst to Division Monthly Report October 1944. Ibid.

NAC. Ernst to Division Monthly Report October 1945. RG27 Vol.645 file 23-2-3-8-1 pt2. Ernst to Division Monthly Report April 1946. Ibid. PAM. As well, the Winnipeg Chamber of Commerce noted the shortage of housing was acute. November 13, 1944. Winnipeg Chamber of Commerce: Executive and General Council Minutes, 1941-46.

NAC. Ernst to Division Monthly Report March and April 1945, RG27 Vol.645 file 23-2-3-8-1 ptl. Ernst to Division Monthly Report September 1945. RG27 Vol.645 file 23-2-3-8-1 pt2. Ernst to Division Monthly Report April 1946. RG27 Vol.645 file 23-2-3-8-1 pt2. The freeze on hiring Japanese workers was preceded by a "wave" of returning servicemen. Once the veterans found jobs and homes, Japanese were allowed to locate in Winnipeg provided that they had living accommodations. The evacuees who lived in Winnipeg tried to avoid congregating in one district as had happened in Vancouver. PAM. Tapes, C842-43-46-62.

Rurnball's exact words were: "get these people the hell out of here fast". The Winnipeg Council on Rehabilitation and Post War Reconstruction, a group associated with the Civilian Committee, also wanted the Japanese workers removed from industrial jobs as soon as possible. Letter to Ernst September 11, 1945. Ibid.

Unquote

By July 1946, 331 evacuees were living in Winnipeg. Many stayed with friends or relatives already established in the city. Approximately 100 new evacuees arrived from the BC interior in July 1946. Ernst to MacNamara Annual statistical Report July 1946. Ibid.

Applications to purchase property came from rural and urban areas, and in most cases requests came from evacuees who had been resettled in Manitoba since 1942.
CHAPTER 4

DEPORTATION, COMPENSATION AND THE JAPANESE COMMUNITY

During their years in Manitoba the Japanese families managed to adapt to a different lifestyle, but their future in the province remained uncertain. The evacuees had been moved to Manitoba in April 1942 under the obligation that once the war was over they would be removed. The sudden end to the war with Japan in August, 1945 caused the federal government to seek a permanent solution to the "Japanese problem" in Canada. The Dominion Government's answer involved deporting or repatriating a large number of evacuees from Canada and dispersing the remaining persons across the country. For many Canadians, including the evacuees, dispersal was acceptable, but deportation/repatriation was a threat to citizenship. The assault on citizenship rights united Japanese evacuees as well as concerned Canadians throughout Canada. In Manitoba the MJJC and its successor, the Manitoba Japanese Canadian Citizen Association (MJCCA), gained some valuable allies in the struggle against the federal government's deportation policy. They also continued to receive support in their fight for compensation for lost property in BC. This chapter will discuss these issues from a Manitoba perspective as well as look at how the MJJC/MJCCA led the evacuees' protest in the province.
The MJJC was illegally established in September 1942 by Shinji Sato, Harold Hirose, Tom Mitani, and Ichiro Hirayama. Through their experience in marketing cooperatives in the Fraser Valley, and the Fisherman's Association in Steveston, each understood the necessity and usefulness of community representation.¹ The BCSC, however, refused to endorse the MJJC. The Security Commission was sceptical that such an organization would assist the Commission's work. Instead the BCSC believed that the MJJC would increase the number of evacuees coming into Winnipeg and would create problems.²

While Commission officials in Vancouver did not see the value in an evacuee organization, Graham, the Commission's local representative certainly did. Before leaving the position in August 1942, Graham suggested to his superiors that allowing evacuee representatives would be a positive step in the resettlement process. His successor, R.C. Brown, likely knew of and accepted the MJJC. Brown realized that the MJJC boosted the evacuees' morale, and in conjunction with the Sugar Beet Company's fieldsmen, notified him of problems in the project. Also, MJJC representatives were valuable interpreters when dealing with evacuees who had a poor command of English. Undoubtedly, Brown's support for the MJJC led to its official sanctioning in early May 1943 by the BCSC's successor, the Japanese Division.³

Once approval was granted, the MJJC submitted the names of the elected representatives and executive members to the
Division. The MJJC comprised 16 individuals: one elected person from each sugar beet district and one Winnipeg representative. Of the 15 district representatives, five sat on the executive in the positions of Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Treasurer, and two Auditors. Harold Hirose was appointed Secretary and spokesman for the MJJC. Elections were held annually. Despite the rural to urban population shift in 1943, the electoral structure remained constant.

The membership of the MJJC in 1942-43 was Issei dominated. Of the sixteen individuals only two were Nisei. Prior to evacuation all the MJJC's Issei representatives had been active in farming and fishing organizations. After their resettlement in Manitoba it was natural for these individuals to play leading roles. Their resettlement in Manitoba, however, disrupted previous living patterns and created new problems with which the Issei were unfamiliar. The evacuees were forced to deal directly with Manitobans and the federal government on a regular basis. As a result, leadership began to be transferred from Issei to the Nisei. Better educated and bilingual, as well as more energetic, the Nisei began to assume greater prominence. The transfer of community leadership was gradual. The percentage of Nisei representatives slowly increased, eventually controlling the MJJC/MJCCA. The first significant shift in generational leadership occurred in the spring of 1946 with the
consolidation and creation of the MJCCA. The Issei element continued to act as advisors to the MJJC/MJCCA members. It seemed that the Japanese community in Manitoba was fortunate to have Issei members with forward and progressive attitudes. A cooperative transfer of leadership from the Issei to Nisei led to an amicable working relationship between the two generations (a situation which did not always develop in other centres). 4

The general mandate of the MJJC was to cooperate with the Division, businesses, and anyone connected with the Japanese families in Manitoba. The MJJC hoped that by participating in the implementation of policy all parties involved would benefit. 5 In specific terms this meant improving the situation of the evacuated families in Manitoba without alienating the authorities, the farmers, or the Manitoba Sugar Beet Company. The MJJC's initial grievances, which they presented to the Division and the sugar beet industry on behalf of the evacuees were for better sugar beet contracts, living conditions, and employment opportunities. On all of these points the MJJC achieved a measure of success.

Following the harvest years 1942-43, the Division, under constant lobbying from the MJJC, agreed to permit the evacuees greater employment and residence opportunities. The MJJC was particularly active in arguing for the plight of young families with one worker who were unable to earn
sufficient incomes. Presented with mounting maintenance costs, the Division allocated to young families stable year-round jobs outside the sugar beet industry. For those evacuees who remained on the sugar beet farms, the MJJC negotiated better contracts on their behalf. Faced with an exodus of farm labour the sugar beet industry, in a bid to convince the evacuees to stay on beet farms, was compelled to improve sugar beet contracts and housing conditions in the spring of 1944.

The fundamental goal of the MJJC was to enhance the conditions of the evacuees in Manitoba. Presented with the much larger issues of deportation and compensation, however, national coordination among Japanese Canadian organizations was required. Although the creation and subsequent formal affiliation with the National Japanese Canadian Citizens Association (NJCCA) did not occur until September 1947, the MJJC/MJCCA cooperated in the national movement to resist deportation and seek compensation for property losses. In preparing to join the national body, the Manitoba organizations consolidated in March 1946 to form the Manitoba Japanese Canadian Citizen Association (MJCCA). In step with the MJJC's constitution, the MJCCA pledged to promote the welfare of the Japanese community in Manitoba and attempted to acquire full citizenship rights for Japanese Canadians. By committing itself to these goals the
MJJC/MJCCA was an important element in the evolution of the Japanese community in Manitoba.

The task of solving local matters occupied the MJJC through much of 1942 and 1943. Articulating the concerns and needs of the evacuees on sugar beet farms, and lobbying for diversity in employment and residence were at the forefront of the MJJC's agenda. With daily survival demanding the evacuees' immediate attention, concerns raised about property left in BC were not expressed until December 1943.

While the evacuees were enroute to Manitoba, plans to sell their property were being drafted. The groundwork for property sales began in April 1942, spearheaded by Ian Mackenzie, federal Minister for Pensions and Health. Recognizing the success of the Japanese Fishing Vessel Disposal Committee, Mackenzie wanted to employ a similar structure to sell all land owned by the evacuated families. For Mackenzie this would accomplish three tasks: assist veterans to acquire land, hinder the Japanese families' return to BC, and enhance the possibility of deportation after the war. In order for veterans to have access to the land, the property was to be held in trust by the Soldiers Settlement Board. In an effort to assist veterans purchase property, the federal government established the Veteran's Land Act (VLA) program in August 1942. The VLA scheme gave limited financial assistance (up to $4,500) for land purchases. To ensure that land sales proceeded Mackenzie
convinced Thomas A. Crerar, Minister for Mines and Natural Resources, and Norman McLarty, Secretary of State and the Legal Custodian of Enemy and Japanese Canadian property, that new regulations were necessary to hold land until the VLA program started in August 1942. Mackenzie gained their support for the passage of an order-in-council giving the Custodian of Enemy Property the power to sell the evacuees' land in its care without the owner's consent. By January 19, 1943, the Custodian was free to dispose of the evacuees' property.¹²

By early April 1943 the New Canadian informed its audience of the federal government's powers and intention to sell all real estate and personal possessions in storage.¹³ In response, the evacuees living in Kaslo BC formed the Japanese Property Owners' Association and took legal action to challenge the plan. Legal proceedings began in late July 1943 with a filed Petition of Rights in the Exchequer Court of Canada. The petition was not heard until May 1944, at which point the process was delayed by the legal argument as to whether the Custodian of Enemy Property was an agent of the Crown. If the Custodian was not a federal agent the case was in the wrong court. The judgement on this technicality took three years. Finally, Justice J.T. Thorson ruled that the Custodian was not a federal agent; the case was dismissed.¹⁴ While the evacuees' appeal was tied up in legal
filibustering, the Custodian bought the evacuees' land for the VLA program.

Events in BC had minimal impact on evacuees scattered throughout rural Manitoba. When evacuated from their homes in April 1942, they were assured their land would be protected by the Custodian of Enemy Property. When news arrived from BC that the Custodian was preparing to sell the evacuees' property, a few members of the MJJC sent donations to the Kaslo group in support of the court challenge. The MJJC, in December 1943, also asked the Division for assurances that all property vested in the Custodian would not be sold for taxes since taxes on land were being paid by the evacuees. The Division assured the MJJC that the land in question would not be sold for taxes and that taxes and insurance would continue to be paid from the evacuee's incomes. Given the publicity and the action taken by the Kaslo group, the Division undoubtedly knew of the Custodian's intentions and seems to have lied to the MJJC. It remains unclear why the MJJC did not press the matter further. Perhaps the MJJC and the Japanese community in Manitoba believed that once the case went to court all land transactions would be halted pending a court decision. Regardless of the MJJC's short-term motives, concerns about property in BC seemed to be peripheral to events in the province.
The MJJC's preoccupation with local matters led them to ignore other issues. A press statement by BC's Minister of Public Works calling for a ban on Japanese Canadians returning to the province in January, followed by the Soldiers Voting Bill in June 1944, disenfranchising all evacuees in Canada, did not elicit a negative reaction from the MJJC.\textsuperscript{16} It was left to the \textit{Winnipeg Free Press} to note that refusing the evacuees voting rights hindered the resettlement process.\textsuperscript{17}

The MJJC also remained silent when Prime Minister Mackenzie King outlined government policy affecting the evacuees after the war. King acknowledged that "no person of Japanese race born in Canada has been charged with any act of sabotage or disloyalty during the years of war."\textsuperscript{18} Despite their spotless record, the federal government felt it was necessary to take further measures. The King government believed that it would be detrimental for the good of the nation to allow persons of Japanese origin to congregate in one province; thus they advocated instead an even dispersal across Canada.\textsuperscript{19}

To facilitate this dispersal, King announced that a quasi-judicial commission was required to ascertain which members of the Japanese community in Canada were worthy to remain in the country. The loyalty commission was given the task of establishing a "list of disloyal Japanese persons, some of whom will be Japanese nationals, some British
subjects by naturalization, and some British subjects by birth." Once classified as disloyal they would be slated for deportation/repatriation to Japan, and prior to deportation, all persons waiting to be deported would be stripped of their Canadian citizenship. Following King's announcement, the MJJC's reaction appeared to be cautiously optimistic. Ernst reported that the Japanese community in Manitoba believed the segregation program would benefit the community. The MJJC did not object to King's statement that citizenship rights would be lost prior to leaving the country. It is unclear whether the evacuees accepted the government's accusation that disloyal elements existed in their midst, but they seemed to agree that declaring loyalty was a positive way to settle the issue.

Approximately eight months after King's speech in the House of Commons on August 4, 1944, the segregation program started. A loyalty commission was not in place, but the government had issued repatriation forms for the evacuees to sign if they wished to return to Japan following the war. It remains uncertain how the segregation process was applied in the Manitoba project. Little mention was made by Ernst concerning the issue. It seems, however, that all evacuees wishing to return to Japan were to report to the local branch of the R.C.M.P. It was unclear whether the R.C.M.P. or the Division actively canvassed the project, or if the MJJC helped the evacuees fill out the forms.
Whatever method was used to implement the segregation policy, many evacuees in Manitoba indicated their willingness to return to Japan. By January 1946, 34.3% or 405 persons in Manitoba applied for repatriation/deportation. As early as May 1945, Division officials expressed their concern at the high number of requests coming from Manitoba. From March to May 1945, 47 requests were made, compared to only 5 from Alberta— a considerable disparity as there were only 239 Japanese Nationals in Manitoba as opposed to 786 in Alberta.

The reasons for such a large number wishing to leave Manitoba varied. Many found it difficult financially to re-establish in the province; the fact that they might be forced to leave Manitoba after the war compounded the problem. Premier Garson, in March 1945, indicated the province would not waive the portion of the 1942 agreement pertaining to the removal of evacuees after the war. More importantly, the federal government continued to prohibit the evacuees from voting and purchasing property— commercial or residential— thus keeping them dispossessed and easily uprooted. Other evacuees chose to leave because of the rancour they felt for the federal government. Many expressed feelings of being humiliated by the experience of being displaced from the coast and feared that they had no future in Canada. About half the total number of evacuees who signed for repatriation anticipated that they could retire.
on their savings. Others wanted to be near family and close friends in Japan. A large number of Japanese Canadians also signed due to family pressure.28

When the evacuees indicated their willingness to return to Japan, few believed the war would end so soon or with Japan's total destruction. By September 2, 1945, Japan had accepted an unconditional surrender.29 Japan's quick capitulation after the US dropped the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki brought the deportation/repatriation issue to a climax.

In order to deal swiftly with the evacuees after Japan's defeat, the federal government moved to make the signatures on the segregation forms legally binding. To accomplish this task the federal government needed to pass a law before the War Measures Act terminated on January 1, 1946. This law was the National Emergency Powers Act, Bill 15. Bill 15 would last one year and was designed to allow for a gradual transition of power from war to peace time regulations. In October 1945, Bill 15 was introduced into Parliament. The Bill was attacked because of clause g which would grant the government control of "entry into Canada, exclusion, and deportation and revocation of nationality."30 The offending clause was removed and the remaining Bill passed in December. Within Bill 15, however, was Section four which granted the extension of all powers passed under the War Measures Act to continue for another year. Thus,
Cabinet only needed to pass an order-in-council prior to January 1, 1946 to give the government similar powers to clause g. On December 15, Cabinet approved the necessary laws, and on December 17, 1945, Prime Minister King outlined the classifications from which the government was to deport people of Japanese origin.

The process involved three orders-in-council, 7355-57. The first order defined the four classes of persons to be deported: all Japanese Nationals who had signed for repatriation, or who were interned at the Angler internment camp, all naturalized Canadian Japanese who failed to revoke their request before September 2, 1945, and "Canadian-born Japanese who wished to go to Japan and who did not renounce such intention before an order for their deportation was made," along with the wives and minors of the above groups. The second order-in-council divested Canadian and British status from any naturalized persons when they left the country. The final order established a loyalty tribunal to investigate those Japanese, naturalized or Nationals, who did not apply for deportation/repatriation. The investigation was designed to determine whether they should be allowed to remain in Canada. As well, naturalized Canadians who attempted to revoke their signatures after September 2, 1945, and who were referred to the Minister of Labour, would receive a special hearing. No such appeal
process was open to Nationals even if they attempted to withdraw their signatures prior to September 2, 1945.\textsuperscript{33}

The introduction of Bill 15 Clause 9 into Parliament was crucial. The powers the government wanted raised the concerns of Members of Parliament (MP's), particularly in the CCF party, interest groups, and newsmedia. Protest against the deportation of Japanese Canadians was coordinated by the Cooperative Committee on Japanese Canadians and the Japanese Canadian Committee for Democracy (JCCD) out of Toronto.\textsuperscript{34} Reaction to the federal government's policy also took place in Manitoba. Condemnation of federal policy came from the MJJC, Y.W.C.A., church groups, the Civil Liberties Association of Winnipeg, lawyers, and the city's newspapers. While concern for the Japanese Canadians was genuine, it was the threat to citizenship rights which unified the opposition to Bill 15.

With prevailing tolerant attitudes in Manitoba, threats to citizenship rights based on religion or ethnic background were not readily accepted. When Parliament debated clause 9, the Winnipeg Free Press took exception to the proposed legislation, stating that it was unlawful, immoral, and motivated by racial hatred. Likening clause 9 to the Nazi Nuremberg Law, the Winnipeg Free Press argued that the signatures could not be legally binding because they were secured under conditions in which free exercise of will was difficult, if not impossible. The paper asserted that
deporting Canadian citizens was a crime against humanity by the standards of international law.

In addition to criticizing federal legislation, the Free Press called on the Manitoba government to cancel any agreement with the federal government that would remove the evacuees after the war. The paper also urged the provincial government to accept them as residents of the province on the same basis as Canadians of Polish, German, and Scottish descent. To the credit of the Free Press, its comments went beyond simple criticism and offered constructive options. At the same time, it hit a receptive chord amongst many of the residents in the province. If the governments believed people of Japanese origin were undesirable, who was next?

Not surprisingly, the Y.W.C.A. voiced its disapproval. When the evacuees arrived, the Y.W.C.A. helped them resettle. The Y.W.C.A. viewed the proposed laws as dangerous, giving too much arbitrary power to government without fair trials for the accused. Strong letters of protest were sent to MP's from Manitoba, Premier Garson, the federal Minister of Labour, and national newspapers. The Y.W.C.A. also contributed one thousand dollars to help the evacuees with legal expenses.

Although the Civil Liberties Association of Winnipeg was not active in resettling the evacuees, it contributed to the critique of Bill 15. By their own admission the
Association was only incidentally interested in the plight of the Japanese Canadians. Their main concern was with the future character of Canadian citizenship. They recognized that the evacuees were a problem in Canada, but believed the solution need not imperil the civil rights of all Canadians. The Association stated that citizenship status should not exist at the discretion of the Minister of Labour and his officials. Nor should laws affecting citizenship rights be based on racial descent. Moreover, the Association maintained that when the BCSC and Manitoba concluded their agreement in 1942, the Province and the federal government were committed only to internal deportation. By implication this gave the Province authority over residence within their jurisdiction. Thus, the Association requested that Garson waive any standing agreement to remove the evacuees after the war, and denounce Bill 15 as a threat to citizenship rights. Premier Garson did not respond to the Association's petition.

Many United Church congregations, individual citizens, and university students throughout Manitoba raised similar objections. Like the Civil Liberties Association, their protests were directed to the federal government and Premier Garson. Rural and urban church groups, women's auxiliaries and mission societies denounced Bill 15. They requested that the Premier object to the legislation and officially sanction the evacuees' permanent resettlement in Manitoba.
Moreover, the Winnipeg Presbytery of the United Church of Canada urged the Manitoba government to oppose any deportation action taken by the federal authorities against Japanese Canadians "solely on the basis of forms signed (perhaps under pressure) in the war years... and who are of good character and have been unconvicted of any disloyalty."41

The official provincial government position would not be issued until late December 1945. Garson's replies to his critics seemed to endorse Prime Minister King's policy outlined on August 4, 1944. Placing the issue on the doorstep of the federal government, Garson privately reminded church groups and others that the Manitoba government had no control over the evacuees' removal after the war.42 Until federal policy was confirmed, any statement by Manitoba accepting Japanese Canadians as residents of the Province would have little significance, "except perhaps as an implied criticism of Dominion Government policy."43 Garson appeared unwilling to condemn federal policy for fear of being asked to accept more evacuees. As for the possibility of signatures being acquired under duress, Garson stated that until official evidence proved this rumour, he supported the Prime Minister's position.44

Prior to Garson's private replies to concerned citizens, he directed R.E. Moffat of the Provincial Treasurer's Department to acquire information on the future
plans of the federal government. Moffat indicated that the federal government intended to proceed as outlined in King's August 4, 1944 speech. Central to King's announcement was the implementation of segregation forms to determine loyalty. These forms were to be signed voluntarily by individuals wanting to return to Japan. After discussions with Mr. Gordon Robertson, Secretary to Prime Minister King, and Jack Pickersgill, of the Prime Minister's Office, Moffat learned that despite strict instructions that no pressure be brought on the evacuees to sign, "it seems clear that, under the circumstances certain pressures were used (by the R.C.M.P.) and that the date and atmosphere of the inquiries were such that in many cases the Japanese expressed a desire to return to Japan although they had no fundamental sympathy with the Japanese Government." Despite this information, Garson continued to suggest to concerned Manitobans that the signatures given by the evacuees were largely voluntary.

Three days after the Dominion Government announced P.C. 7355-57, the Manitoba Government issued a press release. The Province's position remained consistent with Garson's earlier comments stating the issue was a Dominion matter and as such it was "a federal responsibility to further dispose of the Japanese in Manitoba." This statement seems to suggest that the Province still expected the federal government to live up to the 1942 agreement. The Dominion Government, however, would have accepted any offer by the
Province releasing it from the removal provision in the 1942 agreement. In correspondence between G.H. Aikins and A. MacNamara, the latter stated that the federal government would "welcome a statement from the Province indicating a willingness to waive the provisions of the agreement for the removal of Japanese from the Province by the Dominion Government, at the request of the Province, following the end of the war." An offer of this nature from Manitoba never materialized.

In the press release the Province agreed with the Dominion that any disloyal persons or individuals wishing to go to Japan after the war should be assisted. On the matter of Japanese Canadians who were loyal, however, the Province believed that they should have "unrestricted freedom of movement within Canada." By endorsing freedom of movement, Garson satisfied many critics' concerns without openly declaring Manitoba a "haven" for evacuees. Thus Garson avoided any clear statement welcoming the permanent resettlement of existing evacuees or future settlers in Manitoba.

Despite Garson's reluctance to oppose federal policy, a large coalition of groups supporting the evacuees' struggle was being coordinated by the Cooperative Committee on Japanese Canadians in Toronto. Following the federal government's announcement of P.C 7355-57, the Cooperative Committee and their lawyers argued the legal validity of the
orders-in-council. Furthermore, the Canadian public, as well as influential citizens, pressured the Dominion Government into referring the matter to the Supreme Court of Canada.50

Working in unison with the Cooperative Committee was the MJJC's Civil Defence Committee, co-chaired by George Sasaki and R. Tachibano. The most pressing duties of the Defence Committee were to ensure all cancellation forms were sent to the authorities, processing and communicating information to the evacuees in Manitoba, and maintaining communication between the Cooperative Committee, private Winnipeggers, and local support organizations such as the Winnipeg Free Press. Moreover, the Defence Committee collected $1,574 in preparation for legal expenses challenging the federal Orders.51

On January 8, 1946, the three orders-in-council were referred to the Supreme Court.52 Support for the evacuees' position in Manitoba continued. The Winnipeg Tribune criticized the Orders as unconstitutional and undemocratic and expected the Supreme Court to overrule the federal laws. To lend weight to its position, the Winnipeg Tribune consulted prominent Winnipeg lawyers such as W.W. Kennedy, L. St. G. Stubbs, E.J. Tarr, J.S. Lamont, and S.M. Cherniack. They maintained that unless acts of disloyalty had been committed the Orders in question were a serious attack on the rights of Canadian citizens.53
The Supreme Court handed down its judgement on February 26, 1946. The majority of Justices ruled that the Dominion Government had the authority to carry out the Orders contained in P.C. 7355-57, except the section of 7355 relating to wives, and children under sixteen years of age, since these people were not under the Orders' jurisdiction. The Cooperative Committee appealed this decision to the Privy Council in England for a final ruling. The case was heard in July and in December 1946, the Privy Council ruled that all portions of the Orders were valid.54

While the federal government waited for the Privy Council's ruling, it ceased all official deportation proceedings.55 During the suspension, however, the Dominion Government announced that it would provide transportation to any evacuee who voluntarily wished to return to Japan.56 Despite the cessation of deportation Orders, the Government's "incentive program" created the possibility that many, if not all, of the 405 evacuees who signed segregation forms in Manitoba might leave.57

Presented with the possibility of a large reduction in their labour force, the Manitoba Sugar Beet industry expressed their concerns to the Ministry of Labour. The Manitoba Sugar Company determined that the industry would lose up to 30% of the evacuated workers from the previous year. Repatriation and migration by younger workers to more
profitable occupations in the province were the chief sources of the decline.\textsuperscript{58}

The sugar beet industry in Manitoba was placed in a difficult position. At the Dominion Provincial Agricultural Conference held in December 1945, the federal government wanted an increase in sugar beet production to relieve the sugar scarcity. Unfortunately for Manitoba sugar beet growers, a decrease in available labour made meeting the 15,000 acre quota very difficult.\textsuperscript{59} To alleviate the expected labour shortage, the sugar beet industry enlisted the support of the Provincial government. The Provincial Minister responsible for Agriculture, D.L. Campbell, acknowledged that the labour shortage was serious. Unlike the sugar beet growers' suggestions that additional evacuees be used, Campbell suggested that Prisoners of War supplement the difference.\textsuperscript{60}

Campbell's proposal reflected the Manitoba Government's preference that no more evacuated families be resettled in the province. This point was made clear after G. Collins, Assistant Deputy Minister of Public Works for Manitoba (formerly of the Japanese Division), replied to the federal Deputy Minister of Labour, A. MacNamaras', informal request that Manitoba cancel the removal clause in the 1942 agreement. Collins stated that he informally polled some members of the Provincial Cabinet and received an unfavourable reaction. Collins did suggest, however, that a
housing settlement be established at the Transcona Munitions Plant complex. MacNamara thought the idea had merit. The Transcona plant was geographically located to assist the federal dispersal policy and potentially help meet the labour needs of the Manitoba sugar beet industry.61

Acting on Collin's suggestion, MacNamara directed Ernst to inspect the complex. Ernst reported that the staff house at the plant would accommodate up to seventy families and was outfitted with toilets, showers, kitchens, and dining halls. Heating, additional plumbing items, electrical supplies, and furnishings should be installed.62 Nevertheless, the Department of Labour acquired the Plant from the Real Estate Disposal Branch of the War Assets Corporation.63

From the outset, preparations for the Transcona complex were hindered by government bureaucracy. Following the transfer of land and building ownership, securing the necessary supplies and utilities such as heat, water, and electricity for long term operation became an overwhelming task. The Japanese Division needed plumbing, electrical, and interior furnishings which were usually purchased from the War Assets Corporation. Existing supplies, however, could not be "frozen"; extra equipment not bought from War Assets had to be purchased on the open market, which increased costs.64
Moreover, the utility equipment in the complex was only guaranteed by the War Assets Corporation until the end of August; after August alternative sources for these necessities would have to be found. Without the equipment on the complex site, the Division's only option was to lay 100 yards of underground pipe to access the Greater Winnipeg Water District's service. In order to have electricity, half a mile of hydro poles had to be installed to connect to the Winnipeg Hydro electric system. In addition, new transformer equipment was required to stepdown the incoming power. The cost for these additions was considered too excessive. As a result, by mid-October 1946, the Transcona facility was shutdown after the remaining evacuees found other locations.

Despite its brief time in operation (approximately three months), the Transcona hostel was an effective way to disperse evacuees within Manitoba and to the rest of Canada. The first 100 evacuees arrived at the hostel in July. In the following months smaller numbers passed through on their way to Eastern Canada. As a temporary facility to assist Japanese evacuees relocate, the New Canadian looked upon the hostel in a favourable manner. The early closure of the hostel was labelled an administrative blunder on the part of officials in Ottawa which added to the hardships of already impoverished families trying to re-establish themselves. The closing of the hostel undoubtedly hindered resettling evacuees in Manitoba. Prior to the opening of the Transcona
establishment, however, evacuees from interior centres in BC began relocating in the province. From May to July 1946, fifty-four families arrived, taking employment in various occupations throughout urban and rural Manitoba. 69

The alternative to relocating in Canada was to return to Japan. After the federal government suspended deportation Orders in February 1946, the New Canadian seemed to begin a campaign aimed at convincing its readers to stay in the country. From February to October 1946 the paper carried articles and eyewitness reports which detailed the horrendous conditions in Japan. On a visit to Winnipeg, Sgt. Robert Kitajima, an interpreter in the US Army Air Corps who visited Japan as part of the US post-war study group looking at bomb damages and food shortages, characterized local conditions as bleak: "if people knew what it was really like they would think twice before they decided to return to Japan." 70 Supporting that assessment were articles and editorials highlighting the harsh conditions and severe food shortages. Most telling were reports that the first Japanese evacuees to return to Japan were from the US and were "desperately trying to return (to the US), because of the situation in Japan." 71

Despite the reports carried in the New Canadian and other newspapers, many did leave for Japan. Of the potential 405 persons who had signed for repatriation in Manitoba, 118 evacuees had left for Japan by December 1946. 72 Within the
families returning to Japan, considerable acrimony existed between parents and offspring. The parent(s) were either Japanese Nationals or naturalized Canadians, but their children were Japanese Canadians. The Japanese Canadian children could not write or speak Japanese and hoped for an early return to Canada. They left Canada because they were too young to live on their own, or they had to help their parents. In some cases the departures meant family separation. The Eyemoto family had eight children; the two oldest stayed in Canada while the others unwillingly returned to Japan under the direction of their father. Likewise, eighteen year old Toshiko Sasaki begrudgingly accompanied her elderly parents back to Japan leaving two sisters in Canada. "One of the remaining sisters fell alongside the train when it was leaving...the girl would not move and she was carried away." Unfortunately for the family members, many of the Japanese Canadians were not allowed to return to Canada in the years immediately after their departure.

By the end of 1946, sustained public pressure and a successful resettlement policy eliminated the need for further deportations. On January 24, 1947, Prime Minister King announced that orders-in-council 7355-7357 were revoked. The federal government urged the remaining evacuees not to return to BC. In Manitoba, the MJCCA assisted evacuated families to resettle in the province.
For the Japanese families remaining in Manitoba, and their counterparts throughout Canada, just restitution for economic losses incurred by the evacuation became an important issue. When the federal government rescinded the deportation orders in January 1947, it stated that the land sales by the Custodian had been conducted equitably. The Dominion Government was prepared, however, to correct any unfair land transaction provided that the plaintiff proved the sale was made below fair market price. Following survey work by the JCCD and the Cooperative Committee on the property losses of evacuees living in the Toronto area, the JCCD, and their legal counsel A. Brewin, appeared before the federal Standing Committee on Public Accounts. Based on their surveys the JCCD stated that irregularities in Japanese evacuee property sales had occurred and a Royal Commission was needed to correct the inadequacies. The Standing Committee agreed, and on July 18, 1947, a Royal Commission was established. Justice Henry Bird of the British Columbia Supreme Court was appointed Commissioner. The Commission was charged with the task of holding hearings on property losses and recommend to the Dominion Government what compensation was to be paid to qualified Claimants.

The Public Accounts Committee suggested that the Royal Commission investigate alleged losses which resulted whenever the amount received was "less than the fair market value of property at the time of sale or loss." The terms
stated in order-in-council 1810, however, stipulated that damages could only be awarded in cases where the claimant proved that due to the Custodian's neglect the property sold for less than the fair market price.78 Such reference terms were not acceptable to the evacuees or the Cooperative Committee. Following further appeals by the Cooperative Committee, and letters from Japanese provincial organizations protesting the Commission's narrow terms, the federal government on September 17, 1947, expanded the Commission's mandate to encompass all property lost, sold or stolen while in the Custodian's care.79

From surveys conducted by the JCCD in the Toronto area, it became apparent that the price of property sold by the Custodian were below fair market value.80 In May 1947, the MJCCA received survey forms from the JCCD for a similar study. The MJCCA endorsed the study, but cautioned that such an exercise should be only a starting point for further analysis.81

The opportunity for additional research proposed by the MJCCA presented itself with the establishment of the Bird Commission. Although not entirely content with the Commission's terms of reference, the MJCCA believed it was a starting point. Before the process of compensation could be adequately carried out, however, it was felt that a more centrally controlled Japanese Canadian organization was required. As a result, early in September 1947, the JCCD was
dissolved and replaced by the National Japanese Citizen's Association (NJCCA). The NJCCA and the Cooperative Committee led the compensation struggle for evacuees across Canada. 82

The MJCCA believed the best chances for compensation rested in a unified front; they chose to cooperate with the national movement coordinated by the NJCCA and the Cooperative Committee in Toronto. By abdicating autonomy in this matter, the MJCCA and their lawyer Saul Cherniack had to rely on the NJCCA and the Cooperative Committee's abilities and final recommendations. The MJCCA's role in the compensation struggle was mainly an administrative effort; collecting fees and forms, and presenting the claims to the Bird Commission on behalf of the evacuees in Manitoba. The NJCCA and the Cooperative Committee, through the provincial bodies like the MJCCA, collected fees and individual names for the Commission hearing. Two sets of duplicated forms were sent from Toronto to the MJCCA. One set listed the property to be claimed and the other set indicated whether the evacuees wished to use the legal service arranged by the Cooperative Committee on their behalf. 83 To cover the cost of legal services, the Committee required that each individual send a 1% retainer fee of the total amount claimed. All cheques and money orders were to be payable to the Cooperative Committee, and mailed by the MJCCA to Toronto. All legal fees were paid by the Cooperative
Committee. Copies of the Manitoba claims were to be given to Saul Cherniack.84

To ensure that all eligible evacuees claimed for property losses, the MJCCA created the Property Loss Committee composed of Chairman Harold Hirose, Secretary Thelma Scrambler, and Saul Cherniack.85 The claim forms were mailed to the evacuees by the Property Loss Committee. After completing the forms, they were to be sworn before a Notary, Commissioner for Oaths, or lawyer, and mailed back to the Committee. Since the vast majority of claimants in Manitoba were Issei, many needed assistance in completing the claim. Consequently, arrangements were made for them to meet with the Property Loss Committee.86 Through the Committee's efficiency and hard work, by November 22, 1947, 159 of the total 175 claims and retainer fees were registered with the Cooperative Committee. The remaining claims arrived prior to the extended January 15, 1948 deadline.87

After three months hearing test submissions in BC and Alberta, the Bird Commission moved to Manitoba in April 1948 to hear the first 42 cases. Saul Cherniack presented the Manitoba claimants' cases. Once the first set of cases were settled, a precedent was set for all other Manitoba claims to be heard by a sub-commissioner, Judge A.G. Buckingham of Manitoba. The remaining cases were heard in September 1948. All transcripts, along with Judge Buckingham's
recommendations, were sent to Justice Bird for a final decision.88

As the Commission's hearings continued across the country, the rate at which the cases were settled proved to be too time consuming. Neither Justice Bird nor claimants' counsel wanted the Commission to last for an extended period of time. As a result, in April 1949, the Cooperative Committee and the NJCCA, on behalf of the MJCCA, accepted Bird's settlement proposal for evacuee property claims.89 The settlement proposal stated that property sold in the Veteran's Land Act, principally the Fraser Valley farms, be given the largest adjustment in sale compensation. Specifically, this gave all sales in the village of Mission a 125% increase on the actual sale price, and all other VLA lands an additional 80% increase in actual sale price. All other real estate outside Vancouver would receive a 12.5% adjustment in the sale price, while the property in Vancouver received a 5% increase.90

For the 175 claimants in Manitoba, the settlement was acceptable. Of the 175 claims, 141 were within the VLA land. A noticeable number, however, were defined as real estate outside Vancouver (22) and 12 were designated as Vancouver properties. Thus, approximately 19% of the claims in Manitoba only received an increase of between 5 to 12.5% over the sale price. Despite this fact, there was no dissent registered with the MJCCA, as happened in Toronto by the
Vancouver property owners who had resettled in that city.91 It took another year before Justice Bird made his recommendations to the federal government, and in June 1950 the Canadian government accepted the Commission's findings.92 In the absence of open criticism by evacuee claimants in Manitoba, the issue was tentatively settled until a final redress package was granted to the remaining Issei and Nisei Canadians in October 1988.

By the fall of 1947, the Dominion Government wanted to end its involvement with the resettlement program and leave the evacuees in Manitoba. In September 1947, A. MacNamara proposed to the Manitoba government that the evacuees residing in the province be accepted as residents providing that they had lived there on a self supporting basis for two years.93

The possibility of the evacuees becoming permanent residents was accepted by the Manitoba government, but not without reservations. Premier Garson noted that the new Old Age Pension Act would affect the provincial Treasury by having to provide pensions to all of the 181 eligible evacuees resettled in Manitoba.94 Garson argued that except for the forced relocation the potential claimants would not be living in the province. As a result, the Manitoba government should not be expected to pay the evacuees' full pensions.95
In an intra-governmental memorandum A.H. Brown, Department of Health and Welfare, agreed with Garson's position and informed MacNamara that special procedures would be applied to exempt the evacuees from section 13 of the Pension Act. In January 1948 H. Mitchell, federal Minister of Labour, proposed to Garson that the new residence regulations for the evacuees eligible to claim pensions would not be considered to start until April 1, 1948. Thus, BC would pay all of the evacuee pension cost until April 1, 1948. As for welfare and maintenance, Mitchell suggested that the Dominion and the province split all welfare and assistance costs equally, for a two year period from March 31, 1948 to March 31, 1950, at which point the Dominion contribution would end. The responsibility for administering the program lay with the province. With maintenance duties the only concern, the Japanese Division closed its office in 1948, and welfare disbursements were made from the Provincial Department of Health and Welfare. In order for the province to be reimbursed, they would complete a Dominion Statement of Claim Form. The form would be sent to the Dominion District Treasury Auditor who in turn, would pass it to the Chief Treasury Officer, Department of Labour in Ottawa.

In mid-March 1948, Garson responded to Mitchell's proposal. Garson agreed that the evacuee issue should be concluded, but not at the province's expense.
reminded the Dominion Government that in the June 30, 1942 letter of understanding, points four and ten,\textsuperscript{101} clearly committed the federal government to fulfil its obligations until "the termination of the state of war now existing between Canada and Japan."\textsuperscript{102} Garson asserted that any future agreement between the federal government and Manitoba, which would make the cost of pensions and welfare assistance the responsibility of the province, should start from the date when a peace treaty was signed. Garson's Cabinet accepted the fundamentals of the proposed Pension Act, the welfare policy, and their administration as put forward by the Dominion Government; all that remained was the issue of dates.\textsuperscript{103}

The federal government rejected Manitoba's proposal that a final agreement begin after a peace treaty was signed. In a stiffly worded letter Mitchell acknowledged that in the original agreement the federal government was responsible for the evacuees while they were temporary residents. Since the evacuees' arrival in Manitoba, however, federal policy had changed, encouraging permanent resettlement across Canada.\textsuperscript{104} Mitchell reminded Garson that in his December 1945 press release he stated that the resettlement program was a Dominion responsibility, but the province would co-operate.\textsuperscript{105} The province had co-operated and the evacuees established themselves as part of the provincial community. Consequently, the evacuees should be
recognized and accepted for what they were, namely residents of the province. Since the nature of their status changed, Mitchell did not see the logic in treating the evacuees as temporary residents until a peace treaty was signed.106

After further consideration, the Manitoba government accepted the federal proposal. The federal and provincial governments would share equally welfare and maintenance cost, with administration carried out by the province, and Manitoba would provide Old Age Pension coverage after April 1, 1948.107 With this agreement in place, the members of the Japanese community were officially acknowledged as residents of the province with the same rights as other Manitobans.

The time immediately after the war was filled with intense uncertainty, frustration, and remorse, for the evacuee's. The prospect, of deportation/repatriation, family separation, or at the very least, another move to somewhere else in Canada was disturbing. Equally troublesome was the possibility that once again the evacuees would not have a say in the decision process.

The struggle against the federal government's assault on their citizenship rights proved to be a unifying event for evacuees across Canada and a startling jolt for the Canadian public. Dominion Government attempts to deport Canadians of Japanese heritage, alerted Caucasian Canadians of the federal government's willingness to employ race related legislation. This contradiction of the principles
for which Canadian men and women fought in the Second World War drew the scorn of many influential organizations such as the Y.W.C.A., Church, and Civil Liberties Associations, and the news media, including the Winnipeg Free Press.

Throughout the controversy, Manitobans, like their counterparts in the rest of Canada, voiced their disdain for the actions of the federal government. Moreover, many demanded that Premier Garson show leadership and denounce the federal policy. Unwilling to criticize the Dominion Government, Garson chose a "hands-off" position, a tactic which ensured the province's public neutrality and provided minimal assistance to the evacuees. Nevertheless, continued pressure by concerned Canadians and Japanese Canadians led the federal authorities to rescind P.C. 7355-57 in January 1947.

Once citizenship rights were secured, restitution for land sold during the war became an important corollary to a successful conclusion to the episode. By 1947, a well organized coalition of influential Canadians embodied in the Cooperative Committee on Japanese Canadians, and a working organization of Japanese evacuees, NJCCA, pressed the federal government for compensation. After appointing a Royal Commission to investigate the charges of land sale abuses during the expropriation of evacuees' property, the federal government was forced to address the evidence presented by the Bird Commission. Consequently, the
remaining Issei and Nisei in Manitoba, and throughout Canada, received a degree of financial compensation for their losses.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

*For the purpose of this discussion the terms Deportation and Repatriation will be defined as follows. Repatriation: to send or bring back a person(s) to his own country. Deportation: to remove (an unwanted person) from a country. Oxford Universal Dictionary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981.


2NAC. Eastwood to Brown August 28, 1942. RG 36/27 Vol.16 file 610.

3NAC. Brown to Eastwood May 15, 1943. RG/27 Vol.31 file 1713.

4NAC. Brown to Eastwood May 15, 1943. Ibid. Interview with H. Hirose, April 16, 1991. See footnote 8 for a list of local organizations. Other executive members were Shinji Sato as Chairman, Vice Chairman Kurahachi Yoshino, Treasurer Ichiro Hirayama, and Auditors Tamotsu Mitani, and Takahara Miyake. Successive executive lists have been lost.


6The change in Division policy was discussed in Chapter 2, p.47-53.

7For further details see chapter 2, p.57.

8The New Canadian, March 9, 1946. The organizations which consolidated included: Manisei club, the Civil Rights Defence Committee established to fight deportation, Issei club and the Niseiettes. The executive of the first MJCCA consisted of T. Umezuki, S. Sato, K. Oyama, M. Hayashi, G. Sasaki, B. Sasaki, Miss Y. Hikida, Mrs' H. Kusano.

9Ibid. At the national convention of the NJCCA the Manitoba delegation won approval for a provincial charter system in the constitution allowing provincial chapters more autonomy. The New Canadian April 3, 1949.

10This was a nationally appointed Committee designed to sell fishing boats after they were impounded. For further details see, Ken Adachi, The Enemy That Never Was, Chapter 13, p.320-330; F. LaViolette, The Canadian Japanese and World War II, p.205-208, or A. Sunahara, The Politics of Racism, chapter 5.

11Sunahara, p.102-104, and LaViolette p. 214. Mackenzie enlisted T.A. Crear and Norman McLarty out of necessity. The VLA program did not exist but a similar programmed from the First World War, the Soldiers
Settlement Board, existed and was under the jurisdiction of T. A. Crerar, Minister of Mines and Natural Resources. Mackenzie needed Crerar to sponsor an order-in-council allowing the Soldiers Settlement Board to buy the land in question and hold it in trust until the VLA program was operating in August 1942. Norman McLarty became involved because he was the Legal Custodian of Enemy and Japanese Canadian property. In order for the Custodian's powers to be expanded to include selling the land to the Soldiers Settlement Board, McLarty had to initiate the necessary order-in-council.

12Ibid.

13The New Canadian April 3, 1943


15NAC. Ernst to Brown, Japanese Division Office Manager, December 16, 1943. Brown to Ernst, December 29, 1943. RG 36/27 Vol.31 file 1703. Hirose to Kaslo Property Committee, June 1, 1943, Hirose's personal correspondence. His letter acknowledged support for the group, a $3 donation and citation of property ownership.

16Winnipeg Tribune January 28, and June 30, 1944. In rejecting the Japanese Canadian enfranchisement, Senator John T. Haig (PC Manitoba), justified his vote against the bill because, in his opinion, the Japanese could not assimilate. Winnipeg Tribune July 1, 1944. For a more detailed discussion of the Soldiers Voting Bill see Adachi and Sunahara as cited.

17Winnipeg Free Press June 16, 1944.

18House of Commons Debates August 4, 1944, p.5915. King also made it clear he wanted to adopt a policy that was similar to the US.

19Ibid. p.5915-16.

20Ibid. The announcement that a Commission was to be established and disloyal persons would be found indicated that King felt disloyalty existed and that it had not been discovered. As well, King publicly demanded the Commission "find" those disloyal persons to deport/repatriate or else they would have failed in their duty. Fortunately, the Commission was never established. King also advocated even dispersion of evacuees across Canada; this would mean Manitoba would receive a total of 2600. No negative public reaction was reported. Winnipeg Tribune August 8, 1944.

21Ibid. Interestingly P.C. 10773, November 26, 1942 already stated that citizenship could be lost on a Petition to Protecting Power or application for repatriation to an enemy country. In any event, by December 17, 1945 King announced that citizenship was removed upon
leaving the country in naturalized citizen cases. Canada also stopped post-war immigration from Japan for an indefinite period.

22NAC. Ernst to Japanese Division, Monthly Reports October 1944, RG 27 Vol.645 file 23-2-3-8-1 ptl. Hirose acknowledged that some members of the 220 Japanese Nationals were strongly sympathetic to Japan. Interview with H. Hirose, April 16, 1991, Winnipeg, Manitoba.

23NAC. Ernst to Japanese Division, Monthly Report June 1945. RG 27 Vol.645 file 23-2-3-8-1 ptl. An added factor facing the MJJC was that it held elections during the spring and new members were involved. This may have affected the MJJC's abilities.


26NAC. Lister to T.B. Pickersgill, May 5, 1945. RG 27 Vol.645 file 23-2-3-8-1 ptl. One may speculate that despite more tolerance in Manitoba lower crop yields provided less money, making it harder to re-establish.

27Winnipeg Tribune March 17, 1945 and May 16, 1946. P.C. 1457 February 1942. The law was amended December 20, 1943, allowing evacuees to lease buildings for business without permits on a yearly basis.

28NAC. Ernst to Japanese Division Monthly Report July 1945. RG 27 Vol.645 file 23-2-3-8-1 ptl. No specific number of Canadian born were mentioned. Others may have signed because of administrative misunderstandings. T.B. Pickersgill assumed citizenship was protected until they left. The evacuees may have signed in order to get a free trip to BC to reunite with relatives; intending to revoke at a later date.


30Winnipeg Free Press November 6, 1945. The clause raised protest. This will be discussed later.

31Winnipeg Free Press, December 29, 1945. The Orders-In-Council passed on December 15, 1945 were closely tailored after the proposals by the Minister of Labour in the House of Commons on November 21, 1945. His proposals were encapsulated in P.C. 7355.

32House of Commons debates December 17, 1945. p.3697. H. Mitchell noted September 2, 1945 as a cut off date because Canadian citizenship
was a sacred thing and he believed that during the war many Japanese wanted to renounce their citizenship and return to Japan. Once the atomic bomb was dropped the Japanese changed their minds. Mitchell disagreed with their intentions. House of Commons debates November 22, 1945, p.2438.

33Ibid. p.3697-98. In King's August 4, 1944 speech he indicated that citizenship would be lost upon signing to leave Canada.

34For details see LaViolette Chapters 10-11, Adachi chapters 12-14 and Sunahara Chapters 6-7.

35Winnipeg Free Press, October 6 and 18, November 6, and December 29, 1945. It should be noted also that articles in the newspapers on returning Winnipeg Grenadiers stated that they harboured no ill feelings towards the evacuees in Manitoba. Winnipeg Free Press, October 17, 1945, and the New Canadian January 19, 1946.

36PAM. Y.W.C.A. Minutes of Meetings of Board of Directors October 1941-October 1946; November 8, 1945 and June 12, 1946.

37PAM. W.L. Morton to Garson December 1, 1945. RG 18 A4 Box 36, and G106 file 52. The petition by the Civil Liberties Association was composed mainly by Morton. Ibid. It is interesting to note that the Association believed the "real villain" in Ottawa was Ian Mackenzie.

38Ibid.

39Ibid.

40The New Canadian November 3, 1945. PAM. Garson to R.E. Moffat, October 27, 1945. G106 file 52. Some examples of petitions were Mrs. A.B. Rutherford/Mrs. C. Moore Virden Women's Mission Society, Mrs. R. Dunn Secretary United Church Women's Mission Society Portage, Mrs. L. D. McKillop President United Church Mission Society Dauphin, Brandon East Presbytery Young Peoples Union of the United Church of Canada. The Youth Union asked Garson to "restore to Canadian Japanese within the borders of Manitoba the full rights and responsibilities of citizenship-implying the provincial vote. The Premier replied that the province could not restore rights they had not removed. Garson avoided any statement or action such as sanctioning the provincial vote.

41PAM. Minutes of Meeting, the Winnipeg Presbytery Church of Canada, November 13, 1945. G106 file 52. W.L. Morton made a similar statement to Garson.


43PAM. Garson to G.A. Woodside, Secretary, Presbytery of Winnipeg, United Church of Canada, December 17, 1945. RG 18, A4 Box 36. Garson to W.L. Morton November 20, 1945. Ibid.
Ibid.

PAM. Garson to R. Moffat October 27, 1945 G106 file 52. R. E. Moffat worked in the Department of Provincial Treasurer. Garson was also Minister for Dominion-Provincial relations, and Provincial Treasurer.

PAM. Moffat to Garson November 8, 1945. RG 18 A4 Box 36.


NAC. A. MacNamara to G.H. Aikin's January 15, 1946. RG 27 Vol.645 file 23-2-3-8-1 pt2. Given Aikin's previous connections with this issue and his concern for the sugar beet industry's labour supply, this proposition would have been transmitted to the Provincial government.


Report on the Re-establishment of Japanese in Canada, 1944-46, Department of Labour: Ottawa. p.14. For further discussion on this point see LaViolette chapter 10-11, Adachi chapter 13 and Sunahara chapter 7. Some of the more prominent individuals supporting the Cooperative Committee were United Church Moderator Rev. J. Arnup, Publisher B.K. Sandwell, Liberal Senator A.W. Roebuck and Saskatchewan Premier T. Douglas.

The New Canadian November 24, and December 8, 1945. The Committee had six other members, S. Sato, T. Umezuki, Miss Yoshio Hikida and K. Oyama. NAC. Ernst to Japanese Division Monthly Report February 1946. RG 27 Vol.645 file 23-2-3-8-1 pt2. Ernst did not mention specific Winnipeggers, but one may speculate that they were associated with the Y.W.C.A. or Church organizations. The New Canadian March 16, 1946. Moreover, the Defence Committee in conjunction with the Cooperative Committee planned a test case to challenge the Orders if they were not referred to the Supreme Courts. The test case involved the Winnipeg residents Shoji Minamichi of 219 Edmonton street; Mitsuo Yagi of 220 Kennedy street who was a Japanese National with a Canadian born wife with three children and Masajiro Ibuk a naturalized Canadian with three children. Winnipeg Free Press January 11, 1946.


Winnipeg Tribune, January 7, 1946.

For persons without money and who wanted to leave Canada, the federal government gave financial assistance.

Moreover, the Manitoba Sugar Beet Company preferred more Japanese evacuees, but was pessimistic about attracting more labourers from BC. D.L. Campbell, Department of Agriculture and Immigration, Province of Manitoba to MacNamara, April 1, 1946. Ibid.

The Manitoba Sugar Beet Company preferred more Japanese evacuees, but was pessimistic about attracting more labourers from BC. D.L. Campbell, Department of Agriculture and Immigration, Province of Manitoba to MacNamara, April 1, 1946. Ibid.

Campbell forwarded the suggestion to use POW's despite the fact that the evacuees harvested more acres on average than POW's.

In the original plan the plant was to operate until at least the spring of 1947.

The specific price for the plant complex was to be settled at a later date. The War Assets Corporation was responsible to the Department of Munitions and Supply.

The utility equipment was not included in the sale despite the efforts of the Department of Labour to have it transferred.

After the first large group, (100) subsequent numbers ranged from 20-30. They stopped the flow of evacuees to the facility in September in order to shut the complex down. At the end of August 1946, Ernst resigned from the Japanese Division. R.H. Davidson Asst. Commissioner of Japanese Placement to A.H. Brown September 26, 1946. RG 27 Vol.645 file 23-2-3-8-1 pt2. It is interesting to note that of the 100 persons Japanese Nationals with children numbered 10 families, naturalized Japanese with families numbered eight,
and Canadian Japanese families totalled five. They came from a cross section of interior centres, the largest number were from Slocan and Tashme, but many others came from Lemon Creek, New Denver, and Roseberry. The Hostel was administered by Ernst and J.S. Burns, the former Supervisor at Lemon Creek. Burns went on to administer the Neys hostel in Ontario. T.B. Pickersgill to Ernst May 16, 1946. RG 27 Vol.645 file 23-2-3-8-1 pt2.


69NAC. Ernst to Japanese Division, Monthly Reports May to July 1946. RG 27 Vol.645 file 23-2-3-8-1 pt2. Like the families who came to the Transcona hostel, the most common were Japanese Nationals totalling 24; Canadian Japanese numbered 23 and naturalized Japanese amounted to seven. Judging from Ernst's reports sugar beet farming, McCabe Brother's Grain Company, and various other industries in Winnipeg employed the new arrivals.

70The New Canadian, February 9, 1946.

71Ibid., August 17, 1946.

72NAC. Japanese Repatriated to Japan from Manitoba During 1946. Department of Labour. RG 27 Vol.646 file 23-2-3-8-3. The majority of people left in May 1946. Ernst to Japanese Division Monthly Report May 1946. RG 27 Vol.645 file 23-2-3-8-1 pt2. Most of the 118 were headed by naturalized parent(s) 16 families; the second largest group was Japanese Nationals at 13. They went on the second ship which sailed June 16, 1946.

73Winnipeg Free Press, May 22, 1946.

74Winnipeg Tribune, May 22, and September 17, 1946.

75Report on the Re-establishment of Japanese in Canada, 1944-46, Department of Labour: Ottawa, p.23. In an attempt to ensure resettlement beyond the west coast, the federal government continued restrictions on residence for another two years. Ibid.


77Adachi, p.324-25. The Standing Committee on Public Accounts became involved after irregularities in the disposal of evacuee property came to light in Parliament after CCF questioning. The Secretary of State Colin Gibson referred the actions of the Custodian to the Standing Committee for investigation. For further details see Adachi chapter 13, and Sunahara chapter 8.

78Ibid.
79 P.C. 1810 and 3737. MJCCA to King August 16, 1947. Hirose's files Property Losses Evacuation Claims. For further discussion see Sunahara chapter 8 or Adachi chapter 13.

80 The New Canadian, November 9, 1946. As early as November 1946 the MJCCA and the New Canadian were advising evacuees to return all cheques from the Custodian. Cashing the cheques might acknowledge the right of the Custodian to sell their property and indicate that the recipient was satisfied with the settlement; thus removing the evacuees' option for future claims.


83 Justice Bird was to travel across Canada making local legal assistance necessary. The MJCCA hired Saul Cherniack who was accepted by the Cooperative Committee and the NJCCA. Saul Cherniack was chosen as legal counsel because he was active in supporting their position during the deportation issue. He was also an acquaintance of members of the MJCCA whom he met during the war as a translator in the Far East. Undoubtedly, his language ability was an added advantage.

84 Cooperative Committee on Japanese Canadians to Provincial Chapter organizations of NJCCA. Hirose's files as cited.

85 Hirose to Nishikawa October 6, 1947. It became clear that the Manitoba Committee was to be responsible for claims in Fort William, and S. Cherniack represented them as well. A factor which created this situation was the deadline of November 31, 1947 for claims. This was later extended to January 15, 1948 due to geographical dispersion and difficulty in filling out the forms. Nishikawa to Hirose November 18, 1947. The New Canadian, November 22, 1947.

86 The New Canadian, November 22, 1947. Hirose to Nishikawa October 6, 1947. Hirose to Nishikawa November 24, 1947. Hirose's files as cited. As a result of Division policy many claimants' did not have access to a Notary, or lawyer as they lived in remote areas. For these people the rules seemed to be bent.

87 Boos, Secretary of the Cooperative Committee to Hirose November 22, 1947. Claims from Manitoba equalled 175 or approximately 1.1% of the total number of claims in Canada. The retainer fees totalled $1,771.00 from Manitoba and Fort William. The remaining retainer fees were collected by August 1948. Hirose's file as cited.
Other items such as net and fishing gear were allowed a further 25% on the sale price; boats and gear received a 23.5% increase and motor vehicles and other chattels ranged between 5 to 25% increase over the sale price. Ibid.

Hirose's files as cited. An additional 5 claims were disallowed, abandoned or withdrawn; all were from Vancouver. For further discussion of the events in Toronto see Sunahara or Adachi, as cited, or Nunoda chapter 9.

Prior to Justice Bird's final assessments, total amount for claimants' from Manitoba equalled $166,099.60. Hirose's file, Property Losses Evacuation claims.

PAM. MacNamara to Garson, September 19, 1947. G153 file 10. It remains unclear what was to be done with the evacuees who were not self supporting.


PAM. Garson to MacNamara, October 21, 1947. G153 file 10. Likewise, Garson pointed out that welfare payments presented similar problems. Under the provisions of the former Old Age Pension Act, the cost of the claimants' pension was split between the two provinces in which the person had lived within the last twenty years. For example, if the person lived fifteen of the last twenty years in BC and moved to Manitoba, BC would pay the majority of the pension. Under the new system pension liability was based on where the applicant had lived for the last 1095 days (three years). Manitoba would have to pay all of the 181 pensions in full.


NAC. Department of Labour, Japanese Division Memorandum, July 17, 1948. RG 27 Vol.649 file 23-2-4-10.

101Point four stated that the evacuees would not be an expense to any level of government within Manitoba, and if the Japanese failed to pay for relief, medical, medicine, or hospitalization services, the federal government would reimburse the appropriate level of government for services rendered. Point ten stated that the federal government agreed "to remove from your province any Japanese placed therein through this Commission upon the termination of the state of war now existing between Canada and Japan." NAC. Garson to Mitchell, March 15, 1948. RG 27 Vol.649 file 23-2-4-10.

102Ibid.

103Ibid. The Manitoba government also pointed out that the federal government owed them $157.19 for Old Age Pension costs. Before any agreement could be reached the account had to be settled. The federal government paid the outstanding account on June 3, 1948. Department of Labour to Garson, June 3, 1948, Ibid.


105Ibid.

106Ibid. Mitchell also pointed out that the federal proposal presented to Manitoba was accepted by BC, Alberta and Ontario.

CONCLUSION

Despite the efforts of previous writers, the literature discussing the Japanese wartime experience consistently fails to provide a well balanced account of what happened to the 1,180 evacuees in Manitoba. This study looked at those evacuees resettled in Manitoba, acknowledging the role of the federal and provincial governments, interest groups, rural and urban reactions and the response of the Japanese community relocated in the province.

The evacuees were resettled in Manitoba due to a combination of factors which existed inside Manitoba and outside the province. Within Manitoba the sugar beet industry suffered from a shortage of labour. G.H. Aikins, President of the Manitoba Sugar Beet Company, shrewdly viewed the evacuees as a solution to the industry's chronic labour shortage. The sugar beet proposal was welcomed by the BCSC as it met two vital criteria: it was both a destination for the Japanese evacuees, and a productive use of their labour.

Not all interest groups in Manitoba were eager to receive the evacuees. The Manitoba government refused to be directly associated with the project, and insisted that all responsibility lay with the federal government, or the BCSC and its successor the Japanese Division. Some municipal governments such as Winnipeg and Lockport protested and
passed resolutions restricting or proscribing evacuees from locating or working in their jurisdiction. The actions of local government were supported by a segment of the population associated with labour unions and citizen groups.

Despite the objections of some residents, evacuees were placed on sugar beet farms in the province. The resettlement process was badly organized, and cumbersome. The schedule was restrictive as the BCSC wanted the Japanese people out of BC and relocated in Manitoba for the start of the sugar beet season. Consequently, the Security Commission's criteria and regulations were not followed.

The BCSC established an ill-conceived administrative structure designed to assist the evacuees and anyone associated with the project in the province. After the first harvest season, it became apparent that the evacuees could not live off their summer earnings. If the Security Commission, and its successor the Japanese Division, were to avoid paying large maintenance costs, changes were necessary.

Policy changes within the project occurred for a number of reasons. Weather and soil conditions made sugar beet farming in most areas less profitable than expected. To avoid high relief expenses and as a result of persistent lobbying by the MJJC, the Division granted more employment and residential exemptions. In co-operation with the NSS, the Division established a system of seasonal employment
which encouraged spring to fall work on sugar beet farms, and winter employment in rural towns or in a forestry related job. Thus, by serving its own interests rather than those of the sugar beet industry, the Division jeopardized the industry's labour supply.

With greater economic opportunities the Japanese community began to stabilize. Participation in local unions, reduced welfare cases and the establishment of social organizations were solid indications that a more stable and adequate financial situation would lower grievances and discontent. Moreover, by granting greater employment opportunities to the evacuees, federal policy initiatives at the local level worked against the federal government's deportation plan in 1946. As the evacuees became more familiar with the province, they found permanent employment in rural locations or in Winnipeg.

The migration of Japanese families into Winnipeg was a contentious issue for the Division. Yet the sugar beet industry could not sustain the evacuees on a permanent basis. Despite its original rural resettlement policy, and in violation of city by-laws, the Division found jobs for evacuees in Winnipeg. By the summer of 1943, Winnipeg was experiencing a labour shortage and removed the restrictions on Japanese male evacuees. Yet the urban movement was complicated by resistance from unions, citizen groups and later by housing and job shortages as veterans returned.
These obstacles were not insurmountable. Over time, the evacuees became union members, and housing and jobs were located in areas that Caucasians did not want; even veterans, it seems, harboured no ill-will towards the evacuees. Through the co-operation of organizations such as the Y.W.C.A. and the NSS, the Division was able to ensure that employment opportunities existed. Thus, through the co-operative efforts of the evacuees and the favourable attitude displayed by most Winnipeggers protest against their presence abated.

While opposition to Japanese families in the province decreased, their future remained in doubt. The evacuees were resettled in Manitoba with the understanding that after the war they would be removed. At no time did the Manitoba government indicate that they were prepared to release the Dominion Government from this obligation. As part of the federal government's solution to the "Japanese problem", the evacuees were to be deported/repatriated, or dispersed across Canada. To the Japanese community within Manitoba (led by the MJJC/MJCCA) dispersal was tolerable, but deportation/repatriation was unacceptable; for many Canadians, the latter action was a threat to citizenship rights. The struggle against the federal government's attempt to deport evacuees proved to be a unifying cause for Japanese across Canada, and an enlightening event for Canadians. Because of the federal government's assault on
citizenship rights, organizations such as the Y.W.C.A., Church and Civil Liberty Organizations, and the news media, including the Winnipeg Free Press, voiced their disapproval of the Dominion Government's actions.

The provincial government was also called on to show leadership and denounce the federal deportation policy and cancel any clause which would force the removal of the evacuees from the province. Premier Garson did not respond to either suggestion. Despite the province's intransigence, public pressure and a combination of voluntary deportation and dispersal convinced the federal government to rescind orders-in-council 7355-57 in January 1947.

For the Japanese families in Manitoba, just restitution for property lost in BC then became an important issue. Through the efforts of the MJCCA, a well organized coalition of concerned Canadians embodied in the Cooperative Committee on Japanese Canadians, and a working organization of Japanese evacuees, NJCCA, the federal government was pressed for compensation. Following the findings of the Bird Commission, the evacuees remaining in Manitoba received a degree of financial compensation for property losses in BC.

This study has tried to reveal why Japanese evacuees were resettled in Manitoba and how the BCSC and its successor, the Japanese Division, managed the project and met the needs of the evacuees. The thesis also endeavoured to show that the reaction of the Manitoba government,
interest groups and concerned citizens ranged from non-committed, to supportive to hostile, depending on the particular group. As well, the work ventured to illustrate that the attitudes of the province's residents were not static. Sceptical at first, by 1945, most residents supported the Japanese fight against deportation, and were willing to recognize them as citizens. Finally, this work attempted to show that through the efforts of the MJJC/MJCCA, the Japanese community in Manitoba had a considerable degree of control over their own future which allowed them to adapted and re-established in the province.

By examining the history of the resettlement of Japanese Canadians in Manitoba between 1942 and 1948, a greater appreciation for the differences between regions will be gained, which will contribute to a better understanding of the wartime experience of Japanese Canadians in Canada.
Appendix B  Segregation Form

Source: PAM  RG18 A4 Box36

COPY

No. CBW

GOVERNMENT OF CANADA
DECLARATION

I, I, ______________________ (M. or F.) born ________ day, month, year,
registered as Canadian-born British subject, (J.R. ________) under Order-in-Council P.C.No. 9760, dated Dec.16, 1941,
hereby declare my desire to relinquish my British nationality
and to assume the status of a national of Japan.

II. Further, I request the Government of Canada, under the
conditions set out in the Statement of the Minister of Labour,
dated February 13, 1945, to arrange for and effect my repatria-
tion to Japan.

III. I declare that I fully understand the contents of this docu-
ment and I voluntarily affix my signature hereto:

Date.............1945

______________________________________________________
Signature

__________
Interpreter

Application approved

Date .............1945

* * * * * *
SOURCES

UNPUBLISHED SOURCES

National Archives of Canada:

Bird Commission, RG 33/69
Saul Cherniack Papers, MG 30/E266
Department of Labour, Japanese Division, RG 27 Vol 640, 645, 646, and 649.
Orders-In-Council, RG 2

Provincial Archives of Manitoba:

Immigration file, No. A66589-C-10586.
Minister of Public Works, RG 18 A4 Box 36
Premier Bracken Papers, G113 File 112
Premier Garson Papers, G106, file 52; G113 File 52; G153 File 10
Winnipeg Chamber of Commerce; Executive and General Council Minutes, 1941-1946.
YWCA Records of Annual Meetings and Board Meetings P-3833, P-3853, and P-3956.

Provincial Legislative Library: Political Scrap book, Re: Charles Graham, George Collins.

University of Manitoba Archives: Winnipeg Tribune Collection

Winnipeg City Archives: City Council Minutes, 1942-1945

Knox United Church Archives:

Knox Sessional Minutes of Church Elders, 1942-1948.
Knox Sessional Minutes of the Manitoba Japanese United Church Elders, 1944-1946.
Personal Files of H. Hirose: Property Losses Evacuation Claims.

Newspapers

Morris Herald, 1942.
New Canadian, 1945-1948.
Portage Graphic, 1942.
Selkirk Journal, 1942.
United Church Observer, 1942-1946.
Winnipeg Tribune, 1942-1948

Interviews


PUBLISHED SOURCES


Broadfoot Barry, *Years of Sorrow Years of Shame*,


Glynn-Ward, Hilda, *The Writing on the Wall*,
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974.


Ito, Roy, We Went To War, Stittsville:Canada's Wings, Inc, 1984.


Kitagawa Muriel, This Is My Own, Vancouver:Talonbooks, 1985.


McWilliams Carey, Brothers Under the Skin, Boston:Little Brown and Company, 1942.

McWilliams Carey, Prejudice:Japanese Americans, Symbols of Racial Intolerance, 1944.

MacInnis A., "Should We Send the Japs Back? No!" Maclean's 56, December. 1, 1943.

Nakano Takea, Within the Barbed Wire Fence, Toronto:University of Toronto Press, 1980.


**UNPUBLISHED PAPERS AND THESES**


