

**Community Leaders as Determinants of Conflict and Peace: Understanding the Causes
and Spatial Variation of Ethnic Conflict in Jos, Nigeria**

by

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Abstract

Jos, a Middle Belt Nigerian city, is commonly referred to as the hotbed of ethnoreligious conflicts in Nigeria. In the post-independence era, the city has been bedevilled by four major conflicts between the mostly Christian indigenous Berom ethnic group and the predominantly Muslim settler Hausa and Fulani ethnicities. The 2000s saw recurrent fighting between these groups in the city, and Jos has remained turbulent since then. Yet, not all the Jos communities that are inhabited by these ethnic groups have been involved in the conflict. Both Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa are, for example, inhabited by Berom, Hausa and Fulani, populated by Christians and Muslims and relatively low-income communities. Yet, only the former was enmeshed in intergroup conflict between 2001 and 2010. Informed by the phenomenological approach's requirement of "minimum structure for maximum depth," I explored the experiences of intergroup relations of 12 participants in each community in order to understand how Dadin Kowa avoided the conflict even though neighbouring Angwan Doki was involved in it. With semi-structured interviews as my main research instrument, I explored people's relational experiences of before, during and after the conflict in order to produce a comprehensive view of its social environment. To make sense of the unearthed stories, I constructed a model of understanding using the General Inductive Approach. My model of understanding, which consists of a causal network and a temporal sequence, indicates that ethnicized electoral politics is the epicentre of the causal conditions in both communities yet the interventions of the Dadin Kowa community leaders halted their progression to violent intergroup conflict there.

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Dedication

To God Almighty, my source of wisdom.

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Chapter One: Introduction

Conflict does not just occur suddenly. Every conflict-affected society has a history that can illuminate its contemporary situation, and that history is not always limited to the probable sources of discord but may also include experiences of peace. Through my thesis, I seek to highlight the significance of a conflict analysis that is grounded in history, yet not simply the conflict-relevant history. My thesis is also grounded in people's recollection of their peace-time history. In other words, by exploring people's experiences of intergroup relations over time, I illuminate our understanding of the conflict in Jos based on people's stories of both conflict and peace. I explore the experiences of intergroup relations to unearth these stories inductively and not privilege one type of story but all the types of stories that exist in the consciousness of the participants. Through this process, I account for the spatial variation of conflict in Jos, specifically the presence of conflict in Angwan Doki and the absence of the same in Dadin Kowa.

Key terms

There are some frequently recurring terms in my thesis, which I clarify under the three subheads below.

Indigenous

Being indigenous in Nigeria is different from the notion of indigeneity in North America.¹

Whereas the descendants of the first inhabitants of Canada are regarded as Indigenous anywhere in Canada, indigenous status in Nigeria is limited to each state such that a person might be indigenous in Kano state but will be regarded as a settler if they relocate to Plateau state and vice versa. There are many indigenous groups in Jos, such as the Berom, Afizere, and Anaguta.

Although the indigenous groups comprise both Christians and Muslims, they are predominantly Christians. Given the dominance of Christianity within the indigenous groups, they are generally labeled as Christians. Although I acknowledge that not all indigenous people are Christians, I use both terms interchangeably when referring to all the indigenous groups and depending on the context of the discussion. While discussing a religion-related theme, for example, I use religion, while I switch to indigenous when discussing a land-related theme. While presenting the stories of a participant, however, I use the exact group identity of that participant.

Settlers

As alluded to above, the settler concept is fluid in Nigeria. As I show in Chapter 3, many ethnic groups in Jos are regarded as settlers. In my study, however, I use settlers to refer to the Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups because the other settler ethnic groups are not part of the Jos conflicts. Although these are two distinct ethnicities, some Hausa people describe themselves as Hausa-Fulani because of the influence of Fulani culture on their way of life. Given that not all Hausa recognize or self-identify as Hausa-Fulani and the Fulani never identify themselves with this

¹ In the African context, “indigenous” is conventionally spelled with a lowercase “i” as against the use of an uppercase “I” when referring to Indigenous people in the case of North America.

acronym, it is not used in my work. Similar to my usage of indigenous, I use the term settler to refer to the Hausa and Fulani residents of Jos. I debated whether it was appropriate to use this term given that the Hausa and Fulani in Jos reject that identity not only because their ancestors migrated to the city more than a century ago but also because it is used to justify their exclusion. I was knowledgeable about this sentiment before I embarked on the study, so I did not use the term to refer to any of my participants. In reporting some of my findings, however, I use it not only to indicate the source of a story and/or the status of the people to whom the story applies but also to provide additional context for the narrative. Therefore, my usage of the term, settler, should not be interpreted as tacit support for it and the actions that the concept justifies.

Like the indigenous groups who are mostly Christians, the Hausa and Fulani are predominantly Muslims. Consequently, both ethnic groups are collectively regarded as Muslims as is evident in the narratives of the indigenous participants in my study. The indigenous participants in my study also use the settler term to refer to the Hausa and Fulani alone, rather than the entire settler population in Jos. In reporting my findings, therefore, I do not deviate from this practice, as doing so will alter the context of the reported stories.

Community leaders

The term, community leaders, is used loosely to refer to unelected leaders in Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa. It includes religious leaders, such as Pastors, Priests, Imams and Mallams. I also use the term to refer to elders and local Chiefs or local traditional rulers, such as the Sarki and Mai Angwa.

Purpose of the study

I explored the ecology of the Jos conflicts, specifically the factors that account for two communities of similar demographic characteristics having different relational or conflict outcomes. Angwan Doki is an ethnically mixed and religiously mixed low-income community, and it was engulfed by the first city-wide troubles of 2001 as well as the subsequent conflicts in 2004, 2008 and 2010. Yet, Dadin Kowa, with a similar population make-up, has never experienced violent conflict. In the existing literature on the Jos conflict, religious differences, inequality and the political appropriation of local grievances are advanced as causes (Milligan, 2013; Higazi, 2011; Orji, 2011; Krause, 2011). However, these factors provide only partial insights into the occurrence of conflict in Jos given that not all the communities in the city have been susceptible to their effects. Consequently, I explored the Jos conflict using a research design that produced the type of holistic picture that highlights the spatial variation of conflict in the city.

Research questions

This study was guided by the assumption that a complex mosaic of factors drives every conflict. Therefore, I aimed to provide a holistic view of the ecology of the Jos conflict by showing how each causal factor interfaces with others to condition conflict and peace in the city's communities. I set out to answer the following questions to achieve the aforementioned aim:

- What are the causes of the conflict in Angwan Doki, an ethnically mixed and religiously mixed low-income community in Jos?

- What enables Dadin Kowa, also an ethnically mixed and religiously mixed low-income community, to avoid the cycle of conflict that has bedevilled much of Jos for decades?

The communities are classified as ethnically and religiously mixed because they are populated by a near equal number of Christians and Muslims, and indigenes (Berom and Afizere) and settlers (Hausa and Fulani). In light of the demographic and economic similarities between both communities, I expect that the conditions of peace unearthed in Dadin Kowa will provide additional context for understanding the causes of conflict in Angwan Doki. Such a comparison will also shed light on the variation of conflict across Jos city.

Significance of the study

My model of understanding provides a holistic view of the social environment of the explored conflict, which is relevant for peacebuilding practice. The model highlights the complexity of the Jos conflict, which underscores the need for a comprehensive solution to the underlying drivers rather than quick fixes that address only the symptoms of the conflict. My findings reveal that just as one factor – ethnicized electoral politics – engendered and intersected with other conditions to cause intergroup conflict in Angwan Doki, it took one factor – community leaders – to prevent the same conditions from culminating in a violent conflict in Dadin Kowa. My comparison of people’s experiences of intergroup relations indicates that community leaders working with local peace structures were central to conflict avoidance in the latter. Conversely, conflict recurred over one decade in the former, where the community leaders depended on law enforcement officers. In terms of practice, therefore, my study indicates that communities in weak states exhibiting conflict early-warning signs should be helped to harness their local peace

resources, as these may be more reliable than the state security apparatus. Also, it shows that conflict avoidance is possible even when the theorized conditions for occurrence exist and there is a cohort of people disposed to acting on, or exploiting, them.

Overview of chapters

My thesis comprises nine chapters. Following this introduction (Chapter 1), I review the generic intergroup conflict literature in Chapter 2. Extant intergroup conflict scholarship is clustered around such themes as perceived threat, historical narratives, nationalism, segregation, religion, natural resources, and horizontal inequalities. Although the studies in the abovementioned clusters are thematically similar, my review in chapter two shows that they espouse diverse causal explanations. The diversity of the advanced causal channels underscores not only the complexity of conflicts generally but also the limitation of the extant literature as a basis for refracting the divergent conflict outcomes in the aforementioned Jos communities. In Chapter 3, I provide some contextual information on Jos. I show, for example, that Jos has a temperate climate, which attracts different people to reside there and partly accounts for the city's ethnic diversity. Subsequently, I outline the four major conflict episodes that have bedeviled contemporary Jos and the existing causal literature.

As I outline in Chapter 4, I inductively explored people's experiences of intergroup relations in Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa to understand why the conflict outcomes in these communities differ. My sample included everyday people who had experiences of intergroup relations before, during and after the conflicts. Given that I used the same research instrument in both Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa, I could account for the divergence between the conflict

outcomes in the communities by isolating the participants' conflict-time experiences that differ. The findings derived from this process are discussed under four different chapters. First, in Chapter 5, I discuss the nature of the pre-conflict intergroup relations in both communities, which was essentially integrated living. Second, in Chapter 6, I piece together the participants' reflections that highlight how intergroup animosity resulted from people's perspectives on religion and land ownership, perception of discrimination, ethnicity-laden electoral politics and external interference by malevolent actors.

Third, in Chapter 7, I show that the effects of the aforementioned factors manifested in the heightening of perceived threat. As I describe in this chapter, perceived threat conditioned segregation. Also, segregation cemented the erosion of intergroup trust, which was the bedrock of integration in pre-conflict Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa. Fourth, in Chapter 8, I outline the role of the youth in each community's progression towards conflict and show the similarities between their activities. Additionally, I discuss the responses of the respective community leaders to the escalatory behaviour of the youth in their communities and highlight the differences in the leaders' approaches, which explain why the conflict outcomes in both communities diverge. In Chapter 9, I re-present the foregoing findings in my model of understanding, which not only provides a comprehensive picture of the causal conditions of the Jos conflict but also highlights the critical factors that underpinned the occurrence of conflict and conflict avoidance in Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa, respectively.

Conclusions

The Jos conflicts occurred between the city's indigenous ethnic groups and the settler Hausa and Fulani ethnicities. Both categories of ethnic groups cohabit Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa, which are located in Jos. Yet, the conflict between both groups occurred in only the former. Based on people's stories of intergroup relations in times of peace and conflict, I account for the existence of conflict in Angwan Doki and the sustenance of peace in Dadin Kowa. Given that they are both located in Jos, I discuss the demographic, geographic and other characteristics of the city in the succeeding chapter in order to provide some contextual background on these communities.

Chapter Two: Context

In this chapter, I describe the terrain and weather in Jos as well as its geographic and geopolitical location in Nigeria. Also, I discuss Jos's sociocultural characteristics in order to highlight the ethnoreligious diversity of the city. Additionally, I explore the British colonial administration's mining-related activities in order to show the relationship between it and Jos's ethnic and religious composition. Further, I trace the beginnings of the Jos troubles and outline in greater detail the different conflict episodes that have bedevilled the city in the 21st century, focusing specifically on their lifespan and the immediate events that preceded them. In the end, I outline some scholarly explanations of the causes of these conflicts.

Geography and geopolitical location

Jos, which the British officially founded in 1915, sits on a pear-shaped mountainous highland that rises above 1,000 metres over the surrounding lowland (Krause, 2011, p. 16; Tambo, 1978, p. 201; Plotnicov, 1972, p. 7). The area features a beautiful landscape that comprises impressive ridges, which according to Danfulani (2006, p. 2), makes it an attractive destination for nature lovers. Located on a mountainous plateau, Jos is one of the few Nigerian cities with a temperate climate (Krause, 2011, p. 16). As a result, it was the preferred vacation destination for British colonial officers and other Europeans, making the area second to only Lagos in terms of the cities with the highest concentration of Westerners as of 1963 (Bonkat, 2014, p. 283, Danfulani, 2006, p. 2). Also, Jos continues to be Nigerians' preferred domestic vacation destination (Ambe-Uva, 2010, p. 43), and home to much of Nigeria's retired elite (Krause, 2011, p. 16).

The 2006 census estimates show that approximately 821,618 people live in the Jos area (Nigeria, 2006), which includes Jos North Local Government Area (LGA), Jos East LGA and Jos South LGA (the site of my research). In modern-day Nigeria, Jos is part of Plateau state, which has 17 LGAs, including the abovementioned ones (Krause, 2011, p. 19).

Figure 1: Map of Plateau State




Source: PNG Wave, <https://www.pngwave.com/png-clip-art-vcand>.

The state spans approximately 26,809 square metres in landmass and is situated on mostly rocky terrain (Bonkat, 2014, p. 282). Geographically, it is nearly 288 kilometres from Nigeria's political capital, Abuja, and its central location makes it a connecting pointing to the rest of the country (Danfulani, 2006, p. 2). Administratively, the state is part of Nigeria's North-Central geopolitical zone, which comprises Plateau, Benue, Kaduna, Taraba, Bauchi and Nasarawa (Ambe-Uva, 2010, p. 43). The educated and political elite of the region's minority ethnic groups object to this administrative designation because it links them to the larger Northern Nigeria in which the predominantly Muslim Hausa and Fulani ethnicities are numerically and politically dominant. To distinguish themselves from the rest of the North, the smaller and mainly Christian ethnic groups named the region the Middle Belt (Krause, 2011, p. 17).

Ethnically diverse population

Danfulani describes Nigeria as “a very highly complex, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multi-cultural and multi-religious polity, with a diversity of cultural groups, having some 395 ethnic groups” (2006, p. 1). Out of this number, 296 are from the Middle Belt alone (Danfulani, 2006, p. 1).

Figure 2: Map of the Middle Belt



Source: The Nation Newspaper, <https://thenationonlineng.net/middle-belt-reject-secession-vote-one-nigeria/amp/>.

The Middle Belt is a unique region in that, apart from being the most ethnically diverse in the country, it is the area that separates the Christian-dominated south from northern Nigeria in which Islam is the dominant religion. Plateau, a Middle Belt state, is a microcosm of not only the region but also of the country. Comprising 58 different ethnic groups (Best, 2007 cited in Orji,

2011, p. 475), Plateau state is one of the most ethnically diverse Nigerian states. This ethnic configuration is reflected in its capital city, Jos (Orji, p. 475).

Also, as in wider Nigeria, Jos's population is not religiously homogenous. The city consists of both Christians and Muslims, although several demographic estimates suggest that the former are in the majority (see, for example, Ambe-Uva, 2010, p. 43; Orji, 2011, p. 475; Milligan, 2013, p. 320). One such estimate is Milligan's, which shows that the city is made up of 65 percent Christians and 35 percent Muslims (2013, p. 320). Although the Christians are a clear majority, Milligan's figure shows that the Muslims are not an insignificant minority. Additionally, the different communities in the city do not all reflect the religious distribution of wider Jos. For example, although some communities, such as Angwan Rukuba, Dong and Dogon Karfe consist of a Christian majority, others, such as Angwan Keke, Sarkin Arab and Bukuru central have a Muslim majority population.

Several Jos communities, including the aforementioned, are ethnically mixed and the different groups reflect cross-cutting identities. Among the 58 ethnic groups in the state, the Anaguta, the Berom and the Afizere are officially recognized as original inhabitants or indigenes of Plateau, while the Hausa-Fulani are defined as settlers both in government documents and by the groups classified as indigenes (Ambe-Uva, 2010, p. 43). The Hausa-Fulani are not the only "non-indigenous" ethnic group in the state. Other southern Nigerian ethnicities in the state, such as the Igbo, Yoruba, Tiv and Urhobo, are also defined as such (Orji, 2011, p. 475). The main fault line in Jos, however, is between the indigenous Anaguta, Berom and Afizere ethnic groups and the Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups, ostensibly because the other settler groups do not lay claim to the city (Orji, p. 475).

The complexity of Jos's sociocultural make-up is evident in the fact that neither of these socially constructed categories comprises a religiously homogenous population. The city's inhabitants tend to perceive all Hausa and Fulani as Muslims and all indigenous tribes as Christians (Emelonye, 2011, p. 19). This is, however, a mischaracterization of the groups. As Ambe-Uva (2010, p. 43) notes, the settler Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups are predominantly Muslim, while most of the indigenes are Christians, yet none is exclusively one or the other. Additionally, as in most places in which indigenous identity is socially constructed, indigeneity in Jos is fluid. For example, political competition between Afizere and Berom leaders led the latter to deny some Berom people access to indigeneship certificates in Jos North Local government, which effectively makes such individuals settlers (Milligan, 2013, p. 324). In other words, while ethnic groups like the Hausa, Fulani and Igbo are officially designated as settlers, the tribes that the state recognises as indigenous to Jos can themselves become settlers by default.

Origins of Jos's ethnic and religious diversity

As the foregoing shows, Jos is an ethnically and religiously heterogeneous city. Although 58 ethnic groups are estimated to be indigenous to Plateau state, the ethnic diversity of Jos is not solely owed to the multiplicity of these tribes. Two other factors account for its cosmopolitan status. While its temperate climate continues to attract people from both northern and southern Nigeria, the economic activities of the British colonial administration in Jos also propelled both forced and voluntary migration to the area. The British colonial administration established a tin mining industry in Jos, beginning with an administrative office in 1905 (Bonkat, 2014, p. 283).

By 1910, Jos was incorporated into the Administration's mining network as a minor servicing point, however, it became the hub of the tin mining industry by 1915 (Plotnicov, 1972, p. 4). The colonial administration recruited much of the labour force externally as the indigenous tribes, who were mostly farmers and unfamiliar with the wage labour concept, were indisposed to working in the mines (Krause, 2011, p. 20; Tambo, 1978, p. 204).

While many of the mineworkers from the old northern region were forced to work in the mines, most of the southern workers voluntarily migrated to Jos to benefit from the mining industry. The Hausa and Fulani were among the northern tribes that were forcefully recruited from Borno, Bauchi, Niger, Sokoto, Kano, Benue, Katsina and Zaria to work in the tin mines (Sha, 2005 cited in Bonkat, 2014, p. 283). A sizeable number of the Yoruba, Igbo and some southern minority ethnic groups also migrated to Jos to join the mining industry or explore the trading opportunities that it created (Krause, 2011, p. 20; Plotnicov, 1972, p. 4). Having arrived earlier than most mineworkers, the Hausa were the main labour force in the industry for several years (Plotnicov, 1972, p. 4). The temperate climate and the tin industry drew many Nigerians to Jos, yet the city's attraction transcended the country's borders. As Plotnicov (1972, p. 4) notes, the British constructed a good transportation system to support the tin mining industry, yet the rail and road network also facilitated the influx of people from other West African countries to Jos.

Apart from being disinterested in joining the mining industry, some of the indigenous tribes were opposed to the industry altogether. They were opposed to the influx of Nigerian and other migrant labour as well as the industry's encroachment into their farmland (Krause, 2011, p. 20). Yet, by December 1942, the mining industry had 14,880 employees working in 85

European-owned mining companies in Jos (Gwamna and Kudu, 2010 cited in Bonkat, 2014, p. 283). By the mid-1940s, the industry's employees had increased to over 40,000, while mining camps exceeded 200 (Krause, 2011, p. 20). While the mining industry and the concomitant economic boom created a large migrant population in Jos, the refusal of the indigenous tribes to be incorporated into the industry and the colonial economy, in general, made the migrants more economically prosperous than their indigenous hosts (Krause, 2011, p. 22; Plotnicov, 1972, p. 6). As far back as the early 1930s, the indigenous tribes had become resentful of the migrant workers because they were better off economically (Plotnicov, 1972, p. 6).

Conflict episodes

For several decades, Jos' "indigenous" and "settler" ethnic groups have been embroiled in conflict. As in most protracted social conflicts, intermittent periods of negative peace separate the conflict episodes in Jos. One report suggests that the conflict dates back ninety years (Ukwayi, Okpa & Dike, 2018, p. 31), but it provides no information on the nature of that episode and the exact parties that were involved. Plotnicov's account of Jos's intergroup relations suggests that the first large-scale violence occurred in October 1945, following what was initially an interpersonal dispute between a Hausa man and an Igbo man (Plotnicov, 1972, p. 6). There was another outbreak of intergroup conflict in 1966. This time, the Hausa and Berom youth teamed up to evict the Igbos from Jos, resulting in many casualties (Higazi, 2011, p. 15). The Hausa and Berom may have collectively fought against the Igbos in 1966, yet they have themselves become estranged and recalcitrant foes in the last two decades at least.

For example, Sulieman's (2011) detailed account of the origin of the Jos conflict shows that the first major indigene-settler troubles occurred in 1994 when the indigenous groups protested the Federal military government's appointment of a Hausa man as the Chairman of Jos North LGA (cited in Segun and Jegede, 2013, p. 39). A different account of this conflict episode shows that religious institutions were the main targets (Ambe-Uva, 2010, p. 44) suggesting that the appointee's Islamic religion may have influenced the indigenous people's resistance to the appointment. Four years after the 1994 episode, the conflict resurfaced following an interpersonal squabble between a settler Hausa man and an indigenous Berom man (Egwu, 2004 cited in Segun & Jegede, p. 39).

Although a few cases of conflict were reported during military rule, the intensity and frequency of the Jos conflict increased after the return to civilian rule in 1999. For example, the conflict only gained nation-wide attention during and after the 2001 ethnoreligious troubles. The 2001 episode, like the 1994 case, started as a protest over an unpopular political appointment. The selection of Mukhtar Muhammad, a Muslim and Hausa man, as the Plateau state coordinator of the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NPEP) caused protests by indigenous Christian groups and counter-protests by Muslims, resulting in about 1000 deaths (Ambe-Uva 2010, p. 44; Krause, 2011, p. 1; Higazi, 2011, p. 15). An equally destructive battle occurred between the indigenous and settler groups in May 2004, which led the Federal Government to declare a state of emergency that temporarily transferred security functions to a military intervention force (Segun & Jegede, 2013, p. 39). Also, disputed local government elections in November 2008 caused another round of fighting between indigenous Christian and settler Muslim groups, which resulted in the destruction of Mosques and Churches and caused about 700 deaths in only a few

days (Krause, p. 1). Between January and March 2010 and from August to September 2011, a few deadly clashes also occurred in several communities, including Dogo Nahawa, Ratsat, Angwan Rogo, and Angwan Rukwuba, etc. (Segun & Jegede, p. 39).

Causal explanations

The existing explanations of the causes of this conflict can be classified as political, economic, and historical. Consistent with Byrne and Carter's (1996) social cubism theory, which explains the environment of the Northern Irish and Quebec conflicts, each factor of the Jos conflict seems to contain elements of the others. The politics of inclusion and exclusion framed differently as indigenization, neo-patrimonialism and patron-clientelism, feature prominently in the literature on the Jos conflict. For example, Milligan (2013) notes that the Jos conflict stems from Nigeria's Federal Character Principle (FCP), which requires equal representation of the 36 Nigerian states and the capital, Abuja, in all federal government parastatals and agencies (p. 321). This principle, Milligan notes, increases the value of one's ethnic identity (p. 321). And because, in this context, ethnicity is valuable only when it is territorialized, the competition for indigeneship at the local government level becomes fierce and destructive.

Ironically, the FCP principle, which was designed as a national inclusion strategy, serves the purpose of exclusion at the state level. The operations of both the FCP and the state equivalent are dependent on indigeneship certificates issued by local governments, yet as Higazi's (2011) work shows, the issuance of the certificates is politicized (p. 11). Higazi notes that the lack of clear parameters for determining one's status makes the policy susceptible to abuse by the officials entrusted with the duty of issuing indigeneship certificates. People with no

ancestral roots in Jos may be denied the certificate even though they were born, and have lived, in the city their whole life. Also, even when such people acquire indigeneship certificates in their ancestral state of origin, they are still denied access because they are non-resident indigenes (Higazi, p. 11). Although inclusion and exclusion are determined in the political realm, these are essentially economic battles since it is resource distribution that drives them. The politics of exclusion in Jos, which the indigeneship policy legitimizes, is symptomatic of the failed transition from patrimonialism to bureaucratic rationality in Nigeria. As Orji (2011) notes, political contests in Jos degenerate into ethnic violence because people's rights prospects are largely dependent on the control of political institutions (p. 476).

Other explanations locate the politics of differentiation, which drives the Jos conflict, in British colonial policies. Krause (2011), for example, concurs that the Jos conflict is a contest between the so-called indigenous and settler ethnic groups over who can legitimately claim ownership of the city (p. 2). Krause states, however, that the real problem stems from the decision of the British colonial administrators to govern the Plateau based on the northern emirate system of rule, which made Hausa Muslims prominent political actors while it disenfranchised the native tribes (p. 2). Relatedly, Wika (2014) notes that the capitalist economy introduced in Jos by the British colonial government attracted a large external labour force, which resulted in a heterogeneous population. And such an ethnically mixed population was amenable to the colonialists' divide and conquer policy (p. 60), which, as Krause also contends, stoked animosity between the native and settler populations.

The perspectives examined above are reasonable explanations of the Jos conflict, yet the analyses are informed by preconceived assumptions about the conflict that are not grounded in

local people's experiences of intergroup relations. Except for colonial legacy, however, these factors also feature prominently in the generic intergroup conflict literature in which I intend to locate my proposed study.

Conclusions

Jos is by most accounts a beautiful city. It is located at the intersection of Christian-dominated southern Nigeria and the predominantly Muslim northern Nigeria. Its temperate climate coupled with the tin mining industry that was established during the British colonial administration attracted people from not only the north and south of Nigeria but also West Africa and Europe. Therefore, the city owes its ethnoreligious diversity to its relatively cool weather and those early migrants who sought the benefits of the mining industry in the early to the mid-20th century. Due to the preponderance of the city's migrant population in the formal economy during colonial rule, they were more economically prosperous than the indigenous tribes. This created local animosity towards that population. The first recorded conflict was, however, between the Hausa and Igbo both of whom are considered part of the city's migrant population. Although the Berom, an indigenous tribe, teamed up with the Hausa in a subsequent conflict to evict the Igbos from Jos, the 21st-century manifestations of the Jos' troubles are between the Hausa and Berom. The colonial policy of divide and conquer and contemporary politics of exclusion have been advanced as causes of these contemporary conflicts. My study goes beyond this focus, exploring the reasons for the spatial variation or occurrence.

Chapter Three: Literature review

In this chapter, I review the generic intergroup conflict literature in order to outline the dominant explanations of such conflicts and to highlight the debate around each potential cause of the same. Overall, I explore seven scholarship clusters: perceived threat, historical narratives, ethnic nationalism, segregation, religion, natural resources and horizontal inequalities. There are two main schools of thought on the nexus between threat perception and intergroup conflict. On the one hand, threat perception is said to cause conflict because it makes the threatened group aggressive. On the other hand, there's the view that individual or group-based situational factors can mitigate its effect. Similarly, perspectives diverge on the effect of historical narratives on intergroup relations. One perspective is that narratives of victimhood inspire conflict because they stimulate aggressive behaviour but there is another perspective that highlights its variable impact on individuals' behaviour. In the case of the ethnic nationalism literature, the struggle for political control and identity insecurity are identified as the channels through which the phenomenon causes intergroup conflict.

Like the foregoing, the scholarship on segregation is not unitary. One school of thought is that segregation contributes to conflict because it facilitates collective action. In contrast, there is the view that, when effectively monitored, segregation can be instrumental to peace. The scholarship on religion reflects a similar structure. While there is the perspective that religion causes conflict because it facilitates mobilization, there is the view that religious values also inspire peaceful relations. Also, the natural resource literature is bifurcated between those who view it as a cause of conflict and those who do not. The strongest debate is, however, between

the scholars who view it as a cause of intergroup conflict. While one school of thought notes that resource abundance causes conflict, a different school states that it is resource scarcity that engenders conflict. Finally, in the horizontal inequality literature, there is a split between the scholars who view intergroup conflict as a natural consequence of unequal resource distribution and those who note that to spur conflict, the resentment over asymmetric resource distribution must be politically mobilized.

Perceived threat and intergroup conflict

Research on the impact of threat perception on intergroup relations has produced mixed results. Some studies (see, for example, Fritsche, Jonas & Kessler, 2016; Cakal et al. 2016; McDoom, 2012; Kamans, Otten & Gordijn, 2010) have shown that threat inspires aggression in intergroup relations. Other works (see, for example, Rovenpor et al., 2016; Hirschberger et al., 2016; Jonas & Fritsche, 2013; Halperin, Porat & Wohl, 2013; Garcia-Retamero, Muller & Rousseau, 2012) demonstrate that certain factors that are either situational or intrinsic to the individual or group that feels threatened can neutralize its effect. However, none of the emergent schools of thought is a monolith. For example, the scholars that identify a positive relationship between threat and intergroup conflict differ on the type of groups that are susceptible to the destructive effects of threat.

One of the earlier works on the nexus between threat and intergroup conflict is Rempel and Fischer (1997). The authors contend that perceived threat contributes to intergroup conflict because it hampers effective decision-making among groups (p. 216). Their findings can be summarized as follows: when groups are confronted by threatening situations, cohesion is

demanding of ingroup members. In other words, a unified position is adopted, dissent is outlawed, and alternative viewpoints are marginalized. The resultant groupthink ultimately results in escalation because it engenders dysfunctional decisions (pp. 229-231). Rempel and Fischer's (1997) work is valuable to the extent that it provides some insights about threat effects in intergroup conflict. However, this contribution, specifically the relationship between threat and the quality of group decision-making, is also the source of their study's shortcomings. Although unstated, their work is hinged on the assumption that group decision-making is always possible, which may be implausible vis-à-vis some types of threat, for example, physical threats. To be sure, the authors assert that their findings hold even when the level or degree of threat varies (p. 230). Yet, in protracted social conflagrations, such as the indigene-settler conflicts in Jos, we cannot realistically expect conflicting groups to respond similarly across all threat forms since some may pose an imminent danger and cause some ingroup members to strive for self-preservation rather than comply with ingroup expectations of, or demand, for harmony.

More recent works on the nexus between threat and intergroup conflict explore threat as a heterogeneous phenomenon. One such study is McDoom (2012). Although the author notes with the notion that threat results in boundary activation - that is, the return to tribal groupings, and the development of negative attitude towards the outgroup - he avoids the pitfall identified with Rempel and Fischer's analysis above as he concentrates on the threat to physical security. In such a threatening situation, McDoom contends, identity becomes more salient, hence outgroup members are perceived as a collective threat and ingroup solidarity is demanded and enforced (pp. 143-152). Another study examines the way ethnocentrism mediates between the perception of loss of control and intergroup conflict (Fritsche, Jonas & Kessler, 2016). Similar to the

conclusions of McDoom (2012) and Rempel and Fischer (1997), the authors demonstrate that threat engenders intergroup conflict.

Unlike the latter, however, they are specific about the type and source of threat examined. The authors identify economic crisis as a threat to individuals' sense of global control (p.102). In their words, "feelings of threat are proposed to occur in those who think that they will not be able to improve their work or who anticipate that possible personal improvements would not reduce personal job insecurity" (p. 104). McDoom's analysis can be extrapolated to Nigeria's Hausa/Fulani-Berom conflict. Given their status as settlers in Southern Nigeria and the Middle Belt, the former ethnic groups are probably aware that being hardworking is insufficient for achieving higher levels of productivity as long as indigeneship laws continue to limit their access to land and other resources. In this context, the violent appropriation of land may be viewed as the only viable path to attaining the desired productivity levels.

Amid economic uncertainty, writes McDoom, individuals under threat would return to their tribal affiliations as a means of restoring their sense of control of the world around them. The process of alignment results in ingroup favouritism and intolerance of outsiders (McDoom, 2012, pp. 101-103), which are a recipe for conflict. According to Fritsche, Jonas and Kessler (2016), individuals tend to think of the ingroup as a homogenous unit so they will subject themselves to ingroup standards or ideals (p. 105). Thus, groupthink may, to some extent, also result from the process of responding to control threat. However, unlike Rempel and Fischer's (1997) theory, this process is more organic than compelled. Fritsche, Jonas and Kessler do not examine the effect of control threat on the process of decision-making per se, but by specifying the type of threat under consideration – loss of control resulting from economic crisis – their

work, unlike Rempel and Fischer's, provides a better foundation for assessing the relationship between threat and the quality of group decisions in the context of intergroup conflict. For example, loss of control, unlike the fear of physical harm is not as much an imminent danger as to deny ingroup members the time to decide whether to act independently of their group or not. Having said that, Fritsche, Jonas and Kessler's (2016) work is also limited by the apparent rigidity of their theory. They claim that control threat breeds ethnocentrism, and ethnocentrism causes conflict. However, they fail to account for the relevance of power, first, in the emergence of ethnocentrism and, second, in the relationship between it and aggressive behaviour.

In other words, does the theorized transition from control threat to increased intolerance of outsiders and eventually aggression apply to both powerful and powerless groups? Sedentary farmers in Nigeria's Middle Belt region consider nomadism to be an archaic culture and situate the herder-farmer conflict in herders' refusal to opt for ranching in place of migrating seasonally (Silas, 2018). This can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, such a sentiment is simply an indication of their belief about the root of the conflict and/or implying their thoughts about potential solutions. On the other, the reference to nomadism as archaic is evidence of a perception of the superiority of sedentarism, which is their way of life. Yet, farmers' perception of cultural superiority cannot be divorced from the group's consciousness of power since sedentarism is prioritized in the determination of tenure rights in Nigeria. Moreover, such an expression indicates the belief that, as the legally defined indigenes of the region, the farmers are entitled to demanding cultural changes from herders but are not obligated to grant any such concession. My point is that some sort of power, whether political, economic or cultural, enables the development of ethnocentrism out of a threatening situation.

Kamans, Otten and Gordijn (2010) also focus on specific forms of threat, yet their analysis is more elaborate than Fritzsche, Jonas and Kessler's in that they consider how power might facilitate the transition from feeling threatened to the point of acting aggressively. In the case of Kamans, Otten and Gordijn (2010), the nexus between threat and intergroup conflict is a function not only of power but also of the threat content (p. 293), that is, the type of threat being experienced. In their view, physical threats will arouse feelings of fear in powerless groups resulting in avoidance. Conversely, powerless groups will respond aggressively when valuable resources are threatened because this form of threat arouses anger, rather than fear (Otten & Gordijn, 2010, p. 293). In essence, it is the interface between group power and threat content that ultimately determines whether a threatening situation results in avoidance or aggression.

Garcia-Retamero, Muller and Rousseau (2012) noted that the question of whether a potentially threatening situation culminates in destructive behaviour depends on the power-value mix in intergroup relations. Their study shows that although ingroup fear is affected by outgroup power, ingroup response is ultimately shaped by ingroup members' assessment of the cultural value similarities that exist between both groups (p. 182). In other words, an otherwise threatening situation will result in a cooperative response if ingroup members discover that they share certain values with the powerful outgroup. To be clear, states' cooperative behaviour in the international system constitutes the context of Garcia-Retamero, Muller and Rousseau's study. Nevertheless, I find their analysis to be of relevance here in that they take the individual, rather than the state, as the basic unit of analysis and explore the influence of values and power, which are also relevant variables in intergroup conflict.

Of the two forms of threat assessed by Otten and Gordijn (2010) – physical and resource threats – none was found to affect powerful groups. The authors note that because powerful groups are confident in their ability to shape conflict outcomes, “they can rise above threats and provocations made by the powerless” (p. 294). This presupposes that because a powerful group enjoys an advantageous status vis-à-vis a powerless adversary, it is less prone to respond aggressively to threatening situations. Cakal et al. (2016) refute such a conclusion and contend instead that while advantaged groups are less likely to feel threatened, their reaction to a threat is fiercer because of the resources that they command and the fact that they have more to lose (p. 734).

Despite the obvious differences among the causal mechanisms examined above, they are bound by one limitation. Save for Garcia-Retamero, Muller and Rousseau (2012), the studies above are focused on structure, on ethnicity, on the group itself as if it is a thing without its parts. Some of the authors aver that solidarity is demanded from ingroup members in the face of threatening situations yet they fail to further interrogate the very process of demanding loyalty and what it suggests about the history of groups and of their constituents. What does the necessity to compel compliance to ingroup standards and norms say about a group and its members and what are the implications for the notion that threat leads to cohesion and ultimately aggressive behaviour? It suggests that individuals have a history, a set of values; that these values may be intrinsic to the individuals yet alien to the larger group. And that these values may continue to guide individuals’ conduct even in the face of a threatening situation and in spite of structural demands for cohesion.

Some studies have examined how such pre-existing beliefs, values or dispositions mediate between threat and intergroup conflict and the implication of this dynamic for conflict outcomes. For example, based on their study on the relationship between existential threat and intergroup conflict, Hirschberger et al. (2016) posit that individuals' perception of threat in a given situation and their responses to supposedly threatening situations will differ because both processes – that is, perception and response – are shaped by pre-existing hawkish or dovish tendencies (p. 2). Rovenpor et al. (2016) reach a similar conclusion. From the author's point of view, the comprehension of our environment and desire for a meaningful life are important to humans, meaning that threats are created when their achievement is constrained (p. 544).

However, people do not automatically respond negatively to it. Rather, it is individuals' pre-existing value frameworks that determine the nature of their reactions (Rovenpor et al. (2016, p. 560). Thus, when faced by meaning threat, antisocial individuals or high ingroup glorifiers will favour a punitive reaction, while prosocial individuals or low ingroup glorifiers will encourage a nonviolent response (p. 544). It is reasonable to expect divergent responses to meaning threat because to the extent that people are committed to their personal values, meaning threat will invoke positive behaviour in some ingroup members and negative attitudes in others. These studies underscore the importance of assessing threat, at least in the context of intergroup conflict, as a heterogeneous phenomenon. Similar to the contentions of Rovenpor et al. (2016), Jonas and Fritsche (2013) argue that threat, specifically Mortality Salience (MS) or death awareness, does not always provoke destructive behaviour in the context of intergroup conflict.

According to Jonas and Fritsche (2013), the threat effect of death awareness may be cushioned by such factors as the perception of death controllability, thoughts about familial and

other relationships and individuals' interpretation of what constitutes responsible ingroup membership (p. 552). Jonas and Fritzsche effectively respond to the Terror Management Theory (TMT) of intergroup conflict, which posits that MS leads ingroup members to become prejudicial and aggressive towards an outgroup because people tend to impulsively respond to this form of threat by striving to establish a sense of symbolic immortality (p. 522). However, the authors hinge their argument on only external influences on MS, that is, on factors outside the awareness of death. Yet, we can also estimate the malleability of the theorized MS effect by looking at factors intrinsic to the threat itself. As TMT posits, MS results in efforts to minimize existential anxiety, culminating in hostility towards an outgroup. However, such a mechanism is implausible if the outgroup is the source of MS and the ingroup's existential anxiety is partly a product of outgroup power. In this sense, the ingroup is unlikely to behave aggressively towards the outgroup since the fear of retaliation may further exacerbate existential anxiety.

Historical narratives and intergroup conflict

Threat perception does not develop in a vacuum. Rather, it is rooted in narratives about historical intergroup relations, past outgroup misdeeds and ingroup achievements. The impact of historical narratives in the most protracted conflicts around the world is well known. For example, narratives about the past have given rise to conflict in Northern Ireland and continue to shape Catholic, Nationalist, and Republicans-Protestant, Unionist, and Loyalists relations to this day. Conflicting historical narratives have fuelled animosity between Israelis and Palestinians and engendered protracted conflict between both nations. Through the political appropriation of historical narratives, the Hutus were motivated to commit genocide against the Tutsi. But what

constitutes historical group narratives and how might they affect intergroup relations? This section of the review explores the historical narratives literature in order to answer this question. Apparently, only a small portion of studies in the broader intergroup conflict stream of research focuses on how and why historical narratives affect intergroup relations.

However, the few that focus on the subject offer divergent perspectives on most aspects of the relationship save for the incompatibility of narratives. A common feature of historical narratives in the context of intergroup conflict is the certainty of contradiction. To be clear, historical narratives are stories by which individuals or groups rationalize their actions and define their purpose (Pilecki & Hammack, 2014, p. 813) and they may include origin stories or tales of generational vitality (Klar & Baram, 2016, 37) or even past conflicts, which legitimize ingroup claims. The same stories which glorify the ingroup happen to be the source of the outgroup's derogation. For example, Goldberg and Ron (2014) note that, "each group constructs a narrative that legitimizes its stance and defames the other side... [*by fostering*] ...negative perceptions of the Other and self-righteous entrenchment" (p. 3). Similarly, Nyhan and Zeitzoff (2018) assert that "narratives emphasize the uniqueness of ingroup suffering and denigrate or ignore injustices suffered by outgroups" (p. 611).

The development of contradictory narratives is symptomatic of each group's desire to be portrayed in a good light and, as Klar and Baram (2016) note, such a desire is sometimes aimed at inducing third-party support for the ingroup's cause (p. 38). For example, both Israelis and Palestinians assign the victim label to themselves, not only because each has employed violence against the other, but also due to its capacity for arousing international sympathy (Pilecki & Hammack, 2014, p. 824). Although these narratives are embedded in the minds of ingroup

members, they are not individual members' creation. Even though a group may amplify the historical misdeeds of an outgroup, Schori-Eyal et al. (2017) note that historical narratives sometimes result from past traumas (p. 538). In contrast, Nyhan and Zeitzoff (2018) argue that they are mostly conspiracy theories peddled by ethno-political leaders in polarised societies to galvanize support for their political agenda (p. 612).

As the foregoing shows, the roots of historical narratives vary, and researchers unanimously agree that the basic quality of competing groups' historical narratives is their incompatibility. However, there is a lesser consensus among them as to the relationship between these conflicting narratives and intergroup conflict. For example, Pilecki and Hammack (2014) see narratives of victimhood as having an adverse effect on group behaviour in that they are employed to rationalize aggressive behaviour towards an outgroup as an effort at self-defence (p. 823). This characterization of the nexus somewhat conflicts with Schori-Eyal et al. (2017), and Klar and Baram's (2016) ideas. For example, while not ruling out the possibility of adverse behavioural outcomes, Klar and Baram argue that ingroup members are not equally motivated and determined in acting based on the ingroup's narrative (p. 38). Similarly, Schori-Eyal et al. contend that the likelihood of individuals responding positively to negative narratives about an outgroup depends on whether they are motivated by traditional or universalism values (p. 539). Whereas the latter prioritizes the "welfare of all people," the former emphasizes the "immutable nature of enemies" (p. 540). In other words, while traditionally motivated individuals are likely to be defensive about the ingroup's historical narratives and strive to undermine counter-narratives, the universally motivated ingroup members are unlikely to toe these lines if it means harming the outgroup.

Nationalism and intergroup conflict

Narratives, which glorify a group's past and announce and amplify outgroup threats, also induce love for the nation and the desire for its preservation. That is what the concept of nationalism connotes. Smith (2010) refers to it as "an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential 'nation'" (p. 1). Inherent in this definition is conflict itself in that these people or populations exist within a state or across different states, whose boundaries would have to be redrawn or whose authority must diminish if the demand for unity in the form of an ethnic homeland is to be realised. From Eastern Europe to the Middle East, from Southern Asia to Central and Western Africa, evidence of ethnonationalism-driven conflicts abounds. In the Middle East, the Kurds are in a struggle with the Turkish, Syrian and Iraqi governments for an independent homeland. In Central Africa, nationalist struggles in Sudan led to the creation of South Sudan in 2011 after a bitter north-south conflict. In Western Africa, nationalist sentiments in the late 1960s drove the Igbo-dominated Eastern region into conflict with the Hausa-dominated Nigerian Federal Government. In the last year, the same sentiments drove Catalonia and Madrid to the brink of war.

Given its near-global impact, it is important to understand how love for one's nation spurs intergroup conflict. Scholarship on nationalism suggests two channels, namely identity security and the struggle for political control. Molina (2010) notes that a people develop a prestigious image of their nation and the very idea of a nation is intrinsically connected to the people's mental representation of it so much so that any contradiction of their perception creates

an identity security threat or directly threatens the existence of the nation (p. 241). Hence, faced with such an attack on the nation, the forces behind the national project, such as journalists, civil servants, political activists, politicians and intellectuals, evolve negative narratives about the source of the threat and create a profile that highlights the differences between it and their nation's values, which then motivate ingroup aggression towards the enemy Other (p. 241). Molina's explanation of how nationalism catalyses intergroup conflict is supported by Kuzio's (2015) study of Ukraine, which shows that the conflict between the Eastern and Western regions, resulted from factors such as the suppression of Ukrainian identity and language under Yanukovich and the ex-President's penchant for kowtowing to the Kremlin (p. 160).

Nationalism's effect on intergroup conflict is not restricted to a group's motivation to aggressively fend off threats to identity security. A glorified national image may also drive elite struggle for political power. For example, Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010) note that, "political leaders and followers are driven by the strategic motive to avoid or even to overturn dominance by ethnic 'others'... [*in order to gain*] symbolic advantages such as the prestige of belonging to a 'state-owning' ethnic group" (p. 95). Hence, ethnic groups will be motivated to challenge the incumbent government if they are unsuccessful in ethnonationalist competition for state control (p. 95). Nevertheless, the fact that the nationalist struggles for power are driven by symbolic factors, such as bolstering group image, does not rule out the relevance of material considerations in an ethnic group's desire for state control nor should both objectives be viewed as mutually exclusive. In fact, as Tonnesson (2016) rightly notes, "it is primarily when occurring in conjunction with people's deeply felt concerns for their livelihood that nationalism takes on dangerous proportions" (p. 241).

Segregation and intergroup conflict

The desire for a unified nation or belonging may motivate co-ethnics to live in the same areas, engendering social distance. And social distance is said to promote conflict because it hinders intergroup contact. Integration, on the other hand, has long been believed to foster peace because it promotes intercultural awareness and, by extension, intergroup tolerance in plural societies. However, new research on its theoretical opposite, segregation (or social distance), raises questions about the conventional thinking around the relationship between integration and peace, on one hand, and separation and conflict, on the other (see, for example, Bhavnani et al., 2014; Weidmann & Salehyan, 2013; Ireland 2008). Hence, I explore the debate around the nexus between segregation and conflict in order to show that although social distance is proven to be a cause of intergroup conflict, the relationship between both phenomena is more conditional than secure. Major contributions to this debate come from Karoly Takacs of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, who, in a series of studies, outlined how segregation may affect intergroup conflict. For example, Takacs (2007) shows that segregation contributes to intergroup conflict by facilitating collective action through social control (p. 59).

Social control, according to the author, is achieved through either normative or confirmation pressure, that is, the desire to be liked by ingroup members and for conformity with ingroup behavioural expectations (Takacs, 2007, p. 60). In this study, he found that the need for belonging (confirmative pressure) produced more harmful effects on intergroup relations (p. 73). In contrast, in a prior study, which explored the segregation-conflict nexus in the context of intergroup competition, the most harmful segregation effect resulted from normative pressure

(Takacs, 2001, p. 766). Either way, both studies show that segregation adversely affects intergroup relations because it facilitates collective action. However, the proposed causal links are only indirect at best as they are silent on the attitudinal effects of segregation, which partly engender the unhealthy competition that the Takacs' studies focus on.

Enos and Celaya (2018) fill this void. They explore the effect of segregation on perception and the relationship between the resultant perceptions and conflict. In the authors' view, the lack of contact is a factor in intergroup conflict. However, the true relevance of limited contact lies in the negative perception of outsiders, which the situation inspires (p. 26). Also, the authors identify categorization as a first-level effect of segregation. Similar to the views expressed in the threat perception stream of scholarship, Enos and Celaya argue that in the course of categorization, individuals tend to perceive the ingroup and outgroup as more homogeneous than they are in reality and amplify ingroup-outgroup differences (p. 28). This categorization process, according to the authors, is facilitated by segregation because spatial separation tends to intersect with sociocultural identities. And resulting from the process of categorization is the stereotyping of and discrimination against the Other (p. 28). Segregation is a factor in the herder-farmer conflicts in Nigeria. The Fulani herders live in secluded settlements, popularly referred to as "Hausa quarters" in parts of southern Nigeria and "stranger quarters" in some parts of the Middle Belt. And the segregated herders and farmers are of different ethnicities and religions,² which reinforce Enos and Celaya's claim about the intersection of segregation and sociocultural identities. The presence of both conditions indicates that segregation may be a factor within the conflict.

² See Eke, S. (2018). Borromean conflict model: Analysing and resolving herders-farmers conflict in Nigeria's middle-belt region. *Peace Research: Canadian Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies*, 50 (1), 5-25.

As noted, Enos and Celaya (2018) discuss the convergence of segregation and social-cultural identity in category formation. However, they ignore the emergent question of whether specific identities interact with spatial separation differently or whether the effect of the interface is uniform across all identity forms. Such disaggregation of identity, as in the case of threat perception, is necessary to arrive at a deeper understanding of when segregation may or may not engender intergroup conflict. That is, whether segregation becomes more or less likely when it converges with particular identities.

For example, would segregation have adverse effects on indigene-settler relations in Nigeria if either their ethnic or religious backgrounds is controlled? Corvalan and Vargas (2015) reveal the significance of such a question. Like Takacs (2007, 2001), they contend that dense ingroup interaction helps groups overcome the collective action problem of mobilization and coordination, but they go further to assert that the spatial concentration of ingroup members also incentivizes territorial claims (p. 213). However, the likelihood that segregation will cause conflict depends on whether it coincides with religious, ethnic or linguistic boundaries (p. 212). The authors note that much of the data on civil war show that whereas religious segregation has a negative relationship with conflict, ethnic and linguistic segregation strongly correlates with conflict (p. 212), at least, in terms of reinforcing pre-existing ones (p. 221).

Obviously, by disentangling segregation, Corvalan and Vargas (2015) enhance our understanding of the segregation-conflict nexus. Yet, this advancement is limited to the very act of disentangling the phenomenon in that the authors do not explain why only ethnic and linguistic segregation tends to coincide with intergroup conflict. In other words, despite the authors' discovery of a correlation between these forms of segregation and conflict, they do not

establish spatial distance between ethnolinguistic groups as a cause, much less a predictor of intergroup conflict.

As noted in the introduction to this section, a few scholars suggest that segregation can also be an instrument of conflict prevention. For example, Bhavnani et al. (2014) note that, “arrangements conducive to reducing the extent of intergroup interactions including localized segregation, limits on mobility and migration, partition, and differentiation of political authority can be expected to dampen violence” (p. 226). Such a mechanism, according to Ireland (2008), can prevent intergroup conflict because it minimizes the contempt for otherness that ethnic mixing may engender (p. 1334). Weidmann and Salehyan (2013) also suggest the possibility of segregation becoming a conflict prevention measure but add that its utility ultimately depends on a state’s capacity for effective policing and the achievement of perfect segregation or completely homogenous ethnic enclaves (pp. 53,60). These scholars indicate that the segregation effect in intergroup conflict is by no means unidirectional.

Religion and intergroup conflict

It is undisputable that religion was employed to justify the colonial conquest of much of Africa and the Americas and it continues to be used by contemporary global terrorist networks to rationalize violence. In the context of intergroup relations, however, the relationship between religion/religious values and conflict is still contested. For example, whereas studies such as Pollack et al. (2018), Fredman, Bastian and Swan (2017), and Neuberg et al. (2014) emphatically advance the notion that religion engineers intergroup conflict and differ only in terms of the causal channels explored/uncovered, other scholars (see, for example, Saroglou, 2016) indicate

that the connection is conditional. At the polar end of the spectrum are studies suggesting that any notion of a positive relationship is spurious (Seul, 1999) and that religion can be a force for peace in the context of intergroup conflict (Kunst et al., 2018).

Regarding the existence of positive links, the results of Neuberg et al. (2014) are telling. The authors found that the disadvantaged groups that are disposed to confronting a powerful competitor despite the potential for adverse consequences are those with high levels of religious infusion, that is, groups for whom religion is salient (p. 198). Neuberg et al. explain this tendency as follows: when a group's daily activities are intertwined with religious practices, its members are more likely to imbibe dominant prejudices against an outgroup and to behave aggressively towards a nonbelieving adversarial power because the ingroup's religious values are deemed incompatible with those of the powerful adversary (p. 199). Similarly, Fredman, Bastian and Swan (2017) found such coalescence of daily life and religious practices/values to be a good predictor of support for aggressive behaviour against an outgroup (p. 883). The mechanism of influence on intergroup relations lies, in the words of the authors, "on the systematic installation of religious ideology... {which} ...motivates retaliatory behaviours because it involves protecting a community of kindred souls as well as an abstract cause" (p. 885).

Relatedly, Pollack et al. (2018) found that people's inclination to fight on behalf of their group increases with the awareness of divine assistance. In their study, belief in the support of a supernatural being increased participants' confidence in victory and reduced their fear of death, enhancing their battle readiness (p. 2). This also gets to the heart of the question of why religiously infused disadvantaged groups would overlook the risks of being aggressive towards a powerful adversary. Neuberg et al. (2014) contend that the incompatibility of values increases

the motivation for battle among religiously infused groups despite the potential costs. However, it seems more plausible that in the context of power asymmetry, individuals' belief in an external power source, which is independent of the group's physical powerbase and capable of ensuring the ingroup's victory, will increase the propensity for aggression towards a powerful adversarial outgroup than the mere incompatibility of values.

As noted above, some scholars are less direct in their assessment of the effect of religion on intergroup conflict. For example, Saroglou's (2016) work suggests that the probability that religion will inspire ethnoreligious conflict depends on the degree of religious infusion within the respective groups. Saroglou (2016) noted that a group's propensity for developing a negative attitude towards an outgroup depends on the dimension of religion that is dominant within it (pp. 37-38). Thus, a group that comprises mainly dogmatic denominations, such as Christian Orthodox, Islamic fundamentalists and Jewish radicals, is likely to be more intolerant of non-adherents even within the ingroup (p. 38). Additionally, it is reasonable to expect that as long as religious fundamentalists are the most powerful denomination within their ethnic community, they can shape the behaviour of some of their more liberal kinsmen through the strategic employment of reward and punishment. In other words, the presence of religious fundamentalists in a community increases the likelihood of aggressive behaviour towards nonbelieving outgroups regardless of their population share.

Nevertheless, some scholarship questions the veracity of the religion-conflict linkages advanced above. A case in point is Seul (1999). Contrary to the position advanced by Fredman, Bastian and Swan (2017), Seul challenges the idea that ethnoreligious groups fight for some abstract goal or nonbelievers' conversion. He reported that "conflicts between religious groups

typically are caused by the same material factors and social dynamics that incite and fuel conflict between ethnic, racial, and other identity groups” (Seul, p.564). He further asserts that many conflicts appear to be fought along religious lines because religion supplies, especially for struggling groups, the “secure moral frameworks” for justifying violence and mobilizing collective action to improve the fortune of the ingroup (pp. 563-564). This analysis is supported by Dobewall, Strack and Muller (2011), who contend that a group is able to justify conflict when the lifeway of the outgroup is perceived as contradictory to theirs (p. 221).

Seul (1999) makes an important contribution to the religion-conflict debate by explaining that religion plays a facilitative rather than a causal role in the outbreak of intergroup conflict. He notes that religion provides, in his words, “the moral frameworks” that legitimize the ingroup’s cause. Yet, he argues that it is objective considerations that drive conflict, including those that manifest religious fault lines. In contrast, I contend that to accept religion as merely a rationale employed by ethnoreligious conflict entrepreneurs and not as a cause of conflict is to assume that the ingroup would undertake the campaign regardless of whether or not those rationalizing religious symbols exist or can be invoked. In other words, to the extent that some violence legitimizing “moral” frameworks exist in religion and are invoked to mobilize participation in a conflict, religion is as much a cause of intergroup conflict as material factors.

Natural resources and intergroup conflict

Natural resources are an example of a material factor within conflicts and contestations over access to them have led to intergroup clashes, for example, the herder-farmer conflicts in Africa, which are fought over a non-lootable resource - land. Also, external interest in natural resources,

especially lootable crude oil, and aluminium has resulted in proxy wars between rival ethnic groups. Hence, I explore the debate about the natural resource-conflict nexus in order to show how and why natural resource scarcity, abundance and exploitation engender violent conflict between groups. The scholarship on the subject suggests that the linkages between natural resources and intergroup conflict are multifaceted. For example, some scholars see a direct connection between resource abundance and the onset of intergroup conflict. These studies explore such factors as contests for profit rights, mismanagement and unequal distribution of proceeds, and rebellion financing (see, for example, Macuane, Burr & Monjane, 2017; Rustad and Binningsbo, 2012; Bannon and Collier, 2011; Alao 2007). In contrast, other conflict researchers show that resource scarcity factors, such as drought, intensifies intergroup competition, which culminates in conflict (see, for example, Bromwich, 2018; Beyene, 2017; Sekeris, 2010). However, the debate is not solely restricted to the abundance and scarcity schools as a few scholars, such as Bayramov (2018) and Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2009), have questioned the validity of the natural resource-conflict nexus altogether.

Nevertheless, there is substantial theoretical and empirical support for the notion of a positive relationship between natural resources and intergroup conflict, which are distinguishable based on the channel of influence that is advanced/uncovered, abundance or scarcity. Included in the abundance school are studies that connect a country's resource endowment, either independently or in interaction with other factors, with the outbreak of intergroup conflict. For example, Bannon and Collier (2011) note as follows:

All ethnically differentiated societies have a few romantics who dream of creating an ethnically "pure" political entity, but the discovery of resources has the potential to

transform such movements from the romantic fringe into an effective and violent secessionist movement (p. 6).

Similarly, Wegenast and Basedau (2014) argue that the interface of abundant oil resources and the existence of identity-based divisions increase the likelihood of ethnic conflict because they jointly provide a cause to fight for, a pool of foot soldiers and funding for rebellion (p. 432).

Citing the conflicts in the Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone and Liberia, Ross (2004) advanced a related argument. He avowed that groups could solve the funding problem associated with armed conflict by selling future mineral extraction rights (p. 57).

Despite the apparent logic of the analyses put forward by Wegenast and Basedau (2014), Bannon and Collier (2011) and Ross (2004), the financing channel is not without criticisms. For example, Bayramov (2018) notes that, “the existing works give a misleading impression that resource incomes can cover easily invasion, investment and international costs of wars” (p. 79). Similarly, although agreeing that natural resources, broadly defined, may be associated with conflict onset, Humphreys (2005) argues that the financing channel is a weak link among several causal mechanisms in that natural resources are largely used to fund conflicts that break out over other reasons (pp. 512, 534). In his words, “insofar as natural resource dependence matters through feasibility effects, it is a ‘permissive cause’ rather than a ‘root cause’ of conflict” (p. 512). Yet natural resource abundance may have a feasibility effect but still be a root cause, especially when its impact on the trajectory of group behaviour is viewed in relation to other factors. For example, diamonds were used to fund the violent struggle for political power in Sierra Leone and Liberia, yet the resource is also a root cause in that groups fought to seize control of the state because it is the distributor of resource rents. Similarly, oil bunkering or

illegal extraction was used to finance the Niger Delta insurgency in Nigeria, yet abundance is a root cause in this instance since the initial struggle was in response to extraction-induced environmental degradation. Alternatively, natural resources may not play a financing role, yet be a root cause as in the case of Mozambique where, according to Macuane, Burr and Monjane (2017), the desire to control access to future profits accruable from prospective resources has exacerbated the competition for power among ethnopolitical factions (p. 24).

Contrary to the theory of abundance, scarcity has been proven to drive groups into violent conflict by increasing competition. Beyene (2017) shows how ecological and political factors interface to give rise to intergroup conflict. The authors explain the conflict between Somali and Oromo ethnic groups in Ethiopia as resulting from competition for land and water points and the structuring of political and administrative units along ethnic lines, which exacerbates the conflict over scarce natural resources (p. 19). A similar explanation is advanced about the Darfur conflict in Sudan. Bromwich (2018) shows that drought-induced famine was a significant factor in the conflict's onset but adds that its role is better understood in combination with national policies that gave Arabs an upper hand in the competition for land (pp. 11-12). Sekeris' (2010) analysis of the nexus between scarcity and conflict in sub-Saharan Africa is the most eclectic. The author notes that drought in some areas of the continent inspires migration to the more fertile places (p. 11). Subsequently, migration increases the population in the fertile areas and the upsurge in the population disrupts the existing land tenure system by "substituting the ancestral communal land management [*with*] individual property through titlization processes and the marketization of land" (p. 10). He further asserts that the emergent property rights regime will reflect pre-existing imbalances in land ownership, thereby deepening the scarcity of land. And given that the supply

of land is limited, private ownership increases its value, thereby incentivizing land appropriation (p. 10).

Land grabbing, which Sekeris (2010) identifies as a consequence of the interface of climatic shocks, population growth and inequality, may itself be a cause of scarcity. Rutten and Mwangi (2014) note that “the practice of grabbing land in anticipation of the arrival of international players in agriculture or mining activities” is an example of how abundance produces conflict between external actors and local community users (p. 61). Yet, as the analysis in Sekeris (2010) shows, land grabbing does not necessarily occur in the context of land abundance. And the fact that land appropriation is aimed at profiting from future land sales to external investors does not mean that the battle line would be between local land users and external investors. In fact, by reducing the supply of land (inducing artificial scarcity), land grabbing could very well propel unhealthy competition and conflict between local groups.

Despite advancing divergent channels of the natural resources-intergroup conflict nexus, the causal mechanisms that the abundance and scarcity schools advance are by no means entirely dichotomous. Ethnic groups may fight to gain control over resource rents or equitable distribution of the same in natural resource-dependent countries, whether it is land and water or mineral resources. The violent struggle for mineral or property rights may negatively impact the environment either through the burning of land and poisoning of water or destruction of the extraction infrastructure, which may cause scarcity of land, water or resource rents. Additionally, a group fighting for equitable distribution of rents may resort to vandalizing the resource extraction infrastructure of the state, which, depending on the type of mineral resource, will degrade the environment and adversely impact occupations that depend on nature, such as

farming and fishing. Consequently, a conflict that results from the abundance of a natural resource can cause scarcity of another type of resource, which may inspire another round of conflict either through the channel of unhealthy competition between user groups or from the process of demanding a solution from the government.

Additionally, the struggle for equitable rents sharing formula or the violent attempt to call the government's attention to environmental problems is hardly a conflict between ethnic groups and the government since the state in resource-dependent countries, at least, resource-dependent African states, are largely perceived as representing the interest of the numerically or politically dominant group.

Horizontal inequality and intergroup conflict

A state's skewed distribution of natural resource rents occurs in the context of a pre-existing hierarchy of power or socioeconomic stratification, hence, may deepen historical inequalities or engender new ones. The coincidence of inequality and identity creates horizontal inequality (Ostby, 2008, p. 144), which, unlike vertical inequality or inequality between individuals, has been substantially proven to cause intergroup conflict. This section of the review explores, therefore, the horizontal inequality stream of the broader intergroup conflict research in order to identify the causal channels advanced and dissimilarities between existing works as well as to point out unresolved inconsistencies. Despite the near-universal acceptance of the negative effect of horizontal inequality on intergroup behaviour, scholars differ in their assessment of the exact linkages between this form of inequality and intergroup conflict. Most analyses revolve around the notion that intergroup comparison is both the effect of the unequal distribution of resources

and the cause of intergroup conflict. However, the same studies diverge on the questions of whether the transition from comparison to the violent restoration of equilibrium is organic or unnatural and what conditions might reverse the theorized effect of horizontal inequalities.

As noted, some studies implicitly or explicitly suggest that dissatisfied groups would naturally act to restore or achieve symmetry in resource distribution (see, for example, Kustov 2015; Fjelde & Ostby, 2012; Cederman, Weidmann & Gleditsch, 2011; Ostby, 2008). Ostby, for example, notes that “ethnic conflicts occur between groups which are distinct in one or more of these ways, when one of them feels it is being discriminated against” (p. 143). Relatedly, Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch contend that the observation of economic and power imbalances breeds ingroup resentment if its members assess that the outgroup is undeserving of its superior status, and resentment then induces mobilization for violent collective action to alter the status quo (p. 482). Similar to Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch’s viewpoint, Fjelde and Ostby consider group comparison as the channel linking economic inequalities with discontent (p. 6) but go further to explain why the outgroup members, rather than the state, are the subject of the dissatisfied ingroup’s collective action. They contend that discontented groups can address economic imbalances by employing violence to seize the assets of privileged groups because it requires fewer resources than a confrontation with the state (p. 7).

Kustov (2015) makes the most direct claim of an organic transition as he views violent collective action “as a spontaneous consequence of intergroup economic disparity” (p. 662). Unlike Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011) who allude to the state being both the source of the asymmetries and a party in the conflict, Kustov’s model of intergroup conflict dispenses with the notion of state involvement in communal conflicts. The author notes the following:

The model has no government [...] Consequently, although the basic mechanisms of ascribed identification and intergroup comparison modeled here are arguably likely to apply to a wider range of cases, one may contend that the model is more reminiscent of communal violence or pogroms rather than large-scale civil conflicts (p. 673).

Yet, local communities are not insulated from national political processes and one can argue, as I do subsequently, that local communal disputes are hardly ever stimulated by local factors alone. The omission of the state as an actor in these conflicts is significant because of its implication for Kustov's (2015) claim of spontaneity. For if the state is not a player, the mobilization for collective action may always be organic. Conversely, if the state is viewed as an actor, which is often the case, the notion of external inducers for action becomes indispensable in that ethnic contenders for state control will view the appropriation of ingroup resentment against the effect of state policies at the grassroots as a means to their personal political ends.

The conflict between Fulani herders and indigenous farmers in Nigeria can be used to reinforce or challenge the above perspectives on horizontal inequalities. The disparity between the historical and current conditions of Fulani herders supports Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch's (2011) theory about the roots of ingroup resentment. The successful implementation of indirect rule by Fulani emirs in northern Nigeria earned them the friendship of British colonial officials and shot the entire Fulani ethnicity into national political dominance (Waters-Bayer & Bayer, 1994, p. 214). During post-colonial times, however, the political and economic clout of the Fulanis has dwindled significantly, especially through the Federal government's indigeneship policy, which seeks to redistribute resources (Okello et al., 2014, p. 1). It is this policy that constrains Fulani herders' access to land in the Middle Belt. Hence, herders' aggression against

farmers may be symptomatic of their refusal to accept the superiority of farming groups in post-colonial Nigeria. And in line with Fjelde and Ostby (2012), the Fulani have encroached into farmers' land to graze their cattle and in some cases, have attacked farming communities, expelled the residents and confiscated their land, yet have not waged war against the Nigerian state.³ Yet, contrary to the claim advanced in Kuzio (2015), the state is a party to such conflicts at the communal level since Fulani resentment derives from its actions.

Compared to the scholarship examined above, other scholars incorporate the political mobilization of resentment in their analysis of the transition to violent collective action. One such case is Commercio (2017), who notes that the political mobilization of resentment is essential to understanding the outbreak of conflict in a previously peaceful society. Commercio comments on this issue in the following way:

Conscientization must occur in order for a group to travel to this emotional destination. Once the group – often guided by an ethnic entrepreneur – has arrived at this end-point, the notion that something can be done to rectify unjust status relations can morph into new behavior (p. 3).

In other words, ethnic leaders bring the existence of economic disparities to the consciousness of ingroup members, which then creates the desire for implementing corrective measures.

Similarly, Langer (2008), in his comparison of the governance structures of postcolonial Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire, suggests that group dissatisfaction and violent response result from the involvement of ethnic leaders. Langer notes that the likelihood of “group grievances and discontent actually [*becoming*] an issue in the national political sphere largely depends on

³ See Eke, S (2020). ‘Nomad savage’ and herder–farmer conflicts in Nigeria: the (un)making of an ancient myth. *Third World Quarterly*, 41 (5), 745-763, DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2019.1702459.

whether or not political elites decide to organize the process of grievance formation and/or (violent) group mobilization” (p. 163). Additionally, Langer notes that socioeconomic disparities exist between the northern and southern regions in both Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire (p. 163). However, only Cote d’Ivoire has experienced violent conflict while Ghana has avoided such an outcome because it successfully accommodated elite and popular interests in the disadvantaged northern region through powersharing and inclusive policies, respectively (pp. 187-188). Langer goes further to assert that the avoidance of conflict in Ghana is an indication that “marked developmental inequalities can be ‘neutralized’ by the institutionalization of politically and culturally inclusive policies and customs” (p. 188). Yet, as shown above, the opposite effect of increased polarization and conflict resulted from a similar programme in Nigeria due to the very fact that the redistributive policies coincide with ethnoreligious and ethnolinguistic identities.

Notwithstanding the depth of support for the argument that intergroup conflict results from horizontal inequalities, some studies show that the existence of group disparities does not necessarily indicate the inevitability of conflict. For example, Thomson (2016) and Dutta, Madden and Mishra (2014) contend that the probability that economic inequalities would produce intergroup conflict is a function of the degree of asymmetries. On their part, Dutta, Madden and Mishra argue that low inequality levels do not cause conflict because a minimum threshold must be surpassed before any negative effect on group behaviour becomes noticeable (p. 257). Additionally, the authors note that very high levels of inequality do not increase the likelihood of conflict onset because the costs of executing a violent restorative measure would trump the potential benefits as resource distribution becomes increasingly skewed (p. 259).

These arguments diverge from the previous and are significant because they point to the dynamism of the horizontal inequalities effect.

However, the threshold argument (Dutta, Madden and Mishra, 2014) raises a host of questions, including whether the model applies to real-world situations or whether it would be possible to accurately determine inequality measures in order to identify whether or not a society is nearing or has exceeded an inequality threshold. Nevertheless, their arguments are somewhat reinforced by Thomson's (2016) assessment of the dynamic of Latin American and East African conflicts. According to Thomson, very high levels of landholding inequalities create a dominant group of landholding elite in rural areas and reduces the likelihood of conflict because the landholding group can wield its national influence, which itself results from land concentration in a few hands, to suppress any attempt by the disadvantaged group to violently achieve symmetry with regards to land distribution (p. 513). Thomson's work may be viewed as an advancement of Dutta, Madden and Mishra's model in that his real-world illustration of how intergroup conflict might be forestalled by a high level of landholding concentration increases the plausibility of the notion that horizontal inequality may reach a point where the relationship between it and conflict occurrence becomes negative. However, Thomson's analysis is susceptible to the same threshold critique as Dutta, Madden and Mishra's. In other words, it is plausible to argue that if economic disparities enable a group to acquire political influence, the chance for a conflict outbreak is reduced, yet at what level of asymmetry would an advantaged group accrue national influence?

Similar to the above studies on inequality threshold, Vogt (2018) examines the conditions under which the horizontal inequalities-conflict nexus would not hold, yet unlike the others, his

analysis is not at risk of the threshold problem as he focuses on whether or not asymmetries are crystalized and rooted in historical sociopolitical and socioeconomic relations. According to Vogt, intergroup conflict is unlikely in spite of the presence of inequalities if the contending groups are “positioned in a stable power hierarchy with one ethnic group historically dominating state power to the continuing exclusion of other groups... {and if the} ethnic groups have become embedded within the same socioeconomic and cultural institutions” (p. 106). Resulting from these conditions, Vogt notes, is a situation in which violent confrontation by marginalized groups is unviable because the lack of resources undermines their capacity for collective action and the stability of power hierarchies enables repression by the advantaged group (p. 106).

Additionally, Vogt (2018) notes that this theory will hold in settler-colonial states, but not in the decolonized ones because, in the latter, the primary and stable hierarchy was altered by the departure of the colonisers (p. 107). Consequently, Vogt helps to explain the rarity of indigene-settler conflicts in North America and the preponderance of autochthonous conflicts in much of postcolonial Africa. Vogt’s position is somewhat corroborated by Vala, Waldzus and Calheiros (2016) who suggest that inequalities may not induce negative behavioural reactions “if the status relation is perceived as legitimate and stable” (p. 60). Under such conditions of status legitimacy and stability, the authors note, ingroup members avoid developing negative emotions by ignoring the issues that undermine ingroup status and basing intergroup comparison on the things that bolster ingroup prestige (p. 60).

Conclusions

The multiple debates within each scholarship cluster shows that there are different conflicting possibilities in terms of the applicability of the literature to the Jos context. Although a lot has been written on intergroup conflict already, these literature clusters can only illuminate a qualitatively produced understanding of the Jos conflict, but cannot replace a qualitative inquiry itself. Given the relationship between the literature and Jos conflict context, however, the result of my study is a sort of conversation between my findings and extant scholarship; a conversation in which the literature illuminates my findings, while my findings illuminate and expand the literature.

Chapter Four: Research methodology

This qualitative study began even before I arrived at the research site. What felt like an awkward conversation on the morning of my departure to Jos turned out to be a foretelling of some of what I later discovered, through my conversations with the study participants, to be central to the reality of Jos or literal signposts of its people's identity. I headed to Jos one day after I arrived in Nigeria from Canada. I reached the domestic wing of the Lagos Airport still encapsulated by thoughts of what could be or would be the outcome of the journey. People had asked whether I was excited about my trip. How could I have been? I did not know what the process held in store for me. I had entered into a contract with my Research Assistant (RA) and that was the only thing that was certain at the time. I had not confirmed any interviews and was relying on new acquaintances to link me up with potential participants. I knew where I would be staying but had not secured the accommodation. Immersed in thoughts about what "would be," I could not have envisaged what was imminent.

As I approached the security screening post, I expected the normal protocol of taking off my shoes, offloading my backpack of metal and electronic contents and going through the metal detector door. What I did not anticipate was the conversation or, I should say, the interrogation that greeted me at the other side of the security door. The following are the remnants of my memory of those exchanges:

[AIRPORT SECURITY:] Good morning! How are you?

[SURULOLA:] Good morning, sir! I'm fine.

[AIRPORT SECURITY:] Where are you going?

[SURULOLA:] Wondering why he was asking given that he had my boarding pass, I answered "I'm going to Jos. Why"?

[AIRPORT SECURITY:] Nothing. I just asked.

[AIRPORT SECURITY:] How do you make money?

[SURULOLA:] Knowing that Nigerian security personnel consider young and neatly dressed youths as potential suspects of internet fraud, I was offended by the question, so wearing a frown, I asked, “make money”?

[AIRPORT SECURITY:] Yes, what’s your source of livelihood? What do you do to make money?

[SURULOLA:] Although infuriated by the obvious intrusion into my privacy, I managed to stay calm and responded honestly saying, “God is my provider but why do you ask”?

[AIRPORT SECURITY:] You know some people make money through farming in Jos, so I wanted to know what you do to make your own money?

[SURULOLA:] Okay. I didn’t know about that.

[AIRPORT SECURITY:] You didn’t know? Many of the residents of Jos are farmers. They say the land is very fertile there. Many civil servants retire and relocate to Jos and set up farms there as their post-retirement work.

[SURULOLA:] Oh, that’s good.

The airport security turned out to be an “uninvited participant,” whose second-hand knowledge is reflected in the personal stories of the study participants. It is also consistent with my own observation of farms and poultries in several of the homes that I visited as well as on the rocky-mountains beside the city’s expressways.

In this chapter, I describe the specific steps that I took to answer my research questions as well as the theoretical underpinnings of those procedures. I start by explaining the actions I took to control the influences of my research background and personal and professional identity in the collection and interpretation of data. Next, I explain the phenomenological and inductive bases of my research design and the rationale for combining both approaches. Following that, I describe the pool of participants whose insights are the lifeblood of this thesis. In the same section, I explain the specific purposive and snowball sampling strategies that facilitated my access to these participants. Subsequently, I discuss the phenomenological philosophy that underlies my data collection procedures and the nature of my data collection instruments.

After that, I discuss how I analysed the data. I started by explaining the theoretical basis for analysing phenomenological data inductively, then moved to describe the specific inductive procedure that I employed. I end the section with a note on the steps I took to ensure that my findings are trustworthy. After the analysis section, I demonstrate how my study conforms to the Tri-Council's ethical standards relating to the privacy, confidentiality, safety and total wellbeing of my study participants. After this, I discuss the risks that I envisaged before the study and the specific measures that I implemented to mitigate them. The last section of the chapter describes the obstacles that I encountered during the study and how they impacted my work.

Positionality and reflexivity

I did not commence this study as a *tabula rasa* ignorant of the conflict and extant scholarly explanations; neither am I personally detached from the indigene-settler issue in Nigeria. I am a Christian, who was born and raised in his ancestral home state, Edo. As a result, I have the same religious affiliation and citizenship status as do majority of the indigenous people in Jos, Plateau State. Also, most perceptive Nigerians, including myself, are familiar with the Jos troubles. So, I entered my study sites with some knowledge about the subject, and with this knowledge came additional responsibilities. As a qualitative researcher, I cannot deny the inherent subjectivity of my interpretations. Yet, to make my findings credible, I had to base my analysis solely on the data, using the participants' own stories to highlight both inconsistencies and harmonies within and between stories. As Padilla-Díaz (2015, p. 103) notes, qualitative researchers can only objectively analyse participants' stories if they suspend their preconceived assumptions about the topic of research.

Bracketing off my judgements requires that I am first and foremost upfront about my prior knowledge and the potential for having unconscious biases. In the last three years before my fieldwork, I had studied and written about indigene-settler issues in the Middle Belt, which undoubtedly shaped my opinions about the roots of the conflict in the region of which Jos is a part. As noted, I was obligated as a qualitative researcher to work towards bracketing off those opinions and preventing them from influencing my interpretation of the data or the inferences that I drew from the participants' narratives. My research instrument, which allowed the study participants to independently develop their own narratives, insulated their stories from the possibility of being structurally conditioned by my previous theoretical position. Also, I constantly reflected on my past research experiences and concomitant opinion while analysing my findings. Additionally, I examined each participant's statement either in relation to their other statements and/or the stories of other participants. Using both these strategies, I ensured that I was not unconsciously relying on my opinion to interpret the participants' stories.

While I bracketed off my past views, I could not avoid being impacted by the participants' stories. As I listened to them and transcribed the interviews, I reflected on the relationship, or lack thereof, between the participants' experiences and my own reality as an indigenous Christian in a Nigerian state, Edo. Like Plateau, which Jos city is a part of, Edo state is made up of both Christians and Muslims as well as indigenous and settler ethnic groups. One striking difference between both states is that the indigenous and settler labels are not used in Edo State because indigenous identity is not politicized. Individuals occasionally refer to themselves as indigenes to assert belongingness but not to exclude others. This assessment is reinforced by the ease with which people obtain indigeneship certificates in my state. In contrast

to the relevant stories presented later in this thesis, people living in my Local Government, Oredo, can walk into the Council secretariat and apply for an indigeneship certificate for less than a dollar and without going through an Odionwere (Street Head).

The religious reality of Edo also differs from Plateau's. Although it is a predominantly Christian state, there is also a sizeable Muslim population. Yet, in contrast to the stories unearthed about Jos, religious rhetoric is absent in political campaigns in my state. One major difference between Plateau and Edo in this regard is that majority of the Muslims in the latter are indigenous to the state's northern senatorial district and are significant power brokers there. Also, the Muslim Hausa and Fulani "settlers" in Edo are dispersed across the State's northern, southern and central senatorial districts and, as a result, do not pose a political threat to any indigenous political establishment.

Other researcher roles

In order to gather the stories needed for understanding the causes and variation of the Jos conflict, I relied on research participants with whom I had no prior relationship. Consequently, I had to develop some level of trust between each participant and myself. I did so by being open about the purpose of the research and being honest about my potential uses of the knowledge that they brought to the study. Also, I gained the participants' trust by responding positively to their expressed emotions of sadness and joy. By using my countenance to validate their mood, I created an atmosphere amenable to open and frank storytelling. Additionally, by openly acknowledging the importance of their insights to my work, I believe I succeeded in balancing

real or imagined power differentials that resulted from my status as an urban-bred Nigerian academic and researcher from a foreign university.

Although validating the participants' mood helped me to gain their confidence, I had to navigate a very thin line between trust building through affirmation and the dangerous potential of legitimizing destructive beliefs. Through gasps, sighs and laughter, I responded positively to the stories that were devoid of negative perceptions about the outgroup. In cases where hateful rhetoric was expressed, I maintained a neutral face to permit them to keep talking while simultaneously avoiding a validation of their beliefs. Given that different types of stories were narrated in each interview, I managed to keep a neutral face at certain junctures and yet sustain the participants' openness. My icebreaker question, for example, facilitated the development of trust before the questions about relational experiences. It elicited the participants' views about the city, which were mostly stories of fondness. These stories provided ample opportunity for the development of trust through validation.

In addition to the contradictory goals of affirmation and refraining from legitimizing destructive beliefs, I was also confronted with an internal conflict between wanting to obtain complete narratives and fearing that I might be probing too much. As my description of the data collection process shows below, I had a semi-structured data gathering structure. This empowered the participants as they were able to lead the telling of their own stories. This system partly helped to equalize the power dynamic during the interviews and provided many pregnant stories that needed further development. Yet I had to be cautious about asking for the details around apparently significant but troubling events in order to avoid (re)traumatizing the participants.

The above measures produced deep insights on the subject matter, but I knew when it was time to halt data collection. I realized that I had reached data saturation when, unlike the initial interviews, new interviews only expanded the evidence for existing themes but did not produce new themes that needed further development. I did not seek more interviews beyond the 24th participant as I had stopped hearing new evidence at this point.

Research approach

I combined the phenomenological and general inductive qualitative approaches to make optimal use of their respective strengths to facilitate addressing my research question.

Phenomenology

Given my interest in learning about the causes of conflict based on people's experience of intergroup relations, phenomenology offered the most useful means for obtaining the needed data. As a phenomenological study, my work was structured to elicit stories about participants' experiences of intergroup relations, thereby uncovering the conflict drivers, both real and perceived. By providing an avenue for each participant to tell his/her experiences and narrate historical events, I was able to gather data over an extensive period, not just a snapshot of time, which would have defeated the essence of my work. As noted, studies have linked Nigeria's indigeneship policy and resultant economic inequalities to the Jos conflict. However, it remained unknown how much of these explanations and how much more exist in the experiences of those that have lived through the conflict. Yet, knowledge of their perspectives is necessary for effective conflict resolution and peacebuilding. As I show subsequently, the phenomenological approach provides a framework for accessing those perceptions in the broadest way possible.

Phenomenology, as Creswell (2013) notes, is one of the five qualitative research approaches. The approach exists within the humanistic research paradigm, but its roots are essentially philosophical (Mapp, 2008, p. 308). In his critique of pure reason, the German enlightenment philosopher, Immanuel Kant used the term phenomenology to distinguish between posteriori or empirical knowledge, the understanding of a thing based on experience, and a priori knowledge, the cognitive image of that thing independent from the experiences of the thing (Padilla-Díaz, 2015, p. 102). As a tradition of philosophical research, however, phenomenology was adopted in the early 20th century by scholars who built on earlier works that view human experience as the root of philosophical insights (Mayoh and Onwuegbuzie, 2013, p. 3).

Most notable among the former category of scholars are Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, who founded the transcendental (descriptive) and hermeneutic (interpretive) phenomenological schools, respectively. Husserl contends that lived experiences embody an essential structure or essence, which is discoverable through description (Mayoh & Onwuegbuzie, 2013, p. 6). When varied experiences of a specific phenomenon are observed, notes Husserl, we can identify a common thread of insights cutting across all of them and emphasize the universal quality of the themes evident in the description of those experiences (Mayoh & Onwuegbuzie, p. 6). In contrast to the Husserlian emphasis on description, Heidegger's approach focuses not only on the interpretation of lived experiences but also on interpretations that are shaped by the researchers' personal experience and knowledge of the same phenomenon (Mapp, 2008, p. 309). Their divergent analytical preferences,

notwithstanding, both forms of phenomenology are bound by certain methodological goals to which I now turn.

The central purpose of phenomenological philosophy, as Giorgi (2009) notes, is to achieve a deep understanding of a thing through the stories of individuals that have experienced it (cited in Mayoh & Onwuegbuzie, 2013, p. 3). Lester (1999, p. 1) shares this view. He notes that the phenomenological approach aims to gather “‘deep’ information and perceptions through inductive, qualitative methods such as interviews, discussions and participant observation” in order to illuminate phenomena based on the experiences of people who have lived through them. Given the centrality of personal perception and subjectivity in the phenomenological approach, Lester (1999, p. 1) notes that they are powerful tools “for gaining insights into people’s motivations and actions.” To extrapolate to the context of my study, it is within this subjective world of people, including their interpretation of situations, events and other people’s actions, that their motivation for participation in a conflict is nurtured or their facilitation of peace is bred.

Although phenomenology is typically used to answer questions of meaning, the goal of phenomenological inquiry to fully describe a lived experience makes it the most viable means for creating a comprehensive picture of the causal milieu of ethnic conflict in Jos. I did not seek an understanding of the essence of participants’ experiences of intergroup relations. Phenomenology, however, provided the best means for collecting rich data because the approach prioritizes detail. Given my central focus on the causes and variation of conflict, my analysis of the obtained data expectedly falls outside the traditional procedures for analysing phenomenologically obtained data. So, whereas phenomenology served my purpose of gathering

deep insights, the analysis of these insights is more amenable to a different analytical system, the general inductive analytical procedures of Thomas (2006). Moreover, by proceeding from the raw data and progressing through themes and the eventual development of the essence or meaning of a phenomenon, the transcendental and hermeneutical analyses of phenomenological data are essentially inductive. The transcendental and hermeneutic analytic procedures, however, include additional technical nuances that are not needed for analysing my data because of the research questions that I sought answers for.

General inductive approach

In contrast, the analytical procedures of the general inductive approach avail me of some flexibility in my analysis of the data. As I show shortly, the general inductive approach permits the development of answers from all the data that are related to the research question. It neither restricts the researcher to participants' stories about their personal experiences nor is it focused on the sole objective of constructing a common meaning across several individuals' lived experiences as is typical in phenomenological analysis (see, for example, Creswell, 2013, p. 76). In essence, therefore, the holistic understanding of the causes of Jos's ethnic conflict requires a rich dataset, which a phenomenological design makes possible through the collection of lived experiences of intergroup relations. Yet, the analysis of the data, especially to answer the question of why conflict occurrence varies across communities, is best served by the general inductive approach to qualitative data analysis.

Inductive analysis, as Thomas (2006, p. 238) notes, involves constructing themes, concepts, and models through detailed readings and interpretation of raw data. The researcher

using this approach aims to build connections between the research questions and emerging themes yet allow the latter to evolve naturally from the data (Thomas, p. 238). This contrasts with the systematic attempt to flesh out a common meaning in order to arrive at the essence of a thing, which is a phenomenological requirement. Additionally, unlike the restraints imposed by the more technical approaches, the general inductive approach permits the emergence of findings from such frequent, dominant or significant themes that freely emerge from the data (Thomas, p. 238). The collective reading of these themes then constitutes the underlying structure of the lived experiences of intergroup relations and helps to answer the question of why conflict occurs in Angwan Doki but not in Dadin Kowa.

In other words, using the approach, I identified the underlying structure of the data, specifically the commonality and divergence of the respective communities' stories about intergroup relations, the latter of which helps us to understand why Dadin Kowa has been relatively peaceful while Angwan Doki has not. In contrast, phenomenology would only have facilitated the production of "a coherent story or narrative about *participants'* experience" (Thomas, 2006, p. 241 emphasis is mine). I did not seek a coherent story, but a comprehensive one even if it is a complex mosaic of things.

Research participants

Purposive sampling, which involves the systematic recruitment of research participants based on predetermined criteria, is generally the means through which study samples are selected in a phenomenological inquiry (Padilla-Díaz, 2015, p. 104). To be included in a phenomenological study, potential participants must meet certain requirements that demonstrate that they have

experienced the phenomenon under study and over a considerable number of years. I recruited participants for this study through this sampling method. Because of the temporal scope of my investigation, individuals aged 29 and below were excluded from my study while those aged 30 and above were included. The community members who do not meet the identified inclusion criteria and those who do but did not live in the community before, after and during or close enough to the 2001 conflict were excluded from the study. I established these age and residency requirements because only such individuals would have the depth of experience of interethnic relations that could yield meaningful and deep insights into the causes and variation of the conflict. In addition to purposive sampling, I used the snowball sampling technique, which produced a steady stream of potential participants.

Participant recruitment

The study was undertaken in Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa. Before commencing the study, I visited Jos in order to learn about the sociocultural and demographic composition of the city. I made some contacts during this initial visit. So, when I commenced my study, I approached some of these contacts to help me to distribute my recruitment letter to members of the targeted communities who they know may be interested in the study. These initial contacts were not participants in my study because none met the inclusion criteria. Due to their previous work in and with these communities, they were, however, familiar with some community members. So, I asked each contact to distribute my recruitment letter to members of both communities that met my inclusion criteria. I emailed each contact to ask for her/his help in distributing the recruitment letter.

The recruitment letter invited interested individuals to contact me directly via phone or email to confirm their interest in participating in the research. In order to ensure that my contacts did not feel pressured to recommend someone and that they did not compel, force or coerce people to participate, I did not ask them to recommend people. Rather, I emailed them to ask for assistance in distributing my recruitment letter to community members that met my inclusion criteria in Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa communities. The contacts distributed the recruitment letter in-person as this was most feasible. Interested individuals then contacted me directly to signify their interest in participating. Not only did this strategy ensure that my initial contacts did not feel pressurized to suggest someone, it also prevented them from knowing definitively that the person/people that received the recruitment letter participated. The participants may have themselves disclosed their involvement to the contacts, however, my snowball sampling strategy was implemented in a way that ensured that the identity of the participants was concealed from even the contact that initiated the recruitment.

The first three individuals from each community that contacted me, and who satisfied my inclusion criteria, formed the first pool of participants. The first set of participants, three in each of the communities, was invited to distribute the recruitment letter to other community members that met my inclusion criteria. The ethnicity, gender and age of the potential participants solicited at this stage of recruitment depended on the age, gender and ethnic distribution of the existing sample. Despite realizing that no other indigenous tribe is as populated as the Beroms in both Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa, I continued to strive for more ethnic representation until I reached my required number of interviews. Similar to how I selected the first set of participants,

the next set of three participants from each of the communities that contacted me, and satisfied the participation requirements, were added to the pool of participants.

These new participants also helped to distribute the recruitment letter to other potential participants, and I repeated the process until I reached the desired sample size. Because the study participants did not know who actually partook in the study, they were not required to sign a confidentiality pledge. In order to maintain the voluntariness of participation, the same language that I used in soliciting recruitment assistance from my initial contacts was what I used here. Interested and suitable individuals who contacted me after the maximum number of participants was reached at each stage of the recruitment were placed on a waiting list and advised accordingly. Some of these participants were later included particularly when it became clear that it would be near impossible to achieve a balanced ethnic and gender representation. The purpose of this snowball strategy was to ensure that I achieved my desired sample size easily and secured alternative participants that could be called upon if others decided to withdraw. My initial communication with all the potential participants was done via phone.

Participant profile

The study included 24 participants, 12 in each of the two research sites. The Afizere, Berom, Fulani, Hausa and Tarok residents of Dadin Kowa and Angwan Doki constituted the participants of the study. However, the sample allotment in each of the two communities was done according to indigeneship status. I strived for a balanced representation of the different ethnicities in each category because neither the indigene nor the settler categories are ethnically monolithic. In other words, I wanted an equal representation of the Anaguta, Afizere and Berom people in the

indigenous pool and equal representation of Hausa and Fulani people in the settler (or non-indigenous) pool. As shown in Table 1 below, I was unable to achieve the desired ethnic balance. However, representation is balanced in terms of indigeneship status and religious affiliation. Despite being ethnically mixed communities, Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa are mostly populated by the Berom (indigenes) and Hausa (settlers). So, I had to focus on achieving a representative sample by other means, such as religious affiliation.

Table 1: Participant Distribution

Angwan Doki			Dadin Kowa		
Category	Demographics	Number of Participants	Category	Demographics	Number of Participants
Gender	Female	3	Gender	Female	3
	Male	9		Male	9
	Total	12		Total	12
Age	30+	1	Age	30+	3
	40+	3		40+	4
	50+	6		50+	4
	60+	2		60+	1
	Total	12		Total	12
Tribe	Afizere	1	Tribe	Berom	6
	Berom	6		Fulani	1
	Fulani	1		Tarok	1
	Hausa	4		Hausa	4
	Total	12		Total	12
Religion	Christian	7	Religion	Christian	6

	Muslim	5		Muslim	6
	Total	12		Total	12
Status	Indigene	7	Status	Indigene	7
	Settler	5		Settler	5
	Total	12		Total	12

Given that the indigene and settler labels are contested and controversial, no participant was referred to as such and no document that was presented to them contained this categorization. In fact, those participants who ordinarily would be labelled as settlers vehemently rejected such characterizations in their stories because the label has been the basis for their discrimination. For convenience, however, these labels are used in describing the participants throughout this chapter. In each of the two communities, seven indigenes (Afizere, Berom, and Ebira) and five settlers (Hausas and Fulanis) participated in the study.

Also, I hoped to achieve equal age and gender distribution. I wanted a sample that comprised three males and three females from each of the categories (indigene and settler groups) of participants in each community. This too was a tall order given the cultural limitations faced by women in the communities. Table 1 above shows the gender distribution of the participants. In Dadin Kowa and Angwan Doki, I recruited three females and nine males, respectively. Under the study limitations section, I document the obstacles that I encountered in recruiting female participants. In addition to my proposed gender-mix, I wanted each of the categories of participants in the respective communities to be made up of three middle-aged persons (30-58) and three seniors (59 and above). Some participants were very open about their age, yet most were guarded about their specific age and were only willing to provide a range. As

a result, I had to jettison my initial age classification and went by the age ranges that most of the participants were most comfortable with. As table 1 above shows, all the participants fulfilled my inclusion criterion and 20 of them (83 percent) ranged between 40+ and 60+, which indicates that a significant majority of the participants have substantial experience of intergroup relations in their community.

Data collection

Data collection in phenomenological research, unlike the analysis of phenomenological data, is marked by its requirement of minimum structure, which is aimed at achieving maximum depth in participants' narratives (Lester, 1999, p. 2). The profound interview, which takes the form of either an open or semi-structured guide, is the most appropriate strategy for obtaining the deep insights that are desired in a phenomenological inquiry (Padilla-Díaz 2015, p. 104). Either strategy, as Padilla-Díaz (2015, p. 104) notes, provides the participants with space to freely narrate their experiences unencumbered by the controls of a structured guide. In practice, however, the utility of the open and semi-structured guides is said to be constrained by time limitations and the difficulty in achieving a balance between avoiding undue interruption of the narration and keeping the participant focused on the topic (Lester, p. 2).

As I show below, the semi-structured interview was one of my data collection methods, so I had to grapple with the conflicting goals of avoiding undue interference in participants' storytelling and keeping them focused on the relevant issue. I did not commence my interviews with a plan for this other than planning to let my experience in the first one or two interviews determine my strategy and to continue to modify the strategy as dictated by the subsequent

interviews. After the first interview, I opted for maximum freedom for participants to tell their stories and had no reason to adjust this plan in subsequent interviews. While bearing in mind the interview duration that the participants and I consented to, I allowed them to take their stories wherever they desired for two reasons.

First, I quickly realized that even in stories that initially seemed unrelated to the subject, I could still identify a few obviously relevant information. After the participants clarified these points or expanded on them at my behest, it became clear that much of what initially appeared as irrelevant stories were the background for understanding the relevant stories. Second, I noticed that after I redirected my first participant from a story about a former military ruler back to his experiences of intergroup relations, he kept checking with me whether he was staying on the topic rather than focusing on telling his story. So, throughout the remaining interviews, I allowed participants to complete their stories before subtly redirecting them to the issue or asking for more details about undeveloped points.

Phenomenological studies are aimed at obtaining deep insights from participants and semi-structured interviews facilitate this process. Yet, the mere use of this data collection method does not guarantee access to the full range of participants' experience on a phenomenon. There are additional relational techniques, such as showing empathy and building rapport, that also motivate openness in participants, especially in cases where they have been personally affected by the issue under study (Lester, 1999, p.2). Before and during my interviews, I strived to establish some rapport with the participants through affirmative nods and freely laughing about their funny stories as I would with my friends. I allowed myself to flow with the emotions in the room as dictated by the narrated stories, seamlessly switching from a neutral to an upbeat mood

when following up on a funny story. Likewise, depending on the state of the participant and the severity of the narrated event, I maintained a sombre tone as I acknowledged participants' tales of sorrow or hardship and sought their clarification of sad events.

Data collection in phenomenological research is obtained through means other than minimally structured interviews. Lester (1999) outlines a range of additional options that can facilitate in-depth data gathering, including focus meetings, analysis of personal texts and participant observation (p. 2). Observation was my second data collection tool. I opted for the non-participant variant given the nature of my research question and the type of activities that I observed, which necessitated and permitted concealed observation, respectively.

Instruments and procedure

As noted above, I used two research instruments in my study, namely a semi-structured interview and non-participant observation. The interviews were conducted in Jos at mutually agreed locations that protected confidentiality and were convenient for the participants, my research assistant and me. Several interviews were held in the homes of participants. Others took place at the Plateau State Youth Centre and in the private offices of participants. Some participants preferred to be interviewed in my Research Assistant's car in their neighbourhood and some distance away from their homes. Using a semi-structured interview guide, I invited each participant in a one-on-one setting to tell stories about their lived experiences of intergroup relations within their community. I started by asking participants to tell me what it is like living in Jos. The plan, as suggested by a member of my advisory committee, was to make the participants comfortable before moving into the main questions. Many of the participants talked

about the natural beauty of Jos, which many Nigerians know. The beauty of Jos, with its many ramifications, is connected to one of the identified causes of the conflict in extant scholarship, competition over land. Yet, this dimension of that causal factor had been missing in the previous analyses of the Jos conflict.

I asked three major questions after asking about life in Jos. Rather than solely ask about participants' experiences of intergroup relations, I triangulated the question by posing the same question three times and concerning different periods. The purpose was to gather an extensive body of data that could either show the consistency or inconsistency of experiences, thereby producing a nuanced understanding of the conflict milieu. First, I invited the participants to talk about how things were like between the groups in their community before the 2001 conflict. Next, I asked them to talk about how things were like between the groups at the time of the different conflict episodes. The last major question invited the participants to talk about how the groups have been relating since the last conflict. One of the ways I redirected participants back to the issue, obtained clarification and got them to add detail to their story was to ask follow-up questions such as, "could you say more about the experience...?" Other follow-up questions included "can you say more about that," "what happened afterwards?" I also followed-up asking questions such as, "...can you tell me who you had this experience with," "was it someone from your ethnic or religious group," "what did you feel," "why did you feel this way," and "why do you think so" etc.

I used the same guide for both Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa participants because the interview centred on experiences of intergroup relations, rather than the experience of conflict or peace. I used an instrument that could be applied within both communities so that any divergence

in the experiences of intergroup relations would be evidence of why the conflicts occurred in one but not the other. In line with the longstanding protocol followed by qualitative researchers, I kept brief notes during the interview. I took notes about how a participant answered my questions and behaved while responding. I also documented the general tone of their responses. I made more extensive observational notes immediately after each interview. The interviews were administered in English and I transcribed the data myself. Six of the interviews were under 40 minutes, while 19 ranged between 60 to 90 minutes. One member-check session followed each interview a few days later and took no more than 20 minutes to complete. The purpose was to allow the participants to review their interview transcripts and certify them as accurate or so they could request amendments.

Some of the interview data were triangulated against the insights that I gleaned from my nonparticipant observation of the mood in public gatherings. I observed the mood in public spaces, such as markets, in order to gain additional context for the study. Using my visual senses only, and without listening in on people's conversation, I observed the mood in these spaces in search of some cues. I wanted to know whether the interactions were taking place between people of the same ethnicity, different ethnicities or both, whether the mood was relaxed or tensed, and whether the nature of the mood varied according to the ethnicity of the interacting parties. I intended to observe the mood in beer parlours (local bars), yet I had to jettison the idea after discovering that some of the people who patronize such spots are also abusing banned substances.

Data analysis

Unlike most intergroup conflict research that deductively test a theory or model, I analysed my data using a General Inductive Approach (GIA) in order to create a framework for understanding the causes and spatial variation of ethnic conflict in Jos. As noted earlier, my analysis is based on the GIA approach outlined in Thomas (2006). In the GIA approach, the researcher starts the analysis from reading the raw data and then progresses to the development of a model of understanding (Thomas, p. 239). The model of understanding is the main outcome of an inductive analysis as the raw data and the categories that evolved from them are embedded in it (Thomas, p. 40). By using the phenomenological data collection procedure, I was able to gather deep insights from the participants. It was, however, through the application of the GIA, by beginning with the raw data, building themes, finding similarities and divergent perspectives and experiences, identifying when causal factors became salient or waned, that I was able to construct a model that achieves my research objective of producing a comprehensive picture of the conflict milieu.

Like Heideggerian phenomenological analysis, a researcher using the GIA is not detached from the data analysis process as he/she must decide on the relative importance of the themes and determine what merits inclusion in the framework (Thomas, 2006, p. 240). Informed by this principle, my model includes some themes that are neither causes of conflict nor explanations of why its occurrence varies in Jos. I decided to include them, notwithstanding, because they either reinforce or contradict some experiences that are directly relevant for addressing the research question. It was important to include these themes since my interest is not in presenting a coherent story but in providing a comprehensive understanding. I describe

below how I arrived at a holistic understanding of the conflict milieu as well as how I ensured that my analysis is trustworthy.

Inductive coding

My analysis started during my first interview. I wanted to see the model evolve in real-time, so I kept a memo and noted all the themes that were emerging as each participant told his/her story. I had a notepad for this purpose but transferred its content to a miniature-coding table on my computer at the end of each day in which data was collected. On a few occasions, I completed the transfer early the next morning and before leaving my room for another interview appointment. As each participant spoke, I documented what I thought were the obvious themes in their narrative. I avoided flipping my notes backwards to see whether a theme had already been written, so I documented the same themes multiple times in many cases.

So, by transferring the notes to my computer, I was able to not only see the patterns that were emerging in the data but also have the time to delete the redundant themes in the new interview column. At this early stage, I could sense the emergent pattern because there was a separate box against each participant's column that showed where such a theme already appeared. At this stage, and perhaps, due to the triangulation of my interview question, I could already tell from the documented categories that some factors were more salient at certain points in time than others. As I collected the data, I immersed myself in my memo. Most times, I napped immediately after completing the electronic memo and would then reflect on it immediately after waking up. I did not return to my memo when I commenced the main coding phase.

I coded the raw data manually because I wanted to immerse myself in the participants' stories, which software coding would have deprived me of. Before I started coding the data, I saved a separate file containing each participant's anonymized transcripts in my encrypted USB flash drive to create a backup of the original file. Having done so, I read each participant's transcripts multiple times until I understood all the segments of their stories and the point they intended to convey through those stories. Next, I pulled out different segments of each transcript that directly or indirectly speaks to either the cause or variation of conflict in Jos. I titled each category of text segments based on a recurrent phrase or word in the texts or non-recurrent phrase or word that represents the substance of all the text segments in that category. Subsequently, I moved through all the transcripts and grouped all the similar categories irrespective of the participant's community. These categories of data constitute my upper-level themes.

Some of my text segments apply to more than one category. So, as commonly done in inductive coding, I placed such text segments under all the categories to which they apply. Having gotten my upper-level categories, I read each of them several times in search of similar stories and/or viewpoints and grouped them accordingly. So, under each upper-level category, there are two or more lower-level themes or contradictory perspectives/experiences within the upper-level category. Within these lower-level themes, I grouped the participant's stories according to their respective communities in order to show the similarities and/or divergence of experiences across Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa. Apart from two lower-level themes, all the lower-level and upper-level themes traverse between Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa stories.

As noted earlier, the goal in the inductive analysis is the development of a model of analysis. As Thomas (2006, p. 240) notes, this model could be an open network in which case it takes the form of a non-hierarchical or non-sequential system, it could be a temporal sequence, which signifies a movement over time or it may represent a causal chain, showing how the occurrence of one category causes another to change. The product of my inductive analysis is a framework for understanding the causes and variation of ethnic conflict in Jos, which reads as both a causal network and a temporal sequence. It shows that certain factors first occurred before others became salient or changed in form. It shows how one factor led to the emergence of another in both Dadin Kowa and Angwan Doki, how new factors strengthened those that precipitated them and how the occurrence of two related factors in Dadin Kowa altered the causal network there.

Trustworthiness of findings

Using three validation strategies, I ensured that the above framework accurately represents the data. In qualitative research, the trustworthiness of research findings and interpretations can be guaranteed through several validation techniques. These strategies include sustained observation and engagement in the research site, triangulation, dependability, clarifying researcher position, thick description, etc. (Creswell, 2013). Creswell (2013) notes that any pair of these techniques are enough to validate the findings of a qualitative study. Consequently, I employed three of these validation strategies, including dependability, clarifying researcher position and thick description. Dependability, as Lincoln & Guba (1985) note, involves comparing the research findings and interpretations with the raw data in order to ascertain whether they are aligned

(cited in Thomas, 2006). Thus, I tested my model of understanding for consistency by comparing it with the raw data, which was backed up in my encrypted USB drive before the transcripts were coded.

While the audit of my analysis determined dependability, the thick description validation emanated from how I undertook the analysis. This validation strategy, as Creswell (2013) notes, involves providing details on a theme or code that allows readers to determine the transferability of the findings to similarly structured settings. Stake (2010) notes that rich interconnected details produce thick description (cited in Creswell, 2013). My presentation of the themes aligns with this validation strategy. For example, my findings are a product of the participants' reflections on their experiences under different conditions, in different settings and at different times. In some cases, I used one participant's experience in a situation to illuminate another participant's experience in a similar or different context. In other instances, a participant's prior reflection on their experiences in a different time period was used to corroborate and/or challenge a subsequent story in the same or a different time period. In essence, by undertaking my analysis based on multiple reinforcing and contradictory narratives that resulted from both similar and different circumstances, I further enhanced the validity of my study.

Whether I was corroborating, challenging or inferring from a participant's story, my analysis derived from the stories of the study participants themselves, which satisfies my third validation strategy. In addition to dependability and thick description, I was upfront about my Christian identity and indigenous status in my State in Nigeria not only to bracket off potential prejudices but also to allow readers determine for themselves whether my analysis is free from these potential influences.

Ethical considerations

This study complies with the Tri-Council Policy Statement on ethical conduct for research involving humans. It was reviewed and approved by the Joint-Faculty Research Ethics Board of the University of Manitoba (U of M).⁴

Informed consent

I obtained informed consent from all the participants in the study. I took appropriate steps to protect the privacy of the participants in all the phases of the study. Before signing on to partake in the study, the participants were informed about its purpose and scope. The participants knew they were consenting to a 60-90-minute interview and a 20-minute transcript review a few days after the initial interview. Also, they were informed about, and consented to, my data management plans, including tape-recording the interview, assigning pseudonyms, and safely storing their transcripts in both an encrypted USB and a secure storage box. The participants also sanctioned my intended uses of the data, such as writing my thesis, publishing in scholarly journals and presenting at academic conferences.

Despite consenting to all of these, participants were aware, and I reminded them at the beginning of the interview that they could withdraw from the study at any point before July 6, 2019. After this date, withdrawal was no longer possible as I had commenced my analysis. Participants knew that they could withdraw their consent simply by informing me via email, SMS or phone call, and that withdrawal meant that I would discard all the information related to their participation. None of the participants requested to withdraw from the study.

⁴ See Appendix III for ethics approval certificate.

Privacy and confidentiality

I implemented the Tri-Council's recommended measures for protecting the participants' privacy and the confidentiality of their stories before and during the interviews as well as in the storage of their information. Given my use of a snowball recruitment procedure, I took steps to ensure that the participants' privacy and confidentiality were not compromised during the recruitment process. My first set of participants helped me to distribute the recruitment material to the next set of potential participants. They, however, were not aware of who joined because they were not involved in the final recruitment protocol. They simply helped me to distribute the recruitment letter and each interested person then contacted me with their inquiries or to notify me of their intention to join the study. Also, the interviews were conducted separately and in different locations, making it difficult for non-participants to learn about the purpose of the interviews and the identity of the study participants. My RA sat in on all the interviews, so I implemented two safeguards against privacy and confidentiality breaches. First, I ensured that all the notes taken during the interviews were returned to me at the end of the day. Second, as part of his employment contract, he signed a confidentiality pledge agreeing that he will keep confidential all the information about the participants.

On my part, I ensured that I handled participants' data securely. The interviews were audiotaped with my digital recording device and the audio recordings were transferred to my encrypted USB drive and stored in my secure safe, which was permanently left in my Jos accommodation during the entire duration of my fieldwork. The audio files were deleted from the USB drive once transcribed and the participants approved the transcripts. The transcripts

were coded, meaning that the participants were assigned pseudonyms, and the information needed to re-identify the participants were stored in my encrypted USB flash drive and secured in my safe. The reidentifying information was deleted after the transcripts were checked and approved by the participants, while the coded transcripts were retained until after my defence. My handwritten notes of observation were anonymized since I was unaware of the identity of the people that I observed. Moreover, I had no use for their personal identity beyond the ethnoreligious characteristics that were knowable through their dressing and tribal markings.

Risks and precautions

I anticipated that those participants who had difficult experiences during the conflict could experience some form of emotional stress through the process of telling their story. I mitigated this risk in two ways. First, I informed the participants through the recruitment letter, the consent form and at the start of the interview that they could refuse to answer a question, including those that would cause them any distress. Second, I included the contact information of a Jos-based trauma counseling centre in the consent form and reminded each participant of its existence at the end of each interview session. I discovered the counselling centre during my pre-fieldwork visit to Jos in November 2018. None of the participants showed serious emotional stress and none communicated any need to access the counselling service, yet I cannot categorically state that none of the respondents utilized the service since they could have done so without informing me.

Also, there was the risk of insecurity, which is partly why I established contacts in the city during my pre-fieldwork visit and asked for safety advice before I decided to explore the

causes and variation of the conflicts there. In ensuring the safety of the participants, I asked them during the recruitment process to suggest an interview location where they would feel most comfortable sharing their stories. In every phase of the study, my contacts in Jos continued to advise me on my safety in the city, including in the interview venues that were chosen by the participants. Additionally, I restricted my movement in the city as I gained more knowledge about the security situation. For example, no interview was scheduled for earlier than 9 am or later than 3.30 pm. Consequently, I never left my accommodation too early or returned too late. Also, there were days that I didn't go out for any interviews, as there was news on social media, confirmed by my RA and other contacts, about inter-ethnic gang squabbles.

For security reasons, I also didn't schedule an interview on the day of the annual Berom cultural festival as I was advised that the day is usually emotionally charged throughout the city. During my fieldwork, the state government made a new proclamation that altered the structure of the state's traditional council. This policy effectively depleted the authority of the Gbong Gwom Jos, a Berom traditional ruler, as it reduced the number of communities that are under his jurisdiction. Upon the advice of my contacts, I didn't schedule an interview the day after the news broke. I returned to the field two days after because the Gbong Gwom released a statement saying that the Berom people should remain calm as he was already consulting with the state government to address the situation.

Limitations of the study

Before the commencement of my fieldwork, I visited Jos in order to learn about the culture and traditions of the people. During this pre-fieldwork visit, I also inquired about the security

situation of the place in order to know whether it would be safe to undertake my study there. This visit to Jos facilitated my access to participants during the study phase, and it helped plan my intra-city commute and in keeping the participants and myself safe. However, it did not prepare me for the cultural and security constraints that laid ahead. While some cultural norms restricted the full participation of women and created a gender imbalance in the stories gathered, the security situation in the city limited the extent to which I could further deepen my understanding of the data through an extensive non-participant observation.

I sought a balanced gender representation in my sample and planned to achieve it through snowball sampling. I quickly found out from a male Muslim participant that most Muslim men would not allow their wives to speak with a stranger. There was one outlier as I managed to speak with one Muslim woman in her personal chamber, whose husband even excused us for privacy. This Muslim woman was, however, highly Western-educated, which perhaps explains the family's liberalism. For the most part, accessing female participants was a tall order. One participant even said that he could pass my recruitment letter to men but not to women and added that, despite being familiar with my RA and me, he would not even be comfortable allowing his wife to speak with us. Later, I observed in the markets that most of the Hausa and Fulani Muslim traders were men, which suggests that most of the Muslim women truly avoid social interaction.

This perception was further reinforced by a participant's story about Muslim girls being socially inactive, which caused him to encourage the sister of one of his Muslim friends to interact more with people in order to become more enlightened. All of this made me cautious in the recruitment process and limited my ability to involve Muslim women. Yet as the participants profile above shows, it was not the limited number of female Muslim participants alone that

accounted for the skewed gender representation. Getting access to Christian women was also difficult because of their involvement in the local economy as petty traders. I could not schedule interviews within the time of the day that I considered safe for both them and me. While cultural constraints and their business commitments restricted my access to female Muslim and Christian participants, respectively, household responsibilities, including childcare, made it difficult for both categories of women to participate.

However, future research should seek the experiences of more women to achieve a gendered understanding of the Jos conflict and the spatial variation of occurrence. There are two possible changes that can facilitate access to female participants. First, having a female RA can make the male partners of potential female participants consent to their involvement in a study. Second, with the necessary ethical precautions, connecting with local associations of women in the communities and recruiting female study participants through the leaders of those groupings can minimize the cultural impediments to female involvement.

Female participation, as I alluded to above, was also hampered by the general security situation in the country. I could not schedule interviews for the Christian women traders after they closed their business since it would have fallen outside my daily security corridor. Beyond limiting female involvement, Jos' insecurity, especially at night, prevented me from undertaking an extensive observation as I had planned. By hampering my immersion in the city, the pervading state of insecurity denied me access to the kind of in-depth contextual nuance that could illuminate the participants' reflections of their post-direct violence experience.

Conclusions

In order to understand why Angwan Doki has experienced indigene-settler conflicts whereas David Kowa has avoided the same, I combined a phenomenological design with an inductive analytical one. While the former provided me with the avenue for gathering deep insights, the latter provided me with the tools for developing a model of understanding that could explain not only the causes but also the variation of occurrence. Using a semi-structured interview guide, I gathered the stories of 24 study participants about their experiences of intergroup relations. Because the guide was structured to explore the participants' experiences of intergroup relations, rather than their perspectives about the causes of conflict or the conditions of peace, I could use the same interview guide for both Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa. When I completed gathering the participants' stories, I analysed them inductively, starting from multiple readings of the raw data, then building categories and linking up categories to create a model of understanding. Because I used the same research instrument in Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa, I can conclude that the observed differences in the respective experiences of intergroup relations explain the divergent relational outcomes.

Chapter Five: The Nature and drivers of social, cultural and economic integration in Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa

In this chapter, I discuss the participants' experiences of social, cultural and economic integration as well as the factors that enabled these conditions. The chapter, which consists of two main parts, evolves as follows. In the first part, I unveil the specific forms of pre-conflict integration that are evident in the participants' experiences of intergroup relations in both Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa. Here, I present the participants' tales about having a single common identity that was detribalized and depoliticised. Also, I discuss their stories of intermarriages between the indigenous Christian and settler Muslim ethnic groups in both communities as well as the conflicting perceptions about the significance of this pre-conflict tradition.

Subsequently, I recount the participants' experiences of the indigenous Christian and settler Muslim groups jointly celebrating their religious festivals and show that the narratives reinforce the notion of the existence of a common identity before the 2001 conflict. The structure of the people's occupation pre-conflict also demonstrates the integration of the groups in both communities. In this regard, I discuss the participants' experiences of heterogeneously populated industries, deep economic ties and symbiotic businesses. Next, I discuss the participants' experiences of settlers nurturing indigenous children and offering financial support to indigenes and vice versa. The type of social climate that pervaded both communities before the first conflict episode, which is the subject of the second part of this chapter, enabled the above forms of integration. In this part, I present the experiences of the participants that indicate the existence

of trust between the indigenes and settlers before fighting broke out in Jos. Afterwards, I discuss the stories about the integrated schooling system that existed pre-conflict and how it facilitated integration in the wider society.

The nature of integration in pre-conflict Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa

As noted, the nature of integration in the communities before the conflict can be understood within the context of the people's shared sense of a common identity, communal celebration of Christian and Islamic religious festivals, individual investments in collective welfare and their economic ties.

A common identity

What was evident in the participants' narrated experiences is a strong sense of both groups having a common identity pre-conflict. Although differing in nature, such tales of a shared identity traverse both Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa and emerged from the narratives of both the indigenous and settler participants. In both communities, the participants talk about being unaware of their respective identities beyond their identity as humans. The cultures of the indigenous and settler groups were intertwined before the conflict so much so that it was difficult to differentiate people based on their cultural practices. The language of the settler Hausa group was (and still is) the main means of communication in Jos apart from English. The indigenous Berom, Afizere and Anaguta groups, who have been at daggers drawn with the settler Hausa and Fulani groups since 2001, also speak this language. Likewise, the Hausa and Fulani people can

speak the Berom language. Also, baby christening before the conflict was unethnized as some of the indigenous Berom people gave their children Hausa names and vice versa. In fact, it is evident in the participants' stories that a sense of brotherhood existed and that the tradition of brotherliness was trans-generationally transmitted.

Angwan Doki

In Angwan Doki, the Muslim participants recall being unaware of people's ethnicity due to the absence of ethnic identity markers. For example, while narrating his experience of intergroup relations before 2001, PX divulged the following:

I'm now about 63 years old. In all my years, I never had any problem with any Christians. As children, we played together, grew up together and even our parents did things together. We didn't even know who was a Christian or a Muslim. It was when they [*the* Christians] were going to church that we noticed who was a Christian.

We never could have imagined that today there would be places that are a no-go area for Christians and other places that are a no-go area for Muslims. Even our parents never thought of that. We just found ourselves in this *situation*.

And I can tell you without fear of contradiction that in the 1960s, nobody knew who was a Muslim or who was a Christian except when you're seen in your place of worship.

PX, a Hausa Muslim male, is unequivocal in his statement about not having any personal dispute with Christians. Based on his experience, he believes that religion played no role in people's interaction before the conflict. In his view, religion was so insignificant a determinant of interpersonal relations that people's religion became apparent only when people visited their places of worship to perform religious rites. Despite experiencing multiple conflicts between the indigenous Christian and the settler Muslim groups over the course of a decade, PX still finds it

inexplicable that a people who paid no attention to each other's religion in the past, could now fight a war along religious lines.

PL, also a Hausa Muslim male and resident of Angwan Doki, expressed a similar viewpoint as PX. While emphasizing his belief that the period before the conflict was marked by oneness he tells a story of how the lack of rigid ethnic markers enabled a group of Hausa Muslim men to install their Berom Christian friend as the traditional ruler of his village. Below is PL's recollection of this event:

Let me tell you something. When we were young, there was the need to enthrone a new Berom Chief in Gyel. The present ruler of Gyel, who is the overall traditional ruler of Jos south was a tailor in the same lane as my parents in the Bukuru market. They shared a common understanding and comradeship of trade. He [Gyel ruler] was interested in becoming the Chief. I can't recall the exact year, but I can remember this event. The current ruler of Gyel spoke to some of our parents that he was interested in becoming the Chief of Gyel but that there were powerful people against his ambition.

One unique thing that you'll get from this is that our parents then mobilized and dressed up in their Berom attire, mainly blankets, and moved down on the day of the selection of the Chief. They [Hausa co-traders] moved down to the venue and cued up behind their friend [Gyel ruler]. That was how he became the traditional ruler and he's still the traditional ruler till this date.

So, you can see that the level of interethnic tolerance and understanding and humanity was universal. You were valued as a person not because of your ethnicity but because of your personal virtues; a peaceful person, industrious and hospitable. These were the keys on which interpersonal relationship was measured.

The participant, intent on showing that ethnicity was not a factor of how people related pre-conflict, speaks about the positive relationship between a Berom Christian trader and Hausa Muslim traders, including his father. In his view, despite having different religious and ethnic affiliations, these traders were bounded by a shared identity of being traders on the same market lane. Trusting the efficacy of the bond established through their common trade, the Berom

Christian man who needed help ascending the throne in his village, solicited the support of his Hausa Muslim friends. His options for support were not limited to his fellow Berom people. Upon realizing that the kingmakers in his village were opposed to his chieftaincy ambition, he reached out to his Hausa Muslim friends. And they, in turn, could offer a helping hand to their friend because the cultural boundaries were fluid enough to facilitate their participation in the kingmaking process of the Berom people.

Additionally, other participants in Angwan Doki told stories about language use that shows that the Hausa Muslims and Berom Christians were culturally interwoven. Whilst attempting to differentiate the pre-conflict and current social relations in the community, PH, a Berom Christian, stated the following in his story:

The experience is quite different. It has stages. When I was born in 1964, I grew up and met them living here with us, most especially the Hausa-Fulani. We grew up with them. We attended the same primary schools with some of them.

Even our parents gave names of Fulani to us, but I wasn't given any such name. Some of the Fulanis also christened their children Berom names. And the relationship was quite understanding.

PH recognizes the newness of the animosity that currently pervades the community. In attempting to show that the indigenous and settler groups have not always been at loggerheads, he notes that, in the past, the ethnicity of the family that a child was born into did not determine his\her christening. Given that parents generally know the meaning of the names that they call their newborn, the cross-ethnic christening of babies suggests that the Berom people had some understanding of the Hausa language and vice versa. Beyond this, it shows, as the participant notes, that interethnic relations were cordial at the time.

Relatedly, PN, also a Berom Christian, talked about his understanding of the Hausa language and how it facilitates his social interaction in the Hausa-dominated settlements today. He noted the following in his narrative:

You see, I grew up in a mixed environment. Sometimes, when I speak Hausa people think I can't speak English and when I speak English, people think I can't speak Hausa. I grew up in a mixed house [...] So, even now whenever I go to the Hausa environment, I know how to relate with them [...] I know all their greetings. So, I can survive anywhere in Jos.

PN, who like PH is a Berom Christian, is confident about his ability to blend into any area in Jos, including the Hausa-dominated settlements. He explains his interethnic mobility as resulting from his fluency in the Hausa language, a proficiency, which he derived from his upbringing in an ethnically mixed neighbourhood and apartment in Angwan Doki.

Dadin Kowa

The narrated stories of the Dadin Kowa residents that suggest detribalized and unethniced intergroup relations pre-conflict are not markedly different from the narratives of the Angwan Doki community members that I discussed above. Although the tales from Dadin Kowa are more on the Berom Christian side, a Hausa man's description of the nature of intergroup relations pre-2001 also reflects a universal notion of brotherhood. When I prompted him to talk about how the Hausa and Fulani Muslims lived with the Berom and other Christians before the first conflict episode, he made the following statement:

Before the 2001 crisis, the people of Jos lived peacefully. They saw themselves as humans. People were living peacefully irrespective of their religion, ethnicity or

background. People enjoyed living with other tribes. They learnt from them. When it was time for your own celebration, they joined you to celebrate. And during theirs, you joined them too. At that time, life was very sweet [...]

Even in my house, in our family house, there were Muslims and there were Christians living together [...] In the past, the Muslim brother could accompany his Christian brother to the church. He may not enter but would wait outside until the service ends and then they would return home together. The same was true for the Muslims. A Christian brother would accompany a Muslim to the mosque and wait until their prayers ended [...]

After the 2001 conflict, people no longer came together and stopped seeing themselves as humans [...] Now, I see you as either a Christian or a Muslim. In fact, I no longer see you as such, I see you as an unbeliever if you aren't of the same religion as me.

In responding to my invitation to narrate his experiences of intergroup relations pre-conflict, BP reminisces about the time in which life was sweet. He views this period as enjoyable because it was the time in which identity was not a factor in determining people's house address in Dadin Kowa. His recollection of the time is pleasant because it was a period in which the only significant identity was people's common humanity; an orientation, which in his view, has eroded throughout the conflicts. While highlighting the insignificance of religion in pre-conflict social relations, he refers to Christians and Muslims as brothers. This unconscious declaration reinforces his claim that the only salient identity before 2001 was the identity of being a human.

The stories of the Dadin Kowa Christian residents in this regard reflect not only the prevalence of this orientation before the conflict but also the intergenerational transmission of this sense of brotherliness. WP, for example, articulated it as follows:

We intermarried. We go to their ceremonies. Even immediately before the 2001 conflict, I attended my Fulani friend's daughter's wedding in their village, Toro. My wife and I went. We entered the mosque. Before the conflict, they would come here for Christmas festivities and we went to their place at Salah.

We dined together and never thought about who was a Hausa or Berom. And this had been happening right from the beginning. In fact, there was no beginning. We met our parents behaving this way. The only thing was that the Fulani would never own a piece of land, but that interwoven relationship was there for centuries.

The participant, a Berom Christian, notes when deciding to honour invitations to ceremonies, invitees never considered the host's ethnic or religious affiliation, and people were disposed to attend ceremonies in outgroup houses of worship. He recalls growing up within this environment and believes that the root of this orientation of brotherhood among the different ethnic groups even predates this current generation of community elders.

Just like PL's statement on the spirit of oneness in Angwan Doki, a Berom Christian resident of Dadin Kowa, QP, recounts that the people in the community lacked visible identity markers that differentiated them. In responding to my invitation to talk about his own experiences of relating with Hausa and Fulani Muslims, the Participant commented as follows:

You won't even know that a person is a Hausa man except through his name. Before the conflict you wouldn't know who belongs to a particular ethnicity or religion. We dressed in the same way. The only visible difference was their observance of the daily five prayers and their Salah celebration.

Similar to the perspectives already discussed, QP notes that the people in Dadin Kowa were so culturally intertwined that their modes of dressing were indistinguishable. People's identity, in his view, only became apparent through their name. And given that, as PH notes, the christening of babies was not always based on the family's ethnicity, this too may have been an unreliable ethnic marker prior to 2001. Similar to PX's stories, QP notes that religious infusion was low

prior to the conflict so much so that people's religious affiliation became apparent only through their participation in religious rituals.

Similar to the narratives of Angwan Doki residents above, language use and people's way of life in Dadin Kowa were not culturally defined. For example, when asked about her pre-conflict experiences of intergroup relations, KP noted that:

It was a peaceful place. There were intermarriages. You would see the Berom marry the Fulani and the Fulani marry the Berom. There are some Fulanis today that speak Berom and other indigenous languages. This shows that they had a good relationship. Some of the Fulanis can speak Tarok and other indigenous languages. Sometimes if you see a Fulani man, you'll think he is Berom or Angas because of how he lives.

Now, the Fulani man and the Berom man are like cat and dog because of what has been happening. Apart from the intermarriages, they ate together and worked together and worked together before 2001. If there was a special church event and you invited them, the Fulanis and Hausas would come and celebrate with you. The same with the Muslims. When they had weddings, the Christians attended. The Christians entered the Mosques and rejoiced with them.

The participant, a Berom Christian woman, contrasts the conflict period with the pre-2001 era. She stresses that even though the conflict is fought along ethnoreligious lines, the people were tolerant of each other's religion and were culturally interwoven before the conflict began. Her comment about the willingness of the Christians in the community to attend ceremonies in the Mosque underscores the religious tolerance of the time and corroborates WP's own account of doing so. Further, her comment about the difficulty in differentiating between the Fulani and indigenous tribes before the conflict reinforces QP's claim that the different ethnic groups dressed similarly pre-2001.

In addition to the interwoven lifestyles in Dadin Kowa, the population that speak the language of the indigenous Berom people and that of the settler Hausa group was heterogeneous.

Responding to my question about her personal experience of intergroup relations pre-2001, PT, a Berom Christian woman, proclaimed the following:

At that time, you couldn't differentiate a Berom from a Hausa or Fulani kid, except through their accents. You only noticed the difference because when the Berom kids spoke Hausa it won't be as fluent as when a Hausa kid is speaking the Hausa language. You couldn't even differentiate them by their dressing.

In her view, people were unaware of the ethnicity of the people with whom they related prior to 2001. Similar to the experiences of Participants KP and QP above, PT noted that people were indistinguishable by their dress code because they dressed in the same way. It was only by paying attention to people's accents that their ethnicity could be discerned.

Joint celebration of sociocultural festivals

Just as the indigenous and settler groups were integrated linguistically and in their dressing culture before 2001, so was their observance of religious events devoid of ethnoreligious borders. Prior to 2001, participation in the religious festivities of the indigenous Christian ethnic groups and the settler Muslim ethnicities in both Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa was not limited to the ingroup members only. The participants' stories show that the indigenous and settler ethnic groups celebrated each other's religious festivals together and made merry irrespective of whose event it was. The Christian groups went out of their way to accommodate the religious restrictions of the Muslim groups because they wanted to remove all the hindrances to their full involvement. The Muslim groups, on their part, did not wait to be invited by their Christian neighbours to celebrate with them. Rather, they anticipated the festivals as they would their own.

Likewise, the Christian groups looked forward to the religious festivals of the settler groups because they knew it was a period in which the entire community made merry.

Angwan Doki

In Angwan Doki, the indigenous Christian participants recall participating in Salah celebrations, while the Muslims remember their involvement in Christmas-time festivities. When I asked them to say more about how they related with the other group before 2001, the participants talked about the involvement of ingroup members in the outgroup's festival as a way of substantiating their claim that it was a peaceful era. OP, for example, commented as follows:

When it was salah, we went to Muslims' houses, ate, drank and played together. At Christmas, they also came to visit us, and we ate and played together. It was awesome. Truly, it was awesome [...] There was a time I went to one of their houses. Their father is married to four wives and there are many kids in the house. In fact, that family would be a strong voting bloc. Ha ha ha.

I visited their home at Salah. Instead of giving us food individually, they had to dish it in a basin as there weren't enough plates to serve everyone. We ate together and went outside to play. It was quite awesome. We played games together as well. I also had a friend whose father is a Muslim while the Mom is a Christian. The family celebrates both Christmas and Salah. To be honest, whenever we had church programmes and we invited them, they came. That's why I said our relationship with them was very cordial back then.

The participant, a Berom Christian, recalls the fondness of, and his nostalgia for, the time in which religious festivals were jointly celebrated in the community. He talks about the Muslim and Christian kids eating from the same bowl in his Muslim friend's home and thinks it was because the number of kids exceeded the available plates. Whether that was the reason or not, "eating from one bowl" symbolizes the cordiality which OP thinks characterized intergroup relations during this period. His story also shows that the tradition of jointly celebrating religious

festivals may have developed in Angwan Doki because not all the families were religiously homogenous.

Another participant's recollection of pre-conflict intergroup relations in the community not only corroborates OP's assertion that religious festivals were jointly celebrated; it also goes further to show that non-adherents of a religion anticipated its festivals because the merriment that accompanied them were not bordered. On the nature of intergroup relations before the conflict, PP, an Afizere Christian, articulated it as follows:

You see, when the Muslims were fasting, we would count down to the Salah celebration. On the Salah day, we will go from house to house eating and drinking. The Muslim kids did the same thing at Christmas. The only problem then was that they will ask you beforehand whether they could slaughter the animal for you. They will ask you, who slaughtered the animal? They will refuse to eat if the person that slaughtered it is a non-Muslim.

Apart from showing that the Christian kids looked forward to partaking in the goods of Salah, PP's remark shows that the Muslims were willing to join their Christian neighbours in celebrating Christmas so much so that they would take steps to ensure that there were no obstacles to that happening. The participant sees the Muslims' request to slaughter the Christians' animal as problematic. Such requests, however, indicate the Muslims' perception of their Christian neighbours as understanding and tolerant of their religious beliefs.

In contrast to PP's view that the Muslims' request to slaughter the Christmas animal was problematic, other Christians in the pre-2001 period thought otherwise as they invited their Muslim neighbours to do the slaughtering. For example, while commenting on the bond that existed between the groups before the 2001 conflict, PX highlighted this practice as follows:

We were relating like brothers. When it came to Christmas, you would see Muslims move to the Christian homes and celebrate with them. In fact, because of the peaceful coexistence, a Christian man would say, “I know you’re a Muslim, so I won’t slaughter my ram or chicken myself so that we can eat together. I don’t want you to reject the meat because it is against your religion.”

PX, a Hausa Muslim, believes that intergroup relations pre-2001 were marked by a sense of brotherhood because he experienced the Christians’ accommodation of the religious principles of the Muslims.

That feeling of brotherhood between the indigenous Christians and settler Muslims is also manifest in PL’s experience of the sociocultural festivals of the Berom people. While decrying the current state of intergroup relations in Angwan Doki, the participant, a Hausa Muslim, remarked that:

All these indoctrinations started breeding barriers. Hence, we lost the beautiful life that we cherished. During Christmas, we would go to wait at the corridors of the church for our friends to finish the Christmas service so that we could accompany them to their houses to have a feast. It is during that time that some communities hold their cultural activities. The Berom cultural festival, which is now called Mandia, was previously referred to as Inze Berom. We would join them and do the traditional dances.

PL’s story shows that the Muslims were enthusiastic about Christmas just as PP’s narration indicates that the Christians looked forward to Salah in the pre-conflict era. Additionally, PL’s participation in the Inze Berom shows that what ordinarily would be a symbol of nationalism was, in the pre-2001 era, another avenue for the indigenous and settler ethnic groups to fraternize.

Perhaps, explaining the prevalence of the joint celebration of religious festivals pre-2001, UP, another Hausa Muslim, notes that she doesn’t see any Quran-based principle that prohibits

such a practice. In an attempt to highlight the cordiality of pre-conflict intergroup relations in the community, UP made the following remark:

There was 100 percent relationship. These two churches, which you can see across the window, ECWA no. 1 and Assemblies of God Church, are almost in my compound as there is no fence separating us. We were living together with the pastors [...] During Salah and Christmas, we ate together, played together and did everything together. I know the Quran and I know the Bible, and I don't think there's anything preventing me from celebrating Christmas with the Christians. We are human beings and it is mentioned in the Quran that Christianity is the religion.

The participant, a Hausa Muslim, notes that she celebrates with Christians at Christmas because there are no religious impediments to doing so. Beyond this perception, her comment also suggests a great deal of religious tolerance that may have created the environment in which she views celebrating Christmas with Christians as okay. Given the proximity of churches and Christian clergy to her residence, she may have become so accustomed to the Christians' way of life that she considers celebrating with Christians as religiously permissible.

Dadin Kowa

As the stories below show, before the first conflict episode, Dadin Kowa residents' celebration of Christian and Muslim festivals was similar to how the Angwan Doki community members celebrated them. The Christian and Muslim youths in Dadin Kowa viewed Christmas and Salah as opportunities for having a get-away. This viewpoint emerges from MP's attempt to elaborate on his claim that, if at all there were disputes in the community before the 2001 conflict started, they were not at the group level. MP, who is a Hausa Muslim, commented on pre-2001 intergroup relations as follows:

It was a very cordial relationship. I will tell you one thing. Before 2001, we used to have a pre-Salah picnic in which the Muslims would invite their Christian friends. We also organized picnics during Christmas. During Christmas, the Christians hosted the picnic. We would go to the outskirts of town with our girlfriends.

Something happened in one such outing. One time we were out on one of these picnics, and there was a misunderstanding involving a Hausa and Fulani boy. It was a Berom man that intervened and made sure that the clash didn't escalate. The relationship between our parents was the same. It was only since 2001 that the whole thing turned *{sour}*.

MP's intention was to show that there was no group-based animosity prior to 2001. He substantiates this point by stating that when two Hausa and Fulani boys had a quarrel, it was a Berom man that acted as a mediator. His point is that given that the Hausa and Fulani fall under the settler category, the indigenous Berom man would have left them to fight if there was intergroup animosity at the time. Beyond his core message, however, MP's story shows that during religious festivities, the indigenous Christian and settler Muslim youths in Dadin Kowa went out of the community to celebrate. Such trips would have required an element of mutual trust among the youths and the parents/guardians that permitted their outings. So, the fact that such trips happened in the first place further substantiates MP's claim that intergroup relations pre-2001 was cordial.

Similar to the recollection of the participants from Angwan Doki, the Dadin Kowa participants note that it was difficult differentiating between the indigenous Christians and the settler Muslims at both Christmas and Salah, which further reinforces the earlier analysis about the existence of a single common identity pre-2001. Speaking about this period, PC, a Hausa Muslim, narrated the following:

Life was very sweet before the conflict that's why people referred to Jos as the home of tourism. In the past, people saw their neighbours as brothers. There was no fighting. We all lived in peace and shared things among ourselves. I was born in Plateau state in 1968, had my primary education here in Zarmaganda [*another community separated from DK by a major road*].

Then, we lived with the Berom, Igbos and many other tribes. Christians and Muslims were together. During Salah, you won't know who's a Christian or a Muslim. We also celebrated Christmas in the same way, together. Everything was normal.

The sense of brotherhood that exists in the foregoing excerpted interviews is also manifest in PC's story about the nature of intergroup relations. He speaks of the period with fondness because it was a time in which Christians and Muslims were indistinguishable during each other's festivities.

PJ, an Epira Muslim, recounted a similar experience when I invited him to narrate how the indigenous Christians and settler Muslims related before 2001. He believed religion did not really divide local people. This is what he had to say on the issue:

Before the 2001 crisis, I was born and brought up in the same neighbourhood as Christians. Nobody cared about your religion. Religion was secondary. Nobody cared. We lived together. Believe me, before the 2001 crisis, nobody knew whose celebration Christmas, Salah or Easter was. We celebrated everything together. On Christmas day, all the Christians shared their food with us. It was the same thing on Salah day. You'll never hear people say 'it's not my celebration' or 'it's your celebration'. Everybody celebrated together.

Nobody knew the difference between Christians and Muslims. On Christmas Day, I always followed my friend to his Catholic Church as his parents were Catholics. Also, when it was Salah, all of us wore our newly sewn clothes and say we are going out to celebrate Salah and their parents never complained. I also liked going to the church with my friend because I enjoyed dancing to the drumbeats. But things are no longer this way. Believe me, we just separated following the 2001 conflict, the Christians and the Muslims.

Growing up in a mixed neighbourhood made PJ aware of the Christian way of worship and made him fond of it to the extent that he enjoyed going to church to experience it. Living in a mixed neighbourhood facilitated the joint celebration of religious festivities, and the intercultural sharing that likely grew out of living in an ethnically and religiously mixed neighbourhood blurred the lines of identity demarcation even at times of significant “ingroup” events. Further reinforcing the theme of brotherhood that runs through the other stories from Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa, both the Christian and Muslim kids adorned new clothes to celebrate a Muslim festival, Salah.

Other experiences of how religious events were celebrated pre-conflict in Dadin Kowa clearly indicate that it was not a coincidence that the Christian children had newly sewn clothes to wear at Christmas. The experience of BP, a Dadin Kowa Hausa Muslim, shows that it was an intentional practice in the community. On the question of how the people related before the outbreak of the 2001 conflict, BP recounted the following in his story:

Okay. It was really nice. Really sweet! If you came to my community, you’ll find that even in the same compound, you will find both Muslims and Christians. You’ll find Berom, Hausa, Afizere and Miyongo living in the same compound. That’s in a large compound. They all lived together and respected themselves as humans. There were no religious or tribal barriers between them. People partook in different festivals irrespective of the tribe celebrating it. During Ramadan, when it was time to break our fast, the Christians would come and join us. They would say, “can you do the Kunu Samya? I like that drink so much. Please when you do it, give it to me together with that gote.”

We ate together. And when it was the eve of Salah, both the Christians and Muslims were always eagerly waiting for the announcement on the TV. Throughout that night, there will be no sleeping. People would be chatting and waiting for the next day because once it was Salah, we all enjoyed it together. We ate together; the meat, the food, everything. And even for the Christian and Muslim kids, their clothes were sewn uniformly. Because we believed we were of the same group, we were age mates and were living in the same house, so we would do everything together. So, it was really nice.

BP's narrative about the Muslim and Christian children wearing new clothes for each other's religious festival is corroborated by KP's story about how religious festivals were celebrated pre-conflict.

KP, who, unlike BP, is a Berom Christian, highlighted this experience whilst he lamented about the current state of intergroup relations in Dadin Kowa. He articulated it in the following manner:

Now, when its Christmas, we celebrate all by ourselves. If you give the Muslims food, they will reject it. This is unlike before. When I was little, we would be given a big tray of food. We would be going from one house to another sharing food. Even the Muslims wore new clothes for Christmas and celebrated with us. But now it is different now.

The Christian and Muslim Dadin Kowa parents' tradition of sewing uniform/new clothes for their children for both the Salah and Christmas celebrations indicates that the feeling of community that accompanied the celebration of religious festivals was not only a children's affair. Rather, it shows that the Dadin Kowa parents had the same mindset of brotherhood as their children did. As discussed above, WP asserts that the relation of the Christian parents with the settler Muslim parents shaped the Christian and Muslim children's relationship pre-conflict. Hence, it is plausible to note that the environment that allowed BP, KP and the other children in their respective neighbourhoods to jointly celebrate the Christian and Muslim festivals as one community was the creation of their parents.

In addition to the intentionality of the Christian children adorning new clothes during Salah, BP's story about pre-conflict intergroup relations in Dadin Kowa shows a deeper

involvement of the Christians in the build-up to the Salah festival. His recollection that both the Christian and Muslim children in Dadin Kowa looked out for the TV announcement that heralded Salah is similar to PP's experience of the groups in Angwan Doki keenly anticipating each other's festivities because the benefits were not identity-driven. Beyond reinforcing this notion of ingroup enthusiasm for outgroup festivals, BP's narration shows that prior to 2001 the Dadin Kowa Christian children partook in Iftar, which is the daily breaking of Ramadan fast at sunset.

His experience of Christians joining the Muslims to perform Iftar is also evident in QP's recollection of how the groups related before 2001. The participant, a Berom Christian, described the nature of intergroup relations at the time as follows:

Before 2001, I had many Hausa friends. I could go to their houses and sleep there, and they could also come to my house and sleep-in. We did many things together. We ate together, most especially during festive seasons.

Previously, when it was time to break their fast, they would call me, and we broke it together. Before breaking the fast, we will drink [*kunu*]. We drank *kunu* before eating anything because they used it to prepare their stomach for food after which we would eat a variety of food; rice, *chin-chin* and *gote*.

In slight contrast to QP's description, BP's experience of the Iftar is that rather than simply accept what was available at the event table; the Christian children had specific requests for foods and drinks. Such requests show that the children were at ease with their Muslim neighbours at a level that only brothers/sisters and friends would. The attitude of the children could be viewed as "kids being kids" yet such an explanation is untenable in this context given the nature of the children's post-direct violence relationship, which is discussed in a different chapter.

It takes a village

It takes a village is an African proverb that means that a child's safe and proper upbringing is the responsibility of the community, not just his/her biological parents or immediate guardians. This proverb is representative of the category of data that is discussed in this section. Unlike the traditional connotation, however, the proverb is used here to represent not only the practice of an entire community caring for children but also people's inclination to promote the wellbeing of others. In both Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa, indigenous Christians and settler Muslims were invested in the education of their neighbour's children pre-2001. Also, in the same period, the children in the respective communities saw their neighbour's home as an extension of their biological parents' kitchen irrespective of their ethnicity or religion. Still, in the pre-conflict era, the community elders were involved in reprimanding erring children when their parents were absent. Unlike the preceding two issues, the practice of disciplining other people's children is mostly evident in the stories told by the Dadin Kowa participants. I now discuss the meaning of "it takes a village" in the context of Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa.

Angwan Doki

Although not as pervasive in the narrative of the Angwan Doki participants as their Dadin Kowa counterparts, the welfare of people in the community was viewed as the collective responsibility of everyone in both communities pre-2001. The education of Angwan Doki's children before the conflict started was not left to their biological parents, family members or people affiliated to the children ethnically or religiously. Both Christian and Muslim participants from the community recall either supporting the education of outgroup kids or receiving educational support from the

outgroup. One such participant is PN, a Berom Christian who recognized that, “whenever something happened, you wouldn’t know who brought particular alms as people of different tribes chipped in something. Whenever your child was sent back home from school because of non-payment of fees, anybody could help you.” PN’s experience of pre-conflict relations shows that there was a deep feeling of community in Angwan Doki, a view that is reinforced by PH, who was a recipient of such financial assistance. While describing the cordiality of the era before the conflict, PH, another Berom Christian, averred that, “even when my father didn’t have my school fees, my friend’s father, who’s a Hausa Muslim, will give me school fees to go and pay”.

In addition to fees payment, educational support, as UP recalls rendering, was also provided in the form of recommending the outgroup’s children for school admission. UP, a Hausa Muslim woman, commented on intergroup relations in the same period as follows:

When I was in science school, there were so many students in need of skills, but they could not all be enrolled in the Government Technical College in Kuru. I personally helped four Christian boys to gain admission into the school. I have a 95 percent good relationship with their parents. They were running helter-skelter trying to get them admitted. As a worker in the science school, I had colleagues in GTC, so I recommended the kids and they were accepted. They are my children. I don’t see them as Christian kids. I see them as mine.

Similar to the narratives of PN and PH, UP’s story also reflects the communal spirit that existed in Angwan Doki pre-conflict. This is evidenced not simply by the act of support itself but by the motivation that is indicated in her statement. She did not talk about being moved by the pleas from the Christian children’s parents. Rather, in the same breath as her description of the support that she provided, she talks about having a good relationship with their parents and viewing the children as hers.

While the foregoing discussion shows that Angwan Doki's adults were invested in the education of the community's children irrespective of their ethnicity and religion, the children themselves were aware of the goodwill that prevailed in the community and embraced it. They, for example, saw their neighbours' kitchens as much a source of food as their parents.' PH's story about pre-conflict intergroup relations reflects this tendency among the community's children. The participant, a Berom Christian recounted the following in his story:

The experience was very cordial before the conflict [...] Our houses were so close. You would see a Muslim house, next was a Christian house, then a Muslim house, and followed by a Christian house. Very close!

And sometimes if you don't have food, you go to the Muslims' house, you'll be given food to eat. At other times they may be the ones in need of food, and they come to our house to find food.

Going to each other's house was like going to our own home. It was like you going to, maybe your uncle's house to go and eat. You didn't have to necessarily go to your birth house to find food whenever you were hungry.

Even when I misbehaved at home and my parents deprived me of food to punish me, my Muslim friend's parents would call me in and give me food. Now, there's no such relationship.

Similar to the previous excerpts in this section, and in line with the previously discussed sub-themes, PH's story is reflective of an integrated community. Apart from reinforcing the notion of an ethnoreligiously mixed community, his experience shows the familial nature of living in Angwan Doki pre-2001. As he notes, going to your neighbour's house to eat "was like going to your own home *or* your uncle's home." Similar to the structure of UP's narration above, PH tells this story about Angwan Doki's children's access to food in the pre-conflict era within a particular context, which is the ethnically and religiously mixed nature of the community. The significance of this is that it is through the interaction that takes place within such a space that

common experiences evolve, and it is the existence of such an experience that allows for the development of the familial bond that explains the children's relationship with their neighbours.

PH recalls that he found succour in the home of his Muslim friend when his biological parents deprived him of food as punishment for a wrongdoing. It was not in all cases, however, that an outgroup member served as the proverbial right hand that drew an erring child closer. For example, UP, who is a Hausa Muslim, partly describes the communal nature of pre-conflict relations as follows:

We considered all the children like ours. We discipline them as needed, not minding whether they are Christian or Muslim. We treat them equally because we don't know what they would become in the future. It may be to our own benefit in the future if we discipline them now.

As UP's recollection of pre-conflict relations shows, there were instances in which outgroup members acted as the proverbial left hand that disciplined a child. They, in her view, did this because it was in their best interest to do so as a well-trained child could be beneficial to them in the future. The motivation for disciplining outgroup children, like the underlying thinking behind the children's treatment of their neighbours' homes as an extension of their biological parents' kitchen, flows from the familial bond that prevailed in the community pre-conflict. It is this orientation to intergroup relations that made UP, and the other people to whom she refers, to believe that the children of other community members could serve their interests when they are grown.

The foregoing shows that before 2001, the people of Angwan Doki were invested in the welfare of the community's children, yet children were not the only group that benefitted from

the spirit of brotherhood in the pre-conflict period. For example, PN, a Berom Christian, commented on the pre-2001 era as follows:

Back then, when people had problems they were viewed as collective problems, rather than individual problems [...] I can't even assign a tribal name to who was helping out because, before 2001, there was nothing like a Berom person or Fulani person. We were just people. In a house owned by a Berom, Hausa or Fulani man, we had people of different ethnic backgrounds living there. So, it was just people with no tribes. It was just a community thing.

Apart from reinforcing PH's description of Angwan Doki's settlement pattern as deeply mixed before 2001, PN's story shows that the familial spirit that pervaded the community made people to address individual problems collectively.

Dadin Kowa

The Dadin Kowa participants stories on the subject of "it takes a village" mirror those of the participants from Angwan Doki yet differ both in terms of the variation of the experiences narrated and the number of participants whose narratives reflect this subject. Included in the stories from Dadin Kowa is people's concern for the education of the children of others. Similar to the tendency in Angwan Doki before the conflict, the interest in the education of the community's children was neither based on the ethnicity nor the religion of the children. For example, BP, a Hausa Muslim, recalls the role of the Christians in ensuring that the Muslim children were enrolled in western-styled schools:

The Christians were the ones pushing or encouraging the Muslims to enrol their children in school. They would say "stop allowing your children to hawk on the streets." They would say "send them to school." Sometimes, the Christian parents

enrolled these Muslim children in school by themselves because they respect Western education more than Muslims.

Also, SP, a Berom Christian lady, comments on pre-conflict intergroup relations as follows:

In the past, my Dad paid fees for many children, including Christian and Muslim children. Before 2001, I remember my father telling me to wait for my school fees till the following week because what he had was for paying our neighbour's child's fees [...] We lived together as one. We did things together as a family.

As I discuss next, the stories of BP, a Hausa Muslim, and SP, a Berom Christian, are mutually reinforcing. The former recounts how Christian parents in the community encouraged their Muslim neighbours to enrol their children in school and in some cases enrolled the children by themselves. This is reinforced by the latter's story about her father footing the school fees of both Christian and Muslim children even at her expense. The latter's story reinforces the former in that her father would not have taken such an extraordinary step of withholding her school fees for the benefit of their neighbour's child, except he was trying to ensure that the neighbour had no excuse for withdrawing the child from school. SP's story itself reinforces BP's because by paying their school fees, SP's father was encouraging school attendance among the Muslim children, whose parents, as BP notes, are not as enthusiastic about Western education as the Christians. In addition to the explanatory relationship between both experiences, the actions narrated are reflective of, at least, interpersonal relationships that were unfettered by ethnicity or religion.

Further demonstrating the familial bond that characterized the relationship of the Christian and Muslim parents in Dadin Kowa pre-conflict is their arrangement for school pick-up and drop-off. QP, a Berom Christian, described the practice as follows:

The Hausa kids had their own Arabic schools, but the educated Hausa parents took their kids to Western-styled schools, including the church-owned schools. There were Hausa and Fulani kids in my school. Depending on the schedules of our parents, any of my parents could drop me and my Muslim neighbours off at school in the morning while their parents would pick us up in the afternoon.

As QP's experience of pre-conflict relations shows, the members of the indigenous Christian and settler Muslim groups were reliant on each other to the point of the parents sharing school-runs in order to maximize their time. In addition to demonstrating intergroup reliance, this practice also indicates that there was considerable trust between both groups before 2001 as a parent would not leave such a responsibility to other people, except he/she believes that the child would be safe.

Dadin Kowa's parents, as other experiences show, did not entrust only their children's safety during school drop-off and pick-up to outgroup neighbours. The stories that I discuss next reveal that childcare by an outgroup member was a common practice in the community before the first conflict episode. For example, SP, a Berom Christian, narrates her experience of being left under the care of a Hausa Muslim neighbour nicknamed Babaladi as follows:

I would never forget my mother taking me to Babaladi's home whenever she was going to the market. Babaladi was a Hausa Muslim who we considered as our grandmother. My Mom would ask her to look after us while she goes to the market. Also, if my mother was going out before we returned from school, she would leave our lunch with Babaladi. Our parents also took us to her apartment whenever they weren't returning home for the night, especially when they made a brief trip to the

village. And it wasn't even every time that my mother provided food before leaving. She would just leave it to Babaladi to figure out what we would eat.

This story shows that the participant's mother saw Babaladi as a support structure, and she, in turn, was willing to assume this role whenever she was approached. It further backs up the earlier narratives about children's access to food in the community yet, unlike the previously discussed experiences, SP's story shows that the perception of "kitchen extensions" was not solely a childhood phenomenon. SP's parents themselves expected that she and siblings would be fed in their absence whilst under Babaladi's care. This expectation of theirs coupled with the practice of leaving their children under the care of Babaladi shows that they trusted her despite their different ethnoreligious affiliations.

Similar to SP's experience, WP notes that Berom children stayed with Fulanis and vice versa. Unlike SP's story, however, this shows that Dadin Kowa's children lived under the care of an outgroup family for extended periods of time to the extent that they became socialized into their way of life. Below is his narration of this experience:

Some Berom boys even lived with the Fulani. We could go to their house and remain there for as long as we liked. They will even buy clothes for you. Some of the Fulani boys would come to a Berom man's house and stay there permanently. They won't go back to their parents. Those were our primary schoolmates who picked interest in us. They would follow us and start learning.

Today, some of them are graduates, including medical doctors in the main Jos town. Some of our boys also went to the Fulanis and stayed there. That's why today many of our people also rear cattle. Those ones have turned into Fulani. So, we had centuries of relations. It started a long time ago.

WP describes a communal life in which children could switch between homes. This narrative like much of the foregoing discussion reveals that intergroup relations were characterized by mutual trust pre-conflict, a theme that is further demonstrated in the second part of this chapter.

As DP's experience shows, the practice of looking after other people's children was not limited to those whose parents specifically made such requests neither did it end in Dadin Kowa post-direct violence. DP's story about intergroup relations reflects both these points. In response to my request for detail on his claim that pre-conflict intergroup relations were cordial in Dadin Kowa, he responded in the following manner:

We lived peacefully. As I told you, my father's best friend was a Berom Christian man and until his death, which was two months ago, he would call me on the phone after I closed from the Mosque every Friday. Because he knew when we close, he always called between 2.30 pm and 3 pm every Friday.

He would ask, "How are you, your family, your wife? Are they fine?" I would say, "Yes sir". Then he would end the call. If his wife was seating close to him, he would say, "speak with your mother" and he would pass the phone over to her. If his older kids were there, he would also give them the phone. In fact, during the conflict, he asked all of us to move over to his house.

DP's point was that his father's friend would not have consistently checked on him and his family after his father's demise if the relationship were rancorous before the conflict. It was also because of the positive relationship pre-2001 that his father's friend offered to accommodate him and his siblings during the conflict. By constantly checking on his late friend's family after the conflict, the Berom Christian man was attempting to fill the parental void that was left after the passing away of DP's father. Moreover, the family friend's reference to his wife as DP's mother shows that he viewed himself as DP's father either because he felt that his friend's demise created this responsibility or due to the families' relationship pre-conflict or both.

The investment in the welfare of other people's children in pre-conflict Dadin Kowa was not restricted to only education support and childcare. The adults in Dadin Kowa were also involved in moulding the character of the community's children irrespective of their family's ethnic or religious background. Several stories, told by both Berom Christian and Hausa Muslim participants, point to this practice. QP, a Berom Christian, recalls one such instance as follows:

There's a house we used to go for evening prayers, called Gida Adua. We practised dance routines there. There was a boy called Ahmed [*not real name*], a Hausa Muslim boy, who always came there with other Muslim kids to watch us perform [...]

Our parents *had a* good relationship. If you did something wrong, a Hausa man could discipline you just as your father would have. There was a very stubborn Hausa boy in our community whose parents apparently lost control over. There were Christian parents in our community that would call him over to their place and counsel him.

This excerpt shows that people did not perform their correctional duties in relation to their biological children alone. Rather, they were involved in counselling other children of the community, even those with a different ethnoreligious affiliation. In a situation of animus, the Christian parents would have ignored the conduct of the Muslim boy since such behaviour could be broadcasted to paint his entire group in a bad light. Because, as other stories show, the parents in the community viewed parenting as a collective responsibility, the Christian parents in QP's story felt that they were duty-bound to counsel Ahmed.

The above discussion on collective parenting is based on a Berom Christian's story about Christian parents counselling a Muslim boy. For other stories, however, the narrators of similar practices in the community are Hausa and Epira Muslims. And, in contrast to QP's experience, their stories are about Christian adults reprimanding both Christian and Muslim children. Also,

whereas QP's experience relates to verbal counselling, the stories examined next pertain to the proverbial correctional rod. One such story is from PJ, an indigenous Ebira Muslim, who recounted his experience as follows:

You see behind this hall, there's a church. That was our playing ground growing up. We were fond of insulting each other's parents when we played football {soccer} on the church's field. When there was a foul, we would start trading insults and someone would want to upset you by saying "your father," implying that whatever insults you hurl at them, you're indirectly hurling at your Dad.

The Reverend there caught us one day and asked all of us to lie down on the floor. He flogged our buttocks for that but later sent us to the dining to go and eat. None of this can happen today, as they would be afraid to come close to us because we're Muslims.

The collective reading of the experiences of PH and UP about communal parenting in pre-conflict Angwan Doki is similar to PJ's story about intergroup relations in Dadin Kowa before 2001. While UP recalls how an adult member of Angwan Doki served as the proverbial left hand in disciplining an outgroup child, PH recounts his experience of another community member acting as the proverbial right hand by offering food to an outgroup child, who was being deprived his meal by his parents as punishment for some wrongdoing. By not sparing the rod after witnessing PJ and his friend curse at their respective parents, and later feeding them to compensate for the effect of his punishment, the Reverend in the story above served the role of both proverbial hands.

Beyond the parallels with the Angwan Doki stories, several aspects of PJ's experience highlight the cordial nature of intergroup relations in Dadin Kowa before 2001. For example, although PJ is unclear about the ethnoreligious composition of the football (soccer) teams, his involvement in football matches that regularly held on the field of a church shows the lack of

intergroup animus at the time. Also, the Reverend would not have applied the “stick” in disciplining the lads in the churchyard except he was confident that it was acceptable to their parents, a point which BP addresses in his statement about the practice. BP, a Hausa Muslim, described pre-conflict communal parenting:

And if a Muslim child did something wrong, a Christian could punish him, and his parent won't ask why. It was the same thing with the Christian kids. If they misbehaved, a Muslim could punish them because their parents believed that the Christian man or woman meant well.

Read collectively, the two main points in BP's statement reinforce my earlier analysis of PJ's story about a Reverend's disciplinary action against him and his friends. Evident in BP's narration is Dadin Kowa parents' belief that an adult who disciplined their child acted in good fate. It also highlights the commitment of the community's adults to the proper upbringing of the children. If the community's parents had this shared understanding that adults disciplining their children is good training for them, it, therefore, follows that the adults' commitment to reprimanding other people's erring children was partly hinged on this common sense of purpose.

Although the foregoing discussion focuses on the pre-conflict period in Dadin Kowa, the practice of disciplining other people's children did not end after the Jos conflict. This perspective is highlighted in PJ's narration of an incident involving his own son:

As far as Dadin Kowa is concerned, people still live as one. For example, my son misbehaved while I was out yesterday. He insulted a Hausa man. I was told that he was disciplined by a man who I know is a Berom Christian. I learnt about this because my neighbour told me that this man spanked my son because he cursed at an older guy. The only reason I didn't go the Berom man's house and place my knees on the ground to thank him is that I don't know where he lives exactly in Dadin Kowa. I would have thanked him because he wants the boy to be a better person...

PJ's appreciation of the man who disciplined his son in his absence lends credence to BP's assertion about the attitude of Dadin Kowa's parents towards other adults who discipline their children. The action of the man who implemented the disciplinary action and PJ's reaction to this event, which occurred post-direct violence, both reinforce the notion of the existence of communal parenting in Dadin Kowa and suggests that this practice may have outlived the conflict in this community.

The foregoing discussion pertains to the attempts of Dadin Kowa's Christian and Muslim adults to shape the character of the community's children, readiness to care for them in diverse ways and willingness to support their education financially. Yet the acts of support by both groups pre-2001 were not directed at Dadin Kowa's children alone. The stories of MP and SP about intergroup relations during this period show that adults were themselves beneficiaries of the goodwill that characterized intergroup relations. For example, MP, a Hausa Muslim, revealed the following in his story:

I remember that when my father wanted to farm, one of his friend's, a Christian Berom man, invited him to farm on his land. That was my father's first year of farming, and he had a bumper harvest of Irish potatoes, which at that time was grown only in Plateau state in Nigeria. He had a bumper harvest and, fortunately, he lost his job and had to take to farming full-time. It was because of this new occupation that my father was able to fund my education.

Similarly, SP, a Berom Christian, reported on this issue in the following manner:

We loved ourselves as family. We helped each other, both educationally and in farming. People tried to link up their neighbours with jobs in their workplace. When a Christian or Muslim woman's daughter was getting married, both Christians and

Muslims would contribute to the wedding as they also saw the lady as their daughter [...] As I said, it was a Muslim man that helped my Dad to get the job that made him prosperous now [...] We related very well.

The above excerpts indicate that before the conflict, people sought the economic prosperity of their fellow community members, not just those with whom they were ethnically or religiously related. MP, for example, notes that his father, who is a Hausa Muslim, was rescued from potential financial troubles by a Berom Christian who offered him a piece of land on which to farm. Similarly, SP notes that the familial nature of intergroup relations pre-2001 resulted in a labour force network that shared information about job openings in their establishments. It was through such information sharing by a Muslim, she remarks, that her own father, a Berom Christian, gained the employment that accounts for his financial prosperity today. Read collectively, both experiences show that the offering of economic support pre-conflict was not unidirectional. The settler Hausa Muslims contributed to the economic wellbeing of their indigenous Berom Christian neighbours and vice versa.

Economic ties that bind

Other experiences of intergroup relations in both Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa reveal several more entrenched systems of economic interdependence pre-conflict. The stories discussed under this section show that before 2001 the indigenous and settler groups were economically integrated both in the formal and informal sectors. In some cases, the indigenous people and the settlers had established symbiotic occupational relationships pre-conflict, implying that the success of one group's business relied on the cooperation of the other. Also, before the conflict

occupations were ethnically and religiously heterogeneous. Although an ethnoreligious group may have dominated an occupation or business, none was homogeneously populated neither were they perceived as so.

Angwan Doki

The Angwan Doki Berom Christian and Hausa Muslim participants' accounts of pre-conflict intergroup relations show economic linkages between the two groups, and the involvement of both groups in the same occupations both formal and informal. UP and PE speak to the interdependent economic relations that existed between both ethnoreligious groups. UP, a Hausa Muslim woman, expressed the following in her story:

There are so many things we did together. The Fulani herders and Berom farmers were living together for centuries. Anywhere you found a Berom farmer, there was a Fulani herder too. The Fulani would camp in a place for a whole year grazing their cattle and fertilizing the land, then at the end of the year, they would move to another place. It is at that point that the farmer would then cultivate the land. They were living together peacefully. So, why are they always fighting now?

UP's comment was in response to my request for detail after she characterized pre-2001 intergroup relations in the community as peaceful. I asked her for examples of what both groups did together that makes her believe it was a peaceful time. Her reference to the groups' centuries-long co-habitation at the beginning of her comment suggests that her parents or other community elders may have handed down some of her knowledge about intergroup relations. It, however, does not mean that the succeeding story is not a personal experience since the temporal comment was a continuation of the same general statement that had prompted my request for specific

examples of peaceful co-existence. Rather, it suggests that the practice that she narrates did not occur only during her lifetime.

The practise shows that the Berom people's access to land was not a hindrance to the Fulani's satisfying their land needs and vice versa. The rotational land use described in UP's story is illustrative of a system of cooperation that allowed each group to achieve their occupational objectives while simultaneously enabling the other group to achieve theirs. The interdependence that characterized intergroup relations during this period accounts for UP's belief that it was a peaceful time, and, in her view, makes the antagonism of today puzzling.

Similarly, PE describes a similar practice of economic interdependence. Compared to UP, however, his narration is more indicative of a transactional relationship than a cooperative enterprise. The participant, a Berom Christian, characterized intergroup relations in Angwan Doki as follows:

The Hausa have the advantage of being traders. The local man [*Berom Christian*] knows nothing about business. Everything he needs is supplied by the other man [*Hausa Muslim*] but he produces the raw materials which the businessman [*Hausa Muslim*] comes to buy and resells to him as finished products. Haha.

The context of PE's comment above was my request for clarification after he stated that the Berom people lived in peace with the Hausas before 2001 because they were ignorant. Unlike UP's viewpoint, the symbiotic trade relationship that he describes does not make the current intergroup rivalry puzzling. Rather, he views this practice as evidence of the Berom people's subservient position in pre-conflict intergroup relations in the community. Although his comment was driven by a different motive, PE's account of pre-conflict intergroup relations in

Angwan Doki reinforces UP's narrative about the economic interdependence that existed between the indigenous and settler groups.

In contrast to PE's perspective, PN believes that the peaceful nature of intergroup relations pre-conflict was conditioned by the prevalence of ethnically mixed occupations. The participant, who like PE is a Berom Christian, commented on that period as follows:

We had no problem back then because there wasn't any group specialized in one occupation. In the past, farming and cattle herding were done by both Fulani and Berom people. The Beroms owned cattle and the Fulanis also farmed. So, it's unlike now in which it's only the Beroms that are going into farming, while only the Fulanis are going into cattle rearing. People got into either occupation depending on what they felt would earn them a living [...]

If someone started a business and they were profiting from it, someone else, irrespective of their tribe, could start the same business because it has been proven to be profitable. That is why today there are still many Berom cattle herders and many Fulani farmers, whether dry season (irrigation) farming or the normal rainy season farming.

It was after the 2001 conflict when people {indigenous tribes} started to say that the land belongs to them that many Fulani people went back to their default setting of cattle rearing, which they are known for.

The existence of ethnically heterogeneous occupations pre-2001 is also evident in PH's recollection of intergroup relations at the time. PH, a Berom Christian like PE and PN, communicated on this issue in the following way:

We farmed together, and on the Berom side, if you couldn't pay your child's school fees, you gave your children to the Fulani to train him in cattle rearing and after a year the Fulani man will give the boy one cow to start off his own business. The number of cows the child gets depends on the number of years he stayed with the Fulani man.

PN's account of intergroup relations demonstrates not only occupational heterogeneity pre-conflict but also how this form of economic integration engendered peaceful co-existence. In his view, because occupations were not ethnically homogenous in Angwan Doki, interpersonal occupational disputes did not morph into intergroup conflicts. This is a valid interpretation of PN's comment about occupational heterogeneity in that his entire statement was intended to substantiate his claim that the indigenous and settler groups lived in peace before 2001. The stories of PN and PH offer different explanations of how the occupations in the community became mixed. The former notes that because proven profitability, rather than contiguity to ingroup members, determined occupational choices, the indigenous and settler groups in Angwan Doki worked the same jobs. PH's story about the apprenticeship of Berom children under Fulani herders sheds a different light on the evolution of heterogeneous occupations in the community. This practice coupled with the Berom children receiving a "start-off grant" at the completion of an apprenticeship with a Fulani herder explain why cattle herding was not solely a Fulani occupation even though they were the dominant group, as PN notes.

Dadin Kowa

The economic ties that bound the indigenous and settler populations in Angwan Doki were also a feature of intergroup relations in Dadin Kowa before 2001. For example, similar to UP's recollection about the existence of a symbiotic economic relationship between the indigenous farmers and settler herders in Angwan Doki, PT and WP describe how both groups collaboratively achieved their occupational objectives. PT, for example, narrated the following on the issue:

Unlike now in which people can buy manure, we, the Beroms, relied on the Fulani to fertilize our lands. We would invite them to bring their cattle to graze our land so that as they did that, they would fertilize our land with their cattle dung.

WP described this practice in a similar manner as follows:

The life in Jos before the present troubles was one of the best. We lived in a heavily mixed society. Do you know what I mean by heavily? Heavily! We were mixed up economically. They *Fulani herders*] would bring their cattle to fertilize our land. Every Berom family had its own Fulani that come to fertilize their land. When they move during the dry season, you will then farm on the fertilized land during the rainy season.

These stories show that the Beroms did not simply tolerate the presence of Fulani herders on their land. Rather they welcomed them because it was beneficial to their own occupational needs. Yet the joint use of the land was not haphazard. It was systematically arranged such that the Fulani's use of the land did not interfere with the Berom's and vice versa.

In addition to their occupational interdependence pre-conflict, other stories show that the ethnoreligious affiliation of traders did not determine who patronised their businesses. Both DP and PT, a Hausa Muslim and a Berom Christian, respectively, recount this aspect of pre-conflict relations in Dadin Kowa. DP described the nature of pre-conflict commerce as follows:

When you go to Dadin Kowa market, it is mixed. There's nothing like religion there. It is mixed. If you have what I need, I will come and buy. Christians buy from the Muslims and Muslims buy from Christians.

PT, on her part, details her personal experience of business patronage, revealing the following in her story:

There was another Hausa woman nicknamed Yariya because she makes Yariyo, which was made of ground corn and is fried like a pancake. She would take it to our primary school and other schools to sell to the kids. She later became an established trader to the extent that people from many communities eventually started going to her home to buy food. She's the first person I know who could make *tuwo*. Whenever my Mom wasn't around and my Dad needed food, he would send us to Yariya's home to buy *tuwo* or *yariyo* for him...

DP notes that the community market was ethnoreligiously mixed, which was inevitable given that, as he notes, identity affiliations did not sway the choices of potential customers. If they did, the traders with a similar ethnoreligious background would have congregated in the same area rather than be dispersed across the market. Moreover, as PT's story shows, it was the quality of goods that influenced people's patronage. So, if the good or service were of good quality, people of different backgrounds would seek out such sellers, as PT's story about the *tuwo*-maker suggests.

The drivers of integration in pre-conflict Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa

Pre-conflict intergroup relations in both Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa, as the participants' narratives reveal, was defined by the communities' social, cultural and economic integration, which manifested in the people's shared sense of a single common identity, joint celebration of sociocultural festivals, shared commitment to the welfare of the communities' children and symbiotic economic relationships. These dimensions of integration, as the subsequent discussion shows, were to varying degrees enabled by a culture of trust, intergroup marriages and people's schooling experience. The existence of a culture of trust is evident in simple acts ranging from

food sharing to the habitation of the same residence, and tougher choices like trust-based business relationships and sheltering in the outgroup's home at the onset of the conflict.

Although intermarriages can be viewed as evidence of integration, they were also a means to an integrated community as they had the effect of making people view themselves as one or strive to achieve identity sameness. Likewise, the communities' schools built the foundation of an integrated society as they created opportunities for intergroup contact, fostered positive perception about outgroup members, facilitated the development of a culture of sharing and the collaborative achievement of shared goals.

A culture of trust

Integration in Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa in the pre-conflict period was built on a culture of trust, which is deducible from how the indigenous and settler groups related. I discuss the participants' experiences of these relations in this section. People felt comfortable sharing in the meals of outgroup families because they viewed these homes as an extension of their own kitchens. Yet this perception is itself rooted in the shared belief that the other could do no harm. Also, the existence of mixed settlements pre-2001 is further evidence of the trust that existed between both communities as hardly anyone would co-habit a place with people that they feel threatened by, not even with those with whom they are ethnically or religiously affiliated. Further, the use of outgroup members as sale intermediaries without any financial agreements, as one participant's story shows below, is also a testament to this culture of trust.

Although, as subsequent chapters outline, some community members retreated from their neighbours at the start of the conflict, a few others took refuge in the homes of outgroup

members, which further indicates that the communities were built on trust pre-conflict. I now discuss the experiences of participants in Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa that highlight this driver of integration in the respective communities.

Angwan Doki

In Angwan Doki, we can deduce people's perception of trust from their tendency to share meals coupled with their implicit and explicit rationale for doing so, the settlement structure of the community and their business relationships. The first of these variables is reflected in the experiences of PV, PG and OP all of whom are Berom Christians. For example, in response to my question about the nature of intergroup relations pre-conflict, PV characterized pre-conflict intergroup relations as follows:

We loved each other. We [*indigenous Christians and settler Muslims*] were living in peace like brothers and sisters. When I visited them. I felt welcomed and comfortable in my spirit. We went to each other's house. We visited each other. When they offered us food, we ate it without being afraid of being poisoned. I went to their houses during festive periods like Salah. I stayed with my friend and chatted with her and her husband. Whenever I was offered food, I ate it.

PG expressed a similar sentiment recounting his experience of visiting a farm owned by a Fulani neighbour as follows:

We used to live in peace. There was so much love. There was no problem. We did many things together, including eating together. We could go to the farm and sleep on a Fulani man's farm. We also cooked and offered food to the Fulani man on the farm. There were no issues. People were free to do whatever they pleased. In fact, it was peaceful and loving. We lived really well with the Hausa Muslims living around here.

OP made a related remark in his recollection of pre-conflict relations. This is what he had to say on the issue:

Our relationship with them was very cordial. There's one thing with the Muslims, they like eating junks. Their grannies would make some sweet junk foods that we didn't even know what they were made of [...] The Muslim kids would come to school with such junk food and share them with us, and we loved them. But if they give us that same food now, we won't go close to it.

Embedded in PV's narrative are both the forms of integration discussed in the previous part of this chapter and her perspective about their roots, which is the subject of this discourse. Her reference to Hausa Muslims as brothers and sisters is in concert with the other narratives that I discussed as being evidence of a common human identity pre-conflict, while her Salah visits fall under the communal celebration of religious festivals during that period. Similar to the stories of Participants PG and OP, she also touches on the notion of kitchen extensions, which was discussed as an example of people's investment in the wellbeing of all the community members. Most relevant here, however, is her stated understanding of why these dimensions of integration existed. In OP's view, the Christians joined in Salah celebrations because they were at ease with their neighbours, and she ate with the Muslims because she never feared being poisoned.

In essence, people accepted meal offers from the other not simply because they needed to satisfy their cravings, but also because the satisfaction emanated from a trusted source. PG alludes to the same motivation when he notes that there were no obstacles to how people related, including Fulani Muslims accepting food offers from Berom Christians. A similar view is evident in OP's story about food sharing before 2001. His contrasting statements about people's

past responses to food offers and their likely reactions today shows that the practice of food sharing between the different ethnoreligious groups before 2001 was driven by trust.

The same factor underpinned the willingness of indigenous Christian and settler Muslim ethnicities to live close to each other during this period. Embedded in much of the experiences discussed in the preceding part of this chapter are references to the mixed nature of the settlements in the community before the conflict. For example, Participants PX and PH, a Hausa Muslim and Berom Christian, respectively, alluded to this when they noted that the children of indigenous and settler families grew up together. Similarly, UP's recollection of the pre-conflict period discussed above shows that indigenous Christian and settler Muslim homes existed side-by-side. In his words, "wherever you found a Fulani man, there was a Berom man also."

A related statement of PL, a Hausa Muslim, aligns with those of the foregoing three Participants but goes beyond them by indicating what drove the practice. Describing the neighbourhood patterns of the period before the conflict, PL revealed the following in his story:

It also has a mixture of different ethnic groups, especially from 1945. You have Urhobo, Ibos, Berom, Yoruba etc. You'll find that in the housing settlements and social interaction, there was trust, accommodation and real understanding between the communities [*ethnic communities*]. I'm talking about before the 2001 crisis. Those were years of brotherhood. You'll see a Hausa man's house; next to him would be an Ibo man's house. You will see a house belonging to a Berom and the next would be Ibo or Yoruba.

Similar to PX, PH and UP, PL describes Angwan Doki as ethno religiously mixed before 2001 and indicates that the different ethnic groups were comfortable living in the midst of other ethnic communities because their relationship was based on trust. His description of pre-conflict economic ties in the community also shows that intergroup relations hinged on trust. While

recounting pre-2001 intergroup relations, the participant noted that, “when the Beroms wanted to sell their cows, they gave it to Hausa-Fulani men, most of whom were butchers, who would sell and then remit the money to the Berom.” By noting that the Berom sold cows through Hausa and Fulani men, who are typically the cattle sellers today; PL reinforces the assertions of PN and PH that occupations were ethnically heterogeneous before 2001.

However, beyond lending credence to those stories, the practice that PL describes further indicates that there was mutual trust between the indigenous Christians and settler Muslims before 2001. On the one hand, the Beroms would not have entrusted their cows to the Hausa and Fulani men to butcher and sell if they were not confident that they would be given the correct proceeds. On the other hand, it is unlikely that the butchers would have undertaken such tasks except they believed that the cow owners would accept whatever returns they make.

Dadin Kowa

The experiences of Dadin Kowa Participants, like those from Angwan Doki, also show that trust was a feature of intergroup relations in the community pre-conflict. Some stories show that the different ethnoreligious groups were not only mixed up in the same neighbourhoods, but also allowed their children to live with an outgroup family. Other stories reveal that even when people felt endangered, they considered outgroup homes as safe shelters from harm. In the discussion that follows, I detail both these occurrences based on the experiences of the indigenous Christian and settler Muslim participants and demonstrate how their recollections of events are reflective of a culture of trust.

The culture is evident in WP's story about his relationship with MT, a Fulani boy, during his teenage years. He recounts the experience as follows:

I know one boy, MT, whose father had one of the largest herds of cattle on the Plateau. We would go to the club, and we would return to my family house and stay here sometimes for up to three days, and his father won't even ask where he went because he knew he was in safe hands. I could go to his house and stay there, and my father won't even look for me. All I had to say before leaving home was that I was going to MT's house. I stayed there only during the holidays, but MT stayed in my family house for much longer and at any time because he wasn't schooling.

The trust factor is also reflected in the experiences of PJ, which like WP's, emanates from a boyhood story. He narrated the experience in the following manner:

Believe me, it was the 2001 crisis that made me realize that you couldn't just walk into a friend's home and spend the night there. Whenever I went to ask my Dad for permission to visit my Berom friend, he would say I should take my *wahala* [troubles] along with me [...] But since the crisis started, people have been afraid to invite you into their home. Before the 2001 crisis, we were one people, brothers and sisters. But after the crisis, people started to say this person is a Christian, that person is a Muslim.

Both WP and PJ narrate their childhood experiences of living with the Other. They recall spending their holidays or sleeping in at their friend's home, which shows that there was mutual trust between the visitors and their hosts. It is safe to say that the participants' parents also trusted the other since these experiences occurred at childhood or during their teenage years and because, as the participants note, they always requested their parents' permission to do so. The children's desire to be at their friends' and the parents' approval show that the cordial relationship that existed pre-2001 was not simply a matter of convenience. Rather, it was driven by the mutual trust that existed between the indigenous and settler families in the community.

After all, neither family would have approved of their children's intention to live at their friends' home or have their friends stay at their own home in an environment of mistrust.

I have discussed people's pre-conflict experiences of intergroup relations that demonstrate the role of trust in the community's integration. Other experiences of people's actions at the onset of the conflict further reinforce the notion that the demonstrated bond between the different ethnoreligious groups hinged on a culture of trust. For example, PR, a Berom Christian, narrated people's reaction to the 2001 conflict as follows:

Across the main road, you'll find a large compound, which is owned by a Berom Christian. During the conflict, many Christians and Muslims were living there because the compound is tightly secured, and people felt safe there. The man accommodated everybody, Christians and Muslims.

PT, also a Berom Christian, talked about a similar experience, and he highlighted it in the following way:

On the day my nephew and his wife were killed, there were Hausa and Fulani Muslim women taking shelter in my house. Some were in my room while others were in my husband's mother's room; both women and children. It was after the news about their deaths got to Dadin Kowa that these people left the house, perhaps out of fear.

These experiences, as Chapter seven shows, are unrepresentative of how most of the population reacted at the onset of the conflict. Both stories, however, shed light on the nature of the relationship that existed before the fighting broke out. The thrust of the stories is that people sought refuge in the houses of outgroup families even though the outgroup was the source of the threat. The fact that these people sheltered at outgroup homes is an indication that they lived near each other. This is a plausible interpretation in that it is unlikely that the threatened individuals

would leave their kinsmen and go to the outgroup for safety if the ethnic groups were segregated. And the fact that the outgroup homes were viewed as safe spaces, even though the source of the threat were outgroup kinsmen from elsewhere, shows that the community members had developed a trust-based relationship prior to the conflict.

Intergroup marriages

Intermarriage between indigenes and settlers, which could itself be deemed an example of social integration, happens to have fuelled social inclusion before the conflict. Unlike the themes discussed above, only the Angwan Doki participants told significant stories of intermarriages. The closest that a Dadin Kowa participant came to talk about intermarriages is WP's story of how he almost wedded a Fulani Muslim. He noted that "...but for the death of my Fulani friend's sister, you would have met her here as my second wife." In contrast, the Angwan Doki participants discuss both the existence of ethnoreligious mixed marriages and their effect on intergroup relations pre-conflict. PL, a Hausa Muslim, for example, described the ethnic composition of a friend's family as follows:

Within the Angwan Doki community, there are lots of Hausa Muslims that have married from the Berom ethnicity. Without mentioning any names as the confidentiality of your research demands, you saw a friend that came in when our interview started whom I told to wait for me? Right now, in his house, he's married to two Berom women and those Berom women have each delivered more than five kids for him. Is there no interaction? So, you can see that we related even up to intermarriages between Hausa-Fulani and Berom.

PL's comment was in response to my request for more information about his previous comment about deep interactions between the indigenous and settler populations in the community.

Among his several evidence of pre-conflict interactions was the inter-ethnic marriage of his friend, who had earlier interrupted our interview. Although he mentioned only one concrete example of intermarriages, the participant notes that it was a widespread practice in the community.

PH's experience of pre-2001 relations corroborates PL's viewpoint. The former, a Berom Christian, shared his knowledge of intermarriages in the pre-conflict era:

Hausa and Fulani Muslim men married Berom Christian women and Berom Christian men married Hausa and Fulani Muslim women. But they were taking more of our women than our men were marrying their daughters. You know their religion doesn't allow them to abandon their faith and become Christians, so you'll find that only a few of them actually converted to Christianity after marriage. We had more Muslim men marry Berom Christian ladies because men don't have to change their religion after marriage, unlike women.

Similar to PL's statement, PH's comment shows that intermarriages took place between the different ethnoreligious groups. Unlike PL, however, he asserts that the ratio of Christian men to Muslim men that married from the outgroup was skewed towards the Muslims. In his view, the potential for religious conversions after marriage coupled with the relative disposition of the Muslims and Christians to doing so accounted for a disproportionate number of Muslim men marrying Christian women. His point was that the ratio would have been balanced if the Muslim families were more disposed to having their daughters marry into a Christian home.

While Participants PL and PH talked about the existence of intermarriages, their comments do not indicate how this practice affected intergroup relations pre-conflict. The next set of stories does both. For example, PX, a Hausa Muslim, notes that, "people even lost their ethnic identity due to the intermarriages between the citizens." Similarly, PE, a Berom Christian,

described the efforts of his settler Muslim brother-in-law to blend into the family after marrying his sister. He expressed his opinion as follows:

In fact, my own family has three sisters who married Muslim men. One of their husbands was a Commissioner for Justice. When he came around, he would share in the local alcoholic drink. Even though he's a Muslim, he would ask someone to buy him some and would drink it. So, he didn't give us any feeling that he was different from us. He made us confident that we are one because he was doing what the indigenes were doing.

You know, he gave us the impression that even though he's of a different religion; he was acclimatizing and socializing with the local people. So, we've interacted with people on the other side, as I said, up to the level of marriages between them and my blood sisters [...] So, at our own level and understanding at the time, the relationship was peaceful.

Both excerpts from PX's comment on the result of intermarriages and PE's story about the same show that intermarriages between the indigenous and settler ethnic groups partly fuelled the development of a shared sense of a single common identity in Angwan Doki. They, however, relate to different phases in the process. Whereas PX's statement relates to the end state of the process of identity transformation, PE's story is an example of the kind of incremental changes that could result in it. PE notes that his brother-in-law was inclined to socialize with the Berom people. Given that ethnic and religious identities are mostly performed, the man's participation in the practices of the Beroms, other than the one described in the excerpt, can produce changes in his perception of self.

Ethno-religiously mixed schools

The integration of Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa pre-conflict partly derived from the communities' schools, which were a meeting point for the different ethnicities and the two

dominant religions. The participants' stories show that the schools provided a space for contact between the different ethnoreligious groups and fostered the development of a positive perception of the Other. By creating opportunities for children from diverse backgrounds to play together, the schools facilitated the bonding of the students, which shaped their future relationships. The culture of sharing, which is evident in much of the discussion in part one, is also present in the participants' schooling experiences. Given that schools are involved in the formative years of a person's attitudinal development, the exhibition of this behaviour at school suggests that the schools played a role in its formation in the wider society.

Angwan Doki

Before 2001, according to some Angwan Doki participants, the community's schools were a meeting point for different ethnicities and were a place where friends were made and where a culture of sharing was forged. PL touches on the role that the schools played in bringing diverse people together. The participant recounts his schooling experience as follows:

When I started primary school, the first teacher that taught me how to say the word A is from the Berom community. Most of the teachers are from different ethnic groups. Some are Igala (Benue state), Ibo (Anambra), Berom (particularly from Jos south). Another one was from Bassa. The Hausa-Fulani teachers were few as they mostly taught Islamic Studies. We mingled with people from different tribes. We visited their houses after school and drank gote, which is a delicious stew-like local cuisine.

PL, a Hausa Muslim, notes that the staff and student population at his school were ethnically mixed before the conflict. The participant's story shows that the ethnic composition of the teaching population created an environment in which a non-Hausa teacher could be instrumental

to his cognitive development. Positive impacts like this probably shaped the participant's relationship with other people of the same ethnic affiliation as his teacher. Also, because the student population was ethnically mixed, it was possible for students from diverse ethnoreligious backgrounds to interact, which, as the participant notes, continued even after school hours. This is corroborated by PX, who notes that "when you attend the same school and you meet them {*Berom and other Christians*} outside, you see them as brothers, not enemies."

The continuation of intergroup interactions and friendships outside the school, as PG's story reveals below, spurred broader relationships between the families of the children. While responding to my question about how the indigenous and settler groups related before the conflict, PG, a Berom Christian, talked about the effect of school-yard friendships on inter-family relationships as follows:

There was togetherness between the children. My daughters, for example, made friends in school who visited us after school hours occasionally. When they came here, they ate and played freely. Sometimes, my own kids also went to the homes of their Hausa Muslim friends and ate and played there as well. In fact, in some cases, I and the other kids' parents became friends because of the friendship of our daughters.

PG's comment reinforces PL and PX's assertions that school friendships did not end on the schoolyard. Additionally, she details its domino effect of making her and other parents in the community become friends. In this context, therefore, the school did not simply serve as a structure that reinforced previously existing positive perceptions of the Other or inter-family relationships. Rather, it spurred on new ones.

UP also tells a story that hints at how the schools may have shaped intergroup relations in the community. The participant, a Hausa Muslim, talks about the practice of sharing that existed between her and her school friends as follows:

There were so many tribes in my school [...] Back in our school days, when we had a snack, we shared it with the other kids without minding their tribe or religion. We never ate alone. We never ate alone. Today, nobody wants to share what they have. They hide it. Back then, there was nothing like tribe or religion. We knew nothing about it. During our long or short break, one of us would buy two or three small tins of moimoi for 1 kobo. We would call our schoolmates to eat because we couldn't finish it. Even if you don't call them, they will come on their own to ask for some. There was no discrimination. We knew nothing like that.

Like the preceding narratives, UP's story shows that she attended an ethnoreligiously mixed school. The participant notes that she and her schoolmates were disposed to sharing their snacks with each other and that one's ethnoreligious affiliation never influenced their decision to do so. This is somewhat reminiscent of the earlier stories of how Fulani herders and Berom farmers shared the earth's resources. Yet as the stories in Chapter six show, this practice sharply contrasts with people's inclinations today. UP, unlike PG, does not directly state how or whether this school practice affected intergroup relations in the broader society before the conflict. As I note above, however, because schools are involved in the early stages of people's development, PG's story is an example of how schools either created the culture of sharing or strengthened it or both.

Dadin Kowa

Similar to their Angwan Doki counterparts, the Dadin Kowa participants' pre-conflict experiences of intergroup relations show that their community's schools were also spaces in

which a culture of sharing as well as intergroup friendships were forged. Having brought diverse ethnic groups together, the schools in Dadin Kowa also created opportunities for these children to collaboratively achieve their common goals, thereby shaping their long-term relationships.

This is evident in MP's pre-conflict experience, which he recounts as follows:

When we were in secondary school, we rarely stayed on the school field during recess. We would go to the school's farm and pluck some maize and then take them to one of our friends' home nearby and cook them [...] This friend was a Berom Christian. We would eat to our satisfaction and never saw any religious differences whilst we ate. In fact, we rotated between our houses to cook maize during our school's recess. Also, I remember preparing for my WAEC exams with two of my Christian friends.

There was no mobile phone then, so we would agree to meet at a location very early in the morning to read. We would study together for hours until around 10 am, and then either go to our respective houses or head to one of our houses for breakfast. After eating, we would rest for a while and go back to that same location usually around 2 pm and continue studying. I'm still friends with these people to date. They still invite me to their events, and I attend. So, I still have a cordial relationship with my friends from secondary school, but in terms of others, well, I can't tell.

In the excerpted interviews of PT and WP above, they narrate how Dadin Kowa's Fulani and Berom adults collectively addressed their respective economic needs. MP's recess and studying stories show that the practice of intergroup collaborations for the achievement of individual objectives was not restricted to the community's adults. Despite being a Hausa Muslim, the participant recalls teaming up with his Berom Christian school friends to pursue their common good. Given that MP and his friends worked together to satisfy their belly and academic needs, it is safe to say that they were interested in each other's wellbeing. In this sense, the school was a space where team spirit was fostered. Also, as the participant notes, his friendship with the Berom Christian boys outlived their school years, suggesting that their relationship ethos was sustained in their post-school dealings.

Similar to MP's recess story, PR notes that he and his Hausa Muslim school mates quenched their hunger together after school hours. Compared to the former, however, he recalls that this was achieved in a Berom home. The participant, a Berom Christian, partly described his experience of pre-conflict intergroup relations as follows:

As I said, we lived together peacefully. This youth centre was a forest. This was where we played. Our primary school is at the back of the youth centre. We schooled there together. Up till today, there's a rocky tunnel that starts at Total petrol [gas] station and goes through under the youth centre to our primary school. That was our route to and from school. The tunnel was a mineral transportation route. After school, we would go home and eat together. You know Berom people and *gote* are inseparable. So, we will go to our apartment and take *gote* together.

The stories of MP and PR, like the Angwan Doki participants' accounts of their school experiences, show that they attended ethnically mixed schools. Commenting on her school experience, PT noted that, "there was no difference between me and the Hausa and Fulani kids in my school... You could never tell who was Christian or Muslim."

PR, unlike MP, does not comment on the impact of his school experiences on his post-school relationships with his Hausa Muslim schoolmates. Even though his story shows that intergroup school friendships transcended the school playground, PR does not say whether the practice of eating *gote* in a Berom family house continued after their school years. Yet, his story, like those preceding it, supports the notion that the integrated school structure contributed to the community's integration. The acts of going to school together, returning home together and eating together were the result of the integrated nature of the children's neighbourhood. Yet PR's school further reinforced that nature through its own integrated structure since school children typically spend most of their productive hours in school. If diversity was not accommodated in

PR's school, the resultant disconnect between the school and neighbourhood experiences would have undermined the aura of togetherness and the children's sense of it.

Findings

Emerging from this chapter are seven key findings, which I highlight in this section. Four of these findings namely communal identity, inclusive sociocultural festivals, communal parenting and economic interlinkages underscore the integrated nature of intergroup relations before the first conflict episode in 2001. Although the latter three findings namely a culture of trust, intermarriages and ethnoreligiously mixed schools are also reflective of an integrated community, they appear to be the foundation of the first four dimensions of integration. Collectively, these findings show that in the pre-conflict period, the indigenous and settler ethnoreligious groups living in Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa communities were socially, culturally and economically integrated.

First, the reflections of the participants from both the indigenous and settler communities suggest that there was a sense of communal identity in both Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa before 2001. This assessment derives from the narratives that indicate the dearth of aesthetic and linguistic differences between the indigenous and settler tribes. In Angwan Doki, for example, people's ethnic and religious identities were both unknown and insignificant in social relations. Consequently, as PL notes, a group of Hausa traders only needed to dress like the Berom in order to help elect a Berom co-trader as the local Chief in his village. In fact, as QP recalls about Dadin Kowa, the Berom and Hausa had evolved a similar fashion sense, which made people's dress an ineffective basis for differentiation. This reflection corroborates and is reinforced by

BP's assertion that people's common humanity was the only salient identity that shaped intergroup relations in Dadin Kowa pre-2001.

Ironically, there were also linguistic affinities between the Hausa and Berom tribes living in Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa. In the former, for example, PH notes that Berom parents gave their children Hausa names and vice versa. In light of the other stories that suggest that ethnic and religious identities were unimportant factors in social relations, it is unsurprising that the ethnoreligious affiliation of families did not determine the names of newborns. Also, the use of a tribe's language was not limited to the members of that tribe. For example, PH, a Berom Christian from Angwan Doki, asserted that many Berom people, including himself, are fluent speakers of Hausa.

Similar narratives emerged from Dadin Kowa. For example, KP, a Berom Christian, remarked that there are Fulani who speak indigenous languages today. Given that conflict normally undermines contact, it is more likely that this proficiency was developed in the pre-conflict era than in recent times. Similarly, PT's reflection on the existence of a common fashion culture also indicates the shared use of language in Dadin Kowa. The participant noted that although dress code was an ineffective identity marker, the native speakers of a local language could be determined based on their accents. While suggesting the possibility of ethnic differentiation, he discloses in the same breath that there was a shared use of language in Dadin Kowa. Although this sense of the people having a common identity emanated from the participants' stories about their own experiences, the narrated practices are not limited to the generation of the participants since WP recalls being socialized into this social environment from childhood.

Second, the Christians and Muslims' inclusive sociocultural festivals in both communities show that the indigenous and settler populations were integrated before the 2001 conflict. For example, BP recalls that both categories of children residing in Dadin Kowa were so enthusiastic about Salah to the point of staying up late on the eve of the celebration just to witness its official proclamation by the Islamic authorities. Similarly, PP, an indigenous Christian, noted that the Christian and Muslim Angwan Doki children keenly anticipated each other's religious festival because the accompanying merriment was not exclusive to any one group. OP's story about Christians and Muslims "eating from one bowl" corroborates PP's remark that the benefits of Christmas and Salah applied to both sets of children.

Even the Christian and Muslim parents were themselves inclined to have inclusive religious festivals. As BP, a Hausa Muslim noted, neighbours in Dadin Kowa sewed uniform clothes for their children to celebrate both the Christmas and Salah festivals. Relatedly, PX, a Hausa Muslim, noted that Angwan Doki Christians made a special effort to include their Muslim neighbours in their celebration. They did so by requesting that a Muslim slaughter their Christmas chicken or ram in order to make it religiously permissible for their Muslim neighbours to partake in the feast. These accommodations and joint celebrations could not have occurred in an acrimonious environment.

Third, the stories narrated by both the indigenous Christian and settler Muslim participants in Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa indicate that parenting was a communal rather than an individual responsibility, which further reinforces my assessment that the pre-conflict period was an era of integrated living. Neighbours facilitated the education of other people's children, including those from the outgroup. In Angwan Doki, for example, PN, a Berom

Christian, recalled that a person from any religious group paid the fees of children whose parents could not afford to do so. PH, a Berom Christian, who noted that his father's Hausa Muslim friend once paid his school fees, corroborates this. Relatedly, UP, a Hausa Muslim, talked about recommending her Christian friend's children for admission into the Plateau State technical college because she viewed them as her children too. Dadin Kowa was not so different as participants talked about both Christian and Muslim parents contributing to the education of an outgroup child. For example, BP, a Hausa Muslim, noted that Christian parents encouraged their Muslim neighbours to enrol their children in school. In the same vein, QP, a Berom Christian, reported that Christian and Muslim neighbours even took turns to drop-off and pick-up the children from school.

In both communities, caring for outgroup children transcended making school runs. In Dadin Kowa, for example, SP, a Berom Christian noted that her parents frequently left her and her siblings under the care of a Hausa Muslim senior, who looked after them and fed them while her parents were away from the community. Similarly, PH and UP stated that the Angwan Doki children had access to food in other people's homes when they lacked food in their own home or were being deprived of food as a punishment for wrongdoing. These stories of mutual support are a testament to the people's investment in the immediate wellbeing and future prosperity of the communities' children, which shows that the indigenous and settler populations were integrated pre-2001.

In addition to providing education and other support, the parents in the community were committed to moulding the character of the children irrespective of their ethnoreligious roots. In Angwan Doki, for example, UP noted that the adults in the community often disciplined other

people's children because they believed that a well-trained child was beneficial to the community in general. This orientation is not surprising considering the familial nature of intergroup relations pre-2001. Stories from Dadin Kowa show that these practices were not exclusive to Angwan Doki. For example, QP recalled that a Reverend punished him and his Christian and Muslim friends for making abusive remarks about each other's parents during an altercation on the football field.

In Dadin Kowa, there were underlying beliefs that enabled such correctional interventions. While QP's reflection suggests that people were disposed to disciplining outgroup children because well-trained children were beneficial to the entire community, BP noted that the parents in the community generally welcomed such interventions because they were driven by good intentions. These stories further highlight the integration of each of the communities. If the indigenous and settler populations in these communities were not integrated, the adults would not have been committed to moulding the character of the outgroup children since their future indiscretions would have reflected poorly on the outgroup only.

Fourth, the participants' stories indicate that there were economic linkages between the ethnoreligious communities in Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa. This connection is evident in the stories of how the indigenous and settler groups satisfied their occupational needs. For example, UP, a Hausa Muslim noted that the groups in Angwan Doki maintained a system of land use rotation, which gave both the indigenous farmers and the settler herders yearly access to indigenous lands. Similarly, PT, a Berom Christian, noted that the indigenous Berom farmers invited the Fulani herders to graze their land during the dry season as a way of fertilizing the soil in preparation for farming in the rainy season. These economic relationships must have fostered

friendships since, as WP points out, each Berom family had its own Fulani herder whom they relied on for manure annually. Yet, these stories also indicate that neither group was simply philanthropic. Rather, each group gave something because it was personally beneficial to do so.

The symbiotic relationship between the indigenous and settler groups was not limited to land use. For example, PE stated that as farmers, the Berom people in Angwan Doki provided the raw materials that fuelled the businesses of the Hausa, who processed these crops into finished goods and resold them to the Berom. Related stories from Dadin Kowa portray a slightly different dynamic. In contrast to PE's depiction of the composition of businesses in Angwan Doki, DP and PT's stories indicate that the businesses in Dadin Kowa were heterogeneously populated. Similarly, however, both DP and PT suggest that the quality of goods, rather than the ethnoreligious affiliation of the sellers, determined patronage.

While most of the stories in this chapter relate to the integrated nature of pre-conflict relations in Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa, a few stories indicate the roots of this situation. First, some of the participants' recounted experiences, such as food sharing and seeking refuge in outgroup homes highlight the existence of a culture of trust between the groups. In Angwan Doki, for example, PV and PG's stories establish that there was mutual trust between the Berom and the Hausa and Fulani. While PV noted that the Berom Christians ate the food offered by the Hausa Muslims without fearing being poisoned, PG recalled that the Fulani Muslims also comfortably ate the food prepared by their Berom neighbours. PX, PH, UP and PL also recalled that the neighbourhoods in Angwan Doki were ethno religiously mixed. Similar trust-based stories emanated from Dadin Kowa, except that they reflect deeper levels of trust-based relationships than the Angwan Doki participants' accounts.

For example, while the Angwan Doki participants commented on the ethnoreligiously mixed neighbourhoods pre-2001, the Dadin Kowa participants recalled living in outgroup homes pre-conflict. One such participant is WP, a Berom Christian, who noted that there was a Fulani boy who came to live with his family because he was so fond of the Berom. This childhood practice is corroborated by PJ, a Hausa Muslim, who stated that he easily obtained permission from his father to spend his holiday in his Berom friend's home. In an atmosphere of mistrust, it is unlikely that the indigenous and settler groups would have lived together much less shared a meal. For some others, as PT's story about sheltering Hausa women and children shows, the level of trust was so high that even at the onset of the Jos conflict, people sought refuge in the homes of their outgroup neighbours. In an atmosphere of mistrust, it is unlikely that the indigenous and settler groups would have lived in mixed neighbourhoods much less shared a meal or lived under the same roof.

Second, the stories of some participants indicate that intermarriages between indigenous Christians and settler Muslims engendered a feeling of community. In this regard, the two communities diverge. Whereas the Angwan Doki stories show the existence of intermarriage and their role in forging a spirit of brotherhood, no Dadin Kowa participant discussed its existence in a significant way. The closest to doing so was WP, a Berom Christian, who noted that he almost married a Fulani Muslim. PL, PH, PX and PE all commented on the existence of intermarriages in Angwan Doki, but it was PE (a Berom Christian) and PX (a Hausa Muslim) that elucidated its effect on intergroup relations. These participants' narratives are mutually reinforcing. While the former noted that his Hausa Muslim brother-in-law strived to blend into his family by behaving like the Berom, the latter stated that people's identities were recalibrated due to intermarriages.

Third, some participants' accounts of pre-conflict relations indicate that their communities' ethnoreligiously mixed schools either created or strengthened pre-existing relationships. In the Angwan Doki case, some stories show that the mixed schools engendered intergroup contact, which itself fostered positive relations. The experiences of PG (Berom Christian), PL and PX (Hausa Muslims) lend credence to this assertion. For example, PL stated that his school brought diverse ethnic groups together and that these friendships were sustained outside the school premises. For other school children, as PX noted, the attendance of the same school fostered a sense of brotherhood. The effects of schoolyard friendships were not limited to the schoolchildren as PG stated that her daughters' relationships with their schoolmates made her friends with their mothers. In essence, the schools reflected the wider intergroup bond, reinforced it and forged new relationships.

In summary, people's sense of having a common identity, joint celebrations of religious festivals, collective investment in communal wellbeing and economic interdependence were to varying degrees founded on three pillars: a culture of trust, interethnic and interreligious marriages, and an integrated school system.

Conclusions

Angwan and Dadin Kowa were largely integrated communities before 2001. This is evidenced by the existence of a communal identity, inclusive sociocultural festivals, community parenting and economic linkages. People's common humanity was the only salient identity, so the respective groups were inclined to feast together during the sociocultural festivals of either side. Given that people's common humanity was the only salient identity, the adults in the

communities were invested in nurturing all the children irrespective of their specific ethnoreligious affiliations. For the same reason, the parents in the communities tolerated other people's intrusion into the affairs of their children. This sense of oneness was replicated in the economic sphere as the people were either part of heterogeneous occupations or worked collaboratively to satisfy their diverse economic needs. The prevailing culture of trust, intermarriages and mixed schools were partly the result of this integrated structure of society and partly the cause of the same. Despite being the bedrock of the longstanding integration of Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa, the aforementioned factors could not forestall the breakdown in intergroup relationships.

Chapter Six: From “community” to intercommunal strife: Tracing the path to disharmony and conflict

In this chapter, I discuss the unravelling of intergroup relations in Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa as evident in the participants’ stories. The same sociocultural and socioeconomic conditions that were previously absent in intergroup relations later became the instruments through which malevolent actors sowed seeds of discord in furtherance of their political aims. As shown in the preceding chapter, the indigenous Christian and settler Muslim ethnic groups considered themselves as one people despite having different ethnoreligious affiliations. They celebrated Christian and Muslim religious festivals communally, and their respective economic objectives were collaboratively pursued. Following the transition to democracy, however, Plateau state politicians manipulated the people’s sociocultural differences to create intergroup economic competition in order to gain electoral support among their co-ethnics. The relative effects of these political interventions are evident in the sociocultural and socioeconomic transformations in Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa.

To show these changes and their roots, I discuss participants’ narratives around religion, land ownership, electoral politics, politics of patronage and instigation by external co-ethnics. Although the participants express diverse perspectives, the overall narrative about the conflict period reflects major shifts in perceptions around religion and land ownership. While some participants note that religion played no role in the deterioration of intergroup relations, other participants question the religious motives of their neighbours. Also, in spite of the diversity of their viewpoints, the perspectives of all the participants on land use and ownership contradict

their pre-conflict experiences of intergroup relations. As the discussion below shows, these shifts in perspectives resulted from the narratives of politicians during elections and their actions while in office.

Perspectives on the effect of religion on intergroup relations

The Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa participants' views on the impact of religion on indigene-settler relations are substantively and structurally similar. Both sets of participants gave accounts of Christians and Muslims targeting each other and expressed views on the destructive religious motivations of the Other. In both communities, however, there are also a few participants whose narratives reflect a negative nexus between religion and conflict. The only exception to the structural similarity of the data is the ethnoreligious affiliation of the participants whose views reflect a positive relationship between the variables and those whose perspectives show otherwise.

Angwan Doki

Although a positive and negative religion-conflict nexus is evident in the narratives of both categories of Angwan Doki participants, the indigenous Christians expressed the former viewpoint predominantly. The perspectives that suggest a positive relationship between the variables differ in terms of the period to which they relate. While a few perspectives show that religion might have become salient only during or after the first conflict episode, most indicate that religion started shaping intergroup relations before the first conflict episode. PP's

perspective falls under the latter category. When I asked whether he had anything else to add to his stories, the participant, an Afizere Christian, made the following remark:

I want the country to be better. I want us to be close. You see, a Hausa man has two hands and the indigene also has two hands. There's no difference between Christians and Muslims. We need peace. I always tell people that even the smallest tribe or religion cannot be wiped off the face of the earth, so why waste your time? Why do you want to start a conflict that would lead others to kill you or your relatives if they can't reach you?

You say you're fighting a religious crisis. Which religion? How many of us are truly practising the religion? If you go to this Kugiya market, you'll see people drinking alcohol and abusing drugs, yet they're bearing Christian names. You commit adultery, you're not a sincere Christian, and you don't even go to church. Yet you say you're fighting a religious conflict. It is the same thing among the Muslims.

We need peace, and to get peace we need to understand ourselves. We should see a Muslim as an individual created by God and a Muslim should see a Christian as a creation of God. If we do this, we will be able to resolve this thing [*conflict*].

The participant's statements on the physiological similarities between Christians and Muslims and of their common divine origin are similar to the narratives of a shared human identity, which were discussed in the preceding chapter. These statements suggest that PP personally does not think that religion is a real cause of conflict, yet the succeeding stories indicate that he believes the warring individuals were either motivated by religion or claimed to be. He, for example, denounces the individuals that partook in the conflict for saying they are engaged in a religious war even though their personal lives contradict the teachings of the religion that they claim to represent. Also, his comment on the impossibility of eliminating a whole religion suggests that he witnessed the targeting of people because of their religion or that he is aware of people expressing this desire or both.

PP's perspectives on the religion-conflict linkages in Angwan Doki are not unique to just himself. For example, PH, a Berom Christian, shows that even though his religion has never driven him to act violently, other community members participated in the conflict because of their religion. Responding to my request for an explanation of the disjuncture between his experiences of intergroup relations pre-2001 and the outbreak of the first conflict episode, the participant revealed the following in his story:

Toh, we don't really know what happened, but I know that in the 18th century, there was a lot of Jihad and the Hausa and the Fulani claim that they own Jos. And I believe, I strongly believe that the 2001 crisis started because of what they had in mind. I've come to understand that the Hausa-Fulani may relate something to you, which is quite different from what he truly wants from you. They want to expand their religion and their religion is synonymous with conflict. That was what Usman Dan Fodio practised. He would come and capture your people and would insist that you become a Muslim or be killed.

Sometimes, I tell my Muslim friends there's no religion that's going to take you to heaven. I believe that's why China doesn't have Christianity or Islam. They practise a different religion and they don't believe in God. Most of the Chinese people don't believe in God. The mind is their religion. The church can't take you to God. That building you see as a church will not take me to God oh! It will not give me salvation. It is what I believe in that will save me. So, why will I fight for a person that hasn't asked me to go and kill? My religion allows me to go close to you [Muslims] to tell you your mistakes, but it doesn't say I should kill you. So, I cannot kill you. So, why do you [Muslims] want to kill me? What have I done to you?

Compared to PP who believes that both the indigenous and settler tribes were motivated by their respective religions, PH states that only the settlers were driven by religion. He views the emergence of the 2001 conflict episode as a continuation of the violent jihad of Usman Dan Fodio, the founder of Islam in northern Nigeria. He does not believe that the Angwan Doki Muslims and their progenitor were self-motivated to undertake their violent proselytization, as,

in his view, “their religion is synonymous with conflict.” He contrasts his depiction of the inherent violence of Islam with the teachings of his own faith, Christianity. The participant notes that, compared to Islam, his religion permits him to correct wrongdoers, yet it does not direct him to kill those that refuse to change. In asking why he should be targeted even though he did nothing wrong, the participant expresses his belief that his Muslim neighbours were not only motivated by their religion to undertake the war; they were also disposed to eliminating him in the process.

Similarly, PH provides an account of how the settler’s religion adversely shaped intergroup relations. The participant does not go as far as PP who notes that Islam inspires the settlers to eliminate unrepentant unbelievers. However, he notes that the religion made the settler Hausa view the indigenous people as inferior humans. In accounting for the difference between his pre-conflict experience of intergroup relations and its deterioration, PP made known the following in his story:

Actually, if you look at a Hausa man in the metropolis, he looks down upon the indigenes. Let me explain. If there’s a livestock to be slaughtered, chicken or cow, the Muslims would say their religion doesn’t allow them to eat any livestock slaughtered by non-Muslims. They only ate our meat when we allowed them to kill the animal, and it was happening that way. It is possible that this was happening because the Christians weren’t wise then, I don’t know. They would call the Muslims to slaughter their animals so that the Muslims would be willing to eat a portion.

But over time, the Christians started refusing. They would ask, “who are you, that I’ll allow you to slaughter my chicken so that you could eat from it?” They would say if they agree, it means that there’s something wrong with their own Christian religion. They would say if the Muslims don’t want to eat, they should leave it.

That’s how it all started. The Muslims started labelling the Christians *arini*, meaning infidel or a person whose religion isn’t recognized by God. This practise is no longer common as the enlightened Muslims now eat the animals slaughtered by Christians. Now, if you go to the restaurants and the food was cooked by Christians, these enlightened Muslims will not complain.

Although the aim of the remark may have been to show that religion adversely affected indigene-settler relations in Angwan Doki, the participant's comment reveals that the deterioration of intergroup relations resulted from changes in how the indigenous Christians responded to the religion-driven dispositions of the Hausa. He noted, as discussed in the preceding chapter, that the indigenous people invited/accepted the request of the Hausa and Fulani to slaughter their animal before it was cooked. The Hausa and Fulani, as the participant notes, made these requests because their religion prohibited them from eating an animal that was slaughtered by unbelievers, and the indigenous Christians accepted the requests because they wanted their Muslim neighbours to eat with them. He notes that this practise ceased after the indigenous people became wiser and started to challenge the settlers' perception of superiority. The participant's story also shows that the Muslims subsequently ascribed derogatory labels to the indigenous Christians. Although religion features prominently in this account, the origin of the Christian's attitudinal change is central to understanding the collapse of the relationship since the animal slaughtering practice was acceptable before they "became wiser."

In addition to the foregoing narratives about how religious teachings stoked intergroup animosity in Angwan Doki, the dominance of one religion within the ethnic communities coupled with the way targets were selected during the conflict created the perception that the conflict was driven by religion. Both these situations are evident in the accounts of PA and PP, respectively. The former, a Hausa Muslim, commented on the conflict as follows:

There's no need for the fight between Christians and Muslims. After all, to me, it is not a religious fight. Let's tell ourselves the truth. It has never been a religious fight. If it is really a religious fight, we won't be able to even talk about it this way. The whole country would have been involved but for the fact that it is a political matter that is limited to Jos. But because it involves a lot of killing; this one is dead and you

know a Berom man is a Christian, if an Ibo man who's a Muslim is killed, they'll say "ah, a Christian has killed our brethren, so let's go and revenge." So, this is the problem, but it has never been a religious fight.

The participant notes that the conflict was essentially political even though it had a religious appearance. The participant does not view the conflict as religion-driven but understands why other people may believe it is so. He notes that because Jos is religiously microcosmic of Nigeria, the conflict would have spread to other states if it were substantively religious. He, however, reckons that people were drawn to believe that it is religious because the warring ethnic groups were predominantly of a certain religion and because it was the religious affiliation of the victims, rather than their ethnicity, that determined participation in retaliation.

The pattern of target selection may also have bolstered the people's perception that it was a religiously driven war. PP's recollection of the conflict is instructive on this issue. He commented on the 2001 conflict as follows:

If you were unfortunate to pass certain roads, you were likely to die because whenever there were rumours about attacks the youths and drug-addicted criminals would set up roadblocks and start searching motorists. Both the Christian and Muslim youths did so in the neighbourhoods which they dominated. If the road was barricaded by a group of Christian youths, they could ask you questions on Christianity.

They could require you to say the Lord's prayer or something before they allow you to pass through unhurt. They could also determine your religion through your dressing. If there was a conflict today, Christian youth gangs will conclude that I'm a Muslim because of how I'm dressed, except I properly demonstrate my Christianity through other means. It is the same among the Muslims.

This remark, like PA's comment above, does not indicate that religion was a substantive cause of the conflict. The account, however, shows that religion was a facilitative cause in that it provided the means for ingroup-outgroup differentiation. Even if the conflict was a "political matter," as

PA notes, the use of visible and performed religious markers in target selection paints the picture of a religious conflict. Moreover, as PA also states above, people avenged the deaths of victims based on their religious affiliation.

PE, like PA and PP, discusses the pattern of target selection during the conflict. Unlike the previous two participants, however, he recounts his observation of how targets were selected to buttress his claim that religion was a substantive cause of the conflict in Angwan Doki. In the following excerpt, PE, a Berom Christian, describes the conflict and retrospectively assesses the nature of pre-conflict intergroup relations:

If it doesn't have a religious undertone, why were churches burnt? In all the crises, our people didn't burn any mosque except when it grew so hot and people realized that the attacks on churches meant that there was a religious objective, that our people started hitting the small mosques located around them [...] What does it tell you when your own churches are being attacked? What impression does that give you? It gives you the impression that the conflict has a religious undertone [...]

As I said, the crisis helped us to understand them. They [*the Muslims*] felt it was inappropriate to give their daughter to an infidel in marriage, but their sons married our own daughters. So, there was that. We understood that the marriages they were doing were what they call social jihad. The aim is that if they can't fight us with a gun, they use other means to convert us. So, their men marrying our women was simply social Jihad. If they impregnate your daughter and you send her away, they will welcome her because the children will be born into their own side.

That's how they gained inroads into our group [...] Our people [*Berom Christians*] lived in ignorance of the Muslims faith. A Muslim's faith is everything to him. It is his business, his religion and every aspect of his life. The Christian grows up before realizing that religion is everything to him even though he may not know the entire content of his religion. The Muslims, on the other hand, think of religion this way right from childhood. So, the Christians assumed the Hausa man was living in peace with them. But as time passed, things became clearer.

Similar to PA's assertion that the attacks were along religious lines, PE notes that the Berom attacked Mosques only after realizing that the Hausa had torched churches. The orchestration of

attacks on churches and mosques reinforces the claims of PA and PP that the pattern of target selection created an appearance of a religious war. Compared to these participants, however, PE views the Hausa people's choice of targets as a piece of substantive evidence that the conflict was a religiously motivated campaign against the indigenous Berom people. This view aligns with PH's contention that religion shaped the behaviour of the settler ethnic groups but not the indigenous groups. PE's conviction about the religious motive of the settler Hausa Muslims stems from experiences other than what he views as their unprovoked attacks on churches. The participant notes that the outbreak of the 2001 conflict was another dimension of the settler's longstanding jihad against the indigenous Berom people.

He retrospectively examines pre-conflict intergroup relations and concludes that inter-ethnic marriages, presented as evidence of cordial intergroup relations in Chapter 5, were aimed at converting Christian brides into Muslims. PE believes that because they could not pursue a violent jihad at the time, the Hausa Muslims opted for a social campaign to depopulate the community of Christians. He defends his characterization of inter-ethnic marriages by pointing to the preponderance of Hausa men marrying Berom women. He contends that the Hausa Muslims were indisposed to Berom men marrying Hausa women because it was against their objective of making Muslims out of Christian brides and their offspring. By stating that religion shapes all the actions of the Hausa right from childhood, PE discounts the possibility that something else accounts for the structure of inter-ethnic marriages and the outbreak of the conflict.

Although some of the interview excerpts portray religion as a substantive cause of the conflict in Angwan Doki, aspects of the same narratives undercut this argument. For example,

PP and PE expressed views that depict religion as having an adverse effect on intergroup relations yet they also show that it was not originally so. PP states that the indigenous ethnic groups accommodated the Muslims' religious beliefs on animal slaughtering until they became wiser. Similarly, PE notes that the Berom believed that the Hausa were peaceful people until a clearer perspective was gained about their real motives. The emergence of this new wisdom is critical to understanding the transformations in religious tolerance in the community, and, therefore, central to deciphering whether religion was a substantive or facilitative cause of the conflict.

To varying degrees, the excerpted interviews of Participants PA, PE, PH and PP portray religion as positively related to the conflict. In contrast to these narratives, UP and PX's comment on the conflict only reflects a negative relationship between religion and the conflict. In justifying his objection to the notion that religion fuelled the conflict, PX pointed to his decades-long experience of peaceful intergroup relations. The participant, a Hausa Muslim, articulated the following:

I can tell you. I'm now about 63. In all my years, I never had any problem with any Christians. As children, we played together, grew up together and even our parents did things together. We didn't even know who was a Christian or a Muslim. It was when they were going to church that we noticed who was a Christian. We never could have imagined that today there would be places that are a no-go area for Christians and other places that are a no-go area for Muslims. Even our parents never thought of that. We just found ourselves in this mess. And I can tell you without fear of contradiction that in the 1960s and several decades after, nobody knew who was Muslim or Christian except when you were seen in your place of worship.

The participant implies that religion could not have caused the conflict given that it was not an important determinant of interpersonal relations during his teenage years and much of his adult

life. Unlike Participants PP and PE, whose comments on religion indicate that the emergence of new knowledge facilitated the erosion of intergroup understanding, PX only recalls that the community suddenly found itself enmeshed in a conflict between Christians and Muslims. The sudden occurrence of the conflict, however, also suggests that factors independent of religion may have dampened intergroup tolerance since, as PX notes, both religions had co-existed peacefully for a long time.

Similar to PX's narrative, UP's perspective on the religion-conflict nexus partly hinges on the historical relationship between both religious communities. Because other participants had raised the possibility that religion conditioned the conflict, I asked the participant for her thoughts about whether the religious differences between the groups adversely affected their relationship. The participant, a Hausa Muslim, responded as follows:

Allah created all the Muslims and Christians and all the tribes. There are some people not worshipping anything while others are worshipping idols. There are so many verses in the Holy Quran, which says that Allah created all of us. Some are white, some are black, some are tall some are short. He created all of us. Allah knew what he was doing when he created different tribes. Irrespective of their languages, people are first and foremost human beings.

Before the conflict, we were all together. Two or three of my children attended missionary schools. I know so many Muslim kids that attended Baptist High School. You can't get your children into the school without being friends with the principal or a teacher, so I have so many Christian friends. Even now my grandchildren are in Baptist High School because I know education is education [...] That's why I could take my children and grandchildren to where they can be properly trained. I'm a Muslim, a mother, a mentor and a leader.

I know that the Bible and the Quran are divine books and they are both against what's happening [...] Allah says in the Holy Quran that you must love your brother, and He says that every human is your brother, not only someone who is from your tribe or of the same religion. He says that you can't take something good and give something bad to your brother. That even if you don't want peace, you must give your brother peace [...] So, how can a true believer use his own hand to hurt his

brother? Even the Bible says that if someone slaps you on one cheek, give them the other side. Islam and Christianity are in tandem.

In addition to stating that the indigenous and settler ethnic groups lived peacefully in the past despite their religious differences, UP uses the common root of all the religions to dispute the claim that religion fuelled intergroup animosity. The participant notes that religious differences could not have caused the conflict since the same God is the source of all the religions and tribes. She notes that she and other Muslim parents enrolled their children in a Christian missionary school, which would not have been possible if there was Christian animus towards the Muslims. In fact, her comment shows that it was the cordial relationship that existed between these Muslim parents and the school's Christian administrators that facilitated their children's admission. UP notes that it is this sort of relationship, rather than the conflict, that aligns with the Islamic teachings of love and the Christian teachings of tolerance.

Overall, the above comments and stories can be distinguished in terms of whether they portray the conflict as religiously driven or not. Some of the participants, including PP and PA, disagree that the conflict is a product of religious beliefs. Their comments, however, indicate that religion facilitated it. The main contradiction is between PE and PH, on the one hand, and PX and UP, on the other. Whereas the former believe that religion, specifically Islam, was a substantive cause of the conflict, the latter contended that neither Islam nor Christianity fuelled it. The two categories of Participants differ not only in their espoused views but also in their ethnoreligious affiliations. PE and PH, who view Islam as a causal factor, are indigenous Berom Christians, while Participants PX and UP are settler Hausa Muslims.

Dadin Kowa

The Dadin Kowa data is structurally similar to Angwan Doki's. Although most of the participants' views indicate that religion adversely affected intergroup relations, a few participants recount their experiences of intergroup relations that undermine those claims. Regarding the positive nexus, one participant's story shows that derogatory labels were used against religious Others, while the narrative of another participant is indicative of the Christians' perceptions that their neighbours were executing an Islamic agenda. Three other participants noted that religion had no negative effect on intergroup relations, yet certain segments of their comments suggest that it served a facilitative role. In terms of the negative nexus, one participant refutes the claim that religion adversely affected intergroup relationships by sharing his childhood experiences of religious tolerance in Dadin Kowa. Also, another participant discounted the notion that religious differences created intergroup animosity, noting that it is disputes over mundane issues that appear as inter-religious squabbles.

As noted above, several narratives point to how religion conditioned intergroup animosity. One such story is BP's. Asked whether there were signs of tension before the conflict broke out elsewhere in Jos, the participant stated as follows:

Whenever the Christians saw me, they referred to me as a Malo, not a Muslim. A Malo is a derogatory nickname for a Muslim. The Muslims were also in on the name-calling. The Muslims would say that they no longer want to deal with an *anjuhubaya*, which means the back pocket. This is a derogatory term that is used to refer to someone who's a non-Muslim. We started calling ourselves names that we weren't used to. It caused a serious problem because name-calling was foreign to us. This showed that there was something wrong. It made people hot-tempered. Hatred also resulted from it.

The participant, a Hausa Muslim, recounts the changes that he experienced before the Jos conflict broke out. His comment indicates that the conflict may not have been a sudden occurrence as PX notes. Before the conflict broke out in other places, the respect for the Other in Dadin Kowa had already started to wane. Religious tolerance was replaced with contempt for the religious Other and this attitude was not subtly expressed. The participant notes that the contemptuousness for the Other manifested in derogatory labels, which made people irritable and induced mutual hate. Although there was no violent conflict in Dadin Kowa, BP's comment shows how intergroup animosity resulted from religious differences.

In contrast to BP, who discusses how religious differences produced intergroup tension, PT situates the conflict solely in the teachings of Islam. Similar to most of the interviews in both Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa, her experience of pre-conflict intergroup relations did not indicate that conflict was on the horizon. So, I asked whether she had any thoughts about the divergent realities. She responded in the following way:

Toh, it is not only in Jos. It is happening in other parts of Nigeria. It is not just a Jos or Plateau thing. We believe the Hausa-Fulani or the Muslims, in general, have an agenda. They're working towards an agenda. Their youths are the foot soldiers for that agenda [...] Their leaders are the first people to come to say that they want peace and our leaders would have to accept. But we know that the Muslim leaders are just pretending as they are part of the jihadist agenda. And I can say this anywhere. It flows down from the President, Buhari. That's why Buhari is in power. He is there to serve the agenda, and the actions of the Muslims in Jos are based on that same national jihadist agenda.

Similar to the Angwan Doki participants, PE and PH, PT opines that the conflict is part of the grand effort to Islamize Nigeria. She notes that the positive response of her Hausa and Fulani neighbours to the Islamic agenda of ridding Nigeria of Christians underlies the collapse of

intergroup relations in Dadin Kowa. The participant, who is a Berom Christian, acknowledges that the Hausa and Fulani Muslim leaders have expressed a desire for peace. She, however, notes that the leaders' outward expressions of a desire for peace are disconnected from their positive disposition to the Muslims' jihadist objective. PT's usage of "we" indicates that she believes her views are commonly held within the Dadin Kowa Christian community, yet no other Dadin Kowa participant expressed the same perspective about a jihadist campaign.

Having said that, PT's claim about two-faced religious leaders is partly supported by PJ's explanation of why the conflict between the indigenous and settler groups could occur in spite of their decades of cordial relations. The Participant, an Ebira Muslim, commented as follows:

The problem is lack of knowledge and the knowledgeable who don't want the children to know their left from their right. This includes both the Christian and Muslim clerics. Everybody preaches what favours him, rather than you and me. Knowledgeable people can evaluate courses of actions to know the consequences before doing them. For example, the Quran says that if I kill, I should be killed too.

The Holy Book even recommends high monetary compensation when a person is killed accidentally talk less of deliberate murder. As far as I have the mind to kill, the Holy Book says I should be killed too. There's no way I would kill since I know these consequences.

Jesus was preaching peace when he said if I'm slapped on the left; I should give the right. If you do so, you will reduce the tension but if you go to get a stick to revenge the slap, the other person would look for a more dangerous weapon. We need the spirit of forgiveness. If we do, our relationships will be sustained.

This viewpoint diverges from PT's in two ways. First, PJ does not portray religious leaders as simultaneously preaching peace and seeking war, yet he notes that some Islamic and Christian clerics promote conflict by deliberately withholding their knowledge about the truth about their religion. He holds that such clerics are accountable for the breakdown in intergroup relations because their followers' ignorance of what is religiously permissible underlies their participation

in the conflict. Although the participant notes that religion did not cause the Jos conflict, his comment suggests that he believes that there are religious doctrines that promote conflict. The participant's reference to clerics' selective teachings as problematic indicates his belief in the existence of conflict-promoting religious precepts. Second, PJ and PT differ on their views about the category of clerics that promote conflict. While the former, who is a Berom Christian, singles out only the Islamic clerics, the later, an Ebira Muslim, notes that the actions or inactions of both Christian and Islamic clerics facilitate conflict.

The subject of religion also appears in DP's discussion of the emergence of the conflict. Although, DP discounts the notion that religion propelled the Jos conflict, his comment ultimately shows that relations between the indigenous and settler groups were infused with religion at some point. His comment, however, differs from PJ's in that it shows how and why religion served a facilitative rather than a substantive role. Asked about his thoughts about why intergroup relations broke down despite the many years of peaceful coexistence, the participant quipped "it's political." The comment below is his response to my request for detail about how politics shaped intergroup relations:

I said so because a religious man won't harm his brother {*neighbour*}. Islam doesn't instruct us to take a knife and stab our brother. Even Christianity doesn't instruct that. I know this because I studied the Bible in secondary school and most of the teachings in the Bible are also contained in the Quran. So, why are we killing our brothers? We even intermarry.

So, that's why I told you that it is political and not religious. They turned it into religion because anything that is coloured with religion becomes very solid. If there's already flame, religion increases the flame that's why it is painted as religious.

I said it is political because the politicians are trying to create the perception of a religious conflict so that they can motivate people from their religion to vote for them. That's it. During campaigns, they tell you anything just to win.

The participant, a Hausa Muslim, notes that neither Islam nor Christianity condones violence. DP references his experience of inter-ethnic marriages pre-2001 as proof that neither religion inspires a hateful attitude towards the religious Other. In his view, political actors advance their personal objectives through religious codes because people are easily aroused by it. Although the conflict appears religious, its religious outlook is rooted not in Islam-Christianity contradictions but in the framing of electoral competitions as religious struggles.

Both factors, religious contradictions and political manipulation, are also present in MP's perspective on religion. The participant, a Hausa Muslim, provided an eclectic assessment of the collapse of intergroup relations as follows:

Myself, I attended Christian schools. I attended a Catholic primary school. When a Bishop visited our school, we would line up and welcome him. Even in the primary school we were baptized and receiving Holy Communion. It was against our religion, but we did it and it wasn't a problem for our parents because of the relationship.

The problem now is that there's a political division. In the north here, for anybody to achieve their political ends, if they don't get us northerners through religion, they will get us through tribal sentiments because we are very sensitive. I may come here and say these people look at me as a Muslim that's why they're victimizing me. A Christian man may also say, "yes, these Muslims because I'm a Christian, they want to victimize me." So, their people would be mobilized to fight for their religion even though the real battle is originally political.

Like I earlier told you, if you want to get a northern man if you don't get him through religion, you'll get him through tribal sentiments because we have made religion a factor of our lives. If you want to see me change my mind about something, you'll start to talk about Islam so that I will be provoked. Also, when you meet a Christian in this area and you try to tell him that Christianity is an inferior religion, he'll fight back. He won't wait for 10 seconds before fighting back. That's why I said that religion is very sensitive. When people want us to fight each other, they use religion because we can't escape it.

North-central, which Plateau is a part of is the centre of religious crisis because there are different ethnic groups here and some are claiming to be the majority in the zone. When different groups are claiming to be the majority, what will happen? Conflict [...] If you don't see religious conflict in the core north, it is because 90

percent are Muslims. So, if they want to fight there, they can only kill themselves. But if you come to the north-central, you hardly find a house without a Muslim and a Christian.

MP situates the transformations in intergroup relations, not in religious teachings, but in the narratives of political actors. The participant believes, in contrast to DP, that there are contradictions between Islam and Christianity. For example, he notes that his participation in Christian rituals was impermissible in Islam. However, MP rejects the notion that these contradictions caused the conflict since both religious communities had co-existed peacefully in spite of their religious differences. Rather, like DP, he notes that it is the rhetoric of politicians that dampened intergroup harmony. In MP's view, the political actors in the Christian and Muslim communities in the state frame their personal political travails as evidence of the religious Other's persecution of the ingroup. He contends that the politicians succeed in making their personal problems group-based issues because identity is salient in the state. And identity salience is unpreventable because, like the rest of the Middle Belt, Plateau state is a melting pot of the two religions and disparate ethnicities.

Much of the stories and views discussed thus far portray religion as the most salient identity marker and the basis for target selection, which makes it at least a facilitative cause of the conflict. Yet other recounted experiences of the conflict period highlight the effects of cross-cutting identities in people's conflict behaviour. Although their specific accounts vary, FP, MP and BP's recollection of the conflict shows that allies and enemies were not solely determined based on religious affiliations. FP commented on the effect of religion on intergroup relations as follows:

Well, as a person, I will tell you that the relationship was neither very bad nor very good in Dadin Kowa. Sometimes, you could be stopped by a band of Christians outside Dadin Kowa, but I can say that my relationship with Christians here wasn't bad. Let me put it this way. There was no problem. Sometimes it depends on your ethnicity.

For example, I'm a Tarok Muslim, so I will tell you that I have that advantage sometimes because I'm able to speak my local language. What you should know is that this is a land issue. There's nothing like religion in the whole matter. It is a land issue. So, as a Plateau indigene, a Berom Christian or Tarok Christian would not molest me when they see me since I'm an indigenous Muslim. So, sometimes I have that advantage.

The participant asserts that Dadin Kowa remained relatively peaceful during the conflict yet Dadin Kowa residents were still susceptible to attacks outside the community. He notes that, as a Muslim, he would have been targeted if he strayed into Christian neighbourhoods in other communities. However, he states that because the conflict was land-based, rather than religious, his indigenous Tarok identity exempted him from potential attacks by Berom or Tarok Christians.

MP's experience reinforces FP's, and both perspectives undercut the claim that religion was a cause of the conflict. MP's comment below was excerpted from his conflict-time experience outside Dadin Kowa. This is what he had to say on the issue:

One Salah day I went out to get my children's shoes, and at the terminus, I was told that a mosque was attacked in town whilst people were inside praying. The mosque was in a Christian-dominated community in town. I was on my way to collect my children's shoes when we saw black smoke. And that time, whenever we saw black smoke, we knew that something was wrong. A few moments later, some people rode past us on a motorcycle screaming, "they're killing people in Gada Biou. They're killing people in Gada Biou." So, I turned back since I didn't know what the situation was like where I was headed. I was terrified on my way back home.

And, unfortunately for us, the Jos crisis is different from any other conflict in Nigeria. Even if you're a Christian and you happen to find yourself in another Christian-dominated community at the wrong time, they could kill you because they

don't know you. You may be wearing a cross on your neck, but they will still kill you if you're not from their own ethnic group. It is the same for Muslims.

The participant, a Hausa Muslim, narrates his experience in the main Jos town. He recounted his conflict-time experience in order to underscore the chaotic nature of life during the conflict period, yet his reflection about that experience is relevant for understanding the relationship, or lack thereof, between religion and the conflict. He notes that one's religious affiliation was insufficient for achieving ally status within the Christian and Muslim communities. In line with FP's viewpoint, he contends that people of the same religion could be deemed enemies except they were ethnically affiliated. Similarly, BP's conflict-time experience shows that ethnic affiliation was expected to determine people's true allegiance even though there was a suspicion of malevolent motives among the religious Other. The participant, also a Hausa Muslim, commented on his conflict-time experience in the following manner:

People continued to relate peacefully in Dadin Kowa, but people were uncomfortable doing so except with people of the same tribe and religion. For example, Hausa is a language, which is different from being a Muslim. Islam is the religion of most of the Hausa. I'm a Hausa by tribe and a Muslim but you would find someone else who may be a Hausa by tribe but isn't a Muslim. You understand!

It is the same with the Fulani and other tribes. If it so happens that two neighbours are of the same ethnic group but different religions, we would be wary of associating with them but expect them to look out for us. We withdrew from them if we felt that they weren't doing so.

We believed that if you go to a church or mosque, messages were being passed across. So, if something happens and you didn't tell me before it did, I'll start to see you as an enemy since you were aware of it and didn't tell me.

The participant's comment about the transmission of messages in places of worship reflects his perception, or belief about others' perception, that religion was a motivating factor in the

conflict. Yet, it also outlines, as FP's experience shows, that people expected their co-ethnics to align with their tribe rather than with their religious body. In contrast to FP's experience, however, BP's comment indicates that a person's ethnic affiliation did not always guarantee ally treatment, suggesting that the determinant of allegiances was fluid.

As the foregoing discussion shows, the Dadin Kowa participants offer mixed evidence about the nature of the religion-conflict nexus. Some of the recounted experiences and viewpoints underscore the necessity for using a historical assessment of the influence of religion on intergroup relations in order to understand its role, if any, in the Jos conflict. Several participants believe that the conflict was religiously inspired, yet there are others who describe it as driven by other issues, such as the contest over land ownership.

Contested homeland

Compared to the religion dimension, the subject of land is not a prominent feature of the participants' conflict-related narratives about intergroup relations yet the few remarks on the issue show that it is emotionally charged. Much of the land-focused data emanated from the Angwan Doki interviews, the collective reading of which indicates that there is a contest over the ownership of Jos. The comments below reinforce FP's assertion that the Jos conflict is a land dispute cloaked in religion.

Angwan Doki

The Angwan Doki participants' narratives revolve around changes in the value of land, conflicting first arrival claims, denial of land rights, the threat of collective expulsion, and a

collective group siege mentality. PP's explanation for the disconnect between the Jos conflict and his experience of pre-conflict intergroup relations highlight the role of land value. The participant, an Afizere Christian, commented on the issue as follows:

The problem is civilization. I say civilization because, in the olden days, you could buy a land for a penny or the owner could just pronounce you the [*mew*] owner. Also, the population was small. Now we have many children, there's competition for the land. So, one of the things is that because some people feel that if someone [*settlers*] paid 10 kobo for acres of land in a big city like Jos, and is now selling small portions for millions, the offspring of the initial sellers feel that their parents were cheated, so they want to take back the land, which is illegal. They will say their parents were deceived when they were old, that they wouldn't have sold for such a meagre price, hence they want to reclaim it.

The participant's remark shows that the development of Jos and the concomitant increase in the price of land have led people in the indigenous community to reject the transactions that resulted in the transfer of high-value lands to settler families for only a token of their current worth. Rather than seek a review of the transactions, which would also have been problematic, the heirs of the original owners sought to claim their "birthright" forcefully. This explanation of the contest over land deviates from the commonly referenced conflict of indigeneship claims, which is the subject of PV and PL's reflection about why intergroup relations deteriorated.

PV, a Berom Christian, expressed her dissatisfaction with the Hausa and Fulani indigeneship claims. She justified her withdrawal from her Hausa friends as follows:

Where I am is my village. I feel like I'm in my village and I welcomed a stranger in, and that stranger is supposed to behave properly. It is not fair when that same stranger is trying to destroy you, trying to pull you out of your fatherland. That's not fair. So, my behaviour towards them changed. I just wanted them to see that I was offended.

I can't go to Kano and start saying that this is my town. This is my town, despite knowing that its not mine. If someone welcomes me to Kano, I will say thank you, I'll live with you in peace.

But for someone to desire to capture someone else's land after they were welcomed with open hands is not fair. It took all of us in my house a very long time before we started relating with them [*Hausa neighbours*] again.

The participant's comment highlights the breakdown in intergroup relations and the role of conflicting indigeneship claims in this process. Her comment about welcoming the Hausa and Fulani into Jos highlights her perceptions of her people as hospitable and serves to assert her tribe's first-comer status. As "second comers," the Hausa and Fulani can make no claims to Jos, she asserts. Her remark indicates the perception that both the indigenous and "stranger" tribes cannot simultaneously own the city. In fact, by claiming ownership of Jos, the Hausa and Fulani are indicating their desire to capture the land, which undermines the peaceful coexistence of both groups. Yet, the Participant's reference to her change in attitude towards her Hausa neighbours indicates that the relationship was initially cordial. This raises a host of questions, including the sources of the conflicting narratives on land ownership and why it only started to adversely shape intergroup relations around 2001.

PL touches on the same issues raised by PV and PP. His reflections do not address all the questions that emanated from PP's comment, but they indicate the intensity of the first arrival dispute. PL's remark below was made in the context of his explanation of the breakdown in intergroup relations in Angwan Doki. This is what he had to say on the issue:

So, the conflict between the Berom and the people of Jos {Hausa-Fulani} is that if you look at the city very well, you'll find that our settlements are in the heart of the city. When we arrived, you weren't here. We also came from somewhere but when you arrived from Niger Republic through Sokoto, down to Jos, we were already here.

Hence, we are more aboriginal than you. Those lands you see us occupy are owned by us. We met them uninhabited.

And those our lands you see outside Jos city were not taken forcefully; they were paid for to your community members that own them. So, you cannot say we aren't indigenes here. You cannot say we don't belong to Jos. You cannot say we don't have the right to have our own traditional leaders [...] You see, the Hausa that arrived particularly during the construction of railways and roads for the mining industry bought most of their lands from the Berom owners and paid for them. They were largely either for farming or residence purposes.

Later, particularly between 1979 and 1983, a question was raised by the Berom youths that the value of the monetary payments for the lands was grossly inadequate. So, the Hausa-Fulani said you cannot compare a penny that was given 10 or 20 or 50 years ago with the Naira of today. That if you scientifically evaluate the payment made then, you'll see that it was equitable. Part of their argument or part of the issue of their emancipation agenda then was that even though our fathers bought the land, they paid an unreasonably small amount. So, they want us to make up for the difference.

PL's comment, like PV's remark, shows that there are conflicting claims of indigeneship. PV, a Berom Christian, portrayed her tribe as the owners of Jos land. PL, a Hausa Muslim, challenges this perspective. His view reinforces PV's assertion that the Hausa are claiming Jos as their land. In contrast to PV's criticism of the Hausa claim, PL justifies it. The participant claims that the Hausa are indigenous to Jos, and that they arrived in the city earlier than everyone else. He notes, contrary to the Berom perspective, that all the ethnic groups currently living in Jos migrated from somewhere to the city, but he insists that the Hausa are "more aboriginal" than the Berom since they were the earliest to arrive there. The rigidity and contradictory nature of these indigeneship claims dampened the quality of intergroup relations in Angwan Doki, making the source of those narratives critical to understanding the roots of the conflict in the community. PL's remark does not indicate his perceptions about the source of these narratives, yet he does so with regards to the land value dispute, which is the subject of PP's comment.

In addition to being structurally similar to PV's comment, PL corroborates PP's remark about the Berom-Hausa disputes over historical land transactions. In contrast to PP, however, he notes that the Berom youths are demanding a review, which the Hausa vehemently object to. He goes beyond discussing the controversy by revealing his view about its origin. He believes the calls for the review of those land transactions is rooted in the Berom people's emancipation agenda and began between 1979 and 1983, which corresponds with Nigeria's Second Republic. He notes that the Hausa insist, contrary to Berom demands, that the status quo must be maintained since their forebears legitimately procured the lands.

From the perspective of the Hausa, they cannot relinquish their lands in Jos because they have nowhere else to go to. PX, a Hausa Muslim, discloses this perspective in his lamentation about the dilemma of the Hausa. He divulged the following in his story:

And let me tell you, we claim to be Hausa but where do we come from? My parents gave birth to me in Jos. It was my grandparents that migrated here. My own father doesn't even know his village. His father didn't show him where he comes from. My father is around 90 years old but doesn't even know his hometown. So, tell me, where do I go to? If somebody with whom I grew up, with whom I attended the same primary and secondary schools says I don't belong here where would I be accepted?

What do you want me to do if he says I should leave? Would I leave? I may not leave because I don't know where else to go. That's why Plateau is very volatile. You'll also find a Yoruba man whose parents gave birth to him here. He doesn't even know whether he's from Ogbomosho or Oyo, Ekiti or Lagos. All he knows is that his father is a Yoruba man. Where do you want him to go? He may not agree to go anywhere.

PX's reflection undermines PL's narratives about Hausa indigeneship even though they are both Hausa and Muslims, suggesting that the Hausa do not have a unified position in their standoff with the Berom. Through the tone and substance of his remark, PX discloses his belief that the

Hausa or at least his Hausa family migrated to Jos later than the Berom. His comment, for example, shows that it was his grandfather, rather than earlier ancestors, that migrated to Jos.

Also, he does not insist that the Hausa must remain in Jos because they are, as PL claims, “more aboriginal” than the Berom. Rather, he notes that the lack of an alternative homeland makes it inevitable for the Hausa to fight to have a place in Jos.

While expressing his views on the emergence of the conflict, PL reiterates his claim about Hausa indigeneship, and inadvertently explains why some Hausa may not be inclined to do the same. He noted the following in his story:

The Hausa-Fulani understanding is that the conflict was pre-meditated with the aim of sending us packing from Plateau state and its our understanding that it was backed by the government. The then governor, Chief Joshua Dariye, stated that it doesn't matter how long we've been on the plateau, that even if we've been on the Plateau for over one thousand years, we're still tenants. And that the landlord can at any given time request his land. This statement was supported by the Gbong Gwom Jos, who's the Berom paramount traditional ruler and Chairman of the Council of Chiefs of Plateau state. So, the Hausa-Fulani then said that “okay, this is a grand design to take us out.”

Let me tell you the dilemma of the Hausa-Fulani people in Jos. I told you earlier that I was born here. So, no matter how much you balkanize the country, I won't move from this community to another part of Nigeria. I may have traced my paternal ancestry to Katsina and Kaduna, but I feel more at home here. This is the culture I understand, the environment that suits my physiology, where I grew up and developed. So, there is a problem or a dilemma for the Hausa-Fulani man on the Plateau. Those of us born here and have lived here are not ready to move anywhere. We see ourselves as Plateau state indigenes and are not ready to move. There are others who weren't born here. They came to trade or farm because land is available here. These categories can at any given time move back to where they came from.

So, what do you do with those Hausa-Fulani Muslims that see themselves and understand themselves and hold on to the belief that Berom men are not more Plateau than them? What's their future? What's the future of their upcoming ones, their own children who they haven't taken anywhere outside Plateau, who they have socialized to believe that Plateau is home. Jos is home. And with the crisis over the years, the group of Hausa-Fulani, who at the flash of a crisis run away, are already gone. Those remaining are not going anywhere. They are only waiting for destiny. If

their death comes, so be it. But as long as they are alive, capable and haven't found a job outside Jos, they would remain here no matter the power of guns used.

The participant believes that the Jos troubles is not a dispute over land ownership simply degenerating into conflict. Rather the Berom orchestrated the conflict in a bid to evict the Hausa from Jos, which would make them the undisputed owners of the land. This mirrors PV's viewpoint, except that PV thinks it is the Hausa who are seeking to confiscate land that is rightfully the Berom's. Similar to PX's assertion, PL notes that Jos is the only home that he knows personally and is the place of his birth. Unlike PX, he has successfully traced his paternal roots and yet he is not inclined to leave Jos because it is the environment that he is familiar with. Also, PL distinguishes between the Jos-born Hausa like himself and the newer Hausa migrants to Jos, most of whom he says have already returned to their states of origin.

Obviously, his reference to new migrants indicates that the Hausa did not all arrive in Jos at the same time, which probably explains the contradictions between his efforts to claim indigeneship and PX's reluctance to do the same. It also explains the differences between both participants' knowledge of their ancestral roots. PX, for example, is aware that his existence in Jos is tied to his grandfather's migration to the city. PL, on the other hand, knows that Katsina and Kaduna are part of his ancestral roots, yet he is oblivious to which generation of his ancestors made the move from those territories. Also, in light of PL's initial claim about the Hausa's status of first arrival, it is possible that there are Hausa families whose ancestors migrated long enough for them to have no knowledge of their roots. PL intended to demonstrate the Hausa's dilemma of their struggle to have a place in Jos, yet through his comment, he inadvertently explains why the Hausa may have varying levels of attachment to Jos.

While the comments above describe the dilemma facing the Hausa community in Jos, PH tells a story about the long-running battle of the Berom against people trying to confiscate their land. After my opening protocol, and before I invited him to recount his experiences of intergroup relations, PH narrated his father's pre-independence struggle for the Berom people. The participant, a Berom Christian, commented on the issue in the following way:

The British had planned to relocate the Berom out of our traditional lands to make way for mining, but my Dad upon returning from the Second World War resisted the relocation because the place we were being relocated to was infested with tsetse flies. My father had experienced how tsetse flies killed black people in South Africa, so he was against moving to the designated relocation site. On the day the panel was going to decide on the relocation, my father went to the conference room and sat on the chair of the panel head, a White man.

Other people came and saw him. They told my Dad that he would be locked up oh. My Dad told them not to worry, that they didn't know what was going on. The Chairman came in with his exco and they saw my Dad on his seat. They asked him "do you know that the seat doesn't belong to you?" And he asked back "Who does the seat belong to?" The Chairman said it belonged to him as the Chairman of the committee. Then my Dad said, "fine, just as you're the Chairman of this committee, we're the Chairmen of our land." That was the end. That's why you see that the Berom man is still on the Plateau here.

The participant intended to show that the conflict with the Hausa and Fulani is not their first campaign to protect their land. This historical narrative, interfaced with the contemporary perception of the Hausa and Fulani land grab, probably created a siege mentality within the Berom community.

Dadin Kowa

The competition over land ownership was not a feature of the Dadin Kowa participants' narratives about intergroup relations. Also, my invitation to the Dadin Kowa participants to

comment on the possible role of land ownership did not return any substantively land-related story to justify their inclusion in this section. Most of the participants simply referred to the contest over land, or indigeneship more broadly, as a creation of the political class. Although one participant, WP, comments on his inability to access his land, his story does not advance understanding in regard to the breakdown in intergroup relations in Dadin Kowa. Below is an excerpt of the narration of his ordeal:

I'm a farmer by profession but I have not been able to access most of my farms. The Fulanis are using them as grazing land now. The farm you just saw is very small. I only planted a few maize and cocoyam, which may not take the family year-round. The farm at the riverside is the major problem. During the dry season, I can use the water to irrigate. Now you can't even go there because, during the dry season, the upper-land is dry, so the Fulanis move to the wetlands and start grazing there.

Apart from being a recent post-direct violence experience, the Fulani who the participant references are nomads from other states, who are not Dadin Kowa community members. Moreover, there are no related Dadin Kowa stories that provide a context within which WP's experience can be examined.

Ethnicized electoral politics

Similar to the structure of the data on land ownership, much of the stories around ethnicized electoral politics emanated from my Angwan Doki interviews. While a few remarks show that ethnicized politics has waned in recent years, most of the stories discussed below establish linkages between this form of politics and the emergence of conflict. Some stories indicate that politicians peddled narratives of a Hausa and Fulani land grab in order to obtain the votes of the

indigenous tribes. Other stories reflect the perception that there is systemic opposition to the rights of the Hausa and Fulani to have political representation. This perception is corroborated by actual narratives of opposition to Hausa and Fulani aspirations for political leadership, which some Hausa participants describe as legitimate ambitions. The indigenous tribes' opposition to Hausa political leadership coupled with the latter's perception of systemic obstacles to their political aspirations, made for violently disputed election outcomes.

An Angwan Doki's participant's comment indicates the waning of ethnic-based electoral politics and is reinforced by a Dadin Kowa participant's comment which disapproves the interethnic political alliances birthed during the 2015 election cycle in the state.

Angwan Doki

The Angwan Doki participants' stories highlight two main factors that mediate between electoral politics and indigene-settler conflict. First, the politicians peddle narratives about the mistreatment of indigenous tribes by their settler neighbours in order to gain electoral support. Second, there are conflicting perspectives about who can legitimately seek political office. PA's reflection on the conflict falls under the latter category. I asked the participant for his thoughts about why the indigenous and settler groups could turn on each other in spite of the long history of cordial relations that he had recounted earlier. The participant, a Hausa Muslim, responded as follows:

You know the majority of the people in Jos come from the Eastern and Western Nigeria, the Niger Delta, Hausa people and Fulani people. So, if they say conduct an election, who do you think would win such an election? We agree that the Berom

people own Plateau state up to the University of Jos area. They own the land from Idu here up to Laranto, up to the University of Jos.

But they are claiming that if at all there should be an LG Chairman, it should be from Dun where they are in the majority. But how many of them [*Berom*] are in Jos? If one thousand elections are conducted, the victor will be either a Fulani or Hausa man. I think this is the genesis of the problem.

The participant acknowledges that the Berom own much of Jos land, yet he contends that it does not justify their electoral goals. In light of his view that the Berom are the numeric minority in Jos, PA rejects their insistence that a Berom must always be the Local Government chairman in Jos North. He contends that, because of their numeric superiority, either a Hausa or Fulani would produce the LG Chairman in any credible election, suggesting that the electorate would always vote along ethnic lines.

Parts of PX's reflections on the breakdown in intergroup relations reinforce the above claim about ethnic-based voting as he portrays the state government as collaborators in the Berom effort to undermine the political potentials of the Hausa. The Participant, a Hausa Muslim, articulated the following in his story:

People thought that a Hausa man is a settler here but doesn't want to behave like a settler, rather wants to be a part and parcel of the business of the community. He wants to rise to traditional leadership posts. That's what people are thinking but that isn't the case. These are mere insinuations, which aren't true. How would anyone take over the kingship of another tribe? That's not possible. They can, of course, seek political office as the constitution allows that.

But the government is unable to hold LG {*Local Government*} elections in Jos North because the Muslims are more in the population and there's no way an indigene can get elected there. That's why for the past 25 years, there haven't been LG elections in Jos North. For this long, the government has not been interested in holding elections because they know the settlers will take over the LG council of Jos North, which is the headquarters of the state.

If someone who they say isn't a part of the state is leading the state capital and would be the landlord of all the LG chairmen going to the state capital for some official engagement, they won't be able to keep saying that we are second class

citizens. That's why the government just keeps appointing a caretaker government in Jos North. Here in Jos South, we are the overall minority but within Angwan Doki we are the majority. So, we can get the councillorship, but we don't get it because of the manipulation of the political elite.

PX notes that the Berom view the Hausa as acting beyond their status as settlers. He contends that even though their activities are geared towards assuming political office as is guaranteed under the constitution, they have been misconstrued as an effort to usurp the traditional authority of the Berom monarch. He believes that the Berom are threatened by the numeric strength of the Hausa in Jos North LG so there have not been local council elections for decades. He notes that the government prefers appointing a caretaker administration for the local council because it enables them to impose a Berom Chairman, and since this sustains the Berom narrative about the Hausa being inferior citizens. Also, he concedes that even though the Hausa are the main minority ethnic group in Jos South, which Angwan Doki is a part of, they are unlikely to win the LG Chairmanship post. However, he notes that even in Angwan Doki in which the Hausa are the majority ethnic group, the electoral process is manipulated to prevent them from achieving political representation at the ward level.

The aforementioned views are echoed in IP's comment about the breakdown in intergroup relations in Angwan Doki. However, he provides a broader context for understanding some of the issues raised in PX's reflections. The participant, a Fulani Muslim, commented on this issue as follows:

You see, the whole crisis started after Jos North was created. The mistrust started to brew after its creation. The perception of the Berom was that Babangida created it for the Hausa. Then there was an LG election won by a Hausa man that was followed by fighting between Christians and Muslims. Then I think there was one Friday in Jos

North in 2001 around Congo Russia when a lady passed through a group of Muslims praying.

I think those are the issues. I think it was a political issue that degenerated into what's happening now. It started in Jos North but has moved here, and also to Barkin Ladin and Ryom. When the crisis started in the North, the Berom attacked us here because we're Hausa and Fulani too. They say the Hausa people want to take over their land, that we even have the guts to contest for political office.

Yet, the constitution of Nigeria allows for that. You can go anywhere and contest. As long as the constitution is operable, nobody can deny you that right. You know we have our own separate village head here. Since the village head, a Hausa man, died in 2001, no one has been appointed by the government to take over. It's all because of the crisis because there's the fear that it will be resisted by the Berom.

The above excerpt mirrors some of PX's views and broadens others. Like PX, for example, IP insists that regardless of their designation as settlers, the Hausa and Fulani are well within their rights to seek political office in Jos since the Nigerian constitution does not prohibit such an aspiration. Also, IP's comment offers a different explanation for the government's refusal to hold local council elections in Jos North. While PX notes that the numeric threat of the Hausa drives the government's inaction in Jos North, IP's reference to the origin of the local council offers a different explanation. He notes that the Berom perceive that the creation of the council out of the defunct Jos Local Government was aimed at giving the Hausa an electoral edge since they are the majority there. In this sense, while it may be true that the Hausa's numeric strength drives the government's inaction, the Berom believe this electoral advantage is illegitimate because it is the product of gerrymandering.

Like PX, IP also addresses the tensions around the legitimacy of traditional authorities in Jos. PX notes that it is believed within the Berom community that the Hausa are aiming to take over the Berom traditional stool. Although he insists that the fear is unfounded, IP indicates that the government has acted on that fear by withholding the appointment of a Hausa traditional

leader to avoid drawing the ire of the Berom. Contests, such as this, coupled with the government's role as the final arbiter raises the stakes in the state's elections.

Yet, elections, as PX notes, are manipulated in favour of the Berom. Although PX contends that the local elections are rigged to benefit the Berom, he does not say how this occurs. PL's comment on the root of Hausa disaffection illuminates the process. The participant, a Hausa Muslim like PX, narrated the following in his story:

This community as an electoral ward has a voting population of between 35 to 40 thousand. The Hausa-Fulani constitute 70 percent, while the other ethnic groups share the remaining 30 percent. And it is clear that historically the councillorship of the ward was produced by the Hausa-Fulani community.

That's not the case today because during elections the Hausa-Fulani areas are either denied voting materials or they are supplied late, or they change the result at the collation point. It even got to the point that the Hausa-Fulani members of the PDP met with their fellow PDP members in government at the time.

They [*the Hausa*] said "look, if it is the issue of participation, we have the majority to participate. Allow a free and fair election to hold so that if the Berom win, we will accept it and if the Hausa-Fulani win, you would accept it as well." Even the allotment of political party officials is manipulated. Someone who is not a resident of Bukuru [*which Angwan Doki is a part of*] would be given the position of the Bukuru Ward Party Chairman. And the state government makes sure that it stays that way. This is the cause of our discontent.

The participant, like PA and PX, touts the Hausa's numeric superiority in Jos as a yardstick for expecting more political representation. PL goes further to explain how the Berom-led governments have kept them under-represented politically. In his view, the government limits the Hausa-dominated neighbourhoods' access to voting materials during elections in order to artificially reduce their vote share. He notes that their political affiliations did not change their fate as this practice occurred even when the Hausa were members of the governing political party.

As the narrative of a Berom participant suggests, the claims of the Hausa about Berom opposition to their interest in political leadership are not unfounded. PV, a Berom Christian, decried the Hausa's desire to operate beyond their status as settlers. She expressed her objections to their ambitions as follows:

When you give a Hausa person the opportunity to know you a bit, if you're not careful, they would want to take advantage of you. So, I think they were trying to take advantage of us, having studied us and learnt our strengths and weaknesses. For example, I have a Hausa friend who isn't from Plateau state. Yet, he wants to contest for an elective office here. We don't do things like that in Nigeria. We're not in the U.S. where immigrants can do anything they like. This is how the Hausa behave. If they notice that you're a good person, they would want to exploit your kindness. It is because we welcomed them here that they have the courage to want to contest for public office.

The participant considers the presence of the Hausa in the state as a mark of Berom hospitality but notes that, by seeking to hold public office, they are overstretching the kindness of the Berom. Also, the participant compares the Hausa to immigrants in the U.S., indicating her belief that they are not entitled to the same citizenship rights as the Berom.

While the narratives of the indigenous Christian and settler Muslims diverge regarding the legitimacy of the political ambitions of the latter, both categories of participants espouse a common perspective about the role of the political class in stoking animosity. For example, PP situates the transition from cordial to acrimonious intergroup relations as symptomatic of the nature of politics practised in the state. The participant, an Afizere Christian, communicated the following in his story:

It feels like it is our democracy that's behind all of this. Some politicians, when they go to campaign, they can say anything just to gain votes in that community [...] Our

governments should know that their citizens are not pawns for their political games. They don't mind wasting several lives just to win elections. In many cases, they depend on religious crisis to gain popularity. Some politicians come to our community and preach that we are under siege by the Muslims so that the Christians will feel the need to vote for them. And the people actually vote for these politicians based on religion.

PL's reflections on the breakdown in intergroup relations reflect the same reasoning. The participant articulated on the issue as follows:

Why destroy lives just for the sake of gaining political power? Why misinform communities so that you can distract them and gain power yet fail to do better. And in the wee hours of the night, you go to the same communities you disparage in order to curry their support at elections. Of what value is this to the political elites? After all, you can only enjoy your loots from the state when there is peace.

PP notes that Christian politicians portray the Hausa Muslims as an imminent danger to the ingroup in order to establish their image as champions of ingroup interests, who should be saddled with the duty of advancing ingroup goals in government. Such campaigns of misinformation, PP's comment indicates, are not unsuccessful as some community members have been receptive to them. Similar to PP's view, PL notes that political figures peddle false narratives about the outgroup in order to conceal their inability to fulfil their pledges to their co-ethnics. The participant's comment further underscores the insincerity of the politicians as he notes that these individuals also go to seek the support of the outgroup despite portraying them as an imminent danger to the ingroup.

PV's comment about interethnic political cooperation reinforces PP's claim that politicians canvass for the outgroup's votes despite demonizing them. The participant, a Berom Christian, commented on the inevitability of such cooperation as follows:

There are some things that you can't afford to do alone. One of such things is politics. If you don't align with them, you'll end up losing. And in my house, we have politicians, so we have to welcome everybody and make them feel comfortable irrespective of who they are. All you want is their vote, so you need to have a good rapport with them.

For example, at this past Christmas, food materials were brought from the state government house, from the governor himself. I was instructed by one of the Commissioners on what to do. My Uncle wasn't even aware until I had shared everything to the people in the community, including Hausa-Fulani [...] Even if you don't love them anymore, there are things that you can't avoid doing with them.

In her comment examined above, the participant noted that the Hausa's interest in public office exceeds their entitlements as settlers in the state. She also described them as exploitative for aiming to assume political leadership posts after being warmly welcomed into the state by the indigenous tribes. Yet, going by this excerpt, she appears willing to form political alliances with the same people, thereby corroborating PP's comment about the schizophrenic nature of Angwan Doki politics.

While PP and PL note that politicians discursively misrepresent the Other, PX's comment on the roots of disharmony in Angwan Doki indicates that they also achieve their aim through learned collaborators. PX, a Hausa Muslim, explained this practice and its rationale in the following way:

I can tell you that politics and intellectuals contributed to it {*the conflict*}. You know people believe University graduates when they speak because they believe that they know what they're saying. They believe he must have read about it in school. It is these intellectuals that now go to the villagers and tell them that, "these people [*Hausa and Fulani Muslims*] that you see are the people that enslaved our people. They caused us a problem, made our parents slaves in our fatherland."

So, they would say, "the time has come for our people to regain our land or our leadership." This comes from the intellectuals. Some are lecturers. People tend to believe them because they also believe that their messages are divine. And these

intellectuals are sometimes used by politicians to spread all these messages. So, it is a collaboration between the intellectuals and politicians that is the root of the problem.

The participant notes that politicians demonize the ethnic Other in order to mobilize electoral support within the ingroup. PX's reference to "reclaiming land" implies that his comment is about Berom politicians. In his view, they peddle historical narratives about the outgroup's mistreatment of the ingroup's forebears, which is then used to justify their quest for political power. He notes, in contrast to PL and PP that the politicians rely on learned co-ethnics to implement their disinformation campaigns as they are generally viewed as credible either because of their education or perceived divine insights.

Dadin Kowa

The narratives from Dadin Kowa contain no major references to ethnicized electoral politics. In fact, the only related data also include, either directly or indirectly, references to interethnic political cooperation. BP's reflection on the transition from harmony to disharmony indicates some transformation in the character of politics. The participant, a Hausa Muslim, reported on the issue in the following manner:

When it gets to election time, you'll begin to hear that we'll not vote for this person because he's a Muslim or we won't vote for that person because he is a Christian. But, thank God, with the recent development, even the Muslims and Hausa have realized that if they cannot be successful electorally, they can support someone else who would protect their interest irrespective of their religion or tribe. Their interest is now development and the way forward.

His comments show that people's voting behaviour was dictated not so much by the character of a candidate or their political party, but by their religion. The participant does not say when this practise began but notes that the voting trend has shifted more towards interethnic political alliances, and away from religion-based voting.

While BP seems to approve the change in the voting pattern, other participants appear displeased by it. PT, for example, made the following comment when I asked whether she had additional thoughts to share:

I always wonder whether this conflict will finally end one day, or this is how we are going to continue. That's the question I always ask myself. If I'm to answer my own question, based on my experience and what's happening, especially the Christian government who are working with the Muslims to retain power and ignoring their [*the Muslims*'] agenda, there will be no end. To me, there are many of us who think the government, because of their quest for power, are backing the Hausa.

She predicts a gloomy future for Jos's intergroup relations not because the underlying issues that divide the people subsist but due to the political alliance between the Christian-dominated government and the Hausa Muslims, who she says have an agenda against the Christians. BP and PT differ not only in their views regarding the emerging interethnic political alliance but also in terms of their location in Dadin Kowa. While PT relocated to a Christian-dominated settlement at the fringes of Dadin Kowa after the 2001 conflict, BP is still resident in the main Dadin Kowa community.

In the first section, which focuses on the Dadin Kowa and Angwan Doki participants' narratives around the religion-conflict nexus, I identified a turning point in intergroup relations. In the subsection on Angwan Doki, I discussed PP's recollection of a shift in Berom people's attitude regarding the community's animal slaughtering practice, which accommodated the

Hausa's religious beliefs about unclean meat. Although the participant does not explicitly describe it as such, this change in attitude was evidence of the erosion of the previously cordial Berom-Hausa relationship. PA, on his part, notes that this breakdown in intergroup relations was politically driven. As his comment above shows, PA locates the roots of disharmony in the struggle over political leadership.

The comments of other participants in this section, including PP's, better illuminate the unravelling of religious tolerance in Angwan Doki. PP, for example, recalls that politicians oriented the community towards believing that they were under an Islamic siege. Similarly, PX notes that political surrogates sought to advance their principals' political fortune by disseminating narratives about Hausa and Fulani Muslims mistreating the indigenous tribes. The peddling of such narratives by politicians and their surrogates explains why a people who were previously tolerant of their neighbours' religious beliefs suddenly turned around to say it would be demeaning of them to accommodate those same beliefs.

Politics of patronage

The politicians, as the stories below suggest, engage in ethnic-based election campaigns and perform their public office roles to the benefit of their co-ethnics. The subject of political patronage, like the issue of ethnicized electoral politics, features only in the narratives of the Angwan Doki participants. With the exception of a Berom participant, whose comments are indirectly related to the subject, this section is based on the views of the settler Hausa participants. PL, a Hausa Muslim, describes how the government's skewed distribution of

resources and social services caused and sustained intergroup animosity in Angwan Doki. He explicated the following in his story:

In order to devalue the assets of the Hausa-Fulani communities, roads are left unmaintained, drainages are left clogged, schools are left unattended to, and abattoirs are not provided for them to slaughter their cattle. So, the people had to resort to self-help. How would such a government tell you it is working for you when they diminish your standard of living daily? So, these things destroyed our brotherhood [...]

The state sustains the animosity because of the discriminatory distribution of resources, denial of rights, artificial re-delineation of constituencies to favour one tribe and widen the prosperity gap between the Hausa-Fulani and Berom communities [...]

Given that the constitution of Nigeria makes provision that certain appointments cannot be obtained, certain educational facilities cannot be accessed without proof of indigeneship in a state, everyone living on the Plateau started to scramble for the indigeneship form. So, the issue is that the people in authority are largely Berom. Most of the Hausa-Fulani are either traders, dry season farmers or transporters. For them to acquire indigeneship certificates to obtain admission or access scholarship opportunities, they must pass through District Heads, Village Heads or the LG authorities. And the LGs are not in their control. So, right from the District Head's office, they are denied access since the District Head must acknowledge that you're from that community.

But it has been agreed in an unwritten code that no Hausa-Fulani would be given an indigeneship form. So, there's no way you can access indigeneship forms. So, tensions began to mount. You'll find out that one Hausa Fulani man is married to two, three or four wives and will have 10 or 15 or 20 or more than 30 children. And they keep on filing, but you can't gain access to government facilities for them. So, tension started building internally. When you approach the government, there will be the usual ceremony of saying "we'll look at it." When you write the government, it will be KIVed [*kept in view*]. So, these files kept piling up. Relations started deteriorating.

The young minds in the Berom community were brainwashed to think that the Hausa-Fulani man usurped their lands, usurped their jobs, so they had no future left. They tell them that if you see a good car, it belongs to a Hausa-Fulani man. If you see a beautiful woman, she's the wife of a Hausa-Fulani man. Such examples were given to young minds. These examples derailed our sense of being one family and our feeling of brotherhood. So, this new school of thought erased all the gains of integration that had developed in Jos.

The participant notes that the Hausa view their lack of resources and inaccessibility to social services as the results of the government's effort to undermine their quality of life. As such, they consider the government as an unreliable structure for addressing their resource and service needs. Also, PL suggests that the government's discriminatory conduct was ultimately aimed at making the Berom more prosperous, especially in light of their peddled narratives about the material and social dominance of the Hausa. Although these actions of the government are discriminatory, they were executed legally. PL, for example, states that the Hausa's inaccessibility to government services and resources were enabled by their lack of indigeneship certificates. As PL notes, the local governments are responsible for issuing these certificates, which means the relationship between them and people's life prospects increased the stakes in local elections.

The participant's reflection also indicates that the tension mounted within the Hausa community not simply due to their perception of government bias, but also because their large family sizes worsened the effects of the discriminatory practices. Even though the government was perceived as biased, PL recalls that efforts were made to obtain fairer government policies. The government's inaction on these demands, according to the participant, exacerbated Hausa frustration. Intergroup peace became unsustainable because while there was Hausa grievance towards the Berom-led government, the Berom youths simultaneously developed the same attitude towards the Hausa population because they had been oriented into believing that the Hausa had appropriated their opportunities.

PL's perspective on government discrimination is also echoed in PX's explanation of the roots of the conflict. The participant, who is also a Hausa Muslim, recounted the following in his narrative:

Despite being born here and having my own grandchildren here, I'm not an indigene. I cannot get anything. Even if I apply for the indigeneship certificate, they will give me a settler citizenship certificate. I can't get any government job with this. For the government to settle this matter, our constitution must be explicitly clear that as a Nigerian citizen one can get anything in any part of the country. Except this happens, we'll remain in this cycle of conflict. Apart from the traditional stool of another tribe, people should be able to get anything in any region of their own country.

The participant decries the government's refusal to issue him an indigeneship certificate, which would grant him access to public services and resources. PX believes that, as a Jos-born Nigerian citizen, he should be officially recognized as an indigene of his local government. He believes that the lack of clarity in the Nigerian constitution allows for discrimination against people like himself that are deemed as having no ancestral roots in Jos. He noted that unless the constitution's ambiguity is resolved, the Jos conflict would be unsolvable.

In contrast to PL and PN, who reveal their perceptions about the government's discrimination against the settler Hausa population, PH laments about his loss of patronage since the emergence of the Berom-led but Hausa-allied state government. PH, an indigenous Berom Christian, revealed the following in his story:

I used to supply office equipment to the government. Back then if I told you I was broke, I still had like 5,000 Naira or 10,000 Naira in my pocket. Now, if I tell you I'm broke, I'm really broke. No kobo! Today, if you submit a proposal to an office, nobody will honour it. Must I decamp to APC before they give me food to eat? No! Instead, APC should give me food to eat so that I can decamp very happy with my supporters. You're starving me but want me to decamp. [...]

If you give me food, you give me what I want, then you'll see what I'll do, you'll see the kind of people that I'll bring into your political party because whatever you give me, I'll extend some of it to my followers, to my associates. I'll tell them that this is the goodwill of that political party, why can't we go and join them?

So, you see I would have given them a reason to decamp with me. If your wife is hospitalized and because I'm so close to you, you tell me, and I say let's go and talk to my friend who's a Commissioner. I talk to him, saying that my friend needs #500,000 to pay his wife's hospital bills, then he gives me #300,000, I'll take it to my friend and say this is from Commissioner x of the APC. Even before I say the words "decamp from your political party," he'll move. You do see the problem, ba [*right*]?

Obviously, a comment about losing political patronage indicates the existence of the practice. In essence, therefore, PH's complaints about his loss of patronage imply that PL's perception about the Berom-led government's discriminatory practices is not unfounded. The participant believes that the government wants him to switch political parties before he is awarded another contract. This suggests that party affiliation, rather than the merits of a proposal, is what determines the award of contracts. Yet, not everyone has or perceives that they have the same flexibility of access to economic opportunities. For example, whereas PH is convinced that he can regain his lost economic opportunities simply by switching political parties, PL and PX believe that their status as settlers limits their access to public services and resources.

In PL's view, the discrimination of the Hausa even goes beyond denial of economic opportunities. He outlined several other government practices, which he feels unjustly target the Hausa population. This is what he had to say on the issue:

The Hausa man sees the state government's introduction of property rates as a deliberate policy of sending him away or makes him uncomfortable. They wonder why these taxes are paid only in the city centre where the Hausa-Fulani are more. They wonder why the rates aren't paid in Gyel, for example. Let it even be at a disproportionate rate since the urban areas are more affluent than the rural ones. But

we end up paying the taxes that develop this state [...] So, for a long time, the Hausa-Fulani community resorted to civil disobedience. They refused to pay property rate tax, shop tax, community tax and others.

When you see people pay taxes, it is because it is a requirement for certain state services not in fulfilment of their duty to the state. This is because they feel that the state does not recognize them. The state government even descends so low to the point of deciding who becomes the leaders of student union governments just because they want to sustain the political dominance of the Beroms. So, the Hausa-Fulani man in Plateau sees himself as a dominated person, as a person whose rights are clearly denied even though enshrined in the constitution.

The deliberate relocation of government offices from Hausa-Fulani areas to virgin lands is not seen as a process of development but as a process of victimization. Jos is the capital of Plateau state. During the Jang admin, the government office was relocated closer to Jos south from the heart of Jos north even though Jos north is the capital of Plateau state constitutionally. The deliberate attempt by the Jang admin between 2011 and 2015 to forcefully eject the Jos north LG secretariat from where it has been in the heart of Jos north for more than 70 years, and scatter it around outside Jos, was seen as a deliberate attempt to constrain the Hausa man's access to government institutions.

The participant notes that the state government's property tax unjustly targets the Hausa as it is restricted to the area of Jos in which they are numerically dominant and is not enforced in other Plateau cities. Because of its limited application, PL believes that the purpose of the property tax is to make the continued residence of the Hausa in the state unsustainable. In addition to the structural obstacles to the Hausa benefitting from public services and resources, the participant notes that the government also relocated the state institutions to remote areas in order to further limit their access. Also, as the participant's comment suggests, it is not only the mainstream electoral process that has been manipulated to produce an indigenous incumbent. The quest for indigenous political dominance also motivates the state government to intervene in the elections of the Students Union government in the tertiary institutions in Plateau state.

The politics of patronage, which the Hausa experienced as discrimination, may have been driven by the desire of the political class to sustain political leverage within the indigenous communities. Yet, two participants' stories indicate that the increase in population without a corresponding increase in resources and the capacity for service delivery also contributed to the practice. PP's comment on the government's inability to meet the needs of all Plateau people sheds some light on these disparities. The participant, an Afizere Christian, expressed the following in his story:

In fact, we haven't seen anything yet. The worst is yet to come given the rate at which our population is growing. Look at an African man, he takes pride in the number of children that he has. We're very funny. Look at the schools now. The fees are so high. In the past in government colleges, you were given a transportation fare to go back home after the school term. Now, they want to even cheat you. Even the government is feeling [*the heat of*] over-population as it is no longer able to take care of the citizens as it did in the past.

A Berom participant, PH, made a similar comment. This is what he had to say on the issue:

Now the population is also a problem. There's a population problem in Nigeria. In those days, we were 70 million, then we increased to 150 million, now we are about 200 million without a provision for the population. The government is not doing anything to take care of the citizens. Even the white-collar job, the civil service, they're no longer employing those that are qualified. Also, in the area of agriculture, there's nothing that the government can show in times of food scarcity. There's nothing that the government can show it is doing to make food available. In those days, we used to know that there are reservoirs. The PADP provided big reservoirs for grains to be stored for a future time in which the citizens might need them.

PP contends that the pride that having a large family size procures for African men influences their quest for many children, thereby increasing the state's population beyond the government's carrying capacity. He notes that school fees are rising just as the government is unable to

sufficiently fund schools and provide other essential services to match the population growth rate. If the trend continues, the participant envisages that there could be more catastrophic outcomes in the future. PH essentially echoes the same sentiment but outlines the different effects of the rising population. He, like PP, notes that the state's population is rising astronomically while the government is unable to meet the needs of the citizenry. He states that even after obtaining university education, people are still unable to find befitting civil service or other white-collar jobs. Worse still, the government has no programme in place that guarantees food security.

The inability of public service institutions to meet the needs of the entire population makes the promise of patronage a viable campaign platform during elections. Also, the government's shortcomings in service delivery coupled with the ethnicized nature of electoral campaigns, makes people expect that their co-ethnics in government would cater to their economic needs. The politicians, on their part, can leverage their resource distribution powers to sustain their public office positions due to the government's service delivery incapacities and their constituents' lack of faith in public institutions. This practice, as the stories above show, bred intergroup tension in Angwan Doki.

External incitement of conflict and the internal desire for diffusion

While the political class may have inadvertently stoked intergroup tension and conflict through the nature of their politics and governance, there were other individuals who deliberately sought to cause conflict in Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa. Although this was a shared Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa experience, the narratives differ both in terms of volume and substance. The

tales of the Dadin Kowa community members directly reflect external pressure or the internal desire for participation, whereas the narratives of the Angwan Doki community members are opinion-based or inferential.

Angwan Doki

The Angwan Doki participants perceive external involvement in the conflict either in terms of malevolent actors sowing the seeds of discord for pecuniary or other gains or actively participating in the conflict. PP's comment on the breakdown in intergroup relations illuminates the former. The participant, an Afizere Christian, noted the following in his story:

The relationship was soured due to hearsay. I always say that there are agents who don't want peace. In 2001, there were people writing threatening letters and dropping them in the settlements of the other side. Even Christians who were benefitting from the conflict would write notes as Muslims saying that they are coming to invade us, that they will Islamise Nigeria and then drop the notes in our communities. They will write letters because they wanted us to feel under siege [...] We suffered during the conflict as we became separated even though we couldn't do without each other.

The participant states that intergroup animosity was rooted in unfounded stories about the imminent attacks of Muslims against Christians. Also, PP notes that even Christians who wanted to provoke conflict prepared threatening leaflets in which they impersonated Muslims, and planted them in the community in order to cause anxiety, and possibly pre-emptive attacks.

In contrast, OP's recollection of the origins of the conflict suggests that it was external actors that carried out the attacks that sparked the conflict in Angwan Doki. The participant, a Berom Christian, commented on the issue as follows:

We couldn't believe it. We couldn't believe that our neighbours could do this to us. To be frank, it wasn't the neighbours that we grew up with that attacked us. The people that attacked us were different. The people with whom we grew up won't have the guts to do such a thing. We believe that some of them came from elsewhere. We couldn't recognize them. So, that was how it started.

His remark indicates that the outbreak of the conflict was shocking, ostensibly because of the long periods of cordial intergroup relations that preceded it. The participant, however, believes it was outsiders that perpetrated the attacks that set off the conflict as none of the attackers was known to be from Angwan Doki.

While OP locates the origins of the conflict in attacks by outsiders, PP believes that its recurrence is the result of the actions of external actors who are beneficiaries of the war economy. The participant, a Berom Christian commented on this issue in the following way:

It was good. Most of the Hausa, and including the indigenes, actually do not like what's going on. It looks as if the devil just came from nowhere to pollute this city. I say so because if you sit with a lot of them and us, you will see that these are good people. But there are also some of us who will see black and insist that it is not black. And some people are wicked too.

You know if the crisis continues, the government will continue to provide extra funding for the security personnel. So, I don't think the soldiers will be happy to go back to the barracks. Apart from that, NGOs will come with aid and politicians will gather people in the name of IDP [*Internally Displace Persons*] camps, just to gain money and popularity and tarnish the image of their opponents.

The participant made the above comment while reflecting on the nature of intergroup relations post-2001. He believes that the majority of the Hausa and Berom are against the conflict, and indicates that external actors stimulated the succeeding conflict episodes. PP describes a war economy that consists of additional security funding by the government, resources for establishing and maintaining IDPs as well as the funding of social welfare programmes by Non-

Governmental Organisations. He suggests that the people currently involved in this economy would lose its benefits if the conflict abates, so they are invested in ensuring its sustenance.

Dadin Kowa

The Dadin Kowa stories on incitement can be classified based on whether they indicate internal desire for conflict participation or reflect external pressure for internal conflict eruption. In the first category are stories that reveal some community members' desire for intra-ethnic cooperation in fending off outgroup aggression against their co-ethnics in other communities and for sponsorship of war preparation internally. In the second category are narratives on experiences of outsiders pressurizing their Dadin Kowa co-ethnics to organise revenge attacks on their behalf, external co-ethnics mocking Dadin Kowa Muslims in order to stimulate a violent reaction in the community, outsiders demonizing Dadin Kowa Muslims in order to inspire Christian attacks against them and outsiders threatening to be spoilers in Dadin Kowa.

WP's comment pertains to the first category as it emphasizes the necessity of battle readiness. The excerpt below is part of the participant's reflection on the state of intergroup relations post-2001. He reported on the issue in the following manner:

You can be a billionaire in this community but in public gatherings, if you can't give out money to procure arms to save your people and yourself, you have no voice. You're a nobody. If you want to be somebody, you must bring money. The people want to see how capable you are in warfare. That's when you would talk, and people would listen. In summary, that's our state of life. I told you something. We use third eyes power that is traditional power.

If you don't have third eye powers, you're the cheapest prey. I told you if someone is a millionaire or billionaire without arms, such a person is just like a dog that can be hit and killed at any time. The present Senator, ID Gyang's house was attacked. His cattle were stolen. Do you know what that means? In contrast, a poor man who is

well armed and ready to fight and has maybe more cattle than the Senator, when the Fulanis go to this man's house, they won't be able to take even one cow.

So, you see the difference? Now, if they are in a public gathering, it is the poor man that can speak, not the billionaire. If the billionaire wants to have the right to speak, he should be capable to defend some of his tribesmen. The billionaire is not able to defend himself talk less of defending someone else. Who would go close to him? That poor man would become the automatic leader of the community, not the Senator. The Senator would be a laughingstock. People would look at him and mock him.

The participant's comment indicates his belief and/or perception about the general mood within the Berom Christian community in Dadin Kowa. It reflects a sense of imminent danger, which necessitates adequate preparation. As a result, a person's worth lies not in his wealth but in their willingness and ability to channel it towards building up an armoury for the tribe's collective self-defence. He believes that a poor man who uses his black magic for protection is accorded more respect than a wealthy man who cannot protect the community. No other Dadin Kowa participant expresses this view, but KP's reflections somewhat reflects a desire for the indigenous tribes in Dadin Kowa to be involved in the conflict.

KP, however, does not share WP's sense of imminent danger. Rather, she espouses concern over the indifference of the indigenous tribes in Dadin Kowa to the plights of their co-ethnics in other communities. KP, a Berom Christian, commented on this subject as follows:

We the indigenes, we contribute to the problem. We are tribalistic. We don't love each other. If you go to northern Nigeria, as long as you're a Muslim, you're considered as a brother. That isn't the case with us the indigenes in Jos. If you're not from a person's immediate ethnic group, you are not a brother even if you're Christian. We're self-centred. We aren't united. If we did, as the citizens of Plateau, no one would have been able to penetrate us and cause problems. If a particular indigenous ethnic group is in trouble, the other indigenous groups will say, they

caused it for themselves. Let them face it. But the Hausas are not like that. They will gang up and fight for themselves. That's their life.

That's why whenever a conflict starts, they will organise themselves and fight to the latter. If it is us, the indigenous people, some of us will even enter their houses and close their doors. They will say, toh, it doesn't affect me. Isn't it in Bassa they're fighting? They will say maybe the indigenes rustled the Fulani's cows that's why they were attacked. But it isn't this way among Muslims. If you kill one of theirs, believe me, they'll gang up and kill more than 10 people somewhere else in retaliation. That's why they've overpowered us on the Plateau. If we are united, no one can penetrate us. The problem is that we're divided. That's the problem of Plateau.

The participant's comment reflects his desire for the indigenous tribes in Dadin Kowa and elsewhere to view any aggression to one indigenous tribe as an aggression to all of them. He decries the division within the indigenous community in the state, and expresses his admiration for the Muslims, who, unlike the Christians, are united despite their ethnic diversity. Also, he notes that whenever an indigenous tribe conflicts with the Fulani or other non-indigenous group, the other indigenous tribes do not rally to their defence because of the lack of unity within the indigenous Christian community. He notes that due to the community's division, the Fulani or Hausa attacks against an indigenous tribe is viewed as provoked. Also due to the same factor, the indigenous tribes feel detached from the conflicts in other communities even if it involves an indigenous tribe. He believes that, in contrast to the attitude of the indigenous Christians, the Muslims would not only seek revenge for an attack against one of their group members, they would make it ten-fold greater than the original attack.

While KP wishes that indigenous tribes, including those in Dadin Kowa, are disposed to fighting alongside their co-ethnics in other communities, other stories indicate that external co-ethnics themselves actively sought their Dadin Kowa kinsmen's involvement in the conflict. This

suggests that those external pressures coupled with the indispositions of Dadin Kowa's indigenous tribes may have, in fact, shaped KP's reflection on Christians' disunity. PR's recollection of the conflict reflects some of these pressures. The participant, a Berom Christian, had the following to say on the issue:

There was no problem here but there was conflict in neighbouring Anglo Jos. When it started, some of the people ran here to Dadin Kowa. When the Anglo Jos Muslims that came here quarrelled with their Dadin Kowa Muslim brothers, they would say, "now you're laughing at me because my house was burnt in AJ. We will make sure that something happens here too so that yours will be burnt as well." We had to invite the police to arrest, I think, 15 Anglo Jos children who were taking shelter here because of their threats.

We did so because if we didn't take any action, they would have acted on their threats. Some of the Muslims outside Dadin Kowa would even try to instigate fighting here. They would say to Dadin Kowa Muslims "so, you're living with Christians? Continue, and one day they would fight with you." When they return, their attitude towards us would change. There was a friend of mine with whom I had a misunderstanding. He pointed his finger at me and said, "the next time there's crisis in Jos, I will finish you." Up till today, he left Dadin Kowa and didn't return, all because of external gossip.

Although people from a neighbouring conflict-affected community threatened to initiate a conflict in Dadin Kowa, such individuals were not the main threat to peace in the community. Due to their overt threats, they could be reported to law enforcement, as PR's comment suggests. The main source of the threat to Dadin Kowa's peace were those who employed a more subtle approach by demonizing the outgroup in order to inspire disharmony in the community. The participant's comment, for example, shows that the Muslims in neighbouring communities suggested to their co-ethnics in Dadin Kowa that their Christian neighbours could not be trusted. Although such narratives did not result in conflict, the participant's recollection of the conflict period indicates that it adversely affected his friend's attitude towards him. KP's recollection of

the nature of the discourse during the conflict indicates that the peddling of demonizing narratives was not limited to the external co-ethnics of Dadin Kowa Muslims. For example, he recalls Christians outside the community saying, “you think you people are living with humans? One day they will harm you”.

PC also comments on similar external pressures during the 2001 conflict. He communicated on the issue as follows:

If you leave yourself unguarded like a mattress, someone will come and make trouble on you. There was a time some youths came to DK from neighbouring Anglo Jos shouting, “where are the people who are killing all the Christians? You Christians, you’re here saying you want peace.” Muslim youths also came from there and said, “they [Christians] are killing Muslims in Anglo Jos. All the Muslims have died already, and you are here saying that you’re creating peace. Peace for what”?

BP’s comment on the nature of intergroup relations post-2001 sheds additional light on these efforts. This is what he had to say on the issue:

Can you imagine a very young Muslim boy from Anglo Jos, which is a conflict-affected area telling his Dadin Kowa Muslim schoolmate “look at you, you’re a woman. You cannot fight the Christians.” The Anglo Jos boy attends school in Dadin Kowa and he made this comment as he and the Dadin Kowa boy were walking out of their school. These were very small children. Even when you discuss with grown-ups from Angwan Doki, they’ll say, “look at you, you’re a woman. You cannot fight.” These people want to see us fighting in Dadin Kowa.

Both PC and BP are Hausa Muslims. While the former’s comment reveals the efforts of external co-ethnics to achieve conflict diffusion in Dadin Kowa, the latter’s story underscores the failure of those pressures and the frustration of its masterminds.

PC's introductory statement highlights his awareness of the conflict environment and the desires of his co-ethnics to inspire their participation in the conflict. He notes that people must be wary of troublemakers who are intent on negatively influencing their behaviour. He recalls that during one of the conflict episodes, Christians and Muslims in neighbouring Anglo Jos berated their Dadin Kowa co-ethnics for not revenging the deaths of their kinsmen in Anglo Jos. His comment indicates that these external co-ethnics were disappointed with the desire of their Dadin Kowa kinsmen to sustain the peace in Dadin Kowa, which further indicates that their objective was to drag Dadin Kowa into the conflict.

BP's comment is similar to PC's story in that they both highlight outsiders' desire for the conflict to reach into Dadin Kowa. BP's account of intergroup relations during the conflict highlights the response of those people to their failure to achieving that agenda. Ironically, the external co-ethnics labelled their Dadin Kowa kinsmen as weaklings for failing to succumb to their pressures. The participant recalls an Anglo Jos boy referring to his schoolmate as a woman for refusing to fight Christians. The context of the child's usage of "woman" shows that his intention was not to characterize his schoolmate as an affectionate person or a nurturer. Rather, he used "woman" derogatorily to portray his schoolmate as a feminine weakling. Given BP's emphasis on the child's young age, it is unlikely that he was grown enough to independently develop this orientation about Dadin Kowa Muslims. The schoolboy likely parodied the narratives of the Muslim adults around him in Anglo Jos, which, if it is in fact the case, highlights their frustration with their co-ethnics in Dadin Kowa.

Although KP expresses frustration with the indigenous tribes for refusing to assist their external co-ethnics in conflict and the external co-ethnics themselves failed to stimulate conflict

in the community, not all of the community members were detached from the conflict. PT, for example, notes that “the Muslim boys in Dadin Kowa go to Angwan Doki to fight and they return to say that we’re in peace.” The participant provides no detail about this practice and no other Dadin Kowa participant provided a similar account. Having said that, her statement lends credence to OP’s comment that the people who fought in Angwan Doki came from outside the community.

Findings

Several findings emerged from the data. First, narratives about the outgroup’s religion sowed seeds of discord in both Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa even though some people’s perceptions about the outgroup remained unchanged. Although some Angwan Doki participants noted that religious differences played no causal role, several Christian participants believe that it influenced the Muslims’ actions. For example, PP, an Afizere Christian, rejects the notion that the conflict is religion-based since the perpetrators of violence neither attend church services nor adhere to scriptural admonitions against intoxicants, such as alcohol and hard drugs. Similarly, PA, a Hausa Muslim, noted that the truth about the Jos conflict is that it is non-religious. In the same vein, PX, a Hausa Muslim, stated that religious differences could not have driven the conflict since the Muslims and Christians were religiously tolerant enough to live side-by-side with each other.

In contrast, despite previously portraying their Muslim neighbours as tolerant of their religious differences in the pre-conflict era, some Berom Christian participants believe that the Muslims were religiously motivated to wage war against them. For example, PH noted that the Muslims were simply continuing the Islamization campaign of their Jihadist ancestor, Usman

Dan Fodio, who either forcefully converted or killed non-adherents of Islam in the early nineteenth century in the area that is now known as northern Nigeria. Relatedly, PE stated that the conflict represented an expansion of the scope of the Muslims' Jihadist campaign, which they previously undertook socially by marrying Berom women and converting them to Islam. Evidently, religion-based narratives influenced the descent into discord in Angwan Doki. Even the participants that deny the existence of a religious undertone also allude that some people believe otherwise. For example, PA's assertion that his viewpoint represents the truth about the role of religion implies the existence of a different perspective. Also, PP aired his perspective on the subject whilst attempting to debunk other people's claims of being involved in a religious war.

The Dadin Kowa participants, like their Angwan Doki counterparts, differ in their perspectives about the role of religion. Compared to the Angwan Doki participants' stories, however, both the Berom and Hausa participants in Dadin Kowa suggest a positive nexus between religion and the conflict. For example, BP, a Hausa Muslim, stated that Christian and Muslim neighbours started to assign derogatory labels to the outgroup before the 2001 conflict broke out. Similarly, PJ, a Berom Christian, suggests that people perpetrate violence having been misguided by the clerics. PT, a Berom Christian, aligns with this position generally but insists that only the Muslims have a religious motivation, which is part of their broader ambition to Islamize Nigeria. In contrast, DP and MP, both of who are Hausa Muslims, believe that the conflict is political but is infused with religion because people are more sensitive to it. This viewpoint is corroborated by the experience of FP, an Ebira Muslim, who believes that the indigenous Christians have not been hostile towards him because he is indigenous like them.

Although the comments of the latter group of participants undermine the claim that the conflict has a religious undertone, their comments show that religion played a facilitative role in the conflict at a minimum.

Second, the contrasting narratives about the legitimate owners of Jos land stoked animosity between the indigenous and settler populations. Land ownership, compared to the role of religion, does not appear to be significant in Dadin Kowa. Although the theme is evident in one participant's account of intergroup relations, the story relates to his experience outside the community. In contrast, all the related views expressed by the indigenous and settler Angwan Doki participants suggest that land ownership was a contentious issue in the period immediately preceding the conflict and has shaped intergroup relations since then. While some Berom believe that the Hausa are intent on usurping their land, some Hausa claim ownership of Jos land. For example, PV, a Berom Christian divulged that her relationship with her Hausa neighbours turned sour once she realized that the Hausa were seeking to take over Jos despite being settlers. Also, PP, an Afizere Christian stated that some Berom youths have attempted to renegotiate the land transactions that were completed by their forefathers and the Hausa's. Conversely, the Hausa resist such revisions and contend that they are the legitimate owners of those lands since they were fully paid for. Also fueling discord, as PL's comment highlights, is the claim of some Hausa that they have the right of first arrival in Jos since their progenitors met much of Jos as uninhabited land. The continuance of cordial intergroup relations was untenable whilst such contrasting narratives subsisted.

Third, the mutual suspicion about the religious motives of the Other and the contest over land ownership are rooted in the narratives of a malevolent political class, who demonized the

outgroup. Some stories from Angwan Doki reveal that Berom politicians create and manipulate anxieties over land in order to bolster ingroup support for their political ambitions. For example, PP, an Afizere Christian, disclosed that indigenous politicians mobilize ingroup support for their political aspirations by claiming that indigenous ethnic groups are under siege from the Hausa and Fulani. A Hausa Muslim participant, PL, corroborates PP's remark as he noted that the same indigenous politicians that disparage the Hausa before fellow indigenous people also visit the Hausa at nightfall to seek their votes. The reflections of PV, a Berom Christian, reinforces PL's remarks. Although PV had earlier declared the political ambition of her Muslim friend illegitimate, she later stated that interethnic political cooperation remains a necessity. Even though interethnic political cooperation persists, it does not erase the impact of destructive political narratives on broader intergroup relations.

In fact, these narratives have fostered conflicting perspectives about the rights of the Hausa people to political representation. For example, while PV, a Berom Christian, denounced her Muslim friend for desiring political power in spite of his status as a settler, IP, a Fulani Muslim indicated that the settlers use the Nigerian constitution, which grants electoral rights to all Nigerians across the country, to justify their political ambitions in Jos. Consequent upon the narratives about the illegitimacy of their political aspirations, the Hausa have also developed a perception that there is systemic opposition to their quest for political representation. For example, PX, a Hausa Muslim, stated that the state governments' indefinite suspension of local government elections and consistent preference for appointing caretaker councils are aimed at depriving the Hausa of an opportunity to assume those posts electorally. The result of all of this is the deterioration of intergroup relations.

Fourth, the indigenous politicians engaged in patronage politics when they assumed political authority, which created a perception of discrimination among the Hausa and a sense of entitlement among some Berom. The experiences of the Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa participants also differ in terms of the presence or lack of narratives around patronage politics. Whereas the stories of the Dadin Kowa participants have no trace of the subject, the perception of discrimination and patronage politics are evident in the narratives of the Angwan Doki participants. The comments of the Angwan Doki participants reveal that there is a perception among the settler Hausa people that the distribution of resources and social services are deliberately skewed against them. PL, a Hausa Muslim, suggested this when he noted that the state government denies the Hausa people schools and good roads to undermine their standard of living and deprives them of indigeneship certificates to limit their access to government employment and admission into government-owned universities.

The settler Hausa's perception of discrimination is reinforced by the narratives of Berom participants that reveal both their desire for state patronage and dissatisfaction with the loss of privileges under the new environment of intergroup political realignment. For example, PH, a Berom Christian, complained about his current financial situation and noted that he was financially stable when he could easily access government contracts. Although PL deplors his lack of access to the current State government, his remarks also highlight a sense of entitlement, which contrasts with the feeling of PL, a Hausa Muslim. For example, the latter noted that the State government applies its property tax policy in only those areas in which the Hausa are numerically dominant in order to make their life uncomfortable. Given the Hausa's perception that policies are disproportionately applied, it is unsurprising that the relationship between the

indigenous and settler populations further deteriorated. Although the political class was key in stoking disharmony between the indigenous and settler groups, the participants' narratives show that other malevolent actors sowed seeds of disunity in Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa as well.

Fifth, the participants' stories reveal that the deterioration of intergroup relations in the communities may have partly resulted from the attempts of external co-ethnics to cause diffusion, especially in Dadin Kowa. Several Angwan Doki participants believe that outsiders and war profiteers fuelled the animosity in the community. PP, an Afizere Christian, gave an account of their activities, noting that the Christians and Muslims that benefited from the ensuing chaos authored and distributed threatening notes about impending attacks by the outgroup. Similarly, OP, who is also a Berom Christian, noted that the actors that manage the response to the conflict were invested in perpetuating it because of the financial benefits that accrued to them. Narratives about the involvement of unknown individuals in the fighting reinforce this perspective. For example, OP noted that the Hausa Muslim perpetrators of violence in his neighbourhood were not the same neighbours whom he had been living with.

In the Dadin Kowa case, there were intensive attempts at diffusion. Some external co-ethnics wanted their kinsmen in Dadin Kowa to undertake revenge on their behalf. The Hausa Muslims and Berom Christians in the communities bordering Dadin Kowa pursued the same objective of pulling the community into the conflict but did so using different tactics. For example, PR, a Berom Christian, noted that their Hausa Muslim neighbours started to keep to themselves after visiting their relatives in neighbouring communities, which suggests that they had been admonished to do so. In contrast, PC, a Hausa Muslim, stated that Berom Christians from Anglo Jos visited Dadin Kowa and openly requested that their co-ethnics joined the

conflict, stating that Dadin Kowa's peace is unjustifiable if other Christians are being killed by Muslims elsewhere.

Having failed in their direct effort to stir trouble in Dadin Kowa, these external co-ethnics resorted to name-calling to goad their relatives on to assume a more aggressive posture towards their outgroup neighbours. Ironically, while the Dadin Kowa Muslims were mocked as weaklings by their co-ethnics in neighbouring communities, the indigenous Christians in the same communities demonized the Dadin Kowa Muslims as "wolves in sheep's clothing" in order to instigate Christian attacks against them. In addition, although Dadin Kowa remained relatively peaceful throughout the four major conflict episodes, the experiences of some participants suggest that external co-ethnics may have had some effect on Dadin Kowa community members. For example, some stories show that Dadin Kowa Berom Christians even wanted to assist their co-ethnics, but not by fighting their neighbours in Dadin Kowa. They desired to assist their external co-ethnics in defending themselves, and this is corroborated by stories of Dadin Kowa youths going to fight in other communities and the perception of the Angwan Doki participants that "mercenaries" were used in their community.

Conclusions

The indigenous and settler ethnic groups, who once viewed themselves as having a common human identity and enjoyed inclusive sociocultural festivals, not only started to see themselves as different but also developed a negative perception about the outgroup's religion. Also, the same groups that jointly used indigenous lands to satisfy their respective occupational needs later began competing over land ownership. As the foregoing key findings indicate, people's new

perceptions about the outgroup's religion and the discourse around land ownership are reflected in the narratives of politicians, which suggests that the transformation of people's attitudes towards the outgroup is rooted in those narratives. To the Hausa, the indigenous government officials use their power to limit the Hausa's access to social services and government jobs as a way of fulfilling their election-time promise to stop them from usurping the indigenous groups' economic opportunities. Consequently, people stopped regarding the outgroup as family and started to perceive them as the enemy.

Chapter Seven: The roots of segregation and the effacement of trust in Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa

The dissemination of divisive narratives coupled with the outbreak of conflict in Jos North birthed two related processes in Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa in Jos South, namely ingroup clustering and spatial and social distance between the indigenous Christian and settler Muslim ethnicities. In this chapter, I discuss the participants' stories that pertain to these processes. The stories indicate that the narratives that demonized the outgroup increased the ingroup's threat perception, and the conflict in other areas exacerbated the threat levels within both the indigenous and settler populations in Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa. The narratives of land grab created fear of land loss, while the conflict between the co-ethnics of the indigenous and settler groups in other communities caused apprehension or fear of imminent violence or potential danger within Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa. Due to the threat perception levels in Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa, the indigenous and settler groups pulled away from each other, resulting in multiple dimensions of segregation.

Ingroup members moved out of the outgroup-dominated heterogeneous neighbourhoods to the areas mostly inhabited by the ingroup. The emergent residential segregation set off similar processes in schools and marketplaces as well as in the utilization of transportation services. The rise in threat levels and social distance occurred in both Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa, but these processes heralded conflict only in Angwan Doki in 2001. The 2001 conflict in Angwan Doki and, perhaps, the isolation of the respective groups, gave rise to mistrust there. In contrast, mistrust in Dadin Kowa was the result of conflict in neighbouring communities in Jos South and

the lack of contact internally. The mistrust of the Other inhibited reintegration in Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa and likely contributed to future conflicts in Angwan Doki. In the three sections below, I discuss the abovementioned processes, namely the emergence of and rise in threat perception levels, social distance and its aftermath and the origin and effects of mistrust of the outgroup.

Dimensions and sources of perceived threat

Perceived threat is evident in the narratives of both the Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa participants, yet they differ slightly in form. Whereas fears of outgroup domination and harm are evident in the reflections of the former, only fears of harm are evident in those of the latter.

Angwan Doki

In Angwan Doki, the Berom participants' tales reflect their fear of loss of land, which a Hausa participant's narratives reinforce. Some reflections pertain to Hausa and Fulani Muslims regarding the indigenous people as inferior, while others concern beliefs about the Hausa and Fulani's pursuit of dominance and the actions that seemingly corroborate them. The Angwan Doki stories also explicitly or implicitly indicate the indigenous groups' fears of attacks by the settlers, while a Berom participant's comment reflects his belief that indigenous groups may be seeking to eliminate the Hausa and Fulani settlers. Other stories relate to the general fear of violence and of unfamiliar people.

The fears of outgroup domination are evident in PH's comment on the roots of the conflict. The participant, a Berom Christian surmised the following in his story:

The real problem is the intended expansion of Islam. In those days, we lived peacefully with them without any problem. In 2001, we started hearing them say, contrary to history, that they are the real owners of Jos.

PH's reference to Islamization as problematic reflects fears about the potential dominance of a religion other than Christianity, while his comment on the emergence of conflicting narratives around land ownership indicates fears of a potential loss of status in Jos. In his comment on the nature of intergroup relations in Angwan Doki, PE also highlights the perception of the Berom people that the Hausa and Fulani people have a domineering attitude and are seeking to establish their dominance in the state.

While responding to my question on whether there were signs of a deteriorating relationship before the conflict broke out, PE recounted the issue in the following manner:

From what we heard from our forebears, because of the experience of the Uthman Dan Fodio Jihad [...] a Hausa person never sat on a seat that an indigenous person sits on without having negative premonitions about it. In fact, they would use coal or fire to burn the seat before sitting on it because they believed it was a taboo. So, would you say that there's peace? There must be something deep within.

So, the Jihad had created the impression in the people that there can never be true peace, but we were forced by circumstances of colonialism to agree to live together [...] It was said several times and it has been mentioned publicly by people on the other side that they want to fulfil the mandate of their forefather, Usman Dan Fodio, who said from the deserts in the north up to the seas in the south, an Islamic nation would be created. History shows that this people fought, and they never won Jos Plateau, the high Plateau.

Some of their great generals were killed around here in Jos Plateau, but have been convinced otherwise through religion. I said earlier that Islam is about everything to them, including leadership and lifestyle. For them, leadership and the domineering spirit comes from their religion. You know if you fought a battle and you didn't win,

you'll look for other means to win. In the course of this crisis, we heard of comments made privately and in public, such as "this land is too good to be left for the infidels."

And as I said, they're business-oriented and have a domineering and conquering attitude. My father built this place in 1963 but we didn't come to the community until 1976. When we came here, there were only seven houses and the Theological College up there. But this has changed because these people {*Hausa and Fulani Muslims*} know the weakness of our people. They know that our people are simple, that if our people have enough food to eat, they feel that they don't have problems.

They know that although there are some of us who are religious and Christians and would not act outside honour, there are also those who haven't given their lives to Christ, whose major concern is to seek what they'll go and get drunk with. So, they lured them with little sums of money, and you would see people parting with their landed properties and inheritances [...] I remember when I was growing up in our community, our people owned horses, which was an evidence of wealth.

If you own a horse it means you're wealthy. People had goats as many as 50 but over time, people got lazy and so they lost their wealth. So, they became dependent on the other side [*Hausa and Fulani Muslims*] for the peanuts that they were shown. For the other side, this was an advantage. Like I said, there were only seven houses when we came here, but in no time, because of the multiplicity of marriages among the other faith [Muslims], their population in this community, especially on the other side of the major road, became three times more than that of the indigenous population. This is to show that the person you're dealing with has a plan that you are unaware of.

The participant, a Berom Christian, notes that despite having a relatively peaceful relationship with the Hausa and Fulani Muslims before the conflict, the Berom people considered the peaceful demeanour of these groups to be a façade. This perception, his comment indicates, is rooted in historical narratives about the fallouts of the early 19th century Jihad in the area now known as northern Nigeria. The outcome of one of these fallouts, he notes, is the Hausa and Fulani people's treatment of the local people as inferior beings. So, there could not have been genuine peace since the indigenous groups knew that the Hausa and Fulani people regarded themselves as superior beings. The indigenous people's perception about the Hausa and Fulani's

domineering attitude was, as the participant's comment indicates, reinforced by contemporary Hausa and Fulani narratives about wanting to complete the same Islamist campaign that culminated in the subjugation of the ancestors of the indigenous people.

Although PE is convinced that the Hausa and Fulani do have and exhibit a domineering attitude, he also believes it is unfounded. His comment reflects an acknowledgement that there was a Jihad but says that there are historical records indicating that the forebearers of the Fulani did not conquer Jos. He suggests that it was through religious indoctrination that Jos's Hausa and Fulani Muslims were made to believe that the Usman Dan Fodio-led Jihad was successful in the area. PE notes that the Hausa and Fulani Muslims, regardless of whether they have been misguided or not, aim to complete Usman Dan Fodio's Jihad. In his view, the settler's motivation for Jihad goes beyond completing their progenitor's mission, as they are also motivated to appropriate the resources of the land to the exclusion of the indigenous tribes. Their ambition to take over the land, the participant notes, aligns with the Hausa and Fulani people's lifestyle of domination since land ownership would be instrumental to them in taking control of Jos.

Also, PE notes that in furtherance of their domination objective and aided by their business orientation, the Hausa and Fulani Muslims have been accumulating large portions of Jos land. Their business acumen, he contends, enabled them to exploit the indiscretions of some indigenous people and purchase their lands for less than the market value. Additionally, the participant suggests that the Hausa and Fulani Muslims' multiple marriages, which enabled their population to become triple the size of the indigenous population within a short period, were undertaken in pursuance of the same objective of being the dominant group in Jos.

PL's reflections on his life in Jos reinforce PE's assertion that the Hausa and Fulani are laying claim to Jos, which further justifies the indigenous people's fears of losing their land. The participant made the comment in response to my question about the nature of life in his city, Jos. The participant, a Hausa Muslim, opened his response as follows:

To me, Jos is my home. Bukuru [*which Angwan Doki is part of*] is my world. I was born here over 52 years ago. This is the home I know. This is where I was socialized as a child. This is where I made friends. It is where I want to see prosper above any other city in the world. I would like to talk about here, not Jos in general.

You see, Angwan Doki is 9 kms away from the main town. In fact, if you go to the archives, you'll find that Bukuru town [*which Angwan Doki is a part of*], was established long before the growth of Jos. The present Bukuru town was established in 1902. Its heartland is largely occupied by the Hausa-Fulani tribe, and it has a traditional institution controlled by the Hausa-Fulani.

At first glance, it appears that PL chose to speak about Bukuru instead of Jos because the ownership of Jos is contested and because he was focusing his response on his sense of home. His decision to comment on his life in Bukuru, however, embodies a deeper significance as the remainder of his comment indicates.

Rather than cite his residency in Bukuru as the rationale for referencing it as the scope of his experience, he distinguishes the main Jos town from Bukuru even though it is today part of Jos South Local Government. The intent, as his subsequent statement indicates, was to portray Bukuru as Hausa land. By noting that the Hausa and Fulani were numerically dominant in the town and in-charge of its traditional authority, the participant is suggesting that the land was originally theirs. Although no indigenous Berom participant directly comments on the distinction between Bukuru and Jos, they are likely to view PL's comment as revisionist history given their other comments that portray the Hausa and Fulani as settlers in Plateau State. Moreover, it is

comments like PL's that PE is referring to when he notes that the Hausa and Fulani suddenly started claiming ownership of Jos land.

While the indigenous people's fears about an impending Hausa and Fulani domination of the area may have been exacerbated by comments like PL's, PP's reflection on the degeneration into conflict highlights the actions of the Hausa and Fulani that likely also lent credence to those fears. PP, an Afizere Christian divulged the following in his story:

Another thing is that traders are economically empowered, so the Hausa men who we claim are non-indigenes are always in the town. Because they trade in the towns, they make quick money. As they do so, they're empowered economically. Because of this, our young ladies go after them. They're enticed with money. Some of the ladies became Muslims. Some were impregnated. So, the indigenes became annoyed. This is also part of the genesis of the problem [...] The indigenes should also know that they cannot chase the Hausa out of Jos. There are many economic sanctions that can be imposed to curtail their growth.

For example, we should stop selling our lands to the Muslims. You say you don't want them to remain here, yet you can't stop selling lands to them. I will blame the indigenes for the land disputes. You're crying that the Hausa are taking your land, yet you're still selling more lands to them. The Hausa are traders. They've empowered themselves economically. If an indigene puts up his land for sale, he prefers to sell to a Hausa because he can pay higher than an indigene. Yet, after some time you'll start asking how non-indigenes are getting land. Even when the former Governor advised the indigenes to stop selling their land, most of them accused him of not empowering them economically yet wants them to stop selling their lands to non-indigenes.

PP's comment is similar to those of PE and PH in that they all suggest the sources of angst within the indigenous community. For example, PP acknowledges that the Hausa have enjoyed business successes, which he ascribes to the location of their trade within the city centre. He further notes that their resultant financial purse attracted them to indigenous ladies, which was concerning to the indigenous men because it meant not only the loss of their women to the Hausa

men but also to a different religion. This latter concern aligns with PH's remark that the Hausa people have an Islamization agenda. PP believes that the religious conversion of the indigenous ladies coupled with the economic power of the Hausa, which facilitates their land purchases, have inspired efforts within the indigenous community to drive the Hausa out of Jos. This perception is evident in his suggestion that the indigenous people apply economic sanctions against the Hausa because expelling them from Jos is impracticable. The participant notes that if the indigenous people are genuinely concerned about halting the growth of the Hausa, they should desist from selling their lands to them.

It is on this subject of land sales that PP and PE provide similar insights. PP's advice on halting land sales to stem Hausa expansionism corroborates PE's claim that the group has been acquiring indigenous people's lands. And the comments of both participants indicate that the purchases by the Hausa made the indigenous people apprehensive. Despite the aforementioned similarities between PP and PE's comments, they differ in terms of their characterization of the land transactions. The latter believes that the Hausa amassed so much land by exploiting the indiscretions of some indigenous people and paying them meagrely for their land. In contrast, the former indicates that these transactions aligned with the conventional economic practice of selling to the highest bidder, which was often the Hausa because of their better financial power.

As noted, perceived threat in Angwan Doki was not limited to the fear of numerical demographic domination by the outgroup. The participants' stories also reflect the fear of potential physical harm, which derived from secret killings and rumours about violence. The reflections of PN (Berom Christian) and UP (Hausa Muslim) about the first conflict episode

encapsulate both these phenomena, respectively. PN commented on the former in the following way:

Before the conflict, there were Christian boys with Muslim girlfriends and Muslim boys with Christian girlfriends. During the conflict, a boy could go and see his girlfriend in the neighbourhood dominated by the other religion, only for his corpse to be found later. This happened in both Christian and Muslim neighbourhoods. Because of the secret killings, people were living in fear and nobody trusts anybody anymore.

In addition, UP provided an account of the latter condition as follows:

If it was the time of the conflict, and you told someone that you were coming to this street, they will ask, “are you sure you will be safe there?” If you tell someone that you were going to Gero road, they will tell you it is insecure. People acted as if there were terrorists here, which was not the case. Now, you are free to go anywhere... Our relationship was broken because they were afraid of me and I was afraid of them.

Even the children would say, “this is a Muslim, do you want to go close to them? They will kill you. They will kill you.” All that people were talking about is murder, murder, murder. They would say, “how can you go where someone would kill you? How can you go there?” So, they were living in their own part of the community, and we were living in our own part.

Both accounts of the nature of intergroup relations around 2001 show that the fear of imminent death was salient yet, as noted above, the participants offer different accounts about the sources of mortality salience. For example, PN, a Berom Christian, indicates that the secret killings of outgroup intimate partners within the Christian and Muslim-dominated neighbourhoods created angst within the respective populations. The reference to the existence of intergroup intimate relationships further indicates that there was some element of intergroup trust pre-conflict, and that the fear of physical harm by the Other was a new phenomenon at the

time. And, as such, was responsible for the structural changes in the community, as is discussed further in the second section of this chapter. Like PN, UP's comment indicates that the fear of physical harm by an outgroup member resulted from the conflict. However, unlike the former, the latter notes that this perception resulted from false stories circulating in the gossip train about dangerous neighbourhoods. The narratives of inevitable attacks in Muslim-dominated neighbourhoods were widespread enough to make the Christian children caution their ingroup peers against visiting outgroup-dominated neighbourhoods.

PH's comment indicates that the fear of the Other within the Christian population was exacerbated by the failure of their Muslim friends to warn them about potential attacks by fellow Muslims. While reflecting on the nature of intergroup relations post-2001, the participant, a Berom Christian, articulated the following in his story:

If something bad is about to happen, those of our friends should be able to inform us that there's a plan to attack us. Since 2001, we've not had any Muslim group informing us that something bad is being planned against us. Crisis just erupts *kpa* [*unexpectedly*]. That's just the situation. It's worse than when there's conflict because when there's conflict, you plan, you organize yourself and know how to move. But when they were pretending that there was peace, there were more killings than when there was full-blown fighting.

The participant expresses his disappointment with his Muslim friends for not warning him and other Christians about imminent violent attacks by their group. His comment suggests that intergroup relations was good to the point that the indigenous Christians expected their settler Muslim friends to be open about the plans of their co-ethnics. PH also notes that the Christians were more vulnerable to attacks by the outgroup when there was a lull in fighting than during a

conflict episode, a situation which he ascribes to the abovementioned inactions of their Muslim friends.

PH's comment above suggests that the primary source of his fear was not his Muslim friends, in spite of their aforementioned inactions; rather it was their co-ethnics, whose plans they failed to reveal. PA's recollection of his conflict experience reinforces the notion that the latter category of the outgroup was the people's primary source of fear. The participant, a Hausa Muslim commented on conflict-time intergroup relations as follows:

Hmmm. The relationship was very bad. I must tell you the truth, the relationship is very bad and I'm not happy about it. These are the people that I could visit at any time or call them at any time. They could come to my house. I could go to them but for me now to even go there in the afternoon is a problem. It is a problem. If my friend sees me, I agree that he won't like me to be hurt but what about the youths there who don't know me?

That's where the problem lies. If my friends say "ah, no, don't touch this man, he's my friend," how many of the youths know me? So, that's why I have to be careful about how I move. The same thing with him. You understand? So, it was the same thing with him. He couldn't come where I live for fear of being killed because there was a lot of tension. That's it.

Like PH, PA's comment shows that his primary source of fear was the co-ethnics of his outgroup (Christian) friends who were unfamiliar with him. He indicates that because of such people, it is frightening to visit his friend even at daylight. The participant believes that his Christian friend would attempt to protect him, but he doubted his ability to convince his co-ethnics to not harm him.

Despite the similarity between PH and PA regarding their perception of threat, their comments differ in terms of their references to the groups to which this condition applies. Unlike PH, whose comment suggests that this form of perceived threat is limited to the Christians, PA

notes that the fear of the Other was prevalent within both the Christian and Muslim populations. Moreover, PA's identity as a Hausa Muslim suggests that fear of the Other was not a uniquely Christian phenomenon. And the fears within the Hausa Muslim population were not unwarranted as PP's statement about his conversations with fellow indigenes suggests. PP, an Afizere Christian, recounted those conversations in the following way:

I always tell people that I have never seen in the Bible where even a small tribe was completely wiped away. People are saying that the Hausa are not from here. Hence, they want to chase them out. They will need to devise other means to satisfy their interests because the Hausa can never be wiped out. Since we can't wipe them out in Jos here, why bother fighting? Why fight when the conflict can end up consuming even your own relatives?

PP recalls having conversations with other indigenous people in which he opposed the idea of seeking to eliminate the Hausa because it was not only impossible to do so but could also have unintended effects on the masterminds. His comment about the lack of historical precedents for believing that such a plan would succeed, suggests that the idea was either mulled over by some indigenous people or the participant perceived that it was being considered. Also, the participant notes that the promoters of Hausa expulsion justify it by pointing to their settler status, which suggests that the motive for such a campaign against the Hausa was the contest over land ownership between the indigenous tribes and settler Hausa and Fulani populations.

Dadin Kowa

Unlike the Angwan Doki participants, whose comments on intergroup relations highlight fears of outgroup domination and physical harm, the stories of the Dadin Kowa participants reflect only

the latter. The stories of some Dadin Kowa participants indicate that the conflict in neighbouring communities caused angst within Dadin Kowa, especially about possible death. MP's account of the nature of intergroup relations during the conflict is one such story that highlights the anxiety about death. The participant, a Hausa Muslim, revealed his experience as follows:

Ah, it was very bad. The radio contributed negatively because where there wasn't any problem, they would say there was fighting there. It was a terrible experience. We lost someone here. He wasn't hacked here. It happened outside the community. He was slaughtered outside the community. Placed inside his car and the car was set ablaze. So, when such things happen to your next-door neighbour, you would be asking yourself whether you're next.

You'll wonder whether you'll be alive the next day. It was a terrible experience. This was strange to us. We had never needed to protect ourselves this way. The aftermath of the conflicts is visible in our lives, both the Christians and Muslims. Hmm, during the conflict, people stayed in their own neighbourhoods. The Christians whose houses were in our neighbourhood continued to live there but those outside stayed back in their neighbourhoods.

But I know of a Christian man who continued to honour invitations to attend events in the Mosque and supported us when we needed support. They couldn't come to our area and we couldn't go to theirs except when we were going to buy something. And even when we were going to buy something, one must make sure it isn't in a hidden area. The same thing applied to both Christian and Muslim-dominated settlements. People passed through only open places where someone could easily see you if something bad was about to happen to you.

As indicated in MP's reflection, the Christians and Muslims in Dadin Kowa generally became afraid of dying due to the murder of people who were known to them. With the exception of one Christian, the participant notes that inter-neighbourhood mobility was limited due to the fear of being killed in an outgroup-dominated neighbourhood. MP, however, notes that it was leisure visits that were affected as people from either side of the divide continued to patronize businesses in outgroup-dominated settlements. Yet, even the people that continued patronizing outgroup businesses were evidently still anxious about going into the outgroup-dominated areas

as they avoided commuting through secluded spaces. This condition of fear, MP notes, partly resulted from the dissemination of inaccurate information by radio stations.

While MP notes that the radio partly created an atmosphere of fear within Dadin Kowa, FP, a Tarok Muslim, states that the fear of the Other was shaped by the conflict in neighbouring communities. This is what he had to say on the issue:

The interaction, like I said, reduced from 100 to 40 percent. We related, quite alright, but the trust had been lost. People were suspecting each other. People feared that if they spent the night in an area dominated by the other group, something bad could be done to them. So, at times, you find that Christians whose houses were in the Muslim areas moved out at night and returned in the morning, especially when there was trouble in neighbouring communities. When there was fighting nearby, Christians didn't feel free to stay back in their homes in Muslim-dominated areas in Dadin Kowa even though there wasn't any fighting here.

FP notes that the conflict in neighbouring communities dampened intergroup relations in Dadin Kowa as the Christians and Muslims became afraid of each other. The fear of the Other, he further remarks, affected people's residency pattern. Unlike MP, who states that people who lived in outgroup-dominated neighbourhoods maintained their residency during conflict times, FP notes that Christian residents in a Muslim-dominated settlement remained there only during the daytime because it was perceived to be safer.

Similar to MP and FP whose comments suggest that everyone felt threatened, PR's experience indicates that the fear of the Other was prevalent in the entire community. The participant, a Berom Christian, revealed his conflict-time experience in the following manner:

In Angwan Mission, behind the COCIN church, its all Christians, no Muslims. During the conflict the Hausa Muslims would tell their children not to go there that there are only Christians there that we can kill them, and that nobody would know.

We also told our children not to go to Akao because they're only Muslims. In Dadin Kowa, we are mixed. You'll find Christians and Muslims living side-by-side and even in the same compound.

But the Christians were afraid of Akao because it is solely inhabited by Muslims, while the Muslims were scared of going to Angwan Mission because only Christians live there. At that time, I stopped my kids from going to the Muslim-dominated settlement for security concerns. Although there wasn't any conflict here, kids were disappearing, that's why we stopped our kids from going to the other side. But we the fathers still moved together.

Despite indicating that there was palpable fear in the community, like Participants MP and FP, PR's comment shows that perceived threat did not affect the interactions of all age demographics in Dadin Kowa. PR notes that despite being afraid of the outgroup, the community's adults continued interacting amongst themselves, yet they restricted their children's movements to within the ingroup-dominated neighbourhood. The limitation of the mobility of Dadin Kowa's children, the participant notes, followed the sudden disappearance of children from the community. In the case of PR's experience, therefore, the source of fear was not solely external.

Although none of the foregoing perspectives suggest that there was violent conflict in Dadin Kowa, the recounted experiences show that the conflict in the neighbouring communities caused anxiety among the people about dying. As BP's comment below indicates, the events in neighbouring communities coupled with the ethnoreligious composition of Dadin Kowa caused fears about the outbreak of full-blown conflict in the community.

You know in a group there are bad eggs and this applies to the different religions and tribes. When something happened in this neighbouring community, Anglo Jos, the Dadin Kowa people will call their neighbours and say "are you aware of what's happening? There's problem in that place. What do we do to protect our surroundings?" We call ourselves together and discuss and say that we shouldn't allow any strangers to come in and cause problem. You know Dadin Kowa is a big place. It is a very big place.

In some parts of Dadin Kowa, neighbours will say we must kill them because they're not from our religion. This made the other people afraid, then they moved out of their houses. Some of the Christians moved out of Dadin Kowa to Zarmanganda across the road because they were afraid of living in Dadin Kowa. But you know if a crisis is happening and your neighbours or brothers in the other community were affected, you will feel unsafe. For example, Anglo Jos is a nearby community and many of the people living in DK have their relatives there. So, you'll be hearing rumours.

When something is happening there, they will be communicating with their people here. "This people came to attack us. You have to be very careful. What are you still doing? You have to go and face them." So, intergroup tension sets in. People will be afraid. And if there's any suspicious movement, you'll start to see that the Muslims are congregating separately, in contrast to the past in which such gatherings would have been between Christians and Muslims. This was how we knew that something untoward was about to happen.

In the participant's view, Dadin Kowa comprises both benign and malevolent individuals. He recalls that while the benign voices sought to prevent a spill over from the conflict-affected neighbouring communities, the malevolent actors expressed their desire to attack the outgroup within Dadin Kowa. Some Muslims' war narratives, for example, prompted some Dadin Kowa Christians to relocate from mixed neighbourhoods to a Christian-dominated settlement. Additionally, people's awareness that their external co-ethnics conflicting with the co-ethnics of their neighbours further exacerbated the fear of the Other and created anxiety about possible diffusion into Dadin Kowa. In addition to the effect of the spread of war narratives within Dadin Kowa and the anxiety generated by the ethnoreligious composition of the conflicting parties in the neighbouring communities, the fear of the Other in Dadin Kowa also resulted from people's communication with their co-ethnics in those communities.

BP notes that not only did these external kinsmen misinform their Dadin Kowa co-ethnics about their conflict and the activities of the outgroup, they pushed for retaliations within

Dadin Kowa. Intergroup tension grew in the community because both the Christians and Muslims were receiving destructive messages from their co-ethnics in the neighbouring conflict-affected communities. He further notes that the mounting tension was evident in the transformation of intergroup relations, particularly regarding the community's response to threat. As a result of the narratives of external co-ethnics, collective responses to potential threats ceased and were replaced with ingroup consultations.

Spatial and social distance

As indicated in some of the participants' stories above, the fear of the Other set off ethnic clustering and the restriction of contact with the outgroup. These transformations are evident in the experiences of both the Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa participants and are discussed in greater detail below.

Angwan Doki

The Angwan Doki participants' narratives about their conflict experience indicate that there is evidence that segregation resulted from perceived threat. Collectively, OP and UP's accounts of their conflict-time experience show that neighbourhoods, schools and markets became segregated between Christians and Muslims. OP, a Berom Christian, narrated his experience in the following way:

As time passed, the Berom Christians pulled back from Muslims and vice versa. We separated. Despite separating, there was still tension between us. The Hausa and Fulanis were afraid, thinking that the conflict will escalate. There was a week in

which the situation was so tense that only the wives and children were permitted to go to church on Sunday while the men stayed back to guard the homes.

Similarly, UP, a Hausa Muslim, noted the following in his story:

But now the difference is clear. Now you will observe a Christian-dominated area and a Muslim-dominated area. Tribes are also settling in different areas of the community. They are going to different schools and different markets. What kind of life is this? What kind of life is this?

PA's comment shows that although the Christian and Muslim community members responded to intergroup tension by withdrawing from the outgroup, isolation did not dampen anxiety. People remained apprehensive likely because they were disconnected from the outgroup and were oblivious of their plans. For example, UP expresses her disappointment with the emergence of segregated neighbourhoods, given the communities' history of integrated living. While PA comments on residential segregation, UP's expression of dismay indicates that it extended to both schools and markets.

Other participants discuss each of these dimensions of segregation in greater detail. The residential dimension of segregation in Angwan Doki is evident in the stories of IP, PN and OP. IP highlights this phenomenon in his account of the period immediately preceding the onset of the conflict in the community. The participant, a Fulani Muslim, narrated his experience in the following manner:

During the conflict, there were signs that there would be conflict because some of our friends started withdrawing themselves from us. If you weren't observant you won't have [*noticed*] that something was brewing. But we saw such signs. You know, those of us living in the Muslim-dominated areas began to notice the gradual withdrawal of the Berom Christian inhabitants. A lot of them started withdrawing

from us about a week before the 2001 conflict erupted. We were still communicating but not as usual. Those are some of the signs that I can remember.

Likewise, residential segregation is evident in PN's experience of post-direct violence intergroup relations, which he describes as follows:

For now, it isn't what it used to be, especially for some of us who grew up in mixed settlements, with Christians, Muslims, Fulani and Berom, and whose primary and secondary schooling were in mixed settings, with both religions and different ethnic groups. Now, we live in isolation. Someone who used to be your neighbour now lives far from you. Now, I have nephews who live in a completely Christian environment. And it's the same with my Muslim friends. They live in completely Muslim settlements due to what has transpired in Jos.

IP, a Hausa Muslim, notes that although the eruption of the conflict may have been unexpected to some residents, it was not surprising to him and some others who noticed that their outgroup friends had started to keep some distance from them. The implication is that there was already a sense of threat, driven by both the external and internal factors discussed in the previous section, before fighting broke out in Angwan Doki. Further, the participant recalls witnessing Berom Christians exit the Muslim-dominated neighbourhood in which he resides, indicating that the separation was both social and spatial. Also, he recalls that much of these processes occurred in the week preceding the conflict onset, which likely corresponds with the week of heightened tension referenced in PA's comment above. The fact that the participant's comment indicates that the community's settlement pattern was altered prior to the conflict reinforces the claim that segregation in Angwan Doki was the creation of perceived threat. Community voluntary segregation was aimed at conflict avoidance.

While IP's comment relates to the emergence of social and spatial distance, PN comments on the continued existence of the phenomenon post-direct violence. The participant, a Berom Christian, remembers growing up in an ethnically and religiously mixed settlement but notes that the indigenous Christian and settler Muslim groups now live apart from themselves. In contrast to his upbringing, he notes that his nephews are being raised in a homogenous neighbourhood, depriving them of opportunities for inter-ethnic and inter-religious interactions.

Like PN, OP speaks of spatial distance and restriction of social interaction as consequences of the conflict. OP, a Berom Christian, recounted his experience of intergroup relations at conflict-time as follows:

Those who we lived together with, some for more than 20 years, no harm was done to them. However, we continued to keep a distance and the gulf grew wider and wider. Our community leaders and youth leaders tried to bring us back together, but the previous relationship is no longer there as not everyone would feel comfortable going to the Muslim settlements. I can go there but I won't take the risk to go as often as I did in the past because I feel that the place is now dominated by people from other places who don't know me.

They don't know that I'm not a troublesome person. They will notice you if you're a stranger and can do anything to harm you if they don't feel comfortable with your presence. However, the Hausa and Fulani come to our own settlement. They come here to do their trade. Most of them are vendors and shoemakers. They also come here to buy chicken from our poultries, and nothing happens to them, but if we go to their area, we aren't sure of returning safely.

There was a Berom man that went there and still hasn't returned to date. He wasn't found alive nor was his corpse found. He isn't the only one that has gone missing after they were last seen entering the Muslim-dominated area. Presently, we no longer live together. Those of us in the Muslim-dominated areas moved to the Christian-dominated side. So, we are apart from each other, watching each other from afar. If we meet in a neutral place, we still converse but the relationship isn't as it used to be.

OP states that although no Muslim in his mixed neighbourhood was harmed during the conflict, the Christians and Muslims increasingly became isolated. Some of his neighbours relocated to live in the settlements in which their ethnoreligious group is numerically dominant and apparently due to fear of being harmed. The participant's comment about the community leaders' failed attempts at reintegration further reinforces his claim that segregation resulted from the conflict. In spite of being segregated, the participant's comment indicates the sustenance of inter-settlement mobility, albeit in a limited fashion.

OP notes that whereas the Muslims frequently visit the Christian-dominated area to conduct their businesses or patronize Christian businesses, the Christians are wary of visiting the Muslim-dominated neighbourhood for fear of being killed. My own observation corroborates the former. During my fieldwork in Angwan Doki, I saw some Fulani herders lead their cattle through the so-called Christian-dominated neighbourhoods, while others were watching over their cattle as they grazed on empty fields. While, in some instances, the Fulani herders were young boys, most of those that I came across were middle-aged men. Also, despite being separated spatially, the participant indicates that social interactions continued in neutral spaces. Yet, his comment on business patronage suggests that interactions also took place in some non-neutral spaces post-direct violence.

The effects of perceived threat went beyond residential segregation. The fear of the Other had second-order consequences, including segregated schooling. Like UP, PN identifies the community's schools as one of the key voluntarily segregated institutions in the community. PN's comment on its origin indicates that the segregated schooling resulted from ingroup clustering. The participant, a Berom Christian, described the schooling situation as follows:

They {schools} are not segregated officially. They are segregated by default for being located in either a Christian-dominated settlement or Muslim-dominated neighbourhood. No matter how good a school in a Christian neighbourhood may be, no Muslim parent would enrol his children there. Likewise, the Christians; they won't register their child in a school that is located in a Muslim area irrespective of the quality of education.

As the participant notes, the segregation of schools followed the segregation of residential settlements. And given the role of schools in forging intergroup cohesion in past decades, the younger population became deprived of a critical site of intergroup contact.

PP's reflections on his conflict-time experience centre around the segregation effect of the conflict, especially with regards to the community's markets. The participant, an Afizere Christian, recounted his experience in the following way:

We all lived in the same settlement. We were all in the same place. We did everything together. During the conflict, we went apart. Markets were even separated. There was a different market for Muslims and Christians. This system didn't favour anyone.

You know we need each other. There are some things that come from southern Nigeria that are sold by the Christians, and there are goods that come from northern Nigeria that are mostly sold by the Muslims. They buy from us and we buy from them. So, we can't do without each other.

The feeling of bitterness that comes with conflict makes us to establish separate markets, but after a while we come back together. Here, in Kugiyya market, you'll discover that immediately after the conflict nobody will buy food from another religion. But that can't last for too long, so if you go there now there's nothing like that happening. The crisis is becoming part of us now. It was when it first started that it was disturbing us. Now we don't even care about it because we're identifying that there is a criminal dimension to it. It is not only a religious crisis. Criminals are exploiting religion to achieve their aims.

To contrast his pre-conflict intergroup relations with his conflict-time experience, the participant opens his response by pointing to the mixed nature of his neighbourhood before the conflict. He

notes that the indigenous Christian and settler Muslims drifted from each other, which manifested in structural changes to the community's markets. The markets, he notes, became bifurcated or established along religious lines. The participant also indicates that because of their deep linkages and entrenched economic interdependence, it was unsustainable for the Christian and Muslim groups to pursue their economic interests independently of each other. The economic dissociation was driven by the resentment that evolved from the conflict, but their economic interdependence was deep enough to propel the reintegration of the markets over time. In contrast to their responses to the initial conflict episodes, PP notes that the structure of the markets now remain unchanged during conflict partly because the conflict is now an entrenched part of Jos life and due to their awareness that it is also triggered to serve criminal ends.

Unlike PP, who notes that markets were temporarily segregated during the conflict, PL states that the markets were the only institutions that remained integrated during the conflict. The participant's comment, like those discussed above, was provided in the context of his reflections on his conflict-time experience of intergroup relations. PL, a Hausa Muslim, noted the following in his story:

Throughout the crisis, the only place that knows no discrimination is the marketplace. When there are curfews or insecurity, you still don't choose where you buy from. There was a case of a Hausa-Fulani trader risking his life to carry his wares to a Berom Christian woman who takes them on credit to go back and sell to her communities who cannot access the Hausa-Fulani communities, and then gives the man the returns when she sells up the goods. And he picks another batch and gives to her.

In essence, the market and the Nigerian currency understand every language and worship all religions. No matter the crisis or tension, people continue to maintain their economic relations within the market and still protect each other irrespective of the situation.

The participant reveals that in contrast to its effect on other aspects of life, the conflict did not produce prejudices in the markets. He alludes that residents even ignored curfews and the potential risks to themselves just to access needed goods or services irrespective of the location of the businesses. PL's subsequent remark, however, suggests that it may have been business owners that took risky steps to sustain their businesses, rather than buyers going out of their way to satisfy their goods and service needs. The evidence he provides in support of his claim is not of buyers risking their lives but of a Berom trader assisting a Hausa man, who could not enter the Christian neighbourhoods, to get his goods to Christian buyers, who felt threatened about going to the Muslim neighbourhood to patronize him.

The crux of the participant's story, however, is that although the conflict hindered market access, the conflict-induced resentment did not affect business patronage. PL's story shows how Christian and Muslim traders collaborated to circumvent the conflict's impact on the accessibility of businesses, but no part of his story indicates that the buyers were knowledgeable of the source of the products. Yet, in light of PP's comment about intergroup dependence to access certain goods, we can assume that the buyers were aware that the products were sourced from the outgroup. Despite knowing its source, the buyers continued to use the products, which reinforces PL's claim that the 'market' knew no discrimination during the conflict.

In contrast to PP and PL, who contend that the conflict caused temporary market segregation, PN suggests that it resulted in a permanent bifurcation of the market. The participant, commented on his experience of conflict-time intergroup relations as follows:

The relationship was broken because they stopped trusting one another. You see, Bukuru had a central market. During the last of the conflict episodes, the market was torched. So, people were aggrieved that you're not only killing their people, you

were also attacking their livelihoods. This worsened the division. After every crisis, people normally come back together through the market.

But after the market was burnt, people started setting up trading kiosks in their neighbourhoods, so that market interaction, which normally brought people together, was no longer there. Sports and markets bring people together, but the market does so faster. Without the market, interaction is minimal which has made it difficult for trust to be restored.

The participant, a Berom Christian, notes that the markets were not insulated from the troubles, yet market segregation was not sustained beyond a conflict episode. The return to normalcy in the markets, the participant suggests, facilitated the restoration of relationships as they provided an avenue for interaction. This opportunity was lost following the burning of the community's main market and the ingroup's perception that it was the outgroup's strategic effort to undermine their source of livelihoods. This perception, according to PN, resulted in traders setting up business posts in their neighbourhoods rather than centrally. While this may have been PN's experience, my observation of the central market during my fieldwork suggests that this trend did not permanently affect the heterogeneity of the market and of the buying population. In an hour-long observation at a trading post in the Bukuru central market, aided by my Research Assistant who observed the patterns of tribal marks and dressing of the traders and customers, I noticed a mixed market setting and cross-ethnic and cross-religious patronage. In one instance, we found a Hausa male fish seller beside a Berom female vegetable seller, who were patronized by both women in hijab and western-styled clothing.

Other comments show that market and residential separations were not the only manifestations of segregation. PL, for example, notes that transport service delivery and

patronage were also bifurcated along ethnoreligious lines. He commented on this issue in the following way:

Many Hausa-Fulani are transporters, so there was a time that rumours were flying around that Hausa-Fulani will kill you if you enter their commuter buses or cars. Because many Hausa-Fulani sell food, mostly fruits, there was fake news that they had injected their fruits with poison and that if you eat what they sell, you'll die. So, you started seeing Berom youths buying cars and buses, which they now use to commute their people.

So, transportation services became segregated between Hausa-Fulani transporters for the Hausa-Fulani and the Berom transporters for the Berom people. Before people enter a bus, they check to see who the driver is and assess the ethnicity of the occupants before entering. So, this division continued to widen, thus deflating trust between us.

In the participant's view, false narratives about Hausa and Fulani transporters exacerbated the threat perception of the Berom population, which resulted in the establishment of separate transport businesses to serve their commuting needs. So, the threat of harm not only deprived people of opportunities for extensive social contact in the residential settlements, it also restricted the avenues for brief intergroup interactions.

While segregation constrained intergroup interaction, the lack of contact between the indigenous and settler ethnicities caused the erosion of the familial bond that characterized intergroup relations pre-2001. PN's comment on his post-direct violence experience shows that the loss of community in Angwan Doki is a result of segregation. He stated the following in his story:

But now, a lot of young people can only survive in their immediate environment. You'll find a Muslim who can't speak English, hence must live in isolation. You'll also find a Christian who lives in isolation because he isn't fluent in Hausa or may be

fluent in Hausa but knows nothing about Muslims' way of life, and, as a result is unable to fit into the other side.

PG made a similar remark about the same period. This is what he had to say on the issue:

During the conflict, we lost the togetherness that we enjoyed in the past. We could meet when tensions reduced and become friends again, but the togetherness was no longer there because some of the Hausa families moved out of our area during the conflict. We still have conversations when we meet elsewhere, but the bond isn't as strong as before. There was real fear during the conflict to the extent that the trekking routes we used before became no-go areas for us if they are [*located*] in the settlement of the Muslims.

PN's narrative indicates that, in contrast to the past, the younger generation are unable to blend into the outgroup population due to their lack of knowledge of the outgroup's language and way of life. And both these conditions, the participant notes, are the result of almost two decades of segregation. Similarly, PG notes that despite having a relatively cordial relationship post-direct violence, the limitation of interactions caused by the spatial distance between the Christian and Muslim populations has undermined the familial bond that existed between them.

In contrast to the effects of Angwan Doki's pre-conflict integrated structure, one of which was interethnic marriages, there has been a dissent into enmity since the first conflict episode. Although the bitterness engendered by the violence can produce such a condition, and likely did, PN's reflection on intergroup relations post-direct violence implicates the religious segregation of the community. The participant, a Berom Christian, gave an account of the nature of post-direct violence intergroup relations. He revealed his experience in the following manner:

Its worse when you talk about the younger ones. I was passing by an area and heard a young boy say that Muslims are wicked. It is disheartening when you hear a 12- or

13-years old Muslim or Christian boy say that he would kill anybody from the other side if he catches them. It is disheartening because this is the result of their upbringing. The children that were born after 2001 view the people of the other region as enemies because they didn't grow up with them as neighbours. People who grew up in completely Christian environments see the Christians as the best people, as their best friends. Meanwhile, there are Muslims that are more caring than the Christians.

The participant notes that the teenage Christians consider the Muslims as enemies, and this is not unexpected. Having lived apart all their lives, their only knowledge of the outgroup is based on narratives of war, so all they know is their perception of enmity and disposition to harm them. Also, alternative avenues for developing a positive view about the Other are limited as the community's schools are themselves segregated. And, although PN comments on the Christian teenage population, the situation is unlikely to be much different among the Muslim population given that they too have grown up in isolation and attend segregated schools.

Dadin Kowa

Similar to Angwan Doki, the stories of some Dadin Kowa participants reveal that residential segregation resulted from the fear of the Other, while others highlight its adverse effect on the younger population. Although not explicitly tying its origin to threat perception, FP's description of how the community became residentially segregated implicitly links both phenomena. The participant, a Tarok Muslim, recounted his experience in the following story:

During the crisis, we witnessed Christians moving out of the areas dominated by the Muslims, Muslims moving out of the areas dominated by Christians. So, the settlement now is Muslim separate, Christians separate. That's how the settlement is now in Dadin Kowa. There are very few Christians still found in the Muslim settlements, but you hardly find any Muslim settled in the Christian-dominated areas.

The participant's description of people's reaction to the conflict, mirrors those of the Angwan Doki participants. And, although, as I note above, he does not explicitly link fear of the Other with the relocations, their occurrence at the time of the conflict suggests that they resulted from it.

In the same vein, BP's comment shows that the conflict engendered residential segregation yet, unlike FP, he explicitly identifies its root. The participant, also a Hausa Muslim, gave an account of how the process unfolded as follows:

So, because of the kind of rumours they peddled about the other religion planning evil, people started changing their houses. So, if you look at your neighbourhood and it is dominated by the Muslims, as a Christian, you'll approach a Muslim living in a Christian-dominated area to ask whether you can exchange your houses. The problem was that serious. But some people who didn't sell their houses have returned to their initial homes and we are all living together again.

BP recounts the dramatic steps taken by some community members to delink themselves from the outgroup for fear of being harmed. The participant notes that both Christians and Muslims in outgroup-dominated neighbourhoods swapped their houses in order to live among their co-ethnics. His comment, however, indicates that, for some residents, the fear of the outgroup did not outlive the conflict as some community members whose homes were unsold, returned after the conflict. For those returning community members, it is likely that the threatening narratives that inspired their relocation did not produce fear of their outgroup neighbours per se. They were afraid of their neighbours' co-ethnics, who could either harm them or influence their neighbours to do so. Hence, they felt comfortable returning when these threats abated.

In contrast, SP's account of the origins of segregation shows that Dadin Kowa community members became uncomfortable living in mixed housing or neighbourhoods following the news from other communities about people turning on their outgroup friends. The participant, a Berom Christian, recounted thus:

Before the conflict, people were living in face-to-face [single room] apartments, sometimes made up of half Christian and half Muslim tenant population. Now, you won't find any house where Christians and Muslims are living together. The people started separating during the conflict. People were scared to live in mixed apartments, especially people living in an apartment dominated by a different religion. As the Hausa would say, "no matter how close you and your chicken may be, one day, you'll kill it."

When the conflict starts, people forget about who is or is not their neighbour. They only know religion at that point. There was a case the last time, of two friends who ate together a few hours before conflict broke out in another community. One of the boys was murdered and we later heard that he was killed by the same friend who had just eaten lunch in his house. So, this is why people run away from their [*outgroup*] friends when the conflict starts.

As the participant's comment reveals, Dadin Kowa had religiously mixed neighbourhoods as well as mixed apartment buildings. This residential structure was altered during the Jos conflict as people became uncomfortable residing with the outgroup. And, consistent with the other participants' accounts above, the relocating residents were the neighbourhoods' religious minority. The category of people that moved suggests that their decision was driven by perceived threat. SP's reflections of the event and perceptions that propelled the relocations further reinforce this assessment. His comment indicates that people relocated from their mixed apartments because they believed that in spite of being cordial with their outgroup neighbours, these friends were not indisposed to harming them. Moreover, it was clear that as religion became salient, the significance of past relationships waned. Perhaps, the news that a person was

hacked by his outgroup friend despite sharing a meal only a moment prior to the murder created the perception that religion had taken precedence over past relationships, thereby heightening the fear of outgroup neighbours.

Similarly, QP suggests that the Christians in his neighbourhood became threatened by their proximity to Hausa Muslims after they heard about the killing of their co-ethnics by the Hausa in other communities. The participant, a Berom Christian, reflected on his conflict-time experience of intergroup relations as follows:

When you hear that a Hausa man killed your brother, you can no longer trust a Hausa man as you would think he could target you next. That's why we started avoiding each other. We stopped living with each other. If you were in a settlement dominated by another religion, you moved out. So, they [*Hausa Muslims*] moved out of our settlement. They went to live in another settlement dominated by Muslims.

So, people stopped relating with their friends from the other side, as you couldn't go to their area. We thought they would kill us thinking that we are spying for our people. There wasn't any interaction between us. Even in schools, there were no interactions.

Similar to SP's submission, QP recalls that people withdrew from their neighbours because of their respective ethnic affinity with the conflicting groups in other communities. QP further notes that the separation reduced the opportunities for intergroup communication. His comment shows that interethnic interaction declined because seeing outgroup friends became difficult as the neighbourhoods increasingly became homogenous. The homogeneity of the neighbourhoods made an outgroup member more visible and made the presence of outsiders suspicious. This aligns with my observation on our way to a participant's home.

On our way to the said participant's home, we strayed into the wrong neighbourhood as we were navigating with landmarks rather than street names and house numbers. This

neighbourhood was visibly dominated by the Muslims as evident in the clothing of all the ladies, including young children that we saw on the road and in the front yard of the houses. Given that Dadin Kowa was, by all accounts, not involved in the conflict per se, we did not realize that our presence there was problematic. This only became evident when we slowed down to ask for direction. We were first greeted by many unrelenting stares, which I initially interpreted as the usual response to seeing strange faces in the neighbourhood. I knew that we were unwelcome when my Research Assistant and I waved at a man who was sweeping his front yard. Our intention was to ask him for further directions to a landmark as we suspected that we had lost our way. He had already paused sweeping the yard and had been staring at us. Despite looking at our direction, the man ignored our greetings and gestures but maintained his stern gaze. We drove out of that street to the main road where the participant eventually met us.

The suspicion of outsiders derives from the perception of the outgroup as enemies, and the segregation of the community has further fuelled this perception. This is reflected in SP's comment on the state of intergroup relations post-2001. The participant, a Berom Christian, articulated the following in his story:

When the conflict started, Christians separated from Muslims and the Muslims separated from the Christians. So, the Muslim and Christian parents started to tell their kids that the other group is dangerous and should be avoided. They tell them that if you see the kids from the other group, kill them. And you know children, even if you people were friends, you'll turn into their instant enemy once their parents teach them to hate you. Once they see you, they'll remember what the parents said. To kids, Mommy and Daddy cannot lie.

Similarly, PR, a Berom Christian reflected on the idea of the external ethnic enemy. This is what she had to say on the issue:

If you look at the first gate here, the Muslims are dominant there. They all moved to the first gate area because of fear. When the conflict started, their parents told them not to go to some areas in the community and that includes where I live. They were told that Berom men killed their Fulani brothers in the villages, so they're afraid that I would kill them.

As the above excerpts indicate, the emergent segregation of the community did not simply limit intergroup interactions. It facilitated the demonization of the outgroup. As their stories suggest, the participants believe that the Dadin Kowa parents oriented their children towards viewing the outgroup as enemies in order to prevent them from visiting their section of the community. Given the lack of alternative knowledge sources, occasioned by segregation, there is likely a population of young people who know the outgroup simply as their enemies.

Effacement of intergroup trust

While perceived threat engendered social distance between the indigenous Christians and settler Muslims, the conflict between both groups led to the erosion of trust and exacerbated the fear of the Other. Although mistrust is evident in the narratives of both the Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa participants, it appears mostly in the reflections of the Christian participants from both communities.

Angwan Doki

In Angwan Doki, the mutual mistrust between the Christians and Muslims is rooted in people's perception about the activities of their outgroup friends or proxies during the conflict. The

reflections of PV, a Berom Christian, fall under the former. She described the state of intergroup relations as follows:

The relationship is no longer like before. Now, I can't go to her house, to be candid. I can't go to her house and feel comfortable to eat like I did in the past. I hardly even visit. I only go there when I have items to distribute to the community. In the past, we were never scared of being poisoned. Now, we wouldn't eat their food. In fact, we've now learnt how to make Hausa snacks by ourselves so that we don't have to contract it to them to avoid being poisoned [...] We look at them as very dangerous people no matter how close they may be to you.

Actually, during the crisis the people that burnt our house were our neighbours. We moved out of the house, so didn't see this happen first-hand. But the people that stayed back took photos and videotaped our neighbours burning my family house. So, we saw the people. Some were our neighbours, so that's why I know that no matter how close you're to them, they can change at any time.

I was carrying a heavy heart because of the destruction during the crisis. I held grudges against them, so whenever I saw them, I would walk past them without even greeting. In fact, I stopped going to my married friend's home.

PV expresses her mistrust of outgroup neighbours following the conflict. To indicate her mistrust for her outgroup best friend post-direct violence, she notes that she can no longer eat in her house without thinking she would be poisoned. She further buttresses her extant mistrust for the outgroup by indicating that this is a widespread perception within the Berom Christian population in the community. She notes that her ingroup learnt how to make Hausa snacks, which they love but are no longer comfortable buying from the Hausa because they may be poisoned. This story encapsulates both the cordiality of the past and the descent into disharmony, which in this context is exemplified by the lack of trust for the outgroup. The participant's comment indicates that her mistrust of the outgroup was borne out of her realization that her Hausa neighbours partook in the destruction of her family's property during the conflict.

OP's account of the effect of the conflict on intergroup relations in Angwan Doki diverges from PV's experience, which she advances as the basis for Berom people's mistrust of the Hausa. OP, who is also a Berom Christian, recounted his experience as follows:

We withdrew from the Muslim members of our community suddenly because the people who attacked us launched the attack with their consent. We believed that they participated covertly. They didn't want to do it themselves as we would have recognized them. They weren't at the forefront, but we believe they gave this people the blueprint of the community.

Like PV, he believes that his Hausa neighbours were complicit in the attacks on the Berom population in the community. He notes that the Angwan Doki Hausa colluded with their proxies of likely external co-ethnics to attack the Berom. While OP mentions that his Hausa neighbours joined their proxies in planning their attack, he states, in contrast to PV, that they were not directly involved in executing it.

Similar to PV's viewpoint, PE notes that the Hausa and Fulani Muslims are untrustworthy, and his comment indicates that his perception is also a product of his conflict-time experience. The participant discloses this perception in his response to my question on his pre-conflict experience of intergroup relations. The participant, a Berom Christian like PV, commented on his experience as follows:

There [*was*] what we call relative peace. There [*was*] peace depending on the individuals and on the ignorance of the other side. If you do not know the other person's intentions, you'll assume that they love to live in peace with you and that has been the basis of our relationship. So, there was what could be called relative peace, but it was so because of the ignorance of the indigenes. They didn't understand the person they were living with, so it was assumed they were in peace.

You would relate with them, [*but*] if they had anything hidden, you won't know. But they gave you a face to trust and gave you what they wanted you to trust about

them and in your innocence, you truly would take that. In your ignorance, you felt that you were living peacefully with them. So, as I said, the crisis opened the eyes of the indigenes to the true identity of the other side. So, it will take divine intervention for the indigene who truly knows himself to get to trust the other side fully.

PE not only holds that there is no valid reason for trusting the Hausa and Fulani Muslims post-direct violence but also believes that the Berom people's pre-conflict perception of them as being trustworthy lacked valid justification. He discounts the significance of Berom people's perception of the Hausa and Fulani as trustworthy since, in his view, it was not based on the reality of their nature.

In other words, the Hausa and Fulani cannot be said to have been trustworthy prior to the conflict since it was through their deceitfulness that they earned the trust of the indigenous groups. So, unlike PV, whose mistrust of her Muslim neighbours derive from conflict-generated resentment, PE notes that the conflict simply revealed that the Muslims should not have been trusted in the first place. The view that the Muslims were deceitful is also evident in the narratives of PG, a Berom Christian, who notes that, "you may sit with a Fulani man today and give him your kunu [*local beverage*] and he will drink but sill turnaround and attack you tomorrow."

While the reflections of Participants PV and PE highlight their perspectives as Berom Christians, IP comments on post-direct violence intergroup relations from his perspective as a Fulani Muslim. He communicated the following in his story:

You see, my friends and I remained friends, but our friendship went cold. Everybody was afraid to go into the other person's area. The relationship with neighbours who weren't our friends before the conflict was quite hostile. Our friends weren't hostile towards us even though they withdrew from us. The trust that we used to have is no longer there, but we thank God that things have started improving now. The trust isn't how it used to be though.

My family has two gas stations located in the Berom-dominated area. During the crisis, in 2001, the station was attacked. It was set ablaze. The second one, which was still being constructed was vandalized. I think we have had four cycles [*episodes*] of conflict now. In each cycle [*episodes*], one of our properties was attacked. In the one of 2008, they even carted away our 48 herd of cattle. In that episode, they burnt some of our cars parked in the station.

One of our herdsmen was killed and his body wasn't found. Since 2001, the trust is no longer there. The Fulani man is looking at the Berom man that he's going to harm him. And the Berom man is looking at the Fulani man as if he's going to harm him. So, there was no longer trust. So, even if you tell a Fulani man to go to the Berom Mai Angwa to report wrongdoing by a Berom, the Fulani will think that he would be killed there. If you go there, you wouldn't return alive, except you meet with the Mai Angwan in a neutral place.

There are parallels between the narratives of PV and IP even though they are of different ethnic and religious affiliations. Consistent with the views of PV, a Berom Christian, IP notes that his relationship with his Christian friends strained following the conflict. Also, like PV, he became mistrustful of the outgroup because his family's properties were destroyed in an outgroup-dominated area. In addition to his personal perception, IP notes that Fulani Muslims cannot feel safe in an outgroup-dominated neighbourhood even today.

Whereas PV and PE discuss mistrust as a one-dimensional phenomenon, PH's reflections on intergroup relations portray it as mutually held by the Christian and Muslim populations. Also, in contrast to PV, PE and IP, whose narratives suggest that mistrust of the outgroup is rooted in people's conflict experience alone, the comments of PH show that it is both the result of people's conflict experiences and an effect of spatial distance. The participant reflected on this issue in the following manner:

I have a lot of Muslim friends. You saw some of them when you arrived this morning. Most of them are my friends. We grew up together. They're working with different NGOs, but I just told them that, ah, this one is not real. Since 2001 I haven't seen any progress towards peace coming from your side. Now if I even send my fowl

to your area, the fowl will not come back alive. And definitely you know a thief would not want their property to be stolen, so they think that what they're planning against the Christians, the Christians are also planning against them.

So, that's how we're living. Today, we have separate settlements. We no longer stay together. You can move around. From Kugiya, from Bukuru market here up to Rayfield, that's their own settlement. That's the result of the crisis. And us too, we settled here. Then someone will come and say that there's peace. If there's peace, let's come back to the way we used to live. If there's peace, let me shake your hand, hold your hand. If I cannot hold your hand, then there's no peace.

Let us go back to the way we used to live before. Get a piece of land close to me and come and stay, let the Berom Christians also be able to go to their own places and go and stay. Like I said before, if there's peace, let us return to how we used to live. Let's behave the way we were behaving. Let's treat ourselves the way we were treating ourselves. Now, I cannot give my child to them to marry. If I can give a child out to them in marriage, and they can do likewise, then I'll believe that we've resumed living like before.

If I or my fellow Beroms can go to their area or spend the night there and return safely, then I'll believe that the olden days are coming back. If you're celebrating any event and you invite me, then I'll say that we're heading back to the olden days. But now, the Muslims don't invite us, and the Christians don't invite them. So, if we restore our past communal behaviours, then, I'll say yeah. Ahn, there's no relationship now.

When we meet, we could discuss but what's in the heart is in the heart. What's in my heart is to harm him! Of course, since if he gets me somewhere, he too would want to harm me. You see the problem? Ehn! If you're my friend and you're a Muslim and you're present in a meeting in which an attack against me was planned, what are you supposed to do? You're supposed to come and tell me so that I will take pre-emptive steps. But you didn't tell me? Is that supposed to make me continue to have good or any relationship with you.

The participant's comment, like the foregoing reflections, indicates that trust is lacking in the community and is a post-direct violence phenomenon. The participant acknowledges that he still has Muslim friends, who are working towards achieving peace in the community. Yet, he doubts their sincerity because it is still unsafe for Christians, including himself, to visit the Muslim end of the community, which was unofficially partitioned during the conflict as people moved into

their ethnic enclaves. To demonstrate his claim about the persistence of mistrust, the participant highlights the inability of the Christian and Muslim populations to resuscitate their pre-conflict relations. He notes that despite claiming to be relatively peaceful, Christians are still not disposed to living in the Muslim-dominated neighbourhoods and vice versa, his Muslim friends and him are not as close as they once were, and intermarriages are a non-starter, Christians still cannot sleep at their Muslims friends' home as they previously did, and religious festivals are still commemorated without the outgroup's involvement.

PH believes, in contrast to the suggestions in the preceding excerpts, that mistrust is mutually felt within the community. He, however, like the other participants, does not say the Muslims have any justified basis for being suspicious of the Christians but notes that the Christians are justifiably suspicious of the Muslims. He notes that the Muslims are simply mistrustful of the Christians because their sense of guilt for plotting against the Christians makes them believe that the Christians are doing likewise. Yet, he acknowledges that he also wishes to harm the Muslims. However, he insists that he is disposed to doing so only because he knows the Muslims are planning to do the same. The participant's mistrust of the outgroup also extends to his Muslim friends, who he accuses of not alerting him about their group's plots. The suspicion of the outgroup, although partly driven by the conflict experiences, results from the ingroup's inability to see or hear about what takes place in the outgroup's neighbourhood. And this condition is itself a product of social and spatial distance.

Similar to PH's assertion, PN holds that mistrust of unknown outgroup members is both a Christian and Muslim phenomenon. Compared to PH, however, he apparently believes that the

Muslims are justifiably mistrustful of Christians just as the Christians are mistrustful of them.

The participant, a Berom Christian, had the following to say on the issue:

After the conflict, there have been several efforts to bring peace, including through NGO workshops and music concerts. However, not much can be achieved through these efforts as social gatherings cannot change what's already on people's mind. The mistrust has already been created. If my relative was killed or got missing in your neighbourhood, how do you expect me to trust you that if I find myself in your area, you people are not going to do the same thing to me.

So, apart from my friends who I know as people and know what they can do, I don't trust other people. I can't trust the people that I don't know because I know someone who went to a Muslim environment and didn't return alive. So, a Christian isn't sure that if he goes to a Muslim neighbourhood he will survive, and a Muslim also thinks that he will be killed if he goes to a Christian neighbourhood. This is widening the gap between people.

In contrast to the views of PV, PE and PH who are also Berom Christians like him, PN maintains that people are still trustful of their outgroup friends in spite of the conflict. As mentioned above, he holds that the mistrust of unfamiliar outgroup members applies to both the Christian and Muslim populations. In his view, people are generally distrustful of unfamiliar outgroup members due to the atrocities committed by the outgroup against their co-ethnics during the conflict. The participant notes that this feeling is so entrenched in the psyche of people to the extent that it cannot be erased through superficial interventions. However, he, asserts that people remain trustful of their outgroup friends because they are perceived as benign, and so incapable of harming anyone.

Dadin Kowa

According to the Dadin Kowa participants, whose comments reflect this subject, Christians and Muslims are mistrustful of the outgroup, including those with whom they relate personally and irrespective of the nature of past personal relations. SP's reflections on post-direct violence intergroup relations encapsulate the lack of trust even for friends. The participant, a Berom Christian, doubts that inter-ethnic friendship is strong enough a bond to dissuade people from siding with their ethnoreligious group when conflict erupts. In her words, "no matter how you and your brother, the Hausa and the Christians, are relating, as soon as something little happens, they'll forget that life is precious, they'll start killing themselves." The lack of trust for outgroup friends is also evident in QP's post-direct violence experience. The participant, a Berom Christian, expressed the following in his story:

Ah! There was no relationship during the conflict. It was purely enmity. No one wanted to talk to the other. You couldn't go to each other's houses anymore. Nobody trusts anybody now. You might think the neighbour will poison you. There was one day after the crisis, my family gave a Hausa man food. He gave the food to his dog thinking we might have poisoned the food. So, we had to stop sharing food with them after this experience.

QP's comment highlights not only the mistrust of the outgroup post-direct violence, but also the extent of cordial relations pre-conflict. The participant notes that intergroup relations were strained during the conflict, and his comment also indicates that this continued post-direct violence due to the lack of trust for outgroup neighbours. Their act of food sharing after a conflict episode implies that the participant's family still considered the said man to be a friend. The family's extension of such a gesture following a conflict highlights the depth of the

relationship before the conflict, which, perhaps, made them assume it would be welcomed. In contrast, the Hausa man's usage of the food underscores the reality of intergroup relations post-direct violence and shows that mistrust is not simply a dormant feeling. Rather, it manifests in people's behaviour. And the family's adjustment of their behaviour to align with the man's current disposition highlights how mistrust could undermine intergroup relations.

The existence of, and effect of mistrust on, interpersonal relations is also evident in BP's experience of intergroup relations after the first conflict episode. The participant, a Hausa Muslim, commented on this experience as follows:

Immediately after the 2001 conflict people tried to forgive and to forget what happened in the past. They attempted to reunite. Then another crisis occurred. In some situations, you may find that there is a Christian, there is a Muslim, there is a Hausa, there is a Berom, there is a Fulani, who are all neighbours and living together. But after the conflict, people no longer trusted their neighbours who are of a different religion. Even if you're from the same religion, you would ask, are we of the same tribe? If it is not your tribe then you'll be suspicious of such a person even though you are friends. For example, the Sarkin Gyan is a close friend of my father.

The Sarkin Yongo is a Berom. He and the Sarkin Gyan were close friends of my father. They had lived together. When it was Salah time, they would come to our house and they would all eat together [...] But after that crisis, they stopped coming [*to our house*]. And even my father stopped going to their places because he is afraid. That trust is no longer there.

One thing that affected their relationship is rumour and perceptions about the other religion and tribes. Because I see you as a Christian, and maybe in the course of the problem, I encounter someone who's of the same religion as yourself or your tribe who isn't a trustworthy person, so I will assume that everybody from that tribe is like that.

QP's abovementioned experience includes his family's gesture to an outgroup member post-direct violence. This act of giving reinforces BP's claim that people attempted to restore past relationships since reconciliation could also be pursued through simple acts of kindness. BP,

however, notes that these efforts were hampered by the resurgence of the conflict in other parts of Jos, which also made people distrustful of the outgroup. The participant describes the community as ethnically and religiously mixed in order to highlight the degree of integration pre-conflict. The level of inter-ethnic and inter-religious contact, notwithstanding, people, in BP's view, became distrustful of everyone outside their immediate ethnoreligious group because the conflict in other communities was fought along ethnoreligious lines. However, the erosion of trust was not only the result of the conflict parties' ethnoreligious identities. As the participant notes, it also resulted from negative personal encounters with the Other as well as negative narratives about them.

Like the negative narratives about the outgroup, negative personal encounters with an outgroup member, as BP notes, can create a negative perception about the whole group. WP, a Berom Christian, does not disclose whether his mistrust of the outgroup is founded on narratives or personal experiences, but he is generally distrustful of the entire outgroup. He expressed his views as follows:

Since the start of the conflict, I have kept my distance from them [*Hausa and Fulani Muslims*]. I'm not talking about ending business ties. I mean even normal interactions. We hardly sit together and talk the way we are seated right now. Everybody is scared of the other. Why? If I enter his house now, I will use my third eyes [*spiritual powers*] to peruse the house to see what weapon he has. If he comes here, I know he would do the same thing. So, hardly would he come. I won't even allow him to come [...]

A person who you don't trust, how can you sit close to him? And the naked truth is that this is not a warfare of machine. We use spiritual powers. That's why the JTF [Joint Military Taskforce] is a waste of money [...] I may be talking with them and tell them that I'm in peace with them. Before God and man, I'm not telling the truth. I'm deceiving them. If a Fulani man comes to tell me that he's in peace with me, I know he's lying. That's not true. I know so because I'm still holding my own secret meetings on how to drive the Fulani out of Jos.

We're still meeting with our warriors, re-strategizing and discovering the Fulani plans to mobilize their people from Kano, from Bauchi, and we're intercepting arms. So, how can I believe him? How? There are still mixed feelings because the Christians in DK are selling their houses to the Hausa and Fulani and moving out. So, you see, there's still fear. Nobody is still believing anybody. When the Hausa are caught with firearms, they say that they know the Christians will come and kill them one day that's why they need to stockpile arms to defend themselves.

Similar to the other Dadin Kowa participants, WP highlights the mutual mistrust that characterizes Christian-Muslim relations post-direct violence. He states, there are no interactions between himself and an outgroup member. The participant maintains that even if interactions were to occur and peace professed, all of this is a façade since the true intention of people is to harm the outgroup. He notes that while he and other Berom Christians are plotting to expel the Fulani from Jos, the Fulani are recruiting mercenaries from among their co-ethnics in other states and are stockpiling weapons so as to wage a war against the indigenous groups. Whether the comment about weapons stockpile is accurate or not, it highlights the precarious state of intergroup relations in Dadin Kowa. If this narrative about the weapons stockpile is untrue, the existence of such a rumour is likely fuelled by the lack of awareness of what takes place in the outgroup's neighbourhood, which is a segregation-induced condition. If it is true, then the act is emblematic of the development of a group-wide siege mentality.

In fact, the sense of being under siege is reflected in WP's comment about the Muslims' rationale for gathering arms. For example, he notes that the Hausa and Fulani Muslims accuse the Berom of stockpiling arms in order to justify their decision to do the same. This justification coupled with the participant's own perceptions of the Hausa and Fulani Muslims are an indication that the respective populations are mutually mistrustful of the Other. Mutual mistrust,

as WP's comment shows, is accompanied by the mutual disposition to harm the Other. As a result of the desire to harm the outgroup and each group's consciousness of this intention, the participant notes that positive intergroup encounters are currently untenable. So, if his path crosses with an outgroup member's, his first act would be to employ his spiritual powers to observe whether there are traps set up for him.

Like WP, PT paints a bleak picture of the state of intergroup trust in Dadin Kowa. She does so in her characterization of intergroup relations since the last conflict episode. The participant, a Berom Christian, commented on the issue as follows:

You know as the Hausa say, "if fire has ever burnt you, whenever you see the ashes you'll be scared because you think it is fire." So, that fear has come to stay. As if the conflict occurred once and never reoccurred, we would have forgotten. But we can't forget because the conflict comes and goes. So, in the people's mind, we are still in conflict even when we aren't fighting. There's no trust anymore. Bringing it back will be difficult because the conflict keeps recurring.

On the Christian side, we're taught to forgive. Most of the Berom here are mostly Catholic Christians, so on a daily basis we're told in our daily masses that we must forgive so that our own sins can be forgiven. You know when a child is taught something from childhood, it is hard for the child to depart from it.

So, it is in our nature, because of the priestly teachings to always forgive and forget. But I can't speak for the Hausa. However, I still meet with the Hausa Muslims that I knew before the conflict, but you still don't know their innermost thoughts towards you, especially given their own proverb that even if you're familiar with your chicken, a day will come when you'll slaughter it. They are the ones that can tell what's in their own heart.

But for us, because we have decided to forgive, we forget over time and begin to live peacefully again. Naturally, you can't restore that cordial relationship because of the lack of trust. Truly, we now see ourselves as enemies. And that's natural. Now, you came to my house and I welcomed you, then you'll start planning to remove me from my house to occupy it. How can I trust you?

Since you want to take possession of my house, it is only natural for me to see you as an enemy. There's partial interaction but because when you go to churches, you see a police or soldier on guard to protect the worshippers you can't be free with the Hausa and Fulani.

Today, if you're in church and you see a Hausa or Fulani walking past, you'll think he's coming with a bomb. The Catholic Church in Rayfield was bombed some time ago, so if you see only one Hausa boy beside the church, you'll be scared to go in. Since the conflict started, I've never heard of the Christian boys attacking a mosque.

Although there was no outright conflict in Dadin Kowa, the PT notes that the fear of the outgroup resulted from the pain which they inflicted during the conflict. So, this comment is likely shaped by her family's experience of losing her younger brother and his wife, who were murdered by a close friend, during the conflict in a neighbouring community. She holds that the erosion of trust is not simply the result of the conflict, but, rather, of its recurrent nature. As a result of its multiple occurrences, she maintains, people still consider themselves as living in a state of war and view the lack of fighting as a temporary pause in violence. This war mentality, perhaps, explains why WP believes that the Hausa and Fulani Muslims are stockpiling firearms and why he and some of his co-ethnics are also plotting against the Hausa and Fulani in their community.

In contrast to the apparent dispositions of WP, who appears to still hold grudges against the Muslims, PT states that the Berom Christians have forgiven the Hausa for their role in the conflict. She notes that the Berom Christians have forgiven the Hausa and forgotten about their wrong deeds because they were taught in the Catholic Church not to bear grudges against their neighbours. However, she remains wary of her relationship with the Hausa as she believes that they are disposed to harming their friends irrespective of the depth of their friendship. In other words, although the Christians have forgiven the Muslims, her closeness to her outgroup friends cannot be restored because their pre-conflict trust has been lost. Mistrust, in PT's view, is evident in the Christians needing security during church services and being suspicious of any Hausa that

comes close to the church premises while the worshippers are inside. In the absence of trust, the participant notes, old friends have become enemies. As per her reflection, enmity is not only a consequence of the bad memories of the Jos conflict but also the result of the purpose for which the Hausa undertook their campaign, which was the appropriation of Berom land.

The foregoing comments indicate that there is a high level of mistrust between the indigenous Christians and the settler Muslims, yet it is PT and WP's characterizations of the state of post-direct violence intergroup relations that are the gloomiest. This is likely not unconnected to their location within the community. Apart from suffering a personal loss during the conflict in Jos, PT was one of the community members that moved out of a mixed neighbourhood in Dadin Kowa during the conflict and she has resided in a Christian settlement since that time. Likewise, WP, who admits to not having any sort of relationship with the outgroup post-direct violence has lived within a Christian cluster since 2001. So, their comments ought to be examined in the context of the social and spatial distance between them and the outgroup.

Although all the perspectives above portray the state of intergroup trust as dire, not all the participants characterize it as being in a terrible state. FP, for example, holds that although there was no trust between the Christians and Muslims during the conflict, intergroup trust has since improved. The participant, a Tarok Muslim, reported on the issue in the following manner:

There was no trust during the conflict. As a Muslim, if I was seen in a Berom-dominated area, or a Christian-dominated area, I was perceived as either an inferior person or an intruder, but this was outside Dadin Kowa. If at all there's something that's to be discussed, I won't be allowed to be privy to such a discussion because of my faith.

In Dadin Kowa, we related well during the conflict, but there was mistrust. There was just no trust between the Muslims and the non-Muslims. There are killings taking place post-conflict, but nothing is happening in Dadin Kowa. I would say that

out of 100 percent mistrust during the conflict, the level of mistrust in DK is now only 30 percent.

We live peacefully in Dadin Kowa. We trust each other now more than before. If you walk around Dadin Kowa now, you won't know that there was a time we were very suspicious of each other. We are living together, do everything together and our market is just one.

During the conflict, you won't find any Muslim in the Kabong market but now we have only one market in Dadin Kowa for both Christians and Muslims. There were satellite markets within Jos in which you'll find no Muslim, but I think it has reduced especially in Dadin Kowa. Now we do everything together. During the conflict in Jos, you couldn't even urinate in the other group's area, whether Christian or Muslim. But today, everybody is free to do so.

Despite being indigenous to Jos like the Berom and most of the Christians in the city, FP remembers being treated as an outsider in both Christian-dominated and Berom-dominated areas in other Jos communities during the conflict. Contrary to his experience in those places, he recalls having a good relationship with the indigenous Christians in Dadin Kowa during the conflict period but acknowledges that the respective groups were mistrustful of each other. In contrast to the perspectives above, the participant notes that intergroup relationship has improved post-direct violence as outgroup mistrust has significantly diminished. The improvement in intergroup trust, in the participant's view, is evidenced by the restoration of a heterogeneous market and mixed neighbourhoods.

As in the case of WP and PT, FP's situation is different from the rest of the participants whose views pertain to trust, hence must be considered when examining his perspective about the state of intergroup relations during and after the conflict. As noted above, FP is a Muslim and he is also Tarok, which is an indigenous tribe in Plateau State. Although some Dadin Kowa Christians may be suspicious of him because of his religious identity, other Christians are likely to better relate with him simply because he is indigenous to the state and, as such, cannot be

perceived as a settler that is planning to usurp indigenous people's land. This dynamic, perhaps, explains why the participant was able to maintain cordial relations with Dadin Kowa Christians during the conflict despite the lack of trust between Christians and Muslims in the community.

Findings

Three main findings namely perceived threat, segregation and the erosion of trust emerged from the discussion in this chapter. The Jos conflict did not start in Angwan Doki or Dadin Kowa but its effects, which partly caused a spill over into Angwan Doki, were experienced in both Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa. Although the effects manifested in both communities, the specific circumstances that produced them differ. These situations are summarised here. First, the Christian and Muslim populations felt threatened by the outgroup partly due to the outbreak of conflict in other Jos communities and because of the issues explored in Chapter 6. In Angwan Doki, threat perception was the result of both these factors. For example, PE noted that the Hausa were motivated to complete the violent Jihad of Dan Fodio, which was aimed at conquering and occupying "pagan" lands.

This view, which is a mainstream perspective among the indigenous Berom like PE, must have made the group anxious about their future existence in Jos. Those fears could not have been allayed by the Hausa's claim that their numeric dominance in Jos and the existence of Hausa traditional authority in the past are indications that they are legitimate owners of Jos land. As PP's comment indicated, the indigenous groups also believed that the Hausa were using their wealth, which they derived from their businesses, to lure the indigenous women and systematically accumulate indigenous lands.

Beyond the anxiety around the potential loss of land, the respective groups in Angwan Doki were apprehensive about their safety. For example, Christian and Muslim participants, such as PN and UP, respectively, indicated that as stories of secret killings spread in the community, people became increasingly afraid to visit their outgroup neighbours. Similarly, although PA, a Hausa Muslim, maintained his relationship with his outgroup friends, he was afraid of other outgroup members who had no relationship with him. This was a legitimate fear given that those individuals would have viewed him only as an enemy if they ran into him in their neighbourhood. Relatedly, a Berom participant, PH, stated that his fears were exacerbated by the lack of information from his Hausa friends, who he expected to forewarn him about the plans of their co-ethnics. PH did not comment on why his friends left him in the dark and his experience is not representative of all the Angwan Doki participants. For example, PN and PP (Berom Christians) recall both voluntarily sharing and responding to information requests from outgroup friends during periods of heightened tension and even conflict.

Compared to Angwan Doki, perceived threat appears to have emanated largely from stories about the conflict in other communities. For example, MP and FP noted that radio reports about the fatalities or violence occurring elsewhere fuelled people's anxiety. Also, some people in the conflict-affected communities informed their relatives in Dadin Kowa about the violent occurrences in their community, which, according to BP, led the Dadin Kowa co-ethnics to clamour for retaliatory attacks within the community. Consequently, people felt safe only in the ingroup-dominated neighbourhoods, as PR noted. The diversity of their experiences, notwithstanding, the participants from both Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa recalled that there was a palpable sense of fear in their community.

Second, the fear of the outgroup caused social and spatial distance. This was true for Angwan Doki, as the comments of both the Christian and Muslim participants indicate. For example, OP's statement shows that once people started to sense that tension was brewing, they withdrew from the outgroup to avoid being caught up in a potentially violent escalation. IP, a Fulani Muslim, reinforced this perspective as he recalled that the Christians pulled back from the Muslims around one week before the 2001 conflict broke out. Both these experiences are corroborated by UP, who noted that people started to cluster around people with a similar religious and/or ethnic affiliation. PN, a Berom Christian, reinforces the claim about neighbourhood segregation as he stated that his nephews were brought up in a Christian dominated neighbourhood. Additionally, for such children's parents, the dominant religion in the neighbourhood in which a school is located, rather than the quality of education on offer, determines enrolment. In light of the dearth of intercultural encounters and pre-conflict interactions, these children perceive the outgroup solely as enemies.

The effect of perceived threat was not limited to school and residential segregation. As PL stated, for example, transporters and traders dedicated to the ingroup sprung up in response to people's fear of being abducted or poisoned by the outgroup. While PL contended that markets became permanently bifurcated, PP and PN stated that market segregation was only temporary. My observation during my fieldwork in the community reinforces the latter position. Although there are kiosks within the segregated enclaves, which are likely to receive more ingroup patronage, there is still a major market in which Christians, Muslims and different tribes sell their goods and are patronized by diverse customers. However, this does not invalidate the participants' perceptions nor question other remarks about school and residential segregation.

The people in Dadin Kowa responded to their sense of threat in a similar way. For example, FP and BP's stories show that Christians and Muslims began exchanging homes permanently or temporarily in order to cluster around the ingroup. Similarly, QP stated that people whose relatives were killed by the outgroup in other communities withdrew from their outgroup neighbours in Dadin Kowa. As SP indicates, people believed that the benign dispositions exhibited by their outgroup friends before 2001 had been compromised, so they sought alternative accommodation within the ingroup's enclave. Additionally, PR, a Berom Christian reported that some parents portrayed the outgroup as dangerous enemies to prevent their children from returning to their former neighbourhood or visiting outgroup-dominated settlements. In this sense, it is not just the lack of intergroup encounters that limited the children's knowledge of the outgroup to the enemy images evoked by conflict. The narratives of parents also fuelled the formation of these images.

Third, the loss of intergroup trust resulted from both threat perception and segregation. For example, PN, a Berom Christian reported that although pre-conflict friendships are still founded on trust, people are generally mistrustful of the outgroup because they attribute personal losses to their activities. In contrast, OP, a Berom Christian, does not distinguish between his pre-conflict outgroup friends and the larger outgroup because he believes that they helped the perpetrators of violence to map out the community. Likewise, PE, also a Berom Christian, believes that the Hausa are like wolves in sheep clothing, so they were even unworthy of his trust pre-2001.

Some participants' comments suggest that people acted on their lack of trust in the outgroup. IP, a Fulani Muslim, suggested that people took precautions, including restricting their

interactions with their outgroup friends, in order to avoid being caught off guard again. For some Berom people, as PV's stories indicate, the mistrust of the outgroup is manifested in their development of culinary skills to avoid patronizing Hausa food sellers. Similarly, PH, a Berom Christian, believes that because the groups are spatially distant and remember the activities of the outgroup during the earlier conflict episodes, each is convinced that the other is up to something sinister. Consequently, they plan their own sinister moves in order to be ready to counteract the outgroup's.

This perspective is also evident in the Dadin Kowa data but comes from a participant who lives in a Christian-dominated settlement. The participant, WP (Berom Christian), suggests that the respective groups are planning for war and stockpiling their armouries because each side believes that the other is doing the same. In Dadin Kowa, mistrust appears to manifest itself in other ways. For example, QP's story shows that people are disinclined to continue sharing meals with the outgroup because they do not trust the content of the food. As BP's aforementioned remarks indicate, this level of mistrust derives from the rumours about the outgroup peddled by the external and internal co-ethnics that seek to inspire conflict in Dadin Kowa as well as people's encounters with malevolent outgroup members, which changed their perception of the outgroup and their outgroup friends. For others, such as PT, a Berom Christian, they may have forgiven the outgroup but cannot forget because the conflict occurred multiple times. In this sense, people are mistrustful of the outgroup not simply because their co-ethnics were involved in a violent conflict. Rather, their mistrust stems from the recurrent nature of the conflict, which makes it difficult to dismiss the memories as isolated accidental events.

As I explain next, these three findings are interlinked. Common across both communities, also, is the occurrence of segregation along religious lines. The respective communities were unofficially partitioned along religious lines either due to people's perception of the conflict as religion-based or simply because the indigenous groups are mostly Christians while those designated as settlers are predominantly Muslims. In both Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa, segregation resulted from people's threat perception and fuelled the further erosion of trust. Yet mutual mistrust also resulted from people's conflict experiences, including in Dadin Kowa, which avoided conflict.

As the participants' narratives indicate, segregation did not prevent the outbreak of conflict in Angwan Doki due to the co-occurrence of spatial distance and mistrust. In fact, the interface of segregation and mistrust probably created the conditions that enabled subsequent conflict episodes in the community. Mistrust sustained segregation and the sustenance of segregation hindered opportunities for debunking the negative narratives about the Other and for challenging conflict-produced perceptions of the outgroup. Even though Dadin Kowa avoided the conflict, this outcome cannot simply be attributed to segregation given that the phenomenon also occurred in the community simultaneously with mutually felt mistrust.

As noted earlier, mutual mistrust, segregation and perceived threat occurred in both communities, which shows that there were conditions conducive for the outbreak of conflict in Dadin Kowa as well. Yet, only Angwan Doki experienced a spill over of the conflict. Also, as evident in WP's submissions, not all the Dadin Kowa community members were disinclined to participate in the conflict. Likewise, PT's experience shows that Dadin Kowa residents suffered personal losses from the conflict in neighbouring communities, which could have inspired their

participation or made the diffusion efforts of their external co-ethnics successful. Yet, diffusion did not occur.

Conclusions

This chapter highlights both the perceptual and physical changes that occurred in Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa before, during and after the Jos conflicts. In contrast to the mixed neighbourhoods and schools that characterized the communities before 2001, Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa became segregated between the indigenous Christian and settler Muslim populations because each side became afraid of the other. The same groups whose relationships were driven by a longstanding culture of trust became suspicious of each other. The same people that anticipated sharing in the outgroup's meals, accepted invitations to do so and viewed the outgroup's kitchen as extensions of their own started to view them as chameleons. These transitions occurred in both Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa and were both a cause and the effect of heightened intergroup tension. Although they culminated in violent conflict in Angwan Doki, Dadin Kowa avoided conflict. This suggests that just as there were conducive conditions for conflict, there were also countervailing factors against its occurrence.

Chapter Eight: The third “identity” and the forces of its (dis)empowerment

This Chapter explores Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa youth’s role in the conflict and the responses of the community leaders to their threat. The threats of outgroup domination and of physical harm were not restricted to a particular demographic group neither did social distance impact intergroup relations only at certain levels of interaction. Likewise, the erosion of trust does not apply to only a section of the respective populations. Yet, by many accounts, a section of the communities’ youths were the main instruments for the transition from intergroup tension to violence. This cohort of young people, who exist in both Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa and in the Christian and Muslim communities, are, in the participants’ viewpoint, constantly under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol. Controlled by these substances, they take to criminality, which thrives under the chaos of conflict and anarchy. Although youth gang violence occasionally snowballs naturally into conflict between indigenous Christians and settler Muslims, the youths also deliberately cause intergroup fighting because it creates an opening for them to loot. As the stories below indicate, all the vices associated with Angwan Doki youths are also present among their Dadin Kowa counterparts, yet the transition to intergroup conflict has occurred only in Angwan Doki.

The progression from youth violence to intergroup conflict in Angwan Doki and the failed transition to the same in Dadin Kowa suggests that while enabling conditions are present in the former, inhibiting factors exist in the latter community. In this Chapter, I explore the

participants' reflections on the vices associated with Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa youths and how it affects intergroup relations. Next, I examine how the relationship between parents and children in Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa differ as well as the divergent behavioural outcomes that result from them. Finally, I discuss the differences in the respective communities' approach to the conflict and the nexus between these approaches and the emergence of conflict in Angwan Doki and the avoidance of the same in Dadin Kowa.

The third identity: Drugs, crime and gang violence

In this section, I discuss the experiences and perspectives of the participants regarding the behaviour and activities of the youth in Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa. The stories show that although they impact their communities differently, the Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa youth are behaviourally aligned.

Angwan Doki

One consistent feature of the stories about the community's youth is their abuse of hard drugs and the concomitant effect on their behaviour. This narrative is reflected in the stories of both the indigenous Christian and settler Muslim participants about Angwan Doki's young people. PX, for example, partly associates youth recalcitrance in the community with substance abuse. The participant, a Hausa Muslim, commented on this issue in the following manner:

You cannot control the youths when somebody has told them to go and fight, that they will be protected. Also, were the youths not already being controlled by the drugs that they took? Most of them are under the influence of drugs. You can't kill a human until you're under drug influence. A right-thinking person cannot kill another

except they're under some influence. They can't even kill a chicken talk less of killing a human being without drug influence.

Even now that we're crying that our youth are taking drugs, it is because the drugs are available to them and some are jobless. A university graduate doesn't have a job but knows where to buy drugs, so he goes and takes some to cool himself and then becomes an addict. Those youth terrorizing students and lecturers in Unijos [*University of Jos*] are using drugs. Those cult members work under the influence of drugs. So, the main problem of society is how to control the youths.

The participant notes that the community's youths are uncontrollable because their powerful backers guarantee their protection. Beyond the control of their sponsors, the participant surmises, hard substance abuse predisposes the youths to behaviours, which they would otherwise be uncomfortable with. In his view, these youths, who naturally are indisposed to slaughtering domestic animals, have no problem murdering fellow humans once they are high on hard drugs. He notes that youth control is the society's main conundrum, but the youth's vices are rooted in their unemployment, which drives them into the destructive habit that makes them uncontrollable.

The idea that Angwan Doki's youths undertake atrocious acts on behalf of other people whilst under the influence of hard drugs is also reflected in UP's conflict story. The participant, also a Hausa Muslim, narrated her experience as follows:

The youths in our community named this ECWA church no. 1 Sambisa Hall [*in reference to the camp of the terrorist group, Boko Haram*], which I reported to the police because the boys are disturbing us here. The youths killed a girl and cut off her breast. They also stabbed an Alhaji to death. When the police were coming, they were blaring their siren, so the boys ran away from the church compound. So, the police reported back to the headquarters that there were no boys there.

I told them that [*the*] boys are coming from Bauchi, from Barkin Ladin. They're coming from every angle to come and converge here, and they consume dangerous drugs. They're already addicts. It is not only young men that come here to abuse

drugs, there are also young ladies. I went there to see for myself and I saw them, all kinds of people. So, that's why I know that it is teenagers that are causing the problem. When people want to do their dirty jobs, they give the boys a little money and some hard drugs, and the boys will go and destroy, kill and burn anything on their path.

They are coming from the north, south, east, and west. Every religion is there. Every tribe is there. Every gender is there, which is the worst. They are not discriminating amongst themselves there. It is when something good is to be shared that people start to differentiate between Christians and Muslims. If you go there, there is Igbo, Anaguta, Afizere, in fact, Nigeria is there. They come from Bauchi, Kaduna, Taraba, from everywhere.

The participant, based on her experience, believes that Angwan Doki has only one youth gang that comprises all the tribes, religions and genders. These youths are, in UP's view, not only coming from different parts of the state but they are also coming from different parts of the country to converge in her neighbourhood in Angwan Doki. In contrast to the prevailing practice in the wider society, this group is non-discriminatory and does not exclude based on ethnicity or religion. They include both indigenous and settler youths. After all, they have a shared interest in drug abuse and criminality, as her comment indicates. Similar to PX's perspective, she links the wider societal conflict to the activities of these youths, who she notes are easily transformed into agents of destruction with a token sum and some hard drugs.

In the same vein, PP ties the conflict in the community to the activities of this cohort of drug-addicted youths. The participant, an Afizere Christian, commented on the youths' excesses as follows:

Our young ones who take drugs are almost everywhere. They form criminal gangs, both Christians and Muslims, and all tribes. Once they want to make gains, they will cause problem and put the name of religion because they know religion is sensitive and people react to it. They try to cause conflict because they benefit from the

conflict. When you run away from your shop, they loot it. When it happens, the Muslim youths will go to their own side, but they're criminals.

The Christian criminal youths will also go to their own community. They are the drug addicts. They stay in the forefront. They're the ones burning people's houses. Before they burn your house, they will loot it. That's how they benefit from conflict.

We are peaceful now, but if you go to Kugiyya market, you'll see them, very many of them, seated there doing nothing. But if there's conflict now, the Christians and Muslims among them will separate and they would be the ones causing trouble.

The youths begin to fight. If one group dominates another, the dominated one will then stage a revenge in the other group's community and they pick what is valuable to them, and if they like they leave the houses untouched or burn them. Then it is termed a religious crisis [...]

During the conflict, I look at them and I see that it is not all of them that are troublemakers. I know the ones that are criminals, but we Christians also have criminals in our midst. We shouldn't hide this fact and blame one side.

So, if we also have criminals, how can I generalize and say that a whole ethnic or religious group are criminals. It is youths that do all of this, not aged people. So, how can I say that it isn't criminal. And if you look at the youths, their pants are down, they're in pencil trousers and their eyes are red from excessive drinking and drug abuse. It is not as if they're fighting the youth gangs of the other religion. They just block the road and waylay people indiscriminately and kill people before the police arrive.

When the police come, the boys disappear, leaving only corpses on the ground. And if you talk to the criminals, they will say the government didn't give them work. Meanwhile, they aren't willing to work. They want the government to spoon feed them, which isn't possible. Even [*University*] graduates aren't finding work let alone someone who doesn't have any skill. If you are sitting down doing nothing and waiting for the government to assist you, then something must be wrong with you.

Similar to UP's assertion, PP states that the gang of drug and alcohol-addicted youths in Angwan Doki are neither exclusively Christian nor exclusively Muslim. These youths are recognizable not only by the visible signs of substance abuse but also by their indecent dressing. They are, in his view, the people who champion the violence that accompanies intergroup conflict in the community. PP disputes the claim that the youth take to criminality because they are unemployed and suggests that they would have acquired a skill if they were interested in having

a decent job. Unlike PX and UP, who note that they engage in violent acts at the behest of other malevolent actors, PP contends that these young members of the community start a conflict to advance their own illicit objectives. He asserts that the conflict is simply a criminal enterprise since it is spearheaded by these youths who seek to loot businesses when the fighting ensues. The participant contends that the conflict only assumes a religious outlook because these youths portray it as so in order to broaden the scope of the conflict.

Like UP asserts, PP notes that this cohort of youths from the Christian and Muslim communities usually congregate together. His experience, however, extends our understanding of the youths' behaviour beyond UP's story. Compared to her story, for example, his comment shows that the ingroup youths withdraw from the outgroup when fighting breaks out ostensibly because their interests are no longer aligned. At the onset of the conflict, the fighting is usually between the emergent rival youth gangs, while the wider community is drawn into it only when one youth gang overpowers the other. Apparently, to save face, the overpowered gang stages a revenge attack against their rival's co-ethnics, which sets-off a broader conflict that involves rival gangs setting up road-blocks to target outgroup commuters. Despite being in opposing camps during the conflict, PP's comment indicates that the youth gangs return to their initial unified structure after the fighting ceases.

In contrast to the foregoing narratives that link both Christian and Muslim youths to the abovementioned vices, OP views youth criminality in Angwan Doki as essentially a Muslim problem. The participant, a Berom Christian, described his post-direct violence experiences in the following way:

Recently, the Hausa-Fulani youths are into robbery and snatching phones. There's this road along the dam. There's a footpath there that people follow to get home. The Hausa and Fulani are the most populated there. Their youths sit on the pavement of the dam. When it gets dark, they start snatching people's belongings. It happened to one of my friends. They approached her and collected her bag. Her phone was with her and she resisted giving it to them.

She then flung it into the grass, so they hit her on the head. They headbutted her, so she started bleeding. She was coming to meet us at a bar. So, she ran to us. When we saw her bleeding, we screamed and asked what had happened. She told us that the Hausa and Fulani youths that stay around the dam snatched her bag. By the time we got there, the boys had already left. So, we took her to the hospital. Apart from that, several of them rob at gunpoint.

Even my wife's younger brother bought a phone. One night, on his way back from Rayfield in a *keke* {tricycle}, the boys waved their flashlight at them, so the *keke* driver stopped because he thought they were security personnel. Then the boys appeared with sticks and robbed the occupants of the *keke*. That's what the boys do now. And if you don't let go of your property, they'll stab you. There was one lady that was stabbed. They stabbed her all over her body because she refused to let go of her phone. The people doing this are young, they walk in groups.

You may see only two of them walking. The others appear suddenly after you've been accosted. And when the Hausa and Fulani Muslims go to the Berom-dominant areas, the youths don't treat them like that [...] The Hausa Muslim youths are behaving this way because of how they've been raised by their community and parents. It is because of the influence of their environment on them. If someone grows up in a community where they fight frequently, that person is likely to be a troublemaker.

Perhaps, shaped by the experiences of his friend and in-law, OP believes that only the Hausa and Fulani Muslim youths are engaged in criminality in the community. His story shows that even when there is a pause in fighting, people are still vulnerable to physical harm and loss of property because of this cohort of criminally minded youths. This condition itself, OP's story also indicates, increases the likelihood of a return to full-blown confrontation. While PP notes that the community's youths misrepresent their criminal motives as religious goals, OP's story reveals a channel through which the youths could inadvertently cause intergroup fighting. OP, for

example, notes that he and his friends set out to confront the attackers of their female friend. If the attackers were still at the scene of the incident, there likely would have been a violent confrontation between both groups, which could have spiralled into a wider conflict since they are of different ethnoreligious affiliations. This scenario reinforces the perspectives earlier discussed in Chapter six that suggests that interpersonal conflicts snowball into an interreligious conflict when the disputing parties are of different identities.

Compared to the perspective of OP, who notes that only the Muslim youths are criminally minded because of the nature of their upbringing, PL believes that socialization into a culture of war predisposed both the Christian and Muslim youths to a life of crime. PL, a Hausa Muslim, disclosed his perspective as follows:

On the other hand, there's a group of youths that largely grew up during the conflict. They didn't attend religiously mixed schools nor ethnically mixed schools in which Berom, Hausa, Ibo and other tribes sat on one bench, used the same table, and were taught by a teacher who could be Christian or Muslim. All the stories they hear are about hate. The youths of the respective groups only hear about how their relatives were hacked by the other side. The Hausa-Fulani man believes that churches have turned into armouries, while the Berom feels threatened whenever he hears the Muslims' call for prayer, not knowing whether it is a call for attacks.

Dilapidated schools within the Hausa-Fulani communities created a group of youths that are in so-called schools but are miseducated because there's no knowledge in the schools. This group of people benefitted negatively from the crisis by becoming drug addicts. Within the Christian Berom communities, there are also a group of people destabilized by the conflict. They were previously enrolled in schools located in predominantly Muslim areas, and so, they resorted to taking drugs and drinking. They are full of hate also. This group of people have grown into a nightmare for both the Hausa and Berom communities.

They are the source of the increased crime rate in Jos. Out of schoolchildren have seriously increased since the conflict started. At the same time, theft and rape have increased. Human life is nothing to these youths as they are constantly on drugs for 24 hours. These groups are untouchable in both communities and are only accessible by the politicians. Because these youths have nothing to eat, politicians

then give them a token and turn them into party thugs who snatch ballot boxes and chant their names at rallies [...] Let me end by saying what my fear is. There is a generation of people like me in both sides who are able to interact reasonably, albeit fearfully sometimes, with these groups of youths in the other side.

We've been able to do this because we know the value of humanity and the limitations of life in seclusion. But now we have a set of youths growing up who have no interaction with the other side, no knowledge of religion, whether Christianity or Islam. All they understand is survival imperatives. So, they resort to vices such as kidnapping for ransom and rape. Simply put, life has no value to them. So, how do you change this society? Even the elites that send their children to private schools or foreign schools, their kids cannot blend with these youths in the community.

While much of the foregoing discussion revolve around how Angwan Doki youths consciously or inadvertently stimulate intergroup conflict, PL's reflections are focused on how the conflict itself turned this cohort of youths into agents of future conflicts. He notes that this category of the population lack experiences of integration and by extension have no positive memory of relating with the outgroup. Having been raised under segregation, their only insights into the Other pertain to narratives of war, which only breeds hatred. Also, the lack of contact engenders a mindset of war that makes every outgroup action to be viewed suspiciously. In addition to limiting opportunities for positive relationships and engendering mistrust of the outgroup, the conflict undermined the youths' quality of life, which predisposed them to illicit activities.

Although the conflict transformed a section of the Christian and Muslim youths into drug addicts, PL's comment indicates that this developed through different channels. On the Muslim side, the youths ended up as addicts having been miseducated in schools that were underfunded due to their location in non-indigenous neighbourhoods. As for the Christian youths, they become exposed to drug use having dropped out of their schools in Muslim-dominated neighbourhoods for security reasons. So, within both religious communities, there emerged a

group of youths who had no value for human life due to substance abuse. Hence, as Participants UP and OP also note, they terrorize other community members either for their own pecuniary gain or to advance the objectives of other malevolent actors.

Dadin Kowa

The narrative of the participants with regards to Dadin Kowa youths is a story of drugs, violence and crime that cuts across both the Christian and Muslim youth populations and affects both religious communities. The youths' propensity for violence is evident in PR's comment below.

The participant, a Berom Christian, narrated his experience as follows:

As a Christian, you can't move around second gate at night, but the troublesome youths include both Christians and Muslims. The boys attacked and killed a Deputy Commandant in the military because they thought he was Christian. He was going to pray in the Mosque, and some Muslim youths said, "see this arini [*derogatory name for Christians*] wants to enter our mosque."

So, they beat him up and he later died from his injuries at the hospital [...] Last month, a Muslim boy stabbed another Muslim boy in the second gate area, thinking he was a Christian [...] We're trying to make peace with everyone, but those youths from outside Dadin Kowa who come to the first gate area to do menial jobs and trade are the source of the problem. There are houses in the first gate area that are inhabited by 20 to 30 boys. They are Yan Chirani, those traders that come from outside Plateau to sell their goods during the dry season.

Now, we are trying to curtail their excesses by having the people that accommodate them to sign a guarantor's form. So, if the boys commit a crime and run away, the guarantors will be held accountable. If they have a job, they won't be doing this. At the time I grew up, if you don't go to school, you would acquire a skill. But these ones neither have an education nor a skill. Yet, they want to make it [*in life*]. So, their only alternative to making it is to steal.

The above excerpt from PR's story shows that, similar to the "Sambisa Hall" in Angwan Doki, there is an area in Dadin Kowa where out-of-school and unemployed youths converge. PR notes

that everyday these youths congregate at this spot, known as first gate, to terrorize passers-by, rob people of their belongings and kill them on occasion. The participant recalls that the Muslim youths at the first gate have attacked other Muslims. However, he notes that they were simply cases of mistaken identity. Yet, in light of other comments on the insignificance of religion in the lives of the youths, it could also be that the youths knew their victims' real identity when they attacked them. Further, the participant notes that the community's effort at maintaining the prevailing peace is being undermined by the activities of this cohort of violent youths, who he says are mostly temporary residents in Dadin Kowa.

The idea that the seasonal youth migrants were a threat to the peace in Dadin Kowa is also evident in KP's reflection with regards to the state of intergroup relations in the community during the period of the Jos conflict. The participant, a Berom Christian, commented on this situation in the following manner:

All those seasonal hawkers that migrate from the north, those ones that stay back in the north to farm during the farming season but come here to do menial jobs like planting crops or patching clothes during the dry season were a source of concern during the conflict. So, an Alhaji sent them back to their respective states. They were sent packing because these are the people that normally loot during the crisis.

You know they don't live here and have nothing to lose. So, they like to cause confusion. And when this happens, they start breaking into shops and houses, burgling them and then run away. This happened in Angwan Doki after people fled their homes during the crisis. People ran out of their homes and left their doors open, so the youths there looted their homes easily.

The participant notes that the community was threatened by the presence of these youths, who were not raised in Dadin Kowa, so much so that an elder took the extraordinary step of expelling them. KP states that these youths, who, as PR notes, act violently in the first gate area, are the

kind of people who would cause a conflict to burgle people's homes amidst the chaos or exploit an existing conflict for the same criminal objective. She notes that these youths looted people's properties in Angwan Doki during the conflict, reinforcing PP's abovementioned claim about the malevolent activities of the youths in the community.

Similar to the respondents' foregoing experiences with these youth, BP notes that the youths used the conflict as an opportunity to burgle abandoned homes and shops, but his comment indicates that Dadin Kowa youths were far more involved in the city's conflict than simply exploiting it for criminal ends. The participant, a Hausa Muslim, narrated this viewpoint in the following way:

If you check the security mapping of our community, you'll find out that the first gate is printed in red ink because it is a hotspot where any person goes to do their illegal things. During the 2008 crisis, there were Muslims from Dadin Kowa, young people, who went out of our community to the crisis-affected areas in the city. Their aim was to go and steal properties because they know there's fire in those places. On their way there, they met a roadblock mounted by Christian youths, but they narrowly escaped. When they came back, they said "we will start ours here." So, they set up their own roadblocks and burnt tires.

Unfortunately for them, the person they put tires on ran away before they could set him ablaze. When I stepped out of my house, I saw this person running. I asked what was happening and he shouted that I should allow him [*let him be*], I should allow him [*let him be*]. I could recognize that the guy is a Muslim and the people who tried to kill him are Muslims as well. He wasn't even given any chance to identify himself. As long as the youths don't know you, they will just finish you. But to God be the glory I was able to assist him in escaping.

The participant's story corroborates PR's depiction of the first gate area as a hotbed of youth criminality. Additionally, BP's comment indicates that a section of Dadin Kowa's Muslim youths aimed to exploit the conflict in other communities for criminal gains since there was no such opening in Dadin Kowa. Although they failed to accomplish their initial goal, the youths

appear to have gained from the same outgroup youth gang that foiled their mission as they returned to Dadin Kowa to set up their own roadblock to isolate and murder unfamiliar passers-by.

The abovementioned views about the propensity for youths to exploit conflicts for criminal ends is also evident in PC's reflection on the activities and attitude of the youths in Dadin Kowa. The participant, a Hausa Muslim, commented on their excesses as follows:

The youths need to be re-oriented. For some youths, once a crisis erupts, they see it as an opportunity to steal, to loot. I know some shop owners in town who lost most of their goods to looting during the crisis. This kind of people, you can't call them Christians or Muslims. You have to separate them from the people. They're more than the devil. They don't go to the mosque; they don't go to the church.

Despite claiming to be involved in a religious campaign, the youths are, according to PC, far from being religious because they are not involved in the practices of the religion they claim to represent, and because of the nature of their activities during conflict. Similar to what KP and BP reported, PC notes that conflict provides criminally minded youths an avenue to steal. Compared to the Angwan Doki case, no participant directly commented on these youth's efforts to stir up fighting in Dadin Kowa in order to advance this objective. However, their perception of conflict as an opportunity for looting indicates that the youths in Dadin Kowa also had an incentive to stimulate conflict.

While the foregoing perspectives indicate that the youths cherish conflict because it is a channel for achieving their criminal objectives, other experiences show that alcohol and drug abuse also influence the violent behaviours of some of the Dadin Kowa's youths. DP, for example, commented on the influence of alcohol on intergroup youth violence as follows:

While we were in that meeting, another news came to us that a different set of children had attacked somebody. Luckily, the Dadin Kowa boys were caught and handed over to the police. They were apprehended in possession of knives, arrows and spears. They hid them inside their pants. The problem is caused by the drinking bars. We don't have a lot of them in our end, but our children usually crossover to this side to drink alcohol and then start to make trouble after drinking. We told the Berom tribal leader that their settlements are too populated with beer parlours.

Everywhere you go, there's a beer parlour. So, we can't stop the children from drinking because we may not know when they sneak out. Again, when they have boyfriend and girlfriend issue, they start to fight because they're intoxicated. Regardless of this, the relationship between the Berom Christians and Hausa Muslims is very good [...] The Berom tribal leader did something huge when he successfully stopped his people from attacking the Muslims in revenge. Up to four attacks took place in quick succession.

While the first victim was recovering from the stabbing wounds in the clinic and the community was busy gathering the funds to pay his medical bills, another Christian boy was stabbed. Luckily, the second boy is a strong man, he held the spear, so it didn't cause a deep cut, then he grabbed the Hausa Muslim boy and shouted for help. Then the community people ran out, held on to the main attacker and caught his other three accomplices, all of whom were handed over to the police.

The participant's comment reinforces the aforementioned claims about the youths in Dadin Kowa stories as it shows that they are not insulated from violent behaviour. In spite of near-fatal violent incidents involving both sets of youths, however, DP notes that the relationship between the larger Christian and Muslim populations remains cordial in the community. Similar to the narratives around youth violence in Angwan Doki, DP notes that alcohol abuse also fuels violence among Dadin Kowa's youths. He links alcoholism among the community's youths to the proliferation of bars in the Christian neighbourhood but his comments on intergroup dialogue and hospital bills payment indicate that the consequences of youth alcohol abuse are addressed communally.

Like DP, SP notes that the addiction problem of the youths is responsible for their violent tendencies. The participant, a Berom Christian, commented on the drug use by youths, the roots of the community's drug problem and the effect on the behaviour of the youths as follows:

The Hausa parents rarely send their kids to get a skill. They don't care. You see some of the youths here selling drugs. Some of them sell weed. You see the youths with a wheelbarrow, you think he's a barrow pusher that helps people to carry groceries to their car. No, he's selling drugs. You see, a boy with a shoe-shining box and you think he's a shoe shiner. No, he's selling drugs. In 2017, the Hausa leaders went to report to the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency that the Hausa youths are going to sell drugs to their wives.

You'll just see a Hausa boy entering a Hausa man's house, they're going there to sell drugs to the man's wives. We've made several arrests. There was a man who is now dead who would go and bail these boys when we reported them to the police. Give him two hours and they are out. The problem we're having here is drugs. When they take their drugs, they start waylaying people and asking them to submit their mobile phones and bags [...] Most of the drug abusers are from the main Jos town, Bukuru and Anglo Jos. It was this same age range of people that were making trouble during the conflicts.

In SP's view, the problem of youth criminality is a problem of drug abuse because their involvement in violent crimes is preceded by the use of drugs. The participant notes that the drug problem stems from the youths who use drugs as well as from the youth sellers who sell them the drugs. Further, she contends that the Hausa parents are disinterested in helping their wards acquire a skill, suggesting that the drug industry is driven by youth unemployment. However, she contends that even when the youths appear to be engaged in menial jobs, such as helping shoppers to transport groceries in wheelbarrows and shoe-shinning, these seemingly entrepreneurial economic activities are often a charade aimed at concealing or facilitating their drug business. The participant's comment also indicates that the youth vices transcend selling drugs to other youths or acting violently after consuming the same; and includes selling to

Muslim women in their homes ostensibly through the guise of rendering a service, such as shoe-shining.

Several narratives portray the youths in Dadin Kowa as having a propensity for violence due to drug and alcohol abuse, but a few participants exempt the community's youths from the vices that characterize much of the city's youths. PR and KP, for example, suggest that the youth problem in Dadin Kowa stems from new migrants to the community. Although they exclude the community's youths from the vices commonly associated with the youths in Jos, PR and KP do not characterize Dadin Kowa's youth population in a way that truly distinguishes them from the larger youth population. In contrast, MP does so in his account of the nature of intergroup relations during the conflict and narrates how some youths from neighbouring Jos communities sought to transform the Dadin Kowa youths into active conflict participants. The participant, a Hausa Muslim, recognized the following in his story:

We have some talented youths here, many educated ones. Everyone is trying to be successful. I think if you're educated, you'll not allow your dreams to be cut short since you have a future target. The ones that aren't educated have skills. They make slippers, own barbershops. They keep themselves busy. They're not the type that sit idle envying others and hoping to harm them and steal their properties. But I won't say we're all good. We have the good, bad and ugly. We still have some bad eggs.

For example, in the first gate where we have people taking Indian hemp, we still have the bad ones there. The way first gate is going, we aren't comfortable. The youths in DK are not so harsh as the ones in Anglo Jos and Angwan Doki. Those youths come to poison the minds of our youths so that they'll cause conflict. Let me give you an example. There was a time that teenage youths in Dadin Kowa went out for hunting in Gyel area. I know this version of the story about them going hunting is false but that was what we were told. These boys were killed.

It happened during the conflict when the Fulanis and the Gyel were fighting, and the Fulanis were killing and chasing the Gyel people out of their homes. I don't know what took these five youths there, but the five youths were caught and killed. Their corpses were found and brought back here. That day wasn't funny. I ran out of

the house with my children. The youths from Anglo Jos and Angwan Doki came here to poison the minds of our youths, saying that, “you people are fools. Why would you allow them to kill your brothers and sisters and you spare the Christians here?”

Suddenly, they started burning tires and breaking people’s wheel screens on the main road here. I didn’t even know that anything was happening as I was busy cooking in the kitchen. It was the daughter of one of my neighbours that ran into my house to inform me that they were killing people. When I came out, I saw flames everywhere, so I called my children with a loud voice. After dropping off my children in *Zarmaganda*, I went back home to lock my home as I didn’t want anyone to loot my properties.

MP’s conflict time experience corroborates previous accounts of the conflict and also sheds a different light on the role of Dadin Kowa’s youths during the troubles. For example, he talks about returning to his house to lock the doors after taking his children to safety, reinforcing other participants’ claims that looting often accompanied the violence. In contrast to other perspectives, however, the participant notes that Dadin Kowa’s youths are either formally educated or have learned a craft. MP acknowledges that there are different shades of characters in the community, and also notes that the Dadin Kowa youths are largely more level-headed than their counterparts in other communities. Similar to the views discussed above, he states that the first gate is the den of recalcitrant youths and recognizes that it is the youths from outside the community that are corrupting the behaviour of the Dadin Kowa youths. To advance this claim, the participant tells a story of the slaying of five Dadin Kowa Muslim youths in Gyel, which shows that even after losing five fellow Muslim youths, it was their external co-ethnics that spearheaded the clamour for retaliation against the Christians within the community.

The notion that the Dadin Kowa youths are naturally good-natured is also evident in BP’s reflection on the state of intergroup relations post-direct violence. The participant, a Hausa Muslim, reflected on the issue in the following manner:

The main danger here is that if a place is peaceful, many people would want to go there but you may not know who's who [*you may not know the motives of people*]. So, Dadin Kowa is now filled with people with their different attitudes developed in other places where they must have participated in the [*conflict*] or have been criminals. These ones are polluting our young children gradually. If the community doesn't address it, this peace we're [*experiencing*], we'll lose it because we've started identifying people going with knives, stabbing people and snatching their mobile phones.

It is not up to a month ago, people came to watch a football competition in our community. Two Dadin Kowa boys stabbed two people from Anglo Jos, and one was killed instantly with a knife. The Anglo Jos people even attempted to retaliate. So, we called the attention of our people and said, "we really need to watch out, that these young people you're seeing they can bring us problems because many people don't have good attitudes." So, if we're not careful they would be the ones to bring problems to us.

BP notes that many people have sought refuge in Dadin Kowa because of its relatively peaceful nature, and they have arrived there with their experiences of conflict and criminality. He believes that Dadin Kowa's youths' excesses today derive from their interaction with this cohort of new residents. Further, the participant contends that if this menace of youth violence and crime is left unchecked, the peace of the community may be lost entirely; suggesting that the dispositions of youths determine conflict and peace in the area.

Although BP's comment about the nexus between youth behaviour and peace suggests that the benign dispositions of the youths in the community enabled conflict avoidance, several other views about the Dadin Kowa and Angwan Doki youths suggest that their behavioural tendencies do not diverge significantly. Yet, youths propelled or facilitated the conflict in Angwan Doki, while the vices of Dadin Kowa youths did not escalate to a large-scale community-wide conflict. Some of the stories of the participants whose views are discussed

above, and other perspectives explored below indicate that the divergent outcomes derive from each community's control over its youths and the nature of the interventions that the respective community leaders undertook to de-escalate disputes and forestall the escalation of tension.

Loss of parental control

Although the views on parental control are limited and are focused on only the conflict-affected area, I examine them below because, when read in concert with the experiences detailed in the subsequent section, they provide some context for understanding why the conflict outcomes in Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa diverge. Some participants identified the lack of parental control as a precipitating factor while commenting on the behaviour of the youths and their role in the conflict. The loss of parental control, according to these participants, derives from the failure of parents to satisfy the financial needs of their children and the concomitant reliance on the children to improve the family's economic wellbeing. PC, for example, uses his phone call experience with the parent of a street child to underscore the inability of parents to influence their children's behaviour. The participant, a Hausa Muslim, recounted the following in his story:

In a household, the leader, that's the father leaves the children and their wives to feed themselves. The fathers will put on their *babariga* [*long flowing native attire*] and go somewhere just to sit and discuss with their friends, while these small kids go about causing trouble. There was a time I caught one boy here. He and others came from town to pick up waste metals to resell. A fight broke out between two of them and one stabbed the other boy with a broken bottle. I beat up the boy. I collected his father's phone number to report what his son did.

He said "I've not set my eyes on that boy for the past one week. The boy has already passed my power, *toh*" So, if there's this kind of children, how would the state be peaceful? Your father doesn't know where you are and doesn't know how you eat. You have a whole household of eight people living in a single room. The

parents sleep on the bed while the kids are made to sleep under the bed. Tell me how one can make sense of this? Our beliefs here are different from those inside the city, that's why in times of conflict, neighbouring towns like Anglo Jos and Rayfield, and Angwan Doki may be affected but it doesn't get to us [...]

The one thing that differentiates us from people in the town is that we can control our kids unlike there where the kids lord it over their parents. The parents can't say a thing that the kids will listen to. Up till this day, we haven't allowed our children to become our elders that's why we can't have any problem. We are their elders, so when we tell them what to do, they must, they must, they must listen and do as we say!

As I discuss in the preceding section, some participants note that the vices associated with youths, such as drug abuse, alcoholism and crime, are the result of joblessness. PC highlighted that some fathers in places like Angwan Doki spend much of their time idling by and with their friends. He suggests that these parents are themselves jobless like the recalcitrant youths who cause the troubles in their communities. Further, the participant states that these fathers abdicate their parental responsibilities to their wives or to the children themselves and recalls his encounter with a youth from one such home. Following his conversation with the boy's father, he realized that the man was neither aware of his child's whereabouts nor was he concerned with how he was faring. The participant, however, states that even when the children live with their parents, they are not catered for. All of this, in his view, accounts for the cohort of depraved youths that fan the city's troubles. Also, PC notes that apart from creating this group of recalcitrant youths through economic neglect, their parents have no control over them. The participant seems to believe, however, that it is the Angwan Doki parent's liberalism that accounts for their loss of parental control. Yet, his preceding story suggests that it is their economic and emotional neglect, rather than their liberal attitude, that explains the parents' lack of influence over their children.

The notion that the cohort of deviant youths in Angwan Doki are products of their parents' economic neglect is also evident in PL's reflection about the inability of their parents to positively shape the behaviour of youths in the community. The participant, a Hausa Muslim, reflected on this issue as follows:

Also, there are certain inherent factors that are associated with the poor in both communities. They've given birth to more children than they can cater for. And the economic cushion provided by the extended family has been destroyed by modernization. Before, a child could go to their maternal or paternal uncles house and eat three square meals.

These children from poor homes are left to fend for themselves. You'll be shocked to find out that some kids as young as seven or eight years have to do menial jobs in order to buy food for themselves. And some of them, their parents don't even know where they spend the night, another break from the past. When you come as an elder and you want to talk to them, they will ask, "are you feeding me"?

PL notes that parents bear children beyond their economic carrying capacity and are unable to satisfy their needs. Additionally, the communal safety net of relying on extended relatives or on the neighbours' kitchen, as I discuss in Chapter 4, are now untenable due to the general decline in people's economic power. The consequence is, as PC also notes above, the emergence of a group of latch-key children who must satisfy their economic needs independently and, as a result, view their economic independence as the reason why they should be completely free.

PX expresses a related but different argument. The participant, a Hausa Muslim, made the following remark in response to the question of why the excesses of the community's youths have gone unchecked. This is what he had to say on the issue:

You know when someone is an adult the parents have little influence over him. Someone who has graduated from the university and has been at home looking for a job, would you consider that person a child? The parents may even be soft on him

hoping that one day he would get a job and assist the family. He is not a secondary school student that requires assistance from his parents, which provides them the opportunity to exercise their control over him. So, those people are youths by age but not by parental control or community control.

While the aforementioned views suggest that Angwan Doki's youths are out-of-control because their parents are not economically responsible for them, PX notes that the youths are uncontrollable not only because they are financially responsible for themselves but also because the parents view their children as the means to improving the family's economic wellbeing.

Findings

Two main themes emerged from the data. The participants' narratives shed light on the nature of the communities' youths and the respective community leaders' response, or lack thereof, to their excesses. First, the participants' stories show that the youth in Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa are a source of, if not the main security threat in both communities. The narratives of the Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa participants indicate that the youths in both communities are inclined to cause conflict because they are paid to do so, in the case of Angwan Doki, or because they profit from the chaos that accompanies it. PX, a Hausa Muslim, alluded to the former as he indicated that the youths who stirred up conflict in Angwan Doki were acting on orders.

Similarly, UP, another Angwan Doki Hausa Muslim, noted that when people have dirty jobs to undertake, they turn to these youths, who come from different parts of the state and country to converge in Angwan Doki. For PL, a Hausa Muslim, politicians can get these boys to undertake those dirty jobs on their behalf because the boys are poor and therefore easily influenced by money.

While some of the youths stirred up conflict in pursuance of other people's political or other objectives, others were motivated to do the same because their criminal endeavours thrive under such a condition. The stories of both Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa participants lend credence to this assertion. For example, PP, an Afizere Christian, commented that when the Angwan Doki youths need money, they stir up trouble because it creates an opportunity for them to loot shops and homes. Similarly, KP, a Berom Christian, asserted that the Yan Chirani (seasonal menial labourers and traders) in Dadin Kowa cause conflict because the emergent confusion facilitates the looting of abandoned homes. BC, a Hausa Muslim, reinforces both these claims as he recalled seeing shops that were burgled after some youths started fighting.

In contrast to the second category of youths discussed above, there is a third cohort, who do not need intergroup conflict to pursue their criminal objectives. For example, OP, a Berom Christian talked about different groups of Hausa youths violently robbing his female friend and brother-in-law in Angwan Doki. Similarly, SP, a Berom Christian, observed that because the Hausa Muslims rarely make their children acquire a skill, the Dadin Kowa Muslim youth resort to drug peddling and other crimes. While OP and SP stated that these youths are involved in crime because they have been raised poorly, PL, a Hausa Muslim, considers them as solely products of the conflict since they became idle and took to drug abuse because security concerns compelled their withdrawal from their former schools in the Christian-dominated areas. These youths appear to be pursuing their individual objectives. Yet, their activities can exacerbate intergroup tension not only due to people's perception of such youth groups as ethnically homogenous but also because outgroup prejudices persist.

Further, several participants noted that some of these youths are addicted to hard drugs and alcohol, which predisposes them to a life of violence and crime. This perspective is evident in the reflection of PX, who stated that Angwan Doki youths cannot hibernate livestock for domestic consumption, yet they can kill humans once they become intoxicated. SP, a Berom Christian, made a related remark about the youths in Dadin Kowa, noting that they start snatching purses and mobile phones after consuming hard drugs. Also, DP, a Hausa Muslim, reported that the youths in Dadin Kowa start fighting at the slightest provocation because they are always drunk, and are rarely sober because of the prevalence of beer parlours. As the comments above indicate, the Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa youths are similar in many respects. Yet, they diverge in their success in stirring up conflict or the extent to which their excesses negatively impacted intergroup relations in their respective communities.

Conclusion

The Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa youth gangs were ethnoreligiously diverse until their activities culminated in conflict. Their actions pushed both communities to the brink of violent conflict, yet only the former experienced violent intergroup conflict. The youths' addiction to hard drugs and alcohol predisposed them to a life of violence and crime. In some cases, they attempted to stir up conflict either in pursuit of their own objectives or those of their political paymasters. Irrespective of the nature of their motives, the youths' activities exacerbated intergroup tension in both Angwan Doki and Data Kowa.

Chapter Nine: Community leaders' engagement and the Spatial

Variation of Ethnic Conflict in Jos

They { *community leaders* } are running around in search of peace even though the true source of peace is within them. Peace [*and conflict*] are like a t-shirt; you select the one you want and wear it.

The foregoing discussion shows that ethnoreligious groups are driven to conflict amid resource threat, identity insecurity and negative perceptions of the outgroup; and when some actors are genuinely influenced by these conditions or exploit them for personal gains. Yet, the discussion in this chapter indicates that even when all these conditions exist, conflict is not inevitable. It shows that with a combination of formal institutions, local informal structures and other measures, local leaders can alter the trajectory of Intergroup relations. This perspective is encapsulated by PC's statement above, which he made while reflecting on his conflict-time experience in Dadin Kowa.

In their stories around their community's efforts to curtail the youth vices discussed in Chapter Eight, the Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa participants convey contrasting narratives. While the Angwan Doki participants externalize the roots of their community's inability to control the youths, the Dadin Kowa participants, including PC, highlight their community leaders' courageous performances and efforts at organising, delegating, consulting and leading their community's successful response.

Angwan Doki

Following their failure to control their youths, the Angwan Doki community leaders had to rely on law enforcement whose own challenges made them undependable intervenors. Post-2010, however, some leaders actively pursued peace, perhaps explaining the relative calm in Angwan Doki during this period.

Lack of statutory authority and the inevitability of community leaders' dependence on an ineffective law enforcement institution

In the Angwan Doki case, the participants' stories demonstrate the helplessness of community leaders as they grappled with the unfolding conflict and highlight the relationship between their lack of legal status and helplessness and their inevitable reliance on law enforcement. The comments of PE and OP reflect both the helplessness of community leaders and the concomitant resort to law enforcement intervention. PE, a Berom Christian, articulated the following in his story:

On a Sunday morning, during the 2001 conflict, we were in a church service and a band of Hausa and Fulani Muslims came to meet us in the church. The church leaders couldn't douse the fears of the congregation, so the people just rushed out of the church to defend themselves as the other people were already very close to the church. It took the intervention of law enforcement officers to quell the tension.

OP, also a Berom Christian, tells a similar story. This is what he had to say on the issue:

Having attempted to prevent the conflict to no avail, the community leaders then invited state security personnel to intervene. The security officers then invited the leaders of both groups to dialogue. After the meetings, the leaders went back to their respective communities and told them to calm down.

As the first excerpt shows, PE recalls his church leaders requiring law enforcement assistance to forestall imminent violence following their inability to prevent their people from confronting an approaching group of outgroup members. Like PE, OP's comment indicates that community leaders could not prevent their people from fighting. OP's remark, however, provides deeper insights into the incapacities of the community leaders to maintain peace. For example, it shows that the tension was not restricted to the everyday people alone as the Christian and Muslim community leaders were unable to dialogue and de-escalate tension without law enforcement officers serving as facilitators.

While the foregoing comments highlight the inability of Angwan Doki community leaders' to independently steer their people away from conflict, the comments of other participants externalize the reasons for their apparent incapacities. PL, for example, situates the weakness of the Muslim community leaders in the state government's refusal to ratify the selection of a Hausa traditional ruler. The participant, a Hausa Muslim, noted the following in his story:

I had painted the picture of the state not allowing traditional institutions to exist. When a Hausa-Fulani man is found wanting, when he has done wrong, the person he fears the most is the Sarki. Now, you left the society without an officially recognized leader. And these youths know that the so-called leader appointed by the community has his limitations, he doesn't have any statutory powers that would make his decisions binding. Would they take such a leader's words seriously? So, this is the fundamental problem. The denial of leaders in some communities has produced a category of youths that don't fear anyone.

The participant, as noted above, explains why the Angwan Doki community leaders failed to control the community's youths. He notes that traditional rulers, perhaps, because of the belief that their authority is divinely bestowed, were typically more revered than law enforcement

officers when they had statutory powers. People's reverence of them, in his view, empowers these traditional rulers to be a critical resource for regulating the youths' behaviour. Yet, because of political considerations, as discussed in Chapter 6, the state government has failed to give legal backing to the chosen heir apparent. In place of this calibre of traditional authority figures, each Muslim community resorted to appointing a leader to oversee their affairs. These community leaders are, however, disregarded for the very reason that necessitated their appointment in the first place. In essence, the lack of traditional rulers, and the disregard for appointed leaders and law enforcement account for the existence of a youth cohort whose actions generate, exacerbate or transform disputes into violent conflicts in Angwan Doki.

Similar to PL, PP believes that the weakness of the existing Chiefs explains the prevalence of out-of-control youths in the community. Additionally, PP's comment highlights how the interface between a weakened traditional authority and their dependence on the police engenders the problem. The participant, an Afizere Christian, recounted the following in his story:

I blame our government, and corruption is also a problem. Even the security personnel are willing to collect bribes. We have the Village Chiefs. The Chiefs know the criminals. After reporting them to the police, these criminals would return from prison within two to three days, and they will go and threaten the Chiefs. I don't know whether they bribe the police or not but what I know is that without taking any corrective action they release these criminals back into society.

That's why I say that the government is responsible. In fact, around 80 percent of the blame should go to the government. In the past, a Chief was more powerful than the police, but they don't seem to have any constitutional powers anymore. These Chiefs should have punitive powers as they know each family. They're closest to the grassroot. They [*the Chiefs*] will ask us to hand over the criminals to the police, but the police will ask us to bring money for this, bring money for that.

At the end of the day, even if someone is killed, they [*the police*] will quote non-existent laws and say that there's no evidence against the criminals. These youths will then be released back into the society and start to threaten us. That's why some

people say nothing when they see these youths committing crimes. Each chief has the names of everybody. He has the record on everyone, even thieves. So, if the Chiefs had prosecution powers, they would have been able to curtail the problem.

The participant holds the government accountable for the excesses of the youths because they took away the powers of traditional rulers to adjudicate criminal matters yet fail to effectively prosecute the criminally minded youths. He believes that youth vices exist simply because the local Chiefs are weak, and because these leaders refer criminal cases to the Nigeria Police Force, which is itself ineffective because its officers are corrupt. Also, the failure to prosecute perpetrators and criminals, in his view, disincentivizes future report filings with the police as the released youths return home emboldened and pose a direct threat to their local Chiefs. The participant believes that, even without the police corruption problem, the Chiefs are better positioned to tackle the threat posed by the criminally minded youths because they already have first-hand intelligence about their activities.

In addition to suffering a corruption problem, some law enforcement officers are themselves guilty of the very vices that predisposes the community's youths to violence and crime. This perspective is reflected in UP's explanation of the community's inability to control its youths. The participant, a Hausa Muslim, revealed the following in his story:

The youths cannot be controlled by community leaders because politicians are sponsoring them. They give them money to work for them, which they use to buy their drugs. The government and community cannot do anything because they are working for the politicians. Even when you go to where the youths buy their intoxicators, you'll find some security operatives there. So, who will arrest who?

How can you separate the criminal from law enforcement? If you go there between 6am and 7am you'll find them with law enforcement officers, including NDLEA [*National Drug Law Enforcement Agency*] officials. So, how will you stop them? Every political party has its own group of thugs. That's what's spoiling these young

people. If they're intelligent, they won't accept 10k [10,000 Nigerian Naira] to go and fight while the politicians' children are abroad.

UP's comment reflects her belief that the excesses of the youths derive from their relationship with politicians and with some law enforcement officers, who indulge the youths through their own indiscretions. While PP asserts that police corruption prevents effective prosecution, she notes that some drug law enforcement personnel undermine their own regulatory authority as they not only use hard drugs themselves, but also patronize the same drug joints as the youths. While these law enforcement personnel enable the youths to access a critical stimulant of their violent and criminal behaviours, politicians also contribute to the problem since they fund the youth's drug use. In other words, the politicians contribute to youth violence not only because they mobilize the youths to do their "dirty jobs," as PX notes, but also because it is their payment for those jobs that also pay for the youth's drug life, which underpins their disposition to violence and crime.

Transition to active peacebuilding post-2010

While no Angwan Doki participant's comment shows that a community leader or elder successfully intervened to forestall conflict or control their youths during the conflict, PX's reflection on the post-direct violence period highlights the peacebuilding efforts of community leaders, the inclusiveness of the process and its positive impact on intergroup relations. The participant, a Hausa Muslim, narrated his experience as follows:

When we met with the CAN [*Christian Association of Nigeria*] Chairman and discussed what to do, we concluded that we should organize a peace rally. So, we approached the chairman of the caretaker committee of Jos South and told him our

plans to bring Muslims and Christians together for a peace rally. He said it was a good idea. We also approached search for common grounds, a European NGO, who also said it was good. The chairman supported us with one million naira, while the NGO promised us food, a public address system and other logistics worth one million naira. We brought all the Imams and Reverends from all the Christian denominations and asked, what's our problem now?

Our problem is that a Christian man cannot go to an area where Muslims are dominant, and a Muslim can't go to where the Christians are dominant. What do we do to break this thing? We concluded that the rally should be a big rally at the stadium, involving both Muslims and Christians, traditional rulers, politicians, youth leaders, women leaders and community members. That all of us will gather in the stadium and embrace one another for peace. The one million provided by the LG was distributed to the religious leaders to pay for at least three buses to convey people from their respective communities to the stadium.

The youths were the first to get to the peace rally organized by myself alongside Christian and Muslim clergy. At the rally they pleaded with us, that they've been at the forefront of the conflict and that they would never allow anyone to use them again [...] Subsequently, the remaining 15 LGs started emulating our peacebuilding model. Now, as far as Jos south is concerned, we have never had any crisis since that time. We hear on the radio of crisis in other places, such as Barkin Ladin, but not here [...] We've been collaborating with the police, so we would go and pick up the person from the police station. There was someone they found in Shen area and they contacted our youths, and they went to get him [...]

We are trying to rebuild our relationship so that we don't experience another conflict in the next one hundred years. Students of conflict know that conflicts occur daily even internally. The important thing is how it is managed [...] I don't know what the community leaders were doing during the conflict because in a conflict situation, there are shadowy causes of the conflict, who could be Imams, Bishops, military personnel, traditional rulers. You may not know them, but they are there within us. So, you can't say who was behind it. All we know is that there was a political undertone. They [*community leaders*] will come and tell you to maintain peace and you'll see their effort but won't know that one of them is causing the problem.

There may be three of us meeting and if one person disagrees with the other two, he would go back to the community lie about the discussions and say the other people are trying to make them second class citizens, so they should rise up to the occasion. The three of us would know that he's the cause of the conflict and the community members who he instigated would know, but after the fighting ends, it is the three of us that would still be nominated by the government to constitute a commission of inquiry. The community members would be certain that the Alhaji would be prosecuted because they know that he caused the problem, but the commission of inquiry will negotiate among themselves and nothing will happen to him.

The same Alhaji that will take bags of rice to share to the community members and everybody will be celebrating, “Alhaji has brought food,” “he’s our man,” “this man is a good man.” The same person who led community members to their destruction would be celebrated. So, the role of the shadowy ones, nobody can tell.

The participant’s comment about the community leaders engaging in peacebuilding post-2010 is corroborated by PN and OP’s accounts of their post-direct violence experience, which are discussed in Chapter seven. PX’s comment reflects his belief that community leaders were passive in their response to the conflict while they also consciously fanned the flames of the troubles. These leaders, PX notes, got away with their involvement in the conflict because they were the same people that the state tasked with unearthing the roots of the problem. In the post-direct violence era, however, the participant’s comment shows that Angwan Doki community leaders have been more active peacebuilders. His experience during this period shows that religious leaders now voluntarily engage in interfaith dialogue, which, during the conflict, had to be initiated by law enforcement personnel. Also, in contrast to OP’s comment about security operatives initiating intercommunal dialogue, PX’s post-2010 experience reflects intercommunal mobilization for peace as well as the outreach of community leaders to other peace stakeholders.

As I show in Chapter 7, perceived threat engendered segregation, and segregation exacerbated intergroup tension in both Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa. By seeking to address the lack of inter-neighbourhood mobility, the community leaders demonstrate their awareness of the effect of the twin problems of threat perception and segregation on intergroup relations. PX’s comment indicates that the leaders identified the problem and they also devised a low-tech intervention in the form of a peace rally. The participant also states that following the community’s peace rally, Angwan Doki has become conflict-free and its success has motivated

other conflict-affected communities to adopt the same peacebuilding model. Beyond revealing the transformed disposition of the community leaders, the participant's experience also highlights the malleability of the character of the youths. For example, the participation of the youths in the rally and their acknowledgement of their role in the conflict show that they are not irredeemably criminally minded and violent.

Dadin Kowa

In contrast to Angwan Doki, Dadin Kowa avoided the Jos conflict from the beginning. This outcome is traceable to a combination of mitigating measures, such as the institution of community policing structures, informal peacebuilding arrangements and social control policies.

Formal institutions: Intergroup community policing and collaboration between local leaders and law enforcement

In contrast to the passive involvement of Angwan Doki community leaders in conflict mitigation, Dadin Kowa's community leaders actively pursued peace during the conflict, responded proactively and were committed to peace to the extent of endangering their lives in pursuit of it. Like Angwan Doki, however, Dadin Kowa also had a cohort of youths who were disposed to conflict. This is evident in the already examined narratives of the participants from the community as well as PT's recollection of her conflict-time experience. PT, a Berom Christian, recounted her experience as follows:

In DK now, we're pretending that there's peace but there's no peace. The boys go out from here to join their fellow Muslims to kill elsewhere and they come back and say we're in peace. Sometimes our Christian youths try to react, but when the information gets to the Christian leaders, they would object to it.

PT discounts the notion that Dadin Kowa is a peaceful community since the Muslim youths fight alongside their co-ethnics in other communities. Although her intension was to show that the “peace” title associated with Dadin Kowa is misleading, her comment highlights why Dadin Kowa avoided the four major conflict episodes in Jos. It shows that while there were youths inclined to fight, there were also community leaders who were indisposed to the same.

Other participants’ reflections indicate that it was not just the existence of unwilling accomplices among the community leaders that forestalled conflict in Dadin Kowa. Rather, the relative peace of the community was sustained due to the actions these leaders were disposed to taking. They, for example, established a local security arrangement to prevent diffusion. PR’s recollection of his experience during the conflict sheds light on this arrangement. The participant, a Berom Christian, had the following to say on the issue:

If we have any problem, we call the Fulani and Christians to dialogue. In the whole of Jos, I think its only Dadin Kowa that hasn’t had any crisis. Even if something happens around 1am or 2pm I would be called. I will then call my Muslim friends together and we tackle the problem together. There hasn’t been any problem in Dadin Kowa, except when it is caused by visitors [...] Like I told you, there was no conflict in Dadin Kowa. We formed a vigilante. When we went on patrol, we had five Christians and five Muslims.

We manned a checkpoint at the restive first gate with two or three Christian and two or three Muslim members of the vigilante. If we wanted to search a car, we did so together. That’s how our vigilante still functions today [...] I like Dadin Kowa because you can enter anywhere and worship unlike when we were worshipping in fear. See how we worshipped here in DK during the conflict; on Sunday, we send our Muslim members of our vigilante to go to churches and keep watch. On Friday, the Christian members go and secure the mosques until the Muslims finish praying. We’ve stopped doing this because everything is fine now.

The participant comments on the relative peace that existed in Dadin Kowa and how it was achieved. He describes how the community kept watch using a community-policing framework,

yet his comment provides deeper insights into the success of this intervention beyond the mere existence of a local policing structure. It shows that, despite the segregation of neighbourhoods during the conflict, the established vigilante group was heterogeneously composed. Moreover, the patrol beats reflected the ethnic composition of the larger group, with the only exception being when the Christian members had to secure the Mosques during Jumar and vice versa. The heterogeneous composition of the vigilante group likely facilitates its work as its members can contribute their unique knowledge and perspectives while conducting patrols, during investigations and in identifying the visitors with a legitimate purpose in the community.

The heterogenous nature of the community's vigilante is also reflected in MP's comment on the efforts taken to stop the conflict from engulfing Dadin Kowa. The participant, a Hausa Muslim, proclaimed the following in his story:

The conflict didn't get here but the experience was still traumatic. People were unable to sleep because they feared that they could be attacked whilst asleep. So, some of us youths volunteered to keep watch throughout the night. We rotated three hours night shifts daily so that others could sleep. The vigilante was mixed. The community elders asked the elders from both sides to nominate youths that would serve as vigilante.

So, in each three-hour shift, one Christian and one Muslim youth were paired and assigned to watch over a street. This was how we protected our community. In fact, the clergymen were very instrumental to the success of the task of protecting Dadin Kowa. I only know about the Muslim clergy though. The Imams kept emphasizing that we must not fight. That if we start a fight, we don't know how it will end or who it will consume. That it may end up consuming those who start it.

MP reinforces PR's narrative beyond corroborating his claim about the ethnoreligious makeup of the community's vigilante group. He notes that the Dadin Kowa residents were not insulated from fear during the conflict. Yet, like PR, his comment shows that the community remained

peaceful during this period, an outcome, which he associates with the work of its vigilante force. Also, MP's comment demonstrates that the community leaders played important peace-promotion roles during the conflict. Just as PT's remarks illustrate that the Christian leaders were indisposed to conflict, MP's comment indicates that the Muslim leaders counselled their people to avoid conflict. Although the participant recalls that youths volunteered to participate in the vigilante group, he notes that the community leaders initiated the process that birthed the group.

Other experiences show that the community leaders' peace-promotion roles were not limited to establishing the vigilante group. PC, for example, discusses how they ensured that the vigilante is accountable to the community. The participant, a Hausa Muslim, made the following known in his story:

What I can tell you pertains to my community, Dadin Kowa. We have a strong Chairman who manages our vigilante in Dadin Kowa. The community leaders met and set up a committee to oversee the affairs of the vigilante in Dadin Kowa [...] It is the Chairman of the community I'm referring to, not the Local Government Area. The task brings both the Muslims and Christians together.

That's another thing that brings us together. The Chair and Vice Chair are Christian Berom men while the Secretary and Financial Secretary are Muslims. The outgoing Chairman is a Reverend. That man plays a vital role in the affairs of Dadin Kowa. He's leaving as Chairman because he's now retired from his pastoral work and is moving elsewhere.

The community leaders' decision to set up a vigilante monitoring committee reflects their understanding that the vigilante could produce unintended consequences if it operates without a framework for external control. Additionally, MP reinforces other participants' claims about the heterogenous nature of the vigilante, which he notes provides an avenue for sustaining intergroup interactions. So, by setting up the vigilante, the community leaders not only ensured security locally but also facilitated intergroup bonding.

Although the Dadin Kowa community leaders instituted a seemingly successful local security outfit, they still worked with the state's security personnel in their effort to insulate their community from the Jos conflict. The comments of the Dadin Kowa participants reveal that in contrast to the relationship between Angwan Doki community leaders and law enforcement officers, there was a more entrenched synergy and manifest interdependence between the Dadin Kowa community leaders and law enforcement personnel. For example, PC's recollection of his conflict time experience shows that in contrast to conventional expectation, the community leaders succeeded in resolving a security matter after law enforcement officers failed to do so. The participant, a Hausa Muslim, provided an account of his conflict-time experience in the following manner:

Sometime ago, seven Hausa Muslim youths from DK were killed in another community and our youths were agitating for revenge. An elder found them gathered at the first gate here. Security operatives were preventing them from leaving and they were resisting the officers and were posturing as if they wanted to fight the security agents. When he got there, he instructed them to go back, and said they will hear from him. *Walahi* [I swear], none of them could have disobeyed him. Do you know how many people could have lost their lives because of this incident? So, thank God, they obeyed and went back. Soon after, the Commissioner of Police called the DPO [*Divisional Police Officer*] for our area and requested to meet with the elder and asked the DPO to take him to the Police HQ for our meeting.

There's no one that can identify who killed the seven youths, so you can't punish innocent people. That's the issue. You didn't see them being killed. Thank God the situation was controlled. You see, these kids take Indian hemp and other drugs, but we can't dissociate from them because of that. I will ask you to accompany the elder to the first gate around 7 pm, you'll see them smoke their Indian hemp (marijuana) and other things. You'll see how they would react as soon as they sight him. They start hiding their drugs because they don't want him to see them. It is not as if he can hurt them or something, it is just that they respect him. If the police arrest them for using drugs, he's the one who goes to bail them out, and counsels them afterwards.

If we hadn't prevented a revenge, it would have spread to other places. When this thing happened, everybody was asked to ensure that their children were indoors. We, however, selected some youths to stay outside and keep watch. The youths outside were not allowed to react to anything, so they always called us to let us know

whatever they saw. This won't happen in other communities. The youths are beyond the power of their elders, so won't accept any such control. The youths in Dadin Kowa have been the spinal cord of the peace here. Without the spinal cord, I don't think a human can live. So, without the cooperation of our youths, there will be no peace. If the youths say they will behave well, you won't witness any problem. The only thing to note is that people should make their children their children, rather than their friends. Those are just the issues.

PC, like PT, indicates that there were Dadin Kowa youths who were agitated to the point of willing to seek revenge for the death of their co-ethnics. And, similar to the preceding narratives, the comment shows the existence of community leaders who were opposed to conflict. Also, in contrast to the sequence of events that accompanied a violent incident in Angwan Doki, PC's comment shows that the youths in the community responded positively to an elder even though they previously resisted law enforcement on the same matter. Compared to the situation in Angwan Doki, where law enforcement officers facilitated intercommunal dialogue, this elder was invited to a security meeting with the State Police Commissioner following his successful intervention.

As the participant's comment indicates, the said elder intervened not only due to his belief that innocent people would be the victims of a reprisal attack but also because of his desire to prevent the conflict from escalating. The elder successfully averted a potential conflict because the youths respect him. As PC's comment suggests, the elder can influence the youths because despite their deviant behaviours, he continues to associate with them and facilitates their bail whenever they run afoul of the law. In other words, it is his relationship with the youths, rather than his elder identity that makes him revered among them. The elder is respected to the extent that the first gate youths conceal their marijuana whenever they notice him approaching the area.

Similar to the stories of other Dadin Kowa participants about the security roles that the community leaders undertook, PC's comment shows that the vigilante group was established at the behest of the community leaders. It also reveals that they implemented additional security measures, such as admonishing parents to monitor their children so that potential risks could be detected early and addressed. Although PC believes that the community has avoided conflict because of these measures, he notes that the youths who submit to these control measures underpin the peace in Dadin Kowa rather than the measures themselves. And the youths are compliant because they view their fathers as elders rather than peers.

PC's story also shows that the community and law enforcement have a symbiotic relationship rather than a dependent one. This relationship is evident in the participant's reflection on why conflict exists elsewhere. This is what he had to say on the issue:

It doesn't get here because we don't want it. So, if you come across any stakeholder as you do your work, tell them if they don't want to fight, fight won't come to them. Let's tell ourselves the truth. It is bitter but what I just told you about the stakeholders is the truth. If we are bold enough to tell the truth, there'll be wellness.

It is we the people that are destroying our own peace, but here in Dadin Kowa, we don't have any problem between ourselves. Before the police arrest anybody here, they come to the elders first because they know everybody. They know who has a bad character. So, when the police come, they will expose such a person. They will say, take him away! Conversely, if the person is good, they'll say, "no, you can't arrest this person."

The participant notes that conflict occurs because the peace stakeholders in the conflict-affected areas have chosen a path of conflict. He shows that in contrast to those preferences, the Dadin Kowa elders facilitate the work of security personnel by providing information on suspects. His story indicates that while law enforcement relies on the community leaders for the intelligence that facilitate their work, the community needs law enforcement to prosecute deviant youths.

The community's reliance on law enforcement for prosecution, as is required statutorily, is also reflected in PR's story about his conflict-time experience. However, he does not express dissatisfaction with the process as the Angwan Doki participant, PP, does. PR, a Berom Christian, commented on his experience in the following way:

During the crisis, we tried our best to prevent the troubles from coming here. We promised each other that no matter what happens elsewhere, we won't let it get here. We have a Muslim youth leader and a Christian youth leader. If anything happens, the two youth leaders will come together and decide on how to tackle it. If someone wants to cause any trouble, they will be reported to the youth leader from the person's religion and we will then hand the person over to the police. What we do here to stem violence is that once we hand someone over to the police, no one from the community will go and bail the person out.

They are left with the police to be prosecuted. We determine how long we want you to stay in prison. Sometimes we would decide that we want someone to remain in detention for three days, one week or three months, so we would leave the person in police custody for as long as we decide before going to bail them. In the past, if you take someone to the police station, the minute you leave there you see the person right behind you. But nothing like that happens anymore.

The participant's comment indicates that like Angwan Doki, Dadin Kowa also invites the police to arrest troublemakers. Yet, the outcome seems different, at least in the context of PR's narrative. In contrast to PP's complaints about ineffective prosecution and the resultant perils for local Chiefs in Angwan Doki, PR's comment about the determination of an offender's bail suggests that Dadin Kowa community leaders take extra steps to ensure that prosecution is effectively undertaken.

Informal intergroup peacebuilding institutions

In addition to instituting a local policing structure and collaborating with law enforcement, the Dadin Kowa community leaders had an organised approach for ensuring the

sustenance of peace in their community. This is evident in FP's reflection on his conflict-time experience. The participant, a Tarok Muslim, had the following to say in his story:

In DK here, we have the Elders Forum and Dadin Kowa Graveyard Committee. These were the groups that controlled the children especially the kids who couldn't be controlled by their parents. These are children who moved from other communities to stay here because of their trade. So, it was both committees that stopped the problem here. These committees were constituted by Muslims. I don't know whether there were any such committees in the Christian side, but I know that sometimes church leaders also worked with the Muslim Elders Forum [...] The Graveyard Committee had been existing long before the conflict started.

Similar to FP's substantive point about the coordination of the community leaders' peacework, PJ articulated the following in his story:

There were some problems in Dadin Kowa, but our elders organized themselves quickly to ensure that it didn't escalate. We have two Mallams and two Pastors in this community who always come together and discuss whenever there's problem. I wonder what the religious leaders in the other communities were doing when the conflict started in their areas.

In the section on the participants' perspectives on the youths in their community, I examined the views of PR and KP, who note that the young visitors to Dadin Kowa were a security threat. FP's comment indicates that the elders' peace committees tackled this security conundrum during the conflict. He believes that it is these local structures that sustained Dadin Kowa's peace. In the same vein, PJ, an Ebira Muslim, notes that there was tension in Dadin Kowa during the conflict, yet his comment also shows that it did not escalate because the community leaders were proactive enough to organize themselves and douse the tension. Both participants also indicate the existence of an intergroup peace dialogue. Although FP notes that Muslims constituted the

peace coordination committees, he also recalls witnessing meetings between Christian and Muslim religious leaders; an experience that PJ's remark wholly corroborates.

In the same vein, BP's recollection of his conflict-time experience reflects intercommunal dialogue and a collaborative response to security threats. The participant, a Hausa Muslim, recounted his experience as follows:

But to God be the glory, I'm living in Dadin Kowa. Dadin Kowa is in Jos south and is one of the peaceful communities. Although there are conflicts, none has escalated to a dangerous extent. For example, some people, about three to four, were killed. Some houses and mosques were burnt but they are not that much. After such incidents, members of the community would come together; the leaders would call a meeting and say "since this thing hasn't gotten here, we should try to see how we can manage it and what can we do to ensure that it doesn't come to our community."

We used to have problems in this first gate [*one of the main entrances into the community*]. Many people that live there or have businesses there are not permanent residents here. They just come to transact their business. So, if they cause any problems, they will run away and leave us to settle our problems. So, we would be the ones to be burning our houses. So, we tell ourselves that we must be very careful. This COCIN Church that you see here, some of our Muslim elders have a relationship with the Reverend.

So, if there's a problem, if some of our youths are causing problems, they'll call our attention to it. They will say that this thing that is happening can cause a problem, so we need to call our respective followers to order. So, this is how they manage the situation; with the intervention of the religious elders, the good elders, not the bad ones, and also the leaders of the tribe. In Dadin Kowa, the Berom have their own leader, the Hausa have theirs, and also do the Langtang, Mangu and other tribes. They all have their leaders. So, people will say where is the problem coming from?

Is it from this part or the other parts? Then the leader of the identified source will be called upon to discuss how they can cooperate to prevent a crisis. This was what transpired throughout the time of the conflict. We will call ourselves together. And the youths, most of them listened but some did not. Because there was no room for conflict here, these disgruntled ones will go to a community where there's a problem and make trouble there. Thank God things are very good now because the Muslims and non-Muslims have realized that they need to come together and work together as brothers and not as enemies.

If a Muslim brother is doing something bad to a Christian brother, a Muslim brother would prevent this. If I remember correctly, around 2007, the Muslims and Christians established a group, Dadin Kowa elders' forum, which comprises the religious leaders, traditional rulers and also some youths. They come together to discuss their problems and find solutions. During some meetings following the conflict, people aired their grievances. They would say, "You called me a name which I don't like." So, other people would intervene and reconcile them.

Like PJ, BP's comment shows it is not that Dadin Kowa has been conflict-free per se. Rather, what distinguishes the community from the conflict-affected ones is their success in avoiding escalation. The participant notes that potential conflicts are avoided because when an incident occurs, the community leaders come together and commit to preventing conflict diffusion from other communities. His remark suggests that the community leaders recognize that the potential for trouble stems from the activities of the temporary residents of Dadin Kowa. Consequently, they believe that any retaliation would amount to allowing outsiders to determine their fate. Much of these deliberations appear to have occurred under the auspices of the Elders' Forum.

In contrast to FP's aforementioned view, BP notes that the Elders Forum was the idea of Christian and Muslim religious leaders as well as different Dadin Kowa tribal heads. He reveals that whenever a youth behaves improperly, a community leader could reach out to the individual's religious leaders to inform them. Also, the participant's comment shows that whenever a problem arises, the community leaders engage in collaborative problemsolving to pinpoint its source. During such summits, people candidly expressed their grievances with others, while third parties within the Forum intervened to reconcile the aggrieved person with his/her offender. BP states that although most of the youths responded positively to the Forum members' peace interventions, some disgruntled youths went outside Dadin Kowa to fight

alongside their co-ethnics, corroborating PT's justification for her fringe belief that Dadin Kowa is not genuinely peaceful.

While the foregoing shows that the elders promoted peace through intergroup dialogue at the Forum level, FP notes that the elders from the respective ethnoreligious groups controlled their own people. The participant, a Tarok Muslim, narrated the following in his story:

Well, we could control our children, especially the Muslim children. When they tried to get out of line, we the elders tried to control them. And the Christian children were also controlled by their elders. That's why we were able to overcome the problem here in DK [...] So, that fear was there [...] I was still working with the state government at that time. I worked at the state secretariat and I remember people running here and there [helter-skelter] whenever there was crisis in the town.

Everybody will run out of their offices and when I reach Dadin Kowa, I'll find out that a line had been drawn between the Muslims and Christians on the major road and this was done by the Muslim and Christian children. But as I said earlier on, thank God that the elders on both sides were able to control the children. And that's how we managed up to this time.

The participant recalls the chaos that accompanied the conflict in Jos, and his comment shows that Dadin Kowa was not insulated from the rising tension since the Christian and Muslim youths were prepared to face-off whenever conflict broke out in Jos town. However, he notes that the situation never degenerated into a full-blown confrontation because the elders on either side kept their youths in line.

While FP's comment suggests an informal division of duties between religious leaders, there was a formalized devolution of responsibilities from the Elders Forum to a women's group and a youth wing. This decentralized response to the conflict is evident in PC's reflection on how the community leaders responded to the conflict. The participant, a Hausa Muslim, shared his viewpoints as follows:

One of the ways is to maintain our control over our sons and be more powerful than our wives. You should be able to control anyone that you're responsible for, so some tribal leaders feel that they'll reduce their powers by creating sub-groupings like the youth and women peace groups, which we have here. They want to be in total control because of the benefits. I know people who are keen on acquiring worldly things, but our leaders have chosen not to live their life that way.

If there's a gathering of all the tribal leaders in Jos, I will wish that their desire for worldly things contributes to the problem in their communities. They are running around in search of peace even though the true source of peace is within them. Peace is like a t-shirt; you select the one you want and wear it [...] This work you're doing can be likened to when a person kills another man then they ask another person to raise up the dead man. They bring people like you in to see how you can control the problem they caused.

PC believes that people in positions of authority and power need to have control over the people under their jurisdiction. However, he insists that this control imperative does not require the centralization of power. The participant suggests that the Dadin Kowa community leaders are able to keep the people under control while simultaneously sharing power with local peace stakeholders, such as women and youths. In fact, he alludes that the failure of the tribal leaders in other communities to share power explains their inability to forestall conflict in their communities. The participant believes that the leaders in these communities are disinclined to devolving power because they believe that doing so would diminish the pecuniary gains that are accruable to them. Thus, he states that the actions and inactions of these leaders constitute the roots of their community's problems. Yet, they explore everywhere else in search of solutions but fail to examine themselves.

Community leaders' conciliatory and dramatic interventions

As indicated above, the existence of an Elders Forum and their devolution of power created the conditions that facilitated peace-maintenance efforts, yet the stories of several Dadin Kowa participants show that community leaders' individual acts of bravery and conciliation ultimately shaped the trajectory of intergroup relations during the conflict. One such participant is PJ, who narrated his experience as follows:

As the elders would say, "the mouth which receives kola can still receive a slap," meaning that if my tongue made me eligible for a gift, it can also make me receive punishment. During the 2001 crisis, the Mosque behind the COCIN church was burnt, so the Muslim youths gathered and said they were going to burn down all the churches in Dadin Kowa. The COCIN Reverend went to one of the Mallams and said they shouldn't allow outsiders to cause problems in Dadin Kowa as he was sure that none of his church members could have burnt the Mosque.

He said that since the Mosque had been burnt, he was committing to rebuilding it because of the relationship between him and the Muslims in the community. After the crisis, he still returned to the Mallam to ask for an estimate but the Mallam said there was no need because of his first utterance whilst the Mosque was still burning. If there wasn't a good relationship between the Mallam and the Reverend before the conflict, what do you think would have happened to the Reverend when he went to the Mallam's home? They would have said since the Reverend went through a *lungu* [*bush path*], he should just be killed. What would have happened?

The whole world would have heard that a Reverend was killed in Dadin Kowa. Or what do you think would have happened to the Mallam when next he visited the pastor? The Mallam frequently visited the Reverend inside the church premises. Do you think after this experience, the Mallam would allow his people to burn down a church? Do you think the Reverend, the same person who offered to rebuild the burnt Mosque, will ever allow his own people to burn down a Mosque? [...] In short, down this road, there's a Hausa Muslim whose home was set ablaze by someone who came from Kufwor. [...]

It is owned by a Hausa Muslim. It was the same COCIN Church Reverend that came out when this happened and said they should hold meetings more frequently and involve all the youths. In the past, it was only the elders, such as the Mallams and Reverends, that held the peace meetings. There was a time that the Christian and Muslim youths were staring themselves down, separated by a road demarcation.

It was two Reverends and my Mallam that quelled the situation. Since my Mallam was in the scene calming people down, will I still throw stones at the other group? I wouldn't because it may hit my Mallam if I did. I think that also applies to the Christian youths. They wouldn't want to hurt their Reverend who was also pacing around to control the situation. The Mallams and Reverends then told everyone to go home that they've left their houses unguarded. It was after this incident that all the elders came together and concluded that the youths should be included in their peace meetings. That's how the youths got involved. We must thank God for the peace though as we aren't living in peace because of the power of the elders or the youths. It is just God.

PJ describes the simple yet significant interventions of community leaders that enabled Dadin Kowa to avoid major escalations. He reveals that there were attacks in the community and he believes that outsiders orchestrated these incidents since Dadin Kowa community members would be indisposed to doing so for fear of inadvertently hurting their own relatives. The participant's comment indicates that a Christian religious leader in the community holds the same perspective and referenced it in his conciliatory outreach to the Muslims during the conflict. PJ recalls how this religious leader, a Reverend, resolved a potentially escalatory incident simply by reaching out to the Muslim community leaders to assure them that Dadin Kowa Christians were not part of the attackers. Despite shifting the responsibility for the attack to outsiders, the said Reverend still committed to rebuilding the damaged Mosque just to placate the Muslim population and ostensibly to ensure that there was no outstanding grudge that could inspire retaliation.

This gesture apparently convinced PJ of the benignity of the Reverend as he notes that such an individual, who offered to rebuild a Mosque that his church members did not destroy, would never permit them to burn any Mosque. The participant's comment indicates that the Reverend's pledge was not simply aimed at dousing the tension during the 2001 conflict. It

shows that the Reverend was prepared to honour his pledge after the conflict. However, the Mallam declined the offer because he viewed the initial conciliatory step as enough compensation for the damaged Mosque. PJ believes that the events that followed the burning of the Mosque are indicative of the nature of the relationship that existed between the religious leaders and explains why the incident did not culminate in a full-blown conflict. The participant notes that due to the past cordial relationship between himself and the Mallam, the Reverend was not attacked when he reached out to the Muslims. PJ believes that any attack on the Reverend could have escalated the situation since the Christians would have attacked the Mallam in revenge. In other words, de-escalation was achieved due to the Reverend's outreach to the Muslims and also because he returned unharmed to the district.

The participant's comment also indicates that the Reverend was deeply involved in the community's peacekeeping activities. For example, the participant states that the inclusion of the youths in the intergroup peace summits was the Reverend's initiative. The excerpt also demonstrates that other religious leaders were just as committed to preventing conflict as the abovementioned Reverend. For example, a near violent clash between the Christian and Muslim youths was averted because of the participant's Mallam and two Christian religious leaders, who intervened. This narrative corroborates PC's story about a Dadin Kowa elder who successfully prevented a violent confrontation between Christian and Muslim youths in the community. In PJ's view, the agitated youths responded positively to the religious leaders because they wanted to avoid hurting them mistakenly. Also, the participant notes that it was after this incident that the elders incorporated the youths into the peacekeeping structure of the community,

highlighting the community leaders' self-appraisal of their peacework and the dynamism and flexibility of their emic peace model.

Other narratives show that the community leaders were willing to insert themselves in more dangerous situations than the incident that PJ narrates. BP's recollection of his conflict-time experience includes one such incident, which he described as follows:

Something happened in our community in 2008. Some people came from other communities to live with their friends here. When they arrived, they said Mosques were being burnt somewhere so we must burn a church. So, they took their fuel (gasoline) and set out to a church to burn it. Then some of our elders who were around asked them, "What are you going to do"? They said they were going to burn a church. Unfortunately for these youths, one of the elders went with them and was urging the people to go and burn it.

Surprisingly, when they got there, that elder entered the church premises and asked the people to pour the fuel and set it ablaze whilst he's inside if they were serious about burning it. He said he couldn't let them burn the church whilst he's alive since there was no trouble in our own community that warranted it. So, what's the essence of you burning the church? So, through his action, he passed a message to them and they retreated.

The comment of the participant, a Hausa Muslim, shows that an elder in the community endangered his life just to prevent the burning of the church. And through this act of bravery, the elder not only dissuaded the youths from executing their plan but also potentially averted a violent tit-for-tat exchange between Christian and Muslim youths.

In the same vein, KP describes how the creative intervention of a Muslim elder prevented a Muslim youth from burning a church, thereby avoiding a major escalation of tensions in the community. The participant, a Berom Christian, recounted her experience as follows:

I remember one fuel {*gas*} station attendant, a Hausa Muslim, who is married to a Berom lady. So, at the peak of the crisis; you know some of these young men would like to start trouble because they've never built a house or bought a chair. Maybe

they have only one mattress. Hence, they devise strategies to see how they can cause confusion to enable them loot. So, this fuel attendant brought fuel and said he was going to burn down one Redeemed Church. Then an Imam came out and said if you really want to burn down this church, we have to start with your wife since she's a Berom Christian. She has to be our first victim. The Imam said the man should go ahead and burn the church but know that his wife would be burnt also since she's Berom. That was how that church was saved. They {*Muslim elders*} warned his parents to caution him.

The Muslim elders said the Christians in Dadin Kowa are not the ones killing Muslims in other communities, so why would he want to cause problems here even though we are in the peace? They said if he truly wants to fight, he should go to where the conflict is and contribute his manpower there. Hahaha [...] hahaha [...] hahaha [...] After this incident, the Imam was named Sarkin Arana. Arana is a derogatory term for Christians. So, they started referring to him as the Christians' leader or Christian's Mallam, Sarkin Arana. The man said, "yes, I agree. But what about you? As a Muslim, have you ever observed our five daily prayers to make you think you're clean?" He said they were unclean. He asked them whether they have ever prayed five times a day as the Quran demands of all Muslims? So, I think we need such people to tell others the truth. If this happens, we won't have any problems.

The participant recalls that during the conflict, it took the ingenious intervention of a Muslim Elder to prevent a Muslim youth from burning a Church. KP believes that the youth was not acting on any grievance. Rather, he was intent on starting a fight to create the sort of chaos that could facilitate looting people's properties. In responding to this situation, the Muslim elder did not appeal to the youth per se. Rather, he agreed that the church should be burnt, but on the condition that his wife, who is an outgroup member, would be eliminated as well. The participant's comment indicates that despite successfully dissuading the youth through his creative intervention, the Muslim elder followed up the matter by speaking with the youth's parents and requesting that they control him. Following his effort to protect the Church, some Muslim youths nicknamed the elder the same derogatory term that they call Christians by. Yet,

the elder was unperturbed. Instead, he contrasted his commitment to Islam with the passive religious life of the youths.

Similarly, PC narrates how the bravery of another elder during the Jos conflict helped to maintain Dadin Kowa's peace. The participant, a Hausa Muslim, recounted his experience as follows:

When there was crisis in Jos, people from Kangam, Miyango gathered at that mountain-top located southward from this classroom. They wanted to come and fight here. These people left their own areas and wanted to come and fight here. They were Christians of different tribes, including Berom. So, a Hausa Muslim elder went to a Reverend who lives nearby and asked him to accompany him to the mountain-top. He said, "ah [*name deleted*] you can't go there because these people have taken their beer and drugs." The elder went regardless.

He asked his youths to remain here while he went to meet the other group at the mountain top. He said, "Yes, what's the problem? I don't know you, I don't know your parents, I don't know your house, but maybe many years ago I killed a member of your family who I don't know. So, if that's the case, look at me here, kill me! If that's the way you want it, just kill me and go back." The Reverend was there; everyone was shocked. Even the Reverend pulled one of the young boys there and beat him up because he was insisting on fighting with me or beating me up.

He beat him up right there. He said, "don't you know you're going to cause another trouble here?" The Reverend then asked me to go back, that he would talk to them. Then he spoke further with them and after a short while they left [...] If the elder wanted to benefit from the conflict, he would simply have allowed his youths to go to the mountain-top and confront the Christian boys. There won't have been any sign of peace in Dadin Kowa afterwards; it would have been pieces. So, that's why I told you that there are many leaders benefiting from the killings that's why it can't stop [...] Some stakeholders in the state come together to discuss peace but peace may be in their mouth while fighting is in their heart.

The above excerpt not only describes the heroics of a Dadin Kowa elder, but also shows that relations between the leaders of the respective groups remained cordial during the conflict. It also indicates, like the foregoing narratives suggests, that both Christian and Muslim community leaders were committed to protecting the peace in Dadin Kowa. The Muslim elder's act of

approaching a Reverend further reinforces the already established fact that Christian and Muslim community leaders were committed to peace and highlights the elder's perception of the Reverend as a peacekeeper. Both the elder's action and the Reverend's response and expression of concern for the elder's safety show that the Jos conflict did not erase their pre-conflict dispositions. The main significance of PC's story, however, is the elder's willingness to endanger his own life to keep Dadin Kowa peaceful.

In spite of the personal risk involved in approaching the outgroup youths without his co-ethnics by his side, the elder instructed the Dadin Kowa Muslim youths not to accompany him. PC's narrative shows that to the amazement of onlookers, the Muslim elder offered himself up to be killed by the external outgroup youths if that would make them to return to their homes. While this daring act may have humbled some of the youths, it took the intervention of the Reverend for the Christian youths to disperse. PC notes that the Reverend protected the elder from being attacked by a Christian youth and dialogued with the others before they retreated. The participant alludes that by not allowing any Muslim youth to accompany him to the mountain-top on that day, the elder helped to preserve the peace in Dadin Kowa.

Social control policies

Another way the community leaders kept troublemakers out of Dadin Kowa was to admonish the parents in the community to stop receiving visitors from other communities. This measure is evident in MP's reflection on the nature of intergroup relations in Dadin Kowa during the conflict. The participant, also a Hausa Muslim, articulated the following in his story:

Generally, we lived in peace. There was no problem apart from when we noticed a stranger in the community. One of the protective steps we took was that Christian

and Muslim families were to allowing visitors to their homes. The elders made this proclamation because if you allow strangers in who have been victims of the conflict elsewhere, they could take out their revenge on innocent people here. So, each family prevented their relatives from coming here. Also, if you allow your relatives to come and you see them bleeding, you will definitely be moved to seek revenge on their behalf.

PJ believes that isolating Dadin Kowa from the rest of the Jos population was important because not only are people with war memories more likely to become violent, their injuries could also have inspired their relatives in Dadin Kowa to retaliate against their outgroup neighbours. In addition to the participant's justification, this extraordinary step of isolating Dadin Kowa from the rest of Jos was appropriate in light of all the reports that linked outsiders to the rising tension in the community.

While the stories of Participants BP, PC and MP show that the elders' interventions prevented outsiders from causing trouble in the community, other experiences reveal that community leaders also had to remove troublemakers from Dadin Kowa. One such experience is KP's, which he narrated in the following manner:

Since the crisis started in Dadin Kowa, we never experienced one because of the help of the elders. Whenever there's crisis, the elders normally convene at the COCIN church to deliberate on how to stop the crisis. They discuss how the respective group leaders can stop their youths from taking any untoward action. Let me talk about the 2011 conflict. After the previous 2008 conflict ended, the 2011 one occurred. We have many Hausa and Fulani shoe shiners and wheelbarrow pushers who live here in the first gate area because of the building material market.

During the crisis, one Alhaji in Dadin Kowa came out, saying that he won't allow anyone from elsewhere to cause trouble here. So, he went from house to house with a lorry. He went from house to house picking up these newcomer youths in Dadin Kowa. He would ask, "Where are you from?" If you say Sokoto, he will say "oya [*come on*] go back." That was what he did that saved us. He went from house to house. When he saw many youths in a compound he would ask "where are you from, what are you doing here?"

If you say you're a shoe shiner from another state, he would say "oya [*come on*] enter this truck. They will drop you off on the way." That was how he reduced their numbers. So, this Alhaji asked the non-Dadin Kowa youths to go home. Dadin Kowa's population reduced drastically after they left. If you weren't living with your family or owned a house in Dadin Kowa, you were asked to leave. That was how Dadin Kowa kept its peace in 2011.

KP's opening comment adds to the evidence of the existence of peace in Dadin Kowa and her conflict time experience further highlights the instrumentality of the elders to the maintenance of the status quo. The participant, a Berom Christian, notes that those seasonal migrants, who other participants portrayed as a threat to Dadin Kowa's peace, were evicted during Jos' last major conflict episode. Her comment shows that a Muslim leader initiated, funded and supervised the removals, committing both his money and his time to keep Dadin Kowa safe. Perhaps, because of the difficulty in separating the deviants from the rest of the migrant youths, the Muslim leader ensured that all temporary residents were evacuated. The participant believes that this action contributed to the sustenance of peaceful intergroup relations in the community. Apart from explicitly stating so, she mentions the reduction of the community's population after the evacuation in order to underscore her point that the Muslim leader helped to address a potential security threat.

Findings

Just as the youths' impact on their respective communities differs, so are the responses of the Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa community leaders different. The participants' stories indicate that the former was unable to curtail their youths, while the latter succeeded in doing so. A few participants associate the preponderance of out-of-control youths in Angwan Doki with parents'

loss of economic leverage over their children and the reversal of the structure of economic dependence in families from dependent children to dependent parents. PX, PC and PL shed light on these matters. For example, PX, a Hausa Muslim, indicated that parents cannot exercise any constructive influence over the youths because they are either economically dependent on them or relying on them to lift the family out of poverty. Similarly, PC and PL reported that because parents abdicate their responsibilities and leave their children to fend for themselves, they have lost their capacity to shape their children's behaviour. Given that the practice of communal parenting became untenable during times of heightened intergroup tension, the inability of parents to moderate their children's behaviour meant that there were no checks and balances on the youths' conduct.

Other recounted experiences indicate that the failure to checkmate the Angwan Doki youths stems not simply from the transformation of the economic profile and structure of families, but also from the specific choices of the community leaders during the conflict. The leaders were, for example, reliant on a law enforcement institution that is corrupt, and is ineffective in prosecuting perpetrators. As OP noted, for example, community leaders in Angwan Doki invited law enforcement personnel to prevent Christian and Muslim youths from fighting after failing to dissuade the youths on their own. Yet, other stories highlight the ineffectiveness of law enforcement officers in handling security matters. For example, PP noted that the police unjustifiably released youths that were accused of murder without prosecuting them. This indicates that turning to this institution was not a viable response to the problem. Moreover, as UP observed, other law enforcement personnel have been found patronizing the same hard drug joints as the youths, whose excesses they are expected to curtail.

In contrast, the Dadin Kowa community leaders controlled their youths using local structures of peace and truncated the destructive plans of the youths through individual acts of bravery, flexibility of their peace model and proactive problemsolving. For example, PC talked about a Muslim elder stopping Muslim youths from avenging the killing of some Dadin Kowa Muslim youths outside the community even though the police had earlier failed to dissuade them. PC, a Hausa Muslim, suggested that the elder succeeded because he is revered in the community. However, the reverence of elders was not the only factor that facilitated their interventions in Dadin Kowa. For example, FP's comment about the existence of an Elders Forum and the Dadin Kowa Graveyard Committee shows that the elders were organised and willing to take on this conflict.

Also, PJ and BP's comments about the elders' cooperative efforts to prevent conflict escalation show that the leaders from the Christian and Muslim populations were united in their responses to the rising tensions. Also, as PC indicated, the elders delegated some responsibilities to women and youth groups, which likely aided effective intelligence gathering and timely responses to potentially escalatory incidents. Additionally, the inclusion of the youths in the conflict prevention structure after a near-violent incident indicates that the elders were dynamic, adapting their approach as the troubles evolved.

The data also shows that the Dadin Kowa community leaders were willing to take personal risks to forestall the outbreak of conflict. For example, BP recalled that a Muslim elder prevented a group of Muslim youths from setting a church ablaze because he entered the auditorium and asked the youths to set it ablaze whilst he was inside. Also, as PC reported, when a group of Berom Christian youths from outside Dadin Kowa came close to entering the

community to attack the Muslims, a Hausa Muslim elder offered himself up to be killed if they agreed to pull back afterwards. Similarly, KP, a Berom Christian, noted that when a Muslim youth was threatening to burn down a Church, a Muslim elder confronted him, saying that they should start with his Berom Christian wife if he was truly serious about waging a war against the outgroup. Although these daring moves could have resulted in fatal consequences, they appear to have prevented the loss of lives in Dadin Kowa.


Additionally, the Dadin Kowa community leaders implemented certain security measures that likely contributed to the community's avoidance of conflict. For example, KP, a Berom Christian, observed that a Muslim elder identified all the Yan Chirani in the community and financed their repatriation to their home states. This intervention highlights the community leaders' willingness to implement extreme yet necessary measures independently of law enforcement officers. Even when the community leaders turned to law enforcement officials, they followed up referred cases to prevent malpractices. As PR noted, for example, no one from Dadin Kowa bailed suspected offenders out of jail, except if the community leaders sanctioned such a move. To augment the security cover that the law enforcement agencies provide, the community leaders constituted a community policing unit, which comprises Christian and Muslim youths, and an ethnically mixed committee that supervises its activities.

Given that the interventions of the Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa community leaders differ, it is plausible to link each community's responses to the nature of the impact of its youths on intergroup relations. This conclusion is reinforced by Angwan Doki's avoidance of conflict since the community leaders transitioned from being passive to active peacebuilders.

Model of understanding

Encompassing the findings in chapters five to nine of this thesis, my model of understanding consists of three levels of conditions that collectively make up a causal network and a temporal sequence. The findings show that multiple factors drove the conflict. While there may have been immediate triggers not reported by the participants, the model below in Figure 3 outlines the underlying social environment that made such situations to escalate to large-scale intergroup conflict. Although most of the causal factors that are captured by the model apply to both Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa, they produced recurrent and violent conflicts in only the former. This, as I show below, is tied to the differences in the responses of the respective community leaders to potentially escalatory acts. Given that Dadin Kowa also reached the brink of conflict on several occasions, it is plausible to conclude that it is the responses of the leaders that account for conflict avoidance there rather than the potential nonexistence of some causal conditions, such as conflicting narratives around land ownership.

Figure 3: Graphic illustration of model of understanding



Source: Author’s Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa Fieldwork Data.

As Figure 3 above shows, the model comprises three levels - one, two, and three. While level one and level two consist of the primary and secondary conditions of the causal environment, respectively, level three consists of the factors that ultimately determined whether the causal environment resulted in conflict or not. Level one captures four primary conditions – religion, land, discrimination and ethnicized electoral politics. Ethnicized electoral politics is the

epicentre of this level not only due to the settler Hausa and Fulani perception of the indigenous state government as discriminative but also because the narratives of political campaigns transformed people's perception of the outgroup's religion and altered their disposition to a culture of communal resource ownership and use.

Given that the primary conditions gave rise to the secondary conditions, the levels are not neatly delineated or bordered even though their labels differ. Some of the conditions on either level are made up of the same stories/reflections. For example, religion, land and discrimination are level one conditions yet some of their constitutive stories/reflections show that these factors also heightened fear of the outgroup or threat perception (level two) to varying degrees. As I show in the overall key findings section, Christians' perception of threat was influenced by their belief that their Muslim neighbours had an agenda to Islamize the state and that their settler neighbours desired to usurp their land. On the other hand, the settlers' perception of threat was created by their view of the state government's draconian policies as an effort to compel them to voluntarily emigrate from the state.

Level two includes three secondary conditions – perceived threat, segregation and loss of trust. The level one conditions (religion, land, discrimination and ethnicized politics) raised the threat levels, while threat perception gave rise to segregation. In turn, segregation sustained the threat levels and engendered loss of trust, which undermined the possibility of both groups reintegrating. Both levels one and two constitute the factors that drove both communities to the brink of conflict. On their own, however, these conditions could not have manifested in conflict except they were acted upon genuinely or otherwise. In both Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa, the youths were the people that acted upon these conditions either out of their own accord or at the

direction of other actors not included in my model. The reason behind the success of the Angwan Doki youths in this regard and the failure of their Dadin Kowa counterparts to do the same is captured in level three of the model.

Level three consists of the community leaders' responses to the youths' potentially escalatory actions in their respective communities. As the overall key findings show, some Angwan Doki participants believe that their local Chiefs failed because they lack statutory powers. Yet, the same situation applies to the local Chiefs in Dadin Kowa. Other Angwan Doki Hausa participants noted that their youths would have been controllable if there was a Hausa monarch for the Hausa people in Jos just as the Berom people have the Gbong Gwom, whose jurisdiction extends throughout the city. Yet, the Dadin Kowa participants did not share any story of the Gbong Gwom Jos intervening in their community. Even if he did, he still would have needed the support of the local Hausa Chiefs, who some other participants say lack statutory authority. Moreover, such a possibility begs the question as to why the Gbong Gwom did not intervene in Angwan Doki or why he was unsuccessful there.

Therefore, as level three shows, the divergence of the conflict outcomes in Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa derive from the differences in the responses of the community leaders. In the former, the community leaders were passively involved in conflict management and prevention and were reliant on law enforcement. In contrast, the latter were actively involved in conflict management, employed local peace structures and were proactive and dynamic in their responses. This conclusion is reinforced by the changes in the trajectory of Angwan Doki following the community leaders' transition from passive to active peacebuilders post-2010/2011. Since their multi-stakeholder peace rally, there has been no violent conflict in

Angwan Doki even though other communities in Jos and the wider Plateau have had conflicts intermittently during the same period.

As my findings indicate, segregation and loss of trust predisposed Angwan Doki to future conflicts after the 2001 episode. Thus, their avoidance of conflicts post-2010/2011, despite the persistence of these factors, reinforces the claim that the community leaders' modification of their peacekeeping approach contributes to the changes in the trajectory of intergroup relations in the community. Consequently, the most plausible explanation for the divergence of the conflict outcomes in Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa during the Jos conflicts (2001, 2004, 2008 and 2010/2011) lies in the way the community leaders responded to the troubles in their respective communities.

Conclusions

As indicated above, the elders in Angwan Doki could not curtail the excesses of the youths because they relied on an ineffective law enforcement apparatus. In contrast, their counterparts in Dadin Kowa successfully did so because they utilized existing local peace structures, created new ones when they were needed and implemented creative problemsolving strategies to deescalate conflict. Given that the actions and inactions of the respective community leaders ultimately determined the trajectory of intergroup relations in their community, community leaders' intervention choices must be considered when discussing conflict occurrence in Jos.

Chapter Ten: Conclusions

In this Chapter, I restate the questions that drove my research, summarize the overall key findings that emanated from the process and, based on these findings, draw conclusions that address my research questions. Subsequently, I discuss the implications of my findings and conclusions for the extant intergroup conflict literature and future research. My research inductively explored the causes and spatial variation of ethnic conflicts in Jos, Nigeria. As the foregoing chapters show, the city has been bedevilled by conflicts between the indigenous ethnic groups, including the Berom, Afizere and Anaguta, and the settler ethnic groups, such as the Hausa and Fulani. Yet, not all the communities that are co-habited by the indigenous and settler groups have been involved in these conflicts. We can glean from the earlier chapters that both Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa are in Jos and are inhabited by both categories of ethnic groups. Yet, whereas the latter managed to avoid the conflicts, the former did not. In light of this puzzle, I explored the Jos conflict in a way that allowed for the emergence of not only a comprehensive understanding of its causes but also why the conflict outcomes in Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa differ. I needed to compare the nature of intergroup relations in the former with the latter to address both research questions.

To enable such a comparison, I used the same research instrument - a semi-structured interview - to explore 24 participants' experiences of intergroup relations rather than their views about the causes of conflict or the conditions of peace in their respective communities. To gain a broad understanding of the conflict milieu, I asked the participants to narrate their experiences of intergroup relations before the first major contemporary conflict in 2001, during the different

conflict episodes and since the last major episode in 2010. Using the follow-up prompts in my research instrument, I obtained not only a deep understanding of their experiences but also the participants' perspectives about the events that make up their experiences of intergroup relations. In addition to the interviews, I engaged in limited non-participant observation to gain deeper insights into the nature of post-direct violence interactions. The overall key findings from this research process and how they relate to the pertinent literature are summarized in the next section.

Overall key findings

In line with the General Inductive Approach (Thomas, 2006), this section outlines the overall key findings from my study. The main heading of each category of findings constitutes an upper-level theme, while the corresponding lower-level themes are summarized under it. After presenting the main findings with the aforementioned format, I outline my model of understanding, which, as I note in Chapter four, consists of a causal network and a temporal sequence. It is the collective reading of both dimensions of my model that explains why Dadin Kowa avoided the Jos conflicts, while Angwan Doki did not.

Pre-conflict experiences of integration

Before the outbreak of the 2001 conflict, the members of Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa communities viewed themselves as having a common identity. As the participants' reflections demonstrate, this was not simply a supranational identity that transcended a local identity. As the discussion in chapter five indicates, this perception existed in both Angwan Doki and Dadin

Kowa. In Angwan Doki, for example, people's religious identity was so insignificant in social relations that it only became apparent through their church attendance or observance of Islamic prayer hours. In fact, during this period, the individual integrity of people, rather than their ethnoreligious affiliations, shaped interpersonal relationships. Moreover, the only salient identity was the common humanity of people. Additionally, the common use of the Hausa language coupled with the practice of christening children based on either one's language or an outgroup's language further blurred the lines of ethnoreligious identities in Angwan Doki.

The identity situation in Dadin Kowa pre-conflict was not different from that of Angwan Doki. Similar to the use of language in Angwan Doki, the people in Dadin Kowa were linguistically connected because of their collective use of the Hausa, Berom and other indigenous languages. As a result, it was impossible to identify people by their primordial identities, except for the community's children whose accents gave away their ancestral identities. Additionally, the people in Dadin Kowa could not be aesthetically distinguished because the different ethnic groups dressed similarly. Also, interreligious friendships were both common and perceived as safe to the extent that people accompanied friends to their places of worship even though they did not participate in the rituals. This sense of common identity was not developed in the generation of the participants, which shows that it was a norm into which they were socialized.

This sense of a common identity in Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa transcended the use of language and fashion. It also manifested in the observance of religious festivals in the respective communities. The Salah festival of the Muslims and the Christians' Christmas were celebrated communally and, because of intermarriages in the community, some families even hosted their neighbours at both Christmas and Salah. The Christians, in consideration of the

religious beliefs of their Muslim neighbours, invited them to slaughter the animal meant for their Christmas feast to eliminate all obstacles to the communal celebration of Christmas. A further indication of the collective celebration of each religion's festivals is that the children from both religious communities always keenly anticipated both the Christian and Islamic festivals. While the Muslim kids waited in the corridors of churches during the Christmas service to accompany their friends home for their feast, the Christian kids moved from one Muslim neighbour's house to the next to have their share of those families' Salah meals.

As in the Angwan Doki case, the celebration of religious festivals was also a communal affair in Dadin Kowa. As in the former, the latter's children were enthusiastic about the religious festivals so much so that both the Christian and Muslim kids stayed up late to witness the official announcement of the commencement of Salah. Further, during Christmas, the Christian youths hosted their Muslim friends to a picnic in the outskirts of Dadin Kowa, while the Muslim youths did likewise at Salah. As a result of the joint celebrations, participation in religious festivals was also not a clear religious identity marker. Moreover, both the Christian and Muslim children wore their newly sewn clothes for both the Christmas and Salah festivals. Also, both the Christians and Muslims jointly broke the Muslims' pre-Salah fast each day even though the Christians did not participate in the fast itself. Additionally, people never personalized their religious festivals neither did they perceive another religion's festival as the Other's. The Christians considered themselves as insiders to the point of making specific requests from their Muslim neighbours for their local food and drinks.

While the joint celebration of religious festivals reflects the bond that existed between the children from both religious communities, a different sub-category of stories – “it takes a

village” - highlights the community that existed between Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa parents and the children from both religions in the respective communities. In Angwan Doki, for example, individuals’ problems were viewed as collective problems. Consequently, when children needed food, they could walk into their neighbours’ homes and get fed. Also, the parents themselves saw the disciplining of the children in the community as a collective, rather than an individual, responsibility.

This communal parent-child relationship appears to have been more prevalent in Dadin Kowa given the sheer volume of related stories and the broader range of topics that exist in the participants’ narratives. Given their exposure to Western education, the Christian parents were invested in ensuring that the Muslim children received the same education and went as far as enrolling them and occasionally paying their fees to encourage continued attendance. Also, the responsibility for school drop-off and pick-up was shared between the Christian and Muslim parents, depending on each parent’s availability. Also, neighbours irrespective of their religion assisted with childcare and, on occasion, assumed the role of guardians over extended periods. Additionally, the adults in the community were inclined to using the proverbial stick on other people’s children not only because they viewed the children’s upbringing as a communal responsibility but also because the children’s parents themselves viewed such disciplinary measures as corrective and well intentioned.

The economic sector was not exempted from the integrated structure of life in both Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa, and the participants’ stories reflect similar economic ties. In both communities, for example, the Berom and Fulani were occupationally linked. While the Berom relied on the cattle dung of the Fulani to fertilize their land, the Fulani had easy access to

grazing fields because of that dependence. There were Fulani herders whose cattle grazed on the farmlands of a network of farmers on a seasonal basis, clearly indicating that this economic relationship was a permanent one. In addition, some Berom children apprenticed with Fulani cattle herders, resulting in the existence of Berom cattle herders today. Similarly, because people shared information about job opportunities with their neighbours, other occupations were also heterogeneously populated. Additionally, as farmers, the Berom are known as food producers, but it was the Hausa, many of whom are traders, that retailed the crops produced by the Berom farmers. As is evident in Chapter seven, however, this trading relationship has waned since the 2001 conflict.

The integrated structure of the society in Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa was owed to a culture of trust, ethnically mixed schools and intermarriages. Whereas the stories of the Angwan Doki participants reflect all three integration factors, only the first two are evident in the narratives of the Dadin Kowa participants. In Angwan Doki, evidence of intergroup trust includes people's positive disposition to eating the food offered by someone from a different religion, spending the night in the home of an outgroup member, and feeling safe in mixed neighbourhoods and face-me-I-face-you (single-room apartment) buildings. In Dadin Kowa, intergroup trust extended beyond the pre-conflict era and continued into the early days of the Jos conflict. At the start of the Jos troubles, for example, a Hausa Muslim sheltered several Berom Christians in his secured compound, while some Hausa Muslim women took refuge in the home of their Berom Christian neighbour.

In Angwan Doki, the existence of mixed schools engendered intergroup contact and fostered a culture of sharing, which itself created positive perceptions about the outgroup. The

emergent friendships transcended the school playground, percolating into the larger community and turning the parents of the school pupils into friends themselves. The stories from Dadin Kowa do not show that the parents in the community became friends due to the friendship of their children. They, however, indicate that a culture of sharing was also forged between the Christian and Muslim children in the schools within the community. Unlike the culture of trust and mixed schooling, intermarriages only featured in the stories from Angwan Doki. Intergroup marriages strengthened the bonds of friendship and were a symbol of the community's integration pre-2001. As I explain in the next section, however, it later became a source of indignation among the indigenous groups.

The transition from “communal bond” to intercommunal strife

As the discussion in Chapter six shows, the participants' reflections about their conflict-time experiences suggest multiple channels through which intergroup relations became strained. First, the role of religion was a common feature of the conflict-time reflections of both the Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa participants. In Angwan Doki, however, the participants' views diverge along religious lines. While the Christian participants' narratives advance the notion that religion was either a substantive or facilitative cause of the conflict, the Muslims' discount such an idea. The former's views include the belief that the conflict was only a violent manifestation of the Muslims' Jihad, which was previously undertaken socially through intermarriages. Other indigenous Christian participants hinged their views on their experiences of Muslims specifically targeting Christian motorists during the conflict, the burning of churches by Muslims and the Muslims' sudden inclination to assign derogatory labels to the Christians. The Muslims, on the

other hand, discount this perspective by pointing to the insignificance of people's religious identity pre-2001 and the enrolment of Muslim children in Christian missionary schools.

Similarly, the Dadin Kowa participants' narratives with regards to their conflict-time experiences contain two contrasting narratives on the role of religion in the emergence of intergroup animosity. However, unlike Angwan Doki in which both the Christian and Muslim participants had extensive views on the subject, the religion-related reflections are a feature of mostly the Muslim participants' narratives in the Dadin Kowa case. Just as the Muslims in Angwan Doki called the Christians derogatory names, the Christians in Dadin Kowa reportedly also labelled their Muslim neighbours derogatorily. As in the case of Angwan Doki also, a few Dadin Kowa Christian participants note that the Jos conflicts were part of the Muslims' agenda to Islamize Nigeria. Other participants noted that intergroup relations deteriorated because some people claimed religious victimization to curry the sympathy of their ingroup and due to the perception in both religious communities that people were being radicalized in their respective religious houses.

In contrast, a different cohort of Muslim participants, including indigenous Muslims, questions the significance of religion in the conflict. Some participants base their view on their knowledge of their religion, noting that a truly religious person would not slay their neighbour since murder is prohibited in Islam. Other Muslim participants hinged their perspective not on religious precepts but on their knowledge of the Jos conflict, including Christians killing other Christians because they were unfamiliar with them and indigenous Muslims being spared in Christian settlements because of their indigenous connection.

Second, the participants' conflict-time reflections include contrasting narratives around land ownership, but this lower-level theme is a feature of only the stories from Angwan Doki. Similar to the structure of their views on religion, the indigenous Berom and settler Hausa participants from Angwan Doki express conflicting perspectives on land ownership. On the one hand, the Berom believe that the Hausa are intent on appropriating their homeland just as the British did under colonial rule. On the other hand, the Hausa claim that they have the right of "first arrival" in the Jos area in Plateau state since their forefathers met the land uninhabited. Additionally, there is the centrist perspective that the earliest Hausa migrants to Jos purchased portions of Jos land from their Berom owners hence the Hausa community can legitimately claim ownership of them. The existence of land-based narratives in Angwan Doki and the lack of the same in Dadin Kowa is likely connected to the history of both places. While Dadin Kowa means sweet for everyone, the Berom reject the name Angwan Doki because of its Hausa origin and call the community Rahowl Kanang to demonstrate Berom ownership of the land.

Third, the participants' stories reveal a conflict of perspectives about the political rights of the settler Muslims and the alignment of ethnoreligious identity and politics. Compared to the narratives around religion, the reflections of both the indigenous Christians and settler Muslims suggest that this ethnicized form of electoral politics contributed to the transition from intergroup harmony to discord. In Angwan Doki, some indigenous Berom people are dismayed by the political ambition of the settler Hausa, while the Hausa are angered by the systemic constraints on their quest for political representation in places in which they are numerically dominant. Also, politicians and their educated elite collaborators disparage the outgroup to mobilize support within the ingroup. Although there is much less relevant data in the narratives of the Dadin

Kowa participants, the few stories/reflections that are shared also reflect ethnicity-based politics. The narratives, for example, show that politicians' ethnic identity influences voting behaviour and that people dislike interethnic political coalition building.

Fourth, in Angwan Doki alone, the participants' reflections suggest that government patronage stirred up animosity. While the settler Hausa are aggrieved by the Plateau state government's favouritism towards the indigenous groups, the indigenous groups have themselves grown accustomed to these privileges such that the loss of state privileges makes them resentful of the indigenous-led state government. The Hausa people believe that the state government deliberately targets them with draconian policies to stimulate voluntary emigration. Moreover, the Hausa believe that their official designation as settlers, despite being born and raised in Jos, undermines their life prospects in the state. Also, while high population density makes the government unable to satisfy the needs of all its citizens, the large sizes of families make state patronage an avenue for economic survival. The participants' stories highlight the perception of the Hausa that this situation disfavours them because the government allocates its inadequate resources to the indigenous groups.

Fifth, the Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa participants' recollection of their conflict-time experiences shows that internal and external actors incited conflict in both communities. Perhaps, because Angwan Doki was drawn into the Jos conflict earlier on, only a few stories of incitement exist in the data from the community. One such story relates to the distribution of fake letters purportedly authored by the outgroup to create tension within the ingroup and motivate violence against the outgroup. In contrast, the effort to induce conflict in Dadin Kowa was more intense and direct. External co-ethnics relayed stories about the atrocities of the

outgroup to provoke a violent reaction within the community and disparaged their Dadin Kowa co-ethnics for failing to seek revenge for the killing of their brothers elsewhere. Although the most vicious attempts to drag Dadin Kowa into the conflict came from external elements, some members of the community also desired to participate in it.

The manifest consequences of intergroup discord

In Chapter seven, we see that the abovementioned factors of discord intersected with stories about the Jos conflict and/or experiences of the same, and exacerbated threat perception. The resultant perception inspired ingroup clustering and segregation, and both these conditions resulted in the effacement of trust. Although they manifested differently, these conditions evolved and existed in both Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa. In Angwan Doki, Hausa people's narratives around land ownership made the indigenous Berom people believe that they risked losing their land to the Hausa. Similarly, the Hausa believed that there were plans to expel them from Jos, and the personal reflections of indigenous participants suggest that these fears were legitimate. Also, the indigenous Berom Christians felt threatened by the possibility of being forced to convert to Islam. This sense of threat within the Hausa Muslim and Berom Christian populations was also ingrained in the psyche of the children, who admonished their ingroup friends to stay away from the outgroup to avoid being harmed. In Dadin Kowa, people became afraid of the outgroup after hearing about the killing of their immediate neighbours in conflict-affected communities in Jos and the internal discourses of revenge among other outgroup neighbours.

The fear of the outgroup, irrespective of its source, caused spatial and social distance in both Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa. In Angwan Doki, there was a sense of heightened tensions and imminent conflict when neighbours started to distance themselves from the outgroup. People feared that past relationships would not prevent an outgroup neighbour from turning on them, so the Christians and Muslims withdrew from each other and settled permanently in different neighbourhoods within the community. This created the phenomenon of “Muslim-dominated” and “Christian-dominated” settlements. The spatial segregation created artificially segregated schools and a current youth population with limited or no positive knowledge of the outgroup. Also, the community’s main market, which facilitated intergroup interaction after a conflict, was burnt down, thus eroding a crucial reintegration channel.

The stories of Dadin Kowa participants show that similar processes unfolded in their community. In Dadin Kowa, the Christians felt insecure in the neighbourhoods dominated by Muslims because of the peddled narratives about an impending Jihad. Generally, people feared that their outgroup neighbours would view them as spies for their external co-ethnics. Consequently, they made temporary or permanent changes to their residency. For those who felt threatened in mixed neighbourhoods only at night, they resided in their homes only during the day and sheltered in an ingroup-dominated neighbourhood at night. Other residents feared to live in mixed settlements both during the day and at night hence the Christians permanently swapped houses with Muslims to live within an ingroup-dominated settlement.

In both Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa, the cumulative effect of the two conditions above and the knowledge or experiences of the conflict was the erosion of intergroup trust, which was the foundation of integration in the pre-conflict era. In Angwan Doki, the physical

separation coupled with past news of killings created constant suspicion in both the Christian and Muslim settlements that the outgroup was planning an attack. As the reflections of several participants indicate, some indigenous people believe that the real identity of the settler Muslims, which was hidden before the conflict, became clear to the indigenous population due to their conflict-time behaviour. The narratives of the settler Muslim participants indicate that this feeling of mistrust was mutual. Due to mutual suspicion, people started to patronize only ingroup food sellers and commercial transporters. Other reflections show that even after the conflict, people still feel unsafe in outgroup homes or outgroup-neighbourhoods.

In Dadin Kowa, people no longer felt safe accepting meals from an outgroup member. Also, some Berom people lost their trust for their Hausa community members and viewed them as enemies because their external co-ethnics were claiming ownership of Jos. For some people, a religious or ethnic connection alone was not enough to assuage their suspicion of a person. For such people, trust was possible only when there were both ethnic and religious connections.

Community leaders as determinants of conflict and peace

While the erosion of intergroup trust and the other discussed conditions created a conducive environment for conflicts in Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa, the participants' stories that are discussed in Chapter eight indicate that the activities of the respective communities' youths exacerbated intergroup tension and caused the transition to violent conflict, in the case of Angwan Doki. The Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa data are similar with regards to most of the causal conditions, including the behaviour of the communities' youths. Yet, Dadin Kowa avoided the Jos conflicts while Angwan Doki did not. The findings summarized here indicate

that the communities differ in terms of the conflict prevention and management strategies that were adopted.

In Angwan Doki, according to the participants, drug-addicted youths were the perpetrators of violence, yet this cohort of youths were not all Angwan Doki community members as many came from other Plateau communities and other northern Nigerian states. Although drug abuse predisposed these youths to violence, they were also motivated to start conflict because they could loot people's homes and shops during the chaos and resulting anarchy. These youths, the study participants' note, were not divided into Christian and Muslim camps until they had caused conflict and were ready to reap the spoils of conflict in their respective communities. Additionally, the youths' violent dispositions created an aura of untouchability around them and connected them to unscrupulous politicians, who engaged them as political thugs.

The stories from Dadin Kowa show that there is an identical cohort of youths in the community. Similar to the Angwan Doki case, these youths were addicted to and influenced by, drugs and alcohol. Similar to what happened in Angwan Doki, some of these youths are not Dadin Kowa community members per se as they come from neighbouring conflict-affected communities and other places in northern Nigeria. The youths, who come from outside Plateau state, arrive in Dadin Kowa in the guise of seeking menial jobs but end up as peddlers of hard drugs. While some participants noted that it is this group of youths that corrupt the Dadin Kowa-bred youths, the stories of others show that both categories of youths in Dadin Kowa have behaved in ways that drove the community to the brink of conflict. Although the excesses of the Dadin Kowa youths never degenerated into an internal indigene-settler conflict, the participants

shared stories of Dadin Kowa youths participating in the conflict in other communities either to assist their co-ethnics in those places or to loot the homes of people who fled to safety.

What ultimately distinguished Dadin Kowa from Angwan Doki was the response of the respective community leaders to the excesses of their youths. The reflections of a few Dadin Kowa participants show that the Jos conflict began in Jos North but southern Jos communities, such as Angwan Doki, were drawn into the conflict because the parents in these areas have no control over their children. Yet, there is evidence that even the Dadin Kowa parents were unable to curtail their children's excesses by themselves. For example, the stories about how the conflict was averted in Dadin Kowa show that it was the community leaders that took the decisive steps that kept the youths at bay.

The Angwan Doki participants' reflections on their conflict-time experience indicate that their community leaders attempted to prevent the conflict, albeit unsuccessfully. On the one hand, the Christian community leaders could not stop their people from reacting to the aggressive behaviour of the outgroup given their failure to prevent outgroup attacks. On the other hand, the Muslim community leaders failed to prevent their youths from besieging the Christian-dominated neighbourhood. Some stories indicate that the local Chiefs in the community are handicapped by their lack of statutory authority as well as the youths' awareness of this limitation. In light of their inability to control their youths, the leaders of the respective religious communities invited law enforcement to intervene, yet the youths remained uncontrollable. The Police failed to prosecute the accused perpetrators of violence, and the released youths also returned to the community emboldened and posed direct risks to the safety of the local Chiefs, which made the elders reluctant to provide future reports to the police.

In contrast, the Dadin Kowa community leaders succeeded in managing intergroup tension in their community using a mixture of the state security structure, their local peace architecture and individual acts of courage. The community leaders' peace interventions were structured and decentralized. There was an elders' council that comprised only male members, a women's wing and a youth wing, who were the leaders of a local policing unit.

The community leaders created a community-policing unit, comprising both indigenous Christian and settler Muslim youths that were recommended by their respective religious communities. The Unit assigned policing duties to groups of Christian and Muslim members and was responsible for securing the streets, yet they were answerable to the elders' security management committee, which was set up primarily for this purpose. The community leaders' conflict prevention engagements transcended supervising the local policing unit. The community was on several occasions at the brink of conflict and only managed to avoid it because of several other interventions.

For example, when Christian youths in Dadin Kowa were planning to attack their Hausa neighbours because they participated in the conflict in other communities, the Christian religious leaders dissuaded them from doing so. As a result of their longstanding relationships, the Christian and Muslim religious leaders also worked collaboratively to break up other near-violent confrontations between the respective youths. In one case, leaders from both religious communities broke up a staredown between Christian and Muslim youths even though law enforcement officers had earlier failed to do so. Law enforcement officers also routinely sought intelligence from the community leaders to aid in their investigations.

The community leaders' interventions were not limited to coordinating other peace institutions and collaborating with the police. They also implemented radical proactive measures and inserted themselves in dangerous situations to prevent an escalation of tensions even when the police were absent. They, for example, required that each family prevented their external co-ethnics from visiting them in Dadin Kowa and evicted all the migrant youths that were living in the community without parents or guardians. Also, when Christian youths from another community attempted to enter Dadin Kowa to attack Muslims, a Muslim elder offered himself to be killed if that would make the youths halt their advance into the community. Another instance of such creative, yet potentially dangerous intervention, was when a Muslim elder prevented Muslim youths from burning a church by requesting that they set the building ablaze whilst he was inside. Similarly, a Muslim religious leader prevented a Muslim boy from burning a church by insisting that for the church to be burnt, his wife must also be killed given that she is a Berom Christian.

Theoretical implications

In addition to accounting for the divergence of the conflict outcomes in Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa, my research produced relevant data that advance or challenge extant scholarship on intergroup conflict.

On perceived threat

My data, for example, contribute to the debate between scholars who argue that perceived threat causes aggression and those who contend that pre-existing attitudinal or situational factors can mediate the destructive effect of the phenomenon. While my findings are both supportive and critical of the former perspective, they contain only critical data on the latter. For example, McDoom (2012) notes that under conditions of threat, identity becomes salient, tribal clusters are formed and a negative attitude towards the outgroup is developed. A section of my model corroborates this claim. While politically-inspired narratives around religion and land ownership made the indigenous Berom people withdraw from their settler neighbours, they caused the settler Hausa and Fulani to suspect their potential eviction from Jos. Each of these developments culminated in each ingroup perceiving the outgroup as enemies.

Otten and Gordijn (2010), like McDoom (2012), suggest positive linkages between perceived threat and intergroup conflict. Yet, my findings reinforce only one dimension of their claim. Otten and Gordijn (2010) surmise that perceived threat causes intergroup conflict but note that its actual influence depends on the type of threat and the power status of a group. The authors note that threat to valuable resources will stir up aggressive behaviour in powerless groups because that type of threat arouses fear and anger. In contrast, threats do not inspire aggression in powerful groups because they are confident in their ability to determine the outcome of intergroup competition (Otten & Gordijn, 2010). While one aspect of my data aligns with the first part of the authors' argument, others contradict the second dimension. In the context of political power, the settlers in Angwan Doki are powerless, yet they responded aggressively to the threat of an imminent expulsion from the city.

In contrast, other data on perceived threat contradict the latter aspect of the authors' argument. In Angwan Doki, for example, the indigenous groups are politically powerful, and that political power is being exercised for their benefit. Yet, their perception of their settler neighbours as a threat culminated in an aggressive reaction. The apparent shortcoming in Otten and Gordijn' (2010) argument derives from their underlying assumption that all the members of a group are collective holders of group power and that every member is conscious of group power and its significance. The latter dimension of their argument also ignores the transient nature of power, which could motivate the holders of power, such as the indigenous political incumbents in the Jos case, to instigate their group to act on their fears because it will facilitate their retention of power.

In contrast to the aforementioned arguments, other scholars note that pre-existing dispositions, beliefs and values can mitigate the effect of perceived threat, thereby preventing the outbreak of conflict. Hirschberger et al. (2016), for example, contend that pre-existing hawkish or dovish tendencies shape people's responses to existential threat. In contrast, however, my study shows that Angwan Doki Christians, who can be categorized as dovish based on their reflections on pre-conflict relations, appear to tacitly support the aggression of their kinsmen against the Muslims. This suggests that pre-existing dovish dispositions may shape people's reaction to perceived existential threat only to the extent that they are not personally threatened or if they believe that they are insulated from the threat to the ingroup.

On historical narratives

The stories from Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa also show that narratives about past relations were disseminated to reshape intergroup relations. They support both ends of the historical narratives debate, which is typified by the positions of Pilecki and Hammack (2014) and Klar and Baram (2016). Pilecki and Hammack (2014) note that narratives of victimhood adversely affect group behaviour since they are used to rationalize aggression towards the outgroup. Conversely, Klar and Baram (2016) contend that although historical narratives and intergroup conflict are positively related, their effect on ingroup members differs. My research reinforces both these perspectives. Although my findings show that indigenous politicians and their local educated elites peddled narratives that accused the ancestors of Hausa and Fulani settlers of enslaving indigenous ancestors, they also indicate that not everyone responded positively to such narratives. For example, the tone and tenor of the indigenous participants, who reported the dissemination of such stories, suggest that the narratives did not shape their attitude towards the outgroup.

On segregation

My work also intervenes in the debate around segregation, specifically whether it engenders conflict or peace. On the one hand, Enos and Celaya (2018), note that segregation causes conflict because it hinders intergroup contact, and the lack of contact enables the development of negative perceptions of the outgroup. On the other hand, some scholars contend that segregation dampens violence because it limits intergroup interactions (Bhavnani et al., 2014), thereby minimizing contempt for the outgroup (Ireland, 2008). While some of my findings reinforce the

former perspective, others directly contradict the latter. In Angwan Doki, for example, segregation contributed to future conflicts because it sustained perceived threat and made people suspicious of the outgroup. In contrast to the latter position (Bhavnani et al., 2014, Ireland, 2008), my study shows that segregation sustained contempt for the outgroup because it hindered the restoration of relationships and intergroup trust.

On religion

As I showed in Chapter 2, the literature on the nexus between religion and intergroup conflict is divided between scholars who see positive linkages (Fredman, Bastian & Swan, 2017; Saroglou, 2016) and those who argue to the contrary (Seul, 1999). As I show below, my work corroborates only the latter perspective. Saroglou (2016) notes that religion causes the development of negative attitudes towards the outgroup yet only if the ingroup is dominated by an extremist faction. The participants' reflections on pre-conflict relations in Jos indicate that fundamentalists dominated neither the indigenous groups nor the settler groups. The participants' accounts of their conflict-time experience show that the youths who claimed to be fighting on behalf of their religion were not even committed practitioners of either Christianity or Islam. Yet, the stories show that both the Christians and Muslims developed a negative attitude towards each other. The disjuncture between these findings and Saroglou's argument regarding the type of groups that have a propensity for developing negative attitudes derives from the author's instrumental study of religion, which inhibits the identification of other variables.

In contrast to Saroglou (2016), Seul (1999) contends that the same material factors and social dynamics that drive other identity-based conflicts also inspire religious wars. The stories

of my study participants about the behaviour of Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa youths lend credence to this assertion as they show that even though the youths claimed to be fighting a religious war, they were simply fighting or intended to fight to reap the spoils of war.

On natural resources

The debate in the relevant natural resource literature is between the proponents of abundance and scarcity channels. My study findings do not include any data on abundance, hence do not resolve this debate. However, the synthesis of some participants' stories advances the latter perspective, which Beyene (2017) and Bromwich (2018) represent. Beyene (2017) notes that the Oromo and Somali ethnic groups in Ethiopia are in conflict over access to water and land not only due to scarcity but also because the competing groups belong to different political and administrative units. Similarly, Bromwich (2018) argues that the Darfur conflict resulted from the interface between drought-induced famine and the existence of national policies that privilege the Arabs over the Blacks.

My work contributes to the scarcity literature by revealing, like Beyene and Bromwich's, an interface between ecological and political factors. My findings on the pre-conflict economic ties between the indigenes and settlers show that even though land was scarce in Jos, it was political interference in intergroup relations at the local level that caused intergroup competition, not the scarcity of land per se. For example, before indigenous politicians began peddling narratives about Hausa land-grab, the indigenous and settler groups had developed and sustained a mechanism for ensuring that both groups mutually benefitted from the existing land.

On horizontal inequalities

Much of the extant scholarship on horizontal inequalities indicate that conflict is produced when inequality and group identity intersect. There is, however, much less consensus on whether a group's violent reaction to perceived inequalities occurs organically (Kustov 2015; Cederman, Weidmann & Gleditsch, 2011; Ostby, 2008) or unnaturally (Commercio, 2017; Langer, 2008). For example, Ostby (2008) notes that the perception of discrimination induces ethnic conflict. On their part, Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011) contend that a group responds aggressively to their observation of power and economic imbalances if they believe that the outgroup's higher status is unmerited. While these assertions imply that these responses are organic, Kustov (2015) categorically states that they are spontaneous reactions to intergroup comparison.

Although my work does not support the specific claim about the organic nature of the mobilization for collective action (Kustov, 2015), it corroborates the assertions that the observation of discrimination (Ostby, 2008) and the perception of economic imbalances (Cederman, Weidmann & Gleditsch, 2011) spur ethnic conflict. Consistent with Ostby's argument, for example, the settler Hausa's belief that the Plateau state indigenous government unfairly targeted them with its draconian policies made them resentful of their indigenous neighbours. In line with Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch's (2011) contention, the indigenous Berom people developed a negative attitude towards their settler Hausa neighbours because they believed that they are economically superior because they usurped the opportunities that ought to accrue to the indigenous groups.

In contrast to the notion of an organic response to inequality, Commercio (2017) and Langer (2008) suggest that it is ethno-political leaders that facilitate ingroup mobilization for collective action. Commercio (2017) specifically notes that ethnic leaders inform the ingroup of existing injustices and inspire ingroup anger so that corrective measures are pursued. Similarly, Langer (2008) argues, based on his study of Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire that the transition from group grievance to violent confrontation depends on whether political leaders are inclined to drive the process. While my data does not indicate how the process of grievance formation evolved among the settler Hausa, the Angwan Doki participants' election-related stories show that political campaigns drove this process within the community's Berom population.

Future research

The relevance of my findings to multiple clusters of the intergroup conflict literature underscores the importance of studying conflicts inductively. My work shows that a comprehensive understanding of the social environment of a conflict results from an inductive study, in contrast to the deductive testing of theories, which limits our understanding to only the applicable pre-conceived variables. It is important to comprehensively grasp any conflict because therein lies the raw material for effective resolution. Although my use of an inductive approach helped to resolve the Angwan Doki-Dadin Kowa puzzle, it also produced new questions.

Given the significant position of the troubled youths in the structure of my data, exploring their own experiences of intergroup relations from the earliest time possible to the present will further illuminate other people's perspectives about their behaviour. Such a study would shed additional light on why the Angwan Doki community leaders failed to control this

cohort of youths even though their Dadin Kowa counterparts successfully did so. Specifically, the following questions are pertinent: 1) How do the Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa youth perceive their respective community leaders and what has been the nature of their relations over time? 2) Why were the Dadin Kowa community leaders disposed to initiating and leading conflict mitigating measures in their community while their Angwan Doki counterparts passed such roles over to law enforcement? A) How do each group of leaders perceive the outgroup?

The same would apply to politicians from both communities. Given that their activities constitute the epicentre of level one of my model, an inquiry into their own experiences of intergroup relations during the same periods would further explain the divergence of Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa. Additionally, it may also account for the dearth of contrasting narratives around land ownership in Dadin Kowa, which may further reinforce my characterization of ethnicized electoral politics as the epicentre of the primary causal conditions.

Conclusion

I explored people's experiences of intergroup relations in Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa not only to uncover the causes of the conflict in the former but also to understand how the latter avoided conflict. By comparing those communities and knowing the similarities and differences between their respective trajectories, I can state why the latter, unlike the former, was not drawn into the Jos conflicts. Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa were similar in many ways before 2001. In both communities, for example, the indigenous and settler populations were integrated. They viewed themselves as "people" or "humans" rather than persons belonging to different identities. This sense of common identity was reproduced in their observance of Christian and Islamic

religious festivals, which were jointly celebrated. Also, the respective populations were economically integrated as they maintained symbiotic economic relationships. Additionally, the upbringing of children in both Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa was a communal, rather than a parental, responsibility. All of this, as the participants' comments show, was enabled by a culture of trust, mixed marriages and mixed schools.

Despite the nearly century-long history of togetherness in both communities, the narratives of politicians before, and since, Nigeria's return to civil rule in 1999 reshaped people's perception of the outgroup. Hence, they started viewing themselves as competitors, adversaries and enemies. Consequently, the outgroup became demonized because of their religion and land ownership became contested. War stories from other Jos communities, coupled with the aforementioned narratives heightened people's perception of threat. Perceived threat then engendered ingroup clustering and intergroup distancing, which made the respective populations live in constant suspicion of the outgroup. All these conditions caused intergroup animosity in both Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa but degenerated into conflict in only the former. As my model shows, violent conflict was averted in Dadin Kowa not only because the community leaders were not reliant on a weak and ineffective law enforcement infrastructure, but also due to their creation and use of local structures of peace and spontaneous problemsolving.

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Appendix I: Interview Guide

Interview Guide

Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study. We have already gone over the consent form, and you have signed it. Correct?

As we have discussed, you do not have to answer any question and you may choose to withdraw from the study at any time before July 6, 2019. I will now ask you some questions. Please only respond to the questions that you're comfortable answering and do so without talking about other people specifically. Are you ready to begin?

- 1) What is it like living in Jos?
 - a) Can you say more about that?
 - b) Why do you feel this way?
- 2) What were things like between the groups living in the community before the conflict?
 - a) Can you say more about that?
 - b) What happened afterwards?
 - c) Without revealing any personal information of other people, can you tell me who you had this experience with? Was it someone from your ethnic or religious group?
- 3) Tell me how things were like between the groups at the time of the conflict.
 - a) Can you say more about that?
 - b) What did you feel?
 - c) Why did you feel this way?
- 4) How have things been like between the groups since the last conflict?
 - a) Can you say more about that?
 - b) Without revealing any personal information of other people, can you tell me who you had this experience with? Was it someone from your ethnic or religious group?
 - c) What did you feel?
 - d) Why did you feel this way?
- 5) Is there anything else you would like to say?
- 6) If I have other questions, may I contact you again?
- 7) If you have anything else to say, please feel free to contact me.

Note:

- 1) Because this is a guide, not a questionnaire, some of the follow-up prompts may not be used in eliciting more information from participants.
- 2) As stated under methodology, this interview is not expected to exceed 90 minutes and the same questions will be used in interviewing community members in both Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa.

Appendix II: Observation Guide

Observation Guide

Using my visual senses only, that is without listening in on people's conversation, I will observe the mood in public spaces in search of the following cues:

1. Whether interactions are taking place between people of the same ethnicity, different ethnicities or both,
2. Whether the mood is tense or relaxed, and
3. Whether the nature of the mood varies according to the ethnicity of the interacting parties.

Appendix III: Ethics Approval



Human Ethics
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PROTOCOL APPROVAL

TO: Surulola Eke (Advisor: Sean Byrne)
Principal Investigator

FROM: Julia Witt, Chair
Joint-Faculty Research Ethics Board (JFREB)

Re: Protocol J2019:022 (HS22672)
"Blood, Soil and Purse? Understanding the Causes and Spatial Variation of
Ethnic Conflict in Jos, Nigeria"

Effective: April 30, 2019

Expiry: April 30, 2020

Joint-Faculty Research Ethics Board (JFREB) has reviewed and approved the above research. JFREB is constituted and operates in accordance with the current *Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans*.

This approval is subject to the following conditions:

1. Approval is granted for the research and purposes described in the application only.
2. Any modification to the research or research materials must be submitted to JFREB for approval before implementation.
3. Any deviations to the research or adverse events must be submitted to JFREB as soon as possible.
4. This approval is valid for one year only and a Renewal Request must be submitted and approved by the above expiry date.
5. A Study Closure form must be submitted to JFREB when the research is complete or terminated.
6. The University of Manitoba may request to review research documentation from this project to demonstrate compliance with this approved protocol and the University of Manitoba *Ethics of Research Involving Humans*.

Funded Protocols:

- Please mail/e-mail a copy of this Approval, identifying the related UM Project Number, to the Research Grants Officer in ORS.

Research Ethics and Compliance is a part of the Office of the Vice-President (Research and International)
umanitoba.ca/research