

The Textual Transmission and History of Plato, *Symposium* 201d1 – 212c3

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Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the history and textual transmission of Plato, *Symposium* 201d1–212c3. The first chapter summarizes the content of the passage. This summary reveals a passage which is of great interest at various levels to the study of Plato. Chapter two deals with the direct tradition. It demonstrates that the medieval manuscripts form a bipartite stemma, while the papyrus vacillates between the two branches of the stemma; the result is that the primary witnesses show a stable text. Chapter three looks at the indirect tradition. The variant readings of the testimonia do not link any author closely to any of the primary witnesses or manuscript families; in short, the testimonia do not provide compelling evidence to suggest that the state of the text in antiquity was different from that recorded by the medieval manuscripts. The first part of chapter four examines the indirect tradition (direct quotations); the second part of the chapter explores the ways in which *Symposium* 202d1–203a8 influenced later authors. The first part demonstrates that the variants in the testimonia conform to practices of quoting common in antiquity, showing that, for the most part, the text that the testimonia transmit is essentially the same as that transmitted in the primary witnesses. In the second part, a selection of passages demonstrates that the influence of *Symposium* 202d1–203a8 extends far beyond that of manuscript transmission and verbatim quotation.

To explore the textual tradition, the starting point has been the 1989 edition of Vicaire and Laborderie, but their readings have been checked against those of the apparatus to the forthcoming second volume of *Platonis Opera* in the new Oxford Classical Text, and, in some places, against the manuscripts, papyrus, and editions of the testimonia themselves.

The thesis concludes that the ancient transmission of *Symposium* 201d1–212c3 was relatively stable; that the testimonia show that the state of the text in antiquity resembled that transmitted in the primary witnesses; and that the influence of *Symposium* 212d1–203a8 can be seen from Plato’s immediate successors to modern day sources.

Introduction

Symposium 201d1–212c3 contains the conversation between Socrates and Diotima in which they discuss Eros as a *daimon*, his birth and parentage, how the pursuit of Eros manifests itself, and what conclusion a properly conducted pursuit reaches. The outline of Eros as a *daimon* and the outline of what a *daimon* is, including its functions, has had historical importance. The influence of our passage extends from Plato's immediate successors all the way to the teachings of the present-day Catholic Church.

The text of *Symposium* 201d1–212c3 is understandably vexed. The presentation of our passage in modern editions of the text is not a clear one. Editions abound in editorial conjecture, but an examination of our passage, once stripped of these interpolations, extrapolations, seclusions, omissions, and rearrangements, should reveal interesting relationships and tendencies among our witnesses. Two centuries of determined scholarship have given us certain expectations of how the primary manuscripts will behave. Modern editions fall short here: many present only the evidence from three primary manuscripts (B, T, and W): for the *Symposium* there are two more that deserve consideration (D and P). Because it makes use of all five primary manuscripts, the 1989 Budé text of Vicaire and Laborderie (a revised edition of Robin's text) will be the starting point for drawing relationships between the witnesses to our passage. Vicaire's apparatus, however, is often inaccurate and in many places wrong. To remedy the situation, I have been able to make use of draft versions of the apparatus and preface to the forthcoming second volume of the *Oxford Classical Text*, comprising the third and fourth tetralogies, an edition which also incorporates testimony from all five primary manuscripts. A recent study on the textual tradition of the *Symposium* is Christian Brockmann's *Die handschriftliche Überlieferung von Platons Symposion*, which accepts only four primary

manuscripts (P in addition to B, T, and W), and which tries to establish relationships between manuscripts without convincing support from the evidence of the text;¹ Brockmann's book is not cited often.

The purpose of this thesis is to look at the textual transmission of *Symposium* 201d1–212c3 without the clutter of editorial interference. By looking at the primary manuscripts, the papyrus, and the indirect tradition, I expect that the state of the text in antiquity will reveal itself. Because our passage has been so important to the history of ideas, the witnesses to the text may reveal how the text was understood in antiquity, perhaps even betraying the influence of that thought in their transmission. The description of *daimones* contained within the passage (202d1–203a8) has such importance and influence, as a brief survey of its influence will demonstrate, that establishing the state of the text in antiquity will demonstrate both how the motifs contained within it were adapted and modified, and how these changes themselves went on to influence other texts.

A summary of the contents of our passage, namely the key points in the exchange between Socrates and Diotima, will comprise the first chapter. In the second chapter the focus will be the five primary manuscripts and the papyrus. The purpose of this chapter is to draw out the relationships between these witnesses and to compare them to the expectations formed by modern scholarship; arguments about the relationship between the papyrus and the manuscripts will be drawn without the influence of prior assumptions. Special attention will be paid to how the evidence of our passage either confirms or challenges scholarly views about the

¹ For more on Brockmann, see Murphy's review (1994) and that of Joyal (1996).

independence and dependence of the primary MSS, namely the relationship of B and D, and the relationship of P to both T and W.

In the third chapter the focus will be on the indirect tradition and its relationship to the direct tradition, not only to determine the state of Plato's text as it was available to the authors of testimonia, which predate our medieval manuscripts but not our papyrus, but also to see whether the testimonia preserve traditions later found in particular primary witnesses.

The fourth chapter falls into two parts: the first part looks at the indirect tradition again, but focuses on the particular changes made to the text in order to determine whether these changes are consistent with ancient practices in citing, quoting, and paraphrasing and whether they point to deliberate tampering by an author: how true to Plato's text and ideas are his successors? This part of chapter four also deals with the difficulty of knowing whether the changes originate in the authors of the testimonia, or whether these changes are the result of error in the transmission of their texts. The second part of the fourth chapter deals with the influence of the description of *daimones*, with a brief survey of the *Symposium's* *daimones* and the changes they underwent throughout history, all of which reinforces the importance of ascertaining the state and history of Plato's text.

Chapter One

Summary

Introduction

The industry of the ancient authors who quote our passage should suffice to demonstrate its interest and importance. A brief summary of the content of our passage will provide context for a look at the extent to which this passage influenced and inspired later authors.

The passage (201d1–212c3)

Diotima asserts that Eros is by nature in an intermediate state: neither good and beautiful nor bad and ugly, neither god nor mortal. His position is that of a δαίμων. As a δαίμων his purpose is to be an intermediary (one of several δαίμονες) between gods and mortals, and his δύναμις is to perform these intermediary acts.² To accept these statements requires acceptance of several premises: a) there are intermediate states rather than a dichotomy of opposites; b) Eros cannot be a god because gods (apparently) must be beautiful and happy on account of their *possession* of good and beautiful things; and c) Eros is defined as lacking and therefore *pursuing* good and beautiful things (201e–203a).³

² See Sheffield (2006, 43–44, n.2) (see also 40, 46–47) for Eros as a “dynamic” intermediary, a sense which I think is also embodied in his active mediating between the mortal and immortal spheres. Osborne (1994, 110–111) argues that Eros is an intermediary daimon between gods and mortals because he needs to make humans aware that they lack immortal “features” (beauty, wisdom, happiness, and immortality) and inspire their pursuit of these features: “Eros is responsible for their ability to perceive a lack and their desire to make good the lack.”

³ Sheffield (2017, 125–138) discusses the type of desire that Eros must be and the nature of the object it desires, and why the very specific characterization of it in the *Symposium* is necessary to make philosophy an erotic art (127–129). Nussbaum (1986, 177–179) argues that lovers lack and yearn for particular *instances* of beauty (because all that is beautiful is not identical), but are not wholly devoid of beauty themselves.

Eros receives his intermediary nature from his parents and from the circumstances of his birth. His mother Penia sought to conceive him by Poros to satisfy her lack of resources.⁴ Because Eros is born of two opposite parents he is intermediate between them and participates in their natures equally:⁵ he is (paradoxically) always in a state of lacking but his abundance of resource pulls him back. It is also from his father that Eros pursues the beautiful and good and possesses all good or noble aptitudes (κατὰ δὲ αὐτὸν πατέρα ἐπίβουλός ἐστι κτλ. 203d4–8). Underlying these statements are several premises which need acceptance: a) the occurrence of his conception on Aphrodite's birthday makes Eros her attendant and somehow establishes beauty as the object of his desire; b) even though Eros both utterly lacks resource and abounds in it, he is intermediate not because he is between those states but because he moves from one to the other and does not wholly participate in the nature of either parent; and c) because he participates in the nature of his father Poros, somehow⁶ Eros inherits only resource for noble pursuits or qualities, including, of course, wisdom, which Eros cannot wholly possess because he is not wholly his father (203b–203e).

Eros is free to pursue wisdom because he neither altogether possesses it nor lacks it. The premises behind this statement are as follows: a) Eros has inherited pursuit of wisdom from his

⁴ Much is made of the aetiological nature of his parents' names (Penia and Poros being, of course, on opposite ends of the spectrum of resource). But Sheffield 2006 48–49 provides a good discussion about how Penia has enough resource and calculation to identify an object and strategy to sate her need.

⁵ Sheffield (2006, 43) stresses that Penia is not included among the gods as Poros is, which must underly Diotima's claim at 203e3 that Eros is neither mortal nor immortal as a condition of his birth.

⁶ Sheffield (2006, 4–7, 41n.5, 45) discusses the educative purpose of *symposia* and the (moral) content appropriate to them, including the strategies of praise and *encomium* used to instruct youths. The origin of zeal for good, which is unclear from the simple aetiology of choosing the name Poros, might then be implicit in or requisite for the setting of a symposium. Certainly, *euporos* would have been more to the purpose if Plato did not think that pursuit of *kalon* and *agathon* was somehow implicit or naturally assumed. Sheffield does introduce the notion that Poros is in possession of these because he is a god (43), but does it necessarily follow that Eros seeks to obtain his father's characteristics? Or does he partake of them through being intermediate between his parents? Certainly by making Poros Penia's opposite, Plato artificially creates a Poros who is inclined to noble pursuits. Sheffield mentions Eros' pursuit of good (47–49) but does not seek an origin for it. The use of *euporos* and its cognates is dealt with by Sheffield (43, 49).

father,⁷ from his affinity for beauty which stems from Poros and from the day of his birth, and from not being a god and therefore not being wise; b) because his mother lacks wisdom it is clear that Eros' intermediate state between wisdom and ignorance is not one of flux between the extremes (because he would neither need to seek wisdom if wise nor care to seek it if ignorant), but a general middle state (203e–204b).⁸

The intermediate nature of Eros is embodied in a lover because the lover himself is imperfect and pursues that which or he who is perfect. The premise behind accepting Eros as a lover is that lovers must love only what is beautiful, and therefore what is itself incapable of love because it is perfect, without deficiency, and it cannot desire if it does not lack something.

Eros is the desire⁹ for beautiful things. Beauty is assumed to be the desired end here only because, as Diotima says, Socrates decreed it so. But love of beautiful things is untenable as the goal of a philosophical discussion, so it is necessary instead to discuss love as desire for good things, for the possession of good things, and further for perpetual personal possession, and for the happiness attendant on such possession.¹⁰ This reduction to personal perpetual possession could not be possible without the switch from a desire of beautiful to a desire of good (for surely desire for a beautiful boy is not compatible with the aging of the boy, and perpetual possession precludes multiple *eromenoi*). How then can Eros be a desire felt by a lover? The application of Eros is metaphysical or at least transcends the human. Presumably physical beauty entails mental

⁷ Sheffield (2006, 61–62) notes the difficulty of determining how or to what degree Eros inherits wisdom from Poros.

⁸ Sheffield (2006, 62–64) discusses how Eros' intermediacy affects his pursuit of wisdom and what it means for his attempts to attain wisdom (if in fact he is even able to attain wisdom). Sheffield (58–61) also discusses at length the importance of *aporia* to the pursuit of wisdom.

⁹ Sheffield (2006, 2n.2) provides compelling evidence for using “desire” as the best word to characterize *eros*.

¹⁰ See Lear (2006) for a discussion on the substitution of good for beautiful (102–105), and for a discussion on the role of beauty and its connection to procreation, immortality, and the divine (106–118). For the moral difference between *καλόν* and *ἀγαθόν*, see Guthrie (1975, 247 n.1); and for what *καλόν* and *ἀγαθόν* meant to a Greek, see Guthrie (1975, 177–178).

and moral beauty which must on some level translate to mental and moral goodness (204d–206a).

Pursuit of Eros has as its (not necessarily final and ultimate) end the manifestation or birth of an inner divine element,¹¹ just as Penia was able to conceive an end to satisfy her lack. Beauty (*to kalon* not *to agathon*) provides the stimulus for creation. Creation fulfils the desire of Eros because Eros is not just a desire for beauty but a desire for immortality.¹² Immortality for humans comes through bodily generation or channeling the soul into a creative outlet. The premises for accepting these statements are as follows. The inner divine element will not manifest itself except in beauty because both the divine element and the divine process of creation, by virtue of being divine, are harmonious only with beauty; as noted earlier, beauty is strongly associated with the divine. The natural aging and educative processes are not enough to renew or regenerate humans or to create a sense of immortality, so they must seek additional means of immortality (206b–208b).

Fame and immortal reputation are the realization of this desire for immortality, as is the begetting of children. There are several premises behind this statement: a) a desire for immortality is Eros because choosing death or incurring danger brings immortal fame and this is the only reason for which people go to such extremes; b) parents run risks for their children so that their creation may endure; c) dying for a loved one (not limited to an *eromenos*) brings immortality through the resultant fame attached to the deed; and d) the loved one is not the

¹¹ The all-important notion of pregnancy of the soul.

¹² Osborne emphasizes that the focus of Eros shifts from a desire to possess something beautiful to a desire to possess immortality; the desire for *possession* of beauty is now a desire to *gaze upon* the beautiful (1994, 102–103).

immortal creation that a child is, so his or her survival is not the goal; dying for a child might bring twofold experience of immortality through fame and the progeny's survival (208c–e).

The divine element in the soul can manifest itself specifically in a relationship with and the education of a physically beautiful *person*; a beautiful *soul* is optional. The underlying premises are as follows. Beauty encourages procreation or generation: the soul needs a beautiful medium upon which to beget, and only upon seeing a beautiful body will the soul bring forth its beautiful ideas.¹³ These ideas are immortal. Somehow there is room for the soul to create without a partner. Presumably the other virtues the soul begets either do not require a beautiful medium in which to manifest themselves or, during the education of a beautiful person, they manifest themselves in a person previously unfit to educate.¹⁴ Diotima speaks of the benefit of having a beloved who is beautiful in both body and soul, claiming that the virtues brought forth by the lover's soul are nurtured through continued discussion; but among these virtues, which are καλλίωνων and ἀθανατωτέρων, she also includes the law codes of Solon and Lycurgus and the great works of Homer and Hesiod: of what use is a beloved who is beautiful merely in body (209a–e)?

The stimulus of beautiful bodies produces the desire to create, but this is only one step in the process of Eros. The proper hierarchy is to love a particular beautiful body, and to use that

¹³ Guthrie (1975, 387) is very strict about the role beauty and eros play in the soul's pregnancy: "Pregnancy is not the *result* of love excited by the beautiful, but a universal state which *causes* excitement at an encounter with beauty." Ferrari (1992, 255) is likewise emphatic about the result of Eros: what is created by those who pursue the "Greater Mysteries" is itself *beautiful*. What is key in distinguishing those who pursue the "Lesser Mysteries" from those who pursue the "Greater," Ferrari claims, is that the former "... cannot be said to have examined and understood that connection;" this connection is "between the beautiful and the good," meaning that those who pursue the "Greater Mysteries" produce something beautiful instead of being mere "conduits" for beauty (255). Burnyeat (1977, 8) emphasizes that "the pregnancy is the cause, not the consequence, of love... pregnancy precedes intercourse, because birth and intercourse are imaginatively equated."

¹⁴ Strictly speaking, Diotima describes the soul's creation of virtues as requiring a beautiful medium, but she does not elaborate how beauty is necessary for the birth of other virtues by the souls of poets and craftsmen among others.

body to give birth to the virtues and ideas of the soul. The next step is recognition of the universal or non-particular nature of beauty.¹⁵ What follows is the embracing of Eros directed towards all beautiful bodies and then towards all beautiful souls. Next comes appreciation for the beauty in societal constructs, and then comes pursuit of knowledge. Pursuing the beauty of knowledge is the final break of Eros with the particular. Knowledge is the ultimate end of desire because recognizing universal beauty provides an unlimited scope for the soul to create upon; this process is philosophy. Proper ascent results in true knowledge about beauty.¹⁶ The premises behind this hierarchy of pursuit are as follows. These steps in Eros require relinquishing or subordinating the desire for immortality to the recognition of universal truths. Dissociation from Eros of a particular body or soul is possible for an individual;¹⁷ and replacing desire for beauty with appreciation for it still falls under the term Eros because the association and education is still happening upon bodies, even if in a more general way. Societal constructs, being the manifestation of the soul's divine element, are beautiful. Knowledge is somehow beautiful, if only because it is the manifestation of the soul. The manifestation of the divine element of the soul through philosophy and knowledge results in true knowledge about beauty (the element

¹⁵ Nussbaum (1986, 179–180) emphasizes that at each stage the lover makes a decision to broaden his spectrum of what is beautiful, a decision made from a sense of obligation. This obligation, Nussbaum argues, greatly reduces the sort of extreme tension usually associated in erotic relationships (see also 181).

¹⁶ At this stage, Nussbaum explains (1986, 180–181), all beauty is the same in *quality*, removing conflict between pursuit of one beauty over another: “The lover, seeing a flat uniform landscape of value, with no jagged promontories or deep valleys, will have few motivations for moving here rather than there on that landscape. A contemplative life is a natural choice.”

¹⁷ Ferrari (1992, 256) explains the mental state of the lover who distances himself from particular objects one step at a time: “The mark of the suitable initiate is that he does not take the nature of the beautiful for granted as would an honor lover, but is prone to become more deeply fascinated by the beauty that first attracted it. This displacement of attention is what motivates his climb to each new level of the upward path.” Nussbaum (1986, 182–183) argues that this sort of Eros, once the summit has been achieved, is compatible with normal (erotic) Eros because it fulfills the need for stable love: “It is, we see, the old familiar *eros*, that longing for an end to longing, that motivates us here to ascend to a world in which erotic activity, as we know it, will not exist.”

which the soul creates is apparently equivalent with or antecedent to knowledge of beauty) (210a–d).

Beauty in its true nature is eternal, universal, and constant; it takes no one shape nor is it subjective; it is part of everything but never depleted.¹⁸ Eros in those whose souls desire to give birth can lead them to this ultimate truth because they are capable of recognizing the progressively greater scope of beauty. A sort of immortality is possible through pursuit and knowledge of true beauty because knowing the truth allows the soul to beget true virtues.¹⁹ There is a necessary precept that begetting a true virtue is pleasing to the gods, which somehow imbues the creator (or the progeny?) with immortality (210e–212a).

¹⁸ John Dillon (2011, 15–20) provides a comparison of the infinite nature of the ultimate (“One” or “God”) in Plotinus and Ficino – in Book II of his *Platonic Theology* not his *Commentary on Plato’s Symposium* – who both use concepts similar to those Plato uses to describe the infinite nature of true beauty.

¹⁹ Nussbaum (1986, 183–184) suggests that the satisfied contemplative life of one who has reached the summit can perhaps be seen in the idiosyncrasies of Socrates:

“[Socrates] seems at this point in his life to be always remarkably in control of his activities, free from ordinary passions and distractions... Socrates has so dissociated himself from his body that he genuinely does not feel its pain, or regard its sufferings as things genuinely happening to him... We cannot explain all this by supposing his physiology to be unique. We are invited, instead, to look for the explanation in his psychological distance from the world. He really seems to think of himself as a being whose mind is distinct from his body, whose personality in no way identifies itself with the body and the body’s adventures... [his] soul, self-absorbed, pursues its self-sufficient contemplation.”

Chapter Two

The Direct Tradition

i. Chapter Introduction

In order to have a basis for understanding what Plato's text might have looked like, the primary manuscripts and the papyrus need to be discussed. This discussion will establish a point of comparison for the testimonia, and will shed light on whether and how (and why) the text changed in transmission.

The manuscript tradition of the *Symposium* reflects a stemma consisting of the families β , T, and δ . The relationship of the family T, which for the dialogue is represented solely by the MS. T, to the other families is a complicated one. The passage under consideration displays a closer relationship between T and δ than between T and β . And while the papyrus shows a closer relationship to T and δ , its affiliations vary widely, not just between the families β and δ but against both as well. For portions of the passage, the apparatus is taken up more by the variants introduced by the papyrus, the testimonia, and modern conjecture than by disagreement among the primary manuscripts.

i.1 The manuscripts

For the text of Plato's *Symposium* there are five primary manuscripts: B and D (representatives of the family β), T (the only representative of its family), and P and W (which are representatives of the family δ).

papyrus. It is also worth noting that the division of the primary manuscripts into the bipartite stemma of T PW and BD began at an early date if each group agrees (as a group) separately with the papyrus.

iii. The family β

iii.1 The relationship of B and D

The MS. B is the oldest of the medieval primary witnesses for the *Symposium*, and although it did not make its way into Western scholarship until the beginning of the nineteenth century, it was long considered the *codex optimus*, receiving consideration over other MSS. without regard for their potential value as primary witnesses.⁵⁶

B provides a reading which diverges from the rest of the MSS. several times:

203c6 πένης b D T W Π : πενίης B

203d7 πόριμος φιλοσοφῶν T W Πc (m.1) : πορισμος φιλοσόφων B : φορισμὸς
φιλοσόφων D : φρονιμος φιλοσοφων Π

209c6 καλλιόνων b D T PW : καλλίων ὦν B : καλλειονων Π

210c7 ἵνα ἴδηι d T PW : ἵν' αἰδηι B : ἵν' αἰδη D : ινα ειδη Π

211b1 ἔν τῳ T W Π : ἐν τῷ B : ἐν τῶ D : ἐν τινι P, Wsv ipse

211c3 ἐπαναβασμοῖς T Π : ἐπαναβαθμοῖς B PW : ἐπ' ἀναβαθμοῖς Bpc : ἀπαναβαθμοῖς D

⁵⁶ Dodds (1959, 35–37).

It is worth noting that the first two discrepancies occur closely together near the start of our passage while the latter four are spaced evenly towards the end of our passage. The difference between B and D in the reading at 210c7 is one of iota adscript which could date back to different readings of a majuscule script: it is, in other words, an important indication of the independence of B and D. For the reading at 211c3 the agreement of B, D, P, and W in reading θ rather than σ as T and the papyrus probably dates back to misreading of majuscule script, but the reading in D is singular enough to argue again for independence from B.

B rarely agrees with a single witness except where it agrees solely with D. But in the middle of the passage there is one reading where B agrees solely with the papyrus:

206c7 ἔνεστιν B Π : ἔστιν D T PW

The only other reading where B agrees with a single witness is at 203b4 where it appears to agree with the indirect tradition, which will be discussed further in the next chapter (see chapter three, iii). The evidence suggests, then, that for the passage, B was little influenced by other traditions except as the β tradition as a whole was influenced. When B was transcribed from a β ancestor it received little outside contamination except from a copy which preserved the readings which are also found in the papyrus tradition (i.e., B often differs from δ , but often in conjunction with the other MSS. of the β tradition; when B diverges from the rest of β , the only witness with which it agrees is the papyrus). The secondary witness V and a correcting hand in B both agree with the papyrus at 209d5 (against BD),⁵⁷ which shows both that we should give credit to Byzantine and later scribes and scholars for finding the true reading, and that the papyrus, in spite of its many errors, does on occasion preserve the true reading where the

⁵⁷ 209d5 κατελίπετο b V Π : κατέλιπεν τὸ BD : κατελείπετο T PW.

manuscripts trace back to an archetype which preserved the Platonic reading, and, more precisely, to one which erroneously broke the participle, necessitating the corrections variously undertaken in each manuscript; this likely means that the exemplar dates to shortly after the introduction of miniscule around AD 800. That Eusebius echoes the error could point to his use of a text which also contained this word-division, suggesting that it, too, was written at a period where Plato's participle was no longer understood as such. The agreement between Eusebius IO and Origen proposed earlier is specifically an agreement with Origen M at 203b4, and the corrector of M, in particular. It may be a stretch to suggest that the exemplars used by the primary MSS. of Plato were much older; they may simply have been written by scribes whose understanding of Greek was not troubled by the participle.

Origen also makes omissions at:

203b2 ὅτε γὰρ ἐγένετο : ὅτ' ἐγένετο Origen

203c2 καὶ : om. Origen

203d6 ἀεί τινας : ἀεὶ Origen

A fourth omission, inaccurately reported by Vicaire, needs to be added:

203e2 τε T W : om. BD Π Origen

The omissions at 203b2, 203c2, and 203e2 are not significant, but the omission of τινας at 203d6 is serious, especially when combined with the alteration of the following word from πλέκων to προσπλέκων.

Overall the text of Origen remains very close to the Platonic text in this section. With the exception of the omission of τινας at 203d6, the changes Origen introduces are slight and mainly

of a stylistic nature. A slight relationship between Origen and Eusebius IO is possible, as is a relationship with the papyrus corrector, and one with W (possibly T as well, but it is more likely that BD strayed from the rest of the tradition; Origen nowhere demonstrates a special relationship with BD).

v. Hermias (fifth century)

In our passage Hermias (*in Phaedrum*) quotes five sections: 201d5, 202d13, 202d13–e4, 203d7–8, and 204a1.

In his first section (201d5) Hermias gives ἤτις με ἐδίδαξε τὰ ἐρωτικά instead of ἦ δὴ καὶ ἐμὲ τὰ ἐρωτικά ἐδίδαξεν which appears in the main tradition. He has changed the presentation of the subject and he has rearranged the word order. The spirit of his quotation remains the same, but he has made the text his own.

For the second section (202d13), Hermias quotes only the words δαίμων μέγας, but he does so in several places. While the phrase is an important one, his use of it has little to add to a discussion on the transmission of the text.

The third section Hermias quotes is a longer one (202d13–e4). Hermias makes use of this section more than once, but even though he retains some of the original phraseology, these quotations are better described as paraphrases. While they are not important for the current discussion, they will be addressed in chapter four (ii.2).

The fourth section (203d7–8) is, again, a paraphrase or a complete rearrangement of the original, but none of the important elements are left out, replaced, or augmented: Hermias provides:

εἶπε γὰρ αὐτὸν καὶ ἐν Συμποσίῳ τὸν ἔρωτα φιλόσοφον καὶ δεινὸν γόητα καὶ φαρμακέα καὶ σοφιστήν.

Plato reads

φιλοσοφῶν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου, δεινὸς γόης καὶ φαρμακεὺς καὶ σοφιστής.

The presentation of Plato's text in indirect statement accounts for the difference.

In the fifth section Hermias quotes (204a1), his grammar is, once again, different, meaning that the snippet quotation of Plato cannot be given verbatim: θεῶν οὐδεὶς φιλοσοφεῖ] θεῶν γάρ, φησὶν, οὐδεὶς φιλόσοφος Hermias.

The quotations Hermias makes from our passage are seldom verbatim and often appear in paraphrase. It is important that he retains the phraseology of Plato, and his testimony might even be an ideal check for situations involving a choice between synonyms. For our passage, Hermias provides slim evidence for the transmission of the text, and the piecemeal nature of his quotations means that he does not show allegiance to any of the medieval MSS. families.

vi. Clement of Alexandria (c. AD 150–211)

Clement provides testimonia in his *Stromata* for two sections in our passage: 201d2–d5 and 209d7–e4.⁹⁷

The first section is clearly a paraphrase and differs from the Platonic text in several ways. There is a change of case, two omissions (one of them sizable – nine words), a change of word

⁹⁷ Vicaire claims that Clement also quotes τοιούτους παῖδας at 209c8, but he is in fact quoting those words from the end of the following section (209d7–e4).

Apart from his omissions Clement agrees with the *codices* and the papyrus, except where the papyrus provides a unique reading at 209e1.¹⁰⁰ The omissions seem to be deliberate, especially given the length of the last one, and could perhaps point to an effort to generalize. But the overall impression is that Clement knew the Platonic text well or was working with a sound text of Plato, but that he had a rather loose approach to the text of Plato.

Where Clement departs from the main tradition, the changes appear to be (almost entirely) Clement's own. Clement's testimonia do not align with any particular family or shed light on the ancestry of the text to which he had access.

vii. Hermogenes (second century)

Hermogenes quotes one section from our passage: 203b2–b3. The question is, given that he manipulates one portion of the text by conflating the subjects of the sentence, of how much value is his testimony for a (hotly contested) reading elsewhere in the section?

203b2 οἱ θεοὶ οἳ τε ἄλλοι BD T W Π Orig. Eus. : οἳ τε ἄλλοι θεοὶ Hermog.

If Hermogenes deliberately conflates two of the subjects within the sentence, the meaning is not much changed from Plato (but perhaps the syntax is simpler). The new word order does, however, retain the emphasis on Poros: both versions contain the vital elements of the phrase ἄλλ- ... τε ... καί which gives special emphasis to what follows, in both cases Poros. If this subtle shift in the presentation of the subjects suits Hermogenes' purpose in quoting this passage in a long line of other quotations, then it might be considered a deliberate change, but the difference between his text and Plato's is so little that intent is not likely the cause. An argument

¹⁰⁰ καὶ ἐν Ἑλληνισι BD T PW Clem. : καὶ Ἑλληνισι Π. Interestingly, the papyrus omits this ἐν but incorporates the second, whereas Clement includes the first and omits the second (καὶ ἐν βαρβάροις BD T PW Π : καὶ βαρβάροις Clem.).

for careless transcription, even transcription from memory, should also be kept in mind (and it could still be a happy coincidence if an error in quotation benefits his purpose, but the decision to quote several passages seems to call for careful quotation).

Of course, it is not entirely necessary to determine whether there was intent in his transposition, because in the second part of our question Hermogenes does follow a tradition for one reading. But if Hermogenes was quoting from memory or carelessly transcribing the text, then it may be accident that he agrees with other sources at 203b2: εἰσιτῶντο b, T ipse, W Hermog. Orig. Eus. : ἡσιτῶντο BD T, corr. W ipse : ἴσιτωντο Π. The multitude of sources for εἰσιτῶντο shows that Hermogenes could easily have had a text which had this reading. The fact that Hermogenes and the other testimonia preserve the correct reading against several primary manuscripts shows the later corruption of the text, a point made even more clear by the correction attributed to the scribe of W. The corrections in B and T show that the true reading was still known in the early medieval period, either preserved in more rigidly copied texts, through testimonia, or through the very exemplars they were copying (given how common the variants are, it is not impossible that three manuscripts independently made the identical error).

The section that Hermogenes quotes is too short for him to demonstrate allegiance to a particular family, but he does provide testimony which aligns with that of other testimonia.

viii. Pollux (second century)

Pollux quotes a single word from 202e5 ἀμοιβή. He is talking about a concept found in several authors, and is therefore not attempting to transmit the text of Plato.¹⁰¹ Given the fact that

¹⁰¹ The text of Pollux reads: λέγοιτο δ' ἂν ἐπὶ τούτων καὶ τὸ ἀμειβεσθαι. ἀμφίβολος δ' ἡ ἀμοιβή· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ παρ' Ἀρχιλόχῳ καὶ παρ' Εὐρυπίδῃ ἐν Ὀρέστη, τὸ δὲ παρ' Ὀμήρῳ 'σοὶ δ' ἄξιον ἔσται ἀμοιβῆς' καὶ παρὰ Πλάτωνι ἐν Συμποσίῳ οὐ σαφές.

Pollux is a lexicographer who often only cites single words, how is it fair to say that Pollux transmits the text of Plato, let alone cite him for omitting τῶν θυσιῶν? An argument which attributes the correct reading to Pollux is that of Th. Bergk, who argued that Pollux's classification of ἀμοιβῆς as οὐ σαφές “not clear” only makes sense if Pollux was consulting a text without τῶν θυσιῶν, which he felt must be a gloss added to explain ἀμοιβῆς.¹⁰² If Bergk is correct in assuming τῶν θυσιῶν to be a gloss, these words made their way into the textual tradition in antiquity because they are present in the papyrus. While Bergk and Pollux are correct that the meaning of ἀμοιβᾶς needs to be clarified, it is interesting that τῶν θυσιῶν makes its way into the texts of all primary witnesses; if τῶν θυσιῶν is a gloss, our primary MSS. and the papyrus descend closely from an archetype which incorporated this gloss at a very early date. If these words are not a gloss, then it shows that Plato understood that the meaning of his text needed to be made explicit. The omission of τῶν θυσιῶν is compelling for editors who seek near-perfect symmetry in the τῶν μὲν ... τῶν δέ clauses: τῶν μὲν τὰς δεήσεις καὶ θυσιάς, τῶν δὲ τὰς ἐπιτάξεις τε καὶ ἀμοιβὰς τῶν θυσιῶν. With the removal of τῶν θυσιῶν, only the presence of τε in the second clause prevents exact symmetry for those who think Plato the sort of author to pursue such symmetry. In his commentary on the *Gorgias*, however, E.R. Dodds repeatedly points out Plato's neglect and avoidance of symmetry.¹⁰³

ix. Methodius (third century)

Methodius quotes three sections (three lines, really) from our passage: 209d2–3, 210d6, and 212b5.

¹⁰² Bergk (1870, 678).

¹⁰³ See Dodds (1959, 403) under “symmetry, neglect of.”

In the first section, 209d2–3, apart from changing the verb tense, the text resembles that of Plato. 209d2–3: οἷα ἔκγονα ἑαυτῶν καταλείπουσιν BD T PW Π : ὅσα ἔκγονα καταλείπουσιν Procl. : οἷα καταλελοίπασιν ἑαυτῶν ἔκγονα Method. The section is either an instance of careless reporting, changing word order and tense for his own purposes, or (more likely) reporting from memory.

The second section, 210d6, is more complicated. Plato reads φιλοσοφία ἀφθόνῳ while Methodius gives ἐν ἀφθόνῳ καὶ καθαρᾷ φιλοσοφία. Whether this should be considered evidence for textual transmission is debatable. Methodius is undoubtedly giving a direct reference to this very passage of Plato because shortly afterwards he quotes the first section, 209d2–3. The classification of philosophy as καθαρᾷ reflects the theme (chastity) of his work (συμπόσιον ἢ περὶ ἀγνείας, in contrast to Plato’s περὶ ἔρωτος), so with his rephrasing and introduction of a new adjective, Methodius both makes the text his own and alters the meaning to suit his needs.

The third section is also short: 212b5: ἔγωγέ φημι χρῆναι BD T PW Π : ἔγω χρῆναί φημι Method. The difference to the Platonic text is slight.

Given the changes we see in each section Methodius quotes, it seems that he deliberately references the Platonic text while changing it to suit his purpose. Where discussion of the textual tradition is concerned, the changes introduced by Methodius discourage serious consideration of any alternatives he introduces, particularly that of verb tense at 209d2–3.

Determining the ways in which ancient sources understood the contemporary text of Plato may shed light on that text, and determining how ancient authors transmitted the text may add to or reduce their value in establishing the text of Plato. The latter does not detract from their value for the history of ideas.

i.1 Additions

The presence of additions in testimonia is not such a troubling phenomenon for the textual tradition because, as Whittaker says, “nothing of the original has necessarily been lost.”¹⁰⁷ Clarity seems to have been the motivation.¹⁰⁸ In our passage, additions do not make up a significant portion of the variants in the indirect tradition, and several authors do not make any additions at all.

Stobaeus makes several (six) additions including additions of two particles, one definite article, one preposition, one verb (which is necessary for the grammar of his sentence), and one long interpolation:

202d1–2 τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ καλῶν] τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν Stob.

202e3 θεοῖς τὰ] θεοῖς τε τὰ Stob.

203a6 ἡ χειρουργίας BD T W : ἡ περὶ χειρουργίας Π Stob.

203a7 καὶ BD T W Procl. : τε καὶ Π Stob.

208a4 ἔξοδος BD T WP Π (Stob. Tr.) : ἔξοδός ἐστιν Stob.(SMA)

208b5 ἀθανασίας γὰρ χάριν παντὶ BD T WP Π ἀθανασίας γὰρ ἅμα καὶ εὐδαιμονίας εἰς
τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον παντὶ Stob.

¹⁰⁷ Whittaker (1989, 76).

¹⁰⁸ Whittaker (1989, 80).

Most of these additions are of little account, but the addition of the article at 202d1–2 needs to be compared to the behaviour of Stobaeus (and other authors) towards definite articles (see below, i.5), and the large interpolation at 208b5 seems deliberate

The additions made by Origen are few (see below). As discussed in the third chapter, the “addition” at 203e3 may in fact be the original reading. The text at 203e5 is problematic, containing several variant postpositives and enclitics. What may be happening is an elaborate case of contamination¹⁰⁹: the oldest readings (the papyrus, the papyrus corrector, and Origen) show that *αυ και* was a reading from an early date. The reading found in T and W shows a possible conflation of the early reading and the reading of the β family. The reading that Origen provides differs from the oldest reading only by the addition of a postpositive.

203e3 *πάλιν* BD T W Π : *πάλιν πάλιν* Πc Orig.

203e5 *τε αὖ καὶ* T W : *τε καὶ* BD : *καὶ* Π : *αυ και* Πc : *δ’ αὖ καὶ* Orig.

Hermogenes makes one addition which is tied to an omission he makes earlier in the same line, and it is rightly classified as a transposition (or conflation as suggested in chapter two) and will be discussed further under the heading of word order.

203b2 *οἱ θεοὶ οἳ τε ἄλλοι* BD T W Π Orig. Eus. : *οἳ τε ἄλλοι θεοὶ* Hermog.

Plotinus possibly makes two additions. The addition of a preposition (206e8) is unremarkable, but the addition of the definite article (206c5) is only an addition if we accept the reading of the papyrus which is favoured by modern editors against that of the *codices* and Plotinus.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹ For similar examples of contamination in dialogues of the first two tetralogies, see Joyal (1996, 122); West (1973, 12–14, 35–36), provides a succinct explanation on contamination. See, also Dodds (1959, 38–39, 50 n.4, 64).

¹¹⁰ The manuscript tradition of Plotinus is divided here: those without the article are BRJUSCQ, and only Aac and E have it, so (depending on the value attached to the various MSS. by scholars of the Plotinus MS tradition) Vicaire

206c5 καλῶ Π : τῶ καλῶ BD T W Plotin.

206e8 ὡς θνητῶ] ὡς ἐν θνητῶ Plotin.

The additions in our passage seem to have little bearing on the meaning of the text and, apart from Stobaeus' large interpolation at 208b5, the purpose behind most of these additions is unclear. Plotinus' insertion of an article suits his purpose in discussing philosophical beauty and forms, allowing him to discuss beauty as *the beautiful*. Addition of particles and conjunctions could be attributed to style, and insertion of prepositions is clear evidence that additions serve to enhance clarity. The addition of definite articles is interesting, even significant, for its possible effect on meaning and for what it reveals about how authors of the indirect tradition understood Plato; the phenomenon of articles will be examined once the scope of their manipulation is clear.

i.2 Subtractions

Subtractions or omissions are, like additions, more prevalent in some authors than others, and in our passage, Stobaeus is the only author with more than three omissions. Omissions can be accidental but are often intentional.¹¹¹

Clement omits both a subject and the adjective which modifies it, and he omits a (repeated) preposition later in the same sentence: three omissions in one sentence could suggest intentional omission. The direct tradition¹¹² reads: καὶ ἄλλοι ἄλλοθι πολλαχοῦ ἄνδρες, καὶ ἐν Ἑλλησι καὶ ἐν Βαρβάροις, but in Clement the subject is completely removed.

209d7 ἄλλοι : om. Clem.

209e1 ἄνδρες : om. Clem.

may be giving the wrong impression in this presentation. For an outline of the MS tradition of Plotinus, see Henry and Schwyzer (1964, v–ix).

¹¹¹ Whittaker (1989, 76–77).

¹¹² With the exception of the papyrus, which reads καὶ Ἑλλησι.

209e1–2 καὶ ἐν βαρβάροις BD T PW Π : καὶ βαρβάροις Clem.

In the following lines, Clement makes a third omission:

209e2–3 πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἀποφηνάμενοι ἔργα γεννήσαντες παντοίαν ἀρετήν : om. Clem.

An omission of such length argues for intention, and it is not Clement’s purpose to reproduce large tracts of the *Symposium*; rather he is incorporating a brief quotation into his own work: by making this quotation concise (including the omissions earlier in the section) it better fits his discussion. The text which Clement does reproduce is quite close to Plato, which suggests that he had a well-transcribed exemplar.¹¹³

The 13 omissions of Stobaeus fall into several categories: particles, conjunctions, definite articles, verb forms, and phrases of two or more words.

202c10 δὲ δὴ : om. Stob.

202c10 τὰγαθὰ BD T W Π Stob. : ἀγαθὰ Stob.(P)

202c10 τὰ καλὰ BD Π : καλὰ T W Stob.

202e1 τε BD T Π : om. W Stob.

202e5 τῶν θυσιῶν BD T W Π Stob.(F) : θυσιῶν Stob.(P) : om. Pollux

203a5 σοφὸς ὦν BD T W Π : σοφὸς Stob.

203a5 ἢ περὶ τέχνας : om. Stob.(F)

¹¹³ Outler (1940, 121–123) emphasizes that while Clement must have made use of anthologies, he had firsthand knowledge of Plato, making only occasional errors: “Clement’s readings are, in the main, faithful; their deviations can be explained as signs of carelessness rather than as proofs of ignorance. As a matter of fact, his citations of Plato are quite as faithful as is his use of Scripture.” But, Outler notes, Clement is not free from mistakes in reporting Plato, leading him to conclude that “In the first place, he often quotes them from memory; in the second place, his cavalier handling of them does not indicate the disciple, treating the master’s sayings with loving care, but rather the use of proof-texts to confirm views already held on other authority” (1940, 124); see also 127 for Clement’s habit of taking “from Plato only that which he wishes to find, that which is in accord with a position derived in part from his Hellenistic education and in part from his Christian convictions.” Outler also emphasizes that Clement was not alone in his Christian appropriation and use of Plato – it was somewhat the norm (1940, 236–239). From Outler, then, we expect that Clement quotes Plato where the content provides what he needs, but that some errors will occur because the meaning inherent in Plato is not what interests Clement, but rather a precedent for ideas he wishes to express. Van Den Hoek’s article is also useful for understanding the methods of gathering and using material contemporary to Clement, as well as his idiosyncrasies in using that material (1996, 223–243).

203a7 ἐστὶ : om. Stob.

208a4–5 λήθη γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἔξοδος : om. Stob.(B)

208a7 γὰρ : om. Stob.

208b1 τῷ τὸ BD T WP Π : τῷ Stob.(A)

208b1 καὶ παλαιούμενον BD T WP Π : om. Stob.(SMA)

208b2–b4 ταύτη ... ἄλλη : om. Stob.

Seven of these examples are omissions unanimous across the Stobaeus MS. tradition.

Only one of these unanimous omissions (202c10) is an omission of the definite article. Two are omissions of copulative (or linking) verb forms (203a5 and 203a7). The length of the unanimous omission at 208b2–b4 suggests that it was undertaken for a particular reason: the omission removes a vocative and a contextualizing verb of speech (ἔφη), resulting in a quotation less tied to place and speaker. A desire to generalize or modify the grammar to suit a new sentence may be behind the omissions of postpositives, enclitics, and particles in 202c10, 202e1, and 208a7.

The manuscript tradition of Stobaeus, however, is complicated. Of particular interest is the inconsistency within the Stobaeus MS. tradition: five omissions occur in only one Stobaeus MS, while a sixth example (208b1) appears in three MSS. Half of these unique omissions consist of omissions of the definite article. Twice the MS. Stob.P omits the article where Stob.F does not (202c10 and 202e5).¹¹⁴ The remaining unique omission of a definite article by a Stobaeus MS. is the omission at 208b1 of τὸ by Stob.A. Discrepancies in the application of the definite article seem to belong mostly to the first section Stobaeus quotes and to the two MSS. (Stob.P and Stob.F) which transmit that portion of Stobaeus. The three remaining examples of omissions not

¹¹⁴ Both MSS. (F and P) omit the article at 202c10, making that omission unanimous among the MSS. which transmit this portion of Stobaeus.

universal to the Stobaeus tradition are all phrases of two to four words in length (203a5, 208a4–5, and 208b1). The question is whether the omissions, in these cases, were Stobaeus' own and were subsequently corrected in individual MSS. (by comparison with Platonic texts), or whether Stobaeus followed the Plato tradition and a later copyist made the omissions.¹¹⁵ Where the Stobaeus MS. tradition varies it is important to note that one reading may be right, or both readings may be wrong, but both cannot be correct. These questions do not, for the most part,¹¹⁶ have a bearing on the (mostly) secure Plato text, but they do have a bearing on the Stobaeus MS. tradition: the question is whether Stobaeus originally transmitted a text different from Plato's. Unfortunately, there is no way to demonstrate conclusively that, where the Stobaeus MSS. disagree, the copyist of one MS. was not using Plato to correct the text of Stobaeus. The discussion on definite articles will seek to resolve (below, i.5), or at least simplify, this dilemma, but it is helpful to lay out the scope of the problem here.

Consider the case of 202e5: Stobaeus suddenly appears to favour inclusion of the article after previously omitting it – who is to say Stob.P is not the correct *Stobaeus* reading (even if it is not the Plato reading)? The same argument in favour of Stob.P could be made for the reading at 202c10. And who decides that T W and Stobaeus are wrong at 202c10? Calling something an omission seems to assume that there is a secure text. The omission at 208a4–5 should not be considered deliberate on Stobaeus' part because a later scribe may have intentionally excised

¹¹⁵ Whittaker (1989, 76–78) allows for the possibility that scribes of the indirect tradition made omissions, but replacement of omitted content does not fall within the scope of his work; Whittaker also notes the possibility of accident or faulty memory, but he further demonstrates the possibility of an omission having its root in the scholarship through which ancient authors were familiar with the text. Such an outlook should be kept in mind when looking at omissions as a whole, but because we are dealing with issues of variants within the Stobaeus tradition, our concern is with whether Stobaeus made a conscious decision to omit or whether the omission came later. West (1973, 10–11) provides some examples of such interference by later copyists.

¹¹⁶ As we have seen, the omission of the article at 202c10 τὰ καλὰ BD Π : καλὰ T W Stob is unanimous to the Stobaeus MSS. but there is discrepancy among the Plato MSS.

it,¹¹⁷ and because only one MS. omits it. Because the omissions of the definite article occur mostly in the first section, their omission could be deliberate (for the sake of style or to generalize the meaning), but the fact that two of those omissions are only in Stob.P limits this conclusion. To say that Stobaeus demonstrates a tendency to omit definite articles (more often than he adds them) requires unanimous omissions. It is remarkable that a pattern of omitting articles can be ascribed to Stobaeus (or to the scribe of Stob.P) when the omission of small words, including articles, was common.

Four other authors make subtractions, and three of them join Stobaeus in omitting definite articles. Origen omits a conjunction, an indefinite adjective, and an enclitic:

203c2 καὶ θεράπων BD T W Π : θεράπων Orig.

203d6 ἀεί τινας : ἀεὶ Orig.

203e2 τε καὶ : καὶ Orig.

Proclus omits a definite article and an adjective:

209d2 ποιητὰς τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς BD T WP Π : ἀγαθοὺς ποιητὰς Procl.

209d2–3 οἷα ἔκγονα ἑαυτῶν καταλείπουσιν BD T WP Π : ὅσα ἔκγονα καταλείπουσιν

Procl. : οἷα καταλελοίπασιν ἑαυτῶν ἔκγονα Method.

Both Hermogenes and Pollux omit a noun and its definite article:

203b2 οἱ θεοὶ : om. Hermog.

202e5 τῶν θυσιῶν BD T W Π Stob.(F) : θυσιῶν Stob(P). : om. Pollux

It is tempting to make much of the omission of definite articles: first, four of the six authors who make omissions are subtracting the article; second, three of these authors do not make many omissions. The omission by Hermogenes, however, as already discussed, is a transposition and

¹¹⁷ See Whittaker (1989, 76–77).

belongs to the category of changes in word order. If the omission by Pollux is in fact the original reading, in spite of the fact that it occurs in a reference to Plato among other authors (meaning it is hardly a verbatim quotation), then it would be an instance of five primary witnesses and an indirect witness all adding in the same gloss. Still, the fact that authors are independently altering an element (definite articles) which affects meaning justifies a larger discussion once the data are compiled.

i.3 Word order

Changes to word order (transposition) are perhaps not a significant category when trying to determine the original state of the text: the words (theoretically) remain the same.¹¹⁸ Whittaker argues that ancient authors might not have considered changes to word order to be actual emendations of the text, but when they consistently alter the word order the changes might well be deliberate.¹¹⁹ The intention behind rearranging the sequence of words seems to have been to present something new (while retaining the original meaning).¹²⁰

Changes to word order in our passage are fewer than additions or omissions, but three of the five ancient authors who make changes in word order do so more than once, which, given the (small) scale of the sections they quote, might indicate deliberate rearrangement. Several of these transpositions are coupled with addition or omission of the definite article.

Stobaeus makes two changes to word order, both in the first section he quotes.

202d1–2 τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ καλῶν : τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν Stob.

202d8 εἴη ὁ Ἔρωσ : ὁ Ἔρωσ εἴη Stob.

¹¹⁸ Whittaker (1989, 73).

¹¹⁹ Whittaker (1989, 72).

¹²⁰ Whittaker (1989, 73).

Proclus also makes two changes to word order, but unlike Stobaeus he omits rather than adds the definite article.

209d2 ποιητὰς τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς BD T WP Π : ἀγαθοὺς ποιητὰς Procl.

212b3–4 συνεργὸν ἀμείνω Ἔρωτος : συνεργὸν ἔρωτος ἀμείνω Procl.

The one change Hermias makes is simply of word order.

201d5 τὰ ἐρωτικά ἐδίδαξεν : ἐδίδαξε τὰ ἐρωτικά Hermias

Hermogenes makes a transposition, leaving out the article in the process, because the new word order renders it unnecessary.

203b2 οἱ θεοὶ οἳ τε ἄλλοι BD T W Π Orig. Eus. : οἳ τε ἄλλοι θεοὶ Hermog.

Methodius makes two changes to word order.

209d2–3 οἷα ἔκγονα ἐαυτῶν καταλείπουσιν BD T WP Π : ὅσα ἔκγονα καταλείπουσιν

Procl. : οἷα καταλελοίπασιν ἐαυτῶν ἔκγονα Method.

212b5 ἔγωγέ φημι χρῆναι BD T WP Π : ἔγω χρῆναί φημι Method.

Aside from changing the word order Methodius eschews the qualified form of the personal pronoun, perhaps in an effort to generalize the quotation (by removing the less emphatic element).

Changes to word order, then, are not common among the ancient authors who quote our passage verbatim or nearly verbatim. And even though several authors make more than one change to word order, no one makes more than two such changes. Whether or not one considers changes to word order as deliberate (at least as a stylistic tool) requires a few observations. First, only half of the ancient authors quoting from our passage make changes to word order; a noticeable absentee is Origen, who quotes from our passage at length. Second, the case of Stobaeus, who quotes three sections from our passage, illustrates that changes in word order do

not necessarily go hand in hand with long quotations: across his three quotations he makes only two changes to word order, both in the same quotation. Third, rearrangement of word order is sometimes accompanied by addition or subtraction of the definite article or other emphatic elements, suggesting a desire to alter the emphasis of the quotation.

i.4 Substitutions

Substitutions are common and take many forms.¹²¹ In our passage there are some examples of replacing one word with a similar (in some cases cognate) word, and some examples of changing the number or grammatical form. The most common instances of substitution in our passage involve verb forms, which can vary in several ways.

Where simple substitutions are concerned, six authors provide evidence. Stobaeus twice replaces adjectives: in the first section he replaces one adjective with a non-cognate adjective, and in the second he replaces an adjective with an emphatic form.

203a4 τοιαῦτα σοφὸς BD T W Πc : τοιαῦτα σφοδρὸς Stob.

208b5 πᾶν BD T WP : ἅπαν Stob.

Proclus substitutes the more common form of an adjective for the less common one, provided we assume that the *codices* have the original reading. And, given the common nature of the change (itacism), the reading of the papyrus and Proclus is likely an orthographical variant.

204c5 τέλειον] τέλειον Π Procl.

Two MSS. of Eusebius replace a singular with a plural but retain the case and gender. The discrepancy either reflects a change which Eusebius made, but which later copyists corrected on

¹²¹ For a list of some common categories of substitutions, see Whittaker (1989, 83–84).

the basis of Plato, or a change which occurred when later scribes introduced a variant into their texts of Eusebius.

203b4 οἶον BD T W Π Orig. Eus.IO : οἶα Eus.ND

Origen likewise replaces a singular form with the plural, while retaining the case.

203c3 ἐκείνης BD T W Π : ἐκείνων Orig.¹²²

Hermias makes two substitutions, one a replacement of a verb with a cognate noun, the other a simplifying substitution which replaces particularizing grammatical elements with generalizing ones.

201d5 ἢ δὴ καὶ ἐμὲ BD T W Π : ἥτις με Hermias

204a1 οὐδεὶς φιλοσοφεῖ BD T W Π Procl. : οὐδεὶς φιλόσοφος Hermias

At 201d5 Hermias replaces a relative pronoun and an emphatic particle with an indefinite relative. The context of the section in each author dictates his choice of relative: Plato needs the relative and emphatic particle to emphasize the final point in his long introduction to Diotima; Hermias, in contrast, names Diotima, then quotes only this portion of the sentence and has no need for the specific language Plato employs.

Themistius makes two simple substitutions: the first replaces an adjective with a cognate adverb, the second replaces a postpositive conjunctive particle with a different conjunction.

203d6 δεινός BD T W Π Orig. : δεινῶς Themist. : om. Paris. 1810

210a8 δὲ codd. Π : καὶ Themist.

¹²² Origen (or a later scribe) might have thought that τοῖς γενεθλίοις referred to the birthdays (understanding it as a plural of ἡ γενεθλία instead of the dative of the plural noun τὰ γενεθλία) of multiple entities, requiring the genitive plural ἐκείνων instead of the singular ἐκείνης.

There are many examples of substitutions involving verb forms.¹²³ Whittaker's examination of an entire text, in which he collects a large number of changes to verb forms, is able to demonstrate convincingly that these changes are deliberate.¹²⁴ In contrast, an examination of our passage (201d1–212c3) does not reveal data on a comparable scale: there is no ancient author who consistently alters verb forms, even among the authors who quote significantly from our passage. While the purpose and method of quoting differ from author to author (and they differ from Whittaker's author Alcinous), no one author demonstrates the same set of habits.

Whittaker notes the common phenomenon of interchanging compound and simple verbs.¹²⁵ In our passage there are two examples of this:

203d6 πλέκων BD T W Π : προσπλέκων Orig.

208b2 ἐγκαταλείπειν BD T WP Πc : ἐγκαταλιπειν Π : καταλείπειν Stob.¹²⁶

Change of person/subject occurs once:

202d11 πρότερα ἔφη T W Π : πρότερα ἔφην BD Stob.¹²⁷

Change of voice occurs once:

201d4 ἐποίησε BD T W : ἐποίησατο Π Clem.

Change in tense occurs twice:

208b2 ἐγκαταλείπειν BD T WP Πc : ἐγκαταλιπειν Π : καταλείπειν Stob.

209d2–3 οἷα ἔκγονα ἑαυτῶν καταλείπουσιν BD T WP Π : ὅσα ἔκγονα καταλείπουσιν

Procl. : οἷα καταλελοίπασιν ἑαυτῶν ἔκγονα Method.

¹²³ Several of these are examples of movable *nu* which do not add anything to the discussion: 203c6 καθέστηκεν : καθέστηκε Orig.; ἐστιν : ἐστι Orig.; δ' ἐστιν ε. : γὰρ ἐστι φ. Procl.; 201d5 τὰ ἐρωτικά ἐδίδαξεν : ἐδίδαξε τὰ ἐρωτικά Hermias.

¹²⁴ Whittaker (1989, 84).

¹²⁵ Whittaker (1989, 83).

¹²⁶ The papyrus corrector does not change the form of the verbal prefix from *εν-* to *εγ-* but the important detail here is that he corrects the tense to agree with that of the *codices*.

¹²⁷ While the change Stobaeus makes reflects the form found in BD, making the switch to a first-person singular verb enables Stobaeus to dissociate his quotation from its context: Stobaeus likely made this change consciously.

A common form of substitution involves replacing a verb form with a cognate noun.¹²⁸ In our passage there is one example of this:

204a1 οὐδεις φιλοσοφεῖ BD T W Π Procl. : οὐδεις φιλόσοφος Hermias

Where the participle is concerned, only the example at 203d6 counts as a substitution (see above). The transmission of much-discussed *προσαιτήσουσα* (203b4) is too convoluted to be the result of deliberate change.¹²⁹

i.5 The definite article

This chapter has drawn repeated notice to the addition and subtraction of definite articles. Most of the authors who quote our passage do not provide more than one example of alterations of the article. In stark contrast, Stobaeus provides more examples than all the other authors combined.

Proclus and Pollux both omit the article: Proclus also changes the word order (so perhaps he sought to introduce variety), but Pollux also omits the accompanying noun, although this is either a paraphrase or the only transmission of the true reading (see above chapter three, vii).

209d2 ποιητὰς τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς BD T WP Π : ἀγαθοὺς ποιητὰς Procl.

202e5 τῶν θυσιῶν BD T W Π Stob.(F) : θυσιῶν Stob.(P) : om. Pollux

Hermogenes does not technically do anything to the article: he, like Pollux, omits a noun-article pair, but Hermogenes then transposes the noun, rearranging the sentence without changing the meaning. Strictly speaking, Hermogenes does omit the article upon transposition, but the

¹²⁸ Whittaker (1989, 84).

¹²⁹ As previous discussions have noted, while Eusebius and Origen both ultimately have the same reading, Origen initially (probably) had the correct reading because the final readings in multiple manuscripts of Origen are the result of correction from a form or forms which retained the root (*προσαιτησ-*) found in most Plato MSS. (all when the evidence of Bpr. joins the discussion). See above, chapter three, iv.

article could not sit in its new home. The context, then, necessitates the omission of the article, and the omission does not reflect a desire to influence the meaning of the section.

203b2 οἱ θεοὶ οἳ τε ἄλλοι BD T W Π Orig. Eus. : οἳ τε ἄλλοι θεοὶ Hermog.

In contrast to the other authors, and perhaps more interestingly, Plotinus adds an article.

206c5 ἐν δὲ καλῶ Π: ἐν δὲ τῶ καλῶ BD T WP Plotin.

Unlike the previous examples (but perhaps indicative of the discussion still to come of Stobaeus), which showcased variant readings unique to the testimonia, Plotinus is not alone in his reading. The *codices* provide the same reading as Plotinus, and it is in fact only the papyrus which does not have the article. Only the decision of modern editors to favour the reading of the papyrus relegates Plotinus' reading to the category of 'addition.' If the earliest reading, that of the papyrus, is the original reading, our passage may have originally been free from the philosophical overtones found in the medieval tradition. The evidence from Plotinus, intriguingly, demonstrates that the philosophical desire to link this passage to Plato's forms was present from an early date. The presence of this article in both Plotinus and the medieval MSS. may lend further support to the proposal that these MSS. trace their origin to the philosophical environment of fifth- and sixth-century Alexandria.¹³⁰

Stobaeus presents several variant readings of the article, many of which also reflect discrepancy among the Plato MSS. Some examples also reflect disagreement among the Stobaeus MS. tradition.

¹³⁰ Even taking into account the discrepancy among the Plotinus MS. tradition here (see i.1), the point stands that a variant with philosophical overtones crept into the tradition at an early date. For convincing discussions linking the Paris manuscript of Plato (and therefore its immediate descendant T) to fifth- or sixth-century Alexandria, see Whittaker (1987, 280–282), (1991 513–521), and Westerink (1981, 112–115).

Twice Stobaeus agrees with T δ (PW, or W alone) and the papyrus in recognizing a definite article where β does not:

202d5 ὁ γε τῶν d T W Π Stob. : ὁ γε γ' ὧν Bpc D : ὁ γεγῶν (sic) prB

208a8 οὐ τῷ b T PW Π Stob. : οὔτω BD

These examples probably suggest a miscopying at the time the archetype of B and D was copied into miniscule from majuscule, rather than anything about the relationship of Stobaeus to other Plato MSS., and there is nothing ‘deliberate’ in Stobaeus preserving the text of the main tradition. There are three further examples where some MSS. of Stobaeus preserve the Platonic reading but others do not:

202c10 τοὺς ἀγαθὰ BD T Π Stob.(F) : τοὺς ἀγαθὰ Stob.(P) : τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ
W

202e5 τῶν θυσιῶν BD T W Π Stob.(F) : θυσιῶν Stob.(P) : om. Pollux

208b1 τῷ τὸ BD T WP Π : τῷ Stob.A

The earlier discussion on omissions in Stobaeus highlighted the importance of knowing whether a copyist corrected Stobaeus from Plato or whether Stobaeus was faithful to the Platonic text: how far can the divergences of Stobaeus from Plato be attributed to Stobaeus? A few more examples will go some way to clarifying the issue. There are two more readings where Stobaeus agrees with some of the Plato MSS. against others:

202c10 τὰ καλὰ BD Π : καλὰ T W Stob.

202e8 καὶ τὰς τελετὰς BD Π Stob. : καὶ τελετὰς T W

The latter example is the only place (in this discussion on articles) where Stobaeus agrees with BD against T and W. These two examples demonstrate that Stobaeus both omits and preserves the article. The Plato MSS. are varied in their approach to the article, as is Stobaeus: what is

interesting is that, where the article is concerned, Stobaeus never provides a reading that is not also found in the manuscript tradition of Plato. This agreement may be coincidence, since articles are such small words, rather than firm evidence for a relationship between the Plato MSS. tradition and Stobaeus. Only one reading provides evidence for the MSS. of Stobaeus departing unanimously from all the Plato MSS. (in an instance of the article):

202d1–2 τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ καλῶν BD T W : τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν Stob.

Even here, however, the addition of a definite article is perhaps less significant, at least where a desire to discover an author shaping the material he quotes is concerned, because its conjunction with a change in word order results in a variation on the stock phrase καλὸς κάγαθός while preserving the meaning of the Platonic text.

Stobaeus, then, unanimously departs from the whole Plato MS. tradition only once (202d1–2), and then perhaps under the influence of a stock phrase. Most of the evidence points to Stobaeus trying to preserve a tradition also preserved by some Plato MSS. (T and W in particular). The evidence of Stob.P still holds value until someone proves that Stob.F preserves the original text of Stobaeus. While there is no definitive proof that Stobaeus did not seek to shape his quotation of Plato by his own use of definite articles (though certainly the copyist of Stob.P seems to have done this!), the evidence from multiple examples is more than enough to suggest that Stobaeus attempted to be faithful to Plato.¹³¹

¹³¹ This examination of definite articles within Stobaeus' quotations highlights a few themes within the Plato MSS. First, where the article is concerned, there is a definite dichotomy between T W and BD. Second, and rather interestingly, the papyrus seems to favour the definite article regardless of a relationship with any MS. family.

ii. Part two

ii.1 The influence of *Symposium* 202d1–203a8

[Plato's] precise definition of the vague terms 'daemon' and 'daimonios' was something of a novelty in Plato's day, but in the second century after Christ it was the expression of a truism. Virtually every one, pagan, Jewish, Christian or Gnostic, believed in the existence of these beings and in their function as mediators, whether he called them daemons or angels or aions or simply 'spirits' (πνεύματα).¹³²

So comments E.R. Dodds on Plato's description of δαίμονες at *Smp.* 202d1–203a8. While Dodds notes the enduring influence of our passage, Plato's contemporaries and near-contemporaries already took inspiration from the passage. Xenocrates, head of the Academy from 339 B.C., adopted the intermediary nature of Plato's δαίμονες, using a comparison with triangles to demonstrate his point.¹³³ This thesis has thus far concerned itself strictly with the textual tradition, both direct and indirect. The examination of the indirect tradition has dealt solely with testimonia which are intended to be relatively precise quotations. The effort to establish the state of the text and to determine how the testimonia agree with or differ from it is necessary to provide a comparison for those authors who do not quote Plato verbatim.

The influence of *Symposium* 201d1–212c3 extends so far, from antiquity through the Renaissance and beyond, that there is neither space nor time to examine the total extent. Some

¹³² Dodds (1965, 37–38).

¹³³ Dillon (1977, 31–32); it is Plutarch (*Obsolescence of Oracles* 416C–D) who preserves this theory of Xenocrates. Dillon also mentions that 'Xenocrates makes a point of declaring a man's soul to be his daemon (Fr. 81),' a sentiment which may have been influenced by Plato's *Timaeus* 90a (1977, 30).

Alcinous expresses the idea found in *Smp.* 202e1 in different phraseology. But his expression of the important words from *Smp.* 202e3–4 retains much of the same phraseology: he keeps one of the two participles, moves the second object clause forward, and reduces the first object clause to an adverb (ἀνάπαλιν, “vice versa”) in a kind of shorthand. Clearly Alcinous is not quoting verbatim; rather, he produces a rephrased and rearranged version of Plato. Given the freedom with which Alcinous alters the early part of the section, it is interesting that he takes such care to preserve the participle and object clause, but keeping these provides a “hook” for his readers because they recall Plato’s text instantly. It seems that even by the second century, use of forms of διαπορθμεύω, drawn from *Smp.* 202e3, is already commonplace.¹³⁷ The participle Alcinous omits is ἐρμηνεύων, but he has compacted such a large section of Plato (202d7–e4) that it is unsurprising that he has not transmitted this participle. Not only does this passage of Alcinous preserve the phrasing of Plato’s *Symposium*, it also accepts the belief introduced in the *Symposium* that Eros is a δαίμων not a θεός.

Alcinous was one of many authors to find *Symposium* 202d7–e4 worth transmitting. The second-century A.D. sophist Maximus of Tyre (*Dissertationes* 8.8) shows the influence of this section of the *Symposium*:

καθάπερ γάρ, οἶμαι, τὸ βαρβαρικὸν τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ διήρηται φωνῆς συνέσει,
 ἀλλὰ τὸ τῶν ἐρμηνέων γένος τὰς παρ’ ἑκατέρων φωνὰς ὑποδεχόμενον καὶ
 διαπορθμεῦον πρὸς ἑκατέρους, συνῆψεν αὐτῶν καὶ συνεκέρασεν τὰς ὁμιλίας·
 οὕτω δ’ ἂν καὶ τὸ δαιμόνων γένος ἐπίμικτον νοεῖται καὶ θεοῖς τε καὶ ἀνθρώποις.
 τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν τὸ ἀνθρώποις προσφθεγγόμενον καὶ φανταζόμενον καὶ

¹³⁷ Whittaker (1990, 68 n.551) notes that the use of διαπορθμεύω to describe intermediacy in Patristic texts stems directly from *Smp.* 202e3 (see below for further discussion).

εἰλούμενον ἐν μέσῃ τῇ θνητῇ φύσει καὶ ἐπωφελοῦν ὅσα ἀνάγκη δεῖσθαι θεῶν τὸ
θνητῶν γένος. πολλὴ δὲ ἡ δαιμόνων ἀγέλη·

While Maximus does not preserve Plato’s phrasing, the verbal stems of the two participles (διαπορθμεῦον and ἐρμηνεῦον) are both present in Maximus; the latter is in the form of a cognate noun. More interestingly, these retained elements are present in a simile, which Maximus introduces by καθάπερ ... οὕτω καὶ (“just as ... so also”). Maximus does not say that δαίμονες are a race of linguistic interpreters who convey, he says they are *like* that.¹³⁸ Maximus uses ἐν μέσῃ, which he draws from *Smp.* 202e6, to express the intermediate place rather than the thematic μεταξύ which Plato uses throughout the dialogue (even as early as 202a3),¹³⁹ and which other authors employ to invoke the passage. Two other patterns which we shall see again are present in this section of Maximus: the classification of δαίμονες as a γένος and as an ἀγέλη or “herd.”

Proclus makes a clear reference to our passage in his commentary on the *Timaeus* (1.341.16–18):

ἐν δὲ τοῖς κρείττοσιν ἡμῶν γένεσιν ἡ ἀγγελικὴ τάξις ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν ὑποστᾶσα
συνεχῶς ἐρμηνεύει καὶ διαπορθμεύει τὸ ἄρρητον τῶν θεῶν.

Here Proclus converts both participles to finite verbs, the forms that suit his grammar, but he talks of an ‘angelic order or company,’ and what they interpret and convey are things that are ‘secrets of the gods.’ The adverb συνεχῶς denotes that these actions are done “constantly” or “continuously,” as one would expect from personal guardian spirits. The role of δαίμονες as

¹³⁸ Maximus may have been inspired by Plato’s *Phaedrus* 246a3–7 to refrain from a *definition* of divinity in favour of a *simile*.

¹³⁹ Of the eight times μεταξύ occurs in the *Symposium*, seven of those are in our passage.

guardian spirits watching over their charges is one which prevails even in modern Catholicism (see below, ii.4). While the language Proclus uses is different from Maximus and others, there remains a tendency to describe intermediaries as a group (Proclus does not use the term δαίμονες here). Instead of an adverb or adverbial phrase to express the intermediate nature of his ἀγγελικὴ τάξις, Proclus uses the more descriptive phrase ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν ὑποστᾶσα.

Elsewhere (*in Timaeum* 3.165.22–27) Proclus again employs the two participles, and again he retains little else of Plato’s text:

ἔτι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀγγελικὸν κατὰ τὴν νοερὰν τοῦ δημιουργοῦ προέρχεται ζωὴν, διὸ καὶ αὐτὸ νοερόν ἐστι κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ ἐρμηνεύει καὶ διαπορθμεύει τὸν θεῖον νοῦν εἰς τὰ δεύτερα. τὸ δὲ δαιμόνιον κατὰ τὴν δημιουργικὴν τῶν ὄλων πρόνοιαν καὶ τὴν φύσιν κατευθύνει καὶ τὴν τάξιν ὀρθῶς συμπληροῖ τοῦ παντὸς κόσμου.

His use of ἐρμηνεύειν and διαπορθμεύειν must have been strong enough markers to induce readers to think of Plato’s text, and his use of τὸ δαιμόνιον is reminiscent of πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον.

Proclus makes use of the phrase πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον at *in Rem Publicam* 2.337.13–17:

εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ δαιμόνων ἔστιν φῶλον ἄλογον καὶ οὐ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον λογικόν—
ἐπεὶ πῶς ἢ Διοτίμα φησὶν τὴν γοητείαν καὶ οὐ τὴν ἱερατικὴν μόνην γίνεσθαι διὰ
τοῦ δαιμονίου γένους, εἰ μὴ πρὸς τῷ λογικῷ τι δαιμόνιον καὶ ἄλογον ἦν;

By using this phrase Proclus gives a Platonic flavour to his φῶλον δαιμόνων (yet another way to describe a group of δαίμονες!).

Proclus also uses the phrase πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον at *in Tim.* 3.165.5–7:

πᾶν γὰρ τὸ δαιμόνιον τὴν μεταξὺ χώραν ἀναπληροῖ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων.

Proclus has changed Plato's notion of δαίμονες which act as conduits in an intermediate space: now everything that has to do with a δαίμων (πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον) fills up (ἀναπληροῖ) that intermediate space.¹⁴⁰

In his commentary on the *Alcibiades* (46.1–11), in a long discussion inspired by Socrates' reference to his divine sign, τὸ δαιμόνιον (*Alc.* I 103a4–b2), Proclus draws upon the same passage in the *Symposium* but drops the adjective πᾶν:

ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅταν μὲν **τὴν δαιμονίαν μεσότητα** νοῶμεν, θεῶν αὐτὴν καὶ ἀνθρώπων μεταξὺ θεωροῦμεν, ὅταν δὲ νοῦν ἐν τῷ ἄκρῳ τάττωμεν, ψυχὴν ἐξάπτομεν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς. καὶ ἔχεις τὴν μὲν ἐτέραν διαίρεσιν ἐν Συμποσίῳ, **τὸ γὰρ δαιμόνιον** ἐκεῖ πού φησι **μέσον εἶναι θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων** ... διὸ καὶ ἐνταῦθα περὶ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως τῆς ζητήσεως οὔσης νοῦ μὲν οὐδεμία μνήμη γενήσεται, τῆς δὲ τοῦ δαίμονος προνοίας ὑπομνήσει τὸν νεανίσκον ὁ Σωκράτης, ποτὲ μὲν αὐτὸν δαίμονα προσαγορεύων, ποτὲ δὲ θεόν.

At 46.5 Proclus uses the phrase μέσον ... θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων, but earlier in the passage (46.2) he used the phrase τὴν δαιμονίαν μεσότητα to describe the same relationship (a noun which, as we shall see, Michael Psellus also uses at a much later date). It is especially significant that Proclus is using Plato's *Symposium* to inform his description of Socrates' divine sign, and nor is he the only author to do so.

Hermias (*in Phdr.* 70.9–13 L-M) uses our passage to describe the nature of Socrates' divine sign. Hermias is attempting to explain Socrates' divine sign because it is mentioned in the *Phaedrus* (242b8–c3). His use of our passage comes after he has cited the passage from the

¹⁴⁰ Proclus also uses the phrase at *in Platonis Rem Publicam* 1.41.20, where he is not providing a verbatim quotation, but rather summarizing.

Phaedrus where Socrates' divine sign prevents him from crossing the river Ilissus; Hermias goes on to say what the divine sign is *not*, and he now says what it *is*:

ὅτι μὲν οὖν ταῦτα [sc. μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς, “a part of the soul,” and ἡ φιλοσοφία αὐτή, “philosophy itself”] οὐκ ἔστι τὸ δαιμόνιον Σωκράτους, ἐναργῶς λέγεται, τί δέ ἐστι, ῥητέον. πᾶν μὲν οὖν τὸ δαιμόνιον γένος εἴρηται καὶ παρ’ αὐτοῦ ἐν Συμποσίῳ μεταξὺ εἶναι θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων, διαπορθμεῦον τὰ τε παρὰ θεῶν εἰς ἡμᾶς τὰ τε ἡμῶν ἀναγγέλλον τοῖς θεοῖς.

Several elements from our passage are present here: the participle διαπορθμεῦον remains, as does the phrase μεταξὺ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων; Hermias also preserves the object clauses, but with some rewording which includes the introduction of the new participle ἀναγγέλλον into the second object clause. Hermias also joins other authors in classifying δαίμονες as a γένος; to be specific, he classifies πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον as a γένος.

The second-century Latin author Apuleius wrote a work on Socrates' divine sign, *de deo Socratis*. In this work he quickly summarizes 202d1–203a8, but then elaborates on the duties of δαίμονες.

Ceterum sunt quaedam divinae mediae potestates inter summum aethera et infimas terras in isto intersitae aeris spatio, per quas et desideria nostra et merita ad deos commeant. Hos Graeci nomine daemones nuncupant, inter <terrícolas> caelicolasque vectores hinc precum inde donorum, qui citro ultro portant hinc petitiones inde suppetias ceu quidam utri[us]que interpretes et salutigeri. Per hos

eosdem, ut Plato in Symposio autumat, cuncta denuntiata et magorum varia
miracula omnesque praesagiorum species reguntur. (13.18 – 14.6)¹⁴¹

Earlier in the same work, Apuleius refers to the separation of the divine and mortal (*nam, ut idem Plato ait, nullus deus miscetur hominibus* 11.10) which Plato mentions at *Smp.* 203a1–2 (θεὸς δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ οὐ μίγνυται), but he prefaces this with a long expansion on the ways in which the two spheres are distinct (10.15 – 11.10). Apuleius, then, adopts Plato’s description of δαίμονες from *Symposium* 202d1–203a8 and expands upon it, yet Apuleius’ δαίμονες are not limited to the role and form Plato prescribed. In Apuleius, δαίμονες conform to Middle-Platonic ideology as far as their intermediate nature is concerned, and his work shares similarities with the ideas of Plutarch and (as we know from Plutarch) Xenocrates; as Dillon puts it, ‘We have here, then, in the *De Deo Socratis*, the most complete connected version of Middle Platonic demonology extant.’¹⁴²

In his edition of Alcinous’ *Didaskalikos*, Whittaker notes, “C’est sans doute sous l’inspiration de *Banquet* 202 E 3 que les pères de l’Église ont employé ce verb [διαπορθμεύειν] et ses dérivés pour désigner le rôle intermédiaire du Fils.”¹⁴³ He then notes that Lampe demonstrates this use of διαπορθμεύω in his *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*.¹⁴⁴ A selection from these and other authors now follows.

¹⁴¹ Apuleius goes on to say that members of this race are responsible for ensuring the successful occurrence of the omens found in dreams, sacrifices, augury, and weather, among other phenomena, for these are the result of both the authority of gods and the agency of *daimones* (14.6–14). All references to Apuleius are to the page and line number in Tomas (1970).

¹⁴² Dillon (1977, 317–320). Dillon notes, “What he [Apuleius] is primarily concerned with, however, since it is with these that he proposes to link the daemon of Socrates, are the guardian daemons mentioned by Plato in the myths of the *Phaedo* (107dff.) and *Republic* x (617de, 620de), who accompany a man through life, know his inmost thoughts and most secret actions, and after death act as his advocate (or accuser) before the throne of judgement,’ a sentiment found in Plutarch rather than Plato (1977, 319–320).

¹⁴³ Whittaker (1990, 68 n.551).

¹⁴⁴ Lampe (1969, s.v. διαπορθμεύω).

The eleventh-century (c. A.D. 1018–1081) intellectual Michael Psellus uses elements from Plato’s text and elements which had become common when adapting Plato (*Opuscula psychologica, theologica, daemonologica* 126.5–11).

εἰσὶ δέ τινες ἀγγέλαι δαιμόνων ἐστερημένοι σχεδὸν τῆς ἀγαθοεργίας, οἵτινες λέγονται κακοί, καὶ **ἕτεροι ἀγγέλαι δαιμόνων** ἐστερημένοι τῆς ὄντως γνώσεως, οἵτινες ἄλογοι καὶ θηριώδεις ὀνομάζονται. **ἐρμηνεύειν δέ φασι τὸ δαιμόνιον γένος** καὶ **διαπορθμεύειν θεοῖς τε τὰ παρὰ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀνθρώποις τὰ παρὰ θεῶν**, τῶν μὲν ἐκφαντορικὸν ὑπάρχον ὡς κεκρυμμένων καὶ ἀφανῶν, τῶν δὲ ἀναγωγὸν ὡς **διαπορθμεύεσθαι** πρὸς τὴν μόνιμον τῶν κρειττόνων ἀγαθότητα δεομένων.

Psellus uses the two participles (in infinitive form, as befits indirect speech) and he preserves verbatim the two object clauses: these lines (126.7–9) are a direct quotation of Plato, modified to suit the grammar. The description of δαίμονες as an ἀγγέλη or “herd” which we saw in Maximus of Tyre also appears here, and the presence of τινες indicates a metaphor (“as it were”). The appearance of φασι, “they say,” is curious: Plato (or rather, Diotima) is the subject in the original source, but Psellus ignores that fact, perhaps indicating how commonplace the passage has become. By using φασι, a verb which has a long history of use in expressions of traditional belief, Psellus indicates that the passage has become standard fare.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁵ For an extensive list of instances of φασι being used in this way, see Fraenkel (1982, II, 470–471 on Aesch. *Agamemnon* 1040); see also Johansen and Whittle on this use of φασι in epic (1980, II, 234 on Aesch. *Suppliants* 291). The so-called Alexandrian footnote is also common in Latin: see Ross (1975, 77–78) and Hinds (1998, 1–2).

Earlier in the same passage (126.2) Psellus provides a verbatim quotation of 202d13–e1 καὶ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον μεταξύ ἐστὶ θεοῦ τε καὶ θνητοῦ, with a slight change in word order to suit his grammar.

καὶ ὅλως τὴν **μεσότητα** τῶν δαιμόνων ἀφορίζοντες οἱ παρ’ Ἑλλησι σοφοὶ **μεταξύ** φασιν εἶναι **πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον** θεοῦ καὶ θνητοῦ. μάλιστα δέ **φασι** τὴν δύναμιν χαρακτηρίζειν τὴν **μεσότητα** τὴν δαιμονίαν καὶ ἐκ τούτου δεῖν θηρᾶν τὴν νοητὴν αὐτοῦ αἰτίαν.

Here Psellus reinforces that the sentiments found in our passage have become ubiquitous by again using φασι. In addition to incorporating the thematic μεταξύ, he uses μεσότητα, both of which flag the Platonic passage, much as ἐν μεσῶ accomplished the same in Maximus and even in Proclus (*in Alc.*, see above). More importantly, Psellus says that Plato’s description of δαίμονες is the definition (ἀφορίζοντες) of daemonic “middleness” (τὴν μεσότητα τῶν δαιμόνων). His use of this noun (and the use by Proclus above) – which does not appear in the *Symposium* – shows that the notion of “the intermediate” is so strongly associated with Plato that words which invoke intermediacy will call to mind our passage. More importantly, Psellus’ use of terminology that had been introduced hundreds of years earlier suggests that this particular word - μεσότητα – had become shorthand for the passage as a whole, perhaps even a title for the passage.

Maximus Planudes (c. A.D. 1250–1305) was a Byzantine humanist. In his *Compendia e Platonis dialogis* 114.1–17, as the title suggests, he provides a long verbatim quotation of 201e8–203a6. What is left out is the interaction between Socrates and Diotima: the text of Planudes is not punctuated by Diotima’s questions and Socrates’ professions of ignorance. Rather it is the philosophical statements of Diotima which he records, turning the dialogue into a

philosophical treatise. As expected, Planudes also retains the important phrase πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον from *Smp.* 202d13.

The ninth-century Byzantine emperor Leo VI (A.D. 866 – 912) is an example of an author who is influenced by the language of the *Symposium* but employs it in a Christian context (*Homily* 37.59–63).

οἱ μὲν ἐξ ὧν διακονοῦσιν—ἄγγελοι γὰρ εἰσι τῶν ἐκ Θεοῦ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους
διαπορθμευομένων—, ἔλαχον καὶ τὴν κλῆσιν, οἱ δέ, ὅτι διὰ παντὸς
 ἐπεστραμμένοι πρὸς αὐτὸν αὐτὸ τοῦτο διαμορφούμενοι ὄμμασιν, ἐκ τῆς τῶν
 ὀμμάτων πληθύος πολύοματα λέγονται.

Leo retains the participle but changes its voice to reflect a slightly different function in the sentence: ‘messengers of things being conveyed from God to humans’ perhaps downplays the agency of ἄγγελοι, placing more emphasis on the origin of what is being conveyed: ἐκ Θεοῦ. The expression ‘from God to humans’ is different from Plato’s, if only by the slight change of participle and the switch to the singular ‘God,’ but the recognizable πρὸς ἀνθρώπους is still present. Leo manages both to make an erudite reference to Plato and to disguise his pagan source.¹⁴⁶ The switch from παρὰ θεοῦ to ἐκ Θεοῦ is one that is sanctioned by the latter’s occurrence six times in the *New Testament*.¹⁴⁷ What is perhaps most interesting is that Leo

¹⁴⁶ Leo is not alone in simultaneously embracing Plato and rejecting him as a pagan: compare the comment which his contemporary, Arethas, makes on Plato, *Apology* 27e1, in the margin of MS. E.D. Clarke 39 (B): καλῶς γε σὺ ποιῶν, Σώκρατες, ὄνοις καὶ ἵπποις τοὺς θεοὺς Ἀθηναίων παραβάλλεις, (you do well, Socrates, when you compare the gods of the Athenians to donkeys and horses) (Cufalo 2007, 20). Wilson’s view on this *scholium* is harsh (1983, 122–123): ‘...the remark serves only to warn us not to expect from Arethas the intellectual distinction of a philosopher.’ Wilson does, however, admit that in Arethas, ‘Once again we have an example of the rule that churchmen of the highest standing were liberal and tolerant in their attitude towards the literature of the pagan past’ (1983, 120), a sentiment which must apply to Leo also.

¹⁴⁷ Even though παρὰ θεοῦ occurs five times and ἐκ θεοῦ occurs six times in the *New Testament*, Leo chose the expression that is not present in his pagan source.

employs ἄγγελοι, as Proclus used ἡ ἀγγελικὴ τάξις, rather than ἀγέλαι δαιμόνων (Psellus), ἡ δαιμόνων ἀγέλη (Maximus of Tyre),¹⁴⁸ τὸ δαιμόνων γένος (Maximus of Tyre), or φῦλον δαιμόνων (Proclus): the language is clearly Christian.

John Chrysostom (c. A.D. 354–407) had a typical *classical* education in rhetoric, consisting of the study of pagan authors including Plato, with an initial view to join the civil service; his pursuit of a career in the Church came after completion of his formal education.¹⁴⁹ In his work *in Genesim* 53.83, he employs only one of the two participles (διαπορθμεύοντες), but he retains the formula of the object clause. He has adapted the language of Plato to a context which deals with teachers rather than *daimones*.

καὶ τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς δὲ τοὺς ὑμετέρους, ὅσοι διὰ σωματικὴν ἀσθένειαν νηστεύειν οὐ δύνανται, προτρέπεσθε μὴ ἀπολιμπάνεσθαι τῆς πνευματικῆς ταύτης τροφῆς, διδάσκοντες αὐτοὺς, καὶ **τὰ παρ' ἡμῶν αὐτοῖς διαπορθμεύοντες**, καὶ δεικνύντες, ὅτι ὁ φαγὼν καὶ πιὼν μετρίως οὐκ ἀνάξιός ἐστι ταύτης τῆς ἀκροάσεως, ἀλλ' ὁ ῥάθυμος καὶ διακεχυμένος.

In his *Dialogi cum Mahometano*, proem. 2, the late fourteenth-century/early fifteenth-century (A.D. 1350–1425) Byzantine emperor Manuel II Palaeologus follows the practice of preserving the one participle (διαπορθμεῦον) while using a cognate (ἐρμην-) of the other.

καὶ γὰρ καὶ **ἐρμηνεῖς** ἡμῖν τοὺς λόγους **διαπορθμεύοντες** ἦσαν, ὃ πολλάκις βουλομένῳ μοι λέγειν μὴ πάντη γήινον μηδὲ χαμερπές, ἀλλὰ γενναιότερόν τι καὶ

¹⁴⁸ Proclus also uses αἱ τῶν δαιμόνων ἀγέλαι (*in Alc.* 32.5).

¹⁴⁹ Kelly (1995, 6–8, 14–17); he prefers (4) to assign John's birth to 349.

ὑψηλότερον (τοιαῦτα γάρ, ἃ πρεσβεύομεν) ἐμποδῶν ἐφαίνετό τε πανταχῆ καὶ
προσίστατο·

He is not quoting the *Symposium*, but it is clear that he is following in a tradition of phraseology which has its origin in the *Symposium*.

Joseph Bryennius was a “monk who was also a scholar, a theologian, and an ecclesiastical diplomat.” He was an exact contemporary of Manuel II Palaeologus (c. 1350–1430).¹⁵⁰ In this passage (*Orationes* 12, lines 260ff.) Bryennius is not quoting, but he still shows the influence of the *Symposium*.

καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ζωαρχικῆς οὖν Τριάδος, εἰ καὶ ὁ Υἱὸς πρὸς ἡμᾶς **διαπορθμεύει** τὸ
Πνεῦμα, ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ καὶ αἰτίος ἐστὶν αὐτῷ τῆς ὀντότητος, αὐτὸν αἴτιον αὐτῆς
ἔχοντι τὸν Πατέρα, ὃν ἄρα καὶ ὁ Υἱός.

In a Christian context he uses one of the participles, in a different form, but it is a strong example of how the participle has become integral to expressing conveyance from the divine to mortals.

ii.3 Plutarch

In the discussion on the indirect transmission of *Symposium* 201d1–212c3, Plutarch was noticeably absent. The lack of verbatim transmission of Plato’s text does not mean that Plutarch did not transmit the text in a looser fashion.

Plutarch makes use of the ideas of *Smp.* 202d7–11 and elsewhere in his *Isis and Osiris* 360E:

¹⁵⁰ Rees (2000, 584). Rees’ paper provides a good look at Bryennius’ methods of quotation and his “reminiscences,” and notes his strong belief in Greek orthodoxy and tendency to “Christianize” (584–596).

τῆ δυνάμει τὴν φύσιν ὑπερφέροντας ἡμῶν, τὸ δὲ θεῖον οὐκ ἀμιγῆς οὐδ' ἄκρατον ἔχοντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ψυχῆς φύσει καὶ σώματος αἰσθήσει συνειληγός.

Plutarch's οὐκ ἀμιγῆς mirrors Plato's οὐ μείγνυται (203a2), and he echoes Plato's τίνα δυνάμιν ἔχων (202e2).¹⁵¹ Here Plutarch includes Plato as one of several ancient authorities on the subject of *daimones* and the characteristics of those who are neither god nor mortal. The phraseology is not that of the *Symposium*, but the ideas expressed are similar.

Elsewhere (*Isis and Osiris* 361C), Plutarch's reliance on our passage in the *Symposium* is much clearer when he tackles *Smp.* 202d7–203a1:

ὁ τε Πλάτων ἐρμηνευτικὸν τὸ τοιοῦτον ὀνομάζει γένος καὶ διακονικὸν ἐν μέσῳ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων, εὐχὰς μὲν ἐκεῖ καὶ δεήσεις ἀνθρώπων ἀναπέμποντας, ἐκεῖθεν δὲ μαντεῖα δεῦρο καὶ δόσεις ἀγαθῶν φέροντας.

For the most part, Plutarch does not employ Plato's vocabulary, in stark contrast to those authors who chose to preserve the signpost participle διαπορθμεῦον, favouring instead the semantically related διακονικόν. Because he names Plato, he does not need specific language to recall the passage.¹⁵² He does, however, employ a cognate, ἐρμηνευτικόν, of the other participle which acts as a predicate of τὸ γένος. While τὸ γένος is a feature in other ancient authors who quote our passage, Plutarch refrains from modifying it with the typical δαιμόνιον (Alcinous, Hermias, Psellus) or ἐρμηνέων (Alcinous). Plutarch also eschews μεταξύ in favour of ἐν μέσῳ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων, changing the singular nouns of the *Symposium* to plurals.

At 416F (*Obsolescence of Oracles*), Plutarch recalls the same passage:

¹⁵¹ Nor is Plutarch the only of our authors to incorporate δύναμιν: Psellus (126.2) also took care to transmit it.

¹⁵² Plutarch employs this verb (διαπορθμεῦον) only once. In part one of this chapter (i.4) we came to expect the replacement of words with synonyms, as per Whittaker (1989, 83–84).

οὕτως οἱ **δαιμόνων γένος** μὴ ἀπολείποντες ἀνεπίμικτα τὰ τῶν θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων ποιοῦσι καὶ ἀσυνάλλακτα, **τὴν ἑρμηνευτικὴν**, ὡς Πλάτων ἔλεγεν.

He uses a cognate (ἑρμηνευτικὴν) of one of the participles and the phrase δαιμόνων γένος. Plutarch is in no way providing a quotation here, yet other elements from the *Symposium* are present. When he says ἀνεπίμικτα τὰ τῶν θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων, he echoes *Smp.* 203a2 (θεὸς δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ οὐ μείγνυται), his use of ἀνεπίμικτα bringing to mind οὐ μείγνυται, and with τὰ τῶν θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων, he recalls θεὸς ἀνθρώπῳ.

Plutarch makes several references to Plato's concept of δαίμονες,¹⁵³ but Plato is only one of the many authors he draws upon.¹⁵⁴ Plato's authority was probably a necessary component of any conversation involving δαίμονες, but Plutarch's discussion is by no means a faithful reproduction of Plato. Plutarch follows the patterns found in other ancient authors, employing cognates of Plato's participles, talking about δαίμονες as a γένος, and phrasing intermediacy in a way different from Plato's μεταξύ.

ii.4 Medieval, Renaissance, and modern traces

In the medieval *Historia Regum Britanniae* (6.18), Geoffrey of Monmouth (twelfth century) discusses the intermediary nature of spirits, or *daimones*, to explain the birth of Merlin.

adductus autem Maugantius, auditis omnibus ex ordine, dixit ad Vortegirnum: "in libris philosophorum nostrorum, et in plurimis historiis reperi, multos homines huiusmodi procreationem habuisse. nam ut Apuleius de deo Socratis perhibet, **inter lunam et**

¹⁵³ Plutarch *Isis and Osiris* 360E, 361C, *Obsolescence of Oracles* 416F.

¹⁵⁴ For a discussion of Plutarch's system of δαίμονες see Dillon (1977, 216–224), especially on Plutarch's dependence on Xenocrates and Plutarch's theory of guardian δαίμονες. Brenk (1977, 85–112) discusses Plutarch's δαίμονες as they appear in *Obsolescence of Oracles* and *Isis and Osiris*.

terram habitant spiritus, quos incubos daemones appellamus: hi partim hominum, partim uero Angelorum naturam habent: et cum uolunt, assumunt sibi humanas figuras, et cum mulieribus coeunt. forsitan unus ex eis huic mulieri apparuit, et iuuenem istum in ipsa generauit.

He names Apuleius' *de deo Socratis* as his source, but Apuleius had clearly taken what Plato wrote on *daimones* in the *Symposium* and incorporated it in his work on Socrates (see ii.2 above). Interestingly, Geoffrey does not place these spirits between God/gods and humans, as Plato did in the *Symposium*, but says they derive their natures from humans and angels. Christian influence may also be present in the notion of a spirit taking human form to procreate with a human woman.

The *Commentary on Plato's "Symposium"* by the great Renaissance humanist Marsilio Ficino (1433–99) is an exploration of Platonic philosophy, with statements made in the *Symposium* serving as the starting point for discussions of Platonic philosophy across the whole. It is unsurprising that Ficino does not discuss intermediaries and *daimones* in the manner other authors do, given that his *Commentary* takes the form of a contemporary symposium during which the speakers use other Platonic works to explain the philosophy introduced in Plato's *Symposium*. Such a format means that Ficino's discussion on *daimones* draws on the presentation of *daimones* across all of Plato's works. In Ficino,

The beings which inhabit the region of ethereal fire located under the moon, or that of the pure air, or that of humid air located next to the water, the Platonists call daemons. The rational beings which inhabit the earth they call men. The gods are immortal, and impassible, but men are passible and mortal. Daemons are immortal, of course, but passible. The Platonists do not ascribe the passions of the body to the daemons, but

certain emotions of the soul, by which they somehow love good men and hate evil men. They mix agreeably and eagerly in the governing of lower things, but especially of human affairs, and from this friendly service, they all seem good; but some Platonists and the Christian theologians claim that there are other certain bad daemons. For the present we are not concerned with bad daemons. The good daemons, our protectors, Dionysius the Areopagite is accustomed to call by the proper name, Angels, the governors of the lower world, and this differs very little from the interpretation of Plato. Those whom Plato calls gods, and the souls of the spheres and stars, we can, after the manner of Dionysius, call Angels, ministers of God, which is still no different from what Plato called them; for, as appears in the 10th Book of *Laws*, Plato does not in the least bind spirits of this kind within the narrow limits of the spheres, as he does the earthly creatures in bodies, but he asserts that they are endowed with such great virtue by the supreme God that they are able to enjoy the vision of God at once, and they are able without any labor or care to rule and move the globes of the world according to the will of their father, and by moving them, easily govern lower creatures. Therefore it is rather a difference in words between Plato and Dionysius than a difference in meaning.¹⁵⁵

The familiar concept of *daimones* as intermediaries who interact with the mortal world is still present, but Ficino give them a role which, as we shall see, is recognizably Christian. Interestingly, the gods, which are here equated with Angels, are able to be intermediary and access that ultimate “vision,” which reminds readers of the ultimate end described by Diotima. Ficino introduces three “Venerian daemons,” two of which have their daemonic status because they are

¹⁵⁵ Jayne (1944, 185–186).

“the mediaries between lack of beauty and beauty,”¹⁵⁶ a role which corresponds to that of *daimones* laid out in our passage. While Ficino does not give evidence for contemporary thought on our specific passage, his attempt to explain the whole of Plato and to join it to Christianity is significant. It is also worth noting that Ficino had a keen interest in our passage: a manuscript written in Ficino’s hand transmits excerpts including the text of *Smp.* 201d1–6 and 202d13–203a8.¹⁵⁷

The characterization of *daimones* introduced in *Smp.* 202d1–203a8 became so integral to thought on angels and guardian spirits that its presence can still be felt today. In his discussion on ‘Guardian Spirits,’ in his book *The Catholic Catechism*, John A. Hardon demonstrates implicitly that Plato’s thinking about *daimones*, as laid out in the *Symposium*, is ingrained in Catholic doctrine.

...The Church bids the faithful to honor the angels whom God has given as guardians of the human race. It is certain that each of the faithful has his own guardian angel, as implied in the Scripture and found in the common understanding of believers... we may say that every human being has a guardian spirit since, in the present dispensation of providence, angelic assistance is part of God’s universal salvific will... Within the realm of created beings, the angels are most like God because they are pure spirits (having no body), but they are also like us because we too have intelligence and will. They are providential intermediaries between God, whose vision they already enjoy, and mankind, whom they are entrusted to lead to the vision not yet attained... Otherwise than

¹⁵⁶ Jayne (1944, 187).

¹⁵⁷ Milan: Ms F 19 Sup. It contains excerpts of many Platonic dialogues.

the saints who are also intercessors for us before God, angels are specially appointed to guard and direct their charges on earth. That is one side of their ministry, from men to God, and this is intercessory. Catholics are therefore bidden to invoke the angels on both counts, to solicit their continued protection and to ask for their prayers in our regard. As St. Ambrose puts it, “The angels should be entreated for us, who have been given us to guard us.”¹⁵⁸

Specifically, angels or guardian angels are provided by God to help mankind reach God’s vision: Hardon’s description of this function is reminiscent of Diotima’s description of the function of Eros in leading lovers to an ultimate end. These guardian angels are also described as intermediaries, able to lead humans to the divine because they partake in the nature of each. Surely the *Symposium* is the ultimate origin of the post-Platonic understanding of the intermediate nature of spirits, however much it was later appropriated by Catholicism. The dual function of guardian spirits also has roots in the *Symposium*: they “guard and direct their charges on earth,” but also, at least in Catholic practice, humans seek God through angels and through their guardianship. Plato established the existence of spirits who are both divine and human in nature, who act as intermediaries travelling between both the divine and the human, and whose knowledge of the divine enables them to lead mankind. Such spirits remain entrenched in modern Catholicism.

¹⁵⁸ Hardon (1975, 86–87).

Conclusion

As demonstrated in part two of chapter four, *Symposium* 201d1–212c3 has been an influential passage for the history of ideas in Western thought from the time it was written. Even though the focus of chapter four, part two was on only a small portion of our passage, it was abundantly clear that, from the time of Plato’s immediate successor Xenocrates, people were transmitting, translating, and transforming the text, each interpreting it in light of their own philosophical, literary, and religious priorities and emphases.

The text of *Smp.* 201d1–212c3 which comes to us through our primary witnesses, the MSS. B, D, T, P, W, and the papyrus (*P.Oxy.* 5.843), is a stable one in spite of, or because of, the attention given to the passage. There is a strong bipartite *stemma*: as expected, BD and PW form two separate branches, with T agreeing with PW much more than it does with BD. The papyrus does not show a tendency to agree more with one set of manuscripts than with the other. While the focus of this thesis has been on the state of the text rather than on which readings are more “correct” or “Platonic,” the tendency of modern editors to favour the MS. B may lead to the inference that there is one very secure tradition (transmitted by B and D) and a few other traditions (those of T, PW, and the papyrus) which often vary from this more correctly transmitted text. This inference is not true. Although they most often agree with each other and with the papyrus, the readings of BD and TPW both vary in quality. It is important when trying to determine the state of the text to give all primary witnesses equal consideration. In spite of the slight favour editors have traditionally shown BD since the early nineteenth century, it is clear that the medieval MSS. preserve a fairly uniform text with relatively small discrepancies.

Other ancient authors have also preserved small sections of our passage in their own works. In most cases these testimonia are not lengthy enough to demonstrate allegiance to any one MS. or MS. family, permitting us to conclude that the text they used differed little from that preserved in the medieval MSS. Where readings in the text differ from those of the primary witnesses it is clear that the testimonia are usually inferior witnesses, but, nonetheless, they do sometimes provide readings of value. The indirect tradition itself, let us recall, has been subject to its own imperfect transmission, and nowhere can we safely say that a later scribe has not corrected an ancient author through comparison with the text of Plato.

While the testimonia, for the most part, do not undermine the state of the text in the medieval manuscripts, the variations found within them do leave us with something of value. The unique readings of the indirect tradition rarely change or modify the meaning of Plato's text. If the testimonia were to alter the meaning found in the direct tradition then there would be grounds to question whether the text was different, or understood to mean something different, in antiquity. But the closeness of the testimonia to the primary witnesses, at least in meaning if not in exact wording, reinforces the impression that the text is stable.

Quotation, paraphrase, reference, and allusion are not distinct classifications, and ancient authors subjected our passage to all these treatments. Plato's definition of δαίμονες (202d1–203a8) became integral to Western thought. It was transmitted through phrases and key words from the passage, words which then became part of new phrases developed by those who used the passage. Even words which were synonyms for words within the passage came to symbolize and recall it. Plato's description of δαίμονες was so influential in describing the interaction between the divine and mortal that Christianity, from its inception to the present day, was able to unite and reconcile its God with humans through the agency of a Platonic intermediary figure,

Christ. The study and transmission of this Platonic passage may have been the work of the educated classes, but the ideas contained within it became the common property of all. Plato's δαίμονες were thoroughly integrated into the public consciousness.

The investigation of *Symposium* 202d1–203a8 has looked into only a sample of the many ancient and medieval authors who make use of it. This thesis is only intended to be an overview, but the study could be taken to completion by looking into all instances where this passage influenced later authors. And further, while Plato's description of δαίμονες was the focus, it is only one section of our passage, and there are other sections which were influential. The myth of Penia and Poros had impact and influence upon later authors and merits a similar examination. Likewise, motifs such as the great chain of being, assent to contemplation of forms, and especially procreation or fertility as a metaphor for thought, all lived on in other authors. Our passage of Plato's *Symposium*, then, contains many sections which make it influential, the promise of which is easily visible from this overview of its most influential part.

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