Writing Postcolonial African Genocide: The Holocaust and Fictional Representations of Genocide in Nigeria and Rwanda

By

Chigbo Arthur Anyaduba

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of The University of Manitoba in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of English, Theatre, Film, and Media

University of Manitoba

Winnipeg

Copyright © 2018 by Chigbo Anyaduba
Abstract

This study examines fictional representations of genocides occurring in postcolonial Africa. By addressing the historical, political and cultural dimensions underpinning writing about mass atrocities in 1966-1970 Nigeria and 1990-1994 Rwanda, the study highlights the evolving patterns of imagining violent encounters in postcolonial Africa centred on the idea of genocide. This idea of genocide, I argue, derives significantly from an association of African genocidal suffering with the Nazi Germany genocide of Jews in Europe – the Holocaust. Thus, I work to illustrate the ways and forms in which fictional representations of largescale violence in Nigerian and Rwandan contexts invoke the cultural memories and representational practices associated with the Holocaust in order to give distinctive shape and character to our understanding of violent experiences in these countries.

Drawing on novels written in response to the genocides in Nigeria and Rwanda, I call attention to a body of imaginative literature that presents a compelling picture of the scope, strategies and prevailing thematic concerns that have preoccupied discussions about violence, identities, morality and justice in Africa. I argue that these novels show significant influence by popular tropes of Holocaust writing in terms of their thematic and stylistic elements. These novels establish a clear link between African genocides and the Holocaust, minimally through direct comparison of African atrocities to atrocities perpetrated by the Nazis against Jews, and also through their deployment of notable tropes characteristic of Holocaust literature.

The nexus of traumatic Holocaust and African atrocity memories in fictional representations of African genocides, I go on to argue, has significance for reasons not generally accounted for in scholarly works on African genocide literature. This significance emerges from the critical consideration of literary projects that moralize their genocide narratives.
Acknowledgements

First, I acknowledge the fabulous funding and support that have made my dissertation and my overall academic experience at the University of Manitoba easy and possible: the Vanier Canada Graduate Scholarship, the Queen Elizabeth Scholarship, the University of Manitoba Graduate Fellowship, the Margaret H. Tyler Scholarship, and several other grants and awards disbursed to me by the government of Canada, the University of Manitoba, and other agencies in acknowledgement and support of my studies, conference travels and wellbeing.

Several individuals, all of whom I cannot name, contributed invaluably to making this dissertation a reality. My acknowledgement here will not go far enough to credit their incredible support and encouragement throughout the process of my dissertation. I am greatly indebted to these individuals and can only name just a few. I have so much to thank my supervisor, Dr. Adam Muller, for his mentorship, friendship and conscientious guidance throughout this process. His support and understanding made all the difference, for me. I cannot translate into words my gratitude to Dr. Diana Brydon. Her generosity, mentorship, friendship and immense support have made all the difference, for me, and she remains an enormous inspiration to me. I thank members of my examination committee for their incredible insights, comments and suggestions for revising the dissertation.

I would also like to thank specially the Department of English, Theatre, Film, and Media for all the unflagging support and encouragement. I am deeply grateful to Drs. Vanessa Warne, Glenn Clark, Warren Cariou, David Watt, Pam Perkins, Mark Libin, Erin Keating, Michelle Faubert, and Brenda Austin-Smith. Thank you to Anita King, Darlene McWhirter, Marianne Harnish, and Mabelle Magsino for all the support and encouraging words. I thank the members of the discussion group at the Centre for Globalization and Cultural Studies. I also express thanks to fellow graduate students, past and present, whose
friendship and encouragement made my academic and social experience at the UofM quite easy and treasured: Dr. Mike Minor, Mike Hayden, Jeremy Strong, Zach Montreuil, Kristian Enright, Kevin Ramberran, Katie Leitch, Dr. Katelyn Dykstra, Sabrina Mark, Gretchen Derige, Karalyn Dokurno, Mandy Elliot, Melanie Dennis Unrau, Vanessa Nunes, Ishrat Ismail, among several others. Many thanks to Ademola Adesola, Benjamin Maiangwa, Mobolaji Ibrahim, Uche Umez, James Yeku, Tosin Gbogi, Oyindamola Olatinsu, Agape Karagi, Ngozi Regina Eke, Constance Amadi, Marion Kiprop, Drs. Jessica Jacobson-Konefall and Libe Garcia Zarranz. Special thanks to Drs. Chima and Bisi Anyadike for their unwavering support and continued belief in me. Thanks too to Bill Brydon, Emily Muller, Stephanie Minor, and Dr. Regine King for all the cheers and encouraging words. I also thank friends at the Protestant Institute of the Arts and the Social Sciences, Huye, Rwanda, and friends and kin at Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria.

Finally, my immense gratitude and love will always go to my families whose powerful love saved me: Mumisco Chinwe Dorothy Anyaduba, Nonso Anyaduba, Mummy-Mummy Oluseyi Stella Joseph, Temitope Comfort Joseph, Ogbeni Olorifufu Adeolu Joseph, and Ifeoluwapo Rita Adeniyi. After it’s been all said and done, the love and care of family and friends humbled me. I am forever thankful and indebted to you all.
Dedication

To the demons in my head: I hope you can now permit me to speak, freely!
## Table of Contents

Abstract .................................................................................................................................................. ii  
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................... iii  
Table of Contents .................................................................................................................................. vi  
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 1  
Chapter 1: Genocide in Africa’s Postcolony .......................................................................................... 20  
Chapter 2: Writing Genocide in the Postcolony: The Holocaust and Literary Representation of African Genocide ................................................................................................................................. 61  
Chapter 3: Genocide as a Ritual of Transition: Soyinka’s Tragic Vision of Genocide in *Season of Anomy* ............................................................................................................................................. 100  
Chapter 4: Writing the “African” Holocaust: The Rwandan Genocide as a Gospel of African Decolonization in Diop’s *Murambi, The Book of Bones* .............................................................................................................. 142  
Chapter 5: Witnessing the Rwandan Genocide: Pornography in Courtemanche’s *A Sunday at the Pool in Kigali* .............................................................................................................................................. 179  
Chapter 6: Gendering African Genocide Fiction: Adichie’s Feminist Vision of Genocide in *Half of a Yellow Sun* ................................................................................................................................................... 220  
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 256  
Works Cited .......................................................................................................................................... 260
Introduction

Literary encounters with genocidal atrocities in Africa have attempted to reimagine the conditions giving rise to genocides. This literature taken together tries to make genocides in Africa thinkable in certain ways. In the attempt, fundamental questions are raised about the nature of genocide, including: What explains why some groups attempt to eliminate others? Who counts as victims, perpetrators, and bystanders in the theatres of these mass atrocities? What understandings of human goodness and evil can we derive from representations of genocidal horrors? What is the role of art and the artist before, during, and after genocides? What have genocides meant for the literary imagination in postcolonial Africa? What is the relation of genocidal to colonial violence in Africa? These questions are not simple and oftentimes they provoke complex responses. Nevertheless they lie at the heart of my project.

Extant discussions of genocides occurring in postcolonial Africa suggest that the conditions under which these mass atrocities are produced derive mainly from the twin legacies of European colonialism and modernity—specifically through the nation-state system foisted on African peoples, and through the ideas of sovereignty and political and moral subjectivity that this system enabled and depended on.¹ The prevailing critical assumption, that is, is that there was no neat transition from the colonial period to a postcolonial one in Africa. Rather, the colonial system with all its violent racist baggage was carried along into the postcolonial period in ways that encouraged the instances of mass violence and brutal atrocity witnessed since independence.

What is missing from this conception of postcolonial African violence as derived from and underpinned by Africans’ experience of European colonialism is due acknowledgement of the extent to which Africans’ and indeed the world’s understanding of

postcolonial mass violence has been shaped by the representational conventions and practices associated with the legacy of the Holocaust. My concern in this dissertation, therefore, is with mapping the various intersections linking Holocaust memory to representations of genocide in Africa, specifically in Biafra/Nigeria and Rwanda. I understand the Holocaust to be an important point of reference for African writers and other artists attempting to make sense of genocides perpetrated in Africa. The resulting nexus of Holocaust memory with memories of African genocides presents me with some ambivalence. On the one hand, reference to the Holocaust (its history, tropes, and analytical categories) provides those working with and on African genocides with a ready-made descriptive toolbox whose utility has already been demonstrated, and whose meanings are widely understood (if not always shared). This toolbox has helped to make African genocides visible globally. On the other hand, the Holocaust has also in various ways overdetermined the explanatory and moral-evaluative frames through which African genocides have been conceived of and responded to in art as well as in the “real” world, such as in discussions of post-conflict reconciliation and redress. I argue that the sublimation of Holocaust memory into mediations of violent encounters in Africa has broader implications in ways not generally accounted for in scholarly works on African genocides that focus more narrowly on the “process of brutalization” (Mbembe, On the Postcolony 14) of European colonialism, but not often on the process that is constituting post-genocide subjects and subjectivities in Africa. These implications suggest themselves more broadly in literary projects that privilege moral responses to genocides and flawed, if not non-usable (because they are unstable) political visions of justice and political organization in a genocide’s wake. I explore in my dissertation the significance of tensions in novels between the experience of genocide in 

---

2 Throughout this study, I use “the Holocaust” to refer to what has become standard description for Nazi Germany genocide of Jews in Europe.
Biafra/Nigeria and Rwanda that arise from their authors’ desire to have the atrocities at their centres acknowledged as genocide both particularly and universally.

Genocide in Africa’s Postcolony: The Examples of Nigeria and Rwanda

Notwithstanding disputes over the use of genocide to describe the mass atrocities committed in Nigeria and Rwanda, I have used the word genocide with more nuance than suggested in its standard understanding as articulated by the United Nations’ Genocide Convention. Article II of the UN Convention on the Punishment and Prevention of the Crime of Genocide (UNGC) defines genocide as meaning:

any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. (280)

The UNGC definition emphasizes deliberateness (intent) leading to systematic genocidal action. As a narrative (i.e., supposing we regard law as story, as some scholars are inclined to do), the UNGC definition of genocide has been significantly shaped by the Holocaust frame. In this frame, genocide is imagined to follow a teleological course from intent to action, a course believed to be the way in which the Holocaust proceeded. This understanding of genocide informs several scholarly and literary projects on postcolonial African genocides. The novels that I discuss in my dissertation also show that their authors clearly understood

3 See, e.g., Payam Akhavan, Reducing Genocide to Law, and In Search of a Better World.
the atrocities in both Nigeria and Rwanda to be genocidal on this standard UNGC understanding of the term. The reliance on the UNGC, as a form of Holocaust trope, propels writers to narrativize African mass atrocities to “fit” the image of the Holocaust. Recent Holocaust and genocide scholarship, such as the work by Christopher Browning (see, e.g., *Ordinary Men*), has challenged the teleological narrative of genocide and the emphasis on genocidal intent. I rely on this recent scholarship in my study in order to broaden understanding of genocides occurring in Africa (see Chapter 1 of the dissertation).

That said, it is important to also underscore (at the risk of contradiction) that the mass atrocities in Nigeria and Rwanda do meet the criteria for considering genocide as enshrined in the UNGC. The reason for my highlighting this point is in order to dismiss certain denialist notions that mass atrocities in both countries do not meet the international standard and official understanding of genocide. Thus: the 1966-70 mass atrocities against Igbos in Nigeria fit neatly under the UN’s definition. Victims were identified by their killers as belonging to an ethnic group, and then massacred because of that group membership. The killings were deliberate, well planned and systematically executed, at least in the Northern Region of Nigeria where most Igbos were killed in 1966 and subsequently in Biafra during the war, during which the Federal Military Government of Nigeria led by Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon invaded and blockaded the former Eastern Region of Nigeria.

In January 1966, a group of military officers carried out a coup that led to the deaths of Nigeria’s top leaders in government. The January coup was organized by five officers, four of whom were of Igbo ethnicity. The coup plotters claimed that their goal was to rid Nigeria of corrupt politicians (see, e.g., Ademoyega; Madiebo). Most of their victims were top government officials of the ruling coalition parties, including the country’s prime minister and the premiers of then Northern and Western Regions of Nigeria. However, the coup failed after the top military command intervened to suppress it. The coup nonetheless ushered in a
military regime led by the country’s top military officer, Major-General Aguiyi Ironsi, who happened to be an Igbo. The leaders of the Northern Region who felt aggrieved by the coup’s outcome branded it an example of Igbo treachery that was hatched from an Igbo conspiracy to impose Igbo hegemony over Nigeria. In May of the same year, mobs and militant bands began killing Igbo residents across the North in several cities in the region. By July, a second coup took place, this time led by military officers from the Northern Region. The July coup plotters murdered the Igbo head of state and subsequently undertook a systematic purging of Igbo officers from the military. Killings of Igbo civilians living in the North intensified during this period, and spread to the Western Region as well. Between July and December 1966, systematic massacres of Igbos living in Northern and Western Regions of Nigeria took place, leading to thousands of deaths and the displacement of millions of survivors who escaped from these regions to the Eastern Igbo homeland.

The systematic mass murders of Igbos and other so-called Easterners in Nigeria precipitated the secession of the Eastern Region of Nigeria from the federation in May 1967. Lieutenant-Colonel Chukwuemeka Ojukwu, who was the military head of the then Eastern Region, announced the secession and called the resulting new nation Biafra. Nigeria invaded Biafra a few weeks after its declaration of independence in order to force it back into the federation. The war that followed was marked by heinous crimes including massacres of whole Igbo villages by Nigerian troops, the mass rape of girls and women, and the prosecution by the Nigerian military of a war of blockade and mass starvation targeting Igbo civilian populations and leading to the deaths of over two million people. The war ended in January 1970 with Biafra capitulating. 

---

Contention between scholars has generally not been over the facts concerning atrocities against Igbos. Instead, controversies have taken up such issues as how to characterize the systematic murder of Igbos across Nigeria before and during the war. The contentions have generally been polarized along the lines of the agent-structure debate regarding how we measure and determine social outcomes. For those who argue against labelling the killings as genocide, the argument has generally been that no clear evidence of genocidal intentions could be established as belonging to the Nigerian military government.

To account for the systematic nature of the killings, such scholars generally view the massacres of Igbos as revenge for the first military coup, which is believed to have been propelled by an Igbo conspiracy to rule Nigeria.

However, the premise of the revenge hypothesis – i.e. that the first coup was an Igbo coup – is not only factually inaccurate but also difficult to accept theoretically since many of the junior soldiers who participated in that coup were non-Igbo: For example, the soldiers who killed the Northern Premier were mostly non-Igbo people from Northern Nigeria, including members of the Premier’s palace guards. A problem with the revenge hypothesis is that it is specious and fails to explain how to characterize the rationale that places collective guilt and blame on a whole people because of the supposed crimes of its members. Some scholars have argued that no evidence of such an Igbo conspiracy exists in reality (Uzoigwe, *Visions of Nationhood*). Nor, I should add, are such claims of a grand conspiracy ever a justifiable reason for genocide. Not only is their ample evidence of genocidal intentions in the statements, publications and actions of Nigerian leaders before and during that period, as some other scholars have pointed out, but also the systematic pattern of killings and the fact

---

5 I addressed this subject in details in my first chapter of this dissertation.
that victims’ ethnic (or racialized) identity constituted a major reason for their murders are proof enough that a genocide took place.7

Similar disagreements as are found in the discourse of Igbo genocide in Nigeria are present in the case of the 1994 Tutsi genocide in Rwanda, although the atrocities in Rwanda have now almost become incontestably accepted as genocide. Following the end of the Rwandan civil war in 1994, several historians of modern Rwanda traced the crisis of the 1990s back to the activities of European colonizers in the country.8 Scholars such as Mahmood Mamdani have attributed the genocide to the politicization of social identities of the Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa in Rwanda during colonial times. During the period of decolonization a majority Hutu rebelled against members of the ruling Tutsi class, resulting in violent massacres of Tutsis in Rwanda between 1959 and 1963. These massacres led many Tutsis to flee Rwanda into neighbouring countries. The persecution of Tutsis continued through successions of Hutu governments. In the 1980s, a group of Tutsi refugees in Uganda organized themselves into a rebel unit demanding return to Rwanda. The Rwandan government under President Juvénal Habyarimana refused to accept the refugees, a situation that set in motion a long civil war. Following the murder of President Habyarimana in 1994, Hutu militants and soldiers launched a campaign of extermination that massacred Tutsis and Hutus across the country, even while the civil war raged on between government forces and the rebels. By July, the Hutu government had lost the war to the Tutsi-led rebel group known as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), and millions of Rwandan Hutus fled the country into neighbouring countries. The genocide claimed somewhere around a million victims.

7 See Uzoigwe, Visions of Nationhood; Korieh, The Nigeria-Biafra War; Achebe, There Was a Country. See also Parts I and II of the edited collection, Writing the Nigeria-Biafra War by Falola and Ezekwem.

8 Stapleton, A History of Genocide in Africa; Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis; Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers; Meredith, The Fate of Africa.
Unlike the Nigerian case, most scholars agree that the massacres of Tutsis and so-called moderate Hutus in Rwanda amounted to a genocide. The Rwandan atrocities led to the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to try perpetrators of genocide, an institution that gave further legitimacy to the genocide attribution. Major controversies about the genocide generally involve the assignment of responsibility for the assassination of President Habyarimana, which is believed by many to have triggered the 1994 genocide. Some historians have argued that the assassination was a consequence of a plot by members of the Hutu government who were against the power-sharing agreement President Habyarimana reached with the RPF. Some others contend that it was carried out by the RPF as part of their ploy to resume the civil war and defeat militarily what they already knew was a disorganized regime (see Stapleton 53-57). Yet as was the case in Nigeria, the massacres in Rwanda were ethnically-based and occurred during a moment of chaos and confusion. The massacres were well organized and systematically executed. Many victims were murdered because they identified as Tutsi, or were identified by others as such.

Writing Genocide in Postcolonial Nigeria and Rwanda

Nigeria and Rwanda stand out in the discourse on African genocide literature, not least for the volume of literary work concerning atrocity events produced in these two countries, but also because they provide fertile ground for considering how narratives become important avenues through which traumatic experiences may come to be witnessed and transformed into instruments of justice. Nigeria and Rwanda are also significant since both countries’

---

9 Another major controversy relates to a 2006 revisionist publication by French investigative journalist Pierre Péan claiming that the RPF equally committed a genocide of their own against Hutus and that most of the deaths attributed to Hutu extremist groups were the work of the RPF (see Pierre Péan, Noires fureurs; See also, the 2014 BBC documentary, Rwanda: The Untold Story).
violent histories contain important moments in Africa’s recent past when the word “genocide” was mobilized for a range of political, socio-cultural, and legal purposes. The violent crisis between 1966 and 1970 in Nigeria provided arguably one of the first major moments of contestation in postcolonial Africa when accusations of genocide were made and questions raised about the nature and scope of the ethno-political violence happening in Nigeria. However, it was only in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda that a broadly accepted norms governing the literary representation of African genocides emerged, comprising a nascent canon. What I highlight in my dissertation is that African genocide literatures now organize representations of experiences of extreme violence in ways importantly, though not entirely, indebted to the Rwandan experience. This experience now serves as a paradigm of genocide and genocide writing in postcolonial Africa. My contention is that the reason for this canonization of the Rwandan genocide is, at least in significant ways, a function of how representations of the Rwandan experience have adapted the representational and commemorative tropes of the Holocaust.

However, by discussing fictional works responding to mass atrocities perpetrated against Igbos in Nigeria as genocide literature, I redraw the map of postcolonial African genocide scholarship not only by “rediscovering” the Nigerian genocide of Igbos before and during the Biafra-Nigeria War, but also by highlighting a sustained influence of the Holocaust at different historical moments since the 1960s on the representation and understanding of mass atrocities emanating from Africa’s postcolony. The novels about Nigeria and Rwanda that I have selected to discuss in my thesis show clearly that writers considered themselves to be writing about genocide. This imaginative corpus has contributed significantly to some basic conceptualizations of genocide as it has unfolded elsewhere on the continent following decolonization.
Furthermore, in my dissertation I examine the role played by these genocide novels in societal reconstruction following genocides. Questions I attempt to answer in this study include the following: What informed the critical receptions of these novels? What are the implications of the discursive practices and traditions shaping interpretations of these novels? What memories do these novels and their critical reception privilege and/or aim to secure? This last question is extremely important, since my research suggests that both Nigeria and Rwanda are contexts within which literature and its criticism mark certain violent experiences as worth imagining and writing about, and others as needing to be repressed. In the case of Nigeria, for example, the massacres of Igbos or “Easterners” between 1966 and 1967 has drawn fewer imaginative and critical responses than the eventual war that lasted from 1967 to 1970. The war experience appears to have overshadowed the genocide of 1966 in literature (even though some writers and scholars of the Nigeria-Biafra War contend that the war itself was genocidal, especially given the level of violence unleashed on civilian populations by the forces of the Federal Military Government). Likewise, in the case of Rwanda, literary and critical responses to the Rwandan crisis have basically focused on the genocide of Tutsis and moderate Hutus, but not often on the brutal civil war that began in that country around 1990 and which was being fought alongside the genocide that took place in 1994. The basis of post-1994 Rwandan trauma as explained in imaginative and critical writings about the country has been linked to the deaths of targeted civilian populations, and not to the suffering of the battlefield. Hence I underscore in my dissertation some of the factors accounting for the repression of aspects of violent encounters during and after the genocides I am interested in. These factors, as I discuss in more detail in Chapter 2, result from political circumstances and commemorative practices (or a lack thereof) that have shaped how writers have responded to atrocities in the two countries. In the Nigerian context, a genocidal government won the Biafran war and proceeded to engineer a culture of genocide denial founded on a
nationalist narrative involving the idea of a war being fought in defense of Nigerian unity. This nationalist narrative further led some writers opposed to the government’s position to evoke the Holocaust in their work in order to make comprehensible the idea that the Nigerian atrocities constituted a genocide. In the Rwanda case, the RPF won the war and cast itself as a heroic force that decisively ended a genocide. Since the war narrative also implicated it in violence and atrocities, the RPF-led government privileged instead the memories of the 1994 genocide during the country’s post-war reconstruction. Writings drawing comparisons between the Rwandan genocide and the Holocaust further served (at least implicitly) to represent the RPF’s role as a moral one directed towards ending genocide, and so rejected any mention of the idea that the RPF was itself a violent force engaged in political conflict with, and committing atrocities against, the defeated Hutu government. In both the Nigerian and Rwandan contexts, references to the Holocaust have served to further a moral agenda by castigating “evil,” a moral function that downplays the political preconditions of genocide and distorts the political visions of justice and reform emerging in both countries in the aftermath of mass violence and atrocity.

Methodological Approach to the Postcolonial African Genocide Novel

My preference for novels over other forms of literature written in response to the genocides in Nigeria and Rwanda is a consequence of the way fictional narratives have come to constitute a very significant intellectual and artistic response to mass atrocities taking place in Africa’s postcolonial moment. Focusing on novels allows me to survey the diverse range and variety of these artistic and intellectual responses to African genocides. There are four primary texts lying at the explanatory heart of my dissertation,\(^\text{10}\) two concerning the genocide

\(^{10}\) Also, I have limited my choice of primary texts to novels written in or translated into English. But whenever the need arises I make reference to works written in French or to the original French versions of some
in Nigeria and two the Rwandan genocide. The “Nigerian” novels are Wole Soyinka’s *Season of Anomy* and Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s *Half of a Yellow Sun*. Boubacar Boris Diop’s *Murambi, the Book of Bones* and Gil Courtemanche’s *A Sunday at the Pool in Kigali* are the main texts I draw on pertaining to the genocide in Rwanda. I have selected these novels because they not only continue to attract a great deal of critical attention, but also because they exemplify, for me, important representational modes that characterize major artistic responses to genocides in these two countries.

My focus on Nigeria and Rwanda is by no means part of an attempt to make a case for there being national genocide literatures in Africa, which has been the concern of some scholars writing on the discourse of war fiction.11 This is because, as several other scholars have shown,12 instabilities and atrocities occurring in postcolonial Africa cannot be reduced to simple explanations that privilege the artificially imposed boundaries of African nation-states. Rather, instability and atrocity operate through and within agencies and geographies that exceed the boundaries of nation-states. My justification for choosing these contexts for a study of genocide in literature produced in postcolonial Africa is essentially because the mass atrocities scarring both countries crucially mark the occasion of critical turns in the ways in which genocides in Africa have been conceived following the Holocaust.

Throughout the dissertation, I have used such generic terms as “Africa,” “postcolonial Africa,” “Africa’s postcolony” or “African literature” not to homogenize the complex nature of socio-political and historical realities on the continent or to suggest that violent realities in Nigeria and Rwanda represent what obtain in all of Africa. In the *Encyclopedia of African...* of my primary texts, especially in the case of Rwanda where a number of novels written about the genocide first appeared in French and some have not yet been translated into English. In all, I show in the dissertation that these novels stand as representative of the kind of diversity that any penetrating critical discussion of genocide literatures in Africa demands. Such diversity accommodates a broad array of thematic, identitarian, historical, geographical, and stylistic approaches to genocide.

11 See, e.g., Coundouriotis, *The People’s Right to the Novel*.
Literature, Simon Gikandi notes, “there is always the danger that the diversity of the continent and its complicated history will be subsumed by the desire for a larger narrative of culture and society” (xii). With Gikandi’s submission in mind, I acknowledge that differences of historical experiences across the continent cannot be homogenized under the rubric of Africa or under any national name such as Nigeria or Rwanda. Accordingly, I recognize the multiple forms, complexities and differences of historical events and experiences on the continent as well as the multiple dimensions that the understandings of these experiences have unfolded. My use of such generic terms is essentially conceptual in order to highlight a broad process that I consider lying at the background of crises in Africa of which the Nigerian and Rwandan instances provide only a foreground. Thus, I have not overly concerned myself in the dissertation with the tedious, tendentious and perhaps irresolvable question of what constitutes “African” in the specific and different national contexts of my focus. Instead, I have used such generic categories as a diversifying approach to highlight thematic threads in the discourse of African experiences.

Importantly, my focus on novels is not arbitrary. Unlike other literary forms such as poetry and drama, the novel has a unique history and form as a literary genre that has been put into the service of humanitarian activism. The historian Lynn Hunt, writing in her book Inventing Human Rights, uncovers the more than cursory connection between the rise of the novel and human rights discourse in Europe. Building on Benedict Anderson’s argument concerning how national identities result from imagined ideas of community sponsored largely by the organs of print-capitalism, Hunt argues that the novel has been significant for mobilizing empathy for human rights violations because, given its social history and affiliations with print technology, it was able to facilitate the birth of a more secular moral awareness in readers. For Hunt, the novel was able to create and channel the language and

---

13 For an incisive delineation of this point, see, e.g., Pius Adesanmi, You’re Not a Country, Africa.
empathy characteristic of human rights advocacy through its secularization of moral 
sentiments and consciousness.\textsuperscript{14}

In the African context, the rise of the novel in the twentieth century accompanied the 
rise of anticolonial struggles and independence claims across the continent. It is not merely a 
coincidence that as quests for individual freedom and group rights arose in Africa, novels by 
Africans grew in popularity in Africa and globally. For example, as the success and 
tremendous importance of James Currey’s Heinemann’s African Writers’ Series show, the 
“African” novel created new modes and languages through which experiences of colonial and 
postcolonial violation occurring throughout the continent could be expressed.\textsuperscript{15} Like Hunt, I 
identify the popularity of the novel with writers of African genocides as resulting from the 
genre’s provision of an adaptive and secular cultural apparatus for exposing abuses, 
witnessing atrocity, seeking justice in the face of oppression, and for seeking to expand the 
moral consciousness of those historically constructed (at least in the West) as sub-humans. In 
its specific representations of genocide in Africa’s postcolony, the novel assumes a 
significantly useful place within which the dominant symbol of African human rights abuses 
and their attendant suffering can be appropriated and secularized.

My general approach to reading these novels is informed by multiple sources. First, I 
do not take for granted the value of close readings that scrutinize the aesthetic choices and 
thematic concerns of the novels I am concerned with. This approach also takes seriously the 
role of the novel as a genre and its stylistic matrices in representing genocide in Africa’s 
postcolony. In addition, this formalistic approach is productive when it comes to elucidating

\textsuperscript{14} On the novel’s uses as instrument of human rights practice, see also Elizabeth Swanson Goldberg 
and Alexandra Schultheis Moore, eds., \textit{Theoretical Perspectives on Human Rights and Literature}; Joseph 

\textsuperscript{15} See James Currey, \textit{Africa Writes Back}. Importantly, in its over four decades of active existence, over 
eighty percent of Heinemann’s African Writers’ Series publications were novels. On the popularity of the novel 
in Africa, see also, Simon Gikandi, “African Literature and the Colonial Factor.”; Bernt Lindfors, \textit{Long Drums 
and Canons}. 

14
and inferring meanings suggested by the texts. Yet this approach also by itself poses its own challenges. One of its essential difficulties arises from the fact that, as Edward Said has noted, African novels aren’t often read with an eye on the socio-historical and political contexts informing them. With this criticism in mind, I have read my chosen novels closely, all the while remaining cognizant of the social, political and historical specificities of the issues they address, as well as the contexts of their own production and reception. I have engaged with the critical reception of these novels when and as required, as well as discussed the implications of their representations of genocide within their original contexts of production. My overall goal through this multivalent and intersectional approach, one that draws additionally on theories of genocide, trauma, and narrative, as well as on ideas from the disciplines of postcolonial and literary studies, is to instill a robust critical appreciation of what in the dissertation I identify and theorize as the postcolonial African genocide novel.

In Chapter 1, “Genocide in Africa’s Postcolony,” I examine the major stakes involved in discussing genocide in Africa’s postcolony. The chapter provides some background required to address the question of what genocide means in Africa, as well as insight into the implications of designating certain kinds of violence in Africa “genocide.” Focusing on Nigeria and Rwanda, I explore in this chapter how the trajectory of scholarly discussions of genocide in postcolonial Africa pivots on the history of European colonialism on the continent. Scholars tend to assume that colonialism set the stage for genocides occurring later in the postcolony. I argue instead that this assumption not only excludes other important factors fuelling exterminatory forms of violence on the continent, but also that it sidelines from serious consideration some of the major factors determining how African genocides are represented in literature. One such factor not generally accounted for in the critical literature is the extent to which cultural memories of the Holocaust have been instrumental in shaping critical and fictional representations of genocide in Africa’s postcolony.
In Chapter 2, “Writing Genocide in Africa’s Postcolony,” I grapple with the question of what is meant by the postcolonial African genocide novel. I argue that since the mid-twentieth century, following World War II, the postcolonial African genocide novel emerged from an artistic practice of comparing African genocides to the Holocaust. I contend that novelists’ comparison of African suffering to that of Jews during the Holocaust is typically a consequence of writers’ desire to legitimize the reality of African suffering as genocide. In securing this connection, the postcolonial African genocide novel generally adopts features and elements typical of canonical Holocaust literature. I identify four major motifs indicating the influence of the Holocaust on attempts to fictionalize African genocides, namely: (1) the portrayal of genocide as an encounter with hell; (2) genocide conceived of as ritual sacrifice; (3) genocide memorialization understood as a moral imperative; and (4) a naturalist aesthetics that requires graphic representations of the body in pain. I argue in this chapter that the prevalence of these motifs in literary representations of African genocides suggests that the African genocide novel is a distinct literary form. I furthermore contend that these motifs reveal that the African genocide novel is driven by a moral and humanitarian impulse that privileges moral-symbolic as against political responses to genocide in Africa.

In Chapter 3, “Genocide as a Ritual of Transition: Soyinka’s Tragic Vision of Genocide in Season of Anomy,” I discuss Wole Soyinka’s novel, Season of Anomy as expressing a tragic vision of genocide aimed at finding purpose for the deaths of victims. I claim that Soyinka’s deployment of the descent trope in the novel has been influenced by Holocaust writing. The mythos of hell underlying an artist’s quest in the novel, I argue, suggests Soyinka’s attempts to dramatize his artistic vision and commitment in a way suggestive of an African writer having to confront an African “Holocaust.” I therefore advocate seeing Soyinka’s tragic genocidal imagination as ill-suited to the representation of the Igbo genocide in Nigeria. The flaws in Season of Anomy arise from Soyinka’s choice of a
tragic metanarrative that valorizes sacrifice and masculine heroism. The tragic form of Soyinka’s novel turns victims of genocide into sacrificial objects required for their killers’ redemption, and problematically encourages a heroic vision of genocide.

In Chapter 4, “Writing the ‘African’ Holocaust: The Rwandan Genocide as a Gospel of African Decolonization in Diop’s *Murambi, The Book of Bones,*” I show how in his novel Boubacar Boris Diop “emplots” the Biblical story of Cornelius’s meeting with the Apostle Simon Peter in order to advance an idea of the Rwandan genocide as a gospel of African decolonization. The mythos of the Gentiles’ conversion to Christianity that underpins *Murambi* reveals Diop’s investment in the redemptive message of Christianity. This redemptive message, which is arrived at through introspection leading to conversion, is, I argue, an inadequate response to genocide. I therefore conclude that Diop’s message in *Murambi* is flawed because it privileges a moral response that fails adequately to address a genocide’s political preconditions and awful reality.

In chapter 5, “Writing the Rwandan Genocide: Pornography in Courtemanche’s *A Sunday at the Pool in Kigali,*” I discuss Gil Courtemanche’s novel, which I consider to be characteristic of certain Western artistic attempts to represent the Rwandan genocide that bolster racist stereotypes of Africa even while advocating for humanitarian and empathetic response to African suffering. Rather than merely offering a “bystander’s” or an “outsider’s” perspective on the Rwandan genocide, as some critics have suggested, I contend instead that Courtemanche’s narrative refuses to alienate or distance the “Western” agent from the Rwandan atrocity. Placing the reality of the Rwandan genocide within the wider systems of modern life, *Sunday* in my view draws both symbolic and historical parallels between the Rwandan genocide and the Holocaust, dramatizing the encounter with genocide in Rwanda as an encounter with an African hell-on-earth that in crucial ways resembles Auschwitz. I argue further that the writer’s use of the naturalist aesthetic elements are pornographic.
Courtemanche uses this pornographic approach in part to unmask and mock the West’s voyeuristic disposition to African suffering even though this style nonetheless supports and reinforces the voyeurism it condemns. Overall, I show that Courtemanche’s approach fails to take representation of the Rwandan genocide beyond the colonial practice of racist representation that seems normatively present and detectable in several, particularly Western, depictions of African suffering.

Chapter 6, “Gendering African Genocide Fiction: Adichie’s Feminist Vision of Genocide in *Half of a Yellow Sun*,” presents Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s novel as exemplifying a feminist imagining of the Igbo genocide in Nigeria. I discuss Adichie’s novel as demonstrating a significant attempt to depart from the masculinist tropes characterizing Soyinka’s, Diop’s, and Courtemanche’s representations of genocide. In its departure, Adichie in *Half of a Yellow Sun* deploys domestic and romantic fictional tropes in her attempt to manage the task of imagining genocide. Although like the other writers Adichie compares the Igbo genocide in Nigeria to the Holocaust, I show that her use of the domestic and romantic forms in her novel serves to “feminize” the genocide novel by deconstructing its patriarchal foundations in order to provide an imaginative horizon broad and deep enough for thinking about the specificity of women’s suffering in the context of the Nigerian genocide. However, I contend that Adichie’s feminist vision in *Half of a Yellow Sun* presents readers with problematic and racialized images of masculinity. In particular, I argue in this chapter that Adichie’s portrayal of Igbo masculinity implicitly places blame and responsibility for the genocide on the shoulders of Igbo men. I trace the logic of this blaming in the novel to its indebtedness to conventions in Holocaust survivor testimonial writing, as well as to the literary and cultural legacies of Chinua Achebe’s *Things Fall Apart*.

It might be apparent by now that my reading of the African genocide novel is designed both to make a case for the genre’s significance as well as to highlight and
problematize its indebtedness to established patterns and themes in Holocaust writing. This indebtedness to the tropes and thematic foci of major works of Holocaust literature has contributed to moralizing African genocide narratives. In all four novels covered by my study, moral concerns trump political ones. The moralizing rhetoric of the African genocide novel thus may be seen to lead generally to the depoliticizing and de-historicizing of the conditions responsible for genocide, creating the impression that genocide is a matter of individual moral failings requiring individual moral response and reform. The tendency to moralize African genocide in this way, which I argue throughout the dissertation distracts from attempts to marshal cogent political visions of redress in a genocide’s aftermath, derives to a significant extent from the influence of the Holocaust on African genocide representations.
Chapter 1
Genocide in Africa’s Postcolony

Introduction

This chapter examines what is at stake in discussing genocides occurring in Africa’s postcolony generally. The specific concern in this chapter is to explore the question of what is genocide in postcolonial Africa by way of beginning a discussion of representations of genocide in Africa. Accordingly, I describe the nature of violent phenomena designated as genocide as well as the contentions regarding how these phenomena may be understood. In addition, particularly within African contexts, I highlight some of the implications of discussing genocides in Africa using the ideological, linguistic and discursive apparatuses of mass atrocity that have been shaped by Western colonial practices. By considering a discursive practice that processes realities of genocide in Africa through the activities of European colonizers, this chapter describes the issues arising from narrowing our understanding of histories of genocide on the continent to European colonialism.

Two major implications stand out when thinking about genocides in Africa’s postcolony as the direct legacies of European colonial activities. The first is a tenacity of thinking that insists on a structural model of genocides in Africa. This structural model focuses on the macrodynamics behind social or collective actions and outcomes. Therefore, to the question of what causes genocide in Africa’s postcolony, the structuralist understanding looks towards colonialism and Western modernity as essential instigators of

---

1 I use “postcolony” in the sense in which Achille Mbembe uses it to designate the “age” and “entanglements” resulting from and following multiple dimensions and histories of slavery, conquests and colonizations in Africa. In other words, the postcolony does not merely suggest a time after colonization but rather the complex realities of entanglements, temporalities, and subjectivities occasioned by the colonial experiences in Africa (see Mbembe, On the Postcolony 102). While my focus has been on the history of European colonialisms and its aftermaths on the continent, I am by no means implying that the experiences of colonialism in Africa is singular. Nor am I suggesting that there is only one African postcolony deriving only from the experience of European colonization.
mass atrocity in Africa. The second, which is a consequence of the first, is a tacit scholarly endorsement of an idea of the genocide concept whose origination and semantic register are founded on a largely Western imperialist notion of racial violence that has become canonized in the Holocaust. On this view, genocide is understood as an exceptional phenomenon driven by ideas of race. By calling attention in this dissertation to how representations and thinking about genocide in Africa is significantly tied to the “prototype effect” (Hinton 10-11)² of the Holocaust, I argue in this and subsequent chapters for a committed rethinking of genocides occurring in Africa’s postcolony. This rethinking entails extricating the concept and phenomenon of genocide in Africa from its entanglement with European colonialism. Such a rethinking of the idea of genocide potentially fills in a number of analytical gaps in our understanding of genocidal mass atrocities in Africa, as well as of their representations in literature.

To speak about genocide and the postcolonial is equally to speak in terms of complexities and multiple decentering. First, the postcolonial, as several critics suggest,³ signals a complex consideration of a time after European colonialism – a “post-colonial” with a hyphen. The “post-” in this sense of postcolonial suggests both temporalities and spatialities resulting from the history of Europe’s colonial activities in Africa. In this sense of the word, therefore, “postcolonial genocide” implies a concept of exterminatory violence occurring among formerly colonized peoples in the official aftermath of European colonization.

To conceptualize the postcolonial in terms of temporality or an “after” colonialism demands reappraisal of the order of power in the postcolony, as well as of how this order

---

² The Holocaust as prototypical genocide meant that other genocides – including genocides that occurred before Nazi atrocities – are now measured based on their resemblances or even links to the Nazi genocide of Jews in Europe.
authorizes exterminatory forms of violence. In addition, it demands we ask how and why this order is able to produce genocides or preconditions of genocide. This temporality within which we have to make sense of genocide has to be understood in terms other than those associated with the concept of time in abstraction from material reality. This is because the temporality in question is in fact quite material given its production of new territories, state systems and sovereignties. Also, this temporality, which derives from the colonial generally, suggests a basic proposition: namely that the colonial condition in some proximate or remote ways sowed the seeds of genocides in the postcolony. From this proposition, popular among many scholars of Africa, a number of questions must be addressed and which might be summed up thusly: Are genocides in so-called postcolonial Africa essentially a continuation of patterns of colonial violence? Put differently, are genocides in Africa’s postcolony the direct result and legacy of colonialism? The issues resulting from answers to this question, which I will discuss in subsequent sections of this chapter, border on considerations of the nature and causes of genocide in postcolonial Africa.

The second issue to consider when speaking of the “postcolonial” in its relation to genocide in Africa manifests in the decentering aspect of postcolonial practice. As a deconstructive concept that questions colonial hierarchies of power, the postcolonial scrutinizes the historical, socio-cultural, economic and political contexts that gave rise to the ideas and discursive practices of genocide (Eze, “Epistemic Conditions for Genocide” 118). It challenges valuations and hierarchies of suffering implicit in certain uses of the genocide concept. These valuations and hierarchies may be found in the canonization of genocide – a legacy of the Holocaust – as a unique, exceptional act of violence that requires a rather exalted and serious attitude of apprehension in comparison to other instances of mass

---

4 See, e.g., Nhema and Zeleza, editors, The Roots of African Conflicts; Mamdani, When Victims Become; Uzoigwe, Visions of Nationhood.
atrocity. In the light of this understanding of the postcolonial, the evolving meanings and uses to which the genocide concept is invoked for explaining mass atrocities in Africa’s postcolony become a focal consideration of scholarly practice. In this consideration, therefore, viewing the genocide concept as a political instrument with its own specific history, context of origination and use becomes significant. The driving question for me will be to ask for the evolving historical and political circumstances within and outside Africa prompting the appropriations of the genocide concept for describing and responding to mass atrocities on the continent. In other words, of primary interest to me in what follows is the question of what politics impel the uses to which the genocide concept is put regarding African experiences of mass atrocity and war.

Both issues arising from a postcolonial perspective on genocide – one demanding placing genocides in broader historical contexts that must begin with colonialism, and the other seeking to decentre certain colonial assumptions of the genocide concept by calling attention to its specific political usages in Africa – constitute a significant background from which this examination of representations of African genocides must begin. This take off point is significant for at least three reasons. First, it highlights some of the questions regarding the conceptualization and uses of the genocide concept for imagining and discussing mass atrocities in Africa. Second, it resists genocidal canonizations by insisting on treating the phenomenon and the event given its name as a particular form of politics with a particular history and set of implications. Finally, it emphasizes its own limitations through how it encourages us to question the assumption that genocide in Africa’s postcolony is a modern phenomenon, one put in motion by colonialism.
What is Meant by Genocide

While my discussion of the concept of genocide relies heavily on the immensity of work done by scholars from different disciplines, I base my reflections on the concept’s implications for our understanding of mass atrocities in Africa. This African focus provides a robust context within which to revisit some of the genocide concept’s assumptions, while also suggesting alternative ways to rethink some of its resulting claims. Considering also its Western origin and its popularity among Western scholars, the genocide concept has not gained popular traction among many African scholars who would rather embrace relatively less contentious concepts of violence, such as “civil war,” when describing mass atrocities occurring on the continent. This anxiety over the use of the genocide concept to describe violence in Africa is perhaps best appreciated when African experiences constitute a significant barometer for examining the implications of the concept’s uses.

In the early 1940s, Polish lawyer Raphael Lemkin, responding to Nazi Germany’s atrocities in Europe and also to such historical precedents as Ottoman Turkey’s attempted extermination of Armenians in the second decade of the twentieth century, coined the word “genocide” to describe as a crime the deliberate exterminatory acts and practices directed against human groups. By combining the Greek word “genos” (people) and the Latin word “cide” (murder) to mean literally mass murder of a human collectivity, Lemkin provided what many scholars consider to be one of the most important definitions of genocide. In his 1944 book, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, Lemkin defines genocide as “the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group” (79), explaining further that “genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of

Footnote:
5 For a comprehensive discussion of Lemkin’s concept of genocide, see, e.g., Moses, “Genocide”; Shaw, What Is Genocide?; Power, “A Problem from Hell”. See also, Irvin-Erickson, Raphaël Lemkin and the Concept of Genocide.
all members of a nation” (79). He uses genocide “to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves” (79). In other words, what makes genocide different from other varieties of mass murder is not its noticeable production of tremendous numbers of corpses. It is rather its attempt to destroy a people. That is, victims of genocide are exterminated for what they are imagined to be or what they are identified by. This murderous attempt on human forms of belonging – whether such form of belonging is imagined or real – is what makes genocide an extremely morally and politically reprehensible act. For Lemkin, therefore, genocide targets the corporeal manifestations of human groupness and seeks to destroy the essential foundations of group identity.

Lemkin’s definition provides the basis for not only the official and legal definition adopted by the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (subsequently UNGC),6 but also for how scholars from different disciplines have been grappling with the genocide concept. Many scholars believe that Lemkin conceives of genocide in basically two senses: as a deliberate and systematic attempt at group destruction and as a social process of group destruction.7 As a deliberate attempt at group destruction, genocide is understood to be the intended practice of destruction put in motion and executed by a governing authority. Within genocide studies, this view is associated with the critical perspective known as “intentionalism.” As a social process, genocide must be understood neither as a spontaneous nor random act, but basically as a sustained and ideologically-driven activity and set of social and material processes informing policies, behaviour and all

---

6 Article II of the UNGC defines genocide as meaning: “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”

relations between perpetrators and victim populations. This view is associated with the perspective known as “functionalism.”

Scholarly conceptualizations of genocide have generally tried to revise and reinterpret aspects of Lemkin’s original concept of genocide or its variant in the UNGC. Some fault what is believed to be Lemkin’s and the UNGC’s essentialist and primordialist conception of human groups as possessing internal cohesiveness and blood connection.\(^8\) The problem with Lemkin’s concept of human group, for these critics, is that it excludes from consideration systematic mass atrocities perpetrated against groups that do not possess the essential features marking members of the national, the ethnic, the racial or the religious community – a notion of group identity that suggests the presence at work in genocide of what Paul Boghossian dismisses as “indelible identifications,” that is, “identifications that one is born with and that one can do nothing about” (74; emphasis in original).

Critics such as Boghossian argue against limiting the notion of a genocide victim’s group to these “indelible identifications.” The reason is that in some ways the implicit rationale of such group definitions is premised on the moral assumption that genocide is heinous only for targeting people “because of what they indelibly are, as opposed to what they may have blamelessly become” by choice, ideological affiliation and status (Boghossian 74). Boghossian asks, “why should indelibleness matter morally in this way? Is it really more morally reprehensible to kill people for what they biologically are than it is to kill them for what they may have blamelessly become?” (74).

One implication of this ontologically fixed conception of group identity is that exterminatory patterns of violence directed at certain groups of people who are not considered \textit{indelibly} defined get ignored or treated as non-genocidal mass atrocities. So, to

---

\(^8\) See Shaw, \textit{What Is Genocide?}.
remedy this gap in the notion of group implied in Lemkinian concept of genocide, categories such as politicide, democide, classicide, ethnocide, urbicide, auto-genocide and gendercide have emerged as an alternative nomenclature in order to account for different ways of reconceptualising human groups in the context of organized mass violence. This proliferation of “the many cides of genocide” has led to what Martin Shaw calls a “conceptual jungle” (Shaw, What Is Genocide? 84-100).  

Other subjects of contention resulting from the genocide concept, and even more particularly highlighted in the UNGC’s definition of genocide, include the nature of the violence that is properly considered genocidal. Is genocide basically a matter of the physical destruction of a group or does it involve something more than physical destruction? The UNGC’s definition emphasizes physical or biological destruction, thereby seeming to diminish aspects of violence targeted at the culture of groups, and so the means of a group ensuring its identity and distinctness. Lemkin originally conceived genocide as constituting much more than the violent physical destruction of groups. In an influential early writing, he distinguished between barbarism (as violence directed at the physical bodies of members of a

---

9 On propositions for reconceptualising group and mass violence in the genocide concept, see, e.g., on politicide (the killing of political groups), Harff and Gurr, “Toward Empirical theory of Genocides and Politicides”; on democide (deliberate government killing of unarmed civilians), Rummel, Death by Government; on gendercide (as against femicide and gynocide, gendercide broadly suggests the deliberate murder of gender groups), Warren, Gendercide; on genocide as mass murder of social and political groups, Tal, “On the Study of the Holocaust and Genocide”; on group based on the idea of shared ethnicity of perpetrators, Hannum and Hawk, The Case against the Standing Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea; on mass murder of members of a social class, Legters, “The Soviet Gulag: Is It Genocidal?”; on the notion of victim groups as perpetrators’ constructs, Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide; on genocide as political strategy and act by armed power groups, Shaw, What Is Genocide?; on cultural genocide (that is, the destruction of cultures and cultural groups), Nersessian, “Rethinking Cultural Genocide under International Law”; on colonial genocide (that is, genocide perpetrated on colonized peoples), Moses and Stone, eds. Colonialism and Genocide; Woolford et al. Colonial Genocide in Indigenous North America; Maybury-Lewis, “Genocide against Indigenous Peoples”; on genocide as utopias of race and nationalism, Weitz, A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation; on genocidal massacre and stages in the genocidal process, Kuper, Genocide; Charny, “Toward a Generic Definition of Genocide”; Stanton, “The Eight Stages of Genocide”; on genocide as a kind of war, Shaw, What Is Genocide; War and Genocide; Straus, “‘Destroy Them to Save Us’.”

10 Although the UNGC includes as genocide “forcibly transferring children of the group to another,” it is not however explicit whether such a forcible transfer is considered genocidal because it signifies an attempt to eliminate a group’s culture or whether it is considered genocidal because it does not enable a group to physically perpetuate itself, its spirituality, worldview and corporeal identity in its children.
group) and vandalism (i.e. violence directed at the cultural and spiritual aspects of group life), suggesting that he perceives genocide as constituted by much more than just the physical destruction of individual members of a group.

For some scholars,\textsuperscript{11} it is the misunderstanding of the role played by violence in genocide and the emphasis of particularly legal scholars on genocides marked by physical destruction that reveals the lingering colonial and imperial politics that informed the drafting of the UNGC’s legal definition of genocide. The drafters of the international law on genocide were mostly former colonizers who thus ensured that aspects of colonial destruction of the cultures of colonized peoples remained excluded from consideration as genocide. This fraught history of the concept’s origins has additional implications in the context of African genocides, as later sections of this chapter show, since these attempted exterminations are marked by violence extending beyond the physical and/or cultural destruction of groups.

It is worth noting that only four countries in Africa participated as independent political entities at the drafting of the UNGC in the 1940s – Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia and South Africa.\textsuperscript{12} South Africa eventually declined to sign the convention before it came into effect in 1951, perhaps obviously because of its policy of apartheid that was being introduced at the time. However, it is worth pointing out that from 1951 through the 1960s colonized Africa began gaining independence from European colonialists at a remarkably quick pace.


\textsuperscript{12} See Timothy J. Stapleton’s recent book, \textit{A History of Genocide in Africa}. While this book is perhaps significant for its attempt to present a historical analysis of mass violence in Africa within the discursive frame of genocide, it contains some fundamental flaws that I address in my discussion of the methodological challenges to understanding genocide in Africa and beyond. (1) Stapleton insists on a legal formalist understanding of genocide that excludes instances of mass atrocities that in some ways fail in some unaccounted ways to meet the criteria set down in the UNGC. (2) The author gives a deterministic reading of mass atrocities in Africa. For example, one of the most controversial claims in the book is that the proliferation in Africa of the genocide rhetoric and advocacies to recognize instances of mass murders as genocide are responsible for prolonging violence. Apart from there being no clear-cut way to determine the direct linkage between advocacy for recognizing an event as genocide and the prolongation of violence, to blame the advocacy to end violence for the continuation of violence seems (at least to me) unfair, and analytically or methodologically jaundiced and misrepresentational.
though within this rapidly changing context any links between the legal life of the UNGC from 1951 onwards and African independence from European rule remained fairly arbitrary. In the decades following independence, the genocide concept and rhetoric found popular use among several African groups who drew upon the word to agitate for different interests or to call attention to their experiences of violent abuse under different postcolonial political regimes.

For example, in 1960, the UN secretary-general, Dag Hammarskjöld, accused the first prime minister of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Patrice Lumumba, of perpetrating genocide against the Luba people in the resource-rich South Kasai region. During the same period, roughly between 1959 and 1962, Tutsi victims of Hutu uprisings in Rwanda invoked genocide rhetoric to describe their ill-treatment and human rights violations, including massacres and displacement from their traditional homeland. Between 1966 and 1970, the Igbo and later the secessionist Biafran government (of former Eastern Nigeria) labelled as genocide the organized massacres and persecutions across Nigeria of Igbo and other groups from the Eastern Region of Nigeria. These charges led to a UN investigation in 1968 to determine whether genocide was taking place.13 Also by 1967, the UN Commission on Human Rights suggested that the 1960 Sharpeville massacre in South Africa was genocidal. Similarly, in the late 1960s, separatists from the southern parts of the former Sudan charged the north-controlled government of the country with genocide.

The rise of totalitarian regimes in Africa from the late 1960s through the 1990s, as well as the occurrence of many so-called civil wars during this period, was accompanied by an intensified employment of the genocide concept in accounts of mass killings of civilians happening across the continent. The brutal regimes of Idi Amin in Uganda, Mobutu Sese

13 For a recent discussion of the politics of this UN investigation and its implication for how the massacres became characterized afterwards, see Karen E. Smith, “The UK and ‘genocide’ in Biafra” 247–262.
Seko in Congo-Zaire, Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, Jean-Bedel Bokassa in Central African Republic, Mengistu Haile Mariam in Ethiopia, Hissene Habre in Chad, among several others, were dogged by charges of genocide. In 1972 in Burundi, for example, hundreds of thousands of people (identified as Hutu) were massacred by the Tutsi-led military dictatorship of Michel Micombero. The massacres drew intense charges of genocide by victims and international human rights groups. Similar charges of genocide resulted during the bloody wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Angola, Rwanda, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Sudan, to name just a few sites of violent conflict. In Zimbabwe, the autocratic regime of Robert Mugabe has been accused of genocide against the minority Ndebele. In addition, during recent elections in Kenya in 2007 and Ivory Coast in 2010, charges and counter-charges of genocide were traded.

In all these instances of charges of genocide, only the case of the 1994 genocide of Tutsis and so-called moderate Hutus in Rwanda, and controversially the case of Darfur in the former Sudan (charges that eventually led to the successful secession of the country’s south which became present-day South Sudan) received official, international recognition and legal prosecution by the International Criminal Court. Notwithstanding these important acknowledgements of genocidal intent, the use of the genocide concept and the rhetoric surrounding it to describe mass atrocities in Africa is not recent. Nor is it unpopular. Officially, however, oftentimes the refusal to recognize cases of atrocities as genocide results from what some scholars and activists fear may constitute a political, moral and analytical emptiness of the genocide concept when it becomes easy to apply it to just any case of mass murder.\footnote{See, e.g., Kuper, \textit{Genocide}; Stapleton, \textit{A History of Genocide in Africa}.} Although it is not the concern of this dissertation to query why and how such applications might make the term analytically worthless, the question should still be asked
why there seems to be anxiety over acknowledging that genocide is not as rare and
exceptional an occurrence as many wish to believe.

The point being made here is not whether the use of the term meets the legal
requirements stipulated in the UNGC. Nor is it to dismiss the warning by the concept’s
gatekeepers who would rather insist on certain narrow definitions and strict criteria for
determining genocide if only to maintain the concept’s special, exceptional status as a
signifier of extreme evil. Rather, the point is to acknowledge the nature of the politics that is
impelling the uses of the concept in Africa. Paying closer attention to this politics shows not
only the “methodological problems” or conceptual crises confronting theorization of
genocide in postcolonial Africa, but also the patterns of influence shaping the discourse of
genocide in Africa and beyond. On this methodological question, the stakes include how
best to determine the causes and outcomes of social action.

On the Micro-, Macro-, Meso-Dynamics of Genocide

Over the years, the nature of scholarly contestations regarding the definitions and uses of the
 genocide concept has coalesced roughly around three ways of approaching why and how
genocide happens. These approaches attempt to answer the question of what is more
important for determining social outcomes. Are individual agents or social structures central
for considering the causes of genocides? Are agents and structures mutually inclusive or

---

15 In recent years, some scholars have argued that certain evolving representational trends in the West
appropriated memories of Nazi genocide of Jews (the Holocaust) and turned them into a paradigm of
extreme/absolute evil. (See, e.g., Alexander, Remembering the Holocaust. This association of the Holocaust
with absolute evil accounts for how we have come to imagine genocides more generally, oftentimes leading to
implicit comparisons between genocides in others places and the Holocaust. See Hinton, “Critical Genocide
Studies” 10-11.

16 For a discussion of some methodological challenges in theorizing genocides in Africa, see, e.g.,
Zegeye, “Methodological Problems to the Understanding of the Rwandan Genocide” 309-316; Jaworski, “The
Methodological Crisis of Theorising Genocide in Africa” 349-365.
exclusive categories when considering the nature and causes of mass violence such as genocide?

The first school of thought proposes looking at the human agents of murder in order to understand why and how genocides happen. The focus of this approach is not primarily on broad social conditions but on the microdynamics of genocide. This approach looks for the causal role played by individual free will, personal motivations, social roles, and individual preferences responsible for genocides. Group behaviours and psychology or what psychologist Ervin Staub describes as perpetrators’ psychological self-concepts and situations that enable them to inflict harm on their victims are central concerns for proponents of this school. Known broadly as intentionalism, this school of thinking considers individual agents more important for determining social outcomes than social structure. Hence, motivation for violence and the condition generating murderous intentions are central considerations of intentionalists. For a set of violent acts or events to be considered genocidal, there must be a demonstrable murderous intention by the perpetrator to eliminate a group. It is this special criminal intent (also referred to as dolus specialis), not merely the act of killing (dolus eventualis, i.e., conditional intent as constituted by act), that constitutes the essential factor marking an atrocity as genocide. The emphasis on intention as the locus for determining genocide is often traced to the concept’s UNGC legal origins and to discourses on the psychology of genocide that informed some of the early debates about the causes of genocide.

---

17 For exhaustive discussions of some of the stakes in the agent-structure debate, see, e.g., Waltz, Theory of International Politics; Dessler, “What’s at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?” 441-473. More recently, Rützer and Stepnisky, Sociological Theory 9th ed.
18 For studies on the microdynamics of genocide and group violence, see Staub, The Roots of Evil; Waller, Becoming Evil.
19 The disciplines of psychology and law have largely provided grounds for intentionalist understanding of mass atrocities. See Staub, The Roots of Evil. For a discussion of the genocide concept as essentially a legal term, see, e.g., Schabas, “The Law and Genocide” 123-41. For a differing view that contests genocide as a sociological term and one that emphasizes the influence of social structures on human agency, see Shaw, “Sociology and Genocide” 142-62. See also, Waller’s Becoming Evil.
For intentionalists, focusing on genocidal intent is important when distinguishing genocide from other forms of mass murder. It is the specific intention to commit genocide that makes genocide a different kind of crime, or what some generally refer to as “the crime of crimes” (Boghossian 74). Specific intent suggests that there is a requisite motive or purpose undergirding the committal of an act. In the context of genocide, while an accused may be guilty of committing mass murder based on their act of killing, there has to be additional evidence of the accused person’s intent to murder in order to eliminate permanently a victim group. In other words, as different from general intent, the special or specific genocidal intent requires the additional evidence of an intention to eliminate a group. General intent suggests that one only need to intend one’s action.

It is noteworthy, however, that Lemkin’s view of genocidal intention differs from the UNGC’s emphasis on special or specific intent to commit genocide. Lemkin’s notion of intent, as Irvin-Erickson explains, implies the dolus eventualis, which Lemkin conceives in terms suggestive of a juridical, as against a philosophical, question implied in intentionalist thinking (see Irvin-Erickson 127-29). Lemkin explains genocide as a crime which – however broad its process – requires purposiveness and intent to exterminate target groups:

The crime of genocide involves a wide range of actions, including not only the deprivation of life but also the prevention of life (abortions, sterilizations) and also devices considerably endangering life and health (artificial infections, working to death in special camps, deliberate separation from families for depopulation purposes, and so forth). All these actions are subordinated to the criminal intent to destroy or cripple

---

20 See also, Shuster, “Philosophy and Genocide” 219-21.
21 For a discussion of specific and general intents in the context of genocide, see Kai Ambos, “What does ‘Intent to Destroy’ in Genocide Mean?”.
permanently a human group. ("Genocide as a Crime under International Law" 147; emphasis added)

For Lemkin, therefore, the criminal intent to destroy a human group constitutes an important indicator, not merely when appreciating the operational process of genocide but importantly when treating it as a crime. As a lawyer, Lemkin was essentially advocating for the criminalization of a practice that was not new or unique but prevalent in history.

For proponents of intentionalism, however, the genocidal intentions of perpetrators are a crucial point of focus. Focusing on intent is believed to broaden considerations of the phenomenon of genocide, particularly in the determination of group form that constitutes a target victim of genocide. As noted in the previous section regarding what some scholars considered flaws in Lemkin’s and the UNGC’s conceptualizations of human groups, some intentionalist thinkers depend on their reading of killers’ intention and motives to offer what they believe is a more flexible understanding of groups. For example, in his definition of genocide, Holocaust scholar, Steven Katz summarizes this intentionalist understanding of the genocide concept as any “actualization of the intent, however successfully carried out, to murder in its totality any national, ethnic, racial, religious, political, social, gender or economic group, as these groups are defined by the perpetrator, by whatever means” (131).  

For Katz, groups should be thought of in terms of how perpetrators define their victims.

But, as Katz’s definition of genocide shows, this attention on genocidal intent largely ends up in thrall to the agency of perpetrators at the expense of other significant agents in the genocidal process. Why, we may ask, should the categorical perspective of killers matter most in our determination of genocidal outcomes? What about the perspectives of victims or

---

22 For similar positions on genocidal intention, see also Chalk and Jonassohn, eds., The History and Sociology of Genocide; Jonassohn and Björnson, Genocide and Gross Human Rights Violations.
those designated as bystanders? To what extent do these other agents determine the nature and outcome of destructive social actions? One salient point often made by scholars and activists in relation to genocidal outcomes is that the actions or inactions of bystanders may significantly influence perpetrators’ actions and thereby serve as important determinants of social action and outcome. This point constitutes a major criticism of intentionalist focus on perpetrator-agents, not to talk of the complexities involved in determining the nature of intention, whether intention and motive are separable from actions, or else arbitrary and difficult to interpret.

Although intentionalist understandings of genocidal outcome did not particularly find sustained scholarly traction among scholars of African violence, from the late 1960s and with the emergence of military dictatorships across the continent, the figure of the dictator stood

---

23 I have used “bystander” throughout the dissertation not to suggest merely a passive onlooker to genocidal atrocity. Instead, I use the term to designate actors who by virtue of their status or position as “outsiders” or those Ervin Staub calls “external bystanders” (“Preventing Genocide”189) to a conflict are not primary targets of or parties to violence. The concept of bystander has been popularized in social psychology through the work of John Darley and Bibb Latané, who use the phrase “bystander effect” to describe a phenomenon in which individuals fail to intervene to help victims of violence (see, e.g., Darley and Latané, “Bystander intervention in Emergencies”). In the context of genocide, the word “bystander” has been used to describe mostly political actors (but also humanitarian groups, journalists and missionaries) who fail to intervene to end or ameliorate mass atrocity (For scholarship on the use of the term in the context of the Holocaust, see, e.g., Rabinbach, “From Explosion to Erosion”; Berenbaum, The World Must Know; Linenthal, Preserving Memory; Novick, The Holocaust in American Life; Berger, “It Ain’t Necessarily So”). The phrase, “bystanders to genocide,” was used by Samantha Power in an essay of that title and later in her book, “A Problem from Hell”, to criticize the United States’ apathetic response during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda (for a critical discussion of bystanders in the context of Rwandan genocide, see, Adelman’s review article, “Bystanders to Genocide in Rwanda”). However, in recent years, some scholars have raised the question of whether or not the category of bystander really exists (see, e.g., Levine, “On-lookers”). They argue that groups often referred to as bystanders (governmental and especially non-governmental groups such as journalists and humanitarian workers) generally play direct significant roles in shaping the nature and outcome of conflicts as against merely stand by as passive onlookers to violence.

24 I use “social action” loosely to refer to similar action that may be designated as group, mass or collective action, action carried out by social agents working to realize common goals. In its rather Weberian suggestiveness, “social action” denotes an antipositivist understanding of the social realm, in which human actions relate to or are informed by social structures within which such actions take place and derive their meaning. My preference for “social action” (as against mass, group or collective action) is because the phrase suggests much more than the action of a group of people. It is both the action of a group of people and a consideration of such group action within the context of a social realm; that is, the action of a group whose meaning is best appreciated only within the social context giving rise to it.

25 See, e.g., Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil; Power, “A Problem from Hell”.

26 On this point, see Shuster; Lang, Act and Idea in the Nazi Genocide.
out for studies of African violence. Often depicted as a psychopathic and sociopathic aggressor and a buffoon, say as in the figure of Uganda’s Idi Amin or Zaire’s Mobutu Sese Seko, the African despot seems more like the agent of irrational murderous activities. The African despot, standardly conceived, exhibits symptoms of an authoritarian personality as understood by Theodor Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel Levinson, and Nevitt Sanford in their research on Nazi genocide perpetrators. This authoritarian despot embodies intense prejudice towards certain groups. He is fascistic and anti-democratic. This authoritarian configuration of the African despot has inspired distinct representations of power and violence among African writers, a body of work that some literary critics now regard as African dictator literature, so-named after the Latin American dictator genre.

Supporting this despotic character on the standard account is a mass of followers with tremendous propensity to obey. Obedience to authority, as Stanley Milgram shows in his study of the same title, could be a product of altered cognition. This altered cognitive state, called the agentic state by Milgram, emerges from within the context of a strictly hierarchical setup where “one is in a state of openness to regulation by an authority” (Waller 114). In this

---

27 See, e.g., Achille Mbembe’s discussion of the African/Cameroonian despot in On the Postcolony. Mbembe’s discussion of the despot is not particularly based on an intentionalist but rather a structural explanation of the conditions of despotism.

28 For a discussion of the multiple perspectives and roles of dictators and dictatorships across the world, see Ezrow and Frantz, Dictators and Dictatorships. See also, Martin Meredith’s 2005 study of the political history of several African regimes in The State of Africa: A History of the Continent since Independence.

29 See Adorno et al., The Authoritarian Personality.

30 The focus on dictatorial regimes also undermines an important observation made by Michael Mann about the democratic character of genocides across the world. Mann’s thesis is that modern genocides and ethnic cleansings have mostly resulted from democratic conditions in which the majority tyrannize the minority. See Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy.


32 See Milgram, Obedience to Authority. For critical reading of Milgram’s “Obedience to Authority” hypothesis, see Blass, ed., Obedience to Authority: Current Perspectives on the Milgram Paradigm; see also, Waller, Becoming Evil 107-127.
state, moral responsibility is held hostage to authority, shielding local agents (i.e. perpetrators) from taking personal moral responsibility for their actions. In the agentic state, individual conscience becomes substituted for the conscience of authority.

In the context of genocides and mass atrocities, the assumption is that to determine the cause and outcome of social action against targeted groups, we have to look at the figure, intentions and choices of the despot and those who have been authorized to conduct specific actions in the despot’s name. A problem with this focus is that genocidal intent and motives are sought in the intentions, actions and motivations of only a certain kind of perpetrator: the administrator, architect, or mastermind of genocide. Hence, this focus on administrators precludes from consideration such actors as executioners and foot-soldiers who generally constitute the larger population of perpetrators. The attention on administrators or authoritarian figures of genocide gives the impression that the dolus specialis of genocide can only be attributable to directors of genocides, and not to those who actually carry genocides out. In other words, the supposition is that if in the agentic state those under authority lack the agency and responsibility of autonomous judgement, then we have to seek responsibility for social action in the wielders of authority.

A legal consequence of excluding so-called “ordinary” perpetrators of genocide from considerations of genocidal intent is that the largest population of killers in a genocide gets exempted from prosecution for the crime of genocide, a situation that also fails to account for the motivations of functionaries and how such motivations shaped their operational dispositions and conducts in the course of a genocide. The absurdity created by the focus on

33 In recent years, scholarly focus is shifting significantly to so-called ordinary peoples who constitute the majority of killers during genocides. See, e.g., in the context of Rwanda Jean Hatzfeld’s study on genocide perpetrators in Rwanda, *Une saison de machettes* (2003; translated into English as *Machete Season: The Killers in Rwanda Speak* [2005]). Before *Machete Season*, Hatzfeld published a study focusing on Tutsi survivors of the Rwandan Genocide called *Dans le nu de la vie* (2000; translated into English as *Life Laid Bare* [2007]).

34 See Ambos, “What does ‘Intent to Destroy’ in Genocide Mean?” The point here is not that ordinary or common perpetrators of genocides go scot-free. Oftentimes, as was the case in Rwanda, they are prosecuted
the *dolus specialis* of those in positions of authority is what leads Kai Ambos to propose a legal revision of genocidal intent in a way that accounts for and holds ordinary perpetrators responsible for genocide. He suggests reconceptualising genocidal intent to include a *dolus eventualis*, that is, conditional intent by which perpetrators can be held culpable for murderous acts the group-destructive outcomes of which they are reasonably expected to foresee.

Notwithstanding this proposal for reconsidering genocidal intent, the general emphasis on intent, whether focused specifically on planners or expanded to accommodate a broader spectrum of killers, seems to focus essentially on the psychopathology of perpetrators, their personalities, motivations and general rationale for committing mass murder. To be sure, this focus may usefully call attention to the psychological conditions that radicalize a group and persuade its members to murder members of another group. It might also highlight conditions that sponsored psychological constructions of otherness generally considered implicit in genocides. Yet it perpetuates an impression of perpetrators’ abnormality, oftentimes resulting in characterizations of genocide as an exceptionally “extraordinary evil” doable only in special mental conditions of insanity, abnormality and irrationality.

---

for other genocide-related offences, such as crimes against humanity, or for minor offences depending on the nature of their participation in genocide. In Rwanda, the institution of the Gacaca court system led to prosecution of ordinary/common peoples who participated in murders and other criminal behaviours during the genocide. These perpetrators were handed lesser sentences compared to those in authority during the 1994 genocide of Tutsis. For a comprehensive study of the Gacaca court prosecution of genocide perpetrators in Rwanda, see, e.g., Bornkamm, *Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts*.  

35 There are some other intentionalist thinkers who emphasize looking at genocidal intent beyond individual agents. Such thinkers locate genocidal intent even in social systems and consciousnesses. See, e.g., Charny, “Toward a Generic Definition of Genocide” 64-94; Churchill, *A Little Matter of Genocide*; Reisman and Norchi; El-Kaim-Sartre and Sartre, *On Genocide*; Huttenback, “Locating the Holocaust on the Genocide Spectrum” 289-304; Thompson and Quets; Barta, “Relations of Genocide” 237-252.  

Rejecting the major assumptions of genocidal intent, some of which gave the impression that genocide is an extraordinary event perpetrated by abnormal people, several other critics offered alternative explanations to account for why and how genocides happen. In what became generally known as the structural (also called formalist, objectivist or functionalist) model to genocide, proponents emphasized what they considered to be the broader social and organizational preconditions for genocide.\(^{37}\) Structuralist approaches emphasize the macrodynamics of social outcomes. According to the structural model, genocide is not reducible to the intentions of its perpetrators nor is it the acts of irrational people. Rather, we have to understand genocide as the work of normal people aided by circumstances that rationalize and normalize their mass destruction of other groups. Structuralists generally trace genocidal causes back to the conditions of war, modernity, civilization and the attendant genocidal rationalities and bureaucratic systems that these conditions enable in the process of their emergence.\(^{38}\) To the question of the cause of social action and outcome, structuralists insist on the importance of social organizations and ideologies over individual agents.

One important distinction between intentionalists and structuralists\(^ {39}\) is that whereas the former treat every case of genocide as intended and deliberately organized (and so view the absence of genocidal intent as signalling something other than an occurrence of genocide), the latter would more likely argue that genocides result from intended and unintended causes. While genocides in the literal sense of “group destruction” do occur because of the deliberate and intended activities of perpetrators, structuralists could argue that

---


\(^{39}\) Note that oftentimes the difference between intentionalists and structuralists is only a matter of the degree of emphasis each critic places on how to determine the cause of genocide. Some structuralist thinkers would not dismiss the place of intent entirely, but may tend to emphasize their marginal rather than central place in the genocidal process. See Powell; Shaw. See also, Meierhenrich, “Introduction: The Study and History of Genocide” in *Genocide: A Reader*, 3-55.
given certain other considerations, genocides could happen even when the intent of perpetrators is not to destroy another group per se. For example, European colonial missionary activities around the world have been seen by some scholars as destructive, even though, as some may argue controversially, the intention of some missionaries might not have been to destroy groups.40

For structuralists, therefore, what is more important for determining genocide is not intention but the broader social processes that collectively legitimate group destruction, making it possible for ordinary people to become perpetrators. The structuralist view aims to explain how social structures and norms contribute to the destruction of groups. For example, in dealing with the question of how “ordinary” and “civilized” people in Nazi Germany could perpetrate genocide, structuralists might rather focus on how social systems such as modern Western bureaucracies and the logics and ideologies of civilization and modernity, when coupled with prevailing and longstanding antisemitism, gave rise to conditions that justified and normalized the mass murder of the Nazis’ victims. They would generally look to modes of political organizations such as totalitarianism, democracies, modern social conditions with its bureaucratized institutions, its scientific rationality, racism, eugenicist ideologies and the nation-state systems.41 Intentions are not easily, if ever, measurable. The variance in intent evident in an action, over the course of which intentions may evolve or change, poses additional challenges for those intentionalists seeking to explain occurrences of genocide. As a result of these and other challenges, structuralists prefer to view genocide not as specifically the work of authoritarian sociopaths and psychopaths intent on eliminating targeted groups,

40 The assumption more generally is that genocides need not exhibit clear exterminatory intentions before acts of group destruction are considered genocides. For insightful studies on systems approach that highlight different micro-, macro- and meso-levels that might institute genocide, see Woolford et al., Colonial Genocide; Moses and Stone, eds., Colonialism and Genocide. See also, Woolford, The Benevolent Experiment.

41 See, e.g., Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem; Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust; Alvarez, Governments, Citizens and Genocide; Levene, Genocide in the Age of the Nation-State: Vols. I & II; Mignolo, The Darker Side of Western Modernity; Waller, Becoming Evil; Powell, Barbaric Civilization; and Mann The Dark Side of Democracy.
but rather as a more general phenomenon that could potentially result from some (or some combination) of the convergence of immoral ideologies and nationalisms, the nature of political and governing structures of society, and similar social conditions that are conducive to group destruction.

However, on the structuralist way of explaining why and how genocides happen, an account of individual intent or of how perpetrators come to internalize and normalize dangerous ideologies that numb their moral intuitions and recognition of the Other’s humanity is reduced to a chain of structural conditions. This makes structuralists more invested in the structure than in the performative dimensions of genocide (Powell 38). Structuralist approaches have also been criticized for their de-emphasis of the experiential dimensions of genocide and for their rather deterministic appreciation of what structuralists regard as destructive social systems and structures. The flux and contingencies generally observed in specific instances of genocide are not easily accounted for by excluding the subjective aspects of individual agents.

While structuralist insights offer useful ways of looking at how the nature of society, its politics, and its intimacies could together produce genocides, they also seem to suggest that without these structures genocides might not happen. However, we should ask the question: Were modern bureaucracy, racism, and scientific rationality the enablers of the Nazi Germany’s genocide of Jews and other targeted victim groups? Have genocides not happened even in contexts within which the kinds of modern systems of organization and institution often blamed for genocidal violence were not in place? Didn’t other so-called pre-modern social and ethical systems – marked by deeper investments in pre-modern ideologies

as, religion, nationalism, civic pride, etc. – also produce genocides? How do we explain how similar social structures produce genocide in one place but not in another location, even when both are broadly structurally the same? Perhaps most significantly, do we not risk exculpating agents from responsibility for their murderous actions by emphasizing social structures and systems as the primary causes of genocidal evil?

To remedy the limitations of the agent-structure approach, scholars are now turning to a kind of multi-level analysis that in the social sciences is generally referred to as a meso-level explanation of social actions and outcomes. This middle-ground approach combines conditions in the micro-macro levels to explain how and why genocides happen. A psychopathological interpretation of killers cannot in itself alone explain convincingly why and how genocides happen. Traits such as prejudice, psychological constructions of otherness and stereotyping may be constant among group relations. Yet the reality of genocide is not constant and genocide does not directly always result in individuals manifesting these prejudicial traits. Similarly, structural conditions cannot account convincingly for why and how genocides happen “[b]ecause large processes such as modernization, state-building, and democratization are typically slow-moving [and] understanding their logic does not always contribute to knowledge about individual and collective decision making in times of genocide” (Meierhenrich, “Introduction” 13). In other words, the incentives of large-scale social change or the motivations behind war and mass conflict do not by themselves explain why certain groups of people (such as, priests, doctors, teachers, farmers, and soldiers) murder others in peculiarly pernicious ways. Accordingly, it becomes important to

---

43 Several scholars have called attention to how genocide is far from being a specifically modern phenomenon. Genocides have been prevalent in so-called pre-modern times, especially considering works by Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons, who named only the twentieth and twenty-first centuries as the “centuries of genocide.” See Totten and Parsons, eds., Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts. See also, Bloxham and Moses, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies; Stone, ed., The Historiography of Genocide; Levene, Genocide in the Age of the Nation-State: Vols. I & II.

understand how structures combine with desires and ideologies within specific contexts to produce genocide.

The meso-level approach aspires to create a middle ground between the micro and macro levels characteristic of earlier ways of analyzing genocide. This approach is fundamentally relational. Rather than creating a dichotomy between agents and structures, the meso-level approach seeks to show how these categories relate and make sense in their particular and immediate contexts. The value of this approach is that it allows an understanding of genocidal outcomes to emerge from multiple considerations. These multiple considerations call attention to what sociologist Andrew Woolford has described as “the mesh” or dynamic network of relations, conditions, temporalities, changes, resistances and complexities propelling and legitimating social action. This approach treats genocide as a process in which individuals perpetrate genocides as a result of their relation to the prevailing conditions of their society, their relation to other individuals, and their relation to the steady and constant processes of social and individual becoming and unbecoming.

Like the agent-structure problems described above, the meso-level approach is concerned with the question of the causes and effects of genocidal actions and outcomes. It answers this question by treating agents and structures as mutually constituted and mutually inclusive categories. As mutually constituted and inclusive categories for considering genocides, we have to understand social outcomes as an interactional process between agents and structure within specific and unique temporal and spatial contexts. Agents and structures are not fixed and constant. Nor are they stable categories. They must be understood as fluid

---


46 Woolford uses the notion of mesh to explain colonialism as a network of complex and processual relations and activities that are not reducible to a single formulation or frame of understanding. See Woolford, “Discipline, Territory, and the Colonial Mesh.”
and complex, as well as real and material. Additionally, the determination of outcome cannot be fixed. Outcomes relate to specific temporal situations and to specific modes of consciousness. For example, we may argue that the outcome of decades of structural processes and individual actions in Rwanda is the 1994 genocide. The suggestiveness of an outcome, nonetheless, implies definitiveness of an event in ways that fail to appreciate how what is called an outcome relates to perhaps broader, ongoing activities. For example, many scholars have called attention to how the civil war and genocide in Rwanda spiralled into and fuelled even bigger catastrophes in the Great Lakes region, catastrophes that consumed many more millions of people and caused immense instability that continues to endure.  

Some of the methodological cleavages surrounding questions of genocidal agency and structure are important to consider when dealing with genocide in postcolonial Africa. This is because each writer and scholar entering the domain of mass atrocity representations in and about postcolonial Africa have invariably had to grapple with the agent-structure question. Each writer’s ways of imagining, representing, answering or dealing with this question shapes his or her general outlook on the topic of genocide and mass atrocity in Africa in ways I will discuss in the next section.

Genocide in Africa’s Postcolony

For many scholars grappling with genocides and mass atrocities occurring in Africa’s postcolony, a dominant inclination has been to seek links between European colonialism and postcolonial violence. It has become widely accepted in scholarly and other circles that European civilization was founded on an ideology that normalized and rationalized the

---

47 See, e.g., Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*; Harrow “‘Ancient Tribal Warfare’” 34–45; Vambe and Zegeye, “Racializing Ethnicity and Ethnicizing Racism”; Reyntjens, “Rwanda, Ten Years on: From Genocide to Dictatorship” 15–47.
colonization of Others. That this (racist and imperialist) ideology sanctioned violence and was destructive to colonized peoples is generally uncontested. The question for consideration has rather focused on how the history of Europe’s colonial project in Africa continues to shape and determine violence in Africa’s postcolony. In other words: to what extent do the agency and structure of postcolonial violence directly relate to or derive from the history and legacies of colonialism? The dominant response to this question by many African scholars has been that genocides and mass atrocities occurring in Africa’s postcolony are largely the direct products and legacies of European colonization.

Understanding this claim requires us to understand the colonial as implicitly and intrinsically genocidal. This understanding is believed to hold the promise of explaining the nature of violent structures and agencies arising from the colonial experience and constituting a significant basis of genocides in the postcolony. The assumption is that to understand genocide in Africa’s postcolony, we should seek a better appreciation of the nature of colonialism and the rationality that instigated it.

This way of thinking about genocides in the postcolony is for the most part indebted to a structuralist view of violent outcomes occurring on the continent. In part, it is also a dismissal of certain scholarly attempts to separate what some believe to be the ideal form and promise of European civilization or modernity from its supposedly deviant colonial excesses. In such scholarly attempts at separation, European civilization and modernity are construed as embodying “the ideals of universal reason” that are not entirely despicable, but

---

48 For example, noting Raphael Lemkin’s original conception of genocide, Dirk Moses has argued in the context of Australian settler colonialism to see genocide as “intrinsically colonial” (see Moses, “Genocide and Settler Society in Australian History”). For more on recent scholarly discussions of the linkages between colonialism and genocide, see also the contributions in the edited collection by Moses and Stone, Colonialism and Genocide.

49 See, e.g., Irele, “Contemporary Thought in French Speaking Africa.” Irele believes that while colonialism was a destructive phenomenon, it embodied certain positive ideals that must not be ignored.

50 Irele, “Contemporary Thought” 296.
when misused, misunderstood, or exploited license the kinds of contradictions that engender genocides.\textsuperscript{51} This pattern of thinking tries to separate the \textit{real} from its \textit{ideal}, as if such a separation, as Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze observes in his edited anthology \textit{African Philosophy},\textsuperscript{52} is ever possible since the ideal is already implicated in the historical realities that constituted it.

In recent years, some scholars have begun discovering or rediscovering the vexed links between colonialism and genocide. The goal of their inquiries seems to be to use such connections to broaden our understanding of genocide and colonialism as mutually inclusive categories.\textsuperscript{53} In a number of these recent studies, however, the approach has been to focus on instances of group destruction (whether physical, biological or cultural) within a colonial system. This approach leaves the impression that only in instances of certain forms of physical and cultural harms can we construe colonialism as genocide. For example, in an edited collection by A. Dirk Moses and Dan Stone entitled \textit{Colonialism and Genocide}, most of the contributions focus on cases of the colonist’s massacres so as to describe certain colonial activities as genocide. For some of these studies, genocide has to be seen as one of the patterns of violence deployed under the colonial system. This kind of violence oftentimes manifested in attempts to physically destroy colonized groups such as indigenous Tasmanians\textsuperscript{54} or Namibia’s Herero and Nama peoples,\textsuperscript{55} and the range of biological and cultural abuses of colonized peoples in settler colonies. In this kind of consideration of colonialism and genocide, such phrases as “colonial genocide” and “cultural genocide” have

\textsuperscript{51} For a criticism of this way of describing European civilization, see, e.g., Powell, \textit{Barbaric Civilization}.


\textsuperscript{54} See Curthoys, “Raphael Lemkin’s ‘Tasmania’” 66-73. See also Lindqvist, \textit{The Dead Do Not Arise}.

\textsuperscript{55} See Zimmerer, “Colonial Genocide.”
become useful terms for describing colonialism as constituting patterns of colonial violence that could be regarded as genocidal. Even when scholars like Moses argue that Raphael Lemkin’s original conception of genocide suggests that “genocide is *intrinsically colonial*,” the trend has still been to treat colonialism and genocide as two separate phenomena: the former constitutive of good and evil; the latter an evil element that may be found subsumed and only occasionally active within the former.

This view of genocide as an occasional occurrence within the colonial system runs counter to the view of some anti-colonial thinkers such as Aimé Césaire and Frantz Fanon who were writing in the 1950s and 1960s. For instance, Césaire writing in *Discourse on Colonialism* sees no difference between colonialism and genocide, and in fact, he describes Hitler’s Nazi genocides in Europe as the colonial norm:

People are surprised, they become indignant. They say: “How strange!

But never mind—it’s Nazism, it will pass!” And they wait, and they hope;
and they hide the truth from themselves, that it is barbarism, the supreme barbarism, the crowning barbarism that sums up all the daily barbarisms;
that it is Nazism, yes, but that before they were its victims, they were its accomplices; that they tolerated that Nazism before it was inflicted on them, that they absolved it, shut their eyes to it, legitimized it, because,
until then, it had been applied only to non-European peoples; that they have cultivated that Nazism, that they are responsible for it, and that

---

56 Moses, ed., *Genocide and Settler Society* 27; emphasis in original. Note that we can inverse Moses’s phrase and ask to what extent we can consider colonialism intrinsically genocidal. Scholars such as Helen Fein have argued that to treat both terms as one and the same thing leads to a misuse of terms or a “rhetorical abuse” and “semantic stretch” that offers little analytically for explaining the phenomena of genocide and colonization (See Fein, “Genocide, Terror, Life Integrity and War Crimes” 96).
For Césaire as well as other influential anti-colonial thinkers such as Albert Memmi and Frantz Fanon, European colonialism embodies the ideology of Western civilization, and through its practice the West legitimized its savagery and justified its abuse and extermination of other peoples. European colonialism, as Fanon puts it, is founded on the logic of “a Manichaean world” (The Wretched of the Earth 31-32). This Manichaean world is a racist system that dehumanizes the colonized and casts them as irredeemably evil. Viewed through such a racist lens as ontologically evil and pitched in a perpetual conflict with the forces of good (the colonizer), the colonized becomes the object of exterminatory violence.

Some thinkers on postcolonial violence in Africa build on this understanding of colonialism as implicitly genocidal. Their assumption is that there is a rationale or an “epistemic condition” (Eze, “Epistemic” 115-29”) impelling genocides in Africa’s postcolony. This rationale that is producing violence in the postcolony (genocide inclusive) has to be seen as the direct legacy of colonialism. This legacy is founded on what Achille Mbembe has described as colonial rationality (On the Postcolony 24-58). This colonial rationality is responsible for settling the nature of subjects and subjection constituted under European colonization. By “subjects” I mean those living under the rule and governance of the colonial sovereign.

To understand this colonial rationality, according to Mbembe, its commandement (governing order) and its operations, we have to underscore the notion of right that it establishes: the right to own, to appropriate, to occupy “native” territories; the right of

---

57 See, e.g., Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized; Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth.
conquest, the notion of protectorates or the right to “protect” colonized property or contract out occupied territories to companies and agents given the responsibility to “develop” it on behalf of the colonial sovereign. For Mbembe, these rights coalesce around at least three forms of violence: founding violence; violence used to legitimate founding violence; and violence that authorizes and makes permanent the exercise of violence.

The founding violence of colonialism is the violence of rights over the racialized Other categorized as “the native.” This violence presupposes its very own legitimacy in that it derives from the right of conquest. Through conquest the colonist establishes the space of his rule by exception by introducing his own supreme, unconditional laws – “the supreme denial of rights” to the conquered (Mbembe, Postcolony 25). Mbembe elaborates this process further: Having founded his right to occupy using violence, the colonist sets out to legitimate this right. To carry out this legitimation, he creates imaginaries and languages that normalize his violent mission. In these legitimating imaginaries and languages, there is no distinction made between ruling, civilizing, colonizing, killing, and enslaving. This violent situation is the condition of absolute subjection, that is, a condition in which the colonial sovereign decides what constitutes common sense, claiming for himself the right to make meaning, thus transforming the colonial subject into the property of the sovereign – the object of power. To make permanent by way of maintaining this imaginary of absolute subjection to the colonial commandement, a third violence has to be regularly performed through punitive “wars” and pogroms until catastrophes become banal, “constituting the central cultural imaginary that the [colonial] state shared with society [colonized subjects], and thus had an authenticating and reiterating function” (Mbembe, Postcolony 25).

These patterns of violence, according to Mbembe, combine to act both as authority and morality, by so doing eliminating “the distinction between ends and means,” establishing what constitutes right and wrong. As a result, the colonized remains in a perpetual condition
of wrongfulness, and whatever is done to him constitutes a right. The colonial state uses naked force as it wills or acts to destroy or recycle social forms. In the colonial state, as Mbembe puts it, “[t]he lack of justice of the means, and the lack of legitimacy of the ends, conspired to allow an arbitrariness and intrinsic unconditionality” (Postcolony 26) that characterizes the supreme sovereignty of colonialism. One manifestation of this arbitrariness is that in the exercise of its supreme will colonial power could conscript any colonized subject to satisfy its absolute desire to create, manipulate or destroy. This kind of colonial rationality is what, for Mbembe, Africans reappropriated in the postcolony: “This reappropriation was not merely institutional; it also occurred in material spheres and in the sphere of the imaginary” (Postcolony 40).

To elaborate further on the notion of postcolonial genocide as derivative of a kind of rationality, the philosopher Eze argues that there are “epistemic conditions of genocide” (“Epistemic” 115-29). These epistemic conditions are not to be understood as a single factor or phenomenon of violence. Rather, they encapsulate exterminatory ideologies operating on an Us/Them binary, as well as several other social, cultural, political and historical conditions. By “epistemic,” Eze means the “mental and historical forms in which we know things,” informing how we come to rationalize and justify our actions and inactions (“Epistemic” 128). This “epistemology of genocide” is a matter of rationality, a kind of rationale underpinning violent mass action in the postcolony. For Eze, the question to ask, then, is: “[a]re there systems of thought that could be said to constitute either necessary or sufficient conditions for genocidal act?” (“Epistemic” 118). Closely following this question is the agent-structure question: What is the connection between thought and action? For Eze, the link between action and thought can be found in the historical conditions upon which we come to think and behave as rational beings. Genocide becomes possible on this view simply
because we can think. Genocide is thus to be understood as a practice, which like most other kinds of collective action, is guided by a rationale.\footnote{59}

One possible objection to the notion of genocide as propelled by rationality may result in the following question: if rationality can propel and constrain action, could we not also consider irrationality – taken to mean insanity or madness – to propel collective actions such as genocide? Put differently, could not some kind of group or collective madness, say resulting from a breakdown of law and social cohesion, be held accountable for genocides? This cannot be for Eze, since the preconditions of genocidal outcomes are collective and systematic action, organization, purposiveness, and a commitment to this murderous purpose. In addition, according to Eze, since there are no historical examples of genocides resulting from collective madness per se, we have to look instead towards what Norman Cohn describes as the “ideological warrants”\footnote{60} driving murderous social action. Such ideological warrants explain why killers deny or continue to justify their murderous actions before, during and after genocides. For Eze and Mbembe, social action embodies an authorizing rationale. Our task should, therefore, be to underscore the nature of this rationale and its operational forms.

Following insights derived from Fanon, Mahmood Mamdani claims that the question of how to make sense of genocides occurring among formerly colonized peoples requires us to consider these genocides as in some sense continuing and extending the conditions characteristic of European colonialism. These colonial conditions derive largely from the racialization of colonized groups by the colonist. This racialization is a complex process that

\footnote{59} For varying and incisive discussions of genocide as a rational practice, see the contributions in Roth, ed., Genocide and Human Rights. See also, Poewe, The Namibian Herero; Totten, Parsons, and Charny, eds., Genocide in the Twentieth Century; Hinton, ed., Annihilating Difference.

\footnote{60} See Cohn, Warrant for Genocide. Cohn explores in this book the historical processes and nature of the circulation of Protocols of the Elders of Zion, a document purporting to describe Jewish conspiracy to control the world. Cohn suggests that the forged Protocols provided ideological grounds for anti-Semitism in Europe and was popular in the Third Reich.
extends beyond the binary of colonizer-colonized categories. This racialization of colonized
groups enabled the colonial system to appoint among the colonized delegates responsible for
helping with the business of governing. These delegates – often racialized as non-natives,
albeit still colonized – occupied “a contradictory middle ground between settler citizens
In addition, according to Mamdani, implicit in this colonial racialization is a politicization of
group identities along the lines of autochthonous natives and nativized aliens. The colonizer
described the former group as true native and the latter as migrant-settlers from places
assumed to share affinities with Europeans. This racialization and politicization of group
identities among colonized groups culminated into a struggle between those categorized as
native and settler.

Mamdani claims that the operational genocidal impulse of the colonial system is
twofold: it consists of (1) the colonizer’s eliminationist violence directed against the native;
and (2) the counter-violence of the colonized intended to root out the violent colonizer. In this
latter impulse, Mamdani notes, the colonized saw the colonizer’s violence as despicable, and
thus imagined his own violent resistance against colonialism as redemptive, justifiable,
democratic, de-colonial and an affirmation of denied humanity (*Victims* 9-10). In the exercise
of this impulse to eliminate the settler, explains Mamdani based on Rwanda, the native turned
also on other colonized groups designated as settlers. The struggle against colonialism led the
“native” – a term that in the colonial lexicon represents a pejorative designation for those
lacking in rationality and so endowed by nature with the base instincts of animals – to
translate his or her “nativity” into a positive moral weapon against the colonizer and those
perceived as the colonizer’s delegates. Following this reconceptualization of nativism, the
“native” perceives him/herself as the defender of the land, an autochthone whose very
existence depends on the annihilation of the threatening outsider.
The native’s genocide, for Mamdani, is at first clothed in (and legitimated by) the logic of nationalism (in whichever way the nation is defined) and it finds expression in an inclination to root out the threatening alien who constitutes a problem for the integrity of the native’s nation. The crime of colonialism, according to Mamdani, involves much more than the expropriation of the native: it was specifically “to politicize indigeneity in the first place: first negatively, as a settler libel of the native; but then positively, as a native response, as a self-assertion” (Victims 14; emphasis in original). The political categories of the settler-native dialectic did not end with the official end of colonization or with the exit of the European settler. These categories carried into the postcolony in consequential ways.

This politicization of racialized identities among colonized groups as indigene and settler within the colonial state is precisely what Mamdani claims as one of the main conditions propelling the genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda. The colonizers of Rwanda racialized the Hutu as autochthones and the Tutsi as settlers who migrated into the region from Ethiopia. Their doing so accounts for why the campaign against the Tutsi was xenophobic, extreme, and eliminative. This genocide, for Mamdani, did not begin and end in 1994. To be understood it has to be seen as part of a longer history that emphasizes the activities of Rwanda’s colonists.

The notion of the native genocide seems applicable in some other postcolonial African contexts. For example, the genocide of Omanis of Arab descent by Zanzibaris in what is now commonly known as the Zanzibar Revolution of 1964 was based on the perception of Omanis as alien settlers and non-indigenes. Likewise, the genocide of the Igbo across Nigeria from 1966-1970 was based on xenophobic practices that identified the Igbo as settlers in parts of the country in which they were targeted for elimination. The

---

genocides and atrocities witnessed during the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, which in part began as the “native’s” revolution against descendants of freed slave settlers from Europe and the Americas, and the massacres in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi, among several other places in postcolonial Africa, all bear traces of the native-settler friction (Badru 149-69).

Often, the group that sees itself as indigenous to a territory within the postcolonial state resorts to exterminatory violence against so-called foreigners and settlers. Mamdani describes this situation as the crisis of postcolonial citizenship, in which those defined as native or indigene assume inalienable ownership of the state (or portions thereof) thereby claiming for themselves the right to rule, depose, kill, govern and colonize those seen as aliens. Mamdani’s argument in favour of viewing the 1994 genocide in Rwanda as a native’s genocide is useful for underscoring how the process of othering and identity construction within the colonial system carries into the postcolonial moment, contributing a marked tendency towards genocidal violence among African groups.

However, a major flaw in his explanation of genocide in Rwanda results from Mamdani’s claims that only within the situation of racialized identity forms can genocide result. Mamdani distinguishes between what he describes as “ethnic” and “racial” forms of violence in postcolonial Rwanda. He contends that the category of Tutsi identity was constructed in racial (as opposed to ethnic) terms by European colonial anthropological literature that insisted that the Tutsi were racially superior to their Hutu neighbours, and that this superiority was essentially a by-product of their phenotypical and genotypic differences. Both groups were believed to have migrated into the Great Lakes region of Rwanda, Burundi and some parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo from different places, Tutsis being the late arrivals. This colonial politicization of group identity along racial lines is what Mamdani identifies as the essential precondition of the 1994 genocide. He claims that race, and not
ethnic difference, explains the character of the exterminatory violence experienced by Tutsi victims in 1994:

This is not an “ethnic” but a “racial” cleansing, not a violence against one who is seen as a neighbor but against one who is seen as a foreigner; not a violence that targets a transgression across a boundary into home but one that seeks to eliminate a foreign presence from home soil, literally and physically. From this point of view, we need to distinguish between racial and ethnic violence: ethnic violence can result in massacres, but not genocide. Massacres are about transgressions, excess; genocide questions the very legitimacy of a presence as alien. *(Victims* 14)

Mamdani’s argument is generally that ethnicity suggests dynamism and a mutually inclusive identity form in which groups see themselves as different from other ethnicities because of dynamic social and cultural conditions and practices. Race on the other hand constitutes an ontological, unchangeable category, a mutually exclusive and irredeemable identity form. Mass violence based on the former, according to Mamdani, does not lead to genocide compared to violence resulting from the latter.

Mamdani’s distinction between racial and ethnic violence is problematic on several accounts.\(^{62}\) First, it assumes that genocides can occur only under circumstances of group othering that is based on biological, social, and political racism. Second, it excludes for consideration as victims of genocide in places such as Rwanda other people loosely referred to as “moderate Hutus,” a silence that leads some critics to dismiss Mamdani’s writing about the genocide in Rwanda as serving the interests of Tutsi elites who ended the genocide and

---

\(^{62}\) For an incisive criticism of Mamdani’s theorization of postcolonial African genocide, see, e.g., Vambe and Zegeye, “Racializing Ethnicity and Ethnicizing Racism” 775-793.
won the civil war in 1994.\footnote{On this point, see Vambe and Zegeye, “Racializing Ethnicity and Ethnicizing Racism”; Lemarchand, “Bearing Witness to Mass Murder” 93-101; Lemarchand, “Disconnecting the Threads: Rwanda and the Holocaust Reconsidered” 48-70; Reytjens, “Rwanda, Ten Years on: From Genocide to Dictatorship” 15-47.} This criticism is also based on Mamdani’s pregnant silence in his book \textit{When Victims Become Killers} over the violent activities that followed the 1994 genocide, particularly the violence perpetrated by post-genocide Rwandan government on Hutus and other peoples in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

I argue that we can attribute Mamdani’s race-centric view of genocide to the tendency of “thinking [African genocides] through the Holocaust” (Mamdani, “Making Sense of Political Violence in Postcolonial Africa” 2), a tendency that leads to exceptionalizing the historical conditions of genocide in Africa’s postcolony. For instance, Mamdani sees genocide as emanating from xenophobia driven by racism.\footnote{Mamdani, “Making Sense of Political Violence in Postcolonial Africa” 1-24.} His discussion of the Nazis’ extermination of European Jews focuses mainly on how nationalist ideologies that constructed Jews as dangerous foreigners and settlers inspired the violence against them. It is this xenophobic dimension of the Nazi genocide, rooted in racist anti-Semitism against people believed to originate from elsewhere that Mamdani projects onto genocides occurring in Africa’s postcolony. He excludes the fact that implicit in Nazi genocides is also the notion of life more and less worthy of living, an idea fundamental to the Nazi view of non-alien “Aryan Germans” such as gays, along with the physically and mentally challenged, as being unworthy of life to such an extent that their elimination from society can be justified. Mamdani’s discussion of genocide in the postcolony emphasizes biological racism as an essential precondition of genocide in ways that reinforce the notion of groups as immutable and fixed. Through his emphasis on racism against supposed foreigners as the mainspring of genocide, he excludes other important elements – such as scientific rationality, eugenicist thinking, modern state bureaucracy, and the vicissitudes of war – that other scholars have
included in their accounts of the preconditions for the attempted annihilation of different groups under the Nazis and in the Rwandan context.

Mamdani’s distinction between the violence arising from racism and that attributable to ethnicity treats genocide with the kind of exceptionalism that heralded not only the Holocaust uniqueness debate but also a similar exceptionalism in the use and application of the genocide concept. Mamdani seems to consider the massacre of Tutsis in Rwanda a genocide because it resembles the Nazi genocide of European Jews, which for him was similarly founded on a specific history of European racialism and carried out using an organized state apparatus. Mamdani also assumes that only within the category of racialized figurations of irreconcilable ontological differences is it possible to conceptualize the exterminatory violence of genocide. Hence he chastises Western media and scholars for labelling the Darfur atrocities as genocide (“The Politics of Naming”). He does not see the kinds of racialism at work in Darfur that he believes was operative in Rwanda.

Regarding the genocide of Igbos in Nigeria, scholars do not generally tend to make distinctions between ethnic and racial forms of violence. Rather, the politicization of ethnic/racial identities is always adduced by scholars like G.N. Uzoigwe as the cause of the

---

65 The Holocaust uniqueness debate centered on the idea that the Nazi genocide of Jews was unique, singular and unprecedented. What is at stake in the Holocaust uniqueness debate is the insistence on seeing the Nazi genocide of Jews as singular and unparalleled. For an incisive review of the stakes involved in this debate, see Moses, “Conceptual Blockages” 148-180. For a philosophical argument about the paradigmatic status of the Holocaust resulting from debates about its uniqueness, see Gaita, “Refocusing Genocide: A Philosophical Responsibility” 153-166.

66 On this point, see, e.g., Meierhenrich, “Introduction” 3-55.

67 It is worth noting that the kinds of racialism and eugenicist thinking found in European colonial activities were also present in Arab and Islamic activities in several parts of Africa, especially in Libya, Mauritania and the former Sudan. That Mamdani excludes this factor in his dismissal of genocide in Sudan is telling, as some scholars have pointed out.

68 Several critics actually took Mamdani to task over his claims that the atrocities in Darfur did not constitute genocide. Not only, according to some of these critics, is racism central to these atrocities, but also there are clear-cut signs of state-organized mass murders of targeted groups. See, e.g., Vambe and Zegeye, “Racializing Ethnicity and Ethnicizing Racism” 775-793.

69 Just like Mamdani, however, some scholars of the 1966-70 genocide of Igbos in Nigeria emphasize racism (construed problematically in terms suggestive of a confluence of biological traits and cultural and religious practices) as the major basis for which Igbos were massacred across Nigeria. See, e.g., Ekwe-Ekwe, *The Biafra War and Biafra Revisited*.)
genocide of Nigerian Igbos between 1966 and 1970. In his historical analysis of how the Igbo became targets for genocide in Nigeria during the calamitous events of 1966, Uzoigwe calls attention to colonial and postcolonial discourses and structures that politicized ethnic identities in the country. Through this politicization, Nigerian groups came to imagine others in stereotypical terms that informed their political relations with others. For Uzoigwe, the Igbo have been constructed as democratic, progressive, clever, resourceful, domineering, mercantile, clannish, and stereotypically “Jewish.”

This ethnic caricature of Igbo character would ordinarily not have had any significant wider implications in the 1960s since ethnic stereotyping was the order of perception and relation in colonial and postcolonial Nigeria. However, according to Uzoigwe, from late colonial to postcolonial times different ethnic identities in Nigeria became entangled with contentious political activities and visions. This fragmentation of Nigerian social and political solidarity meant that in the Nigerian national imaginary individuals represented not just unique persons but also the political visions and claims associated with their particular ethnic group. For Uzoigwe, this politicization and ghettoization of ethnicities, underway since colonial times, also accounts for why the categories of indigene and settler citizens exist and continue to trouble relations in Nigeria. The indigenous citizen is the Nigerian resident in his or her ethnic homeland. The settler citizen is the Nigerian resident outside his or her ethnic homeland. Between May and October 1966, “Igbo” settlements in most parts of then

---

70 See Uzoigwe, Visions of Nationhood 93-123. See also, Achebe, There Was a Country. On colonial and postcolonial literatures expressing racial/ethnic stereotypes of Nigerian groups, see, e.g., Morel, Nigeria: Its Peoples and Its Problems; Basden, Among the Ibos of Nigeria; Anber, “Modernisation and Political Disintegration: Nigeria and the Ibo,” 163-169; Kirk-Greene, Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria; Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism; Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties. For recent discussion of the racialization and politicization in Nigeria of Igbo identity as resourceful and progressive, see, e.g., Anthony, ‘‘Resourceful and Progressive Blackmen’’. Modernity and Race in Biafra, 1967–70” 41-61.
71 For a discussion of the continued tension of settler and indigenous citizenship in Nigeria, see Fourchard, “Bureaucrats and Indigenes” 37-58.
Northern and Western Nigeria (i.e. not the Igbo’s traditional territory) disappeared through massacres and forced deportation.

**Conclusion**

Although one clearly can hold European colonization responsible for contributing to the proliferation of mass atrocities occurring across postcolonial Africa, colonialism is by no means solely responsible for the emergence of dangerous and vulnerable identity patterns in Africa. Nor is racism [and the production of politicized ethnicities] a unique byproduct of Western colonization, being marked only by a single definition based on an historically specific idea of biological superiority.\(^2\) Even scholars like Uzoigwe would not go as far as Mamdani and suggest that racism is uniquely responsible for genocide in Africa’s postcolony. Instead, he and others argue that it makes better sense to understand genocide in Africa as a modern phenomenon. As a modern phenomenon, genocide proceeds from certain exceptional circumstances involving the collision of politicized ethnicity and religion, modern state-forms, democratization processes, and technological scientism.\(^3\) What remains common to scholarly claims about genocide in Africa’s postcolony is their acknowledgment of a peculiar kind of rationality that is responsible for propelling forward and intensifying exterminatory practices. Furthermore, these scholarly claims insist that this genocidal rationality is modern and colonial.

My own view, which I will be developing over the next chapters of my dissertation, is that extricating the genocide concept from its entanglement with European colonialism is


highly productive when it comes to making sense of genocides occurring in Africa’s postcolony. This disentanglement of the genocide concept from its roots in the relatively recent history of European colonialism helps broaden consideration of genocidal rationales at work in the postcolony while offering more nuanced accounts of the causes and outcomes of genocide in Africa. A missing link in the conception of African genocide as derived from, and underpinned by, Africans’ experience of European colonialism is due acknowledgement of the extent to which Africans’, and indeed the world’s, understanding of postcolonial mass violence has been shaped by the representational tropes and practices associated with the legacy of the Holocaust. I will now go on to argue that the Holocaust serves as the “political unconscious” of representations of African genocides, and thus as the bedrock for imaginative representations of genocide in the postcolony.

---

Chapter 2

Writing Genocide in the Postcolony: The Holocaust and Literary Representation of African Genocide

Introduction

This chapter examines the stakes involved in writing about genocides that have occurred in Africa’s postcolony. I argue that genocidal atrocities in Africa have provoked a body of imaginative literature which, among other things, has attempted to imagine the conditions giving rise to genocides. Taken together, this literature has tried to make genocides in Africa thinkable in certain ways. Importantly, it highlights a confluence of sensibilities shaping atrocity writing in Africa since the mid-twentieth century. At the heart of this important literary confluence lies the Holocaust. Hence, I call attention in this chapter to the relationship of the Holocaust to this genocide literature on postcolonial Africa. I contend that only when these literatures are read within the broader cultural contexts within which they have been written will their importance be fully realized.

The deep implication of the Holocaust in African traumatic memory motivates reappraising African history through the lens of literary, historical and philosophical responses that supply the vocabularies through which colonial and postcolonial African suffering has been rendered thinkable. Figurations of European racism against Jews, Jewish suffering, martyrdom and survival inform dominant literary and historical themes emanating from genocidal contexts in postcolonial Africa. Accordingly, I show in my readings of literature written in response to genocides in Nigeria and Rwanda how representations of African suffering since late-colonial and postcolonial times have depended on verbal and

---

1 In recent years, scholars are beginning to make “the case for seeing Jewish studies and postcolonialism as part of a historical constellation that has mutual filiations and genealogies” (Goetschel and Quayson 1). My study highlights aspects of these filiations and genealogies as underpinned by the influence of the Holocaust on African genocide literature.
symbolic languages of violence supplied by those attempting to depict the Holocaust. In trying to witness and make genocides occurring in the African postcolony thinkable, African and non-African writers have appropriated cosmopolitanized memories of the Holocaust in ways resulting in the depiction of African genocidal suffering understood in Eurocentric terms. Consequently, African literary debts to representations of the Holocaust in Europe and North America suggest a kind of continuing colonization of the language of mass violence on the continent.

The Holocaust as Cultural Icon of Genocides in Africa: The Examples of Nigeria and Rwanda Genocide Literatures

During the Biafra-Nigeria War in the late 1960s, an American-based Igbo poet, Jemie Onwuchekwa, compared the murder of Igbos in Nigeria before and during the war to the Nazi German murder of Jews, writing thus in a poem he titled “Requiem”:

> Once in 53  
> Three times in 66  
> Nigerians shoot civilians  
> through the ears  
> rehearsing all known tortures  
> murdering all males  
> and raping old women  
> forcing teenage girls in leper clinics  
> hundreds butchered…  
> the 30,000 innocents  
> mowed down Nazi fashion  
> a final solution  
> that failed again. (Onwuchekwa 28)

In these lines, Onwuchekwa catalogues a historical process of persecutions and systematic murders of Igbo civilians occurring before and after Nigeria’s Independence from Britain, which he considers similar to the Nazis’ “final solution.” The lines “a final solution / that failed again” encapsulate the poet’s defiant view that Biafra will survive the genocidal onslaught from Nigeria. The poet does not intend his funerary song in this poem to mourn the
demise of Biafra. Rather, he intends it at the time as an oration to the murdered “Innocents” whose deaths envisioned in the collection as sacrifice are propelling the emergence of a new Biafra nation, similar to the State of Israel rising from the ashes of the Holocaust following World War II. “Biafra,” writes the poet earlier in the collection, will emerge to “shake up / the bloody / [African] continent” (6). But by the time Onwuchekwa’s collection appeared in 1970, Biafra had been defeated and no African Israel resulted from the Igbo genocide.

In the late 1960s, during the Biafran War, the Holocaust had not yet become the paragonic symbol of genocidal suffering that it is today. However, following the Eichmann trial in Israel and the Auschwitz trials in Germany in the early 1960s, awareness of the genocide of Jews by Nazi Germany was spreading beyond the Western world. Such comparisons of suffering elsewhere to the Nazi genocide of Jews, as found in Biafra writing and its media reports, reveal the growing awareness of the Holocaust in African conflict zones at the time. The reference to Nazi German genocide of Jews in Onwuchekwa’s poem cited above is not coincidental. Several literary accounts on the genocide in Nigeria during and after the crisis years compared the experience of Igbos to the Holocaust. In such literature, the comparison of Igbo suffering to the Holocaust offers the basis for writers to internationalize Igbo experience in Nigeria and by so doing draw on the Holocaust to pass a moral message on a supposedly universal condition of human cruelty.

Employing complex Biblical symbolism based on imagery depicting Jewish exile and return, Michael Echeruo addresses in his poetry collection titled Mortality (1968) the raging war in Nigeria by metaphorizing it as some kind of a creative process arising from catastrophe. In a poem titled “The New Jerusalem,” the poet-persona describes the New Jerusalem of his imagination as “the loitering memory / of sweet birds / in Eden” (19). Like Onwuchekwa, Echeruo was living in the US at the time. He imagines himself as an exile in the US charmed by recollections of songs from an idyllic African home now encircled by
chaos. In an explanatory note to this poem, Echeruo describes this New Jerusalem as “a conjunction of African and Jew” (54), linking the history of the Jewish state of Israel with modern African states. Like the Jewish state, these nations are being born from catastrophe.

Similarly, in a poem titled “Vultures” from his 1971 collection *Collected Poems*, Chinua Achebe reflects on a troubling realization that human beings possess simultaneously a capacity for human care and a vulture’s inhumane savagery. The poet-persona imagines a Nigerian military commander as a vulture and compares him to the Commandant of the Nazis’ death camp at Belsen:

Thus the Commandant at Belsen
Camp going home for
the day with fumes of
human roast clinging
rebelliously to his hairy
nostrils will stop
at the wayside sweetshop
and pick up a chocolate
for his tender offspring
waiting at home for Daddy’s
return…. (*Collected Poems* 52)

Achebe’s reference to the Holocaust in these lines evokes a popular conception of Nazi death camps as a site of savagery often symbolized using the imagery of the crematoria: i.e. “fumes of / human roast.” These lines are evocative of the “grave in the sky” metaphor used by Paul Celan in his “Death Fugue,” which describes the cremation of Jewish victims in the Nazi camps. But Achebe is more interested in his own poem with the ironies of human character, the human capacity for monstrosity and affection as situations dictate. Reference to the Holocaust in Achebe’s poem thus serves to provide an occasion for meditating on the ironic condition of human cruelty and humaneness.

We find a related idea of the Holocaust as a metaphor for moralizing about the human condition in Wole Soyinka’s 1972 prison memoir, *The Man Died*. The Nigerian Federal
Military Government had jailed Soyinka at the time for his knowledge of the genocide against Igbos and for his attempts to mediate between Biafra and Nigeria to resolve the crisis. In this memoir, Soyinka expresses his frustration over the unending cycles of brutality and a pattern of genocidal murders taking place in Nigeria, a pattern he compares to the Holocaust: “How much longer will it go on, this pattern of power-initiated crime and the political scapegoat? A hideous image looms from those Nazi mists, the blood-thirst of a bestiality of power, a rabid snarl and slavering model for the Yisa Adejos of the world, animalistic regressions which evoke a shudder even from the reconciled heart of carnage” (93). Just as with Achebe’s reference to the Holocaust in his poem, Soyinka here evokes the Nazi death camp to convey his moral commentary on the banal and routinized nature of human cruelty. His other publications based on the 1966-70 crisis equally draw on the Holocaust in this way in order to moralize about cruelty. In his celebrated poetry collection *Idanre and Other Poems*, Soyinka justifies borrowing “alien” imagery for articulating local concerns. In a poem addressing the massacre of Igbos in Northern Nigeria in 1966, titled “Massacre, October ’66,” the poet employs imagery and symbols of ritual sacrifice from the Abrahamic faiths to describe the massacres as a desecration. In the final lines, he writes

```
I borrow seasons of an alien land
In brotherhood of ill, pride of race around me
Strewn in sunlit shards. I borrow alien lands
To stay the season of a mind. (52)
```

In these lines Soyinka suggests that his representation of local experience using foreign imagery helps to promote an identification with suffering elsewhere, while at the same time it remains a mechanism used by the poet to create some form of psychological distance between himself and the local suffering he is trying to articulate.

---

2 Yisa Adejo was one of the military officers that Soyinka encountered in a prison where he was held and interrogated during his twenty-seven-month incarceration between 1967 and 1969.
Such comparison between Biafran/Igbo suffering and the Holocaust intending to convey a moral message on a general human condition pervades the atmosphere of Flora Nwapa’s 1975 Biafra novel, *Never Again*. Nwapa is the first female novelist from Nigeria and the first Biafran woman to publish a work of fiction on the crisis. “Never Again” echoes the credo of “Never Again Auschwitz,” which in part is a charge against global indifference to human suffering as well as an appeal to the world’s conscience so as to ensure that genocides and wars never recur. Having experienced severe suffering and witnessed extreme human cruelty during the crisis, Kate, the novel’s hero, meditates thus on the situation of human idiocy: “What folly! What arrogance, what stupidity led us to this desolation, to this madness, to this wickedness, to this war, to this death? When this cruel war was over, there will be no more war. It will not happen again, never again. NEVER AGAIN, never again” (73; emphasis in original). Kate’s emphatic “never again” expresses her enduring commitment to witness atrocity and war suffering as a moral duty to posterity. “Never again” is also her way of stressing the reality of anguish that requires a more sober, intimate and spiritual response.

This comparison of Biafra to the Holocaust has continued in recent writings about Nigeria’s traumatic past, as in, for example, Chris Abani’s *Graceland* (2004), Uzodinma Iweala’s *Beast of No Nation* (2005), Dulue Mbachu’s *War Games* (2005), Nnedi Okorafor’s post-apocalypse fantasy, *Who Fears Death* (2010), and notably too in Chimamanda Adichie’s *Half of a Yellow Sun* (2006). For example, as in Nwapa’s *Never Again*, the comparison of Biafra to the Holocaust in Adichie’s *Half* suggests the novelist’s attempt to construct an ethical vision of Biafra that gestures towards a wider global experience. Among several other

---

linkages to Holocaust memory in Adichie’s novel including direct comparison of Igbo victims to Jewish victims of Nazi genocide, the journal sub-text of the novel is significant for establishing linkages to the Holocaust. The journal’s title, “The World Was Silent When We Died,” evokes a moral indictment notable in Holocaust writing markedly in Elie Wiesel’s *Night*. The original Yiddish version of *Night* from which the French translation was derived is titled *And the World Remained Silent*. In *Half*, the charge of “silence” against “the world” is an expression of moral indictment of indifference and a clarion call to act to end the suffering of others. Yet, in all these examples, this comparison of Igbo/Biafran suffering to the Holocaust decontextualizes and depoliticizes the writers’ message from its local setting, invariably transforming it into a moral message on a universal human condition.

Writing in his book, *The Biafran War and Postcolonial Humanitarianism*, Lasse Heerten notes that in the late 1960s during the Biafra-Nigeria War, the Holocaust had not become “the symbolic core of a memory culture focused on genocidal suppression and violence” (177). In his study, Heerten focuses on Western (mostly American) media representations of the war to show how Biafran humanitarian advocacy and Western media reports of the war compared the suffering of Biafrans to that of Jews caught up in the Nazi genocide. Such comparison of Biafra to the Holocaust, according to Heerten, served to make both events visible in distinct ways while at the same time rendering aspects of both violent phenomena invisible. While on the one hand the Holocaust provided an analogue conducive to comprehending Biafran suffering as genocide, images of Biafran suffering provided Western audiences at the time with striking visuals of the suffering and anguish inflicted on Jews by the Nazis. Such comparisons, according to Heerten, contributed to shaping the Nazi genocide of Jews into the Holocaust in which “the murder of European Jews ceased to be one entry on a long list of Nazi crimes” but became instead “the historical and symbolical core of a new understanding of National Socialist rule and the Second World War” (202; emphasis in
The entanglement of Biafran and Holocaust memories that Heerten has described reveals what Michael Rothberg has explained as a “multidirectional” process through which atrocity memories mutually shape one another.

Rothberg has argued that the emergence of the Holocaust as an icon of suffering evolved through a process of cross-referencing Jewish suffering under the Nazis with suffering elsewhere, particularly during the long period of decolonization. Writing in *Multidirectional Memory*, Rothberg challenges the linear trajectory of memorialization used for considering the emergence of the Holocaust as a symbolic core for understanding genocide. The traditional understanding of the Holocaust’s emergence as a cultural icon insists on three major moments: the Eichmann trials in Jerusalem in the early 1960s; the Auschwitz trials in Frankfurt from 1963 to 1965; and the 1978 American Holocaust miniseries. Rothberg contests this linear history and instead suggests a model of multidirectionality or cross-referencing in which memory of the Nazi genocide became entangled with that of atrocities elsewhere. A notable example in this regard is the Algerian War of Independence (1954–62) against colonial France during which anti-war activists in Europe and decolonization theorists compared the torture of and violence against Algerians with the Nazis’ torture and murder of Jews during World War II (Rothberg 175–98). Through such entanglements, the Holocaust facilitated the articulation of other histories of suffering at the same time as it developed into an icon of suffering able to shed light on events having little or nothing to do with it. For Rothberg, the entanglement of Holocaust memories with other atrocities is possible because “the public sphere” of atrocity representation is “a malleable discursive space in which groups do not simply articulate established positions but actually come into being through their dialogical interactions with others” (5).

---

4 There is no consensus regarding how the Holocaust emerged to become a cultural icon of genocidal suffering following World War II. The controversies hover around two broad claims: those suggesting that the
Given this multidirectionality, it becomes possible to understand how the rhetorical comparison of Biafra with the Holocaust – ostensibly through showing famished Biafran children as resembling the “Musselman” in the Nazi death camps, or by portraying victims’ corpses as heaps or collectives and not as individuals – participated in the creation of an emerging international iconography of suffering founded on the idea of genocide, genocide taken to mean a racist, hate-driven violence directed against innocent victims (Heerten 178-185). In addition, Biafran representation, as Heerten’s study shows, thrived on its use and spectacularization of photographic images of famished Biafran children, which were used to advocate humanitarian support and international intervention in the conflict. Biafran war propaganda and Western media and humanitarian activism combined to represent Biafran suffering as comparable to the suffering of Jews in Nazi Germany. These Biafran representations further exploited colonial narratives that stereotyped Igbos as Jewish, commercialist, and progressive in order to champion Biafra’s struggles as one similar to the Jews in order therefore to elicit support from the Western world. These representations created “rhetorical equivalence” between Biafran suffering under Nigerian onslaught and Jewish suffering under the Nazis in order to foster an understanding of the Biafran conflict as genocide (Heerten 202).

However, focussing on representational practices at the time of conflict, as Heerten’s study does, generally leads us to conclude erroneously that the practice of comparing Biafran and Jewish suffering is essentially informed by an awareness of emergency actions required in response to the demand to end suffering in Nigeria. But since such comparisons continued in conflict literature years afterwards, we must consider more closely the factors behind these distinct nature and enormity of violence perpetrated against Jews by the Nazis is the reason for the Holocaust’s iconic status (see, e.g., Avishai Margalit and Gabriel Motzkin, “The Uniqueness of the Holocaust,” *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, vol. 25, no. 1, 1996, pp. 65-83.), and those contending that the Holocaust became a powerful icon of suffering through complex social and political processes aided by representation and comparison with atrocities elsewhere (see, e.g., Alexander; Levy and Sznaider; Rothberg; Heerten). My own discussion falls precisely within the latter discourse.
practices. Heerten is right to conclude that representations of Biafra in the heat of the conflict left little room particularly for Western audiences, who were the primary targets of such representations, to understand the complex causes and effects of the Biafran conflict. The result has been an oversimplification of secondary understandings of the conflict and consequently proposals offering easy solutions to complex and multifaceted problems. A major implication of this pattern of rhetorical comparison that uses “the imagery of innocent victims as universalized icons of humanity” is that it “depoliticizes, decontextualizes, and [oftentimes] dehistoricizes our understanding of complex emergencies” (173). By subsequently comparing Biafran suffering to Jewish experience in media representations at the time of conflict and in literature, both histories become de-territorialized and effectively reduced to a series of narrative acts focused on making atrocities public and on depoliticizing conflicts so as to privilege a more narrowly moral humanitarianist agenda. In the context of Biafra, the narrative regime of genocide addressed to an international moral imperative for humanitarian intervention results in the suppression of the serious, unaddressed political questions of self-determination and justice in genocide’s aftermath.

In the case of Rwanda, comparisons of the 1994 Rwandan genocide to the Holocaust are even more telling in literature and other media. Unlike Biafra, the Rwandan genocide happened at a time when the consciousness of the Holocaust in the West is already established and pervasive. Popular accounts of the 1994 Rwandan genocide referenced the Holocaust frequently. In his book *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families*, Philip Gourevitch opens his moving chronicle of Rwanda’s genocide by suggesting that atrocities in the country outweigh the Holocaust in terms of rate and speed of death: “The dead of Rwanda accumulated at nearly three times the rate of Jewish dead during..."
the Holocaust” (3). This pattern of comparison runs nearly throughout Gourevitch’s book. Similarly, Jean Hatzfeld in his chronicle of Rwanda’s genocide perpetrators, Machete Season, makes comparisons to the Holocaust because, as Hatzfeld claims, he found close analogies between both genocides: “I have often mentioned the Jewish genocide, and not the Armenian, Gypsy, or Cambodian genocides, because I am more familiar with it—thanks to many memoirs, books, and the film Shoah—and because during my visits to Rwanda, I noticed many analogies between the Jewish and Tutsi genocides, especially regarding the way in which they were implemented” (208). The association of Rwandan violence with the Holocaust in both accounts seems to provide the reader a prism through which to think of and legitimize the atrocities in Rwanda as genocidal to an immensely horrifying degree.

Popular accounts of the genocide by African writers show the same comparative tendencies. In Boubacar Boris Diop’s novel, Murambi, the Book of Bones, cultural memories of the Holocaust pervade the whole atmosphere of the story. Several characters in the novel seem to emerge not specifically from Rwanda’s historical contexts but from the Nazi death camps. For example, the nihilist Dr. Joseph Karekezi in the novel is arguably the literary offspring of Nazi doctor Joseph Mengele. Paul Rusesabagina’s genocide memoir, An Ordinary Man (written with Tom Zoellner), references cultural memory of the Holocaust, setting it against a Rwandan genocidal context wherein the capacity for human good and evil may be rethought. Through citations of Nazi atrocities in Europe and their representations, Rusesabagina’s memoir seems intended to acknowledge the banality of human virtue, ostensibly establishing a dialogue between itself and such relatively more pessimistic historical accounts of the Holocaust as Christopher Browning’s Ordinary Men as well as Hannah Arendt’s notion of the banality of evil.

In 2008, a Rwandese Gilbert Gatore published a novel in France titled Le passé devant soi (translated as The Past Ahead by Marjolijn de Jager in 2012). The novel presents a
diaristic account of the genocide, dramatizing events as though they were impressions in a child’s mind. Gatore’s publisher includes the following biographical information about the author: “Gilbert Gatore was born in Rwanda in 1981. On the eve of the civil war, his father gave him The Diary of Anne Frank to read. Profoundly moved, the young boy decided, like the heroine, to keep a diary throughout the conflict” (The Past Ahead xi). One can argue that such attempts to reproduce Holocaust memory in Africa, as Gatore’s novel and other examples cited above reveal, highlight the workings of a largely Western culture industry that lies behind and is responsible for the production of these works, one that is intent on exploiting the cultural significance of Holocaust memory so as to “sell” African genocides to Western audiences. In Canadian Gil Courtemanche’s novel A Sunday at the Pool in Kigali, the Rwandan genocide becomes the African Holocaust, one that the “White Man” encounters in Africa as one legacy of a colonial racism that continues to shape his relation with, and place on, the continent.

Just like in the case of Biafra, the rhetorical comparison of the Rwandan genocide to the Holocaust de-politicizes, decontextualizes and de-territorializes the Rwandan atrocities. It is not merely a coincidence that in these literary representations little to no reference is made to the Rwandan civil war that was occurring alongside the genocide, and importantly contributing to it. Hence the narration of genocide can be seen to set in motion representational practices that depoliticize mass conflict in promotion of a moral humanitarian vision.

---

6 A recent memoir, The Girl Who Smiled Beads, by a Rwandan genocide survivor Clemantine Wamariya (written with Elizabeth Weil) similarly compares the child Clemantine’s experience in Rwanda to the kind recounted in Elie Wiesel’s Night.
The Motifs of African Genocide Literature

In addition to comparing African atrocities to the Holocaust, the genocide literature of Nigeria and Rwanda presents four motifs important for understanding its importance and some of the problems it creates. These motifs are: (1) the presentation of genocide as an encounter with Hell; (2) genocide conceived of as ritual sacrifice; (3) genocide memorialization understood as a moral imperative; and (4) an aesthetic of naturalism propelling graphic narratives of suffering inflicted on the body. These motifs emerge from a confluence of writers’ representations of the events comprising a genocide, as well as victimization, perpetration, survival, and genocide witnessing. The prevalence of these motifs suggests that genocide literature is a distinct literary form in postcolonial Africa. Their recurrence in atrocity representations in Nigeria and Rwanda – two distinct geographical, political, cultural and temporal contexts – further shows that the genocide literature has evolved consistently in the postcolony to convey a sense of the reality and meaning of genocide in Africa.

The first motif – the imagination of genocide as an encounter with Hell – constitutes the pivot on which many stories of African genocides revolve. Important exemplifications of this motif can be found in Soyinka’s novel, Season of Anomy and Diop’s Murambi. Season of Anomy dramatizes the genocide of Nigeria’s Igbos by restaging the Orpheus myth and Dante’s journey through hell in a mythical postcolonial African country. The encounter with genocidal atrocity happens in hell, and the writer who witnesses hellish horrors emerges afterwards with a new, richer, and more nuanced moral awareness. Similarly in Murambi, the writer-witness to genocide journeys through massacre sites which he understands as an encounter with hell. He returns afterwards declaring a commitment to write the horrors of genocide as a moral imperative. We find related depictions of encounters with atrocity as journeys through hell in Adichie’s characterization of Ugwu’s experience of warfare, and
Olanna’s visit to Northern Nigeria just before the massacres occurring there take place, as well as in Courtemanche’s characterization of Bernard Valcourt’s exposure to genocide in Rwanda, among several other accounts. This framing of genocidal encounters as journeys through hell shows that African genocide literature has evolved as descent narratives. While the descent narrative is not peculiarly absent in African literary traditions generally, the particular instances of this trope in postcolonial African genocide literature shows evidence of influence by post-World War II Western descent narratives themselves largely shaped by Holocaust writing.

In her book *Hell in Contemporary Literature*, Rachel Falconer argues that the hell trope or the descent narrative is popular in Western writing and that it evolved to occupy a central place in Western literature following World War II. Although this trope is a very ancient one, the difference between its articulation in ancient literature and in post-1945 narratives is that “while the descent to Hell still functions as a quest for knowledge, reparation of loss or superhuman power, the descent occurs within a context which, unlike their classical predecessors, is already understood to be infernal” (Falconer 4). Hence, post-1945 hellish narratives are often fatalistic and address metaphysical questions about the scope and limits of agential (moral and other) determinism. This is especially notable in the Holocaust’s witness narratives, such as those by Primo Levi, Sarah Kofman, Winfried Georg Sebald, and Anne Michaels. The representation of traumatic encounters as Hell, according to Falconer, usually proceeds as an infernal journey through the depths of evil in what Falconer describes as a “katabatic imagination” (2). The katabatic imagination portrays traumatic experience as some kind of hellish journey. This way of imagining has become a dominant trope in writings about genocide in Nigeria and Rwanda. This katabatic trope, which sometimes leads writers to depict genocidal traumas as unimaginable – proves central to all of the novels that I have selected to discuss in my next four chapters.
A major consequence of the katabatic imagination for the representation of African
genocides is that it conceives of genocide as in important ways some form of ritual sacrifice.
This is the second motif I will be addressing in my dissertation. The prevalence of the theme
of sacrifice reveals attempts in African genocide literature to imagine victims’ death as a
hecatomb. “Hecatomb” is a term used by ancient Greeks and Romans to designate ritual
practice based on the idea that public sacrifice leads to the wellbeing of the community. By
conceiving of genocidal murder as implicated in some form of a hecatomb, writers seek to
identify a purpose to the deaths of victims. One can find this theme of redemptive sacrifice
prominently depicted in Soyinka’s *Season*, Diop’s *Murambi*, as well as in Adichie’s *Half* and
Courtemanche’s *Sunday*.

The third motif—witnessing genocide as a moral imperative—is most telling in the
prominent presence of the figure of the journalist, the writer, and the artist in the African
genocide literature that I examine. This figure of creative production tours massacre sites in
search of meaning. By the end of such infernal travels, he or she declares a commitment to
serving as a witness to genocidal horrors, a position occupied in part out of a felt sense of
moral duty to the genocide victims, and also to posterity. A consistent feature in African
genocide literature is that most writers insistently reject cynicism and despair in the aftermath
of their encounters with genocide. They propose instead memorializing genocide so that
public memory can be used as a moral guide to prevent against the recurrence of such
catastrophes.

Finally, the impulse to memorialize genocide as a moral imperative in atrocity
narratives is conducive to a kind of naturalism. By naturalism, I refer to the artistic tradition
underpinned by the worldview that the environment shapes human actions and that true
representation of reality should be based on detailed, scientific observation. This literary
tradition is traceable to the nineteenth-century work of French writers Edmond and Jules
Goncourt who attempted in their “urban fiction” to present graphic details of ordinary people’s experience that barely made it into art (Coundouriotis 5-6). However, it was the French writer Émile Zola who popularized this form as adequate for giving visibility to ordinary people’s lived experience.\(^7\) Naturalism emphasizes “the materiality of the body” (Coundouriotis 6) and because most nineteenth-century naturalist writing in Europe focused on common people’s experience of deprivation, the form encourages a spectacularization of suffering. For this reason, Thomas W. Laqueur contends that nineteenth-century literary naturalism gave vent to the genre of “humanitarian narrative” because this body of literature “came to speak in extraordinarily detailed fashion about pains and deaths of ordinary people in such a way as to make apparent the causal chains that might connect the actions of its readers with suffering of its subjects” (177).\(^8\) In other words, naturalism’s propensity to create spectacles of suffering invariably makes it exploitable in the hands of writers aiming to mobilize some form of empathy for suffering subjects or marginalized groups.

In the context of African genocides, vivid descriptions of suffering and the portrayal of genocide as physical violence directed against victims’ bodies reveal an artistic sensibility that spectacularizes suffering as a means to secure empathy for victims and advocate for humanitarian intervention. Naturalism in this context therefore encourages readers to take a closer look at the mutilated and wounded bodies of victims, ostensibly in an attempt to rehumanize and elicit empathy for them.

These four motifs help to explain the nature and implications of comparing African genocides to the Holocaust (beyond the understanding that such comparisons provide by

---


internationalizing African genocides and making them recognizable as such). On this point though, we may consider the prevalence of Holocaust comparisons in African atrocity representations as suggesting that the Holocaust in Africa contributes to what Avishai Margalit has called a “shared memory” of suffering. Shared memory, according to Margalit, is a form of memory we experience as members of a community of memory “through channels of description rather than by direct experience” (52). Shared memory depends on “a division of mnemonic labour” (52) aided by memory institutions and representational practices such as artmaking and storytelling. The process through which memory becomes shared and sustained requires the active, voluntary participation by members of any memory community. Shared memory, according to Margalit, encourages a sense of belonging to a community of memory. The Holocaust, which contributes to the shared memory of suffering in Africa, also facilitates a sense of belonging to a global community of genocide sufferers. The synchronicity of memories of African atrocities with memory of the Nazi genocide highlights the process through which new and old victim communities attempt to enter – through representations of their respective traumas conveyed in terms common to both – into an expanding community of genocide sufferers.

Yet there are serious consequences arising from these strangely undertheorized and in the main unacknowledged traces of the Holocaust in representations of African genocides. We can begin identifying these consequences by thinking about the latter representations as perpetrating a kind of “symbolic violence” on African social and moral self-consciousness. Symbolic violence, as Pierre Bourdieu explains it, is a kind of violence that is “exercised upon social agents with his or her complicity” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2002, 167). It results from an exercise of misrecognized and normalized symbolic power shaping thoughts and perceptions. Symbolic power shapes how we make meaning and imagine ourselves to be in the world. Oftentimes, we misrecognize or see no harm in our representational practices.
Symbolic violence occurs when certain dominant discourses successfully conceal their cultural, economic and political harms and thus mask our positional awareness of their effects on us.⁹

What I am suggesting here is that the circulation of Holocaust memory within African genocide narratives functions as a kind of Lacanian Master-Signifier around which representations of postcolonial African genocides may accrete and stabilize. Every discourse, as Slavoj Zizek explains, is “ultimately grounded in a violent imposition of a Master-Signifier which is stricto sensu ‘irrational’” (Violence 62; original emphasis). It is irrational because it needs no justification for its position as the “Master” of meaning: it simply is so because it is so. The Holocaust as the primary constituent of genocide discourse cannot guarantee open and equal representation of all other genocides. Instead, it encourages an asymmetrical encounter with African genocides in ways that hinder fully understanding mass violence in Africa’s postcolony. This hindrance is most obviously manifest in the lack of coherent visions of political justice concerning how to deal with the legacies of Africa’s genocidal past and present.

⁹ Alexander Laban Hinton has highlighted this point of what I am describing as the Holocaust’s symbolic violence on representations of African genocides. As Hinton explains, people generally come to an understanding of such phenomena as genocide through metaphors, metonyms, or prototypes. In the context of genocide understanding, Hinton notes, “the Holocaust has long served as the prototype of genocide and Auschwitz as one of its key metonyms. What this means is that in the back of our minds many, if not most, of us have the Holocaust prototype in mind when discoursing about [other genocides]” (“Critical Genocide Studies” 11). In the context of African genocides, what this means is that the enormity of African suffering continues to fail to produce an extensive and widely shared vocabulary for comprehending African suffering in the same way the Nazi genocide of the Jews has done. While this act of symbolic violence may serve the interests of those (Western political, economic and cultural establishments) with the cultural capital to provoke the misrecognition of realities of African genocides, its deeper implications manifest in the depoliticization of African mass atrocities. Also on this point of genocide studies and Holocaust canonization, see, Dirk A. Moses, “Toward a Theory of Critical Genocide Studies.”
Writing Igbo Genocide in Nigeria: Rethinking the Genre of War Fiction

To date, no event in Nigeria’s colonial and postcolonial history has produced more literary and historiographical responses than the genocide and war of 1966 to 1970. More than 200 books – including novelistic, biographical, poetic and dramatic texts – have appeared since 1968.\(^\text{10}\) The first published novel about these events was in German in 1969: Victor Nwankwo’s *Der Weg nach Udima* (*The Road to Udima*).\(^\text{11}\) This novel was also the only one on the subject published during the war. The novel highlights the realities of the ways both the Nigerian and Biafran militaries used or disposed of civilian Igbos/Biafrans, seemingly at will. The use of deceitful slogans and wartime propaganda especially by the Nigerian military feature prominently in Nwankwo’s novel. Some characters in the story resemble historical German figures, a notable example being Ukpabi Asika an Igbo working as civilian administrator for the Federal Military Government of Nigeria whom the Biafrans nicknamed as “Lord Haw Haw,” a reference to propagandist William Joyce who was the English German-Nazi radio broadcaster during World War II (Jeffs 283-85).

By the end of the war in January 1970, a tremendous number of publications began to emerge.\(^\text{12}\) In very important but not always direct ways, many of these writings address

---


\(^\text{11}\) The manuscript was originally written in English. Nwankwo met the German journalist, Ruth Bowert, who was covering the war at the time. She liked the story and gave it to Franz-Josef Stummann, who translated it into German and got it published in 1969. The original English manuscript was lost during the war and an English translation of the German version was published as *The Road to Udima* in 1985 (Fourth Dimension, 1985). For a discussion of the publication history and Nwankwo’s thematic concerns in *The Road to Udima*, see, e.g., Nikolai Jeffs, “Ethnic ‘Betrayal’, Mimicry, and Reinvention.”

themes of genocide and war, re-imagining the circumstances fueling mass atrocities.

Nevertheless, critical reception of these books has conspired to mute the theme of genocide since critics have mainly discussed them as examples of war literature. My discussion here focuses on the critical reception of novels since the novel as a literary genre has so far received the most sustained and committed scholarly attention. But what I say about the so-called war novels in Nigeria applies to other genres of writing related to that past.

Taken broadly, critics have tended to categorize any novels representing the violent events of 1966-70 in Nigeria as “war novel[s],” “civil war novel[s],” “Nigerian [civil] war novel[s], or Biafra War novel[s].” To be clear, these novels embody themes of war in ways that necessitate their reading as war fiction as well. In fact, Raphael Lemkin conceives genocide as war, except for him genocide signifies total war in which no distinction is made between enemy combatants and civilian non-combatants. Recent scholarship especially in political studies has also highlighted the nexus between war and genocide. The strength and coherence of claims concerning the existence of links between these two violent processes


14 See, for example, Scott Straus, “‘Destroy Them to Save Us’: Theories of Genocide and the Logics of Political Violence,” Terrorism and Political Violence 24, no. 4 (2012): 544-560.
requires revision of our conceptions of genocide and war otherwise understood as mutually exclusive processes/categories.

For example, in the case of the Nigeria-Biafra War, one such critical link connects war and genocide to nationalism. Oftentimes, nationalism is both war’s and genocide’s driving force. Ironically, at the same time nationalism is often a response to (and outgrowth of) war and genocide. The relation of war to genocide in the Nigerian context is not marginal, but rather central to understanding literatures written in response to the atrocities of 1966-1970. However, the discourse on the Biafran War has tended to sideline any critical consideration of genocide and its representation in the Nigerian context in ways that have ended up excluding from serious consideration some important questions about that violent past, especially those regarding the place and influence of the Holocaust in African writing. Recovering the discourse of genocide in creative and critical responses to Nigeria’s traumatic past, I argue, offers the possibility of more complete readings of novels taking the Biafran conflict as their subject.

As war fiction, what seems most pertinent to any scholarly discussion of these novels is the following: (1) how the experience of war propels a rethinking and reimagining of postcolonial nationhood from the viewpoint of “ordinary people”;15 (2) how the emergence of “the Nigerian war novel” or “Biafra War novel” presupposes an evolving “Nigerian national literature” that is based on apprehensions of war as a crucible of national births or rebirths;16 (3) how the aesthetic choices evident in Nigerian war fiction suggests fictional, historiographical and ethical dilemmas implicit in writing war in Nigeria;17 and (4) how

---

15 See, for example, Eleni Coundouriotis, The People’s Right to the Novel, 2014.
writings about the Nigerian civil war provide a template for reimagining Nigerian nationhood in terms of gender and class justice.\(^\text{18}\) Scholars who have taken up these issues have produced work that tends to advance two broad theoretical claims. The first holds up so-called Nigerian war fiction as a “people’s history” that reimagines Nigerian nationhood based on the experiences of common peoples. The second regards this body of literature as dramatizing a contest between relatively “introverted” and “extroverted” national literatures (Coundouriotis 16-24).

According to Eleni Coundouriotis,\(^\text{19}\) considered as a genre that articulates a popular Nigerian history, the Nigerian war novel is prodigiously a witness literature or set of proxy accounts testifying to the travails of common or ordinary peoples in their quest for survival during wartime. On this reading, writers of war fiction in Nigeria’s postcolony represent war using the “language of suffering” of people whom official histories tend to sideline.\(^\text{20}\) Due to the war writer’s inclination to articulate the suffering of ordinary peoples and turn that suffering into a protest against war in general, Coundouriotis contends that the discourses of humanitarianism and victimization remain conspicuous in the Nigerian war novel. These discourses developed around a naturalistic aesthetic practice, particularly since naturalism is “historically entangled with the emergence of humanitarianism” (Coundouriotis 3).\(^\text{21}\) As a genre, the war novel is believed to have aided the ascendancy of naturalism in nineteenth-

\(^{18}\) See Adimora-Ezeigbo, “From the Horse’s Mouth”; Pape, “Nigerian War Literature by Women”; Oike Machiko, “Becoming a Feminist Writer” 60-70.

\(^{19}\) My focus is on Coundouriotis’s book, The People’s Right to the Novel. It is a recent and perhaps definitive critique of African war fiction and provides a review of significant critical literatures on the subject. It brings together some of the most important literatures of catastrophe in Africa’s postcolony in a compelling discussion as war literature.

\(^{20}\) For a discussion of humanitarianism as a practice that is based on accounts of traumatic experiences using the language of suffering, see Didier Fassin and Richard Rechtman, The Empire of Trauma, translated by Rachel Gomm. Coundouriotis also notes that the Biafran War influenced Western humanitarian practice in ways that institutionalized humanitarianism as “proxy testimony” account of suffering. For more explanations on Biafra and Western humanitarian practices, see Kevin O’Sullivan, “Humanitarian Encounters” 299-315. See also, Didier Fassin, Humanitarian Reason.

\(^{21}\) For a discussion of naturalism’s historical entanglement with the discourse of humanitarianism in France, see Harry Levin, The Gates of Horn.
century Europe (France), particularly in the work of Émile Zola (Coundouriotis 3-7). The perceived ethical imperative to relate in detail the horror and immensity of human suffering is one reason for naturalism’s proclivity for details. These details are supposed to invite the audience to empathize with sufferers, whose misery is documented in extremely fine detail.22

Coundouriotis claims that writers’ focus on ordinary people is their way of undermining official histories in favour of a more democratic explanatory project. This project condemns the divisive and militarized ethnic nationalisms fuelling conflicts in Africa’s postcolony. The preference for naturalist aesthetics predisposes writers to stage war as an abnormal circumstance occurring in “an environment in which man appears as different from what he normally is, unmasking a self that he must subsequently struggle to disavow” (Coundouriotis 9). Amid such chaos, human behaviour and action become the sum of the prevailing conditions of anomy. For Coundouriotis, writers of war fiction use their work to dramatize the nature of this chaotic environment and to caution against its deterministic elements that undermine individual moral agency.23

Central to this reading of Nigerian/Biafran war fiction is the agent-structure question, and more specifically the causes and implications of social actions that are representationally dominant in these novels. I do not disagree with the critical reading calling attention to the prevalence of naturalist aesthetics in these novels. Issues of nationhood, audience and aesthetic practice raised by this reading are also relevant for my discussion of these novels as genocide literature. However, a major problem with this reading of “Nigerian war novels”

22 Yet, at the same time as these horrific details invite the audience closer, they become entangled in what Hannah Arendt has described as “politics of pity.” This politics of pity operates in situations of power inequality in which a privileged audience from a distance gazes in pity at the suffering of the disempowered. In this arrangement, pity and sympathy for those suffering are based not so much on closer identification with suffering as they are on distance and privilege. See Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, 79-80. For more discussions of this politics of pity in relation to “distant suffering,” see Luc Boltanski, Distant Suffering. See also Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others.

23 On this point of naturalism in African literature, see also Neil Lazarus, “Realism and Naturalism in African Fiction.” Lazarus suggests in this essay that African naturalism is different from European naturalism because African writers refuse to deny individuals agency even in the chaotic context of war and catastrophe.
concerns the idea of “ordinary people” and their history. To be clear, ordinariness in this context suggests the conditions of deprivation, poverty and in some accounts illiteracy that poor peoples of a nation usually experience. These ordinary peoples’ experiences oftentimes do not make it into official discourses and mainstream historiography, which is a reason why fiction writing that sheds light on marginal voices and perspectives becomes important. As Coundouriotis rightly notes, fictions of this kind provide a means to recover sidelined experiences and put them at the centre of consideration regarding war and nationhood.

Yet this perspective on “ordinary people” in the context of war makes no distinction between people conceived of as ethnic (or similar identitarian) entities, and people understood as the *demos* (common people) of a nation. Indeed the “people” of the novels in question – on whose account Coundouriotis argues for approaching war experience in Nigeria as signalling a writing trend reimagining nationhood from common people’s experience – are not properly speaking the ordinary people most affected by the events in Biafra. In fact, these are mostly Igbos and other minority groups persecuted across Nigeria at the time of the conflict there. Their experiences were not by and large the experience of common Nigerian people generally. Rather Biafrans experienced victimization from a genocidal regime in Nigeria. Therefore to describe so-called “Nigerian war fiction” as part of the genre comprised of the Nigerian people’s novel ignores the genocidal circumstances of the Biafran crisis and its legacies, further marginalizing the perspectives and experiences of Igbo victims.

Scholarly readings of the “Nigerian war novel” such as Coundouriotis’s attempt to make the case for reading works of this kind as literature of the people and for the people, the people here signifying the common peoples of the Nigerian nation. Such scholarship encourages us to view the Nigerian war novel as writing the Nigerian nation. Coundouriotis’s claims about the “Nigerian war fiction” as the “people’s novel” echo popular scholarly work from the 1970s and ‘80s that treats some of this “war” literature as narratives of an emergent
Nigerian nationalism. The emergence of this scholarship coincided with the rise of socialist and feminist activism in the 1970s. Many critics and authors with these ideological leanings began at this time to reconsider the terms standard in discussions of the Nigerian-Biafran crisis. Their aim was to shift the analytical focus away from ethnicity and racism, since emphasis on the latter was polarizing, tended to exceptionalize Igbo suffering, and appeared inadequate for thinking about the crisis from a widely shared national position. Hence, scholars and writers with socialist and feminist bents began to interpret the Biafran crisis as one impelled by class and gender injustice, and not specifically ethnic injustice. By focusing on class and gender struggles, these critics and writers downplayed the subject of genocide. The ethnic/racial underpinnings of the violent events of 1966-70 become muted in favour of an appreciation of suffering cashed-out broadly enough to accommodate experiences of injustice and hardship widely shared by other Nigerians.

In 1974, the Marxist-socialist critic Omafume Onoge published an influential essay titled “The Crisis of Consciousness in Modern African Literature,” wherein he makes the case for a sociological appreciation of modern literary history in Africa. Onoge claims that from late colonial period African literature has proceeded to develop in response to three writing impulses or consciousnesses: nativist, critical realist, and socialist. The nativist consciousness, exemplified in the Negritude writings of Senegalese Leopold Sedar Senghor, is literature of self-assertion responding to colonial violence. Critical realism, by contrast, characterizes the literature of postcolonial disillusionment, lamenting the failures of postcolonial African states to realize their promise of freedom and independence. For Onoge,

---

24 For examples of some important socialist/Marxist criticisms proposing a sociology of African/Nigerian literature, see Omafume Onoge, “The Crisis of Consciousness in Modern African Literature” 385-410; Chidi Amuta, “The Nigerian Civil War and the Evolution of Nigerian Literature” 85-99. See also Craig W. McLuckie, Nigerian Civil War Literature. For a similar socialist interpretations of African drama, see Biodun Jeyifo, The Truthful Lie. For scholarly discussion of war fiction by women as indicative of an emergent feminist consciousness in Nigeria suggestive of gender struggles/war, see Marion Pape, “Nigerian War Literature by Women” 231-41.
the problem with these two creative impulses is that they fail to underscore the history of capital impelling the conditions of exploitation that these literatures are lamenting, and as such fail to offer a usable vision of redress. For the critic, usable redress should organize around and dramatize class struggles by way of provoking in working peoples a new awareness of their place in the postcolonial capitalist world order. Accordingly, Onoge describes literatures thematizing class struggles as being impelled by a socialist impulse/consciousness. He endorses this consciousness because it allows authors to reimagine the postcolonial African state by dramatizing class struggles, and by using the tensions constitutive of class conflict to mobilize working class people against the neocolonial African state.

Drawing on Onoge’s sociological criticism of African literature and his endorsement of the socialist impulse, the critic Chidi Amuta sees in writing about Biafra an emerging Nigerian national literature that brings the popular concerns of working-class peoples of various ethnicities into the national consciousness. He notes thus: “literary works based on or inspired by the civil war in Nigeria, as well as those that have arisen with the liberation struggles and other anti-imperialist struggles in Africa, represent some of the most important manifestations of the national imperative in African literature” (86). For Amuta, the focus in these writings on working-class experience suggests that the war helped to rid “Nigerian literature of the disturbing infestation of [ethnic] gods and godlings” (93), thus serving as artistic response to national experience of capitalist exploitation foisted by colonialism: “With the receding ethnic base, the sacred groves of ethnic deities are relieved of the unwholesome duty of serving as moral sanctuaries for people who pour libation with beer and imported spirits” (93). Amuta suggests in this quote that the emergent Nigerian war novel focusing on Nigerian working people’s experience has come to remedy the distractions aided by previous ethnic-driven literary works that he regards as complicit in neocolonial capitalist
exploitations of the working people. According to Amuta, this remedy is possible because these war novels have been underpinned by Marxist ideologies that predisposed writers to dramatize the crisis of postcolonial nationhood as based on class struggle.

Insisting on viewing postcolonial violence in terms of class struggle, these critics as well as some writers25 dismiss previous literary works concerned with realities in Nigeria’s postcolony as problematic. According to the critics, these works, the kind Onoge has categorized as driven by nativist and critical-realist consciousness, are problematic because they represent national experience of capitalist exploitation as localized ethnic experiences. Accordingly, as critics like Amuta suggest, many of these writings about the problems of postcolonial nationhood infused with ethnic consciousness contributed to the crisis in Nigeria because they failed to envision the postcolonial state as resting on shared structures of meaning and experience, particularly the shared experiences of working peoples’ impoverishment and suffering across ethnicities. These critics propose that by focusing on class, writers could speak to shared experiences of exploitation and suffering across ethnicities in ways that serve to promote a Nigerian victimization narrative, as opposed to more fragmentary narratives tied to the experience of “other” victims belonging to distinct minority ethnic groups.

The obvious problem with such a view is that it tends to obscure the extent of the chaos brought about by colonialism’s forceful integration of different previously autonomous groups into the colonial state. Dismissing this reality cannot resolve the problems it presents. The suggestion that focusing on certain shared experiences, such as class and gender

25 There are writers whose novels reveal a deliberateness to reimagine the 1966-70 crisis from apparently Marxist perspectives. See, for example, Isidore Okpewho’s *The Last Duty* (1976), Kole Omotoso’s *The Combat* (1972), Festus Iyayi’s *Heroes* (1986), and Ken Saro-Wiwa’s *Sozaboy* (1985). Yet, even in these novels – for example, Okpewho’s *The Last Duty* and Iyayi’s *Heroes* – the subject of genocide is not sacrificed for an entirely class understanding of that past. In part, Okpewho’s novel centres on the genocidist politics informing relationships between Igbo residents and other ethnicities in the then Mid-Western region of Nigeria during the war. Iyayi’s *Heroes* recounts a journalist’s testament to the deliberate and systematic violence directed at Igbo civilians.
injustices, can resolve the problem of ethnic strife in the postcolony is simply false and unrealistic. On the one hand, it tends to assume that experiences of so-called working peoples are the same across ethnicities within the postcolonial state. As several writers show in their novels, many Igbo working people killed in the massacres of 1966 or forced to leave their places of residence in other regions outside the East suffered prejudice and aggression for several reasons, including the fact that they were Igbos and so viewed as an economic threat to other ethnicities. The suffering of Igbo working people contending with postcolonial capitalist exploitation and ethnic prejudice in their region of settlement cannot at the same time serve to advance understanding of the widely shared experiences and other commonalities of Nigerian peoples.

Equally, Igbo writers from the Biafra region have produced the majority of the novels later claimed as Nigerian war novels (Griswold 235). Many of these authors, writing during and after the defeat of Biafra, have used their work to account for their experience as “Biafrans,” as opposed to “Nigerians,” or to account for the intergenerational legacies of that conflict. Some of the older writers wrote or began writing some of these accounts during the heat of the Biafran conflict when Biafran nationalism and the quest for survival prevailed in their imaginations. For example, in her discussion of women’s writing on the violent events of 1966-1970, scholar and writer Akachi Adimora-Ezeigbo observes that no woman outside the Biafra region has yet written a full-length literary work or a memoir centering on the experience (Adimora-Ezeigbo “From the Horse’s Mouth,” 223). However, at the same time she classifies her selection of writings by women who suffered as Biafrans/Igbos as an instance of Nigerian civil war literature. Even so, she never explains how these writings serve or function as specifically “Nigerian” literature.

Like several other critics, Adimora-Ezeigbo’s feminist criticism of Biafra writing takes what arguably are specifically “Biafran” (or, to distil it further, “Igbo”) stories, claiming
them as articulations of an emergent Nigerian national feminist consciousness, one suggestive of writers’ attempts to transcend an ethnic imaginary in favour of one that is more broadly national. This scholarly claim belies, distorts, or misrecognizes the commitments of writers who reject identification with the project of Nigerian nationalism, a cause in the pursuit of which many Igbos/Biafrans lost their lives. One way to understand such scholarly distortions is to consider the question of the audience of this body of literature.

Again, I turn to Coundouriotis. We may consider her attempt in *The People’s Right to the Novel* as one of breaking with critical practices that have always interpreted African writing as directed at Western audiences. For example, Eileen Julien has argued that the implied reader of much African writing is Western. She describes this supposed attribute in African writing as marking what she refers to as “extroverted” literature. The notion of extroverted literature designates African literatures that are essentially addressed to Western audiences located outside of Africa. Coundouriotis uses her reading of African novels to challenge the claim that African writers address Western audiences in their work. For Coundouriotis, African/Nigerian war fiction disrupts this extroverted tradition. She instead moves to explain the specifics of what she views as a set of “introverted” representational practices yielding works directed towards African audiences. Introverted literature speaks to the people within the nations whose traumas are being depicted, and so Coundouriotis views Nigerian war fiction as contributing to efforts to redefine the nation in Africa’s postcolony.

Contrary to Coundouriotis’s claims that Nigerian war fictions are introverted and primarily address Nigerian audiences, I argue first of all against any such dichotomy between introversion and extroversion. For instance, if we consider the possibility that some “Igbo” writers might have considered as their audience Nigerians residing outside the immediate

---

traumatic contexts of the war and genocide, then the claim about an introverted literature gets complicated. By itself, even if we accept hypothetically—because in reality this is far from the case—that the primary audience of such writing consists of members of the Nigerian nation, writing [to] Nigeria will not automatically presuppose introversion since the Nigerian audience in question resides outside the immediate traumatic context of Biafra that informs the writing.

Second, a major problem with seeing Nigerian war fiction as introverted is that doing so conceives of this kind of writing as contributing to the postcolonial nation state’s establishment. This is perhaps one flaw with critical discourses on African war writing in general: its emphasis on the nation and the national project. As I will go on to show, some of the novels Coundouriotis and other critics read as examples of national literature resist any such pigeonholing/localizing. If anything they speak against and beyond the nation.

What changes by imagining that we should approach these so-called “war” novels as instead responses to genocide? By reading these fictions as genocide literature, it becomes possible to problematize sweeping claims that they perform a service for postcolonial Nigeria. The scholarly de-emphasis of the specifically ethnic character of the Biafran conflict in favour of references to broader categories of class and gender identity shifts attention away from the exterminatory character of the violence meted out against those identified as Igbo. By so doing, many critics of this literature ignore questions of genocide and privilege the notion of the shared struggles and plights of oppressed Nigerian peoples generally conceived. In this way too, the peculiar circumstances that condemned a targeted group to destruction in Biafra is presented by these critics as a measure of national class and gender oppression, even when both wealthy and poor Igbos, men as well as women, were targeted for massacres and expulsion across Nigeria. This kind of scholarship demonstrates a general and enduring failure to respond to the Igbo genocide as such in Nigerian and Biafran writing. This is a
significant failure since it obscures links between the traumatic experience of genocide, defeat in war, and an emergent exilic consciousness amongst the defeated that led several writers to appropriate a different, universalizing vocabulary in order to articulate their experience of suffering.

Many of the novels held up by critics as Nigerian war novels barely depict battlefield combat. They are described as war fictions because they are set during the same time period as the Biafra-Nigeria War. Other than that, most of these novels focus on genocidal atrocities perpetrated against civilians, not on military operations per se. The few novels that show military combat are written mainly by soldiers who fought during the war. Examples of this kind of work are I.N.C. Aniebo’s short stories and his novel, Anonymity of Sacrifice (1974), which represents the combat experiences of Biafran soldiers. Other novels that portray significant details of battlefield encounters include Eddie Iroh’s trilogy, Forty-Eight Guns for the General (1976), Toads of War (1979), and (marginally) The Siren in the Night (1982), and also Sebastian Mezu’s Behind the Rising Sun (1971). These novels attempt to imagine the circumstances of war and its toll on combatants and civilians alike. Many of the characters in these works are military personnel, and their narratives revolve around scenarios based on combat experience. The battlefield in these novels provides the basis for their authors’ dramatization of common soldiers’ sacrifice, heroism and their disappointment at the lack of discipline and leadership by those above them.

Most fictional accounts of the 1966-70 Biafran crisis have focused more on the trauma and suffering experienced some distance away from the battlefield. These novels chronicle the trauma of suffering amongst an Igbo civilian population blockaded and shelled endlessly by the Nigerian military, as well as Igbos’ experiences of betrayal, oppression and abuse during the war. To enlist these novels as “civil war novels” without qualification is to take for granted something about the nature of the violence these writers are attempting to
Imagine. While an argument can be made that war fiction may include experiences of suffering unrelated to battlefield encounters, such a view nonetheless still needs to account for categorizing as war literature a sustained literary practice that has consistently focused on atrocities perpetrated against defenceless civilians. If, as Raphael Lemkin explains, genocide is also a kind of war systematically directed against a population in a way that blurs the boundary between combatant and civilian, then any way of conceiving of war fiction needs to account differently for bodies of imaginative writing calling attention to, respectively, aggression against civilians and the violence of the combat experience.

The failure in Biafra scholarship to account for the genocidal character of postcolonial violence has negatively affected cognizance of writers’ attempts to create a vocabulary supple yet probing enough to capture the contradictions inherent in African violence, some of which is exterminationist. This scholarly snub of genocide and its related discourses in and about Biafra has resulted in neglect and misrecognition of certain dominant representational approaches in literatures about that past. As I argue elsewhere in this dissertation, these approaches have depended on, and have been adapted from, the representational and commemorative tropes of the Holocaust.

**Writing Rwandan Genocide: On the Emergence of an African Genocide Canon**


---

27 For a discussion of Twagilimana’s *Manifold Annihilation* as genocide and civil war fiction, see Nicki Hitchcott, “Visions of Civil War and Genocide in Fiction from Rwanda” 152-165.
apparently because the writer completed the book in 1993. Unlike most accounts of the events of April-July, 1994, Twagilimana’s novel concentrates on events leading up to the genocide. His novel highlights the totalitarian conditions and arbitrary violence that were an omnipresent feature of the Rwandan civil war. Twagilimana remains one of the few Rwandan and non-Rwandan writers to write about the civil war. In other words, *Manifold Annihilation* remains one of the only available literary works that addresses the 1990s Rwandan crisis from a perspective of war that provides context for thinking about the prevailing circumstances in the early 1990s prompting the genocide of 1994.

By the time *Manifold Annihilation* appeared in 1996, only a few testimonial and personal accounts of the genocide had been published. Most of the work in print at this time had been reports of investigations into the genocide. The best known of these documentary texts include the influential African Rights reports published in 1995 as *Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance*, reports and investigative documents by Alison Des Forges such as *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*, published in 1999, and *Rwanda: Histoire d’un génocide* [“Rwanda: History of a Genocide”] by Colette Braeckman. In 1997, the first survivor testimony, by Yolande Mukagasana, was published in French under the title, *La Mort ne veut pas de moi* [“Death Does Not Want Me”]. In addition, journalistic reports and other works of non-fiction by writers such as Philip Gourevitch²⁸ and Jean Hatzfeld²⁹ were influential in calling attention to the Rwandan genocide.

Many scholars, however, believe that the event that most crucially shaped artistic responses to the 1994 genocide was a commemorative project from 1998 known as *Rwanda:*
Ecrire par devoir de mémoire [“Rwanda: Writing as Duty to Memory”]. 30 This project was first proposed in 1995 by Chadian writers Nocky Djedanoum and Maimouna Coulibaly, who were the directors of the festival Fest’Africa in Lille, France. According to Boubacar Boris Diop, one of the writers who participated, the project arose out of some African writers’ expression of commitment to write about violent realities occurring on the continent following the 1995 execution of writer and environmental rights activist Ken Saro-Wiwa by the Nigerian military government of Sani Abacha. 31 The writers gathered at the festival thought that it was about time African writers took a more active role in writing about violent events taking place on the continent, particularly the atrocious realities beyond each writer’s national borders. During the discussions at the 1995 Fest’Africa, as Diop recollects, it became apparent to many of the writers that they had mostly failed to write about the genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda, an attempted extermination that Diop considered “one of the greatest tragedies of the twentieth century” (Tadjo, “Interview with Boubacar Boris Diop,” 426).

To remedy this failure, the Fest’Africa directors decided to send ten African writers to bear witness to the Rwandan genocide in order to demonstrate African writers’ ethical commitment to memorialize the tragedy. With the sponsorship of Fondation de France and the French Ministry of Cooperation, as well as with the support of the Rwandan government, participating writers travelled to Rwanda in 1998 to memorialize the genocide in its aftermath and interact with survivors four years after it took place. The guiding objective of the project was to attempt genocide memorialization out of a sense of the writer’s moral duty 32 “to act against forgetting and to express solidarity with the Rwandan people” (Kopf 66).

---

30 In a translated account (by Vera Wülffing-Leckie and Caroline Beschea-Fache) of his experience participating in the project, Boubacar Boris Diop renders the theme as “Rwanda: Writing against Oblivion.” See Diop, Africa Beyond the Mirror 5.
31 See Véronique Tadjo, “Interview with Boubacar Boris Diop” 425–430. See also, Diop, Africa Beyond the Mirror.
32 For a discussion of the project’s theme, see, for example, Audrey Small, “The Duty of Memory: A Solidarity of Voices after the Rwandan Genocide,” Paragraph 30, no. 1 (2007): 85-100.
A central feature in the publications from this project is reference to the Holocaust.\textsuperscript{33} Not only are all these works focused essentially on events that took place in Rwanda between April and July, 1994, the katabatic imagination of the genocide is also prevalent in these writings, perhaps because these writers visited Rwanda as tourist-outsiders. It is remarkable that in the wake of the “Rwanda: Ecrire par devoir de mémoire” project a tremendous amount of cultural and artistic responses to the genocide in Rwanda began to emerge, including films and survivors’ memoirs.\textsuperscript{34}

The Rwanda project was not without its controversies, however. First among its critics were scholars. In response to participants’ framing of the project as a manifestation of their moral duty to remember, critics were quick to question the legitimacy and ideological foundations of a memory project sponsored by the French government, a key player in the genocide. Furthermore, some critics expressed concerns about whose memory would be privileged in the project – that of the writers, survivors, perpetrators, or bystanders. This was not an unreasonable concern given that most of the texts emerging from the Rwanda project


\textsuperscript{34} See, for example, Paul Rusesabagina, and Tom Zoellner, \textit{An Ordinary Man}. See also Immaculée Ilibagiza and Steve Erwin, \textit{Left to Tell: Discovering God Amidst the Rwandan Holocaust}; Esther Mujawo and Souad Belhaddad’s books, \textit{Survivantes} (2004) and its sequel \textit{La Fleur de Stéphanie} (2007), testimonial work on trauma, recovery and reconciliation. See also, Gilbert Gatore, \textit{The Past Ahead}.
were published in France, and their translations generally addressed Western readerships. As Martina Kopf summarizes the anxieties raised about the usefulness of such a project, “in addition to the question, whose memory they transmit and recreate, the question invariably arises, whose memory they nourish and intend to transform. Is it the collective memory of Rwanda, the collective memory of Africa or of an equally vague ‘world public’?” (68).\(^{35}\)

The artists involved were well aware of the problems of the *Rwanda* project and concerned about the contribution it would make to discourse on the Rwanda genocide. In response they attempted to use their writings to foreground these problems. As a result, even given legitimate ethical worries about language, audience, the politics of memory, as well as the choice of style and representational strategies for writing about the genocide, many critics agree that the project was remarkably successful if only because it popularized the genocide and shaped the nature of subsequent discussions about the atrocities that were committed before, during and after the events of 1994. Some scholars thought that the project was significant for at least two major reasons. First, it provided a much-needed “African” perspective on the genocide, one that helped to reclaim the explanatory initiative from journalists and writers from the so-called Global North.\(^{36}\) Second, the project contributed to modifying the ways of thinking and writing about genocide characteristic of the legacy of the Holocaust.\(^{37}\)

In both the Nigerian and Rwandan contexts, literary works and the discourses shaping their interpretation serve to mark certain violent experiences as worth imagining and writing about, and others not. In the case of Nigeria, for example, discussions of writing about the

\(^{35}\) For more on criticisms of the project, see also Véronique Porra, “Y a-t-il une spécificité africaine dans la représentation romanesque de la violence génocidaire?” in Isaac Bazile/Hans-Jürgen Lüsebrink (eds.), *Violences postcoloniales. Représentations littéraires et perceptions médiatiques*, Berlin 2011, 145–163; Audrey Small, “The Duty of Memory: A Solidarity of Voices after the Rwandan Genocide” 85-100.

\(^{36}\) See Alexandre Dauge-Roth, *Writing and Filming the Genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda* 87-166.

\(^{37}\) See, e.g., Kopf, “The Ethics of Fiction.”
massacres of “Igbo” or “Easterners” between 1966-67 and during the war from 1967-70
have tended to focus on war while sidelining the subject of genocide. Likewise, in the case of
Rwanda, literary and critical responses to the Rwandan crisis have concentrated on the
genocide of Tutsis, but not often on the brutal civil war that began in that country around
1990 and which was being fought alongside the genocide that took place in 1994. The basis
of post-1994 Rwandan national trauma, which may be detected in imaginative and critical
writings about the country and its genocide, as well as the Rwandan state’s rules and
regulations governing commemorative activity generally, focus nearly entirely on the deaths
of targeted civilian populations and ignore the suffering experienced on the battlefield.

Unlike in Nigeria, where a genocidal government won the war, the Tutsi-led Rwandan
Patriotic Front (RPF) insurgency defeated the genocidal government in Rwanda, a
development that has contributed in important ways to how the memory of the violent past
has been shaped afterwards. The memory of the war has not served the RPF government well
as the basis for post-1994 Rwandan nationalism, since accounts of the conflict implicate the
RPF in its extreme violence and atrocities.\(^{38}\) Whereas in Nigeria the discourse of genocide
did not gain traction in constructions of a post-war national consciousness,\(^ {39}\) in Rwanda
genocide figured prominently in the new Rwandan national identity. In order to sustain that
consciousness, the Rwandan government of Paul Kagame has systematically repressed the
memory of the long civil war and invested instead in a national imaginary organized around

\(^{38}\) The official Rwandan government narrative of the war often emphasize that the RPF fought the war
to end genocide, a narrative that downplays some of the major political issues leading to the war such as power-
sharing and reallocation of land to displaced Tutsi refugees. See, for example, Filip Reyntjens, “Rwanda, Ten
Years on: From Genocide to Dictatorship. In S. Marysse & F. Reyntjens, eds., 15-47.

\(^{39}\) It is understandable why the war became the organizing condition for national consciousness. The
victims of genocide lost the war. The narrative of their victimization cannot at the same time be the basis of the
national consciousness of their oppressors. Hence, the state represses the narrative of genocide that charges it
with guilt in favour of a war memory that continues to describe that past as victory for Nigerian unity and as the
heroic feat of Nigeria’s military. To date, no significant monuments are erected in any part of the country to
commemorate civilian victims. January 15 of every year is known as Armed Forces Remembrance Day in
Nigeria. The day is used to mark the official surrender of Biafra and kept in honour of “the unknown soldier”
who sacrificed “his” life for Nigeria’s unity.
the memory of the 1994 genocide, which it officially conceives of as an extreme evil, perpetrated almost entirely against the Tutsis, that is on a moral par with the Holocaust.

As a result of this official shaping of Rwanda’s national memory culture, artistic and discursive practices in the country have become heavily invested in the project of genocide representation. Unlike in Nigeria, many of the artists writing about the Rwandan genocide are non-Rwandans. So far, their works have found more traction with audiences outside of Rwanda. In order to address this global audience, a majority of whom are European and North American, many writers have drawn on vocabularies of suffering that are likely to resonate with readers located outside the specific traumatic context of their writing.40

Contrary to Coundouriotis’s claim that “African” writers responding to postcolonial wars and genocide on the continent are writing [to] the nation, we can instead see an attempt in these genocide writings to write beyond the postcolonial and post-genocidal nation-state. If the violent encounters associated with colonialism motivated thinking about independence and the nation, postcolonial violence seems to inspire a radical rejection of the nation, as well as any idea of the nation’s autonomy.

Conclusion

I would like to conclude by briefly summarizing my main aims in this chapter. I have first attempted to make a case for recognizing the corpus of African genocide literature as a distinct genre, the Nigerian and Rwandan variants of which I have worked to contextualize intellectually, aesthetically, and ideologically. Second, I have argued for recognizing

40 The comparison of the genocide in Rwanda to the Holocaust is popular in Rwanda. Just as with the Igbos in Nigeria, colonial literature compared Tutsis to the Jews. Such comparison of Tutsis to the Jews continued before, during and after the genocide of 1994. In post-1994 memorialization of the genocide, the Holocaust is often invoked as the means to think about the genocide in Rwanda. For example, Rwanda’s national genocide memorial in Kigali designed by UK-based AEGIS Trust is not only modelled after the Holocaust museums in the US and Israel, but also reserves a gallery for comparing the genocide in Rwanda to the Nazi genocide of Jews.
genocide literature as an important canon of works that continue to contribute to literary culture in Africa, most notably by playing an influential role in mobilizing humanitarian and empathetic responses to African suffering. Third, I have explained how African genocide literature helps highlight the confluence of impulses and sensibilities shaping atrocity writing in Africa since late colonial times. At the heart of this important confluence lies the Holocaust. I have finally contended that the Holocaust remains an important point of reference for African writers and other artists attempting to make sense of genocides perpetrated in Africa. In ways both positive and negative, productive and distorting, the Nazi genocide has provided writers with the rhetorical and conceptual tools for articulating genocidal suffering in Africa.

The nexus of African traumatic memories and the Holocaust has seriously complicated representations of African genocide. On the one hand, reference to the Holocaust (its history, tropes, and analytical categories) provides those working with and on African genocides with a descriptive toolbox centred on the language of suffering whose utility has already been demonstrated, and whose meanings are widely understood (if not always shared). This toolbox has helped to make African mass atrocities visible and thinkable as genocide. On the other hand, however, the Holocaust has also in various ways overdetermined the explanatory and moral-evaluative frames through which African genocides have been conceived of and responded to in art as well as in the “real” world, such as in discussions of post-conflict reconciliation and redress. I will be considering some of the consequences of this overdetermination in greater detail in subsequent chapters.
Chapter 3

Genocide as a Ritual of Transition: Soyinka’s Tragic Vision of Genocide in Season of Anomy

History is full of failed prometheans [sic] bathing their wounded spirits in the tragic stream.

Destroy the tragic lure! Tragedy is possible solely because of the limitations of the human spirit. There are levels of despair from which, it rightly seems, the human spirit should not recover. To plunge to such a level is to be overwhelmed by the debris of all those anti-human barriers which are erected by jealous gods. The power of recovery is close to acquisition of superhuman energies, and the stagnation-loving human society must for self-preserving interest divert these colossal energies into relatively quiescent channels, for they constitute a force which, used as part of an individual’s equipment in the normal human struggle cannot be resisted by the normal human weapons. […] To ensure that there is no re-assertion of will the poetic snare of tragic loftiness is spread before him—what greater sublimity than the blind oracular figure, what greater end to the quest for self than acceptance, quiescence and senescence! (Soyinka, The Man Died 88)

Introduction

Wole Soyinka notes in his book Myth, Literature and the African World (Myth, subsequently) that the African tragic genre like tragedy elsewhere in the world derives from a state of anguish based on “the fragmentation of essence from self” (145). This fragmentation generally occurs, according to Soyinka, as historical ruptures or catastrophes severing society from its normal state of being (145). The shared or communal experience of historical catastrophe oftentimes threatens the collective psyche of a people, throwing it into a liminal, existential gulf. The tragic genre emerges as a kind of symbolization enacted as a ritual ceremony that society stages in order to navigate this existential gulf and emerge on the other side of the liminal zone with a new social awareness and harmony. In other words, the tragic impulse rendering shared historical experience of catastrophe into tragedy, according to Soyinka, is a symbolized ritual practice of appeasement, a gulf-bridging rite of passage. As such, tragedy as a representational form is a reparative artistic project.
Soyink’a’s theory of tragedy deals with how best to represent catastrophe and transform representation into a reparative practice. Soyinka privileges the tragic form as the suitable representational mode of not only witnessing catastrophe but also dealing with the stress of its traumatic aftermaths. As a ritual of appeasement, tragedy, for Soyinka, demands sacrifice from the artist in order to placate the cosmic forces guarding the existential gulf of history. While it is not clear from Soyinka’s book what these cosmic forces are and why they require constant appeasement, the writer’s theorizing of the tragic impulse he describes as “African” is based on his own interpretation of the Yoruba tragic cosmology. As Soyinka sees it, the Yoruba tragic impulse emphasizes the place and importance of the human realm, a fundamental distinction, according to Soyinka, between this impulse and the Judeo-Christian and Greco-Roman impulses fused in the Western/European tradition that celebrates abstractionism by its fixation on either the heavenly or “chthonic realm” (*Myth* 2-5). The Yoruba tragic impulse, Soyinka contends, may encourage plunging “straight into the ‘chthonic realm’, the seething cauldron of the dark world will and psyche, the transitional yet inchoate matrix of death and becoming” (142). But it also refuses to freeze the tragic process within this liminal gulf. It ascends from the chthonic realm in order to reassert stability and celebrate “the cosmic struggle” of existence (143). However, the Western/European tragic impulse, according to Soyinka, succumbs to the trauma of the abyss, entranced by horror, and becomes unable to bridge the gulf of historical ruptures. Soyinka describes the representational impulse that freezes the tragic process at the zone of horror as a failure of artistic will, symptomatized by artistic incapacity to follow through the tragic ritual to its conclusive end.

Following the massacre of Igbos across Nigeria and the resulting Biafra-Nigeria War between 1966 and 1970, Soyinka’s artistic response to the tragedy of genocide became one of reinserting the message of recovery and regeneration. In doing this he speaks against
hopelessness and what he calls “the tragic lure” (*The Man Died* 88) in post-World War II Western artistic and philosophical responses to catastrophe. More than any of Soyinka’s other writings directly dealing with the atrocities perpetrated by the Nigerian state against Igbos in the late 1960s, his novel *Season of Anomy* (*Season*, subsequently) and his prison memoir *The Man Died* (*Man*, subsequently) articulate this vision of recovery and regeneration. In these texts, Soyinka advocates against cynical attitude to disaster: “Destroy the tragic lure!” (*Man* 88).

The present chapter examines the representation of the 1966-70 crisis in Nigeria in Soyinka’s writing, particularly in his novel, *Season*. I argue that in *Season* Soyinka imagines the crisis as genocide and renders it according to his vision of tragedy as a regenerative process. The writer depicts the atrocities perpetrated by the Nigerian state against the Igbo as a genocide comparable to the German Nazis’ genocide of Jews in Europe. The comparison of Igbo experience to that of Jews serves in Soyinka’s novel as the basis for understanding the crisis as genocide, and for the dramatization of the writer’s tragic vision of genocide in the postcolony. This comparison finds its most articulate portrayal in the novel’s characterization/racialization of victims as a special, chosen breed of “Innocents” murdered because of their distinctive progressive attributes as a racialized cultural group. So represented, victims of genocide present in *Season* as sacrificial scapegoats whose atrocious deaths provide the moral basis for reworking the terms of nationhood in the postcolony.

At the centre of this project of post-genocidal nation-building in *Season*’s story world lies the figure of the artist or the writer. This figure embodies Soyinka’s tragic vision of catastrophe through his performance of witnessing genocide, which he sees as a moral imperative. The artist is the one who through his act of witnessing shapes wider understanding of the tragic aspects of genocidal atrocities, and so he turns witnessing of the sort he can provide into a moral project. Witnessing genocide presents in Soyinka’s novel as
expiatory and the artist witnessing atrocity serves a priestly function since it results in a kind of social cleansing. The novel dramatizes this cleansing/witnessing through the deployment of tragic mythological tropes based on journeys through hell. The recurring theme of this journey is the exercise of will. In *Season*, the artist exercises immense will in forcing himself to tour massacre sites just so that he can witness the horrors therein and demand that society acknowledge its moral failings. Genocide as hell in *Season* typifies senseless acts of torture and murder within a postcolonial African state. The motivation impelling this hell is racism, portrayed in Soyinka’s novel as killers’ sense of hollowness, expressed through their attempt to annihilate the Other as a means of asserting their own existence and identity. In the world of Soyinka’s *Season*, the artist’s task in the hell of genocide must be to help society confront this hell and transcend its liminal condition and resulting anomy1 so as to help society move towards social harmony.

Throughout this chapter, I contend that Soyinka’s tragic vision of genocide in Nigeria is problematic. This tragic vision with its underlying optimism de-historicizes the political conditions of genocide in Nigeria. By so doing, it proffers a rather abstract/metaphysical response to catastrophe and avoids the more challenging demands inherent in advancing a usable historical and political vision of justice in a genocide’s aftermath. A major problem with Soyinka’s portrayal of genocide, I argue, can be found in the representation of genocide victims in *Season*. In the novel, victims of genocide present problematically as a special breed, and as sacrificial objects. While acknowledging that this image of victims in *Season* echoes those found in Holocaust literature, and like them derives from Soyinka’s attempt to

---

1 It is important to note that while the influence of Émile Durkheim’s concept of anomie is present in Soyinka’s, the latter’s (Soyinka’s) particular understanding and depiction of the concept differs slightly. In his 1897 book *Suicide*, Durkheim uses “anomie” to describe a breakdown of social norms leading to abandonment of self-regulatory morals. Anomie, for Durkheim, manifests as a structure of everyday life and is symptomatic of individual self-destruction, or what Durkheim describes as “anomic suicide.” In Soyinka’s particular delineation of the concept in *Season* and in some of his other works such as the play, *Madmen and Specialists*, anomie functions in such limit cases as war and genocide, and is symptomatic not only of suicide as Durkheim would have it but of genocide and the destruction of social conscience.
find moral and political purpose for the mass deaths of Igbos, I instead read Soyinka’s Season as complicit in a political culture of ethnic/racial essentialism in Nigeria that enabled the genocide in the first place. Even more consequential, the portrayal of genocide victims as sacrificial objects enlists victims as a means of atonement, and so they become thinkable as a crucial prerequisite for the harmony of their killers. This view coincides with the killers’ rationale for murder, and further inhibits clear thinking about justice in genocide’s aftermath. These problems, as I will show subsequently, underscore the failures of the tragic genre, as exemplified in Soyinka’s writing, to provide an adequate representational form for writing about African genocide. The reason for these failures, at least in Season, is the genre’s valorization of sacrifice, its fatalism, and its dependence on heroism in attempts to represent genocide. These flawed elements of Soyinka’s tragic vision have consequences not just for victim representations but also for representations of women.

The overall aim of this chapter is to locate Soyinka’s Season in a particular historical moment in the evolution of the postcolonial African genocide fiction, one recognizable through the novel’s appropriation of the conventional forms of tragedy as a fitting artistic form for witnessing genocide. I will provide context needed in order to understand the contributions of Soyinka’s Season to genocide fiction in Africa’s postcolony. I argue that Soyinka’s artistic and moral vision of genocide is influenced by representations of the Holocaust, and I will show how this influence manifests itself in his artistic responses to the late-1960s crisis in Nigeria. My argument will unfold in the broader context of an analysis of Season’s tragic vision of genocide, which I claim is a dramatization of atrocity witnessing as a journey through hell, while stressing the flaws and limits of Soyinka’s tragic vision of genocide in Nigeria.
Context

Soyinka is one of the most important figures to emerge from the turbulent events of 1960s Nigeria. His remarkable activism at the time turned him into an international figure of renown. He insistent advocated that African writers should play an active part in the political realities of their societies, remarking thus at a Stockholm Conference in 1967 (a few months before his arrest by the Nigerian military): “The artist has always functioned in African society as the record of the mores and experience of his society and as the voice of vision in his own time. It is time for him to respond to this essence of himself” (“The Writer in a Modern African State” 21; original emphasis). As the genocide of Igbos across Northern and Western Nigeria broke out in May 1966 following military coups in the country, Soyinka was among a few non-Igbo citizens who publicly condemned the atrocities. Soyinka was unequivocal in calling the atrocities genocide. In Man, he describes the massacre of Igbos in the North as “ATROCITIES” (119; emphasis in original) and as a “holocaust” (165) “on a scale so vast and so thorough, and so well-organized that it was variously referred to as the Major Massacres (as distinct from the May rehearsals), genocide, and sometimes only as disturbances and – this gem is by Ukpabi Asika – a state of anomy!” (119).

Soyinka writes in his prison memoir of his shock during a 1966 visit to Northern Nigeria as part of his effort to mobilize colleagues in the region against violence when he realized that many of them were complicit in the planning, organization and execution of Igbo massacres in the region (Man 164-69). During this visit, the writer chanced upon a document circulating that called for the extermination of Igbos: “It was an open, inflammatory call for a Jihad against the ‘yamirin’ [Hausa pejorative for Igbos, literally meaning water-beggars/seekers]. It called teachers to keep their schools closed, parents to keep their children at home and all true natives of the soil to stay within doors until ‘we have wreaked our will on the southern infidels’” (Man 167). For Soyinka, the genocide of Igbos in
the North, at least, was well planned and served as a pretext for certain Nigerian political elites to shore up political power, concentrating it to themselves by scapegoating a vulnerable group in their region (Man 107-9).

In August of 1967, the Federal Military Government of Nigeria under Lieutenant-Colonel Yakubu Gowon arrested Soyinka on allegations of espionage for Biafra. By this time, war had broken out between Nigeria and the newly declared sovereign state of Biafra. The former Eastern region of the country had declared its independence from Nigeria on May 30, 1967, in response to the killings of Igbos living outside the East. It had renamed itself the sovereign state of Biafra. Soyinka travelled to meet with Lieutenant-Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, the military head of Biafra, and other influential people on the Biafran side, including the Yoruba military commander of a Biafran regiment, Major Victor Banjo. According to Soyinka, a third force, more like a peacekeeping force, was required to be put in place in order to broker peace between the two warring sides (Man 47-56; Soyinka, You Must Set Forth at Dawn 99-122). He considered his mission to be primarily concerned with negotiating such a third force (real or symbolic) into existence, and thus to creating conditions suitable to brokering peace between the warring parties.

Soyinka’s incarceration triggered protests internationally, and he became one of Amnesty International’s prisoners of conscience.² The Nigerian military government refused to release him notwithstanding pressure from different international groups. In his prison memoir, Soyinka writes about the government’s plans to murder him in prison, his experience of torture, and his suffering from solitary confinement in Kaduna prison. The government held him in different prisons for twenty-seven months between August 1967 and

---

Following his release in October of 1969, Soyinka began publishing work on his traumatic prison encounters, including some of the ideas he had developed while in prison. Much has been said about how his prison experience influenced his perspective on art and society from the 1970s on. What is not generally discussed is Soyinka’s preoccupation with genocide following the commission of atrocities in Nigeria in the late 1960s. Even criticism of his post-1970 writing has essentially ignored the subject of genocide in his work. Instead, many of these studies focus on the ideological implications of what is believed to be Soyinka’s complex aesthetics, his articulation of his commitment to freedom, and his mythologized visions of tragedy. The latter is particularly relevant to my reading of Season, which I take to be a novel preoccupied with genocide and its representation.

Season, first published in 1973, is one of several works by Soyinka that responds directly to the genocide of Igbos in Nigeria. His earliest writings on the atrocities and on his experience of imprisonment began to emerge late in 1969 in Poems from Prison, a collection of poems he managed to smuggle out from prison to friends. From 1971 onwards, a number

---

3 See, e.g., C. Tighe, “In Detentio Preventione in Aeternum: Soyinka’s A Shuttle in the Crypt” in Critical Perspectives on Wole Soyinka, ed. James Gibbs (London: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 186-197. In this essay, Tighe among other things makes a passing connection between Soyinka’s A Shuttle in the Crypt as well as The Man Died and Holocaust writings by Hannah Arendt, Peter Weiss, and Arthur Koestler.

of his works began to appear: *Before the Blackout*, the play *Madmen and Specialists* (1971), his prison memoir *The Man Died* (1972), and the collection of poems, *A Shuttle in the Crypt* (1972). Several critics of these works describe them as cynical, pessimistic and nightmarish, and as providing an outlook on Soyinka’s traumatic prison experience. Yet, in these criticisms there is no significant acknowledgment of the writer’s focus on genocide, nor is there evidence of any attempt being made to trace the influence of the Holocaust on Soyinka’s way of writing about the Nigerian crisis.

Such influence is demonstrable. For example, in *The Man Died*, Soyinka remarks on his conviction that what the Nigerian state did to the Igbo was genocide, a view strongly shaped by his fascination with Hannah Arendt’s writing on the banality of evil. He writes, “For nearly six weeks I have lived in close company with two products of what Hannah Arendt (Eichmann in Jerusalem) described by that strange expression—the banality of evil” (20). The “company” Soyinka refers to here is a group of two soldiers, Ambrose Okpe and Gani Bidan, who murdered an Igbo photographer, Emmanuel Ogbona. Following international media outcry, the government staged the semblance of a justice process by arresting and imprisoning the two soldiers. Soyinka observes the regal and heroic treatment given to the soldiers prior to their eventual acquittal and during their short stay in the same prison where he too was being held. Drawing on Arendt’s thought about evil’s banality, which he views as the authorization and normalization of malevolence and immorality, Soyinka concludes that genocide and a state of anomy are “what happens to human beings and to a nation when any group within that nation is tacitly declared to be outside the law’s

---

protection and is fair game for any man with the slightest grudge of fanatical inclination that turns to homicide” (20-1). This state of anomy in Nigeria, according to Soyinka, is similar to Nazi atrocities against Jews in Europe based on the Nigerian military government authorization making normal the murder of a target group (Igbos). In such a situation of anomy in which there is no legal consequence for violence done to an outlawed group, even humanists can easily transform into pathological killers. Soyinka depicts the nature of this pattern of transformation in his absurd play, *Madmen and Specialists* (*Madmen*, subsequently).

*Madmen* dramatizes a series of absurd events in which a doctor transforms into a pathological killer during the course of a war, events culminating in his killing of his own father. The play’s hero, Dr. Bero, resembles the cynical Doctor in Rolf Hochhuth’s 1963 play on Nazi genocides, *The Deputy*. Hochhuth’s Doctor is a dramatic portrayal of the notorious Nazi doctor Josef Mengele, the so-called “Angel of Death.” In *Season*, a similar doctor character, this time Lebanese, is present as a figure of cynicism and degeneracy before the artist-hero of the story uses words to heal him. The circumstances surrounding the transformation of a specialist sworn to protect human life into a pathological murderer preoccupies some of Soyinka’s writings on the 1966-70 catastrophe.

According to Soyinka, social anomy results from the corrupting influence of absolute power as it may be found accreted in fascist regimes (*Man* 107-10). In *Man*, Soyinka shows the condition of human degeneracy, in this case the degeneration of the intellect because of tyrannical power’s onslaught. This degeneracy – in part based on the traumatic condition of imprisonment, solitude and torture from denial of access to books and other intellectual resources – manifests in Soyinka’s memoir as an attempt by fascistic power to suppress the intellect. As Soyinka posits in this memoir, a vibrant intellect may serve as a bulwark against the idiocies inherent in fascism and absolutism. This helps to explain fascism’s violence
against intellectual structures and members of the thinking and creative classes. In the face of fascism’s assault on the intellect and intellectuals, too often the writer capitulates and descends into silence or cynicism. As he puts it in his famous statement: “the man dies in all who keep silent in the face of tyranny” (*Man* 13).

Contrary to claims by some critics that Soyinka’s *Madmen, Man* and his other writings dealing with the late 1960s crisis and war in Nigeria present a rather bleak view of life (see, e.g., Tighe), I contend that the cautious, revolutionary optimism of the writer’s statement against cynicism is central to his writings on the crisis. This revolutionary optimism undergirds the project of Soyinka’s tragic vision, as I will show subsequently through an extensive discussion of *Season*. The central anxiety in Soyinka’s work of the 1970s responding to the atrocities in Nigeria raises the question of how artists can resist the force of cynicism wrought by catastrophe. With what vocabulary can the writer speak and articulate the horrors of genocide to an indifferent world and to a society implicated in the commission of its crimes?

Soyinka’s 1972 poetry collection, *A Shuttle in the Crypt*, depicts a remarkable attempt to find such a vocabulary through portrayal of attempts not only to speak against cynicism but also to offer a vision of regeneration. This vision comes from deep self-meditation. Like *Man, Shuttle* is a poet’s expression of a will to survive in which survival depends entirely on the poet-hero’s acute resort to egotistic assertion of the will (Tighe 187-189). The “shuttle in the crypt” of a debased world is the poet’s vision of his soul-searching, and of his wanderings in the abyss of death. He refuses to allow his imagination to be entranced by a fascination with horror. His emergence from this crypt signifies an assertion of the intention to transcend the horrors of hell, and so his survival. The motif of a descent into hell is central not only to this poetry collection but to all of Soyinka’s writings on the catastrophic events in late 1960s Nigeria, particularly in *Season* (as I shall argue below). It is through the trope of a descent
into hell – his katabatic tragic paradigm – that Soyinka delineates his tragic visions of the cosmic violence of genocide and the role of the artist following such failures of humanity.

The Tragic Vision of Genocide in Season of Anomy

Season is set in a fictional country called Aiyétómò that resembles Nigeria, a setting that affords the writer license to project ideas and advance his views on incidents leading to and during the genocide. The critic Willfried F. Feuser notes that this use of fiction in Season is Soyinka’s attempt to stylize “history into myth” in order to free himself from the “material fatigue of history and the humdrum events of a calendar-type chronology” that was normative practice of writing the crisis in the early 1970s (146). In Season, Ofeyi, a Promotions Officer working for a corrupt Cocoa Corporation, rebels against the corporation after experiencing a cultural epiphany during his encounter with the communal ethos of Aiyéró, a cocoa community not bound by “the shackles of memory” like its mother country Aiyétómò (9).

The Cocoa Corporation is run by a cartel of regressive and corrupt individuals who represent a neocolonial capitalist regime and a corrupt postcolonial government. Before his rebellion, Ofeyi and his “woman” Iriyise have been helping to promote the Corporation’s deceitful business, which robs the people of their community’s common wealth.

Tension with the Corporation arises after Ofeyi’s and Iriyise’s transformative encounters at Aiyéró. Turning dissident, Ofeyi uses the cartel’s propaganda machinery that he oversees to spread Aiyéró’s communal, anti-capitalist values of progress and egalitarianism by way of revealing the Corporation’s lies to the people: “Ofeyi envisioned the parallel progress of the new idea, the birth of the new man from the same germ as the cocoa seed, the Aiyéró ideal disseminated with the same powerful propaganda machine of the Cartel throughout the land” (19). Ofeyi sees in Aiyéró men the perpetuation of indelible communalist values and resourcefulness. To begin evangelizing about Aiyéró values, he
“plants” Aiyéró men across the country and has them lead other communities towards acceptance of their progressive worldview. Confronted with an impending revolution due to the spread of Aiyéró’s communitarian values, the corrupt cartel moves quickly to attack the Aiyéró. Fearing that the Aiyéró have influenced the Aiyétómò population unduly much, the cartel launches a violent campaign of calumny, scapegoating the Aiyéró and representing them as a plague in need of a final solution. Soon after, bloodthirsty groups in Aiyétómò begin hunting down any Aiyéró person in sight. Aiyéró people become the scapegoats required to secure the cartel’s grip on power. During the course of this genocidal outburst against the Aiyéró, the cartel kidnapped Iriyise, detaining her in a place called Temoko prison, which is described in the novel as a wasteland that resembles Dante’s vision of hell in his Inferno. The kidnapping of Iriyise sets Ofeyi on a journey into Temoko to retrieve his woman, a narrative device paralleling the plot of Season, which likewise gestures towards the myth of Orpheus’s journey to the underworld in order to recover his dead wife, Eurydice.

Soyinka uses his retelling of the Orpheus myth in Season to parallel historical events in the 1960s Nigeria. In Season, the Aiyéró as the antithesis of corrupt greed that the cartel stands for represent a popular and stereotypical idea in Nigeria of Igbos as egalitarian, resourceful and progressive (see, e.g., Anthony 41-61). Season shows the genocide as propelled by a confluence of corrupt capitalist greed and fascist power mongering aiming to eliminate the challenge to the status quo represented by the egalitarian and progressive values of the Aiyéró. Accordingly, Soyinka represents victims of genocide in Season as embodying an ontological cultural trait of egalitarian and communitarian values. This ontologized cultural trait poses a threat to the cartel’s fascist regime, and the seriousness of this threat may be correlated to the level of violence perpetrated against the Aiyéró. It is worth noting that this way of representing genocide victims is complicit in the ideology of cultural and identity essentialism that lies at the heart of violent conflict in Nigeria through to the present.
day. According to the logic of such essentialist thinking, Igbos represent modernity and progress, which is conceived of in stark contrast to an image of Northern Nigeria as conservative and backward (see, e.g., Anthony 41-61).

Soyinka’s depiction of the Aiyéró as victims of genocide reveals a rather conventional way of thinking about groups as possessing certain indelible cultural traits. Since the genocidal impulse, as genocide scholars like Paul Boghossian (74) have noted, targets not just the individual members of a group but also the things (beliefs, practices, rituals, etc.) that make a group what it is, culture is often a core target of genocide. As James Waller explains, group racialization in the context of genocide usually coincides with the inability or refusal of perpetrator groups to imagine victims distinctly as humans outside of the ontologies of the latter’s biological and cultural characteristics (196-220). Such imagined ontologies often become the premise on which group elimination finds validation. In Season, Soyinka conceives Igbo victims of genocide as carriers and proselytizers of indelible cultural traits, reinforcing the very same ethnic stereotypes of Igboness in Nigeria that many Igbos as well as the Biafran military government believed to constitute the reason for the genocide. Through its depiction of the Aiyéró, Soyinka’s Season endorses rather than deconstructs this essentialist imagination of Igbo identity for which the Igbo fell prey to genocide in the first place. By characterizing victims in terms suggestive of a cultural ontology that is uncorrupted by neocolonial capitalism and fascism, Season fails to account for the specific historical context of colonialism that gave vent to such racialized thinking about nativist cultural ideals as emblematic of alternative visions of progress and modernity.

Even more problematic, Season suggests that victims have been massacred because they are attempting to proselytize a liberating cultural ethos that can salvage the country from corruption. Following the January 1966 military coup led by five majors, four of whom were Igbo, aggrieved groups in Nigeria branded the coup as an Igbo attempt to secure their group’s
hegemony in the country (Uzoigwe, *Visions of Nationhood* 65-121). While historians of that past have variously shown this claim to be false (Uzoigwe, *Visions* 65-121), it served as a pretext by providing “epistemic conditions” (Eze, “Epistemic Conditions” 115-29) for the genocide of Igbo living outside the former Eastern Region. The representation of Igbo in *Season* as proselytizers of a liberating cultural ideal fits Nigerian genocide perpetrators’ justification for eliminating Igbo whom they considered as attempting to dominate other Nigerian groups and establish the Igbo as the new master race in the country.\(^6\) This image of the victim as embodying threatening cultural traits for which the agents of death are seeking to eliminate him or her is problematic because it not only enlists victims as contributors to their own victimization but also aligns with thinking that blames victims for possessing indelible and problematic traits that condemn them to elimination. While perpetrators of genocide oftentimes imagine their victims as an offending essence to be exterminated, *Season* does not dramatize victims’ ontology as deriving from killers’ imagination. Rather, in Soyinka’s novel, victims do actually possess such an essence.

The essentialist imagination of genocide victims in *Season* is particularly a product of Soyinka’s relation of genocide in Nigeria to the Nazis’ genocide of the Jews in Europe. In *Season*, Soyinka designates the killing of victims as “the Massacre of the Innocents” that is evocative of “biblical horrors” (48). As James Waller explains, the discourse on Nazi genocide of Jews triggered consideration of genocide as an extraordinary violent phenomenon signifying pure evil (13). The victims of such outbursts of pure evil cannot but be innocents and killers must be embodiments of evil (Waller 13-19). As pure evil, genocide becomes conceived as an extraordinary phenomenon, one driven by an extremely violent

\(^6\) For more on this point, see, e.g., Achebe, *There Was a Country* 74-83; Uzoigwe, *Visions of Nationhood* 65-121; Adebanwi, “Confronting the Challenges of Nationhood in Pre-Biafran Texts” 130-65.
ideology; its perpetrators are “mad,” psychopathic aggressors, and its victims are innocent (Waller 33-53; 59-91; 98-127).

Imagining genocide victims as innocents also intersects with the tragic form’s emphasis on and valorization of sacrifice. In conventional tragic paradigms, among the Yoruba, the scapegoat has to be innocent to be useful as a means for communal atonement and for mediating social transition. As Carl Jaspers states, “Transition is the zone of tragedy” (qtd. in Eagleton, Sweet Violence 143). As a site of transition, tragedy offers opportunities “for collective pondering of moral questions to arrive at a rational conclusion” (Eagleton 143). In Season, Soyinka portrays what the narrator calls “The Massacre of the Innocents” (48, 110) as an inevitable ritual sacrifice of Aiyétómò’s historical transition. The sacrificial scapegoats (Aiyéró victims) are the atoning objects aiding this transition. They are atoning not for their own sins, but for “the crime of existence itself” (Eagleton 143). Their sacrificial atonement is therefore justified for the sake of their country.

Besides its problematic representation of victims as embodying some kind of a cultural essence, Season does not depict genocide as the consequence of some primordial hatred between the Aiyéró and the Aiyétómò. Instead, genocide results from a situation of anomy comprising a suspension of moral and social values instigated by greed and fascism. The consequence of genocide is that it numbs people’s moral awareness and recognition of wrongdoing. Rather than just confront their moral failings, they oftentimes resort to denial, as such when transforming into steadfast justifiers of impunity. For Soyinka, the winner of this state of anomy and the destruction of collective moral will is the corrupt multinational cartel. The defeat of this commercial entity can only be made to happen when society musters enough will and courage to confront its guilt and dedicate itself to transcending its anomy. The artist’s task is therefore to help society confront this guilt by witnessing it and showing society what its transcendence looks like, and entails. In Season, Ofeyi’s quest to recover
Iriyise from the genocide-induced hell of Temoko becomes a metaphorical dramatization of this artistic task.

From the point of Ofeyi’s sojourn to Temoko in the novel, the story takes on the form of a hero’s traumatic, hazardous, rescue mission into a postcolonial hell in search of the regenerative spirit of a beaten and complacent people symbolized by Iriyise. The experience of hell is such that can strengthen the subject or traumatize him by his infernal encounters. Ofeyi succeeds in this rescue mission by rescuing not only Iriyise’s comatose body but also by winning over the guardians of hell as new converts to Aiyéró revolution. The circumstances informing his successful quest underscore Soyinka’s overall reparative tragic vision. Hell in Season is the site of genocide. Soyinka’s tragic vision of genocide develops along Ofeyi’s heroic adventure into hell – that is, into the site of genocide – in search of Iriyise. This quest revolves around a narrative of regeneration symbolized throughout the story using images of seasonal cycles of birth, death and regeneration.

Importantly, the naturalist aesthetics deployed by Soyinka in his portrayal of the environment and of Iriyise as a symbol of regeneration aligns with the sexual and vegetal imagery underpinning the novel’s plot. Season contains five sections each entitled as follows: “Seminal,” “Buds,” “Tentacles,” “Harvest,” and “Spores.” The vegetal and seasonal imagery of these titles underscores the theme of a regenerative cycle that is central to Soyinka’s tragic vision. Each of these sections dramatizes the stages in a society’s cycles presented in terms suggestive both of a farming cycle and of a woman’s menstrual cycle. In Season, Soyinka depicts Ofeyi as resembling a farmer and a husband in the struggle to plant and cultivate his “seed.” At once, Iriyise’s body becomes a metaphor for the nation/land that goes terribly bad in a season of anomy, one that the artist (in Ofeyi) must repair. “Seminal” is the time of sowing, when Ofeyi encounters the values of Aiyéró and like a farmer sows these values into his “land.” This is also the time Iriyise’s figure transforms in the story into a mystical, radiant
embodiment of social renewal (16). The Aiyéró values Ofeyi sows represent progressive ideals whose budding in the larger society present symbolically in Iriyise’s transformation into a goddess of choreography (32-83). As Ofeyi’s seeds begin to develop into ideological tentacles in society, the corrupt neocolonial, capitalist and fascistic postcolonial government fights back. Ofeyi finds that as he spreads his adopted Aiyéró values in society, the cartel also spreads its own corrupt seeds. Where Ofeyi’s seeds grow as a challenge to the cartel’s corruption, the cartel’s corrupt seeds, like weeds, develop into a genocide-driven ideological tentacles, killing off Ofeyi’s good seeds, ostensibly leading to “the Massacre of the Innocents” (48). The cartel’s abduction and “rape” of Iriyise underscores its corrupting work against Ofeyi’s. Ofeyi recognizes that his failures as an artist-farmer to confront the cartel’s atrocious seeds early on inexorably lead to catastrophe. As a result, he throws himself into ensuring he redresses his earlier failings by witnessing this catastrophe for society. The time of “harvest” is, therefore, necessary to ensure Ofeyi rescues the surviving Aiyéró seed from rotting in the soil. Harvest time is when Ofeyi confronts the atrocities wrought by the cartel. Besides rescuing those of his Aiyéró seeds that have survived (that is, he retrieves Iriyise from hell), Ofeyi has to “harvest” and bury properly the corpses that have been sown in mass graves and massacre sites. He “harvests” these corpses by artistically witnessing them, by courageously confronting them, and by refusing to succumb to defeat. Inscribing meaning and purpose for these deaths becomes, metaphorically speaking, a means of providing a proper burial. Like resilient spores, the artist’s regenerative voice must be strong in order to succeed when confronting the atrocious consequences of anomy. Soyinka uses Ofeyi’s successful heroic quest to retrieve Iriyise (society’s regenerative spirit) in order to dramatize this cycle of resilient regeneration following genocide.

Yet this tragic vision of regeneration is problematic on several scores beginning with the writer’s representation of Iriyise. In her influential 1990 essay, “Periodic Embodiments: A
Ubiquitous Trope in African Men’s Writing,” Florence Stratton observes that several postcolonial African male writers often appropriate the figure of the “African” woman as all that is ideal in Africa’s past (as seen in many Negritude writings) or as a mark of rape and plundering by colonial and postcolonial powers. For Stratton, the undercurrent in these male, seemingly emancipatory dispositions to the condition of African experience, represented through symbolized womanhood, is such that the African male writer sets himself up as the creative, active agent against a passive and romanticized female object. In these men’s writing, often in response to critical historical interfaces in national history, the woman is reified as the figure of innocent or disfigured nationhood. In this way of imagining womanhood, women’s creativity and active participation in history remain excluded from national discourse. As Season depicts them, women are symbols of a kind of national coma that the male writer-activist must work to dispel.7

Stratton goes further to show how in Season Soyinka appropriates the woman’s body in Iriyise as the national soil on which the visionary male writer must inseminate his redemptive vision. There is a vexed link in Soyinka’s story, according to Stratton, between male creativity and the woman’s body. At one point in the story, after gazing upon Iriyise’s dancing body Ofeyi muses about the result that comes from a union between a man’s creative vision and a woman’s body: “Vision is eternally of man’s own creating. The woman’s acceptance, her collaboration in man’s vision of life results time and time again in just such periodic embodiments of earth and ideal” (82). Noting the implications for women of the “African” male writer’s vision of the woman’s body, Stratton remarks of Soyinka’s representation of womanhood in Season that

---
7 A similar symbolization of “African” womanhood can be found in Gil Courtemanche’s novel on the Rwandan genocide, A Sunday at the Pool in Kigali. See Chapter 5 of the dissertation.
“Man’s vision” in this text is of national re-vision, of the redemption of the nation from the prevailing “season of anomy” by a transformation in the construction of nationhood from an ideology predicated on tyranny and exploitation to one engendering freedom. Woman’s collaborative role is to embody that vision. As one of “such periodic embodiments,” Iriyise is “earth and ideal,” prostitute and virgin […]. She is thus an embodiment of the nation both as it has been degraded, tainted, corrupted, prostituted – down through the ages, and as it is re-envisioned by man (Soyinka-Ofeyi) – a kind of virgin land. (141)

I agree with Stratton’s analysis, and note that themes of fertility and impotence, virginity and prostitution, honour and cowardice pervade the atmosphere of Season in ways that reduce specific conditions of violence to gendered metaphors and symbols. In its symbolic use of the woman as the figuration of the nation, the corpus of the (male) writer must inseminate with visions of post-traumatic healing and recovery the woman’s body. In this way, the male writer presents as a hero in a struggle to rescue his land (woman), an honourable quest for which he is ready to make the ultimate sacrifice. Season through its hell mythemes (described in more details in the next section) presents Ofeyi’s rescue narrative of his woman as the struggle of man striving to regain his honour. Ofeyi’s quest to rescue Iriyise is also a hero’s refusal to succumb to shame and dishonour resulting from the kidnap of his woman. The hell myths on which the narrative of Ofeyi’s quest is based in the novel derive from masculinist traditions that represent men as heroes and women as objects of men’s will, or, as is sometimes dramatized in Season, as the instigators of male rebellion (219). For example, Demakin – one of Ofeyi’s companions in the course of his quest – describes Iriyise as “a Chantal, a Deborah, torch and standard-bearer, super-mistress of universal insurgency” (219); that is, for Demakin Iriyise is the instigator of Ofeyi’s resilient and revolutionary mission.
This way of using women’s condition (as well as, we should add, the disfigured victims of genocide) as a metaphor raises questions about whether Soyinka’s primary interest “really [lies] in exposing the injustices done to women” and victim groups, or else in the convenience of artistic symbolization (Stratton 153). The masculinist tropes undergirding Season’s narrative serve the male interests to the detriment of women in part because, according to Stratton, they signal “a gendered theory of nationhood and of writing, one that excludes women from the creative production of the national polity, of identity, and of literary texts” (152). It is perhaps no wonder then that a node of tension in representations of the genocide of Igbos in Nigeria continues to generate significant conversation along gendered lines.

Genocide as Hell

The literary critic Stanley Macebuh identifies the mythic imagination as a central thread in Soyinka’s writing. The mythic, according to Macebuh, embodies Soyinka’s way of rethinking modern experience by rewriting mythical models of the past. While acknowledging the centrality of myth in his writings, several of Soyinka’s critics have dismissed his use of myths as romantic and nativist because, for them, his mythical approach emphasizes “imagination and emotion tending to irrationalism” (Hunt 67), “valorises myth over the demands of language” (Gurnah 79), and generally offers a glib view of “individual regeneration through the enactment of ancient ritual” (Cooper 22). Some other critics see Soyinka’s use of myth in his writing as offering acute insight and philosophical depth to African socio-political realities (Gagiano 130). In both strands of criticism there is no acknowledgment of the extent of the Holocaust’s influence on Soyinka’s use of myths in his writing dealing with the 1960s

---

8 On this topic, see my discussion of Chimamanda Adichie’s Half of a Yellow Sun in Chapter 6 of the dissertation.
crisis in Nigeria. While I agree with the former critics that Soyinka’s valorization of myth is oftentimes problematic, I, like Annie Gagiano, do not agree that Soyinka’s use of myth is escapist and non-viable. I find the deployment of myth in *Season*, albeit very problematically, to be motivated by Soyinka’s articulation of political radicalism as a weapon against fascism and repression.

Soyinka appropriates mythologies from diverse cultures including Greco-Roman, Judeo-Christian, and Yoruba traditions. These myths constitute some of the essential components of the narration in *Season*. The myths Soyinka deploys in *Season* reveal his preoccupation with themes addressing the role of art following catastrophe and in particular genocide. It is therefore important to identify the myths central in Soyinka’s imagination of the genocide of Igbos in Nigeria. There are at least three dominant mythemes underlying the narrative of *Season*: A confluence of the Orpheus myth and Dante’s myth of the Inferno, and the Yoruba Ogun myth. These three myths are descent narratives showing the artistic project of *Season* as based on the katabatic imagination. The hell iconography in Soyinka’s imagining of genocide is influenced by Holocaust discourse of the 1950s and 60s that significantly uses the idea of hell to explain Western modern experience and the evils of Nazism.

In her study *Hell in Contemporary Literature*, Rachel Falconer shows how the descent narrative or the katabatic trope prevails in post-1945 Western literature. Although the katabatic narrative has fascinated ancient poets in different parts of the world, Falconer observes that the descent into hell trope found a new relevance when deployed as a response to the experiences of war and atrocity following World War II (4; 25-31).¹ Even prior to 1945, according to Falconer, Western modernist writers such as Joseph Conrad and T. S.

---

¹ See also Chapters 3 and 4 of *Hell in Contemporary Literature* devoted to discussing representations of the Holocaust as Hell).
Eliot found the katabatic narrative a useful paradigm for meditating upon the conditions of modern existence (27-28). The trope, however, occupied a central place in post-1945 writing regarding military and Nazi atrocities. For example, in Primo Levi’s 1947 Auschwitz memoir *If This Is a Man* (or *Survival in Auschwitz*), the Auschwitz camp is described explicitly as a kind of hell: “This is hell. Today, in our times, hell must be like this,” Levi writes (*Survival in Auschwitz* 22).

Similarly, in related lectures that the critic George Steiner gave in the 1960s which were later incorporated into his book *In Bluebeard’s Castle* (1971), Steiner attributes the cause of the Holocaust and Western totalitarian violence to the loss of belief in heaven and hell in the Western mind. Steiner writes, “the mutation of Hell into metaphor left a formidable gap in the co-ordinates of location, of psychological recognition in the Western mind” (48). This “formidable gap,” according to Steiner, is what Western totalitarian state has attempted to bridge by recreating these metaphysical realms on earth. However, of the two metaphysical realms, “Hell proved the easier to recreate” (48). Steiner links the Nazi death camps and ancient Western conceptions of hell, noting thus: “the concentration and death camps of the twentieth century, wherever they exist, under whatever regime, are *Hell made immanent*. They are the transference of Hell from below the earth to its surface” (47; original emphasis).¹⁰ Steiner’s claim about hell’s immanence in modern Western history was not unpopular, at least among Holocaust survivors, as several Holocaust memoirs reveal (Falconer 16-17).

That Western iconographies of hell found a central place in Soyinka’s artistic responses to genocide in Nigeria is not particularly a coincidence. Soyinka uses this trope not only as a fitting artistic response to the demands of witnessing genocidal atrocities in Nigeria,

---

but also in order to respond to Western sentiments, such as Steiner’s, that have described modern history as the dawn of hell. In *Season*, Soyinka rewrites the hell myth by staging it in Africa’s postcolony and creating an “African” artist to witness it. He absorbs this narrative encounter with hell into his own tragic visions of regeneration.

According to Anne Whitehead, Virgil’s version of the Orpheus myth is popular in Western descent narratives and appears to be the version Soyinka draws on for *Season* (16), even though the contours of hell in *Season* also evokes the hell of Dante’s *Inferno*. In Virgil’s story, Orpheus loses his wife Eurydice to death and an afterlife in Hades through a snakebite. Grief-stricken, he embarks on an impossible journey to the underworld to try and bring Eurydice back to life. Orpheus wins over the guardians of the underworld with his songs and they agree to return Eurydice to life under one condition: that Orpheus never looks back as he exits the Underworld. Orpheus fails this test and loses Eurydice a second time. Because of his failure, Orpheus himself is killed and claimed by the underworld, wherein he finally reunites with Eurydice.

---

11 In *Myth*, Soyinka dismisses Steiner’s cynical view in *The Death of Tragedy* regarding the irrelevance and inadequacy of tragedy (in its conventional form) to represent modern experience (*Myth* 48-49). For Soyinka, Steiner’s claims about the death of tragedy comes from a deep sense of self-defeat and cynicism such as are alien to the African mind. Soyinka advocates the consideration of his own “African” version of tragedy that he views as containing the elements of regeneration (see Chapter 2 of *Myth* 37-60). Yet Soyinka is wrong in his assumption that the element of regeneration is absent in Western tragedy, at least of the mid-twentieth century. The call in Soyinka’s thought for recovering the regenerative element of tragedy echoes a similar and even earlier call in Arthur Miller’s plays, even though Soyinka does not acknowledge Miller in his own reflections on tragedy. For example, even before Steiner’s verdict that tragedy is dead, the critic Rollo May in his 1953 book *Man’s Search for Himself* (Delta Book, 1953) characterizes the modern Western age as an “age of emptiness” quintessentially expressed in “the loss of the sense of tragedy” (75-6). He describes post-1945 dramas – e.g., Eugene O’Neill’s *The Iceman Cometh* – as dramatizations of emptiness devoid of Western humanity’s existential struggles to assert belief of “the worth and dignity of the person” (75). However, May finds in works by Miller, particularly *Death of a Salesman* (1949), an indication of the playwright’s attempt not to mourn the loss of tragedy but to assert, quoting Miller, “the ‘indestructible will of man to achieve his humanity’” (78), thereby recovering “the sources of [man’s] inner strength” (80). Raymond Williams’ 1966 study *Modern Tragedy* makes a similar argument for the nature and importance of the tragic, considered from a materialist viewpoint that emphasizes social transformation as one of the primary goals of modern tragedy.
It is not clear from Virgil’s version of the myth whether Orpheus looks back in order to ensure that it is Eurydice who is behind him, or whether he does so out of curiosity to know what in the exit scene of the underworld warrants the demand that he not look back. His backward glance suggests a number of interpretive possibilities: the superiority of artistic curiosity over love (Linder 82-3); the artist as an ignorer of rules and disrupter of order (Sirc 11-30); and the possibility of art to recover or symbolize what has been rendered lost and irrecoverable (Blanchot 171-76). The last point, articulated most clearly by the French philosopher Maurice Blanchot, has over the years found increasing acceptance among scholars (Whitehead 17-18). Blanchot celebrates Orpheus’s looking back as the beginning of the writing process that is initiated in the wake of catastrophe. For Blanchot, Orpheus’s failure signifies the futile attempt to restore and make present an irrecoverable loss. In this way, writing may be considered compensation for what has been rendered irrecoverable by catastrophe.

For Soyinka, it is the celebration of Orpheus’s backward glance that encapsulates the problem that catastrophe presents to the artistic imagination (Man 88). The artist must transcend the lure of this backward gaze in order to escape its hold on the imagination. The captivating backward gaze is not a mark of artistic heroism, according to Soyinka (Man 88). It is rather a symbol of the failure of the artistic will experienced during the artist’s encounter with traumatic atrocity. This backward gaze, according to Soyinka, is a mark of selfishness, symptomatic of individualism and submission to death. Soyinka identifies the celebration of the backward gaze as symptomatic of Western individualism. This Western individualism contrasts with Soyinka’s vision of African communitarianism, which his hero in Season
embodies. The communitarian artist-hero, for Soyinka, deploys his art to the service of community. The individualistic artist renders his on behalf of self and not community.  

Soyinka’s use of the Orpheus myth in Season can also be seen as an extension of his rewriting or updating of the myth, which he reengineers to make it fit for confronting the reality of genocide in Nigeria. Onto the Orpheus myth he inscribes the Yoruba Ogun myth in Season, thus reshaping both the context of Nigeria’s 1966 genocide and Nigeria’s liminal postcolonial situation. Ogun is the Yoruba God of Iron and the patron of soldiers and hunters. He also symbolizes the creative and destructive forces in the cosmic world. In Myth, Soyinka reveals his fascination with a version of the Ogun myth, a revelation that some critics believe sheds light on the inner workings of his writings (Quayson 66-78). In this myth, a deep gulf separates the chthonic realm of Yoruba Gods and the human world. To bridge it, Ogun sacrifices himself on behalf of others by plunging into the abyss and creating a road for other Gods to cross over, and into the human realm. Re-emerging on the other side of this realm, Ogun becomes stronger and more revered by the other Gods for his sacrifice and bravery. His sacrifice signifies a gift to the community, which expresses devotion and gratitude as a result. (Myth 3)

---

12 Some critics have faltered not only when contending with Soyinka’s work but also when addressing work by other African writers by assuming that Western writing has been predicated on an individualistic hero, as opposed to an African communalistic hero. One consequence of this binary is critics’ tendency to engage with African writing in anthropological terms instead of as art. For discussions of these scholarly tendencies and their implications for African literary criticisms, see, e.g., Ato Quayson, Strategic Transformation. See also, J. Z. Kronenfeld, “The ‘Communalistic’ African and the ‘Individualistic’ Westerner: Some Comments on Misleading Generalizations in Western Criticism of Soyinka and Achebe” 199-225.

13 Soyinka’s rewriting of the Orpheus myth can also be considered, in part, as a response to Jean-Paul Sartre’s “Black Orpheus” essay, which was published as the preface to an anthology of Negritude poetry by Francophone African poets. Senegalese Leopold Sedar Senghor’s poems dominate Sartre’s thinking about Negritude poetry. “Black Orpheus” offers a romanticized image of a primitive black consciousness and a primitive black ontology as the basis for Negritude poets’ attempts to reinvent blackness using poetry. This reinvention of blackness from a sense of an idyllic primitive past is partly what Soyinka rejects in Senghorian Negritude (see Soyinka, The Burden of Memory 71-170). Although Soyinka, unlike Senghor and Sartre, must have intended his Orpheus in Season not to be a romantic entranced by visions of lost innocence or burdened by traumatic memory, the Orpheus figure (Ofeyi) in Season, is nevertheless romantic and not the revolutionary Orpheus continuing the “combative imperatives of the dialectics of human history” (Soyinka, Burden 169).
What Soyinka faults in modern Western attitude to catastrophe is what he sees as the “gradual erosion of Earth in European metaphysic scope […] probably due to the growth and influence of the Platonic-Christian tradition” (Myth 3). In other words, according to Soyinka, the fascination with the “chthonic realm” (Myth 2) in Western metaphysics reflects westerners’ fixation on the traumatic zone of horror and reluctance to transcend the psychological domain when responding to horrifying experiences. Soyinka attempts to re-imagine modern experience with an apprehension of a cosmic totality that, while not excluding the “chthonic realm” (Myth 2) of the psyche, restores the important social place of the Gaianic/Earth realm in artistic responses to disaster. This vision emphasizes the role of the writer/artist as witness, mediator, gulf-mender and healer. Seen thus, Ofeyi in Season is an Orpheus voyaging into hell in search of Eurydice/Iriyise. Ofeyi’s quest can only be useful if he succeeds in his mission of rescuing Iriyise. He is only secondarily concerned with undertaking a testamentary mission documenting the traumas of hell, or else in becoming a mere symptom of the artistic curiosity that hell inspires.

Like Orpheus, Ofeyi understands and clutches on to the power of his art in order to survive hell. However, unlike Orpheus, Ofeyi leaves the traumatic sites of hell without looking back. He leaves with new converts, including the fierce Suberu. He leaves bearing Iriyise’s unconscious body (symbolizing the nation’s comatose spirit following the genocide), which notwithstanding the trauma it has suffered exudes signs of life and regeneration. Like Ogun, Ofeyi succeeds in sacrificing himself for the sake of social harmony. He sacrifices his own sanity witnessing the horrors in the abyss of transition and emerges on the other side of the abyss wiser and better predisposed to confront social anomy. He is not the only one who emerges on the other side with changed consciousness: Demakin the revolutionary, Zaccheus the fainthearted, Suberu the unthinking mute, the Lebanese Doctor as the outsider-insider. All
transit to the other side of the abyss changed. Therefore, Soyinka uses Ofeyi’s undertaking to dramatize atrocity witnessing as a transformative process.

Genocide, understood as hell in Soyinka’s novel, is profoundly marked by horror. In this hell, pregnant women are torn open and their foetuses splayed before their dying eyes (201); Biblical Herod’s infanticide is re-enacted as a daily occurrence (221); killers consider their victims to be animal prey and turn their corpses into conspicuous sites of cruelty (164-65); graveyards overflow with corpses and morgue keepers refuse to accept more corpses (220-21); a mother attempting to save her child from the inevitable flings the baby over the wall, misses, and ends up spiking her baby on “the metal barbs” on top of the wall (290); and “raping is no longer a crime” (300). This hell is the result of anomy.

Even so, in this hell, this catacomb of wasted lives, Ofeyi the artist finds the signs of resilient life and of regeneration. He finds this life in survivors hiding in a crypt and compares them to dwellers in ancient Jewish “Massada” [sic] (271), a reference to the Zealot fortress that withstood a Roman siege from 73-74 CE (see, e.g., Jewish Virtual Library).

Soyinka’s comparison of Igbo resilience and sacrifice to that of the Zealots of Masada is not the only such comparison of Igbo experience in Nigeria to Jewish history. It is also an artistic insertion of Igbo experience into the debate about the moral, psychological and phenomenological nature of human struggle, resilience and resistance. The Roman siege of Masada led to the mass suicide of the defenders. This mass suicide has remained a controversial subject among Jews since it commemorates, on the one hand, the extent of the Jews’ heroic struggle against external oppression, while on the other it serves as a cautionary tale warning against refusing to compromise when all is lost.¹⁴ In the Nigerian context, the Igbo/Biafran struggle was similarly described on the one hand as suicidal (leading to the

Biafran leadership being blamed for their refusal to compromise), and on the other as heroic (see, e.g., Achebe, *There Was a Country* 209-239). In *Season*, Soyinka appears to endorse the latter sentiment, even though his problematic depiction of victims’ struggles as sacrificial, and in some cases as self-destruction, presents additional challenges for thinking about genocide in Nigeria and about justice for the victims of mass violence. The Igbo/Biafran experience in Nigeria does not parallel the Jewish Masada not only because everyone in Biafra does not commit suicide, but also importantly because Biafran struggle against genocide does not aggregate to suicide. In fact, to describe it as suicide gives credence to the propaganda of the genocidal Nigerian military that labelled Biafran struggle and resistance as suicidal.

**Witnessing Hell**

A central drama in Ofeyi’s quest to retrieve Iriyise from her abductors involves him playing witness to atrocity. His friend and fellow musician, Zaccheus, who serves both as his guide and as disciple, accompanies Ofeyi in his quest to hell. Zaccheus is present when a group of soldiers kidnaps Iriyise. Both Zaccheus and Iriyise have driven to Cross-river (representative in *Season* of Northern Nigeria, where most of the massacres of Igbo took place) for a performance. They are “blissfully unaware” that they are heading “into a holocaust that had already commenced” (89). Knowing the prison where the soldiers have locked up Iriyise, Zaccheus, like a Virgil guiding Dante through hell, becomes Ofeyi’s guide and takes the artist through the different traumatic zones of a postcolonial hell. Unlike Virgil, though, Zaccheus often appears overwhelmed and traumatized by the experience of hell and intermittently dissuades Ofeyi from continuing his quest.

The bridge leading into Cross-river bears a sign, “TO DAMN” (169; original emphasis). This bridge leads to a dam site called the Shage Dam, which has been constructed
by Aiyéró men. The dam supplies electricity to the whole nation. The conflation of light and electricity (which makes light) with the Aiyéró further shows how Soyinka’s symbolism associates the genocide’s victims with the progressive ideals serving as justification for their elimination. The Shage Dam project is a possible reference to Kainji Dam in present-day Niger State in northern Nigeria. This dam began to supply electricity to the whole country in 1964, and the project was eventually completed in 1968. Many Igbo and other labourers from the south comprised an influential part of the workforce on the Kainji project. It is significant in this context that in 1966, many of the Igbo workers were lured to the project site by their fellow workers and massacred.

In Season, Soyinka turns this troubled and troubling history of the Kainji Dam electricity project into a metaphor speaking for the dreadful attempt to extinguish the light that Aiyéró men have tried to spread throughout the rest of the country. Zaccheus describes the dam site to Ofeyi as “a dead place” (172). The deeper Ofeyi crawls into this hell the more Dantesque the reality around him becomes. He observes that, like a plague, genocidal atrocities have contaminated everything, including the killers’ own natural means of subsistence. One evocative scene that expresses the depths of the horror Ofeyi witnesses is a massacre at what is referred to as “the formal doorway to the territory of hell” (192). Once through this doorway, Ofeyi voyages into the heart of the theatre of blood, where “the plague had been welcomed into the bloodstream of some who shared neither land nor cause with the Cross-river clans, but who, anxious not to be outdone in the predator game, preyed upon [Aiyéró] victims as they passed” (192-93).

While still standing at this doorway, a horrifying scene plays out immediately before the poet-hero. Ofeyi witnesses a train bearing refugee-survivors stop over a bridge. A wagon filled with corpses is emptied into the river, and the sight holds the artist spellbound:
When the bolts were first removed the bodies simply fell out, tumbled towards
the thin ribbon of water far below the narrow bridge. Then sanitation men in
their uniforms, handkerchiefs tied to their lower faces began to haul out others
one by one, prodding through the metal gaps to push into the void those which
were caught between the girdles of the bridge. Faces of survivors crowded the
windows on that side, set faces followed the motions of this parody of acrobats
through space and sunshine, the distant thuds of bodies bouncing from crag to
crag of the bottomless gully. A child corpse flew right over the steel arch and
plummeted down like a plump wild duck. The distant, barely recognizable
splashes grew even more beggarly as the bodies dammed the trickle. Then the
wagon door was raised, the bolts rammed into place and the train moved on.
(193-4)

The imagery of genocide as “sanitation” or “cleansing” in the scenario described above
resonates in the context of Ofeyi’s observations concerning killers’ polluting their
communities’ water supply. Soyinka thereby stresses the irony of a genocide that is justified
by its perpetrators using the logic of “sanitation,” but that is in fact destructively polluting. In
Season, the Zaki who is the local ruler of Cross-river coerces his subjects into mobilizing
against the Aiyéró, remarking thus through his clerk, “I want a clean sweep of Cross-river”
(126). He calls the Aiyéró “non-natives” of Cross-river who “must be swept out to the last
man” (126). The designation of citizens as non-natives in their own country reverberates
alongside what Mahmood Mamdani has described as the crisis of postcolonial citizenship in
Rwanda (When Victims Become Killers 3-39). This crisis derives from “race branding”
(Mamdani 13; original emphasis), a process familiar to students of the Nazi Holocaust
whereby a group is racialized and set socially and politically apart, having been reconceived
of as an enemy alien (13). However, as I have argued above, while on the one hand Season
shows the genocide of the Igbo in Nigeria to derive from such race branding, on the other it also portrays this branding as an essence not as a social construct.

On the faces of the survivors in the train, Ofeyi notices a seething emotion of revenge as they gaze upon the disposal of their dead relatives: “[Ofeyi] felt that with most, with the few who stuck it till the end there was an element of compulsion, a resolve to brand the scene on their minds for ever, ready for disinterment whenever the time should come” (194). For Ofeyi, genocide presents a test of will on all fronts: it is a test of the survivors’ will to resist the violent impulse to seek vengeance. It is also a test of the killers’ courage to acknowledge their guilt and make amends. Soyinka also presents this scene of the corpses’ disposal as a test of the artist’s resolve, in the wake of having witnessed such horrors, to continue his search for Iriyise. At the same time it is also a test of the artist’s unwillingness to accept that violence has any value, even as an instrument of revenge.

The question of violence remains of central concern to Ofeyi throughout his quest. He keeps asking himself whether there is need for or value to violence. In Season, Soyinka uses the character of Demakin, the Dentist, as Ofeyi’s foil to dramatize the pitfalls of violence as a response to genocide. Demakin is a revolutionary who considers Ofeyi’s idealism naïve and unrealistic. He appears at significant moments in the story to shake Ofeyi out of his resolve not to use violence to confront the Cartel. Only twice in the story does Ofeyi resort to violence. In both cases, he claims that he does so for self-defence and in order to save others. He convinces himself that only at such moments of self-preservation or emergency rescue may the artist resort to physical violence in order to challenge the brute exercise of biopower.

The concern with the artist’s response to violence in Season is perhaps a possible reference to Soyinka’s friend, the famous poet Christopher Okigbo, who upon seeing the atrocities perpetrated against Igbos resorted to violent resistance against the Nigerian state.
Okigbo was one of the most accomplished and popular poets in the 1960s Nigeria. An Igbo himself, he managed to escape to the East during the massacres and then joined the Biafran army to fight for Biafran sovereignty. He died in active combat in 1967. Following his death, Okigbo’s story became a point of controversy among several African writers and critics for thinking about the role of the artist in moments of genocide and war. For example, Kenyan writer and critic Ali Mazrui saw Okigbo’s transformation into a soldier as a betrayal of his artistic practice. In 1971, Mazrui published a controversial novel titled The Trial of Christopher Okigbo wherein he puts Okigbo on trial for abandoning the pen in favour of the gun. Unlike Mazrui who bifurcates writing and soldiering, considering them mutually exclusive practices, in Soyinka’s Season no such binary is immediately obvious. What is more at stake for Soyinka is whether violence can ever serve as a useful counter to violence. Throughout, Ofeyi thinks that the artist’s resort to violence can potentially transform him into the same kind of killer he is fighting against. Ofeyi responds with apprehension to Demakin’s ideology of violent resistance. Ofeyi never resolves this question of when, if at all, the artist can defend the use of physical violence in response to genocide, even though he himself resorts to violence for self-protection and for saving a life in danger.

However, besides Ofeyi’s meditations on the revolutionary, regenerative or vindictive potential of violence, Soyinka’s purpose in Season seems more to be to dramatize the artist’s struggles against cynicism. For Ofeyi, the encounter with hell is ultimately a contest of will: the will to use violence, or not, against the forces of hell; to continue his quest, or not; and to succumb to silence or instead to speak out against the cartel’s atrocities.

When confronted by the fear of dying in Cross-river, Ofeyi finds himself jarred into a recognition of the futility of mortality. He shakes off this fear, since “it was not a watery death he feared, only a death from error” (105). To die by “error,” as Ofeyi fears, is to die lost and forgotten in a mass of irrecoverable corpses; hence, a futile death. The reference to the
fourth section of Eliot’s *The Waste Land*, “Death by Water,” underlines Ofeyi’s struggles against the sense of futility to his artistic quest to find a purpose in genocide and to assert the value of representations. In “Death by Water,” the speaker advocates against the sentiments of renewal and regeneration by telling of the death of Phlebas at sea. Phlebas’s corpse brings about no regeneration, other than to serve as food to sea creatures picking it apart. Ofeyi rejects this vision of a pointless death. How can he just accept that the loads of corpses he has witnessed dumped into the river are no more than food for water creatures and nothing more? He remembers what Pa Ahime, the guardian of Aiyéró, has said to him regarding the death of the Aiyéró men: “If it is given for the men of Aiyéró to be the sacrifice… it was a good cause” (105). At first, Ofeyi refuses to consider the deaths of the Aiyéró men as a sacrifice leading to good things, noting that they are “Not sacrifice […] only more scapegoats to lay a false trail of blood away from the altar of the unholy god, Mammon. No, not sacrifice” (105). Later, as his quest progresses, Ofeyi comes to accept his journey as one intended to give purpose to the otherwise futile deaths of victims. Hence he accepts the victims’ death as required for the country’s social harmony (175-76). Soyinka’s tragic vision of regeneration and reparation resides within Ofeyi’s attempts to give meaning to the deaths of so many victims. In Ofeyi’s world, victims’ death should serve as moral instrument to cause a genocidal society to rethink its failings and make amends.

A major problem with this regenerative vision in *Season* is the novel’s depiction of victims as scapegoats whose deaths are required for their killers’ moral rejuvenation.15 For example, a gripping representation of genocide victims as sacrificial objects is the murderous incident at the Kuntua church in Cross-river—possibly a reference to a similar incident that happened at a church in Kaduna, the then capital of Northern Nigeria. At the church, Ofeyi and his guide Zaccheus witness the burning of worshippers. It is a Sunday and the

---

15 On the subject of scapegoating as communal ritual sacrifice, see Réne Girard’s *The Scapegoat.*
worshippers have defied all dangers, choosing instead to pay homage to the divine. The church bell sounds like a death call, and the worshippers fatalistically head to the church in obedience to its solemn call. Once the worshipper-victims congregate within the church building, assailants surround the church. Soyinka narrates the scenario using imagery of a ritual sacrifice. The assailants from outside seal up the church doors and windows to prevent any escape. Like holy men preparing a sacrifice, they begin to pour petrol on the church building. Soon, “The deadly libation [is] over, the priests withdrew […] only the sudden inferno that leapt up where the church had been, and the ring of watchers around it stepping further back as the heat raged fiercer and black smoke began to obscure their vision” (199). This horrifying scene and the imagery of burnt sacrifice underpinning Ofeyi’s witnessing of the events are reminiscent of the image of “a grave in the sky” used by Paul Celan in his poem “Death Fugue.” In Celan’s poem the “grave in the sky” refers to the poisoning of Jews and their cremation in the Nazi concentration camps. The black smoke of victims’ burning bodies that Ofeyi witnesses evokes in him and his guide Zaccheus a strong sense of ritual sacrifice. Ofeyi watches this ritual and observes its dreadful atmosphere. He hears victims’ agonizing cries as “from a long long way below the earth” (199) while he searches for life and healing in the inferno. The fire is a catastrophic conflagration created from the sacrifice of “the Innocents.”

The image of sacrifice in this scene parallels the sacrifice of bulls Ofeyi has witnessed performed by the guardian of Aiyéró earlier in the novel during a farming festival ritual for the regeneration of life forces (15-16; 176). Once Ofeyi accepts that victims are being killed for a higher purpose, the slaughter begins to take the shape of a ritual sacrifice in his mind. It is only as ritual sacrifice that the artist in Season can make sense of and give meaning to the massacres he witnesses. He understands his assigning of this meaning to be the one thing he can do to prevent all these deaths from being in vain. For Ofeyi, the massacres constitute a
ritual sacrifice required in order to achieve a social transition. As an artist inclined towards an integrated community, he decides to play the role of bridge-builder, like the god Ogun. His quest to rescue Iriyise from hell becomes a metaphor for the artist’s attempt to inscribe meaning and recover remnants of morality from society’s genocidal inferno. Iriyise in Season symbolizes society’s regenerative spirit. During the ritual sacrifice that Pa Ahime performs in the beginning of the novel, Soyinka portrays Iriyise as a willing sacrificial object whose fate has become tied to that of the bull at the altar. He writes that “[Iriyise’s] ivory neckpiece had merged with the hidden rapids in the bull’s convulsive throats. Caryatid and timeless, […] a willing presence at the altar” (16).

In Season, willpower manifests in Ofeyi’s refusal to give up on his quest to overcome all discouragement. Zaccheus his companion, the Lebanese doctor who guides him through a morgue in his search for Iriyise, and the doctor’s sister Taaila, who is in love with Ofeyi, all try at different times to discouraged him from continuing on his journey. Ofeyi refuses. The episode at the morgue is an example of Ofeyi’s resolute will. Inside the cold morgue, as Ofeyi searches through mutilated corpses, Zaccheus’s will fails him. He faints and remains unconscious throughout Ofeyi’s slow search for Iriyise amongst the dead. The cynical doctor is the only one able to help Ofeyi through the experience, but his guidance only inspires hopelessness and discourages Ofeyi further. The pull of cynicism becomes so strong inside the cold room that Ofeyi continually has to work to fight off the hopelessness that the corpses inspire. He does this by despising and forcefully rejecting them:

The feeling grew on him that Iriyise could not be here, that her living essence could not be summed up in one of these wax parodies of the human condition. Not one of these counterfeiting forms could desecrate her image by laying claim to a similarity in fate, so, why seek ye the living among the dead… still he continued… last row, last pallet. Out. In. (226)
Iriyise’s fate here is contrasted with that of the Aiyéró dead generally. Hers is of the life force, the undying essence of her troubled nation and, most broadly, of a battered humanity. To appreciate the resilience of this essential vitality, Ofeyi has to get as close as possible to the horrors of death, to those whose deaths bring illumination to “the human condition” (226). His ability to surmount the challenges of witnessing such horrors as those in the morgue requires an exercise of will of the sort which is central to Soyinka’s tragic vision. According to this vision, willpower first and foremost distinguishes the hero from other people.

In Season, a cogent dramatization of the artist’s ability to exercise his will arrives in the final section of the novel when Ofeyi insists on the power of art to confront and make sense of appalling horror. This occurs deep inside Temoko prison where Iriyise is being kept sectioned in a lunatic wing by the cartel. Inside the prison walls, Ofeyi’s encounter with horror takes a surreal turn. Events in this final episode of the novel appear to take place inside Ofeyi’s head, as though he were in a state of delirium. His real-world quest transforms into a journey to the deeper recesses of his traumatized mind, and so into lunacy. This lunacy is not only the artist’s own mental instability; it is also the lunatic condition of his society. Ofeyi has to probe deeply into this social chaos in order to find a shred of sanity, which can be used to rebuild community. His successful rescue of Iriyise from the lunatic dungeon of Temoko signals the victory of artistic will over the trauma instigated by a genocidal hell. Ofeyi’s ability to use words to tame Suberu the brute prison guard and guarantee Iriyise’s rescue further attests to Soyinka’s vision of the power of art to deal with genocidal horror.

In Season, Suberu is a likely reference to the monstrous dog-beast Cerberus in Virgil’s Orpheus myth who guards the Underworld in order to prevent the dead from leaving. Although Ofeyi requires help from accomplices like Demakin and Zaccheus in order to rescue Iriyise from Temoko, he is also able to tame Suberu with words. Not only does he
tame him, he wins him over to his cause. By converting Suberu Ofeyi reveals his quest to have additionally been to free the monstrous energy and force necessary for the maintenance of the prison. Ofeyi recognizes that the Cartel can only succeed when it has the likes of Suberu at its service. He therefore widens his understanding of his role as an artist to include the reformation of social self-consciousness, and the re-education of people like Suberu who are improperly used by those in power to perpetrate profound evil.

In *Season*, readers are not encouraged to sympathize with or pity the victims of genocide. The cathartic emotional response to tragedy does not find expression in Soyinka’s representation of genocide. An exemplary demonstration of the author’s inclination to force the reader to witness horror without succumbing to it pitiably may be found in the novel’s final episode, in which Ofeyi wanders through a Leper’s Ward in Temoko prison. The narrator warns the reader following Ofeyi to “abandon hope” (282). The director of the prison cautions Ofeyi not to show sympathy to the lepers because they hate such displays and would readily attack anyone showing such sympathy for their situation. The Leper’s Ward episode reveals a surreal drama of abjection, deformity and famine resulting from genocide. Some critics have read this scene as a metaphor for the reality of starvation that took hold in Biafra in which victims transformed into cannibals, squabbling over rot and devouring one another (see Coundouriotis 127). As Ofeyi wanders through the ward, the prison director invites him to witness a game of fighting among the starving lepers. The guards stage this after depriving famished lepers with different deformities of their food. The struggle to feed turns into a chaotic fight among the lepers. Ofeyi watches this spectacle in mute horror. He hears one of the lepers call the others, “Beast of no nation” (296-7). Coundouriotis’s observation regarding the leper’s use of this phrase is instructive: “The leper’s accusation that his fellow inmates are ‘beasts of no nation’ (barbarians?) suggests his own struggle to hold onto a sense of belonging against their unbelonging. Nation is the humanizing reference here, and belonging
to the nation must be claimed against the anomie of war” (127). As a signifier of wretchedness, the phrase “beasts of no nation” suggests total abjection and dehumanization. The phrase evokes the punishing exilic conditions being suffered by those hounded out of their homeland and continuing to face existential risks.¹⁶

**Soyinka’s Tragic Vision**

Soyinka’s vision of tragedy is essentially Nietzschean. Apart from his emphasis on the communal purpose of ritual tragedy, Soyinka’s Ogun resembles Nietzsche’s Dionysus. According to the German philosopher, Dionysus embodies the tragic will to confront pain and suffering. Thus tragedy may be understood less as something to be mourned and instead as something to be celebrated. There inheres in the Nietzschean idea of tragedy a latent pleasure taken in the idea of transcending pain. In *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche identifies the Dionysian principle representing freedom of the will as the essential element of the tragedy (20-1, 38). By so emphasizing he rejects Arthur Schopenhauer’s preference for representation over will as it may be found explained in *The World as Will and Representation*. Schopenhauer treats the will as the primary locus of suffering and pain, and advocates in behalf of representations for what he describes as their capacity to permit us to

---

¹⁶ The notion of exile signalled in the phrase “beast of no nation” also appeared in Achebe’s 1960 novel *No Longer at Ease*, where it found its first use in describing social reality in Nigeria. In *No Longer at Ease*, “beast of no nation” is used to describe Nigerians who have been to Europe to receive education, and returned to their communities afterwards only to find themselves alienated from the realities at home. The feeling of double exile and the crises of identity resulting from their double displacement (in Europe and in Africa) make them beasts of no nation. The phrase “beasts of no nation” became widely popular following famous Nigerian musician Fela Anikulapo-Kuti’s 1989 release of an album with the same title. Uzodinma Iweala’s 2005 novel of the same title and its film adaptation in 2015 used the phrase to describe the experiences of child soldiers, who are used like animals and left with no root, no home, and no national allegiance as they wage wars and wreak havoc in Africa. Their deaths remain unmourned, uncounted, and generally undocumented.
escape the pain of willful desire (253). For Nietzsche, however, the will is something to celebrate especially when it dramatizes a capacity in us to withstand and conquer suffering.17

By the end of Soyinka’s *Season*, cynicism disappears. Ofeyi journeys through hell, rescues Iriyise and looks ahead towards a future that he must now confront with more optimism and preparedness. Thus, the novel dramatizes the victory of will over the horrors of genocidal hell, the victory of awakened consciousness over trauma. As Ofeyi leads the victorious throng out of the hell that is Temoko prison, the narrator declares a verdict that includes a vision of the victory of the Aiyéró’s communitarian ethos. This is signified by his use of imagery of the forest’s victory over street culture and capitalist greed. He observes that “Temoko was sealed against the world till dawn. The street emptied at last as the walls and borders shed their last hidden fruit. In the forests, life began to stir” (320).

Yet there remains something unsettling in this idea of an immediate post-genocidal renewal. Partly this discomfort is a consequence of the aforementioned (and importantly, if not exclusively, perpetrators’) view of the victims as sacrificially redemptive. The alignment of perpetrator and post-genocidal morality in Soyinka’s tragic vision should give us pause. This pause is sustained by the novel’s refusal to consider seriously the place of justice in genocide’s aftermath. No part in *Season*, except for a brief dismissal of vengeance as an adequate response to genocide, interrogates what justice might mean for a genocide’s victims and survivors. Instead the idea of justice in the novel emerges from readers’ confrontation by the traumatic events and atrocities it depicts. *Season* does not envision clearly how transitional justice might properly and reasonably unfold. The novel seems to suggest that only by witnessing atrocity does it become possible to undertake a broad and collective reassessment of shared standards and values. What form this reassessment should take,

---

17 For an incisive discussion of Nietzsche’s and Schopenhauer’s approaches to tragedy, see Eagleton, *Sweet Violence* 41-75.
exactly, and the specific uses to which it should be put, remain unspecified. It is safe to conclude, therefore, that Soyinka’s tragic vision of genocide lacks a vision of justice. This in turn raises questions about the integrity and utility of the writer’s artistic vision as a response to genocide in Nigeria.

Sacrifice in Soyinka’s Season denies the material and ideological reality, and therefore deep contingency, of the historical circumstances leading to genocide. This denial may be understood as potentially offensive, particularly to members of victim groups. For victims, redeeming the mass extermination of co-citizens by linking these deaths to the ritual performance of national becoming might seem downright blasphemous. The failure of Soyinka’s tragic vision of genocide in Season is that it does not trouble the easy alignment of the artist’s and the perpetrator’s gazes. We might therefore want to think of Soyinka’s artistic response to genocide a species of what the French writer Alain Robbe-Grillet termed a “systematic tragification of the universe” (qtd. in Poole 63; original emphasis). Such tragification turns the experience of genocide into an occasion for a process of social and political interrogation that becomes a kind of justice in and of itself.

Even victims of the failed attempt to establish a Biafran nation cannot be considered “sacrificial,” especially those who were murdered in 1966. For they neither died for nor offered their lives to the realization of Biafra. Many Igbo authors writing in response to the genocide preferred to treat Biafra as a byproduct of trauma rather than sacrifice. They use sacrifice only in relation to the cost of the war for volunteers who died fighting for the Biafran cause. The theme of betrayal that predominates a number of stories by Igbo writers focuses more on the dismal condition of double betrayal resulting from unwanted ordinary citizens (that is, beasts of no nation) being spurned by Nigerian and Biafran elites alike. Sacrifice in these works manifests in the form of people wilfully committing themselves to
the Biafran cause, even when it means losing everything. The vision of sacrifice in these works is remarkably different from that of Soyinka.18

Conclusion

The attempt in Season to find a higher purpose for genocide is on a par with popular political and cultural responses to mass atrocities in other parts of the world. Similar attempts to find purpose for genocide played out in responses to the Holocaust and several other genocides (see, e.g., Roth, The Failures of Ethics 192-3). The tendency is usually to ascribe a purpose to genocide in order to find cultural and political use for it. My discussion of Soyinka’s Season in this chapter has served as a springboard for thinking broadly about the impulses behind, and implications for Africa of, appropriating the experience of genocide for such purposes as nation building, agitating for freedom, and for numerous other human rights advocacies. As my critique of Season suggests, the urge following genocide is often to find answers to what Elie Wiesel has called “the metaphysical why” (Legends of Our Time 162). To be clear, this quest for post-genocidal understanding has often resulted in such notable social and political changes as the formation of new nations, and UN conventions and declarations concerning genocide and human rights. However, the reality of genocide more often than not resists meaningfulness, just as it resists representation and so the assignment of any kind of redemptive purpose. As I describe above with reference to Soyinka’s Season, the dramatization of the quest to find meaning in and following a genocide finally reveals the futility of any such mission.

18 Noteworthy, however, works such as Flora Nwapa’s Never Again and I.N.C. Aniebo’s Anonymity of Sacrifice align with similar artistic impulse as found in Soyinka’s Season seeking to inscribe a moral purpose to suffering and mass deaths of victims.
Chapter 4

Writing the “African” Holocaust: The Rwandan Genocide as a Gospel of African Decolonization in Diop’s Murambi, The Book of Bones

Introduction

In Chapter 3, I argued that Soyinka’s Season of Anomy is a katabatic narrative that dramatizes an artist’s attempts to reverse through his handiwork the infernal conditions of genocide by witnessing atrocities in response to a moral imperative. In Season of Anomy, the quest into hell signals Soyinka’s acknowledgment of genocide’s inversion of the universe. The hero’s descent and successful ascent from hell metaphorize a kind of inversion and then reversion or restoration of the order of things. The artist’s traumatic encounters at the bottom of hell function mainly to strengthen his resolve and will regarding the purpose of his artistic mission. His encounters do not change him or alter fundamentally his awareness of himself. The hero’s artistic vision remains intact and hell functions in the novel as a space to test this vision and for him to dramatize its importance. However, unlike in Soyinka’s novel, the hell of genocide in Senegalese Boubacar Boris Diop’s novel Murambi, the Book of Bones (Murambi, subsequently) constitutes a space conducive to the conversion of the artist. Within Diop’s conception of genocide, the artist may be seen as coming into a new awareness both of himself as an artist and of the purpose of his art.

In this chapter, I discuss Diop’s Murambi as a katabatic narrative of the 1994 Rwandan genocide that relies heavily on the Biblical story of the Gentile’s conversion to Christianity. By portraying Rwanda’s genocide as analogous to the Gentile’s conversion story, Diop encourages an affinity between the Holocaust and Rwanda’s genocide. In the two previous chapters, I noted that one consequence of comparing African genocides to the Holocaust is that literary representations become less attuned to addressing the political preconditions of genocide in the traumatic contexts of their origin. This is because such
comparison oftentimes draws on cultural memories of the Holocaust as a moral instrument of individual/social reform. Accordingly, the African genocide novel tends to moralize about genocidal catastrophe and ignore the phenomenon’s central political foundations. In such situations as we shall see in Diop’s Murambi, writing genocide serves less to offer imaginative possibilities for political justice, serving instead as a narrative seeking to transform “the personal and historical into just such a mythical absolute” (Faloner 50).

The Biblical story (in Acts 15) of Cornelius’s conversion and meeting with apostle Simon Peter is central to understanding Diop’s thematic concerns in this novel, at least in so far as genocide and its representation are concerned. I argue that Diop’s deployment of the Cornelius trope in Murambi attempts to envision a decolonizing agenda for postcolonial Africa using the experience of genocide in Rwanda as a primary referent point. Decolonization is at the centre of Diop’s artistic vision in Murambi because, as the writer has suggested, self-hatred of the racist kind exemplified by Rwanda’s (broadly Africa’s) colonial history is a major motivator of the cruelty witnessed during the genocide (Tadjo, “Interview” 426). Hence the Cornelius trope as it is “emplotted” in Murambi is meant to do two things: first, to dramatize the process of emergence of a decolonized African subject based on his or her encounter with Rwanda’s genocide; and, second, to turn the genocide into a moral weapon with which to confront the remnants of racism and colonialism in Africa. Yet, as I contend throughout the rest of this chapter, Diop’s intertextual engagement with the Biblical story of Cornelius fails to realize its decolonizing vision because it offers a theological/mythical account of decolonization that has limited relevance given the actual historical and political conditions (and preconditions) of genocide in Africa.

In what follows, I briefly describe the historical context and considerations informing Diop’s writing of Murambi. Afterwards, my discussion of the novel is divided into two parts. The first (focusing on the novel’s first and third sections) discusses the nature of hatred and
self-hate as it is portrayed in Murambi, namely as propelling the genocide and consequently resulting in an inverted moral universe and psychological fragmentation. The second part (based on the second and final sections of the novel) discusses Diop’s portrayal of Cornelius’s quest into the nightmarish world of post-genocide Rwanda in order to find psychic redemption and give purpose to writing about genocidal atrocity. I argue that Cornelius’s quest ultimately fails to provide any basis for thinking about African decolonization because it jettisons the political in favour of the moral the closer the artist who is the subject of the novel comes to the direct experience of genocidal horror.

Context

As already discussed elsewhere in this dissertation, Diop was among a group of ten African writers sponsored to Rwanda in 1998 to write about the genocide of 1994. The “Rwanda: Ecrire par devoir de mémoire” (Rwanda: Writing as Duty to Memory) project came at a time when artistic representations of the genocide were nearly absent. According to Alexandre Dauge-Roth, the project helped to provide an African perspective on an experience of genocide that was then almost exclusively represented by Western journalists and humanitarian activists (89-98). Diop’s Murambi has arguably come to represent one of the most successful publications to emerge from the project, not least for its moving story of genocide but also for its vision of writing genocide as a moral duty. In 2002, the Zimbabwe International Book Fair included the novel in its list of Africa’s 100 best books of the twentieth century for its impact related to popularizing the Rwandan Genocide through art. As a further testament to its significance, since its publication in French as Murambi, le livre des ossements in 2000, the novel has been translated into several languages, including an English translation in 2006, even though it is yet to be translated into Kinyarwanda, the main language used in Rwanda.
Diop published his first novel, *Le Temps de Tamango* in 1981 and has since grown to become one of the dominant voices writing from Senegal. In *Murambi* critics have been quick to observe what they see as a remarkable difference from Diop’s other novels before and also after it. As Diop himself puts it, *Murambi* is aesthetically bare and shows “a total disregard for novelistic conventions” (Tadjo, “Interview” 426). In his previous books, he builds intrigue and suspense so as to mislead his readers and take them through a kind of discovery quest: “I invited him [the reader] to join me in a kind of treasure hunt […] and with a certain amount of arrogance I say to the reader: ‘Come, we will lose ourselves together, but it will be worth it’” (Tadjo, “Interview” 426). In the case of *Murambi* there was an urgency, Diop claims, to discard aesthetic conventions because the genocide defied any conventional modes of representation. “What was more important,” according to Diop, “was to make use of the fictional form to pass on information and produce a text that was simple and direct” (Tadjo, “Interview” 426-427). In another sense, he wanted *Murambi* to serve as “a funerary stele,” a kind of mourning ritual for victims, because the perpetrators had deliberately humiliated them in order “to convince themselves and especially their victims that they were not really human and that nature had erred by putting them on this earth” (Diop, *Africa Beyond the Mirror* 12).

Yet I disagree slightly with Diop’s claim that *Murambi* is “simple and direct” and unlike his previous writings not based on a discovery quest. As I will go on to explain, central to *Murambi* is a quest in which confronting genocide in its aftermath leads to a kind of self-emancipatory revelation. Whereas in Soyinka’s *Season of Anomy* the quest narrative arises as a consequence of the artist-protagonist’s search to recover the regenerative spirit of a people, and thereby to give purpose to art in genocide’s aftermath, in Diop’s *Murambi* the quest unfolds in relation to the artist-protagonist’s conversion from an old self to a new one, which Diop construes as a self-emancipatory discovery process.
Diop’s vision of decolonization in *Murambi* and as he further explains in his book *Africa Beyond the Mirror* is expressive of what the Kenyan writer Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o has described as a “decolonization of the mind.” This vision of decolonization emphasizes an act of reclaiming one’s own perception of oneself and one’s place in the world.\(^1\) Diop confessed that witnessing the Rwandan genocide four years after the massacres affected him much more than his stylistic choices for writing about the genocide. For the first time, Diop began to show a hesitation to write in French. In Rwanda, the writer believed himself to be witnessing one of the great calamities of colonialism. Witnessing the Rwandan genocide led him to question his artistic commitment to Africa as an African writer and the language of his art. He wrote his novel, entitled *Doomi Golo* (*The Hidden Notebooks*) after *Murambi* in the Senegalese language of Wolof, making it the first Wolof novel to be translated into French and English. Although Diop has since returned to writing in both French and Wolof, he believes that his encounter in Rwanda radically altered his vision and commitments as a writer. The change of the language of his writing – at once political, aesthetic and personal (see Qader 16-17) – symptomatizes the disruptive effects of his encounter with the Rwanda catastrophe. When asked to explain the link between his choice to write in Wolof and his visit to Rwanda in 1998, Diop remarks,

I have often said this and I am always being asked to explain the link. However, I haven’t been able to do so because there is no direct link between going to Rwanda and writing in Wolof. I am well aware of this, but I also

---

\(^1\) In his book *Decolonising the Mind*, Ngũgĩ has argued that language has been a central weapon of imperialism and colonization. The violence of European colonization in Africa, according to Ngũgĩ, is that it is not only content with stealing the colonized people’s land and resources. But also, it perpetrates violence on the colonized people’s language by imposing the colonizer’s language on the colonized, thereby destroying colonized people’s cultures and ability of autonomous self-perception. Hence, African decolonization, according to Ngũgĩ, must aim to jettison the colonizer’s language imposed on colonized African groups. This is because language carries a people’s culture and forms the basis upon which a people makes sense of themselves and their place in the world. To decolonize the mind [through language], therefore, suggests an epistemic, political and cultural project of reclaiming one’s own autonomous perception of oneself and one’s place in the world.
know that if I had not gone to Rwanda, I would never have written in my mother tongue. What I mean is that the encounter between Rwanda and the West was a deeply violent one and it is impossible to understand what happened in 1994 if this is not taken into account. I have reflected on the foreign intervention in Rwanda and see many parallels with my own country. It is not difficult for an external power to apply pressure on the sensitive areas of a dominated country and cause it to explode. Moreover, we cannot overlook the cultural and psychological dimension of genocide. Rwanda is always being cited as an example of hatred for the other: “I destroy the other because when I look at him, I see my own image which I cannot tolerate.” Where does this hatred of the self come from, this scorn for one’s culture, one’s language, of everything which in sum identifies us in relation to the others? It comes from colonisation. Before going to Rwanda, I was strongly influenced by the works of [Frantz] Fanon, Cheikh Anta Diop, and [Amilcar] Cabral, but in the end I had argued to myself that they came from another time. The genocide of the Tutsis nonetheless quickly brought me back to them. (Tadjo, “Interview” 427)

I have quoted Diop at length here because in his response he encapsulates his own perception of his motivations for writing Murambi, as well as his assessment of the novel’s purpose. Diop’s recognition of the linkages between self-hatred and genocide in Africa’s postcolony, between racism and identity, between violence and language, leads him to a way of answering some of the questions that earlier thinkers of African decolonization have grappled with. He has realized, in other words, that the colonial past has refused to remain past. Hence witnessing Rwanda’s genocide must for the writer involve a decolonizing agenda. Only through the concerted effort to decolonize his writing would the author become able to witness genocide properly by assigning it a use or a kind of purpose. Diop’s commitment in
Murambi, therefore, must be understood in the more general context of his unique vision of decolonization as a reclamation of how one sees one’s self, one’s world and one’s place in the world.

While I contend that Diop’s primary thematic preoccupation in Murambi is African decolonization, I also call attention to how the trope of conversion underpinning its story limits the potential of the novel’s decolonizing agenda. The theme of decolonization in Murambi is most clearly manifested in what Arnould-Bloomfield identifies in the novel as the influence of Jean-Paul Sartre’s writing on Diop: that is, Murambi is an example of what Sartre describes as “committed” literature. This kind of literature displaces “the traditional aesthetic duality of European genocide literature” by turning words into active vectors of freedom (Arnould-Bloomfield 506).

My reading of the main character of Murambi, Cornelius, reveals the novel’s quest for a decolonized African consciousness. Some critics read the novel as searching for representational truth or else questing for an adequate representational vocabulary for the Rwandan tragedy (see, e.g., Mc Laughlin; Mortimer; Njoya; Dauge-Roth). Such readings describe Diop’s characterization of Cornelius’s journey to the town of Murambi as an expression of the writer’s search for an ethically useful representation of the genocide. Artistic realism, according to these critics, is what Diop through Cornelius’s quest aimed to depict in Murambi as an adequate representational mode for writing the Rwandan genocide. While not disagreeing entirely with these important claims, I argue that central to understanding Diop’s characterization of Cornelius in his novel requires us to read the character’s quest alongside Murambi’s thematics of Biblical conversion. Tracing Diop’s characterization of Cornelius back to the story of the Gentile’s reception of Christianity not only reveals Diop’s preoccupation with portraying the Rwandan genocide as a kind of
“gospel” for African decolonization, it also has important implications for his theological vision of genocide.

One way to begin considering some of these implications is to place them within the broader context of “thinking” Rwanda through the experience of the Holocaust. On this view, the Cornelius myth in Murambi suggests that Diop may have been advocating in his novel for the use of Rwanda’s experience of genocide in ways resonant with the cultural and political uses of the Jewish experience of the Holocaust. Mamdani articulates my point when he states that “if the Nazi Holocaust breathed life into the Zionist demand that Jews too must have a political home, a nation-state of their own, few have argued that the Rwandan genocide calls for the building of a Tutsi-land in the region. While Europe ‘solved’ its political crisis by exporting it to the Middle East, Africa has no place to export its political crisis” (39). In the case of Rwanda, there is no Israel to which to export Rwanda’s Tutsis or to consider as a horizon for imagining political justice. Even though Paul Kagame’s RPF won the war and consequently established a Tutsi government in Rwanda, the question should still be asked about how to deal with the political conditions that caused the genocide in the first place. Diop’s Murambi fails to confront questions of political justice and control in its articulation of a vision of decolonization. Side-stepping this subject (as we also see in the case of Nigeria), Murambi encourages the use of genocide memory in ways more conducive to moral but not political use. The conversion story lying at the heart of Murambi signals what Diop presents as the process of individual self-reformation resulting from an encounter with genocidal horrors in genocide’s aftermath. The focus on individual reformation obscures the deeper political and social structures that make genocide possible. In Murambi, the cogent issues of political settlement, control and justice lying at the heart of conflicts in Africa remain unaddressed and sidelined in the discourse of genocide.
Murambi chronicles multiple violent encounters during and after the 1994 genocide. Diop’s choice of different narrative viewpoints, identified by some critics as characteristic of his love of polyphonic narratives (see Sugnet 138-39; Qader 19-20; Dauge-Roth 152-65; Samuel; Arnould-Bloomfield; Kroll), interweaves fictionalized accounts of individual testimonies with history. The multiperspectival technique underscores Diop’s attempt to represent the genocide as a tissue of fragments that resist any totalizing single picture of the catastrophe. These fragments bearing witness to genocide reveal a chronicle marked by competing testimonial voices that resonate cacophonously in the genocide’s aftermath.

That said, we could also read this narrative fragmentation as Diop’s attempt to show genocide’s damaging effects on the structure of storytelling itself. Murambi’s narrative shifts from juxtapositions of multiple “I”s and a singular and limited “he” highlight the fragmentation of subjectivity, thereby implying the focal indeterminacy inherent in any telling of a genocide. As Nasrin Qader explains, this indeterminacy marks the haunted nature of genocide representations: “The direct testimonial mode is unbearable for the narration, as if the project of giving testimony cannot bear the weight of this task and shatters under its exigency. Only when testimony becomes haunted, in the sense that it becomes the voice of another, can it allow for narration”; yet this narration in the third person “does not occupy the position of the unimplicated observer […] but is the mark of ghostly space” (Qader 20). In other words, genocide representation is necessarily haunted by the multiple and competing voices of its victims, survivors, perpetrators, and bystanders. If this is so, then we can begin to understand that the multiple viewpoints in Murambi are a recognition of this haunting.

Critical responses to Murambi’s style has largely linked Diop’s narrative choices to some of the conventions deriving from writings about the Holocaust. Described either as a docu-novel style (see Njoya) or as a quest for an adequate aesthetic project for writing African suffering (Mortimer), the broad claim is that Murambi brings to the fore the problems
of representation regarding Africa’s encounter with mass violence. The emphasis in criticisms of Diop’s novel on binaries between symbolic and factual representations, between abstraction and realism, characterizes some of the important discursive contexts within which Murambi has been discussed. In part, these kinds of critical responses to Murambi come from Diop’s own remarks concerning his experience of writing the novel. He states once that during his visit to Rwanda as part of the “Rwanda: Ecrire par devoir de mémoire” project, survivors pressed him not to write fiction about the genocide. He observes:

   It is worth mentioning, by the way, the desperate pleas made by some of the survivors, from the moment they understood the purpose of our visit to Rwanda: “We implore you not to write things in your novel which didn’t actually happen to us; you must repeat faithfully what we have told you. The entire world has to find out exactly what went on here.” (Diop, *Africa Beyond the Mirror* 8)

Diop understands the survivors’ anxieties as an expression of their desire to be believed by those hearing their stories. The violence they encountered already seemed unbelievable even in its factual representations. For survivors, the idea of someone fictionalizing an experience that seemed more unreal than fiction might easily appear to be a kind of double tragedy. For fiction so-conceived risked trivializing their experience of extreme brutality and suffering by reducing it to the status of a work of the imagination.

   However, by refusing to heed survivors’ “pleas” to write “facts” instead of fiction, Diop explains that he was able to unite facts, feelings, attitudes and impressions regarding the genocide (see Tadjo, “Interview” 426-27). According to Diop, the compromise he reached with the haunted survivors in his head was to produce a work strategically and selectively deprived of its aesthetic resources. However, as I note above, the claim that Murambi is
under-aestheticized is arguable given its complex narrative focalizations, and also, as I will show subsequently, given the writer’s incorporation of a Biblical legend into the novel’s major plot. Nonetheless, Diop’s desire not to sensationalize atrocity resonates in the context of similar anxieties expressed by Holocaust writers and thinkers such as Theodor Adorno. Unlike Gil Courtemanche’s rather more pornographic and sensationalist approach to representing the Rwandan genocide in *A Sunday at the Pool in Kigali*, which licenses graphic depictions of genocidal atrocity in order to expose and mock the mentality giving impetus to genocide, Diop’s representation shows more sensitivity to the potential harms done, especially to survivors, by stylized representations of other people’s suffering and pain.

The genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda connects to the Holocaust in both its historical articulation and its artistic representation (see, e.g., Stockhammer; Kopf). For example, references to Nazi antisemitic ideology were dominant in Rwandan political discourse before and during the genocide. Some European colonial literatures linked Tutsis to Jews, and partly in response to this distorting colonial literature, the Pamehutu extremist movement alluded to Nazi antisemitic ideology in their own racist quest to annihilate Tutsis (Mamdani 79-102).

Additionally, post-genocidal political discourse of Rwanda has in significant respects relied upon the Holocaust when constituting the terms of the genocide’s post-hoc literary and commemorative representation. Memorial practices such as the erection of museums to honour victims of the 1994 genocide imitate in several ways the didactic ambitions of and techniques used by popular Holocaust museums as found elsewhere in the world. In fact, in some of the genocide museums in Rwanda photographs of Nazi atrocities against Jews are displayed prominently, presumably in order to further legitimate the Rwandan atrocities as genocide comparable to the Holocaust. To a significant extent, as some critics have noted in other African and non-African genocidal contexts, these resonances between the Rwandan

---

2 See my discussion of this novel in Chapter 5 of the dissertation.
genocide and the Holocaust serve to blur the cultural, political and historical specificity of the former (Heerten; Shenker; Gasanabo, Mutanguha and Mpayimana).

**Narrating Genocide: On the Fragmentation of Language**

*Murambi* is divided into four sections. The first and third sections ("Fear and Anger" and "Genocide," respectively) contain first-person testimonial accounts of genocide by victims, perpetrators, bystanders and survivors. The stories in these sections are loosely related testaments which provide the reader with insights into different characters’ experiences, motivations and responses to the atrocious events of 1994. Apart from the witness accounts by a character, Jessica, the rest of the testaments do not connect to one another. The stories comprising these sections stand alone and only within the context of the genocide are they meaningful. The reader has to piece them together as testimonies of mass atrocity; and the reader has to understand these testimonies as the multiple eyes through which the reality of genocide is seen.

*Murambi*’s first section, “Fear and Anger,” contains three witness accounts by a Tutsi, Michel Serumundo, a Hutu, Faustin Gasana, and an RPF spy, Jessica, a Tutsi who can pass for Hutu. These three accounts attempt to recapture the atmosphere on the eve of the genocide following the death of Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana. Michel Serumundo’s story stresses the indifference characterizing the global response to the suffering of distant others. His recognition that he too has been guilty of this indifference makes him realize that in the moment of his own doom, the world could care less what happens to him. At best, his suffering might just offer some entertainment to a world fixated on its own petty pleasures.

The story by Faustin Gasana identifies the toxic residue from the past that provides strong impetus for the genocide. Faustin goes to see his father just before the killing spree
begins. His father personifies a diseased past that is strong enough still to fuel hatred against the Tutsi. He embodies the ideology of genocide from colonial times that gained its first expression in the late 1950s and early 1960s under the government of Rwanda’s first president, Grégoire Kayibanda. The photographs hanging on the ailing old man’s wall include an official portrait of President Habyarimana and another image of Kayibanda shaking hands with King Baudouin of Belgium. These photographs serve to connect the ideology fuelling the genocide of 1994 to Rwanda’s colonial and deeply ethnicized past, a time during which the old man, then young, participated in the murderous purging of Rwandan Tutsis. The old man is full of wrath and spite, and he admonishes his son to carry out his “duty” with an attitude of discipline and in a spirit of justice so that he may contribute to finally resolving the Tutsi “problem” that he and his cohort have themselves been unable to eradicate. With this support from his family’s patriarch, Faustin Gasana goes on to organize his murderous team. He acknowledges the difficulty of the task ahead, but he considers it his duty to persist in his efforts out of respect and love for his homeland.

The third account in this first section involves a character who is present throughout the novel. Jessica Kamanzi appears as different personas. In the first section, she is an RPF spy disguising as a Hutu. She finds that her duty as a rebel soldier ties her closely to the killers. For Jessica, the victims of genocide are “guilty” for “just being themselves: they’re barred from innocence for all eternity” (28). Jessica finds herself enmeshed and overtaken by genocidal circumstances that strip victims from their innocence by virtue of who they are or what they are identified as being. She finds herself complicit in this subversion of victims’ innocence. In one dramatization of this subversion, her friend, Theresa Mukandori, seeks refuge at the Catholic Church in Nyamata. In order not to blow her cover as an RPF spy, Jessica cannot tell Theresa that the Church is a key target of the killers. Theresa is eventually brutally murdered in the Church. By the end of her account in the first section of the novel,
Jessica is stopped at a checkpoint and asked to provide her identity card. She hands over her fake identity card to one of the killers who looks suspiciously at her. Just then she says:

A woman they’ve wounded but are waiting to finish off a bit later comes towards me, the right part of her jaw and chest covered with blood. She swears that she’s not a Tutsi and begs me to explain it to the man in charge of the barrier. I move away from her very quickly. She insists. I tell her dryly to leave me alone. Seeing this, the Interahamwe militiaman is convinced that I’m on his side. He blurts out in a joyful peal of laughter: “Ah! You’re hardhearted my sister, so you are! Come on, you should take pity on her!” Then he brutally pushes the woman back toward the throat slitters. (32)

Here, an Interahamwe member experiences solidarity with Jessica’s attitude towards the wounded woman. The cruel irony of the situation is that the man who apparently lacks sympathy for the wounded woman beckons to Jessica to show some. Jessica must show no pity in order to win the killers’ approval and evade their suspicion. Her performance identifies her with killers and helps form the basis of the killer’s celebration of cruelty. As a result, Jessica witnesses a murder and identifies with the murderers in order to act against them. Her military duty places her on the same side – at least in terms of her performance of cruelty and disdain towards genocide victims – as the killers.

Even more troubling in this scene is the victim’s expression of hate for Tutsi-ness. The wounded woman asks Jessica to explain to the killers that she is not Tutsi. Like Jessica, she too is expressing hatred and a lack of sympathy for the Tutsi-ness from which she wishes to be freed. Her pleas to be spared are based not her identification with being Tutsi, but on a denial of membership in this identity category. The woman’s denial of Tutsi identity also reveals her implicit acceptance of her killers’ argument for eliminating Tutsis. By denouncing Tutsi-ness as basis for pleading to be spared, she accepts a fault in being Tutsi, an assumed
fault lying behind the atrocities perpetrated against Tutsis. This expression of hatred against Tutsi-ness found in victims and survivors alike as well as in perpetrators is in the most part what Murambi articulates powerfully from multiple viewpoints.

Like the first section, the novel’s third section “Genocide” contains first-person accounts of different actors during the genocide. The stories in the third section highlight even more strongly the hatred against Tutsi-ness and Rwandan self-hatred in general leading to genocide. In particular, narrative accounts of the genocide given by Jessica and Dr. Joseph Karekezi touch on this point. Of the eight chronicles comprising this section of the novel, three belong to Jessica. Each account provides a limited personal witness statement concerning atrocity given by Rwandan victims, perpetrators and a French foreign agent, Colonel Étienne Perrin. Like the testimonies in the first section that underscore the nature of the social fragmentation fueling genocide, the testimonies in the novel’s third section further stress this fragmentation, particularly as the matter of how genocide destroys language and its signifying power is concerned.

Jessica testifies to the frenzy of killing around her. She witnesses how the killers go about ensuring that every Hutu participates in killing, thereby ensuring collective responsibility for the atrocities. This exercise in the creation of a shared guilt requires that every Hutu must kill at least one Tutsi. Killers compelled other Hutus to kill or be killed themselves in turn. Such a situation, for Jessica, demonstrates the destruction of society’s common soul and the establishment of Hutus’ collective guilt and responsibility. The genocidaires’ hatred for Tutsis is so maddening and so thoroughly insisted upon as a collective duty that Jessica has difficulty making sense of the killers’ motivation to kill. Having witnessed the explosion and proliferation of hate-driven murders, she sums up the killers’ defence of their acts: “I’m not killing the Other in order to seize his possessions, no, I’m not so small-minded, I don’t even hate him, I’m killing the Other because I’m completely
mad, and the proof, it’s that the torture I inflict upon him is unique in the history of human suffering” (112). She believes that the killers’ monstrosity and madness may explain the frenzy of their butchery.

However, Jessica resists identifying all Hutus as monsters. She calls attention to the difficulties involved in categorizing all Hutus as psychopaths. Among so many other exceptions, she tells of a Hutu nun, Félicite, who helps Tutsis escape to Zaire and is killed by her own Hutu kinsmen as punishment. For Jessica, Félicite’s show of humanity and her heroic acts are important for recognizing that ethnic identities do not make people good or evil. While they may influence human actions, ethnic identities are constructs and not essential determinants of human action. Félicite’s heroism highlights the sacrifices of those who refuse to act solely out of loyalty to some idea of group identity. Yet, according to Jessica, the sacrifices of those like Félicite’s cannot simplify understanding of genocide. If anything, such sacrifices can only create more complexities, especially in genocide’s aftermath when questions of justice and forgiveness arise. In fact, forgiveness does not appear to Jessica as an adequate request to make from those who have experienced extreme suffering and survived the genocide. She remarks:

Could Félicite’s gestures make us forget, tomorrow, the ignoble behaviour of so many others? After the victory, inevitably, the question will be asked: what is forgiveness worth without justice?

[…] It will be difficult for those who suffered so much to make allowances for things, to forget the worst to remember only the best. It’s easy to calculate the distress of the person who says, “You want me to forgive, but do you know that on Nyanza Hill my seven children were thrown live into a toilet pit?” If he adds: “Think of the few seconds when those children were
suffocated by masses of excrement before dying, think just of those few seconds and nothing else.” (111)

The difficulties Jessica mentions here result from not only the traumatic conditions of survival and the demand for justice. They derive instead from the difficulties of transcending the identity politics at whose behest genocide took place. Félicite is Hutu, but the fact of her being Hutu cannot temper the burden of responsibility for the genocide, and its attendant guilt. Félicite remains Hutu, and her sacrifices cannot readily transcend the ethnic binaries in which her actions and death are implicated. The experience of genocide renders survivors unable to consider life outside of the flawed identity politics leading to their victimization. Like perpetrators who insistently base the rationale for their actions in the past, survivors too become scavengers of the past in order to make sense of their present and future. But such retrospection, rather than being clarifying, instead contributes to the mysteriousness and indeterminacy of the present. The survivor finds himself or herself inhabiting an aporia, or constant state of undecidability and unknowability. Aware of this, Jessica concludes by noting that “All that [i.e. the genocide] is absolutely unbelievable. Even words aren’t enough. Even words don’t know any more what to say” (96).

Ironically in Murambi, only victims – most especially, those who die – speak about the future with hope. They project themselves into a future that they cannot experience as living people. They prophesy their own ghostly presences in the future, a future already threatened by the burdensome memory of a bloody present. Rosa Karemera is one such victim. A partially crippled granny, Rosa hopes to survive the genocide if only “to see the look on Valérie Rumiya’s face when she runs in to me in the neighbourhood” (99). Valérie is the old cripple’s neighbour. She has gone about searching for Rosa’s corpse and urges the Interahamwe to find and kill her neighbour. Her beef with Rosa is that she claims the old cripple “looks down on everyone” (97). The absurdity of Valérie’s rationale for wanting Rosa
dead – Rosa’s condescension – is not the most terrifying thing about her heinous outlook and intentions for her poor neighbour. Even more disturbing is how the representatives or guardians of communal spirit contribute to fueling the genocide. These are grandmothers at the twilight of their lives. Like Faustin Gasana’s decrepit and ailing father, these elderly people direct the energy of youths towards entirely catastrophic outcomes. Murambi shows that genocide is made possible when such old representatives of tradition and community spirit authorize or support the extermination of their neighbours. The novel does not reveal whether or not Rosa Karemera survives, and her absence haunts its narrative.

The unknown beautiful woman who approaches Jessica to explain about the atrocities of a Catholic priest presents an even more strikingly ghostly appearance. Unlike Rosa, the unknown woman does not hope to survive the genocide. She declares to Jessica “I’m too beautiful to survive. I’m as beautiful as the sun, and like the sun there’s nowhere for me to hide” (91). She already accepts what lies ahead of her. Her physical attractiveness has already sealed her fate as a rape victim. She recounts her ordeal with the Catholic priest, whom she considers deranged. She knows that it is only a matter of time before the inevitable happens. She believes Jessica is destined to survive and serve as the vocal witness of her suffering, and so she reveals the details of her experience so that Jessica can take inventory, and remember.

The unnamed woman’s vision of the future derives in part on the myth of Rwandan unity, a myth that the genocide is already dismantling. The future that the perpetrators imagine rests on a different idea of unity, one that is based on pure Hutu-ness. The unnamed woman’s glimpse of the future predicts the failure of this extreme Hutu vision. In her vision of the future, she sees a united Rwanda, one that is comprised of Hutus, Tutsis, and Twa: “I will be the sun. From up there I’ll have my eyes on you, you the Rwandans. Join together. Aren’t you ashamed, children of Rwanda? Whether someone is Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa, what is it to you?” (95). In her admonitory prophecy for the future, the unknown woman adds the
element of shame to the myth of Rwanda’s future unity. This shame comes from what she calls “this awful business” of genocide. This shame from genocide is what the unknown woman suggests to serve as a new basis for a new Rwandan unity.

Jessica must be the bearer of this ghostly message. She is a different kind of survivor: a strong one who bestrides Rwandan identities; a Tutsi who can pass for Hutu, and one who survives precisely because of this ambivalence. She works against the genocide by becoming complicit in it. During her visit to the Ntarama Catholic Church site four years after the genocide, Jessica encounters the body of her friend Theresa Mukandori, whom she allows to take refuge at the church even when she knows it will be attacked in order not to give up her cover. Like another ghostly presence, Theresa’s “preserved body almost intact” refuses to be dead. A signifier of extreme violence, rape and humiliation, her body “had her head pushed back and the scream extracted from her by the pain had been frozen on her still grimacing face. Her magnificent tresses were disheveled, and her legs wide apart. A stake—of wood or of iron—had remained lodged in her vagina” (73). This broken and abused body, ghostly and present, continues in dialogue with her friend, Jessica:

“Jessie, they’ll never be able to do anything, [Jessica hears her friend say as she enters the church] knowing that God can see them.” The dreadful dialogue with her friend was still going on, four years down the road. [Jessica] thought, with sudden violence: “In those days, Theresa, God was looking elsewhere….” (73)

Jessica’s retort signals the need to be pragmatic and real. God cannot save people from genocide. God too on this view is prone to distractions, indifference, and helplessness. Jessica has no illusions about absolutes and transcendent knowledge; that is why the unknown woman sees in her Rwanda’s future. The ambivalence Jessica personifies speaks for the possibility of transcending the self-hatred upstream of the genocide. Jessica acknowledges
and accepts weakness, and refuses to succumb to mystical thinking when confronted by extreme difficulty. Yet she represents only a possible, and so an uncertain, future in the novel.

No character in the novel exemplifies the self-hate lying behind the Rwandan genocide more than Doctor Joseph Karekezi. Karekezi is married to a Tutsi, a reality he considers the consequence of a youthful mistake that he believes has made him disreputable and insignificant in Rwanda. In the past, he has advocated for Tutsi rights and freedoms. However, suddenly in 1994 he transforms into the prosecutor of one of the largest massacres committed during the genocide. Given his earlier respectability, many victims follow his counsel and take refuge within the grounds of the Murambi Technical School. To further reassure them of his “good” intentions, Karekezi sends his wife and two children to take up residence within the polytechnic. With about 50,000 refugees seeking refuge at the school, he invites soldiers and Hutu Interahamwe to slaughter them. He justifies his actions as a consequence of his sense of duty: “Come what may, I’ll have done my duty. Duty. A simple word that I’m fond of” (100). The duty that Dr. Karekezi references here, as with Faustin Gasana’s ailing father in the first section of *Murambi*, is what he has come to believe as the duty of justice. He claims that the murder of Tutsis does justice to the land, and so serves as a cleansing ritual that must be performed in order to secure a just and better future for Rwanda:

I will feel neither sadness nor remorse. There will be atrocious pain, of course, but only the weak-hearted confuse crime with punishment. Among those vulgar cries, the pure heart of truth will beat. I am not the kind of person who fears the shadows in his own soul. My sole faith is truth. I have no other God. The moaning of the victims is only the devil’s ruse to block the breath of justice and prevent its will to be carried out. (108)
Dr. Karekezi here presents an ideological rationale that justifies the genocide in the name of history and justice. For those thinking this way, the genocide seems to be a consequence of the duty to truth and justice, to reconcile a troubled past with the present in order to ensure a just and moral future. On this view the performance of one’s duty necessitates grave sacrifice, particularly on the part of those who must carry it out. Accordingly his wife Nathalie and two of his children, Julienne and François, eventually must also die: “It’s no one’s fault. At the last minute [Nathalie will] curse me, thinking that I never loved her. That isn’t true. It’s just history that wants blood. And why would I only spill other people’s? Theirs is just as rotten” (107). For Karekezi, “The sadistic way that things sometimes happen is just a detail. The ends justify the means. Nothing else counts” (102). He believes that if he succeeds in eliminating all Tutsis in Rwanda, the future will judge him differently. If he fails, however, the post-genocidal era will judge him differently as well.

Joseph Karekezi seems modelled after the notorious Nazi German doctor Joseph Mengele. In Murambi, Mengele is reconfigured and manifests as a cynical doctor, a humanist transformed into a sadistic, psychopathic killer. Medical doctors, humanists, and priests who transform into perpetrators of genocide challenge conventional ideas on many fronts, thereby shaking the moral and psychological foundations upon which traditional stories have been based. What does such a figure tell us about character motivation? This character dismantles any stable and easy understanding of human actions and motivations. As Karekezi says of himself that he is “neither a monster nor an idiot” (102). He is rather an intelligent and rational person, an ambiguous figure, resisting easy subsumption under such fixed categories as mad, monstrous, or power-mad. His indeterminacy is precisely what makes him significant for thinking about the difficulties of understanding human action in genocidal contexts.

The unnerving exchanges between French Colonel Étienne Perrin and Karekezi reveal even more these difficulties. When Colonel Perrin tries to excuse French complicity in the
genocide by declaring that “Not a single Frenchman shed any Rwandan blood,” Karekezi sniggers and retorts “And me, Colonel Perrin? Look at my hands. Do you think I’ve ever held a machete? I’m a poor little surgeon. I save lives! I’ve never spilled a drop of blood either”

(126). Both men – soldier and doctor – are professionals saddled with the duty of saving lives. What genocide exposes is not simply how professionals become killers. Nor does it just show how an act of life-saving can easily become entangled with the project of genocide. Genocide exposes all of these things in intimately crude ways, but even more so it exposes the destruction of society’s ability to make meaning.

The problem is that the same vocabulary is used by cynical perpetrators to rationalize their atrocities as is used by victims, survivors and bystanders in their attempts to make sense of what has happened to them. Truth and justice, the exact same concepts that Dr. Karekezi appeals to when attempting to justify his actions, transform into meaningless signifiers when bystanders and survivors like Jessica speak about genocide in similar terms. Qader observes this paradox of language in her description of how the Rwandan genocide destroys language and makes every act of justice in post-conflict Rwanda in some way resemble the genocide:

How profoundly terrifying when the project of national reconciliation [in post-genocide Rwanda] shares its vocabulary with the project of the genocide. Even transcendental concepts of “truth” and “justice,” like that of “pity,” witness contamination. Nothing is left untouched. In order not to pass by one’s truth, the ethical demand is to remain vigilant toward language. What the genocide has revealed is that language has lost all essential relationship with truth in the sense of foundational concepts. This loss opens an abyss before the subject. What happens when words such as “justice” and “truth” can provide no ground upon which one can stand in conceptual certainty? The conceptual
contamination dispossesses language of its authority and power to posit.

(Qader 35)

Qader’s argument goes some way to explaining why I think Diop portrays in *Murambi* the contamination of language’s meaning-making capacity. The aporias resulting from genocide, which challenge how we conceptualize reality and make sense of things in an atrocity’s aftermath, account for why *Murambi* understood as a response to the “duty” to remember genocide performs the task of attempting to reclaim language’s meaning-making potential from what *Murambi* depicts as the hell of genocide. Like Soyinka’s *Season of Anomy*, *Murambi* reveals itself to be an attempt to recover meaning and find a moral purpose for the deaths resulting from genocide. This quest for purposefulness is necessary because genocide, even when it fails to realize its ultimate objective, succeeds not only in destroying people but also in disrupting our ability to talk clearly about that destruction. It reverses the meanings of things. Hence the artist’s duty to try to reverse this reversal. The search for meaning – dramatized in *Murambi* as a descent into genocidal hell – is central to Diop’s decolonizing agenda.

**Genocide as Gospel: Cornelius’s Conversion and Quest for the Word**

The first and third sections of the novel provide the context and background for the main story of *Murambi*. This concerns Cornelius Uvimana, a Rwandan exile returning from Djibouti, a small and little-known African country in some ways much like pre-1994 Rwanda. Cornelius, like Diop, arrives in Rwanda four years after the genocide to witness what he believes to be the extermination of all members of his own family, and to write a play about the genocide. The second and fourth sections of the novel, told from a third-person narrative viewpoint, focus on Cornelius’s journey and his evolving consciousness as he encounters the aftermaths of genocide while visiting mass grave sites spread across post-
genocide in Rwanda. His journey to his hometown of Murambi is presented as a descent narrative that Diop emplots katabatically. Murambi figures in the story as the heart of hell within which Cornelius must confront the revelations won during his quest. Murambi is represented by Diop as the bottom of a Dantesque hell. Within it, Cornelius’s guide is his uncle Siméon Habineza who, like the Biblical Simon Peter, “baptizes” Cornelius into ideas and helps him find new insights into human cruelty.

Cornelius has returned to his homeland both as a Rwandan believing that all members of his family perished during the genocide, and as an outsider ignorant of the macro- and micro-dynamics of the genocide and its wake. A history teacher attempting to write about the catastrophe of a country that is both close and faraway at the same time, Cornelius embarks on a soul-searching journey that brings him into deep reflection on the nature of the self-hate lying at the genocide’s core. His quest forces him to confront dilemmas inherent in myths about Rwanda, and within himself.

The multiple significations of the character’s name highlight Diop’s investment in dramatizing Cornelius’s relation to these dilemmas. As some critics have observed, the choice of the name “Cornelius”3 for this character suggests an allusion “both to the sharp ‘horns’ of a dilemma and to the cornelian quandaries such dilemmas create” (Arnould-Bloomfield 508). Cornelius’s link to the French “corne” reinforces some kind of a connection to the tradition of the French tragedian Pierre Corneille (1606-84), one of the three great French dramatists of the seventeenth century.4 Corneille’s tragic heroes are often described in French as héra cordélien (the Cornelian hero), and unlike the héra racinien (the Racinien hero) created by Corneille’s great rival Jean Racine (1639-99), they are oriented to duty and

---

3 Etymologically, the name derives from the French “corne,” itself a descendent of the Latin “cornū.”
4 The other two dramatists are the comedian Jean-Baptiste Poqueline Moliere and the tragedian Jean Racine.
sacrifice more than to love.\textsuperscript{5} The resemblance of Diop’s Cornelius to the Cornelian hero suggests that through this characterization Murambi highlights some of the quandaries and difficulties that encounters with genocide inevitably entail.

A peculiar feature of Corneille’s tragedies, particularly evident in the four plays that comprise what scholars describe as his “Classical Tetralogy” due to his works’ strict adherence to ancient Greco-Roman dramatic conventions, is the elevation of certain considerations of “virtue” over crime or above complicity in atrocity. For example, in Corneille’s \textit{Horace}, the eponymous hero is pardoned for brutally murdering his own sister because of the benefits arising from his brutality on behalf of Rome. His sister denounces the latter and is struck down in her turn. Horace however receives a pardon in consideration of the very same acts that his sister condemns. Declaring him pardoned, the King notes that Horace’s recourse to violent force, which he describes as a “Virtue,” has saved Rome from its enemies and so sets the perpetrator above his crimes: “\textit{Ta vertu met ta gloire au-dessus de ton crime}” [“Your ‘virtue’ puts your ‘renown’ above your crime”] (V. iii. 1760). The King’s definition of “Virtue” here is not what matters so much as his privileging service on behalf of the kingdom over the moral and legal demands of fratricide. In \textit{Cinna}, another play from the Classical Tetralogy, the Emperor Augustus has to pardon the traitorous Cinna in order to ensure the future security of the Roman Empire. Just like the pardoning of loyal Horace, Auguste’s pardoning of Cinna also places political duty above personal integrity. In both plays, the Sovereign’s pardon wins the allegiance of the masses.\textsuperscript{6} The affinity between Diop’s Cornelius and the Cornelian hero touches on the character’s situation of dilemma and also his inclination to the “virtues” of duty following genocide. Cornelius’s resemblance to the


\textsuperscript{6} In yet another play from the Classical Tetralogy, \textit{Polyeucte}, the eponymous hero offers himself for what he believes to be a bigger duty than allegiance to empire and family. His ultimate sacrifice for Christianity instigates revolution against the pagan Roman Empire.
Cornelian hero provides a context for explaining the quandary surrounding his quest in *Murambi*. In the novel, Cornelius has to confront the dilemma of writing as an ethical duty to a memory of genocide in which his own father (acting upon the notion of duty) organizes the murder of his own mother and siblings. Cornelius’s characterization in *Murambi* hinges on identifying his duty to the memory of genocide and the way to render such a duty.

However, while the allusions to Corneille are helpful in explaining his dilemma in *Murambi*, a more central trope in the novel relates to the Biblical story of the Gentiles’ conversion to Christianity. Cornelius’s journey to Murambi and his encounter with his uncle Siméon Habineza echoes the Biblical Cornelius’s encounter with Apostle Simon Peter. In the Biblical account, Cornelius is a Roman centurion and the first Gentile convert to Christianity. He is in search of truth and personal redemption, just like Cornelius who arrives Rwanda an outsider, a non-initiate, in search of the truth about the destruction of his family.

The Biblical Cornelius is on a journey of self-discovery and his meeting with Simon Peter results in his baptism. This baptism serves as a gateway through which the traumatic gospel of Jesus’s death and resurrection passes and spreads to other parts of the world. In Christian theology, Cornelius’s conversion signifies the freeing of the Christian gospel from a Jewish-centric, Zionist mission (Donaldson 450). Likewise, we can consider the Biblical Cornelius’s story as a metaphor in *Murambi* that implicitly challenges and displaces the narrative supremacy of the Jewish Holocaust and ideas about this genocide’s uniqueness. In other words, Diop indirectly advocates against patterns of exceptionalist thinking in post-genocidal African contexts and proposes instead that we turn memories of genocidal atrocities into a kind of moral creed suited to the needs and demands of African decolonization.

Diop invests heavily in the redemptive message of Christianity. This redemptive message centred on death and resurrection emphasizes an introspective quest towards truth.
As suggested in the Bible⁷ and dramatized in Murambi, truth holds the key to self-emancipation. Cornelius’s journey to his hometown of Murambi presents in the story as a search for such kind of self-emancipatory truth. At first, Cornelius sees his return to Rwanda as an attempt to reconnect with his past and reckon with a history of violence that resulted in the annihilation of his family:

To come back to one’s country—to be happy there or to suffer—was a rebirth, but he didn’t want to become someone without a past. He was the sum of everything he had experienced. His faults. His cowardliness. His hopes. He wanted to know, down to the very last detail, how his family had been massacred. In Murambi, Siméon Habineza would tell him everything. He had to. (44)

What is revealed here is a man attempting to recover his family’s story from the troubled narrative of his country. The recovery of this story is at one and the same time Cornelius’ search for his own place in Rwanda, and so a search for a subject-position entitled to speak on behalf of those who cannot speak for themselves. In the initial stages of his quest, Cornelius hopes to write a play about the genocide. He plots it to resemble a historical play, which he hopes to stage in acknowledgment of his own duty to his country. He thinks of his play as dramatizing the colonial origins of Rwanda’s problems, one that could be used to help him commune with the country he has been estranged from since the age of 12.⁸

One evening, after consuming lots of alcohol, Cornelius recounts his thoughts about the play to a man named Roger who is suspected “of having behaved badly during the events,” (54) even though he claims to have saved the lives of twenty people at the time.

---

⁷ “Then you will know the truth and the truth will set you free” (John 8: 32).
⁸ Siméon Habineza smuggled him out of Rwanda in order to protect him and his friends, Jessica and Stanley, from attacks against the Tutsi.
Cornelius’s plot pivots on a French commander, General Perrichon, whose cat suddenly goes missing in the midst of the genocide. The General suspects his Ethiopian gardener is responsible, but he is unable to interrogate the suspect because the gardener has also disappeared. The cat is important to the General because it is the bearer of classified information. General Perrichon enlists the services of two Rwandans – Pierre Intera and Jacques Hamwe – to find his cat. Pierre Intera and Jacques Hamwe represent the Hutu extremist militia, Interahamwe. In Cornelius’s imagined play, these two go about with their machetes searching for the General’s missing gardener in order to retrieve the General’s cat.

Alarmed by the idea behind Cornelius’s play, Roger asks how things will end and whether or not the General will find his missing cat. Cornelius replies,

“Oh no! You don’t know me very well, I’m not going to let that half-wit of a General Perrichon have his way. Oh yes, I forgot to tell you, all that time his wife hasn’t stopped blubbering. She’s going to leave him, because she won’t have anything to do with a general who’s incapable of protecting a cat from an Ethiopian gardener in times of war. He’s going to go crazy with sorrow and at the end he’s going to wander on to the stage going ‘meow… meow…’” (58-59)

Cornelius’s overly abstract and conceptual play reveals the returnee’s misapprehension of the realities of the Rwandan Genocide. First, its satirical purpose notwithstanding, the play is built around a conceit that imagines Tutsis as Ethiopian migrants to Rwanda. Troublingly, this might seem to give credence to the Cushitic myth evoked during the genocide (i.e. that Tutsis were interlopers originating in Ethiopia) in the name of which Rwandan Tutsis were systematically massacred. Secondly, Cornelius’s play presents an instance of reductionist thinking in so far as it represents the genocide as essentially the byproduct of trivial pastimes
of the French in connivance with Hutu extremists. The history of violence in Rwanda, as Cornelius understands it at this early stage in the story, is specifically the result of earlier European colonization. In his view, Rwandans were one people living in harmony until the Europeans arrived. This mythical Rwandan past is what Cornelius talks about in Djibouti: the myth of Rwandan unity, of a people living as one people until Europeans arrived with their divisive ideas and practices. This myth is not of course particularly Rwandan. It is however one frequently cited by anticolonial activists who view black Africans as brothers and sisters, as a people split apart by ignorant and unsympathetic European invaders and colonizers.

In his book *Silences in African History*, Congolese historian, Jacques Depelchin denounces work by African and non-African scholars that restricts the view of history on the continent to just the activities of European colonization. In response to studies such as V.Y. Mudimbe’s *The Invention of Africa* which imply that European colonization was the most active period in Africa’s history, Depelchin asks, “in a colonizing process which started with Atlantic slavery, what criteria would define which period was the most active?” (15). Depelchin dismisses novels such as Chinua Achebe’s *Things Fall Apart* for giving a misleading impression that African societies began falling apart with the institutionalization of European colonialism in the nineteenth century. According to Depelchin, long before the nineteenth century, the slave trade implicated several African communities in the conquest and destruction of others, causing immense harm to many societies on the continent. Curiously, anticolonial narratives muffled the broader and more distant histories of diversities and differences on the continent in favour of a mythology of black African unity given political expression in the anticolonial discourse of pan-Africanism. This invidious mythology, for Depelchin, offers both “physical and psychic comfort” (153) to those seeking

---

9 Yet Depelchin’s emphasis on the Atlantic slave trade that centres the beginnings of Congolese experience of European violence is equally narrow and not addressed to broader historical realities on the African continent, including the activities of Arabs and histories of African empires.
to galvanize efforts to confront a common foe. In order to do so effectively, important aspects of the past must be discarded and forgotten in favour of an emphasis on shared suffering caused by a single, alien foe. The failures of African anticolonial struggles and activism, according to Depelchin, have been on their perpetuation of thinking similar to European colonial practice that imagined Africans as belonging to a racialized community of siblings, endorsing a mythology of a united black African race and hence failing to take seriously the important differences and divisions within its ranks that European colonists exploited.

Cornelius is vigorously committed to this myth of unity, and is therefore recognizable as an African historian of the ken that Depelchin denounces. A major problem with crusaders on behalf of this myth is that they oftentimes make the case for African unity by silencing any acknowledgment of the very real violence and dissensions among and between Africans. Each time this mythology is confronted and challenged by brutal events such as genocide, it assigns the primary blame for the violence to Europeans. When this view is challenged, those who espouse it frequently point out that their interlocutors are insufficiently morally and politically well-informed. This is the attitude Cornelius evinces when his fiancée in Djibouti, Zakya, challenges him about his claims about Rwandan oneness:

Zakya was not easy to convince. One day when he found her a little reticent, he explained to her that there had never been any ethnic groups in Rwanda and that nothing distinguished the Twa, the Hutu, and the Tutsi. Straightaway a flash ran across Zakya’s face. Worried that that meant she might be taking him for a liar, he threw himself into some rather chaotic explanations. “We have the same language, the same God, Imana, the same beliefs. Nothing divides us.”—“Yes, it does,” replied Zakya spitefully: “between you there’s this river of blood. After all, that’s not nothing. Stop making things up.” Then she
added, “I’m not an idiot, and you’ve got to tackle the problems of your
country in some other way if you want to solve them.” (66)

Zakya challenges the basis of Cornelius’s claim that there exists some kind of an indelible Rwandan unity. She is aware that the lived reality of the categories of Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa cannot mean nothing for those assigned to them. Some version of these categories existed even before colonial times, and became the basis upon which colonizers politicized ethnic identities in Rwanda (Mamdani 13-14). In the context of the genocide, this myth of a prelapsarian Rwandan unity was laid bare, and destroyed. For those who lived through these events there had to be a new and usable mythology created that was capable of addressing and offering ways through the problems of the present. Zakya’s spiteful reply is an admonishment to the school of thinking that Cornelius represents, at least at this stage in the novel. In reacting to his reductive and simplistic utopianism Zakya challenges Cornelius to confront realities of violence by not forgetting the “materiality [of the river of blood separating people], not [effacing] it in favor of some mythical symbolic ideal of unity” (Qader 26).

Part of the problem with Cornelius’s play is that it opts for a symbolization of material reality, thereby reducing the reality of Rwanda’s genocide to the convenient mythology of African suffering as it was caused by European colonialism. As a Rwandan exile returning to his homeland with the belief that his whole family has been murdered, Cornelius’s play exposes the ironies of his self-righteous anger against colonization. He fails to apprehend his own involvement in Rwanda’s history of genocide. This attitude of righteous and ignorant self-denial is what Cornelius’s journey to Murambi redresses. A Gentile in search of the Holy Grail, Cornelius’s conversion has to begin with deeper soul-searching. His initial encounters at different massacre sites before reaching Murambi prepare him to confront what he comes to recognize as his own complicity in a genocide he would
rather wish was caused by Europeans. By the time he realizes that the massacre of about 50,000 victims at the polytechnic in Murambi is the handiwork of his own father, Dr. Joseph Karekezi, Cornelius’s conversion journey reaches its crux. The story of the genocide from this point onwards suddenly transforms for Cornelius into a personal story, the story of his coming to grips with the knowledge that he is the son of a “monster” (179). He now understands why survivors have looked upon him with curiosity, and why one Murambi survivor, Gérard, has been so angry that he has even considered killing him.

In Murambi Cornelius meets his uncle Siméon Habineza. Unlike all his other guardians at different mass grave sites – Jessica, Stan, Roger, Gérard – Siméon is the guardian not of a location of mass atrocity but of Dr. Karekezi’s house, Cornelius’s childhood home. Cornelius’s return to Murambi thus becomes a return to home, to a past, to a flawed childhood and to the need to reckon with what it means to be complicit in genocide. In his return, Siméon encourages Cornelius to be like

the solitary traveler […] If he gets lost, he looks up at the sky and the trees, he looks all around him. But the traveler could have said to himself, bending down toward the ground: “I’m going to ask the path, who has been here for such a long time, he’ll surely be able to help me.” Now, the path will never show him the way to go. The path does not know the way. (167)

Siméon’s words invite Cornelius to undertake a process of self-examination. Mythology and tradition cannot provide answers to the riddles of his existence. Cornelius must find his own answers within himself. So too must everyone else attempting to come to terms with the genocide in Rwanda. When Cornelius confides in Siméon his frustrations and inabilities as a writer to articulate the genocide in his writing, the old guardian replies that “There are no words to speak to the dead […] They won’t get up to answer you. What you’ll learn there [at
the Murambi massacre site] is that everything is quite over for the dead of Murambi. And maybe then you’ll respect human life more” (167-68). Siméon’s retort is not a denouncement of the power of words to render the experience of genocide. Rather, he cautions against the temptation to approach massacre sites hoping to find divine inspiration. In Siméon’s caution lies the essence of Diop’s attempt to modify the terms of Biblical conversion story. Encountering victims’ mutilated corpses cannot inspire lofty visions of existence. Instead, in Murambi Cornelius’s encounter with his own family’s complicity and victimhood prompts a new awareness of things that requires further introspection and self-reform.

Siméon’s attitude towards genocide in its aftermath contrasts with Gérard’s. The latter denounces the power of words (fiction) to serve as a useful response to genocide. Gérard describes to Cornelius how he survives the Murambi massacre by taking refuge under a heap of corpses whose blood he swallows to stay alive. This experience leaves him guilty and despondent, and results in his declaration to Cornelius that the words used to represent genocide are uselessness: “And all the beautiful words of the poets, Cornelius, can say nothing, I swear to you, of the fifty thousand ways to die like a dog, within a few hours” (175). For Gérard, words hold conceits and sell misleading impressions that grant their speakers and hearers a kind of ease. Words are also of course complicit in the Rwandan atrocities and so must not be regarded as innocent instruments useful for appeasing the dead. “It’s important that you believe me,” Gérard says, “I’m not making it up, for once that’s not necessary. If you prefer to think that I imagined these horrors your mind will be at peace and that’s not good. This pain will get lost on opaque words and everything will be forgotten until the next massacre” (176). Gérard’s anxiety echoes those of survivors who encouraged Diop not to write about the genocide in the first place. At the same time, however, it is only via words that Gérard can hope to share his experience and encourage Cornelius to believe him.
Like Diop, Cornelius refuses to accept that words fail to animate the experience of genocide. As with Ofeyi in Soyinka’s *Season of Anomy*, Cornelius sees in words the potential for a different kind of use. In part, Cornelius’s insistence on the potential of words to serve as some kind of a valuable response to genocide results from his encounter with Siméon. Like the Biblical Simon Peter, whose baptism of the Roman centurion causes the convert to epiphanically speak in tongues, Siméon’s guidance prompts his nephew onto a new awareness of himself. Siméon is not some ancient sage like Pa Ahime, the guardian of Aiyéró in Soyinka’s *Season of Anomy* who advocates for a return to an ideal tradition. Nor does he speak about self-discovery in abstract terms. His vision of self-awareness is strongly political and it does not excuse colonization as a major instigator of violence in Rwanda. However, Siméon also does not hold colonization solely responsible for the failures in Rwanda. According to Siméon, the journey of arresting a troubled history must begin with a new awareness of the self, a knowledge of the self-hatred that impelled atrocity in the first place: “I know the damage foreigners did to us, four years ago and well before. But that damage was only possible because we were not free people. Have we ever been bothered by our chains? Sometimes I think not. We can’t hold our own lack of pride against anybody else” (171).

That said, interpreting Cornelius’s quest as ultimately one about finding his own artistic voice reduces *Murambi*’s significance since it takes the novel to be primarily about representation. This creates the impression that Diop understands writing to serve as an expression of duty to a genocide’s memory. In addition, *Murambi* does not dramatize aesthetic realism and conspicuously draw attention to style as the main goal of Cornelius’s quest, since the novel opens with testimonials and chronicles – that is, with realist modes of narration – and closes with a fictional mode. In fact, as Elisabeth Arnould-Bloomfield suggests, the novel’s organization can plausibly be read as a rejection of testamentary
approaches to genocide since it opens with chronicles and closes by privileging a third-person fictional narration. While the challenges of representation are prevalent in Murambi, the pivot of the story revolves instead around a moral vision that is less concerned with style than it is with content.

What seems most consistent in Cornelius’s journey to Murambi is not the dramatization of the trip’s representational challenges. Rather it is the novel’s emphasis on the nature and uses of speech. The topoi of the Biblical story of the Roman centurion in Murambi supports Arnould-Bloomfield’s argument about the overarching goal of Diop’s novel: “its power does not consist simply in looking but in speaking, and the critical context in which the writer’s task must be read is not that of the events’ true representation but of writing’s commitment to freedom and change” (509). Diop like Soyinka advocates against cynicism, supporting the notion that writing about genocide should have a positive purpose. As Cornelius demonstrates in Murambi, writing about genocide must serve as an instrument of decolonization. Cornelius’s vision of decolonization is one that begins with an acknowledgment of own complicity by virtue of his father’s roles in the historical “sin” of genocide. This acknowledgement requires the creation of a new consciousness, a new self-awareness that confronts Africa’s history pragmatically, accepts responsibility for African failures and constructs practical basis for African decolonization and dignity. Through Siméon Habineza, Cornelius comes to understand the Rwandan genocide as an expression of African self-hatred for which the dead contribute to “the resurrection of the living” (181). To resurrect the living echoes the redemptive message of Christianity and means in this context the moral use of genocide for decolonizing purposes, that is, for reorienting the African mind.

However, Cornelius’s conversion journey in Murambi raises questions about the nature of the “sin” for which he seeks redemption. In the novel, Cornelius’s sin – in the fashion of Biblical Original Sin – is given as one that is based on his “blood” ties to a father
who has perpetrated great evil. His sin is not his per se. Rather it is his sin by biological
association. Curiously, this conception of Cornelius’s moral burden in Murambi is not too
different from the rationale inherent in the biological racism fuelling the Rwandan genocide
against the Tutsis. Both rationales place moral responsibility on individuals due to their
perceived or actual biological connections to others. This is the rationale that feeds
Cornelius’s acceptance of his own complicity and victimization in the genocide. His
redemption follows his recognition and acknowledgement of this complicity, which in turn
leads him to conclude that his writing must be directed towards atoning for his father’s
cries. This atonement, as he envisions it, involves collecting traumatic stories about
genocide to use them as a kind of gospel intended to cause similar self-reflection in others.

This vision of redemption and atonement can be read as a quasi-theological response
to genocide in its aftermath. Following from this theological vision, the image of African
decolonization that emerges from Murambi is that of the African individual coming to terms
with the complexity of his selfhood and his complicity in the violence to which he has been
subjected. The political preconditions of genocide – contests over territory, resources, and
political control of the country – do not figure in Cornelius’s commitment to write genocide.
Cornelius would rather put his writing in the service of a kind of preaching (of African self-
love and education). He encourages us to think about Rwanda’s genocide as a symptom of an
identity crisis, and in the process ignores aspects of the tragedy that allow it to be read as the
violent expression of a political crisis so severe that it requires a new kind of political
solution distinct from those more usually associated with the cessation of war. In short,
Murambi provides no imaginative horizon for rethinking Rwanda politically, or for
addressing the continuing and unresolved political tensions in the country.
Conclusion

In this chapter, I have discussed Diop’s preoccupation with the theme of African decolonization as it is evident in his novel *Murambi*. This decolonization theme is, I contend, dramatized in the novel by Cornelius’s journey to his hometown of Murambi some years after the 1994 genocide. I argue that Cornelius’s quest to Murambi deliberately parallels the Biblical story of the Roman centurion Cornelius’s conversion journey to meet Apostle Simon Peter. I have attempted to show that Cornelius’s journey to Murambi reveals Diop’s efforts to advance a conception of Rwandan genocide representations as functioning like some kind of gospel.

The aim of this genocidal trauma-gospel is to bolster individual self-reflection, self-awareness and self-love. Accordingly, the vision of post-genocidal decolonization in *Murambi* revolves centrally around introspection. I have argued that while this vision is useful for tasking Africans with taking responsibility for their own complicity in atrocities, it does not envision prospects and mechanisms for political decolonization. The commitment of Diop’s vision is thus finally more moral-theological than it is political in ways that undercut his novel’s decolonizing agenda.
Chapter 5

Witnessing the Rwandan Genocide: Pornography in Courtemanche’s *A Sunday at the Pool in Kigali*

Introduction

In this chapter, I discuss Gil Courtemanche’s *A Sunday at the Pool in Kigali* (subsequently *Sunday*) as comprised of a pornographic imagination of Rwandan Genocide – the language here chosen deliberately to reflect pornography’s excessive drama and conflation of sex and violence. The novel’s pornographic representation of genocide is most apparent in its depiction of genocide as an orgiastic spectacle of violence. I discuss some of the stakes involved in Courtemanche’s pornographic imagining of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide that spectacularizes suffering as a way to imagine genocide, condemn it, learn from it, and force one’s perception beyond it.

*Sunday* was first published in French in 2000 as *Dimanche à la piscine à Kigali*. It chronicles the romantic escapades of an aging French-Canadian journalist, Bernard Valcourt, during the 1994 genocide. The novel was translated into English by Patricia Claxton in 2003. Upon publication, it became an international bestseller, winning the 2001 Canada’s Prix des Libraires book of the year and CBC’s Canada Reads French Language contest in 2005 (Dawes 29). In 2006, Lyla Films released a film adaptation of the novel titled, *Un Dimanche à Kigali* (*A Sunday in Kigali*), in Montreal, Canada. Some reviews of the novel praised it for its “humanist accents which could easily find a place next to the works of Albert Camus and Graham Greene” (Paen, “Bye Bye 2000”), as well as for its intimate staging of genocide as “a gentle love story” (Sullivan, “When Truth Is Plainer Than fiction”). Michael Keren appraises the novel as an “authentic account of the events” (25) of the Rwandan Genocide created from a Canadian bystander perspective.
However, some important critics of Sunday have disapproved of the novel’s pornographic representation of genocide. For example, Heike Härting describes Courtemanche’s Sunday as a “pornographic narrative” (69) that sexualizes violence. This sexualisation of violence in the novel, for Härting, may have been done “to demonstrate the intersections between Rwanda’s genocide and the spread of HIV/AIDS” (70) in Rwanda and to highlight Western exploitation of Africa. Härting argues that notwithstanding the writer’s intentions the novel’s “gratuitous and pornographic scenes of apocalyptic sexual frenzy clamor for moral affect and perpetuate normative representations of Africa as a site of intimacy and abjection rather than shock readers into political consciousness” (66). The charge that Sunday is pornographic results from its graphic description of sex and violence. Härting’s criticism echoes a prevailing moral anxiety over mass atrocity representations and not least Western representations of racialized Others in popular media, culture and literature. The claim is often that such “pornographic imagination” of the Other’s suffering participates in further dehumanizing the Other by trivializing the experience of suffering through its representation and transformation into a cultural object of pleasure.

Confronted with criticisms that his novel is senselessly racist and pornographic, and that it represents an old Canadian male journalist’s sexual fantasies of Rwandan women, Courtemanche has responded, thus: ‘‘They ask, ‘How come a white man can write about the sexual life of a black woman?’ But curiously enough, the black women I met in Rwanda come back and say, ‘Thanks for writing that.’ They whisper in my ear because they wouldn’t like their husbands to hear’’ (qtd. in Dawes 32).

Both in this kind of authorial response and in the novel’s general depiction of love, sex, and violence, the charges that Sunday is racist and pornographic, and that it trivializes the experience of genocide, are hard to dislodge. James Dawes’s response both to the novel and to Courtemanche’s response to his critics sums up this charge most acutely. For Dawes,
in Courtemanche’s novel, the Rwandan Genocide serves primarily as “an occasion for whites to fantasize about themselves […] through the inversion of racist stereotypes: black women whisper secretly in the ears of the white man, who is more desirable, and more free in his desire, than hapless black cuckolds” (33).

While not disagreeing with this criticism of *Sunday* as pornographic, my intention here is rather to critique the novel for what it offers without presuming that pornography is a morally inappropriate representational form for writing genocide. Oftentimes, in the context of mass atrocity representation, “pornography” has been used without a clear definition to dismiss literary representations of atrocity as an expression of moral degeneracy and immoral cultural practice. This rather puritan attitude to literary explicitness towards sex and violence is in part what I hope to separate out from my reading of Courtemanche’s *Sunday*. Focusing on representative extracts from *Sunday*, I will argue subsequently that Courtemanche’s novel is pornographic and that its pornographic imagination of Rwandan Genocide is indicative of the writer’s endeavour to show the cultural, moral and political decadence that instigated genocide. While in my overall analysis I fault Courtemanche’s pornographic imagination for its racism, my argument is not based on the moral assumption that pornography (in whatever way it is defined) is inherently immoral and inadequate as a representational approach to genocide. If anything, I contend that the nature of the brutality unleashed in Rwanda inexorably elicits pornographic responses, even if only as authentic witness accounts to atrocities. Lest my discussion of pornography in Courtemanche’s *Sunday* be considered vague, it is important to first consider the following questions of what is meant by pornography and how it came to signify an inadequate representational approach to writing mass atrocity.
Pornography and Genocide

As a working definition, I use pornography in the context of literature to suggest the representation of reality through explicit dramatizations of sexual practice. There is still no generally accepted definition of pornography. Etymologically, pornography derives from the Greek word “pornographos” suggesting writing or illustration about prostitutes or harlots (Merriam-Webster Dictionary). In this sense, pornography implies writing or illustration meant to titillate or to create sexual sensation in its audience. From the 1950s, an additional meaning of the word emerged to refer “to a depiction of sensational material (such as violence) in order to elicit a reaction” (Merriam-Webster Dictionary). Since then, the term has come to be defined in different ways based on the ideological perspective used to define it. Some of the definitional problems associated with pornography are not so much about the word as about the nature of materials so-designated. Ranging from the nature of sexual and violent content considered pornographic to moral concerns over explicit depiction of sexual practice and violence, “pornography” came to signify expressions of moral disapproval over certain representations of sexuality and violence.

The historian Carolyn J. Dean has noted that particularly since the 1960s and mostly in response to representations of the Holocaust, there has been a remarkably sustained expression of anxieties over what several critics have described as the pornography of violence and suffering undergirding post-World War II Western visual culture. These anxieties are premised on claims suggesting that the culture of humanitarian advocacy that “advertises” the undignified and dehumanized suffering body in supposed attempts to generate empathy and compassion for it ended up creating emotional, psychic and even political distance in those viewing this suffering body. The phrase “empathy fatigue” or
“compassion fatigue”\(^1\) has come to delineate what scholars, journalists and humanitarian advocates characterize as a desensitization of feeling due to the proliferation of spectacles of human suffering and abjectness. The reason often adduced to this seemingly moral numbness in society’s encounter with the suffering body from war and mass atrocity contexts is what several critics claim is a pornographic representation of violence. The notion of what constitutes pornographic representation of violence generally ranges from claims about the sexualisation of suffering and violence to the nature of explicit details of violence and sex in literary and media forms.

In the context of mass atrocity representation, the term pornography came to assume both literal and metaphorical significance in criticisms of “an often eroticized objectification of pain” (Dean 91). Pornography, in the sense in which it has come to be used in relation to representations of mass atrocity, suggests a tendency to turn the violated body and the indignity of pain into objects of pleasure. As Dean explains, this usage of the term “pornography” to suggest cultural degeneracy encouraging gratification in the suffering and dehumanization of others gained popularity especially in criticisms of Holocaust representations. Critics, notes Dean, “frequently use the term ‘pornography’ to describe the ‘marketing’ of the Holocaust, presumably to describe the reduction of human beings to commodities, the exposure of vulnerable people at the moment of their most profound suffering, and thus their victimization all over again” (Dean 91).

This description of pornography as a morally offensive representation has relied on an evolution of cultural perception that is suspicious of our responses to “bodily suffering” (Dean 91). The moral sentiment behind this suspicion of how the body is used to depict

---

\(^1\) On discourses highlighting this trend of empathy fatigue based on over-exposure to images of suffering, see, e.g., Cohen, *States of Denial*; Lifton, and Mitchell, eds., *Hiroshima in America*; Orwin, “Distant Compassion”; Moeller, *Compassion Fatigue*; Boltanski, *Distant Suffering*; and Dean, “Empathy, Pornography, and Suffering.”
suffering arose in part after World War I as a response to widespread belief that the Great War sapped [Western] society of moral character. The term “pornography” came to signify this cultural and moral decay, “the aimless and compulsive pursuit of self-gratifying pleasure and the depletion of will, discipline, and therefore, dignity” (Dean 91). Images of war dead began to be described as “pornographic” to imply that “they no longer always revealed the tragically annihilated presence of [human] dignity but [that these images] reduced men’s sacred bodies to objects of excitement, pleasure, or domination and thereby further violated the dead or demeaned” (Dean 91). The moral sentiment linking pornography to cultural decadence found even stronger acceptance in criticisms of not just Holocaust representation but also of the social condition of anomie believed by many commentators to be behind the Holocaust.

As far back as 1965 in an essay titled “Night Words: High Pornography and Human Privacy,” George Steiner makes a connection between what he calls “the ‘total freedom’ of the uncensored erotic imagination” since the nineteenth century and “the total freedom of sadists” (18). This uncensored freedom and attitude regarding sexual perversion disguised as art, for Steiner, characterizes the pornographic mindset and culture that encouraged Nazi SS guards: “The novels being produced under the new code of total statement shout at their personages: strip, fornicate, perform this or that act of sexual perversion. So did the S.S. guards at rows of living men and women” (18). Although in this essay Steiner does not designate representations of the Holocaust as pornographic, his thoughts partake in what would become a cultural anxiety that holds the proliferation of the pornographic accounts of the Holocaust accountable for the profanation of Holocaust memories.

Writing in her 1977 book, The Jewish Presence, Lucy Dawidowicz laments the mutual invigoration Nazism and pornography share, or as Susanne Kappeler puts it, “Nazi sadism is a stock in trade of pornography, and one of the most marketable ones at that” (92).
Alvin H. Rosenfeld also finds a shift in Holocaust representation “from places where mass suffering once was, prurience has come to be” (60). Holocaust representations in film and literature have also received scrutiny regarding their depictions of sex and violence. For example, Steven Spielberg’s film, *Schindler’s List* received different and varying labels as a pornography of suffering.² Likewise, several reviewers of Jerzy Kosinski’s novel *The Painted Bird* and D. M. Thomas’s novel, *The White Hotel*, dismissed them as merely pornographies of violence, serving only the demands of a decadent cultural enterprise.³ In a number of these linkages made between Holocaust representation and pornography, writers and scholars alike invoke the Holocaust “as a fragile body of memory increasingly subject to violation” (Dean 101). Writing in *Selling the Holocaust*, Tim Cole in like manner expresses guilt during his first trip to Auschwitz. He regards his encounter with concentration camp sites as immoral and pornographic: “We were tourists of guilt and righteousness: guilt at an almost pornographic sense of expectancy of the voyeurism ahead” (97). As a tourist to concentration camp sites, Cole sees himself titillated by expectancy of what he is about to encounter at the sites. For Cole, secondary witnesses at these sites, especially when tourists or historians, are voyeurs because they are aware of an excitement of a sexual kind that such encounters with concentration camp sites arouse in them (113-4).

Related claims about Holocaust pornography trailed the opening of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in 1993. The journalist Philip Gourevitch criticizes the US Holocaust Memorial Museum as one that could potentially induce pleasure and excitement in visitors (Gourevitch, “Behold Now Behemoth” 55-62). Michael Sorkin dismisses what he

---


³ For discussions of some of these criticisms of Kosinski’s novel, see, e.g., Cahill, “Kosinski and His Critics” 66–68; Finkelstein, *The Holocaust Industry*; Vice, *Holocaust Fiction*. Some other popular Holocaust novels received related criticism as pornographic writing. For example, see Michael Rothberg’s criticism of Philip Roth’s novels in *Traumatic Realism*. For a contrary reading of Thomas’s novel as not pornographic, see, e.g., Granofsky, “The Pornographic Mind and *The White Hotel*” 44-56.
sees in the Museum’s propensity to provide excessive details concerning victims’ suffering in ways that always create “entertainment, even pornography” (74). These kinds of responses to the Museum and other cultural memories and representations of the Holocaust are what make Dean to suggest that the use of “pornography” to criticize certain Holocaust and other mass atrocity representations is a product of an association of “visual cognition with human degradation and violation” (93). This association of visual cognition with human degradation links “pornography” to visual culture in a way that regards pornography as one of the excesses of modern mass media practice. As a kind of excess alluding to degraded and inappropriate sexual behaviour and the profanation of the sacred dignity of the body, pornography has come to be taken as a threat to any empathetic connection with the Other’s suffering, a threat intensified by pornography’s capacity to numb our moral feelings.

Regarding representations of African suffering, especially in the West and/or in those works on the topic produced for Western consumption, related notions of a pornography of African suffering is pervasive. Linkages between Holocaust representations and pornography are found in criticisms of media and especially cultural representations of genocides of Igbos in Nigeria and Tutsis in Rwanda. Although, as Lasse Heerten observes in the context of Biafra in his book The Biafran War and Postcolonial Humanitarianism, the Western media appropriated a pornographic iconography of the Holocaust in order to render African mass atrocities thinkable as genocide, and by so doing participated in rendering the Holocaust thinkable as the ur-genocide, similar expressions of moral outrage in the context of the Holocaust against what some critics see as pornography’s degrading practice echo in African mass atrocity contexts.

The moral disgust with this supposed pornography of suffering derives from assumptions about pornography’s capacity to dehumanize victims over again. Such themes concerning pornographic media representations of the 1994 Rwandan genocide pervade some
of the contributions in the edited collection entitled *The Media and the Rwanda Genocide*, by Allan Thompson. As Steven Livingston observes in the context of Western media representation of Rwanda’s genocide, the assumption behind such oftentimes-pornographic depiction of distant suffering is that it can influence policy responses. Livingston like several others dismisses this form of media coverage and the policies they instigate as irresponsible.  

Similarly, Stanley Cohen writing in his book *States of Denial* quotes a human rights activist condemning humanitarian and media representations of African suffering because of the pornographic suggestiveness of these depictions: “The public display of an African child with bloated kwashiorkor-ridden stomach in advertisements is pornographic, because it exposes something in human life that is as delicate and deeply personal as sexuality, that is, suffering. It puts people’s bodies, their misery, their grief and their fears on display” (178). The moral anxiety in the quotation above comes from the assumption that the body is sacred and that the body in pain should belong in a sacred and private domain. To display it publicly amounts to its profanation.

Yet, we know that suffering has both a private and public aspect. Oftentimes, corpses from mass atrocity contexts left to decompose, say, by the roadside already reside in a public space. In this sense, we must ask, is it the journalist’s camera or the writer’s word that is making these bodies public, or else the real violators of these bodies? Put differently, is representing violated bodies in their moment of indignity an immoral act? This question is even more relevant in the context of Rwanda, because following the genocide, the Rwandan government in a bid to affirm the genocide to the world decided to leave some victims’

---

bodies at the massacre sites where they were killed by Hutu extremists, a decision that many critics condemn as encouraging dark and genocide tourism.\(^5\)

Two points are worth noting here regarding some of the prevailing claims about the relation of pornography to atrocity representations. These points can be misleading, and so require careful clarification. The first links pornography with inappropriate or pathological sexuality, “forms of sexuality we disapprove of” and therefore do not want represented in real life (Kappeler 2). For some, pornography suggests a form of degraded sexual practice used for depraved titillation. On this view, the pornographic sexual practice is obscene and sadistic (Kappeler 2). As obscene sexuality, pornography encapsulates the “dirty” qualities of sexual behaviour. As sadistic sexuality, pornography is violent and serves as morbid entertainment. The second point derives from the first and concerns the use of pornography in non-sexual contexts of atrocity to express disapproval over representational approaches. The charges levelled at pornographic sexual practice (obscenity and sadism) are thus transferred to atrocity representations. In this sense, pornography understood as perverted sexual practice becomes a metaphor for dismissing what some critics see as degraded cultural and representational practices.

For example, in her feminist critique of pornography,\(^6\) *The Pornography of Representation*, Susanne Kappeler contends that critical engagement with pornography has focused on “porn” at the expense of “-graphy” (2-4). For Kappeler, pornography is not so much about sexuality as it is about representation: “Pornography is not a special case of sexuality; it is a form of representation. Representation, therefore, not ‘real-life sex’, should

---

\(^{5}\) See, e.g., Guyer, “Rwanda’s Bones” 155-175; Sharpley and Stone, eds. *The Darker Side of Travel*.

\(^{6}\) Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin perhaps have made even more vocal especially in a legal context aspects of the feminist view that Kappeler advances. This view conceives pornography as a form of gender-based violence against women. See, e.g., MacKinnon and Dworkin, *In Harm’s Way*; MacKinnon, *Only Words*. For a contrary feminist view that challenges the notion of pornography as violence against women, see, e.g., Wendy Brown, *States of Injury*.  

188
be the wider context in which we analyze this special case of representation: pornography” (2). As a structure of representation, for Kappeler, pornography is a patriarchal representational form in which women are objectified for the male subject’s gaze. This structure of representation, for the critic, is intrinsically violent because it subjectifies male gaze and objectifies the woman’s body for the pleasures of this masculine gaze. Given this supposedly inherently hierarchical pornographic structure, Kappeler argues that pornography as representation or pornographic representation is an exercise of patriarchal power over women’s bodies. It is an act of annihilating women as subjects and perpetuating man’s dominion over the woman. This exercise of power, for Kappeler, need not be limited to a literal understanding of man-woman relation as it can be applied to other contexts of power relations.

To illustrate the implicit hierarchical nature of pornography’s objectification of human beings, Kappeler cites the 1983 murder of a black worker, Thomas Kasire, by his white employer, van Rooyen, in Namibia. According to the story, van Rooyen suspected that Kasire belonged to a liberation movement, the South Western African People’s Organization (SWAPO). Based on this suspicion, van Rooyen detained and tortured Kasire for days before gruesomely killing him before friends he invited to witness the killing. As the torture and eventual murder were taking place, van Rooyen’s friends took photographs of the victim in different poses at van Rooyen’s request. Kappeler interprets these pictures of gruesome murder, which were used subsequently as court evidence against van Rooyen, as reminiscent of “pornography, a woman in place of the black man, the white men in their respective positions – in the picture, behind the camera – unchanged” (6). Kappeler describes these photographs as pornographic representation. Pornographic representation, for the critic, does the exact thing that pictures of Kasire’s humiliation and murder do: the photograph served to
objectify the victim, annihilating the victim as subject and perpetually rendering him as a thing.

Although, like Kappeler, I approach pornography in this chapter as a form of representation, it is important to note some of the misleading claims in these debates about what pornography means and does. The notion that pornography is a form of pathological sexuality signifying cultural decadence is rather a puritanical attitude to representations of sexual practice. Not only can we not objectively determine in all cases what constitutes obscene and sadistic sex, in a loose sense too, there is equally nothing inherently “dirty” and disapproving in representing sexual practice between consenting adults.

We should ask, is it pornographic representation that objectifies its target or representation in general? In fact, every photograph or writing has to be considered as a reifying form. How is pornographic objectification different and more abhorrent than other forms of objectification resulting from representation? Kappeler’s explanation of the Namibian murder photograph fails to show how the photographs objectify the victim in ways that a non-pornographic photograph in general will not do. Assuming that these photographs were taken by someone attempting to use them as evidence against the killer, would the same photographs be pornographic as Kappeler suggests? In such a situation, we may find that our moral disgust and attitude towards the photographs might be different when we come to associate the intention propelling the photographs with serving a noble aim of witness against atrocity. We should also remember that Kasire’s photographs served as court evidence against their author, a fact that challenges the notion that such a photograph essentially devalues the victim. Accordingly, we can discuss pornography without reducing the pornographic to an inherently dehumanizing and devaluing form.
For critics dismissive of pornography, a major consequence of pornographic representations is that they numb their audience’s empathy, and so prevent them from connecting with the suffering of people being depicted in this way.7 On this view, the audience is viewed as losing sight of their moral sensibility and as taking immoral delight in the pain of others.8 This criticism of pornography’s capacity to degrade what it depicts is perhaps the underlying anxiety in the critique by Dawes and Härting of Courtemanche’s novel described in the introductory section of this chapter. In this anxiety, pornography signifies “the problem of excessive affect in which the desire, identification, and agency intrinsic to empathic imagination turn into obliteration of the other, and historical memory becomes nothing but the reflection of a now spatially infinite, narcissistic [white, male] self” (Dean 106). I do not disagree entirely with this criticism of Sunday. However, it is important to note that “excessive affect” is not in itself immoral since, for example, grief felt or expressed over atrocity can also signify an instance of excessive affect. The problem, therefore, might not be so much one of pornography as it might be an expression of moral expectation.

By putting aside moral expectation in the context of a reading of Courtemanche’s novel, I am inviting reflection upon broader questions of Western representations of African suffering and the uses of pornography as a metaphor for criticizing and apprehending “our” relation with others’ suffering. That is, I see Sunday as encouraging the pornographic in order to mock it and ridicule our dispositions toward certain others’ suffering, while at the same time forcing us to see beyond pornographic pleasures and look upon suffering with more seriousness. My aim here is to call attention to the failures of this representation of genocide

7 Note that this view of empathy is not generally accepted. For example, Dominick LaCapra in Writing History, Writing Trauma rejects this notion of empathy that suggests self-projection into the other’s suffering. He regards true empathy as the ability to feel compassion for the other as other.

8 On this point, see Sontag, Regarding the pain of Others 41-42.
in Courtemanche’s novel not because pornography is self-evidently condemnable, but because Sunday’s rather flawed pornographic representation of genocide reinforces the racism present in the broader context of Western representation of African suffering.

**Pornography in A Sunday at the Pool in Kigali**

To begin the exploration of pornography in Sunday, it is noteworthy to remember that the novel is largely about prostitution and the love story between a “prostitute” figure in Gentille and a client in Bernard Valcourt. The central setting of the novel is not so much Rwanda as it is a “hotel” in Rwanda. Hotel in the novel is a place of lodging for Western foreign expatriates and Rwandans alike, a place for prostitution and libertine impulses. The imagery of hotel in Sunday echoes that in D. M. Thomas’s novel, The White Hotel, another fictional work described by some critics, notably by Kappeler, as a pornographic representation of the Holocaust. The white hotel in Thomas’s novel is the setting where the central character Lisa Erdman’s sexual fantasies of love and catastrophe play out. In Courtemanche’s Sunday, the hotel is the dark setting of a white man’s sexual fantasies of a love that ends disastrously.

Like The White Hotel, Sunday employs a documentary style. In the novel’s preface, Courtemanche remarks that Sunday is fiction, but “also a chronicle and eye-witness report.” Hence, it is as an authentic documentary account that the story is presented. Although narrated from a third-person perspective, the narrative viewpoint focuses on Valcourt.9 Quite like a journalist’s camera chronicling framed episodes of Rwandan suffering, the narrative follows Valcourt’s gaze, his critical perception of Rwandan reality and his voyeuristic fantasies. This narrative viewpoint with its documentary vision makes Sunday read more like Valcourt’s confessions of his pornographic fantasies of the Rwandan Genocide. Yet, as a

---

9 I use the character’s surname, Valcourt, since the narrator uses it throughout the novel to refer to him.
form of confessional, we can understand Sunday as both a satire of its own limitations to representing genocide and an elegy to a genocide occasioned largely by a failure of representation.

To the issue of pornography in Sunday, it is important to note further that violence in the novel is dramatized through sexual acts. Beginning with its characterization of Rwandan women, Sunday portrays virtually all its female Rwandan characters in sexual terms. Be they prostitutes, market women or wives, these women materialize in the story as objects of men’s sexual gazes, gazes that concentrate on the sizes of their breasts and backsides. The major focus of this pornographic gaze in the novel is Gentille. The narrator describes her as the young woman, “whose name is as lovely as her breasts, which are so pointed they abrade her starched shirt-dress, Gentille, whose face is more lovely still, and whose ass is more disturbing in its impudent adolescence than anything else about her” (5-6). When Cyprien, one of fifty HIV carriers Valcourt is using for his documentary on the disease, tries to warn Valcourt to take Gentille out of Rwanda due to the impending genocide, he points out to Gentille that she is a prime target of the killers because she has “a nose that’s as straight and sharp as a knife, skin the colour of café au lait, legs as long as a giraffe’s, breasts so pointed and firm they stick through your blouse, and buns, buns… that drive me wild” (89). Equally, for Valcourt, the smell of Gentille’s body is a “pornographic smell,” not like “titillating perfumes or powerful and exotic spices, but a dark smell of flesh, heavy hair and warm, moist sex” (35). Like other men in the story – Rwandan and Western foreigner alike – Valcourt wants to “fuck” Gentille (34).

The novel’s rhetorical practice that represents Gentille as an object of men’s sexual desire is a criticism of a decadent culture impelling genocide. This decadent culture is the result of racist and pornographic mentality that instigates hatred, exploitation and violence. Sunday portrays this decadent and immoral culture suggestive of a pornographic mentality as
a way to understand the process through which human subjects are transformed into objects for elimination. Gentille’s physical traits that attract sexual attention are illustrative on the one hand of the racialization of Tutsi women in Rwanda as objects of sexual desire.

On the other hand, she is an allegory of Rwanda’s condition since she is both Hutu and Tutsi in one; she is also an object of local and international racism, of sexual fantasies and political opportunism. As Gentille’s father explains to Valcourt, Gentille will inevitably fall prey to the blinding self-hatred of her country’s division, because she represents Rwanda’s traits in their totality, traits that each warring side would seek to eliminate in her: “Gentille is like the fruit of the red earth of this hill, a mysterious mix of all the seeds and all the toil of this country. Son, you’re going to marry a country they want to kill, one that could be simply Rwandan if it had the chance” (199). The multiple rapes and instances of sexual exploitation that befall Gentille before and during the genocide are only possible because of the pornographic mentality that racializes her as sexual object of rape in the hands of Rwandan men. This pornographic mindset also renders her an object of sexual exploitation by Western men, leading to the apathetic response at the time of her violation.

The pornographic mindset that Sunday depicts as underpinning the genocide manifests in the novel’s general characterization of Rwanda as a place of sexual orgy. In Courtemanche’s story, prostitution signifies the nature of relationship between Rwanda and various Western countries acting as agents of development. Sunday takes rape and prostitution to be emblematic of the relationship between Western countries and Rwanda. Rwanda is the fateful harlot and the white Western male her pretentious, exploitative John. Images of carcasses and vultures pervade Courtemanche’s depiction of Rwanda’s relationship with the West. Rwandan prostitutes are “carcasses – some plump, some skeletal” (3) and Western expatriates are “vultures” that sometimes “turn into crocodiles” (14). These images of scavenging signify a situation of decadence. Importantly, the unequal union of African and
Westerner based on scavenging, exploitation and the abuse of power is one of the novel’s main preoccupations and themes. It animates and organizes the romantic events driving the relationship between the novel’s two central characters (Valcourt and Gentille) forward.

*Sunday* portrays the nature of this decadent culture and its dangerous pornographic mindset through some dramatic episodes that will serve as representative excerpts for further discussing the novel’s pornographic representation of the Rwandan genocide. In these episodes and throughout *Sunday*, the depiction of disease, violence and their ravages conflates violence with sexual intercourse. Consider the strange transitory ritual of a Rwandan friend of Valcourt’s – Méthode – who is terminally ill with AIDS. Méthode does not want to die piecemeal from AIDS, so he convinces a Canadian nurse, Élise, to euthanize him. He prefers this kind of painless death to a death by machete, which he prophesies is about to happen in Rwanda. For Méthode, the Tutsi are a condemned people, like the Jews of Europe. The fate of AIDS is even more preferable than the fate of the Tutsi:

> A triumphant end for a life of thirty-two years, an end [Méthode] was no longer afraid of because he would rather die of AIDS than be hacked up by a machete or shredded by a grenade. “That’s the fate waiting for all Tutsis. We have to leave or die before the Holocaust.” Since the sickness had been keeping him in bed, Méthode had been reading everything he could find about the Jews. Tutsis and Jews – same fate. The world had known scientific Holocaust, cold, technological, a terrifying masterpiece of efficiency and organization. A monstrosity of Western civilization. The original sin of Whites. Here, it would be the barbarian Holocaust, the cataclysm of the poor, the triumph of machete and club. (41)

References to the Holocaust such as the one found in this quote are pervasive in *Sunday*. The Holocaust provides the legitimating force for apprehending the massacre of
Tutsis in Rwanda as genocide as if without such comparisons the reader cannot understand the killings as genocide. However, beyond the Holocaust citations in Sunday, Méthode’s preference for a painless death as against death by machete is given more significance when, as a result of Valcourt’s prodding, Méthode agrees to have his final moments recorded on television as his own testimony against a life lived with AIDS. Méthode uses the opportunity of the camera to speak rather about the looming genocide, conflating the impending massacres with the disease that has ravaged his whole being. Valcourt documents these last moments of Méthode’s death supposedly as part of his documentary calling attention to the ravages of AIDS in Rwanda. As with the genocide, Rwandan government and other stakeholders have tried to suppress the grave reality of HIV/AIDS epidemic in the country.

Méthode’s final moments are quite significant in the story not just for their conflation of AIDS with genocide, but even more for explicit narrative style that assaults readers with raw details of an eroticized death ritual. The scene depicting Méthode’s death helps to bring home the irony that Sunday consistently dramatizes. This irony results from the way the novel uses the staging of dark pleasure to stress the gruesomely dark reality of Rwanda in 1994. The death ritual that Méthode demands from his friends and family as final duty is also instructive. He has asked to be properly “fucked” by “a real woman” (45). Mathilde, a prostitute, agrees to be Méthode’s “real woman.” She too is HIV positive. Like the death that is to come, mutual and illicit sharing of HIV and AIDS remains rampant in Courtemanche’s story. Everyone who matters to the dying man, including his mother, gathers to witness this final ritual of the AIDS victim’s last grasp at pleasure from a shrunken life. The result is a grotesque spectacle of sexual intercourse strangely supported and masterfully supervised by the dying man’s mother.

---

10 Some critics have also called attention to this invocation of Holocaust memory in Courtemanche’s novel as the author’s way of making the Rwandan massacres globally legible as genocide. See, e.g., Eaglestone 72-85; Härtling 65.
At one point during the intercourse when Mathilde struggles to rekindle life in the dying man’s penis, Méthode’s mother urges the prostitute on: “Give him a nice big one before he leaves for heaven, my girl” (54). Once this sex ritual takes a life of its own, the gathered friends congregate around the bed to watch, Méthode’s mother urging the prostitute working on her son’s penis to “suck it, so a last drop of life can come out of him” (55). When the last drop of life fails to come out of “the living dead man,” he exclaims, “I have no penis left, I have no sperm left. Your tongue is like a serpent bewitching me, but my tongue is still alive, let me drink you.” Without a word, Mathilde undressed, and supported by his mother and Raphaël, applied her crotch to Méthode’s mouth. Exhausted, sated, satisfied, fulfilled, trembling, she collapsed on Méthode, who uttered a loud cry of pain. (54-55)

Notice in this scene the voyeuristic gaze characterizing the novel’s general depiction of Rwandan women’s bodies as objects of male desire. Just as women’s bodies sexualized in terms of their breast and bum sizes, Méthode’s diseased body – as with the bodies of other AIDS sufferers and equally the mutilated bodies of genocide victims in the story – becomes an object of voyeuristic spectating. In addition, the gathered audience of this scene is not viewing suffering per se but its sexualisation in Méthode’s intercourse with the prostitute. This scene pornographically represents Rwandan reality in Sunday. Just as with the overall narrative language of the novel, the narration of this scene employs explicit sexual language that Härting has described as “sexual blazoning,” a rhetorical approach that “creates the effect of an unmediated and directly recordable reality” (70).

The voyeurism in this narrative style is even more inscribed in the narrated event itself. The sexual act between Méthode and Mathilde has an audience in attendance. Since pornography, as Kappeler reminds us, is a matter of representation organized around
spectatorship, Méthode’s death ritual presents an exemplar of a condition that *Sunday* portrays as lying behind Rwandan genocide and its representation. This condition is one of a culture of voyeurism that initiates violence upon the sexualized body. This culture of voyeurism also exploits the sexualized and mutilated body for its own gratification. This culture of voyeurism is behind the activities of some Belgian doctors in Rwanda who have to catalogue a vast list of their AIDS patients in order “to prepare the scientific papers that would open doors for them at the annual International AIDS Conference” (40). This voyeuristic practice lies behind the booming “tourism” of massacre sites in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide. It is also behind Valcourt’s documentary on AIDS in Rwanda for which Méthode is an interviewee. The conflation in this scene of bodily degeneracy caused by AIDS with sexual act providing pleasure in the spectators gathered to watch allegorizes the Rwandan condition as impelled by a decadent, pornographic cultural mindset.

This pornographic scene is less a drama of orgasm for the living dead in Méthode and Mathilde. Rather, it is the staging of this orgiastic ritual for the orgasmic entertainment of the witness-bystanders. Like Valcourt and others witnessing the surreal death ritual that would become Rwanda’s fate, the reader also witnesses this act and art of voyeurism and oddity. *Sunday* refuses to completely objectify victims of AIDS like Méthode. As Valcourt remarks about dead victims of genocide towards the end of the novel, even “dead people have the right to live” (251) as well as the right to speak and testify to their own suffering. At his funeral, Méthode talks to those gathered to mourn him through a television set placed over his coffin. The television screens a message by the dead man recorded just before his death. From the screen on top of his coffin, Méthode says, “My name is Méthode… I’m Tutsi, you know that, but above all I’m Rwandan. I’m going to die in a few hours, I’m going to die of AIDS” (58). Méthode’s speech takes the shape of testimonies of Rwandan survivors giving accounts of their ordeal, survivors whose lives after the genocide seem more like an afterlife.
It is as one in the afterlife that Méthode testifies against AIDS and genocide, both of which he blames on the “accident” of history. This accident, for Méthode, is the ignorance propelling AIDS epidemic and fuelling racism in Rwanda. It is also what condemns him to death for being more Tutsi than Hutu: “So here I am, a Hutu-Tutsi and victim of AIDS, possessor of all the sicknesses that are going to destroy us” (59).

Méthode does not die of “all of the sicknesses,” nor does he die from AIDS as he states in his testimony. He dies from Canadian nurse Élise’s poison, administered to help him die a painless death. His is what he describes to his mother as “a beautiful death” (50). A good or beautiful death is a death of pleasure, of eating, drinking and fucking (50). In lamenting the reality that takes children before their parents, Méthode’s mother rejects her son’s notion of a good death, noting that “[f]or a young man, there’s no such thing as a beautiful death. Or a death that makes sense. All children’s deaths are ugly and senseless” (50). Yet she acts as director in the absurd drama of her son’s good death. What she does not acknowledge is that implicit in Méthode’s good death drama is the decadence of pleasure. His quest for a life of pleasure brings him sickness and death. The paradox of pleasure is such that it is gratifying and destructive at the same time. Méthode’s death ritual dramatizes this paradox most acutely. His sexual act with Mathilde becomes his re-enactment for his friends of the nature of his and their shared ruin.

This theme of “a good death,” of the pleasure that kills is what unites victims, perpetrators and bystanders in the story. In their different ways, all are after a beautiful death. Killers kill and rape for pleasure and ruin themselves in the process. Western bystanders ruin themselves in pursuit of their sexual fantasies. Victims such as Méthode die from pleasure. This theme of “a good death” is one that perhaps continued to haunt Courtemanche even after the publication of Sunday. In his second novel entitled A Good Death, the plot of the story revolves around a similar enactment such as that found in Méthode’s death ritual. In this case,
the story is about an old, once-tyrannical father dying of Parkinson’s Disease. At first, the family tries to prevent him from the “good” things he wants to eat because the doctors already declare that those things will speed up his death. Eventually, the family comes around and decides to speed up the old patriarch’s death by stuffing him with all the delicious food he is not supposed to eat. Death by pleasure ultimately results, not through food, but through another pleasurable indulgence in fishing. By the end of the story, the theme of human questing for happiness as both a homicidal and suicidal mission is prominent. This homicidal and suicidal trait in the quest for pleasure is even more pronounced in another representative pornographic episode in *Sunday*, that of Cyprien’s death.

Just like Méthode, Cyprien is dying of AIDS. Yet he still wants to “fuck” all the tomato vendors at the market (79). He pities Valcourt for his solemn attitude towards Rwandans who like him are dying slowly from HIV. He sees no difference between his kind of death and deaths in Western countries. He thinks that Valcourt is the one who acts like a dying person: “You’re the one who talks like a dying man, like every word you say is going to be your last” (82). Cyprien accuses the Canadian journalist of “trying to teach him how to live while waiting to die. He wanted to teach the White that you could live only if you knew you were going to die” (86). To live, for Cyprien, is to live for the present and to maximize its every pleasure. Just like Méthode, Cyprien describes this pleasure as “accidents” when Valcourt and Élise accuse him of homicide for infecting his wife with HIV, conceiving HIV-infected children and infecting market women with his disease because he refuses to use condoms. “God won’t punish me,” remarks Cyprien in defence of his acts, “because my wife and I wanted some pleasure. You see, it was an accident” (80). As described in the novel, this pleasure fuelling the AIDS epidemic in Rwanda is a symptom of social anomie so widespread that “devout, virginal nuns […] were gathering prostitutes and teaching them about the virtues of condoms,” and parish priests hand out packs of condoms from their offices with
“the photograph of the Pope watching protectively” in silent support (18-19). The moral degeneracy in the country has reversed the Catholic Church’s values and Valcourt thinks of these nuns and priests as “heroic, pious transgressors” on a mission to save not just the country’s soul but also its body.

Cyprien’s gruesome death scene is even more surreal, dramatic and graphic than Méthode’s. A Hutu condemned as a Tutsi accomplice, Cyprien returns to his neighbourhood after escorting Valcourt and Gentille to the safety of the Hôtel des Mille-Collines only to find a gang of militiamen who invite him to help them rape his own wife: “Come party with us, Cyprien, come on. Move it, Hot-Nuts, your wife’s back here, she’s waiting for you and wants you” (95). The gang leader complains of having tried without success to give Georgina, Cyprien’s wife, an orgasm: “We’ve tried everything but nothing works. Your wife has no pleasure” (96). After sarcastically describing the horrible ways in which the gang attempted without success to give Georgina “pleasure,” the leader remarks to Cyprien, “Now, you know all the secrets of the Whites and Tutsis you hang out with, so you’re going to show us, Cyprien, you’re going to show us what a man’s got to do to make your wife come” (96).

Here, Sunday illustrates the nature of sexual assault characterizing the Rwandan Genocide. The gang leader’s scornful reference to Cyprien’s sexual knowledge of “Whites and Tutsis” suggests, as Härting puts it, that “sexual violence against women is legitimized through the historical and present racialization of identity” (68). This understanding of the sexual violence underpinning the genocide is not to be understood solely as a metaphor. In Philip Gourevitch’s account of the events of 1994, We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families, as well as several other non-fictional chronicles of the genocide, rape against women is a central feature of the orgy of violence against Tutsis and moderate Hutus. Many of the corpses displayed at massacre sites after the genocide testified to the mass rape and sadism that accompanied the genocide. Rape in Sunday, therefore, is not
simply a matter of gender violence. It is central thematic preoccupation in the novel’s representation of genocide and is portrayed in the novel as an act of power.

The killers’ invitation to Cyprien to participate in the rape of his wife further complicates the meaning of rape in Courtemanche’s novel. Finding his own fate and that of Georgina’s already sealed for the worst, Cyprien oblige the killers’ request and beckons to Georgina saying: “Wife, better to die of pleasure than torture” (96), a view that conflates the couple’s impending death with that of Méthode’s by intricately linking sexual pleasure with death. Ironically, Cyprien does not apprehend his own coerced rape of his wife as violation and torture. His inability to see rape for what it is – violation – links him largely to the killers. Cyprien in effect is asking his wife to find pleasure in her own rape by him, a rape coerced in order to entertain their killers. Just as in Méthode’s “beautiful death” scenario, there is a live audience that views Cyprien’s coerced rape of Georgina. The audience consists of Cyprien’s friends too, except that this time the audience of the sadomasochistic drama is comprised of the killers who also precipitate the slow unravelling of the predictable climax of the affair:

Slowly and most of all with a delicacy he did not recognize in himself,

[Cyprien] removed her skirt, then her T-shirt in the colours of Rwanda. On his knees between her thighs, he looked at her at length while the militiamen howled their impatience. He lay down on her and began to kiss her […] The little bearded fellow came up and slashed him savagely across the back with his machete. Cyprien felt his blood running down like a hot river between his buttocks and wetting his testicles. Never had he had such an erection. He sat up and, for the first time in his life, plunged his head between his wife’s thighs and sucked, kissed, ate. He had almost no strength left. He penetrated her, and just as he was about to come, the policeman fired. His body gave what seemed
like a hiccup and he fell on his back beside his wife. Sprayed with semen, the policeman began to bellow. (96-7)

The policeman who is the leader of the gang kills Cyprien at his moment of orgasm, which further conflates sexual pleasure with death. Notice too that Georgina’s response to Cyprien’s performance remains muted in this scenario. She remains passive as her husband strips her of the remaining vestiges of her identification with a nation that has robbed her of humanity (“her skirt, then her T-shirt in the colours of Rwanda”) and participates in her dishonouring. The only time we hear directly from her in this scene is immediately after Cyprien’s murder when she begs to be killed, saying: “Kill me now, please” (97).

The circumstances of Cyprien’s and Georgina’s death scene resonate alongside Ugwu’s rape scene in Adichie’s *Half of a Yellow Sun* as discussed in Chapter 6 of this dissertation. Although informed by completely different circumstances, we are presented in both works with a situation in which a man is forced to violate a woman that ordinarily he should be protecting. In Cyprien’s case, the rape of his wife is both for the entertainment of his killers and for his own humiliation and debasement. *Sunday* negates Cyprien’s complicity in violence with the Hutu militiamen. Unlike in Ugwu’s case, where he is cast as a co-violator, Cyprien’s situation remarkably highlights a crudely different condition of his own victimhood. He is a patriarch participating in the dishonour of his own family. He publicly rapes his wife for the entertainment of his and his wife’s killers. His actions may seem cowardly. However, he is not the kind of man who tries to prove himself a hero to anyone, and so is unlike the kind of hubristic Igbo men found in Adichie’s novel. Cyprien is a very pragmatic man. It is difficult to hastily judge his participation in Georgina’s rape. The voyeuristic reader inclined to the story’s pornographic gaze perhaps does not readily see Cyprien’s actions as rape because this reader recognizes the absurdity and horror of his
situation. This reader’s judgements are directed more at the killers [and perhaps also to such readers themselves], who play voyeurs to his death scene.

At the same time, Cyprien’s character complicates any hasty moral judgement of the genocide or its perpetrators. Cyprien himself is Hutu accused of being a Tutsi accomplice. A notorious womanizer with HIV, Cyprien participates in intentionally spreading the deadly disease among market women who are unaware of his health situation. He also infects Georgina with the virus. In this act of masculine sexual violence and inscription of death upon female bodies, Cyprien participates in “the intimacy of tyranny and lends it an aura of political normalcy at the expense of the violated female body” (Härting 68). Yet as a patriarch driven to criminality “by neglect, shame, and the national, personal, and international denial of the disease and of [his] human dignity as an African” (Härting 68), Cyprien wears the garb of a victim. He is both victim and victimizer.

Importantly, it is not just the sheer dark humour and the graphic detail of this rape and murder scene that assaults the reader following its slowly unravelling climax. This scene also banalizes absurdity and cruelty and reveals aspects of some of the deeper ironies of the genocide. Just as Soyinka’s *Season of Anomy* depicts how killers blinded by their hatred for their victims contaminate their own lives through the performance of their murderous acts, so too this scene suggests that Rwandan genocide perpetrators dig their own graves in pursuit of the murderous pleasures of killing. Georgina, like Cyprien, is HIV-positive. By dehumanizing and raping her, the militiamen sow the seeds of their own slow deaths. Sunday suggests that this mutual contamination of killers and their victims is equally reflective of the nature of relation between bystander-witnesses and victims’ mutilated bodies. Georgina’s and Cyprien’s death scenario reveals “the sexualized nature of the Rwandan genocide and indicts the West/reader as the voyeuristic onlooker” (Härting 68) at this pornographic violence. The voyeuristic gaze of the bystander also serves to taint his moral consciousness. Hence, the
genocide, as well as its witnessing or representation, is an exercise in mutual self-destruction. Just as killers ruin themselves by killing, voyeuristic spectating of a victim’s suffering can ruin the spectator.

The notion of mutual contamination between the oppressor and oppressed, between spectators and the objects of the pornographic gaze, reinforces what Achille Mbembe has described as “aesthetics of vulgarity” (104). Mbembe uses this phrase in On the Postcolony to describe the convivial relation of resistance and collaboration linking postcolonial African dictators and their subjects. This conviviality is possible because in the postcolony the oppressor and the oppressed “share the same living space” and are both “liable to be entangled with” each other’s logics. The aesthetics of vulgarity suggest “the use made of the grotesque and the obscene” by both dictators and their subjects in a mutual robbing of one another’s vitality that Mbembe calls “mutual ‘zombification’” (104). Sunday invites a consideration of the Rwandan genocide in terms suggestive of mutual zombification.

The cruelty and indignity of Cyprien’s and Georgina’s deaths, their dismemberment, and the fact that their bodies feed hungry stray dogs together reveal Courtemanche’s apprehension of the Rwandan genocide as essentially what happens to the body (as well as the impact of such bodily mutilations on the mind of victims and bystander witnesses), namely its gruesome degradation and zombification. The writer’s emphasis on the physicality of genocidal violence and the voyeurism such physical mutilations activate may explain his preference for the pornographic as an aesthetic instrument for witnessing this degradation. In Sunday, the body is the primary target not only of genocidal violence, but also of its representation. At once Courtemanche’s deployment of the pornographic style may suggest the general degradation of the social body of Rwanda.

Most prominently in the novel, Courtemanche uses Gentille to show that it is the physical attributes of the Tutsi that constitute the major focus of their physical elimination.
The Tutsi physique was one of the defining elements of the genocide, since it served as one of the major marks of difference between Hutus and Tutsis. This emphasis on the body as the site of genocide highlights two further elements in need of consideration in a discussion of Courtemanche’s representation of the Rwandan genocide: genocide as the violence of language; and the violence of desire. The violence of language here signifies division or difference by symbolic means. It is language that ensures, as Slavoj Žižek explains, that neighbours who live on the same street “live in different worlds” (66). To designate a human body as Tutsi is a violent act, one that simplifies that body and imposes upon it meanings external to it.

Violent language is associated with the violence of racism, as well as of representation. Hence linguistic violence is the originary instigator of any genocide. On the one hand as language can simplify a group in order to normalize violence on them, on the other it can instigate desire for the absolute. It is violent language that leads to violent desires to perpetuate ideas of oneself above and beyond the Other as Hutu extremists have done because, as Žižek explains, it is language “which pushes our desire beyond limits, transforming it into a ‘desire that contains the infinite,’ elevating it into an absolute striving that cannot ever be satisfied” (Violence 65). This desire that contains the infinite is generally not an occasional striving. It is often tied to the conditions of our social life. Oftentimes it manifests as the desire for immortality, or for the infinite. In our general thinking, according to Žižek, this desire for the infinite stands in contrast to mortality, which is often construed as evil: “According to the traditional ideological commonplace, immortality is linked to the good and mortality to evil: what makes us good is the awareness of immortality…, while the root of evil is the resignation to our mortality (we shall all die, so it doesn’t really matter, just grab what you can, indulge your darkest whims…)” (65).
Cyprien’s preference for mortality, as with several other Rwandan characters in the novel, which he understands to be the most suitable way of philosophically approaching the demands of existence, expresses itself in his insistence on the notion that the aspiration for immortality constitutes evil. Cyprien finds the Hutu killers’ desires for immortality, their desire to perpetuate themselves infinitely and absolutely by eliminating the Other who must be condemned as mortal, in some ways as similar to Valcourt’s general disposition towards ailing Rwandans. In Valcourt’s eyes, these living corpses look like the physical embodiment of evil. He finds their brute mortality repulsive. To be distanced from them is to be permitted the room to construct a superior sense of oneself. For Cyprien, however, the acceptance of mortality tempers genocidal violence. Even so, Cyprien’s attitude to mortality might also serve as his alibi for his own crimes of infection, and therefore as a shield against the stark reality of his own guilt.

However, even though Sunday makes a subtle case for the acceptance of shared mortality in response to extreme violence, particularly the violence instigated by language, it makes this case while making use of a flawed pornographic style that on account of its racism disables its critique of the confluence of political, cultural and historical circumstances that impelled genocide in Rwanda. The novel’s attitude to its employment of a pornographic mindset to represent genocide seems priggish and seems to suggest that only in such instance of moral depravity can genocide result.

**Racism in A Sunday at the Pool in Kigali**

Simply put, Sunday contains too much explicit sex, rape, and violence, too much racism, too much moral disregard and insensitivity to a long history of Western racism that generally characterized Africans in depraved terms. In the world of the novel, disease-ravaged Méthode demands as his death wish to have proper sex as token for quitting life. Cyprien seeks “to fuck” all tomato vendors at the market with his “infected cock” (93). A multiply raped
Gentille seeks sexual pleasure as compensation for her rape. What distinguishes Rwandan from Western characters in the novel is the former’s innate proclivity for bodily pleasure and the latter’s investment in reason and idealism. The relationship between beautiful Gentille and old Valcourt demonstrates this racialized union between the African body and the Western intellect, between sentiment and rationality, between emotion and reasoned thought. The failure of this union, as Härting notes, suggests that Africa’s darkness and uncivilization impair anyone, usually Westerners, attempting to rescue her children. This racialization of the Rwandan body and the Western mind in a failed union makes Härting conclude about Courtemanche’s novel that surely “its gratuitous and pornographic scenes of apocalyptic sexual frenzy clamor for moral affect and perpetuate normative representations of Africa as a site of intimacy and abjection rather than shock readers into political consciousness” (66).

One of the most controversial aspects of Sunday is its depiction of Gentille, especially after her capture by a Rwandan military commander. Having been abducted and raped multiple times by the officer, and gang-raped by different men including men set upon her by the commander’s wife, Gentille’s main desire is to find pleasure and feeling with her body. What matters to her most is her body’s loss of beauty and the lack of excitement she feels at sex, both consequences of her brutal rape experiences. She notes in her diary that she has one regret related to these encounters – their utter lack of pleasurable content: “I’d rather my rapist remind me of my husband and give me pleasure. I know it’s ridiculous. This time [the commander] was in less of a hurry and pawed my breasts and my buttocks. Not a single memory came back” (243).

During one of her gang rapes, what rankles Gentille is how her rapists refuse to acknowledge her beauty and fail to show desire: “They didn’t even ask me to undress. They know I’m beautiful but they’re not interested in that. They don’t want to look, they want to get inside” (246). She goes on to describe her rapists’ wilful attempt to humiliate her: “The
first was enormous and completely drunk. He picked me up with one arm and laid me on the little table so my legs dangled and he could stay standing, without ever leaning on me. ‘They’re dirty, the Tutsis, they have to be washed.’ And he stuck his beer bottle in my vagina” (246). In the wake of this encounter, it finally dawns on Gentille that what the killers are after is to render her – and the Tutsis that she represents in their imagination – ugly and without jouissance. In the wake of their sexual violence she becomes a remnant of what used to be a beautiful Tutsi body. She is transformed into a decomposing thing, and she loses her sexual vitality, signifying her complete abjection.

By the time the genocidaires are done rendering her body ugly, without breasts and lacking desire, there is nothing left of it for Bernard Valcourt to return to. Both her perception of herself and Valcourt’s thinking of her suggest an imagination of Gentille in terms representing her as body. We see this perception of Gentille as body after Valcourt finally finds her and declares that “We’re going to leave here” (256). She tells him,

Bernard, I’m not a woman any more. Don’t you smell the sickness?
Bernard, I don’t have breasts any more. My skin’s dry and tight like an old drum. I can only see with one eye. I probably have AIDS, Bernard. My mouth is full of sores that keep me from eating sometimes… Do you understand what they’ve done to me? I’m not human any more. I’m a body that’s decomposing, an ugly thing I don’t want you to see. If I left with you I’d be even sadder than I am now because I’d see in your eyes as you look away that what you really love is your memory of me. (257)

To preserve Valcourt’s memory of her beautiful body before it is ruined by the genocide, Gentille refuses to reunite with Valcourt. Valcourt challenges neither her description of herself as a decomposing body nor her refusal to follow him. He accepts this view of Gentille as rotten and leaves her.
The problematic depiction of Gentille’s attitude to her experiences of rape and her inflexible assessment of herself in essentially physical terms made tragic by the disfigurement and degradation of her beautiful body exposes not just the masculinist vision propelling Courtemanche’s story but also its racism. The novel’s depiction of Rwanda as a mutilated, disfigured, decomposing body was quite pervasive in the media following the genocide. The pornographic gaze organizing the specifics of Courtemanche’s depiction of Rwanda signifies not just journalistic desire for the defiled naked body, but also the necrophilic craving of this media for the Rwandan corpse. These pornographically rendered details of barbarity – made possible by the genocide, it must be added – provided opportunities for different international agencies as well as Western writers and journalists like Courtemanche to realize “a vision of powerful, amplified self,” to imagine and hypothesize adventure into the heart of African darkness, like Marlow in Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness* “to gaze upon himself and see how he has acquired new depth and meaning by encountering tragedy and horror (Dawes 34).

Not even his self-criticisms of his place and role in the Rwandan hell can excuse Valcourt (and by extension the writer himself) from his tours through these scenes both as a witness and as a tour guide for other Westerners. In several instances in the story, Valcourt is summoned to guide newly arrived European or North American men and women to sites of the horrors of Rwanda, introducing them to tableaux of death and diseases. Arthur and Joan Kleinman, quoting a British psychiatrist (Ian Palmer) in Rwanda in 1994, note that the atrocities in the country created “a voyeurism among Westerners [in Rwanda] – the relief agencies, the United Nations and the journalists” (23). Like tourists, Western visitors and diplomats sightsee massacre sites to feast on the indignity and cruelty done to African bodies, a situation that highlights “the more ominous aspects of globalization, such as the commercialization of suffering, the commodification of experiences of atrocity and abuse, and the pornographic uses of degradation” (19). The suggestion here is also that Western
journalistic, touristic and artistic practices are turning the Rwandan genocide into marketable sleaze designed to gratify Western audiences. Although Sunday criticizes this practice, its representation of Rwanda as a place of sexual depravity and savagery overlaps with a normative practice of Western journalistic practice that depicts Africa in such racist terms.

Racism in Courtemanche’s novel serves as subtext to the novel’s representation of the Rwandan genocide and recalls Chinua Achebe’s criticism of Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness* in so far as Western representations of the Rwandan genocide serve as pretexts for setting “Africa up as a foil to Europe, a place of negations at once remote and vaguely familiar in comparison with which Europe’s own state of spiritual grace will be manifest” (Achebe, “An Image of Africa” 2), of Africa as “a site of grim self-discovery for white men” (Dawes 35). The same kinds of criticisms that Achebe applies to Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness* easily apply to Courtemanche’s *Sunday*. As some critics have noted, *Sunday* seems like a modern version of *Heart of Darkness*. On this reading, Valcourt is at once Kurtz and Marlow, bearing a legacy of darkness in him, seeking communion with the darkness of Africa, and playing participant-witness to the barbarity that takes place in this darkness.

The theatre of this kind of inordinate voyeurism and vulgarity is Africa, the literal and metaphorical place of banal barbarisms and where the West seeks orgiastic epiphanies confirming its own “kinship” with barbarity. The problem underlying this Western image of Africa, at least for Achebe, is that those like Kurtz and Bernard Valcourt who fail to heed the warnings inherent in their fantasies about Africa will be ruined by their close association with the continent.¹¹ These Western men and women are like the pregnant Marie-Ange Lamarre in *Sunday*. Marie-Ange is the wife of the new Canadian Consul to Rwanda. Not even the relatively minor incapacities associated with a near-term pregnancy can tame Marie-Ange’s sexual fantasies about Rwanda. Through Valcourt Marie-Ange meets Justin, the pool

¹¹ On this point, see Razack, *Dark Threats and White Knights*. See also, Mayer, *Artificial Africas*. 

211
attendant at the Hôtel des Mille-Collines. Justin is presented by Courtemanche as the vengeful African monster and HIV carrier who, like Mustafa Sa’eed in Sudanese novelist Tayeb Salih’s *Season of Migration to the North*, has vowed to “decolonize” white women with his huge penis: “Every time he fucked a White—and there were so many of them walking around with their uncertain bodies and their hidden lusts, their fascination with the barbarous, powerful negro—every time, he was getting even for being a… mere lust object for the boss ladies… for being Black” (129-30).

Marie-Ange’s sexual encounter with him leads to her premature delivery (or perhaps an abortion), an encounter that also leaves her infected with HIV. The pornographic representation of this encounter reinforces the racist stereotypes of Africa as a place of depravity, a place for Western realization of dark lust. Justin takes on the image of the African savage with virile but destructive sexuality. He presents a sexual foil to Valcourt. Where his sexual virility is the object of white women’s wanton desires, Valcourt’s mind is given as the dream of black women’s romantic desire.

To be clear, Courtemanche’s preference for a pornographic vision of the Rwandan genocide is most probably intended to condemn Valcourt’s position as a privileged bystander, as well as the voyeurism that his privileged position allows, in order to highlight the ironies of his inappropriate fantasies and those of others like him (Keren 24-26). In this sense, one may understand the novel to demonstrate an awareness of its Western racist and pornographic gaze in order to expose, ridicule and critique it. This way of looking at the pornographic elements of *Sunday* further suggests that the problem of pornographic representation is not exclusively with the author but essentially with a culture that demands such salacious imaginings of others’ suffering. Understood in these terms, Courtemanche’s novel is a critique of this spectatorial culture and an invitation to the reader to confront and look beyond his or her own “pornographic expectancy” (Dean 102).
By the end of the story, pornographic excess begins to give way to the plain and the simple. Valcourt learns in retrospect to remain in his world. He learns how best to be a bystander even when living in the world of others. He remains in Rwanda, but this time “with a Swedish woman his own age, a doctor who works for the Red Cross” (258). Although still in the business of journalism and so a user of words, Valcourt finds less fascination with wordiness and representation. His romantic partnership signifies his effort to offer more practical healing to the wounded Rwandan body, far different in kind from his previous attempts to chronicle it pornographically. These shifts and transformations in Valcourt’s life gesture towards his newfound moral and political consciousness.

Nevertheless, and echoing Achebe’s criticism of Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness*, the novel’s criticism of Western voyeurism and hypocrisy participates in a broader racist discourse through its appropriation and endorsement of language that speaks about African suffering in pejorative terms, even when it is claiming to do so in order to denounce racism. There is a prevailing mythos underlying Courtemanche’s characterization of Valcourt. This mythos has a long history in Western travel writing and representations of the colonized world. We can loosely sketch this mythos thus: A “white” man (sometimes a woman) tired of life in the West seeks a new adventure in Africa; he finds himself fatally attracted to the decadence and degeneracy of the African world, a decadence that in some direct and remote ways is linked to him or the history propelling his generally undefined mission on the continent. This white man scavenges through the debris of the African world in search of meaning in his own life. More like a *bildungsroman* of the aged and exhausted, the man’s exposure to African suffering brings him an epiphany, illuminates his darkened mind – unless like Conrad’s Kurtz it is already too late for him – and he is forced to confront the reality of the horrors of existence.
We find these foster children of Kurtz and Marlow in writings by both African and Western writers. For example, in several of J.M. Coetzee’s novels, but prominently in *Waiting for the Barbarians* and also in *Disgrace*, we find this kind of character. The Magistrate in *Waiting for the Barbarians* and David Lurie and his daughter Lucy in *Disgrace* emerge from within this mythos. Violent encounters with black Africa and its dark realities find them out, to echo Achebe’s powerful criticism of *Heart of Darkness*. Likewise in his surrealist novel that reimagines colonial relations, *Radiance of the King*, Camara Laye gives us Clarence. He too is seeking to commune with the African jungle. He is fatally drawn to this mysterious environment, and as with Kurtz the darkness finds and overcomes him. The same is true of Richard in Adichie’s *Half of a Yellow Sun* and Valcourt in Courtemanche’s *Sunday*.

In several instances, the communion with Africa sought by these characters inspires in them visceral, corporeal love, almost as if an idea of a sensualized African body might hold the answers to all the mysteries of their desires. Rape and illicit sex characterize this desire to commune with Africa. Richard seeks it in Kainene and is unable to completely grasp it. Valcourt seeks it in Gentille and is unable to fully have it, at least in a lasting sense. In these novelistic quests there is a kind of mutual conviviality between the foreign seeker and the feminized African body. In *Sunday*, what the African woman seeks to obtain from access to the Western foreigner’s mind, the foreigner desires to obtain from her body. Whereas Gentille finds the magical words of old Valcourt soothing, Valcourt finds her body sexually alive. This kind of conviviality also characterizes the relation in *Sunday* between killers and

---

12 It is important to note that a counter-mythos of black Africans desiring the white body is also not in short supply. Ranging from Frantz Fanon’s discussion of the colonized peoples’ desire for whiteness in *Black Skin, White Mask* and *The Wretched of the Earth* to recent fictions including Adichie’s *Half of a Yellow Sun* as I highlighted in Chapter 6 using Richard, this subject of the nature of desires and uses of white body in imagination of African colonial and postcolonial experience has attracted quite strangely very little scholarly attention.
their victims, one that is suggestive of what Mbembe describes as “the mutual zombification” characteristically arising from violence in Africa’s colonial and postcolonial worlds.

This mutual zombification requires a context within which both the oppressor and the oppressed rob each other of “vitality,” leaving both “impotent” (Mbembe 104). *Sunday*’s pornographic representation of the Rwandan genocide dramatizes this experience of mutual zombification – the reciprocal devitalization of selves – and participates in the aesthetic practice of vulgarity characterizing violence representation in Africa’s postcolony. The staging of vulgarity in *Sunday* – one that is excessive, theatrical, grotesque, obscene and embodies a kind of baroque *jouissance* – signals a stylistics of “madness, pleasure, intoxication” (Mbembe 116), an hedonically charged dramatization of routinized cruelty, not merely for the sustenance of brutal power but for entertainment. Without its theatrical elements – a crowd of onlookers, say – the glamour will be lost in these atrocious scenes.

Yet, precisely because the vulgarity repudiated in the novel’s representational choices is a product of colonization, *Sunday* inadvertently perpetuates the very underpinnings of the colonial. In colonial imaginaries, Africa is the landscape of barbarism, the alter ego of the civilized world, a theatre of the grotesque and the obscene. The violence of colonial representations of Africa and its dark realities is what Mbembe calls the “*spirit of violence*.” Mbembe notes that this spirit makes violence in the colony “omnipresent” and normalized in ways suggestive of sexual practice: “[T]here is no violence in a colony without a sense of contiguity, without bodies close to one another, fleetingly or longer, bodies engaged in particular forms of fondling and concubinage – a commerce, a coupling” (Mbembe 175). The violence dramatized in *Sunday* is also the violence of colonization, of the penis, since to colonize is to “accomplish a sort of sparky clean act of coitus, with the characteristic feature of making horror and pleasure coincide” (Mbembe 175).
This colonial mode of representing Africa as a world of impulsive sensations, dark and chaotic, or a world where such sensations, when fantasized, can be realized, characterizes Courtemanche’s pornographic narrative. His is, properly put, a colonial gaze upon African suffering, one refusing to vitalize and ennoble the suffering of the damned and the dehumanized, instead turning it into a fetish object through the meditation on which a fading Western man can attempt to regain some semblance of humanity.

There is an implicit contradiction and hypocrisy in the way Courtemanche renders Gentille’s Rwanda as a site of catastrophe that is in fundamental ways different from the non-violent outside world that Valcourt represents. The inside-outside bifurcation perpetuates the very binary of Africa as a metaphor of violence to which the West understands itself to be the antithesis. Courtemanche’s novel does little in its narrative trajectory to overturn this myth, and he does not acknowledge the fact that in the West there are nationalist and racist sentiments similar to those that resulted in genocide in Rwanda. Valcourt refuses to “rescue” Gentille from the darkness of Rwanda not because of his apprehension that no refuge exists outside the country. Rather, his decision to remain in Rwanda until it is too late is selfishly prompted by the “allure of the jungle” that is Valcourt’s attraction to barbarism.

Unlike Richard, Valcourt is trying not to find but to forget himself. Meeting Gentille significantly changes the trajectory of his quest and he begins to think about marriage. The youthful Gentille restores his humanity. Valcourt is unable to take Gentille out of Rwanda and his inability to do so dramatizes remarkably the paradox of his situation: the degeneracy of Rwanda is what revives him. Removing Gentille from Rwanda, he knows too well, is the surest way to lose her. In Rwanda Valcourt matters as a white man, a foreigner, a writer of horrible things. Like the scavenging vulture, he lives on the decomposing world of Africa’s postcolony.
Courtemanche refuses to grant Valcourt the redemption he seeks through his Rwandan experience. He cannot ultimately be restored by Gentille’s young body. Whether this lack of restoration expresses the West’s failure to salvage its own modernity and claims to civilization from the African hell is unclear from the novel. What is clear is that Bernard Valcourt, a man now “at peace with himself” (258), in the end accepts his place in the cycle of violence that he believes to be in the process of reconstituting itself. This time, however, it is the Tutsi who are in charge and he, Valcourt, has to play his part once again from the sidelines as an outsider-insider.

Courtemanche’s narrative further highlights some of the issues regarding the flaws of his representational strategy in Sunday. Although the novelist claims in his preface that the events in his novel, though fiction, are “a chronicle and eyewitness report,” his choice of a fictional mode with a largely conventional narrative form does little to advance an alternative conception of genocide (in Rwanda or elsewhere). Sunday’s narrative form emphasizes causality, a harmony of actions centred on individual motivations as well as predicated on maintaining certain accepted modes of social organization such as the family. Both Soyinka’s Season of Anomy and Adichie’s Half of a Yellow Sun adopt this narrative mode as well. Both novels attempt to reassert familial forms of social relations in significant part as expressions of resistance to genocide. In Season of Anomy, Ofeyi combats the disintegration of familial relations. He has to ward off the lure of infidelity to the point of transforming a mistress into an ally so as to rescue his Iriyise. In Half of a Yellow Sun, Odenigbo’s and Olanna’s family survives genocide and war with a new awareness of itself. This awareness is grounded in a rejection of any masculinist hierarchy that anoints the man as the family’s head, and acceptance of a view of women as equal partners in the domestic union.

In Courtemanche’s Sunday, genocide disrupts the budding inter-national, inter-racial family by Valcourt and Gentille. In its atrocious aftermath, however, this familial experiment
does not survive even though its founding love does. Unlike Soyinka’s and Adichie’s novels, which emphasize survival and familial continuity, Courtemanche’s text emphasizes the facts of genocidal destruction and tells the story of a different kind of continuity and survival – not of the family but of what it is in the family that has died. Yet in another sense *Sunday* is not too different from Soyinka’s and Adichie’s novels. Love in its very heroic ideal survives between Gentille and Valcourt, both of whom make sacrifices of physical distance and bodily denial in order to grant the other psychological ease.

**Conclusion**

In his defence of the thematic foci and stylistic choices found in Courtemanche’s *Sunday* and some other “African trauma literature” in their representation of African suffering, Robert Eaglestone argues that texts such as Courtemanche’s are “forms of engaged literature that seek to influence, explain, and educate” (84). This kind of literature makes genocide communicable by narrativizing it and by insisting that difficulties and complexities accompanying the atrocities of genocide can be grasped and thought through. Part of the pain of the Rwanda genocide was that wilful Western colonial ignorance failed to apprehend the situation for what it was, misrepresenting genocide as little more than an instance of the recurrent savagery of Africans innately predisposed to murder one another. It is for this reason, according to Eaglestone, that a novel such as *Sunday* relies heavily and positively on cultural and representational apparatuses available for describing traumatic encounters, especially for Western audiences.

What Eaglestone does not fully acknowledge is that the use of a pornographic rhetoric to depict African suffering for Western consumption in *Sunday* iterates the same racist attitude that wilfully mischaracterized the genocide in order to ignore it. Although *Sunday* attempts to reproach this racist attitude, in its narrative style, choices and story, the novel fails
to do justice to this reproach, since it instead reinforces and feeds the tastes of its voyeuristic Western consumers.
Chapter 6

Gendering African Genocide Fiction: Adichie’s Feminist Vision of Genocide in *Half of a Yellow Sun*

Introduction

African genocide novels, particularly those written by men, tend to depict encounters with and experiences of mass atrocities during or after genocide as descent narratives in which male heroes embark on a quest in search of the meaning of their lives and societies. During the course of these quests, female characters are usually excluded or marginalized because they are already in hell, a condition requiring the male hero’s rescue or else serving as the basis for the hero’s new awareness of life. As we see in Soyinka’s, Courtemanche’s, and even Diop’s novels, women’s experience of atrocity are portrayed as symbolic of the infernal conditions of African genocide. Women’s abjection, which is often presented in men’s writing as a metaphor for the extreme suffering of victims in general, serves to motivate the male artist’s descent into Africa’s genocidal hell and his coming to possess some transcendental knowledge based on his encounters with its denizens. In this chapter, I discuss Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s 2006 novel *Half of a Yellow Sun* (subsequently *Half*) which, I will argue, represents a significant attempt to depart from such masculinist tropes of the African genocide novel exemplified in the other three novels I have discussed in my dissertation. Unlike in Soyinka’s *Season of Anomy*, in Adichie’s novel women are not the comatose subjects of an African postcolonial hell awaiting saving by men. Nor are they naïve romanticists desiring the white man’s intellect as dramatized in Courtemanche’s characterization of Gentille in *A Sunday at the Pool in Kigali*. In Adichie’s novel, women as well as men are persons with their own autonomous agency, and all equally strive to make sense of their place in a chaotic world. In its revisionism of the dominant quest trope found in African genocide fiction by men, *Half* deploys what some critics consider to be a feminist
trope (see, e.g., Andrade, “Adichie’s Genealogies”; Coundouriotis, The People’s Right to the Novel; Emenyonu, ed., A Companion to Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie). This so-called feminist trope uses elements of domestic fiction in order to re-imagine Igbo genocide in Nigeria and offer alternative visions of reform in genocide’s aftermath.

In The Nation Writ Small, Susan Andrade argues that the domestic genre has been the preferred narrative form used by several African women writing about national experiences. Andrade argues that unlike men’s writings that centre on political actions and public life, African women’s writings generally focus on experiences within the private space of the family. For Andrade, this notable focus on private experiences in women’s writing does not, however, presuppose an absence of a political vision and political commitment in women’s writing. Instead, according to Andrade, the domestic genre enables African women writers to animate shared historical experiences as well as highlight the gender dynamics of such encounters. In this way, too, the private aspects of the domestic genre affords female writers the opportunity to explore intimately and with acute detail the more intimate aspects of national struggles.

In light of Andrade’s observations, several critics have praised Adichie for how she reinvents in Half “the genre of domestic fiction by using it to tell the story of war,” and by so doing “feminizes” the war novel in the tradition of women forebears in Nigeria such as Flora Nwapa and Buchi Emecheta (Coundouriotis 225). Jane Bryce argues that Adichie’s Half belongs to “a wider corpus” of “Nigerian” women’s writing on the Biafra-Nigeria War that “fundamentally questions, not only the authority of fathers, but [also] the legitimacy of [patriarchy’s] official history by which nationalism is configured” (450). Seen thus, Half’s questioning of official history that is organized around male experience underlines Adichie’s feminist vision. This vision has been considered remarkable by critics for its liberal humanist ethics (Wenske 72-4) which derives “genealogically” from a revisionist extension of a
masculinist trope present in writing such as Achebe’s (Andrade 93). This liberal humanism suggests an imaginative horizon supplied in the story for understanding gender dynamics in a war context, and for tasking characters with responsibility for their actions.

These readings of *Half* focusing on Adichie’s feminist vision attempt to show the important contributions of the novel to a feminist reworking of an otherwise masculinist discourse of war in Nigerian writing. According to Eleni Coundouriotis, as a whole the notion of “feminizing” and “domesticating” the war novel suggests the genre’s “submission to the moral and political authority of women’s points of view” (225). Coundouriotis contends that this feminist project in Adichie’s *Half* is revisionist in so far as it explores the political implications of “the claim that [such an approach] strengthens women’s political identity by demonstrating how they reform men” (225).

In this chapter, I relocate Adichie’s feminist vision in *Half* within the context of an analysis of genocide writing by examining the novel’s representation of some major male characters, in particular the novel’s representative Igbo and non-Igbo men. In contrast to sentiments expressed by some of the critics cited above, I contend that the feminist vision in *Half* presents some challenges for thinking about Igbo genocide in Nigeria, notwithstanding how the novel clearly sets out to expose this genocide. These challenges relate to how Adichie portrays men, in particular Igbo men. The image of the “Igbo man” in *Half* presents as what I will go on to describe in a subsequent section of this chapter as hubristic masculinity, a type of male being-in-the world that has remained central in several works of Biafran fiction, one that scholarly accounts focusing on such writings have failed to explore adequately. I trace the source of this hubristic Igbo masculinity in *Half* back to Chinua Achebe’s hero Okonkwo in *Things Fall Apart* (*TFA*). I argue that the masculinity of the sort epitomized by Okonkwo has been misappropriated and depicted as an ideal type of Igbo maleness in *Half*, which in turn leads to Adichie misrepresenting the Biafran tragedy by
failing to hold perpetrators of the Nigerian genocide accountable for their crimes. I reveal the logic of Adichie’s victim/survivor blaming in *Half*, which I trace back to the novel’s indebtedness to conventions in Holocaust survivor testimonial writing, as well as to the legacies of Chinua Achebe’s novel. I will go on to reject the critical reception of this image of the Igbo man especially in feminist scholarship on Biafran writing, a body of work that distorts Igbo masculinity and obscures Igbo men’s historical role during the Biafran conflict.

To appreciate the significance of my argument, it is important to recover Adichie’s novel from the critical discourse on war writing within which it has mostly been read. Instead I will treat the novel as an example of genocide fiction. The war narrative impelling the bulk of critical responses to *Half* has not only distracted attention from the novel’s main historical pivot (that is, genocide), it has also encouraged contentious or disputed interpretations of Adichie’s text. It is therefore my aim in this chapter to: (1) read *Half* as a novel of postcolonial “African” genocide; and (2) problematize its feminist vision of Igbo genocide in Nigeria. Understood as a genocide novel, *Half*, like the other African genocide fiction discussed in this dissertation, invokes the memory of the Holocaust in order to present atrocities against Igbos in Nigeria as genocide. By so doing, *Half* portrays Igbo genocide in Nigeria as manifest in what the philosopher Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze has called the “epistemic conditions of genocide” (115). These epistemic conditions, according to Eze, are constituted from the racism and exterminationist ideologies that lie at the heart of genocides in postcolonial Africa. On the one hand, as I will go on to show shortly, Adichie’s vision of genocide in *Half* imagines the crisis of Biafra as propelled by racist ideologies against Igbos in Nigeria. On the other, the feminist vision in *Half* seeks to challenge masculinist representations of that past in order to imagine a unique historical sphere for considering women’s experience at the time. In doing so, I argue, the novel problematically reinforces the racism that it exposes. For as I will further contend, *Half* racializes masculinity in its
portrayal of men, and in the process the novel generates a narrative that problematically and perhaps inadvertently blames men and holds them responsible for the Biafran genocide.

*Half of a Yellow Sun as Genocide Fiction*

Notwithstanding the fact that several scholarly engagements with *Half* regard the novel as an example of war fiction, and therefore ignore the story’s significant concern with narrating genocide, Adichie’s novel is unequivocal in its identification of the massacres of Igbos especially before the war as genocide. *Half* chronicles from multiple perspectives the stories of mostly Igbo individuals caught up in a time of genocide and genocidal war. A central factor in the novel’s complex plot is a family’s struggle to survive the conflict around them, a cogent dramatization which involves the destruction of Odenigbo and Olanna’s home. Prior to the genocide, Odenigbo’s parlour is a salon of sorts, an intellectual hub of open debates and flourishing space for intellectual exchanges. The Biafran crisis sweeps away the vibrancy of this home, which I take to represent civil society. As revealed in *Half*, genocide and war usually emerge from and consequently lead to the loss of civil society. By the end of the fighting, even though the family survives it has lost nearly everything: its library, its democratic spirit, intellectuals, poets such as Okeoma, colleagues, and relatives who have all contributed to its vibrancy and “ongoingness.”

The novel’s narrative rests on the specifics of Olanna’s relationship with Odenigbo, both of them middle class Igbo academics. In its inception, their relationship suffers a nearly catastrophic blow – at about the same time as Nigeria degenerates into ethnic crisis – when Odenigbo succumbs to pressures from his mother and impregnates a peasant woman, Amala. In an awkward act of retaliation, Olanna involves herself in a sexual affair with Richard, a white British writer visiting the country who is Kainene’s (Olanna’s twin sister’s) lover. The
affair estranges Olanna further from Kainene. Amidst the complicated web of these illicit affairs and betrayals is a peasant boy, Ugwu, Odenigbo’s houseboy, who participates from the margins as a servant taking inventory of these complex and evolving encounters. The context of illicit affairs and betrayals in Olanna’s and Odenigbo’s circles parallels a political context of national crisis taking shape in 1960s Nigeria. The post-Independence Nigerian government has colossally failed to realize the promises of earlier independence struggles. In a sense, the betrayals and tensions found in Olanna’s and Odenigbo’s relationship metaphorize the political situation in Nigeria which ultimately led to a military coup.

However, following the coup, Igbos found themselves treated as scapegoats for Nigeria’s political problems. In *Half*, the ensuing genocide of Igbos across the country provides an opportunity for mending the cracks in the relationships of these Igbo characters who have to strive to survive a genocidal war in their newly declared nation, Biafra. In representing this genocide, Adichie compares it to the Nazis’ attempted genocide of European Jews. In comparisons of Igbo suffering to that of Jews in the Holocaust, *Half* identifies racism as lying at the heart of the Igbo massacres. For example, in the novel the English woman Susan expresses her disgust for the Igbo and her tacit support for a genocide against them:

There are lots and lots of Igbo people here—well, they are everywhere really, aren’t they? Not that they didn’t have it coming to them, when you think about it, with their being clannish and uppity and controlling the markets. Very Jewish, really. And to think they are relatively uncivilized; one couldn’t compare them to the Yoruba, for example, who have had contact with Europeans on the coast for years. I remember somebody telling me when I first came to be careful about hiring an Igbo houseboy because, before I knew it, he would own my house and the land it was built on. (194)
Susan’s view reflects a more general and prejudicial representation in *Half* of the Igbo in stereotypical terms linked to supposedly essential Jewish traits — i.e. the distorted and offensive idea of Jews as ontologically greedy, domineering money-grubbers, commercialists, overambitious and arrogant (194-95). *Half* narrativizes a culture of xenophobia and ethnic labelling in which the Igbo find themselves scapegoated as a problem population and blamed for the political crisis in Nigeria (197-98). As dramatized in *Half*, the rhetoric on the lips of some killers as they butcher and deport their Igbo victims on their way back to their Eastern homeland is equally telling: “Go, Igbo, go, so that *garri* will be cheaper! Go, and stop trying to own every house and every shop!” (198).

Through such comparison to the Holocaust, *Half* hints at racism – especially the kind of racist practices that accompanied European colonialism – as providing the epistemic preconditions for the Igbo genocide in Nigeria. This racism hinges on what Mahmood Mamdani in *When Victims Become Killers* has described in the context of Rwanda as the crisis of postcolonial citizenship in Africa, a crisis resulting from the classification of citizens into indigenous/native and non-native citizens (13-14). The ascription of non-native status to citizens in their own country is part of a colonial history in which, according to Mamdani, segments of a nation’s population are racialized, discriminated against and ultimately, as with the Rwandan case, nearly exterminated (Mamdani 13).

*Half* suggests that Igbo identity was racialized in Nigeria as a political and economic threat – as ontologically commercialist, domineering, and arrogant. Accordingly, in *Half* to be Igbo is to be seen as an existential threat to others, and so something in need of elimination in the name of national self-defence. *Half* portrays this genocidal aspect of the 1960s crisis as the factor that provides the impetus for Igbo nationalism at the time. In other words, the originary trauma of the Biafran genocide, at least for the Igbo, served to feed Igbos’ sense of themselves as members of a distinct (and oppressed) community. For
example, it is not the political explanations (such as military coups) adduced as reasons for the mass murder of Igbos that matter to the servant boy, Ugwu, who transforms in the story as a result of his encounters with the horrors of the Biafran conflict into the anointed writer of his people’s traumatic history. For Ugwu, “What mattered was that the massacres frightened and united the Igbo. What mattered was that the massacres made fervent Biafrans of former Nigerians” (257).

However, Half also faults the “fervent” Biafran nationalism that emerges in response to genocide. Half shows how the construction of this nationalism in terms saturated with “Igbo” patriarchal rape and masculine arrogance condemns it to self-destruction. In an interview published on her website, Adichie has stated that part of her motivation for writing Half was because she was enraged by “the thought of the egos and indifference of men leading to the unnecessary deaths of men and women and children” (“The Story Behind the Story”). This fury at men’s ego, which Adichie holds responsible for the unnecessary deaths of people, is directed precisely at Igbo men and Biafran leadership, at least as depicted in Half, and fails to properly hold the Nigerian military government responsible for genocide. A reason for this failure to hold the Nigerian genocide perpetrator fully accountable in the novel is perhaps that Half directs its criticism of patriarchy at qualities of maleness historically stereotyped as well as depicted in the novel as Igbo/Biafran. In this criticism, Half attempts to expose the dangers of this exuberant Igbo masculine ego, to condemn its arrogance and to get it to accept responsibility for its recklessness. So represented, as I will go on to show in subsequent sections of this chapter, the feminist vision underpinning Adichie’s representation of Igbo genocide invariably participates in a culture of blaming Igbo men for genocide in Nigeria.

It is ironic how a novel that advances claims that there was an attempted genocide of the Igbo ends up holding Igbo men largely responsible for and complicit in their own
victimization, as well as that of others. A closer look at Adichie’s novel reveals the reasons for this contradiction. The representations of hubris undergirding the Igbo masculinity with which Adichie grapples in Half derive less from the historical circumstance of her narrative than it does from Achebe’s Okonkwo in Things Fall Apart. By crafting Igbo men in Half in the image of Achebe’s Okonkwo, Adichie offers a problematic conflation of the Biafran situation with the colonial context of Okonkwo’s tragedy. Even more problematically, Adichie depicts Igbo and other masculinities in the novel as racially distinct, and portrays male characters’ distinctive ethnic/racial traits as a basis for understanding aspects of their motivations and actions. In Half, the Igbo male’s general resemblance to Okonkwo is made to appear distinct from the masculinity of the average Hausa and Englishman.

**Okonkwo as Figure of Hubristic Igbo Masculinity**

Before examining Adichie’s representation of male characters in Half, let us briefly consider what the term “hubristic masculinity” means for representations of Igbo masculinity in literature. By hubristic masculinity, I am designating a constellation of proclivities and attributes that characterize maleness as excessively arrogant in ways leading to tragic consequences. Simply put, the hubristic man is a man blinded by arrogant pride. He is the stuff of the heroic genre, which “traditionally” across most societies was precisely a male genre. At once this figure embodies the qualities of courage we admire and the stubborn inflexibility we condemn. The important point to note here is that the hubristic man emblematizes two key features: He is a *tragic hero* responding to a *tragic situation*. In depictions of historical epochs and moments of transition, this tragic heroic figure has been the privileged enabler for thinking about human struggles and social/political changes.
In the context of the Igbo genocide in Nigeria and its artistic representations, the hubristic man occupies an important place in writers’ and critics’ discourses on the past. We find traces of such hubristic figures in Ofeyi, the hero of Soyinka’s *Season of Anomy*; in James Odugo the journalist and the courageous Samson Ukoha in Cyprian Ekwensi’s *Survive the Peace*; Dr. Amilo Kanu in Chukwuemeka’s Ike’s *Sunset at Dawn*, and several representative male characters in Buchi Emecheta’s *Destination Biafra*, such as Chijioke Abosi, John Nwokolo and Saka Momoh. Taken together, each of these male characters figures in the narratives either in order to dramatize tragic heroic qualities associated with the hubristic man, or else as an egotistically blinded figure used in stories to challenge the heroic assumptions associated with the hubristic man. For example, in *Season of Anomy* Soyinka insists on a heroic vision of the hubristic man by creating a narrative drama that sees Ofeyi conquer his hubris and successfully rescue his woman, Iriyise, from a postcolonial hell. In *Survive the Peace*, Ekwensi offers two variations of the man of hubris in the journalist James and the soldier Samsom, both of whom meet their tragic ends in what is supposed to be a dramatization of the depth to the tragic loss of important qualities of manliness as a result of Nigeria’s genocidal onslaught against the Igbos. Similarly, Ike in *Sunset at Dawn* portrays Dr. Kanu as a man of hubris whose death is meant to underpin the lamentable sacrifices that Biafra suffers in its struggles to survive a genocidal war. In Adichie’s *Half*, as I will discuss shortly, this hubristic man is shorn of his heroism in order to dramatize his foibles and the hollowness of his dangerous ego, as well as to envision his reformation.

A major source of this hubristic man is Okonkwo in Achebe’s *TFA*, perhaps not so strange a trend considering the popularity and importance of *TFA* as the prototypical “African” novel portraying a tragic transition from one epoch to another (Boehmer). Arguably no fictional character in modern “Nigerian” literature has successfully seduced and continues to influence Nigerian writing more than Okonkwo. He has become a kind of
mythical figure, possessing an otherworldly life as if he once lived in the real world and actually died (Jeyifo, *Things Fall Apart* 19). Forged from the crucible of a collapsing indigenous socio-political system and an emerging British colonial system, Okonkwo embodies the qualities of the traditional male tragic hero. He is the personification of courage and fearlessness, as well as of the excess of masculine hubris.

Two broad impulses have converged around the interpretation of Okonkwo. One regards Okonkwo as representative of his community, and as such his downfall signals the demise of community and tradition. The other view reads Okonkwo’s fall as emblematic of an individual tragedy. Some earlier readings of *TFA* align with the former tendency and find in Okonkwo a profound statement against colonialism. The tragic-hero, rather than being an exception in a society that distances itself from him, becomes the very symbol and representative of that society’s seeming collapse. Richard Begam, for example, reads Okonkwo as representing Igbo culture more generally. Even though at almost every turn in the novel Okonkwo appears as someone working against community and holding views contrary to Umuofia’s principles, Begam describes his fall as indicating “the collapse of Igbo culture” (Begam 398), thereby linking Okonkwo’s fate to the fortune of his people.

Several critics in recent years have rejected this position and find Okonkwo’s fall less about the ruin of his community than it is about his own ruin. As Biodun Jeyifo puts it, there are those in the story “for whom things did not exactly fall apart” (*Things Fall Apart* 19). Simply put, Okonkwo represents an incarnation of the “rigid and inflexible version of society’s masculine values and principles” (Jeyifo, *Things Fall Apart* 19). Jeyifo further notes that Okonkwo is a societal exception, and argues that his fall does not suggest the collapse of Umuofia. Other characters such as Obierika, Nwoye (Okonkwo’s son), and, we should also add, the prominent female figures in the novel such as Ezinma, all represent what Jeyifo sees
as characteristically normative versions of the Umuofia society that refuse, unlike Okonkwo, to be inflexible in the face of change.

Adélékè Adéèkó has designated as the “Okonkwo topos” the influence of Achebe’s hero on Nigerian writing (“Okonkwo” 73). The Okonkwo topos, or formula, according to Adéèkó lies at the heart of literary projects by other Nigerian writers, including Soyinka in *Death and the King’s Horseman*, Flora Nwapa in *Efuru*, Ben Okri in *The Famished Road*, Chris Abani in *Graceland*, and Chimamanda Adichie in *Purple Hibiscus* and (as I contend in this chapter, *Half of a Yellow Sun*), all of whom in different ways attempt in their works to re-write Okonkwo as a figure of late-colonial and postcolonial historical transition (“Okonkwo” 73; “Great Book” 37-40). The reason for this writerly fixation on Okonkwo in Nigerian writing, according to Adéèkó, is because many Nigerian writers “find the conclusion of Achebe’s *TFA* unsatisfying and therefore keeps [sic] reimagining it” (“Okonkwo” 73).

The dissatisfaction of these writers with the ending of *TFA* is due to the “closure” signalled by Okonkwo’s suicide. Indeed Adéléké suggests that Okonkwo occupies a central place in Nigerian writing because of the closure implied by his suicide. Significantly, however, Adéléké’s reading of Okonkwo’s suicide contradicts his claim that Okonkwo’s hubris leads to his own ruin and not his community’s destruction. Reading Okonkwo’s suicide as inaugurating a kind of closure, Adéléké interprets him as a representative of an indigenous ruling class who resorts to “annihilating urges” when faced with the reality of losing his familiar (and traditional) hold on power (“Okonkwo” 73). He sees texts such as Soyinka’s *Death and the King’s Horseman* as re-writings of the “closure” suggested by Okonkwo’s suicide. As I will go on to contend, interpretations such as Adéléké’s of Okonkwo as a representative of his society’s leadership class encourages perceptions of Okonkwo and the masculinity he epitomizes as normatively characteristic of “Igbo” leadership.
In the Biafran context during and after the genocidal war of independence, the Biafran military leader Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu came to represent a real-life equivalent of Achebe’s fictional Okonkwo. For example, the popular 1986 film adaptation of *Things Fall Apart* compares Ojukwu to Okonkwo in ways that transform Okonkwo’s story into Biafra’s story. In the director’s commentary accompanying the last scenes of the film, it becomes clear that the filmmakers were intent on paralleling Biafra’s tragedy with Okonkwo’s since they considered the latter to represent the aspirations of a quintessential Igbo heroic spirit and Igbo masculinity, both of which have been matched in modern times only by Ojukwu.¹

Through such links to Biafra, Okonkwo’s tragedy finds parallel in Biafra’s tragedy. In this way, the film encourages a reductive reading of the complexities of people’s lived experiences of genocide and war as a tragic and cautionary story of one man’s hubristic downfall. Meanwhile, the propaganda issued by the Nigerian government during and after the war maintained that Ojukwu should be held responsible for the suffering of his own people given his refusal to compromise and surrender much earlier than he did (Achebe, *There Was a Country* 209-39). Ojukwu’s selfishness, arrogant inflexibility, his hubris, as the government’s narrative averred, led to and prolonged the war and his people’s suffering.

I disagree with Adéèkó that Okonkwo represents the traditional ruling class facing colonial conquest. I instead concur with Hugh Hodges’s apt objection to Adéèkó, and contend instead that Okonkwo acts alone and rarely on behalf of community. He embodies a rather totalitarian impulse like the invading colonial system that he positions himself against

---

¹ Director’s commentary in the last scene of the film reads thus: “In Igbo language, ‘ebube’ means ‘glory’. ‘Dike’ means ‘the brave.’ The chant, in the context it is used, indicates a praise, honor and overjoy glorification of Okonkwo. In Igboland, if you praise a charged-up man in that manner, the man will ‘fight and kill a lion’ even if he intended to run away. In modern day Igboland, the former Biafran Head of State Lt. Col. Emeka Ojukwu, who led the Igbos during the civil war 1967-1970, remains the only son of Igboland that is held in the same esteem as Okonkwo. This explains the conferment to Ojukwu, by the Igbo community, of the title “Ikemba,” “the strength of the people.” For an incisive discussion of *Things Fall Apart* adaptation into film, see Ugochukwuk, François. “*Things Fall Apart*—Achebe’s Legacy, from Book to Screen.” *Research in African Literature*, vol. 45, no. 2, 2014, pp. 168-183.
(Hodges 53). Okonkwo’s suicide is thus readable as “anomic and, perhaps more importantly, egoistic,” suggesting his own “final rejection of all social and moral obligations” to his community (53). In Okonkwo’s Igbo world of Umuofia, suicide is abominable. Okonkwo’s suicide has to be understood as signalling his final rejection of his community, not the political ritual of resolving difficulty as Adéèkó explains it based on his reading of suicide in Soyinka’s Yoruba world of *Horseman*.

Adéèkó is, however, right that Okonkwo has been a key influence on Nigerian writing dealing with epochality, in part because as a man of hubris he embodies some of the major tensions inherent in any historical transition. Yet where he sees in other Nigerian intertextual relations to *TFA* as based on the urge to re-write the closure signalled by Okonkwo’s suicide, I see a misappropriation of the Okonkwo figure in artistic response to the Biafran tragedy, particularly in such contemporary appropriations of this figure as exemplified in Adichie’s *Half*. Adichie’s novel falls within an artistic tradition of Biafran writing that rejects heroic representations of that past, particularly heroic representations of men’s actions. In her rejection of this heroic image of the man of hubris, Adichie characterizes the male Igbo figures in her novel as so full of arrogance that they make bad decisions that bring calamity on themselves and their communities. *Half* dramatizes the dangers posed to society by this hubristic maleness. The problem with Adichie’s fictionalization of masculinity in the context of the 1960s Igbo genocide, however, is that it misappropriates the figure of male hubris in Achebe’s *TFA* and presumes Okonkwo and others of his type are figures adequate for thinking about the Biafran tragedy generally.
Hubristic Masculinity in Adichie’s *Half of a Yellow Sun*

In *Half*, Igbo men such as Odenigbo and Ugwu figure as hubristic and so are considered distinct from other ethnically representative male characters. Two such male characters are Richard (the English writer and Kainene’s lover), who transforms in the story into a war correspondent on the Biafran side, and Mohammed, the Nigerian Muslim Hausa and Olanna’s ex-lover. One way to understand the overall characterization of these men in the story is to look at the sexualities they exhibit since, as Zoe Norridge explains, sex serves a synecdochal function when explaining violence and the mechanisms of characterization in *Half*. *Half* presents Richard as sexually feeble; Mohammed is exoticized and shown to possess a certain Arab charm and conservative sexuality. The Igbo men in the story such as Odenigbo, Colonel Madu, and even Ugwu, possess more robust sexualities. Compared to the Igbo men of the novel, both Richard and Mohammed embody enervated masculinities that make their involvement in and closeness to the Biafran tragedy of no serious consequence since it fails to signify morally.

Richard is represented as an exhausted white European male of the late colonial and early postcolonial period whose place in the emerging postcolonial order is anything but assured. He is a European man of late modernity whose ignorant and sometimes hypocritical apprehension about decolonization leads him to embrace a romanticized and sensualized image of Africa. Like Clarence in Camara Laye’s novel *The Radiance of the King*, Richard traverses postcolonial Nigeria in an illusory and frustrating search for manhood, voice and communion.² The foster child of Conrad’s Kurtz in *Heart of Darkness*, Richard straddles

---
² Clarence is a figure from France. In Laye’s *Radiance of the King*, this figure sheds his sense of “white” superiority the deeper he reaches into the darkness of Africa. In the context of Biafra, Irish writers presented interesting examples that may be considered models for Adichie’s characterization of Richard in *Half*. The European men in these Irish literatures on Biafra usually find themselves occupying a marginal, if not precarious, position in both Europe and the new postcolonial state. Writings and documentaries by Irish writers who witnessed the war in Biafra in different capacities offer images akin to Adichie’s Richard. Like Richard, the image of a European journalist witnessing the atrocities of postcolonial Africa is dominant. Examples include
between the complicated worlds of two women whose towering shadows threaten to nullify him. In *Half*, Richard’s “betrothed” Susan represents the haughtiness of the colonial past that he desires to leave behind. Kainene, on the other hand, figures as his exoticized African mistress with whom he aims, without success, to find communion.

In *Half*, Richard shows up as a foil both to Odenigbo and to Colonel Madu. Richard’s relationship with Kainene is fraught with sexual incapacities in contrast with the sexual potency that Colonel Madu appears to personify each time he comes into the circle of the relationship Richard shares with Kainene. Richard’s sexual encounters with Kainene underscore his enfeeblement in the story and present an instance of classic gender role-reversal. He is the one who prepares the room in preparation for sex with Kainene. He emerges from sexual intercourse with Kainene feeling more uncertain about himself. The only time in the story that Richard achieves what seems like a satisfactory sexual experience is when Kainene’s twin sister, Olanna, has sex with him to get even with Odenigbo. He is neither fully in charge of what happens nor is he seriously interested in Olanna. In the lives of the twin sisters and other Igbo characters in the story, Richard appears to be merely a pawn in the politics of their relationships, in the context of which he is used mainly to arouse jealousies and sustain fantasies.

To put Richard’s character in its symbolic place and judge his significance in the context of the Biafran tragedy, it is important to understand his position as an Englishman, a former colonizer, an aspiring male writer, and a war reporter. As an Englishman coming from a recent, if not continuing, history of colonialism, he finds himself struggling to reconcile his place in that history by attempting to write a book concerning a people he knows little to

Vincent [Lawrence] Banville’s *An End to Flight*, Desmond Forristal’s *Night Flight to Uli* (documentary) and *Black Man’s Country* (a play). For a recent and incisive study of the Irish imaginations of Biafra, see Bateman, “Biafra in the Irish Imagination.”
nothing about. But since as the novel shows, the structures of such previously racist colonial constructions of superiority have wilted significantly, Richard finds himself wallowing confusedly in the muddle of an emerging postcolonial Nigeria. He rejects what seems in the story like the sterile and monotonous highlife of a former colonizer represented by Susan whom he leaves for Kainene in what appears as his effort to seek communion with the formerly colonized. His unsuccessful but passionate attempts to find communion in the form of satisfactory sexual union with Kainene symbolize his efforts to establish a definitive union of repossession with the formerly colonized. However, his sexual incapacities and embarrassments with Kainene speak more to the frustrated outcomes of his quest.

When the war suddenly comes, Richard extends his quest for a relationship with Kainene to include helping Biafra. As is the case with his place in the lives of Kainene and Olanna, he finds himself once again used as a pawn by a Biafran leadership that is intent on internationalizing news of the atrocities of Nigerian military. As a war reporter, Richard becomes more uncertain about his place in a Biafran world that continues to reject him even as he learns the Igbo language, has remained devoted to Kainene and has done his best to help with the war effort.

His uncertainties about his place in the postcolonial Igbo world make Richard finally realize that Biafra’s story is not his to tell. He hands over to Ugwu (a subaltern child-soldier veteran) the fragments of his notes that he has produced from his observations. After he comes to the realization that he will never see Kainene again following her disappearance near the end of the war, Richard’s quest in Biafra leaves him more confounded: “he would see things only in shadow, only in half glimpses” (537). His encounters in Biafra are a descent quest. Unlike Valcourt in Courtemanche’s A Sunday at the Pool in Kigali, Richard’s descent journey does not lead to some transcendental knowledge of the postcolonial world or to an empowering awareness of himself, even though he ends up like Valcourt without his
African mistress. The Biafran genocide, in other words, destroys the prospects of his relationship with Kainene.

Yet Richard’s display of frenzied and oftentimes puerile passion for Kainene, especially when the latter goes missing, may elicit both the reader’s disapproval and sympathy for him. Throughout the novel, Richard’s agency as an outsider-insider shows him to be a pawn in the postcolonial Nigeria/Biafra world. Accordingly, *Half* encourages us to see him as merely a pawn in the politics roiling amongst the formerly colonized, and so as a not-so-powerful, near passive and unsure agent in a history of genocide and war that the British government and media of the day helped to inflame and prosecute.3

In the case of Mohammed, *Half* presents him as descending from “a lineage of holy warriors” and thus as “the very avatar of pious masculinity” (56). He is a picture of a gentleman, handsome with “caramel complexion” (55), wealthy and materialistic but in a gracefully simple way in contrast with the wild and raucous affluence of Olanna’s parents and the arrogant sophistication of her lover, Odenigbo. Mohammed is the quintessential “Northern” Nigerian Muslim man, resembling the quaintness and erotic exoticism of the charming Arab-Muslim. He is conservative, caring, religious and vain, in contrast with the wild, ferocious, liberal, activist impetuousness of Odenigbo.

While Mohammed represents the Northern oligarchy in Nigeria, he is also representative of dissenting voices speaking against – although less publicly – the genocide of Igbos in his region. In the world of the story, he is detached from and less implicated in the atrocities against Igbos taking place across Northern Nigeria. Not only does he save Olanna from being victimized by perpetrators of genocide in his region, he also remembers her

during the war and manages to send her relief items. The overall picture of this only major representative of the Northern elite in Adichie’s story is not of someone morally responsible or accountable for any of the atrocities that take place around him. His is rather the picture of an aloof, graceful and passive participant in that history. This portrayal of Mohammed might not be of any significant consequence except for the fact that he is the principal character of Northern extraction in the novel. His marginal place in the novel, and the lightheartedness with which he graces the world of *Half*, belie a history that has involved witnessing a very active and vibrant Northern elite that is complicit both in the organization and execution of genocide and a pernicious war.

Unlike Richard, Mohammed is far removed from the tragedy of Biafra. If Richard’s devitalized masculinity and sexuality signify his uncertain place in that tragic conflict, Mohammed’s exoticized “pious” masculinity and sexuality create a mystery that cannot be comprehended and apprehended in that history. He is more a figure out of Sudanese novelist Tayeb Salih’s *Season of Migration to the North*, and so like a person modelled after Salih’s Mustapha Sa’eed, an Arab-African and passive Othello, who suffers from the disorientation that comes with double exposure to Arab and Western civilizations.

Richard and Mohammed represent racialized versions of masculinity — the former (white/European) replete with enervated masculinity, and the latter (Hausa/Muslim) exoticized. Their devitalized and exoticized sexualities parallel their diminished place in Adichie’s fictional historiography of the Biafran tragedy. The agency of these characters as devitalized agents in a history of genocide and war invites nominal consideration of their moral failings and responsibility for the atrocities of that past. This representation of Richard and Mohammed as diminished and declining contrasts sharply with Adichie’s portrayal of Igbo men in the novel.
Half characterizes Odenigbo, a middle-class university professor with strong activist leanings, as opinionated, irascible and emptily arrogant. He represents an intellectual and civilian version of the Biafran military leader Ojukwu: beard-wearing, radical, revolutionary, aggressive and full of unwarranted self-regard. In Half, Ojukwu, like Okonkwo in TFA, represents a figure of agency and power. His presence inspires chants of “Power! Power!” (214). After Ojukwu’s declaration of Biafran independence, Odenigbo – whose name loosely translates as the voice of the Igbo – becomes Ojukwu’s mouthpiece when addressing students of the University at Nsukka during a rally. There he declares that “Biafra is born! We will lead Black Africa! We will live in security! Nobody will ever again attack us! Never again!” (205). Meanwhile, his speech about Biafra’s birth coincides with the period of Baby’s birth, a child he himself has fathered through rape. The paralleling of Baby’s birth in the novel with the circumstances of Biafra’s “birth” reveals that the new nation is anything but ideal. Odenigbo here presents as a hypocrite. The new nation that he idealizes as a haven of security bears all of the hallmarks of the violence he is denouncing.

The first instance of rape in Half is committed by Odenigbo against Amala, the peasant woman his mother has brought to him from the village. The remarkable thing about Adichie’s depiction of Amala’s rape is that she explains it to be something impelled by a conspiracy of individual and cultural authorities. Odenigbo’s mother rejects her son’s relationship with Olanna because of what she considers Olanna’s worldliness. She forces a peasant woman on her son as replacement for Olanna. Odenigbo succumbs to pressures from his mother in what Half dramatizes as a willful failure to resist social and cultural impunity that has enabled him to exploit the peasantry such as Amala represents. During the rape, Amala remains unresponsive, signifying her non-consent. Although Half does criticize Odenigbo for failing to resist the pressure from family and culture, both he (an educated middle-class patriarch) and his mother (guardian of patriarchal culture) are still complicit in
Amala’s rape. Hence, the rape presents in the novel as a crime on the peasantry by the new and old elite class. The product of this dreadful union is Baby. Odenigbo’s rape of Amala thus signifies the rape and exploitation of the peasantry by the Igbo elites whom he represents. This elite class exploits flaws in cultural traditions of their people to satisfy their own venal whims and desires, even at the same time as they position themselves as champions of modernity.

Amala’s rape and the birth of Baby (which coincides with the birth of Biafra) turn out to be the beginning of the family that Odenigbo and Olanna end up managing during the war. Because this family is born from a rape, Adichie can be seen to suggest by extension that the Biafran nation is likewise tainted. Both “families” are not, after all, innocent and morally pure. The violence giving rise to them produces ripples of illicit affairs and betrayals. It is within the context of these affairs, rapes, and betrayals that Adichie inscribes the narrative of Igbo genocide. That this latter family is not innocent in no way provides justification for its attempted elimination.

However, Adichie’s does not allow the violent beginnings of Odenigbo’s and Olanna’s family to go blameless. The burden of responsibility for this atrocity basically falls on Odenigbo’s arrogant shoulders, even though in actuality it is Olanna who takes full responsibility for Baby. This drama of responsibility for the consequences of Odenigbo’s crime between the couples metaphorize what Adichie perceives as the situation of Biafra at the time: the arrogant acts of Igbo men leading to a difficult situation in which Igbo women had to assume responsibility for their men’s destructive excesses. Note that this way of imagining the beginnings of Biafra conveniently excludes any active Nigerian involvement. Responsibility for the problems of this beginning squares up around the consequential acts of men like Odenigbo who are ruled by their hubris.
Odenigbo’s arrogance is evident in his response to genocide and war. As the killing of Igbos takes place across Nigeria, Odenigbo grows more intemperate and gives his support fully to the Biafran cause. Out of anger, he fails to take full consideration of his society’s inability to control and direct the looming catastrophe. His ego prevents him from acknowledging weakness, and from reflecting deeply on the difficulties of his people’s situation. Odenigbo’s character comes almost straight out of Achebe’s *TFA*. He may be considered a reincarnation of Okonkwo, save that this time he has to confront not a colonial problem, but a postcolonial one.

*Half* refuses to grant Odenigbo heroic qualities. The longer the war lasts, the more degenerate he becomes, particularly when he insistently refuses to concede defeat in the name of a lost cause. Olanna is the one at this moment in the novel who steps up to take on a leadership role in order to save her family from starvation and disintegration. Her actions during the war underline the historical roles of and sacrifices by many Igbo women at the time who attempted to save their families (see Uchendu 403-422). Olanna further serves as a moral voice urging restraint in the face of the pressure to make rash decisions. She beseeches other men such as the poet Okeoma to serve as one of Biafra’s ambassadors instead of as a soldier (407). But Okeoma refuses and succumbs to his pride, preferring to blindly serve and die while under arms for Biafra.

Like Odenigbo, the houseboy Ugwu’s trajectory in the story revealingly thematizes the moral grey zone within which a hubristic Igbo masculinity is shown to be complicit in the abuse of Igbo society. Ugwu’s participation as a child soldier in the rape of a bar girl poignantly highlights this point. By then nicknamed Target Destroyer due to his show of bravery on the battlefield, and notwithstanding his forced conscription as a child soldier, Ugwu finds himself in a dilemma when his group gang-rapes a bar girl. He is both unable to stop his fellows from raping the girl and unable to resist the impulse to live up to the general
expectations of his manhood that are revealed when one of his cohorts taunts him: “Target Destroyer, aren’t you a man? I bukwa nwoke?” (458).

Ugwu’s rape scene resonates alongside the classic dramatization of hubris in Achebe’s TFA. This rape scene is strongly reminiscent of the scene in TFA in which Okonkwo joins in the killing of Ikemefuna. In both scenes, arrogant pride and the fear of being called weak and unmanly motivate the characters’ participation in violence. In the case of Okonkwo, he is supposed to be carrying out a divine instruction on behalf of his community, even though finally he acts more to protect his ego than to further the general good. By killing Ikemefuna, Okonkwo seemingly performs a duty for his community, but in doing so he commits a sacrilegious act against the land. In Adichie’s Half, Ugwu finds himself in a similar circumstance. He is supposed to be acting on behalf of his society, even though his actions have been forced upon him, and even though raping a bar girl is not formally part of this duty. Yet like Okonkwo, Ugwu is not confronting an impossible situation. He can simply refuse to participate in the rape and risk ridicule. Instead he rapes the girl to keep face, and by so doing he loses the reader’s moral sympathy for his plight. He becomes as despicable as the mass of anonymous Nigerian rapist-soldiers who have raped his own sister. Ugwu’s participation in rape thereby serves to link Biafran and Nigerian atrocities, blurring the line between victims and perpetrators.

Ugwu is subaltern, though he is in the process of rising above his original social status and gaining a “public” voice for himself. In TFA, Okonkwo too emerges from a similar subaltern background to become an aristocrat. If Odenigbo represents the hubristic middle-class Igbo man, Ugwu is his subaltern avatar, even though as subaltern Ugwu lacks full autonomy in the diegesis and has limited control over the terms of his participation in the war.
The rapes committed by Odenigbo and Ugwu occur at significant moments in the novel: the former occurring before the genocide and the latter near the end of the war. Both are perpetrated by Igbo men – a master and his servant – on ostensibly peasant Igbo women. Both also reveal a confluence of forces propelling (and overdetermining) individual action. In both Odenigbo’s and Ugwu’s rapes, the individual’s failure of will, not pressure from culture or an anomic environment, may be held responsible for the resulting atrocity. Adichie consistently peoples her work with characters tasked with accepting responsibility for their actions and decisions. In her novels, individuals are often required to accept responsibility for actions taken within the context of an environment within which they are not properly free. For instance, characters such as Mama, Kambili, and Jaja (in *Purple Hibiscus*) as well as Ifemelu and Obinze (in *Americanah*) have to grapple in different ways with the choices that they make and so must come to terms with what it meant to accept responsibility for them. In the case of Ugwu’s commission of rape, *Half* refuses to portray him as a child soldier or other victim of war, one who lacks agency and so the ability to manage the terms of his own involvement in the crime. Instead, Ugwu comes to acknowledge his own complicity and finds redemption in his acknowledgement of his larger moral failing. In fact, the basis of Ugwu’s trauma is not his experience of war and atrocity. Instead, it is his participation in rape. The image of the bar girl staring coldly at him continues to haunt him long after he has abandoned the battlefield. That this image of his crime remains a point of anguish in his mind is perhaps testament to Ugwu’s moral consciousness, which acknowledges his complicity in a crime. Unlike his master, Odenigbo, who relinquishes responsibility for his own rape to Olanna, Ugwu accepts responsibility for his by declaring his commitment to write about the Biafran tragedy, which he views as a manifestation in action of his moral duty to witness atrocity.

The master-servant trope occupies a significant place in *Half*, and is reminiscent of Crusoe’s relationship with Friday in Daniel Defoe’s *Robinson Crusoe*, a novel in which the
master serves as an icon of cultural modernity in contrast with the primitivism of his servant. It is in accordance with this master-servant trope that Ugwu enters into history in the story, first, as a peasant boy serving in the home of educated middle-class university professors, and second as a child soldier serving to satisfy the demands of Biafran military commanders who authorize his abduction and forceful conscription as a soldier. As Odenigbo’s servant, Ugwu encounters all of the foibles of modern middle-class culture. As a child soldier, he is exposed to the traumatic and morally crippling experience of war. In both situations, he serves to witness acts he is complicit in. Even as he witnesses Odenigbo’s rape of Amala, he invents excuses for it (270). Although Ugwu later comes to terms with his own complicity in these atrocities, his dedication to Odenigbo that prefaces the historical account he writes of the Biafran conflict suggests that he identifies with his master. The dedication after all reads: “For Master, my good man” (541; original emphasis).

While Ugwu’s use of “Master” in the dedication seems to suggest that he has not outgrown his status as servant by the end of the novel, even though he has managed to write Biafra’s history, by the end of the novel he has become Biafra’s official historian and his dedication to Odenigbo (who is, remember, considered the voice of the Igbo) at once suggests his usurpation of his master’s role as well as his acknowledgment as an apprentice of the high quality of his master’s training. That in Half master and servant are complicit in the rape of women whom they are supposed to protect is telling, particularly since Adichie redeems one of these men as a moral witness to a crime he himself has helped to perpetrate.

Jane Bryce has observed that rape in Adichie’s novel and novels by other Nigerian women such as Buchi Emecheta performs an ideological function, one that emphasizes the specificity of women’s private experience as distinct from communally shared historical experience. For example, in Emecheta’s Destination Biafra rape is significant because of how the author attempts to construct war as essentially a product of masculine hubris of which
women remain its most wretched victims. In Emecheta’s *Destination Biafra*, Debbie, the protagonist, is raped by both Biafran and Nigerian soldiers, an experience that reduces her to a subject of multiple masculine abuses. Her suffering from gender-based violence assumes great prominence in the world of the novel, leading the critic J.O.J. Nwachukwu-Agbada to ask why Emecheta in *Destination Biafra* “bemoans the rapes [of women] more than the deaths [of people in general]” (388). What Nwachukwu-Agbada gestures towards with this question, perhaps, is the specific politics of rape undergirding Emecheta’s narrative conception of the Biafran tragedy. Bryce views this politics as signalling the feminist ideology underpinning literary responses to Biafra by writers such as Emecheta and Adichie (Bryce 447). These writers, according to Bryce, attempt to use the representation of rape to locate the particularities and uniqueness of women’s experience in war, a morally and politically urgent task given women’s standardly marginal place in that history. Rape in a novel such as *Half* therefore is intended to express something about women’s victimization and the gendered experience of war and genocide, as well as to provide a way to work women’s perspectives into more putatively “official” representations of traumatic military and cultural history.4

Notwithstanding Bryce’s insights, however, the subject of rape defies easy explanation, especially in the context of a genocide. As Nicola Henry explains, oftentimes, as a weapon of war and genocide, rape bears significations that transcend its direct, individual victims.5 The act of rape by a genocide perpetrator may serve at once to perform violence and humiliation on its immediate victim as well as on the group the victim represents. Hence, Nwachukwu-Agbada’s unease with the depictions of rape in Emecheta’s novel, and by

---

4 Curiously, the politics of rape undergirding Adichie’s as well as Emecheta’s narrative uses women in similar ways as we find in the masculinist tropes of novels by Soyinka, Diop and Courtemanche that portray the woman as an iconic figure of extreme suffering and abjection. The difference, however, is that *Half* refuses to portray women’s abjection as requiring men’s saving grace and heroism.

5 See also Chapter 6 of Daniela De Vito, *Rape, Torture and Genocide*.
extension Adichie’s *Half*. Specifically, Nwachukwu-Agbada expresses anxiety over how sexual violence in these novels is dissociated from the contexts enabling their perpetration. Historically, women have been raped not only because they were women; they were sexually violated because they were Igbo or Biafran women. But in attempting to mark out the specificity of women’s suffering in Biafra’s tragedy, Emecheta and Adichie use rape to articulate the unique suffering of women abused by both Biafran and Nigerian men, and in this way they depict men from the two warring sides as united by an unwritten pact to rape Igbo women. By conceiving of rape in this way (i.e. in gendered terms as generically male violence directed against women), the rape of Igbo women by Nigerian soldiers ceases to be part of a broader network of genocidal violence directed against Igboness and made possible by the anomic circumstances created by the Biafran war. Any identitarian (and therefore genocidal) motives for these sexual violations is thereby negated, neglected, or obscured.

Through its collapse of the distinction between victim and perpetrator complicity in violence against women, Adichie’s *Half* relegates the genocide of Igbos to the context of a moral grey zone wherein survivors like Ugwu are also perpetrators and therefore must accept responsibility for their own suffering and that of their community. Ugwu’s position as a writer and a moral witness in this way becomes compromised. The judgemental title of his book, *The World Was Silent When We Died*, loses its moral force once we realize that he too has participated in crimes against the “we.” Although Ugwu fashions his role as writer to atone for his complicity in atrocity, he cannot claim at the same time to be the voice of a moral witness condemning the wider world for its indifference to and complicity in a crime that he himself has helped to perpetrate.

*The World Was Silent When We Died* echoes the original Yiddish title of Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel’s memoir *Night*, which provides an account of his Auschwitz
experience. The Yiddish translation of Wiesel’s book is *And the World Remained Silent,* implying the author’s reproach to global indifference and complicity in what appeared to Wiesel to be the world’s silence as the Holocaust was going on. Ugwu’s account is a similarly accusatory reproach to global indifference during and after the mass murders of Igbos in Nigeria. Ugwu’s first entries in his history recount the story of a woman who escapes Igbo massacres in the North while bearing the head of her murdered child in a calabash. Olanna, who has seen the woman in the train they use to escape to the East, is horrified by the woman and what she is carrying. Ugwu connects this woman to German and Rwandan women who have undergone similar experiences:

After [Ugwu] writes this, he mentions the German women who fled Hamburg with the charred bodies of their children stuffed in suitcases, the Rwandan women who pocketed tiny parts of their mauled babies. But he is careful not to draw parallels. For the book cover, though, he draws a map of Nigeria and traces in the Y shape of the rivers Niger and Benue in bright red. He uses the same shape of red to circle the boundaries of where, in the Southeast Biafra existed for three years. (104)

This reference to genocide in Rwanda provides a basis for dating Ugwu’s writing to after the 1994 Rwandan genocide, a period that coincides with the time of Adichie’s own writing on Biafra. The parallel between Igbo experience of atrocity in Nigeria and atrocities in Germany and Rwanda that Ugwu hopes to avoid invariably results not just in comparisons between the

---

6 Vice notes that the “accusatory polemics” of Wiesel’s Yiddish memoir gave way in its shortened French translation and subsequently in the English translation that is based on the French version of the memoir. Rather than merely an expression of rage and a polemic against the World, “indeed, in the English translation, it seems that Eliezer, the narrator, is reproaching his own family and friends for not heeding warnings of the fate to come, not the outside world” (14). Both this kind of accusatory polemics in Wiesel’s memoir and the victim-blaming in the memoir’s life in other languages finds expression in Adichie’s *Half.* The influence of Holocaust literature on Adichie’s own writing has not been adequately acknowledged. In her *The New Yorker* profile piece on Adichie, Larissa MacFarquhar reports Adichie as remarking thus about Holocaust writing: “They somehow connect me to something about human beings. I don’t know. I just know that I have a connection to the story of the Holocaust. I find that I’m drawn to stories in which life is normal, and then it’s not, overnight.”
Igbo genocide and these other atrocities, but also echoes in the novel of ubiquitous comments and sentiments characteristic of Holocaust survivor testimonies.

One key feature of such testimony is the tendency by survivors to understand themselves inhabiting a grey zone within which they may be understood as complicit in perpetrating or aiding in the perpetration of atrocity. As we see with Ugwu, the survivor’s recognition of his or her own complicity in evil gives him or her a moral edge over the perpetrators. In his Auschwitz memoir *Survival in Auschwitz*, Primo Levi describes surviving Auschwitz as inducing in him feelings of guilt and shame. He describes this situation in what he refers to as the “grey zone,” a space in which the Jewish prisoner recognizes himself in a zone of complicity with the Nazi prison guard. In one instance of this grey zone, Jewish prisoners work as *sonderkommando* – work units of prisoners used by the Nazi German prison guards to run the camps. These *sonderkommando* units literally ran the gas chambers and ensured that the killing of Jews was carried out effectively. In return, the *sonderkommando* received what could go as privileged treatment at the camp and quick death. For Levi, however, victims and killers inhabit different parts of the Grey Zone. While both are not morally equivalent, they are nonetheless morally flawed.⁷

In *Half*, Ugwu’s participation in rape evokes a connection to Levi’s Grey Zone. Within this zone, Ugwu is both a victim of Nigeria’s genocidal atrocities and a perpetrator of rape against defenceless Igbo women. Yet unlike in Levi’s Grey Zone, in Adichie’s the line between Ugwu and Nigerian rapist soldiers is blurred and the Biafran survivor is indistinguishable from the Nigerian perpetrator. The difference between Ugwu and the Nigerian rapist soldiers in *Half* is that Ugwu expresses guilt for his own actions and accepts responsibility for them, an expression of which perhaps Adichie uses to grant him some

---

moral reprieve over the Nigerian perpetrator since he will become the anointed writer of that history. Seen thus, we can understand *Half* as encouraging a view that the guilt of the survivor who like Ugwu has been complicit in atrocity distinguishes him from the perpetrator’s supposed lack of a conscience. This guilt as we see in Ugwu serves as the ethical basis for his writing about Biafra.

The problem with the notion of the survivor’s guilt in the context of Adichie’s novel is that it not only assigns the Igbo survivor (i.e. Ugwu) complicity in the attempted genocide on his own people, it also places the enormous burden of moral redress on his shoulders. The novel’s exclusive focus on the experience of Igbos does not provide any alternative imaginative horizon for considering the Nigerian perpetrator. Ugwu’s character, for example, serves to provide the only lens through which to view Nigerian soldiers who have committed acts similar to Ugwu’s. He cannot judge them because he recognizes himself in them. He becomes morally crippled by becoming a rapist, and thus is unable to imagine a space of justice for victims such as his own sister. His expressions of guilt and shame are merely testimony concerning suffering and moral failures; they offer no meaningful vision of justice and political or other redress.

In *Half*, Adichie’s rebuke of hubristic Igbo masculinity seems to be in an attempt to assert women’s moral and political authority in the novel in order to reshape male characters’ excesses. Hence she portrays women such as Olanna, Kainene, and Eberechi, Ugwu’s girlfriend, as moral arbiters holding up men’s excesses for condemnation. For example, the thought of confessing his rape of the bar girl to Kainene, Olanna, and Eberechi scares Ugwu, especially after he witnesses how Kainene publically humiliates the two priests who have habitually raped the starving refugee girls in their care (499). In particular, as Coundouriotis rightly observes, Olanna serves as the novel’s primary moral arbiter (Coundouriotis 228). She
is the one who steps up and takes responsibility for Odenigbo’s rape, and she takes it upon herself to raise Baby.

Near the end of the novel, in a re-dramatization of the dangers of masculine hubris, Olanna is also the one who ensures that the excesses of Odenigbo’s ego do not spell calamity for everyone else. An incident occurs after Biafra’s surrender. A group of Nigerian soldiers stops Odenigbo’s car at a checkpoint as he drives his family back to Nsukka. When the soldiers order them all out of the car so that they can be made to carry out a humiliating task, Odenigbo stubbornly refuses. Olanna quickly acts in the face of her husband’s arrogance by disembarking from the car and urging the men (Odenigbo and Ugwu) to carry out the soldiers’ orders. Her quick intervention saves the family from what seems likely to be a catastrophe (519-21). This scene speaks trenchantly for what in part we might consider as Adichie’s feminist vision of the Biafran tragedy. Odenigbo’s stubbornness is symbolic of the novel’s general conception of the stereotypically masculine Biafran leadership. It was in compliance with the directives of this arrogant leadership that Igbo society risked and almost lost everything. The excessive show of ego led men to make choices that brought catastrophe upon themselves and upon society. Likewise Odenigbo’s ego might have got him and his family killed. He has not learnt how to deal with his pride. His ego blinds him to the risk his stubbornness may bring on his family. It takes Olanna’s wise intervention to change the predictable pattern of this event. That Odenigbo continues to plead with the soldier assaulting him to allow “my wife stay with our daughter” (520) even when Olanna has already begun to carry out the soldiers’ punishment speaks of a man more in a battle for his honour. Olanna’s refusal to heed her husband suggests her understanding of this masculine excess. She has yet to recover from the horrors of the inflexible stances taken by the overly masculine Biafran leadership, including their refusal to accept defeat when all hope of victory has been lost (thus prolonging the suffering of the embattled populace). This is Adichie advocating for a
reconsideration of the terms and limits of hubristic masculinity, and charging women not to relinquish control of their lives to inflexible, arrogant, and prideful men.

This feminist vision and gender politics in *Half* are problematic not just because of the novel’s racialization of Igbo masculinity as inherently hubristic, nor for its tacit assignment of blame to this masculinity for the Biafran calamity. The novel’s feminist politics also distracts attention from the ethnic political circumstances of the genocide in favour of providing a flawed gendered vision of the tragedy. Olanna’s role in the novel as a moral arbiter and icon of feminine empowerment is less revolutionary than it seems. Not only does Adichie overly sexualize Olanna by imbuing her with huge sexual appeal and characterizing her as arousing sexual fantasies in virtually all of the novel’s male characters who come into contact with her, including Ugwu, her various interventions likewise show her to be less than progressive. In traditional patriarchal domestic arrangements, women often as depicted in writing and films act as correctives to the hubris of the patriarch of the family, whose dirty leavings she has to clean up after and cover up. Even with Olanna’s portrayal as an empowered modern woman in Adichie’s novel, her actions expose her as complicit in patriarchal violence, partly because of the way she responds to the flawed application of patriarchal power around her. None of her supposedly corrective actions – for example, accepting responsibility for Baby – has serious consequences in terms of creating conditions more conducive to justice or structural changes for the less privileged victims of misogynist violence and rape.

In addition to the flawed feminist vision of genocide in *Half*, Adichie’s choice of the genre of romance fiction for writing about genocide cannot escape criticism that her novel trivializes the historical experience of mass atrocity by turning catastrophe into melodramatic sentiment. Maureen Ikeotuonye has dismissed *Half* as an unsavory romance, remarking thus about Adichie’s choice of the genre:
As an Igbo woman, the genocide of more than 3 million Igbo people during what is often misrepresented as the “Nigerian civil war” was not a “love story” in any conceivable sense. My grandmother lost her husband and seven of her siblings and many other relatives during that war. She will never describe it as a love story, in fact Chinua Achebe (2012) in his book There Was a Country: A Personal History of Biafra described it as a “nightmare”. Why is Adichie then shrouding a horrific event that happened to her own people in the far removed sentimentalism of “Mills and Boon” – an early 20th-century Victorian sadomasochistic “romance” fiction genre? Adichie’s take on what is a serial historical trauma for her people is the typical Lugardian functionalist colonial apology, comparable to the “one Nigeria” rhetoric of the colonial elite that seeks to conceal historical abuses and ongoing injustices. (303)

I agree with Ikeotuonye that Adichie’s choice of the romance genre for Half detracts from the seriousness of her treatment of genocide, and fails to provide a platform for thinking meaningfully about the ethnic political nature of the Biafran conflict and its traumatic legacies. As Ikeotuonye puts it, Adichie’s feminist vision in Half is cloaked in a misdiagnosis of the Biafran tragedy, serving “as part of the designs of mass distraction and constitutes an obstacle to critical public conversation in and about” the genocide of Igbos in Nigeria (305).

The polarizing vision of gender relations in Half doesn’t just conceal the extent of unanimous response to that genocide among many Igbo men and women, it also gives the erroneous impression of the Biafran conflict as a “gender war” (Pape 231-41). By deploying

---

8 I identify Half’s conformity to the romance genre in its thematic focus on romantic love relationships. Romantic love in Half provides the centre around which the story’s multiple plots and major characters pivot. The theme of romantic love is also central to Adichie’s other two novels: Purple Hibiscus and Americanah, as well as to several stories in her short story collection, The Thing Around Your Neck. Half also conforms to the historical romance or historical fiction, particularly – as Susan Z. Andrade observes about the historical romance from Africa and Latin America – for its being “explicitly national-allegorical as to bear as title” (The Nation Writ Small 28) the emblem of Biafran nationalism.
romantic tropes in order to deconstruct otherwise flawed masculinist tropes in Biafran writing, *Half* inadvertently compromises and obscures one of its primary narrative premises – that a genocide was committed against the Biafran people. The genocidal circumstances that serve as a backdrop to the novel’s action gets set aside in favour of a diagnosis of the gender relations of Igbo victims. By so doing, Adichie encourages readers to think about genocide in Nigeria as partly having been brought about by the unchecked hubris of Igbo men. In this way, *Half* remarkably fails to hold the Nigerian military government at the time accountable for genocide. For a novel that hints at how the politicization of ethnic identity in Nigeria under British colonialism led to the forms of xenophobic and genocidal violence witnessed in the 1960s, it is strange to understand *Half* ’s recourse to gender and sexual politics, which serve more to hold Igbo men accountable for atrocities committed against their own people than they do to provide an imaginative space within which to hold the Nigerian genocide perpetrator accountable for genocide, and to think about justice and redress.

The ending of Adichie’s novel finds Odenigbo still stubbornly holding on to a dead cause in what appears to be a final staging of gendered responses to the recent Biafran trauma. Having survived genocide and war, Odenigbo and Olanna have to confront a post-war assault on their memory of that catastrophic set of events. The victorious Nigerian soldiers have set about confiscating artefacts related to Biafra. Odenigbo and Olanna respond in ways indicative of two post-war attitudes towards Biafran traumatic memory held by many Igbos. For Odenigbo, traumatic memory is concrete and physical. To destroy the artefacts of suffering namely Biafran flag and currency notes is a gross violation. Hence he chooses to risk grave danger and hold on to the physical traces of his Biafran war experience. Olanna, on the other hand, decides to burn hers. Odenigbo disapproves and challenges her saying “You’re burning memory” (539). Olanna replies: “‘I am not.’ She would not place her memory on things that strangers could barge in and take away. ‘My memory is inside me’”
(539). Odenigbo here represents the not-so-changed masculine impulse seeking to retain a hold on that memory for some future struggle. He wants to use the memory of what has befallen the Igbo people to continue and advance their communal struggle. This patriarchal disposition signifies a man still invested in rendering his own experience as communal, or representative, of the experience of all others. For her part, Olanna thinks that her memory of the war and its traumas is personal. She rejects Odenigbo’s reprimand, insisting that hers is a more pragmatic approach to memory of this kind.

Although Odenigbo and Olanna disagree on how to keep their memories of suffering alive, they both accept that traumatic memory has some value as a way of looking back or refusing to let the past be. Within the novel, traumatic memory can be seen as a kind of currency. However, the novel provides no clear guidance on how to spend this currency wisely. If we ask what we should do with memory of the Igbo genocide and/or the Biafran War in the twenty-first century, Adichie offers us no more than a moving story of resilience, love, and complicity in atrocity.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have presented an overview and critique of Chimamanda Adichie’s feminist vision in her award-winning 2006 novel *Half of a Yellow Sun*. By reading the novel as a work of genocide fiction, I have argued that Adichie’s feminist vision possesses a major flaw arising from how the novel portrays Igbo men as complicit in their own genocide. The image of the “Igbo man” in *Half* represents an instance of what I have described as hubristic masculinity. I have traced the sources of this idea of Igbo masculine hubris from *Half* back to Chinua Achebe’s hero Okonkwo in *Things Fall Apart*. I have also addressed how Adichie’s indebtedness to Holocaust testimonial narratives has influenced her characterization of the hubristic man in *Half*. I argue that the masculinity epitomized by Okonkwo has been
misappropriated in the novel where it is reproduced as a kind of normative Igbo maleness, which in turn leads to a fundamental misrepresentation of the Biafran tragedy as a distinctly Igbo catastrophe. Because of this misrepresentation, *Half* encourages readers to find in the Igbo genocide a gender dynamic in which all men are construed as perpetrators. It becomes possible accordingly to see how the novel encourages a view of the genocide’s male victims as complicit in both their own immediate suffering and the attempted annihilation of their society. As a result, I conclude that Adichie’s *Half of a Yellow Sun* fails to imagine a scenario for holding perpetrators of violence meaningfully accountable for crimes they have committed, even as it inadvertently participates in a long tradition in Nigeria of blaming Igbo men for the tragedy of Biafra.
Conclusion

The primary goal of my attempt to explore postcolonial African genocide novels in my dissertation has been shaped by two perhaps conflicting impulses. The first is to make a case for the existence of the genre by tracing the outline of its literary history and theorizing its dominant artistic elements and themes. The idea of the existence of postcolonial African genocide novel as a literary genre suggests that not only have writers been committed to writing about African genocides for some time, but also that the subject itself constitutes a significant inseam of African literary culture and experience since at least the twentieth century. That the genocide genre has not been duly acknowledged in African literary criticism is a disservice that I hope to have redressed in my dissertation by arguing for the genre’s centrality in the indigenous discourse on postcolonial African mass violence. Lying at the heart of my attempt to shine more light on the genre of the African genocide novel is my desire to identify the significance of some of the deeper humanistic concerns expressed by writers about genocides occurring on the continent, and particularly their anxiety that genocide negatively affects the artistic imagination.

The second impulse is to highlight what I see as the genre’s debts to the tropes and vocabulary supplied by those writing fictionally and non-fictionally about the Holocaust. These tropes manifest overtly in the dominant features and tendencies exhibited by the African genocide novel, including the idea of genocide as a descent into hell, the portrayal of victims as objects of ritual sacrifice, writing about genocide as duty to a moral imperative, and the use of the style and rhetoric of modern humanitarianism. By invoking cultural memories of the Holocaust in the context of African genocide narratives, African writers invite further reflection on the mechanisms whereby the history of Nazi Germany’s genocide of European Jews becomes used as a platform for imagining postcolonial genocides in Africa. A major consequence of the African genocide novel’s formal and thematic dependence on the
Holocaust is that works in the genre tend to overlook or otherwise downplay the particularities of local political and cultural contexts and events.

My argument is not that the dependence on Holocaust writing by those attempting to represent African mass atrocities as genocide is utterly mistaken. Instead, I have contended in my dissertation that the particular influences of Holocaust writing, at least in the contexts of Nigerian and Rwandan genocide literature, encourage artistic responses to African genocides that moralize the narrative of African genocides. All of the tropological features of the African genocide novel outlined above nurture a tendency in the genre to galvanize visions of redress centred on varying notions of individual moral reform – which is a central trope of Holocaust writing. This tendency in my view shrinks the imaginative horizon responsible for sustaining ideas about how to respond to genocide in terms consistent with real political redress and justice.

In Wole Soyinka’s *Season of Anomy*, genocide presents as an allegory of an anomic and horrific condition requiring a demonstration of superhuman will in order to be confronted. In the novel, Ofeyi’s successful show of will in confronting and transcending the horrors of mass atrocity signals the individual’s victory over the anomic conditions of genocide. The political preconditions for genocide in the postcolony – in particular, the flawed nation-state system inherited as a legacy of European colonial political arrangements, a culture of racism and xenophobia, and the economic injustice endemic in postcolonial African states – barely exist to help focalize ideas about redress and justice in Soyinka’s and the others’ novels. In Boubacar Boris Diop’s *Murambi, the Book of Bones*, these structural enablers of mass violence and genocide lie at the margins of the novel’s vision of redress. Instead, Diop in *Murambi* remains more concerned with a moralizing genocide narrative centering on individual (and therefore private) introspection as the basis for redress and reform in the aftermath of atrocity. Gil Courtemanche’s *A Sunday at the Pool in Kigali*
similarly stages genocide as the site of Bernard Valcourt’s quest for the meanings in his own life. Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s *Half of a Yellow Sun*, which deconstructs the masculinist tropes underpinning African genocide novels written by men, likewise succumbs to genocide’s moralizing pull. In Adichie’s nove, individual soul-searching as we see with the character of Ugwu signals her vision of justice.

What the moral dimension to the genocide narratives in these novels does not imply is that writers responding to postcolonial African genocides are constrained by an inability to find a vocabulary suitable for representing African genocides, one that at once offers prospects for moral and political redress. Instead, what these novels show is that the metahistorical trajectory of the African genocide novel, and perhaps also postcolonial African historiography in general (like other global histories since World War II), is advancing along a developmental trajectory that is increasingly moral in nature, or else oriented towards engagement with an evolving and more and more publicly prominent ethical consciousness. In my dissertation, I have contended that lying at the heart of this moral consciousness, at least in so far as postcolonial writing about African genocide is concerned, is the Holocaust.

Whether attempts to view postcolonial African history through a primarily moral lens are beneficial or not, or otherwise demand closer observation, stands beside the point of my own observations in my dissertation. What my work underlines is the profound influence of the Holocaust on African genocide fiction, the critical recognition of which I have argued invites a closer look at the kinds of visions and commitments delineated in artistic projects responding to genocides in Africa. These artistic visions embody commitments to moral agendas that tend to depoliticize and dehistoricize African genocides, turning their representation into allegories conducive mainly to individuals’ own personal ethical reform. Therefore one question that must be asked of the genocide novel is whether [and, if so, why] African genocides resulting from essentially political crises in some way overdetermine the
likelihood of moral responses to them. Moral visions of redress privileged in African genocide novels tend to encourage a view of genocide as resulting from a breakdown of individual and social moral structures; hence, the genre’s tendency to displace politics as the main locus of redress in a genocide’s aftermath. At the end of the day, I understand this influence of the Holocaust on the African writers and others writing about African genocides to be symptomatic of a continuing colonization of the language and concepts of African mass suffering.

In sum, by working in my dissertation to expose and understand the tendencies, debts, and collisions in which the African genocide novel is implicated, I have attempted to proffer decolonizing primary (i.e. textual-interpretive) and secondary (i.e. broadly conceptual) critiques that continue to be much-needed in both literary and genocide studies circles. My dissertation makes an original contribution to knowledge by showing how and why the African genocide novel has become a significant means not just of witnessing genocidal atrocities, but also of providing a path to representation and justice in the wake of atrocious crimes. My study reveals and problematizes the kinds of imagination that genocides bring about, and seeks to explain how memories of the Holocaust continue to influence attempts to imagine genocides in the African context. To the best of my knowledge, no study yet exists that provides such a comprehensive discussion of genocide literature in postcolonial Africa, or that links Nigeria and Rwanda in a focused discussion on this topic. While the arguments in my dissertation have enabled me to rethink some emergent literary traditions in Africa, my larger hope is that my work will provoke further debate on what genocide in Africa means for our understanding of literary representations of mass atrocity.


---. *There was a Country: A Personal History of Biafra*. Heinemann, 2012.


---. Murambi, the Book of Bones. Translated by Fiona Mc Laughlin. Indiana UP, 2006.


---. *Sardines*. Allison and Busby, 1981.

---. *Sweet and Sour Milk*. Allison and Busby, 1979.


---. *We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families: Stories from Rwanda.* Picador, 1998.


269


Hodges, Hugh, “Beasts and Abominations in *Things Fall Apart* and *Omenuko,*” *Ariel: A Review of International English Literature*, vol. 43, no. 4, 2013, pp. 49-68.


---. *Things Fall Apart; Things Fall Together*. Bookcraft, 2010.


“Things Fall Apart.” *YouTube*, uploaded by MediaAfric, 9 Dec 2007, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o7FS951cRNU&list=PL88311C51E9D5C528](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o7FS951cRNU&list=PL88311C51E9D5C528).


---. *Night*. Translated by Marion Wiesel, Hill and Wang, 2006.


