

Police and Market: the Creation of Pacifying Police Units in Rio de Janeiro

by

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of the University of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

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ABSTRACT

This study focuses on the creation of the Pacifying Police Units in Rio de Janeiro and the close connection between public and private interests in this program. This research explores the benefits and the trade-offs of private sponsorship in light of the UPP program. The UPP was developed to promote an alternative way to deal with drug trafficking in the *favelas*. Amongst the UPP's innovations are the community-oriented approaches for policing the communities, the permanent occupation of locations undermined by drug trafficking, and the combination of law enforcement with social policies that intended to reduce the gap between wealthy districts and the *favelas*, seeking the integration of the “divided-city”. One of the most remarkable innovations in this project was its proactive action to attract private sponsorship. This enables the UPPs to absorb some market features, such as the massive publicity; as well as to address some potential market interests in the city. For instance, the geography of the UPPs prioritized *favelas* close to affluent zones and tourist spots in the city. The selection of Brazil to host the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games also helps to explain why and how public and private organizations were put together through the UPP project. Between 2008 and 2012, the Pacifying Police Units contributed to the reduction of violence in Rio, improving the level of police legitimacy in the city. After 2016, crime rates in the city returned to previous levels, before the UPPs. This has led many to believe that the project failed in promoting long-term security in Rio, and that the project should be discontinued.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

After more than two years living in Canada, I have a large number of people and organizations that in some way contributed to my research or even to make me feel closer home. Thanks for all the Graduate Sociology Department at University of Manitoba - colleagues, professors, and staff. Thanks to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for awarding me with a generous fellowship. Thanks to the committee members, Dr. Rick Linden and Dr. Anna Fournier for providing valuable comments and suggestions on this thesis. Many thanks to my advisor Dr. Russell Smandych, the positive results in this work I share with him, the flaws are my responsibility. Thanks to my mother, Teresinha, and my wife, Cinara – who was my emotional support and inspiration during these years.

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Chapter 1 - Introduction

This study focuses on the creation of the Pacifying Police Units in Rio de Janeiro and the close connection between public and private interests in this program. This research explores the benefits and the trade-offs of private sponsorship in light of the UPP program. The UPP (Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora or Pacifying Police Unit), was created as a new paradigm for policing the *favelas* in Rio de Janeiro. Since 2008 there have been 38 UPPs established covering 1.5 million people in the city and 9,000 police officers have been allocated to this program. Among the innovations of the UPP project is the fact that it introduced community-policing methods to *favelas* undermined by drug trafficking; and that led the local public administration to proactively act in order to attract private sponsors for the project.

In the UPP project there is a clear synergy between public and private interests. However, despite the benefits created by more security in occupied communities, the close connection between public and private businesses yields some conflicts in the conception of public security in democratic societies. Ideally, public police forces should provide security for the entire community, instead of working for specific groups, and protecting particular interests. The geography of the UPPs shows that the project prioritized regions close to affluent districts and tourist spots (Cano and Ribeiro, 2014). This shows that economic factors were taken into account to select the *favelas* covered by the project.

The 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro created additional concerns related to security issues in the city. These mega-events were regarded as a unique opportunity to “sell” the city to the world. The Pacification Police Units internalized such interest through a humanitarian discourse of “pacification” and “integration”, and the UPPs were also “sold” internally and internationally as a different way of facing violence created by drug trafficking.

In the past 30 years, the local government has applied different approaches trying to reduce the power of drug dealers in those areas. In the 1980's and mid-1990's, inspired by the American experience, the approach to combating drug trafficking was based on *war on drugs* tactics. According to critics, the *war on drugs* was costly, did not reduce crime rates, and although achieving short-term results by arresting high profile drug dealers, in the long term, the former traffickers were replaced by others able to continue the war to keep the illegal drug market.

War on drugs tactics were overlapped by the so-called "militias," private paramilitary groups of extermination. Despite their controversial methods, government and media considered the "militias" as a "necessary evil." The complicity of state, media and society provided legitimacy for Draconian measures. Both the war on drugs and the "militias" were a fertile terrain for human rights violations, such as torture and extrajudicial executions. Nevertheless, abuses undermined police acceptance in the communities, and were not effective approaches for crime control as well.

Because of the failure of previous experiences, the Pacifying Police Unit was developed. In the official discourse, its primary goal was to regain areas controlled by drug dealers in Rio de Janeiro and to "integrate" the *favelas* into the "formal city". Instead of resorting to the previous methods, which aimed at combating drug traffickers by force, the UPP was intended to be a more community-oriented approach, aimed at enhancing public legitimacy, and permanently occupying violent hotspots in the city.

Between 2008 and 2012 the number of confrontations between police and traffickers dropped. As a result of that the number of police executions and police officers who died in confrontations declined; homicides in the city were dramatically reduced; and police legitimacy increased. However, critics say that only the *favelas* close to the wealthier neighborhoods and near to strategic spots for tourism and real estate were occupied. It means that the public security for the UPPs was not only defined by the level of crime in the communities, based in statistics of "crime hotspots", but also by local and international market interests in the city. As a result, this impacts directly on the distribution of public security throughout the entire society.

This study focuses on the convergence and trade-offs of public and private interests for the creation of the UPPs. In Rio de Janeiro, local and global businesses have donated millions of dollars for the UPPs. In this thesis, I analyze the nature of this sponsorship and examine how it creates zones in which public and private share interests, as well as zones in which public and private have competing interests. Additionally, I look closely at the social impact of the UPPs as a public policy, asking questions such as: who *pays* and who *benefits* with private sponsorship? (Grabosky, 2007).

This study seeks to fill a gap in the literature about policing in Brazil. Much has been said about the level of brutality of Brazilian police forces, challenges of an authoritarian police culture, the need for democratic police reform, and the demilitarization of policing (Lima, 2014; Belli, 2004a; Coimbra, 2001; Belli, 2004b; Mesquita-Neto, 1999; Pinheiro, 1997). But there is more to say about the global trend of pluralization of police forces in “global risk societies”, the increasingly close connection between public and private, and more precisely the phenomenon of private sponsorship to public police. In this regard, the Pacifying Police Units can be regarded within the larger phenomenon of transformation of police forces in the world.

Policing in a global city like Rio de Janeiro cannot be understood only through “state-centric” or even “institutional-centric” approaches. My research shows the interaction between public and private and its role for creation and execution of the Pacifying Police Units. This study is not limited to either the creation of a “new type of police” from the state point of view or to how market pressures push the state towards a police reform. In contrast, it focuses specifically on the possible common grounds and limits involving apparent different spheres. In doing so, it is possible to identify positive outcomes, as well as zones of conflict between public and private auspices.

Since 2014 crime rates in Rio de Janeiro have gradually returned to levels prior to the introduction of the UPPs. Many have seen this as a demonstration that the Pacifying Police has failed in promoting security in the city permanently, casting doubt on the UPP’s future. This study shows that internal limitations such as the resistance of officers to community-oriented methods challenges police reform in Brazil. However, the return of high crime rates to the city should also be

regarded as being linked to issues that go beyond the UPPs. I explore some exogenous aspects that may contribute to the increasing violence in the city.

This study is organized in six chapters, including this introduction and the conclusion chapter. Chapter 2 focuses on the methodology and data sources applied in this research. Chapter 3 presents the literature review of this study. The literature on police in Brazil and its key elements are useful to understand the UPPs. The notion of an authoritarian police culture can help to explain the police behavior in the country – especially police abuses and human rights violations. The “divided-city” perspective takes economic inequalities as a major factor to explain violence in Rio de Janeiro. Chapter 3 also explores literature on the phenomenon of pluralization of police in global risk societies, as well as the literature and key concepts on the private sponsorship of the public police. The synergy between public and private makes the UPP project a singular case in Brazil, where there is not a tradition of private sponsorship of public organizations. However, the convergence of public and private interests through the UPPs in Brazil can be regarded within the larger phenomenon of pluralization of police around the globe. In this respect, the private sponsorship for public police forces in Brazil and elsewhere is part of this large process of transformations of public roles in security.

Chapter 4 is focused on the explosion of violence in Rio de Janeiro – a process that correlates with the entering of cocaine in the local drug market – and the state policies of crime control in the *favelas* until the creation of the Pacifying Police Units. The chapter shows the differences between the UPPs and previous tactics, the achievements of the program since its creation, and some of its challenges.

Chapter 5 examines the synergy between public and private interests for the creation of the UPPs. For the first time in the Brazilian history, a public police program acted proactively to capture private sponsors. Beyond the entering of private money, the UPPs also absorbed characteristics of private corporations such as the massive publicity behind the project. From its humanitarian narrative of “pacification” and “integration” the UPPs intended to attract local and

international supporters to the program. In addition, the chapter shows some limitations of private sponsorship for public police, considering the assumption that public security should be provided for the entire society, instead of only for affluent citizens or regions with more potential to the establishment of business and where market interests prevail. Finally, the chapter explores recent scandals and changes surrounding the UPP project.

Chapter 2.0 - Methodology and data sources

This study draws on secondary quantitative data available from public and private organizations such as Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), Institute of Public Security (ISP), Map of Violence and Fiocruz Institute, and the Brazilian Forum of Public Security. These databases were useful to analyze crime rates in Rio de Janeiro, which allow us to identify the longitudinal impact of the UPPs in terms of violent crimes.

Most of data on violence in the city and state of Rio de Janeiro can be found at the ISP website, which provides comprehensive data on crime rates, homicides, and police executions in the city. The Map of Violence provides national statistics on homicides, prison population, and which groups are most affected by violence in the country. The Brazilian Forum of Public Security also provides a wide range of data sources on crime rates in the country, including surveys conducted with police agents, which allows understanding officers' perceptions on the violence in the country, as well as their perception about the own police corporation.

One of limitations in this study lies in the narrow access to official documentation on the private sponsorship for the UPPs. This illustrates that in order to facilitate future projects where public police raise money from private actors the transparency level must be improved in the country. In this respect, documentary research, which includes the collection and analysis of newspapers, magazines, websites were used to find reliable information on private sponsorship. The UPP website also provides valuable information on the project, and highlights some of the major private partners as well.

This research is also based on other qualitative sources. In particular, it draws on published and unpublished research about the topic, including books and book chapters, Master's and Ph.D. theses, papers published in journals, and papers presented in conferences. These qualitative sources are examined to develop a better understanding on the problem of violence in Brazil, and

government strategies to control crime, as well as the connection between public and private in the development of the UPPs.

Chapter 3.0 – Literature review

3.1 – The literature on police in Brazil and its relevance to understand the UPPs

The Pacifying Police Units were influenced by past studies on policing in Brazil, but they were primarily influenced by the literature on urban violence in Rio de Janeiro – especially that based on the “divided city thesis”. Considering the broader topic of public security in Brazil, critical studies on policing dominate the literature. Most of them have focused on the limitations of military police organizations in terms of structure and practices. The lack of police accountability, excessive use of force, and the authoritarian legacy are some of the most frequent topics discussed in Brazilian policing research (Lima, 2014; Belli, 2004a; Coimbra, 2001; Belli, 2004b; Mesquita-Neto, 1999; Pinheiro, 1997).

Recently, another relevant subfield has been developed in the local policing literature, which is the explosion of private police sector in the country (Knisely, 2010; Silva, 2008; Oliveira, 2005; Zanetic, 2005 and 2011). According to these authors, the Brazilian state has gradually lost its monopoly over public security following a global trend. For others, beyond the state losing its monopoly for private security companies, the Brazilian state has never accomplished a complete monopoly of violence. In contrast, it has always shared some grey areas with unofficial actors, such as crime organizations (Chesnais, 1999; Costa, 1999; Paes-Machado, 2006).

The military approach of the public police forces in Brazil, that is, their hierarchical structure, military training, and police authoritarian attitude towards communities have developed a low level of police legitimacy throughout the Brazilian society. Bretas and Rosemberg (2013) argue that the dictatorial regime in Brazil (1964-1984) shaped a negative perception of police not only in society but also among social scientists. The return of democratic rule in the country was correlated with the explosion of urban violence in the large cities (Caldeira and Holston, 1999).

Police abuses became part of institutionalized crime control policies. In other words, human rights violations, such as police extrajudicial executions and the use of torture, might be considered as an aftermath of high crime rates in the large Brazilian cities (Almeida, 2004) and the way the state has approached this problem. In fact, human rights have been regarded by police agents and many politicians as an obstacle to effective crime control policies. In such context, human rights are not universally guaranteed throughout society (Cano, 2011). Rather it is commonly believed that there are people who deserve human rights protection and those who deserve to be exposed to the exercise of state violence.

In order to overcome abuses and increase police legitimacy Brazilian states have developed external institutional mechanisms of police control and accountability. Zaverucha (2008) underlines the role of police ombudsman created to absorb complains related with corruption, abuses and human rights violations of public police agents. According to Zaverucha, the ombudsman has been an important innovation considering that in most of Brazilian military police departments there was no institutional channel where citizens could report police abuses.

The introduction of community-policing in many states also highlights the need for police reform in the country. Among the difficulties of introducing community-oriented policing practices in Brazil is the lack of continuity throughout different administrations, internal resistance among officers to adopt new practices, and the high level of urban violence which pressures community-policing to adopt or be replaced for military methods (Muniz et. al 1997; Mesquita-Neto, 2004; Bengochea et. al 2004; Bordin, 2009). In the state of Rio Grande do Sul, for instance, 30 percent of police agents are part of Special Squads or Special Operation Units – these are the most prestigious units among police agents but also those that adopt warlike tactics of crime control (Bengochea et al, 2004).

Considering police forces in Rio de Janeiro, Cano and Ribeiro (2016) argue that the ethos of the “warrior policemen” is internalized in the local police culture, which creates a barrier to undertake police reform through community-oriented policing methods. The UPP project was

clearly influenced by previous studies on policing in Brazil, but its primary influence rests on the “divided-city thesis”. Beyond making the *favelas* safer places, the UPP project intended to “integrate” the poor areas into the “regular city”.

Arias (2006) argues that studies on violence in Rio are concentrated in the “divided-city” and neoclientelist approaches. From the metaphor “hill and asphalt” in Rio, the “divided-city” perspective sees a gap between *favelas* and rich neighborhoods in areas such as public security, infrastructure, economic opportunities and social recognition. The “divided-city” claims that *favelas* are spaces where the state has lost or even has never completely owned its legitimate monopoly of violence. *Favelas* are places where drug traffickers coordinate a parallel order.

Arias (2006) shows that the neoclientelist approach focuses on political connections between drug traffickers and state agents. It begins from the premise that political relations are built upon asymmetrical power capacities. In this respect, drug dealers have wider access to state power than the regular *favela* dwellers. This shapes close ties between crime and public spheres making traffickers even more powerful. Their capacity to bribe state agents paves a “free-way” for illegal business. The neoclientelist perspective explains the UPP intention of reducing corruption among officers by a higher level of internal control, combined with the introduction of wage bonuses for officers, with the aim to discourage practices of bribes in areas where drug dealers have economic power. The “neoclientelist” and, especially, the “divided-city” paradigms are useful to observe some of the objectives in the UPP project.

The project and its publicity claimed that the UPPs would go beyond just policing violent areas in the city. It was claimed that the “pacification project” would “integrate two different cities”. I show that “integration” and “pacification” were used within a humanitarian narrative for attracting local and international supporters. However, the idea of a “divided-city” creates in the media, politics and society two separate perspectives to understand Rio de Janeiro. On the one hand, there is a “legal”, “wealthy”, and “safe” city. This is the city of which everybody should be proud.

On the other hand, there is the underworld of the *favelas* - zones of “illegality”, “poverty”, and “shame”. This city should be integrated into the formal economy.

Finally, this study considers that one of the main innovations of the UPP project lies in its proactive attitude towards bringing private sponsors. In Brazil, there is a lack of studies on private sponsorship of the public police. Even if considering studies on the UPPs, where there is notorious convergence of public and private capitals, this topic has been almost neglected in the literature. In the following sections of this chapter I will explore the literature on pluralization of policing and the literature on private sponsorship of public police. The creation of the UPPs and the capture of private sponsors have to do with a wide range of transformations in police organizations around the world in the last few decades.

3.2 - Risk society and the pluralization of policing

Since the second half of the 20th century, democratic states have gradually lost their monopoly over public security. In the new governance of security, public and private share space. In this respect, the literature on risk society and pluralization of police organizations allows me to answer questions such as: Why have traditional police forces been replaced or overlapped for new forms of policing?; and How should the UPP project be seen in light of larger transformations in contemporary states?

I argue that recent transformations in police organizations around the world cannot be separated from a broader set of transformations in contemporary societies. Ulrich Beck’s (1992) concept of risk society is a good point of departure for analyzing those changes. To put this in another way, there is a close connection between the diversification of security provision with the contemporary global risk culture. In this respect, the pluralization of policing responds to higher demand for individual and collective forms of risk management.

Beck defines risk society as an essential characteristic of post-industrial societies. According to him, modern industrial society challenged the feudal order, both regarding politics and social institutions. In this sense, in the very same way industrial society challenged the traditional order, risk society challenges the modern industrial paradigm. In the current stage of development there is a more widespread social consciousness about the risks created by modernity, which yields both individual and collective responses to mitigate potential risks. Beck considers the present stage of modernity as “reflexive modernity”.

For this reason, according to Beck, in contemporary societies individuals are more aware of a wide range of potential threats that have developed during this stage of modernity. On the one hand, modernity created remarkable scientific innovations, which improved human life. On the other hand, modern science exposed the public problems and risks generated by the modernity itself. The idea of risk is linked with individual and collective probability of harm. In addition, even though it is not the same as destruction, it relates to the actual threat of destruction. According to Beck,

The discourse of risk begins where trust in our security and belief in progress end. It ceases to apply when the potential catastrophe actually occurs. The concept of risk thus characterizes a peculiar, intermediate state between security and destruction, where the *perception* of threatening risks determines thought and action (Beck, 2000, p. 213).

In this respect, the “world risk culture is a permanent condition. It refers to the perception that *no-longer-but-not-yet*” (Beck, 2000, p. 213). Political parties and corporations have internalized the potential of unknown risks aiming at either better electoral outcomes or economic gain. The public fear in the United States after 9/11 and the “War on Terror” helped George W. Bush’s re-election. However, when public expectations on the reduction of risks are not satisfied by governments, it makes room for political change. Barak Obama’s victory can be understood as a response to the frustration with the actual results of the Iraq War (Krahmann, 2011). On the

corporations' side, the fact that risks can never be completely eliminated creates even larger demand for those who promise to reduce the risks. "In fact, private security firms exacerbate risk perception in order to sell their services" (Krahmann, 2011, p. 357).

The idea of "risk management" has been absorbed by security firms, making it one of the most profitable industries in the world. Insurance companies, alarm, electric fence, and private security firms have increasingly become important factors in the local and global economy. According to Abrahamsen and Williams (2009, p. 5), "risk is not simply a synonym for danger; it is a particular way of thinking about and responding to potential dangers. It is preventative, not restorative".

Private corporations tend to be focused on "unknown" risks. In this regard, experts and statistics play an essential role in legitimating the risk industry. When risks are estimated they are most often thought from the worst perspective. In 2016, the emergence of Zika Virus in Latin America was a source of many debates in the North Hemisphere on whether the Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro should be postponed or even moved to another place (The Guardian, 2016). At that time, there was no solid evidence about the reasons and the actual dimensions of the problem. However, the argument was that there was a potential risk for tourists and athletes, but none could precisely say the scope of that risk. After the event, the World Health Organization reported that there was no record of Zika virus in Rio during the Games (New York Times, 2016). It illustrates that this approach of predicting risks by the worse scenario sometimes fails.

The idea of risk society cannot be separated from globalization and the expansion of neoliberalism. Global and interconnected societies expand the perception of potential risks – even when the real probability of harm is too narrow. From terrorism to the Zika virus, in the current stage of modernity there is a widespread notion that any phenomenon cannot be completely isolated to a single place. For instance, environmental issues are not seen as a problem exclusive of industrial societies. Nations' commitment in reducing emissions is not exclusively due to the

interest to preserve their own boundaries; instead, eco-friendly actions are initiated in the name of the “entire planet” and “future generations”.

In global risk societies, individual actions are taken through long or short-term calculations to avoid harm. This sort of social behavior becomes even more relevant at the time of instantaneous information and the unprecedented expansion of global channels of communication. Manuel Castells (1996) argues that in the contemporary world the boundaries among countries and communities have been eroded by global networks of communication, labour and services, and flux of capital. Castells’ concept of network society also helps to understand how and why police have been restructured. In contemporary societies, local policing and national armed forces are penetrated by more complex networks involving public and private or local and global than they used to be in the past.

One of the most influential of Max Weber’s ideas is that a core characteristic of the modern state lies in its legitimate monopoly of violence (Weber, 1946). In the modern era, police organizations and national armies were key institutions by which the state manifested its legitimate violence. However, in the post-industrial world the provision of security is shared with local and international private initiatives which offer a wide range of services that will meet individual and collective demands for reducing the vast array of risks created by contemporary societies.

Bayley and Shearing predicted that “future generations will look back on our era as a time when one system of policing ended and another took its place”. According to them, the causes of this restructuring are many: “fear of crime, the inability of government to satisfy society's longing for security, the commodification of security, the rise of mass private property, and cultural individualism” (Bayley and Shearing, 1996, p. 585).

Drawing on Castells, Loader (2000) explains that pluralization can be understood as a shift from *police to policing*. Where the state was traditionally regarded as focal to provision and accountability in security, it now reconfigures its role in a broader and more diverse “network of power”. Sure enough, this network continues to encompass the direct provision and supervision of

policing by institutions of national and local government. But it now also extends – as we shall see – to private policing forms secured through government; to transnational police arrangements taking place *above* government; to markets in policing and security services unfolding *beyond* government; and to policing activities engaged in by citizens *below* government (Loader, 2000, p. 324).

Behind the global risk culture and the pluralization of police organizations there is in place an ideological discourse of *responsibilization* promoted through public actors and authorities. The *responsibilization* language illustrates that states have sought to share with individuals their responsibility in the provision of public safety. In this regard, individuals are encouraged to identify potential risks and take individual actions to reduce the likelihood of damage (Garland, 1996; Hinds and Grabosky, 2010; Kemshall, 2011). Installing electric fences, CCTV systems, and hiring private guards are some within the many actions individuals can take for improving their own security. However, if individuals do not take any of those “preventive” actions they accept the fact that in case of damage they are also responsible for their own victimization.

Within the *responsibilization* mentality individuals cannot expect state omnipresence. In contrast, states encourage “proactive attitudes” among individuals and communities. Gray (2009) argues that *responsibilization* language is also applied in contemporary states to reduce corporations’ role of ensuring safety in the workplace. Increasingly, individuals are responsible for their own security during their worktime. Both considering urban security and work safety, the idea of *responsibilization* implies a relation of “partnership” between individual and state or even between individual and corporations:

Workers are assigned ever greater responsibility for their own safety at work and are held accountable, judged, and sanctioned through this lens. In the area of organizational safety, workers and employers are supposed to be ‘equal partners’, with a shared responsibility towards workplace safety. However, despite the neo-liberal discourse of ‘equal partnership’, the *responsibilization* strategy process does not affect all parties equally (Gray, 2009, 326).

For some authors, the “transformation thesis” in policing has overestimated the lost terrain by states to private interests (Jones and Newburn, 2002; Hoogenboom, 2010). According to these scholars, the state never had a complete monopoly of public security. In contrast, there always has been some level of private policing in modern societies. However, in recent decades in most democratic countries private security workers have come to outnumber public police forces. This shows that even if the state has not completely lost its control in policing, it is not possible to say that contemporary states still have the monopoly of violence. While it might be an exaggeration to say that the process of privatization in security created a scenario of “perfect competition” – where a few global companies control many local markets; it is not possible to say that the expansion of private organizations in security did not affect classic theoretical and practical understanding on public security.

The “Nothing Works” slogan in vogue in the 1970’s and 1980’s illustrates the changing in the paradigm of public policing: “attention is being shifted to dealing with the effects of crime—costs and victims and fearful citizens—rather than its causes” (Garland, 1996, p.447). In contemporary societies, criminality is no longer regarded by the public as a social problem, generated by many factors such as unemployment, low level of education, age, gender, and so forth. Crime is considered as an individual choice, no matter how social structures may increase or reduce its likelihood. Brodeur and Shearing (2005) show that surveys of public opinion in Canada and UK indicate that more people believe in the criminal courts than the police for controlling crime. This both reinforces the idea that individual perceptions of insecurity are not proportional to actual crime rates and that there is in place a global trend of support to penalization throughout different democratic societies.

Garland (1996) argues that in Britain criminality has become a normal social fact in the last decades. This phenomenon has developed a generalized fear of crime that can be explained by the

media exaggeration of crime rates and the politicization of crime control policies. For this author, despite that victimization is a very concentrated phenomenon:

For most people, crime is no longer an aberration or an unexpected, abnormal event. Instead, the threat of crime has become a routine part of modern consciousness, an everyday risk to be assessed and managed in much the same way that we deal with road traffic—another modern danger which has been routinized and 'normalized' over time. High rates of crime have gradually become a standard, background feature of our lives—a taken for granted element of late modernity. Advertisements for security locks which tell us that 'a car theft occurs every minute' make the point quite well—crime forms part of our daily environment, as constant and unremitting as time itself (Garland, 1996, p. 446).

Political organizations also have internalized the “risk management” culture. The emergence of the penal populism around the world illustrates this phenomenon (Roberts et al. 2003; Pratt, 2007; Sozzo, 2014). In Brazil, part of the Congress is made by the “Bullet-Caucus” (Santini and Viana, 2012), where most of politicians were elected through a campaign platform based on “zero tolerance” and “toughness on crime”. High crime rates have motivated more people to support violent approaches in the public security area.

The pluralization of police forces has to do with larger transformations in contemporary societies. Understanding the “world risk culture” is essential for observing the creation of UPPs, which can be regarded as a public-private joint initiative to reduce crime rates in Rio de Janeiro, but also reducing potential risks for tourists and investors in strategic zones in the city. The establishment of Pacifying Police Units in Brazil is the local manifestation of broader process of transformation in police organizations around the world.

3.3 – Private sponsorship for public police: literature and concepts to understand the UPPs

The private sponsorship for public policing is another facet of “pluralized” forms of policing, in which governments attract private partners to enhance public capacity. This

pluralization begins by the transition from a more centralized to a more decentralized paradigm in security. In this respect, the transition from police to policing (Loader, 2000) is much more than only the transfer of public security to private interests. One of the most significant innovations in the UPP project was the synergy between public and private, as well as the proactive role of state agents to attract private sponsors.

To date, Pacifying Police Units in Rio de Janeiro pioneered in Brazil the attraction of private capital as one of the main features of the project. The literature focused on private sponsorship for public police and its key concepts helps to address questions including: What can motivate private actors to sponsor public police projects?; What are the positive outcomes and the potential trade-offs in a closer relationship between state and donors?; and, finally, Who *pays* and who *benefits* with private sponsorship? (Grabosky, 2007).

In this study, I consider three potential reasons to explain private sponsorship for the UPPs. The first possible motivation lies in non-material interests. Starting from Marcel Mauss' notion of "gift", the potential explanation for private sponsorships is due to symbolic motivations such as social recognition, prestige, and sense of belonging (Ayling et. al, 2008).¹ Ayling et al. argue that (2008, p. 172):

[...] donation becomes sponsorship when the relationship becomes more of a commercial arrangement and public recognition of the donor by the recipient is an important, and sometimes the primary, motivation for the gift. The corporate donation of vehicles to police might fall into this category, the display of the company's name on the vehicle sufficing as acknowledgment of the company's generosity.

According to these authors, the gift can range from a "pure" donation through sponsorship to conditional grants. In this respect, pragmatic interests may also drive private sponsorship. Here private sponsors might act as "social investors", allocating money to public and social issues. The

¹ Drawing on Natalie Zemon Davis the authors use the concepts of coercion, sale, and gift for explaining public strategies of resources enhancing.

trade-off of pragmatic relations lies in the pressure that sponsors may put over public administration in order to make sure the sponsored projects will be developed in places more likely to yield economic return.

Finally, private sponsorship also may bring risks of pragmatic-clientelistic relations between public actors and corporations. In this area, some private companies may fund public projects under the condition they will earn back some advantage in future negotiations with public administrations. The long history of clientelist practices in Brazil and recent corruption scandals involving public and private businesses, make it reasonable to consider the potential risks of corruption and the need of a broader level of accountability to the public and private spheres.²

Critics argue that the pluralization process and the expansion of private corporations in security impacts directly on the idea of sovereign power (Verkuil, 2007; Fairfax, 2010; Petersohn, 2010). The boundaries of nation states are more fluid which allows a larger penetration of private interests within all spheres of the state linked to national security – e.g. internal policing, military forces, and even criminal justice. A more robust power of global corporations may result in a lower capacity of sovereign states to define their own will. The growth of private firms in security goes beyond local security. For example, increasingly states are hiring private security firms to carry out tasks national armies used to perform overseas (Mendel, 2002; Markusen, 2003; Singer, 2003).

Sometimes, states outsource military functions to private security companies seeking to promote their interests abroad. Silverstein (1997) shows that the US has hired private security companies to act in the war on drugs in Latin America, as well as in military operations in the Middle East. Silverstein argues that the action of private military corporations has made room for extra-judicial executions and human rights violations. Avant (2005) considers this process as harmful for the accountability of democratic states.

² Risk of corruption in private sponsoring is not an exclusive problem of developing countries. See Ayling et al. (2008).

In contrast, Abrahamsen and Williams (2009) do not see the expansion of the private sector necessarily competing with public interests. They argue that it has created “global security assemblages” in which public and private interests may interact and cooperate. As such, what is at stake in “security privatization” is much more than a bare transfer of previously public functions to private actors. Instead, these developments indicate important changes in the relationship between security and the sovereign state, structures of political power and authority, and the operations of global capital (p. 3).

In some respects, globalization allows private interests to meet with public ones. In some countries in Africa, local governments rely on private agents to increase the capacity of the state within their territories (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2009). Putting it in another way, countries in which the capacity of public investment is very limited can use private agents (investors, global and local private companies in security) to reinforce the state’s control. One of the potential trade-offs when public security relies on private capital is that the distribution of security throughout communities may become sharply unequal. Looking at the Pacifying Police Units, the presence of private financial support through local and global organizations, makes the idea of “global security assemblages” relevant to understand the increasing of public capacity, seeking to create a “safer space” for tourists and business.

A larger presence of private interests in local and global security brings attention to private police accountability and human rights violations. Risse and Sikkink (1999) argue that the socialization of states into global networks involving human rights organizations, NGOs, and corporations favors domestic absorption of human rights norms. In this respect, considering the UPP case, where in Brazil there has been a lengthy record of human rights violations in the public police, the interconnection between local police with exogenous global actors may create additional pressures for the incorporation of human rights practices and discourse.

Economic limitations drive states to search for solutions for improving public services. In this respect, the public search for private sponsorship is an important characteristic of the ongoing

transformations in security around the globe. As already mentioned, equality in the provision of security is one of the potential limitations when public security operations depend on private capital. In this respect, two essential questions for this study are who *pays* and who *benefits* with private sponsorship? (Grabosky, 2007).

In Brazil and elsewhere, limitations in the public budget also mean limitations for public security. In order to face such restraints, governments are increasingly encouraging private donations for enhancing public resources. In the past, private support to public interests could be observed in areas like arts, health, and education. In recent years, local administrations around the globe are relying more on private donations to public police organizations (Grabosky, 2007; Ayling et al. 2008).

According to the literature, the growth of private sponsorship in public policing has to do with a broader trend of governments allowing others to perform functions they used to exclusively perform in the past. In countries like the US and the UK there is a longer tradition of private sponsorship for public police. In other countries, this phenomenon is more recent. Grabosky (2007) shows that In Australia, private actors provide benefits (gifts, meals, and monies) for public police forces in exchange for protection at private festivals.

Considering the positive aspects of closer public-private ties, on the companies' side, the "reputational association with the 'good guys' can bring great cachet to a company, and by so doing increase their profit" (Ayling et al. 2008, p. 172). For police, sponsorship expands their resources and by consequence improves their material conditions of promoting public safety. Looking at the public-private interaction in violent cities, the reduction of crime rates can create a positive environment for doing businesses in areas previously undermined by crime.

Amongst the limitations of the private sponsorship, the literature suggests the capture by the donor, inequality in the provision of service, and the erosion of legitimacy (Grabosky, 2007; Ayling et al. 2008). Another limitation lies in the level of transparency in the sponsoring. *Who, how much, and how* the donation involves different actors? In countries like Brazil, in which in the last decade

has seen many scandals of corruption linking public-private connections, the level of transparency in the sponsorship is an additional issue to be observed.

The UPP project was developed through the combination of public resources and the attraction of private actors who provided financial support. It is a singular case in the Brazilian police, but considering global trends, the capture of private resources may become more common in the future in Brazil. The mega sport events hosted in Rio, the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games, may have motivated private actors to sponsor security projects in the city. However, if private financial support was motivated primarily by calculations of economic gain through the games, instead of “altruistic sponsors” private agents acted as “investors”. In such a scenario, it is predictable to think that after 2016 private sponsorship may decline.

Mendes (2014) has carried out one of the rare studies that critically examine this problem. According to this author, behind the Pacifying Police Units there is a neoliberal framework which connects this public security policy in with stock market language. In other words, for those who have planned and implemented the UPPs, attracting local and international “social investors” is an essential part of the project. Mendes argues that this market-oriented mentality makes the UPPs closer to the capital field than to the local *favela*'s dwellers, creating a gap between the UPPs and the communities. In this perspective, the actions and policies are always designed from top to down.

In the next chapter, I will examine the creation of Pacifying Police Units in Rio de Janeiro. This innovation within the local Military Police is linked to the failure of previous tactics applied to regain control over *favelas* undermined by crime organizations. Among the wide range of challenges in policing those areas it is possible to highlight the low level of police legitimacy in the communities – which is due to a remarkably long history of police brutality and corruption, as well as to the strength of drug dealers. The UPPs were intended to tackle these problems by designing a different type of policing for *favelas*. In this respect, the success of the UPPs should result in better police legitimacy in the communities, and weaken the power of drug dealers, improving crime rates in poor neighborhoods in the city.

Chapter 4 – The creation of Pacifying Police Units: origins and achievements during initial years

4.1 – The drug problem and the explosion of violence in Rio de Janeiro

In recent decades drug trafficking and its aftermaths, which can be summarized as territorial disputes among drug gangs and draconian approaches of state to deal with the drug problem, have made Rio de Janeiro a violent city. The power of crime organizations in Rio's *favelas* is related to the entry of cocaine into local communities in the 1980's. This reinforced the economic and warlike power of local gangs, increasing the lethality in the disputes. As a result, crime rates grew substantially in the city.

According to Arias (2006) explanations for the violence in Rio are concentrated in the "divided city" and neoclientelist approaches. The "divided city" approach argues that crime organizations have established a parallel order of power in the *favelas* outside the state's capacity for keeping order. For those drawing on the "divided-city" thesis, criminality is caused by the brutal economic and symbolic inequalities in Rio de Janeiro. For the state and media, the "dual city" narrative has constructed an idea that there is a city to be shown beyond the violence and the *favelas*. On the one hand, there is a city of endless beauties that should be reason to be proud. On the other hand, there is a city of violence and fear. Such shameful zones should not be considered part of the official plan of the city.

State and media proudly overemphasize affluent areas, especially Rio's South Zone. For instance, Arias (2006) shows that in an article published in the most influential local newspaper, drawing on public administration data, it was claimed that if Rio's South Zone were a country it would have the highest Human Development Index in the world. In contrast to such a wild imaginative exercise, the same media was outraged when Google Maps "over represented" the *favelas* in the city – areas that historically are not included in the official cartography (Novaes,

2014). According to Ferraz (2016), Rio's city hall recently asked for the American company to remove the term "favela" from its search tools and replace it with the word "hill". This shows that both the media and public authorities try to portray a city beyond the *favelas*, which in effect neglect the existence of one fifth of the city.

Political discourses and media massive exposure on television of "chaotic *favelas*" dominated by dangerous and powerful criminals yielded fear of violence even in areas where drug trafficking is not present. In Rio de Janeiro, where many no-go areas are regarded as war zones, there is in essence a geography of fear. In this respect, there are the "crime-free zones", occupied for "good people" (*gente de bem*), where media, politicians, and their inhabitants should be proud. On the opposite side, there are the "bad zones" in the city. Areas undermined by the drug trafficking, disorder, and poverty. Those neighborhoods are zones of fear and shame.

Brazilian scholars also have been influenced by the "divided-city" thesis, taking economic segregation as a major explanation for high crime rates in the *favelas*. However, for Arias, the weakness in this approach lies in the fact that:

the "divided city" does not go far enough in examining how the depth interconnections among state officials and favela leaders contribute to the violence affecting Rio. The conflict in Rio's *favelas* does not occur because *favelas* are cut off from the state but, rather, because of the way the state is present in those communities and the relationships state actors maintain with criminals who operate in them (Arias, 2006, p. 4).

Additionally, social inequality and social segregation are not new features of Rio's society. In 1808, the Portuguese Royal Family moved to Rio de Janeiro, as an aftermath of Napoleonic occupation of Portugal. The modernization of the city, the construction of palaces, museums, and modern libraries contrasted with a backward type of capitalism based on enslavement (Fausto, 2001). The greatest Brazilian novelist, Machado de Assis, one of few free black men who succeeded in the nineteenth century, portrayed with irony through his characters a local elite that did not possess the ethic of labor. According to Da Matta (1991), the Brazilian Carnival is the only

place where the poor play a genuine part in the “Brazilian Royal Society”. It is the only moment in Brazilian social life in which there is integration between rich and poor.

Although segregation between rich and poor has been a historical feature of this city, the urban violence explosion in Rio is a more recent phenomenon which correlates with the return of democratic institutions to the country (Arias, 2006; Caldeira and Holston, 1999). At same time democracy was re-established in Brazil, in the 1980’s, cocaine entered in the local drug trade which dramatically affected crime rates in the large cities. In the 1990’s, Rio de Janeiro was amongst the most dangerous cities in the world. For example, in 1994 the homicide rate was above 45 per 100,000 people (Mapa da Volência, 2012). The most affected by violent deaths were the poor, youth, and black male population.

Globalization integrated local crime into broader networks of organized crime. With this change the capacity of crime organizations to buy weapons and drugs increased, and by consequence expanded their economic and political power. This developed an attractive market, where different gangs started to struggle for domination. Some organizations have influence in other Brazilian cities and have close ties with global crime networks (Souza, 1996). Although Brazil is not an important producer of illicit drugs, the country has a large border with ten countries, which makes it very difficult to prevent drugs entering. Most of drugs that access the Brazilian market come from Andean countries using the Paraguayan border. In Brazil, cocaine is sold in the internal market as well as it goes to other destinations such as Africa, Europe, and North America (Misse, 2011). Brazil is the second largest world market for cocaine, only behind the US (Lenad, 2012). The entry of cocaine into the local drug market is regarded by many as the main reason for the explosion of violence in Rio de Janeiro. According to Cano and Ribeiro (2016, p. 365), images of groups of young men walking up and down the alleys carrying AK47s and AR15s became commonplace and came to symbolise life in the *favelas*. Misse (2011) shows that such heavy weapons enter in the country through the same route as the cocaine.

Drawing on this data, it could be argued that more effective state policies to control drugs entering in the country could also help to mitigate the lethal capacity of drug traffickers. However, most homicides in Brazil are result of shots from weapons manufactured in the country (Instituto Sou da Paz, 2013). Additionally, heavy weapons such as AK47 and AR15 are not guns used most by crime groups. Brazil has very rigid legislation regarding civilian access to weapons, and illegal weapon carrying is responsible for 7 percent of the national prison population (Infopen, 2014). In contrast, Santini and Viana (2012) show that Brazil has a large weapon's industry, making the country the fourth world exporter of light weapons. Overwhelmingly, weapons fabricated in Brazil are used for robberies and are the cause of most homicides in the country. According to Zaluar (2005), from 1996 to 1999, more than 44,000 weapons were seized in Rio de Janeiro, where 72.9 percent were of national fabrication. Zaluar argues that crime groups have accessed those weapons through corrupt police officers and clientelistic connections with state agents.

According to Arias (2006) the neoclientelist approach takes a different route in comparison to the "divided city" thesis. This perspective focuses on political connections between traffickers and public agents. It claims that political relations are built upon asymmetrical power capacities. For this reason, drug dealers have more access to state power than the regular *favela* dwellers. This reinforces the ties between crime and public spheres making traffickers even more powerful. Their capacity to bribe state agents paves a "free-way" for illegal business.

Large crime organizations have more access to economic power and by consequence to the weapons. At the end of the Brazilian dictatorship, within the prison system, Rio's main criminal group was created. The *Comando Vermelho* (Red Command), well-known through its acronym CV, introduced the retail sale of cocaine in the city. Souza (1996) argues that the CV is a large crime network which spreads itself in various levels. Although the media focuses its attention on the drug dealers who live and control the *favelas*, those criminals are not the top agents in the organizational hierarchy. The *favela's* drug traffickers operate the retail dimension in the drug business, outsourcing to other individuals the task of bringing the drug to the communities. The most

powerful leaders who control the international drug wholesale market and have political connections usually do not live in the *favelas*.

While CV intended to establish a monopoly in the local market, in the 1980's another criminal group was created aiming to challenge it. The Terceiro Comando (Third Command) made the fight for drug control in the *favelas* increasingly competitive which impacted on the high homicide rates. In the 1990's other trafficking groups were also established, such as the Comando Vermelho Jovem (Youth Red Command), Amigos dos Amigos (Friends of the Friends), and Terceiro Comando Puro (Pure Third Command), this made the territorial disputes of crime organizations even more complex and violent (Misse, 2011).

4.2 – The failure of previous methods for reducing drug traffickers' power

This section deals with the state actions developed in order to combat drug power in Rio de Janeiro before the creation of the Pacifying Police Units. Police abuses became an institutionalized part of state policies for drug control in the *favelas*. However, draconian methods did not reduce drug traffickers' power, nor made the *favelas* safer places. In contrast, it shaped a negative image of police officers in the communities.

The first public policy designed to face the explosion of violence was the war on drugs approach. Through this approach, the police started to apply extermination as a *praxis*, paying gratuities to police officers who were successful in arresting or killing drug dealers (Misse, 2011). According to Cano and Ribeiro (2016), the war on drugs approach relied on the militarization of policing and confrontation. The BOPE, Brazilian special police known after the blockbuster *Tropa de Elite*, applied war tactics to take back the communities. For Cano and Ribeiro,

After occupying the community, leaving a few dealers dead and apprehending drugs and weapons, police stayed only for days, or weeks at most, and later withdrew only to return a few months later to start the cycle again. Unsurprisingly, these

interventions did nothing to eliminate drug trafficking, for dead dealers were quickly replaced and business continued as usual (Cano and Ribeiro, 2016, p. 365).

In the 1990's the state of Rio de Janeiro was forced to authorize Federal Armed Forces to act in the *favelas*, which for a short period ceased the violence in the city, it was not able to dismantle the commandos and prevent the return of violence in the following years (Misse, 2011). The use of military apparatus such as armored cars and machine-guns for the local police forces were justified by the high lethal capacity of some criminal groups. However, Cano and Ribeiro (2016) argue that the continuous use of those resources combined with extralegal methods shaped a negative police image in the communities, and a militarized approach made the *favelas* even more unsafe places, although most people had no connection with crime organizations. Many civilians were killed in the crossfire between police and drug dealers. In the official discourse, it was regarded as the “collateral damage of the war”.

From 2006 to 2015, the police in Rio killed more than 8,000 people, almost twice the number of people executed during the US at the same period (Bianchi, 2016). Rio's police agents are also the most affected by deaths in confronts against crime groups in Brazil. However, for each police agent killed, more than 20 individuals are executed (Martín, 2017). In light of this unofficial war, many of the “divided city” metaphors can be applied to explain the relation between police and society, police and state, or even police themselves.

According to the Brazilian Forum of Public Security (2015), 73 percent of Brazilian Military Police officers have had a close colleague killed in service; 63 percent of them said they were themselves victims of harassment in the workplace; about 50 percent said they had financial difficulty supporting their families; 65.7 percent were discriminated against for being a professional of the public security system; 61.8 percent avoided taking public transportation by fear; 44.3 percent of them hide their uniform when going home; and 67.7 percent fear to be victim of homicide during the workday. The precariousness of work conditions, high level of violence, and argued lack of social recognition conspire to make those numbers.

Police perceptions of “isolation” may explain why extrajudicial actions are accepted by many officers. In the same survey, 64.5 per cent said that the main reason for their insecurity in the workplace is due to the impunity of criminals; about 60 percent believe it is because of the lack of support throughout society; and 55 percent argue they lack support in the police command. This shows that most of police officers think they are “alone” in a “war” where neither society nor the police command support the purpose of their “everyday battle for justice”.

The hierarchy in the Brazilian Military Police is comparable to that used in the army. The Military Police are in charge of crime control in the cities. They act within states’ jurisdictions. Each state also has a Civil Police Department. At the national level, there is the Federal Police. Both Civil Police and Federal Police have a non-military type of hierarchy. In some states, Civil Police agents require a college degree. For Federal Police agents, a college degree is mandatory. Military Police officers typically require high-school as a minimum education level. Federal Police agents act in issues related to “high policing” duties. Because of the positive image portrayed in the media and better wages than Military Police, Federal Police have a higher level of prestige in society. Salary inequalities may explain the perception of lack of recognition.

The “isolated police officer” narrative contributes to abuses and excesses have negative effects on the image of the entire organization. Widespread human rights violations, such as extrajudicial executions, and police brutality undermined police legitimacy in the favelas (Cano and Ribeiro, 2016). In some places, police officers become known as *Comando Azul* (*Blue Command*), making their practices to be considered for many dwellers similar to drug commands (Misse, 2011).

Police brutality in Rio de Janeiro is not a recent phenomenon, but rather it has been institutionalized over the years. In the 1950’s, led by the former local police chief, the “Grupo de Diligências Especiais” (Group of Special Diligences) was created, which had as its main purpose to execute criminals in Rio de Janeiro. This group was known as “Death Squad” and its practices were adopted in other states of the country. Despite media critics, they continued operating throughout

different administrations, claiming they sought “justice” when the judiciary “absolves so easily the bandits”. Their famous motto was “a good bandit is a dead bandit” (Misse, 2011, p. 21).

More recently, the explosion of street crime and homicide rates in the country have attracted more popular support for extralegal discourses, even when many police officers argue they do not have public support. In a recent survey, 57 per cent of Brazilians agree with the idea that “a good bandit is a dead bandit”. In smaller cities 62 per cent agree with it (G1, 2016).

The combination of social fear with prejudices led to the creation of ambiguous zones where public and private, legal and illegal, judicial and extrajudicial forces operate. In the 1980’s, death squad agents started to sell their services to local small businesses, seeking to create “crime free zones” by killing robbers and traffickers in the favelas. In the 1990’s, this kind of protection came to be offered, by selling or extorting, to the entire community. At that time, there became established a more complex network involving police, local associations, and leaders with political career intentions (Misse, 2011). Such practice prevented the entering of drug dealers in some zones in the city increasing the internal control in the communities. However, those practices were not very different from the actions of crime organizations. According to Misse,

This model become widespread in other districts of Rio de Janeiro’s West Zone, creating an organization akin to the mafia named as “Justice League”, whose political wing was represented by deputies and councilmen and its armed wing was made by military and civil police, on duty and retired, prison guards, firefighters, and municipal guards, called by the media since 2006 as “militias” (Misse, 2011, p. 21).³

The “war on drugs” was overlapped by the so-called “militias”. Cano (2008) defined militias by the following characteristics: (a) control over neighborhoods by irregular armed groups; (b) coercion against residents and local business owners; (c) oriented by economic gain; (d) a legitimization discourse related to the ‘liberation’ from drug dealers and the creation of a protective social order; and (e) open participation in, and control of, these groups by law enforcement agents.

³ Translated from the original in Portuguese.

Social fear along with the lack of public confidence in the police and state made room for non-official methods of crime control. Cano and Ribeiro (2016) show that in this “state vacuum” the militias developed a parallel system of taxation for local business and dwellers in exchange for protection. Misse (2011) argues that the “state vacuum” also made room for the militias to monopolize many profitable services such as gas, internet and cable TV, and irregular transportation companies.

Indeed, the state and the media tolerated those practices, considering the militias as a lesser evil than the drug dealers. For Cano and Ribeiro (2016, p. 368) “the turning point was the incident in May 2008, when a group of journalists from *O Dia* newspaper, working undercover in the favela of Batan, were tortured by members of the militia they intended to report on”. At that point, media and politicians started to reject the militias.

The failed experience of previous methods to control drug trafficking in the city and their precarious results in the reduction of crime rates forced the state to search for other tactics of crime control. The World Cup (2014) and the Olympic Games (2016) also motivated the private sector to take part in new approaches. In this respect, the UPPs changed both the approach towards drug control policies and also the way the state controlled the *favelas* during festivals, political meetings, and sport events.

Rio de Janeiro has a long experience hosting international events, such as RIO-92, Rock in Rio, Pan-American Games, without mentioning its traditional Carnival and New Year’s Eve celebrations. In RIO-92, a United Nations Conference was held for heads of states to discuss world environmental challenges, and Rio became a “besieged city” for two weeks. At that time, a warlike security operation was established with 25,000 officers from the Brazilian Army Forces, Federal and Civil Police, and local Military Police. Three war tanks were “pulled over” in front of Rocinha – the largest South Zone *favela* (Stycer, 2012).

During the Pan-American Games in 2007, a similar operation was carried out by the state in the local *favelas*. According to Amnesty International (2017), a mega security operation in the

Favela do Alemão resulted in the death of 19 people and many others were wounded. Independent investigators showed that many deaths were extra-judicial executions. That massacre became known as the “Pan-Slaughter” (*Chacina do Pan*).

Typically, during big events there is a pattern in terms of security in the city. It is to establish a “security belt” intended to isolate the *favelas* from the affluent areas. This policy can be seen in the temporary occupation of communities by the police and armed forces, suspension of public transportation, and even the establishment of barricades in the main *favelas* entrances – as a way of preventing public access to strategic zones. The idea of “divided-city” goes beyond symbolic and economic divisions, there is a geography of segregation which is more visible when the authorities want to “promote the city” – extending a curtain over one fifth of its population.

Past military occupations were undertaken just during event times; there a high level of state violence was put in place, and the contrasts between rich and poor areas usually became more visible. Thus, the permanent occupation in advance of the mega sport events, as well as the objective of “integrating” the *favelas* into the “formal city”, beyond just tourist areas, show some remarkable innovations of the UPP project in contrast to previous tactics.

In the following section, I will present the origins of the Pacifying Police Units. The UPP’s objectives and design show its close connection with the “divided-city” thesis. Additionally, the eminence of the mega-events explains public and private concerns towards risk management in violent areas close to rich areas and tourist spots in the city.

4.3 – The Pacifying Police Units: origins and results from 2008 to 2012

The origin of Pacifying Police Units has to do with the failure of former policies to retake the *favelas* from drug traffickers (Da Silva, 2010; Freeman, 2014). It was a joint initiative among local police departments, state policymakers, scholars, and local and international companies. In contrast to the previous methods, which relied on armed confrontation – when the police just

entered in the communities to undertake a war operation, withdrawing the troops after the “ceasefire” - in the new approach, the police would permanently occupy territories. Instead of the military approach, police units would use community-oriented methods, respecting human rights, to enhance police legitimacy in the *favelas* (World Bank, 2012; Cano and Ribeiro, 2016).

The permanent presence of police agents in the *favelas* has both objective and symbolic motivations. First, it discourages the massive presence of drug dealers - while they will still exist they should reduce their influence over communities. The reduction of drug trafficking should also reduce the confrontation between police and gangs, and territorial disputes involving different crime organizations. For this reason, the success of permanent policing in *favelas* should make those areas safer.

Considering the other effects of the permanent presence of police, it should recover symbolic power of the state. Over the years, the robust power of drug traffickers in the *favelas* caused the state lose its legal control to the authority of drug lords. Consequently, conflicts among dwellers that were supposed to be reported to state authorities, such as fighting among dwellers and domestic violence cases, were “solved” instead through the mediation of drug dealers’ local authority (World Bank, 2012). Even if the state has never completely lost its presence and power over the poor areas in the city, its legal and symbolic power has been overlapped by this illegal order.

In contrast with previous methods, the Pacifying Police Units were designed to increase state capacity not only through a more visible presence of police officers, but also by the expansion of public services within the *favelas*. From the “divided-city” perspective, Rio de Janeiro’s geography has been defined through dichotomies such as “the hill and the asphalt”, “the legal city and the illegal city”, “the formal and the informal city” and so forth. Thus, clearly influenced by this approach, one of the most important innovations in the UPP project lies in the fact that the concept of public security was regarded extending beyond policing. From the beginning there was the perception that the UPPs’ success would rely on the combination of policing with more public

effort in terms of infrastructure and social policies. Such a combination would “integrate” the *favela* into the “regular city”.

In order to regain police legitimacy in the *favelas*, the UPPs’ officers were supposed to present a different attitude in the communities. In other words, it means more discrete use of force, which would yield the community perception of equal treatment among its different groups (men and women, black and white, youth and adult population). In this respect, the very idea of “pacifying police” begins with the pacification of the police themselves (Cano and Ribeiro, 2016).

According to Skogan (2008), police reforms fail for both internal and external reasons. Considering internal obstacles for the UPPs, the first one is the authoritarian police culture. Coimbra (2001) shows that the authoritarian tradition in the Brazilian police forces comes from the country’s history of slavery, and is reinforced throughout many years under authoritarian rule. According to Cano and Ribeiro (2016), many police officers remain opposed to this community-oriented approach, because of the *ethos* of the “warrior policemen”, who see themselves as fighters in a chaotic world dominated by dangerous criminals, and who believe the only way to fight against crime is by the use of lethal force.

For this reason, police officers were specially recruited and trained for the project. The training was based on community policing concepts and human rights (World Bank, 2012). The corruption amongst police units is another challenge for police reform. For this reason, Pacifying Police agents earn additional monies to make sure they will not be bribed by drug dealers (World Bank, 2012; Freeman, 2014; Cano and Ribeiro, 2016). Here there is a closer influence of neoclientelist approaches.

The Pacifying Police Units were officially implemented in 2009, after a short trial in the community of Dona Marta in 2008 (Cano, 2008). Beyond regaining communities from the rule of drug traffickers and increasing police legitimacy, the specific objectives of the UPPs were (a) introduce or expand public services and private business; (b) the formalization of economic

activities and urban services; and (c) integrate the *favelas* into the “formal city” (World Bank, 2012; Cano and Ribeiro, 2016).

The project has been carried out in four stages (World Bank, 2012; Oosterbaan and Wijk, 2015). The first one is the “retake” stage (*retomada*), the BOPE undertake a military operation to regain territories controlled by drug dealers (World Bank, 2012). In the beginning, this stage happened without advance notice, which generated warlike confrontation between police and drug dealers. In subsequent operations, the police proactively communicated with the communities on the day and time of the occupation, providing an opportunity for the drug dealers to surrender to the police or leave the community (World Bank, 2012; Cano and Ribeiro, 2016).

The second stage is the “stabilization” period (*estabilização*), in which BOPE soldiers swarm the communities to find drugs and weapons. The third stage is the “permanent occupation”, in which the BOPE withdraw the troops and the UPP is established. This stage is often followed by the “crash of order” against many types of informal trades and housing (World Bank, 2012). The last stage is the “UPP social” branch, created in 2010 by the Secretary of Social Service and Human Rights, and placed in charge of promoting social policies in the communities (World Bank, 2012).

Foley (2014) points out that despite the fact that the “pacification” approach claims to be based on humanitarian rather than violent actions, the idea of territorial occupation is very close to methods applied in the “war on terror” in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the “war on drugs” tactics. The large operation undertaken in 2010, which mobilized two thousand Brazilian Armed Forces, Federal and local police officers, seeking to occupy the *Favela do Alemão*, shows that the “pacification” is, at least in the initial stage, very similar to a war operation.


Nonetheless, the introduction of the UPPs presented positive outcomes in its initial years. For Cano and Ribeiro (2016), the first positive impact of the UPP lies in the fact that permanent police presence discouraged criminal groups from returning to the communities. This explains the drastic reduction of violent crimes in occupied *favelas*. Lethal crimes declined by 34 percent - from a total of 6122 lethal crimes in 2007, to 4030 in 2011 (Oosterbaan and Wijk, 2015). Moreover, the

deaths generated by the confrontation between police and traffickers were reduced, which has led some critics to argue that instead of the police pacifying communities, the police pacified themselves (Cano and Ribeiro, 2016).

The decrease in homicides in Rio was correlated with the reduction of police executions in the city, which is potentially an aftermath of lower levels of confrontation between police and traffickers. Although the UPPs still raise many doubts over their actual application of peaceful methods, their introduction coincided with a radical decrease of homicides in Rio between 2008 and 2012.

As the graph below shows, there is a connection between lower homicide rates and the reduction of police executions. Even if considering that homicide rates in Rio de Janeiro were declining before the introduction of the UPPs, after 2008 there was a greater reduction. This also coincides with lower levels of police lethality in the city, which happened after the UPPs. However, since 2012 both homicide rates and police executions did not follow the continual path of decline.

Figure 1 - Police executions and number of homicides in Rio de Janeiro



Elaborated based on ISP (Institute of Public Security)⁴

⁴ Available at <http://www.ispdados.rj.gov.br/CrimesVida.html>
Accessed on 07/24/2017

While police executions could be considered high for international standards, they were less frequent in Rio from 2008 to 2012. The deaths of police officers in confrontations also were diminished at that period as another positive result of the UPPs. However, in the recent years drug traffickers have tried to reoccupy lost territories which has resulted in more police officer deaths; in 2012, 18 agents died, and in 2015, 26 police officers were killed working in a UPP (Barbosa and Ponso, 2016). As a result of more conflicts, homicide rates and police executions have also increased in Rio since 2012.

The UPP's approval rates in the communities from 2008 to 2012 were very high. To illustrate that, in a survey conducted in 2009, in some pacified communities, about 90 per cent of people believed they were safer after the occupation, and that the program should be continuously expanded (IBPS, 2010). Beyond recovering territories, the UPP program was an opportunity to regain community confidence in the police. Throughout several decades engaging in confrontation with traffickers, abuses with *favelas* dwellers not linked with crime, and corruption amongst officers, eroded police legitimacy. In many places, the lack of confidence in public authorities made room for traffickers to control spheres of legal and symbolic power.

If, on the one hand, police in Rio de Janeiro have a remarkable path of human rights violations - on the other hand, communities dominated by the "hill owners" (*Donos do Morro*) have been hostages of a parallel order of justice. In order to keep the police away from the *favelas*, drug lords developed an internal code of conduct known as "law of silence" (World Bank, 2012).

Despite the abuses by the drug lords themselves, they did not tolerate rapes, robbery, and physical fights in the *favelas*; also, they did not allow the dwellers to keep relations with people from other communities, especially those places dominated by rival gangs. Those who infringed the "law of silence" could be punished with torture or death (World Bank, 2012). In this sense, the occupation in the *favelas* also meant a shift in terms of conflict resolution. Before, conflicts were

mediated by local drug dealers, and next the police became the authority responsible to mediate conflicts (World Bank, 2012; Cano and Ribeiro, 2016).

The power of drug lords generated a false sense of stability in the process of everyday life in the *favelas*. In the absence of state rule the drug dealer played the role of having the legitimate monopoly of violence, creating a twofold process. On the one hand, the drug dealer is the mediator of local conflicts. Such authority discourages crimes that are supposed to be regulated by the rule of the law. As a result of the absence of the state as the main mediator of social conflicts, the drug dealer has the power of punishment according to personal will. In this complex social system, the legal state and its legal institutions are not acknowledged by the individuals. The drug dealers become the state in its absence. Keeping in mind that such “absence” has never been absolute (Freeman, 2014). Even before the UPPs the state was present in the *favelas* through public schools, health centers, and also official and unofficial police operations. The militias, for instance, made up of off-duty and retired officers, shows that even within the illegal order of power the drug traffickers shared space with other actors.

Despite the reduction of lethal crimes in the pacified communities, non-lethal crimes increased after the occupation. Cano and Ribeiro (2016, p.368) argue that there are two main reasons for this: “(a) a sharp reduction in non-reporting rates, since residents who had been traditionally wary of reporting crimes to the police were now driven into police stations in order to do so; and (b) the absence of former brutal authoritarian control by the ‘owner of the hill’ may actually have increased petty crime”.

The idea of pacification is a continuous process. The level of security varies from one UPP to another. In some communities, police engaged more in confrontations with drug dealers. In other areas, the UPPs were internalized as part of the communities’ everyday life (Cano and Ribeiro 2016). In those areas, the community-oriented profile has successfully enhanced police legitimacy (World Bank, 2012; Oosterbaan and Wijk, 2015).

A relevant barrier that prevents the improvement of police legitimacy in the communities lie in cases of “*baile funk*” bans – popular parties in the favelas, where Carioca Funk music is played for local artists. The “funk ban” illustrates the lack of dialogue between the UPPs and communities in zones considered by the state and police as illegitimate. Funk Carioca is known by its sexualized lyrics, references to trafficking disputes, and the cult of luxury brands - the so-called “Funk Ostentação” (Ostentation Funk). For many Brazilian upper-classes people, the funk is the strongest manifestation of cultural decay in the country and it is a symbol of moral degeneration for the youth. In this respect, the “funk ban” is compatible with the idea of a civilizing process carried out by state agents.

While the UPP has been criticized for lacking communication with the funk followers; in the local schools and places that represent the “traditional family”, they have intensified their presence. UPP officers attend school events, sports competitions, and community anniversaries. Their presence is not for policing itself, but for showing to the public that they support community.

These practices are more like community-policing rather than regular Military Police patrols, in which community dwellers usually were intimidated by the presence of officers. The new approach of UPP’s officers attending community and the local schools events can create a bridge between youth and police. The photos 1, 2 and 3 illustrate a closer presence of UPP’s officers in areas connected with the “traditional family”. However, the police also need to improve their relationship with dwellers in zones normally not recognized by police as a part of the “traditional society”.



Photo 1 – UPP officers with the kids



Photo 2 – UPP officer attending an anniversary party



Photo 3 – UPP officers attending a community celebration⁵

⁵ Photo 1, 2, and 3 obtained from UPP's website. Available on: <http://www.upprj.com/index.php/foto>

Different perspectives towards school and funk followers illustrate that even the *favelas* are spaces of contrasts. There are more prestigious zones in which the *favela* is closer to the “asphalt”, as well as there are places that represent and reinforce the “divided-city” mentality. The school is the space where the state civilizing project takes place; the “baile funk” is an unrecognized cultural manifestation, the space where “uneducated teenagers” are prone to “all sort of perversions” such as sex, drugs and violence. For this reason, an entire generation should be stopped, re-educated, and civilized. In this respect, there is a clear distinction in the UPP approach towards the kids and teenagers attending the school, and young men and women who attend the funk parties. In a city with so many contrasts between rich and poor, black and white, recognized and unrecognized, it is very difficult to prevent community-oriented policing from absorbing some of these contradictions – since most of them were developed and consolidated over decades.

Finally, community policing is costly, because it relies in a large number of police officers (Skogan, 2008). Therefore, budget limitations reflect on the length and capacity of public policies in security. The participation of private actors, sponsoring the UPPs, extended the state capacity in carrying out the project. In this respect, the UPP’s connection with private corporations has to do both with a large set of transformations within police organizations, and transformations in the public sphere.

In the following chapter, I will approach the conception of private sponsorship in the UPPs, the humanitarian discourse behind the “pacification” as a way of attracting local and international support, and the geography of the project which has prioritized areas of more economic potential for tourism and businesses. I show that the innovation of private sponsorship for public police can bring some benefits for the public administration, but also it yields new forms of conflicts between public and private interests.

Chapter 5 – Police and market: the private sponsorship for the UPPs in Rio de Janeiro

5.1 – The transformation in police organizations and the UPPs in Brazil

One of the most important aspects of the Pacifying Police Units has been almost neglected. This is, the unprecedented connection between public and private interests. In other words, one of the most significant innovations of the UPP project lies in the remarkable amount of money it captured from private sponsorship. The closer contact between public and private interests to shape and undertake this security policy has to do with a wide range of transformations into the Brazilian state, which are parallel to ongoing transformations in other countries. In the last decades, police organizations have been transformed around the globe. The private sponsorship for the UPPs can be considered within this large set of transformations.

In recent years, private police have outnumbered public police forces in many countries (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2009). This phenomenon illustrates that states have lost their monopoly in security, and police organizations have become more fragmented (Bayley and Shearing, 1996). In other words, a security shift from police to policing has occurred (Loader, 2000). Two factors may explain these transformations in the provision of security. First, the large demand for security in the global risk culture; as well as economic transformations within contemporary states.

Fear of crime is not an isolated phenomenon of countries undermined by high crime rates. In contrast, in contemporary societies media and governments have transformed crime in a normal social fact, even when crime usually is a very concentrated problem (Garland, 1996). In order to reduce individual risks, there has been established a large security industry providing electric fences, CCTV systems, and private guards. In this context, individuals are encouraged by states to identify potential risks and to take proactive actions to reduce the probability of damage (Garland, 1996; Hinds and Grabosky, 2010; Kemshall, 2011). Drawing on Beck (1992), there is a close connection between the diversification of security provision with the contemporary global risk

culture. Thus the pluralization of policing responds to higher demand to individual and collective forms of risk management.

This fact explains why the private security industry has grown around the world. In the United States, private spending on domestic security is \$282 billion annually, in contrast to \$68 billion in public spending (ASIS International, 2013). In Canada, from 2006 to 2011, the private security industry grew 40% in terms of employment, and more than 140,000 people work in a variety of jobs related to private security (Hovbrender, 2011). In Brazil, private industry employs more than 550,000 while public police forces are about 500,000 (Zanetic, 2011).

The advance of private security in Brazil and elsewhere enlarges the safety in rich neighborhoods, where dwellers can afford private security. For this reason, especially in developing countries, the expansion of private security in some affluent areas highlights income inequalities. From the state point of view, a more active role of private security companies in strategic zones can attract more businesses for those areas, which can also create jobs, and increase governments' revenues. Looking from this point of view both state and private corporations gain with private security. Nevertheless, this process may strengthen income concentration since people living in more affluent locations will also have more security and more economic opportunities, especially in cities with high crime rates.⁶ Additionally, wealthy districts will become safer than poor areas, where security still relies on limited public resources.

Thus, the expansion of private security guards may impact positively on the reduction of crime. However, it motivates the creation of enclaves of security in areas of high economic potential. For instance, in Brazil, the expansion of shopping centres and gated communities illustrates this phenomenon. The decline of street commerce and the ascension of shopping malls in the large cities shows an increasingly phobic-like "anti-public behavior" through the population. It develops a new culture of consumption that prioritizes safe commercial zones controlled by private security. There are more than 550 shopping malls in the country - 53 in São Paulo and 39 in Rio de

⁶ I will return to this issue in the following sections.

Janeiro (Abrasc, 2017). The decline of commerce in public areas in Brazil means that if the state cannot guarantee security on the streets, shopping malls have the “guarantee” of active private security guards who will make sure that the “risks from streets” will not go into their “zones of safety”.

Transformations within contemporary states also help to understand changes in policing. Looking at the Brazilian case, in the last decades the state and its public functions have been profoundly transformed. The Brazilian state has been reshaped both in the political and economic fields. The return of democratic rule in the 1980’s coincided with the reduction of public functions in the country. Former president, Fernando Collor created the “National Program of Destatization” (*Programa Nacional de Desestatização*) in 1990, which resulted in one of the largest privatization programs in the world (Anuatti-Neto et. al, 2005). The privatization of public companies was followed by the states, and has continued as a regular practice throughout the different administrations. In recent decades, this privatization policy has been combined with public-private partnerships in areas such as infrastructure and public transportation.

In the 1980’s, Brazil had one of the highest inflation rates in the world. In some years, it was higher than 1000 per cent annually. The economic crisis, which also affected most countries in the region, in fact, was one of the strongest arguments for justifying the need for “less state” in the country. In this regard, privatization, reduction of welfare, and social protection also belong to the “risk management pack”. Even though most of the people are not aware of the scope of public debt, and do not have any training in macroeconomics, they do have terrifying memories of the “inflation times”, what makes many support economic orthodox approaches. Thus, reforms have been supported by many who fear the return of uncontrolled inflation rates in the country. According to Beck (2000), the idea of risk-management is founded on the probability of harm. This explains why politicians have internalized such fears for developing conservative agendas.

Recently, the Brazilian Congress approved a very controversial measure in the name of “budget responsibility”. The “Freezing of Public Spending” for the next two decades. It means that

no administration will be allowed to exceed the current level of public spending, adjusted by the annual inflation. However, critics argue that areas that require more public investment such as public security, public health, and education will be the most affected by this policy. Considering the possible future in the policing area, it is reasonable to predict that either private companies might cover the increasing demand for security in the country - as it has already been observed in areas such as education and health care - or even the UPP's model of capturing private sponsors for public police might become a widespread practice in the country.

5.2 – The phenomenon of private sponsorship and the UPP's

Scarcity of public investment in relevant sectors, make room for more private participation. In some areas, public companies have completely been transferred to private initiative. In others, such as private sponsorship, public administration captures resources from private corporations in order to enlarge public capacity of carrying out public policies. In some fields, such as education, arts, and health there is a larger tradition of private sponsorships (Zunz, 2014; Wright, 2002; MacDonald, 2008; Clouth, 1960).

Considering public police forces, there is a well-known practice in Brazil of small groceries, cafés, and bars providing free meals and perks for on-duty officers as a way of discouraging robberies (Bordin, 2009; Neves, 2005). In Brazil, where private sponsorship and philanthropy is not very institutionalized among affluent citizens, the UPP project innovated in bringing private sponsors into the public security area.

In US, UK, and South Africa there is a larger tradition of private sponsorship for public police (Ayling et al. 2008; Grabosky, 2007). In Brazil, where philanthropy is rare even considering universities and hospitals, private sponsoring for public policing stands out. Additionally, contemporary governments encourage private agents to support public policies in security because

in a “global risk society” responsibility in security provision is shared. Individuals are also made responsible for their individual responses toward risks.

Eduarda La Roque (2012), former president of *Instituto Pereira Passos* (IPP), and one of the most influential policymakers of the UPP project, recognized her interest in attracting private supporters to promote social policies in occupied *favelas*. Her intention was to create a “social fund of investment”, where private organizations would invest in local NGOs. Self-proclaimed an intellectual sympathetic with neoliberalism, she argued private companies have legal advantages in comparison to the public administration – such as more mobility to allocate resources for specific community needs.

In her article “*Rumo ao fim da cidade partida*” (*Towards the end of the divided city*) it is possible to identify a genuine intention to connect public and private auspices. La Roque’s philosophy helps to explain the close ties between social and financial languages within the “pacification” and “integration” discourse. According to her, one of the main difficulties to capture sponsors is convincing private investors to put money where they will not earn financial return (La Roque, 2012).

The current study considers three potential reasons for offers of private sponsorship in light of the UPPs. The first motivation lies in non-material interests. Starting from Marcel Mauss’ notion of “gift”, the explanation for private sponsorships is due to symbolic motivations such as social recognition, prestige, and sense of belonging (Ayling et. al, 2008).⁷ Here some companies may want to “give back” to the country, promoting their corporations through a “greater purpose”. International actors and celebrities might be attracted by values such as “human rights”, “charity”, and “hope”.⁸

According to Ayling et al. (2008), the gift can range from a “pure” donation through sponsorship to conditional grants. Due to the UPP’s idiosyncrasies, I suggest that pragmatic

⁷ Drawing on Natalie Zemon Davis the authors use the concepts of coercion, sale, and gift for explaining public strategies of resources enhancing.

⁸ In the following section I show how humanitarian language was applied to promote the UPPs and attract supporters.

interests may also drive private sponsorship. Although La Roque argued that companies would not earn economic return, which could fit with the idea of “gift”, when altruistic actors support the community for prestige and social acknowledgement, the geographic area occupied by the UPPs has paved new spaces for private investments. Additionally, those areas were close to wealthy neighborhoods and tourist spots in the city – where economic actors potentially have more interest considering security. In this regard, private sponsors might act as “social investors”, allocating money to public and social issues, but predicting future economic opportunities.

The selection of Brazil to host the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games, also attracted the attention of local and international companies. In this respect, the public objective of making Rio a safer and “peaceful” city cannot be separated from pragmatic motivations of private actors. On the one hand, public agents may pragmatically have used the mega-events to attract sponsors. On the other hand, private actors may have sponsored the project considering the potential of economic gain during and after the mega-events in the city.

In pragmatic sponsorship the returns are not guaranteed, and because of risks of failure, when funded policies do not accomplish their goals, pragmatic actors sometimes earn back just symbolic gains for supporting communities. In other words, assuming the relation between public-private agents is not built under corrupt negotiations, the idea of “gift” does not disappear even within pragmatic motivations.

Another aspect to be considered is that even if sponsorship was motivated by pragmatic reasons, it may not necessarily be an asymmetrical relation of power in which only economic interests will prevail. It may be established as a “gain-gain” type of relationship, where both sides can share assets (Ayling et al., 2008). Higher levels of public security both improve business environment and government’s approval from communities as well. There may be a balance between public and private interests and both sides are benefited from this relationship.

However, private sponsorship also may bring risks of pragmatic-clientelistic relations between public actors and corporations. In this type of sponsorship, some private companies may

fund public projects under the condition they will earn back some advantage in future negotiations with public administrations. The long history of clientelist practices in Brazil (Holanda, 2012; Faoro, 2013) and recent corruption scandals involving public and private businesses make it reasonable to consider the potential risks of corruption and the need of a broader level of accountability to the public and private spheres.⁹

In 2010, the Brazilian newspaper *Folha de S. Paulo* reported that “*Companies help to finance the pacification*”. In the report, they highlighted that the Brazilian investor Eike Batista donated \$20 million yearly to the project. Other local companies such as Bradesco insurance, Odebrecht, Souza Cruz, and EBX group also supported the UPPs as sponsors. International agents such as the Coca-Cola company sponsored the construction of two UPPs, and the American Embassy provided English classes in the communities. For the anthropologist, Silvia Ramos, one of the policymakers in the program, the participation of private companies was regarded as “an investment in the future, capitalist, but with a social sensibility” (Folha de S. Paulo, 2010).

Looking at the UPP’s sponsors, the areas of concentration of private actors are very diverse. Souza Cruz is an important Brazilian company in the tobacco area. Bradesco is one of the biggest private banks in the country. At that time Eike Batista’s companies and investments were in areas connected with oil and infrastructure. Odebrecht was the largest Brazilian multinational, leading the construction sector. International actors such as Coca-Cola Company and the American Embassy in Brazil also supported the project.

As mentioned before, symbolic and pragmatic motivations are not incompatible. Some companies may desire to improve their brand reputation throughout communities in actions that are proclaimed to “give back” to the people. Other private donors may not have the interest of consolidating a brand name, but they are more concerned in security issues themselves. Smaller

⁹ Risk of corruption in private sponsoring is not an exclusive problem of developing countries. See Ayling et al. (2008).

donors may search for positive publicity combining it with future businesses opportunities in a safer environment.

The connection of relevant UPP sponsors with white collar crimes in the federal level draws attention to the risk of sponsorships motivated by pragmatic-clientelistic interests. In 2015, Marcelo Odebrecht, the company CEO, was arrested for being involved in the largest corruption scandal in Brazilian history the so-called “Operação Lava-Jato” (Operation Car Wash). According to the prosecution, the company developed illegal schemes with political parties and politicians in order to take advantage of future public contracts in the construction field (BBC Brasil, 2015). Most recently, Eike Batista was also denounced for keeping illegal ties with public administration and political parties.

There is no evidence of corruption between UPP projects and their private sponsors so far. But considering that in 2016 two former Rio governors were arrested for corruption, better levels of accountability are required in any dimension of public-private relationship. Past cases of corruption connecting public and private actors in the country make a warning for the need of even more transparency considering private sponsorship.

5.3 – Humanitarian discourse as a means of attracting supporters

Since the beginning of the Pacifying Police Units, local government has been effective in promoting the project underlining the positive results achieved through “humanitarian attitudes”. The massive investment in advertising can be regarded as part of public intent in increasing police legitimacy in the communities, as well as bring more local and international supporters to the project. More than any other Brazilian public policy in security, in the UPPs, humanitarian discourse was used to bring supporters within the country and abroad.

National companies that sponsored the UPPs may want to gain local social recognition. This brings positive publicity to the brands, which can improve future economic returns. International

supporters, such as Coca-Cola company, the American Embassy, and international celebrities might be also interested in attaching their names to a program that claims to “pacify” poor zones undermined by violence through human rights values and humanitarian policies.

The connection between the UPPs and market cannot be restricted only to the proactive capture of private sponsorship. This project absorbed other market features, such as the massive publicity. The UPP became a brand name that was “sold” in Brazil and around the world as a project that has tried to build the peace in communities undermined by drug trafficking throughout humanitarian actions. The UPP brand was strongly advertised in billboards, newspapers, and public transportation (Wold Bank, 2012). This shows that public administration was not only interested in increasing police legitimacy throughout occupied communities, but also, it wanted to publicize it at an international level.



Photo 4 – “I support the peace”



Photo 5 – Came to stay



Photo 6 – “Your community is being pacified”

As illustrated in the photos 5, and 6, the content in English reinforces the idea that the UPP project has tried to promote itself beyond the Brazilian boundaries. The UPP webpage (upprj.com) includes both Portuguese and English content, where it reports on the project history, achievements, and partnerships. Two quotations of the former Security Secretary José Mariano Beltrame in English illustrate the message this project wanted to send to the world:

The UPP have come to stay. It is not just a security project; it is a state policy of life improvement and hope development to the people of Rio de Janeiro [...] The UPPs represent the consolidation of the pact between the Military Police and the citizens, to whom we must destine the best of our efforts. Besides hope and citizenship, UPP symbolizes all the appreciation we have for human life.¹⁰

The idea in place that the “UPP is not just a security project” and words like “hope” and “human life” illustrate the humanitarian discourse behind this project.

One of the main characteristics of community-oriented policing is the better level of communication throughout communities. In this respect, more publicity can be seen as a means of strengthening communication between police and society. However, the publicity regarding the UPPs has established communication beyond the local level. The UPP’s publicity has emphasized

¹⁰ Available in http://www.upprj.com/index.php/as_upps_us
Accessed on 31/07/17.

the humanitarian narrative, which is in tune with a human rights framework. Even though in Brazil human rights raise controversies, whether they are or not an obstacle for crime control (Cano, 2011). At the international level human rights are a more consolidated language in economic and political arenas, especially in developed nations. Even if the “humanitarian” discourse did not come without contradictions (Foley, 2014; Mendes, 2014), it was effective in building a positive image for the UPPs towards international agents.

La Roque (2012) admitted having traveled around the globe to promote the UPPs, as well as to attract sponsors. Human rights and humanitarian discourses, combined with an entrepreneurial perspective on the current and future potential of *favelas* were used to “sell” the UPP as a different security program in the marketplace.

Cunha (2012) points out that the positive outcomes of the UPPs allied with the positive international publicity, created euphoric reports in the local media. The presence of international celebrities, such as Beyoncé and Madonna, and international missions such as the visit of the American Ambassador in Brazil, and Harvard’s Public Policy students to settled communities, strengthened the image of success, acknowledged by international actors.

In this respect, the presence of international agents is internally regarded as a symbolic acknowledgment and success. For this reason, to attract the attention of international companies and global celebrities was essential for the promotion of the project. The discourse of overcoming the rule of drug traffickers and “integrating” the “divided-city” through humanitarian actions was instrumental in building public legitimacy and in attracting supporters. Moreover, the state’s ability to promote the project through a “humanitarian” narrative which claimed to “incorporate” excluded communities into the legal sphere of state, successfully, attracted international attention.

5.4 – The geography of the UPPs: who *pays* and who *benefits*?

According to Grabosky (2007) the convergence of public and private auspices raises two essential questions: who *pays* and who *benefits* from this relationship? Taking the assumption that in democratic societies police must work for the entire community, the convergence of public and private interests arguably has some obvious limits.

To date 38 UPPs have been established, covering 1.5 million people in the city. Nine thousand police officers have been allocated to the project, As photo 7 shows, the geography of the UPPs prioritized regions close to affluent districts and tourist spots, where, according to Cano and Ribeiro (2014), there is more public and private interest in making those areas safer. Clearly, it was planned to create a “security belt” in the city, in wealthy areas more visited by tourists (Novaes, 2014). In this respect, *favelas* located close to wealthy neighborhoods were highly prioritized by the project. More security in the occupied *favelas* made room for the creation of business, but the benefits in terms of security and economic gains were not equally shared throughout the communities.

The fact that *favelas* located away from zones with more “potential” for business have not received special public attention shows that when public policies rely on private support, priorities also might be taken based on the projections of short or long-term gain. Such selection is neither randomly made nor taken just based on “crime hotspots” in the city. In contrast, *favelas* occupied by the UPPs were in strategic zones, creating a “security-belt” for the World Cup and Olympics.



Photo 7 – UPPs in Rio de Janeiro

The local government and police argue that budget limitations do not allow establishing the UPPs in all *favelas* in the city. Most of Rio’s attractions – such as the Sugar Loaf and the Copacabana Beach - are located in the South Zone. It is also where affluent dwellers feel afraid of living close to the “underworld of the *favelas*”. Moreover, the selection of Rio as a host city for the World Cup and Olympics was evidently an additional motivation for local and federal governments to reinforce public security in neighborhoods which could put the international reputation of the city and country at risk. Nicknamed as the “Marvelous City”, Rio de Janeiro’s iconic beauties make it the most visited Brazilian tourist city. Albeit the explosion of violence impacts negatively on Rio’s reputation, affecting its actual potential to become one of the leading tourism destinations in the world. With the selection of Brazil for the mega-events, making Rio safer became one of the highest priorities of the state and companies linked to the tourism industry.

Rio de Janeiro has long been viewed as the main Brazilian postcard city. In this sense, hosting the two most important sport competitions in the world was seen by politicians and businesses as a unique opportunity to “sell the city”, attracting even more investors and tourists to the country (Cunha, 2012; World Bank, 2012; Cano and Ribeiro, 2016). Local, national and international companies have a lot to gain with a safer city. Local and global hotel chains settled in

Rio, for instance, increase profits with a larger presence of tourists, which impacts on other service businesses linked with tourism industry such as restaurants, pubs, shopping malls, and so forth.

The real estate sector was one that benefited most from the policies of “pacification”. Neri (2011) shows that before the UPPs rent prices in *favelas* were on average 25 per cent lower than similar properties located in other neighborhoods. This author defines such processes of devaluation as the “*favela effect*” – when the bad reputation of a neighborhood has a negative impact on the real estate prices. The massive publicity behind the UPPs and the reduction of crime rates in the occupied communities, affected this sector positively. Neri shows that after the occupation rent prices increased more than 6 percent annually in “pacified” communities.

In a survey conducted with small entrepreneurs in “pacified” communities, 28 percent have improved sales, 24 percent considered that their profits were higher, and 41 percent observed improvements in the security (SEBRAE, 2012). As mentioned before, the real estate sector has been positively affected by the UPPs, and after Rio was nominated as the host city for the Olympics the income in the city increased above the national average (Neri, 2011).

Looking from a “gain-gain” point of view, the massive infusion of local and international monies stimulated the local economy, creating more jobs and opportunities. In this respect, even though the private sponsorship is motivated by pragmatic interests, it also can bring benefits for the communities that the state and companies have defined as “strategic zones”.

Through the private sponsorship, the UPPs have developed a hybrid structure involving public and private actors, connected in the local and global level. Abrahamsen and Williams (2009, p. 8) definition of global security assemblage fits closely with the Brazilian case:

In this global security assemblage, a hybrid structure of public and private, local and global security actors combine to facilitate economic activities aimed at a global market, deemed by both the government and international development donors as essential to state reconstruction and economic recovery.

A more porous relation between public and private interests could represent the collapse of public power. However, according to these authors, instead of *global security assemblages* undermining public power, they can strengthen state capacity to improve security in zones of private interest. The problem is that the newly established “protected areas” through public-private joint action may not entirely benefit the local communities. In contrast, it “may serve to consolidate productive enclaves whose economic benefits escape the local populations that surround them” (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2009, p. 15).

On the one hand, the market celebrates better opportunities and ongoing returns. On the other hand, life in occupied communities has become more expensive. Cunha highlights that the pacified communities now attract more visitors than before. However, among the economic trade-offs generated by the UPPs, real estate speculation has increased, and the housing prices have grown up to 400 per cent in some communities (Cunha, 2012).

Critics have argued that the close connection between the UPPs and the market impacts negatively on democratic principles regarding police and society. In a radical perspective, Mendes (2014) argues that behind the humanitarian ideas of “pacification” and “integration” are the stocks and financial market frameworks. This represents a new dynamic in the public-private relationship, where public organizations absorb market language. Looking at this phenomenon in a broader manner, contemporary states have transformed public services, not only by privatization, but also by the incorporation of the private features into the public environment.

In democratic societies, public security policies should not be defined by the “economic potential” for communities. Even if the UPPs earned private funds, the idea of security as a “public good” should not be affected by private sponsorship. Mendes (2014) points out that the UPP’s close connection with businesses privileged dialogue with companies, small and large entrepreneurs, rather than with community leaders and youth. This challenges the idea that in democratic societies public services must serve public needs. Limited dialogue of police officers at the community-level may undermine police legitimacy in the *favelas*. This can create the perception that the Pacifying

Police Units were established to police the poor, instead of accomplishing its publicized objective of “integration”.

Nevertheless, a porous boundary between public and private in Brazil cannot be seen as dislocated from the global context. In global risk societies, local public police must work with foreign public and private organizations. Brazilian drug trafficking cannot be set apart from its broader international dimension. Considering one of the benefits in connecting the UPPs with international actors made it absorb, at least in its discourse, values such as human rights.

In this respect, the amalgam between public-private and local-global on the one hand may represent a better level of police accountability, making the organization behave in accordance with both economic and human rights global frameworks. On the other hand, this process may create a gap between police and local community, since the police become more prone to a “top-down” profile due to exogenous forces and constraints.

The mega sport events in Rio acted as an extra fuel for public and private actors allocating resources in strategic areas in the city. Many dwellers of occupied communities thought the UPPs would be removed from the *favelas* after the Olympics (G1, 2015). This illustrates that people from communities that experienced continuous police presence for the first-time were aware that economic motivations helped to drive 9,000 police officers to the *favelas*.

In recent years, Brazil has been swept by one of the largest political and economic crises throughout its history. Homicide rates in Rio have increased again, which makes some believe that the UPP project did not accomplish its promise of “integrating the divided-city”, making Rio permanently safe. Even though the UPPs are under the threat of being eliminated, it was a systematic public effort by Brazilian police force to use private capital in order to enhance public capacity.

The public-private synergy in the UPP program resulted in some positive outcomes. In its initial years, there was reduction of homicides and police executions in the city. It also had a positive impact on the local economy of occupied communities. The trade-off generated through

this relationship is that since community-policing is costly, the priorities will be defined by the economic motivations of both public and private interests.

5.5 – Recent scandals and challenges surrounding the UPP project

Despite the reduction of crime rates in initial years, the UPPs were not capable of eliminating police abuses and corruption amongst police officers, which have negatively impacted on police legitimacy within occupied communities. Additionally, in recent years, violence has returned to previous levels before the introduction of the Pacifying Police Units, casting doubt on the future of this project.

In the beginning, the UPP project effectively attracted the support of human rights activists, NGOs, and community's leaders. Many who had in the past experienced militarized policing practices in the *favelas* were favorable to new methods of crime control. However, police abuses have undermined the level of support and legitimacy within the communities. One of the most emblematic cases was the extrajudicial execution of the builder Amarildo Souza. In July 2013, Amarildo was tortured and executed by UPP police officers at the *Favela da Rocinha*. After his disappearance, human rights activists launched the campaign "Where is Amarildo?" (*Onde está Amarildo?*). Amarildo became a country-wide symbol for the debate on police abuse and human rights violations in Brazil (Amnesty International, 2016).

In 2016, 13 police officers were convicted of crimes of torture, concealment of a cadaver, and fabrication of evidence (Folha de S. Paulo, 2016). Because of the Amarildo case, many NGOs and social movements which supported the Pacifying Units in the beginning have switched to a critical perspective regarding the UPPs. According to Menedes (2014), Amarildo's execution was not an isolated case. Drawing on Institute of Public Security (ISP) data, this author shows that 119 people disappeared, just in 2010, in the *favelas* where UPPs operate. In the same year, there were

885 deaths from police actions, which were registered as “self-defence.” Such figures cast doubt on the claim that Pacifying Police Units came to be different from regular police forces.

A relevant challenge that prevents the UPPs from eliminating police violence lies in the local police culture and a long tradition of abuses. The “*ethos of warrior*” amongst the police forces in Rio contributes to the idea that the Pacifying Police are not “real police”. According to Oosterbaan and Wijk (2015), 70 percent of UPP police officers would rather work in a regular police role, which suggests that pacifying police are not considered “real policing”. In light of this finding, the difficulty of changing police culture may be a significant reason for the failure of the UPPs. The Amarildo case shows that the pacification process cannot be restricted to within community boundaries, but also must extend to fundamental changes in wider police attitudes.

According to a community leader, another limitation of the Pacifying Police lies in its low level of dialogue within the communities:

Considering what is written on the project, it is ok. But its practice is a different thing. The biggest mistake of the state was that it does not want to dialogue with the social and cultural bases of the community. They think that good is only what came from outside. The project itself is not bad, but the execution of the project was (Correio do Brasil, 2012).¹¹

In this respect, the better level of dialogue of the UPPs with agents from outside the communities, such as corporations and politicians, makes *favela* leaders skeptical about the real intent of UPPs’ agents to create a closer connection between police and communities.

Police abuses are not the only factor that has helped to undermine police legitimacy. Recently, the UPP’s commandant of the *favela* of Caju was arrested for keeping restricted weapons, ammunition, and drugs in the UPP’s office, showing strong evidence of his close ties with drug trafficking (O Dia, 2017). Scandals of police corruption within the UPPs also add to questions about how different the Pacifying Police Units are from conventional Military Police in Rio.

¹¹ Translated from the original in Portuguese.

In recent years, crime rates have begun to increase in Rio, especially after the mega-events in the city. The return of high levels of violence to the *favelas* correlates with one of the worst recessions in Brazilian history. Critics have argued that the return of high crime rates to Rio is because of internal limitations in the UPP project; such as the inability of the project to change the local police culture, improve the level of dialogue within the communities, and eliminate corruption amongst police officers. However, the brutal economic crisis in Brazil should also be considered as a relevant exogenous variable that prevented the UPPs from maintaining the positive outcomes of initial years; especially in light of the fact that the success of UPP project depended on maintaining a close connection between public police and market economic support.

6.0: Conclusion: thoughts on UPP's future

The Pacifying Police Units were developed for revamping the way the Brazilian state deals with drug trafficking in Rio de Janeiro. Differently from the previous tactics based on the confrontation with criminals, the UPPs intended to enhance police legitimacy through community oriented methods, settling permanently in zones previously dominated by drug dealers. This study showed that the UPP's innovations go beyond policing approaches. For the first time in Brazil, public administration acted proactively in order to attract private sponsors.

The connection between police and market in the UPP project has to do with the broader phenomenon of pluralization of policing. In Brazil and elsewhere, traditional public police roles have been modified through a wider participation of private security companies. Additionally, limitations in public budgets have motivated states to search alternative sources for financing public policies. In Brazil, this has given rise to a state trend of encouraging private companies to sponsor public police organizations.

Critics argue that the synergy between police and market through private sponsorship may undermine democratic principles of public policing; chiefly, the one that says that public police should work for the entire community, not just for one particular group. Private sponsorship also brings additional concerns on greater levels of transparency considering *who are the donors?*; *how much?*; and *where will the resources be allocated?*

Private sponsorship in public police might be welcome by governments, considering budget limitations. But private investment in public police raises many questions on the nature of this partnership and how it may affect communities with lower levels of social, political and economic capital, using Bourdieu's terms. The areas occupied by the UPPs are predominantly close to valuable locations, such as Leblon and Ipanama, where the housing price per square meter is typically over \$7,000.

Even if private sponsors did not put pressure on the public administration when the areas of occupation were defined, the state also had its own strategic and economic interests. Such as promoting the city, and improving Rio's international image. In this regard, the mega-events help both to explain the geography of the occupation, and also how the UPPs were integrated with the public and private interest of "selling" the city. The humanitarian narrative of "pacification" and "integration of the divided-city" also can be seen as part of the project of "selling" Rio de Janeiro and the UPPs to the world.

The support given to public security policies by private agents has both positive and negative effects. On the positive side, additional monies enlarge the capacity of state in carrying out public policies. In the UPP's experience, private money was used to build police stations, and social programs such as sport programs for youth. Beyond improving the material working conditions for police those activities show to the public that companies are "socially responsible" and want to "give back to communities." Thus, pragmatic motivations of private actors are not incompatible with the idea of "gift", when symbolic gains such as social recognition and belonging drive the sponsorship.

The trade-offs of this relationship are that the corporations may act as "investors" instead of "sponsors". As investors, they may want to support only projects in locations where they see potential for profit. *Favelas* located outside "tourism routes" were not included in the project of pacification. It might show that when public policies rely on private financial support the priorities in policing will not only be defined by the level of criminality, but also by the potential for future profit a safer neighborhood will yield.

In recent years, some relevant UPPs sponsors, as well as two former Rio governors were linked to corruption scandals. Thus, if the private sponsorship in policing and elsewhere becomes an institutionalized practice by the Brazilian public administrations, it ought to strengthen mechanisms of accountability. In this regard, transparency is the main mechanism for avoiding the establishment of pragmatic-clientelistic sponsorships.

From 2008 to the 2012, evidence suggests that the effective presence of police forces in the *favelas* reduced lethal crime rates, which made occupied communities safer. During that period, the improvement in the security area positively impacted on businesses in those communities. When crime rates dropped more people were interested in starting small business, which created jobs and fostered the local economy (Da Silva, 2012). The real estate sector was one of the sectors that benefited most from the permanent occupation, substantially increasing housing prices in the *favelas*. However, economic benefits were not equally shared within occupied communities. Due to real estate speculation, after the UPPs the cost of living in the *favelas* increased, affecting more local dwellers.

When crime rates were lower police legitimacy increased in the occupied communities, though studies have indicated that legitimacy among teenagers is lower than among adults and small businesses owners. The UPPs have aggressively policed *Baile Funks* (Cunha, 2012; World Bank, 2012; Cano and Ribeiro, 2016). Restrictions on liquor and loud music have made many youths believe that the *favelas* were better places when they were ruled by drug dealers (World Bank, 2012).

This shows that police agents should be open to improve dialogue with all segments of the communities, and that just illegal practices should be condemned. In contrast, the UPP's agents had better results in improving legitimacy in spaces closer to the "traditional family", and where the state "civilizing process" takes place such as schools, than in other areas where neither police nor the state recognize as legitimate manifestations of culture. In recent years, conservative parties have raised in the Brazilian Congress the banner of "funk ban", which illustrates that police behavior and prejudices cannot be separated from other spheres of the Brazilian society.

Since 2012, conflict between drug traffickers and police has increased. However, only after the Olympics crime rates and police executions returned to previous pre-UPP levels. Brazilian newspapers and some experts are now casting doubt on the future of the Pacifying Police Units. Some critics believe that the UPPs did not accomplish their promises of integrating the

communities and reducing confrontations between police and traffickers. If the UPP project does collapse, it will be due to internal limitations in promoting police reform, as well as to exogenous forces such as the current economic crisis that reduces resources available to security programs.

With respect to internal limitations, police officers' resistance to changing police culture has proved to be one of the main difficulties in the UPPs. The "*ethos of warrior*" amongst the police forces in Rio develops an idea that Pacifying Police are not "real police". Among the many challenges for the future of the Pacifying Police Units are the police officers themselves.

The return of violent crimes, especially after the Olympics, has been the main argument of those who believe the UPP project has collapsed. However, considering the complexities surrounding crime control in Rio de Janeiro, the return of high crime rates should not be exclusively blamed on the UPP's limitations. Community-policing should be seen as a long-term project in which its desirable success is regarded as a back and forth process. In other words, without continuity it is impossible to build long-term solutions to security problems. In addition, other factors contribute to the return of high crime rates in the city, and most of them have little to do with the UPPs.

The current rise of crimes in Rio may indicate some limitations in the UPPs, such as the internal resistance for changing police culture. However, there are external factors that contribute to the return of violence. Among them, is the explosion of unemployment in Brazil. In 2017, more than 13 million people did not have a job in the country. Additionally, the economic crises also decreased the public and private capacity to invest in security. The state of Rio de Janeiro has been one of the most affected by the economic crisis in Brazil.

Budget limitations have directly impacted on the capacity of the state to pay public workers properly, and to hire new police agents. The lack of police officers in Rio de Janeiro motivates the return of criminals to occupied *favelas*. Recently, the explosion of crime and the return of confrontation between police and drug traffickers led the Brazilian state to send army troops to police the communities. Many have seen this as proof that pacified methods did not work to control

permanently crime in *favelas*. But economic crises in Brazil cannot be separated from the gradual replacement of community-oriented police with military approaches.

This study has shown that private sponsorship of public police forces has been adopted in many countries as a strategy to enhance public budget and state capacity. In Brazil, where philanthropy and private sponsorship is rare even in areas like education and health care, the proactive capture of private capital for public police forces stands out. In recent decades the Brazilian state has increasingly been transformed into a so-called “minimum state”. In this context, the private sponsorship of public police might become a more usual practice in the country. If this becomes the case in years to come, the UPP project will be a paradigmatic case for future experiences where the police and market join interests in Brazil.

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